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Eskimo Housing Programmes, 1954-65: A Case Study Of Representative Bureaucracy

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECEUE
ESKIMO HOUSING PROGRAMMES, 1954-65:
A CASE STUDY OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

by
Patrick Gerald Nixon
Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario
December 1983

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P.G.N.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Overview

Students of Political Science and Public Administration in North America have been increasingly concerned with the expanding role of public bureaucracies in the policy-making process. The concern appears to be based largely on the recognition within the literatures of public policy analysis and the policy-making process that non-elected officials in various forms of public bureaucracies play a significant, if not primary, role in policy creation and initiation over and above their traditional executive or implementative functions.

Amongst those who accept either the legitimacy or inevitability of these developments there has been a desire to make public bureaucracies more representative in the sense of making them an ethnic, religious, social class etc. facsimile of the societies they serve, facilitating more empathetic and hopefully better service. Others have argued that bureaucracies ought to be more representative of communities they serve in the sense of "taking to heart" and actively advocating the interests of various societal groups, most particularly those historically forgotten or ill-represented by formal, electorally based political leadership, institutions and processes.
The value of testing this latter conception of "representative bureaucracy" in studying public policy, and the role of the bureaucracy in the policy process, seems twofold. Normatively it suggests a potentially positive, progressive role for the public service and, as an analytical tool, may shed light on a broad range of governmental activities not sufficiently explained by conventional notions of parliament/bureaucracy relationships, the policy/administration dichotomy, or policy analysis from the perspective of the pressure point/incrementalist schools.

Given the above, studies on the role of the bureaucracy in the policy process are needed, particularly in cases where the bureaucracy acted in large part autonomously from their political masters in shaping and implementing policy and in instances where the bureaucracy consciously adopted an advocate/representative approach. Such studies hopefully will enable us to discover the factors which facilitate public bureaucracies taking an advocate/representative position and evaluating the consequences for their constituents/clients and the general public interest.

The task of this chapter then is to review literature concerned with the role of the bureaucracy in the policy making process, discuss problematics within this literature, note the potential value of a "representative bureaucracy" model and, lastly, cite reasons why Eskimo* housing programmes between 1954 and 1965 afford a particularly

*For the purpose of this dissertation, the term "Eskimo" is used instead of "Inuit" as the study is historical in nature and the term "Eskimo" was one employed by both the government and the native peoples themselves during the period examined.
appropriate test of its usefulness.

2. Bureaucracy and Public Policy Making

While Canadian scholars have generally accepted a place for bureaucracy in the policy process, conflicts have arisen over the nature, scope, and control by elected officials of bureaucratic influence.

In a recent edition of R.M. Dawson's *The Government of Canada*, it notes:

- All government measures with very few exceptions are the product of the cabinet and the public service. The initial inspiration or impulse will often originate with an individual minister or the cabinet... (however) the process may be reversed for an enormous number of new and modified policies grow out of the administration of existing statutes and regulations.

For Dawson, "these policies will almost invariably originate with the public servants themselves."\(^1\) In Corry and Hodgetts' *Democratic Government and Politics*, there is the recognition that, though in theory the bureaucracy "has no sphere of action in which it can count on going its own way",\(^2\) because of the increasing complexity and scope of government in the positive state, "officials take every day a multitude of decisions that are not approved in advance by the responsible executive and often cannot, in practice, be reversed by it."\(^3\) For


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 478. They include here such things as administrative discretion, subordinate legislation, and administrative enforcement and adjudication.
these authors, however, this bureaucratic intrusion into policy creation is:

... (done) so within the bounds assigned by ... superiors (that is to say elected representatives responsible to Parliament) ... and (is)" always subject to possible intervention.

Further, these intrusions are felt to fall within the area of what Doern and Aucoin have termed the on-going policy structure,\(^5\) "the structure that operates ... in the conversion of manifest or latent support for existing programs into outputs".\(^6\)

In the more recent literature on the policy process and the role of the bureaucracy within it there has been less willingness to see the bureaucratic role as so limited in scope and so controlled by elected political masters. For J.R. Mallory:

... the centre of gravity in making decisions, of both a fundamental and administrative nature, has shifted from cabinet ministers to the large staff of anonymous officials who from day to day exercise the powers of government.

In support of Mallory's position, former Liberal cabinet minister Paul Hellyer has commented:

You might say that I'm at war with the system--the way it operates, the way it has operated in the last governments ... It's too rigid, a handful of people--a small coterie of a dozen

\(^4\)Corry and Hodgetts, p. 236. Peter Self, in Administrative Theory and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 151, likens political activity of this sort to lightning, "in that it may suddenly strike into any corner of the administrative system but (importantly) rarely does."


\(^6\)Tbid., p. 4.

or fifteen people in the public service make too many decisions. Their views are rubber stamped down the line by the cabinet; there's no way the cabinet can buck the Prime Minister and the in-group. Then the party in turn endorses the cabinet position.\(^8\)

Thomas Hockin in his text \textit{Government in Canada} adds: "Complaints by another cabinet minister, Eric Kierans, ... contained ... similar sentiments."\(^9\)

Further, in a study of policy outputs of the federal government over an extended period of time, David Falcone and Michael Whittington concluded that political variables, such as the specific party in power, play a minimal role in explaining the variations in policy outputs of governments over time.\(^10\) As well, specific policy studies in recent years\(^11\) have suggested that not only did the bureaucracy "go with the ball" once presented it by cabinet, but in fact it created the need and provided the impetus for the policy innovation in question along with the particular form of government action required.


\(^9\) Ibid.


Significantly, John Meisel in assessing youth policies of the late 1960s and early 1970s stressed that "they were conceived independently of the whims and the agencies of the (formal) political environment".\footnote{12}

Not only specific programs and policies emanate from essentially bureaucratic initiatives as some literature indicates, but there has also been evidence that broad thrusts of policy affecting decision making over time and in many policy areas comes from this source as well. Witness here W.A. Mackintosh's declaration that the White Paper on Employment and Income of 1945, for some "the most important economic policy proposals ever to have been prepared and initiated in this country",\footnote{13} "... was written entirely by me except for two easily identifiable paragraphs added by Mr. Howe".\footnote{14} For Hockin, these developments in policy making have occurred since "the public bureaucracies often have more specialised and comprehensive information than do outsiders (i.e. their transient political masters) on public policy".\footnote{15} As a result, public servants have become "not

\footnote{12}{Quoted in Redekop, p. 259.}
\footnote{13}{Ibid., p. 251.}
\footnote{14}{Ibid., p. 251.}
\footnote{15}{T. Hockin, Government in Canada, p. 139. On a similar point, Peter Self in Administrative Theory and Politics, p. 289, notes: "It is apparent that the actual knowledge of politicians about the requirements of the public is often deficient and democratic theory no longer seems to hold that the politicians' interpretative right is an exclusive one. Thus the range of public demands which must be considered in administration has undeniably widened and the administrator has come to play a more central role over their elucidation."}
only indispensable sources of information but within countless areas of public policy often authoritative on what is currently considered possible or advisable.\textsuperscript{16} Coupled with this:

\ldots The management tasks of the executive class in the public service are so varied and far-reaching that their momentum and direction can only be vaguely comprehended by reading the statutory authority for these tasks. In short, authority patterns for policy making, and constellations of autonomous activity and purpose, are naturally evolved by public servants.\textsuperscript{17}

Hockin concludes, "All this renders the classical notion of the public servant as an implementor of ministerial rules almost meaningless in many policy constellations"\textsuperscript{18} and, as Neil Swainson has observed, leaves "\ldots a disproportionately heavy share of government responses to an increasingly changing and demanding society to be generated within and sustained by the public bureaucracy."\textsuperscript{19}

If we define political power as the ability to affect public decisions and grant that public bureaucracies have an increasing share of this power, the chief problematic becomes the means of holding this bureaucratic power accountable to the people. As such, the two devices traditionally employed to achieve this, namely Parliament\textsuperscript{20} as

\textsuperscript{16}T. Hockin, Government in Canada, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{20}It would seem analytically useful to define Parliament in this instance as all non-executive members of the House of Commons and Senate.
surveillor and scrutineer of public policy, and the concept of executive or ministerial responsibility as well as their apparent contemporary inadequacies, must now be examined.

3. Parliamentary Surveillance and Ministerial Responsibility: The Viability of Traditional Accountability

The structure of political institutions and political processes in Canada is such that Parliament is generally viewed as playing a "reactive" or "refining" role in policy making. Further, given the norms of party discipline, exigencies on members' time for non-policy making functions, and limits to their expertise in any number of policy areas, questions have been raised and debate has centered not on the vitality of their role as policy makers but rather on the efficacy of their individual and collective ability to successfully scrutinize policy produced elsewhere. Reforms have been attempted, most particularly with respect to the committee system and the restructuring of procedure, but research by Byers, Hoffman, and Lovinck and others indicates that reforms to date, for various reasons, have been less than ideal in bringing about a return to effective Parliamentary

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21 Kornberg's research on legislative behaviour in Canada is helpful for understanding some of these demands as well as MPs' redefinition of their roles to satisfy them. See A. Kornberg, Canadian Legislative Behaviour: A Study of the Twenty-Fifth Parliament (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1967).


23 D. Hoffman in Ibid., pp. 400-415.

scrutiny of government action. Indeed, many authors now cite other functions of Members of Parliament and the House of Commons as likely being more significant for the political system as a whole than their roles in policy making. As a result, the mantle for holding bureaucratic power accountable to the people is left resting squarely if not solely on the concept of ministerial responsibility.

The concept of ministerial responsibility has been understood to mean either one of two things. First, in less complicated times it suggested that the relatively minimal actions governments took were under the direct supervision of a cabinet minister responsible to Parliament and hence to the electorate. Conceivably, when government actions were few and the public bureaucracies small, this was a practical, effective check on bureaucratic activity. Most if not all authors would agree that these simpler times, sadly perhaps, are no longer with us. Consequently, the notion of ministerial responsibility, no longer being able to rest on the ability of the minister to supervise effectively his administrative charge, has evolved to mean that, irrespective of whether the minister in charge knows what is going on in his department or whether or not he feels he has the power to control the activities of his public servants, he still is accountable.

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25 Former PC leader Robert Stanfield has stated: "Frankly I do not know how the House of Commons can be restored to effective supervision of the government." In J. Redekop, Approaches to Canadian Politics, p. 256.


27 See a revealing comment on this matter by Bryce Mackasey in T. Hockin, Government in Canada, p. 136.
to Parliament for their actions. The proverbial "buck" stops at his desk. Although this raises questions about the flow of information to elected officials, in the normal course of government business, its credibility as a control mechanism rests on the implication that when a "sculp" for a "wrong policy" or scandal is required his will be expected. Needless to say, ministers of the Crown have not over-indulged themselves in accepting this responsibility. Few resignations can be noted to buoy the efficacy of this principle and, in fact, of recent times ministers have taken to claiming as a defence to charges of wrong-doing that they knew "nothing about it" and cannot be held fully responsible for all bureaucratic actions.

Recent reforms in the policy making structure (most particularly the development of central agencies such as the PCO, PMO, FPRO and TBS, cabinet restructuring, and the mechanistic and structural departmental changes coming with the introduction of Program Planning Budgeting (PPB)) were designed, at least in part, to place the political executive in more effective control of the management of public affairs. Yet the success of these innovations in achieving these particular ends is

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29 Denton notes that Guy Favreau is one of the few but suggests that the reasons for this were as much due to political unpopularity as administrative failure. Ibid., p. 357.

30 Alistair Gillespie in respect to AECL overpayments, Messrs. Goyer, Allnand and Fox in respect to RCMP "wrongdoings" are such examples.

31 M. De Bane thus commented on problems with Lockheed over their contract bidding practices. Quoted in ibid., p. 358.
questionable. For Campbell and Szabowski, the development of "superbureaucracies", though theoretically more effectively integrating, evaluating and managing the government apparatus, have placed in the centre of policy making a group whose personal role perceptions and structural positions cannot and ought not to be held accountable and responsible in the traditional sense of these terms.\textsuperscript{32} For J.R. Mallory, the growth of these agencies, particularly the Privy Council Office, "necessarily ... (has led) to the concentration of power in the hands of the Prime Minister", bypassing the rest of cabinet.\textsuperscript{33} For T.M. Denton, these developments have led to the structural and legal blurring of the concept of ministerial responsibility.\textsuperscript{34} For former ministers Hellyer and Kierans, the development of these agencies has meant that, "while policy matters have been somewhat expedited most decisions (are) heavily influenced, if not controlled by a small group of advisors in both the P.M.O. and P.C.O."\textsuperscript{35}

In respect to cabinet restructuring, Hockin notes that deputy ministers, assistant deputies and heads of divisions are allowed to attend many cabinet meetings, ". . . leading some Ministers (to) complain in private that public servants often do more talking than the

\textsuperscript{32} C. Campbell and G. Szabowski, \textit{The Super-Bureaucrats} (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1979), chapters 7 and 8.


\textsuperscript{34} T.M. Denton in Schultz et al., pp. 347-354.

\textsuperscript{35} Quoted in Hockin, p. 146.
ministers”. This is in marked contrast, Hockin suggests, to the previous system "in which most major issues were aired at full cabinet with very little participation from public servants”. 36

Concerning the effects on the policy process of PPB, Doern and Aucoin report:

... Even though the logic and the practice of the new PPB approach indicates a greater degree of "political" control over both new policy and ongoing policy structures, certain features of the PPB approach (for example the preparation of program forecasts and the recent development of the departmental "policy and planning" units) may in the long run, give the bureaucracy a much greater capacity to involve itself in new policy than it ever had under the old negative input oriented "standard objects" method of budgeting. 37

In summary, as was the case in discussing parliamentary reforms, the questions we raise in respect to the efficacy of these measures in making government more manageable and thereby controllable should not be viewed as a belief that these efforts have been completely futile. Rather we are suggesting the problems involved in attempting, by this kind of action, to redress what Denton has called a fundamental tension in the system:

... between two strands of constitutional thought ... realism on the one hand and a concern for limiting (bureaucratic) power on the other ... the evidence (being) that the constitutional system narrowly defined as those parts of the political system that are supposed to ensure that government is responsible to the people is no longer congruent with the constitutional system more broadly defined as the real relationships of power. 38

36 Hockin, p. 148.

37 Doern and Aucoin, p. 273. This is a fear shared by a number of American authors including T. Dye, Ira Sharkansky and Aaron Wildalvsky.

38 T.M. Denton in Schultz et al., p. 344.
For Denton and others, this fundamental incongruity has led to a belief in the "increasing vacuity of the traditional concept of ministerial responsibility" and leads to the suggestion that other efforts and directions may be more profitably pursued in an attempt to achieve truly accountable government.

4. Representative Bureaucracy: Possible Antidote?

As the literature of political science and public administration have noted that public bureaucracies are increasingly the major arena for political action, "taking the place of traditional legislative bodies as the source of political solutions and the definition of political problems", they also have provided evidence suggesting that traditional mechanisms, for holding the impact of non-elected officials on policy making responsible, are less than ideal. However, so far failing to exorcise these conventional notions from our thinking has left us carrying a conceptual baggage which, rather than providing

39 T.M. Denton in Schultz et al., p. 345.


41 Peter Self, in Administrative Theory and Politics, p. 284, seems to agree suggesting that, given among other things the "growth of specialized policy fields, and the accompanying increase of administrative discretion", the decision making capacity of elected political leadership has been reduced "to the point where traditional theory is no longer adequate". Further, given that the "will of ministers" has become "hollow even to administrators themselves" as a justification for all their acts, "administration needs the help of theories which can supplement and adapt the guidance provided by general purpose political leadership".
a useful check on bureaucratic power, has generally served to mystify, even exclude, its activities from political debate.

Among others, Campbell and Szabowski suggest problems in continuing this view:

Officials in traditional bureaucracies (do) not see the need for public accountability. Viewing political objectives and preferences as given them by their political masters they considered individual ministerial responsibility and the collective responsibility of the Cabinet to Parliament as sufficient and adequate. Internal accountability (has meant) ... simply the faithful discharge of their administrative duties in accordance with the directives of their hierarchic superiors. 42

As a consequence, public officials have been "shielded from public exposure", even though their role has changed and they are now involved in shaping policy decisions "which are intended to have a profound effect on the political and economic system as a whole". 43 For Hockin, the "double cover of anonymity" brought on by the fiction that a minister sanctions all this activity, or that such activity is logically nothing more than an extension of statutory guidelines, leads to the shielding of the role of the bureaucracy in policy making from Parliamentary scrutiny and public curiosity. 44 For Denton, this exclusion of civil servants from any direct public accountability prevents Parliamentary committees from compelling civil servants to

42 Campbell and Szabowski, p. 13.

43 Ibid., p. 185. Admittedly, part of the problem here is in distinguishing between administrative and policy functions of the bureaucracy. For a discussion of the tension between policy and administration, see Self, pp. 149-151.

44 Hockin, p. 141 ff.
testify before them, leads to bureaucratic monopoly of information and a separation of powers between Parliament and the executive-bureaucratic arena. The result is that:

It is in the interest of civil servants and ministers to invoke the doctrine of ministerial responsibility not as a way of achieving accountable government but rather in order to limit the accounting owed to Parliament.

Given these arguments and relatively recent case evidence indicating difficulties in accounting for government spending, security activities, and internal bureaucratic business behaviour, other mechanisms for holding accountable the activities of non-elected public officials would seem to be warranted. On the surface at least, the notion of representative bureaucracy suggests itself as one such instrument.

In the traditional understanding of the relationship between elected and non-elected officials in a democracy, the term representative bureaucracy has appeared, as Samuel Krislov has noted, oxymoronic or, more kindly, an unfamiliar juxtaposition. The role of elected officials is to represent and respond to the needs of the public from

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46 Ibid., p. 348.
47 Any of the reports to Parliament of the Auditor-General in recent years is evidence here.
49 We are referring here to revelations concerning the purchase of Lockheed aircraft for the Department of National Defence and AECL payments to "induce" overseas sales of CANDU reactors.
whom they received their mandate. The role of the bureaucracy is to efficiently and neutrally carry out orders given by its elected masters. However, as we have argued, the greater the degree of discretion and policy initiation capabilities possessed by public servants, and the weaker the traditional controls on these activities, the more appropriate it seems to apply to bureaucrats concepts hitherto unheard of.\textsuperscript{51} Inasmuch as representation of public interests is an essential part of democratic policy making, it seems reasonable to apply this criterion to all those making public policy. The question is, what do we mean or should we mean by representation when applied to the non-elected bureaucracy? Further, what are the potential advantages and disadvantages of adding such a concept to both our analysis and evaluation of bureaucratic behaviour?

In the Canadian literature, representative bureaucracy has generally been taken to mean that membership in the public service should proportionately reflect the total society it serves in terms of race, religion, social class, region of origin, etc. For proponents the assumption is that thereby greater responsiveness and accountability to the broad spectrum of the population would be achieved.

Defined as such, the concept of representative bureaucracy has generally been rejected by Canadian scholars. David Cameron in his

\textsuperscript{51}This applies more specifically to Canada for, as Self has noted, "the belief that the American bureaucracy should be socially representative has a long history". Self cites the Jacksonian revolt against a "closed and somewhat aristocratic administrative elite" as an example of this. See Self, p. 228.
summation of proceedings at the Eighth National Seminar on Public Ad-
ministration in Canada wrote: "The implications (of representative
bureaucracy) are sufficiently frightening to render it inappropriate
as a means of securing bureaucratic accountability." 52 Mullins and
Wilson, in their review of the concept, concluded that the basic as-
sumption of representative bureaucracy was likely incorrect but worse
if it was not, for if applied it would probably lead to:

... immobilization of the public service ... creating counter-
vailing forces producing statement ... negative bias towards
non-represented groups; politicization of the public service with-
out political responsibility; loss of bureaucratic neutrality, and
diminished concern for the wider public interest. 53

For Mullins and Wilson then, arguments supporting this concept were
"not only bogus, but also dangerous". 54 Finally, in a generally even-
handed treatment of this notion Kenneth Kernaghan suggested "such im-
portant (bureaucratic) values as efficiency, neutrality, and account-
ability (might) clash with representativeness". 55

52 D. Cameron, "Power and Responsibility in the Public Service",
Canadian Public Administration (Fall 1978), p. 371.

53 W. Mullins and V.S. Wilson, "Representative Bureaucracy: Lin-
guistic Ethnic Aspects in Canadian Public Policy", Canadian Public
Administration (Winter 1978), p. 533. The U.S. experience with local
government in the nineteenth century and the general problematic of
the Jacksonian revolt and its aftermath of political patronage as a
means of bringing a broad cross-section of the population or (at least
in this case) party adherents into government administration is a
valuable lesson here.

54 Ibid., p. 534.

55 K. Kernaghan, "Representative Bureaucracy: The Canadian Per-
Contentious as these fears are, a second school of thought concerning representative bureaucracy—one which has been dominated by American students of public administration—argues that the term properly understood does not necessitate a reshuffling of the manpower complement of the public service but rather the adoption within the bureaucracy of empathy for and active advocacy of the needs of one's constituent/clients. The American "New School of Public Administration" or "Minnowbrook Perspective" led in this view of representative bureaucracy, though British scholars like Self have equally argued that "representative bureaucracy can be more broadly understood as the inculcation of the bureaucracy with the ideas and values of the society as a whole".

56 The fears expressed in these works are serious, if contentious. Although a number of arguments are employed to question the validity of the notion of representative bureaucracy, the two most significant appear to be that "representativeness" does not necessarily imply responsiveness and that the legitimate exercise of political power must invariably, for better or worse, lead back to traditional mechanisms of political behavior and accountability. In respect to the first point, though the empirical evidence is scarce, the contention that representatives of various societal groups once placed in positions of authority may not respond or act as members of merely the social group or class from which they came, seems reasonably enough made to counter many of Mullins' and Wilson's fears, and to convince us that the symbolic and psychological benefits of such a practice may outweigh short-run neglect of the principles of merit and neutrality. See P. Sheriff, Moir and Negro, A. Gouldner, and J. Porter for such evidence. See M. Edelman, Symbolic Uses of Politics, and its application here as employed by Kernaghan, and Mullins and Wilson. See F. Marini, ed., Towards A New Public Administration, particularly articles by Harman, Laporte, and Frederickson.

57 Self, p. 242.
Calling for an activist role for public bureaucracies in advocating the interests of for the most part historically disenfranchised societal groups, such writers as Frederick Mosher, Donald Rowat, Carl Friedrich, and Frank Marini have suggested that the concept of bureaucratic accountability meaning formal political accountability with its concurrent notions of value neutrality and administrative efficiency ought to be replaced or reconstructed to include the quality and effectiveness of response by public servants to public needs.

Challenging concerns regarding the loss of bureaucratic efficiency and neutrality as a result of such a development, Rowat and Krislov have argued that the inevitable influx of new ideas to the public service would balance a loss in neutrality, and Gouldner suggests

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63 Rowat, pp. 204-207.

64 Krislov, p. 22.
these new ideas and bureaucratic roles would create a tension within the bureaucracy necessary for the creation of "dynamic, creative public policy".\footnote{A. Gouldner, "Metaphysical Pathos and The Theory of Bureaucracy", American Political Science Review, Vol. 49 (June 1955), p. 507.}

While much of the preceding arguments rest on normative judgments as to the societal value of a progressive minded and activist public service, it would appear useful to empirically test whether public servants have, as a practical matter, adopted a representative/advocate role for themselves.\footnote{Kernaghan suggests bureaucrats, if not academics, tend to already view themselves and their roles in these terms. See Kernaghan, p. 508.} If, in our study of public policy making, this is found to be true, it will enable us to add to either our normative objections or plaudits for this activity, empirical evidence as to the factors which facilitate the bureaucracy taking on such a role and the consequences for both the constituent/clients of public servants as well as the general public interest. For these purposes, Eskimo housing programmes between 1954 and 1965 appear to provide a particularly useful test case.

5. **Eskimo Housing: A Case Study in Representative Bureaucracy**

The contention that public bureaucracies ought to be viewed and evaluated as functionally independent representatives/advocates of constituent/client interests appears to be a profitable way of understanding Eskimo housing programmes between 1954 and 1965. Conversely,
an examination of Eskimo housing during this period is a useful way of determining both the possible benefits and pitfalls in accepting representative bureaucracy as a legitimate bureaucratic mandate.

On the surface, any analysis of government involvement in the North, particularly in respect to aiding Eskimo peoples before 1965, is unsatisfactory if we maintain the conventional perception of the sources of policy creation and innovation. Clearly the premises of the incrementalist and pressure point schools that policy is created from the clash or emergence of interests demanding accommodation belie the evidence of this case. As of 1954 Eskimos could hardly have been less of a political force and consequently this paradigm concerning policy creation breaks down. Further, viewing the federal bureaucracy as an independent advocate or representative of Eskimo interests—at least as federal public servants perceived them—becomes suggestive for understanding the otherwise mystifying initiatives of the 1954–1965 period. Indeed, given the absence of Eskimo political organization in Ottawa at this time, a policy of "thinking little and doing little" about the North and its peoples may well have continued without the apparent bureaucratic advocacy of the Eskimo cause. 67

Along with the analytical usefulness, then, in employing the concept of representative bureaucracy as an explanation of policy developments here, our study also will reflect problems in the

67 See Kenneth Rea, Political Economy of The Canadian North (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 47; and Jean Chretien, "The Unfinished Tapestry—Indian Policy in Canada", speech given as part of Dunning Lectures at Queen's University, Kingston, March 17, 1971, p. 5.
bureaucratic representation process, some of which have been previously noted by its critics, and some of which are specifically a consequence of and a lesson for bureaucratic activity in a cross-cultural contact situation.

In summary, the study of Eskimo housing programmes between 1954 and 1965 provides the opportunity to investigate what factors facilitate the public service taking an activist/representative role

68 For example, Guy Peters has warned prophetically with respect to Eskimo housing, that administration can contribute to cross-cultural tension, even when attempting to help an underling group. He writes:

... One aspect of this tension between groups is the usual position of the dominant culture personnel in administrative agencies administering programmes designed to aid people from the subject culture. As with social class, we find that the majority of administrators come from the dominant cultural groups within a society. On the other hand a disproportionate share of their clients tend to come from the subject cultures. This not only contributes to the underlying tension between the groups, but it may also place limits on the effectiveness of the administrative structures. Most public administration is people processing. It involves the communication of desires and demands from client to administrator, the making of some decision on the part of the administrator, and the transmittal of that decision to the client. This is obviously a communication process, and as with all communication processes, it involves the use of common values, symbols, and cognitive structures. This consensus does not necessarily exist between members of different sub-cultural groups. In these cases the probable result of interactions between administrators and clients is not the development of effective communication and empathy, but rather hostility, resentment, and the reinforcement of existing prejudices. This will be especially true when the programme involved is a social programme affecting the values of the client and the administrator.
vis a vis their constituent/clients, the multiple pros and cons of such a role and, finally, conditions that we will broadly call environmental, which may make this role ultimately problematic.

