Somali Children and Youth's Experiences in Educational Spaces in North America: Reconstructing Identities and Negotiating the Past in the Present

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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SOMALI CHILDREN AND YOUTH’S EXPERIENCES IN EDUCATIONAL SPACES IN NORTH AMERICA: RECONSTRUCTING IDENTITIES AND NEGOTIATING THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

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by

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Graduate Program in Anthropology
Collaborative Program in Migration and Ethnic Relations

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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The thesis by

Melissa Stachel

entitled:

Somali Children and Youth’s Experiences in Educational Spaces in North America: Reconstructing Identities and Negotiating the Past in the Present

is accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Date_____________________

Chair of the Thesis Examination Board
Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine the experiences of Somali children and youth in both state sponsored and community educational spaces in North America to investigate how these experiences shape their identities and worldviews in the context of displacement, prolonged armed conflict in Somalia, and a post-September 11 environment.

This work is based on two years of preliminary research (2008-2010) and 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork (2010-2011) among Somali youth and their families in Kitchener-Waterloo and Toronto, Ontario and Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Minnesota. I draw on life history interviews and focus group sessions of 51 Somali children and youth between the ages of 14-30 as well as interviews and focus groups with 24 Somali elders, mothers, fathers, educators, and community leaders.

Using popular memory and post-colonial approaches to examine the experiences of displaced children and youth in educational spaces, I make two interrelated arguments. First, the North American view that Somali children and youth are simultaneously ‘at risk’ and ‘the risk’ is inseparable from the larger ‘War on Terror’ led by the US, in which Muslims including Somalis are perceived and treated as potential terrorists or its victims. The ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘risk’ discourse in Western societies have been fostering Islamophobia, as well as obscuring the involvement of powerful Western states in either creating or spurring conflicts, resulting in massive displacements. The risk discourse has another consequence: it conceals or dismisses the strengths and capabilities of Somali children and youth. Furthermore, by perceiving Somali children and youth in terms of risk their actual experiences in Canada and the
US are obscured. This includes their experiences of structural violence, including poverty, access to education, unemployment or underemployment, and Somalis’ positions in gender and racial hierarchies. My second argument is that contrary to popular perception that Somali youth are experiencing an identity crisis, my research reveals that youth are actively engaged in reshaping their social and political identities, negotiating and questioning their past in the present, imagining their future, and granting meaning to their experiences in state sponsored and community educational spaces.

Keywords

Somalia; North America; children and youth; educational spaces; refugees; migration; popular memory; identities; past-present relations; colonialism and imperialism; structural violence; agency
Dedication

To Wesley

and

To Somali children and youth who are struggling to receive an education in North America and to Somali communities who are providing spaces of belonging and learning to the children and youth in community educational spaces
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Certificate of Examination</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Appendices</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 1: Somalis in North America: Conceptualizations of Children and Youth in Terms of Risk in a Post-September 11 Environment ..........................................................1

1.1 Introduction: Somalis in North America ..........................................................1

i) Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts .........................................................7

1.2 Fortress America in a Global World: The Effects of Geopolitics on the Experiences of Somalis in North America .............................................................11

i) Multiculturalism and Hierarchies of Citizenship ........................................17

1.3 Somali Studies ....................................................................................................22

1.4 Refugee Children and Youth: Deconstructing Children and Youth as ‘At Risk’ and ‘The Risk’ .........................................................................................22

1.5 The Geopolitics of Educational Spaces: Reconstructions of Somali Children and Youth Identities ..............................................................29

1.6 The Reconstruction of Somali Youth Identities in North America: A Popular Memory Approach .................................................................33

1.7 Methodology: Fields of Research, Subjects, and the Researcher’s Position 35

i) Fields of Research: Toronto the Largest Somali Centre ..................................35

ii) Main Field of Research: Kitchener-Waterloo ................................................38

iii) Field of Research in the United States: Minneapolis- Saint Paul ..............39

iv) Fieldwork: Participant-Observation and Interviews ......................................41

v) Oral Histories ....................................................................................................45

vi) Generational Analysis .....................................................................................46

vii) Position of Fieldworker/Researcher ................................................................49

1.8 Organization of the Dissertation ......................................................................51

Chapter 2: The History of Somalia in a Global Context .............................................54

2.1 Introduction: Deconstructing Internal Explanations and Western Historical Narratives of the Ongoing Armed Conflict in Somalia ........................................54

i) Overview of Somali Clans and Pre-Colonial Territories ................................56

2.2 Somalia’s Geopolitical Significance and Colonial History ..............................61

2.3 The Effects of Colonial Policies on Somalia’s Economy ..................................71

2.4 Anti-Colonial Resistances ................................................................................75

i) The Dervish Anti-Colonial Struggles and the Role of Islam .............................75

ii) Somalia’s Political Movements, Nationalist Independence Struggles ..........78
Chapter 3: Representations of Somalis in the North American Media and their Effects on Somali Youth

3.1 Introduction: Media Images and Representations

3.2 Methods of Research

3.3 The Representation of Somalis and Somalia in Newspapers

3.4 Meaning and Agency in the Context of Structural Violence

3.5 Interpersonal Violence: Fighting with Peers and Joining Gangs

3.6 Spaces of Belonging, Challenging Representations, and Creating Change

3.7 The Reconstruction of Somali Youth Identities

3.8 Conclusion

Chapter 4: The Migration Trajectories and Educational Experiences of Newcomer Somali Children and Youth in Canada

4.1 Introduction: The Mohamed Family

4.2 Methods of Research

4.3 The Experiences of Somali Children and Youth in Ontario Public Schools

4.4 Consequences of Neglecting Refugee Children’s Pasts

4.5 Conclusion

Chapter 5: “He who knows where he comes from, knows where he is going:” The commemoration of Somali Independence in the Diaspora

5.1 Images and Sounds of Independence: Commemoration in Minneapolis

5.2 Historical Background
List of Tables

Table 1: Number of Interviews with Somali Youth According to Age……………………Page: 44

Table 2: Number of Interviews with Somali Youth in 3 Generational Cohorts…Page: 49
List of Figures

United Nations, Somalia, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011……………..Page: 59
List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Ethics Approval Certificate………………………………………Page: 307

Appendix 2: Approval for Use of Copyright Material…………………………Page: 309
Chapter 1: Somalis in North America: Conceptualizations of Children and Youth in Terms of Risk in a Post-September 11 Environment

Introduction: Somalis in North America

The attention given to Somalis in the Canadian and American media was amplified when a few Somali youth from both Toronto and Minneapolis returned to Somalia to join Al-Shabab (‘the Youth’), an armed group that is fighting the current Somali government. This has led to a growing interest in Somalis, especially the youth, who are increasingly being perceived as ‘at risk’ or vulnerable to manipulation, for example, from being recruited by gangs or even radicalized, and themselves considered ‘the risk’ by virtue of membership in a group regarded as a threat to Canadian and American societies.

Undoubtedly, such perceptions and social attitudes towards Somalis affect Somali youth, who as some scholars and activists have observed are being alienated and have a growing identity crisis (Bryne 2010). The alienation of Somali youth is not surprising and it is possible to identify a number of contributing factors, including: restrictive Canadian and American refugee policies, a less hospitable social environment towards Muslims and refugees following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (here on 9/11), as well as the American government’s support to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (2006-2009), discussed later in this work. The structural violence Somalis experience in Canada and the US contribute to alienation in the adoptive society (Dirie 2010) and are contingent and variously shaped by Somali positions in socio-economic, racial, and gender hierarchies (see McDowell 2008). This case led me to raise three main questions: (1) Why is there a perception among Canadians, Americans, and even some Somalis that the youth are becoming radicalized when few have actually joined Al-Shabab; (2) if
Somali children and youth are alienated from their adoptive country, what are the contributing factors; and (3) how do Somali children and youth in North America negotiate their relationships and identification to Somalia and/or to their adoptive country.

In general, Canadian organizations and programs concerned with refugees and immigrants view and treat Somalis as victims of violence. The assumption is that they are traumatized, but also in need of being weaned of their cultural habits, that is to become modernized and civilized before being included in Canadian society. Examples of such programs in Canada are government-assisted refugees’ life skills programs, which include classes on hygiene, laundry, Canadian culture, raising children in Canada, and food preparation, among others. Women, in particular, are targets of these programs, which disregard their past experiences, discount their everyday realities, and their poverty. In Kitchener-Waterloo, for example, Somali women’s groups are instructed as preparation for living in Canada by social workers who have little knowledge of their histories and experiences. Instead, the group’s focus is on parenting based on an ethnocentric framework. The parenting sessions include topics such as raising children in Canada, appropriate disciplining, parental responsibilities, parent-child relationships, understanding children, and communicating with children. The view of refugees as helpless and vulnerable in psycho-educational interventions in North America mirror those of humanitarian aid organizations working in refugee camps (see Harrell-Bond 1999, Malkki 1996, Summerfield 1999b). Underlying the educational programs is the view that refugees are not only victims of war, but also victims of their ‘traditions’ and backward cultures. They must become ‘worthy’ of Canadian or American citizenship, in today’s political environment regarded as a privilege or a prize, and not a right. The focus
on the pathology of refugees (Harrell-Bond 1999, Summerfield 1999b) further obfuscates the racism, discrimination, poverty, and unequal access to power that is a reality of their lives in Canada and the US.

In contrast to North American beliefs and media representations of Somali women as victims and children and youth as simultaneously ‘at risk’ and ‘the risk,’ I encountered a different reality. During my fieldwork I saw an educational system that was failing its Somali students by neglecting their diverse histories, experiences, and everyday realities. For example, the Ontario education system has not adapted or accommodated the growing number of English Literacy Development (ELD)\(^1\) students, exemplified in the high student-teacher ratios and the unavailability of an appropriate literacy program (Derwing and Munro 2007). Equally distressing is the decreasing support of government-assisted refugees in Canada, and indeed of all community-based programs that provide assistance to refugees and newcomers.

Throughout my research, I interviewed newcomers who were highly motivated and had great ambitions for their future in Canada but had become demoralized because they could not find a job in their profession. As is the case with many immigrants and refugees in Canada, many Somali newcomers’ credentials were not accepted because they lacked English proficiency and/or they did not have ‘Canadian experience.’ The housing situations of many of the families I worked with were deplorable. I saw parents with a newborn baby living in an apartment with no heating in the middle of winter, and children and youth with bed bug bites who did not want to eat or sleep in their apartment

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\(^1\) English Literacy Development (ELD) is a program developed in Ontario schools that is intended for English language learners who had limited access to schooling or speak a variety of English that is significantly different than the English of instruction in Ontario schools, and have significant gaps in their first language literacy skills. ELD instruction is designed to help students improve their skills in reading, writing, and oral communication in English (Ministry of Education 2007).
because of the cockroach infestations. In addition, I visited families who did not know about services available to them and were unable to access them when they did. One service available to refugees was mental health services where I witnessed both adults and children being patronized and treated only as vulnerable victims.

Despite structural inequalities and contrary to popular perceptions, I met many Somalis, young and old, who were resilient and sought various strategies to cope in their new society. In Kitchener-Waterloo, I was a tutor in homework programs where Somali students worked hard to complete their homework, and build their reading, writing, and numeracy skills. In Toronto, I found youth who were advocates for the rights of Somali and Muslim youth. They were proactively working towards making change at the personal, community, and national levels. In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, youth were running for political office, getting involved in political campaigns, and starting up groups and organizations that met the needs of Somali youth in the Twin Cities.² In all of these sites, I met youth who were politically conscious and socially aware of the issues facing Somali and/or Muslim youth. Many youth played a critical role in their families; sending remittances to Somalia, taking care of sisters and brothers, and acting as cultural and language interpreters and mediators for other family members. I also met and worked with youth considered ‘at risk’ because they were fighting with peers at school or were not regularly attending school; however, structural inequalities made their experiences more complex. It was not possible to explain their lives and experiences by blaming them or their parents for their behaviour.

Somali communities have responded to structural violence as well as the perceived ‘identity crisis’ among children and youth by constructing community

² Minneapolis and Saint Paul are known and referred to as the Twin Cities.
educational spaces that offer young people help with their mainstream or state sponsored schooling and also offer children and youth a sense of connection to Somalia, Somali culture and history, as well as Islam. In these educational spaces Somalis learn about their history, religious and cultural life, and forge relationships and supportive networks. This education and these relationships help sustain them as individuals and as a group in a larger society to which they have experienced different forms of exclusion. For younger generations, such spaces provide them with dignity, a sense of identity and belonging to a collective group and have given them the courage to learn in new ways, create goals, and work towards change in Somali communities locally and globally.

State sponsored schools as well as community educational spaces, such as *dugsi* (after school and weekend schools for learning Islam), homework programs, community centres, commemorations, events, youth groups, organizations, and mosques are important because youth spend most of their time in these spaces. In these spaces, private lives, state agendas, and societal views of Somalis, Muslims and refugees, or, parents, teachers, community leaders and students are entangled. It is from my fieldwork in these various spaces of learning that I became interested in understanding how these educational spaces shape and are shaped by the everyday lives of Somali children and youth and from where I developed the questions that guide this study.

The main questions raised in my dissertation are: (1) What are the experiences of Somali children and youth in state sponsored and community educational spaces in North America; and (2) how do these experiences shape their identities, worldviews, and senses of belonging in the context of displacement, prolonged armed conflict in Somalia, and a post-September 11 environment.

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3 Spaces here do not necessarily imply physical spaces, but political, social, and cultural spaces.
In answering these questions, a main underlying assumption is that historical and geopolitical contexts are critical dimensions that help us better understand the experiences of Somali children and youth and that these larger processes affect their everyday experiences, their worldviews, and aspirations for the future. In this chapter and throughout this dissertation I make two interrelated arguments. First, the view that refugee children and youth are both ‘at risk’ and ‘the risk’ serves a role in contemporary imperialist projects, including America’s ‘War on Terror.’ There are two interrelated North American views of children and youth that underlie risk discourse and can be applied to the Somali case. First, Somali youth are viewed as vulnerable and in need of protection. The belief reproduces the modernity narratives that posit the global South as premodern, that is occupying a space outside of civilization and progression, and therefore in need of the global North to mediate and solve its problems through humanitarianism and intervention. Second, youth are perceived as dangerous and a threat to societal order. In the current post-9/11 environment, the popular stereotypes of Somali youth as violent by way of gangs or terrorism position them as both internal and external threats to Canadian and American societies. Both viewpoints of Somali children and youth justify the interventions of the global North. The interventions of northern states are represented as having a right to dominate others for their own interests and that others should be grateful. In North America, Somali children and youth are affected by these viewpoints and stereotypes that conceal youth’s strengths and capabilities. They also obscure the roles of the North in instigating and prolonging the conflict in Somalia and blame Somali refugees for being refugees. Furthermore, the viewpoint conceals other factors that influence Somali youth’s lives in North America, such as poverty, access to
education, unemployment and underemployment, and their positions in gender and racial hierarchies.

Secondly, I argue that even though there is the perception in North America and even among Somali communities that there is an identity crisis among the youth, my fieldwork revealed that Somali youth are engaged in reshaping their political and social identities. They do this by drawing on subnational, national, and supranational solidarities including the family, the nation, Islam, and/or other transnational solidarities, granting meanings based on their experiences in state schools as well as in community educational spaces. In this work, I argue for a research approach that considers the social and historical agency of displaced children and youth and includes the influence of larger global dynamics on their everyday lives.

**Definitions of Key Terms and Concepts**

I use “community educational spaces” as an overreaching term to highlight and examine learning that takes place outside of state sponsored schools and includes, but is not limited to, after-school homework programs, *dugsi*, youth groups, Somali language classes, community programs and events, commemorations, and the transmission of memories in the forms of narratives, poems, proverbs, songs, and legends. In using the term "community" I do not imply a homogeneous and unchanging group of people. Instead, I seek to refer to a place created by Somalis of different backgrounds who have come together for a common purpose and to forge relationships that change over time (Cohen 1985), since communities are connected and affected by local and global politics (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:10-11, Howard and Proulx 2011:14). In using the term “space,” I do not suggest physical space, but seek to emphasize the relational nature of space (Massey 2004:5) and thus examine the meaning of these educational spaces (see
Massey 1992) to Somali communities, in general and Somali children and youth, in particular. In addition, I investigate the educational practices that take place in these spaces.

The study also examines Somali children and youths’ different experiences of displacement and migration. I define “displacement” as the uprooting and movement of people into new communities, which can be within as well as across borders (Colson 2003:1). The term displacement incorporates the term “refugee” which has a legal definition in international law and refers strictly to those who fled their countries and crossed into the borders of another. I situate the label “refugee,” a category that defines only some of my interlocutors, within its historical and political contexts and highlight its impact on displaced children and youth.

Somalis themselves use the term “diaspora” to distinguish between their experiences in North America and other countries abroad from the experiences of family and friends in Somalia. Rima Berns McGown (2007-2008:10) suggests that a definition of diaspora needs to allow for change in both the diaspora community’s relations with the wider society and changes to the diaspora community’s identity. The recognition of the influence of geopolitics on relations between communities as well as the reconstruction of identities is the reason I use Rima Berns McGown’s (2007-2008) approach to diaspora. Diaspora is defined, by Berns McGown (2007-2008:10) as a community of people that live outside of the place they once considered to be home; however, they continue to have connections to that homeland as well as connections with their adoptive country. Relationships between the diasporic populations and the adoptive society are reshaped or reproduced depending on the local and the global political environments (Berns McGown 2007-2008:10). To discuss the ongoing process of Somali families adapting to living in a
new society I use the term integration. Integration here is a gradual process between both the adoptive society and the immigrant communities. In this way, both communities change and transform over time (Berns McGown 1999:6). Integration is different from “assimilation,” which means that immigrant groups are expected to assume the adoptive society’s identities and values gradually, over time (Berns McGown 1999:50, Berns McGown 2008:55).

I also use the term structural violence in order to highlight the unequal access to power between the global North and the global South as well as the inequalities encountered by Somalis, albeit in varying degrees and ways. I use Paul Farmer’s (2006:6-9) definition of “structural violence” to mean the suffering that is characterized by structured historical and often economic processes that produce inequalities and limit agency. Anthropologists use the term “agency” to refer to an individual’s ability to imagine alternatives to normative cultural practices as well as to independently act to pursue their own goals (Lavenda and Schultz 2007:56).

Memory and identity—major themes in my dissertation—imply one another, and identification is a process that invokes the past. As such, I view both memories and identities as fluid, interrelated processes (Fabian 1999). The meaning associated with group identity, a “sense of sameness over time and space,” is sustained by remembering. On the other hand, “what is remembered is defined by an assumed identity” (Gillis 1994:3). As a result, identity is the interplay of one’s experiences in the world and his or her worldview formed in particular historical and cultural settings (Gilroy 2002[1997]:301). Yet, identities are not static, but are reconstructed through the revision of our memories to adapt to the present (Passerini 1987:17) and shape how we see the future, and in that sense are always political (Gillis 1994:5). In addition to identity, I use
the term “senses of belonging” to emphasize the ways an individual identifies with a particular place and society, especially feelings of exclusion and inclusion from the desired attachment, be it to people, places, or modes of being, and the ways in which individuals or groups are caught within wanting to belong and wanting to become (see Probyn 1996, Fortier 2000).

In defining memory, I draw on the work of the Popular Memory Group (PMG)\(^4\) (1982), who used the term “popular memory” to refer to the field of history or the ways the past is reproduced that is much broader than written professional or dominant historiography. It includes the various ways the past is invoked in society. Popular memory, in this context, involves non-elite versions of the past that are not always in opposition to dominant or hegemonic memories. Popular memory is a relational study, wherein the hegemonic historical narrative may provide the framework to think through private memories (Popular Memory Group 1982:205-207). Hegemonic historical discourses need to be seen as processes that are continuously resisted, limited, and altered (Williams 1977:112).

As the following chapters will show, I build upon Jo Boyden (2003) who calls for an alternative approach to research and to practice with displaced children and youth. I consider the definitions of adversity, risk, protective processes, and resilience that come out of social and medical science and inform international law as it pertains to children, including UN *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC) (1989) as well as practices associated with the central mandate of CRC to protect children exposed to adversity (Boyden and Mann 2005:3). I use these psychological definitions in this work to be

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\(^4\) Popular Memory Group was a group of scholars in the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies who met in the early 1980s to define the concept of “popular memory.”
critical of their uses in international law and practices, as such I recognize the issues and
the limitations as well as the influence of these terms on displaced children’s lives,
specifically in relation to the North America representation of Somali youth in terms of
risk. In the field of psychology, “adversity” is conceptualized as risk to an individual’s
well-being, development, and functioning. “Risk” is based upon the variables that
increase the possibility of developing psychopathologies or developmental impairments.
There are both internal risks, identified as specific to particular individuals, and external
risks, that result from environmental factors (Boyden and Mann 2005:6, Boyden
2009:112-113). “Protective processes” are positive reinforcements in a child’s life that
come from the individual, family, or community (Boyden and Mann 2005:6, see also
Summerfield 1999a). Protective processes are identified in their relations and interactions
with risks. “Resilience” was historically referred to in health sciences and applied physics
as the ability to “bounce back.” Today the term is used to refer to an individual’s capacity
to adapt, recover, or withstand adversity (Boyden and Mann 2005:6).

**Fortress America in a Global World: The Effects of Geopolitics on the Experiences of Somalis in North America**

Two interrelated processes have defined the current geopolitical environment: the
expansion of US global imperialism and the reconstruction of fortress Europe and
America, a concept to describe the restrictive anti-immigrant and refugee borders and
laws (Razack 2008, Thobani 2007). I begin with two important assumptions that underpin
my research. First, the refugee determination system and refugee policies in North
America are not isolated from larger geopolitical contexts and shifts in imperial
arrangements (Chimni 1998, 2009). Second, even though the discourse on asylum seekers
places the blame for conflict and displacement solely on the countries of origin, Western
imperialism and meddling in the global South plays a significant role in instigating or
prolonging these conflicts, including the instability and armed conflict in Somalia
(Chimni 1998, Marfleet 2006). I adopt B.S. Chimni’s (1998) approach that recognizes the
role of external powers and institutions, mainly in the global North in shaping domestic
state policies in the global South. Specifically, in using such an approach the political
agendas and neo-colonial interventions of northern states in the South become linked to
the geopolitical shift of refugee policies in the North with implications to the legal status
and fate of asylum seekers.

The US’s contemporary imperial project is to assert its national sovereignty as
global sovereignty (Thobani 2007:220). As the strongest superpower in the world,
America is making the decisions where and when it is under threat, using the ideology of
humanitarianism as the cover for its interventions and to justify violations of international
laws (Chimni 2009). In particular, the US has led the global campaign against ‘Terror,’
which now is synonymous with Muslims, Islam, and the Middle East and Arabs. Through
military and law enforcement, the US has sought to control Muslims, to strip them of
rights, and to subject them to surveillance in the name of the ‘War on Terror’ (Zouaoui
2012). The ideological war relies on the demonization of Muslims, positing Muslim men
as barbaric and Muslim women as oppressed (Thobani 2007:221, Razack 2008:84).

Edward W. Said (1993) argues that colonizers use narratives to explain “strange
regions” and/or peoples of the world. The power over narratives, whose stories are told
and whose are silenced, is important to culture and imperialism. Culture, Edward W. Said
(1993) argues, is often associated with the nation or the state and becomes the catalyst
that constructs ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Similarly, Mahmood Mamdani (2004) conceptualizes the
narratives told in the West as “Culture Talk.” These narratives construct the East as
possessing a premodern culture, which is either not yet modern or antimodern. In the West, modernization theories, and an Orientalist framework continue to dominate in the post-Cold War era when discussing or dealing with the Middle East.

In a similar way, during the Cold War, Africa was represented as having an inability to progress and reach modernity due to ‘African tribalism’ (Mamdani 2004, Razack 2008). According to Mahmood Mamdani (2004), with the end of the Cold War, Islam and the Middle East became viewed not only as incapable of reaching modernity, but also as resistant to it. To this end, Sherene H. Razack (2008) observes that Muslims, in the domains of culture and religion, are constructed as premodern and in opposition to law and reason, attributes that characterize modernity. Since Muslim men and women are conceptualized as occupying a space outside of civilization and progression, they are considered to be outside the law and therefore it is justifiable to direct violence at them (Razack 2008:11). Somalia provides a salient case of how two parallel narratives of African ‘tribal wars’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalism;’ are brought together into a single narrative to explain the ongoing civil war in the country, explored in chapter 2. These narratives have the effect of separating Muslims from other Canadians and Americans and have social consequences for Somali children and youth, discussed in chapter 3.

At the same time that America is asserting its global sovereignty and facilitating the movement of capital and goods, the state is restricting the movement of people and closing its borders to immigrants and refugees. Since 9/11 in the United States, the US and Canada tightened control over their borders. Increasingly being targeted as potential terrorists attempting to enter Western states, refugees and asylum seekers have been affected by these border restriction policies (Gibney 2002). The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 adopted September 28, 2001 emphasized the need to create safeguards
against “terrorists” using the refugee protection system making explicit the association between asylum seekers and terrorism (Zard 2002:32). The resolution inevitably led to a transformation of state refugee policies, resulting in the steady erosion of international law, including refugee law.

Globalization has challenged two key understandings of national states: sovereignty and territoriality (Sassen 1996, Sharma and Gupta 2006). Some scholars propose that the functions of the nation-state are being eroded and that the growing use of international law by individuals and populations to reclaim their rights within the nation-state may contradict the principle of territorial sovereignty (Dauvergne 2006). According to Saskia Sassen (1996), the tension between the protection of human rights and the protection of state sovereignty are made evident in policies directed at immigrants and refugees. The tension begins with the state’s internal conflict between controlling who enters the state and protecting its citizens. Nonetheless, state sovereignty and human rights are not separate issues because the international human rights regime operates partly within national states. In fact, Mark Franke (2008), a human rights scholar, argues that a response to displaced persons cannot be carried out within the current human rights regime. International human rights, developed by the West, cannot offer the same human rights to the displaced as they do to the emplaced because they are based on inequalities between displaced persons who seek emplacement and persons who are citizens of states (Franke 2008).

It is important to point out that the political category “refugee” as well as the humanitarian and the human rights regimes emerged within a specific geopolitical context and historical moment, which offers insights into current policies that restrict human movement across borders, particularly in the global North. Between the early 1880s and
World War I (1914-1918) there were massive refugee flows within Europe. There were 2.5 million Jews leaving Eastern Europe. In addition, in the early 20th century massive displacement of Europeans resulted from the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empire and the emergence of new nation-states. The result was that 50 million people, predominantly Europeans were moving to the West at a time when the world’s population numbered one billion (Chimni 1998: 357-358). At the time, millions of people were displaced, which led European states to tighten their borders fearing that newcomers might threaten their sovereignty and national cohesion (Loescher 1996). The state control over sovereign territories and the interstate system of border control transformed the meaning of “foreigner” to “outsider” (Sassen 1999:78). Consequently, the state was able to define refugees as not belonging to their states and to deny them the same rights as their own citizens. Unlike refugees in the past who had been outsiders in similar ways to transients, refugees in the 20th century were a distinctive category. Territorial sovereignty and border control transformed the role of the state, granting it the power and legitimacy to exclude refugees from civil society (Sassen 1999:79).

World War II (1939-1945) displaced millions of people, causing a “refugee crisis” (Malkki 1995). As a result, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was drafted, and the conceptualization of “refugee” was institutionalized. However, “Convention refugee” only applied to refugees who were displaced as a result of World War II before January 1, 1951. Both Canada and the US welcomed refugees fleeing from Communist regimes, as an ideological weapon to confirm the “East’s tyranny,” and believed that if they did not help there would be a “danger to liberal democracy” (Harrell-Bond 1986:11). The 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention, removed the geographical
and temporal limitations whereby a “refugee” could be from anywhere in the world, and there are no limitation as to time of displacement. Henceforth, the Geneva Convention became international refugee law. Human rights as declared by the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948) also became the framework through which displacement issues were addressed. In addition, there was a standardization of the management of refugees and of institutions to meet refugee needs, such as the administration of refugee camps and refugee law (Malkki 1995). Protection and assistance in the region of origin was initiated and granting asylum was, until the late 1980s, the privileged solution and the core principle of the UNHCR’s international protection mandate (Chimni 1998).

According to B.S. Chimni (1998), in the 1980s and especially at the end of the Cold War, the discourse surrounding refugees changed. For Western liberal democracies, refugees no longer had political or ideological value. Consequently, a “myth of difference” was propagated suggesting that contemporary refugees were essentially different from the European Cold War refugees. The ‘normal’ refugee was thought of as a white, male, anti-communist, who was markedly different from refugees arriving from the third world. Subsequently, the shifts in the geopolitical environment justified stricter borders or the “non-entrée regime,” influenced the policies and priorities of the UNHCR, and became the justification for attempts to revise refugee law (Chimni 1998:359). Those who espouse this view of difference, generally also adopt the internalist approach to refugee flows that blames conflicts and displacement on local states and actors in the global South (Chimni 1998). The internalist approach does not consider that the formation and direction of refugee flows is dominated by colonial and neo-colonial links (Sassen 1996). The myth of difference serves the North, places the blame and lays the burden of asylum on the South (Chimni 1998).
As B.S. Chimni (1998:359) explained, the myth of difference proposes that globalization has removed the “natural barriers to movement” enabled by revolutions in transportation that had historically kept the number of asylum seekers low. Xenophobia is heightened among citizens of northern states who believe northern countries are being ‘flooded’ with refugees who are abusing the refugee determination system. The dialectic between the state’s increasing control over entry and the rise of xenophobia becomes apparent in policies implemented by Canada and the US following 9/11. The policies and their implementation also show the tension between the protection of universal human rights and the protection of state sovereignty. The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) and the US Refugee Act (1980) are both based upon internationally recognized human rights under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Nonetheless, the immigration acts act as tools of control, creating policies that restrict the movement of refugees and asylum seekers entering North America (Stachel 2009). The Canadian and American states have increased border controls, tightened screening practices, increased legibility or surveillance and control in the everyday experiences of refugees and asylum seekers (see Sharma and Gupta 2006).

Multiculturalism and Hierarchies of Citizenship

Although Canada and the US are represented globally as countries of immigrants, hierarchies of citizenship based on race, ethnicity, and religion remain dominant. Both Himani Bannerji (2000) and Eva Mackey (2002) argue that in Canada there is an assumption of a core white, Anglo-Saxon majority that has the effect of constituting other cultures as ‘multicultural.’ The national subject is “exalted” above all multicultural others and embodies and personifies the values and ethics of Canadian society. This national subject is represented as a legitimate citizen of the state; however, the outsider is seen as a
stranger who wants what nationals have, with the effect of provoking anxiety and even hostility among citizens (Thobani 2007:4).

Since the 1980s official multiculturalism has helped to construct the identity of Canada as tolerant and benevolent (Mackey 2002:2), while simultaneously erasing Canada’s colonial history and the ethnic cleansing of First Nations. In its place, it has constructed a narrative of overcoming difficulties and challenges from inside ‘others’ such as, First Nations, immigrants, and refugees who threaten the values of Canadian society (Thobani 2007:42-43). For instance, national narratives represent immigrants and refugees as being responsible for bringing premodern or antimodern traditions, ‘foreign’ diseases, old ‘tribal’ feuds, and gangs to the country (Thobani 2007:4). The multicultural model admits difference; however, the reasons for difference are constructed in terms of ‘ethnic cultures.’ According to Himani Bannerji (2000:44-45), when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau created multiculturalism policy there were few multicultural demands on the government by immigrants. The issues they did raise had to do with racism, immigration and family reunification, job discrimination, and difficulties with childcare and language. Contrary to popular belief that multiculturalism was a response to third world immigrants, multiculturalism policy was constructed from above and became a way for the Canadian government to reduce issues of injustice, such as racism, to issues of cultural diversity that focus on religion and ‘tradition.’ The effect was that third world immigrants were culturized and mapped into specific ethnic communities (Bannerji 2000:44-45), perpetuating the idea that ‘multicultures’ have identifiable cultures, seen as traditions brought from their past (Mackey 2002:151). In other words, people became defined in terms of their cultural identity and the politics of race and class were obfuscated (Bannerji 2000:45). Similarly, in the US, citizenship is tied to ideas of
exclusion and selection. The US is governed by an Anglo-Saxon hegemony and white race and middle and upper class interests are projected as universal for the nation. Immigration to the US has been characterized by “benevolent assimilation” whereby immigrants’ are cleansed of their ethnicities and transformed into ‘worthy’ citizens (Ong 2003:71-73).

Based on theories of modernity and liberal universalism, national narratives that construct immigrants and refugees as both internal and external threats, are a part of the larger nation-building project. Canada’s national narratives are filled with tales of its territorial transformation from a “wilderness” to a “civilization” (Mackey 2002:17). An essential element to obtaining civilization is the improvement of the nation’s people. The goals of progress and development are primary tenets of Western liberal culture. Underlying these goals is an assumption of Western liberal culture’s authority and right to define others as ‘cultural’ and subordinate to its unmarked core culture. Western liberal culture, therefore, gets to decide the differences that are allowed and the differences that need to be developed, altered, or improved (Mackey 2002:161).

The geopolitical environment in North America has further entrenched hierarchies of citizenship by legally authorizing the suspension of rights in the name of the ‘War on Terror’ (Razack 2008). What is being established is a fortress surrounding an imagined national community with rigid boundaries and borders that racialize bodies and mark them as belonging or not to the nation. The national subject perceives that they are under threat from ‘others,’ both inside and outside their nation (Razack 2008:4-5).

Sherene H. Razack (2008) argues that the abandonment of populations through the restrictions and the suspension of the rights of citizens are justified on the basis of emergency and are accomplished as a racial project based in race thinking and the logic
of exception. Race thinking denies the humanity of non-Europeans; while the logic of exception enables the construction of metaphorical (not physical) camps for those without rights. Those outside the camps create laws and rights that are denied to the inmates of the camps who are considered sub-human (Razack 2008:6-7). In the context of the ‘War on Terror,’ race thinking directed at Muslims, justifies the suspension of Muslims’ rights in the interest of national security (Razack 2008:4, Zouaoui 2012). In the aftermath of 9/11 President Bush distinguished between “bad Muslims,” who were responsible for terrorism, and “good Muslims” who were eager to prove that they were not terrorists by joining the US and its allies against “bad Muslims” (Mamdani 2004). Mahmood Mamdani (2004) argues the discourse of “good Muslims” and “bad Muslims” reconstructed all Muslims as bad unless they prove that they are good.

Immigration policy changes and law enforcement, including security certificates, demonstrate the role of metaphorical (not physical) camps in Canada. Security certificates allow the government of Canada to detain a permanent resident or non-citizen without charge and to withhold all the evidence against them if he or she is suspected of terrorism or organized crime, that is, they are guilty unless proven innocent (Razack 2008:4). Similarly, in the US, the USA PATRIOT Act (2001) allows aliens suspected of terrorism to be detained while it erases the legal status of the individual (Razack 2008:13, Zouaoui 2012), that is, the withdrawal of his or her rights. The policies that were created from America’s ‘War on Terror’ target many refugees from the South, especially Muslims from refugee producing countries, including Somalia.\(^5\) In this context, experiences of

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\(^5\) Canadian citizens of Somali background have experienced abandonment in other countries because of accusations of passport fraud (see Alsop 2009, Diebel 2009). Similarly, American citizens with Somali background had their names placed on no-fly lists and were abandoned in other countries (see Ferguson 2010, Miller 2010), and Somali-Canadians have been deported to Somalia (see CBC News 2009, 2010)
Somali refugees in North America are clear examples of the tensions and contradictions in these laws and policies.

In Canada and the US, Somalis are often represented as an internal threat and considered to be responsible for bringing premodern or antimodern traditions, such as the cases of Somali youth becoming radicalized. In my fieldwork, I found the traumas of war and/or domestic violence were both blamed for making these youth particularly prone to violence and the reason they joined gangs. Also blamed were older generations’ transmission of old ‘tribal’ feuds that are being waged on North American streets. These representations and viewpoints pathologize the youth and their families rather than allowing for an investigation into the gaps and issues with integration and the influence of geopolitics on their everyday lives and relationships with non-Somalis. For instance, during June-August 2012, in Toronto, there was an increase in gun violence and many of the victims were Somali youth. The local media quoted a tweet made by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney, on the social media platform Twitter that linked the violence to “foreign gangsters” and said if convicted they “should be deported without delay” (Grant 2012). Furthermore, in recent years, second-generation Somali male youth from Toronto have been moving to Alberta in search of jobs in the oil sector. Over the period of five years, 35 young Somali men have been murdered in Alberta. Although having little evidence, both the Toronto and the Edmonton media have assumed that the young men were involved with gangs and drugs (Jibrill 2011:3). The references and assumptions made in the media concerning Somali communities affect Somali youths’ sense of belonging to North America, discussed in chapter 3.

despite the non-refoulement clause in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that forbids the expulsion of a refugee to a place where he or she will be persecuted.
Somali Studies

The existing literature on Somali refugees is limited, and deals with such issues as their settlement or camp experiences (Israelite et al. 1999, Lohrentz 2004, Horst 2008), the impact of policy on Somali refugee women (Spitzer 2006), their experiences as Muslims in the West (Berns McGown 1999, Tiilikainen 2003), the collapse of the Somali state (Mubarak 1996, Besteman 1999), or the history of Somalia (Lewis 1988 [1965], 2008, Samatar 1988, 1994, Cassanelli 1996, de Waal 1997, Mohamed 2007). Rima Berns McGown (1999) offers an examination of processes of inclusion and exclusion within Canadian and British nation-states and suggests that the contemporary political environment does have an impact on the ability of Somalis to become integrated in North America. Some of these studies recognize the importance of integrating history and contemporary political processes into the analysis (Cassanelli 1996, de Waal 1997, 2007, Besteman 1999, 2007, Berns McGown 1999); however, few show how past experiences in Somalia are pertinent to the experiences of refugees in North America, although such an approach may be found in studies on other refugee groups. Neglecting connections between past and present experiences, as well as between the home and the adoptive countries, leads to a synchronic and ahistorical analysis. The research presented here is among the first that focuses solely on Somali children and youth and connects their experiences in North America to larger colonial and imperial processes.

Refugee Children and Youth: Deconstructing Children and Youth as ‘At Risk’ and ‘The Risk’

At the beginning of the 20th century, in the United States and Europe, infant and child mortality began to decline and more children began attending secondary school, which raised questions about children’s development and learning (Levine 2007).
Although Sigmund Freud’s early 20th century writings on psychosexual stages in child development were considered *universal* and were interpreted as reading that children are highly vulnerable during the early stages of development, early ethnographic accounts conducted by Bronislaw Malinowski (1927) and Margaret Mead (1928) in the Trobriand Islands and Samoa respectively, were evidence that there were cultural variations in views of child development and child rearing. Since 1928 anthropologists have been conducting ethnographic research throughout the world and have offered cultural critiques of developmental theories (LeVine 2007). Psychologists, nonetheless, continued to develop theories of childhood that claim universality.

In the contemporary globalized world, theoretical frameworks for child development continue to be influenced by developmental psychologists, most prominently by the work of Jean Piaget who emphasized the universality of child development (Boyden and Mann 2005). Such theoretical frames of reference attempt to measure risk and help to develop protection policies such as the UNCRC (1989). From this view, child development is governed by universal and biological stages and the developmental stage of the child is the main indicator of how the child will respond to adversity. A further theory that has dominated child development research is the emphasis on the first years of life being most critical to the adaptation to adult life resulting in little research on middle and late child developments. The ideas of child vulnerability and dependence construct assumptions that children must be raised by parents in secure environments and be excluded from adult responsibilities (Boyden 2003). Ethnographic evidence, nonetheless, shows that children and youth often mitigate risk to their families in times of adversity. For instance, Jo Boyden (2009a) found that children in Ethiopia respond to household adversity in the context of poverty through work. The research
shows that children’s work can provide rewards to youth who are concerned about their families and want to assist them; and in doing so they mitigate risk to the family and protect themselves against adversity. This is also applicable to my research where I found that Somali youth are concerned with their families’ adversity and respond by finding paid work or helping to contribute to household livelihoods, explored in detail in chapter 4.

Some psychologists and other social scientists view child development as influenced by environmental and individual factors that help them to adapt to adversity, stressing resilience, coping, and protective processes. For their part anthropologists view children as social agents who differ from adults because of the degree of access to power and knowledge rather than by their developmental capacities. They see children as meaning makers who shape their views based on socio-cultural values, their historical experiences, and their contexts (Boyden 2009a:113-114). Derek Summerfield (1999a) suggests the Western medicalization of distress that focuses on trauma, advanced globally through humanitarian agencies, overlooks the individual’s relations within his or her social world. As a result, children who have experienced adversity are disconnected from others and from their socio-historical contexts, as well as the meanings they give to their experiences (Summerfield 1999b, 2000).

Anthropological research on refugee children poses challenges to the developmental psychological paradigms, which dominate programs and policies that attempt to protect children and help them to cope with adversity. Ethnographic research shows that the state and the adoptive society may be the biggest risk to displaced children and youth. Jo Boyden and Jason Hart (2007:237) argue that the UNCRC does not pay sufficient attention to the ways states are risks to children or the ways that children and
youth provide their own protection, in many cases against abuses brought upon them by
the state. The UNCRC (1989) has institutionalized special children’s rights over those of
adults, while at the same time suggesting that children are incapable of exercising these
rights themselves. As a result, the state is the signatory and bearer to UNCRC and takes
on primary decision-making rights over children (Boyden and Hart 2007:237). Yet,
practices such as the detainment of asylum seeking children with their families in
detention facilities in the US and Canada raises the question of the role of states in
upholding, or violating, the rights of children (de Berry and Boyden 2000).

The risks posed to children and youth as well as protective factors and coping
strategies are diverse since they depend on culture and context. Jo de Berry and Jo
Boyden (2000) argue that in situations of adversity, including armed conflict and
displacement, conceptions and distinctions between child, youth, and adult become fluid.
Jo Boyden (2003) argues that dominant theoretical views that focus on protection and see
children as vulnerable and incompetent have unintentionally undermined children’s
resilience and coping strategies in the context of armed conflict. For instance, in the
Palestinian context, Randa Farah (2005) found that refugee children and youth in camps
in Jordan are affected by the oppression brought against their families and communities
as well as the prolonged history of displacement and exile. They respond by getting
involved in the political process as they navigate and negotiate their own identities and
senses of belonging. Hence, children and youth react, reinvent, and reshape ideas and
social norms in their communities.

Cultural institutions also play a role in mitigating risk and in resilience and coping
(Summerfield 1999b). In the case of unaccompanied, young males, Cecile Rousseau and
colleagues (1998) found that the collective meanings of separation of young Somali men
from their families in nomadic culture, and the continuity and reorganization of the lineage structure and age-group structures to meet the needs of newcomers in the diaspora, contributed to the men’s resilience. All of these studies demonstrate the interdependence of generations rather than children’s dependence on adults. They also show that the cultural institutions and the contexts of children are important in defining what constitutes risk and protective factors, and play an important role in children’s coping with adversity (Rousseau et al. 1998). Finally, Western approaches are often based on the assumption that an individual is autonomous and that trauma is an individual-centered event, but war and displacement are collective experiences and many non-European societies, including Somalia, are sociocentric (Summerfield 1999b). Individuals in sociocentric societies’ do not imagine their identities outside a collective group, be it the extended family or village kin, meaning an individual’s coping strategies are not located within the individual but are dependent on a wider network of relationships.

Anthropologists also emphasize the need for examining risk, resilience, and coping strategies from a gendered perspective. According to Cathrine Brun (2000), humanitarian interventions and academic studies, which largely focus on women and girls in conflict situations make men in general and male youth in particular invisible. In research and practice, by making young men visible, the nature of men’s challenges, the outcomes they desire, and their limitations, become more apparent. In looking at the roles of young women, dominant assumptions also need to be deconstructed. Hirut Tefferi (2007) suggests the dominant view of girls’ vulnerability undermines the reality of their roles and responsibilities in household livelihoods. For instance, Randa Farah (2005) found that in the Palestinian case, young women play an important role in mitigating risk
by assisting the family in exile, whether by caring for younger siblings, helping in
domestic chores, or working to contribute to household income.

Children and youths’ experiences and voices are generally silenced in hegemonic
or subaltern historical reproductions of the past. Nonetheless, recognition of young
people’s resourcefulness and competencies emphasize youth as products as well as agents
in history (de Berry and Boyden 2000, Farah 2005). To start from a point of child and
youth agency is not to say that children and youth do not suffer in the face of adversity or
are not vulnerable because they are among the most vulnerable. Instead, it is used to
emphasize that similar to adults, even under structural constraints children have agency
and struggle to make meaning in their environments (Bluebond-Lagner and Korbin 2007,
Willis 1990). By taking into account both the agency and the vulnerability of children, the
researcher becomes attuned to children and youths’ historical, social, political, and
economic contexts while recognizing the diversity in childhood experiences (Bluebond-
Lagner and Korbin 2007).

In North America, children and youths’ experiences of displacement and
settlement are often framed in terms of trauma, despite its specific Western cultural and
historical origin and conception. From a Western developmental psychological
perspective, refugee children and youth are ‘at risk’ since child experiences are theorized
to affect later development. For instance, children and youth who are thought to suffer
from post-traumatic stress disorder are believed to be prone to traumatic reactions and
long-term impairment (Summerfield 1999b, Boyden 2003). In this way, the child or youth
can also become ‘the risk’ if it is suspected that those long-term impairments will make
him or her prone to violence. The perspective also assumes a trauma cycle since current
developmental theories of trauma suggest that trauma is passed down through
generations, which makes mothers and fathers a risk to their children (see, for example, Bek-Pedersen and Montgomery 2006).

It is not to say that children and youth have not experienced trauma, but it is critical to contextualize their experiences and to not reduce the individual to his or her mental health and disregard larger processes that impact individuals and families in conflict situations. Derek Summerfield (1999a), a cross-cultural psychiatrist, argues that the discourse of trauma reduces war-affected populations’ experiences to issues of mental health. He suggests that it is not the “trauma of war” but the “trauma of poverty” that negatively impacts people who have been displaced. Jill Korbin (2003) also argues that the discourse of trauma takes the focus away from structural violence, which is the cause of most children’s suffering. The effect of stressing pathology rather than structural forces, argues Jo Boyden (2003), is that the viewpoint influences policies and practices that concern displaced children and youth. The focus on psycho-emotional health has led to a shift away from physical health. For instance, mental health is the focus of interventions rather than health care. Furthermore, children are viewed as passive victims of war rather than survivors with the effect of being excluded from the development of policies and programs that affect them.

Canadians and Americans see the perceived crisis of Somali youth in North America as a marker of risk to Canadian and American societies. In this work I build upon Sharon Stephens’ (1995) theory that children are often considered simultaneously ‘the risk’ and ‘at risk.’ Similarly, my study supports Catherine Bryan and Maryiam Denov’s (2011) research with unaccompanied⁶ refugee youth in Canada. These authors found that the dual identities of “refugee” and “child” placed these young people into two conditions.

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⁶ Unaccompanied refugee children and youth immigrate to Canada without parents or guardians.
categories of risk evident in anti-youth and anti-refugee discourse. My research places this risk discourse in a geopolitical and historical context. For instance, in chapter 3, I examine how the post-9/11 social and political environment that represents Muslim men as perpetrators of violence and Muslim women as victims of violence informs the representation of Somali youth in terms of risk. These hegemonic discourses reproduced and perpetuated in the media have led to the assumptions that Somali children and youth are helpless victims, vulnerable, and/or particularly prone to violence. Throughout this work, I challenge the perspective by showing youth’s coping mechanisms, their important roles and responsibilities in their families, homes, and communities.

The hegemonic discourse connected to the ‘War on Terror’ has also informed Somali communities that have responded in their own ways. Stuart Hall and colleagues (1978) conducted a study on mugging in Britain and found that the muggings largely committed by youth were viewed as a marker of the disintegration of the social order in the country. From the perspective of Somali communities, the few cases of Somali youth leaving school, joining gangs, and becoming radicalized, marked the disintegration of Somali social systems, including socially acceptable behaviour and norms. In some cases, Somali individuals have internalized the identity crisis theory that growing up in the diaspora is the main reason for the problems. One response to this view has been that Somali communities have created community educational spaces to reconnect children and youth to their culture, history, and religion.

**The Geopolitics of Educational Spaces: Reconstructions of Somali Children and Youth Identities**

In this research, I use educational spaces as research sites to examine how geopolitical processes connected to America’s ‘War on Terror’ impact the everyday
experiences of Somali children and youth. As a result of the literature on education and my own research, I start with the point of view that children and youth leave school early because of a system that fails to accommodate the needs of refugee children in state schools. Educational theorists have long discussed the exclusion of certain groups of people from mainstream schools. The leading theorist of education, Paulo Freire (2002[1970]) argues that traditional approaches to education continue to fail marginalized groups. Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo (1987:121) critique the widely held view that students leave schools and ask instead whether the students were left by schools. Beginning from this viewpoint, Freire and Macedo (1987:123) argue that in literacy education, students may refuse to read the words that are chosen for them and decide that they violate their world. In other words, youth who leave school refuse to engage in predetermined intellectual activities and do not accept the exclusion of their experiences. Meredith Rogers Cherland and Helen Harper (2007:244) suggest that we need to examine which bodies are literate and what kind of literacy is offered to which bodies. Antonio Gramsci (1971) argues that education was created by and for the ruling class, to maintain their status; however, “organic intellectuals,” that is, intellectuals from the working class, can reform education. Building upon the work of Antonio Gramsci (1971), other educational theorists have examined the ways educators can reform curriculum to include the histories, experiences, and worldviews that go beyond sex, race, and class boundaries (Freire 1985, hooks 1994, Cherland and Harper 2007). In North America the inflexibility of the system, which fails to include diverse histories and experiences of the students shows that education continues to benefit the elite, in this case the white, Anglo-Saxon majority. Inequalities in education are concealed through rights thinking— the belief that education is for everyone (Razack 1998:17), effectively blaming students who leave
school early (Freire and Macedo 1987:121). This work considers the power relations in state schools and curriculum and explores Somali students’ knowledge, including national, community, and religious forms of knowledge.

Much of the work in anthropology of education fails to consider the impact of colonial and imperial links between migrants’ homes and homelands and those of the adoptive country (see Lukose 2007). Through linking imperial relations between Somalia and the US and Canada and examining Somali communities, we can better understand the diverse experiences of marginalization within the American and the Canadian nation-states (see Grosfoguel et al. 2005). Researchers who assume that state schools are sites for assimilation also assume that students are being touched or are learning in school when in fact, many students, especially those with significant educational gaps, are being systematically denied an education. This becomes evident in my examination of the experiences of newcomer Somali youth in Canadian public schools in chapter 4.

While recent research in the anthropology of education has examined the reconstruction of identities (Lee 1996, Lopez 2003) and the links between Americanization and racialization in schools (Lee 2005), these studies assume the nation-state as a site of assimilation and integration (Lukose 2007, Villenas 2007). From a Foucauldian perspective, school is a site for managing and disciplining students’ bodies (Cherland and Harper 2007). Yet, the view that schools assimilate students, transforming them into national subjects, does not consider the impact of other forms of learning on students’ senses of belonging (see Lukose 2007). The anthropology of education has largely ignored how peer, familial, religious, and community-based learning intersects with state schooling.
The structural violence experienced by Somalis in North America has led Somali communities to create community educational spaces that help students in their mainstream schools while teaching the youth about Somalia’s history, national struggles, culture, and language as well as Islam. Throughout my fieldwork, I was a participant-observer in many of these spaces. For instance, in Kitchener-Waterloo I was involved with the African-Canadian homework support program that used donated public school classrooms two nights per week, so that parents and tutors could help students with their homework. There were tutors who spoke Somali to offer the students support in their native language and to act as a liaison between parents, tutors, and students. In addition to these kinds of spaces, there are religious-based educational spaces, including *dugsi*, after school and weekend Islamic schools that teach the Qur’an to students. In these spaces, desks in classrooms are separated from the prayer rooms for teaching children and youth. At mosques, there are also programs designed for youth during their winter and summer holidays that have seminars, speakers, and sports leagues with the purpose of teaching Islamic ideals and creating an Islamic environment for youth. In some of these spaces, there are libraries with books written in Arabic to promote literacy in the language. In the context of learning Islam, reading and writing Arabic may promote a connection and a sense of belonging to the larger Islam community. Similarly, in the sites for this research, Somali parents and educators receive donated space from public or adult schools as well as community organizations to hold Somali language classes for Somali children on weekends. The recognition that Somali children and youth have low levels of literacy in their native language prompted the creation of these classes. The reasons for learning Somali language differed between young children and older youth. For young children, there is an effort put forth by Somali community leaders and educators to teach the
Somali language to children because they fear that children will not learn the language. Furthermore, Somali educators suggested that learning to read and write in one’s native language will improve proficiency in English. Among older youth, learning to read and write Somali was a personal goal, many commenting that they wanted to know their native language. Similar to the case of learning Arabic, learning Somali may be seen as a way to foster a sense of belonging to the Somali nation and to provide a space for intergenerational dialogue.

Other community educational spaces may not resemble classrooms, but they promote learning. These include commemorative events, such as Somalia’s Independence Day, the focus of chapter 5. They also include Somali initiated events, such as Somali World Peace Day, an event that took place in Minneapolis on May 23, 2011 that sought to bring Somali children and youth together to promote peace in Somalia. There are also a plethora of Somali organizations, such as the Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota that supports and runs many Somali programs in Minneapolis. In addition, the Somali-Canadian Diaspora Alliance, a group of men, women, and youth that works towards creating a sovereign and peaceful Somalia. Through this work I examine not only the experiences of Somali children and youth in state sponsored schools, but also in these community educational spaces. I look at how these educational spaces inform each other and contribute to reshaping their political and social identities.

**The Reconstruction of Somali Youth Identities in North America: A Popular Memory Approach**

Somali children and youth are negotiating between simultaneous and sometimes conflicting identities, intensifying the processes of change in the diaspora as they try to bridge their senses of belonging between their families, communities, and religion as well
as the adoptive society (see Berns McGown 1999, de Berry and Boyden 2000). In this research, I examine how Somali youth interact, relate, and identify with their families, the wider Somali institutional and informal communities, the adoptive society, and the Somali struggle. To do this I examine how youth represent themselves, investigating the main identity references and the ways they vary by socio-economic status and gender.

