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**LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONISM IN ONTARIO 1935-1963:
A STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF UNION GROWTH**

VOLUME I

by

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Department of Political Science

**Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
December 1990**

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the proposition that the emergence and growth of local government unionism in Ontario, during the period 1935 to 1963, can be explained in terms of the hypothesized relationships identified in the aggregate union growth literature. Developments in both general municipal employment and the municipal utilities (hydro-electric power, urban transit and water works) are addressed. Specifically, the significance of trends in local government employment, unemployment and labour force composition are explored. This is followed by a detailed examination of local government compensation. The relevance of existing labour relations policy for local government unionism is then assessed. Finally, the contribution of union characteristics and of local authorities as employers is considered.

Each category of independent variables influences both the propensity and the opportunity to unionize, although by no means equally. In general, labour force and compensation related variables appear to impact primarily on the propensity to unionize. This is particularly true of compensation related variables. Overall, these variables interact with local government unionism in the hypothesized manner. Public policy is not a primary determinant of local government union growth during the study period. The results for union characteristics are mixed, with some variables performing in the

expected fashion, while others do not. Contrary to the hypothesized relationship, employer attitudes and behaviour toward unions are identified as playing a decisive, positive factors in local government union growth.

The thesis concludes with a critical assessment of the research findings and a brief discussion of the implications of the historical development of local government unionism for contemporary collective bargaining.

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List of Abbreviations

Labour Organizations

A.C.C.L.	All Canadian Congress of Labour
A.A.S.E.R.E.	Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees
A.F.L.	American Federation of Labour
B.S.E.I.U.	Building Services Employees International Union
C.B.R.T.	Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transportation and General Workers
C.C.L.	Canadian Congress of Labour
C.E.T.U.	Canadian Electrical Trades Union
C.F.L.	Canadian Federation of Labour
C.I.O.	Congress of Industrial Organization
C.L.C.	Canadian Labour Congress
C.U.P.E.	Canadian Union of Public Employees
I.A.F.F.	International Association of Fire Fighters
I.B.B.W.	International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
O.F.M./P.E.	Ontario Federation of Municipal/Public Employees
N.F.P.E.	National Federation of Public Employees
N.O.C.U.E.W.	National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers
N.U.P.E.	National Union of Public Employees
N.U.P.S.E.	National Union of Public Service Employees
O.B.U.	One Big Union

Employer Organizations

A.C.R.O.	Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario
A.M.E.U.	Association of Municipal Electric Utilities of Ontario
A.M.O.	Association of Municipalities of Ontario
A.O.M.R.	Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves
C.F.M.M.	Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities
C.U.T.A.	Canadian Urban Transit Association
M.E.A.	Municipal Electric Association
O.M.E.A.	Ontario Municipal Electric Association
R.O.M.A.	Rural Ontario Municipal Association

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Ontario some groups of local government employees have been unionized and have bargained collectively with their employers, on an ongoing basis, since at least the end of World War I. Their organizations were, however, small in number and existed only in the largest urban centres. Beginning in 1935, new unions began to appear in previously unorganized localities. By the early 1950s, unionization among local government employees had reached sufficient proportions to support the creation of national organizations, but it still remained concentrated in the large to mid-sized municipalities. Over the next twenty years, the unionization of local government employment proceeded at a hurried pace, with the result that by the 1970s, union penetration approached saturation levels. By the 1980s, with a few notable exceptions, only the smallest municipalities remained completely union free.

Union penetration did not proceed evenly across all employee groups, either in aggregate terms or with respect to individual municipalities. Union activity among firefighters and urban transit employees typically predated that by all other groups. Next were the "outside" workers, followed by those "inside" (office, clerical and occasionally professional employees). From the 1950s to the 1980s more specialized groups of workers, typically employed by boards, commissions

or other special purpose bodies, were also unionized. The 1950s saw the first major inroads in the unionization of support staff in hospitals and boards of education. Public library personnel were generally organized in the 1960s, while homes for the aged and social services were added mainly in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the municipal utilities, operational or outside workers usually organized first, followed by inside workers.

The Problem to be Studied

The thesis will investigate the emergence and growth of unionism among local government employees in Ontario during the period 1935 to 1963. Developments in both general municipal employment and the municipal utilities (hydro-electric power, urban transit and water works) will be addressed. Education and health care are not included.¹ The study will also consider the reasons for the extent of union penetration² and the relatively high level of union membership density.³

The presence of widespread unionism among local government employees in Ontario, and in Canada in general, imposes a number of potentially important constraints on the activities of the employing authorities. However, despite the existence of a considerable literature dealing with various aspects of local government in Canada,⁴ little attention has been devoted to the study of the relevant unions and their important influence.

Some discussion of union activity by local government employees is found in the industrial relations literature,⁵ but generally the focus here is on the problems and issues associated with contemporary collective bargaining. The macro-orientation of much of the union

growth research has also resulted in the subject not being adequately considered. As a consequence very little is known about the development of local government unionism in this country. Articles concerned with the emergence of public sector collective bargaining in Canada tend briefly to note the long history of union activity at the local level⁶ before moving on to an extended discussion of the development of unions and collective bargaining among federal and provincial government employees during the 1960s and early 1970s. The implicit assumption appears to be that the development of unionism at the local level is inherently uninteresting or of little relevance. In reality, neither is the case. The local government system developed in piecemeal fashion over an extended period of time, whereas, at the senior levels of government, in the majority of cases collective bargaining appeared as an essentially complete system in a very short period of time. This was typically the result of special enabling legislation. Such statutes as the 1967 federal Public Service Staff Relations Act were frequently hailed as "great experiments" and garnered considerable academic attention.⁷ This thesis seeks to fill at least a portion of the gap in our knowledge of the emergence of unionism among local government employees.

Kumar and Dow argue that a general consensus exists, in the industrial relations literature, that union growth is best understood in the context of its total environment. To this assessment must, however, be added the qualification that considerable differences remain as to the relative contribution of particular variables. Moreover, they are also commonly operationalized in a discrete fashion

with minimal attention to the possible inter-relationships and causal linkages among them. Kumar and Dow identify four groups of factors as influencing aggregate union growth.⁸ They are:

1. Economic stability factors, such as changes in prices and wages, employment growth and fluctuations in the level of unemployment;
2. Changes to the public policy environment that affect union organizing and collective bargaining;
3. Structural factors, such as the existing level of unionism and shifts in the demographic and industrial/occupational composition of the labour force;
4. Internal organizational factors, such as union leadership, resources and strategies and on the employer's side, management attitudes and behaviour.

The hypothesized relationships between each group of variables and union growth are summarized briefly below. The aggregate union growth literature is explored at length in Chapter 2.

Price inflation is generally positively related to union growth. In this context unionism is largely a defensive response to inflationary pressure on real incomes and living standards. Changes in money and real wages are also positively correlated with union growth, as unions are "credited" with these gains. Comparative compensation inequalities generally have a positive effect. High levels of unemployment, on the other hand, discourage unionism. Severe economic dislocation may, however, generate grievances, which are ultimately manifest as union membership during the subsequent recovery. Employment growth typically has a positive impact on aggregate union membership if

it occurs in areas where there is already a strong union presence. It may also encourage new unionism to the extent that it disrupts established employer-employee relations and results in increased bureaucratization in the work place.

The introduction of "modern" labour relations legislation⁹ is generally held to have a positive impact on unionism. This derives primarily from the statutory prohibition of certain "unfair labour practices" by employers. The provision of administrative procedures for securing bargaining rights, the requirement that employers recognize and negotiate with designated bargaining representatives, and the existence of sanctions for failure to comply, also play a positive role.

Opportunities for union growth may be limited by the existing level of union membership. According to the saturation thesis, the higher the level of union membership in a particular constituency, the more difficult it will be to make further gains. Labour force composition is also significant, in that, certain classes of workers are traditionally more reluctant to unionize than others.

Finally, the capacity and willingness of unions to organize non-union workers is clearly positively related to union growth. On the employers' side, hostility to unions, and the willingness to oppose them by whatever means, has a definite dampening effect. Such a negative response is clearly anticipated as the norm.

Working Hypotheses

The thesis examines the proposition that the emergence and growth of local government unionism in Ontario can be explained in terms of the hypothesized relationships identified in the aggregate union growth

literature. Specifically, five hypotheses are assessed:

1. That the growth of unionism, among local government employees, was positively influenced by changes in the size, distribution and composition of local government employment;

2. That changes in worker compensation and inter-occupational wage relationships had a positive impact on the growth and development of local government unionism;

3. That public policy played an important, positive role in promoting local government union growth and development;

4. That union growth strategies and the tactics and resources utilized for their accomplishment; inter-union rivalry and competition; relations with central labour bodies; constituent militancy and finally leadership positively influenced the growth and development of local government unionism and;

5. That employer attitudes and behaviour towards local government unions generally inhibited their growth and development.

This is the first application of this literature to the study of local government unionism in Ontario.

Some factors affecting unionization affect all sectors of the economy, although not necessarily in a uniform fashion. Other causal factors are unique to local government and local government employment. Because of their importance, the causal factors unique to local government will receive most of the analytical attention. The study is thus very much an examination of local government and local government employment in Ontario and how its special characteristics contributed to the emergence and development of unionism in this sector.

In assessing the applicability of the various hypotheses, it is not merely sufficient that the operative factors be found relevant. They must also function and interact with union growth in the anticipated fashion. There is good reason for suggesting that they may not. First, the literature in question is largely American. As will be seen in Chapter 2, the study of aggregate union growth in Canada is a relatively recent phenomenon and has produced mixed results where the growth of national unions is concerned. Second and more importantly, significant differences exist between public and private sector employers, both organizationally and in terms of the context in which they operate.

The emergence and growth of unionism in any context must be considered in the light of two separate issues: first, the conditions that gave rise to the propensity to unionize; and second, the existing opportunities to operationize this desire. Each category of independent variables influences union growth at both levels, although by no means equally.

Approach

The analytical categories developed in the aggregate union growth literature will be applied to the study of unionism among general municipal employees and in the municipal utilities (municipal hydro-electric power, public transit, and water works). Specifically, the significance of trends in local government employment, unemployment and labour force composition are explored. This is followed by a detailed examination of local government compensation, both from a time series and comparative perspective. The relevance of existing labour

relations policy for local government unionism is then assessed. Finally, the contribution of union characteristics and of local authorities as employers is considered.

Although quantitative modelling has proven extremely popular in the study of aggregate union growth, it will not be used in this case. Ample use is, however, made of relevant statistics for both analysis and description. A large number of the tables contained in the thesis are unique and represent aggregations of data from a number of different sources.

In addition to secondary sources, the research uses a wide variety of primary archival, statistical and other published and unpublished material. A list of primary sources is provided in the bibliography. Interviews were not found to be necessary as a research tool because of the comprehensiveness of a series of recorded interviews conducted by Gilbert Levine, in 1977. At the time Levine was the Research Director for the Canadian Union of Public Employees. In addition, nearly all of the principals are now deceased.

Outline of Subsequent Chapters

Chapter 2 surveys the union growth literature. Much of the research in this area has been concerned with developing an adequate explanation for the pattern of aggregate growth in the United States as well as in other advanced industrialized countries. The analytical categories developed in this literature are highlighted and the theoretical and practical implications of their application to the study of local government unionism are discussed. The findings of research into the recent decline of unionism in the United States are

incorporated where relevant.

Chapter 3 contains a descriptive and analytical examination of the period prior to the emergence of widespread unionism among local government employees. It provides historical background. The relatively low level of union activity stands in contrast to subsequent developments and thus affords the opportunity for "before and after" comparisons.

Chapter 4 documents the emergence and development of unionism in general municipal employment, municipal hydro-electric power, urban transit and water works during the period under study.

Chapter 5 provides an outline of general socio-economic and political developments that provide the overall context for the emergence of local government unionism.

Chapter 6 begins the detailed examination of the hypothesized determinants of local government union growth. The chapter assesses the contribution of changes in the pattern of local government employment and labour force composition to the emergence and development of unionism.

Chapter 7 examines trends in local government remuneration, with particular emphasis on money and real wage developments, comparative wage relationships and benefits. Their impact on union growth is considered.

In Chapter 8 the development of labour relations legislation as it pertained to local government authorities in Ontario is outlined. The origins of the policy of exceptionalism in the application of such legislation to local government authorities and its implications for

union organization are discussed.

Chapter 9 examines the contribution of union related variables. In particular, the emergence of national unions of local government employees, from essentially a grass roots base, and the role played by such bodies in the organization of local government employment is documented at length.

Chapter 10 looks at local government authorities as employers, and investigates why the vast majority accepted union activity among their employees, recognized these organizations and entered into collective bargaining relationships even though there was no binding statutory obligation for them to do so.

Chapter 11 provides an overview of major developments in local government unionism in the post-1963 period.

Chapter 12 delineates and discusses the major conclusions forthcoming from the study.

NOTES

¹ The rationale for this design is the connection to municipal council. Municipal utilities are typically linked to council through some sharing of personnel at the political level. In addition, in some instances utilities are actually provided by the municipality on a departmental basis rather than through a separate commission or authority. Boards of education and hospital boards, on the other hand, enjoy an autonomous relationship with respect to both board membership and the discharge of their responsibilities.

² Union penetration is the extent to which a particular sector is organized. In quantitative terms, it is the number of employers that are organized divided by the number of employers available to be organized.

³ Union membership density refers to the proportion of a particular constituency that are union members. Quantitatively, it is the number of workers who are union members divided by the total number of workers available to be union members.

⁴ For example see: K.G. Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954); Donald J.H. Higgins, Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977); Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, eds., City Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); T.J. Plunkett, Urban Canada and Its Government (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968); T.J. Plunkett and G.M. Betts, The Management of Canadian Urban Government (Kingston: Queen's University, 1978).

⁵ J.C. Anderson, "Union Effectiveness: An Industrial Relations Systems Approach" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1977); Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984); Bryan M. Downie and Richard L. Jackson, eds., Conflict and Cooperation in Police Labour Relations (Ottawa: Canada, Ministry of Supply and Services, 1980);

⁶ Allen Ponak and Mark Thompson, "Public Sector Collective Bargaining," in John C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 373-406; Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1986),: 253-283.

⁷ H.W. Arthurs, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?" Michigan Law Review 67 (1969),: 961-xxx; S.B. Goldenberg, "Collective Bargaining in the Provincial Public Services," in J.F. O'Sullivan, ed., Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1973),: 11-43; Jacob Finkelman and Shirley B.

Goldenberg, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service: The Federal Experience in Canada (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1983); D.D. Carter, "Legal Recognition of Collective Bargaining in the Ontario Public Sector," Relations Industrielles 29 (1974),: 776-xxx.

⁸ Pradeep Kumar and Bradley Dow, "Econometric Analysis of Union Membership Growth in Canada, 1935-1981," Relations Industrielles 41 (1986),: 237-238.

⁹ The term "modern" in this context refers to labour relations legislation embodying the collective bargaining principles of the American Wagner Act of 1935.

CHAPTER 2

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

The dynamics of union growth have been a subject of considerable debate for most of this century.¹ Much of this work has focused on developing an adequate explanation for the pattern of aggregate union growth in the United States. Most early analyses sought to relate union growth to changes in the business cycle, although the role played by other factors was usually acknowledged. Later researchers attempted to distinguish their work from that of their predecessors by stressing its multi-causal nature and by wrongfully labelling that of earlier writers as uni-causal.

Bain and Elsheikh observe that almost every conceivable determinant of union growth has subsequently been added to the list. This comprehensiveness is, however, identified as a major problem. They charge that inadequate attention has been given to determining the relative importance or weight of the various factors on the list. Moreover, it has not even been demonstrated that some of the alleged determinants actually play a role in union growth. They conclude that the debate has not advanced significantly since Davis wrote in 1941.² Indeed, from the perspective of statistical analysis, they argue that it has actually regressed. Although the availability and quality of the statistical data has increased over time, the work of later researchers

is said to be less empirically based than that of their predecessors. The criticisms raised by Bain and Elsheikh, while insightful, must be seen in context. Their project was to develop a quantitative model of union growth with multi-national applicability. They implicitly claim to be more scientific in their research methodology based on their adoption of this approach.³

This chapter surveys the general union growth literature as developed primarily in the American context. It is followed by a brief discussion of applications to the study of union growth in Canada. This latter assessment is of particular importance. While the analytical categories seem to have general validity with respect to the growth of Canadian unionism as a whole, the results have been less than satisfactory in explaining the development of national unionism.

1. The General Literature

As noted in Chapter 1, a general consensus has developed that union growth is best understood in the context of its total environment. However, as amply illustrated by the comments of Bain and Elsheikh, serious differences remain concerning the appropriate ranking of the various contributory variables. Researchers have also been primarily concerned with exploring the dynamics between union growth and its hypothesised determinants rather than investigating the linkages and relationships which may exist among the independent variables themselves. As a consequence there is no integrated general model of union growth, but rather a number of discrete hypotheses concerning the relationship between particular classes of determinants and the phenomenon. To a degree it reflects the theoretical

underdevelopment associated with the systems model of industrial relations, upon which much of this research is conceptually based.

In their extensive survey of the American union growth literature, Fiorito and Greer, utilize Dunlop's industrial relations systems model⁴ as a framework for ordering the various independent variables. The framework was modified slightly and contained the following analytical categories: "employee, union, employer, government, technological context, market context and socio-political variables". The authors suggest that this approach "facilitates" an examination of the relationship between particular independent variables and the pattern of union growth. They do, however, concede that as a consequence the complete formulation of any one contributor may be obscured.⁵ This is not necessarily a negative feature from the perspective of designing a research agenda. The framework may be appropriate for the organization of a comprehensive literature survey, but it is far too elaborate to serve as an organizational schematic for this thesis. Without digressing into an extensive discussion of appropriate frameworks, it is sufficient to state that the analytical categories must encompass the most important or central determinants of union growth. Every peripheral or minor contributing factor simply cannot be accommodated.

As asserted in Chapter 1, five major hypotheses emerge from the general literature. In the context of local government unionism they are:

1. That the growth of unionism, among local government employees, was positively influenced by changes in the size, distribution and composition of local government employment;

2. That changes in worker compensation and inter-occupational wage relationships had a positive impact on the growth and development of local government unionism;

3. That public policy played an important, positive role in promoting local government union growth and development;

4. That union growth strategies and the tactics and resources utilized for their accomplishment; inter-union rivalry and competition; relations with central labour bodies; constituent militancy and finally leadership positively influenced the growth and development of local government unionism and;

5. That employer attitudes and behaviour towards local government unions generally inhibited their growth and development.

For the purposes of this thesis, the survey of the literature and those subsequent chapters, concerned with assessing these hypotheses, are organized according to the following analytical categories.

- a. Economic determinants: labour force variables;
- b. Economic determinants: compensation related variables;
- c. Political determinants: the public policy framework;
- d. Organizational determinants: union variables;
- e. Organizational determinants: employer variables.

These categories cover virtually all of the major determinants of union growth identified in the literature.

a. Economic Determinants of Union Growth: Labour Force Variables

This discussion of labour force variables encompasses unemployment and employment trends, technological considerations, which refer primarily to the manner in which work is organized, and labour force

composition. While analytically separate, all relate in one way or another to the nature of the local government labour force. Each is considered in turn.

i. Unemployment and Employment Trends

An important theme in time series studies of the relationship between the business cycle and union growth is the effect of downturns in economic activity and, in particular, increases in unemployment. There is a general agreement among students of union growth that, in the short-term, the level of unemployment is negatively related to unionism. Bain and Elsheikh suggest that this relationship is operationalized in a number of ways. First, unemployment may significantly affect the opportunity to unionize because of its impact on the relative bargaining power of unions and employers. Simply put, high or increasing levels of unemployment reduce the bargaining power of the union and enhances that of the employer and vice versa. In times of high or increasing unemployment, relative to previous levels, employers may be both more willing and better able to oppose the organization of their work-force. Moreover, to the extent that high levels of unemployment are concomitant with declines in aggregate demand, production lost due to employee job action will be less costly to employers. They note that some employers may actually use a strike by their employees as a means of reducing their labour costs and increasing their profits as a result. Further, should the employer desire to continue production during a strike, the larger number of unemployed should make it easier for the employer to obtain temporary replacements for the strikers. This, of course, is only viable if the

level of skill required to perform the work is relatively low.

Second, Bain and Elsheikh argue that unemployment is negatively related to the propensity to join a union. There are several reasons for this. The unemployed worker has little incentive to join the union because he does not gain access to union negotiated benefits, in the collective agreement, until he becomes an employee. The cost of union membership in terms of dues and fees is also proportionally higher for the unemployed worker, with limited resources, than for the gainfully employed. Finally, workers may be reluctant to join the union for fear of antagonizing the employer, which they believe will increase the potential for job loss.

In addition to its adverse impact on union joining, unemployment is said to have negative consequences for union membership retention. Again, the unemployed worker, regardless of his membership status, is denied access to union negotiated benefits and has a proportionally higher cost of union membership than the employed member. Another disincentive to retain union membership during periods of either high or escalating unemployment derives from its negative relationship to union bargaining power. In such circumstances the union may have a difficult time obtaining concessions or even keeping previously won gains in contract negotiations. If the benefits accruing from union membership are reduced so, theoretically, is the economic incentive to remain a union member.⁶ Bain and Elsheikh do, however, note Shister's argument that there are a number of forces at work which act to counter the impact of unemployment and promote union membership retention. They are:

1. The existence of financial incentives either in the form of union unemployment benefits or the maintenance of eligibility for other union and perhaps even employer benefits;
2. Information about jobs;
3. Access to jobs in closed trades, where closed shop union security provisions are in place and make union membership a prerequisite for employment;
4. Social and political reasons;
5. A great many unions either waive or reduce the level of dues paid by unemployed members to a nominal level. Hence membership can be maintained at very low cost.

Bain and Elshiehk conclude that, while union growth and unemployment are negatively related, the relationship is relatively weak and characterized by a lag between cause and effect. The lagged relationship was also anticipated because unions frequently allow members a period of grace before dropping them from the membership rolls for non-payment of dues.⁷

From a more long term perspective, severe depressions are said to create fundamental worker unrest. This results from layoffs and high levels of unemployment, the loss of general confidence in business and business leadership, and employers capitalizing on poor economic conditions to exploit workers. Ashenfelter and Pencavel use the peak unemployment rate in a period of economic downturn as a proxy for labour's stock of accumulated grievances during subsequent recoveries. They report a positive relationship between this variable and union growth.⁸ A number of studies have confirmed this finding, although

others have not.⁹ Moreover, the process by which economic downturns and consequent worker hardship are operationalized as union joining is rarely considered adequately.

Piorito and Greer note that various unemployment measures have been used in time series studies as a proxy for employer resistance to unionization. While numerous studies have reported a positive relationship between union growth and both low unemployment and rapid employment growth, other research has produced contradictory results. It is, therefore, entirely possible that unemployment is an inappropriate statistical proxy for employer opposition.¹⁰

Closely related to unemployment, but analytically distinct, are long term employment trends. Changes in the total number of employees in a given industry or sector of the economy may have an important impact on unionism in that industry or sector. Shister observed that an expansion of employment in a sector already heavily unionized should automatically translate into increased union membership either because of formal union security provisions in collective agreements or due to informal pressures on new employees to join the union.¹¹ Conversely, a survey of more recent trends in American union membership, in the so-called "smoke stack" industries, reveals the devastation wrought by significant reductions in the number of employees.¹² Employment expansion may also have a positive impact on unionism to the extent that it contributes to employee concentration. The reasons for this are discussed below.

Bain concludes that, while there is little doubt that unemployment explains much of the fluctuation in union membership, both in aggregate

and within particular industries, it is considerably less effective in accounting for inter-industry differences.¹³

ii. Technological factors

Technological factors refer to the type of work that is done and how it is organized in a very broad sense. Employee skill levels, whether the work place is fixed or variable, the size of the work group, job content, the relationship of residence to work place and the relative stability of the work force are all pertinent, in this regard.¹⁴ Several of these are clearly linked to employer characteristics.

Fiorito and Greer report that a number of technological variables have been used in the study of unionism. For their part, they focus on the impact of intra-industry variations in occupational characteristics, working conditions and employee dissatisfaction measures. They note that there is near unanimity in the literature that occupation has a very significant impact on unionization. White collar and non-operating personnel have traditionally been much more difficult to organize than blue collar workers. In addition, certain industries have proven more union resistant than others. While both occupational and industrial variations in unionism have been well documented, little work has been done to explain why these relationships exist. Fiorito and Greer suggest that the answer may be found in research into the impact of working conditions. This approach facilitates a more precise investigation of occupational and industrial variations than is possible relying merely on occupational categories. By way of their own contribution, full-time and part-time employment status is offered as a

working conditions variable with a potentially important influence on unionization. While this is sometimes a function of employee preference, the net result with respect to unionism is the same. Part-time employment tends to promote lower labour force attachment to the job than full-time employment and this may impact negatively on union growth. In concluding their discussion of technological variables, Fiorito and Greer cite research indicating a positive relationship between measures of employee dissatisfaction and union organizing. Among these variables are the level of satisfaction with job security, the type of work, job influence and the nature of supervision. While the employer exerts some influence over these factors, they are frequently a function of technological considerations.¹⁵

One important technological determinant of unionism that is omitted by Fiorito and Greer is employment concentration. Bain observes that union density is generally higher among larger as opposed to smaller groups of employees. This is true for both union penetration as well as aggregate membership. Employment concentration pertains to both the number of firms in the industry and the size of individual constituent plants and offices in terms of the number of employees. The larger the number of employees in an organization the more it will be necessary for management to deal with them in a bureaucratized fashion. Among other things this means that employees are treated as members of categories or groups and not as individuals. Moreover, the terms and conditions of employment, opportunities for promotion and other aspects of the employment relationship are governed by formal rules applied

equally and impartially to all members of the group. The working conditions of the group become standardized and management discretion in this area is limited. The standardization of both rule making and administration is said to facilitate unionisms and perhaps to even make it inevitable. Once workers have accepted the validity of general rules to govern their conduct, it is not a distant leap from unilateral management determination of these rules to joint decision making through collective bargaining. Moreover, because the rules are group rules there is an inherent logic in trying to modify them through group or collective action as opposed to individual overtures. Employment concentration may also inhibit the employer's capacity to preempt union organizing drives before they pose a serious threat. This is simply because the distance between management and workers in a large organization makes it more difficult to monitor developments on the shop floor. Hence, by the time the employer becomes aware that a union is organizing among the employees, the campaign may already be well established. The greater bureaucratization concomitant with large groups is not the only reason why employment concentration is positively related to unionism. Another important reason is that union organizing strategies frequently target large groups.¹⁶ This point will be discussed in detail in the section dealing with unions variables.

Shister produces a lengthy list of the various ways in which technological factors can influence union growth, however, only the ease of worker replacement, labour turnover and union bargaining power are relevant to this study. Each is considered briefly.

The ease with which an employer may obtain replacement workers, in the event of a strike, is in some instances a function of technological factors. For example, the possession or relatively high levels of specific skills would make obtaining replacements more difficult than for unskilled labourers. Skilled employees typically possess greater bargaining power, which should make it easier for them to unionize and obtain meaningful employer recognition than for unskilled workers. The ease of replacement is also influenced by trends in the labour market. If the industry is growing, it will be more difficult to find replacements than if the industry is stable or in decline. Blum argues that those workers who are essential to the operation of the firm or industry occupy a "strategic position".¹⁷ They are typically the first to unionize and are relatively easier to organize than non-strategic groups. Unskilled, semi-skilled and those who can easily be replaced are generally more difficult to organize and will be among the last to join a union, if they do so at all. Firms and industries will also be more easily organized to the extent that they can be effectively hurt by strike action and that they are able to pass along additional costs, resulting from unionization, to their customers.¹⁸

Technological factors frequently influence labour turnover. The rate of labour turnover in a given industry will affect both the propensity of individuals to join a union as well as the effort and, in particular, the cost to a union interested in organizing in this sector. A high level of labour turnover can, therefore, act as a very powerful barrier to union growth.

The ability of a union to obtain concessions from the employer

impacts both directly and indirectly on union growth. It is direct in the sense that it may be a prerequisite for the continued survival of the union. The effect is indirect, in that, it may influence union growth in other sectors through the proximity effect. Union bargaining power, in turn, is frequently significantly influenced by technological considerations.¹⁹

iii. Labour force composition

Fiorito and Greer note that the majority of cross-sectional studies of inter-industrial differences in American unionism have included an explanation of variations in inter-industry labour force composition. Bain also cites labour force composition as a potentially important determinant. Race, sex, education, age, experience, marital status and the number of dependents are typically the main factors said to influence the propensity to unionize. Only those characteristics of possible relevance to local government unionism will be discussed here.

According to the conventional wisdom regarding the importance of worker gender, women tend to be less inclined to join unions than men. The fact that industries with a high proportion of females employees also generally have a low level of unionization, is usually cited as evidence of this anti-union predisposition and hence of the negative relationship between the proportion of females and union growth. Fiorito and Greer note that occupational effects resulting from "sex based occupational segregation" may be involved.²⁰ Bain concurs, and argues that the apparent negative relationship between women and unionism is spurious. Female employment is not evenly distributed across all firms in the economy, but rather, tends to be concentrated

in small establishments. The three non-manufacturing industries (trade, finance, insurance and real estate and services), which together account for over seventy per cent of all Canadian female employment, are dominated by small establishments. Thus, according to Bain, the real causal relationship is between unionism and employment concentration. As already noted, small establishments are more difficult to organize than large establishments. He concludes that the proportion of women probably exerts little influence on union density independent of establishment size. This view is consistent with research indicating that men and women harbour essentially similar views concerning unionism.²¹

Numerous American studies have found the level of education to be inversely related to unionism. Fiorito and Greer suggest that this is because of the greater individual bargaining power typically enjoyed by better educated workers. This reduces the need for collective action. They also note that the labour market has generally been favourable for better educated workers and that their employers have frequently demonstrated caution in dealing with them. Both factors have a dampening effect on unionism, the former because the employees can simply change jobs to find more attractive conditions, and the latter because it may mitigate the level of employee grievances against the employer. In addition, highly educated workers may actually identify with management and may not wish to jeopardize their chances of some day entering its ranks. To this may be added the tendency among certain highly educated employee groups, especially professionals, to resist unionism precisely because it is unprofessional.²²

The empirical results for age and experience are inconclusive. Fiorito and Greer conclude that the adverse impact of these factors on unionism is either weak or offset by the relatively greater militancy of younger workers.

Very few studies have examined the significance of marital status and the number of dependents. The limited research, that has been conducted, indicates a positive relationship between family responsibilities and unionism.²³

b. Economic Determinants of Union Growth: Compensation Related Variables

Fiorito and Greer note that a wide range of wage related variables have been incorporated into both time series and cross-sectional studies of American union growth.

Time series analyses have typically focused on changes in one or more of the following: prices, money wages and real wages. Price increases or inflation, usually measured in terms of changes in the Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.), are generally held to be positively related to union growth. The argument is that workers will join unions and elect to remain union members because the union affords some protection against inflation. The growth of unionism during an inflationary period is thus seen as being largely defensive, with the unions assuming the role of guardians of real worker incomes and their standard of living. Fiorito and Greer observe that, while some empirical evidence has supported this assessment, other studies have not. Changes in money wages are also said to be positively related to unionism. This variable is used to capture the "credit effect" whereby unions are credited with money wage increases. This, in turn, promotes

both membership growth and retention. Finally, real wage changes, (changes in wages after controlling for the influence of inflation), are positively correlated with union growth. This is an attempt to measure the impact of real improvements in member living standards on unionism. It posits a role for unions that is aggressive, in the sense of seeking real remuneration gains, as opposed to merely defending the status quo.

With respect to cross-sectional studies, income, wage rates and wage and benefit inequalities have been the main analytical components. Fiorito and Greer report that, while some studies have found income to be positively related to unionism, the results are somewhat suspect, given the failure to control for simultaneity. Wage inequity variables, which are intended to measure the perceived influence unionism on comparative wage levels have, however, consistently exerted a positive influence on union growth.²⁴

The analysis of the impact of wage inequity dovetails nicely with Shister's development of the "proximity influence" as a major determinant of union growth. The positive impact of inequity on union growth is dependent upon an awareness or perception of inequity vis a vis some other group. Shister does not limit his discussion strictly to differences in remuneration, but rather explores the significance of proximity in relation to a broad range of variables. He begins by noting that disaggregate union growth, regardless of the level of analysis, does not occur independent of union developments elsewhere in the economy. While union penetration of one sector does not automatically result in the organization of another, union growth in

the first sector might, depending upon the particular circumstances, be a prerequisite for growth in the second.

Shister identifies two types of proximity, physical proximity and institutional proximity. Physical proximity is merely the physical closeness of one group of workers to another group in which a union has been organized and has performed successfully. Institutional proximity, on the other hand, refers to institutional linkages among groups of workers physically separated from each other. In such circumstances, they may be linked through their employment in the same company or in the same industry. They may also be linked through a union, which may organize workers who are neither employees of the same firm nor working in the same industry. The influence of proximity on union growth is operationalized in a number of ways. Only two of these pertain to remuneration and are dealt with here. The remainder are considered in the discussion of the parties of interest. Shister argues that union collective bargaining gains in the "lead sector" greatly enhances the attractiveness of union membership to non-union workers. This ultimately results in union joining. He also notes that, even in cases in which the absolute level of wages in the unorganized sector exceed those in the union sector, these workers may, nevertheless, feel considerable resentment if they perceive that their wage increases have failed to keep pace with those of unionized workers in the lead sector. The end result is, again, union joining.²⁵

c. Political Determinants of Union Growth: The Public Policy Framework

A number of authors, following Dunlop's original model, have treated the political and sociological determinants of union growth

jointly. The result is an extremely unwieldy analytical category, which Fiorito and Greer correctly describe as containing the most diverse set of variables of any systems component.²⁶

The impact of politics and public policy on union growth is an issue that has evaded consensus. Much of the debate in the literature centres on the importance of political and public policy variables to union growth relative to the contribution of the sociological and economic environments. For Rezler, politics is of overwhelming importance in accounting for the growth of American unionism. He argues that the general philosophy and practice of Democratic administrations, and in particular their positive attitude towards unions, were chiefly responsible for the dramatic surge in union growth during both World Wars and the Great Depression. He rejects the idea that the Wars or the Depression were primary causes in themselves.²⁷

A number of other prominent scholars of the period disagreed. Bernstein, for example, maintains that government and public policy were only secondary factors operationalized during wars and periods of social unrest and had the effect of increasing union membership.²⁸ Blum notes that both Rezler and Bernstein, despite their differences over ranking, would have still agreed that the 1935 Wagner Act, the positive posture of the Roosevelt Administration toward unions and more favourable court decisions all promoted union growth. He also cites more recent work which attributes much of the stagnation in the American labour movement to the passage of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.²⁹ For Shister, public policy is an independent variable influencing union growth only in the short term. Over the long term, he argues that it

essentially reflects or is a function of the broader socio-political environment.³⁰ The basic premise of this critique of the role played by public policy is that, for unions to grow, societal values must be at least somewhat favourably disposed towards them. The analysis is clearly cast at the level of accounting for the collective mobilization of workers in the United States as a class.³¹

Ashenfelter and Pencavel attempt to capture the effect of pro-union sentiment on union growth, in the United States, by using the proportion of Congressional seats held by the Democratic Party as a proxy. This is based on the traditionally amicable relations between organized labour and the Party. A positive statistical relationship was found to exist between the proxy variable and union growth.³² Several studies have replicated these findings, although a number of others offer either contradictory or statistically insignificant results. There has also been considerable criticism about the way in which the proxy variable is formulated.³³

Dunlop adds another perspective by challenging the whole idea that the Wagner Act played a significant role in promoting the initial organization of workers. He contends that union membership would have increased much as it did between 1933 and 1937 with or without the Act. For Dunlop, the importance of the Wagner Act for union growth is the fact that it prevented a decline in union membership after the economic downturn of 1937. He concludes that the War Labour Relations Board of World War II actually made a far more significant contribution than the Wagner Act because it stabilized collective bargaining during a critical formative period.³⁴

The debate over the importance of politics and public policy in union growth remains largely unresolved. Blum suggests that some theoretical reassessments are in order in light of the fact that, despite a generally favourable political environment in the United States during the 1960s, union membership growth failed to keep pace with increases in the labour force. All of this suggests that, while politics and public policy may not be sufficient conditions for union growth, they may act positively in concert with other factors.³⁵

Fiorito and Greer note that the majority of time series analyses of American union growth have not identified labour relations policy as a major contributor to union growth. In most formulations, public policy is regarded as either incidental or more as a function of broader societal developments, which also affect the growth of unions, than as a primary causal factor in its own right. Nevertheless, a few studies have reported a positive relationship between public policy favourable to unions and union growth.³⁶ Bain and Elshiekh, for example, identify a strong positive relationship between the variable used to capture the impact of the Wagner Act, prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, and increased unionism.³⁷

Bain, in assessing the relationship between public policy and union growth in Canada, argues that public policy is a "strategic factor" in union growth. In the public sector, Bain offers a number of examples, in both the United States and Canada, in which governments as employers have adopted favourable policies toward unionization by their employees. This granting of union recognition has typically resulted in a marked increase in union membership among the affected employee

groups. The same outcome has been documented in a number of European countries, including Britain.³⁸

In the private sector, the regulation or "containment" of employer opposition to unions has also had a positive impact on unionism. Bain cites the 1935 Wagner Act in the United States and the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations (P.C. 1003) (1944) and various provincial labour relations statutes in Canada as making important contributions to private sector union growth.³⁹ This was accomplished through the prohibition of a number of unfair labour practices and the requirement that employers recognize and bargain with unions duly certified to represent their employees. The details of P.C. 1003 and relevant provincial legislation are discussed in Chapter 8.

d. Organizational Determinants of Union Growth: Union Variables

Several aspects of unionism itself have been identified as important contributors to the pattern of union growth. Fiorito and Greer note that only two of these, saturation effects and union instrumentality beliefs, have been subject to multiple study verification. Both have been examined mainly in time series analyses. The saturation effect posits a negative relationship between the proportion of workers in the firm, industry, etc., who are already union members and the ease of further union growth in that locale. The higher the percentage of union members, the more difficult it will be to make additional gains. Diminishing returns in relation to organizing efforts, union complacency due to high membership levels and the difficulties involved in attempting to organize certain special worker groups, are all cited as potential explanations for this relationship.

Occupational and industrial characteristics are important aspects in a number of the saturation arguments.

Union instrumentality beliefs refer to beliefs about unions as tools to achieve worker objectives. Several studies have found that an individual who believes that unionization will result in improved terms and conditions of employment is more likely to support unions. Further, a 1980 study determined that perceptions that unionization lead to positive results, such as "improved fairness", produced support for unions, while the perception that negative consequences would result had the opposite effect. Studies of both instrumental and non-instrumental beliefs about unions have confirmed the link between perception and worker support for unions. Fiorito and Greer argue that the way in which the remaining union variables have been studied "inhibits generalization".⁴⁰

The significance of union leadership and leadership goals, while apparently subject to only limited quantitative assessment have, nevertheless, been the focus of considerable debate between those who downplay its significance, relative to structural constraints, and those who argue for a more dynamic influence. Bain, for example, contends that only a very small part of union growth can be unambiguously attributed to the independent influence of union leaders and their policies.⁴¹ Gilson and Spencer, on the other hand, advocate a more dynamic role for these factors and criticize Bain's approach as "dangerously mechanistic, bordering on simple determinism".⁴² Although Shister attributes considerable importance to the influence of "creative" leadership on union growth, he acknowledges that leaders can

only influence such growth within the limits provided by the relevant work environment and socio-legal framework.⁴³

Closely related to the leadership controversy is the whole issue of the significance of a union's growth strategy and the tactics by which the organization's objectives are pursued. If its membership is increasing, has this occurred through new organizing, raiding or mergers with existing unions? Blum notes the potentially positive influence of inter-union rivalry. According to conventional wisdom, such competition is counterproductive because valuable union resources are expended opposing one another rather than employers. Union membership growth is also said to be adversely affected. Blum suggests that, while negative consequences may be forthcoming, this need not be the case. Indeed, there may be circumstances in which inter-union competition has a positive influence on union growth, in that workers who might otherwise be ignored are organized.⁴⁴ The positive influence of inter-union rivalry is also strongly promoted by Lester. His examination of union growth in the United States concentrates on the contribution made by union related variables. Specifically, he argues that a missionary spirit, strong inter-union rivalry and rank and file activism are the most important factors in explaining American union growth. Moreover, he attributes the stagnation of the American labour movement to the displacement of these characteristics by bureaucratization, which occurred as unions matured and their memberships stabilized.⁴⁵ These issues are also raised by Rose and Chaison.⁴⁶

Bain contends that strategic considerations generally make unions

more likely to target larger groups of workers for organization than smaller groups. There are several reasons for this. First, such workers may be more receptive to union membership because of the bureaucratization of the work place, which tends to be more pronounced with increased organizational size. Second, because union organizing campaigns may benefit from scale economies, the larger the group, the lower the per capita cost of the effort. Third, larger groups are typically less costly to administer once they are organized. Fourth, the larger the group, the greater the potential that indigenous leadership will develop. This will facilitate both the administration of the local and the administration of the collective agreement. Fifth, collective agreements covering large groups have a more substantial influence on the average level of wages and conditions in a given industry, than a large number of agreements covering smaller groups. Finally, the greater the number of union members, the more bargaining power the union will theoretically have with the employer as well as within the labour movement as a whole.⁴⁷ In addition, Fiorito and Greer note that prior unsuccessful organizing activity has been found to have a positive influence on union success in subsequent organizing. They suggest this may capture a "campaign intensity" effect.⁴⁸

For Shister, the proximity influence works in a number of ways to promote union organizing activity and union membership growth. First, in those product markets in which lower labour costs serve as the basis for competition, unions have an incentive to organize non-union workers in the sector to reduce the effectiveness of non-union competition based on lower labour costs. Second, organizing techniques developed in

the organization of the "lead sector" can subsequently be used in the organization of the non-union sector. Finally, union successes in the lead sector are said to provide organizers with a powerful psychological incentive to continue their work. Shister concludes that the proximity influence explains why it is usually easier to organize a group of clerical workers in a plant where the production workers have a strong, viable union, than in those plants where the union is either weak or doesn't exist. He observes that the most successful white collar unions emerged in those industries in which production workers were already represented by strong unions.⁴⁹

A final consideration in the discussion of union variables is the impact of such factors as union security provisions and union strength in the context of employment expansion. Both should exert a positive influence on union growth. Union security provisions, and in particular the union shop, will increase aggregate membership levels, while the presence of a strong union, if coupled with aggressive organizing, should result in both increased aggregate membership and union penetration in the affected sector.⁵⁰

e. Organizational Determinants of Union Growth: Employer Variables

The attitudes and behaviour of employers toward unions is an extremely important consideration in any examination of the pattern of union development. Where employers resist unions and adopted policies designed to keep the enterprise union free, union growth has been adversely affected. However, in those instances in which employers have accepted unions, granted full union recognition, negotiated with the union and even encouraged employee participation, the impact on union

growth has been positive. Bain notes that union recognition is commonly viewed as an "either or" proposition: either the union has employer recognition or it does not. He argues that, in reality, union recognition is more a matter of degree along a continuum. At one extreme is the employer whose vehement opposition to unions results in either minimal recognition or none at all. At the other end of the spectrum is the employer who accepts unionism and is both supportive and conciliatory in dealings with the union. The vast majority of cases fall somewhere in the middle.

Employer recognition is positively linked to union growth in three important ways. First, a number of workers in any organization typically identify with management and are, therefore, much less likely to join a union in the face of management disapproval. Second, workers may also hesitate to join a union, when confronted with employer opposition, because to do so is perceived as career inhibiting. Finally, and certainly the most important of the three, workers usually support unions on the basis of material gain and not because of some deep rooted philosophical commitment to the labour movement. Many workers may demand to see hard evidence of such benefits before they will join the union. The less recognition that is forthcoming from the employer, the more difficult it will be for the union to demonstrate to skeptical workers that it can be beneficial to them. Bargaining will be hard and employer concessions obtained only through great difficulty, if at all. In such circumstances, not only will the union experience considerable resistance in recruiting new members, but in addition, membership retention will be a problem. The costs of membership will

simply exceed the benefits.

In concluding his discussion, Bain observes that differences in employer attitudes and behaviour have made a significant contribution to the variations in the pattern of unionism between North America and Western Europe.⁵¹

Fiorito and Greer report that various unemployment measures have been used in quantitative time series studies as a proxy for employer resistance to unionization. While numerous studies have identified a positive relationship between union growth and both low unemployment and rapid employment growth, other research has produced conflicting results. The reasons for the negative relationship between unemployment and unionism has already been discussed at length in the discussion of the economic environment.⁵² The use of unemployment measures as a proxy for employer resistance is a very crude specification. There may well be a positive correlation between the level of unemployment and the capacity of the employer to resist unionism, but the relationship of each of these variables to unionism is clearly more complex than is adequately captured here. Indeed, there is considerable uncertainty as to exactly what is being measured.

Shister argues that union organization of the lead sector or lead firm will tend to have the effect of reducing employer opposition to unionism in the unorganized sector or among unorganized firms. This is primarily a function of the proximity influence and may occur for a number of reasons. First, if the lead sector and the unorganized sector are competing with one another, the chance that union penetration of the unorganized sector will produce a labour cost disadvantage

vis-a-vis the lead sector is significantly reduced. Second, the decision to resist unionization can be extremely expensive, with the ultimate results by no means guaranteed. Third, employers in the non-union sector may become aware of benefits accruing to management in the lead sector from unionization. Finally, there is little risk of peer sanctions for "giving into unions" if the lead sector has already been unionized and the unorganized sector is merely following that lead.⁵³

2. Applications of the Union Growth Literature to Canada

Despite the longevity of the debate about the sources of union growth in the United States and elsewhere, the subject has received little attention in Canada until relatively recently. International comparative studies of union growth, such as by Bain and Elshiekh, have tended to omit Canada because "Canadian business and union activity is less fundamental in the sense that much of it is transmitted from the United States".⁵⁴ As a consequence of such beliefs and of indigenous neglect, there are only a handful of significant studies of aggregate Canadian union growth. Virtually all employ some type of quantitative statistical analysis, most commonly in the form of a single behavioural equation using ordinary least squares regression. The analytical categories are derived almost exclusively from the American union growth literature. An examination of these applications is extremely important in order to assess the validity of the hypothesized relationships in the Canadian context. Unlike the first part of the chapter, the discussion here focuses briefly on the contribution of individual authors and follows rough chronological order.

Swidinsky builds on the work of Hines⁵⁵ and Ashenfelter and Pencavel⁵⁶ to construct a multiple regression model which accounts for seventy-two per cent in the variation in Canadian union membership growth between 1911 and 1970. Specifically, the annual rate of change in aggregate union membership is regressed against the following independent variables: the rate of change in employment in unionized firms, the lagged rate of price inflation, the rate of change in the number of strikes used as a proxy for changes in union recruiting activity, the rate of unemployment, lagged union membership density and the rate of change in American union membership.⁵⁷

Bain and Elsheikh criticize Swidinsky's formulation citing a variety of theoretical, methodological and statistical deficiencies. A model utilizing a number of the variables from Swidinsky's specification is also presented. They conclude that changes in Canadian union membership are explained by changes in U.S. union membership, the current rate of change in prices and the level of unemployment.⁵⁸

Bain discusses the determinants of union growth in the context of a non-quantitative analysis of the relationship between unionism and public policy in Canada. He notes that the lengthy debate has produced a long list of aspiring candidates, with business cycle variables being the most frequently cited. For his part Bain identifies four major factors as having "strategic" importance. They are: the business cycle, in particular, fluctuations in prices, wages and unemployment; labour force concentration; employer attitudes and behaviour; and public policy. The last three are structural factors which act to limit the impact of the business cycle on union growth.⁵⁹

Chaison and Rose demonstrate the limitations of the econometric analysis of union growth. They report that the Bain and Elshiekh model fails to adequately explain the pattern of Canadian national union growth. A modified model is proposed, which attempts to explain changes on national union membership in terms of: changes in price levels lagged one year, the level of unemployment lagged one year, union membership density in Canada (for all types of unions), changes in U.S. union membership, the proportion of national union members in organizations that are truly national in scope, the proportion of national membership in unions affiliated with labour federations, and a dummy variable to capture the impact of P.C. 1003.⁶⁰

The new model is able to explain only twenty per cent of the variation in national union growth between 1922 and 1970. Chaison and Rose conclude that the various independent variables in the model, whether taken individually or in tandem, do not appear to be determinants of the pattern of Canadian national union growth. This was in spite of the fact that a number of these variables are fundamental components of traditional union growth theory and have been found statistically significant in research conducted in other countries. They suggest that the model's poor performance derives from the fact that traditional theories of union growth were developed primarily in the context of studies of unionism in Britain and the United States. As a consequence, these formulations are unable to capture the unique features of the Canadian labour movement, such as the importance of the public sector, the nature of unionism in Quebec, and the presence of both small provincial or regional unions and a Canada wide union in

transportation and communications. They argue that future research must incorporate the significant features of the Canadian experience if an adequate explanation for the pattern of Canadian national union growth is to be developed.⁶¹

Maki tests the hypothesis that political factors have a significant impact on the pattern of union growth in Canada. The study covers the period from 1962 to 1978. Following Ashenfelter and Pencavel, Maki uses the party in power at the provincial level as a proxy for policy orientations with respect to unionism. The model also utilizes measures of both employment growth and unemployment. The results indicate that political factors, as specified, do have a statistically significant impact on union growth. The variation accounted for by political factors is, however, relatively small.⁶²

Abbott integrates selected variables adopted from Ashenfelter and Pencavel, Bain and Elsheikh and Swidinsky with a number of his own innovations. The independent variables included: the rate of change of unionizable employment, the rate of change of money prices, union membership density, worker discontent as proxied by changes in unemployment, the rate of change in American union membership, union militancy as indicated by the level of strike activity and finally, major legislative enactments. Here, Abbott includes a dummy variable to capture the effect of P.C. 1003 and combines this with a union density measure to determine whether this change to the public policy framework alters the saturation level of union membership. The result is a model which accounts for over ninety per cent of the variation in aggregate Canadian union growth between 1925 and 1966. Despite its greater

econometric rigor, Abbott's work still suffers from a number of the same methodological and statistical problems that plagued earlier research. The author, himself, is well aware of these difficulties and strongly advocates further research in this area.⁶³

Eastman argues that because of the complex and reciprocal causal relationship between union growth and wage and price inflation, the use of a single behavioural equation is inappropriate. In its place he presents a model for the simultaneous determination of union growth and wage and price inflation in Canada. The independent variables in his union growth equation include: the rate of change of the Consumer Price Index as a proxy for real wages, the annual per cent change in employment in manufacturing to proxy the rate of growth in the unionizable sectors of the economy, unemployment in trade unions to proxy union bargaining power and union membership density among unionizable workers to capture the saturation effect. The model accounts for approximately seventy-three per cent of the variation in union growth for the period 1947 to 1970. Price inflation has a strong, positive impact on union growth. The manufacturing employment variable is also positively related to union growth, but exerts a weaker influence. The remaining variables are not statistically significant, although this may be a function of the multicollinearity evident in the results. Eastman offers three major conclusions based on this work. First, he argues that price inflation is an extremely important contributory factor in union growth, which is consistent with the view of unions as defensive organizations. He qualifies this with the proviso that in certain cases particular unions might suffer from

declining rates of membership growth as inflation increases. Second, aggregate unemployment does not have the expected dampening effect on total union growth. Unemployment in unions does, however, have a negative impact among certain union subcategories. Finally, despite the speculation that unions have a strong impact on wages, the research indicates that wage developments, in fact, have a much stronger impact on union growth than the reverse. Eastman notes that this is especially interesting given that many workers actually join unions because they believe that the direction of causation runs the other way.⁶⁴

Rose and Chaison examine the divergent performance of the Canadian and American labour movements in terms of union growth, union membership density and certification application results. A quantitative model is not employed. In the United States they find evidence of "union stagnation and decline", while in Canada there is "vitality and growth". After first documenting the extent of this divergence, they then move on to identify the principal causal factors. Interestingly, neither the labour nor product markets are said to play a major role. Instead, Rose and Chaison cite public policy considerations, increased employer resistance and a variety of union related variables as being chiefly responsible for the decline of American unionism. In the area of public policy, inadequate protection against employer anti-union tactics, the strong reliance on representation votes, which tend to promote both employer interference and delays, and restrictions on union security, such as the abolition of the closed shop and passage of right to work laws, have all had a negative impact. Increased employer opposition to unions is also very

much in evidence, including the use of legal tactics to obtain procedural delays and unfair practices during certification campaigns. The latter have "skyrocketed". Related to this is the growth of non-union competition in sectors of the economy traditionally characterized by a strong union presence as in construction, trucking and bituminous coal. Finally, deficiencies in union structure, the desire and ability to organize and union and worker militancy have all made a negative contribution. The authors do, however, caution that additional research is needed to clarify their specific roles and isolate other union related factors.⁶⁵

Kumar and Dow construct a model which seeks to explain the pattern of union membership in Canada in terms of linear and non-linear changes in prices, lagged employment growth, changes in unemployment during cyclical expansions and contractions, the percentage change in real wages, the level of union density, the rate of change in union membership in the United States, public policy changes following the introduction of P.C. 1003, and the changes in the ratio of employment in service and goods producing industries and in the ratio of male and female employment. Drawing on the work of Ashenfelter and Pencavel and Bain and Elsheikh, as well as cross-sectional research in the United States, Kumar and Dow produce an econometric model which accounts for over ninety per cent of the variation in aggregate union membership between 1935 and 1980. The results clearly suggest a dynamic relationship between union growth and the various independent variables. This relationship is both linear and non-linear as well as asymmetrical and interactive. The model demonstrates greater structural

stability than either the Ashenfelter and Pencavel or the Bain and Elsheikh formulations. The authors note that, despite the improvements made in their model, a number of concerns remain unresolved. Among these are, the appropriateness of using a single behavioural equation, statistical problems such as errors in the data and misspecification of variables, the validity of the model for developments outside the period studied and finally, the omission of organizational variables. They conclude with a call for further research and suggestions for varied research strategies.⁶⁶

Gilson and Spencer note that much of the debate about the determinants of union growth reflects the ongoing tension between macro and micro levels of analysis. They critically observe that for well over a decade research in this area has been dominated by the macro approach and the search for an adequate explanation of aggregate union growth. The use of econometric models to determine the relationship between union growth and a variety of independent variables, but particularly business cycle measures, is common to most. Gilson and Spencer argue that the concern with fine tuning the explanatory power of these quantitative models has resulted in something being lost. What is omitted is the influence of organizational factors, and more specifically, the role played by union leaders and their decisions. They are critical of Bain and Price for suggesting that union leadership "is very much a secondary and derived determinant of aggregate union growth" has already been noted in the first part of the chapter. Citing work by Chaison and Rose and Undy,⁶⁷ Gilson and Spencer maintain that aggregate level research must be "enriched" with individual, micro

level case studies. Only in this way can a union's organizing activity be measured and adequately assessed. Case analysis is useful, not merely to document changes in membership levels, but more importantly to provide valuable insights as to where new members are coming from and old members are being lost.

Of particular interest to the authors is the relationship between individual union growth strategies and developments in union composition. By integrating marketing concepts with union growth theory they construct a typology of union growth strategies. Using this scheme, strategies may be classified and their implications for union composition assessed. According to the typology, unions expand either by market penetration or market development. In the case of market penetration, the union remains within its traditional jurisdiction. Market development, on the other hand, involves operating outside the union's traditional jurisdiction. In both instances new members are obtained through one of two methods. The union could focus on workers who are already organized, in which case, it might target smaller or weaker unions for takeover or merger or simply engage in raiding. The other alternative is to organize the unorganized. In the case of market penetration, near saturation levels in union membership, in certain sectors of the economy, will make this difficult. Leadership becomes important because these growth strategies, and the resultant changes in union composition, must be "managed" and "operationalized". Gilson and Spencer conclude that union leaders affect the magnitude of membership growth through their decisions about how and where new members will be recruited.⁶⁸

Conclusions

For well over a decade the study of union growth has been dominated by the search for an adequate explanation of aggregate developments. The use of econometric models to determine the relationship between union growth and a variety of independent variables, but particularly business cycle measures, is common to most. Ashenfelter and Pencavel and Bain and Elsheikh are generally considered to be the seminal works in this regard. Numerous authors have subsequently extended and built upon their contributions. A major deficiency in the literature is the absence of an integrated model of union growth. Instead, there are a number of discrete hypotheses concerning the relationship between particular determinants and the phenomenon. It has been argued that much of the problem ultimately rests with the theoretical underdevelopment of the systems approach to industrial relations upon which much of this work is conceptually based.

In assessing this research, two main issues must be examined. The first concerns criticisms regarding the application and operationalization of the statistical techniques used to study this problem. The second, and easily the more important of the two, pertains to the choice of a quantitative approach itself. Each will be discussed briefly in turn.

In examining the application of statistical methodology to the study of union growth, the intent is merely to highlight the major concerns which have emerged and not to engage in an extended discussion of technique. One of the important problems faced by time series studies of union growth is the structural stability of the model

over time.⁶⁹ These models essentially aspire to be timeless. They seek to provide a statistically significant explanation for the pattern of union growth, at any time during the study period, in terms of relatively few independent variables. This may simply be an unrealistic expectation. Related to this are concerns about the lack of predictive power. In other words, if the premises upon which the model is constructed, including structural stability, are valid, then it should not only be able to explain past patterns, but also predict developments beyond the study period. Their performance has generally been poor in this regard.⁷⁰ Another important question is the appropriateness of using a single behavioural equation as opposed to simultaneous equations to model such a complex phenomenon as union growth. Finally, there are the usual discussions concerning the accuracy of various statistical series and questions of appropriate model and variable specification, including the use of proxies.

Assessing the merits of utilizing quantitative analysis to study union growth raises a number of fundamental questions about research design. It is, therefore, worthwhile to briefly consider the rationale behind the decision to quantify. As noted at the outset of this chapter, Bain and Elsheikh argue that, despite the longevity of the debate and the accumulation of a multitude of contributing independent variables, very little is really known about the real determinants of union growth. They advocate the use of quantitative analysis as a remedy.

Gilson and Spencer argue that much of the debate about the determinants of union growth reflects the ongoing tension between the

macro and micro levels of analysis. The macro approach has dominated recent research at the expense of more disaggregated work. They contend that the preoccupation with macro level analysis has resulted in the omission of certain key organizational variables, such as union leadership, which are also inherently difficult to quantify. Quantitative analysis tends to shift the focus of research to those factors that are readily quantifiable and away from those things which are not. Generalizations derived from macro level analysis may not be valid for disaggregate developments. Variables excluded because of their lack of statistical significance at the macro level may be of critical importance in explaining what had occurred in a particular industry or sector. Certainly this is the import of the Rose and Chaison study of national union growth in Canada.

The preoccupation with "statistical success" has also had a dampening effect on theoretical development. This is particularly evident in the Canadian literature. Many articles are concerned primarily with describing the specification of the quantitative model and reporting the results. The broader theoretical considerations are frequently accorded insufficient attention.

NOTES

¹ For a discussion of the union growth literature in terms of the contributions of individual authors see: George Sayers Bain and Farouk Elsheikh, Union Growth and the Business Cycle: An Econometric Analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976),: 1-57.

² Horace B. Davis, "The Theory of Union Growth, 1880-1923," Quarterly Journal of Economics LV, (August 1941),: 611-637.

³ Bain and Elsheikh, op. cit.,: 23-25.

⁴ John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems (New York: Holt, 1958).

⁵ Jack Fiorito and Charles R. Greer, "Determinants of U.S. Unionism: Past Research and Future Needs," Industrial Relations (Berkeley) 21, 1 (1982),: 2.

⁶ Joseph Shister, "The Logic of Union Growth," Journal of Political Economy LXI (October 1953),: 415-416 (Hereafter cited as "Logic"); idem, "Unresolved Problems and New Paths for American Labor," Industrial and Labour Relations Review IX (April 1956),: 449-450. cited in Bain and Elsheikh, op. cit.,: 66.

⁷ Bain and Elsheikh, op. cit.,: 65-67.

⁸ Orley Ashenfelter and John H. Pencavel, "American Trade Union Growth 1900-1960," Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXIII (August 1969),: 434-448.

⁹ Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 12

¹⁰ Ibid.,: 11.

¹¹ Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 415.

¹² Joseph Rose and Gary N. Chaison, "The State of the Unions: United States and Canada," Journal of Labor Research VI, 1 (Winter 1985): 97-111.

¹³ George Sayers Bain, Union Growth and Public Policy in Canada (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1978),: 17-18. (Hereafter cited as Union Growth).

¹⁴ This description is from Dunlop's work and is cited in Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986),: 17. Also see: Dunlop, op. cit.,: chps. 1-4.

¹⁵ Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 10.

- 16 Bain, Union Growth, op. cit.,: 19-23.
- 17 Dunlop states that occupying a strategic position is not the same as having a skill, but rather it refers to the bargaining power of a group of workers by virtual of their critical location in the production process. John Dunlop, Dispute Resolution (1984),: 63-66.
- 18 Albert A. Blum, "Why Unions Grow," Labor History, 9, 1 (1968),: 61.
- 19 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 418-420.
- 20 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 4-5.
- 21 Bain, Union Growth, op. cit.,: 16-19.
- 22 This generalization is certainly less valid than it once was. During the 1970s and 80s, the incidence of collective bargaining by professionals increased dramatically. For a general discussion of this phenomenon see: Mark Thompson, "Collective Bargaining by Professionals," in John C. Anderson and Morley Gunderson, Union-Management Relations in Canada (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1982),: 379-397.
- 23 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 4-5.
- 24 Ibid.,: 11.
- 25 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 422-423.
- 26 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 12.
- 27 Julius Rezler, Union Growth Reconsidered: A Critical Analysis of Recent Growth Theories (New York: The Kossuth Foundation, 1961),: 8.
- 28 Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," Labor History II (Spring 1961),: 131-157. cited in Blum, op. cit.,: 53.
- 29 Blum, op. cit.,: 53.
- 30 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 424-429.
- 31 Blum, op. cit.,: 54-58.
- 32 Ashenfelter and Pencavel, op. cit. cited in Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 12.
- 33 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 12, 13.
- 34 John T. Dunlop, "Comments," Labor History II (Fall 1961),: 362-363. cited by Blum, op. cit.,: 53.

- 35 Blum. op. cit.,: 54.
- 36 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 9.
- 37 Bain and Elshiekh, op. cit., 87-91. cited in Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 9.
- 38 Bain, Union Growth, op. cit.,: 25-26.
- 39 Ibid.,: 25-26.
- 40 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 7-8.
- 41 George Sayers Bain and R. Price, "The Determinants of Union Growth," in George Sayers Bain, ed., Industrial Relations in Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983),: 30. cited in C.H.J. Gilson and Ian Spencer, "Trade Union Growth: A Marketing Model," Relations Industrielles 42, 4 (1987),: 757.
- 42 Gilson and Spencer, op. cit.,: 757.
- 43 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 429-432.
- 44 Blum, op. cit.,: 60-61.
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- 47 Bain, Union Growth, op. cit.,: 21-22.
- 48 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 8.
- 49 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 423.
- 50 Ibid.,: 415; Blum, op. cit.,: 63-64.
- 51 Bain, Union Growth, op. cit.,: 23-25.
- 52 Fiorito and Greer, op. cit.,: 8.
- 53 Shister, "Logic," op. cit.,: 423-424.
- 54 Bain and Elsheikh, op. cit.,: 3.
- 55 A.G. Hines, "Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom 1893-1961," Review of Economic Studies 31, 4 (October 1964),: 221-251.
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- 58 George Sayers Bain and Farouk Elsheikh, "Trade Union Growth in Canada: A Comment," Relations Industrielles 31, 3 (1976),: 482-490.
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- 63 Michael G. Abbott, An Econometric Model of Trade Union Membership Growth in Canada 1925-1966. Working Paper No. 154, Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., 1982,: 1-22, 77-83.
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- 66 Kumar and Dow, op. cit.
- 67 R. Undy et. al., Changes in Trade Unions (Hutchinson, 1981). cited in Gilson and Spencer, op. cit.,: 759
- 68 Gilson and Spencer, op. cit.,: 756-773.
- 69 Neil Sheflin, Leo Troy and C. Timothy Koeller, "Structural Stability in Models of American Union Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics XCVI, 1 (February 1981),: 77-88; R.B. Mancke, "American Trade Union Growth 1900-1960: A Comment," Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXXV, 1 (February 1971),: 187-193; Arvil V. Adams and Joseph Krislow, "New Union Organizing: A Test of the Ashenfelter-Pencavel Model of Trade Union Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics LXXXVIII, 2 (May 1974),: 304-311.
- 70 William J. Moore and Douglas K. Pearce, "Union Growth: A Test of the Ashenfelter-Pencavel Model," Industrial Relations (Berkeley) 15, 2 (1976),: 244-247; Jack Fiorito, "American Trade Union Growth: An Alternative Model," Industrial Relations (Berkeley) 21, 1 (Winter 1982),: 123-127.

CHAPTER 3

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONISM IN ONTARIO 1900-1935

Introduction

From 1900 to the beginning of World War I, Canada experienced an unprecedented rate of population growth and economic expansion. This rapid industrial growth, coupled with the failure of wages to keep pace with rapidly escalating prices, both during the War and in its immediate aftermath, provided a powerful impetus to the growth of Canadian unionism.¹ It also generated considerable labour militancy, which manifested itself in a record level of strike activity in 1919² and in the creation of the One Big Union (O.B.U.).³

Organized labour's success was, however, short-lived. After peaking in 1921, the membership of unions affiliated to the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (T.L.C.)⁴ declined throughout the remainder of the decade. This was also the case with the rival Canadian Federation of Labour (C.F.L.)⁵, whose membership peaked in 1923 and thereafter suffered from the same malaise as the T.L.C. Jamieson notes that the 1920s were a unique period in both Canadian and American labour history because union membership and bargaining power declined during a time of general prosperity, economic growth and high employment. This was, of course, with the exception of the brief depression at the beginning of the decade. He attributes this "paradox" to three factors. First, a number of affiliates left the T.L.C. as a

result of internal differences within the Canadian labour movement. Second, as was the case with the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.), the craft union structure and orientation of the T.L.C. was ill-suited to the organization of the largely unskilled and semi-skilled labour that was employed in the then emerging mass production industries. Finally, in both Canada and the United States, the 1920s were one of the rare periods in which there was considerable price stability, while wages rose due to increased productivity. Moreover, the largest wage increases tended to occur in the new mass production industries, which the mainstream of the labour movement was least capable of accommodating.⁶ The decade also witnessed a widespread attack on unions, by employers, typified by the nation wide "open shop" campaign in the United States. In this general context a variety of employee representation plans were promoted as substitutes for unionism.⁷

During the Great Depression, of the 1930s, this decline in union fortunes became a veritable rout as union members and workers in general were laid-off in record numbers. The T.L.C. did not regain the level of membership it enjoyed in 1921 until the early 1940s.⁸ With the exception of the hydro-electric utilities, these aggregate developments were largely mirrored in local government employment.

1. Municipal Employment

a. Police Unions

The latter years of World War I witnessed a considerable amount of organizing activity among municipal police as, beginning in 1917, police unions appeared in Canada for the first time. By 1918, they

existed in five Ontario cities as well as in an additional five centres outside the province. There was no national or international body for police. As a result, all police unions in Canada, with the exception of those in Quebec, were directly chartered by the T.L.C.⁹

The existence of these organizations was vehemently opposed by employers, who frequently fired union members in their largely successful efforts to break them. The involvement of municipal police in the Winnipeg General Strike only served to confirm the worst fears of civic authorities.¹⁰ Only a single Ontario police union survived past 1921.¹¹ With the exception of a brief interval between 1935 and 1937, when a second T.L.C. chartered organization existed, it remained the sole police union in Ontario into the 1940s.¹² Even associational activity by police appears to have been very limited during this period.¹³

One of the more important consequences of these developments was that police in Ontario were generally isolated from the mainstream of the Canadian labour movement. When legislation appeared in 1947, prohibiting the affiliation of police officers and their associations with unions and other labour organizations,¹⁴ it only confirmed the regime that had already been established in practice. In a number of other provinces police unions affiliated with the T.L.C. and other central labour bodies persisted. An examination of these organizations falls beyond the scope of this study.

b. Fire Fighter Unions

Unions of municipal fire fighters also began to appear in Canada during the War. Although the Hamilton Fire Fighters' Protective

Association, T.L.C., had existed since the early 1900s, it was not until 1916 that it was joined by other fire fighter unions. By 1917, there were three unions in Ontario and another five in the rest of the country. With the exception of a single union in Vancouver, which held an A.F.L. direct charter, all were directly chartered by the T.L.C.¹⁵ The formation of the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.), in February 1918, altered the basis of fire fighter unionization in both Canada and the United States. The new organization was chartered by the A.F.L. as an international union and given jurisdiction over the organization of all fire fighters in both countries. In accordance with accepted practice within the A.F.L., the Vancouver direct charter was surrendered to the I.A.F.F. It then became the new organization's first Canadian local.¹⁶ The I.A.F.F. subsequently affiliated with the T.L.C. setting the stage for a jurisdictional dispute in the early 1920s, involving most of the directly chartered fire fighter locals in Ontario. By 1919, the number of fire fighter unions in Canada had increased to twenty-four and existed in all provinces except Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. Seventeen were chartered by the I.A.F.F., while six held T.L.C. direct charters and one was a National and Catholic union of fire fighters in Quebec City. Most I.A.F.F. gains came in the form of newly organized locals, although there were also instances in which organizations chartered by the T.L.C. surrendered their charters and joined the I.A.F.F.¹⁷

Despite some serious initial employer opposition to municipal fire fighters forming unions and affiliating with the T.L.C.,¹⁸ it appears

that an accommodation was soon reached whereby the existence of these bodies was tolerated. Certainly the fact that the I.A.F.F. openly discouraged strike activity by its members must have played an important role.¹⁹

In Ontario, the number of I.A.F.F. locals peaked at eight in 1919-1920. Thereafter, it declined slightly and then remained at approximately the same level until the mid-1930s (See Table 3-1). These locals were found in the largest cities. The organization of fire fighters in the medium to large sized cities in the province was accomplished by the Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters.²⁰ The Federation came into existence in 1920 and in that year reported eleven unions with 1,030 members in affiliation. All of these were chartered by other labour bodies and it was not until 1922 that the Federation began to issue charters in its own name. In 1923, it had thirteen locals with 329 members under charter (See Table 3-2). In addition, five locals of the I.A.F.F., with a combined membership of 953, were listed as Federation affiliates.²¹

After some initial conflict between the Federation and the I.A.F.F., over the thorny issue of jurisdiction,²² the two organizations appear to have reached a settlement. The details as to how relations were normalized are not available. The compromise seems to have involved a system whereby the Federation granted its own charters and also accepted I.A.F.F. affiliates on a "dual charter" basis.²³ The vast majority of I.A.F.F. locals were also Federation members.

The Federation continued to grow throughout the 1920s, both in

TABLE 3-1. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS: NUMBER OF LOCALS AND MEMBERSHIP FOR ONTARIO, 1918-1941

<u>Year</u>	<u>Locals¹</u>	<u>Members</u>
1918	3	N/A
1919	8	N/A
1920	8	N/A
1921	6	N/A
1922	6	N/A
1923	6	N/A
1924	6	N/A
1925	5	N/A
1926	4	N/A
1927	4	850
1928	5	903
1929	6	1,086
1930	6	1,090
1931	6	1,138
1932	6	1,106
1933	6	1,106
1934	8	N/A
1935	10	N/A
1936	24	1,586
1937	32	1,768
1938	34	1,870
1939	35	1,760
1940	35	1,776
1941	35	1,821

¹ Between 1927 and 1933, inclusive, and again in 1936, all I.A.F.F. locals in the Province were reported as affiliates of the Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters.

Source: Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1918-1941. (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization)

TABLE 3-2. PROVINCIAL FEDERATION OF ONTARIO FIRE FIGHTERS, 1920-1937

Year	<u>Chartered Locals</u>		<u>I.A.F.F. Affiliates</u>		<u>Other Affiliates</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	No.	Members	No.	Members	No.	Members	No.	Members
1920	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	11	1,030
1921	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15	1,185
1922	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	18	1,250
1923	13	329	5	955	0	0	18	1,284
1924	15	367	3	N/A	1	N/A	19	1,195
1925	17	562	4	N/A	1	N/A	22	1,539
1926	21	799	3	N/A	1	N/A	25	1,620
1927	24	842	4	850	0	0	28	1,692
1928	25	872	5	903	0	0	30	1,775
1929	26	712	6	1,086	0	0	32	1,798
1930	26	726	6	1,090	0	0	32	1,816
1931	26	726	6	1,138	0	0	32	1,864
1932	26	726	6	1,106	0	0	32	1,832
1933	26	726	6	1,106	0	0	32	1,832
1934	26	739	7	1,142	0	0	33	1,882
1935	22	519	8	1,182	0	0	30	1,701
1936	7	106	24	1,586	0	0	31	1,692
1937	0	0	32	1,768	0	0	32	1,768

¹ The Federation was listed as a District Council of the T.L.C. in the Report on Labour Organization from 1920 to 1922 inclusive and aggregate membership data was provided. In 1922, the Federation began issuing charters in its own name. Detailed information as to the composition of the Federation was first received by the Department of Labour for publication in the 1923 Report. As a consequence, disaggregated statistics, for the organization, are not available prior to this. Report on Labour Organization, 1923.

Source: Report on Labour Organization, 1920-1937.

terms of the number of locals under charter and its aggregate membership. After peaking in 1928-1929, there was considerable stability in the organization until 1935, when a number of Federation locals also became affiliates of the I.A.F.F. In 1936, the bulk of the Federation's remaining locals followed suit, leaving only seven with 106 members that were not I.A.F.F. affiliates.²⁴ At the Federation's 1937 annual convention in Kingston, delegates voted overwhelmingly in favour of their locals as well as the Federation itself affiliating with the I.A.F.F.²⁵ This ended the Federation's existence as an independent entity, thereafter it functioned as a provincial federation of the international body.²⁶ By the late 1930s, the I.A.F.F. was the largest single organization of municipal employees, both in Ontario and in Canada as a whole.²⁷

Unlike much of the labour movement, organizing activity among Ontario fire fighters, during the 1920s and 1930s, was extremely successful. By 1921, the number of fire fighter unions in the Province exceeded the combined total in the rest of Canada. This remained the case until the early 1960s. The I.A.F.F. was able to achieve almost complete penetration of its jurisdiction in Ontario.²⁸ By 1941, every city, town and village with a population of 10,000 or more, with the exception of Cornwall, was organized. Significantly, much of this penetration dated from the early 1920s (See Tables 3-3 and 3-4). In addition, unions existed in the townships of York, Scarborough and Teck (Kirkland Lake), all of which had populations in excess of 20,000 people.²⁹ The performance of these organizations is equally impressive in terms of their membership density³⁰ (See Table 3-5). If union

TABLE 3-3. LIST OF ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES WITH FIRE FIGHTER UNIONS
1923, 1931, 1941, BY UNION

1923

Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters: Chartered Locals

Belleville, no. 15	Kingston, no. 14	Sarnia, no. 21
Brantford, no. 8	Kitchener, no. 19	Sault Ste Marie, no. 3
Brockville, no. 24	Pembroke, no. 22	Woodstock, no. 10
Chatham, no. 17	Peterborough, no. 11	
Galt, no. 18	St. Thomas, no. 16	

I.A.F.F.: Chartered Locals

Fort William, no. 193	London, no. 142	Toronto, no. 113
Guelph, no. 123	Ottawa, no. 162	Windsor, no. 159

T.L.C. Directly Chartered Local

Hamilton Fireman's Protective Association, No. 11

1931

Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters: Chartered Locals

Belleville, no. 15	Kitchener, no. 19	Sault Ste Marie, no. 6
Brantford, no. 8	Niagara Falls, no. 33	Stratford, no. 32
Brockville, no. 24	Oshawa, no. 31	Sudbury, no. 38
Chatham, no. 17	Peterborough, no. 11	Walkerville, no. 26
East Windsor, no. 28	Port Arthur, no. 29	Welland, no. 30
East York (Twp), no. 37	St. Catharines, no. 25	Windsor, no. 27
Galt, no. 18	St. Thomas, no. 16	Woodstock, no. 10
Guelph, no. 9	Sandwich (Twp), no. 35	York (Twp), no. 39
Kingston, no. 14	Sarnia, no. 21	

I.A.F.F.: Chartered Locals

Fort William, no. 193	London, no. 142	Ottawa, no. 162
Hamilton, no. 288	North Bay, no. 284	Toronto, no. 113

TABLE 3-3. LIST OF ONTARIO MUNICIPALITIES WITH FIRE FIGHTER UNIONS,
1923, 1931, 1941. BY UNION (cont'd)

1941

I.A.F.F.: Chartered Locals

Belleville, no. 497	Pembroke, no. 488
Brantford, no. 460	Peterborough, no. 519
Brockville, no. 536	Port Arthur, no. 496
Chatham, no. 486	St. Catharines, no. 485
East York (Twp), no. 418	St. Thomas, no. 447
Forest Hill, no. 560	Sarnia, no. 492
Fort William, no. 193	Sault Ste Marie, no. 529
Galt, no. 499	Scarborough (Twp), no. 626
Guelph, no. 467	Stratford, no. 534
Hamilton, no. 288	Sudbury, no. 572
Kingston, no. 498	Teck (Twp)(Kirkland Lake), no. 573
Kitchener, no. 475	Timmins, no. 535
London, no. 142	Toronto, no. 113
Niagara Falls, no. 528	Welland, no. 481
North Bay, no. 284	Windsor, no. 455
Oshawa, no. 465	Woodstock, no. 477
Ottawa, no. 162	York (Twp), no. 411
Owen Sound, no. 531	

Source: Report on Labour Organization, 1923, 1931, 1941.

**TABLE 3-4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN MUNICIPALITIES
IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1921, 1931, 1941**

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1921</u>	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>
<u>Population Category¹</u>			
Over 100,000:			
Number of municipalities:	3	3	4
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions ²	3(100%)	3(100%)	4(100%)
General Municipal unions	2(67%)	2(67%)	4(100%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions	1(33%)	2(67%)	3(75%)
Public Transit unions	3(100%)	3(100%)	4(100%)
50,000 - 99,999:			
Number of municipalities:	1	2	1
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions ²	1(100%)	2(100%)	1(100%)
General Municipal unions	1(100%)	1(50%)	1(100%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	1(100%)	2(100%)	1(100%)
25,000 - 49,999:			
Number of municipalities	2	3	10
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions ²	2(100%)	3(100%)	10(100%)
General Municipal unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	3(30%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions	0(0%)	1(33%)	1(10%)
Public Transit unions	2(100%)	2(67%)	6(60%)
10,000 - 24,999:			
Number of municipalities	19	24	17
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions ²	12(63%)	21(88%)	16(94%)
General Municipal unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	3(18%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions	2(11%)	1(4%)	3(18%)
Public Transit unions ³	4(21%)	4(17%)	3(18%)

**TABLE 3-4. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN MUNICIPALITIES
IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1921, 1931, 1941
(cont'd)**

	Year		
	1921	1931	1941
Population Category ¹			
5,000 - 9,999:			
Number of municipalities	21	28	32
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions ²	2(10%)	1(4%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(3%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions ²	2(10%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

¹ Municipalities were sorted using population data from the Census of Canada.

² Fire fighter union data is for 1923.

³ Includes both municipal and private sector provision. The extent of penetration may be understated in the smaller municipalities as it is not known if all provided public transit.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1918-1941; Canada, Department of Labour, Report of the Department of Labour, "Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907: Proceedings," 1909-1941, (hereafter cited as I.D.I. Act Proceedings); T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1935-1941; A.C.C.L./C.C.L., Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1935-1941.

TABLE 3-5. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY FOR FIRE FIGHTER UNIONS IN ONTARIO, 1923, 1931, 1941

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1923</u> ¹	<u>1931</u>	<u>1941</u>
Number of union members	1284	1864	1821
Number of fire fighters	<u>1409</u>	<u>1802</u>	<u>1878</u>
Union membership density	91%	100%	97%

¹ The 1923 calculation of membership density should be regarded only as a crude estimate due to problems associated with the statistics used. First, the number of union members is understated because of the absence of data for the T.L.C. directly chartered union in Hamilton and one undetermined I.A.F.F. local. Second, the employment number used is from the 1921 Census of Canada and by 1923 total employment could have changed significantly.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1923, 1931, 1941; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.), Census of Canada, 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17.

membership statistics for 1923, 1931 and 1941 are compared with fire fighter employment as reported in the corresponding Census of Canada, then, even allowing for some inaccuracy in the data, it is quite clear that union membership among full-time fire fighters was very high.

The success of the fire fighter unions in organizing their constituency during this period is extremely interesting, especially given the initial employer opposition, the general lethargy of the labour movement and the adverse economic conditions of the 1930s. It stands in complete contrast to what was occurring in other sectors of local government employment at the same time, in particular, the near absence of unions among general municipal employees and minimal presence in hydro-electric power.

c. General Municipal Employee Unions

As with the other groups under study, the years 1917 to 1919 saw a significant increase in trade union activity among general municipal employees in Canada. The majority of these organizations were directly chartered locals of the T.L.C.³¹ A separate national union for municipal employees did not appear until the 1940s.³² Moreover, unlike the other sectors being studied, there was also no international union organizing in this area until 1935.³³ Immediately following World War I, the A.F.L. chartered a small number of municipal unions directly, but the majority of these had ceased to function by the mid-1920s.³⁴

In Ontario union activity among general municipal employees dates from at least the latter part of the Nineteenth Century.³⁵ Little is known about these organizations, except that they appear to have been very limited in number, existing primarily in the largest centres. An

extremely high mortality rate seems to have been another common characteristic. Mirroring developments elsewhere, the number of municipal unions in the Province increased from one in 1916 to a total of seven in 1919 (See Table 3-6). Of these, three held T.L.C. direct charters, while another two were directly chartered by the A.F.L. The remainder consisted of an O.B.U. local in Port Arthur and an independent body in Ottawa.³⁶ The modest growth of unionism in general municipal employment did not produce the serious employer opposition so prevalent with police and fire fighters. Indeed, the federal Department of Labour noted that it attracted little, if any, attention.³⁷ By 1921, only three the T.L.C. bodies were still in existence. Except for the 1931 addition of a fourth T.L.C. directly chartered local, this remained the case until the mid-1930s, when several new unions were formed in unorganized municipalities.³⁸

The vast majority of municipal unions in existence in Ontario prior to the 1940s were organizations of outside workers. In certain municipalities, such as Toronto, Hamilton and Ottawa, the inside (office and clerical) workers did become involved in employee associations. These were not, however, generally regarded as unions. It was only in the 1940s that unionism gained even a modest foothold among this class of municipal employees³⁹ (See Table 3-7). In addition to organizations devoted exclusively to municipal employees, in some instances those municipal workers practising a particular trade were members of the craft union with jurisdiction over the organization of that trade.⁴⁰ For example, in 1918 the International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen, Local 300, counted certain employees of the City of

TABLE 3-6. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN ONTARIO, 1885-1941

<u>Union name, local number and affiliation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
Toronto Civic Employees' Benevolent Union, No. 1 (T.L.C.)	Toronto	1885	1915
Toronto Civic Employees' Benevolent Union, No. 2 (T.L.C.)	Toronto	1894	N/A
Toronto Civic Park Employees' Federal Union, No. 1 (T.L.C.)	Toronto	N/A	1914
Ottawa Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 15 (T.L.C.)	Ottawa	1913	1946
Labourers' Union of Guelph (Independent) ¹	Guelph	N/A	1920
Toronto Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 43 (T.L.C.)	Toronto	1917	Still exists
Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 16208 (A.F.L.)	Hamilton	1918	1921
London Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 60 (T.L.C.) ²	London	1918/1938	1937/1940
International Brotherhood of Stationary Firemen (oilers and fitters), No. 300 (A.F.L.) ³	Toronto	N/A	N/A
Civic Employees (O.B.U.) ⁴	Port Arthur	1919	1920?
City Employees' Association (Independent)	Ottawa	1919	1920?
City and County Public Service Employees' Federal Union, No. 16915 (A.F.L.)	St. Thomas	1919	1921
York Township Municipal Employees' Federal Union, No. 10 (T.L.C.)	York Township	1931	Still exists
Hamilton Civic General Staff Association, No. 5 (T.L.C.) ⁵	Hamilton	1933	1941
Hamilton Civic Maintenance Association, No. 33 (T.L.C.) ⁶	Hamilton	1934	1940
Ottawa Scavenging Department Employees' Federal Union, No. 39 (T.L.C.)	Ottawa	1934	1937

TABLE 3-6. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN ONTARIO, 1885-1941 (cont'd)

<u>Union name, local number and affiliation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
Windsor Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 82 (T.L.C.)	Windsor	1935	Still exists
London Civic Employees' Union, No. 1 (A.C.C.L.)	London	1935	1939
North Bay Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 22 (T.L.C.)	North Bay	1936	Still exists
Kitchener Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 68 (T.L.C.)	Kitchener	1937	Still exists
Ottawa Civic Employees' Union, (A.C.C.L.)	Ottawa	1937	1940
Fort William Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 87 (T.L.C.)	Fort William	1938	Still exists
Oshawa Civic Employees' Union, (A.C.C.L.) ⁷	Oshawa	1938/1941	Still Exists
Fort Frances Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 65 (T.L.C.)	Fort Frances	1940	Still Exists
Port Arthur Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 58 (T.L.C.)	Port Arthur	1940	1963?
St. Thomas Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 35 (T.L.C.)	St. Thomas	1940	Still exists
London Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 107 (T.L.C.) ²	London	1941	Still exists
Scarborough Township Employees' Union (C.C.L.) ⁸	Scarborough Township	1941	1942

¹ The Labourers' Union of Guelph was listed for the first time in the 1919 Report on Labour Organization. It had existed for a number of years prior to this, but had not been reported. The organization included municipal workers as well as other workers who lacked sufficient members to form their own union. Report on Labour Organization, 1919, : 159.

