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An Explication Of The Nature And Function Of The Unmoved Mover In Aristotelian Metaphysics

Richard Anthony Howe

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AN EXPLICATION OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE UNMOVED MOVER IN ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS

by

Richard Anthony Howe

Submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The problem which we attack in this dissertation is that of obtaining a clear picture of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotelian metaphysics. Such a picture is difficult to obtain because of two popular but erroneous accounts of Aristotelian metaphysics: the Neoplatonic and naturalistic. The Neoplatonic account pictures Aristotle's metaphysics as gradational with the Unmoved Mover expressing being at its most undiluted. The naturalistic account either writes off Aristotle's theology as part of his Platonic youth or argues that the Unmoved Mover is the form of the world or first heaven.

Our method is to examine the Aristotelian texts as well as a wide range of papers by primarily contemporary commentators. We do make use of the genetic method but with great restraint.

We begin by investigating types of Aristotelian equivocity since Aristotle says that being has many senses. In particular, we investigate analogous metaphor and focal meaning and argue that both are forms of intentional homonymy rather than disguised forms of synonymy.

Since the Unmoved Mover is said to be substance, we move on to a consideration of substance in the Categories and in the Metaphysics. We find some differences between the two doctrines but the individual

substance is always given ontological priority over other beings.

We next consider arguments for the existence of the Unmoved Mover drawn primarily from the Physics and the Metaphysics. The Metaphysics emphasizes, where the Physics does not, the priority of the Unmoved Mover as pure act over all beings with potency. The Metaphysics concludes with the Unmoved Mover as a final cause. It seems that an efficient cause is meant in the Physics.

We continue by examining the nature of the Unmoved Mover and related problems like the plurality of movers.

We find that the Neoplatonic account and naturalistic accounts as we have described them are incorrect. Being is not some homogeneous nature for Aristotle. Nor can we say that the Unmoved Mover is the form of the world or first heaven. We reject the idea that Aristotle's theology in Metaphysics, Lambda is a relic of his early Platonism. A comparison with his theological texts elsewhere in the corpus leads us to believe that Metaphysics, Lambda was his last word on the subject.

We conclude that all of the unmoved movers are pure act, immaterial and final causes (each for its heaven). They are differentiated and ranked only according to the heavenly sphere each moves. Aristotle never tells us how they are internally differentiated since he has no direct insight into the divine essence. Once we come to know them, even if imperfectly, they serve as a reference for understanding all being and as a source of inspiration for leading the life of reason.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

Unless otherwise noted all references to Aristotle's works are to the Oxford translation under the editorship of W. D. Ross and J. A. Smith. The following are abbreviations used throughout this dissertation:

An. Post. - Analytica Posteriora

Cat. - Categorie

E. E. - Ethica Eudemia

Ethica Nic. - Ethica Nicomachea

De Gen. Animalium - De Generatione Animalium

De Part. An. - De Partibus Animalium

Met. - Metaphysica

Rhet. - Rhetorica

S. E. - De Sophisticis Elenchis

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING ARISTOTLE'S THEOLOGY

John Herman Randall, Jr. writes:

> The language of Book Lambda is the language of the Platonic myths, the "likely language" of which the Timaeus speaks. And much in Book Lambda can be interpreted as "Platonism," if you have the will, and forget Aristotle's thought and its content. In the thought of Aristotle, God stands to the world as form to substance, as the end at which processes aim to the process within which that end is discriminated, as possibilities completely fulfilled to the present partial achievement. The Unmoved Mover may well be called a Platonic myth, like the "Active Intellect" of the De Anima.[1]

Joseph Owens, writing from what is perhaps the opposite side of the philosophical spectrum on this question, says, "...The primary Wisdom contemplates form without matter--which is the nature of separate Entities."[2] He continues, "When sensible things are called Being, it is not their own nature, but the nature of the separate Entities which is primarily designated."[3]

These two quotes are representative of two extremes of interpretation of Aristotle's philosophical theology. On the one hand we have Randall claiming that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover[4], which is Aristotle's term for the divinity, is nothing more than a myth. It can only be taken literally if we willfully forget Aristotle's thought and its content. The doctrine doesn't fit into Aristotelian

metaphysics. It is, if interpreted literally, "Platonism." Consequently, Randall suggests that it not be so taken but rather that it be seen as a myth.

J. Owens offers us an interpretation which is quite the opposite of Randall's. Far from being a foreign element in the Aristotelian metaphysics, the doctrine of the divinity or the "separate Entities" as J. Owens calls Aristotle's unmoved movers is central to this metaphysics. It is the object of study of "primary Wisdom," as J. Owens calls Aristotle's metaphysics or first philosophy. The Unmoved Mover is what first philosophy studies for J. Owens.

These two extremes help to illustrate one of the problems which confronts anyone who wishes seriously to investigate Aristotle's doctrine of the Unmoved Mover. The controversy is still so great over this doctrine that we find some commentators claiming that this doctrine is everything to Aristotle's metaphysics and others claiming that it is little or nothing. It is our intention in this dissertation to avoid both these extremes and argue in favor of a more moderate, and we think, a more accurate account of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover.

We have dubbed these two extreme positions, which we find to be incorrect, the naturalistic account and the Neoplatonic account.

The first account is termed "naturalistic" because most of

its defenders are recognized naturalists such as Santayana and Randall. This position limits the important content of Aristotelian metaphysics to the realm of mobile material beings.

Danto gives a good description of naturalism, saying, "Naturalism, in recent usage, is a species of philosophical monism according to which whatever exists or happens is natural in the sense of being susceptible to explanation through methods, which although paradigmatically exemplified in the natural sciences, are continuous from domain to domain of objects and events. Hence, naturalism is polemically defined as repudiating the view that there exists or could exist any entities or events which lie, in principle, beyond the scope of scientific explanation."[5]

Of course, modern science is meant in this quote. Obviously, non-material, divine beings are outside the scope of modern scientific explanation. However, it is not so obvious that such beings would be outside the scope of Aristotelian science, especially the science of being qua being. In the context of interpreting Aristotle's metaphysics, the defender of the naturalistic account is one who would either deny any literal importance to Aristotle's doctrine of immaterial beings or who would minimize the importance of this doctrine (as interpreted literally). This denial of the importance of Aristotle's theology leads to the conclusion that Aristotle was a naturalist. Randall offers a good example of this conclusion when he says, "Aristotle's central concern is

not with 'metaphysics' or with logic. It is with nature--that nature of which human life is the clearest illustration."[6] And also, "For Aristotle, as Woodbridge sees him, was a naturalist just because he was a humanist, interested not in nature as man writ large but in man as nature writ clearly and in perfected form."[7]

We have seen that Randall is a representative of the naturalistic account. Any talk of the Unmoved Mover as substance is a myth. The Unmoved Mover represents, in fact, merely order in the universe and the ideal of the life of reason. He says, "Just so, for Aristotle, God is immanent in the world as its intelligible order, and transcends the world as its ideal end."[8] Lest we imagine that this ideal end is also an actual substance, Randall sets us straight, "Where is nous actualized? Where does nous think itself? In things? in separate ideal existence? To be consistent Aristotle must answer, No, in the minds of men. So interpreted, Aristotle's natural theology would be sound, probably the only sound natural theology in the Western tradition."[9] Randall is claiming that "Unmoved Mover" partially means the intelligible order of the cosmos. Randall seems to feel that this order is bound up with potency (perhaps because the cosmos is material). Part of the meaning of "Unmoved Mover" is also pure actuality. But for Randall this "transcends the world as its ideal end" and exists only "in the minds of men." If we interpret Randall correctly here, he is denying that the Unmoved Mover as pure actuality does exist outside of human

thought as an independent substance.

Santayana is another representative of this view. For him the Unmoved Mover seems to be the harmony or order of the universe. It is a sort of epiphenomenon of the universe, the effect rather than the cause of the material universe. We must quote the entire, rather lengthy and poetical passage to convey adequately his meaning:

> Avincenna... When the plectrum, in the hand of an imperfect player, strikes the strings of the lute, the hard dull blow is sometimes heard, as well as the pure music. In this way the material principle, when not fully vivified and harmonized, can disturb and alloy the spirit, in a life that is not divine. In the mind of God no such material accident intrudes, and all is pure music. But would this music have been purer, or could it have sounded at all, if there had been no plectrum, no player, no strings, and no lute? You have studied the Philosopher to little purpose, if you suppose that it is by accident only that the deity is the final cause of the world, and that without any revolution of the spheres the divine intellect would contemplate itself no less blissfully than it now does. That is but a sickly fancy, utterly divorced from science. The divine intellect is the perfect music which the world makes, the perfect music which it hears. Hermes and Pan and Orpheus drew from reeds or conches, or from their own throats such music as these instruments were competent to make; all other sorts of harmony, musically no less melodious, they suffered to remain engulfed in primeval silence. So the soul of this world draws from its vast body the harmonies it can yield, and no others. For it was not the essence of the sounds which conches and throats and reeds might produce that created these reeds and throats and conches, but contrariwise. These sources of sound, having arisen spontaneously, the sounds they naturally make were chosen out of all other sounds to be the music of that particular Arcadia; even so the divine intellect is the music of this particular world. It contemplates such forms as nature embodies. The Philosopher would never have so much as mentioned a divine intellect--the inevitable note, eternally sustained, emitted by all nature and the rolling heavens--if the rolling heavens and nature had not existed. The Stranger. I admit that such is the heart of his doctrine, and if he was never false

> to it, he was a much purer naturalist than his disciples have suspected. The eternity he attributed to the world, and its fixed constitution, support this interpretation: nature was the organ of the deity, and the deity was the spirit of nature.[10]

Gomperz qualifies as yet another representative of the naturalistic position in that he attempts to minimize the Unmoved Mover into a mere theoretical entity of Aristotelian astronomy.[11] Gomperz seems to overlook the fact that being the first mover in Aristotle's astronomy may imply quite a bit more than is apparent at the surface.

Perhaps, more than anything else, it was Werner Jaeger's famous thesis on Aristotle's development which opened the door to the naturalistic interpretation. In any event, it is clear that Jaeger belongs in this camp. According to Jaeger, Aristotle moved from an early Platonic position to a mature position of devotion to the special sciences. This thesis is turned with devastating force against the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover. Accordingly, this doctrine, as presented in the Metaphysics, belongs to an early Platonic lecture, Book Lambda. Jaeger tells us that "the theory of the immaterial first principles, is lacking in the final version of the Metaphysics."[12] Jaeger concludes, "In thus surrendering metaphysics to the special sciences, he began a new era."[13] In Jaeger's account, Aristotle's theology or at least his monistic theology is a relic of his immature, Platonic period of development. His mature thought shows a real tendency to reject metaphysics, with its con-

cern for supersensible beings, in favor of the empirical sciences.

We shall argue against the naturalistic position. We shall argue that the Unmoved Mover is an extremely important concept in Aristotelian philosophy and is one which was not rejected by Aristotle in favor of empirical science. Indeed, this view of science as being opposed to metaphysics and theology is quite foreign to Aristotelian thought as we shall see.[14]

If we stand against the naturalistic account, we also will argue against the opposite extreme which we will term the Neoplatonic account. We take the term "Neoplatonic" from Merlan who writes, "...Some of the most characteristic features of Neoplatonism originated in the Academy and in Aristotle. It is perfectly legitimate to speak of an Aristoteles Neoplatonicus."[15] In using the name "Neoplatonic," we are not suggesting that the defenders of the position wish to attribute to Aristotle everything found in later thinkers such as Plotinus and Proclus. We know of no advocate of this position who attributes a doctrine of emanation to Aristotle, for example.[16] As we see it, the advocates of the Neoplatonic account claim that Aristotle is committed to a gradational metaphysics. For them, "being" designates one nature and there are degrees of being with the immobile substances being the highest and clearest expression of being. The advocates of this account are, of course, aware that Aristotle says that being is not a genus,[17] and that "being" is said in many ways.[18] Consequently, they defend their reductionist

view with what we believe to be an erroneous analysis of Aristotle's explanation of pros hen equivocity or focal meaning. A term which is a pros hen equivocal is one which appears to have many meanings, one primary and the others secondary. This account holds that these secondary meanings refer to the one primary meaning in the sense that the secondary uses of the term really only designate the nature designated by the primary use. In short pros hen equivocity is, at bottom, univocity. Of course, the designation via the secondary uses of the term is somewhat indirect, much as a copy may be said to designate the original model, whereas the primary use of the term designates the same nature directly. This same nature is seen as more diluted or less clear in its secondary instances than in its primary. In the context of Aristotelian theology, the nature in question is being and the Neoplatonic account concludes that Aristotelian first philosophy is theology in the sense that its object of study is only the fullness of being as expressed in the immobile and and immaterial beings, the Unmoved Mover.

Merlan is a good example of an advocate of the Neoplatonic account. He talks of the objects of theology subsisting to a higher degree than other objects.[19] He speaks of being as an element of everything[20] and claims that, for Aristotle, some beings have more being than others. He says "being in them is more powerful, clear, undiluted."[21] He draws an analogy between being as an element and hydrogen and oxygen as elements of water.[22] He concludes that, because the

Unmoved Mover is being to the highest degree, the study of the Unmoved Mover is the study of being qua being, i. e., the study of being qua being is the study of the best kind of being not of being, in general.[23]

Nogales[24] offers another example of the Neoplatonic account. He claims, "As there exists among the categories a reduction to the unity of substance, there also exists a reduction to the unity of substances among themselves."[25] For Nogales, not only "being" but also "substance" is a pros hen equivocal. Nogales believes that substances are arranged in a hierarchy where "each grade is more perfect than the previous one, in such a way that the lower grades not only are included in the higher, but are subordinated to them." Nogales concludes, "As a result, in the explanation of the higher grade must necessarily be found the explanation of the higher ones."[26] These passages clearly indicate that Nogales has accepted a synonomy or univocity account of pros hen equivocity. To speak of degrees of perfection is ordinarily to imply sameness of kind. Nogales does not say that his talk of degrees is non-ordinary. On the contrary he seems to use it in an ordinary and straightforward way when he speaks of "diverse grades of being of substance"[27] and when he talks of the Unmoved Mover as precontaining all the perfections of the finite substances.[28] Nogales should draw the conclusion that Aristotle was a monist and a pantheist if all being is reducible to that of the divinity. This conclusion he does not draw but he does admit that his account does make Aristotle

appear "much more Platonic than some interpretations of history of philosophy believed him to be."[29]

What Veatch[30] has to say on this subject is admittedly sketchy. We think it probable that he is an advocate of the Neoplatonic position because he speaks of a pros hen equivocal series not only between accidents and substance but between various kinds of substances and between the constituitive elements of substance: matter and form. For him, form is the primary instance of "substance" and the Unmoved Mover is pure form. We take Veatch to hold a synonomy account of pros hen equivocity because he speaks of the Unmoved Mover as "being in the truest or most perfect sense."[31] To speak of "most perfect" being is again to speak of degrees of being and to imply a sameness of kind. Veatch, then, appears to present Aristotelian metaphysics as a gradational metaphysics.

It is not absolutely clear whether we should place J. Owens[32] in the Neoplatonic camp because, as we shall see below, he does not seem to be always consistent. However, there is evidence which would incline us to place him in this camp. In speaking of the pros hen series which obtains between substance (J. Owens translates "ousia" as "Entity" rather than "substance") and accidents, he says, "So the inference that Entity alone contains in itself the nature of being seems fully legitimate. The examples used to illustrate the doctrine stress the presence of the 'nature'

in the primary instance alone. The nature involved is found only in the first instance."[33] This means that, as J. Owens sees it, the being of accidents is reducible to that of substance. That is what it means to him to say that "being" is a pros hen equivocal. But J. Owens further maintains that there is a pros hen series between substances.[34] The Unmoved Mover is the primary instance of substance.

Must we not conclude, then, that the being of all other substances is reducible to that of the Unmoved Mover? If this is so, then first philosophy as the science of being qua being should study only the Unmoved Mover in which the nature of being is present alone. J. Owens does not explicitly state this conclusion but we think that he is forced to it on his interpretation of the pros hen series of substance and accidents. If this is true, then it is clear that he adheres to a synonomy account of pros hen equivocity in that all uses of a term designate the one nature of the primary use. We fail to see how J. Owens can avoid concluding that "being" designates only one nature (that of the Unmoved Mover) and is, at bottom, a univocal, rather than a genuinely equivocal, term. For these reasons we think it probable that he does hold the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle's theology and metaphysics (although it is not clear how J. Owens can hold for an Aristotelian metaphysics which is gradational since the nature of being ought, for J. Owens, to be found only in the Unmoved Mover).

We intend to argue that the Neoplatonic account is incorrect on several counts:

1.) Being does not constitute one nature for Aristotle. Consequently, Aristotelian metaphysics is not an example of a gradational metaphysics in the usual sense of "gradational."

2.) The correct interpretation of pros hen equivocity is not that it is a form of univocity or synonmy but rather that it is a genuine case of systematic equivocity. This means that the primary use of a term designates a nature different from the secondary and yet they have some connection over and above the chance connection of only both having the same name.

3.) There is no pros hen series between substances.

We believe, then, that both the naturalistic and Neoplatonic accounts of Aristotle's theology are incorrect and will argue accordingly. This polemic will occupy a substantial part of this dissertation. One reason which prompts us to embark on an investigation of Aristotle's theology is a desire to work through the naturalist-Neoplatonist controversy and, by doing so, to try to get an accurate picture of Aristotelian theology. We think that such a picture involves rejecting both sides of the controversy. Also, we think and will argue that the Unmoved Mover is not only the ultimate telos of the cosmos, but also the telos of Aristotle's metaphysics. If this is so, then a clearer analysis of the concept of the Unmoved Mover will also shed light on those metaphysical concepts which

necessarily precede it and so give us not only a better insight into these concepts but also a clearer overall picture of Aristotelian metaphysics. We take it as self-evident that such a picture would be of value to anyone interested in the history of Western philosophy.

Perhaps at this point it would be well to state what we do not intend to do:

1.) We do not intend to exhaustively discuss all or even most of the important concepts of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. We intend to deal with those concepts which are directly relevant to our thesis.

2.) We will not engage in an historical survey of interpretations of Aristotle's theology but rather confine ourselves more or less to contemporary commentaries. This does not mean that we will not refer to some historical commentator, if by doing so, we can shed light on some point relevant to our thesis. Reasonable limits to this dissertation preclude any exhaustive historical survey.

We shall argue for our thesis in the following way:

I. In Chapter I, we shall come to grips with the problem of the Aristotelian corpus. In discussing this problem we shall consider the genetic method of Jaeger which was used by Jaeger to minimize the importance of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover by assigning it to an early Platonic period in Aristotle's development. However, other scholars have used the genetic method and reached

the conclusion that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover belongs to Aristotle's most mature period. These conflicting conclusions, along with other evidence, raise the problem of control of the genetic method. Although we cannot solve this problem, we do believe that Aristotle's corpus contains evidence of his philosophical development. Consequently, we shall act as if the corpus was written by Aristotle and we will attempt to resolve prima facie contradictions in the text by a deeper philosophical understanding of the concepts involved. Where this is impossible and where there seems to be clear evidence of a change in thinking, we will have recourse to a genetic account. The reader can expect to encounter the genetic explanation only rarely.

II. In Chapter II, we shall investigate types of Aristotelian equivocity. First, we will briefly discuss ambiguity in general and then equivocation on single terms. This kind of equivocation is either chance or systematic. We will proceed to investigate the systematic variety. This investigation will lead us to a discussion of analogy and the metaphors which depend upon it and pros hen equivocity. We will argue that these are two different species of systematic equivocity and that the proper interpretation of each is in terms of the homonymy account. This account claims that different natures are designated by the different uses of metaphorical or pros hen terms. We will argue that the homonymy

account is superior to the alternatives, especially to the synonymy account, which claims that it is the same nature which is designated, though in different ways, in all uses of intentionally equivocal terms. We will also discuss why this investigation of equivocity is so important to Aristotle's metaphysical endeavor.

III. In Chapter III, we will begin our task of explicating the nature and function of the Unmoved Mover. Since Aristotle speaks of the Unmoved Mover as substance,[35] it will be necessary to unpack the concept of substance. We must discover what characteristics a being must have to be called "substance." Our search for these characteristics will take us first into the Categories and then into the Metaphysics.

1.) Since we are attempting to avoid both the Neoplatonic and the naturalist accounts, it will be necessary, while discussing the categories, to pay close attention to the relation of accidents to substance. As we have seen, one of the characteristics of the Neoplatonic account is the reduction of the being of accidents to that of substance. It is important to combat this reduction from the beginning. We will do this by arguing that accidents have both essences and definitions through these are predicated of accidents and substance in a pros hen equivocal way. We will again argue that pros hen equivocals designate different natures so that the essence of an accident and its definition is not reducible to that of substance. We shall point to texts from the corpus which count

against the reductionist position and its conclusion that the science of being qua being is concerned exclusively with substance.

2. We shall move on to consider the claims that "substance" designates a universal, or a form which is neither a universal nor a particular. It will be argued that, if "universal" is taken as something common to many things, then it cannot be substance. It will also be argued that the position that substance is form which is neither particular nor universal makes little sense and leads to the absurd conclusion that a thing does not coincide with its own essence.

IV. In Chapter IV, we will examine arguments for the existence of the Unmoved Mover in order to ascertain its function and relation to the material universe. We shall concentrate on the arguments of the Physics and the Metaphysics but we shall not overlook other arguments in the corpus. We will, of course, point out both the weaknesses and strong points of these arguments. At the end of this chapter we should have a clearer picture of Aristotle's world view and the place of the Unmoved Mover in it. We shall be left with two important questions at this juncture:

A. Is there a pros hen series between substances?

B. Is metaphysics or first philosophy to be identified with theology?

V. In Chapter V, we will discuss what Aristotle says about the nature of the Unmoved Mover. In the course of our examination, we shall argue that there is no pros hen series be-

tween substances but that this does not imply, as the Neoplatonic account would have it, that all substances share one nature. We shall also argue that, given the description of the Unmoved Mover, those advocates of the naturalistic account who make the Unmoved Mover the form of the material universe or an effect of the material universe are mistaken. Included in our discussion of the nature of the Unmoved Mover will be an investigation of those problems which surround this doctrine and which are relevant to our thesis, such as the goodness of the Unmoved Mover, the substantiality of the Unmoved Mover, the immateriality of the Unmoved Mover, and the plurality of unmoved movers.

We shall close by discussing the apparent identification of first philosophy with theology. We shall argue that, if this identification is properly understood, it need not force an acceptance of the Neoplatonist account. Our conclusion will be that Aristotle presents his doctrine of the Unmoved Mover as an important part of his metaphysics but that it is not the whole of his metaphysics. The naturalist account is wrong in making the Unmoved Mover little or nothing and the Neoplatonist account is wrong in making this doctrine everything in the sense that to know the Unmoved Mover is to know all "lesser" beings.

Since we have heretofore stressed what we reject in interpretations of Aristotelian metaphysics, let us end this introduction by mentioning some points which we will argue are correct

in an interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics. First, we think that Aristotle's discussion of equivocity is important to his metaphysical enterprise primarily because of his wish to avoid a Platonistic reduction of being to a single Form and his wish to avoid a physicistic reduction of being to some kind of elements (e.g., atoms). It is necessary for Aristotle to show that "being has several senses" and that his predecessors made the mistake of oversimplifying their metaphysics by limiting these senses to one.

While Aristotle admits the equivocity of "being," he finds it to be an intentional equivocal, i.e., a pros hen equivocal with "substance" as its primary (but not only) sense. We do not think that "substance" is treated as a pros hen equivocal. Where it is used equivocally, we find the equivocation to be either chance or analogous metaphor.

We find that "substance" is predicated of the Unmoved Mover in the sense that the Mover is a determinate and individual being and not just the form of the cosmos or of the first heaven. The Mover is the highest substance because it is absolutely independent and independence is one of the most important characteristics of substance. Other substances are either directly or indirectly dependent on the Unmoved Mover and so they are relatively (relative to accidents, their environments, and each other), not absolutely independent.

The Unmoved Mover, we think, functions directly as the

final cause of the first heaven and indirectly as, perhaps, the final cause of all other rational beings. We say "perhaps" because it is not at all clear in the latter case. We reject the idea that Aristotle presents the Unmoved Mover as an efficient or a formal cause.

Finally, we believe that regarding the relationship of first philosophy and theology, one should pay attention to first philosophy or metaphysics as it is actually presented by Aristotle. There metaphysics is seen as a process from things best known to us to those most knowable in themselves. It is the process of making what is most knowable in itself, known to us. It is a working through to a goal. One cannot simply say at the beginning that metaphysics equals theology. Metaphysics as actually presented is not only a study of the divine but a step by step study of lesser beings as well.

These remarks should give the reader a general idea of the negative and positive aspects of our position. We will present arguments for and statements of our position in greater detail in the following chapters.

FOOTNOTES

[1]John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 141.

[2]Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951), p. 295. (Hereafter referred to as The Doctrine of Being.)

[3]Ibid.

[4]We use "Unmoved Mover" in capitals to refer to the first god and "unmoved movers" to refer to the secondary gods.

[5]Arthur C. Danto, "Naturalism," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, Vol. 5 (1967), 448.

[6]Randall, "Introduction" in Fredrick E. Woodbridge, Aristotle's Vision of Nature, Edited with an Introduction by John Herman Randall, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. xvi.

[7]Randall, "Introduction," pp. xx.

[8]Randall, Aristotle, p. 143.

[9]Randall, Aristotle, p. 144.

[10]George Santayana, Dialogues in Limbo (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1957), pp. 245-246.

[11]Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, IV, trans. G. G. Berry (London: John Murray, 1912), p. 354.

[12]Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: The Fundamentals of the History of His Development, trans. Richard Robinson (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 354.

[13]Ibid.

[14]See Randall, Aristotle, p. 137. Randall finds the use of Aristotelian theology by the medievals to be a "colossal irony." Compare his position with Friedrich Solmsen, Plato's Theology (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1942), p. 181 and p. 192.

[15]Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 231 (Hereafter referred to as Platonism).

[16]Wolfson maintains that the doctrine of emmanation is not Greek at all but Christian. See Harry A. Wolfson, "Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes," p. 244.

[17]Met., 998 b. 22; 1045 b. 6.

[18]Met., 1019 a. 5; 1026 a. 34-b. 2; 1028 a. 5.

[19]Merlan, Platonism, p. 160.

[20]Merlan, Platonism, p. 178.

[21]Merlan, Platonism, pp. 171-172.

[22]Merlan, Platonism, pp. 173-174.

[23]Merlan, Platonism, p. 174.

[24]Salvador G. Nogales, S.J., "The Meaning of 'Being' in Aristotle," International Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1972), p. 333.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., p. 335.

[28]Ibid., p. 337.

[29]Ibid., p. 339.

[30]Henry B. Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974).

[31]Veatch, p. 161.

[32]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being.

[33] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 153.

[34] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 295.

[35] Met., 1071 b. 21; 1072 a. 30-35.

Chapter I

The Problem of the Aristotelian *corpus*

Werner Jaeger's book, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development* was first published in German in 1923. This book propounded the now famous genetic account of the Aristotelian *corpus*. This interpretation claims that no unified system of thought[1] is present in the *corpus* but rather a record of Aristotle's intellectual development. According to Jaeger, this development was supposedly a movement from the Platonism found in the fragments of the Aristotelian dialogues[2] to a more mature position of positivism or a surrender of "metaphysics to the special sciences."[3]

This view handled the *prima facie* contradictions in the *corpus* very well. One could now assign one statement or passage to an earlier phase of Aristotle's thought and another to a later, more mature phase. Of course, this interpretation wreaked havoc on the older tradition which had seen the *corpus* as a unified philosophical system. Be that as it may, it has become a very persuasive and popular interpretation. Randall claims that the genetic account has psychological probability on its side.[4] This probability has fallen somewhat due to the fact that several, mutually opposed conclusions

have been reached using the genetic account. Let us consider some examples.

First, a specific problem may be examined. Whereas Jaeger calls book Lambda of the Metaphysics "an early lecture" and interprets the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover as part of Aristotle's earlier Platonism[5], an Aristotelian scholar of no less repute than Ross writes, "Thus the belief in an unmoved first mover is not an early belief but Aristotle's last word on the subject...."[6]

Let us move on to interpretations that deal with the corpus as a whole. I. Düring offers an interesting example. He accepts the genetic account in general but reverses Jaeger's scenario. According to Düring, Aristotle, at first, fiercely opposed Plato's philosophy but later, when more mature adopted a position akin to his master's.[7] The picture here is of a bright, young student who at first revolts against his teacher only to conclude, later in life, that the old master had something worthwhile to say after all.

Zucher has reached the conclusion that it was Theophrastus rather than Aristotle who wrote most of the corpus.[8] It seems that Zucher sees Aristotle as a student of Plato and a Platonist, whereas he sees Theophrastus as a scientist with a strong curiosity about natural things. Tradition has it that Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle as the head of the Lyceum. It was quite likely, according to Zucher, that he added his scientific investigations to Aristotle's more Platonic visions. The prima facie inconsistencies in the text

are explained by the claim that the corpus is a mixture of statements from both a scientist (Theophrastus) and a mystical Platonist (Aristotle).[9]

Grayeff advances a more extreme account, which may be seen as a logical development of Zucher's view. Grayeff claims that "many generations of scholars have proved that the Corpus Aristotelicum contains a great deal that is obviously not the work of Aristotle, but, as has been variously suggested, the work of Theophrastus, Eudemus or of other peripatetics."[10] Accepting this and the legend concerning the loss of the corpus for three centuries,[11] Grayeff concludes, "What has come to us as the Corpus Aristotelicum is, in fact, ... the Corpus Peripateticum or the School Library of Peripatos. For contradictions, critical objections, discussions, differing viewpoints and varying standards are found in the corpus to a degree that seems impossible to attribute any part of it, i.e. any part of some length, to one individual author."[12] More specifically Grayeff claims that "there may not be a single chapter in the corpus which, as it stands, now, is purely Aristotelian. It is not improbable that the whole corpus passed through the hands of two or three successors and, in some cases, more than three, who amplified, criticized, explained and defended the text that was the basis of their own work."[13]

This view is quite at odds with Jaeger's original conclusion. If we accept Grayeff's interpretation of the corpus, we can no longer

look to the corpus as evidence for Aristotle's intellectual development simply because we cannot be sure who wrote it.