A popular memory approach is useful to emphasize how memory and by implication identity is reshaped by present political contexts (see Thomson 1994, Ugolini 2004). As we shall see, this is reflected in different generations of Somalis narratives of the past. The common experience of displacement and exile has led to more Somali involvement in politics in the diaspora, including many youth who feel they have a political and civic responsibility to Somali communities. Most of the Somalis I have spent time with are involved in the political situation at home and in the processes of recreating national consciousness in the diaspora; however, their goals are not always the same.

Somalis support various Somali political projects, ranging from a call to build one or more secular nation-states to one that adopts Islamic Shari’a as its basis. Eric Hobsbawm (1990) argues that political nationalism is becoming less important. In his view, the older political nationalisms have been superseded by more recent ethno-linguistic nationalisms as reactions to global changes. Yet, Eric Hobsbawm is depoliticizing nationalisms by separating the cultural level of the nation from the political level of the state (Smith 1995). Nations and nationalisms have distinct histories that influence their construction and they are always political. Nationalisms do not need to be formed by dominant or hegemonic states. In the past, nationalism in countries like Somalia emerged as a framework to forge an alliance of various classes to resist colonialism and reclaim a national history. In that historical moment, nationalism was an ideology for liberation
from colonial rule (Swedenburg 1991). Although Ted Swedenburg (1991) focused on classic 20th century anti-colonial movements, in the diaspora, countering imperial interventions often results in forging alliances based foremost on Somali belonging despite the differences within based on, for example, class or clan. Displacement, in some cases, breaks down divisions between Somalis from different places, socio-economic statuses, and migration trajectories to build an alliance and reclaim Somali identity as a project for the future of Somalia. That is not to say that all youth have similar visions for the future Somali state and society: although many believe in self-determination, some seek unity of northwestern and southern Somalia, while others seek an independent and sovereign Somaliland. The complexity of national aspirations will be explored in chapter 5.

The literature shows that Somalis identify with a particular region and to both their paternal and maternal clan-families; however, they also have broader attachments to both Somalia and the Islamic umma7 envisioned as larger than the Somali nation (see Lewis 1999[1961]), Berns McGown 1999, Tiilikainen 2003). These levels may peacefully coexist, although in some contexts they may become oppositional attachments. This research examines how Somali youth negotiate these multiple-identity references in the diaspora (see Gupta 1997).

**Methodology: Fields of Research, Subjects, and the Researcher’s Position**

**Fields of Research: Toronto the Largest Somali Centre**

The largest numbers of Somalis have sought refuge in Canada, since the beginning of the Somali conflict in the north (1988) and in the south, subsequent to the

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7 Islamic umma denotes the community of Muslims that transcends national and state borders and boundaries (Berns McGown 1999).
collapse of Siyad Barre’s government (1991). Most live in the province of Ontario, with approximately 75,000 Somalis residing in the Greater Toronto Area (Israelite et al. 1999). A failed coup in 1987, attempted by members of the Majerteen sub-clan of the Daarood clan-family, and the civil war in northern Somalia (1988-1991) between Barre’s government and Isaaq clan-family members led to the displacement of over a half a million people. The displacement of Somalis within and across borders escalated in the 1990s with drought, famine, and the renewed civil war. Many sought refuge in Ethiopia and Republic of Djibouti, but thousands eventually found resettlement in other countries, such as Canada (Lewis 2008). The first wave of Somalis to Toronto was from the Majerteen sub-clan. Rima Berns McGown (1999:23), who conducted ethnographic research with Somalis in Toronto, suggests that Somalis originally from Mogadishu, mainly Daarood and Hawiye, settled in a cluster of apartment buildings near the airport west of the city and gradually moved to less concentrated areas. To this day, many live in high-rise apartment buildings in the Dixon Road and Islington Avenue areas, or in other low-income neighborhoods including Rexdale, Jamestown, and in the Jane and Finch corridors (Jibril 2011:14). Many of the Isaaq clan-family members settled in the north of the city in North York and in the east in Scarborough (Berns McGown 1999:23).

In the early 1990s Somali individuals and families were mainly inland refugee claimants, however, others entered as Convention refugees as well as immigrants. In the cases of refugee claimants, the lack of identity documents, especially among Somali women was a major issue. Many Somalis did not take their identity documents with them because of frantic departures and banditry. As well, women were less likely than men to

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8 Inland claimants enter Canada as asylum seekers applying for refugee status within Canada.
9 Convention refugees have obtained refugee status in another country and have immigrated to Canada as government-assisted or sponsored refugees.
have a driver’s license, passport, or other official documents. There was also no way of obtaining new documents or to authenticating existing ones because of the lack of an existing government in Somalia. The case led the Canadian government to pass Bill C-86 in 1993 and amend the Immigration Act in 1997, which created a category of refugees without identity documents, Undocumented Convention Refugees in Canada Class (UCRCC). The effect of the policy was that undocumented refugees from Somalia, the majority women and children, had to wait five years after refugee determination before they were able to apply for permanent residency leaving many families in legal limbo for over ten years. Their immigration status affected their ability to gain employment, for youth to get post-secondary education, and prevented family reunification (Israelite et al. 1999, Spitzer 2006, Jibril 2011).

The newcomer Somali individuals and families who were displaced as a result of the Ethiopian occupation (2006-2009) and/or have lived in cities or camps in various countries as refugees before settling in Toronto come from both urban and rural areas of Somalia. These newcomers usually immigrate to Canada as Government Assisted Refugees (GARs). Somalis have migrated from different regions, including Northern, Central, and Southern Somalia. Somalis in the city occupy various social positions, including their level of education and socio-economic status; however, the majority live in poverty. According to Michael Ornstein (2006), 63 percent of Somalis in Toronto live below Canada’s unofficial poverty line.11 Three-fourths of Somali children live in families below the low income cut off. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2011)

10 Government assisted refugees immigrate to Canada under government assisted refugee program and are sponsored by the Canadian government for their first year in Canada through financial and settlement support.
11 There is no official poverty line in Canada the “Low Income Cutoff” continues to be the measure used by Statistics Canada.
estimates that Somalis under 30 represent 80 percent of the Somali-Canadian population (personal communication with Metropolis roundtable, October 6, 2011). Toronto as a site for research shows the heterogeneity of the Somali communities.

**Main Field of Research: Kitchener-Waterloo**

Kitchener-Waterloo is the main site of my fieldwork because there is increasing settlement of newcomers in second and third tier cities in Canada. Kitchener-Waterloo has a unique history of being a place of refuge for people who face persecution. Between 1796 and 1798 Pennsylvania German Mennonite farming families who were looking for a place to live where they could practice their beliefs without persecution were interested in settling in the area (Eby 1895). Mennonites continue to help asylum seekers and refugees in Kitchener-Waterloo where they have established centres, organizations, and spaces of sanctuary (MCRS 2012). In 2002, Citizenship and Immigration Canada created a federal plan to encourage newcomers to settle outside of Canada’s main immigrant destinations (Montreal, Vancouver, Toronto) with one of the main alternatives being Waterloo Region. The immigrant and refugee population in Waterloo Region comprises one-fourth of the total population (Abu-Ayyash and Brochu 2006). According to one of the Board of Directors for the African-Canadian Association of Waterloo Region and Area, there are approximately 4,000-5,000 Somalis living in Kitchener-Waterloo. Similar to Toronto, many Somalis in Kitchener-Waterloo were displaced from Somalia during Siyad Barre’s presidency (1969-1991), particularly in the years before his government was overthrown. Many of these families first settled in Toronto and moved to Kitchener-Waterloo. There are various reasons Somalis have chosen to move to Kitchener-Waterloo, but the majority of the Somalis I spoke with in the area, noted they moved there to raise their children in a
city that has less violence and gangs, compared to Toronto, and to live close to universities.

There are also many newcomer Somalis who are being resettled in Kitchener-Waterloo. Similar to the newcomers in Toronto, these Somali individuals and families were displaced from Somalia following Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia (2006-2009) and/or they have lived in cities and camps as refugees in other countries throughout the world before resettling in Canada (personal communication with Somali community leader, November 21, 2010). The majority of Somali households in the region are female-headed since many men died or went missing during the war. The increasing amount of Somali families that are female-headed households and are resettled in Canada is also a result of international resettlement policy, which gives higher priority to “women at risk” (Boyle and Ali 2009). Many Somalis live in poverty in Kitchener-Waterloo; however, there are some who are educated and who occupy a higher socio-economic status.

Field of Research in the United States: Minneapolis-Saint Paul

Somalis have also sought refuge in the United States with Minneapolis-Saint Paul or the Twin Cities, as the largest Somali centre, known as “second Somalia” or “little Mogadishu.” The majority of Somalis live in the area around Cedar and Riverside Avenues and East Franklin Avenue in Minneapolis. The first Somalis who were resettled in Minneapolis were displaced after Barre’s regime ended (1991) and five hundred Somali refugees were resettled in Minneapolis in 1991. Both Lutheran and Catholic churches sponsored this group.

Family reunification, access to social services, and the availability of jobs in meat processing plants that did not require English proficiency contributed to the growth of the Somali population in this city (personal communication with Somali Action Alliance,
The actual number of Somalis in Minneapolis is disputed. According to the US Census Bureau (2010), the 2010 census estimates that the Somali population in the state of Minnesota numbers 32,398 with a margin of error that is +/- 3,622. The census is based on American Community Surveys taken between 2008-2010. Yet, the director of the Somali Action Alliance estimates that Somalis in Minneapolis may number 72,000-80,000 (personal communication, May 19, 2009). There are many reasons for the discrepancy in the data. One reason is the rapid increase of the Somali population through natural increase and immigration. Second, many Somalis have refugee status and are left out of the census; therefore, the numbers published by US immigration statistics do not incorporate the entire population. Finally, some Somalis do not fill out census, which may be considered a subversive act, to avoid being written into state registers (see Sharma and Gupta 2006).

The Somali population in Minnesota is younger than the general population with a median age of 25 years resulting in approximately half of the population being 24 years old or younger (US Census Bureau 2010). According to US Refugee Resettlement Watch (2009) as of 2007 about 51 percent of residents who were born in Somalia are living in poverty; therefore, Somalis in the US are among the youngest and the poorest in Minnesota. Nonetheless, Somalis in Minneapolis-Saint Paul are more successful in securing employment compared to other Somali diaspora populations. According to Barbara J. Ronningen (2004), in 2000 in the state of Minnesota, the employment of the Somali population over the age of 16 was 47 percent. Benny Carlson (2007) calculated this figure for the population between 20-64 years of age and found that between 55-60 percent of Somalis are employed. Carlson compared these numbers to Sweden where employment among Somalis over 16 years was 23 percent in 2003 and 28 percent in the
age 20-64 age group, concluding that the employment of Somalis in Minnesota is twice as high as Sweden. During Benny Carlson’s (2007:180) research and fieldwork, he found that Somalis are employed in production and transportation (36 percent), sales and office occupations (26 percent), service occupations (22 percent), and within the health and care sector (35 percent). As of 2005 the African Development Centre in Minneapolis estimates that there are 800 Somali businesses in Minnesota (Carlson 2007:180-181). These statistical distributions index that the socioeconomic status of Somalis in Minneapolis-Saint Paul is diverse and heterogeneous.

**Fieldwork: Participant-Observation and Interviews**

In October 2008, I decided to attend a conference held at the University of Toronto by the Somali Cause and the Somali-Canadian Diaspora Alliance. The conference’s focus was on Somali history with the purpose to examine the causes of the current civil war and the issues affecting the youth in the diaspora, topics that I soon learned were common themes at Somali conferences and meetings. The main concern at this historical moment was the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, which occurred in December 2006 and continued until 2009. During the conference I was struck by the strength and knowledge of the women and youth and I was interested in how Somalis in the diaspora were involved in politics both in Somalia and in their adoptive societies, a topic that would morph into this work a few years later. When I returned to the university I started to make connections with refugee organizations in Kitchener-Waterloo where I lived for many years and have many networks and connections to individuals and organizations.

This work is based on two years of preliminary research and 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork. Throughout 2008-2009 I conducted preliminary research in
Kitchener-Waterloo at an organization that provides services to asylum seekers, a
government organization that helps government assisted refugees for the first year after
resettlement, and a homework support program for African children and youth. During
this time, I began to question the systems and institutions that are supposed to meet the
needs of newcomers and became critical of how state sponsored schools are educating
refugee children and youth.

I was encouraged and hosted by members of the Somali Cause to carry out
preliminary research in Minneapolis-Saint Paul during May-June 2009 and May-June
2010. During these visits, I conducted fieldwork at a community centre, a Somali
community organization, a Somali civic organization, Somali malls, and mosques. I also
attended and was involved in community events for and by Somali youth. In addition to
this preliminary fieldwork, throughout 2009-2010 I attended private, weekly Somali
language and culture sessions with a Somali teacher.

In June 2010-October 2011 with the guidance of Somali friends as well as the
help of a local education program, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Kitchener-
Waterloo. In this site, I tutored in both middle and secondary school homework support
programs, tutored a Somali family of seven children in their home, and was a board
member for a women’s organization. I also visited with Somali families in their homes, at
work, at events, and in mosques. During these 16 months, I also conducted fieldwork in
Toronto where I met with Somali individuals and families in their homes, at coffee shops,
work, community centres, and organizations. In both sites, I had meetings and discussions
with refugee and immigrant organizations, education programs, and other non-
governmental and community organizations and centres that meet the needs of Somali
youth and their families.
In June-July 2011 I returned to Minneapolis-Saint Paul to conduct fieldwork with much of the focus on Somalia’s Independence Day commemoration. With my guide, interpreter and historical educator, Abdulrahman Adem, I met with Somali men and women of different generations and from different regions in Somalia at their homes, in parks, at organizations and events, coffee shops, restaurants, and Somali malls. I attended all of the Independence Day events including, a Northern Independence Day conference at a hotel (June 26), the annual soccer tournament, and the Somalia and American Independence Day commemoration (July 2). During this time, I also spent time with youth in youth led events and at Somali organizations and centres.

Along with participant-observation, the research draws on in-depth, life history interviews and four focus group sessions with 51 Somali youth in Kitchener-Waterloo, Toronto, and Minneapolis. I conducted the interviews with 26 males and 25 females between the ages of 14 and 30 [see Table 1]. While the youth were within these age ranges their stories are reminiscent of experiences of their childhood. I tried to keep the interviews as open as possible, letting the individual tell his or her own story in his or her own way; however, when I was asked to raise specific questions I focused on five main themes, including (1) memories of home and homeland, whether the memories are their own or have been transmitted, as well as their migration journeys, (2) education experiences throughout their lives, (3) peer relationships, (4) family and community relationships, and (5) hopes for the future. The research presented here also draws from interviews and one focus group session I conducted with 24 Somali mothers and fathers, elders, community leaders, and educators. All of these interviews and focus group sessions were between 30 minutes to 4 hours in length.
I also conducted shorter interviews and focus group sessions (between 5 minutes and 60 minutes) with 37 of these participants who were between the ages of 14 and 80 on their memories or the transmission of memories of Somalia’s Independence Day in Minneapolis-Saint Paul. For these interviews my interlocutors\textsuperscript{12} chose the memories they wished to record, which included personal memories of the period leading up to Independence Day, the day of independence, the unity of the North and the South, the period following independence, poetry recited and songs sung at the time of independence, and the transmission of memories to younger generations of Somalia’s independence. Many also spoke of the personal meaning of independence.

Table 1: Number of interviews with Somali youth according to age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ages of Somali youth interviewed</th>
<th>Ages 14-19</th>
<th>Ages 20-24</th>
<th>Ages 25-30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of the interviews were conducted in English; however, some of the interviews with elders, mothers, and fathers as well as newcomer Somali youth involved a translator. Even though I studied the Somali language for two years, I did not have the proficiency to carry out extensive interviews in the language. Somali oratory is also rich in metaphor, poetry, and allegory, some of which I would miss if I did not have assistance (see Besteman 1999). If my interlocutors felt more comfortable speaking in Somali, I offered to have a Somali interpreter present in the interviews. In Kitchener-Waterloo, I employed two different interpreters depending on the age of the interlocutors. For the mothers and fathers, I employed a Somali mother who had experience as an interpreter; however, for the newcomer youth I employed a Somali university student who has years

\textsuperscript{12} I use the term “interlocutor” instead of “informant” or “interviewee” to emphasize the methodology of conversational interviews.
of experience working for an embassy in refugee camps. In Toronto, I employed a Somali mother as an interpreter for interviews and meetings with mothers and fathers. In Minneapolis, I employed a Somali university student who had experience as a research assistant and interpreter. During my 2011 fieldwork in Minneapolis-Saint Paul, I was very fortunate to have a Somali father and educator who is also a professional interpreter work with me to conduct Somalia’s Independence Day interviews and focus group sessions. The presence of an interpreter did have an effect on the interviews and focus groups. The interlocutors may have silenced parts of their histories and may not have spoken as openly because of the presence of another Somali community member, or were encouraged to speak out for the same reason. Nonetheless, in some contexts, such as the interviews around memories of Somalia’s Independence Day, the presence of an interpreter allowed me to access information that I would not have learned on my own.

**Oral Histories**

Oral histories allowed me to examine the past-present relation (see PMG 1982) between Somali history and the contemporary conflict in Somalia and how these memories affect Somalis in North America. In this research I use oral history as an expression of popular memory to examine how Somali youth’s identities are reshaped by present political contexts (see PMG 1982, Thomson 1994). Through a popular memory approach the researcher recognizes that a group of people is grounded in a shared history, but that each person has experienced that history differently (PMG 1982, Hall 1990a). Oral history draws our attention to the past-present relation where the tension and close relationship between historical and political aims is most apparent, and where the present shapes how we remember the past and vice versa. In other words, memories reconstructed through oral histories help us understand the present structures of power and
contemporary political climates (PMG 1982, Samuel and Thompson 1990). Another aspect of popular memory I use to complement oral histories is the examination of Somali poetry and songs. Somalia is often described as a land of poets, which continues in various oral forms today. I use the work of Said S. Samatar (1982), who examined the role of oral poetry on the 19th century Somali national resistance movement, to aid in my analysis of the poetry and songs as expressions of popular memory during Somalia’s independence.

**Generational Analysis**

In this work, I use a generational analysis of oral histories to examine how Somali youth are negotiating between simultaneous identities, some of them not necessarily oppositional, for example between attachments to family and Somali nationhood and/or an Islamic *umma*. The study of generations emphasizes differentiation within as well as between generations (Whitehead et al. 2007). If relations between generations are historically changing and these changes are linked to historical and global events it is important to understand how these events affect people (Kertzer 1983). David I. Kertzer (1983) uses the term in three ways that are useful for this study: (1) generation as principle of kinship descent, (2) generation as historical period, and (3) generation as a cohort.

First, anthropologists use generation to examine larger kinship relations and include studies of how remembrances and private histories are transmitted. One key aspect of popular memory comes out of the centrality of generation or ‘telling the children’ as a fundamental impulse to remember and to silence (Bertaux and Thompson 1993:1-2). Here there can be a struggle to connect public events and private experiences because in public representations, such as commemoration or myth, people need to make
sense of their memories within their private lives by seeking coherence with public representations (Thomson 1994). For example, Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson (1993) examine the role of the family in the transmission of memories. The researchers found that most parents seek to transmit only the aspects of their families’ culture, which they approve of and quite often deliberately attempt to hand down. They may also transmit their ambitions and unrealized projects to their children, but the children are meaning makers and therefore make these memories their own. Therefore, transmission is at the same time individual and collective and takes place through a two-way relationship (Bertaux and Thompson 1993: 2).

The transmission of memories often requires the narrator to not only remember his or her own experiences, but also those in past generations. Luisa Passerini (1987) argues that in the context of generations the personal memory combines with the collective memory and individual mythology turns into tradition, shared within social groups. The case of the private transmission of memories and public commemoration, legends, and other oral literature surrounding Somalia’s Independence Day will explore to the extent possible not only the memories transmitted to youth, but also the silencing (Inowlocki 1993) of narratives between generations. The learning and silencing of familial histories and/or national histories may impact Somali children and youth’s senses of belonging to home and adoptive countries and the memories of generations influence each other in complex ways (Feuchtwang 2000).

The second way I use generation is to refer to a group of people who have experienced the same historical event. These major historical events often provide anchors to their narratives. In chapter 5, historical ruptures distinguish different generations. Elders, between 60-80 years old, who were children and youth during
Somalia’s independence, anchor their narratives in the time of independence (1960). The second generation, between 31-59 years old, ground their narratives in Syiad Barre’s military coup (1969). Finally, the third generation, the youth between 14-30 years old, anchors their narratives in the current armed conflict in the north (1988) and in the south (1991), as well as their experiences of displacement and settlement in the West.

Finally, I also use generation as a cohort to discuss and analyze the experiences of Somali children and youth as well as to integrate the local perspective of the generations of youth. I separate the younger generations into cohorts based on the historical period and the age at which they resettled in North America. Due to the prolonged civil war and over two decades of displacement and migration this work shows that straightforward analytic categories of first, second, and third generation in migration studies are much more complex. In this study, the first generation is the cohort of newcomer Somalis who resettled in Canada and the US, but were born in Somalia and spent most of their lives in the country or in other countries, such as Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia, or Saudi Arabia. The 1.5-generation is the cohort of Somali youth who were born in Somalia and were displaced as young children with their families. These children were raised in Canada and the US, but may have spent some part of their lives in other countries. The second generation is the Somali children and youth who were either born in Canada or the US. The age ranges of children within families and the migrations of Somalis throughout the last couple of decades have resulted in children within the same families being born and raised in different countries. Table 2 shows the number of interviews I conducted with youth in each of these generations. As is evident from the table most of my interlocutors were from the first and 1.5-generations; therefore, the majority of this work draws on the experiences of these generations. In my analysis, I will examine the personal histories of
the younger generations to uncover the complexity of migration trajectories and to attempt to understand the multiple ways in which each generation relates to home and homeland as well as to the adoptive country.

Table 2: Number of Interviews with Somali Youth in 3 Generational Cohorts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generations of Somali Youth</th>
<th>First Generation</th>
<th>1.5 Generation</th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
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Throughout the chapters I will be drawing on fieldwork and interviews in all three of my field sites. I found that the experiences of Somali children and youth were more similar between countries and distinguished more by generations. There are some factors, nonetheless, that distinguish youth’s experiences between countries, such as state laws and the way they obtain refugee status and I point out the significance of these differences throughout the dissertation.

**Position of Fieldworker/Researcher**

Conducting ethnographic research with Somali individuals and families was influenced by my multiple subject positions, including (1) my position as a Canadian with mixed European background, (2) my female gender position, (3) my age, and (4) my positions as a wife and a mother.

In this research, my subject position as a Canadian from European descent working with Somalis influenced my relationships with many of my interlocutors. Somalis’ experiences of colonization, being recipients of aid in camps, and the current geopolitical environment puts me in an unequal power relationship with my interlocutors and increased the frequency of issues surrounding trust (see Abu-Lughod 1993). My position as an anthropologist has a colonial legacy in Somalia and the politics of representation; the questions I ask, how I write, and for whom I write are important issues
I considered throughout my research (Marcus and Fischer 1986). Oral history minimizes this dynamic because it refuses generalizations by making history central in the analysis. Oral history reveals positionality because there is always a narrator and an audience, the perspective is always partial, and the telling of oral histories is motivated (Abu-Lughod 1993).

As a young woman I did not have access to some of the spaces where men move and live. For example, I did not have access to particular spaces within the mosque. I also did not always have access to informal conversations between boys or informal settings where boys spend their time. Nonetheless, my younger age allowed me to discuss issues with Somali youth and gain access to some spaces where Somali youth spend their time. For example, I was able to sit with other young women in their homes and at coffee shops to discuss politics, popular culture, family, and education. Young women also felt comfortable telling me about issues that affected them and confiding in me.

I also developed deep and lasting relationships with mothers and believe this was based on my position as a mother. My role as a mother helped build trust. For instance, I met an elder who was also a Somali historian through a friend. When we first met he was reluctant to speak to me about his views of independence, stating that he did not know me or my intentions; however, after seeing me with my son at the Independence Day commemoration, he asked me if that was my son and when I introduced him, he decided to do an interview with me.

**Organization of the Dissertation**

In addition to this chapter, the dissertation has four main chapters that examine how the past and present are interrelated, and how this relationship informs the lives of Somali children and youth in North America. The first part of this work shows the
processes that posit Somalis in general and Somali youth in particular in terms of risk by examining the historical and political processes. In chapter 2, I deconstruct the two parallel modernity narratives of ‘African tribalism’ and ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ that have been used by the West to explain the ongoing civil war in Somalia. To do this, I build upon and support the argument put forth by B.S. Chimni (1998) that internalist explanations place the blame of conflict and the resulting displacement solely on the refugee producing state, which obfuscates the responsibility of external interventions that contribute to conflicts. Instead I take an externalist approach to Somalia’s history by examining the conflict in its historical and international contexts. Through linking colonialism and imperialism I show the effects of imperialist policies on Somalia’s politics, economy, and social structures.

In chapter 3, I use the media as a site to examine how geopolitics, specifically the politics of representation, affect the everyday experiences of Somali youth in educational spaces. I argue that the focus on the violence or victimization of the youth conceals a wide range of experiences, as well as the creative and complex ways the youth react to their marginalization and the stereotypes about them. I also argue that the hegemonic discourses pertaining to Somalis as either perpetrators of violence or victims of violence in the media have politicized Somali female and male bodies, and as a result Somali youth are targets of routine forms of violence, expressed in discrimination and marginalization, as well as interpersonal forms of violence, including bullying. Many Somali youth find spaces of belonging in community educational spaces. These spaces help them get involved in their communities and/or give them the knowledge and skills to challenge stereotypical representations of Somalis and Somalia. As a result of their
experiences in state sponsored and community educational spaces, Somali youth are reconstructing their social and political identities.

In chapter 4, I examine the case of first generation Somali children and youth, who immigrated to Canada as Convention Refugees attending Ontario public schools. The chapter investigates the multiple ways Somali children and youth are excluded through language and education policies that maintain a particular conception of Canadian national identity. It also looks at the inflexibility of the system to accommodate and transform the curriculum to meet students’ needs. In the chapter, I also consider the consequences of erasing students’ pasts and deeming their everyday experiences and realities irrelevant. To do this, I explore their diverse migration trajectories and education experiences. I argue that Somali children and youth’s personal histories and everyday experiences within their families and communities are important to the learning process. In this chapter, I suggest that the social and historical agency of students rather than their victimhood needs to be considered to not only reveal the different needs of the students, but also to recognize their competencies and to include these strengths in the curriculum.

In chapter 5, I examine how the past is being negotiated in the present among different generations. Somalia’s Independence Day is seen as a pivotal point in Somalia’s history and is being remembered by different generations in the present with an eye to the future. I argue that Somalis in North America invoke the history of anti-colonial struggles led by youth groups in present struggles against foreign intervention and domination. These memories transmitted in public spaces, such as Somalia’s Independence Day commemoration in Minneapolis, and in private spaces, such as in the telling of stories, songs, poems, proverbs, and legends, provide lessons to warn against divisiveness and to emphasize the national “struggle.” These memories are transmitted to maintain hope for a
united future Somalia and to show younger generations that the present struggle for a unified nation will be difficult. In these community educational spaces, older generations are transmitting their unrealized national ambitions, but youth are making their own meaning from these messages. I conclude the dissertation by illustrating the diverse roles of community educational spaces and how they shape Somali children and youth identities in North America.

In highlighting the relations between the past and the present, colonialism and imperialism, I hope to stress how geopolitical processes reconstruct and reshape Somali children and youth’s identities in the present. What these chapters show is that Somali children and youth have experienced adversity, but they are social and historical agents who are resourceful and react to their marginalization in creative and complex ways. Somali children and youth have multiple references of identity and move within and between multiple sites. More specifically, Somali youth are actively reshaping their subnational, national, and supranational identities, which are shaped by their experiences in state schools as well as community educational spaces.
Chapter 2: The History of Somalia in a Global Context

Introduction: Deconstructing Internal Explanations and Western Historical Narratives of the Ongoing Armed Conflict in Somalia

In this chapter, I build upon the arguments put forth by B.S. Chimni (1998) who suggests that internalist explanations place the blame of conflict in countries in the global South and the resulting displacements solely on the refugee producing state, which obfuscates the responsibility of external interventions that contribute to conflicts.

Somalia has been referred to as a “failed state” in both academic and popular discourse. There is a plethora of research that examines the reasons for its “failure” (see Touval 1963, Laitin and Samatar 1987, Samatar 1994, Simons 1995) and many newspaper articles and reports are dedicated to the topic. Many analyses of states remove the state from its construction and context, viewing states as disconnected social facts based on a functionalist approach. A functionalist and synchronic approach ignores the historical formation of states, how they came into being, and the transnational dynamics that influence their construction and transformation (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Researchers who view states as social facts hold Western states as the ideal type according to which other states are ranked (Sharma and Gupta 2006). Consequently, if a state is absent or weak by comparison it is considered a failure. Critics of this approach point out that a number of scholars 13 who regard the Somali state as a failure adopt an internalist explanation and suggest that the Somali clan system of politics is to blame for the collapse of the state. A complex history is oversimplified by attributing the state’s demise to ‘tribalism’ and the continuity of the armed conflict to Muslim fundamentalism. Based on such a static and localized perspective, warlords and ethnic nationalisms are

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13 Some scholars regard the Somali state as a failure but also include the role of imperialism in its failure that is why I added a number of scholars as opposed to all scholars.
perceived as internal products, rather than byproducts of larger processes and histories that include the West as colonizers (Razack 2004:16).

In the introduction I discussed Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) understanding of modernity narratives as “Culture Talk.” These modernity narratives are used by the West to separate those cultures that are regarded as ‘peaceful,’ ‘civil,’ and thus modern from those cultures that are regarded as predisposed to violence or terror and thus premodern and/or antimodern. Mahmood Mamdani (2004:20-21) distinguishes between two “Culture Talk” narratives. The first narrative views premodern peoples as not yet modern due to their late progression or inability to reach modernity. In the Somali case, the Cold War narrative of the civil war views Somalis, and Africans in general, as having no history and no politics as well as no creative ability (see also Fanon 2004[1963]) and is represented as the reason for clan warfare (Besteman 1999, Cassanelli 1996, de Waal 1998, Samatar 1992). The post-Cold War narrative is associated with the post-9/11 political environment that represents Muslims as premodern and also antimodern. The narrative represents Muslims as having a history that is ruled by customs and traditions, which predisposes them to violence (Said 1997). The narrative also represents Muslims as threatened by Western freedoms that is that “culture (modernity) is the dividing line between those in favor of peaceful, civic existence and those inclined to terror” (Mamdani 2004:18).

Following this line of thinking, Muslim fundamentalism is blamed for continuing the armed conflict in Somalia (see Harper 2007, Marchal 2004, 2007). In this chapter, I deconstruct these two narratives that are generally used to explain the ongoing civil war in Somalia and argue that Western historical narratives ignore the role of colonial and neo-colonial policies in shaping local and global Somali societies and politics.
In light of the above, knowledge of the history of Somalia is critical in order to understand the ongoing conflict and to challenge preconceived notions about its causes, not least a presumed tribalism, an old colonial concept that is generally used when examining political life in African societies. In fact, a Somali intellectual insisted I learn the history of Somalia from pre-colonialism to the present, so I could see the problems that result when terms such as ‘tribe’ are used to describe the contemporary conflict. As a result of my research into Somalia’s history and based on extensive fieldwork, I agree with scholars who challenge the proposition that ‘tribalism’ or the Somali clan system of politics is to blame for the collapse of the state, and instead examine the war within its regional and international contexts (see Samatar 1982, Cassanelli 1996, Besteman 1999, de Waal 1998). The following is by no means a comprehensive history of Somalia, which is impossible to cover in a dissertation chapter. Instead, the chapter provides the reader with a concise background of the major historical turning points in Somalia’s history in order to emphasize how internal and external factors are interlinked, or how external processes and forces shaped Somalia’s contemporary history and society.

**Overview of Somali Clans and Pre-Colonial Territories**

In the following section, I will introduce the main Somali clan-families, their territories, and the clan structure prior to colonialism. I will also offer an overview of the bases of clan divisions in Somali society. The outline is intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of Somali kinship systems in order to comprehend the analysis of colonial policies that tribalized and racialized Somali society, discussed later.
Somalis are related to the Cushitic-speaking family, which includes the Afar of Djibouti, Eritrea, and the Awash Valley, and the Oromo and Borana of Ethiopia and northern Kenya (Lewis 2008:1). The Somali trace their ancestry to either Samaale or Saab and although they are believed to have been antagonistic to one another, both are believed to have Arab origins and are descendants of the Prophet Mohammad (Lewis 2008:2-3).

The descendants of Samaale constitute the majority of the population and are predominantly nomadic pastoralists. The word Somali (‘Soomaali’) comes from the ‘Samaale,’ the name of the mythical ancestor of the four pastoral clan-families. The word ‘Samaale’ emerges from ‘Soo maal’ meaning ‘go and milk,’ stressing pastoralism as the root of the culture (Samatar 1982:10). Samaale clan-families are Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, and Daarood (Lewis 2008:4). These four clan-families have similar kinship systems.

Counting approximately twenty generations to their common ancestor, a smaller unit of the clan-family is the clan. In pre-colonial Somalia, the clan acted as a corporate political unit and had a degree of localization, meaning they were connected with certain territories (Lewis 1999[1961]:4). In large clans, there was a clan head, called a Sultan, but there was no centralized government. In larger clans, the sub-clans were each led by a Sultan (Lewis 1999[1961]:5). The most distinct group within the clans was the primary lineage. This was the lineage by which a person identified as being a member. Marriage, used to maintain or build relations with other primary lineages, was exogamous at this level. An individual could count six to ten generations to the founding ancestor of his or her primary lineage (Lewis 1999[1961]:6). At the lowest level of the system was the dia-

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14 Djibouti is home to Somalis who were part of the French colony. Today, it is a sovereign country (Lewis 2008:42-43).
paying group that Somalis called *jilib*. The group consisted of a few small lineages ranging from hundreds to thousands of members and could trace descent of four to eight generations to a common founder (Lewis 1999[1961]:6). In pre-colonial Somalia the *dia-* paying group was the most important corporate political group and was the level of segmentation where the clan and social contract met (Mohamed 2007:227), discussed in more detail below.

In the past, the Dir clans inhabited the areas of Harar, Borama, and Zeila as well as the territory around Merca in southern Somalia. The Isaaq lived mainly in the northwest and central parts of Somalia, contemporary Somaliland. The Daarood were the largest Somali clan-family and occupied northeastern Somalia or Puntland,\(^{15}\) northeastern Kenya, and the Ogadeen region of Ethiopia (Lewis 2008:5). The Hawiye inhabited the Hiran and Mudug regions of Somalia and part of Benaadir where Mogadishu is located, in between the Daarood to the north and the Digil and Rahanweyn to the south [In Figure 1]. They also occupied the areas across the Jubba River and in northeastern Kenya. The descendants of *Samaale* were considered ‘nobles,’ enjoying high status. Other clan-families, including *Saab* descendants were placed into the category of ‘commoners’ or ‘low-caste’ (Lewis 2008:4-7).

The other two main clan-families, Digil and Rahanweyn, are known collectively as Digil-Mirifle, and traced their ancestry to *Saab*. They were predominantly agriculturalists or pastro-agriculturalists (Samatar 1982:10). The *Saab* were not considered by noble Somali clans to have lineal purity as they were of mixed origin that included Somali, Oromo, and East African Bantu (Besteman 1999:113, Lewis 2008:4-6).

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\(^{15}\) Puntland is a region located in northeastern Somalia. Its leaders declared it an autonomous region in 1998, but it does not seek independence from the Federal Republic of Somalia (Lewis 2008:100).
Figure 1: United Nations, Somalia, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011
Minority clan-families, captured as slaves, were absorbed into the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. During the Arab slave trade Somalis were protected from being captured into slavery since the Qur’an states that Muslims cannot own other Muslims. Nonetheless, some Somalis were involved as middlemen in the trade. For some time the Benaadir region, located on the southern coast of Somali territory was a transit point for slaves coming from Central Africa. The British also freed some slaves who were incorporated in the Horn of Africa as forced laborers (Akou 2011:30). Somali involvement in the trade encouraged a plantation economy in the Shabelle River Valley. Dozens of East African groups were enslaved in Somalia, including the Yao, Zigula, and Makhuwa, from the area between Kenya and Mozambique. They were enslaved to work in Somali owned plantations (Besteman 1999:51, Declich 1995:95). After escaping from the plantations or being freed for converting to Islam they settled in the forests in the Jubba River Valley (Besteman 1999:113). Another group that were descendents of slaves were the Boni, who were hunting and fishing people that lived along the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers. Also inhabiting the area between the rivers near Baidoa, was the Eyle of Bur Heibe, a hunting group known for their pottery (Lewis 2008:6). There were also indigenous Cushitic peoples, such as the Shebelle and Gabwing (de Waal 1997:162). Somali Bantu groups speak Af-maymay, a language related to Somali (Lewis 2008:4). According to Ioan Lewis (2008:6, see also Akou 2011:39, Besteman 1999:114-115), the Somali Bantu were generally referred to as jareer (or ‘hard haired’16) by other Somali clan-families. The ‘jareer’ category is equated with African and slave, which placed them into a category separated from Somalis of Arab descent. Catherine Besteman (1999:113)

16 The term “jareer” is used by Somalis to make a physical distinction between Somalized Bantu who are referred to ‘hard haired’ and themselves, ‘soft haired’ (Lewis 2008:6).
argues that the ancestors of ex-slaves adopted Somali clan affiliations to negotiate social relations and build kinship networks. By the 1970s Somali Bantu, known collectively as Gosha, considered themselves to be citizens of the Somali nation-state, spoke Somali dialects, and practiced Islam.

Other minority clans, Midgaan, Tumaal, and Yibir were also known as Saab, but they had no connection with Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. These clan-families had small populations and were located in northern Somalia. They were distinguished from the four main clan-families in the north because of their specialist trades in hunting, shoemaking, and metal craftsmanship, practices that were considered ‘unclean’ to the noble Somalis (Lewis 2008:7).

**Somalia’s Geopolitical Significance and Colonial History**

Somalia’s location on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean had geopolitical significance for European empires and local Ethiopian expansion. Towards the end of the 19th century Somalia was the stage for colonial conquests by Britain, France, and Italy as well as Egypt and later Ethiopia. In 1897 the European partition of Somalia was complete except for the frontiers, which were later defined (Lewis 1988[1965]:40).

By 1827, Britain had taken control of Aden (contemporary Yemen) and wanted to control one of Somalia’s port towns, Berbera. Britain sought to maintain control of the Somali coast to supply Aden with meats and other commodities that were considered important to supply Aden’s British army with food and commodities to defend British India (Samatar 1982:91). Although Egypt and Britain both had interests in Zeila and Berbera, the British gained control of the towns. A combination of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the Mahdist uprising (1881) against the Anglo-Egyptian occupation in Sudan led to Egypt’s withdrawal from Somalia. As a result, both Britain and Ethiopia
started claiming the territory. Soon thereafter, in 1887, the British signed a protectorate for northwest Somalia or British Somaliland (Brons 2001:132). Even though the British had signed protection treaties with individual Somali clans, some of them were incorporated in the Ethiopian claimed territory. The territory included Ogadeen, a region that would become disputed for years to come. Other Somalis became a part of British Kenyan territory or the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) (Lewis 2008:29).

The French also had trading interests in Somalia. In particular, they wanted to construct a coaling station in the Red Sea to supply naval communication with Indochina. They also wanted to connect the Gulf of Aden to their colonies in equatorial Africa (Samatar 1982:91). They had acquired the port of Obok in 1859 in northwest Somalia and constructed a trading company with Ethiopia in 1881. After the trading company was established, a rivalry between the British and the French ensued. In 1888 imperialist competitiveness between Britain and France led to an agreement to divide northern Somalia between Zeila and Djibouti (Brons 2001:132). The Franco-Ethiopian railway was constructed to link Djibouti with Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s main port (Lewis 2008:29).

Prior to the partition of Somali territory, Italy had imperial interests in Ethiopia, but after much diplomatic fighting over Italy’s protectorate over the country the Ethiopian Emperor, Menelik II, wrote the Circular Letter in which he asserted Ethiopian claims to the territory and Ethiopia as a unified Ethiopian state. Nevertheless, the Italians continued to claim their protectorate over Ethiopia, which led to the battle of Adwa in 1896.

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17 Ogadeen is a sub-lineage of the Daarood clan-family and claims territory that was demarcated as part of Ethiopian territory. Even though Somalis largely inhabit the territory from the Ogadeen lineage, other Somali clan-families also live in the area. Today, the main actors in the Ogadeen conflict are the Ogadeen National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). The ONLF is a national organization that seeks the freedom of its people in the region (Seid 2009).
Ethiopia won the battle and expelled Italian rule, although Italy kept Eritrea as a colony. Britain, France, and Italy came to recognize Ethiopia as a superpower in the region and began to negotiate with Emperor Menelik II who was seeking imperial expansion over the Cushitic-speaking Oromo and Somali peoples around Harar and to the southeast (Lewis 2008:29). By 1900 the Emperor had seized Ogadeen region in west Somalia (Brons 2001:134). According to Maria H. Brons (2001:134), it was Italy’s defeat that made the occupation of Somalia more important to the colonial government that had a vision of shipping through the Suez Canal and Red Sea to India (Lewis 1988[1965]:41). As a consequence, in 1905, Italy started its direct administration of Italian Somaliland (Brons 2001:136). The demarcation of borders was carried out without taking into consideration Somali aspirations, livelihoods, or territorial distinctions, and separated Somalis into five different territories, including French Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud or Reserved Areas (R.A.) and Ogadeen, Italian Somaliland, and the N.F.D in Kenya (Lewis 1963:148). The division of clan territory constructed international boundaries that cut through pastoral lands. The partitions between protectorates caused pastoral groups to fight over smaller amounts of resources (Brons 2001).

In the early Italian colonial period, two trading companies were the basis for Italian interest in Somalia; however, in 1923 when Benito Mussolini came into power the Italians looked to Somalia to build its military and establish a colonial armed force, corpo zaptie (Brons 2001:142). This was in part due to Italy’s over-reaching goal of occupying Ethiopia. In the early phases of World War I, the Italian colonial army began invading Ethiopian-Somali Ogadeen. A confrontation between Ethiopian and Italian Somali troops in 1935 at Walwal, located in eastern Somali Ogadeen, was used as an opportunity to occupy Ethiopia. In 1936 Italy’s vision became a reality and it merged Italian Somaliland
with Eritrea and Ethiopia, and drove the British out of their Somaliland protectorate to form Italian East Africa (Brons 2001:144-145, Lewis 2008:31). After the defeat of the Italians by Britain and its allies in 1941, Italian, British, and Ethiopian Somali territories came under British rule with the exception of Djibouti for eight years (1941-1949). At the end of WWII the British decided they could not maintain the East African Empire and the "Big Four Powers," Britain, France, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. began to negotiate Italy’s ex-colonies. Britain proposed a united Somali state under UN Trusteeship and British administration; however, the proposal, known as the Bevin Plan, was rejected and Somalia was repartitioned. The British Somaliland protectorate was reinstated, Italy returned to administer its former colony in 1950 under UN Trusteeship, and the Ogadeen region was returned to Ethiopia (Lewis 2008:32).

Similar to the British colonial policies that retribalized and reordered the social map of Sudan (Mamdani 2009), colonial policies tribalized and racialized Somali clans. Mahmood Mamdani (1996:3-4) argues that the colonial state everywhere in Africa shared essential features that sought to respond to "the native question," that is, how a small foreign minority can rule over an indigenous majority. This was accomplished, he argues, through direct and indirect rule. Direct rule was the initial response and was characterized by unmediated, centralized, and absolute power. Natives were to follow European laws and only civilized natives had access to European rights. It transformed economic institutions by appropriating land, destroying collective independence, and defeating and dispersing tribal populations (Mamdani 1996:17-18). Indirect rule was mediated, decentralized, and absolute. Land remained communal and indirect ways to control the natives were used. Depending on the context, tribal leadership was either reconstituted or imposed where it never before existed. While native authority was imposed in the rural
areas, urban-based natives were neither subject to custom nor considered citizens with rights (Mamdani 1996:17-18). In the Somali case, in the north the British imposed a tribal authority where one never existed, undermining Somali political and economic institutions, described in detail below. In the south, a similar form of indirect rule was instituted. In addition, both the Italians and the British imposed European notions of race onto the populations that reinscribed the master-slave distinction, distinguishing clans, and reinforcing the pastoral-agriculture divides (Besteman 1999:120-121).

Pre-colonial Somali politics were governed by two related and interacting principles of kinship, specifically clanship and social contract, known as Xeer and translated as compact, contract, agreement or treaty. Agnates bound by treaty (tol heerleh) were political groups made up of men who were not based merely on a shared common ancestor, but on treaties that defined their collective political and jural responsibility. These political groups settled conflicts between individuals and groups through payment or collection of compensation for transgressions committed by or against the group (Samatar 1992:631, Mohamed 2007:227). According to I.M. Lewis (1999[1961]:161) men were said to be of the same Xeer when their relations were governed by contractual agreements directly entered by them or inherited through their ancestors. Even though agreements were inherited through the male line that is passed down through their father’s lineage at birth, they were in constant flux and changed over time to attend to the needs of individuals or groups. New contracts could be made or entered into by individuals and groups depending on their current needs (Lewis 1999[1961]:159-160, Mohamed 2007:227). Contractual agreements were most often made at the level of the dia-paying group, but they could be made at any level of segmentation. Jama Mohamed (2007:228) suggests that there was a distinction between
the political council (*shir*) and the law council (*xeerbeegti*). The former was held at the level of the *dia*-paying group or the clan to meet and discuss such issues as recognizing a new *dia*-paying group, adopting a peace treaty, or planning a war. The latter council resolved conflicts between *dia*-paying groups, lineages, clans, and individuals, for example, murder, theft, injury, insult, divorce, and inheritance. There was no centralized administration or government and no single leader of the councils, but it was the responsibility of the elders to ensure that contracts were honored (Lewis 1999[1961]:162, Mohamed 2007:228). Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992:632) argues that the *Xeer* was a necessity in pre-colonial Somalia since there was no centralized state and the household was the basic unit of livelihood and production with pastoralism at its base. In this context, no household or lineage could get enough of a surplus of resources to dominate or exploit other families or groups. *Xeer* was voluntary and was a necessity to rely on one’s own labor and livestock, preventing men from exploiting each other.

Colonial policies, Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992) argues, led to the commoditization of livestock and changed the relationship between pastoralists, merchants, and the state. The former social order based in livestock production, governed by the rules of the *Xeer*, and the needs of the household were transformed as competition over commodities increased and there was accumulation of wealth in urban centres. Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992) suggests that kinship without contract turned into clannism. Clannism was encouraged by British colonial policies of indirect rule, which aimed to tribalize and reestablish clans, and to construct boundaries to divide and conquer. To do this, for example, they granted power and authority to elders of *dia*-paying groups, giving them the title of *Aqils* (chiefs), constructing a hierarchy within clan-families, lineages, and territories where one never before existed. The British colonial administrators identified
the ‘tribes’ and the ‘chiefs’ that ruled each of the clans or ‘tribes,’ so the ‘chiefs’ could act as mediators between the colonial administration and the ‘tribes’ as a measure to begin indirect rule (Mohamed 2007:229). Jama Mohamed (2007:230) argues that the colonial administration tried to transform *Aqils* into rulers, but they were not men of influence and credibility. Those men who did have influence did not want to identify themselves with the colonial government. Moreover, there were no ‘tribes’ in the country and no ‘tribal’ hierarchy that could require mediators. I.M. Lewis (2008:28) suggests that some clans had institutionalized clan heads, but they were not chiefs in the sense of much of the rest of Africa’s political structure.

Commissioner Cardeaux of the British administration in Somalia blamed ‘detribalization,’ rather than the invention of “artificial positions of leadership,” for *Aqils* lack of political clout and was determined to reinstate their status and authority through the creation of a strong organization that would bring together ‘tribes’ (Mohamed 2007:230). The organization was administratively run by *Aqils* and also had a military component. Taken together, these components created a political body to enable Somalis to govern themselves while maintaining the power of the British (Mohamed 2007:230). Yet, the appointment of *Aqils* weakened the *dia*-paying groups who were traditionally egalitarian, creating a culture of jealousy and rivalry (Lewis 1999[1961]:203). The leaders of pre-colonial political and jural councils had no more power than an elder and had no power of coercion. Leadership was obtained and maintained by voluntary loyalty based on admired qualities, including wealth, poetic gift, oratory ability, political ability, piety, wisdom, courage, personal strength, and/or tactics in war (Mohamed 2007:230, emphasis added). In other words, the administration constituted *Aqils* and *Sultans* as
leaders creating “artificial positions of leadership,” while establishing police and military units that had the effect of diminishing the authority of the elders (Mohamed 2007:230).

According to Jama Mohamed (2007:231), the late colonial period was characterized by development initiatives and the “imperialism of knowledge”\(^\text{18}\) to make the colonies more productive following the war. Political reform included establishing local authorities in ‘traditional institutions.’ In addition, the British colonial administration established modern institutions, such as the Protectorate Advisory Council, its successor the Legislative Council, Local Government Councils, and the Executive Council that were to be built on a ‘traditional basis’ or customary law. Jama Mohamed (2007:232) argues the British colonial administration realized that Aqils did not have authority in rural areas and were not cooperating with the colonial administration, so the British sought to displace them. The administration looked to civil servants and traders, who had an education and were known to possess knowledge, to govern the people. This “new governing class” would support indirect rule, acting as a liaison between the clans and the British colonial administration. Even though the British wanted to displace the Aqils and Sultans they could not be completely excluded in the rural areas since political reform called for the establishment of “modern institutions along traditional lines;” therefore, they did get positions in local government councils that as a collective replaced the power of the single authority of the Aqils (Mohamed 2007:232). In the rural areas, the local government councils were in control of taxation, judicial institutions, and the police. In the towns, local government councils ran the municipal affairs (Mohamed

\(^{18}\) “Imperialism of knowledge” means the appearance of ‘white man as expert,’ which sought to ‘modernize’ Somali institutions. During this time colonial ‘experts’ taught Somalis about ‘modern’ agriculture, irrigation, livestock husbandry, soil and forestry improvement, public health, education, institutional development and political reform (Mohamed 2007:231).

In Italian Somaliland, indirect rule was also established. The Italian District and Provincial Commissioners identified local leaders who were labeled by the Italian-Arab hybrid, *capo-qabilah* or ‘chiefs.’ These chiefs were advisors to the colonial administration. Nevertheless, when Benito Mussolini came into power in Italy in 1922, Somalia began to be ruled by a strong differentiation between the ‘natives’ and the Italian colonizers. In contrast to the few British settlers in British Somaliland, there were thousands of Italian settlers in Italian Somaliland (Lewis 2008:30).

Along with chiefs’ artificial positions of leadership, divisions were made based in European notions of race. Mahmood Mamdani (1996:24) argues that in many colonial states throughout Africa the town and country or rural areas were divided along ethnic lines. In Italian Somaliland, colonial administrators’ categorization of race and the use of ‘tribe’ constructed a hierarchy that separated people of slave ancestry from other Somalis as a separate race, engendering a division between the pastoral, nomadic

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19 The concept of “race” emerged in the 19th century to enable scientists to classify people according to their inherited physical characteristics. It is no longer used in this way, but continues to be appropriated to create, maintain, and reproduce social hierarchies (Robbins and Larkin 2007:312). This is evident through colonialism and in new forms of imperialism.

On the other hand, the concept of “ethnicity” is widely used in the social sciences and can be distinguished by two viewpoints: primordial and instrumental. In this work, I take the instrumentalist view of ethnicity although it has its own problems and limitations. The instrumentalist view of ethnicity regards humans have lived and worked in a wide range of groups, resulting in people having multiple collective identities. From this viewpoint human beings choose and construct identities according to their situation. Instrumentalists see the cultural contents and meanings of ethnic identities change with cultures, periods, economic and political circumstances, according to the perceptions and attitudes of each member. They are never static, and never fixed. Every ethnicity is different and is undergoing change (Smith 1995). There are some problems with this view. First, the view makes the assumption that people only “put on” an identity in situations and does not consider that people have multiple identities at the same moment or in the same situation. These identities are, in other words, simultaneous, and often contradictory. Second, it does not consider the heterogeneity within groups.
Samaale and the agricultural, sedentary Saab, particularly the Somali Bantu as racially distinct (Besteman 1999:119-120).

Theories of race and racial purity shaped Italian and British colonial policies that determined the rights to public education and facilities based on race categories of European, Asian, or African, with the best resources and rights for Europeans and the worst for Africans (Akou 2011:41). Colonial administrators were confused as to where to place Somalis in their constructed racial hierarchies; therefore, they imposed their own racial categories onto local constructions of difference (Besteman 1999:120). Emphasizing their difference from the Bantu ancestry of the Gosha villagers and the Boni, the pastoral Somalis obtained status by promoting their Arab ancestry (Besteman 1999:120-122, Akou 2011:38-39). According to Catherine Besteman (1999:119), colonial documents show that the British administration did not want to place Somalis into the same category as other Africans. The administration even asked for a revision of the official colonial racial categorization so that Somalis could be categorized as Europeans or Asians rather than native, black Africans. For their part, Somalis pleaded their case to the Native Chief Commissioner to recognize their Arabian ancestry and their superior status to other groups so as to escape the Registration Act that would treat them the same as native, black Africans.

