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Justus Sherwood, Vermont Loyalist, 1747-1798

Ian Cleghorn Pemberton

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JUSTUS SHERWOOD, VERMONT LOYALIST, 1747-1798

by

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Department of History

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Graduate Studies
The University of Western Ontario
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ABSTRACT

Justus Sherwood was born on March 7, 1747 in Newtown, Connecticut. No documentary evidence exists on which to base an account of his youth; thus an attempt has been made in the early part of this biography to present an examination of the major environmental influences which may have shaped his later actions and attitudes. This approach has the disadvantage of relying greatly upon supposition, but the lack of direct evidence offers no alternative. Sherwood's later life can be documented from several sources, the most important being the Frederick Haldimand Papers.

In the early 1770's Sherwood followed the northward march of land-hungry Connecticut men to the New Hampshire Grants where he became involved with Ethan Allen and the notorious Green Mountain Boys. He was not prepared to follow them into rebellion against the Crown, however, and his outspoken Toryism compelled him to flee to the British lines at Crown Point in October 1776. Sherwood joined a Loyalist regiment, the Queen's Loyal Rangers, and participated in the Burgoyne campaign of 1777 as a scout and forager. He saw action at Bennington where he lost most of his company. Shortly before Burgoyne's surrender, Sherwood probably joined his regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel John Peters, and escaped with the remnant of the Rangers to Fort
George and Ticonderoga. For the next three years he was posted at St. Johns, Quebec, where he worked in the secret service.

In October 1780 Sherwood was sent to Castleton to discuss with Ethan Allen the question of returning Vermont to British rule. Sherwood was the chief British agent in the protracted negotiations which ultimately failed to effect Vermont's reunion with Britain. During 1781 he conducted three meetings with Vermont emissaries, and by October he appeared to be on the verge of success. The defeat of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, however, strengthened the Whig faction in Vermont, compelling the Allen party to beg for more time to educate the people on the advantages of reunion. Sherwood maintained a correspondence with Ethan and Ira Allen until the close of the Revolutionary War in an attempt to keep the question open. Sherwood's personality and his intense desire to see the negotiations successfully concluded militated against him, causing him to be indecisive and uncertain in his dealings with the Vermonter. He was unable to see his opponents' point of view, and his mood fluctuated from one of great confidence to utter despair.

In June 1781 Sherwood was placed in charge of all secret service activities on the northern frontier, a position which he held until the end of the war. His headquarters was the Loyal Block House, a post which he built in July 1781 on Grande Isle in Lake Champlain. His
work consisted of sending out parties of agents to
gather intelligence in the northern colonies and to
kidnap prominent Whigs. His assistant, Doctor George
Smyth, who also aided him in the Vermont negotiations,
was valuable as a contact with Loyalist informants
behind the rebel lines, but he was jealous of Sherwood
and chafed under the restrictions which were placed
upon him. Sherwood also had to handle the New England
traders who by the summer of 1782 were heading northward
to do business in Canada, despite General Haldimand's
prohibition against such trade.

Immediately after the war, Sherwood explored
potential sites for Loyalist settlement at Gaspé and
on the upper St. Lawrence and Bay of Quinte. He tried
to check the illegal Loyalist settlement on Missisquoi
Bay and to defeat the plot of some seigneurs to persuade
the Loyalists to settle on their lands. He spent the
summer and autumn of 1784 surveying and overseeing the
settlement of Augusta Township on the upper St.
Lawrence, where he chose to settle and where he brought
his family. His interest in acquiring land now became
a major personal concern. He remained prominent locally
until his death in 1798, serving as a justice of the
peace and a member of his district land board. His
second son, Livius Peters, continued his tradition of
public service.

Sherwood's historic importance may be seen from
his role in the Revolutionary War and in the post-war period. He was a dedicated Loyalist leader who devoted himself entirely to his work, and yet he did maintain many of the friendships which had been forged in Vermont. Sherwood demonstrated well the ambivalence of the American Tory who was a more complex individual than he has often been portrayed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In this endeavour I have benefited greatly from the warm and friendly assistance which I have received from the staffs of archives, libraries, and museums in both Canada and the United States. I should like to thank all of those people who assisted me with their knowledge, their interest, and their encouragement, and specifically mention those individuals who were particularly helpful to me: Mr. John Buechler of the Special Collections Room, Guy W. Bailey Library, University of Vermont; Mr. Charles Morrissey, Secretary of the Vermont Historical Society, Montpelier, and his small but dedicated staff; Mr. James McCabe of the Martha Canfield Library, Arlington, Vermont, who introduced me to the Doctor George Russell Collection of Vermontiana; Mr. Charles Gardner Bennett of the Genealogical Library at the Bennington Museum, Bennington, Vermont; Mrs. Janet Axman and Mr. Robert Schnare of the History and Genealogy section of the Connecticut State Library, Hartford; Mr. William E. Meuse, Jr. of the National Park Service at the Saratoga National Battlefield Park; Mr. Thomas Dunnings of the Manuscript Department, New-York Historical Society, New York City; Professor Howard Peckham, Mr. William Ewing, and Mr. William Joyce of the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Miss Barbara Wilson of the Public Archives of Canada;
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My wife Ann checked references for me, typed the rest of the first draft, and perhaps most important, put up with me and made my life bearable until the task was completed.
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>AHR:</td>
<td>American Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.M.:</td>
<td>British Museum</td>
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<td>CHR:</td>
<td>Canadian Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.L.P.:</td>
<td>Crown Land Papers in the Public Archives of Ontario</td>
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<td>CTCP:</td>
<td>Connecticut Tercentenary Publications Commission</td>
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<td>GBL:</td>
<td>Guy Bailey Library, University of Vermont</td>
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<td>NYHS:</td>
<td>New-York Historical Society</td>
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<td>New York Public Library</td>
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<td>New York State Library</td>
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<td>OHS, P &amp; R:</td>
<td>Ontario Historical Society, Papers &amp; Records</td>
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<td>PRO Vermont:</td>
<td>Public Records Office of the State of Vermont</td>
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<td>TRSC:</td>
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<td>VHS:</td>
<td>Vermont Historical Society</td>
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CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS IN CONNECTICUT

On April 6, 1727, John Sherwood, the son of Doctor Thomas Sherwood of Stratford, Connecticut, married Hannah Parruck of nearby Newtown. At the time of the marriage, John was still four months from his eighteenth birthday, while Hannah was just sixteen.¹ The young couple, the future parents of Justus Sherwood, settled in Hannah's home town, not far from the Housatonic River in northern Fairfield County in Connecticut. John Sherwood was apparently not one to set the rafters of the Newtown meeting house ringing with his oratory, as the town records do not indicate that he played a prominent role in civic affairs. He was almost certainly a farmer like the vast majority of his neighbours. By 1767, his lands were listed on the Newtown tax records as being valued at £56 6s.² Connecticut in those pre-Revolutionary days was not the bustling hive of commercial and industrial activity which it was to become in the early nineteenth century. Farmers constituted a very sizeable majority of the colony's population, and even professional men and artisans frequently engaged in agricultural activities on a part-time basis.³

As has so often been the case in an agriculturally based society, families tended to be large. Between 1730
and 1756, Connecticut's population more than tripled from 38,000 to 130,611, with natural increase rather than immigration being primarily responsible. John and Hannah Sherwood were thus not unusual in producing fourteen children during this same period. Three of these youngsters died either in infancy or in childhood, but the remaining eleven survived the rigours of a frontier farm and reached maturity. The tenth child, a son, was born on March 7, 1747, and was subsequently christened Justus. The tumultuous events of the future and his own internal resources would carry him far from the peaceful banks of the Housatonic and place obstacles in his path which his less adventurous brothers could never have imagined. Ira Allen's modern biography has described Justus at the age of thirty-three as "a man of character, educated beyond the average of those times, brave and trustworthy." Such evidence of Justus Sherwood's life as does exist would indicate that Wilbur's judgment is well-founded.

The reconstruction of a man's life from incomplete evidence presents a myriad of problems, not the least being the attempt to capture some flavour of the individual's childhood. Justus Sherwood kept no day-to-day record of his Newtown years, and it is thus with considerable justification that earlier efforts to chronicle his life have simply dismissed this vital period as one about which little is known. His father's
correspondence, if any existed, has not survived to shed light on the activities of young Justus. One may suppose, however, that as a younger son of a farming family, Justus was kept well-occupied. The following passage, taken from the life of a contemporary figure, the Presbyterian missionary, John Brainerd illustrates what was expected of a youth in the position and circumstances of Justus Sherwood:

He was taught that time was a talent to be always improved; that industry was a cardinal virtue, and laziness the worst form of original sin. Hence he must rise early, and make himself useful before he went to school; must be diligent there in study, and be promptly home to do chores at evening. His whole time out of school must be filled up by some service, — such as bringing in fuel for the day, cutting potatoes for the sheep, feeding the swine, watering the horses, picking the berries, gathering the vegetables, spooling the yarn, and running all errands. He was expected never to be reluctant, and not often tired. It may well have been that such a full and strenuous childhood was a major factor in preparing Sherwood for the often difficult life which lay ahead of him.

One supposition upon which most writers concerned with Justus Sherwood have agreed was that the man was well-read and well-educated. The language and syntax of his numerous letters and reports as seen in his official correspondence demonstrate why this observation has been made. Sherwood probably read a good deal in his spare time; perhaps he borrowed books from neighbouring
farms or took advantage of the private libraries which early characterized the New England towns. Justus apparently never progressed as far as college; indeed as a younger son in a large family, it would have been highly unlikely that he would have been chosen to go to Yale, then the only institution of higher learning in Connecticut.\textsuperscript{11} New Englanders, however, were justly renowned for their concern for education, and Newtown was no exception. The first free school had been established at the town meeting of November 29, 1726.\textsuperscript{12} As the town grew, new school districts were created. Two such districts, North Center and Middle, had been organized by 1733. By the time that Justus Sherwood was fourteen, six more districts had been formed.\textsuperscript{13} Justus thus had ample opportunity to acquire the basic education which would later stand him in such good stead.

The Anglican community of Newtown was blessed with a particularly eloquent and powerful leader in the Reverend John Beach. This divine, a colourful and dedicated man of God, had been converted from Connecticut's leading faith, Congregationalism, in 1732, and had then gone to England where he was ordained as a minister of the Anglican church. By 1746 as a missionary for the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, he had built a church in Newtown, and he continued to serve his parish there until his death in March 1782.\textsuperscript{14} The Reverend Mr.
Beach was a man of unbending principle; he was devotedly loyal to his king and continued, despite threats against his life and an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him in his own pulpit, to offer public prayers for his lawful sovereign until his death. His persistence may well have been encouraged by the presence of a large number of Loyalists in Newtown which has been described as "a hotbed of Toryism." It would, however, be ungenerous to ascribe Mr. Beach's Loyalist sentiments to a desire to pander to the foibles of one particular faction within the community. By all accounts, Mr. Beach was a man who formulated opinion rather than being swayed by it. A memorialist has described him as "a scholar thorough - a reasoner cogent - a controversialist able - a preacher persuasive - a pastor untiring - a Christian hero undaunted."16

The Reverend Mr. Beach's influence on the political attitudes of the Sherwood family must remain a matter of conjecture. Perhaps some significance may be attached to the fact that most of the Sherwoods lived quietly in Newtown during the Revolution, neither enlisting in the Continental Army nor taking the freeman's oath of fidelity to the new state government. They might have been Tories in their hearts and consciences, or they may simply have been riding out the storm of war, prepared in the end to accept either the rule of Congress or Westminster. Although John Sherwood
seems to have been a Presbyterian,\textsuperscript{18} Justus Sherwood's later support of the Anglican Church in Canada would lend strength to the suggestion that he had been exposed to that faith at some time during his life in Newtown. He would have been nine years old when Mr. Beach constructed a place of worship for supporters of the Church of England. He may have heard Mr. Beach preach on the duties of man to God and King, and been profoundly affected by the experience. He could conceivably have sought out this well-educated and strong-willed man and talked to him, thus adding to his own knowledge and strengthening his feeling of loyalty to established authority. Even in these relatively early years, the firm and forceful intellect of the Reverend John Beach could have exerted a positive influence on Justus Sherwood, stoking the fires of his future attitudes and moulding the mind of a faithful servant to his sovereign. It must be admitted that this association rests largely on supposition, but there was at least a good chance that in a small frontier community, Justus was influenced by the strongly-held views of one of the natural leaders of the community.