There are a number of Aristotelian commentators who would wish to reject or severely limit the genetic approach. Grene, for example, argues that the evidence surrounding the authorship of the corpus is so meager as to allow "no external control"[14] of interpretation. Barker agrees saying, "The fact is that the use of the genetic method is vitiated by subjectivity. The inquirer who uses it becomes the prey of his own interpretation of Aristotle; and he gives or withholds chronological priority--in other words he makes this an early stratum, and that a later--one the grounds of his own inner feelings about the 'early' and the 'late' Aristotle."[15]

Grene gives the philosopher the following advice on how to fruitfully approach the corpus:

> True, even the greatest philosopher may contradict himself; and where he does so, we may well suppose, as a working hypothesis, that he has changed his mind. But there must be some coherence, some unity rich enough to be meaningful and illuminating, in some one stage of his thought, if he is to come through to us as a great philosopher at all.... Critical analysis is essential to history, but it should be criticism subordinate to an aim that is essentially anti-critical: i.e. the imaginative projection of the historian into the situation of his subject, his sympathetic identification with him. While remaining ourselves, with our twentieth-century standards and beliefs we must, if we would understand a dead philosopher, yet put ourselves intellectually in some sense in his place; and this we cannot do if our principle attention is directed to denying rather than asserting his identity. It is logically possible, though, I should think, highly improbable, that there is no unified Aristotle, but we should not let ourselves be led into the byways of geneticism until we have made a serious effort to discover him if he does exist.[16]

Grene's position is not an unreasonable one. Some classical scholars speak against the unity of authorship of the corpus. Very many more (including the historical tradition from the ancient world on) speak in favor of such a unity of authorship. In light of this state of affairs, it does not seem to be unreasonable to approach the corpus as if it were the work of a single author, or accept the unity of authorship as a heuristic device. Of course, such a device is not at odds with the genetic method, as such, but only with a particular conclusion reached by that method.

Lloyd cautions against too quick and frequent uses of the genetic method:

> Moreover there is no compelling reason to assign two passages to two different periods of Aristotle's thought unless the doctrines they contain are strictly incompatible and that is very rarely the case. Often two theories that seem at first sight contradictory can be reconciled with one another when due allowances are made for the different points of view from which a complex problem may be tackled. To mention one example, Nuyens suggested that those passages that refer to the heart as the seat of certain vital functions represent a different stage in the development of Aristotle's psychology from the doctrine of the soul as "the first actuality of the natural, organic body." But here, as other scholars such as Black and Hardie have shown, there is no good reason why Aristotle could not have held both doctrines simultaneously, and there are passages in the psychological treatises that strongly suggest that he did so, which would indicate that whatever we may think of the relationship between the two doctrines in question, Aristotle himself was unaware of any incompatibility between them.[17]

Grene is even more strongly against the employment of the genetic approach. She says, "Meanwhile, let us at least hold in abeyance the genetic solution, which is philosophically a counsel of

despair, until or unless we find that all else fails."[18] One of the reasons for her rather strong conclusion is her perception of what she takes to be a serious mistake on the part of Jaeger. She claims that Jaeger's mistake was a philosophical one. He, all too simplistically, assumed that one cannot be a scientist and a metaphysican. This is an assumption based on a late nineteenth century and early twentieth century view of science rather than an Aristotelian view. According to Grene, Jaeger paid too little attention to Aristotle's philosophy. She feels that it is philosophical criticism rather than ~~that of~~ classical scholarship which is most needed to get a clear picture of Aristotle.[19] Lloyd agrees that philosophical analysis is most needed to understand the corpus. He points out that "the factors which we must consider are not the relative chronology of the treatises in different interrelations of different aspects of his (Aristotle's) thought. The question is a philosophical one which would remain open even if we had the relative and absolute dates of composition of his various works."[20]

Certainly, the position recommended by Grene and Lloyd has its advantage. Few serious students of Aristotle would wish to resolve all prima facie conflicts in the corpus by a quick appeal to the genetic account. It is much more desirable to stimulate one's philosophical imagination by an attempt to reconcile apparently conflicting texts by a deeper understanding of the doctrines involved. However, we must point out certain dangers which might accom-

pany this approach. First, it is not likely that all apparent contradictions in the corpus can be resolved by a correct understanding of the doctrines involved. There are some conflicts which do drive one to the "counsel of despair." An attempt to find in the corpus a completely consistent system of philosophy can lead to a falsification of Aristotle's thought. Furthermore, it is true that the genetic account does allow for various conclusions. Yet, so does the account that finds in the corpus a consistent system of philosophy. One can recall, for example, the different conclusions reached by Aquinas and Averroes. With a work as old as the corpus, one cannot expect a great deal of hard, external evidence. In light of the scarcity of evidence, the student of Aristotle needs all the tools he can get to help him reach an understanding of the many, complex doctrines found in the corpus. If used with caution, the genetic account can be a valuable tool. Is it better or worse, when no other evidence is available, to assign contradictory texts to different times or to say, with Lloyd, that "whatever we may think of the relationship between the two doctrines in question, Aristotle, himself, was unaware of any incompatibility between them"?[21] Many conflicts in the corpus arise over key issues such as the problem of universals or the possibility of the science of metaphysics. To say that Aristotle was unaware of incompatibilities here would certainly do more to destroy his reputation as a great philosopher than most conclusions reached by the defenders of the

genetic account.

We will, therefore, treat the corpus as if it were the work of Aristotle[22] and we will, at times, have recourse to the genetic interpretation. However, where there is a real possibility of another interpretation, we will point it out. Also, we will attempt to resolve prima facie contradictions through a philosophical analysis of the texts in question. When this cannot be done and when it is probable that Aristotle is stating his own position, not repeating one taken from a previous philosopher or common belief, that we will point out a probable genetic solution. This is not to say that all the opinions of previous philosophers and of common belief are rejected by Aristotle. Some he repeats, accepts and incorporates into his own position but others he repeats only to later reject. It is, of course, the latter which we refer to above. We can only hope that our discussion will shed some additional light on the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover and some related concepts.

Footnotes

[1]Natorp had earlier rejected the idea of a unified system in the corpus because of a problem within the Metaphysics. He did not, however, advance the genetic account. See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 15.

[2]Vol. XII of the Oxford translation.

[3]Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 354. It should be noted that Jaeger also finds a parallel development within the Aristotelian dialogues. On this point see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 24-38.

[4]Randall, Aristotle, p. 29.

[5]Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 354.

[6]Sir David Ross, "The Development of Aristotle's Thought," Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolog, 1960), p. 14.

[7]For a discussion of Düring see C. J. DeVogel, "The Legend of the Platonizing Aristotle," Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, p. 255.

[8]For a discussion of Zucher's view see Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 28.

[9]Grene, p. 28.

[10]Felix Grayeff, "The Problem of Aristotle's Text," Phronesis, (1956), 105-122.

[11]Ibid., pp. 105-106.

[12]Ibid., p. 118.

[13]Ibid., p. 119.

[14]Grene, p. 28.

[15]Ernest Barker, trans., The Politics of Aristotle: Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Appendixes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. xlii.

[16]Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, pp. 29-30.

[17]G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), pp. 24-25.

[18]Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 37.

[19]Ibid., p. 31.

[20]Lloyd, p. 26.

[21]Lloyd, p. 25.

[22]See J. Owens The Doctrine of Being, pp. 29-30. He feels that ancient editors did add "superficial connecting links" between the books of the Metaphysics.

Chapter II

Equivocity

Aristotle introduces us to equivocity in his Metaphysics by telling us that "the unqualified term 'being' has several meanings of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true ('non-being' being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the 'what,' quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' may have), and again besides all these there is that which 'is' potentially or actually."[1] The equivocity of "being" is of utmost importance since Aristotle believes that metaphysics or first philosophy is the science of being qua being.[2] Aristotle adds a qualification to this observation of the equivocity of "being" saying, "There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be,' but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity."[3] "Being" is equivocal but not completely so. There is a connection between its various senses. All are related to some central point which is a kind of being. This kind of being is substance: "So, too, there are many senses in which a thing may be said to be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances,

others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself."[4]

Aristotle consistently refuses to oversimplify philosophical matters. In this case rather than stipulate that only one sense of "being" is correct, he openly admits the equivocity of "being." He does not tell us where he discovered his list of these senses but we may assume that he got it from ordinary discourse and the philosophical discussions of previous philosophers. Aristotle's method includes examining the opinions of previous thinkers before launching into his own account.[5] Obviously, he presents his account because he feels the previous thinkers have missed the mark somewhere usually because they failed to see the full complexity of the object of study.[6] In any event, we see that this equivocity of "being" is such that all senses of "being" relate back to a primary sense which is "substance." This sort of equivocity where several secondary senses relate to a primary sense is today called pros hen equivocity[7] or focal meaning.[8]

Aristotle recognizes more types of equivocity than complete equivocity and pros hen equivocity. He clearly points out that the fallacy of amphiboly (as well as other fallacies)[9] may occur because of syntactical ambiguity which he describes as "words that

have a simple sense taken alone have more than one meaning in combination."[10] One example is, "I wish that you the enemy may capture."[11]

For our purposes it is equivocation on single terms such as "being" or "substance" which is of interest. Besides complete equivocity and pros hen equivocity on single terms Aristotle mentions a third kind. In Book Lambda, while again discussing the science of being qua being, Aristotle says, "The causes and the principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all."[12]

Thus we find that, when single terms are concerned, equivocation may be complete or chance[13], or pros hen--toward a central kind of thing--, or by analogy. We will discuss these types below. Here let us again notice that because Aristotle refuses to oversimplify, he is led to recognize the equivocity of some of the key terms of his metaphysics, especially "being." We must also point out that equivocity is a very important topic in our discussion of the Neoplatonic and naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics. Let us briefly consider some examples of these interpretations:

1. J. Owens feels that "substance" is equivocal and intentionally so. It is a pros hen equivocal. In considering any material substance, J. Owens claims that we have a pros hen equivocal series. Form is the primary sense of "substance," whereas matter and the concrete individual are secondary senses.[14] Since first philosophy

is the science of being qua being and substance is the primary instance and sense of being, and form is the primary instance and sense of substance, it follows that first philosophy is the science of form. J. Owens feels that there is also a pros hen equivocal series among different kinds of substances. Those substances which are pure form without matter are the primary instance of substance and being. Thus, first philosophy is essentially the science of immaterial beings, if there are any. Such beings are described by Aristotle as divine[15] and so, first philosophy is theology.[16]

One may admit that "substance" seems to be used equivocally and yet claim that the term is used, however indirectly, to designate one nature. For example, in considering J. Owens' position, one may raise serious doubts as to whether "substance" is considered to be equivocal in spite of J. Owens' affirmation that it is. He says, "...In pros hen equivocals, the one definite nature can be seen according to various ways in all the secondary instances."[17] And, if we might repeat another passage from J. Owens, "When sensible things...are called Being, it is not their own nature, but the nature of the separate Entities which is primarily designated...."[18]

2. Merlan, whose position is similar to that of J. Owens, is more explicit. He seems to feel that all beings are synonyms (using "synonym" and "homonym" to refer to beings as well as terms), although he does see a problem: "It is very difficult to see how 'to be' can be applied to the sensible and the supersensible with-

out becoming a homonym."[19] This difficulty does not prevent Merlan from thinking that "being" designates only one nature: "Suppose everything were ultimately to consist of hydrogen and oxygen and the 'first' combination of hydrogen and oxygen were water, then the study of water would imply the study of hydrogen and oxygen and thus be a study of hydrogen and oxygen in general or of these two as common to all things. Water science would be the first science, therefore general science."[20] The first instance of a nature is "more powerful, clear, undiluted."[21] It is because of this clearness that the study of the first instance is, in a sense, the study of all the rest. It is the same nature which is being studied in all cases but it is present not only more clearly but also to a higher degree in the first instance. Merlan is as explicit as we could wish: "But for a Platonist there are degrees of being; some things participate in being more than others. Therefore, being can be studied better with some things, less well with others. This is precisely Aristotle's viewpoint in Met. G and E,I."[22] As one would expect, this interpretation leads to the conclusion that Aristotle was a Neoplatonist.[23]

Rorty, we think, interprets J. Owens (and Merlan) correctly when he says, "In the Owens scheme, we have to say that we do not really understand what a horse is unless we understand what God is, and we also have to make sense of a form which is the form of no matter and of an actuality which is the actualization of no potential-

ity."[24]

3. Randall, representing the naturalistic interpretation, admits an equivocation in talk referring both to the divine and to material substances. He seems to feel that this equivocation is "sheer" or complete:

> It (the Unmoved Mover) is not even the eternal "sustainer" of the world, in the Neoplatonic sense: for to Aristotle, the world does not need to be sustained, it needs rather to be explained and understood. The Unmoved Mover exercises no providence, it has no "will" and no "purpose." It is not "intelligent" as man has the power of intelligence; it does not "think," as man can be said to think at times. It can be called nous or intellect only in the sense in which Spinoza's Order of Nature or Substance can be said to be "intellect." And Aristotle could even say, with Spinoza--with some exaggeration in both cases--that there is no more in common between this Cosmic Nous and human nous than there is between the Dog, the constellation in the Heavens and the dog, the animal that barks. It is an intelligible structure or order, a principle of intelligibility. Hence Avicenna, Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas and the rest, in identifying the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle with the "God" of the religious tradition, were, like all rational or natural theologions, indulging in double talk. The technical theological term is, they were speaking not univocally but "equivocally"--they were equivocating.[25]

Much of what Randall says about the Unmoved Mover is controversial. More generally, it would seem that, for Randall, all terms in Aristotelian metaphysics which are used to describe the Unmoved Mover as well as material substances are used equivocally. This is not as obvious as Randall leads us to believe. Further, Randall suggests that there is only one type of equivocation: complete equivocation or "double talk". This is to oversimplify a complex issue. Even if it were so, why did Aristotle, himself, engage

in such double talk (we assume Avicenna and company were confused by religion)? Perhaps Randall would admit some intentional connection between the equivocal uses of the same term. If so, perhaps he, like Santayana,[26] would see the Unmoved Mover as a secondary instance of being. Santayana finds the Unmoved Mover to be an epiphenomenon. Randall, above, calls it a structure or order and elsewhere refers to it as "a purely intellectual ideal."[27] An intellectual ideal would seem to be an accident of the human soul. Of course, knowledge in the human soul could correspond to an actually existing object of that knowledge. As we said in our introduction, we do not think this is Randall's point. First, he talks of a "purely intellectual ideal." Second, he identifies the Unmoved Mover with order in the cosmos. We doubt that Randall would wish to say that Aristotle believed that the order of the material cosmos (which is marked by potency) is an example of pure actuality. We shall advance further arguments against Randall in our chapter on substance.

4. Lesher, who seems to be neither in the naturalistic nor Neoplatonic camp, denies that there are different senses of "substance" in Aristotle.[28] Lesher claims that "substance" means only the species-form which is universal and so charges Aristotle with being caught in a dilemma: either Aristotle is inconsistent in claiming that the Platonic universals cannot be substances while allowing his universal species-form to be substance or he offers us an un-

argued for alternative to Platonism in that he considers the species-form as existing as a non-universal.[29]

It should be clear that a discussion of equivocity is important primarily because Aristotle, himself, characterizes equivocity as important to his metaphysics which he identifies with theology. Secondarily, the doctrine of equivocity is important because the ways that commentators understand and apply this doctrine lead to varying interpretations of Aristotle's metaphysics in general and his doctrine of the Unmoved Mover in particular (if, indeed, they are two different studies). Let us now turn to an examination of the Aristotelian study of equivocity.

Types of Equivocation

For Aristotle, equivocation can be either chance or intentional.[30] Chance equivocation occurs when the two or more meanings of the term or statement in question are logically unrelated. Perhaps a good example is "root" which may refer to a mathematical item or a part of a tree. It is not necessary that one know either meaning to grasp the other. Sometimes chance equivocation is called sheer or complete equivocation or just equivocation by both Aristotle and some commentators. If we mean chance equivocation we shall qualify it with the adjective. With systematic equivocation, there is some logical connection between the plurality of meanings of the term or statement in question.

We have said that equivocation on single terms is important for our purpose. If a term designates an essence, it must designate only one essence uniformly throughout an argument if it is to be considered univocal. Words which designate more than one essence are equivocal and, following Ackrill's translation of the Categories, the beings so designated are homonyms.[31] In considering these essence, Leszl warns, "For it is not single criteria, but sets of criteria that must be compared. If we have two sets, which are different qua sets, we have straightforward homonymy independently of whether some of these criteria (properties) coincide or not. Otherwise, calling an ox 'a man' would not be sheer equivocity (as it certainly is), since they are both animals, and thus share some essential properties."[32] We should also point out that equivocity, in itself, is not something fallacious. It is only when one is unaware of which meaning is in use or of a shift in meaning that a fallacy may occur.

It would appear that Aristotle believed that an equivocal term had a specific number of meanings and that the philosopher should "render their definitions."[33] To help with this task he points to many criteria for determining whether a term is used equivocally or not.[34]

Analogy and Metaphor

There are references to two major types of intentional equi-

vocity: the first is analogy and the second is focal meaning or pros hen equivocity. It is the former which we will discuss first. Aristotle finds analogy to be different from straightforward univocity. He asks, "Are the goods one, then by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good or are they rather one by analogy?"[35]

Analogy can yield knowledge, even scientific knowledge: "The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the 'this' or existent."[36] Analogy does give some sort of universal knowledge[37] but it is different from knowledge of things with the same species or genus.[38]

It may very well be that Aristotle's notion of analogy was originally drawn from mathematics.[39] In any event, analogy involves four terms and shows that a similar relationship or function which exists between the first and second also exists between the third and fourth.[40] Aristotle gives an example: "Certainly as sight is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases."[41] Such analogies are transcategorical: "For in each category of being an analogous term is found--as the straight is in length, so is the level in surface, perhaps the odd in number, and the white in color."[42] This type of analogy seems to be what the medievals called the "analogy of proportionality."[43] Several other features of Aris-

totelian analogy ought to be pointed out here. In a successful analogy there is usually an epistemological dependence of one term on the other three. However, this does not necessitate that the definition of the fourth term include that of any or all of the other three. If it was necessary that the definition of the fourth term included that of the third, we would say that the third term was logically prior to the fourth (thus epistemological priority and logical priority are distinct). Nor can we say that analogy requires ontological dependency, i.e., we cannot necessarily say that the fourth term depends for existence on the other three. Color or number does not seem to be ontologically dependent on length. Such dependency is not explicitly excluded.[44] It is simply not essential to this type of analogy.

We do not always describe an analogy explicity. We may, more often, have recourse to metaphor based on analogy.[45] For example, we may say that Achilles is a lion rather than describing the analogy.

How is one to interpret Aristotle's doctrine of analogy? Leszl lists four possible interpretations but it seems to us that only two are plausible enough to warrant serious discussion:

1. Synonymy--it is really the same nature which is designated by both the metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of a term. This account reduces analogy to some kind of univocity. A term used metaphorically (with an analogy as the basis for the

metaphor) designates one nature even if it does so indirectly.

2. Homonymy--the metaphorical and non-metaphorical uses of a term designate different natures and the term is truly equivocal. The equivocation is intentional and not the chance variety.

The synonomy account holds that analogous or, more properly, metaphorical uses of a term are possible because, at bottom, it is one common nature which is designated by all uses of the term. The secondary or deviant uses designate this common nature indirectly. Analogy is reduced to univocity. An obvious question which arises is, if this is true, why speak of analogy at all? A defender of this account might reply that it is the indirectness of the designation in analogous metaphor which differentiates it from pure univocity. So, when we say that the big cat of Africa is a lion and that Achilles is a lion, we are designating the nature of the cat in both cases, though indirectly in the latter.

Perhaps this position could be fortified by stressing the functional element of Aristotle's thought.[46] Often in Aristotelian metaphysics, one discovers nature through function, or more simply, what a thing is by how it acts.[47] One might claim that things which have identical functions have the same nature. Leszel objects. "Certainly we can admit a univocal use of such words by defining them exclusively in terms of that identical function of things; but in this case the logical discrepancy between the primary and secondary or transferred uses of the word is lost, and thus there is

no analogy, but pure and simple univocity."[48]

Let us consider whether Leszel's objection is correct. If we call Elsa (the famous lion of Born Free) a lion and Achilles a lion, are we designating the same nature in both cases? If so, what is the nature designated? In the case of Elsa we designate the big cat of Africa but in Achilles case we mean "courageous creature" or the like. Achilles is called a lion in non-technical language because courage is (mistakenly, according to Aristotle) taken to be an essential characteristic of the lion. Clearly, then the two uses have two different senses. Nor would Aristotle accept the fact that "courageous creature" is designated by both uses because he would deny that the animal could really possess the virtue of courage.[49] The defender of synonomy might reply that our particular example is faulty because of the discrepancy between the rather popular view of the lion and courage and Aristotle's rather technical ethical view. The defender of synonomy might wish us to consider a fish's fin and a canoe paddle. Here, he might argue, that if we call a paddle a "fin," in this case and in the case of the fish's fin we are designating something which is used to propel one through water. Both uses designate the same nature--something which can be used to propel one through water. This defense is rather strained. At best it shows that the two beings in question have the same (fairly ultimate) genus or generic nature. Now it may be that when Aristotle speaks

of the "nature" of a thing, he refers only to the genus.[50] If the defender of synonomy is content with the conclusion that in some metaphorical uses of terms the beings designated by the primary and transferred uses of the term in question have the same generic nature, then we are also content to agree. However, we believe that the defender of synonomy would want more than this. He would want to say that the various uses of a term designate the same essential nature. The essential nature is given in a real definition and must contain not only the genus but the (specific) differentia.[51] So our defender would probably be committed to the claim that the things designated by the primary and metaphorical uses of a term were one in species. There seems to be no evidence in favor of this claim.

If we turn to Aristotle's texts we find clear evidence against the synonomy account: "Yet a further method of selection is by analogy: for we cannot find a single identical name to give a squid's pounce, a fish's spine, and an animal's bone, although these too possess common properties as if there were a single osseous nature."[52] Two points deserve mention:

1. Although we have an analogy between three kinds of beings, we have no linguistic device (metaphor) for naming it in this case.

2. More importantly, it is "as if" (hosper) these beings had one nature. This clearly implies they do not. Even if Aristotle means only "specific nature" here, it is sufficiently damaging to the synonomy account as we have argued immediately above.

There is more, equally damaging, evidence against the synonymy account. Aristotle explains that things may be "nearly related either generically or analogically, with the result that they seem not to be equivocal (homonymiai) though they really are."[53] In speaking of metaphors, Aristotle tells us that they are "transferred from their proper sphere."[54] Again in the Metaphysics, Aristotle speaks of analogy as a kind of equivocation: "...We may neglect the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy...."[55]

The case against the synonymy and for the homonymy account would seem to be well supported. However, we do find apparent textual support for account number one: "A 'potency' or 'power' in geometry is so called by a change in meaning. These senses of 'capable,' or 'possible' involve no reference to potency. But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary kind of potency...."[56] It is not at all clear that Aristotle is speaking of analogy here. Also he seems to claim that the senses of "possible," etc. in geometry "involve no reference to potency." Those senses which contain some reference to a primary sense would seem to involve focal meaning rather than analogy (as we shall see in our discussion of the former) and Aristotle explicity tells us that "power" in geometry is so-called because of an analogy.[57]

It should be clear that the synonymy account is a very improbable interpretation of Aristotelian analogy, or more precisely,

analogous metaphor. The evidence rather lends support to the homonymy account. Leszl states this position clearly: "The statement 'Achilles is a lion' is false, when taken literally. But it is true, when taken non-literally. Since we assume that there is no change in that to which it applies, the only explanation of this change in truth-value (i.e., of the fact that the statement is true instead of being false) is that there is change in meaning. 'Achilles' and 'is' are clearly used in the same sense; it is 'lion,' then, which is not used so, but is equivocal."[58]

We think that enough evidence has been presented to block any attempt to establish a monistic, Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics based on a synonymous account of Aristotelian analogy. Usually, such an attempt is not primarily made at the level of analogy. Nogales offers us a typical example of the Neoplatonic use of analogy when he says that, as accidents are to substance, so sensible substances are to the divinity. However, the latter relation is claimed to be based on focal meaning.[59] Of course, Nogales has not used a metaphor but has directly described what he takes to be an analogy between accidents and substance and between sensible substances and the Unmoved Mover. The claim that there is such an analogy must be justified. Since it is based, to a large degree, on focal meaning we must turn to a consideration of this concept.

Focal Meaning

As we have seen focal meaning is called "pros hen equivocation" by J. Owens. Some refer to it as "analogy of attribution."[60] We have used both the terms "focal meaning" and "pros hen equivocation" and will continue to do so. However, in using the latter designation we do not wish to beg the question regarding the interpretation of this device.

Although there are several interpretations of focal meaning, most commentators seem to accept certain points about focal meaning no matter what interpretation they accept.

A.) Focal meaning is somewhat different from ordinary synonymy or univocity. The reason is clear. If we take synonymy as it is described in the Categories,[61] we find it impossible to apply to cases of focal meaning. For example, if "healthy" is applied both to a man and the sun, we could not very well say that the definitions (in terms of genus and species) of a man and the sun were the same.[62] However, this should not be taken to rule out all possibility of the synonymy account. Other grounds are offered in defense of this account, as we shall see.

B.) Focal meaning is systematic and not chance equivocation. We emphasize that this type of systematic equivocation may be interpreted in different ways.

C. There is certainly a logical connection between the primary and secondary uses of a term in that the secondary are depen-

dent on the primary.[63]

Let us consider what Aristotle says on the matter. In the Eudemian Ethics, he tells us that "good," "love," and "friendship" are pros hen equivocals. He clearly rules out both ordinary univocity and chance equivocity: "There must, then, be three kinds of love not all being so named for one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet having the same name quite by mere accident."[64] He criticizes those who insist on only one definition for a term: "But because the universal is primary, they also take the primary to be universal, and this is an error. And so they are not able to do justice to all observed facts about friendships; for since one definition will not suit them all, they think there are no other friendships: but others are friendships only not similarly so."[65] We may assume that it is some of the Platonists who are being criticized. Aristotle's point seems to be that a universal in the sense of a common characteristic is held to be primary to those beings which have the characteristic. Aristotle does not spell out what "primary" means in this context but, if he is referring to the Platonists, we may assume that they would find the universal to be primary logically, ontologically, and epistemologically. It is not our purpose to decide whether this doctrine is true of Plato and the Platonists. Rather, we think that it is important that Aristotle clearly claims that their error is in taking

the primary to be universal. We take him to mean that in a prior-posterior series the first member is not universal or common to all the other members.[66]

Now when one uses a term in pros hen equivocal ways, there is a prior-posterior series in the sense that one of the uses is primary in some sense to the other uses. Aristotle's own example of such a series is friendship. He tells us that there are three kinds of friendship: 1.) That based on mutual love of excellence of the persons involved, 2.) That based on the usefulness of each person to the other, and 3.) That based on the pleasure that each gets from the other.

The first of these seems to be the primary kind (see n. 65 above) but the others may also be called friendships. To deny this is "to do violence to the facts, and makes one assert paradoxes."[67] It is not clear what the paradoxes are. We would speculate that one would inadvertently predicate friendship of the latter two relationships in ordinary discourse, yet deny it when considering the situation from a Platonic position. Yet, reality is not so simple. It is because of the facts that this strict limitation of terms is incorrect. A non-univocal application of a term, if systematic, may point out some connection between beings which may not be seen, if different terms were used. Of course, there is the risk of confusion, but Aristotle seems to think it is worth the risk. He makes no attempt to change ordinary usage by inventing, for example, substitutes for "friend-

ship" in the latter two cases.

Aristotle draws attention to the fact that "friendship" and "love" are used just as "medical" is--in a pros hen equivocal way. He writes, "For all the senses of love are related to one which is primary, just as is the case with the word 'medical,' and just as we speak of a medical soul, body, instrument, or act, but properly the name belongs to that primarily so called. The primary is that the definition of which is implied in the definition of all; e.g. a medical instrument is one that a medical man would use, but the definition of the instrument is not implied in that of medical man."[68]

In this example, it is the medical man which is the primary instance of being medical and consequently the primary application of the term "medical." Aristotle tells us that the definitions of the secondary instances imply the definition of the primary. So a medical instrument is an instrument that a medical man (qua medical man, we may assume) would find useful. Notice, however, that there is no indication that the secondary use designates only the primary. A medical instrument is an instrument which a medical man would find useful. It exists as an instrument, albeit a medical one. Although the definitions of the secondary instances imply that of the first, it is not identical with the first. If "imply" here means "designate the same nature," then the implication should work also from the primary to the secondary but Aristotle tells us that this is not the case. The type of oversimplification which assumes only one

nature named for one name is "the death of discussion."[69]

The doctrine of focal meaning, whatever interpretation we might give it, comes into play in attempting to solve the problem of whether or not there can be a science of being qua being. Aristotle, at one point, denies the possibility saying, "And then being is not one in all we have just mentioned so neither is good; nor is there one science either of being or of the good...."[70] Elsewhere he writes, "There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these treats universally of being as being."[71]

There is, of course, a prima facie conflict between the two texts. J. Owens feels that systematic equivocation is never ruled out as a basis for the science of being, at least not in the Metaphysics.[72] We agree wholeheartedly with J. Owens on this point. It is focal meaning and analogy which gives sufficient unity to the subject matter (being) to permit a single science of it. Aristotle, in other words, does not restrict science to the study of things generically the same. He points out, "For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion."[73] He explains more clearly, "There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be' but all that 'is' is related to one central point,

one definite kind of things, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health...."[74] Aristotle means to exclude 'being' from chance equivocity but not the intentional variety.

What of the apparent contradiction concerning the science of being? G. E. L. Owen offers a resolution of this conflict.[75] He claims that the Eudemian Ethics is an early work in which the concept of focal meaning was not as fully applied as it was in the later books of the Metaphysics which speak of the science of being. He says, "Aristotle does indeed use the idea of focal meaning in the Eudemian Ethics: he applies it to his stock example 'medical' and then in detail to 'friendship.' But he has not seen its application to such wholly general expressions as 'being' or 'good'."[76]

On G. E. L. Owen's account, Aristotle gradually developed the notion of focal meaning and extended it later to 'being.' In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle rejects the primary as universal saying, "But because the universal is primary they also take the primary to be universal and this is an error."[77] In the Metaphysics, he says, "...The science of this [immovable substance] must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is, first."[78] G. E. L. Owen believed that Aristotle retracted or reformulated his position on primacy and universality.[79] He argues for reformulation. He claims that in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle's notion of priority was only one of natural priority rather than logical

priority in regard to being. G. E. L. Owen contends that "at this stage or in this context he does not consider the idea of focal meaning or the associated notion of logical priority at all."[80] If this is not so, says G. E. L. Owen, then Aristotle contradicts himself. If he had as full a knowledge of focal meaning in the Eudemian Ethics as in the Metaphysics, then he was inconsistent in denying the science of being in the former and affirming it in the second. However, this apparent inconsistency is resolved if we accept G. E. L. Owen's developmental account of focal meaning.

Leszl objects to G. E. L. Owen's interpretation of the apparent conflict. The basis for Leszl's objection is that he finds logical and natural (or ontological) priority to be co-extensive throughout the corpus.[81] Leszl argues that the type of science of being which is denied in the Eudemian Ethics is a deductive science, in which one knows all lesser beings if one knows the form of Being, itself.[82] Leszl claims that in Metaphysics, Gamma, Aristotle is speaking of a different kind of science. Leszl says, "This new science is conceived as a sort of dialectical (non-deductive) inquiry, which considers, e.g., the logical dependence between the various senses of 'being' and, in a parallel way, between the various senses of 'one' and, at the same time, the ontological dependences which underlie them."[83]

We agree with Leszl in part but we also disagree in part. First, we think that Aristotle, in the Eudemian Ethics, does indeed

deny that we have access to a generic form of Being, itself, from which we can deduce the forms of all lesser beings. Yet this admission does not commit us to saying that Aristotle was fully aware of "being" as a pros hen equivocal in the Eudemian Ethics. Of course, Leszl does not claim that such an admission makes his case. He feels, rather, that because logical and natural priority are found to be co-extensive throughout the corpus, that Aristotle must have been aware of the pros hen equivocity of "being" and the logical priority of "substance" since the natural priority of substance is mentioned in a work as early as the Categories.[84] In itself, it is not crucial to us whether or not logical priority is found in the Categories. However, Leszl's claim that natural and logical priority are co-extensive is of import to our thesis. If Leszl is correct, then Aristotle's admission of a natural priority between substances in Metaphysics, Lambda would commit us to accepting a logical priority as well. This may be but we cannot see that simply because there is a natural priority, there is a logical priority.