Both the British and the Italians categorized the Somali Bantu as inferior to other Somalis and territorialized them in the Jubba Valley. The term ‘tribe’ was applied to the Bantu, a classification that helped to reconstitute them as a unified group with a distinct territory and as separate from pastoral Somali clans. As a consequence of constructing the valley as a space inhabited by ex-slaves, in the 1930s the Italian administration saw the area as a place for agricultural exploitation. They believed the ‘ex-slaves and their
descendants’ would be ‘suitable’ for forced labor campaigns and conscripted them as banana plantation laborers. In short, European racial categorizations justified the re-enslavement of the villagers (Besteman 1999:120-121). As evidenced later in the chapter, the separation of slave descendants from other Somalis was reinforced with Barre’s policies, which strove to establish a unified Somali state, but excluded the Bantu from the nation. Later, during the war, racialized populations were marginalized making them subject to gross violations throughout the war.

The Effects of Colonial Policies on Somalia’s Economy

The earliest written document concerning Somali people and Somali territory, a Greco-Egyptian shipping manual from the first century, describes Somali territory as The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea and provides a list of the products available along the northeast coast, including cinnamon, fragrant gums, spices, tortoise shell, frankincense, ivory, and myrrh (Akou 2011:14). Although some of these products came from other places and were simply transported through the Horn of Africa, Somali nomads also carried products such as frankincense to the coast for the purpose of trade (Akou 2011:14). As early as the 7th century, Arab and Persian trading settlements were established in Zeila in the north, Mogadishu in the south, and along the coast at Merca and Brava. According to Ioan Lewis (2008:2), these centres reinforced an Islamic identity and spurred population movements west and south on the Somali peninsula. In 1331 Ibn Battuta, an Arab Muslim explorer from Morocco, visited Mogadishu and noted a “thriving textile industry” that was producing and exporting cloth to Egypt (Akou 2011:15). In the 1400s Vasco da Gama, a Portuguese explorer, noted that Arabs, Somalis, Beja, and Harari had total control over long-distance trade in the Red Sea (Akou 2011:16). Later, the wealth of these traders attracted the attention of the Portuguese. As a
result, Portuguese sailors attacked and looted cities along the coast, including Zeila and Mogadishu. During these attacks Brava was destroyed, residents were killed, and others held captive. Riches such as gold, silver and other merchandise were stolen. The Portuguese failed in their attempts to control local trade to secure a sea route to Asia; however, according to Heather Marie Akou (2011:16-17), who conducted an in-depth historical, archival and ethnographic analysis of Somali material culture, the Portuguese incursions and attacks on Somalia prompted a change in the economy from one based on trade to pastoralism.

In the 19th century, settlers from the Middle East built homes in urban areas of Somalia and sometimes intermarried with Somalis (Akou 2011:39-40). In rural areas, the majority of people were nomads, traveling with herds of camels and sheep. According to Ioan Lewis’ (2008:3), 60 to 70 percent of Somalis were nomadic pastoralists. These animals provided families with milk, meat, and leather for clothing. The roles of men were to find water and pastures, take care of the herds, and protect the household from raids and wild animals. Women raised the children, tended to the baby animals, built and dismantled the household shelters (aqal) when moving to another place, made baskets, and prepared food. In the 1870s, a British explorer noted that urban and rural women both used frankincense and that the highest quality came from the Horn of Africa; however, Somalis would travel across the Arabian Peninsula to collect it for trade (Akou 2011:17-18).

Other Somali clans had a wide range of skills they used to make products or to offer a service. The Boni, Midgaan, Yibir, and Tumaal had specialized trades making sandals, amulets, shields, and weapons. The Midgaan performed circumcisions and made products out of leather. They hunted large animals, such as the rhinoceros, making
durable sandals and shields from the hides. Tumaal, descendants of nomads who intermarried with Midgaan were blacksmiths and produced weapons and some types of jewelry out of iron and other metals. The Yibir made amulets, prayer mats, and sandals. In addition, they performed rituals to protect nomads against snakes, scorpions, illnesses or other potential dangers during events such as marriage and childbirth (Akou 2011:20-22).

With the Arab slave trade and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 nomads increasingly traded with Europeans who were looking for livestock to supply their colonies in Africa and the Middle East as well as materials such as ostrich feathers, tortoise shell, ivory and leather to ship back to their homelands (Akou 2011:28). The invention of the steamship and the regular trade on the coast, brought opportunities for Somalis to travel as sailors, laborers, pilgrims, and scholars. Until the colonization of Somali territory, Somalis had complete control over the interior as Europeans rarely traveled inland. This may be in part due to the reputation Somali nomads had of being extremely fierce as well as the harsh climate and rocky hills on the northern edge of Somali territory (Akou 2011:28). Pastoralists migrated to towns along the coast to sell their livestock during the dry season and would migrate through the hills, desert, and eventually to the grassland in the interior to the Haud during the rainy season. During the rainy season they would graze their livestock, and collect products to be traded in the dry season. In the south, the Geledi Sultanate, a group of ‘noble’ Somali clans, controlled the region’s trade and the agricultural lands between the Jubba and Shabelle Rivers (Akou 2011:28-29). As discussed earlier, agriculturalists from Mozambique and Kenya as well as Oromo from neighboring countries were enslaved by Somali pastoralists who
considered agriculture to be inferior, so they used slaves to cultivate the land (Besteman 1999:120-122, Akou 2011:30).

Northern and southern Somalia’s economies have been affected differently as a result of the differing policies of the colonial administrations. Until 1935 in the north of Somalia, there were very few British colonial administrators in the protectorate at one time. The British administration’s central concern was to foster trade in livestock and other products with Aden (Yemen) (Akou 2011:46, Samatar 1982:10). Heather Marie Akou (2011:46-48) argues that increase in trade had major effects on the domestic economy: it drove up the price of bridewealth, particularly in times of drought when there was too much demand for the livestock. As a result, men were unable to rely on their family to provide bridewealth to get married and moved to coastal towns to find jobs. Women and children found themselves living in extreme poverty in urban centres where kinship systems, and traditional ways of getting support during periods of insecurity, were breaking down (Akou 2011:71). In addition, the rapidly growing urban, educated middle class was incorporated into the government, not contributing to the growth of other sectors of the economy (Samatar 1992:633). Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992:633) argues that the reason educated Somalis were going into government service was due to the stagnant economy and the lack of alternative job opportunities. Some university graduates from Europe and the Middle East, however, did get jobs outside the government as lawyers, engineers, journalists, teachers, and doctors (Akou 2011:68).

In the south, Italian colonial policies shared more features with direct rule. The Italian administration seized the agricultural land between the Shabelle and Jubba Rivers to create banana, rice, coffee, peanut, sesame, and cotton plantations. The result was the displacement of nomads and farmers and the further marginalization of former slaves,
forcing them and other Somalis to work on the plantations. Labor policies restricted pastoralists from exporting livestock or any other commodity without the permission of the Italian administration (Akou 2011:46). The economic depression of the 1930s had a dramatic impact on Italian Somaliland. The territory was pillaged of its food and other products that were sent to Italy, the rest of Europe, Arabia, Japan, and the US. Even so, there continued to be a market for imported textiles, soap, and perfume. At the end of WWII many Italians stayed in Mogadishu and Kismayo, where Somalis were employed in their homes and businesses (Akou 2011:68).

The colonial policies of the British and the Italian administrations had direct effects on the politics and economy of Somalia. Foreign invasions and colonial economic policies transformed market institutions. In the north, increase in trade commoditized livestock and reinforced wealth accumulation, changing the relationships between the merchants, the state, and pastoralists. In the south, Italians directly controlled the economy, stripping agricultural land of its resources and preventing the development of traditional forms of livelihood, including agriculture and pastoralism. The partitioning of the Somali territories without the consideration of pastoral lands and routes as well as clan territorial distinctions contributed to conflict over the scarcity of resources. It also instigated and fueled the conflict over the Somali regions of Ethiopia and Kenya, as we will see below in the analysis of post-colonial governments’ policies.

Anti-Colonial Resistances

The Dervish Anti-Colonial Struggles and the Role of Islam

Beginning in 1898 and lasting 21 years, many Somalis took part in anti-colonial struggles against Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia, known as the Dervish movement led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, a political and religious leader known to the British
as the “Mad Mullah.” The Sayyid established a Sufi-based movement, evidenced in the name of the movement, Dervish, which is derived from the Arabic *Darwish*, which is used to signify a “Muslim believer who has taken on vows of poverty and a life of austerity in the service of his God and community” (Samatar 1982:93). At the end of the 19th century, in part due to the suppression and colonization of Muslims at the hands of Euro-Christians, there was a revival of Islam throughout the Muslim world. In Somalia, the revival was characterized by the proliferation of brotherhoods, increasing pilgrimages to Mecca, and renewed immigration of Arab Sheikhs who built mosques and religious schools. The most important brotherhoods in Somalia were: the Qaadiriya and the Ahmadiya. The Qaadiriya Tariqa or path was founded by the Baghdadi Saint, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Saalihiya. The Ahmadiya, and its militant offshoot, the Saalihiya, trace their ancestry to the Meccan teacher and mystic Ahmad b. Idris al-Faasi (Samatar 1982:96).

The Qaadiriya Order had a greater following, but did not have a desire to join the Sayyid. The Sayyid used the Ahmadiya Order to transform it into the Dervish resistance movement (Samatar 1982:106). The emergence of Sufism in Somalia allowed for heads of religious brotherhoods to exercise autocratic power that was not possible in egalitarian pastoral politics (Samatar 1982:96-97). The Sayyid used this centralizing tendency in the brotherhoods for his political movement. While Islam largely informed the movements, pastoralism helped to shape it. The Sayyid is best known for his use of oral poetry as a political weapon and to this day is known as the greatest poet in the Somali language (Samatar 1982:93,96-97).

Said S. Samatar (1982) argues that the Dervish resistance began as a response to Ethiopian raids to capture livestock belonging to Ogadeen Somalis. Thus, the British found themselves in a war with Somali Dervishes who were primarily formed as self-
defense against the Ethiopians. Muslim brotherhoods were supposed to cut across clan lines, however the Sayyid found that he had to draw from his maternal clan, the Dulbahante, as followers of the movement, and he defended his paternal clan against raids, the Ogadeen sub-lineage of the Daarood clan-family (Lewis 1988[1965]:70-72). The Dulbahante, which made up the majority of the Dervishes, inhabited a rich pastoral land. They were known for their regular bouts of warfare, their command of camel husbandry, and excellent horsemanship, all of which contributed to the success of the movement. The Dervishes numbered 20,000, including 8,000 cavalry (Samatar 1982:110).

The Dervish army received arms from Djibouti and looted Ethiopian controlled Ogadeen areas. After they had command of the Ogadeen sub-lineage they began raiding the Isaaq clans’ livestock because they were long time rivals over pastoral lands. Due to the raids, Emperor Menelik II joined forces with Lt-Colonel E.J.E. Swayne to organize a British force to fight the Dervishes. Even though Britain’s military was weak because of its involvement in the second Boer War (1899-1902), the British led four major expeditions with Ethiopian and Italian support against the Dervishes between 1901 and 1904 (Lewis 1988[1965]:70-72). The Dervishes used guerilla tactics that won them three victories; however, in the fourth expedition they decided to engage in a head on battle with British forces that left the Dervish army broken (Samatar 1982:122-125).

Defeated, the Dervishes believed they needed the good will of one of the protectorates and signed a treaty with the Italians. Using the peace and ports agreement, the Sayyid began to rebuild his army. The Dervishes continued to sabotage the colonial administrations while declaring peace with them. They would loot and terrorize clans loyal to the British and the Italians (Samatar 1982:126). After news that the Dervishes
were looting, killing, and robbing property got to the Sayyid’s master in Mecca, it is rumored that his master wrote a letter to the Sayyid declaring that Sayyid was no longer his student. After news of the letter circulated the Dervish army, 600 conspirators held a meeting known as the ‘Tree-of-Bad-Counsel’ to overthrow the Sayyid (Samatar 1982:127-129). Soon, infighting began between those loyal to Sayyid and those who sought to overthrow him. In putting down the revolt the Sayyid executed rivals including holy men that had the effect of turning more supporters against him. Nevertheless, the Dervishes continued to lead major raids with almost the near destruction of Berbera (Samatar 1982:130-131). The last blow to the Dervishes was an outbreak of smallpox and rinderpest killing a large part of the army. In December 1920, Sayyid Mahammad 'Abdille Hasan, age 64 died of influenza and the Dervish resistance came to an end (Samatar 1982:136).

**Somalia’s Political Movements, Nationalist Independence Struggles**

The legacy of the Dervish resistance movement remained with the Somali people and in the 1940s Somali national organizations began to develop with the expansion of the Italian empire, World War II, and the post-war changes under the British Military Administration (BMA). Throughout Africa, nationalist movements emerged to wage anti-colonial resistances. Mahmood Mamdani (1996:19-20) suggests that colonial resistances were struggles that came out of the urban middle class who were in a position where they were neither subject to custom as in the rural areas, nor were they considered to be citizens with rights. It is within this space of liminality that anti-colonial struggles sought to deracialize and detribalize the state by forging a large popular front that cut across classes, tribes or clans within a national framework. In the Somali context, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was the first Somali national organization, founded May 15, 1943 in
Mogadishu. At first, the club was an organization that dealt with the grievances of Somalis in the city (Barnes 2007:277). It was a youth club with membership being restricted to Somalis between the ages of 18 and 32 who were mostly middle class professionals. By the mid-1940s, SYC expanded into different urban centres throughout Italian Somaliland, expanding the range of membership and also developing more ambitious national goals. To build Somali nationalism, the SYC sought to break down the clan system, end clan disputes, and expand education and social programming. Nationalism as the ideology of the SYC was evident in the oath that members had to give before joining the club, which compelled them not to reveal their clan affinities and instead identify themselves as Somali. The increasing Somali control over newspaper press reported in Arabic and radio furthered the cause of national unity under one state (Lewis 1999[1961]:270).

After the collapse of the Italian colonial armies in 1941, the British Foreign Minister (1946) proposed the Bevin Plan, which sought to join former Italian Somaliland with British Somalia and the Ogadeen Province in Ethiopia to form Greater Somalia under British Trusteeship, expanding the British East African Empire. The SYC wanted trusteeship under the “Big Four Powers” that would unite the Somali territories and form one independent state rather than the Italians. Nevertheless, the Italians were looking to regain their control over Italian Somaliland. In addition, the Bevin Plan did not gain international acceptance and, as a result, Italy was appointed the governing authority under UN Trusteeship (1950-1960) before gaining independence (1960) (Lewis 1999[1961]:285-286). It is argued by some Somali studies scholars (Barnes 2007:277-278, see also Lewis 2008) that the British proposition to amalgamate the Somali
territories gained popular support among Somali political parties from which it became a rallying point for Somali national struggles.

The Greater Somali idea was taken up by the SYC. Somalis who were knowledgeable of the international debate concerning the future of the Somali territories joined the struggle (Barnes 2007:278). The SYC changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL) and made its official introduction in 1947 by presenting its four-point program. The SYL’s program objectives were:

1. To unite all Somalis generally, and the youth especially, with the consequent repudiation of all harmful old prejudices, including tribal distinctions;
2. To educate the youth in the ways of modern civilization by means of schools, cultural activities, and propaganda;
3. To assist in eliminating by constitutional and legal means any existing or future situation which may be prejudicial to the interest of the Somalis; and
4. To develop a Somali language, and to help use the already existing writing known as Ismaniya\(^\text{20}\) (Lewis 1963:149, Sheik-Abdi 1977:661).

At this time, the League had already expanded to include local branches in towns throughout ex-Italian Somalia, its membership increased through clan networks with branches also found in the Ogaden plains, the Haud, and Jigjiga (Barnes 2007:286). Meetings at the branches were popular with poetry, songs, and speeches remembered amongst the elders today, memories, expanded on in chapter 5.

In the British protectorate in northern Somalia, the Somali National League (SNL) formed in 1935 and became a political party in 1951 with its centre in Hargeisa and local branches in many of the districts. It also presented a four-point program that included:

1. To work for the unification of Somali people and territories, (2) to work for the advancement of the Somali by abolishing clan fanaticism and encouraging brotherly relations among Somalis, (3) to encourage the spread of education and the economic and political development of the country, and (4) to co-operate with the British Government or any other local body whose aims are the welfare of the inhabitants of the country (Lewis 1963:149).

\(^{20}\) Ismaniya is a locally invented script that was in use by Somalis since the 1920s (Pilaszewicz 1985:53).
Other national parties included the Liberal Party, Greater Somalia League, which was an offshoot and more extremist version of the SYL, and the National United Front (NUF). The NUF was widely based and was the party to publicize Somali demands for self-government outside of the protectorate. The movement’s formation was in response to the transfer of the Haud and Reserved Areas from the BMA to the Ethiopian administration in 1955. The British, in a treaty signed in 1897, recognized the Ethiopian claim to the territory; however, Somalis never recognized the treaty. As a result, in November 1954 when the territory was given to the Ethiopian administration and incorporated into Harar Province there was outrage in British Somaliland. At the time of independence, a similar process occurred among the people of N.F.D. who formed the Northern Province People’s Progressive Party (NPPPP) with the main purpose being the secession from N.F.D. and its reunion to Somalia. After independence the region became part of the North Eastern Province and was in a state of emergency for the next 30 years (Lewis 1963:150).

The external threats furthered the causes of the national organizations that aimed to unite the Somali territories (Lewis 1999[1961]). There were also lineage parties, most notably Hisbia Digil-Mirifle (HDM), later called the Independent Constitutional Party. The Party represented the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families and was constructed to ensure the inclusion of these clan-families at the level of the state. It was located in southern Somalia and was the main competitor of the SYL. In 1956 the Italians set up Legislative Assembly and Somalis, for the first time, voted for representation in the UN Italian Trusteeship to prepare for independence. The elections resulted in the SYL gaining 43 of the available 60 seats and the HDM became the official opposition gaining 13 seats (Lewis 1960:286-287). Nonetheless, the aim of all the national parties was to unite all of
the Somali territories to form Greater Somalia, based on the principle of self-determination, and the only differences between the parties were how pan-Somalism should be achieved (Lewis 1963, Barnes 2007).

In 1956, the Legislative Assembly, led by Prime Minister Abdullahi ‘Ise controlled internal affairs and made the first order of business a resolution of the country’s border dispute with Ethiopia; however, the party did not refer to the Greater Somalia ideal for another three years when independence was on the horizon and the Greater Somalia League was adding pressure. Finally, on July 26, 1959 the Prime Minister declared that his government would strive to reach the goal of uniting all Somalis with legal and peaceful means to form a “single Great Somalia” (Lewis 1963:150).

On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland was declared an independent state, and on July 1, 1960, Italian Somaliland was also granted sovereignty. On the same day that Italian Somaliland became independent the north and the south joined together to form the Somali Republic (Brons 2001:157). The Somali flag was hoisted and the colonial flags were taken down. The flag symbolized the aspiration for unity of the Somali territories: it is blue with a white five point star representing the unification of Somalis who were divided as a result of colonialism in the five territories, including the N.F.D. in Kenya, Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Somali region of Ethiopia (Ogadeen and the Reserved Areas), and Djibouti (formerly French Somaliland) (Akou 2011:68, Besteman 1999:128).

Following independence the effects of colonial economic policies became apparent. Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992) argues that after independence, the leadership had little experience or interest in developing the traditional major sources of the economy,
pastoralism and agriculture. Without being able to produce a surplus to be reinvested and expand the economy, resources had to be obtained from outside the country. In the 1960s, during the Cold War, loans and grant programs poured in from overseas making Somalia the highest recipient of aid per capita than any other country in Africa (Samatar 1992:634, Akou 2011:70). Pastoralism and agriculture that the majority of Somalis depended on were not the sectors of the economy that received loans (Samatar 1992:633).

Furthermore, the money was not invested into new productive enterprises or infrastructure such as, schools or hospitals. Instead, the money went to the increasing numbers of bureaucrats and parliamentarians and to the Somali military (Akou 2011:70). Two interrelated factors contributed to the increased gap between the rich and the poor and corruption in Somalia. First, the moral force of the materially constrained conditions of the household economy and the Xeer were undermined by the commoditization of livestock. This helped contribute to the competition over commodities and the personal or household accumulation of wealth (Samatar 1992:633-635). Furthermore, Abdi Ismail Samatar (1992) argues the failure of the colonial state to develop traditional sectors of the economy, such as pastoralism and agriculture, and the absence of new economic developments made the state the most profitable financial source because of the access to state revenue, including foreign assistance. Consequently, there was competition among the elite for state offices because the main way to access state funds was through becoming an elected representative or a minister. As a result, there was an explosion of political parties who increasingly formed along clan lines, numbering more than 60 parties before the 1969 elections (Marchal 2004:120). The influence of the competition over state funds was obvious when in 1969 the SYL won the elections and the majority of
the opposition parties who ran against them in the election crossed the parliamentary floor to become part of the ruling SYL party (Samatar 1992:635).

In a review of Afyare Abdi Elmi’s (2011) book entitled *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace-building*, world-renowned economist Samir Amiin (2011) observed that if one defines “democracy” as simply the practice of a multi-party electoral politics and relative freedom of expression, it would be appropriate to describe the period between 1960 and 1991 as such. Nevertheless, it was a “neo-colonial democracy” whereby Somalia was dominated by European colonial economic interests, especially Italy and Great Britain. In fact, for the majority of the Somali people, the Somali Republic, which depended to the extreme on European aid, was a great disappointment.

**Cold War Politics in Somalia: Siyad Barre (1969-1991) and the Modern State project, Factionalism, and the Collapse of the State**

On October 15, 1969 after President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, General Mohamed Siyad Barre staged a *coup d’état*. Barre had been a police inspector for the BMA in southern Somalia and was trained in Italy where he also studied politics privately (Lewis 2008:38). In the beginning, the people supported the new regime that included the termination of the growing number of political parties by Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the privatization of public resources (Samatar 1992:636, Brons 2001:171). Siyad Barre embarked on building a modern unified Somali nation-state. His policies were anti-colonial and he declared himself a socialist on October 21, 1970, as had many African and national liberation movements in the colonial world (Lewis 2008:39). Samir Amiin (2011) refers to the first period of Barre’s presidency (1969-1982) as “popular nationalist.” During this time,
Barre’s government largely succeeded in its programs and policies, while harnessing popular approval and credibility. Barre laid the foundation for the revival of Somalia as a nation or Somalia’s national identity by emphasizing its African belonging and its own language, and adopted Islam as its religion (Amiin 2011).

In this Cold War and anti-colonial context, it is thus not surprising that the army depended on the Soviet Union for support and from 1969 to 1974 the government focused on local development and strengthening its authority. One of the most impressive policies was the establishment of a Somali script (1972) and mass literacy campaigns and education (1973-1974) throughout the country to overcome the educational and language barriers introduced during colonialism (Brons 2001:17). Until 1972 written documents were in English, Italian, or Arabic favoring people who were educated and/or were loyal to the colonial administrations. In addition, Somalia’s first university was established (Akou 2011:72). Other positive developments were funding for health care and a campaign for rural development that included health and veterinary components (Lewis 2008: 40-41, Akou 2011:72). Barre’s government also gave more rights to women, including the right to own property, equal division of assets upon divorce, and participation in politics (Brons 2001). In 1974, the Barre government looked to secure a place in global politics by joining the Arab League and by acting as host and chair for the Organization of African Unity Heads of State meeting (Lewis 2008:42). Somalia’s relationship with the Arab League gave students more opportunities to attend universities in the Middle East. In addition, as oil prices increased, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries hired tens of thousands of Somalis for both short and long term employment (Akou 2011:74).
Barre’s national project called for the abolishment and the repression of clan affiliations. To replace clan idioms, the word *jalle*, meaning “comrade” or “friend” was introduced as the approved form of greeting. Significantly, Somali territory was remapped by transforming the eight provinces into 15 new regions with 78 districts and renamed to exclude the clans’ associations with territories. The death sentence was reintroduced to replace the compensation practices of *dia*-paying groups (Lewis 2008:39).

In addition to eradicating clan loyalties, Barre’s national campaign outlawed unequal and hierarchical relationships between Samaale and Saab Somali clans, and argued that the master-slave distinction no longer existed because of assimilation and the Somali democratic ethos (Besteman 1999:128). Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues that in post-colonial Africa, the bifurcated state was deracialized following independence, but not democratized. In radical states, such as Somalia under Barre, states sought to deracialize and detribalize; however, they kept in place Native Authorities, reinforcing difference. For instance, in Somalia, former lineage and clan heads (chiefs and elders) were renamed “peace seekers” binding them to the state (Lewis 2008:39). Minority and low caste clans, such as Saab descendants, Somali Bantu (or people of the Gosha area), and indigenous groups, already had marked identities that stigmatized them in Somali society (Besteman 1999:128-129). According to Catherine Besteman (1999), while Barre’s nationalist campaign rejected clanship it still drew support by invoking paternal and/or maternal lineages and blood ties to harness legitimacy. She argues that state proclamations of the

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21 Mahmood Mamdani (1996:8) uses the term “bifurcated state” to show that the post-colonial state contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. In urban centres power was centered on the language of civil society and civil rights. On the other hand, in rural areas power was based in community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power to enforce tradition. The former was organized on the principle of differentiation to check the concentration of power, the latter around the principle of fusion to ensure a single colonial authority.
homogeneity of the nation placed the Gosha as a racialized ethnic group who were outside the nation based on blood descent. In other words, the Gosha and indigenous groups became the internal other.

Mahmood Mamdani (1996) argues the processes of detribalization and deracialization of colonial states gave more power to state administrations for them to obtain more control over local authorities. According to Maria H. Brons (2001:173), Barre’s administration increased state control over clan elders in an attempt to eradicate clan loyalties. The government promised to end corruption and therefore replaced civilian government representatives with military personnel who were made chairmen of the revolutionary council. The National Security Service (N.S.S.) and the National Security Courts were in charge of law and order (Lewis 2008:40). In addition, the campaign that guaranteed employment for all, recruited orphans and other marginalized youth to establish the “Pioneers of Revolution,” a group that spied on households, reported any subversive behavior, and made sure that everyone attended classes at the neighborhood Orientation centre (Akou 2011:73).

Mahmood Mamdani (1996:26) argues that post-colonial governments claimed to increase development in the economy; however, they increased pressure on the rural peasantry with the result of enlarging the divisions between rural and urban centres. Barre assumed control of Somalia’s economy with a focus on the agricultural production in the interriverine areas. The state controlled the export of bananas; farmers of grain were allowed to keep a small amount for their own consumption, but were required to sell the rest for a set price to the Agricultural Development Corporation. Imports were similarly controlled by the state as well as major industries, such as sugar factories at Jawhar and meat processing plants in Kismayo. Nonetheless, the pastoral economy was still the main
source of revenue. Livestock was exported to Arab markets by private import and export companies, but hides and skins were exported through government agencies (Lewis 2008:40-41).

The reunification of Somalia was one of the main rallying points for Somali nationalism. As part of the effort, in 1977 Barre looked to regain control of the Somali inhabited Ogadeen territory in Ethiopia. The Somali National Army (SNA) had been receiving military aid from the Soviet Union and Egypt. They used this aid to supply military aid to the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) operating in the Ogadeen region. In the meantime, the Soviet Union became more interested in Ethiopia with its increasing dedication to revolutionary socialism after the overthrow of Haile Selassie and Ethiopia-US relations worsened (Lewis 2008:43). Vying for power, the US began to give aid to Somalia and also established three military bases to challenge the Soviets who already had their own military bases in the north (de Waal 1997:162). Meanwhile, the WSLF started to expel Ethiopians from the Somali region of Ethiopia (Lewis 2008:43-44). In September 1977, the WSLF was able to advance to Harar, but the Soviet Union came to Ethiopia’s defense. On March 9, 1978, following international exchanges between the US and the Soviet Union, President Siyad Barre announced Somalia’s withdrawal from the Ogadeen region and it was promised that Soviet and Cuban forces would back down as well, leading to Ethiopian victory. Even though Somalia and Ethiopia had come to a peace agreement, there was considerable anxiety that Ethiopia would not stop at the border and would advance into Somalia. Consequently, arms were widely distributed in the north. As promised, Ethiopia’s advance stopped at the border, but had gradually reimposed Ethiopian rule on Ogadeen. The WSLF did not give up their
struggle and continued to fight in Ethiopia until they were defeated in 1981 (Lewis 1988[1965]:238-239).

As Samir Amin (2011) observed, the Ogadeen War (1977-78) was a turning point for the Barre regime, initiating a second phase of his government. The second phase (1982-1991) differed in significant ways from the first phase. Barre’s abandonment of socialism was accompanied by the replacement of Soviet support with the backing of Saudi Arabia and the US. Henceforth, the Barre regime opted for ‘openness’ of its markets, including Saudi capital, a move much appreciated by imperialist powers, who unsurprisingly ceased to reproach him for his repressive policies (Amiin 2011).

During and following the Ogadeen War (1977-1978), ethnic Somalis and Oromos from western Somalia and Eastern Ethiopia were displaced to Somalia. There were approximately 400,000 refugees registered in the camps in December 1979 and by the next year this number doubled as the number of camps reached over 30. Another 500,000 refugees were thought to have found refuge with relatives. Even though the US was showing support for Somalia, their support and Western aid went mainly to civilian projects (Lewis 2008:64). Little of the international aid given to Barre’s regime went to refugees. After Ethiopia’s victory, promises of national unity, development, and socialism were renounced and Barre’s government increased its dictatorial rule, oppressing any kind of opposition to the point of near genocidal destruction of the northern capital Hargeisa in 1988 (de Waal 1997:161).

Under Barre, repression worsened and those who were excluded from power waged an armed rebellion mobilized along clan lines. As a result of his repression of northern clan-families, the Somali National Movement (SNM) was created with the Isaaq clan-family as its base. The other resistance fronts included the Hawiye based United
Somali Congress (USC) and the Ogadeen based Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (de Waal 1997:162). These were not the only resistances. At this time, there were many movements that sought to replace Barre and his government.

For his part, Barre also used clan affiliations for his “divide and rule” tactics (de Waal 1997:161). These tactics served to reinforce and intensify older clan rivalries. While Barre publicly renounced clan affiliations he drew his own support through clans related to himself and his kin. According to I.M. Lewis (2004:501), “three groups in particular exercised special power, a trinity known *sotto voce* as MOD after the initial letters of the corresponding clan names: M (Marehan) represented the president’s own clan, O (Ogaadeen) that of his mother, and D (Dulbahante) that of his most prominent son-in-law, head of the sinister National Security Service (NSS).” Barre’s divide and rule tactics involved his government befriending certain groups and distributing arms and money to them so they would attack his enemies who were accused of tribalism (Lewis 2008:76).

The aid given to the Barre government through humanitarian assistance in the late 1980s sustained the government. The government used its aid to sharpen the conflict and to assist in land grabbing. Aid, given to heads of sovereign states, continued to fuel the war after the fall of Barre’s regime. As a result, between 1991 and 1992 there was a struggle to control Mogadishu, which can also be seen as a struggle to control foreign aid. Factional leaders mobilized support by promising future rewards once they had control over the city. Although during much of 1992 there was little foreign aid in Somalia, the imagining of these resources continued to influence factions (de Waal 1997:162). By destroying Somalia’s economy with corruption and inefficiency, Barre also promoted competition over scarce resources. This resulted in increased clan solidarity as a strategy of survival (Lewis 2008:76).
Land Grabbing and Famine (1975-1992)

Some Somali scholars (Cassanelli 1996, de Waal 2007) have argued that a focus on clan rivalry in the history of Somalia causes us to overlook the creation of the rivalry and the centrality of resources in the civil war. In this section I explore this argument and attempt to answer the questions put forth by Lee V. Cassanelli (1996:14): why did clan rivalries which were always there become so deadly and why did a society whose members were used to harsh conditions of nature become so vulnerable to malnutrition, famine, and death?

The 1992 famine was concentrated in the Shabelle and Jubba Valley and in the Bay Region. Consequently, the people who were most affected were the interriverine people who were mainly from minority clans, including the marginalized Saab Somali (Rahanweyn and Digil clan families), the indigenous Shebelle and Gabwing, and the Bantu. These regions are the most fertile for agriculture and the people were not accustomed to famine. Agricultural production boomed in the 1980s, but the farmers were not the ones who received the rewards. As discussed earlier, the land was taken from landowners by the Italian administration for banana plantations and the farmers were recruited as plantation laborers (de Waal 1997:162). Following independence, the government and national elites became more interested in local resources; therefore, land and water rights became part of state policies and programs. According to Lee V. Cassanelli (1996), the value of resources became a national interest as a result of the convergence of several trends and five interrelated processes including,

1) Agricultural land became more valuable in relation to other sources of investment and speculation
2) New wealth in the form of foreign aid, overseas remittances, live-stock export earnings, military subsidies accelerated the process of class formation
3) The growing concentration of state power in the hands of one segment of the Somali population led other segments to seek alternative sources of wealth and power.

4) The militarization of the Horn of Africa resulting from the Ogadeen War and the Cold War produced an environment in which transfer of resources by force became more common.

5) The urbanization of Somali society (symbolized by the explosion of Mogadishu’s population) intensified regional migration and placed new demands on the country’s natural resources (Cassanelli 1996:19).

Agricultural land was becoming the resource that elites were competing for. The Land Act of 1975 took all of the land from its original landowners, making it state property. Barre then redistributed it to his friends and allies. Control of land meant access to development aid loans (Cassanelli 1996:21-22).

As discussed earlier, the civil war following the fall of Barre’s regime did have elements of clan warfare as clans that were oppressed during the regime settled old scores, but underneath clan militarization was a struggle to secure resources in an increasing resource poor country (Cassanelli 1996:23). After the collapse of the regime in January 1991, the interriverine peoples suffered because of five interrelated factors: 1) The Shabelle and Jubba Valley were a battlefield during 1991 to 1992 as competing factions or ‘warlords’ battled for territorial control; 2) identified as descendants of slave ancestry they held weak ties to Somali clans and as such were not defended and the last to receive aid; 3) they were sedentary agriculturalists; therefore, they were easily targeted and armies were drawn to these fertile lands which could sustain them during the civil war; 4) militias presented themselves as ‘liberators’ from the elite ‘landowners’ promising farmers the return of their lands, but these promises were not kept; and 5) the local people were not well armed (de Waal 1997:166-167, Besteman 2007).

The Hawiye-based, USC led by General Mohamed Farah Aidid who were fighting against the Daarood ‘landowners’ of Barre’s government overran most of the interriverine
areas and presented themselves as ‘liberators.’ Yet, they only intended to replace ‘landowners’ and not return the land to the original owners (de Waal 2007). When the ‘liberators’ were pushed out by the Daarood forces (‘landowners’) the reprisals against the Bantu were brutal. The Daarood militia turned the Shabelle and Jubba Valley into a battleground where militiamen looted and exacted taxes at checkpoints on roads and villages (de Waal 1997:164). Catherine Besteman (2007) argues that genocidal acts occurred in the valley at this time. Militias massacred groups of villagers who tried to maintain control over their land and they forcibly divorced Somali Bantu women from their husbands to marry them involuntarily for the purpose of ensuring their children were members of the clan militia rather than the Bantu. These women and other farmers were subject to rape, torture, murder, looting, and forced labour (Besteman 2007).

In the Bay Region famine was slower to develop than in the valley. In February 1991 battles between USC and SPM led to the near destruction of Baidoa. Siyad Barre set up his quarters here where he dispatched 300,000 militiamen, mostly Mareehaan clansmen, towards Mogadishu. Barre’s men fed themselves through looting. The Rahanweyn who inhabited this region were seen as UCS supporters, so the Mareehaan militia targeted them. In Baidoa, they hunted down people suspected of supporting the USC, killed them and placed their bodies on display (de Waal 1997:165). The Rahanweyn were also targets because they lay on the frontlines between contending factions and were located on the road from the Ethiopian border to Mogadishu (de Waal 2007).

The famine in the Bay Region was one of the most devastating on record. Some villagers paid Mareehaan forces to be left in peace, which impoverished them. The refugees who fled to southern Somalia died in countless numbers. They also
overwhelmed the host populations by bringing destruction, hunger, and epidemic disease. Nevertheless, by the second half of 1992 the famine began to fade as maize prices began to drop and the lower Shabelle was starting to gather good harvests (de Waal 1997).

It becomes clear that the legacy of the second phase of the Barre regime paradoxically reinforced clan affiliations even when it sought to erase them to build a modern nation-state. Under Barre, resources were redistributed to his own clansmen who also got rich through development aid. It is no surprise that with depleting resources, clan militias were created to secure their own clan-family’s future. The most affected were the historically marginalized groups of the interriverine areas. The famine of 1992, a product of political rivalries and partition efforts at securing resources, was localized to this population. The interriverine people’s location and history as ‘outsiders’ made these groups the targets (Besteman 1999, 2007, de Waal 2007).

**Neo-Colonial Policies in Somalia: Canadian, American, and UN Humanitarian Interventions in Somalia 1991-1993 and America’s ‘War on Terror’**

In the introduction, I discussed Western colonial narratives that suggest Africans are incapable of reaching modernity without the help of the West (see also Mamdani 2004). This racist and ethnocentric ideology underpinned many colonial and ‘development’ projects where ‘natives’ were believed to be in need of being civilized and assisted. This discourse informed the 1992 humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Sherene H. Razack (2004) argues that modern peacekeeping is part of the imperial project pitting civilized white nations on one side and uncivilized Third World nations on the other. Peacekeeping, in the New World Order, is built upon the notion that the global North is to mediate and solve the problems created by tribalisms and warlords in the South. Sherene H. Razack (2004:10) argues, “Empire is a structure of feeling,” that the global North has
a right to dominate others for their own best interests and that the others should be grateful (see also Said 1993).

The US, together with the UN, launched Operation Restore Hope in December 1992, camouflaged as a peaceful non-military operation, by which the US State Department set a precedent where imperial interventions are disguised under the humanitarian label. The US chose Somalia as a test case during the famine, although at the time of the intervention there were signs of political optimism and the famine was waning. Nonetheless, the US government, through the media and other channels propagated a distorted image of the famine and the civil war, to justify the intervention (de Waal 1998:132, see also Marchal 2004:114).

Two US policies and incidents led to the explicit violence in Somalia that is remembered in the North American imagination and also show that humanitarianism was not the focus of the intervention. First, the amount of aid for the operation was US$2 billion (Somalia’s gross domestic product at the time was less than US$1 billion), which transformed Somalia’s politics by creating an atmosphere that caused deadly competition over the control of the state and thus the aid (de Waal 1997:172). Second, the mandate of the United Task Force (UNITAF) was to protect those who were distributing the humanitarian relief; therefore, their focus was on protecting relief workers rather than those receiving aid. To this end, US Special Envoy Robert Oakley began a working relationship with General Aidid, the military leader who removed the Barre regime, and now controlled the majority of Mogadishu. Later, the US plan changed to instead marginalize Aidid and was met by strong resistance (de Waal 1998:132). Third, General
Mohammed Sayed Hersi\(^\text{22}\), known as ‘Morgan,’ took over the town of Kismayo, controlled by an Aidid ally. The news that the Belgian troops sat back while General Morgan took over Kismayo was announced on the BBC and met with protest by the people of Mogadishu who believed that the UN and the US had a secret deal to hand over the town to Morgan. As a result of the protests, UNITAF troops opened fire on the demonstrators (de Waal 1997:132-133). The turning point was when a UN raid on Radio Mogadishu, which was targeted as a weapons storage site ended in the death of 23 Pakistani soldiers. The UN Security Council blamed General Aidid for the ambush and passed Resolution 837 that stated to take any means necessary to apprehend those involved in the attack (de Waal 1998:133).

Canada’s involvement in Somalia peacekeeping took place under the Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984-1993) who committed Canada to the first UN mission in Somalia. In addition to pressure by the US-led coalition to get involved, Canada joined the operation because it deemed it an opportunity to smooth US-Canada relations, and to elevate Canada’s profile as a leader in peacekeeping on the international stage. From the Canadian perspective, there was no reason to believe the mission would not be a success. Furthermore, the PM was under increased pressure by the Canadian public to take an active role after images and shocking reports of starving children were widely disseminated in the media. As a result, Mulroney sent troops and aircraft in August 1992 (Dawson 2007:3-4).

\(^{22}\) General Mohammed Sayed Hersi or ‘Morgan’ was also known as the “butcher of Hargeisa” for his role in the 1988 near destruction of the city when he was the senior commander for Siyad Barre who was his father-in-law. Morgan was trained in the U.S. and he received arms from Kenya in 1991-1992 (de Waal 1998:144).
In North America, many remember the images produced by the media following the US Rangers assaults near Olympic Hotel on October 3, 1993. “Black Hawk Down,” a Hollywood movie directed by Ridley Scott in 2001 that was an adaptation of a book of the same name written by Mark Bowden, helped popularize the “Battle for Mogadishu” and more specifically the images showed a dead US pilot being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu (Fishman and Marvin 2003). Others remember the capture of a US prisoner of war that forced the US to withdraw from Somalia (Razack 2004). What are conveniently forgotten are the scandals and the war crimes that were committed against the Somali people.

In 1993, the peacekeeping operation ended in scandal and revealed for a brief moment its colonial origins (Razack 2004:4). Two incidents known as the “Somalia Affair” are highlighted even though many more official and unofficial peacekeeping incidents have occurred. On March 4 1993, Canadian soldiers, who said that they were protecting the base from theft, shot two Somalis in the back, one fatally. Only a couple of weeks later, on March 16, Shidane Abkur Arone, a 16-year-old Somali prisoner, was tortured to death by Canadian soldiers. Dozens of men knew of or witnessed the torture. Trophy photos of Arone’s torture were also taken and kept by the soldiers. Soon videotapes of soldiers making racist remarks and then another of racist violent hazing rituals against black soldiers surfaced. Later, other trophy photos were found that included photographs of Somali youth bounded and hooded (Razack 2004:4-5).

While the Canadians took every official crime to court, other countries did not prosecute their troops for the war crimes committed in Somalia. The Belgians who were stationed in Kismayo harassed, beat, tortured, and killed Somalis, many unarmed. There were also reported cases of children locked in metal containers, throwing children in the
Jubba River, and dragging people behind tanks. The Italian troops looted internally displaced persons’ camps, and committed rape and assaults. The Malaysian soldiers looted soldiers and assaulted hospital staff. The Pakistanis and Nigerians opened fire into mainly unarmed crowds. Tunisians shot civilians in a university compound and the French opened fire on a truck sitting at a checkpoint. The US attacked Digfer hospital when they suspected Aidid has taken refuge there although no evidence was ever shown to prove this. The attack included the use of artillery shells and helicopter rockets. French troops later returned to the hospital to loot whatever was left. In another incident, the US shot ten tow rockets into a building where supporters of Aidid were holding a meeting, although it was primarily a civilian meeting with elders and religious leaders present (de Waal 1998:133).

The war crimes committed by UN troops reveal the racism and the colonialism of peacekeeping (see Razack 2004). Sherene H. Razack (2004) shows that racial violence that occurs in the global South disappears in the global North when the narrative transforms to blame the incidents of violence on the trauma Canadian troops endure as a consequence of helping the Third World reach modernity. In the introduction I explained Sherene H. Razack’s (2008) argument that race thinking and the logic of exception allows for the construction of metaphorical camps for those without rights. For the US and the UN troops in Somalia, metaphorically speaking the Somali people were inmates of the camp; the troops believed Somalis were without law or reason and therefore violence against them was justified. Race thinking also provides the avenue by which violence in the North is forgotten and a new story is written, one that transforms the troops into heroes and heroines and maintains the goodness of the North (Razack 2004:7,11). It is through racial logic in which it is believed that Third World people need to be disciplined
and instructed, justifying the violence in the name of progress. Also missing in the narrative is the geopolitical interests of imperial states that are behind the intervention – not humanitarianism.

*America’s ‘War on Terror:’ The American-Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia (2006-2009), Al-Shabab, and the 2011 Famine*

Mahmood Mamdani (2004) argues that national identities shift and histories are revised under the pressure of changing political agendas and geopolitical processes. This is evident in the new imperialist agendas carried out in Somalia, which currently blame Muslim fundamentalism for prolonging the civil war. In reality, international political agendas continue to be furthered in vulnerable countries, such as Somalia, the new front for the American’s ‘War on Terror’ (Abdi 2007b, de Waal 2007, Harper 2007). Roland Marchal (2007) suggests that we may be witnessing a new military doctrine similar to the Cold War where the US is getting regional powers to be its allies in order to reach its own war objectives.

Americans had very little interest in Somalia following the failed 1992 Operation Restore Hope. Nevertheless, both the terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998 and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US served to legitimize America’s direct and indirect involvement in Somali politics (Abdi 2007b, Marchal 2007). The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was put on the US government list of terrorist organizations even though they were initially local responses to insecurity led by clan elders and had very little extremist elements. As of 2006 there were fewer than ten of these courts and they improved security in the areas they controlled (Harper 2007, Marchal 2007). According to the Somali Cause (2010:3), the era of the UIC was significant because from it emerged a “Somali solution to a Somali
problem without external assistance in contrast to past failed efforts of the international community.” The American interest in Somalia coincided with the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which attempted to govern from Jawhar and Baidoa because Mogadishu was controlled by warlords. Yet, the CIA initially funded and worked with the warlords in Mogadishu who formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-terrorism. Conflict soon ensued between the Alliance and the UIC (Abdi 2007b:76, Marchal 2007).

The UIC defeated the warlords, so the US turned to UIC enemies: the TFG and the Ethiopians. The TFG was formed with international support in 2004 under a five-year transitional mandate that would be followed by national elections in 2009 (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2008). The President of the TFG from 2004-2008 was Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. With American support Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006 (Abdi 2007b:76). Ethiopia claimed to support the TFG and justified the invasion on the pretext that they were protecting themselves from terrorists. From December 2006 to 2009, the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) remained in south and central Somalia and as a result there was an influx of weapons and small arms that contributed to the conflict. Battles between TFG/ENDF forces and anti-government forces led to countless human rights abuses, such as the killing of over 1,000 civilians which included unlawful and politically motivated killings, kidnapping, rape, torture, official impunity, harsh and life threatening prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention. During this time there were also restrictions on freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and movement. There were also accounts of violence against women and children, including rape, child abuse, the recruitment of child soldiers, trafficking of people, forced child labor, and abuses against clan and religious minorities.
(Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2008). Ethiopia defeated the UIC by dropping air bombs on Mogadishu’s air and sea ports (Harper 2007). There were also bombardments on pastoral lands, which led to the death of countless civilians. Kenya closed its borders to civilians who sought asylum to escape the bombings. Kenya justified its treatment of refugees on the basis of national security (Abdi 2007:77).

Roland Marchal (2007), Mary Harper (2007), and the Somali Cause (2010) suggest that American involvement in Somalia mobilized Islamic movements that were united in their opposition to the US. The uprising against the US was popular. The absence of security following the defeat of the UIC and the risk of another Ethiopian invasion led to a radicalizing of the Islamic group, Hizb Al-Shabab (‘the Youth Party’), the anti-government militia that is currently fighting the TFG in Somalia. It was the American initiated union of Ethiopia and TFG militia, however, that led to countless killings, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, and the new humanitarian crisis (Abdi 2007:76).

This work comes at a time when civil war in Somalia does not seem to abate, causing a large number of people to flee Somalia and take refuge in Canada and the U.S. In fact, Somalia was recently in its worst humanitarian crisis in 18 years. Along with the armed conflict, in 2011 Somalia experienced the worst drought in 60 years, which coincided with hyperinflation leading to rapid increases in food prices and non-food prices. The drought and increase in food prices caused widespread famine to hit southern Somalia, affecting mainly the agriculturalists in Bay, Bakool, and Lower Shabelle regions (UNHCR 2012). As of July 2011, there were 1.46 million internally displaced persons in the country and 4 million people who lacked food security (UNHCR 2012). Rural individuals and families were forced from their homes and moved to Mogadishu in search
of relief. When the UNHCR officially declared famine in two regions of Lower Shabelle and Bakool on July 20, 2011 images and stories of the causes of the famine ranging from global warming to ‘mother nature’ (First 2011), to Al-Shabab (Guled and Houreld 2011), circulated the North American media. These stories display Somalis as either perpetrators or victims of violence, often weaving these narratives together. Omitted from these newspaper articles are any analysis of the war and the involvement of the US in prolonging the conflict. Instead, the US and Canada are represented as saviors of the Somali people. There is little to suggest that aid was getting to much of the population because of US sanctions or the apparent structural violence that exists, including access to medicine for the cholera epidemic that ravaged the country. In chapter 3, I interrogate these media images of the famine and explain the effects of such representations and the role they play in the current ‘War on Terror.’

**Conclusion: Narratives and their Consequences**

In this chapter, I have argued that the ongoing civil war in Somalia and the resulting displacements cannot be examined using an internalist approach. In the global North, African tribalism and Muslim fundamentalism are used as historical narratives to explain the civil war and the continuation of the armed conflict. These explanations obfuscate the repercussions of external interventions and forces, including European and North American states, in instigating and prolonging the conflicts, placing the blame for conflict and the burden of displacement exclusively on the South (see Chimni 1998). Second, the colonial narratives that include race thinking and the logic of exception (Razack 2008) justify both colonialism and the new imperialism, under the auspices of development aid and humanitarian intervention, new labels under which northern states
can commit violence against poor countries and populations (see Mamdani 2004, Razack 2004).

Drawing on narratives of ‘tribalism’ to examine the politics and history of Somalia evokes discriminatory beliefs, based on the assumption of social evolutionism, that posit Somalia’s political organization as premodern and, thus incapable of providing the basis of a nation-state. I have exposed the myth of ‘tribalism’ in Somalia and shown the complex history and clan systems, including the role of the Xeer in Somali politics. Colonial administrators tribalized Somalia and contributed to a hierarchy of citizenship, which racialized slave descendants and constructed them as different from other Somalis. The creation of this hierarchy had dire consequences for these minority groups both under colonialism and Barre’s regime. Clan rivalries turned deadly because of decades of oppression under Barre’s regime fueled and financed by international development aid, coming out of Cold War politics. Vying for a regional ally in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union and the US distributed arms and made Somalia the highest recipient of aid per capita in Africa in an economy that was damaged during colonialism.

The modernity narratives in the West informed the UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. First, the intervention was in the interests of the US and other peacekeeping countries in their goal to control the Horn of Africa. Second, peacekeeping is based on the belief that the North needs to save the South from tribalism and warlords, even through domination, in the name of progress. During colonialism, the Western narrative suggested that Africans were incapable of reaching modernity, however the neo-colonial narrative, supporting development, humanitarian, and military intervention, suggests that Africans in the South are only able to reach modernity with the help of the North (see also Razack 2004). Finally, the war crimes committed against the
Somali people during the humanitarian intervention revealed the racial thinking that underlies peacekeeping and the logic of exception that justifies the violence the peacekeepers inflicted on civilians.

The 9/11 attacks on the US changed Western narratives of Somalia’s civil war, blaming not only African tribalists, but also Muslim fundamentalism for prolonging the war. At the same time, US politics towards Somalia may have helped create the radical group, Al-Shabab, which is now on America’s list of terrorist organizations. These narratives of Somalia’s civil war affect Somali children and youth in their everyday lives, transforming their identities. Hegemonic narratives are not isolated from the eyes and ears of youth, but are consistently in the media. The media representations of Somalis and Somalia not only have an effect on how Somali children and youth feel about themselves, their families, communities, and histories, but also how their peers treat them in the schoolyard. The representations of Somalis as either victims or perpetrators of violence position them as at risk affecting the way children and youth are viewed by their teachers, as we will see in chapters 3 and 4.

Modernity narratives also erase the unequal effects of civil war and famine on certain populations. It was minority or ‘low-caste’ groups, which have been impacted the most. After the beginning of the civil war, the people who remained in Jubba Valley were forced into labor camps, lost their land, and did not have any political rights. Many more fled to Kenya where they continue to suffer abuse by other Somalis. To curtail the violence UNHCR has removed Somali Bantus identified for resettlement to a separate camp. Over 12,000 Somali Bantus have now been resettled in the US (Besteman 2007). For the rest of the Somali populations the continuing civil war has internally displaced millions. Others have escaped persecution to refugee camps in Kenya and Yemen as well
as to other countries, such as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and South Africa. Others are now resettled in Europe and North America.

In taking an internalist approach to the conflict in Somalia, there is little appreciation for the transnational processes, including social relationships that exist between Somalia and the US and Canada. These relations are important since only 10 percent of the approximately 8.5 million Somalis live in the West (Horst 2008: 145). Imperialism in Somalia has direct effects on Somalis in North America, a point emphasized throughout this work. Divisions and alliances among Somalis in North America are constantly constructed and dismantled based on the conflict, events, and processes in Somalia. In the following chapters, I will discuss these transnational social relationships as informing the experiences of Somali children and youth in North America.
Chapter 3: Representations of Somalis in the North American Media and their Effects on Somali Youth

Introduction: Media Images and Representations

On August 28, 2009 at 3:36 p.m. Saqal arrived at Toronto’s Pearson International Airport after a year of grueling examinations, interviews, and medical tests that earned her a World University Service of Canada (WUSC) scholarship\textsuperscript{23} to study at a Canadian university and make her a permanent resident of Canada. Saqal was born in Baidoa, Somalia, but grew up in Kakuma, Kenya in a refugee camp with her mother and four siblings. Her family came to live in the camp when in 1996 armed militias who were targeting men in the family murdered her father. Saqal’s brother was also briefly kidnapped and tortured, but was returned to the family. She traveled with her mother and siblings for days to cross the border into Kenya. Even though Saqal’s mother had little money, with the help of other family members, she was able to send Saqal to school in the capital, Nairobi. Saqal never really thought she would migrate to the West, but when the opportunity to apply for a WUSC scholarship arose she thought she would give it a try. Saqal now lives in Ontario and is finishing her fourth year of university. Together with some of her friends, she started a Somali Students’ Association, and she helps her family financially in Kenya. Saqal’s story of survival and strength in dealing with adversity is not unique; I heard many similar stories while interviewing Somali youth in Canada and the US. Yet, many of us never hear of Somali youth like Saqal in the media, which instead, widely propagates news about the few cases of youth who return to Somalia to join \textit{Al-Shabab} or join gangs in North America. Silenced are the stories of

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\textsuperscript{23}WUSC is a Canadian based international organization with a student refugee program whereby students at Canadian universities sponsor refugee students to their university and offer the opportunity for refugee students to pursue a post-secondary education in Canada as permanent residents (WUSC 2012).
\end{flushright}
resilient young men and women who strive for dignity and a better life, while the media is quick to disseminate images of starving children, veiled women, and violent men. These contradictions led me to raise a number of questions: (1) What is the role of the media in perpetuating the idea that Somali youth are ‘at risk’ or ‘the risk’, (2) what are the consequences of these representations in the current post-9/11 environment in North America, and (3) how do dominant representations of Somalis and Somalia in the media affect the everyday lives of Somali children and youth.