The French and Indian War which began on the far-off frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania in 1754 may indirectly have been an important conditioning factor in Justus Sherwood's early years. Justus would have been eleven when General James Abercromby suffered his bloody defeat at Fort Carillon on Lake Champlain. He would
have been twelve when the happy tidings of Wolfe's victory at Quebec were received in the Housatonic Valley. These events would have had a personal impact on Newtown, for by 1757 thirty-one of the town's young men had gone off to serve in the militia, some of them seeing action in William Shirley's campaign against Crown Point. Connecticut had also been well-represented in the provincial troops which accompanied Abercromby. The tales these veterans told on their return to their homes must have been heard by young Sherwood, introducing him, perhaps for the first time, to the wonders and potentialities of the wild lands which lay to the north, especially around Lake Champlain and in the Green Mountains. At the age of twelve, of course, he was too young to strike out on his own into a region which was still a vast wilderness. In time, however, as he grew older and stronger, as his knowledge of farming increased, and as other sons of Connecticut showed the way, Justus found himself in a position to satisfy any yearnings which he might have earlier experienced and to join the northward movements of the first settlers of Vermont.

On August 31, 1768, soon after coming of age, Justus Sherwood took his first truly independent step in life: he purchased from his older brother Ebenezer "one certain tract of land in the bounds of said Newtown about ten or twelve acres be the same more or less..." for the sum of fourteen pounds.
obtained the purchase price of Ebenezer's land is not known. He may have been working for wages for his father or for one of his brothers. He may even have been temporarily involved in sheep-raising, an occupation for which Newtown was well known. However the money may have been raised, Justus now had his own home, for the purchase included Ebenezer's house. It was perhaps typical of Justus in these restless years of early manhood and certainly very typical of the land speculation in Connecticut at this time, that he remained on this land for only six months. On March 6, 1769, he sold his recently acquired holding to his father for twelve pounds. Justus perhaps found that being on his own at that point was too difficult and too expensive, or he may have been drawn by the hope of greater profits. Whatever his motives were, he did not wait too long before buying a smaller, more expensive, and better farm. On October 6, 1769, he acquired "a certain parcel of land...containing six acres 13 rods of land lying at or by ye Crambury (sic) Pond so called and is bounded beginning at John Starlings Bounds & southwest corner of ye Crumby Pond then runs rhode (sic) that goes from Newtown to Stratford." This farm, bought from a man named Summers, bordered his former homestead. It offered two advantages which the latter had lacked: access to water as well as lying on a main highway. For these reasons, this smaller farm was more
valuable. An indication of this step up in the world may be seen from the next land purchase which Justus and his younger brother Daniel undertook jointly on February 28, 1771. On that date, the Sherwood brothers paid fifty pounds to Jeremiah Hubbell for "six acres of land with a dwelling house and barn standing thereon in said New-town at a place called and known by the name Pine Swamp Hill." 25 Seven months later, on October 11, Justus sold out his share of this land to Daniel for twenty-five pounds. 26 Justus may have been helping Daniel, two years his junior, to get himself established, and thus was only interested in getting back his original investment. Almost certainly, Justus was now thinking in terms of moving from Newtown and heading north to that region between the Champlain and Connecticut valleys known as the "New Hampshire Grants", the future state of Vermont.

If Justus Sherwood confided to anyone his reasons for leaving Newtown for the New Hampshire Grants, no evidence of such a discussion remains extant. He did, however, undoubtedly share the motives of thousands of other Connecticut men who had been pushing northward since the 1740's. Sherwood's own dealings in land between 1768 and 1771 indicate how the price of land was increasing. Newtown itself was an agricultural frontier, and its rising land values hinted at the promise which land still further north would hold. Connecticut's
economy, almost entirely dependent on agriculture, was already seriously depleting the scanty arable land of that small, overpopulated colony. Furthermore, taxes were heavy, markets were poor, and transportation to those markets was generally inadequate. These factors combined by the 1760's to produce a growing and genuine mania for cheap fertile land.27 According to Vermont historian Walter Hill Crockett: "It was the old land hunger that drove men and women and little children into the Vermont wilderness."28

Religious considerations were another factor which prompted migration from Connecticut, and may have played a part in Sherwood's decision. Congregationalism, the established religion of Connecticut, was involved in a bitter struggle with the Church of England and, to a lesser degree with the Baptists and several other minor non-conforming groups.29 The adherents of the Anglican faith were particularly zealous, and wished to see an American bishop created for the colonies.30 The Congregationalists, clinging to the old Puritan ideals which had originally brought them to Connecticut, resisted this movement vigourously. As a result, many Connecticut migrants left the colony to escape what they felt was the repressive attitude of Congregationalism. Their influence, strongest in western Connecticut, was carried northward to the western part of the New Hampshire Grants. By 1780 there were twenty-one Congregational-
churches in Vermont, but only two of these were located west of the Green Mountains. Arlington and Shaftsbury in southwestern Vermont were founded by the Anglicans and Baptists respectively.

Justus Sherwood's move to the New Hampshire Grants marked a definite watershed in his life. Although he may not have been completely aware of it, Sherwood was severing the bonds which had tied him to his family. With the exception of a cousin, Thomas Sherwood, who served with him during the Revolutionary War, no evidence exists to prove that Justus ever again saw any member of his family. As he was apparently a rather self-sufficient young man, perhaps this state of affairs did not especially bother him. His land purchase in Newtown with Daniel might be interpreted as indicating a certain fondness for a younger brother; in any event, Justus did not make a financial profit at Daniel's expense. A close relationship may also have existed between Justus and his sister Abigail who was two years his senior; Abigail named her first child Justus, perhaps as a tribute to her brother. John Sherwood's will seemed to favour his two eldest sons, John Parruck and Ebenezer, at the expense of his younger children. Justus was mentioned in the will, but was not left any considerable property. Whatever filial sentiments Justus Sherwood may have felt were not sufficient to keep him in Newtown, at least not while the New Hampshire Grants
beckoned.

In certain respects Justus was no pioneer when he departed from his home town; Connecticut settlers had already blazed a clear trail for him to follow. The first of these enterprising people had moved into western Massachusetts during the early 1740's, but had subsequently been scared off by the Indian menace during King George's War. In 1752, during the brief breathing spell between the latter war and the final climactic struggle with the French which broke out in 1754, two families from Wethersfield began the settlement which became Pittsfield, Massachusetts. After the fall of New France in 1759-1760 and the consequent end of French and Indian raids on the New England frontier, more families joined this original nucleus. Most of the land proprietors of Pittsfield in these early years were from eastern Massachusetts, but the vast majority of the settlers came from Connecticut. Williamstown, in the northwest corner of the Bay Colony, was founded in 1753 by natives of that province. After 1758, however, most of the settlement's new blood hailed from the over crowded little colony to the south. Nor did the flood of wandering Connecticut pioneers dry up in the Berkshire Hills. By 1760 a new postwar tide of settlement was lapping at the southern fringes of the New Hampshire Grants.

The Grants were so named because since 1749, the
governor of New Hampshire, Benning Wentworth, had been cheerfully granting land in this region to almost anyone who requested it. By 1764 he had granted about 3,000,000 acres, most of it to New England land speculators. New Hampshire's claim to this area dated from the 1620's when Captain John Mason had been granted the region which stretched from southern Maine to Lake Champlain as a reward for services rendered to the Crown. A long drawn-out border dispute with Massachusetts followed, which was finally resolved in New Hampshire's favour by a royal decision of March 5, 1740. Wentworth, who became governor in 1741, interpreted the decision of 1740 to include the Green Mountains under his province's jurisdiction. The boundary with Massachusetts was described as running west from a point due north of Pawtucket Falls "until it meets with his Majesty's other governments." Wentworth conveniently assumed that this meant that the line should run as far west as Connecticut and Massachusetts had run their boundaries, to within twenty miles of the Hudson River. By such an interpretation, Wentworth was totally ignoring the rival claim of New York to this area. The New Hampshire governor enjoyed one considerable advantage over his New York rival; he could grant land in freehold rather than under the manorial system still prevalent in New York. The freehold system was easier and cheaper, requiring only the payment of a New Hampshire lawyer to
establish clear title, while a holder of a New York land patent was required to pay an annual feudal due known as a quitrent. The incoming Connecticut settlers naturally chose to take up land which had been granted at Portsmouth rather than at Albany.

New York's legal title to the region dated back to the first cession of New Netherlands to the English in 1664, and was stronger than New Hampshire's somewhat nebulous claim. The Yorkers to some degree however were the authors of their own misfortune. They did not try to settle the disputed area, nor were they prepared to accept any private New England land titles which had been granted. They thus guaranteed that New Hampshire would have a built-in force of irate settlers in the Grants who would, in effect, serve as the defenders of that colony's sovereignty over the area. They could have checked this process to some degree by devising a scheme whereby settlers could avoid the relatively high New York quitrent. Albany's final blunder was one of timing: New York submitted a claim for the territory to Whitehall in 1753, but New Hampshire's claim had been filed two years earlier. A royal proclamation in 1764 awarded the area to New York, but by that time, New Hampshire, assisted by eager speculators and settlers from Connecticut, was effectively in possession. These land-hungry Yankees had no desire to see New York rule over the Grants and were prepared to protect themselves
by force. Thus when Justus Sherwood made his fateful decision, the scene of his future activities was already settled by hardy men who would permit no one to dominate them. It would be a more exciting and more challenging life than Newtown had offered him.

Although the exact date is unknown, Justus almost certainly made his northward trek during the winter of 1771-72. He had liquidated at least some of his holdings the previous fall with the sale of his share of Jeremiah Hubbell's land to Daniel. One unanswered question centers around the farm which he had purchased from Summers in October 1769. No record of the sale of that farm exists, and Justus did not claim any compensation for its loss in his memorial to the Loyalist commissioners after the Revolution. He could have leased it to one of his relatives who remained in Newtown, a stratagem which would have permitted him to hold and presumably receive income from this valuable piece of property. Further speculation is raised by the fact that on March 21, 1796, Justus Sherwood, in conjunction with one Daniel Shepard, purchased eight and one half acres of land at the east end of Pine Swamp Hill in Newtown, state of Connecticut.\(^{45}\) It is very likely that the Justus Sherwood mentioned in this 1796 transaction was in reality a nephew of the Justus Sherwood who was by this time a resident of Upper Canada. Newtown records do indicate the presence of a namesake of Justus
in December 1795. At the same time, Justus the Loyalist may conceivably have felt that the passions of war had calmed sufficiently to allow him openly to purchase land in the town of his birth.

Whatever Justus's Newtown holdings may have been, he did apparently depart shortly after his settlement with Daniel. Almost all migrations from Connecticut to Vermont had to be made in winter when the snow mercifully filled the hollows and covered over the stumps on the rough-hewn trails and when both the Connecticut River and Lake Champlain offered the traveller a highway of ice. From Newtown Sherwood probably followed the Housatonic to its source near Pittsfield, Massachusetts, close to the head-waters of the Hoosic River which flowed through the southwest corner of the Grants. Despite the cold and the depth of the snow, the journey to the frontier was far easier in the dead of winter. Documentary evidence indicates that by the following March, Justus Sherwood was in the Arlington-Bennington area in the southwest corner of the New Hampshire Grants where a new and exacting phase of his life was beginning. The next four years would see this restless and energetic young man mature into a leader, and develop the philosophy which John Beach had perhaps already implanted in his mind. The seed had been sown in Connecticut, but it would be in Vermont where the potential of Justus Sherwood would
begin to become apparent and provide the strength which would sustain him through the difficult years which lay ahead.
FOOTNOTES

1Donald Jacobus, History and Genealogy of the families of Old Fairfield County (2 vols., Hartford, 1930), II, 864.

