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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE
THE MANAGERIAL APPROACHES OF
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

by

W. George R. Vance

Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation investigates the meaning of the common perceptions found among Chief Administrative Officers in a recent study, that the success of the CAO position and of the CAO system hinges upon the individual CAO's personal style. In establishing the investigative framework, the necessity of complementing formal analytic perspectives in the evaluation of local government effectiveness is demonstrated, and the validity and practical utility of selected measurement-oriented models of leadership style are criticized.

The concept of style in the management and political psychology literatures is critically reviewed. Style is generally found to be either a trait or habit, or a name given to a particular set of responses to a style scale.

Style is also found to be inseparably associated with the basic behavioral science concepts "attitude" and "behavior." Two prominent schemes to measure style, Situational Leadership and The Managerial Grid, are judged to be of doubtful validity and limited usefulness. The CAO's style is understood to mean the style of the CAO-in-the-organization. Style is thus encompassed by the concept of organizational culture. Style and culture are elaborated, and are taken to be appreciated by the CAO and the organization's members, in what are termed "conscious/analytic" and "unconscious/intuitive" ways. It is proposed that the outside investigator's "conscious/analytic" or formal approach to the appreciation of the CAO's style can yield only a partial appreciation.
The style of the CAO is taken to be dependent upon the CAO's perceived role in the organization. The position and the role of the CAO in the organization are examined in the British, American, and Canadian literatures. Formal analytic approaches to the CAO position, and a formal policy-administration conception of council and staff roles, are found to dominate the literature.

"Managerial approach" is the conception of management style that guides the collection and interpretation of the data. "Approach" comes first from Kotter and Lawrence's 1972 assessment of the effectiveness of 20 American mayors, and second from Kotter's 1982 study of the work patterns of 15 effective private sector general managers. The "agendas" and "networks" of the mayors and general managers are the two basic dimensions of their managerial approaches that are taken from the two studies noted.

Thirty-seven (37) large-municipality CAOs were interviewed and 59 small-municipality CAOs completed a questionnaire that corresponded to the interview schedule. Interviews are shown to be superior to questionnaires for assessing the managerial approaches of CAOs.

In conclusion the approaches of the large-municipality CAOs are classified in terms of two dimensions: Individual-Team-oriented, and Bureaucratic-Entrepreneurial. Finally, the implications of the findings of the thesis for further research and for the training of CAOs are discussed.
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It has taken me more than twice the amount of time normally permitted to complete the thesis requirement of the Ph.D. program. Although some of the main ideas in this thesis were developed in residence, they were applied first to a thesis on a different subject that was never completed. Accordingly, my first debt is to those at the University of Western Ontario, and especially in the Department of Political Science, who influenced my ideas and contributed to my first attempt to apply them, and who supported the extension required for the present project.

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Michael Boggs and Sheila Bowles of the CAG's Office in Burlington have actively assisted me from the outset of the project. In
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I hope that the Ministry, the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association which endorsed the project, and the CAOs who sat for interviews and completed questionnaires, all judge the research findings to be a reasonable return on their respective investments.

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PART I

CHAPTER 1

MANAGEMENT STYLE AS A RESEARCH CONCEPT

A. Introduction

The reality of appointive or elective office ... is that leadership is an impossibility. Decisional avoidance, not innovation, is the operational code of today's urban administrator. Decisional avoidance, in turn, is a consequence of government structure. (Hagan 1976, 7)1

This quotation from a study of American Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs) nicely introduces the three primary objectives of this dissertation: (1) to demonstrate the necessity of complementing formal analytic perspectives in the evaluation of local government effectiveness, (2) to show that certain more formal measurement-oriented methods of investigating leadership style are misguided and misleading, and (3) to identify and classify the managerial approaches—including the "operational codes"—of Ontario CAOs. Each of these three objectives is now amplified.

The establishment of the CAO position in Ontario and its spread among Ontario municipalities have been influenced by American thought on the City Manager, and by British thought on the Chief Executive Officer. The analysis of the CAO in these literatures emphasizes outward forms—structures and procedures in particular; hence, its characterization as "formal" or "structural". The attempt here is to provide a complementary emphasis by treating the CAO as a percipient individual.

The thesis reviews many studies of management/leadership some of which are closely analyzed. It is argued that less formal methods of
studying managers—the most formal being those that attempt to measure managerial effectiveness—are most appropriate. This is partly because some of the key elements of managerial effectiveness are intrinsically unmeasurable, and may be unknowable in any formal way. One of these key elements is the ability to use language effectively. The meaning of managers' words to those they try to influence is extremely resistant to quantification. This difficulty and a distorted conception of "behavior" have contributed to the discounting of managers' words in more formal models.

The "operational code" of CAOs are not addressed as such. Their equivalents in the thesis are sets of beliefs that CAOs hold about roles, relations, responsibilities, performance, and other aspects of their jobs, that reflect and elaborate the cultures of their organizations. Such beliefs constitute what are called the "conscious/analytic" aspects of CAOs' approaches to their jobs. The dissertation documents CAOs' managerial approaches and produces a comparative framework of basic approaches as a conclusion.

The arguments supporting each of these methodological and substantive theses are elaborated in a number of different ways throughout the dissertation. Their interdependence means that they cannot be isolated from one another and presented sequentially. To assist the reader in following the arguments much use is made of forward and backward references and of summaries and intermediate conclusions.

The next section reviews the Canadian literature on the CAO, ending with the study from which the dissertation's concern with style emerged.
B. THE CAO IN THE CANADIAN LITERATURE

There are about a dozen Canadian studies which focus on, or include sustained references to, the CAO in the Canadian literature. They share an emphasis on outward organizational forms, meaning that the CAO position together with its supporting documentation, rather than the CAO performing in a particular job context, is the object of analysis. With one exception the studies to be reviewed take an approach that can be associated with traditional public administration. In this respect they reflect Sancton's observation that "the study of local government in Canada has remained an academic ghetto" with few students venturing "much beyond the subject's original base as a sub-field in traditional public administration" (Magnusson and Sancton 1983, 310). Such an approach in British research has been characterized by Christensen (1979) as "traditional, legalistic, and institutional".

Almost all of the Canadian literature on the CAO is Ontario based since the CAO is most prevalent in Ontario municipal administrations. Early American experience has been credited with inspiring the city of Chatham to appoint a City Manager in 1921 (Dent and Nyitrai 1982, 1). Ircha (1981, 7) follows Rowat's "weaver" in crediting Canada's British political traditions of "sovereignty and constitutional power" with restraining the Canadian impacts of the American urban reform movement. He goes on to refer to the CAO system in Canada as a "muted, but parallel form of municipal administration to the U.S. council-manager system" (p.10), and to note that the system began to spread seriously outside of Quebec only after 1950.

In 1970 the number of Ontario municipalities with CAO or equivalent
positions stood somewhere between 7 and 20 or so. The lower count is that of Dent and Nyitrai who note that in 1970 the Municipal Act was amended to authorize councils to appoint a CAO, and that prior to that time such appointments were authorized by private bills (1982, 1-2). The higher number is an estimate by the retired CAO of Guelph who was appointed by by-law in 1967 without benefit of special legislation. (Letter from F.M. Woods to M. Boggs, CAO of Burlington, May 18, 1982).

Whatever the precise number of CAOs prior to 1970, in the following years Ontario CAOs mushroomed to 75 in 1972, to 116 in 1975, and to 216 in 1982 (Dent and Nyitrai 1982, 1-2).

Whatever stimulus the legislative amendment gave to the increase in the number of CAO positions in Ontario in the 1970s, was probably reinforced by the publication in 1973 of The Hickey Report. Hickey recommended that:

The council of every municipality in Ontario should be required to appoint a CAO for the following reasons:

(a) it is essential that the head of the council be free to exercise leadership in the determination of the policies of the council, to approve and appraise proposals, to appraise results, to carry out his other public duties and not be burdened with administrative matters.

(b) it is in the best interests of the council and the municipal corporation that the council appoints a CAO to lead, co-ordinate and direct the officers in the administration of the corporation, subject to the policies and directions of the council, and

(c) it is essential that the role of the head of the council and the role of the CAO be stated clearly in the statutes and that there not be conflict or misunderstanding, insofar as their respective roles are concerned. (1973, 77)

Hickey recommended further that in smaller municipalities "the person appointed the CAO could be appointed to some or all of the other offices of the municipal corporation."
The success of Hickey's recommended "Council-CAO system", which was to have no committees or very few committees, hinged for him on the following two essential conditions:

a) the duties of the councillors, the CAO and the COs [i.e. Chief Officers, the British equivalent of department heads] be logical and be stated, clearly, in a procedure by-law, and
b) the relationships between the councillors, and the CAO and the COs be co-operative, helpful, understanding and they operate as a team--with common goals and objectives! (p.12)

One can see that Hickey's stated reasons for promoting the idea of a CAO for every municipality are little more than assertions of strongly held opinions. The notion in reason (a) of the first excerpt that the mayor should be free of "administrative matters" as distinguished from "policy matters", is perhaps the foremost traditional tenet of local government thought. This tenet, referred to hereafter as the policy-administration dichotomy, or simply policy-administration, will be challenged in Chapter 3 as unsound and organizationally dysfunctional.

Reason (b) above is notable for the expectations of "leadership", "co-ordination" and "direction" associated with simply having a CAO. As will be seen the CAO was to overcome widely perceived "problems" of the same names. However, these problems were not defined and analyzed in such a way that the proposal of a CAO position could be seriously evaluated as a solution.

Reason (c) in the first excerpt and condition (a) in the second both reveal a narrow, literal impression of the purpose and meaning of statutory language, and of statutes themselves. Hickey appears mistakenly to believe that the language used to specify the roles of the mayor and the CAO respectively, can be made so clear that it will mean
the same thing to all readers. He seems not to recognize the communicative capacity of the very passing of the statute. It may, for example, invite municipal officials to appoint a CAO simply to enhance the municipality's status. Nor does Hickey seem to be aware of some of the day-to-day implications of actually establishing CAOs by means of precise and uniform legislation in municipalities that vary greatly in many ways.

Finally, with respect to condition (b), is it realistic to expect teamwork to flow from the statutory imposition of structures, even reinforced by Hickey's exhortation to co-operate?

While they may not be very persuasive, Hickey's reasons for appointing a CAO are consistent with his formal overall perspective. His analysis of local government decision-making and his recommendations for its improvement are developed primarily in terms of organizational structures and procedures.

This emphasis on organizational forms as the key to local government effectiveness that is so explicit in Hickey's Report, is common to other Canadian writers. A few years after the publication of The Hickey Report, Plunkett and Betts applauded its promotion of the CAO as "light years away from the traditional practice where administrative co-ordination and leadership was supposedly provided (if at all) through the office of the Clerk" (1978, 117). They went on to write about "fragmentation" and municipal failure as a consequence of having a certain structure (e.g., a system of administrative committees of council) "and/or" not having a certain structure (e.g., a CAO).
Later in their book Plunkett and Betts address the implications for a municipality of the appointment of a CAO under Ontario's Municipal Act:

The appointment of a chief administrative officer under these provisions does not imply any substantial administrative change unless the by-law assigns real authority and responsibility to the incumbent of such a position. Moreover, an appointment of this kind does not involve any change in the political structure or the role of the council. However, the latter might well be altered if the operative by-law assigned substantial administrative responsibility to the chief administrative officer which could lead to a reduction of the role of the council in this area. (Plunkett and Betts 1978, 210)

In this excerpt administrative change and change in the role of council are portrayed as varying directly with the strength of the content of the operative by-law. This appears to ignore the role adjustments one might expect solely from the hiring of a CAO to fill a new position, the perceptions of the by-law by all involved, and their differential ability to act on their perceptions. Initial minor accommodations under an outwardly weak by-law could well lead to major changes.

This failure to allow for informal elements and personal influence seems inconsistent with the authors' recognition, a short space earlier in their book, of the importance of individual style:

Increasingly, the urban administrator or manager has to recognize that his "right" to manage does not stem only from the power inherent in his office either by way of legislation or of detailed job description. It is equally dependent upon his ability to command the respect... of the employees under his jurisdiction. Thus style of leadership becomes important for the effect that this has on employee morale and motivation and, ultimately, on the development of an effective organization. (p.195, emphasis added)

If the CAO's by-law does not guarantee for him the compliance of his subordinates, why should it guarantee the CAO's compliance for council?

Plunkett and Betts' reference to the CAO's style of leadership is
one of only two that were found in the local government literature. Outwardly it reinforces their observation that "the notion of management has, all too frequently, been limited to considerations of structure" (p.197). However, the demonstrated weaknesses in related observations put the value of this reference to style inoubt.

A symposium on regional government in Ontario held at the University of Western Ontario in 1977 heard two similar justifications of the CAO position: "I suggest very strongly that the most effective administrative system is one that employs a Chief Administrator" was the response of a practising CAO to an observation made in the report of a regional government review commission, that a 'Technical Co-ordinating Committee of some department heads might match a CAO in effectiveness (U.W.O, 1977, 15). A professor of political science made the following statement:

I also strongly favour mechanisms for more co-ordination, including a chief administrative officer—that I think is absolutely vital. . . . What is needed is an administrator who can see the whole picture, and particularly, of course, the implications of planning. Now an administrative officer would do these sorts of things. He would sift out the administrative trivia, which is now burdening committees and councils to some extent, and he would bring forward intelligible and useful reports which would focus the attention of council on major policy questions. (p.22)

It seems that the need identified here is not simply for the CAO position, but rather for a particular individual in the CAO position.

These references illustrate three common beliefs of the 1970s: first, that weak leadership, the lack of co-ordination and direction, and fragmentation, were perceived to be critical problems of municipal administration; second, that the perceived solution to these problems
was to change formal structure; and third, that "the CAO system" was perhaps the most preferred structure.

That talking as a managerial activity has been discounted as a function of the preference for more formal study methods, is part of a more general loss of control over language. Examples of the misguided and misleading use of language in citations and in interview and questionnaire responses pervade the dissertation.

"Fragmentation" and its allies provide good early examples. For the most part they seem to have been simply repeated until they came to be accepted as givens. Rosenthal has noted that "repeated use of and attention to any word gives it a certain positive value, the value of being treated as worthy of our attention" (1984, 5). In two studies referred to below certain of these concepts were formalized and measured, the measurements being of dubious value.

The positive value of certain words that is of primary concern to Rosenthal is "the value a word gets from our attitude toward what it stands for" (p.5). This value can be positive or negative, and it can be so much a part of a word's meaning that whenever we use the word we practically see a plus or minus sign over it: the sign of our approval or longing or some other positive attitude, or else of some negative attitude like our disapproval or maybe our fear. (p.5)

Rosenthal's book concentrates on four sets of terms that have come to be accepted and used uncritically primarily for their positive value. Only one of the four sets, "relationship--whole--system--community--environment", is nominally related to terms in this dissertation. However, the references to the CAO reviewed above and below suggest that
CAO—leadership—co-ordination—unity—direction form another positively valued set. "Style", "situation", "participation", and "team" also turn out to be "plus" terms that are similarly "empty" for many people who use them.

Rosenthal shows throughout her book how the quests for scientific status, through measurement, of anthropology, psychology, sociology, and history, have contributed to the corruption of all four sets of terms. Her analysis of "values education" leads her to the following denunciation:

The mad scientism of presuming to measure values just adds to the folly because what all the pseudo-scientific instruments for generating values data and all the elaborate statistical procedures and semantic differential processes and the like add up to is the simple relativist statement that "good" and "bad" are relative to the community; and such a statement, like all statements of ethical relativism if their inferences are really followed, leads—as we find yet again—to obviously unacceptable ethics. (p. 168)

In sum, Rosenthal's work offers support from a unique perspective for the weakness of the language in which the merits of the CAO have been discussed, and for the undermining of meaning through measurement in the social sciences.

Edelman ([1964] 1970, 1971) and Gusfield ([1963], 1969) provide analytic perspectives on what may be termed "CAO language" that are compatible with Rosenthal's. Within their frameworks such terms as "fragmentation" and "leadership" become symbolic political catchwords or slogans meant to confer status on the idea of the establishment of the CAO position and, by association, on those who supported the idea. Their symbolic language and action perspectives arise again below.

The first promotion of the CAO position in the Canadian literature
that is, based on analysis and systematic evidence was reported by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) in 1982. In its study of management and planning in Canadian municipalities of fewer than 25,000 people, municipalities with CAOs were distinguished in several ways. They had a significantly higher incidence of council restructuring and reorganization, and of written descriptions of overall operating objectives; they had a lower incidence of involvement by standing committees in day-to-day administration (FCM 1982, 50). These statistical relationships were explained as follows:

The presence of a CAO is associated with the ongoing reorganization of Council. As community needs change, the position of a CAO generally contributes to a clear distinction between the prime responsibility for policy (which appropriately rests with Council) and administration (which appointed officials are hired to carry out), and the establishment of a clear policy base from which the municipality operates. (p.50)

The existences of "recent council restructuring" and of "written objectives" seem on the face of it less revealing than, say, an account of the dynamics of restructuring and of formulating written objectives. The processes and results of restructuring and of writing objectives cannot be presumed always to be positive. In the absence of some hypothesis, to render such existences as numbers and to cross-tabulate them with the existence of a CAO is simply a mechanical exercise. The more interesting significance of a significant correlation coefficient may lie in the causal linkages that make the CAO responsible for the restructuring and objectives. Without the support of such linkages the statistical associations simply cannot be used as evidence favouring the establishment of a CAO.

The CAO form of administration is also credited in the FCM study,
presumably on the basis of a similar statistical association, with reducing the number of standing committees in the larger municipalities (p.49). Finally, information obtained in on-site interviews demonstrated that a CAO contributes substantially to good relations between elected representatives and appointed officials through the establishment of clear reporting duties and responsibilities, thus reducing confusion, duplication and the potential for error. Further, the CAO improves communication and co-ordination among individual departments and improves the timing and quality of technical input to Council by the administrative staff. (pp.50-1)

As with reorganization and written objectives, these claims cannot be accepted without some explanation of why the CAO necessarily achieves the effects for which he is credited. Such explanations must also identify communication and co-ordination problems in municipalities without CAOs, in terms that make the addition of a CAO a reasonably promising remedy.

Noteworthy among the pro-CAO claims made in the FCM study, are the CAO's role in reinforcing the policy-administration dichotomy, and the reference to "technical input" as the contribution of the CAO and staff to council. The implication of the latter is that day-to-day administration is "technical", not political. From this position it is a short step to Ircha's general prescription that

only by drawing from both the political astuteness of the elected officials and the technical organizational expertise of the appointed administration in a balanced manner will our municipal government systems be able to face the challenges which lie ahead in our uncertain future. (1981, 21-2)

If policy and administration are inappropriate general role descriptions for council and staff, then their reinforcement conceptually through the specialization of "political" and "technical"
skills would seem to compound the difficulty. The weaknesses and undesirable consequences of such thinking are dealt with at length in Chapter 3.

Although the FCM study included both CAO-led and non-CAO municipalities, it lacked a pre-CAO data baseline. Such a baseline would have supported a more persuasive before-and-after comparison by individual municipality. However, to be convincing, such a baseline would also have to contain data on more persuasive measures of CAO effectiveness than the FCM used. On this analysis the FCM's evidence simply does not support the claims it makes for the CAO which, in turn, do not support its recommendation that "municipalities which do not presently employ a CAO actively consider the establishment of such a position to oversee the administration of the municipality" (p.5). The word "consider" seems misleading since the study did not provide any disadvantages against which a municipality might balance the claimed advantages of having a CAO.

During the time that the FCM data were being analyzed and reported, a questionnaire and interview study focussing on the role of the Ontario CAO was being conducted under the auspices of the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association (OMAA). Two Senior Policy Advisers with the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, G. Dent and E. Nyitrai, constructed a variety of profiles of such characteristics as education, income, formal authority, and responsibilities (Dent and Nyitrai 1982). As their central conclusion they agreed with the dominant perception of the interviewed CAOs that "the success of the position (and the system) largely hinged on the individual's personal style" (p.39).
This conclusion raised a number of questions which the dissertation
attempts to answer as part of its third primary objective. What do CAOs
mean by "success", by "the CAO system", by "personal style"? Can
personal style be formalized so that the styles of CAOs can be
identified and compared? Can CAOs' success or effectiveness be defined
in terms of style? How do CAOs' perceptions of their proper roles
relate to the perceptions of their styles? How do the styles relate to
the styles of their organizations?

It should be clear from this review of the Canadian literature that the growth in the numbers of Ontario CAOs since 1970 has taken
place without benefit of the close analysis of problems and of
prospective remedies that one associates with careful planning. CAO
seemed to arrive on the Canadian scene as a positive term referring to
such valued terms as co-ordination, leadership, and unity of direction.

Furthermore, just as personal differences among incumbents received
no attention, differences among municipalities that could conceivably
make them more or less receptive to a CAO position were also overlooked.
The variety of municipal structures and practices in Canada led Sancton
to ask rhetorically:

How can anything of significance be known about city politics when structures and practices vary from city to city and when there are not even two cities in the whole country that share the same local political parties? (p.310 in Magnusson and Sancton, 1983)

There is compelling evidence from Britain that to redesign local
governments on structural premises and without regard for "the variety
problem" is unsound and can be very costly. This British experience is
summarized in the next section.
C. The CAO, the Corporate Approach, and Corporate Culture

In the early 1970s Britain legislated nation-wide local government reorganisation which was accompanied by the wider adoption of the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), the equivalent of the Canadian CAO.

According to Haynes (1980, 43), the expectations of the CEO held by the Redcliffe-Maud (1969) and the Bains (1972) Committees, whose reports to the national government provided the primary impetus and rationale for the reorganisation, were that the CEO would:

1. better co-ordinate municipal departments;
2. present to council more-integrated views of the department heads;
3. improve the general level of efficiency; and
4. actively diffuse modern management techniques.

"Efficiency" and "modern management" should be added to the positive referents of CAO. In addition to the CEO, two other corporate structures, a "policy and resources committee" of council and a senior management team (SMT) of department heads, were integral parts of the reorganization. These three structures, along with their stated objectives and supporting procedures, constitute what was referred to as "the corporate approach" or "corporate management".

Dearlove (1979) is highly critical of the rationale for the reorganisation. He contends that it was misguided partly because not enough research had been done prior to the reorganisation "to know ... how things worked within unreformed local authorities" (p.46). Dearlove critically, and persuasively for the most part, "unpacks" what he calls "four boxes of orthodoxies": democracy, efficiency, central control, and councillor calibre. Proponents of the reorganisation contended that their corporate approach would increase the population and territory of
local authorities, which would attract higher calibre councillors, resulting ultimately in more democratic and more efficient local government. Dearlove demonstrates that these so-called problems could not stand up to analysis, and that the proponents of the reorganisation could not, or would not, explain how and why the new structures would work.

In response to the contentions that councillor calibre was unacceptably low, and that the reorganisation would raise the calibre of elected officials, Dearlove writes sarcastically:

'It has all been so very simple. Local government is a big business; local government should, therefore, be organised like a business; and local government should be managed by businessmen -- by men of calibre who will provide 'vigorous leadership' and 'think about the big things'. (p.39)

This is a good description of big business as another positive referent and political symbol.

Over a period of years following the reorganisation, a research team from the Institute of Local Government (INLOGOV) at the University of Birmingham systematically assessed its effects by means of questionnaires and interviews involving large numbers of municipal officials (Hinings et al. 1980).

Like the FCM study discussed above, the Hinings group used questionnaire and survey measures that reflect a conception of social science in which numerical measures seem to be ends rather than means. That the personal and social meanings of their data were destined to be overshadowed, if not lost entirely, to "objective" measurement, can be seen in their operational definition of "integration", one of their twenty or so elaborately defined research constructs.
Integration is defined as "the co-ordination of activities into an effective unity" (1980, Appendix A, p.2). Its two sub-constructs are extent: "measured by the existence of policy committees and sub- [i.e., sub-committees], management teams and interdepartmental working groups" (p.2), and style. Style is comprised of three sub-constructs: (1) structural openness "measured by the range of participation in the policy committees, management team and corporate groups" (p.3); structural concentration "measured by the extent to which all major or ad hoc matters of policy go through the policy committee, management team and corporate groups" (p.4); and (3) collective emphasis "measured by whether departments mainly deal with each other on a one to one basis or through multi-departmental meetings; whether the management team usually reports as a team, and whether the policy committee seeks to impose a framework within which service committees have to operate" (p.1).

The researchers' lone concession to "subjectivity", which they evidently take to mean "participants' perceptions", was in the measurement of the construct performance "by the assessments of officers of how their authority is performing"; performance was also measured "objectively" by expenditures (p.2). The Hinings group's work provides a good illustration of how behavioral scientists, in supposed imitation of the physical scientists, transform purposive human actions into "unmanned" processes through their "objective" measurements.

At the outset of its research the Hinings group had complete faith in the merit of the structural form of corporate management. However, its data were so bad that it was forced to conclude that "the actual
management structure and procedures introduced [by the reorganisation] had little impact on performance at either the objective or subjective level" (p.256). The Hinings group went on to reinforce this conclusion as follows:

We are not arguing here that every authority should of necessity be corporate. There is no hard evidence in any area of local government which demonstrates the superiority of one management structure as against another whether corporate or not. We are arguing that structural design comes after the analysis of activities, not before. (p.266, emphasis in original)

The importance of this concession cannot be overstated. If sound analysis of activities had routinely preceded the creation of CAO positions in Canada, one suspects that their growth would have been far less remarkable.

In addition to reflecting poorly upon the thinking behind the reorganisation, the Hinings group's concession also reflects poorly upon the common bias in favour of "hard evidence" gathered by more formal research methods. Haynes arrived at the same assessment of the reorganisation by the non-statistical study of one local authority, Birmingham. There, the corporate approach failed completely and the authority reverted to its unreformed ways within two years.

Haynes concluded that the failure was predictable because of the "basic lack of correlation between the organisation's dominant culture and its procedural and structural machinery" (1980, 186). This clash was especially obvious in the meetings of the SMT, which were marred by either excessive conflict or excessive silence: "unspoken and atmospheric" conflict emerged under an "outward display of corporate unity and common purpose" (p.180).
Haynes identified the following three principles of the post-failure corporate system in Birmingham:

1. Departmental boundaries are sacrosanct with few exceptions.
2. The chief officers are primarily responsible to the standing committees to which they report, not to the Authority as a whole.
3. Interdepartmental and interdisciplinary committees are to be kept to a minimum. (p.185)

In Haynes' analytic framework the structural elements are the mechanisms and devices which form the supportive framework of the local authority. The procedural elements are the actual philosophy and process of management. The cultural elements encompass the values, beliefs, prejudices, goals, and expectations of the individuals in the organization (pp.186-8). This list of cultural elements is based on the following list of the functions of organizational culture which Haynes took from another source:

1. It specifies the goals and values toward which the organisation should be directed and by which its success and worth should be measured.
2. It prescribes the appropriate relationships between individuals and the organisation, that is, it makes specific what the organisation should be able to expect from its people, and vice versa.
3. It indicates how behaviour should be controlled in the organisation and what kinds of control are legitimate and illegitimate.
4. It depicts which qualities and behavioural characteristics should be valued or vilified, as well as how these should be rewarded or punished.
5. It shows members how they should treat one another -- competitively or collaboratively, honestly or dishonestly, closely or distantly.
6. It establishes appropriate methods of dealing with the external environment. (cited in Haynes 1980, 119)

Presumably, Haynes would want to broaden the Hinings group's conclusion that structural design should be based upon an analysis of
"activities", which to Haynes would mean procedural elements. To activities Haynes would add organizational culture. One may also presume that, for the corporate approach to have had a reasonable chance of success in Birmingham, its ideas and advantages would have had somehow to become part of the culture of the organization before the new structures were introduced.

The Hinings group's and Haynes' conclusions regarding the premises and the impacts of the reorganisation serve to distinguish between what Peters and Waterman have referred to as "the hardware" and "the software" of organizations (1982, 10-11). The CAO position is part of the organization's hardware. The culture or style of the organization, of which the incumbent CAO is in a position to be a (the?) major source, is part of its software. Peters and Waterman urge professional managers to be more sensitive to their organization's software, and indeed to "manage" it:

All that stuff you have been dismissing for so long as the intractable, irrational, intuitive, informal organization can be managed. Clearly, it has more to do with the way things work (or don't) around your companies as the formal structures and strategies. (p.11, emphasis in original)

In the context of the reorganisation, the question Peters and Waterman raise here is whether any of its legitimate objectives could have been accomplished by means of software changes rather than hardware changes.

This discussion of the wholesale reorganisation of British local government dramatically illustrates the weakness of analyzing local government effectiveness, and of promoting corporate management, solely in terms of structures.

In the next section the concept of style is defined in the contexts
of studies of politics and of management.

D. Style in Political and Management Studies

1. The Study of Local Government and Politics

In contrast to certain other academic fields, the study of urban government and politics is relatively unimpressive, even to its own practitioners. Thus Goodman complains that the American study of urban politics remains a painfully eclectic field, operated as a cottage industry. A large scale project amounts to two researchers analyzing a particular policy area... in a handful of cities. For 29 articles there will be 29 different methods... The range of methods chosen gives representation to almost every discipline in the universe of the humanities and social sciences. (Goodman 1977, 244)

The scholarly requirement of explicitly grounding research methods in theories or models, means that there is a correspondingly wide range of theories and models. This range can be demonstrated using the ten "distinctly different and important models of mayoral behavior" that Kotter and Lawrence culled from "the more serious literature" (1974, 19). The models are listed in Table 1-1.

Most of these models were not developed expressly for the analysis of mayors, but were adapted from more general models in political science. A similar list of models could of course be developed for the study of Chief Administrative Officers. Indeed, models (3a), (3b), and (7) in Table 1-1 may be regarded as mayor-CAO models, the American City Manager being the equivalent for present purposes to the Ontario CAO.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Summary Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Power Broker</td>
<td>Power is to the politician as capital is to the capitalist; 'power stock' is 'invested' and 'exchanged' through 'bargaining' with a view to 'maximizing' the 'return on investment'.</td>
<td>Edward Banfield, <em>Political Influence</em>, 1961, e.g. Mayor Daley of Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public</td>
<td>The mayor's dominant behavioral characteristics are originality, risk-taking, initiative, energy, openness, organizational ability and promotional ingenuity. Like the private entrepreneur, the mayor solves problems and creates benefits.</td>
<td>J.V. Cunningham, <em>Urban Leadership in the Sixties</em>, 1970, e.g. Richard Lee of New Haven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a. Public</td>
<td>The mayor as Public Executive 'manages' as a corporate executive, essential public services, in the 'technically' rather than 'politically' defined public interest.</td>
<td>E. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, <em>City Politics</em>, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. Policy</td>
<td>The mayor and council set policy, rather like private corporate Chairman and Board of Directors, while the City Manager executes policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Formal Structure</td>
<td>The mayor's behavior is mainly a function of the local government structure ('strong' or 'weak' mayor or 'City Manager') and supporting charter which identifies formal responsibilities and relationships.</td>
<td>Developed by citizens' groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personality</td>
<td>The mayor's behavior is mainly a function of his personality. The 'good' mayor is free of 'personality problems'.</td>
<td>Many case studies representing an array of theories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Community Power</td>
<td>The mayor's behavior is determined by decisions and interests of the 'elite' in the community.</td>
<td>Floyd Hunter, <em>Community Power Structure</em>, 1953.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To appreciate Kotter and Lawrence's rejection of these models for their study, it helps to know their research objectives. A partial list of the questions they wanted to answer follows:

- What is "strong leadership"? Does it mean advocating programs, creating a consensus, getting things done, or something else?
- Is there one approach to the job of mayor that works better than others?
- Are some of the roles that mayors play (e.g. legislator, chief executive, chief of state, party head) more important to a city than others?
- Is one type of city charter best in helping mayors with their jobs?
- Is it possible to make any valid generalizations about mayors? Is every city and situation unique? (p. 1)

Interdependencies between the mayor and the City Manager, and the close parallels between these positions individually and combined and Canadian mayors and CAOs, make Kotter and Lawrence's questions meaningful for Ontario CAOs as well. Most of the comments on their work that follow assume this applicability, some restate it.

Kotter and Lawrence's use of the term "approach" in the second question, and its usage as revised in Kotter's GMs study, provide the basis for the definition of the term in this dissertation. It will be shown below to be interchangeable with style, which links it closely to "strong leadership" in the first question above. In the structural perspective discussed earlier simply having a CAO was taken to be an indication of strong leadership; Kotter and Lawrence view the question of effective leadership in terms of the particular incumbent's approach to the job.

Thus their second question suggests that approaches may be identified and compared for effectiveness, which is presumed to be what Dent and Nyitrai's respondents meant by "success". Their fourth
question allows that approach and structure may interact in some consistent fashion.

Kotter and Lawrence's third question about roles does not accommodate the primary role distinction made earlier by Hickey, whose view was that the mayor's "policy" roles are much more important than "administrative" roles.

Question five is their statement of what was referred to earlier as the variety problem.

In sum, only one of the questions noted earlier as arising from the principal Dent and Nyitray conclusion, namely, the relation between personal and organizational style, is not covered explicitly in Kotter and Lawrence's guiding questions.

Some of Kotter and Lawrence's guiding questions are reflected in the models numbered (6) and (7) in Table 1-1; the central ideas of models (2) and (3b)--entrepreneurship and expertise--also recur as important themes.

Kotter and Lawrence (pp. 32-38) systematically assessed the power of each of the ten models of mayoral behavior, against the data they had collected from twenty cities, by rating the models on three questions:

* How well does the model describe the mayor's behavior?
* How well does it predict the mayor's impact on his city?
* How well does it account for why the mayor behaved as he did? (p. 33)

They concluded that, while "each model has a certain limited usefulness", and while all of the key elements in their twenty-city situations were addressed by some model, "[n]one is entirely satisfactory... and none is significantly better than all the rest"
(p.38). And finally, "Perhaps our most important observation is that the models often complement and supplement one another" (p.38). In other words, each model captured a piece of mayoral action, a relatively small piece which had little explanatory power, and some pieces overlapped.

Compared to Kotter and Lawrence, Christensen (1979) is obviously more impressed with the "inputs, outputs, community power structures", and other concepts and constructs central to the major models of American political science. His view, noted earlier, of British research as "traditional, legalistic, and institutional" description and case study was meant as an unfavourable comparison with American research. "Inputs" and "outputs" are central components of Easton's influential account of "the political system" (1960). While federal government operations in Canada have long been interpreted in terms of the systems metaphor developed in the United States (see, e.g., Van Loon and Whittington 1972), it has not become prominent in the study of local government, on the relative order, say, of Linbergh and Sharkansky (1978) in the United States.

While "systems" concepts do not figure in the studies of the Hinings group and of FCM reported above, the influence of American social science is unmistakable in their striving for objectivity through measurements, many of which are relatively crude.

This discussion has revealed that the individualism for which its political culture is reputed, also dominates the study of local government in America. While there are numerous models to choose from none of the ones reviewed by Kotter and Lawrence were suited to
answering their questions, which are the same kinds of questions being posed here. In the relatively small Canadian literature the approaches of traditional public administration are most prominent. Within this literature Plunkett and Betts was the only reference to leadership style to be found.

2. Style in Political Psychology

The writer's present methodological position has evolved from an earlier position that was influenced by the literature in political psychology, a sub-field of political science. That literature provides a useful reference to style, which in turn provides an opportunity to clarify "behavior" as the central research concept in empirical social science.

The reference to style comes from Barber's 1972 study in which it is accompanied by the constructs character, world view, power situation, and climate of expectations. Barber's statement of intent shows how these constructs are linked, along with his general methodological orientation:

This book is meant to help citizens and those who advise them cut through the confusion and get some clear criteria for choosing Presidents. To understand what actual Presidents do and what potential Presidents might do, the first need is to see the man whole... as a human being like the rest of us, a person trying to cope with a difficult environment. To that task he brings his own character, his own view of the world, and his own political style. None of that is new for him. If we can see the pattern he has set for his political life we can, I contend, estimate much better his pattern as he confronts the stresses and chances of the Presidency. (pp.3-4)

In sum, for Barber the President's past is prologue and, if one knows
how his character, worldview, and style are patterned in his early political life, one can predict how he will perform in the Oval Office. Barber classifies Presidents using a typology of four basic Presidential characters fashioned from two dimensions, an active-passive and a positive-negative dimension.

For Barber, style is an habitual way of performing one's roles that is observable to others with whom one associates regularly (p.7). The President's "world view" in Barber's framework is "what he sees", what he pays attention to and acts upon.

Greenstein has noted (1969, 116) that Barber's premises are consistent with work done by Smith using his (Smith's) "map of the analysis of personality and politics". Smith's map is presented in Figure 1-1 in a simplified, and slightly adapted form (1968, 25).

Smith regards his map as a "heuristic device" or a "declaration of intellectual strategy", rather than "a theory that can be confirmed or falsified by testing deductions against evidence" (p.16). The arrows indicate causal relationships. Briefly, the map proposes that political behavior be regarded as "a joint resultant" of the individual's personal characteristics and the situation he is in (pp.18-9). These personal characteristics are to be seen as being shaped in his "more enduring social environment" which, in turn, is to be seen as influenced by "the more remote or distal facts of politics, economics and history". These facts are also seen as affecting the structure of the immediate situation as, for example, "the alternatives on a ballot". The dotted arrows are likened to "feedback loops" and reflect the proposition that individual behavior influences, in turn, its own causal forces.
For present purposes Smith’s conception of behavior is perhaps most significant. “Political Behavior” in Panel V is concerned with personal political decisions as carried into action: voting, information-seeking, policy formation or implementation, influence attempts or— the source of much of our psychological data— question-answering. The data that come from our observations of people, what they say as well as what they do, belong here; only by reconstruction and inference do we arrive at the contents of the central personality panel. (p.18)

This means that for Smith there is not a rigid distinction to be drawn between behavior and thoughts or attitudes. It also means that, unlike other investigators whose work is to be reviewed later, Smith does not
take the prediction of behavior to be a useful objective, let alone the ultimate goal of behavioral science. He later expresses surprise at "some psychologists and sociologists [who] have been surprised at the lack of one-to-one correspondence between single attitudes and behavior and have questioned the validity of attitude measurement on these irrelevant grounds" (pp.21-2). When the term "behavior" is used by the present writer, it is Smith's broad and flexible action-oriented view that is intended; "action" is often used instead of behavior to emphasize this.

Barber, Greenstein and Smith provide both authority and ideas for certain aspects of this research. In particular, Barber's "world view" corresponds to "role view", which is the CAO's view of his proper duties and responsibilities, vis-à-vis the mayor and council, the SMT, and the municipal staff in general. In terms of Smith's map this research concentrates on the right side of Panel III and on Panels IV and V. Panel III is taken to encompass the values, beliefs, prejudices, goals and expectations that were associated above with organizational culture. The deeper psychological bases of attitudes, and the formative influences in the development of CAO's attitudes and personalities, will not be investigated for reasons given in Chapter 5.

3. Style in the Management Literature

A review of the management literature reveals two types of treatment of management style. The first is an impressionistic treatment in which style comprises most often one dominant trait. This treatment of style is found in self-help books addressed to practising
managers, and in popular management books addressed to the general public. It would appear to be consistent with the usage of style by the CAOs interviewed by Dent and Nyitrai. Some examples follow.

"Management style," in Golightly's "working definition", "is a combination of characteristics that indicates what a person is, influences the things he does, and controls the effectiveness with which he does them" (1977, 11). Golightly illustrates various aspects of style using anecdotes. For example, the importance of "having style" is supported by a story in which an otherwise highly qualified candidate for president is passed over because he "doesn't have any style." By such means, Golightly sets the stage for his introduction of "the spectrum of styles" each of which is distinguished by its "one dominant characteristic" (p.21):

- Management by inaction
- Management by detail
- Management by invisibility
- Management by consensus
- Management by rejection
- Management by survival
- Management by despotism
- Management by creativity
- Management by manipulation
- Management by leadership

"Management by leadership" is the one most strongly prescribed by Golightly. In Chapter 2 a more serious attempt than Golightly's to distinguish between management and leadership is found to be unpersuasive. It is argued at that point that the two terms should be regarded as interchangeable. 8

"Management by detail" is the way the former chairman of I.T.T., Harold Geneen, was characterized by one of his executives (Pascale and Athos 1981, 95). Geneen's personal style is later described both as "attentive, committed, determined, pragmatic, forceful, and disciplined", and "negatively" as "obsessive, compulsive, domineering,
perfectionistic, paranoid, and even addictive" (p.121). Pascale and Athos cite Geneen as the outstanding example of their generalization that, by contrast with Japanese organizations, American organizations are characterized by the personalities of their Chief Executive Officers who "leave a personal imprint" (p.90).

Much more familiar than any of Golightly's traits-as-styles is Management By Walking About or Management By Wandering Around, or simply MBWA. Peters and Waterman associate it with United Airlines and Hewlett-Packard, and use it as an example of something that contributes to informal communications in an organization (1982, 122).

In the second type of treatment, management style is embodied in a set of questions the answers to which define the respondent's style. Although there are several style scales, two of the most prominent, The Managerial Grid (Blake and Mouton [1964] 1978) and Situational Leadership (Hersey and Blanchard [1969] 1982), are selected for close analysis in the thesis.

How, one may ask, do the treatments of management style just discussed relate to the broader management research literature? Mintzberg has provided a convenient list of eight dominant schools of research on managerial work (The Nature of Managerial Work, 1973, quoted in Anderson et al. 1983, 2):

1. The 'Classical' school, which emphasizes composite pictures or sets of functions that characterize 'all' management jobs
2. The 'Great Man' school, which selects 'effective leaders', observes them, and presents them as models for other would-be great men
3. The 'Entrepreneurship' school, which focuses on the manager as innovator, creative thinker, and opportunity finder
4. The 'Decision Theory' school, which focuses on how managers make decisions in a complex environment.

5. The 'Leader Effectiveness' school, which looks at personality traits and management style as 'the' factors that lead to effective performance.

6. The 'Leader Behavior' school, which looks at what some managers actually do on the job to draw conclusions about management behavior and required skills.

7. The 'Leader Power' school, which zeros in on sources of power managers can use to maximize their control.

8. The 'Work Activity' school, which relies on diaries of practicing managers, paying particular attention to time, as a way to identify trends and draw conclusions about management activity.

"Management style" is mentioned under only one school, to which the Managerial Grid and Situational Leadership belong. The narrow conception of "behavior" as "what managers actually do" is consistent with the dominant conception of behavior in behavioral science. Its effect here of separating the Leader Behavior school from the Leader Effectiveness school, implying that "behavior" and "performance" are essentially different, is noteworthy. That both "behavior" and "performance" are presumed to be different from "management activity", which is the focus of yet another school, reinforces concerns about the validity and usefulness of these distinctions.

The 'Classical' school parallels the traditional public administration school of local government study discussed earlier. Students of managerial work have moved earlier than their counterparts in local government, to renounce the classical approach. Ironically, their arguments are often as vulnerable as those of the classical approach.

The general distinction between 'classical' and 'non-classical' approaches corresponds roughly to the distinction between the generic functions or responsibilities of managers and their day-to-day
activities. Overmuch has been made, by Mintzberg among others, of the lack of straightforward correspondence between generic management functions and observed management activities.

This point is illustrated in the following way by McCall et al. in their review of "diary and observational" studies of managerial work (1978, p.1). They begin with the following quotation from an early work by Mintzberg:

A typical chief executive day may begin with a telephone call from a director who asks a favor...; then a subordinate calls to tell of a strike at one of the facilities...; this is followed by a relaxed scheduled event at which the manager speaks to a group of visiting dignitaries...; the manager returns to find a message from a major customer who is demanding the renegotiation of a contract...; and so on.

This is followed by the rhetorical questions: "Was this manager initiating structure or showing consideration?" Was he planning, organizing, controlling?" That direct and discreet answers to these questions do not emerge from the activity account, neither makes the authors' point that the "classical functions" are irrelevant, nor justifies their dismissal as "folklore" by Mintzberg (1975). Why should one expect the personal or the organizational meaning of these managerial activities to be conveyed by such descriptions? Shouldn't the assignment of meaning be the responsibility of the investigator? At bottom, the problem is one of a mismatch between one's research questions and answers.

Although Kotter's study of general managers (1982a, 1982b) is cast consciously in the Mintzberg mould, Kotter's observations on this point are comparatively less dramatic and more useful. Kotter simply observes that the classical management functions do not figure in any formal or
conscious sense in his general managers' approaches to their work. This observation runs against what Kotter (1982a, 131) terms "the reigning belief today" and which he illustrates with the following excerpt from a 1981 article in the New Republic:

The professional manager in America exists above the industrial din, away from the dirt, noise, and irrationality of people and products. He dresses well. His secretary is alert and helpful. His office is as clean, quiet, and subdued as that of any other professional. He plans, organizes, and controls large enterprises in a calm, logical, dispassionate, and decisive manner. He surveys computer printouts, calculates profits and losses, sells and acquires subsidiaries, and imposes systems for monitoring and motivating employees, applying a general body of rules to each special circumstance. The symbols in which he thinks and works are those of finance, law, accounting, and psychology. Finessed and massaged into every new formulation, they yield wondrous abstractions. And because the professional manager deals in abstractions, he can move from company to company with relative ease, manipulating people and capital as he goes. Without any abiding commitment to the company, he is a master of the quick fix, yielding the sort of short-term profits institutional investors love.

Evidence for Kotter's strong disbelief in such images of managerial activity is presented in Chapter 4.

McLeod (1980) conducted an on-the-job study of sixteen Ontario Directors of Education, modeled point for point after Mintzberg's 1973 study of five executives, and emerged with much the same picture of managerial activity as Mintzberg and Kotter. The present writer's working experience with CAOs suggests that a similar picture would emerge from such a study of CAOs.

McLeod's efforts in recording the Directors' movements with stop-watch precision seem unjustified in terms of his main conclusion that "New Republic type" accounts of managerial work are unhelpful abstractions. McLeod's report stops after the presentation of precise
time expenditures. Had he attempted to interpret these time accounts he might have provided some ideas for improving the Directors' effectiveness.

That the "Leader Behavior" studies do not deserve to be classified separately from the "Work Activity" studies, is illustrated by McCall et al.'s review of what was at the time a "small body of accumulated research on what managers do"; it generated the following ten generalizations:

- Managers work long hours; they are busy doing a lot of things; their work is fragmented and episodes are brief;
- The job contains a lot of variety; managers spend the bulk of their time within their own parts of the organization;
- The work is primarily oral; managers have contact with a variety of people (by no means all in the direct chain of command);
- Managers are not reflective planners; information is the core of the job; and finally, managers really don't have an accurate picture of how they spend their time.

(1978, 36)

They also offered a number of "insight[s]" into some implied perennial questions about management (pp.38-40). Their explanation of the "reactive" manager and the 'non-delegating' manager, comes down simply to "the nature of the job". That is, the nature of the job makes planning and delegating difficult. Managers' complaints about paperwork, the slow and irregular upward movement of information through the hierarchy, and managers 'getting out of date', are also explained more or less as the unchangeable nature of the job. The high proportion of time spent talking, and the low proportions spent reading and writing, are presented as the most significant aspects of its nature. Finally, as McCall et al. see it, the nature of the job is also to account for making "most human relations" activities virtually
impossible, which explains why "managers don't manage people better".

Evidence from Kotter and Lawrence, and Kotter, that some mayors and GMs respectively do overcome the nature of the job, suggests that perhaps McCall et al.'s observations flow from the absence from their analysis of any sort of theoretical framework. This weakness is consistent with their emphasis on detached observation and with their narrow conception of behavior, both of which also characterize McLeod's study. They make no explicit judgments. However, on close reading one can discern clear preferences for less talk and more reading and writing, for more planning, and for less "information unevenness across managerial positions". In the absence of some foundation for these preferences they cannot be evaluated.

In terms of Kotter's GMs study, as will be seen in Chapter 4, these preferences are not persuasive. The 'problem' activity patterns of which McCall et al. complain, do not constitute individual or organizational problems in Kotter's work. Thus, one may agree with McCall et al. that the demands of the job may determine "what a manager does", more than the individual or the organization, and that managers tend "to become slaves to their appointment diaries" (pp.40-1). However, it is the perceptions of "what a manager does", and their effectiveness in advancing the organization's purposes, which should be the major test of the appropriateness of the manager's activities.

McCall et al. draw some conclusions about research methods, survey methods in particular (pp.36-7), which are relevant for this survey project. They note that very little is known about "actual managerial behavior", that the questions of "what" and "how" should take precedence
over "why" in research efforts to increase this knowledge, and they emphasize the importance of "matching method to question". In this last regard, they prefer diary and observational studies, to survey methods. More specifically, they write (p.37, emphasis in original): "If one hopes to find out about the behavior of managers, questionnaires are weak tools..." This alleged mismatch between behavior, which they take to be an important research interest, and questionnaires is repeated later (p.44). It appears in conjunction with a call, not for more "minute-by-minute" accounts of managerial activities, but for "multiple method research designs" aimed at reconciling "how general management responsibilities (such as planning) play out within the chaotic activity patterns in a manager's daily life".

From these comments it seems that McCall et al. take "behavior" to be more than the activities of a manager that can be observed and recorded in the fashion of their earlier excerpt from Mintzberg's work. How much more is not clear. Nor are they clear about which research roles can be legitimate for survey methods,

E. The CAO and the Organization: Patterns of Style

All reasonable conceptions of style involve personal characteristics observable to others. Since style is inconceivable apart from behavior it is not necessary to say that style is inferred from behavior. The broad view of behavior/style/character supported in this dissertation is reflected in Kaplan et al.'s recent description of the "how" of an executive's job as "his process of making a decision, his way of relating to others, his manner, style, behavior [his]
modus operandi . . . his managerial character" (1984, 2, emphasis theirs).

Unfortunately Kaplan et al. were attempting in this definition to distinguish the "how" from the "what" of an executive's job. This proposition is similar to McCall et al.'s previously noted proposition that questions of "what" and "how" should take precedence over "why" questions in research on "actual managerial behavior". Attempts to make these kinds of distinctions are regarded here as a reflection of the "mad scientism" railed against by Rosenthal in an earlier citation. No matter how carefully it is worded every account of "what" a manager does assumes, and probably implies fairly obviously, theories of and answers to "how" and "why". Apropos here is Lewis's observation that "there is no fact without theory, implicit or explicit" ([1980]1984, 246).

The context of Lewis's observation is a discussion of what he refers to as the "macro-micro' conundrum of social science": how to "successfully link the person and the organization in which he is nested in an intellectually satisfying way, a way we can imagine and derive in part from our own experiences as organizational members and social investigators" (pp.245-6). Lewis wants his elaboration of the "public entrepreneur", which is discussed in Chapter 4, to be taken as a refreshing departure from previous social science which conceives of public organizations as "mindless machines", whose members are "empty-headed drones led by detached managers" (p.245). While Lewis's work provides a number of useful concepts, they are not tightly woven into a theoretical framework on which they depend for their validity.

From the earlier treatment of the CAO-as-structure it should be
clear that the present writer shares Lewis's dismay with the organization-as-machine operated by the detached manager. Accordingly, the attempt here is to understand the CAO within his job and organizational contexts. Furthermore, these contexts are assumed to change in response to many forces one of which is the CAO himself.

Following Kotter the CAO is seen as occupying the potentially influential position of municipal general manager. The CAO's influence is a function, among other things, of his agenda and the network of supportive relationships he has developed to implement his agenda. Agenda and network are the research constructs that focus attention on important aspects of the CAO's approach or style. His agenda and network are expected, in turn, to reflect the CAO's view of his role and of the role of municipal staff in general.

The agenda-network system works within a larger system of structures and procedures, and within a larger system of beliefs referred to earlier as the organizational culture. These larger systems may constrain the CAO's agenda. Alternatively, his agenda may include changes to these systems to lessen their constraining power.

One dimension along which CAOs' approaches to their jobs are expected to vary is "deliberateness". In Kotter's terms this is the conscious/analytic--unconscious/intuitive dimension. The unconscious/intuitive elements of every CAO's approach are critical but by their nature much more difficult, if not impossible, to identify. All research methods are bound to understate them. For this reason any formal comparison of CAOs' approaches, including this one, is bound to be biased against those who are less conscious/analytic.
Since the CAO is a part of the organization, the natural difficulties of identifying the unconscious/intuitive elements of CAOs' approaches, apply as well to the identification of "the intractable, irrational, intuitive, informal organization". These difficulties would appear to conflict with Peters and Waterman's strong prescription that the "informal organization" be managed. The management of the informal organization appears to imply its disappearance through formalization.

This consideration of the informal elements of the CAO's management style and of the organization in which the CAO works raises the question of research outcomes. It will be seen in Chapter 4 that the commonalities in the approaches of Kotter and Lawrence's 20 mayors were strong enough to generate five distinct approaches. Each approach is a pattern of agenda setting, network shaping, and task accomplishment elements. However, Kotter does not resolve the approaches of his 15 effective general managers into named patterns in the fashion of the mayors. Rather, he identifies twelve "visible" daily activity patterns that are common to all of the GMs. This less formal treatment of pattern identification evidently reflects an appreciation by Kotter of the critical role of the unconscious/intuitive elements of effective management, which he did not have when he studied the mayors.

To search for patterns by which to identify and to compare the styles of the CAO-in-the-organization is part of the third primary objective of the dissertation that was set out at the beginning of this chapter. Expected patterns are not identified at the outset since there have been no previous studies of CAOs along these lines. Also, as demonstrated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, there is a close relation between
the research methods used and the patterns that are found. Although the agenda-network framework used here comes from Kotter's studies, the data collection methods match Kotter's only partially. Thus CAOs were expected to look in some respects like Kotter and Lawrence's mayors, and in others like Kotter's GMs.

F. The Objectives and the Organization of the Dissertation

This chapter began with the statement of three general themes, theses, or objectives for the dissertation. Its first objective is to illustrate the need to complement the formal analytic approach to the evaluation of local government effectiveness. This has been done in the present chapter in reference firstly to the development of the CAO position in Canada and, secondly, to the reorganization of local government in Britain. This structuralist thinking arises again in Chapter 3 where it is seen to underlie the traditional policy-administration distinction between council and staff roles.

The references in this chapter to the development of the CAO in Ontario and to the British reorganization have also touched upon the dissertation's second objective, the demonstration of the inappropriateness of highly formal methods of studying local government leadership. The RCM's and the Hinings group's studies were used to make this point.

In Chapter 2 this second objective is pursued through close analysis of two prominent cases of scientism applied to the study of style, The Managerial Grid and Situational Leadership. The Managerial Grid is further scrutinized through the review of a Grid-based study of
conflict-handling styles of Canadian university deans. Chapter 2 reveals the distortion of the concept of behavior, assisted by the misleading use of language to which Rosenthal has drawn attention in this chapter, in the misguided interests of measurement and prediction. Collectively, the methodological points made in Chapter 2 against The Managerial Grid and Situational Leadership, make Kotter's work, which is presented in Chapter 4, comparatively attractive.

Although methodological issues continue to be important in Chapter 3, it is here that major attitudes relevant to the CAO's approach to his job—the B side of Panel III in Smith's map—begin to be explored in the literature. The literature's central attitudinal objects are the proper roles of council and staff. The traditional policy-administration framework, until recently, the only framework available to CAOs for defining their roles with respect to council, is criticized. An alternative "expectations" framework is endorsed, and role possibilities and problems for the CAO in relation to both council and subordinate staff are identified. Two other major topics addressed in Chapter 3 are the inappropriate use of expertise and professionalism as bases for distinguishing between council and staff roles, and the meaning of corporate management.

In Chapter 4 Kotter's research on mayors (1974) and on general managers (1982a) is presented. It establishes Kotter's methodology as more defensible, and his research questions and agenda-network framework as more promising, than those reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 ends with the elaboration of public entrepreneurship as the most effective approach for a CAO and his organization.
The origin, development, design, and implementation of the research are presented in Chapter 5. The research questions are related to the interview schedule and to the questionnaire, and the interview and questionnaire samples are described.

Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the presentation and interpretation of the interview and the questionnaire responses respectively.

Chapter 8 recapitulates the course of the investigation and its major findings. It presents a framework, based on the interview responses, for classifying the approaches of CAOs. Finally, it discusses the implications of this study for management training and for further research.

The placement of quotation marks with respect to punctuation follows Fowler's "logical system".

Ellipses are used, following The Chicago Manual, both to indicate an omission in quoted material and to indicate "faltering speech". The latter is very common in quoted passages from interview transcripts in Chapter 6. To conserve space in certain tables in Chapters 6 and 7, the spaces between the dots have been omitted.

American spelling is used. There are, however, long sections of text in which British local government activities are analyzed using British references. When certain key words—most notably "reorganisation"—from these references are used in the text outside of direct quotations their British spelling has been retained for consistency.


3. The British literature also turned up only one reference, which likewise was not pursued. The source is Eddison who writes (1975, 186-7, emphasis his): "There can be no prescribed recipe for the right style for a chief executive and indeed it is probably true to say that an ability to adopt a variety of styles is appropriate. That there can be no correct style should not however be taken as a licence for any style. . . . The man who does not question his own style can be sure that it is wrong. What questions should he ask? What should he be looking for?" Unfortunately, Eddison did not attempt to answer these questions.

4. Other like-minded treatises on the social sciences that have influenced the author include: Barzun (1964), Anddenski (1972) and Lülich (1973). The methodological sources that help make these accounts so agreeable to the present writer include Pirsig ([1974] 1975), Zúkav (1979), Owens (1983), and Eccles and Robinson ([1984]).

5. There is one other study that deserves to be mentioned, although it does not warrant discussion in the text. This is Wilson's 1981 study of seven southern Ontario CAOs, which is the only study known to the writer
besides Dent and Nyitrai (1982) that takes CAOs as its main subject. Wilson asked his subjects to complete a short and elementary questionnaire in order "to see what if any differences existed and what could be said to account for these distinctions" (p.i). His exercise was mainly a descriptive one which yielded such findings as that 6 of 7 respondents were not members of civic groups or fraternal organizations (p.94).

6. The term "unmanned" is from Barzun 1964.

7. Christensen's mention of "inputs [and] outputs" is evidently a reference to the use in political analysis of the systems metaphor first elaborated at length by David Easton, and which is not represented in Table 1-1. Regarded by many political scientists as high-level theory, "systems analysis" strikes the writer as being more powerful as an organizing device (as, for example, in Lineberry and Sharkansky 1978), than in generating insights or explanations.

Edelman ([1964] 1970, 1971) has taken issue with the prevailing image of government to emerge from the application of the systems approach. This image is one of an instrument, and more or less rational (meaning "efficient") mechanism, for converting the "inputs" of citizens' political beliefs, demands and attitudes into the "outputs" of public policies and processes. Edelman also disputes the associated premise that citizens' responses to attitude surveys generally "can be taken as 'hard' data which have a clear, continuing, and systematic meaning" (1971, 3). His alternative model assumes that individuals' positions on public issues are mobilizable rather than fixed; that governmental activities are themselves potent influences upon change and mobilization of public attitudes; and that the significant "outputs" of political activities are not particular public policies labeled as political goals, but rather the creation of political followings and supports, i.e., the evolution of arousal or quiescence in mass publics. (p. 4)

The implications of this "alternative model", if it is a "fairly accurate one", are that political scientists and policy advocates should recognize political maneuver as itself the end-point of the game; for in the process (rather than in the content of statutes, court decisions, and administrative rules) leaders gain or lose followings, followers achieve a role and a political identity, and money and status are reallocated, often to different groups from those formally designated as the beneficiaries of the governmental activity in question. (p. 4)

"Edelman's "symbolic" approach to political analysis, with its emphasis on the meanings for various publics of different types of government messages and media, is both refreshing and revealing.
However it is important to recognize here, that what distinguishes Edelman's approach is neither its "accuracy", nor its constituting a discreet alternative to the systems model he opposes. "Accuracy" implies some absolute or consensual standards against which Edelman's observations and conclusions can be checked. There are of course no such standards. Nor is it a discreet alternative to the prevailing model. A proponent of this systems approach might argue that Edelman is merely beginning his analysis at the "output" end of the systems cycle rather than at the "input" end, and that his contribution is only the identification of additional outputs. In short, Edelman's account may be regarded simply as another interpretation of the political system.

The main points drawn from Edelman's work can be reinforced by Gusfield's like-minded analysis of the American Temperance movement ([1963]1969). Beginning with the distinction between "political action as significant per se [i.e. symbolic] and political action as means to an end [i.e. instrumental]" (p.166), Gusfield develops "a dramatistic theory of status politics". Unlike Edelman, Gusfield conceives of his symbolic approach as an addition, rather than an alternative, to other models, in this case the models of class-based "pluralism" and of "psychological expressionism". This point of emphasis, rather than exclusion, is furthered by his noting that "Most movements and most political acts contain a mixture of instrumental, expressive, and symbolic elements".

Gusfield distinguishes (pp. 171-2) between "two forms of political symbolism" which he calls "gestures of cohesion" and "gestures of differentiation", which correspond roughly in their effects respectively to Edelman's quiescence and arousal. Gestures of cohesion appeal to the unifying elements in the society and the grounds for the legitimacy of the political institution, irrespective of its specific officeholders and particular laws. Gestures of differentiation: "point to the degradation of one group in opposition to others within the society".

The focus in Edelman's and Gusfield's work is the relationship between the national government and the mass public. However, their theoretical framework is taken by the present writer to apply to the analysis of any political system, which is to say any organization in which there are leaders and followers. Edelman and Gusfield are persuasive reminders (1) that how leaders and systems "get things done" are as much a part of effectiveness as what gets done, (2) that, to paraphrase the familiar maxim, language speaks as loud as deeds, and (3) that counting is unlikely to be a very meaningful measure of the meaning of either words or deeds.

8. For other impressionistic treatments of management style, see Guttshalk and Cangemi (1980) and Schoenberg (1978).

9. These views may be compared with Litchfield's (1985). In a review of Geneen's autobiography Managing (with Alvin Moscow, Doubleday, 1984), Litchfield writes, possibly paraphrasing Geneen, that "Geneen's style was participatory and characterised by his long office hours and marathon meetings". On another subject, Litchfield explains Geneen's aversion to management theory by saying that theories "are black and white and in no way correspond to the tapestry of grey that is real
life". Unfortunately, this apparent wariness of dichotomies is later contradicted "by a truly unique test in which Geneen maintains that you can know a man by the kind of desk he keeps. There are two kinds of executives: one has a clean desk top, the other has a cluttered one. 'It's been my impression that when I come upon a man who has a gleaming, empty, desk top, I am dealing with a fellow who is so far removed from the realities of his business that someone else is running it for him.'"

10. MBWA was the subject of a recent editorial in the Newsletter of the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association (1983, pp.1-2). The editor concluded that: "In the final analysis, it is essentially a matter of management style as to whether one practices MBWA. The major difficulty in implementing the concept may well be simply finding the time to do it. The conception of management style that is implied by this idea of 'implement it if you can find the time', is not accepted here. As a manager one either is, or is not comfortable managing people through informal exchanges while walking about; it is not a matter of first finding the time to walk about. MBWA is discussed further in Chapter 4, and in the presentation of the interview responses in Chapter 6.

11. "Initiating structure" and "showing consideration" are explained in Chapter 2.
CHAPTER 2

LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND THE MEASUREMENT OF STYLE

A. Leadership and Management

In Chapter 1 leadership and management were treated as synonyms and an undertaking was given to justify this treatment, at least within the organizational and job contexts under study in this dissertation. That is the first purpose of this chapter.

Sayles (1984) is one authority who doesn't differentiate between leadership and management. His straightforward approach to these concepts is revealed when he defines "the real problem of leadership and management" simply as "how do you make something happen" (1984, 2). Similarly, Kotter and Lawrence credit the desire to "make something work" as the driving force behind the mayors in their study. These simple definitions of leadership and management stand in favorable contrast to the more elaborate definitions which are found more widely in the literature.

Jago's 1982 review and classification of the literature is an economical way to illustrate the definitional problem, to confirm a number of central methodological points, and to introduce The Managerial Grid and Situational Leadership.

Jago begins by acknowledging the tendency of researchers to coin their own definitions of leadership (p.315). He somewhat apologetically offers his own conception of leadership:
Leadership is both a process and a property. The process of leadership is the use of noncoercive influence to direct and coordinate the activities of the members of an organized group toward the accomplishment of group objectives. As a property, leadership is the set of qualities or characteristics attributed to those who are perceived to successfully employ such influence.

(p.315, emphasis his)

Jago wants the element of noncoerciveness to distinguish "between leadership processes and motivational processes", and thus to distinguish leadership from "supervision" within the framework of "some formal authority structure" (p. 316). However, he goes on to acknowledge that "most of the research on leadership to be reviewed has been confined only to the study of managers and their structurally defined subordinates in work settings" (p. 316). When one considers that "Almost no manager has authority comparable to the responsibility he or she has been given" (Sayles 1984, 3), Jago's authority-structure distinction loses its point. In any case, nothing in his review seems to depend in any critical way upon his "far less restrictive definition". One may suppose, then, that even for Jago management and leadership are interchangeable.

From this problematical beginning, Jago then presents his typology of leadership perspectives, which is depicted schematically in Figure 2-1 (p.316, Table 1).

**Figure 2-1: Jago's Typology of Leadership Studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Approach</th>
<th>Universal</th>
<th>Contingent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focal Leadership</td>
<td>Leader Traits</td>
<td>Type I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct Leadership</td>
<td>Leader Behaviors</td>
<td>Type II</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is perhaps appropriate to observe first, that Jago's own 'leadership as process' does not appear as a critical dimension in his typology. The second point to note is the critical distinction between traits and behaviors. While this distinction refers to what Jago calls the "focal leadership construct" in the theories under review, the discussion to follow will demonstrate that the line between traits and behaviors has not been drawn operationally in a way that removes the contention of circularity.

Apart from this weakness, which evidently does not concern Jago, his typology seems to be an effective device for organizing a large number of leadership studies both conceptually and chronologically. In universal theories, effective leadership is distinguished by a common set of traits possessed by the leader, or by a common set of behaviors, which do not vary across roles, tasks, or situations. In contingent theories the traits and behaviors which constitute effective leadership are contingent upon the task or the situation. Historically, Type I theories were developed first, were dominant for the first half of the present century, and now have few serious proponents. Type II and Type III theories are developments mostly of the 1960s and 1970s, while Type IV theories, as outgrowths of Type II theories, are most recent.

The Managerial Grid is one of the dominant Type II theories. In these theories, which were the first to use the term "style", the central focus is the behavior of leaders when interacting with followers. The behavior under study is typically defined and categorized into styles by leaders' and followers' responses to paper-and-pencil questionnaires.
The two dimensions by which styles were first identified in the pioneering Ohio State University leadership studies which began in 1945, are "Consideration" (C), and "Initiating Structure" (IS). Consideration involves the degree of two-way communication and consultation, mutual trust, respect, and warmth a leader exhibits toward his followers; Initiating structure involves the degree to which the leader defines and organizes relationships among group members and establishes well-defined channels of communication and methods of accomplishing the group's task" (p.319).

Fiedler's "Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness" is the lone model in the Type III quadrant. Fiedler's thesis is that "group productivity is dependent upon the match between: (1) a personality trait labeled task versus relationship motivation and (2) the favorableness of the leadership situation" (p.322). The motivation trait is measured by the "Least Preferred Co-worker" scale, which consists of 16 bipolar adjective pairs on which the leader is to score from one to eight "the person with whom he works least well". The main assumption behind the LPC is that "everyone's least preferred co-worker is about equally 'unpleasant';" thus differences in LPC scores are reflective of differences in "an underlying personality trait among the people doing the scoring" (p.322).

The favorableness of the situation is determined in terms of three dimensions: "Leader-Member Relations" (i.e., group trust of and willingness to follow the leader), "Task Structure" (i.e., clarity, variety of means of accomplishing the task, etc.), and "Position Power" (i.e., the leader's authority to reward and punish) (pp.322-3). Results
of tests of Fiedler's model show that task-oriented leaders perform best in very favorable or in very unfavorable situations, while relationship-oriented leaders perform best in moderately favorable situations.

Although there are close parallels between Type II and Type III theories, they differ greatly in application. Under Type II theories the manager can be taught to adapt his style to the situation in which he finds himself. Under Fiedler's system managers should be placed in positions which suit their style, or the job should be engineered to fit the manager.

Type IV theories differ from Fiedler's in that effective leadership is contingent upon the leader's behavior rather than upon a trait (i.e., task- or relationship-orientedness). One Type IV variant presented by Jago (p.326) is an operant conditioning model derived from Skinnerian learning theory. The test results cited are mixed: positive reinforcement is consistently associated with higher follower performance and satisfaction, while negative rewards are associated alternatively with higher and lower levels. Hersey and Blanchard's Situational Leadership is presumably an example of a Type IV theory since, as will be seen below, the effective leader matches his style to the maturity of those being led. Curiously, it is not referred to at all by Jago.

Jago clearly regards the contingent theories of effective leadership as having the most to offer. However, he finds their one- and two-dimensional formulations "overly simple" (p.330). He also finds the "average style" approach wanting, based as it is on the assumption that the leader's style is the same with all of his
subordinates (p.331). Finally, Jago questions the validity and reliability of "self-report" and "follower-report" measures of behavior, which he terms "subjective"; in his view "more objective measures of leader behavior, including direct and independent observation" are needed (p.331).

In accepting and promoting a firm distinction between traits and behaviors Jago, and those whose work he reviews, invite some fundamental questions. Are not all of their leadership traits, or "trait constructs"—alertness, dominance, and talkativeness are examples—at bottom simply collective names for a variety of observations of the subject? Are observations solicited and organized by questionnaires and scales necessarily more "subjective", and therefore less valid, than "direct and independent observation" of subject leaders? Can observations of others made by human sensory apparatus ever be free of what might be termed 'eye of the beholder' effects, which is presumably what is meant by "objective"?¹

Of all the traits mentioned in Jago's review, none seems less persuasive on contact than Fiedler's "personality trait labeled task versus relationship motivation". To be fair, Jago does express doubts about this trait (p.323), defined operationally as the LPC score, and about its reported correlations with situations of varying favorableness. However, these doubts are based on the LPC having been 'inductively arrived at', and there being "no unequivocal explanations for why the relationships exist as they do". That is, Jago seems to accept without question the idea of a task-versus-relationship-motivation trait.
In summary, Jago's work constitutes a review and classification of leadership studies, the primary merit of which is that it places The Managerial Grid and Situational Leadership in historical context. Although Jago makes a concerted attempt to be critical, his success is limited by his uncritical acceptance of certain basic assumptions, such as that traits can be separated from behaviors.

Parts B and C, and D are devoted respectively to the presentation of, and to the contest between, two research models, namely, Hersey and Blanchard's (1974, 1982) "Situational Leadership" and Blake and Mouton's (1978) "Managerial Grid". These models, along with their supporting instruments, were serious contenders for dominant roles at the beginning of the development stage of this research, but were finally assigned minor comparative and validating roles. They provide good opportunities to illustrate both a number of central methodological issues, and also the comparative advantages of the Kotter (1974, 1982a, 1982b) framework which displaced them. Part E reviews Garnier's (1980, 1982) study of Canadian university deans, which represents an application of a framework derived from Blake and Mouton's work. Its main contribution to the dissertation is its scale which assists with the exploration of CAOs' approaches to handling conflict.

B. Situational Leadership

Hersey and Blanchard define the style of leaders as "the consistent behavior patterns that they use when they are working with and through other people as perceived by those people" (1982, 126). In the same place, the authors admit to having used "style" and
"personality" interchangeably and undertake to distinguish between the two terms in Chapter 9. No such distinction has been found in that chapter by the present writer. However, in Chapter 11 the authors make a distinction between "leadership personality" (not "overall personality") and "Leadership style" (p.237). The former includes "self-perception and the perception of others; leadership style consists only of an individual's leader behavior as perceived by others, that is superior, subordinate(s), associates, and so on".

This distinction is closely related to Hersey and Blanchard's central belief in the separability, both for analytic and for manager training purposes, of attitudes and behavior. The two dimensions of their model, task behavior and relationship behavior, correspond to "Consideration" and "Initiating Structure" which were defined above. They are defined by Hersey and Blanchard as "dimensions of observed behavior" (p.101); in other words, theirs is "purely a behavioral model since it emphasizes only activities that managers engage in" (pp.90-1).

Throughout their book, one finds this theme reinforced through questionable assertions. A good example appears in a discussion of the disclosure by leaders of personal information to others in the organization:

First, the most relevant disclosure is not what people say about themselves but rather their behavior. It is not words that mean, it is people that mean. And if you want to understand people better, you really have to look at the behavior those people engage in to gain relevant insights into their values and what this behavior represents (p.241).

This amounts to nothing more than the "actions speak louder than words" adage taken to the absurd extreme where words have no meaning at all.
A leader’s style is determined in Situational Leadership from the responses of the leader and his subordinates/peers/associates, to a form of the questionnaire called the “Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD)”. This instrument contains short descriptions of twelve managerial situations, for each of which the leader-respondent can choose from among four alternative actions what he would do if he found himself in each situation. (Other groups of respondents are required to attribute one of the Alternative Actions to the leader based on their observation of the leader in the past). Situation 1 reads as follows:

**SITUATION**

**ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS**

1. Your subordinates are not responding lately to your friendly conversation and obvious concern for their welfare. Their performance is in a tailspin.

A. Emphasize the use of uniform procedures and the necessity for task accomplishment  
B. Make yourself available for discussion but don’t rush them set goals.  
C. Talk with subordinates and C. Talk with subordinates and them set goals.  
D. Intentionally do not intervene

The twelve situations are written to portray subordinates of four different levels of maturity. Thus, Situations 1, 5, and 9 are meant to portray subordinates at the lowest level of maturity (M1), maturity being defined (p.151) "as the ability and willingness of people to take responsibility for directing their own behavior" in relation to a specific task. Each of the four alternative actions represents one of four styles which correspond to the four quadrants of a two-by-two matrix, the axes of which represent task behavior and relationship behavior. These are the Basic Styles of their "Tri-dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model".
The effectiveness dimension, which is not depicted above, is defined as "the environment in which the leader is operating" or as "the interaction of the basic style with the environment" (p.97). In keeping with their behaviorist approach, Hersey and Blanchard want the reader to:

think of the leader's basic style as a particular stimulus, and it is the response to this stimulus that can be considered effective or ineffective. This is an important point because theorists and practitioners who argue that there is one best style of leadership are making value judgments about the stimulus, while those taking a situational approach to leadership are evaluating the response or the results rather than the stimulus. (p.96)

Two observations are appropriate here. First, the crude Stimulus-Response, or S-R, model is incompatible with the typical management environment of several concurrent streams of action consisting of many stimuli and many responses. It would be impossible even to identify the Stimulus and Response of the Hersey-Blanchard program in the manager's daily "stream of unanticipated crises and events in which the manager is
torn hither and yon... among many competing, unscheduled, unanticipated and often insoluble demands" (Sayles 1984, 3). In this environment it is simply inconceivable that the manager's style can change continuously in response to the varying levels of maturity of the many subordinates with whom he interacts. Second, the reference to advocates of "one best style" is evidently to Blake and Mouton and their Managerial Grid; it is the first sign in this account of the bitter conflict between the two pairs of model-builders.

Hersey and Blanchard's assertions to the contrary, the environment can be of little or no consequence in their scheme. At the end of their Chapter 6 on "Diagnosing the Environment", they note that it would be "impossible" for the leader to consider for every "leadership decision" all the interacting environmental variables they have identified: "As a result... we are going to zero in on what we think is the key to environmental variables--the relationship between the leader and the follower" (p.146). In effect, they are dropping the environment, their alleged effectiveness dimension, leaving them with relationship behavior and task behavior.

To be effective the leader must diagnose the group and the task, and adapt his style to suit the group's level of maturity for the specific task. As noted above, maturity is the ability and the willingness of the members of the group to perform the task in question. Thus, "delegating" would be the most effective style for followers who were both able and willing.

Most leaders tested with LEAD instruments are shown to have a primary and a secondary leadership style: "A leader's primary style is
defined as the behavior pattern used most often when attempting to influence the activities of others. In other words, most leaders tend to have a "favorite leadership style" (p.233). The authors present statistical data that are meant to establish the validity and reliability of the LEAD-Self instrument (i.e., the LEAD questionnaire that is completed by the leader). For example, 75 percent of a set of managers retested after a six-week interval maintained their dominant style, while 71 percent maintained their alternative style (p.105). No information is given on the consistency between the LEAD-Self and LEAD-Other results for individuals, although the authors discuss a device for assisting respondents to appreciate discrepancies between self-perceptions and the perceptions of others (pp.237ff.).

In sum, Situational Leadership is based upon the agreeable premises that the effectiveness of a manager's actions is in some sense dependent upon the situation, and that the maturity of the individuals being managed is a relevant consideration. However, the behaviorism in which the theory is advanced is so obviously wanting as to make the entire enterprise suspect.

Finally, the LEAD instrumentation, as represented here by Situation 1, appears on its face to lack validity. The relationship between the "Alternative Actions" listed for each Situation and the domain of possible actions seems, in the absence of any explanation by the authors, to be one of mere convenience. Assuming the role of hypothetical respondent, the present writer craved both more information about the Situations, and a fifth response choice such as "E. Other (Please Specify)." While it might be interesting to compare the
responses of CAOs with the standardized scores of other groups on the LEAD questionnaires, speculation would probably have to govern the interpretation of the CAO-scores in their own right.

C. The Managerial Grid

Blake and Mouton's Managerial Grid ([196] 1978) is a two-dimensional schema of management styles, each of which is a compound of one of nine degrees of each of "concern for people" and "concern for production". The person who combines the highest concerns for both production (X-axis) and people (Y-axis), has a "9,9" or "Team Management" style. This style is held out to be the highest order of management evolution, the "one best style".

A "9,1" manager has a "Boss" style which relies heavily on positional authority and the unquestioning obedience of subordinates. These styles are shown in Figure 2-3, along with four other benchmark styles (Blake and Mouton 1982, 23).
Figure 2-3: The Managerial Grid's Basic Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High</th>
<th>1,9</th>
<th>9,9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Club Management</strong></td>
<td>Thoughtful attention to needs of people for satisfying relationships leads to a comfortable, friendly organization atmosphere and work tempo.</td>
<td><strong>Team Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concern for People</strong></td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td><strong>Organization Management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impoverished Management</strong></td>
<td>Exertion of minimum effort to get required work done is appropriate to sustain organization membership.</td>
<td><strong>Authority-Obedience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>9,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Concern for Production</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One's Grid style is determined by one's combination of choices of statements chosen from "six dimensions - decisions, convictions, conflict, temper, humor, and effort - that best describe one's behavior". Thus, the "9,9" manager's "behavior" is described by this paragraph, the
sentences of which respectively reflect each of the six dimensions just named:

I place a high value on sound, creative decisions that result in understanding and agreement. I listen for and seek out ideas, opinions, and attitudes different from my own. I have strong convictions but respond to sounder ideas than my own by changing my mind. When conflict arises, I try to identify reasons for it and seek to resolve underlying causes. When aroused, I contain myself even though my impatience is visible. My humor fits the situation and gives perspective; I retain a sense of humor even under pressure. I exert vigorous effort and others join in. (p.2)

When evaluated using the Grid most managers are found to have a dominant and a back-up style.

The word "behavior" is placed in quotation marks in the paragraph preceding the "9,9" excerpt to draw attention to Blake and Mouton's rather flexible usage. For none of the six item statements is observable behavior expressly defined. For example, "vigorou effort", which is perhaps the most suggestive of observable behavior, can take many different forms. Similarly, at the other extreme, 'valuing sound, creative decisions' can also be outwardly manifested in many ways; however, it would appear to require a much keener observer to detect "valuing sound, creative decisions" than to detect "vigorou effort".

In a recent defense of the Grid, after pointing out that the "variables of the Grid are attitudinal and conceptual", Blake and Mouton refer to their item statements as "behavior descriptions derived from and connected with the thinking that lies behind action" (1982, 22-3). They then conclude the short section with this problematical assertion:

Because a leader's actual behavior and conduct can be predicted from knowledge of how he or she thinks about achieving production with and through people, the Grid is a more comprehensive statement of leadership theory. (p.23)
The "comprehensiveness" claim aside, what is troublesome about this statement is the alleged relationship between thought and behavior. Not only are they conceived to be distinct from each other, but thought is supposed to predict behavior. Smith is cited as taking exception to this type of thinking in Chapter 1.3

The authors report that self-deception is common among managers who evaluate themselves, which leads to other doubts about the Grid's validity (pp.203-4). They cite as an example a study in which the 69.2 per cent of participants who initially saw themselves as "9,9", dropped to 24.6 per cent following a week-long seminar in which each manager received "written feedback from his colleagues."

D. Situational Leadership vs. The Managerial Grid

It seems likely that anyone who becomes familiar with the literature on managerial style, will form the impression that Situational Leadership and the Managerial Grid are the leading brands in the market, in which Fiedler has a small niche. The term "market" is appropriate because huge consulting businesses have grown up around each product. The commercial and competitive cues are so numerous and so obvious that one simply cannot regard these schemes as the serious science they may once have been.

Examples of such cues on Hersey and Blanchard's side are their failure to include in their major book all twelve situations that constitute the LEAD-Self questionnaire and its scoring system4, as well as their casual dismissals of the Managerial Grid.

Referring to the names of the Grid's axes, Hersey and Blanchard
assert that: "Concern for' is a predisposition about something or 'an attitudinal dimension. Therefore, the Managerial Grid tends to be an attitudinal model that measures the values and feelings of a manager..." (p.90). Their rejection of Fiedler's Contingency Model, which seems to them "to be reverting to a single continuum of leader behavior", is based at bottom on the statement that "Most evidence indicates that leader behavior must be plotted on two separate axes rather than on a single continuum" (p.95). In this claim, Hersey and Blanchard seem to have forgotten the Environment, the third axis of their Tri-Dimensional model.

Hersey and Blanchard deal with the question "Is there a best style of leadership?" in a similar and suggestively self-serving fashion (pp.91-3). They begin by mentioning briefly several alleged proponents of the "one best style" position: Chester Barnard, Andrew Halpin, the Ohio State Leadership Studies and Blake and Mouton. Of Blake and Mouton's work they merely comment that "In fact, Blake and Mouton have developed training programs that attempt to change managers toward 'a 9,9 management style" (p.92).

Their next step is to take issue with two sets of results reported by Rensis Likert for first-line supervisors and for clerical workers respectively. Specifically, they note that leaders of each of the two styles defined by Likert were associated with both high and low production in both studies. While this appears to be a valid observation, it does not carry in a compelling way the burden of their argument against one best style. Another easy explanation for the results is that production is probably rarely, if ever, a function of
the leader's style exclusively.

The clinching evidence against one best style is taken from a research project done by Hersey in Nigeria, the results of which were almost the exact opposite of a pro-"one best style" study they had cited earlier. They conclude from this that "a single normative leadership style does not take into consideration cultural differences", and "Therefore, based on the definition of leadership process as a function of the leader, the followers, and other situational variables, the desire to have "a single ideal type of leader behavior seems unrealistic" (p.93, emphasis theirs).

The "one best style" issue is the nominal theme of a lengthy in-kind retort from Blake and Mouton (1982). In this retort Blake and Mouton ally the Grid with the "one best style" of others such as Rensis Likert's "System 4" and Douglas McGregor's "Theory Y". Although they identify other proponents of "situationalism", it is Hersey and Blanchard's version which is attacked at length. One can easily find many instances of patently weak arguments of thinking-predicting-behavior variety cited above. Three of their several "possible answers" to the question "Why the appeal of Situationalism?" should be a sufficient illustration of this point:

One answer is related to the times in which we live--this "do your own thing" era.

A second answer comes from sheer frustration with complexity --which leads to a desire for the ease of simplicity. Principles of behavior are complex, difficult to learn, and more difficult to practice. Acting without principle is less demanding and has its own rewards in the sense that the sole criterion is likely to be short-term.
A third answer is reliance on common sense. Life experiences are not to be disregarded as a source of emotional validity. If they lead to conclusions that run counter to scientific analysis, reliance is placed on personal experience and subjective "rightness" over science. (pp. 33-4)

One aspect of Blake and Mouton's attack on Situationalism is of more than passing interest. They conducted a test which, in their words "provides an empirical demonstration as to which of the two basic approaches actual leaders evaluate as the sounder" (p. 27). The test was the administration to 100 managerial personnel of the LEAD-Self questionnaire, modified by the addition to the four Alternative Actions for each of the twelve situations, of a "9,9" alternative which they designed. Thus, for Situation 1 the "9,9" alternative read: "Initiate a critique session with the entire group to diagnose the underlying problem responsible for this rapidly declining productivity and what to do about it" (p. 27).

Blake and Mouton took some steps to administer the test fairly. For example, half of the respondents came from 41 different agencies, companies, and institutions, and "received the test from third parties who had no interest in the controversy" (p. 28). The authors report that there was no significant difference between the responses of the two samples. Each respondent was instructed to rank the five Alternative Actions from most to least effective. The "9,9" alternatives were chosen most effective for all situations by proportions of respondents ranging between 72 per cent and 90 per cent, all of which represented a confidence level of .001. The authors report the replications of these results on another American sample, and on samples from nine other countries.
An alternative to Blake and Mouton's preferred explanation of these results was suggested earlier. That was a fifth response choice such as "Other, please specify" might have attracted a significant following. In any case, one must wonder that Blake and Mouton failed to consider the "self-deception" that they have found to accompany Grid responses, as at least a contributing factor in explaining their results.

The principal conclusion to be drawn from this presentation of Situational Leadership and the Managerial Grid, and of the feud between their respective proponents, is that neither is sufficiently impressive to serve as a dominant or exclusive exploratory tool in the present project.

The study to be described in the next section is relevant primarily for its contribution of a thought provoking scale on conflict-handling, which was derived from The Managerial Grid. It also provokes further analysis of the relationships between and among beliefs and behaviors and the instruments developed for studying them.

E. Garnier's Study of University Deans

With the goal of improving the administrative effectiveness of the academic dean, Garnier set out to discover:

1. the different dimensions of an effective deanship,
2. the main correlates of an effective performance for a dean, and
3. the conflict-handling skills a dean should possess in his dealings with senior academic officers, departmental chairpersons, and faculty members.(1982, 2)

To operationalize his two major variables, the dean's managerial effectiveness, and the dean's mode of handling conflict, Garnier
developed one questionnaire, and used two instruments which had been developed by others within the Blake-Mouton framework. The questionnaire, called the "Dean Managerial Performance Description," was patterned after Morse and Wagner's (1978) work and contained 20 items clustered in six major categories of managerial activities:

1. managing the faculty's environment and its resources,
2. organizing and co-ordinating,
3. information handling inside and outside the faculty,
4. providing for growth and development of department chairpersons and faculty members,
5. motivating associates and conflict-handling between academics, and
6. strategic problem-solving and decision-making.

From interviews with his target groups of respondents and from the literature, Garnier identified five "key issues" which a dean has to confront in his job as a matter of course:

1. budget allocations across departments,
2. personality differences between dean and department chairpersons,
3. promotion and tenure decisions,
4. performance appraisal and determination of salary increases for department chairpersons, and
5. determination of long-term goals and priorities of departments and faculty or school.

Budgeting, promotion and tenure, and goal setting were characterized as "substantive issues," in contrast to personality differences and performance appraisal which were "personal" or "affective" issues. For each of these five key issues, Garnier used Renwick's (1975) scale to gather the respondents' perceptions of which of the five conflict-handling styles was most representative of the dean's behavior. The five styles are shown below arrayed along two dimensions of cooperativeness and assertiveness in Garnier's (1980, 39) adaptation of a map taken from Thomas and Kilmann (1974):
These instruments were incorporated into separate questionnaires addressed specifically to the senior academic officers to whom the deans reported (n=25), to department chairpersons (n=20), and to faculty members (n=19) from five Ontario universities. Five academic deans from each of these universities completed the Thomas-Kilmann instrument consisting of thirty pairs of statements describing the five conflict-handling modes, to yield a profile of the dean's styles of handling conflict. Finally, Garnier's design included a number of hypotheses which were tested statistically.

Garnier hypothesized that he would find a significant positive
relationship between the deans' perceived effectiveness and Problem-solving as a style of handling conflict. Forcing and Avoiding were expected to be significantly negatively related to effectiveness, while no significant relationship was expected to obtain for Compromising and Smoothing. Two different sets of findings appear to have been reported by Garnier on these questions. For example, positive but insignificant correlations between Problem-solving and perceived effectiveness of .07 for senior academic officers, .17 for chairpersons, and .19 for faculty members, are reported at page 110 of his dissertation (1980). However, in his 1982 article Garnier reports a positive correlation of .39, significant at p < .001, for faculty members (p. 8).

Garnier combines this latter finding, with the finding that faculty members perceive that deans use Problem-solving less frequently than Compromising, Smoothing, and Forcing, to conclude that "there is room for improvement with respect to the managerial effectiveness of deans and for university management in general" (1982, 8).

This conclusion seems too quickly and too strongly drawn, even if the higher correlation coefficient is accepted. It begs the question of the importance of faculty members relative to others, in relation to the deans' responsibilities, style, and performance as perceived by others, such as their senior academic officer supervisors. That is, for a dean to be perceived by faculty members to be handling conflict in the way that they prefer, may not be well received by others of different preferences with whom the dean must work. Moreover, adopting a different conflict-handling style may require resources that the dean could better use in non-conflict handling responsibilities.
Garnier draws a number of other similar conclusions using similar reasoning that is also questionable. Thus, the small negative correlation of -.13, significant at \( p < .001 \), between forcing and effectiveness as perceived by faculty members, leads Garnier to conclude that "Forcing as a dominant style of dealing with people in conflict situations should be avoided when possible" (1982, 8). Immediately after stating this conclusion, Garnier cites evidence from department chairpersons indicating that forcing was perceived as "slightly effective" in dealing with the issues of budget allocations, promotion and tenure, and goal setting (p.8).

These weak relationships between forcing and issue-effectiveness as perceived by chairpersons, appear to be the only statistically significant relationships between conflict-handling styles and issues. This suggests that Garnier's issues, as well as the conflict-handling styles, generally were not good discriminators. It is not possible to say with any confidence what this means. For example, it may mean that the instruments he imported from other environments are not suited to the university environment, or to the specific universities in Garnier's sample. Or it may mean that conflict is not a large enough portion of the deans' responsibility or experience, to make it the central point of departure for management research.
F. Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter three measured treatments of management style—Situational Leadership and the Managerial Grid, and the offshoot of the latter employed by Garnier—were discussed at length. These treatments were found to have a number of weaknesses, which led to the conclusion that none of them was suitable for use here as an exclusive or dominant research model.

Several methodological issues were addressed, the main ones being the constitution of a meaningful conception of management behavior for research purposes, and the most appropriate tools for investigating it. In most conceptions of behavior encountered in the chapter, behavior is taken to be distinct from attitudes, thoughts, traits and verbal expression. The most rigid separation was Hersey and Blanchard's behaviorist contention that "It is not words that mean, it is people that mean." This is especially curious in light of one of McCall et al.'s generalizations from Chapter 1 that managerial work "is predominantly oral."

In contrast, Blake and Mouton are not as rigid as Hersey and Blanchard and emphasize "the attitudinal and conceptual" rather than the behavioral. However, their rigid adherence to "9,9" as the "one best style", runs against their findings that most subjects have a primary and a secondary style, and that a considerable percentage of subjects deceive themselves when responding to the Grid instrument. If most subjects emerge from a test with an otherwise defective instrument, showing two of five basic styles, the "one best style" claim is at least questionable, if not suspect. And despite their easy dismissals of
Hersey and Blanchard's model, their own faith in predicting "actual behavior" from how a person thinks, suggests that they are not far from Hersey and Blanchard in theoretical space.

In contrast to the investigators reviewed in this chapter, CAOs are treated by this investigator as human beings acting and reacting from reasons and motives, both conscious and unconscious. Unless the context indicates otherwise, behavior is interpreted, and used, by the writer expansively, rather than restrictively. It includes thoughts, feelings, reasons and actions, which in turn include the CAOs' accounts of these in interviews with the writer, and on questionnaires. Behavior is taken to reflect motivational complexes which cannot be known completely and with certainty. Behavior cannot be reliably predicted in any strict sense. Observation and analysis can, however, lead to plausible explanations of behavior.

The open-ended questions and various "measuring instruments" used in the interviews and questionnaires are simply tools designed to provoke and to register "systematic" responses. The significance of the responses lies mainly in their similarities and differences, and in the patterns of behavior into which they can be meaningfully organized by the investigator. Consistent with thinking of behavior in this way, is the proposition that any approach that is taken to study it must be only one of many possible approaches. There can be no one correct, or best, approach.
Notes to Chapter 2

1. The words "subjective" and "objective" are two of the misleading words whose development Rosenthal traces (1984, see especially Ch. 8). She traces the modern confusion in their usage to relativity theory. Social scientists imported them from popularizations of relativity theory without really understanding their meaning to physicists. In the social sciences "subjective" has come to be associated with "relative", while "objective" has come to be associated with "absolute truth". The following excerpt on their confused meanings in anthropology reinforces comments in Chapter 1 on scientism and on status as a motivating value:

Though initially acknowledging relative's connection with subjective, cultural relativism goes on... to shake off its subjectivist associations and to embrace objectivity (relative's traditional opposite) instead. Similarly, the anthropological observer is directed by cultural relativism to detach himself from his own frame of reference -- a command that not only contradicts the assumption of Einstein's and history's relativity that detachment from the relevant frame of reference is impossible, but also conflicts with the inherent meaning of relative as "not independent, not ultimately detached." What moved cultural relativism to make these inherently uncongenial associations was anthropology's desire for scientific status. Like a teenager taking on uncongenial companions in order to identify himself with a coveted social group, cultural relativism took on the terms objectivity and detachment in order to sound properly scientific in its method -- and snubbed its own sister subjectivity because of her embarrassingly unscientific appearance. (p.133, emphasis in original)

2. Andrew S. Grove (1984), the president of Intel Corporation, promotes task-relevant maturity (TRM) as the key consideration in selecting individuals for a group to work on a particular task. He acknowledges "some researchers" who are not named as the source of this idea. Blanchard (1983) has recently co-authored a best-selling book entitled The One Minute Manager in which his behaviorist management theory is crudely reduced to "one-minute praising", "one-minute reprimands", and "one-minute goal setting". This book has been effectively satirized by Andrè and Ward's (1984) The 59-Second Employee, which is subtitled "How to Stay One Second Ahead of Your One-Minute Manager".

3. Wicker's (1969) is the first comprehensive review of attitude-behavior studies known to the present writer, in which attitudes and behavior were operationally defined in accordance with the premises
being rejected here. Wicker found no close measureable correspondence between attitudes and actions.

4. The reader is advised in a footnote that "LEAD instruments are distributed through the Center for Leadership Studies, Escondido, Calif." (p.105), which is their consulting arm.

5. The sample sizes given here for the department chairpersons and for faculty members are taken from certain tables (e.g. Table 2 in the 1982 article, and Table 4-4 in the dissertation). However, elsewhere (1982, 6), Garnier puts the numbers of participating department chairpersons and faculty members respectively at 140 and 1125.
CHAPTER 3

THE CAO IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss a number of key pieces of organizational software, recalling Peters and Waterman, that play an especially important part in the way things work (or don't) in municipal corporations. The most important pieces for present purposes are the CAO's conceptions of his role in the municipal organization, and of the organization's preferred culture.

Structurally, the CAO is positioned below the mayor and council and above the senior staff. The mayor, the council, and the senior staff constitute the three major reference points for the CAO in defining his role. Both the role each of the two individuals and their respective groups define for themselves, and the effectiveness of each in playing this preferred role, will be constrained or enhanced by the other three players.

The CAO defines his role consciously/analytically and unconsciously/intuitively as he plays it. Although CAOs may not think of their roles by name, the role options open to them can be suggested by the names of the mayoral models numbered (1) to (4) in Table 1-1. That is, the CAO may play the role of "power broker", "public entrepreneur", "public executive", "policy expert" or "coalition builder". Whatever role the CAO plays is a part of the organizational culture by definition; however, large or small a part depends on the nature of the role
and how effectively it is played.

It is clear from Chapter 1 that the literature on the CAO is short, narrow and light. It does not discuss CAOs' roles specifically. As explained in Chapter 5, the CAO literature was of little help either in legitimizing or in reshaping the interdependent roles of the City of Burlington CAO and Management Committee. However, if the subject is broadened from the role of the CAO to the role of staff, the local government literature has much to say.

As was seen in Chapter 1, the dominant message of this literature is that the role of staff is to administer the policies made by council. It is this pervasive policy-administration conceptual framework within which all existing CAOs have, at least initially, formulated their roles. Those who have managed to redefine their roles to escape its confines, are probably working with councillors or senior managers who still subscribe to policy-administration as a general role model. The central task of the present chapter is to review critically this policy-administration thinking. It constitutes a further contribution to the dissertation's first primary objective of demonstrating the weakness of the structural perspective in the evaluation of local government effectiveness. More importantly, this chapter contributes to the third primary objective by defining the attitudes that are thought to be key elements of CAOs' approaches to their jobs.

Policy and administration in the local government literature parallel in their legitimating function, and in their lack of precision, the classical functions of planning, organizing, directing and controlling in the management literature. Both sets of abstractions are
vulnerable to critical analysis, and neither is very useful for guiding everyday activities.

A general CAO role that is both sturdier and more useful can be defined in terms of the major responsibilities and relationships that emerged from Kotter's study of general managers as six key challenges and dilemmas (1982a, 12-18). They are listed in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1: Kotter's Key Challenges and Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Setting basic goals, policies, and strategies despite great uncertainties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Achieving a delicate balance in the allocation of scarce resources among a diverse set of functional and business needs, not allowing short-run concerns to dominate long-run ones, or marketing issues to stifle production needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Keeping on top of a very large and diverse set of activities. Being able to identify problems (&quot;fires&quot;) that are out of control and to solve them quickly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Getting the information, cooperation and support needed from bosses to do the job. Being demanding with superiors without being perceived as uncooperative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Getting corporate staff, other relevant departments or divisions, and important external groups (e.g., big unions, or customers, or suppliers) to cooperate despite the lack of any formal authority over them; getting things done through them despite resistance and the like.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certain terms and concepts in Table 3-1 require translating from the multi-divisional private sector corporation of Kotter's study to the local government organization. "Marketing issues" and "production needs" in Responsibility No. 2 have no precise correspondents in local government. One expression of this challenge in the latter context might be not allowing representational issues to overwhelm service delivery. "Bosses" in Relationship No. 4 should be read as mayor and council in local government. "Other departments or divisions, and important external groups" in Relationship No. 5, could include any of the large number of special purpose boards and commissions (hereafter, SPBs for "special purpose bodies") such as libraries, school boards, conservation authorities, and utilities.

Kotter further identifies Responsibility No. 1 and Relationship No. 5 as the two "fundamental dilemmas" which preclude "a simple straightforward and formal" approach to the classical functions of "planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling" (1982a, 76).

In general the "Responsibilities" and the "Relationships" of this table are what Kotter means by agenda-setting and network-building respectively.

Throughout the following critical review it will become evident that the policy-administration framework for defining the CAO's role is incompatible with effectively pursuing the responsibilities and relationships defined by Kotter. This incompatibility stems from conceptions of expertise and professionalism, and of "corporateness", which are dominant dimensions of the policy-administration framework.
B. Policy and Administration as Council and Staff Roles

This part of the chapter consists of a sequential review of policy-administration thinking in Britain, the United States, and Canada. The section on Canadian thought concludes with the one attempt that is known to have been made to analyze the issue of council and staff roles and relations without resort to policy and administration (O'Brien 1982, 1984). Expertise and professionalism are discussed in the final section.

No attempt has been made to this point to attribute in any regular and precise way the acknowledged influences of Britain and the United States on the development of the Ontario CAO. In fact, the literature is probably too uneven to permit such attribution to be made reliably. However, it is relevant to the following discussion to distinguish between the British tradition of cultivating "administrative generalists" as public servants, and the American system "with its newfound emphasis on the technical specialist".

This distinction is made by Wilson with reference to public administration at the federal level in Canada. He notes (1982, 547-48) that Canada adopted the American system of "scientific management" by a process of conscious choice that was limited in scope. While the distinction clearly emerges in the municipal writings reviewed below, there is no evidence of a choice being made for the municipal public service in Canada, however narrow in scope.
Perhaps the most determined official attempts to advance beyond the simplistic labor-dividing device of policy and administration, have been made by Britain's Maud and Baines Committees. They were struck by the British Government in the late 1960s to investigate and to report upon the operations of local government. As discussed in Chapter 1, their reports provided the rationale for the "corporate approach" which was the object of the reorganisation. The Baines Committee's observations are worth citing at length:

The Maud Committee exploded the myth of policy being a matter for the elected members and administration for officers and it is disturbing to find, five years later, that many members and officers still see this as a sufficient description of their respective roles and one behind which they can shelter as occasion requires. It is perhaps even more disturbing to see how a rigid interpretation of the role of one or the other defeats any attempt to create a sense of unity of purpose within an authority.

We believe that if local government is to have any chance of achieving a corporate approach to its affairs members and officers must both recognise that neither can regard any area of the authority's work and administration as exclusively theirs.

Officers must accept that members have a legitimate interest in the day to day administration of cases involving their constituents and that is frequently only a lack of information which causes them to pursue such matters into the administrative machine.

Members must equally realise that the skilled professional officer is not just a servant who is paid to do as he is told. We do not dispute that the major policy decisions must be taken by the elected members, but the officers have a role to play in the stimulation and formulation of policy and in seeing that the members have available the necessary advice and evaluation to enable them to make the best decisions. . . . (1972, 55)
That the Bains Committee found the policy-administration role definition to be so prevalent five years after Maud's assault testifies to both the comfort it provides to its adherents, and to its resistance to extinction by fiat. Policy and administration have provided more comfort than any other role distinction to American and Canadian local government observers and officials as well.

2. American Thought

The beginnings of the CAD in Ontario were traced in Chapter 1 to the council-manager plans of the American urban reform movement of the early 1900s. The International City Managers' Association (ICMA) was formed by these early city managers. Much of the American literature on council-staff roles has been written or published by, or under the auspices of, the ICMA (which has since come to stand for the International City Management Association). At its inception ICMA's primary objective was to promote the adoption of the council-manager plan, and thus the growth of its membership. Such promotion remains one of its primary purposes today.

It is this promotional purpose that is captured in Boynton's observation that "The council-manager plan is first of all a marketing device..." (1974, 5). Gerfield has used the proposal to adopt city manager government as an example of a "gesture of differentiation" ([1963] 1969, 171-3). Such gestures "state the character of an administration, in moralistic terms [indicating] the kinds of persons, the tastes, the moralities, and the general life styles toward which government is sympathetic or censorious." City manager government...
representing "[t]he impersonal, moralistic, and bureaucratized 'good government' is much closer to standards of conduct typical in middle classes". Conversely, the "machine politician is closer to the open, personalized, and flexible government that represents the lower-class systems of social control".

Given the birth of the council-manager plan in the conflict of mass reform and its subsequent promotional use by the ICMA, it is not surprising that most of its accounts in the literature are analytically weak.

A good example of this is a 1968 article in which the then Executive Director of what was then the International City Managers' Association sought to rebut allegations that "the council-manager plan somehow smothers subordinates or even completely chokes political leadership" (Keane 1968, 115). He began by trying to clarify "the meaning of our terms", the first of which was the council-manager plan itself:

The plan was originally built upon the concept that a clear line between administration and policy can be drawn. Thus the first basic principle is that an elected council (as a group) sets policy; it hires a manager to administer policy and he in turn is responsible for employment of all other employees within civil service restrictions where they exist. (p.115)

Keane goes on to refer to this distinction as one element of "the model", two others of which are non-partisan elections and elections at large. He then acknowledges that "In practice, many council-manager cities" violate the model by having partisan elections and election by wards (p.116). Nothing is said in the same place about violating the policy-administration principle. However, Keane then draws from the City
Manager's Code of Ethics "further principles of council-manager government":

First, the code states that the manager is a "community leader" thus recognizing that policy and administration are not easily separated and that the manager plays an important role in the development of policy. Second, the code states that the manager resists the encroachment on his appointive power, thus recognizing his exclusive day-in, day-out administrative authority. (p.116)

If policy and administration are not easily separated, then one may ask how the manager is to identify his exclusive administrative domain in order to enforce his authority. It seems fair to conclude that Keane has confused rather than clarified the meaning of terms.

Richard Stillman, one of the most prominent American authorities on the city manager, supports the view that the early adoptions of the city manager plan were the result of its being successfully associated with three "manipulation symbols"--the business corporation, neutral expertise and pragmatic reform--which he thinks are still popular (1977, 660). Stillman's reference to "symbols" brings Edelman's and Gusfield's work to mind; however, as the discussion of Stillman's work proceeds it will become apparent that, unlike Edelman and Gusfield, Stillman seems to have been manipulated by these "symbols" himself, rather like the voters who supported the reform movement.

Stillman sees the city manager as afflicted with certain ongoing "value problems". One of these is that the appeal to voters of the sharp separation of policy and administration in a business corporation, is for the city manager a "terribly difficult, if not an impossible dichotomy to achieve on a daily working basis" (p.660). This "problem" statement is unsettling in its suggestions that the
policy-administration distinction is a useful one, and that it obtains in business corporations where it is presumed to be easier to maintain. Of the relation between the council-manager plan and the business corporation, Boynton reminds one of Dearlove's comment cited in Chapter 1 when he writes:

The business corporation and the corporate ways of doing business provided a major intellectual model for those advocating the implementation of the council-manager plan and most specifically the analogue of the corporate or general manager. The model presumed a corporate board that set policy and a general manager who implemented that policy.

(1974, 4)

That this is as sharply as the business analogue seems to have been drawn, seems consistent with its use as a "manipulation symbol" to use Stillman's phrase. At this stereotypical level it seems fairer to regard corporate boards with Andrews (1980, 1981) as bestowing "routine assent" upon management's conduct, than to regard them as "setting policy". To be useful in advancing the analysis of council and staff roles and relations, any business analogy must be based on a more detailed and compelling account of the business providing the comparison.

Stillman propounds a second dichotomy which corresponds to policy and administration, namely, the city manager as "the neutral professional expert" versus "the politician". This is the thrust of his 1977 article which carries the title: "The City Manager: Professional Helping Hand, or Political Hired Hand?". The voters who adopted the earliest manager plans were also manipulated by what Stillman terms the "apolitical symbolic appeal" of the manager's neutral expertise. Their legacy is a second "value problem" for the modern
manager, namely, the conflict between having to appear as the neutral expert while dealing with the different opinions the manager faces among councillors on many issues (pp.660-2). For Stillman, the question arising from the politician-professional distinction appears to be: how can the manager overcome the patent contradiction between expected professionalism and necessary politics? His answer is that the manager must maintain a "schizophrenic double identity".

Thus it is that the unproductive policy-administration dichotomy is compounded by the politician-professional dichotomy. If schizophrenia were a condition that one could consciously "maintain" or avoid, it might be quite rational for a manager whose objective was to avoid a "schizophrenic double identity" to regard himself as a professional who confined himself to administration.

Unfortunately, Stillman promotes a third dichotomy which reinforces the other two. This is the distinction between university schooling and on-the-job training. The earliest city managers tended to be engineers by schooling and experience. In recent years the backgrounds of city managers have tended to be some combination of "administrative generalist" (i.e., public administration, often at the graduate level) and specialist (e.g., solid waste, collective bargaining). "No doubt," Stillman writes, "the advanced degree gives the practitioner a professional image while the on-the-job training gives the pragmatic skills for coping with daily hazards of occupational survival" (p.660). The troublesome implications of this line of thinking are that university schooling imparts no "pragmatic skills", and that pragmatic skills are to be distinguished from "political
Here is the conclusion which Stillman draws from his reviews of both the literature and the major trends:

Managers cannot totally embrace either role of professional or politician. If managers become neutral experts without reference to the political facts of life, they would jeopardize their own survival, but if they become politicians without responsible knowledge or expertise in urban affairs, they jeopardize their credibility and worth to the public they serve. In short, managers cautiously and continuously tread a middle ground between two poles of politics and expertise. (p.666)

This conclusion brings to mind Ircha's conclusion from Chapter 1, that elected officials should contribute "political astuteness" while appointed staff should provide "technical organizational expertise". Stillman's is to be preferred for its allowance that there is (should be?) a political element to the city manager's role. However, one might doubt the ability of Stillman's "cautious" bureaucrats operating the "middle ground" to handle Kotter's key challenges and dilemmas effectively. Such bureaucrats are later contrasted with public entrepreneurs who seem more the match for Kotter's private sector general managers.

In a very recent major work which he authored jointly with Anderson and Newland, Stillman appears to have changed his thinking about the role of the city manager rather substantially. Although policy and administration continue to be regarded as good normative and empirical role descriptions, they are confined to the time of the "model charters", that is, to the first council-manager plans (1983:47). Since the 1950s, it is noted, the manager's traditional responsibility for providing services has been expanded to include...
"conflict resolution", with the manager "now...expected to be a full partner in the political side of the policymaking process" (p. 48). (It may be recalled that Kotter's relationship No. 6 includes the resolution of interdepartmental conflict; Kotter does not discuss the resolution of conflicts among the GMs' superiors, although it is implied in relationship No. 4. Anderson et al. go on in the same section to make the 1970s a watershed for the manager's responsibilities:

The roles of the manager...after the 1960s have become ambiguous at best...The job calls for a blend of interpersonal, professional, and technical skills. To say that the managerial function is primarily to administer the council's policies is to neglect a large number of activities that make up a typical day on the manager's calendar. It would be more appropriate to describe the "managerial function" as the shorthand term for everything the local manager is expected to do. (p. 49)

It is doubtful that the job demands or approaches of city managers have changed over time in any way that makes policy-administration more or less applicable. The acceptance of such rationalizing may however be a reasonable price to pay for official recognition of its inadequacy. The excerpt remains somewhat curious for its omission of political skills in the list of required skills, in light of the authors' recognition of the manager's role in conflict resolution.

In their arrival at 'expectations' as the determinant of the city manager's function Stillman et al. anticipate the discussion of O'Brien's work in section (3) below.

In sum, it seems both misleading and unproductive to frame the role choices open to the city manager as a choice between politician and professional; both conceived narrowly and as mutually exclusive
opposites. This conceptual approach merely reinforces the policy-administration approach to dividing labor between politicians and staff, which Maud and Bains found so unsatisfactory.

(a) Survey Research on City Managers' Roles

American city managers and chief administrative officers, unlike their British and Canadian counterparts, have been subjected to a considerable amount of survey research. Both the survey instruments and the results of this research are relevant to the present project.

In his 1977 article Stillman reviewed much of this research and used it to support certain trends that he found. One of the trends discussed by Stillman is the more active view city managers have been taking of their role in developing policy. He cites a number of regional studies of managers which demonstrate for him the considerable influence exerted on policy formulation by managers in certain cities (p.665). The strength and extent of this influence is reported to vary greatly with the size of the city (i.e., the larger the more influential), with the degree of political conflict in the city (i.e., the more conflict, the more influential), and with the manager's self-definition of his leadership role (i.e., the more active the conception of the role, the more influential the manager).

