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Democratic Opposition Parties and Democratic Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in Political Science

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Democratic Opposition Parties and Democratic Outcomes in Hybrid
Regimes

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in Hybrid Regimes)

(Monograph)

by

Jeremy M. Ladd

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
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ABSTRACT

Leading up to and following the end of the Cold War a new wave of democratisation commenced in Sub-Saharan Africa and around the world which, in both cases, has been characterized by “blocked transitions,” the “rise of competitive authoritarianism,” and the proliferation of hybrid regimes. This thesis is primarily concerned with “democratic” outcomes within these hybrid regimes. Excluding data from prior to the end of the Cold War in global investigations of democracy, this thesis utilizes a temporally truncated dataset to reanalyse dominant theories of democratisation both at the global and regional (Sub-Saharan Africa) level, finding that when contaminating effects are removed the strongest correlation with democratic outcomes lies in the strength of prominent opposition parties.

Keywords: Democratization, Sub-Saharan Africa, Opposition Parties, Democratic Outcomes, Hybrid Regimes, Democracy, Authoritarianism.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis aims to investigate two relationships which represent gaps in the existing literature on democratization in the post-Cold War world, namely: the relationship between domestic opposition parties and democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes, i.e. in regimes which have already introduced certain aspects of democracy without meeting all the minimal requirements which constitute democratic regimes; and, secondly, how and why these domestic opposition parties do, and do not, generate the capacity to influence the course of democratization. It is the aim of this thesis to investigate these questions primarily as a question of Sub-Saharan African politics and, in so doing, the first question will be addressed quantitatively utilizing two datasets, one global and the other regional, including only Sub-Saharan African states, while the second question will be addressed through comparative case studies of three African states: Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda.

It is the position of this thesis that strong and democratic domestic opposition parties are an important causal variable in democratic outcomes when they are able to monopolize a significant portion of the opposition as a whole, and that they do or do not acquire the capacity to do so based on a number of domestic variables, such as, but not limited to, their ability to finance themselves, to co-opt pre-existing organizational structures, as well as a given regime's ability to construct formal institutions that allow it to exert control over the domestic party system.

From the beginning of "the Third Wave"¹ of democracy, and both approaching as well as following the end of the Cold War, many scholars began to focus on the question of transitions to democracy as a distinct question within the democratization literature in

¹ Huntington 1991

comparative politics and international relations. Over time, although this is certainly not a new phenomenon,² focus has shifted to the phenomenon of partial transitions: “democracies with adjectives,” “authoritarianisms with adjectives,” *et cetera*. In the determination of what constitutes the causal variables on democratic outcomes, predominant hypotheses over time have focused on or across different conceptual levels of analysis to include structural factors, such as the socioeconomic system, or the international system; institutional factors, such as the design of the electoral system or government; and voluntarist factors, such as the agency of autocrats in government and that of key opposition leaders. While this thesis primarily focuses on non-incumbent political parties and the party systems within which they operate, providing a slight shift in focus from the foci of some of the predominant theories over time, the established alternative theories in the literature, their gaps, and their relationship to the position of thesis, must nevertheless be addressed.

The most predominant structural theories of democratization have focused on the important questions of the relationship between a given socioeconomic system and democratization, and the relationship between international and transnational ties and democratization.

Socioeconomic theories of democratization have a long established position in the literature which, with a number of expected modifications over time given its age, posits that socially and economically “developed” societies tend toward democracy, whilst underdeveloped societies are either not democratic or typically fail to consolidate democracy. There are a number of strengths and weaknesses to this position, but this thesis focuses specifically on one of its more heretofore reliable positions: that there is a

² Diamond 2002, 23; Levitsky and Way 2002, 59; Ottaway 2003, 4

discrete correlation between wealth, as an indicator of socioeconomic development, and democracy as a form of governance. Recent literature and events question the coherence of a theory which essentially posits that wealthy states are either democratic, or at least highly stable whatever their form of governance, and that poor states are either not democratic, or are not capable of consolidating democracy. In the context of this thesis, the gap that must be explored is that many “poor” states have taken measurable steps toward democracy and have consistently progressed in that direction, or are even widely considered to be democracies, without the expected authoritarian regression.

One of the more predominant theories regarding the relationship between the international system and democratic outcomes is that linkages formed between states and Western Europe or the United States over time may explain democratization, or the lack thereof, in a given state, particularly when qualified by the vulnerability of regimes to leverage. The gap this thesis attempts to explore in regard to this theory is the low expectation it holds for democratic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular where, nevertheless, some democracies do exist, and where many additional states are arguably on a path progressing toward that end.

Institutional theories of democratic outcomes, such as the differential effect of presidential and parliamentary systems on democratic outcomes, and the relationship between voting systems and democracy, provide integral insight into the inner workings of different systems and practices of governance. The overarching concern of this thesis with these institutional design theories is to test the relationship between institutional design and democratic outcomes, and to determine if there is a distinct relationship between institutional design and the capacity of domestic opposition parties to acquire

strength and durability as organizations.

Finally, the most predominant voluntarist theory of democratic outcomes over time has been the theory of “pacted” transitions. Although the value of pacts as guarantors that a given transition will actually result in democracy has been importantly called into question by at least one of the scholars who has studied them in depth, the gap that this thesis attempts to explore is not the outcome of agreements reached by agents, but what is structurally implied by pact makers reaching the negotiation table. It is the position of this thesis that the ability to bring a given negotiation to the table is a result of the structural capacity of the organizations of which individual oppositionists are a part, and that the value of opposition organizations, i.e. of political parties in the context of this thesis, should be explored as separate and distinct from the agency of individual organization leaders.

The most important gap in the literature this thesis addresses is the relationship between democratic opposition parties, party systems and democratic outcomes.³ The logical coherence of this position is so evident it is nearly common sense, but the ability to empirically demonstrate it in global or otherwise large studies has proven elusive. Most, if not all, of the theories mentioned above, as well as those which are not addressed herein, have either attempted to incorporate opposition parties into their explanatory models, or have indicated where they are not addressed that they, in all probability, play an important role. Nevertheless, many attempts to demonstrate the relationship between opposition parties and democratic outcomes have been inconclusive, and some scholars

³ Erdmann, Basedau and Mehler 2007, 10 where it is indicated that this still represents a significant gap in the comprehension of the literature.

have even suggested, as a result, that their role in democratization may be non-essential.⁴ It is the position of this thesis that opposition parties play an essential role in the process of democratization, but that the difficulties encountered in demonstrating as much have been a result of the unspecified duration,⁵ highly complex, and multifarious nature of democratization, and the competing domestic and international interests which are brought to bear in the process of democratization. By appealing to restricted temporal parameters, important distinctions between what influences authoritarian versus hybrid regimes, and new measurement and operationalization approaches suggested by recent research, this thesis attempts to explicate and make discrete the relationship between democratic opposition parties and democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes.

The plan of this thesis is to commence by expounding the theoretical relationship between opposition parties and the process of democratization (Chapter 2), followed by a review of the broader literature (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 the design of the research and the methodological approach will be discussed in detail. Chapter 5 will present the quantitative results concerning the relationship between democratic opposition parties and democratic outcomes, as well as highlight some of the changes which occur in the relationships between other explanatory models and democratic outcomes when they are exposed only to the temporally truncated dataset argued for herein. It should be noted that the overarching purpose of exposing some of these alternative models to retesting within new parameters is not to cast disapprobation upon them, but to investigate the

⁴ See, for example: Diamond and Gunther 2001, x, that it would be too much to argue that institutionally strong political parties are a necessary condition for consolidating or maintaining democracy, and: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 109, wherein the authors suggest that opposition weakness is both a cause as well as a consequence of democratic deficits, and find only a weak correlation between opposition strength and democratic outcomes.

⁵ See, for example: Schedler 2010, 69-70

position that, given the extremely complex nature of democratization, those variables which can be expected to hold explanatory power can, and probably do change at different stages of the process. In Chapter 6 the cases of Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda are presented in detail, followed by case analysis in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 will consolidate and discuss the major findings of the thesis.

The normative desirability of studying non-incumbent political parties as a factor in democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes rests on the fact that the most common form of autocracy today is made clandestine by elections,⁶ and while these elections produce a veneer of democracy to the international community, they also provide a realistic avenue to challenge incumbents without recourse to violence.⁷ All cases herein are hybrid regimes, and in all cases the incumbent has stood successfully for re-election in the context of elections where opposition parties have been allowed to contest. Whilst incumbent turnover may be far more greatly correlated with open-seat elections,⁸ it could be argued that the ability of democratic opposition parties to compete in *pro forma* democracies, even where they lose, may be the most important factor for democratic outcomes in those regimes. The testing and clarification of this position is of particular importance in the African context where political parties have come to be amongst the least trusted institutions,⁹ but where democracy as a form of governance is widely supported.¹⁰

⁶ Magaloni 2008, 727

⁷ *Ibidem* 728

⁸ See, for example: Cheeseman 2010, 139-153; Howard and Roessler 2006, 365-381; Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 203, 205-206, 220

⁹ Erdmann, Basedau, and Mehler 2007, 7

¹⁰ See, for example: Joseph 2003, 164

Chapter 2: Theory

This chapter will discuss some of the definitional underpinnings of certain concepts used throughout this thesis, as well as the theory which informs its approach. Definitional specification will be discussed first, followed by theoretical review.

What is intended by “electoral authoritarian,” “competitive authoritarian,” “hybrid,” *et cetera* is the breadth of the literature on hybrid regimes, and this thesis views as well as utilizes these terms as a largely synonymous “grey zone.”¹¹ This thesis is therefore not concerned to engage within-category taxonomies,¹² the generation of which is, unfortunately, still ongoing. Such taxonomies are avoided in the least because they negate the distinct toward-democracy trajectory of these regimes in general over time,¹³ as well as in African cases specifically.¹⁴ What is meant here by electoral authoritarianism, then, is a regime which has institutionalized the fundamental characteristics of democracy in a *de jure* sense, but which falls short of at least one minimal requirement of democracy in a *de facto* sense.¹⁵ In particular, this thesis is concerned with regimes where it is clear that one or all of the following minimal criteria of democracy are routinely violated: open, free and fair elections;¹⁶ universal suffrage;¹⁷ political rights and civil liberties, in particular of association, free press, and ability to criticize the government;¹⁸ and the presence of a relatively even playing field between the

¹¹ Howard and Roessler 2006, 365

¹² For example in: Armony and Schamis 2005, 113-128; Collier and Levitsky 2009, 269-288; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 270-297; Morlino 2009, 273-296; Schedler 2002, 36-50

¹³ The complexity of this relationship is captured nicely in: Schedler 2010, 69-80

¹⁴ van de Walle 2002, 66-67

¹⁵ See, for example: Schmitter and Karl 1991, 75-88

¹⁶ Levitsky and Way 2002, 53

¹⁷ *Ibidem*

¹⁸ *Ibidem*

incumbent and opposition parties.¹⁹ These regimes are distinguished from democracies by their systemic violation of these minimal criteria, and from authoritarian regimes by the fact that elections still take place, and are still taken seriously.²⁰ The overarching characteristic of these regimes is that they are not imperfect democracies, and not “transitional,”²¹ but are regimes seeking to maintain the procedural illusion of democracy whilst constraining the risks of truly free competition.²²

Issues relating to democratic opposition parties in hybrid regimes are theorized in this thesis utilizing an integrative approach:²³ at the structural-institutional level of the party system and the regime; and at the voluntarist level, regarding the agency of parties in legislature and in the public sphere generally. As stated, it is the position of this thesis that democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes are driven by strong democratic opposition political parties, and that the strength of these parties lies in their ability to finance themselves, co-opt pre-existing organizational structures, and in the absence of effective institutions constructed by domestic regimes capable of exercising control over the party system. Additional factors which may play a role in the ability of political parties to generate the capacity to effectively push the process of democratization forward include the distribution of salient identity cleavages, and in Africa in particular, ethnicity, as well as the presence or absence of violence in the party system, and party system fractionalization, including the presence of a large number of independent professional politicians.

Party strength and its relationship to democratic outcomes has been theorized in a

¹⁹ Levitsky and Way 2010b

²⁰ Levitsky and Way 2002, 53-54

²¹ Ottaway 2003, 6-7

²² *Ibidem* 3; Levitsky and Way 2002, 51

²³ See: Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 3-32

number of ways, but for the purposes of this thesis “strength” is taken to be a quality which is indicated by the ability of a given non-incumbent political party to monopolize elected legislative seats which are not acquired by the incumbent,²⁴ and the importance of party strength is conceptualized in contrast to the effects of party “weakness,” incoherence, and withdrawal.

In terms of party strength, an important component of political parties in hybrid regimes in the literature is the issue of party weakness, or “opposition weakness.” Weakness, in this regard, refers to the small size of multitudinous political parties in hybrid regimes,²⁵ and their limited endurance over time,²⁶ individually incapable of effectively competing with incumbent parties, and collectively unwilling to coalesce into a smaller number of larger and more competitive parties, or to form a collective opposition bloc. Party weakness is important, particularly in Africa, because collective oppositions are correlated with electoral victory,²⁷ whilst divided oppositions serve to preserve incumbent governments.²⁸ This effect is thought to operate through the removal of votes from the incumbent, the reduction of the incumbent’s ability to divide the opposition and play its factions against one another, an increase in the perceived costs of repression and manipulation, and the realizable mobilization of voters against the incumbent.²⁹ Strong opposition parties are thought to coordinate popular mobilization and carry political change forward, even in the face of reluctant incumbents,³⁰ and it has

²⁴ Lebas 2011, 27

²⁵ Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 210

²⁶ *Ibidem* 210-211

²⁷ Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 198-200; Schedler 2009, 199-200; van de Walle 2006, 78

²⁸ Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 167-168; Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 71-72; Teshome 2008, 8; van de Walle 2006, 77

²⁹ Howard and Roessler 2006, 371

³⁰ Lebas 2011, 7

been theorized that it is the strength of the opposition which determines whether or not elections are indeed competitive, and whether democracy characterizes the relationship between government and society.³¹ It has been posited, furthermore, that it is not the resources or cohesiveness of ruling parties, but the strength or weakness of the opposition which determines authoritarian persistence.³²

Whilst “liberalizing electoral outcomes” may lie most strongly in the ability of the opposition to cohere,³³ and therefore to generate a strong position, opposition cohesion appears to be correlated with perceptions regarding the probability of winning elections.³⁴ However, this should also mean that competitive authoritarian regimes seeking to win elections by smaller margins (thus avoiding the known correlation between exceptionally high vote percentages and authoritarian regimes), should *ceterus paribus* encourage stronger and more cohesive opposition parties. Regarding this latter point, it could be suggested that the very occurrence of competitive authoritarian elections, hypothesized elsewhere as a causal factor in democratic outcomes,³⁵ is actually acting on the dependent variable of democratic oppositionism, and that the cohesion and capacity of these opposition parties should be measurably increasing over the course of comparatively tightly won elections, unless incumbents take additional measures beyond allowing election results to be more evenly distributed. By adopting this position this thesis dismisses certain structural-institutional hypotheses of opposition cohesion as tied to two-round elections,³⁶ presidential versus parliamentary systems,³⁷ pre-regime history of

³¹ *Ibidem*

³² *Ibidem* 8

³³ Howard and Roessler 2006, 375, 376

³⁴ van de Walle 2006, 86

³⁵ See, for example: Lindberg 2006a

³⁶ van de Walle 2006, 88

elections,³⁸ cultural understandings of appropriate executive tenure,³⁹ the absence of “ethnic” fragmentation,⁴⁰ socioeconomic development,⁴¹ external pressure,⁴² and diaspora funding;⁴³ whilst adopting a revised version of the thesis that elections are an independent variable on democratic outcomes, insofar as it suggests they are an independent variable on opposition strength.⁴⁴

In addressing theories of how strong opposition parties gather strength and maintain coherence, the additional issue arises of participation of democratic opposition parties in the electoral process at all. In the course of his research, Lindberg has found that it is more important for democratic outcomes that political parties participate in the electoral process and accept its results, than the quality of the overall process itself;⁴⁵ and this position is adopted herein insofar as those factors being investigated are contingent on that participation taking place. The primary factors which seem to influence whether participation and acceptance takes place are the freeness and fairness of elections,⁴⁶ and the absence of electoral violence,⁴⁷ whilst electoral system design and the participation or non-participation of old authoritarian rulers does not appear to be correlated with these outcomes.⁴⁸ The obvious ambiguity here is the complex relationship that appears to exist between opposition participation and the freeness and fairness of elections. The freeness

³⁷ *Ibidem* 89

³⁸ *Ibidem* 90

³⁹ *Ibidem*

⁴⁰ *Ibidem* 91

⁴¹ *Ibidem*

⁴² *Ibidem*

⁴³ *Ibidem* 92

⁴⁴ For Lindberg’s thesis see: Lindberg 2006a; Lindberg 2006c; see also: van de Walle 2002, 75

⁴⁵ Lindberg 2006b; Lindberg 2006d; Schedler 2009, 199

⁴⁶ Lindberg 2006d, 162

⁴⁷ *Ibidem* 159-160, although he only finds this correlation in presidential systems

⁴⁸ *Ibidem* 158-161

and fairness of elections are less important than the participation of the opposition, but that participation may turn on the freeness and fairness of elections. In addition, in an earlier study of African democracy the active participation of a cohesive opposition was shown to be correlated with the freeness and fairness of elections.⁴⁹

A large number of variables have been theorized as related to the ability of opposition parties to become strong, coherent and meaningful organizations in a given polity. In order to maintain a manageable analysis this thesis attempts to discern and expound only those variables which may be logically understood to be of critical or integral importance. As such, those theories relating to the financing and structural underpinning of opposition political parties will be discussed below, followed by theories regarding variable characteristics of party systems which may significantly impact the ability of political parties to generate strength, such as the presence or absence of violence, fractionalization, and salient identity based or ethnic cleavages.

Of all the factors which structure the performance of parties, financing has been suggested to be of primary importance.⁵⁰ This has been noted as a major obstacle for political parties in Africa specifically,⁵¹ and relates most logically to opposition strength in terms of the ability to run statewide electoral campaigns.⁵²

African party financing may be conceived of as occurring in three phases: the decolonization phase of mass-based parties funding themselves through membership, local patrons, and external agencies and governments interested in the outcome of decolonization; the conflation of ruling parties with the state, wherein finance shifted

⁴⁹ Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 203

⁵⁰ Burnell 2007, 3

⁵¹ See, for example: Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 167

⁵² See, for example: Lebas 2011, 24

from party membership to state resources; and the return to multipartyism, wherein incumbent parties continued to fund themselves through state resources, whilst non-incumbent parties had to utilize the strategies of grassroots funding, funding via local non-governmental organizations, and external funding from governments and unofficial foreign donors.⁵³ Enquiring into party financing is important insofar as it likely separates successful from unsuccessful parties in competitive authoritarian regimes,⁵⁴ primarily in the context that whilst it may be morally and financially infeasible to institutionalize state funding for political competition in less wealthy states,⁵⁵ a defining characteristic of hybrid regimes is the funding of the incumbent through state resources, and the opposition through any other means.⁵⁶ This vastly differential funding, furthermore, can corrupt the electoral process through the distribution of patronage and the use of the state toward partisan ends.⁵⁷ The effect of patronage, in particular, may be amplified by the prevailing socioeconomic conditions characteristic of Africa such as extremely low incomes.⁵⁸ It has been theorized, therefore, that the ability of the opposition to fund itself is correlated with opposition strength.⁵⁹ An important structural factor related to party financing is the level of restriction on the sources of funding an opposition party may appeal to, namely the banning of foreign funding.⁶⁰ There are reasonable justifications

⁵³ Southall and Wood 2007, 202-203

⁵⁴ Burnell 2007, 11; Rakner and van de Walle 2009, 114

⁵⁵ Burnell 2007, 8

⁵⁶ Ottaway 2003, 147; Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 205, 216-217; Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112

⁵⁷ See, for example: Gyimah-Boadi 2007, 29

⁵⁸ *Ibidem* 31

⁵⁹ Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 117 suggesting that this is a novel opposition strategy in Africa, and the obvious implication appears to be that it could lead to opposition success.

⁶⁰ Ottaway 2003, 150-151

for such a prohibition, such as preventing foreign interference in domestic politics,⁶¹ but in the context of less wealthy states where incumbents may appeal to state resources to fund campaigns or build/maintain popularity,⁶² while opposition parties may not, foreign funding may be the best opportunity for opposition parties to level the playing field.

It has been suggested that opposition parties are more likely to acquire strength, as defined herein, where they are able to co-opt pre-existing organizational structures not restricted by societal cleavages such as region and identity.⁶³ Although Lebas posits this primarily in the context of historic unionism,⁶⁴ this concept should be expanded to include pre-existing organizational structures in general, and in the cases below it will be clear that it is pre-existing political structures in particular which this thesis attempts to address, although it is not suggested that there is a need to “precise” the theory to this level. This more general approach is particularly important in the Great Lakes region, not included in Lebas’ qualitative study, where historic unionism certainly existed, but neither prevented the postcolonial/Cold War authoritarian tendency, nor definitively contributed to opposition formation in the contemporary period (although not absent). It will also be clear that in looking to pre-existing political structures, as an aspect of what may be regarded as a broader applicable universe of potential structures, the established theory of “elite defection” is being inverted and it is being posited that it is the political networks and not the political prominence of defectors that strengthens the opposition. Taking this stance also provides a structural lens through which to account for the

⁶¹ *Ibidem* 151

⁶² Dimitrov 2009, 79

⁶³ Lebas 2011, 5

⁶⁴ This is a central theme of Lebas’ work: Lebas 2011

importance of professional politicians, for example.⁶⁵ Similarly, long duration grassroots party movements, such as those that attempt to start small by building parties at the local level first,⁶⁶ are disregarded because there appears to be quite effective government preclusion of the ability of such movements to gain momentum in hybrid regimes. This notion of structural inheritance, it should be noted, directly contradicts the position that the “short path to electoralism” is a major obstacle to opposition parties in new democracies.⁶⁷

In line with the notion that the options available to democratic actors for acquiring power are limited to the democratic process, and are therefore much more limited than those available to incumbent and non-democratic opposition actors willing to use violence, coercion and manipulation,⁶⁸ it is theorized that the presence of violence in the party system is negatively correlated with opposition strength, and that it is indicative of other factors theorized as being related to opposition weakness, such as weak rule of law.⁶⁹

It is the position of this thesis that independent members and small parties, knowing that their chances of acquiring power are negligible, are incentivized to coalesce with incumbents. Independent candidates in particular may run without a party label with the specific goal of being admitted to the winning party after elections,⁷⁰ or may run as independents because they were unable to secure a party nomination but possess the

⁶⁵ See, for example: Schmitter 2010, 26-27

⁶⁶ See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 117-118 where this is highlighted as an opposition strategy. It is of note that one of the evidentiary examples utilized to convey this position is the Democratic Party in Uganda which is an absolute non-contender in comparison to the dominant opposition party.