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69 See G. Downs, Bureaucracy, Innovation and Public Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Press, 1976); V. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation (University of Alabama Press, 1969); and R. Simeon, "Studying Public Policy, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1976) for a definition of this term as it is used here.
II

WHITE NON GOVERNMENTAL AND GOVERNMENTAL ESKIMO CONTACT PRE 1940

1. Overview

We have argued in Chapter I that the concept of representative bureaucracy might prove valuable for understanding Eskimo housing policies between 1954 and 1965. One reason for suggesting this was that the constitutional position of the Northwest Territories during this period was such that it placed the peoples of the region under the tutelage and care of the federal government, politically represented not by elected peers but by federal public servants located in Ottawa. Indeed, this constitutional position of the Northwest Territories vis-à-vis the federal government was largely the product of history.

While the federal government has traditionally had responsibility for administering the Eskimo populations, because of specific historical developments in various parts of the North the role of federal government agencies responsible for carrying out this mandate varied from region to region. In Labrador, for example, the long and often solitary "rule" of the Moravian mission over Labradorian Eskimos, and the special interest the Newfoundland government had taken in this area produced distinctive types of administrative structures and responsibilities. In the Yukon Territory, the Klondike gold rush and a relatively early discovery of resource potential in other
minerals, brought an extensive influx of southern Whites by the turn of the century, resulting in a certain autonomy in their relationship with the federal government. Lacking similar developments, the Eskimo peoples of the Northwest Territories did not experience a special relationship with a provincial or semi-autonomous territorial government, developing instead a direct and pervasive connection with the federal government and its bureaucracy.

In addition to this unique constitutional position, the nature of White-Eskimo contact and the structure of government administration in the Northwest Territories was different from southern Native-White experiences, one consequence of which was, again, the enhanced role of the northern public servant. The histories of constitutional development in the North and White-Native relations thus form the introduction to our study.

2. The Early Explorations

Northrop Frye's phrase, "Canada began as an obstacle, blocking the way to the treasures of the East, to be explored only in the hope of finding a passage through it,"¹ aptly describes the post-Columbus period of European exploration and "discovery" in Canada but much less aptly describes its initial, though less consequential, period of European contact. As R.A.J. Philips has observed:

The ferment that led explorers to the Canadian frontier did not begin in the fifteenth-century courts of Lisbon and Madrid, or in the counting houses of London and Bristol. It started much earlier, in Scandinavia.²

The Eskimos, it appears, first encountered Europeans about the year AD 1000 when some Icelanders pushed westward from newly-colonized Greenland and, skirting the coast of Labrador, met and fought with a mysterious people, who they called Skraelings, off the shores of "Vinland". This land has been variously identified as being either northern Newfoundland, the peninsula of Gaspé, or anywhere between James Bay and New England.

The colonization which did occur around Newfoundland provided timber for Greenlanders who lived beyond the treeline; and activity that occurred in the North, most predominantly on Baffin Island, was undertaken, as Philips remarked, "not as a curiosity, or as a route to somewhere else, but for two prized resources: falcons and polar bears".³ By the fourteenth century what are now the Canadian Arctic islands often appeared on maps as a source of falcons and polar bears, regarded by royalty as precious gifts, hence giving commercial significance to the Viking domination of trade over these islands.

Icelanders retreated from America by the fifteenth century to be replaced by a series of explorations conducted largely by the finances of England, if not manned by the sons of England, and ostensibly carried out in search of Asia.

³Ibid., p. 43.
Three-quarters of a century after John Cabot described Newfoundland and the Grand Banks, Martin Frobisher made three voyages to Baffin Island between 1576 and 1578. Frobisher, searching for the Orient, wound up in an abortive search for gold, though for the first time recorded contact was made with the Eskimo population. On August 19, 1576 Frobisher's party encountered Eskimos on an island off the southeastern shore of Baffin Island. After being shown their houses and "their manner of food and life, which is very strange and beastly", a skirmish ensued ending with the loss of five of the Englishmen and the abduction of an Eskimo hostage who was escorted back to England where, it is said, he died of cold.

By 1670, with the incorporation of the Hudson's Bay Company, voyages to the North were increasingly devoted to the pursuit of fur rather than to the Northwest Passage. Except for the Atlantic coast of Labrador where Moravian missions had established settlements on the coast, Eskimos had been rarely affected, or for that matter contacted, by Europeans. As Diamond Jenness notes:

... (Though) it is true that from the mid-seventeenth century onwards numerous fur trading posts sprang up along the south-western shore of Hudson Bay and its continuation to James Bay... this was an Indian territory, not Eskimo, and the sailing ships that navigated the strait and bay to provision the posts did not touch at other places.\(^4\)

Around 1750 the Hudson's Bay Company tried to strengthen its relations with the Eskimos on the east side of Hudson Bay, opening a

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 45.

\(^5\)D. Jenness, Eskimo Administration: II. Canada (Arctic Institute of North America, Technical Paper No. 14, 1964), pp. 9-10. Other works authored by Jenness and cited here will be differentiated by the inclusion of their year of publication in parentheses.
trading post in 1756 at Great Whale River. However, Jenness writes, "operations in the area must have been very unsatisfactory, for the post was closed and reopened several times during the next hundred years and has operated continuously only since 1852". Although Scottish and Dutch whalers operated off Greenland, Canada's Arctic remained largely unknown to Europeans, and Jenness grimly adds: "Two sentinels, Cold and Silence, guarded the retreats of the Eskimos and repelled every European adventurer who tried to storm their gates."  

The nineteenth century would be different. In the first half of the century, the search for the Northwest Passage resumed, partly for purposes of trade and, it would seem, partly for the glory and practice of Empire. In 1818 the British Navy sent John Ross to the Canadian Arctic; Sir Edward Parry, in 1821, travelled through Lancaster Sound as far as Melville Island. In 1845 the British Navy dispatched the famed Sir John Franklin to the Arctic. While hot water was provided in the cabins, and stores included cut glass, delicate china, heavy silver, a library of twelve hundred books, and a barrel organ that played fifty tunes, there was not a single sledge, tent or pair of snowshoes aboard. Richard Finnie glibly described the expedition and the nature of White-Eskimo relations it so characterized:

The third winter began the final physical deterioration of the men; twenty of them slowly died of food poisoning and scurvy. On April 22, 1848, 105 survivors trekked southward. They fell  

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6 Ibid., p. 10.  
7 Ibid., p. 10.
down and perished one by one, leaving a trail of skeletons and abandoned equipment extending as far as Montreal Island, Chantrey Inlet.

Some of these pitiful strugglers were seen by Eskimos, who could have saved them and restored them to health and probably would have if the men had sought their aid. But the early English explorers in general did not have much to do with the Eskimos. There were exceptions, but most of them seem to have regarded Eskimos as hardly human curiosities, rather than as invaluable guides and mentors; so they gallantly suffered in the best English tradition, wearing their Naval uniforms and carrying swords, and finally eating one another, perhaps on silver plate.\(^8\)

Franklin’s expedition was seminal for Northern exploration and the nature of White-Eskimo contact: the grandness of the calamity captured European and American imaginations, encouraging the departure of over forty expeditions in search of Franklin, some of which did much to chart the North. More significantly, it indicated to all who would care to listen that acquainting oneself with, and accommodating to, the land and its inhabitants was to be a prerequisite for successful Arctic travel. On later trips, the Englishmen John Rae (1846-1847) and Leopold McClintock (1857), and the American Charles Hall (1860), either from desperation or inclination, made conscious efforts to learn the Eskimo ways, thus beginning a new epoch of White Arctic activity, one which would bring Whites to the North on a more enduring, and for the indigenous Eskimo populations more devastating, basis.

3. The Beginnings of Colonization

The early explorations we have outlined in themselves had little effect on Eskimo life but initiated a chain of events which

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would dramatically alter White perceptions of the North, and the nature and structure of their activity there. Although concerned with traversing the North in order to reach the other side, early Arctic explorations had indicated a potential wealth of furs, minerals and sea life which eventually would bring a new generation of Whites to the North, to stay. Further, this new era would tend to view Eskimos not as obstacles but as accomplices in, if not employees for, the new activities. Such was the nature of whaling and Hudson's Bay Company activity in the North which consequently deserves special attention.

Although it is arbitrary to affix a date for the start of this new era, the 1840s seem the most appropriate, since it was in 1840 that the English captain William Penny established the first sedentary whaling station in Cumberland Sound. Also, during the 1840s the decline in popularity of the beaver hat changed the trade emphasis of the Hudson's Bay Company, propelling it northward. By this time, Scottish whalers had staked out Baffin Bay and operated a shore headquarters at Pond Inlet; New England whalers worked to the south in Foxe Basin and around Southampton Island. However, both the Scots and Americans, following Penny's example, maintained small shore stations near Cumberland Sound and established close relations with about five hundred Eskimos, employing some. Jenness writes:

The Scottish whalers who operated out of Pond Inlet never became as intimate with the Eskimos of north Baffin Island as did their fellow countrymen, and Americans with the Baffin Islanders.

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9 W.F. King, "Report upon the Title of Canada to the Islands North of the Mainland of Canada" (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1905), p. 28.
further south, because they practised a slightly different method of hunting the big sea mammals. They used steamers in preference to sailing vessels and neither wintered in the Arctic, as a rule, nor enlisted Eskimos in their crews.10

The New Englanders, on the other hand, travelled North, in the Eastern Arctic, in sailing ships to remain there until their holds were full, usually requiring at least one winter. The Americans hired Eskimos:

... to man some of their small boats and search out the whales, using the mother ship as a shore station, and they continued to employ most of the natives throughout the winter, the men to hunt for fresh meat and the women to make fur clothing.11

This contact clearly had a lasting influence on Eskimo lives, although the whalers "tried to mitigate the effect of change"12 by insisting that their employees hunt seals and narwhals as before to obtain their daily diet of meat. Likely the whalers did so to decrease reliance on the ship's provisions but consequently "neither undermined the diet of the Natives nor completely disrupted their original economy".13 Nevertheless, Eskimo life measurably changed. Steel traps (gins) were introduced to the North and, as Philips noted:

... A white fox skin, at the turn of the century, was worth as little as a dollar, but it was enough of a supplement to income to introduce the vocation of trapping.14

10 Jenness, p. 11.
11 Ibid., p. 11.
12 Philips, p. 117.
13 Jenness, p. 11.
14 Philips, p. 118.
Anticipating later government activities, the whalers shuttled a large group of Eskimos from the south coast of Baffin Island, first to Southampton Island, later to Repulse Bay, to ensure a good labour supply for the whaling industry. Its effect on the Eskimo population was prophetic. A.P. Low, first sent to the Arctic to "flag raise" in 1903, wrote:

Big Island natives who were moved to Southampton Island quickly killed or frightened away with their rifles the caribou in the neighborhood, and directly brought about the destruction of the local Eskimo tribe . . . who in 1900 numbered 68 persons. . . . (By 1902) the entire band (had) died of starvation and disease.15

Therefore, in the southern half of Baffin Island and on the western coast of Hudson Bay, "the Whalers pressed more directly and heavily on the Eskimos than farther north; and before many years had passed, they forced the aboriginal culture to buckle."16 "The white man's tastes were introduced: tobacco, tea and other foods, metal utensils instead of stone, woven garments instead of fur, canvas tents instead of skins,"17 and "the clinker-built whaleboats that ships captains left behind"18 instead of their hunting kayaks, uniaks or travelling boats.

Consequently:

. . . A new generation of Eskimos arose that lacked the ancient skills and hunting lore of its parents, a generation that had lost its autarchy and (they) could hardly survive without contact with the civilized world.19

16 Jenness, p. 11. 17 Philips, p. 21.
"There can be little doubt," wrote Commander Wakeham in 1897, "that those (Eskimos) who have been brought up about the stations would be badly off were these closed and abandoned."\textsuperscript{20} With the invention in 1906 of a cheap substitute for whalebone, the whalers, "after having taken a million dollars a year",\textsuperscript{21} within a couple of years closed their stations and sent their ships no more to Canada's eastern, or for all intents and purposes western, Arctic.

The second great arm of White commercial activity in the North was based on the fur trade, and foremost among traders was the Hudson's Bay Company. The Company's activities in the North, although somewhat erratic, both preceded and survived the whaling industry.

Although the Hudson's Bay Company's permanent establishment as a fur trading enterprise in the Arctic and with the Eskimos was relatively late, circa 1901, the Company had been involved here for two hundred and forty years. Following its charter of May 2, 1670 which granted it not only a trading monopoly but the power to build fortifications, wage war and seize trespassers, the Company had undertaken a series of Arctic and sub-Arctic explorations in search of fur, and preservation of its territorial sovereignty. Samuel Hearne had travelled up the Coppermine River to the Arctic Ocean in 1771. By 1820 the Company occupied a former Northwest Company post at Fort Simpson; and in 1825 Peter Warren Dease, a chief factor of the Hudson's Bay Company, travelling with Franklin opened a post at Great Bear Lake. In 1839 Dease and

\textsuperscript{20}Quoted in \textit{ibid.}, p. 12. \textsuperscript{21}Philips, p. 119.
Thomas Simpson, a cousin of the Hudson's Bay Company governor, George Simpson, mapped parts of Queen Maud Gulf, Victoria Island and King William Island. George Woodcock, writing in *The Hudson's Bay Company*, indicates the chief reasons for these movements:

Once fur was sought, rather than pelts for felting, the Mackenzie River gained a new importance for the Company. On the Barren Lands martin and fox were abundant, and in the marshy delta, through which the river emptied into the Arctic Ocean, there were many muskrats. The forts along the Mackenzie and on connecting lakes were expanded. Eventually eleven posts in the region were trading with the Eskimos, as well as Indians, and by the middle of the (nineteenth) century the profit from this trade amounted to more than $30,000 a year.22

By the early 1900s the Company expanded into a vacuum left by the whalers. Branching out from the Cape Wolstenholme post in 1909, the Company pushed into Lake Harbour in 1911, Chesterfield in 1912, Cape Dorset in 1913, Frobisher Bay in 1914 and onward:

Following much the same policy as the Whalers, (the Company) made no effort to introduce a dollars and cents economy among the new converts to the fur trade, but promoted a special barter system that used tokens in place of coins; and for its unit of value set up, not the beaver skin familiar throughout woodland Canada, but the fur of the white fox.23

Peter Usher explains the growth of the Hudson's Bay Company in the burgeoning fur trade:

The white fox trade had its beginnings in the last days of the whale fishery in both the eastern and western Arctic. The establishment of the Cape Wolstenholme, Quebec, post in 1909 marked the real beginning of the Hudson's Bay Company's Arctic trade, for although they had regularly sailed through Hudson Strait for 240 years, they had never exploited its shores. The expansion of the trade was extremely rapid; the network of


23 Jenness, p. 12.
posts and induction of the Eskimos into the trapping and trading system being virtually completed within 15 years. The Company extended its operations to the eastern and northern Baffin early in the 1920's, and by 1925 . . . had obtained an effective monopoly throughout the eastern Arctic.24

The missionaries form the third and, for our purposes, final force of White non-governmental contact with the Eskimo population. Philips records that the first Christian exhortation occurred in the Canadian North on Martin Frobisher's third expedition, although it was not until 1765 that a Moravian mission was established in Labrador, and 1771 before a permanent mission was instituted at Nain. Although failing to establish a Methodist mission in the Mackenzie District, preacher James Evans introduced in 1842 a form of Pitman syllabic shorthand, still in Northern use.

In 1852 the first missionaries crossed the 60° parallel into the Northwest Territories and the first permanent mission was established at Fort Resolution by Roman Catholic Father Peter Henry Grolier. Then, in 1855 Anglican Archdeacon Hunter located a mission at Fort Simpson.

Travelling mostly with the help of the Hudson's Bay Company, a relationship which proved essential, as otherwise "the logistics of setting up mission stations in the far North would have severely strained the resources of the missions including Arctic expertise,"25 the Anglicans set up seven stations in the east and central Arctic


between 1852 and 1899. An Anglican Diocese of the Mackenzie was created in 1874 with Bishop C. Bompass as its head. "Despite the undeniable vigour of his predecessors and himself", as Philips observed, by 1887 Bompass had to report that, of his estimated Diocese population of 10,000, half were more or less under the Romanist influence, while 3,000 could be claimed by the Church of England, and 2,000 still were unreached.  

The Roman Catholic Church entered the centre of Anglican power when the Oblates opened a mission in Fort Simpson. In 1867 the Grey Nuns established themselves in Fort Providence. The next year the Abbé Émile Petitot travelled extensively in the Mackenzie Delta and became "the first missionary to approach the Arctic coast of the mainland". According to Finnie, several priests penetrated to the Arctic coast around the Mackenzie Delta from Herschel Island to Liverpool Bay at intervals between the 1860s and 1890s but had made no real impact on the Eskimos. By the early 1900s the Oblates began locating mission stations in the far North, and "between 1912 and 1947 nine mission stations were opened, followed by a further six in the years after World War II". The Church of England established its first Arctic mission at Churchill, Manitoba, where the Reverend J. Laflhouse built a church in 1883. In 1889 an Anglican missionary went north to Chesterfield Inlet. From 1892 to 1902 the Reverend Issac O. Stringer

26 Philips, p. 122.  
27 Jenness, p. 15.  
28 Finnie, pp. 51-52.  
29 Paine, p. 9.
lived on Herschel Island, and during the First World War the Reverend H. Girling moved eastward as far as Dolphin and Union Strait and "won the allegiance of most Eskimos in that area". 30 Doctor E.J. Peck opened the most southeasterly of all Arctic missions in Little Whale River, Quebec, in 1894, and extended his teaching as far north as Ungava. The pioneer missionary of Baffin Island was the same Reverend Peck who went to Cumberland Sound near Pangnirtung in 1894. It was he who adapted James Evan's Cree syllabics to Eskimo.

From these early beginnings missionary activity in the North mushroomed in the 1920s and in the immediate post-World War II era in the wake of the development of new Arctic settlements. By 1946, as Finnie wryly comments:

... (There were) few degraded pagans (left) among the Indians and Eskimos, the great majority of natives throughout the North-west Territories being nominally Christians and there (being) hardly a tribe or a group left that is not within easy travelling distance of a mission of some sort.31

4. The Nature and Consequences of Pre 1940
White Non-Governmental Eskimo Contact

Non-governmental White activity in the North and among the Eskimo populations can be characterised as exploitive colonialism, as is demonstrated by two significant features of this activity. One, whether we are describing the involvement of the early explorers, the whalers, the Hudson's Bay Company, or for that matter the missionaries, contact was established and maintained, or more importantly, withdrawn.

30 Philips, p. 124.
31 Finnie, p. 55.
on the basis of the needs and interests of the White contacting agents, demonstrably not on the needs, expressed or imagined, of the indigenous Eskimo peoples. When the North and its peoples were of some value, whether economic or evangelical, contact was made but often was quickly withdrawn when this value declined. Secondly, the nature and structure of the relationship between Whites and the Eskimo populations clearly was one of the conquering to the conquered, the powerful to the powerless and, eventually, the independent to the dependent. In describing the relationship of the Hudson's Bay Company with Northern native groups, Robert Paine has commented:

It is important to realize that this merchant enterprise has always operated on the basis of the ability of each local station to maintain a balanced account, a deficit often meant the closure of a particular trading station. Perhaps it is this prerogative of withdrawal that was the most injurious feature of the trading relationship to the Inuit, it also underwrote the ultimate asymmetry in the power relationship between trader and client.  

While much the same could be said concerning the nature of whaling activity, the Hudson's Bay Company's contact differed.  

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32 Perhaps the missionaries' zealous perception of the Eskimos' need for "divine light and guidance" is an exception here, although by the 1950s missionaries themselves began questioning their own motives for a Northern presence. See Jenness (1961; 1968).

33 Paine, p. 10.

34 The whalers had come to the Arctic, employing Eskimos for purposes of exportation of whale products. In the course of these activities, they introduced white man's tools, clothing, food, fishing technology and techniques, as well as disease and alcohol, the making of the latter constituting (according to Philips, p. 119) the "major skill imparted to the native people". Eskimos were routinely employed to man small sailing crafts, gather driftwood for fuel, hunt caribou for fresh food and making clothing for the crews in exchange for goods on which the natives were becoming increasingly dependent. Eskimo
because of its inclination for permanence, not so much a permanence in any one location but a belief (as Philips, Woodcock, and Rich have argued) that the Hudson's Bay Company was in the country to stay. This belief was based on the Company's sense of its sovereignty over these vast areas and reaffirmed by its internal corporate philosophy. As such, it allowed the Company to "outweigh its impotent and bumptious rivals" in exploration surges and also governed its stance in the trade of certain goods, most notably alcohol, with the indigenous people. Despite this, its essential goal of economic exploitation resulted in the need to encapsulate native groups and create a dependency of the Company. In a letter of counsel to his staff in 1821, George Simpson aptly stated the Company's position:

girls were bartered for tobacco and tea, and Eskimo women--married or otherwise--were often taken on board, as Jenness and Philips clinically reported, "for duty with the senior officers of the ships". (Philips, p. 118 and Jenness.) Disease, alcoholism, failed resettlements, dependency and often declining populations were the legacies of this contact.

The Hudson's Bay Company's contact differed, not in essential nature and rationale from that of the whalers--both being interested in extracting riches from the North. The structure and extent of the Company's contact was different, and consequently so was its role in the Eskimo experience of Whites. The criterion of the Hudson's Bay Company which distinguished it, both in southern and northern operations, from its fur-trading competitors and which measured and often moderated its exploitive ventures, was its inclination for permanence.

36 Philips.

37 Woodcock.


39 Philips, p. 61.
I am convinced they (Native peoples) must be ruled with a rod of Iron to bring and keep them in a proper state of subordination and the most certain way to effect this is by letting them feel their dependency upon us. . . . In the woods and northern barren grounds this measure ought to be pursued rigidly next year if they do not improve, and no credit, not so much as a load of ammunition given them until they exhibit an inclination to renew their habits of industry. 40

Philip Godsell, long a member of the Hudson's Bay Company in the North, wrote in 1923:

Now, just as Doak had told me at our campfires on the Mackenzie River, the indiscriminate sale of rifles and ammunition had led to such a slaughter of the caribou that they had become quite scarce. Not only that, but they had forsaken their customary paths of migration to and from Victoria Land to have their young. Now the natives waited in vain at the crossroads which the caribou had used as far back as the oldest man in the tribe remembered, and they could not understand. As a consequence, the erstwhile self-supporting Eskimo was becoming more dependent upon the traders and commenced to look for debt. The effect upon the Eskimos of giving up customary food and skin clothing for imported woollen and cotton goods . . . and imported salted and canned provisions, etc., is to greatly lower their native vigor and resistance to disease. . . . One trader with whom I discussed the serious effects these conditions were likely to have on the natives only laughed: "The sooner the caribou are gone the better . . . for the more foodstuffs can be imported and the natives will be forced to trap and become fur producers or starve." 41

It was this pressure toward dependence on the White man economically that most profoundly altered the character of the North, and it endures as the Company's most pronounced legacy. The shift from a subsistence economy to one based on trade, begun by the whalers, deepened with the northern activities of the Hudson's Bay Company to a point of "establishing an economic serfdom". 42

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40 Quoted in Philips, p. 72.

41 Quoted in Philips, pp. 75-76.

The traders systematically encouraged Eskimos to spend more time hunting the animals whose skins were most highly prized in the Southern market and to spend less time hunting animals for food purposes. As Brody noted, "this shift in hunting sometimes left the Eskimos hungry and it created a need for new equipment with which to trap". Further, Brody observed:

... The imbalances that accompanied this shift were in some measure rectified by exchange: the hunter-become-trapper traded skins for food and new equipment, and thereby their dependence on trading posts rapidly became acute.44

Partly because of its perceived historical sovereignty in the area and partly due to its trading monopoly (having successfully undercut or bought out the competition), the Company's effect and role in the North was not merely economic. Philips writes:

In the absence of a police force or the pressures of public opinion, (the local trader) exercised life and death power over the local people. It might be simply exercised by achieving a social objective through economic pressure, such as the taking of an Indian woman into the post, whatever her wishes or her family's... On a more extreme scale, if some Indian lost his life in a quarrel with the White man, there was likely to be a judicial inquiry, (structured and mediated by the Company trader)... The company developed the esprit de corps of a select priesthood and this survived amalgamation, and even the rapidly diminishing administrative powers of the traders after 1870.45

Writing in 1946, Richard Finnie remarked:

Notwithstanding its official relinquishment of political sovereignty in the North, the company still adheres to a policy of benevolent despotism, so far as it is able, in its relations with the Eskimo.46

43 Brody, p. 22. 45 Philips, p. 73.
44 Ibid., p. 22. 46 Finnie, p. 32.
Attesting to this, over a hundred years after George Simpson's letter of counsel to his staff, Sir Patrick Ashley Cooper, governor of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1934, could still imperially address Eskimos in this manner:

Our men who live with you the year around and trade with you have often told me what good hunters you are and how you try your best to do their bidding, and I wish you to believe that we have your welfare at heart. If times are good with us, they are also good with you. If you make good hunts you benefit by them and are happy, but if your hunts are poor, we both suffer and are sorry. I would ask you to be more diligent in trapping so that with the foxes you catch you will be able to buy better guns, seal nets, and hunting equipment so as to make it easier for you to obtain a supply of food. The more fur you catch, the more seals you obtain, the more of the white man's goods we will bring into the country for your use... So for your own good I ask you to be good hunters, pay your debts, and live happily with one another... and now that we have seen you we are happy and will leave you with confidence that you will work with our post manager as one large happy family, you following his advice as if he were your father, for he does the things which I tell him and I want you to do the things which he tells you.47

Clearly aiding the Hudson's Bay Company in compelling the Eskimos to "do the things which he tells you" were the Christian missions. Two statements must be made in evaluating the consequences of the missions on Eskimo life before World War Two. First, the proselytizing mission of the churches led not only to the eradication of traditional religious observances and spirituality, but its often zealous application produced extreme suffering for many natives. Religious fanaticism was a factor in a series of slayings at Home Bay on Eastern Baffin Island in 1922; on Belcher Island in 1941, one Eskimo proclaimed himself Christ and murdered three others who refused to believe. After

47Quoted in Finnie, pp. 32-34.
announcing the end of the world, he led his followers over the sea ice to meet God, resulting in the deaths of six children. Some Eskimos, strident in the profession of their new belief, risked starvation rather than hunt on Sunday or, similarly, refused medical or dental help if it arrived on a Sunday.

More importantly, the ending of traditional religious beliefs tended to foster growth in the traders' business, and clearly often both the trader and missionary viewed their relationship as complementary. This included not only the "paganizing" of traditional sealskin trousers for Eskimo women with their replacement by skirts available only from the Hudson's Bay Company but, more profoundly, it challenged the basis of the traditional economy and provided a legitimacy for its passing. Williamson observed:

The shamans of the Eskimo have been the intellectual elite in a culture in which profound respect for intelligence was one of the most important values. . . . (However) the Eskimo (also) respected people whose technology showed evidence of intellectual power, though they found the white men often childlike in their helplessness in arctic settings. . . .