2Jane E. Johnson, Newtown's History and Historian (Newtown, 1917), 220.


5Jacobus, History and Genealogy, 865.


10Wilbur, Ira Allen, I, 192; Charles A. Jellison, Ethan Allen, Frontier Rebel (Syracuse, 1969), 255.

11Franklin B. Dexter, Biographical Sketches of the Graduates of Yale College (5 vols., New York, 1896). Volumes II and III cover the years when Sherwood would have graduated had he attended Yale.


15 E. L. Johnson, *Newtown's Bicentennial*, 121.

16 Jane E. Johnson, *Newtown's History*, 82.


18 Charles R. Hale (comp.), *Newtown Revolutionary War Soldiers* (Folio in Connecticut State Library); Jane E. Johnson, *Newtown's History*, 121-23.


23 Newtown, Register of Deeds, IX, 195.


31 Lewis D. Stilwell, *Migration from Vermont* (Montpelier, 1948), 76.


33 Jacobus, *History and Genealogy*, 866.

34 Ibid.


45 Newtown, Register of Deeds, XVIII, 353.


CHAPTER II

THE MAKING OF A LOYALIST

Justus Sherwood discovered shortly after his arrival in the New Hampshire Grants that neutrality in the struggle between New York and New Hampshire interests was impossible. Justus was drawn into the conflict, although his role in the ensuing difficulties appears to have been only a minor one. His sympathy definitely lay with his fellow settlers from Connecticut who had obtained grants under New Hampshire patents. He also became friendly with the leaders of the resistance to Albany, the Green Mountain Boys. The latter, organized early in 1770, was a loose military association or unofficial militia which was dedicated to protecting the rights of New Hampshire patent holders.¹ Their activities were occasionally marked with violence, although the Mountaineers spilt very little blood in pursuit of their goal, relying more on the periodic burning of a Yorker barn and the threats and bluster of their eloquent commander, Ethan Allen.² Until at least early 1775, Justus Sherwood was associated with this extra-legal body, and probably supported it as long as it directed its attention to the iniquities of Albany rather than attempting to sever the British connection. At least two other future Tories, Jeremiah French and William
Marsh of Manchester, were also involved with the Green Mountain Boys.3

Justus's arrival in the Grants coincided with an apparent escalation of the agitation over the fate of the future state of Vermont. Governor William Tryon of New York had, on December 9, 1771, issued a proclamation offering a reward of £20 for the capture of three prominent Green Mountain Boys: Ethan Allen, Ramember Baker, and Robert Cochran.4 These three issued a counter proclamation of their own on February 5, 1772. They contemptuously offered a reward of £15 for James Duane, a prominent New York lawyer who was interested in Vermont lands, and £10 for John Kempe, New York's attorney-general. This proclamation against Duane and Kempe was expressed in the sort of calm and well-reasoned language that would appeal to the less radical elements of the community, men like Justus Sherwood. The two New Yorkers were accused of having "by their menace and threats, greatly disturbed the public peace and repose of the honest peasants of Bennington, and the settlements to the northward, which peasants are now and ever have been in the peace of God and the King, and are patriotic and liege subjects of George the Third."5 An Albany magistrate, John Munro, who was a resident of Shaftsbury, decided that the time had come to check these turbulent Vermonters, and devised a plan to arrest Remember Baker.
Sherwood's real baptism in violence came about as a result of this celebrated escapade.

Justice Munro enlisted ten of his own servants and two constables to make up his posse. During the early morning hours of a Sunday late in March of 1772, the Yorker party made its way to Remember Baker's house in Arlington, about fifteen miles north of Bennington in the southwest corner of the Grants. The attackers broke down Baker's door and attempted to seize him in his bed. The object of the attack fought for his life and liberty with considerable gusto. Seizing an axe, Baker retreated to his attic, knocked a board out of the wall, and jumped outside into a snowbank, which engulfed him up to his waist. Unable to extricate himself from the deep snow, Baker was taken by Munro's men who, in the flamboyant phrases of Ethan Allen, "unhumanly cut him with their swords across the head, and cut one arm near half off, and almost split his thumb off from the hand of his other arm." In the course of these proceedings, Baker's wife and twelve-year old son were also badly wounded. Baker was then bound and was placed either on a horse or in a sleigh for an uncomfortable ride to Albany and imprisonment. Justice Munro apparently did not seriously anticipate any difficulty, for he permitted his men to stop and rest before they had reached the safety of the west bank of the Hudson. The subsequent delay gave a pursuing party of enraged
Vermonters sufficient time to overhaul the New Yorkers and rescue Baker. Munro later reported with disgust that he could have held off the attackers, if most of his own men had not panicked and run for cover in some nearby woods. However, the Albany magistrate did submit to Governor Tryon a list of the miscreants who had frustrated his mission. One of the fourteen men on that list was Justus Sherwood.

The fact that Sherwood was identified by Munro as one of Baker's rescuers has naturally led to the assumption that the youthful Justus had thrown in his lot with the Green Mountain Boys. This suggestion is supported by an affair which occurred shortly after the Baker incident. Sherwood and Seth Warner, a prominent member of the movement of resistance against New York, were riding together when they were suddenly confronted by the persistent Munro. The latter attempted to arrest the two men, but was driven off when Warner drew and shattered his sword on the unfortunate New Yorker's head. According to Ira Allen's later report, the blow did not seriously injure Munro who was saved by "his thick hat, hair, and skull." Munro, when he eventually recovered his senses, must certainly have felt that Sherwood was a loyal member of the Allen-Warner clique. The friendship which developed between Sherwood and the Allens has also been suggested as a factor which drew Justus into active participation in
the activities of the Green Mountain Boys. This rela-
tionship has perhaps been too much taken for granted or
has been endowed with a depth which it did not have. It
did, however, exist, and was based on a common antipathy
to the New Yorkers. In February 1775 Ethan Allen con-
erred with Sherwood at the latter's cabin over the
"Bloody Law," a recent New York statute which forbade
on pain of death any assembly of more than two people
anywhere in the Grants.12 More than six years later,
Sherwood recalled those days when he spoke of "my
former personal friendship with Ira Allen" and "my
former good friend, General (Ethan) Allen."13 The
relationship was undoubtedly cordial, but the question
remains how far Sherwood really was committed to the
views of his friends.

Some slight doubt has been cast on Sherwood's
role in the Baker affair. In 1795 a Vermont publica-
tion, The Rural Magazine, printed a list of nine men
who had supposedly rescued Baker twenty-three years
earlier.14 This list was entirely different from the
one which John Munro had compiled. Two nineteenth-
century Vermont historians, Hiland Hall and Isaac
Jennings, have accepted this 1795 account as the true
one.15 Hill argued that there were actually two posses,
one from Bennington, and one from Baker's home town of
Arlington and the nearby town of Sunderland. The Rural
Magazine list included only Bennington settlers, while
Munro's list included only Arlington and Sunderland men. Hall further speculated that as the actual rescue occurred closer to Bennington than to Arlington, that the party from the latter place might have arrived on the scene after the rescue had taken place, and that both groups had returned together. While Hall may indeed be correct, it seems odd that Munro would have submitted to Tryon a list of the late arrivals and not have included any of the individuals who had originally effected the rescue.16 As far as Justus Sherwood is concerned, Munro's evidence would indicate that he played a role of some sort in the affair. In any case, it indicates that he had indeed arrived in the Grants by March 1772.

Sherwood's relationship with the increasingly belligerent Green Mountain Boys remains unclear. Certainly Sherwood knew the organization's leaders and sympathized with their long-term goals. The charge of one Vermont historian, H. P. Smith, that he was actually a secret agent of a company of New York land-jobbers appears to have no foundation.17 No list of the Green Mountain Boys includes Justus Sherwood's name, but the only lists in existence were compiled after Ethan Allen's attack on Fort Ticonderoga on May 10, 1775, an event which Sherwood certainly would have deplored.18 One historian, Eula C. Lapp, has stated that Sherwood was a member of the force which took Ticonderoga, but she has offered no supporting evidence for this assertion.19 It
seems highly unlikely that Justus would have taken part in such an enterprise against British authority "in the name of the Great Jehovah and the Continental Congress."

In certain financial and practical matters, Justus Sherwood's connections with prominent Green Mountain Boys may be readily seen. The Brownson brothers of Sunderland, Eli, Timothy, and Gideon, all had dealings with him. On May 18, 1773, Justus sold Gideon Brownson for the consideration of $32 a tract of land in Sunderland on the banks of the Battenkill River. The ledgers which the three Brownsons kept show several transactions involving seed and clothing which they conducted with Sherwood between December 1773 and May 1775. The ledgers reveal as well the fact that Sherwood periodically employed a young man named David Mallory who was very much involved with the Green Mountain Boys. Eli Brownson's ledger states, interestingly enough, that Sherwood sold Mallory a blank book, paper, ink powder and a Bible, while Justus's wife, Sarah, made him a jacket and a pair of Indian stockings. Mallory was subsequently shot and killed near Arlington in July 1777 while on a raid to seize cattle from known Tories. He had been dispatched on this mission by Seth Warner after the latter had retreated to Manchester following the battle of Hubbardton.24

Sherwood's place of residence between the late winter of 1772 and the spring of 1774 was Sunderland, a
small community northeast of Arlington where Ethan Allen and his clever and ambitious younger brother Ira also lived. In 1764 eleven Anglican families had left Newtown and had ultimately settled in Arlington. Sherwood undoubtedly knew some of these people and would thus have had assistance in getting himself established. For whatever reasons, he preferred Sunderland where he remained until new opportunities beckoned him still further north.

The opportunity to follow the expanding frontier of the Grants provides yet another connection between Justus Sherwood, the Allens, and Remember Baker. These latter enterprising individuals by the spring of 1773 had organized the Onion River Land Company, which offered "a large tract of land, situated both sides the mouth of Onion River, and stretching westerly on Lake Champlain containing about forty-five thousand acres, and sundry lesser parcels of land further up the said river." During the summer and fall, this new company blazed a crude road from the northernmost settlement, Castleton, to the Onion River (the present Winooski River), a distance of seventy miles. This road followed approximately the present course of Highways 30 and 7 from Castleton to Winooski via Middlebury and Vergennes. In the spring of 1774 Sherwood joined the rush to these new lands, ultimately settling in New Haven, six miles
southeast of the town of Vergennes, and about a mile from the banks of Little Otter Creek. During the month of June, he built himself a log cabin and subsequently planted an orchard of young apple trees. The foot-loose young man now appeared ready to settle down, especially as he had recently married Sarah Bottum, the daughter of Elijah and Dorothy Bottum of Shaftsbury.

Justus apparently made a fine choice in the young bride who would in time give him five children. Sarah, like her husband, was Connecticut-born; her birthplace had been the town of Norwich in the year 1754. When she was fourteen, her father disposed of his Norwich property for $193, and moved his family north to the settlement of Shaftsbury, five miles south of Arlington in the New Hampshire Grants. The Bottums were among the first settlers in Shaftsbury, and were renowned for the fine grade of sheep which they raised. Justus Sherwood's in-laws were people of some property and standing in the community, and Sarah probably brought a handsome dowry to the cabin in New Haven. In any case, Sarah herself was also handsome, being described in one account as "stately" and "dark-haired." That she was a woman of strength and character may be deduced from her journey from Shaftsbury to Ticonderoga in the fall of 1777 to join her husband. She was seven months pregnant at the time and she had to pass through nearly one hundred miles of country which was still in an uproar
from the Burgoyne invasion. There can be little doubt that Sarah must surely have been a source of both courage and comfort to Justus.