⁶⁷ Carothers 2006, 53-58

⁶⁸ Ottaway 2003, 175

⁶⁹ See, for example: Carothers 2006, 58-60

⁷⁰ Rakner and van de Walle 2009a, 212-213; Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112

independent resources to win a seat.⁷¹ It can be suggested, therefore, that a proliferation of independent members and small parties are inversely correlated with opposition strength.

Regarding identity based “ethnic,” “regional,” *et cetera* parties, considered a general characteristic of African political parties,⁷² as well as African society generally,⁷³ it may be argued that because the interests of these parties are comparatively narrow, i.e. that they have no concern for brokerage policy or constituents external to their identity group, and where they do not form a majority and therefore the incumbent government, they may be easily co-opted by incumbents willing to acquiesce to some or all of their policy demands. This position is borne out in the literature which considers “ethnic” parties in Africa as the building blocks of large political coalitions held together by patronage, which patronage lies more or less exclusively in the hands of incumbents.⁷⁴ In this literature politicians attempting to break with ethnicity as a basis for political parties are regarded as both novel as well as largely unsuccessful.⁷⁵ However, this position has been challenged by more recent work which suggests that local politics are more contentious than the “ethnic” position would suggest, and that party fragmentation at the national level is mirrored at the local even in “ethnically homogenous” regions.⁷⁶ Regardless of the interaction of ethnic parties with incumbents, it can be argued that their very presence in the party system is negatively correlated with democratic outcomes insofar as their appeal to, and politicization of identity, takes votes and competitiveness away from democratic opposition parties. However, the ability of “ethnic” parties to do

⁷¹ See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 110-112

⁷² Gyimah-Boadi 2007, 26-27; Erdmann 2007, 37

⁷³ See, for example in the context of party research: Erdmann 2007, 44-45

⁷⁴ *Ibidem* 46

⁷⁵ *Ibidem* 47

⁷⁶ Lebas 2011, 33

so may have been rooted in the “collapsed state” phenomenon, and prior to that the structural distribution of power in the colonial regimes, both of which may only represent temporary aberrations; while much research in addition has been produced on the propensity of citizens to turn to ethnic associations in the context of scarce resources and benefits traditionally provided by the state.⁷⁷

Given that the level of analysis with which this thesis is concerned is the party system and aggregate electoral outcomes, and not individual voter preferences, the investigation of ethnicity herein shall be confined to the presence or absence of obvious ethnically based parties, whether *de jure* or *de facto*. As noted above, one of the predominant concerns of this thesis is the investigation of the co-optation of cross-cutting organizational structure not limited by societal cleavages such as ethnicity. This is not to say that if one surveyed electors in a given state regarding a particular election one would not find that ethnicity played an important role in their decision making, neither is this qualification an indication that this thesis is in a position to contradict research which indicates that this may not be the case.

⁷⁷ See, for example: Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004; Emizet 1999, 185-228

Chapter 3: Literature Review

As mentioned above, the primary alternative hypotheses of democratic outcomes can be broadly categorized into structural, institutional and voluntarist factors. Some of the most important structural hypotheses of democratic outcomes have focused on the importance of the socioeconomic system, and the impact of the international system, on democratic outcomes; while widely known institutional hypotheses have focused on executive and electoral design; and the most perdurable voluntarist hypotheses have focused on pacts.

In regard to socioeconomic hypotheses, which are closely related to modernization theories of democracy, the most enduring has been the correlation of wealth and democracy, where wealth is taken to be an indicator of economic development. While thresholds of strong correlation between absolute GDP figures and democracy have been located in past research,⁷⁸ as well as more recently, this hypothesis has been unable to reliably account for the institutionalization of democracy: income can only be shown to be correlated with the stability of democratic (and possibly any) systems.⁷⁹ That being said, this correlation is broadly accepted in the literature,⁸⁰ and even critical perspectives on the relationship between economic development and democracy maintain the association between economic development and democracy in the “old” world and poverty and autocracy in “new” countries; the caveat being that “new” countries have simply remained poor as well as autocratic.⁸¹ To be fair, this

⁷⁸ See, for example: Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 155-183; Geddes provides an overview of research on this relationship in: Geddes 1999, 117-119; see also Lawson 1999, 8 for a synthesis from the even older literature (Lipset and Dahl).

⁷⁹ This was the overall implication of the research conducted in, for example: Przeworski and Limongi 1997

⁸⁰ See, for example: Carothers 2006, 60-61

⁸¹ Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 176

theory does not suggest that democracy cannot be established in poor states, it suggests only that it is unlikely to survive.⁸² Newer research, however, suggests that in isolating African cases it can be shown that poverty, through the intervention of aid, is actually positively correlated with democratic outcomes,⁸³ whilst older research has long suggested a relationship between poor economic performance and authoritarian breakdown.⁸⁴

It is the position of this thesis that emerging democracies in less wealthy states in the contemporary world present a gap not explained by the literature which focuses on the relationship between wealth, as an indicator of socioeconomic development, and democracy. While negative cases typically exist, and certainly have throughout the duration of this literature, the number of negative cases present today, particularly where one allows oneself to account for toward democracy movement in hybrid regimes, gives call for a reassessment of this position. It is the position of this thesis, not that socioeconomic theories are without merit, but that important changes occur and have occurred in the international states system, and within given states whence they become hybrid regimes, that alter the impact of traditionally important factors, such as wealth, on democratic outcomes. A reassessment is particularly in order when studying African cases, where economic wealth is outside the reach of the vast majority of citizens, but where few states could be considered to be purely authoritarian regimes today.

Regarding international influences, the most recent and coherent theory of the effect of the international system on democratic outcomes has been the theory of linkage

⁸² *Ibidem* 169

⁸³ See: Boduszynski and Englebert 2008, 29-49

⁸⁴ Geddes 1999, 140

and leverage, argued by Levitsky and Way.⁸⁵ In this conceptualization linkage and leverage are thought to explain why states become democracies, competitive authoritarian regimes, or remain autocratic.⁸⁶ Leverage is defined as a government's vulnerability to external pressure, which vulnerability is primarily grounded in the size and strength of its economy, the presence or absence of competing foreign policy objectives between western states, and the presence or absence of "black knight" support.⁸⁷ Linkage is defined as the density of political, economic, social, diplomatic and organizational ties, as well as the extent of cross border flows of capital, goods and services, people and information between a given state and the U.S. and pre-2004 members of the European Union.⁸⁸ Linkage is thought to work through the mechanism of shaping the incentives, interests and capabilities of governments vis-à-vis their citizenry.⁸⁹

This thesis does not call into question that both linkage and leverage play meaningful roles in democratic outcomes within specified parameters, but there are several important gaps in this theorization of the effects of the international system on democratic outcomes, namely: that the impact of linkage and leverage are severely dependent on additional factors, such as the strength and organizational capacity of incumbent governments to resist leverage; that they are meaningfully contaminated by other hypotheses, such as the material ability of persons to form linkages as coded by Levitsky and Way;⁹⁰ that the empirical coding of linkage is over-determined in

⁸⁵ See, for example: Levitsky and Way 2010a

⁸⁶ See, for example: *Ibidem* 50-54

⁸⁷ *Ibidem* 40-43

⁸⁸ *Ibidem* 43

⁸⁹ *Ibidem* 45-50

⁹⁰ For coding and conceptualization, wherein I should note that the former does not fully account for the

meaningful ways, such as the importance of geographical proximity to the West;⁹¹ and finally that this theory makes important admissions regarding the present study, namely the overall importance of opposition mobilization.⁹² While the theory of linkage and leverage may explain democratization within certain parameters, such as why comparatively wealthy states in the Americas and western Eurasia became democracies after the Cold War, without accounting for their history of democracy or the democratic influence of potential membership in the European Union or Organization of American States, whilst the more easterly Eurasian states have not, for which the heavy explanatory power and coding weight accorded to geography is questionable; the theory presents a wide gap concerning Sub-Saharan Africa insofar as it neither adequately explains nor harbors any expectation of democracy in the region, which is characterized by Levitsky and Way as medium to high in leverage but low in linkage.⁹³ This particular confluence of linkage and leverage would mean that hybrid regimes in Africa are essentially explained by their broad poverty and geographic location, a somewhat problematic position which certainly merits another investigation.

While poverty and natural resource wealth comprise only the most significant, but not the universe of measures utilized in the analysis of leverage, it is nevertheless worth questioning its applicability in the African context. The remaining components of this relationship would have to be explained by the organizational capacity of incumbent

latter, see: Levitsky and Way 2005, 22-23; Levitsky and Way 2006, 383-384; and, in particular Levitsky and Way 2010a, 374-375 Appendix III – Measuring Leverage

⁹¹ A problem noted also in: Fairbanks 2009, 85; for the importance given to geographical proximity see: Levitsky and Way 2010a, 374-375; Levitsky and Way 2005, 23 and on page 30 it is noted that all of sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by the absence of linkage; In a later work Levitsky and Way indicate that colonial heritage may also be an indicator of linkage, a safe caveat that is never actually included in their operational analyses, see: Levitsky and Way 2006, 384

⁹² See, for example: Way 2009, 94-96 wherein Way reneges on his original position that opposition participation is a poor indicator of its success, in: Way 2008, 59; See also: Way 2010, 235

⁹³ See, for example: Levitsky and Way 2010a, 237-308

governments, the possession of nuclear arms, or “black knight” support by a non-Western state. It may be contended that the first remaining variable is irrelevant insofar as it is assumed in the context of this analysis, at least vis-à-vis the opposition; the second variable is now inapplicable in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the cut-off for the coding of the third variable, 1 per cent of GDP in bilateral aid from a “black knight,” is so low in the context of highly impoverished states that it simply provides a measure to make the model work in the face of significant contrary evidence.⁹⁴ It is worth noting, in addition, that it is because of the meaningful incorporation of natural resource wealth into the theory of leverage that this otherwise prominent and controversial theory of the relationship between natural resource endowments and democratic outcomes is not considered herein.⁹⁵

Whilst exogenous pressures certainly play an important role, this thesis is concerned primarily with domestic factors, and is geared toward the critical investigation of some of the literature which deprives those domestic factors of importance vis-à-vis structural explanations. The gaps in the linkage and leverage theories are where and how they fail to explain democracy, and domestically driven toward democracy movement, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

On a broad note, the position of this thesis regarding structural influences generally is that they may play an important role in democratic outcomes within their specified parameters, and particularly when considering movement from essentially authoritarian regimes, but that in hybrid regimes the role of structure at most dictates the level of opposition activity required, not the possibility or impossibility of those

⁹⁴ Particular coding schemes, which go well beyond what the body of the text accounts for, can be found in: Levistky and Way 2010a, 372-373, Appendix II – Measuring Leverage

⁹⁵ On this subject, one might look to, for example: Dunning 2008; Luong and Weinthal 2010; Ross 2001

outcomes, nor even necessarily their likelihood;⁹⁶ although structure may *ex post* correlate to the chronological distribution of democratization in the post-communist world.⁹⁷ It is precisely these after the event correlations which may have caused significant problems in democratization theory across time, in particular the temptation to infer causation backward based on patterned distributions of structural variables that may only be historical artefacts possessed of temporary stability.

Regarding institutional theories of democratization, the most influential have been those regarding the design of government, and the design of the electoral system. In terms of the former, it has been broadly hypothesized that parliamentary systems bear a greater association with democratic outcomes than do presidential systems. This hypothesis is founded on the assumption that executives in parliamentary systems are embedded in a house of elected representatives, are responsible to that house, and are thereby more constrained, whereas presidents do not sit in a house of elected representatives, and operate, therefore, with greater autonomy and less responsibility.⁹⁸ This theory has also been satisfactorily applied within the African context specifically.⁹⁹ A secondary hypothesis, relevant to this thesis in particular, is that presidential systems also weaken parties and party systems because executive authority has a level of detachment from parliament, where parties sit, and both citizens and leaders are thereby less interested in weakened parties and their parliamentarians.¹⁰⁰

The gaps presented by this literature lie in the significant amount of negative

⁹⁶ See also, for example: Beissinger 2009, 74-77; Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 69-73; Way 2010, 235

⁹⁷ Silitski 2009, 87

⁹⁸ See, in particular: Fish 2005, 193-245; and also: Carothers 2006, 64-65; Fish 1998, 132-134, 139 M. Stephen Fish also strongly claims that “muscular multipartyism” is also strongly correlated with democratic outcomes, and suggests that parties should be treated as “prime movers” on page 140.

⁹⁹ See, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112-115

¹⁰⁰ See, for example in the African context: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b, 112-115

cases which reside at both ends of the spectrum, i.e. a large number of democratic presidential systems, and parliamentary systems which are autocratic or have spent significant periods of time as autocratic in nature. There is certainly no definitive feature of parliamentary governance which necessarily negates the possibility of authoritarianism.

Regarding voluntarist theories, the most enduring has been the idea of “pacted” transitions between incumbent and opposition leaders.¹⁰¹ Whilst this paradigm is useful, there are several critical gaps in the context of a thesis of this nature. Firstly, one must question why incumbents undertake pacts, and how firm their commitments are to those pacts. As was the case in several Great Lakes states, pacts can be undertaken in moments of incumbent weakness, and can be ignored whence a secure footing is regained. Secondly, one must question with whom these pacts are undertaken. Pacts with insurgent military groups, or minor opposition parties, may not be useful for democracy, and as is historically evident in at least one of the cases below, may serve to preserve the undemocratic system. The former might be useful for peace, but the latter may simply be a tool to break up the opposition. Finally, the relationship between democracy as an outcome of pacts has been challenged.¹⁰²

The general position this thesis adopts in relation to the broader literature is that the liberalization of authoritarian regimes only leads to democracy where democratic ideas and organizations exist under the repression of that authoritarianism,¹⁰³ and the absence of authoritarianism is not the presence of democracy, nor the empowerment of

¹⁰¹ See, for example: O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, referencing in particular the brief summations offered in chapters 3 and 4.

¹⁰² Geddes 1999,140; and, perhaps most importantly in: Schmitter 2010, 23

¹⁰³ Ottaway 2003, 9

democratic opposition parties.¹⁰⁴ What is logically critical in hybrid regimes, in which all or many of the legal and definitional trappings of democracy are present, are active opposition parties to enliven the system, to criticize government, and to provide a realistic alternative to electors.

¹⁰⁴ Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 70-71

Chapter 4: Research Design, Methodology, and Case Selection

In this chapter the details of the design of this thesis, the methodologies it employs, and the selection of its cases, will be detailed. This chapter commences with a discussion of its research design generally, followed by methodological discussion, and is concluded with a discussion regarding case selection.

This thesis will pursue a programmatic mixed methods approach to the research questions, including substantial quantitative as well as qualitative analysis.¹⁰⁵ Regarding the former, the research questions that can be addressed quantitatively will be posited both to a large-N world dataset, as well as to an identical but smaller Sub-Saharan Africa dataset. This approach should have the effect of lending a degree of validity to the findings, insofar as this thesis is predominantly concerned with democracy in the context of African politics. In the quantitative portion of the analysis only the most technically correct applicable statistics and, ultimately, the most parsimonious and conservative models will be utilized in order to avoid the risk the results become confused or highly qualified.¹⁰⁶

In terms of data sources, this thesis relies predominantly on the World Development Indicators, Africa Development Indicators, Database of Political Institutions, and Polity IV datasets; and mathematical calculations on data thereupon. Although the latter dataset may be controversial as an unqualified indicator of

¹⁰⁵ This approach is labelled as “programmatic” in the sense that it is pursuing distinct questions with distinct methodological approaches, as opposed to other more integrated approaches to mixed methods, all of which designs are highlighted in: Creswell and Clark 2007

¹⁰⁶ Aside from simply wishing to only pursue absolutely correct operations given the data at hand on a technical level, which is often not the case, this thesis has also been influenced toward easily interpretable and simple operations by some of the arguments in: Ray 2005; and the complimentary articles: Achen 2005; Clark 2005; 341-352

democracy,¹⁰⁷ it is nevertheless widely utilized for large-N analyses due the facts that: 1) it is unparalleled in terms of the number of observations and the timeframe available; and 2) it provides a much needed common language for scholars wishing to pursue studies of democracy and autocracy coded in a gradated, as opposed to dichotomous manner.

Because there may be controversy between research which approaches democracy as absolute and dichotomous *versus* gradated,¹⁰⁸ it should be made explicit that a gradated measure of democracy has been elected because this thesis is specifically concerned with variation on the dependent variable, i.e. democratic outcomes, with increased analytic differentiation on the dependent variable in order to capture diversity,¹⁰⁹ and with this variation in regimes which would otherwise simply remain static as non-democracies throughout nearly all of the period under investigation. The Polity IV dataset is recoded in two manners for the purposes of this thesis: firstly, by adding 10 points to all scores which normally range from -10 to +10 yielding an all positive integer scale ranging from 0-20, in which all scores at 16 and above are taken to indicate a democracy; and, secondly, where that 0-20 scale is reduced to 5 ordinal grades for certain cross tabulations, where 5 indicates the 16-20 democracy score, and preceding numbers represent descending increments of four points. In both recoding schemes transitional values are recoded as missing and excluded from analysis.

The remaining three datasets are all generated and maintained by the World Bank and are not generally regarded as highly problematic or flawed sources of information. From the World Development Indicators and Africa Development Indicators, the latter being an identical subset, this thesis utilizes the following information: GDP per capita in

¹⁰⁷ See, for example: Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Marshall, Gurr, Davenport and Jagers 2002

¹⁰⁸ See, for example: Collier and Adcock 1999

¹⁰⁹ Collier and Levitsky 2009, 269

current United States dollars; and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. GDP per capita in current United States dollars is elected simply for the parsimony and ease of interpretation granted by the measure, and natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP in order to generate an easy to utilize interval-ratio level measurement. The Database of Political Institutions is utilized for its measurements and loggings of system type, e.g. presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential; electoral system type, e.g. proportional representation or other; and measurements of opposition seats held by the largest opposition party, and total seats held by the opposition.

In terms of the data coding, due to large amounts of missing data, in regard to Africa in particular, and the difficult questions that come with deciding how to manipulate that missing data, the data available has been recoded from the interval-ratio level to the ordinal level. It is the position of this thesis that coding precise and absolute interval-ratio data into larger ordinal grades provides a basis to more safely posit the values of otherwise missing data than, for example, to infer precise numbers taken through the operation of averages. Finally, as has become the norm in large-N political science quantitative analyses, the number of observations available for use in the dataset has been maximized by coding the data into country years, producing thereby 22 mathematically distinct observations for every state in the dataset in the 1989-2010 period. In the operations below this data is used both as a broad cross-section in order to investigate general correlation, as well as, where appropriate, utilized longitudinally in order to investigate the temporal order of correlation.

In order to develop a quantitative measure of “opposition strength” it is inferred

that strong opposition parties are those which monopolize the opposition vote.¹¹⁰ This thesis appeals to the monopolization of the opposition primarily due to the contention that absolute vote proportions between incumbent and opposition in electoral competition are unreliable in contexts that may be significantly characterized by electoral fraud on the part of undemocratic incumbents amongst other factors.¹¹¹ Adapting this originally qualitative conceptualization from Lebas is in expostulation both to the dangers of the alternative of absolute quantification of the opposition vis-à-vis the universe of votes, as well as the weak relationship found between that operationalization of opposition strength and democratic outcomes.¹¹² Secondly, this thesis contends that the most coherent manner in which to test this particular operationalization of opposition strength is in terms of the monopolization of opposition seats (as opposed to votes). This is posited to be the case because voting patterns are only theoretically salient at electoral intervals, whereas it can be assumed that seat allocation continues to have a function in the years between elections, i.e. that opposition members are participating in politics. In order to generate this number, firstly, the number of seats held by the largest opposition party is divided by the total number of seats held by the opposition, and the resulting quotient is multiplied by 100; and secondly, where appropriate, ordinal grades into which the product of the previous operation is converted are generated, for reasons both of compatibility with the ordinal data already in use, as well as for those arguments for ordinal conversion highlighted above.

There are at least two major interacting variables over which this thesis attempts

¹¹⁰ Lebas 2011, 27 adopted from one of three indicators of opposition strength, although Lebas does not believe these can be utilized as standalone measures.

¹¹¹ See, for example: *Ibidem* 26

¹¹² As in, for example: Rakner and van de Walle 2009b,109-111

to exert control in concentrating on the opposition as an insular system, namely the extent of vote rigging in undemocratic regimes, and the extent of the protest vote. The unknown dimensions of these variables in a given competitive authoritarian regime are at once the justification for avoiding the absolute analysis of the opposition vis-à-vis the incumbent,¹¹³ but may certainly also contaminate the opposition vote when it is considered in and of itself. While some argue there is no competitive advantage in the manipulation of votes by authoritarian incumbents vis-à-vis other forms of electoral manipulation, the fact is that if the incumbent is capable of manipulating the proportion of votes it does not receive, it is capable also of manipulating the allocation of non-incumbent votes. It may not be possible, therefore, to discern what form of manipulation has taken place.