TABLE 3-6. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN ONTARIO, 1885-1941 (cont'd)

² The London Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 60 (T.L.C.) was reported dissolved in 1937, reformed in 1938 and dissolved again for a final time in 1940. In 1941, the London Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 107 (T.L.C.) was formed. This new union appears to have represented essentially the same constituency as its predecessor.

³ The sole documentary reference to the presence of this union, in municipal employment in the City of Toronto, is an April 1918 application by the local for the establishment of a board under the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act 1907. The date of this organization's formation and details of its subsequent history are unknown.

⁴ The dissolution date of the Port Arthur Civic Employees' Union (O.B.U.) is uncertain because the O.B.U. did not report its activities to the federal Department of Labour on a regular basis.

⁵ If its name is indicative of its composition, this organization was the only chartered union, in Ontario prior to the 1940s, that consisted primarily of municipal inside workers. It was likely the successor to the Hamilton Municipal Service Association (formerly the Hamilton City Hall Employees' Association), which ceased operation at approximately the same time as the union was formed. In 1941, the union severed its ties with the T.L.C. There is no documentary evidence that it continued as an independent body.

⁶ The Hamilton Civic Maintenance Association gave up its T.L.C. affiliation in 1940 to become an independent body.

⁷ The Oshawa Civic Employees' Union disappeared from the A.C.C.L./C.C.L. directory in 1940 and with it the "municipal" category also vanished. It reappeared in March 1941 as did the "municipal" classification.

⁸ The Scarborough Township Employees' Union (C.C.L.) appeared briefly in the C.C.L. directory between June 1941 and April 1942.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1941; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1935-1941; A.C.C.L., Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1935-1941.

TABLE 3-7. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS IN ONTARIO, 1911-1941

<u>Association Name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
Toronto Municipal Foremen's Association	Toronto	1918	N/A
Toronto City Hall Employees' Association	Toronto	1919	1942
Ottawa Municipal Service Association ¹	Ottawa	1925	1952
Hamilton Municipal Service Association (formerly the Hamilton City Hall Employees' Association) ²	Hamilton	1930	1935

¹ This organization was formed March 22, 1925 "for the purpose of promoting the common interests of municipal employees and improving the efficiency of the civic service". Membership was open to both inside and outside workers with the only requirement being one year of regular employment by the municipality. Report on Labour Organization, 1939,: 243.

² The Association appears in the Report on Labour Organization for the first time in 1930 and is missing from the 1935 Report. See Note 5, Table 3-6.

Source: Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1941.

Toronto among its members.⁴¹ The number of municipal employees organized in this manner is not recorded, although it is believed to have been small. There may also have been a number of small independent organizations of municipal employees, with no affiliation to any other labour body, whose presence was not documented in the federal Department of Labour's Report on Labour Organization in Canada.

Union penetration of general municipal employment in Ontario was limited to the largest cities for most of the period currently under review. Although some expansion occurred in the mid to late 1930s, by 1941, there were only thirteen municipal unions operating in twelve urban municipalities. An additional two were located in York and Scarborough townships (See Table 3-4). The pattern of union penetration was positively related to the size of the employing municipality. Of the five major urban centres with populations in excess of 100,000 people in 1941, Toronto, Windsor, Ottawa and London each had a municipal employee union, while Hamilton had two. Thereafter, the level of penetration declines significantly with each successive smaller population category. The smallest group, with the exception of Port Frances, was completely devoid of municipal unions.

Deriving an estimate of aggregate union membership density in general municipal employment is effectively precluded by the absence of appropriate statistics. Not only are there problems associated with the use of Census employment data for this group but, in addition, there is no source of union membership information, either at the aggregate level or for individual organizations.

2. Municipal Hydro-Electric Power Unions

Unionism in municipal hydro-electric employment dates from at least the first decade of this century. These early organizations were very few in number and generally suffered from a high rate of mortality. Unlike the other sectors under review, in this case the anticipated surge of late war and immediate post-war union organizing did not materialize. Although there was some minimal activity in the late 1930s, hydro-electric power remained largely union free. Very little is known about contemporary employer attitudes to union activity or the extent to which they contributed to this situation.

The main union in this area was the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.). It was an American, international craft union affiliated with the A.F.L. in the United States and the T.L.C. in Canada. The I.B.E.W. had its origins in the November 1891 formation of the National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. At its 1899 Convention in Pittsburg, this organization became the I.B.E.W. This was done to accommodate the union's organizing activities in Canada. In 1900, Local 105 in Hamilton, became the first Canadian I.B.E.W. local.⁴²


The I.B.E.W. claimed an extensive and varied jurisdiction,⁴³ but in practice was an organization of linemen and electricians.⁴⁴ It did not differentiate between public and private sector employment in the organization of its locals and, as a consequence, some were mixed. The union was recognized by the T.L.C. as having a jurisdictional monopoly over the organization of the electrical trades in Canada. This generally precluded the issuance of direct charters to such workers by the Congress.⁴⁵

Armstrong and Nelles note that, after 1901 and again during World War I and its immediate aftermath, the I.B.E.W. was a "powerful and extremely aggressive" union.⁴⁶ This aggression was not, however, evident in the organization of municipal hydro-electric utilities in Ontario. Its fortunes in Canada peaked immediately following World War I, both in terms of aggregate membership and the number of locals under charter. After sustaining severe losses in both categories in the depression of the early 1920s, there was then some improvement, which continued to the end of the decade. In the 1930s, despite some growth in the number of locals, aggregate membership plummeted to a low of 1,950 in 1935. During the subsequent recovery the I.B.E.W. chartered municipal hydro-electric locals in Windsor, Guelph and St. Thomas. By 1941, the union had organized municipal hydro-electric workers in Hamilton, Port Arthur, Fort William, Guelph, Windsor and St. Thomas as well as certain employees of the Toronto Electric Commissioners (T.E.C.) and the Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.)⁴⁷ (See Table 3-8). These unions consisted mainly of operational workers.

The other union to organize public sector electrical workers, during this period, was the Canadian Electrical Trades Union (C.E.T.U.), which was a national union. The C.E.T.U. was affiliated first with the Canadian Federation of Labour (C.F.L.), then with the All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.) and finally with the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.). These changes were strictly a function of the reorganization of the central body and had nothing to do with the union itself.⁴⁸

The C.E.T.U. originated in the September 1920 secession of 852

2



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No 2)

TABLE 3-8. MUNICIPAL HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER UNIONS IN ONTARIO, 1911-1941

<u>Union name, local number and affiliation</u>	<u>Employer</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
I.B.E.W., No. 114 (T.L.C.)	Toronto Electric Commissioners	1911	N/A
I.B.E.W., No. 339 (T.L.C.)	Cities of Fort William and Port Arthur	1911	Still exists
I.B.E.W., No. 353 (T.L.C.)	Toronto Electric Commissioners	1914	N/A
I.B.E.W., No. 120 (T.L.C.)	London Hydro-Electric Commission	1914	N/A
I.B.E.W., No. 105 (T.L.C.)	Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission	1920	N/A
C.E.T.U., No. 3 (C.F.L.)	Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission	1924	1926?
C.E.T.U., No. 1 (C.F.L.)	Toronto Electric Commissioners	1920	Still exists
I.B.E.W., No. 138 (T.L.C.)	Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission	1926	Still exists
Hamilton Hydro-Electric Employees' Association, No. 7 (T.L.C.)	Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission	1931	1938?
I.B.E.W., No. 911 (T.L.C.)	Windsor Utilities Commission	1936	Still exists
I.B.E.W., No. 548 (T.L.C.)	Guelph Light and Heat Commission	1936	Still exists
I.B.E.W., No. 787 (T.L.C.)	St. Thomas Public Utilities Commission	1941	Still exists

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1941; I.D.I. Act Proceedings, 1909-1941.

members of Branch 353 of the I.B.E.W. in Toronto. These workers were employed by the T.E.C., the T.T.C. and a number of private sector employers. Some 150 workers continued as members of Branch 353. After initially operating as an independent organization, the Toronto C.E.T.U. affiliated with the C.F.L. in September 1921.⁴⁹

Dissatisfaction with the I.B.E.W. was by no means unique to Toronto. A number of electrical workers in Regina also left the international union in 1920 to form the C.E.T.U. Regina. This union began as an independent organization, but subsequently affiliated with the C.F.L. in 1921.⁵⁰

In 1921, the Toronto and Regina unions were joined by C.E.T.U. organizations in Hamilton, Niagara Falls and Trenton, all of which were directly chartered by the C.F.L., as was still the case with the Toronto and Regina bodies. Direct affiliation with the Federation was apparently undertaken as an interim measure, while the various C.E.T.U. organizations attempted to build their membership and resources to provide the basis for the creation of a national union. The founding convention of the national C.E.T.U. occurred in July 1922.⁵¹

In contrast to the craft unionism of the I.B.E.W., the new body favoured union organization on an "industrial" basis.⁵² The C.E.T.U. appears to have initially attempted to organize workers regardless of the industry in which they were employed. However, by the 1930s, it had become primarily a union of utility workers.⁵³ This was mainly a result of the union's limited success in organizing in other sectors. As the direct provision of hydro-electric power was not the rule in all provinces during this period, the union's ranks included both public

and private sector utility workers.⁵⁴ It was not until the 1940s, when its activities were confined solely to Ontario, that the C.E.T.U. became predominantly an organization of public employees. Initially, the union appears to have followed the I.B.E.W. practice of organizing mixed locals consisting of electrical workers employed in the utilities as well as those engaged elsewhere. It also, apparently, did not distinguish between public and private sector employment.

The number of C.E.T.U. locals increased through the 1920s to peak at eleven in 1929. The union's aggregate membership did not, however, follow a similar pattern and, after reaching its maximum level in 1923, declined over the rest of the decade. After 1930, with the onset of the Great Depression, the union lost most of its locals and members.⁵⁵ In the mid-1930s, the national organization collapsed and communications between the surviving locals broke down.⁵⁶ By 1938, the union was reduced to its two Toronto branches, consisting of employees of the T.E.C. and the T.T.C. In 1939, these two merged to form a single local. The distinction between the two groups was retained in the local's internal structure.⁵⁷ It was this body that provided the foundation for the C.E.T.U.'s renewed organizing activity in the 1940s that culminated in the formation of the National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers in December 1944.

In Ontario, prior to the 1940s, the C.E.T.U.'s presence in the municipal hydro-electric utilities was limited mainly to the T.E.C. and the T.T.C.⁵⁸ A Hamilton local, consisting of linemen of the Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission, existed in 1924. However, in 1926 this group apparently joined the I.B.E.W., when that union organized the outside

workers of the utility.⁵⁹

In addition to the I.B.E.W. and the C.E.T.U., the Hamilton Hydro-Electric Employees' Association, No. 7 (T.L.C.) operated between 1931 and 1938.⁶⁰ The list of organizations of municipal hydro-electric power employees, derived from the Report on Labour Organization, is not exhaustive. For example, the Hamilton Hydro-Electric Metermen's Association, which appears as a party in a 1933 dispute with the Commission,⁶¹ is not included in the Report.

Union penetration of municipal hydro-electric utilities in Ontario, prior to the 1940s, was the weakest of all the local government sectors examined, with the obvious exception of the police (See Table 3-4). As of 1941, only seven municipal utilities had some portion of their work-force organized. Of the five municipalities with populations in excess of 50,000 people, unions were present only in Toronto, Hamilton and Windsor. The remaining four organizations were found in Guelph, Port William, Port Arthur and St. Thomas. Even this minimal level of penetration is somewhat overstated. Port William and Port Arthur were twin cities in close physical proximity and were both organized by the same I.B.E.W. local,⁶² while the St. Thomas organization was only formed in July 1941. The positive relationship between population size and the incidence of local government unionism appears to be the weakest in this sector.

The calculation of a union membership density estimate is precluded by the absence of both adequate employment⁶³ and union membership data.

3. Municipal Public Transportation Unions

The provision of public transit can only be economically viable if there is a population base of sufficient size and of appropriate concentration to service. As a consequence, public transit systems were relatively few in number during the period under study, being limited mainly to the larger centres. In addition, unlike the other utilities which, with the exception of gas, had been largely assumed by municipal authorities by the early 1920s, the provision of public transit in Ontario remained mixed. In some cases this service was provided by a private firm operating under a franchise granted by the municipality, while in others direct municipal provision was the rule. Both approaches appear to have been equally favoured.⁶⁴ It was only after World War II, in the context of financial difficulties precipitated by inadequate revenues and escalating operating costs, that direct provision became increasingly common.⁶⁵

Evidence of union activity among public transit workers in Ontario can be found as early as 1893.⁶⁶ These bodies were extremely limited in number and did not survive. In the late 1890s, the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America (A.A.S.E.R.E.) began organizing locals in Canada. It quickly became the dominant union working in this area. The Association's predominance was such that, with a few exceptions found mainly in Quebec and Manitoba, an examination of its growth pattern essentially reveals the progression of unionism in public transit. Certainly this was the case in Ontario.

The A.A.S.E.R.E., was founded September 15, 1892.⁶⁷ It was an

American international union affiliated with both the A.F.L. and the T.L.C. The Association adhered to the principles of craft unionism and initially had motormen and conductors as its primary constituency. Bus drivers became increasingly important as the utilization of buses became more common and in 1929 the organization changed its name to the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway, Bus and Coach Employees of America in order to more accurately reflect the changing composition of its membership.⁶⁸ The A.A.S.E.R.E. organized workers in both urban (city and suburbs) and inter-urban transit, with the result that it was not exclusively municipal in nature. There also appears to have been no differentiation between public and private sector employment in the organization of locals. In accordance with the exclusive jurisdiction principle, there were no public transit unions directly chartered by the T.L.C.

Between 1911 and 1941 there was considerable stability in the number of A.A.S.E.R.E. locals in all provinces except Ontario. During this period, Ontario's share fluctuated at between twenty-seven and fifty-seven per cent of the Canadian total. After modest beginnings, in 1916, the number of locals in the province began to increase, peaking at seventeen by 1919. The Association thus shared in the general surge of unionism that characterized the late war and immediate post-war period. Ontario was the only province in which this occurred. After 1919, the number of locals declined steadily throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, until a low of ten was reached in 1935-36. Some modest gains then followed. In terms of membership, only aggregated totals for Canada are available. The Association's membership peaked in 1920 and

thereafter followed the same pattern as the number of locals, also hitting a low point in 1935-36 and then recovering slightly.⁶⁹ Given the stability in the number of locals outside Ontario, it is not unreasonable to attribute much of the decline in aggregate membership to developments in that province.

The A.A.S.E.R.E. faced little in the way of competition from other unions during this period. In the late 1930s, the Transport and General Workers Union of Canada (A.C.C.L.) organized public transit workers in Edmonton and St. Thomas. At its height this union consisted of no more than a handful of scattered locals and did not play a significant role in the organization of public transit workers in Canada.⁷⁰ There were also very small number of independent unions of street railway workers, particularly during the early 1920s. However, by the end of the decade the vast majority of these had either ceased to exist or affiliated with another labour organization.

Prior to the widespread adoption of buses, the principal mode of public transit was the electric street car. This meant that the employer, in addition to requiring personnel to operate the vehicles, also needed electrical workers to maintain the power system. In keeping with the principles of craft unionism it appears that such workers were typically not organized by the A.A.S.E.R.E. as they fell outside its recognized jurisdiction. In the case of the T.T.C. these electrical workers were members of the I.B.E.W. and the C.E.T.U. The Commission inherited both unions when it took over the operations of the Toronto Street Railway and Toronto and York Radial Railway in 1922.⁷¹ A similar situation existed in the jointly owned Port Arthur and Port William

utility, where the electrical workers were organized by the I.B.E.W. Whether this was the case in the majority of public transit systems is difficult to ascertain. Unskilled labourers and office staff were typically unorganized, while shopmen were occasionally members of the appropriate craft unions.⁷²

Unfortunately, employer attitudes toward public transit unions are largely unknown and subject to speculation. Certainly the high level of long-term union activity in this sector, coupled with what in many instances appears to have been a fairly regularized contract negotiation process, suggests that the majority of employers had largely accepted the existence of these organizations. Significantly, the unionization of much of this sector predated the involvement of many public authorities in the direct provision of this service. Hence, in a number of cases in which municipalities assumed responsibility for public transit from the private sector, they also gained a well established local of the Association.

Union penetration of public transit appears to have been substantial for much of the period. This was true, both generally and with respect to municipally owned and operated systems (See Tables 3-4 and 3-9). The limited number of utilities available to be organized and the presence of a strong, fairly aggressive union, were important factors in this level of success. Of the eight municipally owned electric railways reported in existence in 1941,⁷³ only one, the Sudbury, Copper Cliff Suburban, was not unionized. Of the four "bus only" systems identified, only Sault Ste Marie lacked a union.⁷⁴

An estimate of aggregate union membership density for municipal

TABLE 3-9. UNION PENETRATION OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN ONTARIO, 1941

<u>Electric Street Railways.</u>	<u>Union</u>
Fort William Street Railway	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 966 ¹
Kitchener Public Utilities, Street Railway Department	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 1259 ²
London and Port Stanley (Inter-urban)	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 791 ³
North Yonge (Inter-urban)	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 113 ⁴
Port Arthur Civic	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 966 ¹
Sudbury, Copper Cliff Suburban	Not Unionized
Toronto Transit Commission	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 113 ⁵
Township of York and Town of Weston	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 113 ⁴
<u>Bus Only Systems.</u>	
Brantford Public Utilities Commission	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 685 ⁶
Guelph Transportation Commission	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 1189 ⁷
Sault Ste Marie Transportation Commission	Not Unionized
Sandwich, Windsor and Amherstburg (Windsor)	A.A.S.E.R.E., No. 616 ⁸

¹ This organization had a number of A.A.S.E.R.E. predecessors. Local 521 (Port Arthur) was formed in 1909 and contained street railway workers from both Fort William and Port Arthur. At this time the utility was jointly owned by the two municipalities. Local 521 ceased operation in 1914, presumably as a result of a disastrous strike the previous year. In 1916, Local 698 (Fort William) appeared, followed in 1917, by Local 743 (Port Arthur). Both subsequently dissolved in 1920 and 1919 respectively. In 1922, Local 966 (Fort William and Port Arthur) appeared. Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1922; Report of the Department of Labour, 1914, "Detailed List of Trade Disputes in Existence in Canada during 1913"; I.D.I. Act Proceedings, 1913.

² Formed in 1941.

³ Formed in 1917.

TABLE 3-9. UNION PENETRATION OF MUNICIPALLY OWNED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN ONTARIO, 1941 (cont'd)

⁴ Both of these systems were operated for their respective municipal owners by the Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.). As the T.T.C. was organized by the A.A.S.E.R.E., Local 113, it is assumed that unionized workers operated these lines.

⁵ Local 113 was formed in 1899. A.A.S.E.R.E., The Motorman and Conductor 15, 8 (July 1907).

⁶ Formed in 1915.

⁷ Local 796 existed in Guelph from 1918 to 1927, when it was dissolved. In 1938, Local 1189 was formed.

⁸ Formed in 1916.

Sources: Unless otherwise indicated the sources for this table are:
Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1941; I.D.I. Act Proceedings, 1909-1941.

public transit systems in Ontario is precluded by a lack of appropriate statistics. However, membership data is available for the A.A.S.E.R.E., Local 113, in Toronto, in the context of a discussion in the Report on Labour Organization of large union locals. On the basis of 1939 results, the Toronto organization had a membership density of approximately eighty per cent of the operating personnel.⁷⁵ Unfortunately, there is no way of determining whether this was typical of all unionized systems.

4. Municipal Water Works Unions

Unions devoted exclusively to the organization of water works employees appear to have been extremely rare. The Report on Labour Organization notes the existence of only three such bodies during the entire period. Two were found in Winnipeg, while the third functioned briefly in Ottawa in the late 1920s. Discussion will focus solely on the Ontario organization. The Ottawa Water Works Employees' Federal Union, No. 19 (T.L.C.), first appeared in the 1925 Report and was dissolved sometime in 1929.⁷⁶ Indications are that these workers had previously belonged to the Ottawa Civic Employees' Federal Union, No. 15 (T.L.C.), but decided for some reason to form their own organization. Following the dissolution of their local, these workers again became members of the outside worker's union.⁷⁷ Indeed, in those cities in which water works employees were unionized, this was the predominant form of organization.

The only other organization of water works employees to be reported was the Toronto Civic Water Supply Employees' Association. It was classified as a "non-trade union association of wage earners"

indicating some uncertainty as to its labour relations role. Formed in November 1919, its membership consisted of "stationary engineers, electricians, filter, electrical and chlorine operators, oilers, firemen and coal passers, etc."⁷⁸ It was still in existence in 1940.

Conclusions

In the period prior to the emergence of large scale union activity among local government employees, existing union activity was not evenly distributed among the various employee groups. Indeed, there were some sharp contrasts. At one end of the spectrum, with high levels of union penetration, approaching saturation, were the fire fighters and to a lesser degree the public transit workers. Much of this activity dated from the late war and immediate post-war period, although there was also significant fire fighter organizing during the mid to late 1920s. At the other extreme were the police, whose initial experience with unionism appears to have been abortive, and hydro-electric workers for whom union activity was minimal and remained so into the 1940s. General municipal employees fell somewhere in the middle. Union activity by this group was very limited until the mid-1930s when a number of new organizations were formed.

The reasons why local government unionism developed in this fashion are intimately connected to the explanation of subsequent developments. In considering why unionism among general municipal employees and hydro-electrical workers expanded significantly in the 1940s, 50s and 60s, it is also necessary to consider why this did not occur previously.

NOTES

1 Stuart Jamieson, Industrial Relations In Canada, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, 1973),: 18.

2 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66. Study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office, October 1968. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976),: 185.

3 For a history of the O.B.U. see: D. Bercuson, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union (Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1978).

4 Formed in 1886, the T.L.C. was the dominant central labour federation in English Canada until its 1956 merger with the C.C.L to form the Canadian Labour Congress.

5 The C.F.L. existed from 1908 to 1927. The federation was a nationalistic organization which opposed international unionism and its apparent domination of the T.L.C. and its policies. The C.F.L. was never a major force in the Canadian labour movement and had largely ceased to function by the time of its demise.

6 Jamieson, op. cit.,: 19.

7 Ibid.,: 193; Desmond Morton, "The History of the Canadian Labour Movement," in John. C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 162.

8 Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1920-1945. (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization)

9 Ibid, 1918,: 44.

10 I am indebted to Professor Avery, Department of History, University of Western Ontario for this observation.

11 Report on Labour Organization, 1918,: 39, 41-44; Canada, Department of Labour, Report of the Department of Labour for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1919,: 15-16. (hereafter cited as Report of the Department of Labour)

12 Report on Labour Organization. 1921-1940.

13 In its annual survey of associations the Report on Labour Organization in Canada noted the existence of only two police associations in Ontario between 1921 and 1940. They were the Police Association of Hamilton and the Toronto Police Association. While by no means purporting to be complete, the short list, nevertheless, does

suggest that such organizations were not common. Report on Labour Organization, 1921-1940.

14 Ontario, Statutes, The Police Amendment Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 77, s. 10.

15 Report on Labour Organization, 1916,: 220; 1917,: 220; 1918.: 44-45.

16 George J. Richardson, Symbol of Action: A History of the International Association of Fire Fighters, A.P.L.-C.I.O./C.L.C. (New York: International Association of Fire Fighters, 1974),: 6-9, 12.

17 Report on Labour Organization, 1919,: 289.

18 Ibid.,: 1918,: 44.

19 The I.A.F.P. Constitution initially declared that "it shall be deemed inadvisable to strike or take part in strikes as our position is peculiar to most organized workers, as we are formed to protect the lives and property of communities in case of fire or other serious hazards". In 1930, the Constitution was amended and that portion of the strike provision stating that "it shall be deemed inadvisable to strike or take part in strikes" was altered to read "we shall not strike or take part in sympathy strikes". This rule was enforced with some vigour. Richardson, op. cit.,: 13, 125, 149.

20 Report on Labour Organization, 1920-1940

21 Ibid., 1923.

22 Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Report of Proceedings of the 36th Annual Convention, Windsor, September 13-18, 1920,: 166-167; Richardson, op. cit.,: 73, 93-94.

23 Report on Labour Organization, 1936,: 176.

24 Ibid., 1928, 1929, 1935,: 164; 1936,: 177.

25 Richardson, op. cit., 150.

26 Report on Labour Organization, 1937,: 64.

27 Ibid., 1942,: 64.

28 Union penetration is the extent to which a particular sector is organized. In the case of fire fighters, the assumption is that there is a certain threshold necessary, in terms of the population of the municipality, before it is viable to employ a full-time, professional fire department.

29 York, East York, Scarborough and Teck Townships had populations of 81,052, 41,821, 24,303 and 20,410 respectively in 1941.

30 Union membership density refers to the proportion of a particular constituency that are union members.

31 Report on Labour Organization, 1918,: 45.

32 The National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers (N.O.C.U.E.W.), affiliated with the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.), was formed in December 1944. It was not until 1955 that the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) chartered the rival National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.).

33 The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (A.F.S.C.M.E.) held its founding convention in December 1935 and was granted an American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) charter in 1936. In 1937, the rival Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) chartered the State, County and Municipal Workers of America (S.C.M.W.A.). Hugh O'Neill, "The Growth of Municipal Employee Unions," Unionization of Municipal Employees: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science XXX, No. 2 (1970),: 6-8.

34 The A.F.L. direct charters in Ontario were the Civic Employees' Federal Union, no. 16208 in Hamilton and the City and County Public Service Employees' Federal Union, no. 16915 in St. Thomas.

35 The Toronto Civic Employees' Benevolent Union, no. 1, was formed in 1885. In 1894, it was joined by the Civic Employees' Benevolent Union, no. 2. The former continued until 1915, while the demise of the latter apparently occurred prior to 1911 and was unreported. In addition, turn of the century union activity among municipal employees was reported in Hamilton and Kingston. Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette (February 1902).

36 Report on Labour Organization, 1916-1919.

37 Ibid., 1918,: 45.

38 Ibid., 1921-1941.

39 Ibid., 1940,: 247.

40 Ibid., 1918,: 46. A "craft" union is a union "which organizes on the principle of limiting membership to some specific craft or skill, i.e, electricians, plumbers, etc. ..." Canadian Labour Congress, "Notes on Unions, 5 Glossary of Labour Terms," (Ottawa: The Canadian Labour Congress, undated).

41 Report of the Department of Labour, March 31, 1919, "Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907: Twelfth Report of Proceedings, being

for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1919". (hereafter cited as I.D.I. Act Proceedings)

42 Michael A. Mulcaire, The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers: A Study in Trade Union Structure and Functions (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1923),: 11.

43 The I.B.E.W.'s claimed jurisdiction included "all persons engaged in the manufacture, installation, maintenance, assembly and operation of all electrical devices by which electric power is generated, utilized or controlled". This was subject to a number of specific exclusions where the work involved was deemed to fall within the jurisdiction of another union. For example, the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America had jurisdiction over the operators of street and elevated railways, even though these vehicles were typically powered by electricity. Ibid.,: 23.

44 Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Monopolies Moment: The Organization and Regulation of Canadian Utilities 1830-1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986),: 226.

45 The Hamilton Hydro-Electric Employees' Association, No. 7 (T.L.C.) was a directly chartered local of the Congress and thus appears to be a contravention of the exclusive jurisdiction principle. If, however, this organization consisted of inside workers, as its name suggests, then they would not have fallen under the jurisdiction of the I.B.E.W. as it existed during this time period. Lacking an electrical "craft" or "trade", they would have been ineligible for I.B.E.W. membership.

46 Armstrong and Nelles, op. cit.,: 226.

47 Report on Labour Organization, 1911-1941. The I.B.E.W. has no records indicating when a particular Ontario municipal hydro-electric utility was first organized by one of their locals. They can only provide information as to when a particular local number was first chartered. The Union's practice of organizing mixed locals consisting of both public and private sector employees coupled with the fact that, during this period, it was primarily a private sector organization, makes this information of little use. The extent of I.B.E.W. organizing activity in municipal hydro-electric utilities was determined from I.D.I. Act Proceedings and by contacting individual municipal hydro-electric authorities. In several instances both the employer and the union local were uncertain as to when the utility had first been organized.

48 In 1927, the remnants of the C.F.L. joined with Canadian Brotherhood of Railway employees to form the All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.). As its name suggests the A.C.C.L. was extremely nationalistic in outlook. The Congress failed to survive the great depression succumbing to internal dissention in the late 1930s. In

1940, its members joined with Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) affiliates, newly expelled from the T.L.C., to form the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.). This body continued until 1956 when it merged with the T.L.C. to form the Canadian Labour Congress.

49 Report on Labour Organization, 1920,: 126; 1922,: 47. Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, File 13, National Union of Public Service Employees. A.M. Barnetson, "An Early Brief History of the CRTU Formation," 1965,: 1-2.

50 Report on Labour Organization, 1920,: 162; 1922,: 47; 1923,: 82.

51 Barnetson, "An Early Brief History," : 3-4. In his 1965 history of the C.E.T.U. formation Barnetson cites 1924 as the year of the Union's founding convention as a national organization. However, a number of other sources, including the Report on Labour Organization, 1922 and the Canadian Electrical Trades Union, Year Book 1924 (Toronto: C.E.T.U., Grand Executive Board, 1924) indicate that this, in fact, occurred in 1922.

52 An industrial union is a union "which organizes on the principle of including all workers from one industry, regardless of their craft or whether they are skilled or unskilled". Canadian Labour Congress, "Notes on Unions," op. cit.

53 Ontario Hydro Archives, Memo. to Mr. Murray McCrimmon, Re: "Canadian Electrical Trades Union - #3(g)," November 16, 1934. The memo contains an excerpt from the minutes of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario meeting held on November 13, 1934 and covers a presentation made to the Commission by representatives of the C.E.T.U.

54 In 1929, the C.E.T.U. reported a total of eleven locals. Three were in Quebec, four in Ontario and two in Alberta. The remaining two were located in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Report on Labour Organization, 1929.

55 Ibid., 1920-1941.

56 The C.E.T.U. suffered a major disruption in its leadership in 1935 when the Union's Secretary, G.W. McCollum, who was also a member of the All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.) executive, became embroiled in a dispute between the executive and A.R. Mosher, the A.C.C.L. President. Following litigation Mosher emerged in control of the Congress and several of the organization's former executive, including McCollum, left to resurrect the Canadian Federation of Labour. McCollum apparently attempted to lead the C.E.T.U. out of the A.C.C.L. and into the new organization, but was unsuccessful. The C.E.T.U. subsequently requested his resignation as Secretary. For

details of the dispute and its resolution see: A.C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist (September 1936),: 1, 99-100, 106, (October 1936),: 112; (March 1937),: 245-247; (April 1937),: 292; The Labour Gazette (August 1936),: 680; (October 1936),: 858; (November 1936),: 977; (March 1937),: 307. Correspondence between the Toronto local of the C.E.T.U. and the A.C.C.L. executive, in 1937-38, indicates that communications between the various locals of the union broke down in the mid-1930s. Although no reason for this occurrence is provided, it is very likely that the A.C.C.L. dispute played at least some role. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 60, file 9, Canadian Electrical Trades Union, No. 1 (Toronto) 1937-1939. A.R. Mosher, President, A.C.C.L. to A.M. Barnetson, President, C.E.T.U., No. 1, August 31, 1937; A.M. Barnetson to N.S. Dowd, Secretary-Treasurer, A.C.C.L., January 6, 1938.

57 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 60, file 10, Canadian Electrical Trades Union, No. 1 (Toronto) 1940. Memo., C.E.T.U. to A.C.C.L., for the Canadian Unionist, Re: C.E.T.U., Local 1 (Toronto), "First General Meeting for 1940, held January 11, 1940," January 17, 1940.

58 The second C.E.T.U. branch in Toronto was created in 1924 when the Canadian Street Railway Employees' Union, Local 1 (Toronto) joined the C.E.T.U. This organization had formed in 1921 and represented certain of the motormen and conductors in the employ of the Toronto Transit Commission. C.E.T.U., Year Book 1924,: 17.

59 Ibid.,: 13; Information concerning the I.B.E.W. was provided by R.E. Livingston, Personnel Manager, Hamilton Hydro-Electric System, May 27, 1986.

60 Report on Labour Organization, 1931-1938.

61 I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1933,: 36.

62 A single local of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees also represented the employees of the two transit systems. For a history of the provision of hydro-electric power in Fort William and Port Arthur see: A.W.H. Taber, Electricity and Fort William: History of the Development of Electricity in the City of Fort William 1898-1967 (Fort William: Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Fort William, 1967) and R.B. Chandler, History of Public Utilities Commission: Electric Department, Port Arthur for Ontario Hydro Centennial Project "Hall of Memory" (Port Arthur: Port Arthur Public Utilities Commission, 1966).

63 A comprehensive list of municipal hydro-electric utilities does not become available until the early 1980s. See: Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Municipal Directory, 1983 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1983),: 189-208.

64 The primary source of ownership information was: D.B.S.,

Electric Railways, 1922-1941. Additional information was obtained from the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board, Report of the Railway and Municipal Board, 1906-1931 and the Ontario Municipal Board, The Report of the Ontario Municipal Board, 1932-1944.

65 Electric Railways, 1951,: 6.

66 On November 30, 1893 The Toronto Street Railway Employees' Union and Benefit Fund registered under the provisions of the Trades Union Act, 1872. By 1921, only twenty labour organizations had done so. Report on Labour Organization, 1921.

67 Miles E. Hoffman, A Contemporary Analysis of a Labor Union. Development, Structure, Function: Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric and Motor Coach Employees of America (A.F.L.-C.I.O./C.L.C.) (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1962),: 5.

68 Report on Labour Organization, 1929. In 1935, a further name change to the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America was reported. Report on Labour Organization, 1935.

69 Ibid.,: 1911-1940.

70 The union organized a "street railway unit" in Edmonton and a "civic transport and general workers unit" in St. Thomas. The Canadian Unionist (December 1939), "Directory."; The St. Thomas organization consisted of both municipal and private sector workers. It was formed in 1937 and dissolved in 1939. Report on Labour Organization, 1937-1939.

71 In addition to the members of the A.A.S.E.R.E., the Commission also had to bargain with electrical workers organized by the C.E.T.U. and the I.B.E.W. The latter represented certain linemen, troublemen and truckdrivers. I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1935,: 41. (This references only that part of the note regarding the I.B.E.W.'s constituency in the T.T.C.).

72 Armstrong and Nelles, op. cit.,: 226.

73 Electric Railways, 1941,: 5

74 Report on Labour Organization, 1941.

75 Ibid., 1939,: 213.

76 Ibid., 1925-1929.

77 I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1917.

78 Report on Labour Organization, 1939,: 243.

CHAPTER 4

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONISM IN ONTARIO 1935-1963

Introduction

During the 1920s the labour movement in Canada and the United States lost ground in terms of union membership, bargaining power and overall militancy¹ (See Table 4-1). This decline continued into the next decade and reached truly disastrous proportions during the worst of the Great Depression in the early 1930s. With the main stream of the labour movement on the verge of disintegration in both countries, most of the serious union organizing undertaken at this time was done by the communists. In Canada, government fear of communist subversion and revolution precipitated the introduction of a number of repressive measures.²

In 1935, a dramatic turnabout in the fortunes of the labour movement began to occur. Two major developments in the United States were largely responsible. The first was the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, which provided considerable support for union organizing efforts. The full impact of this legislation was not, however, felt until 1937, when the constitutionality of the Act was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. The second contributing factor was the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization, latter the Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.). The Committee initially existed as a group of ten unions within the rubric of the American

TABLE 4-1. UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL PAID WORKERS FOR CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1921-1964¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>United States</u>
1921	16.0%	N/A ²
1922	13.6%	N/A
1923	13.2%	N/A
1924	12.2%	N/A
1925	12.3%	N/A
1926	12.0%	N/A
1927	12.1%	N/A
1928	12.1%	N/A
1929	12.6%	N/A
1930	13.1%	11.6%
1931	15.3%	12.4%
1932	15.3%	12.9%
1933	16.7%	11.3%
1934	14.6%	11.9%
1935	14.5%	13.2%
1936	16.2%	13.7%
1937	18.2%	22.6%
1938	18.4%	27.5%
1939	17.3%	28.6%
1940	16.3%	26.9%
1941	18.0%	27.9%
1942	20.6%	25.9%
1943	22.7%	31.1%
1944	24.3%	33.8%
1945	24.2%	35.5%
1946	27.9%	34.5%
1947	29.1%	33.7%
1948	30.3%	31.9%
1949	29.5%	32.6%
1950	28.4% ³	31.5%
1951	30.2%	33.3%
1952	33.0%	32.5%
1953	33.8%	33.7%
1954	33.7%	34.7%
1955	33.3%	33.2%
1956	32.4%	33.4%
1957	34.2%	32.8%
1958	33.3%	33.2%
1959	32.3%	32.1%
1960	31.6%	31.4%
1961	30.2%	30.2%
1962	29.8%	29.8%
1963	29.4%	29.2%
1964	29.7%	28.9%

TABLE 4-1. UNION MEMBERSHIP AS A PERCENTAGE OF NON-AGRICULTURAL PAID WORKERS FOR CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, 1921-1964 (cont'd)

¹ The two series are not strictly comparable due to the different sources and methodologies employed in their construction. They should, therefore, be viewed as providing a general overview of comparative trends and developments in Canada and the United States, rather than a rigorous statistical comparison.

² Excludes Canadian members of international unions.

³ In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada, on which this series is based, changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of that year and this practice was continued with all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the Canadian series as well as in relation to the American results, the original method was continued. The results from the 1951 Report on Labour Organization in Canada are listed under 1950. The same adjustment was made in all subsequent years.

Source: Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organizations in Canada, 1972, : xxii-xxiii (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the U.S., Colonial Times to 1970: Bicentennial Edition, Part 1. (Washington D.C., 1975), : Series D 946-951, : 178.

Federation of Labour (A.F.L.). Aided in large part by the Wagner Act, these unions were able to make significant organizational gains in both the main primary and mass production industries. The group was expelled from the A.F.L. and subsequently established its own federation, the C.I.O., in 1937. By the end of the decade, American union membership had more than doubled, relative to its lowest point during the worst of the Depression in the early 1930, and exceeded previous record levels set in 1920-21.³

These developments had a significant demonstration effect on unionism in Canada. Despite the absence of favourable labour legislation, the general hostility of provincial regimes, particularly in Ontario and Quebec, and the failure of the federal government to introduce a Canadian "New Deal", union membership also began to grow rapidly in Canada during this same period, although not as quickly as in the United States.⁴ Much of this activity was due to the organizing efforts of C.I.O. unions among Canadian workers. This momentum was temporarily lost at the end of the decade as the severe economic downturn and increased unemployment of 1938, coupled with new divisions within the labour movement, collectively took their toll.⁵

Aggregate union growth in Canada accelerated once more during World War II. Full employment and labour shortages in key war industries, plus the tensions generated by substantial government involvement in the regulation of the economy and employment relationships were all favourable to the expansion of unionism. The accumulated grievances of the previous decade provided a solid foundation for union growth. Union membership grew rapidly. Strike

activity also increased at an alarming rate. In many of these disputes, the refusal of the employer to recognize the union was a central issue. The seriousness of this problem was compounded by the fact that these disputes were increasingly concentrated in crucial war industries. In 1943, the level of job action peaked and the situation reached crisis proportions. Early in 1944, the federal government responded with Order in Council P.C. 1003: Wartime Labour Relations Regulations. This Order suspended the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907 (I.D.I. Act) and either revoked or modified a number of previous Orders in Council pertaining to labour relations. P.C. 1003 combined the traditional Canadian concern with dispute resolution, as embodied in the I.D.I. Act, with the collective bargaining principles of the Wagner Act. This initiative produced the desired reduction in the level of strikes in 1944 and 1945 and also provided considerable assistance to further union growth and collective bargaining.⁶ With the return to peace time conditions in 1947, P.C. 1003 served as the model for most post-War labour relations legislation. Aided by supportive public policy and significant economic expansion, unionism continued to grow over the remainder of the decade.⁷ Canadian labour relations policy and, in particular, its significance for the emergence of unionism among local government employees, is discussed in detail in Chapter 8.

In the 1950s, aggregate union growth sputtered and then stalled. Jamieson argues that certain parallels exist between the 1950s and the 1920s, or more specifically, between 1952-59 and 1922-29. He characterizes the 1950s as a time of stability and growth, widespread optimism, complacency and conservatism. Significant economic growth was

reflected in almost uninterrupted increases in total output, income and employment, although the level of unemployment also increased. This mirrored similar developments in the 1920s. In this environment the labour movement "stagnated", but without the disastrous consequences of the earlier period. After relatively steady growth, but at a progressively declining rate, unionism in both Canada and the United States "plateaued" in the mid-1950s. Despite continued growth in economic output and employment, union membership remained static and union membership density, after peaking at about thirty-three per cent, began to fall. Jamieson contends that unionism had reached saturation levels, in that virtually all the workers that could be organized under the existing regime had been organized. He estimates that two-thirds or more of those remaining outside the labour movement were employed in either small or isolated enterprises, which typically made it uneconomical for a union to attempt to organize them. More important, however, was the difficulty experienced in making inroads among the large and ever increasing numbers of white collar workers. He concludes that, just as in the 1920s, organized labour in the 1950s was the "prisoner" of an outmoded organizational structure. Having highlighted several of the main parallels between the 1920s and 1950s, Jamieson cautions against exaggerating the true extent of these similarities. The two periods, in fact, differ quite fundamentally in terms of the position of the labour movement and the general state of the economy.⁸

By the early 1960s, union membership density had fallen below thirty per cent and it was only in 1966 that this level was again exceeded. The main reason for this increase was the extension of

collective bargaining rights to public employees at both the federal and provincial level.⁹

In Ontario, the overall pattern of union growth in general employment and the municipal utilities generally corresponds to aggregate developments in Canadian unionism up to the mid-1950s. In public transit union saturation had, by and large, already been reached and hence the pattern here differs somewhat. In the 1950s, while the labour movement as a whole languished, unionism among local government employees in Ontario, and indeed elsewhere in Canada, made significant organizational gains. It was also a period of union building, which saw the creation of rival national unions and culminated in their merger and the creation of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) in 1963. This chapter outlines the empirical aspects of this growth in Ontario and highlights its main features.

1. Municipal Employment

a. Police Associations

While an examination of collective action by municipal police in Ontario is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to briefly note the extent of associational formation and bargaining by police during the period under study (See Table 4-2). The true magnitude of police organization is significantly understated due to substantial omissions in the available data. By 1947, however, it had achieved sufficient proportions to justify an amendment to the Police Act, to provide a procedure for the orderly establishment of bargaining rights by police associations and to require compulsory association recognition and collective bargaining by the employer.¹⁰

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Population Category¹</u>			
Over 100,000:			
Number of urban municipalities:	4	4	5
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	2(50%)	4(80%)
Fire Fighter unions	4(100%)	4(100%)	5(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	4(100%)	3(75%)	5(100%)
Inside workers	1(25%)	2(50%)	5(100%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	3(75%)	3(75%)	5(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(40%)
Public Transit unions	4(100%)	4(100%)	5(100%)
Number of townships:	0	1	4
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	1(100%)	4(100%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	1(100%)	4(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	4(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	3(75%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	4(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	2(50%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	N/A	4(100%) ³
50,000 - 99,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	1	1	7
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	1(100%)	4(57%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(100%)	1(100%)	7(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	1(100%)	1(100%)	7(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	4(57%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	6(86%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(100%)	1(14%)

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Population Category¹</u>			
50,000 - 99,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Public Transit unions	1(100%)	1(100%)	6(86%)
Number of townships:	1	4	2
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	2(50%)	1(50%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(100%)	3(75%)	2(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	1(100%)	4(100%)	2(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	2(50%)	2(100%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(25%)	2(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	N/A	N/A	1(50%) ³
25,000 - 49,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	10	13	12
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	5(38%)	4(33%)
Fire Fighter unions	10(100%)	13(100%)	11(93%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	3(30%)	13(100%)	12(100%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	5(38%)	5(42%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	1(10%)	10(77%)	8(67%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	4(33%)
Public Transit unions	6(60%)	8(62%)	7(58%)
Number of townships:	1	1	3
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	1(33%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(100%)	0(0%)	1(33%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(67%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(33%)

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Population Category¹</u>			
25,000 - 49,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	2(67%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	N/A	N/A	1(33%) ⁴
10,000 - 24,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:			
	17	22	30
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	9(41%)	22(73%)
Fire Fighter unions	16(94%)	18(82%)	17(57%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	3(18%)	11(55%)	23(77%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	2(9%)	6(20%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	3(18%)	5(23%)	18(60%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	3(18%)	3(14%) ⁴	8(27%) ^{3,5,6}
Number of townships:			
	8	16	19
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	1(6%)	1(5%)
Fire Fighter unions	2(25%)	1(6%)	2(11%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	1(13%)	1(6%)	4(21%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(6%)	2(11%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(6%)	2(11%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(11%)
Public Transit unions	N/A	1(6%)	1(5%)
5,000 - 9,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:			
	32	33	40

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO. BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY. 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Population Category¹</u>			
5,000 - 9,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	4(10%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	6(18%)	8(20%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	1(3%)	7(21%)	16(40%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(3%)	2(5%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	6(18%)	13(28%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(3%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(5%) ³
Number of townships:	23	30	53
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(2%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	2(7%)	5(9%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	2(7%)	3(6%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
2,500 - 4,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	45	51	56
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	1(2%)	N/A
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(2%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	2(4%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(2%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	13(23%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

	Year		
	1941	1951	1961
Population Category¹			
2,500-4,999 (cont'd):			
Number of townships:	121	120	117
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	N/A
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	2(2%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
1,000 - 2,499:			
Number of urban municipalities:	101	97	101
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	N/A
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	2(2%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	3(3%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Number of townships:	229	228	244
Number with:			
Police associations ²	N/A	0(0%)	N/A
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

Total number of urban and rural municipalities organized by:			
Police associations ²	N/A	22	45
Fire Fighter unions	35	49 ⁷	62 ⁸
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	14	45	80 ⁹
Inside workers	1	18	33 ⁹
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	7	29	76
Inside workers	0	1	16
Public Transit unions	14	17	35

¹ Municipalities were sorted using population data from the Census of Canada.

² Union penetration by police associations is based on information reported by the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in their annual survey of wages and conditions of employment. The 1951 results are based on the Federation's January 31, 1953 report, while the 1961 results were derived from the 1956 report. The result is an overstatement of union penetration in 1951 and an understatement of it in 1961. In addition, the data contained in the surveys is not comprehensive with a substantial number of municipalities being omitted. The union penetration among municipal police is, therefore, likely substantially understated.

³ On January 1, 1954 the Toronto Transit Commission assumed responsibility for all public transit provision in Metropolitan Toronto. The following municipalities were serviced: Over 100,000: City of Toronto, Townships of Etobicoke, Scarborough, York and North York; 50,000 - 99,999: Township of East York; 10,000 - 24,999: Towns of Leaside, Mimico and New Toronto, Villages of Forest Hill and Longbranch; 5,000 - 9,999: Town of Weston, Village of Swansea.

⁴ The Township of Stamford was serviced by the Greater Niagara Transit Commission.

⁵ The Town of Eastview, later the City of Eastview was serviced by the Ottawa Transit Commission.

⁶ The City of Waterloo was serviced by the Kitchener Public Utilities Commission under the provisions of a special act.

⁷ The I.A.F.F. had fifty locals in Ontario in 1951. Their local in

TABLE 4-2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

"La Cave" could not be matched to a municipality and hence was excluded from the tally of municipalities organized by the union.

⁸ In 1961, there were sixty-eight locals in existence. However, beginning with its 1959 issue, the Report on Labour Organization in Canada ceased providing a detailed list of the location of union locals. From 1959 on, only the total number of locals by province was reported. Union penetration for 1961 is, therefore, based on the 1958 Report, which the last year such a list was available. These results appear in Table 4-3. Of the sixty-nine locals in existence in that year, both Port Arthur and Deep River each had two. A single employing municipality was assumed in each case reducing the number of unionized municipalities to sixty-seven. In addition, locals in Barriefield, Camp Borden, Camp Petawawa, Collins Bay and Minaki could not be matched to municipalities and were excluded. This reduced the final estimate of unionized municipalities to sixty-two.

⁹ Union penetration is slightly understated slightly due to omissions in the N.U.P.S.E. data.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1964; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1941-1950; C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1940-1943; Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 84, file 1, Vol. 94, files 1-2, 5-6. Canadian Congress of Labour: Directly Chartered Locals, Vol. 134, files 9-22. Canadian Congress of Labour: Membership 1943-1956, Vol. 7, file 16, A.A.S.E.R.E.: Lawrence O'Connell, V.P., A.A.S.E.R.E. to Percy Bengough, Pres., T.L.C., May 14, 1946; file 18, A.A.S.E.R.E.: Earl Breneman, Pres. and Business Agent, A.A.S.E.R.E., Div. 1259, Kitchener to Percy Bengough, Pres., T.L.C., March 17, 1949; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11. National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963, Vol. 1, files 9-14. National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organization Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964; Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Municipal Employees Wage and Salary Survey and Conditions of Employment, 1953, 1956.

b. Fire Fighter Unions¹¹

During the mid to late 1940s and 1950s, the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) continued its strong organizing performance of the previous two decades. The number of Canadian locals under charter increased from forty-eight, in 1941, to 140 by 1963. Over the same period the proportion accounted for by Ontario decreased from seventy-three to fifty per cent. This suggests that the union's growth, during this period, was much more broadly distributed across Canada than had historically been the case.

In Ontario, the Association enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the organization of fire fighters, with no evidence of the overt organizational divisiveness of the 1920s and early 1930s. The number of I.A.F.F. locals in the province increased from thirty-five in 1941 to seventy in 1963 (See Table 4-3). Interestingly, between 1939 and 1944, new organizing appears to have ground to a halt as evidenced by the absence of new local formation.¹² Beginning in 1944, some modest growth occurred, but these gains, and those over the rest of the decade, were small. During the 1950s, the pace of new local formation quickened and most of the increase in the total number of locals took place during these years. This trend continued until the late 1950s, when the number of locals under charter again stabilized. The level of organizational mortality among I.A.F.F. locals was never really significant. Of the forty-one unions formed between 1944 and 1957, only seven failed at some point during that time.

Although union penetration and membership density both approached saturation levels by the early 1940s, the union was able to sustain its

TABLE 4-3. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS: NUMBER OF LOCALS AND MEMBERSHIP IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>Locals</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Members</u>
	<u>Number Formed</u>	<u>Number Dissolved</u>		
1935	2	0	10	N/A
1936	14 ¹	0	24	1,586
1937	8 ¹	0	32	1,768
1938	2	0	34	1,870
1939	1	0	35	1,760
1940	0	0	35	1,776
1941	0	0	35	1,821
1942	0	0	35	1,215
1943	0	0	35	1,760
1944	2	0	37	1,771
1945	1	0	38	1,742
1946	1	0	39	2,286
1947	3	0	42	2,844
1948	1	0	43	2,700
1949	2	0	45	2,803
1950 ²	4	1	48	N/A
1951	2	0	50	N/A
1952	3	0	53	N/A
1953	4	1	56	N/A
1954	7	0	63	N/A
1955	2	1	64	N/A
1956	3	1	66	N/A
1957	6	3	69	N/A
1958 ³	N/A	N/A	70	N/A
1959	N/A	N/A	72	N/A
1960	N/A	N/A	71	N/A
1961	N/A	N/A	68	N/A
1962	N/A	N/A	70	N/A
1963	N/A	N/A	70	N/A

¹ These locals were formerly members of the Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters. They technically dissolved, surrendering both their federation charters and local numbers, and became chartered locals of the I.A.F.F.

² In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada was changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. The contexts of the 1949 Report were theoretically as of December 31, 1949. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of the year (January 1, 1951), as were all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the series, as well as with other data sources, the original format was continued.

TABLE 4-3. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS: NUMBER OF LOCALS AND MEMBERSHIP IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963 (cont'd)

The statistics contained in the 1951 Report are listed under 1950. The same procedure was followed with all succeeding years.

³ Beginning with its 1959 issue, the Report on Labour Organizaiton in Canada ceased providing a detailed listing of the geographic locations of union locals. From 1959 on, only the total number of locals by province were reported. Local formation and dissolution cannot, therefore, continue to be documented using this source.

Source: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1964.

momentum by capitalizing on new organizing opportunities created by the rapidly expanding population and resultant increase in the number of full-time, professional fire departments. With the exception of the early 1940s, when the War visibly dampened unionism, the I.A.F.F.'s growth pattern may have been strongly influenced by the availability, or lack thereof, of full-time fire departments to organize. Penetration of small municipalities was restricted by their general preference for volunteer fire brigades. In the late 1950s, the I.A.F.F. also organized a few locals consisting of fire fighters employed by other levels of government. Union penetration in 1961 was actually slightly less for certain of the medium sized classes of municipalities than had previously been the case (See Table 4-2). This appears to have resulted from a slight increase in some of the categories, caused by the upward mobility of many municipalities in the classification, and the apparent inability of new organizing to keep pace.

Union membership density remained extremely high throughout the entire period (See Table 4-4). This success was not limited to Ontario, but extended across both Canada and the United States. In 1956, the Secretary-Treasurer of the I.A.F.F. estimated that the Association had organized approximately eighty-five per cent of all fire fighters eligible for membership in both countries. He noted that this was accomplished despite the fact that the I.A.F.F. had never fielded a single paid organizer and since its creation in 1918, only the President and Secretary-Treasurer had ever been paid an annual salary.¹³

c. General Municipal Employee Unions

Beginning in the mid-1930s, the number of unions of municipal

**TABLE 4-4. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG FIRE FIGHTERS IN ONTARIO.
1941, 1951, 1961**

	<u>YEAR</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
Number of union members	1,821 (actual)	2,803 (1949)	4,000 (estimated ¹)
Number of fire fighters	1,878 (actual)	3,284 (actual)	4,640 (actual)
Membership density	<u>97%</u>	<u>85%</u>	<u>85%</u>

¹ Estimated using data from J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in the Sixties (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1975),: 122-123, 174, 176.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1941, 1952; Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.), Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. VII, Table 21; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 23; 1961, Vol. III, Part 3, Bulletin 3.2-14, Table 15; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in the Sixties (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1975).

employees, in Ontario, slowly started to increase (See Table 4-5). These gains were modest with up to three new unions forming in most years. This pattern continued into the 1940s. Initially, this phenomenon was largely unique to Ontario and it was only in the 1940s that the number of municipal unions also began to increase elsewhere in Canada. In 1944-45, municipal union formation in Ontario increased significantly relative to previous levels. The actual number of new unions, however, remained rather small. This late war surge in organizing activity matched broader developments in the labour movement as a whole. Following the war, moderate growth continued, although slightly in excess of pre-war levels. In the 1950s, the pace again quickened and remained heightened for most of the decade. The number of municipal unions formed during this period easily surpassed the organizational gains of the previous fifteen years. The 1950s thus emerge as a time of significant union organizing in general municipal employment. The rate of new union formation slowed somewhat in the early 1960s. Overall, the number of municipal unions increased from a mere nine, in 1935, to over fifty by 1951. Ten years later, in 1961, there were more than 100 in existence.

Until the 1950s, the vast majority of these organizations were directly chartered locals of the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (T.L.C.). Almost all eventually became members of the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.), after its creation in 1955. The N.U.P.E. remained the largest single union of municipal employees in Canada until the formation of the C.U.P.E., in 1963. Some municipal unions were also organized by the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) and by

TABLE 4-5. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN ONTARIO, BY AFFILIATION, 1935-1963

Year	T.L.C./ N.U.P.E. ¹	C.C.L./ N.U.P.S.E. ²	Others ³	Independents	Total
1935	8	0 (1)	N/A	N/A	9
1936	9	0 (1)	N/A	N/A	10
1937	8	0 (3)	N/A	N/A	11
1938	10	0 (4)	N/A	N/A	14
1939	10	0 (2)	N/A	N/A	12
1940	11	0 (0)	N/A	1	12
1941	11	0 (2)	N/A	1	14
1942	15	0 (1)	N/A	1	17
1943	16	0 (3)	1	1	21
1944	20	0 (6)	N/A	1	27
1945	25	7 (3)	N/A	N/A	32
1946	26	7 (3)	1	N/A	33
1947	30	8 (3)	2	N/A	40
1948	31	9 (2)	2	N/A	42
1949	29	10 (2)	2	N/A	41
1950	34	9 (2)	2	N/A	45
1951	N/A	13 (3)	2	2	N/A
1952	N/A	16 (2)	4	N/A	N/A
1953	N/A	19 (2)	1	N/A	N/A
1954	N/A	23 (1)	1	N/A	N/A
1955	48	26 (0)	2	0	76
1956	51	27 (0)	7	0	85
1957	51	38 (0)	8	0	97
1958	55	N/A	9	N/A	N/A
1959	59	40 (0)	10	N/A	109
1960	61	44 (0)	8	N/A	113
1961	63	N/A	6	N/A	N/A
1962	64	N/A	6	N/A	N/A
1963	64	N/A	6	N/A	N/A

¹ The results for 1935-1950 are for T.L.C. directly chartered locals only. Those for 1956-1963 are for N.U.P.E. chartered locals only. By 1957, all former T.L.C. directly chartered municipal unions in Ontario had joined the N.U.P.E. Data is unavailable for 1951-1954 inclusive.

² The number shown is the total number of N.U.P.S.E. et. al. chartered and C.C.L. et. al. directly chartered locals combined. The bracketed figure indicates only the number of directly chartered locals.

³ The number of "other" unions is understated. Unless proof existed that a particular union continued to exist, it was dropped from the count the year after its formation.

TABLE 4-5. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE UNIONS IN ONTARIO, BY AFFILIATION,
1935-1963 (cont'd)

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1958; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1941-1950; C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1940-1943; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 84, file 1, Vol. 94, files 1-2, 5-6. Canadian Congress of Labour: Directly Chartered Locals, Vol. 134, files 9-22. Canadian Congress of Labour: Membership 1943-1956,; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11. National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963, Vol. 1, files 9-14. National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organization Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

its affiliate the National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers (N.O.C.U.E.W.), although this group played only a minor role prior to 1950. During the 1950s, the N.O.C.U.E.W., and its successor, the National Union of Public Service Employees (N.U.P.S.E.), formed in 1952, organized a significant number of municipalities. By the time the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E. merged to form the C.U.P.E., the differential between them, at least in terms of the number of locals under charter, had diminished considerably. In addition to these two major groups, other unions occasionally organized small groups of municipal employees (See Table 4-6).

The number of independent organizations of municipal employees, in Ontario, also appears to have been quite small (See Table 4-7). Generally, they functioned for only a very limited period of time. A major problem with this type of body is determining the extent to which they were bona fide employee organizations, merely disaffected with the labour movement, as opposed to being "company unions" or some other form of employer sponsored worker representation plan.

Just under one-third of all T.L.C./N.U.P.E. unions in existence between 1935 and 1963 failed during that same period (See Table 4-8). The mortality rate for the C.C.L./N.U.P.S.E. group was slightly lower, at roughly twenty per cent. A disproportionate number of these failures occurred prior to 1950. Between 1935 and 1949, roughly thirty-five per cent of all T.L.C. and forty-five per cent of all C.C.L./N.O.C.U.E.W. unions failed. In a few instances, inter-congress competition and raiding were responsible, but these were the exception rather than the rule. This stands in sharp contrast to the post-1950 scores of

TABLE 4-6. OTHER UNIONS ORGANIZING MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO,
1940-1963

<u>Union name, local number and affiliation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
International Union of Operating Engineers, No. 700,	City of Hamilton (operating engineers)	1943?	N/A
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, No. 796 (A.F.L.)	City of Sarnia (outside)	1944	1961
Hamilton Municipal Unit 1 of the Federation of Employee Professional Engineers and Assistants	City of Hamilton (prof. engineers)	1947	1953?
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, No. N/A,	Town of N/A (outside)	1952	N/A
Sudbury and District General Workers' Union, No. 902, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers	City of Sudbury (arena & community centre)	1952	N/A
Sudbury and District General Workers' Union, No. 902, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers	Town of Coniston (outside)	1955	N/A
International Union of Operating Engineers, No. 944	City of Windsor (stationary engineers)	1956	N/A
United Steelworkers of America	City of St. Catharines (outside)	1956	1960
Building Service Employees International Union, No. 268	City of Fort William (arena)	1956	N/A

**TABLE 4-6. OTHER UNIONS ORGANIZING MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO,
1940-1963 (cont'd)**

<u>Union name, local number and affiliation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
International Union of Operating Engineers, No. 796	Metro. Toronto (stationary engineers)	1956	1960
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 911 (successor union)	Town of Amherstburg (unknown)	1956	Now I.B.E.W. 636
Sudbury and District General Workers' Union, No. 902, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers	United Townships of Neelan and Garson (outside)	1957	N/A
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, No. 990	Township of Keewatin (outside)	1957	Still exists
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, No. 880	Essex County (roads)	1957	Still exists
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, No. 1730	Town of Dryden (outside) (inside) (water)	1958	Still exists
United Steel workers of America	Grantham Township (outside)	1959	1960
Canadian Union of Operating Engineers	Metro. Toronto (stationary engineers)	1960	N/A

Source: Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report: 1944-1964.

TABLE 4-7. KNOWN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1940-1963

<u>Organization name</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Formed</u>	<u>Dissolved</u>
Toronto Municipal Foremen's Association ¹	City of Toronto	1918	N/A
Toronto City Hall Employees' Association ²	City of Toronto	1919	1942
Ottawa Municipal Service Association ³	City of Ottawa	1925	1952
Hamilton Civic Maintenance Association ⁴	City of Hamilton	1940	N/A
Belleville Civic Employees? ⁵	City of Belleville	1949	N/A
Independent Civic Employees' Union of the City of Peterborough ⁶	City of Peterborough	1951?	1953

¹ Report on Labour Organization, 1940,: 239. It is not known if this body can be classed as a bona fide employee organization.

² This organization obtained a T.L.C. direct charter in 1942 as the Toronto Municipal Employees' Association, No. 79. It was certified as the bargaining representative for the inside workers of the City of Toronto in 1943. Ibid., 1940,: 239; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1942; J.A. Willes, The Ontario Labour Court 1943-1944 (Kingston: Queen's University Industrial Relations Centre, 1979),: "unreported case no. 100 (1943),: 244.

³ The Ottawa Municipal Service Association originally existed for largely social and recreational purposes. However, in 1948 it obtained employer recognition as the bargaining representative for Ottawa civic employees, displacing the existing C.C.L. organization, which subsequently dissolved. In 1952, the Association obtained a T.L.C. direct charter as the Ottawa Municipal Service Association, No. 503. Report on Labour Organization, 1940,: 239; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 8, Canadian Congress of Labour: National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers. Memorandum re: Organization of Civic Employees, A.R. Mosher, President and Norman S. Dowd, Executive Secretary, C.C.L. to the Mayor and Board of Control of the City of Ottawa, August 12, 1952; Vol. 10, file 8, Trades and Labour Congress: Ontario Federation of Municipal/Public Employees 1952-1957. Ontario Federation of Public Employees, Reports to Delegates at 8th Annual Convention, Hamilton, May 22-24, 1954.

TABLE 4-7. KNOWN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1940-1963 (cont'd)

⁴ The last documentary reference to this organization is a 1944 meeting between Hamilton City Council and the various unions representing city employees. Report on Labour Organization, 1940; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 93, Canadian Congress of Labour: Hamilton Civic Employees' Union, C.C.L., 1943-1945. J. O'Hanley, "Reporter" to N. Dowd, Editor, Canadian Unionist, February 14, 1944.

⁵ The formation of this organization was noted in conjunction with the demise of N.O.C.U.E.W. local 13 in Belleville in 1949. Beyond this little is known about it. The N.U.P.S.E. subsequently reorganized the municipality as local 140 in 1940. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 12, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers. Minutes of Fourth Annual Convention, September 30 - October 1, 1949, London: Report of the Secretary-Treasurer, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees. N.U.P.S.E. Organizational Service 1960.

⁶ This organization was certified as the bargaining representative for the outside workers in the City of Peterborough in April 1951, only to be superseded by the Peterborough Civic Employees' Federal Union, local 504 (T.L.C.) in February 1953. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, April 1951, February 1953.

Sources: As indicated in the notes.

TABLE 4-8. MUNICIPAL UNION FORMATION AND MORTALITY IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963

Year	Number of Unions Formed			Number of Unions Dissolved		
	T.L.C./ N.U.P.E. ¹	C.C.L./ N.U.P.S.E. ² et. al.	Total ³	T.L.C./ N.U.P.E. ¹	C.C.L./ N.U.P.S.E. ² et. al.	Total ³
1935	1	1	2	0	0	0(1)
1936	1	0	1	0	0	0
1937	1	2	3	2	0	2
1938	2	1	3	0	0	0
1939	0	0	0	0	2	2
1940	3	0	3	2	2	4
1941	1	2	3	1	0	1
1942	4	0	4	0	1	1
1943	2	2	4	1	0	1
1944	4	3	7	0	0	0
1945	5	4(2) ⁴	9[7] ⁵	0	3(2)	3[1]
1946	2	0	2	1	1	2
1947	4	1	5	0	0	0
1948	2	2	4	1	1	2
1949	2	5(1)	7[6]	4	3(1)	7[6]
1950	6	1	7	1	0	1
1951	3	4	7	N/A	0	N/A
1952	2	4(1)	6[5]	N/A	(1)	N/A
1953	8	3	11	N/A	0	N/A
1954	3	5(1)	8[7]	N/A	(1)	N/A
1955	N/A	6(1)	N/A	N/A	2(1)	N/A
1956	4	1	5	1	0	1
1957	0	10	10	0	0	0
1958	4	2	6	0	1	1
1959	4	1	5	0	0	0
1960	5	5	10	3	1	4
1961	3	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A
1962	1	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
1963	1	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A

¹ The results for 1935-1950 are for T.L.C. directly chartered locals only. Those for 1956-1963 are for N.U.P.E. chartered locals only.

² The number shown is the total number of N.U.P.S.E. et. al. chartered and C.C.L. et. al directly chartered locals combined.

³ Union formation and dissolution by other unions and independents is not included.

⁴ (1) denotes the number of unions formed or dissolved by virtue of a transfer from the C.C.L. to the N.U.P.S.E.

TABLE 4-8. MUNICIPAL UNION FORMATION AND MORTALITY, 1935-1963 (cont'd)

⁵ [1] denotes the total number of unions formed or dissolved excluding formation or dissolution due to transfer.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1958; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1941-1950; C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1940-1943; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 84, file 1, Vol. 94, files 1-2, 5-6. Canadian Congress of Labour: Directly Chartered Locals, Vol. 134, files 9-22. Canadian Congress of Labour: Membership 1943-1956,; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11. National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963, Vol. 1, files 9-14. National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organization Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

twenty-seven and eight per cent, respectively. Raiding was also much less common during the latter period. These estimates do not include instances in which directly chartered locals dissolved to facilitate their transfer to a national union. In most cases, municipalities in which unions failed were subsequently successfully organized at a later date. These results actually understate the true extent of union mortality, in that they do not incorporate either failed union organizing campaigns or unsuccessful certification applications. Between 1945 and 1961, a total of seventy-one municipal certification applications were dismissed or withdrawn.¹⁴ A significant number of these pertained to new organizing and in a majority of these cases failure before the Ontario Labour Relations Board signalled the demise of the applicant organization in that locality. No data is available on unsuccessful organizing campaigns.

Employer opposition to municipal unionism and collective bargaining frequently played a decisive role in the demise of many fledgeling organizations. However, it is erroneous to conclude that such opposition was universal, or even represented the views of the majority of employers. Indeed, a significant number of municipal authorities appear to have greeted the unionization of their employees with ambivalence and in a few cases were even congratulatory.¹⁵ Many exercised their right, under the Labour Relations Act, to deny their employees access to the protections and procedures of the Act.¹⁶ Some used this as a means of breaking newly formed unions, while others recognized unions formed by their employees and maintained reasonable collective bargaining relationships with these organizations outside

the supervision of the Act. Interestingly, this system of voluntary union recognition produced a mere seven recognition strikes between 1945 and 1966, when it ceased to operate.¹⁷

Virtually all of the early unions consisted of outside workers. However, in the 1940s, organizations representing inside (office and clerical) workers began to appear for the first time. The organization of general municipal employees must be situated in the context of the overall unionization of local government as a whole. (See Table 4-9). Although relatively rare during the 1940s, by the 1950s, unions of hospital workers and school board employees had both begun to form in considerable number. Public libraries were also organized starting in the 1950s, but at a nominal level. The end of the decade saw the first Homes for the Aged locals, as well as an attempt to organize the then municipal jail employees. In 1950, there were approximately fifty unions representing all organized classes of local government employment, excluding the uniformed services and the utilities. By 1963, the number had soared to over 180.

Union penetration of general municipal employment increased steadily between 1935 and 1963, both in terms of the sector as a whole and individual employers (See Table 4-2). In 1935, a mere eight unions were distributed among the five largest municipalities in the province and one township. Only one of these, in the City of Hamilton, is believed to have represented inside workers. By 1941, a small number of medium sized centres had been unionized for the first time, but with unions established in only fifteen municipalities, the level of sectoral penetration remained low. The position of inside workers was

TABLE 4-9. TOTAL T.L.C./N.U.P.E. AND C.C.L./N.U.P.S.E. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION LOCALS IN ONTARIO (EXCLUDING THE UNIFORMED SERVICES AND THE MUNICIPAL UTILITIES), BY TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Hospitals</u>	<u>Libraries</u>	<u>Misc.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1935	8	2	1	0	2	13
1936	9	2	1	0	2	14
1937	8	2	1	0	1	12
1938	10	2	1	0	1	14
1939	10	2	1	0	1	14
1940	11	2	1	0	1	15
1941	11	2	2	0	1	16
1942	15	2	2	0	1	20
1943	16	2	1	0	1	20
1944	20	2	1	0	1	24
1945	29	3	1	1	2	36
1946	30	3	1	1	3	38
1947	35	4	1	1	1	42
1948	38	4	1	1	1	45
1949	37	5	1	1	1	45
1950	41	6	1	1	1	50
1951 ¹	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1952	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1953	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1954	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1955	74	12	7	1	1	95
1956	78	13	9	1	2	103
1957	89	13	12	1	2	117
1958 ²	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1959	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1960	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1961	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1962	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1963	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

¹ The omissions from 1951 to 1954, inclusive, are due to the lack of information concerning T.L.C. directly chartered locals.

² The omissions from 1958 to 1963, inclusive, are due to problems with the N.U.P.S.E. data.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1958; T.L.C., Canadian Congress Journal, "Directory of Affiliations," 1941-1950; C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist, "Directory," 1940-1943; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 84, file 1, Vol. 94, files 1-2, 5-6. Canadian Congress of Labour: Directly Chartered

TABLE 4-9. TOTAL T.L.C./N.U.P.E. AND C.C.L./N.U.P.S.E. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION LOCALS IN ONTARIO (EXCLUDING THE UNIFORMED SERVICES AND THE MUNICIPAL UTILITIES). BY TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT. 1935-1963 (cont'd)

Locals, Vol. 134, files 9-22. Canadian Congress of Labour: Membership 1943-1956,; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11. National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963, Vol. 1, files 9-14. National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organization Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

also substantially unchanged. A decade later, in 1951, a total of forty-five municipalities were organized. In eighteen of these, both inside and outside workers were represented by unions. In some instances, all belonged to the same local, while in others separate organizations were the rule. By 1961, the number of municipalities with unions had grown to approximately eighty. Inside and outside workers were both organized in thirty-three of these.

The organization of inside workers was virtually always preceded by that of their outside counterparts. The emergence of significant inside worker union activity thus generally reflects an increase in the level of intra-employer union penetration. In addition to inside workers, other employee groups bypassed in the initial organization of outside workers were also frequently unionized at a later date.

The pattern of union penetration continued to be positively related to municipal population. By 1951, all municipalities with populations in excess of 50,000 people had at least some union presence among their employees. This was also true of the large townships in this group. For the remainder, as the size of the municipalities decreased so did the level of penetration. Notably, union penetration was considerably higher for urban municipalities than it was for townships in the same population category. Although the overall level of unionism had increased by the early 1960s, the pattern of that penetration remained largely unchanged. The larger number of municipalities with unions did not result from the organization of smaller municipalities. Rather, it appears that the tremendous population growth of the time expanded the number of municipalities,

available to be organized, in the larger categories. It was here that the increased penetration indicated by the greater number of unionized municipalities took place. Jurisdictions with fewer than 5,000 people were union-free for the entire period. It was only in the 1960s that some preliminary gains were finally made in this area.

Union organization of county employees was sporadic at best and generally unsuccessful. The mid-1950s saw a number of mostly futile attempts to organize the outside workers of several counties. In the few instances in which unions were actually established, high organizational mortality was the rule. By the early 1960s, only three such bodies existed as compared to five in the late 1950s. In 1962-63, a concerted effort was made to organize county jail employees. Employers generally opposed these efforts. In several instances, new organizations were broken by withholding union recognition and removing the affected employees from the coverage of the Labour Relations Act.¹⁸ During 1970s, significant gains were finally made among the employees of upper tier municipalities. A number of county jails had also been successfully organized by the time jurisdiction for jails was assumed by the provincial government in 1968.¹⁹

In Metropolitan Toronto, the situation was markedly different. For three years prior to the creation of Metro in 1954, the T.L.C. unions representing workers in the thirteen municipalities in the Greater Toronto area met on numerous occasions to discuss its impact and develop a strategy for organizing the new jurisdiction. It was decided that Metro employees would be best organized and represented by Locals 43 and 79, which represented the outside and inside workers of the City

of Toronto, respectively. In March 1953, this group of unions successfully lobbied the provincial government for changes to Bill 80, which was the legislation creating Metropolitan Toronto. These changes allowed for the continued employment and retention of benefits for employees of lower tier municipalities transferred to the upper level. By May 1954, both locals had signed contracts with Metro covering virtually all eligible general municipal employees. Union recognition appears to have been voluntary.²⁰

Aggregate municipal union membership expanded significantly between 1940 and 1960. At the beginning of the period, total membership probably did not exceed 4,000 members and may in fact have been significantly less (See Table 4-10). With the exception of a few directly chartered C.C.L. locals, which accounted for no more than 150 members at best, most municipal unionists were members of directly chartered T.L.C. locals. A small number also belonged to other unions and independent organizations. By the mid-1950s, membership totalled about 13,000 workers and had grown to approximately 17,500 by 1960. The vast majority belonged to the N.U.P.E. Despite its rapid growth during the 1950s and apparent size, only about fifteen per cent were members of the N.U.P.S.E. (See Table 4-11). The contribution of other unions and independent bodies remained insignificant.

Approximately eighty per cent of the growth in the N.U.P.E.'s Ontario membership between 1955 and 1963 was due to an increase in the membership of locals already under charter in 1955. Stated another way, new organizing, in the sense of unionizing the employees of a municipality in which no union existed, produced only twenty per cent

TABLE 4-10. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963

Year	<u>Canada</u>		<u>Ontario</u>	
	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Collective Agreement Coverage</u>	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Membership</u>
1946	N/A	26,067 ¹ (23,367)	N/A	N/A
1947	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1949	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1950 ²	N/A	44,633 (41,533)	N/A	N/A
1951	N/A	48,556 (45,440)	N/A	N/A
1952	N/A	48,796 (44,780)	N/A	N/A
1953	N/A	48,400 (44,892)	N/A	N/A
1954	N/A	49,974 (46,507)	N/A	N/A
1955	95,179 ³	53,208 (48,990)	N/A	N/A
1956	105,744	57,599 (53,191)	29,919 ⁴	28%
1957	106,336	N/A	28,962	27%
1958	112,652	N/A	30,936	27%
1959	103,967	N/A	30,903	30%
1960	102,412	N/A	32,237 (23,785)	31%
1961	96,974 (60,598)	N/A	31,725 (23,258)	33%
1962	64,100	N/A	23,839	37%
1963	70,402	N/A	24,962	35%

¹ These statistics conform to the 1948 Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.) and are for all government service. The bracketed figures indicate the number of "municipal and other local government" employees covered by these agreements. The federal Department of Labour based these reports on an analysis of their extensive collection of collective agreements. The results are generally consistent with the employer reported information contained in the Department's annual survey of wage rates and hours of labour. The number of workers covered by agreements should exceed the number of union members, because not all those covered were union members. The fact that membership actually exceeds coverage, in those years in which a comparison can be made, indicates omissions in the collective agreements collection as far as the public sector is concerned. This, in turn, highlights the need for caution in interpreting agreement coverage data from the wages and hours survey.

² In 1950, the format for the Report on Labour Organization in Canada, upon which most of the union membership data is based, changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of that year and the practice was continued in subsequent issues. The original format is continued in this table to maintain consistency

TABLE 4-10. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963 (cont'd)

within the membership series as well as with other data sources. Statistics derived from the 1951 Report are listed as of December 31, 1950. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years.

³ Union membership from 1955 to 1961 was determined using the 1948 S.I.C. Under this system, most government activity fell within the service sector. The membership numbers for this period are for all levels of government. More disaggregated data, showing the distribution of membership among the different levels of government, is not available. Prior to 1955, service sector statistics were not broken down, so that even total public sector union membership is unknown. With the adoption of the 1960 S.I.C. government service was removed from the service division and established as a separate public administration division. The post office, which had formerly been classified as a part of government services, was moved to communications division. The bracketed number for 1961, and the results thereafter, are based on the 1960 S.I.C. and are for local government only. Union membership among fire fighters is included in the total. The results for 1955 and 1956 are from Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967, the remainder of the series is from Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties.

⁴ The Ontario statistics follow the same methodology found in the national series. The bracketed numbers for 1960 and 1961, and all results thereafter, conformed to the "municipal and other local government" category under the 1960 S.I.C. As with the national statistics, unionism among fire fighters is included in the total. Police are excluded. No provincial data is available prior to 1956.

Sources: K. Ashagrie and J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967 (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1970),: 74; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975),: 16-17, 122-123, 177, (both publications rely heavily on information collected for the Report on Labour Organization in Canada); The Labour Gazette 1954,: 850-851; 1953,: 1299-1300; 1955,: 444-445; 1956,: 82-83, 1564-1565.

**TABLE 4-11. MUNICIPAL UNION MEMBERSHIP IN ONTARIO, BY AFFILIATION,
1943-1963**

<u>Year</u>	<u>T.L.C./N.U.P.E.</u>	<u>C.C.L./N.U.P.S.E.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1943	N/A	242	N/A
1944	N/A	438	N/A
1945	N/A	N/A	N/A
1946	N/A	N/A	N/A
1947	N/A	N/A	N/A
1948	N/A	N/A	N/A
1949	N/A	N/A	N/A
1950	N/A	N/A	N/A
1951	N/A	N/A	N/A
1952	N/A	N/A	N/A
1953	N/A	N/A	N/A
1954	N/A	N/A	N/A
1955	11,611	1,597	13,208
1956	12,376	1,937	14,313
1957	13,441	N/A	N/A
1958	14,448	N/A	N/A
1959	15,986	N/A	N/A
1960	14,873	N/A	N/A
1961	15,127	N/A	N/A
1962	16,336	N/A	N/A
1963	15,992	N/A	N/A

Sources: P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-14, National Organization of Civic Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 1, files 18-23, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Monthly Reports from Branches, January 1945-June 1949, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analysis 1959, 1960, 1962-1963, Organizational Service 1960; Vol. 3, files 4-11, National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 84, file 1, Vol. 94, files 1-2, 5-6, Canadian Congress of Labour: Directly Chartered Locals, Vol. 134, file 9-22, Canadian Congress of Labour: Membership 1943-1956, Vol. 68, file 13, Canadian Congress of Labour: National Union of Public Service Employees, 1954-1957.

of the increase in aggregate membership. This was not the case for the N.U.P.S.E. where new organizing was responsible for sixty-one per cent of its membership gains. This divergent pattern is attributable to differences in the composition of the two unions. The N.U.P.E. held nearly all of the larger municipalities, which it inherited from the T.L.C. after 1955. Virtually all had existed for some time prior to this as T.L.C. direct charters. The N.U.P.S.E., on the other hand, was a relative late comer to municipal organization. By the time it started looking for municipal employees to organize, most of the larger municipalities were already taken. As a consequence, the N.U.P.S.E. was forced to focus its efforts on the smaller, medium-sized centres. The N.U.P.E. was, therefore, in a much better position to benefit from the tremendous increase in municipal employment that occurred during this period. This employment growth resulted from increases in the population and the consequent heightened demands for service provision. It was in the largest municipalities, and in particular in the Toronto centred region, that this phenomenon was most pronounced. Indeed, approximately eighty per cent of the N.U.P.E.'s membership growth in established locals occurred in locals in this geographic area. The N.U.P.S.E. also benefited from employment expansion, but not to the same extent as its larger rival. As the period progressed, new organizing by both groups targeted increasingly smaller municipalities with small numbers of eligible workers. This resulted in diminishing returns in relation to the effort expended. Consequently both groups quickly expanded their jurisdiction to organize relatively large employers in the areas of health care and education. Despite

significant success in this regard, general municipal employment still contributed approximately seventy per cent of the N.U.P.E.'s total Ontario membership in 1963.²¹

A crude estimate of union membership density, in general municipal employment, can be formulated using the available union membership data and employment statistics from the decennial Census of Canada (See Table 4-12). Serious problems are associated with the construction of the series, in particular, there is considerable uncertainty about the extent to which both encompass the same group of employees. For 1941, using the estimate of 4,000 union members, union membership density is thirty-five per cent. By 1951, total membership had increased to about 8,000. This produces a density of sixty-four per cent. Finally, the 1961 calculation yields an estimate of forty-seven per cent. A major problem with this methodology is that union organizing generally does not conform to the contours of the Standard Industrial Classification. As a consequence, the number of union members is probably overstated relative to the employment statistics. The density estimates are also inflated.²² Utilizing an alternative source of municipal employment data, first available in 1961, membership density decreases to thirty-nine per cent. The problem here, however, is an overstatement of employment relative to union membership, resulting in an underestimation of density.²³ The solution is perhaps to express union membership density for 1961 in terms of a range between forty-three and fifty-two per cent. The estimate for 1951, while somewhat overstated, is not necessarily completely erroneous. As noted previously, during the 1950s local government employment grew significantly. Although

**TABLE 4-12. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961**

	<u>YEAR</u>			
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>	
Number of union members	4,000 (estimated)	8,000 (estimated)	19,258 (estimated)	19,258
Number of general municipal employees excluding fire fighters and police	11,292 ¹ (actual)	12,504 ² (estimated)	37,384 ³ (actual)	44,470 ⁴ (actual)
Membership density	<u>35%</u>	<u>64%</u>	<u>52%</u>	<u>43%</u>

¹ The 1941 Census provides an occupational breakdown of the various industrial groups. The reported municipal total of 15,865 was adjusted by subtracting 1,875 fire fighters and 2,635 police. 900 "public service officials" and a number of other occupational categories, while not eligible for union membership, were not deleted in order to maintain consistency with subsequent census results, in which it is not possible to identify the number in this group. Eligible municipal employment is therefore somewhat overstated.