During their first year of life together, the young Sherwoods were active both in their own domestic activities and in the life of their community. Justus tended his beloved apple trees sufficiently well that, despite later depredations by deer and moose during the war, the trees survived and were transplanted. Sarah bore the first of Justus's children, a son named Samuel. Justus also became involved in local politics, playing a part sufficiently meritorious to wring begrudging praise from the anti-Loyalist nineteenth-century Vermont antiquarian, Abby Maria Hemenway: "it is due that we should mention Justus Sherwood, although the finale of his life was anything but such as demands the acknowledgement of obligations from an American." Sherwood was elected proprietor's clerk at the first New Haven town meeting, which was held on October 10, 1774. In June 1775, the fourth division of land in New Haven was made by a division committee of three settlers; Sherwood served on that committee and also participated in another similar body whose responsibility it was to lay out highways. By the summer of 1775 Justus Sherwood had emerged as a leading figure in his community. He had found his place on this far-flung frontier, and would probably have really been enjoying himself had it not been for the
distant thunder of the approaching Revolutionary War.

During these years preceding the war, Justus was actively acquiring land, both in the New Hampshire Grants and elsewhere. The size of his holdings, claimed in his memorial to be 1,000 acres of wild land on the Susquehanna and between 1,600 and 2,000 in Vermont, would indicate a considerable amount of land.\textsuperscript{42} The Susquehanna holdings suggest a possible connection with the Susquehanna Company, a group of Connecticut speculators interested in Pennsylvania land.\textsuperscript{43} The size of Justus's Vermont holdings may perhaps be attributed to his relationship with the Allens who were themselves holders of thousands of acres. The New Haven Town Council had, presumably as a measure of protection, formed a committee of "adventurers." These men were each granted 150 acres, on the condition that by June 1, 1775, the date of the next division, some improvement had been made on the land. The New Haven adventurers were top-heavy with leading Green Mountain Boys - Ethan Allen, Seth Warner, Robert Cochran, Jesse Sawyer, Peleg Sutherland - and included Justus Sherwood.\textsuperscript{44} Sawyer subsequently sold out his share to Sherwood on January 25, 1776, thus tying Justus more closely than ever to his community as the crisis of American independence approached.\textsuperscript{45} The necessity of having to choose sides was becoming increasingly apparent. Justus would have worried about how his decision would affect his family
and his pleasantly stable life. Judging by his later record, he came to the conclusion with no regrets and no doubts that he must oppose the Revolution and threw himself with vigour and determination into the struggle on the side of the British connection.

The roots of Justus Sherwood's loyalty to the Crown may be traced primarily to his religious beliefs and to his personality. In two respects, Sherwood fitted admirably into a typical Loyalist pattern: he was most probably a member of the Church of England and he was a man of property. He had perhaps been exposed to the staunchly Tory clergyman Reverend John Beach whose influence on him has already been suggested. Alexander Clarence Flick has noted that Anglicanism made loyalty to the ruler and obedience to law religious duties. This did not, however, imply that good Anglicans should meekly submit to acts which they regarded either as blunders or the products of injustice. Sherwood could thus oppose New York Governor Tryon and his supporters in Albany on the grounds that since their policies were unjust, opposition to them did not in itself mean rebellion against duly constituted authority. Flick observed further: "Only when the issue came to be one between submission to the will of the King and parliament, as expressed in law, and resistance by rebellion or revolution, did religious duty enforce obedience. The political science of Anglicanism was,
therefore, a fundamental principle in loyalty." 47 Sherwood would certainly have agreed.

A number of prominent Loyalists - Charles Inglis, Jonathan Boucher, William Eddis, Daniel Leonard - have outlined their political credo for posterity. 48 While Justus Sherwood would have endorsed most of their views, he never committed to paper a concrete statement of his own political ideas. He spoke of the Revolutionary War as "the late unhappy Rebellion," but his correspondence during that conflict was, for the most part, confined to military matters and provided relatively little insight into factors which shaped his political thinking. 49 The reader of Sherwood's letters does, however, emerge with the feeling that the writer respected order and decency, and that he felt that the mobs from which the American rebels drew their support lacked both in alarming quantities.

This conclusion was not an entirely academic one, drawn in the comparative safety of a post well behind the British lines, for Sherwood had had at least two encounters with those whose views so opposed his own before his escape to Canada in October 1776. These incidents, occurring in New Haven and Bennington, no doubt strengthened his original loyalty. Justus had one other characteristic which should be noted: he was basically a reasonable, non-violent man, the sort of person who regarded the use of physical force as a last
resort. During the war, he generally conducted himself with a commendable respect for humanity and rarely lost his sense of perspective. He was, above all, a Loyalist by choice rather than one who followed the dictates of opportunism. One authority, Chilton Williamson, has suggested that the overwhelming presence of Burgoyne's army was a major factor in carrying a number of local Vermont leaders, including Justus Sherwood, over to the British side.\textsuperscript{50} Sherwood's own direct testimonial, and, perhaps more important, the evidence of the strength of his character tend to cast serious doubt on Williamson's suggestion. The latter does, however, raise a valid question: was Justus Sherwood's loyalty truly altruistic?

Relatively few men would have called themselves Loyalists in 1774; Justus Sherwood was not among those few. The property which he had acquired may be suggested as a motive for his subsequent loyalty, and yet the Allen brothers, with far greater property than Sherwood, were at least initially among the leaders of the revolutionary movement in Vermont. Justus would have been well advised to sit back and say nothing, as so many Loyalists and potential Loyalists did, while awaiting the outcome of the war. Instead of adopting such a prudent and cautious course, he chose to attempt during the summer of 1776 to convince his neighbours not to take up arms against the British.\textsuperscript{51} The Declaration of Independence in July 1776 may well have been the turning point in
Sherwood's thinking, convincing him that he could procrastinate no longer, that the time had come to stand and be counted. Perhaps as he debated the question with himself, he considered the desirability of remaining silent. His position in the community, however, and his association with the Allens would never have permitted him to indulge in such a luxury. People would have been asking his opinion, seeking his guidance, and wanting to know where he stood. Thus deprived of the cloak of relative anonymity, Justus Sherwood was compelled to take a position. That these circumstances existed do not detract from the courage of the man, but do help to put his loyalism in a better perspective. The choice which he made was a predictable one, for whether he fully realized it or not, Justus Sherwood was a Tory, by virtue of his background and his temperament.

For Sherwood the war for American independence truly began in August 1776 when an armed company of men appeared at his cabin. In a fit of revolutionary fervour, the men ransacked the house, taking what they wanted and destroying everything else. Sherwood's chests were broken open, and his personal papers were torn, trampled and scattered about the cabin floor. Justus was arrested, but, perhaps because of his influence in the community, he was permitted to put up bail and return to his rifled home. He had, however, scarcely been reunited with his family when his home was invaded a second time by an
armed group whom Sherwood called "a Guard of Insulters."
These worthies, probably operating on their own authority,
kept Justus and his family as prisoners in their own
home, and forced the unhappy Sherwoods to feed them.
Justus was ultimately committed to jail and was brought
to trial for the crimes of being hostile to the country,
of refusing to take an oath of allegiance to the new
regime, and of sending intelligence to General Carleton
in Canada.\textsuperscript{52} Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Jackson has
suggested that the last charge may well have been true,
in the light of Sherwood's later career, but there is no
evidence to support such an assertion.\textsuperscript{53} After he had
been in prison about a month, Justus was taken before a
body known as the Grand Committee, and, presumably on
the basis that he had been found guilty of the charges
against him, he was condemned "to be shut up in Simsbury
Mines during life."\textsuperscript{54}

In his memorial, Sherwood described his sentence
as "shocking" and "worse than death," and he was un-
doubtedly correct.\textsuperscript{55} Simsbury Mines, abandoned copper
mines about ten miles northwest of Hartford, Connecticut,
was one of the most infamous of prisons. The unfortunate
inmates were confined on a damp platform about eighty
feet below the surface of the earth, a place where the
air was foul and was only just made bearable by the use
of pots of charcoal.\textsuperscript{56} Justus managed to escape before
he could be conveyed to Simsbury, and fled into hiding
in the Green Mountains. He then made his way to Bennington, probably to rejoin Sarah who, being seven months pregnant, had sought the safety of her family at nearby Shaftsbury.

In Bennington, Justus gave voice to his pent-up feelings of frustration, and drew unwelcome attention to himself. He was seized, tried before "Judge Lynch," and sentenced to twenty lashes with a bundle of beech rods. This punishment, familiarly known in Bennington as the application of the "beech seal," was reputed to be more of a humiliation to the sufferer than it was actually painful. However true that may have been, those twenty lashes seem to have been instrumental in formulating Sherwood's further plans. Sarah was left with her family, and that December she gave birth to her second child, Diana. Justus again took refuge in the mountains. He managed to gather a band of forty men who shared views similar to his own, and then led this group westward to Crown Point on Lake Champlain. By a happy turn of fate, his arrival at that post in October coincided almost exactly with that of the governor and commander-in-chief in Canada, Sir Guy Carleton. Carleton's correspondence provides no evidence to support any suggestion that Sherwood had either been sending intelligence to Canada or had arrived at Crown Point by prearranged plan. Carleton had just defied the resourceful Benedict Arnold in a naval
engagement off Valcour Island, and had pursued the battered American fleet southward, forcing the Americans to abandon Crown Point and retreat to Ticonderoga. Had Sherwood's little troop arrived even a few days earlier at Crown Point, they might well have found it still in American hands.

For Justus Sherwood, his arrival within the British lines on that fall day of 1776 signaled the end of another period of his life. His Vermont farm at New Haven and his other land holdings were now apparently lost, and his wife and son were behind the enemy lines. When Carleton, thinking it too late in the season to besiege Ticonderoga, withdrew back to St. Johns, Sherwood went with him, having offered his services in a military capacity to the Crown. He would proudly state later that the little troop which he led to Crown Point was "the first body of Loyalists in America that joined His Majesty's Army." 62 Although this was not strictly true - General Gage had formed at least three small Loyalist corps in Boston during the summer of 1775 - Sherwood had the distinction of being among the first American Loyalists to volunteer his services. 63 The Revolutionary War, like his move from Connecticut to the New Hampshire Grants, would provide further opportunities and challenges to test his mettle and try his patience. It was perhaps ironic that this often bitter struggle would bring out the best qualities
which Justus Sherwood had to offer and would give him his own unique place in the histories of two nations.
FOOTNOTES

1 John Pell, Ethan Allen (Boston & New York, 1929), 33.

2 Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 36.


5 Guy W. Bailey Library, University of Vermont: Allen Papers, "Advertisement posted by Ethan Allen, Remember Baker, and Robert Cochran...February 5, 1772."

6 Lewis Cass Aldrich, History of Bennington County, Vermont (Syracuse, 1889), 52.

7 The Connecticut Courant, Hartford, April 28, 1772.

8 O'Cailagh (ed.), Documentary History, IV, 472, Munro's list of the Bennington Rioters.

9 Ibid.

10 Aldrich, Bennington, 52.

11 Vermont Historical Society, Collections (Montpelier, 1871), I, 350, Ira Allen's History of Vermont.

12 Pell, Ethan Allen, 72.


14 The Rural Magazine, I, (May, 1795), 415-20, as cited by Walton, Records, I, 149-50. The magazine was published at Rutland, Vermont by Doctor Samuel Williams. See also VHS, Collections, II, xii.

Walton, *Records*, I, 150.

H. P. Smith (ed.), *History of Addison County, Vermont* (Syracuse, 1886), 526.

The Vermont *Antiquarian*, III, 3 (March 1905), 138-43; GBL: Allen Papers, "List of Green Mountain Boy officers in 1775."


Tbid.: Eli Brownson ledger, I, entry dated December 19, 1773.

Tbid.: 3, entries dated December 18, 1773 and January 27, 1774.


PRO Vermont: Sunderland Deeds, I, 78.