Mainstream media is a site to examine how Canada and the US construct the Islamic World as ‘other’ to the West (Said 1979) and to western-style democracies. Instead of focusing on the historical relationships and mutual influences, distinctions between a backward East presumed to be the haven of Islamic fundamentalism, and hostile to democracy on the one hand, and a superior democratic West, on the other hand are consistently reinforced and reinvented in the media (Abu-Lughod 2002). Somalia is no exception to this broader ideological and political construction. The representations of Somalis in the American and Canadian media are largely about their entanglement with latent violence and explicit violence (Fishman and Marvin 2003:34). For Americans, the perceived association between Somalia and violence stems back to Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993, which was supposed to help end the humanitarian crisis. It was during that time that the US media widely circulated images of Somalis dragging dead American soldiers through Mogadishu. These images represented the Somali people as barbaric and as perpetrators of violence. At the same time, the violence inflicted on the Somali people that included war crimes committed by the US and other UN troops

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24 Latent violence is not direct physical force, but it implied through images and discourse that tells the reader that force has the potential to be used (Fishman and Marvin 2003:34).
25 Explicit violence is intended and performed (Fishman and Marvin 2003:34).
largely went unnoticed. In Canada, what came to be known as the “Somalia Affair,” the fatal shooting of two Somalis and the torture and death of 16-year-old Shidane Abukar Arone at the hands of Canadian soldiers, were even undermined by discourse of the backwardness of Africa (Razack 2004:4), discussed in more detail in chapter 2. The Canadian government responded to the Somalia Affair by disbanding the Canadian Airborne Regiment and granting a Commission of Inquiry. The incidents (many of which were not publicly acknowledged) came to be thought of as the acts of rogue soldiers, soldiers who did not have leadership, or soldiers who were pushed to near insanity due to Africans and Africa itself (Razack 2004:7). The narrative memories of the Somalia Affair continue to be remembered using this discourse. For instance, in a Toronto Star article a reporter compares his experiences in Somalia and in Afghanistan referring to the “insatiable desert” blaming the Somalia Affair on the climate and weak leadership; but never referring to the deaths and torture of the young Somali men as murder or even a mistake. The reporter states:

The Canadian Airborne Regiment’s weak leadership collapsed under the Ogadeen Desert’s corrosive force, and soldiers driven up the wall by petty thieves stealing food, radios and other trifles got the go-ahead to bait them with food and water. The Canadians’ trap killed at least two Somalis: Ahmed Arush, who was shot in the back trying to flee, and 16-year-old Shidane Arone, who was tortured to death in a bunker (Watson 2011).

By presenting the Somalia Affair this way, Canadian peacekeeping identity remains intact and the racism and violence against the Somali people at the hands of Canadian peacekeepers if not forgotten is justified (Razack 2004:7-8). Jessica M. Fishman and Carolyn Marvin (2003:33) found that throughout the height of American military involvement in Somalia, first, when US and UN troops attacked General Aidid’s strongholds in Mogadishu (June 12-25, 1993) and later, when US Rangers carried out
bombardments near the Olympic Hotel for 17 hours (October 5-18, 1993), the front page photographs of *The New York Times* did not depict US using explicit forms of violence despite intensive US bombardments of Somali targets. The combat missions of both American and Canadian troops were circumvented by a discourse of peace and backed by media images of soldiers handing out humanitarian aid (Mzali 2010:84). The stereotypical association of Somalis and violence in North American media intensified following the attacks on the US on September 11. In this chapter, I examine the politics of representation in the media following 9/11, and how they impact the everyday experiences of Somali youth in educational spaces. The educational spaces discussed in this chapter include state schools and community educational spaces. Below we will see the importance of examining the linkages between these educational spaces. Within educational spaces the boundaries between the private and public are often blurred, as the private lives of youth, family dynamics, local community and state agendas, and societal views and attitudes towards Somalis, Muslims and refugees may intersect in diverse encounters.

The chapter seeks to challenge the notions that Somali children and youth are either ‘at risk’ or ‘the risk’. It argues that the focus on the violence or victimization of the youth conceals a wide range of experiences, as well as the creative and complex ways the youth react to their marginalization and the stereotypes about them. I argue that the hegemonic discourses spread in the media pertaining to Somalis as either perpetrators or victims of violence have politicized Somali female and male bodies within the current ‘War on Terror.’ Consequently, Somali youth are targets of routine forms of structural violence, expressed in discrimination and marginalization as well as interpersonal forms of violence, including bullying.
According to Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2004:14), structural violence refers to the invisible “social machinery” of social inequality and oppression, which reproduces social relations of exclusion reinforced by dominant ideologies that stigmatize a particular race, class, caste, gender, and other groups. Structural violence obscures the social, political and economic history of poverty, taking it for granted and blaming poverty on the poor themselves (Scheper-Hughes 2004:14). Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philipe Bourgouis (2004:1) argue that violence cannot be understood only as physical or interpersonal, but also the affects of symbolic violence that are inflicted on personhood, dignity, and an individual’s sense of worth. In this way, the socio-cultural dimensions of violence need to be considered, since they give meaning and power to violence (see also Scheper-Hughes 2004). Structural violence targets ‘dangerous’ populations such as ‘illegals,’ migrants, ‘street’ children, and the homeless. It then becomes ‘legitimate’ to mediate and control these populations (Stephens 1995). Importantly, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2004) posits that the power of symbolic violence derives from the ability to make the oppressed complicit in their own destruction: the poor against the poor or “black-on-black” violence. Her analytical insights are applicable to the Somali case, where some youth do fight with peers inside or outside schools or join gangs. The majority of Somali youth, however, do not engage in violence and seek spaces of belonging by becoming involved in their communities or by challenging stereotypical representations of Somalis and Somalia.
Muslims in North American Media: The Connections Between Racial Thinking, the ‘War on Terror,’ and Somali Children’s and Youth’s Lives

For Somalis in North America, structural violence is experienced at multiple levels including racism, Islamophobia, sexism, political violence, and poverty. The media is a site to examine how structural violence is enabled by national ideologies of racism, sexism, class oppression and other forms of discrimination, and how these intersect and are produced, reproduced, and transformed. According to Yasmin Jiwani (2006:37), the media has four main roles: (1) it shapes public opinion of debates, ideas, and issues by setting the framework and the discourse for discussing such issues, (2) it influences policy makers, (3) it socializes us by delineating and reinforcing particular social norms, where we fit in the society, and the consequences of transgressions, and (4) it creates a space for audiences to be harnessed as potential consumers for advertisers. Stuart Hall (1990b:8) argues that media constructs and defines race, and produces and reproduces often unquestioned ideologies of racism, which become “common sense.” This passive racism, Yasmin Jiwani (2006) argues, is just as violent as overt racism, as it persists largely without being interrogated.

Articulations of race in the media are not separate from historical events and processes. Canadian and American states are built upon violent and racist histories, including colonization and near genocide of First Nations peoples, slavery, and contemporary global imperialism. These relations between Europeans and First Nations,

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26 Islamophobia is a term used for anti-Muslim discrimination (Razack 2008).
27 Stuart Hall (1990b:9) defines ideologies as, (1) concepts and beliefs that are not separate from one another, but instead are articulations of different elements and conceptions brought together in a context, (2) individuals and groups do not produce or reproduce ideological statements consciously, but they formulate their intentions within ideologies, and (3) ideologies work by constructing positions of identification which allow them to make ideological truths as if they are the authors. Subjects can be constructed within different ideologies.
Africans as well as Asian and Middle Eastern peoples have historically been framed within theories of evolution: (1) there were beliefs around fixed relations of subordination and domination, (2) people were grouped by poles of “superior” and “inferior,” and (3) non-Europeans were removed from the realm of history and placed into the realm of nature (Hall 1990b:14). Stuart Hall (1990b) argues that the literature throughout slavery and colonialism is marked with these fixed attributes of colonized races; however, the imperialist’s “white eye” is absent, unmarked, and his or her observations are unquestioned. In the 21st century, the historical traces of slavery and colonialism are seen in the contemporary representations of race in the media. News of racialized groups both within the nation-state and globally focus on their association with violence and conflicts. In Canada and the US, there has been an increased association between immigrants and people of color, and in the media racialized groups are being connected with crime (Jiwani 2006:39). These associations have led to increased xenophobia, providing a basis for the “myth of difference,” which provides justification for the non-entrée regime (see Chimni 1998).

Globally, the media represents conflicts in the post-colonies from an internalist point of view, without interrogating the roles of Western states in instigating or prolonging the conflicts and without questioning the involvement of Western governments in fueling or exacerbating conflicts (Chimni 1998, Monsutti 2006). Today, there are plenty of examples of Western meddling in the Middle East, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria where direct and indirect involvement have become evident leading to death and destruction in these countries. Foreign interventions gain popular support through what has been termed the “CNN effect,” the increased reliance on the images and interviews produced in the media for information without any
discussion of the context. Increasingly, journalists write about wars and armed conflicts, but the reader learns little about the histories of the conflicts (Mamdani 2009:7). In fact, Mahmood Mamdani (2009) suggests that increasingly there is the belief that lack of knowledge of the context of a war should not deter the decision to take action.

Within the current post-9/11 political and social environment, race thinking has been directed primarily at Muslims (Razack 2008), as discussed in chapter 1. Following 9/11, the media was flooded with images and reports of vigils, memorials, and rescue efforts at the World Trade Center; however, anti-war protests were suppressed along with public discussion that the attacks were a direct response to US policies in the Middle East as claimed by Al-Qaeda itself (Thobani 2007:230). Instead, the media drew upon Samuel Huntington’s “clash of the civilizations” thesis. Drawing on the work of the Orientalist scholar, Bernard Lewis, Huntington proposed that the ideological wars of the Cold War will be replaced by a cultural clash, between what he assumes to be a homogeneous mass of anti-Western and irrational Muslims and an equally homogeneous and unchanging, though superior, Judeo-Christian civilization. In such a vision, the world is reduced to bounded and unequal geographies and identities (Thobani 2007:230-231).

Representations of Muslims as barbaric and antimodern in the media became unabashed and concealed long histories of imperial meddling and the struggles against it. Most significantly, the rhetoric obfuscated the economic and geopolitical interests of the US in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern countries (Thobani 2007:230-231).

Canada is not separate from the US in its involvement in perpetuating racialized discourse directed at Muslims. According to Sunera Thobani (2007:232-233), in the Canadian media, American and Canadian values and beliefs are represented as similar. In fact, Prime Minister Stephen Harper has repeatedly linked the presence of Canadian
troops in Afghanistan to the events of 9/11 and the attacks on the twin towers as also directed at Canadians. The Canadian media similarly appropriated the racialized discourse used by the Bush administration to assert their Westernness, which helped to facilitate the spread of these discourses and narratives in Canadian society (Thobani 2007:232-233). Anti-terrorism laws and policies directed at Muslims and the construction of fortress America (and increasingly Canada) (Thobani 2007) contributed to a culture of fear in the US and Canada. The crimes committed by Muslims and associated with terrorism both within and outside these countries are repeatedly reported in the news, perpetuating the notions of ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Muslims (Mamdani 2004), and creating an environment where the national subject perceives himself or herself to be under threat by both internal and external others (Razack 2008).

Gendered representations of Muslims in the media as well as laws and policies emanating from the ‘War on Terror’ are constructed on racial thinking (Razack 2008:84). The Bush administration made the liberation of Muslim women one of the main policy objectives in the war in Afghanistan and used the presumed oppression of Muslim women by Muslim men as one of the justifications to wage the ‘War on Terror’ in general and the American bombing and the intervention in Afghanistan in particular (Abu-Lughod 2002, Razack 2008). Following the declaration of this policy the media was flooded with images of veiled women who soon became the symbol of victimhood. The media representations essentialized and dehumanized Muslim women while silencing their voices and concealing their histories (Thobani 2007).

Building on Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) critique of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslim binary, Sunera Thobani (2007) argues that in North America ‘good’ Muslim women are considered to be those who do not wear the *hijab*, adopt American beliefs and interests,
and want to be active in civilizing projects, especially those targeting other Muslim women. On the other hand, ‘bad’ Muslim women are constructed as those who refuse to unveil themselves and do not condemn their own religion. They are considered fanatical and uninformed or uneducated because they are completely unaware of male domination over them. In Canada and the US, the media represents ‘bad’ Muslim women as being an internal threat to the nation, since it is believed that women are responsible for transmitting racial, cultural, and national difference onto their children (Thobani 2007:237).

The media’s hegemonic representation of Muslim men is as perpetrators of violence. Sunera Thobani (2007:239) argues the men who committed the attacks were represented in the media as barbaric, coming from ancient desert lands whose hatreds go back far in history. Similarly, Yasmin Jiwani (2006:36) suggests that the media represented Muslim men as primitive, which was the reason given for their opposition to the West. The dehumanization of Muslims is possible through processes of dehistoricization and depoliticization of the attacks and the unequal structural relations between Afghanistan and Iraq and the US that removes the war from the realm of history into the realm of nature (Jiwani 2006:39). In contrast, if we examine the contradictions between media representations on the one hand, and the historical realities and present relationships on the other, between Somalia and the US and Canada we will note a huge gap, and the arguments and debates about Somalia change. Taking the grounded and historical relationships as part of the analytical frame enables us to question assumptions, and reveals the racist ideologies for what they are.

As discussed in chapter 1, Sharon Stephens (1995) argues that children are seen as a threat to societal order and adult personal security. Either viewed as dangerous, or at
risk of becoming dangerous, Western views of children and youth in general interweave with the hegemonic narrative of male Muslims, constructing Somali male youth in Canada and the US as a threat to non-Somali, non-Muslim Canadian and American citizens. For instance, on August 7, 2010, The Independent published an article entitled “From high school hero to jihadist targeting the US.” The article written on the allegation of twelve men and two women suspected of using a humanitarian charity to support Al-Shabab begins with: “They call him ‘The Jihadist Next Door:’ an all-American high school student from Alabama who recently popped up in a remote corner of East Africa…” (Adams 2010). Although young Somali women are often represented as victims, those considered ‘bad’ Muslim women are increasingly also seen as a threat. The Globe and Mail reported on April 4, 2011, “19-year-old niece of Somali Prime Minister is said to have become radicalized in Toronto prior to leaving for Mogadishu with a friend” (Freeze 2011). The concern is not that Somali youth are fighting in Somalia, but that they will become threats to American and Canadian societies. Concurrently, women and young children are represented as victims, not survivors, and their individual stories are left untold, as will be explored below.

In light of the above, it is important to examine how youth mediate between the media’s messages and the structural violence they experience, and their responses to both (see also Korbin 2003). The media represents bodies in texts that are intimately intertwined with real lives. Readers learn particular ways of reading text that help them to interpret bodies represented in the text and in life, to mark and unmark bodies (Cherland and Harper 2007:243). The living body represented in text, as in newspapers, is coerced and molded by the representations of it affecting the ways the reader views the living bodies (Cherland and Harper 2007:243). As I show in this chapter the representations of
Somali bodies in the media affect the everyday experiences and relationships of Somali children and youth. For their part, children and youth appropriate the violence they experience and invest it with meaning. They question messages directed at them, select, discard and rework representations and experiences, and in the process reconstruct their identities (see also Hall et al. 1978, Willis 1990).

Methods of Research

This chapter draws on two kinds of methods. First, I conducted a critical discourse analysis of the representation of Somalis and Somalia in newspapers in Canada and the US. At first, my sample consisted of articles in all Sunday editions of Canadian and American newspapers between August 6 and October 16, 2011; however, I found there were very few articles and they often were not in the main sections of the newspaper, but in opinions and blogs. This was surprising considering the famine in East Africa was spreading and had drastic repercussions on Somalia and Somalis. As of July 20, 2011, the UN declared that malnutrition rates in Somalia were the highest in the world. In the southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions, acute malnutrition rates were above 30 percent of the population. Among children less than 5 years old the deaths related to malnutrition exceeded six per 10,000. In the couple of months leading up to the UN report (July 2011) tens of thousands of Somalis had died and the UN estimated that 3.7 million, half of the Somali population, were in crisis (UN 2011).

Since I needed more articles for my sample, I expanded my search to include Saturday and Monday editions. First, I conducted an interactional analysis that examined the interactions between different representations as well as the gaps and contradictions in the texts (Fairclough 2001). Second, I examined the images associated with the article to see how Somali bodies are made visible in the media. Finally, I examined representations
of the relationships between Somalia and Canada and the US, including the historical connections made or silenced in the articles. With this approach, I delineated three main themes: (1) representations of Somalis as perpetrators or victims of violence, (2) representations of American and Canadian relations with Somalia and Somalis, and (3) non-violent or positive representations of Somalia and Somalis. The chapter also draws on the life history interviews conducted with Somali youth between the ages of 14 and 30, as well as with mothers of the youth.

The Representation of Somalis and Somalia in Newspapers

“After 9/11…suddenly, being Muslim I was hyper aware of that. Like hyper aware of what it meant, what it looked like” (Ikraan, March 5, 2011). Ikraan, a 23-year-old Somali woman, is discussing the changes she experienced as a child following 9/11. Yet, the voices of children and youth, such as Ikraan, are generally erased from the news articles. As a result, the effects of geopolitical events on the lives of children and youth go unnoticed. Even when children’s bodies are represented in the images and the text, they remain voiceless. Instead, NGO workers, parents, peacekeepers or military personnel, and others from the West, speak for them (see also Malkki 1996). For instance, on September 3, 2011 the Voice of America wrote a story on the effects of the famine in Somalia. The story’s image was of mothers holding their children and other young children in line waiting for medical care; however, there is not an interview or a quote from a child. Similarly, in a Huffington Post (2011) article on the famine there is a large image of young children waiting in line for food, yet there are no quotes from children. Furthermore, the article does not even focus on the impact of the famine on children, but

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28 To ensure confidentiality all interlocutors names are pseudonyms unless the interlocutor requested their real name be used.
focuses on global warming. Another article published in the Toronto Sun on August 20, 2011 mentions that Islamic Relief Canada was overwhelmed with the amount of starving children at their clinic. The story’s image is of a young boy preparing a fire outside his family’s tent in an internally displaced persons camp in Mogadishu; but the boy is not interviewed.

In my analysis, I found that the two representations of Somalis as either recipients or victims of violence were often interwoven. For instance, in many of the articles where famine was the main topic, the article also discussed Al-Shabab and in most instances its links with Al-Qaeda, which invokes in the reader memories of 9/11. For instance, USA Today, August 17, reported, “famine is worst in southern Somalia, where Al-Shabab, an Islamist terrorist organization with links to Al-Qaeda, is preventing aid groups from helping…” (Dorell 2011), The Edmonton Journal, September 11 reported, “The problem is Al-Shabab, the al-Qaida affiliate that controls most of the starvation-ravaged regions of Somalia” (Gunter 2011), and CBS News, August 6, wrote, “In the south, where the famine is greatest, Al-Shabab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda, is in control” (Hill 2011). These associations repetitively made in the news construct the drought and the resulting famine as the fault of the Somali people, rather than examining the relations between the transnational and local social, economic, and environmental forces that contributed to the disaster.

In the articles, children are represented as the main victims, made explicit by providing statistics on the number of children who have died or are suffering from acute malnutrition; however, the number of men and women who have lost their lives is not presented. In the articles, children are dehistoricized as they are presented in hordes, rather than as individuals with personal experiences and histories. They are not gendered,
but rather homogenized and essentialized. In the majority of the images of the famine there are pictures of women and children, while there is only one of a man, a grief stricken father holding his baby’s body wrapped in a prayer rug (Montreal Gazette 2011). Children in the images are always young children, there are no pictures of adolescents. In many of the images, the children are shown as severely malnourished, lying on beds and are referred to as “faces of famine” (Hill 2011, Gettleman 2011).

For adults, there is a clear gendered differentiation between victim and perpetrator. Women in the images are shown as caregivers of their ill children (Gettleman 2011) and others are of women standing in line at a refugee camp to get food (Gettleman 2011, Hogendoorn 2011, The Huffington Post 2011) or medical care (Voice of America 2011). On the other hand, the pictures and discourse surrounding the war and Al-Shabab represent men as the perpetrators of violence. For instance, in one image there is a group of men in green army clothes, faces covered, carrying bullets around their necks, guns in their hands, and sitting in the back of a truck (Gunter 2011). The outcome of combining these discourses of Somali women and children as victims of famine and Somali men as perpetrators of violence plays into the master narrative following 9/11 of the violence that Muslim women and children face at the hands of Muslim men’s barbarism (Razack 2008:84).

One of the main gaps I found in the articles was the absence of discussion of the structural violence, the human inequalities between the global North and the global South that is evident in the famine, specifically with relation to access to medicine. For instance, in the Montreal Gazette, August 14, an Agence France-Presse article is reprinted which states, “the baby died of drought and famine related complications;” however, later the article explains that the father with the baby was turned away from a government run
hospital in the camp due to lack of drugs (Montreal Gazette 2011). The unequal access to medicine that affects those in the poorest countries in the world is evident in the images of women carrying children waiting in line for medical care for infectious diseases, such as malaria and cholera. In the articles, there is no analysis of such inequalities even when blaming “dirty water and poor sanitation” (The State Column 2011) for the outbreak of such diseases. The extreme human suffering of Somalis in East Africa, who do not have access to medication that is widely available in North America and Europe, is a clear example of the economic and political structural violence inflicted on the global South by the global North. Instead of any analysis of access to medicine, the articles represent people in the Third World, sitting passively waiting for aid to arrive (Hall 1990b:17).

Paul Farmer (1999) argues that transnational inequalities shape the distribution of emerging diseases as well as health outcomes, which is evidenced by the fact that infectious disease is the number one cause of death in the poorest countries in the world. According to the United Nations Office of the High Representative For The Least Developed Countries, Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011). The lack of attention to the structural violence associated with the drought and famine in East Africa is evidence of a dominant neoliberal characteristic by which we look away from the causes and consequences of structural violence (Farmer 2005:16).

Moreover, my analysis of media articles showed that the US and Canada are represented as saviours and reveals the US view that they have the right to control famine relief distribution. In an article in USA Today, August 17, the author suggests that one of the main obstacles in reaching Al-Shabab controlled areas of Mogadishu are the US restrictions that prevent US money from assisting terrorist groups, and that aid was not
getting to the people who needed it because of this restriction. Furthermore, the US State Department did not allow aid groups that received US funds to operate in *Al-Shabab* controlled areas (Dorell 2011). In other articles, the restrictions of aid distribution are not blamed on the policies of the US State Department, but on *Al-Shabab* who were blocking Western aid (Payton 2011). Silenced in these articles is any analysis of the link between humanitarian interventions and imperialism or that other aid groups were involved in famine relief in *Al-Shabab* controlled areas of Mogadishu.

The newspaper articles consistently referred to the amount of government money allocated to the relief efforts. The Canadian media suggested that the amount contributed by the government was sufficient, meaning they have done enough to help. For instance, the *Toronto Sun*, August 20, states, “The federal government said it *has already* made $72 million available *to keep more than 12 million people from death* in the East African country” (Valiante 2011, emphasis added). Yet, none of the articles discussed the fact that the magnitude of the famine could have been preventable. K.B Lankarani (2011) suggests that the drought in East Africa was predicted as part of global climate change in 2010, but it was not taken seriously. In fact, in 2009 Joe DeCapua published an article in *Voice of America* that discussed a report issued by the UN Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia stating that 1.4 million people were being affected by the drought in Somalia and that the humanitarian crisis is likely to get worse. In addition, there were actually few relief agencies, including health care professionals working in Mogadishu despite the propaganda of the relief efforts from the West. K.B. Lankarani (2011) suggests that the health workers were very few and not adequately trained to deal with such a disaster and in a context where infants, children, and mothers were dying at such a high rate. One of the few articles that discussed the lack of relief in Mogadishu was in the
Toronto Sun, August 20, that reported on a team of doctors from Islamic Relief Canada. One of the doctors interviewed stated that she did not see any other international relief organizations during her ten day tour of Mogadishu (Valiante 2011).

The US and Canada are also represented as experts of the East African famine and the conflict in Somalia. For instance, in The State Column, August 14, a US ‘expert’ is quoted to show the number of children who have died as a result of the famine and drought in Somalia (The State Column 2011). In USA Today, August 17, the State department is quoted as the expert in knowledge surrounding Al-Shabab’s refusal of foreign aid and how it prevents people from leaving the areas under their control (Dorell 2011). While American experts are given voice in the texts, Somalis remain for the most part voiceless, and there are very few quotes from government officials, ambassadors, researchers, scientists, doctors, or experts from East Africa.

Even the non-violent or positive representations of Somalis in the media were associated with stereotypical representations. They also had traces of neo-colonial assumptions as they are for the most part Somali-Canadians or Somali-Americans represented as ‘good Muslims’ who are usually victims of violence. One is of K’naan, a Somali-Canadian rap superstar who together with Bono were advocating for Somalia and fundraising for famine relief (Hampson 2011). Other articles featured Somali-Canadians walking to raise money for famine relief (Butty 2011, CBC News 2011). Another article was the only non-violent representation of Somalis, a women’s group in Somalia which was distributing aid; however, the fact that they are females and responded to victims of violence, did not contradict the dominant narratives of Somalis in the news (Dorell 2011).

The stereotypical representations of Somalis shape the experiences of Somali youth in their everyday lives. In educational spaces children and youth feel the structural
inequalities as well as social stereotypes perpetuated by the media in the schoolyard, classrooms, halls, and in their communities. Through the media and other social and political channels, Somali children and youth get the message that only certain kinds of citizens are fully human and they find themselves constantly having to defend and justify who they are and to convince others they are not violent and deserve humane treatment.

The Impact of the Representations on the Everyday Experiences of Somali Youth

I interviewed Somali youth regarding the negative representations of Somalis in the media, and its effects on their lives and identities. In the following quote, a 23-year-old Somali woman talks about her experience after the planes hit the twin towers in 2001.

I didn't understand, I guess, like, the heaviness of what happened. So I get home and my mom's like watching it and she just looks at me and she's like, “Our lives are about to change. It's over. We're screwed. Muslims are screwed.” And like she said it in such a serious way...Then the news reports started coming and then, I mean, ... like it was just... all this Islamophobia was coming out of the television screen and I was like “Okay, yeah, yeah, it's true, our lives are changing, yep. Yeah, we're screwed. We're screwed.” So I just kinda saw it, like, first hand, on the ground, you know? (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

A 17-year old, named Heybe, who was born in Canada, talked about his frustrations over the representation of Somalia as a country because it contradicts his family’s memories:

The media is kind of, all biased. So I get frustrated by sometimes, like they say Somalia is the worst country in the world or that Mogadishu is the most dangerous city in the world. But it is somewhat true, but if they knew of how Somalia was then they would not be saying all this. My mom and dad say it was a peaceful country, a normal country (Heybe, March 8, 2011).

Kadiye, a leader among Somali youth, discussed the lack of media attention to the American-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006. He noted how youth were confused as to why the media was not documenting the atrocities committed against Somalis as they were learning of them from their families back home. Kadiye suggests the war crimes committed against Somalis in Somalia “woke up the youth,” reigniting
Somali nationalism in the diaspora. The youth reacted to this by coming together to create change in their country.

So, in '06 what happened is, Somalia was invaded. And... Somali youth were able to see what was happening there because they have families back home. And they had family that would call and would tell them, 'cause CNN doesn't tell you anything. The news media doesn't tell you anything. So they know that the Ethiopian soldiers are raping women, you know?... They know that they're going house to house for no reason and killing people. And all the stuff that's happening, they're shelling Mogadishu. So, the anger's there. So... that's what... that what woke them up. It angers them that their people are being killed for no reason...nobody is respecting their sovereignty as a country, you know? (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

Here, we see that the lack of media attention on issues that affect Somalis also affects youth’s sense of belonging, conveying to them that the deaths of countless Somali people are not important enough to include in North American news reports.

Others expressed the feelings of shame about being Somali as a result of the representations in the news.

Sometimes I feel ashamed because there are crazy people [in Somalia], right doing all those bombardments. I feel ashamed to say that I am Somali because there are crazy people [in Somalia]. I feel ashamed. I don’t want to see anymore of it. I want to turn it off and I just want to blind myself because it’s embarrassing (Idman, April 22, 2011).

Kadiye expressed worry on how the media would impact Somali youths’ identities:

I think that also we need to do some programs that encourages our kids to be proud of them being Somali. A lot of kids are not proud and I don't blame them because every time they look on TV they see a warlord that's killing people, people who are starving or, or pirates. Or some terrorist. So... that discourages them about being Somali (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

It is apparent that media influences youth’s feelings of their personal, familial, and national histories. It also shows that the demonization of Muslims following 9/11, and foreign interventions in Somalia do not go unnoticed by youth.
Meaning and Agency in the Context of Structural Violence

On October 16, 2010, I sat in a banquet hall in Toronto where I listened to various speakers, who work on behalf of or with Somali youth, discuss the plight of Somali youth and the violence they experience. During that conference, the Toronto District School Board’s Director of Education Equity stated that 36.7 percent or one in three Somalis in Toronto drop out of school (field notes, October 16, 2010). The director, one of the few who focused on the structural inequalities that exist in Canada and how they affect youth, believed that the underlying issues for youth were alienation and disengagement. He argued that the bombardment of negative images in the media impress upon youth that they are of no value. In schools, these beliefs are reinforced through a curriculum that negates or ignores their histories, cultures and everyday experiences, and teachers and other adults who know little about their histories and cultures.

The geopolitical processes represented in the media are felt by Somali youth at school where the social stereotypes and resulting marginalization are mirrored in the schoolyard. These processes are evident in the stories of youth: “You will see that Muslims are almost second class citizens. And then the youth are obviously the ones who are the easiest targets because they’re the ones who go to school, they’re the ones…who are outside more” (Kadiye, June 23, 2011). Here, Kadiye is explaining that the media’s representations of Muslims directly affect children who go to school and are embedded in an environment with peers, who may only know about Somalis from representations in newspapers and other forms of media. Most of the youth I spoke with expressed feelings of discrimination in both American and Canadian societies.

Somali youth I spoke with rarely labeled their negative experiences and interactions with their peers as racist; however, their stories revealed that racism was part
of their experiences. Aasiya, a 17-year old high school student remembers her family’s first weeks of school in Canada:

I remember we started to get a lot of racist comments. It never really hurt me... racist comments. I was called the ‘N’ word once. Yah, you know it didn’t hurt me and I was like I didn’t care. But the disrespect was... I can’t believe you just called me that, sort of, it didn’t hurt. But the fact that you dare say that to me... why would you do that? Like stuff I never heard of, like “I don’t like black people.” What am I going to say to that, I am not going to say “you should like black people” (Aasiya, April 22, 2011).

Jabrill, had similar experiences,

I was picked on because [I was black] and I was Muslim. That is never really easy. At [the school I attended] there were a lot of wealthy kids and... probably my family and me were the only dark people. Maybe they weren’t used to it, but it was easier for them to pick on me (Jabrill, April 22, 2011).

Ikraan, now in her early 20s, articulated her feelings and beliefs regarding the hierarchy of citizenship in Canada and the impact on her family. In discussing her mother’s dreams as well as her own, Ikraan says, “What I do know about is how Canada really puts you in your place and how it tries to put you in your place, like, the racism” (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

Ikraan was a good student in school, but she, like other young women I spoke with, felt that her teachers saw her as an anomaly rather than the norm.

And my one teacher, he was like this older white male, like, old school science guy. He was a nice guy, but I mean... He always made me feel like I belonged, yeah, as in, like I've showed him that I belong in his classes. But at the same time, made me feel like I didn't, as in I was a bit of an anomaly, like “what are you doing here?” (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

Many mothers I interviewed recounted their children’s experiences of racism. Zhara, informed me that her son was called a “negro” and told to “go back to Africa” by other students in a private school he attended. At the time, Zhara and her son did not know the meaning of the word “negro” and she told her son to ignore the comments and to show
that he is a respectful and good student. Yet, the name-calling went on repeatedly until one day when her son was playing basketball one of the boys hit him, calling him a “negro.” The boys ended up in a fight and her son was the one who got in trouble. Zhara kept a detailed record of the bullying and presented the incidents to the principal. Even though the principal took the appropriate action, Zhara pulled her children out of the school. In the next school, however, her son continued to experience racism. Zhara admitted to finding a journal written by her son that expressed his sadness as he tried to understand the reasons his peers treated him this way. He wrote that he is a person just like the others, that he comes from an educated family, and that his father is an important man. Zhara saw a major change in her son as a result of the bullying (Zhara, October 20, 2010). Another mother, Safiyo, had a similar experience with her son. When Safiyo’s son was 15-years old he came home and expressed feelings of anger, frustration, and he had no sense of belonging to Canadian society. He told her that he did not have any friends, that no one is nice to him, and other students call him a “nigger” (Safiyo, December 18, 2010). These cases show that bullying is instigated and inflicted on Somali youth by their non-Somali peers at school and it is based in racism.

There were clear differences in the racism experienced by children and youth based on their neighbourhoods and schools. The youth whose families had high socio-economic statuses and attended private schools experienced consistent racism in the schools they attended. For instance, one family attended four different schools before the children had positive experiences. Similarly, the youth who were raised in predominantly white, Anglo-Saxon neighborhoods expressed more problems arising from racism. The 1.5-generation, explained in chapter 1 as the generation of Somali youth who were born
in Somalia and immigrated to North America as young children, and second-generation youth were also more likely to report experiences of racism.

There were also gendered differences in that more Somali males experienced bullying that was instigated on issues of race than females. In the US, Somali youth consistently recounted stories about experiences with racism; however, their experiences were often outside of their schools and neighbourhoods. The racism they encountered was largely with police as well as government officials and institutions. The reason for this may be related to the fact that many of the Somalis I interviewed in the US lived and went to school with peers from a multitude of backgrounds. This was similar to Canada, in that Somali youth who went to school and lived in neighbourhoods with a diverse population were less likely to experience discrimination in school. What is clear is that the racism experienced by these children and youth in their everyday lives at school erodes their sense of belonging to the larger society. As we will see later in the chapter these routine and normalized forms of violence change the way youth see themselves and their families.

**Gendered Experiences of Islamophobia**

Although some of the youth I interviewed discussed racism, many more discussed their experiences of Islamophobia. For males the discourse around terrorism and piracy was used to bully them. Heybe, a high school student, discusses the changes he has experienced:

What are kind of different now are stereotypes these days. Like they know about Somalia and pirates and all that. Like there are some ignorant kids out there that go around and start making fun of say me and my brother and some other Somalis I go to school with... I don’t know they label us as pirates as well and don’t really see why there is actually Somali pirates out there, they don’t understand the whole reason behind it. Or they call us a terrorist or something because you know how
there is terrorist organization out there terrorizing the country and stuff. We get labeled (Heybe, March 18, 2011).

Others hear similar comments from their friends who pass these off as a joke, “And like, ... my friends, they're my really close friends... so they throw jokes at me. So we had this heated conversation this one time about piracy” (Looyan, February 12, 2011).

Educational spaces, such as mosques or *dugsi*, after school and weekend Islamic schools, are also targets of discrimination. Kadiye, a young man in his early 20s, explains how the media fuels discrimination:

> I mean, when people see stuff like that, they see it on TV; you're seen as an enemy. You know, constantly our mosque... people come at night and spray things like “Go home you terrorist” and stuff, so... Like I said, media has a huge effect on those... Muslim communities here (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

The focus on male Somali youth in terms of risk in the media and popular discourse reinforces Islamophobia and the image of Somali male youth as ‘other.’ Representing young Somali men as perpetrators of violence and thus a threat, dovetails with the ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric.

For women, the *hijab* has become a marker of difference and makes them more visible targets of Islamophobia. The young women I interviewed and who wear the *hijab* believed they were more likely to experience discrimination because they were visibly Muslim. Lila Abu-Lughod (2002) argues that the discourse of “saving Muslim women” mentioned earlier, implies they need to be saved from the oppression of Muslim men. The discourse reinforces the Orientalist notion that Islam is an inherently backward and oppressive religion. This is evidenced by the fact that Somali women’s bodies have become reinscribed as the ‘other’ through articulations of women’s rights (see Razack
2008), implying that their rights are violated by men, mainly because they are Muslim.

Aasiya describes her experience in high school,

I always get, “Islam is so sexist,” I always get it in that, in that kind of tone to, “Islam is so sexist,” but I kind of just swallow it…I’ll have people that will think of me as an oppressed person, sheltered, who don’t know much about the world, have had someone say that to me…I get this all the time, “Be wise!” Because I wear this hijab, they’ll look at me and they’ll think I am the stay at home sort of person, all I know is cook, clean and I just come to school… I know that people think that according to the law I have to go to school and that when I turn 18 that my parents will just marry me off. That is what they think of me, some of them (Aasiya, April 22, 2011).

Idman, who lived most of her life in different countries throughout Africa, recalls the feelings of difference she felt when she first went to school in Canada and her experiences of playing soccer on the school team:

When I came to the school and wore the hijab, I realized some sense of I felt not as comfortable as in Africa. I felt like everyone noticing I was different. I was like oh yes I am different after all. I started feeling [different] because of the way they were looking at you and stuff. I didn’t realize before I was still young and a bit naïve. I didn’t feel shy…I won’t say I felt shy, but not as comfortable as before. Because there was the issue in Quebec and stuff and that kind of thing was all political. So for me it was all weird, but I didn’t take it all seriously. Still soccer is soccer…But honestly I will tell you if you want to know the truth, I think I could have done much better on that team if I didn’t feel so different because if you feel different you can’t do a good job without you even realizing it, it is not conscious (Idman, April 22, 2011).

Idman’s story shows that young Muslim youth are aware of the hijab controversies in Canada and that these narratives, policies, and viewpoints can have an effect on young women’s sense of belonging, experiences and in this case confidence. Some of the young men I interviewed, like Kadiye, expressed concern about the discrimination Somali women face: “And what are girls looked upon as like. Like, you know, ’cause... as if they're weak…because they have this attention in the media of... the veiled woman who's

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29 In 2007 in Quebec, a girl was told she could not play soccer while wearing a hijab. After some debate, the Quebec Soccer Federation upheld the decision that players were prohibited from wearing hijabs on the soccer field (Ravensbergen 2007).
like … oppressed” (Kadiye, June 23, 2011). Somali female youth have been the targets of programs and interventions; however, these are based outside of Somali communities and are informed by these stereotypical representations of female Muslims as victims or ‘at risk.’ They also assume a static, monolithic view of Islam and obscure the diverse reasons women choose to veil, a point I discuss later in the chapter. These cases show that the colonial image of Muslims as premodern and antimodern has led to feelings of exclusion among Somali youth and may hinder their integration in North American society (see also Hoodfar 2003). As we will see below, the gendered representations in the media of Somali males as perpetrators and females as victims of violence are played out in schools and shape Somali youth experiences and belonging.

**Structural Violence in North America: Somali Youth’s Experiences of Poverty**

The focus on the dominant discourse and narratives of the representations of Somali bodies in the media conceals other forms of structural violence, such as poverty, that many Somali children and their families experience in Canada and the US. Educational scholars and practitioners have long recognized that poverty has an impact on educational attainment (Levin 1995). My research confirms this view; I found that poverty impacts the education of Somali youth, which is exacerbated by the pressure on some youth to make money to help their families in Canada or the US, and/or to send remittances back home.

As discussed in chapter 1, Somali communities in Canada and the US are among the youngest and the poorest, a topic that appeared regularly in interviews. A young Somali man from Minneapolis-Saint Paul described his experiences as follows, “The snow starts and it’s freezing. A month later my mom got sick from the cold. She had surgery on her neck and could not work…Before, I lived in West Saint Paul and there
was too much violence” (Aadan, July 2, 2011). Here, Aadan was describing his first few years in the US when no one in his family was working because his mom got sick during the winter and as a result had to move to a low-income area of the city that was known for gun violence. In Canada, Somali youth have similar experiences as a 23-year-old Somali woman explained:

Yeah, we moved around quite a bit and you could just see how living in Canada just brought my family down. At first we were living... when we were living in Mississauga ... we had … a decent apartment, everything was fine, and there was a lot of hope, whatever. And then it just got really, really bad until one point when I was 10 (years old); we were actually in a shelter (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

Iqra explained how the underemployment of her father who was a journalist in Somalia had lasting effects on her father and her family:

My Dad on the other hand, went through what most immigrant [men go through], he couldn't find a job...He couldn't work at the BBC anymore, he couldn't find a job here, so he became a dishwasher...And that destroyed him, until the end, I think that was the... it was the beginning of the end for him... He lost everything. He lost his self-esteem, his dignity, he just... everything was stripped away from him. And then he ended up, his health... losing his health. I guess, in the same time frame (Iqra, April 16, 2011).

These cases show that the underemployment of Somali parents affect children and youth who experience the effects of living in urban poverty.

In the US, the inequity reflected in schools is not lost on the youth. Kadiye remembers his experience in Nashville, “The school was terrible, and they had books that were very old. Teachers there... as long as you went to school, you passed. As long as you had attendance, you passed” (Kadiye, June 23, 2011). Alma compares her experiences in school in Toronto and Waterloo, “I lived the Toronto lifestyle and it's just like... it's not good, and especially the schooling and everything is not as good as here” (Alma, February 10, 2011). Aamino believes that in some areas of Toronto there are lower levels of educational attainment,
In Toronto, schools where... in certain areas ... the children there don't graduate in general. Let alone, like, the Somali community and there's a lot of, like, violence there, you know, guns, drugs and like... I think a lot of people there are caught up with that too ... in Toronto (Aamino, March 7, 2011).

In my fieldwork I also found that some young Somali men and women needed to get a job to contribute to their families. In many cases, the youth were the only members of the family who were able to get employment. Aadan describes how his brother supported the family, “No one was working in the family. My brother worked at a bagel factory and went to school at the same time to support the family” (Aadan, July 2, 2011).

One grandmother who has been raising her grandchildren since her daughter was killed in Somalia 18 years ago explains the families’ finances and how it impacts school:

When we came here [Maandeeq] was younger and now she is 18, there are so many things I can’t help with. The government should help her with finance; we only get $150 per month for her now. If she doesn’t get what she wants she may leave [school]. Girls are vulnerable and they are affected if don’t get things they need. Now she turned 18 and she gets only per month $150 and we need more money to have higher standard of living. I want her to be independent, to be on her own [cheque], but now she is included in my cheque (Dhuuxo, April 23, 2011).

Maandeeq’s brother who was 18 years old when his family settled in Canada never attended school and rather finds ways to make money to support his family.

Unaccompanied young men and women discussed the problems they experienced balancing school and work in order to support themselves. Anwar came to the US at 21 years of age and found work as a cab driver while he attended university, “I was 21 when I came, I mean, then... you know, it was a challenge... to just do normal things that...like a 21 year old does. And go to school at the same time. Just pay... for myself. And just contribute to back home” (Anwar, June 26, 2011). Basra, an 18-year-old recent high school graduate, also found it hard to balance going to school and supporting herself, needing money for herself as well as her family. Amiin who worked two jobs while
attending university also said that he is finding it difficult to keep up with his schoolwork. As a result, students may leave school early to help support their families.

It is not uncommon for an individual to have many dependent relatives in Somalia and/or other countries who rely on his or her monthly remittances. These transnational relationships undoubtedly affect the emotional and economic well-being of Somali youth in Canada and the US. Many youth discussed the difficulties they have in trying to send remittances to their friends and family, while studying or continuing their education. Basra believes that many youth leave school because of the pressure to remit money, as was her experience:

I came at 16 years old, four years ago. I started high school and I tried to drop out at 18 (years old) to get work and help my family back home, I needed money for my family and myself. The elders told me to go back to school, to finish high school. Many students leave school to send remittances – everyone needs to send money home. If mom calls and says “there is no food” then what do you do? There is pressure from family to send money, to leave school to help family (Basra, June 14, 2011).

Anwar told me how much of his initial income went to his family members, “I remember this... when I came to this country, and there’s this stipend... that you get from the county and... they give you like $250 for the first month, and for 8 months that will continue. For cash assistance, or [living]. [I was] looking for a job and I remember, I was sending $100 back home from that” (Anwar, June 26, 2011). In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, I had informal focus group sessions with both male and female youth and elders on the reasons that Somali youth are leaving school. Both the youth and the elders said that many youth leave school or do not go to college because there is pressure from family back home to remit money. Two of the boys I spoke with, who are experiencing this, said they could not go to college right now because they are by themselves and need to remit money back to their families in Somalia and in Kenya. The elder commented that a family member
might call the boy and put pressure on him to send money because someone in the family is sick or in need. It is hard for youth to both hold a job and to go to school (field notes, June 15, 2011).

Routine and normalized forms of violence are embedded into many Somali youths’ lives. Many of the youth I interviewed came from female-headed households, the majority of which are on social assistance. The mothers had problems paying the bills with the limited income they received, finding it difficult to raise their children while attending English language classes in order to get a job. Families headed by both parents experienced unemployment and underemployment, which not only affects the families’ economic well-being, but also their emotional health. A group of youth that is often overlooked is unaccompanied refugees who have to support themselves as well as their family in Somalia or in other countries while attending school. The importance of remittances that ensure the survival of families in Somalia and elsewhere in the diaspora directly affects the socioeconomic status of youth in Canada and the US.

**Interpersonal Violence: Fighting with Peers and Joining Gangs**

“It’s a society where, I guess, you have to prove yourself. It’s like a prison. If you don’t prove yourself then you’re going to be bullied” (Kadiye, June 23, 2011). Here Kadiye, is attempting to describe the environment a Somali newcomer experiences in school. In the analysis of the interviews I found that some Somali youth who were once the recipients of violence started to react to their marginalization by fighting back and getting involved in violence. Many of the youth I interviewed, both male and female, had experienced fighting in school. Kadiye attempts to understand the reasons he fought with his peers at school:
And... constantly having to fight... I don't know, as a child, this was growing up in Africa you were taught that it's okay to fight more until you win at your fighting. 'Cause [the view] we have as children in Africa, never to give up, you know?... So, and even bullies, they don't want to get hurt. They don't want to constantly fight every day. They want someone that they could beat up today and then that's it, they're easy to bully afterwards. So me being hardheaded, they didn't like me (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

Others discussed how being bullied caused them to start fighting. Jabrill talks about his experiences in elementary school,

[During the] first few weeks of school I had a few racist comments...the ‘N’ word, being black, it didn’t really offend me because I don’t understand how it can offend you because its just words but I felt angry that they felt they had the right to say that. And I don’t know I have changed very much, but I used to fight a lot. I was a little fighter. I didn’t understand that fighting was...I knew it was wrong but I didn’t know it was wrong until grade 6 so I was fighting after people who were saying that to me (Jabrill, April 22, 2011).

When I asked Jabrill what caused him to fight he said, “Being isolated...not being picked on but like unanimously being picked on just everybody then you don’t know who or where to fight and you are enclosed into this little box and there was nobody there and I found my way through that. It was a bit tough” (Jabrill, April 22, 2011).

Newcomers I interviewed observed that they were bullied because they were labeled as ‘refugees’ and did not speak English. Roble remembers his experience in elementary school in Minneapolis.

I started as a 4th grader in Minneapolis, 99 percent Somalis come to first period didn’t know English. I was very confused with the lesson. The other students would make fun and they would call me Flight 13 or qohoti as a joke, meaning refugee. I got into fights for the first two months and would fight everyone. I got suspended (Roble, July 2, 2011).

Alma admits to being picked on for being in ESL, “And there's some others that, just like, put you down and then it's like “Oh, you're ESL, you don't know English” and that kinda made me not want to go into ESL and, like...and then push ESL away and then, like, try to learn on my own and then that really didn't help too” (Alma, February 10, 2011). Some
second-generation youth suggested that others call newcomer Somali students names for the way they dress and their lack of English proficiency, but many of the newcomer youth did not admit to this in the interviews.

Other youth describe situations where they were sticking up for brothers, sisters and other family members. In fact, many of the youth believed it was important that they went to school with other family members who would protect them from bullies:

I grew up and abandoned Somali culture. I was fighting in 5th and 6th grades in Ohio. I was in a school where the majority was black. My little brothers got picked on so I would go and fight them. I had to fight to stick up for them. I got detention. I had to fight to protect my older brother. I fought a guy for taking my brother’s seat (Abdikarim, July 2, 2011).

Bullying was directed at Somali youth by a number of different peer groups, including other Somalis. In addition, there is pressure by youth themselves to join certain groups, including gangs and if the individuals do not agree, they may be bullied. The divisions and alliances between sub-clans and clan-families sometimes play a role, thus those who do not belong to the dominant clans are more likely to be bullied. This as we will see below may also lead youth to join non-Somali gangs.

One interesting finding in this research is that when I directly asked youth if they had been bullied almost every one said that they had not. Yet, in the interviews many of the youth spoke about instances of bullying. Thus, researchers need to be aware of the questions they raise, and be attentive to the influence of anti-bullying policies and programs in schools. These programs and policies may have hindered many youth from admitting to being bullied or being a bully in the interviews. Similarly, youth may have their own understanding as to what constitutes bullying and often do not identify their experiences as bullying. Researchers also need to be critical of bullying discourse because this overreaching term has the possibility to conceal the root causes of bullying that
includes racism and discrimination, a much more systematic form of violence. All of the youth I interviewed who once got into fights at school explained they have learned from their experiences and now are against participating in interpersonal forms of violence. Many were able to do this by finding spaces of belonging and challenging the representations of Somalis in community educational spaces, as we will see in the discussion below.

For a few Somali youth, their experiences of structural violence may lead them to violence as a way to cope with adversity. In my interviews, some of the young men explained they were pushed to hang out with certain groups of people because they were excluded from other Somalis. Aadan who immigrated to the US when he was a toddler explains: “Before I came to dugsi I hung out with bad people. They fought, some went to jail, gang bangers. They were the first people I met when I was little, Somali people are cocky and say I am not Somali. The others had my back, not Somalis” (Aadan, July 2, 2011). It appears that Somali youth often get involved with violence when they are labeled, excluded, or ostracized from certain peer groups, including other Somali youth.

One extreme case was of a young Somali man who was the leader of a Somali gang, who made attempts to justify the violence he committed as follows:

There was no one to protect the women. Black Americans did not make us feel welcome. They showed us they didn’t respect us. We come from a warrior country. But we came here to do right-to go to school, to get jobs. They pushed me to be fighting with them and I said I would keep on coming. I organized people to beat them. During, 1997-1999 I went to war with African-Americans…We took this entire neighborhood. [This neighborhood], this is going to be little Mogadishu I said, there will be Somali businesses, this was my vision and it happened. I had to take other businesses out. We would break and damage the store. They would sell it cheap and Somalis would buy it. I started taking taxes from Somali businesses in exchange for offering protection, so that nobody robs their businesses so no one goes inside (Amadayo, July 2, 2011).
Amadayo’s story explicitly shows the relationship between interpersonal, structural, and symbolic forms of violence. Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2004) suggests that violence can be thought of as a continuum that includes “small wars” or “invisible genocide” that make the oppressed complicit in their own destruction, which are carried out in everyday spaces, such as at schools and in the streets. Amadayo’s case shows how the continuum of violence, starting with structural forms, including poverty and discrimination and symbolic forms, such as racial dominance that enabled him to dehumanize African-Americans. These processes of dehumanization led to interpersonal violence, constructing African-Americans as expendable persons (Scheper-Hughes 2004:14). After being stabbed, Amadayo left the gang life and has been attempting to get others to do the same. Yet, he is constrained by his inability to find employment with criminal charges on his record; however, he finds his strength in the dugsi, a place with people who have helped him to reconnect to his faith, offered him social and emotional support, and given him a purpose by providing him with a mentorship role to youth who are involved with gangs.

As discussed in the introduction, the diverse circumstances of young people who have experienced displacement, migration, and settlement need to be taken into consideration and made more visible. By excluding men and/or male youth from research, analysis, and programs, their changing gender roles and family relations, as well as their specific needs and desires are overlooked. Treating men as perpetrators of violence, the nature of their challenges, the outcomes they desire, and the marginalization they experience is concealed (Brun 2000).
Spaces of Belonging, Challenging Representations, and Creating Change

Somali communities have responded to the perceived risk of their youth, particularly to their perceived identity crisis in various ways, including the establishment of community educational spaces to raise awareness of Somali history, cultural life and to develop communal support. For example, many Somali youth find in *dugsi* a place where they feel they belong, and where they build supportive networks, as my field research and interviews revealed.

I was a guest of a friend who worked at a *dugsi* in Saint Paul in 2011. The white brick building sat on a busy street in the midst of the city. As I entered the building there was a woman selling food in a booth and women praying in the room directly in front of the door. I was taken through classrooms that had rows of desks filled with Somali children who were learning the Qur’an. The four young men I spoke with were at the *dugsi* studying the Qur’an. We met in a sunroom located at the top of the building, empty but with a few chairs. The male youth described the role of the *dugsi* in changing their behaviour. Roble explains how his mother convinced him to attend *dugsi*:

A year ago mom would say go to *dugsi* for weekends, after two months you have to go to *dugsi* six days a week. I had to do what she said. If I said no my dad would get pissed at me. I accepted four days, she said three more days. The first few months was hard but then I got the hang of it. There was nothing else to do after school, so I come here. I come here for tutoring, go to study Qur’an after everyday study Qur’an I have finished the Qur’an and now working on memorization…Thursday’s *terbia*… My grades went up, it helped me. I used to have Cs and Ds and now I have As and Bs (Roble, July 2, 2011).

Ghedi describes what life was like before he went to *dugsi* and how it has changed his life,

A year ago I used to hang out with bad people who did bad things. I still hang out. I choose to hang out with the group because we play basketball and football. I have very close African-American friends. I started fighting with other boys. I
came to *dugsi* and been good now and haven’t gotten into a fight since freshman year. I am learning Arabic and the Qur’an (Ghedi, July 2, 2011).