² An occupational breakdown is contained in the 1951 Census, however, the results are not sufficiently disaggregated to provide a picture of the composition of municipal employment. Given that fire fighters are a relatively discrete group and that most are employed at the municipal level, the total number of fire fighters reported (3,284) was used as to proxy municipal fire fighters. The validity of the proxy was confirmed by comparing the number of fire fighters reported employed in specific municipalities with statistics contained in a 1953 study conducted by the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities. There was considerable commonality between the two series. A similar test of police statistics, unfortunately, indicates that the Census occupational results grossly overstate the number of municipal police to the extent that they not of any use. As a consequence, the number of municipal police was estimated using the 1941 ratio of 1.43 police officers to every fire fighter. Using 3,284 (1951) fire fighters, the estimated number of police was calculated at 4,696. The number of police and fire fighters was then subtracted from the municipal total of 20,484 to arrive at the number indicated.

³ For 1961, both the number of police (6,545) and fire fighters (4,640) are available, in usable form, from the Census. Total municipal employment (48,569) was adjusted by deleting both groups.

**TABLE 4-12. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)**

⁴ In this calculation, the municipal employment data contained in Municipal Government Employment (55,655) was used in conjunction with the number of fire fighters (4,640) and police (6,545) reported in the 1961 Census.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. VII, Table 21; 1951, Vol. IV., Table 16, Table 23; 1961, Bulletin 3.2-1, Table 1; Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Municipal Employees Wage and Salary Survey and Conditions of Employment: 1953 Report; D.B.S., Municipal Government Employment: 1961-1966, Table 1.

municipal unionism also made major gains during the decade, employment may in fact have increased at a faster rate producing a reduced level of density in 1961.²⁴

2. Municipal Hydro-Electric Power Unions

Union organizing gains in municipal hydro-electric power, between 1935 and 1940, were minimal, with the addition of only two more systems. As a consequence, the industry entered the 1940s with a very low level of union penetration relative to the other major employment sectors under study. In 1940, only five hydro-electric authorities in the entire province were unionized (See Table 4-13). After modest expansion in the early 1940s, union organizing surged in 1945. Much of this activity seems to have been aided by labour's unrestricted access to the provisions of the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations. This access was lost in 1947. In the immediate post-war period, growth moderated at first and then stalled completely at the end of the decade, as several established locals ceased to function. By 1950, a total of twenty-three municipal hydro-electric utilities were organized, with most of this activity dating from the War years. Organizing resumed slowly in the early 1950s, but surged in 1952-53 and again in 1956-57, the latter being the largest of the two. After 1957, performance remained relatively unspectacular for the rest of the decade. By 1961, an estimated seventy-six utilities were unionized. Moderate growth continued into the 1960s.

Initially, almost all of the workers organized were "outside" or "operating employees". With the exception of York Township Hydro, it was not until the mid to late 1950s that "inside" or "office and

TABLE 4-13. MUNICIPAL PUBLIC UTILITIES: NUMBER UNIONIZED AND NUMBER OF LOCALS INVOLVED, BY AFFILIATION, IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>I.B.E.W.</u>		<u>N.U.P.S.E.</u>		<u>Others</u>		<u>Total</u>	
1935	3	(2) ¹	1	(1)	1	(1)	5	(4)
1936	5	(4)	1	(1)	1	(1)	7	(6)
1937	5	(4)	1	(1)	1	(1)	7	(6)
1938	5	(4)	1	(1)	0	(0)	6	(5)
1939	5	(4)	1	(1)	0	(0)	6	(5)
1940	5	(4)	1	(1)	0	(0)	6	(5)
1941	6	(5)	1	(1)	0	(0)	7	(6)
1942	7	(6)	2	(2)	N/A	N/A	9	(8)
1943	7	(6)	3	(2)	N/A	N/A	10	(8)
1944	8	(7)	4	(3)	N/A	N/A	12	(10)
1945	11	(9)	9	(6)	N/A	N/A	20	(15)
1946	12	(10)	11	(8)	N/A	N/A	23	(18)
1947	14	(10)	11	(8)	N/A	N/A	25	(18)
1948	15	(11)	9	(7)	N/A	N/A	24	(18)
1949	14	(11)	9	(8)	N/A	N/A	23	(19)
1950	14	(11)	10	(9)	N/A	N/A	24	(20)
1951	16	(13)	10	(9)	1	(1)	27	(23)
1952	20	(16)	10	(9)	1	(1)	31	(26)
1953	25	(19)	11	(10)	1	(1)	36	(30)
1954	25	(19)	13	(12)	1	(1)	39	(32)
1955	26	(20)	14	(14)	1	(1)	41	(35)
1956	36	(22)	16	(16)	N/A	N/A	52	(38)
1957	35	(22)	21	(21)	N/A	N/A	56	(43)
1958	36	(22)	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1959	38	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1960	41	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1961	43	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1962	44	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1963	47	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

¹ In a number of cases more than one utility was organized by the same local. This was true for both the I.B.E.W. and the N.U.P.S.E. group. The bracketed figures indicate the number of locals involved.

Sources: Labour Organization in Canada, 1935-1958; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-14, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-1963, Organizational Service.

clerical" staff began to organize. Such activity was always predated by the unionization of the outside workers employed by the utility. In the vast majority of cases, the same union organized both groups.

With only a small number of exceptions, all unionized utilities were organized by either the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.) or the N.U.P.S.E. and its predecessors. Throughout the 1940s, the I.B.E.W. typically enjoyed a slight advantage in terms of its share of unionized utilities. This lead increased during the 1950s. The I.B.E.W. was also active in other provinces and in the United States, while the N.U.P.S.E. group restricted its activities to Ontario for much of the period.

Theoretically, the two unions entered the 1940s as organizers of electrical workers in the public, as well as the private sector. In reality the I.B.E.W. consisted of a number of locals representing electrical workers in both sectors. The N.U.P.S.E.'s predecessor, the Canadian Electrical Trades Union (C.E.T.U.), by contrast, existed as a single local of Toronto Electric Commission employees. The latter situation reflected the collapse of the union in the late 1930s and its singular lack of success in organizing in the private sector. When the C.E.T.U. began once more to organize new locals in the early 1940s, for all intents and purposes, it was a public sector union. In 1945, it became the National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers (N.O.C.U.E.W.), broadening its constituency to encompass many important areas of local government employment. The organization suffered a major setback in the late 1940s and early 1950s, losing a total of five of its unionized utilities between 1947 and 1951. During

the same period, the I.B.E.W. lost only one. The expanded jurisdiction, with its attendant organizing opportunities, coupled with these reversals and the apparent inability to compete with the I.B.E.W. in the utilities, had the cumulative effect of repositioning the N.O.C.U.E.W. as a local government union. This trend became even more pronounced as the 1950s progressed and municipal utility organization remained modest relative to gains made elsewhere.²⁵ The expanded constituency was possible because no other C.C.L. affiliate claimed jurisdiction in this area. For its part, the I.B.E.W. remained essentially a union of electrical workers. Unlike its smaller counterpart, jurisdictional constraints largely precluded expansion into other areas of local government. As a consequence of this divergent growth pattern, by 1960 the number of utilities organized by the I.B.E.W. outnumbered those held by the N.U.P.S.E. by a considerable margin.

The two unions also differed in terms of how they set up their respective locals. In keeping with its craft approach to unionism, the I.B.E.W. often mixed public and private sector workers in the same locals. In addition, in those cases where a broader membership base was deemed desirable, locals were sometimes established on a regional basis. Because of this, workers from different municipal utilities, withing roughly the same geographic area, as well as private sector workers, occasionally all shared the same local. In the N.U.P.S.E. group it was common to have separate locals for each employer, even if they were within close physical proximity. Hence a number of locals might exist within the same municipality. Some doubling up did occur,

but this was done largely as a stopgap measure, until the creation of separate organizations was viable. Some locals were also mixed, in that they contained both general municipal and utility workers, employed by different authorities, but in the same locale.

There is no evidence of organizing by any other national or international union in Ontario. Bona fide independent utility unions were also extremely rare. Between 1951 and 1956, such a body represented some of the employees of the Peterborough Utilities Commission. These workers eventually joined the I.B.E.W. in 1956. No other cases are documented. There are, however, numerous references to the existence of "employee associations". Regrettably, where such organizations are concerned, the record is usually fragmentary at best. Such bodies also fall beyond the scope of this discussion.

The union mortality rate in the utilities, between 1935 and 1963, was significantly lower than in general municipal employment (See Table 4-14). There also appears to have been some variation based on the union involved. As noted previously, the N.O.C.U.E.W. lost five of its unionized utilities between 1947 and 1951. This represented all of its losses in the utilities over the entire period. Numerically it amounts to nineteen per cent of all the utilities the union organized. Over the same twenty-eight years, the I.B.E.W. lost at least three of its utilities or a mere seven per cent of the total organized. In two of the cases the local ceased to function, while in the third, it was the utility that disappeared when the Village of Bronte became a part of the Town of Oakville in January 1959. The utilities in both municipalities had been organized by the I.B.E.W. prior to the

TABLE 4-14. MUNICIPAL UTILITY UNION FORMATION AND MORTALITY, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Utilities Organized</u>			<u>Number of Utilities Lost</u>		
	<u>I.B.E.W.</u>	<u>N.U.P.S.E.</u>	<u>Total¹</u>	<u>I.B.E.W.</u>	<u>N.U.P.S.E.</u>	<u>Total¹</u>
1935	0	0	0	0	0	0
1936	2	0	2	0	0	0
1937	0	0	0	0	0	0
1938	0	0	0	0	0	0
1939	0	0	0	0	0	0
1940	0	0	0	0	0	0
1941	1	0	1	0	0	0
1942	1	1	2	0	0	0
1943	0	2	3	0	0	0
1944	1	1	2	0	0	0
1945	3	4	7	0	0	0
1946	1	2	3	0	0	0
1947	2	1	3	0	1	1
1948	1	0	1	0	2	2
1949	0	0	0	1	0	1
1950	0	2	2	0	1	1
1951	2	1	3	0	1	1
1952	4	0	4	0	0	0
1953	5	1	6	0	0	0
1954	0	2	2	0	0	0
1955	1	1	2	0	0	0
1956	10	2	12	0	0	0
1957	0	5	5	1	0	1
1958	1	3	4	0	N/A	N/A
1959	4	1	5	1	N/A	N/A
1960	3	0	3	0	N/A	N/A
1961	2	0	2	0	N/A	N/A
1962	1	0	1	0	N/A	N/A
1963	3	0	3	0	N/A	N/A

¹ Union formation and dissolution by other unions and independents was minimal and is not reported.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1958, P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-1963, Organizational Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

amalgamation and shared the same local. Unfortunately, because of the manner in which the I.B.E.W. series was constructed, the level of mortality is probably understated. Hence, this estimate should be regarded as providing a minimum and not necessarily the approximate level of organizational mortality.

No documentation is available concerning failed organizing campaigns. However, an indication of at least the minimum level of failure can be established by examining the number of unsuccessful certification applications.²⁶ Between 1945 and 1963, a total of seventeen applications, submitted by the I.B.E.W., were either dismissed or withdrawn. However, in almost half of these cases, a local either already existed and continued to do so or came into existence, despite the disposition of the application. In the remaining eight cases, the campaign was unsuccessful and no local was created at that time. With the exception of Ottawa Hydro, where a certification application was withdrawn in 1947 and the union subsequently dissolved in 1949, there is no overlap between organizational mortality and failed certification applications. The N.U.P.S.E. group had nine unsuccessful certification applications for utilities and in four instances no union was established. The results for both organizations quite likely understate the true extent of failed organizing campaigns, as the vast majority probably never progressed to the point where a certification applications was contemplated.

As with general municipal employment, employer attitudes and behaviour toward union activity by their employees varied widely. In contrast to the several utilities, in which the union enjoyed a degree

of meaningful recognition and was able to establish a permanent bargaining relationship, employer opposition played a decisive role in the demise of most of the N.O.C.U.E.W.'s failed locals. A variety of tactics were used to this end, but typically workers were ultimately persuaded that by forming an independent employee association they could exercise the same influence over their terms and conditions of employment as through union membership, and without having to pay union dues. This argument was reinforced by action at the bargaining table. In virtually all cases, the employer agreed to recognize the union and then stalled negotiations and the conclusion of a collective agreement. At the same time, certain union demands were voluntarily adopted by the utility and incorporated into its staff regulations and procedures. The employer thus appeared benevolent, while the union was deprived of the opportunity to take credit for these improvements and made to look ineffectual in representing its members. In some cases, the situation was further exacerbated by the refusal of union members to pay dues until a collective agreement was concluded. This imposed a financial strain on the rest of the organization. Once the movement toward the formation of an employee association gained momentum, there was also considerable fear of discrimination, by the employer, against those workers who continued to support the union.²⁷ These efforts at union busting were inadvertently assisted by the actions of the Secretary-Treasurer of the N.O.C.U.E.W., who alienated both employers and union members alike, immediately prior to his resignation in 1951.²⁸

Employer opposition appears to have figured less prominently in the dissolution of the I.B.E.W. organizations. As noted previously,

there were actually only two cases of union failure. In 1947, the I.B.E.W. was certified to represent certain outside workers of the Ottawa Hydro-Electric Commission. It is not known if these workers were represented by the union prior to this. Two years later, in 1949, following a dispute over the level of servicing the local had received during contract negotiations, these workers left the union and formed an independent association.²⁹ The documentary record is somewhat confused concerning when the association was formed and it may have operated parallel to the union for a time. The extent of employer involvement in the demise of the union is unknown. The details of the only other case of union failure, in Whitby, are also unknown.

The importance of employer opposition in failed organizing campaigns is even more difficult to gauge. Again, unsuccessful certification applications are the only source of aggregatable data. There were only three recorded cases of employer declarations under Section 78/89 of the Labour Relations Act. All involved the I.B.E.W. and in all instances no union was established.³⁰

Union penetration of the municipal utilities increased significantly between 1935 and 1963 (See Table 4-2). The pattern of this penetration was positively related to the population of the municipality. Initially, union activity was limited almost solely to centres with the largest utilities, but by 1951, a number of medium sized municipal authorities had also been organized. Inside workers were unionized in only a single case.³¹ Penetration of the sector continued into the 1950s. By the early part of the next decade, not only had the number of unionized utilities increased, but several

smaller population categories were represented for the first time. In addition, inside workers were organized in several utilities of varying sizes. In assessing the extent of union penetration of this sector it is important to note that the number of utilities available to be organized was limited. Although there are no contemporary statistics, more recent tabulations indicate that special purpose bodies, responsible for the provision of hydro-electric power, exist in only about one-third of all Ontario municipalities. While there are some examples of departmental provision, consumers in the vast majority of Ontario municipalities, particularly those of smaller size, receive hydro-electric power directly from Ontario Hydro.³²

The available union membership statistics for the public utilities encompass hydro-electric power, gas and water (See Table 4-15). They are not differentiated in terms of these component parts or municipal, provincial and private sector employment. Despite these difficulties, these data are still of assistance in tracing the broad outline of union membership growth in the municipal utilities. The national results indicate a steady growth in public utility unionism between 1949 and 1963. The Ontario series is, however, somewhat different and is characterized by considerable stability. While membership does fluctuate, it appears to do so within a limited range of about plus or minus 1,200. In contrast to the national numbers, no growth trend is present, at least not during the period for which Ontario data is available. Union membership in Ontario municipal utilities experienced modest, but steady growth over this same period.

In 1940, total union membership in the five hydro-electric that

TABLE 4-15. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN PUBLIC UTILITIES EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963

Year	<u>Canada</u>		<u>Ontario</u>	
	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Collective Agreement Coverage</u>	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Membership</u>
1946	N/A	15,814 (13,837) ¹	N/A	N/A
1947	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A	N/A
1948	N/A	N/A N/A	N/A	N/A
1949	7,450	N/A N/A	N/A	N/A
1950 ²	9,600	23,362 (21,727)	N/A	N/A
1951	11,000	25,429 (23,362)	N/A	N/A
1952	10,900	27,443 (25,100)	N/A	N/A
1953	9,950	28,328 (26,096)	N/A	N/A
1954	11,600	29,437 (27,379)	N/A	N/A
1955	26,730	30,276 (27,957)	N/A	N/A
1956	27,140	32,799 (30,075)	15,606	58%
1957	28,418	N.A N/A	15,899	56%
1958	32,634	N/A N/A	16,359	50%
1959	32,463	N/A N/A	15,507	48%
1960	34,946	N/A N/A	17,282	49%
1961	34,259 (33,742) ³	N/A N/A	17,634 (17,117)	51%
1962	35,314	N/A N/A	16,585	47%
1963	38,528	N/A N/A	15,703	41%

¹ This series was derived from the Department of Labour's collection of collective agreements and follows the 1948 Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.). "Public utility operation" consists of electric light and power, gas manufacturing and distribution, and "other" public utilities. Water and sanitary services are included under the municipal and other local government category. The number provided is for all public utility operations, while the bracketed figure indicates the coverage in the electric light and power component. These results are consistent with the employer generated information contained in the Department's annual survey of wages and hours of labour. Collective agreement coverage should exceed union membership, given that it is unlikely that all those covered will be union members. This is the case here, although the magnitude of the difference strongly suggests that different methodologies were utilized in the construction of the two series. The discrepancy is particularly pronounced prior to 1955 and may result from the exclusion of the Ontario Hydro Employees Association (E.A.) from the union membership totals. In 1955, the E.A. joined the N.U.P.S.E. and added 9,500 members to its rolls.

² In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada, from which most of the union membership data is derived, changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report.

TABLE 4-15. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN PUBLIC UTILITIES EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963 (cont'd)

There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of the year and this practice was continued in all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the membership series, as well as with other data sources, the original format is continued in this table. Statistics from the 1951 Report are listed as of December 31, 1950. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years.

³ Union membership from 1956 to 1961 was determined using the 1948 S.I.C. Those after 1961 conform to the 1960 S.I.C. In 1961, membership totals using both classification systems are provided for comparative purposes. The first number is the 1948 result, while the bracketed figure uses the 1960 S.I.C. The lack of a significant difference between the two suggests that, for the public utilities, considerable commonality exists between the two series. Different sources were used for union membership between 1949-1955 and 1956-1963. For those years in which data from the two sources overlap, only slight differences exist. These are likely due to revisions in the constituent data making up the respective series as opposed to differences in the compilation methodology. The results for 1949 to 1955 inclusive are from Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967. The remainder of the series is from Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties.

Sources: K. Ashagrie and J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967 (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1970),: 74; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975),: 16-17, 122-123, (both publications rely heavily on information collected for the Report on Labour Organization in Canada); The Labour Gazette, 1954,: 850-851; 1953,: 1299-1300; 1955,: 444-445, 1956.: 82-83, 1564-1565.

were organized would not have exceeded 1,000 and, in fact, an estimate of between 700 and 800 may be more realistic. By 1969, approximately 5,500 municipal hydro-electric workers were union members. In terms of the distribution of this membership between the N.U.P.S.E. group and the I.B.E.W., the latter is believed to have gained roughly a two-to-one advantage by 1961, by virtue of its superior number of locals and utilities organized.

Despite the addition of a large number of newly organized utilities between 1940 and 1963, aggregate membership gains came predominantly from growth in unions established or already in existence at the beginning of the period. As union penetration extended into the smaller centres, the membership gains diminished. The organization of such small groups of workers also posed serious problems in terms of creating stable, sustainable administrative units.³³ As more of these small employers were organized, the practice of grouping the employees of several utilities under a single local became increasingly prevalent.

Estimating union membership density in the municipal hydro-electric utilities is effectively precluded by a lack of both union membership and industry employment data. Although the available union membership statistics can be adjusted, the reliability of these results is highly questionable.³⁴ Estimating municipal utility employment is even more problematic.³⁵ A crude estimate of density in the municipal hydro-electric utilities is offered for 1961, but it should be viewed with considerable caution in light of these difficulties. In this context, the best approach to assessing long-term union membership density trends is to examine the hydro-electric

power industry as a whole (See Table 4-16). Unfortunately, municipal trends tend to be overshadowed by developments in the Hydro-Electric Power Commission (H.E.P.C.). In 1941, the level of union membership density was extremely low reflecting the limited unionism in the sector and, in particular, the fact that the H.E.P.C. was largely union free. Although some gains were made among municipal utility workers, the massive growth in density by 1951 is attributable mainly to the formation of an association (E.A.) by H.E.P.C. employees, in 1945-46. The 1961 results are a function of both increased union membership among H.E.P.C. employees as well as at the municipal level. Despite the smaller number of utilities organized by 1961, union membership density in this sector is significantly higher than for general municipal employment. This suggests a much greater concentration of employment in the larger centres and is consistent with findings, concerning the number of utilities, reported earlier.

3. Municipal Public Transportation Unions

Union growth in municipal public transit differed from the overall local government pattern. There were two main reasons for this. First, as noted in Chapter Three, significant union activity in this sector, approaching near saturation levels, dates from at least World War I. Despite some losses during the 1920s and the Great Depression, most of these organizations survived into the 1940s. The fact that so much of the industry was already organized limited the gains that could be made in the post-1935 period. Beginning in 1937, there was a nominal increase in the number of public transit unions and by the early 1940s growth had plateaued. Thereafter, the number of unions remained

TABLE 4-16. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER WORKERS IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961

	<u>YEAR</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
<u>Hydro-Electric Power</u>			
Number of union members ¹	750 (estimated)	10,000 (estimated)	13,000 (estimated)
Number of hydro-electric employees ²	9,283 (actual)	21,945 (actual)	21,698 (actual)
Membership density	<u>8%</u>	<u>46%</u>	<u>60%</u>
<u>Municipal Hydro-Electric Utilities</u>			
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
Number of union members	N/A	N/A	3,500 ³ (estimated)
Number of municipal hydro-electric employees	N/A	N/A	6,000 ⁴ (estimated)
Membership density	<u>N/A</u>	<u>N/A</u>	<u>58%</u>

¹ The Employees Association (E.A.) of the (H.E.P.C.) was formed in 1945-46. Prior to this an employee representation plan, dating from 1935, existed. The estimate of union membership for 1941, therefore, encompasses only the municipal utilities. The 1951 estimate is based on a membership of 7,956 in the E.A., with the remainder coming from the municipal level. By 1961, the E.A. had become local 100 of the National Union of Public Service Employees and had a membership of about 10,000. Union membership among municipal hydro electric workers is estimated at about 3,000. Actual union membership data for the industry is available for 1970. It shows the Canadian Union of Public Employees with 11,881 members, which include the former E.A. group, now as local 1000, while the I.B.E.W. has 3,588.

² These results are for all hydro-electric power workers in Ontario regardless of the employer. They include workers employed by municipal hydro-electric power authorities, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario (H.E.P.C.) and the private sector.

³ Estimated using Ontario Hydro's Municipal Utility Data Base.

**TABLE 4-16. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER WORKERS
IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)**

‡ Estimated using industry statistics contained in J.K. Eaton Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975),: 122-123, 174, 176.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. VI, Table 9, 1951, Vol.V, Table 24. 1961, Vol. III, Part 1, Table 17; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975); John Herbert Gillespie Crispo, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: A Study of Union-Management Relations in Ontario Hydro and T.V.A." (Ph.D. dissertation: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960),: 86-91, 98. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-1963, Organizational Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

relatively stable until the 1960s (See Table 4-17).

The second differentiating factor was the nature of public transit provision. Unlike hydro-electric power and water, which had been largely assumed by public authorities prior to the appearance of sustained union activity, public transit provision remained mixed. In some cases transit was municipally owned and operated, while in others the service was provided by a private company under a municipal franchise. In still others, the Canadian National Railway, and in some instances, even the provincial government were involved as purveyors.³⁶ Although smaller municipalities generally displayed a preference for private provision, even among the largest cities, it did not disappear completely until 1960. In several mid-sized and smaller centres, private provision continued to be utilized well into the 1970s,³⁷ and in a few cases beyond (See Table 4-18). When a municipality assumed responsibility for transit provision from a private company, it frequently also inherited an established union representing the workers. The Labour Relations Act provided for the maintenance of the bargaining relationship in such circumstances.³⁸ Another significant aspect of provision is the relatively small number of operators (See Table 4-19). This limited the potential for expansion through new organizing and fostered inter-union competition for organizable groups.

Until the 1940s, the number of Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America (A.A.S.E.R.E.) locals can be used as a crude proxy for the number of public transit systems with unions. The resultant series slightly underestimates the extent of organization because some locals represented employees from more than

TABLE 4-17. PUBLIC TRANSIT: NUMBER OF SYSTEMS UNIONIZED AND NUMBER OF LOCALS INVOLVED, BY AFFILIATION, IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>A.A.S.E.R.E.</u>		<u>C.B.R.T.</u>		<u>Others</u>		<u>Total</u>
1935	11	(10) ¹	0	(0)	0	(0)	11
1936	11	(10)	0	(0)	0	(0)	11
1937	12	(11)	0	(0)	0	(0)	12
1938	13	(12)	0	(0)	0	(0)	13
1939	13	(12)	0	(0)	0	(0)	13
1940	13	(12)	0	(0)	0	(0)	13
1941	14	(13)	0	(0)	0	(0)	14
1942	15	(15)	0	(0)	0	(0)	15
1943	15	(14)	0	(0)	0	(0)	15
1944	16	(15)	0	(0)	0	(0)	16
1945	16	(15)	0	(0)	0	(0)	16
1946	14	(14)	2	N/A	0	(0)	16
1947	14	(14)	2	N/A	0	(0)	16
1948	14	(14)	2	N/A	0	(0)	16
1949	15	(15)	2	N/A	0	(0)	17
1950 ²	15	(17)	2	N/A	0	(0)	17
1951	14	(16)	2	N/A	0	(0)	16
1952	13	(14)	2	N/A	0	(0)	15
1953	13	(14)	3	N/A	0	(0)	16
1954	13	(14)	3	N/A	0	(0)	16
1955	13	(14)	3	N/A	0	(0)	16
1956	13	(13)	3	N/A	0	(0)	16
1957	13	(14)	3	N/A	1	(2)	17
1958	N/A	(14)	3	N/A	1	(2)	N/A
1959	N/A	(14)	3	N/A	1	(2)	N/A
1960	N/A	(14)	5	N/A	2	(3)	N/A
1961	N/A	(13)	N/A	N/A	2	(3)	N/A
1962	N/A	(13)	N/A	N/A	2	(3)	N/A
1963	N/A	(13)	N/A	N/A	2	(3)	N/A

¹ The bracketed figure indicates the number of locals involved. In some cases employees of more than one transit system were members of the same local. In others, two locals operated in the same municipality and it is impossible to determine whether they both were involved with public transit employees. In Sault Ste Marie and the Toronto more than one union was present.

² In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada, from which most of the union membership data is derived, changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of the year and this practice was continued in all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the membership series, as well as with other data sources, the original format is continued in this table. Statistics from the 1951 Report are listed as of December

TABLE 4-17. PUBLIC TRANSIT: NUMBER OF SYSTEMS UNIONIZED AND NUMBER OF LOCALS INVOLVED, BY AFFILIATION, IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963 (cont'd)

31, 1950. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years.

Sources: Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1964; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

TABLE 4-18. MUNICIPALLY OWNED AND OPERATED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN ONTARIO, 1963

<u>Name of Municipal Authority</u>	<u>Year that Responsibility For Provision Was Assumed</u>	<u>Unionized</u>
Belleville Transit Commission	1960	N/A
Brantford Public Utilities Commission: Transportation Department	At least 1922	1915
Fort William Transit	1908 (1892)	1922
Galt Public Utilities Commission	N/A	N/A
Guelph Transportation Commission	At least 1922	1938
Hamilton Transit Commission	1960	1899
Kingston Public Utilities Commission: Public Transit System	1962	1946
Kitchener Public Utilities Commission ¹	At least 1922	1941-1949, 1953
London Transit Commission	1951	1917
Greater Niagara Transit Commission	N/A	1961
Oshawa Public Utilities Commission	1960	N/A
Ottawa Transit Commission	1948	1906
Port Arthur Public Utilities Commission	1892	1922
St. Catharines Transit Commission	1961	1918
Sandwich, Windsor and Amherstburg Railway Company (Windsor)	At least 1922	1916
Sault Ste Marie Transportation Commission	1940	1944-1946, 1949-1951, 1957
Stratford Public Utilities Commission	1952	N/A
Toronto Transit Commission	1921 (1954) ²	1899

¹ The City of Waterloo was also served by this system. The relationship was governed by a special act.

TABLE 4-18. MUNICIPALLY OWNED AND OPERATED PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN ONTARIO, 1963 (cont'd)

² On January 1, 1954 the Toronto Transit Commission assumed responsibility for all public transit provision within the boundaries of Metropolitan Toronto. The following joined the existing T.T.C. to form the new integrated system:

The York Township and Town of Weston Railway (jointly owned by York Township and the Town of Weston since 1925 and operated for them by the T.T.C. since the date of purchase); Danforth Bus Lines (privately owned); Hollinger Bus Lines (privately owned); Toronto Coach Lines (privately owned); West York Coach Lines (privately owned). D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1954.

Sources: D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1920-1955; Canadian Urban Transit Association, Proceedings, 1958-59 - 1962-63; Canadian Urban Transit Handbook, 2nd. ed., Published by the Canadian Urban Transit Association and the Roads and Transportation Association of Canada, 1985, : 2-12; Eric Harding, Lakehead Local Government Review: Report and Recommendations, (March 11, 1968), : 28; Stewart Fyfe, Waterloo Area Local Government Review: Data Book of Basic Information, (July 1967), : 36; R.B. Bowland, General Manager, Stratford Public Utilities Commission, Correspondence, May 28, 1986; Ontario Municipal Board, Annual Report of the Ontario Municipal Board, December 31, 1940. (See Ontario Statute 1940, ch. 48, s. 1, 2, 3.).

TABLE 4-19. NUMBER OF PUBLIC TRANSIT SYSTEMS IN ONTARIO, 1935-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>Electric Railways</u>	<u>Buses</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Urban Transit</u>	<u>C.U.T.A. Membership</u>
1935	18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1936	18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1937	18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1938	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1939	16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1940	15	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1941	14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1942	13	16	29	N/A	N/A
1943	13	19	32	N/A	N/A
1944	13	21	34	N/A	N/A
1945	13	19	32	N/A	N/A
1946	13	20	33	N/A	N/A
1947	13	17	30	N/A	N/A
1948	13	15	28	N/A	N/A
1949	13	20	33	N/A	N/A
1950	12	18	30	N/A	N/A
1951	12	20	32	N/A	N/A
1952	12	25	37	N/A	N/A
1953	12	25	36	N/A	N/A
1954	10	26	36	N/A	N/A
1955	10	20	30	41	N/A
1956	N/A	N/A	N/A	40	N/A
1957	N/A	N/A	N/A	32 ¹	N/A
1958	N/A	N/A	N/A	32 (24) ²	N/A
1959	N/A	N/A	N/A	23	13
1960	N/A	N/A	N/A	22	19
1961	N/A	N/A	N/A	22	20
1962	N/A	N/A	N/A	24	20
1963	N/A	N/A	N/A	25	20

¹ In 1957, twenty-five firms whose operations were "insignificant" were eliminated from the report. Several of these were from Ontario. D.B.S., Urban Transit, 1957.

² Beginning in 1959, only Class 1 carriers (annual gross revenue from urban transit operations in excess of \$100,000.00) are included. The bracketed number for 1958 is a revision based on this criteria. In 1959, Class 1 carriers accounted for ninety-eight per cent of gross revenue in the industry. D.B.S., Urban Transit, 1959.

Sources: D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1920-1955; D.B.S., Motor Carriers: Freight - Passenger, 1944-1955; D.B.S., Urban Transit, 1955-1963; Canadian Urban Transit Association, Proceedings, 1958-1963.

one system. This was the case in London, Fort William/Port Arthur and the Toronto centred region. Taking this into account produces an estimate of seventeen unionized public transit systems in 1941. Of these, approximately ten were municipally owned and operated. The appearance of competition from other unions, beginning in the 1940s and escalating thereafter, requires that further adjustments be made to the estimate. By 1961, the number of unionized systems had expanded to approximately twenty-one, sixteen of which were municipally owned.

The vast majority of this activity involved transit operators, although maintenance and support staff were also frequently included. There is no evidence of widespread union activity among transit office personnel and, indeed, in many systems such workers have remained unorganized to the present day. In some cases in which transit was provided under the auspices of a public utilities commission, along with other utilities, inside transit workers became members of the union organizing all inside utility commission employees.

The A.A.S.E.R.E. continued to be the dominant union in this sector (See Table 4-20). However, despite considerable stability among its core long-term member locals, it failed to make significant gains in terms of new organizing, during this period. Indeed, much of the new local formation and dissolution activity appears to reflect the union's lack of success in this regard.³⁹

A number of other unions became involved in organizing transit workers in the 1940s. The most important of these was the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transportation and General Workers (C.B.R.T.). Originally the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees, this body was

**TABLE 4-20. AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET AND ELECTRIC RAILWAY
EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA: NUMBER OF LOCALS AND MEMBERSHIP IN ONTARIO,
1935-1963**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Locals</u>		<u>Total</u>	<u>Members¹</u>
	<u>Number Formed</u>	<u>Number Dissolved</u>		
1935	0	1	10	N/A
1936	0	0	10	N/A
1937	1	0	11	N/A
1938	1	0	12	N/A
1939	0	0	12	N/A
1940	1	1	12	N/A
1941	1	0	13	N/A
1942	2	0	15	N/A
1943	0	1	14	N/A
1944	1	0	15	N/A
1945	0	0	15	N/A
1946	1	2	14	N/A
1947	0	0	14	N/A
1948	0	0	14	N/A
1949	2	1	15	N/A
1950 ²	2	0	17	N/A
1951	0	1	16	N/A
1952	0	2	14	N/A
1953	0	0	14	N/A
1954	0	0	14	N/A
1955	0	0	14	N/A
1956	0	1	13	N/A
1957	1	0	14	N/A
1958 ³	N/A	N/A	14	N/A
1959	N/A	N/A	14	N/A
1960	N/A	N/A	14	N/A
1961	N/A	N/A	13	N/A
1962	N/A	N/A	13	N/A
1963	N/A	N/A	13	N/A

¹ Only national membership results are available.

² In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada was changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. The contexts of the 1949 Report were theoretically as of December 31, 1949. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of the year (January 1, 1951), as were all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the series, as well as with other data sources, the original format was continued. The statistics contained in the 1951 Report are listed under 1950. The same procedure was followed with all succeeding years.

**TABLE 4-20. AMALGAMATED ASSOCIATION OF STREET AND ELECTRIC RAILWAY
EMPLOYEES OF AMERICA: NUMBER OF LOCALS AND MEMBERSHIP IN ONTARIO,
1935-1963 (cont'd).**

³ Beginning with its 1959 issue, the Report on Labour Organization in Canada ceased providing a detailed listing of the geographic locations of union locals. From 1959 on, only the total number of locals by province were reported. Local formation and dissolution cannot, therefore, continue to be documented using this source.

Source: Canada, Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1964.

for a time the largest national union in the country and formed the backbone of the Canadian Federation of Labour (C.F.L.) and the All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.) during the 1920s and 1930s. Beginning in the mid-1940s, the C.B.R.T. organized a small number of both private and municipally owned transit systems in the province. In 1946, it successfully raided the A.A.S.E.R.E. local in Kingston, taking over the workers of the private sector company that provided transit in the city. The same year it was also certified to represent the employees of the McLelland Transportation Company, a private sector carrier operating in the Kirkland Lake area. In the early 1950s, it organized the transit workers employed by the Kitchener Public Utilities Commission. The Commission had "bust" the existing A.A.S.E.R.E. local in the late 1940s, by opting out of the existing labour relations legislation and refusing to negotiate a collective agreement with the union. A bargaining relationship and collective agreement had existed between the two parties from 1938 to 1946. In 1960, the C.B.R.T. was certified to represent workers of the newly formed Belleville Transit Commission as well as employees of the Sarnia Transit Company. The former was a municipal authority, while the latter was not. Finally, in 196x, the union secured bargaining rights for workers of Trailways of Canada Limited, employed in Richmond Hill and Newmarket. The Company provided public transit in both communities.

In addition to the C.B.R.T., in 1957 the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the United Steelworkers of America were certified to represent the drivers and inspectors and bus garage employees, respectively, of the Sault Ste Marie Transportation Commission. In the

mid-1940s, and again at the end of the decade, an A.A.S.E.R.E. local existed in Sault Ste Marie. The union was, however, apparently unable to sustain the local and it dissolved for the last time in 1951. The extent of employer culpability is unknown. In another case, the I.B.E.W. is believed to have represented transit workers employed by the Oshawa Public Utilities Commission, from at least 1960, when responsibility for provision passed from the Canadian National Railway to the municipal authority. This may, in fact, be yet another example of the displacement of an established A.A.S.E.R.E. local by another union. In Toronto, maintenance workers of the T.T.C. have been members of the International Association of Machinists since at least 1949.⁴⁰

As noted in Chapter 3, electric street railways were the primary mode of public transit provision up to the 1940s and early 1950s. This necessitated the employment of electrical workers to maintain the power grid. Occasionally, as was the case in Toronto, Fort William, Port Arthur and Ottawa, these workers were unionized. The organizing union was typically the I.B.E.W., although the C.E.T.U. co-existed with the international union in Toronto. With the transition to buses, these workers became redundant. As they disappeared, so did the role for the unions that represented them. Unfortunately, the record is unclear as to the full extent of such union activity and its ultimate disposition. By 1983, only the T.T.C. had a union specifically representing electrical workers.

There is no documentary evidence to suggest the existence of independent organizations of transit workers. If they existed at all it is reasonable to conclude that their contribution was minimal.

Little information exists concerning employer attitudes toward union activity among transit employees. Among the long established locals, this issue appears to have been resolved early in the relationship and, hence, was no longer a matter of contention. It was only in the newly unionized utilities, and particularly where municipal authorities were involved, that some tension appears to have existed. In the case of the Kitchener Public Utilities Commission, in 1946, the employer declined to opt into the province's labour relations legislation and refused to negotiate with the existing union and to sign a collective agreement. This action terminated a bargaining relationship which had existed since 1938. The union struggled on for another three years before it finally failed in 1949. Both the A.A.S.E.R.E., in 1947 and the C.B.R.T., in 1953, unsuccessfully sought certification to represent the workers employed by the utility. In the first instance, the Ontario Labour Relations Board lacked jurisdiction to hear the application, while the circumstances involving the C.B.R.T. are unknown. As noted previously, this union ultimately succeeded in establishing a local sometime in the early 1950s. The only other case of a failed transit certification application, that is directly attributable to employer opposition, involves the Seafarer's International Union and their attempt, in 1962, to secure bargaining rights for the ferry employees of the Wolfe Island Corporation. An employer declaration under Section 89 of the Labour Relations Act terminated proceedings.⁴¹ A.A.S.E.R.E. locals also dissolved in Sault Ste Marie and Chatham. In Sault Ste Marie, although the details are unknown, the volatility in union activity during the 1940s strongly

suggests employer opposition and interference. There is no record of union certification applications until the 1957 cases noted previously. The Chatham local existed briefly between 1949 and 1952 and the reasons for its demise are similarly unknown.⁴²

The pattern of union penetration in public transit is similar to that found in the other areas under study (See Table 4-2). The characteristic positive relationship between municipal population and unionism is clearly apparent, with most union activity concentrated in the larger population categories. Here, however, the commonality ends. In both general municipal employment and hydro-electric power, the period from 1935 to 1963 was one of rapid union growth and significantly increased penetration of their respective sectors. By contrast, union penetration in public transit increased only marginally. Of the estimated forty operators providing public transit in 1956, only about half were unionized. Service provision in the smaller centres appears to have been particularly union resistant.

Aggregate union membership in public transit remained relatively stable for much of the period (See Table 4-21). Membership data for Ontario is available commencing in 1956, but aggregate Canadian statistics date from 1949. Despite some year over year fluctuations, the overall pattern is largely unchanged. There is no evidence to indicate that this was also not the case in Ontario.

The vast majority of unionized public transit workers in Ontario were members of the A.A.S.E.R.E. In 1970, this union accounted for ninety-four per cent of all union membership in the industry⁴³ and the extent of this concentration may have been even greater during the

TABLE 4-21. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN PUBLIC TRANSIT EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963

Year	<u>Canada</u>		<u>Ontario</u>	
	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Collective Agreement Coverage¹</u>	<u>Union Membership</u>	<u>Per Cent of Total Membership</u>
1946	N/A	20,148	N/A	N/A
1947	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1948	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1949	18,250	N/A	N/A	N/A
1950 ²	21,850	21,658	N/A	N/A
1951	16,900	21,743	N/A	N/A
1952	21,350	21,490	N/A	N/A
1953	15,500	20,934	N/A	N/A
1954	18,100	20,814	N/A	N/A
1955	19,700	19,263	N/A	N/A
1956	19,594	19,174	8,082	41%
1957	19,769	N/A	8,164	41%
1958	18,894	N/A	8,183	43%
1959	18,624	N/A	8,073	43%
1960	19,362	N/A	8,138	42%
1961	18,443 (18,560) ³	N/A	7,045 (7,162)	38%
1962	19,335	N/A	7,933	41%
1963	19,499	N/A	8,075	41%

¹ Collective agreement coverage is based on an analysis by the federal Department of Labour of their collective agreements collection. It follows the 1948 Standard Industrial Classification. The results are, again, similar to those in the Department's annual survey of wages and hours of labour. The fact that agreement coverage closely parallels union membership suggests that omissions in the collection were not major.

² In 1950, the format of the Report on Labour Organization in Canada, from which most of the union membership data is derived, changed. Up to and including 1949, it was issued as a year end report. There was no Report for 1950. The 1951 Report was issued as of the beginning of the year and this practice was continued in all subsequent issues. In order to maintain consistency within the membership series, as well as with other data sources, the original format is continued in this table. Statistics from the 1951 Report are listed as of December 31, 1950. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years.

³ Union membership from 1956 to 1961 was determined using the 1948 S.I.C. Those after 1961 conform to the 1960 S.I.C. In 1961, membership totals using both classification systems are provided for comparative purposes. The first number is the 1948 result, while the bracketed

TABLE 4-21. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN PUBLIC TRANSIT EMPLOYMENT, 1946-1963 (cont'd)

figure uses the 1960 S.I.C. The lack of a significant difference between the two suggests that, for the public utilities, considerable commonality exists between the two series. Different sources were used for union membership between 1949-1955 and 1956-1963. For those years in which data from the two sources overlap, only slight differences exist. These are likely due to revisions in the constituent data making up the respective series as opposed to differences in the compilation methodology. The results for 1949 to 1955 inclusive are from Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967. The remainder of the series is from Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties.

Sources: K. Ashagrie and J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada 1921-1967 (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1970),: 74; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975),: 16-17, 122-123, (both publications rely heavily on information collected for the Report on Labour Organization in Canada); The Labour Gazette, 1954,: 850-851; 1953,: 1299-1300; 1955,: 444-445, 1956.: 82-83, 1564-1565.

earlier period. The predominance of the A.A.S.E.R.E. in the major centres, with their extensive transit systems and sizeable employment was largely responsible. By contrast, the union's competitors were typically found in the smaller municipalities and were limited by the relatively small number of employees.

Union membership density was assessed using actual and estimated union membership data in combination with employment statistics provided in the Census of Canada and other Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.) publications (See Table 4-22). Membership density was very high throughout the entire period, easily exceeding the eighty per cent level regardless of the methodology employed. The continuity in density, despite fluctuations in the size of the labour force, can be attributed to the strength of the union and its capacity to gain and retain members. The proximity of aggregate union membership to the collective agreement coverage results strongly suggests the existence of mandatory union membership provisions in A.A.S.E.R.E. collective agreements.

When seen in this light, the failure of unionism to extend its penetration of the industry becomes quite understandable. Strictly from a cost-benefit perspective, the effort required to organize the small number of transit workers, still outside the labour movement, simply was not justified in terms of the expected returns. Indeed, it can be strongly argued that the business of the A.A.S.E.R.E., during this period, was principally the maintenance of established bargaining relationships through the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. In this context new organizing would have been largely a

TABLE 4-22. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG URBAN TRANSIT WORKERS IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961

Method A: Census Employment Data

	<u>YEAR</u>		
	<u>1941</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
Number of union members	4,757 ¹ (estimated)	8,545 ¹ (estimated)	7,045 (actual)
Number of urban transit employees	4,851 ² (actual)	8,785 (actual)	7,787 (actual)
Membership density	<u>98%</u>	<u>97%</u>	<u>90%</u>

Method B: Alternative Employment Data

	<u>YEAR</u>		
	<u>1942³</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1961</u>
Number of union members	5,453 ³ (estimated)	8,545 ¹ (estimated)	7,045 (actual)
Number of urban transit employees	6,371 (actual)	10,181 (actual)	7,576 (actual)
Membership density	<u>86%</u>	<u>84%</u>	<u>93%</u>

¹ Union membership in Ontario urban transit was estimated using sixty-five per cent of the total Canadian membership of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees. Between 1956 and 1964 Ontario on average accounted for sixty-five per cent of the national total. This was then used to calculate Ontario union membership for 1941 and 1951, where actual data is unavailable.

² The 1941 Census reports employment in "electric railways", which includes bus drivers working for electric railway systems (4,020), and in "taxi and bus lines". The number of bus drivers in the latter category was obtained from the occupational breakdown and is used as a proxy for the employees of "bus-only" transit systems. The result (831) was added to the number of electric railway employees to produce a crude estimate of industry employment in 1941.

³ Statistics for 1942 are used because employment data for

TABLE 4-22. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG URBAN TRANSIT WORKERS IN ONTARIO, 1941, 1951, 1961 (cont'd)

"bus-only" systems is unavailable for 1941. The calculated union membership uses the national results for 1942 as a base.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. VI, Table 9, 1951, Vol.V, Table 24. 1961, Vol. III, Part 1, Table 17; D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1920-1955; D.B.S., Motor Carriers: Freight-Passenger, 1944-1955; D.B.S., Urban Transit, 1961; Report on Labour Organization, 1941, 1952; J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada Department of Labour, 1975),: 122-123.

peripheral concern. This perhaps explains the proliferation of organizing by other unions in the smaller centres.

4. Municipal Water Works Unions

Union activity concerned exclusively with the organization of water services workers was extremely rare. This was mainly a function of how the provision of the service was structured and reflected the relative scarcity of special purpose bodies concerned solely with water. In many instances, water was included with public works, and thus became a part of general municipal employment, while in others it was grouped with the other utilities in a public utilities commission. Union organizing tended to follow municipal administrative structure. Where water fell within the rubric of public works, the workers were frequently part of the same union that represented works employees. In the case of a public utilities commission, they were often members of the utility worker's union.

The I.B.E.W., the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. all counted water system workers among their number. The International Union of Operating Engineers also did some organizing among water works employees in the 1940s. For the most part these bodies did not survive and the union's overall contribution to the unionization of workers in this industry was almost nil.⁴⁴

Although employment statistics for municipal water services are readily available, the failure of union organizing to follow the S.I.C. means that union membership data for this group is virtually non-existent. This effectively precludes any assessment of membership growth, penetration or union membership density.

Conclusions

With the exception of public transit, local government in Ontario became increasingly unionized between 1935 and 1963. At the beginning of the period unionism in general municipal employment, hydro-electric power and water was minimal. Although the fire fighters had already organized much of their constituency prior to this, they were still able to share in the subsequent growth. The late 1940s and 1950s were a time of considerable expansion for local government. By contrast, public transit after 1945 was an industry in decline. This not only had a dampening affect on union organizing, but also contributed to inter-union competition over the relatively small number of workers still available to be organized or raided.

Unions typically appeared in the largest municipalities first and then spread to progressively smaller centres. In general municipal employment, hydro-electric power and water, outside workers organized first, usually followed by their inside counterparts at a later date. This did not occur to the same extent in public transit. As unionism spread to smaller and smaller municipalities, the return to the organizing union also diminished. This encouraged the organization of large employers in other areas of local government. Diversification occurred in both the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E. groups. Jurisdictional constraints precluded a similar diversification by the other unions active among local government employees.

The extent of employer opposition to the growth of local government unionism is difficult to gauge based merely on a quantitative analysis of union mortality. Significant mortality existed

among both the T.L.C./N.U.P.E. and the C.C.L./N.U.P.S.E. groups. The I.A.F.F., I.B.E.W. and A.A.S.E.R.E., on the other hand, all seem to have enjoyed considerably more organizational stability. These differences may, however, be attributable as much to union characteristics as to the attitudes of the employers they faced. It is perhaps revealing that the level of success ultimately achieved in the organization of local government workers, culminating in the formation of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), in 1963, was largely unanticipated by the N.U.P.E.'s first president.⁴⁵ This and related organizational issues are considered in detail in Chapter 9.

The emergence of widespread local government unionism fundamentally altered the relationship between employer and employee and in doing so introduced a major constraint upon the behaviour of local authorities. Understanding the reasons for this development is thus of tremendous importance.

NOTES

¹ Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66. Study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office, October 1968 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976),: 192. See also: Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker, 1920-33 (Baltimore, Md.: Penquin Books, 1966).

² Jamieson, *ibid.*,: 214-217.

³ *Ibid.*,: 217-218, 277.

⁴ *Ibid.*,: 218.

⁵ *Ibid.*,: 268-269.

⁶ *Ibid.*,: 277-282, 291-294.

⁷ *Ibid.*,: 300-301.

⁸ *Ibid.*,: 345-352.

⁹ Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall of Canada Inc., 1986),: 84-85.

¹⁰ Ontario, Statutes, The Police Amendment Act, 1947, II Geo. VI, ch. 77, s. 10.

¹¹ Unless noted otherwise, the discussion of unionism among Ontario fire fighters is based exclusively on: Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1935-1964 (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization).

¹² With the entry of the United States into World War II, in late 1941, the American government pressured both labour and management to freeze their collective bargaining relationships and avoid damaging industrial conflict. In many instances unions exchanged no strike pledges for "maintenance of membership" concessions from employers. Although there is no direct evidence to support this conclusion, the hiatus in union organizing among fire fighters may well have had its origins in this accommodation. Jamieson, *op. cit.*,: 279.

¹³ George J. Richardson, Symbol of Action: A History of the International Association of Fire Fighters. A.F.L.-C.I.O./C.L.C. (New York: International Association of Fire Fighters, 1974),: 270.

¹⁴ Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

¹⁵ National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "Canadian Union of Public Employees Audio Collection," Garnett Shier,

(First President of the N.U.P.E.). Interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, C.U.P.E. Research Director, June 1, 1977. Shier notes that Mayor Convoy, of the City of Toronto, was extremely supportive of the efforts at forming a union among the inside workers of the City (T.L.C. direct chartered Local 79). He was subsequently invited to unveil their charter. Similar good relations existed between Local 167 and Mayor Lawrence in Hamilton.

16 No aggregated statistics exist as to the actual number of employers exercising this option. Estimates vary, with labour typically arguing that the practice was widespread, while others suggest more modest usage.

17 Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, "Strikes and Lockouts in Canada," 1935-1963.

18 Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11, National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964; The main difficulties associated with organizing at the county level were twofold. First, the labour force was relatively small. Second, rural attitudes have traditionally tended to be unfavourable to unionism of any kind and most county councils consisted of rural members. I am indebted to Professor T.J. Plunkett for this observation.

19 A number of union leaders suspected the provincial government of advising county officials to opt out of the Labour Relations Act, thereby relieving them of any legal responsibility to recognize or negotiate with unions representing their jail employees.

20 Shier, interview, op. cit.

21 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11, National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports 1955-1963.

22 Some N.U.P.E. municipal locals contained workers, such as waterworks, library and hospital employees, who were not included under "local administration" in the Standard Industrial Classification. In the case of N.U.P.S.E. locals, several consisted of both general municipal and utility workers. The result is that union membership in general municipal employment is overstated, although the degree of overstatement is not believed to be significant. With respect to the employment statistics, there is some spillage between local government and the other areas of local government. This results primarily from respondent imprecision in specifying the employer. The overall accuracy of the data is not, however, significantly altered. Art Gardiner, Statistics Canada, telephone conversation regarding employment statistics, April 7, 1989.

23 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.), Municipal

Government Employment 1961-1966 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968). This series includes: A. GENERAL SERVICES: (1) Departmental Activities, (2) Special Activities (such as libraries, arenas, exhibitions, golf courses, etc. B. WATERWORKS SYSTEMS. It does not include: A. MUNICIPAL ENTERPRISES (such as airports, transportation systems, telephone, electric light and power, parking authorities, etc. B. MUNICIPALLY OWNED HOSPITALS. C. SCHOOL BOARDS. D. JOINT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS. E. REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS (other than metropolitan corporations and Ontario counties). The classification system conforms to the organization 1 structure of municipalities and is not compatible with the Standard Industrial Classification. Indeed, the report issues a special caution against equating "general services" with "public administration",: 5.

24 Census data indicates that general municipal employment increased by approximately 137 per cent between 1951 and 1961, as opposed to a mere twenty-nine per cent increased over the previous ten year period. Union membership between 1951 and 1961 grew by only 119 per cent.

25 In 1953, members of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario Employees Association (E.A.) merged with the N.U.P.S.E. and became Local 100 of that union. This added approximately 9,500 members to the N.U.P.S.E.'s rolls, a contribution that remained largely unchanged into the 1960s.

26 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

27 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-11, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946, 1947, 1948.

28 The specifics of this case are discussed in Chapter 9. See: National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "Canadian Union of Public Employees Audio Collection:", Stan Little (President of the N.U.P.S.E. and first President of the C.U.P.E.). Interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, C.U.P.E. Research Director, November 22, 1977.

29 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234; Vol. 1, file 12, National Organization of Civic Utility and Electrical Workers: Convention, 1949.

30 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

31 The Canadian Electrical Trades Union, Local One, was certified as bargaining agent for the inside workers of York Township Hydro in July 1944. The outside workers had been organized by the same union prior to this. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, July 1944.

32 The Municipal Directory for 1983 lists 124 public utility commissions (hydro and water services), 197 hydro-electric commissions and thirteen water service authorities. Such information is not

available prior to this. Ontario, Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Municipal Directory 1983 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1983),: 189-208.

33 The policy of the N.O.C.U.E.W., in such cases, was to attempt to concentrate members employed by different authorities in a single local. The union's constitution also specified that a minimum of four members was required to constitute a local. Despite this support for concentration and its inherent benefits, in several instances workers resisted becoming members of a large local and instead formed a smaller one of their own. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-10, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946, 1947.

34 Disaggregated union membership data, by local, is available for the N.U.P.S.E. and its predecessors, but not for the I.B.E.W. It is, however, possible to estimate I.B.E.W. membership using the N.U.P.S.E. results. Assuming a rough membership equivalency during the 1940s and a two-to-one membership advantage, in favour of the I.B.E.W., by 1961, union membership in the municipal hydro-electric utilities is estimated at 750 in 1941, 2,000 in 1951 and 4,000 in 1961. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-14, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13, National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organizational Service 1960.

35 The only sources of hydro-electric employment data are the Census of Canada and interim labour force surveys. Disaggregated data for the municipal hydro-electric utilities is not available. The relevant series includes municipal workers, those employed by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission (H.E.P.C.), as well as a relatively small number of private sector personnel. Attempting to adjust the series by subtracting the number of H.E.P.C. employees, obtained from the Utility's annual reports, grossly underestimates the municipal share. The source of this problem is indeterminable.

36 The Canadian National Railway was involved in transit provision in St. Catharines and Oshawa until the early 1960s. In Hamilton, the transit system was provincially owned prior to its sale to private interests in 1946. Canadian Urban Transit Association, Proceedings. 1959-1960, 1960-1961; D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1946.

37 The coup de grace appears to have been the introduction of provincial subsidies for municipal transit systems in the early 1970s. The province agreed to subsidize systems up to seventy-five per cent of their operating costs. The private carriers continued to operate, but generally their activities were limited to small centres.

38 The Labour Relations Act did not provide for the continuation of an established collective bargaining relationship, following the

sale of the business, until 1970. Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Act, 1970, ch. 85, s. 22(1).

39 Public transit was generally an industry in decline after 1945. Increased competition from the automobile, plus the need for massive infusions of capital to replace the deteriorating infrastructure, precipitated the exodus of many private sector purveyors. This in turn lead to increased direct provision by municipalities. During this period both the status and wages of transit workers declined relative to other municipal employees such as police and fire fighters. Richard M. Soberman and Heather A. Hazard, eds., Canadian Transit Handbook (Toronto: University of Toronto - York University Joint Program in Transportation, 1980),: 677.

40 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 7, file 16, Trades and Labour Congress: A.A.S.E.R.E. Lawrence O' Connell, V.P., A.A.S.E.R.E. to Percy Bengough, Pres., T.L.C., May 14, 1946; file 18, Trades and Labour Congress: A.A.S.E.R.E. Earl Brenneman, Pres. and Business Agent, A.A.S.E.R.E., Division 1259, Kitchener to Bengough, March 17, 1949; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

41 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964.

42 Report on Labour Organization, 1935-1963.

43 J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa: Canada, Department of Labour, 1975),: 174.

44 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1964. The Ontario Ministry of Labour Collective Agreements Library does not list agreements for most of these, hence it was assumed that they no longer existed.

45 Shier, interview, op. cit.

CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ONTARIO 1935-1963

Introduction

This chapter begins the detailed examination of the hypothesized determinants of local government union growth. It provides the general context in which later chapters concerned with assessing specific determinants must be situated. The years 1935 to 1963 encompass three distinct periods, the latter years of the Great Depression (1935-1939), the War (1939-1945), and finally, the economic boom (1945-1963). Although, each has its unique features, the three are also very much bound together.

The Depression was a time of widespread economic and social dislocation characterized by considerable political instability and state repression. It was followed by World War II, which saw the emergence of an industrial economy in support of the war effort and the deferral of serious consideration of the problems and issues emanating from the Depression. Much of the agenda in post-War Ontario was consequently influenced by the Depression and wartime mobilization. First, there was a huge backlog of demand for both infrastructure provision and consumer durables. Second, the War had transformed an agriculturally oriented society into an industrial society in a relatively short period of time. Third, after slow growth during the 1930s, largely due to a declining birth rate, the population increased

dramatically over the next two decades and was increasingly concentrated in large urban centres. Finally, recoiling from the deprivation of the 1930s, citizens anticipated far greater economic security than in the past and increasingly looked to government to play an active role to ensure it.¹

The Depression, War and subsequent economic expansion exerted tremendous pressure on all governments, but particularly at the local level. Collectively, the entire period witnessed a transformation in the nature and role of local government, as it attempted to meet these challenges. The main features of each period will be discussed. The hypothesized determinants of local government union growth, such as changes in the labour force, compensation, public policy and the organizational characteristics of unions and local authorities, can only be properly understood when viewed against this backdrop.

The chapter also examines the argument that general societal support for unionism must exist for union growth to occur. As noted in chapter 2, there is considerable debate concerning the relative importance of public policy in union formation and growth. Some argue that favourable public policy simply reflects more fundamental societal support for unions, while others suggest that public policy is a primary determinant in its own right.² The role played by the general level of public support for unionism assumes far greater importance in the public sector. Public sector employers are far more vulnerable to public opinion than their private sector counterparts. Failure of politicians to respond in the appropriate manner may result in their electoral demise. This is critical from the perspective of

understanding the typical response of employers to the unionization of their workers. Unfortunately, this class of variables is among the most difficult to operationalize. Attempts to model the general level of public support for unionism, using electoral support for a particular political party, are fraught with methodological and conceptual complications and have produced mixed results. If the formulation is valid, then electoral support for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) and its successor the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.), as the "left-wing" or pro-labour party, should be positively related to the growth of local government unionism. The chapter will critically examine the utility of using provincial electoral results to proxy public support for union activity by local government employees.

1. The Great Depression

The Great Depression of the 1930s was a world wide phenomenon characterized by massive unemployment, price deflation, reduced production and the general collapse of international trade. The Canadian economy, with its dependence upon primary production and raw materials export, was particularly hard hit as countries raised tariff barriers in an effort to protect indigenous industry. A severe drought in 1932-33 exacerbated the situation in the wheat producing provinces of Western Canada. Ontario, with its profitable gold mines and more diversified economic base, generally did not suffer as much as many of the other provinces. Gross National Product (G.N.P.) fell from 6.1 billion in 1929 to 3.5 billion in 1933. By 1933, approximately fifteen to twenty per cent of the Canadian population was dependent upon municipal assistance and roughly twenty-five per cent of the male

labour force was unemployed.³

Government policy at the onset of the Depression was to attempt to maintain balanced budgets. This was the typical response at all three levels of government.⁴ Taxes were increased to offset declines in revenues resulting from the downturn. Public expenditures were also significantly reduced between 1930 and 1933. Public employees suffered both pay cuts and layoffs as their employers sought to reduce spending.⁵ This general response ultimately only added to the economic malaise. The federal government remained visibly reluctant to increase its expenditures throughout the 1930s, even after the demonstrated contribution of increased government spending in the context of the American New Deal.⁶

The provision of social assistance in Canada, prior to the emergence of the welfare state, was traditionally viewed as the responsibility of charitable organizations and as a last resort, municipal government. However, neither the charities nor municipal governments were able to cope with the tremendous growth in the number of needy. The principal source of municipal government revenue was the property tax. Faced with soaring welfare costs and widespread tax delinquency, many municipalities either became bankrupt or teetered on the brink. Provincial governments became increasingly concerned with regulating their financial affairs and ensuring their solvency.⁷ In Ontario, municipalities defaulting on their debentures were subject to direct administration by the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board (O.R.M.B.). In 1932, the system of provincial supervision was expanded with the reconfiguration of the O.R.M.B. as the Ontario Municipal Board

(O.M.B.). Both the powers and jurisdiction of the new board were substantially increased. In 1935, a Department of Municipal Affairs was added to the supervisory regime. During the Depression, almost all of the suburban municipalities surrounding the City of Toronto failed financially and came under provincial control.⁸

It is generally accepted that the Depression played an important role in the tremendous growth in aggregate Canadian union membership in the late 1930s and particularly in the 1940s. This is true whether the Depression is viewed as a primary source of discontent in its own right or as a catalytic agent responsible for releasing pent-up economic, social and political forces of a more fundamental nature. The resurgence of unionism, in the second half of the 1930s, was accompanied by a marked increase in the level of strike activity. The number of Canadian workers on strike in 1937 was only exceeded by the record set in 1919 (See Table 5-1). Over half of the time lost in 1936-37 was attributable to recognition strikes. Jamieson suggests that much of the militancy of this period can be explained in terms the desire to redress years of wage cuts, unemployment and general deprivation. It was also very much a reaction to government suppression of unionism and social protest. This momentum was temporarily lost toward the end of the decade due to a short, but severe recession in 1939 and disputes within the labour movement itself.⁹

2. World War II

When the War began in 1939, Canada had not fully emerged from the Depression. Unemployment still remained relatively high at twelve per cent and the recovery was not evenly distributed across all sectors of

TABLE 5-1. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN CANADA, 1901-1963

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Workers Involved</u>	<u>Time lost (days)</u>
1901	99	24,089	737,808
1902	125	12,709	203,301
1903	175	38,408	858,959
1904	103	11,420	192,890
1905	96	12,513	246,138
1906	150	23,382	378,276
1907	188	34,060	520,142
1908	76	26,071	703,571
1909	90	18,114	880,663
1910	101	22,203	731,324
1911	100	29,285	1,821,084
1912	181	42,869	1,135,786
1913	152	40,519	1,036,254
1914	63	9,717	490,850
1915	63	11,395	95,042
1916	120	26,538	236,814
1917	160	50,255	1,123,515
1918	230	79,743	647,942
1919	336	148,915	3,400,942
1920	322	60,327	799,524
1921	168	28,257	1,048,914
1922	104	43,775	1,528,661
1923	86	34,261	671,750
1924	70	34,310	1,295,054
1925	87	28,949	1,193,281
1926	77	23,834	266,601
1927	74	22,299	152,570
1928	98	17,581	224,212
1929	90	12,946	152,080
1930	67	13,766	91,707
1931	88	10,736	204,238
1932	116	23,390	255,000
1933	125	26,558	317,547
1934	191	45,800	547,519
1935	120	33,269	288,703
1936	156	34,812	276,997
1937	278	71,905	886,393
1938	147	20,395	148,678
1939	122	41,038	224,588
1940	168	60,619	266,318
1941	231	87,091	433,914
1942	354	113,916	450,202
1943	402	218,404	1,041,198
1944	199	75,290	490,139
1945	197	96,068	1,457,420
1946	226	138,914	4,515,030
1947	234	103,370	2,366,340

TABLE 5-1. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN CANADA, 1901-1963 (cont'd)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Workers Involved</u>	<u>Time Lost (days)</u>
1948	154	42,820	885,790
1949	135	46,867	1,036,820
1950	160	192,083	1,387,500
1951	258	102,793	901,620
1952	219	112,273	2,765,510
1953	173	54,488	1,312,720
1954	173	56,630	1,430,300
1955	159	60,090	1,875,400
1956	229	88,680	1,246,000
1957	245	80,695	1,477,100
1958	259	111,475	2,816,850
1959	216	95,120	2,226,890
1960	274	49,408	738,700
1961	287	97,959	1,335,080
1962	311	74,332	1,417,900
1963	332	83,428	917,140

Source: F.H. Leachy, Editor, Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd. ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983),: E190-197.

the economy. As the economy geared up for the war, both excess production capacity and unemployment quickly disappeared. The full impact of war related expenditures was not, however, felt until late 1940. By 1941 there was actually a labour shortage. Consumer goods and services became increasingly scarce as resources were diverted to war production. This exerted considerable upward pressure on consumer prices. Between 1939 and 1941. the consumer price index (C.P.I.) increased eighteen per cent (See Table 5-2).¹⁰

With the outbreak of war, the federal government invoked the War Measures Act, 1914 and greatly extended its authority over a host of areas normally under provincial constitutional jurisdiction, including labour relations.¹¹ Federal labour relations policy during the War is assessed in detail in chapter 8. Despite a definite inflationary trend, wage and price controls did not appear until December 1940. Indeed, during the first two years of the war, Copp argues that the federal government merely responded to changes in the Canadian economy as opposed to directing them. This ceased to be the case in late 1941. By then it appeared that the country was in the midst of an inflationary spiral not unlike that of the first two years of World War I. The government concluded that more substantial and direct intervention on its part was required to bring this problem under control.¹²

In October 1941, the National War Labour Board (N.W.L.B.) and nine Regional Boards were established under P.C. 8253. The Order also made increases to basic wage rates in all industries illegal without N.W.L.B. or Regional board approval. Increases were to be authorized only where existing wages were low. A price freeze was introduced in

**TABLE 5-2. CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (C.P.I.) FOR CANADA, 1920-1963
(1920=100)**

<u>Year</u>	<u>C.P.I.</u>	<u>Percentage Change</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>C.P.I.</u>	<u>Percentage Change</u>
1920	100.00	N/A	1941	74.40	+ .06
1921	88.03	- .12	1942	77.90	+ .05
1922	80.66	- .08	1943	79.10	+ .02
1923	81.00	.00	1944	79.74	+ .01
1924	79.37	- .02	1945	80.11	.00
1925	80.00	+ .01	1946	82.87	+ .03
1926	81.00	+ .01	1947	90.61	+ .09
1927	79.74	- .02	1948	103.68	+ .14
1928	79.93	.00	1949	106.81	+ .03
1929	80.85	+ .01	1950	109.94	+ .03
1930	80.29	- .01	1951	121.55	+ .11
1931	72.56	- .10	1952	124.49	+ .02
1932	66.00	- .09	1953	123.39	- .01
1933	62.62	- .05	1954	124.13	+ .01
1934	63.72	+ .02	1955	124.31	.00
1935	64.09	+ .01	1956	126.15	+ .01
1936	65.38	+ .02	1957	130.20	+ .03
1937	67.40	+ .03	1958	133.70	+ .03
1938	68.14	+ .01	1959	135.17	+ .01
1939	67.59	- .01	1960	136.83	+ .01
1940	70.35	+ .04	1961	138.12	+ .01
			1962	139.78	+ .01
			1963	142.17	+ .02

Source: P.H. Leacy, Editor, Historical Statistics of Canada, 2nd. ed. (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983),: K8-18.

December of the same year. With price controls came rationing. P.C. 8253 was superseded in July 1942, by P.C. 5963. The new order was largely a consolidation of previous Orders, with some relatively minor amendments. Both Orders provided for a cost of living bonus. In December 1943, a further modification to the wage control program was made. P.C. 9384 incorporated all existing cost of living bonuses into basic pay rates and provided that no more bonuses were to be paid. Henceforth, the N.W.L.B. would approve requests for wage increases only if it could be demonstrated that "gross inequity or gross injustice" existed.¹³

By the end of 1943, the federal government's price control program had been extremely successful. The consumer price index levelled off and food prices actually declined in 1943. However, the wage control program, limitations on labour mobility and other restrictions, as well as the failure to enact labour relations legislation incorporating American "Wagner Act principles", had greatly contributed to a hornet's nest of labour discontent and militancy. 1943 was a record year for strikes, surpassed only by 1919. The majority were for union recognition and increasingly such disputes were concentrated in industries critical to the war effort. In February 1944, the government suspended much of its existing labour relations legislation and introduced P.C. 1003. The Order was an amalgamation of the traditional Canadian approach to labour relations, with its emphasis on dispute resolution, and the collective bargaining principles embodied in the American Wagner Act. It is considered in detail in Chapter 8. The Order's immediate effect was to greatly reduce labour opposition to the

government. In 1944 and 1945, the number of strikes and time lost fell off sharply relative to 1943 levels and there were no major strikes until the end of the War.¹⁴ Jamieson notes that the federal government's overall performance in managing the wartime economy was in many respects exemplary. By contrast, its approach to labour relations, during the first four years of the war was characterized by "weakness, indecision and the absence of planning and foresight". After a brief pause, in 1944-45, strike activity set new records for time lost in 1946. 1947 also saw approximately the same number of strikes and, although the time lost was reduced by almost half, it was still only exceeded by the results for 1919 and 1946. Union demands for improved security as well as better terms and conditions of employment, for their members, were central issues in many of these disputes. After 1947, the time lost declined sharply from 1946-47 levels. Jamieson argues that, from the perspective of unionism and industrial relations, World War II and perhaps even 1946-47, can be seen as an acceleration of trends initiated in the 1930s. Each successive wave of union growth and strike activity crested higher than the last, culminating in the events of 1946-47. The end of the war saw the release of pent-up frustrations over the many restrictions imposed by government during the conflict. Thereafter, labour militancy and unrest largely subsided. Unionism in Canada continued to gain both numerical strength and bargaining power, but at a declining rate.¹⁵

There was considerable concern during the War about the nature of the post-war economy. A number of noted economists predicted a return to depression conditions more severe than those of the 1930s.

However, the anticipated problems largely failed to appear. The conversion to a peacetime economy took place rapidly. Pent-up demand for consumer goods and durables ensured that industrial capacity remained fully utilized and provided the basis for a rapid economic expansion.¹⁶ 1946 saw the gradual relaxation of controls on wages and prices imposed during the war. By December 1946, wages and salaries were no longer subject to government regulation.¹⁶ Consumer prices increased by nine per cent in 1947 and by fourteen per cent in 1948.

3. The Economic Boom

Following World War II Ontario underwent an extraordinary economic and social transformation. Its principal features were three fold. First, there was massive growth in the productive capacity and output of all sectors of the economy. Despite recessions in 1954, 1957-58 and 1960-61, the economy still continued to generate rising incomes and a relatively low level of unemployment. This growth produced fundamental changes in both social and political relations. The post-war generation became accustomed to a never increasing material standard of living. The role of government in the economy, and indeed in society as a whole, changed fundamentally as the tenets of laissez-faire were discarded in favour of Keynesian economics.

Second, between 1945 and 1960, the provincial population grew at a phenomenal rate, posting increases in excess of 2.8 per cent per year throughout the period. The pace slowed only slightly in the 1960s. Immigration accounted for about one-third of this. In addition to growing rapidly, the population also became increasingly urbanized. While urbanization facilitated economic development by supplying both a

concentrated labour force as well as a market for finished goods, it placed tremendous demands on the economic and social infrastructure. The population explosion was not confined to the largest centres, but it was here that the pressures it created attained the most serious dimensions. On top of this, there were changes in the age composition of the population. Growth at both ends of the age continuum necessitated increased government spending on education for the young and health and social services for the elderly.

Finally, economic expansion and increased urbanization facilitated the transformation of the Ontario economy in terms of the relative importance of its constituent sectors. Primary goods production was rapidly superseded by secondary manufacturing as the base of the economy. Industrialization resulted in a host of economic and social problems, which mandated increased government involvement. The concentration of economic development in a relatively limited area of the province only worsened the situation.

In response to these overall changes, the provincial government increasingly assumed an unprecedented role in Ontario's economic and social affairs. At the municipal level, population growth, increased urbanization and industrialization produced tremendous demands for the entire range of public services. The large backlog of public works deferred during the Depression and the war only added to the overall scale of the problem. The late 1940s and early 1950s saw massive public expenditures, primarily in the area of hard service infrastructure provision. With this came a substantial increase in the level of provincial financial involvement. The magnitude of the servicing

demands dictated that municipalities could not begin to respond adequately without large scale provincial assistance.¹⁸

Prior to 1945, the province provided only relatively small unconditional grants to municipalities. These had been introduced largely as compensation when the province removed their right to tax individual incomes and corporate profits. In fiscal year 1942-43, such contributions accounted for a mere eighteen per cent of provincial revenues. Beginning in 1945, the province greatly expanded its transfers to municipalities in the form of conditional grants. Municipalities increasingly became administrative adjuncts of the province as they modified their service provision to comply with the conditions specified the grants. Municipal authorities became the delivery mechanism for provincially determined and funded services. By the 1962-63 fiscal year, local government bodies collectively received over forty-five per cent of total provincial revenue.¹⁹ This funding was provided in the broader context of a provincial economic policy geared to promoting and facilitating economic growth through the provision of a hospitable environment. It was only in the 1960s that quality of life issues began to emerge as important concerns. The tremendous expansion in municipal level service provision resulted in substantial growth in public sector employment at this level. The empirical dimensions of this phenomenon are considered in detail in Chapter 6. The availability of provincial monies may well have made municipal politicians more receptive to union activity by their employees, with the possibility of higher labour costs, than if the municipality had to foot the entire bill. However, it is important to

remember that the municipalities themselves also made significant financial expenditures to provide services and hence the argument should not be taken too far.

4. Provincial Politics 1934-1963²⁰

In marked contrast to the socio-economic turbulence that characterized Ontario between 1930 and 1963, provincial politics were remarkably stable. In 1934, after a prolonged period of Conservative rule, the Liberals under Mitch Hepburn formed the provincial government. Coming to power at a time of considerable economic hardship, Hepburn espoused a mixture of populism and traditional values not unlike that then found in other parts of the country. Although initially rhetorically supportive of the rights of labour, this proved not to be the case in practice. In 1937, he personally intervened in a recognition strike between the fledgling United Auto Workers of America, (U.A.W.) which was an affiliate of the American Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.) and General Motors in Oshawa. Hepburn was convinced that C.I.O. unionism was in fact a communist plot aimed at paralysing Ontario industry and its very profitable gold mines. The Oshawa strike ended without the union gaining formal recognition. Despite the resignation of two prominent cabinet ministers in protest, his actions apparently enjoyed considerable public support. The strike became the main issue in the 1937 provincial general election, which the Liberals won handily. Jamieson notes that Hepburn's success in opposing the C.I.O. set the development of industrial unionism in the province back several years. At a more general level, it encouraged employer resistance to unions and contributed to the delay in adopting

legislation supportive of unions and collective bargaining.²¹

In 1942, Hepburn resigned as Premier, but continued as Provincial Treasurer. By then, however, scandals, the ongoing feud with Mackenzie King and his own erratic behaviour seriously had undermined the Liberal party. He was succeeded by Gordon Conant, the provincial Attorney-General. In April 1943, a leadership convention selected Harry Nixon to lead the Party. Nixon promptly called an election for August 4th. In the interim, the Liberals passed the Collective Bargaining Act in April 1943. The events leading up to the introduction of the Act, its significance and general provisions, especially with respect to local government employment, are discussed at length in Chapter 8. Politics aside, labour relations between a municipality and its employees appears to have been regarded as essentially a municipal matter. Municipal authorities were specifically excluded from the Act, but allowed to opt into and out of its coverage at their discretion. Although the legislation was welcomed by organized labour, its passage was not sufficient to keep the Liberals in office.²²

The 1943 election was an important watershed in Ontario politics. A minority Conservative government, under George Drew, came to power. While the demise of the Liberals had been anticipated, the spectacular electoral performance of the C.C.F. came as a surprise (See Table 5-3). With no seats in the Legislature, following the 1937 Liberal sweep, the Party polled thirty-two per cent of the popular vote to gain thirty-four seats. The Conservatives won thirty-eight seats, while the Liberals finished a poor third, with a mere sixteen seats. The success of the C.C.F. mirrored its increased popularity federally and in

TABLE 5-3. ONTARIO ELECTION RESULTS, BY SEATS WON AND POPULAR VOTE, 1919-1963

Year	CONSERVATIVES		LIBERALS		C.C.F./N.D.P.		OTHER ¹	
	Seats	Pop. Vote	Seats	Pop. Vote	Seats	Pop. Vote	Seats	Pop. Vote
1919	25	33%	28	26%	11	10% ²	47	31%
1923	75	50%	14	21%	4	5% ²	18	24%
1926	74	56%	21	22%	1	1% ²	16	21%
1929	92	57%	13	32%	1	1% ²	6	10%
1934	17	40%	70	50%	1	7% ³	2	3%
1937	23	40%	66	51%	0	5% ³	1	4%
1943	38	36%	16	31%	34	32% ³	2	1%
1945	66	44%	14	30%	8	22% ³	2	4%
1948	53	41%	14	30%	21	27% ³	2	2%
1951	79	48%	8	32%	2	19% ³	1	1%
1955	84	49%	11	33%	3	17% ³	0	0%
1963	77	48%	24	35%	7	16% ⁴	0	0%

¹ United Farmers or Progressives won all "other" seats from 1919 to 1937, with the exception of two in 1919 and one in 1923. Their popular vote was 24%, 22%, 11%, 5%, 1% and 1% respectively from 1919 to 1937. The "others" from 1943 to 1951 were Communists.

² Labour Party

³ C.C.F.

⁴ N.D.P.

Source: Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986),: 318.

several other provinces. Although Drew was known for his extreme conservative views on a number of subjects, he quickly consolidated his position by introducing a twenty-two point package of economic and social reforms. The Party also added the "Progressive" prefix to its name. These initiatives laid the foundation for a Conservative majority government in the 1945 election. The Liberals became the official opposition while the C.C.F., battered by an aggressive propaganda campaign, fell to third place. Thereafter, the Conservatives were returned with successive majorities until 1975.

At the end of the War two main issues dominated provincial economic policy. The first involved the provision of the hard service infrastructure needed to support and promote the anticipated rapid post-war economic expansion. The second concerned the reduction of the heavy debt load accumulated by the province and municipalities during the 1930s. The reform of the municipal taxation system was identified as an important priority in this latter regard. In 1944, approximately twenty per cent of all provincial revenue was used for debt servicing. The promotion of industrial expansion and economic growth remained a dominant theme, in economic policy, throughout the study period. The government also enjoyed considerable success in debt reduction. Municipal tax reform was, however, never undertaken²³.

Following the loss of his seat in the 1948 general election, Drew continued briefly as Premier and then left provincial politics to become leader of the federal Progressive Conservative Party. Thomas Kennedy, the Minister of Agriculture, served as Premier on an interim basis in the wake of his departure. During Drew's tenure both the

Police Act²⁴ and the Fire Departments Act²⁵ were amended to incorporate specific provisions governing labour relations between the respective groups and their employers. The details of these changes are discussed in Chapter 8.

In 1949, Leslie Frost became Premier, a position which he held until 1961. Although, the period was generally characterized by considerable emphasis on the development of hard service infrastructure, there were also important initiatives in agricultural, labour and social policy. By 1959, a hospital insurance plan, half funded by the federal government, had been introduced. On the negative side, the government was plagued by a succession of scandals. With respect to municipal labour relations, the Labour Relations Act was amended in 1950 to include municipal authorities unless they exercised their right to opt out of its coverage. In 1958, the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature recommended that Section 78 of the Act, which provided this entitlement, be deleted. There was, however, some municipal opposition to this change and ultimately the provision remained intact until 1966. Generally, the government seems to have continued its approach of leaving the framework for municipal labour relations up to the employing municipality. The only hint of direct involvement came in the early 1960s, when it was alleged that the government abetted certain municipalities in opting out of the Act in response to the unionization of their jail employees.²⁶ The province subsequently assumed responsibility for jails in 1968.²⁷

Jamieson describes the 1950s as a period of stability and economic growth characterized by widespread optimism, complacency and

successor, the N.D.P., may serve as a reasonable indicator of the general socio-political climate, it is not particularly informative with respect to local government unionism. It was during the "conservative" and "complacent" 1950s that municipal unions made their greatest gains, both in terms of membership and sector penetration. The connection is further weakened by the fact that, during the period under study, most local government unions in Ontario were non-partisan, both officially and unofficially. They were also known for their lack of militancy. These features of municipal unionism are considered in depth in Chapter 9.

Conclusions

There is little doubt that, with the obvious exception of the 1930s, the overall economic, social and political environment of the period generally favoured union growth. The emergence of municipal unionism in Ontario coincided with both the dramatic expansion of aggregate Canadian unionism and the transformation of the local level of government. Many of the factors directly contributing to union activity among municipal employees have their origins in this latter development. The wage cuts and layoffs introduced during the worst of the Depression, and the subsequent reluctance on the part of many employers to reinstate former pay levels, once the recovery was well established, largely reflected the general financial malaise that existed among local governments at the time. Municipalities were squeezed and they in turn squeezed their employees. Wartime wage controls, although not directly applicable to the municipal level in Ontario, provided an effective justification for the maintenance of the

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status quo during the War. The post-war economic boom placed different pressures on local government. Instead of retrenchment, the provision of an expanded service infrastructure now dominated the agenda. As a consequence of this increased role, local government employment grew significantly, particularly in the 1950s. Established relationships, understandings and practices in municipal government employment were undoubtedly strained by all of these developments. Union formation was a logical, defensive response on the part of workers confronted with such instability.

Finally, attempts to estimate the level of general public support for unionism, utilizing provincial election results, and to correlate this with the growth of local government unions were clearly unsatisfactory. Popular support for the left-wing or pro-labour party declined significantly at precisely the same time as local government unionism experienced its greatest gains. The specification is also theoretically crude. Most rank and file trade unionists were and remain adherents to the tenets of "pragmatic" or "bread and butter unionism", which essentially holds that the appropriate role of unions is to improve the terms and conditions of employment for their members. Ventures into partisan politics are to be avoided. In terms of their partisan political preferences, they are distributed across the spectrum. This is not to suggest that public support for local government unionism was not an important factor, but rather that using election statistics as a proxy for this support is in this case inappropriate.

NOTES

1 Vernon Lang, The Service State Emerges in Ontario 1945-1973 (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1974),: 1-5; D.R. Richmond, The Economic Transformation of Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1974); 1-5.

2 Refer to Chapter 2, pages 29-32 for the discussion of this issue.

3 The Income Security System in Canada: Report prepared by the Interprovincial Task Force on Social Security for the Interprovincial Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Services. (Ottawa: Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, 1980),: 14.

4 Provincial governments in Alberta and British Columbia did not follow this general trend.

5 In the case of the City of Toronto, the proceeds of a ten per cent across the board wage reduction, were used to fund the City's relief efforts. This was done with the consent of the various unions and associations then representing the City's employees. They apparently concluded that the cuts would be made with or without their participation and consequently decided to appear magnanimous. National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Garnett Shier (First President of the N.U.P.E.), interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., Toronto: June 1, 1977.