This thesis argues that there is utility in electoral data from hybrid regimes, and that the analysis of the opposition as an insulated system provides some protection from the effects of vote manipulation which, while it is certainly exists, can be delimited neither as marginal nor as totalizing. The ultimate decisions on the utility of this data, and on the probable extent of vote rigging in hybrid regimes, obviously, must be left to individual readers and their interpretation of the scholarly and professional literature at large.

In terms of the major opposition parties, furthermore, it may not be possible to determine what proportion of votes were garnered by the opposition's electoral campaign, and what proportion of votes are merely an indication of discontent with the incumbent. The theoretical weight and relevance of the protest vote is, therefore, also left to the reader, as this thesis has no basis upon which to define its actual parameters in the

¹¹³ Lebas 2011, 26

cases at hand.

The particular operations utilized, as mentioned, are restricted to the most technically correct, parsimonious and conservative available. This approach is taken largely because this thesis constitutes a more or less initial investigation. Most of the data is presented below in the form of cross-tabulations and the related statistical measures of independence and association.

For all cross-tabulations Pearson's chi-squared statistic is presented, although the necessity of this presentation is debatable given that this thesis is dealing with a longitudinally ordered universe of cases, and not a sample of cases from that universe. Pearson's chi squared statistic, therefore, is included as a formality based on the fact that a temporal truncation on the parameters of the universe of cases has taken place, and in regard to the fact that it is a base calculation for non-parametric statistical measures of association for nominal variables. In line with the latter, Cramer's phi statistic is included in categorical tables. Additionally, because this thesis is dealing in what can be regarded as the population of cases, and not a sample thereof, retests of established theories are subjected to hypothesis testing as the primary hypothesis, i.e. where the null hypothesis remains that these positions do not reflect the empirical universe. That being the case, no weights or statistical adjustments are applied to the Pearson chi-squared statistic, as the basic null hypothesis assumption of uniform distribution is adopted. There are additional reasons for taking such an approach to the chi-squared statistic, the most relevant of which is the danger of type II error when statistically adjusting for low null hypothesis expectations not based on uniform distribution. Should such adjustments be made in the context of a retest and the null hypothesis fail to be rejected, given the

known danger of type II error, it would be advisable to revert to the very approach this thesis has elected to utilize as it stands.

Where all data in a given cross-tabulation is at the ordinal level or better, additional measures of non-parametric association are included, comprised herein of Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, Kendall's tau, and Spearman's rho. Gamma is included due to its mathematical similarity to tau, and it is simply the position of this thesis that reporting these measures in tandem is more useful than not, while the differential value of these measurements is left to the reader.

In the cases where nominal and dichotomous variables are being tested against ordinal or interval-ratio level data this thesis utilizes the difference of means t-test, as well as cross tabulation with Pearson's chi squared and Cramer's phi statistics.

Finally, in the interest of parsimony, longitudinal data is presented as variation in central tendency across time based on a "year zero" which is the first year a given state qualifies for inclusion, and raw data is included in an appendix. Recoding applicable cases in this manner prevents late entry cases from skewing the effect of those variables under consideration as concerns early entry cases. The reader is encouraged to analyse the raw data for him or herself in order to discern the appropriateness or inappropriateness of more rigorous longitudinal tests, which this thesis has avoided due to the uncontrolled acquisition of cases which are posited herein to pose a logically similar problem to that of attrition more typical of longitudinal studies.

In terms of the qualitative portion of this analysis, multiple case secondary analysis will be conducted with comparative method and purposive sampling case

selection criteria.¹¹⁴ This thesis utilizes multiple cases in order to test predefined hypotheses,¹¹⁵ but also allows room for induction from the data at hand.¹¹⁶ The primary object of the qualitative portion of the analysis is to analyze how strong opposition parties come to be strong. The inability to fully capture this process with quantitative data has to do with the facts that not all data can be made numerically discrete, that some of this data which cannot be quantified may be the same data this thesis is attempting to capture in this analysis, and that even where it is clear that many of the variables could be usefully quantified, such data is simply not available for secondary analysis, i.e. has not yet been gathered.¹¹⁷

Although it has been noted that party-system based explanations can be unreliable predictors of political outcomes in Africa,¹¹⁸ this should not be taken *prima facie* given the lack of reliability highlighted in other broad theoretical approaches as concerns African cases, and it is the position of this thesis that logical relationships should be investigated. This thesis conceives of the “party-system” as the nature and stability of interactions between parties operating in an intermediate position between government and society.¹¹⁹

In selecting the particular cases of states in the Great Lakes region this thesis

¹¹⁴ For an understanding of “multiple case secondary analysis” in general as opposed to a strictly comparative approach see: Berg 2009, 317-337; for an understanding of the contemporary “comparative method” as opposed to one restricted to the J.S. Mill iteration or some broad ill-defined notion of “comparative politics” see, for example: Frensdreis 1983; Przeworski and Teune 1970; for an understanding of the use of that method in case selection see, for example: Meckstroth 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970, 32- (Most Similar Systems Design) and 34- (Most Different Systems Design); for an understanding of what constitutes “purposive sampling” see, for example: Babbie and Benaquisto 2010, 182, and 181-185 for the logic of non-probability sampling in general. For the logic and justification of non-random case selection as utilized herein see, for example: Levy 2008, 8-9; Thomas 2011, 514

¹¹⁵ See, for example: Levy 2008, 7; Meckstroth 1975, 136-137

¹¹⁶ See, for example: Levy 2008, 11-12

¹¹⁷ This and similar logic for utilizing case studies in general is presented in: Gerring 2007

¹¹⁸ Lebas 2011, 22

¹¹⁹ Basedau 2007, 108

intends the elimination of a number of variables which would otherwise have to be addressed.¹²⁰ Purposively selecting from a group of states that at once represent a proximate enough region to lend validity to the analysis, whilst individually originating in different histories of authoritarian politics and coalescing into a singular form of “blocked transition” hybrid regime over the past several decades;¹²¹ which form contemporarily embraces a liberal multiparty based conceptualization of democracy, allow this thesis to disregard questions of equivalence.¹²² In so doing, it is also possible to eliminate consideration of the correlations between authoritarian regime type and democratic outcomes,¹²³ and furthermore this thesis understands the concept of a “blocked transition” to be widely congruent with competitive authoritarianism and *et cetera*. However, while purposively selecting the cases, electing to focus on Uganda and DRC where there are relatively strong opposition parties, and Rwanda where there is not, and in selecting these cases without regard to their absolute state of democracy other than that they cannot be consolidated democracies; this thesis also seeks to avoid issues associated with selection bias in comparative research.¹²⁴ In this sample Uganda constitutes the “crucial” case¹²⁵ where a relatively strong opposition party has been carved out of the prior “no party” organizational structure of the incumbent; Rwanda forms a “diverse”¹²⁶ case wherein *pro forma* democracy exists and multipartyism is legal, but no strong opposition party has yet arisen; and finally, the Democratic Republic of

¹²⁰ For the logic of the use of the comparative method to eliminate irrelevant variables from analysis see, for example: Frenreis 1983, 262; Meckstroth 1975, 137

¹²¹ See, for example: van de Walle 2002, 68-73; Bratton and van de Walle 1997

¹²² For the problem of equivalence in comparative research see, for example: Przeworski and Teune 1970, 106-130

¹²³ For example as presented in: Geddes 1999, 115-144; or as eventually questioned by Schmitter in: Schmitter 2010, 22-23

¹²⁴ See, for example: Collier and Mahoney 1996, 56-91; Geddes, 1990, 131-150

¹²⁵ See, for example: Gerring 2007, 231-253

¹²⁶ Gerring and Seawright 2008, 301

Congo, due to its unique recent history, forms both a “crucial” case in a similar manner to Uganda as concerns the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo*, but also forms a “deviant” case,¹²⁷ as concerns the *Union pour Démocratie et le Progrès Social*. Due to the significant across case differences, but the highly similar and even cross-contaminated nature of the respective political systems, the various forms of cases are drawn together herein in a mixed *most similar systems*, but also *most different systems* design. Uganda and DRC constitute the MDS design, whilst Uganda and DRC vis-à-vis Rwanda will comprise an MSS paired comparison¹²⁸ where the former two represent “positive” cases and the latter represents a “negative” case.¹²⁹

Finally, this thesis elects to conduct the analysis within the temporal frame 1989-2010 in both the quantitative and qualitative portion of the analysis as applicable. In not analyzing African politics prior to 1989 it is possible to exclude several otherwise important variables from the analysis, in particular the impact of Cold War alliances on regime type in African states and elsewhere, arguably the cause, or a crucial factor in, a significant number of aberrations in regime type in otherwise historical democracies.¹³⁰ Following the end of the Cold War and the removal of anti-democratic exogenous pressures, many states in Africa and around the world that entered statehood and/or the Cold War period as democratic states have discretely returned to that form of governance, or are arguably in the process of such a return.¹³¹ Utilizing data from prior to the Cold

¹²⁷ *Ibidem* 303

¹²⁸ See, for example: Tarrow 2010

¹²⁹ Selecting Rwanda as a negative case follows the logic for negative case selection that does not require the negative case to be characterized by the presence of the Independent Variables and/or mechanisms and the absence of the Dependent Variable or outcome, only that the outcome of interest is theoretically possible, *id est* the “possibility principle” as found in: Goertz and Mahoney 2004, 653-669

¹³⁰ See, for example: Magaloni 2008, 737-738 wherein the author conceded that statistical work conducted on regime change over a period including the Cold War could be significantly contaminated.

¹³¹ This position is broadly supported in the Africanist literature, for example in: McFerson 2010, 66-68

War period cannot be done in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, as most contemporary states were formal colonies for some time prior to this period, and the quality of our knowledge of pre-colonial and/or pre-contact systems is highly variable; extensive where there was prolonged contact with a centralized kingdom, and suspect as concerns our understanding of “tribes” encountered, or invented for the purposes of political domination.¹³² Additionally, even where those centralized political systems have existed, the colonial encounter served to dismantle (*exempli gratia*: Kongo), alter (e.g. Rwanda), or incorporate them into larger political bodies (e.g. Buganda); thus making their politics of little relevance to this analysis, which is concerned with the Westphalian/postcolonial state the political elite (controversially) elected to retain in the era of independence.¹³³

wherein McFerson characterizes the period from 1989 forward as one of “fragile progress,” 1995-2002 as one of “backsliding” and 2002 forward as “recovery;” in pages 68-70 McFerson details some of the contaminating issues; see also, for example: Nugent 2004, 369

¹³² These aspects of the colonial encounter are analysed most notably in: Mamdani 1996; Young 1994

¹³³ The history of such decisions and their alternatives may be found in general histories such as: Freund 1984; Herbst 2000

Chapter 5: Quantitative Results

In this chapter the thesis seeks to expose the posited relationship between strong opposition parties and democratic outcomes to empirical testing, as well as predominant hypotheses from the broader literature expounded above. The reason for the latter series of testing is that it is the position of this thesis that the nature of these established relationships may change in the post-Cold War period, and in hybrid as opposed to authoritarian regimes. The chapter will commence with an empirical investigation of certain hypotheses from the broader literature, followed by an investigation of the relationship between strong opposition parties and democratic outcomes.

When the temporal boundaries of the analysis are restricted to the years 1989 through 2010, the correlation between wealth and democracy broadly holds on the global level, as illustrated by Table 1 below.

Table 1: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010							
		Polity Score					Total
	GDP	1	2	3	4	5	
	1	209	221	168	141	254	993
	2	214	187	58	173	766	1398
	3	78	14	4	10	291	397
	4	54	3	18	0	429	504
Total		555	425	248	324	1740	3292
		Pearson chi2	720.3723		Pr	.000...	
		Gamma	0.4471		ASE	0.02	
		Kendall's tau-b	0.3047		ASE	0.014	
		Spearman	0.3548		Pr	.0000...	
* GDP per capita in current USD							
Recoded into ordinal values where 1 = \$2 per day or less, 2 = middle as defined by World Development Indicators (lower middle, middle, upper middle) where not included in the prior category, 3 = high, as values greater than the upper limit of upper middle (\$6247.27) as defined by World Development Indicators in 2010, and where 4 = all values at \$18,000 and above							
After recoding into broad ordinal values, missing data was averaged according to the preceding and proceeding available data							
** Polity Scores were generated using the plus ten method of generating all-positive scores							
The resulting 0-20 scale was recoded into quintiles where 0-3=1, 4-7=2, 8-11=3, 12-15=4 and 16-20=5, where 1 = undemocratic and 5 = democratic							
All transitional polity scores (-88, -77, -66) were recoded as missing, and missing data was, therefore, not manipulated							

Table 1 indicates that there is a tendency in all states with a GDP per capita of greater than \$2 per day, and particularly in states with a GDP per capita of greater than \$6247.27 per year, toward democracy. The results of the non-parametric measures of association for cross-tabulated ordinal data also suggest that a meaningful amount of variation in democracy is explained by GDP per capita. It is of note, however, that the statistical results of this correlation are heavily influenced by states which are not impoverished, whereas states in the lowest income category, with a GDP per capita of \$2

per day or less, are fairly evenly distributed across gradations of democracy in this time period (Table 2).

Table 2: GDP Per Capita and Democracy in the World 1989-2010, where GDP Per Capita is \$2 Per Day or Less				
		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Polity Score			
	1	209	21.05	21.05
	2	221	22.26	43.3
	3	168	16.92	60.22
	4	141	14.2	74.42
	5	254	25.58	100
	Total	993	100	
* See notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity Score				

This latter finding is not expected by the theory iterated above. The important caveat is that, whilst a singular indicator such as GDP per capita is and has been an acceptable simplification of the relationship that modernization theory and its more contemporary revisions posit between economic development and/or capitalism and democracy, the theory itself can be much “thicker” and more complex than this indicator can account for.¹³⁴ This finding is of particular importance for the study of African politics where the majority of states fall within the low income category (Table 3), and where the statistical relationship between wealth and democracy is significantly weaker across the same time period (Table 4).

¹³⁴ See, for example: Boix 2003; Lipset 1981; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
GDP	1	722	68.37	68.37
	2	295	27.94	96.31
	3	36	3.41	99.72
	4	3	0.28	100
	Total	1056	100	
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the coding of GDP per capita				

	Polity Score					Total
GDP	1	2	3	4	5	
1	93	168	137	84	136	618
2	42	61	17	28	123	271
3	0	8	0	2	7	17
4	0	3	0	0	0	3
Total	135	240	154	114	266	909
	Pearson Chi2		84.1078		Pr	.000...
	Gamma		0.2051		ASE	0.051
	Kendall's tau-b		0.122		ASE	0.031
	Spearman's rho		0.1364		Pr	.0000...
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores and the coding of GDP per capita						

As Table 3 illustrates 68 per cent of African cases fall in the extremely low income category possessing a GDP per capita of \$2 per day or less, whilst 96 per cent of the African cases fall within the first two income categories. In Table 4 one can see that the statistical measures of association for non-parametric ordinal cross-tabulation have decreased in strength by over 50 per cent in all cases, and the tau and rho statistics can be regarded as more or less insignificant. The reason for this is evident in the Table 4 cross-

tabulation itself where it is clear that there is no definitive relationship between income and either democracy or autocracy when all African observations between 1989 and 2010 are treated as a large cross section.

The absence of this relationship in broad cross section is further complicated by the fact that Sub-Saharan African states entered the post-Cold War period as predominantly poor and autocratic (see Table 5), whereas across the period 1989-2010 there has been a very significant shift away from purely authoritarian governance (see Table 6), with only a minor shift toward greater individual wealth (see Table 7).

	Polity Score					Total
GDP	1	2	3	4	5	
1	24	3	0	1	1	29
2	6	1	2	1	3	13
3	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	30	4	2	2	4	42
	Pearson Chi2		10.1825		Pr	0.037
	Gamma		0.6726		ASE	0.177
	Kendall's tau-b		0.3857		ASE	0.145
	Spearman's rho		0.4056		Pr	0.0077
* see notes for Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores and the coding of GDP per capita						

Table 5 provides a base indication that the wealth and democracy hypothesis is valid at the commencement of the post-Cold War period with a significant association between poverty and autocracy evident in the cross-tabulation and reflected in the non-parametric statistical measures of ordinal correlation.

Table 6: Democracy in Africa Over Time 1989-2010							
		Polity Score					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Year	1989	33	6	1	1	3	44
	1990	30	4	2	2	4	42
	1991	12	12	1	2	7	34
	1992	10	13	2	2	10	37
	1993	8	14	3	3	11	39
	1994	6	14	3	5	12	40
	1995	5	13	5	4	12	39
	1996	2	16	7	7	10	42
	1997	2	17	9	5	10	43
	1998	2	15	10	4	9	40
	1999	2	12	11	6	9	40
	2000	2	12	10	8	10	42
	2001	3	10	9	9	10	41
	2002	2	10	8	10	12	42
	2003	2	10	9	8	12	41
	2004	2	10	9	5	15	41
	2005	2	10	8	5	17	42
	2006	2	10	8	6	18	44
	2007	2	9	8	6	19	44
	2008	2	10	8	4	20	44
	2009	2	8	11	5	18	44
	2010	2	5	12	7	18	44
	Total	135	240	154	114	266	909
		Pearson Chi2		367.4542		Pr	.000...
		Gamma		0.3285		ASE	0.03
		Kendall's tau-b		0.2843		ASE	0.026
		Spearman's rho		0.3651		Pr	.0000...
* see Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity scores							

Statistical calculations in Table 6 regarding the relationship between the passage of time in the post 1989 period and democracy have been included, despite the almost certainly spurious nature of such a correlation, in order to develop a “cut-off” measure that may be utilized to assess the performance of the remaining tests.

Table 7: GDP Per Capita in Africa at 10 Year Intverals							
		1990		2000		2009	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
GDP	1	33	68.75	37	77.08	23	47.92
	2	14	29.17	10	20.83	21	43.75
	3	1	2.08	1	2.08	4	8.33
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total	48	100	48	100	48	100
* see Table 1 regarding the coding of GDP per capita							
** 2009 is used for the final entry because it is the last year for which Database of Political Institutions data is available, although 2010 data is available from World Development Indicators, I have elected to utilize 2009 for the sake of uniformity							

Table 7 illustrates that over 90 per cent of African cases remain in the first two income categories throughout the entire period of investigation. There has been meaningful movement between the extremely low income category of GDP per capita \$2 per day or less and the second income category, but only 3 discrete cases have broken out of the first two income categories in this time period.

If the theory of linkage must be discarded in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, in the context of this thesis, given the absence it posits of any expectation of democratic outcomes, the theory of leverage must nevertheless be considered herein. Table 8 provides a simple test of leverage on a global scale between 1989 and 2010.

		Polity Score					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Natural Resources	1	10	0	0	0	0	10
	2	5	2	3	1	0	11
	3	10	21	13	17	0	61
	4	163	196	152	123	253	887
	Total	188	219	168	141	253	969
			Pearson Chi2	80.0513		Pr	0.000...
			Gamma	0.3779		ASE	0.062
			Kendall's tau-b	0.138		ASE	0.024
			Spearman's rho	0.1539		Pr	0.0000...
* Crosstabulation only includes states with a GDP Per Capita of \$2 per day or less							
** See Table 1 regarding the generation of Polity Scores							
*** Natural Resources are sourced from World Development Indicators "Natural Resource Rents as a Percentage of GDP" and this percentage is recoded into five values: 0-25=4, 25-50=3, 50-75=2, 75+=1							

In Table 8 the weaker non-parametric statistical calculation for association in ordinal cross tabulation (gamma), as well as the location of major natural resource states provides tenuous confirmation of leverage theory, although the acceptability of the gamma statistic given its ASE of 0.06 is debatable. It is of note however that this pattern is clearly driven by the authoritarian classification of 15 major natural resource producers in the upper left hand corner of the table, and not by the absence of authoritarian tendencies in states which benefit comparatively little from natural resource rents. Additionally, the tau and rho statistics present much weaker results.

Table 9 provides an examination of this relationship in Africa where even the strength found in the gamma calculation in Table 8 above has significantly weakened.

		Polity Score					Total	
		1	2	3	4	5		
Natural Resources	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	2	0	2	3	1	0	6	
	3	2	16	3	11	0	32	
	4	91	150	131	72	136	580	
Total		93	168	137	84	136	618	
		Pearson Chi2		33.5098	Pr		0.000...	
		Gamma		0.1357	ASE		0.09	
		Kendall's tau-b		0.0414	ASE		0.027	
		Spearman's rho		0.0464	Pr		0.2498	
* See Table 8 for coding								

In Table 9, it is clear from the cross-tabulation that comparatively few African states benefit exorbitantly from natural resource rents, whilst the non-parametric statistical measures of association for ordinal cross tabulation are insignificant, although the rho statistic does not present an acceptable result.

The institutional hypotheses discussed above are tested in the tables below, and while it is of note that the institutional hypothesis contending the greater association of parliamentary systems with democratic outcomes is broadly supported by the data for both the world (Tables 10 and 11) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Tables 12 and 13), upon examination of the data (see Tables 11 and 13) it appears to be the case that the correlation is driven by the strong association of parliamentary systems with democracy, and not through any necessary association between presidential systems and authoritarianism.