Rima Berns McGown (1999) observes that Muslims in the West re-negotiate their relationship with Islam. Aadan explains how the *dugsi* he attends in Minneapolis-Saint Paul has adapted its programs to meet the changing needs of Somali-Americans, “Now I learn the Qur’an and understood it. Memorizing is not enough for Somali-Americans. I am hanging out with good people. Now I sometimes help my mom with the Qur’an, and read when I get home” (Aadan, July 2, 2011). Here, Aadan is saying that he had to learn how to analyze and understand the Qur’an to enable himself to relate the teachings to his life in the US. Similar to this *dugsi*, in Kitchener, I attended a mosque that had large prayer rooms along with multiple classrooms for students to learn the Qur’an. It also had a library filled with books in Arabic and English to promote literacy and to provide an Islamic education. The mosque had a large gymnasium for boys’ basketball and soccer. Heybe describes his feeling of belonging to the mosque and the program for boys in Kitchener:

> Fridays we go to the mosque because we are Muslim. All the brothers come together we have a class and then we play basketball…It feels good when you have a group of friends that don’t make fun of each other, like we tease each other. It has made life in Canada a lot of fun (Heybe, March 8, 2011).

It is important to note that young men more than young women attend the *dugsi*. This is partially due to the fact that sports programs are for boys only and many of the other programs target boys who are viewed as ‘at risk’ of leaving school, joining gangs, and getting involved in other forms of violent behavior.

Islamic educational spaces not only provide a space of belonging for Somali youth, but also the courage to assert their Muslim identities and to offer them the knowledge and tools to resist dominant representations of Somalis and Muslims in North
America. Some of the youth I interviewed described situations where they challenged the representation of Somalis through small acts of resistance. Homa Hoodfar (2003) suggests that young women often take to wearing a veil to assert their identity rather than being identified by others as an outsider through processes of exclusion. Ikraan remembers how she resisted Islamophobia after 9/11 by going to school wearing a hijab.

Well, I was really angry. I was really angry at the backlash of what happened. I was like in my school, I could see this in my life. I actually never used to wear the hijab, ever…[Then] I was wearing the hijab and I did for, like, a couple months in eighth grade. I was like screw this, like I want to be visibly Muslim, like talk to me now, like, talk to my face, you know? (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

In Ikraan’s story we can see that colonial stereotypes of Muslims and the demonization of Islam can play a role in young women’s decisions to veil (Hoodfar 2003). Aamino had similar feelings of challenging the representation of Somali women by wearing a hijab.

God blessed me in so many ways and, like, this is something that's an obligation of my faith, and, you know, as a Muslim … I represent people, if I were not to wear it, if I didn't wear it people would know I'm from Somalia but they wouldn't know what faith I was… they wouldn't know what type of person I am, but like... I make it a point that people know because I'm a good person and, like, I want to be a representation, you know? (Aamino, March 7, 2011).

In the current post-9/11 social and political environment young women find it important to reinforce their Muslim identities. The decision to wear a hijab should not be associated with a lack of agency as is represented in the North American media (Abu-Lughod 2002, Hoodfar 2003). In fact, many Muslim women view wearing the hijab as an avenue to assert their Muslim identities, helping them to mediate and adapt to the adoptive society (Hoodfar 2003, Tiilikainen 2003, Abdi 2007a). Research shows that Somali immigrants and refugees, including children and youth, are redefining what it means to be Muslim in North America (Berns McGown 1999, 2007-2008, Tiilikainen 2003). Aasiya articulates how she challenges comments made to her about her religion.
So when I hear you know people say bad stuff about my religion. I usually look at them and I say you have no idea what you are saying and explain to them why they are wrong. They will say okay out of respect…oh, oh okay, I understand, but they still have that thing in them. So I just tell them you know what when you get a chance, I advise you to… I sometimes give them a Qur’an book but they will be like no I don’t want that. Because I am always offering an English version of the Qur’an and say why don’t you read this, so you can understand or I’ll tell them why don’t you come once in a while to the mosque so you can understand (Aasiya, April 22, 2011).

For many Somali youth their Muslim identities are linked with their Somali national identities. As such, many of the youth are challenging the dominant representations of Somalis by coming together, advocating for their communities and getting involved in national and political processes. Aasiya describes her experience of becoming more politically conscious and bringing this consciousness to her classroom,

I came to Canada, I don’t know why but Canada kind of triggered something in me to become politically active… Thinking of Somalia, but raising awareness. I do chapels in school, I would write letters to the PM or do stuff like that. But I really know that I haven’t really reached the point where I am doing something that will really help. I want to. I have big plans but I need to start off small. Like heading up a social concerns group in my class, just starting out small. And I really do want to go back to Somalia even if that means risking my life, but trying to bring peace…I don’t want to see, I don’t want to see, small communities living off…like you know Somali refugees, I don’t want to see that again, I don’t want to see Somalis living in refugee camps, I don’t want to see people in a huge culture clash and not feeling comfortable, I want them to go back home. And if I can’t do it in my lifetime at least I want to ensure it for my children’s lifetime. I know I can’t do it on my own, but I am willing to go back (Aasiya, April 22, 2011).

Similar to Aasiya’s feelings about her role in rebuilding Somalia, Kadiye discussed his vision for a future Somalia. Through educating the youth and bringing together different generations he is working towards raising national consciousness through youth leadership:

We encourage youth to be leaders, we want… I said we were working on different projects back home that deal with such things. Dealing with, you know, elders and chiefs and stuff like that, and getting them to educate the youth and kinda put
them in a leadership position. Where the elders are in a leadership position, and the elders, the chiefs would be the advisors (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

Kadiye is part of a community educational space that teaches the youth in the diaspora about Somali history and national past. In the following, he describes the Somali fraternity he is a part of which aims towards recreating a unified Somali nation among the youth in the diaspora:

Actually this is a fraternity that goes back for a very long time. 124 years to be exact. And,... if you study Somali history you will see that our founding fathers were all part of it...[It] started in 1887… [The Somali Youth League]. They’re the same. Either one of them. We go back to even before that to Dervish…Same thing. That ours is based on pan-Somaliism, which means in Somali terms, Greater Somalia. And we believe that people should have... people should be able to determine... self-determination – to determine whether they want to continue to be part of Greater Somalia or if they want to become their own country, or whether to be part of... join the other brothers... So, in peaceful ways we promote this…And we're focused more on education. We... pick the brightest and we help them reach their highest potential as a person, so someone who's responsible, someone who's loyal, who's honest, who's caring for the poor. Who can be a leader for our communities…To help their communities abroad and also back home (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).

Somali youth are involved in many aspects of reaffirming a national history and harnessing national consciousness both locally and globally. Groups of youth do this by drawing from Somali customs and traditions, using Somali history and weaving aspects of their language, culture, and history with their knowledge and realities in the diaspora. Many youth have created community educational spaces that have enthused youth to become more involved in some way with Somali communities in Somalia or elsewhere in the diaspora. For example, in Minneapolis, there is a program for high school Somali students called, The Young Achievers. The program provides an environment for Somali youth to learn, develop in the areas of art and culture, have positive adult mentors, and prepare for post-secondary education (Wellshare International 2012). I have attended four performances put on by The Young Achievers. During these shows, the youth dress for
the most part in traditional Somali clothes and perform Somali music and dance. They also recite contemporary forms of poetry and encourage the use of Somali oral traditions. The Young Achievers encourage Somali cultural practices to connect Somali youth to one another and to Somalia.

Another youth group that is creating a community educational space is Poet Nation, a US based group of Somali youth that promotes Somali roots in poetry along with other arts and cultural forms (Poet Nation 2012). It aims to connect Somali national and cultural histories to the present lives of youth, and to contribute to rebuilding Somalia. The group performs poetry or the more contemporary spoken word, a kind of poetry or form of storytelling that is used to express social concerns and discuss current events. Maisha T. Fisher (2003:363) writes about the spoken word communities that came out of the US Black Arts Movement and have aligned themselves with community activism. In her research of African Diaspora Participatory Literacy Communities (ADPLC) she found that youth use poetry as a vehicle to combat poverty and violence in their communities. Poet Nation, acts in similar ways, using poetry, traditional Somali music and contemporary hip-hop that sends political, social, and cultural messages to their peers. While touring different venues for performances, they have joined I am a Star, a campaign to unify Somali youth and communities, aid workers in Mogadishu, and other volunteers and donors to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia. Through their campaigns, youth have helped communities in Somalia, including rebuilding hospitals, funding mobile hospitals, making clean water accessible, and improving sanitation, among other projects. In celebrating the Somali nation, the I am a Star campaign has recently raised money that helped two Somali Olympic athletes compete in the 2012 London Olympic Games. These projects not only help to rebuild infrastructure and
institutions in Somalia, but also reignite national consciousness among the youth in the Somali diaspora.

College and university educated youth were more likely to be involved in both local and international activities that focused on rebuilding Somalia or helping newcomer families, although first generation and 1.5-generation youth were more likely to be involved. First generation youth of high school age were not as involved with rebuilding Somalia or being a part of Somali groups. Rather, they were more interested in educational programs created by Somali communities, including homework and Islamic studies programs, which target these youth.

The stories, practices and interviews show how multiple generations of youth are learning from their families and communities. They absorb what they have learned and incorporate transmitted knowledge and histories to make social and political changes in their own unique ways. A number of the Somali youth expressed hopes and plans to return to Somalia and to transform Somali society; others seek to make those changes in Canada or the US.

The Reconstruction of Somali Youth Identities

The geopolitical environment, the representations of Somalis in the media, and the structural and interpersonal violence experienced in Canada and the US has undoubtedly caused many youth to feel excluded from Canadian and American societies. For some youth the exclusion can lead them to feel isolated from their peers. Idman expresses how her feelings of exclusion affect her,

I felt I could realize now I have developed into a new person…. I have become more sensitive from this kind of stuff. I didn’t like it though, I don’t really like it. It kind of like blocks me from improving social life, people here, it is not nice…I felt it made me step back a bit more, not enter. I felt like I had to step back now
because no one accept me because I am different so I don’t want to get hurt (Idman, April 22, 2011).

Some youth expressed feelings of exile, “I guess growing up in Canada you never felt like it was home, 'cause it's not. And I don't have a home, that's how I see myself, like, I can't go back to Somalia, I'm not going to call this place my home” (Ikraan, March 5, 2011). Idman who has been separated from other Somalis for the majority of her life expresses similar feelings of exile, but also longing to belong to the Somali nation.

I find identity means if you know who you are…if you are with your people a lot and you are close with them very much then you will know who you are. Because if you don’t know your own people and your always with other people, but if you’re not of their same culture or their same country, you are not really who you are. You kind of like using another personality to just go through life. Where are you from? I am from Somalia and stuff and stuff. But in your heart you feel this empty hole because you have not been with your people you don’t even know…you can’t even say it with pride. You know how people sit up with pride; you feel they are proud of it because they are with their people they love it even if their country is in war, they don’t care. They love it because they are with their people. I don’t feel that. I feel like I am just… oh yah, I lived in Africa but when I hang out with Africans I feel so much I can relate, I can relate with them even the white people who live in Africa I can relate with them because we talk about things I see that they see… (Idman, April 22, 2011).

Feelings of exclusion compel some youth to work towards proving they belong to the American or Canadian societies. For this reason, some have tried to conceal their Somali identity because they believe it is difficult to cope with multiple national identifications. The view that multiple national identities contradict each other was more common in the US as Kadiye explained:

That's also a huge problem in Somali youth and I think that it would be good to... 'cause they feel that if they give up their Somali identity, they'll lose themselves. And if they give up their American identity, then they are isolated. So they're facing this problem, which... I think... they're confused about, but I don't think it's something to be confused about. I think... you could take both. You take the positive thing from both cultures (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).
Others promote their other national identifications because the representations of Somalis in the media embarrass them: “To be honest if I see too much negative I feel I want to deny who I am. I am in denial sometimes and I will turn on and praise more my mom’s nationality, Yemeni nationality than my Somali nationality because I am half. But I honestly I am ashamed I feel like denying it” (Idman, April 22, 2011). In contrast, Jabrill feels like he needs to embrace his Somali identity and challenge the representations of Somalis.

I don’t feel embarrassed because there are a lot of good Somalis but I feel sorry for them because I don’t believe that people are bad they are just put bad situations and I think that because a lot of Somalis are refugees they get put into situations surrounded by people of lesser education and they may not even have education themselves. So its just poor timing, poor location and I just feel bad for them they could have done a lot better. And it affects me a bit more than people would expect because I think I’ll have to make up for their losses by giving Somalia a better name in my own little way by being successful or helping the country itself…I feel very much Somali. Yah, I always was surrounded by Somali people so I feel it’s a part of me (Jabrill, April 22, 2011).

Still, other youth have embraced their supranational identities. Aasiya articulates her identification with the Islamic umma through her story of choosing to wear the hijab.

For me it’s a personal thing. So the way I interpret the scarf is completely different from people. I don’t believe you have to wear it but that is my opinion. Now many people will say no…but I like it. Because why I wear it, it’s an identity. I wear the scarf as [Aasiya], the girl who wears a scarf, I like it… Like I was in the ROM yesterday, I saw a Muslim woman, may peace and blessing be upon you, asalam alakum, you know, we greet each other, we know each other, it’s a community, a connection why would I not want to wear it. Also you try to explain to them God lets you interpret things the way you want. I also wear the scarf because God always highlights the garment of righteousness, to dress modestly so I mind as well wear the scarf because it’s modest. And I chose to at a very young age and I just love it, it is who I am…See I don’t have a national identity, so I always say I am Muslim. It’s who I am the way I live my life. When I eat, when I talk, when I eat, when I sleep (Aasiya, April 22, 2011).
For Ikraan who identifies with being both Somali and Muslim, she also identifies with the African diaspora or a black identity, in other words, all these levels of identifications may coexist, although depending on the context, one may take precedence over others:

But I mean, it just... even growing up, I mean... because I looked a certain way, like I was always a tomboy, I always had baggy clothes, I had braids, all this kind of stuff. Being, like, a young black person – and being black also is a new identity that I've taken on now. I didn't take it on back then 'cause being Somali was what it was, you know? And like other Caribbean, African peoples in my neighborhood didn't see me as black, and I, to my friends would have all these conversations being like “What am I then, what am I?” If I'm not black, not white, I'm not Asian. They're like “you're just Somalian”. I'm like “What's Somali? Like... like isn't it African?” I just... I didn't know for the longest time where I fit and I didn't really feel comfortable taking that title on, like, I felt Muslim first, or Somali first, and I still do. But in my new environment, I'm black. And that's funny because I've been treated like how... my identity became this way because of how I've been treated, and I get treated as... I'm like the only black person running around in all these scenes (Ikraan, March 5, 2011).

Youth identities have transformed through their interactions and experiences in these various educational spaces. Few of the youth spoke of their subnational identities, whether they were clan related or regional, even though I am aware that they are present. In Toronto, women I spoke with discussed the increasing importance of subnational identities among male youth. The women found these identities less important, but clan-family identity often became an issue for their parents when choosing a marriage partner. Women may be less likely to feel an affinity to their clan-families because women have dual clan identities. As discussed in chapter 2, clan-family membership is traced through the male line; therefore, married women are affiliated with both their husbands’ and thus sons,’ as well as their birth families’ clan-families, although the latter is considered to be the primary attachment. Even though a woman’s primary clan-family is with her father’s clan and her male relatives, women also have strong relationships with their mother’s clan. For women this dual identity offers her support that men are not afforded; however,
it also means that women are also perceived to be ambivalent of their clan loyalty (Gardner and Warsame 2004:159-161). Consequently, males’ subnational identities may be more important to them than to women. Nevertheless, clan-family identities are important in social relations and intersect with political practices within the Somali community, even when submerged. In other cases, youth discussed the bullying they experienced at the hands of other Somalis that were instigated along subnational lines.

For the majority of the youth, whether they were high school students or university educated, national identity is the most important. Almost all of the youth I interviewed identified with being Somali. Many of the youth were involved in rebuilding Somalia, with groups that raised national consciousness among the youth by maintaining knowledge of their national histories as well as reinventing culture and traditions, and in helping Somalis in their local communities. For the majority of the youth being Muslim is inextricably linked with being Somali. Few others identify with the African diaspora, an identity that they adopted in Canada and the US where traces of theories of race from slavery and colonialism remain, and identifying as “black” for these youth represent a form of resistance.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have argued that the representations of Somalis as perpetrators or victims of violence in the media have politicized Somali female and male bodies, leading Somali youth to be recipients of routine and interpersonal forms of violence. What I have attempted to convey in this chapter is that geopolitical processes have direct effects on the everyday lives, identities, and senses of belonging of children and youth. Youth engage with and grant particular meanings to these representations, reacting to them in creative and complex ways. Evidenced by, for example, young Somali women deciding to wear
the hijab to assert their Muslim identity. The development and spread of Somali community educational spaces are not only a response to the events in Somalia, but take on particular importance due to the experiences of discrimination in Canadian and American societies. In this context, Somali community educational spaces have offered youth spaces of belonging and the strength and knowledge to challenge negative representations of Somalis and Somalia.

The research shows that Somali youth have multiple and simultaneous, and not always contradictory identities. At the subnational level some Somali youth identify with a particular region and to both their paternal and maternal clan-families, yet other youth reject the identification with clan-families and/or regions. Nonetheless, youth also have broader attachments; national identification to Somalia as well as Canada or the US, and supranationally to the Islamic umma envisioned as larger than the Somali nation or to the African diaspora (see McGown 1999, Tiilikainen 2003). Consequently, an individual’s subnational, national, and supranational identities sometimes converge (see Gupta 1997). The case of Somali youth builds upon other research that shows identities are reconstructed in different contexts and environments. The belief among Somali communities that their youth are losing their Somali national and/or their Muslim supranational identities is not supported by this research. In fact, Muslim identities seem to be more important to Somali youth in the diaspora. Moreover, Somali youth are taking on new identities in the diaspora, including Canadian and American national identities and African or black identities. In assuming these identities, they are not denying their Somali and Muslim identities, but identifying with them simultaneously. They are transforming what it means to be Somali in North America and in this historical moment.
Even as I challenge the predominant discourse that represents Somali youth in terms of risk, I am not suggesting that none of these youth are not leaving school, getting involved in interpersonal forms of violence, including gangs, and other criminal activities, but instead I seek to change the focus from the youth to the larger social, economic, and political dynamics that put them ‘at risk.’ In fact, youth in general are seen as a risk in North America (Brian and Denov 2011); however, this study shows the influence of geopolitics on the multiple and diverse ways that Somali youth are conceived as a risk. This research shows that the links between bullying in schools due to racism, Islamophobia, and other forms of marginalization need to be considered, rather than merely pathologizing the youth. In examining youth’s perspectives of mainstream schooling or education, we can see the influence of the geopolitical environment on their everyday lives and how it encourages an environment enabling bullying and other forms of marginalization. Further forms of structural violence, such as poverty, intersect with other factors such as gender that can lead youth to leave school. Socioeconomic differentiation is apparent, since some of the youth may be the main providers for their families, and are obliged to contribute to the family’s income, to support themselves, or to contribute to their families in Somalia or elsewhere in the diaspora.

Through using educational spaces as sites to examine how geopolitics affect local lives it also becomes evident that school performance is not separate from families, communities, or global politics. Indeed, these various processes influence educational spaces in very direct ways. When youth were involved in community learning, their grades in mainstream schools improved and their involvements in fights with peers decreased. As a result, this research supports existing studies, which propose that researchers need to examine the interactions between different learning environments,
and how they influence students’ educational attainment as well as their identities (Lukose 2007). The last point becomes increasingly clear in the next chapter as I consider the diverse migration trajectories of first generation Somali youth and the processes of dehistoricization and exclusion in Canadian public schools.
Chapter 4: The Migration Trajectories and Educational Experiences of Newcomer Somali Children and Youth in Canada

Introduction: The Mohamed Family

Aadan Mohamed was born in Somalia in 1993 in the midst of the civil war. In 2001, Aadan and his family were forced to leave the country to Saudi Arabia. Before fleeing from Somalia, Aadan’s mother, Haldhaa convinced their father to send the four eldest children with their uncle to Yemen. During the journey, the boat capsized and all four children and their uncle died. According to Haldhaa, her husband blamed her for their children’s deaths. As a result, he left the family, and Haldhaa responsible for their seven remaining children. Aadan, now the eldest son, felt a sense of responsibility for his family. In Saudi Arabia, Aadan, who had never been to school, was enrolled in grade six in a state school according to his age. Although he was allowed to take the national examinations, he was unable to attend classes, thus, his mother withdrew him from school, realizing he would not pass the exams without background knowledge. Due to his inability to attend a state school, Aadan went to English and Arabic language classes and took a job as a mechanic’s assistant. Aadan explains what happened next:

In Saudi Arabia you need to have an ID. If you do not have an ID they will arrest you. So this one time the Saudi Arabia police arrested me, so our relatives told my mom that she had to get me out of the country. So because of my security, my mom had to take us all out of Saudi Arabia and took us to Syria…They don’t care about age. Because they arrested me my mom was so scared because the officials would deport me back to Somalia. There are no human rights in Saudi. Immediately we would have been deported to Somalia and we could not take that risk (Aadan April 22, 2011).

In 2006, Aadan and his family went to Syria, where the family registered with UNHCR, and found a place to live in a small town. Again, Aadan was unable to attend school. Haldhaa explains the circumstances: “He was told that he could not go to elementary
school because of his age, he was older than the rest of the kids and he could not go to high school because he did not have the educational level, so he learned English and French in night classes” (Haldhaa April 22, 2011). In Syria, Aadan’s younger sisters, Aamino and Saafi, were able to attend a private school for a short time based on their younger age. The four youngest children, including Jamaal and Asad, attended school in Syria, but never became literate in Arabic. The Mohamed family immigrated to Canada under the government-assisted refugee resettlement program in 2009. In Canada, Aadan enrolled in school where he continues to struggle as he finds himself in grade ten, having never before received a formal education.

I began with Aadan’s story to argue that the education system and related policies do not provide an adequate education for such cases as Aadan. During my fieldwork, I found that a general lack of knowledge and/or unwillingness of educators and support workers to engage with, hear and consider the personal histories of their students as pertinent to the learning process. In turn, this leads to students’ inability to receive an education and contributes to their feelings of alienation and exclusion in Canada. The neglect of students’ pasts that strip them from their histories also tells us something about who is an ideal citizen and who is included in the nation: acceptable migrants are those who leave their past behind and become like ‘us,’ that is, migrants will only be accepted when they emphasize their similarities and hide their differences to make themselves more like citizens (Philips 2000:40, see also Bannerji 2000). In this way, certain ethnicities, religions, languages, ways of being, and worldviews are considered to be ‘normal,’ while others are defined by difference reinforcing, maintaining, and reproducing inequalities in citizenship (Bannerji 2000, Mackey 2002, Philips 2000, Thobani 2007). Multiculturalism, the official policy of Canada, flourishes alongside
racism (Hall 2000:48, see also Bannerji 2000, Thobani 2007). Nevertheless, what is considered to be difference changes over time (Hall 2000); for example, in Canada the 1967 *Immigration Act* created inadmissible clauses such as “unsuitability of climate” and “inability to become readily assimilated” (Mackey 2002:52-53) in part, due to the xenophobia coming out of the 1958 recession that was directed towards Italians who were considered to be unskilled immigrants\(^{30}\) (Knowles 2007). In the current social and political environment in Canada, including the state’s involvement in the ‘War on Terror’ and the economic recession, Somali youth are marked by their race, ethnicity, religion, socio-economic status *as well as* their migration status. Research has shown that migration status affects students’ school performance, while maintaining and reproducing social hierarchies (Collins 2012:19, see also Suarez-Orozco and Suarez-Orozco 2001).

In chapter 1, I discussed the tensions between international law and nation-states’ interests and policies. Canada is signatory to the UNCRC (1989), which gives special rights to children. The Convention requires governments to structure their policies to include the best interests of children residing in their territories (Boyden 2009b:265). Under the UNCRC (1989), Article 28 children’s rights to education within nation-states regardless of their status is made clear:

1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular:

   (a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all;

   (b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial assistance in case of need;

\(^{30}\) I also refer to the changing nature of ‘difference’ and groups who have been targeted by immigration policies in the past in a book chapter in an edited volume (Stachel 2009).
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means;

(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all children;

(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of dropout rates.

2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present Convention.

3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries (Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, s. 28, emphasis added).

The Somali case highlights the tension between the Canadian state upholding the rights of refugee children with regards to education and the interests of the nation-state (see also Arnot et al. 2009, Boyden 2009b). As we will see, the above-italicized sections of the UNCRC (1989) are relevant to the case of Somali children and youth since it demonstrates the Canadian state is not fulfilling these specific obligations to serve the best interests of children regardless of their citizenship status. The state is the signatory and bearer to UNCRC (1989) and takes on primary decision-making rights over children even though states may be one of the biggest risks to children, especially refugees or permanent residents, who do not have citizenship status (de Berry and Boyden 2000). In the post-9/11 environment in North America, characterized by the non-entrée regime (Chimni 1998) or the building of fortresses in North America and Europe (Thobani 2007, Razack 2008), the sovereignty of states are coming before the rights of children. As discussed in chapter 1, there is more suspicion of refugees and whether they are victims...
rather than perpetrators of violence, or potential terrorists seeking to enter Western states (Gibney 2002, emphasis added). Children and youth are not exempt from this view and there are escalating fears that refugee children may not be innocent (Boyden 2009b).

In order to discuss the processes of exclusion of Somali children and youth from the national state, we need to explore the term “nation” within the Canadian context. As discussed in chapter 1, the Canadian nation-state was established as a result of settler-colonialism, and by displacing and dispossessing the indigenous populations. Social evolutionary paradigms based on the assumptions that white Europeans occupied the apex of the human evolutionary scale underpinned the colonial project (Bannerji 2000, Day 2000). Despite significant social and political shifts since then, it has been argued by scholars of multiculturalism in Canada (Bannerji 2000, Day 2000, Mackey 2002, Thobani 2007) that multiculturalism policy continues to be used by the Canadian state to manage internal ‘others,’ including First Nations as well as immigrants, refugees, and racialized groups. The ongoing processes that reproduce the Canadian ‘nation’ continue to be based on similar assumptions of a white Canada, which also shaped the official multiculturalism of the 1980s. A ‘multicultural mosaic’ in Canada meant various ‘others’ could exhibit their cultural differences, as long as such differences did not threaten the status quo or the political and ideological system (Mackey 2002:143-45, see also Bannerji 2000, Thobani 2007). In this master narrative of the Canadian nation inside ‘others,’ including refugees and immigrants, are to be controlled and disciplined to ensure they do not threaten the values of Canadian society (Thobani 2007).

Nations change over time since they are affected by social, political, and economic circumstances, and they are always challenged from within; in Canada the clearest example is the struggle of First Nations, including their right to self-
determination, implying there are other nations within the ‘Nation.’ Indeed, nations are emerging and changing entities that cannot be reduced to a single dimension, such as culture, language, or politics (Hobsbawm 1990). Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that the nation is constructed and analyzes the efforts that state builders use to create a sense of belonging and commitment among diverse peoples, including the emergence of a dominant national language, print capitalism, the construction of monuments, and museums to foster the idea of a homogeneous nation. He correctly refers to the nation as an “imagined community,” because there is a feeling of unity between the members even if they have never met. The members often regard themselves as having a common history, bound together on the basis of remembering as well as forgetting (Anderson 1983, Gillis 1994, Poole 1999). In building fortresses, North American and European nation-states are looking to redefine their pasts, to transform their national identities to support ideologies of dominant classes, and to maintain Western European hegemony. This hegemony is sought outside Europe (over poor countries) to expand markets and strategic positions, but also within, which effectively reproduces discrimination against certain races, ethnicities, and religions (Giddens 2000). In this context, Somalis in Canada and the US, including children and youth, are considered by the state as either outside the nation, or as unequal within it.

The US imperial ‘War on Terror’ has changed the ways multiculturalism is conceived and in Europe there is an increase in arguments and local developments against multiculturalism (Gilroy 2005: 432, Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010:1-2). Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (2010:6-13) suggest that opponents of multiculturalism in Europe have constructed a discourse that promotes a “backlash.” The discourse represents multiculturalism as a policy that weakens collective identity because
it promotes ethnic separation, the rejection of national values, and leads to lack of interest of immigrants and ethnic minorities to integrate (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010:7). In addition, opponents of multiculturalism argue that multiculturalism does not acknowledge social problems that they view as connected with immigrants and ethnic minorities. They also see cultural relativism as the main reason for this inability to see the problems with multiculturalism, for instance, not condemning women’s inequalities and forced marriages (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010:9-10). Although multiculturalism in Canada and the US is different from Europe, there has been a “backlash” against Muslims in North America. In the current social and political climate, Muslims are constructed as the ‘other’ to nationalist discourses; however, this representation of “Muslims as threats” and the explanation of terror as a “global clash of cultures” in popular discourse and politics is not confined to the extreme right or popular prejudice as more political elite are also adopting these views (Gilroy 2005:433, Modood 1997:2, Zouaoui 2012).

The perception that refugee children and youth are a threat to nation-states is also informed by the current perception that youth in North America, in general, are disengaged and apathetic to their civic ‘responsibilities’ (Kennely and Llewellyn 2011:897). Recently there has been a revival of civic learning in the Canadian education system that emphasizes “active citizenship” that constructs citizenship not as a right, but as a responsibility (Kennely and Llewellyn 2011). To this end, classes in public schools teach ethics, knowledge, values, and practices of a citizen concentrating on belonging, national identity, responsibility, and participation (Hart 2009:641). The construction of the “active citizen” in Canada is based on North American neoliberalism, characterized by the reversal of welfare programs, capitalist imperialism linked with “lawlessness and military action,” and the emphasis on citizens’ freedoms (Ong 2006:1-2). The “neo” part of
“neoliberalism” is the new emphasis of governments on regulating the self (Ong 2006), which involves processes of “responsibilization” whereby state interventions are used to motivate and manage self-sufficiency with the purpose of reducing claims on the state (Kennely and Llewellyn 2009:899, Rose 1999:74, Walsh 2011:861). The effects of this form of governance on Somali children and youth are twofold. First, the emphasis on self-regulation and responsibility construct those who engage in paid work, have skills and education, English language abilities, and are ‘good’ parents, as ‘ideal’ citizens; however, those who make demands on the state are not considered to be responsible citizens (Hart 2009:643, Walsh 2011:873). In this context, the issues that are affecting many Somali children and their families, including leaving school, unemployment or underemployment, lack of English proficiency, and low levels of literacy are viewed as failures of individuals. They also contribute to the belief that refugees are often a ‘burden’ on the state (see Hart 2009). As will be evident later, these viewpoints may inform the perspective that Somali refugee children are responsible for their situation, and they have cultural and linguistic deficits. The deficit perspective circumvents the structural forces that lead to students’ leaving school, factors that contribute to unemployment, and students’ low levels of literacy. This approach to citizenship also obfuscates the power structures within the education system that consider diverse literacies and cultural competencies as impairments rather than assets (see Hymes 1980, Jaffé-Walter and Lee 2011, McCarty et al. 2011, Van der Aa and Blommaert 2011).

The second way that neoliberal governance affects Somali children and youth is through their classification as children. Citizens’ obligations to states include certain norms and behaviours, which have enabled governments to construct ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizens, with the latter being subject to regulation, management, and discipline (Hart
Children and youth are increasingly viewed as not fulfilling their obligations as citizens, even when the concept of citizenship excludes young people and positions them as potential citizens in need of discipline and training. In this way, they are considered possible threats to citizenship and excluded from participation (Hart 2009:645, 654). Considering the ways that these two aspects of North American neoliberalism intersect and affect Somali children and youth’s lives, it becomes evident that these youth are not considered future neoliberal subjects and are thus considered internal ‘others’ within the state.

Somali children and youth enter into relations with the state through education; in Canada, school is where children spend the majority of their time and is one of the primary spaces for socialization (Boyden 2009b:269). Here, education has the dual purpose of serving the best interests of children and maintaining the interests of the nation-state to develop children into contributing citizens (Boyden 2009b). Within education an assumption of a core white, Anglo-Saxon superiority is maintained and reproduced through education policies that lack flexibility to include the experiences of refugee children, non-English/French language competencies, and different forms of knowledge. In this way, the students who are seen as national subjects are “exalted” above all others and define the norms and values of the nation (Thobani 2007). Thus, refugee students are viewed as outsiders and as strangers, who may provoke anxiety and hostility among their non-Somali peers and even teachers, as discussed in chapter 3.

Even though the Canadian nation is presented as ‘tolerant’ of refugees, they are represented as carrying with them premodern and antimodern traditions. These views have the effect of constructing Somali students’ skills and knowledge as ‘backward’ and irrelevant. Their ‘traditions’ are only tolerated in school if they are not a threat to the
nation, that is, as long as changes to education policies are not required. As such, state education is a site to examine the tension between multicultural policies and state policies via education and national identity. In addition, research in the site of public education draws attention to the extent the Canadian nation-state is invested in the rights of refugee children (see also Arnot et al. 2009, Boyden 2009b).

In the following, I look at the case of first generation Somali children and youth, who immigrated to Canada under the GAR program and are thus considered not to be citizens of the state, while attending Ontario public schools. When children immigrate to Canada they are enrolled into school within days of settlement. Soon, the children are tested and placed in ELD, ESL, or academic streams and in a grade that corresponds with their age. The majority of children presented in this chapter were placed in the ELD stream and thus have significant education gaps. The first section focuses on the ways Somali children and youth are excluded through language and education policies that maintain and reproduce a particular conception of Canadian national identity. It also looks at how processes aim to erase the past and render it irrelevant, and how the inflexibility of the system to transform the curriculum to meet these students’ needs have an effect on language and subject content learning.

The second section examines the consequences of dehistoricizing and discounting the everyday experiences and realities of Somali students in schools. I explore their diverse migration trajectories and education experiences and the transformation of gender and generational relations as a result of displacement. In doing so, I argue that Somali

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31 Students are tested and placed in a stream when they immigrate to Canada. Students with significant educational gaps are placed in the English Literacy Development (ELD) stream. Students who have received a similar education to Canada, but need language skills training are placed in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes. Lastly, students who are proficient in English and who have a similar education to Canada are placed in the academic stream.
children and youth’s personal histories and everyday experiences within their families and communities are important to the learning process. I examine the migration experiences of children and youth with the assumption that they are social and historical agents within their homes, schools, and communities. By arguing that children are resourceful, I am not negating their experiences of adversity and do not deny that children are vulnerable. Rather, I seek to build upon Jo Boyden’s (2003) interrogation of western conceptions of children as weak and passive, and to instead consider whether a focus on child and youth agency may be more beneficial in supporting children and youth who have experienced adversity.

Methods of Research

I draw on the life histories of first generation Somali children and youth in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario who are between the ages of 14 and 30. While a few of my interlocutors were in university, I use their memories as children, including their experiences of displacement, migration, and education in refugee camps to present the context of learning in refugee camps. I also draw from participant-observation of Somali students in after-school homework support programs for middle school and secondary school students, tutoring sessions in students’ homes, and informal discussions with youth during fieldwork. The middle and secondary school students discussed in this chapter immigrated to Canada as GARs and the university students immigrated under the WUSC resettlement program between the years 2004 and 2011. I focus on first generation refugee children and youth in Canada for four main reasons: (1) to offer a detailed analysis of the context of the national and educational policies in the adoptive country, (2) to examine the initial years of education for Somali youth who immigrated to Canada as Convention Refugees, (3) to examine how poor youth are experiencing and negotiating
their identities in Canada, since all of the children’s families represented in this chapter are receiving social assistance, and (4) to provide an in-depth understanding of the students’ everyday lives and the programs in Kitchener-Waterloo that have been created to serve them, especially because the city is the main site of my research.

All of the youth in this chapter live in female-headed households (with the exception of the WUSC students who are unaccompanied) and therefore, the chapter draws on interviews conducted with their mothers who added to the details and circumstances of the family’s migration trajectories and offered their own views on the education of their children. In addition, children within the families who were over 14 years of age were interviewed. I also use interviews and informal discussions with Somali educators and community leaders to contextualize students’ experiences in school.

The Experiences of Somali Children and Youth in Ontario Public Schools

According to the Toronto District School Board (TDSB), as of 2008 36.7 percent of Somali speaking students left school. Among those who graduate from high school, many did not receive grades to be admitted into postsecondary education. Less than 50 percent of grade seven and eight students from East Africa have literacy and numeracy skills as well as knowledge of science at the provincial standard (Jibrill 2011:15). These statistics show that the Canadian state is not fulfilling its obligation to children’s education under UNCRC (1989) in two interrelated ways. First, there are high numbers of Somali youths leaving school. Second, Somali youths’ literacy and numeracy skills are below the national standard preventing them from attending post-secondary schools (Ahmed 2009). A number of authors raised questions and made pertinent points regarding the education of refugee children and youth. For example, J. Rutter (2006) notes that refugee children do not develop well in school and believes that their underachievement
is partly due to their homogenization and the lack of consideration of the social factors that influence students’ learning. Jo Boyden (2009b:267) suggests that research has shown a necessity for an examination of the specific needs and circumstances of refugee students. To this end, I begin with questions proposed by Paulo Freire in a transcribed conversation with Donaldo Macedo (1987:121), who asks whether the students actually ever attended school, not in the literal but metaphorical sense; did the school touch them? If the school did not touch students, did students leave school or did the school leave the students?

To consider these questions we need to begin with the assumption that power relationships and ideologies are embedded in educational institutions and shape education policies, which runs contrary to public pronouncements and official declarations that everyone has equal access to education. The myth reproduces the belief that because there is equal access, students are to blame for leaving school early. To start with an assumption that power shapes education policies, means it serves dominant groups (Freire and Macedo 1987). Antonio Gramsci argues that ruling elites use educational institutions to promote their ideology, and thus create conditions to maintain power (Crehan 2002). In the case of Canada, ruling elites maintain and reproduce neo-colonial ideologies of European superiority.

Based on these theories of education, I demonstrate that there are two main conflicts of interest within the education system. First, there is the tension between multicultural policies and the constant attempt to forge a unified national identity. Second, there is the tension between the educational purpose to serve the best interests of children on the one hand, and education policies and programs that are practiced in public schools.
Language Learning in Canadian Public Schools

In this section, I draw inspiration from the research of the educational anthropologists who have examined educational experiences of Latino/a students in the US (Collins 2012, Lukose 2007, Orellana 2001, Villenas 2007, 2012). These scholars have challenged beliefs of the cultural and linguistic deficiencies of Latinos/as by examining children’s learning in their homes, schools, and communities. Anthropologists who focus their research on education have found that education policy continues to assume that marginal groups’ cultural and language practices are deficient and thus need to be altered to be more like the dominant group (Villenas 2012:13).

In Canada, language policies have historically been a major political issue. Himani Bannerji (2000:9) argues that multiculturalism was a reaction and strategy to mute Quebec’s separatist struggles as well as a way of coping with non-European immigrants. In 1969, the Official Languages Act made English and French Canada’s official languages; however, non-English and non-French ethnic groups, particularly Ukrainians, who sought to be recognized, challenged the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. As a response, in 1971, federal multiculturalism policy was established (Derwing and Munro 2007:16). The policy prompted provincial governments and school boards to create policies that promoted cultural awareness in public schools (Chan 2007:141). The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act granted more rights to non-English and non-French Canadian citizens; however, it is often used to justify rights thinking - the belief that everyone has equal access to education in the country (see Razack 1998). Linguistic rights were given to minority languages in the Multiculturalism Act (1988) in the statement that the policy ensures that Canadian citizens “preserve and enhance the use of
languages other than English and French, while strengthening the status and use of the official languages of Canada” (s. 3(1)(i)). Yet, the policy does not suggest that the education system should maintain students’ native languages and it is obvious the policy has not been implemented as many newcomer Somali students cannot read or write in their native language and struggle to learn English. Karen M. Gourd (2007:125) maintains that educators need to be aware of three aspects that impact English language learning: first, is the recognized need that it is essential that newcomers learn the dominant language; second, the need for English language learners to learn subject areas in their own language while learning the dominant language; third, the need for educators to be aware that intolerant social attitudes towards students’ native languages can lead to students’ feelings of exclusion and sometimes leave students with resentments.

Even though it is recognized that newcomers to Canada need to learn English, the belief that the student’s history is unimportant conceals students’ educational levels and experiences, including their low levels of literacy. As a result, these students do not receive proper English learning programs. It thus becomes easy to blame students for their low levels of literacy and failures. The blaming of students for their educational gaps was evident in an educator’s comments on Saafi’s progress report. The only class Saafi received over a C- was her ELD class where she got 90 percent; however, the comments of the English teacher were that Saafi does not know verbs or how to write. In Science, she received 53 percent and the comments were that “[Saafi] does not understand the concepts” (field notes May 3, 2011). The knowledge or consideration that Saafi had only a couple of years of formal schooling in Syria and just started to learn English one year ago, the comments focused on her inadequacies, rather the relative improvement of her reading and comprehension.
Many of the newcomer Somali students do not have literacy in their native language, so they are learning to read and write for the first time in another language. The cases of 15-year-old Jamaal and 14 year-old Asad, whom I met for the first time on January 6, 2011, and are members of the Mohamed family introduced at the beginning of the chapter, illustrate the obstacles these students’ encounter in school. Both had attended school in Syria, but had never learned how to read or write in Arabic, and since they were too young when they fled from Somalia and their mother could not read, they did not read or write Somali either. Based on their age, Asad was placed in grade seven and Jamaal in grade eight. The teacher had given them a worksheet that required them to fill-in-the-blanks of the Mother Goose rhyme, “Thirty days hath September, April, June, and November; February has twenty-eight alone, All the rest have thirty-one; Excepting leap year, that's the time, when February's days are twenty-nine;” however, they did not even have the basic foundations to know these were months of the year. After working with them, I realized they could not read one word in English (field notes January 6, 2011). Thereafter, I began to tutor them three days per week for over a year. On March 7, 2011, three months before Jamaal was going to graduate from grade eight and enter secondary school, I was teaching them simple combination sounds such as “sh,” “ch” and capital letters, many of which they did not know (field notes March 7, 2011). Haldhaa, Asad and Jamaal’s mother, explains the problems her children face and specifically refers to Jamaal who will be attending secondary school in the fall:

I am here a year and my kids are in a higher-grade level than they should be and they came here not knowing English. We have been here for one year and if the kids [do not learn] from the lower level then it’s hard. They don’t know anything, they don’t know how to read and write and the little things they know are from the teacher and you, [as their tutor]. They don’t know anything. They have improved a little bit, but with that little knowledge, is that going to help them in high school. That is why they should repeat grade eight. I talked to the teacher and he said he is
fourteen years old and he has to go to high school (Haldhaa April 22, 2011). Haldhaa's concerns for her children’s knowledge of subject content as well as low levels of literacy while being advanced in school were a common issue for parents. Abuubakar and his brother, Hanad, and sister, Ladan, all attended school in refugee camps in Yemen, but are also finding it difficult to learn in school in Canada where they have lived since 2008. I worked one-on-one with each of these students over the period of one year and they all struggle with low levels of literacy and homework that requires them to read and write in a level of English that they are not equipped to carry out. All three of the siblings suggested that language was the hardest part about living in Canada.

Even when educators are aware that students cannot read or write in their native language, it is assumed to be unnecessary to their learning and development. The deficit perspective, which views cultural and linguistic differences as barriers, rather than assets to academic achievement, dominate educational policies (Jaffe-Walter and Lee 2011, McCarty et al. 2011, Valenzuela 1999). These perspectives also shape the ways schools approach English language learning (ELL) (Jaffe-Walter and Lee 2011). The approach to education creates social and linguistic inequalities within schools, normalizing ‘standard’ English and/or French, making certain languages and voices acceptable and all other languages and voices as ‘other’ (Hymes 1980, McCarty et al. 2011, Collins 2012). Riva Jaffe-Walter and Stacey J. Lee (2011) carried out a study on how schools in the International Network in New York, a group of schools that serve immigrant students, create expectations of educational possibilities for low-income immigrant students that include a post-secondary education. Despite the fact that students come from over 70 countries and speak over 60 languages the schools encourage content learning in ELL, but also the use of their native languages and their diverse experiences. Somali educators
reiterated the importance of native language literacy throughout my fieldwork. A very well respected Somali scholar and educator talked with me about the improvement he saw in his middle school students when he changed his Friday science lesson to learning Somali. He explains that during the civil war many people spoke Somali, but did not receive formal schooling to learn reading, writing, and grammar. He found that when his students were able to decode the Somali language, their English improved by 200 percent (field notes June 10, 2011). Mohamed, a Somali educator, agrees that supporting native language literacy is the best way to improve the educational achievement of Somali students:

In an ideal world, when a kid starts kindergarten or elementary we would teach them their mother tongue because most of these mothers and parents don’t speak English so if they learn to write or read Somali or Spanish or Hmong they can translate that into English. Another thing the parents would be useful still to help children with their homework and communicate with them. But the kids are learning are street language English and at the same time losing Somali, they do not have academic language and at the same time the parents cannot help because they cannot speak English. If they learn Somali language, to read and write, they can learn reading and writing in English and they will learn English much faster because they have literacy (Mohamed June 11, 2011).

The connections between school, family, and community were also evident in James Collins (2012) study of Latino/a migrant students in New York that found that learning English and Spanish were both about inclusion, the former for education and interacting with peers, and the latter for maintaining their connections with their families and communities. For Somalis, there are similarities, as many youth are trying to learn English to receive an education and ‘fit in’ with their non-Somali peers, but are also seeking to maintain the Somali language to be able to communicate with both their families and communities in Canada and in other countries in the diaspora.

Students who have never attended school or have sporadic schooling struggle to
stay in school because of the lack of support in English learning, while learning subject content. Many Somali children and youth who were born during the war spent many years internally displaced. For this reason, Aadan, whose case was discussed in the introduction, did not have the opportunity to go to school. Similar to Aadan, Amiir never attended formal schooling in Somalia. When he fled to Egypt he went to school to learn Arabic. Amiir’s mom, Maryan, comments on his personal experiences: “It is really a problem that he has never gone to school then he comes here and is put in a grade according to age…It would have been helpful to give extra time, to give him support” (Maryan April 25, 2011). Amiir discussed the problems he has in school and how difficult it will be for him to get his secondary school diploma:

Here I went to school and didn’t know much English. English is the most difficult. My reading and writing is not that good, I am in grade twelve right now. My math is now at a grade 11 [level]. Science is finished (finished compulsory grade nine and ten). It is hard for me to graduate, hard to finish, but can stay until I am 21 [years old] (Amiir April 25, 2011).

Here, Amiir is referring to the 21-year old age caps of students to stay in high school in Ontario. In discussing how the system sets up newcomers who have little educational background for failure, a Somali educator offers his own perspective:

Many of them do not finish high school, unfortunately. For one, here we go by age and if a fifteen year old comes here with no education, no background then he will start ninth grade and while they do ESL classes, they will age out before they take the classes to graduate high school so they age out. So their only option is to do adult education or GED (General Educational Development) and some of them do…. [They are leaving school] because no matter what we say, when they see its difficult and they cannot handle then they let go and they leave because they are really knocking on a door that they cannot open sometimes (Mohamed June 11, 2011).

Earlier in the year, I worked with Amiir in an after school program as his tutor. In one of our sessions, he was able to read the passage, comprehend it, and answer the questions, but he could not put words together to form sentences (field notes January 11, 2011).
Similar to Amiir, Maandeeq had sporadic schooling in Somalia and later in Turkey, which focused mostly on language. A determined student, she struggles to learn to read and write and also to understand subject content:

I decided to go to school when we got here. The language is difficult. When you are new you don’t know anything and need to follow people around. I am learning to some extent to read and write … There is a teacher that wants me to repeat math—I have to finish the course by June, I did the course before and now have to do it again (Maandeeq April 23, 2011).

The repetition of courses was demoralizing for Maandeeq. In the current neoliberal political climate, which expects self-responsibility, the education gaps of Somali students are represented as the students’ problem rather than the school’s responsibility.

There are variations in approaches in ELL and English teaching according to provincial regulations and policies; however, many of the provinces believe it is best practice to mainstream students in English classrooms as soon as possible. The practice is maintained even though many recognize that maintaining native languages is important and language proficiency in another language takes years to develop (Derwing and Munro 2007, Ovando and Wiley 2007). In other words, this best practice manages difference (see McCarty et al. 2011). During my participant-observation at the two homework programs, I found that the content of the homework, especially in core subjects, was too difficult for the ELD students and it was often inappropriate content. For instance, on May 3, 2011, I tutored Somali secondary school students who had geography homework that required them to read six paragraphs on the province of Ontario and answer questions. The students could not read the majority of the words in the passage and had little comprehension of the questions being asked. The only way students could answer such questions was by matching words from the reading to the question, without knowledge of the meaning of the word and with the help of a tutor.
Somali students who have never been to school are unfamiliar with subject content, such as science, geography, and computers; therefore, it is not only about learning the language, but also the content. One Somali educator discusses the differences in knowledge:

Some of the students actually came without knowing their [subjects]…start with for example, basic math, like addition and multiplication and so on and their signs. I mean that was the first time they heard about signs or social studies, for example, the earth is round, was something that they could not even accept and I am talking about high school students who were really at that level of education. And questions, for example, that human beings are animals were not acceptable (Ibrahim June 7, 2011).

Students discussed the difficulty they had with specialized vocabulary and subjects that were new to them. Abuubakar commented that it has been hard to learn to use a computer for the first time and said, “I will try my best to finish high school” (Abuubakar May 26, 2011). Hanad struggles with science because of the specialized vocabulary. Somali community leaders who help with tutoring programs for Somali students have attempted to set up meetings with teachers to discuss the reason students are getting homework in math and science, even though the students cannot read the instructions; but, these requests for meetings have gone unanswered (field notes March 31, 2011). A mother and educator, Fatima, believes that youth are leaving school because there is no one to help them with their homework and they are not taught English before they are placed in a mainstream classroom (field notes July 7, 2010). Haldhaa, a mother, points out the problem that many of the mothers see as the system merely pushing their children through school without getting an education:

Usually what happens is a kid is told, “you do homework the way I want it or you don’t go to class,” so the kid is pressured… The problem with the Canadian system is that the kid is in class and he is just part of the other kids and he doesn’t know how to read and doesn’t know anything and then he comes home and he is not told to do this homework. Then he goes back the next day and the teacher does
nothing to help him improve and so he just sits in class and he is not improving and they are not telling him do this, do that… (Haldhaa April 22, 2011).

In Minneapolis-Saint Paul, the public education system accommodated the needs of Somali refugee students in the early 1990s by introducing a bilingual program that taught students their subject content in Somali, while they built their English skills. The program also helped with parents adapting to the system. Somali educators talked about the success of the bilingual program for Somali children:

There was, at the beginning, enough for schools to help and to hire bilingual teachers for the ELL students and good support in that sense if they need to have bilingual support if they need that until they are ready to be in mainstream. There was a lot of flexibility in hiring and giving a license to teachers who are not licensed in this country, but have been teachers back home. So, that is one of the things that Minneapolis has been very good at, in the beginning, and has done a very good job. And if I focus on the Somali students…and I have been actually the first teacher that has been hired by Minneapolis public schools, knowing that these students who have been coming to this country have missed most of their schooling, if not all, and just coming here and then, with the support we were giving…and at one point, we were, for example, two math teachers, two science teachers, two in one building and two social studies teachers and so on and Educational Assistants, which was used in order to call parents and so on. So that was really a good support and it helped parents to do that transition of moving from bilingual support to mainstream where they can really be successful (Ibrahim June 7, 2011).

Mohamed highlights another important aspect of bilingual education. Educators not only help students with learning subjects, but also are able to assist them socially and emotionally, “They could relate to them and accommodate them psychologically to put them at ease so that was good” (Mohamed June 11, 2011). All of the Somali educators I talked with agreed that the success of the bilingual program was evident in the number of Somali students who went to university and college:

Well the success stories that there are so many Somali kids in college now. And thanks to that bilingual program because there was some teachers from back home that came here and helped them…So the students benefited from that even though the [teachers] were not certified at that time and there are at least 600-700 students in college because of that (Mohamed June 11, 2011).
Ibrahim also sees the evidence for success in the number of students who pursued a postsecondary education:

The things that tell me that this was a successful program were the students that actually graduated from that went to colleges and universities. Of course some of them were not successful, but a good number actually have been very successful. A student that I know now who is doing a PhD was one of those students who were really at that level and after four years the student was ready to go to college. And I have to admit that they were really hard working students, and determined and that has helped us a lot, motivated and I think they wouldn’t have been motivated if there were no teachers who were role models for them, who were helping them and really encouraging them and supporting them. The students were coming after school, and summer schools… What the research says is very clear which is the students have to make one year, 1.5 year of progress instead of one, I mean 1.5 a year while other students are doing one year equivalent progress then they have to… in order to really fill that gap and be successful (Ibrahim June 7, 2011).

Tracey M. Derwing and Murray Munro (2007) argue that in Canada creating bilingual programs in languages representative of the most populous linguistic groups would promote English language learning skills and content knowledge in an environment that supports the maintenance of students’ native language. The authors suggest that the program is no more costly than monolingual classrooms. Similarly, James Collins (2012) suggests that drawing on the native languages of the students can be a resource in their learning. In my own research, I found that the children and youth who previously attended state schools in English and/or had similar education systems that taught core subjects, such as science, geography, and math in another language seemed to have less systematic barriers to receiving an education in Canada. Hani who immigrated to Canada in 2008 and grew up in Yemen had a different experience in Canadian schools because she went to a Yemeni school without a break in her studies and gained proficiency in Arabic and math as well as learned some English:

I was grade eight when I first came. My first teacher was good and I caught up
with English fast. My teacher was proud of me because I caught up with English so fast. I am having a harder time with writing, it is going slow…At first, I was put in ELD but when found out went to school they put me is ESL (Hani April 25, 2011).

Despite the availability of research affirming the importance of programs described above, there have been few of these programs developed in Canada, with the exception of Prairie cities, including Edmonton. In Ontario, native language learning classes are reserved for private lessons on weekends (Derwing and Munro 2007:102). When education boards and curriculum developers do not legitimize students’ languages they are demonstrating that the curriculum is designed for those within the dominant group. It is only when students have a grasp on their world that they can begin to acquire the knowledge of the dominant group (Freire and Macedo 1987).