6 J.C. Strick, Canadian Public Finance (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Limited: 1973),: 97-98, 135; In fairness it should be noted that the New Deal enjoyed only limited success in a number of areas. For a detailed discussion of the New Deal see: J.D. Hicks, Republican Ascendency (1960) and W.E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal (1963).

7 The Income Security System in Canada, op. cit.,: 14.

8 Warren Magnusson, "Toronto," in Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, eds., City Politics in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,: 1983),: 106-107.

9 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Industrial Conflict in Canada 1900-1966. Study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office, October 1968. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976),: 218, 250, 268-69.

10 Strick, op. cit.,: 135.

11 The Defence of Canada Regulations and the Natural Resources Mobilization Act were of particular importance in the consolidation of the federal control over the economy.

- 12 Terry Copp, "The Rise of Industrial Unions in Montreal 1935-1945," Relations Industrielles 37, 4 (1982),: 862.
- 13 Canada, Department of Labour, Wage Rates and Hours of Labour in Canada, 1946: Report No. 29,: 3-4.
- 14 Jamieson, op. cit.,: 277-282, 292-295; See also: Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System during World War Two," Labour/Le Travailleur 3 (1978),: 189-195.
- 15 Jamieson, op. cit.,: 292, 295, 301-302.
- 16 Strick, op. cit.,: 136-138.
- 17 Wage Rates and Hours of Labour In Canada, 1946, op. cit.,: 4; Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, (December) 1946.: 1690.
- 18 Richmond, op. cit.,: 1-9; Lionel D. Feldman, Ontario 1945-1973: The Municipal Dynamic (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council., 1974),: 1-12; Lang, The Service State Emerges in Ontario, op. cit.
- 19 Rand Dyck, Provincial Politics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1986),: .
- 20 Based on the Ontario section in Dyck, *ibid.*
- 21 Jamieson, op. cit.,: 259.
- 22 MacDowell, op. cit.,: 190.
- 23 Richmond, op. cit.,: 11-12.
- 24 Ontario, Statutes, The Police Amendment Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 77.
- 25 Ontario, Statutes, The Fire Department's Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 37.
- 26 There is no documentary evidence to support this allegation.
- 27 Court administration was completely taken over by the province in 1968. Lang, op. cit.,: 43.
- 28 Jamieson, op. cit.,: 345-349.
- 29 Dyck, op. cit.,:
- 30 The Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967 and the Ontario Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1972, extended bargaining rights to federal and Ontario government employees, respectively.

CHAPTER 6

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION GROWTH: LABOUR FORCE VARIABLES

Introduction

This chapter is the first of five concerned with examining the hypothesized determinants of local government union growth. It is followed by chapters which explore the contribution of worker compensation, public policy, union variables and finally, employer attitudes and behaviour.

Here, the hypothesis that the growth of unionism among local government employees was positively influenced by changes in the size, distribution and composition of local government employment is assessed. Specifically, employment and unemployment trends, occupational characteristics and labour force composition are evaluated to determine the extent to which the relationships predicted in the union growth literature are valid in this case. Each is considered in turn.

According to the literature, aggregate union membership will be positively affected by employment growth, if that growth occurs where unions are already established. Employment growth is said to influence the propensity to unionize through the administrative changes that typically come with larger work units. In addition, larger groups should also make it more difficult for the employer to discriminate

against workers for union activity. In the short-term, unemployment is negatively related to union growth, although large scale economic dislocation may generate grievances, which over the longer term increase the propensity to unionize. Occupationally, workers possessing a "strategic advantage" will typically organize before those with less bargaining power. Outside or operating employees are also usually more likely to unionize before their inside or clerical counterparts. Finally, with respect to labour force composition, age, education, experience, family responsibilities and ethnicity are all said to influence the propensity to unionize. Variations attributed to sex are generally regarded as spurious, masking the actual occupational determinants. Education is typically negatively related to unionism, while family responsibilities have a positive impact. The results are inconclusive for age and experience, although younger workers are generally seen as more militant and hence more likely to unionize.

1. Municipal Employment

a. Employment and Unemployment Trends

The main source of aggregated municipal employment data for Ontario, prior to the 1960s, is the decennial Census of Canada. Despite some problems with comparability over time, the Census provides a reasonable overview of trends in general municipal employment. Somewhat more problematic is the fact that these statistics are only available in ten year intervals. This poses a severe limitation on any assessment of the relationship between downturns in economic activity and municipal employment practices. Needless to say, neither the 1931 or 1941 Census results adequately reflect municipal employment at the

trough of the Great Depression. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the number of municipal labourers reported in 1931 may be inflated due to the erroneous inclusion of relief work labourers. Such workers should have been classified as construction workers.¹

Prior to World War II, the size of the civic service in Ontario was relatively small compared to the size it would later attain (See Table 6-1). After modest growth between 1911 and 1921, pre-War employment peaked in 1931, increasing twenty-three per cent over its previous level. By 1941, however, a slight decline had occurred. Whether this resulted from an inflated 1931 statistic or actually reflected decreased employment due to retrenchment during the Depression is unknown. After the War general municipal employment increased tremendously, growing twenty-three per cent between 1941 and 1951 and a whopping 137 per cent over the next ten years. Growth moderated during the 1960s with total employment gaining only twenty-four per cent over the decade.

There were also changes in the distribution of employment among municipalities.² Two developments are of particular importance. First, between 1931 and 1961, the share of total municipal employment held by urban municipalities with populations of 10,000 or more declined by approximately thirty per cent, even though the total number of employers in this class increased substantially. To a large degree this finding reflects the tremendous increases in population and municipal employment which occurred in traditionally non-urban areas following World War II. Most of this expansion was concentrated in the Greater Toronto area. By the mid-1950s, the townships of York, North York, East

TABLE 6-1. GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT, BY SEX AND DECENNIAL PER CENT CHANGE FOR ONTARIO, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961

Year	Employment		Total
	Males	Females	
1911 ¹	13,434 (N/A)	287 (N/A)	13,721 (N/A)
1921 ¹	13,923 (+4%)	698 (+143%)	14,621 (+7%)
1931	16,572 (+19%)	1,446 (+107%)	18,018 (+23%)
1941 ²	15,048 (+7%)	1,622 (+12%)	16,670 (-7%)
1951	17,822 (+18%)	2,662 (+64%)	20,484 (+23%)
1961	43,362 (+143%)	6,207 (+33%)	48,569 (+137%)

¹ Waterworks employees are included in the municipal employment totals for 1911 and 1921.

² The 1941 results include those on active service. Excluding active service, there were 14,243 male employees in 1941. The number of females was unchanged.

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.), Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 16; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1.

York, Scarborough and Etobicoke had combined populations in excess of 400,000 and collectively employed over 3,000 workers, including police and fire fighters. Municipal employment in these jurisdictions was not reported individually in the Census until 1971, by that time they had become urban entities in their own right. The extent of their contribution to total municipal employment, a decade earlier, can be assessed by examining Census Metropolitan Area Data for the Greater Toronto area. In 1961, 6,850 municipal workers were reported for the City of Toronto. However, within the City's Census Metropolitan Area, the number soared to 18,904. Even allowing for domiciling errors, the evidence is irrefutable.

Second, distribution changes also occurred among the urban municipalities themselves. From 1931 to 1961, the largest municipalities accounted for a steadily decreasing share of itemized, urban municipal employment. This resulted from population and employment growth in the smaller and medium sized municipalities. This growth may well have been necessary before municipal unionism could successfully expand beyond its foothold in the larger centres. The subsequent growth of employment in jurisdictions with less than 10,000 people may have been a necessary prerequisite for the spread of unionism to this group.

There are two alternative sources of municipal employment data. Both cover broader constituencies than the census and consequently yield larger employment estimates. Municipal Government Employment, later Local Government Employment, is based on the organizational structure of municipal government as opposed to the Standard Industrial

Classification (S.I.C.). The series begins in 1961 (See Table 6-2). The other source is Taxation Statistics. The constituency here is occupational and the estimates of municipal government employment are the highest of the three. Data is available commencing with the 1946 taxation year (See Table 6-3).

According to the Local Government Employment statistics, the number of employees increased approximately sixty per cent between 1961 and 1971, surpassing the census growth rate by a considerable amount. The gap between the two series also increases markedly over the same period, indicating that municipal service provision continued to expand significantly during the 1960s, although much of it was beyond the bounds of traditional local government administration.

Decennial employment growth calculated using Taxation Statistics generally conforms to the census results for the years 1941-1951 and 1951-1961. However, after 1961, the same divergence found using Local Government Employment data is evident. Over the course of the 1960s municipal employment based on Taxation Statistics increased a substantial seventy-four per cent.

All three series overstate the actual number of "employees" by including occupations, such as judges, officials, managers, etc., not normally considered to be employees. In calculating union membership density, it is necessary to distinguish those actually eligible for union membership from the aggregated total. Unfortunately, there is no empirical basis for accomplishing this.

The statistics necessary for an analysis of seasonality in municipal government employment only become available in 1961.³ There

**TABLE 6-2. GENERAL MUNICIPAL AND WATER WORKS EMPLOYMENT IN ONTARIO,
1961-1964**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population Category</u>					
	<u>Over 50,000</u>		<u>10,000 To 50,000</u>		<u>Less Than 10,000¹</u>	<u>Total</u>
	<u>General Services</u>	<u>Water Works</u>	<u>General Services</u>	<u>Water Works</u>	<u>General Services And Water Works²</u>	<u>General Services And Water Works</u>
1961	33,548	1,990	8,596	767	13,754	58,655
1962	34,706	2,075	9,026	786	14,407	61,000
1963	35,780	2,107	9,645	759	15,009	63,300
1964	36,646	2,084	9,825	758	15,632	64,945

¹ This category also includes all rural municipalities.

² The waterworks component was not separated from general municipal employment in this category.

Source: D.B.S., Municipal Government Employment 1961-1964.

TABLE 6-3. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT IN ONTARIO FROM TAXATION STATISTICS, 1946-1964

<u>Taxation Year</u>	<u>Number of Taxpayers</u>
1946	26,790 ¹
1947	26,710
1948	30,900
1949	25,620
1950	27,860
1951	31,170
1952	36,250
1953	38,410
1954	42,590
1955	44,450
1956	45,987
1957	49,116
1958	51,759
1959	57,848
1960	71,298
1961	72,838
1962	76,478
1963	82,474
1964	81,214

¹ Between 1946 and 1955, inclusive, the occupational classification was "Municipal and Smaller Governments". In 1956, this was changed to simply "Municipal Governments". There is no notation regarding any series incompatibility resulting from this change.

Source: Canada, Department of National Revenue: Taxation Division, Taxation Statistics 1946-1964.

is obviously some risk associated with transferring conclusions based on this and subsequent data to the earlier period. Nevertheless, a few broad observations can be made. Municipal employment appears to be subject to significant variation depending on the time of the year. Employment is typically highest during the summer months, probably due to the influx of summer students, enhanced recreational programs and work on road construction and related projects. By contrast, in the first four months of the calendar year, and particularly in March and April, employment tends to be at its lowest relative to the rest of the year. The results indicate considerable fluctuation in employment over the course of the year and strongly suggest that employee lay-offs, for at least short periods of time, may be common. It may also reflect the existence of seasonal jobs. There is no reason to believe that a similar pattern was not present during the study period. One important difference between the two, however, concerns access to unemployment insurance. For many years municipal employees were denied unemployment insurance benefits, upon lay-off, because they were deemed to be "permanent" employees and as such, to still have jobs.⁴ The municipal labour movement supported by a number of central labour bodies lobbied the federal government for a number of years for changes to this policy. They were ultimately successful in 1955. In some cases the denial of unemployment insurance benefits may have prompted employers to continue to employ workers even when there was really no work for them to do. Full access to benefits would have negated the need for this.

Unemployment among municipal employees is not well documented.

Prior to 1946, the only sources of unemployment data were reports by unions to the federal Department of Labour, indicating the level of unemployment among their members and the Census. After 1946, The Labour Force became the primary source of Canadian unemployment statistics. Each is discussed in turn.

The usefulness of union generated unemployment statistics is very limited in municipal employment, for a number of reasons. First, for much of the survey period, the vast majority of municipal employees were not unionized, hence the data has a very narrow, perhaps unrepresentative base. Related to this is the fact that the response rate among unions is unknown. Second, the report does not differentiate between different classes of municipal unions. This, plus the near absence of unions of general municipal employees, means that until at least the late 1930s, the results probably reflect unemployment trends among municipal fire fighters more than they pertain to municipal employment in general. Finally, there are changes in the way in which the statistics are reported, making the compilation of a consistent time-series very difficult.

It is quite evident from an examination of Canada-wide data that the unemployment experienced by unionized municipal employees was consistently and substantially less than that suffered by unionized labour in general (See Table 6-4). This was the case from 1915 to 1946. The available results for Ontario differ somewhat from this general pattern. Although some sheltering is apparent prior to 1923, towards the middle of the decade municipal unemployment was approximately the same as in the unionized labour force as a whole.

TABLE 6-4. UNEMPLOYMENT IN TRADE UNIONS, FOR MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT AND ALL INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO AND CANADA, DECEMBER 31, 1916-DECEMBER 31, 1946

Year	ONTARIO		CANADA	
	Municipal	All Industries	Municipal	All Industries
1916	0.00%	1.55%	1.23%	2.17%
1917	0.00%	2.44%	0.32%	2.43%
1918	0.45%	2.95%	0.69%	2.76%
1919	1.08%	1.98%	1.25%	4.68%
1920	0.00%	12.39%	1.64%	13.42%
1921	4.48%	9.66%	3.50%	15.09%
1922	2.26%	4.70%	4.30%	6.40%
1923	7.54%	6.40%	2.60%	7.20%
1924	5.31%	8.10%	1.82%	11.60%
1925	6.89%	6.40%	3.10%	7.90%
1926	5.83%	5.60%	2.30%	5.90%
1927	N/A	5.10%	1.00%	6.60%
1928	N/A	4.00%	1.60%	6.60%
1929	N/A	9.70%	2.00%	11.40%
1930	N/A	17.30%	1.00%	17.00%
1931	N/A	20.30%	2.30%	21.10%
1932	N/A	28.50%	6.30%	25.50%
1933	N/A	24.90%	2.80%	21.00%
1934	N/A	18.70%	3.80%	18.00%
1935	N/A	13.40%	3.20%	14.60%
1936	N/A	13.80%	1.50%	14.30%
1937	N/A	12.90%	1.90%	13.00%
1938	N/A	14.50%	2.40%	16.20%
1939	N/A	9.70%	4.20%	11.40%
1940	N/A	5.90%	1.30%	7.40%
1941	N/A	6.00%	0.50%	5.20%
1942	N/A	1.00%	0.00%	1.20%
1943	N/A	0.50%	0.00%	0.80%
1944	N/A	0.40%	0.00%	0.60%
1945	N/A	4.00%	0.20%	3.00%
1946	N/A	0.90%	0.30%	1.50%
1947	N/A	0.90%	0.10%	1.70%

Source: "Unemployment in trade unions at the close of December, as reported by unions making returns," Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette, 1917-1948.

The Census is a much more broadly based source of unemployment data (See Table 6-5). Its utility is, unfortunately, limited by intermittent publication and variations in the reporting format. Unemployment statistics appeared for the first time in the 1931 Census. Ten per cent of municipal wage earners were without jobs and an additional one per cent on temporary lay-off as of June 1, 1931. This compared with thirteen and two per cent, respectively, in the Ontario economy. The results are consistent with the partial sheltering identified in the union generated statistics. In 1941, approximately three per cent of municipal wage earners lacked jobs. This was similar to aggregate levels. By 1951, unemployment was minimal, both in municipal employment and the economy as a whole. Comparable disaggregated statistics are not available from the 1961 Census.

The Labour Force, although it is the premier source of Canadian unemployment statistics in the post-war period, is of very little use in this context (See Table 6-6). The main difficulty is the lack of disaggregation. Data specific to the municipal level is buried inside a much broader industrial classification. The municipal component cannot be identified and hence is inaccessible. In addition, the category is simply too diverse for the series to serve as a reasonable proxy for municipal employment. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, the sole contribution of this publication is as a source of aggregate unemployment trends in the provincial economy. With the brief exception of the late 1950s and early 1960s, unemployment in Ontario was extremely low throughout the entire period.

TABLE 6-5. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNEMPLOYMENT, BY INDUSTRY, BY CAUSE, FOR ONTARIO, 1931, 1941, 1951

<u>Year and Cause</u>	<u>General Municipal Employment</u>	<u>Hydro-Electric Power</u>	<u>Urban Transit</u>	<u>Water Works</u>	<u>All Industries</u>
<u>1931</u>					
No Job	9.60%	6.36%	3.72%	10.11%	13.41%
Temporary Layoff	0.93%	0.76%	0.73%	0.43%	1.78%
Total Unemployment	10.53%	7.12%	4.45%	10.54%	15.19%
<u>1941</u>					
No Job	2.50%	1.20%	1.13%	1.81%	2.47%
Temporary Layoff	0.27%	0.20%	0.22%	0.00%	0.40%
Total Unemployment	2.77%	1.40%	1.35%	1.81%	2.87%
<u>1951</u>					
No Job	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Temporary Layoff	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total Unemployment	0.22%	0.43%	0.21%	0.66%	1.24%

¹ A break down of the number not at work on June 2, 1941, by cause, is available only for the aggregate Canadian results. The provincial statistics are not itemized and simply indicate the total number not at work due to all causes. Sectoral unemployment in Ontario, by cause, was estimated by calculating the ratio of unemployment to all causes at the national level and then applying this percentage to the Ontario "all causes" results.

Source: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. VI, Table 11; 1941, Vol. VI, Table 17; 1951, Vol. V, Table 11.

TABLE 6-6. AGGREGATE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR ONTARIO AND CANADA (ANNUAL AVERAGES), 1946-1964

<u>Year</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>Canada</u>
1946	2.8%	3.4%
1947	1.8%	2.2%
1948	1.7%	2.3%
1949	2.3%	2.8%
1950	2.4%	3.6%
1951	1.7%	2.4%
1952	2.2%	2.9%
1953	2.1%	3.0%
1954	3.8%	4.6%
1955	3.2%	4.4%
1956	2.4%	3.4%
1957	3.4%	4.6%
1958	5.4%	7.0%
1959	4.5%	6.0%
1960	5.4%	7.0%
1961	5.5%	7.1%
1962	4.3%	5.9%
1963	3.8%	5.5%
1964	3.2%	4.7%

Source: D.B.S., The Labour Force, 1946-1964.

b. Occupational Characteristics

The substantial increases in post-war employment were not shared equally, in terms of magnitude or timing, among the constituent groups that comprise municipal employment (See Table 6-7). The decennial growth rates for police and fire fighters show that their numbers increased fairly evenly between 1941 and 1961, whereas for general municipal employment as a whole, most of the growth occurred during the 1950s. Expressed another way, over sixty-two per cent of the total increase in general municipal employment between 1941 and 1951 was accounted for by greater numbers of police and fire fighters. By contrast, over the next decade, these two groups contributed a meagre fifteen per cent to the total employment increase. This suggests that, coming out of the Great Depression and World War II, municipalities typically expanded their protective services first and then, in the 1950s, increased their involvement in other service provision areas.

An occupationally based breakdown of general municipal employment is available from Census for 1911 to 1941. Reporting was most complete in 1931 and 1941, followed by 1921 and finally 1911 in order of declining comprehensiveness. After 1941, this information was not published in disaggregated form. Inconsistencies from census to census make it difficult, if not impossible, to study the employment patterns of specific occupations from a time series perspective. Police and fire fighters, as discrete occupational groups are largely unaffected by this problem, but this is not true for most of the others. For example, a worker reported as a labourer in 1921, might be properly listed as a truck driver using the 1931 criteria. Only in the case of the 1931 and

TABLE 6-7. GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT, BY SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND DECENNIAL PER CENT CHANGE, FOR ONTARIO, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961

Year	<u>Employment</u>			
	<u>Police</u>	<u>Fire Fighters</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Total</u>
1911	1,315 (N/A)	N/A (N/A)	12,406 ¹ (N/A)	13,721 (N/A)
1921	2,125 (+62%)	1,409 (N/A)	11,087 ¹ (-11%)	14,621 (+7%)
1931	2,514 (+18%)	1,802 (+28%)	13,702 (+24%)	18,018 (+23%)
1941 ²	2,695 (+7%)	1,878 (+4%)	11,292 (-18%)	15,865 (-12%)
1951	4,696 ³ (+74%) ³	3,284 (+73%)	12,504 ³ (+11%) ³	20,484 (+29%)
1961	6,545 (+39%) ³	4,640 (+43%)	37,384 (+198%) ³	48,569 (+137%)

¹ Waterworks employees are included in the municipal employment totals for 1911 and 1921.

² The 1941 results include those on active service.

³ The number of municipal police in 1951 was estimated, hence all calculations involving this total must also be viewed as estimates. For a discussion of the estimation methodology see Table 4-12.

Source: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 15.

1941 Census is their sufficient commonality to allow for meaningful comparisons. Unfortunately, the short time-frame negates much of the benefit of time series assessment and the extent to which the 1941 results were affected by the War is uncertain. Nevertheless, significant changes in the internal composition of general municipal employment appear to have occurred over the decade. Despite the decline in aggregate employment between 1931 and 1941, the number of inside workers (clerks, stenographers and typists) actually increased. Labourers, on the other hand, saw their numbers reduced by over one-third during the same ten year period. They, nevertheless, continued to be the largest single occupational group.⁵

c. Labour Force Composition⁶

An overview of labour force composition provides an important profile of the workers involved in local government unionism during its formative period. Between 1911 and 1961, the average age (weighted) of general municipal employees, in Ontario, consistently exceeded the average for all-industries in the province.⁷ This was true for both sexes, with the exception of females in 1961, when parity existed. The gap between the two series is even more pronounced when the contribution of police and fire fighters is negated. Due to the frequently strenuous nature of their work, the average age in both groups was less than the municipal aggregate. The absence of formal pension plans, plus then tendency of employers to "carry" older, less productive workers, may have been at least partially responsible for this phenomenon, particularly prior to the 1950s.⁸ The revised municipal average (without police and fire fighters) exceeded the

all-industries score by the widest margin in 1941. This was due to a significant increase in the municipal average relative to its 1931 level. For its part, the all-industries result remained largely unchanged. Much of the municipal increase was probably due to the impact of the Depression on employment practices. Labour turnover was greatly reduced, hiring was restricted for much of the 1930s and younger, single workers were generally more vulnerable to lay-offs. The enlistment of large numbers of young males in the military was not sufficient to alter the all industries average age from its previous levels. There is, therefore, little reason to conclude that it played a significant role at the municipal level. Mirroring the overall trend in the labour force, female workers in general municipal employment were, on average, several years younger than their male counterparts. This was mainly because, until relatively recently, most females left their jobs when they married. This may have limited the development of a long term commitment to the job on the part of a significant number of female workers, with important implications for the emergence of unionism.

General municipal employment was largely a male preserve. Over the entire period surveyed, male municipal employees were significantly overrepresented relative to their all industries score. While the 1941 aggregate female score is likely an aberration, brought about by women working in war industries, the 1951 and 1961 results clearly indicate a broad trend towards greater female participation in the labour force. By contrast, the proportion of females employed municipally increased only marginally between 1941 and 1961. An analysis of municipal

employment by occupation reveals that virtually all police, fire fighters and outside workers (labourers) were male. Among the inside occupations (office and clerical), there was nearly an even split between the sexes as early as 1931. This divergence, together with the probable difference in the level of job attachment between male and female workers, may help explain why the unionization of inside workers frequently lagged that of their outside counterparts and why both groups commonly had separate locals.

Both age trends and the distribution of employment between the sexes are reflected in the marital status of municipal employees. For the years 1941, 1951 and 1961, single males were significantly underrepresented and married males significantly overrepresented, relative to their respective all industries shares. For those same years, exactly the opposite was true for females. Single females were significantly more common and married females significantly less so than in the industrial aggregate. Widowed municipal workers, of both sexes, were only marginally overrepresented, while the results for divorced workers were inconclusive, due to the small number involved.

The average level of educational attainment for male municipal employees closely approximated that for all industries in both 1941 and 1951. For both series, the 1951 averages were only marginally higher than those of a decade earlier. This was not the case for female municipal workers. Their average level of education was substantially higher than that for the economy in general. The female score actually declined between 1941 and 1951, reducing the size of their advantage. This trend was evident in all of the local government sectors under

study, but is not apparent in the aggregate results.

Finally, there are significant differences in terms of nativity and ethnicity. In 1911, foreign born, male municipal employees slightly outnumbered their indigenous co-workers. By 1921, this advantage had been lost and thereafter the proportion of Canadian born workers gradually increased with each successive Census. Despite this growth, they remained underrepresented in general municipal employment until 1951. By then the pattern had changed with Canadian born males being overrepresented for the first time. They were also overrepresented in 1961. The vast majority of these foreign born workers were from the British Isles, with all other groups being relatively insignificant by comparison. Canadian born female workers were consistently more numerous in municipal employment than in the aggregate labour force. Among foreign born female municipal employees, the British Isles was also, far and away, the most common point of origin.

2. Hydro-Electric Power

a. Employment and Unemployment Trends

Developing an estimate of employment in municipal hydro-electric utilities, in Ontario, is an extremely precarious undertaking.⁹ The decennial Census of Canada is the only source of aggregated employment data for the period under study. Unfortunately, there are very serious methodological problems associated with its use. Only in 1977, do reliable, employer generated and audited, employment statistics become available, through Ontario Hydro's Municipal Utility Data Bank. Employment data was not collected prior to this.¹⁰

It is only with the increased emphasis on industrially based

statistics in 1931. that it becomes possible to use the Census as a basis for estimating municipal hydro-electric employment. Prior to this, the reporting of employment in occupational terms and in a disaggregated fashion much such an exercise virtually impossible. Census data for the hydro-electric industry include the employees of municipal utilities, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario (H.E.P.C.) and any privately owned companies. The size of this last group declined as public ownership of hydro-electric utilities expanded. By 1940, it can be safely assumed that the number of such workers was relatively small. A crude estimate of municipal hydro-electric employment can be constructed by subtracting the number of H.E.P.C. employees from the total reported in the Census for the industry. The remainder will overstate municipal hydro-electric employment by the number of private sector workers (See Table 6-8).

Using 1981 and 1986 Census data, this methodology produces estimates that are only slightly larger than actual employment as reported in the Municipal Utility Data Bank. Although the Census series is consistent from a S.I.C. perspective from 1951 to 1986, the estimates derived for other years are less satisfactory. The 1961 calculation is in line with the validated results, but this is not true for either 1951 or 1971. In both cases municipal hydro-electric employment is grossly understated. In all probability this is due to inconsistencies in the classification of construction workers employed by the H.E.P.C. In the Utility's annual report, directly employed construction workers were typically included in the employment total. However, in the Census tabulations they were likely listed under the

TABLE 6-8. EMPLOYMENT IN MUNICIPAL HYDRO-ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 1921-1961

Year	Census	Ontario Hydro Employment	Estimated Municipal Hydro-Electric Employment
1921	N/A	3,160	N/A
1931	8,681	3,580	5,101
1941	8,386	6,045	2,341
1951	21,945	20,079	1,866
1961	21,698	15,097	6,601

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 16; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1; Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Number of Employees: 1921-1941, internal working document dated June 29, 1960, Ontario Hydro, Resource Centre, Vertical files; Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario, Annual Reports 1951, 1961.

construction industry. The 1931 and 1941 estimates are even more suspect given the variability in the industrial classification schedule. Again, it is important to remember that these totals include a substantial number of personnel who, by virtue of their occupations, would be intrinsically ineligible for union membership.

From an overall perspective, employment in hydro-electric power, in Ontario, appears to have grown sporadically rather than in a steady progression. At least some of this may be due to inconsistencies in the S.I.C. methodology utilized in the earlier Census reports. No employment growth occurred between 1931 and 1941. However, during the 1940s industry employment surged ahead, increasing by about 167 percent over the decade. Thereafter, relatively little growth was evident until the 1960s. This was also the general pattern of employment growth for the H.E.P.C. Unfortunately, the predominance of Power Commission data in the series completely obscures municipal hydro-electric power developments.

Armstrong and Nelles argue that prior to the 1930, there was an extremely high rate of labour turnover in hydro-electric employment. This was true for both office and operating personnel.¹¹ Regrettably, there are no statistics to indicate the magnitude of this phenomenon. Turnover all but disappeared with the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s. Employment mobility restrictions introduced during World War II would also have greatly limited turnover. Post-war developments are unknown, although the relatively low levels of unemployment should have enhanced worker mobility.

In terms of the distribution of employment among municipalities,

the trends identified in general municipal employment are replicated here.¹² Between 1931 and 1961, municipalities of 10,000 or more people accounted for a steadily declining share of hydro-electric employment, as services expanded into traditionally non-urban areas. The expected redistribution of employment in favour of smaller urban municipalities, at the expense of the largest centres, is also evident. It is, however, uncertain whether either shift was based in the municipal utilities or simply reflected changes in the development of the H.E.P.C.

The absence of appropriate statistics effectively prevents any assessment of seasonality in employment in this industry.

The sole source of unemployment data for hydro-electric power is the Census (See Table 6-6). On census day, June 1, 1931, approximately six per cent of those normally employed in the industry reported that they were without jobs. A further one per cent were on temporary lay-off. As noted previously, the aggregate rates were thirteen and two per cent respectively. On the whole, hydro-electric workers were somewhat more sheltered from the adverse affects of the Depression than their municipal counterparts. It is unlikely that these results accurately represent unemployment at its height during the worst of the Depression. By 1941, the employment picture had improved significantly. The percentage of hydro-electric workers without jobs, on June 2, 1941, was a mere one per cent, while less than half of one per cent were temporarily laid-off. These scores were lower than those registered in either general municipal employment or the provincial economy overall.

b. Occupational Characteristics

Occupationally, electricians, linemen, power station operators and labourers were the four most common "operating" vocations, accounting for almost half of all hydro employment in 1931 and 1941. The largest single group of inside workers were office clerks. The respective shares of employment held by nearly all occupational groups, both large and small, remained largely unchanged over the intervening ten years. As in the case of general municipal employment, the absence of statistics precludes occupational analysis outside this rather brief period.¹³

c. Labour Force Composition

In 1931, the average age for both male and female hydro-electric workers was less than their respective all industry scores. By 1941, however, this gap had all but disappeared and the averages for the industry approximated those for the provincial labour force as a whole. Reduced labour turnover and employer retrenchment policies are the most likely causal factors. In 1951, and again in 1961, the average age of male hydro-electric workers did not differ significantly from the aggregate result. This was not true for females who, on average, were about five years younger than the all industries average.

Hydro workers were predominantly male. Over the entire period from 1931 to 1961, the proportion of females working in this sector was about half that found in the labour force as a whole. Increased female participation in hydro mirrored aggregate developments, allowing the relationship to remain largely unchanged over time. Female employees were restricted to inside or office occupations, while males were found

in all major occupational groups. In 1931, there was rough parity between the sexes in terms of inside employment, with females outnumbering males only in the stenographer and typist category. By 1941, they were also more numerous among the bookkeepers and cashiers and for the first time, enjoyed an overall advantage within the inside occupational group.

An analysis of the marital status of hydro workers reveals a different pattern from that found in the general labour force. In 1941 and 1961, single males were substantially underrepresented relative to their all industry totals. In 1951, however, they were slightly more common than in aggregate. Similarly, married males were overrepresented in both 1941 and 1961, and slight underrepresented in 1951. This finding is somewhat surprising given the convergence of the industry and aggregate average ages in 1951 and 1961. The proportion of widowed and divorced males did not deviate significantly from the all industries scores. The results for females are more consistent, with single females being overrepresented and married females underrepresented throughout the entire period from 1931 to 1961. Widows were slightly more common than in the general working population, while the small number of divorced workers precludes meaningful assessment. Overall, trends in male and female marital status tend to reflect long-term developments in the labour force as a whole.

Hydro workers, on average, possessed a higher level of educational attainment than existed overall. The general advantage that female workers enjoyed over their male counterparts was also present in the hydro series, although the gap between the sexes was slightly larger

than the aggregate result.

In terms of nativity, Armstrong and Nelles report that the majority of electrical workers in the period prior to 1930 were young Canadian born males. They found that the proportion of native born employed in electrical generation and distribution, and as office staff, matched that found in the labour force. This was not the case for immigrants. Generally speaking, British immigrants tended to be overrepresented in electrical supply, while those from Europe were overrepresented as labourers and underrepresented in all other occupations. These findings were based on a survey of national statistics with a broader purview than is used in this thesis.¹⁴ Nevertheless, they are consistent with subsequent Census results for Ontario and hence are believed to have general validity for the province during the period studied by Armstrong and Nelles.

The vast majority of hydro workers in Ontario, between 1931 and 1961, were Canadian born. This was true for both sexes, although a higher proportion of females reported Canadian nativity than did males. With the exception of the 1961 female score, the share of total hydro-electric employment held by this group increased steadily over time. Until 1951, Canadian born males were slightly underrepresented relative to the general labour force. In 1951, they achieved parity and by 1961 were overrepresented for the first time. Canadian born females remained overrepresented throughout the entire period. The next largest nativity group consisted of immigrants from the British Isles. Participation by males of this group gradually declined, which the proportion of females stayed roughly the same. British born males were

consistently overrepresented in the industry throughout the period. Females, by contrast, were underrepresented. Although both males and females of European nativity claimed a progressively larger share of hydro-electric employment, between 1931 and 1961, they remained underrepresented relative to their presence in the aggregate labour force. The numerical contribution of workers from the United States and Asia was minimal and conformed to overall trends.

3. Urban transit

a. Employment and Unemployment Trends

The main source of urban transit employment data, for much of the period under study, is Electric Railways. Employment was reported by individual utility and disaggregated by major occupational group. The series included information on bus operations provided by electric railways, but did not encompass "bus-only" systems. This omission was finally addressed in 1941, when statistics for bus-only systems were published in Motor Carriers: Freight-Passenger. This latter source, unfortunately, reported employment as a provincial aggregate and failed to identify the individual systems contributing to the survey in a systematic fashion. An occupational break down of employment was also not provided. Both reports were superceded in 1955 by Urban Transit

The term "electric railway" refers to a particular mode of transportation technology and not to the provision of urban transit. Indeed, Electric Railways included a number of systems within its reporting constituency that utilized this technology, but did not provide urban transit. This was particularly evident in the 1920s, reflecting the earlier proliferation of such railways. By the late

1930s, the number of traction based systems had declined significantly and, with a few exceptions, those electric railways still operating in the 1940s and 1950s generally had a transit role. In many cases electric railways, providing urban transit, were replaced by bus-only systems. Such wholesale conversions tended, however, to be more common in the smaller centres.

During the earlier part of the study period, electric railway employment can be used as a reasonable, if somewhat overstated, estimate for total urban transit employment, as the vast majority of operators used electric street cars to at least some extent. Theoretically, this method of estimation should become increasingly less accurate as one approaches the 1940s and bus-only systems are more common. By 1942, there were approximately sixteen such operators in the province of Ontario. However, while Electric Railways grossly understates the total number of urban transit operators in the province, the fact that most bus-only systems were small and employed relatively few workers, means that the publication provides a reasonable estimate for total industry employment right up to the point at which bus-only data becomes available. This generalization also appears to be true in terms of municipally owned systems, although the failure to identify individual systems is clearly problematic.

Employment in Ontario electric railways declined by approximately forty per cent between 1922 and 1940 (See Table 6-9). Although a large number of railways ceased operation during this period, their collective demise accounted for only one-third of the total drop. The lion's share resulted from staff reductions in systems that continued

TABLE 6-9. EMPLOYMENT IN URBAN TRANSIT IN ONTARIO, 1911-1961

<u>Year</u>	<u>Electric Railways</u>	<u>Bus Only</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Census</u>	<u>Municipally Owned Electric Railways</u>
1911	N/A	N/A	N/A	3,871	N/A
1921	N/A	N/A	N/A	5,251	N/A
1922	8,100	N/A	8,100	N/A	5,241
1923	7,853	N/A	7,853	N/A	4,793
1924	7,660	N/A	7,660	N/A	4,512
1925	7,233	N/A	7,233	N/A	4,439
1926	6,843	N/A	6,843	N/A	4,324
1927	7,506	N/A	7,506	N/A	4,686
1928	7,689	N/A	7,689	N/A	4,758
1929	7,726	N/A	7,726	N/A	4,917
1930	7,452	N/A	7,452	N/A	5,056
1931	6,728	N/A	6,728	6,020	4,791
1932	6,090	N/A	6,090	N/A	4,450
1933	5,607	N/A	5,607	N/A	4,106
1934	5,257	N/A	5,257	N/A	3,780
1935	5,167	N/A	5,167	N/A	3,640
1936	5,148	N/A	5,148	N/A	3,652
1937	5,137	N/A	5,137	N/A	3,615
1938	5,137	N/A	5,137	N/A	3,753
1939	4,853	N/A	4,853	N/A	3,471
1940	4,910	N/A	4,910	N/A	3,470
1941	4,991	N/A	4,991	4,851 ¹	3,596
1942	5,531	786	6,317	N/A	4,050
1943	6,360	1,060	7,420	N/A	4,583
1944	6,824	1,177	8,001	N/A	4,956
1945	7,267	1,306	8,573	N/A	5,239
1946	7,992	1,385	9,377	N/A	5,863
1947	8,484	1,362	9,846	N/A	6,476
1948	8,459	1,267	9,726	N/A	7,248
1949	8,607	1,323	9,930	N/A	7,420
1950	8,713	1,252	9,965	N/A	7,556
1951	8,888	1,293	10,181	8,785	7,668
1952	8,435	1,305	9,740	N/A	7,199
1953	8,738	1,430	10,168	N/A	7,494
1954	8,930	1,195	10,125	N/A	7,839
1955	8,185	1,103	9,288	N/A	7,139
1956	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1957	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1958	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1959	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1960	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1961	N/A	N/A	7,576 ²	7,787	N/A

TABLE 6-9. EMPLOYMENT IN ONTARIO URBAN TRANSIT, 1911-1961 (cont'd)

¹ The 1941 Census reports employment in "electric railways", which includes bus drivers working for electric railway systems (4,020), and in "taxi and bus lines". The number of bus drivers in the latter category was obtained from the occupational breakdown and is used as a proxy for the employees of "bus-only" transit systems. The result (831) was added to the number of electric railway employees to produce a crude estimate of industry employment in 1941.

² This result is from Urban Transit, (53-216) 1961. Both Electric Railways and Motor Carriers: Freight-Passenger were discontinued in 1955 and replaced by a number of publications under the general title of Urban Transit. Unfortunately, employment statistics were not provided until 1961. There is no way to determine whether the results from this source are consistent with the previous totals.

Sources: D.B.S., Electric Railways 1922-1955; D.B.S., Motor Carriers: Freight-Passenger 1941-1955; D.B.S., Urban Transit (53-216) 1961; D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V, 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 16; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1.

to operate, notably the Toronto Transit Commission (T.T.C.). During this period, the T.T.C. was far and away the largest single employer among both municipally and privately owned electric railways in Ontario. The Commission typically accounted for in excess of eighty per cent of employment in all municipally owned systems and over fifty per cent of total electric railway employment in the province. Between 1922 and 1940, the number of T.T.C. employees decreased by approximately 1,500 workers or about one-third of 1922 levels. After two decades of employment losses in the industry, this trend was reversed in the early 1940s. From 1940 until 1947, total employment in Ontario electric railways grew by about seventy-three per cent. Thereafter the size of the work force stabilized and remained relatively unchanged into the mid-1950s.

Employment data for bus-only systems, providing urban transit in Ontario, is unavailable prior to 1942. Given the number of electric railways that abandoned traction for buses in the late 1930s, it can be argued that the publication of data roughly coincided with the accumulation of significant employment levels by this group. After some growth in the latter years of World War II, employment levelled off in 1946 and was largely unchanged into the mid-1950s. The apparent decline in the 1954 results is simply a function of a statistical reordering and does not represent an employment loss. In 1954, the T.T.C. assumed responsibility for all urban transit provision in the newly created regional municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. In doing so it took over a number of privately owned and operated bus-only systems which had served certain area municipalities on a contract basis. As employees of

the T.T.C., these workers were removed from the "City Service" section of the Motor Carriers report and included in the Commission's employment total in Electric Railways.

In 1955, Electric Railways and Motor Carriers: Freight-Passenger were discontinued and replaced by a number of publications under the general title of Urban Transit. Unfortunately, employment statistics for the industry were not reported until 1961. There is also no way to determine if the methodology used is consistent with that employed in the earlier publications. If this is in fact the case, then the industry suffered a decline in total employment during the late 1950s. The 1951 and 1961 Census results rely on different classification criteria and cannot, therefore, be used to either confirm or deny this hypothesis.

The general decline in industry employment through the 1920s and 1930s makes any assessment of short-term employment and unemployment trends extremely difficult. Again, there is considerable variability in the staffing pattern from system to system. In some cases staff levels were generally stable through the 1920s and 1930s, while in others reductions were the rule. Armstrong and Nelles note that prior to World War I and to a lesser extent in the post-war period, this sector suffered from the same extremely high level of labour turnover that plagued hydro-electric employment. Motormen and conductors were particularly given to job transience, but were by no means the only group so inclined.¹⁵ This is not particularly surprising given the frequent proximity of their wage levels to those received by unskilled labourers during this period. The Depression of the 1930s, plus the

increased spread in wage rates received by operators and unskilled workers, probably greatly reduced turnover.

An assessment of trends in the distribution of employment among municipalities of varying size is precluded by the absence of the necessary statistics. It would initially seem logical to assume that the population explosion that precipitated the changes in the distribution of general municipal and hydro-electric employment would have had a similar impact on urban transit. However, it is important to remember that urban transit, in the post-World War II period, was very much an industry in decline, primarily as a consequence of widespread automobile usage. The extrapolation of employment trends from other areas of local government to transit may, therefore, be totally inappropriate.

There are two alternative sources of urban transit employment data. They are the decennial Census of Canada and membership statistics from the Canadian Transit Association (C.T.A.). The Census provides a detailed portrait of employment in urban transit for the entire study period (See Table 6-10). National and provincial aggregates, as well as data for large urban centres, are reported. The usefulness of the Census is limited by its intermittency. However, a much more serious problem is the lack of consistency in the system of industrial classification. In 1911 and 1921, the term "street railways" was used, but in 1931 and 1941 "electric railways" was the organizing category. Although they share much of the same constituency, the two are not the same. "Electric railways" was replaced by "urban and suburban transportation" in 1951, which was itself superseded by "urban transit

TABLE 6-10. URBAN TRANSIT EMPLOYMENT¹. BY SEX AND DECENNIAL PER CENT CHANGE FOR ONTARIO, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, '961

Year	Employment		Total
	Males	Females	
1911	3,839 (N/A)	32 (N/A)	3,871 (N/A)
1921	5,172 (+35%)	79 (+147%)	5,251 (+36%)
1931	5,861 (N/A)	159 (N/A)	6,020 (N/A)
1941	3,882 (-34%)	138 (-13%)	4,020 ² (-33%)
1951	8,345 (N/A)	440 (N/A)	8,785 (N/A)
1961	7,372 (N/A)	416 (N/A)	7,787 (N/A)

¹ The industrial classification system changed over time as follows: 1911, 1921: "street railways"; 1931, 1941: "electric railways"; 1951: "urban and suburban transportation"; 1961: "Urban Transit Systems". Decennial per cent changes were calculated only where the classifications were consistent.

² The 1941 Census reports employment in "electric railways", which includes bus drivers working for electric railway systems (4,020), and in "taxi and bus lines". The number of bus drivers in the latter category was obtained from the occupational breakdown and is used as a proxy for the employees of "bus-only" transit systems. The result (831) was added to the number of electric railway employees to produce a crude estimate of industry employment in 1941.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V, 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 16; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1.

systems" in 1961. Despite these incongruities, the data and overall employment trends reported in the Census are largely consistent with that found in Electric Railways and Motor Carriers. The results for 1911, 1921, 1951 and 1961 are probably closer to the actual urban transit industry totals than those for electric railways in the intervening years.

C.T.A. membership data is available beginning in 1950. Unfortunately, only the total annual membership is reported.¹⁶ In addition, while most major transit systems are now members of the Association, the extent of its representativeness in the 1950s and early 1960s is unknown.

Seasonality in employment cannot be determined due to the lack of appropriate statistics.

The Census is the only source of information concerning unemployment among urban transit workers. In 1931, unemployment was the lowest of any of the sectors surveyed (See Table 6-6). Approximately four per cent were without jobs, while an additional one per cent indicated they were temporarily laid-off. In 1941, a mere one per cent were jobless and the temporary layoff score was almost nil. These results were for "electric railways" which, in their roles as purveyors of urban transit, tended to be concentrated in the larger cities. This was particularly the case by 1941. The extent to which these results are representative of overall unemployment trends in urban transit as a whole is uncertain

b. Occupational Characteristics

In occupational terms, operators (motormen and conductors;

motormen-conductors and bus drivers) were the largest single group, typically making up between forty to fifty per cent of all electric railway workers. Maintenance was the next largest group in the thirty per cent range, while general administration and the "other" category each contributed about ten per cent. There are significant variations from this average distribution from system to system, but this does not appear to be related to the nature of ownership. Overall, there was a definite trend towards increased employment in general administration and maintenance and a reduction in the share of employment held by operating personnel.¹⁷

c. Labour Force Composition

The average age of male urban transit workers in 1911 and 1921 was roughly equivalent to the industrial aggregate. However, in 1931, and even more so in 1941, the average for transit exceeded the all industries score. Armstrong and Nelles suggest that some of this greying, at least during the 1920s, may be attributable to the relative success of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees (A.A.S.E.R.E.) in obtaining improved real wages and conditions and subsequently being able to retain these gains.¹⁸ In the 1930s, reduced labour turnover and employer retrenchment probably played an important role. By 1951, this trend was reversed, with the average age for males again approximating that of the general labour force. Equivalence is, however, illusory. An analysis of employment in terms of the shares held by various age groups reveals that males under thirty-four years of age were underrepresented relative to their presence in the general labour force. In other words, the tendency of

transit workers to be older continued unabated in 1951, and was merely obscured by the use of the average. This was the only case in which the conclusions suggested by an examination of average age differed from those generated by an analysis of age group shares. A decade later, in 1961, the true pattern is once more visible in a comparison of average ages, with transit workers assuming a visibly senior position. The relative decline in the general fortunes of the urban transit industry in the post-war period, mirrored in stagnation in employment growth, undoubtedly contributed to this.

The average age of females employed in the industry was consistently below that of males throughout the entire period. It was also less than the female all industries score, although the difference between the two varied over time. Initially, female transit workers were considerably younger, but by 1931 the gap had narrowed and by 1941, it had almost disappeared. Thereafter, the original pattern reasserted itself and the spread between the two series expanded. These results are consistent with those generated by an examination of age group shares.

The overwhelming majority of urban transit workers were male and, although there was an increase in the representation of females, they never accounted for more than five per cent of the work force between 1911 and 1961. This clearly differentiates the industry from the economy as a whole, where female participation increased substantially over the same period. It also differentiates urban transit from the other local government sectors under study, which saw some growth in the female portion of their respective labour forces.

In terms of marital status, married males and single females were consistently overrepresented and single males and married females underrepresented relative to the aggregate labour force. This distribution largely reflects the age variations discussed above. Of the other categories, only widowed females were slightly overrepresented.

In 1941 and 1951, the average level of educational attainment for male urban transit workers was only marginally higher than the all industries score. Female employees, on the other hand, enjoyed a much more substantial advantage over their all industries counterparts. This was particularly true in 1941. During the intervening years between 1941 and 1951, the average years of school attendance actually declined, with the lead held by female transit workers falling by more than half.

The distribution of nativity in urban transit differs from the sectors under study. It is the only case in which Canadian born males were not a majority throughout much of the period. In 1911, Canadian born workers made up approximately fifty-eight per cent of urban transit employment. However, by 1921, their share had declined to forty-nine per cent and in 1931, a further reduction to forty-five per cent was in evidence. The 1941 Census reported that the forty-nine per cent level had been regained. The overwhelming majority of immigrant workers, in this sector, were British born. This group was clearly overrepresented and Canadian born workers underrepresented relative to their respective positions in the provincial labour force. Disaggregated statistics are not available beyond 1941. In the 1951

Census, nativity was reported for transportation and communications and in 1961, for transportation, communications and other utilities. In both instances, urban transit results make up only a very small part of the total, making the results unusable.

4. Water Works

a. Employment and Unemployment Trends

Information on employment in municipal water works is available only from the Census (See Table 6-11). Prior to 1941, water works were grouped with municipal employment. The water works component was identified in 1931, but not in prior Census. As a consequence, the water works employment series commences in 1931. Between 1931 and 1941, industry employment declined by about twenty-eight per cent. Assuming the classification systems are consistent, this would suggest fairly stringent employer retrenchment in response to the Depression. During the 1940s, employment soared by almost 450 per cent, only to drop to more modest levels by 1961. The high 1951 result and subsequent decline by 1961 may at least in part reflect the tremendous increase in service provision in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, given the magnitude of the fluctuation, inconsistencies in the industrial classification may also have played a role. The extent of labour turnover in the industry is not documented.

In terms of changes in the distribution among the employing municipalities, the trends identified in the other sectors are much weaker here.¹⁹ First, the share of total employment held by urban municipalities of 10,000 or more people declined only marginally between 1931 and 1961. Many newly urbanizing areas provided water

TABLE 6-11. WATER-WORKS EMPLOYMENT, BY SEX AND DECENNIAL PER CENT CHANGE FOR ONTARIO, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961

Year	Employment		Total
	Males	Females	
1931 ¹	1,405 (N/A)	23 (N/A)	1,428 (N/A)
1941	1,015 (-28%)	37 (+61%)	1,052 (-26%)
1951	5,556 (+447%)	138 (+273%)	5,694 (+441%)
1961	1,836 (-67%)	132 (-4%)	1,968 (-65%)

¹ Water-works employees were included in the general municipal employment totals for 1911 and 1921 and cannot be disaggregated.

Sources: D.E.S., Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V, 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 16; 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1.

through service contracts with established systems, making large scale employment growth unnecessary. Second, among the urban municipalities themselves, the expected distribution in favour of smaller centres was only marginally evident. Again, reliance on service contracts with larger centres may be responsible.

An alternative source to the Census is Municipal/Local Government Employment (See Table 6-3). Water works employment in urban municipalities of 10,000 or more is reported, beginning in 1961. In smaller urban municipalities and rural jurisdictions the water works component is not separated from the overall municipal total. The results indicate considerable stability, with little or no growth, over much of the 1960s.

Seasonality in water works employment can be assessed using Municipal/Local Government Employment data.²⁰ Between 1961 and 1971, employment was consistently highest during the summer months, especially in July and August. The low point varied somewhat, but generally employment tended to decline in the fall, remain relatively low over the winter and pick up again in the spring. As with general municipal employment, it is uncertain whether these results can be transposed to the earlier period.

Approximately ten per cent of water works employees were reported without jobs in the 1931 census (See Table 6-6). Less than half of one per cent were on temporary lay-off. These results place water works in a virtual tie with general municipal employment as having the highest level of unemployment among the sectors surveyed. In 1941, the calculated unemployment rate was just under two per cent. The rate for

those on temporary lay-off was nominal. The Census is the only source of unemployment statistics for water works employees.

b. Occupational Characteristics

Major changes occurred in the distribution of employment among the various constituent occupational groups between 1931 and 1941. Over the decade the number of labourers declined by more than half. At the same time, the number of inside workers (bookkeepers and cashiers, stenographers and typists, and office clerks) grew by forty-four per cent. Analysis is limited to this brief period by the availability of data.²¹

c. Labour Force Composition

From 1931 to 1961, the average age of male water works employees was the highest of any of the local government employment groups surveyed. The female average was the highest in 1931, 1951 and 1961. As with the other groups, a greying of the work force occurred during the 1930s. However, because the average age was already so high in 1931, the increase over the decade was fairly small. Needless to say, the averages for both sexes consistently exceeded their respective aggregate levels in the economy.

The distribution of employment between the sexes was very similar to the pattern found in urban transit. In both cases, female participation remained minimal over the entire period and females were greatly underrepresented relative to the general labour force.

In terms of marital status, the results are comparable with the other sectors surveyed. Single males and married females were underrepresented, while married males and single females were overly

abundant relative to their presence in aggregate. The percentage of workers who were widowed or divorced approximated that found in the general labour force, with the exception of widowed females, who were more common in water works in 1941 and in the utilities in general in 1951.

The average educational attainment of male water works employees lagged aggregate levels in both 1941 and 1951. Female scores, while they exceeded the all industries results, were still the lowest of any of the groups studied. The higher average age of water works employees of both sexes may be at least partially responsible, given that younger workers probably tended to have higher levels of formal educational attendance.

The pattern of nativity among water works employees, in 1931 and 1941, was also similar to that of transit workers. While males born in the United Kingdom were never a majority, as they were in urban transit, they were still much more common proportionally than in either general municipal or hydro-electric employment. They were also overrepresented compared to their all industries participation. The only sizeable difference in nativity between water works and urban transit was the presence of a substantial number of European born males in water works in 1931.²² This finding is, however, replicated to a lesser degree in general municipal employment for that same year. By 1941, participation by such workers had declined and the inter-sectoral differences diminished. Female water works employees were predominantly Canadian born in both 1931 and 1941, exceeding the all industries level in the first instance and approximating it in the second. In general,

the pattern of female nativity was consistent with the distribution in the other study groups.

Conclusions

This chapter assessed the hypothesis that the growth of unionism among local government employees was positively influenced by changes in the size, distribution and composition of local government employment. It has been shown that important changes occurred in the pattern of local government employment at approximately the same time as widespread unionism emerged. These changes had a positive impact on the propensity of employees to unionize and produced substantial gains in the aggregate membership of established unions.

The aggregate union growth literature hypothesizes that employment growth will have a positive impact on both aggregate union membership and new union formation. During the post-war period there was a tremendous increase in the number of local government workers. The pace of this expansion differed, however, from sector to sector. In hydro-electric power and water works most growth took place between 1941 and 1951. In general municipal employment, although there was some improvement during this decade, particularly in the protective services, the lion's share of employment growth was situated between 1951 and 1961. Finally, employment in urban transit advanced at a much slower pace and had effectively stagnated by the late 1950s. As noted in Chapter 4, these changing employment patterns had important implications for the expansion of unionism. In general municipal employment a sizeable proportion of employment growth occurred in larger centres with established unions and frequently favourable union

security provisions²². In such circumstances, new employees frequently became union members under the provisions of existing collective agreements. Employment growth thus fuelled a significant part of the increase in aggregate municipal union membership. With its high level of union penetration, this was also the case in urban transit, although the magnitude of the gain was much smaller. Unionism in hydro-electric power lagged that found in the other sectors. As a consequence of increased employment, union membership density in this industry actually declined during the early 1940s. As unions organizing water works employees do not constitute a discrete group, it is difficult to directly link changes in employment to union developments. In some cases these workers belonged to general municipal unions, while in others, they were members of unions representing public utility commission employees. The impact of employment growth in water works was, therefore, largely conditional on the type of representational structure in place. In general, labour force growth appears to have had the anticipated impact on aggregate union membership.

The connection between union formation and changing employment patterns is more indirect. According to the general literature, unionism is positively related to the size of the work unit. The post-war period witnessed a decentralization of employment. The share of total employment held by the largest cities declined as the number of workers employed in traditionally non-urban areas and in smaller municipalities grew. With increases in the size of the work force, existing relationships and understandings would have been disrupted due to the increasing bureaucratization required to effectively manage the

larger group of workers. It is no coincidence that this period of employment growth coincides with the adoption of modern personnel management techniques and procedures, such as classification systems, by a great many municipalities. Finally, the general expansion in the scope of service provision at the local level of government resulted in both increased employment and additional opportunities for union organization. Although the means by which the effects of employment growth become operationalized as union formation are not fully explored, the results are consistent with those predicted.

In the short-term, unemployment is negatively related to union growth, while over the long haul it may exert a positive influence as a source of grievances. The level of unemployment plays an important role in the emergence of local government unionism. It affects both the propensity and opportunity to unionize. Prior to the Great Depression the utilities suffered from high levels of labour turnover. There is no information as to the extent of this practice among general municipal employees, but it is quite likely that they were given to similar behaviour. High turnover means that large numbers of employees are leaving, presumably in pursuit of better terms and conditions of employment. It is very much an indictment of employment practices in the afflicted industry relative to those elsewhere in the economy. The generally low level of unemployment during the 1920s facilitated job transience. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that attachment to job and the willingness to stay and fight to improve conditions would be very strong among the majority of workers. High turnover, and the underlying factors that contribute to it, are clearly not conducive to

the establishment of unionism. The substantial increases in unemployment that came with the Great Depression effectively curtailed turnover in virtually all industries. It can be argued that the closing of this escape hatch was a necessary precondition for the emergence of unionism among local government employees. Even though the employment picture improved substantially in the late 1930s, and full employment existed by the early 1940s, many workers were reluctant to change their jobs because of the overall traumatizing effect of the Depression. In addition, labour mobility was restricted, by the federal government, for much of the war.

In theory, the massive unemployment during the Depression should also have had an impact on worker dissatisfaction and general militancy. Between 1931 and 1941, employment declined in all study sectors, almost certainly as a result of employer retrenchment policies. Despite some evidence of sheltering, the level of unemployment and job loss was substantial. The unskilled were particularly hard hit. In this context, unionism is as much a defensive reaction as a device for achieving improvements. Militancy, of course, is a relative concept. Just because local government employees were generally known for their lack of militancy compared to private sector unionists, does not necessarily mean that they were not influenced by the Depression in the expected manner.

It is commonly argued that, with unemployment at record levels during the first half of the 1930s and employers free to dismiss workers for union activity, employees were not in a position to organize and attempt to gain concessions from their employers. However,

as the economy began to recover and unemployment declined, employee bargaining power improved substantially and unions began to appear. With full employment in the early 1940s, the opportunity became even stronger. Overall, unemployment appears to have the expected effect on local government unionism.

Occupationally, the literature predicts that workers possessing a "strategic advantage" will unionize before those with less bargaining power. Outside or production workers will also typically organize first, followed by their inside or office counterparts. Both hypotheses are valid for local government unionism in Ontario. With the exception of hydro-electric power, skilled workers were the first to organize in large numbers. In part, this was a function of their relative bargaining power, although the craft union structure of the Trades and Labour Congress and the American Federation of Labour, certainly played a role. In this context it can be argued that the unskilled labourers that formed the backbone of general municipal unionism were unlikely candidates for organization. Large scale union activity among outside municipal employees frequently predated that by the inside workers by some time.

Labour force composition provides an aggregate portrait of the workers responsible for the unionization of local government employment. Beyond this descriptive benefit, the implications for the growth of local government unionism are unclear. According to the literature, age and education are generally negatively related to union growth, while family obligations have a positive impact. During the entire period under review, there were no significant changes in the

basic nature of the labour force. Males predominated in all cases. With the exception of hydro-electric power, which tended to conform to the industrial aggregate, local government employees were older, and more were married than in the economy as a whole. Persons of British nativity were also overrepresented.

The emergence of large scale local government unionism coincides with an increase in the average age of all employee groups. The age data strongly suggests that the workers who began to form unions in the late 1930s and 1940s, were long-term employees. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that they were shaped by their employment experiences during the 1930s and before. In this context age can be seen as a positive factor. On the negative side, older employees are generally less receptive to unions than younger, more militant workers. The conservatism and caution that one would normally anticipate, given the age of the labour force, in fact characterized much of their approach to unionism and collective bargaining. With the exception of some female employees, the level of educational attainment was not sufficiently different from the industrial aggregate to pose a barrier to unionism. The impact of a higher proportion of married workers was probably offset by the higher average age. Finally, it might be argued that the overrepresentation of workers of British origin was a necessary precondition for the emergence of unionism, due to their supposed greater personal experience with unions and collective bargaining. However, Gilbert Levine, in his interviews with several of the key leaders in the municipal labour movement, found that many lacked prior union experience. Overall, the assertion appears dubious.

NOTES

¹ Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics (D.B.S.), Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. VII., : xi.

² Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. VII, Table 57; 1941, Vol. VII, Tables 22, 25; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 17, 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Tables 2, 5, 6. A major problem with these statistics is that they rely on a rigid, legalistic definition of what is "urban" and "rural". Hence, although the townships around Toronto were clearly urbanizing following World War II, they remained classed as rural for statistical purposes. It was only after their legal change in status in 1967, that they were reported as "urban" in the 1971 Census. "Itemized, urban municipal employment" refers to reported employment by municipality.

³ Using data from the same source, Foot, Scicluna and Thadaney found significant seasonal variation in local government employment in the period 1967 to 1976. David K. Foot, Edward Scicluna and Percy Thadaney, "The Seasonality of Government Employment in Canada," in David K. Foot, ed., Public Employment and Compensation in Canada: Myths and Realities (Scarborough: Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., for the Institute For Research on Public Policy, 1978),: 63-92.

⁴ R.S.C. 1952, Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940, ch. 273, Part II, (j). Public utility workers were not excluded. The exclusion was eventually removed in 1955.

⁵ Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17.

⁶ Unless noted otherwise all discussion of labour force composition is based on data from the Census of Canada.

⁷ The term "all industries" refers to the provincial aggregate or total.

⁸ The Institute of Local Government, Canadian Municipal Pension Plans (Kingston: The Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1946),: 2.

⁹ Bird erroneously estimated that municipal hydro-electric utilities in Ontario employed approximately 17,000 workers in 1975. In reality they employed less than half that number. Richard M. Bird, "The Growth of the Public Sector in Canada," in David K. Foot, ed., Public Employment and Compensation in Canada: Myths and Realities, op. cit.,: 36.

¹⁰ This information was provided by Ontario Hydro, Municipal Electric Department in a telephone interview May 3, 1989.

¹¹ Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Monopoly's Moment: The

Organization and Regulation of Canadian Utilities 1830-1930
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986),: 225.

12 Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. VII, Table 57; 1941, Vol. VII, Tables 22, 25; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 17, 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Tables 2, 5, 6.

13 Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17.

14 Armstrong and Nelles, op. cit.,: 225.

15 Ibid.,: 225.

16 Canadian Transit Association, Proceedings 1950-1963.

17 Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17; D.B.S., Electric Railways, 1922-1955.

18 Armstrong and Nelles, op. cit.,: 220, 228-229.

19 Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. VII, Table 57; 1941, Vol. VII, Tables 22, 25; 1951, Vol. IV, Table 17, 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Tables 2, 5, 6.

20 D.B.S., Municipal Government Employment, 1961-1964.

21 Census of Canada, 1911, Vol. VI, Table V; 1921, Vol. IV, Table 4; 1931, Vol. VII, Table 56; 1941, Vol. VII, Table 17.

22 Union security provisions are provisions in the collective agreement designed to protect the institutional authority of the union. For example, where the collective agreement provides for a "union shop" the employer may hire anyone he/she wants, but all workers must join the union within a specified time after being hired and retain membership as conditions of employment. Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed., (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1986),: 492.

CHAPTER 7

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION GROWTH: COMPENSATION RELATED VARIABLES

Introduction

This chapter assesses the hypothesis that changes in worker compensation and inter-occupational wage relationships had a positive impact on the growth and development of local government unionism. Trends in money and real wage rates are analyzed, from both a time series and comparative perspective. This is followed by a discussion of hours of work and concludes with an evaluation of pensions and related benefits. These variables pertain primarily to the propensity to unionize.

The aggregate union growth literature posits that union growth is positively related to inflation. Unionism in this context is cast as a defensive response, to protect real worker incomes and their standards of living. Changes in money wages are also positively related to union growth through the "credit effect" as unions are credited with the increases. Finally, real rate increases are said to have a positive impact on unionism through the improvements they bring to member's living standards. Although this discussion has been limited to wages, improvements in the overall terms and conditions of employment can also be expected to exert a positive influence on unionism. It is for this reason that working hours and benefits are considered.

Cross sectional wage analysis assesses the pay of selected occupations relative to one another. The perception that unionism has disrupted an established wage relationship theoretically increases the propensity to unionize among the aggrieved employees. A key issue in any discussion of the impact of inter-occupational wage differentials is information. Precisely how do workers find out that another occupational group is now better paid relative to their own remuneration? Shister suggests that the "proximity influence" plays an important role in this information transfer. Proximity can be either physical or institutional. Physical proximity refers to the physical closeness of one group of workers to a second group in which a union exists and has performed successfully. Institutional proximity, on the other hand, describes the institutional linkages among workers physically separate from one another, but connected through employment in same company or industry.

1. General Municipal Employment

a. Money Wages

After registering significant gains in 1918 and 1919, hourly rates for municipal labourers peaked in 1920, in the majority of Ontario cities (See Table 7-1). Over the next two years rates generally declined in response to a severe downturn in economic activity. Although the economy improved substantially after 1923, performing well for the remainder of the decade, municipal labourers typically saw only a slight increase in their rates during this period. By 1930, fully half of the municipalities, for which there is data, paid a lower labourer rate than they had in 1920. Nine others paid their 1920 rate,

TABLE 7-1. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR MUNICIPAL LABOURERS AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964

YEAR	MONEY RATES		REAL RATES (C.P.I. 1920=100)		GENERAL RATE INDEX	
	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Index Numbers 1949=100	Annual Per Cent Change
1920	.46	N/A	.46	N/A	52.3	N/A
1921	.44	-4.35	.50	+8.70	47.7	-8.80
1922	.42	-4.55	.52	+4.00	44.5	-6.71
1923	.42	0.00	.52	0.00	45.7	+2.70
1924	.43	+2.38	.54	+3.85	46.3	+1.31
1925	.43	+0.00	.54	0.00	45.8	-1.08
1926	.44	+2.33	.54	0.00	46.1	+0.66
1927	.43	-2.27	.54	0.00	47.1	+2.17
1928	.43	0.00	.54	0.00	47.7	+1.27
1929	.44	+2.33	.54	0.00	48.5	+1.68
1930	.44	0.00	.55	+1.85	48.8	+0.62
1931	.44	0.00	.61	+10.91	47.2	-3.28
1932	.44	0.00	.67	+9.84	43.8	-7.20
1933	.42	-4.55	.67	0.00	41.6	-5.02
1934	.42	0.00	.66	-1.49	42.0	+0.96
1935	.42	0.00	.66	0.00	43.2	+2.86
1936	.42	0.00	.64	-3.03	44.0	+1.85
1937	.44	+4.76	.65	+1.56	47.3	+7.50
1938	.44	0.00	.65	0.00	48.7	+2.96
1939	.45	+2.27	.67	+3.08	48.9	+0.41
1940	.45	0.00	.64	-4.48	50.8	+3.89
1941	.47	+4.44	.63	-1.56	55.3	+8.86
1942	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	59.9	+8.32
1943	.57	+21.28	.72	+14.29	65.3	+9.02
1944	.59	+3.51	.74	+2.78	67.4	+3.22
1945	.60	+1.69	.75	+1.35	69.3	+2.82
1946	.64	+6.67	.77	+2.67	75.9	+9.52
1947	.72	+12.50	.79	+2.60	84.9	+11.86
1948	.80	+11.11	.77	-2.53	95.7	+12.72
1949	.88	+10.00	.82	+6.49	100.0	+4.49
1950	.91	+3.41	.83	+1.22	105.5	+5.50
1951	1.03	+13.19	.85	+2.41	119.1	+12.89
1952	1.11	+7.77	.89	+4.71	127.7	+7.22
1953	1.20	+8.11	.97	+8.99	133.6	+4.62
1954	1.24	+3.33	1.00	+3.09	137.9	+3.22
1955	1.29	+4.03	1.04	+4.00	141.7	+2.76
1956	1.35	+4.65	1.07	+2.88	148.7	+4.94
1957	1.43	+5.33	1.10	+2.80	156.5	+5.25
1958	1.50	+4.90	1.12	+1.82	162.6	+3.90
1959	1.58	+5.33	1.17	+4.46	168.9	+3.87

TABLE 7-1. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR MUNICIPAL LABOURERS AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964 (cont'd)

YEAR	MONEY RATES		REAL RATES (C.P.I. 1920=100)		GENERAL RATE INDEX	
	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Index Numbers 1949=100	Annual Per Cent Change
1960	1.66	+5.06	1.21	+3.42	175.5	+3.91
1961	1.71	+3.01	1.24	+2.48	180.0	+2.56
1962	1.76	+2.92	1.26	+1.61	185.9	+3.28
1963	1.81	+2.84	1.27	+0.79	192.5	+3.55
1964	1.87	+3.31	1.29	+1.57	199.8	+3.79

Source: Canada, Department of Labour, Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour (Title varies), 1920-1964.

while in only five cases was the 1920 rate exceeded. Overall, the average hourly rate of forty-four cents was four per cent less than its 1920 level.

In the early 1930s, hourly labourer rates were reduced in most cities as municipalities struggled to cope with the consequences of the Great Depression. Hourly rate cuts were particularly prominent in 1933 and to a lesser degree in 1935. Once reduced, rates tended to remain unchanged through the middle of the decade. This changed in 1937 and 1938, when a significant number of municipal employers reported hourly rate increases. A lesser number reported increases in 1939 and, by 1940, considerable rate stability was again the rule. In the majority of cases, the wage cuts of the early 1930s had been recouped by 1940. These increases were not, however, of sufficient magnitude to negate the losses incurred in the 1920s. Consequently, in 1940, only nine of the twenty-seven employers surveyed paid an hourly labourer rate in excess of their 1920s level. An additional five matched their 1920 rates, but thirteen paid less than they had twenty years earlier. The industry average of forty-five cents was still two per cent below its 1920 level.

During the early 1940s rates increased dramatically. After a small gain in 1941, the average rate grew by approximately twenty-one per cent over the next two years. All respondents reported rates above their 1920 levels. Increases moderated in 1944 and 1945 due to the federal government's progressive tightening of its wage control program.² Although general municipal employment was not directly subject to controls, employers probably used the existence of the

program as a justification for holding the line on wages. Controls were loosened in 1946 and the average rate increased by seven per cent. With their complete removal in 1947, double digit increases were recorded in that year and for every year thereafter, for the remainder of the decade.

The early 1950s typically saw the continuation of significant rate increases, 1950 being the one exception. The trend was finally broken in 1954, after which rate growth became more modest. Overall, the period from 1955 to the mid-1960s was characterized by considerable stability and relatively small annual rate increases.

The pattern of money wage rates, for municipal labourers, generally conforms to the overall pattern for the economy (See Table 7-1). There are, however, some important differences with respect to the magnitude of rate increases and decreases. In both the 1920s and 1930s, declines and subsequent increases in municipal rates were considerably smaller in size than those in the economy as a whole. In decennial terms, municipal rates declined four per cent in the 1920s as compared to a seven per cent loss to rates overall. Municipal workers emerged from the 1930s with a two per cent gain, while the aggregate rate was unchanged over the decade. These results mask significant fluctuations in both series during the intervening years. Significant wage increases occurred in many sectors of the economy in the early 1940s. Municipal rates, however, lagged this overall trend. Increases in the aggregate rate are more evenly distributed over the four years from 1940 to 1943, while municipal rate gains are concentrated in 1942 and 1943. The size of these increases is also larger than that reported

in the aggregate data for these same years. This suggests a deliberate attempt to compensate for the earlier sluggishness. With the exception of 1949-1950, which may have been an aberration produced by the bargaining calendar, municipal rates and the industrial composite run in tandem from 1944 into the early 1960s.

Crawford observes that, until the end of World War II, municipal councils generally took the position that rates should not be tied to wage trends in the private sector. The argument was essentially that the greater job security provided permanent municipal employees, plus the fact that they tended to be cushioned from the full adverse impact of economic downturns, meant that they had advantages not enjoyed by their private sector counterparts. Accordingly, they were not entitled to the same wages paid in the private sector. He notes that the rapid escalation of municipal rates, immediately following the War, suggests the policy was no longer viable.³

There were considerable differences in hourly labourer rates among the various municipalities contributing to the federal Department of Labour's survey of Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour. However, there is a positive relationship between the average hourly rate for each of the population categories and population size.⁴ Municipal labourers in the largest centres typically received the highest average hourly rates. As the size of the employing municipalities decreased, so did the average hourly rate. Except for a brief lapse in the late 1950s, this generalization was valid from 1920 into the 1960s. In the late 1950s, the relationship weakened somewhat as rate difference among all population groups in excess of 25,000 people diminished. In the 1960s,

the phenomenon reasserted itself.

In terms of the actual range of rates, in 1920 municipal labourers in the City of Toronto received the highest hourly rate at sixty cents per hour. Toronto retained its position as rate leader until 1941, when it was displaced by Windsor. Windsor was superseded by Sault Ste Marie in 1957, and was in turn replaced by Oshawa in 1960. Oshawa held this position into the mid-1960s. At the other end of the spectrum, a large number of smaller municipalities competed at various times for the dubious distinction of paying the lowest labourer rates among the municipalities surveyed. Even within particular population categories, there were substantial differences in rates. Much of this intra-category variation was likely due to differences in the regional labour markets in which specific municipalities were situated. The increased unionization of general municipal employment, beginning in the mid-1930s, may also have played a role. Determining both the dynamics and direction of causation between unionism and wages is extremely complex and a detailed examination is beyond the scope of this discussion.

b. Real Wages

The analysis of money hourly rates is deceptive because it fails to consider wages in the context of general trends in the economy and, in particular, changes in the cost of living. Real wages, on the other hand, specifically relates wages and price levels. When average municipal labourer rates are deflated using the Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.), a much different pattern of remuneration emerges than is provided by money rates (See Table 7-1).

During the severe economic downturn of the early 1920s, the substantial reductions in the money hourly rate were more than offset by declines in the C.P.I. As a result municipal labourers actually gained ground in terms of their real pay. Due to considerable price stability over the rest of the decade, both money and real rates follow a similar pattern until the early 1930s.

With the onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, decreases in the C.P.I. again produced significant gains in average real pay. This occurred even though the money rate initially remained static and then declined in 1933. Although real hourly rates increased in both the early 1920s and again in the early 1930s, the increased unemployment that accompanied these downturns, plus reductions in the hours worked by those still employed, make it improper to conclude that the general condition of workers actually improved during these periods.⁵ Generally speaking wage reductions tend to lag price cuts as the economy enters a period of decline. During the recovery phase the opposite occurs, with wage increases typically trailing higher prices.⁶ The latter is precisely what happened in the mid to late 1930s and in the early 1940s. Unlike the previous decade, which saw considerable post-depression price stability, increases in the C.P.I. outstripped growth in the money rate causing the real hourly rate to decline. As the economy improved, the purchasing power of municipal labour pay fell. This period of real wage losses roughly coincides with the emergence of unionism in a significant number of the municipalities contributing to the wage survey.

Between 1941 and 1945, money rates and real rates generally follow

the same pattern. After some initial surges, both wages and prices displayed considerable stability in the latter part of the war, due to the federal government's wartime wage and price controls program. With the return to a deregulated, peacetime economy beginning in 1946, money rates and real rates once more parted company. From 1946 to 1953, significant pay increases were typically all but negated by near equally substantial growth in prices. In 1948, an increase of eleven per cent in the money rate actually translated into a decline of three per cent once the impact of inflation was incorporated. During this period the hourly pay received by municipal labourers grew by approximately ninety-four per cent. By contrast, the real rate increased a mere thirty per cent. It is important to note that by this time the majority of the municipalities contributing to the wage survey, upon which this discussion is based, were unionized. These gains may, therefore, be at least partially a function of unionism and collective bargaining. This coupled with the fact that wages generally tended to be higher in larger centres, strongly suggests that the wage picture presented here represents the most optimistic scenario for municipal labourers. In smaller municipalities, with weaker unions or more commonly no union at all, rates in all probability did not perform as well in relation to inflation. Inflationary pressures and the example of their more successful, unionized counterparts in the larger municipalities, should have generated at least some pressure for unionization among these workers.

After 1953, increases in both the money rate and the C.P.I. moderated, providing considerable stability in real rate growth into

the 1960s.

c. Comparative Wage Analysis

An extremely important consideration in determining the significance of trends in municipal labourer rates is assessing how they compare with those of other worker groups. In particular, the relationship of labourer pay to that of other municipal employees, such as police and fire fighters, as well as that available from comparable private sector employment, must be examined.

In the municipal pay hierarchy, police have traditionally been at the top, followed by fire fighters, with municipal labourers bringing up the rear (See Table 7-2). In a very few instances, fire fighters have occupied the senior wage position, but such cases were exceptional and usually of short duration.

The relationship among the three employee groups has varied significantly over time. Between 1920 and 1940, the gap between fire fighters and police remained roughly constant, indicating that the upward and downward movements in the pay of these workers generally paralleled one another during this period. Both groups were largely able to avoid wage reductions in the early 1920s and by the end of the decade exceeded their 1920 pay in the majority of cases. During the early 1930s, the two groups suffered significant wage reductions. These losses were recouped in the early 1940s. By contrast, the pay of municipal labourers declined significantly, relative to the uniformed services, over the same twenty years. In 1920, municipal labourers, on average, earned about eighty-seven per cent of the annual salary received by police. By 1929, this had declined to seventy per cent. As

**TABLE 7-2. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) ANNUAL SALARIES OF FIRE FIGHTERS,
MUNICIPAL LABOURERS AND TRANSIT OPERATORS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE
(WEIGHTED) MUNICIPAL POLICE ANNUAL SALARIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964¹**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Fire Fighters</u>	<u>Municipal Labourers</u>	<u>Transit Operators</u>
1920	.93	.87	.97
1921	.90	.81	N/A
1922	.91	.76	N/A
1923	.90	.74	N/A
1924	.92	.76	N/A
1925	.91	.76	N/A
1926	.92	.75	.92
1927	.92	.73	N/A
1928	.90	.71	N/A
1929	.92	.70	N/A
1930	.91	.68	.90
1931	.92	.69	.86
1932	.92	.67	.82
1933	.91	.66	.86
1934	.91	.68	.82
1935	.91	.66	.82
1936	.91	.66	.82
1937	.91	.65	.86
1938	.92	.66	.84
1939	.93	.67	.88
1940	.93	.67	.87
1941	.94	.69	N/A
1942	N/A	N/A	N/A
1943	.94	.75	N/A
1944	.96	.75	N/A
1945	.95	.73	.90
1946	.97	.75	.92
1947	.97	N/A	.99
1948	.97	.80	.97
1949	.98	.81	.95
1950	.98	.81	.95
1951	.95	.79	1.00
1952	.96	.79	.93
1953	.98	.80	.95
1954	.95	.79	.92
1955	.98	.79	.90
1956	.97	.78	.88
1957	.97	.77	.89
1958	.96	.77	.88
1959	.97	.78	.89
1960	.97	.78	.91
1961	.96	.77	.89
1962	.97	.76	.89
1963	.97	.76	.88

TABLE 7-2. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) ANNUAL SALARIES OF FIRE FIGHTERS, MUNICIPAL LABOURERS AND TRANSIT OPERATORS AS A PERCENTAGE OF AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MUNICIPAL POLICE ANNUAL SALARIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964¹
(cont'd)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Fire Fighters</u>	<u>Municipal Labourers</u>	<u>Transit Operators</u>
1964	.96	.74	.85

¹ For much of the study period fire fighter remuneration was reported only as an annual salary. The omission of working hours meant that there was no basis for conversion to an hourly rate. Hence, to allow for comparison, the pay received by other employee groups was converted to the annual format. While an hourly passed wage comparison would be preferred, this is the best that can be accomplished with the available data. The scores are weighted by the number of cases in their respective population categories.

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

noted previously, municipal labourer rates fell considerably in the the early 1920s and in many instances these losses had not been regained by the end of the decade. This resulted in a worsening of the position of these workers relative to police and fire fighters. In the early 1930s, the wage cuts incurred by municipal labourers were commonly proportionally larger than those for the other two groups. As a consequence, by 1937, municipal labourers on average earned a mere sixty-five per cent of a police officer's annual salary, down twenty-two percentage points from their 1920 high. By 1940, this gap had narrowed only marginally.

In the early 1940s, these established wage relationships began to change and by the end of the decade a realignment had occurred. Fire fighters made significant gains in pay relative to police and were able to narrow the discrepancy between them to only a few percentage points in most years. Municipal labourers were also able to improve their comparative standing. Proportionally larger wage gains by these workers in the early 1940s and again in the immediate post-war period, repositioned labourers relative to their other municipal counterparts. The new relationship between police and fire fighters remained largely unchanged into the 1960s. Municipal labourers, on the other hand, once more experienced a comparative wage decline. Beginning modestly in the mid to late 1950s, it became even more pronounced in the early 1960s. This may have ultimately contributed to the heightened militancy of these workers during the second half of the decade.

Despite Crawford's characterization of municipal employment as low paying relative to other parts of the economy,⁷ a comparison of average

municipal labourer rates with the pay of common labour in factories, paints a somewhat different picture (See Table 7-3). From 1920 until the early 1940s, municipal labourers in Ontario generally enjoyed an hourly rate advantage over their private sector counterparts. Then, however, the relationship began to change. After losing ground over the first part of the decade, municipal rates assumed a subordinate position beginning in 1946. They remained inferior until 1960, when they once more gained the upper hand.

The emergence of municipal labourer unions in most of the centres contributing to the wage survey corresponds roughly with the deterioration of established wage relationships. This is true both within municipal employment and in relation to comparative private sector work. Subsequent corrective gains by these workers may have been at least partially due to the impact of these new unions on municipal labourer pay through collective bargaining.

Thus far the discussion has concentrated solely on municipal labourers. This group, while quite large, comprises only a part of total general municipal employment. Crawford cites a "long ... accepted generalization" that, under normal circumstances, municipal employees at the low end of the wage scale tend to receive higher pay and those at the high end of the scale tend to receive lower pay, than workers in comparable private sector employment. He states that, while this is generally true of municipal employment, there are still some exceptions. In many instances the type of work done by municipal employees is unique to the public sector; hence there is no basis for comparison. In addition, there is also the problem of making erroneous

**TABLE 7-3. RATIO OF MUNICIPAL TO PRIVATE SECTOR LABOURER RATES
(WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES), 1920-1964**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>	<u>Unweighted Average</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Weighted Average</u>	<u>Unweighted Average</u>
1920	1.18	1.17	1943	1.03	1.05
1921	1.18	1.17	1944	1.02	1.04
1922	N/A	N/A	1945	1.02	1.00
1923	1.15	1.13	1946	.95	.99
1924	N/A	N/A	1947	.94	.94
1925	1.18	1.13	1948	.93	.91
1926	1.20	1.17	1949	.98	.98
1927	1.19	1.16	1950	.93	.92
1928	1.21	1.19	1951	.92	.92
1929	1.18	1.21	1952	.95	.94
1930	1.18	1.18	1953	.98	.97
1931	1.20	1.21	1954	.96	.97
1932	1.31	1.32	1955	.98	.99
1933	1.33	1.35	1956	.92	.95
1934	1.31	1.33	1957	.92	.93
1935	1.28	1.31	1958	.96	.98
1936	1.26	1.29	1959	.99	.99
1937	1.17	1.21	1960	1.02	1.05
1938	1.19	1.23	1961	1.01	1.03
1939	1.21	1.26	1962	1.02	1.02
1940	1.19	1.24	1963	1.02	1.02
1941	1.09	1.14	1964	1.01	1.02
1942	N/A	N/A			

¹ The methodology used is the same as that employed by Gunderson in his various discussions of public and private sector pay differentials. For example see Morley Gunderson, "The Public/Private Sector Compensation Controversy," in Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984),: 1-43. The primary deviation from Gunderson is the use of this approach to study the period from 1920 to 1952. Prior to 1943, the rates for common labourers were reported as a series of unidentified, individual cases within a specified municipality. This required that an average be calculated. After 1943, average common labourer rates were provided by municipality. In all instances, for both common and municipal labourers, where a rate range was given, the mid-point was used.