Table 10: Difference of Means T-Test, System and Democracy, World 1989-2010

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Pres.	1952	10.9667	0.154036	6.805523	10.66461	11.26879
	Parl.	999	17.86587	0.113687	3.593306	17.64277	18.08896
Combined		2951	13.30227	0.124391	6.757303	13.05837	13.54617
Difference			-6.89917	0.230178		-7.35049	-6.44784
						t =	-29.9732
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom		2949
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0		
Pr	0.0000...		Pr	0.0000...		Pr	1
* Polity is recoded using the plus 10 method with transitional values recoded as missing yielding a 0-20 scale							
** system, sourced from Database of Political Institutions is recoded with transitional values as missing (-999) and "assembly-elected president" as missing, yielding the dichotomous categories "presidential" and "parliamentary"							

Table 11: System and Democracy in the World 1989-2010

	Polity Score					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Pres.	425	349	177	212	789	1952
Parl.	1	30	48	95	825	999
Total	426	379	225	307	1614	2951
	Pearson chi2		560.5588	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.4358			
* see Table 1 for the coding of Polity scores						
** see Table 10 regarding the coding of "presidential" and "parliamentary"						

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Pres.	716	9.77095	0.209832	5.61472	9.358989	10.18291
	Parl.	99	14.11111	0.581068	5.781549	12.958	15.26422
Combined		815	10.29816	0.203431	5.807577	9.898849	10.69747
Difference			-4.34016	0.604235		-5.52621	-3.15412
						t =	-7.1829
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom		813
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0		
Pr	0.0000...		Pr	0.0000...		Pr	1
* see tables 10-11 for coding							

	PolityScore					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Pres.	110	195	123	104	184	716
Parl.	0	22	19	0	58	99
Total	110	217	142	104	242	815
	Pearson chi2		62.2931	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.2764			
* see tables 10-11 for coding						

It is of note that the standard deviations in all results above are significant, the smallest one representing a first deviation around the mean of 35% of all possible scores on the dependent variable (Table 10 – Parliamentary), and the greatest over 65 per cent (Table 10 – Presidential). While the means are statistically different, and a fairly tight confidence interval is generated, it should be noted that their value, as a result, is somewhat questionable. It is clear on average, however, that there is a definite association between parliamentary systems and democratic outcomes.

The position that parliamentary versus presidential systems generate stronger

parties is also broadly supported by the data (Tables 14, 15, 16 and 17 below) with, on average, a full quintile difference in the means of party strength between presidential and parliamentary systems.

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Pres.	2118	42.12333	0.790104	36.36195	40.57387	43.67279
	Parl.	1265	65.58994	0.745874	26.52838	64.12665	67.05323
Combined		3383	50.89817	0.600428	34.92306	49.72093	52.0754
Difference			-23.4666	1.173687		-25.7678	-21.1654
						t =	-19.9939
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom		3381
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0		
Pr	0.0000...		Pr	0.0000...	Pr	1	
* party strength is measured as the monopolization of opposition seats by the largest opposition party							
** this number is generated by the dividing the number of seats held by the largest opposition party by the total number of opposition seats and multiplying the quotient by 100							
*** See Tables 10-11 regarding the coding of Presidential and Parliamentary							

	Party Strength					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Pres.	715	89	376	455	483	2118
Parl.	46	35	306	384	494	1265
Total	761	124	682	839	977	3383
	Pearson chi2		437.7048	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.3596			
* see Table 14 regarding the generation of party strength						
the largest opposition party						
** party strength is ordinalized into quintiles utilizing the following						
coding: 0=1, 1-25=2, 25-50=3, 50-75=4, 75-100=5						
*** see Tables 10-11 regarding the coding of presidential and						
parliamentary						

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Pres.	798	42.48906	1.332887	37.65257	39.87268	45.10544
	Parl.	106	68.85214	3.471171	35.73789	61.96945	75.73483
Combined		904	45.58031	1.27598	38.36438	43.07608	48.08454
Difference			-26.3631	3.869942		-33.9582	-18.76794
						t =	-6.8123
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom	902	
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0		
Pr	0.0000...		Pr	0.0000...	Pr	1	
* see Tables 14-15 for coding							

	Party Strength					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Pres.	286	28	120	173	191	798
Parl.	15	5	5	21	60	106
Total	301	33	125	194	251	904
	Pearson chi2	56.9206		Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi	0.2509				
* see Tables 12-13 for coding						

Whilst the tests above are also vulnerable both to significant standard deviations, as well as to being predominantly driven by the results for parliamentary systems, and while negative cases certainly exist both in the world generally as well as in Africa specifically, the clear correlation between parliamentary systems and both democracy and strong parties is convincing enough that this thesis excludes them from its analysis, contending that the findings of greatest theoretical importance are those concerned with presidential systems. This is the case because while it is clear that there is an association between democracy and parliamentary systems, there is no clear association between presidential systems and either outcome. It is of note, however, that Table 17 indicates the strength of the relationship is weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the world at large.

Regarding the hypothesized association between electoral design and democratic outcomes, while there is an obvious statistical relationship between proportional representation and a higher polity score over other electoral systems (Tables 18-21), with a statistically significant and higher mean, this relationship is also much smaller in Africa, and it is also the case that PR electoral systems are not clustered in the “democracy” range in Africa as it is.

Table 18: Difference of Means T-Test, Proportional Representation and Democracy, World 1989-2010

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Other	1002	11.78543	0.203814	6.451608	11.38548	12.18538
	PR	1616	16.63861	0.110389	4.437593	16.42209	16.85514
Combined		2618	14.78113	0.113356	5.79999	14.55886	15.00341
Difference			-4.85319	0.213089		-5.27102	-4.43535
						t =	-22.7754
H0: difference = 0				Degrees of Freedom		2616	
Hyp: difference < 0		Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0			
Pr	0.0000...	Pr	0.0000...	Pr	1		
* see Table 10 regarding the coding of Polity scores							
** pr is recoded with transitional values as missing (-999)							

Table 19: Proportional Representation and Democracy in the World 1989-2010

	Polity Score					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Other	145	178	139	132	408	1002
PR	30	107	82	139	1258	1616
Total	175	285	221	271	1666	2618
	Pearson chi2		420.9684	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.4009			
* see Table 1 for the coding of Polity scores						
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of "proportional representation" and "other"						

In Table 18 there is nearly a 5 point, or 25 per cent difference in the average Polity Score of non-proportional representation systems and proportional representation systems.

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Other	383	11.27154	0.282108	5.520964	10.71686	11.82622
	PR	267	13.03745	0.299804	4.898836	12.44716	13.62774
Combined		650	11.99692	0.209516	5.34164	11.58551	12.40833
Difference			-1.76591	0.420514		-2.59165	-0.94018
						t =	-4.1994
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom		648
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0			Hyp: difference > 0	
Pr	0.0000...		Pr	0.0000...		Pr	1
* see Tables 18-19 for coding							

	Polity Score					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Other	20	107	73	55	128	383
PR	0	47	62	31	127	267
Total	20	154	135	86	255	650
	Pearson chi2		31.2688	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.2193			
* see Tables 18-19 for coding						

Unlike in Table 18, Table 20 demonstrates only a two point difference between PR and non-PR systems, both of which scores are significantly undemocratic, while Cramer's phi statistic in Table 21 has nearly been halved from that in Table 19.

Pertaining to political parties, this thesis contends that because both theories ultimately posit negative outcomes, namely that proportional representation systems spread seats too widely amongst too many (minor) parties, and that first-past-the-post systems make it too difficult for many parties to get a foothold in the system, both extremes represent a negative outcome for non-incumbent parties, as both hegemonic party systems (eased by first past the post systems) and absurdly plural systems (eased by

proportional representation) can be shown to have a negative impact on democracy. In addition, the correlations between a dummy independent variable “proportional representation” and party strength are unreliable in the same sense as those examined throughout this section, perhaps even more so (Tables 22-25).

Table 22: Difference of Means T-Test, Electoral System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Other	1224	57.18736	1.043756	36.51653	55.13961	59.23511
	PR	1768	59.70378	0.612625	25.75939	58.50224	60.90533
Combined		2992	58.67434	0.560145	30.63948	57.57603	59.77264
Difference			-2.51643	1.13854		-4.74883	-0.28402
						t =	-2.2102
H0: difference = 0						Degrees of Freedom	2990
Hyp: difference < 0			Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0		
Pr	0.0136		Pr	0.0272		Pr	0.9864
*See Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength							
** See Table 18 regarding the coding of PR and Other							

Table 23: Electoral System and Party Strength, World 1989-2010

	Party Strength					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Other	205	90	213	245	471	1224
PR	96	46	493	608	525	1768
Total	301	136	706	853	996	2992
	Pearson chi2		230.8835	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.2777			
* see Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength						
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of PR						

As Table 22 illustrate, mean party strength of the most significant opposition party in the global dataset based on electoral system only differs by approximately two points, and the confidence intervals overlap. Table 23 illustrates that all electoral systems modally tend toward democracy, but both have significant numbers of non-democratic cases.

		Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	95% Conf. Interval	
Group	Other	400	51.81183	1.779453	35.58906	48.31355	55.3101
	PR	291	64.09801	1.696786	28.945	60.75844	67.43759
Combined		691	56.98589	1.273912	33.48717	54.48469	59.4871
Difference			-12.2862	2.539218		-17.2717	-7.30065
						t =	-4.8386
H0: difference = 0					Degrees of Freedom		689
Hyp: difference < 0		Hyp: difference = 0		Hyp: difference > 0			
Pr	0.0000...	Pr	0.0000...	Pr	1		
*See Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength							
** See Table 18 regarding the coding of PR and Other							

	Party Strength					Total
	1	2	3	4	5	
Other	86	24	59	112	119	400
PR	15	9	77	75	115	291
Total	101	33	136	187	234	691
	Pearson chi2		50.5649	Pr	0.000...	
	Cramer's phi		0.2705			
* see Table 14 regarding the coding of party strength						
** see Table 18 regarding the coding of PR						

In Table 24 it is made evident that the mean strength of the most significant opposition parties in Africa, unlike global results, is significantly higher. However, in Table 25 it is evident that the modal party strength of major opposition parties in non PR electoral systems is clustered at the high end, with over 50 per cent of observations in the top two ranges. In this regard, this thesis will not engage the relationship between electoral systems and party strength or democracy where the positive value of any observed correlation between electoral system and both democracy and party strength is debatable.

Tables 26 and 27 below offer a preliminary confirmation of the position that strong opposition parties are correlated with democratization in hybrid regimes with presidential systems, and one that passes the critical score set in Table 6 above.

Table26: Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems								
		Polity Score					Totals	
Opposition Strength		1	2	3	4	5		
	0%	343	136	26	53	38	596	
	1-25%	20	23	3	10	32	88	
	25-50%	27	59	43	42	198	369	
	50-75%	10	72	52	58	247	439	
	75-100%	25	59	53	49	274	460	
Totals		425	349	177	212	789	1952	
		Pearson's chi2		826.1008		Pr	0.000...	
		Gamma		0.5655		ASE	0.019	
		Kendall's tau-b		0.4458		ASE	0.016	
		Spearman's rho		0.537		Pr	0.0000...	
* See Table 1 Regarding the generation of Polity scores								
** Where opposition strength is measured as the number of seats held								
by the largest opposition party divided by the total number of seats held								
by the opposition, and the quotient is multiplied by 100								

	Polity Score					Totals	
Opposition Strength	1	2	3	4	5		
0%	105	68	18	27	10		228
1-25%	0	14	2	0	12		28
25-50%	0	29	35	17	37		118
50-75%	5	41	45	29	45		165
75-100%	0	43	23	31	80		177
Totals	110	195	123	104	184		716
		Pearson's chi2	326.8803		Pr	0.000...	
		Gamma	0.5131		ASE	0.033	
		Kendall's tau-b	0.4087		ASE	0.027	
		Spearman's rho	0.4912		Pr	0.0000...	
* See Table 1 Regarding the generation of Polity scores							
** See Table 26 regarding the generation of opposition strength							

Tables 26 and 27 both present strong non-parametric statistical measures of ordinal association. In Table 26 both gamma and rho exceed 0.5, whilst in Table 27, and consistent with the results at large, the results for Africa are slightly weaker with a rho value of 0.49 and a tau of 0.41. Upon examination of tables 26-27 it is clear that the lowest, or most liberal, point at which the pattern seems to shift in confirmation of the hypothesis that opposition strength may be correlated with democracy is where a predominant opposition party monopolizes 25 per cent or more of the opposition seats. In line with this observation, and with the intent of developing a minimal cut-off that may be used in qualitative assessments, tables 28 and 29 below test the strength of this relationship using 25% monopolization as a dichotomous cut-off.

Table 28: Opposition Strength and Democracy in the World 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able to Monopolize at least 25% of Opposition Seats							
		Polity Score					Totals
Opposition Strength		1	2	3	4	5	
	< 25	363	159	29	63	70	684
	> 25	62	190	148	149	719	1268
Totals		425	349	177	212	789	1952
		Pearson's chi2		757.7725		Pr	0.000...
		Cramer's phi		0.623			
* See Table 1 for the generation of Polity scores							
** See Table 26 for the generation of opposition strength scores							

Table 29: Opposition Strength and Democracy in Africa 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems where the Leading Opposition Party is able to Monopolize at least 25% of Opposition Seats							
		Polity Score					Totals
Opposition Strength		1	2	3	4	5	
	< 25	105	82	20	27	22	256
	> 25	5	113	103	77	162	460
Totals		110	195	123	104	184	716
		Pearson's chi2		244.0979		Pr	0.000...
		Cramer's phi		0.5838			
* See Table 1 for the generation of Polity scores							
** See Table 26 for the generation of opposition strength scores							

Both Tables 28 and 29 present results which indicate that 25 per cent opposition monopolization may be used as the basis of a minimal theoretic criteria. With Cramer's phi values of 0.623 and 0.5838 respectively, it may be argued that an important amount of variation is explained by the monopolization of at least 25 per cent of opposition seats by a major opposition party. While higher thresholds would likely yield stronger results, seeking the most liberal threshold likely has greater pragmatic utility in terms of the investigation of hybrid regimes.

It would be at this point in the analysis where it would be natural to pursue a more complex statistical analysis of the relationship made discrete in the analysis above. The most obvious path to pursue at this point would be some form of longitudinal analysis which attempts to increase the validity of the argument for the presence of a causal link between opposition strength and democracy over time. There may be several concerns with pursuing such a path, predominantly the caution that certain methodologists in political science would urge on those seeking to engage in longitudinal statistics without careful scrutiny of their data.¹³⁵ The reservations with engaging longitudinal analysis lie primarily in the instability of the universe of cases over time, where the number of observations satisfying the criteria of inclusion almost triples across the period of analysis, if anything documenting the so called “rise of competitive authoritarianism” after the Cold War.¹³⁶ In addition to the instability of the universe of cases, restricting the analysis to the post-1989 years means that the convention of having 30 longitudinal observations for a given unit cannot be satisfied.¹³⁷ Finally, this thesis does not expect a linear relationship to exist between opposition strength and democracy, but a relationship which hinges on a critical mass of the independent variable, and in relation to a dependent variable which possesses a defined and achievable ceiling, i.e. democracy.

Given that the interest is, in fact, in those cases that enter this universe during the period of analysis from authoritarian backgrounds, it is not clear that enough time has elapsed to meaningfully statistically analyse variation herein. It is the position of this thesis that such investigation at this stage should likely take the form of causal process

¹³⁵ See, for example: Kellstedt and Whitten 2009, 233-243

¹³⁶ It is normally the opposite issue of attrition that must be dealt with in longitudinal studies, and which is therefore discussed widely in the literature, but it may be inferred the somewhat novel problem of acquisition bears the same issue.

¹³⁷ Frees 2004, 7

tracing, although this must be left this to future research. Qualification being noted, both the number of units included in the analysis, as well as the possibility that a dynamic and shared pattern is present amongst them, may satisfy the minimal requirements for a longitudinal investigation.¹³⁸ Table 30 presents this longitudinal data on movement within African presidential regimes with prominent opposition parties monopolizing 25 per cent or more of opposition seats at some point across this period. Consistent with the orientation of this thesis as a whole, this information in the most parsimonious manner could conceivable.

¹³⁸ See, for example: *Ibidem*

Table 30: Central Tendency Variation in Polity Scores Across Time Based on Distance from "Year Zero" as 1st Year in which an Opposition Party Monopolizes at least 25% of Opposition Seats in an African Presidential Regime between 1989 and 2010				
	median	n		
Year 0	10.5	35		
Year 1	12	34		
Year 2	12	32		
Year 3	9	32		
Year 4	9	28		
Year 5	9	29		
Year 6	10	26		
Year 7	14	26		
Year 8	11	27		
Year 9	14	26		
Year 10	15	26		
Year 11	14	27		
Year 12	15	29		
Year 13	15.5	26		
Year 14	15	24		
Year 15	15	21		
Year 16	13	17		
Year 17	16	11		
Year 18	16	7		
Year 19	14.5	4		
Year 20	10.5	2		
Year 21	10.5	2		

Table 30 demonstrates significant variation in central tendency over time in presidential regimes with opposition parties capable of monopolizing at least 25 per cent of the non-incumbent vote. The scope of variation ranges from a low of 9, midway between a pure autocracy and a pure democracy, between the 3rd and 5th years of strong opposition presence, consistent with a dive in score in the period that would normally constitute the second electoral period in which the strong party was participating, to a high of 16 at years 17 and 18. The general pattern of the central tendency reported is one of more or less progressive democratization over time. In years 19 and above it is of note that

median Polity scores drop, and this is in relation to the extremely small number of cases meeting the criteria, one with a high Polity score, and one with a low Polity score.

Of 34 Sub-Saharan African states observed in the period 1989-2010 with presidential systems and possessing a major opposition party capable of monopolizing at least 25% of opposition seats, 18 have experienced positive change and 10 have remained static, or returned to their original categorization after a brief aberration.¹³⁹ Among the first 18 states, six express positive variation without achieving full democratic status, and amongst those six is Uganda. The remaining twelve states have entered as hybrid regimes and acquired Polity scores which would suggest they have become full democracies, or have moved to within a point of such a score. Regarding the 10 neutral outcome states, eight have entered and remained competitive authoritarian regimes, and two have scores which would indicate they are democracies. Amongst those that have entered and remained competitive authoritarian is the Democratic Republic of Congo (although no Polity Score is available according to the coding). Finally, six states included have met the parameters for inclusion in this panel but have deteriorated, three of which appear to constitute “democratic breakdowns” given their initial high scores. This leaves only three negative cases in direct contradiction of the theory herein, of which one is Rwanda.

In conclusion, when data is truncated to exclude the contamination of the Cold War on theories which are not seeking to explain its influence, and when hybrid regimes are taken as the starting point instead of authoritarian regimes, there appears to be a significant shift in the variables which bear explanatory power on democratic outcomes. It is the conclusion of this thesis, based on the data above, that extant and broadly

¹³⁹ For the data corresponding to the discussion in this paragraph, please see the appendix

accepted theories of democratization, whilst they may certainly explain movement toward democracy from authoritarian regimes, nevertheless lose some explanatory power whence those regimes have introduced minimal democratic reforms. Toward democracy movement in hybrid regimes seem to be best explained by opposition strength. The intervening nature of opposition strength is inferred by the fact that those theories discarded within the parameters of this analysis do, quite certainly, bear explanatory power on democratic outcomes within their own parameters, i.e. on movement from authoritarianism to democracy, inclusive of the Cold War years.

Chapter 6: Case Presentation

Chapter 6 will present, through multiple cases, the data concerning opposition strength and financing; structural inheritance; violence in the party system; the proliferation of independents, small parties and identity based parties; and formal and informal institutional constraints on and in the party system, this latter variable which has not been iterated prior to the presentation of case data, but shall be delimited by the data below. Whilst it is clear that all of these variables could be quantified, such quantifications are either presently not available for secondary analysis, or are too crude for the purposes of this analysis. The casework below therefore provides detailed summations of the Ugandan, DRC and Rwandan cases, whilst analysis is reserved for the following chapter.

The Case of Uganda

From independence in 1962 Ugandan politics has gone through several important transitions. Uganda gained independence as a democracy, and more or less remained one until the Amin dictatorship commencing in 1971, with several important and institutionalized political parties, namely: the Democratic Party, the Uganda People's Congress, and Kabaka Yekka, amongst others. These parties reflected politicized cleavages in Ugandan society at independence, primarily cleavages related to religion and identity. By the 1970s democracy had been definitively interrupted by the dictatorship of Idi Amin (1971-1979), followed by the second presidency of Milton Obote (Obote II – 1980-1985), highly contested on its democratic credentials, and finally the short military junta of the Okello brothers (1985-1986) in expectation of NRM victory. In 1986 the current president, Yoweri Museveni, and his National Resistance Movement/Army

(hereinafter NRM, inclusive of future nomenclatural permutations) took power by force, and have remained in government since. It is of note that Museveni was a political refugee, after initially being dismissed from his post as Minister of Defense in 1979, and before he subsequently formed the National Resistance Movement in 1981.¹⁴⁰

On coming to power the NRM instituted a “no-party democracy” system which from 1986 banned the activities and contestation of political parties,¹⁴¹ and required that only NRM members sit in whatever institution served as the effective legislature; although all citizens of Uganda were technically members of the Movement. This system was institutionalized for the nominal purposes of preventing uncompromising political polarization at the hands of ethnically based parties,¹⁴² although the NRM has been heavily identified with southerners as a meta-identity,¹⁴³ and was based in an anti-party and individual merit ideology expressed by comparatively loose organization more or less dependent on the personage of its leader and his patronage capacity.¹⁴⁴ Whilst the no-party years did not ban the existence of political parties, it allowed them only central headquarters, and required them to enter parliament under the NRM banner. This was affected via the conceptualization of the NRM as a “home” to all other organizations, parties and tendencies,¹⁴⁵ and the co-optation of Members of Parliament and local councilors into the NRM, ultimately resulting in the conflation of the NRM with state structure.¹⁴⁶ This destabilized the old political parties in a number of ways, dividing them as to whether or not they should completely boycott Ugandan politics; undeniably

¹⁴⁰ Chretien 2003, 297

¹⁴¹ Legal Notice No. 1/1986, as cited in: Carbone 2008, 78

¹⁴² Carbone 2008, 5, 78

¹⁴³ *Ibidem* 64

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem* 91

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem* 99

associating those who elected integration with the NRM with the incumbent regime and, therefore, bringing their credentials as opposition parties into question; and severely weakening their ability to maintain autonomous organizations in the country in terms of funding, membership and proselytizing.¹⁴⁷ In addition, the NRM objectives of remedying certain salient cleavages in Ugandan political society, such as identity and religion, may have served to undermine the very bases of those old political parties, insofar as Democratic Party support was based in Catholic non-Bugandans, Uganda People's Congress support was based in Protestant non-Bugandans, and Buganda heavily supported the (short lived) *Kabaka Yekka* party;¹⁴⁸ whilst it simultaneously restricted the ability of these parties to adapt to new circumstances.