Leszl's argument is as follows:

> It will always be on the basis of conceptual or logical consideration (even if not limited to a look at the definitions, for the appropriateness of them is itself something which must be established, but always concerning the notions of substance and of the other categories), certainly not on the basis of purely empirical considerations, that the priority of substance will be established. For surely, there is no experience which shows

> that, if all substances were eliminated, quantities, qualities, etc. would also be eliminated while the inverse need not be the case.[85]

Leszl bolsters his argument by analyzing, "health," saying, "For, if any 'natural' dependence (i.e., dependence in existence) would do, it would not be clear either why health should be prior to what is productive of health rather than vice-versa."[86]

The major problem with Leszl's interpretation seems to us that he works from his own understanding of supposedly Aristotelian doctrines without sufficiently examining the texts. For example, Aristotle explicitly says that logical and natural (in this case, priority in substance) are not co-extensive. He cautions, "Still not all things that are prior in definition are also prior in substantiality. For those things are prior in substantiality which when separated from other things surpass them in the power of independent existence, but things are prior in definition to those whose definitions are compounded out of their definitions; and the two properties are not co-extensive."[87]

This text establishes, against Leszl, the separation of natural and logical priority. (We may add that in Lambda Aristotle mentions natural priority in connection with analogy and not with logical priority or focal meaning.[88]) As to the empirical base which Leszl cannot find for the natural priority of substance, perhaps if he said that if any accident perished, its substance would not whereas if any substance did, its accidents would (assuming accidents are not uni-

versals) instead of talk of all substances perishing, he might see an empirical basis.

While it is not to our purpose to discuss the science of being qua being here, we must at least say that Leszl's identification of this science as a "dialectical inquiry" is very curious since Aristotle distinguishes between dialectics and science.[89] We will take this up in our later discussion of the science of metaphysics.

In discussing focal meaning, we have run up against the question whether or not Aristotle's doctrine of focal meaning or at least Aristotle's application of the doctrine developed. Evidence does point to a development in its application, as G. E. L. Owen suggests. In the course of this discussion, we have learned some fairly important points about focal meaning:

1. There must be a prima facie equivocation (even if shown, at bottom, to be univocation) on a single term.

2. The equivocation must be systematic and not chance.

3. There must be a logical series between the primary and secondary senses of the term in that the secondary senses must include the primary sense.

4. It is not necessary, although it may be a fact, that the beings designated by the secondary uses of the term be ontologically dependent on the being designated by the primary use.

Let us turn to the possible interpretations of focal meaning. As with analogy, the only interpretations we find important and

plausible enough to be discussed are the synonymy and homonymy accounts.

I. Synonymy account--this theory holds that the secondary uses of a pros hen equivocal term designate the same nature as the primary use but they do so indirectly. What is designated is thought to be the same in all uses of the term; the way it is designated differs. In a general sense, the synonymy account is not just a linguistic theory but also a theory concerning the relations of accidents to substance and the Unmoved Mover to sensible beings. It is one of the most important theories in the Neoplatonic account of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. It is, in this context, a theory defending a gradational metaphysics as Aristotle's own and should imply a pantheistic theology.

Veatch, for example, writies, "Analogously, we can now begin to see how Aristotle's theology, in turn, is entirely reconcilable with his ontology in terms of this same sort of pros hen equivocation. For why should not a concern with being qua being be understood as a concern with being in the truest and most perfect sense?"[90] Veatch concludes that "the being of all things other than god can only be and be understood with reference to god."[91]

Of course, if there are degrees of being in that some can be more perfect than others, then we are entitled to assume that one nature is designated. A difference in degree ordinarily implies a sameness in kind.

Merlan speaks of a sameness in kind with his example of water science,[92] as we have seen in the introduction. For him the primary instance of a pros hen series is "more powerful, clear, undiluted."[93] He also says that "every case of Oneness is ultimately reducible to the original One."[94] Again, the claim of differences in degrees is linked to the synonymy account of pros hen equivocity.

J. Owens also seems to opt for the synonymy account, although this is not clear as it is with Merlan. He also admits the equivocity of pros hen terms and he explicitly rejects pantheism as genuinely Aristotelian.[95] One might think that J. Owens would, consequently, not admit a pros hen series between substances. Yet, he does. He says, " First philosophy must therefore study one definite nature. This definite nature is found as such in the primary instance only."[96] The nature referred to is "Being:" "The nature of the primary Entity will be the Being expressed in every other instance of Being. In studying the separate Entities, therefore, the Primary Philosophy will be studying all Beings insofar as they are beings."[97] Now this does not agree with those passages where J. Owens claims that the nature is found only in the primary instance. J. Owens does speak of the nature "as such" in the primary instance. Does this mean that the same nature is found in a qualified way in the secondary instances? It would seem so. J. Owens clearly states, "One definite nature is always denoted when pros hen things are expressed in thought or in language, though the reference is in

different ways."[98]

With Nogales, the account is quite clearly the synonymy account. He describes the pros hen series, "Each grade is more perfect than the previous one, in such a way that the lower grades not only are included in the higher, but are subordinated to them. As a result, in the explanation of the higher grade must necessarily be found the explanation of the lower ones."[99]

Here again we find the position that there are grades of perfection of being which implies a sameness of nature. Nogales admits that Aristotle's pronouncements that "being is multiple do cause some difficulty,"[100] but he neutralizes these difficulties by stressing what he calls "intrinsic analogy."[101] According to Nogales, sensible substances are intrinsically constituted in such a way as to depend upon and be reducible to a primary (divine) substance just as accidents supposedly depend upon and are reducible to substances. He says that "as predicamental substance is to other categories, so is prime substance in respect to other substances, that is, their ultimate foundation and the primary source of all their intrinsic perfection."[102] Of course, "ultimate foundation" and "primary source" are somewhat ambiguous but in the context of Nogales' arguments, it should be clear that they represent the synonymy account of focal meaning and a general, Neoplatonic account of Aristotelian metaphysics. Nogales admits that some may believe that he has over-Platonized Aristotle but he answers, "Not in vain did Aristotle

live close to Plato at the Academy during twenty years as his favorite disciple."[103]

To our knowledge, no defender of the synonymy account wishes to claim that terms like "being" and "substance" are synonymous in the straightforward way of the Categories, i.e., that all the referents share both the same name and the same genus and species. Alternative methods of designation are offered by defenders of this account. Merlan sees being as an element which is in every existent. Being is at its purest in the primary instance and is found in a qualified and degraded way in the secondary instances. He claims, "Because being as an element is present everywhere it is katholou (universal). It is one of the two basic constituents of the uppermost sphere of being (with non-being as the other). This uppermost sphere of being somehow 'causes' all the other spheres and its elements are the elements of everything."[104] Merlan takes some support for his position from Lambda, 7, where Aristotle says, "And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of the two columns of opposites is in itself the object of thought; and in this, substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually."[105] The columns of opposites represent being and non-being for Merlan.[106]

Another alternative is the model-copy interpretation. J. Owens quotes Asclepius with approval: "Asclepius seems to have expressed very aptly the general direction of Aristotle's procedure:

'...Philosophy deals universally with Being according as it is Being, not with particular Being. In every case, therefore, science deals eminently with the primary instance just as in the case of reference to man; for knowledge is of the man, and not of the statue, for instance, that is, of the image; for these are because of the man.'"[107] This leads J. Owen to the following analogy: "What is contemplated in the statue is the man; what is contemplated in sensible things by primary Wisdom is the Being of the separate Entities."[108]

G. E. L. Owen also describes the model-copy account, "We may say 'That is a man' when pointing to a creature of flesh and blood, or we may say it when pointing to a painting of one. The uses are different, but the difference does not amount to homonymy: for in both cases we are referring to the same physis--only in the second case the reference is indirect...."[109]

The synonymy account makes apparent sense, if considered through Merlan's explanation or the model-copy interpretation, and it does have apparent textual support. Perhaps the greatest support for this position is found in those passages which identify the science of being qua being with theology: "We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being--both what it is and the attributes

which belong to it qua being."[110] Elsewhere he calls the divine substance "the first and most dominant principle."[111] And he repeats the identification of theology with the universal science of being qua being.[112] Aristotle also speaks of degrees of being calling the substance "more real" than accidents.[113] Within a material substance he calls the form "prior and more real" than the matter and prior to the individual.[114] Finally, we must also consider that in the De Anima, Aristotle seems to suggest that lower forms of life are potentially present in the higher: "Further, some animals possess all these parts of the soul, some certain of them only, others one only (this is what enables us to classify animals)...."[115]

However, the situation is not so clearly in favor of synonymy as a straightforward reading of the above texts would lead us to believe. Let us consider first Aristotle's talk of degrees of reality. The important factor here is that comparative degree means more than one thing for Aristotle. He writes, "For we apply the comparative degree not only to that which possesses more completely an attribute that has a single definition, but also to that whose possession of the attribute is prior; e.g., we say that health is better than wholesome things, and that which by its own nature is more worthy of choice than that which tends to produce this, though we see that it is not by virtue of the definition's being predicable of both that we describe both useful things and virtue as good."[116]

Aristotle tells us here that uses of "more" and "most"

need not always refer to a straightforward difference in degree and its corresponding sameness in kind and definition. It can, in his scheme of things, mean that one thing is prior to another of a different kind. His examples of health and things productive of health, as well as good and things useful for good strongly indicate that he is speaking of a pros hen series. This is very probably the case at Met., 1028 a. 26 where he speaks of degrees of being. He is here speaking about substance and accidents and we have seen that a pros hen series exists between them. Consequently, Aristotle's talk of more reality cannot be assumed to refer to a single nature, Being, in which things share in varying degrees.

We will discuss the material individual at some length in the next chapter. Let us state here some of our more important observations in reference to the above text asserting the priority of form over matter and the individual:

1.) Even if there is a pros hen series within material substance, that does not allow us to conclude that such a series exists between material and divine substances.

2.) If there is equivocity in calling form, matter and the individual "substance," it may be that based on act and potency[117] rather than focal meaning.

3.) If there is a pros hen series with form as logically prior to the individual, then either he is treating the individual on a par with the universal definition or he thinks the individual qua individual has

a definition which is posterior to the universal definition. Should either of these alternatives be true, Aristotle has made a claim which would be in conflict with many important doctrines of his metaphysics.

In regard to the text from the De Anima, Aristotle is speaking of the animal soul. As such, he is speaking generically and not in a pros hen equivocal manner. If so, the text cannot be used to provide evidence for a synonymy account of focal meaning.

When we consider the model-copy argument as a justification for the synonymy account, we find serious difficulties. One might call a marble bust of Socrates, "Socrates" in response to a question. But this obviously does not mean that the bust has the same nature as Socrates, the man. One might object that the use of the name "Socrates" designates the same person in all uses. In short, one would be referring to the nature of the primary instance in every use of the term. There arises an obvious question: in what way do the secondary uses of a term differ from the primary? We have seen the answer already. The secondary uses designate the same nature indirectly. This reply is not adequate. As Leszl points out, "For whatever specifications might be introduced to show that the talk is only indirectly about the original, they (the specifications) cannot be taken as being a part of the indirect talk itself--(which is what would be required by their presence in secondary definitions or paraphrases) but rather should be understood as constituting a

second-order talk with-respect to that talk. It is talk explaining the role of the first-order talk, which states about it that it is that sort of talk (namely, indirect talk about the model) and therefore does not belong to the actual content."[118] Consequently, we do not think that the model-copy argument will support the synonymy account of focal meaning.

Merlan's position that being is an element in all existents and that it is most clear and undiluted in the Unmoved Mover deserves some general comments first. If this is the case, then why should Aristotle prohibit such a univocal science in the Eudemian Ethics and bother himself about intentional equivocation in the Metaphysics? More specifically, Aristotle believes the primary instance of being is substance. He explicitly says that substance is not an element but a principle[119] and that no element in the definition can be substance.[120] One might try to defend Merlan's position by saying that by "being" Merlan means "act" or "actuality." It is this which existents have in common and in varying degrees. But "actuality" is not univocal for Aristotle. He clearly tells us, "But all things are not said in the same sense to exist actually, but only by analogy...."[121] So we see that "act" is no more univocal than "being". The intentional equivocation of act and potency rests on the more basic type of intentional equivocation: analogy.

We can readily admit that to be an accident of a substance includes an understanding of what a substance is but an accident of a

substance is not the same thing as a substance, nor is a medical instrument the same thing as medical science. The arguments put forward in defense of the synonymy account do not stand up to examination. We think that the homonymy account is true to Aristotle's statements on focal meaning.

II. The homonymy account--this account claims that a term used in pros hen equivocal ways is truly equivocal and not some disguised form of univocity. On the other hand, this account recognizes the equivocity here to be systematic. All uses of the term have some connection. To be more specific, the secondary senses of the term must include the definition of the primary sense in their own defintions. If the equivocity was only chance, then no science of being qua being could be built upon it.

We must also point out that we find no convincing evidence in Aristotle's discussion of the Unmoved Mover to sustain the claim that a pros hen equivocal series exists between divine and non-divine substances. In book Lambda, where most of the discussion of the Unmoved Mover takes place, Aristotle says, "Further, if the causes of substances are the causes of all things, yet different things have different causes and elements as was said; the causes of things that are not in the same class, e.g., of colors and sounds, of substances and quantities, are different except in an analogical sense...."[122] Two points should be made concerning this text.

1.) Sensible and supra-sensible substances do belong to the

same class or category--that of substance. Why should we assume that they do not and that "substance" is used equivocally?

2.) Aristotle both here and through Lambda speaks of the causes and principles of first philosophy being unified through analogy and not focal meaning.[123]

We will return to this problem in greater detail in our last chapter (on nature and function of the Unmoved Mover) but since we have been discussing focal meaning here, we thought it only fair to the reader to briefly present our position on this point.

We should also like to emphasize that our discussion of substance will reinforce our arguments that being cannot be an element or ingredient in a substance.

Footnotes

[1] Met., 1026 a. 34-1026 b. 1.

[2] Met., 1026 a. 29-33.

[3] Met., 1003 a. 33.

[4] Met., 1003 b. 6-10. This list of the senses of "being" is not identical to the four-fold division at 1026 a. 34, See Franz Brentano, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, ed. and trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 3-5.

[5] This is part of the task of dialetic which preceeds the science of being qua being (and all sciences since no science can discuss its own first principles). See Topica, 101 b. 1 and S. E., 172 a. 15-21.

[6] See, e.g., Met., 992 b. 18-19.

[7] See J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being.

[8] See G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. Renford Bambrough (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 69-95.

[9] S.E., 165 b. 25-27; 166 b. 20-24.

[10] Ibid., 166 a. 18-19.

[11] Ibid., 166 a. 8.

[12] Met., 1070 a. 31-32.

[13] Ethica Nic., 1096 b. 26.

[14] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 330.

[15] Met., 1064 a. 37.

[16] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, Ch. 19.

[17] Ibid., p. 274.

[18] Ibid., p. 295.

[19]Merlan, From Platonism to Neo-Platonism, p. 180.

[20]Ibid., p. 174.

[21]Ibid., p. 171.

[22]Ibid., p. 172.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Richard Rorty, "Genus as Matter: A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H," Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Georgory Vlastos, ed. E.M. Lee, A.P.D. Maurelatos, and R. M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum and Co.), p. 393.

[25]Randal, op. cit., p. 136.

[26]Santayana, op. cit., pp. 229-248.

[27]Randall, p. 144.

[28]James H. Lesher, "Aristotle on Form, Substance, and Universals," Phronesis, 16 (1971), pp. 176-177.

[29]Ibid., p. 178.

[30]Ethica Nic., 1096 b. 26.

[31]Cat. (Akrill), 1 a. 1-6.

[32]Walter Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle: Aristotle's Treatment of Types of Equivocity and Its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theories (Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1970), p. 110.

[33]Topica, 106 a. 1-8.

[34]Topica., I, 15.

[35]Ethica Nic., 1096 b. 26-29.

[36]Physica, 191 a. 7-12.

[37]Met., 1070 a. 31-32.

[38]Met., 1070 b. 1-10.

[39]See Salvador G. Nogales, "The Meaning of 'Being" in Aristotle," International Philosophic Quarterly, 12 (1972), 317-339. Also for a scholarly but Neoplatonic account of analogy see M.-D. Philippe, "Analogon and Analogia in the Philosophy of Aristotle," Thomist, 63 (1969), 1-74.

[40]Poetica, 1457 b. 16-18; Topica, 108 a. 7-17 and 138 b. 22-27; Met., 1048 b. 7.

[41]Ethica Nic., 1096 b. 26-29.

[42]Met., 1092 b. 18-21.

[43]Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 11.

[44]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 80; J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 123-125.

[45]Rhet., 1410 b. 35-1411 a. 1; Poetica, 1457 b. 16-33.

[46]Randall, Aristotle, pp. 65-67.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, pp. 375-379.

[49]Ethica Nic., 1099 b. 32-1100 a. 1.

[50]See J. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic (Cambridge: University Press, 1977), p. 112.

[51]Topica, 141 b. 27-34; Met., 1023a. 35-36.

[52]An. Post., 98 a. 20-23.

[53]Physica, 249 a. 21-25.

[54]De Anima, 420 a. 29.

[55]Met., 1046 a. 5-6.

[56]Met., 1019 b. 30-1020 a. 1.

[57]Met., 1046 a. 5-7.

[58]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 378.

[59]Nogales, op. cit., p. 337.

[60]Ibid., p. 335.

[61]Cat. (Ackrill), 1 a. 6-12.

[62]See, for example, J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 55; Nogales, op. cit., p. 321; Veatch, op. cit., p. 144; Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 182; Lloyd, op. cit., p. 128.

[63]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 120.

[64]E. E., 1236 a. 16-17.

[65]Ibid., 1236 a. 24-27. See also W. W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning," Phronesis 20 (1975), 51-62. Fortenbaugh presents the interesting thesis that Aristotle considered "friendship" to be a pros hen equovical in E. E., with friendship based on love as primary. However, later in Ethica Nic., he found he could not justify this claim of primacy and dropped focal meaning for analogy.

[66]See Met., 999 a. 6-10, E. E., 1218 a. 1-15.

[67]E. E., 1236 b. 21-22.

[68]E. E., 1236 a. 17-23.

[69]S. E., 176 a. 13.

[70]E. E., 1217 b. 33-35.

[71]Met., 1003 a. 21-24.

[72]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 265-266.

[73]Met., 1003 b. 11-15.

[74]Met., 1003 a. 32-35.

[75]G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century, ed. I. During and G. E. L. Owen (Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1960), p. 169 (hereafter referred to as "Logic and Metaphysics").

[76]Ibid.

[77]E. E., 1236 a. 23-24.

[78]Met., 1026 a. 30-31.

[80]Ibid., p. 172. By natural priority, G. E. L. Owen means that one being could not exist without another "prior" being. Logical priority means that the definition of the second being must include that of the first "prior" being.

[81]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 353; also pp. 344-360 and 530-534.

[82]Ibid., p. 532.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 b. 3-6.

[85]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 353.

[86]Ibid., p. 352.

[87]Met., 1077, b. 1-4.

[88]Met., 1071 a. 33-35.

[89]E. g., see Topica, 158 a. 31-158 b. 4; 100 a. 27-30; 101 a. 34-101 b. 4; Met., 1004 b. 25-26.

[90]Veatch, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

[91]Ibid., p. 161.

[92]Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, p. 174.

[93]Ibid., p. 171.

[94]Ibid., p. 164.

[95]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 300.

[96]Ibid., p. 303.

[97]Ibid.

[98]Ibid., pp. 270-271

[99]Nogales, op. cit., p. 333.

[100]Ibid., p. 338.

[101]Ibid., p. 337.

[102]Ibid.

[103]Ibid., p. 339.

[104]Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, p. 173. See also, Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, Vol. I, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1944), pp. 345-348.

[105]Met., 1072 a. 30-31.

[106]Are being and non-being elements according to Aristotle's definition of element at Met., 1014 a. 26 ff.? Perhaps Merlan was thinking that since the primary instance of being is substance and the principles of (material) substance are considered "substance" in some senses that substance is the primary component in a thing and if divided into its principles, we find they too are "substance" (in some sense or other) and so, substance is an element and since "substance is the primary meaning of "being," being too is an element. This strikes us as mistaken on at least two counts. First, it leaves one with the impression that being and non-being are generic concepts and differ only in the degree to which they are present in beings. But this flies in the face of Aristotle's oft-repeated observation that being is not a genus. Second, it strikes us as strange to identify substance as an element of a thing. Surely, it is what the thing is and not an element of the thing. This we will make more clear below and in our next chapter on substance.

[107]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 465.

[108]Ibid., p. 466.

[109]G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics," p. 185. Leszl places G. E. L. Owen in the synonymy camp. We disagree. See G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," p. 96.

[110]Met., 1026 a. 27-34.

[111]Met., 1064 b. 1.

[112] Met., 1064 b. 7-14.

[113] Met., 1028 a. 26.

[114] Met., 1029 a. 5-6.

[115] De Anima, 413 b. 32-34.

[116] Protrepticus, Fr. 14, p. 50.

[117] Met., 1017 b. 1-6; 1026 b. 1-2.

[118] Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, pp. 259-260.

[119] Met., 1041 b. 29-31.

[120] Met., 1038 b. 30-31.

[121] Met., 1048 b. 7.

[122] Met., 1071 a. 24-27.

[123] Met., 1070 a. 31-32; 1070 b. 18-19; 1070 b. 25-26; 1071 a. 5-6.

CHAPTER III

THE CHARACTERIZATION OF SUBSTANCE

Aristotle gives several descriptions of the subject matter of metaphysics or first philosophy. He tells us that first philosophy must study the first principles and causes.[1] Later he tells us that these must be the first principles and causes of being and adds to the investigation the "attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature."[2]

Aristotle, himself, does offer some further clarification of the subject matter of first philosophy: "And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance?"[3]

It is clear that the concept of substance is of central importance for Aristotelian first philosophy. It is also important to our study of the Unmoved Mover. We have seen, that Aristotle identifies first philosophy with theology (the Unmoved Mover is, of course, divine).[4] He also admits the possibility of immaterial substances[5] and subsequently refers to the Unmoved Mover as substance.[6]

What we must do in this chapter is discover what Aristotle means by "substance" and discover why he thinks the science of "being qua being" is primarily the science of substance.

The first difficulty in unpacking the Aristotelian concept of substance is the translation of "ousia" by "substance". While both the Oxford and Loeb editions of the Metaphysics generally translate "ousia" as "substance", this translation has come under attack from various sources.[7] Buchanan argues that "substance implies a static structure which is not true to Aristotle's thought.[8] J. Owens claims that 'substance' fails to express the direct relation with being denoted by 'ousia'."[9] Both Owens[10] and Buchanan[11] agree that "substance" carries with it the very real possibility of confusing Aristotle's ousia with Locke's idea of substance. Locke's idea of substance is conveyed in the following quote: "The idea then, we have, to which we give the general name substance being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of these qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist sine re substante, 'without something to support them,' we call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word is in plain English, standing under or upholding."[12]

Aristotle would allow that being a substratum is one of the senses and characteristics of substance but he sees substance as something more than the ultimate subject of predication and a substratum (hypokeimenon). Aristotle points out, "We have now outlined the

nature of substance showing that it is that which is not predicated of a stratum [subject] but, of which all else is predicated. But we must now merely state the matter thus; for it is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, matter becomes substance."[13] He objects to this conclusion saying, "If we adopt this point of view, then it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance."[14]

Aristotle will claim that matter can be called substance but only in a qualified sense because it is a part of substance. If it were not substance, then we would have a case in which non-substance is prior (in the sense in which a part may be thought to be prior to the whole) to substance.[15] Yet, Aristotle never stops saying that substance is prior to non-substance. We will discuss Aristotle's treatment of matter as substance in more detail below. Let us here say that Locke's view of substance is not identical with Aristotle's. Although Ross seems to come close to interpreting Aristotle's concept of substance in a Lockean sense,[16] it should be clear that such an interpretation would be a mistake.

There is a fourth difficulty connected with the translation of "ousia" as "substance" which is as serious or more serious than the confusion of the Aristotelian and Lockean doctrines of substance. Augustine[17] argues that "substance" implies a subject "standing under accidents and that this clearly describes a complexity which cannot be predicated of the divinity, who is simple. A being which

is a substance with accidents would be complex because in speaking of it we would always have to add its accidental qualifications. Also it would seem that if "substance" means "substratum for accidents," then an understanding of "accident" would be necessary to grasp the definition of "substance" and so, "accident" would be logically prior to "substance" which flies in the face of what Aristotle says about the logical priority of substance.

Aristotle does characterize the Unmoved Mover as simple and indivisible.[18] If one takes "substance" to imply a complexity, then one will be prejudiced against accepting a simple immaterial being as substance. Indeed given such an interpretation of substance, it is not hard to imagine that one could see Aristotle's theology as a remnant of his Platonic youth and not as a part of his mature metaphysics.

While there are problems surrounding the translation of "ousia" by "substance," they are not insurmountable. In fact, it seems that to be forewarned about the possible confusions connected with this translation is sufficient to avoid such confusions. Also we must recognize that "substance" is most commonly used both in translations of Aristotle's works and commentaries on them. To depart from it may very well occasion more confusions and difficulties (such as in quoting a commentator) than it would clear up. We will then use "substance" for "ousia" and we hope we have given sufficient warning as to the possible confusions.

Most of Aristotle's analysis of substance is contained in the

Categories and books Zeta, Eta, and Theta of the Metaphysics. The presentation in the Categories is clear and straightforward by comparison with that of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's method throughout the Metaphysics is not one of a straightforward presentation of a doctrine derived from a valid, deductive argument. Aubenque,[19] J. Owens,[20] and Ross,[21] to name a few, agree that Aristotle uses the aporematic method. Ross explains:

> His method is aporematic. It is essential, he says, to start with a clear view of the difficulties of the subject, and with an impartial consideration of the pros and cons on each main question. Accordingly, a whole book (B) is devoted to such a presentation, without any attempt to reach a dogmatic result. Not only here, however, but in many other parts of the Metaphysics (notably in Z) the method is thoroughly aporematic; not infrequently, after discussing a question from one point of view without definite result, Aristotle proceeds to discuss it from another with the remark, "Let us try a fresh start." The Metaphysics as a whole expresses not a dogmatic system but the adventures of a mind in its search for truth. The method adopted is, for the most part, not that of formal syllogistic argument from known premises to a conclusion which they establish. The truths which are most important for metaphysics to establish are fundamental. Any direct proof of them would inevitably be a petito principii. The proper procedure, then, is to attempt no proof, but to commend them by showing the paradoxical consequences of the denial of them.[22]

Aristotle's application of this method to the problem of substance resembles someone thinking, in a very loosely organized way, on paper. Aristotle considers various candidates for the designation of substance. Some of these candidates are drawn from common sense and some from previous philosophies. Aristotle does present arguments why these candidates should be considered as substance.

It is difficult to determine which of these arguments are acceptable to him either wholly, or in part and which are not acceptable but merely repeated because they were important to previous thinkers. He also presents objections and sometimes answers to them. Again it is difficult to ascertain which are accepted by him. He does, as Ross says, proceed from many different perspectives. We find Aristotle to be a very historical thinker (unlike a Descartes or the philosophes of the eighteenth century). By this is meant that he thinks it necessary to list the opinions of past thinkers of note and of common sense not only because such opinions are historically important but because they are true. Of course, they are not entirely true. Generally, one might say that these opinions each represent a partial truth, a perspective. What Aristotle seeks is a more comprehensive view (perhaps the comprehensive view). He is eager to learn from the past but also he wishes to avoid the blind alleys and one-sideness of past opinions. It is usually not a question of which of these theories of substance are true and which candidates are substance, but rather to what extent the theories are true and in what sense are each of the candidates called substance (although some are ruled out completely).[23] Aristotle doggedly refuses to oversimplify problems. This makes reading him both trying and a joy (at least to philosophers). To arbitrarily stipulate a meaning for substance would be one kind of oversimplification. This is so because such a stipulation would fail to take into account the dis-

cussions of substance in the Presocratics and Platonists. Aristotle will not allow himself such a stipulation. Having made these preliminary remarks let us turn to what are usually considered Aristotle's first thoughts on substance.

Substance in the Categories

The Categories being part of the Organon may be thought of as a logical work. This is not the whole truth. In fact it is an unusual book which seems to form a bridge between logic and metaphysics. In it, Aristotle uses the grammatical approach[24] to substance. Ackrill explains, "It is important to recognize from the start that the Categories are not explicitly about names but, about the things that names signify .... Aristotle relies greatly on linguistic facts and tests, but his aim is to discover truths about non-linguistic items."[25] It is the use of linguistic facts and tests which we call the grammatical approach. In using the grammatical approach, Aristotle is attempting to gain insights into the nature of substance by examining what it is that signifies substance in proper discourse and in logic. These both amount to the same thing for Aristotle. As Hintikka[26] points out, both Plato and Aristotle viewed thought from the perspective of a not-yet-dead oral tradition. Thought was a dialogue with oneself.[27] If correct talking and correct thinking grasped the nature of things, then an examination of this discourse could yeild insights into these natures. This would seem to be Aristotle's intention in the Cate-

gories. It must be pointed out that Aristotle also approaches substance from an extra-grammatical or, more precisely, an ontological point of view in the Categories. In the Metaphysics, too, we find both the grammatical and ontological approaches to substance. By "ontological approach" we mean Aristotle's method of appealing to our experience of being in order to gain more clarity about substance. The mixture of approaches is what we might expect of Aristotle.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle tells us that "being" is used in many senses,[28] but that the primary sense is substance.[29] In the Categories, he attempts what seems to be an early clarification of the concept of substance by saying, "A substance--that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of all--is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse."[30] He adds, "All other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects."[31]

Regarding things other than primary substances, Aristotle, as we have just seen, claims that they are said of or in primary substances. Of those things which are said of a primary substance, some are predicated[32] of the substance in name only and some in both name and definition.[33] These latter predicates are called secondary substances.[34] Aristotle gives us two reasons for calling these predicates secondary substances[35]:

1) They tell us what the primary substance, of which they are predicated, is. Aristotle points out that it is the species

or genus of a primary substance that may be predicated of it both in name and definition.[36] So we may predicate both "man" and "animal" of Beethoven in answer to the question, "What is Beethoven?".

2) Secondary substances can be subjects of predication in two senses:

a.) One can predicate the genus of the species, e.g., "man is an animal" and an ultimate genus of a proximate one.

b.) Those properties (accidents) which are predicated of primary substances in name only can also be predicated of the genus and species of that primary substance. Aristotle notes, "For if you will call the individual man grammatical it follows that you will call both a man and an animal grammatical; and similarly in other cases."[37]

There is a general problem connected with these claims. Being a subject of predication (or what we might call a logical subject) is not a sufficient condition for being included in the category of substance. Besides the category of substance Aristotle gives us those of quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection.[38] Items in these other categories can certainly function as logical subjects. Color can be predicated of white and knowledge of knowledge-of-grammar.[39] Aristotle recognizes this problem and tries to resolve it by adding to his criterion for designation of substance. A true substance cannot be in another substance.[40] While it would make sense to say of Socrates that he is a human being (secondary substance), it would be incorrect to say that humanity is in Socrates. A human being is what Socrates is. Dancy calls attention to this incorrectness saying, "Suppose we said that it was the presence of humanity in Socrates that warranted us in calling him a man. That

would prompt the question: the presence of humanity in what warrants us in calling it a man?"[41] It would, however, make sense to say that color or some other accidental[42] property is in Socrates.

Ackrill observes that "Aristotle's explanation of 'in a subject' ... is slight indeed."[43] Aristotle gives us the following information: "By 'in a subject' I mean what is in something, not as a part and cannot exist separately from what it is in. For example, the individual knowledge-of-grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body for all color is in a body, but is not said of any subject."[44] A part of a machine may be said to be "in" the machine but we may take it out of the machine, and it will continue to exist. This is not the sense of "in" with which Aristotle is here concerned. He is speaking of the relation of accidents to substance and claims that the former "cannot exist separately"[45] from the latter. He makes the point even more forcefully, saying, "So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist."[46] This is what he calls "natural priority."[47]

How we are to understand this relationship of natural priority has led to some controversy. We might say that, if any substance is eliminated, its accidents are eliminated also but not that, if any of its accidents are eliminated, the substance is eliminated too. This would seem to be acceptable to all commentators but it is not. There are some who hold that accidents are non-unique and recurrent rather

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

than particular, non-recurrent items (which is the traditional view).[48] G.E.L. Owens, for example, writes, "Any particular shade of color is, of course, reproducible. Any bit of linguistic knowledge can, of course, lodge in more than one head."[49] If accidents are reproducible or can exist as a one in many, then if a particular substance was eliminated, the same accidents it had could exist in other substances. It is only that they must exist in some substance.

Unfortunately, this very interesting issue lies beyond the scope of this thesis. We shall not give a detailed discussion of this problem but only say that we agree with the traditional view that an accident in an individual substance is non-recurrent. Just as substances differ in number so do their accidents. It seems to us that G.E.L. Owen is considering accident as universal and from this perspective it can be the same in kind as other instances.

We have discovered some additional characteristics of substance. No substance can be in another in the way that accidents are in a substance. There exists a natural priority between substance and accidents such that the latter could not exist without the former. It is in this sense that accidents are said to be in substances.[50]

We can also see from this discussion that Aristotle certainly considers primary substances to be substrata in which accidental properties or attributes inhere. Aristotle says that primary substances "underlie and are the subjects of everything else."[51] Such a substrate is able to receive contrary attributes. Aristotle says, "For

example an individual man--one and the same--becomes pale at one time and dark at another and hot and cold, and bad and good."[52] Of course, the man in question remains a man throughout this process of change as Aristotle explicitly points out in the Physics.[53]

Furthermore, there is nothing contrary to either primary or secondary substances, although definite attributes also share this characteristic.[54]

Substance does not admit of degrees. Aristotle contrasts substance with accidents in light of this characteristic: "For example, if this substance is a man, it will not be more a man or less a man either than itself or than another man. For one man is not more a man than another, as one pale thing is more pale than another and one beautiful thing more beautiful than another."[55]

Aristotle gives us what he considers to be the sufficient condition for substance or at least for primary substance when he writes, "Every substance seems to signify a certain 'this.' As regards the primary substance it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain 'this'; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one."[56] That a primary substance is numerically one and able to receive contrary accidents are its most distinctive characteristics. As Aristotle insists, "It seems most distinctive of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything numerically one, which is able to receive contraries."[57]

Individuality is not characteristic of secondary substances in spite of the fact that single substantives usually name them: "But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name--when one speaks of man or animal--that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not really true; rather it signifies a certain qualification, for the subject is not, as the primary substance is, one, but man and animal is said of many things."[58] To term secondary substance a qualification is somewhat puzzling. However, if we turn to Aristotle's lexicon in the Metaphysics, matters are soon cleared up. There Aristotle says, "'Quality' means (I) the differentia of the essence, e.g., man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed; and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles--which shows that the essential differentia is a quality."[59]

In any event, secondary substances are not numerically one. The main reason for calling the genus and species "substance" is that they tell us what a thing is rather than what accidents it has.

Let us summarize the characteristics of primary substances which we have gleaned from the Categories:

1. They are logical subjects of which the names of accidents and both the names and definitions of secondary substances may be predicated.
2. They are not said of any other logical subject--properly. We

think the reason for this is that they are not properties of other beings but rather that they are the beings which have properties.

3. One primary substance cannot be in another and be ontologically dependent on that other as accidents are on substances.
4. They are substrata in which accidents may inhere.
5. They can admit of contrary accidents while remaining essentially the same.
6. They have no contraries.
7. They do not admit of degrees, each within itself (perhaps at different times) or each compared with another primary substance of the same species.[60]
8. Each is an individual, one in number, a "this."
9. They are naturally prior to both secondary substances and beings in other categories. They could not exist if primary substances did not.[61]

Substance in the Metaphysics

Aristotle's task in the Metaphysics is expressed as an investigation of being qua being.[62] Quite soon, however, Aristotle turns to a discussion of the categories and especially of the relation between substance and the other categories. W. Mærx voices a disappointment and raises a question concerning Aristotle's entire metaphysical enterprise. He claims that Aristotle promised us, in

therefore, not with a distinction between kinds of words, or terms detached from any semantic reference, but, with the fundamental classification of things essential to the elaboration of scientific language."[66]

Wilson explicitly denies any similarity between the Aristotelian and Kantian categories, "Kant naturally makes the categories forms of the unifying understanding, because of his dominant confusion of the apprehension and the apprehended. Aristotle's tendency is far sounder, for necessity of apprehension can, after all, only mean apprehension of a necessity in the object."[67]

Aristotle himself declares that "the varieties of essential being are indicated by the categories; for in as many ways as there are categories may things be said to 'be'."[68] We suppose one could emphasize the word "said" and conclude that Aristotle is identifying the categories of logic with those of language. That is, one might deny that Aristotle is claiming that things exist in as many different ways as there are categories and instead assert that Aristotle is only claiming that the categories indicate the different ways in which human beings talk of "essential being." We think that this would be the fallacy of accent since Aristotle does tell us that the categories indicate "essential being" and he adds elsewhere that what we say about things is sometimes true.[69]

Finally, we have W. Marx's own description of the Aristotelian philosopher as one who reveals the meaning of being through the

exercise of nous.[70] We cannot see how this description would square with a claim that the philosopher is rather elucidating the categorical structure of the understanding à la Kant.

3. W. Marx may be claiming that Aristotle recognized the possibility of other modes or categories of being not covered by his list of categories because they haven't yet been revealed. We don't think that this is the meaning of W. Marx's question. He does not complain that Aristotle's categories are incomplete but that Aristotle turns to an elucidation of being via the categories. If we are wrong here and this is his point (which is very doubtful), then we must say that he gives no evidence to support the claim that such was Aristotle's recognition. And this would be all the more deplorable since the claim is of the utmost importance. If new categories could be discovered, then one more primary than substance might be discovered. Since Aristotle considers substance to be the primary sense of "being", this possibility would make his first philosophy a very tenuous affair rather than a science.[71] Also, it is clear that the recognition of possible new categories would scarcely link Aristotle with Kant, since Kant arrived at his categories in an a priori way and thought his list to be complete.[72]

4. Thus it would seem that the third interpretation of the question is implausible and the first two merit negative answers. It would seem that W. Marx is either complaining that Aristotle promised what no human being could deliver and consequently failed

to fulfill his promise or Aristotle promised what could in some way be delivered but failed to do so. If W. Marx's complaint can be reduced to the second alternative, then he seems to be saying that "being" can be elucidated apart from the manifold senses of the categories. If so, it is likely that he sees "being" as, in some way, univocal and capable of non-categorical elucidation. If his complaint is reducible to the first alternative, then he has jumped to a hasty understanding of what Aristotle means by "being" or "being-as-such" and later became disappointed when he found out what Aristotle really means by the term. An Aristotelian scholar should, above all, be wary of hasty judgments concerning the meanings of Aristotelian terms.

When Aristotle elucidates being via the categories, he is not simply saying that human reason is "limited" by the categories but that reality is also categorically "limited." It would seem that any rational being would understand reality categorically (though not necessarily through ~~sense~~ experience). The science of being qua being is not a pseudo-science for Aristotle.

We have argued in the last chapter that "being" is not univocal but a pros hen equivocal. The unity of Aristotle's universe rests on causal dependency and logical dependency and not the univocity of "being."

Hopefully we have adequately dealt with W. Marx's general complaint-question and may move on to more specific issues.

Via Negativa

We have seen that first philosophy is the study of being qua being and the primary instance of being is substance. In our attempt to explain what this means, we will first consider those candidates for the primary instance of being and substance which Aristotle rejected. It is hoped that an examination of the reasons for the rejections of these candidates will shed light on those characteristics of substance which make it the primary instance of being.

I. Truth: Truth is rejected as the primary instance of being because it is an attribute in the intellect. Aristotle points out that "falsity and truth are not in things--it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false--but in thought..."[73] He explicates, "It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have truth."[74] Truth then depends for its existence both on external conditions ("that you are pale") and on the intellect in which it exists. It certainly fails as a candidate for the name "substance" since it exists in a substance and could not exist apart from some substance. Truth could hardly be primary given such inherence in substance.

II. The Universe: Aristotle raises the question as to whether the physical universe is a substance and whether its parts (stars, moon, and sun) are.[75] This question may be raised in reference to Plato's doctrine in the Timaeus in which the entire universe is conceived as a single living thing.[76] Aristotle does not explicitly answer

this question here in the Metaphysics. There is certainly talk in the De Caelo of the universe as "a particular and material thing."[77] Sokolowski[78] feels that Aristotle is using terms like "matter", "form", and "substance" in the De Caelo according to common parlance, i.e., in a non-metaphysical way. This may very well be the case, either because Aristotle had not yet set up his criterion for substance or because he was so interested in proving the uniqueness of the universe in De Caelo I, 9 that he ignored the technical problem of substance.

We tend to favor the former interpretation. Although we dislike falling back on the genetic approach, we find it necessary to do so here. For example, at 298 a. 29-32, we find Aristotle claiming that natural bodies (fire, earth, etc.) are substances yet as we shall see below this is at odds with his developed metaphysical doctrine. At Physics II, 1 and Metaphysics VII, 2, Aristotle considers the universe and natural bodies as possible candidates for the title "substance" because they have been so considered by past thinkers and in common parlance and gives no indication that this is his conclusion.[79]

Aristotle in De Caelo I, 9 was concerned with proving that there was one universe rather than a plurality. We find that the unity of this universe is explained in Aristotle's mature thought by a network of causal relationships between accidents and substances and substances and substances. The idea of the universe as a substance smacks of Plato's world-soul and consequently strikes us as early

rather than mature Aristotle and gives rise to many confusing problems of the status of what we have heretofore called primary substances. The universe may well comprise all matter but we see no necessity for it existing in a single form.

As regards the heavenly bodies, Aristotle does indeed consider them substances.[80]

III. Natural Bodies: Aristotle mentions "fire and water and earth and everything of the sort."[81] In reviewing these candidates, Aristotle probably had in mind some of the theories of the Presocratics including the Atomists. One would do well to follow Rorty's[82] suggestion that, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle was trying to avoid both materalistic and formalistic reductionism. Aristotle steadfastly refuses to allow that the simple bodies of the materialists or the Forms of the Platonists should be considered actual substance.

The issue here is why should we not say that simple or natural bodies such as fire, water, atoms or the like are the primary instance(s) of being or substance(s)? These natural bodies may, of course, be found in a pure state, (some, like atoms, excepted) or, through physical processes, come to constitute other types of things. Water may become solidified into earth, for example.[83]

Aristotle rejects these natural bodies as primary substances saying; "Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies--both the parts of animals (for none of them exist separately; and when they are separated, then too they

exist all of them merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them."[84]

Aristotle does not make it clear in the Metaphysics what sense of unity[85] he is denying to natural bodies nor why. It may very well be the case that Aristotle's paradigm of actual substance is, as many commentators suggest, the organism.[86] Indeed Aristotle makes the same suggestion: "Perhaps indeed, neither these things themselves (artifacts), nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature are substances at all, for one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things."[87]

There are problems with admitting natural bodies as actual substances. Solmsen observes that natural bodies are constituted by hot and cold, moist and dry.[88] Sokolowski agrees saying, "The contrary powers constitute the simple bodies; they are not merely the properties of such bodies."[89] There is evidence in the corpus that Aristotle holds that natural bodies are constituted by "powers" in matter.[90] It would seem that natural bodies are derived by a coupling of two of these powers to the material substratum. Aristotle explains, "The elementary qualities are four, and any four terms can be combined in six couples. Contrarieties, however, refuse to be coupled: for it is impossible for the same thing to be hot and cold, or moist and dry. Hence it is evident that the 'couplings' of the elementary

qualities will be four: hot with dry and moist with hot and cold with dry and cold with moist. And these four couples have attached themselves to the apparently 'simple' bodies (fire, air, water, and earth) in a manner consonant with theory."[91] (It will not do to make too much out of "attached" here since the whole point of the passage is that the "simple bodies" aren't simple.)

If this is a true interpretation of Aristotle's account of natural bodies, then we may begin to see why they are not primary substances. A primary substance is a "this" and one in number. We shall see below that such a substance is a union of matter and form or essence. Sokolowski objects to seeing natural bodies as having a substantial form: "How can a substantial form be composed of two factors, like the hot and the solid? A 'form' in the strict metaphysical sense is indivisible and cannot be composed of two parts."[92]

He adds that change of one natural body may occur when one of the powers constituting the body is replaced. Water which is cold and moist becomes air which is hot and moist. He asks "how could one half of the form be changed while the other remains the same?"[93] Without substantial forms, natural bodies cannot be substances.

Sokolowski adds an interesting explanation regarding the rejection of natural bodies as substance by appealing to proper discourse. He observes, "We cannot arbitrarily say that the leg is 'this animal,' or that any other part is 'this animal.' The thisness of the animal is determined by the animal itself and if we are to speak

truly about the animal we must submit our language to the unity of the animal substance manifest to us."[94] On the other hand, he points out that a bucket of water, a river, lake, or ocean can be called "this water." The decision as to what "this water" is is "arbitrary and man made" since water is not an actual substance.[95] The unity of natural bodies is at least a unity of a continuum, "a concatenation of parts outside of parts, sheer externality."[96]

IV. Genus: After mentioning several possible candidates for substance, Aristotle narrows the list down to four in Z, 3: the substratum, the essence, the universal, and the genus. He gives three possible kinds of definitions for "genus:" "A. ... continuous generation of the same kind, B. ... the first mover which is of the same kind as the thing it moves, (3) as matter; for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum which we call matter."[97]

In the Categories, we saw that genus was considered secondary substance. Yet it was less a substance than the species: "Of the secondary substances, the species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary substance. For if one is to say of the primary substance what it is, it will be more informative and apt to give the species than the genus."[98] There would seem to be a difference of degree between secondary substances unlike primary ones. What is meant by differences of degree is not made clear here. Since it is less informative to give the genus than the species in telling what something is, does this fact reflect the further fact that the

genus is not actual substance? Is that what being less a substance implies? No answer is given in the Categories to these questions and in the Metaphysics, although genus is one of the four candidates for substance, it is never as explicitly discussed as the other three. However, at 1028 a. 34, Aristotle tells us that substance is prior in the order of knowledge. This may have been what he had in mind in saying the species was more of a substance than the genus. The species gives more knowledge about what the thing is than the genus.

We can observe that in the Metaphysics, genus still does not count as primary substance (the primary-secondary substance talk is absent, so it is not possible to say if Aristotle would still call it a secondary substance). First, being and unity are denied to be a genus: "But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if unity or being is a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one."[99] Of course, this argument is intended to show that there is no Being, itself or Unity, itself which might function as a summum genus and in which all else participate. We also have Aristotle's often repeated claim that "being" has many senses so it cannot be a summum genus. This passage does cast some doubt on genus as substance since substance is the primary instance of being and is one in number. For-

tunately, Aristotle is more direct in his rejection of the genus, claiming that "neither the universal nor the genus is a substance."[100]

What Aristotle means by genus in his denial of its substantiality is not completely clear.[101] However, in a polemic against the Platonists, he suggests that the genus may count as a universal or as matter. He observes; "If then the genus absolutely does not exist apart from the species-of-a-genus, or if it exists but exists as matter...."[102] The choice seems to be that genera are either universals, in which case they can only exist in various species, or matter. Genera by themselves (outside of being actualized in species) are nothing.[103] The other alternative is that, as we observed, a genus without species signifies only matter. A thing which existed in a genus but not a species may be possible but it would be a heap rather than a substance.[104]

So genus may be thought of as the universal or as matter and we shall see that neither can be actual substance.

V. The Universal: In his rejection of the universal (katholou), Aristotle is sometimes as clear and straightforward as we could wish. He proclaims:

> For it seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For firstly the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing. Of which individual then will this be the substance? Either of all or of none; but it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is to be the substance of one, this one will be the others also; for things whose substance is one and whose essence is one are themselves also one.[105]

Aristotle also complains that a substance cannot be predicated of a subject whereas a universal is "predicable of some subject always."[106]

He considers the possible Platonist objection that surely animal is contained in man as a part of his substance or a substance participating in a substance. This possibility he rejects saying, "A substance cannot consist of substances present in it in complete reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in complete reality one...."[107]

He concludes that "it is plain that no universal attribute is substance, and this is plain also from the fact that no common predicate indicates a 'this' but rather a 'such'. If not, many difficulties follow and especially the 'third man'."[108] If we allow that the universal is an actual substance, then we would also allow that it is one in number, a "this" as the Categories informed us. However, a universal is common and not one in number. Because it is common, it is a predicate of many proper, logical subjects. Nor can we claim that the universal is a "this" in its own right and yet is the substance of another individual. How can one individual substance be the substance of another? But, of course, universals are not individuals by definition. Those thinkers who think they are have not only the above difficulties to contend with but also the Third Man argument which Aristotle levels repeatedly at the Platonists.[109]

Certain points should be emphasized here:

A. Rorty claims that Aristotle's "use of the term 'universal' (katholou) is so baffling that it is very difficult to back up any claim that he thought of certain things as universals and others as particulars."[110] While we would not completely agree with Rorty (e.g., see An. Post., 100 a. 5-9), we do think that his claim should put us on our guard against assuming a priori that "universal" has only one sense for Aristotle. Few of Aristotle's important terms have but one sense within his philosophy. This should be remembered when we find Aristotle speaking of theology as a universal science.[111]

B. A universal cannot be a substance because it is not one in number. If it is considered one in number (contrary to common usage), then difficulties like the Third Man will occur. If one believes that the similarity between individual, material men must be explained by positing a Form of Humanity, itself, in which these men all participate and one also holds that Humanity, itself, is an individual substance, then one should posit the existence of a third Form to account for the similarity between men and Humanity, itself.

C. Aristotle does not claim that the universal has no role to play in the explanation of substance, only that it cannot be an actual substance.

D. If we assume that the first two points are correct interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of universals, we find then a repeated assertion of primary substances or individuals having a natural priority over secondary ones or universals. If we take uni-

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Certain points should be emphasized here:

versals to be naturally prior to individuals in the sense that universals exist as actual substances and constitute those individuals, we involve ourselves in a host of insoluble difficulties. The Third Man problem is not the least of these.[112] This argument accords well with our experience of individuals rather than universals as substances. Granted that the individuals experienced are of certain kinds, yet they are, nonetheless, individuals. There are many more problems surrounding the universal which we shall discuss while considering essence as substance.

VI. Substratum as Matter: The substratum or "that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else."[113] This substratum may be thought of as the individual or primary substance, the form (eidos) or shape (morphe), or the matter.[114]

Aristotle says of matter:

> By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predicates (for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter). Therefore the ultimate substratum is itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet is it the negations of these for negations will belong to it only by accident.[115]

Aristotle adds, "For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say what else is."[116] Schofield feels that Aristotle seriously intends this remark.[117] Robinson thinks that Aristotle is showing us what

the result is if being a logical subject is taken as a sufficient condition for substance. We have already seen in the Categories that the species and genus as well as items in the non-substantial categories can and do function as logical subjects. Aristotle admits that the condition of being a logical subject is somewhat "obscure" and it is not sufficient.[118] He continues, "If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability and 'thisness' are thought to belong chiefly to substance."[119] We disagree with both Schofield and Robinson and think, rather, that Aristotle is here presenting another of his metaphysical puzzles. Matter is not mentioned as a candidate for substance in the Categories as it is in the Metaphysics. It is discussed in the latter to account for our experience of substantial change--when one kind of substance changes into another kind. Such an account offers solutions to many of the problems of the Presocratic physicists, such as how unlike comes from unlike (fire from water). Also Aristotle's matter does not, in itself, come to be or pass away.[120] Parmenides is, at least, partially placated.

When Aristotle speaks of matter as not characterized positively or negatively, he seems to be referring to what is called primary matter as distinguished from secondary matter.[121] Primary matter is described as that which is, in itself, totally undetermined. The Scholastics spoke of secondary matter, referring to matter which is worked up into "heaps" or "things."[122] These "things" may

have accidental characteristics such as size, weight, etc.

Now matter is first denied the status of actual substance because it is not a "this." It lacks the unity of a true substance. Well, of course, this is true enough for primary matter which is indeterminate in itself. It must be true also of secondary matter of "things" since they are distinguished from substances. Whatever unity they may have (physical continuity), it is not sufficient for them to be called substances. It may be that, as we have mentioned above, only living things are true substances. The unity they possess is exhibited in a growth to maturity and an ability to reproduce their kind.[123]

Of course, Aristotle does mention artifacts as substances.[124] However, where he does so in H, 3, he raises the real question as to whether these examples of substance in common parlance are truly substances.[125] It may be that, if artifacts have a claim to be called substances, it is because they are substances by analogy with natural, living substances. Their parts are unified towards an end or telos by the artisan. Art imitates nature.[126]

The second disqualification of matter is that it is not separable. Separable from what? Well, substance was thought to be separable from the other categories in that there was a natural priority of substance over the other categories. We agree with Gewirth that J. Owen's idea that separable always means separable from matter does unfairly tip the scales toward J. Owens' doctrine that substance is primarily form.[127]

Now Aristotle does not believe that something can actually exist in general. It must be determined in some way or other (via the categories). Matter, in itself, is undetermined and so is dependent either on substance or substantial form or the accidental forms or both for its determination. Matter is formed either as an actual substance or a "thing" which we might call an accidental unity since it is determined by the accidental forms of size, weight, etc.. Matter does not actually exist without some such determination and so is not separable from either substantial or accidental forms.

An interesting problem arises in connection with the distinction between a substance and a thing. If a thing is an accidental unity, how is the natural priority of substance defended as a general principle? The accidents of the thing exist in matter and not in a substance and so how are they ("they" being nine-tenths of the world according to Rorty[128]) dependent on substance for their existence? The natural priority of substance may make sense in relation to those accidents which are in the substance in question but does it make sense in relation to "things" also? We cannot see that it does as the account now stands.

One line of defense open to Aristotle would be to broaden the notion of natural priority and say that these "things" are dependent for their existence on the efficient causality of some actual substance that they are not "in." In short, Aristotle might appeal to a god as an efficient cause of the existence of things. We find no such line of

defense in Zeta. It is still one of the open questions of the Metaphysics, at this stage, whether any gods exist.[129] We find no convincing argument for an appeal to a creator-god in Aristotle's discussion of the Unmoved Mover in Lambda. Consequently, we find the notion of natural priority to be considerably narrowed. Aristotle has not shown how "things" or "heaps" are ontologically dependent upon substance.

Of course, there is the further problem of making sense out of the claim that we predicate substance of matter. J. Owens points out the strangeness of this predication.[130] We do not use primary matter as a grammatical subject. J. Owens admits that to do so would result in the barbarism of saying that "matter is humanized, equinized, lapidified...."[131] However it may be in ordinary discourse, Aristotle seems to be saying that we assume matter as a logical subject when we describe a substantial change. It is that which changes, i.e., loses one form and takes another. As such, it is substance only potentially.[132] Since matter lacks the actual determination of substance, it is "unknowable in itself."[133] However, it may be known via analogy. It may even be investigated scientifically: "The underlying nature is an object of scientific knowledge, by an analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form...."[134]

Aristotle tells us, in the Physics, that substance is not predicated of anything else.[135] He suggests that the actual substance

should be considered the proper logical subject rather than the matter when he says that "we speak of 'a statue coming to be from bronze,' not of the 'bronze becoming a statue'."[136] However, in the Metaphysics he claims that "in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself."[137] Yet, Aristotle also says that "what is a first principle ought not to be the predicate of any subject. If it were, there would be a principle of the supposed principle: for the subject is a principle and prior presumably to what is predicated of it."[138] Now the problem appear to be this: how can matter, which Aristotle identifies with potency,[139] have actuality predicated of it? Aristotle clearly states that "actuality is prior to potency."[140] It is "prior both in formula and in one sense and in another not."[141] One can say that, if one predicates a substantial form of matter, matter is being treated as a potential substance. Thus matter, so considered, falls within the category of substance and no other category is prior to substance. But what of the priority of act over potency? Aristotle explains how act is and is not prior in time to potency: "I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually and to the corn and to the seeing subject the matter and the seed and that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior in time; but prior in time to these are other actually existing things, from which they were produced."[142] Ultimately, then, actual substance is ontologically prior to potential substance.

Matter is not actual but potential substance. Even in secondary form it lacks the unity of a true substance and is at best a "thing" or accidental unity.[143] Nor would mentioning the stuff that something was made of be a sufficient explanation of that thing. Aristotle would wish to know why that stuff is a cow rather than a tree or a man.[144]

Let us try to summarize the main points we have gleaned from an examination of some of the more important rejected candidates for actual substance. First, Aristotle still finds that substance must be a logical subject. However, this is not a characteristic exclusive to substance. Accidents, things, and primary matter can all be logical subjects.

The candidates rejected as actual substance all lack the unity of "thisness" of substance. The unity referred to here seems to be a natural, causal unity. Aristotle says, "All the things mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration)."[145] He adds, " ... one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things."[146] Aristotle tries to clarify this point by restricting substance to living things and he consequently characterizes this unity in a biological way as a tendency to grow, to mature and to reproduce. Of course, we may assume that these biological char-

acteristics are meant to apply only to sensible, perishable substances. Yet, they do serve to distinguish them from sensible "heaps". We must point out again, however, that Aristotle exhibits a real hesitation over excluding "heaps" from the category of substance. We must also acknowledge Rorty's point that to allow "heaps" the status of actual substance would damage, if not destroy, Aristotle's anti-reductionist program against the physicists or materialists.[147] The unsatisfactory treatment of this issue certainly casts doubts on Aristotle's doctrine of the natural priority or separability of substance.

Via Positiva

We must make two observations before proceeding to discuss the positive approaches to substance. As we noted in passing above, Aristotle no longer explicitly uses the primary-secondary substance distinction in the Metaphysics. Also Aristotle uses "substance" in two different grammatical ways:

1.) He speaks of substances as individual entities just as he did with primary substances in the Categories.[148]

2.) He also speaks of the substance of something.[149] This corresponds to the essence of the thing in question.

Some of the negative candidates for substance such as the universal, genus, and matter do not qualify as substance under use number one. Also, we shall see that they are excluded as fully as actual substance in use number two.

I. The Substance - Accident Approach. Aristotle reaffirms his view of the natural priority of substance in the Metaphysics and adds to it. He claims that substance is prior in time to the other categories and he explains this by saying that the other categories cannot exist independently whereas substance can.[151] Given this explanation it is reasonable to equate temporal priority with the natural priority of the Categories.

Aristotle adds that substance is prior in order of knowledge and in definition. He explains the first by saying that we know a thing most fully when we know its substance rather than its accidents.[152] Regarding the second type of priority he says about accidents that "in the definition of each term the definition of its substance must be present."[153]

This priority of definition we have called and will continue to call "logical priority." In addition to this priority there is a priority of knowledge between substance and accidents in that knowing what a thing is gives us more knowledge concerning it than knowing its accidents. We have seen this before. There is also an equivocity present between substance and accidents because all are called "being." We have noted that this equivocity is called pros hen equivocity or focal meaning. Substance is being without qualification while the other categories are dependent on substance naturally, epistemologically and logically and are called "being" in a qualified sense.[154] One example is "health". A person may be called healthy and this is the

primary sense and instance of health (health in an organism), whereas the sun and a person's complexion may also be called healthy because the former produces health and the latter is symptomatic of it.

We have mentioned above that Aristotle speaks of the "substance of" substances. It should be noted that he freely speaks of the substance of accidents as well. For example, the following are all spoken of in this way: justice and wisdom,[155] tragedy,[156] place,[157] health and disease,[158] sensory powers[159] and good.[160] "Substance of" is used transcategorically because it means "the essence of" as noted above. Do accidents then have essences and definitions? A simple yes or no will not do for an answer. Aristotle gives us his typical reply that "in one sense nothing will have a definition and nothing will have an essence, except substances, but in another sense other things will have them."[161] He says again, " 'What a thing is' in one sense means substance and the 'this,' in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as 'is' belongs to all things, not however, in the same sense but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too 'what a thing is' belongs in the simple sense to substance but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is...."[162]

He explains this limited type of definition: "For if the other categories are definable, it must be by addition of a determinant, e.g., the qualitative is defined thus, and so is the odd for it cannot be defined apart from number; nor can female be defined apart from

animal."[163] This we take to be another exposition of the logical priority which obtains between substance and the other categories.

Some commentators, usually in the Neoplatonic camp, wish to reduce accidents to substance in two ways:

1.) They reduce the definition of an accident to being an indirect reference[164] to the individual substance of which it is an accident.

2.) They wish to reduce the being of accidents to that of substance.

Let us consider the latter point first since we find it to be the more important. Buchanan writes, "... Aristotle means here that you can ask what the being of a Being (ousia) is, because you can say of Being (ousia) that it is or exists simply...."[165]

J. Owens agrees, "This should mean that when we say 'The man is pale,' the man alone really is."[166] He adds (calling "substance" "Entity"), "So the inference that Entity alone contains in itself the nature of Being seems fully legitimate. The examples used to illustrate the doctrine stress the presence of 'nature' in the primary instance alone. The nature involved is found only in the first instance."[167]

J. Owens goes further than Buchanan, we think. When Buchanan says ousia or substance exists simply, we take him to mean that substances exist without additional qualification which is what Aristotle says.[168] Yet we are hard pressed to understand what J.

Owens means by saying that we mean, "The man alone really is" when we say, "The man is pale." We think that when we say, "The man is pale" that is what we mean.

We do not think that being is one predicate for Aristotle. It is a "disjunctive set of predicates"[169] or more colorfully, a polygamous predicate.[170] We agree with G. E. L. Owen that these senses of being are irreducible.[171] As G. E. L. Owen remarks, "What Aristotle wants to dispel is the myth that there is equally something in common to sharks and shyness on the plea that each of them is a being or existent or thing of some kind. There is no such genus as being (and 'thing,' as Berkeley confided to his notebook, is 'an homonymous word')."[172]

We have dealt with the claim that the definitions of accidents is reducible to that of substance in our previous chapter on types of Aristotelian equivocity. It is tied up with the problem of whether focal meaning is some sort of disguised univocity or not.

Aristotle also argues at length that substance is a necessary category without which accidents and accidental predication make no sense.[173]

Although Aristotle repeats in the Metaphysics[174] the doctrine of the Categories that no substance can consist of another substance actually present in it, he also remarks that the soul is a substance in an animal. He says that one definition of substance is "that which being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is

the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal."[175] This may look as if Aristotle is contradicting himself but we contend that he is not. He is saying that the soul is present not as a substance in an actual substance but rather in "such things as are not predicated of a subject." Of course, he may mean that such things are substances but we think not because immediately above he does say that simple bodies are often called substance because "everything else is predicated of them."[176] Yet, these are at best only potential substance as we have seen. He clarifies this even more by saying that substance has two senses: the ultimate substratum and the essence.[177] In other words we are suggesting that, when Aristotle says the soul is in "such things", we should take "things" in the technical sense of heaps, secondary matter, and potential substances. He further explains "in" by saying the soul is the cause of the being of the thing it is "in." There seems, therefore, to be no reason to see this passage concerning the soul as contradicting Aristotle's doctrine that no actual substance consists of another actual substance.

In examining the substance-accident relationship as approach to characterizing substance we have found:

1. Aristotle has not contradicted his view of this relationship as given in the Categories though he has modified it somewhat.

2. He has added the notion of focal meaning which is that "being" (and "one") is used equivocally over all the categories but that there is a logical priority of substance over the non-substantial

categories as well as an epistemic and ontological priority of substance.

3. "Substance" is now being used not only to indicate the primary substances of the Categories, but also the essence of something. In this later case, we find that "substance" is used transcategorically. We do not feel that this is a genuine break with the doctrine of the categories in the Categories but rather a development of it. We believe Aristotle has made it abundantly clear that, when one speaks of the "essence of" or "substance of" a non-substantial item, he is not predicating this essence in the same way as when he predicates an essence of an individual substance. We point out that the relation of focal meaning is operative between substance and the other categories.[178] The primary and proper subject of predication seems to be a substance.[179]

Substance as Essence

In Z, 4 Aristotle turns his attention to essence as a candidate for the title "substance." Being a substratum was not a sufficient condition for being a substance and this is one of the reasons, we believe, for his turning to essence here (there may of course, be many other reasons, including the possibility that we are missing one or more books between Z, 3 and 4.)

What Aristotle calls the essence of something is usually literally translated as the what-it-is-to-be (to-ti-en-einai) of the in-

dividual which is contrasted with the what-is (ti estin) as being more specific.[180] Aristotle tells us that essence is the substance and the primary substance of the thing.[181] What, exactly, this means has perplexed commentators. Chen points out that perhaps the major problem here is that the Peripatetic tradition concerning this point was broken by the time of the earliest, extant commentaries.[182]

We can speculate that the context of the discussion of essence as substance was originally a Platonic one. Aristotle remarks that "the essence is said to be the substance of each thing."[183] He goes on to discuss the doctrine of the Platonic Ideas and the problems it poses for this statement.[184] We think that it would be reasonable to conclude that Aristotle is addressing the Platonists in this issue of essence as substance. And the Platonist has on his side the argument that things only exist as kinds of things or rather individual members of species. The Platonist could ask if it isn't the form that makes something this kind of individual? If so, isn't the Form the substance of the individual?

Aristotle seems sharply aware of the thrust of these questions when he calls essence the primary substance of the individual.

In continuing our investigation, we find that the essence of a thing is what it is said to be by its very nature.[185] Aristotle contrasts this with something accidental. To say Socrates is musical is not to say what he is by his very nature. To say he is a man is to do so. We also find that only those things which have definition

have an essence.[186] The definition is a formula (logos) "signifying a thing's essence."[187] Primarily these would be individual substances, although, as we have seen above, other categories might have essences and definitions in an intentionally equivocal sense. Aristotle goes on to conclude, "Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence."[188] Aristotle also says that the essence of the individual is its "substance without matter."[189] Essence is identified in some sense with form (eidos): "By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance."[190] He identifies form[191] and substance again and then the soul, form, and essence.[192]

Now if there is one thing which appears clear in Aristotle's metaphysics, it is that no universal is an actual substance and that this was one of the major errors of the Platonists. For example, he concludes that "it is plain that no universal attribute is a substance and this is plain also from the fact that no common, predicate indicates a 'this', but rather a 'such'.[193] This would be well and good except that he also claims that "definition is of the universal and the form."[194] He also says that "there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition."[195] Here the form and universal seem to be identified. Again, form and essence are contrasted with a "this" or individual substance.[196] He adds that there can be no science of individuals.[197] Yet, if no universal is a substance and first philosophy is the science of substance, then how can there be a science of first philosophy? Aristotle, himself, poses this aporia

several times throughout the Metaphysics. Perhaps the clearest statement of this puzzle is given in Mu, 10: "But if the principles are universal, either the substances composed of them are also universal, or non-substance will be prior to substance; for the universal is not a substance, but the element or principle is universal, and the element or principle is prior to the things of which it is the principle or element."[198]

Both essence and matter would seem to be principles of the individual substance.[199] Aristotle's problem is this: principles are in some sense prior to the individual substance of which they are principles. However, substance is supposedly prior naturally, in definition, and in order of knowledge to all the other categories. If the principles are considered as outside the category of substance, then items in a non-substantial category are prior to substance. If we say that these principles are universals, then their individual substances must be universal but no actual substance is a universal. Suppose we deny that the principles are universal? Then we are faced with the greatest difficulty: "The statement that all knowledge is universal, so that the principles of things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents indeed, of all the points we have mentioned, the greatest difficulty...."[200]

If essence expresses the what-it-is-to-be of the individual in a definition, it must be expressed in universal form to qualify as scientific knowledge. Aristotle is emphatic that "the proper object of

unqualified scientific knowledge is something which cannot be other than it is."[201] True universal propositions would give the desired necessity which is lacking in statements about individuals qua individuals.

So we see that immediately as we turn to consider essence as a candidate for substance, we are again immersed in the nest of problems that surround the universal.

J. Owens and Ellen Haring have presented interpretations which we think are similar enough to be grouped together (although J. Owens' position as presented in The Doctrine of Being[202] is much more comprehensive than Haring's three articles[203]). We shall call their interpretation the O-H account for the sake of brevity. The O-H account holds that the doctrine of the Categories in which the individual counts as primary substance has been re-thought by Aristotle in Metaphysics, Zeta (which is considered to be later than the Categories). Here,[204] it is form alone rather than the concrete individual (the composite of matter and form) which counts as primary substance.[205] According to the O-H account the form is the principle of determinacy and, as such, structures the determinable matter into an individual. Although the cause of individuality, the form is not an individual in the ordinary sense of the word. J. Owens writes, "...The whole development of Book Z requires that the form of sensible things, taken in itself, be neither singular nor universal, although it is the cause of Being and the foundation of universality."[206]

Haring, in agreement, concludes, "Substantial form emerges in Z as something at once definite and simple, something ultimate yet neither a universal nor an individual and something in some respects indifferent to matter though immersed in it."[207] J. Owens finds the form to be an individual in a sense different from that of a concrete, material individual (which he calls a singular). He says, "The Aristotelian form is individual in itself, and ~~is the~~ cause of the individuality of the singular thing of which it is the act."[208] J. Owens explains that "form" is equivocal. In the concrete individual, it is "this definite form," yet "that same form can be seen in many other singular things."[209] He claims that, for Aristotle, the existence of a plurality of individuals with the same form is a basic empirical fact.[210] In other words, there are natural kinds. In terms of knowledge, J. Owens claims, as we have briefly seen, that one actually knows the form in the sense of a "this," the form can be found just as well in other concrete individuals. It is potentially universal while actually a "this" (of some sort). Our knowledge is actual when we know the form while we can have potential knowledge of the form as universal since it can be found in other individuals.[211]

Haring points out that "the entity directly signified by the definitory formula is typical form-expanded, the universal.[212] She continues, "The universal is itself expressive of pure form; the definitory formula, therefore, ultimately signifies form alone, the primary intelligible ousia of ousiai."[213] She concludes, "It follows,

however, that the thing itself--since it is form in matter, not form alone--is not identical with its own essence."[214]

With this somewhat startling conclusion, we must pause and examine the O-H account critically. This account does have the merit of being able to resolve many opposing Aristotelian texts and of fitting in well with the general Neoplatonic thrust of both Haring and J. Owens in which first philosophy is the science of pure form. Secondly, and more specifically, it is quite plausible to suggest that "form" is used equivocally by Aristotle. Many of Aristotle's key terms have several senses. However, to suggest that form, in itself, is neither universal nor a concrete individual leaves us bewildered. We find no help in J. Owens' claim that the form is a "this" but in a non-ordinary sense. J. Owens does not explain to our satisfaction what this sense is. Aristotle tells us often that the essential characteristic of a "this" is that it is capable of separate existence. He also tells us that the form is separable only in thought.[215] Further, if form is a "this," how can the "same" form be found in a plurality of individuals? As Gewirth says, "What remains doubtful, however, is the sense in which the 'same form' can be 'seen in many other singulars' and yet not be universal."[216]

Haring's claim that the individual is not the same as its essence raises some serious problems. First, one wonders why she speaks of "its essence?" Second, Aristotle says, "Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely acci-

dental way...."[217] Third, Cherniss objects, "If, however, the universality is accidental because it is merely the repeated particularization of the essence--or the possibility of such repetition--then each and every particularization is similarly accidental to the essence, itself."[218] Cherniss seems to be saying that, if the essence is taken to be the form alone[219] and the form is neither universal nor the concrete individual, then we must conclude that the form is <u>accidentally</u> a concrete individual and <u>accidentally</u> a universal. In itself, a form is really neither. Leszl continues with this line of thought to conclude that, if the O-H interpretation is correct, then all essential predication is ruled out.[220] Leszel seems to be reasoning as follows: the definition is supposed to express the essence of the thing. The definition is of the universal. The form is the essence of the thing (according to the O-H account). The form is not universal. Consequently, it would seem to be impossible to express the essence of the thing as it really is, if we accept the O-H account.

Since both J. Owens and Haring are excellent scholars, one tends to wonder whether it is only they who are troubled by these objections or whether they reach Aristotle, himself. The O-H account certainly marshals apparent textual support.

Let us look first at texts which seem to support the O-H account. Aristotle says that, when accidents are predicated of substance, "the ultimate subject is a substance; but when this is not so but the predicate is a form and a 'this,' the ultimate subject is matter and

material substance."[221] Also Aristotle calls the formula a "this" and says it can be separately formulated.[222] Again, he calls the fully actual nature a "this" and contrasts it with the concrete individual.

We do not believe that these texts force us to conclude that form or essence is an individual, in itself, apart from the concrete individual. We think rather that Aristotle calls the form a "this" first because it is a principle of a "this" or concrete individual. Aristotle's reasoning is made somewhat clearer if we pay attention to what he says about elements, "If they are divided their parts are of the same kind, as a part of water is water ...."[223] Of course, "principle" is a wider concept than "element" as principles can exist outside the individual of which it is a principle.[224] Now principles are prior in some sense(s) to the substance of which they are the principles. The form or essence as expressed in the definition is prior in definition to the concrete individual.[225] Consequently, it must be called a "this" and a substance of the individual substance or the nonsubstantial will be prior to substance and that Aristotle will not allow. Further, the essence of form expressed in the definition can be separately formulated, i. e., if it states the essence as it should, then it has separated the essence from the accidents, so again it may be called a "this" in a sense. But of course the essence or form the separated exists in and depends upon the mind or soul. Aristotle is quick to point this out, saying, "For when a man is healthy then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as

the bronze sphere."[226] He writes, more generally, that "definitions are simultaneous with their effects."[227] He claims that concrete individuals are "without qualifications, capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are not."[228] It is not necessary that we understand "separable" in this last clause to mean separable from matter. It might also mean separable from accidents. A definition of "musical Socrates," although it is a deviant or secondary sense of definition, would not be separable.[229]

Of course, the situation is not so simple. Aristotle also claims, "But man and horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals; but universally, are not substance...."[230] Again, he proclaims that "in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance."[231] Even more definitely he says, "Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances."[232] More specifically, he tells us that "the 'form' means the 'such,' and is not 'this'--a definite thing...."[233] Again, he contrasts the concrete individual with the universal form, saying, "And the whole 'this' Callias or Socrates is analogous to 'this brazen sphere,' but man and animal to 'brazen sphere' in general."[234]

Lesher[235] attacks Aristotle severely for this apparent inconsistency surrounding form or essence. He claims that Aristotle

subscribes to all three of the following statements and so lands himself in a dilemma:

A.) No universal can be a substance.

B.) The form is universal.

C.) The form is that which is most truly substance.

Lesher thinks that Aristotle fails to distinguish between nothing common being a substance and nothing non-particular being one. He feels that if Aristotle meant the first alternative, he has contradicted himself, given his quotes about the form as common or the same in several individuals. If Aristotle meant the second, he offers an un-argued-for alternative to Platonism.[236]

Certainly there is something amiss when Aristotle tells us that the formula is a "this" and then says that no universal term is the name of a substance. This may be simply a contradiction on Aristotle's part.

Woods tries a different approach. He admits that the form or species form is universal but denies that it is predicated universally.[237] Woods claims that it is being predicated universally which disqualifies a candidate from being substance. He believes that in the Metaphysics, Aristotle departed from the doctrine of the Categories in which the species form is predicated of the individual as secondary substance. Woods claims that the individual is recognized only through his species-form; "Aristotle refuses to say that anthropos was katholou legomenon because that would suggest that you could

distinguish men independently of the form--as if you could first distinguish individual substances and then notice that the predicate applied to them which supplied a basis for distinguishing them in the first place."[238]

This is an interesting defense. As we see it, Woods is saying that when one says a substance is its species-form, "is" functions as the "is" of identity and not the "is" of predication (at least not in Metaphysics, Z).

Lesher thinks that Woods' defense fails. Lesher feels that to admit that a species-form is universal is to admit that it is predicable of every member of the species. This is certainly true of Aristotle's position in the Categories but does "predicable" or "predicate" mean the same thing in the Categories as in Metaphysics, Z? Woods has presented arguments and evidence to show that Aristotle changed his mind on the predicability of the species between the Categories and Metaphysics, Z. We think Lesher is too quick on this issue. Lesher's point that one can recognize the individual through sense perception[239] without knowing the species-form seems to us to be off the mark. The issue is whether or not there is a logical identity between the individual members of the species and their species-form (and whether there is the same sort of identity between these individuals and their genus).

One might try another line of defense and argue that "form" or "essence" can refer both to the universal and to the organization

of the particular. This seems to be the tack of Albritton[240] and Sellars.[241] Ross also finds some evidence for this view in Aristotle.[242] Let us consider some of this evidence. Aristotle says, "For firstly, the substance of each thing is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else...."[243] And more explicitly, he writes, "... The causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving causes being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same."[244] In the same vein, he says, "But man and horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally are not substance but something composed of this particular formula and this particular matter treated as universal...."[245] Aristotle says further, "It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus;' if even the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates, has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others the concrete thing), but if 'Socrates' of 'Coricus' means simply this particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its composition."[246] Ross in the Oxford translation (n. 48) explains the last clause about an analogy between universal and particular by saying that as man is body and soul, so Socrates is this body and this soul.

Certainly the universal helps to explain the particular. As G. E. L. Owens puts it: "When Aristotle introduces "ousia" in the

sense of essence or definable nature of a thing and that the ousia is, in the words of the Oxford translation, "the cause of each thing's being" (aitia tou einai ekaston, Metaphysics H 1043 a. 2-3, cf. De Anima B 415 b. 12-13), he is not taking an advance draft on the Ontological Argument. He means just that the definition of "ice" goes to explain what it is for our particular ice-patch to be in existence. (To explain, not to cause: is it too late to complain of "cause" as the translations of aitia?)"[247]

This would help to explain why the form is considered by Aristotle to be prior to the individual.[248] He is presumably speaking of form as universal (expressed in definition) and claiming it is prior in knowledge.

If our reasoning is correct here, then the universal need not be prior in the first two senses:

1. Natural priority--while the universal can be abstracted from accidents, it exists as separate only in the soul and no actual substance exists in another (assuming the soul and matter together as an actual thinking individual).

2. It is not prior in definition but, rather, is the definition of the individual substance.

3. It is prior in the order of knowledge. While we perceive or intuit the individual first,[249] what is most knowable to us is not what is most knowable-in-itself.[250]

It may very well be that Aristotle changed his mind on this

point as Elders[251] suggests. Aristotle may have gone from considering the species-form or universal as substance to considering the individual only as substance. However it may be, it seems that for Aristotle the universal qua universal does not exist actually except in the intellect. It is for this reason that Aristotle, at Mu, 10 (which Jaeger takes to be late[252]) says:

> The statement that all knowledge is universal, so that the principles of things must also be universal and not separate substances, presents indeed, of all points we have mentioned, the greatest difficulty, but yet the statement is in a sense true, although in a sense it is not. For knowledge, like the verb 'to know,' means two things, of which one is potential and one actual. The potency, being, as matter universal and indefinite, deals with the universal and indefinite; but the actuality, being definite, deals with a definite object--being a 'this,' it deals with a 'this.'[253]

Let us notice certain points expressed in this text:

1.) In a sense it is not true that all knowledge is universal.

2.) In a sense it is but here the universal is linked to potency and indefiniteness.

Aristotle continues, "But per accidens sight sees universal color, because this individual color which it sees is color; and this individual a which the grammarian investigates is an a."[254] This text has occasioned a great deal of difficulty. It seems to offer support to Cherniss' objection that a thing is its essence accidentally for Aristotle, that, e.g. the individual a is accidentally an a. If we add to it Aristotle's pronouncement that "things which are of the nature of matter [heaps?], or of wholes that include matter, are not

the same as their essences...,"[255] it would seem to secure Cherniss' case that there can be no essential predication for Aristotle. Well, that depends upon what Cherniss wants. Surely, all definitions will be universal. Even terms used in definite descriptions can be applied to other individuals. As Leszl remarks, why should it be a particular problem for Aristotle that universally stated definitions are definitions of individuals?[256] Now Aristotle clearly says, "...but of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense a formula, and in a sense there is not...."[257] It is true to say that Socrates is a man or biped animal but that isn't all he is. He is a particular man or biped animal. No universal definition can express this particularity. If Cherniss' objection is that Aristotle does not identify the particular individual with his definition in all senses, then Aristotle admits his guilt. Aristotle seems to be saying that we can consider essence qua universal or qua essence of a particular substance. This is similar to his saying that there is no definition of the individual qua individual but a definition can apply to the individual qua member of a species. As Leszl puts it, "To say, as Aristotle does, that the definitory expression is 'common' is to say that it is definitory of each and every member of the class and not that it is definitory of none of them."[258]

Aristotle thinks that, unless one allows for a logical identity between an individual substance and its definition, one becomes embroiled in a host of difficulties which plague the theory of separate

forms, not the least of which is the Third Man.

Yes, but what of the text that says one sees universal color per accidens when one sees color? Does not this text justify Cherniss' complaint? We think not. Aristotle also says, "...it is not by accident that the essence of one and the one are one."[259] This latter quote is very much in keeping with his other pronouncements about a substance coinciding with its essence. The text at 1087 a. 18-21 tells us that sight "sees" per accidens universal color. We could emphasize "sees" and point out that universal color is not the proper object of the sense of sight. Certainly Aristotle tells us, "We speak of an incidental object of sense where, e.g., the white object which we see is the son of Diares; here because 'being the son of Diares' is incidental to the directly visible white patch we speak of the son of Diares as being (incidentally) perceived or seen by us."[260] Strictly speaking each sense has its own proper object. For example, sight sees distinguishable[261] colors or colored patches. If we say we see anything beyond this, we are adding something non-essential to sight.[262] Now addition is frequently the cause for calling something "accidental" for Aristotle.[263]

Continuing in this vein one might argue that the investigation of the grammarian into this a is not meant to refer to cognitive activity. The Oxford translation of "investigates" for "theorein" could be replaced by "looked at" or "observed."[264] So what Aristotle is saying is that abstraction is added to sensation in order to get uni-

versal knowledge. It is not that Socrates is accidentally a biped animal but that abstraction is accidental to the process of sensation.

We agree with this conclusion but not with translating "theorein" with "sees" because one would see only a colored patch on the paper not this a. In our view Aristotle is here saying that sensation or intuition does not automatically yield universal knowledge. One must add the process of abstraction (and, usually, induction).[265] One might even know something about the particular without having universal knowledge concerning all such particulars, e.g., one can know that this figure's angles are equal to two right angles without knowing that it is an isosceles triangle or that all isosceles triangles have their angles equal to two right angles.[266]

Aristotle's claim that actual knowledge is about the concrete individual further strengthens our case that it is the individual that counts as actual substance. Of course, this same claim on the part of Aristotle leads to some controversy. Both Leszl[267] and Cherniss[268] claim that there is actual knowledge of the universal. There is textual support for this claim:

1.) If, then, a man has the theory without the experience and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual...[269]

2.) ...We have often a clear insight into a universal but through lack of observation are ignorant of some of its particular instances.[270]

3.) Further, since there are two kinds of premises, there is nothing to prevent a man's having both premises and acting against his knowledge, provided he is using only the universal premise and not the particular....[271]

These texts obviously do not square with Mu, 10. If Aristotle changed his mind on this point in favor of the Mu, 10 text, then it would seem that any analytic statements about non-extant types or syllogisms composed of all universal propositions would not yield actual knowledge. Such a conclusion makes Aristotle a very radical empiricist and flies in the face of those texts claiming actual universal knowledge.[272] We think rather that, even if Aristotle did change his mind, he did not reach so radical a conclusion. It seems to us that universal knowledge may be considered potential in relation to knowing and recognizing a particular, whereas if the intellect turns its attention to the universal proposition but, perhaps, not the individual example of it.[273] This solution seems to be Aristotle's own in his resolution of the paradox of the Meno.[274]

The main thrust of our arguments have been mostly negative. We reject the O-H account of form as primary substance and existing neither as a universal nor particular but a "this" in some sense, which account seems unintelligible. We also reject the position that the form or essence as a separate universal is considered actual substance. Admittedly the texts are controversial and will probably always be so. However, we find much to agree with in Ross' following statement:

> Socrates and Callias, while agreeing in their specific form, must differ in the form of their matter. By following this line of thought we should arrive at the notion of an essence of the individual, which includes besides the specific form such further permanent characteristics as spring from differences in the matter

> of which different individuals are made. And taking into account the correlation of form and end in Aristotle's system, we should hold that the end of each individual is not only to reach the perfection typical of the species, but to realize it in the particular way for which its individual form fits it.[275]

The only difficulty we have with Ross' position is that it seems to give the impression that the species-form is some existing substance which is plugged into matter but perhaps this is just our reading of Ross.

Let us look at, what seems to us, to be some of Aristotle's clearest remarks on essence which occur at the end of Zeta. First, he tells us, "This, then is plain, that we are not inquiring why he who is a man is a man. 'We are inquiring, then, 'why something is predicable of something (that it is predicable must be clear; for if not, the inquiry is an inquiry into nothing). E.g., why does it thunder? This is the same as 'why is sound produced in the clouds?' Thus the inquiry is about the predication of one thing of another. And why are these things, i.e., bricks and stones, a house? Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence...."[276]

Hocutt observes that a formal explanation is often an explanation for an event.[277] It would seem from Aristotle's description that one is asking why certain matter has this kind of organization rather than another, e.g., why are the bricks a house? Aristotle tells us what sort of answers to expect: "Plainly we are seeking the cause. And this is the essence (to speak abstractly), which in some cases is the end, e.g. perhaps in the case of a house or a bed, and in

some cases is the first mover; for this also is a cause."[278] So we find that "essence" can also refer to the final and efficient causes. Hocutt remarks that a formal explanation is often a blank check for a material explanation.[279] For example, if we have explained the mechanics of why it thunders, we have also explained what-it-is-to-thunder. As Dancy points out, "We already know that we call the noise that takes place in the clouds 'thunder.' We've now explained why it takes place; that is, why it thunders. So what thunder <u>really</u> is, is the noise that occurs when fire is extinguished in the clouds. And this rearrangement of the terms of our explanation gives us a new definition for thunder."[280]

We should not wish to suggest that essence can be reduced to matter (or vice-versa). Aristotle clarifies this point:

> Since that which is compound out of something so that the whole is one, not like a heap but like a syllable--now the syllable is not its elements, <u>ba</u> is not the same as <u>b</u> and <u>a</u>, nor is flesh fire and earth (for when these are separated the wholes, i.e., the flesh and the syllables, no longer exist but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth); the syllable, then, is something--not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else.... But it would seem that this 'other' is something and not an element and that it is the <u>cause</u> which makes <u>this</u> thing flesh and that a syllable. And similarly in all other cases. And this is the <u>substance</u> of each thing (for this is the primary cause of its being); and since, while some things are not substances, as many as are substances are formed in accordance with a nature of their own and by a process of nature, their substance would seem to be this kind of 'nature' which is not an element but a principle.[281]

One use of "essence" refers to the principle of organization that makes this flesh and these bones into Socrates. It is obviously

different from whatever organizes that flesh and those bones into Plato. This helps explain why Aristotle says that "the causes and elements of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause and mine...."[282] Of course, one may abstract from this flesh and bones and simply consider human organization of human flesh in general. One cannot abstract from flesh and bones altogether if one is considering man,[283] unless one considers man to be only a soul imprisoned in an extraneous body.

We do not believe that form or essence should be deified either as a universal or a "this" of some sort. The particular essence and matter belong to the first category because they are two aspects of the individual substances. The essence gives the individual definiteness or actually organizes the matter. The matter makes the individual numerically distinct.

One may object here strongly that the essence or form as soul is separable insofar as it is immortal or it is universal insofar as it is passed on from parent to offspring.

If we consider the last objection first, we see that the essence of the child organizes flesh differently from its parents. Yes, essence or form is universal only if abstracted by the intellect. The essence is potentially universal in things but exists qua universal actually in the intellect. The process of generation is explained in materialistic and finalistic ways by Aristotle. The semen is considered an instrumental cause. It does not actually have the form

of the offspring. It is actually in motion and it imparts this motion (mechanically?) to the matter of the female which seems to form itself into an offspring.[284] The "same form" is passed on in the abstract. That is, parent and offspring are naturally (excluding monsters) the same in species. But don't members of the same species have identical structures, functions, goals, etc.? That depends on how one understands "identical". They obviously differ in time and place and many other ways. Aren't these differences accidental to the what-it-is-to-be of the thing? Again that depends on whether one is concerned with the what-it-is-to-be of Socrates or man, in general.

Lesher would not accept this interpretation because he feels that "substance" is used in only one sense by Aristotle.[285] Also, he expresses no awareness that Aristotle may have changed his mind on the issue of substance as essence. Aristotle's admission of matter as potential substance and talk of the substance of accidents should show that Lesher is much more restrictive than Aristotle on the senses of "substance."

The form as soul and the question of its immortality is much more difficult. That Aristotle raises the question is not surprising. It was certainly a legitimate question within a Platonistic framework. Now we have seen that Aristotle claims the form is not separable, except in thought, from the individual. Even where Aristotle entertains the idea of immortality, he claims that it is only active reason

which is "immortal and eternal."[286] He immediately adds that we would not remember this life.[287] Ross interprets this text in a Latin Averroistic way--that active reason is the same for all men.[288] If such an interpretation is correct, it gives one good grounds for suspecting this to be an early text(s). Such active reason would seem to be a separate, existing universal which also exists in all living men. If this does not smack of Platonism, what would? Consequently, we think that this text should not be overemphasized against the main thrust of the Metaphysics, in which there is no actual separate universal.

A Thomistic[289] account of this problem would have the soul as incorruptible. It would not allow the separate soul the status of substance. It leaves us truly in the dark as to what the existence of a separated form would be like. This account also requires a God of Christian theology to rectify the unnatural condition of the separated form at the last resurrection when it is reunited with the body.

Again, we admit that the texts are not conclusive in favor of our interpretation but we have argued, and we think successfully, that it is the most probable. We reject substance as actual, universal form or as a form which is a "this" in the unexplained way of the O-H account. We find actual substance to be the concrete individual. The individual can be thought of as a particular organization of particular matter. The individual may also be considered universally and so may his essence and matter.

We do not accept a Neoplatonic interpretation which would reduce the individual substance to form alone. Form or essence alone does not exist, in the case of material substances at least, outside of the intellect.

There are many issues we have left untouched in our investigation of substance. The questions concerning the possibility of essential definitions and the theory of knowledge it is based on are two such issues. They are obviously well outside the scope of our study. We have also not treated the question concerning the possibility of non-sensible substances. We will do so in our treatment of the arguments for the Unmoved Mover.

Footnotes

[1]Met., 982b. 9.

[2]Met., 1033 a. 21.

[3]Met., 1028 b. 3

[4]Met., 1026 a. 18-20; 1064 b. 3.

[5]Met., 1071 b. 20-22.

[6]Met., 1071 b. 12-26; 1072 b. 3-11; 1072 b. 25-30; and E.E., 1717 b. 31.

[7]Emerson Buchanan, Aristotle's Theory of Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Mississppi, 1962), pp. 1-8 and J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 65-75.

[8]Buchanan, pp. 7-8.

[9]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 69.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Buchanan, p. 3.

[12]John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1956), Bk. II, Ch. XXIII, pp. 95-96.

[13]Met., 1029 a. 7-10.

[14]Met., 1029 a. 26-28.

[15]Met., 1018 b. 35-1019 a. 10; 1035 a. 1-3; 1038 b. 20-30.

[16]Sir David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 166.

[17]St. Augustine, On the Trinity, Bk. VII, Ch. 5 in Basic Writing of St. Augustine, Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948), II, p. 771.

[18]Met., 1073 a. 6-9. For a discussion of the divinity as simple see Leo Elders, S.V.D., Aristotle's Theology: A Commentary on Book Lambda of the Metaphysics (Assen: Van Gorcum and Co., 1972), p. 170.

[19]" ... La structure de la Métaphysique d'Aristote n'est pas et ne pouvait être une structure déductive, mais seulement une structure aportique, c'est-à-dire au sens aristotelicien du terme, dialectique; pourquoi enfin le discours humain sur l'être se présente à la façon non d'un savoir achevé, mais d'une recherche que saurait de surcroît sans conclusion," Pierre Aubenque, Le Problème de l'Etre Chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), pp. 15-16.

[20]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 30-31.

[21]W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I, pp. lxxvi-lxxvii.

[22]Ibid. Routila sees the Metaphysics, additionally, as an illustration of how to pose and resolve philosophic problems. We agree, but we must stress that important conclusions about being not just about method are found in the Metaphysics. See Lauri Routila, Die Aristotleische Idee der Ersten Philosophie (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 34-35.

[23]For an example of this procedure see Met., Alpha 3-10. For a statement of this method by Aristotle see Topica, 104 b. 1-17. For a discussion of this procedure of starting with endoxa see Evans, op cit., pp. 77-85.

[24]The term "grammatical approach" is taken from Werner Marx, The Meaning of Aristotle's Ontology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 39.

[25]J. L. Ackrill, trans., Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione: Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 71.

[26]Jaakko Hintikka, "Time, Truth, and Knowledge in Ancient Greek Philosophy," American Philosophical Quarterly, 4 (1967), 1-14.

[27]Plato, Sophist (Cornford), 263 e.

[28]Met., 1003 a. 34-36.

[29]Met., 1003 b. 6-14.

[30]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 11-13.

[31]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 34-35.

[32]See Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substance," Philosophical Review, 84 (July, 1975), 338-378.

[33]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 19-34.

[34]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 14-16.

[35]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 b. 17-22; 29-37; 3 a. 1-6; 9-15.

[36]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 11-18.

[37]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 a. 1-7.

[38]Cat. (Oxford), 1 b. 26-28.

[39]Cat. (Ackrill), 1 b. 1-2.

[40]Cat. (Ackrill), 3 a. 20.

[41]Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances," p. 371.

[42]Topica (Oxford), 102 b. 4-10.

[43]Ackrill, p. 74.

[44]Cat. (Ackrill), 1a. 26-30. Aristotle seems to see body and soul as two distinct substances here.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 b. 3-6.

[47]G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysic," p. 171.

[48]For the controversy over recurrent vs. non-recurrent accidents see Ackrill's commentary on the Categories; R.E. Allen "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's Categories," Exegesis and Argument; ed. E. M. Lee, A. B.D. Maurelatos, and R.M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum & Co.), pp. 362-373; Julia Annas, "Individual in Aristotle's Categories: Two Queries, "Phronesis, 19 (1974), 146-152;

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961); Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts on Substance;" James Duerlinger, "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis, 15 (1970), 179-203; and Barrington Jones, "Individuals in Aristotle's Categories," Phronesis, 17 (1972), 107-123; G.E.L. Owen, "Inherence," Phronesis, 10 (1965), 97-105.

[49]G.E.L. Owen, "Inherence," p. 99. For a less contemporary defense of this position see George Grote, Aristotle I (London: John Murray, 1872), p. 90, n.b..

[50]Here we must draw attention to the fact that the notion of natural priority is not a sufficient explanation of being in a substance. If the Unmoved Mover exists, then, as we shall see more fully below, we could not exist if the Unmoved Mover (or heavenly spheres) did not. Yet, we are convinced that we are not "in" the Unmoved Mover. We are convinced of this because Aristotle nowhere retracts his doctrine that a substance cannot be in a substance. Nor does he put forth a Spinozistic doctrine that there is really only one substance, the Unmover Mover, and that we are mere modes of this divinity. This latter point requires arguments to support it and will be presented below. If natural priority is not a sufficient explanation of an accident being in a substance, perhaps Aristotle had in mind some additional criterion such as an ordinary language notion of "in a subject," as Ackrill suggests (Ackrill, p. 74). This seems plausible especially since Aristotle gives us no further criterion. It would seem that he thought this was fairly clear from our experiences of substances and accidents and was content to call our attention to the relationship of natural priority between them.

[51]Cat. (Oxford), 2 b. 45-46.

[52]Cat. (Ackrill), 4 a. 19-21.

[53]Physica, 190 a. 14.

[54]Cat., 3 b. 24-32. Aristotle explains: Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity. There is nothing that forms the contrary of "two cubits long," or of "ten," or of any such term. A man may contend that "much" is the contrary of "little" or "great" of "small," but of definite quantitative terms no contrary exists. Cf. Physica, 191 a. 1-20.

[55]Cat. (Ackrill), 3 b. 37-41. One could argue that there is a sense in which one man is more of a man than another. Surprisingly Aristotle does not do so.

[56]Cat. (Ackrill), 3 b. 10-13.

[57]Cat. (Ackrill), 4 a. 10-14.

[58]Cat. (Ackrill), 3 b. 15-20.

[59]Met., 1020 a. 34 - 1020 b. 1.

[60]This depends upon a straightforward reading of "degrees" which, as we shall see, is not the only reading Aristotle allows.

[61]Of course, there is an apparent problem here which a Platonist would be quick to point out. Isn't it true that these so-called primary substances are always of some kind or other? Socrates would not be if he were not a man. If this is so, then aren't primary substances dependent on secondary substances? Aristotle recognizes this apparent problem and attempts to deal with it in the Metaphysics.

[62]Met., 1003 a. 21.

[63]Werner, Marx, The Meaning of Aristotle's Ontology, p. 28.

[64]Ibid., p. 25.

[65]For example, see D. J. Allen, The Philosophy of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 134: St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961), I, V. L. 9: C 889, p. 345; Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle, p. 71; Randall, Aristotle, p. 118; John Cook Wilson, "Categories in Aristotle and Kant," Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 85; Veatch, p. 166.

[66]Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle.

[67]Wilson, p. 85.

[68]Met., 1017 a. 25-27.

[69]Met., 1051 b. 7-9.

[70]Ethica Nic., 1141 a. 8-9. J. Owens feels that the list of categories is not exhaustive yet he seems unaware of the problem

raised here. Edward Zeller, on the other hand, argues in favor of the completeness of the list. See J. Owens, C. Cs. R., "Aristotle on Categories," Review of Metaphysics, 15 (1960), 73-90 and Edward Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, trans. B.F.C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), I, p. 297, n. 1.

[71]For example, Met., 1060 b. 31; 1003 a. 21.

[72]Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kamp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A 95: B 128, p. 128.

[73]Met., 1027 b. 26-27.

[74]Met., 1051 b. 7-9.

[75]Met., 1028 b. 12.

[76]Timaeus (Jowett), 30 b.

[77]De Caelo, 278 b. 3.

[78]Robert Sokolowski, "Matter, Elements, and Substance in Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 8 (1970), p. 265.

[79]Indeed, the universe would seem to fail to meet the criterion for substance at Met., 1029 a. 28, which is separability and "thisness." The universe is certainly not separable from other substances, since there is only one universe, nor is it separable from matter. In addition, we cannot see how the universe can be considered a "this" or individual substance unless Aristotle no longer considers mortal and immortal organisms to be substances (we see no evidence of this) or he now allows that actual substances can exist in a substance (we see no evidence of this either).

[80]Met., 1071 b. 1-5.

[81]Met., 1028 b. 10.

[82]Richard Rorty, "Genus at Matter," p. 395.

[83]G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 89.

[84]Met., 1040 b. 5-10. This is in direct opposition to De Caelo, 298 a. 29-32 which is why we find that we may be dealing with different stages of Aristotle's thought in these two works. When Aristotle calls these heaps "only potencies" we do not think that he means that these heaps are not at all actual but that they are "only potencies" in relation to substance. Later, at Met., 1040 b. 14 he says, "Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature...." The parts are potential vis à vis the substance in which they are or should be continuous. Concerning "elements," he says at Met., 1050 b. 28-30, "Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g., earth and fire: For these also are ever active; for they have their movement of themselves and in themselves." At De Gen. et Corr., 329 b. 23-25 he says, "But the 'elements' must be reciprocally active and susceptible, since they 'combine' and are transformed into one another."

[85]See Met., D, 6 for the various senses of "one."

[86]See Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1944), pp. 255, 321, 328; Ellen S. Haring, "Substantial Form in Aristotle's Metaphysics, Z," Review of Metaphysics, 10 (1956-1957), p. 311; J. Owens, C. Ss. R., "Matter and Predication in Aristotle," The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, ed. Evan McMullen (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965), p. 109; Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, p. cxiv; Sokolowski, p. 265.

[87]Met., 1043 b. 22-24.

[88]Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his Predecessors (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 351.

[89]Sokolowski, p. 269 also see p. 269, n. 11 for reference to the very many commentators who share this view.

[90]For example, De Gen. et Corr., 329 a 30-35; 330 a. 25-30. Not all commentators accept the idea of primary matter as a substratum for these powers which only further confirms the generalization that no important concept in Aristotle is non-controversial. See Hugh R. King, "Aristotle without Prima Materia," Journal of the History of Ideas, 17 (1956), 370-389. King's theory has not been well received as Sokolowski observes at p. 275, n. 23.

[91]De Gen. et. Corr., 330 a. 30-330 b. 3.

[92]Sokolowski, p. 271.

[93]Ibid. Also De Gen. et Corr., 331 a. 12-331 b. 2.

[94]Ibid., pp. 282-283.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Ibid., p. 281.

[97]Met., 1024 b. 5-10.

[98]Cat. (Ackrill), 2 b. 7-12.

[99]Met., 998 b. 15-21.

[100]Met., 1042 a. 21.

[101]There is at present a controversy over whether genus signifies matter or a universal. It is not to our purpose to engage in this controversy. See Marjorie Grene, "Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form? Aristotle and Taxonomy," Synthese, 28 (1974), 51-69, Richard Rorty, "Genus as Matter (n. 82 above);" and "Matter as Goo: Comments on Grene's Paper," Synthese, 28 (1974); 71-77 hereafter referred to as "Matter as Goo").

[102]Met., 1038 a. 5-6.

[103]Grene, "Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form?" p. 65 and Rorty, "Matter as Goo," p. 75.

[104]Rorty, "Genus as Matter."

[105]Met., 1038 b. 8-14.

[106]Met., 1038, b. 15.

[107]Met., 1039 a. 1-10.

[108]Met., 1038 b. 34 - 1039 a.

[109]It is outside the limits of this thesis to go into a detailed analysis of the Third Man argument in its various formulations. We are concerned with the problem of the Unmoved Mover and not with the problem of universals per se or Aristotle's attack on Plato or the Platonists. We will, however, brush up against the problem of universals again in our discussions below of essence and the science of substance. For a scholarly but unsympathetic account of Aristotle's attack on Platonism, see Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and

the Academy.

[110]Rorty, "Genus as Matter," p. 412.

[111]Met., 1026 a. 23-32; 1064 b. 6-14.

[112]For example, Met., Z, 14.

[113]Met., 1028 b. 35-1029 a.

[114]Met., 1029 a. 1-3.

[115]Met., 1029 a. 16-26.

[116]Met., 1029 a. 10.

[117]Malcolm Schofield, "Meta., 7, 3: Some Suggestions," Phronesis, 17 (1973), p. 102.

[118]H. M. Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle," Phronesis 19 (1974), p. 185.

[119]Met., 1029 a. 9.

[120]Met., 1029 a. 26-29.

[121]Physica, 192 a. 25-33.

[122]Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., "Matter and Predication in Aristotle," p. 195.

[123]Physica, 192 b. 8-23; Met., 1041 b. 29; De Anima, 432 b. 22-25.

[124]For example, Met., H, 3.

[125]Met., 1043 b. 20-25.

[126]Meteorologica, 381 b. 6; De Mundo, 396 b. 11.

[127]Alan Gewirth, "Aristotle's Doctrine of Being," Philosophical Review, 62 (1957), p. 582, 11; see also Met., 1028 a. 33-34 and 1038 b. 26-29.

[128]Rorty, "Genus as Matter," p. 414. Perhaps he is right that Aristotle is hopelessly torn on the question of whether something which is a potentiality (dynamis) also counts as a "this" (tode ti)," p.

412. For example, see Met., 1016 b. 1-19.

[129] Met., 1026 a. 10-30.

[130] J. Owens, "Matter and Predication in Aristotle," p. 197.

[131] Ibid., p. 200.

[132] Met., 1045 b. 18.

[133] Met., 1036 a. 8-9.

[134] Physica, 191 a. 8-10.

[135] Physica, 185 a. 30-32; 186 b. 2.

[136] Ibid., 190 a. 26.

[137] Met., 1043 a. 5-7.

[138] Physica, 189 a. 30-33.

[139] Ibid., 191 a. 8-12.

[140] Met., 1049 b. 5.

[141] Ibid., 1049 b. 11-12.

[142] Ibid., 1049 b. 19-24.

[143] Throughout our discussion of "things," "accidental unity" is used to refer to such things as piles of sand, rocks, mules (perhaps), etc. and not accidental complexes such as the musical Socrates which involve a substance with accidents. See Rorty, "Genus as Matter," p. 414.

[144] Met., 1043 b. 5-10.

[145] Physica, 192 b. 13-16.

[146] Met., 1043 b. 22-23.

[147] Rorty, "Genus as Matter," p. 415.

[148] Met., 1028 b. 9-10.

[149] Met., 1031 a. 17-18; 1028 b. 35. See also Dancy, Sense

and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 94-101.

[150] Met., 1017 b. 21-23.

[151] Met., 1028 a. 30-35. This notion of temporal priority is different from that given at 1018 b. 15-19.

[152] Met., 1028 a. 37-1028 b.

[153] Met., 1028 a. 35-37.

[154] Met., 1028 a. 10-30.

[155] Topica, 149 b. 37.

[156] Poetica, 1449 b. 22-24.

[157] Physica, 210 a. 11-13.

[158] Met., 1032 b. 3-5.

[159] De Anima, 418 a. 25.

[160] Met., 1022 a. 15-17.

[161] Met., 1031 a. 10-12.

[162] Met., 1030 a. 19-25.

[163] Met., 1031 a. 1-3.

[164] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 266.

[165] Buchanan, op. cit., p. 43.

[166] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 266.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Met., 131 a. 1-5

[169] G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," p. 78.

[170] Ibid., p. 72. J. Owens neglects the disjunctive aspect of "being" in reducing "The man is pale" to "The man is." Does J.

Owens mean that the man is not really pale or that being pale is not a real way of being? It would seem so. After all, he speaks of "the nature of Being" which is found in substance alone. We object to the strong implication that "being" is a predicate that designates some homogenous nature. Such a position seems to deny that being is not a genus (Met., 998 b. 22-27; 1045 b. 6) and that "being" really does have different senses (Met., 1026 a. 33- 1026 b. 5; 1017 a. 1-1017 b. 9; 1019 a. 5; 1028 a. 10130; 1045 b. 33; 1078 a. 30; 1089 a. 7.)

[171] G.E.L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," p. 77.

[172] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[173] Met., 1007 a. 29-1007 b. 17.

[174] Met., 1039 a. 3-5.

[175] Met., 1017 b. 14-16.

[176] Met., 1017 b. 14.

[177] Met., 1017 b. 23-25.

[178] Focal meaning and analogy are not mutually exclusive forms of equivocation as we argued in the last chapter.

[179] For a good discussion of this point along with the attending problems it has for Aristotle, see Dancy, Sense and Contradiction, pp. 94-113. See also An Post., I; 22.

[180] J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 180.

[181] Met., 1032 b. 1.

[182] Chung-Hwan Chen, "Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics," Phronesis, 2 (1957), pp. 54-55, n. 41.

[183] Met., 1031 a. 18.

[184] Met., 1031 b. 1-1032 a. 11.

[185] Met., 1029 b. 13-15.

[186] Met., 1030 a. 6.

[187]Topica, 101 b. 38. Also see Evans, op. cit., pp. 104-135.

[188]Met., 1030 a. 11.

[189]Met., 1032 b. 14.

[190]Met., 1032 b. 1.

[191]Met., 1035 b. 34; 1037 a. 25-30; 1037 a. 2.

[192]Met., 1035 b. 14-16; De Anima, 415 b. 10-11.

[193]Met., 1038 b. 35-1039 a. 1.

[194]Met., 1036 a. 29.

[195]Met., 1030 a. 6.

[196]Met., 1033 b. 20-25.

[197]For example, Met., 981 a. 18-20; 1036 b. 31-37.

[198]Met., 1085 b. 37 - 1087 a. 4.

[199]Met., 1038 b. 1-3.

[200]Met., 1087 a. 10-15.

[201]An. Post., 71 b. 14-15; 73 b. 25-31.

[202]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 347-377.

[203]Haring, op. cit., 308-322; 482-501; 698-713.

[204]Met., 1029 a. 41-49.

[205]For a further discussion of the apparent shift see Chen, "Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books Z and H of the Metaphysics" and Constantine Georgiadis, "Two Concepts of Substance in Aristotle," New Scholasticism, 47 (1973), 22-37.

[206]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 390.

[207]Haring, p. 309.

[208]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, pp. 398-99.

[209] Ibid., p. 431.

[210] Ibid., p. 392.

[211] Ibid., p. 434.

[212] Haring, p. 493.

[213] Ibid.

[214] Ibid., p. 501.

[215] Met. 1042 a. 28-31.

[216] A. Gewirth, op. cit., p. 588.

[217] Met., 1031 b. 18.

[218] Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, p. 348.

[219] It may well be that Aristotle means something very different by "form" and "essence." We cannot defend such a position because of the numerous texts where he identifies both. However, at 1041 a. 28-30, "essence" is allowed to refer not only to the principle of organization of the individual but also to the telos and the efficient cause. This would appear to give the term a wider reference than "form" which we have never seen used to refer to an efficient cause.

[220] Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the Particular in Aristotle," Review of Metaphysics, 2 (1972), p. 285. (Hereafter referred to as "Knowledge of the Universal").

[221] Met., 1049 a. 34-35.

[222] Met., 1042 a. 29.

[223] Met., 1014 a. 30-31.

[224] Met., 1041 b. 30-32.

[225] Met., 1029 a. 5-7.

[226] Met., 1070 a. 21-22.

[227] Ibid.

[228] Met., 1042 a. 30-32.

[229] Met., 1031 a. 1-14.

[230] Met., 1035 b. 27.

[231] Met., 1040 b. 24.

[232] Met., 1041 a. 4-5.

[233] Met., 1033 b. 19-25.

[234] Met., 1033 b. 24-26.

[235] Lesher, op. cit., pp. 169-178.

[236] Lesher, p. 178.

[237] M. J. Woods, "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13," Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcisk (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 215-238.

[238] Ibid., pp. 237-238.

[239] Lesher, pp. 172-173.

[240] R. Albritton, "Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's Metaphysics," Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957), 699-708.

[241] Wilfred Sellars, "Substance and Form in Aristotle," Journal of Philosophy, 54 (1957), 688-699.

[242] Ross, Aristotle, p. 170.

[243] Met., 1038 b. 9-10.

[244] Met., 1071 a. 27-29.

[245] Met., 1035 b. 28-30.

[246] Met., 1037 a. 5-9.

[247] G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," p. 82. On "explanation" rather than "cause" for "aitia," see also Max Hocutt, "Aristotle's Four Becauses," Philosophy, 49 (1974), 385-399.

[248] Met., 1029 a. 5-7.

[249]Met., 1018 b. 30-35. He does say here that universals are prior in definition. However, he seems to sense a difficulty since he also claims that the definitions of accidents are prior in an accidental complex but that wouldn't make them actual substance nor, by analogy, would it make the universal actual substance.

[250]Met., 1029 b. 3-12; De Anima 413 a. 11.

[251]Leo Elders, S.V.D., Aristotle's Theory of the One: A Commentary on Book X of the Metaphysics (New York: Humanities Press, 1960), pp. 199-200.

[252]Jaeger, Aristotle, p. 177.

[253]Met., 1087 a. 10-17.

[254]Met., 1087 a. 17-20.

[255]Met., 1037 b. 4-5.

[256]Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, p. 498.

[257]Met., 1037 a. 25-30.

[258]Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal," p. 281.

[259]Met., 1032 a. 1-2.

[260]De Anima, 418 a. 20-23.

[261]De Anima, 425 b. 7-10.

[262]De Anima, 425 a. 22-25.

[263]We cannot agree with Leszl that "symbebekota" does not mean "accidental" in this context. See Leszl "Knowledge of the Universal," p. 304.

[264]Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, Abridged (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 317.

[265]At An. Post., 99 b 34 - 100 a 8, Aristotle tells us that with men a memory comes from sense-impressions and from repeated memories comes experience, "the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul."

[266]An. Post, 73 b. 32-40.

[267]Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal," p. 293.

[268]Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, p. 342.

[269]Met., 981 a. 19-21.

[270]An. Post., 79 a. 7-8.

[271]Ethica Nic., 1146 b. 35-1147 a. 1-4.

[272]See notes 269-271 immediately above.

[273]Leszl, "Knowledge of the Universal," pp. 297-298.

[274]An. Prior, 67 a. 24-31; An Post., 71 a. 35-71 b. 8.

[275]Ross, Aristotle, p. 170.

[276]Met., 1041 a. 21-28. See also Post Anal., 93 b. 38 -94 a. 9 and Dancy, Sense and Contradiction, pp. 132-133.

[277]Hocutt, op. cit., p. 391.

[278]Met., 1041 a. 27-30.

[279]Hocutt, op. cit., p. 396.

[280]Dancy, Sense and Contradiction, p. 133.

[281]Met., 1041 b. 12-31.

[282]Met., 1071 a. 27-29.

[283]Met., 1036 b. 21-24.

[284]De Gen. Animalium, 703 b. 9-31 and Met., 1050 a. 3-6.

[285]Lesher, p. 177.

[286]De Anima, 430 a. 20-25.

[287]Ibid.

[288]Ross, Aristotle, p. 151.

[289]St. Thomas Aquinas, On the Soul, a. 14, c.

[249]Met., 1018 b. 30-35. He does say here that universals are prior in definition. However, he seems to sense a difficulty since he also claims that the definitions of accidents are prior in an accidental complex but that wouldn't make them actual substance nor, by analogy, would it make the universal actual substance.

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CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNMOVED MOVER: THE FUNCTION OF THE UNMOVED MOVER

In our attempt to explicate the nature and function of the Unmoved Mover in Aristotle's metaphysics, we have been led into an investigation of Aristotle's theory on equivocity. We have seen that Aristotle claims that "being" has many senses. As Aristotle sees it, there are many senses of "being" because there are many ways of being and they are irreducible to one another when we are dealing with the basic categories of being. This admission of the equivocity of being causes Aristotle to deny, in the Eudemian Ethics, that there can be a general science of being.[1] Being is not a genus. There is nothing called "being" which all existing things have in common. Consequently, no general science of being, as conceived by the Platonists, is possible. When he reached the Metaphysics, Aristotle seems to have added to his position. Although a single generic science of being is still ruled out, it is possible that another sort of science of being is allowable. Aristotle has recognized that

not all equivocity is complete or chance equivocity. There is also systematic equivocity. A systematically equivocal term may have several senses but these senses have a systematic logical connection. We have discussed two main types of systematic equivocity as applied to single terms: analogy and focal meaning. We have seen that there are two important possible accounts of these types of equivocity and that a choice between them has a serious effect on one's interpretation of Aristotle's ontology and theology. Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, feels that both analogy and focal meaning allow sufficient unity for a science of being qua being. We have argued against a synonymy account of both analogy and focal meaning. Such argument has been directed mainly against the Neoplatonic account. This account would find a gradational metaphysics within the corpus, i.e., every being having the same basic nature, with the primary being, the Unmoved Mover, exhibiting this nature to the highest degree. While this interpretation offers an attractive unity between Aristotle's ontology and theology, it has too many unresolved difficulties.

Since Aristotle tells us that the science of being qua being is the science of substance[2] and that the Unmoved Mover is substance,[3] we discussed substance in Chapter III. We concentrated on Aristotle's doctrine of substance as presented in the Categories and the Metaphysics. In the Categories, the individual is considered primary substance, while the species and genus are called secondary substance. In the Metaphysics, the primary-secondary talk largely disappears

and we find Aristotle speaking of a substance or individual and the substance of a being. The latter term seems to mean the "essence" of a being. The essence is considered prior to the individual and to matter epistemologically and logically.[4] However, though the essence may be more knowable-in-itself, we, human beings, perceive the material individual first through our senses. It is also the case that the material individual is ontologically prior to the essence such that the essence will not exist if the individual does not.[5] If the essence is construed universally, it is also clear that it exists only in individuals.[6]

Aristotle's position on substance is somewhat more complex in the Metaphysics than in the Categories. Yet, it is still the individual substance which has ontological priority, whatever can be said for the epistemological priority of essence or form. Of course, we have not as yet discussed whether the Unmoved Mover should be considered a substance or the substance of the cosmos or first heaven. We will do so in our chapter on the nature of the Unmoved Mover--Chapter V. We only call attention to it here because we wish to tell the reader that we do not plan to ignore this problem.

In this chapter, we will turn to an investigation of the arguments which Aristotle advances for the existence of the Unmoved Mover. In doing so we intend to give an account of the function of the Unmoved Mover, which is part of the purpose of this dissertation. By examining the reasons which Aristotle gives for affirming the

existence of the Unmoved Mover, we can discover what function the Unmoved Mover has in Aristotelian metaphysics. Such a discovery would allow us to assess the relationship between the Unmoved Mover and the cosmos and would give us a better understanding of the connection between Aristotle's ontology and theology.

The Argument of the Physics

This argument for the existence of the Unmoved Mover is mainly presented in Physics, Bk. VIII. Obviously, it is not feasible to quote the entire text here so we shall attempt to reconstruct the argument by quoting the requisite passages.

Aristotle observes, "Now the existence of motion is asserted by all who have anything to say about nature, because they all concern themselves with the construction of the world and they study the question of becoming and perishing, which processes could not come about without the existence of motion."[7] The Eleatics are excluded as natural philosophers here. Any who do study nature are aware of generation and corruption or "becoming and perishing" as important facts of the cosmos. These processes are kinds of motion and, Aristotle suggests, they depend on other kinds of motion. So natural philosophers agree that motion exists within the world of nature.

Aristotle writes, "Motion, we say, is the fulfillment of the movable in so far as it is movable."[8] Again he says that it is "that which is capable of alteration that is altered."[9] It follows that

beings exist which are capable of such motion,[10] otherwise it would make no sense to say motion exists.

A basic question arises for Aristotle: "Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion? Or are we to say that it never had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be?"[11] We are faced with the disjunction that either motion is eternal or it has a beginning and an end. Aristotle adds another disjunctive concerning changing things: "Moreover, these things also must either have a beginning before which they had no being or they must be eternal."[12]

Aristotle finds the position that all mobile beings or motion had a beginning to be unreasonable: "Now if there was a becoming of every movable thing, it follows that before the motion in question another change or motion must have taken place in which was capable of being moved or of causing motion had its becoming."[13] This is a reductio ad absurdum of the position that motion had a beginning. He also argues that since time is the measure of motion, how could there be a "before" motion began or an "after" when it ceases. He sides with Democritus against the cessation of motion.[14] The cessation of motion is taken to be a change from the previous state of affairs, i.e., the process of the last change. So the "last" change would not be the last. There is one after it--the change into rest. Also there would be a time after time supposedly ceased.

Aristotle concludes, "...It is clear that motion is eternal and cannot have existed at one time and not at another: in fact, such a view can hardly be described as anything else than fantastic."[15]

Aristotle goes on to discuss motion from the side of the mover: "Either the movent is not itself responsible for the motion which is to be referred to something else which moves the movent, or the movent is itself responsible for the motion. Further, in the latter case, either the movent immediately precedes the last thing in the series (the moved), or there may be one or more intermediate links...."[16] There is no difficulty with the claim that the cause of motion is either the thing moved or some other mover, nor with the claim that the cause of motion is either mediate or immediate. Aristotle reaches the hypothetical conclusion that "if then everything that is in motion is moved by something else, and the first movent is moved but not by anything else, it must be moved by itself."[17] This is an invalid argument as it stands. Aristotle does not first tell us that anything in motion may be moved by something else or itself. If there is a first moved mover, it must be self-moved. The idea that there is no first mover at all is considered to be logically impossible by Aristotle. He claims that "it is impossible that there should be an infinite series of movents, each of which is itself moved by something else, since in an infinite series there is no first term."[18] This claim that an infinite series is impossible may strike some as objectionable today. Aristotle's point seems to be

that if we appeal to an infinite series of moved movers, we have not explained motion at all. Rather, we have only said that it has always existed. Aristotle complains, "But it is a wrong assumption to suppose universally that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so."[19] Aristotle is not content with the fact that something occurs but he wants to know why it occurs. He criticizes Democritus saying, "Thus Democritus reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happen in the past in the same way as they happen now: but he does not think fit to seek a first principle to explain this 'always'."[20] Empedocles is the target of the same criticism: "And much the same may be said of the view that such is the ordinance of nature and that this must be regarded as a principle, as would seem to be the view of Empedocles...."[21]

Motion cannot be accepted as a brute fact according to Aristotle. His claim is both that motion needs to be explained and <u>can</u> be explained. This claim follows from Aristotle's analysis of motion in terms of causality. He feels that the explanation sought must be in terms of a first mover who is either self-moving or unmoved. Any other mover is instrumental and not the ultimate cause of the motion as a knife is in relation to the man who cuts with it.

Aristotle thinks that a thing cannot be mover and moved in the same respect.[22] We might consider a whole as self-moved but "in the whole of the thing we may distinguish that which imparts

motion without itself being moved and that which is moved: for only in this way is it possible for a thing to be self-moved."[23] He seems to suggest that even this limited sense of self-movement is denied to elements (here called substance): "Again, how can anything of continuous and naturally connected substance move itself?" In so far as a thing is divided that one part of it is by nature active and another passive. Therefore, none of the things that we are now considering move themselves (for they are naturally connected substance), nor does anything else that is continuous; in each case the movent must be separate from the moved...."[24] He distinguishes between living and non-living things in this respect: "It is impossible to say that their [inanimate things] motion is derived from themselves: this is a characteristic of life and peculiar to living things."[25]

Aristotle concludes, "Since there must always be motion without intermission, there must necessarily be something, one thing or it may be a plurality, that first imparts motion, and this first movent must be unmoved...there must necessarily be some such thing, which while it has the capacity of moving something else, is itself unmoved and exempt from all change, which can affect it neither in an unqualified nor in an accidental sense."[26] Aristotle speaks of the Unmoved Mover here as having a capacity. He says later in the Metaphysics that "'capable' in one sense will mean that which can begin a movement (or a change in general, for even that which can bring things to rest is a 'potent' thing) in another thing

Aristotle repeats his claim that motion is eternal and continuous and therefore primarily circular: "But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if that time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous."[56] Aristotle makes it clearer here in Lambda than he did in the Physics that the circular motion he is referring to belongs to the heavenly spheres and planets.[57]

Aristotle adds that the cause or explanation of this continuous, heavenly motion must be a substance: "For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible."[58] This is the familiar doctrine of ontological priority of substance.

Thus far Aristotle is claiming that there is motion or becoming and that at least one kind of motion is continuous and eternal. There could not be a time in which there was no motion since time is identical with or an attribute of motion. This continuous motion must be explained and since sublunar things depend for their existence upon the motion of the heavens,[59] the cause must be a substance otherwise substances would ultimately be dependent upon and ontologically posterior to non-substance. However, substance is

tinuous motion: "Since every motion is continuous, a motion that is one in an unqualified sense must (since every motion is divisible) be continuous, and a continuous motion must be one."

Aristotle's point seems to be that there is only one cosmos and since its motion is continuous and eternal, there has always been and always will be only one cosmos. This conclusion is at odds with some of the cyclical theories of the Presocratics[33] which entailed a plurality of universes. Aristotle's conclusion is that there is only one first mover, "the first of unmoved things." This is not to rule out the possibility that there are a plurality of secondary, unmoved movers. Of course, "unmoved" might be used in different senses when applied to both primary and secondary.