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

comparisons based on apparently similar job titles. Crawford's argument is not supported by the empirical evidence, at least as far as municipal labourers are concerned. It has already been demonstrated that they occupied an inferior pay position, relative to their private sector counterparts, for much of the study period. Whether this was also actually the case for other worker groups is unknown. In theory, in the case of workers sought by both public and private sector employers, the municipality must usually pay a competitive rate if it is to keep its workers. The degree to which a municipality is compelled to do this is largely a function of the general condition of the labour market and the relative scarcity of the particular type of labour being sought. In the case of skilled labour, municipal policy was generally to pay either the going rate for the trade or slightly less to offset the benefit of greater job security that went with municipal employment. This frequently meant paying the current craft union rates established in the private sector.⁸

Another interesting matter pertaining to municipal wage levels concerns restriction on pay for work that was contracted out. In the City of Toronto, a "fair wage officer" was employed by the City to ensure that city rates were paid on all such work.⁹ Whether this practice was also followed in other municipalities is unknown.

d. Hours of Work

Despite a slight tendency towards a reduction in working hours in the 1920s, a work week consisting of somewhere between fifty and sixty hours remained the rule in most of the cities surveyed until the end of the decade. This changed in the early 1930s as municipal employers cut

weekly hours to reduce their wage bills. These changes were sometimes made without tampering with the hourly rate, but frequently downward adjustments to both hourly rates and weekly hours were made concurrently. In some instances, weekly hours were reduced with the agreement of the affected employees in an effort to forestall layoffs. By 1935, the work week in most Ontario cities ranged between forty-four and forty-eight hours, a trend which continued into the 1940s. In 1940, the forty-four hour week was the most common, followed closely by the forty-eight hour week, with the average being forty-six hours. These hours remained largely unaltered over the next ten years and translated into a five and a half to six day work week. During the 1950s, working hours were gradually reduced. By 1960, the vast majority of municipal labourers worked a forty-hour, five-day week. With the exception of Sault Ste Marie, the forty-hour week was universal among respondents by 1962.

In the 1920s and 1930s, there was considerable variability in hours of work from municipality to municipality. Typically, the length of the work week was negatively related to the size of the employing municipality. On average, municipal labourers in the largest centres tended to work the fewest hours, while their counterparts in the smallest municipalities worked the most. The range between the two extremes was quite substantial, amounting to twenty-four hours in both 1920 and 1930. Over time, however, the trend was clearly towards standardization. The range of reported hours became progressively compressed, until near commonality was achieved in the early 1960s. Again it is important to reiterate that this represents the most

optimistic scenario. In smaller municipalities, for which there is no data, it is not unreasonable to expect that longer hours continued to prevail.

e. Pensions and Related Benefits

The analysis of wages provides only a part of the remuneration picture. Prior to World War II, pay for time worked or output produced typically constituted the average worker's total compensation. The post-war era saw the emergence and growth of indirect wage costs or benefits. Aggregated data, concerning the various benefits enjoyed by general municipal employees, police and fire fighters, first becomes available in the early 1950s. Information on the provision of benefits before this is limited to pensions.

It was only in the second half of the 1920s that Canadian municipalities began to approach the whole question of pensions for their employees in a "systematic" fashion. Prior to this, pensions were allocated on an individual basis, largely dependent upon the circumstances involved and at the discretion of council. This practice persisted in a number of locales into the 1950s, although the municipalities involved were generally small in size. By the 1950s, the predominant trend was definitely towards the adoption of formal plans¹⁰ (See Table 7-4).

In Ontario statutory provisions for pensions in municipal employment date from the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849. Initially this was limited to the payment of death benefits for fire fighters killed in the line of duty, but in 1893 coverage was expanded to incorporate disability payments. It was not until 1931 that

TABLE 7-4. ONTARIO URBAN MUNICIPALITIES WITH FORMAL PENSION PLANS. IN ORDER OF ESTABLISHMENT. 1921-1945

<u>Municipality</u>	<u>Year Adopted</u>
Stratford	1922
Ottawa	1931
Windsor	1938
Kingston	1943
Toronto	1943
North Bay	1944
Forest Hill	1944
St. Thomas	1944
Hamilton	1945
Port William	1945
Port Arthur	1945
Sarnia	1945
Chatham	1945
Cornwall	1945

Source: The Institute of Local Government, Canadian Municipal Pension Plans (Kingston: The Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1946),: 66.

municipalities were allowed to make death benefit payments to police officers. In terms of actual pensions, in 1881, legislation was passed to authorize cities and towns to establish superannuation and benefit funds for both fire fighters and police. In 1895, the Act was further amended to encompass other classes of municipal employees. These provisions remained largely unchanged until 1939, when their coverage was specifically limited to superannuation and pension plans established prior to May 1, 1939. Plans established after this date were governed by new legislation. Under the new rules, municipal councils were allowed to establish formal pension plans for their employees either through the Dominion Annuities Branch of the Federal Department of Labour or by contracting directly with an insurance company licensed under The Insurance Act. The initiation of such an undertaking was conditional upon receipt of a petition from not less than seventy-five per cent of the affected workers, calling for the establishment of a pension plan. While the actual decision to institute a plan was at the discretion of the employer, the enabling by-law was subject to the approval of the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs. In 1941, the Act was amended to require similar approval in cases where the employer wished to withdraw from an already established plan. A further amendment, in 1944, allowed pensions to be arranged through either the Dominion Annuities Branch, an insurance company, or both. The scope of provincial supervision was also increased, with the Department of Municipal Affairs gaining the right to designate those employees who could participate in municipal pension plans. In addition, by-laws changing the provisions of existing plans became

subject to Departmental consent.¹¹ In 1946, two or more municipalities were allowed to jointly contract for the purpose of providing employee pensions.

Prior to 1940 there were only three municipalities in Ontario with formal pension plans. Five years later, there were a total of fourteen. By 1950, the number with such plans had soared to over fifty.¹² By the mid-1950s pension plans were common in the vast majority of municipalities with populations of 5,000 or more.¹³ This rapid growth may be attributed, at least partially, to pressure from newly formed municipal employee unions, as well as organizations representing police and fire fighters. Despite the probable union role, the provision of pensions was not limited to municipalities with unions or to unionized employees, but was also fairly typical among those without unions. Interestingly, for a time during the 1950s, unionized workers in a number of centres were the only group specifically excluded from participation in the municipal pension plan. Pension plans were by no means universal. An October 1962 document from the National Union of Public Service Employees reported that 745 out of 976 municipalities did not provide their employees with a pension.¹⁴

With respect to other benefits, by the mid-1950s employer provision of both health and group life insurance was almost as prevalent as pensions, in municipalities with 5,000 or more people.¹⁵ There is, unfortunately, little information as to when these benefits were introduced, but it would seem reasonable to assume that they do not predate pensions. A strong positive relationship is evident between population size and the existence of a formal pension plan. As size of

the population category decreases, so does the percentage of municipalities with pensions. In the case of health and group life insurance, the trend is still visible, although somewhat less pronounced.

2. Hydro-Electric Power

a. Money Wages

Remuneration statistics for municipal hydro-electric utilities are not available for individual municipalities. From 1920 to 1942 the federal Department of Labour's Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour survey reports industry data as a sampling of rates and hours for common occupations. It is coded so that individual employers cannot be identified. It may, therefore, contain results for both provincial and municipal hydro-electric employees as well as those working in the few privately owned utilities. Moreover, for much of the period (1920-1936) neither the number of cases sampled or the particular order in which they appear is consistent from report to report. As a consequence, calculated average rates for specific years vary depending on the particular report that is used. From 1937 to 1941, the data is much more consistent and appears to rely on more or less the same sample base. After 1942, hourly rates are reported as provincial aggregates for selected occupations. There is no notation concerning the comparability of these results with the pre-1941 numbers. Despite these numerous difficulties, it is still possible to construct a crude aggregate average rate series for the purpose of assessing general trends in the industry.

A definite pay hierarchy existed in the industry, ranging from

unskilled labourers and groundmen at the low end to the highly skilled electricians and troublemen at the other. In between were a host of different occupations, with varying wage rates largely dependent upon their relative level of skill. The relationship among these different groups, in terms of their ordering, remained largely unchanged throughout the entire study period, from 1920 to the early 1960s.

Armstrong and Nelles make a number of generalizations about wage developments in hydro-electric power. Unfortunately, their level of analysis is national and the specified sector is much broader than the municipal hydros. Their study is also concerned mainly with developments prior to 1930. They note that, prior to World War I and with the exception of the most skilled workers, hydro-electric employment and the utilities in general were regarded as among the poorest paying sectors of the economy. There was, however, apparently some trade off in terms of improved job security. In the context of both high levels of price inflation and labour militancy, money wages in the utilities doubled during the War. Of the different employee groups, the highly skilled electricians made the most substantial gains. These workers fell within the jurisdiction of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.), although the majority of them were by no means union members. It is also important to remember that unskilled workers were typically not represented by the union at this time. Hence, to the extent that their wages also increased during the war, it was probably a function of tight labour market conditions and traditional wage relationships with more highly skilled workers, some of whom may have been unionized. Unlike the Amalgamated

Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America (A.A.S.E.R.E.), the I.B.E.W. was unable to achieve inter-city parity in electrician's rates. Their wages were still largely determined by the specific labour market conditions of the locality in which they worked. By the early 1920s, the wage levels in hydro-electric employment had improved to the extent that these workers were no longer poorly paid relative to their counterparts in other sectors of the economy. Armstrong and Nelles estimate that labour's share of income in the hydro-electric utilities approached fifty per cent of industry gross income. This, in turn, increased the operating costs of service provision and was ultimately passed along to the consumer.¹⁶

In the early 1920s, all aggregate occupational rates dipped slightly as a result of the economic downturn. In the subsequent recovery, the skilled and semi-skilled occupations quickly regained or exceeded their pre-depression levels. By 1930, rates for these workers were an average twelve per cent higher than they had been in 1920. This was not the case for the unskilled. Labourer rates continued to decline through most of the 1920s. Despite some increases in the latter part of the decade, by 1930, the average labourer rate was still slightly less than it had been ten years earlier. The broadly based, wartime upward wage mobility, identified by Armstrong and Nelles, had apparently ceased, being replaced by relatively poor pay for the unskilled.

During the 1930s, all rates again fell. Thereafter, there was a period of stability, followed by increases toward the end of the decade. As in the 1920s, this aggregate pattern was not followed uniformly by all occupational groups. Unskilled workers, on average,

were the first to suffer wage cuts and the last to recoup them. By 1940, rates for skilled occupations had increased approximately eight per cent above their 1929 levels. Unskilled workers, on the other hand, failed to match their 1929 remuneration. After growing steadily throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, the gap between skilled and unskilled worker pay peaked in 1940.

All average occupational rates increased substantially in the early 1940s. The imposition of wage controls in 1943 curtailed this brief flurry, restricting overall rate growth to nil in 1944 and a mere three per cent in 1945. Small pay gains by unskilled workers reduced the occupational wage differential only marginally and the relationship remained more or less constant into the 1950s. After controls were relaxed in 1946 and removed entirely the following year, rate increases once more assumed significant proportions. Except for 1949 and 1950, double digit growth was present in every year from 1946 to 1953. In 1954 this came abruptly to an end as growth fell off sharply. Although there was some subsequent recovery, after 1955 wages increased at a much more moderate and progressively slower pace. This continued into the mid-1960s. Between 1953 and 1955, the occupational wage gap exceeded its previous record level. However, beginning in the second part of the decade, this trend was reversed. In 1956, average labourer rates increased eighteen per cent as opposed to a mere five per cent for electricians. After increasing at the same pace in 1957, labourer rate growth was twice that of electricians in 1958. It appears that after 1955 a deliberate attempt was made to elevate the wages of labourers relative to the more skilled workers in the industry. The

result was a definite movement toward rate convergence. By 1964, the labourer rate was approximately sixty-nine per cent of that paid electricians. This compared favourably with the fifty-eight per cent ratio ten years before.

Average money rates for hydro-electrical workers do not follow the general wage pattern as closely as in the case of municipal pay (See Table 7-5). A relatively small decline in the early 1920s, combined with a substantial increase in the second half of the decade, produced a net increase of nine per cent for the ten year period. The industrial aggregate, on the other hand, posted a seven per cent decline. In the 1930s, hydro rate developments mirrored those in general municipal employment. Rate fluctuations were far less severe than those reported for the economy as a whole and produced a decennial net gain of three per cent. From 1940 until 1948, hydro rate increases lagged aggregate growth. Wage controls may have played a role in the first part of the decade, but the fact that the trend continued even after controls were lifted indicates that other factors were also at work. After 1948 annual average hydro rate growth either equalled or exceeded that for the economy as a whole. Between 1950 and 1960, hydro rate gains outperformed overall pay growth by approximately twenty-eight per cent. These substantial improvements may well have been due to the impact of a more broadly based union presence in the industry on wage levels. The 1960s saw hydro rates once more conform to the aggregate pattern.

b. Real Wages

Real hourly wages for hydro-electric workers frequently deviated from the path followed by money rates (See Table 7-5). Over the 1920s,

TABLE 7-5. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR HYDRO-ELECTRIC WORKERS¹ AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964

YEAR	MONEY RATES		REAL RATES (C.P.I. 1920=100)		GENERAL RATE INDEX	
	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Index Numbers 1949=100	Annual Per Cent Change
1920	.53	N/A	.53	N/A	52.3	N/A
1921	.52	-1.89	.59	+11.32	47.7	-8.80
1922	.50	-3.85	.62	+5.00	44.5	-6.71
1923	.52	+4.00	.64	+3.23	45.7	+2.70
1924	.52	0.00	.66	+3.13	46.3	+1.31
1925	.52	0.00	.65	-1.52	45.8	-1.08
1926	.54	+3.85	.67	+3.08	46.1	+ .66
1927	.56	+3.70	.70	+4.48	47.1	+2.17
1928	.57	+1.79	.71	+1.43	47.7	+1.27
1929	.58	+1.75	.72	+1.41	48.5	+1.68
1930	.58	0.00	.72	0.00	48.8	+ .62
1931	.58	0.00	.80	+11.11	47.2	-3.28
1932	.58	0.00	.88	+10.00	43.8	-7.20
1933	.55	-5.17	.88	0.00	41.6	-5.02
1934	.55	0.00	.86	-2.27	42.0	+0.96
1935	.56	+1.82	.87	+1.16	43.2	+0.93
1936	.57	+1.79	.87	0.00	44.0	+1.85
1937	.58	+1.75	.86	-1.15	47.3	+7.50
1938	.59	+1.72	.87	+1.16	48.7	+2.96
1939	.60	+1.69	.89	+2.30	48.9	+0.41
1940	.61	+1.67	.87	-2.25	50.8	+3.89
1941	.67	+9.84	.90	+3.45	55.3	+8.86
1942	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	59.9	+8.32
1943	.73	+8.96	.92	+2.22	65.3	+9.02
1944	.73	0.00	.92	0.00	67.4	+3.22
1945	.75	+2.74	.94	+2.17	69.3	+2.82
1946	.82	+9.33	.90	+5.32	75.9	+9.52
1947	.90	+9.76	.99	0.00	84.9	+11.86
1948	1.00	+11.11	.96	-3.03	95.7	+12.72
1949	1.08	+8.00	1.01	+5.21	100.0	+4.49
1950	1.14	+5.56	1.04	+2.97	105.5	+5.50
1951	1.28	+12.28	1.05	+0.96	119.1	+12.89
1952	1.42	+10.94	1.14	+8.57	127.7	+6.80
1953	1.57	+10.56	1.27	+11.40	133.6	+4.62
1954	1.62	+3.18	1.31	+3.15	137.0	+3.22
1955	1.72	+6.17	1.38	+5.34	141.7	+3.43
1956	1.83	+6.40	1.45	+5.07	148.7	+4.94
1957	1.94	+6.01	1.49	+2.76	156.5	+5.25
1958	2.06	+6.19	1.54	+3.36	162.6	+3.90
1959	2.14	+3.88	1.58	+2.60	168.9	+3.87

TABLE 7-5. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR HYDRO-ELECTRIC WORKERS¹ AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964 (cont'd)

YEAR	<u>MONEY RATES</u>		<u>REAL RATES</u> (C.P.I. 1920=100)		<u>GENERAL RATE INDEX</u>	
	<u>Average Hourly Rate(\$)</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>	<u>Average Hourly Rate(\$)</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>	<u>Index Numbers 1949=100</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>
1960	2.25	+5.14	1.64	+3.80	175.5	+3.91
1961	2.31	+2.67	1.67	+1.83	180.0	+2.56
1962	2.40	+3.90	1.72	+2.99	185.9	+3.28
1963	2.48	+3.33	1.74	+1.16	192.5	+3.55
1964	2.56	+3.23	1.77	+1.72	199.8	+3.79

¹ The "Average Hourly Rate" is the unweighted average of rates paid electricians, linemen, groundmen, metermen, meter readers, operators and labourers. Specific occupational rates were estimated in those years in which they were not reported.

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

the average real hourly rate increased by about thirty-five per cent. Relatively small money wage reductions, combined with major price deflation, resulted in significant real rate growth during the first half of the decade. Between 1925 and 1929, money rate increases and considerable price stability also produced real rate growth, although its magnitude was less than over the preceding five years.

In the 1930s, reductions to money rates lagged price deflation by about two years. Real rates soared in 1931 and 1932 as a result. It was not until 1933 that money rates more accurately reflected the economic realities of the time. Thereafter, both wages and prices stagnated. Money rates began to recover slowly in the middle of the decade. From 1935 to 1939, real wages advanced in some years and declined in others, gaining a mere one per cent over the five years. Collectively, real rates grew by about twenty-three per cent between 1930 and 1939, most of it due to price deflation.

Despite substantial money rate expansion in the early 1940s, relatively high levels of inflation greatly reduced the contribution to real wages. The introduction of controls in 1943 successfully restrained both wages and prices. However, their subsequent removal unleashed a renewed cycle of substantial money rate growth and price inflation. Between 1945 and 1949, large increases in money wages produced only paltry advances in real wages. Over the entire decade a seventy-seven per cent money wage gain added only sixteen per cent to real wages.

After lapsing in 1949 and 1950, the inflationary spiral briefly reasserted itself once more in 1951. From 1952 until the end of the

study period inflation was moderate. As a consequence, the double digit increases to money rates in 1952 and 1953 made substantial contributions to real rates. Beginning in 1954, money rate growth also moderated. From then on, the two series run more or less together into the 1960s. Because of the relatively low level of inflation, the proportion of money wage gains going to real wage growth was greater than had previously been the case. Overall, money rates grew by eighty-eight per cent during the 1950s, while real rates posted a fifty-three per cent advance.

c. Comparative Wage Analysis

Assessing the position of hydro-electric remuneration relative to private sector and other areas of local government employment is made difficult by the variety of hydro occupations and problems associated with identifying appropriate worker groups for comparison. As noted previously, the hydro wage scale is bracketed by electricians and labourers at the high and low end, respectively. The rates for both groups are used for comparative purposes. The average hourly rate for hydro electricians is plotted against that paid electricians in the construction industry. Labourer rates are considered in relation to the wages of common labour in factories. To assess the standing of hydro-electric pay relative to that paid other classes of local government workers, the annual pay for electricians is compared with that of municipal police, while hydro labourer rates were measured against those of their municipal counterparts. This analysis is conducted at the aggregate level, rather than in terms of specific municipalities.

Between 1920 and the early 1950s, the average hourly rate received by electricians employed in hydro-electric power consistently trailed that paid in the construction industry (See Table 7-6). This is with the brief exception of 1933-34, when hydro personnel enjoyed a short-lived advantage and 1941-42, when parity existed. From 1920 until the early 1930s, the gap between the two groups narrowed until hydro electricians briefly gained the upper hand, as noted above. After hydro rates returned to their subordinate position in 1935, the relationship was characterized by considerable stability into the 1950s. Typically, the average hydro rate fluctuated at between ninety-four and ninety-six per cent of the average construction rate. In 1953, a substantial jump in the average rate paid hydro electricians catapulted them into the lead, a position which they held until 1964, when construction electricians once more moved ahead.

In the case of labourers, from 1920 until 1942, the average hourly rate in hydro exceeded that paid common factory labour (See Table 7-7). Beginning in 1943, the reverse was true. Initially the differential was fairly small, however, despite fluctuations from year to year, it became progressively larger over time. In 1954, a twenty per cent difference separated the two rates. Large increases for hydro labourers in the late 1950s resulted in these workers once more having the upper hand. They occupied this position into the 1960s, distancing their factory counterparts by a steadily increasing margin.

Within local government employment, electricians in hydro were consistently better paid, in terms of their average annual salaries, than municipal police (See Table 7-6). Although the wage gap between

**TABLE 7-6. RATIO OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC ELECTRICIAN TO MUNICIPAL POLICE AND
CONSTRUCTION ELECTRICIAN ANNUAL SALARIES (UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES), FOR
ONTARIO, 1920-1964¹**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal Police</u>	<u>Electrical Workers (Building Trades)</u>
1920	1.04	.79
1921	N/A	N/A
1922	N/A	N/A
1923	N/A	N/A
1924	N/A	N/A
1925	1.10	N/A
1926	N/A	.88
1927	N/A	N/A
1928	N/A	N/A
1929	1.09	.88
1930	N/A	.85
1931	1.12	.87
1932	1.11	.91
1933	1.18	1.03
1934	1.17	1.06
1935	1.08	.93
1936	1.08	.94
1937	1.06	.96
1938	1.05	.95
1939	1.04	.95
1940	1.07	.94
1941	1.07	.98
1942	N/A	N/A
1943	1.05	.94
1944	1.08	.95
1945	1.06	.93
1946	1.12	.94
1947	1.15	.95
1948	1.19	.94
1949	1.15	.90
1950	1.09	.91
1951	1.11	.94
1952	1.03	.94
1953	1.14	1.01
1954	1.12	.98
1955	1.14	.98
1956	1.15	.99
1957	1.17	.97
1958	1.14	.96
1959	1.14	.94
1960	1.17	.97
1961	1.16	.93
1962	1.18	.94
1963	1.18	.94

TABLE 7-6. RATIO OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC ELECTRICIAN TO MUNICIPAL POLICE AND CONSTRUCTION ELECTRICIAN ANNUAL SALARIES (UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES), FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964¹ (cont'd)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal Police</u>	<u>Electrical Workers (Building Trades)</u>
1964	1.15	.93

¹ The series from which these ratios are calculated are not strictly comparable due to methodological differences in their construction. They should, therefore, be viewed as providing a general overview of comparative wage trends, rather than as a rigorous statistical comparison.

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

**TABLE 7-7. RATIO OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC TO MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR
LABOURER RATES (UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES), FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964**

<u>Year</u>	<u>Municipal Labourers</u>	<u>Factory Labourers</u>
1920	.98	1.15
1921	.98	1.16
1922	1.00	N/A
1923	.98	1.11
1924	.93	N/A
1925	.95	1.14
1926	.93	1.11
1927	.98	1.17
1928	1.02	1.22
1929	1.00	1.19
1930	1.00	1.19
1931	1.00	1.19
1932	1.00	1.29
1933	1.00	1.31
1934	1.00	1.31
1935	1.00	1.27
1936	1.00	1.27
1937	.95	1.11
1938	.98	1.16
1939	.96	1.16
1940	.96	1.13
1941	1.04	1.14
1942	N/A	N/A
1943	.93	.96
1944	.90	.91
1945	.92	.93
1946	.94	.90
1947	.90	.84
1948	.91	.85
1949	.85	.83
1950	.90	.84
1951	.89	.82
1952	.91	.86
1953	.90	.89
1954	.88	.84
1955	.88	.86
1956	1.00	.92
1957	.99	.92
1958	1.05	1.01
1959	1.03	1.01
1960	1.03	1.05
1961	1.02	1.03
1962	1.03	1.05
1963	1.03	1.06
1964	1.06	1.07

**TABLE 7-7. RATIO OF HYDRO-ELECTRIC TO MUNICIPAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR
LABOURER RATES (UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES), FOR ONTARIO,
1920-1964 (cont'd)**

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

the two groups varies over time, changes during the period in which widespread unionism appeared in this sector do not deviate substantially from the historical pattern. With respect to labourers, it is known that the Toronto Electric Commissioners matched the labourer rates paid by the City of Toronto.¹⁷ This policy seems to have been the exception rather than the rule (See Table 7-7). For most of the study period, average hydro labourer rates were inferior to those received in municipal employment. Rate parity existed for a time between 1928-36 and again in 1956-57. The large increases of the late 1950s pushed hydro-electric labourers into the lead for the first time in 1958 and they remained ahead into the 1960s. During the time in which the municipal rate had the advantage, the spread between the two rates fluctuated. The gap was greatest throughout most of the 1940s and into the mid-1950s.

The Toronto Electric Commissioners paid the going rate for skilled labour in certain trades, as established by the Builders Exchange in the City. The Utility also adopted the City of Toronto's "fair wage policy" for work it contracted out.¹⁸ Again, it is not known if these practices were peculiar to this particular employer or were more widespread.

The relationship between wage developments in hydro-electric employment and the emergence of unionism, in this sector, is not overtly apparent. With respect to electricians, there was no significant disruption or alteration of established wage relationships, with either electricians in construction or other classes of local government employees. Indeed, the only significant relational change

was the assumption of the wage lead, from the construction industry, in 1958. This undoubtedly reflects the impact of established unionism on rates. While not directly associated with new union formation, this information could be used as an inducement to persuade the unorganized that union membership was economically worthwhile. The fact that electricians employed in hydro-electric power long occupied a subordinate pay position relative to the construction industry may, however, have played a positive role as a grievance generator.

In the case of labourers, significant union formation coincides with the destruction of the established relationship between hydro labourers and those employed in manufacturing. This, plus the widening of the wage gap with municipal labourers, at approximately the same time, may have combined to create a powerful picture of comparative wage inequity vis-a-vis other groups. The decision to unionize would have been a reasonable response under such circumstances. The only problem with this is that labourers were not the core employee group in either the industry or the unions that were formed. Indeed, it can be argued that the interests of these workers were not adequately represented by these unions and as a consequence their comparative pay position deteriorated significantly relative to other worker groups. It was only in the late 1950s that some attempt to improve their standing was evident.

d. Hours of Work

Average hours of work in hydro-electric employment tended to be stable during the 1920s, at about fifty-three hours per week. Beginning in 1929 hours began to slowly decrease. By 1940, the average work week

had shrunk to approximately forty-seven hours. Despite some fluctuations, this level was maintained until the 1950s. Hours fell rapidly in the early 1950s, with the forty hour week becoming the industry average by the middle of the decade. This continued to be the case into the mid-1960s.

e. Pensions and Related Benefits

There is no aggregated statistical data, covering non-wage benefits in hydro-electric employment, for the study period. There are, however, a number of statutory provisions that are worth noting. In 1927, an amendment to the Power Commission Act provided for the establishment of a pension fund for Hydro-Electric Power Commission (H.E.P.C.) employees.¹⁹ The Act also allowed the Commission to enter into an agreement with individual municipalities whereby the employees of any commission created under the Public Utilities Act or the Power Commission Act, could be brought into the plan. There is no record of the number of authorities that elected to pursue this option.

Another important statute is the Power Commission Insurance Act, 1927.²⁰ This Act empowered the H.E.P.C. to enter into an agreement with any municipal authority or group of municipal authorities engaged in the distribution of hydro-electric power. Under the terms of this agreement the Commission was authorized to act for the municipal authority and to contract with a private insurance company on its behalf to obtain insurance for that authority's employees. This insurance could be in the form of service annuities, income annuities, death or disability benefits or any other benefits that the Commission determined to be appropriate. The H.E.P.C. was also authorized to

contract with insurance companies on behalf of municipal authorities without their consent. In such circumstances, a legally binding insurance contract was imposed on the reluctant participant. The remainder of the Act covered the payment of premiums and provided for the making of administrative regulations. This statute is of particular importance given the complaints voiced by hydro-electric employees about their inability to secure life insurance, due to the hazardous nature of their work. Again, there are no statistics indicating the number of authorities that took advantage of this opportunity or were compelled to do so.

3. Urban Transit

a. Money Wages

Wages and hours of labour, in urban transit, are available for a number of functional employee classifications. Operating personnel have always been the largest single occupational group in the industry. The other employee groups for which there are data are relatively small and insignificant by comparison. The analysis of wage developments in urban transit will, therefore, focus mainly on operator rates.

Unlike the other sectors of local government employment under study, two aggregate indices of average wage rates are available for urban transit. The first covers the period from 1901 to 1943, while the second uses 1939 as its base year and continues beyond 1964. Due to differences in the comprehensiveness of the data used in their calculation, the two are not strictly comparable, even in those years in which they overlap. An additional methodological complication stems from changes in the industrial classification system that is employed.

Street and electric railways are not the same as urban transit.²¹ They refer to particular modes of service provision and not to the provision of the service itself. They encompass approximately the same constituency as long as street and electric railways remains the primary means of urban transit provision. With a small number of exceptions this was the case up to the 1930s. However, with the greater utilization of motor buses and the abandonment of traction based service, in the 1930s and 1940s, this equation increasingly loses validity. As the number of traction systems declined, so did the sample base upon which the index was constructed. It becomes increasingly difficult to argue that the index captures industry trends. With the adoption of the "urban and suburban" industrial classification in 1951, this problem was finally resolved and the index became more representative of the industry as a whole. Despite these limitations, the indices do provide a valuable, long term overview of wage trends in the Canadian urban transit industry. These aggregate developments are surveyed briefly before proceeding to an examination of transit operator rates in Ontario (See Tables 7-8 and 7-9).

Average wage rates for electric railways in Canada peaked in 1920, after having more than doubled over the preceding ten year period. They then declined slightly in 1921 and again in 1922, as the majority of contributors to the index reported rate reductions. This was followed by a modest recovery in 1923 and moderate annual growth thereafter, until the 1930s. After a slight decline in 1931, rates plummeted in 1932 and 1933. Rates stabilized in 1934 and from 1935 to 1941, small annual increases were the rule. By 1940, the industry had recouped the

TABLE 7-8. INDEX NUMBERS OF RATES OF WAGES FOR ELECTRIC RAILWAYS FOR CANADA, 1913-1943 (RATES IN 1913=100)

Year	<u>MONEY RATES</u>		<u>REAL RATES</u>	
	<u>Index</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
1913	100.0	N/A	100.0	N/A
1914	101.0	+1.00	100.0	0.00
1915	97.8	-3.17	95.5	-4.50
1916	102.2	+4.50	92.0	-3.66
1917	114.6	+12.13	87.2	-5.22
1918	142.9	+24.69	96.1	+10.21
1919	163.2	+14.21	99.9	+3.95
1920	194.2	+19.00	102.6	+2.70
1921	192.1	-1.08	115.3	+12.38
1922	184.4	-4.01	120.8	+4.77
1923	186.2	+ .98	121.7	+ .75
1924	186.4	+ .11	124.1	+1.97
1925	187.8	+ .75	123.9	- .16
1926	188.4	+ .32	122.9	- .81
1927	189.9	+ .80	125.9	+2.44
1928	194.1	+2.21	128.4	+1.99
1929	198.6	+2.23	129.8	+1.09
1930	199.4	+ .40	131.3	+1.16
1931	198.6	- .40	144.7	+10.21
1932	191.1	-3.78	153.2	+5.87
1933	182.7	-4.40	154.2	+ .65
1934	182.4	- .16	151.3	-1.88
1935	183.7	+ .71	151.5	+ .13
1936	185.5	+ .98	150.0	- .99
1937	190.5	+2.70	149.4	- .40
1938	193.7	+1.68	150.3	+ .60
1939	194.9	+ .62	152.4	+1.40
1940	200.4	+2.82	150.6	-1.18
1941	215.8	+7.68	153.3	+1.79
1942	232.6	+7.78	157.8	+2.94
1943	253.3	+8.90	169.1	+7.16

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1913-1943.

**TABLE 7-9. INDEX NUMBERS OF AVERAGE WAGE RATES FOR ELECTRIC RAILWAYS
AND URBAN AND SUBURBAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, FOR CANADA, 1939-1964
(RATES IN 1939=100)**

Year	<u>MONEY RATES</u>		<u>REAL RATES</u>	
	<u>Index</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
1939	100.0	N/A	100.0	N/A
1940	103.9	+3.90	99.8	- .20
1941	109.1	+5.00	99.6	- .20
1942	115.8	+6.14	100.5	+ .90
1943	121.2	+4.66	103.4	+2.89
1944	125.7	+3.71	106.5	+3.00
1945	126.6	+ .72	106.8	+ .28
1946	139.5	+10.19	113.8	+6.66
1947	162.3	+16.34	121.1	+6.41
1948	175.0	+7.83	114.1	-5.78
1949	179.0	+2.29	113.1	- .96
1950	192.1	+7.32	118.1	+4.42
1951	215.2	+12.02	119.7	+1.35
1952	233.5	+8.50	126.8	+5.93
1953	241.7	+3.51	132.4	+4.42
1954	251.0	+3.85	136.7	+3.25
1955	256.9	+2.35	139.7	+2.19
1956	274.4	+6.81	147.0	+5.23
1957	284.3	+3.61	147.6	+ .41
1958	306.5	+7.81	154.9	+4.95
1959	322.2	+5.12	161.1	+4.00
1960	338.3	+5.00	167.1	+3.72
1961	349.2	+3.22	170.1	+1.80
1962	359.4	+2.92	173.8	+2.18
1963	371.1	+3.26	176.4	+1.50
1964	377.9	+1.83	176.4	0.00

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1939-1964.

wage cuts suffered during the Depression. Significant increases occurred in the early 1940s. However, by 1945 wage controls had reduced this growth to a mere trickle. With the end of controls, double digit increases were reported in 1946 and 1947. Slightly less substantial gains were common between 1948 and 1952. Thereafter, with the exception of 1956 and 1958, aggregate rate growth assumed much more modest dimensions, particularly in the early 1960s.

The national pattern of wage rate development generally appears to have been replicated in Ontario. Occupationally based wage data are available for electric railways, in terms of specific municipalities, beginning in 1920. Unfortunately, the survey was limited primarily to the largest centres during its first decade. It was only in 1931, that more broadly based wage statistics were first reported. The gradual decline in the number of urban transit systems utilizing traction reduced the number of contributors to a mere handful by the 1940s. Bus-only system statistics were not reported, either as part of the electric railway results or by themselves. In 1951, with the adoption of the "urban and suburban transportation systems" industrial classification, electric railway and bus-only system results were finally united. With this change, operator data for systems in which buses were the sole means of service provision were published.

The limited number of cases available during the 1920s, requires that considerable caution be exercised in extrapolating the results to represent industry wide trends (See Table 7-10). Average hourly rates for operating personnel fell sharply in 1922, but thereafter were stable until the middle of the decade. In 1925, average rates began to

TABLE 7-10. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR URBAN TRANSIT OPERATORS AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964

YEAR	<u>MONEY RATES</u>		<u>REAL RATES</u> (C.P.I. 1920=100)		<u>GENERAL RATE INDEX</u>	
	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Average Hourly Rate(\$)	Annual Per Cent Change	Index Numbers 1949=100	Annual Per Cent Change
1920	.50(.56)	N/A(N/A)	.50(.56)	N/A(N/A)	52.3	N/A
1921	N/A(.56)	N/A(0.00)	N/A(.64)	N/A(+14.29)	47.7	-8.80
1922	N/A(.52)	N/A(-7.14)	N/A(.64)	N/A(0.00)	44.5	-6.71
1923	N/A(.52)	N/A(0.00)	N/A(.64)	N/A(0.00)	45.7	+2.70
1924	N/A(.52)	N/A(0.00)	N/A(.66)	N/A(+3.13)	46.3	+1.31
1925	N/A(.53)	N/A(+1.92)	N/A(.66)	N/A(0.00)	45.8	-1.08
1926	.50(.56)	N/A(+5.66)	.62(.69)	N/A(+4.55)	46.1	+ .66
1927	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	47.1	+2.17
1928	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	47.7	+1.27
1929	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	N/A(N/A)	48.5	+1.68
1930	.54(.59)	N/A(N/A)	.67(.73)	N/A(N/A)	48.8	+ .62
1931	.53	-1.85	.73	+8.96	47.2	-3.28
1932	.50	-5.66	.76	+4.11	43.8	-7.20
1933	.49	-2.00	.78	+2.63	41.6	-5.02
1934	.48	-2.04	.75	-3.85	42.0	+0.96
1935	.49	+2.08	.76	+1.33	43.2	+0.93
1936	.50	+2.04	.76	0.00	44.0	+1.85
1937	.52	+4.00	.77	+1.32	47.3	+7.50
1938	.53	+1.92	.78	+1.30	48.7	+2.96
1939	.54(.56)	+1.89(N/A)	.80	+2.56	48.9	+0.41
1940	.55(.57)	+1.85(+1.79)	.78	-2.50	50.8	+3.89
1941	.61	+10.91	.82	+5.13	55.3	+8.86
1942	.66	+8.20	.85	+3.66	59.9	+8.32
1943	.72	+9.09	.91	+7.06	65.3	+9.02
1944	.75	+4.17	.94	+3.30	67.4	+3.22
1945	.75	0.00	.94	0.00	69.3	+2.82
1946	.79	+5.33	.95	+1.06	75.9	+9.52
1947	.90	+13.92	.99	+4.21	84.9	+11.86
1948	.97	+7.78	.94	-5.05	95.7	+12.72
1949	1.05	+8.25	.98	+4.26	100.0	+4.49
1950	1.09	+3.81	.99	+1.02	105.5	+5.50
1951	1.24	+13.76	1.02	+3.03	119.1	+12.89
1952	1.32	+6.45	1.06	+3.92	127.7	+6.80
1953	1.42	+7.58	1.15	+8.49	133.6	+4.62
1954	1.47	+3.52	1.18	+2.61	137.0	+3.22
1955	1.51	+2.72	1.21	+2.54	141.7	+3.43
1956	1.58	+4.64	1.25	+3.31	148.7	+4.94
1957	1.68	+6.33	1.29	+3.20	156.5	+5.25
1958	1.75	+4.17	1.31	+1.55	162.6	+3.90
1959	1.85	+5.71	1.37	+4.58	168.9	+3.87

TABLE 7-10. AVERAGE (WEIGHTED) MONEY AND REAL HOURLY RATES OF PAY FOR URBAN TRANSIT OPERATORS AND GENERAL RATE INDEX FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES, FOR ONTARIO, 1920-1964 (cont'd)

YEAR	<u>MONEY RATES</u>		<u>REAL RATES</u> (C.P.I. 1920=100)		<u>GENERAL RATE INDEX</u>	
	<u>Average Hourly Rate(\$)</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>	<u>Average Hourly Rate(\$)</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>	<u>Index Numbers 1949=100</u>	<u>Annual Per Cent Change</u>
1960	1.95	+5.41	1.43	+4.38	175.5	+3.91
1961	2.00	+2.56	1.45	+2.56	180.0	+2.56
1962	2.03	+1.50	1.45	0.00	185.9	+3.28
1963	2.09	+2.96	1.47	+1.38	192.5	+3.55
1964	2.16	+3.35	1.49	+1.36	199.8	+3.79

Source: Wages, Salaries and Hours of Labour, 1920-1964.

increase and this pattern continued until 1930. Overall, average operator rates gained about eight per cent between 1920 and 1930. Average rates declined substantially in the early 1930s, falling about eleven per cent between 1930 and 1934. The downturn halted in 1935, when the rate posted a marginal increase over its previous level. Nominal gains followed in each successive year. By 1939, operator rates equalled their previous high, recorded in 1930. This benchmark was surpassed in 1940. Up to this point, annual rate growth was small, not exceeding two per cent in most years. In 1941, this changed. Between 1941 and 1944, average rates increased by about thirty-two per cent. This escalation slowed in 1944 and ceased altogether in 1945, due to wage controls. After beginning slowly in 1946, substantial annual rate increases resumed in 1947 and continued, with only occasional lapses, into the 1950s. Between 1945 and 1953, the average operator rate grew by about eighty-nine per cent. After 1953, the pace of annual rate expansion slowed. Despite this moderation, the average operator rate had still increased by approximately thirty-seven per cent by 1961. In the early 1960s, rate growth slowed still further, gaining only two to three per cent per year after 1961. A mere eleven per cent was added to the average rate by the end of 1964.

The path followed by Ontario operator rates is generally consistent with both the aggregate transit rate indices and the rate index for the general economy. There are, however, some noteworthy variations. In the early 1930s, the magnitude of operator rate cuts more closely approximated reductions in the general index, than in the transit index. This suggests that, as a group, transit operators in

Ontario were harder hit by employer retrenchment than the Canadian transit industry as a whole. This may reflect either the health of the Ontario industry or the general treatment of Canadian transit operators during this period. In the second half of the decade, when rates began to recover, growth in both operator pay and the transit index lagged overall wage developments in the economy. After picking up the pace in the early 1940s, operator rate increases were abruptly curtailed in 1945. The transit and general indices advanced only minimally. In 1946, the gains posted by both were double that realized by transit operators. Only in 1947 did the three series finally reconverge. With a few aberrations, this remained the case until the end of the study period in 1964.

A cross-sectional analysis of Ontario operator rates reveals a positive relationship between hourly remuneration and the size of the municipality in which the service was provided.²² Although there were significant variations in hourly pay from municipality to municipality, overall as the size of the population category increased, so did the average hourly operator rate for the group. This relationship was consistent throughout the entire study period. With only sporadic exceptions, operators in the City of Toronto were the highest paid in the province. The other end of the spectrum was occupied by a number of smaller municipalities. Serious breaks in the comparability of the wage data make any meaningful assessment of changes in the differential between the highest and lowest paid extremely tentative. Nevertheless, it is still possible to make a general observation. It appears that the range between the high and low rates gradually declined between 1920

and 1964. Operator rates were by no means standardized, but clearly there was a definite trend in that direction. On average, municipally owned systems paid higher operator rates than did their private sector counterparts. This remained the case even after the influence of Toronto rates on the calculation was negated.

b. Real Wages

As with the other groups under study, the pattern of average real operator rates differ from that followed by money rates (See Table 5-11). The reduction in consumer prices, in the early 1920s, transformed money rate stagnation and losses into real rate gains. The price stability that characterized the rest of decade, by definition mandated that real rates and money rates would parallel one another. In the early 1930s, the pace and magnitude of economic deflation more than compensated for money rate reductions. As a result, real wages again increased. Money rates began to grow in 1935, but these gains were largely offset by matching increases in prices. Real rates consequently advanced only minimally by the end of the decade. In 1940, real rates actually fell by two per cent and in the following year recorded no change. It was only in 1942 that real rates began to make substantial advances, only to be restricted by the wage controls program. In 1945, real rates declined by two per cent. In the immediate post-war period substantial price inflation eroded most of the benefit from large money rate increases. By 1950, real rates had increased only four per cent beyond their 1944 level. Inflationary prices moderated in the 1950s and money rate increases were of sufficient magnitude to produce real rate improvements. This continued until 1960. In the 1960s, growth in both

money rates and inflation slowed even further. Real rates followed suit. Real rates stalled completely in 1962 and were limited to a mere one per cent in each of the two following years.

c. Comparative Wage Analysis

To obtain a comparative perspective, the pay of transit operators was assessed against that received by municipal labourers, police and fire fighters (See Table 7-2). No private sector group was deemed appropriate for comparison. In terms of their average annual pay, operators commonly fell somewhere between municipal labourers and fire fighters in the pay hierarchy, although there were periodic exceptions. Within these confines operator pay varied widely in relation to that of the other groups. In 1920, the average annual salary of operators was only slightly less than that paid police, but exceeded both fire fighter and municipal labourer results. Despite the lack of complete statistics, it is clear that by the end of the decade operators had lost some ground compared to police and fire fighters. Their relationship with municipal labourers, on the other hand, remained largely unchanged. The erosion of their position relative to the uniformed services continued until the mid-1930s. Between 1934 and 1936, average operator annual remuneration was only eighty-two per cent of that paid police. As the economy recovered, operators slowly recouped their losses. By 1947, they had gained near parity with police and, despite a short lapse in the interim, actually achieved parity in 1951. In the early 1950s operators again saw their relative standing decline. After 1955, it stabilized at about the ninety per cent level and this remained the case until 1963-64, when a further deterioration

occurred. Overall, there is a definite similarity between the path followed by transit operators relative to police and fire fighters, and that taken by municipal labourers.

Transit operators generally earned a higher hourly rate of pay than municipal labourers in the same locality. However, there are a number of instances in which operators temporarily earned either the same rate as municipal labourers or less. This occurred most frequently when provision was in private hands and the company was in financial difficulty, probably anticipating a public buy out. In other cases it merely reflected the problem that transit operators faced in attempting to assert their claim to possess a skill and hence to be entitled to a higher rate of pay than the unskilled. By the late 1940s, this issue appears to have been resolved largely in their favour, at least in the larger centres.

d. Hours of Work

The average work week appears to have declined only marginally during the 1920s. The lack of comprehensive data precludes a more substantial observation. During the early 1930s, both wages and hours fell in the first part of the decade as employers sought to reduce labour costs. Some resurgence occurred after 1935, but by 1940 the average transit work week was still less than its pre-depression level. There are no statistics for the period 1941-1944, however, the 1945 results suggest that very little changed during the intervening years. From 1945 to 1950, hours progressively declined. The calculated average, for the late 1930s and 1940s, may understate actual industry levels due to the unrepresentative base from which the data was

derived. In general, the largest systems tended to retain traction as part of their service provision mix longer than smaller systems. They also tended to have shorter work weeks. As noted previously, these difficulties were largely overcome in 1951, with the adoption of a more comprehensive industrial classification. The reported increase in average working hours, in 1951, resulted from this change and the previous understatement of hours. The work week continued to decline in the 1950s, finally levelling out in 1956 and remaining stable until 1960. In 1961, the addition of a number of smaller systems to the survey produced a slight, temporary increase in hours. However, by 1964, the forty hour week was the industry average. Weekly hours varied widely from system to system. Working hours were typically shorter in larger centres than in smaller localities. Both ends of the continuum declined over the period, reductions at the high end were of much greater magnitude. Overall, the trend was toward convergence and by 1964, with a few exceptions, this had been largely attained.

e. Pensions and Related Benefits

There is no source of aggregated data on this subject for the study period. In terms of individual collective agreements were frequently reported in the Labour Gazette, but such submissions were voluntary and not all contracts were included. Moreover, the focus on collective agreements effectively excluded any employer operating without a union.

4. Water Works

Compensation and benefit information for water works employees is not available. It would, however, not seem unreasonable to assume that

developments here closely paralleled those in general municipal employment.

Conclusions

This chapter assessed the hypothesis that changes in worker compensation and inter-occupational wage relationships had a positive impact on the growth and development of local government unionism. The evidence strongly suggests that this is the case. As noted previously the primary influence of these factors is on the propensity to unionize.

The aggregate union growth literature predicts a positive relationship between inflation and union growth. In the early 1940s and again in the latter part of the decade, wages were subject to considerable inflationary pressure. This roughly coincides with municipal union growth, particularly in the 1940s. By the early 1950s, these pressures had largely abated, but municipal unionism continued to expand none the less. Increases in money rates are also positively related to the emergence of unionism. It is therefore plausible that municipal unions were "credited" with the improvements that occurred, even if they played no role. During the period of wartime wage controls wage growth was limited, but unions were credited with possessing the potential for obtaining subsequent increases during the post-controls period. The same is true with respect to real rate growth. The anticipated positive relationship with unionism is again evident. It is reasonable that unions were also credited with reducing working hours and the introduction of any new or improved benefits.

From a comparative perspective, between 1920 and the mid-1930s,

the wages of municipal labourers declined steadily relative to other classes of municipal employees such as police and fire fighters. As noted in Chapter 4, fire fighters were heavily unionized throughout the study period. Despite substantial money wage increases in the early 1940s, municipal labourers also lost their traditional pay advantage relative to common factory labour. This reflected increased union activity in the manufacturing sector as much as sluggishness in municipal wage growth. Such developments should theoretically have increased the propensity of municipal labourers to unionize. Again the evidence is consistent with the hypothesized relationship. As noted previously, a key element in any assessment of comparative wage inequities is communications. Precisely how do workers become aware that they are losing ground relative to other groups? Given a common employer and residence within the same municipality, information transfer through physical proximity is quite likely. This is not the case for institutional proximity. As indicated in Chapter Ten, the institutional linkages were extremely weak for much of the study period.

Municipal labourers were particularly vulnerable to employer retrenchment policies. This was demonstrated in the economic downturn of early 1920s and again during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Their relative lack of skills, ease of replacement due to high unemployment and the general absence of union representation meant that as an occupational group they possessed little bargaining power. As the purveyors of "non-essential" services their numbers could be significantly reduced, as was done during the 1930s, without generating substantial public outcry.

In hydro-electric power, inflation and increases in money and real wages seem to have had the same positive influence on union growth as in general municipal employment. It is in the area of comparative wage analysis that the results are inconclusive. Unlike general municipal employment, in which labourers were the largest single constituent group, hydro-electric power was much more occupationally mixed. Some workers such as electricians and troublemen were highly skilled, while others such as labourers were unskilled. Labourers experienced a comparative decline in their wage levels, similar to that identified in municipal employment and for much the same reasons. Skilled workers, however, generally did not. Labourers exerted limited influence among hydro-electric employees and even after unions were formed their low pay garnered little attention until the late 1950s. At the other end of the continuum, electricians were well paid relative to the other classes of local government employment surveyed, but traditionally occupied a inferior position compared to their counterparts in construction. There is no evidence of any disruption in these established relationships. Other than a possible desire to redress their position relative to construction electricians, comparative wage analysis provides little assistance in understanding why these skilled workers unionized. If this was the reason, then institutional proximity, through the I.B.E.W., probably provided the major conduit for information sharing.

Public transit in most major centres was largely organized by the 1920s. Union formation in the late 1930s and beyond, therefore, represented more of a filling in of those remaining unorganized, than a

new phenomenon. The industry wage trends surveyed are largely a function of unionism and collective bargaining. The positive impact of inflation and money and real wage increases could have been operative in the few cases in which new unions were formed.

Comparatively, transit pay fluctuated widely relative to that received by municipal police, fire fighters and labourers. Public authorities typically paid higher wages than private companies operating under a franchise. Overall, comparative wage developments tend to be a function of the health of the industry. Following a resurgence during World War II, urban transit was very much an industry in decline during the post-war period. This is reflected in the inter-occupational wage comparisons.

Local government unionism emerged during a period of trauma in the employment relationship. Its true extent is only partially reflected in wage and employment developments. The workers who formed these unions were greatly influenced by these events. Garnett Shier, in commenting on the 1943 formation of Local 79 (T.L.C.), in Toronto, notes that the dissatisfaction that led to the creation of the union extended back prior to the war. It was not merely the perception of being poorly paid, but the nature of the entire employment relationship that gave rise to unionism. Management policies and practices, including favouritism in job assignments and promotion, achieving improved productivity through staff layoffs, general arbitrariness in dealing with employees, and the lack of worker input in the terms and conditions of employment are all cited as contributing factors.²³

NOTES

1 Unless otherwise indicated the discussion of wages and hours is based solely on statistics reported in Canada, Department of Labour, Wage Rates, Salaries and Hours of Labour 1921-1964. The title and reporting format have varied over time. Until 1949, the report was issued as a supplement to the Labour Gazette. After 1949, it was published separately.

2 For a summary of the legal framework of controls see Chapter 8. Hydro-electric power, urban transit and water works, as "war related" industries were automatically subject to these controls. General municipal employees were not and there is no evidence that the Ontario government ever exercised its option to bring them under the program.

3 Kenneth Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954),: 186-188.

4 The municipal populations reported in the decennial Census of Canada were used to sort municipalities into their respective population categories. These categories are the same as those used elsewhere in the study.

5 Those individuals who had jobs and did not have their hours reduced would have been economically better off from the perspective of their real income. However, collectively this was not the case.

6 Sylvia Ostry and Mahmood A. Zardi, Labour Economics in Canada, 2nd., ed., (Toronto: Macmillian of Canada, 1972),: 206.

7 Crawford, op. cit.,: 186-188.

8 Ibid.,: 186-188.

9 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Garnett Shier, (first President of the National Union of Public Employees). Interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, C.U.P.E. Research Director, June 1, 1977.

10 Crawford, op. cit.,: 188-189.

11 The Institute of Local Government, Canadian Municipal Pension Plans (Kingston: The Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1946),: 11-12.

12 Crawford, op. cit.,: 190.

13 Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Wage and Salary Survey and Conditions of Employment of Municipal Employees: 1956 Report (Montreal: The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1957),: 91-93.

- 14 Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, file 17, N.U.P.S.E. Bulletins to Staff June-Dec. 1962. Dr. Mario Hiki, Research Director to Recording Secretaries, N.U.P.S.E. Locals in Ontario : Re: Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (Bill 169), October 11, 1962.
- 15 Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, op. cit.,: 91-93.
- 16 Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, Monopoly's Moment: The Organization and Regulation of Canadian Utilities 1830-'930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986),: 233, 235.
- 17 Toronto Hydro, Minutes of the Meetings of the Toronto Electric Commissioners. There are numerous references to this practice in the 1920s.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 R.S.O. 1927, The Power Commission Act, ch. 57, s. 16-17.
- 20 Ontario, Statutus, The Power Commission Insurance Act, 1927, 17 Geo. V, ch. 21.
- 21 For a history of the role of electric railways in inter-urban transportation in Canada see: John P. Due, The Intercity Electric Railway Industry in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966).
- 22 Armstrong and Nelles note that after 1914, the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway employees was able to make significant progress in reducing inter-city wage disparities among the same classes of street railway workers. They argue that by 1918, the union had made significant gains in wages and had secured rough parity across the country. Subsequently, it was largely able to protect these gains in the severe economic downturn that followed the War. Armstrong and Nelles, op. cit.,: 233, 235.
- 23 Shier, interview, op. cit. Prior to the 1950s there was a general absence of modern human resources management structures and techniques, such as personnel or human resources departments and job classifications. Compensation was frequently chaotic, with the level of compensation for the same work, varying by department within the same municipal authority. I am indebted to Professor T.J. Plunkett for this observation.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONISM IN ONTARIO 1935-1963:
A STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF UNION GROWTH

VOLUME II

by

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CHAPTER 8

POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF UNION GROWTH: THE PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORK

Introduction

According to the aggregate union growth literature, favourable public policy positively influences both the propensity and opportunity to unionize. The very introduction of such legislation legitimizes unions to at least some degree, increasing the propensity to organize. Beyond this implicit support, some statutes contain preambles or statements affirming the value of unionism and free collective bargaining. This was the case with the 1935 American Wagner Act. It was not until the 1970s that the Ontario Labour Relations Act contained a similar declaration. More important, however, is the role played by public policy in enhancing the opportunity to unionize. This is done by limiting anti-union behaviour by employers. Compulsory union recognition and compulsory bargaining, along with the prohibition of a variety of unfair practices are particularly significant. The working assumption is that employers will oppose unions if given the chance, hence the need for compulsion and sanctions to ensure that they do not.

This chapter assesses the hypothesis that public policy played an important, positive role in promoting local government union growth and development. The various public policy frameworks that have directly pertained to the unionization of local government employees in Ontario are examined. The discussion covers the period from 1907 to 1966.

Under Canadian constitutional law municipal corporations are creations of provincial statute and as such lack both the inherent powers and sovereign immunities of the two "senior" levels of government.¹ This fact is of particular significance with respect to both the nature and regulation of municipal labour relations.² Specifically, while the relationship between public sector employees and their respective employers, at the provincial³ and federal⁴ levels, is governed by special legislation specific to that purpose, the relationship at the municipal level is subject to the same general labour relations legislation that is applicable to the private sector.⁵ The right of municipal employees to organize unions and bargain collectively with their employer is provided in this legislation. It is also important to recognize that collective bargaining at the municipal level did not emerge full-blown as a result of a conscious change in government policy, but rather it developed and evolved on a largely ad hoc basis.⁶

The principal piece of labour relations legislation in Canada between 1907 and 1944 was the federal Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907. In addition, during approximately the same period, the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906 and its successor the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, empowered the Board to intervene in certain labour disputes. Other labour relations legislation existed, but it is not directly relevant to this discussion. The primary concern in both the federal and provincial statutes was with the outcomes of collective bargaining, specifically, the prevention of strikes. With the exception of provisions geared to the realization of this

objective, the conduct of collective bargaining and labour relations in general were largely unregulated. It was only in the 1940s, with the Ontario Collective Bargaining Act, 1943 and more importantly, the introduction of Order in Council P.C. 1003: Wartime Labour Relations Regulations by the federal government in 1944, under the authority of the War Measures Act, 1914, that the detailed regulation of the process of collective bargaining became an integral feature of Canadian labour relations legislation. In 1948, when jurisdiction for labour relations returned to the provinces, most, including Ontario, used the federal Wartime Labour Relations Regulations as a model for their own statutes. With the exception of those public transit workers covered by the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906 and the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, and certain groups during World War II, municipal employees in Ontario were specifically excluded from these legislative regimes from 1918 to 1950. After 1950, municipal employment was subject to the provisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, but municipal employers could opt-out of the Act at their discretion. They retained this right until 1966.

1. The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907

In 1907, the federal Parliament approved the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (I.D.I. Act). The Act was applicable to "public utilities", then assumed to fall within federal constitutional jurisdiction. Although this term was not defined, the statute did identify those employers and employees who were subject to its provisions.⁷ The legislation was applicable to industrial disputes occurring in municipal public utilities, but not to general municipal

employment. Initially, the I.D.I. Act was utilized mainly in those industries that fell within its purview, in particular, coal mining and railways. However, after World War I its application was broadened as disputants in industries outside its coverage opted into its provisions⁸.

The main features of the Act are well documented and need not be repeated here.⁹ There is some debate concerning the impact of the I.D.I. Act on Canadian labour relations and its benefit to organized labour. The majority opinion appears to be that the Act was primarily concerned with the reduction and management of overt industrial conflict and that it enjoyed some success in this regard.¹⁰ Woods, however, has argued that the Act also actually promoted collective bargaining because the constitution of a tripartite board of conciliation and investigation required a tacit recognition of the union and its representatives by both the employer and the government.¹¹ Whatever its indirect effects, it is clear that the Act focused principally on the results of collective bargaining and did not attempt to involve the state in the process until negotiations had broken down. The detailed regulation of the structure and process of collective bargaining that governs contemporary practice did not appear until the mid-1940s. During this early period collective bargaining was essentially an unregulated test of strength between the employer and the union, with the state intervening only as a last resort when a strike appeared imminent. Union recognition and the establishment of a bargaining relationship were also resolved in this manner.

The attitude of Canadian labour toward the I.D.I. Act appears to

have changed significantly over time. From its inception until 1918 the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (T.L.C.) called for the repeal of the Act.¹² This changed in 1918 when the Congress began to lobby for an extension of the Act's provisions to industries outside its current purview.¹³ Municipal employee unions were prominent in promoting this change.¹⁴

Although there was some initial employer opposition to the Act, based largely on a mistrust of government intervention in industrial disputes, by 1912, this had generally dissipated as the benefits of the legislation became increasingly apparent. This was not, however, the case for all employer groups.¹⁵ Opposition to the Act on the part of municipal authorities intensified during the first fifteen years of its operation, culminating in challenges to the constitutional competency of the federal government to legislate in this area.

a. Municipal Authorities and the Constitutionality of the I.D.I. Act

The constitutionality of the I.D.I. Act was first challenged, unsuccessfully, in 1911, by the Montreal Street Railway Company. The company was not a municipal authority, but the operator of a public service on a franchise, hence the Act's applicability to municipalities was not directly questioned. The challenge was more general and concerned the competence of the federal government to legislate regarding industrial disputes in industries under provincial constitutional jurisdiction. The Courts upheld the Act's validity and ruled that labour disputes were a matter of general or national importance and as such fell within federal legislative competence by virtue of the peace, order and good government clause of the British

North America Act, 1867 (B.N.A. Act).¹⁶

This decision did not determine the Act's constitutionality with respect to municipal authorities. During the first decade of the statute's operation, the federal Department of Labour, in an implicit admission of the Act's uncertain constitutional standing in this area, adopted an ad hoc approach to its application in cases where the employer was a municipal authority. Boards of conciliation and investigation were constituted only if the employer did not challenge the government's right to do so. The intent was to keep the issue of the Act's constitutionality out of the courts. In terms of actual administrative practice, in those cases in which the matter of jurisdiction was raised, departmental policy was to secure the consent of both of the disputants so that a board could be established under the voluntary opt-in provisions of the Act.¹⁷

This approach broke down in the latter years of World War I under the related pressures of increased union activity on the part of municipal employees, including, for the first time, fire fighters and police, and a general surge in labour militancy. Municipalities had periodically protested the application of the I.D.I. Act to municipal employment, but did not pursue the matter. However, as time passed, municipal authorities became increasingly inclined to challenge the Act on jurisdictional grounds, thereby undermining the Department's strategy. The increased volume of applications from municipal employees also mitigated against the continuation of this approach. From 1907 until March 31, 1914, only five applications involving municipal employment were referred under the Act. This reflected the low level of

union penetration in municipal employment during this period. Over the next four years, however, a total of sixteen municipal applications were dealt with.¹⁸ This clearly increased the pressure on the Department's conflict avoidance strategy. The pivotal event in the adoption of an alternative approach to this problem appears to have been the September 1917 dispute between the City of Edmonton and its street car employees. When the employees applied for a board of conciliation and investigation under the Act, a board was constituted before it was evident that the municipality would not agree to participate in the proceedings. The City subsequently challenged the authority of the board on jurisdictional grounds and obtained an injunction restraining the board from investigating the dispute. The Minister of Labour did not contest the injunction and no inquiry was made.¹⁹

Following the Edmonton incident, the Department adopted an explicit policy of applying the Act to cases involving provincial and municipal authorities only with the joint consent of both of the parties to the dispute. Indications are that this new policy was rigorously adhered to in the administration of the Act.²⁰ Given that the vast majority of board applications came from employees, this decision had the practical effect of removing municipal public utility employees from the coverage of the statute at the discretion of the employer. Municipal unions generally reacted by pressing for an extension of the Act to cover their sector. The Act continued to be administered in cases where the provision of public utilities was contracted out to a private company. In modifying its approach the

Department did not concede that disputes involving municipal authorities were beyond the scope of the Act, it merely noted that its applicability was not clear in these cases. The new administrative policy was simply a more effective means of ensuring that litigation over the matter was avoided.

In marked contrast to its ambivalence concerning municipal employees in "public utilities", the Department had always maintained that police and fire fighters did not fall under the Act. Disputes involving such personnel could, therefore, be made subject to it, only with the joint consent of the relevant parties. Despite repeated calls from organized labour for the extension of the Act to cover these workers, the government showed no interest in making such a change. The idea also enjoyed minimal support among employing municipalities.²¹

Municipal authorities were by no means consistent in their attitude toward the application of the I.D.I. Act to disputes between themselves and their employees. Prior to the Department of Labour's adoption of the joint consent criteria, applications for boards came exclusively from the workers involved. After the policy change, applications were received from a number of employers as well as from workers. In a few particularly important cases, applications were forthcoming from municipal authorities that had previously challenged the validity of the Act on jurisdictional grounds. These cases were made even more interesting by the fact that the workers concerned now refused to consent to the proceedings.²²

In 1923, the federal government's whole approach to the application of the I.D.I. Act to disputes involving municipal

authorities changed dramatically. In a significant reversal of previous policy, the Minister of Labour now claimed jurisdiction in a dispute between the Toronto Electric Commissioners and a number of their employees represented by the Canadian Electrical Trades Union (C.E.T.U.). This action was justified on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent a serious strike that would be both inconvenient and pose a serious danger to the public.²³ It also precipitated the first constitutional challenge to the Act (Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider et al (1925) A.C. 396 (P.C.)) since the 1911 Montreal Street Railway litigation.²⁴ Ultimately this challenge would be successful. In a landmark decision on January 20, 1925 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England declared the I.D.I. Act unconstitutional. The Committee ruled that the subject matter of the Act clearly affected property and civil rights, both of which fell exclusively within provincial legislative competence under Section 92 of the B.N.A. Act. The judgement also declared that the Toronto Electric Commissioners, as a municipal authority, was not subject to the Act because under Section 92 of the B.N.A. Act the regulation of municipalities was a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.²⁵ The uncertainty caused by the court challenge greatly affected proceedings under the Act. In the fiscal year ending March 31, 1925, only nine boards were established. This was the smallest number of boards established in any one year in the history of the legislation.²⁶

The decision of the Judicial Committee did not alter the mechanics of the I.D.I. Act, it merely limited its application to industries under federal constitutional jurisdiction. The decision also left the

provisions of Section 63 unimpaired, thus allowing the parties to a dispute falling outside the scope of the Act to continue to opt into its coverage at their discretion.

The federal government responded to the decision by introducing a number of amendments to the Act to make it conform to the ruling.²⁷ These amendments, in addition to detailing those industries now subject to the Act and allowing for its extension to other industries in time of national emergency, also contained provisions to make the Act applicable to "any dispute which is within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of any province and which by the legislation of the province is made subject to the provisions of this Act". British Columbia was the first province to take advantage of this provision by passing the required enabling legislation in December 1925. Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Manitoba all followed suit early in 1926. Alberta adopted a different approach and passed its own Labour Disputes Act in April 1926. No action was taken by either Quebec or Prince Edward Island. Quebec had previously passed its own labour legislation, while in the case of Prince Edward Island the predominantly agricultural character of the province meant that industrial disputes were not a matter of pressing concern.²⁸

b. Ontario: The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1932

On February 25, 1926 the Legislative Assembly of Ontario gave First Reading to a Bill to extend the coverage of the federal I.D.I. Act to all relevant disputes within provincial constitutional jurisdiction.²⁹ With the exception of Section 3, which stated when the Act was to come into force, the Bill was almost identical to the

enabling legislation introduced by other provinces.³⁰ In no cases were the employees of public authorities specifically excluded from the federal I.D.I. Act's provisions. The Ontario Bill was withdrawn, without explanation, after Second Reading on April 1, 1926.³¹

It was not until February 1932 that enabling legislation again appeared in the Ontario Legislature. The Bill (No. 76) received Royal Assent on March 29th. The Act was proclaimed to come into effect on August 15, 1932.³² The Bill as introduced at First Reading made the federal Act applicable to all industries under provincial jurisdiction, including provincial and municipal employment. However, the Bill as amended by Committee of the Whole and the final Act contained the added provision that "nothing in this Act contained shall apply to or affect any Commission the members of which are appointed by the Crown".³³

A number of publicly owned utilities, in particular, the Toronto Electric Commissioners and the Toronto Transit Commission, had lobbied vigourously to remain outside the Act.³⁴ On the other side, certain unions, central labour bodies and the Deputy Minister of Labour (Ontario) had favoured their inclusion.³⁵ The main reason for the eventual exclusion of the utilities appears to have been based on a very real fear that, if they were made subject to the Act, one of them would successfully challenge the constitutionality of extending federal legislation to provincial jurisdiction through a surrender of that jurisdiction.³⁶ At the time the Ontario Act was being considered, all provinces except P.E.I. had opted into the federal statute. The opt-in provision had been introduced to salvage the national labour relations regime after the disastrous *Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider*

decision in 1925. An adverse judicial decision on this question would have effectively destroyed the entire regulatory system once and for all, and hence had tremendous importance beyond Ontario's borders. It is worth noting that in 1950 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the practice was, in fact, unconstitutional.³⁷

The exception placed provincially appointed commissions, such as those responsible for Ontario Hydro and the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway, outside the coverage of the Act. However, the extent to which it applied to utilities at the municipal level was unclear. While it appears that the Act did not extend to the two Toronto authorities, the status of other hydro-electric commissions in the province was uncertain. In practical terms, however, the extremely low level of union penetration in this sector may have rendered the extension of I.D.I. Act coverage a non-issue among the vast majority of utilities which were not unionized. With respect to public transit, privately owned systems operating under municipally granted franchises were subject to the Act. The status of their publicly owned counterparts was, again, uncertain. Other categories of municipal employees, such as water works and telephone workers, police, fire fighters and general municipal workers were not specifically exempted from the Ontario Act because they were generally held to fall outside the coverage of the federal statute and as such were already excluded.³⁸

c. Industrial Disputes Investigation Act Proceedings Involving Ontario Municipal Authorities, 1908-1944

Between 1908 and 1944, forty-five applications for the establishment of boards under the I.D.I. Act were submitted in labour

disputes involving Ontario municipal authorities.³⁹ Of these, fifteen were power, light and water works cases, while municipally owned public transit made up another fifteen. The remainder included seven fire fighter applications, four pertaining to general municipal employment, three involving municipal telephone workers and a single police application. The requests from the police, fire fighters and general municipal workers tend to be clustered in the brief period of labour militancy at the end of World War I, while utility applications are more evenly distributed throughout the entire period. In addition, the employees of certain municipal authorities were far more disposed to apply for boards on a recurrent basis than were others.

Applications for boards in municipal labour disputes typically involved employee demands for increased wages and improved terms and condition of employment. However, during the Depression of the 1930s, a number of applications were made with a view to forestalling wage reductions proposed by the employer. In one instance, the Hamilton Hydro-Electric Commission applied for the establishment of a board to assist in the orderly implementation of just such a wage reduction.⁴⁰ As economic conditions improved toward the late 1930s, municipal labour disputes increasingly concerned the restoration of such cuts.⁴¹

2. The Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906

The Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906 (O.R.M.B. Act)⁴² and its successor statute, the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932 (O.M.B. Act),⁴³ both contained provisions concerning strikes and lockouts in provincially regulated railways, including street railways. In 1913, the O.R.M.B. Act was amended to also encompass "public

utilities".⁴⁴ The Act specified both arbitration⁴⁵ and mediation⁴⁶ roles for the Board in dealing with such disputes. These powers were carried forward virtually unchanged into the 1932 O.M.B. Act. In 1940, the Board was relieved of its responsibilities as a mediator in labour disputes falling under its jurisdiction⁴⁷ and in 1949, it ceased to have an arbitration role in such matters⁴⁸.

Despite these statutory responsibilities, neither the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board or its successor, the Ontario Municipal Board, played a significant role in labour relations for either municipally owned street railways or their privately owned counterparts. Moreover, with respect to "public utilities" there is no evidence of any activity whatsoever.

3. Wartime Labour Relations Policy and Legislation, 1939-1947

In May 1939, the Criminal Code of Canada was amended to make it a criminal offence for an employer to interfere with a worker's freedom to join a union.⁴⁹ The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations suggests that this was an attempt by the federal government to circumvent the jurisdictional problems created by the 1925 Toronto Electric Commissioners vs. Snider case, in order to achieve at least partial compliance with International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) conventions in this area.⁵⁰ MacDowell, however, takes a much less charitable view of the initiative. She argues that the section's wording, together with the placement of the burden of proof on the worker, made obtaining a conviction "virtually impossible". Moreover, she observes that, while the amendment provided for penalties upon conviction, it completely ignored the remedial dimension, such as

the reinstatement of an employee wrongfully discharged for union activity.⁵¹ The impact of this new policy is difficult to assess, but in general it does not appear to have played a significant role with respect to assisting new union organizing.

When Canada entered World War II in 1939, the I.D.I. Act was still the mainstay of federal labour relations legislation. Although the Act had undergone a number of amendments over its lifetime, the basic administrative provisions and principal intent remained essentially unchanged. It was still concerned with the prevention of strikes. On November 7, 1939, the federal government exercised its power under the War Measures Act, 1914 and issued Order in Council P.C. 3495 extending the I.D.I. Act to cover defence projects and all industries producing munitions and war supplies. The extensive list of affected activities increased the Act's coverage from fifteen to eighty-five per cent of non-agricultural industries. In addition, during the early years of the war, the Minister of Labour made extensive use of his powers under the Order to bring specific industries within the Act's purview. By virtue of the Order, municipal public utilities now fell under its provisions.⁵²

The concern with limiting industrial conflict is clearly evident in the extension of the I.D.I. Act and in a number of other labour relations related Orders from this period.⁵³ In an attempt to expedite the resolution of disputes under the I.D.I. Act, P.C. 4020 and P.C. 4844, (June and July 1941, respectively), established an Industrial Disputes Inquiry Commission. The Commission was also charged with investigating complaints of employer discrimination and intimidation

against workers for union activity. Originally conceived as a three member standing commission, the July Order provided that one or more members could be appointed by the Minister of Labour on an ad hoc basis.⁵⁴

In September 1941, P.C. 7303 extended the restrictions on strike activity in war related industries beyond those contained in the I.D.I. Act. Strikes in these industries became illegal even after the report of the board of conciliation and investigation was issued and could not take place until the Minister of Labour was notified of the impending strike and a majority of the workers involved to strike in a Department of Labour supervised vote.⁵⁵

Also of note during this early war period is P.C. 2685, in which the federal government issued a Declaration of Principles, based largely on the American Wagner Act of 1935, in an attempt to head off wartime labour unrest. The Order, however, lacked any administrative mechanism and its voluntary guidelines had no force in law. After years of lobbying for the adoption of Wagner style labour relations legislation in Canada, organized labour was extremely dissatisfied with the limited nature of the initiative. Logan argues that the seriousness of this disaffection was the main reason for the subsequent adoption of P.C. 1003 in 1944.⁵⁶

Finally, it is important to remember that for six years beginning in June 1940, federal government wage controls effectively removed wage determination from the scope of employer-employee negotiations and in doing so limited the contents of collective agreements. P.C. 7440 (December 1940) had applied to all industries under the extended I.D.I.

Act. In October 1941, its successor Order, P.C. 8253, extended wage controls and the provision of cost of living adjustments to all employees. It also created a permanent administrative structure instead of the ad hoc approach which had previously been followed.⁵⁷ The imposition of wage controls is particularly important from the perspective of new union organizing. Typically the promise of improved wages and benefits serves as a major inducement in recruiting new union members. However, because controls removed wages and monetary benefits, such as paid vacations, from the collective bargaining process, unions could only make such promises in the context of the post-controls period. In a great many cases this involved a wait of several years. Despite this apparently serious constraint, new union organizing and membership growth soared during the War.

In 1943, in the face of a high level of industrial unrest, significant growth in political support for the Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) and internal dissension, the Liberal government of Ontario introduced the Collective Bargaining Act.⁵⁸ This Act was the first truly "modern" collective bargaining statute in Canada, a distinction that derives, not merely from its acceptance of collective bargaining as delineated in the Wagner Act, but also because it superseded all previous provincial legislation by providing for the administration and enforcement of its provisions. As with the I.D.I. Act, the central features of the Collective Bargaining Act are well documented and will not be repeated here.⁵⁹ The Act applied to all employers in Ontario except those falling under the exclusive constitutional jurisdiction of the federal government. This meant that

industries normally under provincial jurisdiction, but now covered by the I.D.I. Act, by virtue of P.C. 3495, were now subject to both statutes concurrently.⁶⁰

Although the Collective Bargaining Act was progressive in a number of respects, this was not the case in its treatment of municipal employment. Municipal authorities were specifically excluded from the provisions of the Act unless they passed a by-law, resolution or minute which declared it applicable to their jurisdiction. They could also specify which of their employees the Act was to apply and thereby deny statutory collective bargaining rights and the various protections of the Act to those they elected to exclude. In addition, the "opt-in" decision could be reversed at any time by the enacting body, at its discretion.⁶¹ The Act did not apply to police, but fire fighters had access to it by virtue of the municipal opt-in provisions. For the next twenty-three years municipal unions in Ontario, supported by a host of central labour bodies, would lobby Queen's Park on an ongoing basis in an attempt to secure full rights under the province's labour relations legislation. Despite their efforts, exceptionalism regarding municipal employment would remain until 1966.

The Act was preceded by the Report of a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Collective Bargaining. The Committee held public hearings for eleven days in May 1943 and heard a number of representations concerning the proposed legislation. The central issues addressed in the hearings were the introduction of compulsory collective bargaining, the problem of company unions, the legal status of unions in general and the appropriate criteria for determining

employee support for a union.⁶² Collective bargaining by municipal employees was not a major concern. In fact, appearances by organizations of municipal employees before the Committee were conspicuous, if only by their absence. Only in the final days of the hearings did the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) present an argument for the inclusion of municipal employees under the coverage of the proposed statute. The submission made by the T.L.C. contained a similar appeal.⁶³

Although representations by municipal employee organizations were minimal, the same cannot be said of their employers. The Committee received numerous telegrams and resolutions from various municipal councils in support of the introduction of progressive labour relations legislation. The vast majority of these submissions appear to have had their origin in a resolution passed by the Council of the City of Toronto and circulated to other municipalities which called upon the province to introduce a "modern" collective bargaining act. The other municipalities were requested to forward their endorsement of the resolution to the provincial government. The submissions did not specifically refer to the extension of statutory bargaining rights to municipal employees and, in fact, it is uncertain whether these municipalities intended the legislation they called for to be applicable to their own employees.⁶⁴

In its report the Committee recommended the exclusion of "municipal corporation(s), or any board or commission functioning as an administrative unit thereof" from the provisions of the new legislation.⁶⁵ Jacob Finkleman, who served as a legal advisor to the

Committee, notes that, during the private executive sessions of the Committee, objections were raised that the inclusion of municipalities would violate local autonomy. However, the final Act contained an opt-in provision as opposed to a complete exclusion. Finkleman writes:

"The reason for the departure from the Committee's recommendation was based at least in part on a consideration other than local autonomy. The Committee was composed exclusively of Liberal members of the Legislature, Mr. Drew, Leader of the Opposition, a Conservative, refused to allow members of his party to serve on the Committee. The C.C.F. was a growing force in municipal politics at that time, but was not represented in the Legislature. The Committee was literally bombarded with telegrams and resolutions from members of municipal councils urging the Committee to recommend the enactment of collective bargaining legislation. There was a certain amount of feeling among the government members that unwarranted pressure was being brought to bear on the Committee by municipal councillors, many of whom, were of another political persuasion or felt that support of such legislation would ingratiate them with trade unionists. One could perhaps draw the inference that the authors of the legislation included the option clause ... so that municipal councillors would be subject to the same sort of pressure as had been exerted on the Committee and the members of the Legislature".⁶⁶

The Collective Bargaining Act was only short-lived being repealed by the Labour Relations Board Act in 1944. MacDowell concludes that the Collective Bargaining Act and attendant Labour Court, despite their various shortcomings, served an important need. The certification procedure and provision for compulsory union recognition and collective bargaining made recognition strikes largely redundant in those industries falling under the Act. The statute's positive influence on unionism is evidenced by the fact that during the first six months of the Court's operation (June 14, 1943 - December 31, 1943) union certification proceedings dominated its activities. 130 certification applications directly affecting about 80,000 workers were received

during that period. Finally, the Act had a significant impact on subsequent enactments at the federal level.⁶⁷

In February 1944, the federal government, confronted by a seriously deteriorating labour relations situation, graphically manifested in an explosion of strike activity, suspended the I.D.I. Act and introduced Order in Council P.C. 1003: Wartime Labour Relations Regulations.⁶⁸ A number of previous labour relations Orders were also either revoked or amended. The Wartime Labour Relations Regulations combined the collective bargaining principles of the Wagner Act with the dispute resolution provisions of the I.D.I. Act. The key features of the Order were:

1. The definition of worker rights with respect to union membership;
2. The prohibition of unfair practices by both employers and labour organizations;
3. Compulsory collective bargaining with the requirement that the parties negotiate in "good faith" with a view to concluding a collective agreement;
4. Provision for the certification of exclusive "bargaining representatives" for specified bargaining units of workers;
5. The delay of strikes and lockouts until after the completion of compulsory two stage conciliation with a fourteen day waiting period after the issuance of the conciliation board report;
6. The prohibition of strikes and lockouts during the term of a collective agreement and the requirement that all agreements contain an alternative dispute resolution procedure.

A Wartime Labour Relations Board was created to administer the Order. Provision was also made for the establishment of provincial boards, although policy determination remained the responsibility of the national board.⁶⁹

The coverage of P.C. 1003 was quite extensive. It applied to all industries and activities normally under federal jurisdiction in

peace-time, all war related industries listed in the Regulations or added later and "residual industries" in any province which passed enabling legislation to extend the order to its jurisdiction.⁷⁰ All provinces, with the exception of Quebec and Saskatchewan, subsequently did so. Ontario's enabling legislation was the Labour Relations Board Act, 1944, which as its title suggests also provided for the creation of the Ontario Labour Relations Board. All decisions of the provincial body, whether pertaining to war related or residual industries were subject to appeal to the national board.⁷¹

The list of industries covered by the Regulations includes "a work, undertaking or business engaged in transportation and communication;" and "public service utilities, including gas, electric, water and power works, telegraph and telephone lines".⁷² Municipal public transit, regardless of the type of ownership and municipal utilities were, therefore, subject to the Regulations. General municipal employment was not and remained under provincial jurisdiction. The opt-in provision for municipalities, that existed in the Collective Bargaining Act, was retained in the enabling statute. This placed general municipal employees, including fire fighters, outside the scope of the Regulations unless the employer decided otherwise. Police continued to be completely excluded.⁷³

4. Post-War Labour Relations Legislation in Ontario, 1947-1966

In 1947, with the return of jurisdiction for labour relations to the provinces, most adopted their own statutes using the Wartime Regulations as a model. In Ontario the Labour Relations Board Act, 1947, was passed. The Act copied P.C. 1003 and P.C. 4020, which by then

were in force only in federally regulated industries, and applied them to those under provincial jurisdiction. There was, however, no surrender of jurisdiction to the federal government as had been the case in 1932 and again in 1944. In order to facilitate the smooth transition from a war to peace-time labour relations system, the Act also provided for the disposition of any appeals still pending before the Wartime Labour Relations Board and the continuation of any conciliation proceedings referred to the federal Minister of Labour on or before the date the Act came into effect.⁷⁴

The following year, in April 1948, Ontario enacted the Labour Relations Act, 1948, which authorized the copying of the federal Industrial Relations and Disputes Act, 1948, then before the federal Parliament. The federal Act generally followed the provisions of the Wartime Regulations. Legislating by direct copy of federal statute continued until 1950, when the province introduced the Labour Relations Act, 1950. Although this Act still closely followed federal practice, there was also some attempt, for the first time, to make adjustments to accommodate the unique features of the province's industrial structure.⁷⁵

With the return of labour relations to provincial jurisdiction, municipal public transportation and municipal utilities ceased to be covered by the federal Wartime Regulations and were excluded from the provincial statute unless the municipal authority involved opted into the Act. These provisions remained a feature of Ontario legislation until 1950. In contrast, both police and fire fighters were granted compulsory bargaining rights in 1947, under the Police Amendment Act⁷⁶

and the Fire Departments Act⁷⁷, respectively. Both groups were specifically excluded from the Labour Relations Act and continue to remain outside its coverage.

Section 78 of the Labour Relations Act, 1950, made the Act applicable to all municipal institutions with the exception of those which specifically enacted measures to "opt-out". The Section provided that:

"Any municipality as defined in the Department of Municipal Affairs Act may declare that this Act shall not apply to it in its relations with its employees of any of them."⁷⁸

Simmons notes that the Department of Municipal Affairs Act defined "municipality" in such a broad and ambiguous fashion that even boards and commissions were able to make such a declaration.⁷⁹

The employees of such municipal authorities retained the right to become union members, to engage in collective bargaining, to negotiate collective agreements and to strike. Opting-out, however, relieved the municipality of any legal obligation to either recognize or negotiate with any union formed by its employees. Moreover, because it was not limited by the unfair practices provisions of the Act, the municipality could legally discriminate against union activists and threat to fire workers if they became union members. Frankel and Pratt argue that the capacity of a given authority to engage in such activities was essentially a function of its strength relative to that of its employees and did not necessarily derive from the fact that the employer had opted-out. They note that while some jurisdictions used Section 78 to avoid union recognition and collective bargaining, this

was not always the case. The City of Toronto is offered as an example of a municipality which continued to recognize and negotiate with the various unions representing its employees, even though it had opted-out of the Act. The circumstances in the City of Toronto case are unique and unfortunately do not constitute a good example of the point that Frankel and Pratt were attempting to illustrate. There are, however, a number of other cases for which their assessment is correct. They conclude that, where the Act did not apply, the nature of municipal labour relations was determined by the size and strength of the employee organizations and the prevailing sentiment toward trade unionism in the community.⁸⁰ Statistics as to the actual number of Ontario municipal authorities that opted-out of the Labour Relations Act are non-existent⁸¹ and hence it is impossible to accurately gauge the impact of this provision on the spread of unionism among municipal employees. Some union accounts of the period suggest that the practice was quite widespread,⁸² while other assessments contend there was more limited usage.⁸³ The Select Committee of the Ontario Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations 1957-58, after extensive hearings, concluded that:

"This Section had caused a great deal of disturbance among municipal employees in that it has deprived them of the rights of certification, negotiation, and conciliation enjoyed by employees in industry generally, and as a matter of fact, this Section has been the cause of numerous work stoppages of essential services which would not have taken place had the collective bargaining process proceed along normal channels."⁸⁴

The Committee recommended that Section 78 be repealed.