The need to recognize the importance of students’ native languages in public schools is often viewed as a threat to Canada’s national identity, since part of Canada’s national identity is based on the relationship between English and French languages. In public schools, where English and French languages are the only recognized languages, the students whose first language is neither are considered to be outsiders. Even though multiculturalism policy gives rights to non-English and non-French speaking linguistic groups, the inflexibility of the education system to meet these students’ needs and include their linguistic competencies in the curriculum reproduces hierarchies of citizenship in the country.

There continues to be a lack of commitment to ELL in Canadian public schools, especially for those students in the ELD stream, many of who came to Canada as refugees. There is a lack of ESL trained teachers and in most provinces there is no provision for educators of ESL to have any specialized training. Furthermore, teachers
who do not teach ESL do not often view ESL students as their responsibility (Derwing and Munro 2007:103). Tracey M. Derwing and Murray Munro (2007:102-103) suggest that students in Canada who have significant educational gaps in both literacy and numeracy have no more funding for support than ESL students who immigrate with comparable educational backgrounds. In addition, there are limited amounts of money for ESL students, with the length of time for funding dependent on the province. For instance, it is two years in Ontario and three years in Alberta; the students, therefore, appreciate the extra time and support given by a few of the teachers in the school. Almost all of the students I interviewed and interacted with discussed the importance of extra time, as the following recognition of their math teacher indicates:

My math teacher has helped a lot. She has given me extra time. Nobody helps me with English, just [the homework support program]. The English teacher gives homework and she doesn’t give extra time and she does not give good explanations. My math teacher is good; she explains everything (Amiir April 25, 2011).

Aamino commented that the teacher recognizes that some students are living in poverty and that the students need to learn English, so she teaches them English as well as math:

The teacher helps us teaching us math and helps with English—she helps us during lunch… As well, if someone comes to school without eating anything the same teacher gives them food that she pays for and it is open to anyone (Aamino April 22, 2011).

This case illustrates that some educators are aware of the structural inequalities for refugee students in the school system and struggle to teach material that is disconnected from the students’ realities (see Freire and Macedo 1987). Ibrahim, who is also a curriculum developer in Minneapolis, explains the concept behind sheltered instruction and the need to train every teacher in English language teaching:

We are moving into what we call our sheltered instruction or style of training to our mainstream teachers. And that is… were helping, for example, the teachers to
do teaching with the methodologies that are different. … The language objective and content objective has to be clear and has to be posted for the students and we are now advocating and training every teacher to be language teacher. That means … because why the students are not successful is because the academic language is mainly the language that is missing. We know from research that the social language takes two years to acquire while the academic language will require seven years or more to acquire. I am talking for example, if it is math are the students going to be okay, do they understand? The teacher assumes a lot when students in a mainstream classroom … when the teacher talks about isosceles triangle or those terms you know they are immediately lost and at other times you can see that the textbooks the ability level is really high … (Ibrahim June 7, 2011).

Even when educators are aware of the educational gaps of their students and attempt to meet their needs, educators’ resources limit their ability to adequately respond.

**Family Involvement in Schools**

Earlier in the chapter I suggested that part of the obligation of citizens to the Canadian state is to be a ‘good’ parent or caregiver, which includes the ability to extend learning in schools into homes. Homework, for example, socializes parents and caregivers to the cultural expectations of their roles and relations with schools and their children’s learning (Doucet 2011:404). Throughout my fieldwork, parents, especially mothers, were often viewed in terms of risk to their children’s education. Mothers were frequently blamed for their ‘culture,’ which was regarded as responsible for their own low levels of literacy. The patriarchal structures in Somali society are used to explain their oppression, instead of looking for the larger and more fundamental structural inequalities.

In the majority of interviews with Somali community leaders and educators as well as with youth, there was a focus on the differences in perspectives on family involvement in schools. I use the term “family involvement” rather than “parental involvement” to acknowledge the diversity of families (Doucet 2011). The belief that all
families are the same, have the same needs, and their children are all treated the same in school conceals the diversity of parents or caregivers in terms of background and history, the complexity of families’ needs, and the constraints on their involvement (Crozier 2001:330). Nonetheless, the blame for the underachievement of the children is placed on the children, and by extension to their parents or caregivers who are viewed as not doing their duty (Crozier 2001:332). A Somali educator pointed out that many Somali students are disadvantaged because several parents do not know how to read or write, and also do not know the system. He also points to the links between school and community:

Their houses don’t have the resources; parents are not resourceful because they are not educated and so on. These are the things that are not really working because this is completely a different system. Most of the time they are not in a nice neighborhood, where their kids can be involved …because as you know the child needs to be in a nice neighborhood, and I am talking about that the community needs to be very involved in the child’s education. The parents need to be part of that and the school needs to be part of that. So at least two of them are not functioning well, so even if the school is doing their job the parents are not really… because they are not educated on the system because of the community piece is not really helpful (Ibrahim June 7, 2011).

According to Fabienne Doucet (2011:407-409), assumptions of the mother’s involvement in schools, including assisting in classrooms, participating in bake sales or other fundraisers, and being able to meet with teachers anytime is rooted in gender and class assumptions and stereotypes. There is also an assumption that families have knowledge of the education system, or need to take on the responsibility for their child’s learning, and to navigate the system in order to get their children an educational advantage. All of these assumptions inform each other and create a dichotomy that constructs working class and poor women as “not involved,” or absent in their child’s education. The degree of family involvement is underpinned by beliefs about who is a “good parent;” thus, Somali parents are often represented as careless, uninterested, and incapable, or as constrained by “their
culture,” tradition, or religion. Mohamed, a Somali educator, believes that Somali parents are brought up believing in the absolute authority of the teacher:

In America and the West there is civil society; advocacy and the immigrants are not good at advocating for their children. Because for the most part they come from countries where dictatorships is the norm and a man with a gun tells everyone what to do and how to do it. So a lot of times they are not familiar with the system and typically for Somalis the teacher is close to God and is responsible for everything, so the parents will not question the teacher for whatever reason (Mohamed June 11, 2011).

Moreover, Diane Masny and Sue-San Ghahremani-Ghajar (1999) suggest that Somali parents have to conform to the schools primary method of communication, which is written form, rather than the more familiar oral and personal exchange. As a result, the inability of many parents to read and write in English impedes their ability to communicate with teachers and staff members. These are all barriers that impede children’s learning.

**Consequences of Neglecting Refugee Children’s Pasts**

When GARs immigrate to Canada they are met with migration and settlement services that seek to discipline migrants (Walsh 2011), to leave their pasts behind, to hide their differences, and to be more like ‘good Canadian citizens.’ In my interviews and fieldwork I found that Somali refugee families were offered and took part in. When they first arrive, Somali refugee children and youth are offered a number of support services. For instance, a government resettlement program supported Aadan, his six siblings and his mother Haldhaha, introduced at the beginning of this chapter. The family received housing and Haldhaha received life skills programs. In addition, the family was assigned a settlement worker, who would find them housing, services, a family doctor, and register the children in school, among other basic needs. Counseling agencies approached Haldhaha to take part in counseling groups. The family members were asked if they were
willing to enroll their secondary school children in an educational support program, where they would be offered tutoring, mentoring, and a support worker. The younger children attended a homework program run by the local Somali community, and at school, the children were assigned a support worker.

Catherine Bryan and Maryiam Denov (2011) conducted a study on unaccompanied refugee children in Canada and found that these children and youth’s dual identities as “refugee” and “youth” constructed them as “risky,” and could be understood in relation to “anti-refugee” and “anti-youth discourse.” Their position as refugees separates them from citizens, which intersects with class, racial, and gender hierarchies and norms that permit the categorization of refugees as risk. The degree to which they are seen as a risk informs discrimination against them (Bryan and Denov 2011:245). I found similarities throughout my fieldwork. During participant-observation in GAR settlement services, mothers’ counseling groups, education support programs as well as informal discussions, and interviews with support workers, I found families, including the Mohamed family, were constructed in terms of risk—at risk for trauma and at risk for leaving school. The services were looking to diminish the risk to the family by regulating their behaviours. For instance, the focus on trauma that the children experienced during the war was a concern for support workers, but their experience of poverty in Canada was not considered. As well, the education support program offered to the Mohamed family, which is partly provincially funded (not community run), has a central mandate to reduce the drop out rate in areas of the city with a high number of students that leave school through homework support, mentorship, and peer support. Even though the students see this program as an immense help with their mainstream schooling, many of the Somali children and youth who had significant educational gaps
felt their needs were not getting met. In addition, in these programs and in schools, the political histories and the complex relations and experiences of Somali children and youth who immigrate to Canada are presented as unstable and unknowable, and eventually deemed irrelevant and unusable to schools and organizations providing services and care to refugee children and youth.

In light of the above, I draw on the personal histories of Somali children and youth in order to illustrate the heterogeneity of their migration trajectories, and to show that forced migration often leads to other forms of migration and movement. Evident in the life histories are the different family experiences with similar migration trajectories, and the diverse experiences of children within families. These narratives show the importance of studies that examine the life histories of multiple individuals within families. In addition, they demonstrate that it is insufficient for migration research to focus solely on migrants’ home and present adoptive countries, since experiences in other adoptive countries reshape their identities and build upon their socio-cultural, historical, and linguistic knowledge.

I also examine the socio-cultural and economic factors that influence Somali children and youth’s learning, examining how displacement and migration transforms gender and generational relations. The research highlights the need for researchers to view refugee children and youth as social and historical agents in order to understand their strengths and coping strategies as well as the ways they contribute to their families’ livelihoods.

In cases of prolonged displacement, individuals and families often experience migration across and between borders multiple times, leading to various forms of migration and movement (Van Hear 2006). Nicholas Van Hear (2006:9-10) argues that
forced migration may lead individuals and families to leave or to send family members to
another country for a number of reasons including: to get an education, to earn money to
support the rest of the family, or to reunite with family members. In the Somali case,
many adolescents are sent to North America for safety, to get an education, and/or a job
to support family members. Hence, extended families depend on these youth for their
survival (see Horst 2008, Tefferi 2007). In cases of prolonged displacement and exile, the
“refugee diaspora,” which includes those in the home country, those in neighboring
countries, and those in countries further from the homeland, develop complex relations
(Van Hear 2006:9), such as the case of the Somali diaspora. The literature on refugees
often examines a single event, such as armed conflict or famine, as the cause of
displacement; however, in cases of prolonged armed conflict such as the Somali case
there are multiple ruptures that cause uprooting and movements within and between
borders over an extended period of time. These recurrent movements and transnational
relationships inform refugee experiences and shape their socio-economic status and
political identities.

The Diverse Migration Trajectories of Somali Children and Youth and their Cultural
and Linguistic Competencies

Many children and youth lost their parents and close relatives during the armed
conflict in Somalia. Children’s multiple displacements, both within and outside Somalia,
have often led to little state level education or sporadic schooling before immigrating to
Canada. Amiir was born in 1993 during the war in Somalia and was internally displaced
within the country until 2005 when his father was killed. His mother, Maryan, explains
their movements: “He was brought up by his grandmother and was not taken to school.
He would go back and forth to visit me. Anytime war broke out, we went to a new place
depending on security. We were always scared and afraid” (Maryan April 25, 2011). Amiir looked at me with sadness in his eyes when I asked him what he remembered of Somalia, “I remember fighting all of the time, we move to place to place to place. There are no good memories” (Amiir April 25, 2011). Soon after the death of his father, Amiir and his mother fled Somalia to Cairo, Egypt where they lived until 2007. Amiir attended Arabic language classes, but did not go to a state school in Egypt. As a result, his first experience with school was in Canada in 2007. Similar to Amiir, Maandeeq was born in Somalia in 1993 and raised in Mogadishu until 2006. Raised by her grandmother since she was three months old because her mother was killed, Maandeeq had sporadic schooling learning basic Somali, English, and math skills. She fled to Turkey with her grandmother and brother at the end of 2006. During this time, she attended Turkish language classes. Maandeeq was resettled, along with her brother and grandmother, in Canada in 2008 where she regularly attended school for the first time at 16 years old. Her older brother has never attended school in Canada; instead, he looks for ways to make money to support the family.

Many Somali children grew up in Yemen, however, the age they arrived and whether their school was in a refugee camp or in the city, influenced their educational experiences. For instance, the Ibrahim family, which includes 19-year-old Abuubakar, 17-year-old Ladan, and 14-year-old Hanad as well as their mother Fardowso are from the Gedo region of Somalia where the older children were born during the civil war. The family was forced to leave their home to live in Mogadishu and then they had to move north to Boosaaso, as their region was one of the hardest hit in the war. During this time, the children attended a madrasah, a school used for teaching Islam theology and religious law. They fled the country in 1996 to Yemen where Hanad was born and they lived for 12
years. Fardowso explains the families living conditions: “In Yemen we lived in a refugee camp that was far from cities and there were only Somalis. The children went to school in the camp. Life in the camp was hard. We were given little food and it was not enough. We tried to get stuff from Yemen people outside of the camp, to get more to survive” (Fardowso May 26, 2011). Her eldest son in Canada, Abuubakar, who was 4 years old when he left Somalia to Yemen, talks about the subjects he learned in the camp school: “I attended grade two to twelve in one school. In school I learned Arabic, math, science, gym, same sort as here, geography, history” (Abuubakar May 26, 2011). His sister, Ladan and brother, Hanad also attended the camp school from grades one to six. In Yemen, Fardowso’s husband left his family on a boat to Saudi Arabia, but was later deported back to Somalia. Soon after Fardowso immigrated to Canada her daughter, who was married with four children and due to be resettled in the United States, died. Every time I met with Fardowso she talks about her separation from her husband and grandchildren, with great sadness and loss. In female-headed households, the eldest son usually takes on more responsibility for the family. As the eldest son, Abuubakar now feels responsible to help his mother to get his father, nieces, and nephews to Canada.

Hani’s experiences of growing up in Yemen differed from the Ibrahim family because she was born in the country in 1996 and she attended a Yemeni school. Her mother, Fariido along with her father, fled Somalia in 1993. Hani’s father died in his sleep in 2006 in Yemen’s capital city, Sana’a, where he worked. Fariido worked as a house cleaner for Arab families and developed a growth in her throat because of her daily exposure to chemicals that needed immediate surgery. Her health condition and need for immediate surgery expedited the process of the family immigrating to Canada. In Yemen, Hani attended an all-girls Yemeni school until the age of seven when she attended a
gender integrated school. She compares her own experience of school to Somali students who are newcomers to Yemen:

We used to stand up and listen to the national anthem and listen to the announcements of the morning. What grade you were in didn’t matter, how old you are, but if you knew the language, you were put according to what you know, not age. They put new girls from Somalia in a class with young kids and they get made fun of, it is weird when you are with girls who are young…I used to get bullied when I didn’t know the language in Yemen (Hani April 25, 2011).

Here, Hani is also pointing to differences in educational placement practices. In many countries, including Yemen and Somalia, children are placed in a grade according to their knowledge of subjects and their language skills. When students immigrate to Canada they are often struck by the age-based educational placement practices in Canada. Hani and the Ibrahim family’s cases show the diversity of the educational experiences of children who grew up in the same country, which reflects the diversity of their needs in Canadian schools.

Other Somali children and youth have faced years of discrimination and fear. Saado and Yaasiin were born in Somalia and fled with their mother to South Africa where they lived until 2011. The two sisters talked about their experiences in school:

In South Africa we were the only two Somalis in school. We adapted to South Africa and tried to fit in as much as possible. You have to learn fast to fit in. If you do not learn English they treat you as if you don’t matter. In South Africa, the first day of high school I was the only foreigner. I am used to being the only foreigner (Yaasiin April 14, 2011).

From her own perspective, their mother Faaiso, articulates the family’s experiences:

We lived in South Africa under terrible conditions. We lived in fear of our lives on the streets, here the cars stop for you, but there they would run you over—kill you, they did not care if you were not South African, especially if you are dressed like a Somali…My daughters went to school in South Africa, they would get bullied at school, called names, pushed even hit by other children. If you were not South African you didn’t matter, you were not a person like them (Faaiso April 14, 2011).
Despite living with fear and discrimination, Saado and Yaasmiin felt they had good experiences with school and they were able to receive an education (field notes, April 14, 2011). Yaasmiin and Saado had only been in Canada for two weeks when I interviewed them, but both thought that the system in Canada was less difficult than in South Africa and were excited to be attending a school with other Somalis and a diverse population.

Many youth grew up in refugee camps or in the capital city, Nairobi, in Kenya. Axmad was 21 years old when he immigrated to Canada under the WUSC resettlement program\(^{32}\) in September 2004. After being forced to leave Somalia in 1991, Axmad and his family lived in refugee camps, first in Mombasa and then in Kakuma:

> I was born in Somalia, I was born in Mogadishu and since 1991 Somali people was killing each other, for tribes and I was one of the tribes being targeted so we were forced to leave. We didn’t have a choice. Then we went to Kenya, my family and me, we were first in Mombasa, there was a camp in Mombasa between 1992-1997 then we moved to Kakuma. I was there until 2004…I went to school there, my primary school, and my high school after that. [School] was in the camp because outside it was expensive, you had to pay money, but now it is free…After 2005 it was free, before that it was money and as a refugee you do not have a lot of rights because you are in a different country… (Axmad February 22, 2011).

Here Axmad, like the others presented above, emphasizes the point that many Somali children and youth did not have the same rights to education as citizens.

In camps, youth discussed not having enough food and water as well as living in fear. These factors had an influence on learning. Axmad attempts to articulate the school environment and the camps where students lived showing the influence of hunger and fear on learning:

> We did not have materials and not as many good teachers [as the Kenyan schools]. Because according to Kenya, the real Kenyan schools, the teachers have to go to a college, like [in Canada], after they finish university. But in the camp someone who has just finished high school, he has not gone to college, he will

\(^{32}\) Axmad immigrated to Canada under the WUSC resettlement program; therefore, he did not receive a scholarship to attend a Canadian university but was sponsored by the WUSC organization.
teach you because of money. Kakuma we had… eight countries [where people are from], but the majority of them are Sudanese, like 80 percent. They taught in English, everything is in English. Although it is the British system… High school was the same; no books and the teachers are not good compared to others. It was very tough compared to other schools in Kenya. If I had resources I could do well… The living too, sometimes you don’t have enough food or you worried about your security. Sometimes the local people come at night and they rape people and they loot people. Local people are so hungry, they don’t have food to eat and the refugee people they get food from UN so they come at night and loot. It was like fearful to live in the camp… School was not stable... We don’t have resources, the food is not enough you are hungry so there is not enough concentration (Axmad February 22, 2011).

Saqal, who immigrated to Canada on a WUSC scholarship, also grew up in Kakuma after fleeing Somalia with her mother and siblings at the age of seven. She offers some more details about the educational environment in the camp and her experience as a girl:

The education system’s pretty horrible. I went to elementary there, but, like, I was in a class of, like, 86 students with three girls only. Actually more like two Sudanese and me being Somali, and it was just you don’t do anything. You are just a dormant in class because girls, they don’t go to school and it was my mom, she sent me to school and I didn’t have any support. I didn’t have any friends, and, like, different cultures, they don’t talk to you, and bully you at the same time. You want something or you ask something, they’ll just hit you back and usually it’s just about fists, and in the camp it’s survival of the fittest. If you’re not strong, you’re down. That’s how it is like. You just try to get everything by force. Even if something belongs to you, somebody else is grabbing but you have to fight for it and get it back. If this person is stronger than you, then it’s your loss. That’s how it is. So it was just horrible. Like, the camp, education was pretty bad. The kid that come to school, some of them don’t even have shoes. Like, we’re taking let’s just say seven subjects. You have, like, exercise book with three pages. Maybe the cover is gone and you have a pencil but, like, it’s not even sharpened. You just come to school and you never actually learn anything. The teacher himself, he’s a refugee. He’s given incentive, like, let’s just say US$20 like, a month. He’s taking ration card like me, going to the same line every month and we’re just the same...(Saqal January 24, 2011).

As a result of the camp environment, Saqal and Axmad both believe that many of the students do not receive an adequate education in the camps. There is a lack of funding

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33 Saqal’s resettlement was different than Axmad’s experience because she immigrated under the WUSC student refugee program and therefore was sponsored by a Canadian university and received a scholarship to attend the university as a permanent resident.
and lack of teacher training programs. As well, the living environment impacts students’ ability to receive an education. Furthermore, many students do not speak the language of instruction and as a result are unable to understand the content of the lessons. The environment is therefore discouraging for students, who feel they do not have a future.

The cases challenge assumed teleological movements across space beginning with the migrant’s place of origin and moving to an adoptive country, usually in North America and Europe, where it is assumed they settle permanently. Each of these youth have experienced multiple migrations before arriving in Canada, spending much of their lives outside Somalia. Moreover, children who seem to have similar migration trajectories can have altogether different educational experiences. In fact, children within the same family can have different educational backgrounds. Researchers need to consider that multiple migrations, living conditions, and school experiences have influenced Somali youth’s educational attainment, leaving many with significant educational gaps that need to be recognized and addressed in Canadian schools. In recognizing the diverse migration trajectories of refugee students, anthropology of education can become more attuned to the diverse socio-cultural, historical, and linguistic knowledge these students bring to the classroom and to their learning.

According to Teresa L. McCarty (2012), viewing diverse linguistic and socio-cultural competencies as assets to be desired and built upon, rather than deficits, reduces academic disparities. Somali community educational spaces recognize the strengths of Somali youth and build upon their competencies in their programs. Somali literacy was and still is to some extent oral. Poetry and songs remain important to the cultural life of Somalis in Canada and the US. Youth groups such as Young Achievers build upon these oral strengths as well as learn and incorporate Somali cultural history in their
performances. I have attended the performances of this group four times, watching them educate and motivate their peers to not get involved in gangs, get an education, and advocate for women’s rights as Muslims, while reinforcing Somali national belonging. Maisha Fisher (2003:364) suggests that “community literacy” is used by youth to communicate between cultures as well as to engage in social action and activism, a common theme I also observed at these events. For instance, on June 18, 2011, I attended a Young Achievers event in Minneapolis. The poetry was presented using a mix of English and Somali languages and focusing on issues facing youth, such as the negative media attention to their neighborhoods rather than the positive moments, the misrepresentation of Islam in the US, a young man’s dreams of coming from Detroit to Minneapolis, youth as the future of the Somali nation, and ending hate (field notes June 18, 2011). Poet Nation, another youth group also uses poetry in its various forms to educate peers and to help develop the artistic and cultural talents of Somali youth. In doing so, Somali youth are making meaning from their experiences using eclectic sources, mainly Somali cultural tropes (in this case oral tradition), and drawing on other cultural forms from the existing social milieu (for example, incorporating English in their poetry or using hip-hop styles) to claim social space, to reconstruct their identities, and to participate in society (see also Moje 2000). These can be considered community knowledge spaces where literacy learning is purposeful (Fisher 2003:363).

Oral literacies are not forms of knowledge that are currently privileged in public schools. Maisha Fisher (2003, 2005) argues that poetry, including spoken-word and hip-hop can be considered literary practices. Educators can use these skills and prior knowledge to help promote academic literacy. First, however, educators need to acknowledge the political nature of literacy and transgress these norms to include diverse
forms of knowledge and linguistic competencies in the classroom (Fecho 1998). These practices will also promote English language skills while recognizing the background and socio-cultural realities of the students.

The oral competencies of Somali students are also informed by their experiences during their migrations. Somali children and youth’s experiences in different countries offered them the opportunity to learn multiple languages. In a globalized world and living in a country with a heterogeneous population, multilingualism is increasingly a valued attribute. Yet, in Canada this seems to only apply to the Anglophone or Francophone majority rather than newcomers who possess such competencies. For instance, Maandeeq speaks Somali, Turkish, and English. The Ibrahim family speaks Arabic, Somali, and English, as does the Mohamed family and Hani. Nonetheless, ELL and English speaking is promoted as more important than the preservation and enhancement of these students’ native and other languages. Instead, the competencies of Somalis are articulated and expressed within community educational spaces where this is being achieved. In Toronto, Kitchener-Waterloo, and Minneapolis-Saint Paul, Somali educators and community leaders are creating weekend Somali language classes. In the classes, students in elementary, middle, and secondary schools learn to read and write in Somali as well as to speak in the language. At a higher education level, Somali educators are teaching Somali literature classes and have even introduced Somali language studies in universities. Arabic language learning is also taught in dugsi, where after school and weekend Islamic schools teach the Qur’an to its Muslim students. Within mosques, classrooms with desks are set up for children to do their work. The Imam or another educator teaches lessons in Islam and the memorization of the Qur’an, which is written in Arabic. In some of these spaces, books written in Arabic are collected in a library for students to take home with
the intention to promote literacy in the language. Diana Masny and Sue-San Ghahremani-Ghajar (1999) argue that educators should engage in pedagogy that legitimates what they term community-based and personal literacies. An approach that considers youth agency would also recognize the competencies of Somali children and youth that can be included in the public schools.

*The Transformation of Gender and Generational Relations as a Result of Displacement and Migration*

A further consequence of neglecting Somali students’ pasts and framing them in terms of risk is that it conceals the transformations and reconstruction of identities in the context of poverty and displacement. Thus, it is important to inquire into the roles of youth in their families and communities in their migration trajectories. One of the assumptions underpinning this chapter is based on Jo Boyden’s (2003) proposition that in times of armed conflict, children may not always be able to rely on adults and therefore develop their own coping strategies.

In many cases, displacement has transformed generational relations among Somalis, inverting roles whereby older generations often become dependent on younger ones. Hirut Tefferi (2007) found that displacement due to armed conflict has disturbed what was considered the transition into adulthood for Somali adolescent boys. Historically, Somali adolescents with a nomadic or pastoral background had responsibilities to take care of the herds. These responsibilities were viewed as a rite of passage overseen by elders; however, the armed conflict has disrupted such practices (see Rousseau et al. 1999). Instead, in neighbouring countries as well as in North America, younger generations acquired greater authority relative to elders, mainly due to their education, their ability to communicate with the adoptive society, and their added
responsibilities. Although young Somali men have more advantages than their elders in the context of displacement, humanitarian agencies undermine the capabilities of these young people. Hirut Tefferi (2007) argues that humanitarian interventions expect youth to act as dependent children or refugees, rather than taking on productive work and making decisions on certain issues, which undermines the traditional roles and responsibilities of adolescents in Somali society.

In general, Somali views of childhood and adulthood are different from those in North America. For example, a Somali community leader recounted his own transition from childhood to adulthood in Somalia, revealing that he left his parents’ home when he was 13 years old because he thought he could take care of himself. He suggested that in Somalia when a child is 15 years old he or she is considered an adult. The individual would have probably finished high school and would be preparing to get married. In the diaspora, although the context and boys’ responsibilities have changed, young men or those considered “adolescents” continue to believe that they should be independent, sometimes living on their own, and often making their own money (field notes June 14, 2011).

Education was one of the ways youth believed they could mitigate risk to themselves when they lived in refugee camps. Despite the structural constraints to receiving an education, some youth came up with creative solutions. Saqal created an opportunity to attend school in Nairobi where she would receive a better education:

We had, like, relatives in Nairobi… And so my mom, like, she said, “Okay, you want to go to school there? Okay, let’s talk to [them]…” whoever that was then close to [the schools] if they can take me in and, like, I can go to school. So it actually worked out a little bit, so I came back, we went to the capital and started my elementary grade four there… (Saqal January 24, 2011).

Saqal had to come up with creative ways to navigate the Kenyan school system because
she was not living with her mother and was also hiding that she was from a refugee camp:

When we finished exam, for example, we get report cards but the kid will never be given their report card. Usually the parent or the guardian has to go. So [my sister] was always like my second mom if I dropped like whatever, like, you know, grade or she’ll just know ’cause she’ll report it to my mom, like how come? Like, what happened? So usually even if a parent is needed, ’cause usually, like, we have parents meeting once in awhile in school, so I used to take her ’cause I had to, or else I’ll be chased the next day. It’s like “Yesterday you didn’t bring your parents so there’s no way you’re going to attend classes.” So I’ll be just told to go home… I tried to hide I was from a refugee camp basically because the other kids were just like good and they were all like Kenyans and stuff like that, and so I just felt like why would I be the only kid from a refugee camp, so they actually seen me as like any other Somali who was living in the capital and had maybe a little bit of good life and I wasn’t from a refugee camp, so nobody actually, even the teachers never knew…And then the other thing they used to bother me about was like every time they used to ask me for my birth certificate, and it was just hard all the time. I finish school with all the excuses every time for four years (Saqal January 24, 2011).

Both Saqal and Axmad went through the grueling process of applying for a WUSC scholarship to study at a Canadian university and resettle in the country. Axmad explains how he succeeded in the competition and how he came to be separated from his family:

When I applied for that program there was a high number of students and they only select like 25 and 200 students applied, 20 of us got scholarships for one year here and I was lucky 25 of us, which I was included got resettlement, so that is how I came here. In that case I can’t come with my family, they say the only person that can come with you is your wife and your kids. At that time I did not have wife and kids. So that is how I separated from my family (Axmad February 22, 2011).

Here Axmad is also pointing to the immigration restrictions for refugees under this program, which leads to the separation of youth from their family members. Saqal saw WUSC as giving her opportunities for her future.

So I just told [my sister], I go “B” [on the national test], that means I can’t get a scholarship to a university that’s located in Kenya, so that means there’s no college for me and my mom can’t pay, so I was just like I don’t know what I’m going to do. I was just so stressed ’cause I didn’t have a life, and all my friends were actually going to the best universities ever ’cause they had money, you know…And I just felt so useless and I had, like, I can do so much but, like, your hands are so crossed because you don’t have money for it, you know…So
Axmad and Saqal’s stories illustrate how they persistently and creatively developed strategies to deal with complex systems and institutions in order to gain an education under local and global structural constraints.

To mitigate risk to themselves and their families, Somali children and youth contribute to their families through various forms of work. Marjorie Faulstich Orellana (2001:367) uses the term “work” instead of “helping,” “learning,” or “playing” to highlight the ways children and youth “support, sustain, and sometimes change institutions.” As mentioned earlier in the chapter, in female-headed households the eldest boy often takes on the responsibility to financially take care of the family and this may affect his ability to receive an education. Saqal discusses the common familial situation:

Most of the kids are like the parents of the house, so they provide for their families, their father, their mother, their siblings. Maybe it’s not a complete family. The father is missing. Maybe he’s dead or he died in the war. So usually to find a complete family with a mother, father and kids and who’s the father who’s maybe a little bit literate and trying to provide for the family is so hard to get. Usually a mother is with the kids. So the oldest of those kids becomes more like the father of those kids and he tries to provide for them, you know, hard labour… And doing other stuff, you know, getting the daily bread and all that. So it’s so hard for the kid actually to get, like, you know, that opportunity, chance to be told, you know what? We’ll provide everything for you; you go to school (Saqal January 24, 2011).
Jo Boyden (2009a) found that in the case of extreme poverty among Ethiopian households children are concerned about the adversity affecting their families and express the desire to help them. The main way that children assist their families is through income generating activities. This is also true for Somali children who have gained employment throughout the migration process to help their families. In this research, the majority of the youth obtained a job to either cope with life in a refugee camp or to help their families. Saqal got an incentive job, common in refugee camps, to cope with the boredom of living in the camp and to have access to basic necessities:

I got the job and then I started interpreting for Joint Voluntary Agency [for the United States Embassy] for a while, which was really cool. They kind of like just interchange me with the clinic one. After the families go through the interview they have to get medical clearance—Before I used to do all of them, but… I just decided to do the clinic one, which was really cool. I really liked it ’cause I was like a mini-nurse … Because you’re a refugee that means you’re getting food from UNHCR and you just like an incentive worker. They call it an incentive worker…So it wasn’t for the money. I just wanted the environment to be there instead of staying at home because staying in the community is much more difficult and just staying at home is like being useless, kind of…They also have water and also, like, they have [air conditioners] (Saqal January 24, 2011).

Similar to Saqal, Axmad finished high school and started to work for NGOs in Kakuma to receive training and to be an incentive worker:

When I finished my high school I started to work for an NGO… I worked in two NGOs, but I worked UNHCR Lutheran Migration Centre for two years and then I worked International Rescue Committee for three years. There was a course I was doing, its called distance learning, called Community Mental Health worker, they train me how to do prescription, we used to have a clinic and meet with people who have post-traumatic stress disorder, any kind of mental illness (Axmad February 22, 2011).

Many of the young men I interviewed who were the eldest in their families sought employment to help their families while they lived in other countries. Similar to Aadan, introduced in the beginning the chapter, who found a job as a mechanic’s assistant in Saudi Arabia, Amiir got a job as a dishwasher when he fled to Egypt and Abuubakar
worked as a machine operator helper in Yemen. While many of the eldest boys in the family found employment, the majority of the girls did not. Instead, young women assisted their families by contributing to and participating in their households.

For young women, displacement and immigration to Canada usually increases their household responsibilities, including spending more time taking care of young children and elders as well as housework. They also include new responsibilities, such as translating. The perception of girls’ vulnerability undermines the reality of these roles and responsibilities (see Tefferi 2007, Boyden 2009a) and does not recognize that many Somali families in Canada are female-headed (Berns McGown 2003). The families represented in this chapter are all female-headed and the majority of the mothers have limited education, ranging from never attending school to high school. For many of the mothers, it has been difficult to learn English, especially if they have low levels of literacy in their native language. As a result, often the eldest daughter becomes the interpreter for the family, taking her mother and siblings to doctor’s appointments, meetings with teachers, service providers, and support workers. For instance, 16-year-old Saafi is knowledgeable about the educational issues of her sisters and brothers because she acts as the family’s translator. She is also the person in the family who is responsible for doing homework with her siblings and translating their report cards to their mother (field notes May 17, 2011). The child who is the interpreter may also be responsible for translating legal forms, filling out forms, banking, and any other aspect of the family’s life that involves reading and writing. Due to the need to be able to speak in English to accomplish day-to-day tasks, children who translate for their families may be responsible for making purchases, making appointments, and dealing with phone calls. Fardowso explains the importance of having her children as interpreters: “The problem now is the
kids go to school full-time, so now if I go to the hospital or appointment there is no one to translate because the kids are in school” (Fardowso May 26, 2011). Along with interpreting, eldest daughters usually take on domestic tasks. Although Saafi is not the eldest daughter in the family, she takes on the responsibility to care for her four younger siblings. The eldest daughter Aamino, however, has her own responsibilities cleaning the apartment and cooking meals for the younger children (field notes May 17, 2011).

These cases show that children contribute to the household through paid or domestic work. The beliefs that surround children’s roles and capabilities differ and transform across socio-cultural contexts (Orellana 2001:376). Children’s work can redefine their roles and relationships within the family. Paid work can help alleviate some of the burden of poverty and offer youth a sense of pride in helping their families. Translating helps families meet their needs, navigate the system, and find other sources of support. Taking care of siblings, including helping them with their homework may ensure younger children’s access to resources and allow them to receive an education since they have someone to help them with their studies at home.

The responsibilities of Somali children and youth, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, also extend to the “refugee diaspora.” During my fieldwork, I found the majority of Somalis continually listen to the news and frequently talk to their family members throughout the diaspora on the telephone because they are deeply concerned with the political situation in Somalia. Their concern, to a large extent, has to do with family and community members who remain in Somalia or in the neighbouring countries, Kenya, Yemen, and Ethiopia, where Somalis’ positions are increasingly precarious. In addition, I found youth in North America help their families in the diaspora, when possible, by sending money to relatives in different countries, including Somalia. Although refugees
in North America usually occupy lower socio-economic positions, small amounts of money by North American standards can enable the survival of many in the Horn of Africa. Remittances sent by Somalis have the advantage of reaching family members directly; in fact the total sum of remittances sent to Somalia is much greater than development aid (Horst 2008:144, see also Monsutti 2008, Van Hear 2006). In the 1980s, the Somali diaspora set up transnational xawilaad companies to deal with the remittance flows between the diaspora and Somalia. Xawil is derived from Arabic (hawala) and means “transfer” of both money and responsibilities (Horst 2008:146). A significant proportion of this money is to help meet the daily needs of families (Lindley 2005) as well as to help individuals and families cross borders (Hyndman 1997, Van Hear 2004). It is not uncommon for an individual to have many dependent relatives who rely on his or her monthly remittances.

Remittances are one of the main ways children and youth contribute to the survival and livelihood of their families who remain in Somalia or in neighboring countries. In the literature and in my fieldwork, there was emphasis on the importance of a family to have daughters. This may be in part due, as Cindy Horst (2008:152) found among Somalis in Dadaab camps in Kenya, to the common perception that sons forget about their families in camps when they settle in Western countries. An excellent illustration of this point is Judith Gardner’s (2004:99) experience in a workshop in Hargeisa when an elder male asked the group: “Can you change my sons into one girl?” When asked why, he responded that the elders with daughters take care of them, they have money for new clothes and food, while he had only sons and he does not have these things. Similarly, a woman in Gardner’s workshop believed that one positive aspect of the war was that women are more highly valued. In my fieldwork while it was common for
Somali men and women to comment on the need to have daughters to take care of them financially, similar to Cindy Horst (2008:154), I found that both young men and young women send remittances. Similar to many first generation Somali youth in North America, Axmad sends money to his family to support them:

I came here September 2004. My mom and one brother and one sister came [to the United States] in January or February 2007. When I was living here I would send money to them. It is real hard, even now I have a few uncles living in Somalia and they call me and I don’t have money. They don’t have money or work and they need support from me. Whenever I work in the summer then I send money but not in the school year (Axmad February 22, 2011).

Saqal, the young woman studying at university on a WUSC scholarship, discusses the pressure and the necessity to send remittances not only to family, but friends as well:

Like, 99 percent of the people [in the camps or in other parts of neighbouring countries] get remittances from this side of the world…Yeah, so some of them they depend on a cousin or, like, a relative. It doesn’t have to be a close, like—family, also a friend…See, like, most of the youth people who are, like, under 25, you know, they depend with—Like, let’s just say about my age, them living with their parents. Some of them they have died, some of them are separated, some of them are back at home, and so you’ll never find a full family, like nuclear family. People just living with each other. Like friends living with friends…so they just, they just become family. So your friend, if they get the chance for a settlement, he’ll keep in touch with you and, like, he’ll keep on sending you, even if it’s US $50, and you’ll become fine with it. Like, that’s what happens… I remember when, like, when I was so broke, like, my friend, she’s in the US right now…when I told her when I was about to leave she actually sent me US $50 (Saqal January 24, 2011).

Saqal is secretive to others about how much money she sends to her family members:

Nobody else knows…They don’t even know that I send money every month…Some students, like, even send, like, CDN $800, $900 per month… some of them have even sent their own, like, you know, siblings to high school to Nairobi to get more, nice, nice education compared to the camp…We just try to make people lead a better life for the moment. So help with their food, we help with their education; we help with their health. That’s what happens… How would that make me feel if my mom, like—even though she will never tell me we don’t have food, or something like that, but I know how home is, you know…So it’s like I wouldn’t feel peaceful inside, you know, so it’s like, it’s like my responsibility… People have to understand…there is a lot of pressure… (Saqal January 24, 2011)
Somali youth in high school are also looking for jobs in Canada to support their families. Abuubakar got a job at Tim Horton’s to send money back home to his family as well as working towards bringing his father to Canada. Amiir is actively looking for a job, taking resumes to potential employers, but he has not been hired. Maandeeq also has interest in getting a job to help her family.

The literature on remittances emphasizes the need to look at the gendered division of remittances as well as the social relations that are involved (Kunz 2008, Wong 2006); however, the literature has rarely considered that youth are among those who remit, assuming it is an adult responsibility. By starting with an assumption of child and youth agency researchers in refugee and/or migration studies can better examine the nature of transnational relationships and connections. Other factors involved in remittances, however, need to be considered such as educational background, career opportunities, as well as the sender’s socio-economic status in the adoptive country (Horst 2008:153).

It is important to note that poverty is a major influence on Somali youth’s learning, an issue that is often overlooked in educational institutions, especially that many of the youth spend much of their time working or seeking employment to assist their families in the adoptive country or elsewhere. When Somali youth are forced to choose between education and work, they sometimes choose to leave school to support their families. The youth narratives build upon other research, which shows that children’s lives cannot be separated from adult wars (Stephens 1995). The latter frequently compels youth to find ways of coping through employment to assist their families during war situations, while seeking opportunities to get an education.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Somali children and youth’s personal histories and everyday realities are essential to their learning. An approach to examining these links between the past, present, and future is to view children and youth as social and historical agents. To do this, I have shown the consequences of the processes of exclusion of newcomer Somali children and youth in schools. Through education, specifically language policies, the ideal national subject is maintained and reproduced and the best interests of refugee children are marginalized. In the context of North American neoliberalism that is characterized by self-responsibility, Somali youth are blamed for leaving school, which conceals the roles of education policies in maintaining the inequalities to receiving an education.

The research demonstrates the diverse understandings of childhood and adulthood and how North American assumptions of children and childhood can undermine children’s competencies and can obfuscate their family and community responsibilities. Approaching studies with children and youth from an agency perspective, we are able to better understand their needs and the ways they mitigate risk, such as the presented cases of combining paid work with effective schooling (see Boyden 2009a).

The chapter also showed that ignoring Somali students’ histories, their needs, and roles within the family camouflages structural inequities and impacts the learning process. This includes a lack of recognition of the diverse socio-economic and social backgrounds and that often poverty and discrimination hinders education. The focus on students’ helplessness stresses individual pathology, rather than considering the inflexibility of the school system in accommodating students’ needs and including their competencies and everyday realities in the curriculum. Community educational spaces
have maintained and harnessed the strengths and knowledge of Somali students in order to build upon them and promote students’ learning. The diverse literacies maintained and skills developed in community educational spaces should to be recognized and used by educators to engage Somali students and construct a space that nurtures their learning.

In spite of the capabilities children have shown throughout their migrations, when these young people settle in Canada they are viewed as helpless refugees. The lack of commitment to ELL, the lack of support for refugee students with significant educational gaps, and inappropriateness of programming for these students is a systematic denial of their education. To return to the questions of Paulo Freire in his conversation with Donaldo Macedo (1987), of whether the school touched the students, it is evident from the narratives of Somali youth and their mothers as well as Somali educators that Somali students are often untouched by schools. Somali students continue to have low levels of literacy in both Somali and English in addition to not acquiring the knowledge of subject content despite attending school.
Chapter 5: “He who knows where he comes from, knows where he is going;” The commemoration of Somali Independence in the Diaspora

Images and Sounds of Independence: Commemoration in Minneapolis

Sky-blue flags with a five-point white star in the middle sway as different generations of Somalis sing nationalistic songs. Young boys and men dress in blue visors with the star in the middle, others wear white shirts with a Somali flag tie, while others have on t-shirts with the flag or the map of Somalia. Young girls and women wear sky-blue dresses with white stars, many with matching hijabs. Nationalistic music blasts over the loud speakers as Somali families walk down the street taking in the images and sounds of the commemoration of Somalia’s Independence Day in front of Safari, a famous Somali restaurant in downtown Minneapolis. Tents are lined up one next to the other and occupy half of the street offering information, selling t-shirts, hats, flags, bracelets, and books. There are places for face painting, food, and drinks. Outside of the building that is home to Safari restaurant there is a sight rarely seen in an American city—a camel, the national symbol of Somalia. The camel gives rides to young children. At the other end of the street a stage is set up where Somali youth groups, such as the Young Achievers and Poet Nation perform traditional and contemporary music. The Somali and American flags are one of many signs of national attachments. Another interesting aspect is the choice of master of ceremonies, Sadiq Warfa, who ran as an independent party candidate for state representative of Minneapolis in the 2010 elections. The street is blocked off for the commemoration, to remember the day when British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland united to form the independent Somali Republic under

34 Parts of the introduction and some of the elder stories and remembrances for this chapter were first written in an article to commemorate Somalia’s Independence Day, June 21, 2011 in Mogadishu Times entitled, “Memories of Somalia’s National Struggles for Independence and the Historical Role of Youth” (Adem and Stachel 2011).
a civilian government. Independence from colonial powers and the unity of the two Somalilands represent a turning point in Somali history. Today, remembering these events and the struggle for self-determination serves to reinforce collective solidarity or national identity in the present, amidst the chaos, fragmentation and dispersal; this relationship between the past and present is the main theme discussed in this chapter.

**Historical Background**

Following the Somali anti-colonial struggle against the status of the British and Italian parts of Somalia as protectorates of the two colonial powers, and ten years of United Nations Trusteeship (1950-1960), Northwest Somalia became independent from the British on June 26, 1960, and six days later on July 1, 1960, south and central Somali territory became independent from Italian rule. The regions included in the British protectorate were Awdal, Togder, Sanag, and Sool, home to mainly Isaaq and Darood clan-families. The regions in the Italian protectorate consisted of Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Jubba, Shabelle, Benadir, Hiran, Galgadud, Mudug, Nugal, and Bari, home to mainly Hawiye, Darood, Rahanweyn, and Digil clan-families (Besteman 1999, Lewis 2008). On July 1, 1960, the same day that Italian Somaliland gained independence, the two regions united and formed the Somali Republic.

The national objectives first proposed by Somalia’s political parties in the late 1940s and early 1950s, prior to independence, focused on uniting the Somali territories partitioned during colonialism. Two national youth groups, one in the north and one in the south, participated in the struggle for Somalia’s independence, appealing to a pan-Somali national identity and the right to self-determination, including political independence. In British Somaliland in 1935, the Somali National League (SNL) led by Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was established and in 1951 it became a political party.
With its headquarters in Hargeisa the SNL, like other political parties established prior to independence, had the goal of harnessing Somali collective solidarity across clan and regional lines, emphasizing the clan-families’ similar cultural identities. They also appealed to their shared religious background as Muslims in contrast to the colonizing Christian governments. A collective identity based on Islam was also maintained and reinforced by regular contact with the Middle East, as it was customary at the time for Somali men to travel abroad as seamen or for religious learning (Lewis 1960:269). The shared religious background of Somalis as Muslims, irrespective of their clan was used by Sheik Mahammad Abdille Hassan of the Dervish movement against the British, Italian, and Ethiopian colonial governments in the early 1800s, regarded by some scholars as the beginning of Somali nationalism (Lewis 1960:276, see also Samatar 1992).

Similar to developments in the North, in the southern part of Somalia during the eight-year period (1941-1949), following World War II when the BMA took over the administration of Italian Somaliland, 13 young, educated middle class men in Mogadishu founded the Somali Youth Club (SYC). The Club spread to other urban centres and became a political party in 1947 changing its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL), and developed a more ambitious project to unify the Somali people and to dismantle the clan system (Barnes 2007:280-281). There were other active political parties in that period, including the National United Front (NUF) in the British protectorate, which later joined with the SNL, lineage parties as well as regional parties. In the last category, most notable is Hisbia Digil-Mirifle (HDM), later renamed the Independent Constitutional Party. The party represented the Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families. As discussed in chapter 2, these clan-families were genealogically separated from the ‘noble’ Somaale (Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Isaaq) due to their Saab ancestry and considered less pure due
to the integration of Bantu Somalis into their clan-families (Besteman 1999:123). The 
*Saab* were also differentiated linguistically, speaking *Af-maymay*, and their source of 
livelihood was mainly based on agricultural production as opposed to pastoralism, the 
dominant economic activity of the *Somaale* clans. HDM, with its stronghold in the 
southernmost regions of Somalia, was the main opposition to SYL. In 1949, the UN voted 
for the former Italian Somaliland to be placed back under Italian trusteeship with a ten-
year mandate (1950-1960) to prepare for independence. At the time, the two main 
political parties in Italian Somaliland were the SYL and HDM and British Somaliland 
was the SNL and United National Party (UNP) (Lewis 1960:286-287). Yet, the aim of all 
the national parties was to unite all of the Somali territories to form Greater Somalia, 
based on the principle of self-determination; the only differences between the parties was 
how pan-Somalism should be achieved (Lewis 1963, Barnes 2007).

Following independence, Somalia’s government became more involved in African 
and international affairs, while maintaining its Islamic ties (Lewis 1963:159). Following 
the formation of the first civilian government (1959), an organization entitled the 
“Charter of the National Pan-Somali Movement” was founded, which included 
representatives from the SYL, the SNL, the *Union Democratique Somali* from French 
Somaliland, the Ogadeen in Ethiopia, and the Northern Province of Kenya. Their primary 
objective was the unity and independence of all Somali territories by peaceful and legal 
means. The organization also sought to extend its relationships with the African continent 
and with the Islamic world (Lewis 1963: 150). The latter was consolidated when the 
country joined the Arab League in 1974. Throughout Barre’s (1969-1991) presidency, 
national solidarity continued to be promoted and the aim to unite the Somali territories
remained a priority; evidenced in the Ogadeen War (1977-1978) between Somalia and Ethiopia.

Since the beginning of the civil war in the north (1988) and in the south (1991) that resulted in hundreds of thousands of Somalis being forcibly displaced, there has not been a nationalist organization or party for a united Somali nation-state that the majority of Somalis supported. Nonetheless, there has been a shared discourse of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism that extends from and connects past struggles to the present aspirations for the future nation-state, although the ideological and political platforms to achieve this shared goal are diverse. As divisions in Somalia persist across the territorial and social landscape, wherein alliances and divisions continue to change, for Somalis in Minneapolis-Saint Paul the yearning and objective to unite remain alive and are expressed through various means and spaces, including the commemoration of Somalia’s Independence Day.

As argued in chapter 2, the ongoing conflict in Somalia has been prolonged in part through foreign interventions, including those of the US and Ethiopia. During certain historical periods, encountering an external common enemy served to unify Somalis; nonetheless, today, Somalia’s internal dissent makes it harder to unify. In the diaspora, bringing together Somalis is a complex process that is shaped by the diasporic experience itself, including policies and attitudes of the adoptive governments and societies. These points led me to a number of interrelated questions that are explored in this chapter: (1) How is Somalia’s past being invoked in the present for aspirations for the future among Somalis in the US; (2) which past is being invoked and what are the counter-narratives; and (3) how are ideas about the past being transmitted among generations.
I argue that the history of anti-colonial struggles led by youth groups, including the SYL and SNL, are invoked by Somalis in North America in present struggles against foreign intervention and domination; these provide salutary lessons to warn against divisiveness and maintain hope for a united future Somalia. The national “struggle” in the past is emphasized by older generations to show younger generations that the present struggle for a unified nation will be difficult.

In this context, the anti-colonial struggles prior to Somalia’s independence informs the commemoration of Somalia’s Independence Day. This commemoration represents an occasion during which older generations educate younger generations about Somalia’s history and national struggles, while transmitting the older generations’ aspirations for the future to the youth. These aspirations are expressed in the common Somali proverb borrowed for the title of this chapter: “He who knows where he comes from, knows where he is going.” In the context of Somali experiences of displacement and migration, the proverb often addresses the perceived identity crisis of younger generations, and more specifically their lack of knowledge of Somalia’s history, culture, and national struggles. In my interviews and during fieldwork, I found that there is a general fear among older generations of Somalis that younger generations will not learn their history and will assimilate into the adoptive society. In turn, this will result in the abandonment of the project to build a functioning future Somali nation-state. This fear might not be justified, however, since youth are learning about the national struggles and history through the transmission of memories. The transmission of memories can be at both the individual and collective levels and include: storytelling, poetry, songs, proverbs, commemorations, conferences, and events. The youth interpret the messages they receive from older generations in these spaces and negotiate and share their experiences and
knowledge among each other and across generations. In other words, the transmission is never solitary and unidirectional, but is changed and reinterpreted by the youth who participate in shaping such events and their meaning.

**Methods of Research**

I carried out participant-observation of Somalia’s Independence Day commemorations and events between June 26-July 2, 2011 in Minneapolis-Saint Paul. During this time, I attended a conference on June 26 called the “Value of Nationhood,” put together by the Anuur Media Centre. I also attended the soccer tournament that took place during what is known as Somali week as well as took part in and observed the Somali Independence Day commemoration on July 2. I recorded these events using audio and video. Through interviews and informal discussions, I collected poetry, proverbs, and songs that were told in Somali and later translated and transcribed.

In addition to these sources, throughout June 2011, I collected 37 individual recollections of Independence Day. These interviews and focus group sessions were conducted with men and women between the ages of 14 and 80 from all Somali regions. In the interviews I focused on five main themes: (1) personal memories or memories of previous generations’ commemorations of Independence Day, (2) how different generations presently commemorate Independence Day in the US, (3) the transmission of memories of songs and poems about national struggles and independence, (4) knowledge of or stories of the SYL and SNL, and (5) memories or transmission of memories of colonialism. Some of my interlocutors decided to record poetry and songs they

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35 The commemoration for Somalia’s Independence Day was held on July 2, 2011 instead of July 1, which is the day that southern Somalia took independence and the north and south united to form Somali Republic, because the organizers wanted to also commemorate American Independence Day on July 4, the date was chosen because it was in the middle of the two.
remembered from the historical periods surrounding independence, and in general my interlocutors wove collective “official” histories with their personal memories. The interviews were conducted with men and women of three different generations including: (1) elders, between 60-80 years old, who were young children and youth at the time of independence, (2) men and women between 31-59 years old, whose parents fought for independence and who were born during and after the period of independence, and (3) youth, between 14-30 years old and whose grandparents fought for independence. Major historical ruptures are often used as markers distinguishing different generations and can also be used to distinguish these generations: (1) independence in 1960, (2) Siyad Barre’s military coup in 1969, and (3) the current armed conflict beginning in the north in 1988 and in the south in 1991. These historical ruptures provide an anchor upon which life histories are narrated and almost invariably they link the historical events to the present conflict.

**Popular Memory and Commemorations of the Anti-Colonial National Struggles Leading to Somalia’s Independence**

The commemoration of Somalia’s Independence Day on July 2, 2011 in the US promoted national aims and interests of unity, while being critical of divisions. According to Ross Poole (2008:162), commemoration exposes political agendas and interests, which are woven into public events. Importantly, they call attention to struggles within as well as between classes and, in the case of the Somali commemorations, between competing solidarities each claiming the status of nation. More specifically, the conflict between the aspiration for a unified Somali nation, which incorporates Somaliland within it, and the competing narrative that proposes Somaliland as a distinctive nation deserving of sovereignty. In addition, another level of collective solidarity invoked by Islamic groups
is supranational (Islamic *umma*), and there are subnational solidarities (Dir, Darood, Hawiye, Isaaq, Rahanweyn, Digil) (see also Sider and Smith 1997).