During the course of NRM rule in Uganda democratic reforms have slowly been introduced in order to bring the country back from a “no-party democracy” to a multi-party political system. Although originally rejected by the electorate in a referendum in 2000, which elected to retain the no-party system for at least a further five years with a 91 per cent majority,¹⁴⁹ this movement gathered momentum most notably from the 2001 elections in the hopes of preventing the removal of presidential term limits and, for some, remaining true the “broad-base” no-party system.¹⁵⁰ It was at these elections that the basis of what has become the dominant opposition party emerged in the form of the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, amongst other groups from within the NRM.¹⁵¹

Uganda entered a new period of official multipartyism in July 2005 after a referendum was held in expectation of elections in 2006, which referendum passed with a

¹⁴⁷ For a summary of the historic political parties during the no-party years see: *Ibidem* 109-136.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem* 16, 21. Chretien 2003, 293-296

¹⁴⁹ Carbone 2008, 3; Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4

¹⁵⁰ Rubongoya 2007, 168

¹⁵¹ *Ibidem*

92 per cent endorsement; although it was ironically boycotted by the “opposition” due to the inclusion of a clause removing presidential term limits at the same time as a positive vote would legalize multiparty politics.¹⁵² However, it has not been the old political parties that have played the substantive role of opposition, but the political organization which has come to be known as the Forum for Democratic Change (hereinafter FDC) under the leadership of Kizza Besigye. Besigye was an early member of the NRM from the war days¹⁵³ who, on believing or stating to believe that the NRM had become dishonest, opportunistic and undemocratic,¹⁵⁴ wrote an open letter in 1999 accusing the government of corruption, tribalism and a democratic deficit,¹⁵⁵ and decided that he would challenge the presidency of Museveni in 2001 (in which he won 26 per cent of the vote),¹⁵⁶ and from 2006 also the legislative dominance of the NRM.

Uganda 2006 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:
NRM	205 (14 indirect)
FDC	37
Total Opposition	92
Total seats in legislature	308
Total elected seats by universal franchise	283
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party	40.22

In the 2006 elections, the first multiparty elections since the controversial elections in 1980 which returned Milton Obote and ultimately resulted in the NRM

¹⁵² Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 11; Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4; Human Rights Watch 2009, 6

¹⁵³ Bisegye is a physician who served as a Colonel and personal physician to Museveni. See, for example: Tripp 2010, 29

¹⁵⁴ Tripp 2010, 29

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem* 65-66

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem* 66

rebellion,¹⁵⁷ the incumbent Museveni secured 59 per cent of the vote, whilst Besigye garnered 37 per cent.¹⁵⁸ The NRM won 205 seats and the FDC 37¹⁵⁹ in a 308 member unicameral parliament of which 214 members were directly elected from constituencies in a first past the post electoral system, 69 from the district level reserved for women, and the remaining seats elected from special interest groups by electoral colleges.¹⁶⁰ This means that the FDC was able to monopolize 40.22 per cent of the opposition (accounting for the fact that 14 incumbent seats were filled indirectly), while independents with 36 (37 with one indirect seat) accounted for 39.13 per cent of the non-incumbent vote, and the FDC accounted for 66.07 per cent of the non-incumbent vote that went to political parties.

The official campaign period for the 2006 elections was limited to 61 days due to a delay in establishing the legal framework for the elections.¹⁶¹ This campaign period was effectively reduced for the main opposition candidate, Kizza Bisegye, in that he was charged with numerous crimes within three weeks of his return to Uganda to contest the elections, including treason and rape of which he was acquitted in 2010 and 2006 respectively, although he was forced to attend 27 judicial hearings within the already brief campaign period.¹⁶² It has been noted that the NRM was able to bring their vastly superior resources to bear on a campaign in which they dominated in all areas.¹⁶³ That being said there is an otherwise egalitarian electoral funding scheme by which all presidential candidates are entitled to 20 million Ugandan Shillings, approximately 8200

¹⁵⁷ See for example the summary in: Commonwealth Secretariat 2011,: 3-4

¹⁵⁸ *Ibidem* 4; Izama 2011, 64

¹⁵⁹ Izama 2011, 66

¹⁶⁰ Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 16, 18

¹⁶¹ *Ibidem* 23

¹⁶² *Ibidem* 23, 27. Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4, 5

¹⁶³ Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 24

CAD, as well as a vehicle and security.¹⁶⁴ In the 2006 elections this funding scheme was not extended to political parties, with the effect of financially barring all but the incumbent from competing in every constituency,¹⁶⁵ exacerbated by the fact that there are no legal limits on campaign expenditure.¹⁶⁶ In addition, incidents of bribery were widely reported, although the practice was not restricted to any one party.¹⁶⁷ Similarly, complaints regarding violence, intimidation and harassment were lodged against the incumbent and opposition alike.¹⁶⁸ It is clear, however, that in the means of both bribery as well as violence, the incumbent possesses superior resources. Regarding media, print media was judged as effectively balanced whilst electronic media was regarded as more biased in its coverage of the contenders.¹⁶⁹ Of note in this regard are that daily newspapers have combined sales of approximately 100,000 newspapers sold, and an estimated daily readership of approximately 1.5 million, or 5 per cent of the population, whilst approximately 64 per cent of the population rely on electronic media and 34 per cent on word of mouth.¹⁷⁰ The elections themselves were regarded as an accurate reflection of the choice of the people, albeit with notable issues,¹⁷¹ including overarching points such as the lack of a level playing field, the conflation of the NRM with the state apparatus, and the presence of considerable violence and manipulation such as murder, bribery, threats, intimidation, vote rigging, and the selective prosecution of the law to the disadvantage of opposition parties.¹⁷² Such inconsistencies have been confirmed by the

¹⁶⁴ *Ibidem* 25

¹⁶⁵ *Ibidem*

¹⁶⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 15

¹⁶⁷ Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 26

¹⁶⁸ *Ibidem* 26-27

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem* 29

¹⁷⁰ *Ibidem* 31

¹⁷¹ *Ibidem* 43

¹⁷² Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 4. Human Rights Watch 2009, 6-7, 19-21

Ugandan Supreme Court without causing them to question the outcome of the elections themselves.¹⁷³

By the 2006 elections the primary policy platform of the FDC was constituted by the desire to rally prodemocracy forces against Museveni and the NRM, uphold the presidential term limit, build strong and professional security agencies, eliminate militaristic motivations from foreign policy, and eliminate corruption and political patronage.¹⁷⁴

Uganda 2011 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:
NRM	263 (13 indirect)
IPC	36
Total Opposition	100
Total seats in legislature	375
Total elected seats by universal franchise	350
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party	36

In the 2011 elections the incumbent Museveni secured 68 per cent of the presidential vote, and the NRM 263 legislative seats. Besigye, now at the head of the so-called Inter-Party Cooperation, secured 26 per cent of the vote and the FDC secured 34 legislative seats. In this latest election the Democratic Party under Norbert Mao secured 1.86 per cent of the presidential vote and 11 seats, whilst the Uganda People's Congress under Olara Otunnu garnered 1.58 per cent of the presidential vote and 9 seats,¹⁷⁵ both of which parties were originally to contest under Besigye and the IPC banner.¹⁷⁶ The size of

¹⁷³ Human Rights Watch 2009, 7

¹⁷⁴ Tripp 2010, 66

¹⁷⁵ Africa Research Bulletin 18726 2011, according to the Africa Research Bulletin the incumbent secured 279 seats in 2011; Izama 2011, 66

¹⁷⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 21

the legislature was increased for 2011, comprised of 375 members of which 238 are elected from single member constituencies and 112 from district seats reserved for women in a first past the post system.¹⁷⁷ 25 seats remain reserved for election from electoral colleges for special interest groups.¹⁷⁸ This means that in 2011 the FDC secured a 34 per cent monopolization of the opposition, and if IPC members are included a 36 per cent monopolization (accounting for the one seat each taken by the Conservative Party and the Justice Forum, as well as for the fact that 13 of the NRM seats are indirectly filled, leaving 250 elected from constituencies and districts). This is a drop of four to six per cent from 2006. Independent candidates secured 41 per cent of the non-incumbent vote with 41 seats (43 including indirectly filled seats), and the IPC monopolized 61.02 per cent of the non-incumbent vote that went to political parties, a decrease of 5 per cent from the FDC's showing in 2006. It is of note that the Democratic Party and Uganda People's Congress, who defected from the IPC, are the only other parties in the legislature. The stronger showing of the incumbent in 2011 was even more generalized, with the average winning margin of FDC candidates who were elected falling from around 30 per cent to around 15 per cent.¹⁷⁹

The NRM campaigned primarily on economic growth, the maintenance of peace, zero-tolerance for corruption, and improvement or expansion of various public goods.¹⁸⁰ Most of the other parties, in an apparent attempt to capture the important Buganda vote, included a promise of federalism in their campaigns.¹⁸¹ The IPC in particular campaigned on "change," as well as, like the incumbent, zero-tolerance for corruption

¹⁷⁷ *Ibidem* 10

¹⁷⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁷⁹ Izama 2011, 74

¹⁸⁰ Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 21

¹⁸¹ See, for example: *Ibidem* 21-22

and the improvement or expansion of various public goods.¹⁸²

Similar to 2006, it has been suggested that the NRM utilized its effective conflation with the state apparatus to utilize state resources for the purposes of campaigning.¹⁸³ This has included the suspicion that a supplementary election budget of 600 billion Ugandan Shillings may have been used for campaign purposes,¹⁸⁴ and continued reports that candidates have effectively engaged in the illegal bribery of electors.¹⁸⁵ Consistent with the above, as well as with monitoring of the 2006 elections, the main concerns of the Commonwealth Observer Group centered around the use of money in the campaign, the NRM's abuse of incumbency, and the lack of a level playing field between contesting parties.¹⁸⁶ Differing from 2006 is the legal extension of the state funding scheme to include political parties, however this funding was not disbursed, and whilst presidential candidates did receive the same 20 million Ugandan Shilling amount.¹⁸⁷ Regarding international donors, it is known that stakeholders in the Ugandan elections such as the electoral commission, political parties, elections observers, *et cetera* were expected to receive multimillion dollar funding packages from USAID as well as from an elections fund managed by the Danish Development Agency.¹⁸⁸ The media landscape has significantly changed from the 2006 elections with more television and radio stations, an exponential increase in internet users (3.5 million in 2010 versus less than 350,000 in 2006), 10.3 million mobile phone subscribers, and static estimates of

¹⁸² *Ibidem* 21

¹⁸³ See, for example: *Ibidem* 14-15

¹⁸⁴ *Ibidem* 15

¹⁸⁵ *Ibidem* 15, 20

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem* 19

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem* 19-20

¹⁸⁸ Human Rights Watch 2009, 26

newspaper readership which remained at approximately 1.5 million.¹⁸⁹ The largest, and state-owned, television station, Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, gave an overwhelming 90 per cent of electoral coverage to the incumbent, with the remaining 10 per cent allotted to coverage of opposition parties being largely negative in nature.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, monitoring of radio coverage indicated that discussion of the incumbent was positive, whilst coverage of the opposition was largely either neutral or negative in nature.¹⁹¹ That being said, such skews in media coverage are believed to be more the result of self-censorship than any delimited restrictions,¹⁹² although this position is debatable in the context of UBC.

Every Ugandan is legally free to found a political party, excepting that is illegal to do so on an ethnic or religious basis,¹⁹³ and all parties are required by law to be internally democratic.¹⁹⁴ The parameters of legal and illegal electoral practices are defined in the Presidential Elections Act, the Parliamentary Elections Act, and the Electoral Commissions Act.¹⁹⁵

Despite the dominant position of the FDC vis-à-vis the opposition, the NRM remains dominant in the party system generally. This dominance does not appear to hinge on its competitive advantage in the distribution of patronage, despite allegations,¹⁹⁶ insofar as it has been noted it is not comprised of the wealthiest persons in the state, and those politicians who are counted amongst the most wealthy typically acquired their

¹⁸⁹ Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 22

¹⁹⁰ *Ibidem* 23

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem* 24

¹⁹² *Ibidem* 25

¹⁹³ Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 17

¹⁹⁴ *Ibidem* 18

¹⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch 2009, 10

¹⁹⁶ See, for example: Mwenda 2007, 24, 29-31

economic status prior to coming into government.¹⁹⁷ Uganda has, in fact, been characterized as possessing a large and expanding entrepreneurial class which,¹⁹⁸ insofar as this class possesses any autonomy, should serve to equalize the domestic funding opportunities of political parties, *ceterus paribus*. Albeit, the true autonomy of this class has been questioned in terms of the state's role as the most significant purchaser.¹⁹⁹ Additionally, it has been noted that the NRM has (historically) received its funding directly from the national budget, despite the fact that state funding has been effectively denied other political parties,²⁰⁰ and that during the no-party years political parties were forbidden from receiving private contributions, whilst the NRM itself imposed no such restriction on itself.²⁰¹ Far from being a truly monopolistic party, rather, it has been posited that the dominance of the NRM in Uganda has rested primarily in the absence of a serious competitor and its advantageous conflation with the state apparatus.²⁰²

The FDC was carved out of the no-party regime by Bisegye, who was a participant in that regime. As such, Bisegye was able to build his support around persons who were already serving in government, both NRM dissenters, as well as politicians whose original loyalties lay with the old political parties.²⁰³ The basis of the FDC was three NRM splinter groups which merged in 2004: Parliamentary Advocacy Forum, Reform Agenda (Besigye's ticket in the 2001 presidential elections), and Democratic Forum,²⁰⁴ and its dominant position in the opposition has been enabled by the confluence of dissent from within the regime, both professional politicians and military brass, and

¹⁹⁷ Tripp 2010, 24

¹⁹⁸ *Ibidem*

¹⁹⁹ See, for example: Mwenda 2007, 23-37

²⁰⁰ Carbone 2008, 95, 103

²⁰¹ *Ibidem* 101-102

²⁰² *Ibidem* 107

²⁰³ *Ibidem* 194

²⁰⁴ Rubongoya 2007, 177

weakness in the historic political parties.²⁰⁵ Thusly Besigye was able not only to enter the fray with an advantage over his non-incumbent competitors, but also to simultaneously weaken the incumbent and enter electoral contestation with an existing base of support in the form of serving politicians who were already secure in their constituencies.

Besigye and the FDC's privileged beginnings have not blessed them with the absence of repression. Its members, including Besigye, have variously been arrested or forced into exile. Besigye himself, amongst other opposition supporters, was physically attacked in June 2010 by a group known as the *kiboko* (stick) squad, a group allegedly supported by the state.²⁰⁶ Protests against the composition of the electoral commission in the same year were met with police brutality,²⁰⁷ and Besigye was arrested a number of times throughout 2011 and faced "preventative detention" for participation in the ongoing "walk to work" protests.²⁰⁸ It would seem, therefore, that the value of carving an opposition out of the governing party in regimes such as that in Uganda does not lie in freedom from oppression.

Whether citizens vote for the FDC on the basis of its platform or in protest of the incumbent, these votes are precarious in the context of an incumbent with a stable hold on power willing and able to campaign for those votes it finds itself losing. This is evident in the context of the latest elections regarding incumbent success in the north, a longtime bastion of opposition to NRM rule, and previously dominated by the FDC.²⁰⁹ On finally taking action to better the conditions of northerners in the same way it has

²⁰⁵ Carbone 2008, 193; Tripp 2010, 72

²⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch 2011, 186

²⁰⁷ *Ibidem* 185

²⁰⁸ Human Rights Watch 2012, 191

²⁰⁹ See, for example: Izama 2011, 71-72; Tripp 2010, 55

done so for the rest of the country, both in terms of peace as well as economic development, the incumbent NRM has made significant inroads with northern voters.²¹⁰ It would seem that if oppositions are to remain perpetually out of power, they can be undermined by incumbents willing to discern why they are receiving any support at all. And as Magaloni has noted, citizens may rally in support of autocrats who can bring economic growth, and despise those who cannot.²¹¹

This early support for the FDC in the north, and now support for the incumbent, would suggest that the salience of ethnicity as a vehicle for voter preference is weaker than earlier scholars would have expected. Neither Bisegye nor Museveni are northerners, but northerners have voted for one and then the other despite the presence amongst their other choices of a candidate representing the region.²¹²

Thirdly, whilst the FDC has unquestionably been the dominant non-incumbent party, it does not clearly dominate the non-incumbent vote. Almost as many votes as go to the FDC go to independent candidates. Additionally, there has been continued internal dissent from within the incumbent NRM party by a group of 38 parliamentarians who form a sort of “internal opposition” equal in strength to the FDC.²¹³ The phenomenon of independent candidates is enabled by two additional and important factors in Ugandan politics: firstly, that the NRM has been the only party capable of fielding candidates in all 215 constituencies, whereas the FDC fielded candidates in 127 in 2006, the UPC 74, and the DP 68;²¹⁴ and, secondly, that experienced politicians from the individual merit years who have lost their party ticket often run as independents against the new NRM

²¹⁰ Izama 2011, 71-72

²¹¹ Magaloni 2008, 729

²¹² Tripp 2010, 55

²¹³ Izama 2011, 72-74

²¹⁴ Carbone 2008, 198

candidates,²¹⁵ and even on pro-NRM platforms.²¹⁶

The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter, and regardless of the various names the state has gone by throughout its history, DRC) gained independence in 1960 from Belgium as a democratic state. Parties had only a short period prior to independence to form, and there were clear machinations on the part of foreign powers, firstly, to retain privileged access to the DRC's rich resources, expressed through the attempt at secession by Katanga province, and secondly to prevent a possible alliance of the Congolese state with the Soviets, expressed through the assassination of independence leader and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the installation and support of Mobutu as dictator. Mobutu's dictatorship in the DRC (renamed Zaire during the majority of his rule) lasted from the 1960s until 1997 when he was finally removed from power by the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire* military alliance (hereinafter AFDL) led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and backed by a number of African states. Laurent Désiré Kabila's rule was also dictatorial, and almost immediately challenged by a second wave of rebellions backed by some of the very states which brought him to power. This second conflict resulted in the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila, the succession of his son Joseph Kabila to power, and an internationally brokered peace deal, the Sun City Accord signed on 19th April 2002, guaranteeing democratic elections and a new constitution at the end of a period of transitional government.²¹⁷ The incumbent party under Joseph Kabila is the *Parti du*

²¹⁵ Carbone 2008, 104; Commonwealth Secretariat 2006, 11; Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 7; Izama 2011, 66

²¹⁶ Izama 2011, 67

²¹⁷ A summation of the Sun City Accords may be found in: Dizolele 2010, 146-151; although a long list of

Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD), although he officially runs as an independent.

During this broad period of political history in the DRC there have been two prominent opposition political parties: the *Union pour Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (hereinafter UDPS) of Etienne Tshisekedi, and the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (hereinafter MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba.

The MLC was a rebel organization, formed on 30th June 1999 in Equateur Province,²¹⁸ backed by Museveni's Uganda shortly after the successful rebellion which brought Laurent Désiré Kabila's AFDL to power (itself backed by Uganda). As one of the prominent parties to the conflict, the MLC was granted a significant position in the transitional government generated via brokered peace, and Jean-Pierre Bemba participated in this government as one of several vice-presidents. Once in government the MLC appeared to more or less commit to democratic politics and, once made the major opposition party by the first post-Mobutu democratic mandate, to opposition politics, although with aberrations consistent with their past as a rebel organization.

Several factors appear to have contributed to the rise and position of the MLC, namely: its disproportionate access to foreign and private domestic funding; its ability to participate in government prior to elections as a high profile organization; the non-monetary resources its leader was personally able to provide it; and the electoral boycott of the UDPS.

In terms of funding, as stated, the MLC was backed by Museveni's Uganda as a

monographs and articles dealing with this period of Congolese history have been published both by (all) academics specializing in the region, as well as by participants, local scholars, and lay westerners, by far the best to date, in my opinion, is: Prunier 2009

²¹⁸ International Crisis Group 2011, 25

rebel organization.²¹⁹ This initial backing must certainly have provided it with a financial stability not comparable with other opposition political parties, *id est* to be a military organization backed by a comparatively wealthy foreign state. In addition, Jean-Pierre Bemba himself was an extremely wealthy man, the inheritor of a fortune generated by his father through a privileged relationship both to the dictator Mobutu,²²⁰ as well as to Laurent Désiré Kabila. These funds meant that, unlike many opposition parties in Africa, Bemba's MLC was able to meaningfully and effectively campaign against the incumbent government.

Also dissimilar from the typical circumstances of new opposition parties was the ability of the rebel MLC organization to spend a period of time in government as a distinct organization prior to elections, with their leader serving as vice-president.²²¹ This, without doubt, provided MLC politicians with professional experience, and their leader as well as their organization generally with a high profile in politics, as opposed to in civil war. Given the unique position of being a party to a peace accord with a significant number of men-at-arms remaining in his private service, Bemba could also more or less afford to be critical of government with impunity and without fear of repression. The clear benefit of this position is that Bemba did not have to construct a party from nothing and campaign from the political periphery, but was able to enter government in force based on a peace accord, and campaign from that privileged position.