Crockett, *Vermont*, V, 484-85.


The *Connecticut Courant*, May 25, 1773.

30 Hemenway, Gazetteer, I, 70.


32 Jackson, Sherwood, 2.


35 Jackson, Sherwood, 2.

36 Walton, Records, I, 192.

37 Hemenway, Gazetteer, I, 71.


39 Hemenway, Gazetteer, I, 71.

40 Smith, Addison, 526.

41 Ibid., 525.

42 Justus Sherwood's claims for confiscated real estate varied slightly in the two sources which were checked. J. J. Talman (ed.), Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada (Toronto, 1946), 400, listed Sherwood's losses at 1,985 acres of Vermont land. The New York Public Library: American Loyalists: Transcript of the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission of Enquiry into the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists..., XXXII, 413-14 has Sherwood's losses numbered at 1,620 acres.

43 Oscar Zeichner, Connecticut's Years of Controversy, 103-11.

44 Smith, Addison, 525.


46 Alexander Clarence Flick, Loyalism in New York during the American Revolution (New York, 1901), 9.
47 Ibid.

48 Charles Inglis, The True Interest of America Impartially Stated (Philadelphia, 1776); Jonathan Boucher, Reminiscences of an American Loyalist: 1783-1789 (Boston, New York, 1925); William Eddis, Letters from America, historical and descriptive (London, 1792); Daniel Leonard, Massachusettensis (Boston, 1775).

49 Talman, Narratives, 398, Sherwood's memorial.

50 Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 70.

51 Talman, Narratives, 398.

52 Ibid., 398-99.

53 Jackson, Sherwood, 3.

54 Talman, Narratives, 399, Sherwood's memorial.

55 Ibid.


57 Talman, Narratives, 399.

58 Smith, Addison, 526.

59 Memorandum on the birth of Diana Sherwood at Arlington, Vermont, on December 11, 1776 from the diary of Elijah Bottem Smedes, made available to the author through the kindness of Doctor and Mrs. Charles McWilliam, River Road West, Prescott, Ontario.

60 Talman, Narratives, 399.


62 Talman, Narratives, 399.

CHAPTER III

QUEEN'S LOYAL RANGER

The pending invasion of the northern colonies by the expedition led by the playwright-general John Burgoyne provided Justus Sherwood with his first employment in the service of his King. In March 1777 Sir Guy Carleton dispatched Sherwood and five men on a scouting party to examine the enemy's defenses in the crucial heavily-wooded region between the southern end of Lake Champlain and the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers.¹ The British force under Burgoyne, who had replaced Carleton in command of operations from Canada, would be able to sail from St. Johns to Crown Point with impunity after Carleton's victory over Arnold at Valcour Island the previous October, and the real test of the expedition's ability to achieve its goal would come in its passage through the treacherous and strategic stretch of country to the south. Sherwood's mission was a success; he reported on the fortifications and artillery implanations at Ticonderoga, Mount Independence, Skeneborough (the modern Whitehall, New York), Fort Ann, Fort Edward, and Fort George, as well as enemy troop movements and dispositions north of Albany.² The only unfortunate occurrence came when two of Sherwood's men were taken prisoner on the shore
of Lake Champlain by an American scouting party. The quick-witted Justus and his remaining three men seized their would-be captors' boats and escaped by taking to the lake, thus providing themselves with transport and depriving the enemy of his. By the beginning of May, Sherwood's party had returned safely to Montreal with its intelligence.3

While it might appear gratuitous to question Sherwood's motives in undertaking this dangerous task, it should be noted that he had a very definite personal reason for accepting such an assignment. Sarah Sherwood had been left with her family in Shaftsbury, and Justus was anxious to take this opportunity to see her and his recently-born daughter, Diana. As a result of this visit, Sarah again became pregnant, and the following December, reunited with her husband in St. Johns, Quebec, she gave birth to her second son, Livius Peters Sherwood.4 Justus was never a man to put the good of the service ahead of his own or his family's personal welfare, and this clandestine meeting with his beloved Sarah must surely be dismissed as the natural act of a loving husband and father.

When the Burgoyne offensive was launched in June 1777, Justus Sherwood was a captain in the Queen's Loyal Rangers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Peters.5 The latter, like Sherwood, was a Connecticut-born migrant to Vermont who had tried unsuccessfully to
ride out the bitter storm which raged through the Grants. Sherwood and Peters, at least initially, seem to have gotten along reasonably well: the former, out of either respect or admiration for his commanding officer, gave his name as a middle name to his son, Livius Peters, while Peters referred to Justus in one report as "a good man." Probably the name Livius was given out of respect to Peter Livius, the new Chief Justice of Quebec and former Chief Justice of New Hampshire. Justus was granted a temporary commission with a full captains' pay in recognition of the fact that he had brought in a body of recruits to Crown Point in 1776. His men were subsequently taken from him, however, and his permanent commission was thus delayed until November 19, 1781. Sherwood frequently chafed under this injustice, and it loomed large in his mind until he became seriously involved in the complicated negotiations with Vermont.

On June 12, 1777 Lieutenant-Colonel Peters received his orders: he was to march his corps from Montreal to St. Johns with as much speed as possible, and from there to embark in bateaux which would carry it south with the main army. For the time being, his corps was to act under the orders of the Quarter-master General, serving as foragers. By the first week of July the expedition had reached the narrow southern stretch of Lake Champlain and had invested
the weakly-defended Fort Ticonderoga. With the evacuation of that post on July 5, the American commander, Major General Arthur St. Clair, retreated eastward toward Castleton, Vermont, with about 2,500 troops. Seth Warner, Sherwood's associate in earlier days, was posted with 1,000 men at the village of Hubbardton, about seven miles north of Castleton, to act as a rearguard. On July 6, Brigadier-General Simon Fraser's corps, to which Peters' men were attached, left Mount Independence near Ticonderoga in pursuit of the enemy.\textsuperscript{10} Justus Sherwood, employed as a scout, led a small advance party of Indians and enlisted men to the village of Hubbardton itself, in an effort to probe Warner's defenses. A skirmish ensued, during which one of the enemy, Captain John Hall of Castleton, was shot in the leg and captured.\textsuperscript{11} Sherwood took four other prisoners, one of whom subsequently escaped, and retired to Fraser's main camp, about three miles from Hubbardton.\textsuperscript{12} Early on the following morning, Fraser, reinforced by the corps of Baron Friedrich Adolphus Riedesel, attacked in earnest and drove Warner's men from the field.

Justus Sherwood did not play a major part in the battle of Hubbardton itself. His role was very largely that of scout and forager. His main action of the day was the capture of several civilians, including one Samuel Churchill and his family. Sherwood's men plundered the Churchill home of all its supplies, and
were about to burn the house itself. The Churchill women, one of whom fainted with fear and exhaustion, begged Sherwood to call off his men and spare their home. Justus, not a man to cause any more hardship than necessary, agreed to spare the homestead. He was, however, disappointed not to find any grain in the Churchill barns, and strongly suspected that the settler had hidden supplies nearby. In a most untypical move for a basically gentle and decent man, Sherwood permitted himself to be persuaded by some of the Indians in his party to tie Churchill to a tree and threatened to burn him alive unless he revealed where his grain was hidden.13 This incident gave Abby Maria Hemenway, who hated to admit that there was any virtue among those who supported George III, an opportunity to depict Sherwood as a "barbarous wretch." With considerable pleasure, she related how Sherwood kept Churchill tied to a tree for three or four hours, constantly taunting and threatening him while demanding repeatedly: "Tell us where your flour is, you old Rebel."14 To the probable disappointment of the Indians and the certain disappointment of Miss Hemenway, Sherwood ultimately relented. Churchill was released and, with his family and several other prisoners, was conveyed to Fort Ticonderoga.15

Peters' embryonic corps of roughly 300 Loyalists had been involved in the main battle and had lost six
men. Sherwood's own role in this opening battle of the Burgoyne campaign appears, at least at first glance, to be singularly unheroic. Scouting, however, was a dangerous and very important aspect of this type of warfare where the terrain was irregular and heavily-forested. Sherwood had proved his ability as a scout during March and April, and it was probably the success of that mission which now dictated the part that he would play. While his treatment of Churchill may be considered brutal, it was no worse or a good deal better than the fate often suffered by prisoners in this first American civil war. Furthermore, Sherwood was also trying his hand as a forager, a role which would become increasingly important as Burgoyne's men floundered in the swamps along Wood Creek on the tortuous trek between Skenessboro and Fort Edward. In the next major engagement of the campaign, the debacle at Bennington, Sherwood would be much more prominent than he had been at Hubbardton.

The raid which culminated in the British defeat near Bennington on August 16 was occasioned by Burgoyne's lack of supplies, especially horses, and by the hope that any Tories in the region could be persuaded to join the colours. The expedition's commander's instructions to the ill-fated raid's leader, Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, specifically spelled out its purpose: "The object of your expedition is to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount Riedesel's
dragoons, to compleat Peters's Corps, and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages."17 The expedition was to be, in effect, a reconnaissance in force across southern Vermont as far as Brattleboro in the Connecticut Valley. Sherwood's part in these proceedings, at least initially, was that of scout and forager.18 Before the Bennington raid was over, Justus would have had his first real taste of battle.

On August 13 Baum's force occupied the village of Cambridge, New York, about nineteen miles northwest of Bennington. Sherwood had been sent ahead of the main column with a party of eighty men to seize some cattle which Baum had been told were grazing near Cambridge under a guard of forty to fifty men. The cattle, as well as a few horses, and several carts and wagons were subsequently captured, along with five prisoners. Most of the defenders managed to escape, and Sherwood pursued them toward Cambridge. After about a mile, a rearguard of fifteen men opened fire on Sherwood's troops, wounding a private in the thigh. The Tories returned the fire, but the enemy was apparently satisfied and withdrew without a further exchange. Sherwood duly retired with the spoils of the skirmish and rejoined Baum.19

Burgoyne's original instructions to Baum had been to proceed to Arlington "'till the Detachment of Provincials under the command of Captain Sherwood shall join you from the Southward."20 The plan envisaged
Sherwood and a large party of scouts foraging in the region around Pownal, Bennington, and Shaftsbury and then driving the horses and cattle which they had taken north to Arlington. Sherwood's knowledge of the area made him the obvious choice for such an assignment. On August 11 Burgoyne received intelligence that a major American supply depot was located at Bennington and that it was guarded by only 400 men.21 Thus, Bennington rather than Arlington became Baum's goal, not simply as a convenient post at which to regroup, but as the first major objective of this sub-campaign. By August 13 Baum had received the disquieting news that there were actually 1,800 men at Bennington, and he assured Burgoyne that he would advance on that town with great caution. He concluded his dispatch of that day on an optimistic note: "Your Excellency may depend on hearing how I proceed at Bennington, and of my success there."22

The battle of Bennington, fought on August 16, 1777, was a sanguinary failure for the British and a real disaster for the Loyalist corps of John Peters. Baum had chosen to entrench himself on the banks of the Walloomsac River, about ten miles northwest of Bennington, to await reinforcements which he had requested from Burgoyne. The Loyalists had been placed on the right wing on the south bank of the Walloomsac. They held a redoubt on the riverbank, as well as a ford in the river which connected them with Baum's main force on the north
bank. The American forces, under Seth Warner of Vermont and Brigadier-General John Stark of New Hampshire, hit the exposed redoubt with a flanking movement. At the same time they launched a major attack against Baum, thus catching the raiders in a pincers movement. The Loyalists were utterly routed; Peters later reported that he lost 200 men out of 270 engaged. Sherwood, by his own report, saw his company of sixty men reduced to twenty-four. In the ensuing retreat, Sherwood's immediate superior, "Colonel" Pfeister, a retired British Army lieutenant who had entered the provincial service, was killed, and Sherwood himself was left in command of the remainder of the Loyalists. Another officer, Captain David McFall of the Queen's Loyal Rangers, was taken prisoner. The Bennington raid which had had the filling out of the ranks of Peters' corps as one of its main objectives had instead practically destroyed that organization. Two years later, Peters recalled his helpless fury at the decimation of his corps. The fault, he declared, lay with Burgoyne who heaped praise on the enemy, and despised the loyal Americans who came forward to help him. There would never have been such a debacle as Bennington, Peters claimed, if Loyalist advice had been heeded.