(Now), the arctic fox was little valued in traditional times and, therefore, of limited significance in the religiosity of the hunt. The need to hunt to serve the fur trade, then, brought about a steady diminution of religiosity, as fox hunting was clearly a secular pursuit.

Changed in their motives and impelled to question old beliefs now undervalued by the non-believing Kablunait (Whites), who came provided with a store of goods for years ahead, without the practices and rituals the Eskimo had once thought vital to survival of man and perpetuation of his soul, the thinking people found a void of intellect and spirit which old resources could not fill.

This need was met, to some extent, by yet another force of change that came in from the south with establishment of trading posts. The Christian missionaries, who also spoke of souls and
preached a moral code analogous to that which Eskimos had largely followed in their unconverted lives, were closely associated by the Eskimo with the traders whom they followed and whose culture they shared.48

The second observation to be made concerning the role of the missions before World War Two is in reference to the creation, partly subsidised by government, of a number of schools and hospitals, at least nominally for purposes of education and medical care. As perceived shortcomings in the missions' provision of these services was one of the reasons leading to direct government involvement in the North by the 1950s, we will discuss the successes and failures of these early social programs in the following chapters. For the moment, suffice to state that the development of this infrastructure by the churches meant that they would have a greater stake, and influence, in northern policy making and administration once the government increased its northern involvement, after World War Two.

5. Government Involvement in the North to World War Two

While the nature of, and the rationale for, the colonial relationship between Whites and Eskimos would change with the arrival of

48 R.G. Williamson, "The Canadian Arctic, Socio-Cultural Changes", Archives of Environmental Health, Vol. 17, No. 4. The Reverend F.W. Peacock, superintendent of the Moravian mission in Labrador, wrote in 1947 on the consequences of early White contact for the Eskimos: "(They) have outgrown their primitive culture and their thought and habit patterns are generally changing. The only active interest they take in their old arts and culture is a commercial one. It becomes more and more obvious that the White Man's influence over Eskimos has been to change them from an isolated, independent, self contained race into a semi-dependent labouring class." In "Some Psychological Aspects of the Impact of the White Man upon the Labrador Eskimo" (Unpublished manuscript, Library of Indian and Northern Affairs, Ottawa-Hull, 1947), pp. 214-215.
government in the North in the early 1900s, the power relationship, which colonialism implies, would not. Its consequences for Eskimo independence and self-reliance would be, therefore, equally devastating. Our task here is to chart the history of, and rationale for, government involvement with Eskimos and the North before World War Two in order, first, to obtain a proper bearing on the legacy that post-World War Two servants would have to confront and, secondly, to understand as we have suggested in the opening comments of this chapter, the peculiar constitutional and administrative position of the Northwest Territories and its Eskimo peoples.

Morris Zaslow concludes his study of the Canadian North by refuting the claim that Canada did not awaken to the importance of the North until the establishment of the federal Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1953. The comment is suggestive and helpful in illuminating a period of Canadian governmental experience which may otherwise be treated as non-history, but it requires clarification and qualification. Certainly Prime Minister St. Laurent’s “absence of mind” 49 summation of governmental involvement in the North prior to 1953 is overstated; nevertheless it was true that direct government involvement in the North, particularly in the social welfare area, 50 was minimal prior to this development. Indeed, by the 1930s

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49 See Rea, p. 2, or Paine, p. 68 for the full text of St. Laurent’s remarks.

50 See Paine, p. 24.
when the sovereignty question apparently was resolved, and mineral finds, including oil at Norman Wells, were considered too expensive to extract and distribute, the government dramatically withdrew from its earlier Northern activities, dissolving the Northwest Territories and Yukon Branches of the Department of the Interior.

The reasons for this minimal government involvement can be explained on philosophic and pragmatic grounds. Philosophically, the laissez-faire role of government theorised minimal involvement of government in the social and economic life of the nation except in the area of aid for economic development. 51

Pragmatically, as Nils Ørvik has bluntly stated, a major reason for the cavalier attitude towards the North by not only Canadians but Americans, British and Scandinavians as well, was "the persistently low estimate of how much the north was worth". 52 As Ørvik noted:

51 Professor David Alexander makes a relevant argument, however, when he warns against the tendency to discuss the situation in the Canadian North in "something of a national and historical vacuum: the lack of government involvement in the north in the early decades of this century and then the rush to supplant church services with secular services and administration does not strike a historian as a uniquely northern course of events. It was a general trend that moved through Canadian society in this century. . . . Moreover the standards implicit in the judgements of such northern critics as Diamond Jenness need to be evaluated; perhaps they were based on what they found and expected as middle class persons in the south? For the working class in the south the neglect of the north might not have looked very extreme and the absence of a governmental presence would not have been at all surprising." Quoted in Paine, p. 23.

52 N. Ørvik, ed., Policies of Northern Development (Kingston: Group of International Politics, Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, 1973), p. 2.
There was little to be extracted, no relevance to national defence, no vested interest to support, no sizeable group of loyal citizens (for whom) to claim protection. As such, although an 1870 Imperial Order in Council transferred the British possessions designated as "Rupert's Land" to Canada, the acceptance of the Arctic Archipelago, home for the majority of Canada's Eskimo, was only reluctantly undertaken by the fledgling government in Ottawa. As Zaslow recounts, the presence of whalers and explorers in the area, as well as two requests for land grants in the Cumberland Sound area in 1874— one from a British subject, one from an American Navy Engineer Corps lieutenant— had left the British government in a quandary:

The British government did not care to assume the governing of the region itself, but feared that if it disclaimed jurisdiction the United States would immediately claim the territory for itself.54

Gordon Smith quotes a revealing colonial office memo of the time:

"The object in annexing these unexplored territories to Canada is, I apprehend, to prevent the United States from claiming them, and not from the likelihood of their proving of any value to Canada.55"

In 1874, Governor General Dufferin was asked to ascertain whether Canada was at all interested in assuming British claims to the Arctic islands. Subsequently, the government of Alexander MacKenzie

53 Ibid., p. 2.


passed an Order in Council on October 10, 1874 declaring Canada's interest in including the territory within her boundary, although preferring to hold the matter over until the next Session of Parliament, "since it was felt the matter should be discussed formally there, as it involved a charge upon the revenue". The debate which followed was symptomatic of future government ambivalence toward the North. As Zaslow recounts, the strongest case for acceptance of these lands was made by John A. MacDonald on the grounds that:

... the territory would cost nothing to administer until settlement arrived, and then it should produce revenues to offset any costs, (further) if Canada did not wish to take it over, Britain would be entitled to abandon its sovereignty and the United States would simply occupy the region gratis.  

For MacDonald, "at the very least Canada ought not to let this happen without securing a decent quid pro quo".  

Ultimately, in language that was so vague as to be innocuous, on July 31, 1880 Canada was granted:

... all British territories and Possessions in North America not already included within the Dominion of Canada, and all islands adjacent to any such territories or possessions.

Gordon Smith has commented:

... Taking the passage quite literally, one would be justified in concluding that it referred to the British Honduras, Bermuda, and the British West Indies as much as to the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.

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56 Zaslow, p. 252.
57 Ibid., pp. 251-252.
58 Ibid.
60 Gordon Smith in MacDonald, p. 204.
Displaying governmental enthusiasm for its new acquisition, an Order in Council dated September 23, 1882 warned:

... that no steps be taken with the view of legislating for the good government of the country until some influx of population or other circumstance shall occur to make such provision more imperative than it would at present seem to be.\(^{61}\)

The "other circumstances" of which the Order speaks must have been mineral finds and to this end Finnie reports:

... Enthusiasts in and close to government, as far back as 1887-1888 induced the Senate to hear evidence bearing upon the natural resources of that portion of the Canadian Northwest which still remains unexploited.\(^{62}\)

Finnie further observed that:

... from 1884 onwards the government had ships sailing in and out of Hudson Bay and to the Arctic Islands on missions of exploration and administration ... (and) ... a few government geologists and surveyors were meanwhile investigating the Barren Lands and the Mackenzie Basin.\(^{63}\)

This activity was, of course, limited in scope and nature and most observers concur that the first real attempt to legislate for the northernmost territories was in 1895, with pronouncement of the Colonial Boundaries Act.\(^{64}\) Following this, an Order in Council was issued constituting the Provisional Districts of Ungava, Franklin, Mackenzie and Yukon.

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\(^{61}\) Dominion Order in Council, P.C. No. 1839, Sept. 23, 1882.

\(^{62}\) Finnie, p. 63.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 63.

\(^{64}\) For a discussion of the significance of the Colonial Boundaries Act here, see W.F. King, "Report upon the Title of Canada to the Islands North of the Mainland of Canada" (Ottawa: Department of the Interior, 1965), pp. 5-6.
In 1897 William Wakeham, the veteran commander of the Gulf Fisheries Patrol, was instructed to post notices around Hudson Bay and Baffin Island proclaiming Canadian sovereignty. Following this, in 1901 Captain J.E. Bernier was allotted $200,000 by Parliament for Arctic exploration, and the North West Mounted Police were moved into Herschel Island, Fort McPherson, and Fullarton Inlet. The years 1903 to 1911 saw the geologist and veteran Labrador explorer A.P. Low, Major Moodie of the North West Mounted Police, and Bernier once again dispatched to assert Canadian sovereignty in the waters of Hudson Bay and the eastern Arctic islands.

There were several reasons for this sudden burst of government activity. Jenness has written:

... (It was) a threat to her sovereignty over the islands fringing her far northern mainland (that) roused (Canada) from her lethargy and ... provoked her to set up an Arctic administration.

In fact, in 1883-84 a multinational exploratory and scientific effort in the North had begun. Further, the polar runs of the American Robert Peary who, on one expedition claimed "the entire region and adjacent for the United States", and similar conquering trips of

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65 Zaslow, p. 261.


the Norwegians Otto Sverdrup in 1898 and Roald Amundsen in 1903,\(^{69}\)
all justified concern.

Of equal significance in contributing to government action
was the growing interest among personnel in various federal government
agencies in the geology, fauna, and meteorological conditions of the
North. The North West Mounted Police played an equally important role
in stimulating government activity in the North by issuing statements
of concern over Northern resources being exploited by non-Canadians\(^{70}\)
without the application of customs and tariffs, and the effect on
Eskimos of the general lawlessness surrounding resource development.
Inspector Charles Constantine, commanding the North West Mounted Police
detachment in the Yukon wrote in his annual report on November 30,
1896 about:

\[\ldots\text{liquor (being) sold or traded to the natives for fur, walrus,}
\text{ivory bone, and their young girls who are purchased by the offi}-
\text{cers of the ships for their own foul purposes.}^{71}\]

Constantine's solution, which was largely followed by government, was
not surprisingly:

\(^{69}\) G. Smith in MacDonald, p. 205.

\(^{70}\) On this point, note the comments of G.L. Jennings in his report
of February 16, 1910: "The value of the trade of the Karluk in pelts
will also be several thousand dollars. I think it is to be greatly
regretted that no Canadian whaling ships or traders from our Pacific
coast (have come) into this territory leaving everything to the
Americans." The report then goes on to list how this trade could be
secured for Canada. Of note is not only the Canadian nationalism but
particularly the resentment of American activity in the North. Other
nationalities operating here clearly did not rate the same ire of the
police or, for that matter, the federal government.

\(^{71}\) In "Arctic Whalers and the N.W.M.P.", p. 238.
the presence of an armed government vessel with a strong and disciplined crew... (who could)... do much good service in putting an end to the traffic in liquor to the natives... (as well as)... protecting the revenues, and more especially the fisheries which must be valuable or so many ships would not be in these waters.\textsuperscript{72}

The Mounties were the logical choice for such an assignment, and they became the veritable presence of the government in the North. Within two decades after the addition of police posts from the initial Herschel Island and northern Hudson Bay locations, they stretched from one side of the Arctic to the other, making the Eskimos in their wake, as Jenness describes, "wards of the police".\textsuperscript{73}

Given the often isolated nature of the police post, its role in the North as the official agent of the Southern government was multi-faceted. Jenness writes:

\ldots (The police) patrolled their districts and arrested law breakers, enforced the game regulations, collected the customs duties wherever they were leviable, served as justices of the peace, postmasters and census officers, searched for the missing and treated the sick where no doctor or nurse was available. At least two of them made long and arduous journeys that added to our geographical knowledge of the Arctic. They were, in fact, the government's handymen, available for any and every task.\textsuperscript{74}

For Philips, "the (policeman) was, in short, the representative of whatever arm of government might be called upon to assert itself or render service in the North".\textsuperscript{75} In the \textit{Eskimo Book of Knowledge},

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 238. \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{75}Philips, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{73}Jenness, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 21.
published by the Hudson's Bay Company in 1931, the police were described as "officers appointed by the King to uphold the laws and are wise men after the heart of King Solomon". As well as bringing Canadian law to both natives and non-natives in the North, the police:

... also engaged, as did the missions, in "unofficial" welfare activities, setting up temporary hospitals, soup kitchens and the like. Later when family allowances were instituted in Canada, it was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police detachments who administered the programmes in the Arctic ... registering the Inuit ... (by use of) I.D. discs ... for this purpose.

The police role and sense of duty with respect to Eskimos was contradictory. On the one hand, they viewed themselves as guardians of a people who clearly were being exploited and abused by the traders and whalers and whose economic way of life, because of White activity, was being threatened. One witnesses this concern as a predominant theme in North West Mounted Police reports throughout this period. Police suggestions to preserve the natural wildlife of the area upon which Eskimos depended ranged from regulations as to how various animals could be captured less wastefully, to the halting of the hunting of some animals, including whales, until the populations could recover. Concerned with the exploitative nature of trader-Eskimo relations, the police

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78 This role was given political legitimacy and responsibility, as the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, as of the N.W.T. Act of 1905, was to be a member of the North West Mounted Police.
suggested that no private trade with Eskimos be permitted except under special license. 79

While protecting and preserving the Eskimos and their lifestyle, the police also were prime agents of acculturation and destruction of traditional Eskimo life. Such activities ranged from persuading natives to stick to their marriage vows—a White custom, to the more profound role of enforcing a legal system which, however reasonably applied, was rarely if ever understood by the Eskimo people and which had a dramatic consequence on the ordering of all Eskimo relationships and activities thereafter. As Rasmussen has noted, the effect of judging Eskimo customs (which Rasmussen considered rational and necessary) by Southern legal standards, was inevitably to "discover criminality (and punish it) . . . where in fact there existed only the normal operations of a well-ordered society". 80 Brody indicated the effect of this policy.

From the Eskimo point of view the police were seen to have enormous power that they could direct against anyone they chose, a fact amply demonstrated in the court cases that occurred and the sentences that were passed. Moreover, the police were obviously in alliance with other whites: juries were selected from the local whites and migrant whites, even for cases in which every word had to be interpreted from Eskimo. . . . Eskimos (therefore) saw southern society as a single thing . . . (the church, traders and police as one). 81

79 See various reports in "Arctic Whalers and the N.W.M.P."


81 Brody, pp. 28-29.
What the police did was "add fear to the many other reasons for accepting the Southerners' wishes and acquiescing in their demands." 82

Concerning the police's role, Brody concludes:

On the local level the police put an official seal on the other whites' determination to change Eskimo life; on a higher level they represented the fact that one nation was determined to include the vast arctic hinterland, not only within its geographical frontiers, but within its moral and legal boundaries as well. 83

As Jenness, Zaslow and others have noted, the nature of police work in general is negative, static and unprogressive. Their task is to enforce laws governing the existing situation, the status quo, and even given the unique administrative and political representative responsibilities of the North West Mounted Police 84 in the North, they were not an exception to the general rule. While the Northwest Territories Act of 1905 gave the reins of authority to a commissioner who until 1918 was simultaneously commissioner of the North West Mounted Police:

... at no time was it the function of the Commissioner to originate policies, or to study the resources and plan for the development of the vast territory, over which he was given control. 85

82 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

83 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

84 Prior to 1924 the Indians located in the Northwest Territories were governed by and under the jurisdiction of the Department of Indian Affairs by virtue of the Indian Act. "The Eskimos, however, were not looked upon as Indians and though aborigines residing in the N.W.T., they were apparently considered wards of the Dominion government, but not the responsibility of any one Department. The care of the Eskimo, though not authoritatively so, was assumed by the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories." (Memo to Deputy Commissioner, N.W.T., 28 September, 1939, from the library of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs in Ottawa.)

85 Jenness, p. 23.
Real power was in Ottawa where policies were created in geographic and cultural isolation from the realities of Northern life; the police role was to enforce laws so conceived.

If sovereignty was the government's primary rationale for Arctic involvement, aiding the search for possible mineral wealth was the second. For this end other government agencies ultimately accompanied the police to the North. The Geological Survey, for example, had been active in the North since 1900, examining the country entering the Mackenzie River system. Robert Bell, assisted by his nephew J. Mackintosh Bell, made topographical and geological reconnaissance of Great Slave Lake, reporting a number of prospective mineral areas. Later, J.M. Bell and Charles Campell explored the eastern shore of Great Bear Lake to the north arm of Great Slave Lake and Fort Rae. It was Bell's report on the cliffs of McTavish Arm which precipitated the famous radium find of Gilbert Labine in 1930.

Although World War One tended to attract government attention elsewhere, the post-War discovery of oil near Fort Norman caused the reorganization of the Department of the Interior and the creation of a special Northwest Territories Branch to administer the natural resources of the region. O.S. Finnie, a mining engineer was appointed its director.

During this period responsibility for administering Eskimo peoples and financing programmes affecting them was unclear. When the government created the Northwest Territories Branch of the Department
of the Interior in 1921, that branch provided some relief in a few Eskimo settlements, thus assuming responsibility for their affairs. However, in 1924 when the Minister of the Interior transferred this responsibility to the Department of Indian Affairs, objections arose that this move would create a ward status for a people who, having signed no treaty with the government, should be left alone and not treated as having special status. Consequently, while the legal status of Eskimos was to remain unchanged, the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs was to assume care for the Eskimo populations, ending the practice of discrimination between the Indians and the Eskimos of the North. Subsequently, the trading companies, missionaries and police were subsidised separately to provide relief of Eskimo distress, principally in the areas of health and education. After 1924, when the Department of Indian Affairs became officially responsible for Eskimo matters, it extended its medical services into the eastern Arctic and in 1926 provided both salary and expenses for a full-time physician on Baffin Island. On March 31, 1928, however, the conduct of Eskimo affairs was transferred by an Order in Council to the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, who was by then Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior. Two years later the government repealed the 1924 amendment to the Indian Act which had allocated responsibility for Eskimo administration to the Department of Indian Affairs. The rationale for such a move at this time is unclear, except insofar as it provided administrative streamlining and possibly the recognition that the North
and its Eskimo people were in a significantly different position vis a vis the federal government than Indians; its practical effects, however, seems to have been minimal, as Fingland reports:

The economy drive of the thirties, following closely on the heels of the transfer of natural resources to the Prairie provinces in 1930 brought about a substantial reduction in the size and activities of the department.86

Indeed, by 1931 the Northern Administration Branch, set up in more hopeful times to administer an expected economic boom, was dissolved.

Between 1930 and 1940 external contestation of Canada's sovereignty in the North ended, or perhaps more accurately was put on hold. Much of the exploration and mapping of the North had been completed, and the government—obsessed by the Depression—limited its Northern activity. These factors created what Jenness has called a period of "bureaucracy in inaction." 87 That government activity which did occur north of 60 was concentrated on clerical support of Labine's radium finds and, beginning in 1934, on the discovery and exploitation of gold. Jenness describes government policy:

The police could continue as before to uphold Canada's sovereignty and maintain peace. . . . The missions, supported by small subsidies, could provide all the hospitalization or rudimentary education required, while the traders, gently regulated, could take care of their (the Natives') economic welfare.88

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87 See Jenness (1964), pp. 49-71.

88 Ibid., p. 50. See also Finnie, p. 73.
In 1936 the administration of Eskimos was charged to the newly-created hybrid, the Department of Mines and Resources, composed of the former Departments of the Interior, Mines, Indian Affairs and Immigration. This move was based partly on economy, but more significantly, on the priority the government felt was due to the North and its peoples. A Bureau of Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs became part of the Lands, Parks and Forests Branch of this new department, and pre-World War Two government direct efforts on behalf of natives comprised:

1. Game regulations enforced by the R.C.M.P.

2. Maintenance of game reserves, sanctuaries, and the establishment of a reindeer herd.

3. The work of seven medical officers in the Northwest Territories (whose) work includes allotting rations to the aged and destitute natives, which where there are no doctors may be done by the Mounted Police, missionaries or traders; and in Indian country the doctors act as Indian agents, paying treaty money each year and listening to tribal grievances.\(^{89}\)

We suggested in the opening remarks of this chapter that the unique constitutional and administrative development of the Northwest Territories, home of the majority of Canada Eskimos, had placed employees of the federal government in a special representative role vis à vis Eskimo peoples, however much or little they cared to exercise this role. Before we conclude our history of White non-governmental and governmental contact with the Eskimos to 1940, it is imperative that we briefly survey these developments.

\(^{89}\) The following comes from Fingland in MacDonald, pp. 130-159; A.B. Yates, "The Federal Government in the North", in Ørvik, pp. 64-73; Rea, pp. 34-38; Philips, pp. 142-159; Finnie, pp. 62-86; and Zaslow, pp. 224-248.
6. The Northwest Territories' Constitutional Position to 1940

The land known as the Northwest Territories, which Canada acquired through annexation in 1870 and 1880, underwent dramatic physical and constitutional changes between that time and 1940. As we know, as populations grew and the wealth of the area increased, Manitoba (in 1870), Saskatchewan (in 1905) and Alberta (in 1905) separated from the territorial government, established by the Temporary Government Act of 1869, to become provinces more or less equal to other provincial governments in the country. The Klondike gold rush and subsequent population boom led to a separate territorial designation for the Yukon in 1898. The Northwest Territories was further reduced in 1912 when southern portions of it became additions to Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. The territory to province process, with its consequent alteration from federal government ward to independence and sovereignty, complete with representative and responsible institutions, was considered the natural course of constitutional development which would affect all of Canada's territories. This process, however, had been arrested dramatically in the Northwest Territories, and their constitutional situation to 1940 was characterised by the absence of indigenous representative and responsible institutions.

When Saskatchewan and Alberta became provinces, the government of the residual Northwest Territories reverted to the form which had
existed prior to 1870. This allowed the Governor-in-Council to appoint a lieutenant-governor and a consultative council of seven to fifteen members. The lieutenant-governor was charged with the responsibility of administering the Territories according to instructions occasionally received from Ottawa and was empowered by the Governor-in-Council to perform legislative as well as executive functions. No provision was made for elected members, and the council's duties were restricted to assisting the lieutenant-governor in the administration of the Territories. Progress in the development of elected members and the first attempts at cabinet government, which had characterised constitutional progress in the Territories between 1871 and 1892, was halted. Provisions for elected representation disappeared completely. In the Northwest Territories Amendments Act of 1905 provision was made for a council of four appointed members, yet for sixteen years no appointments were made. According to the Act of 1905:

... There was to be a chief executive called a Commissioner, who was appointed with all the powers previously enjoyed by the lieutenant-governor, the Executive and the legislative assembly of the Northwest Territories.

In 1921 the council created by the Act of 1905 was finally appointed and extended to six members. The relationship between the Commissioner and council was to remain the same as that between the

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90 Fingland in MacDonald, pp. 133-134.
91 Yates in Ørvik, p. 66.
92 Ibid., p. 66.
93 Fingland in MacDonald, p. 137.
lieutenant-governor and the legislative assembly at the time of the creation of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. 94

The Northwest Territories Act empowered the Commissioner-in-Council to make ordinances for the government of the Territories, but only under instructions from the Governor-in-Council or the responsible minister. 95 As a result, the government of the Northwest Territories would differ from provincial governments, and to a lesser extent from that of the Yukon Territory, in that the

... powers of council would simply be a delegation of Parliament's legislative authority which could be amended or withdrawn at any time and the administration of territorial relations would remain, in the last analysis, in the hands of the federal government. 96

More important for our purposes, although in the provinces the enactments of the legislature are administered by an executive which is itself a part of the legislature and is answerable to it, in the Northwest Territories the Commissioner, though in practice generally recognizing a responsibility to keep council informed, had no constitutional obligation to do so:

... The statutory channel of responsibility lies exclusively between the Commissioner, a federal civil servant, and his administrative and political superiors in Ottawa. 97

Not only was the executive not responsible to council, but council itself until 1946 was composed entirely of senior federal civil servants.

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94 Fingland in MacDonald, p. 137.
95 Ibid.
96 Rea, p. 37.
97 Fingland in MacDonald, p. 139.
It was a structure which placed civil servants in unusual positions of political responsibility and representativeness; and although the indigenous electoral representation would begin to occur in the early 1950s, this structure of government, and the role of the public servants in it, would remain essentially unchanged for the remainder of the period of our study.

7. Conclusions

This history of White non-governmental and governmental contact with Eskimo peoples in the Canadian North from earliest times to 1940 has indicated at least two significant developments which would predetermine both the nature and extent of government involvement in the years ahead. First, with the introduction and then withdrawal or partial withdrawal of "civilization" as represented by whalers, the Hudson's Bay Company and to a certain extent the federal government, the context of a dependency relationship between a growing number of Eskimo people and the "White world" had been set. Further, given the limited resources of the churches in satisfying Eskimo relief, education and medical needs, and the reticence of private commercial companies to do so unless subsidized by government, a need for direct government involvement in Northern social programming was established. However seriously this was taken by the federal government prior to World War Two, it would have substantial consequences for the public sector during and particularly after this great conflict.
Accompanying the need for a more active and direct government presence in the North, the second set of events of importance for us during this period was the unique constitutional and administrative developments in the governing of the Northwest Territories. These developments placed federal public servants rather than indigenous Northerners, white or native, as the locus for the representation of the interests of the Northern peoples. As well, federal public servants were charged with executive responsibility for the administration of these needs within the Territories and their lobbying within the governing bodies of the country at large.

For a while yet, federal public servants would resist the challenge of these responsibilities, "if not in line with national interests", but by the 1950s they would be pushed and would push themselves into a more activist role. Unfortunately, the legacy for Eskimo peoples of five hundred years of White contact previous to these forthcoming activities, "rather than affording, in the ideal an apprenticeship in self-reliance and responsibility, tended to be limited to the acceptance of outside authority".  

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98 Zaslow, p. 282.

99 Ibid., p. 284.
III

THE CONTEXT OF ESKIMO HOUSING POLICY

1. Overview

While historical developments recorded in Chapter II created a need for social programmes to assist Canada's Eskimo peoples and constitutional developments had placed the federal bureaucracy in a primary policy making role in this regard, the motivation for government to act was accelerated by the military and strategic necessities of World War Two and its social, economic and political legacies.

In the first instance, the War gave the North a strategic importance and consequent massive developments of airfields, transportation networks, etc., all of which brought thousands of Southern military and civilian personnel into contact with Eskimo peoples irrevocably changing their social and economic lives. As well, Northern exploration heightened with the discovery of raw materials necessary for the war effort, initiating dreams that the North would be the new economic frontier. For strategic and economic reasons, the federal government was viewed as playing a fundamental role in facilitating any such development.