In addition to personal wealth and the advantage of campaigning from an already

²¹⁹ See, for example: *Ibidem* 25

²²⁰ Bemba's father is Jean Bemba Saolona who was president of the National Association of Companies of Zaire, and this family is from the same region and is related by marriage to the family of Mobutu (Bemba is brother-in-law to the son of the dictator, who also contests elections as the head of the *Union des Démocrates Mobutistes*).

²²¹ See, for example: *Ibidem*.

strong position in government, Bemba was able to bring non-monetary resources to the MLC as a political organization, the most important of which was probably media access. As noted above Bemba was disproportionately wealthy given the virtual empire inherited from his father, and a meaningful part of this empire was in media. Bemba was the owner of television and radio stations, such as Canal Congo Television (CCTV), Radio Liberte, and Canal Kin Television.²²² The advantage provided by these assets are obvious, repression in undemocratic African regimes is almost certainly aided by incumbent ownership, control or repression of the media. Whilst it has been noted that there was hardly neutral media coverage of the 2006 elections, a majority of outlets were owned by presidential candidates with none holding a monopoly and, therefore, *de facto* broad coverage was affected, albeit not without conflict and deaths.²²³ And although there were significant attempts on the part of the incumbent to suppress his media outlets,²²⁴ Bemba and the MLC clearly had access to unrestricted and positive media coverage which could not be censored by the incumbent.

Working against the efficacy of the opposition during the first post-war democratic mandate was the arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba by the International Criminal Court in May 2008.²²⁵ Congolese law, as of 4th December 2007, guarantees senior ministerial rank to the spokesperson of the opposition, but the MLC refused to nominate anyone to this position in order to retain it for Bemba should he have returned.²²⁶

Finally, Bemba and the MLC were certainly able to benefit from the electoral

²²² These possessions are named in: Human Rights Watch 2008, 49; International Crisis Group 2006b, 2, 5

²²³ See, for example: Matti 2010, 46

²²⁴ See, for example: Human Rights Watch 2008, 19-21

²²⁵ See, for example: *Ibidem* 62-65.

²²⁶ International Crisis Group 2010, 7

boycott of the UDPS in the first post-conflict elections,²²⁷ although it was reported that he had been attempting to secure what would have been a very important alliance with the UDPS in the lead up to those elections.²²⁸ The UDPS was expected to be a strong competitor, and some have hypothesized that the position of the MLC in the first democratic mandate was no more than a substitution for the missing UDPS, an argument for which there is some support.²²⁹

The UDPS under Etienne Tshisekedi was formed out of the “Parliament” and single party (*Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution*) of Mobutu’s dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s, first as a group of rebellious Mobutu insiders demanding democratic reform (the “group of thirteen”), and then officially as the UDPS on 15th February 1982,²³⁰ as an opposition organization to Mobutu’s rule which consistently lobbied for democratic reform with popular backing.²³¹ A subsequent but ultimately aborted gesture toward democratic reforms was undertaken by the Mobutu regime in the 1990s, first in the form of “popular consultations” on the party-state system from January 1990, then from the 24th April 1990 announcement that he would abandon the single-party system, from whence a “transitional parliament” (the *Conférence Nationale Souveraine*) was formed on 7th August 1991. This transitional parliament was comprised of opposition and ruling politicians, and was for short times under the Premiership of Tshisekedi as elected by the transitional legislative body and appointed by Mobutu on 30th September to October 1991 (appointed), 15th August to December 1992 (elected), and from 3rd

²²⁷ See, for example: International Crisis Group 2011, 8, 25, wherein it is indicated that the MLC and UDPS are strongly supported in the same geographical area, and electors who would otherwise have voted UDPS voted MLC due to the boycott.

²²⁸ International Crisis Group 2006,: 3

²²⁹ See footnote 224

²³⁰ International Crisis Group 2011, 25; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 184-185

²³¹ See, for example: Matti 2010, 50

December 1997 (appointed) until the AFDL coup under Laurent Kabila.²³² The initial moves taken by the Mobutu regime toward the formation of this transitional legislature and the holding of democratic elections, however, were shortly thereafter discarded and subverted. Some of the interesting and pertinent ways in which Mobutu subverted his own acquiescence to democratisation included generating artificial opposition parties allied with the regime,²³³ by which a pro-Mobutu *Mouvance Présidentielle* alliance was formed in the CNS (as against the opposition *Union Sacrée* alliance),²³⁴ and subverting the authority of the transitional parliament by simply recalling his own parliament and appointing a rival government.²³⁵ The two legislative bodies were eventually consolidated into a 700+ member *Haut Conseil de la République -Parlement de Transition*, which Mobutu was able to dominate with loyal men.²³⁶ After reneging on his commitments to democracy, and the failure of the institutions he constructed for that purpose to make any progress toward democratisation, Mobutu became embroiled in the rebellion that would remove him from power from October 1996.

During this time the UDPS and Etienne Tshisekedi were again brought into power, and vocally came down on the side of integrating the rebels in the hopes they would bring democracy, and thereby the UDPS to power, although this suggestion was rejected both by Mobutu as well as by L.D. Kabila.²³⁷

Contrary to Tshisekedi's expectations, however, upon entering the capital welcomed by the UDPS and their supporters, the rebel AFDL installed Laurent Kabila as dictator and marginalized the position of the political opposition. Laurent Kabila

²³² International Crisis Group 2011, 25; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 184-196

²³³ Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 186-188

²³⁴ *Ibidem* 188

²³⁵ *Ibidem* 195, 202-203

²³⁶ *Ibidem* 203-204

²³⁷ International Crisis Group 2011, 25

attempted to institutionalize a system very much like those envisioned both by Mobutu and Museveni, one without political parties, possessed of “grassroots” “democratic” structure (the *Comités de Pouvoir Populaire*), *et cetera*, but this was rejected by both Congolese and new rebels alike, and L.D. Kabila for reasons unknown in their specificity was assassinated by one of his own famous *kadogo* child soldiers.²³⁸ At the conclusion of the second rebellion and the installation of a peace treaty dictated transitional government headed by the son of Laurent Kabila, Joseph Kabila, the UDPS and the political opposition was again marginalized at the expense of militant organizations that had to be included in government as a price of peace, and the UDPS refused to join the transitional government.²³⁹ Tshisekedi, who felt that as the elected leader of the original transitional parliament in the 1990s (though neither elected by the citizenry nor the only transitional leader) he was entitled to lead the nation, ultimately demanded his party and its supporters boycott the first democratic elections, as well as the constitutional referendum and voter registration.²⁴⁰ Tshisekedi’s attempts however were much less successful than anticipated, and his ultimate decision to boycott the 2006 elections, after initially changing his mind, rested on the fact that the citizens who would certainly vote for him had obeyed his call to boycott voter registration.²⁴¹

There has been much debate surrounding Tshisekedi’s boycott of the 2006 elections in the DRC, the most pessimistic positing that he did not want to risk submitting the UDPS, which had maintained the appearance of popularity, to an electoral competition that might shatter that illusion. The most optimistic position, of course, is

²³⁸ See, for example: Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 245-246

²³⁹ See, for example: International Crisis Group 2011, 25

²⁴⁰ For example, see: Prunier 2009, 303-304

²⁴¹ *Ibidem* 304

that Tshisekedi could not see the value of submitting his organization to what he believed would be an unfair electoral process that would marginalize his organization with the appearance of legitimacy;²⁴² and the most pragmatic would be belief in the offered justification that boycott was an attempt to negotiate the late registration of voters.²⁴³ Regardless of his considerations in 2006, boycotting did not prevent the UDPS from suffering targeted attacks;²⁴⁴ and Tshisekedi did not boycott the 2011 elections, although he has challenged the results. The outcome of these elections suggests that the UDPS will take the place of the MLC as the prominent opposition party in a position comfortably behind the incumbent.

Although it is evidently not as privileged as the MLC, the UDPS is possessed of several qualities that may strengthen its position vis-à-vis other opposition parties, namely: historical democratic legitimacy; popular oppositionism; and inherited structure. Working significantly against the UDPS is that, despite its historical role as an advocate for democracy it has never, even on the occasions when its leader has been Prime Minister of Zaire, had to expose itself to multiparty democratic competition. The UDPS, in addition, is divided and relatively deprived of the resources required for a campaign,²⁴⁵ and is considered to be embodied in the person of its leader and not in the substance of its political ideology.²⁴⁶

The UDPS, due to both its age as well as its long advocacy for democracy, is a high profile political organization committed to democratic reform in the DRC.

Beginning in the Mobutu years and continuing through to today, the UDPS has agitated

²⁴² See, for example: International Crisis Group 2011, 25 on Tshisekedi's belief that the elections were fixed.

²⁴³ Matti 2010, 51

²⁴⁴ See, for example: Human Rights Watch 2005

²⁴⁵ See, for example: International Crisis Group 2011, 25

²⁴⁶ *Ibidem*

for democracy, and has done so through two dictatorships and one multiparty regime and, as such, Tshisekedi and his organization possess a popular legitimacy. Even as an organization that has failed to realize its goals through the past several decades of its existence, the UDPS has retained its position as a popular voice of opposition to incumbent governments in the DRC, and Tshisekedi and his organization have acquired the cult status commonly accorded brave opposition leaders and organizations in undemocratic regimes. Although some may call Tshisekedi's true intentions into question, he is without doubt a hero of democratic ideals to his supporters.

Finally, although it is unclear how directly this can translate into the present day given the post-conflict marginalization of the democratic opposition and the UDPS boycott of the 2006 elections, it is clear that the UDPS was able to initially benefit from being comprised of professional and elected politicians carved out of the Mobutu regime.²⁴⁷

In the 2006 elections Kabila won in the constitutionally provided second round run-off against Bemba of the MLC 58 per cent to 42 per cent.²⁴⁸ The first round figures were around 45 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.²⁴⁹ While many have pointed out the democratic effects of institutions such as constitutionally mandated second round presidential runoffs, particularly in the context of democratic breakdowns, it is of note that the third most popular candidate in the first round, Antoine Gizenga of the *Parti Lumumbiste Unifié*, threw his support behind Kabila in the second round in exchange for

²⁴⁷ The Mobutu regime did hold single party elections, some of which were considered comparatively free and fair.

²⁴⁸ Weiss 2007, 138

²⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch 2008, 14

the office of the Prime Minister,²⁵⁰ although he later resigned (on 25th September 2008) to be replaced by his PALU deputy Adolphe Muzito after Kabila himself began to sit in meetings of Council of Ministers in the Prime Minister's stead.²⁵¹

DRC 2006 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:
AMP	298
UN	116
Total	
Opposition	202
Total seats in legislature	500
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party	57.43

Two hundred and sixty seven political parties were registered in the DRC leading up to the 2006 elections, and 70 of those won at least one seat in the National Assembly, whilst independent candidates won approximately 20 per cent of seats.²⁵² While no party holds a majority in the 500 seat National Assembly, Kabila was able to form a legislative alliance comprised of 298 legislators,²⁵³ centered around the 111 seats held by his party,²⁵⁴ which was able to immediately exclude the opposition from important positions and committees.²⁵⁵ By way of contrast, the MLC won 64 seats.²⁵⁶ This alliance has continued to the present first under the name of the *Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle*

²⁵⁰ International Crisis Group 2006, 3; Weiss 2007, 146; the fourth place candidate from the first round, Nzanga Mobutu (the dictator's son), also threw his support behind Kabila in the second round, although this high number of descendants of former leaders is not abnormal in DRC.

²⁵¹ International Crisis Group 2010, 6; although it is claimed in International Crisis Group 2006a, 14 that it is the president's legal right to do so.

²⁵² Weiss 2007, 138; a breakdown of the parties of middling import can be found in: Prunier 2009, 312-313

²⁵³ International Crisis Group 2006b, 11; Weiss 2007, 138

²⁵⁴ International Crisis Group 2011, 6; Matti 2010, 46

²⁵⁵ International Crisis Group 2007, 2; the opposition would have previously enjoyed significant influence due the nature of the transitional government.

²⁵⁶ Matti 2010, 46

(AMP), and from 18th March 2011 simply the *Majorité Présidentielle* (MP).²⁵⁷ However it has not gone unchallenged by the opposition, which formed under Bemba's MLC as the *Union pour la Nation* holding a majority in five provincial assemblies²⁵⁸ (while Kabila was able to take eight²⁵⁹), and 116 seats in the National Assembly.²⁶⁰ This seat proportion meant that *Union pour la Nation* was able to monopolize 57.43 per cent of the political opposition from the 2006 mandate. Of note, however, is that in the run up to the 2011 elections the MP became more exclusively structured around the President's PPRD party and excluded parties with less than five representatives in the National Assembly, with the effect of encouraging the smaller parties to simply incorporate into the PPRD directly and thereby reinforce its dominance.²⁶¹

Weiss has observed that voting patterns in the 2006 elections appear to reflect a rejection of *de facto* leaders during the war, Kabila taking the East where the rebel factions ruled, and Bemba taking the West where Kabila's government was able to retain power.²⁶² This rejection is also expressed by the fact that only 45 of the 500 members of the Transitional National Assembly were democratically returned.²⁶³ This pattern, however, also mirrors the division of major *lingua franca* in DRC, Kabila winning the Swahili speaking regions, and Bemba in Lingala speaking regions and,²⁶⁴ indeed, it has been noted that both Kabila and Bemba attempted to mobilize voters on regional and

²⁵⁷ International Crisis Group 2011, 5

²⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch 2008, 21

²⁵⁹ International Crisis Group 2007, 2; some of these wins must have been repealed by the courts between publications as there are only eleven provincial assemblies.

²⁶⁰ International Crisis Group 2006b, 11

²⁶¹ International Crisis Group 2011, 6

²⁶² Weiss 2007, 139, 143

²⁶³ *Ibidem* 143

²⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch 2008, 14; Prunier 2009, 312; Weiss 2007, 142

ethnic lines.²⁶⁵ Finally, it has been suggested that Kabila carried the East in 2006 based on the hopes of Eastern Congolese that the President would restore peace to the region,²⁶⁶ the fulfillment of which task is a matter of controversy portending some suspicion regarding his ability to carry the same vote in 2011.²⁶⁷

The incumbent response to opposition has, on the whole, been repressive and manipulative. At an institutional level Joseph Kabila, now the electorally mandated president, has sought to extend electoral mandates from five to seven years, to remove term limits, to give the office of the president constitutional power over the judiciary, to prevent the decentralization of executive power (a question of significant historical salience in DRC, and a provision guaranteed by the terms of peace), to abolish the parliamentary office of the prime minister, and to extend presidential powers, despite the fact that the democratically ratified constitution of the DRC expressly forbids many of these undertakings.²⁶⁸ In parliament the incumbent has purportedly engaged in the intimidation of members and the withholding of members salaries, which pay when actually received is low enough to generate a susceptibility to corruption as it stands.²⁶⁹ Additionally, an informal institutional structure has arisen around the office of the president which is comprised of parallel networks of decision making that exert control over government, the legislature and the judiciary.²⁷⁰ In particular, the prerogatives of the office of the Prime Minister have been effectively stripped, and unelected advisors

²⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch 2008, 13, 19

²⁶⁶ International Crisis Group 2010, 8

²⁶⁷ See, for example: International Crisis Group 2011, 3 which suggests falling Eastern support for Kabila.

²⁶⁸ See, for example: Dizolele 2010, 148-149; International Crisis Group 2010, 18-19; these actions, where constitutionally forbidden, are so forbidden in article 220, see, for example: International Crisis Group 2010, 3

²⁶⁹ Dizolele 2010, 156

²⁷⁰ International Crisis Group 2010, 6

attached to the President impose decisions on democratically elected Ministers.²⁷¹ Vital Kamerhe, a member of the president's party appointed as Speaker of the National Assembly, attempted to use that office in order to affect democratic criticism of government policy only to be pushed out of office and replaced by 2009.²⁷² Furthermore, Kabila has exerted personal control over the Republican Guard and civilian and military intelligence agencies, and has allegedly exerted informal control over additional agencies through networks of personal friends.²⁷³ One of the institutions in which this tendency has apparently culminated is in the construction of a "secret commission" comprised of agents from multiple agencies based on their loyalty to the president, and which allegedly has arrested in excess of 200 persons primarily from amongst civilians, journalists, police and soldiers believed to support Bemba, only one of which arrest has actually been brought to trial.²⁷⁴ Such practices are thought to be spread much wider than in this commission alone.²⁷⁵ A final point worth noting is that local elections in the DRC have not taken place,²⁷⁶ although they are reported to be scheduled for some point in 2013.²⁷⁷

Direct actions against Bemba and the MLC have included intimidation of Bemba's father; the discharging of weapons at a hospital owned by Bemba; looting of the MLC office in Kinshasa; material confiscation, arrests and threats made against journalists working for news agencies owned by Bemba, the looting of, and government bans against those agencies; and the sacking of an MLC provincial governor's house,

²⁷¹ *Ibidem*

²⁷² *Ibidem* 7-8

²⁷³ Human Rights Watch 2008, 26

²⁷⁴ *Ibidem* 37-38

²⁷⁵ *Ibidem* 44-47

²⁷⁶ International Crisis Group 2010, 16

²⁷⁷ United Nations Security Council 2010, 14

amongst other activities.²⁷⁸

Analysing repression of the opposition in the context of the 2006 elections, however, is difficult in the context of the major candidates having recently emerged from a state of war in which they were adversaries and in which opposition leaders, in particular Bemba, retained significant security forces. The government openly claimed that suppression of Bemba was integral in that he planned a coup prior to the second round run-off, and Bemba's material ability to resist such repression resulted in open combat in Kinshasa.²⁷⁹ This sort of conflict continued after the elections, and erupted more than once in 2007 when Bemba continued to refuse to place his personal guard, comprised of somewhere between 400 and 800 men, under central authority (personal bodyguard is limited to 108), allegedly resulting in hundreds of deaths.²⁸⁰ One is left to question however, if Bemba intended to commit to the democratic process, was his ability to outfit a military force capable of resisting government violence a good for democracy? Certainly Bemba and the MLC appeared to more or less commit to the democratic process and the role of the opposition after the elections. But, of course, one cannot know the true intentions of persons in such situations and whether or not those intentions will be for good when one has possession of the power to do good or evil as one pleases, and Bemba is, furthermore, presently accused of war crimes in relation to MLC activities in the Central African Republic.²⁸¹

Leading up to the 2011 elections the opposition was characterized by a decline in the relevance of the MLC, the return to electoral politics of the UDPS under Etienne

²⁷⁸ See, for example: Human Rights Watch 2008, 47-52

²⁷⁹ *Ibidem* 16-19, 60, it is suggested that the coup plot was a government fabrication.

²⁸⁰ *Ibidem* 21-25; International Crisis Group 2006, 3

²⁸¹ See, for example: Human Rights Watch 2008, 62-65

Tshisekedi, and a regrouping of opposition alliances.²⁸² The extant *Union pour la Nation* coalition was reformed into the *Union Sacrée pour l'Alternance*, a grouping of small parties with little political weight, and the *Dynamique Tshisekedi Président*, the coalition backing Etienne Tshisekedi.²⁸³ The problems that lie herein range from the obvious, that the opposition becomes hereby even more divided, to the speculative, that these two coalitions are competing for the same seats already held by the opposition.²⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Etienne Tshisekedi declared himself the natural leader of the opposition and indicated that all parties should unite behind him,²⁸⁵ although the MLC in particular has refused to do so (still controlled by Bemba from the Hague, who expelled in-country leader and UDPS defector Muamba from the party in April 2011).²⁸⁶ In general, the opposition parties formed from belligerents following the peace appear to be in danger of losing their position to the non-belligerent political parties,²⁸⁷ and as it stands, the MLC was the only such party to make a significant electoral showing.

DRC 2011 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:
MP	260
DTP	110
Total	
Opposition	223 (and 17 vacant)
Total seats in legislature	500
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party	49.33

In the 2011 elections Kabila won in the now exclusive first round of presidential

²⁸² International Crisis Group 2011, 6

²⁸³ *Ibidem* 6-7

²⁸⁴ *Ibidem*

²⁸⁵ *Ibidem* 7

²⁸⁶ *Ibidem* 7-8, 25

²⁸⁷ *Ibidem* 8

elections with 48.95 per cent of the vote, whilst Tshisekedi took 32.33 per cent. The next most popular candidate was Vital Kamerhe, now of the *Union pour la Nation Congolaise* with 7.74 per cent, and all other candidates garnered less votes than this. In the legislative portion of the elections, the President's PPRD party directly secured 62 seats, the UDPS 41 seats, whilst other major showings were the People for Peace and Democracy Party (anglicized, PPPD) with 29 seats, the *Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau* (MSR) with 27 seats, PALU with 19, the UNC with 17, independent candidates holding 16 and the MLC dropping to 22 seats, and all other parties showing equal to or less than 16 seats.²⁸⁸ Significantly, the UDPS was able to field 386 candidates, whereas the PPRD fielded 494, PALU 476, MSR 465, UNC 447 and PPPD 394.²⁸⁹ It has been reported that Kabila's *Majorité Présidentielle* coalition now holds only 260 seats, significantly down although still an absolute majority, whilst the opposition coalition holds 110 seats, leaving 113 unaligned, and 17 vacant.²⁹⁰ Regarding the parties with major showings, PALU, as noted above, threw their support behind Kabila in 2006, whilst the PPPD and MSR are considered to be closely related to Kabila, and are part of his legislative alliance.²⁹¹ While some may view the drop in incumbent alliance seats as a gain for the opposition, it now only monopolizes 49.33 per cent of the non-incumbent vote, which is in effect a decline of almost 10 per cent from 2006.