According to John R. Gillis (1994), commemoration is mainly concerned with constructing national and other collective identities. The mobilization of memories, in public events such as Independence Day, promotes a shared past and by implication aims at reinforcing collective solidarity in the present. Nonetheless, homogenization attempts often cause conflict among competing identities. As Rebecca Graff-McRae (2010:9-14) argues, conflict is inherent in the dynamics of commemoration because they are political and are based on oppositions, such as unity–division, freedom–restraint, us–them, and past–present. Rebecca Graff-McRae (2010:9) suggests that commemoration is one of the ways memories act as political forces. Commemoration is under constant negotiation since there are always relations between silenced and hegemonic memories. The aforementioned conceptual propositions on commemorations provide a useful framework to situate Somalia’s Independence Day commemorations in Minneapolis-Saint Paul, where the Somali history of struggle for national unity, and the forces that challenge this project are expressed implicitly and explicitly. There are two components in national movements seeking political independence where the dynamic interplay between unity and division are salient: (1) territory, which delineates a sovereign state from another state and (2) the nation, imagined as sharing features that distinguish it from others and uniting a population despite their differences (Gupta 1997), explored in more detail later.

To complement the public representations of Somali history, I examine private memory, meaning if and how individual Somalis relate to this public version. The PMG (1982) argues that popular memory and hegemonic versions of the past are not mutually
exclusive, neither are the makings of public and private memories. Popular memory and individual accounts of the past draw on hegemonic versions, which have dominance in the public domain (Thomson 1994, Ugolini 2004), and similarly hegemonic accounts are shaped by popular memory. Therefore, my study examines private memory in conjunction with public and hegemonic accounts such as those propounded during Independence Day commemoration events.

In this work, I use Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony,” which can be described as a set of practices and expectations, meanings and values lived by and seen as a reality to the majority of the people in a given society. Elite classes maintain hegemony through the dominance and subordination of particular classes and maintain power through both coercion and consent (Crehan 2002, Williams 1977). Nonetheless, lived hegemony is never singular and is always a process that needs to be viewed in relation with alternatives and oppositions to its dominance (Williams 1977:112-113). The notion of popular memory is more complex in the Somali case because both Somali communities’ “hegemonic” and public versions as well as their private memories are silenced in the context of the wider adoptive societies in North America. As a result, the unified Somali nationalist discourse and representations in the public field, such as the case of the independence commemoration should be examined not only in relation to counter-narratives among the Somali diaspora, but also in relation to North American representations and beliefs about the divisions in Somali politics and society. As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, in North America Somalis are represented as both premodern and antimodern positing Somalis as barbaric without a history, which acts to silence their histories in the US. As such, this commemoration is also used to show Americans that Somalis are a nation and people with a culture and a past and importantly
a group that has a political identity, manifested in commemorating political independence from European colonial powers. Raho, one of the main organizers of the commemoration, summarized this point when she stated: “We want to share our rich culture to this nation (United States), to let them know us” (Raho, July 2, 2011).

A second important point raised by the PMG (1982) in their examination of the notion of “popular memory” is that the past, present, and future are interrelated processes. Often, marginalized individuals or groups invoke the past to draw lessons for the future or, as Ted Swedenburg (1991) had noted, as a “warning” for the present and future struggles. As a result, the present shapes the past and vice versa. This was evident during Independence Day commemorations, when selected events were highlighted to underscore unity, at a time and under conditions of dispersal and disunity in Somalia and in the diaspora.

A third aspect elaborated in the theoretical underpinnings of popular memory is the inseparable relation between history and politics (Gillis 1994, PMG 1982). The role of youth in national struggles both in the past and present must be situated within particular historical, social, and political contexts. Ted Swedenburg (1991) highlighted the importance of context on Palestinian popular memory. Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci, Frantz Fanon and other post-colonial theoreticians, Swedenburg (1991) argues that in 20th century national liberation movements, a history that emphasizes unity was necessary to counter colonial attempts to eradicate or distort the native past. Writing on the Palestinian national struggle, the author concludes that for Palestinians a history that teaches them to remember their past as a unified people is important to warn them against the dangers of fragmentation (Swedenburg 1991:166, see also Farah 2006:241). In the commemoration of Somalia’s Independence Day, the historical role of the youth in anti-
colonial struggles that were based in national unity and led to independence is presented so that Somali children and youth may learn from the past, and use it for the current struggle for Somali unity. Thus, the transmission of this history addresses children and youth who are expected to carry on the responsibility of the struggle and to build the future Somalia.

As mentioned earlier in this work, third world nationalisms were a response to colonialism and the basis of anti-colonial resistances; however, they cannot be assumed to be monolithic. Anti-colonial resistances did not simply replace colonial administrations as there was much more complexity to the relations between states and nations that challenge ideas of identity, showing that identities transform and are influenced by colonialism and imperialism (Said 1993:xxiv). In Somali memories of anti-colonial resistances and independence, we see evidence of how Somali nationalism was a response to the policies and effects of colonialism, most notably the demarcation of borders that divided Somali territories. Evident from the narratives presented below, these memories of anti-colonial resistances inform Somali present anti-imperialist struggles. These present day struggles draw from this historical moment in a response to the current threat to Somalia’s territorial sovereignty.

As discussed throughout this work, colonialism distorted and demeaned the pre-colonial history of colonized peoples (Fanon 1961:149), thus constructing African peoples as backward and barbaric without a history or a culture (Fanon 1961, Lazarus 1993, Mamdani 1996). Frantz Fanon (1961) assumed that nothing from pre-colonial culture in Africa survived colonialism; however, research has shown that throughout Africa pre-colonial culture, traditions, customs, and ideologies survived meaningfully and that colonized people had agency albeit under extreme structural restraints (Lazarus
Furthermore, colonized people were heterogeneous, as there were always ‘native’ groups that were given more status by colonial administrations; however, one group could be dominant in some areas, while being dominated in other areas (Spivak 1988:26). For instance, in chapter 2, I showed how in the Somali case ‘noble’ clan-families, such as the Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Isaaq, were given more status than the Rahanweyn and Digil clan-families, claiming racial difference with the former promoting their Arab ancestry as opposed to the latter’s Bantu ancestry. In any analysis of the effects of colonialism, it is important to take account of the heterogeneity in colonized societies, as well as the processes and linkages of agency and constraints under colonialism.

Since World War II, many North American and European scholars who have focused on nationalism have naturalized European and US nationalisms, while condemning ‘new’ nationalisms that are largely anti-imperialist (Lazarus 1993: 69). Partha Chatterjee (2010[1991]: 23-24) documents the genealogy of Western conceptions of nationalism suggesting that in the 1950s and 1960s nationalism continued to be regarded as a feature of anti-colonial struggles. Nevertheless, as post-colonial states were entering into a new phase of domination under the auspices of ‘development’ and ‘modernization,’ nationalism was being transferred into the histories of certain colonial empires. At the same time, the idea that nationalism was a form of liberation was undermined by stories of secret deals, manipulations, and the corruption of leaders of nationalist groups. In the 1970s, nationalism was represented as being part of ethnic politics and was used to explain civil war in the third world and increasingly acts of terrorism (Chatterjee 2010[1991]:24). Here, we see parallels to the Western narratives used to explain Somalia’s prolonged armed conflict that I presented in chapter 2. In fact,
Eric Hobsbawm (1990) argues that political nationalism is becoming less important. In his view, the older political nationalisms have been superseded by more recent ethno-linguistic nationalisms as reactions to global changes. Yet, there continue to be anti-imperial resistances based in nationalism (Said 1990:11), such as the cases of Palestinians and the people of Western Sahara. A similar process is happening among Somalis in the diaspora, who despite the divisions and fragmentations on the ground support various forms of Somali nationalism with the “hegemonic” version promoting pan-Somali nationalism that cuts across clan lines and promotes a unified Somali territory and society that includes Somaliland.

**How Somalia’s Past is Being Invoked in the Present for the Future**

Elders’ remembrances highlight the turning point of modern Somali nationalism that sought to unify Somali regions and clan-families under a central government. While providing an account of their individual trajectories, the elders drew on the hegemonic or collectively shared ‘official’ history to describe the events surrounding independence. Independence Day commemorations are a crystallization of memories of struggle, national unity, and hope for a future Somali nation-state. These are represented in this public space through symbols of the nation, such as the flag, the singing of the national anthem, and national commemorations of independence.

In the interviews, elders remembered the day of independence through personal stories, songs, poems, and proverbs that symbolized Somali nationalism with a sense of pride and happiness. Many of the elders explained the causes for partitioning Somalia into five parts to explain the meaning of the star on the flag. As you will note many of these explanations draw on public accounts of the history:
Somalia was divided into five different parts... The Somali flag has five points on the star to represent the five regions of Somalia that were colonized: the north by the British, the southern part which starts from Boosaaso to Kisamayo was colonized by Italians, and also NFD was colonized by the British and then later given to Kenya, Djibouti was colonized by the French and later claimed to be a government in 1977, most importantly the Ethiopia-Ogaden in western Somalia was colonized by Ethiopia and that was in 1884 (Abaskuul June 24, 2011).

Elder women in general did not want to talk about their memories. One woman provided an account of Somali history separated from her own personal memories and prefaced her story by stating that she did not know about these events because she was not educated.

Nonetheless, she referred to the first colonial resistance of the Dervish in northern Somalia and the poet Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan (b. 1856, d. 1920), interweaving the anti-colonial struggles in the early 19th century with those in the 20th century:

Those who were scholarly know of that time in 1960. We were nomadic and never went to school and after independence we didn’t go to school. We learned in our history that Italians colonized (southern part of Somalia) and the British colonized the North... There were some songs, but I cannot put the words together. The poet Mahammad Abdille Hasan (leader of the Dervish) was a Somali poet. He was Shakespeare and George Washington combined... He fought Ethiopian and British colonizers until he died in 1920. The Somali flag, each point represents north, south, southwest in Ogaden, southwest NFD, and Djibouti. In 1960 we were expecting Djibouti to join but in 1977, 17 years after independence Djibouti decided to claim their (independent) government. The remaining regions are NFD and Ogadeen. We have 2 out of the 5 regions, yet we have 5 points (Zeinab June 19, 2011).

When I asked other elder women about their memories, they stated, “I don’t recall anything about 1960.” Elder women’s silences may be due to the belief that their personal memories will not be significant to research on Somali history. In fact, many elder Somalis suggested that I read ‘official’ versions of the past in books or talk with scholars.

Another reason for the silences may be because women were often not seen as part of political life in Somalia (Gardner and Warsame 2004). In addition, women’s insights
were rarely included in ‘official’ accounts of history (although they may be represented) even though many women took part in anti-colonial struggles, discussed below.

Another elder, who I met in an apartment common area where a group of Somali men were playing cards in downtown Minneapolis, discussed his pride when he saw Somali institutions, and the opportunities that independence gave to him:

When the Somali got independence I was a nomad and had my own camel. A year later I heard that the country had gotten independence and I moved from the nomadic life into the city, from country to city. I was 18 years old at that time. I was so happy when I saw the flag, Somali people, Somali government, Somali infrastructure, I was so happy to see this. Then I started to go to school…I was working part of the time and going to school at the same time, this is how I got educated. Thanks God I have three different degrees and I am happy with that (Warfa June 19, 2011).

Many of the elders recited the national anthem, which speaks to the flag and the unification of the Somali people.

“Soomaaliyey toosoo Toosoo isku tiirsada ee Hadba kiinna taagdaranee Taageera weligiine
Calanyahow tilmaan wacan buu Midabkaagu taam ku yahoo Xiddigtii na tiirineysaa Dhexda
kaaga sii taallee Soomaaliyey toosoo Toosoo isku tiirsada ee Hadba kiinna taagdaranee Taageera weligiine
Waxa aan la ooyaysoo Ilmadu iiga qubanaysaa Ikhtiyaar nin loo diidoo La addoonsadaan ahayee Soomaaliyey toosoo Toosoo isku tiirsada ee Hadba kiinna taagdaranee Taageera weligiine”
(Waxaa tiriyeey Cali Mire Cawaale)

Translated into English the national anthem reads:

Somalis, arise
Arise and support one another
To the weak ones among you
Always give your support
Flag you have beautiful description
With your distinct color
And the Star that counts (our parts)
Located in your center
Somalis, arise
Arise and support one another
To the weak ones among you
Always give your support  
The reason I am crying  
With tears flowing down my cheeks  
Because I am a person denied independence  
And held in bondage (by colonialism)  
Somalis, arise  
Arise and support one another to the weak ones among you  
Always give your support  
(By Ali Mire Awale)

The national anthem was also sung by the youth on the main stage at the Independence Day commemoration, engaging the large crowd who sang along with great enthusiasm and the majority waving the blue flag with the five-point star.

Other elders used the flag as a symbol of nationalism. On June 30, 1960 Somalis gathered at parliament in Mogadishu as well as in other main cities and towns throughout Somalia to witness at midnight the lowering of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Italian or British, and United Nations flags and the raising of Somalia’s flag. Many elders recited a poem about removing these three flags and replacing them with the Somali flag:

“Sareeyow ma nusquaamoaw aan siduu yahay eegee kana siib kanna saar” [I want to see how it looks, remove it and take it away in order to show me the difference].

Ali, an elder Somali man I met in a café in a Somali mall heard another elder recite the poem and replied, “You just reminded me, I was in Galkeyo at the time and I remember the song. The Italian flag went down and they put up the Somali flag, the song. They removed the Italian flag; let me see how it looks like. They removed the Italian flag and replaced it with the Somali one” (Ali June 24, 2011). Abdikarim wove personal memories and ‘official’ accounts of history with the poem:

I was a youth at independence and I was attending school, I was about 19 (years old) … We were waiting for ten years for the UN to say this is Independence Day… The Italians were in charge transitionally, but… in 1960 the Italians had to
turn over the power to us…We were so happy. It was the first time we have ever seen the Italian flag go down and in the meantime the Somali flag going up…All of the Somali people participated: the military, the students, the people, you name it everyone celebrated independence. [I was in] the East, Boosaaso and before 1960 it was called Majerteen area (Abdikarim June 19, 2011).

Along with the poem, elders including Abdulkadir spoke at length about their experiences seeing the flag for the first time:

I was present midnight July 1, 1960 at Parliament Square. There were three flags at the top of parliament. The…Italian flag, United Nations flag, and Somali (TFG) flag. The new Somali national army was created three months before independence of 1960. Maybe one battalion came at that time to release three flags and host the Somali national flag at the top of parliament building. It was the first thing you saw [when you looked at the] building…For two or three days everyone was celebrating because it was the joining, the creation of the Somali Republic at that time, Italian Somaliland, and British Somaliland and so they became one nation. I remember that for that time…[There were] three days of celebration, different you know traditional folklore dancing, we slaughtered so many animals…everybody was happy, everybody was very excited (Abdulkadir June 24 2011).

Said had happiness in his eyes and pride in his voice when he told me he was one of the men who raised the flag for the first time, “I was one of those who were lucky to put up the flag in Mogadishu. At the time I was in the military and ever since then I was the one who was leading the flag. Thanks to God” (Said June 19, 2011). Abdirashid laughed as he remembered going to the city to see the flag, “I was a nomad and had camels. I heard after one year we got independence. I went to the city; I was 18 years old at the time, to see the flag. When I got there I climbed up the pole to touch the flag” (Abdirashid June 19, 2011).

The celebration following Independence Day was represented by all of the men and women I interviewed as a time of happiness and unity. Elders told these stories with smiles and joy in their eyes, and used gestures and intonation in their voices to transmit
the excitement of those days. Daahir laughed and smiled as he described his experience coming to Beledweyne from the Somali region of Ethiopia where he lived:

We were young at the time, the people I was with we lived in the Somali part of Ethiopia at the time. Once we heard the news we ran as quickly as we could just to reach Beledweyne, which was in Somalia, just for the celebration and it was 400 km. We were running for one day and a night, almost 24 hours we were running just to be part of the celebration. And we came in 12 midnight on the night of independence in Beledweyne (Daahir June 24, 2011).

I was told by some of the men that many Somalis who were living in Ethiopia at the time of independence made the trip to Beledweyne, the closest town to the border, for the celebration. Caamir, an elder man who was a child at this time remembers understanding the importance of the day:

I am 62 years, born in 1950, so about 10 years at the time of independence, in the Northern region. I was in elementary school when we had Independence Day. At that time we were not really sure what independence is, but the people are feeling the excitement and celebrating. When we got independence the people were so happy, I remember, really. In fact, they were dancing, celebrating, slaughtering goats, and families got together. I remember that time, but we were youth…I remember, they were dancing, they were really getting together singing songs…In fact, we were recognizing it because we were students, even though we were in elementary school, but really we were feeling the importance of that day, how the people are feeling, how they are getting together, the dances, the songs, the poems (Caamir June 30, 2011).

Jimcaale, another man who was in Bossaso in the north, describes the celebrations,

“When we took independence we didn’t sleep all night long, we danced and sang with the poets all night long until morning. As we were in this small town, we gathered together, had a festival” (Jimcaale June 19, 2011). Ibrahim remembers seeing the President and the clothing worn by the children:

I think I was 15 years old, going to school in Mogadishu [at independence]. The night before independence on June 30, 1960 there was the celebration to raise the flag and I saw the President. There were a lot of people in the square, in Freedom Square, it was at parliament, and you know, in front, the people gathered and celebrated the flag … Nobody went to sleep that night, we did not go to school the next morning. I don’t know how many days the celebration lasted. The
environment was very nice and joyous. Children especially dressed up, wore blue
dresses like the flag color with one star in the middle (Ibrahim June 26 2011).

Here, we see that the clothes remembered by Ibrahim resemble those that are worn by
youth today at the commemoration in Minneapolis, showing the links between the past
independence commemoration in Somalia and the present one in the US.

The central region is inhabited in part by the Dulbahante sub-clan of the Darood
clan-family (those who largely made up the Dervish resistance army in the 19th century)
who are known as horsemen. The elders originally from this region remember how as
children they knew Independence Day was an important day because the horses were
taken out:

I was in the central part of Somalia in the Muduq region (a region in central Somalia); I was at the time in that place. Whenever there is a traditional celebration, there were many horses in the region. For celebrations, when the horses came out in high number it is the highest honor you can give to anybody [and they were brought out during those days] (Baashi June 24, 2011).

Cabdalle remembers that on that day he was running with his father and a horse:

I was in my hometown, which is Garoowe, the capital of Puntland. There were three flags at that time. I was in primary school, I remember three flags, one for UN, and Italian, and the transitional government ‘cause we have been building constitutions and then the day, Independence Day, we take all of these flags down and we take the flag for Somalia with the star. It was very great and I was running with my father with the horse and celebrating. That is what I remember. Everybody was happy (Cabdalle June 19, 2011).

Happiness filled the eyes and voices of elders when they told these stories, remembering
their lives in Somalia is undoubtedly affected by their current situations of living in exile
and the continuing war in their home country. During my interviews and fieldwork, there
was always the hope of peace and eventual return among Somalis of all generations.

Elders had a sense of pride in sharing how they had once been unified as a nation with a
functioning state, a point that was emphasized throughout the interviews. Elders, in the
interviews, were also in dialogue with the hegemonic discourses and representations of Somalis and Somalia in North America emphasizing their history of unity and statehood. When elders spoke of the divisions and fragmentations in Somalia today, they were always put into direct contrast to the day of independence.

National symbols that were highlighted in elders’ memories of independence were also present at the Independence Day commemoration. The commemoration, both in the past in Somalia and in the present in the US, is a way for youth to engage with the struggle. For instance, during the commemoration, national symbols, such as the camel were present to teach children about Somalia’s history. One of the organizers commented on the reason the camel was part of the commemoration: “The camel is our transportation, our survival, it is our asset. That is our treasure and that is why we brought it here. The younger generation has no idea why we brought the camel here and they are going to raise that question…” (Raho July 2, 2011). The camel is a symbol of pastoralism and not agricultural life, suggesting that the nation is imagined as that of the pastoralists and not the agriculturalists.

Sadiq, the master of ceremonies of the Independence Day commemoration sat across from me at a table in a community centre in Minneapolis and discussed how his father transmitted memories to him and took him to the national stadium in Somalia as a child to celebrate Independence Day:

My father told me a lot about the struggle, how when the country gained independence they were hopeful, a new country, a new beginning and they were very excited…I mean people were going out, even me when I was younger my father took me to the national stadium and we watched the soldiers’ parade so people were feeling a sense of patriotism, love of the country (Sadiq June 30, 2011).
Independence Day commemorations allow a space for dialogue evident in the different perspectives and emotions of youth. Aniso, who was born in Somalia, but fled the country with her family when she was 5 years old, got emotional seeing the Independence Day celebrations in Minneapolis for the first time:

[Independence] means a lot to me because we are not home and at the same time it gives me that [feeling]. Today, I am kind of emotional because people are very happy and people are very outgoing, at the same time we are not home and we are celebrating Independence Day. Even though our home country is wrecked and there is no peace, it kind of has for me an emotional effect on me…I am happy to be here and see people happy and everybody enjoying the day (Aniso July 2, 2011).

There were some youth who just came out to celebrate Independence Day and have fun with friends. In interviews and throughout the week of events, it became evident that the commemoration served as an occasion to foster relations among youth bringing them together despite their clan-families and class differences to celebrate, discussed more later.

Somali Youth League and the Anti-Colonial Struggle Before Independence

The version of history that was invoked in the private and public memories of Independence Day drew from particular time periods and historical moments. Older generations of Somalis selected the memories of the period of the anti-colonial struggle before independence. Differing from the elders who focused on the day of independence, the second generation, who are 31-59 years old and whose parents fought for independence, focused their narratives on the historical period that holds the ideals of the SYL struggle that had not yet materialized to the periods after independence and the unification of the north and south. By selecting memories of struggle as opposed to the period that followed independence, at some level, provides a space to emphasize the anti-imperial resistance and the struggle for unity. At the same time, the selection of these
memories also avoids praising the post-colonial state and its failings. Anwar, a young
man with a family who has a leadership role in a dugsi, sees the Independence Day
commemoration as a unifying and mobilizing tool to create change in the present among
Somalis:

I think it is very important for us to teach people about Independence Day and
what Somali was before the Independence Day, how they came through and what
happened after that…I think the Somalis are very emotional people and when they
realize that or just talking about that, and listen to the songs recorded back then,
everybody would be like, “What happened to us?” And if that’s materialized, it
starts some sort of momentum from that, “what happened to us,” we need people
to be inspired, we need people to have the talent to relate to people, for them to go
out there and speak about things. Some people have the talent to educate and to
just ask people to come together, forget about what happened, and let us talk
about Independence Day and talk about people that inspired it, very inspiring
stories. I think people would just [snaps his fingers], they would just pledge their
hearts and time and money to just get Somalia back to what it was (Anwar June
25, 2011).

Abdullahi Isse, one of the leaders of SYL, is considered a national hero and a
symbol of unity. Four different men emphasized the struggle of anti-colonial leaders and
recounted what they regarded as the legendary story about Abdullahi Isse who went to the
United Nations to seek independence. Here, Said tells me the legend in detail and with
great enthusiasm:

Abdullahi Isse he was the head of SYL, so he went to the United Nations in order
to defend the SYL position for Somalis to get independence…At the time, Italians
had ‘pro-Italians’ (Somalis who had status within the Italian administration), so
Somalis were scared they may [send someone to kill Isse], so the message would
not go to the United Nations, so they made another Somali, his name was Morie.
They injected Morie with poison. Morie is a person who sacrificed his own life,
so the message (for independence) could get to the United Nations. They injected
him with poison, so they intended [Abdullahi Isse] to die and to not take the
message to the UN, so this guy sacrificed his life and said, “I am Abdullahi Isse”
and instead Abdullahi Isse went to the UN, so they thought they killed him and
luckily Morie did not die on the spot, he also survived and he made history. When
Abdullahi Isse went to the United Nations the (authorities) decided to bribe him
and said we will give you gold worth 180 pounds, so you can stop looking for
Somali independence and let us solve the problem in another way. He
refused…He declined to betray his nation. He was the leader. Then at that time,
the United Nations has accepted [that we will get independence] (Said June 19, 2011).

Similar to other experiences of colonization there were elite groups that benefited from colonialism; although they were still dominated by European administrations in certain areas of their lives (Lazarus 1993, Spivak 1988, Mamdani 1996). Similarly, in Somalia there were elites who were considered to be “pro-Italian.”

Other groups that were represented as against SYL in the stories told to me in the week leading up to Independence Day were most notably the HDM. Nonetheless, what were silenced in these stories were the bases for HDM political positions. HDM, the Digil and Rahanweyn political party, suggested that the SYL discriminated against their clan-families in appointing people in government service. HDM, prior to independence, was campaigning for a separate Digil-Mirifle state, even seeking to transfer the Digil and Rahanweyn regions to Kenya under British control. This was in direct contrast to the SYL national goals that sought to amalgamate all of the Somali territories (Lewis 1961:291-292). In the legend of Abduallahi Isse, told by Said above, the Somali elite groups as well as HDM were often both referred to as “pro-Italians” because they were viewed as opposed to the SYL. Yet, the HDM was not an elite group during colonialism and sought its own independence. Silenced from all of the narratives was the increasing fear among Digil and Rahanweyn clan-families of the marginalization they experienced at the hands of ‘noble’ Somali clans in the past and would experience in a Somali state (Besteman 1999, Lewis 1961). Furthermore, the divisions and alliances that were present prior to independence were minimized for the purposes of highlighting Somali national unity.
When narratives did speak to the divisions prior to independence, however, they were used to emphasize the awakening of the Somali people to see that they can be free from the colonizers. Saad explains the awakening of the Somali people to resist:

Somali independence did not just come, it came with a lot of sacrifice, hard work and dedication by the Somali youth. The Somalis say, “All the wars are gone, all the troubles are gone, and man whom was left upon him should have not have slept in the first place, Somali united, Somali united.” It means free at last, free at last (Saad June 19, 2011).

Interestingly, we will see later that the youth in the US today refer to the contemporary anti-imperial resistances as an “awakening” or being “woken up.” Even though there was armed struggle during the anti-colonial resistances and some elders talked about the violence, many more emphasized that the struggle was peaceful. Tahliil stressed the peaceful nature of the struggle: “The SYL are the reason Somalia got independence. They did it without bullets, but with unity and brains, they still got independence. It was a happy time” (Tahliil June 19, 2011).

Stories, such as the legendary tale of Abdullahi Isse going to the UN are told to demonstrate that it is difficult to overcome colonizers as well as to show that there are divisions among the people that need to be overcome by collective, in this case meaning national solidarities. The group that put together the independence commemoration in the diaspora views anti-colonial resistance leaders as heroes. Abdullahi Isse of the SYL is seen as an ideal, to emulate in the present for the future.

Women in the National Resistance Movement

Even though national leadership positions were occupied by men, research shows that women played active roles in anti-colonial struggles (Chadya 2003, Chatterjee 2010[1989], Legg 2003), labeled by Mayer (2000:2) as the “gender ironies of
nationalism.” Some feminist scholars suggest that the national leadership supported women’s causes as a tactic to include as many people as possible in the national struggle (Chadya 2003:153), while others argue that anti-colonial nationalisms that focused on tradition resubjugated women in the third world to a new patriarchy (Chatterjee 2010[1989]: 127); finally, others emphasize the agency of women to highlight the ways they contributed to anti-colonial resistances (Legg 2003:7). To this end, scholars have either considered women as representations of the nation, especially as holders and transmitters of its ‘traditions,’ or participants in nationalist movements (Legg 2003:10). In this chapter, I examine how women were represented and acted as participants in the Somali anti-colonial struggle prior to independence. The role of women in supporting independence and fostering unity was a common theme in the narratives. Iskn, an 80-year-old man playing cards in the common room in downtown Minneapolis, tells a story of the extent of support for the SYL and the contribution of women in the national struggle:

When women sell milk in the market and get 1-shilling they contributed it to the SYL, which is how we got independence. Those women who are nomadic, their small money they got from the camel, they supported SYL to get independence. Whenever SYL came together, women and youth would come to dance for SYL because they meant liberation (Iskn June 19, 2011).

Prime Minister Abdirsaq Hajji Hussein also discussed the past roles and strengths of women in his speech at the Value of Nationhood conference, attended by Somali intellectuals, religious leaders as well as Somali men and women of different generations, in Minneapolis on June 26th, 2011. He emphasized the need to support women in the present for the future nation and state. This also says something about the changing views on women and gender roles in the context of conflict and the diaspora, the Prime Minister noted:
In the village and remote areas, the women used to do all the work, she was expected to do everything including having children. When people are moving as nomads during the war, they used to even do all of the work during the night. One lady, she gave birth while on the journey, and she is the one who did all the work at the same time, putting things together and moving (Somali women who were pastoralists were in charge of setting up and dismantling *aqals* or uterine homes when traveling with the herds). She carried the baby on her back and she also led the goats. Imagine doing all that with being in that kind of situation. Our mothers are the reason why we exist today. They have done so much that no other can do. Our women are very strong and have led us through everything…Especially girls, nowadays, they are the candidates and are doing great job and can be both boy and girl. Especially girls, nowadays, they are number one (Abirsaq, June 26, 2011).

Fadumo Jibrill, who was a young girl at the time of independence, a professor at Somali National University prior to the civil war, and who later formed an NGO in Somalia tells her own memories of SYL and the importance of women and girls in their resistance during her presentation to the audience at the Value of Nationhood conference (2011):

I remember going with my mother, aunts and other female relatives every Thursday and we used to listen to the songs and Arabic Islamic songs [at SYL meetings] and we used to take part it in. My family supported the SYL party. The political parties that were located in that region, the donation they got and the fundraising all came from women. Women were the backbone of these parties. Usually the women were the ones that used to go and listen to the people [speak at the meetings] every week…If we move to the south, Hawa Tako, may her soul rest in peace, she did a lot of work for our independence and most of her supporters were women…Today, the Somali family is carried on the back (figurative) by Somali women. They are the ones doing everything for the success of the family…Back in Somalia, NGOs make the country work and the women are the largest number involved in these NGOs… The resources in Somalia, 80 percent of that is given to the men and the women benefit only 20 percent…Today I am urging you and I want you to make a promise that you will allow our daughters to be part in the development of our country and allow them to be successful. If we empower women it will definitely have a positive impact on the country’s political system …our daughters need not to be part in tribalism36, if this happens their future is at risk, their marriages are at risk, you are poisoning them (Fadumo June 26, 2011).

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36 Many Somalis I spoke with used “tribe” interchangeably with “clan” in their narratives; however, this may be a result of colonial administrations imposing tribe onto Somali society where one never before existed, see chapter 2 for more detail.
Fadumo mentions Hawa Tako in her speech, a woman who participated in the armed resistance against the Italians. During an SYL parade in Mogadishu in 1948, she was killed and later proclaimed a martyr, becoming a symbol of pan-Somalism (personal communication with Abdulrahman, July 2, 2011). Here, Fadumo as with the Prime Minister, links the past achievements of women in the anti-colonial struggle to the present showing their crucial roles and the need to involve women in Somalia and in the diaspora in the present development of Somalia. These speakers are pointing to the “gender ironies of nationalism” (Mayer 2000) evidenced by the fact that women in Somali society and politics had crucial roles in the movement, but were not placed in positions of power within the government. Women’s recollections expose the contradiction inherent in the nationalist struggles that “sought to mobilize women in the resistance without changing gender norms” (Sayigh 2002 in Farah 2007).

In my fieldwork, a number of older generations commented on the changing roles of women and girls in Somali society as a result of the war and displacement. For instance, I met and interviewed one woman who had eight sons and said she was still looking forward to having a daughter because girls are the ones who take care of the family. Research shows that Somali women have increased economic importance both in Somalia and in the diaspora (Gardner 2004). In the diaspora, they are often the main financial providers for their families and there is a perception that girls were more likely to contribute money to relatives in Somalia or in other countries, although in my research I did not find this to be the case. Even though the economic contributions of women to the family have been recognized, whether their roles and status are shifting in Somali society is not yet known (Gardner 2004). The public presentations such as the ones noted above, however, signal that there is a growing recognition that women need to be
included in new forms of struggle as well as in political institutions. In fact, this point was made at many of the conferences I attended that included Somali intellectuals, with many women suggesting that they need to be involved in higher levels of government.

For young Somali women, there was a sense of pride if women in their family were involved in the past anti-colonial resistance movement. I met Sanaa at the soccer tournament that was held in Saint Paul during Somali week. Sanaa was born in Somalia, but grew up in Europe and the US. With pride she told me her familial memories of independence and the involvement of her grandmother in the SYL:

My grandmother used to tell me vivid stories, especially in the south where the Italians were colonizing, how Somalis from different regions came together and put aside their cultural differences from I guess where they live in Somalia. And my grandmother, she was part of the movement, she was part of the Somali Youth League and so that made me very proud, that she was a part of it and she was a woman too. I was very proud. My grandmother she had a picture of herself, a black and white picture, where she was wearing an afro and it was a group of them taking a picture and they were wearing the Somali traditional clothing and she told me this picture was taken right before they had a meeting and back then it was called the Somali Youth Club because they didn’t want to provoke any issues and she was part of that movement so that was really awesome…My grandmother used to say whoever was someone that cared about Somalia should have been involved at the time. The problem was that a lot of people did not have the educational background so a lot of the youth who got involved, the Italian government sort of educated them and so they knew how to write and read in Italian, or English if it was in the north. So it was never a question of why she should be involved, but why shouldn’t I be involved, it was like her duty to be involved (Sanaa June 25, 2011).

Overall, I found that both men and women were eager to talk about independence and especially the elders, who spoke about it with enthusiasm and pride. More men than women wove their private life accounts with Somalia’s history. Although a number of women discussed Somali history, some women suggested that “scholars know about such things,” in reference to public or academic histories, and that they did not. In addition, some women were more cautious in telling me about their lives, while others were keen
to share their personal accounts. The themes within the memories were of unity and peace. The second generation, children of those who participated in the struggle for independence, had recollections that were imbued with feelings of sadness and loss. The remembrances of independence made them think about their lives before the war, evident in their stories of swimming in the sea with friends and visiting with relatives. As a result, similar to the elders’ generation, independence represents a time of peace and unity and provides hope that it may be achieved again. At the June 26, \( \text{th} \) 2011 conference on the Value of Nationhood, elders were invited to give accounts of their recollections and share their experiences; in contrast, during the Independence Day commemoration they were not invited to tell their stories.

**Discourses of Unity and Divisions in Somali Politics and Society**

Seeking political independence based on territorial sovereignty and national unity or consensus have been difficult to attain by past leaders in Somalia and remain a challenge in the present. Historically, the Somali territory was partitioned among colonial powers, and the legacy of the breakup of the territory persists to this day. Although Somaliland secession is regarded as ‘voluntary,’ the basis for it has roots in colonialism. In the struggle to unite two of the five Somali regions (the focus for present unity is of Northwest Somalia or Somaliland and the Federal Republic of Somalia), Somalis seeking unity conjure the memory of the anti-colonial struggle and independence, especially throughout Independence Day commemorations and events. National aspirations persist in the national imagination and are part of a pan-Somali nationalist discourse that circulates and interweaves with other discourses and collective forms of solidarity. For instance, the present Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute over Ogadeen is an example of the legacy of colonial empires and continues to be an area of contention.
The second important challenge to national unity pertains to how to integrate clans within the nation. National leaders often view clan affiliation as divisive. For instance, the first Somali freedom fighter Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan (born 1856 and died 1920) sought to create a Muslim brotherhood that transcended clan affiliations. Later, the SYL and the SNL both sought to create a Somali national identification that superseded the clan-family for the purposes of unity under one Somali national identity. On its part, the Siyad Barre regime treated the discontent and resistance by clans with disdain and repression, and as major obstacles to nation building.

Challenges to unity have intensified throughout the 21 years of war in Somalia, transforming subnational and national identities. As such, counter-discourses to pan-Somali national identity are continuously challenged; most notable is the case of Somaliland. In May 1991, as the civil war spread in the south of Somalia, the Somali National Movement (SNM) held the Borama conference, a conference of clans, attended by clan elders in the northwest (Gardner and El Bushra 2004, Lewis 2008). The elders built upon the SNM political party program (presented in chapter 2) to produce a peace charter. They also constructed a national charter that served as a temporary constitution for two years under the leadership of Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal (former Prime Minister of Somalia) whose government would draft a formal constitution that would be put to a national referendum. They created a government that combined Western forms of government with Somalia’s political realities composed of a non-elected upper house of traditional elders (the gurti) and an elected house of representatives. On May 18, 1991 Somaliland was declared a separate national state (Lewis 2008:94). Throughout the last 21 years, Somaliland has ended conflict within its borders through political settlement and peace processes (1992, 1993/1994), reestablished the Berbera port as a source of...
national revenue, and instituted a militia demobilization program. In addition, leaders restored the basic structure of government with civil servants working regular hours, the creation of the Planning Ministry, a central bank, and a police force (Lewis 2008:95). As well, they established two universities, increased the number of schools, built a successful informal economy, and made Hargeisa one of the safest cities in Africa (Lewis 2008:98-99). Nevertheless, Somaliland has faced difficulties due to its lack of national and state recognition and have been carrying out a national struggle of their own in Somaliland and in the diaspora. In the interviews, I spoke with a few Somalis who identify with the Somaliland national movement and thus provide a counter-narrative to the pan-Somali ideal represented in private and public memories of Independence Day.

Along with Somaliland, there are other regional, clan, religious, and governmental divisions on the ground in Somalia, which has an effect on divisions and alliances among Somalis in the US and Canada. Unlike the case of Somaliland that seeks state sovereignty, in recent years other territories and their leaders in Somalia have established (semi) autonomous regions that see themselves as part of the larger Federal Republic of Somalia. These regions include the semi-autonomous region of Puntland located in northeastern Somalia and is occupied by the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood clan-family (Lewis 2008). In 2006, Galmudug, an amalgamation of the Galgudud and Mudug regions, was established in central Somalia with south Galkayo as its capital (Abtidoon et al. 2012). In 2010, based on the models of Somaliland and Puntland and the support of the Kenyan government who wanted a buffer zone between Somalia and its borders, the Azania State of Somalia, formally Jubbaland, became an autonomous region. The territory stretches from Gedo region, that borders the North Eastern Province in Kenya, to the Indian Ocean, and includes Gedo, Lower and Middle Jubba regions (Dahir 2012). In
2012, the Khatumo state that consists of Sool, Sanaag, and Ayn regions was established in northern Somalia between Somaliland and Puntland. It is inhabited and led by the Dulbahante sub-clan of the Darood clan-family (JD 2012).

Prior to the recent election in September 2012, there were also four major military forces that include the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), as well as in the south of Somalia the Raskamboni Brigade, that fought against the ENDF (2006-2009) and is led by a former leader of the ICU (2006) (Somalia News Room 2012), and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (‘The Majority’), who are a Sufi military group (AMISOM 2010). Both of these military groups are pro-government (TFG) and are opposed to Al-Shabab. The interplay between aspirations for national unity expressed publicly on Independence Day on the one hand, and persistent internal schisms and divisions, some of which are explained above, are spoken to within the narratives of different generations that point to the unity of the past for the future over present divisions. These divisions are also the main points of contention for the Somali youth as will become evident in their narratives.

In Minneapolis, the second Prime Minister and first Internal Minister of Somalia, Abdirsaq Hajji Hussein addressed the Value of Nationhood conference attendees stressing the unity of the anti-colonial struggle in the past and his view that clan divisions caused the civil war. He suggests that Somali nationalism provides a space for unity:

The 13 men who brought us independence fought against tribalism; they made sure every Somali person used his identity as Somali only and nothing else. They ensured that in the constitution that the people should not use tribes and the people were to use only Somali as their identity. SYL didn't have money, they did not have knowledge, and we didn't even have people in Somalia that did the intermediate level of education. There was no Somali at that time that even had 20,000 Somali shillings, I think by saying this, I am not lying. Mogadishu was a little better than the rest of the land in Somalia. SYL didn’t have an income and didn’t have a source of money…The SYL used to fund everything that they did; it came from their own pocket money. Whoever joined SYL was given a condition to pay 1-shilling every month. Hence, SYL used this 1-shilling to do everything
and go everywhere they went. This shows us that if we are united, there is nothing that we cannot do and divided, everything falls apart (Abdirasiq June 26, 2011).

As noted earlier, private memories that recalled past unity and freedom were often contrasted with the present state of disunity and lack of freedom. For example, Saajid, an elder I met at a café at a Somali mall in Minneapolis, remembers a more democratic past and notes that Somalis who were once independent are no longer free:

One thing I remember I was a kid I would go Fridays to go to the coast to swim. When we came back that Friday from the swim, and got to Parliament Square there were microphones in the parliament so we can follow up on the discussions in the parliament. There was a circle of people inside that parliament that were listening, how those people were discussing the problems of the people and the nation. They were discussing in the open, how open and democratic that was. I never knew what was going on at the time I just saw people standing there, but later on until today at the most I remember how valuable that moment was, that’s true. A folk tale symbolizes [our problem]: There was a very poor guy, who begged to his God, please God I am poor and have nothing, please God give me something. God gave him sacks of gold, and once he got the gold, he looked around and he didn’t know how to carry them. So he asked God, just give me one dollar to give to somebody to carry it. So we had the golden opportunity, but we didn’t know what God gave us in the moment (independence) (Saahid June 24, 2011).

Saadiq, another Somali elder man sitting with us at the café explains the meaning of this story, “The man was given all those very valuable treasures, but he still asked for means to transport it. But he has the gold, so why did he ask for the means to transport it when he already had the means himself” (Saadiq June 24, 2011). The meaning of this story is that Somalis need to rely on themselves, rather than allowing foreign interventionists to meddle with their affairs that help to create divisions, a common theme in narratives.

The reconstruction of a unified past contrasted with present schisms and divisions are expressed in the narratives of the second generation (31-59 years old). Sahro, who I met at the Value of Nationhood conference (2011) in Minneapolis spoke to me about her private memories before the conference. She proudly told me that her father was part of
SYL and the important role played by the youth, but when she compared the past to the present, she expressed sorrow and regret:

There was one voice for the Somali people and it was the young people who promoted it… When the people were struggling, how the colonialists used to arrest and beat people, they tried to stop [the Somali people from resisting.] My father was a member of the SYL … It was a great time… At the time, the Somali people were united, there were no tribal divisions; there was nothing of the sort, there was one effort, and one objective: to gain independence. They succeeded (at the time), but now they destroyed everything because they are divided… Really every year we remember how beautiful our country was, how the people, what we have over there, I remember every year. Because when we live here, we don’t have anything, although we have peace… but we are not free. We see our country, where the people are fighting each other for nothing, the people are killing each other for nothing, and foreigners interfere in our country. When I think of all these things I cry because if the problem is from your side you can solve it, but if there is another third party who all the time wants to benefit (foreign interventionists) from both sides we will never get peace. I hope to see Somalis understand, to be united, and drop the foreigners, come together, and see the benefit of Somalis coming together and their country. I hope to see that…the people were like one country because we speak one language and believe in one God and one religion, we are one people, so but now they divide any side they want. They divide by tribe, they divide by religion, this, this, this, so there is no trust…But I hope the youth understand and the old people to understand that we need to unite no matter where we live in the world. We have to unite our worlds, we have to unite our effort, we have to tell our kids to wake up and go back to their country and we have to save our country (Sahro June 26, 2011).

Abdulrahman, an educator with great historical knowledge of Somalia, believes that Somalis can learn from history and they need to unite, not only regionally, but also generationally:

And I believe now, year after year, Somali people are waking up. Now they are realizing that things are out of control…This July independence, which we celebrated yesterday, was about unity… We were poor. We didn’t have a penny, nickel, but we had something that was strong. We had commitment – represented by the SYL. So when people are committed and united, they can make a difference. When they are undivided, they can do anything. So divided we fall and united we stand. So my number one is hope, and I am willing to work on it on a daily basis but I think we need to start with the family, working with the families and then giving them support in what they need. We need to start a new beginning involving our Somali youth and elders and the educated here in the Western world (Abdulrahman July 3, 2011).
Both Sahro and Abdulrahman were born in Galkayo, their recollections underscored unity among the Somali people, and did not speak of existing territorial divisions. When I inquired about Puntland, the ideal of unity was reinforced and the political agendas of these regions were not discussed.

Counter-narratives, were most often expressed by those who emphasized their Somaliland national identity. Although some of my interlocutors from Somaliland acknowledged the unification of the north and the south at the time of independence, they observe that the feelings of unity changed in the latter years of Barre’s government; especially following the Ogadeen War (1977-1978), the exodus of the Soviet Union (1978), and the attempted coup of Barre (1978). Egal attended the Value of Nationhood conference (2011) and talked with me about the people of Somaliland’s lives in these latter years under Barre, including the formation of the SNM in the northwest (1982) and the intensification of that struggle that led to the beginning of the civil war in the north (1988):

In 1988, in the north there was a kind of an ethnic cleansing war, specifically to the north so the government at that time, the Siyad Barre government, were ethnically cleansing in the north, which led to the emergence of a movement that came into power in the north, the Somali National Movement in 1991. They engaged people in Somaliland from every sector, layman, businessman, every class of the community, they engaged. Through reinforcement they tried to gain power in the government, so in 1991 they reclaimed the whole north part and then they reclaimed their government, which is now the Somaliland government. And for the past 20 years the Somaliland government is stable, it has a market economy, which is like capitalist economy although there are no production in factories, infrastructure is little, it is coming now but they have a market economy, which is booming, and they have a stable government, legislatures, and judicial, checks and balances, a full government (Egal June 26, 2011).

In the interviews the youth were more open to talk about divisions and schisms among Somali communities in the diaspora as well as in Somalia. At the commemoration, Dawo,
a young Somali woman in her twenties, expressed frustration with the national representation of unity:

It is hard for the younger generation to appreciate it. It is hard to push it when we never got to enjoy the freedom, the opportunity to go to school or live in a safe environment. If we were to have a stable government, for me then I would appreciate it. People are still dividing here in the diaspora. Somaliland had a day. There was a Djibouti party last night. Now here (celebrating Somalia), where is there unity? It is wishful thinking that we will get there some day (Dawo, July 2, 2011).

The generations differed in their willingness to discuss the existing schisms and disunity. Elders linked their own life trajectories to the larger history of Somalia and the national struggle to promote pan-Somalism. They emphasized that uniting as Somalis takes precedence over other loyalties, although other solidarities were also discussed or included in their stories and explanations. For example, some discussed clan or regional divisions, although many more discussed the differences between political parties, and especially the “pro-Italians” at the time. Despite the variances, all of the elders were strong supporters and admirers of SYL and pan-Somalism. The second generation whose parents fought for independence (31-50 years old) linked their transmitted memories of the anti-colonial struggle and independence to the civil war and the continued prolonged armed conflict. Similar to the elders, they emphasized a pan-Somali ideal; however, counter-narratives of Somaliland struggles were discussed along with the divisions between clans. Below I explore the transmission of memories and focus on Somali youth in the diaspora. As we will see, youth have witnessed and experienced the divisions and fragmentations among the older generations despite the public commemoration and discourse of unity. Nonetheless, unity discourse is not merely rhetoric on the part of older
generations who are attempting to transmit particular memories of Somali national struggles with a view to the future.

“The Youth are the Future of Somalia”: How Ideas of Past Struggles are reshaped in the Present

The 21 years of war in Somalia has devastated their written and archaeological records. The resulting displacements have led to fear that younger generations will become integrated and assimilated in the adoptive societies and the histories will be lost with older generations who learned of national struggles and history through oral histories and poetry. This point was emphasized when I asked the organizer of the Somali Independence commemoration the meaning of the commemoration and she replied, “Independence means a lot…trying to make sure the young generation in this country has a history that they can share tomorrow with their children” (Raho July 2, 2011). Similar to other cases of prolonged conflict and exile (see Farah 2008), Somalis in North America are seeking to preserve, remember, and reconstruct their history through teaching younger generations in public and private educational spaces. Randa Farah (2008) found that in both Sahrawi and Palestinian refugee camps education was seen as critical to redeem the nation from occupation and the family from poverty. In addition, national education orally transmitted among generations enabled children to form connections with their nation and homeland, and with their past and present. Educational spaces constructed by Somali communities, such as the Independence Day commemoration or the Value of Nationhood conference (2011), are spaces where national education, or national consciousness and political awareness takes place. They maintain the connections of the youth to their nation and homeland. Through oral transmission the older generation also transmits unrealized projects to their children and grandchildren. Youth, however, receive
these messages and transform their meaning, drawing on their personal experiences growing up in the diaspora. The focus on educating youth through these informal and public commemorations have strengthened youth who, as their interviews reveal, believe that they can make a difference in their community.

Transmission of memories of the past national struggle and independence was most salient among the second generation (31-59 years old) Somalis who are also the main organizers of national commemorations including, Independence Day, and take on lead roles in the establishment of community educational programs for Somali children and youth. Their involvement in Somali communities and in remembering the Somali past indicates the feelings of responsibility they have to “preserve” or educate younger generations about Somalia’s history. Many of these men and women were born and grew up in Somalia. They were displaced during their young adulthood and remember vividly Siyad Barre’s military coup in 1969 and the beginning of the civil war in the north (1988) and in the south (1991), often referring to both in their oral histories. Their remembrances of independence as told by their elders were the most detailed and personal, and many had relatives who were members of SYL or were related to one of the 13 founding fathers of the SYL. In the following, Abdullahi, who was sent away from Galkayo, where his family lived, to Mogadishu to be raised by and live with his uncle, told me the story of his uncle who left his family as a young child on a journey to Mogadishu. His uncle later became one of the 13 founding fathers of the SYL. The memories were transmitted to him to show his uncle’s struggle to become educated and work towards the goal of gaining independence. Abdullahi sought out stories from his uncle to learn Somalia’s history:
I knew from his history that he left because his family was from the Mudug region (central Somalia), just like mine, so he left at early age from his family. I don’t think he was even 10 years old, maybe 8, maybe 9 years old. He left from there in search of becoming, making himself something… And he told me that story. Actually he told me that story in 2009, three months before he died… (Abdullahi June 21, 2011).

Abdulrahman’s father was a member of the SYL and taught him about the national struggle:

I was born in Galkayo, Mudug province, central regions of Somalia in 1956. I was 4 years old when Somalia became independent in 1960…On Independence Day I was in Galkayo and was very young to notice the activities to celebrate independence. But as I grew up and went to school, I learned from my family, relatives and from school a little bit of how valuable Somali independence was. My father Sheikh Ahmed Aden (Garweyne) was a member of the SYL and I remember in late 1968 that he took me to the headquarters of SYL, so that I gradually learned how Somali independence came into being. My father would sing a song of SYL and for Abdullahi Isse Mohamed- the head of SYL and the first Somali Prime minister, to teach my brothers and I about the freedom fighters and Somali patriotic leaders who sacrificed themselves and their blood to ensure Somalia becomes an independent state in 1960 (Abdulrahman July 3, 2011).

The need to preserve history through oral transmission and poetry for future generations is important to Abdulrahman who is very knowledgeable about Somali history and has memorized several of the songs about the freedom fighters, such as:

“Dadkan Dhawaaqaya, dhulkooda doonaya, hadday ka dhiidhiyeen, Ilaahayow u Dhiib”
[Hear the people’s voice, I want the land, fight back, resist. May God give it to them].
(By Abdillahi Qarshi)

“Way garanayaan labada gudboon, geeri iyo nolol, Guuloow allow gaarsii xurnimo”
[They know the two, death and life, to become successful. God make them independent].

Oral literature, especially poetry was and still is used by Somalis as a tool for harnessing and maintaining political power (Samatar 1992). Edward W. Said (1991) suggests that literature has a role in advancing anti-imperialism. In Somalia poetry was used as a political weapon, first by Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan, known as the
greatest poet in the Somali language, in the Dervish anti-colonial resistances in the 19th century and later, by the SYL in the 20th century. The transmission of oral literature that centres on anti-colonial resistances by older generations to younger generations may be attempting to use it in a similar way, to inspire the youth to come together for a future national struggle. As a teacher and a mother, Sahro believed it is important to tell Somali children about Somalia before the armed conflict to counter media representations and to emphasize that peace is possible:

I taught [my children] about history, I told them what we had (government, institutions, and modern amenities) in our country before the war… These kids they see the media and see people dying and fighting, they never see anything different. They ask me, “did you have cars, did you have houses, did you have car insurance,” and I say “yah, why not?” So they don’t know because they were born here and they have never seen anything good from our country. The media shows the kids only the bad things; people fighting each other, people dying of hunger. For real, our country is somewhere I cannot forget and I hope we see peace, set down the guns. So I told my kids, and I work at a school I am a teacher, so even I tell the kids about what kind of education we had… But really I told them what we had… how everything was good and nice (Sahro, June 26, 2011).

The current armed conflict in Somalia, which caused the second generation— the children of the parents who fought the resistance— to live in exile for the major part of their lives, informs their memories of independence countering present discords and rifts. As in other diasporas, there is a generational gap characterizing the Somali diaspora, and a number of the second generation were aware of this gap and sought to bring together different generations.

Youth Taking on Responsibility for the Future

Children and youth represented the majority of participants at Somalia’s Independence Day commemoration. Large groups of young men and young women stood together waving flags and watching other youth perform on stage. In the weeks leading up to and during the commemoration, I spoke with youth about their knowledge of the
history of independence, its meaning, and how it is celebrated. The responses reflected a medley of perspectives and feelings, including pride, hope, anger, resentment, sadness, and indifference. Throughout my fieldwork and in the interviews, I found that Somali youth were learning about their history in both private and public educational spaces with some seeking out these spaces, wanting to learn Somalia’s history and language. For instance, Fatima, a 26-year-old young woman, learned to read and write in Somali for the first time in the US. She has been studying Somali poetry and literature under a renowned Somali educator based in Minneapolis (Fatima June 29, 2011).