If Peters thought that Burgoyne was largely to blame for the disaster which overtook him, Burgoyne himself had other ideas and other scapegoats. Not too
surprisingly, he chose to suggest that the Loyalists had been one of the many factors which had brought about his defeat. In a statement before Parliament, he outlined his problems, dwelling for some time on the homesick French-Canadian militia which had accompanied the expedition, and then turned his attention to the Loyalists:

The Provincial Corps, of which I had two in embryo (Peters & Jessup), and several detached parties, were yet a heavier tax (than were the homesick Canadiens) upon time and patience. They were composed of professed Loyalists, many of whom had taken refuge in Canada the preceding winter, and others had joined as we advanced. The various interests which influenced their actions rendered all arrangement of them impracticable. One man's views went to the profit which he was to enjoy when his corps should be complete; another's, to the protection of the district in which he resided; a third was wholly intent upon revenge against his personal enemies; and all of them were repugnant even to an idea of subordination.29

Burgoyne's views must be seen as those of a defeated and bitter man desperately clutching at straws to avoid the awful possibility that he would be blamed for the catastrophic defeat of his expedition. His attitude, too, is also typical of the regular soldier who regards the volunteer unit as useless by definition.

Two of Burgoyne's officers supported his view of the Loyalists. Lieutenant-Colonel Kingston, adjutant-general under Burgoyne as well as his secretary, declared that with a few notable exceptions, he would have placed
little dependence on provincial troops.\textsuperscript{30} Lieutenant James M. Hadden of the Royal Artillery observed that the provincials and Canadians with Burgoyne had received but "slender praise" from the regulars, an opinion with which Hadden seemed to concur.\textsuperscript{31} Nonetheless, Burgoyne, Kingston, and Hadden all particularly remembered Justus Sherwood, and commented favourably on his conduct. Burgoyne recalled that Sherwood "was forward in every service of danger to the end of the campaign."\textsuperscript{32} Kingston testified that he especially remembered Captain Sherwood's service and that Sherwood had been from the neighbourhood where the fighting took place.\textsuperscript{33} Hadden conceded that there were some able officers among the provincials "like the brothers Jessup, Lieut. Colonel John Peters, & Capt. Justin (sic) Sherwood. The latter was a man of culture and commanded a company in Peters' Corp."\textsuperscript{34} Such praise for a Loyalist from regular officers was high praise indeed. Sherwood's role in the Burgoyne campaign surely needs no further testimonials than these.

The expedition itself was in desperate straits by September. Bennington had been a total failure, costing the invaders heavy casualties, failing to provide vitally needed supplies of transport and food, and raising instead of shaking the enemy's morale.\textsuperscript{35} Colonel Barry St. Leger's expedition down the Mohawk Valley, which was to meet Burgoyne at Albany, had also
been defeated and turned back. In New York, General William Howe had assumed after Burgoyne's relatively easy initial success at Ticonderoga that the expedition from Canada needed no further aid, and had sailed for Chesapeake Bay to attack Philadelphia. 36

Burgoyne had added to his own problems by choosing to construct a road through the wilderness from Skanesboro to Fort Edward on the Hudson, a distance of twenty-three miles, instead of using the natural water route of Lake George. According to one source, the decision to build this road was strongly influenced by the Loyalist Philip Skene, the great landholder of the region, who wished to see his property improved at government expense. Because of this project, Burgoyne arrived on the Hudson "with an army debilitated with hard labour, his provisions expended, his oxen destroyed, and his few surviving horses fit only for the food of crows, wolves, and vultures." 37 Burgoyne subsequently defended himself against this charge on two grounds. He argued that all his boats were required to haul supplies down Lake George and that his army would not have reached Fort Edward any faster had it waited until transport down the lake was available. Burgoyne felt as well that the construction of the road would be interpreted as a sign of strength by friends and enemies alike. 38 He also attempted to justify himself by saying that he expected assistance from New York from either Howe or
Henry Clinton, who had been left in command of that city when Howe moved on Philadelphia. Burgoyne was aware that he could expect no reinforcements unless Washington moved north to support the American commander, Horatio Gates, but he and his officers apparently convinced themselves that, regardless of any move by Washington, help should be coming up the Hudson. This relief expedition which never appeared became a fixation with Burgoyne and his officers and led to a feeling of bewilderment and betrayal which was repeatedly expressed during their testimonies before Parliament.39

On September 19 the two armies clashed again at Stillwater, a battle which saw fifty-seven members of the Queen's Loyal Rangers die for a cause which now appeared doomed.40 As if the disastrous turn of events since Bennington was not enough in itself, Justus Sherwood now found himself involved in a dispute within the army. On August 20 a smooth-talking Loyalist named McKay had persuaded the pitiful remnants of Sherwood's decimated company to join him on the promise that they would soon be discharged.41 Sherwood was naturally furious at this trickery on the part of a comrade-in-arms and complained bitterly to Burgoyne. He observed to the commander-in-chief that some of these men had been with him at Crown Point and that he felt a genuine sense of responsibility for them. Burgoyne assured Sherwood that it was certainly not his intention that the men
should have joined McKay, and that Sherwood would continue to be recognized and paid as a captain, despite the loss of his company. Given the circumstances, Burgoyne felt that there was little that he could do for the moment, and he urged Sherwood to accept the situation and to try and right it at a more propitious time. The event itself provided a fairly typical example of the recruiting methods of some of the Loyalists. Sherwood ran into other examples of this sort of behaviour before his military career was terminated. That he himself did not resort to such underhanded tactics may be seen as a further measure of the man.

In his memorial at the end of the war, Sherwood claimed that he had been taken prisoner at Saratoga in October 1777 and that he had "suffered many Insults & Abuses by the Rebels who happened to know him." The story sounds plausible, and has generally been accepted. Strong evidence does exist, however, to suggest that Sherwood was not taken prisoner, and that in fact he was able to escape before the final capitulation. Certainly no direct proof, other than Sherwood's own statement, substantiates his being made a prisoner at Saratoga. His memorial does not account for the fact that he was in Canada early in 1778 while the Saratoga prisoners were being held in Boston. On March 9 of that year, he was in Montreal, petitioning Sir Guy Carleton for redress for the grievances which he had
suffered at the hands of Captain McKay. Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Jackson suggests that Sherwood was exchanged, and yet there is not the smallest piece of evidence to indicate that such an occurrence did take place. On the other hand, all indications seem to point to Sherwood having left the ruined expedition with Burgoyne's permission, two or three days before the historic surrender at Schuylerville.

On the morning of October 14 John Peters met Major General William Phillips, Burgoyne's second-in-command. By this time, the American forces had completely surrounded the British camp, and Peters was feeling very apprehensive about his fate in the almost certain event of a capitulation. Indeed, a council of war the previous day had decided upon just such a step. Phillips asked him why he remained, observing that no article of the surrender would protect him or his fellow Loyalists. Peters declared that he wanted written orders to leave camp, so that he could not later be accused of desertion. Phillips agreed to speak to Burgoyne, and that afternoon he handed Peters his orders: "I certify that Colonel Peters with his officers has His Excellency Lieutenant General Burgoyne's approbation in attempting to escape through the woods to Canada." Peters and forty officers and men left camp that night and made their way through the enemy lines. On the night of October 16 a friendly fisherman ferried them across the Hudson in
his canoe, and gave them a meal of bear and moose meat and Indian corn. On the following morning, this good Samaritan and his father, both of whom professed to be Loyalists, guided Peters and his men safely through the neighbouring hills, avoiding those passes which were known to be guarded by the enemy. During that day, repeated cannon fire from the direction of Saratoga celebrated the surrender of the Burgoyne expedition, and spurred on the heavy-hearted survivors of the Queen's Loyal Rangers. At sunset on October 19 Peters reached Fort George at the south end of Lake George. The local commander at first took the bedraggled Loyalists to be deserters, but when he had seen their papers, his attitude changed. He provided food and boats, allowing Peters to conduct his men to the north end of the lake and make the overland march of two miles to Fort Ticonderoga. There the Queen's Loyal Rangers remained until the British evacuated the fort and withdrew northward to Canada.48

John Peters' description of the escape of the remains of his corps does not provide the names of the officers and men who participated in this venture. It could, therefore, be suggested that Peters' narrative does not offer proof that Sherwood accompanied his comrades. Yet if he did not, what were his reasons? Would he not naturally want to try to avoid capture? His memorial makes no mention of his being sick or
wounded, and he certainly would not have remained in the British camp voluntarily. Furthermore, on October 24, the Vermont Council of Safety at Bennington granted Sarah Sherwood permission "to go to her husband at Ticonderoga." Peters' men would have arrived at Ticonderoga on October 20 or 21. Sherwood thus would have had a golden opportunity to convey a message to Sarah that he was safe and to join him immediately before the British evacuation took place. Sarah, seven months pregnant, would certainly not have made such a hazardous journey if Justus had not been waiting for her. The matter of the parole signed by Burgoyne's officers at Cambridge, Massachusetts, may also be offered as evidence; Justus Sherwood did not sign that parole, and he continued to serve the British cause with all his energy.

Justus Sherwood's apparently false statement about what happened to him at Saratoga could be interpreted as a sign of genuine dishonesty and a blot on his character. At the same time, the whole affair should be viewed from the perspective of the time in which it occurred in order to appreciate fully the situation which Sherwood faced. The memorial which he composed for the Loyalist commissioners was designed to put his case for compensation for confiscated property in the American republic in the best possible light. Sherwood was undoubtedly aware that other Loyalists were embroidering their
petitions somewhat, and may have felt that he had to do the same thing. At least in some respects, his memorial underplayed his role in the Revolutionary War, for it contained no reference to his part in the Vermont negotiations and made only passing reference to his work in the British secret service.\textsuperscript{51} He may have been prevented by security reasons from spelling out his role in these affairs, and thus felt that he was entitled to add other details which, while untrue, were justified in order that he should receive his due. Even if this were not so, perhaps all this incident reveals is that, like most human beings, Justus Sherwood had something of an eye for the main chance. It indicates as well an example of the weakness of the loyalist petitions as a source.