Aristotle argues that locomotion is the primary kind of motion. He then argues that it is only rotary motion which is single, continuous and eternal.[34] Rotary motion is, then, the primary kind of locomotion and, so, the primary kind of motion. As such it must be "caused" or explained by the first, Unmoved Mover. Aristotle does not make clear in this context what it is that moves in a circle nor in what sense the first, Unmoved Mover is a "cause." We must turn to the Metaphysics for that information.

The Argument of the Metaphysics

One of the more important arguments of the defenders of the naturalistic account is that Metaphysics, Lambda, where the

doctrine of the Unmoved Mover is discussed, is an early work and the doctrine is not part of Aristotle's mature thought. For example, Jaeger, in his Aristotle (1. 221) writes, "... We may say that Book Lambda represents the stage that we have discovered to come before the traditional metaphysics, a stage that was still purely Platonic and did not recognize the doctrine of sensible substance as an integral part of first philosophy." This position is not very credible to us. First, we find many references to a divinity in Aristotle's works other than the Metaphysics as we shall see below.[35] Second, we find positive references to a divinity within the Metaphysics in books other than Book Lambda. In Book Alpha, Aristotle tells us that God cannot be jealous and that first philosophy is a divine science because it deals with God as a first principle and because God has this science above all others.[36] Also in Book Alpha, Aristotle praises Anaxagoras for introducing nous as a principle.[37] Aristotle later calls the divine activity nous.[38] In Book Alpha the Lesser, Aristotle speaks of eternal things.[39] But he may mean the heavenly bodies rather than the Unmoved Mover. In Book Beta, Aristotle takes Empedocles to task for allowing God to be ignorant of one of the principles, strife.[40] This strongly suggests that Aristotle accepts the existence of a divinity and would ascribe knowledge of the cosmos to it. In Book Gamma, he points to a kind of wisdom more primary than physics.[41] While arguing in favor of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle promises that "we shall ask them (those who are genuinely

troubled over this principle) that among existing things there is also another kind of substance to which neither movement nor destruction nor generation at all belongs."[42] Since he speaks of unmoved, existing substance, it is not probable that he is speaking of universal forms here. At the end of Gamma, he gives a brief argument for a first mover which is unmoved.[43] Aristotle, in discussing necessity in Delta, mentions eternal and immovable beings in a hypothetical way, saying that if such exist, "nothing compulsory or against their nature attaches to them."[44] Later, he mentions a first mover as a beginning absolutely and prior to everything else.[45] Book Epsilon identifies first philosophy with theology if divine substance exists.[46] Book Zeta questions whether non-sensible substances exist[47] and near the end of the book criticizes the Platonists not for the claim that non-sensible substances exist but for making them the same kind as sensible substances. He concludes, "...If we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should be some."[48] Book Theta argues that an actual first mover would be prior to substances with potency.[49] Nevertheless, he may only mean here that actual substances are prior to potential ones. The end of Theta contains a reference to incomposite actualities of which one may be ignorant.[50] This may be taken as a reference to immovable substances. In Book Kappa, we find that the science of Wisdom is above physics and deals with an immovable, final cause[51] and that theology is the best of the theoretical

sciences.[52]

Given this evidence, it strikes us as improbable that theology should be omitted from Aristotle's mature thought. We agree with Ross[53] that Aristotle's concern with the divine is an important aspect of his mature philosophy. Of course, Randall's claim that Aristotle was not interested in religion[54] is too ambiguous. It all depends on what Randall means by "religion." Is Randall referring to established institution and rituals or to a posture towards the divine? In any event, it does not strike us as ironic, as it so struck Randall, that some medieval theologians should have turned to Aristotle for theological clarification. Whether or not Aristotle was "religious," he was certainly interested in theology.

Having argued for Aristotle's concern with theology, let us now turn an examination of Aristotle's argument for the Unmoved Mover in the Metaphysics. After posting particular physical and metaphysical questions, Aristotle asks a general question: "Further, why should there always be becoming, and what is the cause of becoming?--this no one tells us."[55] Aristotle is not asking about the beginning of becoming. He holds that the cosmos and becoming had no beginning, as we saw in our discussion of the argument of the Physics. He seems to be asking why it is that becoming continues unceasingly. Aristotle is dissatisfied with the answers given by previous philosophers--both the Platonists and "physicists." They have not explained becoming adequately, according to Aristotle.

Aristotle repeats his claim that motion is eternal and continuous and therefore primarily circular: "But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if that time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement except movement in place, and of this only that which is circular is continuous."[56] Aristotle makes it clearer here in Lambda than he did in the Physics that the circular motion he is referring to belongs to the heavenly spheres and planets.[57]

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naturally prior to the other categories and so the cause or explanation for the primary motion must be a substance. Aristotle explicitly claims that "it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance."[60]

Aristotle approaches the conclusion from another direction by emphasizing the concepts of potency and act (which he does not do in the Physics argument). He criticizes the theory of Forms from this perspective:

> But if there is something which is capable of moving things or acting on them, but is not actually doing so, there will not necessarily be movement; for that which has a potency need not exercise it. Nothing, then, is gained even if we suppose eternal substances, as the believers in the Forms do, unless there is to be in them some principle which can cause change; nay, even this is not enough, nor is another substance besides the Forms enough; for if it is not to act, there will be no movement. Further, even if it acts, this will not be enough, if its essence is potency; for there will not be eternal movement, since that which is potentially may possibly not be. There must, then be such a principle, whose very essence is actuality. Further, then, these substances must be without matter; for they must be eternal, if anything is eternal. Therefore, they must be actuality.[61]

The immovable cause of the eternal, continuous, circular motion must not have potency in its essence. According to Aristotle, the Forms as exemplars do not act and so cannot explain the eternal motion of the cosmos.

Clark puts it well:

> Rather than face a world which is mere brute contingency, flagrant incomprehensibility, we must conclude that everything cannot be destroyed or have not existed. Things decay thanks to their material elements (Physics V. 2. 7)--which must always leave those elements, and the laws of the world in which they

> exist, still surviving. Can we suppose that something always exists, but not the same thing? A sort of relay race. But such a series cannot guard against failure--there is no reason why the next runner should not be late. Nor does such a series provide any stable framework for its own existence. In this case it does follow that as there must always be something, there is something that must always be. There must be, or must be taken to be if we are to have an intelligible world, something whose essence is actuality (Met., XII, 1071 b. 20) and which is without matter, for matter is precisely the potential for being otherwise. This something cannot simply be, though it may be in part, the set of things that do in fact exist: for if x could not be and y could not be, the combination of x and y is clearly yet more unstable.[62]

Thus beings with the potency for genesis and corruption require a necessary being or necessary beings which have no such potency to explain such motion or change, although matter and forms as such do not come to be or corrupt. Well, the heavenly spheres could fit the description. They have no potency for genesis or corruption but only for circular locomotion.[63] But Aristotle clearly wants to go beyond the heavenly spheres. He argues, "There is then, something which is always moved with an unceasing motion which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore, the first heaven must be eternal. There is therefore also something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality."[64] This text is certainly at odds with Randall's claim that the Unmoved Mover is an ideal of man's mind. Yet, a defender of the naturalistic account could claim that "substance" in this text means essence as it does in some parts of the Metaphysics where Aristotle speaks of the substance of individuals.

it is irresolvable if the discussion is restricted to efficient causality.

Aristotle, himself, raises a possible objection to his argument for an Unmoved Mover. Potency would seem to be prior in time to act.[69] The boy comes before the man. Yet this objection only points up the necessity for the priority of act. True, the child comes before the adult but the child comes from two prior adults: "For the seed comes from other individuals which are prior and complete and the first thing is not seed but the complete being...."[70] Analogously, those beings which are a mixture of potency and act are posterior to or ontologically dependent upon a being (or beings) which is pure act.

What kind of a cuase is the Unmoved Mover? Whatever we may have thought about this Mover in the Physics, we are now told that it is a final cause.[71] Aristotle explains, "And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and the objects of conscious thought are not necessarily the same in man. Our unconscious desires may have very little in common with our conscious thought. Be that as it may, Aristotle is offering a very imaginative solution to the problem of how a mover can move without being moved. He says "That a final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which the action aims; and of these the latter exists among

The essence meant, the naturalist may continue, is that of the cosmos as a whole as Randall and Santayana suggest[65] or the essence of the first heavenly sphere. Aristotle contrasts the Unmoved Mover with the first heaven.[65] This would be very strange, indeed, if the Unmoved Mover was the essence of the first heaven which is, in fact, moved. Nor have we seen any evidence that Aristotle thought that the cosmos was a single substance. Such a theory would be in apparent conflict with his doctrine that no actually existing substance can be in another. None of the naturalists address this problem. Also, Aristotle gives us no evidence in Lambda to suppose that he thought there was only one substance--the cosmos--and that plants, men and stars are not real substances. On the contrary, the first chapter of Lambda speaks of three general kinds of substances.[67] Finally, Aristotle's description of the life of the Unmoved Mover (discussed in the next chapter) and his explicit claim that "the unmovable first mover is one both in definition and in number"[68] forces us to reject the naturalistic interpretation.

Aristotle brings this up to counter objections by the Pythagoreans and Speuisippus that goodness and beauty exist only as effects. In Aristotle view the cause (Unmoved Mover) has more actuality than the effect and exists as a source (of inspiration) and a goal which the first heaven may imitate. However, it seems that the Pythagoreans and Speusippus were speaking of efficient and not final causes. Perhaps Aristotle mentions the problem to show that

unchangeable entities, though the former does not. The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved."[73] Aristotle gives us another example: "Hence if anything imparts motion without itself being moved, it may touch the 'moved' and yet itself be touched by nothing--for we say sometimes that the man who grieves us 'touches' us, but not that we 'touch' him."[74]

The Unmoved Mover exists certainly as a final cause for the first heavenly sphere which, being endowed with nous as all the heavenly substances are,[75] both knows and loves it. Now if the Unmoved Mover is only a final cause, then it would seem that the first sphere (at least) has the power to move itself. Its potency (only for locomotion)[76] should be viewed as a force waiting to be triggered.[77] What is needed is a rational motive. But why does the sphere move in a circle rather than rest and contemplate the Unmoved Mover? This is an old question. We find it in Theophrastus, who suggests that it is simply the essence of both the first sphere and the other heavenly bodies to so move.[78] He points out that the cessation of this motion would destroy the heavens and that we should not expect every substance to act like the best.[79] In short, each thing has its own nature and its own role in the cosmos and must be so considered. This is in keeping with Aristotle's own thoughts on the matter.[80] So we can say that the first heaven moves in a circle because it imitates the Unmoved Mover, which is pure actuality, by actualizing

its only potency--that for locomotion. In other words, it imitates the Unmoved Mover according to its (the first heaven's) nature and thereby contributes greatly to the order of the cosmos. Aristotle suggests that "locomotion" is used equivocally when applied to the motion of the first heaven since it is not in any place.[81] The sphere moves in a circle because this motion best imitates the eternity of the Unmoved Mover ("for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting." Met. 1073 a. 33). This motion finally affects the motion of the sun which causes uninterrupted coming-to-be and passing away on Earth. This continuous generation and corruption is the closest approximation that earthly things can make to eternal beings. (De Gen. et. Corr., II, 10).

Is the Unmoved Mover a cause in any sense other than that of final causality? Well, we have argued against the naturalist's claim that the Unmoved Mover is the form of the cosmos. It is not simply that the Mover is a final cause and so not a formal cause. The two are identified often enough. It is rather that we find no evidence that Aristotle thought of the cosmos as one substance within which reside many other substances. The Mover, being immaterial, cannot be a material cause or explanation. Consequently, we are left wondering whether the Unmoved Mover is an efficient cause of the cosmos in a way similar to Maimonides' or Aquinas' God. Does Aristotle's Unmoved Mover create or sustain the cosmos eternally? Of course, the Mover sustains it as a final cause but as an efficient cause? Perhaps the most important doctrine in the Metaphysics which

would support an affirmative answer to this question is Aristotle's claim that actuality is prior "in substance" to potentiality. He explicitly says that "one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover."[82] However, priority in substance does not necessarily imply efficient causality. Aristotle, in speaking of necessary existing beings, says that "if these did not exist, nothing would exist."[83] This is the same language that Aristotle uses in speaking of the relation between accidents and substance.

Is there any further evidence for the efficient causality of the Unmoved Mover? One may point to the Eudemian Ethics where Aristotle states that "as in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything."[84] Aristotle appeals to extraordinary psychic phenomena and to ordinary deliberation as evidence for his claim. Two points should be made here. First, the Eudemian Ethics is generally considered an early work. If this is so, it may be that here Aristotle had not yet worked out what kind of a mover his god was supposed to be. Second, Aristotle does not in fact tell us here in what way god moves everything. The text is compatible with god as a mover qua final cause. Aristotle does point out in the Metaphysics that "imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire."[85] It would seem that all material things, even elements, imitate the perfect activity of the Unmoved Mover in their own way. Some things imitate it through rational deliberation and

some through a natural tendency. If this is so, then the Unmoved Mover is directly the final cause of the first heaven but indirectly the final cause of the entire cosmos. It would appear that this is the case, for Aristotle says, "On such a principle [Unmoved Mover], then depend the heavens and the world of nature."[86] Linbeck objects that an existence of pure actuality is an impossible ideal for material beings. He suggests that the Platonic Forms are (ontological difficulties aside) better motives. Though the Form of Man represents human nature, it is at least human nature and not something hopelessly beyond like the Unmoved Mover.[87] It seems that Linbeck misses Aristotle's point. While Aristotle argues that a happy life for man is one of unhindered activity, it is activity proper to human nature and not that of some other species.[88] Again, the heavens imitate the Unmoved Mover according to their natures, not contrary to their natures. Rational beings which come to know the Unmoved Mover find it to be the best sort of being and are so inspired as to try and make themselves the best they can be, i. e., to fulfill their natures. Why should this be far-fetched? Plato, in Phaedrus' speech in the Symposium, points out how even the love of one human being for another can ennoble and fulfill both. How much more the love of the best being would inspire one to fulfillment. There is no evidence that Aristotle recommends that material beings should try to be like the Unmoved Mover. Ancient Greek literature is replete with warnings to man not to try to pre-empt the gods through hubris. It is true that Aristotle advises us not to limit ourselves to human and mortal

things but that is because we have nous in us which is "divine" and immortal in some sense.[89] Indeed, this text may be a recommendation to contemplate and so become inspired by the life of the Unmoved Mover rather than to think exclusively of mundane matters.

Sextus Empiricus tells us that Aristotle found the sources of belief in the gods to be observations of the orderly motion of the heavens as well as observations of psychic phenomena. This claim occurs in the Aristotelian dialogue, On Philosophy.[90] Fragments 12 b. 12 and 14 make it clear that Aristotle agrees that such observations should lead to the conclusion that gods exist. Yet, the observation of the order of the heavens is compatible with the Unmoved Mover as a final cause only.

The major trouble is that some feel that the Unmoved Mover should function as an efficient cause. First of all, a Form, such as the Good, could function as a final cause. The Platonist could simply claim that it is a purely actual substance. Of course, there is the Third Man objection but that is not one which Aristotle raises in his rejection of the Forms for the Unmoved Mover. Secondly, Aristotle claims that "that which is potentially, may possibly not be."[91] One might expect, then, that matter, which is potentiality, would require some explanation in terms of efficient causality for its eternal existence. Such an expectation is out of tune with Aristotle's philosophy. He clearly says, "The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to

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

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be--the privation--is contained within it. But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be."[92] However we think Aristotle should have thought, the fact is that there is no hard evidence to support a claim that Aristotle considered the Unmoved Mover to be an efficient cause. In fact the emphasis which both Aristotle[93] and Theophrastus[94] place on a final cause's ability to move without being moved appear to point away from efficient causality.

Since we have mentioned the dialogue On Philosophy, we should point out that it also contains another version of the cosmological argument for the existence of the divinity. It is an argument very much akin to Aquinas' fourth way. Simplicius says, "Aristotle speaks of this in the work On Philosophy. In general, where there is a better there is a best. Since, then, among existing things one is better than another, there is also something that is best, which will be divine."[95] Ross considers this argument an anticipation of the ontological argument.[96] We do not follow him here. Clearly the argument takes its start from "existing things" and not from a definition. Aristotle sees values as objective even though relative to various species and things. However, one may point out that this argument strongly supports the Neoplatonic account of Aristotle's metaphysics. "Better" and "best" refer to differences in degree. Is it not the case, that, where there is a difference in degree, there is a sameness in kind? Are not all existing things the same in kind in that they all exist? The answers to both questions can be that "better" and

"best" may not refer to straightforward differences of degree but to priority and posteriority in a pros hen series. Aristotle, as we have seen, claims that "more being" means prior in this sense rather than greater in degree. We have no reason to doubt that this is the same doctrine which is being used here.

Aristotle also speaks of "good," "better" and "best" in Lambda. He says first, "The first mover, then exists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses--that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to the natural impulse, that without which the good is impossible and that which cannot be otherwise but can exist only in a single way."[97] Aristotle also praises the divine life: "If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God. God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal."[98]

Do not these texts, if interpreted as claiming a pros hen series between the Unmoved Mover and other existing things, justify the Neoplatonic view that "substance" is a pros hen equivocal? Certain points should be made in answer to this question:

1. Even if substance is a pros hen equivocal, if we have been correct in our defense of the homonymy account, then we cannot conclude that all substances somehow share the same specific essence in varying degrees. Aristotle is quite clear on this point:

"And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike--both fishes and fowls and plants...."[99]

2. We do not wish to claim that there is no evidence of focal meaning in Lambda. For example, Aristotle writes, "Anaxagoras makes the good a motive principle; for his 'reason' moves things. But it moves them for an end, which must be something other than it, except according to our way of stating the case; for, on our view, the medical art is in a sense health."[100] We seem to have focal meaning applied to "health" and "good" in much the same way as we saw it in the Eudemian Ethics. There would also seem to be an analogy between the cosmic order and good and the medical art and health. Yet in spite of this admission, we find no evidence to support a claim that "substance" is a pros hen equivocal. We would claim that substances are ordered in a (final) causal series.

3. We do not wish to suggest that differences of degree are unimportant for Aristotle. Even different kinds of things can be ranked in degree in relation to some common end or aspect. Thus we could say that philosophic wisdom is better than opinion, which is better than mere sense experience in relation to knowledge. Similarly in Aristotle's view, it being is good, then that being which is pure actuality and total independence would be the best.

Whether nous is predicated of both man and the Unmoved Mover univocally or equivocally is not a simple matter: the Unmoved Mover, being immaterial, certainly does not require sense

perception as a necessary condition for the exercise of its reason. Yet, Aristotle does suggest that sometimes we are in that "good state" which the Unmoved Mover is always in. It may be that Aristotle intends a univocal predication of nous at least sometimes. Aristotle again mentions nous in the Nicomachean Ethics, claiming that nous is something divine in man and yet it is what man is.[101] Does this mean that man and god have the same nature as some versions of the Neoplatonic account would have it? No. We see no reason for such a conclusion. Even if god and man share an identical property, it is sets of properties which define an essence. Rationality may be man's differentia but man is also an animal. Aristotle, himself, admits that nous is only part of man albeit the authoritative part.[102] Aristotle argues throughout a number of books in the Nicomachean Ethics that the good for man, i.e., happiness, includes many physical and emotional satisfactions which are certainly not necessary for the happiness of the Unmoved Mover or the heavenly spheres (which also possess nous). There is no path to Neoplatonism here. Nor should we turn in the opposite direction with Gomperz, who attempts to trivialize Aristotle's theology by claiming that the Unmoved Mover is "hardly anything more than the First Mover "[103] of astronomy. To make such a claim is to seriously miss the integration of Aristotle's astronomy with his complete world view, including his ethics. The Unmoved Mover is not just a first mover of physics but the highest good. Aristotle remarks, "We must consider also in which

of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both ways, as an army does; for its good is found both in its order and in its leader, and more in the latter; for he does not depend on the order but it depends on him."[104] The Unmoved Mover is certainly naturally prior to order as its cause. However, we have seen Aristotle draw a parallel between the predication of goodness as applied to the Unmoved Mover and order, and health as applied to an animal and medical science. Both seem to instances of focal meaning. But a problem arises. Does Rorty's objection, that one does not know a horse unless one understands what god is, hold against Aristotle as well as the Neoplatonists? We think not. One can understand a horse qua horse by looking to its genus, species, and proximate causes. If one wishes to consider a horse from the perspective of a moving thing, part of a universe of motion, then one must ultimately explain this motion in terms of the Unmoved Mover. Such an explanation is ultimate not proximate and does not rule out proximate explanations in their place. Yet, is it the case that one cannot call order or anything else good without first understanding how the Unmoved Mover is most good? Isn't that what the logical priority of focal meaning demands? Here we think one must proceed carefully. The parallel between "good" and "health" is one of analogy rather than strict identity. Aristotle draws an important distinction between what is knowable-in-itself and knowable-to-us.[105]

We human beings do not know the goodness of god first but rather the goodness of things closest to us. Once the existence of the Unmoved Mover has been established through Aristotle's cosmological argument, then we may come to understand why it is the best and how other goods are dependently related to it.

An objection might be raised that, if the Unmoved Mover is good-in-itself, then how can it be good for the universe? This objection has little real force. Any real good is good for something in Aristotle's view. There is no conflict between being the primary instance of good and yet being good for the universe. However, it should be noted that Aristotle speaks of the universe not as having a good but as containing the highest good.[106] It would seem that the universe is the context in which the highest good exists. The highest good would seem to be the revolution of the first heaven. Aristotle points out that "in conduct our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good, good for each."[107] Again, we should not attempt to become good without qualification but rather to possess the highest good according to our natures. And we should point out that the heavens and men love god not because of what it can do for them but simply because it is pure actuality and good without qualifications. Aristotle seems to suggest that it is the nature of beings with rational desire to love that which is good once it is known. There is a similar doctrine within the Christian tradition to the effect that the saints in heaven, who know the supreme good, cannot but

choose it over all lesser goods.

The Unmoved Mover, then, functions directly as a final cause of the first heaven[108] to which it moves as an object of love because it is pure actuality and the best thing or the most good. It seems to function also as an indirect final cause for the entire cosmos in that species imitate it in the eternal genesis and corruption of their members and individuals tend to actualize their own nature insofar as they are able.

Aristotle turns to consider the movements of other celestial bodies besides the first heaven:

> ...Since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements--those of the planets--which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, there must be substances which are of the same number as the movements of the stars, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without magnitude, for the reason before mentioned.[109]

Aristotle tells us that the number of movements and therefore of unmoved movers is probably either forty-seven or fifty-five. He does not pretend to pinpoint accuracy on this matter.[110] Each of these movers will also be a final cause.[111] This assertion of a plurality of movers does give rise to the problem of distinguishing them from the First and each other. We will discuss this problem in the next chapter.

Let us turn to a consideration of the possible objections to Aristotle's proof in the Metaphysics. The most obvious objection is that the argument for the Unmoved Mover rests upon an obsolete astronomy. The divinity and eternity of the stars as well as circular orbits can no longer be sustained. The interesting question is whether or not Aristotelian principles demand a conclusion that an Unmoved Mover exists, independently of any outdated astronomy. Aristotle's doctrine of the natural priority of substance would certainly demand a sustaining unmoved substance of the cosmos but Aristotle would have to justify this doctrine or he begs the question. He moves from saying that within a substance accidents are naturally posterior to substance to the claim that throughout the entire cosmos substance is naturally prior. The trouble is with "things" or "heaps" which at least give the appearance of existing independently of substance. Unless Aristotle would be willing to call these things substances,[112] he would have to follow a path similar to Aquinas and argue for a creator-sustainer god of all other existing things. This would necessitate coming to grips with Aquinas' concept of esse or something very much like it. We are not suggesting that Aquinas' proofs are all successful but rather that they do not depend upon a rejected astronomy nor the doctrine of the natural priority of substance.

Linbeck suggests that Aristotle was thinking of an ontological argument in Lambda.[113] We see little evidence for this claim. The whole of the Metaphysics is a painstaking analysis first

of material substances and then back to divine substances. Aristotle allows that perhaps there are no immaterial substances, in which case physics would be first philosophy since it would deal with the only substances there are.[114] The closest Aristotle comes to the ontological argument is in saying that the Unmoved Mover exists by necessity.[115] First, this text comes at the end of Aristotle's argument for the Unmoved Mover, after he has argued cosmologically for its existence. Second, Aristotle presents us with three senses of "necessary," claiming that his god has all those. The primary sense is "that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is."[116] We do not see that Aristotle says that it is necessary that the Unmoved Mover exists but only that, once the Mover exists, we see that it cannot change its essence because it is pure act. In other words, as we see it, the necessity applies to a lack of change in an already existing substance. He also claims that the Mover has the necessity that is contrary to the natural impulse. We take this to mean that god has no potency for generation or corruption,[117] nor growth and decay, nor motion. Finally, it is that without which the good of the cosmos is impossible since it is most good and brings order to the cosmos at least as a final cause. Consequently, we cannot see that Aristotle's argument is "ontological."

Aristotle's early argument from order presented in On Philosophy is probably incorporated into the Lambda argument. In Lambda, he explains how it is the Unmoved Mover causes the

order of the cosmos and why the orderly, circular motion of the first heaven leads to this cause. He does not explicitly argue from "degree" in Lambda as he does in On Philosophy but he does explain why the Unmoved Mover is the best. That he does not use this argument in the Metaphysics suggests that he found a better alternative. Perhaps this is what we have in Lambda. The argument as presented in the dialogue is too sketchy to establish anything more than a relative best, not an Unmoved Mover who is pure act and provides the highest good in the universe.

Aristotle's theology is quite different from the Logical Positivist's view of theology. Aristotle's theology is linked to and rests upon testable astronomical statements. Unfortunately these statements have been falsified by modern science. So Aristotle's proofs in the Physics and Metaphysics fail. Whether one could construct a successful proof based on the Aristotelian principles of matter, form, act, potency, etc. is still an open and controversial question. The answer one gives to this question depends to a large degree upon whether one believes that the knowledge of real essence is possible. If we can know the essences of contingent beings, then it may be possible to show the necessity of their dependence on a non-contigent being. Aristotle's theology stands in need of revision, if it is to be viable. Any revision would need to justify the ontological priority of substance and that strikes us as a formidable obstacle.

Footnotes

[1] E.E., 1217 b. 33-35.

[2] Met., 1028 b. 3-5.

[3] Met., 1071 b. 4.

[4] Met., 1029 a. 26-32.

[5] Met., 1042 a. 30-32.

[6] Met., 1038 b. 31-32.

[7] Physica, 250 b. 15-17.

[8] Physica, 251 a. 9-10.

[9] Physica, 251 a. 14.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Physica, 250 b. 11-14.

[12] Physica, 251 a. 17-19.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Physica, 251 b. 10-19.

[15] Physica, 252 a. 4.

[16] Physica, 256 a. 4-7.

[17] Physica, 256 a. 19-20.

[18] Physica, 256 a. 17-19.

[19] Physica, 252 a. 32-33.

[20] Physica, 252 a. 33- 252 b. 1.

[21] Physica, 252 a. 5-7.

[22] Physica, 257 b. 10-11; 25-26

[23]Physica, 258 a. 1-3.

[24]Physica, 255 a. 12-17.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Physica, 258 b. 10-15.

[27]Met., 1019 a. 33-35.

[28]Physica, 259 a. 5-7; VIII, 1, 2, and 6 for eternity of motion.

[29]Physica, 259 a. 7-9.

[30]Physica, 259 a. 4-6.

[31]Physica, 259 a. 11-12.

[32]Physica, 259 a. 15-19.

[33]See Solmsen, op. cit., 195-199 for a discussion of Aristotle's concepts of continuity and unity, pp. 224-25.

[34]Physica, VIII, 7, 8.

[35]See pp. 180 and 182 of this chapter.

[36]Met., 983 a. 1-11.

[37]Met., 984 b. 15-22.

[38]Met., 1072 b. 25-29; also Lambda, 9.

[39]Met., 993 b. 27.

[40]Met., 1000 b. 4-5.

[41]Met., 1005 b. 1-2.

[42]Met., 1009 a. 36-37.

[43]Met., 1012 b. 30-32.

[44]Met., 1015 b. 14-15.

[45]Met., 1018 b. 21.

[46]Met., 1026 a. 10-31.

[47]Met., 1028 b. 29.

[48]Met., 1040 b. 28 - 1041 a. 5.

[49]Met., 1049 b. 25.

[50]Met., 1051 b. 18-26.

[51]Met., 1059 a. 35-38.

[52]Met., 1064 b. 1-5.

[53]Ross, "The Development of Aristotle's Thought," p. 14.

[54]Randall, Aristotle, p. 143.

[55]Met., 1075 b. 17.

[56]Met., 1071 b. 7-11.

[57]Met., Lambda, 8.

[58]Met., 1071 b. 4-5.

[59]Met., 1072 b. 5-12.

[60]Met., 1071 b. 4.

[61]Met., 1071 b. 12-22.

[62]Stephen R. L. Clark, Aristotle's Man: Speculations upon Aristotelian Anthropology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 175-176.

[63]Met., 1072 b. 6-7.

[64]Met., 1072 a. 20-25.

[65]Santayana, pp. 245-246.

[66]Met., 1072 a. 22-25.

[67]Met., 1069 a. 30.

[68]Met., 1074 a. 37.

[69]Met., 1071 b. 23-26.

[70]Met., 1072 b. 35 - 1073 a. 1.

[71]Met., 1072 b. 1-4.

[72]Aristotle is clearly trying to make a divine function intelligible to men which counts against Chroust's rather startling claim that Aristotle advocated a credo qua absurdum position. See Anton Herman Chroust, Aristotle, I.(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 225.

[73]Met., 1072 b. 1-4.

[74]De Gen. et Corr., 323 a. 33.

[75]De Caelo, 285 a. 29; 292 a. 20.

[76]Met., 1069 b. 25-27.

[77]See George A. Linbeck, "A Note on Aristotle's Discussion of God and the World," Review of Metaphysics, I (1948), p. 101.

[78]Theophrastus, Metaphysics, with Translation, Commentary, and Introduction by W. D. Ross and F. H. Fobes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), II. 9 and 11; VIII. 27 (Hereafter abbreviated as Met.).

[79]Theophrastus, Met., II. 10.

[80]Met., 1075, a. 20-25.

[81]Physica, 212 b. 7-10; De Caelo 270 a. 8.

[82]Met., 1050 b. 5.

[83]Met., 1050 b. 19.

[84]E.E., 1248 a. 26. See also De Motu, 700 a 1-15 for a statement that something may be self-moved and moved by the Unmoved Mover.

[85]Met., 1050 b. 28-29.

[86]Met., 1072 b. 14.

[87]Linbeck, p. 102.

[88]Ethica Nic., 1153 b. 10.

[89]Ethica Nic., 1177 b. 30-35.

[90]On Philosophy, 12 a.

[91]Met., 1071 b. 19.

[92]Physica, 192 a. 25-28.

[93]Met., 1072 b. 4.

[94]Theophrastus, Met., I. 5.

[95]On Philosophy, 16.

[96]Ross, Aristotle, p. 179.

[97]Met., 1072 b. 10-13.

[98]Met., 1072 b. 24-28.