Unlike 1943, when municipal employee organizations had been

largely unrepresented at the hearings of the Select Committee, the 1957-58 Committee received submissions pertaining to municipal collective bargaining from a total of nine separate unions and central labour bodies.⁸⁵ The difference is significant in that it indicates the extent to which the unionization of municipal employees had developed and progressed over the intervening fifteen years.

The common theme running through the labour presentations to the Select Committee was the repeal of Section 78 and the extension of complete bargaining rights to municipal employees. The submission made by the C.C.P. (Ontario Section) also argued for reform in this area.⁸⁶ This solidarity stood in contrast to lobbying efforts by labour in the early 1950s, when the majority called for the elimination of Section 78 and the City of Toronto unions pointedly informed both the government and their colleagues that this was not their desire.⁸⁷

The only representation to argue against the repeal of Section 78 was made by the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves.⁸⁸ Ultimately it was their view which prevailed and the provision remained in force. With the revision of all provincial statutes in 1960, Section 78 became Section 89.⁸⁹

By the mid-1960s the consensus among employers appears to have shifted in favour of the repeal of the Section. At the 1964 convention of the Ontario Municipal Association (O.M.A.), the Executive Committee was authorized to establish a committee consisting of representatives of labour and management to examine the issue of dispute settlement through arbitration and other related matters. Among its other recommendations, the Committee called for the repeal of

Section 89. The Committee's report was endorsed by the Executive Committee of the O.M.A. on August 22, 1965 and was adopted by the organization's Convention in General Session two days later.⁹⁰ In 1966, the Labour Relations Act was amended and Section 89 repealed.

Thereafter, municipal employees enjoyed full rights under the Act.⁹¹

a. Certification Proceedings Involving Ontario Municipal Authorities, 1944-1966⁹²

i. General Municipal Employment

Prior to 1952, the total number of certification applications submitted by general municipal employees was quite small. Of these, the number that eventually succeeded was even less (See Table 8-1). Only three municipal unions were certified under the Collective Bargaining Act, 1943. They were: The Toronto Civic Employees' Union, No. 43, the Toronto Municipal Employees' Association, No. 79 and the Toronto Firefighters Association, No. 113. The first two were directly chartered locals of the T.L.C., while the firefighters were members of the I.A.F.F.⁹³

After peaking briefly in 1946 and 1947, more modest application levels were the rule until 1952. Following the change to the Labour Relations Act in 1950, extending its coverage to municipal authorities unless they specifically opted out of the Act, the number of applications increased significantly. The policy change clearly had a positive impact on municipal union utilization of the certification provisions contained in the legislation. The number of applications increased again in the late 1950s. This was largely a reflection of the maturity of the two main unions in this area, the National Union of

TABLE 8-1. ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS; NUMBER OF GENERAL MUNICIPAL CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS PROCESSED, BY FISCAL YEAR AND DISPOSITION, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966

<u>Year</u>	<u>Applications Granted</u>	<u>Applications Dismissed</u>	<u>Applications Withdrawn</u>	<u>Total Applications Processed</u>
1945	2	0	0	2
1946	7	1	0	8
1947	0	3	2	5
1948	1	0	1	2
1949	0	0	0	0
1950	1	1	0	2
1951 ¹	1	1	1	3
1951 ²	1	1 (1) ³	1	3
1952	8	3 (N/A)	4	15
1953	7	2 (N/A)	2	11
1954	6	4 (1)	1	11
1955	3	5 (N/A)	0	8
1956	4	3 (N/A)	0	7
1957	16	3 (N/A)	1	20
1958	14	6 (1)	1	21
1959	11	4 (2)	2	17
1960	14	5 (5)	0	19
1961	12	2 (2)	1	15
1962	10	4 (2)	1	15
1963	9	2 (2)	0	11
1964	2	2 (1)	1	5
1965	12	1 (0)	0	13
1966	10	2 (0)	1	13

¹ Applications made during the first five months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1948. Municipal authorities were excluded unless they opted in.

² Applications made during the last seven months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1950. Municipal authorities were covered by the Act unless they opted out.

³ The bracketed figure indicates the number of dismissals occurring because the employer made a declaration under Section 78, later Section 89, of the Labour Relations Act. The number of dismissals resulting from such declarations were only reported on a regular basis beginning in fiscal year 1958. No systematic data exists prior to this. Moreover, it also appears that, during this earlier period, applicants were allowed to withdraw their certification applications when the employer opted out of the Act.

**TABLE 8-1. ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS: NUMBER OF
GENERAL MUNICIPAL CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS PROCESSED, BY FISCAL YEAR
AND DISPOSITION, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966 (cont'd)**

Source: Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1966.

Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) and its smaller counterpart, the National Union of Public Service Employees (N.U.P.S.E.), and their increased allocation of resources for new union organizing. The 1966 amendment deleting the opt-out provision for municipalities from the Act prompted another surge of applications in fiscal year 1967. Thereafter, the number processed increased markedly.

Of the estimated sixty general municipal unions in existence in some forty-five Ontario municipalities in 1951⁹⁴, only twelve had been certified. In the vast majority of cases, varying degrees of union recognition and collective bargaining were based solely on "voluntary recognition" by the employer. This practice was consistent with the exclusion from the Act. After the 1950 amendment, utilization increased steadily until, by the 1960s, it had become the predominant way for new unions to secure recognition and bargaining rights.

The success rate for municipal certification applications also improved significantly over time. Between 1945 and 1951, on average, about fifty-nine per cent of all municipal applications ultimately proved successful. This level of success is attributed to the fact that employer consent was required for an application to be even heard. The 1950 amendment to the Act had no apparent impact on application success. It was only in 1957, after generally lackluster and uneven performance in the early to mid 1950s, that the success rate began to show significant improvement. This trend continued through the 1960s with a rate approximating ninety per cent by the end of the decade. A comparison of the general municipal pattern with that for "all industries", puts these developments in proper perspective (See Table

8-2). Over the thirty-five years between 1945 and 1970, the success rate for all certification applications, heard by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, ranged between sixty-one and seventy-seven per cent, with an overall average of approximately seventy per cent for the entire period. Until 1960, the municipal rate almost always lagged total performance, although the gap narrowed over time. After 1960, the municipal success rate typically exceeded the aggregate, with the difference becoming quite pronounced by the late 1960s. This again may reflect the increased allocation of union resources to organizing activity.

In considering the implications of these variations in success rates, it is important to recall that the dismissal of a certification application can occur for a number of reasons. Unfair practices by the applicant union, irregularities regarding the union cards or the failure of the applicant to win the necessary majority in a representation vote are all grounds for dismissal. In municipal applications, submitted between 1950 and 1966, an employer decision to opt-out of the Act was simply one more reason why the Labour Relations Board could dismiss the application. Between 1958 and 1966, which is the only period for which there is such data, over fifty per cent of all general municipal dismissals resulted from the employer withdrawing from the Act. In such circumstances the Board no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case. Typically the application was then dismissed. Although the opt-out provision had a devastating impact on the success rate of municipal certification applications, it is impossible to gauge the true magnitude of its dampening effect on the

TABLE 8-2. CERTIFICATION APPLICATION SUCCESS RATES FOR GENERAL MUNICIPAL, MUNICIPAL PUBLIC UTILITY AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC TRANSIT APPLICATIONS, BY FISCAL YEAR, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966

<u>Year</u>	<u>All Applications Granted (%)</u>	<u>General Municipal Applications Granted (%)</u>	<u>Municipal Public Utility Applications Granted (%)</u>	<u>Municipal Public Transit Applications Granted (%)</u>
1945	75%	100%	75%	-1
1946	69%	88%	50%	00%
1947	62%	00%	58%	100%
1948	61%	50%	-	50%
1949	61%	-	-	-
1950	68%	50%	00%	00%
1951 ²	73%	33%	-	-
1951 ³	67%	33%	00%	-
1952	65%	53%	57%	-
1953	71%	64%	71%	00
1954	70%	55%	44%	-
1955	72%	38%	100%	-
1956	74%	57%	33%	-
1957	77%	80%	100%	-
1958	74%	67%	67%	-
1959	73%	65%	60%	-
1960	67%	74%	71%	50%
1961	70%	80%	100%	100%
1962	62%	67%	71%	33%
1963	66%	82%	75%	50%
1964	72%	40%	83%	-
1965	72%	92%	33%	-
1966	73%	77%	67%	-

¹ No results are provided for those years in which no applications were made.

² Applications made during the first five months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1948. Municipal authorities were excluded unless they opted in.

³ Applications made during the last seven months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1950. Municipal authorities were covered by the Act unless they opted out.

Sources: Aggregate Certification Statistics, Fiscal years 1945 to 1954: H.A. Logan, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining: The Canadian Experience 1943-1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956),: 59; Fiscal years 1955

**TABLE 8-2. CERTIFICATION APPLICATION SUCCESS RATES FOR GENERAL
MUNICIPAL, MUNICIPAL PUBLIC UTILITY AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC TRANSIT
APPLICATIONS, BY FISCAL YEAR, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966 (cont'd)**

to 1970: Ontario, Annual Reports of the Department of Labour,
March 31, 1955-March 31, 1966.

General Municipal, Utility and Transit Statistics, All years:
Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1966.

decision to apply for certification in the first place. Faced with certain dismissal there may well have been considerable reluctance to even initiate an application.

ii. Municipal Utilities

Certification applications submitted by municipal public utility unions generally follow the same overall pattern as their municipal counterparts (See Table 8-3). This is not particularly surprising given that the N.U.P.S.E., one of the two major unions organizing in the utilities, was also very active in the organization of municipal employees. In addition, with the brief exception of the years 1944 to 1947, both sectors were also subject to the rules regarding their coverage under the existing labour relations legislation. Although the total number of municipal applications would outnumber those from the utilities by almost two to one by 1970, initially utility applications were slightly more numerous. This was mainly due to the inclusion of the utilities under the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations. When this access ceased in 1947, the number of applications immediately plummeted. Between 1948 and 1951 only two were made. Utilization of the Act picked up in 1952, largely as a result of the 1950 policy change. Thereafter, utility applications more or less followed the municipal pattern for the remainder of the period. They do, however, consistently lag the municipal group in terms of their numbers.

Certification proceedings played a much more significant role in the utilities than in general municipal employment. Twelve of the estimated thirty-one utility unions in existence in 1952⁹⁵, or thirty-nine percent, had been certified. The difference is due to the

TABLE 8-3. ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS: NUMBER OF UTILITY (P.U.C., H.E.C. AND WATER) CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS PROCESSED, BY FISCAL YEAR AND DISPOSITION, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966

<u>Year</u>	<u>Applications Granted</u>	<u>Applications Dismissed</u>	<u>Applications Withdrawn</u>	<u>Total Applications Processed</u>
1945	3	0	1	4
1946	2	2	0	4
1947	7	2	3	12
1948	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	0	0
1950	0	1	0	1
1951 ¹	0	0	0	0
1951 ²	0	1 (N/A) ³	0	1
1952	4	3 (N/A)	0	7
1953	5	1 (N/A)	1	7
1954	4	2 (N/A)	3 (1) ⁴	9
1955	2	0 (0)	0	2
1956	2	3 (N/A)	1	6
1957	12	0 (0)	0	12
1958	4	2 (N/A)	0	6
1959	6	4 (1)	0	10
1960	5	2 (2)	0	7
1961	9	0 (0)	0	9
1962	5	1 (0)	1	7
1963	6	1 (0)	1	8
1964	5	1 (0)	0	6
1965	1	2 (1)	0	3
1966	4	2 (0)	0	6

¹ Applications made during the first five months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1948. Municipal authorities were excluded unless they opted in.

² Applications made during the last seven months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1950. Municipal authorities were covered by the Act unless they opted out.

³ The bracketed figure indicates the number of dismissals occurring because the employer made a declaration under Section 78, later Section 89, of the Labour Relations Act. The number of dismissals resulting from declarations were only reported on a regular basis beginning in fiscal year 1958. No systematic data exists prior to this.

⁴ Applicants were occasionally allowed to withdraw their certification application when the employer opted out of the Act. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, February 1954, : (5144-53) International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, #636

TABLE 8-3. ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS: NUMBER OF UTILITY (P.U.C., H.E.C. AND WATER) CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS PROCESSED, BY FISCAL YEAR AND DISPOSITION, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966 (cont'd)

(applicant) v New Toronto Public Utilities Commission. The Board allowed the applicant to withdraw the application. The "Progress Report" of Ontario Labour Relations Board proceedings states that the Act was found "not applicable".

Source: Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1966.

much lower level of union penetration in the utilities prior to 1944, coupled with their unfettered access to the certification procedure contained in the Wartime Regulations. As with their municipal counterparts, utilization of the Labour Relations Act increased over time. By the 1960s applying for certification was the main way of securing bargaining rights in this sector.

The success rates for municipal public utility applications also more or less mirrors the municipal pattern (See Table 8-2). Between 1945 and 1952, approximately sixty-eight per cent of all applications succeeded. Over the remainder of the decade a slight improvement is evident, although the progression is uneven. These gains continue into the 1960s. Given the volatility of the series it is impossible to draw any conclusions concerning the impact of the 1950 amendment to the Act. Employer declarations under Section 78/89, in proportion to the number of applications submitted, were actually lower than the level for municipal applications. This result must, however, be interpreted with caution, as the number of groups dissuaded from ever making an application is unknown.

iii. Municipal Public Transit

The number of municipal transit certification proceedings is quite limited, due in large part to the small number of such utilities in existence (See Table 8-4). Only a very few certification applications were made in the 1940s and 1950s, with the majority occurring in the early 1960s. Among those systems with long standing collective bargaining relationships, dating from the 1920s or before, applications were rare. This simply reflects the fact that in such circumstances the

TABLE 8-4. ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD PROCEEDINGS: NUMBER OF MUNICIPAL PUBLIC TRANSIT CERTIFICATION APPLICATIONS PROCESSED, BY FISCAL YEAR AND DISPOSITION, MARCH 31, 1945 - MARCH 31, 1966

<u>Year</u>	<u>Applications Granted</u>	<u>Applications Dismissed</u>	<u>Applications Withdrawn</u>	<u>Total Applications Processed</u>
1945	0	0	0	0
1946	0	1	0	1
1947	1	0	0	1
1948	1	1	0	2
1949	0	0	0	0
1950	0	1	0	1
1951 ¹	0	0	0	0
1951 ²	0	0	(0) ³	0
1952	0	0	(0)	0
1953	0	1	(N/A)	1
1954	0	0	(0)	0
1955	0	0	(0)	0
1956	0	0	(0)	0
1957	0	0	(0)	0
1958	2	0	(0)	2
1959	0	0	(0)	0
1960	1	1	(0)	2
1961	4	0	(0)	4
1962	1	0	(0)	3
1963	3	2	(1)	6
1964	0	0	(0)	0
1965	0	0	(0)	0
1966	0	0	(0)	0

¹ Applications made during the first five months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1948. Municipal authorities were excluded unless they opted in.

² Applications made during the last seven months of fiscal year 1951 were subject to the Labour Relations Act, 1950. Municipal authorities were covered unless they opted out.

³ The bracketed number indicates the number of dismissals occurring because the employer made a declaration under Section 78, later Section 89, of the Labour Relations Act. The number of dismissals resulting from such declarations is clearly minimal.

Source: Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1966.

issue of union recognition and the establishment of a stable bargaining relationship had long been resolved, making certification redundant. Interestingly, in a number of cases involving the transition from private to public provision, the unions still applied for certification even though long term bargaining relationships existed. This was likely done to ensure the continuation of bargaining despite the change of employer. The shift to public provision occurred in several cities in the early 1960s, hence the concentration of applications during this period. In only a very few instances does a certification application appear to have been associated with new union organizing.

The overall application success rate is low compared to the other two groups (See Table 8-2). This may well be because, given the long history of union activity and collective bargaining in this sector, the accepted means of securing bargaining rights remained voluntary recognition. A certification application made as part of new union organizing may well be indicative of a problem in obtaining such recognition. Although new union organizing is not involved, the case of the Kitchener Public Utilities Commission is illustrative of this point. In the late 1940s the employer refused to continue an established bargaining relationship with the resident union. This decision ultimately resulted in the ouster of that union and its replacement by another. Both organizations subsequently filed certification applications, which were dismissed. Unfortunately, the reasons for the dismissals were not given.⁹⁶

There is only one recorded example of a municipal authority, the Wolfe Island Corporation, opting out of the Labour Relations Act to

circumvent a certification application.⁹⁷ This may also have been the case in Kitchener, although an opt-out decision is not documented.

Conclusions

This chapter assessed the hypothesis that public policy played an important, positive role in promoting local government union growth and development. Favourable public policy generally has a positive impact on both the propensity and opportunity to organize. During its formative development municipal unionism in Ontario was governed by a policy of exceptionalism with respect to labour relations legislation. Police and fire fighters gained statutory bargaining rights in 1947, but only after unionism was well established among both groups. As a consequence, much of its initial growth occurred outside this regulatory framework and hence, did not derive any direct benefit from it. Even after 1950, when utilization of the Labour Relations Act became increasingly common, the employer still controlled access. While the majority agreed to remain under the Act and allow unions to acquire bargaining rights through certification, some did not.

It is difficult to argue that municipal employees were encouraged to unionize by labour relations legislation, when they were typically excluded from its provisions. After 1950, the positive impact of the Labour Relations Act on propensity probably increased as municipal authorities became subject to its provisions unless they opted out. Employees still, however, lacked full rights under the Act.

In terms of the opportunity to unionize, employer control of access to the Labour Relations Act and its predecessors is of paramount importance. The crucial element of statutory compulsion is clearly

absent. Under these circumstances the decision to allow access was in most cases tantamount to "voluntary recognition" of the union by the employer. While labour relations policy may well have assisted and encouraged the growth of municipal unionism, it is only an intermediate variable, the employer's decision to allow access being a function of other, more fundamental considerations. In sum, it does not play the role anticipated in the aggregate union growth literature.

Exceptionalism had its origins in the early application of the I.D.I. Act to municipal labour disputes and the T.E.C. v. Snider decision. It was reinforced by the opposition of the T.E.C. and the T.T.C. to inclusion during the early 1930s. With the advent of "modern" labour relations legislation in the 1940s, a tradition of exceptionalism regarding municipal authorities already existed. Concern for local autonomy was another important consideration. It was frequently used to justify allowing municipal authorities the right to determine access to the Labour Relations Act. Ultimately Section 89 was repealed, primarily in response to employer requests. Exceptionalism also existed in the application of a number of other labour related statutes such as employment standards and unemployment insurance. Again, the need for local autonomy was commonly cited. Here too, local government employees gradually gained full rights.

Unionization undermined local autonomy with respect to the employment relationship. With a few exceptions, local government employees become subject to the same employment laws that governed the general labour force. Unions played a major role in securing these rights. More important, however, was the impact of collective

bargaining and, in particular, escalating labour costs. As will be seen in Chapter 11, it was the perception that local authorities were no longer capable of controlling these costs that led to the imposition of public sector wage controls in the early 1980s.

NOTES

1 H.W. Arthurs, Collective Bargaining by Public Employees in Canada: Five Models (Ann Arbor: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, The University of Michigan - Wayne State University, 1971),: 15.

2. Municipal labour relations is not subject to the same complications and contradictions that exist at the senior levels of public employment by virtue of the government's dual role as both an employer and the regulator of the labour relations regime under which public sector collective bargaining is conducted.

3 Ontario, Statutes, The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1972, 20 Eliz. II, ch. 67.

4 Canada, Statutes, The Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967, 14-15-16 Eliz. II, ch. 72.

5 R.S.O., 1980, Labour Relations Act, ch. 228. Police and fire fighters are specifically excluded from the provisions of this Act and are each subject to special legislation. One exception in the general application of the Act to municipal employment is the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Transit Commission which falls under federal jurisdiction.

6 T.J. Plunkett, "Municipal Collective Bargaining," in Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Toronto: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1973),: 2.

7 The Act defined "employer" and "employee" as follows:
 "'Employer' means any person, company or corporation employing ten or more persons and owning or operating any mining property, agency of transportation or communication, or public service utility, including, except as hereinafter provided, railways, whether operated by steam, electricity or other motive power, steamships, telegraph and telephone lines, gas, electric light, water and power works;" "'Employee' means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward in any industry to which this Act applies;" Canada, Statutes, Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907, 6-7 Edward VII, ch. 20, s. 2(c&d).

8 H.A. Logan, State Intervention and Assistance in Collective Bargaining: The Canadian Experience 1943-1954 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956),: 4.

9 In particular see: Ben M. Selekman, Postponing Strikes: A Study of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of Canada (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1927) and Paul Craven, An Impartial Umpire: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

- 10 For example see Craven, op. cit.
- 11 H.D. Woods, Labour Policy in Canada, 2nd ed., (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1973),: 60-61, 73-74.
- 12 Selekman, op. cit., 25-27.
- 13 Ibid.,: 25-27, 171, 173, 178.
- 14 Selekman argues that this activity was precipitated by the administrative decision taken by the federal Department of Labour, which removed municipal employees from the I.D.I. Act's coverage. Ibid,: 170.
- 15 Ibid.,: 204-206.
- 16 Margaret Mackintosh, "Government Intervention in Labour Disputes in Canada," in Canada, Department of Labour, Judicial Proceedings respecting Constitutional Validity of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907 and Amendments of 1910, 1918 and 1920: Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider et al (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1925),: 301-302.
- 17 Canada, Department of Labour, Report of the Department of Labour for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1919,: 13-14. (Hereafter cited as Report of the Department of Labour)
- 18 Report of the Department of Labour, "Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907: Annual Report of Proceedings," March 31, 1909 - March 31, 1918. (Hereafter cited as I.D.I. Act Proceedings)
- 19 Report of the Department of Labour, March 31, 1919,: 14; Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette (October 1917),: 790; (November 1917),: 898; (December 1917),: 979.
- 20 Mackintosh, op. cit.,: 301; Report of the Department of Labour, March 31, 1919,: 14.
- 21 Report of the Department of Labour, March 31, 1919,: 14; March 31, 1920,: 14-15.
- 22 Ibid., March 31, 1919,: 14-15. One of these disputes involved the City of Winnipeg during the General Strike of 1919.
- 23 Report of the Department of Labour, March 31, 1924,: 5.
- 24 Mackintosh, op. cit., 302; For a detailed discussion of the Toronto Electric Commissioners and the I.D.I. Act see: C.J. Hendrickson, "No Need For Government Intervention: Toronto Electric Commissioners vs. Snider," Draft manuscript for submission to Labour/

Le Travailleur. Obtained from the Toronto Hydro Personnel Department, December 1986.

25 Judicial Proceedings respecting Constitutional Validity of the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1907 and Amendments of 1910, 1918 and 1920, op. cit.,; 5-7

26 I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1925,: 12.

27 Ibid., March 31, 1926,: 12-13.

28 Ibid.,: 12-13.

29 Public Archives of Ontario (P.A.O.), Unprinted Bills, I-7-H No 98/1926, Bill 98: An Act respecting the Investigation of Industrial Disputes within the Province. First Reading of the Bill occurred February 25, 1926, Ontario, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1926,: 58.

30 I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1926,: 13.

31 Ontario, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1926,: 244.

32 Ibid.,1932,: 12, 53, 119, 181, 190. Order in Council approved by the Honourable the Administrator of the Government of the Province of Ontario, August 10, 1932.

33 Ontario, Statutes, The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, 1932, 22 Geo. V, ch. 20, s. 4.

34 P.A.O., RG 7, II-3, FAI-S, Vol. 2, Labour Department. A.W. Crawford, Deputy Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario to H.H. Ward, Deputy Minister of Labour, Government of Canada, February 15, 1932. Interestingly, the Toronto Transit Commission was a party to I.D.I. Act board proceedings in 1934. I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1934,; 35.

35 P.A.O., RG 7, II-3, FAI-S, Vol, 2, Labour Department, Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour: Legislation 1918-1934. A.W. Crawford, Deputy Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario to Hon. Dr. J.D. Monteith, Minister of Public Works and Labour, Province of Ontario, Re: Industrial Disputes investigation Act: Its Application to Publicly Owned Utilities; Labour Department. L. Silver, Recording Secretary, C.E.T.U. (Toronto Branch) to the Honourable J.D. Monteith, Minister of Public Works and Labour, February 20, 1932.

36 P.A.O., RG 7, II-3, FAI-S, Vol. 2, Labour Department. A.W. Crawford, Deputy Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario Memorandum for J.D. Monteith, Minister of Public Works and Labour, Province of Ontario Re: Mr. Dymond - I.D.I. Act, March 7, 1932.

37 Woods, op. cit.,: 99.

38 The federal Department of Labour appears to have maintained its policy of refusing to apply the Act to virtually all municipal employees in Ontario, except where an application for the establishment of a board was submitted jointly. In October 1941, for example, an application was received from telephone workers employed by the City of Port William. The workers were members of the I.B.E.W., local 339. A board was not constituted because the dispute was held to be outside the scope of the Act. The Labour Gazette (October 1941),: 1186.

39 I.D.I. Act Proceedings, March 31, 1909 - March 31, 1944.

40 Ibid., March 31, 1936,: 36.

41 This was the case in Winnipeg in both 1937 and 1939 and in Port Arthur in 1937. Ibid., March 31, 1938,: 47, 49-52; March 31, 1939,: 46-47; March 31, 1940,: 40-41.

42 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, ch. 31.

43 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, 22 Geo. V, ch. 27.

44 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1913, 3-4 Geo. V, ch. 37.

45 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Railway and Municipal Board Act, 1906, 6 Edw. VII, ch. 31, s. 58.

46 Ibid.,: s. 59.

47 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Municipal Board Amendment Act, 1940, 4 Geo. VI, ch. 20, s. 5.

48 Ontario, Statutes, The Ontario Municipal Board Amendment Act, 1949, 13 Geo. VI, ch. 69, s. 3.

49 Canada, Statutes, The Criminal Code, 1939, 3 Geo. VI, ch. 30, s. 502A.

50 Canada, Task Force on Labour Relations, Canadian Industrial Relations: The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1968),: 18-19.

51 Laurel Sefton MacDowell, "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two," Labour/Le Travailleur 3 (1978),: 179.

52 Alton W. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice Hall of Canada Inc., 1986), 122.

53 MacDowell argues that the principal concern of federal labour relations policy throughout the War, including the enactment of P.C. 1003, was the elimination of industrial conflict and in no way reflected a significant public policy commitment to collective bargaining. MacDowell, op. cit.,: 194.

54 These orders established what would ultimately become the first or conciliation officer stage in compulsory, two stage conciliation. Craig, op. cit.,: 122.

55 H.A. Logan, "Antecedents of the Labour Relations Act, 1950 (Ontario)," in Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Report, 1958,: 12. (Hereafter cited as Logan, "Antecedents,")

56 Craig, op. cit.,: 123; Logan, op. cit., 11, 75.

57 Logan, "Antecedents,": 12-13; Logan, op, cit.,: 12-13.

58 Ontario, Statutes, The Collective Bargaining Act, 1942, 7 Geo. VI, ch. 4. For a discussion of the circumstances leading up to the introduction of the Act see MacDowell, op. cit.,: 189-192; and John A. Willes, The Ontario Labour Court 1943-1944 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1979),: chps. 1, 2 ,3.

59 Willes, op. cit., 24-28.

60 Ibid.,: 41-42. It did not apply to employees of the province of Ontario.

61 The Act specifically excluded "members of any police force;" and "any municipal corporation, board of public school trustees, board of separate school trustees, high school board, board of education or any board or commission created or established by a municipal corporation pursuant to statutory authority unless such municipal corporation, board or commission has by by-law, if it has the power to pass by-laws, or resolution or minute, declared this Act applicable thereto and to its employees or any section thereof and such by-law, resolution or minute may be revoked by a subsequent by-law, resolution or minute as the case may be." Ontario, Statutes, The Collective Bargaining Act, 1943, 7 Geo. VI, ch. 4, s. 24(c) & 24(e).

62 MacDowell, op. cit.,: 191.

63 Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees, Proceedings, 1943.

64 Ibid.

65 Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly Regarding Collective Bargaining Between Employers and Employees, Report, 1943.

66 J. Finkleman, "Municipal Collective Bargaining in Canada," An Address prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa, August 30, 1977,: 3.

67 MacDowell, op. cit.,: 192; also see Willes, op. cit.,: 73-76.

68 MacDowell contends that the federal government's labour relations policy prior to P.C. 1003 and the wage control program exacerbated the situation and made a significant contribution to the level of labour unrest. She also discusses the political considerations associated with the introduction of the Order. MacDowell, op. cit.,: 178-181, 19-194.

69 Craig, op. cit.,: 123.

70 Ottawa, Orders in Council, P.C. 1003: Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, Article 3; Logan, op. cit.,: 29.

71 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Board Act, 1944, 8 Geo. VI, ch. 29; Logan, op. cit.,: 30.

72 Ottawa, Orders in Council, P.C. 1003: Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, Schedule A, 13, 14.

73 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Board Act, 1944, 8 Geo. VI, ch. 29, s. 10(c) & 10(d). In December 1946, the Canada Wartime Labour Relations Board ruled in two appeals of Ontario Board decisions regarding the certification of unions of municipal hydro-electric workers. The Ottawa Hydro-Electric Commission and the Village of Forest Hill (hydro-electric system) both contended that the Ontario Board could not hear applications for certification from their employees, under the Wartime Labour Relations Regulations, because they, as municipal authorities, had not passed the required by-law placing themselves under the Regulations. The applicants argued that the reference to "public service utilities" contained in Schedule A of the Regulations pertained only to privately owned public service utilities. The Board found that Schedule A designated all public service utilities, regardless of ownership, as "war essential" and therefore the Regulations applied to them, without regard to the opt-in provision in the Labour Relations Board Act, 1944. The Board concluded that the Ontario Board had jurisdiction to hear the two certification applications and dismissed the appeals. Canadian Labour Law Cases: Canada Wartime Labour Relations Board 1944-1948. Edited and produced by C.C.H. Canadian Limited (Don Mills, 1966),: Case 10490,: 115-117.

74 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Board Act, 1947, 11 Geo

VI, ch. 54; Logan, "Antecedents," : 14.

75 Logan, "Antecedents," : 14-15.

76 Ontario, Statutes, The Fire Departments Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 37, s. 7, 8, 9. The Act provided for compulsory collective bargaining where not less than fifty per cent of the members of the fire department indicated this to be their desire. There was no formal procedure for union certification, rather compulsory union recognition was automatically required where not less than fifty per cent of the members of the fire department belonged to the union.

77 Ontario, Statutes, The Police Amendment Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 77, s. 10. The Act specifically prohibited police officers from membership in any trade union or body directly or indirectly affiliated to a trade union. The provisions for the establishment of a bargaining relationship, and in this case, for the compulsory recognition of the employee's association, were similar to those contained in the Fire Departments Act.

78 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Act, 1950, 14 Geo. VI, ch. 34, s. 78.

79 C. Gordon Simmons, Collective Bargaining at the Municipal Government Level in Canada. Draft study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, March 1968), : 24-25.

80 S.J. Frankell and R.C. Pratt, Municipal Labour Relations in Canada: A Study of some of the problems arising from collective bargaining between municipalities and municipal trade unions (Montreal: The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities and the Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, 1954), : 25. The principal municipal unions in the City of Toronto apparently fully supported and were perhaps even participants in the City's decision to opt-out of the Act. This was done mainly to guard their membership against raiding by other unions. The Labour Relations Act contained certain procedures and protections that were seen as facilitating raiding and, in any event, their collective bargaining relationship with the employer was not dependent upon the coverage of the Act. Perhaps not unexpectedly, they took strong exception to other municipal unions and central labour bodies purporting to represent all municipal employees in Ontario, in their efforts to have Section 78 repealed.

81 Frankell and Pratt, op. cit., : footnote 19, : 25.

82 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection", Stan Little (President of the N.U.P.S.E. and first President of C.U.P.E.) Interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, C.U.P.E. Research Director, November 22, 1977. Little refers to "dozens" of cases in which the employer opted out of the Act, frequently after the union had already organized the workers and made

initial representations to municipal council regarding contract negotiation. He cites the employer refusal to recognize the union and the subsequent recognition strike in Kingston, in 1952, as the classic case in this regard.

83 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," R.P. Rintoul, interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., December 6, 1977.

84 Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Report, 1958, : 25, 40.

85 Hamilton Municipal Employees' Association, No. 167 (N.U.P.E.);
National Union of Public Employees;
National Union of Public Service Employees;
International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers;
International Union of Building Service Employees;
Windsor and District Labour Council;
Ontario Federation of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.);
Ontario Federation of Labour;
Religion-Labour Foundation Toronto.

86 Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Proceedings, 1957-1958.

87 These unions argued that the opt-out provision afforded them much needed protection against raiding by other unions. They were apparently able to secure employer cooperation in this regard.

88 Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Proceedings, 1957-1958.

89 R.S.O. 1960, The Labour Relations Act, ch. 202, s. 89.

90 Ontario Municipal Association, Report of the Special Committee on Labour Relations of the Ontario Municipal Association. Endorsed by the Executive Committee, August 22, 1965; adopted by the Convention in General Session, August 24, 1965.

91 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1966, 14-15 Eliz. II, ch. 76, s.37. In 1965, with the passage of the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, municipal hospitals lost the right to make a declaration under Section 89 of the Labour Relations Act and any such declarations made previously ceased to have effect. Ontario, Statutes, The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 1965, ch. 48, s. 2(3).

92 The statistics presented in this section, unless indicated otherwise, are based on aggregations of municipal, municipal public utility and municipal public transit cases heard by the Ontario Labour Relations Board and listed in the Board's Monthly Report.

93 Willes, op. cit., "Ontario Labour Court Case Table," : 244.

94 See Table 4-2.

95 See Table 4-13.

96 1713-47: Division 1259 of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America (petitioner) v. Kitchener Public Utilities Commission (Kitchener) (respondent); 3390-52: Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees and Other Transport Workers (applicant) v. The Public Utilities Commission of the City of Kitchener (Kitchener) (respondent). Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, June 1947, March 1953, respectively.

97 4286-62 R: Seafarers' International Union of Canada (applicant) v. Wolfe Island Corporation (respondent). Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, October 1962.

CHAPTER 9

ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION GROWTH: UNION VARIABLES

Introduction

The years from 1935 to 1963 were a period of significant union building at the local level of government. Beginning as a relatively small number of autonomous local unions, separated by geography and differing congressional affiliations, by 1963 municipal unionists had combined to form the largest national union in the country, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.). At the same time, the various international unions active in this area also made substantial organizing gains.

This chapter examines the hypothesis that union variables positively influenced the growth and development of local government unionism. Specifically, the following factors are assessed: union growth strategies and the tactics and resources utilized for their accomplishment; the importance of inter-union rivalry and competition, as well as relations with central labour bodies; the militancy of the constituency, both before and after they are organized and finally the role played by leadership. Union instrumentality beliefs are not directly considered because of problems in obtaining data. The role played by union saturation is explored in the context of union growth strategies. There is considerable debate as to the importance of this

class of variables relative to others, in particular, economic determinants. These factors influence both the propensity and the opportunity to organize. Beyond this they also have a substantial influence on the nature of unionism.

The literature predicts a positive relationship between union growth and an aggressive growth strategy, the resources allocated to support it, inter-union rivalry and competition, amicable relations with central labour bodies, constituent militancy and effective leadership. A number of these, such as effective leadership are quite difficult to measure. Given that these factors are inseparably intertwined with the process of union building, the development of both the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) and the National Union of Public Service Employees (N.U.P.S.E.), is of paramount importance. The emergence of these unions, their principal organizational characteristics and the eventual merger to form the C.U.P.E., are all considered.

The nature of municipal unionism is crucial in terms of understanding the response of employers to its emergence. Employers were not legally required to recognize or bargain with the unions representing their employees, and yet, in the majority of cases they appear to have done so. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 10.

The discussion of the C.U.P.E. and its predecessors is based nearly entirely on an examination of extensive archival material held in the Public Archives of Canada.¹ In the case of the international unions involved in organizing among local government employees, such as the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.), the

International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) and the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees (A.A.S.E.R.E.), there are no comparable archival holdings. Moreover, the records kept by the Canadian offices of these unions are also extremely limited.² As a result, information concerning their Canadian activities, during the period under study, is almost nil. Aside from the number and location of the locals they organized, little else is known. They are, therefore, largely excluded from this chapter. While this constitutes a serious gap in the research, it unfortunately defies resolution.

1. The National Union of Public Employees

Until the formation of the N.U.P.E. in 1955, the majority of municipal unions in Ontario and indeed elsewhere in Canada, were directly chartered locals of the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.). This arrangement was initially required because no national or international union affiliated with the Congress claimed jurisdiction over these workers. There was, in fact, no American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) affiliate organizing in this area until the mid-1930s. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (A.F.S.C.M.E.) held its founding convention in December of 1935 and was granted an A.F.L. charter in 1936. In 1937, the A.F.L.'s newly created rival, the Congress of Industrial Organization (C.I.O.), chartered the State, County and Municipal Workers of America.³ Although their formation coincided with the emergence of widespread municipal unionism in Ontario, neither organization played a role in the province. The A.F.S.C.M.E., in particular, was very interested in organizing in

Canada, but for reasons that will be outlined in subsequent discussion, was unable to do so.

The late development of public sector unions stemmed, at least in part, from the craft union philosophy of both the A.F.L. and the T.L.C. Craft unionism is focused primarily on skilled workers. The A.F.L. was formed in 1886 as a loose federation of affiliated unions. Each affiliate was granted exclusive jurisdiction over the organization of a particular trade or craft. No member union was allowed to infringe on the jurisdiction of another. To do so was to be guilty of dual unionism and commonly resulted in expulsion. The Federation represented the mainstream of the American labour movement. Its organizational primacy and that of its attendant philosophies were not seriously challenged until the formation of the C.I.O. in 1937. In Canada, the T.L.C. was also formed in 1886, but began its existence with a much more broadly based constituency than its American counterpart. However, the Canadian locals of international unions affiliated with the A.F.L. were gradually able to gain control of the Congress. Expulsions were numerous. By the 1920s the conversion of the T.L.C. into an organization similar in many ways to the A.F.L. had been largely accomplished. This included an adherence to the principles of craft unionism. General municipal employees were, by and large, unskilled and hence, were ineligible for membership in established craft unions. The Congress was, however, apparently interested in supporting union activity among these workers and for this reason accepted them as directly chartered locals. These bodies were, in fact, organized in accordance with the principles of industrial unionism and existed

within the rubric of the craft dominated T.L.C.

Although the T.L.C. strongly supported the right of municipal employees to form unions directly chartered by the Congress, it was traditionally much less enthusiastic concerning the formation of a national union of municipal employees. At the 1920 Annual Convention of the T.L.C. in Windsor, a resolution introduced by the Edmonton Civic Service Union, No. 52, calling for the establishment of such a union was reported against by the Resolutions Committee. The Committee substituted a resolution advocating the organization of all municipal and other governmental employees. An amendment to that resolution, calling on the Executive Council of the T.L.C. to hold a meeting of municipal organizations, not chartered by international unions, to discuss the formation of a national union of municipal employees, was subsequently added. The report of the Committee, with the amendment, was adopted by a standing vote of ninety-three to sixty-nine. Interestingly, delegates from both the Toronto and London municipal unions spoke against the formation of such an organization. The nature of their objections are, unfortunately, not recorded.⁴ It is not known if the T.L.C. Executive Council ever convened the specified meeting of directly chartered municipal unions.

It apparently became accepted practice during T.L.C. conventions, for the delegates from the directly chartered municipal locals to meet to discuss matters primarily associated with municipal employment. A banquet was provided by the municipal union of the host city. Although the formation of a national union appears to have been frequently discussed at these gatherings, little in the way of concrete action was

taken until the 1940s.⁵ When the practice of holding such meetings began, their regularity and the extent to which they were working meetings as opposed to social events are all unknown.

There were a number of unsuccessful attempts at creating a national union of municipal employees in the early to mid-1940s. After the 1940 T.L.C. convention in Vancouver, the Executive Council of the Congress was approached by a delegation representing directly chartered municipal unions in Edmonton, Regina and Vancouver. The group proposed the formation of either a national union or council of municipal employees to be affiliated to the T.L.C. The Executive Council responded by submitting the proposal to a referendum vote by its directly chartered municipal unions. They found that only a small minority were interested in the formation of such a body and therefore refused to proceed.⁶

During the 1940s, the A.F.C.S.M.E. unsuccessfully attempted to expand into Canada. In 1942, the annual convention of the A.F.L. was held in Toronto. At the convention, delegates from the union became aware of the recent growth in municipal unionism in Canada and concluded that a organizing opportunity existed. They subsequently contacted the T.L.C. indicating their desire to organize in Canada and soliciting the assistance of the Congress in this regard.⁷ Their interest was generally not encouraged by the T.L.C. leadership, although there were some exceptions.⁸

In the fall of 1944, the situation was further complicated by developments at the T.L.C. convention, also held in Toronto. At the traditional municipal union banquet, forty-one delegates, representing

fifteen directly chartered municipal unions from across Canada, decided to form a national union, affiliated with the T.L.C. An organizing committee was formed consisting of one representative from each province and Robert Stewart and Bert Merson, both of Toronto, as Secretary-Treasurer and Chairman, respectively. Percy Bengough, the President of the T.L.C. was present at the banquet and stated that the Congress was supportive of the project. The group also prepared a resolution, indicating their intent, for presentation at the then ongoing T.L.C. convention. This was ultimately precluded by the constitutional requirement that all resolutions be submitted thirty days prior to the commencement of the convention. Bengough did, however, inform the convention of what had transpired and the announcement was apparently well received.⁹ It is very important to recognize just how narrowly based this initiative was. The majority of the T.L.C.'s directly chartered locals had no interest in changing their status and joining a national organization. Only a small group of activists supported the idea.

In February 1945, Merson was contacted by Arnold S. Zander, President of the A.P.C.S.M.E. Zander suggested that affiliation with his union should be seriously considered as an alternative to the formation of a national organization. In the months that followed, Merson and Stewart devoted considerably more time and energy to talks with the A.P.C.S.M.E., than they did to their original objective. To a large degree, this simply reflected their own preference for affiliation with the American organization. The two were invited to the union's headquarters and later produced a report detailing the terms

under which the T.L.C.'s directly chartered locals could affiliate with the A.F.C.S.M.E.¹⁰ They appear to have played a role in actually negotiating some of these terms, although the full extent of their participation is unknown. What is clear, however, is that they had no mandate, either from the T.L.C. or from the organizing committee which they headed, to participate in such talks.

Unable to secure the co-operation of the T.L.C., the A.F.S.C.M.E. proceeded on its own. During 1944, it established a local in Sarnia and was in the process of setting up a second organization in Brantford by the year end. Bengough's personal intervention prevented the installation of the second charter and the Brantford local was stillborn. The union was extremely perplexed by this action and wrote requesting an explanation.¹¹ Bengough did not respond immediately. When he finally did reply in April 1945, the lengthy letter outlined the position of the T.L.C. with respect to its directly chartered locals. It also advised that the T.L.C. had complete jurisdiction over public employees in Canada by virtue of a long standing agreement with the A.F.L. In concluding, Bengough stated that the union had "exceeded its prerogatives in some of the actions taken" and had infringed on the T.L.C.'s jurisdiction over public employees. Bengough's opposition was based on his strong belief that a large number of the T.L.C.'s directly chartered municipal unions would leave the Congress before they would join an international union. He was particularly concerned that this would provide a major opportunity for the rival Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) The C.C.L. had become increasingly active in organizing among municipal employees and was perceived as a serious threat. Both

Merson and the A.F.S.C.M.E. were made aware of his concerns and advised that the formation of some sort of national organization was a more appropriate first step, with the possibility of affiliation with the American union at some future date.¹² In correspondence with Bengough, Merson acknowledged the potential for problems, but strongly advocated affiliation with the A.F.S.C.M.E. over the formation of an indigenous organization.¹³ At the same time, he continued to encourage Zander about the possibility of a breakthrough.¹⁴

Merson had been careful to conceal his efforts from the municipal unions that had formed the organizing committee in 1944. However, in April 1945, his activities became known to a number of them. The T.L.C. informally approached several of its directly chartered municipal unions to explore their feelings concerning affiliation with the A.F.S.C.M.E. The Secretary-Treasurer of Local 79 in Toronto, wrote to Bengough complaining in the strongest terms that Merson and Stewart had in no way been authorized to approach the union.¹⁵ With the letter from Local 79, the T.L.C. appears to have ceased any further discussion of international affiliation. In response to inquiries from Zander in the summer of 1945, Bengough informed him that the consultative process had ceased due to intense opposition on the part of one of the Toronto locals. This development caught Merson completely off guard.¹⁶

Government travel restrictions, intended to facilitate the demobilization of the armed forces, resulted in the cancellation of the 1945 T.L.C. convention. This, plus Bengough's refusal to convene a special meeting of municipal unions¹⁷, dealt Merson's plans a death blow. He and Zander continued to correspond into the late fall of 1945.

Merson maintained that, had the convention been held, the municipal unions could have been brought together to consider the A.F.S.C.M.E. proposal. He was apparently still convinced that it would have been accepted by a substantial number of them. Zander was advised that, given these circumstances, the entire issue was best left until the next T.L.C. convention in 1946.¹⁸ In September 1945, Merson left Toronto to work for the Progressive Conservative Party in Ottawa.¹⁹ His interest in the project quickly waned and his departure effectively marks the conclusion of the entire episode. By the time the next T.L.C. convention was held in 1946, the organizing committee formed two years earlier was long defunct and the entire process had to begin anew.

The events of 1944-45 represent a critical watershed in the overall development of municipal unionism in Canada. Had the A.F.S.C.M.E. been successful, the entire face of municipal unionism and, indeed, the Canadian labour movement as a whole, would have been very different. After 1945, the affiliation of the T.L.C.'s directly chartered municipal unions with the A.F.S.C.M.E. was effectively a dead issue. In 1961, the union transferred its sole Canadian local in Sarnia to the N.U.P.S.E. At the time of the transfer, they indicated that their experience in Canada had been extremely unsatisfactory. They apparently believed that Bengough had reneged on commitments he had made to them.²⁰

At the 1946 T.L.C. convention in Windsor, the project was discussed at length and another organizing committee formed. Little progress was made and it is uncertain if the group even approached the Congress concerning the subject. In any event, this committee also soon

ceased to function. The entire matter then remained largely in abeyance until the 1949 T.L.C. convention in Calgary.²¹

While attempts to form a national union of municipal employees floundered, organizing efforts at the provincial level were much more successful. In 1945, the Joint Council of Public Employees (B.C. Division) affiliated with the T.L.C. The Council had been formed in the early 1940s as an independent central labour body, and jurisdictionally encompassed all three levels of government.²² The Ontario Federation of Municipal Employees (O.F.M.E.) came into being the following year in August 1946. At the 1944 banquet meeting Bengough indicated that the T.L.C. viewed the establishment of provincial federations of directly chartered municipal unions as a necessary prerequisite to the eventual creation of a national union.²³ The formation of the Ontario organization was, at least in part, a response to that announcement. It also represented a serious attempt to achieve greater co-ordination among the municipal unions in the province. Frustration with efforts at the national level may also have been a factor. At its 1953, convention, the organization's name was changed to the Ontario Federation of Public Employees (O.F.P.E.) to be consistent with the newly created National Federation of Public Employees (N.F.P.E.).²⁴

The O.F.M.E. was a chartered federation of the T.L.C. It could hold its own conventions but had no authority to issue charters. Member unions remained directly chartered locals of the Congress. Municipal unions in the province were under no obligation to affiliate with it and initially many did not. It was only towards the mid-1950s that federation membership became the general rule.

At the Calgary T.L.C. convention in 1949 delegates representing various municipal unions again discussed the formation of a national union. This time the decision was made to establish additional provincial federations of municipal unions as a necessary, preliminary step toward creating the national organization. At the time, such bodies existed only in British Columbia and Ontario. By the 1950 convention in Montreal, similar federations had also formed in Alberta and Saskatchewan. At the 1949 session, provisions were made to ensure that a meeting of municipal delegates to T.L.C. conventions were a regular event. This suggests that such meetings were not always held. In addition, a committee was established to act as a clearing house for information of relevance to municipal and hospital unions and to provide organizing assistance for municipal and other public employees.²⁵ The committee's performance in these areas is not documented.

Real progress in actually forming a national union of municipal employees was not made until the 1951 Convention, in Halifax. It was here that the Provisional Organizing Committee of the National Union of Public Employees was formed. Garnett Shier, the Secretary-Treasurer of the O.F.M.E. served as its chairman. The committee requested that the T.L.C. charter the group as a national union. The Congress refused. A year later, and after substantial preparatory work by Shier, the same request was made in Winnipeg. Although Bengough was still unwilling to charter a national union, he did agree to the formation of a national federation. In September 1952, the committee applied for and received a charter under the name of the "National Federation of Public Employees"

(N.F.P.E.). Shier became its first and only president.²⁶

The N.F.P.E. was a very loose organization which, with the exception of occasional meetings of its executive, largely ceased to function between T.L.C. conventions. Its sole reason for existing was to facilitate the formation of a national union.²⁷ The Federation was not empowered to grant charters but could hold its own conferences and meetings. It employed no staff and relied heavily on volunteerism by the executive and any other members who were willing to help, as well as substantial assistance from the T.L.C. Municipal unions were free to participate at their individual discretion and affiliates paid a nominal per capita tax to finance its operations. Member unions remained directly chartered locals of the T.L.C. They continued to pay their regular per capita tax directly to the Congress and to be serviced by it. When the N.F.P.E. was created, the O.F.M.E. and the other provincial federation affiliated with it. By virtue of this affiliation, O.F.M.E. members became members of the national organization without having to join it directly. Initially, the N.F.P.E. claimed jurisdiction over almost all of the public sector, but was forced to retreat to the local level of government at the insistence of the T.L.C.²⁸

Within two years of its creation, the N.F.P.E. had approximately 18,000 members. Following the 1954 T.L.C. convention in Regina, the Federation again approached the Congress executive requesting the granting of a national union charter. Claude Jodoin had just succeeded Bengough as President. This time the T.L.C. agreed to issue the charter, but subject to the condition that 17,000 votes be cast in

favour of membership in the proposed national union, in a referendum to be conducted of all directly chartered municipal locals. By the time balloting was completed, the vast majority of those participating had voted in the affirmative. The N.F.P.E. became the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) effective March 1, 1955.²⁹ Its first convention was held in Windsor in 1955 in the three days immediately preceeding the T.L.C. convention in the same city. Shier became the N.U.P.E.'s first president. 1956 was the last year that the two conventions were held concurrently. With the formation of the N.U.P.E., the O.F.P.E. and the other provincial federations exchanged their T.L.C. charters for ones issued by the new union. At the union's 1959 convention, the "provincial federations" were renamed the "provincial divisions". The O.F.P.E. became the Ontario Division of the N.U.P.E.³⁰

In April 1955, the union appointed R.P. Rintoul of Calgary, as National Director. Rintoul established an office in Ottawa and hired a single secretary. As the only full-time staff officer, Rintoul was unable to respond to all requests for information and assistance from member unions. The N.U.P.E. continued, therefore, to rely heavily on volunteerism on the part of its elected officers and others.³¹

Rintoul's primary task, prior to the founding convention and in the period immediately following it, was to facilitate the transfer of existing T.L.C. directly chartered municipal locals to the N.U.P.E. The decision to join the union had been left to the discretion of individual locals. Although a substantial majority had already committed themselves to membership, there was still a significant number which had not. Convincing these workers to join the N.U.P.E. was

not an easy task. With the exception of a per capita tax rate slightly lower than that charged directly chartered municipal locals by the T.L.C., the union had very little in the way of material inducements to offer. Some locals were convinced that leaving the Congress would greatly reduce the protection they currently enjoyed against raiding. Others were concerned about the union's lack of field representatives. Even if they joined the N.U.P.E., they would still be forced to rely on assistance from the T.L.C. What Rintoul was able to capitalize on, however, was the pervasive dissatisfaction among municipal unions concerning the level of service they had traditionally received from the Congress. A sizeable number had, apparently, never received any outside assistance during their entire existence. He, in effect, promised them that joining the N.U.P.E. now would ultimately result in the provision of superior servicing at some future date. This commitment was explicit in the union's motto "service above all". Rintoul enjoyed considerable success in selling the new union, as evidenced in the rapid expansion in the number of locals and aggregate membership. The pace was frantic. At one point, Rintoul estimated that he was working "at least" ninety to one hundred hours per week.³²

As the N.U.P.E.'s financial resources grew, pressures mounted for the union to begin to hire field representatives. Typically, this was the next logical step in the process of union building. Instead, Rintoul hired a research officer for the national office to provide member locals with pertinent information and statistical data. This had been one of the commitments made at the founding convention. The logic of the decision is clear. The addition of a single field representative

would have made relatively little impact on the overall servicing picture. However, by providing for the centralized dissemination of information, the N.U.P.E. could potentially service all its locals through regular bulletins and by responding to individual requests. It is important to remember that most of these locals had survived on their own with only nominal outside assistance. Information support was probably more valuable to most of them than the presence of a field representative. In December 1956, Gilbert Levine, who was then a member of Local 79, in Toronto, was hired as the union's researcher. Shortly thereafter, the union's first field representative was recruited. By the summer of 1957, the N.U.P.E.'s full time staff consisted of Rintoul, his secretary, the research officer and four field representatives. Each representative was assigned to one of the union's four servicing areas, British Columbia, the Prairie Provinces, Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces. The N.U.P.E.'s nominal presence in Quebec did not justify the appointment of a representative for that province.³³ By 1961, the union had a total of thirteen field representatives and a headquarters staff of six. In addition, there were fifteen locally employed business agents.³⁴ The number of representatives had increased to fourteen by the time of the merger in mid-1953.³⁵

There is no documentary evidence to suggest that any staff were employed by the provincial federations/divisions during this period. In Ontario, some servicing and organizing was performed by the executive of the O.F.P.E. The province was divided into sections and each officer assigned responsibility for a particular area. There were no full-time

positions, hence it is very unlikely that this approach was either particularly systematic or effective. The Secretary-Treasurer seems to have borne a disproportionate share of the work-load.³⁶ Business agents were not common among directly chartered municipal unions. The T.L.C. apparently deliberately discouraged their employment because it was thought to undermine the identification of these locals with the Congress.³⁷ For these reasons, the O.P.P.E. was forced to rely heavily on the T.L.C. for assistance with respect to both servicing and new organizing. This remained the case until the N.U.P.E. was in position to assume these responsibilities.

As an organization, the N.U.P.E. reflected both the process leading to its creation and the characteristics of the unions that comprised it. The T.L.C.'s directly chartered municipal unions generally had a reputation for being independent, largely self-sufficient and resisting outside interference in their affairs.³⁸ They were also typically not known for their promotion of worker solidarity. Once established around a particular work group, these unions frequently denied membership to those performing different kinds of work. Such workers were usually advised to form a union of their own.³⁹ This contributed, at least in part, to the proliferation of multiple directly chartered municipal unions within single municipalities. Finally, they tended to be tight-fisted with their money, especially where per capita payments to an external body were involved. Directly chartered municipal unions were typically issued a special "B" class charter, with a reduced per capita tax rate.⁴⁰ Its origins are not known, but it was almost certainly introduced to

facilitate affiliation to the T.L.C. by municipal employee organizations. Similar arrangements existed in a number of unions, as an organizing inducement.⁴¹ These characteristics undoubtedly played a decisive role in delaying the formation of a national union of municipal employees. Much of Shier's work in consensus building involved overcoming the inhibiting effect of these factors.

Most of the N.U.P.E.'s chartered locals existed as directly chartered unions prior to its formation. They owed the new organization nothing, while the N.U.P.E. owed them its very existence. The fact that so much of the municipal public sector had already been unionized by 1955 meant that those locals subsequently organized by the N.U.P.E., and consequently more likely to identify with it, were not sufficient to counterbalance the influence of the founding group. Member locals typically continued to assert their traditional autonomy and promote their own interest even after the creation of the N.U.P.E. As a result, the union was a very decentralized organization, not unlike the N.F.P.E. it succeeded. Effective decision making power remained with the locals and they also continued to be responsible for the majority of union functions.

One unfortunate consequence of this decentralized structure was that the N.U.P.E. was underfunded for virtually its entire existence. Member locals consistently refused to agree to the per capita increases necessary to finance the union's operations. At its first convention in May 1955, the union's per capita tax was set at twenty cents per member per month.⁴² At that time, the per capita paid to the T.L.C. by a directly chartered municipal union was twenty-five cents per member per

month. The lower rate was deliberately selected to provide a financial inducement for directly chartered locals to join the union.⁴³ It was, however, probably inadequate from the perspective of effective union building and the development of services. By 1961, the union's per capita stood at fifty-five cents.⁴⁴ However, at the same time, the N.U.P.S.E. charged one dollar and thirty cents, while the T.L.C.'s direct charter per capita was \$1.05.⁴⁵ In his report to the 1961 convention, the National Director noted that servicing had been severely restricted over the past fiscal year, at the direction of the executive board. He also indicated that several important projects had not been undertaken due to a lack of funds. Throughout the N.U.P.E.'s existence Rintoul appears to have conducted an ongoing review of methods and procedures in a concerted effort to control costs and improve efficiency. Substantial increases in the union's membership were not reflected in proportional increases in staff. The existing personnel simply worked harder.⁴⁶ Despite this chronic underfunding problem, the N.U.P.E.'s growth between 1955 and 1963 was spectacular. Had the union been properly financed, there is no way of knowing how much more it would have achieved.

Prior to 1955, from the perspective of union growth strategy, the formation of a national union of municipal employees was clearly the single most important, shared objective among the T.L.C.'s directly chartered municipal locals. New organizing assumed only secondary importance. A major part of the rationale for creating a national union was to provide established locals with a higher level of service than they had obtained from the Congress. This was explicit in the motto

"Service Above All". By 1955, the T.L.C. had an abundance of directly chartered municipal locals. The N.U.P.E.'s objective, immediately following its formation was to convince those locals which had not already elected to join, to become members. To a large extent, this was simply a carry over of its earlier agenda. Once this had been accomplished, it can be argued that the union lacked a deliberate strategy for its future development and consequently it drifted. It also lacked effective leadership. This is clearly evident in the failure to come to terms with the thorny issue of the inadequate per capita tax, the absence of significant national programming and restrictions on service provision. Moreover, despite its numerically superior position, the union made substantial concessions to the N.U.P.S.E. in the merger negotiations.

Overall relations between the T.L.C. and its directly chartered municipal locals appear to have been amicable. The only serious difficulty was the long standing complaint that the level of organizing and servicing assistance provided by the Congress was grossly inadequate. The T.L.C. was not insensitive to these concerns. In 1952 it responded to requests from the O.F.M.E. by hiring two additional organizers to work in Ontario. At the suggestion of the Federation, one of the two was a former municipal employee. It had been argued for some time that such an appointment was necessary because of the unique problems associated with municipal employment. Difficulties soon arose, however, when the O.F.M.E. asked to play a role in the assignment of work performed by this individual. The fact that he had been the Federation's president immediately prior to accepting the T.L.C.

position, only complicated the matter. After considerable discussion, the O.F.M.E. was sternly advised that all Congress organizers worked solely under their direction. It was further stated that this particular individual's status, as a former municipal employee, was irrelevant in the context of his current work and responsibilities.⁴⁷

The protracted process of union building produced additional tensions. Over time, the relationship between the Congress and its municipal unions gradually changed. In the early 1940s, the T.L.C. was quite supportive of efforts to form a national union of municipal employees. However, as the decade passed and the failed attempts mounted, the Congress executive appears to have become increasingly skeptical that this goal would ever be achieved. It is important to remember that there was no continuity to the process prior to 1951. Equally significant is the fact that during the early 1940s only a small number of municipal unions were supportive of the concept of a national union. Although the idea definitely gained currency over the decade, it is by no means certain that its proponents were in a majority even by 1950. The Congress thus had good reason to view the project with a certain apprehension. However, during the 1950s, the T.L.C.'s caution and pessimism increasingly came to be viewed as obstruction by a number of the principals involved in the formation of the union. This seems to have been particularly true of Garnett Shier.⁴⁸

There was also a change in the financial relationship. As noted previously, directly chartered municipal unions were typically issued a special "B" class of charter, with a reduced per capita tax rate. In correspondence with A.F.S.C.M.E. President Zander, in the mid-1940s,

Bengough indicated that the Congress had spent more money in organizing and servicing its directly chartered municipal locals than it had received back in per capita tax revenues.⁴⁹ Whether this was actually the case or merely a ploy to discourage Zander from organizing in Canada is unknown. It is, however, certainly plausible, given the reduced per capita tax associated with the "B" charter. In addition, the Congress provided financial support for both the provincial federations and the N.P.P.E. following its formation in 1952.⁵⁰ In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the tremendous increase in both the number of municipal unions and their aggregate membership converted these organizations from a financial drain into a major source of badly needed revenue in a financially strapped Congress. It would later be argued by some municipal unionists that the T.L.C.'s reluctance to allow the formation of a national union was motivated primarily by financial considerations. Directly chartered locals paid a higher per capita tax than did locals chartered by either national or international unions affiliated with the Congress. The formation of a national union of municipal employees and subsequent transfer of directly chartered municipal locals to the new organization represented a substantial revenue loss to the T.L.C.⁵¹ The "B" charter itself ultimately came to be viewed unfavourably. For many municipal unionists it symbolized what they perceived to be the second class status of municipal employees in the Congress.⁵²

A particularly sensitive subject in relations between the T.L.C. and the activists spearheading the drive to form a national union of municipal employees was the jurisdiction of the new organization. The

N.F.P.E. applied for a T.L.C. charter in September 1952. When the document was finally received, in December, it was made out to the "National Federation of Public Employees in Civic and Municipal Services". Federation President Shier advised the T.L.C., that the executive of the N.F.P.E. was unanimously opposed to the inclusion of the words "in Civic and Municipal Services".⁵³ They were, however, eventually compelled to accept the charter as issued. The dispute resurfaced again in the fall of 1953. The Federation had submitted its constitution, as adopted at its second convention in August 1953, for Congress approval. The document asserted jurisdiction over all public employees at all three levels of government. The T.L.C. refused to accept this and advised that the constitution would not be approved until it conformed with the charter. The document was returned to the Federation with a number of alterations. The deletion of "public hospitals" and "libraries" from the section listing the types of workers eligible for membership in the organization caused considerable consternation. After much discussion, both internally and with the T.L.C., the constitution was amended as directed. However, in the final version the references to jurisdiction over public hospitals and libraries were retained.⁵⁴ They had previously obtained assurances from Bengough that water works employees fell under the jurisdiction of the T.L.C. and were eligible for N.F.P.E. membership. The I.B.E.W. had attempted to claim jurisdiction in certain cases in which hydro-electric and water works employees worked for a single authority.⁵⁵ Federation leaders generally perceived the T.L.C.'s actions as a deliberate and unwarranted attempt to restrict their

jurisdiction to the municipal level of government. They concluded that while they were not in a position to successfully challenge the Congress at this juncture, the matter could be reopened at a more opportune time in the future.⁵⁶ The statement of membership eligibility was transferred virtually intact from the N.F.P.E. to the N.U.P.E. constitution, when the latter organization was formed.⁵⁷ The union did not seriously attempt to assert a broader jurisdiction during its existence.

The organization of hospitals continued to be a particularly contentious issue. After the formation of the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.) in 1956, three affiliates, the N.U.P.E., the N.U.P.S.E. and the Building Service Employees International Union (B.S.E.I.U.) claimed jurisdiction in this area. An agreement among the three concerning jurisdiction expired in 1958 and was not renewed.⁵⁸ Most disputes were, however, resolved on a case by case basis. This situation was further complicated by the entry of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (C.B.R.T.). A group of B.S.E.I.U. locals in Atlantic Canada, had broken away from the international union and established themselves as independent organizations. They were subsequently chartered as locals of the C.B.R.T. This particular dispute lingered on for a number of years with the Congress refusing to take any direct action. At the 1961 N.U.P.E. convention, the union's executive committee was authorized to withhold per capita tax payments from the C.L.C. until the matter was resolved. This was not done. After considerable discussion and negotiation, the C.B.R.T. eventually agreed not to organize any more hospitals.⁵⁹

2. The National Union of Public Service Employees

Organizing activity by the All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.), among local government employees in Ontario was limited to the creation of a small handful of shortlived, directly chartered locals in the second half of the 1930s. The Congress had barely survived the Depression and had neither the resources or the inclination to undertake extensive organizing in this area. In 1940, the A.C.C.L. merged with the Canadian locals of international unions affiliated with the C.I.O. in the United States. The new body was only marginally more active than its predecessor. By 1944, a total of six directly chartered locals were in existence. The direct charter approach was necessitated by the fact that, until the formation of the National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers (N.O.C.U.E.W.) in late 1944, the Congress did not have an affiliate which claimed jurisdiction in this area. After 1944, the number of direct charters gradually decline, largely as a result of transfers to the N.O.C.U.E.W. The last one changed hands in 1954. In general, the A.C.C.L./C.C.L. did not play a major role in the unionization of local government employment through the organization of directly chartered locals.⁶⁰ It was only after the N.U.P.S.E. succeeded the N.O.C.U.E.W. in 1952 that significant inroads were made.

As noted in Chapter 3, the N.U.P.S.E. had its origins in a single organization called the Canadian Electrical Trades Union (C.E.T.U.). The union represented certain employees of the Toronto Electric Commissioners or Toronto Hydro, as it is presently known. These workers had originally been members of the I.B.E.W., but in 1920, they broke

away to form an independent union. Electrical workers employed by the Toronto Transit Commission joined at a later date. In 1922, the Toronto group combined with a number of other directly chartered locals to form a small national union. The C.E.T.U. name was retained. The new union organized according to the principles of "industrial unionism" and claimed jurisdiction over all workers in the electrical industry. This included those employed in construction, as no differentiation was made between public and private sector employment.⁶¹ The C.E.T.U. enjoyed modest success during the 1920s, but by the late 1930s had been reduced to the original Toronto local.⁶² The ravages of the Depression on its membership and constituent locals, plus internal political upheavals⁶³, all took their toll. On paper it appears that the C.E.T.U.'s demise as a national union coincided with the re-emergence of organized labour as a force in the recovery phase of the Depression. In fact, these were simply belated bookkeeping adjustments to reflect the reality that had existed from at least the mid-1930s. It was with this single local as a base that the union's second wave of organizing began.

There was by no means unanimity within the union concerning the desirability of once more functioning as a national organization. Inquiries from the C.C.L. in 1941 about the union's intended role in this regard produced a heated debate among the membership. The Congress clearly wanted the C.E.T.U. to play an active role, but was also aware of the political sensitivity of the issue. While the union's leadership generally appear to have favoured the organization of new locals, a substantial number of the rank and file were quite strongly opposed. Many objected because they did not want their business agent away from

the local for long periods of time and were unwilling to finance organizing efforts. For others, the union's disastrous organizing efforts in Montreal in 1931 weighed heavily.⁶⁴ So strong was this opposition that there were serious discussion of the local severing its ties with the C.C.L. and becoming an independent organization. The C.E.T.U. business agent, T. P. Stevenson, ultimately advised the C.C.L. that his union would help where it could, but given the volatility of the situation, the Congress should adopt a policy of directly chartering new unions, with a view to the creation of being a national union at some future date. He described his own membership as being overly comfortable and possessing a "conservative" mind-set.⁶⁵

The expansionist perspective eventually prevailed. In 1942, electrical workers employed by the Sault Ste. Marie Public Utilities Commission and by Great Lakes Power joined the C.E.T.U. as Local 3. The Township of York Hydro was organized the following year under the rubric of Local 1. In August 1944, Local 4, consisting of employees of the London Public Utilities Commission, was added.⁶⁶ This set the stage for formation of the N.O.C.U.E.W., in December of the same year. A steering committee consisting of members of Local 1 co-ordinated the endeavor. As early as September, the committee had requested that the C.C.L. contact all existing directly chartered locals across Canada and any other organizations that might be interested in the creation of a national electrical and utility workers union. It was felt that the convention call would have much greater legitimacy, if it came directly from the Congress. The C.C.L., however, assigned the entire project a very low priority, with the result that

the notifications were never sent. The C.C.L. Secretary, N.S. Dowd, allowed that the Congress had regarded the December meeting largely as a preliminary gathering, with the actual formation of the union to occur at a later date. Despite this apparent lack of support, the meeting did in fact serve as the new union's founding convention, with N.S. Dowd present to represent the Congress. Stevenson subsequently asked Dowd to send a letter to the same target group as before, this time informing them as to what had occurred and indicating that it had the C.C.L.'s blessing.⁶⁷

Prior to the meeting, Stevenson also contacted the Utility Workers Organizing Committee of the C.I.O., in the United States. They indicated that they were not concerned about coming to Canada if there was a recognized affiliate of the C.C.L. organizing in this area. They accepted Stevensons's assurances that this was the case. They also acknowledged that, given the magnitude of their task in the United States, organizing in Canada was not a high priority at that time.⁶⁸

The name of the new union was a compromise and reflected the range of interests represented at the meeting. Initially, it was proposed that the organization be called the "National Union of Utility and Electrical Workers." However, participation by civic workers, plus the reported reluctance of certain classes of civic workers to join a "union", necessitated a name change. For their part, electrical workers in local one of the C.E.T.U. had insisted that the name "electrical workers" be present in any new name. Effective January 1, 1945, the N.O.C.U.E.W. came into being with branches in Hamilton, London, Sudbury, Sault Ste. Marie and Toronto. It claimed jurisdiction over

electrical workers in both the public and private sectors, other utility workers and general municipal or "civic" workers as they were then called. As before, the principles of industrial unionism were observed.⁶⁹

The union was a relatively weak organization for much of its existence. The founding convention was, in reality, a meeting of little more than a dozen delegates representing three unions. Over half were from local one. Until 1949, it employed only a single full-time officer, the Secretary-Treasurer, T.F. Stevenson. Stevenson had become the business agent for the C.E.T.U., Local 1, in 1937, following the departure of G.W. McCollum, and played a major role in the formation of the N.O.C.U.E.W. in 1944. He became its first Secretary-Treasurer. In this capacity, he was responsible for all of the administrative work the union, servicing its locals, new organizing and occasionally assisting C.C.L. unions in need of help. In addition, he continued to work as the business agent for Local 1.

Whether the organization had a conscious growth strategy at this time is unknown. Despite repeated pleas from Stevenson that the union hire additional personnel and allocate greater funding to new organizing, this was not done until the late 1940s. A single organizer was hired in 1949 and a second added in 1950. Repeated requests for increases in the local per capita tax were also frequently refused on the grounds that the locals received little in the way of service for the money they already paid.⁷⁰ In the interim, the organization relied on an increasingly overworked Stevenson, volunteerism by members of the executive board and assistance from C.C.L. organizers and those from

other unions. In a number of cases, civic, utility and electrical workers were organized by other unions active in their particular area, or by the C.C.L. as direct charters, and subsequently turned over to the N.O.C.U.E.W. The union appears to have been somewhat ambivalent concerning these efforts, particularly where other unions were involved. On one hand their assistance was genuinely appreciated, while on the other there was often real suspicion about their true motives. Delays in the transfer of such organizations produced heated letters to the C.C.L. alleging deception and demanding that the transmittal be finalized.⁷¹ The union's activities were confined to Ontario during this period, but overtures were made to C.C.L. affiliated federations in other provinces concerning the possibility of future merger.⁷² The N.O.C.U.E.W. also approached the C.C.L. as early as 1950 about taking over the independent Hydro-Electric Power Commission Employees' Association (E.A.) in the event that they should some day decide to affiliate with the Congress.⁷³

The N.O.C.U.E.W. suffered from a high level of local mortality during its brief existence between 1945 and 1952. A number of factors were responsible. First, as a relative latecomer to the field, it was forced to organize those employers who remained union free. In such cases, the number of workers was often small and the employer vehemently opposed to unions. Second, the union provided little ongoing support or service to the locals it organized. Under such circumstances those strong enough to survive on their own did so, while the others simply failed. This was the case with the demise of locals in New Toronto/Mimico and Etobicoke in 1947. Finally, some locals, notably the

one in Guelph, left because of differences with the Secretary-Treasurer.⁷⁴

The union's leadership tended to be restricted to a fairly small group of long serving individuals. In 1950, the President of the N.O.C.U.E.W., A.M. Barnetson, retired. Barnetson had become President of the C.E.T.U. in 1924 and held this position until 1944, when he assumed the Presidency of the new organization. G.W. McCollum was elected Secretary-Treasurer of the C.E.T.U. in 1923 and continued in this capacity until his ouster in 1937. Prior to assuming McCollum's position, Stevenson held elective office in the Toronto local. In such circumstances there is a real danger that the union could become effectively a "one man show". Certainly this appears to have happened to both Stevenson and his predecessor, McCollum. There is little doubt that at least some of Stevenson's problems, prior to his demise, stemmed from the fact that actions by him on behalf of the national union were frequently perceived as dictatorial intrusions, by Stevenson the individual, in the affairs of autonomous member locals.⁷⁵ Over reliance on key individuals simply reflected, and indeed contributed to, the general lack of knowledge and union experience among the membership.

From the perspective of organizational cohesiveness, the N.O.C.U.E.W. appears to have functioned very much like a loose federation of affiliated unions. In large part this was because most of the important member locals had enjoyed an autonomous existence prior to the organization's formation. The perceived low level of service probably only reinforced this sentiment. In essence, they had survived

on their own before and if need be, as in the case of Guelph, were prepared to do so again. The failure of so many of the union's new locals meant that no effective counterweight to this founding group developed. By virtue of the limited number of locals, most were represented on the executive board. From this vantage point they were able to resist calls for per capita tax increases and the hiring of additional staff. These changes would have benefited the union as a whole, but not necessarily their own organizations. Tight control was also exercised by the board over the Secretary-Treasurer's salary and expenses. This was a source of considerable irritation for Stevenson.

A lengthy strike in 1950, by Local 5 in Hamilton, put severe pressure on the union and stretched its resources to the limit.⁷⁶ Due to an administrative oversight, the organization also fell substantially in arrears in its Congress per capita payments.⁷⁷ The strike, Stevenson's handling of it and subsequent problems worsened already deteriorating relations between the Secretary-Treasurer and a number of members of the executive board. In the Spring of 1951, the union teetered on the brink of disaster. The locals in Toronto, London, Sault Ste Marie and Hamilton formed the backbone of the union, while the rest consisted largely of small groups. In some cases these smaller organizations existed as functioning locals only on paper. Moreover, not all locals were paying their per capita. In general, the union was not highly regarded, even among its own membership. Complaints about the lack of service abound.⁷⁸ Local 4, in London, threatened to withdraw unless additional locals were organized in South-Western Ontario.⁷⁹ On May 8, 1951, Stevenson resigned to protest certain

executive board decisions.⁸⁰ He was subsequently asked to come to Ottawa, by C.C.L. President Mosher, to personally discuss his union's problems.⁸¹ It is not known if this meeting ever occurred. For its part, the board had become increasingly concerned about complaints from both individual members and entire locals concerning Stevenson's behaviour. His difficulties were widely attributed to a mental breakdown. While this does in fact seem to have occurred, fundamental issues concerning union governance and policies were also in dispute. After losing a bitter fight on the floor of the 1951 convention, Stevenson returned to his job with Toronto Hydro, where he had been on leave of absence since 1937. The level of animosity engendered by Stevenson, in his final years as Secretary-Treasurer, was such that many believed that the union would have broken up had he remained.⁸²

In the wake of Stevenson's departure, a number of important changes were made. There was, however, considerable discussion about the form these changes should take and how drastic they should be. Local 4, in London, requested that the union be placed under the control of a C.C.L. administrator until such time as its affairs were in order. This was not done as the majority felt it would result in the end of the organization.⁸³ Among the changes that were made was the elimination of the position of Secretary-Treasurer. In its place two separate, non-staff positions were created. The executive board also undertook to determine whether the position of Director of Organization should be filled.⁸⁴ The position had been created at the union's founding convention in 1944, but left vacant with the understanding that the Secretary-Treasurer would assume this responsibility on an

interim basis. S.A. Little subsequently assumed this position, on a full-time basis, in October 1951.⁸⁵

The organization's name was changed to the N.U.P.S.E. at its 1952 convention.⁸⁶ By then, the union's constituency had expanded to include both hospital and school board workers. It now also claimed the entire public sector as its jurisdiction.⁸⁷ In addition to being anachronistic, the old name had apparently been difficult to remember and undoubtedly provoked unpleasant associations.⁸⁸

Little's first task, in the fall of 1951, was to revive the organization, re-establish contacts and insure that member locals resumed per capita tax payments. In a couple of instances, workers organized by other unions on behalf of the N.O.C.U.E.W., had refused to be transferred because the situation in the union was so bad. Much of Little's early work involved reassuring members and others that these problems were now resolved.⁸⁹

During the early 1950s, the union employed a staff of four, which included Little as Director of Organization, two field organizers/representatives and an office secretary. On occasion the union was unable to meet its full payroll because some locals were late in remitting per capita tax payments. However, once it was generally accepted that the union's internal political problems were resolved, the regularity of such payments improved as did the organization's overall financial picture. This, in turn, allowed the hiring of additional staff.⁹⁰

Despite some growth, both in the number of locals and aggregate membership, by the mid-1950s, the N.U.P.S.E. was still not a large

organization. This changed significantly in 1955, when the union merged with the E.A. of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission.

The Association had its origins in the employee representation plan introduced in 1935. In 1944, the E.A. itself was established. Both initiatives were sponsored by the employer as part of an ongoing campaign to thwart the organizing efforts of the I.B.E.W. Between 1944 and 1955, the E.A. underwent a gradual transition from being essentially an employer dominated organization to a more independent, union-like body. The I.B.E.W. kept up the pressure throughout the 1940s and into the 1950s. At the height of the battle, in the mid-1950s, the E.A. was devoting most of its resources to combatting the international union. The Association's leadership concluded that it could not continue to survive as an independent organization and, therefore, sought to merge with another labour organization on the best terms possible. Union with the I.B.E.W. was never seriously considered.⁹¹ In 1955, the provisions of the merger between the E.A. and the N.U.P.S.E. were finalized and later ratified at their respective conventions. The deal was approved by the executive committee of the C.C.L. in January 1956.⁹² Despite this set back, the I.B.E.W. kept up the pressure, ultimately raising the issue at the founding convention of the C.L.C. in April of that year.⁹³ Although the Association was the larger of the two, the N.U.P.S.E. name was retained. The complete rationale for the merger, from the E.A.'s perspective, together with the details of the negotiations and eventual settlement are beyond the scope of this discussion. What is important, however, is the tremendous impact of the deal on the N.U.P.S.E.

At the time of the merger it was uncertain which party benefited the most, but over the long term it was definitely the N.U.P.S.E. As of December 1954, it was a relatively small and weak organization consisting of slightly more than 3,000 members scattered across Ontario. A year later, with the merger completed, it reported a membership of approximately 13,000. Despite the preferred per capita tax rate negotiated with the E.A., the financial boost provided by these monies was tremendous. Moreover, the N.U.P.S.E. gained access to membership servicing resources that were both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to its own. The E.A. had employed a full-time staff of between sixteen to eighteen people and had a number of well established service programs, especially in the areas of research and education. After the merger the E.A. functioned as a self-servicing local and thus maintained control over most of its pre-merger resources.⁹⁴ From the perspective of the N.U.P.S.E. mere access seems to have been sufficient. The N.U.P.S.E. also inherited key personnel from the E.A., the most notable being Francis Eady. Eady subsequently became Little's right-hand-man and played an important role in the administration of the union. The acquisition of Eady was particularly fortunate because of his ability to speak French. This gave the N.U.P.S.E. a tremendous advantage over the largely unilingual N.U.P.E. in the province of Quebec.⁹⁵

In addition to physical resources, the merger also gave the N.U.P.S.E. much sought after legitimacy. This was true, with respect to both employers and employees, as well as within the labour movement. In many ways it may have been the most important gain of all. Many of the

municipally owned hydro-electric utilities in Ontario have traditionally looked to the Hydro-Electric Power Commission (H.E.P.C.) for leadership and direction. While it was certainly not a message the H.E.P.C. would have supported, the simple fact that its employees were now represented by the N.U.P.S.E. may have signified to others that allowing the union to represent their employees was now acceptable.⁹⁶ The merger also produced almost immediate dividends in terms of attracting new members. The Winnipeg Federation of Civic Employees (C.C.L.) was apparently so impressed with the E.A. pact that it joined the N.U.P.S.E. in the Spring of 1956, after concluding a similar deal.⁹⁷ This brought an additional 2,500 members to the N.U.P.S.E. More significantly, it marked the passage of the union from a regionally based entity, limited solely to Ontario, to an increasingly national organization. This, in turn, only served to enhance its legitimacy and prestige further. As a result, still more workers joined. The 1960 capture of the Canadian Brotherhood of Municipal Employees, Local 1, in Montreal, had a similar effect in the province of Quebec.⁹⁸ Finally, with respect to the labour movement, the union's new found status was gained just prior to the merger of the C.C.L. and the T.L.C. to form the C.L.C. At a mere 3,000 members the N.U.P.S.E.'s future in a central labour body which now contained its larger and more powerful members, specifically the I.B.E.W. and the N.U.P.E., would have been in some doubt.⁹⁹ At over 15,000 members its survival was assured. Whether this timing was deliberate, as part of the union's overall strategy, or simply fortuitous is unknown.¹⁰⁰

After 1955, the union changed substantially, largely under

Little's direction. Over time the number of full-time staff increased, from four in 1955, to twenty-seven by 1962. Fourteen, including those in the National Office, were based in Ontario. Servicing became highly centralized and was co-ordinated through seven regional offices located across Canada. A researcher was hired in 1961 to provide both qualitative and quantitative support for the union's field representatives and its member locals. All of this was financed by a relatively high per capita tax.¹⁰¹ The N.U.P.E. was clearly the larger of the two organizations at the time of the merger, yet its aggregate per capita tax revenues were only seventy per cent of those collected by the N.U.P.S.E., for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963.¹⁰² As a consequence of these changes, the union was increasingly able to approach the organization of its constituency in a systematic and organized fashion. The results are evident in the tremendous growth, both in terms of aggregate membership and locals, in the mid to late 1950s and early 1960s. By 1962, the N.U.P.S.E. reported a membership of 33,000 in 157 locals. It represented workers in all provinces except Prince Edward Island, although the bulk of its locals and members were still concentrated in Ontario.¹⁰³

In 1959, Little became President of the N.U.P.S.E. and the union's constitution was amended to make the Presidency a full-time position. The job of Director of Organization was eliminated.¹⁰⁴ After 1959, there is little doubt that he exercised nearly complete control. Little's drive and determination clearly contributed to the process of union building. In 1963, when the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. merged to form the C.U.P.E., the force of his personality allowed him to become

the new union's first President, even though his organization was the smaller of the two.¹⁰⁵ Little's approach did, however, contribute substantially to the conflict that ensued in the union following the merger.

As noted previously, the N.U.P.S.E. was a relative latecomer to the organization of local government employees. Both the T.L.C. and the I.B.E.W. had a substantial head start among general municipal and hydro-electric workers, respectively. By the time the N.U.P.S.E. was in a position to organize its constituency in a serious way, most of the larger municipalities were already heavily unionized. The only apparent avenue open to the union was to organize in the smaller centres. Such an approach, however, involved significant problems. As the size of the target group declines, the per capita organizing cost typically increases. In addition, once established, smaller locals are more expensive to administer and service than larger ones. The fact that employers in the smaller centres tended to be more opposed to union activity by their employees than those in larger ones only served to escalate these costs as well as increase the risk of failure. As a growth strategy, the union would have spent a considerable amount of money for only a relatively modest membership gain. This dilemma prompted two related responses. First, the N.U.P.S.E. gradually broadened its jurisdiction to take advantage of large scale organizing opportunities in hospitals, education, the local public sector in general and beyond. Second, it negotiated a series of mergers with other established labour groups with similar constituencies. In this way, the union was able to make spectacular membership gains in a very

short period of time.

In general, relations between the union and the C.C.L. and its successor, the C.L.C., can be characterized as uneasy. The 1950s, in particular, were an especially "stormy" period.¹⁰⁶ From the union's perspective, there were three major interrelated areas of contention. First, the C.C.L. was seen as providing inadequate support for the unionization of public employees at the local government level. Second, the C.C.L. was seen as clearly reluctant to transfer its directly chartered locals to the union, even though they properly fell within its jurisdiction. Finally, the C.C.L., and later the C.L.C., was seen as deliberately attempting to confine the union by restricting its organizing jurisdiction. Each will be discussed in turn.

The alleged lack of support for the organization of the sector had two dimensions. One concerned the low level of Congress activity in organizing workers, while the other focused on the C.C.L.'s indifference to the process of union building. The importance of these issues diminished somewhat as the union became more established and was increasingly able to organize effectively on its own. From the C.C.L.'s perspective it is doubtful that organizing public employees was a priority at this time. Initially at least, the union was probably regarded as a small and very marginal group, frequently in arrears in its Congress per capita tax and fortunate to survive from one year to the next. The union's aggressive expansion in the 1950s largely altered this view. Increasingly its activities were viewed with trepidation. According to Little, the Congress was very concerned that some action by the N.U.P.S.E. would disrupt the impending merger between the C.C.L.

and the T.L.C. in 1956. The union's own merger with the E.A., in 1955, and the furor, that followed was precisely the kind of confrontation they had wanted to avoid. The E.A. merger was subject to C.C.L. approval. After a delay, which nearly proved the deal's undoing, it was ratified in January 1956. At the founding convention of the C.L.C., later in the year, the I.B.E.W. tried to have the N.U.P.S.E. delegate barred. They argued that the preferred per capita tax enjoyed by the former Association members was improper. Had they succeeded, the issue could have split the convention. Their complaints were, however, rejected and the N.U.P.S.E. delegates seated.

The N.U.P.S.E.'s organizing efforts in the City of Ottawa, prior to the merger, were equally unappreciated. In this case the union was in direct competition with the N.U.P.E. Little was asked to withdraw while the C.C.L. and T.L.C. jointly administered a vote by the employees of the City to determine which union they wished to join. The N.U.P.E. was the victor and the affected workers joined as Local 503. Little later charged that the Congress had not properly represented the interests of his organization. There were apparently additional cases in which the N.U.P.S.E. was reined in, although the specific details are not documented.

The reluctance of the Congress to transfer its directly chartered locals to the union was a source of considerable tension in the relationship. This hesitation was based on two considerations. First, on a per capita basis, directly chartered locals contributed significantly higher revenues to the C.C.L., than did affiliated national or international unions. These organizations thus represented

a substantial source of revenue to the Congress, which would diminish when transfer occurred. Second, they were important for political purposes. In 1940, the A.C.C.L., consisting solely of national organizations, merged with the Canadian locals of international unions affiliated with the C.I.O., to form the C.C.L. The direct charters served as a crucial counterweight to balance the influence of the internationals in the Congress. This allowed A.R. Mosher, the President of the A.C.C.L., to retain that position in the new organization. Little argues that the N.U.P.S.E.'s growth was a source of considerable apprehension on the part of the C.C.L. leadership, because it threatened to disrupt established relationships and ultimately, if carried to its logical conclusion, to change the nature of the Congress itself. He notes that, although C.C.L. officials claimed that the direct charters were handed over willingly, the reality was that the union had to fight for each and every one. This policy slowed the N.U.P.S.E.'s development into a truly "national" union. In the case of the Winnipeg Federation of Civic Employees, the C.C.L. unsuccessfully tried to prevent this group from joining the N.U.P.S.E.

Between 1944 and 1963, the union progressively broadened its jurisdiction despite opposition from the C.C.L. and later the C.L.C. In 1944, utility workers and civic employees were added to the core group of electrical workers. In the early 1950s, the jurisdiction was extended again through the organization of hospital and educational workers. The union did not receive prior approval and the perception was that C.C.L. officials were not pleased. In 1952, the N.U.P.S.E. boldly asserted its jurisdiction over the entire public sector. The

full ramifications of this declaration did not become fully apparent until the 1955 merger with the E.A. The C.L.C. was deliberately excluded from these negotiations and basically forced to ratify a deal, that many on the executive disliked. As late as 1958, some C.L.C. officials still questioned whether the N.U.P.S.E.'s jurisdiction properly extended to include these workers.

The disagreement over the E.A. was soon superseded by a jurisdictional dispute over which C.L.C. affiliate had the right to organize hospitals. Jurisdiction was shared among the B.S.E.I.U., the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E. In 1958, the failure to renew a jurisdictional accord governing hospitals resulted in the adoption of an ad hoc approach to the settlement of disputes. Ultimately, both the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. asserted their right to organize all classes of hospitals. in spite of Congress opposition.¹⁰⁷

The N.U.P.S.E. was in trouble with the C.L.C. again in 1962. The Association of Radio and Television Employees of Canada voted to join the union in November 1962, as the Radio and Television Division of the N.U.P.S.E. The C.L.C., however, refused to recognize the merger.¹⁰⁸ This opposition was eventually overcome.

The union clearly regarded the C.L.C.'s actions as malevolent. At the N.U.P.S.E.'s annual convention, in 1960, the National Treasurer charged that the Congress had deliberately tried to restrict the union's jurisdiction to placate other affiliates since 1956. He called on the delegates to reaffirm their commitment to the asserted jurisdiction as set out in the constitution.¹⁰⁹ He was, in fact, largely correct. In January 1957, the Congress announced its policy on

jurisdiction in the public sector. Adherence to its provisions would have limited the N.U.P.S.E. to its traditional constituency and severely reduced its opportunities for future growth. The union simply refused to accept this. Despite intense lobbying by both the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E., a 1959 review of the policy, by the C.L.C., failed to produce any significant changes.¹¹⁰

This ongoing jurisdictional dispute, plus the C.L.C.'s insistence that the N.U.P.S.E. amend its relationship with the former E.A. group,¹¹¹ generally had a dampening effect on the merger talks with the N.U.P.E. Between 1956 and 1961, the union withdrew from such negotiations, on a number of occasions, citing the need to resolve these issue before a merger deal could be concluded.¹¹²

R.P. Rintoul, the National Director of the N.U.P.E. argues that, overall the N.U.P.S.E. had a far more difficult time than his organization to become a truly national union. The C.C.L., he suggests, was completely opposed to the N.U.P.S.E.'s union building efforts. Within the Congress Stan Little was regarded as a complete rebel.¹¹³ Although Rintoul does not comment on relations between Little and the C.L.C., it is safe to assume that this perception persisted after the merger.

3. The Merger Talks

Merger talks between the N.U.P.E and the N.U.P.S.E. began shortly after the founding convention of the C.L.C., in 1956. It was not, however, until September 1963 that the process was concluded and the C.U.P.E. formed. Even then, the two organizations continued their de facto existence as separate entities for quite some time.

The idea of merger enjoyed considerable popular support among the rank and file members on both sides.¹¹⁴ While their leaders were also interested in the merger, it lacked urgency for them. Most of the obstacles in the negotiations stemmed from significant and fundamental differences between the two organizations and disagreements over the kind of union that the C.U.P.E. should be.

In addition, the leadership of the two unions completely distrusted each other. Indeed, much of the negotiations were concerned with how each of them would be accommodated in the new organization, once it was established. This was critical to ensure that one faction did not get control of the union at the expense of the other.

Overall, the talks lacked continuity and it was only really in 1961 that the parties seriously began to work towards a resolution of the matter.¹¹⁵ Over time a number of letters of understanding were signed and later discarded. There is, however, an interesting progression in their contents. Initially, the proposed terms of merger were very favourable to the N.U.P.E., reflecting the N.U.P.S.E.'s clearly inferior position with respect to membership and Canada-wide representation. This gradually changed. Increasingly the N.U.P.S.E. gained ground. As time passed and the union grew and consolidated its position, its assertiveness in the merger negotiations increased. It became far less willing to agree to the merger on the N.U.P.E.'s terms. Ultimately, the leaders of the N.U.P.E., by their own admission, made substantial concessions in order to finalize the deal.¹¹⁶

Prior to the commencement of the merger talks, the two groups knew very little about each other. There was some contact between individual

locals in specific municipalities, but this was the exception rather than the rule. The ongoing rivalry between the C.C.L. and the T.L.C. discouraged such interaction. Even after the merger talks began, there appears to have been very little in the way of cooperation between the two, either in the form of coordinating efforts or information exchange. Certainly, there was less interaction than might be reasonably anticipated, given the expressed desire for unity. On one hand this resulted in a general duplication of effort and represented an inefficient use of limited resources. On the other this continued competitiveness probably had a positive impact on new union formation. Relations continued to be distant within the C.U.P.E.

The merger of the two unions was supported and actively assisted by the C.L.C. With the exception of the electrical workers in the N.U.P.S.E., the two shared virtually the same jurisdiction and the Congress appears to have viewed their amalgamation largely as unfinished business from the 1956 merger of the T.L.C. and C.C.L.¹¹⁷ Between 1956 and 1963, senior personnel from the C.L.C. convened numerous meetings and attempted to mediate in the various issues in dispute.

4. Militancy and Political Action

The workers organized by the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E. were generally not very militant. This is attested to by their low level of strike activity. Indeed, they were frequently criticized by other unionists, in the private sector, for their apparent willingness to accept substandard wages and conditions without putting up a fight and going on strike. Overall, their status in the labour movement was not

very high.¹¹⁸

From an institutional perspective, the N.U.P.S.E. was probably the more militant of the two organizations. However, neither would qualify as such using objective standards. Some locals were noted for their aggressiveness, but they were the exception rather than the rule. In the case of the N.U.P.E., many of its constituent locals began their existence as little more than employee associations or company unions.¹¹⁹ The true nature of the employer-employee relationship was reflected in the way in which collective bargaining was conducted. Shier notes that in the early 1940s contract negotiations with the City of Toronto were conducted in an almost collegial fashion, with the parties sitting around a table discussing issues. In 1943, the mayor publicly congratulated the members of Local 79, when the union was certified to represent the city's inside workers. Civic officials were regular guests at major union social events. Similar relations were, apparently, also enjoyed in a number of the surrounding municipalities.¹²⁰ In other instances, the "cap-in-hand" approach characterized the relationship. Labour relations gradually became increasingly adversarial. However, it is extremely important to note that the militancy that currently pervades public sector unionism was generally not present during this formative period.

The N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E. differed significantly in their approaches to politics and political action. In 1943, the C.C.L. endorsed the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) as the political arm of organized labour in Canada. Both the N.O.C.U.E.W., and later the N.U.P.S.E., emulated this decision. Union bulletins from the

period specifically request members to support the C.C.F. in the various elections that it contested. The union also gave its blessing to the formation of the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.), in 1961 and continued its electoral support.¹²¹ A few N.U.P.S.E. locals actually affiliated directly with the N.D.P., but overall, this was uncommon. While a few of the union's leaders were socialists, this was certainly not true of the rank and file. There is no documentary evidence to suggest that this "activism" caused problems for the union in its dealings with municipal employers.

By contrast, the official policy of the N.U.P.E., as adopted in convention, was to refrain from partisanship. This was consistent with the T.L.C.'s official policy of the day and effectively precluded the development of any formal relationship between the union and the C.C.F./N.D.P. During at least one federal election campaign a bulletin was issued by the National Director specifically reminding member locals of their union's position on political involvement.¹²² As a result of this policy, the N.U.P.E. did not play a role in the creation of the N.D.P. Individual locals were not prohibited from participating and a number did so, but their actions were not condoned. In commenting on the formation of the New Party, in his address to the 1961 N.U.P.E. convention, union president W. Buss expressed some relief that the process was complete so that the C.L.C. could devote its attention to matters of importance to the labour movement.¹²³

The entire political spectrum was represented among the N.U.P.E.'s founding leadership. Shier, the union's first president and chief architect of its formation, was a long standing member of the

Conservative Party in Ontario.¹²⁴ Pat Lenihan, his successor, had a much more radical political background. In the 1920s, he had joined the Wobblies and during the 1930s, worked as a union organizer for the Communist Party. Although he subsequently resigned his membership, he remained ideologically committed to the principles of Marxism throughout his entire life.¹²⁵ Lenihan resigned in 1957 to become the union's first field representative. He was followed by W. Buss, who remained President of the union until the formation of the C.U.P.E. Both he and National Director Rintoul took the view that unions should be politically non-partisan. Their individual political preferences are unknown.¹²⁶

Most rank and file union members do not appear to have been particularly interested in partisan politics. Indeed, the fact that the union officially adopted a policy against such activity suggests that a majority probably opposed such involvement.

5. Inter-Union Rivalry

Inter-union rivalry played at least some role in promoting the unionization of local government employees. This was particularly the case with the N.U.P.S.E., which was confronted on all sides by larger and more powerful opponents. In hydro-electric power, the N.U.P.S.E. competed with the I.B.E.W. In general municipal employment and education it faced the N.U.P.E. Finally, in health care there were the N.U.P.E. and the B.S.E.I.U. In these circumstances, and with little support from largely unsympathetic central labour federations, the N.U.P.S.E.'s survival was dependent upon its ability to grow. This was especially important in the context of the proposed merger with the

N.U.P.E. A small organization would simply have been swallowed up, without a trace, whereas a larger one would amalgamate on much different terms. This was not the case for any of the other unions involved. Competition does not seem to have been an important concern for the N.U.P.E., except where its jurisdiction was infringed upon.

In 1954, the C.C.L. and the T.L.C. concluded a non-raiding pact as a part of the preparation for eventual merger.¹²⁷ By restricting raiding, the accord encouraged growth and competition through new organizing as opposed to fighting over existing union members.

Conclusions

This chapter investigated the hypothesis that union variables positively influenced the growth and development of local government unionism. The significance of union growth strategies, tactics and resources, inter-union rivalry and competition, relations with central labour bodies, militancy and finally leadership were all assessed. In dealing with the contribution of union variables, the union growth literature implicitly anticipates that causation runs from an established union centre down to groups of unorganized workers. While this was true for established international unions like the I.A.F.F., I.B.E.W. and the A.A.S.E.R.E., it was definitely not the case for the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. In these organizations the emergence of local government unionism in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada was largely a grass roots phenomenon. These unions grew from the bottom up and remained highly fragmented long after centralized structures and linkages should have emerged. In the case of the N.U.P.E., in particular, large numbers of directly chartered locals existed for some

time prior to the formation of the national union. These organizations typically received minimal assistance from their parent congress and had little contact with each other. They developed a reputation for fierce independence and strong resistance to any external threats to their autonomy. The idea of labour solidarity often lacked currency among union members, even where non-union workers employed by the same municipal authority were concerned. These characteristics impeded the process of union building. In the N.U.P.S.E., under the direction of Stan Little, this orientation was increasingly subordinated to the concept and structure of centralized unionism. What Stevenson failed to do in the late 1940s, Little had accomplished by the end of the next decade. The relatively small number of founding unions, plus Little's superior political skills, made this transition possible. New locals organized by the N.U.P.S.E. would tend to identify with the national union, rather than some golden age of independence and autonomy. This did not happen in the N.U.P.E. By the time the union was formed in 1955, virtually all municipalities of significant size had already been organized. The N.U.P.E. remained a highly decentralized body, dominated by its larger founding members, throughout its entire existence. This problem carried over into the C.U.P.E., which continues to manifest many of the decentralized features of its predecessor.

As expected, growth strategies had a significant impact on union growth. This is true not merely from a numerical perspective, but in terms of the nature of the unions themselves. The N.U.P.S.E. adopted a strategy of extending its jurisdiction to encompass the entire public sector, organizing where ever opportunities arose and merging with

other established labour organizations. Because of this the union grew from a small, marginal organization in the early 1950s to a national union with a sizeable membership, by the time it merged with the N.U.P.E. This growth repositioned the N.U.P.S.E. in the merger talks with the larger N.U.P.E. and ultimately allowed Little to assume the Presidency of the C.U.P.E. It is difficult to determine whether the N.U.P.E. had a conscious growth strategy beyond the formation of a national union. Certainly after 1955 it continued to grow and to extend its jurisdiction, but overall the union appeared to drift. Its primary *raison d'etre* appears to have been to service its existing membership, although financial constraints severely limited the capacity to do so.

According to the literature, the availability of resources to support new organizing is positively related to union growth. However, the evidence suggests that this relationship was very weak with respect to gains made by the N.U.P.S.E., the N.U.P.E. and the I.A.F.F. Neither the N.U.P.E. or the N.U.P.S.E. possessed sufficient resources to have a serious impact on new organizing until the mid-1950s. The N.U.P.S.E. actually enjoyed a slight head start, with a small number of permanent staff in the field at its inception. Prior to this both groups relied heavily on their respective Congress for help. Neither the C.C.L. or the T.L.C. employed a large number of organizers. Moreover, local government employment was simply one more needy area competing for their already divided attention. Complaints about poor servicing were common. Elected officers from both unions also made important contributions on a largely *ad hoc* basis. In sum, the resources available to support union organizing by these two groups bordered on

inadequate. From this perspective, the tremendous growth achieved by both unions is quite impressive, and perhaps even amazing. As noted in Chapter Four, as of the mid-1950s, the I.A.P.F. had only two full-time union officers and never employed a single field representative. Nevertheless it was able to successfully organize virtually its entire constituency. Unlike both the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E., its apparent penury of resources was by design, rather than by necessity.

The I.B.E.W., on the other hand, was not subject to the same scarcity of organizing resources. During the height of its raids on the E.A., in the mid-1950s, some sources estimated that the union had as many as ten full-time and six part-time organizers in the field working on this single project.¹²⁸ The superior resources of the I.B.E.W. may explain why it was able to outstrip the N.U.P.S.E., in the organization of hydro-electric utilities, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It may also shed additional light on the N.U.P.S.E.'s decision to extend its jurisdiction to less competitive sectors. The resources available to the A.A.S.E.R.E. are unknown.

Inter-union rivalry and competition are generally positively related to union growth. Here the evidence is consistent with the hypothesized relationships. These factors did play an important role in promoting the unionization of local government employment in Ontario. This was particularly the case for the N.U.P.S.E., and its predecessors, whose very survival hung in the balance until 1955. Aggressive organizing by the union may well have encouraged similar action by its two main rivals, the I.B.E.W. and the N.U.P.E. group. Prior to the emergence of central union organizations in the mid-1940s,

competition seems to have been expressed largely through the raiding of established unions, rather than through new organizing. As the merger between the T.L.C. and the C.C.L. became imminent the focus of competition shifted primarily to new organizing.

Positive relations with various central labour bodies are also positively related to union growth. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the assistance and support which the N.U.P.E. received from the T.L.C. generally confirms the validity of this portion of the hypothesis. The relationship is much weaker in the case of the N.U.P.S.E. In fact the union made a number of organizational acquisitions that were opposed by the C.C.L. and later the C.L.C. Overall, Congress policy seems to have been more concerned with containing the N.U.P.S.E., than enhancing its organizing activities. The N.U.P.E. suffered from similar jurisdictional problems, but its relations with central labour bodies were much more positive.

Militancy is another variable with a positive influence on union growth. However, the connection between militancy and local government union growth is weak. Neither local government employees or their unions were typically militant. The concept of the "civic service" was still very much alive during this period, although its potency had diminished by the 1960s. The low level of militancy is particularly interesting in the context of remuneration. As noted in Chapter 7, beginning in the early 1940s, municipal government labourer rates tended to lag those paid in comparable private sector employment. Local government employees were even chided by their labour brethren for their apparent acquiescence and unwillingness to strike. Over time the

level of militancy increased as did their comparative wage position. In terms of approaches to political action, the N.U.P.S.E. supported the C.C.F./N.D.P., while the N.U.P.E. was officially non-partisan and sought to be apolitical.

Finally, there is the role played by leadership. The literature posits a positive relationship between union growth and competent leadership. The concept is, however, extremely difficult to operationalize. On one hand it could be argued that Stan Little was an effective leader because of the progress made by the N.U.P.S.E. under his leadership. His opponents, on the other hand, perceived him as autocratic and opportunistic. His tenure as first president of the C.U.P.E. was a stormy period characterized by considerable internal dissension. The N.U.P.E. had an extremely able administrator in the person of Robert Rintoul, but lacked effective leadership and overall direction. W. Buss, the President of the N.U.P.E. was seen as amiable, but largely ineffective. Part of the reason that the N.U.P.E. finally agreed to grant Little the C.U.P.E. presidency was because of doubts about Buss's ability to do the job.¹²⁹ Then there is the contribution of Garnett Shier, who many credited with playing a decisive role in the formation of the N.U.P.E. Overall, the performance of both Little and Shier supports the argument that effective leadership had a positive impact on local government union growth.

Understanding the general nature of local government unionism is of crucial importance in explaining the usual employer response to it. Under the Labour Relations Act, municipal authorities had the legal right to deny their employees access to its provisions. By doing so

they could remove any obligation on their part to recognize the union or negotiate a collective agreement with it. Despite the existence of this option, bargaining relationships were established in the vast majority of cases in which a union was organized. The lack of militancy, and in the case of the N.U.P.E. political non-partisanship, may have played a pivotal role in encouraging employer acceptance of unionism and collective bargaining. In general, the N.U.P.S.E. had a more difficult time establishing bargaining rights. This has already been partially attributed to the fact that only the hard to organize employers remained without unions by the time the N.U.P.S.E. appeared on the scene. The union's political activism may also have had a dampening effect on employer acceptance and willness to negotiate.

NOTES

¹ The Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.) contain an extensive collection of materials from the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) and its predecessors. These files are closed to the public and access was obtained, to most of the relevant parts of the collection, upon application to the union. In addition, in 1977, Gilbert Levine, the C.U.P.E. Research Director, conducted a series of lengthy interviews with major figures in the building of the C.U.P.E. These are housed in the National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada. Access was again dependent upon the permission of the union. The C.U.P.E. material was supplemented by the Canadian Labour Congress collection, in the Public Archives. Much of this is in the form of correspondence with affiliated organizations. Access is generally unrestricted for the period under study. The collection contains both Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) documents. Unfortunately, a substantial portion of the T.L.C.'s historical records were destroyed by fire just prior to its amalgamation with the C.C.L. in 1956. This occurred prior to the transmittal to the Public Archives. As a consequence, many of the records and other materials pertaining to the T.L.C.'s directly chartered municipal unions no longer exist.

² The general lack of relevant information concerning the activities of the I.B.E.W., the A.A.S.E.R.E. and the I.A.F.F., stands in sharp contrast to the wealth of C.U.P.E. materials. Numerous contacts with the Canadian staff of these organizations failed to produce substantive results. References to these organizations in the C.L.C. collection are equally limited. Moreover, while the representatives of the C.U.P.E. and the I.A.F.F. were quite enthusiastic and cooperative, concerning the project, this was not the case with the other unions contacted.

³ Hugh O'Neill, "The Growth of Municipal Employee Unions," in Unionization of Municipal Employees: Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science XXX, 2 (1970),: 6-8.

⁴ T.L.C., Report of the Proceedings of the 36th Annual Convention, Windsor, September 13-18, 1920,: 183.

⁵ National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Garnett Shier (First President of the N.U.P.E.), interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., Toronto: June 1, 1977.

⁶ T.L.C., Report of the Proceedings of the 57th Annual Convention, Calgary, 1941,: 51.

⁷ P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 7, file 9, T.L.C.: A.F.S.C.M.E. 1942-1945, Gordon W. Chapman, General Secretary, A.F.S.C.M.E. to J.A. D'Aoust, Secretary-Treasurer, T.L.C., October 27,

1942.

⁸ A.R. Johnson, the fraternal delegate from the T.L.C. to the xth annual convention of the A.F.L., in New Orleans, met A.F.S.C.M.E. President Arnold Zander at the convention and indicated that a move by his union to organize municipal employees in Canada would find considerable support among both the leadership and rank and file of the T.L.C. Ibid., Arnold Zander, President, A.F.S.C.M.E. to Bert Merson, Chairman, Organizing Committee of Civic Employees, February 15, 1945.

⁹ T.L.C., Trades and Labour Congress Journal, XXIII, 12 (1944),: 35.

¹⁰ P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 7, file 9, T.L.C.: A.F.S.C.M.E. 1942-1945. Report and Observations of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, March 23, 1945.

¹¹ Ibid.,: Zander, to Percy Bengough, President, T.L.C., December 12, 1944.

¹² Ibid.,: Bengough, to Chapman, Executive Assistant, A.F.S.C.M.E., April 19, 1945.

¹³ Ibid.,: Merson to Bengough, December 4, 1944.

¹⁴ Ibid.,: Merson to Zander, October 26, 1945.

¹⁵ Ibid.,: Garnett Shier, Secretary, Toronto Municipal Employees' Association, Local 79 (T.L.C.) to Bengough, April 26, 1945.

¹⁶ Ibid.,: Bengough to Zander, August 3, 1945; Merson to Zander, October 26, 1945.

¹⁷ Ibid.,: Bengough to Merson, November 20, 1945.

¹⁸ Ibid.,: Merson to Zander, October 26, 1945.

¹⁹ Shier, interview, op. cit.

²⁰ National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Stan Little (President of the N.U.P.S.E. and first President of the C.U.P.E.), interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., November 22, 1977.

²¹ Shier, interview, op. cit.

²² The Joint Council of Public Employees (B.C. Division) was part of an attempt, in the early 1940s, to form a national union encompassing all public employees, in western Canada.. A similar, although smaller organization existed in Manitoba, consisting mainly of the Winnipeg Federation of Civic Employees and other unions in the

Winnipeg area. Efforts to organize in Alberta and Saskatchewan were far less fruitful. By 1945, one of the project's leading proponents, William Black, had concluded that it would not succeed. For all its efforts, the Council remained primarily a British Columbia based organization. They subsequently affiliated with the T.L.C. Black became involved in the efforts to create a national union of municipal employees at the 1946 Congress convention in Windsor. He later participated in the formation of the National Federation of Municipal Employees in 1952 and the National Union of Public Employees, in 1955. National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," William Black, interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., September 11, 1977.

23 Shier, interview, op. cit.

24 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 10, file 8, T.L.C.: O.F.M./P.E. 1952-1957. Irene Sinclair, Secretary-Treasurer, O.F.P.E. to Gordon Cushing, Secretary-Treasurer, T.L.C., June 9, 1953.

25 Ibid.; Garnett Shier, Chairman, Provisional Organizing Committee to Delegates to the Sixth Annual Convention of the O.F.M.E. (attachments), June 7, 1952. One of the attachments contained a brief history of efforts to form a national union.

26 R.P. Rintoul, "The National Union of Public Employees," Canadian Labour (February 1960),: 8; Shier, interview, op. cit.

27 Shier, interview, op. cit.

28 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Bengough to Aubrey T. Dixon, Secretary-Treasurer, N.F.P.E., November 12, 1953; Dixon to Bengough, April 10, 1954.

29 Rintoul, op. cit.,: 8-9.

30 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 1, N.U.P.E. Highlights, September 1959,: 3.

31 Shier, interview, op. cit.

32 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," R.P. Rintoul, interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., December 6, 1977.

33 Ibid.

34 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 27, N.U.P.E., Merger Documents 1961. R.P. Rintoul, National Director, N.U.P.E., to Claude Jodoin, President, C.L.C., May 12, 1961.

35 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 14, N.U.P.E.,

Convention 1963. General Report of the National Director,: 4.

36 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 10, file 8, T.L.C.: O.F.M./P.E. 1952-1957. O.F.M.E., General Constitution as amended to June 9th, 1952. The Secretary-Treasurer received a small honorarium. Shier was particularly active during his tenure. In addition to working full-time for the City of Toronto, he managed the affairs of the O.F.M.E., did field work and orchestrated the formation of the N.F.P.E.

37 Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

38 Ibid.; This is also a recurring theme in several letters from T.L.C. President Bengough to Bert Merson concerning the A.F.S.C.M.E. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 7, file 9, T.L.C.: A.F.S.C.M.E. 1942-1945. Correspondence dated: December 7, 1944, April 20, 1945 and November 20, 1945.

39 There are a number of examples of this, but the case of a group of inside workers employed by the City of Port Arthur is particularly illustrative of the operative rationale. The directly chartered municipal local involved deliberately restricted its membership to employees of the Public Utilities Commission. They made no effort to organize workers in other departments. When this practice was questioned by a visiting T.L.C. representative, they responded that forming a union had been their idea and that if the other employees wanted a union they could form one of their own. They felt that negotiations with the Commission would be much better for them if City Council was not involved. This would have happened had they accepted the other workers. The matter came to a head when wage increases negotiated by the unionized group were not passed along to the others by the employer. The unwanted workers then contacted the Office Employees International Union concerning membership. The T.L.C. intervened to prevent this and ultimately, the group formed a directly chartered T.L.C. local of their own. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 10, file 8, T.L.C.: O.F.M./P.E. 1952-57. A.W. Godfrey, Representative, T.L.C. to Cushing, February 28, 1953.

40 Levine mentions this in several of his interviews.

41 One such case was the I.B.E.W. The creation of the "B" membership was approved by referendum vote in 1935. Prior to this there was only one type of membership, which subsequent to this decision became known as the "A" membership. The "B" membership, with its lower admission fee (\$1.50) and lower monthly per capita dues (\$.50), was intended to facilitate the organization of non-union electrical workers employed in utilities and in manufacturing. "B" members did not, however, participate in either death or pension benefits because they did not contribute to either. They were also denied equal voting rights with "A" members at Conventions and on referenda. I.B.E.W., History and Structure of the I.B.E.W.; Section II. Leadership Training Manual (Washington, D.C.: I.B.E.W., 1969?);: 10-11.

42 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol 2, file 3, N.U.P.E. Constitution and By-laws, 1955, Article XIII, Section 1a.

43 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 3, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Garnett Shier, President, N.F.P.E. to Cushing, October 15, 1954.

44 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 6, N.U.P.E. Constitution and Bylaws, 1960, Article XIII, Section 1a.

45 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 5, file 12, N.U.P.S.E., Merger 1960. Internal memo to the N.U.P.S.E. Executive Board: Basic problems standing in the way of merger between N.U.P.S.E. and N.U.P.E., September 12, 1960. The author is not indicated, but is believed to be Stan Little.

46 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 11, N.U.P.E., Convention 1961. Report of the National Director,: 24-25.

47 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 10, file 8, T.L.C.: O.F.M./P.E. 1952-1957. Bengough to Shier, Secretary-Treasurer, O.F.M.E., December 17, 1952.

48 Shier, interview, op. cit.; Rintoul, on the other hand, believed that the T.L.C. had been extremely supportive and helpful in the creation of the N.U.P.E. Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

49 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 7, file 8, T.L.C.: A.F.S.C.M.E. Bengough to Chapman, April 19, 1945.

50 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Aubrey Dixon, Secretary-Treasurer, N.F.P.E. to Cushing, November 23, 1953.

51 Shier, interview, op. cit.

52 Levine makes this observation in several interviews.

53 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Shier, President, N.F.P.E. to Cushing, November 23, 1953.

54 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Shier, President, N.F.P.E. to members of national executive board, November 23, 1953.

55 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Shier, President, N.F.P.E. to Bengough, December 13, 1952; Bengough to Shier, December 17, 1952.

56 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. Shier, President, N.F.P.E. to members of National Executive

Board, November 23, 1953.

57 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 11, file 8, T.L.C.: N.F.P.E. 1952-1955. N.F.P.E. Constitution and By-Laws, Article III, Section 1; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 3, N.U.P.E. Constitution and By-Laws, 1955, Article III, Section 1.

58 The agreement commenced August 1, 1957 and was one year in duration. Under it, the N.U.P.E.'s hospital jurisdiction was restricted to lay and religious hospitals. In June 1958, the union's executive board decided these limitations were no longer acceptable and consequently served notice that the accord would not be renewed in its present form. They then called on the T.L.C. to convene talks among the principals. The ensuing negotiations did not, however, yield a new consensus. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 9, N.U.P.E. Convention 1958. Report of the President,: 4; Report of the National Director,: 6.

59 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 14. N.U.P.E. Convention 1963. Report of the National Director,: 10-11.

60 In 1943, in addition to its three Ontario directly chartered municipal locals, the Congress had a large group of eleven in Quebec, four in Nova Scotia and one in British Columbia. P.A.C., Department of Labour, RG 27, vol. 945, files 1-2, C.C.L., 1943.

61 Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1920,: 162; 1922,: 47; 1923,: 82 (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization); P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, file 13, N.U.P.S.E. A.M. Barnetson, "An Early Brief History of the C.E.T.U. Formation," 1965,: 1-2.

62 Report on Labour Organization, 1920-1940.

63 A.C.C.L., The Canadian Unionist (September 1936),: 1, 99-100, 106; (October 1936),: 112; (March 1937),: 245-247; (April 1937),: 292; Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette (August 1936),: 680; (October 1936),: 858; (November 1936),: 977; (March 1937),: 307; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 60, file 9, C.E.T.U., No. 1 (Toronto) 1937-1939. A.R. Mosher, President, A.C.C.L., to A.M. Barnetson, President, C.E.T.U., No. 1, August 31, 1937; Barnetson to N.S. Dowd, Secretary-Treasurer, A.C.C.L., January 6, 1938.

64 In August 1931, members of the C.E.T.U. employed by the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated struck for improved wages and conditions. During the relatively short strike considerable damage was done to transmission lines, towers and transformers. A number of the strikers were subsequently arrested and charged with property damage and conspiracy. The General Secretary of the C.E.T.U., G.W. McCollum, was also arrested, in Toronto, and taken to Bordeaux Prison, Montreal. He was charged with "aiding and abetting" in acts of

sabotage. In the course of his arrest all of the union's records were seized. The strikers were eventually found guilty and sentenced to lengthy terms at hard labour. McCollum was acquitted. The Canadian Unionist (November 1931),: 113-114. At one point during the trial E.M. Ashworth, the General Manager of Toronto Hydro, appeared on McCollum's behalf as a character witness. This was done with the authorization of the Commissioners. The union later presented him with a pipe collection for his assistance. Ashworth notes that the legal costs associated with McCollum's defence and that of the others amounted to a considerable amount of money and they withdrew from further activities in Quebec. E.M. Ashworth, Toronto Hydro Recollections (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955),: 193.

65 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 60, file 11, C.C.L.: C.E.T.U. 1941-1943. T.F. Stevenson, Business Secretary, C.E.T.U. to N.S. Dowd, Secretary-Treasurer, C.C.L., June 7, 1941.

66 These organizations, apparently, paid their per capita directly to the C.C.L.

67 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 6, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1947. Stevenson to Dowd, Executive Secretary, C.C.L., November 7, 1944, November 22, 1944; Dowd to Stevenson, November 24, 1944, November 27, 1944; Stevenson to Pat Conroy, Secretary-Treasurer, C.C.L., March 19, 1945.

68 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 6, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1947. Stevenson to Conroy, August 28, 1944.

69 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 17, N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1947. Minutes of Conference of Civic and Utility Workers of Ontario held in Toronto, December 3, 1944; P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 6, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1947. Stevenson to Dowd, December 6, 1944.

70 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 9-14, N.O.C.U.E.W. Conventions 1946-1951. Reports of the Secretary Treasurer.

71 This was the situation with the Timmins Civic Workers Union. Originally organized by the United Steelworkers of America, all parties agreed on its transfer to the N.O.C.U.E.W., early in 1949. When this was delayed Stevenson complained to the C.C.L., alleging that the Steelworkers had reneged on their commitment. The transfer was eventually completed, effective September 1, 1949. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. Stevenson, Secretary-Treasurer, N.O.C.U.E.W. to Conroy; April 7, 1949; August 11, 1949; Mosher to Stevenson, August 16, 1949, August 18, 1949.

72 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, files 11, N.O.C.U.E.W. Convention 1948. Report of the Secretary Treasurer, October 10, 1948,: 1-2.

73 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. Stevenson to Conroy, February 10, 1950; Conroy to Stevenson. February 27, 1950.

74 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 12, N.O.C.U.E.W. Convention 1949. Minutes,: 4.

75 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 14, N.O.C.U.E.W. Convention 1951. Minutes,: 9-10

76 The union spent approximately \$50,000.00 on the strike and was in financial difficulty for some time thereafter. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. Stevenson to Conroy, August 22, 1950; October 30, 1950.

77 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. J.E. Clarke, National President, N.O.C.U.E.W. to Conroy, August 22, 1950; October 30, 1950.

78 Little, interview, op. cit.

79 For a discussion of the poor relations between Local 4 and the N.O.C.U.E.W. see: P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. Henry G. Rhodes, Regional Director, C.C.L. to Conroy: Re: N.O.C.U.E.W., Branch 4, London, April 2, 1951.

80 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 7, N.O.C.U.E.W. Bulletins 1951. Stevenson to Clarke (letter of resignation), May 6, 1951; Bulletin No. 25, Re; Forced Resignation of Secretary-Treasurer, May 8, 1951.

81 P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, C.C.L.: N.O.C.U.E.W. 1944-1952. Conroy to Stevenson (telegram), May 11, 1951.

82 Little, interview, op. cit.

83 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 14, N.O.C.U.E.W. Convention 1951. Minutes,: 13.

84 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 1, file 14, N.O.C.U.E.W. Convention 1951. Minutes, Constitutional Amendments,: 12-13.

85 Little, interview, op. cit.

86 The archival holdings for the N.U.P.S.E. are far less substantial and comprehensive relative to the other organizations studied. As a consequence, much of the discussion concerning the union is based solely on the Levine interview with Little.

87 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, file 20, N.U.P.S.E. Constitution, January 1, 1954, Article 3; Little, interview, op. cit.

88 Little, interview, op. cit.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 John Herbert Gillespie Crispo, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: A Study of Union-Management Relations in Ontario Hydro and T.V.A." (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960),: 86-102; Little interview, op. cit.

92 In September 1955, the annual convention of the N.U.P.S.E. unanimously adopted the report on the merger. The E.A. also accepted the terms at its November convention. There was, however, considerable resistance among the Association's membership. In an attempt to quell the dissidents, a referendum was held on the question and the agreement was approved. The representative assigned by the C.C.L. to investigate the merger, recommended its ratification by the Congress. The executive committee of the C.C.L. did so in January 1956. P.A.C., C.L.C., MG 28, I 103, Vol. 68, file 13, N.U.P.S.E. 1954-1957. Report on merger of Ontario Hydro Employees Association with N.U.P.S.E. by Harry Rhodes, C.C.L. Representative, January 19, 1956; P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 7, file 2, N.U.P.S.E., National Executive Board Notices 1951-1963. January 31, 1956.

93 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 7, file 2, N.U.P.S.E., National Executive Board Notices 1951-1963. May 9, 1956.

94 Crispo, op. cit.,: 103, 106-108; Little, interview, op. cit.

95 Eady played a prominent role in the 1960 contest with the N.U.P.E. for the Montreal based Canadian Brotherhood of Municipal Employees, Local One (C.L.C.). Little, interview, op. cit.

96 Crispo, op. cit.,: 110-111.

97 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 7, file 2, N.U.P.S.E., National Executive Board Notices 1951-1963. January 31, 1956; Little, interview, op. cit.

98 Little, interview, op. cit.

99 Crispo, op. cit.,: 110-111.

100 The answer probably lies in the minutes of meetings of the N.O.C.U.E.W./N.U.P.S.E. executive board. Unfortunately, access to these documents, for the period December 1949 to September 1963, was denied.

101 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 19, N.U.P.E., Merger Correspondence, 1962. S.A. Little, National President, N.U.P.S.E. to R.P. Rintoul, National Director, N.U.P.E. (attachments),

February 7, 1962; Little, interview, op. cit.

102 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 13, N.U.P.E., Convention, 1963. Financial Statements and Resumé 1962, 1963; Vol. 5, file 15, N.U.P.S.E., Merger, January-August 1963. Comparative Statement of Income and Expenditures: For the years ended June 30, 1962 and June 30, 1963.

103 Report on Labour Organization, 1963.

104 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 5, file 6, N.U.P.S.E., Convention, 1960. Minutes.

105 The N.U.P.E. leadership was completely convinced that the merger would not proceed, unless Little was given the Presidency. Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

106 The discussion of relations between the N.U.P.S.E. and the C.C.L., and later the C.L.C., is based solely on the interview with Little, unless noted otherwise. In fairness it must be noted that there is no documentation from the Congress or other independent source to substantiate the allegations of strained relations or lack of support. Congress "bashing" seems to have been popular within the N.U.P.S.E. and may have been politically motivated.

107 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 7, file 2, N.U.P.S.E., National Executive Board Notices 1951-1963. Meeting on Hospital Jurisdiction called by the C.L.C., June 28, 1960.

108 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 5, file 15, N.U.P.S.E., Merger, January-August 1963. Joint Session, National Executive Boards of the N.U.P.E. and the N.U.P.S.E., January 26, 1963; Vol. 3, file 20, National Union of Public Employees, Merger Correspondence, 1963. Draft Resolution on Radio and Television Employees.

109 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 5, file 6, N.U.P.S.E., Convention, 1960. National Treasurer's Report.

110 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 25, N.U.P.E., Merger Documents, 1959. Report of Sub-Committee on Jurisdiction in the Public Service of Canada.

111 Crispo, op. cit.,: 104-106.

112 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 7, file 2, N.U.P.S.E., National Executive Board Notices 1951-1963. Re: unity committee meeting in Ottawa, June 27, 1958, July 9, 1958.

113 Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

114 Ibid.; Little, interview, op. cit.

115 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 27, N.U.P.E., Merger Documents, 1961. Rintoul to Claude Jodoin, President, C.L.C., May 12, 1961.

116 Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

117 The Report of the Sub-Committee on Jurisdiction in the Public Service of Canada strongly recommended that the C.L.C. executive assign "the highest priority possible" to finalizing the merger of the two unions. P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, file 25, N.U.P.E., Merger Documents, 1959. Report of the Sub-Committee on Jurisdiction in the Public Service of Canada.

118 Little, interview, op. cit.

119 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Ben Coffee (Executive Assistant to the National Director, N.U.P.E. 1958-1963; Executive Assistant to the National Secretary-Treasurer, C.U.P.E., 1967), interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., May 24-25, 1977.

120 Shier, interview, op. cit.

121 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, file 16, N.U.P.S.E., Bulletins to Staff, 1961. S.A. Little, National President, N.U.P.S.E. to all N.U.P.S.E. Recording Secretaries, Representatives and National Executive Board Members, January 4, 1961, Re: New Party Developments.

122 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 4, file 4, N.U.P.E., National Director (R.P. Rintoul), Circulars, 1957. Rintoul to all Chartered Locals and provincial Organizations, May 8, 1957.

123 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., MG 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 11, N.U.P.E., Convention, 1961. President's Address, : 10.

124 Shier, interview, op. cit.

125 National Film, Television and Sound Archives of Canada, "C.U.P.E. Audio Collection," Pat Lenihan (Second President of the N.U.P.E. 1956-1957), interview conducted by Gilbert Levine, Research Director, C.U.P.E., May 24-25, 1977.

126 Coffee, op. cit.

127 David Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress 1956-1968 (Montreal: McGill-Queens's University Press, 1972), : 35.

128 Crispo, op. cit., : 101.

129 Rintoul, interview, op. cit.

CHAPTER 10

ORGANIZATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION GROWTH: EMPLOYER VARIABLES

Introduction

The attitude and behaviour of employers toward unions occupies an extremely important position both in the aggregate union growth literature as well as in discussion of the more recent declines in American union membership. Employer opposition to unions and its operationalization in anti-union policies has repeatedly been shown to adversely affect union growth. On the other hand, a positive response to unionism on the part of employers typically has a demonstrably opposite effect. Most applications of the literature accept employer opposition to unions as a given and then attempt to measure the impact of this enmity on unionization.¹ The prohibition of certain unfair labour practices in labour relations legislation is seen as playing a key role in restraining or limiting the operationalization of this latent hostility.²

In the case of the unionization of local government employees, the employer response was mixed in terms of chronology, the size of the municipality, the type of local government authority involved and the degree of recognition or acceptance granted. The union mortality results from Chapter 4 indicate a substantial difference in the rate of union failure, in both general municipal and utilities employment,

before and after 1950. While some of this resulted from employer opposition, much of it involved jockeying for position between rival Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) chartered unions. To a large degree it also reflected the instabilities of the immediate post-Depression period. Strict reliance on aggregate mortality results probably overstates the true extent of employer union busting. The degree to which employers may have played a role in supporting one union over another is unknown. It is, however, likely that there was a preference for employee associations as opposed to bona fide unions. In general, most local government authorities appear to have accepted the unionization of their employees without serious opposition. The positive relationship between employer acceptance of unions and union growth is thus strongly confirmed in this case. However, the hypothesis that employer attitudes and behaviour generally inhibited the growth and development of local government unions is clearly invalid. This finding is made even more interesting by the fact that employer capacity to remain outside the provisions of existing labour relations legislation theoretically afforded them far more opportunity and latitude to defeat unionism than was enjoyed by their private sector counterparts. This advantage may, however, have been offset by other considerations.

This chapter assesses the major factors contributing to the general absence of concerted employer opposition. An analytical framework developed to assess the probable responses of private sector employers to unionism is utilized in modified form. In addition, the implications of the fragmented management structure of local government

for union acceptance and the role played by employer associations are also examined.

1. Factors Influencing Union Acceptance

Anderson identifies five groups of factors that affect an employer's adaption of a particular industrial relations strategy.³ The strategic options are union acceptance, union replacement / suppression (commonly referred to as union busting), and union-avoidance / substitution. The strategic choice model explicitly links a firm's approach to industrial relations to fundamental strategic decisions taken to improve its overall efficiency and effectiveness.⁴ Although these factors purport to explain the dynamics of the selection process in the private sector, they also provide an excellent framework within which to consider the responses of local government authorities to the emergence of union activity among their employees. In adapted form the five analytical categories are:

- a. Employer philosophy and values with respect to unions;
- b. The history of public sector unionism and collective bargaining in the municipality;
- c. Legal and political considerations;
- d. Economic and social conditions;
- e. The nature of the unions involved and bargaining structures.

In each case the operative assumptions will be briefly outlined and their validity, with respect to explaining the behaviour of local government authorities, assessed.

a. Employer philosophy and values with respect to unions

In assessing the relative decline of unionism in the United States

in the 1980s, Kochan, Katz and McKersie stress that it is important to recognize that American business has always strongly opposed unionism. From the introduction of the New Deal until the 1980s a number of factors mitigated against these values being operationalized. However, during the Reagan Presidency these constraints lost much of their inhibiting effect. Reagan's dismissal of striking air traffic controllers is generally regarded as a pivotal event in this regard. As a consequence, a significant number of American firms openly articulated their hitherto latent desire to be union free. Many have taken direct action to attain this objective.⁵ In general the phenomenon has assumed a scale not seen in the United States since the anti-union "American plan" of the 1920s.⁶

At a general level union activity has traditionally enjoyed more public support in Canada than in the United States. This observation aside, Canadian employers historically resisted the unionization of their employees, frequently with the tacit consent of the state. During the Depression and the early years of the War, employers had virtually a free hand in dealing with workers and their unions. Hepburn's campaign against the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) in the late 1930s effectively encouraged employers to oppose unionism and resist granting union recognition. Government vacillation and the refusal to deal with the issue in a substantive fashion ultimately allowed the matter to assume crisis proportions. Continued employer resistance during the war resulted in a surge of recognition strikes, which peaked in 1943. As noted previously, much of this was concentrated in essential war industries. This forced the federal

government to introduce progressive labour relations regulations in the form of P.C. 1003. The Order provided the basis for most post-war labour relations legislation. The new regulatory regime required employers to recognize certified bargaining agents and provided for compulsory bargaining, in "good faith", with the union. Employer behaviour was also restricted by the prohibition of a number of unfair labour practices. In this context, most abandoned the more overt and provocative of their anti-union tactics. In the early 1950s, management attitudes toward unions, and workers in general, softened as business culminated a new image of enlightenment in the management of human resources. The end of the decade, however, saw a resurgence of employer "toughness" in dealings with unions. This carried forward into the 1960s.⁷

The extent to which aggregate trends in management attitudes and behaviour toward unions are applicable to local government is uncertain. During the period under review, there is little evidence to suggest widespread general employer opposition to union activity among most classes of local government workers. As noted previously, some elected municipal officials were actually congratulatory of their employees efforts in this regard. Police and jail guards stand out as definite exceptions to this general observation. There were, however, substantial differences in the level of acceptance accorded local government unionism based on the size and type of municipality involved. Employers in large urban centres were typically more favourably disposed to union activity by their employees than those in smaller urban centres. The same was also generally true for urban as

opposed to rural municipalities and for lower tier municipalities compared to counties. In addition, employer acceptance appears to have varied with the type of authority.

Given the long history of unionism and collective bargaining in the industry, transit authorities should have had the highest level of union acceptance. This seems to have been the case, although union penetration was clearly limited to the larger urban centres. In general municipal employment, there was some longstanding experience with unions, both in terms of fire fighters and a small number of municipal employee organizations. Unionism seems to have been more or less accepted by the majority of urban employers. In the case of hydro-electric power the employer had virtually no prior experience with unionism. This coupled with the identification of hydro as a public trust may have made employers in this industry the least receptive to unionism. Certainly union penetration of hydro-electric power lagged that of other local government sectors, despite the existence of two unions organizing in this area.

The other factor to consider, when assessing employer attitudes toward unions, is the degree to which they may have changed over time as employers learned about unions and collective bargaining. In many cases it appears that employers initially lacked even a rudimentary knowledge of unions and appropriate collective bargaining practices and procedures. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the specification of bargaining units in some of the early certification applications. The unit was frequently constructed so that only the most senior management personnel were excluded. Employees exercising

management functions and others employed in confidential capacities relating to labour relations were covered by the collective agreement and represented by the union.⁸ Subsequent adjustments to the composition of the bargaining unit were required to correct these problems. To a degree the all inclusive approach may reflect the associational origins of much of local government unionism. Another problem area was a tendency to agree to contract language that severely restricted management decision making in a number of key areas.⁹

As time passed, the level of overt employer opposition appears to have diminished. Paradoxically, the level of employer trepidation concerning their ability to deal effectively with unions seems to have increased substantially over much the same period. Writing in 1943, G.S. Mooney, the Executive Director of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (C.F.M.M.) outlined the "emerging problems" for local government. There was no mention of either unions, employee organizations or workers in general.¹⁰ By the early 1950s, however, this had changed. The C.F.M.M. undertook a number of initiatives to assist its membership in dealing with the unions representing their employees. The specific actions taken by the Federation are detailed in part three of this chapter. The tone of the proceedings, while indicating concern, by no means suggests that either municipal unionism or collective bargaining was regarded as a serious threat.¹¹ By the end of the decade, this had largely ceased to be the case. The National Director of the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) noted that municipal personnel directors had become much more organized in their efforts to coordinate employer bargaining strategies. He

concluded that, while they had not been as successful in negotiations as anticipated, they were finally responding to the problems posed by N.U.P.E.'s superior organization.¹² The attitudinal change is also evident in employer rhetoric. By the 1960s, municipal employers were arguing that they were at a definite disadvantage in their dealings with unions.¹³

Employer attitudes toward local government workers, in general, also appear to have changed over time. By the 1960s, the paternalism that had been so prevalent in earlier decades had largely waned. In part this was undoubtedly due to the unionization of the work force and the increasing influence of these organizations, but it was also the consequence of many of the same factors that gave rise to that unionism.¹⁴

Support among municipal councils for the exceptionalist provisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, and its predecessors, should not necessarily be interpreted as an indication of anti-union sentiment. The 1958 submission of the Association of Ontario Mayors and Municipalities to the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature on Labour Relations specifically noted that "there is no objection on behalf of municipal corporations to the organization of their employees for the purpose of collective bargaining ...". The Association's defence of Section 78 centred primarily on the merits of local autonomy in decision making, the need to protect established bargaining relationships from raiding and the fact that a declaration under Section 78 was not automatically tantamount to a refusal to recognize the employee's union or to bargain collectively.¹⁵

b. The history of public sector unionism and collective bargaining in the municipality

If, as Anderson suggests, history is a good predictor of future behaviour,¹⁶ then municipalities with established bargaining relationships with unions or associations representing police, fire fighters or transit workers should have been more receptive to union activity among their unorganized employees than those without any prior experience.

While there is definite clustering in terms of the pattern of union penetration of municipalities, the evidence of enhanced union acceptance is not clear-cut. Indeed, there appears to be a definite difference in the level of employer acceptance accorded the National Union of Public Service Employees (N.U.P.S.E.), and its predecessors, and the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) group. The N.U.P.S.E. generally had a much more difficult time securing employer recognition and despite its smaller size, accounted for a larger share of recognition strikes. For example, the City of Kingston was organized by the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) in 1923, yet a bitter strike was required before the employer recognized the outside worker's union in 1952. There are other examples of municipalities with long standing fire fighter unions, that were decidedly lukewarm to the N.U.P.S.E. organizing other groups of their workers.

The reasons for this apparent differential in accorded legitimacy are difficult to assess. In a few cases it may have been due to the nature of the N.U.P.S.E. itself, and its affiliation to the Canadian

Congress of Labour (C.C.L.). A more likely explanation is that the N.U.P.S.E., as a relative latecomer to the field, was left with those municipalities that did not have general municipal or utility unions, because the employer opposed such activity by these workers. The stage was then set for a confrontation when the N.U.P.S.E. appeared on the scene. This still does not explain the differing levels of legitimacy accorded union activity by different employee groups. A number of factors may have been at work here. Police and fire fighters traditionally renounced strike activity as a means of achieving their collective bargaining objectives; other employee organizations usually did not. In the post-war period, public policy may also have played a role. After 1947, both police and fire fighters gained statutory union recognition and bargaining rights. The employer's discretion in dealing with organizations representing these workers became severely constrained. Under the legislation neither fire fighters nor police were allowed to strike. Interest disputes, if not settled through collective bargaining, were ultimately resolved through third party arbitration.¹⁷ It is entirely possible that some employers, smarting under their loss of flexibility under this system, especially with respect to the level of remuneration, resisted union activity by their other employees as a means of controlling overall labour costs. Moreover, in most cases, a substantial number of years separated the organization of fire fighters and transit employees on one hand and general municipal and utility workers on the other. Employers may well have not made the connection between the two events. This would be particularly the case where an authority, such as a hydro-electric or

public utilities commission, as opposed to municipal council, was the employer. In such circumstances, new union formation among previously unorganized worker groups would be regarded as a novel and hence potentially threatening development.

c. Legal and political considerations

The response of a firm to union activity by its employees may also be influenced by specific legal constraints, such as the prohibition of unfair labour practices, as well as the general political climate of the time. The latter is of particular importance with respect to enforcement of such provisions. In theory, the less rigorous the regulatory regime, the more inclined employers should be to assume an aggressive anti-union approach. In the United States, during the 1980s, the tendency of National Labor Relations Board decisions to favour management, plus the dismissal of the air traffic controllers, have been identified as directly supportive of such employer behaviour.¹⁸

In the case of local government in Ontario, it has already been noted that a policy of exceptionalism existed with respect to the application of labour relations legislation to such authorities. The employer, in effect, controlled the access of workers to the rights and protections contained therein. Allowing the unions representing local government employees to utilize the Act amounted to de facto voluntary recognition on the part of the employer. Direct compulsion was, therefore, not a consideration. Bias in the administration of labour relations legislation has historically not been a major problem in Ontario.

d. Economic and social conditions

Anderson notes that the adverse economic conditions faced by firms in the early 1980s, were probably the single most important factor in the adoption of policies hostile to unionism. Along with these economic pressures came a change in the general public perception of the role and importance of unions in contemporary society. Not only was there a decline in the level of legitimacy accorded unions, but in addition, considerable public support existed for firms taking a hard line in dealing with them.¹⁹ In the climate of retrenchment, union busting became much more acceptable and perhaps even fashionable.

Theoretically, employers should be more willing to accept unions during times of economic prosperity and stability, and less likely to do so when there is a downturn and uncertainty. With the exception of the latter years of the Great Depression, local government unionism emerged in a climate of general economic prosperity and growth. Local authorities generally did not suffer from revenue problems or financial constraints during this period.

Considerable public support appears to have existed for unionism and collective bargaining by most classes of local government employees during the period under study. However, unlike the private sector employer, who is only indirectly influenced by public opinion, public authorities are directly accountable through the electoral process. The private sector employer's labour relations costs are primarily economic, while in the public sector they are mainly political.²⁰ This is one of the principal differences between public and private sector employers. In Unions and the Cities Wellington and Winter argued that

public sector trade unions in the United States were able to exert an irresistible pressure on state and local governments. Given the nature of the public sector, they contended that such unions had a very real advantage in collective bargaining, that is not available to their private sector counterparts. This advantage is most clearly manifest in the ability of unions to secure substantial increases in remuneration because of the reluctance of employers to assume the political costs of a strike.²¹ Christensen has made the same argument in the Canadian context.²² A number of authors have argued that the Wellington-Winter thesis and similar constructs are time bound, being essentially a product of the relative affluence of the 1960s and early 1970s.²³ The general validity of their assessment for this period is not denied. What is challenged, however, is its transportation beyond this particular time frame to the era of cut-backs, restraint and retrenchment that emerged in the 1980s.

It might be argued that the Wellington-Winter thesis is informative in explaining why some local government authorities accepted union activity by their employees even though they may have been opposed to such action. As a result of the policy of exceptionalism in labour relations legislation, union recognition was merely an additional issue to be resolved at the bargaining table. As in the case of the City of Kingston, if recognition was denied, a strike could be called to pressure the employer to comply. According to the model, employer unwillingness to assume the costs of the strike should have typically result in capitulation and the recognition of the union.

There are several problems with this hypothesis. First, the number of actual recognition strikes was very small and such action was not always successful. While it could be argued that the mere threat of a strike was sufficient to force employer acceptance, this argument is inconsistent with both the character of local government unionism and the relative allocation of bargaining power between management and labour. It is important to remember that these organizations were generally known for their lack of militancy and acquiescence. Second, and even more damning, is the failure of this supposed bargaining power to extend beyond recognition to matters of remuneration. If employers indeed cowered in the face of the strike threat, why then were substandard wages typically the rule relative to comparable private sector employment? Finally, the model does not anticipate the appointment of certain classes of local government officials, such as hydro-electric commissioners in major cities.²⁴ The logic behind appointment, as opposed to election, was to shield the management of the utility from partisan political considerations. Given this insulation, it is difficult to argue that such an appointed authority would be particularly vulnerable to public pressure in support of union activity by its employees. Appointed authorities were typically a feature of big city government and yet it was precisely where the employer should have been best situated to resist union activity, by its employees, that unionism first became established.

e. The nature of the unions involved and bargaining structures

According to the model, the strength and weaknesses of the union should play an important role in the employer's decision of how to deal

with it. Strong unions are more likely to survive than weak unions. If the union appears strong enough to successfully resist employer efforts at its destruction, then the employer might well conclude that accepting its existence and entering into collective bargaining is the only viable alternative.²⁵ The working assumption is that employers have a near universal dislike of unions and that weak unions do not survive because the employer will get rid of the union if at all possible. All other things being equal, weak unions should not survive. This prognosis does not, however, encompass employer toleration of very weak unions. In this instance the union is accepted because it does not interfere, in a significant way, with the management of the enterprise.

Local government unions were generally known, in the labour movement, for their lack of militancy and willingness to accept what were regarded as substandard wages and conditions of employment. With the exception of affiliates of international unions, the vast majority of these organizations began their existence as little more than employee associations and continued to function in this manner long after they had assumed more union-like trappings. This seems to have been particularly true where the employer was outside the existing labour relations regime, but continued to bargain with the union representing its employees. In such situations, contract negotiations were not always formalized and written agreements were by no means universal. The negotiated terms and conditions were occasionally adopted by the employing authority as a change to its operating procedures. Such practices, however, became increasingly rare as time passed.²⁶ In several instances, the employer imposed special

restrictions on the scope of union activities, such as prohibiting strikes. Even unions which had acquired bargaining rights through certification and had access to the Ontario Labour Relations Act were commonly subject to such provisions.²⁷ In addition, municipal authorities were generally exempt from the employment standards legislation of the day²⁸ and from the Unemployment Insurance Act.²⁹ In general, in many municipalities the entire process appears to have been approached in a largely a "cap in hand" fashion. Given such circumstances it is difficult to argue that local government unionism, at least during its formative period, significantly impeded or restricted employer behaviour in the majority of cases.

Political activity by employee organizations is a perennially sensitive subject in the public sector. The N.U.P.E. adopted a policy of non-partisanship and to a large extent, of non involvement in politics. The N.U.P.S.E. group, on the other hand, supported the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.), and later, the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.). There is no evidence to suggest that this support had a significant impact on the outcomes of local elections. It may, however, have played a role in persuading certain officials that the organization of local government employees by the N.U.P.S.E. should be opposed for partisan reasons.

Prior to the emergence of stable national unions in the mid-1950s, organized labour at the local government level was really not in a position to resist any concerted anti-union campaign by employers. In 1950, a lengthy strike for improved wages and conditions by Local 5, in Hamilton, almost destroyed the National Organization of Civic, Utility

and Electrical Workers (N.O.C.U.E.W.).³⁰ With the exception of perhaps the strongest unions, it is unlikely that local government unionism could have survived in the face of determined employer opposition. The employer's control of access to the procedures and protections of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, and its predecessors, would have made unions particularly vulnerable to such an assault.

Bargaining structure³¹ is also an important consideration in the employer response to the union. In general, firms which bargain in centralized structures, either company or industry wide, have been found more likely to adopt a union acceptance rather than a union replacement strategy. There are several examples of firms withdrawing from established employer associations and altering the bargaining structure in an attempt to enhance their flexibility in dealing with unions.³² Collective bargaining in local government has always been extremely fragmented and decentralized, with individual authorities assuming responsibility for relations with their employees. The major contribution of this structure to the unionization of local government employment was most probably the preclusion of co-ordinated employer opposition. In sum, bargaining structure does not play the role envisaged in the private sector model.

2. Management Structure

The fragmented and divided management structure of the public sector is frequently cited as a major factor distinguishing public employers from their private sector counterparts. Local government unions faced and continue to face a variety of employer structures. In general municipal employment they usually had to deal the municipal

council and in larger cities, with council and the board of control.³³ This was also true for fire fighters. Police, on the other hand, could face either municipal council or, in larger centres, a special police commission.³⁴ The 1953 study of municipal labour relations done by Frankel and Pratt found that in over eighty-seven per cent of the municipalities surveyed elected personnel were involved in contract negotiations. The size of the municipality had no bearing on their participation. In approximately sixty-nine per cent of the cases elected officials were the only personnel to represent management in negotiations.³⁵ While there was an increasing tendency over time to involve administrative staff, it is clear that, for the period under study, politicians continued to play the dominant role in representing the employer. Unfortunately, similar information is not available for the other study groups.

A separate hydro-electric commission was required to administer the provision of hydro-electric power in cities above a certain population. In smaller centres the municipality had the option of either creating a hydro-electric commission or grouping hydro with other utilities under a single public utilities commission.³⁶ Departmental provision was uncommon.

Public transit was most commonly provided by either a special transit commission or a public utilities commission. Larger centres tended to exhibit a preference for the former. In addition, there are a few examples of provision by a municipal department.

Water commissions were relatively rare, with responsibility for water typically residing with a public utilities commission. Again, in

a few instances it was organized as a departmental function, making municipal council the employer.

Ponak and Thompson identify three main sources of public sector management division. Although applicable to all governments, the discussion here focuses strictly on their relevance for the local level. First, local government is structurally fragmented by design. This reflects a variety of assumptions about the appropriate nature and behaviour of local authorities including, the importance of checks and balances, the need for apolitical decision making and the tension between local autonomy and centralized control. Second, public sector financial arrangements frequently involve the separation of the source of funds from the party responsible for spending them and providing the requisite service. This is true both within local government and from an intergovernmental perspective. Following World War II, the growing participation of the provincial government in the funding of services at the local level and subsequent federal forays, made public sector finance increasingly complex. Finally, political competition on a variety of dimensions severely limits the capacity of the local government employer to present a united front.³⁷ The underdevelopment of political parties and party government allows elected local government officials to function as largely autonomous individuals. The fact that so much of the business of local authorities is conducted in public view further encourages grandstanding and playing to constituents.

The existence of such a fragmented managerial configuration runs counter to a central assumption of collective bargaining theory, which

conceives of the process as a bilateral encounter in which two identifiable parties, one representing the employer and the other representing the employees, negotiate over the terms and conditions of employment.³⁸ The divided management structure has a number of important consequences for the conduct of labour relations.

As a result of the overlapping and unclear lines of authority, considerable time and effort must be expended in intra-organizational bargaining before the employer is in a position to deal with the union. Employer solidarity at the bargaining table may be highly tenuous, particularly if politicians are involved. There was also the additional problem of determining the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining.³⁹

"Phantom bargaining" is another problem. To a large degree, phantom bargaining arises from the separation of administrative from fiscal or budgetary responsibility. It refers to the influence exerted by these latter authorities at the bargaining table, even though they are not participants in contract negotiations. The phantom at the table might well be another part of the local government apparatus, or in the age of complex inter-governmental fiscal arrangements, the provincial government.⁴⁰

Employer fragmentation is also said to contribute to opportunities for "multi-lateral" bargaining. The process becomes multi-lateral when parties other than the management bargaining team become directly involved in the negotiations and purport to speak for the employer. For example, the intervention of a rate payers group, claiming to speak for the community as a whole. This is far less a problem on the union side

due to the principle of exclusive bargaining agency in the certification of employee representatives. Multi-lateral bargaining was identified as an important feature of municipal labour relations in the United States. Anderson, however, found that it was not very common in Canada, because employers had apparently taken steps to protect collective bargaining from outside interference.⁴¹

Intra-organizational division is typically cited as an impediment to the effective collective bargaining. Such divisiveness may be exploited by opponents, resulting in unintended bargaining outcomes.⁴² From the union perspective, the implications of the fragmented structure of local government for union recognition are generally positive. In such a context it would be difficult for the different authorities in a single municipality to develop and sustain a policy of opposition to unionism. In terms of an entire industry, such an undertaking would be virtually impossible. Once the employees of one authority organized, they would invariably be used as justification for allowing other groups of local government workers, in the same community, to do the same. Employers were very much aware of the coordination problems resulting from their fragmented bargaining structure and there was some support for broader based bargaining as a partial solution.⁴³

Even within a single authority, management solidarity would have tended to be transitory. Trade unionists elected to local government office were typically more inclined to support union activity, than officials from other backgrounds. Others might support unionism out of political expediency, in the hope of gaining electoral support. Finally, there are also the inevitable disagreements between elected

and non-elected personnel. This entire discussion, of course, assumes significant employer opposition to unionism and suggests that structure acted as an obstacle to its operationalization. In fact, as noted previously, there is little evidence to suggest that such large scale opposition actually existed.

3. Employer Associations

By virtue of the decentralized bargaining structure, individual local government authorities were directly responsible for the conduct of collective bargaining and relations with their employees in general. There were, however, a number of employer associations which played an indirect, supportive role in this regard and may have had an influence on employer behaviour.

a. General Municipal

At the national level the Union of Canadian Municipalities was created in 1901, but by the 1930s had essentially ceased to function as an ongoing organization. In 1935, in response to the fiscal crisis imposed on municipalities by the Great Depression, the Dominion Conference of Mayors was formed. Two years later, in 1937, it merged with the Union of Canadian Municipalities to become the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities.⁴⁴ The interest of the Federation in municipal labour relations dates from at least the early 1950s, when it moved to address important changes that were occurring with respect to municipal unions. This concern was generated, not merely by the continued growth of unionization and collective bargaining at the local level, but also by efforts at union building and centralization by these unions. The late 1940s and early 1950s, saw

the emergence of first provincial and later national unions of local government employees. Of particular consternation, from the employer's perspective, was the increased tendency to utilize the resources generated by this organizational consolidation to intervene in support of individual locals in contract negotiations.

The Federation's response to these developments took the form of three separate initiatives. First, a proposal to publish a national survey of wages and salaries of municipal employees in Canada was approved at a meeting of the Federation's National Executive and Advisory Board in early 1951. The first report was issued in June 1952. Second, the Industrial Relations Centre of McGill University was commissioned to conduct a detailed study of the entire phenomenon of municipal collective bargaining. A major rationale for the study was the need to assess the inherent limitations that the political nature of municipalities placed on their ability to bargain effectively. There was also a desire to accumulate both factual and interpretative data. This was seen as a necessary prerequisite to the development of effective responses to labour relations by member municipalities. The final initiative took the form of a special conference on Municipal Employer-Employee Relations at McGill University in the Spring of 1953. The Conference was co-sponsored by the Federation and McGill's Industrial Relations Centre. Municipal personnel officers, administrators, academics and others were in attendance.⁴⁵ There is an implicit acceptance of unionism and collective bargaining in all of this work. The Federation's efforts were clearly directed at helping member municipalities better cope with unions within this framework.

There is absolutely no suggestion that union busting might be an appropriate employer response. Perhaps ironically, the Federation's efforts, particularly in the area of providing comparative wage data in support of bargaining by its constituents, spurred both union building and the creation of similar information disseminating services on the union side.⁴⁶

Provincially, associational organization among Ontario municipalities was fragmented and consisted of a number of bodies, the majority of which purported to represent fairly distinctive constituencies.⁴⁷ In addition to these organizations, there were also a number of specialized professional associations, such as the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association, which mainly catered to senior municipal administrative staff. Very little is known about the participation or interest of these bodies in municipal labour relations. There is, however, no evidence to suggest any kind of direct participation in collective bargaining by any of them. At best they represented their membership by making representations to various political authorities and in some cases provided some informational support for collective bargaining.⁴⁸

b. Hydro-Electric Power

In hydro-electric power there were two employer organizations, the Ontario Municipal Electric Association (O.M.E.A.) and the Association of Municipal Electric Utilities of Ontario (A.M.E.U.). The O.M.E.A. was formed in Toronto in 1912, by municipalities which had been active in the municipal power unions. Of these, the Niagara Power Union (N.P.U.), formed in 1908, was the largest and most important. The power unions,

in addition to disseminating information regarding hydro matters to their members, also evolved into a lobby to press for the public ownership and control of hydro-electric power in Ontario. The A.M.E.U. had its origins in the engineers' section of the N.P.U. and consisted of the engineers of the N.P.U. municipalities. This group persisted after the formation of the O.M.E.A. and its activities were expanded. In March 1918, however, the engineering section voted to separate from the O.M.E.A. and the Association of Municipal Electric Engineers of Ontario was born. In June 1919, the Association changed its name to become the A.M.E.U. The O.M.E.A. became the association for the elected officials of hydro-electric utilities, while the A.M.E.U. consisted mainly of management and senior operating staff.⁴⁹ It is not known if either of these organizations played a role or had any interest in labour relations in the industry during the study period.

c. Public Transit

The principal employers' association in urban transit was the Canadian Transit Association (C.T.A.), which began its existence in 1904 as the Canadian Street Railway Association.⁵⁰ The C.T.A. counted most of the major public transit systems in Canada among its members. The 1950 Proceedings of the Association note the existence of an employer-employee relations committee and a manual of member labour agreements. Several of the speakers at the 1950 Convention also addressed aspects of labour relations and collective bargaining in public transit.⁵¹ Labour relations did not, however, dominate the agenda in subsequent years. As with the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, there is an implicit acceptance of the reality that

unionism and collective bargaining were a permanent feature in the industry. Virtually all of the discussion of labour relations in the Association's proceedings, from 1950 on, focused on promoting more effective bargaining by employers, with particular emphasis on controlling labour costs. Convention proceedings for the period prior to 1950 were unavailable.

All of the employer associations examined were relatively weak, decentralized organizations. Membership was voluntary and individual constituents were free to enter and exit without significant cost or penalty. Given the extremely decentralized and fragmented bargaining structure, the involvement of these associations in labour relations was indirect, at best. It does not appear that any of them actively encouraged their members to oppose union activity and collective bargaining by their employees. This observation must, however, be tempered with the caution that the record is largely incomplete concerning the labour relations activities of these organizations. Even had they wished to conduct such a campaign, it is extremely doubtful that any possessed the organizational cohesiveness to have had a significant impact. The repeated breaching of associational guidelines for member contract settlements clearly indicates the true limitations of their influence.

Conclusions

Most local government authorities appear to have accepted union activity among their employees without serious opposition. This chapter has assessed the major factors contributing to this behaviour. From the employer's perspective, given the nature of contemporary public sector

labour relations, it is difficult to appreciate why local government authorities would ever willingly recognize the unions representing their employees without being compelled by statute to do so. The fallacy of this assessment is that it projects both the unions and the process of collective bargaining, as they are presently constituted, back in time to the point where the acceptance decision was made. It fails to recognize that the entire system evolved over time. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, local government labour relations had come to resemble what exists today. This was not, however, the case during the formative period.

Initially the unions were typically not very militant. Indeed, they frequently went to considerable pains to demonstrate just how "responsible" they were. From the employer's vantage point, the fact that most of these organizations were directly chartered locals of the Trades and Labour Congress, coupled with the low level of service provided by the Congress, meant that there was little in the way of outside interference. Even after the formation of national unions of local government employees, in the mid-1950s, they were still dealing with their own employees. It was only toward the latter part of the decade that these organizations had sufficient staff in the field to have a serious impact.

In terms of collective bargaining, it is difficult to argue that union recognition and the negotiation of a collective agreement significantly restricted the employer's flexibility. Substandard wage levels and the frequent inclusion of prohibitions against job action are but two indications of superior employer bargaining power. Unions

were not seen as a threat to employer authority or to their pocket-book. By the late 1950s, this had also begun to change. The process of union building generated resources which ultimately gave the unions a number of advantages over their employers in contract negotiations. In the 1960s, average municipal labourer rates once more exceeded those of their private sector counterparts. The employer was also increasingly limited by the language in collective agreements.

It is frequently argued that employers agree to recognize unions only when they feel there is something to be gained. Given the relatively high level of public support for unions during the formative period, voluntary union recognition might well have been forthcoming in anticipation of electoral reward. As suggested above, such a decision, initially at least, appears to have had very few costs attached to it.

Finally, with respect to strategic decision making, it is unlikely that either elected officials or management personnel were in a position to make the kind of informed decisions about unionism that are implied in the model. As a consequence, by the early 1960s, they were already in some difficulty.

NOTES

¹ The level of unemployment has been used as a proxy for the relative bargaining power of unions and employers. High or increasing unemployment puts the employer in a better position to oppose unionism. It may also heighten the inclination to do so. In a tight labour market, precisely the opposite is true. George Sayers Bain and Farouk Elsheikh, Union Growth and the Business Cycle: An Econometric Analysis (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1976,): 65-67.

² For example see: George Sayers Bain, Union Growth and Public Policy in Canada (Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1978),: 16-27.

³ John C. Anderson, "The Strategic Management of Industrial Relations", in John. C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 106-110.

⁴ For a discussion of the concept of "strategic choice" see: M. Cote, M. Lemelin and J.M. Toulouse, "The Management-Industrial Relations Interface: Exploring the Conceptual Linkages," in Gerard Hebert, Hem C. Jain and Noah M. Meltz, eds., The State of the Art in Industrial Relations (Kingston/Toronto: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University and Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto, 1988),: 171-177; T.A. Kochan, R.B. McKersie and P. Cappelli, "Strategic Choice and Industrial Relations Theory," Industrial Relations Vol. 23 (1984),: 16-39

⁵ Anderson, op. cit.,: 106-107.

⁶ Kochan, McKersie and Cappelli, op. cit.,: 16-39. In the 1920s, the prevailing social climate, with its glorification of free enterprise and competitive individualism, was generally hostile to unions. There was a widespread attack on unionism, by employers, typified by the nation wide "open shop" campaign. The "American Plan" existed in this general context and involved the substitution of employee representation plans for unions. The Plan evolved largely from the work done by William Lyon Mackenzie King during his tenure, as a labour relations specialist, with the Rockefellers. Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Industrial Conflict in Canada 1900-1966. Study prepared for the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa: Privy Council Office, October 1968. (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1976),: 193; Desmond Morton, "The History of the Canadian Labour Movement," in John. C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 162.

⁷ Jamieson, op. cit.,: 259, 280-293, 297, 350, 358-360.

⁸ George W. Noble, "Labour Relations in Canadian Municipalities," Public Personnel Review, 22, 4 (October 1961),: 256-257.

Unions on City Budgetary and Employee Remuneration: A Case Study of San Francisco (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1984).

24 In 1927, the Power Commission Act, 1907 was amended to allow councils, in municipalities with populations of 100,000 or more, to authorize the creation of an appointed three member hydro-electric commission. The decision to constitute such a body was at the discretion of council. In 1935, the Power Commission Act was again amended, this time to require the adoption of an appointed three member hydro-electric commission by all cities and towns with populations in excess of 60,000 people, that were signatories to Power Commission contracts. The cities of Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton, London and Windsor were subject to this provision. This requirement remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of the study period. R.S.O. 1927, The Power Commission Act, ch 57, s. 97; R.S.O. 1937, The Power Commission Act, ch. 62, s. 104; R.S.O. 1960, The Power Commission Act, ch. 300, s.111(2).

25 Anderson, op. cit.,: 109-110.

26 By May 1954, most affiliates of the Ontario Federation of Municipal Employees were parties to written contracts, a few, however, were not. P.A.C., C.L.C., M.G. 28, I 103, Vol.10, file 8, Trades and Labour Congress of Canada: Ontario Federation of Municipal/Public Employees, Reports to Delegates at 8th Annual Convention - Hamilton, May 22-24, 1954.

27 Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1953 Report: Municipal Employees Wage and Salary Survey and Conditions of Employment (Ottawa: Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, 1953),: 14, 28.

28 The Industrial Standards Act specifically excluded all persons employed by "any municipal corporation or by any board or commission created by any Act of this Legislature". Municipal employment was, however, subject to the 1937 Minimum Wage Act. In addition, certain provisions of more general statutes applied to employment practices in local government. For example, the Public Vehicles Act restricted the number of hours the operator of a public vehicle could work in a twenty-four hour period. R.S.O. 1937, The Industrial Standards Act, ch. 191, s. 18; The Minimum Wage Act, ch. 190; The Public Vehicles Act, ch. 289, s. 19.

29 Municipal employees certified as "permanent" by the employer could not collect unemployment insurance payments if they were laid-off. Hospital workers were also excluded from mandatory coverage.

30 The union spent approximately \$50,000 on the strike. The C.C.L. ultimately intervened to achieve a settlement and end the dispute. P.A.C., C.L.C., M.G. 28, I 103, Vol. 58, file 11, National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers. T.F. Stevenson,

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Secretary-Treasurer, National Organization of Civic Utility and Electrical Workers to Pat Conroy, Secretary-Treasurer, Canadian Congress of Labour, October 30, 1950.

31 Bargaining structure refers to how bargaining is organized, or more specifically, the scope of collective agreement coverage and impact. The formal bargaining structure consists of all those employers and employees covered by the provisions of a collective agreement, while the informal structure includes all those employers and employees who are not covered by the agreement, but are affected by it. See: John C. Anderson, "The Structure of Collective Bargaining," in John. C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 209-234.

32 Anderson, op. cit.,: 109-110; For a Canadian case study see: Anne Forest, "The Rise and Fall of National Bargaining in the Canadian Meat-Packing Industry," Relations Industrielles 44, 2 (Spring 1989),: 393-406.

33 The Board of Control was adopted by Toronto in the 1890s and subsequently became mandatory for all cities with populations in excess of 100,000. For a brief discussion of the structure and responsibilities of a Board of Control see: T.J. Plunkett and G.M. Betts, The Management of Canadian Urban Government (Kingston: The Institute of Local Government, Queen's University, 1978),: 218-220.

34 The Police Amendment Act, 1947 provided that "every city shall, and any village or township having a population in excess of 5,000 according to the last revised assessment roll and every county and town may, by by-law, constitute a board of commissioners of police." The Police Amendment Act, 1947, 11 Geo. VI, ch. 77, s. 5.

35 S.J. Frankell and R.C. Pratt, Municipal Labour Relations in Canada: A study of some of the problems arising from collective bargaining between municipalities and municipal trade unions (Montreal: The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities and the Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, 1954),: 35-44.

36 R.S.O. 1914, The Public Utilities Act. ch. 204, s. 34.

37 Ponak and Thompson, op. cit.,: 381-382.

38 See Thomas A. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments," Industrial and Labour Relations Review 27,: 525-526.

39 For a discussion of some of these issues see Frankell and Pratt, op. cit.,: 35-47, 53-56.

40 See: J. Williams, "Shifting Jurisdictions, Phantom Bargaining,

and Essential Services," Canada, Department of Labour, The Labour Gazette (November 1973),: 724-729.

41 Ponak and Thompson, op. cit.,: 381-382.

42 The term "intra-organizational bargaining" was coined by Walton and McKersie in their classic 1965 study. It refers to the internal negotiations that occur within the union and management. Research on municipal employees in both Canada and the United States has found that internal divisiveness enhances the possibility of negotiations collapsing and a strike occurring. John C. Anderson and Morley Gunderson, "Strikes and Dispute Resolution," in John C. Anderson, Morley Gunderson and Allen Ponak, eds., Union-Management Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Don Mills: Addison-Wesley, 1989),: 304-305.

43 Broader based bargaining involves the combination of employers on one side and/or unions on the other to form negotiating coalitions. Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1986),: 470. The Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, in its 1958 submission to the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature on Labour Relations, specifically requested that municipal corporations be given the legal right to name a bargaining committee to represent it and all of its boards to negotiate with the unions representing its employees. This theme is also present in the 1965 recommendations of the Special Committee on Labour Relations, of the Ontario Municipal Association. Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Proceedings, 1957-1958. Ontario Municipal Association, "Report of the Special Committee on Labour Relations of the Ontario Municipal Association," Endorsed by the Executive Committee, August 22, 1965; adopted by the Convention in General Session, August 24, 1965.

44 George S. Mooney, "The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities," Canadian Labour (February 1960),: 15.

45 George S. Mooney, Executive Director, Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, "Municipal Employer-Employee Relations: A Summary of Proceedings of a Special Conference Held at McGill University, April 24, 1953,: Preface.

46 P.A.C., C.U.P.E., M.G. 28, I 234, Vol. 2, file 11, National Union of Public Employees, Convention, 1961. General Report of the National Director,: 20-21.

47 The four main organizations were the Ontario Municipal Association (O.M.A.), the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves (A.O.M.R.), the Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario (A.C.R.O.) and the Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (O.A.R.M.). The O.M.A. and the A.O.M.R. were predominantly urban in terms of their membership, while both the A.C.R.O. and the O.A.R.M. had largely rural constituencies. In 1972, the O.M.A. and the A.O.M.R.

merged to form the Association of Ontario Municipalities. On December 18, 1981, the three remaining organizations merged under the name of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario. Municipal World 92, 1 (January 1982),: 1; Allan O'Brien, "Father Knows Best: A Look at the Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Ontario," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975),: 163-64; Allan O'Brien, "The Uncomfortable Partnership: A Look at the Provincial-Municipal Relationship," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold Ltd, 1970),: 168-69.

48 The involvement of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (A.M.O.) in labour relations dates from at least the mid-1960s. At the 1964 convention of the Ontario Municipal Association, the Executive Committee was authorized to establish a committee consisting of representative from labour and management to examine the issue of interest dispute resolution through arbitration and other matters. The committee was also request to make recommendations concerning appropriate means of dispute settlement. The catalyst to this action was the introduction of a resolution from the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association, calling on the O.M.A. to lobby the provincial government to introduce compulsory arbitration as a means of settling all municipal labour disputes. The resolutions committee, however, recommended that the province be called upon to make compulsory arbitration applicable only in cases of emergency, where life or property would be threatened by the suspension of services as a result of a strike. It was this proposal that was endorsed by the Convention. The Special Committee on Labour Relations ultimately made a number of recommendations that were adopted by the A.M.O. in Convention on August 1965. Ontario Municipal Association, "Report of the Special Committee on Labour Relations of the Ontario Municipal Association," Endorsed by the Executive Committee, August 22, 1965; adopted by the Convention in General Session, August 24, 1965. In addition to making political representations, the Association produced a survey of wages and employee benefits for its members, which also dates from at least the mid-1960s. Ontario Municipal Association, Annual Report, 1967.

49 Merrill Dension, The People's Power: The History of Ontario Hydro (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1960),: 153-154; M.M. Kirkpatrick, "Origin of the O.M.E.A.," (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Electric Association: Miscellaneous Publication, 1966) Ontario Hydro Archives, Toronto.

50 Canadian Transit Handbook, 2nd. ed., (Toronto: Canadian Urban Transit Association and Roads and Transportation Association of Canada, 1985),: 3-36.

51 Canadian Transit Association, Proceedings, June 12-14, 1950.

CHAPTER 11

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS: LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONISM IN ONTARIO

1963-1983

Introduction

This chapter examines the major developments and important trends in local government unionism during the post-1963 period. Although grouped together for the purposes of this discussion, the years from 1963 to the early 1980s really fall into two distinct parts. The 1960s saw the continuation of the general prosperity and public sector expansionism begun at the end of world war II. By contrast, the 1970s were generally a time of economic crisis, culminating in a severe recession in the early 1980s. Government increasingly concentrated on restraint, cut-backs and deficit reduction. The traditional laissez-faire approach to local government collective bargaining, followed by successive provincial governments since the mid-1940s, came to an end with the imposition of public sector wages controls in 1982-83.

An assessment of contemporary local public sector industrial relations reveals the extent to which it is very much the product or "prisoner" of its historical development. This is true, both of the bargaining structure and the participants themselves.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the quantitative dimensions of contemporary local government unionism, including employment growth. This is followed by an examination of the economic

crisis and its impact on collective bargaining, with particular emphasis on the "public/private sector compensation controversy" and the imposition of wage controls. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the major participant unions and employers.

A. Unionism

1. Municipal Employment

a. Police Associations

Between 1961 and 1981, the organization of municipal police by police associations increased markedly (See Table 11-1). The introduction of regional governments in Ontario in the late 1960s and early 1970s played a very important role in this growth. With the few exceptions, virtually all of the new authorities assumed responsibility for policing.¹ This functional centralization brought together members of long established police associations, in the larger centres, with those who had previously been unorganized. Although association membership statistics are not available, union membership density is believed to be quite high. In 1983, approximately ninety-five per cent of all municipal police (uniformed and support staff) in Ontario were covered by the terms of collective agreements.²

b. Fire Fighter Unions

Fire fighters continued to make modest organizational gains during this period (See Table 11-1). After relatively little activity during the 1960s, the number of municipalities with fire fighter unions increased approximately twenty-six per cent in the 1970s. Unlike policing, responsibility for the provision of fire protection remained a lower tier responsibility. The consolidation of lower tier

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY¹, 1961, 1971, 1981

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Upper Tier Municipalities</u>			
Counties:			
Number of Counties:	43	39	26
Number with:			
Police associations	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	3(7%)	8(21%)	15(58%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	2(5%)	8(31%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Regional Governments:			
Number of Regional Governments:	1	5	13
Number with:			
Police associations	1(100%) ²	N/A	10(77%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	1(100%)	2(40%)	16(100%)
Inside workers	1(100%)	2(40%)	14(88%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	1(100%)	2(40%)	3(23%)
<u>Lower Tier Municipalities</u>			
<u>Population Category</u>			
Over 100,000:			
Number of urban municipalities:	5	14	16
Number with:			
Police associations	4(80%)	N/A	16(100%)
Fire Fighter unions	5(100%)	14(100%)	16(100%)

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Population Category</u>			
Over 100,000 (cont'd):			
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	5(100%)	14(100%)	16(100%)
Inside workers	5(100%)	12(86%)	14(88%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	5(100%)	13(93%)	15(94%)
Inside workers	2(40%)	10(71%)	15(94%)
Public Transit unions	5(100%)	14(100%)	16(100%)
Number of townships:	4	0	0
Number with:			
Police associations	4(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	4(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	4(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	3(75%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	4(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	2(50%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	4(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
50,000 - 99,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	7	11	15
Number with:			
Police associations	4(57%)	N/A	15(100%)
Fire Fighter unions	7(100%)	11(100%)	15(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	7(100%)	11(100%)	14(93%)
Inside workers	4(57%)	10(91%)	14(93%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	6(86%)	11(100%)	14(93%)
Inside workers	1(14%)	5(45%)	11(73%)
Public Transit unions	6(86%)	8(73%)	14(93%)
Number of townships:	2	1	0
Number with:			
Police associations	1(50%)	0(0%)	0(0%)

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Population Category</u>			
50,000 - 99,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Fire Fighter unions	2(100%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	2(100%)	1(100%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	2(100%)	1(100%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	2(100%)	1(100%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(100%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	1(50%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
25,000 - 49,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:			
	12	15	20
Number with:			
Police associations	4(33%)	N/A	20(100%)
Fire Fighter unions	11(93%)	12(80%)	16(80%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	12(100%)	13(87%)	19(95%)
Inside workers	5(42%)	9(60%)	15(75%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	8(67%)	11(73%)	15(75%)
Inside workers	4(33%)	2(13%)	11(55%)
Public Transit unions	7(58%)	5(33%)	8(45%)
Number of townships:			
	3	3	1
Number with:			
Police associations	1(33%)	N/A	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(33%)	0(0%)	1(100%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	2(67%)	1(34%)	1(100%)
Inside workers	1(33%)	1(34%)	1(100%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	2(67%)	1(34%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	1(33%)	1(33%)	1(100%)

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Population Category</u>			
10,000 - 24,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	30	29	41
Number with:			
Police associations	22(73%)	N/A	32(78%)
Fire Fighter unions	17(57%)	18(62%)	22(54%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	23(77%)	23(79%)	35(85%)
Inside workers	6(20%)	10(34%)	22(54%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	18(60%)	15(52%)	18(44%)
Inside workers	3(0%)	3(10%)	8(20%)
Public Transit unions	8(27%)	2(7%)	5(12%)
Number of townships:	19	13	16
Number with:			
Police associations	1(5%)	N/A	9(56%)
Fire Fighter unions	2(11%)	1(8%)	3(19%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	4(21%)	5(38%)	9(56%)
Inside workers	2(11%)	3(23%)	4(25%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	2(11%)	1(8%)	1(6%)
Inside workers	2(11%)	1(8%)	1(6%)
Public Transit unions	1(5%)	1(8%)	0(0%)
5,000 - 9,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	40	43	35
Number with:			
Police associations	4(10%)	N/A	28(80%)
Fire Fighter unions	8(20%)	8(19%)	6(17%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	16(40%)	24(56%)	24(69%)
Inside workers	2(5%)	8(19%)	12(34%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	13(28%)	22(51%)	21(60%)
Inside workers	1(3%)	6(14%)	7(20%)

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Population Category</u>			
5,000 - 9,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Public Transit unions	2(5%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Number of townships:	53	56	48
Number with:			
Police associations	0(0%)	N/A	7(15%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(2%)	1(2%)	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	5(9%)	11(20%)	15(31%)
Inside workers	3(6%)	3(5%)	2(4%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(2%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
2,500 - 4,999:			
Number of urban municipalities:	56	46	39
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	22(56%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(2%)	N/A	3(3%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	11(24%)	16(41%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	2(4%)	4(10%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	13(23%)	8(17%)	18(46%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	5(13%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Number of townships:	117	114	106
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	5(5%)
Fire Fighter unions	0(0%)	N/A	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	5(4%)	18(17%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	1(1%)	5(5%)

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Population Category</u>			
2,500 - 4,999 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(1%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(1%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
1,000 - 2,499:			
Number of urban municipalities:			
	101	89	73
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	13(18%)
Fire Fighter unions	2(2%)	N/A	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	3(3%)	11(15%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(1%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	3(3%)	8(9%)	7(10%)
Inside workers	1(1%)	1(1%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Number of townships:			
	244	207	180
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	4(2%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(0%)	N/A	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(0%)	14(8%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	7(4%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
less than 1,000:			
Number of urban municipalities:			
	56	88	74

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO, BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

<u>Population Category</u>	<u>Year</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
less than 1,000 (cont'd):			
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(2%)	N/A	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	1(1%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Number of townships:	244	153	135
Number with:			
Police associations	N/A	N/A	0(0%)
Fire Fighter unions	1(0%)	N/A	0(0%)
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	1(1%)	6(4%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Inside workers	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Public Transit unions	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)
Total number of lower tier urban and rural municipalities organized by:			
Police associations	45 ³	N/A	171
Fire Fighter unions	62 ⁴	65	82
General Municipal unions:			
Outside workers	80 ⁵	124	199
Inside workers	33 ⁵	60	102
Hydro-Electric Power unions:			
Outside workers	76 ⁵	91	112
Inside workers	16 ⁵	29	59
Public Transit	35	31	44

Table 11-1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNION PENETRATION OF URBAN AND RURAL MUNICIPALITIES IN ONTARIO. BY TYPE OF UNION AND POPULATION CATEGORY. 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

¹ Municipalities were sorted using population data from the Census of Canada

² In 1957, the police forces in the thirteen area municipalities comprising Metropolitan Toronto merged into the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force.

³ Union penetration by police associations in 1961 is based on information reported by the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities in their 1956 annual survey of wages and conditions of employment. The time differential, plus the fact that the survey is not comprehensive, probably results in a serious understatement of police association penetration in 1961.

⁴ In 1961, there were sixty-eight locals in existence. However, beginning with its 1959 issue, the Report on Labour Organization in Canada ceased providing a detailed list of the location of union locals. From 1959 on, only the total number of locals by province was reported. Union penetration for 1961 is, therefore, based on the 1958 Report, which is the last year such a list was available. After adjustments, the final estimate of unionized municipalities was sixty-two.

⁵ Union penetration is slightly understated due to omissions in the N.U.P.S.E. data.

Sources: Canada, Department of Labour, Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1935-1964 (hereafter cited as Report on Labour Organization); Public Archives of Canada (P.A.C.), Canadian Union of Public Employees, MG 28, I 234, Vol. 3, files 4-11. National Union of Public Employees: Membership Reports, 1955-1963, Vol. 1, files 9-14. National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers: Conventions, 1946-1951, Vol. 4, files 21-22, Vol. 5, files 1-2, Vol. 7, file 13. National Union of Public Service Employees: Contract Analyses 1959, 1960, 1962-63, Organizational Service 1960; Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, 1944-1984; Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data), Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, Municipal Employees Wage and Salary Survey and Conditions of Employment, 1956.

municipalities, that was part of regional government strategy, in some cases resulted in the creation of larger fire departments and undoubtedly necessitated the establishment of full-time fire departments where volunteerism had previously sufficed.

Until 1984, the International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the unionization of fire fighters in Ontario. Between 1961 and 1981 membership in the I.A.F.F. increased by approximately eighty-six percent, with most growth occurring during the 1960s (See Table 11-2). The large gains in employment and union membership, together with the small increase in the number of locals, strongly suggests that the bulk of membership growth during the 1960s was concentrated in established locals. The larger number of additional locals, during the 1970s, indicates that that new organizing played a more important role than in the previous decade. In 1984, a major fracture occurred in the Ontario portion of the union. Fifty-seven locals left the I.A.F.F. to form their own organization, the Ontario Professional Firefighters Association. The majority of its locals are situated in the middle to smaller sized municipalities and it currently claims approximately 4,500 members. The Association is not affiliated with any other labour body.³

Union membership density for fire fighters was in the eighty-five to ninety per cent range throughout the entire period (See Table 11-3). The union was to keep pace with the opportunities afforded by increased employment, whether in existing locals or in newly formed fire departments.

c. General Municipal Unions

Union penetration of general municipal employment grew significantly during both the 1960s and 1970s (See Table 11-1). This was equally true in terms of both inside and outside workers. With most of the large and mid-sized municipalities already unionized by the early 1960s, smaller centres were increasingly organized. Substantial progress was also made in the unionization of upper tier municipalities. Traditionally hostile to unionism, these bodies had proven extremely resistant to organizing efforts in the 1950s. The creation of regional governments, with the concomitant assumption of increased responsibilities and consolidation of service provision, also greatly assisted union penetration at this level.

Union membership increased by approximately seventy-seven percent between 1961 and 1981 (See Table 11-2). This expansion was fuelled mainly by substantial employment growth in municipalities with established locals, although new organizing also made a contribution. The C.U.P.E. is far and away the dominant union in this sector. Of the 35,885 municipal employees covered by collective agreements in 1983, only 2,000 were represented by other unions.⁴ In addition to the areas under study, it has continued to organize elsewhere in the public and para public sectors. Overall its growth has been phenomenal. Between 1963 and 1985 the C.U.P.E.'s membership increased from 84,800 to 304,300, an increase of 359 per cent. In the course of this expansion it surpassed the United Steelworkers of America as Canada's largest union in 1975.⁵

In terms of union membership density, general municipal employment

TABLE 11-2. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN GENERAL MUNICIPAL EMPLOYMENT IN ONTARIO, 1964-1983

Year	Collective Agreement Coverage			Union Membership		
	Fire	General	Total	Fire	General	Total
1964	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	26,006 ¹
1965	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	26,822
1966	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	27,525
1967	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	28,525
1968	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	30,101
1969	N/A	20,029 ²	N/A	6,184 ¹	23,629 ¹	29,813
1970	N/A	23,090	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1971	N/A	23,598	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1972	N/A	24,835	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1973	N/A	25,745	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1974	N/A	N/A	N/A	6,694 ³	26,986 ³	33,680 ³
1975	N/A	N/A	N/A	7,047	27,537	34,584
1976	N/A	N/A	N/A	7,116	29,334	36,450
1977	N/A	N/A	N/A	7,360	29,564	36,924
1978	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1979	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1980	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1981	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1982	N/A	N/A	N/A	7,422 ⁴	34,000 ⁴	41,422 ⁴
1983	8,266 ⁵	35,885 ⁵	44,151 ⁵	N/A	N/A	N/A

¹ These statistics were derived from the Report on Labour Organization in Canada. In keeping with the previous treatment of post-1949 data from this source, the reported results for 1965 are listed here under 1964. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years. J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa:Labour Canada, 1975),: 122-123.

² Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Collective Bargaining Provisions in Ontario Municipal Agreements, 1970-1974, 1978.

³ Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Labour Organizations (ORGN) Project, 1974-1977 (unpublished data).

⁴ Statistics Canada, Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act (C.A.L.U.R.A.), 1983 (unpublished data).

⁵ Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data).

Sources: As indicated above.

TABLE 11-3. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG SELECTED CLASSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1961, 1971, 1981

	<u>YEAR</u>		
	<u>1961</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1981</u>
<u>Fire Fighters</u>			
Number of union members	4,000 ¹ (estimated)	6,185 ¹ (actual)	7,422 ² (estimated)
Number of fire fighters	4,640	7,115	9,170
Membership density	<u>85%</u>	<u>87%</u>	<u>81%</u>
<u>General Municipal Employment</u>			
Number of union members	19,258 ¹ (estimated)	23,629 ³ (actual)	34,000 ⁴ (actual)
Number of general municipal employees, excluding fire fighters and police	37,384	42,090	60,553
Membership density	<u>52%</u>	<u>56%</u>	<u>56%</u>
<u>Municipal Hydro-Electric Power</u>			
Number of union members	3,500 ¹ (estimated)	5,000 ¹ (actual)	5,500 ⁴ (actual)
Number of municipal hydro-electric employees ⁵	6,000	7,000	6,945
Membership density	<u>58%</u>	<u>71%</u>	<u>79%</u>
<u>Urban Transit</u>			
Number of union members	7,045 ¹ (actual)	8,671 ¹ (actual)	12,500 (estimated)
Number of urban transit employees	7,787	8,200	14,430
Membership density	<u>90%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>87%</u>

TABLE 11-3. UNION MEMBERSHIP DENSITY AMONG SELECTED CLASSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)

1 These statistics were derived from the Report on Labour Organization in Canada. In keeping with the previous treatment of post-1949 data from this source, the reported results for 1962 are listed here under 1961. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years. J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa:Labour Canada, 1975),: 122-123, 174, 176.

2 Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data). Fire fighter union membership was estimated at ninety per cent of collective agreement coverage (8,266).

3 Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Collective Bargaining Provisions in Ontario Municipal Agreements, 1970.

4 Statistics Canada, Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act (C.A.L.U.R.A.), 1983 (unpublished data).

5 Hydro-electric employment as reported in the Census encompasses the municipal hydro utilities, Ontario Hydro and any private sector producers. Municipal hydro-electric employment is therefore estimated for both 1961 and 1971. In 1981, data from Ontario Hydro's Municipal Utility Data Bank is utilized. In Table 6-8 municipal hydro-electric employment for 1961 is estimated at 6,601. This was calculated by subtracting Ontario Hydro employment from the Census total. For the purposes of this table an estimate of 6,000 is used to negate the private sector contribution.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1, 1971, Vol. III, Part 3, Table 2, Part 4, Table 2, 1981, Population: Labour Force - Industry Trends, Canada, provinces, Table 1, Population: Economic Characteristics - Ontario, Table 9; Other sources as indicated above.

occupies the low end of the continuum, scoring only in the fifty per cent range (See Table 11-3). This is largely unchanged from the early 1960s. Although unionism kept pace with continuing employment growth, it appears to have reached a saturation point beyond which further gains are unlikely.

2. Municipal Hydro-Electric Power Unions

The unionization of municipal hydro-electric utilities progressed moderately during the 1960s and 1970s (See Table 11-1). However, union penetration in terms of inside workers increased at a much higher rate than for their outside counterparts. To large degree this reflected the relatively low level of organization among this group at the beginning of the period.

Union membership appears to have increased substantially in the 1960s and then expanded only marginally over the following decade (See Table 11-4). As noted in earlier chapters, determining the extent of union membership in the municipal hydro-electric utilities is complicated by the fact that the sector is shared with Ontario Hydro. The International Brotherhood of Electric Workers (I.B.E.W.) was the dominant union in the municipal portion of the industry throughout the 1960s, followed closely by the followed closely by the new C.U.P.E. The I.B.E.W. saw its membership decline by approximately 800 in the 1970s, even though aggregate union membership in the industry increased marginally. By the early 1980s, the gap between the I.B.E.W. and the C.U.P.E. had closed considerably, with the international union retaining only a slight advantage in terms of the number of utilities organized and aggregate membership.

TABLE 11-4. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT COVERAGE IN HYDRO-ELECTRIC EMPLOYMENT AND URBAN TRANSIT IN ONTARIO, 1964-1983

<u>Year</u>	<u>Collective Agreement Coverage</u>		<u>Union Membership</u>	
	<u>Hydro-Electric Power</u>	<u>Urban Transit</u>	<u>Hydro-Electric Power</u>	<u>Urban Transit</u>
1964	N/A	N/A	12,291 ¹	7,373 ¹
1965	N/A	N/A	12,991	8,152
1966	N/A	N/A	13,118	8,097
1967	N/A	N/A	14,207	8,714
1968	N/A	N/A	14,158	8,706
1969	N/A	N/A	15,469	8,671
1970	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1971	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1972	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1973	18,204 ²	8,036 ²	N/A	N/A
1974	18,154	8,192	17,754 ³	9,900 ³
1975	23,255	8,939	17,152	9,400
1976	23,106	9,067	18,803	11,400
1977	24,122	10,028	19,072	12,000
1978	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1979	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1980	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1981	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1982	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1983	26,652 ⁴	13,098 ⁴	N/A	N/A

¹ These statistics were derived from the Report on Labour Organization in Canada. In keeping with the previous treatment of post-1949 data from this source, the reported results for 1965 are listed here under 1964. The same adjustment is made in all succeeding years. J.K. Eaton, Union Growth in Canada in the Sixties (Ottawa:Labour Canada, 1975),: 122-123.

² Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, March 15, 1974, February 14, 1975, December 19, 1975, December 17, 1976, December 9, 1977 (unpublished data).

³ Ontario, Ministry of Labour, labour Organizations (ORGN) Project, 1974-1977 (unpublished data).

⁴ Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data).

Sources: As indicated above.

Union membership density among municipal hydro-electric workers increased substantially in the 1960s and to a lesser degree in the 1970s (See Table 11-3). By the early 1980s, approximately seventy-nine percent of the labour force was unionized. The fact that increased union membership was accompanied by greater union penetration of the sector strongly suggests that new organizing contributed to at least some of this growth. Approximately eight-two per cent of employees are subject to terms of collective agreements.

3. Urban Transit Unions

Union penetration of urban transit in Ontario increased only marginally between 1961 and 1981 (See Table 11-1). While the statistics indicate a decline in 1971, this is believed to reflect problems in securing comprehensive data as opposed to an actual decrease. Traditionally, the industry has enjoyed a high level of union penetration, with nearly all operators of significant size being organized. Continued union expansion is very much dependent on the provision of new organizing opportunities by the industry.

After remaining quite stable from the mid-1950s until at least the late 1960s, union membership increased substantially in the mid-1970s (See Table 11-4). By the early 1980s, membership growth had slowed once more. A Substantial growth in industry employment, encouraged by the expansion of transit subsidies, was the main contributor. The Amalgamated Transit Union is the dominant union in the industry, accounting for the vast majority of union members.

Union membership density approached ninety per cent throughout the period (See Table 11-3). In 1983, approximately ninety per cent of all

urban transit employees were covered by collective agreements.

4. Employment

Between 1961 and 1981, employment increased substantially in all sectors except municipal hydro-electric power and water (See Table 11-5). Over the twenty year period municipal police enjoyed the highest growth rate, followed, in declining order, by fire fighters, urban transit, general municipal employment and finally municipal hydro-electric power and water. In addition to these inter-sectoral variations, there were also differences in timing. Police and fire fighters made their most significant gains during the 1960s, while for general municipal employees and urban transit the rate of growth was highest in the 1970s. Given the relatively high levels of union membership density, these differences are reflected in the pattern of union membership growth for each employment group.

B. The Economic Crisis

1. Restraint, Retrenchment and Recession

By the mid-1970s the economic boom in Ontario had largely come to an end. Overall, the decade was dominated by stagflation and was followed, in 1981-82, by a major recession. The economic crisis caused problems for all levels of government, as expenditures outstripped revenues and deficits were incurred. Resource allocation became more important and competitive. Provincial and, to a much lesser degree, federal financial support for local government service provision had grown rapidly in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. Municipal governments became increasingly dependent on these intergovernmental grants, many of which were conditional. Transfer payments peaked in

TABLE 11-5. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AMONG SELECTED CLASSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1961, 1971, 1981

	YEAR		
	1961	1971	1981
Municipal	48,569 (+137%)	60,235 (+ 24%)	85,720 (+ 42%)
Police	6,545 (+ 39%) ¹	11,025 (+ 68%)	15,997 (+ 45%)
Fire fighters	4,640 (+ 43%)	7,120 (+ 53%)	9,170 (+ 29%)
General municipal (excluding police and fire fighters)	37,384 (+199%) ¹	42,090 (+ 13%)	60,553 (+ 44%)
Municipal hydro- electric power	6,000 ² (N/A)	7,000 ² (+ 17%)	6,945 (0%)
Urban transit	7,787 (N/A)	8,200 (+ 5%)	14,430 (+ 76%)
Water	1,968 (- 65%)	2,590 (+ 32%)	3,385 (+ 31%)

¹ The number of municipal police in 1951 was estimated, hence all calculations involving this total must also be viewed as estimates. For a discussion of the estimation methodology see Table 4-12.

² Hydro-electric employment as reported in the Census encompasses the municipal hydro utilities, Ontario Hydro and any private sector producers. Municipal hydro-electric employment is therefore estimated for both 1961 and 1971. In 1981, data from Ontario Hydro's Municipal Utility Data Bank is utilized. In Table 6-8 municipal hydro-electric employment for 1961 is estimated at 6,601. This was calculated by subtracting Ontario Hydro employment from the Census total. For the purposes of this table an estimate of 6,000 is used to negate the private sector contribution.

Sources: D.B.S., Census of Canada, 1961, Vol. III, Part 2, Table 1; 1971, Vol. III, Part 3, Table 2, Part 4, Table 2; 1981, Population: Labour Force - Industry Trends, Canada, provinces, Table 1, Population: Economic Characteristics - Ontario,

**TABLE 11-5. EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AMONG SELECTED CLASSES OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES IN ONTARIO, 1961, 1971, 1981 (cont'd)**

Table 9; Other sources as indicated above.; Statistics
Canada, Police Administration Statistics, 1971, Table 13;
1982, Table 3.

1979 and thereafter began to decline. Local government authorities were increasingly forced to rely on their own limited revenue sources. The problems associated with near exclusive reliance on the property tax are well documented and need not be repeated here. The severe recession of the early 1980s simply heightened the existing fiscal crisis. Expenditure restraint was imposed on municipalities in two ways. First, through cutbacks in transfer payments from the provincial government and second, through constituent resistance to property tax increases. Municipal authorities typically responded to this pressure by reducing programs and making more efficient use of their existing resources. Given that sixty to seventy per cent of local government operating expenses were accounted for by employee wages and salaries, retrenchment had a significant impact on both employment practices and collective bargaining⁶. In more recent times the provincial government has transferred responsibility for the provision of certain services to the local level and with it the attendant financial burden.

2. The Public/Private Sector Compensation Controversy

Gunderson notes that the public\private sector wage differential changed considerably in the thirty years between roughly 1950 and 1980. In the 1950s the public sector occupied a subordinate position, gradually gaining the upper hand by the early 1960s and maintaining this position through the remainder of the period. He also observes that by the early 1980s, there was some evidence that this advantage had begun to wane.⁷

The emergence of large scale public sector unionism, in both Canada and the United States, and their apparent success at the

bargaining table prompted a major debate about the appropriateness of unrestricted public sector collective bargaining. In Unions and the Cities Wellington and Winter argue that public sector trade unions in the United States exert a irresistible pressure on state and local governments. Given the nature of the public sector they contend that unions have a very real advantage in collective bargaining that was not available to their private sector counterparts. This bargaining power is most clearly manifest in the ability of unions to secure substantial increases in remuneration. It derives from the reluctance of local authorities to oppose their demands and thereby assume the political costs of a public sectors strike.⁸ The "excessive union bargaining power" thesis was used as the basis for proposals that would have severely restricted local government employees both in terms of collective bargaining and the right to strike. This perspective had its Canadian proponents⁹ and may have formed at least part of the philosophical justification for the imposition of public sector compensation controls in the early 1980s. These programs are discussed below.

Critics charge that concerns about excessive union bargaining power in the public sector are time bound. They are essentially a product of the relative affluence of the 1960s and early 1970s and not generally applicable in an era of cut-backs, restraint and retrenchment.¹⁰ For his part, Gunderson argues that, while some amendments are required, drastic changes to existing public policy, to redress the public sector compensation advantage, are unnecessary and an overreaction. He maintains that, given the existence of substantial

countervailing forces in public sector labour relations, the problem will be largely self-correcting.¹¹

3. Wage Controls

Any discussion of the imposition of public sector wage controls in Ontario must be situated in the context of general economic developments, public sector wage trends, the tenuous financial position of local government and mounting provincial frustration with the apparent inability of municipal authorities to put their financial house in order.

Twice within a ten year period local government employees in Ontario were subject to the statutory wage controls. The first occurrence was under the 1975-78 Federal Wage and Price Control Program.¹² The province passed enabling legislation which placed the provincial public sector, including local government, within the program's jurisdiction. The controls had general applicability and were not specifically directed at the public sector. The second round came in the early 1980s and this time the public sector was specifically targeted. Following the lead of the federal government's Public Sector Compensation Restraint Act or "6 and 5" program, which restricted wages and collective bargaining by its own employees, most provincial governments adopted similar restrictions.¹³ The conventional wisdom of the time blamed public sector wage increases as a major source of the macroeconomic problems of the day.¹⁴ In December 1982, the Inflation Restraint Act came into force in Ontario. It was followed in December 1983 by the Public Sector Prices and Compensation Act.

The Inflation Restraint Act placed limits on both public sector

wage increases and provincially administered prices. In addition to members of the broadly defined provincial public sector, the Act applied to municipal governments, health care and educational institutions. The specific details of the program will not be repeated here. Perhaps the most significant feature of the Act from a labour relations perspective was the suspension of free collective bargaining. During the control period the terms and conditions of employment, as set out in the expiring collective agreement, were automatically extended for one year. This plus the mandatory five per cent wage increase effectively rendered collective bargaining redundant. Any strikes or lockouts occurring during the control period, because they occurred while the collective agreement was still in force, were illegal. The Act also created the Inflation Restraint Board. This body operated in a largely quasi-judicial manner to ensure that compensation increases in those jurisdictions subject to the Act conform to its provisions.¹⁵

The Public Sector Prices and Compensation Review Act provided for an additional one year period of restraint to commence with the expiry of the Inflation Restraint Act control period. Collective bargaining rights were restored to the public sector, but wage increases were limited to an average of five per cent for a given bargaining unit. The Act also extended the mandate of the Inflation Restraint Board and provided it with additional powers to oversee the inflation restraint regime.¹⁶

In the immediate post-controls period indirect provincial control was maintained over local government wages through the

intergovernmental transfer system. In 1984-85 the provincial government set transfer levels based on the assumption the average increases in compensation per bargaining group would not exceed five per cent.¹⁷ What emerged in the 1980s was a system in which the local authorities were typically required to bargain hard in the context of stringent financial constraints. Overall, wage increases during much of the decade were below the rate of inflation.

Panitch and Swartz argued that these public sector wage control programs were part of a broader trend to restrict the collective bargaining rights of public sector employees. They identified a number of other "temporary" measures introduced under the guise of combating the economic crisis and posited a return to "permanent exceptionalism" in the public sector.¹⁸ Their pessimism has generally not been borne out,¹⁹ at least not at the local level of government.

4. The Public Policy Framework

There are two major developments public policy developments that are note worthy. The first was the repeal of the infamous Section 89 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act,²⁰ which allowed municipal authorities to opt out of its coverage. The second was the extension of bargaining rights to federal government employees in 1967²¹ and to Ontario government employees in 1972.²² In both cases the "employer" passed legislation allowing its employees to unionize. These actions had the normative impact of encouraging unionism among both the directly affected workers and those local government employees who still remained outside the labour movement. 1965 also saw the introduction of the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act.²³ The Act stripped the

affected workers of the right to strike and prescribed arbitration as the means of interest dispute resolution. In all other matters they remained subject to the provisions of the Labour Relations Act.

C. Unions

1. The International Association of Fire Fighters

In the early 1980s, fifty-seven Ontario locals of the International Association of Fire Fighters left the international union to form an independent organization. The secessionist locals generally represent fire fighters in the middle and smaller sized municipalities.²⁴ This is clearly the most serious internal division to face the union since the formation of the Provincial Federation of Ontario Fire Fighters in the early 1920s.

2. The Canadian Union of Public Employees

With the exception of the province of Quebec, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) is far and away the dominant union in the local public sector in Canada. As noted previously, the C.U.P.E. was formed in 1963 by the amalgamation of two national organizations of local government employees, each of which had its origins in divergent streams of local government employment. Following the merger, the two organizations maintained de facto existences within the shell of the new union. It was only with the end of Little's presidency and the departure of other senior personnel, that the C.U.P.E. began to function more as a single entity.²⁵

Structurally the C.U.P.E. retains elements of both its predecessors, the provincial Divisions of the N.U.P.E. and the industrially based groupings of the N.U.P.S.E. The Divisions are the

principal coordinating bodies at the provincial level and where, it has been argued, effective power in the union resides. The main responsibility of the Divisions is to coordinate the activities of the C.U.P.E. locals in their respective provinces, particularly with respect to lobbying the provincial government. Their objectives in this regard are two fold; first, to secure beneficial changes to existing policies that affect C.U.P.E. members and second, to act as a general spokesman for the interests of the membership in the political arena. The divisions also conduct the union leadership educational programs at the local union level. To discharge these responsibilities, the Ontario division has a large full-time staff employed in various capacities.²⁶ The apparent concentration of political power at the provincial level is not particularly surprising, given the pattern of union building among local government employees in Canada and the fact that labour relations is primarily a matter of provincial constitutional jurisdiction.

The C.U.P.E. has also developed an elaborate administrative centre headquartered in Ottawa. In addition to a large number of "national representatives", there are functional departments staffed by personnel specializing in a wide range of labour relations related areas, such as membership education, legislation, organization, job evaluation, research and public relations. In addition, the union has constructed an extensive computerized database primarily to provide member locals with timely information in support of collective bargaining. The sophistication of the system is quite high, to the extent that there are concerns that the information generated may be overly elaborate and

complex to be effectively utilized at the local level. The national representatives provide the main physical linkage between the resources and expertise of the headquarters and various locals they are assigned to service. The rep may be called upon to help locals in the development of bargaining strategies, the drafting of contract language and may also participate in the negotiations as a member of the union bargaining team. A major responsibility of the rep is to attempt to insure relative standardization with respect to the terms negotiated by the local. The union has developed "model agreements" to provide guidelines, but this policy has enjoyed limited success. Finally, the rep may become involved in the administration of a collective agreement if there are problems concerning its enforcement.

The maintenance of such an elaborate administrative structure with the diversity of programming and other activities is extremely expensive. In recent years the union has accumulated a substantial deficit. Indeed, its financial problem has become so serious that the issue dominated the recent election of the union's National Secretary-Treasurer. The C.U.P.E. continues to be financed almost exclusively from member dues and proposed increases, to help reduce the deficit, generated a predictably stormy debate at the convention.²⁷

In sum, the C.U.P.E. remains largely decentralized reflecting the structure of collective bargaining among local government employees and the process of union building that led to its creation. As a consequence, it is somewhat less powerful than its aggregate membership might suggest. In fact, the union has been criticized in some quarters, including from within its own membership, for being little more than a

"paper tiger".²⁸ The C.U.P.E.'s tremendous size and the eclectic nature of its constituency have also raised issues concerning the ability to adequately service member locals. Decentralization may be facilitative of local democracy and grass roots participation and has been lauded as such. But it makes the union extremely vulnerable when it is confronted by a centralized authority such as a provincial government determined to institute fiscal restraint and regulate public sector wages as was the case in 1981-82. There is also the additional problem of controlling rank and file militancy which, as the strike of Ontario hospital workers in 1981 indicated, can have far-reaching repercussions.²⁹

At its founding convention in 1963, the C.U.P.E. went on record as supporting the New Democratic Party (N.D.P.)³⁰. A firm foundation for such a declaration already existed in the N.U.P.S.E. and certainly not all members of the N.U.P.E. favoured the traditional, nonpartisan approach to politics. The post-1963 period saw increased partisan political involvement in support of the N.D.P. and the assumption of a relatively high profile in the promotion of a "social justice" agenda.

After residing on the periphery of the Canadian labour movement for much of its early life, public sector unionism gradually increased its status and power within the Canadian Labour Congress (C.L.C.). The 1986 election of Shirley Carr, from the C.U.P.E., as President of the C.L.C provided tangible proof of the new political realities within the Congress. In the 1980s the public sector unions claimed the position due them by virtue of their standing as Canada's largest unions.³¹

3. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

As noted previously, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.) declined to participate in the thesis, hence all information concerning their activities has been gleaned from secondary sources. There are two major developments in the union that must be addressed. The first involves the creation of a single super local representing employees of several municipal hydro-electric utilities in Southern Ontario, while the second concerns relations with the C.L.C.

In the mid to late 1970s, the I.B.E.W. reorganized a number of its established hydro-electric utility locals into a single local, number 636. The reasons for this change are unknown, but are likely related to a desire to benefit from scale economies as well as substantial internal changes within the union itself. A large number of the affected locals consisted of relatively few members.³² Small locals are generally more costly to administer, on a per capita basis, and less self reliant than larger locals. The union may have been attempting to generate some scale economies from the reorganization and facilitate greater coordination in bargaining. The bulk of the union's membership is employed in construction and in 1978 an amendment to the Ontario Labour Relations Act made province wide bargaining mandatory in the industry.³³ This change was in actuality merely part of a broader national trend toward increased centralization in construction industry bargaining. Traditionally, individual locals had enjoyed substantial autonomy in contract negotiations, however, under the new bargaining structure their importance diminished as decision making power became increasingly centralized.³⁴ Although hydro-electric utility locals were

not directly affected by these developments, their restructuring is clearly consistent with these broader changes in the union. Increased efforts at coordination, on the part of employer associations, may also have encouraged the reorganization.

With respect to relations with the C.L.C., in 1981 the I.B.E.W. and several other construction unions left the Congress after the failure to resolve a number of outstanding differences. Longstanding grievances over the C.L.C.'s promotion of nationalism in the labour movement, the increasing role played by public sector unions and its involvement in partisan politics through support for the New Democratic Party were exacerbated by more recent disputes over the organization of construction workers in the Province of Quebec and the alleged failure of the dissidents to observe the standards of internal democratic conduct required by the Congress. These unions were among the most conservative of the C.L.C.'s affiliates and fairly rigorous adherents to the Gompers tradition of business unionism and political non-partisanship. In 1982, they formed their own central labour body, the Canadian Federation of Labour.³⁵

The I.B.E.W. has also suffered from internal dissension which saw challenges to the leadership of long-time International Vice-President Ken Rose ³⁶ and the departure of some hydro-electric power locals, such as in the City of Scarborough.³⁷

4. The Amalgamated Transit Union

The Amalgamated Transit Union also declined to participate in the thesis and as a consequence very little is known of its activities in the post 1963 period. In 1963, the Amalgamated Association of Street,

Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America became the Amalgamated Transit Union (A.T.U.).³⁸ As a longstanding A.F.L. affiliate, the A.T.U. continues to practice unionism in the Gompers tradition, focusing mainly on collective bargaining and avoiding involvement in partisan politics. In the United States it has historically discouraged strikes and advocated arbitration as a more appropriate means of dispute resolution. The influence of this policy on Canadian practice is unknown, although contemporary evidence suggests that it ceased to be relevant by the 1970s. Between 1973 and 1982 the Canadian transit industry experienced more strikes than in had in the preceding seventy two years. In the 1970s, Canadian locals also increasingly sought greater autonomy from their international headquarters, while at the same time attempting greater coordination among themselves. In 1971, locals in eastern Canada formed the Eastern Canadian Joint Council, to provide a clearinghouse for information and ideas. A similar body was created in western Canada and in 1975-76, a national council was established. This organization now employs a director and a number of support staff. In Ontario, locals have taken the process one step further by attempting to coordinate their collective bargaining efforts. In large part this is a response to increased cooperation on the part of employers.

Although the A.T.U. remains the dominant in all provinces except Quebec, the 1980s saw the formation of the independent Canadian Transit Union with a small number of locals in Ontario and British Columbia.³⁹

5. Union Militancy

The post-1963 period witnessed a progressive increase in the level

of militancy among local government employees, and in the public sector as a whole. This trend became particularly pronounced in the 1970s.⁴⁰ On one hand, increased worker militancy clearly differentiates the post-1963 period from the earlier time, in which public employees were frequently chastised by their private sector union brethren for their apparent lack of backbone at the bargaining table. On the other, it can be seen as a logical progression in the process of union building. To a large degree it reflects the perceptual conversion of "public or civic servants" into "employees" and the denial of any special obligation or duty by virtue of public employment. While public sector worker militancy has manifest itself both at the bargaining table and in the political arena, it is important to differentiate between the behaviour of the national and international unions active in the public sector. In the national unions militancy has generally been expressed both ways. However, in the case of the internationals, given their conservative origins and continued adherence to the main tenets of Comperism, militancy has tended to be limited to the bargaining table.

6. Inter-union Rivalry

With the merger of the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. in 1963, the main source of inter-union rivalry in the local public sector disappeared. However, conflict between the C.U.P.E. and the Building Service Employees International Union (B.S.I.E.U.), now the Service Employees International Union of Canada (S.E.I.U.), primarily over the organization of hospitals and healthcare related facilities, has persisted to the present day. There has also been some raiding of C.U.P.E. locals by certain craft unions in the construction trades.

These unions have enjoyed some success in obtaining bargaining rights for groups of skilled tradesmen employed by municipal authorities and represented by the C.U.P.E.⁴¹ In sum, inter-union competition has not been a prominent feature of local government unionism in the post-merger period. As indicated above there has been an increase in the formation of non-affiliated or independent unions. The phenomenon is not, however, unique to the local public sector, but rather is part of a more general trend in the Canadian labour movement.⁴²

D. Employers

A number of important developments occurred on the employer's side during the post-1963 period. As employers "learned" about unions and collective bargaining in general, their overall approach changed, both attitudinally and organizationally. There was also a marked consolidation at the associational level, accompanied by greater efforts on the part of these organizations at coordinating and supporting member collective bargaining. Each of these changes will be discussed in turn.

1. Employer Attitudes

In general local government authorities appear to have accepted unionism, collective bargaining and even strikes as a part of doing business. They may not be particularly enamoured with unions or the process, but typically recognize that a denial of reality is not conducive to effective labour relations. From time to time they express dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the process and press for specific reforms, but beyond this there is no evidence of a concerted attack on the system as a whole. This is not, however, to suggest that all employers hold such enlightened views.

The evidence suggests that as local government labour relations in Ontario matured, the strike or the threat of one, lost much of its effectiveness as a bargaining tool. In a 1979 study of the C.U.P.E.'s strike record over the preceding fifteen years, union researchers concluded that:

"It is obvious that over the years employers have decided with increasing frequency to suffer through strikes in the public sector. Indeed, the general population is starting to become almost blasé about public sector strikes."⁴³

The report noted that over the fifteen year study period the average duration of each strike had increased by more than eight times. Although the study examined strike activity by the union on a national basis, the general trend is replicated in Ontario.

When the report was released Wilfrid List of the Globe and Mail interviewed both Gilbert Levine, the C.U.P.E. Research Director and Bob Wilson, Labour Relations Officer for the A.M.O.⁴⁴ Their views concerning strikes are revealing. Levine argued that with increased public tolerance of public sector strikes, municipal employers had become more combative concerning such work stoppages. He added that some municipalities actually appear to have provoked strike action by their employees as a means of reducing the jurisdiction's wage bill, thereby avoiding an increase in taxes. Levine attributed this apparent change in attitude to the increased industrial relations experience of municipal employers and to the concomitant realization that "the bottom doesn't fall out because municipal workers have gone on strike".

Wilson echoed these comments and noted that lengthy municipal strikes have raised serious questions as to whether the interrupted

"essential services" are really as essential as conventional wisdom has held them to be. He also suggested that much of the growth in strike activity has resulted from the increasing fiscal constraints faced by employers at the municipal level.

2. Organization for Bargaining

The other major development has been the increasing professionalization of collective bargaining by local government authorities. Plunkett writing in 1973 noted that the direct involvement of elected personnel in collective bargaining typically occurred only in the smaller municipalities.⁴⁵ This stands in sharp contrast to the pervasive participation of elected personnel identified by Frankel and Pratt⁴⁶ some twenty years earlier. The current conventional wisdom concerning the composition of the employer bargaining team appears to be that keeping elected officials from direct involvement in collective bargaining, and indeed labour relations matters in general, benefits all concerned. There has also been increased recognition of the importance of labour relations and the need for specialized training to be proficient. A 1975 handbook on Ontario municipal labour relations, produced by the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association as a guide for administrators in small municipalities and elected personnel in all locales, articulates essentially the same view, although in suitably diplomatic fashion.⁴⁷ Not unexpectedly some municipal politicians, particularly those in smaller jurisdictions, have resisted what they see as an erosion of their authority.

3. Employers Associations

The most important developments with respect to employer

associations are the movement toward associational consolidation and increased efforts at this level to coordinate and support constituent collective bargaining. Much of this occurred in the context of the economic crisis of the early 1980s. Considerable pressure was placed upon municipal authorities as the province restricted the level of inter-governmental transfers and placed increased emphasis on spending restraint and deficit reduction.⁴⁸

a. The Association of Municipalities of Ontario

Approximately seventy-five per cent of Ontario municipalities are members of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (A.M.O.), which is a provincially based body headquartered in Toronto. The present organization was created in December 1981 when the signing of a memorandum of agreement formally amalgamated the then existing Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario (A.C.R.O.), the Rural Ontario Municipal Association (R.O.M.A.) and the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (A.M.O.).⁴⁹ At the time the A.M.O. was not only the largest and most powerful of the three, but was also the most diversified in terms of its constituency.⁵⁰

The trend toward associational centralization, on the part of Ontario municipalities, is a relatively new phenomenon dating from the early 1970s. In 1970, there were four organizations purporting to speak either for the municipal level as a whole or various segments thereof. They were the Ontario Municipal Association (O.M.A.), the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves (A.O.M.R.), the A.C.R.O. and the R.O.M.A.. The first two were predominantly urban in terms of their membership, while the latter two represented largely rural constituencies. In 1972,

the O.M.A. and the A.O.M.R. merged to form the A.M.O.⁵¹ The process of associational consolidation was completed with the 1981 merger.

Although, information concerning the interest and role of these organizations in labour relations is fragmentary,⁵² it is certain that any involvement in collective bargaining was of an indirect nature. The A.M.O. produced a survey of wages and employee benefits, which dates from at least the mid-1960s. Following the 1972 merger, the survey was published by the new organization. As noted in Chapter 8, in 1965, it adopted a resolution calling for the deletion of the opt-out provisions for municipal authorities from the Ontario Labour Relations Act.⁵³

The A.M.O. does not participate directly in collective bargaining, but rather provides support for its members. However, unlike the C.U.P.E., which despite its broader agenda exists primarily for collective bargaining purposes, the A.M.O. is required to address a much broader range of concerns. Indeed, it would appear that the Association has been somewhat ambivalent concerning its involvement in labour relations. The A.M.O. currently maintains a relatively small labour relations section. In the mid-1980s the staff consisted of a manager and a secretary. The former position has suffered from high turnover. In addition, at least one incumbent was employed on a part-time basis and worked concurrently for the police association.

At the suggestion of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing in 1983, the A.M.O. applied for and received a grant from the Ministry to purchase a computer and assorted software. With these resources the labour relations section began to develop a database

which member municipalities could use to prepare for contract negotiations. The system contains information on both union and non-union employment. Not unexpectedly, there is a heavy concentration on wage bill and employee benefits data. Although some work was done in 1983, the information for the 1983 year was not complete as of the year end. Significant improvements were anticipated concerning the completeness of the 1984 data. In addition to this system, the Association maintains a collection of member collective agreements and regularly issues newsletters and technical notes to advise its members of current labour relations developments.⁵⁴ Both the data base and collective agreements library largely duplicate resources available from the Ontario Ministry of Labour. In addition, the Ministry has allocated far greater resources to support both projects.

This initiative had its origins in a positions paper presented at the Association's 1976 Annual Convention. The paper called for the establishment of a "municipal labour relations service".⁵⁵ Prior to the Convention, the A.M.O.'s board of directors referred the proposal to the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association for a feasibility assessment. The Personnel Association reported that such a service could be provided at three distinct and progressively higher levels.⁵⁶ Ultimately the initiator of the proposal accepted both the first and second levels of service as "desirable and feasible" and recommended their immediate implementation. The third level of service, would have required the A.M.O. to replicate many of the services provided by the C.U.P.E. to its locals, was rejected as not feasible in the near future.⁵⁷ According to the then manager of Labour Relations, the

services provided by the A.M.O., in the early 1980s, fell somewhere between the first and second levels delineated in the 1976 Personnel Association report. There appears to have been considerable constituent resistance to the provision of a higher level of service due to the anticipated cost involved.⁵⁸ Although the A.M.O. lacks the personnel to allow for member consultation, the Personnel Association has provided some assistance on an ad hoc basis. The A.M.O. has also assumed a higher profile in pressing the provincial government for changes to labour relations legislation that are favourable to municipal employers.⁵⁹

b. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, formerly the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, is a national organization based in Ottawa. The Federation's involvement in municipal labour relations is indirect and has taken the form of sponsoring research into various aspects of the municipal employment relationship as well as the development of educational and informational services for its members.⁶⁰ It does not participate directly in collective bargaining.

As noted previously, the Federation's interest in municipal labour relations dates from at least the early 1950s, when it moved to address the important changes that were occurring in municipal unionism. In the 1980s, the renamed Federation continues to produce information on wages and salaries for its members, although in a somewhat different form than the original publication. Its role in municipal labour relations has not changed significantly from its inception. The assumption of a more direct role is highly unlikely.

c. The Municipal Electric Association

The Municipal Electric Association (M.E.A.) came into being in 1987, as a result of the merger of the Ontario Municipal Electric Association (O.M.E.A.) and the Association of Municipal Electric Utilities (A.M.E.U.). The organization appears to play a much more active and occasionally direct role in constituent labour relations, than is the case for the other associations surveyed. This involvement predates the merger. The O.M.E.A. consisted of a chairman plus three to five commissioners elected annually. A small permanent staff existed to provide administrative support and ensure continuity. The Association acted primarily as a political lobby group for the industry. The A.M.E.U. represented the management and senior operating staff of municipal electric utilities and also employed a full-time staff. Its primary responsibility was the actual servicing of the membership.⁶¹ By the mid-1960s, the A.M.E.U. organized meetings of utility managers at the district level to discuss labour relations matters; published an annual survey of wages and working conditions, a monthly labour relations supplement and a supervisor's bulletin; and conducted seminars on a variety of labour relations subjects. Finally, the A.M.E.U. provided both informational support for member collective bargaining and a consulting service to assist utility managers with specific problems. The stated objective as to put employers on an "equal footing" with unions at the bargaining table. The Association received considerable assistance from Ontario Hydro in support of these programs.

In the early 1970s, in response to problems expected to arise from

changes in the construction industry, the A.M.E.U. moved to upgrade its labour relations service. Specifically, the Association requested help from Ontario Hydro in expanding its role to include prenegotiation assistance as well as direct participation in contract negotiations where requested by a member utility.⁶² This latter capability clearly differentiates the A.M.E.U. and its successor from both the A.M.O. and the Canadian Urban Transit Association. In addition, the O.M.E.A., the A.M.E.U. and Ontario Hydro collectively developed a set of guidelines for the conduct of collective bargaining in the municipal utilities and Ontario Hydro. The initiative was described as the first step in a deliberate attempt to "bring some order into the process of collective bargaining" in the industry.⁶³

In assessing the attitudes of these organizations and their constituents toward unionism and collective bargaining considerable caution must be exercised due to the incomplete nature of the documentary record. In 1968 and again in 1970, resolutions were passed at the annual general meeting of the O.M.E.A. calling for the designation of electric utilities as essential services and the introduction of compulsory arbitration to settle labour disputes, along the lines of the Hospital Labour Arbitration Act of 1965. Under these proposals the right to strike would be eliminated.⁶⁴ Thereafter, the absence of similar resolutions, plus the allocation of increased resources to the A.M.E.U.'s labour relations service, suggests a recognition of the need to function effectively within the existing rules of the game, given that the desired statutory changes would not be forthcoming. Whether this new approach reflected a change in the

degree of legitimacy accorded unions and collective bargaining in general is unknown.

d. The Canadian Urban Transit Association

Formed in 1902, as the Canadian Street Railway Association, the Canadian Urban Transit Association (C.U.T.A.) is a national organization with its headquarters in Toronto. The C.U.T.A.'s membership includes the vast majority of urban transit operators in Canada and its position as representative of the industry is unchallenged. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a number of affiliated regional associations were established to deal with transit matters specific to their locale. In Ontario, the Ontario Urban Transit Association was created to represent the interests of the industry to the Ontario government, particularly the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, which is responsible for the administration of the province's transit subsidy program. From a functional perspective, the C.U.T.A. acts as a clearing house for information relevant to the transit industry and represents the industry in all matters of concern.⁶⁵

The C.U.T.A.'s participation in labour relations continues to be indirect. As noted in Chapter 10, a "Labour Agreements Manual" was created in 1946 and was of considerable assistance in standardizing the terms of member collective agreements. A standing employer-employee relations committee also existed from at least 1950.⁶⁶ Although, the Association continues to play its traditional supportive role in collective bargaining, the 1970s and 1980s saw increased coordination among C.U.T.A. members. Managers from different systems met more

frequently to exchange information and ideas, than they had in the past. A labour relations sub-committee was established to facilitate this largely informal communication. The creation of the four regional groups added another coordinating mechanism. These bodies now hold meetings of their own in addition to those sponsored by the C.U.T.A.⁶⁷ It is quite likely they will eventually develop a provincially based labour relations role.⁶⁸ There was nothing in the C.U.T.A. material to suggest that unionism and free collective bargaining, with the right to strike, are in anyway considered illegitimate by the Association or its members.

Conclusions

Much of what happened in the post-1963 period was largely an extension of earlier developments. Both union penetration and union membership density expanded until they reached saturation levels in all sectors under study. The C.U.P.E. emerged as Canada's largest union in the mid-1970s and organized far beyond its traditional constituency. The union also continued to grow internally. By the late 1970s it had constructed a substantial administrative structure to service its locals as well as perform a number of broader roles in the political arena. The internal divisions which plagued the union during Stan Little's presidency gradually subsided as a new generation of unionists assumed leadership roles. None of this was a departure from previous trends and to a large degree the post-1963 period can be seen as one of consolidation for the C.U.P.E. The other unions organizing local government employees did not deviate significantly from past practice. The one major change on the union side was the growth in labour

militancy. Although militancy increased throughout the labour movement in the 1960s and 1970s, it was particularly pronounced in the public sector. "Requests" for changes to the collective agreement increasingly became expressed as "demands". This militancy represented an important shift from the traditional "cap-in-hand" approach, which characterized much of early local government union-management relations.

The most significant changes of the period occurred in the economic environment and in how employers approached collective bargaining. The two are clearly intertwined. The extended period of post-war economic prosperity came to an end in the mid-1970s. Economic stagnation was followed in the early 1980s by the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. The deteriorating economic environment altered the underpinnings of collective bargaining at the local level. Restraint and cutbacks became the watch words of the new employer agenda. Prior to this, collective bargaining occurred in a context of expanding government programming and spending. The provincial government played a substantial role in this through inter-governmental transfers. It was perhaps too easy to agree to union demands when the funds to meet these obligations seemed readily available. The fiscal crisis changed this. In the late 1970s, employers were increasingly forced to "bargain hard" and attempt to limit wage bill growth. Their limited success is attested to by the introduction of wage controls in 1982. Employers generally emerged from the controls period with a much greater appreciation of the need for restraint.

The second major area of change concerns how employers approached collective bargaining. There were both attitudinal and organizational

dimensions to this. Most municipal authorities probably did not fully appreciate the implications of unionization by their employees, although in fairness, both the unions and the process of collective bargaining changed significantly over time. By the early 1960s union building was largely complete and the C.U.P.E. was able to provide its members with substantial support at the bargaining table. Other unions also did so. Employers perceived that this gave the unions an advantage. The fact that municipal labour rates outstripped those of common factory labour in the early 1960s indicates that workers enjoyed at least moderate success in negotiations. The evidence suggests that over time employers learned about unions and collective bargaining. They also learned not to fear strikes and in some cases to even make strikes work to their advantage. Following the recession of the early 1980s, employers have generally adopted a much more aggressive stance at the bargaining table. Demands for concessions from workers are not uncommon and overall, union control of the bargaining agenda has declined.

Another important change was in employer organization for bargaining. The process became increasingly depoliticized as administrative personnel came to play a larger role. This was consistent with the overall trend towards greater professionalism in local government administration.

Finally, the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a change at the associational level. There was a visible consolidation of employer organizations and a much greater commitment to supporting member bargaining efforts. In most cases, associational assistance dates from

at least the early 1960s. What changed was the quality and quantity of support. Much of this assistance continues to be provided in an indirect form. The M.E.A. has, however, taken this involvement one step further and represented certain members at the bargaining table. Of the three associations both the C.U.T.A. and the M.E.A. appear to be relatively well financed and to enjoy member support for their efforts. This is not the case with the A.M.O. As of the early 1980s, the Association lacked both the resources and member commitment to provide effective labour relations support at any where near the level available from the C.U.P.E. This means that municipalities dependent on external assistance for their bargaining efforts will continue to be at a disadvantage relative to other local authorities.

The local government fiscal crisis played a major role in promoting all of these developments. While there were already definite trends in each of these areas, the crisis clearly expedited them. As a consequence, contemporary local government collective bargaining is much closer to private sector practice than in the past.

NOTES

- 1 Ottawa-Carleton is the only regional municipality not to provided police services. Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, Municipal Directory 1983 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1983),: 2-23.
- 2 Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data).
- 3 Canada, Department of Labour, Directory of Labour Organizations in Canada, 1987,: 87.
- 4 Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Ontario Collective Agreements Data Base, April 13, 1984 (unpublished data).
- 5 Canada, Department of Labour, Labour Organizations in Canada, 1975.
- 6 Robert Krause and Trevor Price, "Financial Restraint in Canadian Municipalities," Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Vancouver, June 6, 1983; See Dan Butler and Bruce D. Macnaughton, "More of Less for Whom? Debating Directions for the Public Sector," in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the 1980s, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1984),: 1-4. for a general discussion of the economic crisis and its significance for the public sector.
- 7 Morley Gunderson, "The Public/Private Sector Compensation Controversy," in Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984),: 1-43.
- 8 Harry Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, The Unions and the Cities (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1971).
- 9 This perspective is clearly evident in Sandra Christensen, Unions and the Public Interest: Collective Bargaining in the Government Sector (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1980).
- 10 Sanford Cohen, "Does Public Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy," Industrial and Labour Relations Review 32, 2 (January 1979),: 190-191. Also see: Harry C. Katz, The Impact of Public Employee Unions on City Budgetary and Employee Remuneration: A Case Study of San Francisco (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1984).
- 11 Gunderson, op. cit.,: 31-34.
- 12 For a detailed examination of the program see: A. Maslove and G. Swimmer, Wage Controls in Canada 1975-78 (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980).

13 All provinces except New Brunswick and Manitoba introduced restraint programs in 1982-83. Gene Swimmer, "Critical Issues in Public Sector Industrial Relations," in Amarjit S. Sethi, ed., Collective Bargaining in Canada (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1989),: 413.

14 For a general discussion of the rationale for targeting the public sector for controls see: Gene Swimmer, "Six and five: Part grandstanding and part grand plan," in A. Maslove, ed., How Ottawa Spends, 1984: The New Agenda (Toronto: Methun, 1984),: 240-281.

15 Ontario, Inflation Restraint Board, A Guide to the Inflation Restraint Act, January 23, 1983,: 5.

16 Ontario, Ministry of Treasury and Economics, "Statement to the Legislature by the Hon. Larry Grossman, Treasurer of Ontario and Minister of Economics, on Public Sector Wage and Price Restraint", "Public Sector Prices and Compensation Review Act, 1983: Explanatory Note," and "Fact Sheets: On the Public Sector Wage and Price Restraint Program," November 8, 1983;

17 "Fact Sheets," November 8, 1983, op. cit.

18 Leo V. Panitch and Don Swartz, "From Free Collective Bargaining to Permanent Exceptionalism: The Economic Crisis and the Transformation of Industrial Relations In Canada," in Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984),: 403-435.

19 For a critical assessment of the Panitch-Swartz thesis see: Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, "The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations," in Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984),: 441-445.

20 Ontario, Statutes, The Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1966, 14-15 Eliz. II, ch. 76, s. 37.

21 Canada, Statutes, The Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1967, 14-15-16 Eliz. II, ch. 72.

22 Ontario, Statutes, The Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1972, 20 Eliz. II, ch. 67.

23 Ontario, Statutes, The Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, 1965, 14-15 Eliz. II, ch. 48.

24 See: Canada, Department of Labour, Directory of Labour Organizations in Canada, 1987.

25 In 1967 Grace Hartman became National Secretary-Treasurer,

replacing R.P. Rintoul, who resigned for personal reasons. In 1975, Stan Little, resigned after twelve years as President of the union. He was subsequently succeeded by Hartman. The Canadian Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.), The Public Employee, 9, 3 (Fall 1988).

26 The C.U.P.E., The C.U.P.E. Story, (1979?),: 15; John Deverell, "C.U.P.E.: A giant with little clout," The Financial Post, October 10, 1981,: B4.

27 See: The C.U.P.E., "C.U.P.E.'s Financial Strength," The Facts, 9, 6 (November/December 1987),: 30-31; Jean-Claude Laniel, The C.U.P.E., "Why CUPE needs a per capita increase," The Leader, 4, 1 (September/October 1989),: 6.

28 Deverell, op. cit.,: B4.

29 See John Deverell, "The Ontario Hospital Dispute 1980-81," Studies in Political Economy, 9 (Fall 1982),: 179-90.

30 "CUPE/SCFP," Canadian Labour 8 (November 1963),: 15-17.

31 See Joseph Rose, The Building Trades-Canadian Labour Congress Dispute (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1982). (Working paper series no. 193).

32 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, "Applications for Successor Status Granted," March 31, 1974-March 31, 1979.

33 R.S.O., The Labour Relations Act, 1980, ch. 228, s. 117-151.

34 Joseph B. Rose, "Construction Labour Relations," in John C. Anderson and Morley Gunderson, eds. Union-Management Relations In Canada (Don Mills, Addison-Wesley, 1982),: 398-421.

35 Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986),: 77-79.

36 John Deverell, "Electricians fight "union dictatorship"," The Toronto Star, September 16, 1986.

37 According to a former President of the successor union, the Utility Workers of Canada, the major grievances leading up to the secession were high dues and the poor level of service provided by the international union. The I.B.E.W. unsuccessfully contested the new organization's certification application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

38 Report on Labour Organization in Canada, 1964.

39 Canadian Transit Handbook, 2nd. ed. (Canadian Urban Transit Association and the Roads and Transportation Association of Canada,

1985),: 23-4 - 23-5.

40 Gene Swimmer, "Militancy in Public Sector Unions," in Mark Thompson and Gene Swimmer, eds., Conflict or Compromise: The Future of Public Sector Industrial Relations (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984),: 147-196.

41 Ontario Labour Relations Board, Monthly Report, May 1983-December 1983. In one case the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen obtained bargaining rights for all bricklayers and apprentices employed by Metropolitan Toronto, the City of Toronto and the Metro Toronto Housing Corporation (September 1983).

42 James Thwaites, "Union Growth: Dimensions, Politics and Policies," in Amarjit S. Sethi, ed., Collective Bargaining in Canada (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1989),: 113, 121.

43 Cited in Wilfrid List, "C.U.P.E. studies picket line power over 15 years," The Globe and Mail, September 13, 1979,: 5.

44 Wilfrid List, "C.U.P.E. studies picket line power over 15 years," The Globe and Mail, September 13, 1979,: 5.

45 T.J. Plunkett, "Municipal Collective Bargaining," in J.F. O'Sullivan, ed., Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Toronto: The Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1973),: 7.

46 S.J. Frankell and R.C. Pratt, Municipal Labour Relations in Canada: A study of some of the problems arising from collective bargaining between municipalities and municipal trade unions (Montreal: The Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (C.F.M.M.) and the Industrial Relations Centre, McGill University, 1954),: 35-44.

47 Ontario Municipal Personnel Association, Ontario Municipal Labour Relations Handbook (Toronto: 1975),: 14-15.

48 See: Krause and Price, op. cit. for a general discussion of this problem.

49 Municipal World, 92, 1 (January 1982),: 1.

50 Allan O'Brien, "The Uncomfortable Partnership: A Look at the Provincial-Municipal Relationship," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold Ltd, 1980),: 168-69.

51 Allan O'Brien, "Father Knows Best: A Look at the Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Ontario," in Donald C. MacDonald, ed., Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1975),: 163-64.

52 The Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves appeared before the Select Committee of the Ontario Legislature on Labour Relations 1957-58, to argue against the repeal of Section 78 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. It was the only local government association to make a representation to the Committee. Ontario, Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Labour Relations, Proceedings, 1957-58.

53 Ontario Municipal Association, "Report of the Special Committee on Labour Relations of the Ontario Municipal Association," Endorsed by the Executive Committee, August 22, 1965; adopted by the Convention in General Session, August 24, 1965.

54 Jean Courmier, Manager, Labour Relations, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, March 1984.

55 M. Solski, Mayor, Town of Nickel Centre, "A Proposal for the Establishment of a Municipal Labour Relations Service," Position Paper presented at the Annual Convention, Association of Municipalities of Ontario, August 8-11, 1976,: 2.

56 The three service levels were:

1. A basic data gathering and distribution service which should provide an up-to-date service on all data related to contract provisions, settlements, trends, arbitration, etc., plus analysis, covering all types of municipal labour contracts to assist municipal governments in all facets of labour relations. This service would be available through mailings and telephone;
2. The services outlined in (1) above, plus qualified personnel to provide labour relations consultative services by mail, phone or personal contact from a central location;
3. The services outlined in (1) and (2) above, but in addition to provide sufficient qualified staff to deliver a full labour relations service in the field including collective bargaining and arbitration in both interest and rights disputes. Ibid.,: 5-6.

57 Ibid.,: 5-6.

58 Ibid.,: 9.

59 Courmier, op. cit.; See for example: A.M.O. Reports 40: "Compulsory and Binding Arbitration," September 1980.

60 See for example: S.J. Frankell and R.C. Pratt, op. cit; M.Z. Prives, Unionism and the Merit System in Municipal Labour Relations in Canada (Montreal: C.F.M.M., 1958); Antal Deutsch, Provincial Legislation Governing Municipal Labour Relations: A comparative study of provincial labour relations legislation governing municipal employer-employee relations (Montreal: C.F.M.M., 1960).

61 "Meet Your Associations: O.M.E.A. - A.M.E.U.," Electrical News and Engineering, May 15, 1951,: 76, 86.

62 In 1988, the M.E.A. was directly involved in contract negotiations between Pickering Hydro and the Utility Workers of Canada, Local 1.

63 Association of Municipal Electric Utilities of Ontario, Annual Report, 1967 - 1972.

64 Ontario Municipal Electric Association, Annual Report, 1968, 1970.

65 Canadian Transit Handbook, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canadian Urban Transit Association and the Roads and Transportation Association of Canada, 1985),: 3-36 - 3-37.

66 Canadian Urban Transit Association, Proceedings 1949-50: 45th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Transit Association, June 12-14, 1950; Proceedings 1952-53.

67 Canadian Transit Handbook, 2nd ed., op. cit.,: 23-8.

68 See John G. Kelly, The Structure of Labour Management Relations in the Ontario Transit Industry (Toronto: Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 1984),: 132.

CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSIONS

The thesis examined the proposition that the emergence and growth of local government unionism in Ontario could be explained in terms of the hypothesized relationships identified in the aggregate union growth literature. Five hypotheses were assessed:

1. That the growth and development of unionism among local government employees was positively influenced by changes in the size, distribution and composition of the local government employment;
2. That compensation related factors had a positive impact on the growth and development of local government unionism;
3. That public policy played an important, positive role in promoting the growth and development of local government unionism;
4. That union variables positively influenced the growth and development of local government unionism, and;
5. That employer attitudes and behaviour towards local government unions generally inhibited their growth and development.

This approach was necessitated by the absence of an integrated theoretical model in the aggregate union growth literature. What exists are a number of discrete hypotheses concerning the relationship between specific determinants and union growth. It has been argued that the main reason for this is the theoretical underdevelopment of the systems approach to the study of industrial relations. In its Canadian variant,

as articulated by Craig¹, it is largely devoid of theoretical underpinnings. The development of an integrated theoretical model in the Canadian context has been further hampered by preoccupation with quantitative modelling and statistical success. The approach encourages the exclusion of variables which defy quantification. It also results in the use of extremely crude proxies, determined largely by the availability of data, in an attempt to model complex relationships. This is particular true in the context of economic determinants. Finally, the focus on the aggregate level has not been particularly helpful. Rose and Chaison² clearly demonstrate the inability of such constructs to explain disaggregated phenomenon such as the development of national unionism in Canada. The lack of an integrated theoretical model has been a major obstacle to the development of a comprehensive understanding of local government union growth. Having examined the different hypotheses individually in detail it is still uncertain how they relate to one another. Overall, the absence of a unifying theme is clearly problematic.

The principal findings of the thesis are summarized and critically assessed below.

A. Synopsis of Research Findings

1. Economic Determinants

Local government is first and foremost in the business of service provision, much of which is labour intensive. Changes in the nature of service provision will of necessity ultimately be manifested in the employer-employee relationship. The economic determinants of union growth must therefore be firmly situated in the changes that occurred

in this role between 1935 and 1963. During the Great Depression soaring relief expenditures coupled with widespread property tax delinquency exerted tremendous pressure on municipalities. The typical response was to reduce labour costs by cutting hourly rates, shortening the work week and laying off employees. In sharp contrast, the tremendous demand for service provision in the post-war period resulted in significant employment growth.

The thesis assessed the influence of both labour force and compensation related variables on local government unionism. In general, economic determinants appear to impact primarily on the propensity to unionize. It is assumed that the propensity to unionize is to a very large degree a function of the employee's level of dissatisfaction with the existing terms and conditions of employment.

a. Labour force variables

It has been argued that important changes occurred in the pattern of local government employment at approximately the same time as widespread local government unionism emerged. Expanding employment was shown to have a significant impact on aggregate union membership growth. In addition, the decentralization of employment, general increase in work unit size and tendency toward greater bureaucratization in employee-employer relations were identified as positive contributors to union growth. With respect to unemployment, its impact on unionism was negative, in the short-term. In large part, this was due to its dampening effect on the opportunity to organize. Over the long-term, it appears to have served as a source of worker grievances. The high unemployment of the 1930s played a particularly

crucial role in the appearance of unionism, by reducing labour turnover. Prior to the Depression, high turnover was common in the utilities and probably in municipal employment as well. With this escape hatch closed, workers were forced to attempt to better their terms and conditions of employment where they worked. From an occupational perspective, the prediction that workers possessing a strategic advantage will typically be among the first to unionize was confirmed, but with the caution that the craft union structure of the Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) may also have played a role. Finally, it was concluded that, while labour force composition is important from a descriptive perspective, its contribution to union growth is uncertain.

b. Compensation Related Variables

It has been argued that compensation related variables played an important role in growth of local government unionism, primarily through their positive influence on the propensity to unionize. The relationship between inflation, money and real wage trends and the union growth is consistent with that predicted in the literature. The results were less satisfactory from the comparative perspective. The emergence of significant unionism among general municipal employees roughly coincides with the disruption of established wage relationships with other groups. With the exception of labourers, there is no indication of a similar disruption of comparative wage relationships in hydro-electric power. In urban transit, comparative wage analysis reflected union performance in collective bargaining, more than it pertained to union growth. Overall, both classes of economic

determinants appear to interact with local government union growth in a manner consistent with the hypotheses.

The study of labour force trends and compensation is primarily intended to provide a window on the terms and conditions of employment. The crucial question is how good a window does an assessment of these variables provide? As noted at the end of Chapter 7, there are other features of the employment relationship that are not readily captured by dealing with wages or changes in the size of the labour force. There is also an unfortunate tendency to become mired in the statistics and to lose sight of both the broader context and the dynamism of the employment relationship. Ideally one would like to interview unionizing workers to ascertain precisely why they elected to organize. For example, employees may have willingly accepted substandard wages in return for other benefits, such as job security. In such a case low wages might not be an important consideration in the decision to unionize. Unfortunately this avenue is not readily available, given the length of time that has passed. The typically incomplete records of both employers and unions pose another obstacle. Nevertheless, individual case studies afford at least some potential to get more complete view of employment relationship and to identify the factors contributing to unionization.

2. Political Determinants: The Public Policy Framework

Favourable labour relations policy is said to positively influence the propensity to unionize by legitimizing unions and collective bargaining. More important, however, is its effect on the opportunity to organize. The aggregate union growth literature assumes employer

opposition to unions to be a largely inherent characteristic. Hence, it must be contained if workers are to exercise free choice concerning union membership. Compulsion is, therefore, extremely important from the perspective of regulating employer behaviour and enhancing the opportunity to organize. It has been shown that public policy did not contribute to local government union growth in the manner anticipated in the hypothesis. Local government employees were subject to a policy of exceptionalism in the application of labour relations legislation for the entire study period. Until 1950, they were specifically excluded unless their employer elected to opt-in. After 1950, they were included, but the employer had the right to opt out. As a consequence a substantial portion of local government unionism developed outside the bounds of the Labour Relations Act. The positive influence on the propensity to unionize would have been extremely weak prior to 1950. While it gained strength after the amendment, its influence was still muted by employer control of access. With respect to the opportunity to organize the hypothesis is at odds with the evidence on two counts. First, the majority of employers did not oppose union activity by their employees. Some did, but even this opposition diminished over time. Second, employers controlled access to the legislation. If they agreed to allow a union access to the Labour Relations Act, it was tantamount to voluntary recognition. From a public policy perspective, employers were in an excellent position to oppose the unionization of their employees. They could have discriminated against union activists and even resorted to wholesale dismissals, if necessary. The aggrieved employees would have had no recourse. Public policy is not, therefore,

a primary determinant of local government union growth during the study period. The focus of inquiry must shift to employer characteristics, for clearly their general acceptance of unionism was critical.

Clearly the hypothesis is too crudely formed. Unlike the private sector, employer hostility to unions cannot be accepted as a given in the local public sector. The capacity of local authorities to circumvent the compulsive aspects of the Labour Relations Act provided an excellent means to oppose unions and yet it was not widely used to this end. In fact, many bargaining relationships existed outside the Act. What needs to be examined are those features of the legislation and the collective bargaining relationship that might encourage a local authority to opt-out.

3. Organizational Determinants

Organizational variables influence both the propensity and opportunity to organize, although their impact on the latter is considerably stronger. Overall, it is apparent that organizational factors played a decisive role in both the growth and development of local government unionism. They exerted a fundamental influence over both the structures and relationships that emerged.

a. Union Variables

It was hypothesized that the growth and development of local government unionism was positively influenced by a number of union variables. Union growth strategies, tactics, and resources, inter-union rivalry and competition, relations with central labour bodies, militancy and leadership are all said to have a positive effect. The aggregate union growth literature assumes that in the

operationalization of these factors the direction of causation runs from an established union centre to unorganized groups of workers. It has been demonstrated that this was not the case for either the National Union of Public Employees (N.U.P.E.) and the National Union of Public Service Employees (N.U.P.S.E.). In both cases unionism grew from the bottom up. Initially, these organizations were fiercely independent and primarily concerned with representing their membership. They commonly displayed little sense of labour solidarity, even when it came to other classes of local government employees in the same locale. These characteristics impeded the construction of union centres and slowed the overall process of union building. These forces eventually moderated in the N.U.P.S.E., but continued to plague the N.U.P.E. throughout its existence. They continue to be reflected in the highly decentralized organizational structure of the Canadian Union of Public Employees.

It has been shown that union growth strategies had a significant impact on both the growth and nature of the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. This was particularly true of the former, which expanded rapidly due to a combination of aggressive organizing and mergers with other labour bodies. In the case of the N.U.P.E., the formation of a national union was the dominant objective among the T.L.C. directly chartered locals. Its creation was justified by the need to service existing unions, rather than to promote new organizing. As a consequence after 1955, the N.U.P.E. appeared to drift, without a conscious growth strategy.

The resources available to support union organizing are said to be positively related to union growth. In this case, it is clear that both

the N.U.P.S.E. and the N.U.P.E. lacked the resources to have a serious impact on new organizing until the late 1950s. The International Association of Fire Fighters (I.A.F.F.) was also able to organize virtually its entire constituency, despite the apparent absence of resources. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and the Amalgamated Transit Union operated in a more conventional manner.

Inter-union rivalry and competition are hypothesized to be positively correlated with union growth. This was found to be true for local government unionism. Again, this was particularly the case for the N.U.P.S.E., which was in danger of being swallowed up by the the N.U.P.E. and the I.B.E.W. following the merger of the T.L.C and the Canadian Congress of Labour (C.C.L.) in 1956. It has also been pointed out that competition produced shifts in growth strategy. Unable to compete directly with the I.B.E.W. in hydro-electric power, the N.U.P.S.E.'s predecessor, the National Organization of Civic, Utility and Electrical Workers altered its jurisdiction and began to organize in less competitive fields.

Relations with central labour bodies are said to be positively related to union growth. It has been shown that the N.U.P.E. received considerable support from the T.L.C. in their efforts to form a national union and generally organize their constituency. There is some evidence to suggest that support for the N.U.P.S.E. may have been more equivocal. From the union's perspective both the C.C.L. and its successor, the Canadian Labour Congress, were much more concerned with containing new organizing by the union than in assisting it. Unfortunately, there is no documentation from the Congressional level

to substantiate this.

The hypothesis also anticipates that worker militancy has a positive influence on the growth of unionism. It has been documented that local government employees were noted for lack of it. Militancy was not, therefore, a major contributor to the growth of local government unionism during its formative period.

The role played by leadership is the last union variable to be considered. In the case of local government unionism, it has been shown that leadership exerted a positive influence. Its relative contribution to the overall growth of unionism is less certain. The use of archival material highlights the contribution of union leaders, and tends to submerge that of others. It is all too easy to attribute a decisive role to a particular individual simply by virtue of the position held.

b. Employer variables

It was hypothesized that employer attitudes and behaviour towards local government unions generally inhibited their growth and development. This specification is consistent with the the aggregate union growth literature, which on one hand posits a positive relationship between employer acceptance of unionism and union growth, and on the other anticipates a negative response. It has been shown that for the most part employers accepted the unionization of their employees. The coercive influence of labour relations legislation was unnecessary and, in any event, non-existent. This had a positive impact on both the propensity and opportunity to organize. Acceptance legitimized unionism in general and reassured the wary. The implications for the opportunity to unionize are obvious.

To understand employer acceptance, it is necessary to determine the impact of unionism and collective bargaining on employer decision making. It is completely erroneous to project contemporary practice back in time. It has been argued that acceptance occurred largely because of the nature of the unions involved. For the most part, these organizations were not militant and tended to operate more like employee associations than trade unions. From a collective bargaining perspective, employer discretion was not seriously limited. Substandard wage levels relative to the private sector and the frequent inclusion of prohibitions against job action provide ample evidence of superior employer bargaining power. Early union leaders also tended to be deferential in dealing with employers. They were extremely concerned with maintaining a positive image and being seen to act in a responsible fashion. In some cases, this resulted in the union actually pressuring employees perceived to be abusing benefits, such as sick leave provisions. The image of the "civic servant" still held considerable currency at this time, although its power had diminished by the 1960s. Finally, it has been argued that acceptance may have been opportunistically motivated. Some employers undoubtedly agreed to the unionization of their employees in anticipation of electoral reward. This was particularly important, given the substantial public support for unions at this time. For the most part, these organizations were non-partisan and apolitical, despite the leanings of the unions to which they belonged.

It can also be argued that employers did not realize the implications of recognizing and bargaining with a union representing

their employees. In some cases bargaining units were formed which included both management and those employed in a confidential capacity relating to labour relations. It was apparently not evident why such personnel should be excluded. The problem was clearly exacerbated by the primitive state of human resources management in local government.

The issue of societal support of unionism clearly needs to be addressed in the context of employer response to unions. The attempt to operationalize societal support for unions in political support for a particular political party is inappropriate. This is not to suggest that public support is unimportant, but rather that it must be measured in a different way.

B. Implications

The manner in which local government unionism developed has important implications for contemporary collective bargaining. The structure of bargaining tended to become fixed soon after bargaining relationships were established. As unionism progressed through different classes of employees, additional layers were added, both in terms of union locals and collective agreements. No concerted attempt was made to rationalize the system. Moreover, decentralization was not perceived to be a problem. From the union perspective it enhanced internal "democracy", while on the other side it allowed specific local authorities to deal directly with their own workers.

The provincial government generally adopted a laissez-faire attitude to the entire development of local government unionism and collective bargaining. Certain classes of employees, such as fire fighters and police, lost the legal right to strike in the late 1940s.

However, to a large degree this legislation only entrenched accepted practice. In addition, both groups gained full statutory bargaining rights, something that was to evade other local government employees for almost another twenty years. The one exception to this general observation is the Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act of 1965. Overall, local government labour relations evolved in an unplanned fashion. This was equally true for both employers and unions. When bargaining rights were extended to public employees in the senior levels of government, the collective bargaining systems were designed with specific objectives in mind. Employers determined the form that collective bargaining with their employees would take. Whether their objectives were subsequently achieved is beyond the scope of this discussion. Local government authorities, however, lacked both the statutory authority and coordinating mechanisms to attempt to orchestrate the development of collective bargaining by their employees. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that they were capable of doing so even if the opportunity had arisen.

Initially, most local government unions were weak, highly decentralized and not very militant. The latter was true even of the international unions organizing in this area. Employers typically possessed an advantage at the bargaining table. Substandard wages were common in general municipal employment and employees were frequently limited as to their rights to job action. Moreover, exclusions from statutes such as the Unemployment Insurance Act and employment standards legislation further consolidated the position of employers. Some attempts were made by employers to coordinate their activities,

but overall this was not seen as a serious concern. The one possible exception to this was in urban transit. Here a well established international union and a deteriorating economic situation in the industry after World War II forced employers to take the coordination of their bargaining efforts and collective bargaining in general far more seriously.

By the 1960s, there is evidence that this situation had begun to change. In 1963, the process of union building was largely completed with the creation of the C.U.P.E. Although internal conflict would continue for some time, the resources available to support member bargaining were substantial. The level of union militancy also began to increase. Both factors were evidenced in gains at the bargaining table. In the early 1960s, municipal labourers once more gained the comparative wage advantage relative to common labour. They had not held this position since the early 1940s. This shift would later be used to support claims of "excessive" union bargaining power.

With the exception of the late 1930s, most of the development of local government unionism occurred in the context of economic prosperity. This changed in the 1970s. Economic performance slackened and a new term "stagflation" was coined to describe the malaise. As the economic crisis mounted, restraint, cutbacks and deficit reduction became the watch words. Ideologically, the tenets of "neo-conservatism" gained wider acceptance. It was in this context that the alleged "excesses" of collective bargaining in the public sector came under attack. This was ultimately manifest in the introduction of wage controls directed specifically at the public sector in the early 1980s.

Local government employees were once more subject to exceptionalism in their labour relations.

The first period of exceptionalism ended in 1966, largely because employers lobbied the provincial government for the repeal of Section 89 of the Labour Relations Act. The whole policy of exceptionalism had been premised on the right and competence of local authorities to make decisions appropriate for their own circumstances. As noted previously, this was also evident in exemptions from employment standards and other legislation. In 1982, exceptionalism returned in the form of wage controls. However, unlike the earlier provisions, the operating premise now specifically questioned the right and competence of local authorities to deal with their own employees. Following the removal of controls program, the provincial government sought to maintain control over wages through the inter-governmental transfer system. Overall, the position of local government authorities shifted from that of a decision maker in the first case to merely another regulated party in the second, much like the unions involved.

From the provincial perspective, collective bargaining by local government employees was initially acceptable because it did not threaten the fiscal viability of employers. There are numerous examples of provincial intervention in local government affairs to ensure fiscal integrity. Free collective bargaining became increasingly unacceptable when it was seen to place this fiscal viability at risk. Because so much of what local government does is labour intensive, wages typically account for sixty per cent or more of total operating expenses. In these circumstances it is all too easy to identify unions as the source

of government financial woes. Local autonomy in employer-employee relations was also supported when a threat was not perceived.

The consolidation of employer associations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, plus the generation of greater support for member bargaining was primarily due to the fiscal crisis in local government. The decentralized structure of local government and tradition of local autonomy in decision making has impeded these efforts, especially in the case of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario. Overall, employer efforts at coordination have clearly not kept pace with those of their employees. In the future, employer associations will likely play both a greater and more direct role in member collective bargaining. The initiatives of the Municipal Electric Association attest to this. To date there have been very few initiatives in the broader based bargaining and the concept still garners little real support from employers and unions alike. This does not, however, mean that changes in bargaining structure will not eventually be forthcoming.

The central issue at the root of all of this is not whether local government employees should receive "fair" compensation for the work they do. Substandard wages amount to a subsidization of the local authority by the employee and as such are unacceptable. Justifications based on an appeal to "public service" are equally dubious. The main problem is determining the appropriate mechanisms to achieve this "fairness". Free collective bargaining has traditionally been the instrument of choice in the determination of local government compensation. As has been illustrated, the relative balance of power between employers and unions has gradually shifted over time. Initially

employers had the advantage. Gradually union bargaining power increased and ultimately a collective bargaining crisis was perceived. Condemning unions and free collective bargaining because of the inadequacies of employers at the bargaining table clearly fails to address the true problem. Simply put, employers must improve their level of competence in collective bargaining and in employer-employee relations in general.

The evidence suggests that employers emerged from the controls period with a far greater appreciation of the need for restraint. In labour relations this has been manifest in "hard bargaining" in contract negotiations and aggressiveness in the administration of the collective agreement. While it is still too early to tell, this may mark the beginnings of yet another shift in relative bargaining power, this time in favour of the employer.

Notes

¹ See: Alton W.J. Craig, The System of Industrial Relations in Canada, 2nd. ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1986),: 1-45.

² Gary N. Chaison and Joseph B. Rose, "The Structure and Growth of the Canadian National Unions," Relations Industrielles 36, 3 (1981),: 530-51.

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