The evidence from which these results are derived comes mainly from the administration of a scale, developed by R.D. Loveridge for his study of city managers in the San Francisco Bay area. Unfortunately, the scale, which is shown in Table 3-2, reveals some of the same conceptual weaknesses that have been attributed above to Stillman.
In embodying so much policy-administration thinking, this scale is susceptible to previous criticisms. In its lack of precision it may also be compared to the description of Situation 1 in the LEAD instrument that was presented in Chapter 2.

**Table 3-2: Loveridge's City Managers' Role Scale**

1. City managers should take initiative in setting policy.
2. City managers should advocate change in policy.
3. City managers should be administrators, not policy makers.
4. City managers should be neutral on controversial issues.
5. City managers should consult with council before submitting [the] budget.
6. City managers should promote good policies to which influencers may be opposed.
7. City managers should work through influencers in the City to achieve their goals.
8. City managers should recruit good people to run for local office.
9. City managers should give help to good councilmen up for re-election.

Source: Almy 1975, 262

The items could be improved a little through the incorporation of the different aspects of policy making identified in Anderson et al. (1983, 51), namely: initiation, deliberation, determination, adoption, implementation, and feedback. However, these refinements would probably still leave questions.

These comments raise a major question about Stillman's trend analysis: Is it fair to conclude from an increasing proportion of responses agreeing with the pro-policy items and disagreeing with the pro-administrator items, that managers are in fact exercising greater
influence in policy formulation now than in the past?

In two large surveys reported by Almy (1975) and Hagan (1976) in the years just prior to Stillman's 1977 article, the responding city managers were almost evenly divided on scale item (3). Hagan compared the 56% acceptance in his study of "the classic administration-politics dichotomy" with the 78% rejection in Loveridge's Bay area survey (1976, 46). He took this to be a sign that "CAO's appear more constrained than do managers in their participation in the policy-making process" (p. 47, emphasis added). In equating respondent's preferences with participation, Hagan seems to be overworking his evidence.

In another survey taken during the same period by ICMA, scale item (3) was worded as an empirical rather than a normative statement (Huntley and Macdonald 1975). The five response choices ranged from "never" to "always"; the responses ranged from 10.1% to 13% respectively, with 76% of the responses distributed fairly evenly among the three middle responses (p. 53, Table 2/5). The responses to another of the sixteen items in the list suggest that a significant portion of the respondents may not have understood the item. Almost 90% of the respondents indicated that they "always" or "nearly always" participate in the formulation of municipal policy. Yet only 38% reported "never" or "once in a while" acting as an administrator and leaving policy matters to council. If this inconsistency was noticed, it was not addressed.

In sum, the meaning and significance of the findings of American survey research into the city managers' roles are uncertain, owing both to the policy-administration framework within which it is cast, and to
the uncritical acceptance and application of the Loveridge scale.

3. Canadian Thought

Ircha. Council-staff relations are the theme of the Ircha paper cited in Chapter 1 (1981). He advances a model in which the Administrator/Manager (i.e., the CAO) is cross-pressured by his senior managers to play the role of co-ordinator, and by council to play the supposedly opposite role of autocrat. The relative merits of these two role possibilities and the qualities that make them polar opposites are not explained in the paper. These weaknesses are relieved somewhat by the allowance Ircha makes for "personality and motivation" in determining the manager's position along the continuum:

Dependent upon the administrator/manager's personality and motivation he may gravitate over time towards one or the other end of the continuum. During periods of economic restraint, however, the need to tighten and control the system becomes increasingly important, hence many administrator/managers may find themselves being increasingly pressured towards an autocratic role. (pp. 17-8)

On the whole Ircha's model does not seem to be very helpful.

City of London Management Committee. Perhaps the most progressive account of council-staff relations within the structural tradition, is to be found in the 1976 Report of the City of London (Ontario) Management Committee (CLMC hereafter). This was a Committee of representatives from business, industry, labor, and the university, appointed by city council in 1974 to review the city's decision-making process and organizational structure.

The structure of the City of London organization at the beginning of the review was rather unique in having both a CAO and a Board of
Control. The CLMC borrowed freely from Bains, whose Policy and Resources Committee, for example, became a recommended Policy Co-ordinating Committee which was to replace the Board of Control.

CLMC divided council-staff relations into Interface I, policy advisory functions, and Interface II, executive functions.

The Interface I relations between council and staff were defined as centering upon nine "larger policy issues" listed expressly by CLMC, and described as requiring "inter-professional, inter-disciplinary, synergistic"—not departmental—procedures" (p. 46). The primary medium for Interface I relations was to be meetings of the proposed "Policy Committees", and between the Policy Co-ordinating Committee and senior staff. CLMC reasoned that "a Council with full authority for the City's affairs" [i.e., after the Board of Control had been replaced], organized in committees which are truly policy-oriented" would make increasing demands for policy advisory services from staff (p. 47).

Since the Board of Control was not abolished as recommended by CLMC, one can only speculate as to whether London's City Councillors collectively would have revised their conceptions of their roles in the way CLMC had planned. The present writer suspects that to inculcate the desired habit of thinking about larger policy issues would have required reinforcing procedures enforced by effective staff and council leaders.

Interface II relations between council and staff centred upon the executive functions which were defined as:

[The day-to-day work of operating the many city services; carrying out the Council-approved programs; "getting things done", generally with a wide delegation of operational]
authority, but always with the responsibility for consultation with and reporting to the Council.

CLMC criticized the common municipal practice of overly close liaison between standing committees and their respective departmental staff (p.49). It saw these "cliques" of political and staff specialists reinforcing "the hierarchical system within the staff", and encouraging councillors to become overly concerned with the "technical and minor financial aspects of a program". Both of these effects ran against the emphasis CLMC was striving to attain for major policy issues. The Committee's conclusion was that the monitoring of executive functions should not be left "entirely to the standing Policy Committees".

With this rather leading conclusion, and the expression of its belief that the Policy Committees "should [not] be in any way restrained" from consulting or quizzing senior staff or their delegates, the Committee proposed the following procedure: "when staff are asked by a Committee to attend and/or to bring or send information or proposals, this should be done through the CAO and the heads of the staff agencies concerned". One wonders whether this procedure would have the effect of reinforcing "the hierarchical system" from which relief was sought in the previous paragraph.

CLMC's attempt to get beyond the British corporate structural approach, to the culture and the dynamics of the organization is commendable. Unfortunately Council's rejection of its major recommendations precluded any research that could have assessed the practical effects of CLMC's reasoning.

CLMC's attempt to divert councillors' attention from "technical and minor financial aspects", raises the general issue of attention to
detail in an organization. This issue is central to the thinking of the management consultants, Ernst and Whitney (1980a, 1980b), who were called in by the City of London a few years after the CLMC study, to address essentially the same problems of corporate management.

Ernst and Whitney associate effective corporate management with senior management attending only to those details which are important "from a total point of view". They also advance the general proposition that attention to detail should diminish as one rises in the organization's hierarchy. However, they do not provide any practical guide to the differences between corporately important and corporately unimportant details. Without such a guide this fundamental distinction cannot be of much help.

To the extent that policy is associated with "larger issues" and administration is associated with "details", as they seemed to be for CLMC, Ernst and Whitney's abstract distinction between what may be termed "corporate" and "non-corporate" details, reinforces policy-administration thinking. It adds to the confusion. Ernst and Whitney's notion that attention to detail should decrease with height in the hierarchy seems problematic, quite aside from their failure to provide a working definition of a detail. Anyone who reflects upon it may draw a parallel with the maxim "management by exception".

The idea of management by exception is that a manager should try to direct his effort toward the most consequential matters facing him. Under this maxim, corporate details would presumably be managed before non-corporate details. The difficulty with "management by exception" is that there is no practical way of classifying the "exceptions" in the
general case. For every CAO the exceptions will be different, and will vary with time.

This discussion suggests that attention to detail and management by exception may not be analyzable in their own right, but that their use by, and their meaning to, CAOs may be revealing.

**Kruger.** John Kruger, the former CAO of Metropolitan Toronto, dealt with council-staff roles and relations in a recent speech to the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association (1983). He opened his address by characterizing the traditional policy-administration doctrine as a "convenient" but "[in]accurate portrayal of reality", and by asserting "the simple truth [that] a municipal department head has to be as much a politician as a public servant if he/she wishes to survive" (pp.1-2).

Kruger went on to describe a four-point "unwritten job description" for a senior municipal civil servant which he contrasts with the roles of civil servants at the provincial and federal levels of government (pp.3-6). The first point is that department heads are required to recommend policy solutions to various problems, in the "very public forum" of the council floor. Second, the merit of the department head's performance will be based not only on the quality of his professional advice, but on his ability to understand the public, and to deal directly "in public with politicians and with the media". Third, department heads are expected alternately to defend their recommendations and not to defend their recommendations in public, depending on assorted situational elements. "And fourth, although the "real power to decide rests with council", the department head shares
that power in practice (as evidenced by the infrequency with which his recommendations are rejected). Nevertheless, he is expected in certain situations to act as if he has no such power, and in others (notably when things go wrong) as if he has.

Kruger's account of the municipal civil servant as politician is essentially an account of his personal experience at Metro Toronto, told in the third person. To anyone familiar with the administration of Metro, through press coverage or otherwise, Kruger's account should seem consistent. Such people should also suspect that, when Kruger refers to these issues as unresolvable "dilemmas" and "the stuff of which heart attacks and ulcers are made"--"the no-win situation" (p.8)--he is being both dramatic and falsely modest.

Kruger's account is for the most part a persuasive personal statement of the unhelpfulness of policy and administration as role identifiers. It is especially noteworthy for the idea that senior municipal managers must be part politician to survive. However, the way Kruger makes this point may be unconvincing to other CAOs, especially to those who see Metro Toronto as unique among Ontario municipalities. Moreover, those CAOs who find Kruger's proposition attractive may be unable to act upon it for want of a coherent and detailed role description.

O'Brien. The final Canadian contribution to the topic of roles and relations to be reviewed here, is O'Brien's 1982 paper. Like Kruger, O'Brien distinguishes municipal civil servants from their provincial and federal counterparts. In particular, he draws attention to the openness both of policymaking among politicians, and in the exchange of
instructions and advice between politicians and staff (p.1).

O'Brien's paper is organized around five "Ws": who, where, when, why, and what. Policy and administration are addressed under the question: "Why attach so much importance to this relationship between politicians and public servants?" (p.8). Although the question is not answered directly, the section contains a number of agreeable observations. For example, O'Brien recognizes "certain risks" associated with "every attempt to draw a firm line between policy and administration", and that if anyone actually knew "where the line should be" it would probably "not stay put" (p.8).

With this as background, O'Brien concludes by setting out the two sets of council and staff expectations in Table 3-3, one for the "policy development process", and one for the "policy implementation process".

O'Brien ends his paper by suggesting that these expectations can be met only with a "great deal of goodwill and conscious effort", and that politicians might benefit, as many staff now do, from courses and seminars on council-staff relations.

O'Brien's lists of expectations invite many questions and comments. For example, what does he take to be the distinction between the policy development and the policy implementation processes? From their constituent expectations one might mistake them for the policy and administration which O'Brien evidently wants to avoid. Are these two processes meant to encompass all activities of the municipal administration? Or simply those council-staff activity areas where expectation-setting is appropriate?
Table 3-3: O'Brien's Council and Staff Expectations

I. Policy Development Expectations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Councillor Expectations</th>
<th>Staff Expectations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. All the relevant facts;</td>
<td>1. That council members read staff reports with an open mind;</td>
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<td>2. Definite answers to reasonable questions;</td>
<td>2. That they consider staff reports;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Information one can trust;</td>
<td>3. That council will ask staff for information it considers lacking;</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Feasible alternatives for council's choice;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Clear recommendations;</td>
<td>4. That political considerations will be added by council;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Information on potential community impacts;</td>
<td>5. That council will make up its mind;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Information on potential administrative impacts;</td>
<td>6. That councillors will not be so unfair and unethical as to criticize in public members of staff who cannot defend themselves in public without being in the invidious position of imputing their bosses or inferior intervening in politics.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Information on costs in financial and human terms;</td>
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<td>9. Expeditious preparation of reports;</td>
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<td>10. No neglect of other duties;</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Communication if council demands are excessive or inappropriate;</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Some assurance that consultants will deliver satisfactory work at the agreed cost by the agreed date.</td>
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<td>13. Timing of information flows that denies the suspicion of agendas manipulated for non-council reasons;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Acceptance of council decisions with good grace and respect for council's legitimate political and policy role.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Policy Implementation Expectations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Councillor Expectations</th>
<th>Staff Expectations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Effective use of human and financial resources;</td>
<td>1. Responsibility without interference;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Attention to the spirit of the policy;</td>
<td>2. Resources appropriate and adequate to the task;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cooperation with the CAO and other departments;</td>
<td>3. Clear policy decisions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Notification of unintended or unexpected impacts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specifically, some "reasonable questions" do not have "definite answers". All councillors do not judge the trustworthiness of information coming from staff by the same standards, nor is there likely to be one standard for the trustworthiness of information among staff. Consultants' services vary in quality, and cost and time overruns can result from uncontrollable and unforeseen circumstances. Why should councillors "read staff reports with an open mind", especially when staff may have been closed-minded in preparing them? Doesn't such recommended open-mindedness run against the expectation held by at least some of the informed public, that elected officials should take firm stands on issues and honor public commitments to these stands? Does the proposed staff expectation that council will add "political considerations", mean that staff proposals are devoid of such considerations?

The comments and questions inspired by O'Brien's lists of expectations suggest that they might be improved through further analysis. However, even thus refined the prospect of their being incorporated "as is" into the culture of any particular municipal organization seems slight. And if they were incorporated in this way, what would be the practical consequence? It seems doubtful that such general expectations; no matter how refined, could function as effective elements of a particular local government culture. This is because the meaning of so many of the constituent expectations--"all the relevant facts", "clear recommendations", "political considerations", "feasible alternatives", "the spirit of the policy"--is so dependent upon local interpretation and circumstance. This analysis would appear to support
Dearlove's contention, at least with respect to council-staff expectations, that "it is not possible to generalise over time, place, and issue as to the relationship between councillors and officers" (1979, 54). 3

However, this is not to say that O'Brien's sets of expectations are of no value. One can imagine them as a useful checklist for the design and maintenance of council and staff expectations in any municipality.

To talk of designing and maintaining expectations is to raise the questions of the form and the formality of such activities. Toward the deliberate and formal end of the spectrum are the courses and seminars noted by O'Brien. Given the long tradition of policy-administration thinking, such formal devices are quite appropriate. But they are not likely to accomplish much in isolation.

This is because, at bottom, the organizational culture is a collection of private meanings of shared experiences, that are held both consciously and unconsciously by individuals. While new meanings can be formally introduced, their adoption and side-effects cannot be reliably gauged before the fact. The organizational culture, like the broader culture, cannot be controlled and shaped from any central point.

Accordingly, Council-staff expectations cannot be approached as the formulation of a "mission statement" through a goals-and-objectives exercise, although the confirming and adapting of such expectations can take place during such exercises. To the extent that they are susceptible to deliberate influence, these expectations must be developed and maintained through a wide range of learning processes and day-to-day activities.
The nature of council and staff expectations means that the potential for identifying and exploring them in this project is hard to assess. At a minimum, the interviews with CAOs should reveal a basic awareness, or lack of awareness, of expectation-setting, and of the importance of trying to influence the development of reasonable expectations. Those CAOs for whom establishing and maintaining such expectations is a conscious agenda item, may be able to share elements of their approach with others.

4. Expertise and Professionalism

Expertise and professionalism have arisen several times in the previous discussion of policy-administration. In this chapter, for example, Stillman described "neutral expertise" as one of three "manipulation symbols" used to promote the Council-Manager Plan in its early days. Later he characterized the prudent city manager as "the neutral professional expert" who takes notice of "the political facts of life", but who takes care not to "become [a] politician without responsible knowledge or expertise in urban affairs".

These statements amount to defining politics narrowly as what the elected know and do, and to distinguishing the elected from staff on the basis of undefined differences in the knowledge each has. Stillman also asserted that university education produced a "professional image", while on-job training produced "pragmatic skills". In Chapter 1 Ircha imputed "political astuteness" to elected officials, and "technical organizational expertise" to the administrator.

Upon close analysis these alleged differences between elected
officials and appointed staff are unfounded and misleading. They are supported neither by the processes of acquiring knowledge/expertise, nor by the processes involved in acting on one's knowledge to attain one's ends. It is granted that the publicly-sanctioned means available to the elected official to pursue his ends (e.g., the 'promotion' of his cause in public), may differ in certain respects from the appointed official. However, such differences are more usually, and to a much stronger degree, matters of role, of strategy and tactics, and of style, rather than of personality and personal schooling and knowledge.

O'Brien is helpful here. He refers to beginning politicians as "amateurs" "whose motives are mixed in various ways, whose talents and intelligence are varied and who exhibit differing patterns of maturity and capacity for growth" (1982, 2)--rather like beginning staff members, it is appropriate to add. More recently, O'Brien has attributed the following "public interest" and "self interest" motives to this "first time" local politician:

A desire to serve or contribute;
A desire to change policy or correct what's wrong;
A willingness to say "yes" to citizens who ask him to run;
A desire to help citizens who have problems.

A vanity that relishes publicity;
The wish to be in the know;
The magnetism of power and prestige for their own sake;
The desire to represent an unnamed group to do favours,
to be a fixer;
The pursuit of career through a stepping stone.
(O'Brien 1984, 5-6)

Here again, with the exception of answering "yes" to running for office, these motives are probably as generally applicable to CAOs and department heads, as they are to politicians. This conclusion certainly seems compatible with Kruger's analysis. Moreover, in the present
writer's view it is unnecessary to restrict these motives to "first
time" politicians.

The challenge to senior staff, in O'Brien's view, is to help
transform the amateur politician into "a professional in the politics
of policy-making" (1982, 2). In the more recent version of this
article, O'Brien notes that most of the help the beginning politician
needs "will have to come from the manager", the "full time professional"
(1984, 6). He goes on to propose that "the moment we say any
professional's judgement is superior to that of the politicians on
public policy questions, something important about democracy has been
lost" (p.7). This leads him to a list of the advantages possessed by
the CAO which make the council-manager partnership "unequal":

You control the information. You can clothe the information
in professional jargon. You select information and often
it's [sic] timing. You have as a resource the whole civic
staff. You have, or ought to have, substantial training in
organization behaviour, communications, finance and policy
development. You and your staff colleagues are professionals.
(p.7).

"Professional" and "professionals" are used four times in the last
paragraph in reference to O'Brien's work. The words connote, firstly,
simply full-time work status, and secondly, someone who is specially
trained to do what he does. Both connotations are meant to differentiate
the manager from the politician; although the emphasis is on the
beginning politician, the differences are presumably generalizable to
all politicians.

What is the practical significance of the differences which are
being promoted by the term "professional"? Does the CAO's alleged
professionalism make him necessarily a better policy analyst than his
politicians? Does the rejection of his advice in critical circumstances, carry risks analogous to those commonly associated with the rejection, say, of a physician's medical advice? Should it?

"No" is the answer that follows from a consideration of the pool of schooling and experience from which politicians are selected, and from a consideration of the learning that accompanies longer service. Rather, these uses of the term "professional", and corresponding uses of the term "expertise", serve mainly to create or to perpetuate perceptions of differences which confer special status on the manager. This is to say that claims by the manager, or attributions to him, of expertise may be regarded as political gestures of differentiation.

If the council-manager partnership is unequal as O'Brien contends, the inequality in a given instance is unlikely to be a product of the professionalism he conceives. If professionalism is a contributing factor, it is more likely the result of the CAO claiming or implying special expertise to enhance his personal influence. This pretense of professionalism is discussed in Chapter 4 where it is referred to as the "apolitical shield".

C. Corporate Management

In Chapter 1 the origin of the term "corporate management" in the context of local government was linked to the British literature of the late 1960s that supported the reorganisation. "The corporate approach" was defined primarily as three structures: the CAO (i.e., CEO), the SMT of department heads, and the central or policy and resources committee of elected officials. These structures were intended to address problems
such as disunity, lack of co-ordination, and fragmentation.

A few references can be found in that literature to suggest that there was some appreciation that structures alone would not be effective in establishing "the corporate approach". For example, Redcliffe-Maud allowed that the success of the SMT "will depend on harnessing the enthusiasm of the specialist to the needs of central management" (1969, s.501). And Bains, on Haynes' reading,

saw participation in the principal chief officers' management team as representing a novel and much more demanding experience. Members were to attend not as departmental reps but as members of a body created to aid the management of the authority as a whole. (Haynes 1980, 57)

Such references suggest that the corporate approach required a massive attitude change, or a shift in the organizational culture of the municipality, to support the new structures. Presumably, this entailed leadership by corporate-minded individuals, especially by the CAO who was to embody the corporate approach more than anyone. That is, the CAO's was the only new position created by the reorganisation.

In their work for the City of London, Ernst and Whinney refer to this requirement as "generalship":

Corporate management deals with the general, overall position of an organization. The term "general" is used here to mean that management at this level deals with details only to the extent as it is necessary to understand the overall situation and that it conceivably neglects details and differences from a total point of view. Corporate management cannot review all details of the organization. The prime pre-requisite for effective corporate management therefore is the presence of generalship, skillful leadership. (1980a, 58, emphasis in original)

While Ernst and Whinney provide authority here for one of the major premises of the thesis, they do not address certain critical practical
questions. What is the content of the leader's "total point of view"? What beliefs and attitudes are entailed by "corporate-mindedness"? How can elected and appointed officials acquire and act upon this corporate outlook to develop a "corporate-minded culture"? The experience of Birmingham as related by Haynes in Chapter 1 gives point to these questions. They also emerge from the writer's personal experience in the City of Burlington.

These experiences show that department heads do not shed what L.J. Sharpe calls their "obsessional professionalism" (attributed by Hambleton 1978, 109), simply on being promoted to CAO, or on being appointed to a SMT. One of the major lessons drawn from the Hinings groups' project was that "It is necessary to train officers and members to enable them to cope with a major change in their management system" (Hinings et al. 1980, 262-70). It was noted earlier that no such training has accompanied the recent wave of appointments of CAOs in Ontario.

Apart from the three corporate structures, the one common element in the assorted references previously made to corporate management is that corporate management is "non-departmental". This is reason enough to speak from this point onward about two classes of municipal administrations: "corporately managed" and "departmentally managed".

Perhaps the easiest way to define corporate management for present purposes would be to describe in detail the structures, procedures, and culture of a municipal administration that is held by informed observers to be corporately managed. Other municipalities/CAOs could then be evaluated comparatively. Unfortunately, no such municipality has been
described in the literature.

LGMP attempted to define the ideal corporate management system absolutely in terms of eight required elements, rather than comparatively (1978c, 11). One of the elements, "The development of appropriate structures," is sufficient to indicate that this approach is inadequate.

In the same document LGMP also provided the following list of questions about the SMT:

I. Who should participate in such a team and who should determine the membership;
II. How decisions are to be reached if consensus is lacking;
III. Whether members retain the right to communicate directly with committees or council, especially where there are differences of opinion on the team;
IV. What responsibilities such a team would carry, and what, if any, formal powers it would have;
V. When the interests of the team (or 'corporate' interests) are different from those of an individual department, to whom does the department head owe his loyalty [sic], and what means are available and appropriate for ensuring that the corporate interests prevail. (p. 39)

Although LGMP did not provide corporate answers to these questions, they are more or less implied for the last three questions. Clues to the corporateness of a municipal organization could lie as well in the recognition of such questions by the CAO, and in the means that may have been used to answer them.

Answering such questions within a municipality entails important judgements of similarities and differences. They require that the common and the corporate elements of departmental operations, be distinguished from those elements unique to each department. One would expect the former to be the continuous focus of management team attention, while the latter would be expected to arise only when they
carried extra-departmental or corporate implications. In addressing legitimate subjects, the members of the SMT would be required to decide what personal competencies are involved, and how to value them.

Are the need for, and the style of, a particular bridge questions of engineering expertise alone? Should they be? The members' answers will determine their roles in the discussion, and the weight that their respective opinions carry in the decision on whether or not the bridge is to be recommended for construction. Such discussions and decisions would be expected to accumulate over time to establish the size and openness of the corporate domain relative to the departmental domains.

The parts played by the department heads on the management team and by the CAO in these discussions and decisions, are also premised in part on perceptions of similarities and differences between the department heads' responsibilities and the CAO's. Should they really share responsibility "for the authority as a whole" with the CAO? If so, exactly how are they to proceed? And again what personal competencies are required?

These questions of similarities and differences are questions of entitlement and power. Getting one's answer accepted by others is a matter of influence, which is to say politics. This means that certain key words used to promote such similarities and differences must be understood primarily in terms of influence.

LGMP's list of questions represents the literature's only meaningful offering on the role and operations of SMTs. The answers to LGMP's questions must implicate the mayor and council. Presumably council and its committees can be analyzed in concert with the SMT, in
the same terms of similarities and differences, and teamwork. No one appears to have done so.

This deficiency may be explained partly by the dominance of policy-administration thinking, which keeps council and staff separated and which keeps "political" narrowly associated with "election". Another factor may be that there is no parallel for municipal councils that comes close to matching the parallel between private sector management teams and municipal SMTs. Also, the policy and resources committees of the "corporate approach" in Britain did not accompany the spread of the CAO in Ontario. For whatever reasons, there is nothing in the literature on the municipal corporate management team construed as the mayor and council and the CAO and department heads.

D. Summary and Conclusion

Despite the inadequacies that some have recognized policy and administration constitute the dominant characterization of the respective roles of councillors and staff in local government. Within the policy-administration framework politicians are differentiated from staff "professional experts" who are "neutral". Within the policy-administration framework policy is associated with "larger issues", which are differentiated from the "day-to-day details" of administration. Finally, the policy-administration role conception is associated with "departmentally" rather than "corporately" managed municipal organizations.

The only research into CAOs roles is based on Loveridge's scale which takes the policy-administration distinction as its primary
premise. No research has been conducted into the work activities of CAOs that would demonstrate—as management research has done for the "classical functions"—the inappropriateness of policy-administration as a CAO role description or prescription.

O'Brien has proposed that the roles of council and staff be defined in terms of expectations. Analysis of the lists of expectations he proposed led to the tentative acceptance of a form of Dearlove's conclusion to the variety problem, namely, that council and staff roles cannot be generalized in terms of expectations. This was taken to mean that expectation setting and maintenance should be done in each organization through a wide range of learning processes and daily activities. In terms of Kotter's agenda-network framework which is discussed in the next chapter, this means that setting expectations should be part of the CAO's ongoing agenda.

There are a few authorities who appreciate that there is necessarily a "political element" in the role of the CAO. "Political element" is the present writer's term for "acting like a politician" or being involved in "conflict resolution", which are essentially Kruger's and Stillman's references to the political role of the CAO. "Political element" means simply, and more generally, that the CAO must influence both councillors and staff to implement his agenda.

The range of possible CAO roles was suggested by some of Kotter's mayoral models. It was also suggested that Kotter's six key challenges and dilemmas can be regarded as role elements.

The first research task that emerges from these considerations is to document the role elements that comprise the subject CAOs'
conceptions of their roles. The most direct way of doing this would appear to be to obtain their reactions to the policy-administration role model. In this connection they can also be asked how councillors differ from staff. The LGMP SMT questions can be used to investigate their roles with respect to their senior managers. Whether or not these questions will yield coherent role descriptions that can be categorized and named must remain an open question.

The second research task is to compare their role conceptions with other aspects of their approaches, primarily with a view to judging the compatibility among them and to identifying larger patterns.

In terms of the dissertation's primary objectives, this chapter has advanced the first objective by supplementing the demonstration in Chapter 1 of the weakness of the structural perspective. In documenting the difficulties of the Loveridge role scale, it has contributed to the second objective of questioning the comparative value of more formal measurement-oriented methods, of investigating leadership style. With respect to the third objective, it has identified a wide range of possible beliefs about the CAO's primary roles.
Notes to Chapter 3

1. The companion form of political symbolism identified by Gusfield is "gestures of cohesion" which "serve to fix the common and consensual aspects of the society as sources of governmental support" ([1963] 1969, 171). See also note (6) to Chapter 1.


3. D'Aquino has recently come to the same conclusion on the parallel question of whether federal public servants' "role in the formulation of public policy amounts in everything but name to making policy decisions" (1984, 17). He concludes that "So many factors and so many players of varying strengths and interests impinge on decisions that it is obviously a matter of degree, and no general answer to the question is possible".

4. Sir John Maud was the chairman of the Maud Committee cited earlier. As Lord Redcliffe-Maud he also served as chairman of the Redcliffe-Maud Committee.
CHAPTER 4

KOTTER'S AGENDA AND NETWORK FRAMEWORK

A. Research Questions, Methods, and Samples

The purpose of this chapter is to add enough detail to previous references to Kotter and Lawrence's study of American mayors (1974) and to Kotter's study of general managers (1982a, 1982b), to allow an appreciation of their agenda setting and network building framework. In this chapter "agendas" and "networks" join "roles" from the previous chapter, as focal dimensions of CAOs' approaches to their jobs. As its third primary objective the dissertation aims to identify the CAOs' agendas and networks and associated thoughts and activities, and the relationships between role perceptions and agendas and networks.

As suggested in previous references, Kotter's work is impressive for both methodological and substantive reasons. It is motivated by good questions and his answers seem to have great potential for improving managers' approaches to their work. The mayors and the general managers are treated as whole people performing demanding jobs in complex environments; they are not reduced to some unnatural "behavior" research construct. Explanation and generalization from systematic observation characterize Kotter's research approach, rather than the measurement of behavior with a view to predicting it.

The "interdisciplinary" conceptual framework strikes one as an original, valid, and useful way of breaking down continuous and interdependent streams of thought and action into manageable pieces for
analytic purposes. The *supporting* "multiple-method" "measurement" apparatus is well matched to the research questions. There is no evidence of the rigid and unreasonable attachment to theory or method which characterizes the style research of Hersey and Blanchard and Blake and Mouton.

It is appropriate here to note that Kotter uses "style" only twice in *The General Managers*, the first time in reference to "a variety of styles" used by the general managers in interacting "with people on various issues" (1982a, 97). The use of questioning, of humor, of praise and of forcefulness, are given as examples. This use of style to refer to characteristic ways of behaving toward others is compatible with the non-measured treatments cited in Chapter 1. Kotter's second use of style occurs in a modest claim that, while his small sample cannot anchor "definitive statements about managerial behavior", his evidence can disconfirm [the] popular . . . supposition that all effective managers use essentially the same 'style' . . . [and] the popular opposite proposition . . . that effective managerial behavior is entirely situation-specific and that no meaningful generalizations are possible. . . . (p.120)

This is evidently a reference to formulations such as Situational Leadership and the Managerial Grid, although Kotter's bibliography contains no references by the authors of such formulations. Kotter's position on the nature of style and on its interaction with the situation, appears to be compatible with the position conveyed by Smith's map in Chapter 1.

Kotter and Lawrence's research interests in mayors were presented in Chapter 1. Of his purposes in *The General Managers* Kotter writes that
proving theories was not the purpose of this investigation. The chief objective was to generate tentative answers and generalizations about important issues. The methodological philosophy employed here is consistent with a tradition of work which seeks to focus in a holistic, dynamic, and exploratory way on some phenomena. (1982a, 196)

Consistent with their exploratory nature the research designs of the two works were not rigidly fixed prior to the collection of data; rather, they were adapted in response to unforeseen difficulties and opportunities, and to new information and judgments of comparative value.

1. Mayors in Action

As noted earlier Kotter's approach to the study of effective managers, and the conceptual framework he employs to explain their behavior, were first developed in his study, with Lawrence, of twenty U.S. mayors who held power in moderate-sized cities in the 1960s. The authors spend a considerable amount of time explaining the evolution of their research design, which changed several times during the field work phase in response to unanticipated problems and results (p.4ff.). These changes involved trade-offs between "usefulness" and "innovativeness" and "methodological cleanness".

Their study began as a two-phase comparative study; similarities and differences found among a small number of mayors in the first phase, were to be explored or "tested" among a larger number of mayors in the second phase. Time and resources dictated a sample of six mayors in phase one. For each mayor, who was to be interviewed for four hours, twelve people who were highly informed about the mayor were each to be interviewed for ninety minutes (pp.5-6). Eight
ational "experts" rated the changes in the "health" of 43 candidate
cities under the administrations of 48 mayors. (The candidate
cities were selected on the basis of size and for having had a mayor in
power for at least four years between 1960 and 1970.) Mayors from
Atlanta, Cleveland, Dallas, Kansas City, New Haven and New Orleans were
selected for phase one.

The application of three measures of effectiveness—the
"experts'" ratings, the mayor's record at the polls, and the
interviewees' impressions of the mayor's successes and failures—
identified three mayors as effective and three as ineffective. By a
process which the authors describe as "complex", "interactive", and
not following "any simple, reproducible rules", "nine pattern
statements" were formulated to account for the observed
differences in mayoral effectiveness (p.11). Three of the nine
patterns -- agenda setting, network building, and task accomplishing
-- define what the authors later refer to as "a new framework".

In phase two, the nine patterns were tested on fourteen mayors
who were selected from the original list of 43. The clinical
interviewing approach was again taken with the mayors. A "pattern
recognition" questionnaire was developed for use in interviews with
the observers, who were reduced to ten per city from the 20 to 30
actually interviewed in phase one.

Although the pattern questionnaire had been pretested effectively
in one of the six phase one cities, it did not "fit" the first mayor
to be studied in phase two (pp.15-6). Moreover, Kotter and Lawrence
report, it consumed so much time and "annoyed" interviewees,
that other important questions had to be left unasked. As a result, "the strict pattern test" was abandoned in favor of integrating the patterns into the interview guide.

2. The General Managers

The General Managers (1982a) is Kotter’s full report of a study of fifteen general managers from nine private American corporations, the objectives of which were to discover the nature of their jobs, their personal backgrounds, what their jobs involve, and why some are more effective than others. The corporations were chosen from a range of industries which represented "[M]any of the major aspects of the American economy" (p.4). The subjects were chosen to reflect a "diverse pool of corporate settings" for general manager (GM) jobs, and "had to be performing well" in their jobs (p.2). Kotter used the perceptions of others with whom the subjects worked as a major determinant of effective performance.

Over a five year period beginning in 1976, Kotter spent about a month spread over one calendar year with each of his 15 subjects. He collected a vast amount of information on each of his subjects using several methods. The kinds of information collected, and the methods used to collect the information are depicted in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: Data Collection for GMs

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<td>Interviews.</td>
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Key: ** = primary source, * = secondary source; "Others" interviewed included superiors, peers, subordinates, and customers.
Source: Kotter 1982a, 161, Figure A.2

Here is Kotter's statement of the types of questions which "originally guided" his investigation:

- What are general-management jobs really like?
  What demands do they make on the incumbent GM? How much and in what ways do these demands vary in different kinds of GM jobs and in different business and corporate contexts? What creates this variation?

- What type of people tend to be effective in GM jobs?
  How can such people be identified? Why are these people effective in GM jobs? How much and in what ways do the personal characteristics of effective general managers vary in different situations? What causes this variation?

- What exactly do effective general managers do? How do they approach their jobs? What do they do on a daily basis? Why do they behave this way? How much and in what ways does all this vary from situation to situation? What causes these differences? (p.155)

The general similarity between these questions and those that guided the mayors study is noteworthy. Also worthy of note is that, like Blake and Mouton and Hersey and Blanchard, Kotter is interested in defining the
dimensions of effective management, and the factors that contribute to it.

B. **Agenda Setting and Network Building**

1. **The Mayors: Agendas, Networks and Task Accomplishment**

As noted in Chapter 1, Kotter and Lawrence identified, critically reviewed, rated, and rejected, ten "distinctly different and important models of mayoral behavior" which they culled from "the more serious literature" (1974, 19). Kotter and Lawrence then distilled the principal foci of all ten models into a "new framework" for analyzing action and purposive behavior (Ch.3). This new framework is shown in Figure 4-1 modified slightly and inconsequentially from its source. The ten models are readily identifiable.