[99]Met., 1075 a. 16.

[100]Met., 1075 b. 7-10.

[101]Ethica Nic., 1177 b. 26 - 1178 a. 10.

[102]Ibid.

[103]Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, IV, p. 222.

[104]Met., 1075 a. 12-16.

[105]Met., 1029 b. 3-12, An. Post., 72 a. 1-3.

[106]Met., 1075 a. 11-14.

[107]Met., 1029 b. 6-7. See also Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics, pp. 396-397.

[108]It is probably for this reason that Aristotle speaks of the First Unmoved Mover as occupying the circumference of the first sphere at Physica, 267 b. 6-9. We feel, with many other commentators, that this text refers to where the influence of the First Unmoved Mover is the strongest and not that that immaterial being literally occupies a place.

[109] Met., 1073 a. 28-39.

[110] Met., 1074 a. 14-16.

[111] Met., 1074 a. 22.

[112] This he sometimes does, e.g., at Physica 255 a. 12-17. One can question whether he is using "substance" according to his criterion or just according to common parlance.

[113] Linbeck, op. cit., p. 106.

[114] Met., 1026 a. 10-33.

[115] Met., 1072 b. 10 ff.

[116] Met., 1015 a. 33-34.

[117] Met., 1014 b. 16 ff.

CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF THE UNMOVED MOVER

We have considered the arguments for the Unmoved Mover in the previous chapter. While we mentioned some of the arguments from the Aristotelian dialogues, our discussion centered around the arguments of the Physics and the Metaphysics. We think that this is appropriate since the latter two works are more apt to contain Aristotle's mature thought than the dialogues which are generally considered early. The arguments of the Physics and the Metaphysics both conclude with a divinity which is the cause of motion. The argument of the Metaphysics tells us more than that of the Physics. In the former, we found that the Unmoved Mover is pure actuality and by being so can actualize the potency for movement in material beings. We found also that it does so as a final cause by eliciting love and through imitation. It elicits love because it is most good. It seems that the Unmoved Mover is considered most good because it is the final cause of the universe,[1] it is eternal; and because it enjoys the best sort of life--that of active thought.[2] It directly affects the first heaven which is alive and has nous (presumably in a higher degree than man) but

seemingly not soul which Aristotle seems to limit to perishable living things.[3] It indirectly affects all other material beings which imitate it according to their own natures. Even the so-called "elements" imitate the circular motion of the first heaven (which is an imitation of the life of the Unmoved Mover). Aristotle claims, "For when Water is transformed into Air, Air into Fire and Fire back into Water, we say the coming-to-be 'has' completed the circle,' because it reverts again to the beginning. Hence it is by imitating circular motion that rectilinear motion too is continuous."[4] It would seem that material beings have this tendency to imitate the divine written into their natures. This doctrine plus that of the natural priority of substance has led us to speculation that the Unmoved Mover is also an eternal efficient cause of the cosmos. The argument of the Physics seems to be directed towards the conclusion of establishing the Unmoved Mover as an efficient cause. If we turn to De Gen. et Corr., we find more evidence for the Mover as efficient cause. Aristotle writes, "God, therefore, adopted the remaining alternative, and fulfilled the perfection of the universe by making coming-to-be uninterrupted. . . ."[5]

One could multiply these texts which seem to give support to the idea of the Unmoved Mover as an efficient cause. The problem is that these texts do not accord well with Metaphysics, Lambda where Aristotle introduces the idea of the Unmoved Mover as a final cause in order to solve the problem of how something can move

without being moved.[6] This seems to us to be a recognition of, and solution to, a problem which is not really solved in the other texts. Consequently, we see Lambda as Aristotle's last word on the subject and the other, opposing texts as earlier.

We have briefly referred to both the naturalistic and Neoplatonic interpretations of the function of the Unmoved Mover and found them both wanting. We will now turn to a more detailed polemic against these interpretations since they are mistaken as much or more about the intrinsic nature of the Unmoved Mover as about its function.

Randall's version of the naturalistic interpretation maintains that the Unmoved Mover is an ideal, in the minds of men, of a life of pure knowing and also of order in the universe. We have seen that for Aristotle the Unmoved Mover is an actual substance and must be a substance to be naturally prior to all other substances. An ideal in men's minds, if only an ideal, would be an accident and, consequently, we would end up with substances being naturally dependent on an accident. This interpretation can scarcely be accepted as Aristotle's view.

Randall also considers the Unmoved Mover as the form of the cosmos. He stresses the text in which Aristotle asserts that the good is both immanent and transcendent.[7] Randall claims that "God could not possibly exist apart from the world. God is the form of the world's matter, the energeia and entelechia of its dynameis, and he would be nothing without the world in which he is an essential

factor."[8] This position seems to be in basic agreement with Santayana's view of the Unmoved Mover as an epiphenomenon.[9]

As we noted in the preceeding chapter, the view of the Unmoved Mover as the form of the cosmos and, therefore, the cause of its order, has more plausibility than the view of the Unmoved Mover as only an ideal. If we accept Randall's interpretation, we must either allow that actual substances (men, animals, all particular substances) exist in an actual substance (the whole of existence) or that there is only one substance: the whole of existence. The latter alternative makes little sense of neither Aristotle's pronouncement in Lambda that there are three kinds of substance--perishable and material, imperishable and material and imperishable and immaterial[10] nor of his painstaking analysis of the different types of substance in the Metaphysics. The former alternative violates Aristotle's oft-repeated maxim that no actual substance can exist in another.

Randall claims that "God could not possibly exist apart from the world."[11] This claim is not directly answered by Aristotle simply because the non-existence of the cosmos or the Unmoved Mover are not considered by him. Aristotle is trying to understand what is. What is, is that the cosmos exists eternally and the Unmoved Mover does so also as its (at least) final cause. If Randall and Santayana are suggesting, as we think they are, that the Unmoved Mover is dependent on the cosmos, then we can only point to Aris-

totle's analogy between the good and cosmic order and the general and order in the army. Aristotle says that "he (the general) does not depend on the order but it depends on him."[12] Of course, one could say that a general is the function of the army. But Aristotle adds that "God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal."[13] He also says, "...the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance."[14] It does not seem far-fetched here to understand this pribrity as ontological priority. Then it should be clear that the mobile world depends on the Unmoved Mover and not vice-versa.

The Neoplatonic interpretation fares little better than the naturalistic one. We have seen that Aristotle says, "And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike...."[15] This surely seems to be a rejection of the view that all things share in one nature in varying degrees. This remark occurs in the context of discussing the relationship of the Unmoved Mover as the highest good to the universe. Aristotle finds many natures hierarchically ordered to the common good as members of a household contribute to the good of the household, each in his own way.[16]

Does "substance" designate one nature? Yes, if "nature" means only a genus or a category. No, if "nature" means a complete essence, i.e., genus and species. To admit that all substances are in the category of substance is not to say that they all share the same complete essence. The former admission is not a justification

for a Neoplatonic account which paints Aristotle's metaphysics as a gradational one. Aristotle compares genus with matter, being indeterminate without the specific difference.[17] In the Neoplatonic interpretation, this one nature which the divinity exemplifies in an undiluted way should be the most determinate type of substance. It is hard to see how an ultimate genus of which there can be no essential predication[18] is determinate.

Aristotle's rejection of gradational metaphysics seems very explicit: "And similarly of the primary substances one is no more a substance than another: the individual man is no more a substance than the individual ox."[19]

One may try a reverse tack and claim, in naturalistic fashion, that the Unmoved Mover is in some sense posterior to the mobile cosmos. We are willing to allow that the Unmoved Mover is posterior to the moved in the temporal order of human knowledge. In itself, the Mover is more knowable than the moved because it is non-composite and pure actuality. We have seen that actuality is prior to potentiality in knowledge. The Mover is also naturally or ontologically prior to the moved, and that which is prior to substance must be substance."[20]

Let us pass on to a consideration of the nature of the Unmoved Mover. Of course, in speaking of the "nature" of the divinity, we are extending the term beyond its ordinary sphere.[21] Theo-

phrastus tells us that our knowledge of the divine must be by analogy.[22] Of course, it may be objected that analogy fails when applied to supra-sensible beings. If one says nous is to the Unmoved Mover as it is in times of clear insight to man (if nous is not the same during those times), then some would object that the analogy gives us no knowledge because we know neither the essence of the Unmoved Mover nor what divine nous is. If one claims that one has some knowledge of the Unmoved Mover, through its effects, the critics can maintain that a cause need not formally possess what it "imparts" to its effects. Medicine does not possess the form of health, only a living body does. However, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover is a final cause. It seems that Aristotle would claim that the activity of mobile beings was like that of the Unmoved Mover. He says in De Gen. et Corr. that " 'coming-to-be should itself come-to-be perpetually' is the closest approximation to eternal being."[23] Where intelligent beings are concerned the final cause is understood as the goal and activity takes place towards it.[24] The house built by the skilled architect should be like the house planned by him.

We do not see that one must already know three or more terms in an analogy for it to be successful in conveying knowledge. For example, one might say as the bronze is to the statue of Zeus, so x is to y. Such an analogy appears to give us some modest knowledge of the relationship or proportion between x and y, although x and y are unknowns. However, one may ask how one can check to

see if the analogy is a true or a false one. We cannot see how one could make such a test as long as x and y remain unknown. Aristotle, unfortunately, does not address himself to these problems. Keeping these limitations in mind, let us move on to consider some specific issues and problems which surround the nature of the Unmoved Mover and the plurality of secondary unmoved movers.

The Life of the Unmoved Mover

Aristotle describes the divine life: "And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration, continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God."[25] Here we are told that god has life. If only all living things are primary substances and god is prior to all other substances, then god is substance (because of the natural priority of substance) and therefore alive. One might object to the theory that only living things are primary substances. But Aristotle may have a point here. It is men who practice philosophy. Men are living animals. It is not at all far-fetched to claim that we get our primary idea of substance from the organic unity of living things (ourselves first?) and later extend it by analogy to inanimate things and universal concepts. Of course, it is not one hundred percent clear that Aristotle would limit substance to animate beings. We have seen him call "elements" natural sub-

stances. However, even if this is the case living beings are higher examples of substance than non-living beings. The Unmoved Mover as the highest substance must be alive (if our dichotomy is limited to animate-inanimate).

We are further told that god is eternal. This is because cosmic motion is eternal for Aristotle. If the effect is eternal, so also must be the cause. God is also self-dependent actuality. If god were dependent on something else, then that something else would be needed to explain god. We would either reach a being that is not dependent or we would simply have an infinite series of dependents. Yet, we have already seen that Aristotle considers such a series as an admission that cosmic dependence for motion has no explanation. This is to give up the principle of sufficient reason and that is something which Aristotle refuses to do.

The Unmoved Mover as actuality is necessary to account for the motion from potency to act in potential beings. Act is prior to potency. We have already discussed the idea that god is most good because it is pure actuality. Aristotle claims that "the real good is the primary object of rational wish."[26] Aristotle tells us elsewhere[27] that wish relates to the end and the Unmoved Mover is an end as the final cause of the first heaven. It is a real rather than merely apparent good because it is grasped by reason which grasps being.[28] Aristotle feels that "desire is consequent on opinion"[29] and so the real good as an object of thought is prior to

any apparent good which is merely an object of desire. Supposedly the first heaven, being an imperishable substance, has nous to a higher degree than men and always rationally wills the real and the highest good. If, like men, the first heaven (and all the heavenly bodies) were in danger of choosing a lesser good over the greater, then the motion of the heavens might stop. However, motion and time must be eternal as we have seen or there would be a time before time began. Thus the cosmos has no beginning and has already existed for an infinite time. Aristotle sees no danger of the heavens ceasing their motion.

Aristotle's identification of the actuality of thought with life or the best sort of life is somewhat controversial. Clearly, this is a statement from a philosopher. Aristotle is again starting from human life. Yet he considers reason something divine in human nature.[30] Clark suggests that Aristotle considered all lower life forms to be deformed relative to man.[31] Some, like Nietzsche, would challenge Aristotle's identification of the best life with that of nous. They would claim that reason is regressive, an evolutionary mistake. The creature that can act quickly and instinctively has a much greater chance of survival than one which must stop and think. Well, we must point out that Aristotle was not worried about the survival of the human species since he thought species were eternal. Furthermore, if survival is to count as our criterion for what is good and bad, then we should think that a theory which asserts that the

theorist and his entire species are a mistake would seem to be self-negating and probably would have such a negative psychological effect on the theorists as to have a very low survival value.

Apart from the model of man, it would seem that, in Aristotle's view, the highly rational celestial spheres would not move in imitation of a non-rational being (or beings).

Aristotle tells us that the Unmoved Mover lives a life of nous. Aristotle also offers us a more detailed description of this life. The divine thinking does not involve a change since the only way that the best could change is for the worse.[32] It has no potency in its thinking but rather actual possession of the object of thought: "For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e., the essence, is thought. . But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore, the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain...."[33]

The object of divine thought seems to be the Unmoved Mover itself: "Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking."[34] The standard interpretation of this doctrine is that the Unmoved Mover thinks about its own thinking since to think of anything lower than itself would be beneath it and inappropriate. This apparent conclusion of this account is that Aristotle's god knows of nothing but itself.

Aristotle's claim that the divine thought thinks itself is

stated as part of an aporia wherein it is objected that thinking is different from the object of thought.[35] The section begins with, "The nature of the divine thought involves certain problems. . . ."[36] Aristotle states the objection that the object of thought and the act of thinking are different but then offers a solution:

> Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For to be an act of thinking and to be an object of thought are not the same thing. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences it is the substance or essence of the object, matter omitted, and in the theoretical sciences the definition or the act of thinking is the object. Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e., the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.[37]

This passage squares well with a doctrine of the De Anima: "Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are. For in the case of objects which involve no matter, what thinks and what is thought are identical for speculative knowledge and its object are identical."[38]

This situation holds true even for men: "Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a man of science has... the mind too is then able to think itself."[39] Yet we do not think that these passages should be pointed to as evidence that the Unmoved Mover knows the world. Aristotle tells us that the object of thought is different for the Unmoved Mover than for other rational beings. He says, "For both thinking and the act of thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing in the world, so that if this

ought to be avoided (and it ought for there are even some things which it is better not to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. Therefore, it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking."[40] There is no suggestion here that the worst thing would become ennobled by being known by the Unmoved Mover but rather that the Mover would become ignoble in knowing anything below himself.

The Plurality of Movers

One may easily be shocked by the mention of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Chapter 8 of Lambda. This text seems at odds not only with Physics, VII but also with Lambda, Chapter 7, wherein "God" is mentioned in the singular. The shock may deepen upon reading, at the close of Lambda, "The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be." This is a serious prima facie inconsistency.

Let us begin by considering once more Aristotle's words on the subject: "...We se that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements--those of the planets--which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle is eternal and unresting; we have proved these points in the physical treatises), each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both immovable and eternal.[41] Aristotle ascertains that the number of secondary movers

is either fifty-five or forty-seven[42] but he disavows any necessity in these figures.[43]

Each unmoved mover is, then, an eternal substance and a final cause[44] of motion for its particular heavenly body. Aristotle believes that each of the living, intelligent celestial bodies must have its own final cause because "a single movement (must be produced) by a single thing."[45] This means that each unmoved mover is one in number and Aristotle tells us explicitly that this is so for the First Unmoved Mover, which is "one both in definition and in number."[46] The secondary unmoved movers are also without magnitude since they are also without matter.[47] This last point raises difficulties because Aristotle maintains that "all things that are many in number have matter...."[48] Hence the obvious question: how can there be a plurality of immaterial movers?

Ross suggests that these movers are pure forms and each is a separate species as the angels were for some of the Scholastic philosophers.[49] Ross finds this solution objectionable in that it could allow for a plurality of "first" unmoved movers and consequently destroy the notion of one ruler over the universe.[50] We fail to see the force of Ross's objection. If there is only one universe, how can there be more than one first Unmoved Mover? The first Unmoved Mover moves the first heaven.

J. Owens agrees that the unmoved movers are pure forms.[51] This does not strike him as problematic since he does, as we have

seen, reduce being to form. Form, for him, is a definite act, which includes determinateness, finitude, necessity and content.[52] Form while potentially a universal is actually a "this." J. Owens claims, "It requires no other principle to account for its specific difference."[53] Thus he agrees that each mover is a different species, while he acknowledges that our knowledge of these differences is based on the effects that these movers produce. Although he suggests that the secondary unmoved movers may be the agent intellects of the spheres, he does admit that Aristotle says nothing on this point. We have argued at great length against the general Neoplatonic account and need not repeat those arguments here. However, there is much to agree with in J. Owen's explanation of this matter. It is true that the specific form designates a species and so gives us the specific difference. Yet, the determinateness of the form is not sufficient to explain how something is one in number, at least among material substances. We fully agree that our knowledge of the unmoved movers must depend upon their effects. The idea that the secondary unmoved movers are conceived by Aristotle as agent intellects of the celestial bodies is an interesting speculation which we leave as an open question.

Merlan[54] offers some insights into this problem of the plurality of movers. He claims that Aristotle was always a polytheist. When Aristotle speaks in the Physics and parts of the Metaphysics, Lambda of god or the Unmoved Mover in the singular, he is speaking of a kind of being, i.e., the divine kind. There is nothing to prevent

there from being many such beings.[55] Similarly, Merlan maintains that Aristotle's talk of one heaven or one world as against many is not meant to exclude a number of heavenly spheres but rather refers to a denial of an infinite number of universes which was one Presocratic doctrine.[56] Merlan claims that Aristotle held that there was only one universe with one Prime Unmoved Mover and many secondary unmoved movers. These unmoved movers are, Merlan says, each a species by itself, although under no common genus.[57] Merlan thus believes that there is no genuine contradiction between the monotheistic sounding texts of the corpus and Lambda, 8. While many of Merlan's insights are valuable, we must object to his characterization of Aristotle as a Platonist throughout his paper.[58] It may be that Aristotle's philosophy takes its point of departure from Platonism but that does not make Aristotle either a Platonist or Neoplatonist (except, perhaps, in the Whiteheadian sense in which all philosophers after Plato are footnotes to him). More particularly, we do not see why, when Aristotle speaks of one Unmoved Mover, he can not be referring both to a kind and an individual. Nor do we see that there could be any genus common to all the unmoved movers. Certainly, "mover" and "substance" appear to name a common genus. We do agree that there is only one universe for Aristotle and that there is one First and a plurality of secondary unmoved movers. Aristotle's doctrine of one movement for one mover is probably intended as a partial defense of his one-universe theory in that the

Prime Mover could not be a final cause for a plurality of simultaneously existing universes.

Wolfson[59] offers a resolution to the problem of a plurality of movers which differs from Merlan's. Wolfson believes that references to the Unmoved Mover are references to an individual rather than a class. He does agree with Merlan that Aristotle was consistently a polytheist.[60]

Wolfson feels that the First Mover is the only one which is unmoved both essentially and accidentally.[61] The other movers are unmoved essentially but not accidentally. He points out that "both the soul of the animal and the immovable mover of each planetary sphere are moved accidentally, the soul is moved accidentally by the motion which as a mover it produces in the animal, whereas the immovable mover of each planetary sphere is moved accidentally not by the motion it produces in the sphere but by the motion produced in the sphere by the other sphere."[62]

According to Wolfson, all these movers are unmoved in relation to their spheres, i.e., they share similarly relation to their spheres and are called "unmoved." In relation to the Prime Mover, however, they are accidentally moved. This may mean that they are moved by love for the Prime Mover, but how can we conceive of beings without magnitude as being moved with their spheres? Well, we do conceive of geometric points as without magnitude and yet able to move. Also, as Wolfson has pointed out, the soul has its

field of operations within the body and can be said to be moved with it. Wolfson explains that each mover "participates, as it were, in that circular motion round the centre of the world and thus may be said to be moved accidentally."[63]

Wolfson makes much out of Aristotle's pronouncement that the First Mover is unmoved essentially or accidentally. He adds, "Nowhere in the entire chapter (Physica, VIII, Ch. 6) does Aristotle describe the movers of the planetary spheres as immovable accidentally."[64]

Wolfson thinks that Aristotle's use of the term "first mover" in the Physica is in contrast with "secondary movers." We find that Aristotle asks if a first mover is one or many.[65] We should expect a certain amount of ambiguity in the term as we are on the path to discovery and clarification. We think that perhaps Wolfson makes too much out of Aristotle's statement that the Prime Mover is unmoved essentially and accidentally. Aristotle never says that the secondary movers are moved accidentally. Where he does speak of unmoved movers that are accidentally moved, he adds that they cannot cause continuous motion.[66] Now the plurality of unmoved movers is introduced to account for a plurality of continuous and eternal movements of the heavens, since a single movement must be produced by a single thing.[67] It would not seem likely that these movers would be moved accidentally.

How can the unmoved movers be distinguished from each

other? Aristotle gives a clear answer: "That the movers are substances, then, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the movements of the stars is evident."[68] Aristotle distinguishes them by their effects.[69] How else could he? He makes no claim to have an intuition into the divine essences.

What makes each of them one in number? Many commentators are deeply disturbed by the fact that matter is supposedly the principle of individuation for material beings, but there is no reason why it should be for immaterial beings. Throughout Lambda, Aristotle tells us that the principles of being are common only by analogy. Why not believe that he means what he says? We do not know how these movers are individuated in their own essences. Again, we distinguish them only through their effects.

Does the existence of immaterial beings support the Neoplatonic account? We think not. Simply because Aristotle posits the existence of immaterial beings, we need not be led to reduce all being to that of these deities. They are archai insofar as they are ultimate final causes, but that does not mean that the being of material substances is reducible to them.

Theology and First Philosophy

There is perhaps one feature in the Metaphysics which, more than any other, appears to justify the Neoplatonic account. It is Aristotle's apparent identification of first philosophy and theology.

We briefly mentioned this problem in the preceeding chapter. Let us now discuss it in more detail. Aristotle writes:

> But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science--not, however to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which exist both separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us. There must then be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e., some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect--geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance the science of this must be prior and be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being--both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.[70]

First, we must point out that at the start of embarking upon this science, all we can say with certainty is that it is the science of being qua being, i.e., substance. Aristotle tells us that if only natural substances exist, then physics will be first philosophy. The study of substance is a study of independent being. There may be degrees of independence. Accidents are surely dependent on substances. Within the category of substance some substances may

depend on others. A science of substance would study the best kind of substance, the kind upon which the others may depend in some way. Scientific knowledge should be of the cause (and be necessary).[71] But we don't know at the outset if there are immaterial, immovable substances which are the causes of (and thus metaphysically prior to) natural substances. This is why Aristotle speaks hypothetically. The science of first philosophy would have to be somewhat different from an ordinary science.

Now a problem confronts us that we have previously put off. Aristotle in the text under discussion says that, if the science of immovable substance exists, then it is prior and universal because it is prior. Elsewhere, he claims that it is an error to regard the primary as universal.[72] Obviously something caused Aristotle to change his position. What he once considered an error he now considers to be acceptable. Why? It seems to us that he has, in the latter case, an extended notion of "universal."[73] "Universal," in the latter sense, is not "that which is common" but rather "that which must be understood in order to understand the particulars."[74] Obviously, Aristotle, in the Metaphysics does not find being to be a genus common to all beings; so, when he calls first philosophy "universal", he cannot mean that being is a common element. We have seen that "being" is a pros hen equivocal and that the idea of logical priority (priority in definition) is a part of pros hen equivocity. Logical priority accords well with the second sense of universal. If

one must refer back to A to understand B, C, and D, isn't A "universal" in sense two? Yes, although this may be a deviation from the normal sense of "universal." To use Evans' example, let us consider taste:

> So to designate taste as the universal element in all the cases of being someone's taste, despite the fact that not all these are cases of taste, is no abuse of the notion of the universal. Taste is the only genuinely unifying element in the whole collection of instances of taste. This can be shown that if we wish to argue that there can be objectivity in matters of taste, i.e., that rational progress towards unanimity of judgment is in principle possible, we must appeal to the notion of expert taste, which is the only form of taste which has an unqualified claim to the name.[75]

To switch from taste to being, we must consider independent being (substance) to understand dependent being (accidents) fully. Also we must consider immovable substances, if they exist, when trying to understand independent beings since they would be the most independent. Does this mean "substance" is a pros hen equivocal? No, we find no evidence of an equivocal use of "substance" within this context. Focal meaning or pros hen equivocity includes more than logical priority. Yet, have we not agreed with the Neoplatonists here? No, we think not. This sense of "universal" that accords with logical priority does not take "being" to be some common property but rather respects the differences between beings. Nor do we say that one may simply study the unmoved movers to gain a knowledge of all else. The knowledge of the divine comes at the end of the enterprise of metaphysics, not the beginning. Perhaps the

gods are most knowable-in-themselves but we must reach them through their effects.

We have found that there is a plurality of unmoved movers. Each is immovable, immaterial, and one in number. Aristotle does not tell us how they are individuated in their natures but distinguishes them by the celestial sphere each moves. There is little evidence that the first mover is superior in power or "more actual" than the others. He is called first because he moves the first heaven. We find little evidence for Wolfson's claim that the "secondary" movers are moved accidentally. Each mover seems to be pure act and as such prior to those beings which have an admixture of potency. Consequently, the study of immovable substance is prior to the study of other kinds of substances, which are prior to accidents. Once immovable substance is proved, other beings must be defined and understood in reference to these divine substances. In this way, the science of immovable substance is universally the science of being qua being.

In concluding this dissertation, we hope that we have exposed the dangers of both the Neoplatonic and naturalistic views of Aristotle's metaphysics. We have reached some of our own positive conclusions. First, the doctrine of substance seems to be modified somewhat by Aristotle between the Categories and the Metaphysics. In the Categories the individual is primary substance and the genus and species are secondary substance. In the Metaphysics, the genus

is ruled out as substance and the individual is considered a substance, while the species-form is called the substance of a thing. The species-form as universal seems to be epistemologically prior in-itself to the individual. The individual is ontologically prior to the species-form since it alone can exist on its own. For this reason we think that, when Aristotle speaks of the Unmoved Mover as substance, he means to refer to an individual rather than the form of the world or the first heaven. After all, the first heaven (and, indirectly, everything else) is supposed to be ontologically dependent upon the divinities.

We cannot make the Unmoved Mover little or nothing nor can we make him everything. As we see it, Metaphysics, Lambda, is Aristotle's latest word on his theology. There, the divinities function as final but not efficient causes. They also seem to function as exemplars because of the need to refer to them, after they have been proved, to fully understand substance and the life of reason. Aristotle's first philosopher is one who studies god--but not just god.

Some may be disappointed at this picture of Aristotle's gods. Yet, they fulfill many valuable functions in Aristotle's philosophy. Being pure act and immaterial, they explain, in a final way, the material and potential being. They move the heavens whose movement unceasingly causes generation and corruption on earth. As final causes they do not interfere in human affairs and, so the scandalous stories about the gods which bothered Plato in the Republic

are neatly side-stepped. Aristotle's gods as the most excellent of substances shed light on other substances once some knowledge of them has been obtained. Also, as pure nous, they can inspire us towards a life of reason insofar as we are able. Aristotle's conception of divinity is quite aristocratic in the best sense of the word. The divinity is excellence which provides a reference for reason and a motive for desire.

Footnotes

[1] Met., 1013 b. 21-28.

[2] Met., 1072 b. 24-29.

[3] De Caelo, 284 a. 1 - 284 b. 1.

[4] De Gen. et Corr., 337 a. 5-8.

[5] De Gen. et Corr., 336 b. 32-34.

[6] Met., 1072 a. 23-27.

[7] Met., 1075 a. 11-15.

[8] Randall, Aristotle, p. 143.

[9] Santayana, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

[10] Met., 1069 a. 30-35.

[11] Randall, Aristotle, p. 143.

[12] Met., 1975 a. 15.

[13] Met., 1072 b. 27.

[14] Met., 1072 a. 35-36.

[15] Met., 1075 a. 16.

[16] Met., 1975 a. 20-23.

[17] Met., 1038 a. 6.

[18] An. Post., 83 b. 1-10.

[19] Cat. (Ackrill), 2 b. 22-29.

[20] Met., 1073 a. 35-36.

[21] Met., 1014 b. 17.

[22] Theophrastus Met., I. 4.

[23] De Gen. et Corr., 336 b. 34.

[24]Met., 1032 b. 1-14.

[25]Met., 1072 b. 25-29.

[26]Met., 1072 a. 28.

[27]Ethica Nic., 1111 b.-27.

[28]Met., 1072 a. 26-36; Ethica Nic. 1139 a. 22-26.

[29]Met., 1072 a. 29.

[30]Ethica Nic., 1177 b. 26 - 1178 a. 7; De Part. An. 686 a. 28.

[31]Stephen R. Clark, op. cit., p. 29.

[32]Met., 1074 b. 27.

[33]Met., 1072 b. 21-23.

[34]Met., 1074 b. 34.

[35]Met., 1074 b. 30-34.

[36]Met., 1074 b. 15.

[37]Met., 1074 b. 37 - 1075 a. 4.

[38]De Anima, 430 a. 3-5.

[39]De Anima, 429 b. 5-9.

[40]Met., 1074 b. 30-34.

[41]Met., 1073 a. 29-33.

[42]Met., 1074 a. 10-14.

[43]Met., 1074 a. 15-16.

[44]Met., 1074 a. 28.

[45]Met., 1073 a. 28.

[46]Met., 1074 a. 37.

[47]Met., 1073 a. 35 - 1073 b. 1.

[48]Met., 1074 a. 34.

[49]Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, I, pp. cxxxix - xcl.

[50]Ibid.

[51]J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 298 and "The Reality of the Aristotelian Separate Movers," Review of Metaphysics 3 (1950), 319-337.

[52]Owens, The Doctrine of Being, p. 298.

[53]Ibid.

[54]Merlan, "Aristotle's Unmoved Mover," Traditio 4 (1946), 1-30.

[55]See De Caelo, 279 a. 20-22; Ethica Nic., 1178 b. 1.

[56]We assume Merlan is referring to the Atomists and perhaps Diogenes of Apollonia. However, some earlier philosophers such as Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Anaxagoras have had the doctrine of infinite worlds (rightly or wrongly) attributed to them. See Kirk and Raven, op. cit., pp. 121-126; 151 n.; 389-90; 412; 433 n and 439.

[57]Merlan, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers," p. 24.

[58]Ibid., pp. 5, 7.

[59]Harry A. Wolfson, "The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes," Harvard Studies in Classical Philosophy 63 (1958), 233-253 (Referred to as "Immoveable Movers" hereafter.)

[60]Wolfson, "Immovable Movers," p. 235.

[61]See Met., 1073 a. 25; Physica, 259 b. 21.

[62]Wolfson, "Immovable Movers," p. 237.

[63]Wolfson, "Immovable Movers," p. 237.

[64]Ibid., p. 238.

[65]Physica, 258 b. 10-11.

[66] Physica, 259 b. 20-23.

[67] Met., 1073 a. 28.

[68] Met., 1073 b. 1-2.

[69] See Topica, 145 a. 13-15.

[70] Met., 1026 a. 10-34.

[71] An. Post., 71 b. 8-12.

[72] E.E., 1236 a. 23-25; Met., 999 a. 1-14.

[73] Evans, op. cit., p. 65.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., p. 66.

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