More importantly for us, World War II witnessed the emergence of a sweeping package of national social welfare legislation administered
by an increasingly professional group of Canadian public servants. The universality principle in social legislation like family allowances and pensions forced the federal government to publicly recognise Eskimos as Canadian citizens entitled to its services, while the increasingly professional nature of the Canadian public service produced a group who, "having won the war", took as their responsibility the task of now making Canada a better place for all Canadians.

For a small, activist, and disproportionately influential group of these public servants, making Canada a better place for its Eskimo peoples would be a primary objective; and as policy developed, better housing would be regarded as one of the principal foundations for such a better life.

2. The Motivation for a Housing Policy

Ironically, the great projects of war which introduced Eskimos to both the technological might of the South and modern wage labour were primarily inspired by the United States. Donald Creighton writes:

Canadians continued to think as they had thought for generations and centuries in terms of a great east-west route across their country and the North Atlantic to England. But the United States was now in the war and the United States was an imperial power in North America with a far northern possession, Alaska, which she was fully determined to use, if necessary, as a base to attack Japan.¹

Consequently, this meant:

... that the Canadian North must be exploited, and exploited as the U.S. decided with giant defence projects which would help to win the war in Europe and the Far East. ²

For Creighton, "it was the Americans who took the initiative and forced the pace of developments"³ such as: the Alaska Highway (stretching from British Columbia through the Yukon to Alaska to serve as the main ground transportation link from the industrial and material supply centres of the South to the northwest coast); the Northwest Air Staging Route (which ran adjacent to the Alaska Highway); the Canol pipeline (from the oil fields of Norman Wells, Northwest Territories, to Whitehorse in the Yukon which was perceived as the means to fuel equipment and aircraft); the "Crimson" Staging Route (with airfields developed at the Paś, Churchill, Coral Harbour in Southampton Island, Fort Chimo in Ungava Bay, and Frobisher Bay near the southeast corner of Baffin Island); and the northern extension of the air ferry to England.

The effect on Northern natives of this massive American presence in territories Canada claimed as her own was twofold. First, it ultimately generated concern over sovereignty providing one causal explanation of post-War Canadian government expenditure in the North. As well, American and to a lesser extent British military involvement in these projects not only directly altered the lives of native populations, but exposed Eskimo living conditions to the world arena. With respect to this latter point, R.A.J. Philips has written of the legacy

²Ibid., p. 72. ³Ibid., p. 72.
left Eskimo settlements neighbouring the Fort Chimo military development:

In those days the Canadian government had little time, inclination or knowledge to consider the effects of the impact of defence construction on the native population. The base became a magnet for those who were finding the living off the land already thin. Jobs requiring no skill were easy to find. . . . Fort Chimo (consequently) became a community of great but transitory affluence. When the boom suddenly ended, the Eskimo could neither continue in the new life or go back to the old. . . . The results were painful. 4

While this boom/bust, activity/withdrawal cycle had characterized much of earlier White/native contact, Jenness notes what was profoundly different and more devastating about war-time contact:

Explorers, whalers and traders had hired individual natives since the earliest days of White contact and nearly every Arctic post of the R.C.M.P. invariably employed at least one Arctic family. . . . (but) the natives had interpreted (these arrangements) as cooperation rather than wage employment and they had been the more content because it did not drain away their manpower into new and unfamiliar fields. Day labour at the air bases, on the other hand, confronted them with an occupation which was totally alien to their culture; an occupation, too, that gravely interfered with their traditional way of life. 5

As Jenness notes:

. . . most communities can sustain without shock the aberrant activities of a few of their members, but stresses and strains quickly develop when large segments of their labour force abandon the established roads and branch off along new paths. 6

Of even more lasting consequence, the war boom in the North opened up to the view of Eskimos a multitude of luxuries such as boats,

4 Philips, p. 152.
5 Jenness, p. 74.
6 Ibid., p. 74.
machines, cinemas, endless supplies of food, weapons, clothing and shelter forms of southern White society. This not only "awakened profound dissatisfaction (in the Eskimos) with their own harsh and impoverished way of life" but, to the large number of Whites present, it made painfully clear the discrepancies between their lifestyle and that of their fellow citizens north of the 60th parallel. Kenneth Rea has written:

The elaborate military undertakings . . . attracted a great deal of public attention to the forgotten lands of the north. . . . They also contributed to the development of a new national awareness of the problems of the native Indian and Eskimo populations of the north.\(^8\)

While it is difficult to measure the extent of influence exerted on government by this "awakened consciousness" brought by the War, one can record that specific reports, articles, etc., generated by northern war-time activity focused on the "northern problem". Professor C.A. Dawson, in *The New Northwest* published in 1947, wrote:

. . . Recent visitors to the north from the U.S. and Canada have been appalled by their (Indian and Eskimo) ill-health and meagre health facilities,\(^9\)
suggesting the need for an independent survey of native problems and new programmes to address them. Jenness writes:

Airmen and construction workers returned with first hand descriptions of the Eskimo settlements they had visited, and foreign newspapers and magazines published accounts of Canada's north that reflected little credit on its administrators.\(^{10}\)

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^8\) Rea, p. 54.


\(^{10}\) Jenness, p. 76.
Indeed, the Danish anthropologist N.O. Christensen wrote of the Eskimo usage of old boxes, beds, springs, etc. discarded by military camps, for housing purposes:

... The dwellings they construct around the military bases from any material on hand on, or in the vicinity of the camp dump make, together with the tents one sees there in the summer, a depressing impression.11

The effect of these appraisals was to create concern among senior Ottawa officials not directly concerned with Eskimo administration. For example, the Deputy Minister of Transport called the N.W.T. Council's attention to the "deplorable health of the natives of Chimo".12 Of particular interest and significance, in the same year--1944, an Undersecretary of State for External Affairs wrote to the Vice-Chairman of the Northwest Territories Council requesting information with respect to council programmes concerning Eskimo education and health. To further strengthen the presence of External Affairs, when the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories13 retired in 1946, he was replaced by H.L. Keenleyside, a ranking official at External. R.G. Robertson, made Deputy Minister of the new Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1953, came from External, as well as two of the four senior officials within the soon to be initiated Northern Administration Branch of this new department. In fact, the latter two claim

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12Cited in Jenness, p. 76.

13The custom being that the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories also was the Deputy Minister of the federal Department of Mines and Resources, that is, the department responsible for Eskimo affairs.
the War generated their personal concern for the North and its inhabitants.

The economic viability of Northern mineral resources and the issue of Canadian sovereignty in the North were two further legacies of the War. The most auspicious mineral developments in the Northwest Territories during the War were the uranium mining at Eldorado, and the continuing gold discoveries in the Yellowknife area. The problem of efficient transportation and sufficient supply to warrant large investments made oil discoveries of local, not national or international, importance. Indeed the great Canol Project designed as the transportation link for Northern oil, though finished before the War's end, was "too late to be of any use"\textsuperscript{14} leading to its abandonment. With the nuclear experimentation of the Allies and the American development of the atomic bomb, Eldorado\textsuperscript{15} took on a major significance as the chief North American supplier of uranium, having the dubious distinction of providing the material for the bombs dropped on Japan. With respect to gold mining, a major discovery on the "Giant" property led to two hundred companies and syndicates laying claims in the area by 1945 with active exploration spreading 150 miles beyond Yellowknife.

Local reservations about these developments concentrated on the instability of this type of resource development. In 1942, Richard Finnie noted Northerners' hopes for the future lay in the

\textsuperscript{14}Philips, p. 151.

development of more enduring mining fields:

Romantic though gold and silver and radium are, the mining of them is essentially unstable. In a few years Yellowknife may become a ghost town, if either the ore or the gold standard runs out. The base metal market on the other hand, is a steady one and the prospects for base metal mining in the North West Territories are favourable. World War Two brought about an acute shortage of copper in Canada and the U.S. (but) copper occurrences in the territories are many. As further discoveries are made, as markets expand, and as northern transportation problems are solved, mining operations may well extend to the remotest corners of the North West Territories. And why not?16

Important as mineral discoveries were, the issue of Canadian sovereignty provided the central motive for an increased government involvement. As mentioned earlier, Canadian governments historically have tended to become involved in the northern territories only after someone else had shown an interest in it. In the post-War period it was the Americans' apparent omnipresence which promoted a Canadian government response.

In 1940 the Ogdenberg Agreement, signed by Roosevelt and Mackenzie King, established a Permanent Joint Defence Board as a mechanism for coordinating American/Canadian military strategy. Ideally, the Joint Defence Board was to assure both cooperation in defence planning as well as guaranteeing a Canadian input. Creighton makes a convincing case, however, that, in respect to northern activity at least, this was rarely the case. He writes:

... The only northern project which (the Joint Defence Board) considered thoroughly and of its own volition was the North West staging route to Alaska. The other three major schemes,

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16 Finnie, pp. 130-131.
Canol, the Alaska Highway, and the northern extension of the air
ferry to England, were all undertaken hurriedly after the U.S.
entered the war.17

Creighton argues that the board's chairman, Mayor Laguardia of
New York, threatened to go over the head of the board to the U.S. presi-
dent on these three latter measures, "if there was any sign of serious
Canadian doubts or questionings".18 Thus it was the President, with
the approval of the American Secretaries of Navy and War, who authorized
the Alaska Highway, disregarding objections of the Canadian Chiefs of
Staff that its value was negligible; and the Canol pipeline scheme was
authorized by the U.S. Army and contracts for oil delivery were signed
with Imperial Oil "more than a fortnight before the Canadian government
signified its approval".19

When U.S. military courts were granted the power to try all of-
fences of U.S. military personnel in Canadian territories, even those
involving Canadians, and given the presence of 33,000 U.S. servicemen
—roughly twice the entire pre-war population of both territories—
concerns were expressed, in part by the British allies,20 that effective
control of the area had been ceded to the United States. King himself
seems to have both recognized and feared these developments, while
feeling powerless to do anything about them. Ironically expressing
the essence of the relationship between Canada's northern natives and
their own government, King commented:

17 Creighton, p. 73
18 Ibid., p. 73.
19 Ibid., p. 73.
20 For a discussion of British objection to the lack of Canadian govern-
ment activity in the North at this time, see Creighton, pp. 73-74.
... Canadians were looked upon by Americans as a lot of Eskimos, a primitive and inferior people who could be pushed around at will and with complete impunity.  

For King:

... The long range policy of the Americans was to absorb Canada. They would seek to get this hemisphere as completely one as possible.  

Consequently, in 1944 he told his cabinet colleagues: "We ought to get Americans out of further development there and keep complete control in our own hands."  

As the Cold War replaced World War Two, the Americans pressed for continuation of their presence and privileges in Canada's North. In April of 1946, the Permanent Joint Board of Defence recommended the continuance and maintenance of the aerodromes and airfields of the three main staging areas in the North. In June, a Canadian/American joint staff committee "set up at the suggestion of American members of the Permanent Defence Board reported in favor of a formal bi-lateral defence pact based on the assumption of a frontal attack from the north by the Soviet Union by about 1950". Though miffed by the release of the proposed agreement in the American press prior to Canadian consent, a less specific continentalist strategy was accepted by Canada in February 1947. With the complimentary Visiting Forces Bill of the same year, the principle that in Canadian territory there would be no

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21 Ibid., p. 137.  
22 Ibid., p. 138.  
23 Ibid., p. 138.  
24 Ibid., p. 138.
military establishments unless they were owned, maintained, and controlled by the Canadian government was compromised, if not abandoned.

By 1955 the DEW Line issue accentuated the appearance of the Canadian government's loss of control to the United States. In April 1954, a report on the DEW Line in the American weekly Life described Ellesmere Island as lying "north of Canada". 25 Further, the DEW Line agreement allowed the U.S. to control construction and staffing of the stations. As such, Canadian newspapers editorialized over having to receive permission from U.S. officials to visit DEW Line stations, and Maclean's was angered by a press conference "where the R.C.A.F. officer referred each question to his American colleagues, obviously his superiors". 26 Many public servants of this era later would recall that there was a feeling among them that "we had pretty much given everything away up there . . . Free And it was time we did something about it." 27

Coupled with what was becoming an enduring protest over the question of Canadian sovereignty in the North, there was an increasing

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27 Senior public servants of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources appear to have been divided at this time on the significance of the issue of U.S. presence in the North or, at least, of its harm. Though most senior staff of the Northern Administration Branch agreed something had to be done and this was one reason for increased government activity—"to show the flag"—R.G. Robertson, deputy minister of the department at that time reflected that he "was never one of those who was worried about the U.S. presence posing any problems for us". Personal interview with R.G. Robertson.
awareness in the minds of military and civilian planners, by war's end and thereafter, of the strategic importance of the North in a "shrunken" world. As Jenness noted:

During the early stages of the war strategists had written off the Arctic as useless and the police had closed a few of their outposts to release more men for military service; but by the war's end the strategists were revising their opinions, for German submarines had successfully operated in the waters of the Soviet Arctic, and large aircraft of longer range had brightened the prospect of trans-polar flights carrying either passengers or missiles. Therefore:

Every island in Canada's far north, every level tract of ground that could serve as a landing field then became potentially valuable, or at least a locality of interest. Consequently, along with the continuation of the staging routes programme, the government:

. reaffirmed its sovereignty over its entire Arctic archipelago by initiating a vigorous programme of exploration and mapping and by co-operating with the U.S. in setting up five manned weather stations that would proclaim Canada's "effective sovereignty" at the same time as they assisted trans-Atlantic flights. The RCMP, reflecting its prime purpose in the government's eyes, "reopened the posts it had closed a few years earlier and established two or three new ones to widen its coverage".

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28 For a discussion of this, see G. Smith, "Sovereignty in the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International Problem"; and R.J. Sutherland, "The Strategic Significance of the Canadian Arctic", both in MacDonald, pp. 194-278.

29 Jenness, p. 76. This is confirmed by Creighton's and Colonel Stacey's analysis that it was the politicians vs. the strategists who pushed for the great war-time military projects.

30 Ibid., p. 76.

31 Ibid., p. 76.

32 That is, "showing the flag".

33 Jenness, p. 76.
While the preceding points are significant factors in explaining heightened post-war activity in this area, an examination of the development of national programmes, collectively referred to as social welfare, and the development of a new kind of bureaucrat who influenced and administered this development proves of even greater importance in understanding not only the scope of government activity in the North, but the nature of it as well.

Donald Creighton, discussing the St. Laurent administration of the early 1950s, notes this dramatic development in Canadian policy making:

The natural conduct of government was only indirectly and formally his (St. Laurent's); it was the business of the managerial civil service, the pupils of Keynes and Beveridge, which had grown so immensely in numbers, experience and assurance during the war.  

While King "disliked and resisted the incorrigible tendency of the trained and talented senior officers in Finance and External Affairs to start off on their own on some new and questionable scheme," St. Laurent had few such qualms as "the new system had already been solidly laid by the time he entered politics, and he was comfortably adjusted to its procedures." For the corporate chairman St. Laurent,

34 Creighton, p. 159. J.L. Granatstein writes in a similar vein: "... In the post war era... it was the officials who seemed to have the upper hand... Matters concerning the economy and finance were all important, and those who understood their mysteries had power thrust upon them." (J.L. Granatstein, The Ottawa Men (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 168. On the post-war growth of the public service, Granatstein records: "... In 1945... the total number of federal civil servants was 115,908, in 1950 there were 127,196; and in 1955 there were 181,582." Ibid., p. 254.

35 Creighton, pp. 159-160. 36 Ibid., p. 160.
"so long as Canada Incorporated maintained a good growth rate and a
favourable consumer reaction he was quite satisfied". While
Creighton's sweeping judgment obscures or leaves unattended many sig-
nificant details of this new system of managing government, the im-
licit notion of an increasingly technical and managerially trained
civil service wresting the control of government policy making from
traditional elected leaders is central to our concern here and, it is
contended, to an understanding of post-war policy regarding the North
and its people.

Theories of the nature and significance of this new manageri-
al, \textsuperscript{38} intellectual, \textsuperscript{39} scientific, \textsuperscript{40} or class \textsuperscript{41} grouping are, of
course, abundant. From the early 1950s and thereafter, the notion of
a technical, professional, new middle class has been used extensively
to explain political phenomena from the Quiet Revolution and the rise
of the Parti Québécois in Quebec to the more recent "aggressiveness of

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

See J. Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (New York: John Day
Publishing, 1941); A.A. Berle and C.G. Means, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948); D. Bell,
The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting
(New York: Basic Books, 1973) as examples of this aspect of the "new
class" argument.

\textsuperscript{39} See J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: Mentor

\textsuperscript{40} See D.K. Price, The Scientific Estate (New York: Oxford University

\textsuperscript{41} See A. Gouldner, "The New Class Project", Theory and Society,
Vols. 6 and 7 (1978), pp. 153-203 and 343-385 respectively.
the Lougheed conservatives".\(^{42}\) In this literature are a number of assertions which seem particularly appropriate for an analysis of the period and programmes under discussion here.

First, this new group of public servants broke new paths in both the context and structure of policy making. The difference was accentuated by their emphasis on theory or rationality as a basis for their decisions. As such, they were relatively freed from the partisan concerns of their political masters and accordingly less likely to act in observance of their structural position within the government. This freedom was based, on the one hand, on their mastery of technical knowledge and reasoned analysis increasingly important for governing and on their unique class position which was, as Leo Panitch has recently noted:

\[\ldots\text{ by virtue of their function in the labour process }\ldots\]
\[(\text{in) a contradictory relationship both to capital and labour, as salaried technocrats, managers and professionals.}\(^{43}\)]

The first two points here require further detail. By reliance on theory and principle, we mean that, rather than trusting inherited patterns of authority or tradition, this new group was concerned with justifying its assertions on the basis of logic and evidence acquired through adherence to a scientifically rooted methodology. This does not suggest value freedom, but requires substantive rational proof for positions taken.


\(^{43}\)\text{Ibid., p. 181.}
A significant indicator of this process at work in post-World War Two Canada was W.A. MacIntosh's desire that his "White Paper on Employment and Income" in 1945 "be no back room pronouncement issued by an information service, nor any hasty commitment of a Minister sniffing the election air". Having "drilled them"—that is Howe, St. Laurent and Ilsely, the three most influential members of King's cabinet—on the full implications of the document, MacIntosh could conclude:

I knew I was accomplishing my prime objective, viz. that no important paper should ever have come to Cabinet with a fuller understanding and realization on the part of the key ministers of what they were committing the government to.

A further point about the composition of these rationalist forces will be particularly useful in understanding post-war development in Northern housing. Alvin Gouldner in the "New Class Project" made a distinction between two groupings within this new rationalist elite: intellectuals and a technical intelligentsia. Although both groups shared a similar discourse, the technical intelligentsia (engineers, accountants, and those in the natural sciences) were essentially interested in "enjoying their opiate obsession with technical puzzles,"

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45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.


48 Ibid., p. 347.
their special mission being to "revolutionize technology continually". On the other hand, the focus of the intellectual or heuristic intellectual found in the arts, social sciences and humanities was "primarily critical, emancipatory, and hermeneutic". Consequently, while both were interested in solving society's problems, one would more likely place emphasis on technical solutions to human problems, while the other would tend to analyze the solution attempting to capture the essence of people or human needs. To use D.K. Price's example, when faced with the problem of health care the technician's response likely would be to develop better equipment, whereas the intellectual's response might be to analyze the style and pace of life which produced the problem, solving it with changes at that level.

Indeed, just such a controversy over "appropriate" housing for northern natives occurred within the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources by the late 1950s.

The development of a professional ethic is a second characteristic often associated with this new group. On this, Alvin Gouldner has written:

"... the more that the new class reproduction derives from a specialized system of public education, the more the new class develops an ideology that stresses its autonomy, its separation

and presumable independence from business and political interests. This autonomy is said to be grounded in specialized knowledge of cultural capital transmitted by the educational system along with an emphasis on the obligation of educated persons to attend to the welfare of the collectivity. In other words, the ideology of "professionalism" emerges. 52

This professionalism for Gouldner is not that of Parsons, which submerges the professions with the status quo, although on specific issues convergence may occur. Rather, it places the new class in (possible) opposition to the status quo claiming in and via its rationality "a technical and moral superiority over the old class", 53 implying that the latter lack not only technical credentials but are guided by motives of either commercial or political venality. What professionalism does, then, is:

... strictly install the New Class as a paradigm of a virtuous and legitimate authority, performing with technical skill and with dedicated concern for society at large. 54

Professionalism's struggle, and indeed that of the new class, is to "institutionalize a wage system, that is a social system with a distinct principle of distributive justice". 55

However problematic Gouldner's analysis is on some points, 56 post-war attempts at rational and national planning for reconstruction

52 Gouldner, p. 169. 53 Ibid.
54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.
56 Problems here are whether the characteristics Gouldner describes entail the creation of a new social class in an intelligible sense of this term and the difficulty of distinguishing between service for all and service for one's particular class interests.
which dominated the Green Book recommendations, the federal-provincial conference of 1946, and the development of social welfare legislation were largely inspired by intellectuals recruited and encouraged to stay in the federal government. Thus they appear as likely examples of Gouldner's "new class", making his analysis suggestive of an understanding of post-war developments in Canadian social and economic programmes.

The notion of "service" is also instructive here. It is in part attributable to the British connection in the post-World War Two Canadian public service. Raymond Williams has argued that:

... From Coleridge to Tawney the idea of function and thence of service to the community has been most valuably stressed in opposition to individualist claims.\(^{57}\)

Significantly, he continues:

... This stress has been confirmed by the generations of training which substantiate the ethical practice of our professions, and our public and civil service.\(^{58}\)

Against the practice of laissez-faire and self-service, Williams writes:

... This has been a major achievement which has done much for the peace and welfare of our society.\(^{59}\)

Peter Self has similarly linked the Oxfordian inculcation of service to its students as instrumental to the development of a public ethic within British administration.\(^{60}\)


\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 315.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Self. See chapter 7, particularly pp. 234-244.
Although these examples are British, they are relevant to our study since many of the top Canadian public servants, both during and after the War, were products of the British education system. For that matter, the path to senior levels in the Canadian public service for the entire period under study here was more easily negotiated with a degree from Oxford, Cambridge or the London School of Economics. With reference to our specific case, Bent Sivertz, Graham Rowley, Gordon Robertson, and others of the most senior rank affecting policy in the North, clearly were imbued with this notion and undoubtedly conferred this mandate upon their subordinates. Certainly all those interviewed for this study expressed that not only was "service" a factor which motivated them in their policy decisions, but all sadly reflected upon what they perceived as its contemporary demise. For these policy actors, at least, the possibility of "service" leading to an arrogant imposition of one's values on others was not a consideration requiring their reflection, though it must ours.

For the present, our contention is that to consider only objective reasons for government involvement in the North, such as sovereignty, strategic significance, etc., is to possibly miss the centrality of this "service" ethic, an ethic which one senior officer of

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the northern service recalled, "placed responsibility on civilization
and civilized men to pass on their privileges to those less fortu-
nate". For the northern service, this mandate would long outlast
the existence of objective factors employed to initiate their programmes.

Besides specific concerns about the North and its natives gen-
rated by war-related exposure, a more broadly based scheme of reform
in Canadian society, and the role of government within it, had a
dramatic—if unintended—effect on the lives of northern natives. We
are referring here to the development of the welfare state in Canada.
Two observations from the literature on this subject reinforce the
notion we are presenting about the new class development in post-war
Canadian society and its general import for understanding the nature
and structure of northern policy making.

Not fundamentally either a Liberal "legal bribery of the pro-
ific French Canadian," or an attempt to pull the rug from under the
socialist hordes at the gate, the Family Allowance Act of 1944, the

62 Personal interview with Bent Sivertz.

63 Creighton, p. 89. On the notion of service at the senior levels
of the post-World War Two Canadian public service, J.L. Granatstein
has written: "They remained because they liked their work and because
they believed that they were doing the most important job in the coun-
try, but primarily because they shared a belief that public service was
a civic virtue: they felt a duty to serve their country and its
people." (Granatstein, p. 10.) As evidence of the social progressive-
ness of this group, Granatstein writes that W.A. MacKintosh "... took
upon himself the personal goal of seeing the federal government fulfill
the commitment it had finally begun to make to a minimum standard of
living for all Canadians." (Granatstein, p. 166, and pp. 10-11.)

64 Various "contagion from the left" theses can be cited here, the
most recent analysis of these appearing in M. Janine Brodie and Jane
Jensen, Crisis, Challenge and Change: Party and Class in Canada
(Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1980), particularly Chapter 7.
first in a stream of social welfare legislation, is most properly un-
derstood as a product of both the economic failure of laissez-faire
capitalism,65 and its primarily intellectual and bureaucratically routed
solutions. As Donald Creighton concisely put it:

The welfare state was not, in fact, a politician's invention at
all, but a system chiefly designed by the new class of civil ser-
vants, trained and talented men and women who had arrived en masse
in Ottawa during the war and who, in the end, had come to in-
fluence the making of policy far more than their predecessors
had even dreamed of doing. The new administrators did not, in
the main, get their ideas from their political superiors; they
got them from the prophets of the new age, the two Englishmen,
Lord Keynes and Sir William Beveridge, and the American, James
Burnham, the author of The Managerial Revolution.66

Creighton contended:

Keynes had given them the concept of the regulated economy, Beve-
ridge the vision of social security, Burnham the idea of a mana-
gerial elite . . . whose commanding position would be based, not
on economic ownership or (formal) political power, but on the
special knowledge and skills which were essential to the govern-
ment in a time of rapid technological and social change.67

We further learn from Andrew Armitage in Social Welfare in Canada that,
once conceived, social welfare became the domain of the bureaucrats,

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65 See ibid., and Martha Derthick, Policy Making for Social Security
(Washington: Brookings Institute, 1980).

66 Creighton, p. 175. One of the civil servants Creighton refers
to is W.A. Mackintosh, of whom Granatstein writes: "Mackintosh be-
lieved that after this war the people of Canada would accept nothing
less than a new society. This meant a greater degree of state inter-
vention than had been the case before 1939; it meant applying Keynesian
principles to federal budgeting; and it meant the creation of social
programmes designed to establish a national minimum standard of living."
(Granatstein, p. 165, and also pp. 166 and 276.)

67 Creighton, p. 175.
United States but also between the West and the Soviet Siberian regions where rivalry was accelerating as a result of the Cold War.

By December 16, 1953 when the Department of Resources and Development became the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and a new era of government northern activity was proclaimed, its northern administration section had been made sensitive to the need for better Eskimo housing. However, the implementation of a housing programme was complicated and delayed for a number of reasons. We have mentioned the issue of administrative anarchy earlier; compounding this problem was an initially frugal St. Laurent government, and technical and philosophic difficulties in developing "appropriate" Eskimo housing. Let us deal with these complicating factors in order.

Supporting the claim that the government was disorganized in both policy and administrative matters affecting the North is the government commissioned work of James Cantley, previously cited, Jenness, Dunning and the comments of most senior public servants charged with the responsibility for Eskimo affairs in the post-1953 period. For example, Bent Sivertz, Chief of the Arctic Division within the new Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, and later Director of the Northern Administration Branch, noted:

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89 For extent of consultation between western governments, see p. 74 and following in "Eskimo Housing and Mortality" (Department of Health and Welfare, Canada, 1960).