Between the autumn of 1777 and the autumn of 1780 Justus Sherwood was posted at St. Johns with his family. He was still listed and paid as a captain in the Queen's Loyal Rangers, but he was unable to reassemble the nucleus of the company which had been lured away from him after Bennington.\textsuperscript{52} In March 1778, as noted above, he petitioned Sir Guy Carleton for assistance in the matter.\textsuperscript{53} In October he sent a memorial to the new governor at Quebec, General Frederick Haldimand, asking to be transferred with what few men he had to the Indian Department as a company of Rangers. Sherwood admitted that his company was badly under strength, but expressed confidence in his ability to find additional recruits.\textsuperscript{54} Neither Carleton nor Haldimand was prepared to help
Sherwood, and the latter thus became a disappointed and frustrated man. As late as April 1780 he was still trying to find suitable men to fill up his company, but was hindered by the fact that most of the Loyalists coming in to St. Johns had already made verbal agreements to join some other provincial corps.55

While Sherwood fretted about his military status, he did manage to keep himself occupied. By the summer of 1778, he was involved in collecting and evaluating intelligence reports at St. Johns. He was concerned with finding reliable couriers who could go safely back and forth to Albany and the Connecticut Valley, and with establishing contacts behind the rebel lines with bona fide "friends of government."56 In October of that same year, Sherwood participated in his first military exercise since the Burgoyne disaster. He accompanied a reconnaissance in force led by Major Christopher Carleton, Sir Guy's younger brother, to Otter Creek and the south end of Lake Champlain, a well-known Tory center.57 His role in such an expedition was two-fold: he was generally familiar with the area in question, and he was involved in procuring intelligence. Lake Champlain and the Richelieu Valley formed a two-way street linking Quebec to the rebelling colonies. With the British military establishment in Quebec relatively small after 1778, it was vital that Haldimand keep a close eye on the enemy's activity at the southern end of this route.
British strength at Quebec was sufficient to threaten the frontier of relatively helpless Vermont or menace the Mohawk Valley, but would hardly have been capable of stopping a major American assault up the traditional invasion route.58

Sherwood's residence in St. Johns was enlivened at least to some degree during the summer of 1780 by a dispute with a fellow officer in the Queen's Loyal Rangers, Lieutenant Gresham French. Peters had accepted French into the rangers in 1777, and had subsequently regretted it, as he found the man to be extremely dishonest.59 Peters reported that French had stolen money which had been part of the corps' pay, and had also privately sold supplies from the King's stores.60 In the spring of 1779 Peters had sent Sherwood a letter asking him to obtain depositions from certain people in St. Johns whom French had allegedly swindled. The courier, Roger Stevens, an ambivalent man who was capable of very good work but was not always reliable, had gone to French's lodgings in Montreal and had shown him the letter. French had then sought Sherwood out, and had tried to convince him of his good conduct.61 Sherwood appeared outwardly satisfied with French's explanation, but he was undoubtedly wary of the man after this incident. By July 1780 Sherwood was convinced, possibly by Peters, that French was a scoundrel. The latter sought allies and found one in Major Daniel McAlpin of
Jessup's corps.

McAlpin, although in very poor health, volunteered to talk to Sherwood and to explain to him in very positive terms that French was a sterling character. The extent to which French had paved the way for Sherwood to be rebuked by higher authority may be seen from McAlpin's letter of assurance to his young friend: "little dependence (is) to be put on the honour of those people who call themselves officers and would wish to be considered as such. Mr. Sherwood is to be here in a few days and shall try what I can do with him before I discharge the man but if he be stiff, I'll ... report Mr. Sherwood's conduct to the Commander in Chief." 62 This interview never took place. Before Sherwood arrived at McAlpin's home in Montreal, the major succumbed to his illness and died.63 French ultimately sought other defenders, urging them to report Sherwood's supposedly unworthy conduct to Haldimand.64 The latter must have been satisfied with both Sherwood's behaviour and his judgment, for officially nothing was ever said of the matter. Such evidence of this feud as does exist can be culled only from French's own frantic letters and from Peters' written accusations. Sherwood never committed his views on the subject to paper and probably regarded the whole incident as a nuisance and a waste of time. The affair should have been one more lesson to him that the enemy within can be almost as
much of a hindrance as the enemy without. Perhaps the question may be dismissed as a typical Loyalist quarrel.

By the fall of 1780 Sherwood was presented with a real challenge, the magnitude of which would make him forget the pettiness of men like McKay and French. General Haldimand wanted him to undertake a mission into Vermont, an enterprise made especially dangerous by the fact that, since February 1779, he had been officially banished by the government of that newly formed state.65 Sherwood's mission - to establish a diplomatic contact with the Vermonters - was as much a turning-point in his life as his initial move to Vermont and his escape to Crown Point had been earlier. He would also play an increasingly important part in the conduct of the British secret service on the vital northern frontier. After three years of uncertainty and frustration, Justus Sherwood was now on his way to carve his own distinctive mark in the war for American independence.
FOOTNOTES

1. Talman, Narratives, 399, Sherwood's memorial.

2. Sherwood Papers, a private collection of typed British Museum manuscripts made available to the author by Mr. Frederick Sherwood: Add. Mss. 21841, fols. 50-51, Sherwood's scouting report compiled during April 1777.

3. Talman, Narratives, 399.


5. Public Archives of Canada: Frederick Haldimand Papers, Bl61, 128, names of the officers of the Queen's Loyal Rangers, September 7, 1780.

6. New York State Library: Miscellaneous Manuscripts, no. 3608.

7. PAC: Bl61, 128, officers of the Queen's Loyal Rangers.

8. PAC: War Office 28, VI, 102, Justus Sherwood's commission, November 19, 1781.


13. Zadock Thompson, History of Vermont, Natural, Civil, and Statistical, in three parts (Burlington, 1842), Part III, 92.


15. Thompson, History of Vermont, Part III, 92.
16 NYHS: Peters Papers, Peters' Memorial to Sir Guy Carleton, July 2, 1778.

17 Nickerson, Turning Point, 235.


19 Crockett, Vermont, II, 117-18.

20 Rogers, Journal, 114.

21 Harrison Bird, March to Saratoga (New York, 1963), 103.

22 VHS, Collections, I, 200.

23 Nickerson, Turning Point, 252-54.

24 NYHS: Peters Papers, Peters' Memorial to Carleton.


27 PAC: BL61, 128-29, officers of the Queen's Loyal Rangers.


29 John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada (London, 1780), 133-34.

30 Ibid., 116.

31 Rogers, Journal, lvi.

32 Burgoyne, Expedition, 134.

33 Ibid., 100-01.

34 Rogers, Journal, lvi.


39 Burgoyne, Expedition, 22-25.

40 NYHS: Peters Papers, Peters' Memorial to Carleton.

41 PAC: War Office 28, IX, 95-96, Sherwood's memorial to Sir Guy Carleton.

42 Ibid., 96.

43 Talman, Narratives, 400, Sherwood's memorial.

44 PAC: War Office 28, IX, 95-96, Sherwood's memorial to Carleton.

45 Jackson, Sherwood, 6-7.

46 The eighth article of the Convention does declare that all corps of Burgoyne's army "of whatever country shall be included in...the above articles & comprehended in every respect as British subjects."

The ninth article specifically mentioned the Canadians, but no reference was made to the Loyalists. See William Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: Miscellaneous Collection, Articles of Convention between Lt. General Burgoyne & Major Genl. Gates at Saratoga, October 16, 1777.

47 NYHS: Peters Papers, Burgoyne's official order for permission for Col. Peters and his officers to escape to Canada on the eve of the surrender at Saratoga, October 14, 1777.

48 NYHS: Peters Papers, A Narrative of John Peters, Lieutenant Colonel of the Queen's Loyal Rangers in Canada drawn by himself in a letter to a Friend in London in 1787.
Walton, Records, I, 192.


Talman, Narratives, 398-400.


PAC: War Office 28, IX, 95-96, Sherwood's memorial to Carleton.


Ibid., B129, 11, Sherwood to Powell, July 23, 1778.

PAC: Add. Mss. 21841, fols. 182-83; 21792, fols. 3, 5, 6, 7, 19, 23, documents relating to the Otter Creek expedition.


Ibid., B161, 130-32, names of the officers of the Queen's Loyal Rangers, compiled by John Peters, September 7, 1780.


Ibid., B161, 96-98, Daniel McAlpin to Gresham French, July 14, 1780.

Ibid., B161, 99-100, Mary McAlpin to Haldimand, July 25, 1780.

Ibid., B161, 231, French to Twiss, January 15, 1781.
CHAPTER IV

THE SECRET SERVICE

Justus Sherwood had been accused by his enemies as early as the summer of 1776 of transmitting intelligence to the British in Canada. The charge may have been true, although no evidence exists to substantiate it. There is evidence of Sherwood's involvement in the British secret service on the northern frontier after Saratoga, and especially after the intrigue with the Vermonters which began late in 1780. The Vermont negotiations continued to occupy Sherwood until the spring of 1783, and the many questions which they raised in British minds made necessary a channel for a continuing flow of intelligence from the Grants. General Haldimand was also anxious to know what was going on in New York and in the New England colonies, and Sherwood's agents were frequently sent to these areas to procure such information. Sherwood's role in the secret service and the problems which he encountered provide an interesting sidelight on the final stage of the Revolutionary War.

The Vermont negotiations are of such importance that they deserve the special attention which they will receive in later chapters. They can never be totally ignored in any consideration of Justus Sherwood's life.
between the years 1780 and 1783; but in this chapter the emphasis will be placed on the problems involved in the gathering of intelligence from the northern colonies which were already members of the American Union. During the vital year of 1781 the secret service was almost wholly involved with the complexities of the Vermont question. That situation changed dramatically early in 1782 when General Haldimand became extremely anxious to learn of any proposed American attack on Canada. The latter had been in no direct danger in 1781, as General Washington had marched his ragged army south to Virginia against Lord Cornwallis. The subsequent British capitulation at Yorktown in October raised the unsettling thought that Washington might strike at Canada and avenge the humiliating defeats of 1775-1776. Haldimand had been continuously apprehensive of such a development ever since his arrival in Quebec in 1778. Starting early in 1779, Lieutenant William Twiss of the Corps of Engineers had begun work to strengthen the province's defenses both at Quebec City and at the vital posts of St. Johns and Isle-aux-Noix on the Richelieu. The secret service was thus well occupied with this problem of providing reliable intelligence during 1782 and early 1783, and it will be with this latter stage of the war that this chapter will be primarily concerned.

The British strategy on the northern frontier in the years following Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga
was essentially defensive. The Mohawk Valley was ravaged each summer from 1778 to 1781 by the Loyalist forces of John and Walter Butler and Sir John Johnson, while the Lake George region could be effectively raided from Crown Point, the southernmost British post on Lake Champlain. General Haldimand regarded such operations as having two purposes. They relieved any American pressure which might be exerted against Sir Henry Clinton in New York, and they gave "His Majesty's loyal subjects an opportunity of retiring from the province...."

They could also serve as a screen to protect a relatively weak Quebec. Even Benedict Arnold's destructive raid on New London and Groton, Connecticut, in September 1781 may be seen as a divisionary effort to draw Washington away from Virginia, where the Franco-American forces were closing in on Lord Cornwallis.

The surrender of Cornwallis on October 19, 1781 was certainly the most serious British military disaster of that year and of the whole post-Saratoga period of the war. The British also suffered a reverse in the Mohawk Valley during that dismal autumn which cast doubt on the strategy which they had followed in that unfortunate region since 1778. Walter Butler and a force of 1,000 Loyalists were routed at Jerseyfield on West Canada Creek by Colonel Marinus Willett and 400 men on October 30. This defeat not only saw the death of Butler, but marked the end of the British policy of invasion and
incendiaryism which had brought so much destruction to the Mohawk Valley. 6

During the course of the year 1781, Justus Sherwood had been primarily involved with the Vermont negotiations. He found the various sessions with the Green Mountain emissaries to be extremely frustrating, but at the same time, he did have the satisfaction of seeing his career advance. On June 18 Haldimand showed his faith in Sherwood's ability and dedication by giving him a direct and independent role in the secret service:

Having thought fit to entrust to your management and direction, the fitting out and dispatching of scouts upon secret service, all Loyalists and others, employed in that duty are hereby directed, punctually to obey and follow such instructions, whether in writing, or verbal, as you shall find necessary to give them, in consequence of the orders you shall from time to time receive, and the trust reposed in you. 7

Sherwood's relative independence in the secret service was probably a result of his earlier work in this branch of the service at St. Johns, as well as a reward for his strenuous effort at Isle-aux-Noix in May when he confronted Ira Allen on the Vermont question. Haldimand must certainly have had confidence in Sherwood to have granted him such an important place in the conduct of the service. Sherwood himself must have been delighted at this development, although he left no official record of his reaction. He had been
at Quebec to confer with Haldimand, and he undoubtedly expressed his appreciation to him personally. In the previous January, Sherwood had had a conflict with Colonel Barry St. Leger over a minor matter relating to the service. Thanks to Haldimand's decision, such conflicts were less likely to occur in future as Sherwood's authority had now been more specifically described.