**Figure 4-1: Kotter and Lawrence's New Framework**

```
City environment

Other contextual variables

Mayor's personality

What to do

Policy Expert
Muddler

Getting and managing resources
Coalition Builder
Power Broker

Doing it:
Public Entrepreneur
Public Executive

Distribution of power in the community

Formal government & structure
definition of mayor's role

Source: Kotter and Lawrence 1974, 44, Fig. 3-2
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The new framework consists of three related behavioral processes and a number of key behavior-influencing elements from the context in which the behavior takes place. The three processes are: (1) deciding what to do, or agenda setting; (2) getting and managing the necessary resources, or network building; and (3) carrying out specific tasks from the agenda, or task accomplishment.

(a) Agenda setting

The various agenda setting processes used by the twenty mayors studied were resolved into four basic patterns arrayed along one continuum, of which the anchoring patterns #1 and #4 are summarized in Figure 4-2. Also shown are the number of mayors in their study who demonstrated each of the patterns.

Figure 4-2: Agenda Setting Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pattern #1</th>
<th>Pattern #4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-run oriented</td>
<td>Middle-and long-run oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual/part oriented</td>
<td>City/wholistic oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Periodic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes &quot;irrationally&quot;</td>
<td>Clearly and logically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unconnected</td>
<td>interconnected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pattern #1---Pattern #2---Pattern #3---Pattern #4
"muddling through" "rational planning"

No. of M: 8 9 3 0
Source: Kotter and Lawrence 1974, 50, Figure 4-1
The Pattern #4 process requires "considerable technical expertise, time, and energy" and a "dynamic and future-oriented" person (p.60), and was associated in their study with a larger domain, "domain" being defined as "the sum of those areas in which the mayor behaves as if he has some responsibility" (pp.61-3).

Especially notable for its confirmation of the criticism of the structural approach in Chapter 1, is Kotter and Lawrence's finding that there was no consistent relationship between the size of the mayor's domain and the form of charter. This finding led them to note that the 'imprecise language' in which charters are written, affords the mayor "considerable latitude in defining his own domain" (p.52); this provides support for the doubt expressed in Chapter 1 about Hickey's faith in setting out the roles of the mayor and the CAO in Provincial statutes. Kotter and Lawrence also found that mayors who used a more "rational" agenda-setting process, had a larger direct impact on their cities; somewhat conversely, Pattern #1 mayors "often help create some long-run problems" (p.64).

(b) Network building

Unlike the agenda-setting processes used by their subjects, the network building and maintenance processes their subjects used could not be represented by one dimension. Rather, they varied significantly (1) by types of cooperative relationships the mayors tried to create, (2) in how actively the mayors tried to reshape their network, and (3) in the kind of staff who were employed in the mayor's office (p.66).
Nine types of relationships were identified and associated with certain prerequisites, advantages and disadvantages (pp. 67-8). It should suffice at this point to list them by name, letting their names carry their meaning. They are listed in Table 4-2, again with the number of mayors who related to their networks "frequently" by each means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Relationship</th>
<th>No. of Mayors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive I -- for</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive II -- against</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-optative</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal I -- reference group appeal</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal II -- friendship appeal</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal III -- charismatic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal/legal</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Column does not add to 20 since some mayors used more than one type of relationship frequently.

The networks of the mayors studied by Kotter and Lawrence served the following five functions:

1. Provided access to financial resources.
2. Provided access to and control over an implementation capacity that could handle the projects his agenda generated.
3. Provided enough support for reelection.
4. Provided access to important power centers that might stand in the way of his agenda items.
5. Provided agenda setting "advice". (p. 84)

Networks can also serve CAOs in the same ways, with the obvious exception of "reelection". There are, however, situations in the work
life of CAOs that may be as critical for them as reelection may be for mayors. For example, the resolving of critical issues at SMT meetings (which may even be decided by a vote) can constitute tests of respect for the CAO. Similarly, the rejection by council of a critical staff recommendation may also have consequences for the CAO that can be likened to those of election defeat for the mayor.

Networks or parts of networks can be created, eliminated, restructured, or reconstituted. Table 4-3 shows the amount and type of "network shaping" done by the twenty study mayors.

Table 4-3: Amount of Network Shaping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Network Shaping</th>
<th>No. of Mayors</th>
<th>Method Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost none</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Some eliminating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mostly reconstituting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Some use of all methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Considerable use of all methods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kotter and Lawrence 1974, 79, Table 5-3

Only two of the mayors studied by Kotter and Lawrence created office staffs which significantly enhanced the mayor's network (pp. 82-3). Four created "some resources of worth," six had a "loyal staff of very limited resources," and eight had no staff or office. The mayor's desire for a "loyal, controllable staff" in the face of much daily uncertainty and lack of control, is presented as the main reason the mayors' offices fell short of their potential.
Kotter and Lawrence found that the stronger networks were built using more processes more efficiently and effectively, and involved more types of relationships; furthermore, strong network mayors engaged in more network shaping and office building activities than those with weak networks (p.85).

(c) Task Accomplishment

Table 4-4 shows the extent to which the mayors studied used the three task accomplishment processes identified by Kotter and Lawrence.

Table 4-4: Use of Task Accomplishment Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Very Little</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Considerable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kotter and Lawrence 1974, 88, Table 6-1

The bureaucratic process and the entrepreneurial process involve behavior generally associated, respectively, with the Public Executive and Public Entrepreneur models presented in Chapter 1. The individualistic process "relies solely on the mayor's personal time, energy, and resources" (p.87). The mayor who used more processes more often had a greater impact on the situation, the greatest impact flowing from emphasis on bureaucratic and entrepreneurial processes rather than from the individualistic process (p.100).
(d) **Agenda-Network-Accomplishment Patterns**

Kotter and Lawrence's next step was to combine the different variants of agenda setting, network building, and task accomplishment processes that were identified into intelligible patterns (Ch.7). While the number of possible agenda-network-accomplishment combinations is relatively large, Kotter and Lawrence found that their twenty subjects exhibited the five patterns labelled and summarized in Table 4-5.

(e) **A General Model of Mayoral Behavior**

From the "new framework" shown in Figure 4-1 above and the five patterns identified in the preceding section, Kotter and Lawrence fashioned a general model of mayoral behavior which is summarized in Figure 4-3 (Ch. 8).

The four major contextual variables identified earlier as most affecting the mayor's behavior--the formal structure of the city, government and the mayor's role in it, the distribution of power in the community, the city itself, and the mayor's own personality (p.44)--are combined and refined to appear in Figure 4-3 as The Mayor, The Agenda, The Network, and The City.

(f) **Coalignment Theory and Action**

The objectives of the final two steps in Kotter and Lawrence's analysis of their twenty mayors were to understand why the particular patterns they found emerged, and to rate the performance of each mayor-pattern combination. The concept of "coalignment" is integral to these
Table 4-5: Five Types of Mayors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ceremonial</th>
<th>Caretaker</th>
<th>Personality/Individualist</th>
<th>Public Executive</th>
<th>Program Entrepreneur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda Setting</td>
<td>#1 muddler</td>
<td>#1 muddler</td>
<td>Personal appeal</td>
<td>Utilitarian,</td>
<td>All types extensively,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>most purposive</td>
<td>personal,</td>
<td>especially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and all</td>
<td>purposive appeal;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>others,in some</td>
<td>some shaping;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>degree; a little</td>
<td>some staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shaping; some</td>
<td>has important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>staff.</td>
<td>staff resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Building</td>
<td>Uses personal appeal; does not try to shape network; no staff or office</td>
<td>Utilitarian and personal appeal; limited network modification; loyal staff of limited abilities.</td>
<td>Personal appeal most purposive some; not much network shaping; no staff.</td>
<td>Utilitarian, purposive, personal, and all others in some degree; a little shaping; some staff.</td>
<td>All types extensively, especially purposive appeal; some shaping; has important staff resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Accomplishing</td>
<td>Primarily individualistic.</td>
<td>Moderate use of bureaucratic and individualistic.</td>
<td>Individualistic process mostly, other two occasionally.</td>
<td>Heavy bureaucratic, moderate, individualistic, limited entrepreneurial</td>
<td>Much entrepreneurial, considerable bureaucratic, some individualistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Mayors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One mayor was classified as both "Executive" and "Entrepreneur".

Source: Compiled from Kotter and Lawrence 1974, Ch. 7.
final steps.

Kotter and Lawrence "borrowed the term 'coalignment'" (pp.213-4) from James Thompson's Organization in Action. There it is referred to as "the central function of administration", and is defined for an organization as finding and manipulating the strategic variables "in such a way that interaction with other elements will result in a viable coalignment". Kotter and Lawrence generalize their own model of mayoral behavior in coalignment terms as follows:

That which most people would describe as successful administration is a behavioral pattern of a particular set of processes that is feasible and stable in the short run; this set of processes, moreover, has a desired impact on a number of key variables, serving to create or maintain a simultaneous alignment among those variables. (p.215)

In addition to its usefulness in explaining their mayoral data, and in making sense of their own administrative experience, this coalignment model is seen as better than other administrative models in three ways: "it avoids simple cause-and-effect dynamics, it focuses on both structure and process, and it does not rely on such mystical forces as those which produce 'equilibrium'" (p.216).

In the general case, mayoral coalignment behavior consisted of:

* using some pattern of behavior in the three mayoral processes
* within a system of short-run constraints
* to produce impacts on the four contextual variables
* which will either move the system toward or maintain it near
* a state in which all six relationships among the contextual variables are aligned. (pp.175-6)

Kotter and Lawrence explain that coalignment behavior is driven by "predominant needs, drives, aspirations, or values related to 'making something work'", and that all twenty mayors "exhibited coalignment
behavior almost all the time" (pp.176-7).

Figure 4-3: Summary of Kotter and Lawrence's Model of Mayoral Behavior

- The Mayor
  - Mayor's cognitive skills
  - Mayor's interpersonal skills
  - Mayor's needs and drives
  - Mayor's values and aspirations
- The Agenda
  - The short-, medium-, and long-run tasks the mayor is currently planning to undertake, specified in as much detail as possible
- Resources (and constraints)
- Agenda-setting process
- Task accomplishment process
- Mayor's behavior pattern
- Resources (and constraints)
- The Network
  - Subcultural traits of the various members of the mayor's network
  - Members' relationship to the mayor (type and strength) both formally (charter) and informally
  - Resources members command
  - Members' expectations of the mayor
- The City
  - Current nature of City's interdependent subsystems—health care, transportation, public safety, economics, education, etc.
  - Size, rate of change, and homogeneity of subsystems
  - Mayor's domain—a subpart of the variable defined as area in which the mayor is trying to have an impact

Key: Short-run dynamics (△)
Longer-run relationships (→→→)

Source: Kotter and Lawrence 1974, 142, Figure 8-8
However, their coalignment efforts yielded varying degrees of success. Kotter and Lawrence depict this variation by arraying the 20 mayors by name along a coalignment continuum the ends of which are labeled "large multiple nonalignments" and "complete coalignment" (Fig. 8-7, p.140). The mayors election records are also shown in the same figure: those mayors who approached complete coalignment tended to retire after several terms in office, while those toward the multiple nonalignment end of the continuum tended to retire or to be defeated after only one term; two of the latter went to jail, presumably during or following their first terms.

In Figure 4-4 the mayors are arrayed along the coalignment continuum by the patterns of their approaches to the job, rather than by their names as they are in the figures from which Figure 4-4 is taken. It should be noted that the Public Executive and Program Entrepreneur patterns tend to be more successful at coalignment than the others. Although Kotter and Lawrence do not make this point at this time, these two patterns emerge later as their favorites.

In trying to explain why the coalignment behavior of some mayors studied was successful while for others it was unsuccessful, Kotter and Lawrence first consider and then dismiss personal skill as an explanation (p.180). They note that "coalignment skill" was usually a prerequisite for the jobs that preceded their elections to the mayor's office.
Figure 4-4: Coalignment Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor's Pattern</th>
<th>Coalignment Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete Coalignment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Program Entrepreneur
- Program Entrepreneur
- Public Executive, Ceremonial, Personality/Individualist
- Public Executive-Program Entrepreneur, Program Entrepreneur
- Ceremonial, Public Executive
- Public Executive, Personality/Individualist
- Ceremonial, Public Executive, Caretaker
- Caretaker, Ceremonial Personality/Individualist, Caretaker
- Caretaker, Caretaker

Large Multiple Nonalignments

Source: Adapted from Kotter and Lawrence 1974, Figure 8-7, p.140

The first explanation for unsuccessful coalignment behavior indicated by their data is that the election process elected mayors who began their terms with major contextual variables out of alignment. For example, mayors who were incapable of carrying out their agendas, or who did not understand their cities, or whose agendas were insensitive to the state of the city. Natural changes in the city and its population constitute the second explanation for unsuccessful coalignment behavior. Such shifts can include the arrival or departure of important individuals or groups, or their movement within the city. These shifts can lead to serious mayor-network, or mayor-city, nonalignment.
Kotter and Lawrence's analysis of the emergence of the five overall behavior patterns (Ch. 11) leads them to the conclusion that pattern emergence is a complex and non-deterministic process, which can be explained after the fact but cannot be predicted (p.189). They do, however, propose a number of "rules of thumb" which are based on "clear and straightforward" relationships. For example, the agendas of Ceremonial mayors are narrowest in scope; those of Program Entrepreneurs are the broadest (p.190). Another example is that city manager charters governed all Ceremonial and most Personality/Individualist mayors, while all Caretaker mayors and most Executive mayors operated under strong mayor charters; Program Entrepreneurs had "no apparent relationship to the city charter" (p.193). These findings that organizational structure was associated with no one particular mayoral style speak directly to the structuralists of Chapter 1. Also, despite Kotter and Lawrence's disclaimer presented in the next two paragraphs about the ranking of effectiveness, they do seem to be most impressed with Program Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship becomes a critical concept later in this chapter.

It was Kotter and Lawrence's intention at the outset of their study to evaluate and rank each mayor's performance in terms of positive and negative impacts upon his city (p.201). However, by the end of the second phase of the fieldwork, they had concluded "that talking about the 'good' or 'effective' or 'best' type of mayor was misleading and not useful" (p.202). In Chapter 12, they present the reasons for this conclusion.
These are varied and include, first, the unavailability of certain types of data, and questions about the validity and reliability of certain statistical data that they had collected. Second, and more importantly, they cited the lack of an urban model which could 'more than crudely approximate' the complexity of cities as open systems (p.206). Thirdly, they noted the absence of a cultural consensus on the relative value of central mayoral achievements in fields such as racial equality, crime, jobs, and health care (p.205); and it appears that they were too modest to impose their own valuations on their subject mayors.

So in lieu of an overall effectiveness ranking for each mayor Kotter and Lawrence offer two "Impact Generalizations" (pp.208-22). The first is that different patterns are associated with different overall impacts in scope and direction; the smallest positive impacts are associated with the Ceremonial pattern, while the Program Entrepreneur anchors the other end of an 'impact continuum', as it were. The second is that the more successful the mayor is at coalignment: "the more efficiently and effectively he will move in some direction", "the more those around him will feel he is doing a 'good' job", and "the more the situation will seem 'right' to most people".

(g) Summary

In their study of mayors Kotter and Lawrence offer an original and elaborate way of breaking down many interdependent activities which take place in a complex environment, and of using systematic information to identify coherent patterns of action that seem both plausible and useful in explaining the successes and failures of mayoral regimes.
The present writer could find no instance of consequence in which the substitution of "CAO" for "mayor" renders the analysis invalid or misleading. This is to suggest that the agenda-network approach can be applied as well to CAOs, and to senior executives in general. It is also to suggest that "elected" is the only sense of "political" that gives meaning to the use of "political" in distinguishing between the mayor's role and that of the CAO. "Political" used in this sense is a relatively trivial observation that does not take one very far. The observation being advanced here is that the approaches of all mayors and CAOs to their respective jobs are more or less political in the sense advanced earlier of exercising power to influence the allocation of tangible and intangible resources.

Although "coalignment" is presented as a "theory", it strikes the present writer as a synonym more or less for "consistency" or "compatibility". In explaining the success or failure of a regime or a project one tries to identify key variables, and consistencies and inconsistencies among them. Kotter and Lawrence's point that one cannot predict such successes and failures is well taken. However, one can try to identify major inconsistencies with failure potential and attempt to remedy them.

Such diagnostic attempts are of course deliberate. This leads to the observation that the emphasis in Kotter and Lawrence's analysis of mayoral behavior is on the conscious and analytic elements of their approaches. It is perhaps most evident in their preference for more "rational" approaches to agenda setting, and in their separate recognition of task accomplishment. The most obvious difference in
Kotter's application of the agenda-network framework to the general managers study is his accommodation of the unconscious and the intuitive elements of the GMs approaches. Not only is the unconscious/intuitive component of the GM's approach given more credit, but also the categories that are used to make sense of this approach are less analytically deterministic.

2. The General Managers: Agendas and Networks

The general methodological position and conceptual framework underlying Kotter's GMs study are fundamentally similar to those of the mayors study. As noted above however, there are important differences. The major differences in the agenda-network framework must be discovered by the reader. Kotter merely acknowledges the mayors study in a footnote, and makes no attempt to explain any modifications or to justify its use. Having discovered the differences on his own the reader must then form his own explanations for them, often having to be content with a large degree of conjecture.

(a) Networks

Kotter and Lawrence treated task accomplishment with the mayors as analytically distinct from agenda setting and network building. However, for the GMs Kotter reports that once the GMs established their agendas and networks during their first year or so on the job, the GMs' networks implemented their agendas more or less automatically most of the time. Thus, he writes that:
The GMs in this study, and especially the better-performing ones, did not waste time and energy intervening where it wasn't really necessary; they gave people who were capable of doing a good job the authority to do just that. They actively involved themselves in execution only when they felt something on their agenda would not be accomplished without their aid. (p. 73)

From his further comments on such "intervention" one is led to conclude that maintaining the network was for his GMs a "standing agenda item", as it were, of very high priority:

[They chose execution strategies with an eye on achieving multiple objectives in their agendas at a minimum cost to their networks. (Probably the single most common reason that the GMs rejected staff [or consulting] advice was because they felt it would cost more in terms of strained relationships in their networks than it was worth in light of their agendas.)

Having approached people, the GMs often influenced them simply by asking or suggesting that they do something, knowing that because of their relationship with the person he or she would comply. In some cases, depending on the issue involved and nature of the relationship, they also used their knowledge and information to help persuade these people. Under other circumstances, they would sometimes use the resources available to them to negotiate a trade. And occasionally they would even resort to intimidation and coercion. . . . (pp. 73-4)

In this excerpt one can detect the complete range of types of network relationships that Kotter and Lawrence listed by name in the mayors study. However, in the GMs study there is no mention of such labels as "utilitarian" and "coercive", although these labels would clearly apply to the GMs' networks. Gone too are the dimensions of the intensity of reshaping activity, and the kind of office staff.

The GMs' networks of cooperative relations included "hundreds or thousands" of "subordinates, subordinates of subordinates, bosses, peers, and outsiders such as customers, suppliers, the press, and bankers"; relations with insiders did not respect
the "formal structure" of the organization and included "very strong ties" to certain subordinates (p.72).

In building their networks the GMs focussed on people they "felt dependent upon" (pp.67-72). They made others "feel obliged to them" or "feel dependent on them", for example, by doing small favors for them; they encouraged others "to identify with them" through personal example; they replaced or removed "incompetent subordinates"; they shaped the environment using both "formal management tools" and "more informal methods". Notably, Kotter writes:

Although all the GMs used [a variety of face-to-face] methods, virtually none talked about them [either because] they simply were not aware of how they built and maintained relationships [or because] they had learned that it was better not to talk about such things. (p.70)

The GMs' lack of awareness of their own influence techniques is the foundation for Kotter's critical distinction between the conscious/analytic and unconscious/intuitive elements of their managerial approaches. This distinction is so fundamental that it seems to account ultimately for the differences noted above, and pursued further below, between Kotter and Lawrence's "rational patterns" explanations of mayoral approaches and Kotter's explanations of general management approaches.

Kotter's following discussion of the indirect methods used by GMs to influence people to act on their agendas, illustrates both his personal powers of observation, and the complexities and subtleties of management that defy the quantification that is for many management researchers the sine qua non of behavioral science. "Indirect" refers first to exercising influence on a third party, as when the GM's network
influences people outside of the network. "Indirect" also refers to the meaning conveyed by the circumstances and media used to convey the direct or instrumental message. In this respect Kotter appears to share Edelman's appreciation of the symbolic.

Meetings set up by the GM are one example of a "staged event" in which the GM influences "others through the selection of participants, the choice of an agenda, and often by his own participation" (p.74). Meetings are also listed with "architecture, language, stories about the organization, time, and space as symbols [used] to communicate messages indirectly" (p.74).

Kaplan and Mazique use the metaphor of international trade to analyze managerial networks (1983). In their analysis they concentrate on bilateral relationships, and draw support from Kotter's work from time to time. They begin with the premise that managers must "cultivate" and "keep growing" trading networks because they "literally can't get their jobs done without them" (p.4).

They refer to reciprocity as the first principle of trade (p.5), to the necessity for diplomatic skill (p.12), and to trade barriers (p.16). To illustrate their point that "some managers don't have an instinctive appreciation of [reciprocity]" (p.8), they cite an accounting manager who was "diagnosed" at a management training program as ambitiously pursuing his own agenda to the exclusion of others' agendas: "He learned that to reduce the threat to others and to build connections, he needed to invest in other people's agendas" (p.8).

The implementation of this lesson raises the question of the limits of self-consciousness. It also touches upon the issues of the limits
and conditions of personal change.

On the reciprocity principle Kaplan and Mazique also caution that:

Giving is always, at some level, self-interested, done to
tuck away an expectation of later return or in order to reap
a psychic reward. None of this is objectionable or
counterproductive, although it can slip into manipulation
... When the psychic or social satisfactions one offers
are self-serving and insincere, the attempt at giving
backfires. (p. 8)

This suggests the potentially close proximity between perceptions of
self-consciousness and perceptions of manipulation.

(b) Agendas

Another difference between the two studies that parallels the
elimination of task accomplishment and the treatment of network
building, is that Kotter does not explain GMs' agenda setting styles
in terms of the pattern #1-to-#4 muddling-to-rational continuum he and
Lawrence used for the mayors.

The GMs' agendas were comprised of "loosely connected vague
and specific goals and plans" covering a "broad range of business
issues", and addressing short-to-long run responsibilities; they were
"largely unwritten" and "related to but different from" (and often at
variance with), the organization's "formal written plans" (p. 66). A
typical GM's agenda is shown in Table 4-6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Business (Product/Market)</th>
<th>Organizational (People)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LONG-RUN</strong> (5-20 YEARS)</td>
<td>Usually contains only a vague notion of revenues or ROI desired in ten or twenty years.</td>
<td>Usually only a vague notion of what kind of business (products and markets) the GM wants to develop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM-RUN</strong> (1-5 YEARS)</td>
<td>Typically includes a fairly specific set of goals and plans for growing the business, such as: see that three new products are introduced before 1981.</td>
<td>Typically includes some goals for sales and income and ROI for the next five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHORT-RUN</strong> (0-12 MONTHS)</td>
<td>Typically includes a very detailed list of financial objectives for the quarter and the year in all financial areas; sales, expenses, income, ROI, etc.</td>
<td>Usually includes a set of general objectives and plans aimed at such things as: the market share for various products.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kotter 1982, Figure 4.1, p.62
In Kotter's words, the GMs created their agendas by:

- aggressively gathering information (mostly from people with whom they already had relationships)
- asking these people questions on a continuous basis (not just in formal planning meetings)
- using their current knowledge of the business and organization (and management in general) to help guide the questioning
- making choices through conscious/analysis and through unconscious/intuitive processes (especially the latter)
- looking for specific programs, projects, and activities that could help accomplish multiple objectives at once, and that they had the power to implement
- doing the above in a continuous and incremental manner that is most time consuming during the first six to twelve months in a GM job. (p.66)

From a methodological perspective the points that stand out in this list are the recognition, again, of the important role played by "unconscious/intuitive processes", and of the "continuous and incremental" nature of GMs activities.

There is no straightforward correspondence between these elements of the GMs' agenda setting process and the elements of any one of the four "Patterns" used for the mayors. For example, the "continuous and incremental" aspects of the GM process corresponds to the mayor's "muddling through" Pattern #1, which is short-run oriented; further, the mayors' "rational planning" Pattern #4 consists of "periodic" rather than "continuous" activity, and is middle- and long-run oriented, so it does not match the GMs' either.

It has been allowed above that Kotter and Lawrence may simply not have appreciated the role of the unconscious/intuitive processes when they studied mayors; that Kotter learned this afterward. Similarly, it is possible that Kotter and Lawrence did not appreciate the mayors' daily activity patterns, in part because they did not directly observe
the mayors at their jobs. Rather, they reconstructed the mayors' activities in terms of agendas, networks, and task accomplishment, from the recollections of a variety of observers after the mayors had left office. Perhaps the fact that recollecting is a conscious activity the results of which must be discontinuous and selective, accounts for the conscious/analytic cast of the agenda, network, and task dimensions in the mayors study. This is another factor that may account for Kotter's less categorical treatments of task accomplishment, network building, and agenda setting in the GMs study.

While much of the information that went into the agendas of Kotter's general managers came from personal contacts with others, the agendas themselves may have been set individually and privately. It may also be observed that one's agenda need not be known by others in more than narrow, fragmented, and short-term detail, in order for them to assist in accomplishing it.

Network building and maintenance appear to differ in certain important respects from agenda setting. While one might plan many of one's networking activities privately, carrying them off effectively is entirely a "public" affair, as it were. Effective relationships between a manager and his contacts require that the latter feel comfortable with the manager's style and purposes. None of Kotter's managers had a naturally self-conscious style. As a previous excerpt indicates, they were also disinclined to raise to consciousness their ways of relating to others.

There would appear then, to be a limit to self-consciousness in personal contacts with others. Near the limit one would expect to
encounter suspicion and mistrust. One might expect this reaction to
greet the manager who has, say, suddenly "found the time" to "Manage By
Wandering Around", but who is basically uncomfortable away from his
office.

(c) **Similarities and Differences**

Kotter seems as concerned to identify the similarities (Ch.4) and
differences (Ch.5) in the approaches of his subject GMS as he and
Lawrence were for their mayors. In keeping with the previous
observation regarding Kotter's less categorical analytic approach, his
explanations of the GMS' similarities and differences seem much more
fluid and specific. To illustrate these points the "Twelve Visible
Patterns" of daily time usage which were common to all of the GMS are
listed in Table 4-7.

It is worth noting that this pattern of time usage is essentially
the same as the generalized activity summary composed by McCaull et al.
from the studies of others and cited in Chapter 1. Secondly the GMS'
common daily activities do not divide in any obvious way into agenda
setting and network building; this is simply a reminder that these are
analytic categories. Thirdly, it seems worth emphasizing here the
predominance of talk in reactive and disjointed conversations. And
fourthly "joking [and] kidding" deserve comment.

In his longitudinal studies of people who are successful in doing
what they set out to do, and of effective organizations, Campbell has
been struck by the important role played by a sense of humor (1983). He
has noticed that humor and creativity tend to go together; He confesses
to being

embarrassed as a psychologist that I cannot point out studies
that say "This is the value of a sense of humor..." We just
haven't done that kind of research yet in psychology. But I
spend so much time in organizations where I see the value of
humor, that I have become a real believer in the value of a
sense of humor. Now I cannot tell you how to develop it. I
don't know of any training programs that will help you
develop a sense of humor.

Perhaps this can be used to reinforce a previous point. It seems
doubtful that the humor of written material or of a situation can be
formalized for training purposes; the humor is likely to be host in the
attempt to formalize.

Table 4-7: Twelve Visible Patterns of Time Usage

1. They spent most of their time with others.
2. The people they spent time with included many in
   addition to their direct subordinates and bosses.
3. The breadth of topics they covered in discussions
   with these people was extremely wide.
4. In these conversations, the GMS typically asked a
   lot of questions.
5. In these conversations, the GMS rarely seemed to
   make "big" decisions.
6. These discussions typically contained a
   considerable amount of joking, kidding, and
   nonwork-related issues.
7. In not a small number of these encounters, the
   substantive issue involved was relatively
   unimportant to the business or organization.
8. In these encounters, the GMS rarely gave "orders"
   in a traditional sense.
9. Nevertheless, the GMS frequently engaged in
   attempts to influence others.
10. In allocating their time with others, the GMS
    often behaved in a "reactive" mode.
11. Most of their time with others was spent in short
    and disjointed conversations.
12. They worked long hours.

Source: Kotter 1982a, 79-81
Reflected in the twelve common uses of time are the following common personal characteristics that Kotter noted earlier in his book: a liking for power and achievement, ambition, emotional stability, optimism, intelligent but not brilliant, moderately strong analytically, intuitively strong, good at relating co-operatively to a broad range of people within their firms and their industries, very knowledgeable about their businesses and their organizations (1982a, Fig.3.1, p.36).

Kotter discusses differences very briefly "in terms of four broad dimensions: (1) with whom [if anybody] they interacted; (2) on what issues; (3) for how long; and (4) and how" (p.96). His general explanation for these differences is a complex causál chain of "the same set of forces" which produced the similarities:

That is, differences in behavior were shaped initially by differences in job demands and differences in the personal characteristics of the GMs. Differences in job demands were in turn influenced by differences in job type, in the organizations involved, and the businesses involved (which were in turn shaped by the differences in the histories of those organizations and industries.... (pp.97-8)

Kotter's most telling overall conclusion is the brief and pointed one that general managers "probably must adopt an approach somewhat like that of [his] GMs... or fail"(p.76).

C. The Effective CAO as Public Entrepreneur

It is clear that of their five types of mayors Kotter and Lawrence were more impressed with the eight mayors whom they termed "Public Executives" and "Program Entrepreneurs", and were most impressed with the latter. One may speculate that if Kotter had been disposed to attach a name to the common elements of the approaches of his GMs,
"entrepreneur" would have been part of it. "Entrepreneurial" was in the
mayors study also the name of one of three task accomplishment
processes, the other two being "individualistic" and "bureaucratic".

Kotter and Lawrence did not define "executive", "entrepreneur/
entrepreneurial" and "bureaucratic" in any detail; rather, they assumed
the broad senses of these terms that were implied in the source models
of mayoral behavior. Thus the most distinguishing feature of the
"Public Executive" and the "Program Entrepreneur" appears to have been
the association of the words "executive" and "entrepreneur" with the
private sector. Just as "City Manager" and "policy-administration" were
uncritically associated with the private sector in an earlier period, so
the "private sector entrepreneur" has become the current positive
association. That there are effective and ineffective private sector
executives and private sector entrepreneurs appears not to have been
considered.

This uniformly favorable impression of the generically defined
private entrepreneur began to attain its current popularity in the years
following the municipal tax protest of the late 1970s now-symbolized by
" Proposition 13". It is associated with a multi-national movement to
"privatize" public services at all levels of government. Symptomatic of
this movement is the ICMA's recent collection of articles entitled
The Entrepreneur in Local Government (Moore 1983). The following
excerpt from the "Foreword", which was written by Mark Keane, ICMA's
then Executive Director, summarizes what is characterized as "this new
way of thinking":

Responding to fiscal and other pressures, local government managers are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial—making public services pay for themselves, seeking new sources of revenue, applying marketing and other profit-oriented techniques to public services, and generally looking beyond the traditional boundaries of their jobs to create and take advantage of new opportunities. (n.p.)

Fortunately this superficial sense of entrepreneurial is not the only one to be found among the constituent articles, although their quality is mediocre on average.

Gaebler, one of the volume’s contributing city managers, associates the origin of the need for the entrepreneurial local government manager with a recent shift in public attitudes (pp.3-4). In this shift, which he suggests was signalled by Proposition 13, an increasing number of “individual voters” have withdrawn their support for services designed to meet “mass needs”. Tewes, who is also a municipal manager, agrees with this analysis, citing the “increasing movement toward individualism and concern for particular, rather than community interests (p.16, emphasis his).”

For Gaebler “The key . . . to becoming entrepreneurial lies with redefining the role of local government” (p.7, emphasis his). In his view “providing services” should be replaced as a definition by:

provid[ing] a forum for determining community consensus, for identifying the needs and the desires of citizens, and for actively matching those needs with all available community resources, not just governmental resources and tax dollars. Local government is a forum where citizens can state their needs and where the manager helps to broker the community’s resources to satisfy those needs. (p.7)

He goes on to urge the entrepreneurial manager to “Be a catalyst, be a broker, but don’t be a doer”, a “doer” being a direct service provider. Tewes stresses (p.17) that “Although privatizing local services is one
option, entrepreneurial thinking means more than just contracting out or relying more on user charges. Unfortunately, he does not provide other illustrations of entrepreneurial thinking to support his contention.

A number of contributors present lists of traits by which the entrepreneurial manager and the entrepreneurial organization can be identified. Gaebler's entrepreneurial manager is characterized by the following seven traits:

1. They are goal oriented, not task oriented.
2. Entrepreneurs are flexible.
3. They constantly challenge what is and question what could be.
4. Entrepreneurs are future oriented.
5. Entrepreneurs are risk-takers, not with crazy projects, but with calculated risks.
6. Entrepreneurs are profit- or bottom-line oriented. They care at least as much about increasing revenues as they do about controlling costs.
7. Entrepreneurs have a sense of ownership; they are owners, not bureaucrats. (p.4, emphasis in original)

Unfortunately, Gaebler's impressionistic trait-listing approach to entrepreneurs has little potential for identifying them exclusively, or for guiding the development of would-be entrepreneurs. His identifying distinctions—e.g., between "goal" and "task" orientation, "flexibility", "future-oriented", etc.—are not set out clearly enough either to evaluate or to apply.

Perhaps the most impressive contribution to the ICMA volume is the report of Kanter's study of 165 effective middle managers in the organizational contexts of the five major private companies for which they worked ([1982] 1983). Her objectives were to "determine managers' contributions to a company's overall success as well as the conditions that stimulate innovation" (pp.24-5). "Innovativeness"
appears to be Kanter's equivalent of "entrepreneurship".

Her research method was to interview each of her 165 subjects for two hours on all aspects of what they identified as their single most significant accomplishment (project) over the previous two years (p.22). This retrospective approach is similar to the mayor's study and seems to have contributed to a similar emphasis on the conscious and categorical. This is evident in the following shared characteristics attributed to the middle managers studied:

1. **Comfort with change.** They are confident that uncertainties will be clarified. They also have foresight and see unmet needs as opportunities.

2. **Clarity of direction.** They select projects carefully and, with their long time horizons, view setbacks as temporary blips in an otherwise straight path to a goal.

3. **Thoroughness.** They prepare well for meetings and are professional in making their presentations. They have insight into organizational politics and a sense of whose support can help them at various junctures.

4. **Participative management style.** They encourage subordinates . . . to be part of the team, promise them a share of the rewards, and deliver on their promises.

5. **Persuasiveness, persistence, and discretion.** They understand that they cannot achieve their ends overnight, so they persevere—using tact—until they do. (p.23, emphasis in original)

Kanter adds that the managers she studied "usually work under top managers who consciously incorporate conditions facilitating innovation and achievement" (p.23, emphasis added).

Kanter’s traits are better described than Gaebler's traits and they compare favorably in content with some of the common personal characteristics that Kotter attributed to his GMs. That is, being confident that uncertainties will be clarified suggests "optimism", similarly "persuasiveness" and "a participative management style" seem to apply to Kotter's GMs although they do not correspond directly to his
identified personal characteristics.

Although one is aware that Kanter's traits are supported by a mass of interview evidence, none of this evidence is presented to support any particular trait. Such evidence would be helpful in determining the extent to which it may have been colored by the subjects' memories. This factor would seem to be particularly apropos to the attribution of "long time horizons" and "foresight". Its importance lies in the use in this dissertation of interviews and questionnaires to gather information from CAOs, much of which pertains to past events and which is not corroborated by other observers or evidence.

Kanter identifies in a way that parallels Kotter and Lawrence's agenda-network-task accomplishment, three phases through which a "prototypical innovation" moves: project definition, coalition building, and action (p.28). Successful innovators employ the following "participative-collaborative management style":

1. Participating more than ordering, though managers sometimes use pressure as a last resort.
2. Building a team, which entails among other things frequent staff meetings and considerable sharing of information.
3. Seeking inputs from others—that is, asking for ideas about users' needs, soliciting suggestions from subordinates, welcoming peer review, and so forth.
4. Acknowledging others' stake or potential stake in the project—in other words, being politically sensitive.
5. Sharing rewards and recognition willingly. (p.34)

Kanter reports that entrepreneurial companies have "cultures that encourage collaboration and teamwork", and have "complex structures that link people in multiple ways and help them go beyond the confines of their defined jobs to do 'what needs to be done'" (p.35). In these organizations information flows freely, and there is "[f]requent and
smooth cross-functional contact, a tradition of working in teams... and emphasis on lateral rather than vertical relationships as a source of resources, information and support" (p.39).

Despite the earlier question about Kanter's evidence, her account of the innovative manager-organization is generally agreeable. Especially agreeable is her recognition of "organizational politics" and the need for "political sensitivity" defined as appreciating others' "stakes".

This recognition of organizational politics is also shared by Lewis whose focus of attention is three prominent American civil servants—Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar Hoover, and Robert Moses—and the bureaucracies in which they worked ([1980] 1984). These three individuals are examples of what Lewis terms the "public entrepreneur", which he defines "as a person who creates or profoundly elaborates a public organization so as to alter greatly the existing pattern of allocation of scarce public resources" (p.9).

Lewis' study is important here as a challenge to the prevailing policy-administration notion of Chapter 3 in which administrators were characterized as neutral professionals whose recommendations are based solely on the expert interpretation of technical considerations. Lewis compares this notion in one place with a belief in the tooth fairy:

Nuclear propulsion for naval vessels was a non-political question for Rickover and his allies; no Republican or Democratic element was obviously connected. Yet to describe Rickover's manipulation of congress, the Navy and the AEC as 'non-political' is worse than believing in the tooth fairy. (p.19)

Lewis analyzed each of his three subjects in terms of the
"structural conditions conducive" to their emergence, and of their "natural histor[ies]". These terms are not compatible with this dissertation for reasons discussed in the next chapter. However, two characteristics of Lewis' public entrepreneurs are relevant. The first is their ability to make their own personal goals the goals of the organization. The second is their "capacity to recognize and employ the apolitical shield", in other words, to make political actions appear apolitical, as if they are merely those of 'a hardworking professional doing his duty' (p.19)

D. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has shown how Kotter and Lawrence answered their research questions, which were presented in Chapter 1, and how Kotter adapted the mayors' questions and conceptual framework to study effective general managers. It has also presented the idea of the public entrepreneur.

The answers to the questions on mayors are, first, that "strong leadership" for the mayor as mayoral behavior that successfully coaligns the six relationships among four major variables--the mayor, the mayor's agenda and network, and the city--in the long run. Second, although no mayor was completely successful at coalignment, the approach that emerged as the best was that of the "Program Entrepreneur".

Kotter and Lawrence provided no clear answer to their third question about the relative importance of the mayor's various roles. Fourth, the Program Entrepreneur's approach worked best regardless of the type of city charter. It seems noteworthy that city manager
charters were associated with two of the least effective approaches. It
seems relevant to wonder how effective the city managers who worked with
these less effective mayors would have emerged, had Kotter and Lawrence
been studying city managers rather than mayors. Finally, the answers to
the "approach" questions indicate an affirmative answer to the fifth
question about the possibility of making "valid generalizations".

The answers to Kotter's three compound questions about GMs are less
categorical. The six key challenges and dilemmas presented in Table 3-1
define the demands upon GMs. Kotter does not give a name to the "type
of people [who] tend to be effective in GM jobs" which was his second
question; he is content to list their personal characteristics. Nor
does he identify their approaches to their jobs--his third question--in
terms of labels. The term "entrepreneurial" seems appropriate based on
comparisons with Kanter's innovators and with Lewis's public
entrepreneurs.

In the mayors study Kotter and Lawrence reflected the symbiotic
relationship between the mayor and his environment explicitly in the
City and Network variables. It is consistent with his overall
presentation that Kotter only implicitly deals with the environment of
the GMs. It should be obvious, however, that the approaches he
describes must be supported by the cultures of their organizations.
Kanter makes this point in these terms. Were it not so awkward to read,
"managers-organizations" would serve as a reminder of this intimate
connection.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the twelve visible patterns
of the GMs' time usage is their informality, meaning their unplanned,
casual, fluid, and relatively unimportant appearance to the observer. These activities seem especially resistant to being formalized for measuring and testing using the instruments and methods of conventional behavioral science. McLeod's Mintzberg-like measurement of the time executives spend on their various activities, which was referred to in Chapter 1, is perhaps the most formal approach possible. It led McLeod to precise executive time expenditure results that are consistent with the impressions Kotter formed from less formal observations of GMs. But, as noted in Chapter 1, McLeod's results led to no meaningful conclusions.

This analysis casts Peters and Waterman's Chapter 1 imperative about 'managing the informal organization' in a new light. Kotter's work suggests a better strategy than thinking of the organization as having distinct formal and informal components, and trying to manage the informal components. This is to manage the organization informally. This is not an easy thing to do. Kotter's GMs were "unconsciously/intuitively" disposed toward informal managerial approaches. Conscious/analytical attempts to be less formal represent something of a contradiction:

It is appropriate to conclude this chapter by referring to a senior manager's personal account of his attempt to manage the transformation of his corporation's "militaristic style of management" to "a more participative approach" (Boyle 1984). In the following excerpt Boyle illustrates both the contradiction between consciously or formally trying to be less formal, and the difficulties of describing (i.e. formalizing) the transformation significant aspects of which were
informal:

Understanding our [i.e. Honeywell's] mistakes is crucial to understanding our story, because some of the mistakes were an integral part of our evolution. In other words, making participation an organic way of working had to come about through an organic process—at least in our organization. Taking a cookbook approach or bringing in executive quick-change artists would not have achieved the same results. On the other hand, I don't believe others must repeat our mistakes to share our central discovery—that the participative process must be managed. (p.74)

In the phrase "Making participation an organic way of working", "making" and "organic" contradict each other. While Boyle rejected a formal "cookbook" approach—"formal" referring to recipes as rules for combining measured ingredients—for his organization, his article must constitute a cookbook of sorts for a reader interested in promoting a similar transformation in his own organization. Finally, Boyle could not convey in his cookbook the unconscious/intuitive elements of his personal approach, which presumably made up so much of the "how" of managing the participative process at Honeywell.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. For ease of reference to both of the major works under discussion in this chapter, "Kotter" will often stand for "Kotter and Lawrence" as well, and "agenda setting and network building framework" will sometimes be shortened to "agenda-network framework".


3. The reasons behind Kotter and Lawrence's decision not to array their subject mayors along a single "effective-ineffective" dimension are paralleled in the organizational effectiveness literature. Steen's 1977 review of 17 models of organizational effectiveness leads to the conclusion that no model seems free enough from conceptual and measurement problems to withstand serious criticism. The strongest agreement appears to be on the most important dimensions of organizational effectiveness, which are adaptability-flexibility, productivity, satisfaction, profitability, and resource acquisition.

The organizational effectiveness literature is also divided on the contribution top executives make to the effectiveness of an organization. Some researchers have contended that large organizations more or less run themselves, with top executives accounting for only a small proportion (e.g., 15%) of the variation in performance, or that top executives are only important in times of rapid growth and crisis (see, e.g., Weiner and Mahoney 1981).
PART II

CHAPTER 5

THE DEVELOPMENT, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT

A. Introduction

This dissertation emerged historically from the writer's involvement in resolving a practical problem in organizational development in the City of Burlington: how to reduce the tensions between Burlington's first CAO and his department heads. Coincidentally, the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association (OMAA) was attempting to document the role of Ontario CAOs and to evaluate the effectiveness of "the CAO system"—two practical tasks of great potential consequence.

The nature of these events, the connections between them, and the mobilization of the resources to support this research, critically affected its design. An understanding of these factors is essential to a full appreciation of the dissertation.

B. The Development of the Project

Early in 1981, the writer began work in the office of the Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Burlington. Among his early assignments was the preparation of a report on the role of the Management Committee of department heads, Burlington's SMT. The CAO, Mr. M. Boggs, was at that time the chairman of a sub-committee of the OMAA that was formed to investigate the role of the CAO in Ontario.
Burlington hired its first CAO in 1979 following the retirement of its long-serving City Clerk who was elevated to the position of City Co-ordinator a few years prior to his retirement. However, this more senior position was largely titular and the role of the Co-ordinator, and his relations with the department heads, remained largely unaffected by it. The appointment of the new CAO, and his duties and responsibilities, were formalized in a "CAO By-law". It soon became apparent that the by-law in itself was not sufficient to establish the CAO's role vis-à-vis certain department heads individually, and the department heads collectively constituted as the Management Committee of which the CAO was chairman.

In the fall of 1980 an interdepartmental task force on teamwork requested that the CAO define in writing the role of the Management Committee of department heads. The task force reasoned that the clarification in writing of the Management Committee's role and, by implication, of the CAO's role, would enhance teamwork in the organization.

As noted, the task of preparing a position paper on the role of the Management Committee fell to the present writer, who quickly discovered the scarcity of reference material on the role and operations of SMTs. The position paper, submitted to the Management Committee in February 1982 (Vance 1982), addressed two kinds of questions.

Firstly, there was the question of the Management Committee's formal stated role. This turned largely on the two somewhat conflicting roles specified in the CAO by-law. The by-law specified
that the Management Committee was to assist the CAO in the review of all staff recommendations and reports, and was also to make recommendations to the standing committees and council on administrative matters.

The position paper favored the latter role, reformulated following the Ernst and Whinney work for the City of London cited in Chapter 3, to advance the idea of "corporate management". The previously noted deficiencies in Ernst and Whinney's account meant that their work was used primarily for the legitimacy their name would lend to the proposal. The Management Committee followed the proposal in its creation and adoption of a statement of purpose (see City of Burlington 1983).

The second kind of question addressed in the position paper had to do with transforming the committee's stated role into daily reality. This meant setting out decision-making rules and general operating procedures designed to reflect and to reinforce the objectives and the ethos of the statement of purpose. The list of questions cited in Chapter 3 from the LGMP publication on "corporate management" appears to be the best series of questions of this type.

Dent and Nyitrai's draft report, noted in Chapters 1 and 3 as the source of the CAOs' perceptions of the efficacy of personal style, was presented to the OMAAA in the fall of 1982. With the release of this report on the role of the CAO, the writer began work in earnest on a research proposal that would use "personal style" as a point of departure for an exploration of the operations of CAO-led senior management teams.

The challenge was to develop a proposal that had enough practical
potential to sustain the established interest of the OMAA executive and membership, while at the same time meeting the academic requirements of a doctoral dissertation. Collaterally, if financial assistance was to be required to conduct the research, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, as a leading candidate source, would also have to be satisfied with the proposal. Compromises were clearly anticipated from the outset as being necessary to accommodate these objectives and constraints.

An exhaustive search of the local government literature turned up only two explicit references to the style of the CAO: those of Plunkett and Betts and of Eddison cited in Chapter 1. The most promising research base appeared to be the business literature on managerial style, a subset of the leadership and management literature dominated by Situational Leadership and the Managerial Grid. Accordingly, the proposal was developed around the themes of CAO style and effectiveness as perceived by councillors and department heads.

The major data collection instruments were to be: (1) the LEAD-Self/Other scales taken directly from Hersey and Blanchard, (2) the conflict-handling scales taken from Renwick and Thomas-Kilmann courtesy of Garnier, and (3) a CAO Managerial Performance Description scale adapted by Garnier from Morse and Wagner. The major research questions to be answered using these instruments were to be:
How effective are Ontario CAOs as municipal managers, in their own estimations, and as perceived by their department heads and by their councillors?

Do CAOs use different management styles to deal with the various situations entailed by their responsibilities? Do their styles change with the issue at hand?

Can the management styles of CAOs be rewarding and reliably measured using the sorts of instruments that have been used in other administrative contexts?

Are certain styles strongly and predictably associated with certain levels of individual effectiveness? Are they associated with certain role conceptions of CAOs? Are they associated with the organization's managerial style and ethos?

To what extent is the organization's perceived effectiveness dependent on the CAO? Or associated with the CAO's effectiveness? Are municipalities that do not have a CAO perceived to be more or less as effective as CAO-led municipalities?

The workload associated with the proposed instruments and questions listed above, together with the expectation that the dynamics under study would not obtain in organizations below a certain size, indicated that a sample of about two dozen of the largest municipalities would be appropriate.

The formal written proposal was presented to the executive of the OMMA on March 11, 1983. The executive's initial reaction was not favorable. Certain members appeared to be especially apprehensive about the assessment of effectiveness in general, and the possible repercussions for CAOs who were found to be comparatively less effective. Another source of apprehension appeared to be the proposed involvement of politicians and department heads. It was concluded that these aspects of the proposal would have to be modified significantly if the executive's formal endorsement of the study, and the members'
participation, were to be secured.

The staff of the Municipal Management Policy Branch were generally supportive of the proposal from the outset. However, they were not satisfied with the number and the size of municipalities in the proposed sample. They required that the sample represent both a cross-section of CAO-led municipalities by size and by jurisdictional status (i.e., one tier, two tier, urban, rural); and a substantial portion of the Ontario population; the more municipalities the better.

In response to the concerns and interests of the OMAA and of the Ministry, it was decided to broaden the study population from the largest municipalities to all CAO-led municipalities, to increase the size of the sample, and to narrow the respondent groups to the CAOs exclusively.

The elimination of the politician and senior staff groups was done reluctantly. As was noted in chapter 2, a significant tendency has been found among principals who respond to the Managerial Grid item statements to respond "deceptively". A suspicion was expressed there that the same tendency operates in the application of the Situational Leadership instruments. Responses from superiors and subordinates, control groups of a sort, would have made the degree of intergroup agreement an important research variable in its own right. The elimination of the politician and senior staff respondents made the Situational Leadership and Garnier-Grid models simply unfeasible as primary research instruments. Their elimination also impaired the planned assessment of the perceived effectiveness of the CAOs.

The demotion of Situational Leadership and The Managerial Grid
opened the way for the reorientation of the investigation in the direction of Kotter's works. It also led to the displacement of the questionnaire as the significant research method by the interview. This is somewhat paradoxical given that the decision to increase the number of municipalities in the sample dictated the retention of the questionnaire, notwithstanding its recognized limitations in dealing with questions such as Kotter's.

The accommodation of the interests of the OMAA and of the Ministry effectively added to the dissertation, a test of the comparative utility of the interview and questionnaire in the identification of managerial approaches.

Finally, the increased costs of conducting in-depth interviews and of enlarging the sample made the financial support of the Ministry indispensable.

The proposal was revised in March and April 1983, in ways that would make it acceptable to both the OMAA and the Ministry, while retaining its academic quality. One of the major decisions made during this period was to try to interview the CAOs of the 48 CAO-led municipalities (cities, counties, and Regions) with more than 50,000 people, with the exception of Thunder Bay and the County of Renfrew, which were judged to be too remote to warrant the travel time and expense. The CAOs of these municipalities and of municipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants were to be surveyed by mailed questionnaire.

During this period as well the Ministry retained Mr. Bill Aughey, who had recently left the position of CAO of Kanata, Ontario, to
advise on the development of the interview schedule from a practitioner's perspective. The revised proposal was presented to the executive and membership of the OMAA at its annual conference May 11-13, 1983, where it gained the Association's official endorsement.

C. Research Objectives, Questions, and Instruments

1. The Preliminary Interviews

A chart was devised to develop a sense of the range, complexity, and degree of importance of various responsibilities, and individuals and groups involved in the CAO's work. The rows of the chart represented the individuals and groups with whom the CAO can be expected to interact; they included the mayor, senior managers, boards and commissions, provincial and professional associations, and the press. The columns represented the classical management functions mentioned in Chapter 1, and were defined for these purposes as: planning, budgeting, organizing, co-ordinating, staffing, directing, motivating, monitoring, and controlling.

An interview schedule was designed to solicit the CAOs' views of the content, the importance, the status, and his handling of these functions and relationships. It also contained a summary scale on style of supervision derived from the Hersey-Blanchard framework, and a conflict-handling scale adapted from situations common in local government.

The responding CAO was to be asked to describe what he would do if he found himself in each of three or four of these simulated conflict situations. The idea for these situations dated from the original
proposal. They were intended to be rather more concrete, and more plausible, situations than the twelve situations of the LEAD instruments. Comparisons between the responses to the two sets of situations were expected to contribute to certain aspects of the debate between Blake and Mouton and Hersey and Blanchard dealt with in Chapter 2.

This preliminary interview schedule was administered to four CAOs in the Ottawa area on June 1 and 2, 1983. Three of the four interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Although the longest interview took upwards of three hours, time did not permit the presentation of the simulated situations.

The most critical observation made during these preliminary interviews was that the items based on the functions-relationships framework for documenting the CAOs' management activity domains, were not effective enough. Too much time was taken up with clarification. These CAOs simply did not think about their work in these terms. Moreover, they had the same difficulty explaining how they do what they do, that Kotter reported for the general managers he studied. It was concluded that a simpler and more evocative framework was required.

Although Kotter's work with general managers had been known to the writer through the summary article in the Harvard Business Review (Kotter 1982b), it was only after the preliminary interviews that the full report of the study (Kotter 1982a) was acquired. Kotter and Lawrence's mayors study (1974), and Peters and Waterman's best-selling book on "excellent" American corporations, In Search of
Excellence (1982), were also acquired after the preliminary interviews. The effect of these major acquisitions was the re-orientation of the inquiry toward Kotter's agenda-network conceptual framework. Given the compromises which had been made with respect to research participants, the agenda-network framework seemed a much more promising route to CAOs' managerial approaches.

In July 1983, the preliminary interview schedule was reworked to capture in a more deliberate way the CAOs' approaches to agenda setting and network building. In August 1983, a questionnaire designed essentially to correspond to this final interview schedule, was prepared. In September the questionnaire was sent to four CAOs of the smaller target municipalities with the objective of identifying weaknesses in directions, item meanings, and item formats.

2. The Research Focus and Questions Revised

The kinds of questions set out in the original research proposal suited the data collection methods and samples that were proposed to answer them. That focus on the comparative perceptions of CAO style and effectiveness using the LEAD and Grid-based instruments, could not be sustained with CAOs as the only respondent group. The research focus and its constituent questions had to change in a way that remained compatible with interviews and questionnaires.

In terms of Smith's Map, Figure 1-1, the original proposal and the revision being described here both concentrate on the "Stylistic Traits" and "Attitudes" of panel III and on the "Political Behavior" of panel V, and the two-way traffic between them. What changed were the roles of
other operational definitions of style and of their associated instruments. In the revised design adaptations of these instruments were assigned probing roles, rather than the probative identification and comparison roles initially contemplated.

In sum the CAO interviews and questionnaires became explorations of attitudes and behavior clustered around the major managerial approach themes identified throughout the first four chapters. The behavior was past behavior as recounted by the CAO, except of course for the recounting itself.

As formalizing devices interviews and questionnaires restricted the exploration of attitudes largely to the CAO's conscious/analytic domain. Interview probes, as the interview circumstances allowed, permitted some excursions into the unconscious/intuitive domain. In contrast, the inability to pursue extemporaneously the promising responses of the questionnaire respondents, rendered their responses much less promising from the design stage onward. Although more evidence may not have been needed, the data and analysis of Chapter 7 confirm again the inferiority of the questionnaire in the investigation of complex patterns of thought.

In the first two chapters the term "style" meant, variously, some enduring habit obvious enough to be thought of as a trait, or the label given to the computed outcome of responses to a set of situational questions or personal convictions. In the fourth chapter "style" gave way to Kotter's term "approach": "Approach" in the mayors study referred to the mayor's way of setting his agenda, shaping his network, and accomplishing the tasks of his agenda. Five combinations of ways of
handling these three processes, referred to as patterns, were given
names. These were presented in Table 4-5.

The managerial approaches within agenda-network framework became
much less categorical in Kotter's study of GMs which was also recounted
in Chapter 4. The similarities among the subject GMs were presented, not
in the pattern language of the mayor's study, but in terms of twelve
visible ways the GMs spent time at work and, in Chapter 3, in terms of
six key challenges and dilemmas.

This chapter has shown how the orientation of the original research
proposal was modified in response to the concerns of the OMAA and of the
Ministry, and in response to the four trial interviews. It is worth
noting the outward similarity between the responsive development of this
research, and the development of Kotter and Lawrence's study of mayors.
The adjustments in the original questions and methods result in the
following statement of the third primary objective of the dissertation:
to identify and compare the beliefs of CAOs associated with certain
basic components of their managerial approaches.

The basic components—agendas, networks, council-staff roles,
style, time usage, corporate management, and personal characteristics—are
listed in Table 5-1 along with their corresponding items in the
final interview schedule and questionnaire, which are attached as
Appendix A and Appendix B respectively. Each item has been shown
opposite only one theme, although it may pertain to several themes. The
supporting rationale for the major items will be discussed in the next
sections.
Table 5-1: Summary of Research Themes and Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Principal References</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agendas</td>
<td>17,13</td>
<td>12,4a</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter,Garnier, Hersey &amp; Blanchard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Internal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO-Mayor</td>
<td>1d,22e,</td>
<td>1d,13b,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23,24,</td>
<td>14,16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO-Council</td>
<td>1e,22d,f,</td>
<td>1e,13a,d,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h,i,23,24</td>
<td>14,16,3n</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO-Sr.Mgmt</td>
<td>1f,23,</td>
<td>1f,14,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24,26</td>
<td>15,16</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CAO-Jr.Staff</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(b) External</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>16,3k</td>
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<td>Council-staff</td>
<td>22a,b,</td>
<td>3a,c,e,</td>
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<td>g,13c</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>O'Brien, Stillman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managerial style and</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,3b,d,f,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blake &amp; Mouton,</td>
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<tr>
<td>effectiveness</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>h-j,l,m,1c</td>
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<td>Garnier, Hersey &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter, Lewis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time use and management</td>
<td>19,20,21</td>
<td>10,11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter, McCall et</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>al., McLeod</td>
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<td>Corporate management</td>
<td>29,18,11b</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hayes, Hinings,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kanter, Kotter, LGMP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peters &amp; Waterman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>19-23</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous</td>
<td>11a,32</td>
<td>1a,9,7</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traits and Skills</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kotter, Kanter,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lewis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a) Agendas

Ontario municipalities have public agendas which are set out in several common documents. Perhaps the most common are official plans and secondary plans, five-year capital forecasts, and annual current and capital budgets. In addition to these documents, municipalities may also have corporate or departmental statements of goals and objectives (or mission statements), and formal plans governing certain policy areas such as economic development and recreation.

These documents establish a framework for the attitudes and actions of elected and appointed officials, in assorted degrees of detail which vary by policy area and by municipality. As documents, these plans collectively constitute a public agenda for a municipality at the point of their approval. Within this public framework CAOs are expected to develop personal agendas. These personal agendas will have public and private elements. "Private" means not being grounded in any formal document or decision process, and possibly not being known to others in the organization. A more specific expression of a previously noted Kotter finding about GMs is that:

Although all but one of the organizations involved had a formal planning process which produced written plans, the GM's agendas always included goals, priorities, strategies, and plans that were not in the written documents. (1982a, 61)

Although the formal plans of the GMs' organizations were generally consistent and compatible with the GMs' agendas, Kotter discerned three differences, namely, the GMs' agendas (1) had less detailed financial content, (2) encompassed a broader time frame, from 1-to-30 days to 5-to-20 years, as against three months to five years for their
organizations, and (3) were less "explicit, rigorous, and logical, especially regarding how various financial items fit together" (p.61).

Once the CAOs' agendas are documented the next task is to determine how they can be characterized. For example, do they reflect their organizations' public agendas fairly closely? Are they an extension of, or a departure from, previous accomplishments? How "basic" or "innovative" are they? These terms are from Kanter who used them to classify middle managers' accomplishments ([1982] 1983, 26-7). Basic accomplishments include: (1) "Doing the basic job--simply carrying out a defined assignment within the bounds of one's job"; (2) "Affecting individuals' performance--having an impact on individuals in the organization as individuals; and (3) "Advancing incrementally--achieving a higher level of performance within the basic job". Innovative accomplishments include: (1) "Effecting a new policy--creating a change of orientation or direction"; (2) "Finding a new opportunity--developing an entirely new product or opening a new market; (3) "Devising a fresh method--introducing a new process, procedure, or technology for continued use;" and (4) "Designing a new structure--changing the formal structure, reorganizing, or introducing a new structure, or forging a different link among units."

Do the CAOs' agendas reflect any particular preoccupations or sensitivities? For example, Bordeleau found that French Canadian public administrators, in contrast to their private sector counterparts, seem less sensitive to issues of optimal utilization of human resources (professional development and supportive attitudes at work) and appear to be less interested in establishing organization control systems..." (1983, 577).

How extensive are the domains of interest of CAOs as reflected in their
agendas? Is there a clear relationship between their conceptions of their roles and responsibilities, and their domains? To the extent that a CAO sees his role traditionally, as a professional administrative agent of Council, his agenda may consist mostly or entirely of narrowly focussed public organizational goals and objectives. Alternatively, the CAO who conceives of a broader and more independent role as both agent and leader, not only of Council and staff but also of other interests such as certain "publics", may have a broader and more personal agenda.

A fair idea of the content of a CAO's agenda should be obtainable through interviewing. By contrast, how the agenda is developed on the job can probably be known only in a sketchy way. To ask a CAO about his approach to agenda setting could be substantially the same as asking managers how they spend their time. McCall et al.'s conclusion that managers tend not to have a clear picture of how they spend their time was reported earlier.

Of some relevance here is McCall et al.'s observation that managers consistently overestimate, among other things, the time they spend on thinking and calculating (1978, 17). Upon reflection, the CAO's perception of time allocation may be just as important as how his time is actually allocated among various activities. As it was for Kotter's GMs, time allocation and consciousness are expected to be good indicators of the degree of formality of a CAO's managerial approach.

Another possibility is that it may reveal some psychological dynamic. For example, time misestimates that appear to be motivated by the respondent's desire to appear to be doing "the right thing", may indicate other-directedness. Simple dissatisfaction or regret, or a
resolve to change his pattern of time expenditure, are other possibilities.

CAOs' agendas are approached straightforwardly in Question 17 in the interview schedule (Question 12 in the questionnaire). The CAO was asked to identify the items on his agenda under the headings "Financial", "Service/Program/Facility", and "Organizational", for three time periods. The "Cue Card" which was given to the interviewee to assist him in responding to this question, like the questionnaire item, did not define these headings. The headings were only clarified in response to hesitation by, or to a request from, the interviewee. The reason was simply to solicit as natural a response as possible.

In keeping with Kotter's experience with general managers, and with the nature of personal agendas, there is no direct question on how the CAO sets his agenda. It was hoped that some sense of method would emerge in the conversation about the agenda itself, and in the conversation about time management.

Question 13 (Question 4a) on achievements in the present and previous positions was expected to complement Question 17. It was also expected to offer clues to the CAO's conception of his role, and to reveal if an agenda or role shift of any consequence tends to accompany promotion to the CAO position. Any strong association between schooling/training and achievements/agendas was also to be explored through responses to this item. Question 16 was also expected to elicit agenda content.

The comments in this sub-section and in those that follow pertain primarily to the interviews. As suggested earlier, the questionnaires
are expected to be generally less revealing than the interviews.

(b) Networks

Networks are also to be documented and then characterized. Who are the CAO's most important internal and external contacts by group, if not by individual? How does the CAO develop and maintain his network? Do his contacts appear to be mainly "problem-driven" or does he create opportunities or "stage events" to expand and to influence his contacts? Are his internal contacts spread widely through the organization both functionally and hierarchically?

The questions relating to internal network members are largely oriented to maintenance activities, the assumption being that the mayor, councillors, and senior managers will all be part of the network. There is, however, one item that was aimed at differentiating among internal members, namely, Question 28 (Question 15). Question 30 is aimed primarily at simply identifying in a general way external members of the network, as an indicator of the CAO's consciousness of the need for such a network. Question 16 in the questionnaire attempts to map both the internal and external networks, and to differentiate among their members. The format of this item satisfies the much shorter time of one hour promised to questionnaire respondents. It also reflects the expectation that network-building would be perceived as less important, by CAOs in smaller municipalities and, accordingly, that such activities would be less extensive.

Question 23 (Question 14) is adapted from the Thomas-Kilmann conflict-handling scale used by Garnier. And Question 26 was inspired
by a summary scale found in a "Starter Kit" of Hersey-Blanchard material. They are examples of items which pertain both to managerial style and to network relationships. The conflict-handling scale was expected to reveal the CAOs' senses of the appropriate place of conflict in management, and their strategic outlook on conflict. For instance, how many CAOs share Kelly's view (1969, in A.M.O. 1984a, 103) that "[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, the most important single thing about conflict is that it is good for you"? For those who are interviewed, this strategic appraisal can be compared with the dynamics of the disagreements related in Question 24. For questionnaire respondents these comparative data took the form of responses to one of eight simulated conflict situations which formed the last item in the questionnaire (Question 24).

(c) Style

Indications of the way the CAO presents himself to others will be generated by almost every question. Indeed the interview itself may provide clues to, and may help corroborate, the CAO's face-to-face style in network activities. The CAO's description of his own style, and his level of satisfaction with it, are also expected to provide revealing indicative and validating impressions. Question 12 (Question 2) is the only major item dealing obviously and directly with managerial style. By itself, it is not expected to be a powerful discriminator. In the interview it was intended primarily to facilitate early rapport, by providing the respondent with a benchmark that was familiar from the project's promotional material.
The responses to this item were expected to be amplified by the responses to Question 31 (Question 18). For those CAOs who regard themselves as relatively effective, their preferred traits and skills are expected to be more or less self-descriptive.

Self-reported time expenditures and management practices Questions 19–21 (Questions 10–12) are also secondary contributors. The requested appointment calendar was expected to contribute as much information on the theme of networks as on time management.

(d) Roles, Responsibilities, and Requirements

In sub-section (a) above the possible association between agenda and role conception was raised. The role choices in general are between some form of traditional policy-administration conception, and some form of general management conception. This choice would seem to be associated with the CAO's conception of his responsibilities and of the meaning of CAO-effectiveness. Associated with both roles and responsibilities are the traits and skills thought to be required to carry out the former.

Conflict is a concept that links all three dimensions. References to ICMA writings in Chapter 3 suggested that the CAO has acquired in recent years a responsibility for resolving conflict among council factions. Presumably, the CAO who accepts this responsibility openly cannot be a dedicated policy-administration enthusiast. Nor, one presumes, could a policy-administration adherent acknowledge a responsibility for the resolution of interdepartmental conflict which Kotter makes a part of one key relationship. What traits and skills are
thought to be required to handle such conflicts? Are there preferred conflict-handling styles?

Closely related to conflict-handling, are the co-operation and consensus implied by corporate management. They were expected to be manifested most clearly in connection with the SMT, although an eye will be kept open for indications of the involvement of councillors as team members. The one interview item on senior staff unity per se, namely, Question 29, will be interpreted with the various other references to senior staff. The complexity of the concept of corporate management made it virtually impossible to treat within the constraints of the questionnaire, in which there is one isolated item, 30.

(e) **Internal Consistency**

Unfortunately, the CAO's success at coalignment cannot be ascertained from the evidence to be collected. However, to the extent that coalignment in any municipality is a product of conscious analysis, one would expect that analysis to be logical, and consequential action to be rational in means-ends terms. Thus, inconsistencies among the major thematic perceptions or the approach dimensions of the CAO may be indicative of poor prospects for coalignment. If, to take a simple example, the CAO's style is inconsistent with his sense of his own preferred style, his effectiveness may be impaired. Reading of such inconsistencies may initiate remedial action.

In fact, self-diagnosis and remedial action may in fact begin in the interview as the CAO responds to the research questions. Such personal remedial action programs may also result from seminars
organized around the research findings.

D. Data Collection

In September of 1983, a letter from the President of the O.M.A.A. was sent to all members of the Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association describing the project and promoting their participation (Appendix C).

Between October 6, 1983, and December 20, 1983, recorded interviews were held with thirty-four CAOs from the larger municipalities. When arrangements were being made for each interview, the CAO was informed that two hours was the length of time required to cover all of the questions adequately. The actual interviews ranged between one hour and four hours in length. The length of the interview was determined primarily by the interviewee.

Seventeen (17) of the interviews were seriously constrained in some way. Time was the most common constraint. In some cases the respondent had made an appointment beforehand that curtailed the interview; in others, unforeseen business of an urgent nature arose during the interview. The interviews were transcribed between November 1983, and May 1984, by several dicta-typists hired for the purpose. The interviews generated close to 700 legal-sized pages of typescript.

One-hundred-and-sixty-nine (169) questionnaires were mailed on January 20, 1984, to the CAOs of the smaller municipalities (excluding the four who were asked to review the questionnaire in September), and to the nine large-municipality CAOs who could not be interviewed for whatever reason. They were requested to return the completed
questionnaires by March 2, 1984. Reminder letters dated March 9, 1984, and May 4, 1984, were sent to those who had not responded by these dates.

E: The Samples

1. The Interview (Large Municipality) Sample

Interviews were held with a total of 37 CAOs of municipalities having a population greater than 50,000. This total includes three of the four preliminary interviews held in June of 1983. Those interviewed represented 8 Regions, 19 cities, and 10 counties, having a total population of about 8 million. If to avoid double counting this total is reduced by the 5 lower tier municipalities within Regions included in the sample, the effective population represented is about 7.2 million. The distribution of municipalities by size is shown in Table 5-2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Municipality ('000s)</th>
<th>50-</th>
<th>100-</th>
<th>150-</th>
<th>200-</th>
<th>250-</th>
<th>300+</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Municipalities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Municipalities</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The ages of the CAOs in the interview sample \( n_1 \) range between 36
and 62, the average being between 46 and 50. They have been in their positions for between 1.5 and 28 years, the average being between 4 and 6. These data are presented in Table 5-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of CAOs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=37)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years In Position</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>13-15</td>
<td>16-28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of CAOs</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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</table>

Almost two-thirds (24 or 64.9%) of the interviewed CAOs came to their positions from other positions in the same municipality. Of the 13 who came from other organizations, all but 2 were employed by municipalities when they were hired.

Of the 36 interviewed CAOs whose educational standing is known, 15 (41.6%) have university degrees; four of these have graduate degrees. Nine of the undergraduate degrees are in engineering; the others are in arts, business administration, and law. Eight (8 or 22.2%) have professional accounting designations, 3 of which are in addition to university degrees. Thirteen (13, 36.1%) have high school and the A.M.C.T.O. (Association of Municipal Clerks and Treasurers Association of Ontario) designation, and 3 have high school only.
All 37 CAOs interviewed are males.

2. The Questionnaire (Small Municipality) Sample

The small municipality CAO population for purposes of this project totaled 173. Questionnaires were mailed to 169 of these CAOs, and 4 were asked to complete the first draft of the questionnaire. Responses to the questionnaire mailing were received from 69 municipalities (41%), although these responses yielded only 56 completed questionnaires (33%), 2 of which were anonymous. The ill health of the CAO, and vacancies created by recent retirements, explained most of the uncompleted questionnaires returned. If the 2 completed draft questionnaires are added to the 56 completed returns, an effective response rate of 34% results.

Of 3 questionnaires sent to CAOs of municipalities greater than 50,000 population, only 1 was returned. Except where noted otherwise, the data from this questionnaire are analyzed along with those from the others, making the operative size of the questionnaire sample equal to 59.

As shown in Table 5-4, which excludes the one over-50,000 municipality, nearly one-half of the responding CAOs reported municipalities of fewer than 10,000 people. Over 80% of the questionnaire municipalities are villages, towns, and townships.
Table 5-4: Questionnaire Municipalities
By Population Size and Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Municipality</th>
<th>0-4999</th>
<th>5000-9999</th>
<th>10000-14999</th>
<th>15000-19999</th>
<th>20000-29999</th>
<th>30000-50000</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Municipalities (nq=58)</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Municipalities</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Municipality</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Township</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Municipalities (nq=58)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Municipalities</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the two anonymous respondents did not indicate the legal status of the municipality.

They range in age between 24 and 60 years, their average age being 45 years. They have been in their present positions a minimum of .5, and a maximum of 15 years; 58% have fewer than 6 years in their positions, which is about average (5.6 years) for the sample. Just over 6 CAOs in 10 (63%) came to their positions from other positions in the same municipality.
Table 5-5: Questionnaire Respondents by Age and Time in Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>&lt;30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>46-50</th>
<th>51-55</th>
<th>56-60</th>
<th>61-65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of CAOs (n=56)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Position</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>13-15</td>
<td>16-28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of CAOs (n=55)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It may be noted here that for many of the CAOs who were promoted internally to their present positions, the promotion seems to have been simply a change in title. An example would be from "Clerk-Treasurer", to "Administrator and Clerk-Treasurer". Only 14 of the CAOs in the small-municipality sample have titles common in large municipalities, such as "C.A.O.", "Administrator", "City Manager", which are not compounded in some way with Clerk and/or Treasurer.

More than one-third (36%) of the responding CAOs have university degrees, while 7 (12%) have a community college diploma, and 30 (52%) finished their formal education with high school graduation. A total of 20 (40%), 9 of whom also have university degrees, have received the A.M.C.I. (Association of Municipal Clerks and Treasurers) designation.

Two of the questionnaire respondents are females.
Notes to Chapter 5

1. In the remainder of this section, such references to questions will be understood to refer to the interview schedule; the corresponding question(s) in the questionnaire, if there is one, will be given in parentheses simply as, e.g., (Question 12).

2. The letters \( n_i \) and \( n_q \) will be used to denote the interview and questionnaire samples, respectively, in tables and figures. Unless indicated otherwise, \( n_i = 59 \) and \( n_q = 37 \). Variances from these figures reflect unasked questions in the interviews, and unanswered questions in both the questionnaire and interview data.

   The results of the fourth preliminary interview, which was with the CAO of a township and which was referred to earlier as having been held over lunch and as unrecorded, are not included in the analysis of interview data because of their potential to distort.
CHAPTER 6

CAOs IN LARGE MUNICIPALITIES: THE INTERVIEW RESULTS

A. Introduction

The research plan was to obtain responses to each of the 31 interview items under common conditions. At a minimum this required about two uninterrupted hours with each respondent. As noted in Chapter 5 almost half of the interviews were seriously constrained, most of them by a shortage of time.

In one interview for example the respondent was somewhat preoccupied with cleaning off his desk in preparation for a week away from the office. In this, and in other time-constrained interviews, the challenge to the interviewer was to select those items which would elicit the most promising responses. To preserve the conversational tone and rhythm of the interview the interviewer tried to select/omit items unobtrusively.

The interviewer became more skilled at constrained interviewing with experience. Experience also taught the interviewer which probes tended to have higher payoffs. A good example of this is the development during the course of the interviews, of a secondary line of questioning about “discretionary dollars”. With the intent of amplifying the respondent’s account of his contacts with provincial ministries and with his MPP, he was asked whether these contacts helped to attract discretionary dollars to his municipality. This question seemed to strike a meaningful chord every time it was asked. One of
the most illuminating responses to this question was along the line that such contacts were not important, because the Province awards its discretionary money on the basis of the merits of one's application. Such responses are consistent with perceiving management, both in the municipality and at the Province, not to involve influencing the allocation of resources among competing interests. Such evoking of valuable responses to other questions than the one being asked was very common.

One of the methods of coping with a shortage of interview time was to leave one or more "cue cards" - a set of 8 sheets of paper each with a key item corresponding to one in the interview schedule - with the respondent, with a request that he return the cue card(s) by mail. Items left for completion in this manner tended to draw different responses than the same items completed during the interview. Since it usually fell at the end of the interview, the traits and skills item was one that tended to be left with the interviewee when time was short. The interviewer's minimum requirement in the interview was to obtain the interviewee's perceptions of the three "most important" and the three "least important" traits and skills. However, in several cases in which this item was left with the respondent for completion, the traits and skills were rated in such a way as to make it impossible to identify the most and least important. Furthermore, when dealt with in the interview, certain scale items were sometimes as interesting for the CAO's reasons and side comments as for the ratings themselves. In cases of self-administration by the respondent after the interview, these reasons and comments were of course lost.
In consequence of such interviewing constraints and circumstances as those just mentioned, the interview data are not as systematic as planned. Accordingly, the writer has had to make adjustments and allowances for these holes in the data in their presentation and analysis which follow.

A final note about the conduct of the interviews is that the interviewer was able to achieve the desired rapport with all respondents but one. One of the indicators of this rapport is the high incidence of laughter which is scattered throughout the interview transcripts.

The subject of laughter leads naturally to one of the early interview items that asked the respondents to indicate "how happy you are currently" with six elements of his work life, namely: job, organization, performance, and relations with the mayor, with the council, and with the senior staff.

Table 6-1 indicates that both collectively and individually the responding CAOs are quite contented, more than half of them scoring more than "happy" on all six dimensions. The slight leftward shift on the personal performance dimension may be attributed to a convention of professional modesty, which was conveyed in terms such as "there is always room for improvement".

CAO No. 18, who struck the interviewer as being extremely unlikely to suffer from Ircha's "cross-pressures" or Stillman's "schizophrenic double identity", claimed to be "walking a tightrope all the time... between council and the department heads". The high levels of contentedness recorded above suggest that such tightropes are few.
Alternatively, and less plausibly, perhaps any stress associated with them is "managed" in a way that preserves happiness.

Table 6-1: Happiness of CAOs (n=32) in Large Municipalities

a. Aggregates (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present job</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Mayor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations w/ Council</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations w/ Sr. Staff</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Rows may not add to 100% owing to rounding.

b. Individual Totals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Score</th>
<th>To 6</th>
<th>To 12</th>
<th>To 18</th>
<th>To 24</th>
<th>To 30</th>
<th>To 36</th>
<th>To 42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the extent that discontentment acts to motivate change, one would not expect these CAOs to be highly motivated in that direction. It is of some interest that only one of the 32 CAOs who were asked to complete the happiness item had any reservations at all about its form or content. CAO No. 26 remarked that "happiness is not something that can be measured in numbers, if you know what I mean. I wouldn't go 'very happy', which is presumably ecstatic". This CAO also balked at
completing each of the cue-card scale items during the interview, on the grounds that his responses needed more thorough consideration; however, as with the happiness item, each of the cue-card items left for completion following the interview was completed as requested.

The presentation of the data in the rest of this section will take the same descriptive form as the happiness data. General tendencies and significant departures will be described and analyzed in terms of the theoretical considerations or empirical results of previous sections. This is consistent with the exploratory character of the research. Roles, styles, agendas and networks will be discussed in that order, although some of the elements under any of these general heads will also be discussed under others as appropriate.

One of the major adjustments made as a result of the incomplete data set relates to the exploration of patterns in individual approaches, and the comparison of identified individual patterns. These explorations and comparisons are necessarily less comprehensive and rigorous than they otherwise might have been. Accordingly, they issue in a general hypothesis about approaches, rather than a firm conclusion.

B. Roles, Responsibilities, and Requirements

1. Policy-Administration (Items 22a,b,c)

The items dealing with the respective roles of council and staff are located in the last third of the interview schedule. This issue often arose naturally as an upshot of some much earlier item. However,
it was when put to the respondent directly that the response proved to be the best indicator of support for or opposition to the proposition.

In the excerpts from the interviews that follow the reader should remark the easy mixing of the descriptive and the prescriptive, sometimes in the same sentence. While such mixing may be inadvertent and insignificant, in some cases it seems otherwise.

The following response is perhaps the best illustration of strong support for the strict separation of policy and administration:

It's called survival. I think there is a risk involved in doing it any other way. To my way of thinking the role of Council is to set the policy, and it's my role to implement that policy as best I can. I think that the risk involved is that when you bring forward an issue in terms of 'we should be doing this or that', or 'why don't we consider doing that?', that you align yourself to a particular position, and you become somebody's enemy at that point in time.

This very strong belief in the strict separation of policy from administration, was reflected in the practice of avoiding recommendations to council that were perceived by the CAO as supporting some councillors' interests at the expense of others. One example CAO No. 9 gave of a recommendation to be avoided, was the spending of money on roads in one part of the municipality, the risk being that of "alienating" other parts "who would like to have money spent in their area". The respondent went on to describe decisions taken on this sort of issue as "political". For him such decisions are properly not "the job of the administrative person".

Here is another response, from CAO No.1, that strongly supports the traditional policy-administration proposition, but which contains an important difference:
I think that it is kind of idealistic I guess, but it is generally the way it works. We don't initiate—we might initiate policy—but council confirms it. That is what we work with, so that it is a council prerogative to establish the policy. If they want to amend what we suggest and all the rest that is fine. I don't push them one way or another. That is one thing that I have had... only a few guiding principles in this goddamn job: first of all you have to be straight with them; and secondly, I refuse to lobby. I will not lobby anybody. ... My job is not to convince them that my way is right. My job is to give them the facts and if they want to ignore the facts they can ignore the facts. They can get into politics and can do anything they goddamn well like. They are the guys who are going to answer for it, not me.

In this view separating policy from administration actually "works", although its author acknowledges on second thought that council's role is restricted to accepting or amending what staff suggests. "Staff proposes, council disposes" is the way CAO No.26 expressed this sentiment. It is noteworthy that in only one of the interview municipalities did council, rather than staff, appear generally to be the initiator of proposals.

In Chapter 1 Lewis was quoted to the effect that there is no fact without theory. While the context of Lewis' quote was social science theory, his observation applies as well to staff giving council "the facts". A staff contention that a proposal is based on "nothing but the facts" may assist in promoting it to Council in a particular situation—a version of the "apolitical shield". This, however, was not CAO No.1's meaning.

Also worth noting in the above excerpt is CAO No.1's claim to be quite unconcerned about being ignored, and more or less immune from any consequences. This claim seems inconsistent both with the general psychological need to be accepted, and with the sense of ownership
which tends to accompany the development of important proposals. It was also belied in the interview by the number of times CAO No.1 returned in obvious dismay, to council's rejection the previous evening of a staff recommendation against what staff considered to be an excessively costly extension of municipal services to an unplanned subdivision.

In this second view of policy-administration, politics is defined by implication first as "lobbying", and second as ignoring "the facts". On the subjects of lobbying and passing only "factual" information to councillors CAO No.37 offered the following:

I don't personally believe in doing a lot of lobbying and setting things up beforehand and making side deals with councillors or whatever. I don't play that role too often, except I feel that part of my role is to help them look good. And if I see something coming up that's going to make them not look good I want to warn them in advance.

CAO No.37 went on to talk about calling certain councillors to "inform" them of events in their wards, without which information they might be "surprised" and therefore "not look good" in open council session.

It seems clear that CAO No.37 did not regard such warnings as lobbying in the sense of "making side deals". However, what if he were to combine Lewis' idea that "information" is never purely factual, Edelman's and Gusfield's observations about reassurance and status, and Kaplan and Mazique's view that giving is always self-interested? He might see "making deals" and "lobbying" less starkly. And he might recognize his warnings to selected councillors as an effective and legitimate influence technique designed to reduce potential embarrassment to himself as well as to certain councillors. He might
also be better prepared to react to both favored and unfavored councillors who perceive such warnings to be deals of a sort.

That is, the receiving councillors might well regard such warnings as favors, and feel obliged to do CAO No.37 a favor in return. This is, the reciprocity, the primary principle of network maintenance for all networks whether their members are councillors or staff. Thus, it seems that, in their determination to avoid being compromised by deals with politicians, some CAOs have taken comfort from certain notions which do not stand up to analysis. Moreover, these notions may limit their potential to influence effectively both councillors and staff.

Others who responded to the policy-administration item took a neutral position which was typically represented by reference to one or to several "grey areas." Still others refused to allow any line at all between policy and administration. Here is CAO No.6, perhaps the most articulate spokesman for the latter group:

When you read the book that is what it tells you. The reality is that it often doesn't work like that. We need data as much in policy as the alderman does in his administration. And if you think about it, that is the way it ought to be because as you start drawing a line so-called between the administration and policy in a very definitive way, you have really put up a wall between the administration and the aldermen. And although I'm not in favor of members of council giving direction to staff rather than seeking information, there are times where, you know, discretion is required. Nothing is black and white in this world.

Notwithstanding his belief in the legitimacy of policy and administration for both council and staff, and his assertion that nothing is black and white, CAO No.6 drew a more, or less black-and-white distinction between what he termed "political awareness" and "political involvement" on the part of staff. The following quotation
is taken from his response to Item 12d on his perception of his personal image in the organization:

If there is a characteristic that I have always tried to maintain, it is this business that you have to be politically aware but you have never to be politically involved. And as soon as you become politically involved you start coloring your advice with anticipated reaction by the politician. It is a loser and it will catch up to you at some point in time.

Interviewer: [By political] you mean not trying to enhance the fortunes of one particular political view on council.

Yes, that's right, you are not creating or trying to project someone else's opinion in your staff report, and it is very easy to fall into what I call "a rat trap". You may get members of council coming into the office saying that "We know that you have a report coming next week on this particular subject". And then they get into a discussion about how they feel about that, usually as an oblique tactic of trying to influence the advice that you are going to give the council. So I have always viewed that as a very important part of this job, this impartiality, the objectivity side of it.

As with CAO No.37 on lobbying, CAO No.6 seems to be relying on a conception of "involvement", as distinct from "awareness", that is more convenient than persuasive. It may be convenient for him to think that he is not "politically involved" when discussing a forthcoming report in his office with individual members of council. It may, however, be equally convenient for the member of council involved in the discussion to think of the discussion as influencing the CAO, especially if the staff report supports his position.

After all, for most issues, there will probably be only a few feasible recommendations. This means that the condition of coincident positions taken by the CAO and a given councillor, will often be satisfied no matter what degree of influence was exercised.
This perception that a member of council has influenced the CAO in a private discussion may also be held by councillors who had no private discussions with the CAO. Nor is there a requirement that such councillors be aware of the CAO's discussions with others. They may simply advance the idea of influence or favoritism with a view to unsettling others, including the CAO, to their own perceived advantage.

Upon analysis then, CAO No.6's distinction between being "aware" of councillors' views, and being "involved" with councillors in formulating his recommended position, seems to be no more tenable than the traditional distinction between policy and administration, which he rejects.

Ironically, the general result that is implied by both distinctions is that of keeping individual members of council at arm's length. One must wonder next whether such distancing necessarily reduces the potential for teamwork between council and staff. The strong suspicion of the present writer is that it must. It is understandable that CAOs should want to avoid manipulating, or appearing to manipulate, councillors for personal aggrandizement, or through insincerity, or deviousness. However, when the fear of such manipulation leads them to avoid legitimate influence techniques and opportunities, and to impair their effectiveness on that account, there is cause for concern.

This analysis of CAO No.6's position has considered and dismissed the possibility that the advocated position is a posture adopted for the consumption of his councillors, that he is describing his apolitical shield. This kind of posturing could be credited to CAO
No.13, on the basis of his response to the policy-administration issue. Although he regarded it as a grey area, his mayor believed strongly in the separability of policy from administration. Other interview evidence suggests that this CAO employs such insights effectively to obtain favorable action.

CAO No.34 took the same flexible general approach as CAO No.6 to the matter of territorial boundaries. He reacted vehemently against the notions that council has a legislated mandate to deal only with policy, and that council is policy-oriented:

That is what everybody tells you, right? Sorry! I have this opinion and I will express it. If anybody tells you that council are the [ex] of directors, are so full of bologna that it isn’t even funny. By legislation the kinds of things that council deals with, whether we like it as administrators or not, are things that one, as a manager, you would normally make a decision on. You know, you take traffic recommendations in and they have no more policy than fly on the bloody moon.

Those who were asked only to talk about the respective roles of council and staff in their municipalities, and how they reinforced these roles, gave responses similar to those cited above. For those who have not yet achieved a day-to-day sense of how responsibility is to be shared, that is accepted without question by council and staff, trial and error seems to be the most common process of resolution. For those with a more flexible view of jurisdictional bounds, or for whom such issues take a back seat to action, the trials seem to be taken more in stride, and may even be deliberately set up or encouraged. For those who are more dependent upon a firm distinction, care may be taken to avoid such tests of authority.

CAO No.33, a representative of the latter group, responded that he
didn't "have many experiences in that line [because] we are usually fairly careful; if there is any doubt . . . we take it back to standing committee and council." Other members of this group (e.g., CAOs No. 2 and 9) appeal to the mayor to discipline councillors in cases of perceived trespassing. Finally, a few cases (e.g., CAOs No. 26 and 21) in which the CAO and department heads simply confront the offending councillors, were reported. Among the issues which provoke these trials are councillors' attempts to attend staff meetings, or union negotiation or arbitration meetings.

One tactic used by several representatives of the former group (e.g., CAOs No. 7 and 18), more to establish an advantage for their preferred course of action than because of any jurisdictional concerns, is simply to initiate a proposal, often by submitting a report, before being asked or directed by council. They are aware that the party who proposes the resolution often carries the day for that reason alone. This relates in a way to the "event staging" of Kotter's GMs.

In summary, the CAOs' responses to the policy-administration items clearly indicate that the degree of support for the idea of their separation, can be an important determinant of how the CAO does his job. They also indicate that a CAO's stance on the separation of policy and administration carries with it a particular conception of the political. CAOs who believe most strongly that policy and administration should be, or are in their own municipalities, the exclusive preserves of council and staff respectively, tend to conceive of the political in ways that justify or create distance between themselves and councillors. To the extent that this distance impairs
the exercise of legitimate influence by both the CAO and the councillors it seems inefficient. It may also prejudice effective teamwork between council and staff.

Finally, CAO No.6's account of his distinction between awareness and involvement, which is closely related to, if not another form of, the policy-administration distinction, is noteworthy from both methodological and theoretical points of view. That is, it was offered spontaneously as part of a response to the outwardly unrelated item 12d on the CAO's personal image in the eyes of councillors and staff. However problematical this particular strategy appears, it shows that conscious deliberation along these lines does go on. This suggests that analysis of the kind being done here should have some potential as a catalyst for individual change. His determination to separate awareness and involvement, while allowing that council and staff have equal needs for (and, presumably, should have equal access to) policy-related and administration-related "data", may be a critical inconsistency.

2. CAOs' Perceptions of Councillors and Staff as Similar or Different (Item 22g).

The primary intent of asking CAOs "how similar to or different from one another are elected councillors and permanent staff?", was to add detail to the policy-administration picture. More specifically, it was expected to yield some indication of the content and centrality of "professionalism" and "expertise", and to elaborate further upon "political".

Of the 16 CAOs of whom this question was asked, 14 perceived the
two groups to be different, I perceived them to be similar, and I
(CAO No.20) simply observed non-judgementally that the now-retired
former municipal engineer is now a councillor.

CAO No.18, who perceives councillors and staff to be essentially
similar, noted that the typically longer service of staff is the only
notable basis for difference. It seems consistent that the policy-
administration distinction is not significant for this CAO. As he sees
it, the full-time status of many of the members of his council means
that, spending so much time at city hall where they have their own
offices, they are well-positioned to become involved by accident or by
design in the entire range of municipal activities. So, rather than
try to police a defined staff preserve, his general approach is to
maintain a constant flow of staff initiatives. The rationale seems to
be that councillors who are kept busy reacting to staff proposals, are
thought to have little time available to "muck right in" in the graphic
phrase of CAO No.19.

In general, the reasons given by those CAOs who perceive
fundamental differences between councillors and staff tend to be very
short and not very persuasive. It seems that only a few had previously
given any thought to the matter. This factor notwithstanding, most
asserted their views quite forcefully. This was true of CAO No.28 who
responded that the two were different without giving any reason.
Moments later, in response to the interviewer's probe, he conceded that
a politician's ability can make him similar to staff.

The probe in question concerned the case of Mr. Peter Wong who was
then in his first term as Mayor of Sudbury, having been elected after
being relieved of his position as City Engineer. A second common probe was to ask if the respondent thought that councillors and staff members could trade places easily and, if not, why not.

CAO Nos. 4 and 31 also responded that the two were different without giving a reason. Notably, the former had begun his career in municipal government as a councillor.

CAO Nos. 9 and 12, both strong supporters of the policy-administration distinction, attributed the difference between councillors and staff to their respective roles. CAO No. 9 elaborated by saying, "certainly the ability is there, the capacity is there; I don't think that any of the council members are dummies, that's for sure."

In response to the case of Mr. Wong, CAO No. 12 discounted it as an exception, and then offered very strong criticism of municipal staff members who run in school board elections. In his view they are taking unfair advantage of the opportunities for public exposure afforded by their municipal positions. This more than anything else seemed to be the basis for his general opposition to "crossovers" between elected and appointed positions.

Two other CAOs, Nos. 6 and 13, defined the difference between staff and councillors in the prescriptive role-related terms of staff not telling council what it wants to hear. Since telling or not telling council what it wants to hear is a matter of perception, and since perceptions can be expected to vary across individual staff members and individual councillors, it hardly seems to make the case for a fundamental difference.

For CAO Nos. 1, 17 and 35, the difference was attributed to
"knowledge", "technical expertise", and "understanding" respectively:

CAO No.1: How similar? I don't think there is any similarity at all... The people we have on staff are completely knowledgeable of the work they have to do; I don't think that the councillors are. They are not knowledgeable of the work that staff has to do." (Interviewer: Not even the veterans?) "I think the veterans are but we had seven new members this year on council.

CAO No.17: I guess, you know, the staff has got a very definite technical role. I don't think anybody could wander into being a City Engineer, any member of council, anymore than I could. I don't believe anybody could probably become a member of council, as they need a particular training. And the very nature of the people getting elected these days, it doesn't mean any particular qualifications therefore. You know the old consensus is that any member of staff can become a member of council, but there aren't many generalists jobs in this organization that members of council can step into. They are mostly technically oriented. The only non-technical job around here is my own, and I don't think that any member of council can step into this job, and do it in some varying form of capability; and I mean that quite sincerely.

CAO No.35: Politicians simply don't understand what departments do, how they work.

As a mere assertion CAO No.35's statement requires no comment. The decisiveness of the other two despite their rather obvious internal contradictions even (or especially) allowing for a lack of previous thought, suggests status-based defensiveness.

Finally, two CAOs based the councillor/staff differences they perceived, vaguely on personality and style respectively. CAO No.19 responded to this question just after explaining how he takes new councillors aside before their first council meeting "to work them over a bit in a nice sort of way". His objectives are to establish his expectations, and to identify those who are likely to give him a tough time, whom he referred to as "the arrangers and operators". He then conceded that he calls himself an "arranger", "but not in the same
When the interviewer pursued the differences between arranging as done by himself and arranging as done by councillors, CAO No.15 grew less and less convincing, which he himself seemed finally to recognize:

What I am doing is I am not arranging things in terms of the political attitude towards them. I am arranging them in terms of the staff presentation and what the pure staff position is. Now if you believe all that, you believe more than I think you will. [Joint laughter]... We like to think that it is pure all the time, but we never completely remove from the political forum. We would be asses if we did... [B]ecause you must maintain the position and the dignity of that group... [I]n all instances it has to appear to be as pure as it can be.

This CAO seems to sense both the weakness of what he terms "the pure staff position", and his need for something like an apolitical shield which he cannot articulate. One suspects, however, from sentiments such as 'working new councillors over', and from his "basis" agenda, that his shield, such as it is, is used primarily for control for its own sake.

For CAO No.21, "the two main things that make politicians different" are that "they are more colorful for one thing [and] they are less disciplined." When asked if it was possible for politicians to develop discipline, he replied negatively that "I think that's the style... of the person that is attracted to that vocation."

In sum, then, it seems that most CAOs are predisposed to regard councillors as different from staff members in some fundamental way. Most either cannot articulate these differences or cannot supply differences that are plausible. For many who responded this item seems to have brought to consciousness for the first time an unconscious...
unfavorable view of councillors in general. That this stereotype is associated with CAOs' perceptions of the proper roles of council and staff seems clear.

As with support for policy-administration, the existence of this stereotype would seem to limit the potential for involving councillors as full members of a corporate team. To the extent that perceived differences are thought not to be a function of schooling, of experience in the municipal environment, or of information, CAOs may forego opportunities to expose councillors to certain analytic techniques or information possessed by staff.

3. The Least Preferred Councillors (Item 22b)

Thirty-one (31) CAOs, or 83.8% of those interviewed, were asked to describe some of the "traits or behaviors of past or present councillors with whom you least prefer to work". The idea for this item came from Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-worker (LPC) scale which was mentioned in Chapter 2. Recall that Fiedler's subjects were required to rate their Least Preferred Co-worker on 16 eight-step bipolar adjective scales, the sum being defined as a measure of a "task versus relationship motivation" personality trait. In this research the idea of the least preferred co-worker (i.e. councillor) was used as a stimulus without the LPC scales.

For 4 of the respondents (CAOs No.16, 20, 23 and 33) there are no councillors with whom they report that they do not, or cannot, get along. The broad range of possible responses to this question made somewhat challenging the classification of the 273 least preferred.
councillors that were described, into the two major categories of Table 6-2.

Table 6-2: Characteristics of Least Preferred Councillors (n=31)

I. LPC disagrees with or criticizes staff and councillors in public, and/or refuses to accept the majority decision (Number of CAOs = 15)

CAO No.19: "Well I had one person . . . [who] staff/CAO every time I was addressing a matter in council, he would just rip right, left, and centre. And I thought: 'What the Christ, is it me, is it him, or is it a misunderstanding?'"

CAO No.26: "[T]he feeling that the administration is a bunch of crooks, and they leave with the same feeling. And also members of council that criticize you in public, I mean really criticize you!"

CAO No.35: "All sorts of faces flash across . . . generally knocking your administration for their own particular reasons to achieve their own objectives whatever they may be."

CAO No.28: "I don't think you see much of it here, but there were 3 or 4 or 5 of them in [my former municipality] You know, their attitude is all wrong . . . Their attitude is that staff are wrong or staff are making some recommendation for their own gain whatever that might be perceived--I could never figure it out . . . [A]nd it annoys the rest of council as well as it disrupts council meetings or committee meetings. Most of these guys are off on their own thing."

CAO No.24: "I think those that concern me the most are the ones that, you know, are not prepared to accept the majority rule of the council, and will continue to fight battles after the issue has been resolved. . . . There are another type of councillor, and you have seen these, who will use the administration at every opportunity to try and advance their own position, and usually this is done by being critical of the administration. . . ."

CAO No.27: "Those that don't want to work as a team. Those that, if they lose a vote, still want to carry it on, and they can't get on with the job."

Continued on next page
Table 6-2, continued

II. LPC has personal weakness(es) (Number of CAOs = 13)

CAO No.9: "The rigid council member who in spite of your arguments or in spite of all of the reasons why they should not vote or behave or act the way they do, they continue to act that way. . . . Like I'm not saying that that's necessarily always the person who is against everything. (Interviewer: So it's a person with whom you cannot reason?) That's right."

CAO No.22: "There's none that I least prefer. I work with all. But there is one slimy councillor [who's] a despicable man. He's a slimy individual, totally untrustworthy, and I don't like him because I don't like the man, and he doesn't have a brain."

CAO No.31: "I suppose you would always classify, and can easily classify council and, you know, put 'em in a little niche. . . . [Going back to treasury I prefer to deal with those who understand finance, rather than] somebody--a housewife to put it bluntly [who] gets an idea because she heard about it at the coffee club . . . just totally impractical, although she thinks that it is a good idea."

Of the sample traits described in Table 6-2 perhaps those classified as "personal weaknesses" require the least explanation. The dogmatism and untrustworthiness perceived by the CAOs in the first two examples appear to be common enough dislikes. However, without more evidence, one can't judge whether or not they are well founded. Despite CAO No.9's claim to the contrary he may be casting simple disagreement as dogmatism; after all, some of his earlier-quoted views seem to be somewhat dogmatically held. In contrast, CAO No.31's comments suggest that the personal background of its proponent may for him be the key initial indicator an idea's practicality. They also reflect a strong belief in functional expertise.

CAO No.22's comments are noteworthy for denying that he has a
least preferred councillor, and then describing just such a councillor in very strong language. This is the sort of contradiction that is commonly perceived to be a failure of elected officials. It seems worth noting as well that CAO No.22 thinks that appointed officials must often perform in the fashion of elected officials simply in order to do their job effectively. He mentioned, for example, his need to respond strongly to criticism from councillors that is made in open council.

The interpretation of category I comments in Table 6.2 is problematic. On the surface they seem to be about unreasonableness and unfair advantage. More deeply they seem to be about conflict and dominance and dissent, that is about the political dimension of the job and the organization. CAO No.24, who supports the policy-administration territorial split, provides a good contrast to CAO No.22; while the latter would respond in kind to the attempt to use staff for leverage, the former would suffer the perceived territorial violation in silence.

CAO No.19 seems to fall between CAO No.22 and CAO No.24 in his response to open criticism. He reported resolving his situation satisfactorily through a "man-to-man" confrontation in private. For him conflict is to be watched for and dealt with immediately by "man-to-manning it" in private. CAO No.28 and CAO No.35 seem mystified by the reasons and objectives of their least-preferred councillors. It seems that they would rather plead ignorance of, or express disgust in interviews at, such maneuvers than respond in kind.

This general perception of open disagreement as illegitimate
anticipates the conflict-handling and disagreement results to be reported later.

4. CAOs' Perceptions of Effectiveness (Items 22d and 14).

Item 22d asked the CAO to "describe the present council". Since it occurred in the sequence of questions dealing with council and staff roles, the responses were expected to focus upon council's performance of its role. If a probe was required it usually suggested that the performance of the present council be compared with that of a previous council. Item 14 asked the respondent "What does it mean to be very effective in this job". It was hoped that the responses to these two items would illuminate CAOs' perceptions about proper and preferred roles.

A total of 16 (43.2%) CAOs were asked to respond to item 22d. Seven (7) respondents indicated dissatisfaction with the present council, 6 were satisfied, and 3 were neutral. Five (5) of the 7 dissatisfied CAOs—Nos. 6, 13, 17, 24, and 30—cited conflict among councillors as the main reason for council's ineffectiveness. Conversely, CAO No.1 explained the higher level of effectiveness of his current council in terms of the absence of "deliberately destructive" councillors. CAO No.17's brief response is perhaps the strongest description of ineffectiveness attributed to perverseness:

Council are perceived to be a fractious, argumentative, uncoordinated and generally malicious group, and it is an environment for cheap shots, and that tends to reflect obviously on the administration.

In this case, as with CAO No.30's, a very small minority of
"deliberately destructive" councillors can evidently be relied upon to obstruct council's work at virtually every turn.

Five (5) respondents—CAO Nos. 3, 10, 12, 21, and 27—explained effectiveness in terms of traits or styles of councillors as individuals. Parochialism, meaning an inability or a refusal of councillors to adopt a city-wide or corporate perspective, was cited in three instances. In two of these instances parochialism was associated with a ward-based electoral system.

In the third, CAO No. 21 suggested only half in jest that he should give each of his councillors a subscription to the Globe and Mail, in order to try to overcome their rural conservative outlook. CAO No. 27 observed that the penchant of councillors in recent years for working full-time at their elected jobs, was responsible for attracting "the wrong type" of person to the position. The "housewife" was "the wrong type" cited. In his view, such "wrong types" working full-time are responsible for conducting an excessive amount of municipal business in public, with what he views as its lower attendant level of effectiveness. CAO No. 24 also complained, in response to another item, that the transformation of the councillor's job from part-time to full-time, had increased the number of unwarranted demands on his time.

CAO Nos. 9 and 23 did not evaluate their respective council's effectiveness, the former saying that, with about 40% of freshmen councillors "the jury is still out".

The responses of the 26 CAOs (70.3%) who were asked to respond to item 14, were interpreted against Kotter's list of six "Key Challenges and Dilemmas", which was presented earlier. In Table 6-3 each of
Kotter's three key responsibilities and relationships is presented in turn, along with sample CAO responses where appropriate. An "Other" category has been added to accommodate responses which escape Kotter's categories.

Table 6-3 indicates that the CAOs' responses and Kotter's categories are not a particularly good match. Several factors affect the interpretation of this result. First, Kotter's list is the product of his analysis of information from several sources. Second, one presumes that the GMs themselves contributed little of the language used in the list. Thus one should not expect to be able to construct a corresponding list solely from CAO interview responses. CAO No.26, who seems to have consciously analyzed most of the issues under investigation here, explained in response to another item that

[It's hard to explain what a [CAO] does, and it's embarrassing and frustrating. They are very busy people. They can't say that they produce the garbage or whatever. They just make everything run.]

Perhaps Kotter's list will provide a useful framework which CAOs can use to think about what they do.

The above factors notwithstanding, it does seem noteworthy that none of the responding CAOs thought about personal effectiveness in terms of Kotter's goal setting and resource allocation responsibilities. This observation is explored further in related contexts in the next sections.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of CAOs</th>
<th>Statement of Responsibilities/Relationships (Abbreviated as needed) and Sample Responses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Setting basic goals, policies, and strategies despite great uncertainties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Keeping on top of a very large and diverse set of activities. Being able to identify problems (&quot;fires&quot;) that are out of control and to solve them quickly.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAO No. 4: &quot;I think you've got to be on top as administrator, available, have ... swift answers ... and get co-operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Getting the information, cooperation and support needed from bosses to do the job. Being demanding with superiors without being perceived as uncooperative.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CAO No. 7: &quot;Well, you obviously have to ... gain the respect of council [and] I do have excellent rapport with the mayor ... We try to eliminate any surprises; walking into council meetings and getting something for the first time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAO No. 13: &quot;I guess being effective ... is to point out to [council] the weaknesses in what they have been doing ... I'm very, very, very--I don't think I like to think ... the word isn't 'political'--that I'm more politically wise ... to have them develop the trust in you that you can ... get these changes to take place.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Getting corporate staff, other relevant departments or divisions, and important external groups (e.g., big unions, or customers, or suppliers) to cooperate despite the lack of any formal authority over them; getting things done through them, despite resistance, red tape and the like.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAO No. 10: &quot;The secret of management is to involve as many actors as you can and still get action.&quot;</td>
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Continued on next page
CAO No. 34: "To see things coming out of the other end of the pipe, I guess, you know, to look at a community and see that you have got a future that is taken care of and you are moving things along to achieve that particular goal. [Even the councillors] who were against [establishing the CAO position] don't raise that issue at all."


CAO No. 8: "Hire competent staff, let them exercise authority within their areas of responsibility, and praise them for meeting expectations, or hold them accountable for not meeting expectations, and stress to them that working for the city is not just a job."

CAO No. 35: "[T]here is a lot of change going on at the present time ... whether it's demographic, or brought about by technology, communication ... and so much of my time is attempting to motivate people to recognize these changes ... and do something about it in the context of their own responsibilities ... and that applies to council as well."

OTHER

CAO No. 17: "I really think communications ... is not exactly the word, but I believe as many people as possible who have to be aware of an issue at any one time are aware of it, and aware of what is happening with it, and the council have as much good material in front of them as possible to enable them to make good decisions."

CAO No. 16: "Cost efficiency."

CAO No. 24: "Well, number one, he is going to have to be the leader of the administration and he will have to demonstrate strong leadership skills [and] have a broad knowledge of local government. ... And he is going to have to work closely with the council."
5. The Incidence and Nature of Formal Performance Evaluations (Item 15)

Performance evaluations or appraisals are of course one of the most common tools used by organizations to promote good performance (see e.g., De Vries, et al. 1983). An annual performance appraisal session can also provide an established opportunity for the CAO and his evaluator(s) to review, and to adjust as required, their respective role and performance expectations.

Kotter characterizes a good performance appraisal system as one that can help a GM focus on the entire job and can help him balance the various aspects of the job appropriately. [It should also be a flexible tool which the GM can use as a part of his network-building activity. (1982a, 141)]

If they concentrate on "short-run or quantifiable performance only", they undermine balance; if they create conflict, they undermine network building among subordinates. All of Kotter's GMs appear to have had formal performance appraisals.

CAO No.14 reported using his annual performance evaluation sessions with each of his department heads, to reinforce his expectation that "you get yourself and your department people a little bit more up to speed on what your systems needs are going to be and those types of things". Yet although he had had "a couple of formal performance appraisals" from the mayor, he didn't get one "this year".

He noted that although he got "continuous feedback" from individual councillors on "the trivial stuff", "on the big things . . . you don't get any feedback". At another point in the interview he identified one bit of "feedback" on what may have been one of the "big
things". He had been accused of presenting council committee's with "light agendas". Since he regarded the accusation as unfounded, he took no positive action (say, a deliberate collective exchange with councillors) to resolve it. A formal performance appraisal would provide a major regular opportunity to refine the difference between the "the trivial stuff" and the "big things", and possibly to resolve outstanding claims of a critical nature.

This situation may usefully be compared with a situation reported by CAO No.13. One of his conscious objectives is to create opportunities for councillors to become involved in non-traditional areas. For example, twice a year he arranges an informal meeting between all councillors and all union representatives, that is removed in time from contract negotiations. The sole purpose of these meetings, for which there is no agenda, is to exchange views on an unrestricted range of interests and concerns.

Periodically CAO No.13 hears, indirectly that several councillors think the "administration is running the show". His most recent response was to add an item to the in camera portion of each committee agenda to this effect: "The [CAO] intends to talk ... about the suggestion [he has] heard from a few quarters that the administration is running the show". These sessions revealed that one councillor was largely responsible for propagating this view of excessive control by the administration. When given the opportunity to substantiate his view he could not identify "one thing... where I had done something administratively that he saw as a councillor role".

Although it is by no means a substitute for many such
opportunities to review expectations, the potential of the regular annual performance evaluation of the CAO is substantial.

The interviews established that 22 of the 31 CAOs questioned, or 71%, do not have a formal performance evaluation. As Table 6-4 indicates, those who are satisfied with their present evaluation arrangements outnumber the dissatisfied by at least 2 to 1, whether or not they have a formal evaluation.

Table 6-4: Performance Evaluation Incidence and Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAO HAS Performance Evaluation</th>
<th>CAO DOES NOT HAVE Performance Evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAOs Satisfied</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOs Dissatisfied</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For most of those who have a formal evaluation, it is done by the mayor, assisted in a few cases by one or more members of council, or by a council committee, on the same form that is used for the other employees. In one case the other members of the SMT also complete an evaluation form for the CAO. Two CAOs who do not have formal evaluations suggested that their performance is evaluated "every two weeks", meaning that they are evaluated at each council meeting.
6. The Traits and Skills of the Effective CAO (Item 31).

Item 31 required the respondents to indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, how important each trait or skill from a list of 17 "which may be found among senior managers", "is to the effective performance of your CAO's job". As noted previously this item was often left with the respondent to complete, for want of time during the interview. Furthermore, when it was covered in the interview, shortage of time or the respondent's preferences often meant that only the three most important, and the three least important, traits and skills were identified. Since these latter data were the one's collected from the largest number of respondents, 30 and 27 respondents respectively, they alone will be reported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-5: Traits and Skills Ranked Most and Least Important</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. MOST IMPORTANT (n₁=30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Motivating others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Confident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Achievement-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. &quot;Reading&quot; elected officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Emotional stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. LEAST IMPORTANT (n₁=27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Memory for detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Knowledge of provincial legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Optimistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Good sense of humor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Face-to-face negotiating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-5 shows the five traits and skills which were ranked among...
the three most important and the three least important by the highest numbers of respondents.

The roughly half of the respondents who ranked "motivating others" among the three "most important" traits and skills, contrasts with the 23% who described job effectiveness in Kotter's "motivating and controlling" terms. The difference may be attributable simply to the open-ended nature of the effectiveness item, as against the forced-choice nature of the present item. The "most important" list is also comprised of three traits—confident, achievement oriented, and emotional stability—that may be thought of as elements of the mature personality, rather than as skills that can be acquired deliberately through training.

While the predispositions to motivate others and to "read" elected officials may have their roots in personality, skill in one's motivating and "reading" seems to be conceived of more appropriately in such terms as personality and time on the job, than in terms of training. If the respondents' collective sense of traits and skills required for CAO effectiveness is shared by their councils and SMTs, and if the CAOs do not possess them, one must wonder question how much potential there is for designing training programs to endow or to enhance such traits and skills.

The presence of "achievement oriented" seems to raise the question of the perceived importance of "goal and objective" setting", that is, about determining "what" to achieve. Goal setting was ranked among the three "most important" by only 20% of the respondents, and placed sixth behind "emotional stability". It may be recalled that none of the CAOs
referred to "setting basic goals", Kotter's first-listed key responsibility (see Table 6-3), as part of the image of the very effective CAO.

There is marginally wider agreement among the respondents about the two "least important" traits and skills, than about the "most important" one. "Knowledge of provincial legislation" may be taken at face value, as most CAOs rely on the municipal solicitor in this regard. However, "memory for detail" is not as neat.

"Memory for detail" comes out of the discussion in Chapter 3 of management by exception and attention to detail. It was concluded there that these terms have no "standard" referent, and that their meaning to individual CAOs may be revealing. "Memory for detail" was expected to generate some sense of the amount, and the kind, of detail councils expect CAOs and staff to supply, both on the spot during meetings, and as a matter of course in reports. The focus of this line of thought in the interviews was on council's expectations in public meetings.

One of the practical indications or implications of such expectations may be the composition of the staff contingent at committee and council meetings. The presence of the CAO and all department heads at council meetings, may indicate council's ongoing concern with too much detail or with inappropriate details. Conversely, the council that prefers or that has been conditioned to accept only the CAO present at its meetings, may be better at thinking collectively and at a higher level of abstraction. Clearly, there are more considerations to be analyzed than can be addressed here. The range of interpretations of "memory for detail" can be seen in the
following comments:

CAO No.35: "When we talk about senior managers, certainly it's very convenient when you're on your feet in a tight situation to have a memory for detail. But it shouldn't really be necessary because the senior managers really aren't dealing in detail, apart from dealing with technology, these days. . . . So I don't see memory for detail as anything particularly important in senior management."

CAO No.36: "I would put memory for detail--it's going to come out wrong--at a 4, because it is the little things that screw you up, and sometimes you have to make certain things have happened in a certain way."

CAO No.10: "I think . . . that if [a CAO] becomes a . . . you know, totally involved in detail (laughing), he has got to be in real bad trouble, eh? It is great to be able to remember that you passed something fifteen years ago (laughing), but you are not going to find it anyway, and you are not going to remember it word for word either."

Perhaps the wider agreement suggested by the 51.9% should be discounted in view of the disparate meanings assigned to "memory for detail". That most CAOs who responded to item 31 in the interview rated or ranked "memory for detail" without hesitation suggests that the term "detail" is meaningful to CAOs in some symbolic way. Unfortunately the small number of elaborating comments obtained makes extended interpretation inadvisable.

Presumably it was Kotter's impression of the GMs, rather than the impression of the GMs themselves, that they were optimistic. Perhaps the low importance assigned to optimism is nothing more than an eye of the beholder effect. As with detail, elaborating comments were few. Even without many such comments on a "good sense of humor" one may conclude from its low ranking that the CAOs disagree with Campbell's view of the value of a sense of humor which was cited in Chapter 4. Laughter was noted earlier in this chapter as a general feature of the
interviews. Perhaps it reflected as much upon the interviewer as upon the CAOs interviewed. Since they were not observed over time with other staff members, it is impossible to compare them with the GMs on this point.

Finally, several side comments suggest that the low importance given to "face-to-face negotiating" by the CAOs is based on taking it to mean "collective bargaining" which is often assigned to the personnel department.

C. Managerial Styles

1. Self-attributed Managerial Styles (Item 12)

Thirty-four (34) of the 37 interviewees were asked to respond to item 12. Although a few of them paused to reflect upon their responses, none required an explanation of managerial style. For CAO Nos.1, 6, and 35, it brought to mind The Managerial Grid or Situational Leadership, with which they had become familiar through a professional development seminar or, in one case, through an undergraduate business course. CAO No.35's response reads like a testimonial for Situational Leadership:

There isn't such a thing as a style which you adopt, of course, and you adopt a different style depending on the situation and the people that you're dealing with as such. Sometimes it's got to be persuasive; sometimes it's got to be coercive. ... Therefore, flexibility in style is ... a key.

CAO No.6's response is interesting for the ways in which it both parallels and diverges from CAO No.35's. The former responded to part (a) of item 12 by characterizing his preferred style as a mixture of
leading by example and of encouraging subordinates:

I guess that I have always taken the point of view that—and I know this is going to sound corny and all the rest of it, but—the strength of a public organization particularly is dealing with people. And if you can get people to perform either by showing, whether it be by personal example or otherwise, or by simply encouraging them to help themselves, I have always found that to be the best approach, although I have been called an autocrat and many other terrible things.

However, his response to part (c), which is about desired style changes, reveals a "firmness" conception of his style similar to the persuasive-coercive dimension of CAO No.35. Persuasion-coercion parallels the "selling-telling" and "team member-boss" themes that are central respectively to Situational Leadership and The Managerial Grid. Nonetheless, CAO No.6 resists being "pigeon-holed" within some such formal schema:

Sometimes you have to be more firm with people around you and maybe sometimes you have to be less firm. And I would rather look at it from that kind of a fluid basis, than say, uh 'this year I am going to be a little more stern than I was last year or this year I am going to be a little more soft than I was the year before.' I just don't see it that way. I see the change ... basically you change to suit the circumstances.

That is why I have difficulty when you raise things like management styles. I have been through the academic side of, you know, everybody who has been in a commerce or business program has: . . . I don't take a great deal of stock in any particular mould, and you are sort of doomed to life with those characteristics or 'see what pigeon-hole we can put them in'.

Within the terms of CAO No.6's own perceptions, his changes "to suit the circumstances" are changes of degrees of firmness only. This seems somewhat inconsistent with his desire to avoid being "pigeon-holed". Since CAO No.6 is among the most reflective and articulate of respondents, this observation seems to underline the difficulty
inherent in describing and analyzing complex work relationships and situations. The language of personal style seems to be a shorthand that loses a lot of information in the note-taking process.

It seems worth noting as a final introductory comment, that only two respondents at any point in the interview, credited their effectiveness in any endeavor to their style. Both of these references occurred in response to items other than item 12. CAO No.12 credited smooth relations between council and staff to his style; CAO No.16 regarded his style as being responsible for council's acceptance of computerization, noting that it had rejected essentially the same proposal from his predecessor.

The managerial styles described by the responding CAOs were grouped into the three thematic categories shown in Table 6-6. It can be seen from the sample responses that the Grid or Situational Leadership "basic styles" could not have been used effectively to classify the responses.

Almost all of the respondents for whom style evokes thoughts of relationships with others, focussed those thoughts on their department heads, on "managing down" as it were. The lone exception among the examples cited in Table 6-6 is CAO No.13, whose thoughts focussed on councillors in meeting situations. This orientation of CAOs toward staff in the matter of managerial style is consistent with the policy-administration perspective. Accordingly, there would appear to be considerable potential for the development among CAOs of the idea of "managing up", with Kotter's fourth key challenge--getting support from superiors--in mind. This would require CAOs to accept that
Table 6-6: CAOs' Descriptions of Their Managerial Styles (n = 34)

Style Theme A: Form of Action (individual-team) and Motive for Action (coercion-persuasion)

Number of responses: 24 of 34 (70.6%)

CAO No.9: "Benevolent dictatorship. (Interviewer: What does that mean?) I mean that everyone knows what my expectations are, and as long as they keep rising to them, I have no problem. I don't try to tell them how to do their job, provided they're meeting certain minimums that I've set and made known to them. But if they fall short, then they know there is a confrontation that they are going to have to go through."

CAO No.18: "I guess my managerial style is one of co-operation rather than confrontation. And if I...Quite often department heads will be at each other on a particular...It's usually a report. The planner won't agree with what the city engineer is trying to do. Rather than have them go off and battle and jump up in front of council against each other--I don't like to see that in front of council--we like to see the department heads all agree. So I get them together and we sort it out. And the report is quite often usually changed to everyone's satisfaction. That's number one."

CAO No.19: "I try to have a style that treats the department heads with respect. I guess I want them to respect the position and I want this position to show respect to them. I guess basically what I am trying to do is that they can consider me as fairly reasonable and honest with them. That is very important to me, is that they get a sense that I am trying to be honest with them at every level and everything we do in terms of being together. . . . I don't like to be a very domineering person, you know. That's all hellfire and all this bullshit that can develop if you have a hero in this job. I am not like that. [I am] I suppose what could be classed as reasonably easy going, unless there is a reason not to be easy going, because then I normally become very angry . . . you know, if I feel 'well, the sonofabitch, he's abusing his privileges in this system', then it can get to be pretty tight and heavy, and I have gone through it in a fair number of occasions in my dealings with them."