90 See Cantley.

91 See Jenness.

92 R.W. Dunning, "Some Aspects of Government Indian Policy and Administration", Anthropologica IV.
who played a central role in the operation of social welfare institu-
tions, and the professionals who provided not only the skills needed for the delivery of these services but, through their professional man-
date, influenced—if not determined—"goal establishment" and the structure of delivery systems.

While these points reinforce the notion of the centrality of bureaucracy, and hence the significance of focusing on it for the studying of public policy, the added importance of social welfare development for the study of northern policy during this period was that it provided a general and national framework which would initially bring the burgeoning southern bureaucracy into the North, and once there would allow the new northern administration to rationalize its programmes within the legitimized parameters of the welfare state, both in its humanitarian and economic reasonableness. As Paine has commented:

... One should recall that the dramatic commitment (by the government) to its northern people began at the time when the Canadian government was embarking on new social programmes for its southern population as well.

With the passing of the Family Allowance Act in 1944 and the Old Age Pensions Act the following year, officialdom for the first time:

... publicly recognized the Eskimos as citizens of the Dominion by distributing among them the family allowances, which a bill passed a few months earlier had entitled all Canadians.


69 Ibid., p. 88. 70 Paine, p. 13.

71 Jenness, p. 64.
The structure of power meant that the fate of native peoples still would be held by Ottawa, and the dependency relationship between northern natives and whites in general, and the government in particular, would clearly increase rather than the reverse. What social welfare and the professional revolution did was to ensure that the North and its people never would be forgotten again, though this was achieved by the North becoming the bureaucratic revolution's first fiefdom.

3. **Early Developments in Housing and Social Programming for the North**

The first task of H.L. Keenleyside, appointed Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources in 1946, was to reorganize the Department which, by 1946, was responsible, as Jenness noted:

... for the regulation of immigration, the care of Canada's Indians and Eskimos, the investigation of the Dominion's mineral and other resources, and the administration of the Northwest and Yukon Territories.72

In addition to transferring the technical areas of geological and mining research to a new Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, Keenleyside introduced two key administrative changes. One was the separation of Indian and Eskimo administration into two distinct and eventually competitive departments. Indian Affairs was combined with the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State's Office which, coupled with immigration responsibilities, became the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Eskimo affairs in conjunction with the remaining functions of the old Mines and Resources Department formed the Department

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72 Ibid., p. 78.
of Resources and Development. The rationale for this change is unclear, but it would seem that the North and its Eskimo residents were considered a new and special enough case to deserve special treatment. Certainly the myth of the Eskimo as the unspoiled native, distinct from the Indian, "who everyone knew about,"73 and who were, therefore, "not very sexy,"74 was a factor involved here. In any case, the separation of Indian and Eskimo affairs would have a profound effect on the development of future social programming and the delivery of social services.

Keenleyside's second administrative change of enduring consequence on Eskimo administration was the introduction of a policy of building schools throughout the Northwest Territories and the Eskimo regions of northern Quebec, and staffing them with government teachers. The first schools were opened at Tuktoyuktuk in 1947 and in Coral Harbour, Lake Harbour, Fort Chimo and Port Harrison in 1949. The goal was to enable Eskimos to deal more effectively with the impending appearance of civilization and the social and economic change it implied. For Ottawa, formal, secularised,75 statutorily required schooling was necessary to achieve this.

Health care was the other major development of this period which not only prefigured but also precipitated later housing initiatives. In 1944, the same year that northern education facilities were

73 Personal interview with Gene Rheuame. A welfare officer with the Northern Administration Branch in the late 1950s, he was the first MP elected in the Northwest Territories.

74 Ibid.

75 That is based on a curriculum of skill development necessary for participation in the approaching development.
surveyed by Dr. Andrew Moore, the Social Science Research Council engaged Dr. D.J. Wherrett, secretary of the Canadian Tuberculosis Association, to "investigate the region's health conditions and its medical and hospital services". His report clearly jolted into action the government, particularly those responsible for northern administration. He recorded:

... Of 729 deaths recently reported among Eskimos 613, or 84% were unattended by either doctor or nurse, and that in every part of the north the rates of pulmonary tuberculosis and other respiratory diseases were extremely high.77

In addition, R.A.J. Philips recollects:

In areas where Eskimos met white men venereal disease took firm root. Devastating epidemics often were not even chronicled. In 1944 forty-eight Eskimos died of diphtheria in the small community of Eskimo Point. The next year forty-five died of typhoid at Cape Dorset. In 1948 poliomyelitis spread on the west side of Hudson Bay, attacking ninety Eskimos by March of the following year. A year later measles hit three hundred in the western Arctic and fourteen died.78

Four central conclusions could be drawn from these reports. First, in leaving responsibility for education and health to the missionaries, the traders and police had failed—partly because of their lack of expertise and the lack of funds to do anything constructive to alleviate the problem, and partly because the orientation of these organizations was either religious, commercial, or legal and at odds with providing rational health care and education. In the view of the reports religious dogma and a "romantic preoccupation with a culture


78Philips, p. 157.
that had already passed,79 had formed the northern education curriculum and had to be replaced by one developing the skills necessary for an advancing civilization. In respect to health care, the reports called for massive immunization and X-ray programmes including evacuation to the South for cures. In both cases, massive government intervention was suggested.

Secondly, there developed a belief that revamping the education system or producing healthier Eskimos would be for nought without a complementary programme of economic development. Thus a holistic approach to northern problems was called for, so that:

. . . any gains made in health and education would (not) be lost upon return to a way of life which provided little more than subsistence.80

As Wherret had concluded in his report:

. . . Health cannot be divorced from socio-economic conditions and a health programme will fail, if at the same time efforts are not made to improve the economic status of these people.81

A third result of these reports was the call for administrative restructuring to accommodate the need for coordination in the health, education, and economic development fields. Commenting on the problems with the existing administrative structure, James Cantley wrote:

79 Personal interview with R.G. Robertson.
80 Ibid.
81 Wherret, p. 56.
While (existing) ... agencies are doing something for the Eskimo, directly or indirectly, they all function independently. No means have yet been provided for co-ordinating their activities or forging a general overall direction and control of Eskimo affairs.\textsuperscript{82}

As such:

\ldots No matter what policies Arctic services may recommend and have accepted by this Administration (the Department of Resources and Development) they cannot do anything to implement them without the concurrence and assistance of one or more of the other interests (other governmental and non-governmental organizations operating in the North).\textsuperscript{83}

Finally, these reports placed a specific emphasis on the need for adequate housing as a principal requirement for proper health, an improved chance at educational success, and as a necessary tool for the encouragement of a more rational economic system for the Eskimo people. Indeed, Wherret argued, in a manner that was to become a tradition within the Department of Health and Welfare, "\ldots as long as a native is born in an atmosphere of contagion, tuberculosis will continue to wreak havoc in these areas".\textsuperscript{84}

4. The Parameters of a Housing Programme

By 1950 when a new Department of Resources and Development was given responsibility for the Eskimo people, R.A.J. Philips (who would shortly play a significant role in developing Eskimo housing programmes) estimated that "not one per cent (of the Eskimo population of Canada)\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{82} J. Cantley, "Survey of Economic Conditions Among the Eskimos of the Canadian Arctic", copy in Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Library, Hull, Quebec, pp. 44-45.

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p. 45.

\textsuperscript{84} Wherret, p. 56.
were housed at the minimum standard laid down by law." The Department was becoming aware of the housing problem and its consequences through Canadian research such as Wherret's, but it also was privy to similar findings concerning both the American Arctic and Greenland.

Of particular significance was the American finding of the late 1940s that "poor health (among Eskimos) results largely from malnutrition and poor housing," and the U.S. action in 1949 under Public Law 52, which established a revolving fund of one million dollars to "rehabilitate the deplorable housing conditions for our remote Eskimo areas of Alaska." The rationale for this undertaking was that:

... the natives in this area had the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world (and therefore) any improvement in housing which would achieve dryness in the home would be a major weapon in combating the tuberculosis rate.

Canadian civil servants thus were aware of the universality of the problem and of other nations' actions in dealing with it. They also were aware of the possible damage to Canada's international reputation if she failed to respond. Indeed the competition to "do the right thing" for our northern peoples existed not only between Canada and the

85 Philips, p. 157. The law referred to here is one of the Northwest Territories Council—still, of course, an adjunct of the federal bureaucracy. This law prescribed a "minimum standard of space for human habitation."


United States\textsuperscript{89} but also between the West and the Soviet Siberian regions where rivalry was accelerating as a result of the Cold War.

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\textsuperscript{89} For extent of consultation between western governments, see p. 74 and following in "Eskimo Housing and Mortality" (Department of Health and Welfare, Canada, 1960).

\textsuperscript{90} See Cantley.

\textsuperscript{91} See Jenness.

\textsuperscript{92} R.W. Dunning, "Some Aspects of Government Indian Policy and Administration", \textit{Anthropologica} IV.
multiple authority was the biggest problem in the administration of the north, as opposed to Greenland where one government authority had an all-encompassing role.  

He continued:

In Canada, other departments were not bound by policies of the Northern Administration Branch whether in regard to employment of Eskimos on government or government-sponsored construction crews, or Treasury Board housing regulations for southern employees going north being at odds with the objectives of Eskimo housing developed by the branch.  

With more than thirty departments working in the North, cooperation was not universal, and for Sivertz, "even when it was existent performance was chaotic because of varying departmental responsibilities and mandates." For Sivertz:

... To change this would have meant changing the structure of government generally, and we (the Northern Administration Branch) were too small a show to achieve this.  

A coordinating body had been established, in fact, by H.L. Keenleyside to address this problem. In 1948 the Advisory Committee on Northern Development had been created to "coordinate all matters relating to northern development for advice to Cabinet". The committee was to be

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93 Personal interview with Bent Sivertz.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid. In fact, differing perceptions of the northern mandate existed within the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources itself, as well as within the government as a whole. For example, Gordon Robertson recalled, "I was never one of those that thought the Americans were in any way a threat to us." However, R.A.J. Philips recalled that the chief motivation for government activity in the North at this time was the American "threat", "which we impressed on St. Laurent through Pickersgill".

96 Personal interview with Bent Sivertz.

chaired by the deputy ministers of all departments concerned with the North, which at the time appeared to make it "an adequate instrument for necessary information exchanges and interest aggregation". Unfortunately, the committee remained dormant, and although activated in 1954 to meet several times a year between 1954 and 1958, it dealt primarily with security matters and was generally considered ineffective and ill-structured to establish a coherent northern policy. In the development of housing policy, the Advisory Committee on Northern Development played no significant role, according to its secretary, Graham Rowley. As had been the case in other areas, any matter which was considered administration was the jealous domain of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, ipso facto "housing fell under administration and therefore Northern Affairs and National Resources refused a role to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development". Consequently, the very mechanism which could have been employed to assure uniform application of a housing strategy was shunned because of the fear that it would interfere with the development of such a strategy. Ultimately, this inability to bring other government bodies in line with Northern Administration Branch objectives, coupled with internal dissent, destroyed their initial housing attempts. In respect to the second point, while the public statements of a "fresh start for

98 Ibid.
99 Personal interview with Graham Rowley.
the North," no longer administered in an "absence of mind," invigorated public servants' perception of their role in the North, budgetary allocations for most of the St. Laurent years did not reflect the new emphasis reported in public statements. In fact, the year the new department was proclaimed with such fanfare, its budget dropped from that of its predecessor by nearly fifteen million dollars. As well, increases for the section of the department responsible for northern administration were slight during the St. Laurent years, both in raw figures and as a percentage of the total departmental allocation. In 1953-54 Northern Administration Branch funds represented one-third of the total departmental expenditure, and by 1956-57 this percentage had actually decreased.

This is not to say that simple dollar allocations necessarily reflect government's intention or quality of programmes developed; however, what it does suggest, particularly in this area of government activity, where so much needed to be done, was to make policy makers aware that there would be a limited "well" to draw from, and therefore

100 Personal interview with Gordon Robertson.
102 R.T. Flanagan, "A History of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources" (unpublished manuscript in Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Library, Hull, Quebec), p. 86.
103 Ibid., p. 86. This is particularly significant as it was this part of northern administration where emphasis was publicly, at least, being placed.
the implicit mandate was to shape programmes accordingly. Indeed, the dam on northern funding was not really broken until the Diefenbaker years, when the "northern vision" was both a "product of the Department's files" and a "dramatic boost to (its) resources". The explanation for St. Laurent's hesitance is at least twofold: As author of the Visiting Forces Bill in 1947 and as a reluctant follower of post-War social welfare programming, St. Laurent had neither a nationalist nor philosophic interest in developing an extended Canadian government presence in the North. In fact, as the corporate manager, activities which would not produce immediate economic benefits were uninviting to St. Laurent. Consequently, those programmes which would be developed would not only have to come from the bottom up but would have to be underscored by the possibility of a general economic gain even, as Graham Rowley has stated, when this was "invariably illusory".

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104 Personal interview with Gordon Robertson. This position was echoed by most senior staffers in the Northern Administration Branch.

105 Nor a sense of fear over American involvement in the Canadian North. Read, for example, Jimmy Gardner's comments to St. Laurent as recorded by Reg Whitaker: "As early as 1951 Jimmy Gardner was bringing some letters to the attention of the Prime Minister indicating a growing resentment over American domination of Canadian life. St. Laurent's response was incredulity: "It is rather hard to believe," he informed his Agriculture Minister, "that there can be any general feeling throughout the country that we are giving control of the country to the U.S." R. Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 209.

106 On this point, Whitaker, Creighton, Brodie and Jensen are all instructive.
Combined with a faulty policy coordinating and administering structure and a limited resource base, came philosophical and technical conflict respecting housing the Eskimo peoples. The technical difficulties in designing and delivering a system of housing in areas of permafrost, excessively cold temperatures, fierce winds, drifting snow, and a short and arduous transportation season were considerable. The lack of wood was merely one of the problems facing those attempting to employ indigenous materials for building construction and heating systems. Summarising the technical dilemma and illustrating how it had plagued any number of housing designs, the editors of *North* \(^{109}\) in 1963, under a section entitled "Headlines We Would Like to See", placed the caption "New House doesn't leak--Built by Northern Affairs Department; Occupant Sweats" \(^{110}\).

As great as these technical difficulties were, however, they were overshadowed in departmental debates by primarily philosophical considerations. The primacy of this debate is highlighted in a study compiled by two researchers for the Division of Building Research of the National Research Council in 1960:

\(^{107}\) *Creighton*, p. 160.

\(^{108}\) Personal interview with Graham Rowley.

\(^{109}\) Published by the Northern Administration Branch of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources.

\(^{110}\) *North* (Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, September-October 1963), p. 50.
Recent activity has already stimulated considerable interest in the development of building systems and techniques designed to satisfy the special requirements of northern housing; (however) contrary to popular belief these special northern requirements do not arise because of any basic differences in the kinds of technical problems that must be met, but are dictated instead by the peculiar economic and logistic factors of the north. ¹¹¹

They concluded that:

... The search for alternative materials for building systems in the north arises not from the technical unsuitability of normal wood frame construction but is dictated primarily by questions of cost. ¹¹²

The question of cost here really has two philosophical dimensions. One, of course, was that of the amount of money the government in southern Canada wanted to spend providing better housing for Eskimos. In the early days of housing development there was the "limited well" we mentioned previously, which enforced restraint. Unexpectedly, by the late 1950s, there was a sense, fueled by the bureaucratically inspired and politically pronounced "northern vision", that unless "a lot of money was being spent you weren't doing enough for the last frontier". ¹¹³ Consequently, early attempts at designing housing which would minimally tax the public purse became unpopular.

The second aspect of the cost question was the notion of affordability. Irrespective of what the government was prepared or not prepared to pay for Eskimo housing, it was argued from a philosophical


¹¹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹¹³ Personal interview with Don Snowdon, former Chief of the Industrial Division of the Northern Administration Branch. This division was responsible for developing designs for Eskimo housing.
position of minimal intervention into Eskimo life that the priority of housing strategies should be on the ability of Eskimos to pay for the houses they received. Given the level of Eskimo income, this implied extremely low-cost housing. Later, when the objective was to bring Eskimos quickly into the Canadian mainstream, whether interpreted benignly or not, the primacy of low cost in housing design disappeared. This minimal intervention versus assimilation debate affected questions of construction and housing design as well as housing location, the government's administrative role, adjunct programmes to complement actual placement of physical structures, etc. Again, given the perceived inadequacies of traditional Eskimo housing and the shack cities which had been developed by Eskimos who had moved to or been surrounded by civilization, a programme of improved housing was essential. The issue was what kind of housing was most suitable.

When the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources was created in December 1953, the effect for the North was largely symbolic; symbolic in the sense that the inclusion of the term "north" within a regular department of the national government, and the utterances of St. Laurent and the new Minister Jean Lesage as to the "absence

114 Ibid. A more detailed discussion of the dynamics involved here appears in Chapter 4.

115 We will deal with the structure and cultural value of traditional Eskimo housing in the following chapter.

116 We refer here to "driftwood" housing and housing built with "garbage" from dumps near the DBW Line, military stations and construction sites.
of mind" which had preceded the department, had the effect of ushering in—rhetorically, at least—a golden era for the North and its inhabitants. Though budgetary and real departmental functions, organization and responsibilities were only minimally altered, one practical result of these pronouncements was the hiring of a new management team. 117 Their mandate was to take a "fresh look at the north" 118 and the government's role within it. R.G. Robertson has suggested that the reason for the appointment of a minister and deputy minister (himself) who had no prior experience with the North was an attempt to give practical expression to the new dawn proclaimed by the Prime Minister. "Lack of experience, therefore lack of pre-conditioned notions of the north," 119 was, according to Robertson, considered an asset for appointment to the new department. Appointees to the Arctic Division of the department which would be responsible for the development of a housing policy conformed to this, if not other, job criteria. Of the four senior people in the Arctic Division, three—R.A.J. Philips, F.A.G. Carter and Jim Houston—were completely new to northern administration; their chief, B.G. Sivertz, had only been involved in this field since 1950. The intent was a fresh look, more specifically a break from the "cloying Romanticism" 120 in which the North and particularly Eskimos were viewed.

117 This was mentioned by Gordon Robertson and by other senior staff of the Northern Administration Branch in personal interviews.

118 Personal interview with Gordon Robertson.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.
by the Church and presumably previous administrations. For some, the task was to bring Eskimos into the Canadian mainstream, a view which was expressed in an article published under the name of Jean Lesage in the Spring 1955 edition of the Hudson's Bay Company's Beaver Magazine. The article, written by Bent Sivertz on the question of the responsibility of government to more actively govern in the North, reads:

If we do not accept this responsibility we are denying the Eskimo the opportunity to participate freely in the life and activities of the Nation. If he has an opportunity to do so, the Eskimo will undoubtedly climb the ladder of civilization. He may feel the strain of the effort, and wonder, as all men do from time to time, whether a simpler life would not be more comfortable. But the Eskimo, like all other groups of the human family, will continue on what he considers to be the path to a better and more rewarding life. Sentimentalists of earlier days used to speak of the noble savage, of the degradations of civilization, of the beauties of primitive life and a return to nature. Their counterparts today advise that the Eskimo be left alone lest he be spoiled. 121

But, Sivertz cautions, to do this would effectively mean "to do nothing" 122 and this "would involve segregation and isolation (of Eskimos) from the increasing activity throughout the north and the denial of the most humane services we could provide." Consequently, "it is clear that Canadians would not be prepared to consider the sort of policy that would be essential to ensure the preservation of the primitive Eskimo" 123.

As this article may be both the most comprehensive and sympathetic expression of government intention and its view of the problem facing northern administration in the post-1953 period, the ironies,

121 Jean Lesage, "Enter the European: V--Among the Eskimo Part II", The Beaver (Hudson's Bay Company, Spring 1955), p. 5.
122 Ibid., p. 9.
123 Ibid., p. 5.
internal contradictions and discrepancies between expressed policy intent and actual department operating style highlighted within it deserve attention.

Three problems of government activity in the North at this time were detailed by Sivertz' article. First is the notion that the traditional Eskimo lifestyle as well as their general will to live might be threatened by the delivery of the "most humane services we can provide", namely health care, educational facilities, welfare, etc. As Sivertz' article records:

Essential contributions from the group are necessary in building a social unit that requires duties from each of its members to enable it to survive. The duties establish routines, ceremonies and obligations and in turn the individual draws direction, reassurance and spiritual sustenance from these societal relationships. The importance of this is probably great enough to justify it being regarded as a requisite for survival for primitive people everywhere.

Citing anthropologist Margaret Mead's work on the peoples of the South Pacific, the article continues:

... On some islands the people deprived of all their gay and complex, though often savage ceremonials, simply died out, uninterested in reproducing themselves in a world that had lost its zest.

For Sivertz:

... The same report is heard commonly throughout the north. The Eskimos are losing their self-reliance and initiative and there are no longer any leaders in the camps. The traders deplore it, but thus far they have not encouraged any signs of

124 Ibid., p. 5.
125 Ibid., p. 7.
126 Ibid.
Eskimos acting as middlemen in trading. The R.C.M.P. deplore it, but their duty is to administer Canadian law, and Eskimos who attempt to follow the traditional legal practices are likely to end in jail. The missions deplore it, but they must oppose the old pagan beliefs. The doctors deplore it but they cannot approve the shaman's method of healing. It is not surprising therefore that the Eskimo is losing his independence when initiative in so many fields leads only to trouble, and the appealing solution is to do nothing.\textsuperscript{127}

The paradox of progress is thus strikingly expressed as well as the dilemma of northern administrators. Because of the white man's presence, "he began to disrupt the well established pattern of their society,"\textsuperscript{128} and given "the white man's witness of the deprivations produced by this disturbance, he and his government are morally compelled to act."\textsuperscript{129} Why? Because on the one hand, the "Eskimos of northern Canada are part of our country,"\textsuperscript{130} and because "for so long (white) men were content to change the ways of the north without stopping to reckon, let alone pay the price, of their influence."\textsuperscript{131} If, however, government action was imperative, it would take place within an understanding that such action might lead to the final destruction of a way of life and a people's will to live.

The stark consciousness of the complexity of the dilemma faced by the people responsible for northern administration suggested

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
here is as startling as it is frightening—startling in that so much of the literature on government activity in the North has been couched in terms of a benign government which knew not what it was doing, and frightening in that it left the government in a predicament similar to that of America in southeast Asia in the 1960s, a predicament best expressed by an American field commander in Vietnam: "It was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it."  

A second point of significance for the development of social policy generally and housing policy specifically can be gleaned from the Sivertz Beaver article. It concerns the process of replacing the responsibility of caring for Eskimo society from the society itself to the government which henceforth would produce a powerful thrust to supplant traditional leadership with the "various white men on the scene". Indeed, the process would be cyclical. The more government assumed the responsibility for the aged, blind, indigent, children, etc. leaving the traditional role of relatives behind, the more the social fabric of the society and the role of traditional caretaking would decrease; therefore the greater need for reliance on government. If the ethic of the post-War Canadian public service was to serve, its activity in the North likely was to provide a perpetual and increasingly dependent clientele for its services.

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133 Lesage, p. 7.
The discrepancy between departmental philosophy and practice is a final insight we can gain from the Sivertz article. "Romantic and sentimental"134 notions concerning the North and its people may have obscured the issue of government responsibility in that region for Sivertz, and as Jenness has argued:

... diverted the attention of the authorities from ... the building up of a region (quoting favourably here from a speech by Deputy Minister Gordon Robertson) where race lines are unknown and where the north will be run by its own people, standing on their own feet, and doing the job better than we from the south could do it.135

However, the department itself employed the very romanticism it had decried, not only to bring in the "best and the brightest" to serve as its functionaries but to garnish extra funds from Treasury Board for its cause. Even as Robertson could claim his appointment was because "St. Laurent wanted a new management team, one which did not have a romantic view of the north,"136 he could likewise recollect:

... You got things for the Inuit you couldn't get for the Indians, (the reason being) ... they (the Eskimos) were new, romantic, the kind of thing that gripped the imagination ... and opened the pocketbook.137

Thus, if romanticism was problematic in one way, it also was the base of the department's political capital; while the hard realities could

134 Ibid., p. 5.
135 Jenness, p. 93.
136 Personal interview with Gordon Robertson.
137 Ibid.
not be overlooked, the romantic image of the Eskimo had to be suitably preserved and used when necessary.

The task of programme and policy developers responsible for housing would be consequently both complex and somewhat contradictory. They were compelled to address the problems of the Eskimos of the 1950s caused by previous white contact, cognisant of the possibility of worsening their situation in an attempt to better it. Given a limited budget, the mandate was to develop a limited programme with as much local control as possible, aware that in delivering such programmes they would be supplanting local leadership and concepts of self-help. As such, an escalating dependence on government services was likely to be created. Finally, while guided by the thought that the Eskimo's traditional culture had to change, northern administrators had to be simultaneously conscious that the quicker the assimilation of the Eskimo, the quicker the loss of their political capital gained by ability to sell—to the public and to politicians—what Hugh Brody has called the "real" Eskimo. Within these parameters, a small group of "bright young men" in the Arctic Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources set out to develop housing programmes for the Eskimo peoples of the Canadian Arctic. Given the mandate they inherited, the initial responses were surprisingly creative and daring, though their tenure would not be long.
5. Conclusions

In Chapter Two it was argued that white activity in the North prior to World War Two had created a need for an increased federal government presence there and a peculiar responsibility for the federal public service. During the War and thereafter, these needs and responsibilities were fuelled by a sense of the significance of the North in mineral development and military strategy and an awareness of the plight of its aboriginal peoples. Within this context, solutions to the problem of Eskimo housing were to develop.

Further, both the policies and the policy process seeking to solve such problems was to be governed by a group of public servants who needed to "serve" as a fulfillment of both their economic class interests as well as their more altruistic imperatives.

Though the mandate was contradictory, Canada's early northern administration enthusiastically adopted the responsibility for the care and advocacy of the interests of Canada's Arctic people. The tragedy of their story is that, by the mid-1960s--slightly over a decade after assuming this role--programme failure and unparalleled criticism from academics, the press, the tourist public, other agencies of government and the Eskimo people themselves would force a retreat from this representative/caretaker position to produce frustration, anger and regret within some of the original policy makers, and a fierce defensiveness in others. Our task now is to chart why.
IV

HOUSING CANADA'S ESKIMOS

1. Overview

In Chapter One we argued that the study of Eskimo housing programmes between 1954 and 1965 would allow us to study factors which facilitate the bureaucracy taking on a representative/advocate role vis a vis their constituent/clients and also provide an empirical base from which we could evaluate the consequences of such a representative bureaucracy on, in this case, Canada's Eskimos, as well as the more general public interest.

Chapters Two and Three have dealt with both the structural and historical variables affecting the relative autonomy that the bureaucracy enjoyed in northern policy making as well as the professional values which led many federal public servants in the post-War world to adopt a representative/advocate position.