In the months leading up to the 2011 elections incumbent activities were characterized by threats and physical attacks against members of the opposition, with UN investigators documenting 188 cases of politically motivated human rights violations

²⁸⁸ All data on the 2011 elections has been sourced from the electoral commission: Democratic Republic of Congo. Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (www.ceni.gouv.cd).

²⁸⁹ *Ibidem*

²⁹⁰ Anonymous 2012

²⁹¹ *Ibidem*; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

prior to the commencement of official campaigns.²⁹² These violations have included restrictions on political activities, the use of unnecessary force against demonstrators, and the arbitrary arrests of opposition party members, their supporters and journalists.²⁹³ On 6th October a UDPS rally in Kinshasa was broken up with tear gas and the firing of live rounds, leaving one person dead and ten wounded,²⁹⁴ whilst some pro-government candidates have openly encouraged their supporters to use violence against the opposition.²⁹⁵ Approaching its exposure to a second electoral contest the incumbent altered the electoral system so that presidential elections were conducted with a single poll, removing the second round run off,²⁹⁶ has sought to replace proportional representation with a majority voting list system,²⁹⁷ and replaced the inclusive 21 member *Commission Electorale Indépendante* with a seven member *Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*, comprised of four majority and three opposition representatives.²⁹⁸ Furthermore, in the case of cash shortfall for elections from traditional donors to the DRC, the new electoral commission approached both Russia and Iran for support.²⁹⁹

The Case of Rwanda

Rwanda gained independence from Belgium after a period of time as a protectorate inherited from the old German colonies in 1962. At that time, given the rigid identity based institutionalization of a questionably historic Hutu-Tutsi social cleavage, it was seen as propitious that postcolonial “democracy” should be characterized, in

²⁹² Human Rights Watch 2012, 104

²⁹³ *Ibidem* 104

²⁹⁴ *Ibidem* 104-105

²⁹⁵ *Ibidem* 105

²⁹⁶ *Ibidem* 104

²⁹⁷ International Crisis Group 2011, 6

²⁹⁸ *Ibidem* 11

²⁹⁹ *Ibidem* 16

Rwanda, as reflecting the right of the majority “Hutu” to govern. Although “Hutu power” was neither reflective of other states with a similar identity structure (e.g. in Burundi), nor was the Hutu-Tutsi cleavage reflective of states with significant *Banyarwanda* populations (e.g. DRC), the expression of “democratic” rule in independent Rwanda was more or less expressed as one-party rule by a Hutu nationalist party until the 1990s.³⁰⁰ As is well known, the “Hutu” dominated government was challenged from 1990 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (hereinafter RPF) which led to the invasion, from Uganda, of an army of ex-patriot “Tutsi” and other Rwandan exiles, many of whom had participated in the NRM/A rebellion about a decade earlier. Although this conflict led to a brokered peace in 1993 (Arusha Peace Accords) which would guarantee the political rights of Tutsi in a government of national unity, the results were the genocide of 1994 followed by the ultimate victory of the RPF and their assumption of power in Kigali.

The RPF government, since 1994, has pursued a policy of democratization, as far as their administration concerns this thesis. This democratization commenced in 1999 with the organization of local elections, and culminated in national presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003,³⁰¹ following a four year extension of the “transition” period.³⁰²

The party system in Rwanda, not unlike in Uganda, has been comprised of several small historic non-incumbent parties which have won insignificant fractions of the vote since being co-opted into government during the Transitional National Assembly, and which have been significantly repressed by the incumbent government. The three extant

³⁰⁰ For example see the brief summation of the independence to RPF period in: Chretien 2003, 299-309

³⁰¹ Longman 2011, 26

³⁰² Reyntjens 2004, 182

historic political parties were the *Mouvement Démocratique Républicain*,³⁰³ the *Parti Social Démocrate*, and the *Parti Libéral*.³⁰⁴ Repression of the MDR, PSD and PL has consisted of the harassment, arrest, and possibly the assassination of members who speak out against the government line.³⁰⁵ Unlike the pattern of events in Uganda, however, there has been no successful formation of a new and strong opposition party capable of garnering a significant proportion of absolute votes or meaningfully monopolizing the vote share of the opposition, and two of the historic political parties have retained their close association with the incumbent beyond the transitional years.

The failure for a new democratic party to take form could, quite possibly, be the result of “elite learning”,³⁰⁶ as Pasteur Bizimungu, a (possibly nominal)³⁰⁷ president in the early years of the regime, resigned 23rd March 2000,³⁰⁸ and replaced as president by Kagame in April 2000,³⁰⁹ attempted to form a new party in 2001³¹⁰ which was immediately suppressed by the regime (the *Parti pour la Démocratie et le Renouveau – Ubuyanja*).³¹¹ This suppression consisted of arrest, harassment, physical attacks, disappearances and murder.³¹² Bizimungu was sentenced to 15 years in prison for embezzling and inciting violence in June 2004, but granted a presidential pardon in April 2007.³¹³ The MDR, led by 1994-1995 Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, who

³⁰³ Stroh 2009, 7; the dominant party at independence was PARMEHUTU, and the MDR is considered the new incarnation of that party after the single-party regime of Habyarimana, see: Chretien 2003, 322-323

³⁰⁴ These two parties were created when multipartyism was legalized in 1991: Stroh 2009, 9

³⁰⁵ Human Rights Watch 2011, 154; Longman 2011, 32

³⁰⁶ See, for example: Beissinger 2007, 269; it could be argued that several aspects of Beissinger’s piece are applicable to the Great Lakes region, in particular concepts like “mutual empowerment” (pp 265-266) given the close and contaminated nature of regimes in this region both now and across history.

³⁰⁷ See, for example: Longman 2011, 32

³⁰⁸ Reyntjens 2004, 181

³⁰⁹ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 5

³¹⁰ 30th May 2001, as found in: Reyntjens 2004, 193

³¹¹ Longman 2011, 33

³¹² *Ibidem* 33; Reyntjens 2004, 193

³¹³ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 5

resigned and went into exile August 1995,³¹⁴ was considered by the regime as the most threatening extant opposition party due to its broad support by the “Hutu” majority (thus creating a fear of “Burundi Syndrome”) and was similarly suppressed leading up to the 2003 elections, which suppression included the arrest of prominent members on the grounds of promoting “divisionism”³¹⁵ and “genocide ideology,” the naming of members of the party associated with these charges, and a parliamentary motion to officially ban the party on 15 April 2003, endorsed by government on 16 May 2003,³¹⁶ forced Twagiramungu, who was contesting the presidency, to run as an independent;³¹⁷ albeit, Twagiramungu’s position was far better than Bizimungu’s.

This pattern of suppression continued through the 2010 elections, where attempts at the formation of several new parties have been stymied. The leader of the *Forces Démocratiques Unifiées – Inkingi*, Victoire Ingabire, was threatened, attacked and arrested on charges of genocide ideology, divisionism, creating an armed group, complicity in terrorist attacks, complicity in endangering the state through terrorism and armed violence, inciting the public to rise up against the state, and collaboration with the FDLR. An attempt by incumbent RPF members to break away and form a Rwandan branch of the Green Party (the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda) resulted in harassment, intimidation, and the assassination of the party’s vice-president.³¹⁸

The Democratic Green Party has been unable to officially register due to its inability to procure the necessary signed documents. In order to do so it must convene a party congress, which it has attempted to do on several occasions, once being disrupted

³¹⁴ Defined as being in opposition to or in disagreement with government policies: Reyntjens 2004, 180

³¹⁵ *Ibidem* 184

³¹⁶ Longman 2011, 33; Reyntjens 2004, 184

³¹⁷ Longman 2011, 39

³¹⁸ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 13; Human Rights Watch 2011, 155; Human Rights Watch 2012, 150; Longman 2011, 34

by persons shouting RPF slogans, and later being denied permission to hold a rally based on its lack of required police clearance, which clearance the police refused to provide. Its attempts to seek the aid of the government on the matter have been ignored.³¹⁹ The leader of the party has refused to contest the presidential elections as an independent.³²⁰

Victoire Ingabire of the FDU Inkingi has been arrested on charges of association with a terrorist group, propagating genocide ideology, revisionism, and divisionism,³²¹ and is being tried alongside four members of the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* who have all incriminated her,³²² while the party has been unable to officially register or field a presidential candidate in the latest elections.³²³

Another new party, the *Parti Social-Imberakuri*, was registered in July 2009 but allegedly taken over by pro-RPF dissident members by March of 2010, their leader arrested in June 2010, and sentenced to four years in prison as of February 2011 on convictions of endangering national security, divisionism, and attempting to organize demonstrations without authorization.³²⁴ Several members of this same party were arrested in June of 2010 for attempting to hold a demonstration.³²⁵

This suppression, combined with a 5% vote share cut-off for representation in parliament and government party funding,³²⁶ has meant that only three parties other than the incumbent RPF, of a total of ten registered parties,³²⁷ have effectively been able to contest: *Parti Libéral*, *Parti Social Démocrate*, and the Party of Peace and Concord,

³¹⁹ See: Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 15

³²⁰ *Ibidem*

³²¹ *Ibidem* 15-16

³²² Human Rights Watch 2012, 150-151

³²³ Human Rights Watch 2011, 154

³²⁴ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 16; Human Rights Watch 2011, 155; Human Rights Watch 2012, 150

³²⁵ Human Rights Watch 2011, 155

³²⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 4, 6

³²⁷ Including the RPF, see, for example: *Ibidem*: 6.

whilst only the RPF, PL and PSD are represented in the Chamber of Deputies.³²⁸ It should be noted in addition that those parties which do not meet the cut-off for government funding may technically receive funding from the Forum of Political Parties, that there is no limit to campaign expenditure, nor requirements to make sources of funding public.³²⁹ Of these parties, the PSD and PL form part of the government in a power sharing agreement, whilst the latter, PPC, although not privy to this power sharing agreement, has no representation in the Chamber of Deputies and is led by a Senator, Dr Mukabaramba, who owes this position to her premature withdrawal from the 2003 presidential elections in order to back RPF candidate Kagame.³³⁰ This being said, the close association of these parties to the incumbent has not prevented the RPF from significantly interfering in their politics,³³¹ and it has been suggested that the mechanism through which these parties have become effectively co-opted by the RPF has been the total incumbent control of appointments without consultation with its coalition parties.³³²

RPF control of the party system has culminated in the creation of the Forum of Political Parties, or the Consultative Forum of Political Organizations in Rwanda,³³³ at first an informal organization later constitutionally mandated in 2003, which must approve all members of parliament put forward by parties, and is undoubtedly dominated by the incumbent RPF.³³⁴ This institution has effectively provided a venue in which the

³²⁸ *Ibidem* 4

³²⁹ *Ibidem* 17

³³⁰ *Ibidem* 14; although this is not very much unlike the practice, though not the ideal, of appointed houses in bicameral parliaments throughout the Commonwealth, of which Rwanda is now a member, and which is comprised of several of the oldest and unquestionably democratic states in the world, as well as arguably the oldest continuous democracy itself, all of which members are characterized by less than ideal appointment practices.

³³¹ See, for example: Sebarenzi 2009, 158-182 wherein the author, a former *Parti Liberal* politician, describes how he was pushed out of his position, seat and country.

³³² *Ibidem* 141

³³³ This title is utilized in: Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 6

³³⁴ Longman 2011, 33-34

RPF can remove legislators it dislikes from parliament, and has allegedly been supported by other parties as a venue by which party discipline can be enforced.³³⁵ It has been suggested that the congruent timing of this institutional innovation with the ending of the transitional government was not coincidental.³³⁶ A second institutional mechanism has been erected by the RPF over eligibility for the franchise, which excludes refugees, prisoners, persons convicted of murder, rape, genocide or crimes against humanity, and importantly, persons “lacking integrity.” In Rwandan law a person of integrity is one who has not been convicted of genocide, genocide ideology, discrimination, divisionism or corruption.³³⁷ Thirdly, at the confluence of the franchise and party regulation, presidential candidates must be possessed of “irreproachable morals and probity,” amongst other more typical criteria.³³⁸

In the background of this repression of a viable opposition is the manipulation of civil society organizations, limitations on the freedom of speech and significant interference in the press,³³⁹ in particular where regime policies are criticized or challenged.³⁴⁰ Media is overseen by the institution of the Media High Council and, regardless, is dominated by the state-owned Rwanda Bureau of Information and Broadcasting.³⁴¹ In the 2010 presidential elections in particular the Media High Council suspended two independent newspapers for the duration of the campaign.³⁴² That being said, there are regulations regarding the equitable and free access to political content

³³⁵ Sebarenzi 2009, 147

³³⁶ *Ibidem* 152

³³⁷ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 9

³³⁸ *Ibidem* 10

³³⁹ See, for example: Longman 2011, 27-31, 34-38

³⁴⁰ *Ibidem* 35

³⁴¹ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 18

³⁴² *Ibidem* 13, 18, 20

during campaign periods,³⁴³ how useful that is in the context of the exclusion of all parties truly in opposition is debatable.

Rwanda 2003 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:	
RPF	40	
PSD	7	
PL	6	
Total Opposition	13	
Total seats in legislature		80
Total seats elected by universal franchise		53
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party		53.85

The overall outcomes of electoral competition in Rwanda has consisted of Kagame officially winning over 95 per cent of the popular vote in 2003, in which his RPF party won 73.8 per cent of the vote, filling 40 of 53 directly elected seats in an 80 seat lower house (while the upper house is not elected).³⁴⁴ The opposition was fairly evenly divided between the PSD (12 per cent) and the PL (10 per cent), although both parties supported Kagame's presidential candidacy and comprise an alliance with the RPF.³⁴⁵ So whilst the PSD technically commanded a 53.85 per cent monopolization of the opposition following 2003, the value of such a number is highly suspect.

³⁴³ *Ibidem* 20

³⁴⁴ *Ibidem* 5; Longman 2011, 40

³⁴⁵ Reyntjens 2004, 186

Rwanda 2008 Elections Summary

PARTY:	SEATS:	
RPF	42	
PSD	7	
PL	4	
Total Opposition	11	
Total seats in legislature		80
Total seats elected by universal franchise		53
Per cent monopolized by largest opposition party		63.66

In the 2008 elections the RPF garnered 78.8 per cent of the vote, winning 42 seats, the PSD taking 7 and the PL 4.³⁴⁶ This represented an absolute loss for the PSD, but a roughly 10 per cent monopolization gain insofar as their command of non-RPF seats rose to 63.66 per cent. Consistent with some suspicions of the nature of vote rigging in electoral authoritarian regimes, it has been suggested that the regime manipulated this number down to the benefit of the opposition in order to appear more democratic.³⁴⁷

In the 2010 presidential elections Kagame again won with 93.08 per cent of the vote in a competition lacking a meaningful challenger,³⁴⁸ and one in which none of the new opposition parties were allowed to contest.³⁴⁹ The PSD candidate won 5.15%, PL 1.37% and PPC 0.4%.³⁵⁰ The campaign was observed to be significantly dominated by the incumbent,³⁵¹ albeit peaceful and none of the parties actually permitted to contest

³⁴⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 5

³⁴⁷ Longman 2011, 40; Stroh 2009, 16

³⁴⁸ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 17, 29, 30; Human Rights Watch 2011, 154; Longman 2011, 41

³⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch 2011, 154

³⁵⁰ Commonwealth Secretariat 2010, 29

³⁵¹ *Ibidem* 17

reported being interfered with.³⁵²

³⁵² *Ibidem* 30

Chapter 7: Case Analysis

In Chapter 7 the raw data from the case presentation above will be analysed in regard to the relationships between the generation of strong opposition parties in hybrid regimes and the critical issues expounded above, namely: party financing; structural inheritance; the presence or absence of violence in the party system; party fractionalization and the proliferation of independent members; and the presence or absence of identity, and in particular ethnic based parties in the party system. These critical issues will be given separate and methodical treatment below.

Party Financing

Although it is not possible to unearth the minutia of party financing in the Great Lakes region of Africa from secondary sources, it may be soundly inferred from the cases above that the ability or inability of parties to finance themselves matters a great deal. It is clear in those cases that the presence of domestic or international funding can make the difference between success and failure between parties which are otherwise similar in structural capacity, as well as in the constraints they face from the incumbent and the party system.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo the well financed MLC out-performed all other non-incumbent political parties in 2006, both those inheriting similar rebel organizational structure and participating in transitional government, and well as traditional political parties. The MLC performance in 2006 was also significantly stronger than that of the UDPS in 2011. Similarly in Uganda where there is a strong opposition party there is also a comparatively flourishing and autonomous business class, and a number of international donors that set aside funds for political parties.

Although these inferences are indirect, their credibility is certainly enhanced by the inability of opposition parties in Rwanda, legal or not, to gain any sort of national voice or make an absolute electoral impact where foreign funding is banned, and access to state funding is tightly regulated in blatant favour of the incumbent.

Structural Inheritance

There is a demonstrable pattern in the states considered herein of the effective marginalization of longstanding historic parties at the expense of comparatively effective but young political parties. In this context it is may be contended that the structural inheritance theory should be expanded to include the advantages afforded political parties formed out of standing legislatures. Regarding the competitive notion of elite defection, the defection of a Besigye or a Tshisekedi, whilst important and certainly exerting a pull on other politicians, cannot logically be the exclusive font of a party's competitiveness, particularly in the style of riding found throughout the Commonwealth. This thesis therefore contends that what makes these new parties competitive are the structural advantages imbued by the professional politicians who have been "pulled." The politicians who enter the party in parliament with an expertise in legislative politics; with established constituencies; (hopefully) with campaign experience and sources of funding, but certainly with the knowledge of how to acquire and retain their positions, as well as the experience of doing so; bring with them thereby a definitive advantage not possessed by new parties and not adequately explained by the elite status of party leaders.³⁵³

Secondly, as was demonstrated by the MLC in DRC, as well as by the incumbent regimes in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda collectively, translating an armed organization into a political one carries similar structural advantages. Although this thesis is not concerned

³⁵³ Of course "elite" is a relative term.

to treat the long history of military coups in world politics herein, nor the extensive scholarship on that subject, military organizations possess strengths directly transferrable to mass politics.

In Uganda structural inheritance may explain the differential success of the FDC, formed by serving politicians in the no-party legislature, over historic political parties such as the UPC or DP which, while having some members who served in Movement politics, were divided as to who was and was not willing to acquiesce to the Movement and the status of those who did. The FDC, by contrast, was able to enter politics as a *fait accompli* body of professional politicians, and one familiar with how NRM Uganda functions.

In the DRC the MLC certainly benefited from the facts that it was a cohesive military organization with defined organizational structure, as well as a participant in government during the transitional years. The MLC also, however, offers a good indication of the limits of the traction of structural inheritance, insofar as there were other significant rebel groups who participated in the transitional government and failed to make a meaningful electoral showing. However, the UDPS may bear the opposite implication, being as it was an organization formed out of a one-party state like the FDC, but so formed nearly thirty years prior to exposing itself to electoral competition, and carved out of an extinct regime. Finally, the UNC under Vital Kamerhe, which contested the 2011 election after Kamerhe was removed from the president's party, indicates yet another qualification of this theory. It may either be the case that structural inheritance is subject to the law of diminishing returns regarding the number of actors and parties that break away from association with the incumbent, or that Kamerhe and the UNC trace the

distinction between structural inheritance and the so-called “elite recycling” phenomenon.³⁵⁴ The contradictory evidence found in the DRC would suggest that structural inheritance is likely a latent variable which requires some other input in order to affect outcomes, as the performance of both the UDPS and the UNC would suggest that the age or novelty of a party’s structure is irrelevant, while the fact that only the MLC garnered a meaningful electoral showing after the transitional government suggests that the mere presence of that organizational structure is not sufficient.

Evidence from Rwanda indicates that, while not sufficient, such structural inheritance may be necessary for strong opposition parties, and therefore democratic outcomes, in hybrid regimes. This may be deduced from the facts that there is no strong and autonomous opposition party in Rwanda capable of monopolizing opposition votes, where both existing political parties (such as the MDR) and attempts at the formation of new parties carved out of the regime (such as the DGPR) have been directly suppressed. Both the *Parti Libéral* and the *Parti Social Démocrate* have shown themselves incapable thus far of acting autonomously from the RPF, and in light of the showing of such parties as the MDR, PL and PSD; the UPC and DP in Uganda; or PALU in DRC; one might be skeptical of the true value of the collaboration of historic political parties with *coup* governments. In fact, the only “historic” political party to make a strong showing has been the UDPS in DRC, and this party ultimately refused cooperation with *coup* governments. It is of note, however, that this rejection was not indicative of its willingness to cooperate should such governments have offered the UDPS a position it

³⁵⁴ I have not given the theory of “elite recycling” independent consideration in this analysis because I am not convinced of its unique traction in Africa, where it has been heavily studied, as opposed to in every known democracy around the world where “elite recycling” is not studied as such, but is simply observed as “politics.”

felt it deserved.

Violence in the Party System

Contrary to the expectations of this thesis, it does appear to be the case that violence in the party system affects the performance of opposition parties, at least according to the investigative criteria herein. Of course, violence may certainly act on the absolute strength of the opposition, and its effect may be non-linear, as is indicated by many studies on opposition mobilization at the end of authoritarian regimes. But it may be the case that the most important violence is not that which takes place in party systems against candidates and party leaders, nor even executed acts of violence, but the intimidation which is brought to bear directly against individual voters.

In Rwanda, for example, it has been noted that the practice of casting votes through thumb-printing, which calls the secret ballot into question,³⁵⁵ in confluence with a dismal record on human rights,³⁵⁶ may serve to significantly intimidate the electorate into supporting the regime. In Uganda violence may be only a surreptitious possibility of not voting for the incumbent, for example through the open implication that only Museveni can control the armed forces and prevent them from (returning to) the practice of terrorizing the population.³⁵⁷ In the DRC, by contrast, open acts of violence appear almost endemic to politics, but both the MLC and the UDPS have been able to significantly monopolize the opposition through the construction of opposition legislative alliances.

The Proliferation of Independent Candidates and Small Parties

As mentioned above, the proliferation of independent candidates and small parties

³⁵⁵ Reyntjens 2004, 186

³⁵⁶ See, for example: *Ibidem* 194-197

³⁵⁷ Izama 2011, 68

can have diverse effects on electoral outcomes, the most troubling of which, in hybrid regimes, is the perpetuation of incumbency. This effect functions through the mechanism of independents and small parties, for various reasons, overtly associating themselves with the incumbent either prior to elections, or after winning seats. The timing of this association is likely tightly related to the motivations for running. However the presence of a large number of independent candidates and small parties does not appear to affect the capacity of a strong opposition party to form according to the criteria herein.

In the case of Rwanda, where there is a five per cent official status threshold,³⁵⁸ the incumbent RPF allowed six minor parties entrance on a common list with the RPF who were otherwise unlikely to meet the threshold.³⁵⁹ This means that while the presence of independents and the number of parties is heavily restricted, this restriction heavily incentivizes those parties and persons to assimilate with the incumbent.

In Uganda independent candidates have consistently matched the electoral showing of the strongest opposition party. As noted, these candidates are not ideological constituency independents, but are typically members of the NRM who have lost party primaries but still possess the means and desire to run, and typically tow the NRM line in parliament. While this may complicate electoral politics for the NRM in those constituencies, it is probably not having a direct effect on the opposition. The continued independence of the UPC and DP, however, and their refusal to join the IPC opposition coalition, probably does unnecessarily weaken the position of the opposition, although this is not typically what comes to mind when thinking of party system fragmentation and

³⁵⁸ Stroh 2009, 9

³⁵⁹ *Ibidem* 10: *Parti Démocrate Centriste, Parti Démocrate Ideal, Parti pour le Progres et le Concorde, Parti de la Solidarite et du Progres, Parti Socialiste Rwandais, and Union Démocratique du Peuple Rwandais.*

the proliferation of small parties.

The party system in the DRC is highly fractionalized, as noted, with nearly 300 registered parties and 70 with at least one seat in the assembly. This fractionalization, however, has prevented neither the incumbent nor the opposition from forming strong legislative coalitions, which would appear to be the natural solution to such fragmentation. That being said, the draw of coalition with the incumbent is obviously a more attractive option, and that fact clearly serves to perpetuate incumbency in a state where neither the PPRD nor the UDPS have a strong individual legislative presence.

Institutional Factors

Several interesting institutional innovations have been expounded in the cases above which bear direct influence on opposition strength.

In Rwanda it has been noted that elections are largely regarded as free and fair, but the outcome of these electoral processes are manipulated *a priori* where the regime determines who can and cannot compete, and how those who can compete are allowed to campaign.³⁶⁰ This manipulation is institutionalized in the form of the RPF dominated Forum of Political Parties, with roots in earlier practices such as the no-party tickets and regulation of local government candidates.³⁶¹ Not dissimilar from NRM rule in Uganda, the prohibition on political party affiliation in local contests neither meant that the incumbent RPF refrained from campaigning, nor from manipulating who could or could not run, or removing those who won from office.³⁶² Manipulation of the campaigns of those who are not banned from contesting in Rwanda has included the confiscation of

³⁶⁰ Longman 2011, 38

³⁶¹ *Ibidem*

³⁶² *Ibidem* 38-39; Reyntjens 2004, 183

party literature, and prohibitions on political rallies.³⁶³

In the 2003 elections the majority of candidates approved by the National Electoral Commission were from the RPF or affiliated with it,³⁶⁴ and as mentioned above former President Bizimungu was banned from contesting, whilst former Prime Minister Twagiramungu's MDR party was suppressed, forcing him to run as an independent. This manipulation continued into the 2010 elections wherein the Green Party (DGPR), as well as the FDU-Inkingi were both barred from contesting, and the latter's leader arrested.³⁶⁵

There is a nascent organization of a similar nature in Uganda, the National Consultative Forum for Political Parties and Political Organizations. However, this institution has never come into existence and is regarded more or less as something which would be a positive development.³⁶⁶ However there are *de facto* institutional impediments to free and fair elections in Uganda in the form of the ambiguity between electoral and criminal offences, the existence of an "incumbent" opposition, and the prolonged exclusion of all parties other than the NRM from government.

In Uganda electoral crimes are technically compound, but are in practice litigated as flaws in the electoral process and rarely referred to criminal courts.³⁶⁷ This issue is further complicated by the fact that high ranking incumbent candidates are unlikely to be charged even under the less severe electoral laws, because all cases must be referred through the presidentially appointed director of public prosecutions, and similarly by the fact that there is a three month statute of limitations on electoral offenses.³⁶⁸ This has

³⁶³ Longman 2011, 39

³⁶⁴ *Ibidem* 40

³⁶⁵ *Ibidem* 40-41

³⁶⁶ Commonwealth Secretariat 2011, 7

³⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch 2009, 12, 13-17

³⁶⁸ *Ibidem* 18-19, 24

had the effect of failing to deter criminal activity related to the electoral process.³⁶⁹

The presence not only of a large number of NRM “independent” candidates, but also of a within government NRM “opposition” must serve, given the no-party political history of Uganda, as well as the apparent unlikelihood of the NRM being removed from power, of undermining the value of opposition parties to the electorate. If oppositionism can be expressed by supporting pro-NRM independents or NRM dissidents who have not left the party, why should an elector vote for the FDC, UPC or DP who can deliver them nothing?

Finally, the prolonged exclusion of all parties other than the NRM from incumbency may serve to make elections no more than an expensive public opinion poll. The NRM has shown itself not only as unbeatable thus far, but also as willing to take steps to remedy electoral unpopularity despite the fact that its removal from power is unlikely, *exempli gratia* its actions to win the northern vote in the latest elections. This has obvious effects on the opposition, and in Uganda’s latest elections the opposition was notably weaker both in absolute terms, as well as according to the criteria of this analysis.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, which neither benefits from the (presidentialised) Westminster system of Uganda, nor the strict regulation of the party system as in Rwanda, different institutional strategies have been adopted. These primarily take the form of incumbent legislative coalitions, and the generation of incumbent allied political parties.

The *Alliance pour le Majorité Présidentielle* in 2006, and *Majorité Présidentielle* later, have served as legislative venues by which the incumbent can construct and maintain an absolute assembly majority in the context of a highly fractionalized party

³⁶⁹ *Ibidem* 12

system. Although the need for such alliances in a party system like that possessed by DRC is indisputable, the function of such alliances in a hybrid regime have ominous implications, namely that the draw of alliance with the incumbent is exponentially stronger than the draw to ally with the opposition. As such, the determination of majority in the assembly probably hinges on the victor in presidential elections, where the incumbent has removed the second round, and does not appear to have a meaningful challenger.

In addition, while the president is affiliated with the *Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie*, he officially runs as an independent, and appears to be diversifying his legislative options and dominance by constructing incumbent alternates in the form of the PPPD and MSR parties. This places parties closely allied with the person of the president first, third and fourth in absolute numbers of legislative seats, before one needs to even consider parties simply allied with *Majorité Présidentielle* such as the historic PALU which comes sixth.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

In conclusion, and given the evidence at hand, it can be contended that democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes are demonstrably contingent on the presence of strong opposition parties, as defined herein. The presence or absence of strong opposition parties appear to hinge on the ability of these parties to fund themselves, and the latent structure they are or are not capable of co-opting and translating into political and electoral tools. Other factors, such as violence in the party system and the proliferation of independent candidates, small parties and identity based parties, do not appear to directly affect the performance of those parties possessed of such funding and structural inheritance. That being said, these parties remain vulnerable to targeted suppression by incumbents, most notably where the party system can be regulated to the exclusion of those parties which might challenge the incumbent, whilst maintaining the illusion of multi-party politics. The best example of such an institution is in the form of Rwanda's Forum of Political Parties. Other institutions, though not as effective, appear to play a clear role in the preservation of incumbency, such as: broad incumbent coalitions and the generation of incumbent allied political parties, both of which notably dilute the value of electoral competition, and both of which have been notably utilized in the DRC under contemporary incumbent Joseph Kabila, as well as under the late rule of Mobutu before him; and the dilution of culpability for crimes committed during elections, of the value of an autonomous opposition when a shadow incumbent "opposition" exists, and long-term preclusion of all non-incumbent parties from electoral success through successive elections in which the incumbent can learn to win the support of dissenting electors, all of which are exemplified by NRM Uganda.

These findings are important because they suggest that the relationships widely reported in the literature between democratic outcomes and other structural and institutional variables appear to lose some explanatory power after minimal democratic reforms have been introduced. Whilst it may be desirable to have a firm linear connection between structural variables that would easily incorporate democracy promotion into ongoing projects in the international community, or between clearly defined institutional arrangements and democratic outcomes, this research suggests that this may not be the case. These simple relationships do exist, but they are neither linear, nor do they appear to retain the same explanatory power in hybrid regimes. Once democratic reforms have been introduced, the strongest association with democratic outcomes appear to lie in strong democratic opposition parties capable of monopolizing the opposition vote and, in the context of hybrid regimes, the ability to monopolize that vote hinges on the ability to co-opt pre-existing organizational structures, to fund parties based around those structures, and the absence of effective institutional restraints on the party-system.

Future research in this area could serve to delineate the intervening nature of the relationship between democratic outcomes and strong opposition parties with greater precision in relation to the broader structural and institutional variables in the literature. Secondly, more research into the measurement of opposition parties in hybrid regimes would certainly benefit the literature. The measurement utilized herein, adopted from an operationalization in a recent qualitative study, has found a discrete relationship where logic has dictated its presence, but where prior quantitative research has been unable to expose it. This measurement may be only an important step in the direction of

determining how to disentangle some benefit from the flawed electoral practices and data that come out of hybrid regimes.

In regard to policy implications, understanding the nature of democratic outcomes in hybrid regimes is important both because democratic governance is manifestly desirable for citizens around the world, as well as because many wealthy and democratic states have made the promotion of democracy an important aspect of their foreign policies. In order to get the best returns for both interested parties, it is necessary to disentangle our understanding of democratic outcomes as casually linked to other normatively desirable projects being undertaken already, or as linked to simple institutional solutions. Democratic outcomes, as the old democracies of the world know already through centuries or more of being on the trajectory toward democracy, are effectuated by the people they affect: by loyal oppositionists and by citizens both free to take up their role as electors without interference, as well as confident that taking up such a role is worthwhile in a given political system. It is clear, in the context of this thesis, that the superior policy approach in regard to democratic outcomes specifically is in the support of democratic opposition party organizations, in particular in terms of funding, and in lobbying for the deconstruction of the institutional constraints in the party system which serve to weaken these organizations.

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APPENDIX

Table 33: Positive, Negative and Neutral Variation in Africa 1989-2010 in Presidential Systems where an Opposition Party Monopolizes a Minimum of 25% of Opposition Seats

POSITIVE CHANGE		NO CHANGE		NEGATIVE CHANGE	
Country Year	Polity +10	Country Year	Polity +10	Country Year	Polity +10
Angola1993		Cameroon1993	6	Central African Republic1994	15
Angola1994		Cameroon1994	6	Central African Republic1995	15
Angola1995		Cameroon1995	6	Central African Republic1996	15
Angola1996		Cameroon1996	6	Central African Republic1997	15
Angola1997	7	Cameroon1997	6	Central African Republic1998	15
Angola1998	7	Cameroon1998	6	Central African Republic1999	15
Angola1999	7	Cameroon1999	6	Central African Republic2000	15
Angola2000	7	Cameroon2000	6	Central African Republic2001	15
Angola2001	7	Cameroon2001	6	Central African Republic2002	15
Angola2002	8	Cameroon2002	6	Central African Republic2003	9
Angola2003	8	Cameroon2003	6	Central African Republic2006	9
Angola2004	8	Cameroon2004	6	Central African Republic2007	9
Angola2005	8	Cameroon2005	6	Central African Republic2008	9
Angola2006	8	Cameroon2006	6	Central African Republic2009	9
Angola2007	8	Cameroon2008	6	Central African Republic2010	9
Angola2008	8	Cameroon2009	6	Congo, Rep.1994	15
Angola2009	8	Cameroon2010	6	Congo, Rep.1995	15
Angola2010	8	Chad1998	8	Congo, Rep.1996	15
Benin1996	16	Chad1999	8	Congo, Rep.1997	4
Benin1997	16	Chad2000	8	Congo, Rep.2003	6
Benin1998	16	Chad2001	8	Congo, Rep.2004	6
Benin1999	16	Chad2002	8	Congo, Rep.2005	6
Benin2000	16	Chad2003	8	Congo, Rep.2006	6
Benin2001	16	Chad2004	8	Congo, Rep.2007	6
Benin2002	16	Chad2005	8	Congo, Rep.2008	6
Benin2003	16	Chad2006	8	Congo, Rep.2009	6
Benin2004	16	Chad2007	8	Congo, Rep.2010	6
Benin2005	16	Chad2008	8	Gambia, The1989	17
Benin2006	17	Chad2009	8	Gambia, The1990	18
Benin2007	17	Chad2010	8	Gambia, The1991	18
Benin2008	17	Congo, Dem. Rep2007		Gambia, The1992	18
Benin2009	17	Congo, Dem. Rep2008		Gambia, The1993	18
Benin2010	17	Congo, Dem. Rep2009		Gambia, The1994	3
Burkina Faso1993	5	Congo, Dem. Rep2010		Gambia, The1997	5
Burkina Faso1994	5	Equatorial Guinea1994	5	Gambia, The1998	5
Burkina Faso1995	5	Equatorial Guinea1995	5	Gambia, The1999	5
Burkina Faso1996	5	Equatorial Guinea1996	5	Gambia, The2000	5

Burkina Faso1997	6	Equatorial Guinea1997	5	Gambia, The2001	5
Burkina Faso1998	6	Equatorial Guinea1998	5	Gambia, The2002	5
Burkina Faso1999	6	Equatorial Guinea1999	5	Gambia, The2003	5
Burkina Faso2000	7	Equatorial Guinea2000	5	Gambia, The2004	5
Burkina Faso2001	10	Equatorial Guinea2001	5	Gambia, The2005	5
Burkina Faso2002	10	Equatorial Guinea2002	5	Gambia, The2006	5
Burkina Faso2003	10	Equatorial Guinea2003	5	Gambia, The2007	5
Burkina Faso2004	10	Equatorial Guinea2004	5	Gambia, The2008	5
Burkina Faso2005	10	Equatorial Guinea2005	5	Gambia, The2009	5
Burkina Faso2006	10	Equatorial Guinea2006	5	Gambia, The2010	5
Burkina Faso2007	10	Equatorial Guinea2007	5	Madagascar1990	4
Burkina Faso2008	10	Equatorial Guinea2008	5	Madagascar1991	
Burkina Faso2009	10	Equatorial Guinea2009	5	Madagascar1992	19
Burkina Faso2010	10	Equatorial Guinea2010	5	Madagascar1993	19
Burundi1994		Guinea1996	9	Madagascar1997	18
Burundi1995		Guinea1997	9	Madagascar1998	17
Burundi1996	5	Guinea1998	9	Madagascar1999	17
Burundi1997	5	Guinea1999	9	Madagascar2000	17
Burundi1998	9	Guinea2000	9	Madagascar2001	17
Burundi1999	9	Guinea2001	9	Madagascar2002	17
Burundi2000	9	Guinea2002	9	Madagascar2003	17
Burundi2001		Guinea2003	9	Madagascar2004	17
Burundi2002		Guinea2004	9	Madagascar2005	17
Burundi2003		Guinea2005	9	Madagascar2006	17
Burundi2004		Guinea2006	9	Madagascar2007	17
Burundi2005	16	Guinea2007	9	Niger1994	18
Burundi2006	16	Guinea2008	9	Niger1995	18
Burundi2007	16	Malawi1995	16	Niger1996	4
Burundi2008	16	Malawi1996	16	Niger1997	4
Burundi2009	16	Malawi1997	16	Niger1998	4
Burundi2010	16	Malawi1998	16	Niger1999	15
Cape Verde1992	18	Malawi1999	16	Niger2000	15
Cape Verde1993	18	Malawi2000	16	Niger2001	15
Cape Verde1994	18	Malawi2001	14	Niger2002	15
Cape Verde1995	18	Malawi2002	14	Niger2003	15
Cape Verde1996	18	Malawi2003	15	Niger2004	16
Cape Verde1997	18	Malawi2004	16	Niger2005	16
Cape Verde1998	18	Malawi2005	16	Niger2006	16
Cape Verde1999	18	Malawi2006	16	Niger2007	16
Cape Verde2000	18	Malawi2007	16	Niger2008	16
Cape Verde2001	20	Malawi2008	16	Niger2009	7
Cape Verde2002	20	Malawi2009	16	Niger2010	13
Cape Verde2003	20	Malawi2010	16	Rwanda2004	7

Cape Verde2004	20	Mozambique1995	15	Rwanda2005	7
Cape Verde2005	20	Mozambique1996	15	Rwanda2006	7
Cape Verde2006	20	Mozambique1997	15	Rwanda2007	7
Cape Verde2007	20	Mozambique1998	15	Rwanda2008	7
Cape Verde2008	20	Mozambique1999	15	Rwanda2009	7
Cape Verde2009	20	Mozambique2000	15	Rwanda2010	6
Cape Verde2010	20	Mozambique2001	15		
Comoros1994	14	Mozambique2002	15		
Comoros1995		Mozambique2003	15		
Comoros1996	14	Mozambique2004	15		
Comoros1997	14	Mozambique2005	15		
Comoros1998	14	Mozambique2006	15		
Comoros1999	8	Mozambique2007	15		
Comoros2005	16	Mozambique2008	15		
Comoros2006	19	Mozambique2009	15		
Comoros2007	19	Mozambique2010	15		
Comoros2008	19	Namibia1991	16		
Comoros2009	19	Namibia1992	16		
Comoros2010	19	Namibia1993	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1991	3	Namibia1994	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1992	3	Namibia1995	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1993	3	Namibia1996	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1994	4	Namibia1997	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1995	4	Namibia1998	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1996	4	Namibia1999	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1997	4	Namibia2000	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1998	4	Namibia2001	16		
Cote d'Ivoire1999		Namibia2002	16		
Gabon1991	6	Namibia2003	16		
Gabon1992	6	Namibia2004	16		
Gabon1993	6	Namibia2005	16		
Gabon1994	6	Namibia2006	16		
Gabon1995	6	Namibia2007	16		
Gabon1996	6	Namibia2008	16		
Gabon2002	6	Namibia2009	16		
Gabon2003	6	Namibia2010	16		
Gabon2004	6	Nigeria2000	14		
Gabon2005	6	Nigeria2001	14		
Gabon2006	6	Nigeria2002	14		
Gabon2007	6	Nigeria2003	14		
Gabon2008	6	Nigeria2004	14		
Gabon2009	13	Nigeria2005	14		
Gabon2010	13	Nigeria2006	14		

Ghana1997	12	Nigeria2007	14
Ghana1998	12	Nigeria2008	14
Ghana1999	12	Nigeria2009	14
Ghana2000	12	Nigeria2010	14
Ghana2001	16	Tanzania1996	9
Ghana2002	16	Tanzania1997	9
Ghana2003	16	Tanzania1998	9
Ghana2004	18	Tanzania1999	9
Ghana2005	18	Tanzania2000	9
Ghana2006	18	Tanzania2001	9
Ghana2007	18	Tanzania2002	9
Ghana2008	18	Tanzania2003	9
Ghana2009	18	Tanzania2004	9
Ghana2010	18	Tanzania2005	9
Guinea-Bissau1995	15	Tanzania2006	9
Guinea-Bissau1996	15	Tanzania2007	9
Guinea-Bissau1997	15	Tanzania2008	9
Guinea-Bissau1998		Tanzania2009	9
Guinea-Bissau1999		Tanzania2010	9
Guinea-Bissau2000	15		
Guinea-Bissau2001	15		
Guinea-Bissau2002	15		
Guinea-Bissau2003	9		
Guinea-Bissau2005	16		
Guinea-Bissau2006	16		
Guinea-Bissau2007	16		
Guinea-Bissau2008	16		
Guinea-Bissau2009	16		
Guinea-Bissau2010	16		
Kenya1993	5		
Kenya1994	5		
Kenya1995	5		
Kenya1996	5		
Kenya1997	8		
Kenya1998	8		
Kenya1999	8		
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Kenya2005	18		
Kenya2006	18		

Kenya2007	17
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Kenya2009	17
Kenya2010	18
Liberia1989	4
Liberia1990	
Liberia1998	10
Liberia1999	10
Liberia2000	10
Liberia2001	10
Liberia2002	10
Liberia2003	
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Mali2010	17
Mauritania2002	4
Mauritania2003	4
Mauritania2004	4
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Senegal1989	9
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Senegal1993	9

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Senegal2006	18
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Sierra Leone1997	
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Sierra Leone1999	
Sierra Leone2000	
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Sierra Leone2010	17
Uganda1995	6
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Zambia1992	16
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Zambia1995	16
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Zambia1998	11
Zambia1999	11
Zambia2000	11

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Zambia2002	15
Zambia2003	15
Zambia2004	15
Zambia2005	15
Zambia2006	15
Zambia2007	15
Zambia2008	17
Zambia2009	17
Zambia2010	17

* Polity scores are generated using the +10 method for all positive scores, transitional values are recoded as missing

** Opposition monopolization is generated from the Database of Political Institutions where the number of seats held by the largest opposition party is divided by the total number of seats held by the opposition, and the quotient is multiplied by 100

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