CAO No.29: "First of all I believe in making use of the abilities that people have. In other words, I don't believe in doing the work of the lawyer, or doing the work of the engineer . . . but I believe in overseeing or directing. I don't know whether that's...like I could expand on it...but in essence I guess I want my people to do what you pay them to do, but at the same time I want to oversee it, make sure it fits in with the total organization's needs as opposed to the individual department's needs. . . . I really don't believe in this 'under the thumb' kind of operation."

Continued on next page
Table 6-6, continued

Style Theme B: Personal Bearing or Visibility

Number of Responses: 5 of 34 (14.7%)

CAO No.12: "My managerial style? Relatively easy, easy going, right. Rely greatly on putting the right people in the right job and try to support them, uh, strongly, among other things."

CAO No.13: "It's not what I would call 'low key'. I probably tend to be fairly aggressive when it comes to committee meetings and taking part in...maybe sometimes sort of being the advocate that gets...Now I like to think I have a sense for how...a sense that I can see some councillors there who aren't agreeing with what is happening but aren't saying anything. So I might tend to be a bit provocative in those situations and try and get what's bothering them out into the open."

Style Theme C: Other

Number of Responses: 5 of 34 (14.7%)

CAO No.7: "I sort of have a philosophy of trying to bring out the best in people. For example, I inherited this job and I also inherited the staff which went with it. There are...here is a variety of styles and a variety of people. Within that management complex there are certain individuals that I am extremely unhappy about but I, don't feel that I should say that they are all bad simply because of one or two who, in my opinion, when I get the opportunity, I will fire. But there again, that has its problems, because of firing there is a cost. You have to weigh that cost against the possibility of the best can be brought out of that person."

CAO No.33: "I guess a pragmatic individual and, again, with my experience and my age, I tend perhaps to fly by the seat of my pants. Somebody asked me the other day about goals and objectives, and I, uh, I said 'no', I said, 'that is something that has never really got me excited', uh. You can put all the things down on paper that you like, but when it comes down to getting something done, it is still up to the individual, and he doesn't have to read a line on a piece of paper to know whether he is doing a good job or not, or what he has to achieve."

Motivating councillors to implement their agendas requires the same array of network building and maintenance skills as motivating department heads.

This "managing up" reasoning is also applicable to the first key
challenge, goal-setting. Both challenges require a broader view of "political" than is contained within the policy-administration perspective.

Nearly three responses in four reflect the theme of securing compliance to obtain action. Most of these also indicate how close the CAO perceives himself to be to those being influenced. This in turn may convey a perception of individual or collective action. Thus the "benevolent dictatorship" response of CAO No.9 suggests that he tends to act from his positional authority. CAO No.18's perception is of cooperation in the cause of collective action or teamwork. In CAO No.19's response, "respect" more than positional authority is perceived as driving teamwork which is suggested by "being together".

The second common theme—personal bearing or visibility—is suggested in the examples by "easy going" and "not...low key". These bring to mind conceptions such as Golightly's in which style is named after a dominant trait observable to others.

The third style classification is the usual "Other" category, represented in Table 6-6 by a "philosophy of trying to bring out the best" and "a pragmatic individual".

The responses reflect varying degrees of confidence, certainty, involvement, and enthusiasm. Some responses convey a sense of authenticity: one imagines the respondent acting in just the way his words describe. Others do not. Of course, these senses were enhanced for the interviewer by other cues such as body language, and by other evidence such as the reactions of other employees with whom the CAO interacted in the interviewer's presence. Trips to the cafeteria
provided one opportunity for such interaction on several visits.

The style responses just reviewed reinforce comments made earlier regarding the validity and usefulness of Grid and Situational Leadership results. As forced-choice instruments designed for broad application, they discount the natural variety captured with an open-ended instrument. However, in obtaining the perceptions of other groups with whom the principal respondent works, Situational Leadership at least, contains an authenticity check of sorts. As was anticipated at the design stage, in the absence of systematic data on others' perceptions of CAOs' styles, the styles that the CAOs attribute to themselves should be viewed as preferences as much as practices.

Thus, one cannot judge at this point, whether or not their department heads and councillors would agree with those respondents who describe their managerial style as persuasive and team-oriented. One can only observe that a majority of respondents prefer to be thought of as limiting or avoiding coercion based on authority, and as being team-oriented. This fundamental preference may be tested for compatibility with others as the responses unfold.

In view of the concern just expressed about the concordance of others' perceptions of the CAOs' styles with the CAOs' themselves, it seems appropriate to discuss the responses to item 12d. Responses to this item were expected to reveal the extent to which CAOs, by design or otherwise, perceive themselves to project a particular personal style or to "leave a personal imprint" on their organizations.

Responses to this item were obtained from 25 of the 37 CAOs in the sample. Five (5) respondents, or 20%, were "not aware" of any
particular image held by others in the organization.

Of the remaining 20 CAOs, whose responses generally took the form of one or more simple traits, it seems noteworthy that only 2 alluded to the dominant persuasion-teamwork theme of item 12a. CAO No.12 responded that "if they are critical of me, they probably think that I support my staff too much". And CAO No.30 replied that he was perceived by council to be "soft" on his senior staff, that "the word is out that I should become nasty". An experience reported by CAO No.9, who once reacted in an openly angry way to a question in open council, seems relevant in this connection. He learned after the meeting that his outburst had reassured a number of councillors. They reasoned that a CAO capable of such an outburst, must be capable of getting tough with his department heads.

It seems inappropriate for councillors to convey a general expectation that the CAO should be tough toward his senior managers. In the interests of teamwork among councillors, CAO, and staff, the CAO should be taking (or creating) every opportunity to impart to councillors more productive expectations.

Among the images the other respondents attributed to themselves on behalf of others were: "honest", "firm, fair, tactful, and a workaholic", "a nice guy", "a kibitzer", "cool, clear, collected", "a pusher", and "someone who swears a lot". Apart from their almost uniformly favorable character, these traits are not very revealing.

Perhaps the most interesting conclusion that may be drawn from the responses to item 12d, is that none of the respondents seems to have a conscious objective of developing an organizational style along the
lines of his own personal style.

This is not to overlook the several respondents with strong convictions who are conscious of setting a personal example for others. The present writer suspects that interviews with others in their organizations would generate images of some CAOs as influential or infectious. Moreover in a few cases these images might suggest something of the character of the organization. But in no case, it is being suggested, would the character of the CAO and the character of the organization be generally coincident.

Of the 31 who were asked "how, if at all" their managerial styles of today differ from those of five or ten years ago, 12 (38.7%) replied that their styles had not changed. Seven (7), or 22.6%, responded that they now obtain compliance from subordinates in a less dictatorial fashion, and 2 report delegating much of the work that they would have done themselves in the past—all of which reflect the dominant persuasion-teamwork style theme.

It seems natural that an incumbent CAO should rely less on his formal authority as he gains experience and confidence on the job, especially if he remains with the same organization. This finding does raise the question of whether training can be designed to accelerate on-the-job experience. If experience can be compressed in this way, then the costs and risks associated with the trials and errors of unassisted experience may be reduced.

Five (5) respondents traced changes, such as "being less involved", getting away from accounting, and "having had to "become all things to all people", to their promotions from department head to CAO.
(One of the "no-change" respondents explicitly rejected this idea that promotion to CAO necessitated a change in style; to explain, he proposed a "ratio" in which the CAO is to department heads as department heads are to division heads.) The remaining 5 responses, which include being "less aggressive" and trying to avoid the "mitty gritty" ("detail" as symbol again), have no thematic similarity.

Twenty-two (22) of the 37 CAOs in the sample were asked if there "is anything about your managerial style that you would like to change?" (i.e., item 12c). Thirteen (13), or 59%, of these replied in the negative. It may be that style is not perceived to be related to whatever changes are contemplated by those who were reported earlier as being only "happy" with their own performance. Four (4) of the 9 who identified desired changes want to be "tougher", "firmer", "more forceful" and "more persuasive"; the changes desired by the remaining 5 include "more patience", and "saying less at council".

2. Conflict-handling Styles (Items 23 and 24)

Item 23 is the conflict-handling scale that was adapted from Garnier. The respondent was asked to indicate which one of five descriptions "comes closest to describing the way you most often handle disagreements in meetings with Senior Staff, with the Mayor, and with Council". The interviewer stressed in the interviews that the "meetings" referred to here were to be interpreted as "private". This was done to remove the presumed pressure of the public and the press toward conflict avoidance in open meetings of council.

Item 24 was designed to be a companion for item 23. That is, the
respondent's reported 'styles' of conflict-handling in the former, were to be compared with the respondent's accounts of specific disagreements with each of the three parties. This design objective was frustrated by the respondents' general inability or disinclination to remember disagreements in enough detail to support close analysis.

The distribution of responses to item 23 is shown in Table 6-7. The respondents displayed considerable resistance to selecting one of the five choices offered. Although only one CAO chose all five styles for the Senior Staff, 5 others qualified their style choices with such phrases as "depends on the issue", or "part of each, I call them as I see them". All but one of the 6 who qualified their responses selected a mixture of two styles. About 40% of the responses over all three sets of relationships comprise some mixture of the five categories offered. Although several motives may have driven this pattern of respondent reaction, it would appear to confirm suspicions expressed earlier about the validity of this particular instrument and of others in the same class.

A suspicion was also expressed in the same place that Problem Solving seemed to be more socially desirable than any of the others. As expected, it attracted the most respondents in all three relationship categories at least partly because, as CAO No.6 expressed it, E "is obviously the most appropriate". For the Senior Staff category, if the response "hybrids" of "E" are added to the 39.4% for "E" itself, a full two-thirds of the respondents are associated with Problem Solving. This preference is consistent from two perspectives
Table 6-7: Conflict-handling Style Responses

(% of Responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SR STAFF</th>
<th>MAYOR</th>
<th>COUNCIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Responses, (100%):</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. AVOIDING</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to avoid disagreements and to refrain from arguing when disagreements do arise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A+B+C+D+E</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. SMOOTHING</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to minimize disagreements which do arise by playing down differences and stressing common interests.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+C</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B+E</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. COMPROMISING</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement, and to negotiate a compromise position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+D</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C+E</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. FORCING</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I advance my position on contentious issues as forcefully as I can with a view both to convincing others of its merits, and to avoiding having to compromise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D+E</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
Table 6-7, continued

E. PROBLEM SOLVING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>39.4</th>
<th>25.0</th>
<th>21.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement, and to seek the others' help in finding a solution.

TOTAL     100.1%  100%  100%

Number of CAOs who report that they never disagree:

0 8 0

Note: Senior Staff TOTAL exceeds 100% owing to rounding.

with the CAOs' clear preference for teamwork discovered in the previous section. First, on the face of it, of the five conflict-handling styles Problem Solving appears to be the most compatible with teamwork. Second, in the terms of The-Managerial Grid, Problem Solving is designed to correspond with Team Management, "the one best style".

Forcing and Compromising are the second and third most common conflict-handling styles for both Senior Staff and Mayor categories, while Compromising and Avoiding occupy these positions for Council. The prominence of Forcing and, conversely, the avoidance of Avoiding, for Senior Staff were intimated in several of the style attributions of the previous section. CAO No. 19's "tight and heavy" phrase may be recalled. Forcing appears to be the only conflict-handling style that represents "toughness", which is a concern for some CAOs. Why Smoothing in its own right attracted no respondents in any of the three relationship categories remains a question.

Despite previously stated concerns about validity and social
desirability, one may safely infer from Table 6-7 that CAOs sense that conflict with elected officials is or should be treated differently than conflict with senior staff. This is consistent with the widely-held perception that councillors are basically different from staff. Additionally, CAOs differentiate between the mayor and the council in this respect. Here is CAO No.34's relatively brief response to item 23 which illustrates this differentiation nicely:

The Senior Staff is E, and having said that, if it is an issue related to the Mayor, uh, I'm going to go to D. (Interviewer: How about Council?) The same thing. Well my function is to present them with the facts and those facts should be correct and therefore D has to follow. And then C, I guess that is the next step, eh? As a staff person you know that you are going to wind up with C and you try to implement C to the best of your ability.

This thinking has something in common with his view that politicians are essentially different from administrators, which CAO No.34 supported by citing a comment his mayor had made a few days prior to the interview, "A politician's basic desire is to compromise, or otherwise he is not going to be re-elected". To this he added that, unlike the politician an Engineer is certainly not going to try "to please everyone"; rather, "his recommendations should normally be made on straight cold engineering facts".

These different approaches taken toward conflict with staff and with elected officials are amplified by the responses to item 24, which required the respondent to "describe in point form" a disagreement he had had within the past year with "each of Senior Staff, the Mayor and the Council (or one of its Committees)".

To jog the respondent's memory, and to facilitate the comparison
of responses, a list of 18 issues was provided. The list was compiled from a review of the City of Burlington weekly SMT agendas and meetings for the previous two years. Issues were selected both for the intensity of the disagreements that surrounded them, and to represent the broad range of local government affairs. This is to say that the present writer had personally witnessed in his day-to-day work for the City of Burlington, a strong disagreement on some aspect of each issue on the list. The parties to the disagreements varied, the most common being the members of the SMT, and the most common forum being the weekly SMT meeting.

In the light of this personal experience, the present writer finds the high proportion of respondents who, for whatever reason, did not identify a specific disagreement to be among the most remarkable aspects of the responses to item 24. For Senior Staff, Mayor, and Council, respectively, the proportions not identifying a specific disagreement are 33%, 67.9%, and 42.9%. These statistics are reinforced by another group of respondents who reported extremely minor and uninteresting disagreements, or potentially revealing disagreements in a sketchy or otherwise unrevealing manner.

What follows is a sample of responses to the disagreements item, chosen to reflect a range of both selected conflict-handling styles, and of substantive issues, for all three parties. Together the sample responses will demonstrate that the possibilities both for their analysis and for formulating useful generalizations are very limited.

CAO No. 29, who selected Problem Solving as his conflict-handling style with staff, drew a blank when he tried to remember a
disagreement with senior staff that took place "about three weeks ago," and which "lasted about forty-five seconds or so." He went on to explain that:

When I say 'disagreements' I don't mean they are ones where . . . like I don't believe in shouting, hollering, or getting mad. . . . I believe that temper control is something that is pretty important. So we agree to disagree and, uh, in this particular instance I just, you know, left it at that. This was the way it was till another time and, you know, another place. You might, uh, have something similar come along and talk about it.

Leaving the matter to another time and place seems more closely to resemble Avoiding than Problem Solving. However, without more detail about the situation little can be made of this apparent inconsistency.

This case may have implications for Garnier's conflict-handling styles. One can imagine much more substantial disagreements than this that require several encounters over time before they are resolved. In such cases leaving the matter unresolved for a later encounter (i.e., another time and place) may well be consistent with Problem Solving. This suggests that there may be an implicit time limit in Garnier's style descriptions, that limits their applicability for respondents.

CAO No. 35 provides a good contrast to CAO No. 29 on the relation between shouting and temper during a disagreement. The former also chose Problem Solving as his conflict-handling style with staff, and responded as follows:

"Is there an opposite to (A) [i.e., Avoiding]? Because that's me. You know we have good shut out battles around the not battles. We put everything on the table and are very frank about it. . . . I'll encourage others to join in and, hopefully, we'll come up with a corporate answer to it.

Interviewer: Do you find that the people you're dealing with around the department head table are actually open enough and prepared to be candid about it?"
Yes. No problem at all. If anything, you know, that's one of the strengths of our organization. . . . Sounds trite to say 'togetherness' as such, but generally it's as good a relationship as you could probably get. Everyone's very candid and frank and we have some real shouting matches, but all in a good sort of vein.

Thus, while CAO No.29 associates the term "disagreement" with shouting and losing one's temper, CAO No.35 associates disagreements with good-natured and controlled shouting. Although shouting is uncommon at SMT meetings in Burlington, the often intense give-and-take described by CAO No.35 accords with the experience of the present writer.

CAO No.1 selected Forcing and Problem Solving for handling conflicts with senior staff. The only recent disagreement he could recall was "a little spat" with his Planning Director over the latter's habit of "talk[ing] around" a question put to him at council, rather than answering "yes or no".

CAO No.26 "want[ed] to sit down at home and think about" his response to item 24, upon which he selected Forcing as his primary conflict-handling style with Senior Staff. He explained in the interview that he operates as an "unemotional, detached, technician", for whom conflict is not an important day-to-day concern:

If I get into a disagreement with a department head about something, I'm quite liable to say 'Well, OK, if that's the way you feel, you make your report to council and I'll append my note.' And that's it. And that doesn't happen very often. Frequently we have a discussion and we . . . he'll agree with me or I'll agree with him, eh, so it's a debate not a disagreement. So a disagreement is not my style.

He went on to characterize himself as "very hierarchically minded" and to characterize the organization as having "a very strong, almost military connotation". He explained that, just as he would not "make an
issue" with the mayor, out of something with which he disagreed "because I work for the mayor", so his staff would not "get into a row with me about something because they work for me". He concluded his comments on this item by saying: "We function very much as a team, but I'm the head of the team... I'm in charge, but hopefully it's not a dictatorial kind of thing. The buck stops here."

This explanation for the low incidence of disagreement strikes one as most convincing. It brings to mind Boyle's reference to the "Patton style of management" from which he converted Honeywell (1984, see also Chapter 4 above). Apart from its mission, the essence of the military organization is its authoritarian chain of command.

The reasonableness of CAO No.26's explanation is independent of whether or not one is persuaded by his distinction between disagreements and debates. Of much greater consequence is the notion of a "military team", which clearly was not intended by any previous use of the terms "team" and "teamwork". Its emergence in this case suggests again how dependent the study's observations and conclusions are on the use of language. Its emergence also leads one to wondering for how many less insightful and articulate respondents the military metaphor is apt.

The final example for senior staff was supplied by CAO No.36, who had earlier emphasized that "I really believe in this team stuff and I think we have got that instilled in our organization". Without hesitation, he recalled and described in detail two important disagreements with staff, and one with council. One disagreement involving senior staff was over whether or not department heads should
take a salary increase of 13.5%, as provided by a formula set out in a
by-law. The department heads had already received a 10% increase as an
interim settlement, and the unions and other management staff had
settled for 11.5%.

He went into the SMT meeting at which the issue was finally
resolved, with his "mind made up" that the SMT should recommend 10%,
and with a fall-back position of nothing higher than 11.5%. His
position was based mainly on sensitivity to public reaction ("we were
getting into all the restraint talk, 6-and-5 philosophy was coming and
so on"), and he was apprehensive about being embarrassed at council ("I
am not going to go back and embarrass myself in front of council for
another 1.5"). Finally, he was aware that the members of the SMT
were divided into several factions on the issue, and that he was in the
smallest one.

This is his description of how the issue was resolved:

After an hour's discussion, strong views on both sides, we
had a consensus vote and it went 5 to 4, with me voting on
the side of 13.5%. It sounds like it is a little bit self-
serving, but you had to have been there and lived through the
situation to understand. And the other thing that we do is
that once that happens, and the meeting is over, we all walk
out supporting the company line so to speak, the solidarity
stuff. Two of the fellows came to me afterward and said they
appreciated the fact that I was at least flexible and that
I... I guess if you win the vote you are considered
flexible, and if you lose you're considered wishy-washy.

Much later in the interview CAO No. 36 indicated a preference for
Compromising as a conflict-handling style, after going through the
following discussion:
Well I would say generally I don't treat senior staff or the mayor and council any differently, perhaps a bit more blunt with senior staff because when you are dealing with council it generally is at a public meeting, and instead of saying a sentence sometimes you say a paragraph. But certainly I try and avoid open disagreements and refrain from argument. That's not to say I don't want to put my point of view across. But I am not going to start an argument just for the sake of starting it. I don't know exactly how you are coming at that. I don't mind a disagreement.

Interviewer: [Y]ou strike me as being "D" just from what you said earlier. It seems to me you are quite forceful [and] you tend to know what you want to do, and you want to bring other people around, although on occasion, as in the salary case ... you went in and you came out with a different attitude.

I like to think I am more in the "C" area. Well, I will preface that by saying that by the time I get the problem it is generally insoluble ... It is never yes or no, well rarely yes or no. And I think in most of those different shades of grey areas I think I am more of a "C". If there is an issue that I feel quite strongly about I can be a "D". I think that respond to the situation; it depends how strongly I feel.

There are several points to be made about this case. First, it questions once again the applicability of the conflict-handling styles to actual conflict situations. Second, it cautions one again not to make much of apparent inconsistencies between self-described conflict-handling styles and the resolution of actual conflicts. Third, it invites one to compare CAO No. 36's working conception of "team" with the "military team" described earlier, and to conclude that the teamwork just described seems to match the prescription. Fourth, it raises the issue of voting, the appropriateness of which is central to some CAOs' conceptions of the proper role of the SMT. CAO No. 36's phrase "consensus voting" combines two concepts that are commonly thought to be mutually exclusive.

Finally, if support were needed for the present writer's
Supposition that the dynamics and rationale of staff decisions are basically similar to those of elected groups, the staff salary increase decision supplies it.

Table 6-7 shows that 8 respondents report that they never disagree with the mayor. This appears to be both a matter of historical fact and of personal policy, which does not obtain for council and for senior staff. Although other factors are relevant this both attests and is attributable to the mayor's special place in the CAO's internal network.

Seven (7) of the 8 disagreements with the mayor that were identified were not nearly as critical as the salary increase issue; nor were they described in nearly the detail. They included the need for a special meeting of council, the need for an employee flex-time system, the role of politicians in hiring a municipal employee, and the mayor's habit of taking "bait" in the local press and writing letters to the editor.

CAO No.19 reported the only remarkable disagreement. It involved the mayor and several councillors who, following a council meeting, staged a lengthy drinking bout in City Hall that left the place in a mess. The caretaker who had to clean it up "start[ed] the rumor mill" with his complaint to his superior. The latter's department head, who was very upset by the incident and who was on bad terms with the mayor at the time, passed it to the CAO for resolution.

Two considerations seem especially important in this situation. One was the CAO's longstanding 'absolute refusal' to socialize with the mayor and councillors. He had often been invited to join them for a
drink at a nearby hotel after council meetings, and his constant refusals had led to a "serious discussion" with the mayor. The second consideration was that as a lawyer the mayor was not likely to accept readily any argument based on the illegality of drinking on the premises without a permit. The CAO had obtained this opinion from the city solicitor.

Arguing from this legal opinion and from the potential of public opinion to "crucify you" if the incident were to become public, the CAO suggested the following resolution to the mayor "who was mad as hell at the time":

I would suggest you do this: you pay for the . . . liquor (which was bought by the city for another occasion). I said put a bill in. Estimate what the consumption was and put a cheque in for . . . Cover-your ass that way, firstly. Then I am going to issue you a memorandum for, and members of council, that that [room] cannot be used for drinking unless you have a permit.

CAO No.19 went on to say that the mayor later "appreciated" his tough stand, and teases him occasionally about being a "puritan". Earlier in the interview CAO No.19 had responded to the mayor's part of the conflict-handling item by saying: "I usually try 'D' with him. That's because it's one on one . . . and go[ing] right back at him is the best way, because he would run right through me if I wasn't standing there and holding him back a little on occasion".

The 15 identified disagreements with council were generally related in even less detail than those with the mayors although some of them seem to have been as critical as the salary increase issue reported above. Interview fatigue was an important contributing factor: council disagreements were usually dealt with after those with
senior staff and the mayor, and the disagreements item was usually covered late in the interview. Two notable aspects of council disagreements are that most seem to have involved several members of council, not all, and that hiring policy or procedure was at issue in 5 of the 15. None merits recounting here.

Item 25 required the respondent to indicate on a scale provided "how often . . . contentious issues [are] resolved . . . in a way that supports your personal position". The responses of the 24 CAOs who completed this item are shown in Table 6-8.

Table 6-8: The Incidence of the Favorable Resolution of Contentious Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<td>(a) Aggregates (%)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TEES</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Individual Totals

Total score: 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

No. of CAOs: 1 1 5 5 4 2 5 1

(n=24)

% of CAOs: 4.2 4.2 20.8 20.8 16.7 8.3 20.8 4.2

Given the generally low incidence of conflict reported by the
respondents and their varied interpretations of conflict, one should suppose that their samples of "contentious issues" also vary widely. The responses may have more to do with confidence and ego strength, than with contentious issues. The outwardly apparent variations in the distribution of responses are too slight to warrant further comment.

3. Styles of Supervision (Item 26)

Item 26 required the respondent to select, from four descriptions of supervisory style the one "that comes closest to describing your usual behavior in dealing with each [of your] Senior Manager[s]". The four styles, their descriptions adapted slightly for clarification, were taken from a Situational Leadership summary instrument.

A total of 32 CAOs, or 86.5% of the sample, responded to this item in some fashion. The responses were compiled as numerical averages and by job function, the distributions of which are shown in Tables 6-9 and 6-10 respectively.

As with previous scale items the responses often departed from the instructions. Three common departures warrant notice. One was to write "All department heads" in the space provided opposite, say, the third style of supervision. The others were to place a position between styles, or to place a position opposite two styles that were not always contiguous.

In all three of these departures, with the exception of certain variants of the third, an average could still be computed; however, depending on the extent of the departure, variation by position within the municipality may have been obscured.
Average scores were calculated for the 25 CAOs. The distribution of the average scores is shown in Table 6-9.

**Table 6-9: Distribution of Supervisory Style Average Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Supervision</th>
<th>Complete Delegation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Score:</td>
<td>2.0-2.5  2.6-2.9  3.0-3.5  3.6-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs:</td>
<td>4  4  16  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of CAOs:</td>
<td>16  16  64  4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-9 shows that almost two-thirds of the respondents for whom a supervisory style average could be computed, perceive themselves to be what might be termed "helpful delegators." This seems consistent with the earlier-noted emphasis on more delegation as a reported style improvement. Delegation as a good management technique may, like persuasion and teamwork, be seen as socially desirable. This raises the possibility that it may be a preference as much as, or more than, a practice.

As with the other scale items the comments that were made about the item itself or in support of the respondents' choices, were often revealing about side-issues:

CAO No.15, who gave "3" as his general style with all department heads, exemplifies the first departure:

I tend to approach it most often from the standpoint of number 3. Like I am going to say 'These are my views'. . . like, uh, like I am not going in on an authoritarian basis. Now, if somebody really is out in left field, it is only
under those circumstances. . . . If somebody really needs his feet pulled out from under, it is only in those circumstances that I will go in from an authoritarian point of view.

He went on to discuss, by way of example, his relations with two department heads. One of them was the solicitor whom,

I use very specifically. I don't involve him in the management process because I want him out there to . . . He has a function to play and, uh, his opinion should be pure and entirely legalistically motivated.

This, then, is a case of the CAO's conception of the solicitor's role and expertise not only mediating the supervisory relationship, but also effectively keeping the solicitor off the management team.

Table 6-10 depicts the style of supervision by job function, for all positions which were reported with enough precision to plot. It shows that solicitors are well down the list in the "hands off" category: 1 CAO in 3 "turns over responsibility" to solicitors, about the same proportion as for fire chiefs, recreation directors, and clerks.

Fire chiefs are also distinguished in Table 6-10 by attracting the highest proportion of "close supervision". In 2 of the 3 cases the CAOs were determined to improve the Fire Chief's management skills to complement his fire fighting capability which was acquired "in the ranks". Their objectives were to improve the fire service and to integrate the Fire Chief into the SMT.

Outwardly, perhaps the most intriguing statistic in column (4) is that social service directors appear to be given the most autonomy by CAOs, even marginally more than public works directors (engineers). Upon analysis, it appears that the autonomy of social service directors
is based primarily on the perception that "it's a provincially run thing". That perceived expertise is a primary factor in the autonomy of engineers, is illustrated below.

Table 6-10: Supervisory Style by Job Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Close Supervision</th>
<th>Explain &amp; Clarify</th>
<th>Share Ideas</th>
<th>Turn Over Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk's</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Svcs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Posns</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style %</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of respondents qualified their supervisory style responses by differentiating between "day-to-day" supervision and supervision required for problem-solving or for carrying out special assignments. Although the LEAD instrument situations do not recognize this distinction, it does seem to be a useful one. Every CAO who made the distinction allowed a higher degree of latitude for day-to-day tasks. One of these respondents was CAO No.10 who reported all of his positions as "4s". When asked what supervisory style he expected to adopt toward the planning director he was about to hire, he replied:
There obviously is an orientation period and so on. You have to remember that I knew bugger all about the [municipality]. I don't know anything about financing or I couldn't know anything about engineering.

Interviewer: So your preference . . . is to delegate to let these people do their own jobs in their own areas?

That's right, and report to their standing committees, and do a damn good job of getting stuff through, getting results through and so on . . . . Now with a new manager obviously, uh, he has got to learn our whole process . . . so there is going to have to be a lot of interaction between that individual and so on so he reaches a point where . . .

Here again is the notion of functional or professional specialization, this time in relation to financing and engineering, mediating the supervisory relationship. However, the idea that the CAO "couldn't know anything about engineering" is a revealing twist. It seems to correspond, on the staff side of the CAO's relationships, to the perceived differences between councillors and staff discussed earlier. In granting autonomy to senior staff on the basis of perceived expertise, and in reinforcing direct relationships between department heads and standing committees, this CAO appears to be contributing to his isolation.

Apart from considerations of perceived expertise this comes close to the "text book" account. One can see in it the "maturity" of the subordinate, defined by Hersey and Blanchard earlier as his ability and willingness to do the job, as the key conscious determinant of the supervisor's style.

Taken together, the several excerpts suggest that supervisory relationships are too complex to characterize in terms of four styles that are dependent upon "maturity". The lesson that one should not place too much stock in the official interpretation of the instrument,
is reinforced by one CAO's choice of "Number 1 [i.e., Close Supervision]... because he is an unsuccessful applicant for [the CAO's] job."

4. Time Expenditure and Control and Preferred Office Procedures (Items 19, 20 and 21)

The three items under discussion in this section were intended to provide some sense of how the CAOs operated daily, without actually following them around in Kotter's fashion. Learning second-hand how CAOs spend their time, and why, raises the point attributed earlier to McLeod et al., that managers' answers to questions about how their time is divided among various activities often do not correspond with evidence from direct observation.

However, the research interest in this section of the project is not in documenting time expenditure. Rather it is in exploring the CAOs' sensitivity to time. Do they try to control their time? If so, how? Have time management books and seminars been effective? Do they feel pressured by time? Are they satisfied with the way their time is spent? How are their office preferences and practices affected by time consciousness?

In some respects the responses to the items under discussion are among the most interesting and revealing. As will be seen, many CAOs are both very conscious of time and very concerned with how they are coping with time pressures. This interest and concern tended to generate what are perhaps the most insistent, disjointed, and wide-ranging responses in the interviews. This seems consistent with
Kotter's settling upon time usage as something of a "common denominator" for GMs.

Strictly speaking, the data collected in response to these items can inform only one of Kotter's "Twelve Visible Patterns" of daily time usage listed in Table 4-6, namely, how many hours they worked. While managers may not be able to estimate reliably how they spend their time, the CAOs in this study at least were able to give reliable estimates of how many hours they work. One CAO could have supported his estimates with a computer printout; he had the program designed solely to enable him to analyze how he spends his time, which is recorded daily by his secretary in units required by the program. Others keep time records either out of personal interest or to satisfy corporate time-recording requirements.

Figure 6-1 is a scattergram that shows how many hours each of the 31 (83.8%) responding CAOs reported working per week. For most, the hours shown represent a total of hours spent "at the office" and hours spent working at home on evenings and weekends. This varied for a few who have a personal policy of not taking work home, and for those who have committee and council meetings in the evening. Some responded with a point estimate for a component or a total; others gave a range.

Figure 6-1 shows that the range of total hours worked extends between 33.5 hours and 75 hours. If the midpoints of responses given in ranges are used, the average total hours worked per week is about 51. In comparison, Kotter's GMs worked an average of just under 60 hours per week, with only 3 of 15 working fewer than 55 (1982, 81).
Kotter reports that "The average GM spent only 24 percent of his working time alone and this was usually at home, on an airplane, or while commuting" (1982, p.80). As it was put in the interviews, item 19b focused on time spent with others at work. Kotter does not report an average for time alone at work. He writes instead that: "Most of the GMs spent much of their work days talking and listening to others; a few spent up to 90 percent of their work time this way" (p.80).

Of the 27 (73.0%) CAOs who responded to this question, 6 gave non-numerical answers such as "very little" or "predominantly with others". The responses of the other 21, who gave point estimates or ranges, are plotted in Figure 6-2. The range of these responses extends from 5% to 60%. Visual inspection suggests that the average is in the range of 20% to 25%. The time CAOs spend with others appears to be about the same as Kotter's GMs.
As interesting as the estimates themselves, are the CAOs' reactions to the amounts of time they report spending with others. Of the 22 CAOs who expressed an opinion in this regard, half (11) are not satisfied with the amount of time they have to themselves.

One of the dissatisfied is CAO No.9, who reports in response to item 20 on communications preferences and practices, doing most of his work in his office, although he meets others in their offices "to some degree." When asked about the amount of time he spends alone he replied:

Not nearly enough. (Long pause) 10%.

Interviewer: Would you like to have more? Oh sure, I'm constantly putting things off until I'm finished with this person. You no sooner get back to it, when someone else comes in. Then you find, heh, you were supposed to be at a meeting 10 minutes ago. You noticed I closed the door. That's not because anything we're saying is secretive. It's because I don't want to be disturbed. When the door is open, anyone who wants to walk in, can walk in.

CAO No.24, whose workday is also spent mostly at his desk, usually spends the first thirty to sixty minutes of each day working alone. He reported that "too many interruptions" make "it very difficult to find time to do writing or reporting here". More homework than he would.
like is the result of these interruptions.

Like the previous respondent CAO No.6, usually begins his day working alone, in his case for an hour to an hour and a half. However, unlike the two previous respondents, he deliberately spends a lot of time out of his office doing business by "Wandering Around". Moreover, as his response will indicate, he is trying to encourage department heads and staff to "interrupt" him, as it were, for informal chats. Thus, it seems curious that his response should express a desire for more time to himself. At least, that's how it begins:

Far too little. I would rather have ... probably I shouldn't really say that ... My first hour and a half of the day is normally alone. And very often it is spent on, you know, where are we going, what are we doing, reports that are due, reviewing reports that have come to my desk, wondering what we ought to do with them. If there is a need to go further or have we gone far enough, those kinds of plans.

One of the things which I try to do ... is making myself as available as possible for the department heads and the staff, in other words, keeping the doors open and encouraging people to come to the office to sit and talk.

That the explanation for wanting more time alone was accepted, may reflect ambivalence, or possibly a sense that it might cast the respondent in a bad light. Alternatively, the question may have raised the matter to the respondent's consciousness for the first time, in which case the response represents the formulation of a position by "thinking out loud".

CAO No.31 is another respondent whose workday is office-based—perhaps office-bound is more felicitous. Although his response may not appear to the reader to express dissatisfaction, the interviewer came to regard this way of speaking as the respondent's style of expressing
negative feelings:

Fifty percent.

Interviewer: Is that comfortable for you or are you trying to increase that?

It is a lot less that I thought it would be. I find that, uh, I find that I am spending a lot more time than I thought I would spend with department heads and with, uh, not so much alderman, but with, uh, talking to people, the general public, you know. I am not saying that it is a bad thing. I think that it is a good thing. But, I didn't perceive that I would have that much involvement with other-people. I find, for example, that I, I uh, I keep getting behind on the paper work that I am supposed to be doing. It is not that extensive, but just because of... for that reason.

He went on to say that in his department head position, he could have his secretary hold his calls so that he could work without interruptions for long periods, something "I can't do... now".

Only one of the dissatisfied respondents wants less, not more, time alone. This is CAO No.12, who estimated his time alone at 20-25%, and who went on by saying: "I would like to have less. I would spend more time out and I could see things."

Those CAOs who seem satisfied with the amount of time they have to work alone, tended to give responses that were briefer and more direct than the dissatisfied. CAO No.8, representing the satisfied group, responded that his time alone as a percentage is "very small" and that "that's the way it should be". CAO No.34 put his time "spent in one meeting or another" at least "as high as 50%", which satisfied him because "my function is to motivate people, [and] I can't motivate them if my door is shut". CAO No.10 estimated his time alone at 15-20% and, when asked if he would like to have more replied simply "No, that's great".
A final spokesman for the satisfied side is CAO No.27, who is not only satisfied with his 15% time alone but is also unsympathetic to CAOs who complain that they do not have "enough training time, or reading time, or just sitting thinking time". He is the CAO referred to earlier who keeps track of his time using a custom-made computer program, and who reports that "I waste a lot of time sometimes" going to see people "90% of the time", rather than phoning them. He seems to exemplify the MBWA style that, like time spent alone, emerged as a pivotal issue in the time domain.

Fourteen (14) CAOs raised the issue of "wandering around", either in those terms or in terms of "getting out of the office". Five (5) wander around comfortably like CAO No.27, while 1, CAO No.21, more or less forces himself to make rounds as it were. The remaining 8 expressed regret in some form at not getting out and about more often. Some seem caught in a conflict between thinking that wandering around is a good idea, and being aware that they are not doing it.

CAO No.14 is one of these. He also seems dissatisfied with his time alone, and somewhat defensive about his feelings on the matter. Coming from one of the most managerially analytic CAOs in the sample, his response on this issue is also noteworthy for its illumination of the role of conscious analysis with respect both to time and to style:

Not much. Very, very little. My time alone is not here. The time that you are looking for I would say is, uh, those two nights during the week that I might work maybe three or four hours a week.

Interviewer: I see. Are you content with that, or is it something that you are trying to change?

No, I am not trying to change it. I think I am trying to organize it better. I would like to have until ten o'clock
in the morning... so that we can do all the paper stuff that needs to be done basically for the day, questions answered, you know, those kinds of things, so that I have got from ten o'clock through the rest of the day until five o'clock I want to be in meetings all the time outside or inside, that is what I want to be doing.

The "very, very little" time spent alone later became the following preference: "I would like to be spending at least 66% of my time, and even higher than that, if I could, with other people. I have read that in my position we should spend really 85% of our time".

That the "better organization" referred to in the above excerpt constitutes change, and that the desire for such change is associated with being dissatisfied with his present use of time, became clearer from his affirmative response to item 19c on time control:

I have read about half a dozen books on time management.

Interviewer: What have they done for you?

I guess eventually they have given me the will that says that I have got to do something about it, and I don't. I don't think that, having read a book, it can do anything.

Interviewer: Can you identify any concrete ideas that you have tried to implement, or have implemented?

Oh yea, sure. I have tried all kinds of little things that didn't have the discipline to carry off. I don't think over a long period of time I have developed a meeting form, for example, every meeting I was in like this, when I take notes and say follow-up and that kind of such, uh... I generally keep lists of things. I have always kept a list of the major things that we are foolish around with, generally sitting on my desk. But, you know, the twenty or twenty-five major things that I must not forget!

Despite much reading and conscious effort CAO No.14 "never had the feeling that I kept this office running, and we are working on that now, and I am hopeful that we are going to be more effective". He thinks it will be "[great] if I can get a couple of hours more
productivity a day out".

This discussion then turned to office communications, during which he reported that he "wandered all the time" in his previous position as a department head. His early wandering as CAO, "drove his secretary crazy", and she was influential in stopping it. He still thinks that "wandering",

is the right way to do it in many ways. You go down and you see somebody on one little thing, and you learn five things when you are down there, and two or three things on the way back up and down the staircase. But I'm not sure that you can afford the kind of time to do that when you are in this office. If you have got an hour to kill it is not a bad idea to wander through, just wander... I think that that kind of wandering around is actually quite productive if you have got an hour or two free or an hour free... but most time, I don't really have the time.

This analysis corresponds to the analysis of MBWA cited in Chapter 1. However, it better demonstrates the limits of conscious analysis in determining managerial style—or better, the possible conflict between conscious analysis and managerial style as a habitual way of acting. One is not likely to develop the habit of "wandering around" if one never has the time; moreover, if one wanders around only when one has a free hour or two 'to kill', one's managerial style could hardly be thought of as MBWA.

Part of the MBWA style is a disposition to do business anywhere and anytime. Anywhere includes hallways, elevators, and cafeterias; it means generally not relying mainly on formal meetings. Anytime needs no illustration; its general connotation is that the notice and forms (e.g., going through a personal secretary) associated with an entry in one's daily planner are neither necessary nor expected.

It has been seen that relatively large groups of respondents
feel, respectively, that they do not have enough time alone in the office, and that they don't get out of the office enough. For some of these respondents "getting out of the office" means taking "royal tours", as it were, of outlying facilities and field operations. The objective of these respondents is not to do business anywhere in the fashion of MBWA.

There is a third aspect of office practice that divided enough respondents into distinct groups to be conspicuous. This is the role of appointments in the CAO's workday. The 18 (48.7%) CAOs whose positions on appointments are clear enough to classify, divide evenly on their preferences for meeting others by appointment. This measure of formality is of course closely related to time alone and to the amount of business that is done in the CAO's office—so closely, in fact, that illustrative excerpts are not warranted.

In item 21 the respondent was asked for a copy of one month's entries in his appointment calendar. The option of changing entries in the interests of privacy or anonymity, say, by substituting position titles for proper names, became a firm request by the interviewer. Without such changes it would be impossible for an outsider to make sense of the appointments.

Twenty-five (25) of the 31 CAOs, who were asked if they were willing to provide the appointment calendar sample, agreed to provide it. With most of those who were willing, arrangements were made for the sample to follow in the mail. A total of 18 samples was received. Since some calendars were photocopied unchanged, and since the changes made to others were not uniform, they were not conducive to
classification or to general comment. It does seem noteworthy that 5 of the 6 CAOs who did not undertake to provide samples are county CAOs who don't find it necessary to keep appointment diaries.

D. CAOs' Agendas and Networks

What are CAOs planning to do in their respective jobs? How broad are the domains reflected in their plans? Are these domains obviously associated with the CAOs' role conceptions? To what extent are their plans known to others and coincident with their organizations' formal public plans? To what extent are they pursuing what Kanter has termed "basic" goals as distinct from "innovative" ones? What networks are in place or are being built to implement these plans? These questions define the main interests of this section of the thesis.

The relation between corporate management and agendas is another question to be explored in this section. Since most CAOs were promoted from department head positions, and since departmentalist thinking has been shown to be antithetical to corporate thinking, it is useful to ask whether department head agendas differ significantly from CAO agendas. Since department heads were not canvassed, an indirect approach to the question will be used. In addition to goals and plans, the CAOs were asked to identify their proudest achievements both as CAOs and "in their previous positions". These achievements are discussed next.
1. Achievements as Department Head and as CAO (Item 13)

The responses to this item are presented in Tables 6-11 and 6-12 using the goal categories of Item 17.9

Table 6-11 indicates that service/program/facility achievements were mentioned by more responding CAOs than any other type of achievement in their previous position. Organization and people-related achievements were the second most frequently mentioned. However, Table 6-12 shows that as CAOs this order is reversed and the frequency gap is widened to the point where organization and people-related achievements were mentioned almost twice as often as service/program/facility achievements.

This comparison suggests that being appointed CAO is associated with a general shift in orientation from the end-user service or facility provided by the municipality to the means of its provision, namely, the people and the systems that comprise the organization. It also suggests an extension of the strong departmentalist orientation of many CAOs that was observed earlier in their support for expertise and professionalism.

The extension is that the CAO appears to have department-like responsibility for "the organization". The day-to-day dynamics of this territorial definition may follow a reciprocity principle of this sort: the CAO respects the exclusive rights of the department heads in their respective departmental functions, in return for their respect for his rights in an "organizational" function. In this organizational culture the CAO is more or less another department head.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL</th>
<th>SERVICE/PROGRAM/ FACILITY</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION &amp; PEOPLE-RELATED</th>
<th>EXTERNAL TO ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revamped accounting system for security</td>
<td>Downtown Revitalization</td>
<td>Developing a first-rate set of department heads</td>
<td>Amalgamation of 4 municipalities</td>
<td>Obtaining environmental approvals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putting the accounts in order</td>
<td>Running provincial urban renewal programs on a self-sustaining basis.</td>
<td>Introducing word processing to the department</td>
<td>Extending benefit plan to other municipalities</td>
<td>Assisting with the redrafting of provincial legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing a new budgeting system</td>
<td>New and renovated facilities including administration building, roads, sewers, waste transfer stations</td>
<td>Grooming subordinates to take over after my departure.</td>
<td>Municipal-provincial study</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Amalgamating three departments.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening the department's role and enlarging it</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Respondents

| 2 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 3 |
### Table 6-12: Achievements as CAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL</th>
<th>SERVICE/PROGRAM/FACILITY</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION &amp; PEOPLE-RELATED</th>
<th>EXTERNAL TO ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining millions of dollars from senior governments</td>
<td>Job creation</td>
<td>Having almost all recommendations approved by council</td>
<td>Establishing regular meetings of directors of all local public organizations</td>
<td>Surviving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving staff through computerization</td>
<td>Securing of landfill</td>
<td>Re-establishing the authority of the office of the CAO</td>
<td>Extending fringe benefits to area municipalities</td>
<td>Staff not involved in any scandals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing or streamlining budgeting system</td>
<td>Renovating or constructing municipal building, museum, library, court house, hotel</td>
<td>Job classification system</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not much</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputation for expenditure control</td>
<td>Downtown redevelopment</td>
<td>Training and development programs</td>
<td>Establishing good relations with a nearby municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large improvements in delivery of social services and ambulance services</td>
<td>Reorganizing council, committees, and administration</td>
<td>Making transit, library, health, tourism, planning direct services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salary and benefit plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Team management and esprit de corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing or streamlining procedures and policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of CAOs

| 11 | 13 | 25 | 7 | 4 | 280 |
This "Department of Organizational Services", as it might be called, handles those matters that either have not been assigned to one of the municipality's conventional departments, or that none of the other department heads regards as important enough to challenge the CAO for. As with certain other observations, this possibility cannot be further elaborated without evidence from department heads and councillors. That it seems to be a productive line of thought will become more apparent in the following excerpts.

A number of CAOs offered brief explanations for the difference in orientation between the CAO and the department head. CAO No.26's response is indicative:

I suppose you really have to categorize [achievements] into internal and external. As regards the internal... I think that I can reasonably say that I have systematized the administration... Then, externally, probably the thing that I recall most is the new hotel development... I think I can reasonably say that I was a sparkplug for that. Now that's a statement I would not make in public...

Interviewer: Do you think fondly of achievements [in your previous position]?

Well, I suppose. There were various things I did there, too. But--how should I put it?--they're not spectacular things. For instance, I...

Interviewer: Is that to say there are different things that motivate an administrator from what motivate a department head?

Well, I think of it in the most simplistic way... The department head is functionally motivated. He's motivated I think more to produce physical results, okay, of whatever kind.

Inasmuch as "the new hotel development", "however spectacular", is a 'physical result of whatever kind' this account supports the CAO-as-department-head interpretation. On the basis of the above excerpt this
CAO could be styled "Director of Organizational Systematization with responsibility for Downtown Development".

To the extent that this organizational orientation is a simple function of being in the CAO position, the cause of corporate management might be advanced by having department heads perform in the CAO's position for limited periods, under a job rotation scheme for example. Hopefully the perceived legitimacy of the CAO and the value of his contribution would increase. This would provide a base for the open sharing of corporate responsibility and the co-operative implementation of corporate plans that signify effective corporate management.

CAO No.17 characterized as "process oriented" the departmental "area" in which he worked prior to becoming CAO. He regarded his achievements there as quite different from his achievements as CAO. The latter included "a better administration", meaning the higher "competence and quality of the municipal employees", which he attributed to "the fairly regular training program" that flowed from his concern for training and development. He allowed that these achievements "may sound rather surprising", but he didn't give them a label to distinguish them from "process oriented". He also noted that as CAO, in contrast to his previous position, "I am a bigger fish in a smaller pond".

CAO No.18 cited as his first achievement as CAO the salary evaluation system for department heads. Next, he named "the whole system... of reports to council", which used to be "sort of hit and miss, with great confusion at council". The third was "bringing the
department heads together. This was exemplified by joint reports "where the [Planner, Engineer, and Treasurer] get together and write a joint-report to council"; "prior to that there would be a report from each of them and council wouldn't know how to deal with them."

CAO No.27 nominated "leadership" as his first achievement, and went on to mention "training and development programs", reducing staff by ten per cent in five years, "goals and objectives programs", "performance appraisal programs", and an annual "corporate management planning and systems report" which results from intensive special meetings with council.

The responses of CAO Nos. 12 and 29 are most notable for wanting to share credit for any achievements with their staff, or with historical circumstances. Those of CAO Nos. 1, 2 and 30 are noteworthy for their mention of failures as well as achievements. Their failures include not eliminating the standing committee system, not restructuring or reorganizing their local government, and having a construction project get out of hand.

The final excerpt from the achievement responses is notable both for its reminder of its perceived dependence on conscious thought, and because it constitutes a better response to item 12a on personal style than to item 13. It comes from CAO No.28 who responded this way:

"Probably not much. I never think about that (laughter)."

Interviewer: So, even looking back there is--

"Oh, I would have to ... oh yea, I suppose. I don't know that we've, uh, yea, it has been a slow evolution. I obviously operate a lot differently than my predecessor, although we were good friends. Uh, his style was vastly different than mine. Uh, I tend to get involved and I tend to have a lot of meetings even if it is only a five minute
meeting just to touch base. And I like to keep tuned in as to what is going on and what not. . . . And I don't leave anything hanging without a decision. Uh, I understand that he left things hanging for three, four, five or six months, and that’s not my style. . . .

So I am sure that there has been a change here in the CAO’s office in how we operate and the influence on staff, and I expect it from councillors. But when you say “What have you achieved?”, I don’t know (laughter). I have to take time to think about that.

In terms of Kanter’s “basic” and “innovative” distinctions the weight of the achievements listed in Tables 6-11 and 6-12 seems basic. Reorganizations and team management stand out as candidates for innovative status among internal achievements. As contributors to team management the joint staff reports of CAO No.18 may not seem very innovative. However, against the historical background of staff resistance to corporate management and to the CAO, it clearly meets Kanter’s test of a “change of orientation or direction”.

If one achievement category were to be cited for being most obviously oriented to innovation it would be the “External” category. Simply, reaching across the historically well-guarded boundaries of municipal government to other local government agencies, seems generally to match the lowering or removal of barriers between departments.

2. CAOs’ Goals and Plans (Item 17)

Item 17 required respondents to identify their “goals and plans for their municipal organization”, with the aid of a chart divided into three columns representing types of goals, and three rows representing three time periods. The difference between formal public goals and
informal, private goals was explained, and goals of both varieties were solicited. The responses of the 32 contributing CAOs are listed in Tables 6-13, 6-14, and 6-15, disguised where necessary to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.10

The goals and plans listed in the tables, like those of Kotter's GMs, range from very specific to very vague, have a broad range of content, and cover a range of time horizons. From this pool of goals and plans one can easily construct a CAO agenda to parallel the "typical GM's agenda" reproduced in Table 4-6.

It is not too surprising given that the interviews were conducted during the budget preparation season, that the single most cited financial goal of Table 6.13 is the percentage budget increase. This encompasses the GM's expenses, income, and return on investment objectives. What are termed "Productivity and Cost-saving Initiatives" have no counterparts in the typical GM's agenda.

In Table 6.13 the goal of debt reorganization in column (1), and the comments in column (6) about having no major plans and waiting for the Provincial grant announcement before setting the budget objective, were contributed by the same CAO, who explained that his municipality is at a "fairly mature stage". These represent the sum of his goals and plans. This agenda, together with his network--both of which are consistent with his general support for policy-administration, is suggestive of Kotter and Lawrence's "Caretaker" mayor.

Also in the "Caretaker" class, and not reflected in any of the three tables, are 3 CAOs who could not identify any goals and plans, and 2 CAOs whose goals and plans were not pursued in the interview as
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Productivity and Cost-Saving Initiatives</th>
<th>(2) Est. Reserve for computer acq</th>
<th>(3) No increase (x2)</th>
<th>(4) Est. program bdgtmg system</th>
<th>(5) Budget Planning and Analysis</th>
<th>(6) Others and CAOs' comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computerizing accts</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>Others and CAOs' comments</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional computerization</td>
<td>Est. reserve for working funds</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More pay-as-you-go (x2)</td>
<td>Acquire a computer</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better use of reserves by attrition</td>
<td>Continue hiring freeze (x2)</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganize debt</td>
<td>Eliminate posns by attrition</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize taxation by reducing avge level</td>
<td>No increase (x2)</td>
<td>Est. program bdgtmg system</td>
<td>Others and CAOs' comments</td>
<td>266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Maintain Existing</td>
<td>(2) General Improvment, Addtn, Expnsn, Rdctn</td>
<td>(3) Specific Improvment, Addtn, Expnsn, Rdctn</td>
<td>(4) Plans, Reviews and Studies</td>
<td>(5) Others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No program cuts</td>
<td>Improve data and text processing systems</td>
<td>Eliminate adult trng programs from recreation offerings</td>
<td>Consultant's review of data processing system</td>
<td>Produce brochure on municipality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain levels of service</td>
<td>Upgrade old infrastructure</td>
<td>Develop a _____ as a tourist attraction</td>
<td>Re-evaluate methods of delivery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce levels of service in ways that are transparent to the taxpayers</td>
<td>Put. more $$ into roads</td>
<td>Secure envirmntl apprvls for landfill</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrial diversification</td>
<td>Water and sewers (x2)</td>
<td>Waterfront study</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uniform water and sewer rates</td>
<td>New or renovated: admin bldg (x2), theme park, industrial park, museum, home for aged (x2)</td>
<td>Review of recreation services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Convert hospital to home for aged</td>
<td>Develop economic growth strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.1.1 emerg phone syst</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolve future of cultural facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Improvement</td>
<td>Specific Improvement</td>
<td>Review and Reorganization</td>
<td>Staff Training, Development Evaluation, Addtn, Repicment</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour-management relations (x2)</td>
<td>Est or refine corp goals and objectives</td>
<td>Get a SPB to take over an historic attrctn</td>
<td>Resolve duties of dept head position and fill position</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve municipality's image</td>
<td>Reduce number of citizen committees</td>
<td>Departmental reorg or amalg (x6,1=personal)</td>
<td>Establish positions of: solid waste manager, director of elderly services, EA to CAO, Assistant CAO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish more contacts with senior govt agents</td>
<td>Eliminate SPBs</td>
<td>Reorg municipality into single tier (x2)</td>
<td>Replace 3 dept heads in 3 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain contacts with staff and elected officials in neighboring municipalities</td>
<td>Develop a more sophisticated planning fn</td>
<td>Complete procedure manuals</td>
<td>Train dept heads to succeed CAO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implement MBO</td>
<td>Make SPB a municipal dept (x2)</td>
<td>Replace promoted tax collector from within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop conflict of interest by-law for staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>Staff development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Get dept up to speed over three years</td>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological testing of 2nd level managers to identify dept head potential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
they were a few months away from retiring.

A final comment on Table 6-13 concerns the entry in column (6) reflecting apprehension about overlooking some goals. This is formal evidence of social desirability as a force motivating the responses.

Many of the goals listed on all three tables involve the completion of projects in progress, some of which would have originated as personal goals of the CAO. Altogether, there are only four goals that were expressly presented in the interviews as personal goals that the CAO was not pursuing openly. Three of the four represent considerable entrepreneurial risk because of their scope and their potential for controversy. They are the uniform rates and cultural facility goals in column (3) of Table 6-14, and the single tier goal in column (3) of Table 6-15. The fourth personal goal is the department reorganization goal highlighted by the same bold print in Table 6-15.

In content most of the goals listed seem basic in Kanter's sense. Two that appear to be narrowly innovative are the conflict of interest policy for staff, and the use of psychological tests to identify managers with department head potential. More broadly innovative are the three risky personal goals discussed above.

Two goals that seem noteworthy in terms of the agenda-network framework are those in column (1) of Table 6-15 on establishing and maintaining contacts outside the organization, or network building and maintenance.

As noted above the goals and plans of the three tables under discussion contain the ingredients for a table corresponding to Kotter's "typical GM's agenda". However, no individual CAO's agenda
canvassed in the interviews is as complete as the typical GM's agenda. The construction of the "typical CAO's agenda" from an average of three or four entries per CAO would not be very instructive. It is presumed that more complete CAO agendas would emerge from exposure of the kind Kotter had to his GMs.

a. CAOs' Goal Setting Practices.

At some point in the interview, often in conjunction with item 17, the CAOs were asked if they used any particular "system" to set goals. Twenty-eight (28) CAOs, or 75.7%, were not aware of having any particular means of setting goals. Like Kotter and Lawrence's Pattern #1 mayors, and like Kotter's GMs, most of them seem to set their goals in a "continuous and incremental manner".

Four members of this group warrant a brief mention. The first is the CAO whose skepticism about goals-and-objectives exercises was quoted in an earlier section. The second is a CAO who noted that planning is made futile for him by the high incidence of "uncontrollable events". The third is the CAO whose goal of establishing a council corporate goal setting seminar was listed in Table 6-15. And the fourth is a CAO who noted that goal setting had become "routinized" as part of budget preparation.

The remaining 9 CAOs attempt in various ways to set goals in the more "rational"-fashions associated with Patterns #2, #3, and #4 of the mayors study. Two CAOs regard the preparation of the budget as a corporate goal setting exercise. One of them uses a form of zero-base budgeting.12 The second CAO prepares the budget as a current corporate
plan against a recent list of council-approved goals and objectives. One device he uses to achieve a corporate character in the budget is a peer review of department budgets. Additionally, through multi-year impact tests, he ensures that all years in the five-year capital budget and forecast are treated with the same seriousness that seems to be accorded in most municipalities only to the first year. It should be noted here that a few other CAOs reported budgeting practices along these lines in response to other items.

Seven (7) CAOs reported having some particular goal setting prop or deliberate event. The simplest is a revolving list of goals maintained on a regular basis. One CAO meets about two times a year with one department head to whom he is particularly close, in an all-day goal setting session. Another meets once a year with each of his department heads to help them set goals for their departments. And another CAO spends one day every three to four months alone in an isolated office to review the progress made towards his goals, and to develop new tactics and targets. His council also meets annually with senior staff in a public goal setting session that lasts one or two days.

Two other councils were also reported to have done corporate plans. For one of them the exercise was a unique event; for the other it takes place in July of each year. In the latter instance the council exercise is preceded by a parallel senior staff exercise; additionally, the CAO maintains a written personal five-year plan.
3. Networks

Who do CAOs rely upon to assist them in implementing their agendas? How vital to their effectiveness are these networks perceived to be? How do they approach network development and maintenance? Pieces of the answers to these questions have been given in connection with dimensions of the interview data already presented. The purposes of this concluding section are to expand the pieces and to join them together.

As good an introduction as any to the network data can be provided by a CAO who thinks in network terms, and whose network activities have been perhaps the most consciously/analytically developed, more consciously/analytically it would appear than any of Kotter's GMs:

There are three networks that I'm locked in on. There is the bureaucratic network all the time. I go down to the department head level. It goes down to [theirs assistants]. The secretaries are the most important piece of information that anyone has. My secretaries are aware of everything down to the [junior] secretaries, and I get a lot that comes back to me. People sometimes meet me in the [carpark] or something. I'm approachable. Every cleaner in this building knows me and I kibbitz with them and so forth. It's a matter and a product of being totally aware at all times.

The second network is the political network that I'm locked into very keenly. Quite often before a council meeting, the mayor will say, "How do you think this will go?" His vote count and my vote count will generally be pretty good, very close. I talk to [all members of council].

And then I'm locked in on the network that's external. I'm locked in to the corporate community at different levels. I network too on the [entertainment] circuit especially to keep informed about the arts. I respond selectively to invitations I receive as the CAO. I go [to events] with a very deliberate purpose in mind: "Who is
likely to be there?", "What problems do I have upcoming that there will be a chance to speak on, on an informal basis?". . . [Lunch] is another way I do it. It's not by chance. In fact, I think it would be fair to say it's planned.

Following this lead, the discussion will begin with the "internal" network of council and staff contacts.

a. The Internal Network.

There were no items in the interview whose objective was to learn how a particular section of the CAO's network implemented a particular agenda item. Nor was there an attempt in the interview to catalogue the membership, or to approximate the size, of CAOs' networks. Rather, the emphasis was on learning how the CAOs approached others in their work environment. How formal or informal are their relationships with others? How important are certain individuals relative to others? What do CAOs offer others? What do CAOs expect from others?

As noted above, partial answers to these questions have been revealed by data presented previously. The conflict resolution, supervisory style, time alone, and office-as-business-location data are particularly relevant. If one can generalize over these variables, and from the uneven data collected, one's summary impression is that most CAOs tend to be rather formal in their relations with others. This impression is reinforced by the data to be presented here.
1. Confidants and Social Relations (Items 28 and 22i)

Item 28 required the respondent to identify "any people in the organization in which you confide the most critical information, and from whom you seek advice on critical matters?" Figure 6-3 shows that 22 of the 26 (70.3%) contributing CAOs confide in one or more members of staff, while only 3 confide in politicians, the mayor in two of these cases; one CAO has a confidant in both the elected and the staff groups.

Figure 6-3: CAOs' Confidants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of CAOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific Dept Head(s) = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Department Head = 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Staff Member = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept Head + Other Staff = 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff + Politician = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician = 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CAO = 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total respondents = 26

In the responses to this item the confidence in question was always treated as work-related; several CAOs also commented on personal confidences. The data suggest that most CAOs are not isolated to the extent of having no one in the organization with whom to share their most sensitive information, and from whom to seek advice on sensitive matters.
There are three municipalities in which the CAOs confide in all of their department heads. In these cases confidants, as reflections of openness, equity, and cohesiveness, may be regarded as indicators of a high degree of teamwork. These findings, together with other teamwork indicators discussed both earlier and later, place two of these three municipalities among the half dozen most highly developed teams.

The one CAO who confides only in the mayor, with whom he has an "extremely personable and close" relationship, explained that none of his relationships with department heads was "absolutely close", because he believes that it is inappropriate "to be personally very close to people who you work with". That this reason was given by most other CAOs for "keeping their distance" from the mayor and members of council, indicates both the range of positions adopted and, again, the attitudinal differentiation between staff and councillors as 'fellow workers'.

Groves provides some concise guidance on "the age-old question of whether friendship between supervisor and subordinate is a good thing" (1984, 86):

There are pluses and minuses here. If the subordinate is a personal friend, the supervisor can move into a communicating management style quite easily, but the what-when-how mode becomes harder to revert to when necessary. It's unpleasant to give orders to a friend. I've seen several instances where a supervisor had to make a subordinate-friend toe a disciplinary line. In one case a friendship was destroyed; in another, the supervisor's action worked out because the subordinate felt, thanks to the strength of the social relationship, that the supervisor was looking out for his (the subordinate's) interests.

Everyone must decide for himself what is appropriate here. A test might be to imagine yourself delivering a tough performance review to your friend. Do you
cringe at the thought? If so, don’t make friends at work. If your stomach remains unaffected, you are likely to be someone whose personal relationships will strengthen work relationships.

It seems that the teamwork that most CAOs would like to establish among senior staff, and which a few appear to have succeeded in establishing, requires an openness that one commonly associates with friendship. Since there is no reason to suppose that CAOs’ relationships with confidants at work, are fundamentally different from those with confidants away from work, Groves’ distinction between “personal” and “work” relationships seems overdrawn. Those CAOs who find themselves differentiating in this way, might be advised to try to treat work relationships as personal relationships. Neither this advice, nor the idea of friendships with fellow workers in the interests of teamwork, implies necessarily having to socialize in situations unrelated to work.

Item 221 asked for the CAO’s “view of the proper social relations between the CAO and senior staff on one side, and members of council on the other”. This item was covered in 28 (75.4%) interviews. Although the question included senior staff, the responding CAOs answered the question for themselves separately, and then often commented, sometimes in response to a probe, on the socializing practices of the senior staff.

The CAOs’ socializing practices are depicted in Figure 6-4 as a continuum. Only a small minority (17.9%) socialize with members of council on what a few termed “a family basis”. One-half of those who responded, limit socializing to such times and places as attendance at annual convention or two, or going for a beer after a council-
committee meeting. The remaining third (32.1%) avoid socializing completely; they only attend such "official functions" as ribbon-cutting ceremonies.

**Figure 6-4: Intensity of Socializing between CAO and Members of Council**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avoid Socializing</th>
<th>Limited Socializing</th>
<th>Family Socializing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 CAOs</td>
<td>14 CAOs</td>
<td>5 CAOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several of the 9 who avoid socializing have been mentioned in earlier sections, in contexts which can now be seen to be closely related. The first is CAO No.19, whose 'absolute refusal' to socialize, and in particular to join councillors for a post-meeting drink, was mentioned in connection with a disagreement. The second is CAO No.9, whose avoidance of recommendations that might favor certain councillors' interests, was discussed under policy-administration. CAO No.37 is the third member of this group. His practice of alerting individual councillors to potentially embarrassing situations, was discussed in the same context. Another was CAO No.6 who tries to distinguish between being "politically aware" and "politically involved". He would have been a member of this group had the interview been held six months sooner than it was. He had recently abandoned his "rigid" position that all socializing was dangerous, and was the only CAO to name both a councillor and a staff member as confidants.

In the first three cases the rationale for completely avoiding
socializing with councillors comes down to not wanting to be indebted to any councillor for anything. Each believes that any such debt could be called, thus comprising his integrity. They regard such borrowing and paying back as political which many CAOs have been shown to understand as unsavory manipulation. This thinking, which some CAOs apply as well to staff, is alien both to network building and maintenance as observed in Kotter's studies, and to teamwork. Such give-and-take, to recall Kaplan and Mazique's metaphor, is the trade propelled by reciprocity along the trade routes that are built with diplomatic skill.

II. Relations with Mayors (Item 22e)

It is clear that the mayor is the most important council contact for virtually all CAOs. The regimen of contacts between them varies from a weekly scheduled meeting to review a council or committee agenda, to half a dozen memos daily and as many unscheduled visits plus after-hours calls and call-outs. The quality and content of mayor-CAO relations emerged throughout the interview, and assorted aspects of these relations have been cited and discussed in previous sections. In some interviews it would have been redundant, and possibly annoying to the respondent, expressly to have asked him to "describe your relations with the mayor".

When the question was asked, it often drew a short and unrevealing response, such as "completely candid", "an excellent understanding", and "I've never had any trouble with the mayor". Mayor-CAO relations are typically so extensive that the question invited such
generalizations; it offered no finer natural starting point. Two supplementary questions that did prove to be revealing concerned the mayor's ability and disposition to influence council as a leader, and the distance between the mayor's office and that of the CAO. A sample response to the first question "Is the mayor a leader of council?" was this:

Yea, I think so. They certainly respect him. I don't think you'd call [the mayor] a leader because it's questionable whether any Ontario mayor is a leader except in the small municipalities where the mayor is virtually everything, the mayor, the CAO. . . . But in the larger ones the members of council are very jealous of their own authority, and they will accord the mayor respect but they won't allow the mayor to lead them.

This view of leadership is curious. Respect for the mayor constitutes all or part of the basis for a "Formal/legal" or "Personal I" type of relationship set out in Table 4-2. One can imagine, if one has not directly experienced, councillors supporting the mayor's position on an issue primarily out of respect. Such cases can surely be regarded as cases of leadership. However, the view in question must remain curious in the absence of information on this mayor's role in council's treatment of particular issues.

As one would expect the disposition of the mayor to take charge, like that of the CAO, varies considerably across the municipalities sampled. Some are content to be meeting chairmen and ceremonial personages; others are willing "to discipline" recalcitrant councillors "after the meeting", and to muster support for their causes in public and private, which latter includes attending SMI meetings.

The offices of most mayors are adjacent, or quite close, to the offices of their respective CAOs, bearing physical witness to the
acknowledged interdependence of their occupants. The evidence from the respondents indicates that familiarity has bred both contempt and contentment. In one instance they share the same personal secretary. In another friction between their personal secretaries undermined the relationship between the CAO and the mayor to the point where one felt compelled to move to another office. This experience led the CAO in question to advise against proximate offices, to insure against such conflict. Another respondent regarded the proximity of the two offices as a necessary evil: it gave him notice of the arrival of the mayor's visitors, to which meetings he would invite himself with a view to restraining the development of "impractical ideas". But it also disrupted his work.

iii. Senior Management Teams

There was no specific item on SMTs but they almost invariably arose naturally in the interviews, often in connection with the council business cycle.

Twenty-eight (28) of the interview municipalities have a SMT, known variously as the Department Heads Committee, the Administration Committee, the Directors' Committee, the Management Committee etc. Only 2 of the 10 counties represented are included in this number. Six (6) of the remaining 8 have a committee of department heads, which is not a SMT, either in the view of the respective CAO, or as defined by its constitution and operations. While having a SMT is no guarantee of a corporately managed municipality, not having a SMT is a reliable indicator that these 8 counties are departmentally managed.
Thirteen (A3) of the 23 SMTs whose meeting schedules are known meet once a week; the remaining 10 meet every two or three weeks or, in one case, once a month.

In all but three cases the SMT is comprised of the CAO, as chairman, and all department heads. In the first exception, the CAO is not the chairman; in the second the police and fire chiefs and the solicitor become members only for budget preparation; and in the third there is a large and small version of the SMT. In one case the Librarian, who is supportive of the CAOs goal of making the Library a municipal department, attends the SMT meetings.

Nine (9) CAOs reported experiences with the mayor attending the SMT meeting. In one case a management consultant's report recommended that the mayor be the chairman of the SMT. Out of frustration, presumably generated by the mayor's inability to understand how the organization worked at the staff level, the mayor stopped attending after a few weeks. In another, the previous mayor attended and was considered by the CAO to have "stifled the discussion".

In 5 cases the mayor attends SMT meetings regularly. In 4 of these his attendance is associated with uniformly bad effects such as "cramping the discussion", "cramping the style", causing the department heads "to tighten up", or making the other councillors "unhappy". In the lone successful case the CAO also encourages members of council to attend SMT meetings. In the 2 remaining cases the mayor attends from "time to time to let the guys know he's still around", or the mayor attends periodically by invitation, reportedly with no ill effects.

On the basis of the information at hand it is impossible to
appreciate the problems 6 of 9 mayors are reported to have caused through their attendance at SMT meetings. Such an appreciation may be critical to the advancement of corporate management. It may be that corporate management can be advanced significantly by teamwork between council and staff, conceived in the same terms as the teamwork that many CAOs imagine between themselves and department heads. In this event it would seem to be a good idea to involve the mayor with the SMT.

Typically, the agenda for the SMT meeting is prepared by or under the direction of the CAO who incorporates suggestions from other members. Usual items include matters of concern to all employees such as salary increases, previews of formal council and committee agendas, reviews of disposition of items by council and committees, and management training presentations.

Notable omissions from the typical agenda are formal staff reports to council. In most cases these formal reports must be approved by the CAO before being placed on a committee or council agenda; in a few cases the CAO merely requires a verbal description of the reports from the sponsoring department heads, along with the committee or council meeting for which they are being prepared. The policy of 2 CAOs is to have department heads take complete responsibility for reports within specified areas of responsibility, which can go forward without any notice to him.

When the CAO is the final report-approving authority at the staff level, differences of opinion tend to be bilateral matters between him and the sponsoring department head. If the department head is inclined
to negotiate, he faces a significant status differential. The common procedure followed in the case of irreconcilable differences is for the CAO to append his differing views to the department head's report.

This is the practice of CAO No. 26 whose military-like expectation of obedience from his department heads was discussed previously. This practice results in a committee or council arbitrating between the CAO and the department head, often in open session. Several CAOs avoid such appearances of disunity at all costs. As one expressed it: "There is one 'unwritten rule: work things out at the SMT'."

In only two cases does the SMT consider formal staff reports to council, and in each case such reports require its approval. In a third case the SMT establishes a position on an especially broad range of critical issues that are to be reported upon formally, and the appropriate department head takes responsibility for conveying its position in his report.

Formal reports are the vehicles for most council decisions. Their approval through the multilateral negotiating forum that is the SMT, must imply some sharing of power and responsibility on the part of the CAO. By submitting all reports to the SMT the CAO also must take certain risks that the projects he sponsors or supports will be changed in ways that he might not prefer. He also risks the perverse and unpredictable influences associated with all group decision making. Of course, the extent of risk will depend in part upon the rules and expectations that govern the operation of the SMT.

One of these SMT operating rules that surfaced in 6 interviews was voting. In 4 of these cases voting is expressly avoided, although for
different reasons. One is a preference for a consensus reached by open discussion. Voting is thought to allow SMT members to take sides without participating in the discussion or without advancing good reasons. Another reason for not allowing voting is the CAO's refusal to be overruled by his subordinates. This says something about persuasion, confidence, and risk, all of which were at issue in the case of CAO No. 36's earlier-noted 5-4 "consensus vote" at the SMT meeting to accept a higher wage increase than he would have preferred.

One other aspect of SMT operations was canvassed in a number of the interviews. This was the height of departmental barriers, a notion which the interviewer came to express in the term "cross-talk". This refers to the enthusiasm of department heads for understanding and for constructively criticizing other departments' proposals. Unfortunately, the CAOs' answers tended to be general affirmations that cross-talk takes place. It seems that direct observation is the preferred method of obtaining a sense of such barriers at the SMT.

iv. Relations with Junior Staff (Item 27).

In item 27 the respondent was asked to describe his contacts with middle managers and with front line staff. In connection with middle managers, the CAOs were often asked about their use of interdepartmental task forces and about the reporting relationships of such groups. The use of first names in the organization was also canvassed.

As indicated earlier, Kotter's GMs cultivated many contacts with staff who were outside of the formal chain of command. Peters and
Waterman have observed that the informality with which they associate so much timely and innovative action, is fostered by the use of first names and by the proliferation of small interdepartmental/interdisciplinary project teams. The daily workings of such groups have the effect of productively undermining the strict chain-of-command.

Perhaps the dominant impressions to emerge from the responses are that CAOs are very wary of violating the chain of command and, partly in consequence of this, do not have many good staff contacts below the department head level. To them the chain of command is "the right way" which must not be short circuited. Or, as another CAO put it: "I unconsciously think it is not proper to go past somebody".

Although interdepartmental task forces were acknowledged by most CAOs, in only 3 municipalities do they seem to be plentiful enough to be regarded as a personal or organizational stylistic attribute. Typically, these task forces report through the department head within whose functional area their project lies. In one municipality such task forces report through the SMT as well as through the departments. In another municipality the CAO has developed what he calls a "perpetual task force" of middle managers, which he uses as his "research arm" and which reports directly to him. To be noted in passing are the observations of 2 CAOs that, whatever the drawbacks of the senior government make-work projects of the last few years, one of their benefits has been to foster interdepartmental co-operation.

In sum, then, these responses reinforce previous findings that most CAOs approach members of staff at all levels, their internal
network, relatively formally and without a lot of conscious deliberation.

b. The External Network

Item 30 sought information on the CAO's consciousness of, and contacts with, a variety of groups and individuals outside of his own organization. Ministries, associations, SPBs, local business and citizen groups, and the local press, were marked for special interest. Coming as it did at the end of the questionnaire and, unlike other cue-card items, evidently requiring too much effort to be answered in writing, this item was perhaps the most unevenly answered. The responses are, however, sufficiently informative to conclude that the approaches of most CAOs to external contacts tend to be formal and narrowly problem-driven.

1. Associations

All but 5 of the respondents were members of the OMAA at the time of the interviews; 4 of the non-members were county CAOs. The 1 "city" CAO non-member characterized himself as not being a "joiner", a term which the interviewer used to good effect in subsequent interviews.

Almost all of the OMAA members were serving or had at one time served, in some executive capacity with the OMAA or with some other association, such as the Municipal Engineers', or the Association of Municipal Clerks and Treasurers. A small number are or have been involved with the Association of Municipalities of Ontario. The reasons given for such involvement are predictable: early warning of provincial
legislative changes, fellowship, problem-solving assistance, a few days away from the office, and much less frequently, professional development.

ii. Ministries

It is appropriate to recall the earlier comment about "discretionary dollars" and the view of one CAO that ministries distribute such discretionary money on the basis of merit. Against this view, are the observations of two CAOs that discretionary money either had stopped flowing to their area following the election of an opposition representative, or had never amounted to much owing to a historic local preference for an opposition MPP. In neither of these cases had it occurred to them to build a staff-to-staff network. Indeed, the state of most CAOs' regular ministry contacts suggests that such influence is thought to be unnecessary, improper, or ineffective.

Of the 25 (67.6%) CAOs whose ministerial networks were discussed, only 7 CAOs maintained any sort of regular contact with ministries, the three most common targets being Municipal Affairs, Natural Resources, and Transportation and Communications. In 3 of these cases the CAO had worked at one time for the Province, while a fourth had grown up with several people who had become MPPs and high-ranking Provincial civil servants. While 2 of the CAOs who had been Provincial employees appeared merely to be maintaining personal friendships with former coworkers, the third had an active program of expanding the contacts established through his work. Although he described his initiatives as "problem-oriented", his agenda setting style seemed to generate a
constant supply of 'problems' that made casual visits during "an hour to kill" in Toronto, rather regular. Three (3) other CAOs in their own right consciously developed and maintained contacts with ministries, which one characterized as "public relations". The seventh CAO reported being pressured by his mayor, whom he described as being "really good at digging out these people", to nurture more contacts on his own.

There is no question that there is a lot of formal commerce between the sample municipalities and various ministries, most of which is related to specific problems. The convention governing most of this commerce is that politicians contact politicians and staff contact staff. This rigid division mirrors the internal policy-administration division.

One of the CAOs who is an active external network builder respects this convention for his own reasons. These reasons are covered in the following excerpt, which also conveys the flavor of his network approach:

I've been to Jim Snow [the Minister of Transportation and Communications] three times, and I know if you don't catch him the right day, he's going to walk in and say "Everybody wants a bloody bridge, that's all I ever hear. Thank you gentlemen, good-bye". I can be like that. And so my reaction is to try and convince [the mayor] we [staff] are successful, that... don't use Jim Snow until you have to. I'll talk to [names of Provincial staff] and some of the guys, and... and try to see what's available through normal channels, and what we can get. And we end up with... the bridge through normal channels...

But if we hadn't, then I would have said... "Well, I appreciate what you've done for us but I want you to know that our [council] expected a bit more, and they are probably going to go and see Jim"...

I firmly believe that these guys [i.e., Provincial staff] are doing the same thing as we're doing. And if you don't give
them a chance to work things through the normal channels, you lose a hell of a lot in the final analysis. Because someday, if that's the way you feel, talk to..." you know, you're not going to be able to talk to him. He's going to say "Well, you like to write the Minister, talk to the Minister." So I like to cultivate the role they play, because I think it is legitimate. Sure you can meet some of the ones at the lower areas--I suppose more in Recreation and Culture--that can just drive you around the bend, but you can soon bypass them if you play things right...

Now, maybe you will show me wrong, but I like to think that guys like [names of Provincial staff] have a lot of respect for the way we do things, and they know that. I think the other thing they know for sure is that if we do get something, they're going to get the credit, which I think is important to them... I'll mention it in council if it is something that should be mentioned in council. I might not mention the individual...

In sum, then, the views of propriety, necessity and effectiveness noted above, and the formality of CAOs managerial approaches, go a long way toward explaining the low intensity of ministry network activities among CAOs.

iii. Local Groups

Of the 18 (48.7%) CAOs whose contacts with local boards and commissions (SPBs) were discussed, less than a third are consciously trying to develop or maintain networks. Three are members of a group of SPB directors, two of which meet twice yearly, and one of which meets monthly. One CAO is trying to initiate such a group, while another CAO reported that the group he initiated had stopped meeting some time ago.

A few CAOs try to keep in touch with individual SPB directors through lunch appointments from time to time. And as mentioned above in one or two cases certain SPB directors attend SMT meetings. Perhaps
the most active CAO with respect to SPBs is the CAO whose comments were just quoted at length; he solicits an invitation to the occasional staff meeting of various SPBs in order to cultivate contacts among employees at all levels.

The service club associations and preferences of 17 CAOs were covered in the interviews. Six (6) belong to Rotary, 2 belong to other clubs, and 2 mentioned church activities as a means of keeping in touch with their communities. Four (4) CAOs are former Rotarians whose memberships lapsed under CAO work pressures, or because they apprehended a conflict of interest between the position and the service club sector. One of these noted simply that he leaves Rotary to his department heads. For another lapsed Rotarian the question in the interview brought the matter to consciousness along with a twinge of guilt or ambivalence:

I used to [belong] . . . a number of years ago. I just got out of it. I've never been a service club type. I should . . . I really should . . . and I think I will join a service club and . . . ah . . . for the reasons of just being better in touch with the community.

Finally, three CAOs emphatically denied any connection with service clubs, one because "I don't go for that atmosphere", the second because he thought it would compromise his independence, and the third because such "high profile" activities are "the prerogative of the mayor".

The local press corps is the last local group that warrants mentioning in connection with the external networks of CAOs. The press relations of 24 CAOs were canvassed. Of the 10 CAOs who clearly expressed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the press, 6 were
satisfied, while 4 were unhappy. Only 3 of the satisfied seem to have consciously built contacts with the press. All of the dissatisfied seem resigned to their unhappiness. One of them attributed his poor press relations to the small size (meaning small mindedness) of the local paper and to the constant turnover of reporters.

Two general rules governing press relations emerged from the discussions. The first is that the CAO's profile in the press must not be allowed to rise higher than the mayor's. One CAO stopped holding weekly press conferences out of displeasure with the coverage they generated. The second rule is that staff reports must reach the councillors before it is offered to the press.

A third less widely held rule is that staff below the department head level may not talk to the press. In one application of this rule, any department head who talks to the press must inform the CAO of the conversation. In another, the department heads do so under the undefined threat that "if they screw up...!"

In a number of municipalities policies for press access to staff are paralleled by policies for access to staff by councillors. Typically, councillor's access is limited to department heads, at least in the first instance, another reflection of adherence to the chain of command. In only one municipality does the CAO encourage councillors to approach the staff person who is likely to have the information being sought. This CAO reasons that encouraging staff to deal directly with councillors will enhance their senses of responsibility and self-esteem.
E. Summary and Conclusion

A massive amount of information on the managerial approaches of 37 large municipality CAOs has been presented in this chapter. Its volume and nature preclude a complete summary. More important findings include the following, which reflect the order of presentation for the most part:

1. Just under half the interviews were seriously constrained which resulted in a variety of individual response sets. Thus, observations are based on loosely connected general impressions rather than strict comparisons between individuals and groups.

2. There is a high degree of contentment among the CAOs with their jobs, their organizations, their performance, and their relations with others in their organizations. This contentment seems somewhat inconsistent with the major areas of potential improvement identified later in the chapter, and may reflect their initial perception of what they were expected to say.

3. Policy-administration thinking is common and generally supported as an explanation of how responsibility between council and staff is or ought to be divided. This thinking is reinforced by beliefs (1) that staff can and do supply council only with "facts" that are free from "political" considerations, (2) that staff do not "lobby" councillors for support, and (3) that staff have "professional and technical expertise" that differentiates them fundamentally from councillors.

4. Policy-administration is the essence of rather formal approaches to determining council and staff expectations, that appear to restrict the nature and volume of communication and (therefore) influence, and
(therefore) teamwork. This approach evokes the terms "bureaucratic" and "individualistic" as used by Kotter and Lawrence.

5. A few CAOs take strong exception to certain tenets of the policy-administration complex and appear intuitively to appreciate the exercise of influence, and the judicious use of the apolitical shield. Their approaches evoke the term "entrepreneurial" as used by Kotter and Lawrence and Lewis.

6. Throughout the chapter the explanations offered by CAOs in support of their positions are often inconsistent, contradictory, or otherwise unpersuasive. This seems somehow to contrast with the rationality associated by reputation with the "technically expert professional administrator". In only one instance did the CAO recognize the weakness of his argument. This may suggest that the unconscious/intuitive faculty is predominant. It may also suggest that these CAOs are more accustomed to influencing by authority than by persuasion.

7. CAOs do not have clear and persuasive images of job effectiveness. Kotter's 3 key responsibilities of goal setting, resource allocation, and problem identification were virtually absent from their responses. Kotter's 3 key relationships fared somewhat better. Interestingly, "Motivating others", one of these key relationships, was ranked among the three most important traits and skills by the highest number of respondents. Notably "managing up" or influencing council, and conflict resolution, did not seem very relevant; this is consistent with policy-administration thinking.

8. Twice as many CAOs do not have formal performance evaluations as those who do have them; almost two-thirds of those who don't have an
annual performance evaluation are satisfied with not having one.
8. Seven (7) CAOs-in-10 attributed to themselves managerial styles that emphasize teamwork and persuasion, some of these also emphasized their ability to be "tough" when required. These styles were oriented toward staff and were associated with "managing down".

9. Of Garnier's five conflict-handling styles, Problem Solving was chosen more than any other for senior staff, for the mayor, and for council. Forcing and Compromising were the second and third collective preferences. Avoiding was important only in relation to council. That Problem Solving may be more of a preference than a practice is suggested by the significant proportions of CAOs who could not cite a recent disagreement of any consequence.

10. CAOs think of their styles of supervision as being close to complete delegation. This too was thought to be motivated partly by the respondents' desires to appear in a favorable light. Inordinate respect for functional expertise was also considered to be a motivating factor. In this vein, it could seem natural for a CAO who was confined to "organizational services" in department-like fashion, to see himself as a delegator.

11. The hours that CAOs spend at their jobs and working alone on the job are close to the hours spent by Kotter's GMs. Half of the CAOs who commented are dissatisfied with the amount of time they have to work alone. Most CAOs do business either formally: they work mostly from their offices by appointment and they respect the chain of command. Many of these expressed regret at not managing time better and at not getting out of their offices more.
13. A comparison of their achievements in their previous positions and as CAOs suggests a change in orientation on becoming CAO. For many the new orientation was characterized as department head of "the organization," suggesting an extension of the conception of department head as functional expert for an exclusive territory. The corporate management culture in which the CAO thinks of himself and the department heads respectively as General Manager and Assistant General Managers, was evident in only a few cases. Most achievements and goals and plans seemed basic rather than innovative, or bureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial. Consistently, goal-setting was not ranked highly as an important skill for an effective CAO. Since goal-setting represents a rational activity, its perceived lack of importance also seems to be inconsistent with the technically expert professional administrator.

14. Network formation and maintenance is mostly problem-driven and organization-centred. Contacts tend to be instrumental, formal, hierarchical, and restrained by concern that authority may be jeopardized. Only in a few cases do councillors participate as team members.

Only a few of the CAO-organization pairs in the large municipality sample seem to evoke the approaches documented by Kotter and summarized by Peters and Waterman. The others seem too formal, if one word can be used to characterize a wide range of dimensions and degrees. There is considerable evidence that the CAOs themselves would prefer less formality in their managerial approaches. In Chapter 8 their own
preferences and positions on the key dimensions canvassed are used to formulate an interpretive framework.
Notes to Chapter 6

1. The individual total scores were obtained by adding together each responding CAO's scores on all six dimensions, the theoretical minimum and maximum being 6 and 42, respectively.

2. This is a direct quotation from an interview transcript. Some long quotations have been shortened, which is indicated by the usual three spaced periods or by square brackets. Three periods without a space separating them indicates a thought that was not completed by the speaker. In general, an attempt has been made to preserve the conversational tone and rhythm. For this reason grammatical lapses have not been corrected and are not noted.

Footnotes will not be used for subsequent quotations and paraphrases taken from these sources in the interests of conserving space and avoiding repetition. Additionally, the responding CAOs were given an undertaking that neither they nor their municipalities would be "identified or identifiable with any particular response in any report of the Project." To honor this commitment it has been necessary to change direct quotations in minor editorial ways that do not affect their meaning. This has been done for example in successive quotations from certain CAOs, whose patterns of speech were suspected of otherwise identifying them. The interviewed CAOs are referred to by a number between 1 and 37, assigned in a non-obvious way, to give the reader some sense of the range of sources cited. In later parts of the chapter the number-referencing system of attributing new quoted material is discontinued against the chance that, even with editorial changes to preserve anonymity, certain numbers may be decoded.

Were footnotes to have been used, the undertaking of anonymity would have limited the information contained in any citation to the relatively uninformative "Confidential interview." and possibly the date on which it was held (although even the date might reveal a CAO's identity).

3. The total number of responses classified in Figure 6-1 is 28 because one response was classified under two categories.

4. Actually, this was the "a" part of item 14. Since the answer to part "b" was given in response to other items almost from the first interview, it was dropped as an item in its own right.

5. The individual total scores in Table 6-8 were computed by adding the number of the column in which each of the A responses appeared, 1 for "almost always" to 4 for "about half the time". The theoretical maximum is 20 (i.e. 4 x 5), and the minimum is 4 (i.e. 4 x 1).

6. To do the calculation, the number of positions listed opposite each style was multiplied by its respective style number, and summed. The sum was then divided by the total number of positions listed, to yield an average.
7. In Table 6-10, to accommodate responses that are mid-way between two style categories, or a combination of two styles, categories (1), (2), and (3) have been expanded to include 1.5, 2.5, and 3.5, respectively.

8. In Table 6-10, "Other" department positions include economic development, energy conservation, building, library, and home for the aged administrator.

9. The descriptions of some achievements have been changed to preserve the anonymity of their respondents.

10. The questionnaire responses to this item were analyzed first while awaiting the completion of the interview transcripts. The headings under which the goals are categorized were thus developed initially for the responses to the questionnaire. The primary development principle was to try to reflect the meanings assigned by the respondents to the three goal types, "financial," "service/program/facility," and "organizational." That is, each questionnaire response was analyzed with others that appeared in the same type-time cell. In the interviews the goals were not identified in the cell-by-cell sequence that was followed in the questionnaire. In the interviews, financial, service, and organizational goals were generally considered in that order, at least on the first run. However, the time periods to which the goals applied were not ordered in any particular way in the interviews; many goals were not associated with any time period at all. In the tables, goals which can be associated with time periods are listed in each column beginning with short-term goals and descending toward longer-term goals.

The effect of the questionnaire categories can be illustrated using the goals of maintaining staff at existing levels, and of reducing staff. On the completed questionnaires these goals were marked in the "organizational" column. Having no additional information with which to analyze such goals, they are shown as "organizationals" goals in the tables in Chapter 8. However, from the descriptions of these goals in the interviews, it is clear that they are primarily cost-saving goals and thus better placed in the "financial" column.

Another difference between the treatment of the questionnaire goal responses and the interview goal responses, is that the number of goals per respondent, and per category, may usefully be counted and compared for the former, but not for the latter. This is because the responses to item 17 in the interview were not the only responses that identified goals.

The categorization of interview goals into types and sub-types, and of questionnaire goals into sub-types, was an interpretive exercise requiring continuous cross-checks for consistency. Undoubtedly there remain goals whose placement can be debated. However, these placements should not compromise the general patterns revealed.
11. The "General Initiatives" and "Specific Actions" of the corresponding questionnaire table have been replaced by "Productivity and Cost-saving Initiatives". The application of the questionnaire headings created unresolvable problems of interpretation.

12. Zero-base Budgeting (ZBB) is a descendant of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), which was in vogue as the foremost rational public policy-making system at the time when Kotter and Lawrence were conducting the mayors' study.
CHAPTER 7

CAOs IN SMALL MUNICIPALITIES: THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

A. Introduction.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the responses to the major questionnaire items. The data are organized in the same order, and displayed in the same fashion as the data for the interview sample. There are several departures from this parallel treatment to accommodate differences between the two sets of responses.

Comparison will be the primary evaluative perspective taken toward corresponding sets of data. One of the major comparative dimensions is population size. As mentioned in Chapter 5 the 50,000 population breakpoint between the interview sample and the questionnaire sample was chosen primarily on the basis of administrative feasibility. It seemed feasible to conduct interviews—the preferred data collection method—with the CAOs of the approximately 45 accessible municipalities with populations greater than 50,000.

However, it was also anticipated that the major analytic concepts would apply poorly to the smaller municipalities. Kotter and Lawrence's 20 mayoral cities had populations in the hundreds of thousands. Kotter's 15 general managers managed organizations that were larger than any municipal administration serving fewer than 50,000, as were Peters and Waterman's "excellent" companies. That CAOs of municipalities of fewer than 10,000 people constitute more than half of the questionnaire respondents, renders the test of applicability
much more severe than anticipated at the design stage. The familiarity among staff, and between staff and council, strictly because the closer interaction that is associated with fewer people, fewer specialists, and a flatter hierarchy, is expected to be acute.

To this interpretive caution must be added a major caution about questionnaire-generated data that arises from the previous chapter. The ability to probe by means of supplementary questions was recognized from the outset as a distinct exploratory advantage of the interview. The evidence of this advantage emerged early and often in Chapter 6. In comparison, this chapter serves in certain respects primarily to confirm the limits of the questionnaire as an exploratory tool. To acknowledge this now is to save several repeat acknowledgements throughout the chapter.

One of the implications of these cautions is that the degree of confidence about the validity and significance of many of the interpretations made in this chapter, especially those on the point of consistency, must be lower than it was for the interview results.

For economy and clarity much use is again made of tables. Some contain numerical data that have required little or no rearranging or classification. However, many tables contain summaries of open-ended responses that required a higher degree of interpretation and classification.

Table 7-1 indicates that the respondents are relatively happy with all six elements of their work life, although they are considerably less happy as group than the interview sample. If the "Happy" and "Very Happy" columns are combined, the elements with which there are the
highest levels of contentment are the job (70%), relations with senior staff (67%), and relations with the mayor (63%). The corresponding percentages for the large municipality CAOs, with rank orders in brackets, are 94% (1st), 88% (3rd), and 94% (1st).

Table 7-1: Happiness of CAOs (n=56) in Small Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Unhappy</th>
<th>Neurotimal</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Very</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present job</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Mayor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations w/ Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations w/ Sr. Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Individual Totals (Min=6, Max=42)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Score</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>31</th>
<th>37</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of CAOs | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 28 | 17 |
Percent of CAOs | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 17 | 48 | 29 |

Contentment with council (59%), performance (56%), and organization (52%) follows. Again the corresponding large municipality CAO percentages and ranks are 85% (4th), 68% (6th), and 69% (5th).

Part (b) of the table indicates that more than three-quarters (77%) of the sample as individuals are "Happy" or "Very Happy" on average with the six elements of work life canvassed. The
corresponding percentage for the interview sample is 97%. An eye will be kept out as other data are presented for possible explanations of the 10 to 20 point disparity on the happiness items between the two samples.

B. Roles, Responsibilities, and Requirements

1. Role Statements (Item 3p parts)

Table 7-2 shows the distribution of responses to the 7 parts of

Table 7-2: Roles of CAOs in Small Municipalities
(n_q=57)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Item Statement</th>
<th>Very Typical</th>
<th>Fairly Typical</th>
<th>Nor Un-typical</th>
<th>Fairly Un-typical</th>
<th>Very Un-typical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Review and development of policies and procedures usually initiated by Staff.</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Remain neutral on controversial issues facing Council.</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Try privately to influence individual Councillors' votes.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Acceptability to Council not a consideration in framing Staff recommendations.</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Try to minimize exposure in press.</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Avoid favoritism toward any individual or group of Councillors</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The sample is 57 rather than 59 because these items were not included in the "pretest". One respondent failed to mark 3a.
questionnaire item 3 that bear most directly on the role of the CAO. Two of the items focus on the CAO as a member of staff while four focus on the CAO as an individual.

Table 7-2 indicates that the "most typical" and "least atypical" role elements for small municipality CAOs (and their staffs), are initiating policy and procedure review and development, minimizing press exposure and avoiding favoritism toward particular Councillors.

Somewhat less common--59.7% for "very" and "fairly" combined, as against 86% and 75% respectively for the policy and press items--are those who do not try privately to influence Councillors' votes. Doubtless some of the respondents read "private influence" as "lobbying" and reacted with the unthinking denial of some of the interviewees. However, even allowing for this reaction, it seems that CAOs in small municipalities are more willing to acknowledge their influence attempts. This seems consistent with their strong acknowledgement that staff "usually" initiate the review and development of policies and procedures. The disposition to keep a low press profile seems common to the two samples.

The practice of remaining neutral on controversial issues facing Council is "very typical" and "very atypical" for equal numbers of CAOs (7%), and "fairly typical" for about a third more CAOs (38.6%) than it is "fairly atypical" (26.3%). This response distribution may reflect the ambivalence toward conflict that was found among the interview CAOs.

Finally, the two extreme response categories attracted unequal proportions of respondents (3.5% to 14.0%) on the practice of framing
staff recommendations with an eye to their perceived acceptability to Council. However, when the "very" and "fairly" categories are combined, identical proportions (35.1%) result. The "neither...nor" category, which may be reflective of uncertainty, attracted 29% of the responses to this item, which is the highest of any item in the entire question 3 sequence.

Taken together the role element responses suggest a lower degree of support for policy-administration thinking than was found among large municipality CAOs. At least that is the inference to which any assumption of consistency points. That this assumption may be questionable is suggested by the plentiful examples of such thinking to be found in subsequent sets of responses beginning with the next item.

2. CAOs' Perceptions of Councillors and Staff as Similar or Different (Item 13c)

Item 13c asked the respondent whether he sees "Councillors and permanent Staff members as being basically" similar to or different from each other, and to give reasons for his view. Eleven (11) respondents (18.6%) chose "similar", while 48 (81.4%) chose "different". These results, along with the types of reasons and examples of each, are presented in Table 7-3.

The reasons given in support of the respondents' choice tend to be somewhat longer than in the other items with the same sentence-completion format. Eight (8) contained distinct ideas and were classified under two reason types, while one (i.e. the first example cited under "DIFFERENT") contained three ideas. As with the interview
Table 7-3: Reasons for Perceived Councillor-Staff Similarities and Differences (N=59)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Examples of reasons given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. SIMILAR</strong> (Total=11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;They are should all be working for the common good of the municipality.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;both should be working for the municipality as a whole....&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;ultimate goals are same.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;should be accountable to those who elect and pay us.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;They each have the concerns of the taxpayer at heart.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. No reason</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. DIFFERENT</strong> (Total=48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;the goals and objectives of Elected Reps are political whereas Staff are more concerned with the day to day management and have a better understanding of the overall process&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Accountability</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&quot;elected councillors must be responsible to the electorate&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>&quot;...different approaches to duties.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Councillors are highly influenced by public opinion &amp; political considerations while Staff is more pragmatic&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;They view issues and situation from two distinct positions....&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Roles</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>&quot;Politics is not administration.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;one group administers policy and the other group makes it&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;one develops policy &amp; the other implements it&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Time</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>&quot;Elected have at most short-views of where the Municipality is going whereas...Staff...have a longer time frame in mind.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;in many cases a Councillor may be on the scene for only a short time on a part-time basis, whereas the staff member is around more or less on a permanent basis and is career oriented for the most part&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on next page
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Examples of reasons given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>f. Knowledge</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>&quot;One has technical knowledge of one or more aspects of Mun administration. Other has full-time permanent position away from Municipal operation and needs votes&quot; &quot;staff have expertise in their professions and Councillors generally are from a different walk of life&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Councillors should be bringing problems to the attention of the Dept. Head for solution, not going to individual staff members.&quot;(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. No reason</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

responses, the examples show a mix of "is" and "ought" statements, one of which began as "are" and was changed to "should."

The range of reasons reflected in Table 7-3, together with their level of persuasiveness, is comparable to those given by the interview sample.

One difference is that the argument from policy-administration seems more direct. The primary difference between the splits in the two samples on this issue lies in the 7 responses to the effect that councillors and staff are similar because they have, or should have, common goals. While this perception might be a useful team-building block, how it is reflected in the relations between councillors and staff is not readily apparent.
3. The Least Preferred Councillors (Item 13d)

Question 13d required the respondent to complete the sentence beginning: "The Councillors I least prefer to work with are those who...". Nine (9) respondents or 15.3% of the sample did not respond to this question.

Table 7-4: Characteristics of Least Preferred Councillors
(n=59)

I. LPC disagrees with staff or fails somehow to respect staff enough (Number of CAOs = 19)

"have no respect for employees"
"become hysterical over issues, try to tell staff how to write reports, rather than accepting their professional opinion"
"can never say anything good about anyone"
"do not enquire or research previous policies or by-laws"
"use confidential information or staff reports to gain political prestige"
"tend not to recognize staff's expertise or experience"
"want to interfere in administrative matters that are my responsibility (in by-law)"
"live in the past and are not prepared to consider change"
"want to give everything & anything to everyone"
"create artificial situations to promote their self-image in public"

II. LPC has personal weakness(es) (Number of CAOs = 30)

"are dishonest--tell you one thing and tell someone else something different--both stories are never the same"
"are not trustworthy"
"are uninformed and chose to remain so"
"have limited understanding of Municipal Affairs"
"form opinions too quickly and refuse to change opinions with circumstances"
"pretend to know things they do not"
"politically ambitious for ego benefits"

III. Other (Number of CAOs = 1)

"Council names 6 reasons out of 9 elected officials"
From Table 7-4 it can be seen that the small municipality responses are similar in content to the interview responses and divide into roughly similar proportions. Although the criticism of staff in public, which figured largely in the interview responses, was not cited explicitly, it is implied in a number of responses. This includes, one suspects, the very general "can never say anything good about anyone".

In the same way "live in the past and are not prepared to consider change" is suspected of being a general statement of disagreement with the respondent, or resistance to the respondent's ideas. It illustrates the difficulty of classification since a case could be made for listing it as a personal weakness.

Similarly, under "personal weakness" probes into the complaints about "limited understanding" and being "uninformed", may lead to the CAO's perception that his information and understanding is naturally superior to the elected officials'. In this event they would be classified as disrespect. In some fashion or other most of the LPC characteristics appear to involve perceptions that deserved status is not being recognized.

The lone "Other" entry presumably means that the CAO least prefers to work with 6 of the 9 members of his council.

4. CAOs' Perceptions of Effectiveness (Item 13a)

Item 13a asked the respondent to rate the effectiveness of "the present Council, compared with other Councils I have worked with", and to explain this effectiveness rating. The comparison with "other Councils" was intended merely to provide a benchmark, a cue to aid
reflection. The CAOs' explanations of Council effectiveness were the primary point of the question. The responses to item 13a are presented in Table 7-5.

As can be seen from Table 7-5, 19 respondents or 33.3% did not provide reasons for their effectiveness ratings or did not respond to the question at all. The reasons that were provided fell into four broad categories with a fifth "Other" category for uncommon reasons. In the table are shown the numbers of reasons associated with each level of effectiveness, along with examples of the reasons given. The reasons given by the respondents were usually single points made in a few words. A few extended to a short sentence.

Six (6) CAOs attributed the Council's degree of comparative effectiveness to the Mayor, while 4 cited the presence of conflict among councillors. Eleven (11) explained the Council's effectiveness with reference to traits of councillors as individuals, such as their elected experience or lack of it, or their age, or vocation. The style of councillors acting collectively, for example, changing their position under public pressure, was the theme of 13 responses. This "individual" or "personal" aspect was rather difficult to distinguish from the "collective" aspect in a few cases, most notably in the case of "parochialism". Four (4) "Other" reasons could not be grouped under any of these heads.

Again the small municipality responses generally mirror the interview responses both in range of content and in the proportions of satisfied and dissatisfied. One major difference appears to be the crediting or blaming of the mayor, which was done in 10% of these
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>(1) Mayor's Effectiveness</th>
<th>(2) Councillors' Conflict</th>
<th>(3) Councillors' Traits</th>
<th>(4) Council's Style</th>
<th>(5) Other</th>
<th>No. Response</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAME</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- "Influence of a well-seasoned Mayor";
- "very aggressive Mayor"
- "younger group"
- "change from farmers to mix of 2 farmers, a teacher, a businessman"
- "voice opinions and accept the agendas and majority decision";
- "more involved, more active"
- "financial restraints...intervenes in administration, can be done"
- "too politically oriented...change minds if pressed"
- "6 of ten positions new"
- "too much discussion; intervenes in fewer projects"
- "Apathy, lesser ability; parochialism; majority new"
- "has no confidence in administrative staff; Council disposes"

No Response: 7 / 7

TOTAL 6 4 11 13 4 19 57
responses but not at all in the interview responses. Perhaps this evidently higher expectation of the mayor in small municipalities is associated with the more intimate relationship observed above.

Another perspective on the role of the CAO was sought through question 5, which required the respondent to complete the sentence: "To be very effective in this job means..."

Seven (7) CAOs did not respond to the question, 2 wrote that they didn't understand the question, and 1 completed the sentence with "Yes", to yield a total of 10 unusable responses (17.0%). The 49 usable responses were generally quite short, ranging between 2 and roughly 20 words.

Unlike the free-form responses considered above, the job effectiveness responses did not form several obvious groupings on the basis of common content. Kotter's key challenges and dilemmas appeared to be only incidentally relevant. The following list illustrates both the brevity of the responses and the variety of content:

1. "to be generally knowledgeable of major areas of programming & activities"
2. "to obtain the co-operation of all those you deal with."
3. "communicating, setting priorities, ensuring that jobs get done."
4. "to be honest, friendly, firm, knowledgeable (know what you are talking about)."
5. "being on top of things."
6. "being a facilitator"
7. "Carry out Council direction promptly and to their satisfaction. Demonstrate achievement in attaining goals & objectives. Maintain good relationships."
8. "Political awareness, thick skin, & experience"
5. Legislating the Mayor's Role (Item 13b)

Item 13b asked the respondent if it would or would not help to have the mayor's duties and responsibilities set out in detail in the Municipal Act. This question was included in the survey at the request of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing which is responsible for monitoring and initiating revisions to the Municipal Act. Although it appears outwardly not to be closely associated with the principal research themes, it actually provides another test of the appreciation of the role of style in municipal administration. Are the respondents aware of the limitations of written role descriptions for all mayors in producing behavior that corresponds to the described role? The responses to item 13b are summarized in Table 7-6.

The respondents are almost evenly divided on the question: 29 (49.2%) think it would help to have the mayor's duties specified in the Municipal Act, while 28 (47.5%) think it would not help. Of the 57 who responded to the question, 22 (38.6%) did not provide a reason to support their view.

The reasons that were given were classified broadly as either "incumbent-based" or "incumbent-free", according to whether or not the respondent's own particular situation seemed to be a primary determinant of his reason. The reasons were then further classified by common content.

The 16 reasons given by the "would help" group, divided evenly on the incumbent-based/incumbent-free dimension. Seven (7) of the 8 incumbent-based reasons reflect the CAO's desire to restrain his particular mayor, while the eighth CAO would like to use the Municipal
Table 7-6: Helpfulness of Legislating the Mayor's Role

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Incumbent-based Reasons</th>
<th>B. Incumbent-free Reasons</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;WOULD HELP&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;WOULD HELP&quot;</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to Restrain the Mayor</td>
<td>&quot;Would increase the Mayor's role as his duties could not be questioned.&quot;</td>
<td>Need Clarification of Role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;WOULD NOT HELP&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;WOULD NOT HELP&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>&quot;as a politician he would only look at politics and the future in the field&quot; (?)</td>
<td>Need to Provide for Individual Variation is Reasonable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>&quot;vary so much from &quot;would only de-municipality to tract from the municipality... individuality cannot be set out in detail&quot; mayor, and do &quot;each has... own abilities... and they tend to dislike being being 'rule-bound'&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No Response | 2 | 59 |
Act to strengthen his particular mayor. These respondents seem not to appreciate the situational dependence of their perceptions of need. Should they find themselves in a situation of changed objectives toward the mayor, they would probably find the now-desired legislation blameworthy.

All 8 CAOs whose reasons did not seem to derive from their particular situations cited the need to clarify the mayor's role. Some strong sense of policy-administration thinking is reflected in most of these.

Fourteen (14) of the 15 "would not help" reasons given, were judged to be free of influence from particular incumbents. These were further divided into those that reflected a perceived need, as distinct from a personal desire, to accommodate variations between municipalities, or between mayors.

In sum, it appears that the latter group of 14, representing about one-quarter of the sample, appreciates the relationship between formal role descriptions and practical role playing.

6. The Incidence and Nature of Formal Performance Evaluations (Item 6a)

Compared with the 29% of large municipality CAOs who have formal performance evaluations, proportionately fewer small municipality CAOs (20.3%) have them. The most striking statistic in Table 7-7 is that 69.5% of the questionnaire respondents are satisfied at not having an evaluation. This is proportionately about twice as many as in the interview sample.
Conversely, while half of the interviewees who have evaluations are dissatisfied, the corresponding fraction for the questionnaire respondents is less than one-tenth. Of the 12 who have formal evaluations, 7 are evaluated by council or a committee of council; 3 are evaluated by the head of council assisted by one or more councillors, while 2 are evaluated by the head of council alone. Perhaps the relatively high level of satisfaction with the evaluation is attributable to the involvement in most evaluations of more elected officials than the mayor.

Six (6, or 10.2%) are trying to improve their situation, 5 by obtaining a formal evaluation, and one by having the mayor play a greater role in the evaluation relative to council.

That the previously expressed ideas of "very effective" performance for the CAO were so brief and so varied may be attributable in part to the low incidence of formal evaluations.

Table 7-7: Performance Evaluation Incidence and Satisfaction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAO HAS Performance Evaluation</th>
<th>CAO DOES NOT HAVE Performance Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAOs Satisfied</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOs Dissatisfied</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction Unknown</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Traits and Skills and the Effectiveness of the CAO (Item 18)

While all respondents attempted this item, 1 response was unusable on the "most important" side, and 3 were unusable on the "least important" side, yielding "n"s of 58 and 56 for purposes of the ranking exercise.

Table 7-8: Most and Least Important Traits and Skills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. MOST IMPORTANT (n=58)</th>
<th>% of n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-confident</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Motivating others</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Setting goals &amp; objectives</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Personable</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emotionally stable</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. LEAST IMPORTANT (n=56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Memory for detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &quot;Reading&quot; elected officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ambitious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Good sense of humor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Policy analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-8 shows the 5 traits and skills that were ranked among the three most and least important by the highest numbers of respondents.

The "Most Important" list closely resembles the interview responses both in content and in levels of support. "Personable" has displaced "Reading elected officials", which was demoted to the "Least Important" list. Again, perhaps the closer council-staff relationship that comes with smaller organizations makes it less necessary for staff to "read" councillors. "Goal and objective setting", the sixth "most important" skill for the interview sample, is the third "most
important for the present sample. However, the small difference of about 5% in the sizes of their respective followings seems insignificant. "Goal and objective setting" displaced "Achievement Oriented" which (under the name "Ambitious") was also demoted to the "Least Important" list. Perhaps "Achievement Oriented" had a more positive connotation for large municipality CAOs than "Ambitious" had for their small municipality counterparts.

The only similarities between the two "Least Important" lists are "Memory for detail" and "Good Sense of Humor", both of which were supported by roughly the same proportions of respondents in the respective samples. While "Memory for detail" was shown to have different meanings for different interview CAOs, there is no information on the meaning(s) assigned to it by the questionnaire respondents. The most that can be said is that "Memory for detail" appears to be a salient concept for CAOs in both groups.

C. Managerial Styles and Strategies

1. Self-attributed Managerial Styles (Item 2)

About one-third (32.2%) of the respondents did not respond to item 2a: "I would describe my managerial style as...". The responses of the 40 who did are summarized in Table 7-9. The examples indicate that they are quite short, the majority containing a few words. Roughly two-thirds reflect one of the two major themes found in the interview responses (persuasion/teamwork and bearing/visibility), while the remaining third formed no obvious grouping.
Table 7-9: CAOs' Descriptions of Their Managerial Style (n=59)

| Style Theme A: Form of Action (individual-team) and Motive for Action (persuasion-coercion) |
| Number of responses: 22 of 40 (55%) |
| "consensus management as much co-operation as possible among the management team." |
| "participative management." |
| "democratic, and consultive" |
| "co-operative as far as possible" |
| "participatory management primarily with occasional (when necessary) autocratic style." |

| Style Theme B: Personal Bearing or Visibility |
| Number of responses: 7 of 40 (15.5%) |
| "quiet & efficient" (also under C.) |
| "being low profile." |
| "confident and relaying confidence to others." |

| Style Theme C: Other |
| Number of Responses: 16 of 40 (40%) |
| "satisfactory" |
| "productive" |
| "moderate" |

Note: Numbers of responses add to more than 40 because several responses contained more than one theme.

As with the interviewees there is a distinct preference for the persuasion-teamwork combination, coupled in some cases with the assurance of "toughness" when necessary.

One part of item 3 may be regarded as an indicator of informality, at least in relation to municipal employees. This is part 3i which asked the respondent about the degree to which he "encouraged municipal employees" to use his first name. Thirty-one (31) and 10 CAOs
respectively, a combined total of 71.9%, responded "Very Typical" and "Fairly Typical". Only 6 respondents (5.3%) indicated that it is "Very" or "Fairly" "Untypical" for them to encourage employees to use their first names; 10 (17.5%) selected the neutral response. The key word in this item, in comparison with the interviews, is thought to be "encourage". While several of the interview CAOs encourage the use of their first names, toleration of their use is more common. This may be another result that flows largely from the small size of the questionnaire organizations.

In response to item 2b, 34 (57.6%) reported that their style "is pretty much the same as it was 5 to 10 years ago"--compared with about 39% of the interview respondents--and 2 (3.4%) did not respond. Of the 23 (39.0%) who noted changes in their style, 8 mentioned the exercise of authority using phrases such as "autocratic to democratic", "less dictatorial", and "try to use Department Heads as a team". The related theme of delegating was the second most common theme, emerging in 6 responses as "delegate more", or have a "stronger desire to delegate", or words to that effect. These same themes were found in the interview responses. The 9 remaining responses, such as "It has grown and adjusted with my growing responsibilities" and "I have more and complete respect of council and staff", had little in common.

Forty-two (71.2%) of the respondents report being satisfied with their managerial style (item 2c). The changes desired by 16 (27.1%; 1 did not respond to this item) respondents include improving the allocation of time (4), delegating more (3), and improving control and disciplining techniques (3).
Item 2d, the last of the four-item managerial style sequence, asked whether or not the respondent was aware of "any particular image" of himself that "is shared widely by Councillors or Staff". Twenty-nine (29) of 57 respondents (50.9%), compared with 20% of the interview respondents, indicated that they were not aware of such an image, while 1 (1.8%) did not respond.

Of the 27 personal images described, 9 and 2 respectively, reflected the dominant managerial style themes of persuasion-teamwork and bearing-visibility. This 33% persuasion-teamwork statistic compares with 10% for the interview CAOs. Competence was mentioned in 6 descriptions in terms such as "competent", "knowledgeable and competent", and "that of a capable but rather difficult person". Others described their image using terms such as "cheap", "fat", and "hard working".

2. Conflict-handling Styles (Item 14)

The distributions of responses to item 14 are shown in Table 7-10. As with the interview CAOs, Problem-solving (E) was selected by more respondents than any other alternative, for the three sets of relationships, senior staff (57.7%), mayor (40.0%) and council (25.9%), for what are supposed to be the same reasons. While Forcing was second for the interview sample, at about 15% for the senior staff and the mayor, Compromising (C) was the second most frequently selected alternative, for all three relationships, 21.2%, 24.5%, and 22.2% respectively. Curiously, small municipality CAOs report Forcing council slightly more than those from large municipalities. And,
whereas Smoothing (B) got no support on its own among the interview CAOs, it was third across the board for the questionnaire sample, at levels of 15.4%, 24.5% and 22.2%. Support for Avoiding (A) was almost identical in both samples.

Table 7-10: Conflict-handling Style Responses

a. Aggregates (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sr. Staff</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A: I try to avoid disagreements and to refrain from arguing when disagreements do arise</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: I try to minimize disagreements which do arise by playing down differences and stressing common interests</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement, and to negotiate a compromise position</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: I advance my position on contentious issues as forcefully as I can with a view both to convincing others of its merits, and to avoiding having to compromise</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement, and to seek the others' help in finding a solution</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total responses for % calculation: 52 53 54

b. Individual Totals (max=15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Scores:</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs:</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs:</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Styles of Supervision (Item 15)

Four (4) CAOs did not respond to this item at all. Also, several respondents completed the item in ways described for the interview sample that rendered their responses unusable for certain purposes. Average scores were calculated for the usable responses in the same manner as for the interview responses. The average of all average scores equals 2.8. The distribution of the average scores is shown in Table 7-11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Close Supervision</th>
<th>Complete Delegation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Score:</td>
<td>&lt;2.0  2.0-2.4  2.5-2.9  3.0-3.4  3.5-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs:</td>
<td>1     11    14   15    7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs:</td>
<td>2.1   22.9  29.2  31.3  14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 31.3% of respondents who perceive themselves to be what were termed "helpful delegators" in Chapter 6, is about half the size of the "helpful delegator" group in the interview sample. The other "half", as it were, is spread in both directions. Perhaps the lower rate of delegation is a reflection of fewer staff reporting to the CAO in small municipalities.

Table 7-12 depicts the style of supervision by job function for all positions which were reported with enough precision to plot.
Table 7-12: Supervisory Style by Job Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervision</th>
<th>Close Supervision</th>
<th>Explain &amp; Help</th>
<th>Share Ideas</th>
<th>Turn Over Total Responsibility No. of Posns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clerk's</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
<td>No. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Posns | 13 | 57 | 78 | 50 | 198 |
| Style %     | 6.6 | 28.8 | 39.4 | 25.3 |

In terms of being given complete responsibility, Fire Chiefs in small municipalities are the most autonomous members of senior staff, they were the most closely supervised in the large municipality group. Works directors are the second most autonomous, as they were in the interview responses. And, while the same proportion of finance officers are given complete responsibility in both large and small municipalities, fewer than 1 clerk in 10 in small municipalities (compared to about 1 in 3 in large municipalities) is given complete autonomy. These relationships between CAOs and clerks may be influenced by the rise of so many CAOs from clerk’s positions. Another contributing factor may be the high proportion of small municipality CAOs who also serve as clerks. As expressed somewhat differently in Chapter 5, "Clerk" is part of the position title of 32 of the 59
respondents in the sample; 15 of the 32 CAO-Clerks are also Treasurers, while 1 respondent is a CAO-Treasurer.

4. Time Expenditure and Control (Item 10)

The first three parts of item 10 are concerned with time expenditure and control. The data for total hours worked, hours spent on work at home, and time spent alone are presented in Table 7-13.

Table 7-13: Time Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Total Hours Worked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of CAOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>b. Hours Worked at Home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of CAOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>c. Percentage of Time Spent Alone at Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of CAOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaire respondents reported total work hours per week ranging between 38 and 70; the weekly average is 49 hours. These figures are similar to the interview sample. Twenty-two (37.3%) of the
respondents do not spend any time on their work at home; those who do, spend between 1 hour and 20 hours, the average being 3.9 hours.

The percentage of time at work which the CAOs reported spending alone varies between 5 and 95, although almost half the respondents (29; 49.1%) fall into the range of 40 to 79. For comparison 60% was the highest estimate for the interview CAOs, and the majority of the estimates were below 30%. Two-thirds (39; 66.1%) of the questionnaire respondents find the amount of time they spend alone at work "about right"; 9 (15.3%) indicate that it is "too low", and 3 (5.1%) find it "too high". Dissatisfaction over having too little time to oneself at work applies proportionately to less than a third of the dissatisfied in the interview sample.

Almost two-thirds (38; 64.4%) of the respondents indicate that they "make a special effort to control the way" their time is spent at work; 17 (28.8%) do not make an effort to control their time; 4 (6.8%) did not respond to this question.

Seventeen (17) of those who make an effort to control their time, and 7 of those who don't, did not complete the "because..." statement. A representative sample of the reasons given by the former, and all of the reasons given by the latter, are listed in Table 7-14.
Table 7-14: Reasons for Controlling Time

A. I make a special effort to control my time at work because...

1. "otherwise I end up working overtime or at home."
2. "otherwise I tend to spend too much time on paperwork."
3. "my time must be productive."
4. "priority setting in my opinion is mandatory."
5. "time is our most important commodity."
6. "because I am attempting to work 'smarter' rather than longer."
7. "it is more efficient—it doesn't work."

B. I do NOT make a special effort to control my time because...

1. "unknown circumstances that arise from time to time."
2. "jobs are performed as requested by Council and public."
3. "Council interrupt at their leisure."
4. "direction required for Deputy Clerk & Treasurer."
5. "take situations as they arise."
6. "we have a very young administration needing a lot of support."
7. "work load can be handled comfortably within present time frame."
8. "I think an important part of the job is being available to staff and Council."
9. "of the varied types of matters that I deal with."
10. "I have an open door policy."

D. Agendas and Networks

1. Achievements as CAO (Item 4)

Unlike the interview item which asked for previous position achievements as well, the questionnaire item was limited to the respondents' achievements as CAOs. In total, 404 achievements were listed by the 44 (74.6%) respondents who gave a response to this item. The responses were categorized using the three goal categories of item 12, as shown in Table 7-15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Service/Program/</td>
<td>Organization &amp;</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial turnaround</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>People-Related</td>
<td>Appointment as CAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing from the Feds a $2 million NIP grant...</td>
<td>Construction of new municipal building with no debt; completion of sanitary sewers in urban area</td>
<td>Introduced modified CAO/ Committee of the Whole system</td>
<td>To be praised by Council &amp; taxpayers for job well done</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of reserves</td>
<td>Ability to provide innovative programs for growing community</td>
<td>Established all employee benefit programs</td>
<td>OMB hearing re recreation centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving serious financial problems; Amalgamating fire depts with $300,000 annual savings...</td>
<td>Home for the aged, welfare department, planning department</td>
<td>Complete restructuring of system; getting all Councillors working; high rate of staff productivity</td>
<td>Nothing specific, general contribution to operation &amp; efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot levies</td>
<td>Renovate Administrative Building using HURD labor</td>
<td>Good relations between council and staff; residents deem operation efficient &amp; courteous</td>
<td>To have budgets approved without major changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council acceptance of debt study and remedy</td>
<td>Many new facilities in 20 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Council-Staff Relations, Staff &amp; Interdepartment Relations &amp; Productivity</td>
<td>(2) Reorganization, Systems, Manuals, Policies &amp; Procedures</td>
<td>(3) Staff Training, Development, Evaluation and Compensation</td>
<td>(4) Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council-staff relations through personnel policy by-law and department heads management team</td>
<td>Councillors policy and information manual</td>
<td>Job evaluation; performance appraisal</td>
<td>Confidential research for Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective liaison between Administration and Council</td>
<td>Updating employment by-laws and benefits; updating administrative and financial systems; Council adoption of a new organizational structure...</td>
<td>Employee benefit package; staff development</td>
<td>Settling CUPE contract in 10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnabout in rapport between council &amp; staff</td>
<td>Data processing</td>
<td>Provide job descriptions of all positions</td>
<td>Progress of the organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of inter-department communication and co-operation</td>
<td>Organizing and working with the present management system</td>
<td>Development management salary schedule and job evaluation</td>
<td>Reduction of staff through attrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting all councillors working; high rate of productivity by staff</td>
<td>Establishing policies and procedures; reorganized entire management structure</td>
<td>Establish management backup positions</td>
<td>Organizational change and efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed department heads management team</td>
<td>Procedural By-law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 33.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7-15 shows that organizational achievements outnumber service/program/facility achievements by three to one, an even larger disparity than the two to one ratio found in the interview responses.

The domination of the CAOs' achievements by organization and people-related goals seemed to warrant their further breakdown, which is shown in Table 7-16. For consistency and simplicity an attempt was made to use the same sub-categories that were used to classify organization and people-related goals in Table 7-20. Unfortunately, this proved to be unsatisfactory and the sub-categories in Table 7-16 were devised. The emphasis is on structure and systems, and relations between council and staff, with staff development a distant third.

In content most of the achievements seem basic rather than innovative, although there is even less information on which to base this judgement than was provided in the interview responses.

2. CAOs' Goals and Plans (Item 12)

Twenty-one (21) respondents, or 35.6%, did not respond to item 12. The 38 who did respond identified a total of 279 goals and plans, an average of 7.4 per respondent. Table 7-17 shows that 7-to-9 goals, identified by 15 responding CAOs (39.5%), was the most common range. It should be recalled that this treatment was deemed not to be appropriate for the interview responses.

The goals identified by the respondents are divided roughly into thirds among each of the three categories. The short run and medium run time period have roughly equal numbers of goals, each of which is about twice the number to be found in the long run period.
Organization and people-related goals, which were dominant in the interview responses, fall off most dramatically from the short run to the long run.

Table 7-17: Distribution of Goals and Plans
(nq=38)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Aggregates</th>
<th>FINANCIAL GOALS</th>
<th>SERVICE/PROGRAM/FACILITY GOALS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION &amp; PEOPLE-RELATED GOALS</th>
<th>TOTAL Row as %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>114 40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-12 MONTHS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM RUN</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>107 38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 YEARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG RUN</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58 20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEYOND 5 YEARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column as %</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Individual CAOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Goals</th>
<th>1-3</th>
<th>4-6</th>
<th>7-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13-20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of CAOs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of CAOs</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 7-18 to Table 7-20 inclusive present the distribution of the short run goal responses within each category, along with examples. The content of the medium-run and long-run goals is not sufficiently different or interesting to warrant their tabular presentation. Since the interview and the questionnaire stimulated two quite
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) General Initiative</th>
<th>(2) Specific Action</th>
<th>(3) Budget Level</th>
<th>(4) Budget Planning/Analysis</th>
<th>(5) Budget Monitoring/Control</th>
<th>(6) Other and Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>No growth</td>
<td>Analyze debt</td>
<td>Keep within budget</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buy out photo-</td>
<td>budget</td>
<td>capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>copier lease</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve tax</td>
<td>Restrained</td>
<td>Improve revenue &amp; expenditure</td>
<td>Control spending</td>
<td>$40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>collection</td>
<td>growth to 5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accumulate</td>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>Reduce</td>
<td>Controlling additional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reserves</td>
<td>current budget</td>
<td>current cost</td>
<td>controlling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td>1.3% tax increase</td>
<td>Review present budgeting</td>
<td>Improve accounting system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>healthy condition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to show quarterly position</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of municipality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More sophisticated</td>
<td>Maintain real income</td>
<td>More accurate records; faster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>computer programs</td>
<td>after inflation</td>
<td>reporting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 36 = 6 1 10 5 9 5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Maintain Existing</th>
<th>(2) General Improvment, Add'n, Expansion</th>
<th>(3) Specific Improvment, Addition, Expansion</th>
<th>(4) Plans, Reviews, and Studies</th>
<th>(5) Other and Personal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN Maintain existing; do not add new</td>
<td>Improve on service delivery</td>
<td>Extend sanitary sewers</td>
<td>Review computer hardware &amp; software</td>
<td>Do maximum work with local unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Automate systems</td>
<td>Continue upgrading all municipal roads; provide senior citizen Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain current levels of service</td>
<td>Reduce unit costs of services</td>
<td>Construct sewage treatment program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain present level of service</td>
<td></td>
<td>Completion of new secondary plan; new parks plan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion of current studies &amp; implementation</td>
<td>Gradual improvement in the efficiency &amp; effectiveness of staff</td>
<td>Start construction of Town Hall</td>
<td>Establish an economic development strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) General Improvement</td>
<td>(2) Specific Improvement or Expansion</td>
<td>(3) Review and Reorganization</td>
<td>(4) Staff Trg., Dev., Evaluation</td>
<td>(5) Other and Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN</td>
<td>Improve relations with employees</td>
<td>Improve working conditions in the parks department</td>
<td>Assessment and recommended improvement</td>
<td>Establish community relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve co-operation</td>
<td>Reduce sick leave abuse; improve community centre organization...</td>
<td>Implemented recreation management &amp; staff</td>
<td>Additional training of staff heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve communications</td>
<td>Return planning function to lower tier</td>
<td>Review status of certain department heads</td>
<td>Orient three new department heads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greater efficiency; productivity increase; better time management</td>
<td>Set up new economic development division</td>
<td>Return planning function to lower tier</td>
<td>Increase Deputy Clerk-Treasurer's responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand responsibilities of staff with same numbers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No increase in staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 40 = 10  6  8  8  6
different styles of response, a strict comparison is not possible. In general the questionnaire responses exhibit the GM-like "loosely connected vague and specific goals and plans" for a broad time span, reported by Kotter. The repetitiveness of the responses and their diminishing numbers toward the medium and long terms seem to be artifacts of the questionnaire method. That is, the respondents appear to have felt obliged to complete each of the cells in the matrix even if it meant reusing the short-term goals and plans for the medium and long terms.

In content, most of the goals seem quite basic. As was seen with the goals of the large municipality CAOs, one or two attract attention for the risk they seem to entail. These include two medium-run organizational goals of decertifying a union and reducing the size of council by about one half. The "Theory Z" relationships goal is intriguing.

3. Networks

Item 16 was the major item used to explore the CAOs' networks within, and outside of, their organizations. The respondents were required, first, to identify the 6 individuals or groups from each of the internal and external lists "who have actively given you the most help in accomplishing your goals over the past year or so". They were allowed to select more than one individual or group from a category. Second, they were required to rank the co-operativeness of each of the groups they identified, on a least-to-most co-operative scale of 1 to 5.
There were a total of 56 usable internal response sets and 55 usable external response sets. The responding CAOs left a total of 18 possible internal choices blank, and a total of 20 possible external choices blank.

The distributions of internal and external responses respectively, are shown in Tables 7-21 and 7-22. In both cases each CAO's responses were listed in descending order of co-operativeness. Since many CAOs assigned the same degree of co-operativeness to more than one individual/group category, the numbers 1 through 6 across the top of the tables represent a rough co-operativeness ordering, 1 being most co-operative.

Table 7-21: Distribution of Internal Network Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inside Individuals/Groups</th>
<th>Most Co-op</th>
<th>Least Co-op</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of Nq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Mayor</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Council</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Council Committees</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Councillors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Sr. Management Team</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Dept Heads</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Departments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Staff Task Forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Employee Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Individual Employees</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Other(Specify):</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7-21 indicates that the Mayor was identified as one of the six most helpful individuals/groups by 51 (91.1%) of the 56 responding
CAOs. For 28 of these CAOs, the Mayor was rated the most co-operative, a rating that was in some cases shared with another group/individual. The next highest number of "most co-operative" ratings is Individual Employees at a distant 10. However, Individual Employees are rated among the six most helpful by 48 CAOs (85.7%), placing this category third collectively behind Department Heads and Mayor. Some Individual Employees are department heads.

The wide gap between the collective ratings for Department Heads (53) and for Sr. Management Team (23) evidently reflects both the non-existence of SMTs in many smaller municipalities, and the recency of those that are in place. The collective rating for Staff Task Forces also appears to reflect their relative scarcity in smaller municipalities.

The 8 "Other" inside individuals and groups specified include personal staff, the Board of Management of the Home for the Aged, and a "Labor-Management Consultation Committee".

The major observation regarding external networks (see Table 7-22) is that Provincial Ministries and MPPs and other municipalities are much more important both collectively and individually than any local groups. This is a direct reflection of small size: small municipalities do not have the staff numbers or the range of staff specialists or the tax base that contributes to the self-sufficiency of large municipalities.

The "Other" external individuals and groups, which include consultants, the Fire Marshall's Office, the municipality's private solicitor, and other CAOs, are not far behind the local groups.
Table 7-22: Distribution of External Network Responses
(n_q=55)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Individuals/Groups</th>
<th>Most Co-op</th>
<th>Least Co-op</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent of n_q</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Local Business Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Local Service Clubs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Local Boards and Commissions</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. TV, Radio, Newspaper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Local Citizens' Groups</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Professional Associations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Provincial Associations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Provincial Ministries &amp; MPPs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Federal Ministries &amp; MPPs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Other Municipalities</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Other(Specify):</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the internal network the average level of co-operativeness ranges between a minimum of 2.8 and a maximum of 5.0; the mean of the 54 averages is 4.1. The corresponding figures for the external network are 2.5, 5.0, and 4.0. Since internal groups were not rated relative to external groups it seems appropriate not to draw any conclusions from this statistical coincidence.

To conclude this section, the responses to part k of item 3, which endorse the perceived importance of external networks for roughly three out of four respondents, are presented in Table 7-23.
Table 7-23: Item 3k -- Outside Contacts and Effectiveness
\( (n_q=57) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Statement</th>
<th>Neither Typical</th>
<th>Fairly Typical</th>
<th>Nor Un-Typical</th>
<th>Un-Typical</th>
<th>Very Un-Typical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In general, the more contacts the CAO has with people outside the organization, the more effective he/she is likely to be.</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. Summary and Conclusion

A massive amount of information, on the managerial approaches of small municipality CAOs, corresponding generally to the information in Chapter 6 on their large municipality counterparts, has been presented in this chapter.

In many respects small municipality CAOs project preferences and practices that are similar to large municipality CAOs in the major areas of inquiry. Although their collective contentedness is somewhat weaker than the interviewees, there is no major aspect of their work life with which they are decidedly unhappy. Like the interviewees the questionnaire respondents do not appear to have a very well developed sense of the meaning of effectiveness for a CAO. One associated factor may be the low incidence of formal performance evaluations, which applies as well to the large municipality sample.

The majority of questionnaire respondents, as do the majority of interviewees, think of their managerial style as persuasive and team-
oriented. Problem Solving is also their most preferred conflict-handling style. Both samples report similar ranges of work hours and hours spent alone, although more questionnaire respondents are satisfied with their time alone. The range of content of agenda items, the higher proportions of organization and people-related items, and the low numbers of innovative items, are also similar over the two samples.

Finally, there is considerable evidence in certain questionnaire responses that policy-administration thinking is common among small municipality CAOs.

However, to conclude from these acknowledged similarities that the managerial approaches of the CAOs in the two samples are essentially similar, does not seem warranted. One simply cannot derive from any individual's questionnaire responses the senses of day-to-day actions and concerns, of authenticity, and of consistency, that are possible with the interview responses. Many of the most interesting interview observations emerged from probing behind the front lines of the initial response. The observations about wandering around that emerged from the discussions of time consciousness and allocation were among the most rewarding.

The questionnaire responses are the 'thin front lines', as it were. They convey a favorable collective managerial image of the small municipality CAO. One suspects on the basis of the interview responses that there is more to the image than meets the eye. Yet it would be perverse to use the large municipality sample as a foundation for such suspicions. In general the sentence completion responses were
disappointingly short and vague, often to the point of being unintelligible. These factors explain the present writer's often perfunctory comments made about responses to individual items.

The questionnaire item that perhaps best illustrates the functional relationship between the method and the response is the goals and plans item. By completing all of the cells in the chart provided, most CAOs created a formal plan that invited assessment in terms of Kotter and Lawrence's "muddling through to rational" continuum. Moreover, in such terms one suspects that most of these plans would be judged to be closer to the rational Pattern #4 than to any other Pattern. However, the content of many of the sentence completion responses leads in the opposite direction. It suggests that the rationality promised by the technical expertise of the professional administrator remains unfulfilled.
Notes to Chapter 7

1. The three budget-related headings used for classifying the financial goals are self-explanatory. The distinction between "General Initiative" and "Specific Action" is meant to be one of concreteness. To illustrate, it should be clear why "Stability" is listed as a General Initiative on the short run financial goals figure, while "Buy out photocopy lease" is listed as a Specific Action. However, "Improve tax collection" and "More sophisticated computer programs" may appear to some to be Specific Actions as well. The former is "general" in the sense that there are a variety of "specific" problems which might underly the goal, and a number of "specific" ways of solving them. As for the latter, while the actions entailed in acquiring or developing "more sophisticated computer programs" are relatively limited, the goal statement gives no clue as to the specific need for more sophistication.

The headings within the major goal categories—financial, service/program/facility, and organization & people-related—were chosen with a view to minimizing changes from one time period to another. The literal concreteness of facilities, along with the nature of programs and services, made the general-specific distinction both somewhat unique and easier to make for the service/program/facility goals. However, the initial difficulty encountered in applying the general-specific distinction to the financial goals, was also encountered with the organization and people-related goals.

While acknowledging these initial judgmental difficulties, it is also appropriate to note that many comparisons between and among categories, sub-categories, and time periods, were done to attain consistency.
PART III

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this chapter the investigation is reviewed, the principal findings are brought together, a conceptual framework for interpreting managerial approaches is proposed, and the implications of this research both for future research and for training CAOs are discussed.

A. Recapitulation

This research was initiated to investigate the principal finding of Dent and Nyitrai's 1982 study, namely, that CAOs perceived the success of both the CAO position and the system in Ontario to be largely attributable to the individual CAOs' personal styles.

In Chapter 1 it was seen that the CAO position in Ontario, and in Britain and the United States from which the thinking behind it was imported, grew through structural analysis and promotion. As a symbol, its promoters associated "CAO" with such positive ideas as "the corporate approach", "neutral professionalism", and "technical expertise". The CAO was also promoted as the solution to the undefined problems of "fragmentation", "lack of unity" and "lack of direction" in local government. The traditional analytic framework in which the CAO position was so favorably assessed, was one in which local government effectiveness was evaluated primarily in terms of organizational forms.

Research on the impact of the reorganisation of local government
in Britain was used to illustrate the necessity of complementing formal structural analysis in assessing local government effectiveness. The corporate structures associated with the reorganisation conflicted with their organizational cultures of the local authorities. The lesson drawn then was that one must attend to both the "hardware" and the "software" of the organization. Style being a piece of software, the emphasis in this research was to be on software.

Also in Chapter 1 style was found to be a word that is positively valued for its many associations. Its informal meanings tend to be synonymous with traits or habits visible to the casual observer. Style was also seen to have been formalized as a particular set of responses to items in a scale or instrument administered by a trained person.

Two prominent formalized treatments of style, Situational Leadership and The Managerial Grid, and Garnier's Grid derivative on conflict-handling, were critically reviewed in Chapter 2. Their premises and practical applications were judged to be seriously deficient. This conclusion, together with the narrowing of the research focus to CAOs alone, resulted in Situational Leadership and Garnier's conflict-handling scale playing only minor roles in the interviews and questionnaires.

In Chapter 3 the prescribed roles of the CAO, of council and of the SMT, and their associated relationships, were considered. Policy-administration was the name given to the traditional view that council's role is to make policy and staff's role is to implement it. This was shown to be associated with attributions of expertise and
professionalism to staff, and political astuteness to elected officials. The deficiencies of policy-administration thinking were documented, and O'Brien's lists of council-staff expectations were nominated as a possible replacement. The final task of Chapter 3 was to define effective corporate management in operational terms. The modest results were to accept "non-departmental" as the best approximation of corporate, and non-departmental answers to the LGMP's questions regarding the SMT as one indication of a corporate management orientation. Evidence of dealing satisfactorily with Kotter's key challenges and dilemmas was also taken to be indicative.

Chapter 4 was devoted to the elaboration of the agenda-network framework that was employed to study the approaches of mayors and private sector GMs. The principal research question that was carried forward into the thesis from these studies was: How do CAOs approach their jobs? Kotter and Lawrence found that five distinct combinations of agenda setting, network building, and task accomplishment patterns characterized the 20 mayors in their studies. Program Entrepreneurs were found to be most successful at coalignment, to have the broadest agendas, to make the largest impacts on their cities, and not to be associated with any particular local government structure.

It was seen that, in contrast to the mayors study, Kotter made no attempt in his study of GMs to define agenda setting and network building patterns so discreetly or to classify the GMs along these lines. Instead similarities and differences among GMs were treated more fluidly and more incrementally. Kotter also recognized that GMs approach their work consciously/analytically and unconsciously/
intuitively, and regarded the latter as the more influential of the two. The analytic dimension in the report of the GMs study that is most comparable to those of the mayors study is time usage, which is reported in terms of twelve visible patterns.

It was supposed that the different analytic treatments used in the Kotter and Lawrence and in the Kotter studies were attributable: (1) to the timing and the nature of the investigators' observations, (2) to the recognition of the unconscious/intuitive approach component, and (3) to Kotter's greater appreciation of both the complexities and subtleties of continuous and incremental managerial activities, and of the effectiveness of informality in such activities. Kotter and Lawrence reconstructed the agendas and networks of the mayors after the event using interviews, documents and the observations of others; Kotter's critical impressions of GMs were gained through first-hand observation of the GMs on their jobs. By its nature the unconscious/intuitive component could not be formalized.

Chapter 4 concluded with a discussion of the concept of the public entrepreneur. It was seen that, while some writers use it uncritically for its positive association with private business, entrepreneur can be used to describe both public and private managers who use many influence techniques to create networks to implement their innovative agendas.

In Chapter 5 the development of the project, the collection of the data, and the samples, were described. The early history of the project was shown to be critical in three respects. First, the difficulties between the CAG and the department heads in the City of
Burlington following the hiring of its first CAO, precipitated the search for practical advice and precedents that figured largely in the original thesis proposal. This admittedly limited experience made the author something of an authority. Second, the research population was broadened at the request of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs. This necessitated the use of questionnaires. And third, the apprehensiveness of the OMAA executive led to the deletion of elected officials and department heads as prospective subjects.

As much more formal devices, questionnaires were suspected of being much less appropriate than interviews for investigating managerial approaches. During the development of the project, the question of the comparative effectiveness of interviews and questionnaires was added as a research theme.

That the interview responses were less systematic than planned owing to serious interview constraints, was the first of fourteen enumerated concluding points to Chapter 6. These points suggest that, while large municipality CAOs compare favorably with GMS in certain respects, the more formal overall nature of most CAOs' managerial approaches distinguishes them from GMS. Another general finding was of inconsistencies between the general managerial styles, the supervisory styles, and the conflict-handling styles CAOs attribute to themselves, and other responses and observations made by the interviewer. Teamwork for most CAOs was applicable primarily to the SMT to the exclusion of less senior staff and councillors.

The questionnaire data presented in Chapter 7 indicated that the small municipality CAOs think of their managerial approaches in
essentially the same initial terms as their large municipality counterparts. The acknowledged inadequacy of forced-choice scales, and the nature of the sentence-completion responses, severely limited interpretation. In Chapter 5 it was reported that municipalities of under 10,000 people were found to dominate the questionnaire sample. This led to the caution in Chapter 7 against assuming that, if more detailed impressions were to have been obtained through interviews with the small municipality CAOs, they would approximate those of the interview sample.

While the answers to the questions that initiated this research have been covered in this chapter-by-chapter review, it is useful to summarize them. The impressions of CAOs, concurred in by Dent and Nyitray, that they have succeeded, that "the CAO system" has succeeded, and that these successes are attributable to personal style, should not be taken at face value. CAOs' responses on a broad range of items suggest that success meant something relatively trivial -- as trivial as having retained their jobs -- and that personal style was too abstract to take the causal responsibility with which it was burdened.

The critique of the literature in Chapters 1 to 3, Kotter and Lawrence's pattern and charter findings in Chapter 4, and the variation found in the interview responses, suggest that it is not very helpful to think of the respondents' organizations as members of "the CAO system".
The Classification of Styles and Cultures

As elements of the organization's software the CAO's managerial approach and the organization's culture overlap. This can be seen when the observations and conclusions of Chapters 6 and 7 are presented as "answers" to the functions of organizational culture set out by Haynes in Chapter 1. The answers can be suggestive only. The illustrative examples are meant to evoke rather than to repeat the evidence given in Chapter 6.

What are the goals and values toward which the organization should be directed and by which its success is to be measured? The CAOs' answers to this question are the goals and plans set out in Tables 6-13 to 6-15. The compatibility between a CAO's agenda and his municipality's formal agenda was not examined closely. However, the "basic" nature of most of the goals and plans would seem to imply compatibility. Also a number of CAOs referred to council-approved statements of goals and objectives.

What does the organization expect from its people and vice versa? This function of the corporate culture was touched upon only lightly and indirectly. The evidence suggests that mechanisms within the CAO's direct control for establishing the organization's expectations are not well developed in most municipalities. Personal contact with individuals at all levels of the organization is perhaps the best mechanism available to the CAO. It has been shown that CAOs are typically not concerned to promote a particular image. Their contacts with middle management and junior staff are limited by respect for the chain of command and by pressures that confine the CAO to his office.
It was also seen that a few CAOs seek out and even stage opportunities to mix with more junior employees.

How should behavior be controlled? Which qualities and behavioral characteristics should be valued? Should members treat one another competitively or collaboratively, closely or distantly? Most of the evidence on these questions relates to the CAO, the department heads, and the councillors. Between council and staff in general some form of policy-administration thinking appears to mediate most relations. Each group is assigned a role for which certain exclusive qualities and behavioral characteristics are thought to be required. This thinking acts to distance council from staff. The enforcement of these impractical territorial roles seems inexorably to foster competition, if only for control, between council and staff. In only a few cases does the mayor attend SMT meetings, and in only one of these does his attendance not restrict the discussion in some way.

The creation and reinforcement of physical and emotional distance between himself and the senior managers is the likely result of most CAOs respect for hierarchy and business formality. While most CAOs prefer persuasion, teamwork, and problem-solving, some evidence suggests that these preferences may be incompatible with others, or with actual practice. Their accounts of the operations of their SMTs suggest that a corporate management orientation is still a remote ideal for many.

How is the external environment to be dealt with? It has been found that queries from councillors (who seem to be treated as part of the external environment in many municipalities) and from the press
tend to be channeled to or through the department heads. In some cases an information memo to the CAO is to follow. In only one case are such queries routinely routed to the employees at whatever level who are able to give the best answers most quickly.

This is a reminder that "personal style" in one of the thesis opening questions—"Can the personal styles of CAOs be formalized and classified?"—should be understood to mean the style of the CAO-in-the-organization. On the basis of the critique in Chapter 2 and the responses in Chapter 6 to the style items, the answer to this question is "not usefully", at least not in terms of scales such as Situational Leadership.

However, it does seem useful informally to classify managerial styles in flexible and fluid terms that are consonant with the referents and uses of "style" itself. The purpose of such a classification is to provide CAOs with a map and a compass. The map may be likened to a small-scale aerial photo; the compass has cardinal points only. With these tools they may locate themselves and plot future directions. The classification framework, which is shown in Table 8-1 may also play a role in the training and research proposed in part C. (It may be noted that the author has used this framework to support his second annual assessment of the operations of the City of Burlington SMT. It proved to be effective in focusing the SMT's four consecutive weekly discussions of its effectiveness.)

In Table 8-1 35 of the 37 CAOs interviewed are assigned to the cells corresponding to the patterns discerned in the interviews. The interviews with two CAOs were too short to permit classification.
The Bureaucratic are distinguished from the Entrepreneurial on the basis of their tendencies (1) to support strongly policy-administration as a division of labor, (2) not to appreciate both tasks and relationships in the political terms of allocating material and non-material resources, (3) to respect the chain of command for internal communications, (4) to rely on their offices as their primary place of business, (5) to be directed by circumstances and events over which they feel they have little control, (6) to hold professional schooling and functional specialization in overly high esteem, and (7) to have networks that are problem-driven rather than prospect-driven.

The Individualistic are distinguished from the Team-oriented on the basis of their tendencies (1) to use the SMT as a purely advisory subordinate body, rather than to assign it status and responsibility in its own right, (2) to involve council less as a regular participant in strategic decision-making exercises such as the formation of goals and objectives, (3) to use interdepartmental task forces and project teams less frequently, and (4) to rely more on positional authority to influence subordinates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INDIVIDUALISTIC</th>
<th>TEAM-ORIENTED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUREAUCRATIC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Between</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTREPRENEURIAL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-1: Four Basic Managerial Approaches of Interview CAOs
C. Implications for Training and Further Research

The approach framework presented in the previous section is intended to help a CAO decide where he and his organization are and, if he is dissatisfied with their present location, to help him decide in what direction he would like to take them. Since training is generally thought of as one of the most common means of reorientation—recall that one of the lessons the Hinings group drew from their study of the impact of the reorganization in Britain was that managers should be trained to cope with a major change in their system—the implications of this thesis for training warrant discussion.

It is consistent with the local government-management literature as a whole, that there are only a few references to training and career development. McAllister cites the findings of a 1974 study of Canadian municipal personnel departments, which on her own inspection remained valid five years later, that manpower planning is "at a rudimentary state" and department-oriented rather than corporate-oriented (1979, 46). She summarized the status of training and development programs this way:

Most municipalities do provide for some training and development of their staff, although the opportunities and activities vary both in substance and sophistication. In certain smaller centres training and development activities are limited to reimbursement of tuition for employees who successfully complete certain job-oriented courses at outside institutions. Larger cities may offer intensive in-house seminars, or support for a sequence of external courses, or involve staff who demonstrate high potential in management training programs. By and large, however, such activities tend to be somewhat unfocused and geared toward short-term benefits.

Rarely does one find a municipality which has developed manpower policies related to training and development of their personnel in light of individual professional and organizational needs. This is most painfully true in that area where the need to anticipate and to prepare for future
eventualities is most pressing—the middle and senior management levels. (1979, 47)

McAllister identifies four objectives for management development, part of the second stage of manpower planning:

--- enhancing the skills of current managers;
--- anticipating change;
--- developing potential managers; and
--- meeting short-term training needs. (1979, 48)

Of most concern here is the development of potential managers, especially of department heads and, in turn, of CAOs. She recommends that individuals be identified as potential managers on the basis of "education, experience, personal characteristics and expressed goals and objectives" (p.50). These individuals are then to be provided with a combination of formal development activities and practical experience that will allow them to acquire the expertise required of a municipal manager" (p.50). She goes on to list every common type of "formal activity and practical experience"—internal and external courses, seminars, conferences, workshops, internships, job rotation, and sabbaticals—as if all have an important contribution to make, and as if a high number of opportunities guarantees effectiveness. She makes no attempt to analyze "the expertise" that she takes to be the object of management development, or to evaluate the comparative potential of the activities and experiences listed.

In a more recent paper with the promising title of "Career Planning for Municipal Administrators" management development is addressed by means of a fleeting reference to "bad hiring and bad training practices [that] serve to handicap even experienced managers" (Cluff 1984, 17). "Bad training practices" are defined only as "little, if any,
orientation to the organization, and "depending again on the style of the senior manager" the failure to provide subordinates "with adequate or ample opportunity for ongoing upgrading" (p.17). In the absence of elaboration the rationale for and content of "ongoing upgrading" must be inferred by the reader. One possible objective of ongoing upgrading is the acquisition or refinement of the basic technical, human, and conceptual "Skills of an Effective Administrator", the title of a 1955 Harvard Business Review article, approvingly cited earlier by Cluff (i.e., at p.4).

Although it is focused on department heads and CAOs, a recent British review (Hinings, Stewart and Butcher 1982) proceeds from a premise similar to McAllister's and Cluff's, namely, the assumed need by CAOs and department heads for "significant reappraisals and continuing general development" (p.1). As McAllister does for Canada, Hinings et al. confirm for Britain the general lack of systematic development in management for CAOs and department heads in (p.29).

The thrust of its companion discussion document is that a variety of voluntary 'renewing and remotivating' opportunities "to acquire new skills, new knowledge and new approaches" should be provided for senior municipal managers (Institute of Local Government Studies and Local Government Training Board 1982). The seminars specifically identified include time management, handling stress, and working with groups, (p.26).

The assumptions and recommendations about management development reviewed to this point are coincident or compatible with what Kotter calls "the popular view" (1982a, 132-3). His sense of what distinguishes
"Effective executives" and of why some are more effective than others differ considerably from the popular view. Effective executives are distinguished by Kotter for their "somewhat specialized" personal characteristics which include ambition, achievement and power motivation, detailed knowledge of the business, and many co-operative relationships.

In the popular view, according to Kotter, they are distinguished by the "broadly applicable" characteristics of "intelligence, analytical ability, and knowledge of management tools, concepts, theories, etc." While the latter characteristics are popularly thought to be "developed in adulthood by means of formal training", Kotter has found that the GMs characteristics were "developed throughout life—in childhood, via education, and in the early career". That is, Kotter gives little credit, if any, to formal mid-career training.

Similarly, while formal training is commonly taken to be one of the ingredients that differentiates more effective from less effective managers, Kotter's view is that the more effective managers simply have the personal characteristics that fit the job. The specialized nature of knowledge of the business and organization leads Kotter to recommend that GMs be hired from inside (p.134). Hiring from the inside requires, in turn, the systematic development of young managers.

Kotter warns organizations not to spend money on training programs, with the possible exception of "moderately long university-based executive programs", both because he found no evidence that his GMs benefitted from them, and because such programs may mislead the trainees. As examples of the latter he uses time management programs "based on simplistic conceptions of managerial work" that urge the manager to
reduce "interruptions" and to avoid short and disjointed conversations (p.137).

One possible exception that Kotter allows to the "hire from inside" rule is businesses in which "many of the key relationships and knowledge are transferrable across companies" (p.134). Presumably this applies to municipal governments, at least within jurisdictional types and size ranges. Even so, this does not obviate systematic internal development of potential CAOs, no evidence of which was found in the interviews.

If the development of effective CAOs parallels the development of effective GMs, then there would appear to be little prospect of significantly improving the managerial approaches of current CAOs. Instead, efforts should be directed first to carefully screening the department head and sub-department head pools for immediate successors who have the personal characteristics of effective general managers. Secondly, municipalities should select for concerted management development certain junior managers whose personal characteristics can be enhanced in preparation for promotion to CAO in the medium term.

If future CAOs are to be able to work effectively with their department heads and their elected masters, then these two groups must be reconditioned to think of council-staff roles and relations in other terms than policy-administration. If this study's findings for CAOs are at all representative of the thinking of senior staff and councillors, then all training techniques, forums and communications media should be used to challenge comfortable images. Within municipalities this reconditioning can begin with the initiation of discussions of the findings of this report among senior
managers, and between senior staff and councillors. More broadly, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing's seminars for newly-elected councillors and Municipal World magazine are good forums, as are the Association of Municipalities of Ontario's Queen's Park decision-making and constructive influence workshops (see A.M.O. 1984a and 1984b).

In the matter of further research, there seems to be no doubt that the present research would have resulted in more illuminating and more decisive results if the CAOs' department heads and councillors had also been interviewed. These two additional groups would have provided a better understanding of the broader culture and the larger team, together with a consistency check for the CAOs' perceptions.

There is a pressing need for first-hand observations and first-person accounts of how SMTs operate in a variety of municipalities. Is the integration of elected officials into the SMT a worthy objective? If so, is it best accomplished formally, say, through negotiations between council and staff, or informally, say, by personal off-hand invitation from the CAO?

This study has attempted to breathe life into the heretofore lifeless corporate structure of the CAO position, and—to use Lewis's terms from Chapter 1—to link the CAO as a person to his organization in an intellectually satisfying way. It has provided both a mirror in which CAOs can see their styles, and a make-up kit of ideas with which they can highlight their present styles or begin to make them over. For those attracted to the latter course especially, the limits of the conscious/analytic and formal elements of their managerial approaches have been stressed.
1. MUNICIPALITY

INTRODUCTION TO INTERVIEW

Phase 1 of the Role of the CAO Project was conducted by Gary Deht and Ernie Nyitral of the Municipal Management Policy Branch of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, in conjunction with the Ontario Municipal Administrators Association. In that study, it was found that CAOs perceived the "CAO System" to be a success, and that the success of the position (and the system) largely hinged on the individual's personal style.

In Phase 2, our objective is to identify, using interviews and questionnaires, the managerial styles and strategies used by CAOs in the performance of their jobs.

This research was conceived jointly as a Ph.D. thesis for the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario, and as a study of the thought and practice of CAOs from which suggestions for practical improvements in municipal management are expected. The project has been endorsed by the Ontario Municipal Administrators Association, and is being funded in part by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.

You are assured that the information you provide will remain confidential to those directly involved in the project. These include the principal investigator (George Vance, Assistant to the CAO of the City of Burlington) and his clerical support staff, the participating staff of the Municipal Management Policy Branch of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing (Senior Policy Advisors Ernie Nyitral and Gary Dent), and the dissertation advisory board at the University of Western Ontario. No participant or his/her municipality will be identified or identifiable with any particular response in any report of the project.

The first of the project's major findings is scheduled to be reported in conjunction with the Annual Conference of the Ontario Municipal Administrators Association in May or June of 1968.

Attached to this introduction is a set of Cue Cards which is designed to assist you in answering certain questions.

Do you have any questions or comments before we begin?

3. TITLE OF YOUR POSITION:

4. AGE

5. TIME IN THIS POSITION: _______ Years and _______ Months

6. PREVIOUS POSITION:

7. TIME IN PREVIOUS POSITION: _______ Years and _______ Months

8. FORMAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING (Completed or In Progress)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Program or Subject of Specialization</th>
<th>Year of Graduation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Community College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] University What degree?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate degree?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[ ] Other Formal Training and Education (Specify):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Role of the C.A.O Project

9. Positions held now or in the past by professional or provincial associations:

Position

Dates in Office

10. Briefly describe your career plans for the next 5 to 10 years:

11. Please refer to Cue Card No. 1, and indicate by number how happy you are currently with each of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very unhappy</th>
<th>un-</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>very happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Your present job</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Your organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Your performance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Your relations with the Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Your relations with Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Your relations with Senior Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42. a. How would you describe your managerial style?

b. How, if at all, does your managerial style differ today from what it was 5 or 10 years ago?

c. Is there anything about your managerial style that you would like to change?

d. Are you known among the staff or Councillors for any particular trait, or habit, or rule, or preference or whatever?

13. Look back over your service first as C.A.O., and then in the position you held before becoming C.A.O.

What were some of the achievements in each of these positions which have meant the most to you?

Achievements as C.A.O. Achievements in Previous Position
Role of the CAD Project

14. a. What does it mean to be VERY EFFECTIVE in this job?
   
   b. How effective do you think you have been and why?

15. a. Is your performance evaluated on a regular basis? [ ] Yes [ ] No

   Would you briefly describe the evaluation process and indicate
   your satisfaction with it?

16. What do you consider to be the greatest challenges facing you at the
   moment?

17. YOUR GOALS AND PLANS FOR YOUR MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION may or may not
   coincide with those contained in formal planning documents such as
   the 5-year Capital Forecast, or a list of corporate goals and
   objectives.

   Refer to the chart on Cue Card No. 2. Please identify YOUR GOALS AND
   PLANS under each of the three headings, for each of the three time
   periods.

   Use the following ONLY IF Respondent has difficulty starting or asks
   for clarification.

   "Financial" goals might relate to assessment mix by or within
   property class, mill rate level, level of indebtedness, level of
   reserves, distribution of revenues among local sources.

   "Service, Program, Facility" goals might relate to changes in the
   number, type, or level, of services/programs/facilities through
   expansion, innovation, privatization, contracting out.

   "Organizational" goals might relate to changes in the organization's
   structure, in the division or in the flow of work, in the level of
   staffing, in the replacement of key personnel, in staff training...in
   short, anything to do with people, be they elected or appointed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINANCIAL GOALS</th>
<th>SERVICE/PROGRAM/FACILITY GOALS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN 0-12 MONTHS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM RUN 1-5 YEARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LONG RUN BEYOND 5 YEARS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Role of the CAC Project

8. a. Is there anything that your municipality does especially well, or especially badly?

b. What kind of a reputation does your municipality have in local government circles?

9. a. On the average, how many hours per week do you work both at the office and at home?

   Hours spent at work: ________ Hours spent working at home: ________

b. On the average, what percentage of your working time is spent alone?

   ________ per cent

c. Do you try to control the way your time is spent at work?

   If "YES", what are some of the methods you use to control your time?

   If you picked up any of these control methods at a time management seminar, would you tell us when you took the seminar, and what difference it has made to the way you do your job?

20. Time management and communications are closely related. Would you describe briefly your PREFERENCES AND PRACTICES for receiving, processing, and disseminating ROUTINE INFORMATION?

   Probe: For example, do you prefer to talk to people over the phone or in person? Do you have people come to your office, or do you go to theirs? Do you drop in on others, or do you try to warn them first? Do you prefer to discuss business matters in scheduled situations, or do you try to do business during chance encounters, say, in the corridor?

21. To explore the structure of your work time in more detail, we would like you to send us a copy of your appointment calendar for the month of March or April. If you wish, you may replace proper names with position titles or general identifiers and make other such changes.

   [ ] Will provide [ ] Will NOT provide

22. Over time, perhaps the most common distinction between the respective roles of Council and Staff has been that Council's main job is to make POLICY, and that the main job of the Staff is to ADMINISTER Council policy.

   a. What is your view of this idea?

   b. How would you describe the respective ROLES of COUNCIL and of STAFF in your municipality?

   c. Do you do anything in particular to reinforce these roles?

   d. In general, how would you describe the present Council?

   e. Please describe your relations with the Mayor.
Role of the CAO Project

(Would it help, in your opinion, if the Mayor's status and duties were set out in detail in the Municipal Act?)

f. What are some of the things that you do to try to keep Council-Staff relations running smoothly?

g. In your view how similar to or different from one another are elected Councillors and permanent staff? Please explain.

h. On every Council there will be some Councillors with whom you find it easier and more rewarding to work, than with others.

Please describe some of the traits or behaviours of past or present Councillors with whom you LEAST PREFER TO WORK.

i. What is your view of the proper social relations between the C.A.O. and Senior Staff on one side, and Members of Council on the other?

23. In most organizations there are certain matters or issues that have a habit of resulting in fairly strong disagreements between those who are responsible for dealing with them.

Examples of such matters in municipal corporations might include performance evaluations, budget allocations, and conditions imposed upon developers.

Using Cue Card No. 3 indicate which of the following ways comes closest to describing the way you most often handle disagreements in meetings with Senior Staff, with the Mayor, and with Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SR. STAFF</th>
<th>MAYOR</th>
<th>COUNCIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. I try to avoid disagreements and to refrain from arguing when disagreements do arise.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. I try to be considerate of others' feelings by playing down differences and stressing common interests.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. I search for a compromise position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. I advance my position as forcefully as I can in attempting to convince others of its merits.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. I try to get everyone's concerns out in the open, and to seek the others' help in resolving the issue.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If there is a description other than the one you chose that comes "second closest", please identify it.
24. Would you please briefly describe in point form THREE disagreements in which you have been involved in the past year. ONE for each of Senior Staff, the Mayor and the Councillor (or one of its Committees).

If possible, describe disagreements which focus on issues from the list provided on Cue Card No. 4; otherwise name your own issues:

Please mention:
- How the disagreement arose
- Who was involved in dealing with it
- How it was dealt with
- How long it took to resolve
- How satisfied you were with the resolution

Senior Staff Disagreement:


disagreement with Mayor:


disagreement with Council/Committee:

List of Issues:

1. Committee structure
2. Labour negotiations
3. Professional development
4. Lot levies
5. Agenda setting
6. Performance evaluation
7. Internal review of a department
8. Overexpenditure
9. Hiring a key manager
10. Traffic signals
11. Official entertainment
12. Conflict of Interest
13. Tendering process
14. Direction for a Staff Study
15. Misuse of municipal vehicles
16. Closing of a recreation facility
17. Fee for personal use of photocopier
18. Sale of municipally-owned land

25. On average, how often are contentious issues resolved with each of the people listed on Cue Card No. 5. IN A WAY THAT SUPPORTS YOUR PERSONAL POSITION?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>always</th>
<th>almost always</th>
<th>most of the time</th>
<th>about half the time</th>
<th>less than half the time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committees</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Role of the CAO Project

26. You may behave differently toward Senior Managers as individuals, owing to factors such as personality differences.

Using Cue Card No. 6 please identify the Senior Management Positions which report directly to you.

Opposite each position indicate which of the four descriptions of leader behaviour comes closest to describing your usual behaviour in dealing with each Senior Manager.

1. I provide specific instructions and closely supervise performance.
2. I explain what I want done, and provide opportunity for clarification.
3. I share my ideas of what is to be done, and help the Manager decide on an agreeable course of action.
4. I turn responsibility for the task/problem over to the Manager.

SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS USUAL BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS MANAGER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

27. Would you describe the contact you have with MIDDLE MANAGERS and with FRONT LINE STAFF in your daily work?
   E.G. How much contact?
   Under what circumstances? Task Forces, Meetings, direct with individuals, awards presentations, farewell gatherings?
   Nature of relationships? Regular information source? First-name basis?

Middle Managers       Front-Line Staff
Role of the CAO Project

28. Are there any people in the organization in which you confide the most critical information, and from whom you seek advice on critical matters? What are their positions? What is the basis for your relationship with each of them?

29. How important is it to you that you and your Senior Managers speak with one voice to, and stand united before, Council? Why?

If IMPORTANT, how do you promote and secure unity?

30. In the course of his day-to-day work the CAO may be involved with a wide range of individuals and groups both inside and outside of the municipal organization. The focus of this question is on outside groups and agencies.

On Cue Card No. 7 is a list of and groups with whom you may be involved. Would you identify the groups outside your organization, and the individuals within them, which are IMPORTANT TO YOUR WORK, and EXPLAIN WHY THEY ARE IMPORTANT, and the NATURE OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP? (i.e., frequency of contact, examples of help sought and given, number of people known personally).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important Groups</th>
<th>Nature of and Individuals/Why Important/Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Associations</td>
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<td>Local Boards and Commissions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Business Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service Clubs</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-V, Radio, Newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Associations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Role of the CAO Project

31. On Cue Card No. 8 is a list of TRAITS and SKILLS which may be found among Senior Managers. Please indicate, using the scale provided, HOW IMPORTANT you think each one is to the effective performance of your CAO's job.

Start by indicating the 3 MOST IMPORTANT; then circle the 3 LEAST IMPORTANT; finally, score the remaining traits and skills.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAITS &amp; SKILLS</th>
<th>LEAST IMPORTANT</th>
<th>MOST IMPORTANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Confident</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Achievement oriented</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Personable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Good sense of humour</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Emotional stability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Optimistic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Enthusiastic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Articulate in speech and writing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Memory for detail</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Motivating others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. &quot;Reading&quot; elected-officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Financial and policy analysis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Face-to-face negotiating</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Knowledge of Provincial legislation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Thinking under pressure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Knowledge of management principles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. Setting goals and objectives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Are there any traits and skills which you would like to add to the list? If so, please list them below, and rate them on the scale.

______________________________ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5
______________________________ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5

Which, if any, of the above traits and skills would you like to improve upon if possible?

32. Finally, do you have any other comments about the way you do your job which might benefit other C.A.O.'s on the job?

/gv
Oct.4/83
D2F3701
ROLE OF THE CAO PROJECT: PHASE 2

QUESTIONNAIRE

January 1984

Instructions

1. Please correct the information on the address label above as necessary.
2. In this Questionnaire:
   "Mayor" means the Head of Council.
   "Senior Staff" means all managers who report to the CAO.
   "Senior Management Team" means the CAO and Senior Staff group which
   meets regularly to deal with inter-departmental and corporate matters.
   Translate these terms to suit your particular circumstances.
3. Your responses will be held in confidence and your anonymity will be
   preserved in all project reports.
4. Your comments and explanatory notes are welcomed, either in the margins or
   as separate attachments.
5. Please return the Questionnaire in the envelope provided by March 2, 1984.

---

1. Please indicate, by circling the appropriate number, how happy you are
   currently with each of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>very unhappy</th>
<th>un-happy</th>
<th>neutral</th>
<th>un-happy</th>
<th>happy</th>
<th>very happy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Your present job</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Your organization</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Your performance</td>
<td>1  2  3  4  5  6  7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
   | d. Your relations with
     the Mayor | 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 |
   | e. Your relations with
     Council | 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 |
   | f. Your relations with
     Senior Staff | 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 |
Role of the CAO Project: Phase 2

2. a. I would describe my managerial style as...

b. My managerial style today is pretty much the same [ ] as it was 5 to 10 years ago.
   OR
   My managerial style differs in the following ways:

c. I am satisfied with my managerial style [ ]
   OR
   I would like to change my managerial style in the following ways:

d. I am not aware of any particular image of me that is shared widely by
councillors or staff [ ]
   OR
   The image of me that is held by councillors [ ] and/or staff [ ] is:

3. Please respond to the following statements regarding your beliefs and practices, by circling the appropriate response.

   a. Reviews of existing policies and procedures, and the development of new policies and procedures to meet new situations, are usually initiated by staff rather than by council.

       Very Typical    Fairly Typical    Neither Typical    Fairly Unusual    Very Unusual

   b. My everyday life as CAO is filled mostly by...

       Problems needing a solution?    Challenges needing a solution?    A rather predictable routine?    Not enough things to keep me interested or busy?

   c. On controversial issues facing council I remain neutral.

       Very Typical    Fairly Typical    Neither Typical    Fairly Unusual    Very Unusual

   d. In order to speed up discussions and meetings, I "put words in other persons' mouths"...

       Frequently    Occasionally    Almost never
Role of the CAO Project: Phase 2

4. I try in private to influence the way individual Councillors vote.
   - Very
   - Fairly
   - Neither Typical
   - Fairly
   - Very
   - Typical
   - Typical
   - Nor Unypical
   - Unotypical
   - Unotypical

5. At work, do you ever keep two or more jobs moving forward at the same time by shifting back and forth rapidly from one to the other?
   - No, never
   - Yes, but only in emergencies
   - Yes, regularly

6. What Council is likely to find acceptable is not a consideration in the framing of Staff recommendations, even on matters of wide public concern.
   - Very
   - Fairly
   - Neither Typical
   - Fairly
   - Very
   - Typical
   - Typical
   - Nor Unotypical
   - Unotypical
   - Unotypical

7. Would people who know you well agree that you take your work too seriously?
   - Definitely yes
   - Probably no
   - Probably yes
   - Definitely no

8. I encourage municipal employees to call me by my first name.
   - Very
   - Fairly
   - Neither Typical
   - Fairly
   - Very
   - Typical
   - Typical
   - Nor Unotypical
   - Unotypical
   - Unotypical

9. In sense of responsibility, compared with other CAO's, I am:
   - Much more
   - A little more
   - A little less
   - Much less
   - Responsible
   - Responsible
   - Responsible
   - Responsible

10. In general, the more contacts the CAO has with people outside the organization, the more effective he/she is likely to be.
    - Very
    - Fairly
    - Neither Typical
    - Fairly
    - Very
    - Typical
    - Typical
    - Nor Unotypical
    - Unotypical
    - Unotypical

11. Would people who know you well agree that you tend to get irritated easily?
    - Definitely yes
    - Probably no
    - Probably yes
    - Definitely no

12. I try to minimize the exposure I get in the press.
    - Very
    - Fairly
    - Neither Typical
    - Fairly
    - Very
    - Typical
    - Typical
    - Nor Unotypical
    - Unotypical
    - Unotypical

13. I am very careful not to do anything that would, or would appear to constitute favouritism toward any Councillor or group of Councillors.
    - Very
    - Fairly
    - Neither Typical
    - Fairly
    - Very
    - Typical
    - Typical
    - Nor Unotypical
    - Unotypical
    - Unotypical

14. The contributions of all Senior Staff in meetings of the Senior Management Team should be based primarily on their general management ability, not on professional expertise in accounting, engineering or whatever.
    - Very
    - Fairly
    - Neither Typical
    - Fairly
    - Very
    - Typical
    - Typical
    - Nor Unotypical
    - Unotypical
    - Unotypical

4. Some of my proudest achievements as CAO have been:
Role of the CAD Project: Phase 2

5. To be very effective in this job means...

6. a. My performance is not evaluated formally. [ ]
   OR
   The procedure for formally evaluating my performance is:
   (Please indicate how often the evaluation is done, who is involved, and
   how the evaluation affects your salary, if at all.)

   b. I am satisfied with my performance evaluation situation.
   OR
   I am trying to change my performance evaluation situation as follows:

7. The most difficult decision I have had to make as C.A.O. was...

8. This municipality is known in local government circles for...

9. My career plans for the next 5 to 10 years are to...

10. a. On the average, I work a total of _____ hours per week, which breaks down
    as follows:
    - at work ______ hours per week (which includes _____ hours in
    meetings of formal committees
    and council)
    - at home ______ hours per week

    b. On average, I spend about ______ per cent of my time at work, working
    alone. I find this percentage about right[ ], too low[ ], too high[ ].

    c. I make a special effort [ ] OR I do NOT make a special effort [ ]
    ...to control the way my time is spent at work because...

    d. I do not have a regular exercise program [ ] OR
    My regular exercise program consists of...
Role of the CAO Project: Phase 2

11. Are you willing to provide a copy of one month from your appointment calendar to assist in the exploration of time management patterns?

[ ] Will enclose. [ ] Will send [ ] Will NOT provide separately

Since budget meetings may distort your routine, and since most municipalities set their budgets in January-February, we would prefer either MARCH or APRIL from your appointment calendar. Please make the entries intelligible to us, for example, by adding position titles or group affiliations to names.

12. a. On the chart below please identify your goals and plans under each of the three headings, for each of the three time periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINITEAL GOALS</th>
<th>SERVICE/PROGRAM/FACILITY GOALS</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION &amp; PEOPLE-RELATED GOALS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHORT RUN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0-12 MONTHS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDIUM RUN</td>
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<td>1-5 YEARS</td>
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<tr>
<td>LONG RUN</td>
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<tr>
<td>BEYOND 5 YEARS</td>
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</table>

13. a. The effectiveness of the present Council, compared with other Councils I have worked with, is the same [ ], lower [ ], higher [ ], for the following reasons:

b. I think that it WOULD HELP [ ] or WOULD NOT HELP [ ]
   if the Mayor's duties and responsibilities were set out in detail in the Municipal Act, because...

c. I see elected Councillors and permanent Staff members as being basically SIMILAR TO [ ] or DIFFERENT FROM [ ] each other because...
Role of the CAO Project: Phase 2

14. In most organizations there are certain matters or issues that have a habit of resulting in fairly strong disagreements between those who are responsible for dealing with them. Place an "X" opposite the statement which comes closest to describing the way you most often handle disagreements in private or closed meetings with Senior Staff, with the Mayor, and with Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SR. STAFF</th>
<th>MAYOR</th>
<th>COUNCIL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. I try to avoid disagreements and to refrain from arguing when disagreements do arise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. I try to minimize disagreements which do arise by playing down differences and stressing common interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement and to negotiate a compromise position.</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. I advance my position on contentious issues as forcefully as I can with a view both to convincing others of its merits, and to avoiding having to compromise.</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. I try to identify precisely the basic points of disagreement and to seek the others' help in finding a solution.</td>
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</table>

15. Listed below are four ways of managing subordinates. Consider in turn each Senior Staff position which reports directly to you, and write it below the description that best reflects the way you typically deal with each subordinate.

1. "I provide specific instructions and closely supervise performance until the job is completed."

2. "I explain what I want done in general terms, provide opportunity for clarification, and check to see that the job has been done."

3. "I share my ideas of what is to be done, help the person decide on an agreeable course of action, and turn the job over to the person."

4. "I turn complete responsibility for the job over to the person."
Role of the CAO Project: Phase 2

16. The lists below represent the wide range of individuals and groups with whom the CAO may come into contact in the course of his day-to-day work.

**Inside Individuals and Groups**
- a. Mayor
- b. Council
- c. Council committees
- d. Councillors
- e. Senior management team
- f. Department heads
- g. Departments
- h. Staff task forces
- i. Employee groups
- j. Individual employees
- k. Other (Specify):

**External Individuals and Groups**
- A. Local business groups
- B. Local service clubs
- C. Local boards and commissions
- D. TV, radio, newspaper
- E. Local citizens' groups
- F. Professional associations
- G. Provincial associations
- H. Provincial ministries & MPP's
- I. Federal ministries & MP's
- J. Other municipalities
- K. Other (Specify):

**Instructions:**
1. Please identify in the circles below the positions of the 6 individuals/groups from each of the above lists, who have actively given you the most help in accomplishing your goals over the past year or so.
2. Please be specific: for example, "c" might be "Administration Committee Chairman", "A" might be "the Chamber of Commerce", "F" might be the "Executive of O.M.A.A.", and so on.
3. You may select more than one individual/group from each category, e.g., from "H" you might identify the directors of two branches of a Ministry.
4. In the square on each spoke write a number from "1" to "5" representing how co-operative you perceive each of the identified relationships to be, where

- 1. Rarely willing to assist me
- 2. Sometimes willing to assist me
- 3. Frequently willing to assist me
- 4. Almost always willing to assist me
- 5. Always willing to assist me
- nq. I must persuade

**INTERNAL**

**EXTERNAL**


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Cameron, Kim

Campbell, David P.

Christensen, Terry

City of Burlington

City of London Management Committee

Cluff, George B.


Cohen, Herb

D'Aquino, Thomas

De Vries, David L., Ann M. Morrison, Sandra L. Shulman, and Michael L. Gerlach

Dearlove, John
Goodman, J.S.
Grove, Andrew S.
Guttschalk, George E. and Joseph P. Cangemi
Hagan, James B.
Hambleton, Robin
Harlow, LeRoy R.
Haynes, Robert J.
Hersey, Paul and Ken Blanchard
Huntley, R.J., and R.J. Macdonald
Hickey, Paul
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McLeod, Gerald T.

Mintzberg, Henry

Moore, Barbara "H., Ed.

Morse, John J. and F. R. Wagner

O'Brien, Allan
Oliver, John E.

Ontario Municipal Administrators' Association

Owens, Virginia Stem

Pascal, Richard T., and Anthony G. Athos

Payne, Hjalmar G.

Pearson, Alan


Pirsig, Robert M.

Plunkett, Tom, and G.M. Betts

Plunkett, Tom, and Katherine A. Graham

Redcliffe-Maud, Committee

Renwick, P.A.

Rosenthal, Peggy D.

Sayles, Leonard R.

Schoenberg, Robert J.

Sloma, Richard S.

Smith, J.H.
Smith, M.B.

Smith, Martin R.

Steers, R.M.

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Wilson, J.G.

Wilson, V.S.

Yates, Douglas
Zukav, Gary