In this chapter the focus is on the initiation and implementation of actual Eskimo housing programmes. As such, it is concerned with the influence the federal bureaucracy exerted in these developments, the personal and professional motivation behind specific public servants taking on a representative/advocate role vis a vis Canada's Eskimo peoples, and the bureaucratic, political, and cultural barriers
that arose which ultimately made this representative role problematic for satisfying Eskimo needs.

2. The Environment of Early Eskimo Housing Policy Making

Walter Rudnicky, hired in 1956 to direct the Welfare Section of the Arctic Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, recalled that the northern housing programme originated in 1957 when he, without authority, issued 40,000 eiderdown sleeping bags to Eskimos in the Western Arctic and Mackenzie area. Gene Rheamene claimed that his commandeering and delivery of surplus army tents to the peoples of Aklavik in 1959 constituted the first housing for northern natives. Both accounts, while obscuring early attempts at designing northern housing underscore the reality that, until 1959, with the relatively extensive introduction of the "rigid digits" and the infamous 512s to Eskimo peoples, very little had been accomplished by the government in the way of actually providing better housing in the North. What had occurred prior to 1959, however, as we have suggested in Chapter Three, was a fundamental debate within the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources as to what housing should be supplied to the North and on what financial basis. The Eskimo Home Ownership Programme introduced in 1959 signified the implementation of the first major Eskimo housing scheme, but it did not signify the government's first thoughts about Eskimo housing. Rather, it indicated the victory of forces within the department
favouring a policy which, once set in motion, seemed inevitably to lead to extensive and extended government involvement and Eskimo cultural assimilation, over those who for various reasons had argued for a limited government financial and contact role.

While the limited contact strategy with its notion of "appropriate" housing ultimately failed to win broad departmental support, it dominated early attempts at designing Eskimo housing. Don Snowdon, Chief of the Industrial Division of the Northern Administration Branch within the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, defined "appropriate" housing for Eskimos as that which demonstrated "design and utility"1 appropriate for northern geographic conditions and provided affordable "maintenance and initial construction costs".2 Further, such housing should be "technologically appropriate in the broadest sense,"3 that is to say, "acceptable to Eskimo people on their own terms . . . meeting the living customs of Eskimo people".4 To understand the development and nature of this initial approach to Eskimo housing, it is necessary to understand a number of variables affecting the decisions of early policy makers.

We have mentioned in Chapter Three some of the environmental variables which affected early Eskimo housing policy making; however,

1 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
the structural position of initial policy actors within the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources is of equal importance. For example, the size of the division within Northern Affairs and National Resources responsible for developing an Eskimo housing programme was extremely small. Walter Rudnicki recalled that, when he joined the Arctic Division in 1956, it employed five headquarters staff including himself, Chief of the Division Bent Sivertz, Don Snowdon, the Canadian artist Jim Houston who headed Arts and Crafts, and Alex Stevenson, head of the Administration Section. Northern Service Officers began to be hired during this period "to handle local administration in remote areas," but "until the very late fifties their numbers were small," so that even combining field and headquarters personnel only a skeletal staff existed to serve "matters relating to Eskimos". As a result, the individual ideas and sympathies of those involved in early policy making acquired a significance that would have been unlikely in larger, more experienced, established departments of government.

Don Snowdon assumes special significance for this study, since he was responsible for developing ideas and designs for northern housing. Snowdon, assisted by Jim Houston and supported by R.A.J. Philips,

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5 F.B. Pingland in MacDonald, p. 143.

6 Six, according to Philips, p. 170, with two of these being posted at DBW Line stations.

7 F.B. Pingland in MacDonald, p. 143.
executive assistant to Deputy Minister Gordon Robertson, initiated the "appropriate" housing concept. Like Philips, Snowdon was transferred to Northern Affairs and National Resources from External Affairs. As Secretary to the Canada-U.S. Permanent Joint Defense Board between 1950 and 1952, he was clearly concerned, as was Philips, with both the "giveaway of the north" and the arrogance of the American military administration in that area. Snowdon's other keen interest was in continuing education. He viewed his role in the Economic Development Section and later the Industrial Division of Northern Affairs and National Resources as "not involved with industry but rather the self-development" of Eskimos so that they could "better control" the new forces affecting their lives, including "dealing more effectively with government".

Philips, besides having a concern for Canadian sovereignty in the North, considered himself a serious student of history. In his personal life he spent many years locating and reconstructing log buildings of the early Ottawa Valley and Quebec Gatineau settlements.

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8 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Two senior officers of the present Territorial Relations Branch of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development recall being used as "cheap labour" for the construction of these buildings.
and brought to his responsibilities in the North a desire to preserve that which, as he perceived it, was of permanent value within the Eskimo tradition. For Philips, "appropriate" housing meant "low cost . . . housing with a minimal cash requirement, . . . easy to heat," with "minimal government influence in Eskimo lives." Key personnel within the department initially supported this "appropriate" housing strategy, but it was their isolation from other agencies of government, from the media, academics and the general public that provided the necessary freedom for their early and sometimes extraordinary experiments. Don Snowden recalled that, during the 1950s, few people outside the Northern Administration Branch of the department had an interest or knowledge of the Eskimo people of the Canadian North and therefore few outside the branch played a significant role in early policy developments. For Snowden:

Parliament provided blissfully ignorant support of northern programmes . . . ; with the exception of Ralph Allen of Maclean's . . . the press never went under the surface; and Academic initiated research on northern social and economic development was inept.

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13 Philips' position is somewhat difficult to pinpoint. When interviewed, he argued that Eskimos did not need the physical amenities of plumbing and electricity found in the south, but in his book Canada's North he wrote approvingly of government policy to not treat the Arctic "as a special area in the way that Greenland had by Denmark", but "to give the Eskimo the same rights, privileges, opportunities and responsibilities as all other Canadians". See Philips, p. 170.


15 Ibid.

16 Personal correspondence with Don Snowden.
Thus, "debates on policy (on housing or other matters) occurred only within agencies of government developing them". 17 Consequently, the country was left "without a critical forum" 18 for the discussion of northern public policy "except within government," 19 and "within government debaters were few". 20 This isolation of policy makers from broad critical debate was to have essentially two effects on early developments in northern housing. First, as we have suggested above, it gave the few responsible for creating an Eskimo housing programme a relatively free hand to develop programmes as they saw fit. Secondly, isolation produced a sense in these individuals that they were the sole protectors and representatives 21 of the Eskimo people, both within and outside of government. 22 Correspondingly, they claimed

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Don Snowden recalled that, during the mid-1950s, there was "a deep social conscience within the Department" and "a sense of advocacy which was unparalleled regarding any minority group before". Ibid. Gordon Robertson commented that "Eskimos couldn't cope with their changing world themselves," therefore "protection had to come from inside the Department" as there was no political party or indigenous native representation. "Pressure for action" then had to "all be internally generated" (within the federal bureaucracy). Personal correspondence with Gordon Robertson.

22 Within government, military and mining people were thought by many within the Northern Administration Branch to have viewed Eskimos simply as a nuisance or "as an impediment to their activities". Thus, they feared that "unchecked mining and military development could come close to destroying the Eskimo people". Personal correspondence with Don Snowden.
this responsibility through their relatively exclusive knowledge of Eskimo life and needs.  

While environmental and structural variables gave early northern policy makers this rather unique independence of movement and righteousness of cause, we have suggested that, to understand the genesis of early housing attempts, one must also understand the design and cultural usage of traditional Eskimo housing which these early housing experiments attempted to duplicate.

Traditionally, both Eskimo housing and community plans had been integrated with their environment in physical design and materials used. Traditional housing forms featured a circular floor plan which revealed the Eskimo people's concept of enclosed space. Arnold Koerte writes:

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23 The Hudson's Bay Company and the churches were unanimously rejected by officials of the department as serious actors in policy making because of their tendency to "automatically object to federal programmes in the north", and because of the "widely held view that the churches and the Hudson's Bay Company had no concern on the one hand and no tools on the other to offer Eskimo people real choices about their lives". These comments are taken from interviews with Don Snowdon and Gordon Robertson but could well have been drawn from any government official spoken to. The antagonism between government and these two traditional White contact groups in the North allows us to understand why the many letters and articles written, particularly by missionaries in the field (see Paine, Chapters 2 and 3) concerning inadequacies of northern programmes fell on deaf ears in Ottawa and did not warrant mention by government officials when citing factors influencing the discussion of northern public policy.

24 See Arnold Koerte, Toward the Design of Shelter Forms in the North: Phase 1, Native Shelter Forms (Winnipeg: Centre for Settlement Studies, University of Manitoba, 1974).
There are important psychological effects on the occupants. The circular floor plan encourages concentric use of space, that is to say, attention is strongly focused on the centre which contains the fire pit and the smoke hole on top. Consequently, the family or clan will share a common focus and will converse accordingly. The smoke hole, common to all native shelter forms, not only vents smoke but allows "the escape of evil spirits". Further, "when the door is closed tightly at night, there is always this direct connection with the outside world and the sky above," symbolically essential to a way of life intimately connected to its environment.

Although the igloo was a single unit, accommodating the immediate family only, a common pattern in the North was the igloo cluster, "with an open ended fluid quality of space . . . which offered a degree of privacy to the various sub-groups of the larger family or clan" without sacrificing a "strong sense of shared space and togetherness even though the latter may well have been more acoustical than visual". Edmund Carpenter has commented on this feature of traditional Eskimo housing:

The familiar western notion of enclosed space is foreign to the Aivilik (a band of Central Eskimo). Both winter snow igloos and summer sealskin tents are dome shaped. Both lack vertical walls and horizontal ceilings; no planes parallel each other and none intersect at 90 degrees. . . . Visually and acoustically the igloo is open, a labyrinth alive with the movements of crowded

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25 Ibid., p. 63.  
26 Ibid., p. 65.  
27 Ibid., p. 65.  
28 Ibid., p. 66.
people. No static walls arrest the eye or ear, but voices
and laughter come from several directions and the eye can
glance through here, past there catching glimpses of the
activities of nearly everyone.29

Another traditional Arctic shelter form, the quarmang, or
"stone house", illustrated two further aspects of traditional Eskimo
culture: mobility and a sense of collective sharing. The base of
the quarmang was made of large stones and was permanent; the portable
portion was the tent-like cover. It could be assembled or dismantled
with the ease essential for a nomadic hunting and trapping economy.
Further:

... it represented a communal concept of ownership, and meant
that in the quarmang the stone walls were common property to be
used freely by those who came along and needed use of them.30

One other feature of conventional Eskimo shelter design seems
particularly significant. Most indigenous forms of Arctic shelter
were of a temporary nature and would be used for from one night to
one month only. Permanence was sacrificed for utility which included
large storage areas for food, equipment and dogs. The challenge for
southern administrators then was to capture these characteristics in
an affordable, easily assembled, modern design, providing in fact
"warmer and dryer versions"31 of traditional shelter forms.

29 E. Carpenter et al., Eskimo (Toronto: University of Toronto


31 This "appropriate" housing ideal was described by R.A.J. Philips
and Don Snowden in personal correspondence.

"Appropriateness" as an objective meant a very small house by southern standards with a minimum requirement of fifty square feet of floor space per person, at a capital cost of not more than twenty cents per square foot. Since:

. . . it was felt that government subsidy covering capitalization or heating of houses would be undesirable as it would enhance the Eskimos' dependence on the white man and hinder his development in the increasingly complex society of the modern Arctic . . . 32

house size was primarily determined by the desire for low material and construction costs and a heating cost related to the consumption of not more than two gallons of fuel per day. 33

The first attempt to achieve something approaching this standard of Eskimo housing was conducted at Cape Dorset in 1956. There, an "igloo-type structure (see illustration) with wooden floors and a small door" 34 was built of "six inch thick white styrofoam weighing one pound per cubic foot". 35 This building was approximately fourteen feet in diameter, light would filter through the translucent styrofoam


33 Cost figures were based on the assumption of an average Eskimo income from hunting and trapping of approximately $300–$400 per year. For a discussion of the calculation of these figures, see Jenness, pp. 101 and ff.

34 "Eskimo Housing and Mortality", p. 67.

blocks, and heating was "even less costly than the required standard of two gallons per day". 36 As noted by government planners of the time, this building had the "added advantage of conforming to a type of architecture basic to the culture of the Eskimos". 37 The styrofoam igloo remained in constant use between 1956 and 1959, withstanding normal Arctic use and not suffering from other forms of deterioration. Experiments during this period on the quality of adhesive used to seal joints between blocks, the method of shaping the styrofoam blocks to reduce construction time, and better exterior and interior protective coatings of the dwelling were conducted by either the Northern Administration Branch or by the Division of Building Research of the National Research Council. However, the styrofoam igloo's history in the Arctic seems to have ended where it began, in Cape Dorset.

A second structure using styrofoam, known as the quonset prototype (see illustration) was constructed in Frobisher Bay in the early winter of 1957. Like the styrofoam igloo it also attempted to capture the shape of traditional Eskimo housing through the use of five light semicircular arches topped by styrofoam sheets slightly bevelled to conform to the curve of the arches with strips of sheet aluminum "pressed down against the styrofoam to compress it in tension against each arch". 38 This building, once constructed, was carried to and

placed upon a gravel pad, a tin chimney was mounted at the top of the curve and a small stove installed. When frost left the gravel pad, styrofoam was covered with plywood sheets for flooring. Although problems arose with the fire-resistant styrofoam's susceptibility to ultraviolet rays which necessitated continuous painting or other protection, "the total cost of this 14'x18' structure did not exceed $450"^39 and government authorities noted:

... The Eskimos who lived in it indicated that they would prefer such a building to the more conventional type of structure (by southern standards) costing approximately twenty times as much.^40

Significantly, given the debate which was ongoing within the department regarding "appropriate" housing, this same government report reflected on

... this interesting commentary, not only on the warmth of the building in winter, but Eskimo concern for utility, not prestige.^41

In other Arctic communities, experiments were conducted during this period with improved quality tents. Certain types of double-walled tents (see illustration), most in igloo-type or derivative shapes, had been developed by members of the RCMP. Framed with wooden members and properly floored and backed, these tents were thought to provide effective accommodation, although the deterioration of most covering materials available at that time added to the cost. It was hoped that

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^39 Ibid., p. 68.  
^40 Ibid., p. 68.  
^41 Ibid., p. 68.
the inevitable development of a highly durable, moderately priced fabric, "such as polyurethane-treated nyons", would reduce costs to the twenty cents per square foot per year standard. Further, with the development of plastic structural members and fibreglass insulation, these tents not only would conform to a "dwelling pattern basic to the Eskimo culture—the skin tent," but for a hunting and trapping society where mobility was required, "these units (would) be especially useful".

A further experiment in Arctic housing was conducted at Povungnituk, Quebec in 1958. Here seven buildings were constructed of a basic shanty-type design. Two structures also were developed with stone walls, using scrap lumber for inside sheathing. Again, low cost was a feature of these experiments, although it was the use of indigenous materials for at least part of the construction that distinguished them. Using light rigid frames of timber supporting peat sod exterior walls and insulated with four inches of caribou moss, these houses attempted to cut costs and employ readily available and traditionally used building materials. A report of the Building Research Division of the National Research Council concluded that "these huts offer marked improvement over the former primitive houses and are relatively inexpensive."

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42 Ibid., p. 68.
43 Ibid., p. 68.
44 Ibid., p. 68.
and that:

... caribou moss ... can provide insulation value almost equal to mineral wool when dried and compressed to half its loose volume. In addition, peat sod can be used where available to build up thick walls. 48

The value of country insulation was disputed, however, in a report from the Department of Health and Welfare which noted that these experiments proved that the use of "moss, peat or other cheap natural insulation provides completely false economies," 49 and that "without exception, there was high condensation on the inside walls, causing extreme discomfort and possibly ill-health". 50

The next type of house designed by southern planners was, in the eyes of at least one central actor in early northern housing, the last attempt at "appropriate" housing for Eskimos. Developed in cooperation with the Plywood Manufacturers Association of British Columbia, the rigid frame unit was known either fondly or sardonically in recollections of those involved in early Eskimo housing as the "rigid digit" (see illustration). The sixteen foot square shelter had a roof pitched from 5'2" to 7'8". It was constructed with plywood sheeting inside and out and insulated with three to four inches of rock wool batts protected by a vapour barrier. Although the subject of embarrassment and abuse by later housing developers both within and

48 Ibid., p. 224.
49 "Eskimo Housing and Mortality", p. 69.
50 Ibid., p. 69.
outside of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, the "rigid digit" initially was regarded as an inexpensive, warm, efficient, functional and culturally unobtrusive housing design; as such it was adopted as the foundation of the government's subsequent low-cost Eskimo housing programme which began in the summer of 1959. Indeed, the rigid frame house seemed to have much to recommend it.

Although moving away from the full concentric pattern of indigenous Eskimo housing, the "rigid digit" embodied the principal of the arch as much as possible using straight structural members, thus achieving a sense of interior space similar to traditional housing. As well, the rigid frame unit harmonized with its Arctic environment to a greater extent than formal frame buildings with their long vertical lines and inevitable pilings. Since most of the dimensions of this unit were multiples of the standard four by eight foot plywood sheet, construction was relatively simple with the exception of cutting angles for the end walls. Additions to the unit could be made with relative ease by simple multiples of four. In 1958 the cost of the prototype unit was approximately $420 FOB Ottawa, or sixty-one cents per square foot. With the addition of a strengthened flooring system and an improved insulated aluminum chimney, the cost rose to $500 FOB Montreal. While this was higher than the twenty cent standard, most administrators thought it still acceptable.

As we have mentioned, initial response to this design was positive. A 1960 report by Health and Welfare Canada noted that:
... Both the utility and efficiency of the rigid frame house are high, and it is a flexible unit suited to most requirements of Eskimos in the Arctic.\footnote{Ibid., p. 70.}

The Building Research Division of the National Research Council reported that the rigid frame was an excellent adaptation of imported materials to Arctic conditions and needs, particularly "for areas where peat sod and caribou moss are not available,"\footnote{Dickens and Platts, p. 224.} providing "basically simple, better insulated and drier quarters"\footnote{Ibid., pp. 224-225.} yet "at a cost he (the Eskimo) can afford."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 224-225.} R.A.J. Philips considered the "rigid digit" to be "dry, easy to heat ... with a minimum cash requirement."\footnote{Personal correspondence with R.A.J. Philips.} Therefore, it met criteria the department was seeking. Further, it met most of the "appropriate" housing criteria required by Don Snowdon:

\ldots with a front porch for the storage of skins and implements, and heat loss reduction which we knew was important to Eskimo people, rather than inclusion of a bathroom with all the trappings that didn't matter a damn to Eskimo people, at this time, (the design was functional).\footnote{Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.}

Also, it was essentially a one-room concept, "which was appropriate to what Eskimos were used to".\footnote{Ibid.} Furthermore, "Eskimos didn't like debt\footnote{While Snowdon maintains this was an important aspect of housing for Eskimo people, D.L. Guemple disputes this aspect of Eskimo culture,} and this was a house that could be purchased with relative ease.
Nevertheless, the "rigid digit" was not to remain the model for Eskimo housing. "Ultimately," Snowdon noted, "we were bludgeoned out of our (appropriate housing) position," and northern housing increasingly approximated the appearance and cost of its southern counterpart. Whether we accept Snowdon's comment that henceforth there was "no attempt to design housing that made any sense for the north and its peoples," it is clear that forces both within and outside the department shifted Eskimo housing design away from the objectives of early planners and toward a facsimile of southern housing. As such, this shift in policy direction introduced a social and political process which would have a long-lasting effect on traditional Eskimo culture and upon Eskimo political, social and economic independence from government. It is to an understanding of the

at least in the Arctic. For Professor Guemple, to have a concept of debt is to have "a concept of property and a concept of alienation of possessions from oneself . . . which for Eskimos didn't exist." Further, he argues, the consequences of indebtedness was a "function of the social relationship to the person owed and the way in which the possessions were achieved". In this case, Eskimos viewed government as having "plenty" and therefore having "plenty to give"; consequently, there was no need to concern themselves with paying back someone "who had lots". (Personal correspondence with D.L. Guemple.) Just how much this traditional cultural trait of the Eskimo had been altered by the mid-1950s by the introduction of credit—therefore debts—to their way of life via the Hudson's Bay Company and sporadic wage labour is arguable; though less arguable are the consequences for government/Eskimo relations of a non-indebtedness housing strategy rather than the dependency or "welfare colonialism" which subsequently emerged.

59 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.

60 Ibid.
development, composition, and significance of these forces or pressures affecting the government's northern administration that we now turn.

4. Change

We have argued that one of the most significant factors which allowed earlier experiments in "appropriate" and low cost Eskimo housing was the small number and relative isolation of early housing policy makers. Another factor which permitted their sometimes "wild" experimentation was the relative political and economic insignificance of the North. For symbolic and sovereignty reasons, it was important that there be a government presence in the Arctic, but the nature of the presence was of less importance. Thus there were few environmental pressures on early planners, giving them considerable political autonomy.

By 1959 the environment had changed significantly. With the rise of John Diefenbaker and the "northern vision", the North had become of pressing national importance. As such, an increasing number of southern tourists, press, and entrepreneurs went north to view the last frontier, generally finding time to comment on conditions there, which they perceived as objectionable. Government activity in the North expanded during this period, as well, bringing a dramatic increase in the number of government departments and agencies engaged

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61 See Chapter One, fn. 79 for references to our use of this term.
in northern programmes. As the number of interested parties increased, the number of opinions concerning Eskimo housing problems multiplied. This interest not only increased the number of policy actors; it ultimately affected actual Eskimo housing policy.

The magnitude of the expansion in the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources itself is illustrated by the rise of expenditures from $3.5 million in 1953-54 to $41 million by 1960-61. Equally, personnel increased within the Northern Administration Branch from 520 in 1954 to 1,560 by 1961. As mentioned earlier, when the Arctic Division assumed responsibility for the Eskimo peoples in 1953, it possessed a mere skeleton staff. Each year thereafter, however, new personnel and sections were added to the Division which, by 1959, had grown so large that it required reorganization. In 1955 an Education Section with its complement of welfare teachers was added, together with the initial recruitment of Northern Service Officers. An Economic Development Section was added in 1957 to assist in finding new outlets for Eskimo economic activity. Six social workers, three in Ottawa and three in the field, were hired the same year, and an Engineering Section developed the next year. Of course, during

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62 See the Advisory Committee on Northern Development Reports on "Government Activities in the North" (Ottawa: Government of Canada), between 1953 and 1959 for details of these developments.

63 Data used here was collected from R.T. Flanagan, "History of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources" (unpublished manuscript), Library of Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa-Hull, 1963; and Jenness, p. 90.
this time staff within the previously existing sections of the Arctic Division increased also. The cumulative effect was the addition of considerably more voices and opinions to the "raging internal debate" concerning suitable Eskimo housing. Other government agencies also were expanding their northern staffs and services. Of these, Health and Welfare, Transport, and Mines and Technical Surveys increased staff engaged with and residing in Eskimo communities, buttressing Northern Administration Branch, RCMP and military personnel already on the site.

In addition to government expansion, increased mining and oil and gas exploration brought businessmen and southern workers to the North; tourism expanded, further acquainting the general public with northern conditions, with both groups "attracting the press from time to time". Their effect, in addition to that of the increased government presence, was to further open debate on northern policy to a much broader forum than had previously been the case.

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64 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.

65 Ibid. One such pressman, Mr. William Eccles of Toronto (who also sold Eskimo handicrafts through a shop in the Royal York Hotel) filed a rather long list-of criticisms—forty-eight to be exact—of government, church and Hudson's Bay Company activities in the North. Three of these criticisms were directed specifically at Eskimo housing and included complaints about discrepancies between Eskimo and "whites" housing, health effects of tent housing, and use of southern prefabs rather than indigenous materials and design. Though the complaints often were unsubstantiated, the Department—indicating, if nothing else, its sensitivity to this kind of criticism—produced a lengthy report reacting to the complaints, persuading others who had been cited to do the same.
With respect to government expansion, the specific consequences on Eskimo housing were twofold. First, government departments felt it necessary to provide housing to a standard acceptable for these employees, either to encourage southern teachers, welfare workers, engineers and geologists to "go north" or to keep them reasonably content once there. This necessitated a housing standard similar to that expected in the South, both in terms of design and conveniences—indoor plumbing, electricity, central heating, and separate bedrooms for family members. While the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources tried for a brief time to encourage its employees to live like the people they served and to accept the different standards applicable there, most departmental employees rejected this idea, at least partly because other government departments were providing "fancier, modern" accommodation for their workers. At a time when an attempt was being made to sell small somewhat unusually designed houses without electricity and plumbing to Eskimo people, a problem arose concerning the discrepancies between houses for whites and those for Eskimos, a dramatic example of which was found in the town of Inuvik. The discrepancy, sometimes referred to as a "racist"

66 As a justification for this policy, Gordon Robertson cited the view that, after all "we were asking them to go and live in a rather hostile place". Personal correspondence with Gordon Robertson.

67 The traditional problem of northern administration of split jurisdiction and the lack of a coordinating authority to enforce a common approach again surfaces here.

68 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
housing policy, was more often criticized by white government employees
than by the Eskimos. Nevertheless, when publicized, it fostered the
kind of criticism which "cut close to the bone".69 As Snowdon com-
mented:

It was very easy for welfare people to frighten senior adminis-
trators into accepting (southern style housing for Eskimos) by
arguing that southern Canadians would cry out against so-called
substandard housing for Eskimo people—though to us substandard
—didn't make any sense applied to a people who still largely
lived on the land.70

Gordon Robertson, Deputy Minister of the Department, echoed a
common objection to Snowdon's (et al.) experiments:

Journalists (and) other whites wouldn't allow the discrepancy
that "primitive" housing would produce. (We would be) accused
of producing a ghetto...a racist policy.71

A second consequence of government expansion was that the
nature of the activities of the professionals who went north brought
them into conflict based on their professional concerns with the
"appropriate" housing designs others within the department were at-
tempting to implement. Professional concerns took two forms, and here
again the comments of Gordon Robertson are instructive:

The education people required a place in the home for students
to study, normally meaning a separate, quiet, heated room.
The medical people objected to food preparation (including the
cleaning of skins, etc.) occurring in a common room and confirm-
ing the rapid transmission of disease when people lived in a
single concentrated space. ... All these objections (meant)
going beyond "primitive" housing.72

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69 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
70 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
71 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
72 Ibid.
Indeed, the Department of Health and Welfare, from Dr. J.H. Wherret in the 1940s to Dr. John Willis in the late 1950s, long had lobbied for massive improvements in Eskimo housing. Criticisms

The Department of Health and Welfare ranks as the most vocal external lobby for "improved" Eskimo housing. Based on data collected by the National Research Council, Health and Welfare reported in "Eskimo Housing and Mortality" (1960) that deaths of Eskimo infants up to the age of one year still accounted for about half of all Eskimo deaths; of all Eskimo children born alive, 23% died before reaching the age of one year as compared to the national average of 3% and that the causes of death included exposure to a broader range of infections than seen before (in Eskimo life) aggravated by the lack of continuous warmth and shelter and a sanitary environment—conditions which affected parents as well, likely diminishing parent care. While this report reacted reasonably favourably to "appropriate" housing experiments, being quite satisfied with their warmth and dryness, subsequent health officials attacked these designs, though often for non-medical reasons.

Dr. John Willis, for example, commented in a report on "Northern Housing and Health" in 1960: "If the Eskimos... are to live as first class citizens... they must have decent housing, comparable with that enjoyed by other Canadians. The present status system by which the majority of Canadians judge each other makes this mandatory. Anything less than "average" southern Canadian housing for Eskimos... automatically brands them and their children as less than average." The report is obsessed with status, including the status of toilets, running water, etc. so that Eskimos could bathe daily and thus move "from the class of Canadians who smell (to) those who do not"; individual rooms so one did not have to dress in front of others and thereby could "preserve their decency" and for these reasons was critical of the "rigid digit". Curiously, while it argued for comparable housing for Eskimo people, it went on to suggest that Eskimos could live in rented apartment style housing "even though most Canadians would not prefer to live in an apartment or rent rather than own" because, in the final analysis, "beggars cannot be choosers". Further, while criticising the rigid frame for insufficient air space for its inhabitants, Willis suggested that if Eskimos could not afford a whole apartment they could "form a syndicate of families" to rent an apartment, "each family in the syndicate occupying one or more rooms according to its contribution towards the rent".

A report of approximately the same period by Drs. G.C. Butler and J. Eadon and a Mr. E. Belcher, while less polemical and contradictory than Willis', concluded: "Most will agree that a living room cum kitchen, and two bedrooms, and a small room for toilet and tub are the minimum requirements (for an Eskimo housing strategy)."
also were voiced by groups within government with specific professional vested interests to protect—most notably the administrators and the engineers.

While "uninformed do-gooders"\textsuperscript{74} received some of the blame for scuttling designs like the "rigid digit", the engineers, and to a lesser extent the strictly administrative personnel of the department, reaped the bitterest and most universal scorn. According to Philips, the engineers could not see beyond "building code houses",\textsuperscript{75} and consequently the curious experimental designs which his section of the department had developed were criticised, however acceptable they were to the Eskimo people. While Welfare personnel believed that, as a matter of equity, Eskimos should get the same kind of housing as fellow Canadians in the South, and of course the same as southern Canadians received in the North, "the engineers, because of professional concerns insisted on housing which closely resembled that in the south".\textsuperscript{76} What was acceptable to engineers was housing that conformed to standard design, construction methods and materials, therefore resembling images of "what a house consisted of" based on their southern professional training and experience. They simply were not going to attach their

\textsuperscript{74}This feeling emerged from a number of officials interviewed but most prominently R.A.J. Philips. He seemed to include in this category the press, tourists, and perhaps even teachers, welfare workers and health personnel. Personal correspondence with R.A.J. Philips.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{76}Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
professional credentials to ill-considered, perhaps whimsical experiments. Not all engineers were intransigent in this position. A.B. Yates, Chief of the Engineering Division within the Northern Administration Branch from 1959 to 1966—although a product of a traditional engineering education,77 including service with the Royal Engineers Corps of the British Army—"attempted to marry the concerns of himself and his staff as professionals with the articulated needs of Eskimo people—but this wasn't always successful."78

Complicating the relationship between the Engineering Division of the Northern Administration Branch and the more creative and innovative forces within the Industrial Division was the engineers' structural link to the administrative wing of the Branch. As we have mentioned, by 1959 departmental activities had expanded to such an extent that a reorganization and decentralization of its responsibilities was undertaken. The former Northern Administration and Lands Branch became the Northern Administration Branch with its own Director, B.G. Sivertz, and two Assistant Directors, R.A.J. Philips and F.A.G. Carter. Philips was

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77. Yates graduated in Science from the University of London in 1952 and then undertook special courses in public, mechanical and military engineering at the University of Glasgow. He served with the Royal Engineer Corps of the British Army between 1942 and 1952, part of which he served on exchange in Canada working on the Alaska-Yukon route. After retiring from the British Army, he emigrated to Canada and worked in the Yukon where he became President of the Yukon Engineers Association until he joined the federal government in 1959.

78. Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
was given responsibility for the policy sections of the Branch, namely the Industrial Division, and would be responsible for housing design under Don Snowden. Welfare under Walter Rudnicki, and Education under Frank Carter—a "purist administrator"—was to handle the administration and servicing sections of the Branch, including the Engineering Division. Carter's structural position forced him to "carry the can for the engineers", voicing their concerns over what had been occurring in Eskimo housing. At the same time, Carter was personally concerned with developing an "administratively sound policy in respect to Eskimo housing". Building code houses met this criterion by being based on already accepted standards of construction and, given that, accepted standards of financing, construction contracting and building schedules.

We have mentioned some of the developments in government northern administration and activities which prompted criticism of early attempts to provide an "appropriate" Eskimo housing programme. At the same time, the rise of John Diefenbaker and the "northern vision" held great significance for northern policy making.

What has to be understood initially is that Diefenbaker's "northern vision" did not generate, with the exception of Roads to

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid. As well as professional or philosophical differences between Carter's and Philips' sections of the Department, there clearly were personal strains between Carter and Philips themselves. Former Carter staffers still recall with disdain how Philips used northern administration staff to help construct his heritage log buildings on "sunny Ottawa afternoons" on the pretext of a staff meeting.

81 Ibid.
Resources, new policies in respect to the North and its peoples. In fact, the "northern vision" was largely a creation of the northern bureaucracy attempting to aid its minister in an election year, at the same time selling their particular cause to the new government. All senior staffers within the northern administration at the time agreed that this was so. Gordon Robertson reflected:

Our position was that the north was going to get attention (only) if we raised the consciousness of the Canadian people about it... and we had a young and driving group of people to do this. ... Consequently we made a lot of noise. We made the "northern vision" which Dief later accepted. ... Everything within that programme except Roads to Resources came from within our files.82

For northern policy makers the result of the "northern vision" was "to provide legitimacy for already existent programmes and encouragement for more--indicating the popularity of a northern presence".83 Financially, the acceptance of this departmentally-created vision by Diefenbaker and the Canadian public in the election of 1958 "meant that our resources went up dramatically".84 Indeed, the budget of the Northern Administration Branch rose from $12 to $41 million in the three years following the Diefenbaker election, and in 1958:

... Alvin Hamilton (the new minister) budgeted $75 million for consultants to study Frobisher Bay and design a housing plan for it—as well as a community plan.85

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82 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
83 While Don Snowden made this remark, Bent Sivertz echoed his point, noting the "northern vision" "provided an impetus for extending what was going on already". Personal correspondence.
84 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
85 Personal correspondence with B.G. Sivertz.
This study, capturing the excitement of the "northern vision"..., suggested a great domed city (for Provisher Bay) encompassing multi-unit dwellings, workshops, and marketplaces. As work on Phase I of this project was initiated, at least one senior staffer dreamt of a "modern industry community of the north" with Canada leading the way in "permafrost studies and construction". Perhaps, as Graham Rowley has suggested, the Department became "captive of its own propaganda". In any case, during Diefenbaker's first years in office, the new importance attached to northern Canada generated expensive ideas and plans concerning its future. It was, therefore, an atmosphere in which small scale, limited involvement and less than grandiose plans and projects were not likely to meet with favour.

A final event of the late 1950s worth at least some note, since its effect was to pressure the government and the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources to increase spending and engage more personnel to attend to Eskimo needs, was the publication of Farley Mowat's second book on the North, The Desperate People. The book is a chronicle of a people driven by starvation and deprivation to murder, and it focuses on a group of Eskimos in the Eastern Keewatin. It is also a tale of government inadequacies and police corruption, "suggesting

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Personal correspondence with Graham Rowley.
government had a callous attitude toward native people". The book had perhaps its greatest impact on, and readership among, federal administrators—some of whom felt betrayed, angered, or vilified by its account. Whatever its credibility, it shocked private citizens into asking what was being done for the still romantically perceived Eskimos and, more importantly, struck fear into "some civil servants who were concerned with what Mowat had written or might be writing". In the end it complemented the effect of the "northern vision" on northern policy making. By raising the consciousness of Canadian citizens, administrators and politicians about the plight of the northern peoples, it made it much more dangerous not to spend and do "all you could" for them. Thus Mowat's book buttressed the position of those within the Department, such as Gordon Robertson, arguing for more resources.

90 Personal correspondence with B.G. Sivertz.
91 Certainly Sivertz and Philips who had "opened up the files" to Mowat and were told "we were doing a fine job" felt betrayed when "slammed in his books". Personal correspondence.
92 Don Snowdon writes of Mowat "being discredited everywhere except in his bank account" and that the "only basis of church, Hudson's Bay Company and government solidarity was in opposition to Mowat's credibility". Personal correspondence.
93 Walter Rudnicki recounted that The Desperate People "was largely based on a report he had done on a murder in the Eastern Keewatin which turned out to have been caused by mass starvation in the area. Certainly, Rudnicki felt the publication of this book forced the Department to take his claims more seriously. Personal correspondence.
94 Personal correspondence with Don Snowdon.
95 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
96 Robertson remembered that, "while Mowat was wrong on details he was right on the general problem"—that is, the lack of funds and
to handle northern responsibilities; and it undermined those who still maintained that the best policy might be the less obtrusive, the less grand and, incidentally, the less expensive.

5. The Move to "Better" Housing 1959-1965

In theory, an Eskimo was expected to purchase a rigid frame house in small annual instalments. Given the cost of the units ($400-$500), it was thought that this was an achievable goal. For a number of reasons, however, the ownership objectives became less and less attainable between 1959 and 1965. Chief among these was the desire of many northern policy makers, for reasons outlined above, to move away from the so-called "primitive" housing of early experiments toward housing more comparable to what could be found in a middle class southern neighbourhood. Naturally, as the size of the house increased, the purchaser's initial cash contribution and annual payments increased, as did the cost of heating and the cost of supplying additional services such as water and electricity which had become necessary components of these later housing plans.

Further complicating the ownership programme was Eskimo cultural confusion over home ownership. As well, many Eskimos were uncertain whether the payments they had been making were for their house or for their fuel or trucked-in water, etc. We mentioned earlier that traditional housing was not owned in the "western" legal sense personnel to do a proper job. The former Deputy Minister also recalled that the book, when published, became a priority item for his attention.
of the term; rather it was used by those who needed it, then passed on. While this simplifies the complex cultural values incorporated in traditional Eskimo housing, it is true that alienation of property from someone else via ownership was foreign to the fundamental Eskimo cultural value that those with less have a right to share in the bounty of those with apparent plenty. To Eskimos, the government's wealth seemed enormous and therefore the need to compensate that government was initially incomprehensible.

Further, as housing designs grew larger and more expensive and as extra services were added whose cost had to be borne by the purchasers, the problem of "getting people to pay" for their houses was greatly aggravated. As a result, by the mid-1960s the majority of Eskimos were living on a rent-free basis in houses they were supposed to be purchasing or had stopped contributing, after making a few initial payments.

With the demise of the "rigid digit", Eskimo housing began to resemble southern housing economically as well as physically. Between 1961 and 1964 a number of designs were employed. The housing design which immediately followed the rigid frame was only slightly larger, but it was of standard wood frame construction and prefabricated in southern Canada. When delivered and constructed, it cost

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98 Multiplied because of extra transportation, construction costs, etc.
99 280 square feet as opposed to 256 square feet.
approximately $3000. By 1961, "approximately 350 of the rigid frame, or these 'matchbox' units had been built in various parts of the north," but policy makers desired a "larger, prefabricated house of new design". Of those subsequently used, some--like the "512", a two bedroom house--"had originally been designed for northern administrators and only later went to natives when other designs proved too small". All designs ultimately employed were considerably more sophisticated and more expensive than their predecessors, reaching on average a cost of $9000-$10,000. As a result, even using the generous terms of the Eskimo Loan Fund, as well as a government subsidy of $1000 allotted each purchaser, the affordability problem increased. "Home owners could not afford to pay both the house payment and cost of services, so payments went in arrears. By 1965:

... Over 800 Eskimo families had indicated an interest in purchasing homes by signing agreements to do so, and indeed some families had completed payments on their homes and had resold the smaller units (they had purchased) for a larger one.

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100 Yates, p. 45.
101 Ibid.
102 Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
103 A revolving fund established in 1953-1954 to assist Eskimos in purchasing supplies and equipment for approved projects which they could not finance themselves. In the case of housing, an Eskimo could obtain a loan of up to $6000 at 5% repayable over twenty years.
104 For example, fuel could cost $500-$600 per year.
105 Buchanan, p. 15.
However, ninety per cent of those Eskimo families who had contracted to buy houses were, by 1965, in arrears of their payments, and fifty per cent had made only one small payment and no others. 107 Further, as Charles Thompson and D.K. Thomas noted:

... When taking into consideration the economic circumstances of most Eskimo families, those who could afford to purchase housing could only afford the smallest house of 280 square feet which was all too often insufficient for their family size. 108

Having moved away from "appropriate" designs, the cost of houses exceeded the capacity of Eskimos to pay; having adopted pre-fabricated southern designs, policy makers were finding that materials and construction methods "did not hold up well over a number of years"; 109 and having moved into the provision of southern amenities in an Arctic climate, they opened themselves to the inevitable criticism of the inadequacies of these services. 110 Not able to retrace the policy developments which had led to this position, the sole solution appeared to be the further expenditure of money in an attempt to perfect designs and improve facilities. Additionally, since ownership was no longer a possibility, a review of the financial arrangement between

107 Thomas and Thompson, p. 11.
108 Ibid., p. 18.
109 Ibid., p. 18.
110 In the Department's memorandum requesting funds from Treasury Board for the Eskimo Rental Housing Programme, criticisms of Eskimo housing strategies up to that time are noted with the conclusion: "In essence, therefore, the present programme falls seriously short in that it is moving too slowly, it is providing too small houses to meet
Eskimos and the government regarding housing seemed necessary.
Renting appeared to be the answer; and as such the door to a greater
government presence in the lives of the Eskimo people widened
perceptibly.

6. The Rental Housing Programme (1965) and The End of
   A Northern Representative Bureaucracy

By 1965 the development of housing policy had been removed
from the Industrial Division of the Northern Administration Branch where
the innovative people within the Department of Northern Affairs and
National Resources traditionally had been, and assigned to a Public
Housing Section of the Territorial Division of the same Branch within
the Department. Since this Territorial Division reported to Frank
Carter, "administrative and engineering concerns dominated the Eskimo
housing policy process".\textsuperscript{111} Also by this time, the southern Canadian
housing industry controlled the design, production, and often construc-
tion of Eskimo housing\textsuperscript{112} so that the possibility of Eskimo involvement

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family needs and does not ensure that Eskimos have available to them at
a cost they can afford the minimum shelter and services required."
"Details of Request to the Honourable The Treasury Board", TB 646089,
October 12, 1965.
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\textsuperscript{111}Personal correspondence with Don Snowden.

\textsuperscript{112}See, for example, the Northwest Territories' Housing Task Force
Report (1972) for evidence of the structure and extent of this control.
Generally, the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources
contracted with southern firms to build prefabricated houses, dis-
assemble them in the South, ship them north, and arrange for their as-
sembly there, using their own crews completely or using their foremen
head Eskimo workmen.
in the development and/or delivery of their own housing became increasingly remote. Both these features of Eskimo housing policy making of the mid-1960s dramatically affected the nature and cultural intrusiveness of the Rental Housing Programme.

On October 12, 1965, the Treasury Board approved the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resource's request to build 1,560 three bedroom houses of not more than 700 square feet over a five year period, at a capital cost of $12.5 million.\textsuperscript{113} Construction was to proceed in the Frobisher area, moving in successive years to the administrative regions of Keewatin, Mackenzie and Arctic Quebec Districts.\textsuperscript{114} Since 800 Eskimo families were already in the process of purchasing a home under the former scheme, the government proposed to buy back those homes still in good condition and rent them back to their former owners.

\ldots For the purposes of determining rental payments, the policy makers divided the family units of each settlement into three categories: (a) those with full time incomes, (b) those on social assistance or pensions, and (c) those with seasonal incomes.\textsuperscript{115} The rent paid was to be twenty per cent of the family's income, with the exception of those in category (b), for whom the rent would be

\textsuperscript{113} TB 6460898, 1965.

\textsuperscript{114} The order of construction was determined partly by need as expressed through the Eskimo housing surveys conducted between 1963 and 1965, partly by the existing level of community planning, and partly by priority areas as determined by variables like "international image, greatest political effect, etc." For example, Frobisher Bay was the logical place to start work not only because of the dire need but also because of the high visibility of this area to a national as well as international audience. These factors are taken from interviews with a number of senior departmental officials of the time.

\textsuperscript{115} Thompson, p. 31.
two dollars a month regardless of the size of their house. For categories (a) and (c) rents were to be based on the family's income with a maximum rent depending on house type. For example, if a man was making $2400 per year or $200 monthly, the monthly rent would be twenty per cent or $40. If he was renting a one bedroom house for which the maximum rent was $37, then that amount would be paid. If the same man, earning the same money, lived in a three bedroom house for which the maximum rent was $67, he would pay only $40.\textsuperscript{116} In effect, the programme represented a massive subsidization of Eskimo housing.\textsuperscript{117} The monthly rent also included the use of basic furniture and household equipment, for example one arborite-topped table and six chairs upholstered in plastic, melmac place settings for four people, down to "one only dust pan, corn broom, and a mop with a detachable head".\textsuperscript{118} Electricity, delivery of oil and drinking water, and garbage and sewage collection also were included.\textsuperscript{119} Limits were placed on quantities of each commodity one could use, and the government reserved the right to cut off a family's intake of these goods if their use exceeded these limits.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} Much of the information here is taken directly from the "Housing Administration Manual" (Ottawa: Northern Housing Section, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1968).

\textsuperscript{117} Departmental estimates were that the actual rental cost of these houses should have been $1270 per year, including amortization and operating costs. However, the average rental to be paid was forecast as not to exceed $325 or about 25\% of the "proper" rent. The latter figure is calculated on the basis of an average annual income of an Eskimo family of $1500.

\textsuperscript{118} J. Bruce, "Arctic Housing", North, Vol. 16, Issue 1, 1969, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 5.
Vital complements to the Eskimo Rental Housing Programme were an adult education scheme designed to dovetail with housing construction, and also community-based Rental Housing Associations. The Housing Associations were to be composed of all members of the community who rented houses from the government. They were to elect a Housing Authority to represent both the government and the members of the Housing Association, that is both the landlords and the tenants. In Phase I of the Authority's development, the local area administrator of the Department was to supervise the program and act as Chairman, or he was to appoint someone to act as Chairman in his place. In Phase II, the area administrator was to act as Secretary to the Authority, and in Phase III, all officers of the Authority were to be elected from the renting group. Unfortunately, no timetable was developed for the movement from one phase to the next, and when housing responsibility was transferred to the Northwest Territories Council in 1974, few communities had moved beyond Phase I. Further, even after the Authority had reached Phase III, its functions were limited. Crucial decisions regarding design, furnishings, construction materials, building locations and employment of work crews continued to be made outside the community.

120. The idea was that "heating, water, sewage and electrical services to be provided (would) be kept to a minimum, in most cases well below southern standards." From Departmental submission to Treasury Board, TB 6460898 (1965).

121. To complicate the "numbers" further, these three phases of Housing Authority Development were programmed as the third phase of the Home Education Programme called Local Management by Tenants.
In addition to the maintenance of the houses, the Housing Authority had the power to assign tenants and to recommend that a family be evicted from a rental house if it was determined that the family had been neglectful of the house, or had failed repeatedly, without due cause, to pay the assessed rent. Eviction would mean removal of the family to a smaller, non-serviced unit somewhere in the community. In short, the Housing Authority was a vehicle for the relinquishing by the government of the most distasteful aspects of being the landlord of almost every dwelling in the Arctic, while at the same time enabling the government to retain its control over the policy, direction and magnitude of the housing programme.¹²²

The Adult Education Programme was established at this same time to explain the rental programme to the native communities and to explain "what it means to be a tenant."¹²³ Further, this programme was designed to educate native people on the use of fixtures in the house, such as the stove, and most importantly to educate Eskimos in "basic household maintenance."¹²⁴ Most of those contracted for these duties

¹²² Buchanan, p. 26. All of the functions of the Housing Authorities were to be executed under strict guidelines and regulations laid down by the federal government. For example, rents had to be assessed according to the number of dependents. Wilf Bean, in a paper entitled "Colonial Political Institutions in the Communities of the N.W.T.", recalled that, in 1972, a decision by the Coppermine Housing Authority to assign new houses on a basis that would allow extended family units to live in the same area of the settlement was disallowed by the NWT Government housing office because it did not adhere to government guidelines for assigning houses on the basis of number of dependents. The paper was prepared for the Indian Brotherhood of the NWT in 1976. (See p. 10.)

¹²³ Bruce, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁴ From "Housing Administration Manual", pp. 3-4.
were home economists who were to work with native women in cooking, baking, housekeeping and child care techniques. Some examples of the information passed on by these "homemakers" come from a booklet published by the Education Division of the Department explaining "the living room is the place where the family eats its meals unless there is a separate kitchen" and "mattresses are for sleeping on and should be placed on top of the built-in bunk beds or double bed. They should not be used on the floor." 125

Though cultural assimilation may not have been a direct goal of the rental scheme, rental housing and its supportive programmes clearly had an integrative and thus assimilative effect. While most aspects of rental housing, from design to community planning, can be viewed from this perspective, a number of features of the Rental Programmes are particularly striking for their cultural implications. First, C.T. Thompson has maintained that the division of rent payers based on full-time or seasonal employment 126 created a caste-like system whereby the seasonal worker, attempting to maintain traditional economic pursuits, was held in less esteem by the community than the full-time wage-labour worker who paid more rent. 127

125 Bruce, pp. 5-6.
126 Created by rents geared to income.
Secondly, the distribution of particular possessions such as furniture and appliances has been interpreted by a number of observers as creating a distinct notion of property and of culpability for its loss or destruction, which de-emphasized the notion of sharing and emphasized the importance of material possessions to one's self-esteem. Further, it is noteworthy that the distribution of material things entailed by the rental programme included only one double sheet and two single sheets for bedding, demarcating both the size of the nuclear family and their sleeping patterns, in separate beds in separate rooms rather than in one communal huddle.

Finally, the formation of the Native Housing Associations and Housing Authorities can be viewed as supplanting traditional methods of social control and cohesion. Traditional methods, documented by Vallée (1962), Steenhoven (1957), Arbess (1966), and Birket Smith (1959), namely that of gossip, ridicule, ostracism and appeasement often subsumed under the general term "public opinion", was replaced by a legalized and institutionalized construct. An artificially created set of "rules of the game" replaced the natural consensus of a people who had a mutual respect for a certain set of values and ways of acting in relation to each other. This break is noteworthy in that it represents a shift from a community based on intimacy\textsuperscript{128} to one where

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\textsuperscript{128}D.L. Guemple has documented (1965; 1969) the informal, flexible and intuitively based pattern of relationships in traditional Eskimo culture characterised by such traits as "name sharing" and "ritual sponsors". He notes not only their cultural but what has been called
\end{small}
individuals, considered isolated and autonomous, would be bound only by "words on a page", illustrated most directly by the landlord-tenant contract. This latter form of social organization seemed to many observers more appropriate to a wage-labour economy where people are viewed as autonomous units selling their labour individually to an employer, than to a traditional economy where collective work and co-operation, along with a good measure of social flexibility, are required for survival. This transition also affected leadership within the communities involved as there was a marked change from an informal ever-changing, more or less collective leadership pattern to one dominated by a single or small group of individuals who were able to develop a special knowledge of the new "rules of the game" and were consequently able to deal more effectively with the federal bureaucracy.  

129 As Buchanan has noted:

"... To operate successfully on a housing association, one cannot look to one's own cultural norms and backgrounds, but rather must adapt to a set of externally imposed rules and procedures."

Whether these cultural effects were by-products of the programme or its central intention is arguable. Clearly there were forces within

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their "eco-system" significance as well. This is documented by S. Arbess (1966), C.T. Thompson and D.K. Thomas (1972), H. Brody (1975) and in two collections of articles on Eskimo-White relations in the Arctic edited by Robert Paine, The White Arctic: Anthropological Essays on Tutelage and Ethnicity (St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977), and Patrons and Brokers in the East Arctic (St. John's, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1971).

129 Buchanan, p. 19.

130 Ibid.
the Department arguing for rapid integration of Eskimo people into
the Canadian mainstream. Bent Sivertz, Director of the Northern Ad-
ministration Branch during this period and later Commissioner of the
NWT, argued forcefully in an article published in North\textsuperscript{131} for "fast
cultural change".\textsuperscript{132} In his article, Sivertz cited Margaret Mead's
critique of "piecemeal changes over longer periods"\textsuperscript{133} as causing
perhaps "greater social disorganization and individual maladjustment
... (than) very rapid change".\textsuperscript{134} In a letter to Blair Fraser of
Maclean's in the same year, Sivertz mentioned the work of Norman Chance
of McGill University and Philleo Nash\textsuperscript{135} who had been Commissioner of
Indian Affairs in the United States, both of whom supported his parti-
cular view of rapid cultural integration, criticising "interim methods
... (such as) farming, handicrafts, stock raising, guiding hunters
and fishing"\textsuperscript{136} as a means of effective social change. Significantly,
Sivertz' position\textsuperscript{137} represents a direct criticism of the work of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131]\textit{North}, Vol. 10, No. 5 (September-October 1963), pp. 3-4.
\item[132]\textit{Ibid}.
\item[133]\textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.
\item[134]\textit{Ibid.}, p. 6.
\item[135]Nash was considered the architect of the 'new Puerto Rico' and an
advocate of modern factories on Indian reserves.
\item[136]Letter to Blair Fraser, November 12, 1963; obtained through
personal correspondence with B.G. Sivertz.
\item[137]Which found its expression in departmental memos from time to
time, one of which G. Rowley referred to as "characterising some of
the thinking within the department of that period". Personal
 correspondence.
\end{footnotes}
Industrial Division which had been attempting to develop just this
kind of social and economic programme for Eskimo peoples.

Less strident than Sivertz, Gordon Robertson maintained that,
while "we knew Eskimo life had to change," specific programmes con-
ected with the rental scheme are best explained by the bureaucratic
policy making process itself. That is, given the austerity years of
1962 and 1963, and the Glassco Commission's desire for greater control
of money spent:

... when going to government for large amounts of money for
housing, questions were naturally asked about whether people
could pay back at least minimal amounts, that property wouldn't
be destroyed, and therefore we had to do and say what we could
to meet these points.\footnote{139}

Further,

... houses would not achieve basic results wanted, (better
health, education) unless people living in the house knew how
to cope with a house—nor would it meet basic purposes if you
had sixteen people come and live in the house.... Therefore you get led on to some of these things—more dramatic
social intervention—in order to achieve your objective rather
than these things being the objective themselves.\footnote{140}

Whichever interpretation we adopt, in the final analysis the
unmistakable fact remains that rental housing and its supportive pro-
grammes dramatically altered traditional lifestyles; and, although
partially successful in providing better housing from a physical
standpoint, it often was at the cost of social cohesion and

\footnote{138} Personal correspondence with R.G. Robertson.
\footnote{139} \textit{Ibid.}
\footnote{140} \textit{Ibid.}
organization, with the consequent result of the development of a pattern of "welfarism" and its social byproducts which has yet to be broken. Further, though it may be naive to argue that rental housing was intended to drive people off the land to facilitate major schemes of northern development, particularly oil, gas and mining, it is nevertheless true that implicit in the location of housing was the possibility of Eskimo wage employment and, further, there are cases where the introduction of rental housing in a community seems best understood as a method of quieting Eskimo opposition to government and industry plans for that area. The clearest example of this is perhaps Sachs Harbour on Banks Island.

In Sachs Harbour a relatively permanent settlement had developed naturally by the late 1950s with no government assistance; Eskimos had built houses which they considered comfortable and adequate. Interestingly, only after oil and gas explorations increased in the area, by the middle to late 1960s, did the government make a significant appearance. Seismic testing had been conducted for some time without native consultation, but as the people of Sachs Harbour were beginning to organize a protest about the testings' disruptive effect on their hunting and trapping activities, the government


142 By creating a dependent wage labour class as well as removing people "from the land" thereby lessening their concern for environmental damage.
responded to an earlier request for a single room schoolhouse by announcing the introduction of the Rental Housing Programme for Sachs Harbour. In addition, an expanded RCMP facility, new nursing and the requested school buildings would symbolize the government's growing interest.

As was the policy with the Rental Housing Programme, houses were erected complete with electric power, running water, and subsidized fuel costs. Although most native people felt they had adequate shelter, they desired the subsidized fuel and services provided by the government in their houses. Peter Usher noted that "many (natives) would have gladly paid the full rental fee just for the fuel and services," but this was not to be. In order to have subsidized fuel and electrical service, one had to rent a house from the federal government, which also included submitting to the homemaker's programme and the Housing Authority. In effect, one became a tenant of—and consequently dependent on—the government for the provision of basic needs.

At the time, many in Sachs Harbour recognized that it would be more difficult to debate land claim issues with the government or protest oil and gas explorations directed by the same government once they were dependent on subsidized shelter and services. They asked:

How can we claim land rights over the island when by renting we acknowledge that we do not even own the land under our houses?\(^ {144}\)


\(^{144}\) Ibid., p. 26.
Most significantly, the Sachs Harbour case typified a growing schism within the Department, which after 1966 was called Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Were the goals of protection of native interests and procuring northern development compatible? Early administrators may have been able to honestly reply "Yes", but by the late 1960s a real contradiction between these departmental mandates seemed evident to people inside and out of the Department. It was at this time, and we think largely as a result of a belief that these dual goals were incompatible, that indigenous Eskimo representation through the development of Eskimo organizations was introduced.\textsuperscript{145} As massive community development programmes were undertaken by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, it accelerated the delegation and decentralization of social policy administration and policy making to the Northwest Territories Council. As a result, by 1969 operational control of government housing programmes had been ceded to the Northwest Territories Council, and as of January 1, 1974 the responsibility for all housing programmes was placed under "the control and policy direction of the Government of the Northwest Territories".\textsuperscript{146} In respect to housing, after twenty-one years, the federal northern administration was no longer in a position to be, nor did it view itself as, the representative and advocate of Eskimo concerns.

\textsuperscript{146} This had been recommended by the Northwest Territories Housing Task Force which reported in June of 1972.

\textsuperscript{145} For example, the Eskimo Brotherhood and Inuit Tapirisat.
7. Conclusions

Don Snowden commented that Eskimo housing problems were related "to the larger malaise of insisting on implementation of professional standards as seen by and through the sectorial eyes of bureaucrats". 147 Indeed, this criticism applies not only to the technically trained engineers and administrators, but for Gouldner's heuristic-humanitarian disciplines as well. In the development of Eskimo housing programmes social workers, teachers, medical practitioners, and engineers were all motivated by the best of human values as well as professional concerns. All, in one fashion or another, took what they perceived to be the Eskimos' interests to heart, and through their role in the policy process attempted to develop policies and programmes which met these concerns. Significantly, though, rarely were the Eskimo people seriously asked to participate in this process which made decisions affecting their lives. This is true from the "appropriate" housing stage through the rental scheme, to the final NWT Housing Task Force report, and the delegation of federal powers to the Territorial Council.

This neglect possibly can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, the professional ethic and standards which guided northern administrators themselves provided legitimate "southern style" solutions to problems they encountered in exercising their responsibilities

147 Personal correspondence with Don Snowden.
for Eskimos. Within this context it did not appear necessary, particularly as there were no structural requirements to do so, and as they were dealing with a "primitive" people, to ask what Eskimos desired or how they felt about what was occurring. Further, while northern public servants acted as representatives of Eskimo interests, they also were middlemen between Eskimos and the larger society. Thus straddling two realms, they ultimately had to contain Eskimo desires as much as advocate them, a process which could only have been complicated by direct Eskimo participation. For at least both these reasons, then, Eskimo housing reflected the values of external agencies. As such, however well intended programmes were, a process which made decisions for people rather than by them was justifiably open to the criticism that it incorporated alien political, administrative, and economic priorities. Clearly, many of the problems in Eskimo housing seem inescapably to lead us back to this position, perhaps providing one answer to why—for great sums of money, effort, and expertise were expended over an extended period of time—even the rather limited objective of better housing for Eskimo people had by the time the federal government left the field, only minimally been met.

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148 This is applicable to the "appropriate" housing strategy as well. In that case, priorities were of a different sort, ranging from economic frugality to a deep concern for maintaining as much as was possible of traditional Eskimo life and autonomy. Nevertheless, while we may argue that these priorities—had they gained ultimate support—would have been more advantageous to the Eskimo peoples than what replaced them, they were directed solely from the outside and, as such, amounted to simply a more sensitive guess as to what Eskimos needed and more importantly, by their absence of Eskimo consultation, laid the groundwork for others, perhaps less sensitive, to follow suit.
1. Close-up of the interior of one of these early Eskimo stone houses.

2. This structure, of driftwood and earth, was observed at the Alaskan Eskimo village of Eek, in the Kuskokwim River delta area. Similar structures were used in the Mackenzie River delta area.
A sealskin tent, location unknown. (Photograph courtesy of National Museum.)
4. A snow house consisting of five connecting domes; built for the Governor-General, Cambridge Bay, April, 1956.

5. Interior of multi-domed snow house, Cambridge Bay.
6. Interior of the abandoned sod house at Igloolik; notice the sleeping and living platform around the central "well".

7. Sod blocks from the wall of an abandoned sod house at Igloolik.
9. Substantial wooden shack built by Eskimos at Craig Harbour, September, 1955. The only window is the one visible over the door, but are windows really necessary?

10. A small shack built from old packing cases, Eskimo Point, August, 1956. This was not insulated in any way and would be colder than a snow house in winter.

12. The shack is warmer but dirtier than the tent. For the Eskimo infant the choice is probably gastro-enteritis in the shack or pneumonia in the tent.
13. Another Eskimo house at Resolute.

14. The styrofoam igloo, such as the one built at Cape Dorset, provides low cost efficient accommodation, with the reservation that durability is unknown.
15. Interior of experimental styrofoam igloo, Cape Dorset. Mr. J. A. Houston and Eskimo Enooakee

16. The prototype quonset style styrofoam house at Frobisher Bay provided warm accommodation. The owner stated he would like to live in a standard wooden frame house in summer, but in the styrofoam house in winter.

19. Interior of prototype "rigid frame house" showing framing and insulation. (See page 69.)

20. Rigid frame construction embodies the principle of the arch to the greatest degree possible using straight structural members.
21. The rigid frame unit harmonizes with its Arctic milieu to a greater extent than formal frame buildings with their long vertical lines and inevitable pilings. These units were built at Frobisher Bay, 1959.

22. Eskimos framing up their rigid frame unit in the Arctic.
CONCLUSIONS

The idea of viewing the public service as a representative bureaucracy, meaning by this public servants acting as advocates for various societal groups, was employed in Chapter I for its potential in shedding light on a broad range of governmental activities not sufficiently explained by conventional notions of Parliament/bureaucracy relationships, the policy/administration dichotomy, nor policy analysis from the perspective of the pressure point/incrementalist schools.

Clearly in respect to Eskimo housing programmes between 1953 and 1965, the impetus for government action and the expenditure of what would eventually be a considerable amount of public funds did not come from the Eskimos themselves nor did it initially come from general societal or political pressure for action. This study has argued that the motivation and, to a large extent, the major developments in Eskimo housing during this period were generated within the federal bureaucracy, and initially within a very small group of public officials. Indeed, Eskimo housing programmes of this period seem as pure a case as one could imagine of a public policy conceived, developed, and administered entirely within the realm of non-elected officialdom. In this light, even the "northern vision" of John Diefenbaker and
Alvin Hamilton, while doing much to publicize the northern cause, was evidence of political leaders acting as instruments of bureaucratic activity rather than indicative of their directing the bureaucracy to respond to politically designated goals.

To conclude the analysis of Eskimo housing within the representative bureaucracy framework is first to point out that not all elements of the public service, nor all activities of the federal government vis-à-vis Eskimos should be viewed as based on a notion of advocacy of the Eskimo position. Certainly the history of government involvement in the North, as described in Chapters II and III, suggests that historically the federal government took an interest in northern and Eskimo affairs only when it was important to do so from a southern Canadian perspective. However, one does find between 1953 and 1965 a significant number of individuals in policy making positions who clearly did perceive themselves as advocates of Eskimo interests at least as they understood them.\(^1\) The history of their activities takes us from a time of high hope and optimism, if not arrogance, about the possibilities of bringing Eskimos a better way of life, to the end of the 1960s when the federal government, for all intents and purposes, gave up the task of itself representing the interests of the Eskimo people.

\(^1\)As Hugh Brody has written on the policy of rapid cultural integration: "Certainly most whites interested in northern Canada at this period were convinced that incorporation would be the best thing for Eskimos. They probably believed that, were Eskimos able to express themselves on the subject, they themselves would join enthusiastically in realizing the objectives of the colonizers." Brody, p. 18.
The policy process involved in this journey deserves summarizing. In the initial stages of Eskimo housing policy, a small group of individuals in the Arctic Division of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, a group who perceived that they possessed an intimate knowledge and understanding of the needs of Eskimos, designed programmes which they felt would produce minimal costs for both the traditional Eskimo culture and the federal budget. We have mentioned earlier that the idea was to provide basic shelter where it was desperately required and, having provided such shelter at a low cost, be able to turn it over to the Eskimo peoples which, because of the housing design, they could maintain and heat efficiently and, because of the minimum cost, own. This initial housing strategy failed. Largely for the best of reasons, engineers, educators and welfare workers within Northern Affairs and National Resources, Department of Public Works officials, and medical personnel within the Department of Health and Welfare believed the minimal shelter forms erected by the Arctic Division to be a disgrace, creating a "northern ghetto".

Complementing this view, southern whites taking federal positions in the North demanded and received southern Canadian style housing with its various conveniences as a prerequisite for accepting northern postings. Consequently, it became very difficult for the government to build "rigid digits" for Eskimos, however adequately and appropriately they met Eskimo needs, while providing relatively large, luxurious housing for the neighbouring whites. Gradually the disparity became difficult to ignore.
As a result, the policy of providing basic and affordable, if somewhat odd-looking, housing for Eskimos was ultimately replaced by one which, by the nature of its expanded budget alone, would require more external control—-not only over departmental expenditures but inevitably over the nature of Eskimo lives as well. For Eskimos, such was to be the price of living in "boxes" recognizable to the southern Canadian eye; such was to be the price of "entering the twentieth century".

We mentioned in Chapter I that our study of Eskimo housing, viewed as the creature of an advocate or representative bureaucracy, might tell us something about the role of the bureaucracy in contemporary policy making as well as highlight the consequences for the effectiveness of the bureaucratic process when public servants adopted an advocate or representative position. Further, we suggested that the role of the bureaucracy in cross-cultural contact situations might be further understood by our study as well. Indeed, insights into both these matters can be gained by the Eskimo housing case.

In the first instances, two lessons from the literature on the bureaucratic process help explain developments we have mentioned in Eskimo housing that are of particular consequence for a representative bureaucracy: one, that of the nature and consequences of bureaucratic growth on administrative behaviour and performance; and two, the process of politicization of a policy area and its effect on the development and achievement of policy goals.
Peter Self has suggested that bureaucratic growth is one of the "intrinsic conditions of administrative action" which "offer little incentive to high levels of personal endeavour" within a bureaucratic organization. One of the characteristics of such growth, he writes, is the development over time "of very elaborate requirements of consultation and accountability" which, as a policy field develops, means that administrators must work "within three interlocking circles which comprise his own agency and its special public, other public agencies and the general organs of political control". Further:

... Consultative and co-ordinative needs (will) have steadily expanded because of (this) proliferation of agencies and interest groups (abettcd by) the increasing interdependence of public programmes and the widening range of special skills that can be utilized in public decisions.

As a result of this expansion of policy actors, a process clearly evident in our Eskimo housing study, Self writes:

... An emphasis on the team style (will develop) with the slow accumulation of relevant material (being demanded) before final decisions are reached.

As this overshadows the personalized decision making of earlier days, the inevitable tendency will be towards

... the diminishing of personal decisiveness and responsibility (as) the individual's share of the final result (of an administrative action) is hard to estimate either for blame or praise.

\[ \textit{Self, p. 225.} \]  \[ \textit{Ibid., p. 225.} \]  \[ \textit{Ibid., p. 225.} \]  \[ \textit{Ibid., p. 225.} \]  \[ \textit{Ibid., p. 225.} \]
There is, as well, a more specifically personal side and consequence of bureaucratic growth, or what J.K. Galbraith has termed "the aging process of big organizations." On this point, Guy Peters has written:

There is a tendency in organizations gradually, and almost imperceptibly to shift from what might be called public goals to what may be termed private goals. Even though the organization was established to fulfill some need in society, over time the organization's survival and possibly organizational development may supercede that societal goal.

Anthony Downs and Peter Self have discussed this shift in terms of the tendencies of individuals within expanding organizations to move from what they call a zealot to a conserver role. Peters summarizes this development as it applies to both individuals and organizational entities:

... When young (administrators) seek to achieve societal goals through their actions in the public service but, over time, because of a natural aging process, the growth of personal responsibilities and perhaps cynicism about the possibility of social change they become less interested in producing change (or, in our case, culturally "appropriate" change) but more interested in personal gain and security. Their major goals in office become: 1. to continue the existence of the agency, 2. possibly to expand its role and budget, and 3. (only) finally to do something for the society.

In Eskimo housing, while the move from public to private goals or zealot to conserver bureaucratic roles is not as strident as suggested

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9 Peters, p. 122.


11 Peters, p. 122.
here, nevertheless, it is clear enough that a central motivation behind the move away from so-called "appropriate" housing was the instinct to preserve and expand the bureaucratic enterprises of the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. In the context of the late 1950s in Canada, the political climate—used here in its broadest sense—was such that to accomplish these organizational objectives it was necessary to expand services to Eskimo people largely irrespective of the cultural consequences. This is not to say the notion of aiding or serving Eskimos ended; however, it is to note that this aid or service in the future would only be such that was politically and administratively saleable rather than, as a chief priority, culturally appropriate.

The process of politicization of a policy area, particularly as it pertains to the expansion of individuals and groups involved in the discussion and resolution of policy issues, is equally relevant to an understanding of Eskimo housing. Peters writes of the politicization process in terms of the ability of a section of the bureaucracy to "play the game of politics and to control policy areas".\footnote{Ibid., p. 176.} The point is that, "as an issue becomes politicized i.e. becomes a matter of direct public concern, the ability of the bureaucracy (or, in our case, a section of the northern bureaucracy) to dominate solutions to the problem lessens,"\footnote{Ibid.} for, as a matter becomes political, there is a
In Eskimo housing, once this policy field was so politicized by the elections of 1957 and 1958 and their effect on public interest in the North, the issue of housing Eskimo people was indeed opened up, though most of the new discussants would come from within the federal bureaucracy rather than from the public service's formal political leaders or the public at large. In any event, the politicization of northern and Eskimo issues, as it attracted and led to the involvement in policy discussions of a plethora of hitherto foreign viewpoints, produced not only the scuttling of the initial "appropriate" housing strategy but a blurring of Eskimo policy goals in general.

The consequences for the viability of a representative bureaucracy from these lessons concerning bureaucratic activity seem, at least, twofold. Implicit to the notion of representative bureaucracy are the ideas of a personal and ongoing commitment to the interests of one's clients, and secondly the control by individuals and groups committed of their specific areas of bureaucratic activity enabling them to consistently "deliver the policy goods". Irrespective, then, of the question of formal, political impediments interfering with the achievement of bureaucratically advanced societal goals, the study here suggests that there may be internal organizational barriers which cripple the effectiveness of this kind of "public interest"

14 Self, p. 278.
representation. Relying then on the public bureaucracies to provide appropriate social change, however logical in class terms, and from the point of view of hereby locating a powerful and relatively accessible societal group, may nevertheless prove to be a strategem doomed to failure—indeed, one for which statist liberals in Canada and elsewhere in the "western world" may be currently paying the price.

The cross-cultural context of the federal bureaucracy's involvement in the North complicated its representative role at least as much as the organizational issues mentioned above. While the government's northern policy, and within it Eskimo housing programmes, may be viewed as a positive reaction to the moral problem of encountering a devastated people, its solutions were complicated by the implicit sense of cultural superiority vis-à-vis northern natives which imbued southern Canadians and inevitably its members who "went North". Indeed, this sense of superiority provided both a moral imperative for government activity in the North and, at once, its greatest problem.

Various terms have been used to describe the government's position here. An anthropologist studying white-Eskimo relationships in the Canadian Arctic labelled them "welfare colonialism"; 17 Doug Wilkinson

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15 As Kenneth Rea put it, justification for the federal government's presence in the North was never much of a problem "... in the field of welfare, despite the qualms of neo-Malthusians, the provision of relief to a population facing famine could be for political purposes adequately justified on humanitarian or moral grounds without recourse to more elaborate argumentation. Rea, p. 53.

16 Taken here in the broadest sense to include political, economic, societal, religious, etc.

17 Paine, p. 2.
a former Northern Service Officer with the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, suggested "reluctant imperialism";\textsuperscript{18} what is central to both is the nature of the relationship between representatives of the government and the Eskimo people and that, ultimately, was one of superior to inferior, dominator to dominated, powerful to powerless. This asymmetry of power, rather than the intentions behind its use, pervades these observations and, it may be argued, pre-determined the failure of Eskimo housing programmes and the representative bureaucratic process by which they were developed and put in place. Certainly as a result of this structure of government-Eskimo interrelationships, Eskimos were— as Albert Memmi put it— "removed from history and from the community,"\textsuperscript{19} and hence removed from the decision making processes which affected their lives. In housing, this non-participation was true even in the development of what has been called "appropriate" housing programmes and was only nominally resolved with the coming of the rental scheme in 1965. As such:

... Any decision taken by the colonizers (had) a basic flaw. ... (Even) a decision made for the material benefit of the colonized (could) at the same time be construed as disadvantaging them; a generous or sensible decision (could) be at the same time morally wrong. This is so because it is the colonizers who make the decisions that control the future of the colonized (and) because (at best) they are made ambiguously on behalf of colonizer and yet in the name of the colonizer's culture (and of their political, administrative and economic priorities).\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} D. Wilkinson, cited in \textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 46.
More pointedly, decisions so made may well be viewed as predominantly in the interest of the decision making group, even if ostensibly—as so many public servants involved in Eskimo housing claimed—they were made solely for the benefit of the Eskimo people. The paradox here is perhaps made clearer by viewing the government/Eskimo relationship within the context of clientelism.

Of clientelism, S.J.R. Noel has written:

... It delineates a relationship between individuals that is often important and sometimes even central to the functioning of their society—namely a relationship based upon the roles of patron and client. Individuals in these roles are of unequal status and in control of unequal resources yet are related through a personal understanding concerning certain mutually beneficial transactions... (which) typically involve the bestowal of material rewards or advantages, security, or access to opportunities on the part of the patron in return for his client's reciprocal bestowal of loyalty or service. 21

Further, as H.J. Gens has put it, using the terms caretaker/client to denote a similar relationship: 22

... Caretaking is not an altruistic act but a reciprocal relationship in which the caretaker gives his service in exchange for a material or non-material return. 23

In such a role, "the caretaker also asks his client (to bow) to his superior expertise—and status—thus placing them in a subordinate position during the care process". 24


22 H.J. Gens, cited in op. cit., p. 86. See Peters, p. 119, for a more general discussion of the reciprocity involved in such a relationship.

23 Gens uses this framework for discussing the role of government in a low-income Boston neighbourhood.

24 Ibid., p. 86.
In the North, as Paine has noted:

... Whites (mostly federal public servants) ... (view themselves) as taking care of the Inuit and what they expect in return (though this is rarely recognised) is that they (the Inuit) accept the "middle class" package.25

While patron/client and caretaker/client relationships suggest a mutuality of interests in the human transactions they describe, the concept of patronage more clearly denotes the reciprocity involved here. As such, many public servants—believing their activity existed on "a higher moral plane than that of patronage"26—sought to obscure the nature of their role in the North by the employment of more apparently altruistic caretaker/helper/tutor27 terms to describe their work. The effect was to distort the reality of their position, complicating their understanding of Eskimo responses to government initiatives.28 Thus Eskimo failures to pay rents, or keep their houses

25 Paine, p. 86.

26 Ibid., p. 78.

27 See J.J. Honigmann and I. Honigmann, Eskimo Townsmen (Ottawa: Northern Coordination and Research Centre, Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961). Further, citing the Honigmanns' favourable quoting of a housing officer assuring Eskimos of their autonomy, Paine writes: "Not written tongue in cheek this amounted to a rhetorical legitimation of tutelage ... yet tutelage is ... based upon conformity whose inducements include subtle coercions and, as Vallée (1962:128) noticed, implies a relationship in which manifest 'superiority' is attributed to the tutor." Paine, p. 79.

28 For specific instances of this, see Paine, p. 94. Further, Paine notes that not only is there confusion among Eskimos in respect to the intent of government programmes but there is "a constant source of uneasiness among whites" and "between them and the Inuit". Paine, p. 94.
clean, or keep membership down to the required numbers, or join the housing authority, etc. were interpreted as part of the difficulty in achieving programme ends when dealing with such an unsophisticated, naive—or, more perjoratively, child-like, backward, primitive—people, rather than as a conscious, reasoned rejection of "the goods" being offered. As Paine has commented, the root of many of the social policy failures in the North lies in:

... the official insistence that social problems in the north are reducible to the Eskimo problem, ... the corollary (being) that their mission and their own lives in the north are publicly (and largely privately) presented as unproblematic.29

A final point of interest in an analysis of Eskimo housing and representative bureaucracy is the concept of "service" as a motivation for public service activity. It was argued in Chapters III and IV that the idea of service to the community was a notion which informed many in Canada's post-World War Two public service and the northern service in particular. In lieu of this study and the centrality of this notion to its analytical framework, it would seem the service ethic needs more careful consideration as the basis for bureaucratic action.

Raymond Williams has analysed the development of the service ethic in terms of the development of the idea of culture in modern western societies. For Williams, this was a development which occurred as a criticism of the laissez-faire or bourgeois model of society. Williams writes:

29 Paine, p. 87.
The contributors to its meaning have started from widely different positions and have reached various attachments and loyalties . . . but they have been alike in this, that they have been unable to think of society as a merely neutral area or as an abstract regulating mechanism. The stress has fallen on the positive function of society, on the fact that the value of individual men are rooted in society and on the need to think and feel in these common terms.\(^\text{30}\)

One imperative arising from this general position was the idea of service. We have quoted Williams elsewhere claiming that, "from Coleridge to Tawney the idea of function and thence of service to the community has been valuably stressed in opposition to individualist claims,"\(^\text{31}\) and that this stress had informed "the ethical practice of our professions and of our public and civil service"\(^\text{32}\). What remains is to record his important criticism of this concept as the central principle shaping modern notions of community and, therefore, the basis of public action.

Williams writes that the service ethic is inadequate, because:

\[\ldots\text{In practice it serves, at every level, to maintain and confirm the status quo.}\ldots\] (As such) the real personal unselﬁshness (in our case, the higher motives and best intentions of northern public servants) exists within a larger selﬁshness, which was only not seen because it was idealised as the necessary form of a civilization.\(^\text{33}\)


\(^\text{31}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{32}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{33}\) Ibid., p. 315.
Williams includes here such governing concepts as "the Queen's peace, national security, law and order etc.," some of which can be directly transposed to that which informed Canada's northern public service, though phrases like making the North "a showpiece in which a distinct image of Canada (could) be identified and reflected for all Canadians to see" could be added, as well.

While this service, then, as we have earlier argued, can on the one hand be seen as helpful in improving certain conditions of, in this case, the Eskimo people, it was "improvement within a framework which is thought in its main lines inviolate". In the view of northern public servants, they were offering the Eskimo people the inviolate values of personal self-betterment, autonomy, etc. For the Eskimo people to accept such values, however, meant they would be cut off from their community and its traditional notions of common betterment and active mutual responsibility. For the most part, it was these values that—at least for the period of government-Eskimo contact under study here—Eskimo people refused to jettison. As such, not only were housing and other bureaucratically designed social policy initiatives frustrated, but the belief that southern Canadian public servants could represent Eskimo interests was dismembered.

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34 Ibid.
35 Cited in Paine, p. 3. Further, see Bent Sivertz, in North (1954).
36 Williams, p. 315.
It was argued in Chapter I that viewing public bureaucracies as principle actors in policy making and secondly as active advocates of the interests of specific societal groups would prove useful in more fully understanding the policy process, as well as allowing for evaluation of a type of bureaucratic activity, though lacking in theoretical legitimacy, at times has been taken to heart by public servants.

The study of Eskimo housing programmes between 1954 and 1965 has accomplished a number of these objectives. On the policy side, the public service played the central role in communicating the need for government action and in formulating and implementing both micro and macro policy in this area. During the period under study here, elected officials were on the one hand reluctantly dragged into a northern involvement and on the other manipulated into proffering as their own bureaucratically designed initiatives. To paraphrase Peter Self, political lightning was not felt in Eskimo housing between 1954 and 1965 unless induced by the public service.

In respect to our framework of representative bureaucracy, two points should be made. First, northern public servants did perceive themselves as advocates of Eskimo concerns, and, second, actively pursued redressing them. Lacking direct Eskimo involvement in the determination of what the solutions to their problems should be, however, meant that bureaucratic answers were open to criticism and replacement by competing bureaucratic and societal groups. As a result,
representative bureaucracy failed organizationally in being able to consistently deliver policy goals and culturally in convincing the Eskimo people of the legitimacy of their role. Ultimately, such failures explain not only the problems in delivering Eskimo housing, but may explain as well a more general societal rejection of any bureaucratically led public interest representation.
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Information on those interviewed is related to their position at time of interview as well as location and dates of interview(s).
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