The proverb presented in the title of this chapter, “He who knows where he comes from, knows where he is going,” has been internalized by some youth and many have taken on the responsibility that they are the future of the Somali state and society. This was evidenced at the commemoration where many youth, who promoted unity among Somalis and the youth as the future, sang nationalistic songs and put on performances. Pictures of the 13 founding fathers, the SYL, were also present. Neighbors for Nations, a program that is designed to strengthen the local communities in the US, to unite and mobilize in order to provide humanitarian relief to Somalia, had a large booth with mainly Somali youth working there, offering t-shirts, Frisbees, and the chance to become part of the program. The goals of the program are to get the Somali diaspora involved in rebuilding Somalia’s infrastructure, while teaching youth about what is happening in Somalia. As well, the program seeks to improve the well-being, protection, and opportunities for Somalis in Somalia.

Sadiq believes, as his parents’ generation does, that it is a fundamental responsibility to transmit the histories and struggles to younger generations of Somalis who never knew a peaceful country:
But now it is also about responsibility, especially my generation to tell the younger generation that there is hope and there was once a government in Somalia, that had a court system that was functioning, many people here don’t know if they were born after 1991 so it is our job to educate them to tell them there was a country functioning, it is possible to bring back together but it takes effort and working together (Sadiq June 30, 2011).

Anwar, who migrated to the US when he was 18 years old, stresses the importance of learning about independence in order to work towards a future goal of a united Somali nation:

For us to be successful or to increase our chances of doing something good we have to understand where we came from and how we started. And that people died for it, people did good things because of it, people struggled, SYL, all of those heroes that most of us have, no matter which tribe you belong to, no matter what clan .., no matter which part of Somalia you come from. I mean it is one of those things that can unite us, and believe me if you ask a Somali person right now, “What is the solution to Somalia?” They will say [nationalism] would be the best and religion - these would be the only two things to bring people together. Then for us to be successful in that category, I think we have to know what Independence Day means and how it used to be observed in the country. I am glad we are recognizing independence in a manner that its getting bigger and bigger every year. It means a lot; it means everything for the Somalis. It means I can relate to it more than anything else. I am an American technically, but you know in the heart and soul I am there (Anwar June 25, 2011).

Here, Anwar shows his national pride and aspirations for peace in the country, his strong identification with Somalia even though he says he is “technically” American.

Some who believe they are the future leaders are acting upon this responsibility. Later in our conversation, Sadiq tells me he believes that there is renewed hope among the youth:

Through the social media I can see when I am talking to them, I see a sense of hope now… I really see a sense that the nation is reborn again…Especially in social media and when I am talking at schools, a sense of hope really that I have never seen before. I think it started last year at the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Somalia’s independence. The people are realizing they have to do their part, not just blaming the foreigners or other people and finally, sharing their sense of responsibility. I think youth want to take part in their leadership, mentor that is what I see… (Sadiq, June 30, 2011).
Kadiye, a young man in his early twenties agrees, drawing on the past anti-colonial struggles as bases for future aspirations:

The SYL was formed in 1943, by youth. And their ideology was nationalism and Somalism. The idea of one Somali people, one Somali language, one country. They were against the colonial powers, they wanted to kick them out, but not by using force, but through educating their people and peaceful means. And a lot of people argued we can't have something like SYL nowadays... I disagree with them... I think that we can not only have SYL, we can have something ten times better, even a hundred times better because we have resources that they didn't have... The Internet did not exist... social networking. So we have a lot of resources that they didn't have. We're able to reach all the Somali communities across the world, easily and within a minute, you know? So, yeah, I think if we can find the right leaders, we can do something a lot better than they have (Kadiye, June 24, 2011).

Kadiye’s narrative shows the continuity in the belief in a peaceful struggle as emphasized in older generations’ memories. He articulates his view that there will be another youth revolution to overthrow those who are running the country, including those in the diaspora who are benefitting from the conflict:

Well, I think that a Somali revolution, it's about to happen. And whether... whoever is... sponsoring whatever's happening in Somalia, the chaos in Somalia, has to accept that a Somali revolution will occur, and that nothing lasts forever. The same way the colonial powers had to accept that they had to step away. And they had to give this country their independence... In Africa, there is a saying: “When two elephants fight, the grass suffers.” And the grass did suffer there. But at the same time, you have to look at what they did accomplish and I think they did more good than bad. They were able to prevent the colonial powers from doing what they did in other colonies, from bringing settlements, from converting the people [to Christianity...], exploiting the land... They were successful in those areas. So... there is going to be three revolutions in Somalia. The first one was Dervish and the colonial resistance. The second one was with the SYL. And the third one is what's coming... So, with this one, the question is would it be like Dervish, or would it be like the SYL. And I think it's going to be more of the SYL because, you have these very educated youth. So I think it'll be peaceful, mostly peaceful... I think if you get the social and community support, you can... you can cut them off because, we know where they're getting the funding, and if you cut that off, then... Those will eventually run out (Kadiye, June 23, 2011).
Here, Kadiye compares the Somali Dervish anti-colonial resistance in the early 19th century as violent as opposed to the SYL struggle considered peaceful. The focus on peace may be linked to the contrast to the current violent reality on the ground in Somalia therefore memories of the past SYL struggle are drawn from in order to promote peace today.

The narratives of youth also emphasized that memories of Somalia’s independence prompts them to think about what the country could be. Sanaa explains the changing meaning of the national anthem, “Soomaaliyey toosoo,” that I presented at the beginning of this chapter and how she views it as a source of inspiration for the future of the nation:

There were a lot of songs, but everybody knows these songs, their like national independence songs, “Soomaaliyey toosoo,” stand together and its changed over time now. Initially the last part was about colonialism, so its sad we were colonized and colonialism is a thing of the past now, and now it is sad that Somalis can’t put their differences aside and come together. The song was not just about showcasing the nationalism of the Somali, but the national struggle they had to face and I memorized it when I was about 6 years old because my grandmother always sang it… For me, when I hear a song I don’t think about Italy or the past, I don’t think of Britain, I don’t think of colonialism. I think of what Somalia could be, I think about the future. All these crisis are happening in Somalia, so when I think, it may be more recent because of my involved in the Somali movement, but when I was younger I just thought it was part of who I am, part of my history, part of my memory, even though I don’t remember (Sanaa June 25, 2011).

**Blaming Older Generations for Divisions and Fragmentations**

The ways youth interpret the messages given to them during the commemoration are in part informed by their experiences and relationships with older generations. On June 9, 2011, I sat in a classroom located on the ground floor of the Cedar and Riverside high-rise apartment buildings in Minneapolis waiting for the closing ceremonies of the homework support program. Young children sat around the desks excitedly. Sitting with me were two youth in their early twenties who began to talk about the future of Somalia.
Kadiye who has just been discussing his visions of bringing youth together says, “The youth are the future of Somalia,” to the reply of Fadumo, “So I am told.” These two sentences illustrate the transmission of future responsibilities and unrealized aspirations of older generations onto younger generations. When Fadumo says, “So I am told” she is indicating both the burden of these responsibilities and the contradictions felt by many of the youth about their role. Although youth are told “they are the future,” some feel thwarted or frustrated by this expectation. For instance, Kadiye explains, “We can’t help our elders, but the youth still have a chance.” From his perspective the divisions originated and were the fault of older generations, so unity among the younger generations is the future. Nevertheless, he admits elders hold the power in the community. Later in a life history interview Kadiye discusses his views of division and unity among different generations:

The tribe itself is damaging our youth...because the youth, the community is so divided. So that's damaging...If you look at... just the Twin Cities you will see a lot of committees of elders from different clans. And.. every time I talk to youth, they constantly tell me that they hate this tribal things,... tribal divisions... the elders are doing. And they wish there was a way to kind of overthrow the elders... They're very powerful. And there's nothing that they can do, the youth can do. But... so I tell them, first of all, nobody lives forever, so the elders will eventually die out, you know? And also, if us youth just organize ourselves and mobilize, and we're united as youth... in the name of Somalis instead of tribes, yeah, then we will get to a point where we will have more influence than they do in the community, we are the future, they're not. So... there is ways that we can kind of, easily push the others away (Kadiye June 24, 2011).

Although the elders I interviewed stressed unity over divisions, from the youth’s perspective it was the elders who were keeping people divided. Many in the youth’s generation were angered and frustrated with the older generations, blaming them for the divisions in Somalia as well as in the diaspora.

Some youth viewed the commemoration with anger due to the prolonged armed
conflict and resulting displacements and disasters. As a result, they struggled with the idea of celebrating. Sadia was frustrated when we discussed independence and was struggling with the contradictions of the commemoration’s promotion of unity when there were divisions on the ground:

We gained independence and look where they're at right now. They don't have any independence. You can be free from someone, but then you're not free within yourself... I can't go back home right now if I wanted to. You know? It's because where I'm from, where I want to go see is, it's bad. And in 20 years of civil war, we need to celebrate, I think I'm going to, I'm not going to celebrate, like... I will celebrate, you know, what I mean? I'm happy that we have, our independence, but I'll be happier if we get our independence from the civil war. I think that, that'll be the renewal of the Somali country, right? I'm going out to celebrate, you know, but ... for me there is no reason to celebrate... a lot of people disagree with me, but then it’s... what the hell are we celebrating? Like, literally, what the hell are we celebrating? (Sadia July 1, 2011).

Sadia believes that the money used for the commemoration should be sent back to Somalia to help the people, “I'd rather send money, I actually collect money from a group of friends of mine and then we just send money back home...I would love celebrating independence, Somali Independence Day when my country is back” (Sadia July 1, 2011).

The divisions in the diaspora obviously frustrate the youth. Fatima, who was once active in promoting unity among Somali clans, believes she was duped into believing this message. In her experience, the public representation is unity, but divisions remain prominent in the diaspora. As a result, she now supports an independent and sovereign Somaliland. Fatima talks about her views of Independence Day with anger and disappointment in her voice:

I can't stand the damn blue flag. I don't celebrate it, and my southern friends who knew me all along, who knew how crazy I was about the country and pan-Somalia, look at me now like, “What happened?” And I'm like, “Don't talk to me, I'm from Somaliland. I have a country now.” I was against the idea of Somaliland being it's own independent country. Now I'll die defending that idea.. I was discouraged... I was disappointed, and people that disappoint me are people that are close to people... that implanted in me this thing, this hope about pan-Somalia
about a united Somalia, about a nation. That was all a lie, it was all a lie. It was all a lie (Fatima, June 29, 2011).

Fatima’s story shows the changing nature of identities due to political processes and factors, and everyday experiences.

In the narratives there is counter-blame between older and younger generations. The older generations view youth as a social and economic responsibility, but also view them for their social and economic benefits, especially in the diaspora where youth hold social capital, through their education and knowledge of the system. On the other hand, some of the younger Somalis blame the older generations for the divisions and fragmentation of the Somali nation, viewing them as a burden to their progress towards unity. The effect of blame and counter-blame is that intergenerational dialogue is impeded, evidenced in the little elder involvement and presence at the commemoration of Independence Day. Similar to other political movements, if the situation of the Somali people was improving this would have an effect on generational dialogue since it would provide moral and political encouragement. The political, economic and social conditions in Somalia at the time of research (2011), however, were in disarray exacerbated by the absence of a unifying leadership, external intervention, and dispersal. These factors are important and play an important role in promoting or constraining unity and collective solidarities.

**Negotiating Different Pasts**

The anger and resentment of the youth I interviewed was in part related to their need to negotiate different versions of the past. Fatima, who now feels a sense of national belonging to Somaliland, tells me her memories of intergenerational conflict with her father when she supported the idea of a unified Somalia:
I remember getting in trouble with my Dad and with my Mom, and they would take the Somali flag off of my car 'cause my Dad is like a hard core Somalilander and... because he experienced, you know, Barre’s brutality and his brothers were killed by him, and to him it's like, “Are you kidding? You want us to be part of Somalia again? You know what they did to us”. And I was always trying to have debates with him, five minutes after he gets pissed off...And then I'll try to debate with him and say, you know, a Greater Somalia is better... I was sold, the idea of pan-Somalia, the idea of united Somalia...And it was not by anyone, it was just by my own childhood experience, what it means not to have your own country, what it means not to learn things in your own language. And what it means not to be able to read or write in Somali, and to learn that on my own – that's what installed this love and I didn't care if people killed each other, my philosophy was get over it, let's get together now. What happened, happened, the damage has been done to both sides (Fatima, June 29, 2011).

Here, Fatima shows how her national identification was affected by her experiences of growing up in the diaspora. It is not that she felt any less Somali being raised in the diaspora, actually quite the opposite, through her experiences she identified with pan-Somalism. She also had trouble trying to reconcile the idea that a person’s clan was put before the nation, as Fatima explained:

And then people that, you know, act as friends and will work together hate each other because of their tribe. And, to me, that did it for me, that was the part that disappointed me. And then I realized you know, what? These people don't care about Somalia; these people will never care about Somalia...and... then I tried to understand what is it about tribe that's worth killing people for, that's worth destroying a whole country? Why... a guy that you share blood with, a guy that you don’t know, a guy that's like the fourth, fifth, sixth cousin, means so much to you that a whole nation of people, I just... don’t understand... Would mean so much to you than a friend that you always grew up with and know... And that's the question that I didn't find the answer yet because this thing is deep rooted and that's when I figured out the power of tribes (Fatima June 29, 2011).

Anwar feels ashamed and a sense of disappointment when trying to reconcile the past and the present state of Somalia:

At least I want my kids to know what I know, if not more. And I think its very inspiring, and it makes me very emotional to even talk about it right now, I see what is going on right now and what the country is. I think it would be horrifying for them (SYL) to be alive at this time. I mean if they were alive, how it makes them feel, you know they were young and inspired (Anwar June 25, 2011).
Sanaa, a young Somali woman I met at the soccer tournament at Saint Paul, spoke of the competing narratives of the Somali past she heard from her mother and grandmother, the former identifying mainly with a religious community, while her grandmother with a nationalist ideology and period. Sanaa attempts to reconcile these identities in her narrative:

I feel like my grandmother’s period there were much more Sufi influences in Somalia where women wore more traditional clothing and their hair out (not wearing a veil) and my mom grew up in the period where people struggled more and the people, a lot of people were in fear of the unknown and all new changes, so they clung to religion, so my mom has a much more religious understanding of the whole thing and she believes that nationalism is great but faith is more important, so I had different narrations growing up (Sanaa June 25, 2011).

Parents, grandparents, and other relatives transmitted their memories of independence to the youth, emphasizing the struggle and unity as they did in their oral histories. Competing and neglected narratives about women’s participation, and about armed conflicts after independence were also transmitted. Similar to other scholars, I found that the transmission of memories between generations was gendered (see Connerton 2008, Inowlocki 1993, Thompson 1993). In the Somali case, daughters often learned from the recollections of their female kin, while sons learned from their male kin. It also seems that youth are more likely to be proud of the resistance movement if the memories were transmitted and they know their kin were involved in some way. Although older generations’ narratives emphasized unity over divisions, youth had different experiences and perceptions of older generations. As a result, youth did not represent Somalis in the diaspora as unified, but emphasized the divisions among older generations and sometimes commented on the effects on the youth. The reason for this discrepancy may be that the transmission of Somali culture, history, and national
struggles by older generations to younger generations reflects the values and beliefs embedded in Somali nationalism that they quite deliberately are attempting to hand down.

**Conclusion: Transformative Identities**

Despite the variances of responses a shared theme was the struggle for national unity that included discourses of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, which implied drawing on the past to critique the present and express future aspirations. Paul Willis (1990) argues that messages are not so much “sent” and “received” as they are made in reception; therefore, youth react or respond to the messages in their own ways as they negotiate and change their meaning within particular environments and contexts.

Similar to other cases of post-colonial nationalisms (see Farah 2008), which aimed to build modern nation states whose institutions were largely inherited from colonial administrators (see Mamdani 1996), Somalis discouraged clan affiliations to reinforce a sense of national belonging, since clan ideology conflicts with national projects. For older generations, the history of independence is romanticized and idealized because it is contrasted to the current divisions in Somalia, life in exile and the yearning to return. As a result, they draw from this historical moment for inspiration for the future.

Older generations are also drawing on their experiences in the diaspora for the future. The economic importance of girls and women as a result of displacement and migration (see Gardner and El Bushra 2004) have prompted older generations to remember women’s contribution to the anti-colonial resistance and struggle for independence in both private and public narratives. In these narratives, the past contribution of women and active roles in the resistance movements prompted a debate around the need to have even more women represented in current and future national struggles and, especially in the rebuilding of the Somali state.
Youth have played a central role in Somalia’s history through anti-colonial resistances and independence. The interviews with youth on the subject of independence demonstrate that they have insights and opinions about solutions to the Somali national project and the problems that afflict the state institutions. In this context, Somali youth’s identities are in constant flux as they negotiate what it means to be Somali in the diaspora, shaped by existing circumstances and environments as well as future aspirations and dreams. Many respond to displacement and the current armed conflict in Somalia by getting involved in the political processes; therefore, they are historical agents who play an important role in shaping Somalia’s society and cultural life (see also Farah 2010).
**Conclusion: The Relations Between Educational Spaces**

In this dissertation, I have examined the experiences of Somali children and youth in both state sponsored and community educational spaces in North America to investigate how these experiences shape their identities and worldviews in the context of displacement, prolonged armed conflict in Somalia, and a post-9/11 environment. I have made two interrelated arguments. First, the North American view that Somali children and youth are simultaneously ‘at risk’ and ‘the risk’ is inseparable from the larger ‘War on Terror’ led by the US, in which Muslims including Somalis are perceived and treated as potential terrorists or its victims. The ‘War on Terror,’ however, has been mobilized for further imperial control and domination of strategic locations, including the Horn of Africa. The ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘risk’ discourse in Western societies have been fostering Islamophobia, or fear of Islam and Muslims. At the same time, the risk discourse obscures the involvement of powerful Western states, especially the US, Canada, and countries in Western Europe in either creating or spurring conflicts, resulting in massive displacements.

The risk discourse has another consequence: it conceals or dismisses the strengths and capabilities of Somali children and youth. Furthermore, by perceiving Somali children and youth in simplified binaries of ‘at risk’ or ‘the risk’ their real experiences in Canada and the US are obscured. This includes their experiences of structural violence, including poverty, access to education, unemployment or underemployment, and Somalis’ positions in gender and racial hierarchies.

My second argument is that contrary to popular perception among Canadians, Americans, and even Somali communities that Somali youth are experiencing an identity crisis, my research reveals that youth are actively engaged in reshaping their social and
political identities, negotiating and questioning their past and present, imagining their future, and granting meaning to their experiences in state and community educational spaces.

Chapter 2 aimed at deconstructing larger historical narratives and discourses pertaining to Somalia and its history. I developed my arguments while drawing on the work of a number of scholars, namely: B.S. Chimni (1998) who proposed that internalist explanations blame conflicts and the uprooting of peoples on refugee producing states, rather than examining the roles and responsibilities of external states. He posited that the meddling of rich industrial states in poor countries in the South more often than not instigate and prolong conflicts (see also Monsutti 2006). I also drew on Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) argument captured in his phrase “Culture Talk” where he explains how Cold War narratives of premodern Africans and post-Cold War narratives of antimodern Muslims are both used in North America to explain the armed conflict in Somalia. Racist and Orientalist perceptions persist and ignore the colonial history and present policies in Somalia, which shaped Somali society, culture and politics in Somalia and in the diaspora. In drawing on these scholars, I challenge the assumption that the Somali clan system was to blame for the collapse of the state and examined the war within its regional and international contexts. I highlight the links between colonialism and imperialism in the Somali case to show their effects on Somalia’s politics, economy, and social life. Linking past colonialism with present imperialism illustrated how countries in the global North helped lay the foundation and prolonged the armed conflict in Somalia. This historical analysis was necessary in order to place Somali children and youth’s experiences in North America into local and global political histories and
environments and to deconstruct the hegemonic histories and discourses of Somalis and Somalia.

In chapter 3, I examined the role of the North American media in representing and perpetuating discourses of Somali youth in terms of risk. Using Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) analysis of the post-9/11 discourse of “good” and “bad” Muslims and Sunera Thobani’s (2007) gendered analysis of the same dichotomy, I highlighted the connections between current media representations and imperialist projects, including humanitarian interventions and America’s ‘War on Terror.’ The main focus of the chapter, however, was on the effect of media representations of Somalis as perpetrators or victims of violence on Somali children and youth in educational spaces. Somali youth have experienced routine and normalized forms of violence, such as discrimination, and interpersonal forms of violence, such as bullying in state schools. Some youth’s experiences of violence in state schools have led them to leave school, get into fights, and, in a few cases, join gangs. Somali communities, nonetheless, have created community educational spaces that offer youth a space of belonging, and provide the milieu to draw strength and knowledge to challenge negative representations of Somalis and Somalia. Youth’s experiences in both of these educational spaces have transformed their identities in the North American context. Their familial, community, and national histories embarrass some Somali youth. Others have embraced Somali or Somaliland national identities, challenging dominant North American discourse and representations of Somalis and Somalia. Still others, draw on their Muslim identities. Finally, Somali youth’s experiences of racial hierarchies in North America, have caused some to take on African and/or black identities.
In chapter 4, I consider the case of first generation Somali children and youth who immigrated to Canada as Convention Refugees and are attending Ontario public schools. Starting with Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo’s (1987) assumption that schools leave students rather than blaming students for leaving school, the case shows the ways language and education policies that maintain and reproduce a particular conception of Canadian national identity exclude Somali students. I look at how processes of dehistoricization that render the past irrelevant combined with the inflexibility of the public school system to meet the needs of these students has an effect on both language and subject content learning. In the chapter, I consider the consequences on Somali students when their pasts are erased and their everyday realities are discounted. To do this, I examine Somali students’ diverse migration trajectories and argue that these histories connect to the present and are pertinent to the learning process. Finally, I build upon Jo Boyden’s (2003) work where she encourages researchers to assume that children and youth are agents, and here I explore how Somali children and youth are social and historical agents in their homes, communities, and schools.

In chapter 5, I rely on some of the theoretical developments by the Popular Memory Group (1982) to examine Somalia’s Independence Day commemoration in the US. A major idea that I developed in the chapter is that Somalis in North America invoke past anti-colonial struggles as salutary lessons in the present. Celebrations and commemorations generate a dialogue among different generations of Somalis about how the past is linked to the present struggles against foreign intervention and domination. On such occasions, older generations educate the youth about Somalia’s history, while transmitting their aspirations for the future to the youth and to warn against divisiveness. Older generations quite deliberately seek to hand down memories of unity of the Somali
people prior to independence and the “struggle” to gain independence to younger
generations in public spaces, such as Somalia’s Independence Day commemoration and
in private spaces, such as the transmission of familial memories. Many youth are learning
about Somalia’s history and national struggles through the individual and collective
transmission of memories; however, the youth interpret the messages they receive,
renegotiate them, and grant them meaning in light of their own experiences. Some
negotiate the messages among other youth, for example, by coming together as youth
across different socio-economic and clan-family backgrounds to work towards unity with
the view to be the future of the nation and state of Somalia. Memories received from
older generations are also negotiated through youth’s experiences of divisiveness in
Somali communities in the diaspora and in Somalia. Although the older generations send
messages of the strengths and importance of unity to younger generations, the youth have
come to blame older generations for the fragmentation of the Somali nation and view
them as a burden to progress towards unity.

Tales of Two Research Sites: Research Conclusions and Significance

Kitchener-Waterloo

At 5:00pm on a Tuesday night in March 2011 I walk into a public school with an
after-school education support program for secondary school students. It is a community-
based program (not run by Somali communities) that seeks to remove the systematic
barriers to gaining an education in major cities in Canada through tutoring, mentoring,
and peer support with the main purpose of reducing dropout rates. Sitting at a table as I
enter is Maandeeq, all alone, doing her homework. At another table, sisters Saafio and
Aamino Mohammed, with their friend Ladan, are talking and laughing. Sitting at the table
beside them first generation, young Somali men, Abbubakar, Amiir, and Aadan are trying
to look like they are doing homework, but are instead enjoying being able to hang out with each other. I sit at each table for the next two hours helping them with their homework. All of the students have trouble reading the words and most do not understand the meaning of the instructions; however, they want to learn and are working hard to complete their work.

At 7:00 pm I walk down the hall to a small classroom filled with mainly Somali students, but there are also some students from other countries in Africa. The African-Canadian Association of Waterloo Region and Area runs the after-school homework support program for African students of all ages; however, it is elementary and middle school students who mostly attend. Jamal and Asad are there along with their younger sisters. Jamal and Asad have been assigned the same homework, a reading comprehension assignment about playing baseball on a team. They have a hard time understanding the story because of the names of the players and they have little knowledge of the game (field notes March 3, 2011). Nonetheless, we finish the homework using glue to paste the pictures that match the sentences written underneath them. Afterwards, we read Somali folktales. The students are excited to see the story written in Somali on the left with the English version on the right. They laugh and smile recognizing the folktales told to them by their relatives.

The next day I visit the Kitchener mosque. One of the Somali community leaders gives me a tour of the classrooms and explains that they are used for teaching youth the Qu’ran. We enter into the gymnasium where approximately ten tables are set up and are full of Somali boys: half from Kitchener and the other half from Windsor. I am invited to eat and then to attend the soccer match between the two cities. I meet a young Somali man who tells me he now lives in London and supports the Somali community through
his work at a non-profit organization. Growing up in Kitchener-Waterloo, he felt the need to help his community and was involved in the soccer program in the city for a number of years.

**Minneapolis-Saint Paul**

In June 2011, I enter the Brian Coyle Community Centre located across from the Cedar and Riverside high-rise apartment buildings in downtown Minneapolis. The centre is bustling with young children and youth in computer labs, in the gym, and outside in the park. I walk down the hall to a room, home to the Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota. In the middle of the room, elders sitting around a table welcome me. There is a small barrier to separate the table, offering some privacy to the Somali workers who assist in the daily needs of their community members offering programs that include refugee social services, employment services, youth mentorship programs, and education and outreach. After introducing me to each of the staff, the executive director takes me across the street to some rooms located on the bottom floor of the high-rise apartment building. Here, there is a women’s center with a computer lab, large common room with rugs and couches, a smaller room filled with children’s toys, and a full functioning kitchen. The centre offers ESL classes for the women, family childcare, a sewing cooperative, and family literacy programs.

Through other doors, right in front of the apartment’s playground, is a large classroom with desks. This classroom is for the children who attend the Somali homework support program. In an adjoining room there is another classroom, this one I am told is for Somali women who want to be trained in Early Childhood Education. The program has been a success with women obtaining jobs before they even finish their diploma.
Later in the day, I meet with Fatima, a young Somali woman in her early twenties, who tells me about how she has learned to read and write Somali for the first time in the US. She is eager to learn about Somali literature, an education she is receiving outside of a formal institution with a Somali educator, Said. Said is well known in the community for his role as an educator and as a Somali intellectual. In our conversations, he tells me about the bilingual program in Minneapolis public schools in the 1990s and the need for native literacy, which he has instituted in his teachings of middle school students and at the university level.

My experiences in these two field sites were different from one another. In Kitchener-Waterloo, there were few financial resources and community supports for Somali community educational spaces. My interlocutors were mainly newcomer Somali families who immigrated to Canada as Convention Refugees. The majority of these families lived in female-headed households and were on social assistance. In these cities, there were a few Somali intellectuals whose families occupied higher levels of socio-economic status; however, there were limited numbers involved in Somali community educational spaces. On the other hand, in Minneapolis-Saint Paul there are many Somali intellectuals and entrepreneurs. Most of my interlocutors have lived in the US for many years and have citizenship status, although they immigrated as church sponsored refugees, under family reunification, or as immigrants. The wider Minneapolis communities were actively involved with learning and supporting Somali communities. There was also a lot of financial and social support for community educational spaces from within the Somali communities. Despite these differences, there were two main themes that connected Somali children and youth experiences. First, Somali children and youth were active agents coping with diverse institutions, individuals, and authority.
figures, albeit under structural constraints. Second, Somali institutions, such as community centers, but also programs that provide alternative educational spaces, played a critical role in the lives of children and youth, and shaped their self-identification and experiences.

The Roles of Community Educational Spaces in Somali Youth’s Experiences in North America

Community educational spaces created by Somalis play a role in mitigating risk to Somali children and youth. In fact, when Somali children and youth experienced exclusion in their state schools, community educational spaces offered them spaces of belonging. Initially, a reaction to meeting the unmet needs of their youth in schools as well as the growing fear that Somali youth were facing an identity crisis, community educational spaces have provided many more benefits to children and youth.

Older generations of Somalis have created educational spaces where students are learning Somalia’s history, national struggles, traditions, cultural values (as learned from their elders), and contemporary politics. In addition, some youth have established their own spaces of learning; for example, Poet Nation is looking to Somalia’s oral roots in poetry to make social and political changes in local Somali communities and in the diaspora. In chapters 3 and 5, Kadiye provides another example, a Somali fraternity that teaches Somalia’s history and national past to youth with a view to unify Somali youth in order to help end the 21 years of conflict in Somalia and start a new national struggle. These community educational spaces have granted youth knowledge that empowers them to present counter-narratives to negative representations of Somalis and Somalia. Some youth I interviewed actively sought out these community educational spaces making a conscious effort to learn about Somalia’s past. Somalia’s Independence Day is one such
occasion that offers a space for older generations to educate younger generations. As Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson (1993) propose on intergenerational transmission of memories, the Somali case shows that older generations are transmitting national ambitions and unrealized national projects onto the youth in the diaspora; however, the youth did not receive these unchanged, rather they grant their own meaning and understandings of these memories. Youth were often proud of transmitted memories, which offered them a sense of belonging to their home country (see also Feuchtwang 2000). Similar to Randa Farah’s (2008) findings in Sahrawi and Palestinian refugee camps, I found that national education allows children to form connections with their present life in the diaspora and Somalia, and to reconnect a ruptured past with their present. This research builds upon existing scholarship that examines how generational relationships shift through dialogue or conflict depending on the political and historical contexts (Farah 2005). Somali youth often have fundamentally different experiences from their elders. Yet, the ongoing armed conflict in Somalia and a hostile environment in North American societies, provide the contexts that bring generations together; they have come to depend on each other, the younger generation to facilitate living in a new social milieu in the present, for example, by acting as translators and mediators within the larger society, while the elder generation reconnects the younger generation to their past.

It has been maintained throughout this work that politics cannot be separated from history (see PMG 1982). This was evident in chapter 5, with the examination of different generations’ memories of Somalia’s Independence Day. The commemoration was critical of divisions and promoted aims and interests of unity, wherein many believed Somali identity and belonging is conceived as more important than other identifications. Although there were variances in private remembrances of independence, there was a
shared anti-imperialist theme and an emphasis on the struggle for national unity. In oral narratives of Somalia’s Independence Day, significant historical events were used as anchors for constructing individual histories. Similar to Alistair Thomson’s (1994) analysis of Anzac memories, I found that older generations’ narratives sought coherence with hegemonic narratives or popular ‘official’ accounts of Somalia’s history.

The common experience of displacement and exile for Somalis has led to increasing Somali involvement in politics in the diaspora. Most of the Somalis I have spent time with are involved in the political situation at home and in the process of reclaiming a national past and harnessing national consciousness in the diaspora; however, their goals are not singular. Themes of reconciliation among Somalis and the hope embodied in Somali youth in the diaspora are constant themes in Kitchener-Waterloo, Toronto, and Minneapolis. The majority of Somalis, including the youth, I have worked with feel they have a civic and political responsibility to Somalis throughout the diaspora and work in some way to fulfill that responsibility. In other words, global processes have not diminished their aspirations for a sovereign and independent nation-state. My research builds upon scholarship, which argues that globalization processes and nationalist aims to build a state do not necessarily contradict each other, but may interact, and co-exist, although variously and unevenly depending on the specific context (see Sharma and Gupta 2006, Farah 2010).

Children and youth are influenced by global dynamics. The Somali case shows that politics, policies, representations, and discourses emanating from America’s ‘War on Terror’ affect the senses of belonging and influence the reconstruction of Somali children and youth’s identities in North America. In this research I have shown that North American narratives of Muslims as premodern or antimodern (Mamdani 2004) are played
out in schools, where Somali children and youth are subject to various forms of violence by their peers. Similarly influenced by these perceptions and stereotypes, educators view Somali students’ histories and experiences as unknowable or irrelevant. Somali youth are characterized as either at risk or the risk playing into the post-9/11 narratives that have been reflected in stringent refugee policies. Refuted by some Somali studies’ scholars who place the conflict within its historical and international contexts (Besteman 1999, Cassanelli 1996, de Waal 1998, Harper 2007, Marchal 2007, Samatar 1992) are internalist explanations that blame Somalis for the current armed conflict. Nevertheless, this view continues to persist and positions Somali youth as a risk or potentially violent, which along with similar discourses in the media about refugees in general, serves to justify attempts to revise refugee law (Chimni 1998:259) as well as the building of fortresses in North America and Europe (Razack 2008, Thobani 2007). This non-entrée regime heightens xenophobia within Canadian and American societies (see Chimni 1998). Building upon this fear, the stereotypes render Muslims in Canada and the US as less deserving of full human rights or even their complete suspension (Mamdani 2004, Razack 2008:6-7).

In practice, state policies that are presumably implemented to ensure “national security” further entrench hierarchies of citizenship (Razack 2008, Thobani 2007), in which Somalis are on the lower hierarchical scale. The hierarchy contributes to feelings of alienation from society that often lead to social and economic problems in Somalis’ lives. This study contributes to an understanding of how various adoptive societies’ attitudes about refugees from different countries shift under the pressure of the geopolitical environment, and how adoptive societies respond to refugees seeking asylum and settlement based on their interests and current needs (see Chimni 1998, Ong 2003).
This study supports other research that challenges the Western discourse of refugee youth in terms of risk (Boyden 2003, 2009a, Boyden and Mann 2005, Stephens 1995) and builds upon others that suggest that risk obfuscates the structural violence many individuals and families experience in Canada and the US. (Korbin 2003, Summerfield 1999). To begin with child agency is not to assume that displaced children are not vulnerable or have not experienced adversity, but offers a different lens to view these children’s experiences and by grounding their experiences in history refuses to pathologize youth. It also exposes the structural racism, inequities in access to education, and poverty that influence children and youth’s experiences and how these factors influence their well-being.

Global politics and social inequities impact Somali youth’s experiences in Canada and the US. Poverty in North America is exacerbated by sending remittances to family members in Somalia or in neighbouring countries. Both young Somali men and women remit to family members, which can impact their education. Some youth have left school or do not continue to post-secondary education because of this responsibility. Children are also affected by living in urban poverty and the stress that underemployment and unemployment brings to their families.

Conceptualizations of refugee children and youth as at risk also conceal their strengths, coping strategies, and the important roles they hold in their families (Boyden 2003, Boyden 2009a). I suggest that displaced children and youth need to be considered as gendered actors with specific needs, strengths, vulnerabilities, and desires (Brun 2000, Tefferi 2007). In this research, I found that by making young men visible, and refusing to frame them in terms of risk, the different challenges they experience are revealed. For instance, in chapter 3, I suggest that the young men I interviewed experienced routine and
normalized as well as interpersonal forms of violence in school. For their part, the reasons
the young men engaged in interpersonal forms of violence was as a result of experiences
of discrimination, being bullied, or being excluded from certain groups, including other
groups of Somalis.

In a similar way, refugee studies should not assume young women’s vulnerability
and victimhood (see also Tefferi 2007, Boyden 2009a). For young Somali women, the
representation of the veiled woman that needs saving in the North American media, was
instrumentalized to justify the US military invasion of Afghanistan (Abu-Lughod 2002,
Thobani 2007), and has led to Islamophobia and violence. In research on male and female
experiences with routine, normalized, and interpersonal forms of violence, youth need to
be disentangled from the discourse of risk and examined from a gendered perspective to
understand the reasons people become violent and/or the ways they react to the violence.

A gendered perspective that views children and youth as social and historical
agents will also be able to grasp the ways they contribute to their families and
communities (see Boyden 2009a, Orellana 2001). In chapter 4, I showed that Somali boys
feel a sense of responsibility to take care of the family in Canada and the US, especially
in homes that are female-headed and are low-income. As a result, Somali boys wanted to
find or were engaged in paid work to help their families.

Displacement and migration has increased and changed women’s roles and
responsibilities (Gardner and El Bushra 2004). Many Somali households are female-
headed making more women the main source of livelihood in the diaspora (Gardner 2004,
Berns McGown 2003). Girls and young women, in turn, help their mothers with domestic
chores and household duties. They have also taken on new roles as translators in day-to-
day interactions and interpreters of documents, banking, and payment of bills, among
other tasks that require English literacy. Girls’ roles as interpreters help Somali families to learn of and access community supports and services. As tutors to their younger siblings Somali girls support their brothers and sisters educational development. Research that views youth as social and historical agents has the potential to reveal other possible risks as well as the ways that children and youth mitigate risk to themselves and to their families (Boyden 2009a, Boyden and Mann 2005). Taken together, these cases show that Somali youth have adult responsibilities in their homes and in their communities; therefore, Western conceptions of childhood and adulthood cannot be assumed in studies with children and youth who have experienced displacement (see also de Berry and Boyden 2000).

Some scholars have argued that although women’s roles as the main contributors and source of livelihood for their families are being recognized in the Somali diaspora, their political and social statuses in Somali society have not changed (Gardner 2004). Fieldwork with Somali intellectuals and during Somalia’s Independence Day, however, reveals that in public presentations and in private memories, there is a growing awareness that women’s status should change. Women were represented as occupying a crucial role in past resistance movements. In public presentations, such as the Value of Nationhood conference (2011) and the Somali-Canadian Diaspora conferences (2008, 2009), there was a growing recognition that it is essential for women to be included in new forms of struggle and Somalia’s political institutions.

My research also showed that many refugees experience multiple ruptures that occur over time which lead to migration. These ruptures may not be significant enough to be written into ‘official’ accounts of history, but can be unearthed through a popular memory approach (PMG 1982). It is important to capture popular memories of
movements and migration since transnational relationships are developed during this time and they inform refugee experiences, shape their socio-economic status, and political identities. For instance, as was evident in chapter 4, after being forced to leave Somalia an individual or family may live at length in multiple countries and cities, under different circumstances in each (Van Hear 2006). In addition, forced migration can lead to other forms of migration, including sending family members to other countries for an education, employment, or to support family elsewhere (Van Hear 2006). Children and youth’s experiences of and access to education in these countries can either lead to significant education gaps or help them with their education in the adoptive country. Neglecting students’ pasts and framing them in terms of risk conceals the skills, knowledge, and competencies that they have learned both inside and outside educational settings before immigrating to North America. These include the ability to speak multiple languages and their diverse literary practices. Other researchers have suggested this knowledge can be used in the classroom to promote learning (Fisher 2005, Ghahremani-Ghajar 1999, McCarty 2012).

In examining generation as a cohort, this work demonstrates that straightforward analytic categories of first, second, and third generation are much more complex in studies on immigration, especially in cases of prolonged displacement and exile. In this study children in one family could occupy different generation categories. Similarly, children within the same generation may have diverse experiences since they have lived in multiple cities, countries, and circumstances throughout their migration trajectories.

School performance cannot be separated from family dynamics, communities, and global politics. These aspects of children’s lives are intimately intertwined. Community educational spaces assist students with their mainstream schooling by helping them with
homework, literacy, and the development of skills and knowledge. This has the effect of increasing students’ grades and keeping them in school. The extra support, the inclusion of Somali experiences, and the recognition of students’ personal histories is in stark contrast to the Somali students’ experiences in state sponsored schools.

This research supports others that challenge the assumption that state schools are sites for migrant assimilation into the adoptive society (Lukose 2007, Villenas 2007) because the view takes for granted that educators are teaching the students and the students are learning. In this way, students who are resistant to assimilative practices or who do not receive an education are blamed for leaving school rather than the inequities in the system (see Freire and Macedo 1987).

In the current neoliberal political environment there is an emphasis on self-responsibility (Kennely and Llewellyn 2009, Ong 2006, Rose 1999, Walsh 2011). The view that every person is responsible for their own successes or failures plays into rights thinking in North American education—that everyone has equal access to education (Razack 1998). This point of view has the effect of blaming Somali youth for leaving school early. For this reason, educational researchers need to be aware of the power dynamics that reproduce and maintain this view (Freire and Macedo 1987). More specifically, research in education also necessitates the examination of refugee students’ past experiences with school and their specific needs (Boyden 2009b). In this work, I have shown that the Ontario education system is not meeting the needs of students with significant education gaps. These students are not getting the proper support for English language learning and subject content learning in their native language (see also Gourd 2007). Despite the fact that research shows the importance of native language literacy (Collins 2012, Jaffe-Walter and Lee 2011), the deficit perspective that sees cultural and
linguistic differences as barriers continues to inform education policies (McCarty et al. 2011). In addition, a particular view about the Canadian nation as bilingual receives precedence over policies that support the maintenance of native language literacy. The inflexibility of the system also does not include students’ diverse skills and knowledge. Somali youth’s experiences throughout their migration trajectories as well as their everyday experiences, including their engagement with community learning–literacy practices outside of school, can be used and can have a positive impact on academic learning (Fisher 2003, 2005).

At the level of the family, the responsibilities of children and youth, including their contribution to household livelihoods, have transformed their roles and identities. Similar to Rima Berns McGown (1999) findings, I concluded that for some Somali youth in the diaspora, emphasizing an Islamic background is important. Some Somali young women wore *hijabs* to school to assert their Muslim identity (see also Hoodfar 2003). A reflection of their experiences of being placed into racial hierarchies in Canada and the US, many Somali youth are also taking on African or black identities. At the level of the nation, all of the Somali youth I interviewed identified either with being a Somali or a Somalilander. Younger generations are negotiating the meanings of the memories transmitted by older generations of Somali anti-colonial struggles. Youth have eagerly imbibed lessons about the struggles of youth like them in Somali history to inform their present. Thus, many have taken on the responsibility that they are the future of the Somali state and society. Many of these youth also have simultaneous attachments to Canada and the US, although many expressed feelings of exclusion.

Clan-family and Somali regional identities seem to be less important for youth in North America; however, they continue to be important in social relations and they
continue to intersect with political practices within the Somali communities, especially among older generations. Clan-family and regional identities are often publicly discouraged by Somali community leaders and therefore are not always publicly articulated. Consequently, multiple levels of belonging and identity can co-exist—they do not necessarily conflict. As a result, the popular belief among Somali communities that youth are losing their Somali identities and ‘traditions’ is not supported by this research.

Instead, Somali children and youth are transforming what it means to be Somali in North America and at this historical moment.

**Somalia Today and Hope for the Future**

In the months of August and September 2012, Somalia experienced a turning point, an important historical moment. Somalia’s chief justice swore in over 200 members of the new parliament (MPs) on August 20, 2012, which ended the eight-year transitional government (Khaleej Times 2012, Middle East Online 2012). One hundred and thirty-five traditional elders who represented all of Somalia’s clans chose the MPs (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 2012, Middle East Online 2012). A committee denied approximately 70 MP candidates to run due to their links to warlords or for having committed violent acts. There are several women lawmakers and a high number of university graduates who make up the new parliament (Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 2012, Khaleej Times 2012).

On September 9, 2012, Somalia’s MPs elected a new president, Hassan Sheik Mohamud who won the election against the departing President Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Bayoumy 2012, Guled 2012). The new president worked as a professor at the Somali Institute of Management and Administration Development founded in 1999 with
hopes to rebuild the country. In 2011, he started a new political party called Peace and Development (Guled 2012).

Despite these positive moves in Somali politics, there continues to be devastation in the country. One year after the famine, malnutrition rates are stabilized; however, Dollo Ado, an Ethiopian border town, has five camps that are housing 170,000 refugees with hundreds crossing the border in search of refuge every week (UNHCR 2012). The number of internally displaced has also been exacerbated by heavy rains that flooded the Shabelle River in October 2012, leaving 21,000 people without homes and destroying wells (American Refugee Committee 2012). According to UNHCR (2012), as of January 2012 there were 1,356,845 internally displaced persons in Somalia. As of October 16, 2012 there were 1,028,853 Somali individuals outside of Somalia registered as refugees (UNHCR 2012).

Moreover, imperial policies aim to maintain and/or expand the domination of rich industrial countries, especially the US, Canada, and Western Europe over strategic locations, such as the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. These processes of domination result in vastly unequal distribution of global political and economic power and resources will continue to exacerbate conflicts and displacement. Somalia is no exception, and such policies will continue to have harmful effects on Somali children and youth in Somalia and in the diaspora, despite the recent elections and changes in Somalia.

Yet, I also have no doubt that Somali communities in North America, including the youth, will continue to maintain their connections and to send remittances to help other Somalis in Somalia and in neighbouring countries, while resisting and/or coping with discrimination and feelings of exclusion. Moreover, as my research showed younger generations, including those who were brought up in North America are either hopeful or
actively involved in promoting Somalia’s sovereignty, in rebuilding the state, and in reconciling the 21 years of armed conflict. By focusing on youth and children, this dissertation thus highlighted the effects of the interplay of two processes: those of imperial domination and those of resistance, albeit in diverse forms, locations and manifestations.
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Documents Received for Information:

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information. If you require an updated approval notice prior to that time you must request it using the UWO Updated Approval Request Form.

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the study or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the NMREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of monitor, telephone number). Expedited review of minor change(s) in ongoing studies will be considered. Subjects must receive a copy of the signed information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the NMREB:

a) changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of the study;
b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that are both serious and unexpected;
c) new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.

If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to this office for approval.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

Chair of NMREB: Dr. Riley Hinson
FDA Ref. #: IRB 00010841

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information:

☐ Grace Kelly (gracekelly@uwo.ca)
☐ Janice Sutherland (jsutherland@uwo.ca)
☐ Elizabeth Wambolt (ewambolt@uwo.ca)
☐ Denise Grafton (dgrafton@uwo.ca)

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.
Use of Human Participants - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. Randa Farah
Review Number: 170948
Review Level: Delegated
Approved Local Participants: 0
Protocol Title: Somalia in North America: Diverse and Shifting Identities
Department & Institution: Anthropology, University of Western Ontario
Sponsor:
Ethics Approval Date: May 02, 2011        Expiry Date: October 31, 2011

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revised Study End Date</td>
<td>The study end date has been extended to October 31, 2011 to allow for study completion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is to notify you that the University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above referenced revision(s) or amendment(s) on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB’s periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information. If you require an updated approval notice prior to that time you must request it using the UWO Updated Approval Request Form.

Members of the NMREB who are named as Investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The UWO NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information

- [Name]
- [Contact Information]

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.

The University of Western Ontario
Office of Research Ethics
Support: Services Building Room 5150 • London, Ontario • CANADA – N6A 3K7
PH: 519-661-3036 • F: 519-850-2466 • ethics@uwo.ca • www.uwo.ca/research/ethics
Dear Ms. Stachel,

Thank you for your email dated 28 September 2012.

On behalf of the Secretary of the United Nations Publications Board it is our pleasure to grant you permission to reproduce the following UN map in your PhD dissertation:

**Somalia, Map No. 3690 Rev. 10, December 2011**

We request that the map number be retained for references purposes and that your publication give attribution to source, the United Nations. If possible, we would also like to request that a copy of your publication be deposited in the Acquisition Unit of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library of the United Nations (United Nations, Room DN-2440, New York, NY, 10017 USA).

Please note that our permission is only valid if you wish to reprint the UN map as an official UN document, i.e. without any modification to it. If you would like to modify the UN map and add to or delete any data from it, you may do so without our permission, but please be advised that it will be your own new map and that you would be responsible for the content. In that case we would request that you delete the UN name and reference number from the new map. You may state if you wish: "based on UN map..."

Thank you for your interest in our maps.

Best regards,

Geraldine Velandria
Associate Geographic Information Officer
Geospatial Support Unit
Cartographic Section, SSIS/LSD
Department of Field Support
United Nations

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https://lwc.uwo.ca/lwc_static/layout/shell.html?lang=en&2-4.01.224943
Re: Permission to Use Copyrighted Material in a Doctoral/Master's Thesis

Dear Ilyaa or other concerned parties,

I am a University of Western Ontario graduate student completing my Doctoral / Master's thesis entitled, "Somali Children and Youth in North America: Diverse Shifting Identities in the Context of Prolonged Armed Conflict in Somalia, displacement, and a Post-September 11th Environment." My thesis will be available in full-text on the internet for reference, study and / or copy. Except in situations where a thesis is under embargo or restriction, the electronic version will be accessible through the Western Libraries web pages, the Library's web catalogue, and also through web search engines. I will also be granting Library and Archives Canada and ProQuest/UMI a non-exclusive license to reproduce, loan, distribute, or sell single copies of my thesis by any means and in any form or format. These rights will in no way restrict republication of the material in any other form by you or by others authorized by you.

I would like permission to allow inclusion of the following material in my thesis, the article I wrote with Abdulrahman Adem about the memories of Independence Day entitled, "Memories of Somalia's National Struggles for Independence and the Historical Role of Youth" that was published in Mogadishu Times on June 21, 2012.

The material will be attributed through a citation.

Please confirm by email that these arrangements meet with your approval.

Sincerely

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Melissa Stachel

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Melissa Stachel
PhD Candidate
Department of Anthropology
Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations
The University of Western Ontario
London, ON, CANADA

---

Ilyas M.
Editor-in-chief of the Mogadishu Times
Hi Abdulrahman,

I hope this email finds you well. I am writing to get permission from you to use parts of the article that we published in Mogadishu Times in my doctoral dissertation, please see below and let me know if you have any question. I hope you and your family are well.

I am a University of Western Ontario graduate student completing my Doctoral / Master’s thesis entitled “Somali Children and Youth in North America: Diverse and Shifting Identities in the Context of Prolonged Armed Conflict in Somalia, displacement, and a Post-September 11th Environment”. My thesis will be available in full-text on the internet for reference, study and / or copy. Except in situations where a thesis is under embargo or restriction, the electronic version will be accessible through the Western Libraries web pages, the Library’s web catalogue, and also through web search engines. I will also be granting Library and Archives Canada and ProQuest/UMI a non-exclusive license to reproduce, loan, distribute, or sell single copies of my thesis by any means and in any form or format. These rights will in no way restrict republication of the material in any other form by you or by others authorized by you.

I would like permission to allow inclusion of the following material in my thesis: Memories of Somalia’s National Struggles for Independence and the Historical Role of Youth published by Mogadishu Times on June 21, 2012, written by Abdulrahman Adem and Melissa Stachel.

The material will be attributed through a citation.

Please confirm in writing or by email that these arrangements meet with your approval.

Sincerely

Melissa Stachel

Melissa Stachel Fellin
PhD Candidate
Department of Anthropology
Collaborative Program in Migration and Ethnic Relations
The University of Western Ontario
London, ON Canada

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=5f8fa66805e&view=pt&q=copyright%20permission&q=cr&search=quary&th=13a1a09d3b6c4f8d
Abdulrahman Adem <
To: Melissa Stachel <

Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 11:03 AM

Melisa Stachel,

You have full permission to use the article and other materials we have co-created. Let me know anything else. You are always more than welcome and let me know of any way I could help in your dreams. Adem
CURRICULUM VITAE

MELISSA STACHEL

EDUCATION

2008-2012 PhD Anthropology and Migration and Ethnic Relations, University of Western Ontario, London ON
Dissertation Title: “Somali Children and Youth's Experiences in Educational Spaces in North America: Reconstructing Identities and Negotiating the Past in the Present” (Supervisor: Dr. Randa Farah, Defended December 5, 2012)

2006-2008 MA Anthropology, University of Western Ontario, London ON
Thesis Title: “An Ethnography of the English Language Industry in the Republic of Korea” (Supervisor: Dr. Andrew Walsh)

2000-2004 BA Anthropology and Psychology, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON
Thesis Title: “Gender and Power: A Regional Comparison of the San’s First Menstruation Rite” (Supervisor: Dr. Mathias Guenther)

POSITIONS AND EMPLOYMENT

2006-2012 Teaching Assistant, Department of Anthropology, University of Western Ontario

2011 Research Associate, Bloorview Research Institute

2008-2009, 2010 Research Associate, Kitchener-Waterloo Reception House

2007-2008 Research Associate, Mosaic Family Counseling (formally, Catholic Family Counseling Centre)

FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS & AWARDS

2011 Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Doctoral Fellowship
2011 Dr. Benjamin Goldberg Research Award of the UWO Developmental Disabilities Division
2011 Regna Darnell Graduate Award for Fieldwork in Anthropology
2010 University of Western Ontario Autism Centre of Excellence Research Award
2010 Graduate Thesis Research Award
2010 Award of Research Excellence for poster presentation of Somalis in North America: Diverse and shifting identities in the context of prolonged armed conflict
2010 Regna Darnell Graduate Award for Fieldwork in Anthropology
2009 Graduate Thesis Research Award
2009  Anthropology Department Research Scholarship
2008  Dean’s Graduate Scholarship in Migration and Ethnic Relations
2007  Graduate Thesis Research Award
2006  Graduate Thesis Research Award

FIELDWORK EXPERIENCE

2008-2012  Somali Children and Youth's Experiences in Educational Spaces in North America: Reconstructing Identities and Negotiating the Past in the Present (Dissertation Research, Supervisor: Dr. Randa Farah)

2010-2012  A qualitative, cross-national analysis of the experiences of Somali parents raising children with and without autism (Supervisors: Dr. Victoria Esses and Dr. Gillian King)

2011-2012  A qualitative, cross-national analysis of the perceptions and experiences of Somali health care professionals working with Somali children with autism spectrum disorders and their families (Supervisors: Dr. Victoria Esses and Dr. Gillian King)

2006-2008  An ethnography of the English language industry in the Republic of Korea, (MA Thesis Research, Supervisor: Dr. Andrew Walsh)

PUBLICATIONS

Stachel, Melissa

Lindsay, Sally, King, Gillian, Klassen, Anne, Esses, Victoria, and Melissa Stachel

Stachel, Melissa

Adem, Abdulrahman and Melissa Stachel
Stachel, Melissa

**CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

Stachel, Melissa

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SERVICE  
2009-present  Editor, Journal of Internal Displacement

2008-2009  Editor, Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology

2007-2008  Co-Editor-in-Chief/Production, Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology