Torah in the Diaspora: A Comparative Study of Philo and 4 Maccabees

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Abstract

This thesis examines how Judaism was Hellenized by comparing how difference, boundaries, and syncretism function in both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Recent historical and anthropological methods demand rejection of old approaches to these works which differentiated between the Judaism and the Hellenism in them and were often dominated by attempts to show where these authors’ intellectual fidelities lay. By re-evaluating ideas of boundaries and identity, this thesis argues that these authors could be committed to the ends of both Judaism and Hellenism. This necessitates recognition that identity and boundaries are ultimately products of individual self-consciousness; these authors attempt to understand the world around them using multifarious resources. While the Torah is vitally important to the Jewish identity of both these authors, it becomes a symbol which transcends perceived boundaries between Judaism and Hellenism and becomes applicable to both paradigms.

Keywords

Judaism, Jewishness, Jews, Hellenism, Hellenization, 4 Maccabees, Philo, Symbol, Identity, Boundary, Torah, Law, Natural Law, Ancestral Law, Diaspora, Alexandria
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Chapter 1

1 Introduction and Literature Review

1.1 Introduction

Though the Hellenization of Judaism was ubiquitous in the Graeco-Roman world, the question of what Hellenistic Judaism was is far from settled.\(^1\) Sometimes used as a catchall title, or subdivided by various geographical locations or cities as though each one presented a homogenized center of Judaic thought, the reality is that Hellenistic Jewish theology and philosophy does not present a fixed position at any point in time but rather many evolving discourses.

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\(^1\) There are ongoing discussions of whether the term “Judaism” is accurate and/or legitimate. Shaye Cohen traced the emergence of “Judaism” as an “ethno-religion” in *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 109-138. Daniel Boyarin argues that the mutual emergence of Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity defined both in *Border Lines: The Partition of Judeo-Christianity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). The term “Judaism” is further problematized by Seth Schwartz, as is the term “religion.” He argues that it was not until the branding of “Judaism” as a religion and its interaction with Christianity (300-400 C.E.) that Jews turned inward and became pronounced religious communities in *Imperialism and Jewish Society 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 198. Daniel Schwartz, examines the problem of translation into English terms in “‘Judean’ or ‘Jew’: How should we translate *Ioudaios* in Josephus?” in *Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World*, ed. Jörg Frey, Daniel R. Schwartz, and Stephanie Grippentrog (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 3-29. In his article, “Jews, Judeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient History,” *JSJ* 38 no. 4-5 (2007): 457-512, Steve Mason critiques the use of “Judaism” as a religious category by historians, arguing that such categories are based on an anachronistic use of the concept of religion. He proposes that up to the 3rd C.C.E. the designators “Jew” and “Judean” were primarily ethnic and geographic. On the question of “Judaism” and “Hellenism,” Wayne Meeks argues that the use of these concepts create a hermeneutic power dynamic that seeks to label ancient authors as one or the other in “Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy: Toward a Social History of the Question,” in *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide*, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 17-28. For the similar issue of problematization of the terms “Hellenism” and “Hellenization,” see Philip S. Alexander, “Hellenism and Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical Categories,” in Engberg-Pedersen ed., 63-80. Alexander says that Hellenism is a modern ideological construct, “a highly charged and value-laden concept in the discourse of post-Enlightenment European thought” (67). Despite their problematic nature, this study uses the designators “Jew” and “Judaism” to describe both the ethnicity and the religious positions of Philo and 4 Maccabees because of the historiographical necessity for categorization. In addition, “Hellenism” and “Hellenization” will be used to designate the cultural context(s) in which Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees were constructing identity.
Two authors who have been seen, among many others, to embody the formation of Jewish identity in the Diaspora are Philo Judaeus and the unknown writer of 4 Maccabees. These two works are similar in many ways. They both appeal to the four Stoic virtues, both try to connect Greek concepts of virtue to Jewish life and practice, and both proclaim the importance of the Jewish law to philosophy and ethical living. Both works also present Jewish history as containing the answer to two significant problems with which Hellenistic philosophy was grappling, namely, the failure to produce moral perfection in its followers and the inability of reason to eradicate the passions.

Two theories about Jews and Hellenization which dominated past approaches to these works will be challenged and expanded on in this study. The first is that Jews and Hellenism were fundamentally at odds. In the past this resulted in multiple studies which claimed that these authors were fully committed to either Torah supremacy or Hellenistic philosophy and used the other insincerely. With new approaches to the study of Hellenization, this assumption has been challenged, yet the literature review below will show that recent studies of Philo and 4 Maccabees have utilized fresh approaches such as gender studies and post-colonialism without adequately correcting this assumption or expanding on the complicated issue of identity using anthropological theory. This study

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will approach both works as products of authors who believe that Judaism as a philosophy can and must answer, not only the philosophical problems of Judaism, but Hellenism as well. This challenge will be referred to throughout this paper as a crisis of applicability.

The second theory which is prevalent in studies of Jewish history is that the Torah was fundamental to Jewish identity in the Diaspora. This study will not contest this but will suggest that, for both Philo and 4 Maccabees, Torah functioned on a symbolic level in addition to other ways such as textual and behavioural. In Philo’s work, Torah is a corporeal manifestation of the unwritten or natural law of God, and in 4 Maccabees, it carries the universal significance and ethical demands of an ancestral law. For both of these authors, the Torah becomes the bridge between Jewish and Hellenistic philosophy. This shows that some conceptions of boundaries between Judaism and Hellenism are over-simplistic; Torah becomes the justification for Hellenization. Torah legitimates the philosophical discussions of both works; however, its symbolic meaning is flexible enough to allow differing philosophies as well as local forms of patriotism.

Consequently, both authors have unique and disparate interactions with similar Hellenistic ideas. Both present relatively different approaches to the same basic problems in Hellenistic philosophy based on distinct understandings of the Torah and the Jews’ place in the world; however, both works are driven by Hellenistic concerns.

So, the purpose of this study will be to draw conclusions about first century Diaspora Hellenization from a comparison of these two works. These are not necessarily true for all Diaspora Jews but, nevertheless, the conclusions drawn here may lead to a better understanding of the way that they interacted with Greek culture and philosophy. Since
this study will be a comparison, the shorter work of 4 Maccabees will dictate the issues presented. For both works, Torah operates as a symbol which gives the authors a sense of identity but is not so restrictive that they cannot use it to justify and clarify Hellenistic ends. Furthermore, both works show that Diaspora Judaisms could not be inward focused. The rise of Hellenism and the abstraction that accompanied it created the need for overarching systems which could not only identify the place of Judaism in the world but also the place of Hellenism. Hellenism provides the framework for Jewish self-perception and is, ironically, used to justify both Jewish inclusivism and exceptionalism. Finally, the realities of life in the Graeco-Roman poleis are clear in Philo and seem to be present in 4 Maccabees as well, specifically, that Jews were in danger of being relegated to a lower social class. This means that both of these works attempt to justify Jewish philosophy/theology as a serious philosophical force which produced Hellenistic ethics better than Greek philosophy could. Consequently, even in attempting to display Jewish thought, they are governed by a Hellenistic framework and both end up arguing that Jews make better Hellenes.

1.2 Synopsis

Although the issues will be summarized briefly here, it is necessary to provide some background to both 4 Maccabees and Philo. The beginning of critical approaches to 4 Maccabees can be attributed to Erasmus, who focused on the issue of martyrdom in relation to the upheavals of the Reformation. Among nineteenth century scholars it

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garnered increased attention as a text which represented “a great advance… in the application of Platonic wisdom and Greek rhetoric.” Increasing interest in biblical manuscripts, as well as Constantin von Tischendorf’s discovery of Codex Sinaiticus, led to text critical study of the work. 4 Maccabees is witnessed in Codex Sinaiticus (fourth century C.E.), Codex Alexandrinus (fifth century C.E.), and partially (omitting 5:11-12:1) in Codex Venetus (ninth century C.E.); it is notably absent from Codex Vaticanus (fifth century C.E.). It is also witnessed in the Syriac Peshitta under the title: *The Fourth Book of Maccabees and their Mother*, where it seems to be reliant on Codex Sinaiticus.

Early scholars debated the question of authorship and the belief that Josephus penned 4 Maccabees (Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.* 3.10) was almost unanimously discarded because of the absence of stylistic elements of Josephus’ works. The question of geographic origin also dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth century and Alexandrian provenance was frequently proposed because of the author’s Hellenizing tendencies and obvious Diaspora roots. However, Jakob Freudenthal suggested that the linguistic use fit much better in

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7 To my knowledge David S. Williams is the only modern scholar who has argued for Josephan authorship in *Stylometric Authorship Studies in Flavius Josephus and Related Literature* (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1992).
Asia Minor. Jan Willem van Henten recently echoed this argument for an Asia Minor provenance saying that, in comparison to 2 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees shows a shift toward interest in Seleucid rulers. This argument is unconvincing since, at the time of writing, the Seleucids were primarily remembered in written sources or cultural memory. Furthermore, as Chapter Four will suggest, it was in the interests of someone presenting Jewish belief as a superior philosophical system to downplay the factionalism among Jews which is presented in 2 Maccabees. Van Henten’s argument is more convincing when he argues that the inscriptions from Asia Minor match the funerary epitaph style of 4 Maccabees.

The broad identification of Asia Minor led to the narrow argument for the work originating in the Jewish community at Antioch. Perhaps the best case for Antiochian origin is made by H. Anderson, who suggests that Jerome knew of a cult of Maccabean martyrs there. The work may be in veneration of an Antiochian martyrs’ shrine, and the author speaks of a special occasion which the work is celebrating (4 Macc 3:19). Finally, the word ἀντίψυχος is only elsewhere used in Ignatius (Eph. 21; Smyrn. 10; Poly. 2, 6), Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Hist. Rom. 59.8), and Lucian of Samosata (Lex. 10), which might be evidence of an Asia Minor or Antiochian provenance by geographical proximity.

9 J. Freudenthal, Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft (IV Makkabäerbuch) (Breslau: Schlettersche Buchhandlung, 1869), 112.
10 Jan Willem van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 80.
11 van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs, 80.
Further research into the possibility of 4 Maccabees being composed in Rhodes might prove beneficial because of the potential influence of Posidonius of Rhodes, which will be examined in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, though discussion of origins is certainly important, a century of these arguments has proven inconclusive. This study will focus instead on the clearly demonstrable fact that Philo and 4 Maccabees are responding to very similar ideological challenges of Hellenism, whether or not they were composed in the same location.

There are several elements of 4 Maccabees which enable a rough dating of the text. It cannot be dated with certainty earlier than the Common Era, since the jurisdictional connection between Syria, Cilicia, and Phoenicia, which the text mentions (4 Macc 4:2) did not happen until the reorganization of these provinces by the Julio-Claudian emperors (18 – 55 C.E.). Attempts to date the text have also focused on the portrayal of the Jerusalem temple, but this argument is unconvincing. R. B. Townshend argued that the work was pre-70 C.E. based on several apparent references to the temple and suggested that 4 Maccabees was composed between 63 B.C.E. and 68 C.E. Both Elias Bickermann and Moses Hadas echoed this, but many scholars have suggested that the references to the temple which they cite are unconvincing (4 Macc 4:20, 14:9). Urs Breitenstein, for example, argued that 2 Maccabees was the source for 4 Maccabees and that it was penned after the destruction of the temple because the author removed most

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references to the temple from 2 Maccabees. Therefore, there is not enough evidence in the text to clearly support whether it was written before or after the fall of the temple, especially since a lack of interest in the temple cult should not be surprising for a work written in the Diaspora.

Linguistic and philological efforts to date the work have been the most successful. Elias Bickermann, for example, traced the replacement of the term νομικός with γραμματεύς (2 Macc 6:18; 4 Macc 5:4). He also noted that the word for religion (θρησκεία) was only used from the time of Augustus on. Ultimately, there is general consensus that the text was produced in the first century or the early second century C.E.

One of the most unique linguistic characteristics of 4 Maccabees is its Atticizing style, which employs frequent use of the optative mood. Furthermore, Bickermann says that it is written in the “choicest ‘Asianic’ Greek” of the period, following Eduard Norden who divided the work into two parts, the first of which is “simple and essential,” and the second of which contains a frantic description of the torture which is dressed up with the highest rhetoric.


18 Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem, 203.


22 Bickermann, Studies in Jewish and Christian History, 1: 277; E. Norden, Die Antike Künstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance (Leipzig: Teubner, 1898), 418-419 (“...sind von geradezu rasender Leidenschaftlichkeit, aufgesetzt mit allen Mitteln der höchsten Rhetorik, die er mit grosser Geschicklichkeit handhabt”); on Greek rhetoric in the work see Freudenthal, Die Flavius Josephus, 19.
Emil Schürer calls the genre of 4 Maccabees either *discourse* or a *sermon*. Despite this, Schürer and others have rejected the proposition that 4 Maccabees is an example of synagogue preaching because of the lack of reference to any scripture in the opening.\(^{23}\)

According to James Davila, the intended audience is certainly Jews. He identifies this through the use of the first person plural: “the implied author and the implied audience are Torah observant and of Jewish ethnic origin.”\(^{24}\) Furthermore, they are Jews who are aware of the choice which they faced between following the Torah or compromising in order to receive a better standing in a Graeco-Roman society.\(^{25}\) This study will ultimately propose that people in any Hellenized Diaspora settlement could be the intended audience of the text, but the advanced language and philosophical nuances of the work are unlikely to be grasped by anyone without extensive education.

Since less mystery surrounds the figure of Philo of Alexandria, some biographical information will suffice here. The historical figure of Philo of Alexandria was from a wealthy family, and his lack of financial constraints meant that he could focus on a deep study of both the Hebrew Bible/Septuagint and Greek philosophy.\(^{26}\) It is uncertain whether or not he knew Hebrew and/or Syriac, as Ferdinand Delaunay suggested over a century ago.\(^{27}\) Philo is only referenced elsewhere in the primary sources by Josephus, who called him the brother of Alexander the Alabarch:

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But Philo, the principal of the Jewish embassage, a man eminent on all accounts, brother to Alexander the Alabarch, and one not unskilful in philosophy, was ready to betake himself to make his defense against those accusations; but Caius prohibited him, and bid him begone; he was also in such a rage, that it openly appeared he was about to do them some very great mischief. So Philo being thus affronted, went out, and said to those Jews who were about him, that they should be of good courage, since Caius’s words indeed showed anger at them, but in reality had already set God against himself. (Ant. 18.1)  

It is also known from his own writings that he went to the embassy of Caligula to petition him about plight of the Jews in Alexandria in 40 C.E. (Legatio ad Gaium). In the 20th and 21st Century he has been considered a key figure in both Middle Platonism and the birth of Neo-Platonism.

1.3 Literature Review

1.3.1 Hellenization and Judaism

As stated in the introduction, theories of Hellenization have evolved in the last century to challenge the thesis that Judaism and Hellenism were always diametrically opposed to one another, as well as the assumption that there were always clear distinctions between the two. A short review of this progression is provided here, but Lester Grabbe (2008) has written a more extensive survey of the literature on this topic than this work can provide. This section will use Grabbe’s overview as a basic framework, referring to other works where necessary. The other challenge is that it cannot simply be assumed that the Hellenization of Judaism was the same in the Diaspora and in Palestine but, since not all works make this distinction, they must be discussed as a group. W. W. Tarn (1927) represents a type of early view of Hellenization which is based on the assumption that the

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29 Schürer, Literature of the Jewish People, 323.
extant texts represent the historical realities of Judaism. In this approach, Jews were thought to have challenged Hellenization because of their strong faith and refusal to compromise.\(^{31}\) Elias Bickermann (1947; 1949; 1962) expanded on this theory by arguing that the Jews had a unique encounter with Hellenization because of the triumph of the Maccabees which, he says, gave the Jews the power to accept some Hellenistic cultural influences but to keep the Torah central.\(^{32}\) The appeal of Bickermann’s approach was his avoidance of the issue of, as Martha Himmelfarb says, “how much is Jewish and how much is Greek in a particular text;” he focused instead on what the reception of Hellenism by Jews looked like.\(^{33}\) Victor Tcherikover (1959) accepted Bickermann’s theory, but divided the responses to Hellenization according to social class. He suggested that it was the upper class of Jews who adopted Hellenistic ways, juxtaposed against the majority of the regular people who kept faithful. He furthermore applied this analysis to the Diaspora, saying that because the Jews offended the Gentiles around them by not accepting their gods and not associating with them, they were consequently forced to remain in a lower class.\(^{34}\) Martin Hengel (1974) also built on Bickermann’s thesis, but he began with the assertion that Jews were universally Hellenized. This meant that there was a fraction of the Jewish population which embodied Bickermann’s model of resistance to Hellenism, while most others embraced it like Tcherikover says, but that it is virtually

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impossible to identify which groups were which since all Jews eventually succumbed to the process. Arnaldo Momigliano (1975) rejected Hengel’s view and, ultimately, Bickermann’s on the basis of a lack of evidence for the way that Hellenization in Palestine functioned. Perhaps his greatest contribution to the study of Hellenization has been to reverse the direction of impact, and examine the effect which the Jews (and others) had on the Hellenes. This led to a study by Louis Feldman (1977), in which he suggested that not all Jews were Hellenized. Feldman has been frequently criticized, however, for his underlying assumption that Judaism which Hellenized was not true Judaism, therefore his article is a rather visceral response to Hengel’s claims that Stoicism and Platonism influenced Judaism, especially the Rabbinic movement.

What these works ultimately highlighted was the complexity of the relationship between Jews and Hellenes, and two excellent studies by Erich Gruen (1998; 2002) have shown this and will frame the approach of this study to Philo and 4 Maccabees. In *Heritage and Hellenism*, he dismisses the claim that Judaism and Hellenism were at odds with one another either in the Diaspora or Palestine, arguing instead that Hellenism was widely accepted and desired by many Jews. This work also rebutted Bickermann’s theory that the Hasmonean dynasty (140-37 B.C.E.) represented the defeat of Hellenization in Palestine, and he shows how extensively Hellenized the Hasmonean leaders were. In *Diaspora: Jews amidst Greeks and Romans*, he makes the case that the presence of Torah

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was a consistent boundary marker for the Jews, but he also argues that Jewishness and Hellenism were not necessarily seen to be in conflict with one another. Ancient authors, including Josephus and 4 Maccabees, wrote about Torah observance in an ironic way to highlight the Jews’ consistency and the Greeks’ inconsistency towards their own philosophy. As Gruen says, “ethics, not ethnics, matter.” So, “the Hellenic medium thus served to convey Jewish commitment to Torah in contrast with the irrationality and atrocities of the Greeks themselves.”

Two scholars have recently reiterated the idea that Jews had a unique and measured contact with Hellenism. Martha Himmelfarb (2005) has defended the legitimacy of Bickermann’s argument and suggests that the Jews were able to have the unique contact with Hellenism that they did precisely because of the Torah: it remained the cultural point of reference in contact with the outside world. She furthermore says that Philo (and Josephus) “(adapted) Greek ideas and values in the service of a new understanding of Jewish tradition, which is, none the less, distinctively Jewish.” This has been echoed in a recent study by Louis Feldman (2006).

The question of Greek influence on the Jews in Palestine is to be viewed in the way the Greek language and traditions were adopted into their own native and distinctive time-honored background… The question thus becomes how did the Jews manage to maintain their indigenous character and unique self-definition and time-honored culture and values while adapting to contact with the Greek language and culture?  

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40 Ibid., 217.
He extends this approach to the Diaspora, citing synagogue evidence to claim that Diaspora Judaism was even more aware of the danger which Hellenization presented, and therefore was more zealous.\(^{43}\)

1.3.2 Jewish Identity in the Diaspora

The last decade has seen a renewed focus on the difficult issue of Jewish identity. These works have both elucidated and complicated the understanding of Diaspora issues. Graham Harvey (1998) examines the title “Hebrew” which is used in 4 Maccabees as well as other Pseudepigrapha; he argues that it was often an indicator of religious faithfulness rather than simply an ethnic designator.\(^{44}\) In fact, recent studies have challenged the idea of clear-cut cultural boundaries between Jews and Hellenes as literary constructions; the lived realities of Jews, especially in Diaspora, were likely more complicated. Martha Himmelfarb (1998) suggests this, and she argues that 2 Maccabees was the first work to display awareness of cultural boundaries between Hellenism and Judaism.\(^{45}\) Shaye Cohen (1999) echoes this, and he attributes the emergence of this dichotomy to Rabbinic Jews. He argues that, in fact, there were very few identity markers for Jews in the Hellenistic Diaspora.\(^{46}\)

This has caused the adoption of anthropological concepts of boundaries as messy places of interaction between Jews and Hellenism. Tessa Rajak (2001) suggests that boundaries

\(^{43}\) Ibid., 10.


\(^{46}\) Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness*. 
were always in motion and that they were the place where a great deal of activity happened, over and against the idea of a dividing wall between the two in the pre-70 Diaspora.\textsuperscript{47} This is similar to the approach taken by Maren Niehoff (2001) in \textit{Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture}, who uses the categories of anthropologist Frederik Barth to examine Philo’s construction of boundaries. These, she says, are based on the recognition of matrilineal descent as legitimate in order to present Jerusalem as the mother city. She therefore suggests that in Philo it is the Egyptians, not the Romans, who constitute an “other.”\textsuperscript{48} The approaches of both Rajak and Niehoff are complemented by a book edited by John Barclay (2004) which contains several essays about the nature of identity formation in Diaspora. In particular, his introduction identifies some modern approaches to Diaspora study including the recognition of both “local and translocal identities,” the “ambiguity of cultural self-expression,” and the influences of the Diaspora as a site of “contested power.”\textsuperscript{49} What these studies have ultimately acknowledged is that Jewish identity in antiquity is a more complicated issue than ever imagined. As Rajak says:

Far from being the isolated, inward-looking entities of earlier stereotype and caricature, these Jews… could and did function as active members of the pagan cities in which they lived. From this insight, some scholars have moved on, correctly I believe, to an even newer appreciation of the potential limits of integration and the cost of preserving a communal identity… rather than focusing on these Jews exclusively as practitioners of accommodation, we have moved on to ask how they might have expressed resistance, defiance, subversion, or at least reserve.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47} Tessa Rajak, \textit{The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome} (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
The recent focus on anthropological approaches to identity in the study of Jewish history is in many ways a culmination of the work done by anthropologists in the second half of the last century. Since recent interdisciplinary approaches to Jewish history have helped to elucidate the process of Hellenization and the evolution of diasporic identity, this type of approach will also be fruitful to apply to this study of Philo and 4 Maccabees. Barth’s (1969) seminal work on boundaries argued that cultural boundaries do not function as walls but rather they create opportunities, an approach which has only recently been applied to the history of Judaism, especially by Rajak (above). Several of Barth’s works will provide the foundation for the methodology of this thesis.\(^{51}\)

### 1.3.3 Diaspora Identity, Symbol, and Patriotism

Anthropological approaches can also serve to elucidate how Torah functioned in the Diaspora, not by denying that there were many Jews who examined the Torah’s teachings and sought to live by them, but by providing the added dimension of the Torah as a cultural symbol. Therefore some understanding of symbols and their relationship with patriotism in the Diaspora can clarify the role which Torah played. The anthropologist Anthony Paul Cohen (1994) argued that society is made up of self-conscious individuals and that the problem with studying social organization is that the individual’s consciousness is never adequately taken into account when viewing the homogeneity of

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the group. Therefore symbols can have varying meanings to different individuals. His distinction that symbols carry meaning but do not “impose” it is crucial to this study. One of the most effective ways to understand the social homogeneity to which a symbol can contribute is to recognize the symbol as a bridge between the individual and the group; this is a particularly effective tool in understanding/creating nationalism or patriotism. Anthony D. Smith (2009) provides an approach to symbols which he calls ethno-symbolism. He examines how symbols provide meaning for national groups and suggests that symbols carry meaning on a number of societal levels. The application of such anthropological understandings of symbols to a historic study of Diaspora Jews is in its nascent stages, and one recent study which draws upon these theories is by Nina Livesey (2010), who argues that the reason why circumcision was effective as a cultural symbol was because of its ambiguity. She says that in 4 Maccabees circumcision was used to signify control over the passions, while in Philo it was a vital part of marking Jewishness, yet also important in controlling the passions.

52 Anthony Paul Cohen, Self Consciousness: An Alternative Anthropology of Identity (London: Routledge, 1994). The use of Cohen’s study of individual self-consciousness here is not an argument that Diaspora Jews in the Mediterranean societies perceived themselves to be individualistic. Rather, the benefit of applying Cohen’s definition of a symbol to the ancient world is that its ambiguity enhances the perception of collectivism but meaning is negotiated on an individual level. For a discussion of collectivism in the Mediterranean world, see Bruce J. Malina, “Collectivism in Mediterranean Culture,” in Understanding the Social World of the New Testament, ed. Dietmar Neufield and Richard E. DeMaris (London: Routledge, 2010), 17-28.

53 Cohen, Self Consciousness, 18.

54 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach (London: Routledge, 2009), 13. Smith’s ethno-symbolism is meant to draw from three prevailing theories of nationalism: modernism (the belief that nationalism is a byproduct of the modern industrialized nation), neo-perrenialism (that some nations existed before the modern state), and postmodernism (that the nation is a construct), see 6, 10, 11.

55 Nina E. Livesey, Circumcision as a Malleable Symbol (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).
1.3.4 Past Approaches

This literature review has thus far focused on methodological approaches to Hellenization and Jewish identity, but will now turn to the issue of how the assumption that Jews and Hellenes were in some way at odds governed past approaches to Philo and 4 Maccabees. This initially appeared in studies of 4 Maccabees in discussions of how Stoicism fit into the text and, consequently, how genuine that Stoicism was. R. B. Townshend (1913) thought that there was a uniquely Jewish approach to passions in the text and that they should not be eliminated, like the Stoics taught, but controlled by reason. His contemporary, C. W. Emmet (1918), upheld the Jewish goals of the author by arguing that the writer wanted to “commend… the accepted Greek philosophy of the day, which he regards as fully embodied within the Mosaic Law.” Bickermann’s “The Date of Fourth Maccabees” was originally published in 1945 and has now been republished several times. He attributed the creation of 4 Maccabees to the inspiration which 2 Maccabees provided for the Jews. Hadas (1953) utilized Bickermann’s arguments extensively, arguing that the work is much more Jewish than Stoic. As evidence of this Hadas emphasizes the difference between control and extirpation of emotions; he suggests that Greek philosophy was a tool of Judaism for the author. Hadas’ argument that control of the passions rather than extirpation was an original Jewish idea was effectively refuted by Robert Renehan (1972), who argued cogently that the author draws from Posidonius of Rhodes’ teachings on the control of the passions. Furthermore, Renehan argues against attempts to identify the author’s philosophical “school,”

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suggesting rather that the first two centuries of the Common Era were a period of
philosophic eclecticism; this work will build on Renehan’s article and attempt to further
identify the nuances of Middle Stoicism which affect the work.  
Modern interpretations,
as will be shown below, turned to other areas of study without particularly exploring the
possibilities for the understanding of Hellenization which Renehan’s work creates.

A similar dichotomy has dominated the approaches to Philo throughout the last century
and into this one, usually focusing on the question of how Jewish Philo was or, by
contrast, how Greek. Interpreters of Philo usually claim that this loyalty to either Judaism
or Greek philosophy made the one subservient to the other. Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough
(1935) argued that Philo was merely an opportunist attempting to create a unique Jewish
mysticism which echoed the mysticism of the religions around him, but that he held
relatively little regard for the scriptures. This is very different from the position taken
by Harry Austryn Wolfson (1947). In his expansive work on Philo, he attributes virtually
all of European philosophy to the advances made by Philo while maintaining throughout
the work that Philo was extremely faithful to Judaism. Bickermann (1962) also argued
that the Jews, including Philo, merely adopted the Greek philosophy which they
considered to be to the service of God, but that their primary loyalty was to Judaism.
Samuel Sandmel (1969) contested both of these positions, suggesting that Wolfson and

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60 Robert Renehan, “The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees,” Rheinisches Museum für
Philologie 115 (1972): 223-238.
61 E. R. Goodenough, By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel of Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven: Yale
63 Bickermann, From Ezra to the Last of the Maccabees, 181.
others are overly optimistic and that, in fact, Philo subverts Judaism to Greek principles.\textsuperscript{64} Yehoshua Amir (1973) disputed this and argued that Philo does show complete loyalty to the text of the Bible, even though his approach is allegorical.\textsuperscript{65}

Alan Mendelson (1988) argued that Philo saw the Jews as supreme, and that the Torah was a marker of that supremacy. He says that Philo thought that others in the world around could see this supremacy, and therefore even Gentiles were beginning to observe the Torah.\textsuperscript{66} David Dawson (1992) suggests that Philo “subordinates” Greek concepts into scripture as well as the meanings of classical texts, while arguing that meaning in text is not limited to the text itself but is drawn out and created by a community of interpreters.\textsuperscript{67}

Recent studies have focused on the synthesis between Judaism and Hellenism in Philo’s writing as scholars have recognized that Philo’s relationship with Hellenism is much more complicated than simply acceptance or rejection. Nevertheless, even these studies have not, in every case, moved beyond the quest for Philo’s true loyalty. Ellen Birnbaum (1996) said that a distinction can be made in Philo’s work between Israel and Jews. Therefore, Israel is a spiritual entity, a metaphor for all true philosophers, while the category of Jews is an ethnic identity; her study attempts to discuss the dichotomy between the two, as people who want to see God (Israel) and people who are bound by

the law (Jews). 68 The tension between Philo’s Judaism and his Hellenistic environs is discussed in David Winston (2001) who suggests that Philo is a complete believer in mystical Platonism but still believes that the Bible and its interpretation can fit into this Platonic worldview. 69 This is contrasted by Jutta Leonhardt (2001), who examines Philo’s approach to worship and argues that he clothes Jewish worship in Hellenistic forms while maintaining the supremacy of Judaism. 70 Jonathan Dyck (2002) discusses the culture of Alexandria and imperial policies of Rome, in response to both Dawson’s and Daniel Boyarin’s readings of Philo as a cultural revisionist, and he argues by contrast that “far from revising (let alone subverting) Greek culture and imperial rule, Philo was endorsing it.” This endorsement was a result of Philo’s allegorical interpretation which essentially accepted Graeco-Roman intellectual supremacy and conformed to it. 71 Himmelfarb (2005) has recently revived Bickermann’s arguments by suggesting that Philo’s primary loyalty was to a literal Torah observance, and that he made Platonism subservient to it. 72 So, studies of Philo have still not really moved beyond the question of whether his loyalty was to Judaism or Hellenism, and more work is justified to explore further the complicated relationship that Philo has with both.

One of the ways scholars have suggested that Philo universalized Judaism, thereby bridging the gap between Judaism and Hellenism, is with a type of nascent natural law

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72 Himmelfarb, “The Torah Between Athens and Jerusalem,” 113-130.
theory; this will be discussed in Chapter Three. The issue of whether Philo had a natural law philosophy is a well-worn subject. It has evoked serious debate since Adolf Hausrath (1875) said that Philo’s view of the Jews was as sojourners in the world who, through the enactment of virtue, fulfill a type of universal law. Goodenough (1962) discusses the *logos* in Philo as the governing force of the world which streams from God and says that obedience to the law in Philo is identical to “conformity with the nature of God.” In this vein, it was Helmut Koester (1968) who scrutinized dozens of ancient texts and suggested that Philo had invented the idea of natural law. However, Richard A. Horsley (1978) later concluded that Philo was dependent upon Cicero for the concept of natural law.

This study will therefore suggest that some form of natural law is present in Philo. David T. Runia (1986) examined the use of Plato’s *Timaeus* in Philo, a source that influenced several of his philosophical ideas including the role of the *logos*, the influence of the demiurge in the world, and its role as creator. Ronald Williamson (1989) saw the implantation of the *logos* into creation as a fundamental part of Philo’s understanding of law, so that the patriarchs before the law were already following it. Marcus Bockmuehl (1995) also identifies the *logos* as the constitution of the universe and claims that, for Philo, nature and God are inextricably linked, if not interchangeable; this shows the influence of Stoicism (*Contempl. 70; Opif. 143; Mos. 2.14, 51*).

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(2005) traces the roots of a natural law tradition which includes Philo.\textsuperscript{80} A strong case against Philo’s belief in natural law has been made by Himmelfarb (2005), who follows Bickermann in saying that Philo rejects the superiority of the spirit of the laws as seen in some other Alexandrian writings and instead transforms Platonism to fit the Torah (she cites Migr. 89-92).\textsuperscript{81}

The approach to the complicated relationship that both 4 Maccabees and Philo had with Hellenism justifies an overview here of the scholarship on several of the issues which will be used to explore this topic. In suggesting that both works are interested in Hellenistic ends, a review of what those ends are is helpful. Both works are primarily interested in the fulfillment of virtue (ἀρετή). Graeco-Roman and Jewish ideas of virtue appear in both texts and, again, there is discussion over which is prominent. The character of the mother in 4 Maccabees dominates the closing of the work (4 Macc 13:19; 15:1-16:24) and has fascinated recent scholars. David deSilva (2002) suggests that her devotion to the Torah to the point of death is a type of philosophical subversion. He argues this by comparing, with Plutarch and Aristotle, the way in which the parental affection of the mother for her children shows that she trusts God.

The more frenzied the experience of passion through which Torah observance enables one to remain steady in one’s moral purpose, the more fully he can laud the Jewish way of life as the superior ethical philosophy.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{81} Himmelfarb, “The Torah between Athens and Jerusalem,” 113-129; Bickermann, From Ezra to the Last of the Maccabees, 181.
Mary Rose D’Angelo (2003), in contrast, examines the relationship between Roman “family values propaganda,” in an effort to lead to the concept of “family orthodoxy.”83 She examines the presence of εὐσεβία as a virtue; this notion, she says, was used by Jewish writers after Augustus in an attempt to avoid persecution by appeal to familial virtues. In particular, she focuses on the mother taking on masculine qualities.84 Susan Haber (2006) compares the use of martyrdom in 2 Maccabees, which she says was likely was the origins of the mother martyr traditions in 4 Maccabees. Here the mother martyr chooses circumcision for her sons and passes on instruction. Haber makes specific reference to the role of breast feeding in passing tradition, a nurturing act linked to the education in the law, which is presented in Chapter Five. She furthermore says that the mother standing for the law is shocking in light of the perceptions of women at the time.85

The second Hellenistic model of virtue throughout the text which has attracted a great deal of attention concerns the use of athletic imagery, which is prominent in both Philo and 4 Maccabees. The scholar who first identified this motif in these texts is Victor C. Pfitzner (1967). In his study on Paul, he examined how athletic imagery marks striving for virtue; he called this an “agon motif.”86 This agon motif is usually connected to the issue of reason controlling the passions, a common theme in both Philo and 4 Maccabees. George W. E. Nickelsburg (1981) differentiates the victory which reason has over the

84 Ibid., 145.
passions between two types, pleasure and pain, and he says that the cardinal virtues stand over the passions as well (4 Macc 1:20). David C. Aune (1994) presents one of the few direct comparisons between Philo and 4 Maccabees on this subject and claims that mastery of passion is different for different people in Philo, whereas mastery of the passions is possible for all in 4 Maccabees. Many of the works discussed above take up the issue of reason and passions and will be more fully discussed in Chapter Five.

The virtue that is achieved from observance of Jewish Torah is also clearly a key component of 4 Maccabees. DeSilva (1995) argues that obedience to the Torah is the sole source of virtue.

The author’s demonstration seeks to show that the sort of reason which achieves the Greek ideal of virtue is devout reason, which is reason choosing wisdom as taught in God’s law, the Jewish Torah.

He therefore argues that the author’s primary loyalty is to Torah observance. His monograph (1998) takes a similar line of argument, suggesting first that the author returns to the stories of the Maccabees to promote the value of upholding the Torah, even during oppression. For Jan Willem van Henten (1997), by comparison, the virtue achieved is derived from martyrdom, which he says is greatly emphasized by the author of 4 Maccabees when compared with 2 Maccabees as its source text; 4 Maccabees is framed as a contest to test Jewish virtue. John J. Collins (2000) recently described 4

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90 deSilva, *4 Maccabees*, 11.
Maccabees as advancing a unique apologetic, which “lies in its combination of a rigid, uncompromising obedience to the law” but having “a thorough command of Greek language and rhetoric and a veneer of philosophical terminology.” He also emphasizes that it presents an agon motif.  

One final approach to 4 Maccabees is worth mentioning here. The difficulties of Diaspora and the Hellenistic process has been explored recently in a post-colonial analysis by Desilva (2007), who describes how the author of 4 Maccabees is speaking from a place of subjection, as a minority in a Greek city. Antiochus IV is representative of Empire, who these Jews stand against. He says that the work is meant to criticize the Roman imperial system through Antiochus, who “does not take sufficient trouble to understand the inner logic and ‘reasonableness’ of the way of life they so readily ridicule and marginalize.”

This literature review has been brief by necessity, but is an attempt to identify the issues that a comparative study of Philo and 4 Maccabees must address. Studies of Hellenization have moved beyond the simple differentiation of Jews and Hellenes as always at odds by recognizing that boundaries are complicated and messy places where a great deal of interaction and evolution occurs. It is this type of challenge which both of these authors face and embody through their rapprochements between Judaism and Hellenistic philosophy. The use of anthropological theories of boundaries, symbol, and identity has begun over the last decade, but there is still a great deal of work to be done on these fronts. This study will be an attempt to continue to move beyond discussions of how

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Jewish or Greek Philo and 4 Maccabees were, in an attempt to understand better through comparison how both works interacted, adopted, and rejected elements of Hellenism, and to identify how they used the Torah in this process.
Chapter 2

2 Methodology

In order to understand better both the historical context of Philo and 4 Maccabees and to begin to sketch a methodology which can govern this thesis, this chapter will identify anthropological approaches to cultural boundaries and attempt to integrate these with the relevant historical issues. This will include a discussion of how Torah could function as a symbol for both of these authors, which will be further examined in the next chapters. It will also continue the recent trend of moving beyond a discussion of which worldview Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees were primarily committed to and attempt to do justice to the way in which the interaction with Hellenism happened for both authors. It will ultimately argue that the desire for a universally applicable system meant that Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees were genuinely concerned for the ends of both Judaism and Hellenism.

2.1 The Crisis of Applicability

As the literature review has shown, the assumption of a “struggle with Hellenism” carried through the twentieth century and is even present in recent studies by Feldman and Himmelfarb, though admittedly this is a minority position today. Furthermore, in light of modern anthropological theory, the struggle motif must be rejected in a study of Diaspora Jews. If the idea of a struggle between Judaism and Hellenism is over-simplistic, than the idea that assimilation and boundary creation were the responses to this struggle must be as well. In 1977 Tcherikover wrote that Jewish identity fluctuated
between two mutually contradictory principles: between the ambition to assimilate arising from the Jew’s desire to exist among strangers by his individual powers, and the adherence to tradition, induced in the struggle for existence by the need of support from the strong collective organization represented by the community.  

The failure to understand this struggle properly has carried over to more modern discussions of identity and assimilation in the Diaspora. John Barclay, for example, recently considered diasporic identity creation to be a process of “negotiation,” and he identified three factors which governed that negotiation: the feeling of belonging elsewhere, the inability to be full members of either culture, and the susceptibility to power struggles within communities which governed their ability to interact with the host culture.

Erich Gruen says that the responses to the perceived challenge of assimilation have varied. The first is the one which he said has dominated modern scholarship: a type of gloominess that portrays the people as constantly yearning after some real or perceived homeland. The second, which does in some way seem to represent the spirit of both Philo and 4 Maccabees, is that the Jews recast their identity and became people of the book. Gruen advocates caution to both approaches.

It is not easy to imagine that millions of ancient Jews dwelled in foreign parts for generations mired in misery and obsessed with a longing for Jerusalem that had little chance of fulfillment.

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94 Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews, 346.
96 Gruen, Diaspora, 232.
97 Ibid., 234.
It seems then that both of these are biblical motifs which scholars have imposed on Diaspora Jews. Therefore the relationship Jews had with Hellenism should be seen as much more complicated.

We can therefore abandon simplistic dichotomies. Diaspora Jews did not huddle in enclaves, isolated and oppressed, clinging to heritage under threat. Nor did they assimilate to the broader cultural and political world, compromising their past, ignoring the homeland, and reckoning the book (in Greek) as a surrogate for temple. The stark alternatives obscure understanding.

The assumption of longing for homeland and a struggle with Hellenism have frequently led to the belief that Diaspora Jews made a conscious choice as to where their allegiances would lie and the assumption that they always chose from two identities: one to believe in with their heart and one to pay lip service to, as Chapter One outlined. The first question which needs to be addressed, consequently, is whether the Hellenization process allowed room for genuine commitment to both Hellenism and Jewishness by Diaspora Jews and, based on Philo and 4 Maccabees, the answer is a resounding yes.

In order to show that Philo and 4 Maccabees may have been genuinely concerned with the ends of both Hellenism and Judaism, it is necessary to discuss briefly the threat which Hellenization posed. The crisis which it presented to the ancient world has been called one of abstraction, prompted by large-scale cultural interactions. Building on Karl Jasper’s interpretation of 800-200 B.C.E. as “the Axial Age,” Benjamin Schwartz suggests that increasing contact between peoples during this time period resulted in an amplified form of cultural awareness; this was a “standing back and looking beyond.” He argues that, though there were precursors of this type of contact at other historical

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98 Ibid., 235.
99 Ibid., 6.
points, this was the first time that it happened on a large scale.\footnote{Benjamin Schwartz, “The Age of Transcendence,” \textit{Daedalus} 104 no. 2 (Spring, 1975): 1-7, esp. 3.} Hans Jonas claimed that Hellenization was a crisis on both a historical and philosophical level. The source of this, he said, was that the conquests of Alexander the Great created a unity of culture on a massive scale which, in turn, caused the abstraction of ideas and beliefs; this was primarily the movement of formerly nationalistic religions beyond territory.\footnote{Hans Jonas, \textit{The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity}, 3rd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 14-21.} The ensuing “spiritual crisis,” Jonas says, catalyzed widespread eschatological movements such as Qumran and Christianity.\footnote{For the rise of eschatology across the ancient world see T. F. Glasson, \textit{Greek Influence in Jewish Eschatology} (London: S.P.C.K., 1961); Adela Yarbro Collins, \textit{Cosmology and Eschatology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism} (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Lars Albinus, \textit{The House of Hades: Studies in Ancient Greek Eschatology} (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2000); J. Barr, “The Question of Religious Influence: The Case of Zoroastrianism, Judaism and Christianity,” \textit{JAAR} 53 (1985): 201-235; Jonas, \textit{The Gnostic Religion}, 3-4, 31.} It was manifested in the rise of transcendent ideas about God and the growth of “radical dualism of realms of being—God and the world, spirit and matter, soul and body, good and evil, life and death.”\footnote{Jonas, \textit{The Gnostic Religion}, 3-4, 31.} Consequently, this crisis has been perceived as the historical problem of mass contact between belief structures and competing philosophical ideas.\footnote{Andreas Mehl, \textit{Roman Historiography}, trans. Hans-Friedrich Mueller (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2011), 59.}

The rise of Alexander the Great and the Greek empires certainly prompted Hellenism, but it is important to recognize that Hellenization was primarily a socio-economic and cultural process rather than an imperial and militaristic one. His conquests would leave behind mercenaries in city centres around the Mediterranean; they would be joined by other Greek and Macedonian settlers to form a somewhat homogenous ruling class. This meant that social mobility, another feature of Alexander’s world, was dictated by
acceptance and imitation of the ideals of this ruling class; the remnants of this system were present in Philo and 4 Maccabees’ time.\textsuperscript{105} The division of the empire following Alexander’s death saw both the Ptolemies and the Seleucids concentrate on Mediterranean based empires, especially as the Seleucids were limited by the powerful Maurya Empire to the east; this enabled an increase of travel and diplomacy between Greek cities. However, from the Jewish perspective, the ensuing power struggle between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies in the Syrian wars made Palestine the primary battleground, which framed the stories of 4 Maccabees.\textsuperscript{106} The Seleucid’s power would begin its decline after losing much of Asia Minor to the Attalids, who were allied with the Romans.\textsuperscript{107} This accounts for the rise of Hellenization in Palestine itself, and the struggle for domination that came to be seen by the author of 2 Maccabees as a struggle of Hellenization versus Jewishness (2 Macc 4:13).

Philo and 4 Maccabees have often been described as battling between Jewishness and Hellenism, but why was Hellenization still an issue after the rise of the Roman Empire? On the one hand, their interest in Hellenism suggests that the issue was far from settled and that, even with the rise of the Roman Empire, the challenge that Greek culture presented had not diminished for Jews. Rome had itself faced the challenge of Hellenism and Hellenistic ideas and had its own ambivalent relationship with it. In 161 B.C.E. Greek philosophers were expelled from the city. This prompted a revival of Roman imperial mythology written by figures like Quintus Ennius of Rudiae and Marcus Porcius

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 124.
Cato, both of whom expressed disgust at the amounts of Greek literature and knowledge that were brought back to Rome from campaigns.\(^{108}\) Ironically, these nationalistic literary accomplishments relied heavily on Greek culture. Therefore, the perception that there was a struggle to be waged with Hellenism was not limited to Jewish literature. Ironically, however, these Roman voices of opposition were futile as the spread of Hellenism would become, both directly and indirectly, facilitated and increased by the rise to power of the Roman Empire well into Late Antiquity.\(^{109}\)

On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that, for both Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees, the relationship with Hellenism is more complicated than a simple struggle between two clear alternatives. The main evidence for this is that both authors are committed to satisfying the main goal of Hellenistic philosophy, the achievement of virtue; there is no reason to see their interest as insincere. 4 Maccabees is wholeheartedly committed to answering the question whether “pious reason is master over the passions” (4 Macc 1:1), and the work attempts to correct the king’s (Antiochus Epiphanes) assumption that observing the Jewish religion does not make one a true philosopher (5:7). Philo represents a much larger body of literature, but he also seems primarily concerned with answering questions of reason and the passions and whether Judaism was a serious philosophy (Mos. 1.25; Leg. 1.23). For this reason, it seems that the abstraction and challenge which Hellenism presented to Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees, without the

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benefit of modern pluralism, did not always signify a crisis of difference or struggle between two opposing worldviews but rather a crisis of applicability. It broadened the framework required to understand philosophical truth and the spectrum of problems which any philosophical or religious system had to answer. This seems to be true for both Philo and 4 Maccabees: both works seem concerned with answering the ends of Hellenistic philosophy as well as the concerns of Judaism (in both cases these are often one and the same), namely, the necessity for individual virtue and the need to deal with the passions. So, abstraction led to the broadening of philosophical and religious ends. It is not strictly a crisis which sought to create paradigmatic superiority but rather it sought to respond to and account for an ever-widening concern for applicability. This trend has been noted by Boyarin in his study of the Apostle Paul. He describes Paul’s ethos as being driven by “a Hellenistic desire for the One,” which he says “produced an ideal of universal human essence, beyond difference and hierarchy.”\(^{110}\) Without presenting it in quite so lofty terms, it does seem like a desire for universal applicability captures the spirit of these texts in some way.\(^{111}\)

That these Jews were committed to both Judaism and Hellenism can be seen as syncretism, but this should not carry with it a value judgment. As was shown above, religious syncretism in the Hellenistic world was widespread, brought about by a

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\(^{111}\) The desire for universal applicability is reflected in the Greek magical papyri where incantations frequently appeal to numerous deities from across the Mediterranean world. For one example, see *PGM I*. 262-347 in Hans Dieter Betz, ed., *The Greek Magical Papyri in Translation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1:11.
geographical connectedness which forced the contact of religious ideas. This syncretism is paralleled in the philosophical world by what the classicist Robert Renehan calls a period of “philosophical eclecticism” by the first century (and it is important to note that many Hellenistic writers considered Judaism to be a philosophy). To call any phenomenon “syncretistic” creates a difficulty in historical study. This is especially true in the study of religion, both because of the word’s essentialist preconceptions of the nature of religion and its judgmental overtones. The theorist Robert Baird has criticized the category of syncretism as “universal and inevitable” and he suggests that to call any religion “syncretistic” is, in effect, to say nothing. While it is true that the word should not carry judgmental overtones, examining the differences in the ways which Philo and 4 Maccabees syncretize worldviews is perhaps the best reason for comparison.

Approaching these works as attempts to legitimize and reconcile both Jewish and Hellenistic philosophy demands the move beyond simple understandings of difference in the works; this is corroborated by anthropological theories of ethnicity. On the issue of the creation of identity for both Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees as Diaspora Jews,

113 Renehan, “The Greek Philosophical Background,” 233.
115 Baird, Category Formation, 145, 148.
the work of anthropologist Frederik Barth makes it possible to see that these writers attempt to negotiate familiarity with their Hellenistic neighbors rather than difference. Barth calls ethnicity the “social organization of cultural difference” and encourages an enlargement of the view of culture.

Ethnic relations and boundary constructions in most plural societies are not about strangers, but about adjacent and familiar “others.” . . . They involve co-residents in encompassing social systems and lead more often to questions of how “we” are distinct from “them” rather than to a hegemonic and unilateral view of the other.116

This not only explains why Jewish authors would need to answer the challenges of Greek philosophy as well as Jewish practice, but it also shows why both works might highlight the Jews as superlative in fulfilling the Hellenistic goal of virtue. Philo turns to universal or natural law to explain why the Jews show the best way to fulfill Hellenistic philosophical goals. In 4 Maccabees, Jewish exclusivity is not defined in terms of Hellenistic philosophy being wrong or inapplicable; rather, Jewish exclusivity is possible because observance of Torah best enables the individual to achieve Hellenistic ends where the Hellenes had failed. So, rather than viewing these authors as having allegiance to one view or the other, Barth’s work better describes the way that Philo and 4 Maccabees interact with Hellenism:

[P]eople may use multiple images and perform a multiplicity of operations as they grope for an understanding of the world, fallibly exchanging, adjusting, and reconstructing their models as they harvest the experiences that ensue.117

As will be shown below, Barth’s work gives credibility to Himmelfarb’s view that the clearly framed challenge between Judaism and Hellenism represents a literary creation which was applied *ex post facto* to the events themselves.

Furthermore, the historical impact of persecution on Philo and 4 Maccabees complicates an understanding of the presentation of difference between Jews and Hellenes. The hope of avoiding persecution is also a commonly cited reason for the Jews’ adoption of Hellenistic philosophy. While 4 Maccabees is of unknown provenance, Philo’s Egypt in the first century of the Common Era saw a rise in anti-Semitism. It is possible that persecution of Jews increased because of the alliance with the Romans by the Jewish *ethnarch*, Hyrcanus, who assisted Caesar in his invasion of Egypt. In any case, responses to anti-Semitism in Alexandria can be seen in Jewish writings from as early as the *Letter of Aristeas*, which attributed the creation of the Septuagint to an attempt to alleviate Jewish persecution in that city. Several contemporary sources seem to show a Jewish motivation for showing Hellenism and Judaism compatible with one another; they face persecution for attempting to function in the Graeco-Roman *poleis*. The Boule Papyrus (19-20 B.C.E.) contains a petition to keep Jews, who its author considers to be “impure” citizens of Alexandria, off of the public records list and to ensure that they pay the poll-taxes which were imposed on lower-class Egyptians. Appeals were made to the emperor against the Jews. An example of this is the accusations of Isodoros and

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119 R. J. H. Shutt, ed., *Letter of Aristeas*, in Charlesworth, ed., 2:13. The dating for Aristeas is uncertain, it may represent persecutions as early as the third century B.C.E., or it may be a much newer composition.
Lampon to Emperor Claudius that the Jews were “wishing to stir up the entire world,”
and that they “do not have similar feelings (as the) Alexandrians, but the same fashion as the Egyptians.”¹²¹ Philo shows how offensive this claim is: he asserts that the Egyptians were by nature envious and that they disliked seeing anyone else succeed (*Fla. 29*).¹²²

Perhaps this accusation, more than any other, shows that the Jews of Alexandria desired to function on the level of the Graeco-Roman aristocracy, but were viewed as outsiders. This creates a problem however in identifying difference between Judaism and Hellenism; in many cases the difference is identified by antagonists rather than by Jews themselves. This may be further emphasized by the practical absence of visible identifying traits for Jews in the first century. Food laws and circumcision were the only defining factors, and circumcision was not necessarily a visible symbol (except at the baths) and food laws were in danger of being broken, a problem to which 4 Maccabees alludes (*4 Macc 5:19-20*).¹²³ This evidence again points to the possibility that Philo and 4 Maccabees considered themselves to be true Hellenes as well as true Jews, and that these two were not necessarily mutually exclusive.

### 2.2 Torah as a Symbol

This study will argue that one of Torah’s roles for Philo and 4 Maccabees was symbolic. Despite the absence of normativity in Diaspora Judaism on a general level, both works

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¹²¹ *CPJ* 2:78. no. 156c.
¹²² One papyrus records Emperor Claudius’ exhortation in 41 C.E. to the Alexandrians to do everything possible to get along with the Jews. His orders gave Jews some freedom to practice their own religions, but ordered them not to bring other Jews there, see *CPJ* 2:41 no. 153; Philo records the persecution in *Against Flaccus* (54-56) and his part in the delegation to Caligula to plead the cause of the Alexandrian Jews in *Embassy to Gaius* (25-31); 3 Maccabees (200 B.C.E.-70 C.E.) also records earlier persecution by Ptolemy IV, see H. Anderson ed., “3 Maccabees,” in Charlesworth, ed., 2:510-512.
follow one historical trend in Diaspora Judaism, the move to a higher reliance on Torah both before and after the fall of the temple.\textsuperscript{124} Jack Lightstone argues that even the advent of the synagogue \textit{circa} the third century B.C.E. did not introduce a holy site that would replace the temple; rather, through the synagogue movement, Torah became the instrument for “decentralizing the locus of sacredness and denationalizing it.”\textsuperscript{125} Lee Levine, in his study of synagogues, has noted that in Diaspora synagogues of Late Antiquity the Torah shrine became distinctive.\textsuperscript{126} In the past this prominence of Torah in the Diaspora led to the conclusion that Torah became some type of surrogate for the land, an idea which Gruen disputes.\textsuperscript{127} Emanuel Maier, for example, argued that Torah functioned as a mystical space in the absence of physical homeland, in a manner of speaking the Torah became the homeland.\textsuperscript{128}

The belief that Torah became a primary instrument of Diaspora Jewish self-identification is fairly widely accepted, but more study is needed of the question of \textit{how} Torah was an


\textsuperscript{126} Lee Levine, \textit{The Ancient Synagogue: The First Thousand Years} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 301.

\textsuperscript{127} Gruen, \textit{Diaspora}, 6.

identity marker. It cannot simply be assumed that the textual and nomistic interest in the Torah shown by the Pharisees and the early rabbinic figures carried over into the Diaspora, especially since this is not the case for Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees.

Viewing the Torah as a symbol is not an entirely new development, nor is the terminology clear; the mere introduction of the term “symbol” creates ambiguity. However, it must be recognized that ambiguity is a desirable trait for the relationship between symbol and patriotism, as will be shown below. The value of a symbol to cultures in contact, on the other hand, for Philo and 4 Maccabees, is that the ambiguity which accompanies it lends itself well to cross-cultural interactions (whether intentional or unintentional). Jacob Neusner argued that Torah was a symbol in the sense that it was “abstract and encompassing,” that it could stand for every element of Jewish life. This is supported by the increased prominence of the physical scrolls of Torah in Diaspora synagogues, the Torah as unit clearly played an important role in the gatherings of Diaspora Jews. Yet both authors’ interest in the Jewish law seems somewhat superficial. 4 Maccabees references the dietary laws, but seems more interested in the respect that faithfulness to the ancestral law commands and the Stoic virtues which it produces. The author does not highlight nuances in the law itself, and historical figures are simply used to show how they overcame their passions (4 Macc 4:2, 17, 3:16). Philo’s approach to Torah has been best outlined by Adolf Hausrath:

129 Gruen, Diaspora, 25, 118-119.
130 Jacob Neusner, Torah, From Scroll to Symbol in Formative Judaism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985), 3.
Where it (scripture) contradicted his own belief, it was re-interpreted allegorically. As the letter of Aristeas showed, the Jewish dietary laws were instead designed to contain the whole ethics of the Greeks. If they banned certain foods, it was because they want to teach that one should not associate with the unclean. If they prohibited the enjoyment of birds of prey, it was so that they (could) recommend justice and moderation.\textsuperscript{132}

Philo’s approach to the law, therefore, is to show that it is a container of deeper meaning: the allegorical. For both works the virtues which could be produced by following the laws were the primary good to be achieved in Torah observance, and both feel somewhat free to focus on Hellenistic ends. This should call into question how the Torah functioned as an identity marker. It seems that for both of these authors the existence of the Torah was just as important as extensive examinations of what the Torah actually taught. Could this be reminiscent of the flexibility of Torah in the Pauline writings?\textsuperscript{133}

The recognition of the extent to which Torah carries symbolic meaning for Philo and 4 Maccabees can help to elucidate social cohesion and patriotism among Diaspora Jews beyond extensive theories of nationalism, especially since such studies often focus on issues of territoriality or top-down nationalistic constructions, neither of which are appropriate to this discussion.\textsuperscript{134} This marks the difficulty of applying nationalistic theories to Diaspora Jewish identity. Questions of nationalistic sentiments or local patriotism in Philo and 4 Maccabees must be assessed without reference to an actual nation. Therefore, a theory of nationalism or patriotism, the term which will be used here,

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\item \textsuperscript{132} Hausrath, \textit{Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte}, 142 (My Translation).
\item \textsuperscript{133} John M. G. Barclay, \textit{Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews} (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 22.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Eric Hobsbawm provides a caution to applying nationalistic theories to history. He suggests that nationalism is a modern invention based on “the political nation,” and he critiques studies of ancient nations which claim that they were nationalistic as examples of what he calls “retrospective nationalism.” See Hobsbawm, \textit{Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 74. I take issue with Hobsbawm’s theory based on ethno-symbolic criticism, see Anthony D. Smith, \textit{Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism}, 14-18.
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must account for the nationalistic sentiments in these works without necessarily relying on territoriality.\footnote{Another method which would enable the study of patriotism without territorially would be to construct a socio-biological account similar to Pierre van den Berghe’s work. He describes ethnic communities and races as the push to kinship nepotism, in which the biological impulse is a “genetic behavioral predisposition.” This is a tantalizing approach which provides new explanations for things such as biological inheritance and bloodlines. See Van den Berghe, \textit{The Ethnic Phenomenon} (New York, Elsevier, 1981), 18-19.}

That the Torah carried symbolic meaning (in addition to literal meaning) provides a way to understand Diaspora patriotism and the flexibility which that carried for Philo and 4 Maccabees and, therefore, how it is possible that there was no struggle between Judaism and Hellenism. A symbol is valuable because it takes on multifarious meanings depending on the interpreter.\footnote{Mari Womak, \textit{Symbols and Meaning: A Concise Introduction} (Oxford: Altamira Press, 2005), 3; Raymond Firth, \textit{Symbols: Public and Private} (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1973), 65-66; Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays} (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 91-92.} Anthropologist Anthony Cohen suggests that symbols are often viewed with the faulty impression that every member of a group approaches a symbol in the same way. He says that it is not right to assume “the existence of common understandings and meanings among even closely knit groups of people.”\footnote{Cohen, \textit{Self Consciousness}, 17.} The value of a symbol is not that it carries an identical meaning for all members of a group, but rather that they \textit{think} that they are in some level of agreement because they all interpret the same symbol. The group provides the framework for the interpretation of the symbol; its ideologies influence how the individual perceives it. Cohen cites the impossibility of the symbol standing for something literally.

If symbols did indeed refer objectively to other things they would be redundant: why use a symbol if instead you can simply refer to the thing for which it supposedly stands? Their potency lies in their capacity to refer to those ‘other things’ in ways which allow their common form to be retained and shared among
members of a group, while not imposing on these individuals the constraints of uniform meaning.\textsuperscript{138}

Therefore, the next chapter will argue that Torah is that thing which signifies without imposing meaning in Philo and 4 Maccabees, and therefore both authors feel free to apply it to questions of Hellenism.

So, in the question of identity formation in the Diaspora and the relationship between Judaism and Hellenism, a symbol such as the Torah which is meaningful in various ways to various individuals can create a sense of group cohesion through a sense of patriotism. Ultimately, the ambiguity of the Torah as a symbol for Philo and 4 Maccabees is meaningful enough to provide group identity and patriotism but flexible enough to justify application to the problems of Hellenism. Therefore patriotism and a universally applicable system are not mutually exclusive. Anthony D. Smith’s view of ethno-symbolism provides the most cogent explanation for how the Torah could function as a marker of patriotism in Diaspora. Smith argues that ethnicity and symbolism interoperate as real coefficients in national identity, as opposed to the postmodernist view that identity is strictly a construction. He says that even leader-constructed nationalism does not create meaningful symbols in the life of the nation, but rather that it selects from symbols which already exist and politicize them because of the intrinsic and extrinsic value which they carry.\textsuperscript{139} Therefore this theory can operate on a functional level for both an ancient society and one not necessarily linked to territorially or a national leader. Smith explains how symbolic resources are to be understood in a culture.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{139} Smith, \textit{Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism}, 32.
For ethno-symbolists, that means analyzing communities, ideologies and sense of identity in terms of their constituent symbolic resources, that is, traditions, memories, values, myths and symbols that compose the accumulated heritage of cultural units of population. This is to privilege the domain of culture only insofar as we are dealing with the form, contents and appeal of particular ideologies and a sense of shared identity. Against the modernist emphasis on material and political domains, ethno-symbolists highlight the role of subjective and symbolic resources in motivating ideologies and collective actions.\(^{140}\)

The politicization, therefore, of existing symbols relates to nation building theory on a theoretical level, but in a study of Diaspora Jews it also explains the relationship between symbol and patriotism. The Torah as a unit can provide subjective meaning for Diaspora Jews and add cohesiveness to communal identity simply by virtue of its existence without appealing to content. As the next chapters will show, the text meaning of the Torah is important to Philo and 4 Maccabees, but the symbolic value provides the possibility of a subjective meaning beyond the text. So, both works appeal to the legitimacy of Torah as a whole.

It seems, therefore, that for these two works the symbol of Torah operates on two levels. The first is simply the creation of group solidarity.\(^{141}\) The second function is that a symbol serves as a bridge between the local and abstract reality. This can account for the connection between a Diaspora community and an abstract or translocal idea of Judaism. However, this symbolic power of Torah can also be seen as the bridge between text and meaning. As will be shown here, for both works the text serves as a localized form of a more abstract meaning, either natural law or ancestral law. For both works the abstract

\(^{140}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{141}\) Tamar Mayer, “National Symbols in Jewish Israel: Representation and Collective Memory,” in *National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative*, ed. Michael E. Geisler (Lebanon, N.H. Middlebury College Press, 2005), 3-34, esp. 4. Mayer cautions that symbols can become crystallized into “hegemonic ideology and monolithic nationalism,” but maintains that enduring symbols “crystallize the group’s consciousness and bring forth a sense of identity and solidarity with the group.”
meaning is what the truth of Torah points to, but it is also what the truth in Hellenistic philosophy points to. As it regards patriotism, the abstract meaning which Torah represents for Philo and 4 Maccabees is reminiscent of Benedict Anderson’s idea of a nation as an “imagined community.” He says, “It is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”

This may sound like an argument for the Torah as some type of metaphorical homeland, but this is not intended. Alon Confino criticizes Anderson for lacking an explanation of how the transition can be made between the tangible local reality and this “imagined community.”

Nationhood is a metaphor for social relations among millions of people: we need a method that can tell us about the way people devise a common denominator between their intimate, immediate, and real local place and the distant, abstract, and not-less-real national world. Such a method must also be a remedy to the artificial dichotomy between nationalism from above and from below by exploring nationhood as a process by which people from all walks of life redefine concepts of space, time and kin.

So, rather than simply thinking of Torah as metaphorical homeland, a much more productive view for the purpose of studying Philo and 4 Maccabees is to see the Torah as being a vehicle for transcending the everyday life of these Diaspora Jews and therefore providing an answer to the problem of abstraction which Hellenization created. Again, in order to avoid false dichotomies, this does not mean that Torah carries meaning in an abstract sense and not a local sense; rather, its power as a symbol is that it can do both. Furthermore, because the Torah as a symbol does not impose meaning on Philo and 4

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Maccabees, the language and concepts for understanding this abstraction of Torah come from the Hellenistic world in which the authors were immersed.

Therefore, understanding Torah as a symbol does not necessarily eliminate the necessity of observing its statutes, though it certainly seems to for Philo. The impact of social cohesion on Jews as a group would, according to Cohen’s thesis, come from the Torah carrying meaning without “imposing it.” It is the “representational power” which gives the Torah its applicability. Might this explain why Philo feels free to allegorize the vast majority of the Hebrew Bible, or why 4 Maccabees could use the issue of refusing to eat pork to claim that the outcome of Jewish observance of the “ancestral law” is superior Hellenistic virtue? It is not realistic to suggest that this symbolization of Torah was an intentional move by Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees. It most likely was not, but the reference to Torah creates a perception of some type of orthodoxy while also leaving the authors free to interpret that Torah using Hellenistic philosophy as they saw fit. The thing which forms the group, says Cohen, is that “symbols are individual things which provide an entry way into the group who shares commitment to those same symbols.”

So, recognition of a symbolic element to the Torah permits these authors to fully engage in local concerns. This will be explored in the following chapters. However, the balance of local participation and abstract connection to Judaism has been further identified in several other studies of the Diaspora. Gregory Sterling, in his study of Jewish self-

144 Mayer, “National Symbols in Jewish Israel,” 2; Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 92.
145 Cohen, Self Consciousness, 19.
definition in Alexandria, argues that two things are paramount: faithfulness to the ancestral tradition and the ability to participate fully in Hellenistic culture.\textsuperscript{147} This balance of loyalties is the view which will form the basis for the rest of this study, and Chapter Four examine the moves in Hellenistic philosophy which define both Philo and 4 Maccabees.

## 2.3 Rethinking Boundaries as Opportunities

One other area of anthropology from which a study of these two works benefits is that of cultural boundaries and ethnic identity. Frequently the field of religious studies (especially Jewish and Christian studies) is dominated by the ideal of a cultural or religious boundary which can be represented by outward movement. For past studies of Hellenization, this is usually a perceived boundary which the group intentionally sets up for protection.\textsuperscript{148} These views of boundaries rely on the assumption that a cultural boundary is some type of wall or the “edge of a container,” to which the group cognition and actions may expand but not pass.\textsuperscript{149} Frederik Barth has argued instead that the idea of a boundary as a wall needs to be expanded and that boundaries must be re-envisioned as things which create opportunities:

> Human activities perversely create such leakages through conceptual boundaries by reconnecting what has been separated. They arise above all from two sources: inventive behavioral responses to the imposition of boundaries, and the effects of social positioning.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Gregory E. Sterling, “‘Thus are Israel:’ Jewish Self-Definition in Alexandria,” \textit{SPhilo} 7 (1995): 1-18, as read in Collins, \textit{Between Athens and Jerusalem}, 15.

\textsuperscript{148} Bickermann, \textit{From Ezra to the Last of the Maccabees}, 181; Hengel, \textit{Judaism and Hellenism}.

\textsuperscript{149} Barth, “Boundaries and Connections,” 27.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 28.
He explains the opportunity for linkage, which is created by the imposition of a physical or social boundary, by using the image of a smuggler, for whom a boundary creates opportunity rather than limits. Boundaries, he says, are formed across complex linkages, and frequently the deterioration or acceleration of one link or another can change the way a boundary is perceived.  

Understanding boundaries as opportunities can enrich the interpretation of both Philo and 4 Maccabees by challenging several assumptions which have driven scholarship. First, the problem of “how much Hellenism was acceptable” was once thought to dominate the psyche of these works and Hellenistic Judaism as a whole, but as seen above it has recently been called into question on a methodological level, and seems inappropriate to Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees.  

Gruen has shown that the reality in Palestine was that the Hasmoneans, rather than gaining cultural superiority through the Maccabean victory and the establishment of the Hasmonean dynasty, actually resembled Greek client kings in every way. They adopted Greek ways of life including clothing and coinage.  

Gruen’s work dismantles the assumption that Judaism and Hellenism were constantly at odds and says instead that “the Hasmonaean age, in fact, discloses a complex pattern of reciprocal relations and mutual dependency that undermines the concept of fundamental antagonism.”

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151 Ibid., 34.
153 Gruen, Heritage and Hellenism, 2.
154 Ibid., 9.
So, once the assumption of “the struggle with Hellenism” is set aside, both works can be seen to be genuinely concerned with reconciling Hellenistic and Jewish philosophy, especially in an effort to be taken seriously as philosophers by their counterparts. Both works needed to be committed to the ends of Hellenism because of what this chapter has called a “crisis of applicability,” essentially that Hellenism raised questions to which these Jewish writers were concerned with providing answers. Boundaries and difference did not create separation, but rather presented opportunities to create universally applicable systems. The way in which Torah functioned as a symbol will be further examined in the following chapters, but it ultimately created the ability for these authors to espouse Hellenistic ends freely and still consider themselves to be committed Jews.
Chapter 3

3 Philo: Jewish Universalism through Natural Law

Philo mixes elements of Hellenistic philosophy in his work, and he shows the greatest affinity with Platonic and Stoic thought (he is usually categorized as a Middle Platonist). This heterogeneous approach to philosophy may have been a tendency of Alexandrian philosophy, but there are insufficient sources to assess properly the similarities with Philo’s contemporary, Eudorus of Alexandria. In an attempt to broaden the applicability of Judaism, Philo embodies the Platonic vision that the universe is not generated for an individual but the individual is for the world (Plato Leg.10).

The previous chapter argued that the crisis of Hellenization led to the need for a worldview which answered the problems of both Jews and Hellenes. This chapter will be an examination of how Philo treats the idea of nomos. Often the term does not refer to the Torah, as will be made clear throughout. It will be argued here and in the next chapter, building on the anthropological approaches to symbol in the previous chapter, that for Philo and 4 Maccabees the Torah stood for something beyond its text and content. Since Philo and 4 Maccabees also could be sincerely committed to the ends of both Judaism and Hellenism, this chapter will argue that Torah is used to broaden the scope of Judaism’s applicability rather than to narrow it.

There are three key moves to broadening the application of Judaism in Philo. The first is the adoption of a tendency that will be shown to be widespread in Alexandrian writing, the universalization of history. The second has been well studied: in allegorical interpretation, the Torah, rather than being the marker of Jewish exclusivism, becomes
the vehicle in which cultural boundaries are crossed. Finally, Philo sees reality to be what
the text of Torah signifies rather than what it contains; this is the allegorical reflection of
the natural law, the *logos* which was written into creation. It is important to note that
identifying the symbolic function of the Torah for these authors does not imply a
judgment as to their faithfulness to Judaism. Philo’s approach to Hellenization is to
promote the universal acceptance of the Torah and he sees it (and the Jews) as the
fulfillment of the Hellenistic vision and therefore as a light for the world. The historical
context of this chapter has been extremely well studied, but perhaps a fresh and
interdisciplinary examination of how Philo interacts with Hellenism will be fruitful.

3.1 Universal History: Undermining Difference

Universalism, or the broadening of the applicability of Judaism, was a common
phenomenon in the Diaspora. Terence Donaldson has noted that this universalism was
understood historically as involving converts to Judaism through proselytism (not the
intentional proselytism of Christianity), the idea of “righteous Gentiles” (non-Jews who
fulfill the demands of Torah without knowledge of it), and the notion that the
Gentile/nations were part of a shared eschatological vision.155 James Dunn says that there
was a long history of “a recognition that Israel’s calling was not simply for their own
benefit.” Written into the covenant with Abraham is an insistence that other nations will
be blessed because of Abraham’s faithfulness.156 Peder Borgen argues that there were

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155 Terence L. Donaldson, “Proselytes or ‘Righteous Gentiles’? the Status of Gentiles in Eschatological
Pilgrimage Patterns of Thought,” *JSP* 4 no. 7 (1990): 3-27; for later views of universalism see Marc
Hirshman, “Rabbinic Universalism in the Second and Third Centuries,” *HTR* 93 no. 2 (Apr. 2000): 101-
115.

156 James D. G. Dunn, “Was Judaism Particularist or Universalist?” in *Judaism in Late Antiquity*, ed. Jacob
“cosmic and universal principles that were revealed in the Law of Moses” but, while this is true for Philo, these cosmic principles do not seem to be limited to the Torah.\(^{157}\)

There were numerous attempts to universalize Jewish history in Alexandrian literature in the two hundred years prior to Philo. The *Letter of Aristeas* claims that the Jews worshipped the God who created the world, whom the Greeks called Zeus (*Let. Aris.* 16).

One of the well-attested strategies for this type of historiography was to set up the patron philosopher or religious figure as the source for all wisdom that was to follow, often they were thought to have inspired Plato.\(^{158}\) This trend gave rise to Philo’s claim that Plato borrowed from Moses, an argument first advanced in the second century B.C.E. by the Jewish writer Aristobulus (*Aristob. 4.3*). Artapanus made Moses responsible for the ingenuity of ancient nations such as Egypt and Ethiopia (*Artap. 3.27.11*). Philo also begins his account of creation by attributing Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to Moses:

Moses, both because he had attained the very summit of philosophy, and because he had been divinely instructed in the greater and most essential part of Nature’s lore, could not fail to recognize that the universe must consist of two parts, one part active Cause and the other passive object; and that the active Cause is the perfectly pure and unsullied mind of the universe, transcending virtue, transcending knowledge, transcending the good itself and the beautiful itself; while the passive part is in itself incapable of life and motion, but, when set in motion and shaped and quickened by Mind, changes into the most perfect masterpiece, namely this world. (*Opif.* 8-9)

This attribution of philosophy to a cultural patriarch or matriarch was not unique to Judaism: others claimed that Plato had borrowed from Pythagoras (see also Plutarch, *On


Isis and Osiris). This method of historiography was yet another factor in Philo’s ability to move beyond distinctions between Judaism and Hellenism. As Isaiah Gafni said, Jews had no problem “perpetuating the culture that surrounded them,” as long as it could be asserted that the culture traced its ingenuity back to Jewish forefathers. Once again this downplays any potential struggle with Hellenism. Dawson called Philo’s use of Moses “the basis for a revisionary stance toward the dominant, Hellenistic culture,” but the difficulty with this perspective is that the evidence suggests that this was a common feature of Alexandrian historiography. To call Philo a revisionist based on this evidence does not seem accurate. It seems that, as the previous chapter argued, Philo is simply drawing on multifarious resources in an attempt to understand his world and to cause Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish history to coalesce into a universal picture. This also is clarified by Barth’s envisioning of boundaries as opportunities: the desire here is to “reconnect what has been separated.”

3.2 Allegory: Meaning beyond the Text

If universalization was the tendency in Philo, as in other Jewish writers, Philo’s use of allegory must be connected to this trend. The remainder of this study will therefore turn to a detailed study of Philo’s use of the term nomos, as evidence of Philo’s allegorical approach and the natural law that the allegory is meant to highlight. Furthermore, it

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160 Isaiah Gafni, Land, Center and Diaspora: Jewish Constructs in Late Antiquity (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 40.
161 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 73.
162 Barth, “Boundaries and Connections,” 27.
163 I am grateful for the Greek concordance to Philo’s works; see Peder Borgen, Kare Fuglseth and Roald Skarsten, eds., The Philo Index: A Complete Greek Word Index to the Writings of Philo of Alexandria (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Leiden: Brill, 2000).
seems that the allegorization of Torah is evidence of the symbolic way in which it functions for Philo.

From the very beginning of his writings, Philo wants to find a balance between literalism and allegory.

While among other lawmakers some have nakedly and without embellishment drawn up a code of the things held to be right among their people, and others, dressing up their ideas in much irrelevant and cumbersome matter, have befogged the masses and hidden the truth under fictions. Moses… refrained, on the one hand, from stating abruptly what should be practiced or avoided, and on the other hand, in the face of the necessity of preparing the minds of those who were to live under the laws for their reception. (Opif. 1-2)

Despite this apparent respect for balance between the literal and figurative, Philo does seem to place a much higher emphasis on the value of allegorical reading. This is accompanied by occasional derision of those who do not sense the allegorical meaning of the law. For example, in his discussion of Joseph and Potiphar, Philo speaks of “those, who are occupied with literal wording of law (τοῖς ρήματα τοῦ νόμου πραγματευομένοις), rather than with its allegorical (πρὸ ἀλλεγορίας) interpretation” (Leg. 3.236). The people who are unable to see the allegory are referred to as “those who follow the letter of the law (νόμον γραφῆς).” Philo frequently opposes these people (Conf. 14; Migr. 89). He even calls them “the self-satisfied pedantic professors of literalism (τοὺς τῆς ῥητῆς πραγματείας σοφιστὰς καὶ λίαν τὰς ὀρφῶς ἀνεσπακότας)” (Somm. 1.102).

164 Dyck, “Philo, Alexandria, and Empire,” 166.
165 Maren Niehoff has devoted an article to exploring the contempt for an Alexandrian-Jewish community of text critical exegetes who were unable to see the allegorical meaning of scriptures, see “Homeric Scholarship and Biblical Exegesis in Ancient Alexandria: Evidence from Philo’s ‘Quarrelsome’ Colleagues,” The Classical Quarterly 57 no. 1 (May 2007): 166-182; she has also written a monograph
While the allegorical trend carries extensively throughout Philo, only several examples of how he interprets allegorically will be given here for the sake of brevity.¹⁶⁶ What these examples show is the primacy of Hellenistic virtues and the Stoic war with the passions in Philo’s interpretive framework. When speaking of the snake in Genesis, he references the “snake fighter” (Lev 11:22) which is found in the “detailed law (μέρος νόμοις).” He says that this is, “nothing but a symbolic representation of self-control, waging a fight that never ends and a truceless war against intemperance and pleasure” (Opif. 163). In the story of Joseph mentioned above, Philo suggests that Potiphar was a eunuch. Therefore, the temptation for Joseph is no longer adultery (as Potiphar was unable to consummate a marriage), but rather the giving in to pleasure. Joseph says, “I shall be sinning against God the Lover of virtue, were I to show myself a lover of pleasure; for this is a wicked deed” (Leg. 3.235-7). This love of virtue continues in a very confusing allegorical interpretation of Hagar and Sarah, in which Philo identifies the relationship between philosophy and virtue. In this story the perfect counsel of Sarah, who Philo says is the picture of divine virtue, is to tell Abraham to bear seed with Hagar, who he says is the image of philosophy and learning. Through Hagar’s instruction, Abraham is brought to the place where he can “apply his unfettered powers to virtue.” Virtue is presented as the

end and the means to achieve happiness: “let that which seems good to virtue be law for each one of us; for if we choose to hearken to all that virtue recommends, we shall be happy” (Leg 3.245). On the law which makes the camel unclean because it does not “part the hoof” (Lev 4:4), Philo says that it carries no meaning if taken literally, but the hidden meaning is that the “soul of the keen learner, when it has by listening taken in this and that proposition, does not hand them over to forgetfulness” (Agr. 131).  

So, this becomes an analogy for learning.

These (limited) examples show the trend of Philo’s hermeneutic and exegetical approach, but it is not clear how to reconcile allegory with Philo’s identity. So, his use of allegory has mistakenly been seen as a method of subjecting Hellenistic philosophy to Judaism. Dawson has argued this.

It becomes unmistakably clear that for Philo allegorical interpretation is an effort to make Greek culture Jewish rather than to dissolve Jewish identity into Greek culture. Philo’s concern for the specific practice of Judaism in Alexandrian society reveals that for him allegorical interpretation is central to Jewish communal identity and survival in a hostile environment.

Dawson’s view is that there is an implicit power dynamic in Philo’s allegorization. This is directly opposed to Adolf Hausrath’s view cited above, which gave Philo freedom to mold Judaism to Hellenism. Indeed, Hausrath’s view might seem more convincing in light of the examples given above: in every case it is the principles of Hellenistic philosophy which dictate how allegory should be applied, for the pursuit of virtue and the conquering of passions and the importance of education.

167 On hidden meaning of the law, see Agr. 157; Plant. 111, 132; Migr. 105, 145, 204; Cong. 73, 94, 137, 163, 169; Fug. 53-55; Mut. 233-6; Somn. 69-70, 74-76, 92; Abr. 68.

168 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 74.

169 Hausrath, Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte, 142.
It is tempting to attribute Philo’s use of the ambiguous idea of allegory to a desire for self-preservation in either of his two communities. It is this ambiguity which Dyck has said would sit well with all elements of the Jewish community in Alexandria. But, the use of allegory need not be thought of as a way to reconcile two irreconcilable worldviews; rather, it is possible that his use of allegory is based on an assumption that the worldviews complement each other. For Philo, allegory makes Torah the means by which to bridge any real or perceived difference between Hellenism and Judaism since, interpreted allegorically, Torah points to universal ideas of virtue.

This view is contrary to Dawson’s thesis that allegory is a type of dialectical evolution of meaning which he calls “cultural revisionism.” As mentioned above, he considers Philo’s primary loyalty to be to Judaism. The thrust of his argument is as follows: the desire to understand Torah prompts a reading of a philosophical text which is intended to clarify the meaning of the Torah but, in applying this meaning out of context, it becomes subject to Judaism. This type of hermeneutic power which Dawson applies to the interpreter is said to subordinate the meanings of philosophical texts to scripture, but Dawson’s argument fails to account for whether scripture would be subordinated to the same power dynamic, if it were to be clarified through Hellenistic philosophy (it would). Furthermore, as Chapter Five will show, Philo’s loyalty was not only to understanding Judaism, but he engaged with significant discussions within Hellenistic philosophy.

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170 Dyck, “Philo, Alexandria and Empire,” 173.
171 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 10-11
The use of allegory seems to come out of a Hellenistic paradigm of body-soul dualism and Stoic theories of language. Both of these assume that the real meaning is not in the text itself, but in what the text represents. The dualism of body and spirit will be taken up in Chapter Five, but Boyarin says that Philo’s hermeneutic approach can be seen as reflecting his approach to anthropology, namely, that just as the human person contains a body and soul, so the text represents the body, and the spirit of the text the soul.172

Language is represented in two senses; in its “content” it represents the higher world, while in its form it represents the structure of world as an outer form and inner actuality.173

In this case the thing which the text symbolizes is behind the text: the text provides a link to this real thing. Dawson also says this. He emphasizes that language, like a name, is an imperfect physical manifestation of a perfect unseen reality.174 This idea is not only taken from a Platonic dualism between body and soul or the real world and the world of the forms. A clear Stoic view of language is also built into Philo’s allegorical approach, which Diogenes Laertius said for the Stoics was the appearance (φαντασία) of thought (Diog. Laert. 7.49).175 Plutarch said that the Stoics saw everyone as being two, one the visible and one the unseen, in flux and changing (Comm. not. 1083A-1084A). Seneca records

They (the Stoics) say that a “sayable” is what subsists in accordance with a rational impression, and a rational impression is one in which the content of the

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172 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 13.
173 Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 15.
174 Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 84-88.
impression can be exhibited in language. (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 8.70 [SVF 2.187])\textsuperscript{176}

In Stoic thought meaning behind language was based on the *logos* which language represented. Language becomes a way to bridge the seen and unseen world, and the Stoics spent significant time distinguishing between words and meaning, as well as on the physical element of voice as being the “vibration of air” (this is similar to the special type of divine voice which Philo says is created by God to give the laws: Dec. 33-35).\textsuperscript{177} It seems that Dawson’s claim that Philo subjects Hellenistic philosophy to the Torah is therefore further challenged by the fact that the paradigm which forms Philo’s view of Torah is Hellenistic.

The allegorical interpretations of laws do not, in Philo’s mind, render all of them obsolete. The argument here is that the Torah operates as a symbol but, as the previous chapter argued, this is not used to make either Judaism or Hellenism superfluous. The Torah maintains its value. Therefore, the use of allegorical interpretation is not to be seen as diminishing the value of the text and its proclamations. On the issue of circumcision, for example, Philo says that there is no reason to do away with it. Though it represents the excision of pleasure, he says that to only pay attention to the inner meaning of things would mean being

\[\ldots\text{ ignorant of the temple and a thousand other things}\ldots\]

We should look on all these outward observances as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the soul. It follows that, exactly as we have to take thought for the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must pay heed to the letter of the laws. (Migr. 92)

\textsuperscript{176} Long, Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:196
\textsuperscript{177} Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 132.
The laws remain containers of a deeper meaning, but the body of the text is not to be discarded either, therefore showing the perfect harmony between Philo’s two worlds and therefore the balance which he seeks to strike between them. Any link between Torah and patriotism is therefore influenced by what Anthony Smith calls “double historicity.” This is the “embeddedness in very specific historical contexts and situations, and their rootedness in the memories and traditions of their members.” Therefore, Philo applies a subjective interpretation of the abstract meaning of the Torah, but this does not preclude him from ascribing meaning to it from his Hellenistic background.

3.3 Natural Law: Meaning behind the Text

If allegory serves as the bridge to the thing behind the text of Torah, which Philo is trying to approach, then the real thing behind the law is the law of nature. In his introduction to De decalogo, Philo also uses the term unwritten law (ἄγραφος νόμος) to explain what has gone before, and even his examination of the Decalogue is not focused on literalism but the allegorical (Decal. 1). The place to begin in order to understand what it is that allegory refers to is Philo’s work on creation. Natural law for Philo centres on a view of creation. He believes that the universal and unwritten spirit of the laws are recorded into the character of the world and, though Torah represents the highest corporeal form of their presentation, the laws are accessible by other means; this seems to be similar to the

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178 Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism, 30.
179 It is necessary to assert here that the term “natural” or “unwritten” law must not be confused with later developments in this vein in both philosophy and theology, neither is it to be identified with the Oral Torah (תורה שבעל פה) of the Mishnah, which was not conceptually developed as unwritten Torah until the Talmuds (c. 4-6 C.E.), see Jacob Neusner, Formative Judaism: Religious, Historical, and Literary Studies: Third Series: Torah, Pharisees, and Rabbis (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 8; Efraim Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: At the Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1975), 1:305.
earlier Stoic view of natural law.\footnote{Gisella Striker, *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 210.} In his writing on the first human he says that “the world was his city,” but he describes that world as having a constitution which is “nature’s right relation, more properly called an ‘ordinance,’ or ‘dispensation,’ seeing it is a divine law” (*Opif.* 143).\footnote{Sandmel, *The First Christian Century*, 121.}

There was an emergence of natural law thinking before Philo. In Sirach (second century B.C.E.), the Torah became synonymous with divine *sophia*, which Michael Stone says gave it “a cosmic dimension . . . As a result, Torah becomes not just the specific revelation to Moses on Sinai, but the pattern according to which the universe was created” (see Sirach 24).\footnote{Michael E. Stone, *Ancient Judaism: New Visions and Views* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 138.} One result of this was the universalizing of ethics, which can be seen, for example, in the writings of the first century poet Pseudo-Phocylides. He presented a collection of wisdom maxims designed to persuade non-Jewish readers of the value of the Jewish laws; these are also reminiscent of the so-called Noahide laws which were guidelines for all humanity and combined Septuagint and “Greek nomological” material.\footnote{P. W. van der Horst ed., “Pseudo-Phocylides,” in Charlesworth, ed., 2:565-567; Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 170; G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of Tannaim* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1927) 1:274; P. W. van der Horst ed., *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), 64-66, 95 line 115; David Novak, *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism* (New York: Mellen, 1983); for the laws given to Noah in Rabbinic writings, see Hyam Maccoby, *The Philosophy of the Talmud* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 49, 51; Michelle Slee, *The Church in Antioch in the First Century CE: Communion and Conflict* (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2003), 21 (Slee lists b. *Sanh.* 56; b. *B. Qam.* 38a; b. *Yoma* 67b; b. *‘Abod. Zar.* 64B; t *‘Abod. Zar.* Zar. 8.4; *Gen. Rabbah* 34.8; *Sifra* 18.4).} Rudimentary ideas of natural law have been further identified in other Alexandrian literature: the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, *Sibylline Oracles* 3, and the Wisdom of Solomon. According to Gregory Sterling, however, Philo represented the
culmination of natural law thinking, since he could say “the world is in harmony with the law and the law with the world.” Therefore, the broadening trend in Alexandrian historiography did not only lead to a concept of natural law for Philo, but an idea of natural law in which the Torah was its reflection.

Philo has been called a Middle Platonist, but it seems that this title is too limiting as he presents a complicated syncretism. As will be shown below, he applies a Platonic dualism to the understanding of creation. Nature proceeds from a Platonic God who is also an Aristotelian First Cause (Opif. 8-9). However, this world of the forms or the idea of creation, in which are rooted the laws of nature, means that in the dualism between the world of forms and the material world the Stoic idea of ethics can take place. Therefore, the “laws of nature” can operate according to Stoic principles. Philo’s ethics reflect the Stoic interplay between nature and the human.

The Platonic idea of the world of the forms is present throughout Philo’s work. He explains that the world as an ideal exists first within the mind of God, and then the real world is modeled on this ideal. With his contemporary, Eudorus of Alexandria, he thought that

> the monad will be the archetype of Form, the Dyad the archetype of Matter. The working of the monad on the dyad produces the world of Forms, or Ideas, which, as reason-principles or logoi (or collectively as the logos), create the material universe.  

Therefore, Philo says in De opificio mundi that, in the creation of the world, God saw that in order for there to be a good imitation (μίμημα) there had to be a good model

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185 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 128.
(παράδειγμα) (16-19). These are the same terms used in Plato’s *Timaeus* (28E, 48E) to describe the way in which God made the world, drawing upon a model. Philo also seems to be influenced by Stoic ideas of nature in identification of the corporeal and the incorporeal in all things. Despite the relative absence of metaphysics, the Stoics too thought that action and words could be imitations of “cosmic events,” because the entire world was the manifestation of the *logos*. The dualism between the seen and unseen therefore extends throughout Philo’s teaching. For example, when he speaks of the temple, he says,

There are… two temples of God: one of the this universe, in which there is also as High Priest his first born, the divine word, and the other the rational soul, whose priest is the real man; the outward and visible image of whom he is who offers the prayer and sacrifices handed down from our fathers, to whom it has been committed to wear the aforesaid tunic, which is a copy and replica of the whole heaven, the intention of this being that the universe may join with man in the holy rites, and man with the universe. (*Somn.* 1.215)

From an understanding that the whole world is based on an ideal in the mind of God, Philo can situate the place of Torah in this paradigm. Torah becomes a reflection, or perhaps even a manifestation, of the model of the God’s ideal world. He describes the Torah as being a small thing that holds colossal beauty and has the ability to completely overwhelm those who come into contact with it; and he uses the metaphor of a seal which holds an image of a thing (*Opif*. 6). So, the Torah is not the thing itself, but the best reflection of the thing, “not mimesis of the visible but representation of the invisible.”

This is almost identical to the modern definition of a cultural symbol, as expressed by

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Anthony Smith. Philo sees the Torah as a replica of something eternal, indeed, the best replica. The law is a picture of another reality. The laws which it presents are described as being “fixed, not by the creation to which we belong, but on principles which are divine and older than we and all that belongs to earth” (Post. 89).

Therefore, the legitimacy of the Torah, as well as all other earthly laws, is based on its (their) reflection of these laws of nature. There is a cosmic sense to these laws. In the first instance this is God’s hand in the universe. For example God “guides all things in what direction he pleases as law and right demand” (Opif 46). Humankind has no choice but to be in awe of the ways that the planetary bodies interact: several times Philo describes the complicated way in which the world acts as being controlled by “the laws of perfect music” (Opif. 54, 70). The complicated operations in nature are described as being “carried out under ordinances and laws which God laid down in His universe as unalterable” (Opif. 61). Human action reflects this law written into nature, for example, in the numerous national festivals.

The sun, too, the great lord of the day, bringing about two equinoxes each year, in the Spring and Autumn, the Spring equinox in the constellation of the Ram, and the autumn equinox in that of the Scales, supplies very clear evidence of the sacred dignity of the seventh numbers… during them there is enjoined by law the keeping of the greatest national festivals. (Opif. 116)

This also reflects the harmony with nature, which will be discussed below. The dualism that is written into nature further extends to the human being. As Boyarin has noted, Philo considers the two creation stories of Genesis to describe two different creations, the

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literal creation of humans and the spiritual creation of Adam as mind and Eve as soul.\(^\text{189}\)

Chapter Five will show Philo’s adoption of the Platonic ideas of soul, but the human is reflected in his elegant cosmic system through body and mind.

Through this (the mouth), as Plato says, mortal things have their entrance, immortal their exit; for foods and drinks enter it, perishable nourishment of a perishable body, but words issue from it, undying laws of an undying soul, by means of which the life of reason is guided. (Opif. 119)

Throughout Philo’s writings there is a discrepancy between the seen and the unseen and in every case it is the unseen thing that carries the real meaning: the soul bears the true meaning, not the body; the spiritual is the true essence, not the corporeal. This is also true of the Torah, the laws of God reflect the laws of nature, and at some points might even be considered interchangeable. The natural laws are not limited to the Jews, however, but they apply to the whole world (Ios. 29).

It is worthwhile to compare Dawson and Boyarin in their views of Philo’s concept of language. They both feel that Philo presents language as representative of an unseen meaning, as discussed above. For Dawson this meaning is represented in Torah, while for Boyarin the limitation of language is that the real thing behind the language is accessible by other means, or perhaps by other language. When Philo’s view of natural law is applied to the practice of virtue, it seems that Boyarin is correct. Torah does not function as the exclusive carrier of meaning, since virtue is accessible through the natural law.

When Mind, the ruler of the flock, taking the flock of the soul in hand with the law of nature as his instructor shows it the way with vigorous leadership, he renders it well worthy of praise and approval, even as he subjects it to blame if he disregard nature’s law and behave slack and carelessly. (Agr. 66)

\(^{189}\) Boyarin, A Radical Jew, 19.
Great indeed are the efforts expanded both by lawgivers and by laws in every nation in filling the souls of free men with comfortable hopes; but he who gains this virtue of hopefulness without being led to it by exhortation or command has been educated into it by a law which nature has laid down, a law unwritten yet intuitively learnt. *(Abr. 16)*

The application for Philo seems to be that virtue is open to anyone who follows the natural law, and it can be achieved without the Torah. What is especially strange is that the achievement of virtue without reference to a written law leads to a natural pride in the Jewish forefathers for Philo, because they developed virtue without even needing the law.

The enacted ordinances are not inconsistent with nature . . . the first generations before any at all of the particular statutes were set in writing followed the unwritten law with perfect ease, so that one might properly say that the enacted laws are nothing else than memorials of the life of the ancients, preserving to a later generation their actual words and deeds. *(Abr. 5)*

It seems that, in relating the stories of heroes from Jewish history, Philo’s interest is in virtuous individuals who fulfill Hellenistic (especially Stoic and Platonic) models of virtue before they are chosen by God. This is the case with Noah who, Philo says, found favor with God by the virtue of his very nature *(Leg. 3.77)*. In his discussion of Abraham, Philo says that Abraham observed the law of God and that the law is “nothing else than the Divine word enjoining what we ought to do and forbidding what we should not do” *(Migr. 130)*. He also shows a high respect for Abraham because he acquired virtue without needing the law: “he did them (the commandments), not taught by written words, but unwritten nature gave him the zeal to follow where wholesome and untainted impulse led him” *(Abr. 275)*.

The best example of Philo’s celebration of individual virtue is Moses: his personal virtue as both lawgiver and interpreter is paramount to Philo’s understanding of the laws themselves. He calls Moses “the greatest and most perfect man that ever lived” and says
that “the glory of the laws which he left behind him has reached over the whole world, and has penetrated to the very furthest limits of the universe” (Mos. 1.1-2). Moses’ virtue is the reason that God chose him to bear the laws, since he adhered to an unwritten standard of virtue before the written standard was given to him.

He (Moses) was ever opening the scroll of philosophical doctrines, digested them inwardly with a quick understanding, committed them to memory never to be forgotten, and straightway brought his personal conduct, praiseworthy in all respects, into conformity with them; for he desired truth rather than seeming, because the one mark he set before them was nature’s right reason, the sole source and fountain of virtues. (Mos. 1.48)

Moses is presented as a savant in all areas of learning, mastering the zenith of all cultures and religions. Therefore Moses fulfills God’s ideal before God ever calls him and, in doing so, the character of Moses also fulfills both the Stoic model of virtue (having access to every pleasure of passion in Pharaoh’s house, but denying them all, Mos. 1.25-28), and the Platonic model of virtue (being the philosopher king, Mos. 2.2). The supremacy and excellence of Moses showed his fulfillment of Hellenistic virtue before the law is given and is the reason that he is chosen to bear the law.

The fact that the patriarchs’ virtue is emphasized in Philo shows not only that virtue is accessible outside of the law, but also that Philo was following the wider trends of Hellenistic historiography (as does 4 Maccabees): history should be interesting and readable, but people reading it should also be spurred on to proper and virtuous action.

The first century also witnessed a rising interest in historical biography, an approach

exemplified by Plutarch, for example, who tended to reveal the character of prominent individuals didactically.\textsuperscript{192} Therefore Philo’s whole project seems to follow a Hellenistic desire for historical figures which inspired individuals to virtue, an identical approach to 4 Maccabees. Furthermore, the celebration of virtuous individuals challenges the views of both Dawson and Himmelfarb. They both suggest that Platonism is transformed by the Torah because of Philo’s apparent insistence on practice of the law.\textsuperscript{193} However, since Philo is the most proud of individuals who achieved virtue without needing the Torah, it seems that any emphasis on praxis cannot be limited to the enacting of Torah commandments.

A few remarks can be made based on the anthropological framework laid out in the previous chapter. It should be said that remarks on identity, both here and in the next chapter, are not necessarily indicative of any real or lived identity, but rather focus on the literary identity which Philo and 4 Maccabees construct. The understanding of Torah as the symbol for a natural law in Philo’s work has a fascinating application to Philo’s understanding of boundaries. Here, rather than defining or limiting Jewish identity, Torah itself serves to create the link to Hellenistic philosophy. It transcends the boundary and the very symbol which is often historically understood to define and delineate Judaism becomes that which unites and crosses the cultural bridge between, what Frederik Barth calls, “adjacent and familiar others.”\textsuperscript{194} Therefore the Torah becomes a symbol for the Jews being a light to the nations and, for Philo, contains the culmination of all Hellenistic

\textsuperscript{192} Breisach, \textit{Historiography}, 71-72.
\textsuperscript{193} Dawson, \textit{Allegorical Readers}, 111; Himmelfarb, “Jewish Difference,” 123.
\textsuperscript{194} Barth, “Enduring and Emerging Issues,” 13.
philosophy; it is the pinnacle of human law but, because it is only a corporeal manifestation of the natural law, it points to deeper truths and meaning.

Boyarin has argued that the unintended consequence to Philo’s merging of philosophical traditions was the softening of Jewish laws and traditions, which is not necessarily the case. Instead, the individual laws take on an expanded meaning and greater cultural relevance and applicability. In any case, whatever Philo’s motives were, the application of natural law which is corporeally (though not exclusively) represented by Torah serves to transverse any boundary between Judaism and Hellenism, rather than to reinforce a boundary wall. Birnbaum’s recent work corroborates this. After a careful analysis of the Philonic corpus, she concluded that “Hebrew” and “Jew” were national/ethnic designations, while the term “Israel” was reserved in Philo’s thought for all true philosophers of any nation.

197 Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism, 91-127.
4 Maccabees: Jewish Superiority through Ancestral Law

The author of 4 Maccabees’ approach to Hellenization is to show how Jews are superior to Hellenes in the practice of virtue. The fascinating thing is that, rather than using Jewish ends to justify this superiority, the author focuses almost completely on showing how the Hebrews in 4 Maccabees champion Hellenistic ethics. The author draws from multifarious systems of honour and virtue to create the impression of Jewish superiority on many levels, especially by creating a greater emphasis on the boundary between Judaism and Hellenism. Ironically, in showing how the observance of Torah achieves virtue, the author uses the idea of ancestral law which had a long tradition in Greek philosophy. Therefore the Torah becomes the way for the author to transcend the boundary between Judaism and Hellenism, which is first emphasized in order to show the superiority of Jewish ethical practice.

Torah is not simply used figuratively in the work. In the literal sense, the prohibition against eating pork sets the scene for the contest which will be presented (4 Macc 1:34, 5:2, 6). The issue of circumcision is also mentioned once in passing (4:25).\textsuperscript{198} However, in a symbolic sense, it is not the prohibition that really matters; rather, it is in the strength that the Hebrews have to withstand the attacks of the king that they prove themselves superior. This chapter will argue that the author of 4 Maccabees highlights and sharpens the difference between Jews and Hellenes that was already present in the source text, 2

\textsuperscript{198} Livesey, \textit{Circumcision as a Malleable Symbol}, 27-30. Livesey argues that circumcision is the mark of pious reason’s control over the passions.
Maccabees. The two sides are then compared in their attempts to achieve virtue and Hellenism is shown to fall short while Judaism is successful at creating virtue. However, the work is so thoroughly Hellenized that the author’s understanding of virtue is completely dominated by Middle Stoic ideals, so that the Jews and Hellenes on a metaphorical level become two horses in the same race.

4.1 The Emphasizing of Difference

Fourth Maccabees’ answer to a crisis of applicability is to frame Judaism and Hellenism as two distinct sides in a contest for virtue and then to claim Jewish superiority. Difference is used here as a literary form of juxtaposition between the virtues of the two nations, so the author will identify and accentuate this difference. It is important to recognize that the difference between Jews and Hellenes presented here is not necessarily a real or historical difference, but rather a literary difference created by the author.\(^\text{199}\)

Himmelfarb has argued cogently that the idea of a clear distinction between two factions of Jews and Hellenes in the Maccabean struggle is a literary creation of 2 Maccabees. The same dichotomy is recreated by the author of 4 Maccabees.\(^\text{200}\) What is fascinating is that, in contrast with the difference between Jews and Hellenes in 2 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees creates an even stronger emphasis and clarification of the difference between these two groups. Remarkably, this shows an evolution towards a stronger definition of difference between Judaism and Hellenism. While both works contain positive views of the high priest Onias and negative references to Jason, who bought the priesthood from


\[^{200}\] Himmelfarb, “Judaism and Hellenism,” 20.
Antiochus (2 Macc 4:7-8; 4 Macc 4:1, 16-17), 4 Maccabees omits the lengthy description of the power struggle for the priesthood as well as the detailed history of Antiochus’ attacks on Egypt which are contained in 2 Maccabees (2 Macc 3:1–5:26). It seems that 4 Maccabees omits from the source text most of the details about the Jewish factions in Palestine in order to downplay the role of Jews who were labeled “philhellenes” in 2 Maccabees, thereby placing the blame for Hellenization on Antiochus Epiphanes as an outsider and enabling a more unitary depiction of “the Jews.” As mentioned in the literature review, this challenges van Henten’s view that the shift to Antiochus shows 4 Maccabees’ Asia Minor provenance, because the distinction seems to serve a literary rather than historical function.  

The focus on Antiochus serves to further identify the literary boundary which the author wishes to draw between Judaism and Hellenism. Since the problem of Jewish Hellenizers was still well known in the first century (Josephus, for example, called Aristobulus I a “philhelle” [Ant., 13.318]), the omission of the reference to philhellenes in the work cannot be an accident. So, Himmelfarb’s thesis of difference as a literary creation is justified and, between 2 and 4 Maccabees, there is a consistent interest in sharpening this difference between Jews and Hellenes.

This difference is further emphasized by downplaying the theme of God’s judgment on the Jews from 2 Maccabees, in which there is frequent discussion of how the Jews were being rightly punished by God, as a judgment for sins.

201 van Henten, The Maccabean Martyrs, 80.
Now I urge those who read this book not to be depressed by such calamities, but to recognize that these punishments were designed not to destroy but to discipline our people. (2 Macc 6:12)

After him they brought forward the sixth. And when he was about to die, he said, “Do not deceive yourself in vain. For we are suffering these things on our own account, because of our sins against our own God.” (2 Macc 7:18)

Fourth Maccabees does not contain this sentiment, aside from the references to the martyrs atoning for the sins of their people, which will be discussed below. The author of 4 Maccabees seems to downplay the culpability of the Jews and the divine punishment that follows.

This emphasizing of difference between Judaism and Hellenism could perhaps be seen as an emergence of the type of Jewish identity which is present in Rabbinic Judaism. This was also marked by a gradual movement away from both Hellenistic philosophy and the Greek language. Some of this may have been fairly benign; there is some admiration for Greek thought in the Rabbinic writings. Shaye Cohen has identified an example of this in the text “may the beauty of Japheth (Greeks) dwell in the tents of Shem (Jews)” (Gen. Rab. 9.27).202 There is also an extensive discussion in Megillah over the issue of translation, some of which even shows respect for the law translated into Greek (y. Meg. 1.9. B). At its worst, however, the attitude towards Greek language in Rabbinic thought is downright hostile. Even the Septuagint is overwhelmingly rejected, as for example in the following text from the Soferim: “the day the Law was translated was as hard for Israel as

202 Maccoby, The Philosophy of the Talmud, 86; Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness, 43.
the day they made the golden calf; for the Torah could not be translated according to all its demands” (1.7-8).\footnote{As cited in Natalio Fernandez Marcos, The Septuagint in Context: Introduction to the Greek Version of the Bible (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 45.}

The emphasizing of the differences between Hebrews and Hellenes in 4 Maccabees will, ironically, show the ubiquitous impact of Hellenization. This author, in trying to present Jewish patriotism in the first century, had nowhere else to turn and no other cultural resources to draw upon to define excellence and national superiority than those available in the Hellenistic world around, much like Philo. Again, Barth’s view of familiar and adjacent others is justified.\footnote{Barth, “Enduring and Emerging Issues,” 13.} As will be shown below, the author is so thoroughly Hellenized that even this portrayal of Jewish patriotism relies almost completely on Hellenistic philosophy. This (thoroughly Hellenized) opposition to Hellenism is also seen in Johann Cook’s recent study of the Book of Proverbs in the Septuagint, which challenges the ancient myth that they were translated by Aristobulus (Prov 6:10, 2:11, 17 LXX).\footnote{Johann Cook, “Ptolemy Philadelphus and Jewish Writings: Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas as Examples of Alexandrian Jewish Approaches,” in Ptolemy II Philadelphus and his World, ed. Paul McKechnie and Philippe Guillaume (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 193-206.}

The recognition of the author’s intent to identify difference based on his cultural milieu challenges Emil Schürer’s labeling of the author as a philosophic “dilettante,” it is not accurate to question motives if the author had no other resources upon which to draw.\footnote{Schürer, Literature of the Jewish People, 245.} The next chapter will also take issue with this because 4 Maccabees is so interested in Hellenistic ends and the discussions which were internal to Hellenistic philosophy.
4.2 The Personification of Difference

The difference between Jews and Hellenes which the author hopes to accentuate is best understood through an examination of the literary function of the character of the king. First of all, the question why 4 Maccabees would be interested in the evil deeds of a Seleucid king after the rise of Rome is answered by a perusal of early Jewish literature: Antiochus Epiphanes is frequently the figurehead for anti-Jewish sentiment. His dealings with Jerusalem are recorded by Josephus, who says that the sons of Tobias were cast out of Jerusalem by the High Priest Onias and fled to Antiochus Epiphanes to beg him to attack Judea, which he did with a surprising fury and hostility towards the Jewish customs (Wars 1.1-2). As the quintessential antagonist in Jewish history, Antiochus figures prominently in 4 Maccabees as in 2 Maccabees before it.207

Consequently, Antiochus becomes the personification of the difference which the author of 4 Maccabees emphasizes, and he functions as a caricature which juxtaposes Jewishness and Hellenism. One of the uses of caricatures in Diaspora literature was as a "Jewish construct" of both Greeks and Hellenism, as Erich Gruen says:

Jewish compositions constructed the Hellenes as foils, as aliens, as the “other,” thereby the better to set off the virtues and qualities of their own nation. . . [T]he insistence on differentiation, even an unbridgeable gap, between the cultures on the one hand, and a high esteem for the Greek achievement and those responsible for it on the other, could reinforce rather than cancel out each other—to the advantage of the Jews.208

Antiochus Epiphanus’ words and thoughts are put forward in the form of Rededuelle or “speech duels,” which David deSilva says serves to heighten the effect as well as to

208 Gruen, Diaspora, 219.
occlude any objections to the argument by stating them and defending against them, deSilva’s examples of this are given below. This means that the king, his servants, and even the narrator provide convincing reasons of why the law could or should be abandoned, and in each case the protagonists rebut the arguments and reinforce Torah observance. In these exchanges, Antiochus’ argument is offered first:

Before I begin the tortures against you, old man, I would give you these words of advice, namely, that you save yourself by tasting pork, for I respect your age and your gray hairs. Although you have had your gray hairs for such a long time, you do not seem to me to be a philosopher, since you observe the religion of the Judeans. Why should you abhor eating the very excellent meat of this animal when nature has provided it? …Will you not awaken from your silly philosophy, dispel the nonsense of your reasonings, and, adopting a mind worthy of your age, pursue a true philosophy of what is beneficial? (4 Macc 5:5-13)

Young men, with friendly feelings I admire each and every one of you. Greatly prizing the handsomeness and the goodly number of you brothers, so many as you are, I not only advise you not to display the same madness as that of the old man who has just been tortured but also encourage you to yield to me and take advantage of my friendship. Just as I am able to punish those who disobey my orders, so I can be a benefactor to those who obey me. Trust me, then, and, if you disown the ancestral law of your polity, you will receive leading positions in the affairs of my state. Enjoy your youth by embracing a Greek way of life and changing your mode of living. (4 Macc 8:5-10)

You see the result of your brothers’ stupidity; they were tortured on the rack and died for their disobedience. You too, if you do not obey, will die, a tortured wretch, before your time. But if you obey, you will be my friend and will lead in the affairs of my kingdom. (4 Macc 12:3-5)

Antiochus presents several different elements of temptation. The temptation to follow other philosophical traditions, the offer of positions in his government, and the threat of torture all challenge the Hebrews to forsake their way of life. In each instance, however, the martyrs stand firm in their opposition.

O Antiochus, we who have been persuaded to adopt a way of life in accordance with divine law do not consider any compulsion more powerful than our ready obedience to the law. Therefore we do not deem it right to transgress the law in any way. (4 Macc 5:16-17)

Why do you delay, O tyrant? We are ready to die rather than transgress our ancestral commandments. For we would cause our forebears to be ashamed with good reason, if we did not show ready obedience to the law and to Moyses our counselor. (4 Macc 9:1-2)

Irreverent tyrant, most impious of all the wicked, were you not ashamed, when you have received good things and your kingdom from God, to kill his attendants and torture on the rack those trained in piety? For these deeds, justice will store up for you a fire more fierce and everlasting and tortures, which for all time will not release you. (4 Macc 12:1-12)

By recognizing the literary juxtaposition of Judaism and Hellenism in the exchanges of these two characters, the antagonism which forms the pathos of the author of 4 Maccabees can be located in the king’s words. Hellenism is not to be accepted, but is presented as a foil and a temptation. The king entreats them to embrace a “Greek way of life” (8:8). Here the voice of the enemy is presented, the threat is unveiled, and the temptation seems to be simply to accept Greek culture. In his response, the martyr makes a remarkable counter statement, saying that he is proving through his sufferings “that children of the Hebrews alone are invincible in virtue’s defense” (9:18). The result of the emphasizing of difference between Judaism and Hellenism is to be able to claim supremacy in virtue over and against the Greek conquerors.

4.3 Difference and Patriotism

With the creation or emphasizing of the difference between the Jews and Hellenes, the author can now turn to a major goal: highlighting the superiority of the Jews. Once difference is emphasized, Jewish patriotism can stand out and once again the
emphasizing of the boundary creates an opportunity.\textsuperscript{211} It ultimately accentuates the Jew’s ability over the Hellenes to achieve the same philosophical goals. The issue for the author of 4 Maccabees is not “how much Hellenism is acceptable,” unless one speaks of the Hellenes’ fondness for eating pork, but is rather “who better enacts virtue and true philosophy?” From this perspective the whole work is framed as a patriotic struggle, drawing upon various cultural motifs such as ancestral law, athletic imagery, and maternal affection (below) to display the ethical superiority of the Jews.

At first glance, this presentation of Jewish patriotism seems reminiscent of the rejection motifs in Rabbinic literature in which God offered the Torah to the Gentiles and they refused and therefore became guilty of impiety.\textsuperscript{212} However, since the whole work is driven by the Stoic premise stated in the first paragraph – “pious reason is master over the passions” (4 Macc 1:1) – it would be naïve to suggest that the differentiation here is simply a distinction between those who are Torah observant and those who were not. The fact that the author states this Stoic question as the subject of the book again challenges the assumptions that Hellenism and Judaism were always at odds as well as that the author only uses Hellenistic ideas pragmatically; this in turn challenges interpretations which claim that 4 Maccabees argues for Jewish superiority through nuance and subtlety. For example, Emil Schürer says that the reason employed within the texts to conquer emotions “is not human reason as such (like the Stoics), but ‘pious reason’ (ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός).”\textsuperscript{213} Distinctions between a “Jewish” control and a “Stoic” eradication of the passions have also been proposed (the next chapter will discuss this as a Stoic, not

\textsuperscript{211} Barth, “Boundaries and Connections,” 27.
\textsuperscript{212} Maccoby, The Philosophy of the Talmud, 36.
\textsuperscript{213} Schürer, Literature of the Jewish People, 245.
Furthermore, attempts have been made to identify nuances within the text’s approach to distinct schools of Hellenistic philosophy, leading Hadas to argue that the only Stoic in the story is the King. The next chapter will address these concerns, but these arguments based on nuances in the text are complicated by the philosophical eclecticism of the day, rendering the recognition of distinctions between ideologies impossible.

4.4 The Transcending Torah

It could be argued that the author of 4 Maccabees attempts to emphasize the Torah as a marker of difference. However, like Philo, the author of 4 Maccabees explains the law by explaining the Hellenistic ethic behind each law.

It is for this reason, certainly, that the temperate Joseph is praised, because by mental effort he overcame sexual desire. For when he was young and in his prime for intercourse, by his reason he nullified the frenzy of the passions. Not only is reason proved to rule over the frenzied urge of sexual desire, but also over every desire. Thus the law says, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife... or anything that is your neighbor’s.” In fact, since the law has told us not to covet, I could prove to you all the more that reason is able to control desires. (4 Macc 2:2-6)

Given the necessity for universal applicability which Hellenism demanded, the author either knowingly or unknowingly draws upon imagery which carries weight in a thoroughly Hellenized culture to explain why Torah observance is valuable for the attaining of virtue.

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216 Renehan, “The Greek Philosophical Background,” 228.
The author describes the Torah as ancestral law (πάτριος νόμος), and the observation of ancestral law becomes a source of virtue. Remarkably, just as Philo uses the Torah to transcend cultures, so too the author of 4 Maccabees ends up using Torah as a symbol which transcends the differences identified above; it becomes that which has meaning in both cultures. This means that the Torah becomes the best method for achieving Hellenistic virtue; as will be argued in the next chapter, this is especially achieved through education in the Torah.

The first stage in the shift to the Torah as a symbol of ancestral law is the emphasis in the text on the virtue which is achieved by being faithful to something without being swayed by emotions.

Even if, as you suppose, our law were in truth not divine and we wrongly considered it to be divine, not even so would it be possible for us to invalidate our reputation for piety. (4 Macc 5:18)

Never may we, the children of Abraam, think so basely that we play the coward and feign a role unbecoming to us! For it would be irrational if, after we have lived life until old age in accordance with truth, and maintained, by observing the law, the reputation of such a life, we should now change our course and ourselves become a model of impiety for the young so that we should set a precedent for eating defiled food. It would be shameful if we should survive but a little while and during that time be a laughingstock to all for our cowardice; shameful if we were despised by the tyrant as unmanly and did not champion our divine law even unto death. So then, O children of Abraam, die nobly for the sake of piety! (4 Macc 6:17-22)

The reasons given for observing the law in these quotations are interesting: reputation, avoiding cowardice and subterfuge, maintaining rationality and consistency, setting an example for the youth, and being manly are all given as reasons not to deviate from the Torah. However, the text of the Torah is not referenced. 4 Maccabees is instead, as Paul
Reddit says, interested in “not simply pious behavior, but rational living.”\(^\text{217}\) In this case the Torah again functions as a symbol, not on the level of its contents but in the way in which the laws are observed; it does not matter which laws are observed, but the fact that observing the Torah leads to a rational life becomes the theme of the text. Since the Hebrews are unwavering and do not display passions in the face of torture, the author can claim their virtuous superiority.

The way in which Torah functions as a symbol, is that the author is intent through the work in showing that the Torah is the Jews ancestral law.\(^\text{218}\) One of the primary uses of ancestral law in the Hellenistic world was to highlight the difference between legitimate and illegitimate law. This is a theme that is mentioned in a similar fashion in 2 Maccabees (2 Macc 6:6, 7:2), but it is greatly expanded and emphasized in 4 Maccabees. Early Greek thought saw a close relationship between the idea of a tyrant (τύραννος) and ancestral law. Aristotle records that a tyrant was one who went against the ancestral statutes of the Athenians (Ath. Pol. 16.10). Herodotus said that there is no act of tyranny that is worse than meddling with law and ancestral customs (3.80.5). In the famous trial of Andocides for his violation of the Eleusinian sanctuary, his accuser, the priest Callias, attempts to use the ancestral law to convict him to death, as opposed to the inscribed law which only sentenced him to a fine.\(^\text{219}\) An appeal to ancestral law, therefore, was an appeal to a higher legitimacy than the written laws of the land or the authority of a tyrant.

When he had plundered them, he issued a decree that, if any of them were found living according to the ancestral law, they should die. (4 Macc 4:23)

I do not so pity my old age as to subvert the ancestral law by my own act. (4 Macc 5:33)

O boys, noble is the contest to which you have been summoned for the testimony you can bear for our nation. Fight zealously in defense of our ancestral law! (4 Macc 16:16)

Therefore, ancestral law is portrayed as the legitimate authority. It is in following this legitimate authority that true virtue can be achieved. These Jews patriotic struggle is therefore rooted in the need to defend this authority from the tyrant who has chosen to undermine it.²²⁰

This Greek idea of ancestral law and tyrant can be seen elsewhere in Jewish history. Josephus makes a similar comparison in presenting Herod Antipater as a tyrant for creating a sculpted golden eagle; Josephus says he is corrected by two young men who are seen to be defending the ancestral law (Ant. 17.149).²²¹ Josephus also records that the Pharisees followed an “ancestral tradition” (Ant. 13.10.5). Philo also uses ancestral law to distinguish between a true king and a tyrant in the story of Melchizedek. Here Philo says that a king is one who is “the author of laws,” while a tyrant is the author of lawlessness (Leg 3.79). As Martin Goodman has argued, in all of these cases the appeal to ancestral law, rather than specific reference to the text of the Torah, becomes a way to create an

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ethical justification for behaviour. For 4 Maccabees, therefore, ancestral law broadens
the applicability of the Torah so that it can also apply to a Hellenistic world.

It seems difficult to explain with certainty why this reference to ancestral law is so
prominent. The lack of reference to the Torah might appear strange. David deSilva says:

For those Jews committed to the Torah, the author presents material to reinforce
the commitment and to strengthen them for the endurance of whatever
disadvantages would accompany identification with the Jewish race; . . . for
waver ing or confused Jews, the author presents material to exhort them to take a
stand for the Torah and piety, calling them back to commitment to Jewish
particularism.

One possibility is that the author of 4 Maccabees is writing to a Jewish audience for
whom the Torah carried very little cultural weight, and ancestral law is added to
strengthen the appeal. Otherwise, it becomes unavoidable that the author might have a
Gentile audience in mind as well as Jews. The audience may well have been thoroughly
Hellenized Jews, but this would strengthen the point that the difference between Hellenes
and Hebrews is a literary construction rather than a historical reality, since this would
mean that they were so Hellenized that they needed to see Torah as ancestral law to
believe that it was worth upholding.

Again, this is not to say that the author of 4 Maccabees has no interest in the text of the
Torah, but that there are elements in the work which can only serve to justify Torah
observance to highly Hellenized readers. The powerful symbolism that the Torah presents
is therefore, to borrow from Confino, the bridge between some type of local Hellenized

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Catherine Hezser, *Jewish Literacy in Roman Palestine* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 199.
223 deSilva, *4 Maccabees*, 45.
Judaism and an abstract perception of Jewish identity which is equally Hellenized. The tyrant tries to persuade the martyrs to abandon their ancestral law by offering them positions in his government (4 Macc 8:7), but they refuse. This same ancestral law then becomes the lynchpin for explaining how the Jews withstanding torture can achieve the Stoic virtues. It serves to show extremely Hellenized people why the Jewish religion best achieves the virtues which their own Hellenized society extolled.

Therefore, it seems that 4 Maccabees makes a universally applicable argument for Jewish patriotism. Patriotism is presented as the willingness to die for their nation, which is an exact parallel to the Hellenistic ethic that dying for the state is a high honour (Cicero, *Fin.* 3.62-68). So, the martyrs’ victory is thorough. First of all, they have brought national peace, religious revival, and defeat of their enemies (4 Macc 9:24, 16:16, 18:4). So complete was their victory and bravery, the author of 4 Maccabees says, that Antiochus commended their bravery to his troops, and that by emulating this they were able to conquer Egypt (17:23-24); they therefore become not only the most virtuous, but the models of virtue even to their enemies. Finally, in withstanding the assaults of Antiochus Epiphanes they are shown to be victorious in the interchange:

> For since you can neither sway our reason nor compel us to eat defiling food, is this not your overthrow? Your fire is frigid to us, the catapults painless, your violence unavailing. (4 Macc 11:25-27)

So, the work ends with a celebration of Jewish patriotism. Throughout the Hellenistic world, being loyal to the land from which one came was an important thing. There are frequent examples of devotion to one’s homeland in Greek literature, which Simon Swain

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225 Gruen, *Diaspora*, 239.
calls “local patriotism.” Swain says that the integration into Roman political life did not create the same homogeneous ruling class that the Greeks had; rather, people maintained local identities. This is to say that it cannot simply be assumed that the patriotism advocated in 4 Maccabees is any different than the other local patriotisms operating across the Greek and Roman world; Jews should not be considered uniquely patriotic. Instead, just like those around them, loyalty to one’s ancestral traditions garnered a certain amount of respect.

Perhaps the most interesting use of this patriotic rhetoric in 4 Maccabees is that the martyrs become saviours of their people; their blood provides a ransom (ἀντίψυχος) for the sin of the nation (17:10, 21). Although it is not used often in classical texts, the term ἀντίψυχος means “given for life” or “giving one’s life for another.” This is the only mention in 4 Maccabees of any wrongdoing by the Jewish people; as discussed above, this was a significant theme of 2 Maccabees. It is interesting to note that this is not the same word for ransom that appears in Christian literature (λύτρον). However, ἀντίψυχος does appear in the letters of Ignatius, generally with a less grandiose meaning. It several times occurs as a term of endearment (Eph. 21; Smyrn. 10; Poly. 2, 6).

The individual dying for national redemption was also a well-established tradition in Greek culture of individual martyrs dying and bringing glory to the nation. No matter what the influence, the conclusion of 4 Maccabees first emphasizes the difference

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227 Ibid., 70.
229 van Henten, _The Maccabean Martyrs_, 187.
between Greeks and Jews, and then claims nationalistic victory. This has been gained, not by military victory, but by ethical superiority.

Truly the contest carried on by them was divine, for then virtue, testing them for their perseverance, offered rewards. Victory meant incorruptibility in long-lasting life. Eleazar contended first; the mother of seven boys entered the fray, and the brothers contended. The tyrant was the antagonist; the world and human society looked on. Godliness won the victory and crowned its own athletes. Who did not marvel at the athletes contending for the divine law code? Who were not astonished? (4 Macc 17:13-16)

Wherefore those who, for the sake of piety, gave over their bodies to sufferings were not only admired by human beings but also deemed worthy of a divine inheritance. Thanks to them the nation gained peace; by reviving loyalty to the law in the homeland, they pillaged their enemies. (4 Macc 18:3-4)

Therefore, patriotism is upheld through Torah observance, but that observance also fulfills Hellenistic virtue while showing the Hellenes to be faulty in their understanding of how to achieve that virtue. Personal virtue is fulfilled by observance of the law and the protagonists’ ability to face martyrdom comes from their “education in the law,” and from the opening it is clear that this is the only way to exercise pious reason.

Fourth Maccabees is evidence that the process of Hellenization was so complete that at least this Diaspora Jew had to create and emphasize the difference between Judaism and Hellenism in a literary way, while using ideas typical of Hellenistic moral discourse. Nevertheless, a type of Jewish exclusivism could even be maintained by someone who was thoroughly Hellenized and had a thorough Hellenistic education, but it was necessary to draw on resources from a Hellenized world to create that type of patriotism. What is ironic is that, even in an attempt to create patriotism, framing the Torah as ancestral law renders it something that transcends any cultural boundaries and is able to be relevant to Hellenized readers.
Chapter 5

5 Towards Hellenistic Ends

What is remarkable about both of these works is the extent to which both are invested in relevant and contemporary discussions of Hellenistic philosophy. It seems that Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees do not simply appropriate Greek philosophy into a Jewish context, but that they are driven by it in their attempts to understand their world. These influences show how problematic it is to try to identify these authors’ loyalties, or to ascribe to them over-simplistic ideas of identity. If, as the previous chapters argued, Torah is a symbol which is used to broaden the scope and applicability of Judaism rather than narrow it then the interest in Greek philosophical discussions is not contradictory to a view of the importance of Torah.

On the level of historiography, this chapter will show the nature of the contact that Jews had with Hellenism. This was not contact with static paradigms but with evolving discourses which they were able to play a role in shaping. Since the descriptors “Platonic” and “Stoic” have frequently been ascribed to both Philo and 4 Maccabees, it is proper to identify where the two authors fit in relation to these movements. As this chapter will show, the remarkable fact is that they do not only have an intellectual stake in Jewish discussions but in those dominating Hellenistic philosophy as well. It will seek to emphasize that the discussions which were evolving in the Hellenistic schools of philosophy had their own evolution concurrently to Jewish philosophy, and that these influenced one another.
It is important to note that each of the issues referenced briefly in this chapter were part of significant discussions ongoing for centuries before, and monographs can and have been dedicated to these. Rather than rehearse centuries of arguments, this chapter will briefly identify elements of the struggle with passions which were contemporary to both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Therefore this chapter should serve as a historical identification that these issues were relevant to Philo and 4 Maccabees rather than an extensive philosophical discussion of the evolution of each issue.

The primary discussions of Hellenistic philosophy which are identified in this chapter are the application of the Platonic tripartite soul to the struggle with the passions, the importance of education to this struggle, and a brief discussion of freedom and agency in morality. Though Stoic sources from this time period are scarce, Posidonius of Rhodes (135-50 B.C.E.) will be cited extensively in this chapter as background for both works.\textsuperscript{230}

5.1 Philosophical Eclecticism

The context for Philo and 4 Maccabees is a highly eclectic philosophical landscape.\textsuperscript{231} With the discovery of fragments of Posidonius of Rhodes, a link to Middle Stoicism has become clear for both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Though there was an overzealous interpretation of Posidonius’ role in all areas of Hellenistic philosophy in the last century, the connection with Philo and 4 Maccabees is worth exploring (although the list of influences should be expanded to include other philosophers like Eudorus of Alexandria,

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{230} On the paucity of evidence in Hellenistic Philosophy see Nicholas P. White, “The Basis of Stoic Ethics,” \textit{HSCP} 83 (1979): 143-178. White critiques the pseudo-orthodoxy in Stoic studies created by \textit{SVF}.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{231} Renahan, “The Greek Philosophical Background,” 223-238.}
and perhaps Antiochus of Ascalon). These philosophers represent the type of approach taken by both Philo and 4 Maccabees, the blending of Platonic, Stoic, and Peripatetic thought which has been categorized as Middle Stoicism and Middle Platonism.

Posidonius lived in Rhodes, a place which Nock said “showed, in an outstanding degree, the old civic virtues.” Though few of his works remain, Posidonius was apparently such an influential figure that Cicero sent a work to him asking for editing. Furthermore, Pliny the Elder reports that when Pompey went to Rhodes he sat in on a lecture of Posidonius (Nat. 7.112). Posidonius is considered a Stoic, and accepted Stoic physics, but he revolutionized old Stoic ideas by accepting elements of Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. John Dillon speculates that there must have been some teacher in Alexandria teaching a type of Platonism built on the teachings of Antiochus of Ascalon, and that he may have been influenced by Dion and also the Stoic Diodorus, who studied under Posidonius. Eudorus of Alexandria and Philo became the purveyors of this unique blend of Alexandrian Platonism. The difficulty presented in fully examining the Stoicism in both Philo and 4 Maccabees is that none of the works from Early or Middle Stoicism survive complete; as A.A. Long as lamented, the extensive sources from Later Stoicism are from a time when something like a Stoic orthodoxy had been developed, while the sources which reflect the evolution of that development have been lost. Perhaps the greatest “problem” of philosophical history faced here, then, is the simple lack of sources.

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232 John Dillon criticizes the trend in the last century to attribute all developments in Middle Platonism to Posidonius: see Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 106; Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, 47.
234 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 113.
235 Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 115-117.
It is fully possible to argue that both Philo and 4 Maccabees relied heavily on Middle Stoicism, this will be done below, but Middle Stoicism remains relatively obscure.\footnote{A.A. Long, “Hellenistic Philosophy,” in \textit{The Columbia History of Western Philosophy}, ed. Richard Henry Popkin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 79. Long speculates that few Christian scribes would be interested in transcribing the views of Stoicism.} For both 4 Maccabees and Philo, Jewish history provides an answer to the problem of moral uprightness and both have startling assertions to make: those who have best lived virtuous lives can be found among the Jewish historical figures, many of whom fulfill Hellenistic ideals of ethical perfection. The history of Hellenistic Jews during this period has often focused on whether or not they were considered true philosophers by their peers. Arnaldo Momigliano has argued that the Septuagint was the translation of Jewish philosophy, but that it perhaps did not receive the high esteem hoped for.

The consequence must now be faced. About 300 B.C. Greek intellectuals presented the Jews to the Greek world as philosophers, legislators and wise men. A few decades later, the alleged philosophers and legislators made public in Greek their own philosophy and legislation. The Gentile world remained indifferent… The failure of the LXX to arouse the interest of the pagan intelligentsia of the third century B.C. was the end of the myth of the Jewish philosopher.\footnote{Momigliano, \textit{Alien Wisdom}, 92.}

Erich Gruen, on the contrary, claims that Jews are often highly regarded as philosophers by their contemporaries. This respect is often linked to varying myths about the Jewish people’s escape from Egypt, most of which consider the Jews to be high class of philosophers who were either expelled from or left Egypt by choice.\footnote{Erich S. Gruen, “Jews and Greeks as Philosophers: A Challenge to Otherness,” in Harlow et al., eds., \textit{402-422, esp. 422; Nock, “Posidonius,” 8; Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Image of the Jews in Greek Literature: The Hellenistic Period} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).} For the sake of this study, the discussion of how they were regarded by their peers is secondary to the...
question of whether they considered themselves to be more than simply Jewish apologists, and the way that they interact with Hellenistic ideas suggests that they did.

5.2 The Tripartite Soul and the Passions

One of the primary discussions in contemporary philosophy which Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees are interested in is the question of how an individual could wage war with the passions. By the first century B.C.E. the answer to this Stoic question had changed drastically, in favor of control rather than eradication of the passions. Many scholars of 4 Maccabees have recognized this distinction in the work.\(^\text{240}\) The attention given to the passions is also one of the most significant differences between 2 and 4 Maccabees. In 4 Maccabees reason is master (αὐτοδεσπότης) of the passions. It rules (κρατέω) and is ruler (αὐτοκράτωρ) over the emotions, which the author says is the main issue addressed in the book (4 Macc 1:13). Fourth Maccabees makes it clear that the way in which reason rules the passions is not to destroy them, but to prevent the individual from succumbing to their power:

> For reason does not overcome its own passions but those opposed to justice, courage and self-control, and it overcomes these not so that it destroys them but so that one does not give way to them. (4 Macc 1:6)

It is obvious that Philo is aware of the distinction between control and eradication of the passions, though his position on the subject is not as easy to discern as that of the author of 4 Maccabees. There seems to be some disagreement in Philo over whether passions are controlled or extirpated, and in some respects it seems that he does see it as possible to

extirpate the passions. The figurehead for this extirpation is Moses, and his battle with the passions draws clear Stoic lines:

Moses thinks that it is necessary completely to extirpate and eradicate anger from the soul, being desirous to attain not to a state of moderation in the indulgence of the passions, but to a state in which they shall have absolutely no existence whatever…God has endowed the wise man with the best of all qualities, the power, namely, of eradicating his passions. (*Leg* 3.129, 131)

It seems that Philo makes a distinction between passions and suggested that some can be eradicated and some merely controlled. David C. Aune also claims that Philo thinks not everyone is able to control the passions. 241

The variation between passions which can be controlled is interesting in Philo, and might give clarity to 4 Maccabees. Philo says that eating and drinking, which are necessary for the body, must be approached with the control that reason can provide (*Leg.* 3.145, 155). Such normal physical appetites are merely controlled instead of eradicated; it may be that this is the approach which 4 Maccabees takes as well, but there is not enough information in the work to assess this. Philo says that the ability to withstand temptation of food laws is especially important at banquets.

In the company of reason, I then become a master instead of a slave: and without being subdued myself win a glorious victory of self-denial and temperance; opposing and contending against all the appetites which subdue the intemperate. (*Leg.* 3.156)

The discussion of control of the passions, and the application of a belief in a Platonic tripartite soul to this Stoic problem, had featured prominently in Hellenistic philosophy for a century before both works. This move in Hellenistic philosophy only seems to have

evolved in the figure of Posidonius of Rhodes and his teacher Panataeus to a lesser degree.\(^{242}\) Stoic ethics were one part of the three part system, divided into physics, ethics and logic, a categorization first made by Zeno of Citium and echoed by Chrysippus and others (Diog. Laer. 7.39-41). There seems to have been a shift to a focus on ethics in the third century B.C.E. Diogenes Laertius records that Aristo of Chios “abolished the topics of physics and logic, saying that the former is beyond us and the latter none of our concern; ethics is the only topic which concerns us” (Diog. Laer. 7.182-4).\(^{243}\)

In opposition to Plato, who thought that moral excellence could be achieved through the political structuring of the state, for most Stoics the focus was placed on the individual developing moral excellence.\(^{244}\) The passions which had to be eliminated were rooted in the mind in early Stoicism. Galen records this in several of his works, especially in his criticisms of Chrysippus, for not believing that “the emotional element of the soul is distinct from the rational” (Fr. 33).\(^{245}\) If the passions were a rooted in the psyche, then they could be eliminated through proper reasoning. Where there was disagreement among the Stoics, it was not usually disagreement on what this end was, but rather how it could best be achieved.\(^{246}\) Cicero records that that the Stoics thought that passions, if left untreated, led to diseases (\textit{Tusc.} 4.23). It was also this interest in perfection which led to

\(^{242}\) Julia Annas, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 80. Annas advises caution in interpreting Posidonius, since his writings come to us through Galen who “uses him as a stick with which to beat Chrysippus.”


the Stoic application of therapeutic practice, and Galen records that Chrysippus dedicated a book to curing passions (Loc. Aff. 3.1, 8.138K).\textsuperscript{247} It is this model of Stoicism that was mistakenly applied to 4 Maccabees by several scholars in the past.\textsuperscript{248}

Posidonius took a different approach to the passions by taking up Platonic philosophy of the soul. This adoption of Platonic philosophy by Posidonius has been downplayed in its importance to the emergence of Middle Platonism; John Dillon has said that it cannot be the “necessary and sufficient condition of the emergence of Middle Platonism.”\textsuperscript{249} This is certainly true, especially since Dillon highlights that Posidonius taught Stoic materialism rather than the metaphysical dualism of Middle Platonism. What is clear, however, in turning specifically to the Stoic challenge of overcoming the passions, is that the adoption of the Platonic ideas of the soul by Posidonius is the necessary but not sufficient cause for the view of passions in both Philo and 4 Maccabees (though it may have been transmitted to them by others whose writings have now been lost).\textsuperscript{250}

Posidonius… (believes) that emotions were neither judgements nor what supervened on judgements, but were caused by the spirited and desiring powers or faculties, in this following completely the old account. And time and again in his work On Emotions, he asks Chrysippus and his sympathisers what is the cause of the excessive impulse. (Fr. 34)\textsuperscript{251}

Early Stoics generally held the cognitive view of passions which was rooted in a one part soul, Diogenes Laertius says, therefore emotions were seen as faulty intellectual judgments; this meant that only humans had passions since only humans were rational

\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 712.
\textsuperscript{249} Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 113.
\textsuperscript{250} Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, 115.
\textsuperscript{251} Kidd, ed., Posidonius, 3:90.
Consequently, they thought that the basis of passions was faulty reasoning.\textsuperscript{253} Galen records that Posidonius drew instead upon Platonic philosophy to suggest a three-part soul, the “desiring, the spirited and the rational” \textit{(SVF 1.571)}.\textsuperscript{254} In this citation Galen also claims that Cleanthes believed the same thing. There is furthermore good reason to suspect that this move was not limited to Posidonius; Eudorus of Alexandria (64 B.C.E.-19 C.E.) is only available in fragments, but also seems to have held a similar mix of Platonic and Stoic ideals.\textsuperscript{255}

With the adoption of the tripartite soul into Stoicism, Posidonius could move away from passions that were mistaken judgments, arguing rather that they came from the “irrational part of the soul.” Dillon says,

> They cannot be utterly eradicated, and their cure must rely on careful training as well as purely rational exhortation, which leads to their control rather than their rooting out.\textsuperscript{256}

4 Maccabees provides a similar comment on the issue of control rather than eradication.

> But this argument is entirely ridiculous, for it is apparent that reason prevails not over its own passions but over those of the body. No one of us can eradicate such desire, but reason can provide a way for us not to be enslaved by desire. No one of you can eradicate anger from the soul, but reason can help to deal with anger. No one of us can eradicate malice, but reason can fight at our side so that we are not overcome by malice. For reason is not an uprooter of the passions but their antagonist. (4 Mace 3:1-5)

The same distinction is made in Philo.

\textsuperscript{252} Long, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics}, 175.
\textsuperscript{254} Kidd, ed., \textit{Posidonius}, 3:89.
\textsuperscript{255} Dillon, \textit{The Middle Platonists}, 115.
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 112, (Dillon cites Fr. 31 of Kidd, ed., \textit{Posidonius}, 3:86-87).
The irrational portion is sense and the passions which are the offspring of sense, unquestionably so if they are not the result of any choice but our own. This helper (the mind) then is later born and of course created. (*Leg.* 2.6)

This development seems important to both Philo and 4 Maccabees. For the sake of discussion, the point of comparison here is that the discussion of whether reason could eradicate or merely control the passions was *en vogue* in the century before Philo and 4 Maccabees as was the return to Plato to answer this Stoic problem.\(^{257}\) The (perhaps natural) repercussion to this is that education became the focal point for dealing with the passions rather than therapy.

## 5.3 Education and the Passions

As shown above, Posidonius was opposed the possibility of complete eradication of the passions, and he suggested instead that education was the way to defeat them.\(^{258}\) Galen records that Posidonius thought that children after age fourteen must be educated so that reason could come to control the passions, like the rider controlling the team of horses (Fr. 31 D). This education would lead to the emotions being subject to the “commands of reason” (Fr. 31 C).\(^{259}\)

Both Philo and 4 Maccabees agree that education is the way to make a virtuous person, and they both suggest that individuals from the Jewish tradition fulfill these highest levels of virtue through their education. For 4 Maccabees there is a clarification of this Stoic idea: it is education in the Jewish law that leads to ethical excellence.

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\(^{257}\) Renehan, “The Greek Philosophical Background,” 226-227. Renehan uses this distinction to show that Hadas is mistaken in labelling the author a Platonist and not a Stoic. See, Hadas, *The Third and Fourth Books*, 116-118.

\(^{258}\) Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 112.

Reason, then, is the mind preferring, with sound judgment, the life of wisdom. Wisdom, in turn, is the knowledge of things divine and human and of the causes of these. It amounts, moreover, to training in the law, training by which we learn divine matters reverently and human matters advantageously. (4 Macc 1:15-17)

Therefore, in addition to the categories of reason and the life of wisdom, the clarification that it comes from education in the law (ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδεία) is critical. The education in the Torah enables ethical excellence by which these figures achieve virtue and are able to withstand when testing comes.

They grow more robust through common nurture, daily companionship, other education and our discipline in divine law. So strong, indeed, is the sympathy of brotherly love. Yet the seven brothers felt still greater sympathy toward each other. For since they were trained in the same law, diligently practiced the same virtues and were brought up together in right living, they loved each other still more. (4 Macc 13:22-24)

This education in the Torah makes it possible, as Marcus P. Adams says, to “master their passions, suffer many tortures, and even die ‘for the sake of virtue’” (4 Macc 1:7-8).

Adams claims, on the basis of his text-critical study, that the ideas of education in the law as well as the triumph of reason over the passions are greatly emphasized in Codex Alexandrinus in comparison with other manuscripts. Furthermore, the idea of the mother’s nurturing and breastfeeding also becomes a metaphor for passing on divine truths.

As stated previously, Philo believes that it is possible to attain virtue outside of the Torah. For those who have already attained virtue, education is superfluous, but for those who have not, or for children, education is necessary.

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There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man…the bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching. Just as the perfect master of music or letters requires none of the directions that apply to those arts, whereas the man who stumbles over the subjects of his study does require what we may call laws or rules with their injunctions and prohibitions, while one who is now beginning to learn requires teaching. (Leg. 1.94)

Training in the law also is shown to be a way to eliminate the passions.

Another example of his allegorical interpretation is the law of leprosy, when mildew is in the house the stones must be taken out. In the same way, he says, when “the handiwork of pleasures and desires and passions… weigh down the whole soul… we are to get rid of the principles which cause the infirmity, and introduce in their place good healthy principles by means of a training under the law. (Det. 16)

Education in itself seems to become virtuous for Philo and he praises people who learn for the sake of learning (Leg. 3.167). It also becomes part of Philo’s system of biblical interpretation. In his exegesis of difficult passages, Philo quickly considers that they must be for the education of the readers. One of the most interesting examples of this is Philo’s interpretation of Genesis 6:7, where God is angry that he made mankind. Philo says that this does not actually mean that God is subject to the passion of anger, but it is “introduced for the instruction of many” (Deus. 53).

One of the key factors which affect Philo’s writing is his frustration with the Greek historians of his day for forgetting about Moses, despite their education, showing a flaw in Greek education (Mos. 1.3). Philo portrays Moses’ education as having more multifarious roots than the author of 4 Maccabees does for Eleazar and the seven brothers. Philo notes that Moses was educated in Egypt and excelled at every branch of Egyptian wisdom, mathematics, and music (Mos. 1.5, 23). In addition to this, Philo says, Moses had an excellent Greek education, as well as knowledge of Assyrian literature and Chaldean astronomy (Mos. 1.23). Despite this excellent pedagogy, Moses’ preference
was for the education in the things of his maternal ancestors (Mos. 1.32), and it was this education which led to true ethical superiority.

This leads to Philo’s designation of Torah as part of an educational process. David C Aune says that “the Torah contains the actual utterances of God, which are the ‘royal road’ of true and genuine philosophy” (he cites, Post. 101-102). For both works education becomes a key component in the fight for virtue and, for both, Torah is a part of that struggle.

### 5.4 The Triumph of the Mind

If the emphasis on education was rooted in the idea of the tripartite soul and the mind’s role in subduing the passions, then the other trend in Hellenistic philosophy which is foundational to both Philo and 4 Maccabees is the adoption of the mind as the centre of human cognition. This mind (and it is important to note that for both Philo and 4 Maccabees it is one mind) becomes central to the battle with the passions. The author of 4 Maccabees writes:

> …he enthroned the mind among the senses as a sacred governor over them all. To the mind he gave the law; and one who lives subject to this will rule a kingdom that is temperate, just, good, and courageous. (4 Macc 2:22-23)

The mind is capable of controlling the emotions, but the law is given to prepare the mind for this task. So, when the virtues are tested, Eleazar says under torture that it would be irrational to betray the ancestral law that he had observed all his life (4 Macc 6:17-18). Philo echoes this in attributing the human mind to being the thing which is made in the image of God.

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262 Aune, “Mastery of the Passions,” 127.
Let no one represent the likeness as to a bodily form; for neither is God in human form, nor is the human body God-like. No, it is in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul that the word “image” is used; for after the pattern of a single Mind, even the Mind of the Universe as an archetype, the mind in each of those who successfully came into being was moulded. It is in a fashion a god to him who carries and enshrines it as an object of reverence; for the human mind evidently occupies a position in men precisely answering to that which the great Ruler occupies in all the world. (Opif. 69)

Again the mind occupies the role of governor (both works use the term ἡγεμόν) in reference to how the mind controls the body. Philo applies this, not only to the dualism of the body and soul, but also to the approach to passions. Philo claims that Moses was able to control his passions, and he uses the image of the control of a horse several times; in this analogy the mind is considered the rider and the horse the passions (Mos. 1.26; Leg. 2.99). This is identical to the analogy used by Posidonius, who describes the mind as a charioteer controlling a team of two horses: desire and anger (Fr. 31 D). This was also an analogy that Plato used (Phaedrus 246a). Therefore when the joyful song of Miriam is sung, that “the horse and rider were thrown into the sea,” Philo is clear in his interpretation; this refers to the mind’s overthrow of the passions (Leg 2.102-3).

Galen records Posidonius’ view that the mind is the center of human cognition and moral control, as opposed to Chrysippus who, even with advancements in human dissection and anatomy by the doctor Herophilus, continued to suggest that the heart was the ruling part of the body. Therefore, once again, the contemporary discussion of how the mind overcomes the passions is present in Philo and 4 Maccabees.

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5.5 The Struggle for Virtue

Controlling the passions is no simple task and becomes individual’s battle against themselves. Posidonius thought that vice grew from the seed of evil which resided inside of the human being rather than coming in from the outside world and corrupting the individual; left to run rampant it would corrupt, but if brought under subjection its growth would cease (Fr. 35 C). The presence of a nature within that must be overcome is also central to both works. In 4 Maccabees the root of evil behaviour is within the human being, as Posidonius taught, and the law teaches the individual to act contrary to their nature.

Thus, as soon as one adopts a way of life in accordance with the law, even though a lover of money, one is forced to act contrary to natural ways and to lend without interest to the needy and to cancel the debt when the seventh year arrives. If one is greedy, one is ruled by the law through reason so that one neither gleans the harvest nor gathers the last grapes from the vineyard. (4 Macc 2:8-9)

This necessity of acting contrary to one’s nature is also prominent in Philo. At every step in the fulfillment of virtue the body interferes with the enactment of that virtue; Philo says that to have a physical body is to struggle with the passions (Leg 1.103). Therefore Philo accepts the traditional Stoic view of passion as “immoderate and excessive impulse.” Both pleasure and pain are the same passion, Philo says, because all passions are rooted in pleasure, even pain is the lack of pleasure (Leg. 3.113). This is similar to what the author of 4 Maccabees says: “of the passions, the two most comprehensive types are pleasure and pain, and each of these pertains by nature both to the body and to the soul” (4 Macc 1:20).

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266 Aune, “Mastery of the Passions,” 126.
Both works frame the struggle with passions using athletic imagery. It is a match for a prize which, Philo says, is a crown “such as no assembly of men can confer” (*Leg.* 2:108).\(^{267}\) The author of 4 Maccabees spends considerable time framing the struggle between the martyrs and the king in athletic terms (4 Macc 17:11-16).\(^{268}\) This same struggle is shown throughout Philo’s works, and is especially prominent in his allegorical interpretations. It is shown in the life of Jacob, says Philo, who struggled with the passions both over his birthright and the blessing of his father; the image of Jacob wrestling with God is analogous to how we are to wrestle with the passions (*Leg.* 3.190).

### 5.6 Freedom and Morality

The final issue of Hellenistic philosophy which is related to the struggle with the passions for both works is the problem of moral culpability. In 4 Maccabees this is related to the question of whether the martyrs are guilty if they are forced to eat pork. The king says to Eleazar: “bear in mind that, if indeed there is some power overseeing this religion of yours, it will excuse you for any transgression committed under duress” (4 Macc 5:13). The king again encourages the seven brothers that if they transgress the law under compulsion they will be forgiven, and at one point the narrator speculates that they might have used compulsion as a reasonable excuse to avoid torture, but they did not (8:14, 22, 24). Eleazar tells the king: “do not consider any compulsion more powerful than our ready obedience to the law” (5:16).

\(^{267}\) deSilva, *4 Maccabees*, 66.

Freedom was a central feature for Philo as well and, like 4 Maccabees, it seems the primary reason for freedom was related to the question of moral accountability.

For that is the only quality in us which the Father, who created us, thought deserving of freedom; and, unloosing the bonds of necessity, he let it go unrestrained, bestowing on it that most admirable gift and most connected with himself, the power, namely, of spontaneous will, as far as he was able to receive it . . . But man, who has had bestowed on him a voluntary and self-impelling intellect, and who for the most part puts forth his energies in accordance with deliberate purpose, very properly receives blame for the offences which he designedly commits, and praise for the good actions which he intentionally performs… But the soul of man, being the only one which has received from God the power of voluntary motion, and which in this respect has been made to resemble God, and being as far as possible emancipated from the authority of that grievous and severe mistress, necessity, may rightly be visited with reproach if she does not pay due honor to the being who has emancipated her. And therefore, in such a case, she will most deservedly suffer the implacable punishment denounced against slavish and ungrateful minds. (Deus. 47-48)

In Philo there is a value placed on this freedom because of the moral responsibility which accompanies it.

So, both works also show the difficulty that the Stoics were having between holding the idea of fate and desiring to give individuals moral responsibility; this is a problem which has recently been identified by several scholars. Josiah Gould has identified in Chrysippus’ philosophy the disjointedness between the fatalism based on principles of motion and the desire to speak to morality, which he says remained an unsolved problem.269 Suzanne Bobzien has also spoken to this problem between moral responsibility and fate which she says seems to have been an interest of the Stoics, but

most of the discussion of which is unfortunately lost.\textsuperscript{270} So, here Philo and 4 Maccabees both speak to the problem. The author of 4 Maccabees said that they could have used this as an excuse to eat pork, but they did not. This seems to either heighten the martyr’s virtue or downplay the excusability of action done under compulsion. Philo uses the principles of motion to explain the God has given the individual freedom of action.

This chapter has very briefly outlined some of the influences from Hellenism which define issues of relationship between Judaism and Hellenism for Philo and 4 Maccabees. Of course, this is far from an exhaustive discussion of the Stoic and Platonic influences present in the works, and it is impossible to do justice to each of these points here, but it still shows the debt which both authors show to Hellenistic philosophy. The extent to which they are committed to these discussions, and the nuances which they represent, show that they cannot be considered simply using Hellenism to the service of Judaism, but are committed to both. They have a stake, as it were, in the ongoing discussions of Hellenistic philosophy.

6 Conclusions

There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this comparison. First, it seems that interrelationship between Hellenism and Judaism in Philo and 4 Maccabees is not negotiated in wide communities or even locally, but the individual engages with the discussions of the day and formulates their own conclusions. Therefore any boundary between Judaism and Hellenism must be individualistic because of the necessity for subjective interpretation of the ideas of a community. The disparity of the works’ appropriations of similar cultural language and frameworks might, in fact, show diverging hermeneutic communities, but all that can be said for certain is that these authors have different views. This shows, as Barth says, that cultural identity must be understood through the “experiences through which it is formed,” and in this case the interaction of Jews with Hellenization takes on multifarious forms.²⁷¹

Peering beneath the veneers of communities, religion, and philosophy, there appear two individuals trying to make sense of their world, beyond questions of a struggle between Judaism and Hellenism or authorial fidelity. Scholars who have attempted to show where these authors’ loyalties lay have overlooked the complicated process of identity negotiation. Dawson’s work shows the shortcoming of this type of study. He says that Philo sees Greek culture as “deficient Judaism” but Judaism could just as easily be seen as “incomplete” without Greek philosophy to elucidate the true meanings of Torah.²⁷² The resources of culture rather complement one another in the author’s attempts to understand the world. This presents the ultimate difficulty to historians who would

²⁷² Dawson, Allegorical Readers, 121.
analyze the fidelity of these authors; they must at some point step into the circular relationship between Judaism and Hellenism.

As Philo and 4 Maccabees are members of various communities, and those communities on various levels, it is clear that as individuals their boundaries show a rich dialogue with many elements of the culture around them. On the level of methodology, this dialectic again presents a challenge to the study of boundaries. Cohen identifies a problem which faces anthropology and subsequently history; it is that anthropologists see ethnic boundaries as being between cultures rather than between minds. So, in studying Hellenization and Jewishness in Philo and 4 Maccabees, it becomes clear that both works envision a different relationship between Jews and Greek thought. However, what is perhaps most interesting are the elements of Hellenization which are simply taken for granted by both Philo and 4 Maccabees. Neither asks if Jews should be attempting to acquire virtue or defeat the passions, but both authors simply assume this.

So, both authors have either consciously or unconsciously adopted these Hellenistic goals. Therefore, as interpreters of their world, Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees naturally and perhaps unintentionally use the cultural language and resources which are available to them to make sense of their own patriotism and ethnicity. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz famously said,

Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun. I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.

274 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5.
Cohen unpacks this definition by Geertz.

There are three interrelated and powerful principles contained within Geertz’s precise and eloquent formulation. The first is that culture (“webs of significance”) is created and continually recreated by people through their social interaction, rather than imposed upon them as a Durkheimian body of social fact or as Marxist superstructure. Secondly, being continuously in process, culture has neither deterministic power nor objectively identifiable referents (“law”). Third, it is manifest, rather, in the capacity with which it endows people to perceive meaning in, or to attach meaning to social behavior.275

Therefore, Philo and 4 Maccabees create and recreate both Jewishness and Hellenization. Philo seems to undermine boundaries and 4 Maccabees seems to enhance them, but they both either knowingly or unknowingly create a concept of culture through the dialectic between Judaism and Hellenism. Secondly, the “identifiable referent” which has been considered to be the Torah comes with questionable and ambiguous meaning, and in both works the words and content of the law is used to cross the boundaries between Judaism and Hellenism; both approaches to the Torah highlight extreme subjectivity with which they interpret it. Thirdly, the focus on ethical behavior provides a way to understand meaning between the cultures of which they are a part.

Consequently, both Philo and 4 Maccabees as individuals become subjects of Hellenization and in their search for understanding of their world they inevitably dialogue with it (perhaps unknowingly). Therefore the understanding of Hellenization of these two works cannot speak of Hellenization on the communal level, but rather on the level of the self. So, reclamation of the self in the study Hellenization would be a valuable endeavor.

As Anthony Cohen has suggested:

The self is [not] autonomous—such a claim would be facile. Selves are acted upon: they are social. They are also cultural. But the self is not passive as a subject of society and of culture; it has agency, is active, proactive and creative. Constituted by a society and made competent by culture, individuals make their worlds through their acts of perception and interpretation.276

This methodology, applied to these works, again enables a move beyond discussing syncretism and author loyalties to seeing the unique ways that these individuals formulate their identity.

The autonomy of the self in the interaction with Hellenism is highlighted in these works in the various ways that Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees respond to the same issues. For example, the way that they approach the Stoic idea of harmony with nature in one sense shows Philo’s natural law leanings and 4 Maccabees’ perspective that Judaism and Hellenism are at odds, but ultimately shows that both authors could come to various conclusions by interacting with the Stoics’ linking of “nature” and “God.”277

Therefore Philo discusses how observing the law creates harmony with nature. This idea was conspicuous in the Stoics, whose idea of harmony with nature was integrally bonded to their idea of natural law.

Zeno represented the end as: ‘living in agreement’. This is living in accordance with one concordant reason, since those who live in conflict are unhappy. His successors expressed this in a more expanded form, ‘living in agreement with nature’, since they took Zeno’s statement to be an incomplete predicate. (Stobaeus 2.75,11-76,8)278

Diogenes Laertius furthermore quotes Chrysippus, who says:

276 Cohen, Self Consciousness, 115
278 Long, Hellenistic Philosophers, 1:394
Living in agreement with nature comes to be the end, which is in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the whole, engaging in no activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law. (Chrysippus *De finibus*, 7.87-9)²⁷⁹

Cicero records that the Stoics “have perceived the final good to be agreement with nature and living consistently with nature . . .” (*Tusc.* 5.81-2), and he quotes Cato who says that this final good is “. . . selecting those (things) in accordance with nature and rejecting those contrary to nature, that is—a life in agreement and consistent with nature” (*Fin.* 3.31).²⁸⁰

Philo adopts the idea that living according to the law promotes harmony with nature which strengthens the argument for his natural law inclinations and the connection to the Stoic idea of natural law.²⁸¹ For Philo, obedience to the law of God does not only provide heavenly benefit but also fulfills the Stoic vision of alignment with nature. He sees living by the law as essentially living in harmony with the law of the universe and says that Moses accepted:

. . . that the world is in harmony with the law and the law with the world, and that the man who observes the law is constituted thereby a loyal citizen of the world, regulating his doings by the purpose and will of nature, in accordance with which the entire world itself also is administered. (*Opif.* 3)

Following the laws therefore creates a type of harmony in the individual, because the arrangement of one’s life matches the arrangement of the universe and, in the same way, the individual’s actions will match their words (*Mos.* 2.48). The laws on an individual level, says Philo, are meant to work for “harmony of the universe” and they are “in agreement with the principles of eternal nature” (*Mos.* 2.52).” Therefore Philo shows the

purpose of the individual laws given by Moses, and he presents this as the reason why people should be attracted to the observance of the law (Mos. 2.51).\(^{282}\)

The approach to nature in 4 Maccabees is almost completely opposite to that of Philo, shown in the *Rededuelle* of the text in which the perceived threats of the author of 4 Maccabees are exposed, the speech of the king. Contrary to Philo’s view that harmony with nature arises from following the law, it is this same position which is argued for by the enemy king in 4 Maccabees. He says that by avoiding pork the Hebrews are spurning the gifts of nature:

> Why should you abhor eating the very excellent meat of this animal when nature has provided it? For it is senseless not to enjoy delicious things that are not shameful and not right to decline the gifts of nature. (4 Macc 5:8-9)

The king’s expression here, “the gifts of nature,” can be cautiously advanced as offering something similar to both the Stoics’ and Philo’s idea of “harmony with nature.” His ignorance is exposed, however, several lines later in Eleazar’s response, when he says that God sympathizes with human nature, which is the reason why he has given things to eat that will benefit humankind and things to avoid which will harm the soul/life (4 Macc 5:25-26).

The above example also shows the problem which confronts historians. Any concept of ethnic or community boundaries falls short of understanding discrepancies in the individual’s attempt to understand their world. Therefore, the above discrepancy may be the result of some specific teaching behind both works, but it is more likely representative of random variations in their synthesis. Therefore, discrepancies in the

boundaries of any potential group show the necessity of assessing identity on the level of individual experience.\textsuperscript{283} This justifies Barclay’s idea of the “negotiation” of identity, but specific negotiations can only be assessed on an individual and not a communal level.\textsuperscript{284} Philo adopts the Stoic harmony with nature as complementary to Jewish teaching, while the author of 4 Maccabees sees it either as a threat, or as a mistaken understanding which needs correction. This further undermines anything that could be categorized as Judaism or Hellenism and the authors’ faithfulness to either of these, since faithfulness to one or the other assumes that it would be easy to identify either one, which it is not. This has been Cohen’s critique of the way in which boundaries are studied.

Rather than questioning their existence, or questioning the extent to which they might reasonably be generalized (whose boundaries are they?), they have been concerned almost exclusively with the ways in which boundaries are marked.\textsuperscript{285} There are two ongoing challenges which this study has not been able to overcome, indeed which no work may ever. The first is the incredible complexity of these works, both in the philosophical prowess of Philo and 4 Maccabees and in their paradigmatic attention to detail, which means that a study like this must always generalize and oversimplify. The second issue is that, as the literature review has shown, many modern religious historians are still influenced by ideas of orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Both of these are artificial categories created by historians and there is a need to move beyond them. Moreover, categorization is further hindered even by the attempts to isolate a “religious”

\textsuperscript{283} Cohen, \textit{The Symbolic Construction}, 20.
\textsuperscript{284} Barclay ed., 2-3.
\textsuperscript{285} Cohen, “The Anthropology of Ethnicity,” 64.
manifestation in the ancient world. Were Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees Jews who practiced philosophy, or philosophers who also happened to be Jews? If they were both how is it possible to distinguish between Philo and 4 Maccabees as Jews and as philosophers?

The failure to adequately answer this question has resulted, for the study of Jewish history in particular, in what Cohen calls an “ethnographic preoccupation.” As a side note, it also seems that the classification of 4 Maccabees as a religious text has caused Classics scholars to overlook it. Furthermore, Philo has been well studied under the category of Middle Platonism, but his contributions and recordings of the murky world of Middle Stoicism have also been frequently overlooked. Ultimately, as Renehan argues, even the categories of Middle Stoicism and Middle Platonism are modern constructs and not lived realities.

In regards to Torah, for Philo and 4 Maccabees its usefulness seems to be in presenting new possibilities for understanding of the Hellenistic world, and a better method by which to achieve Hellenistic virtue. The Torah as a symbol therefore becomes the thing which transcends cultures in its applicability, which is to both Hellenism and Judaism. Philo and the author of 4 Maccabees show Cohen’s description of a symbol to be true. He compares symbol to language, saying that, just as language does not give meaning but a

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286 Brent Nombri argues that the distinct category of “religion” is a modern invention which is read into history in *Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); in regards to historiography and the taxonomy of religion, see Tomiko Masuzawa, *The Invention of World Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 47-64.
287 Cohen, “The Anthropology of Ethnicity,” 64.
way to make meaning, so symbol creates the possibility of meaning.\textsuperscript{289} For Philo, allegory is not meant to obscure boundaries but rather to clarify the universal reality behind the text. For 4 Maccabees, ancestral law is a way of claiming universal legitimacy for the Torah, showing that its applicability was to all Hellenistic cultures, and not only Jews. Therefore the author could explain that Antiochus used the lessons that he learned from dealing with the Jews in his successful attack on Egypt (4 Macc 17:23-24).

Finally, the idea of a struggle with Hellenism must be redefined as the individual’s struggle for universal meaning, for neither Philo nor 4 Maccabees is this meaning exclusivist. Therefore, even the highlighting of difference is not the indicator of two mutually exclusive worldviews. Ultimately, looking for cultural difference or a struggle between Judaism and Hellenism by analysts of religious history has self-fulfilling consequences. Therefore, when Himmelfarb says that Philo (and Josephus) adapted “Greek ideas and values in the service of a new understanding of Jewish tradition, which is, none the less, distinctively Jewish,” this does not carry with it an understanding of what it means to be “distinctively Jewish” or what it would take to be “distinctively Hellenistic.”\textsuperscript{290} The problem of historical categorization is clear. It seems that the categories which dictate views of these works such as Judaism and Hellenism must again be re-evaluated, not only as over-simplistic, but as creating the dichotomies which the historian seeks to find.\textsuperscript{291}

\textsuperscript{289} Cohen, \textit{The Symbolic Construction}, 16.
\textsuperscript{290} Himmelfarb, “The Torah between Athens and Jerusalem,” 113-130.
\textsuperscript{291} Barth, “Enduring and Emerging Issues,” 11
7 Bibliography

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