Sherwood's new independence was marked in another manner as well: he was to construct a post at Dutchman's Farm on Grande Isle near the north end of Lake Champlain during the summer of 1781 and assume command of it himself. This post, to be named the Loyal Block House, was started on July 2 by a gang of workers whom Sherwood had recruited from various camps after his sojourn at Quebec and whom he described as "including old men, boys and unincorporated Loyalists." The difficulty of finding satisfactory labour may in part be explained by the vigourous recruiting practices which Loyalist officers employed. By July 14 Sherwood was not satisfied with the rate of progress of his workers, and he requested that Captain Robert Mathews, Haldimand's military secretary, send him a public letter which he could display to the men as an inducement to greater effort. Mathews complied with this request, and by August the post was sufficiently advanced that Sherwood could take up residence in it. As a forward isolated post, the Loyal Block House provided an ideal site for carrying on both the secret
service and the negotiations with Vermont. The post served as Sherwood's home until May 1783, when the war's end and Haldimand's concern for settling the Loyalists caused him to leave Lake Champlain.

The project of building the post was complicated by factors other than the lack of manpower. Sherwood had chosen the site specifically for strategic reasons: "The spot on which I propose setting the Block House is a rise just at the extremity of the point about five yards higher than the other ground & may be fronted with an Abbitis (sic) of about fifty yards in length from water to water."\(^{10}\) The position would provide a view to the south down the lake for a distance of about twelve miles. Furthermore, there was a nearby channel which would provide a safe harbour for ships. On the debit side, the site was removed from any stands of timber; logs would have to be drawn from at least a mile away. The engineer in charge of the construction was obliged to bring hay for his horses from as far away as Missisquoi Bay and Sherwood had to stretch his limited personnel even further in order to supply the foraging party with a guard.\(^{11}\) On July 12 Justus went to St. Johns with the thought of bringing down some prisoners to act as labourers. This idea did not meet with approval, probably because it would have been too easy for the men to escape. Colonel St. Leger did however provide "thirteen brave fellows" from the 34th Regiment
to help with the task of constructing the Loyal Block House.\textsuperscript{12}

The summer of 1781 also marked the advent of Doctor George Smyth as an assistant to Justus Sherwood in the operation of the secret service. Smyth, an Irish-born physician from Fort Edward, had been corresponding with Haldimand under the pseudonym of "Hudibras". He had come under Rebel suspicion and had subsequently been detained in Albany. In June 1781 he escaped and made his way to Quebec, where Haldimand proposed to employ him in the secret service and in the Vermont negotiations.\textsuperscript{13} Sherwood had found the latter to be a lonely and trying affair, and he welcomed the addition of Smyth whom he generously described as: "the first man in Canada that I could have wished for in this business."\textsuperscript{14} Mathews commended Sherwood for accepting Smyth whom he had interviewed at Quebec, and specifically noted that the doctor would regard himself as being in a subordinate position to Sherwood: "I am further to acquaint you...that notwithstanding you and Dr. Smyth act together, he will always look upon you as the principal and original agent in whatever may be transacted, and will not forget his voluntary promise in case of success."\textsuperscript{15} Smyth's "voluntary promise" probably referred to the Vermont question; as the latter had been Sherwood's main concern since the previous October, it was only proper that he should receive the major part of
the credit in the event that Vermont should be persuaded to return to the empire.

By the beginning of 1782, Sherwood was operating from the Loyal Block House while George Smyth performed his work at St. Johns. The two men dispatched scouts to the southward to gather intelligence from the Schenectady-Albany region to Boston. The scouts were usually either taken from the various Loyalist regiments in Canada or were volunteer "friends of government" who had come in from the colonies. Their methods of collecting information were direct and relatively unsophisticated: they spoke to known Loyalists, many of whom served as resident British agents or "listening posts"; read and collected local newspapers; and generally kept alert. Theirs was a dangerous undertaking, for they could expect the traditional spy's reward if they were captured. Even when they were not risking their lives, these British agents rarely had an easy life. Their pay was frequently in arrears, and especially at the Loyal Block House essential supplies were often low. Morale was a constant problem with which Sherwood had to contend in attempting to maintain a reasonably high standard in the secret service on the northern frontier.

General Haldimand's apprehension over American intentions in the wake of Yorktown was clearly placed before Sherwood early in February 1782. Captain Mathews wrote to Sherwood at the Loyal Block House that a
Congressional invasion would probably avoid Lake Champlain because of the British squadron, and come via the upper Connecticut River Valley. Scouts should thus be sent to that quarter immediately, should be extremely judicious in what they believed and should return as quickly as possible. Mathews left no doubt as to the anxiety which was felt at Quebec over the possibility of an invasion of the province: "I am commanded by His Excellency to acquaint you (with) the indispensable necessity of procuring authentic intelligence of the Enemy's preparations and motions in every quarter (which) is such, that no pains, no trouble or expense must be spared to effect it." Sherwood required no urging on this matter. One of his scouts, Roger Stevens, had returned to the Loyal Block House on January 29 with a report that 4,000 French troops were assembling at Albany for an attack on Canada. These men were to be reinforced by 6,000 American volunteers, a body which Congress would permit its Gallic ally, bound to America by the perpetual alliance of 1778, to raise and equip. The projected assault, it was assumed, would be launched either before the British navy could arrive at Quebec in the spring, or in co-operation with the French fleet of Admiral De Grasse which had so recently been instrumental in the defeat of Cornwallis. Such intelligence as Sherwood could gather seemed to confirm the impression that an enemy offensive was
being prepared. On February 13 Ensign Thomas Sherwood, a young cousin of Justus, reported at the Loyal Block House. Thomas declared that General Washington was trying to raise 25,000 troops for the spring, and that in both New York and Connecticut there was considerable military activity and excitement. New York City and Canada were both mentioned as possible objectives, although the latter would only be attempted when and if French naval forces entered the St. Lawrence. Justus Sherwood issued a general order to all resident agents behind enemy lines in which he stressed that the divining of American intentions was of paramount importance:

Washington's particular objective in reinforcing his army with so large a number of new levies (is the problem). Whatever his object may be, you will do well to communicate it as soon as you can, but should it be this province, it is expected that you will at any expense or risk immediately dispatch different messengers, unknown to each other, to this post...with the particulars sealed and directed to His Excellency...The agents for secret service, your messengers, will be rewarded well and either detained or sent back to you direct. Your bills for whatever expense you necessarily incur...will at any time be honoured here and the money will be sent you by the first safe opportunity.19

The relations between Justus Sherwood and George Smyth, although outwardly cordial, did suffer from the fact that Smyth did not relish his subordinate position. Smyth was a crusty independent soul who was valuable to the secret service because of his knowledge and his
Loyalist contacts, but he was obviously not an easy man with whom to work. He thus seized upon the delicate situation which had developed by the late winter of 1782 as a means to curry favour with General Haldimand. Smyth suggested that a scout be sent to Albany where he would gather a certain amount of information and then would report directly to Haldimand. Such an arrangement in time of crisis would save valuable time by cutting out the middlemen at the Loyal Block House and St. Johns. Dr. Smyth might thus be hinting at the redundancy of his own position, but he would also be undercutting Sherwood. Smyth had recently been annoyed at Sherwood's insistence that all parties of scouts had to stop at the Loyal Block House going to and from the colonies, and may have been impelled to make his suggestion on the Albany scouts partially for spite. Whatever Smyth's motives were, Mathews declared that Haldimand approved of the scheme, as he felt that an intelligent field observer would certainly be able to note the building up of magazines or any other warlike preparations and thus give the British time to prepare their defenses. The apparent conflict between Smyth and Sherwood, however, boded ill for future co-operation.

Sherwood's sources of information continued to indicate that a Franco-American attack on Canada was being planned. Corporal Mathias Snetzinger, one of Sherwood's scouts, reported at the end of February
that 8,000 stands of arms and as many uniforms had been deposited at a post on the Hudson between Poughkeepsie and Albany. Cannons taken at Yorktown had been transported to Hartford. It was reported that 7,000 French troops with some American support were to strike at Canada via the Mohawk and Connecticut valleys. Sherwood dispatched a party of men to southern Vermont to keep a careful watch on the situation. Haldimand was particularly anxious about an attack on Quebec by the Connecticut Valley route.

As the winter of 1782 waned, however, Sherwood's and Smyth's agents and scouts began to report more encouraging news. One of Smyth's sources of information, James Ellice of Schenectady, declared that there were no American preparations underway for an invasion of Canada, and that the few Continental troops at Albany and in the Mohawk Valley were badly equipped. Sherwood's agent at Arlington, Elnathan Merwin, who signed his dispatches with the pseudonym of "Plain Truth", corroborated Ellice's observations. According to Merwin, the report that Washington was being reinforced for a northern offensive was nothing but a ruse to keep army morale high. The French army, he declared, was not in evidence on the northern frontier. Ensign Thomas Sherwood, reporting to the Loyal Block House on March 22, confirmed that the French were not gathering on the upper Hudson, and were indeed on their way back to Europe.
Several reports at this time stressed the domestic disorders which were occurring in western Massachusetts and Connecticut and which made an offensive against Canada even less likely. Law courts were being attacked and broken up by angry mobs, while taxes for continuing the war and the prospect of the "perpetual alliance" with the French were subjects of bitter debate. The agitation which would culminate in Shays' Rebellion four years later was beginning to manifest itself to the relief and delight of the British.

The British agents who reported disorder in western Massachusetts were indeed telling the truth. By the spring of 1782 this frontier region was in a turmoil, primarily caused by depression and exacerbated by heavy taxes and a scarcity of currency. Had the British not been so defensively-minded in the wake of the Yorktown disaster, they might have exploited this situation. Joseph Hawley, a prominent Whig from Northampton, bitterly described the situation:

Many of the Insurgents say...that it cost them much to maintain the great men under George the 3rd, but vastly more under the Commonwealth and Congress. We have had it Huzzaed for George the third within 8 rods of our Court House....

Despite these encouraging signs, Mathews urged Sherwood to remain vigilant. Some sources still spoke of an attack against Canada or perhaps New York, and as late as May 1, Sherwood was asking his agents
for all the information they could gather on the state, numbers, and preparation of the armies of Washington and General Nathanael Greene. Indeed on that same day, General Washington drew up an ambitious plan for the conquest of Canada which he envisioned for that September: a Franco-American force of 8,000 men would strike at Quebec via the Richelieu while the French navy would co-operate in the St. Lawrence. Washington's plan never materialized, but its very existence justified the British fear of invasion. Sherwood's lightly-defended blockhouse, rarely garrisoned by more than fifty men, would have been one of the first British posts to have fallen in this onslaught.

The conflicting reports which Sherwood received and analyzed at the Loyal Block House during the months which followed Yorktown undoubtedly worked on his nerves. Prisoners taken by his scouts formed one source of information, although an unreliable one. One such captive, Private John Bullard of the Second New Hampshire Regiment, freely reported that a major assault was being prepared up Lake Champlain, with a diversionary force under Colonel Marinus Willett being sent against Fort Niagara. Another prisoner, Asaph McFarson, angered Sherwood by talking in vague generalities about the situation. Sherwood dismissed the man as "a very ignorant fellow" who "says that he heard there was 16,000 French troops landed at Rhode Island, but does
not know when it happened. He heard Canada was to be invaded this summer but does not know of any preparations for that purpose. He heard Vermont was raising troops, but don't (sic) know how many nor for what intent. In short, he don't (sic) seem to know anything."35 Secret service work could be an exasperating business.

By the late winter and spring of 1782 at least one of Sherwood's agents was reporting that, far from mounting an attack, the northern frontier of the United States was expecting an attack from Canada.36 There was also much concern over a rumour that Congress had permitted the French to recruit Americans for service with the French army in Europe.37 General Haldimand was considering the possibility of adding to the enemy's unhappiness and confusion by launching a diversionary attack on the northern frontier, when he was warned by Sir Guy Carleton, Clinton's replacement at New York as the British Commander-in-Chief, to undertake no offensive action.38 The war government of Lord North had fallen on March 20 and the new ministry, headed by Lord Rockingham, was seeking peace with the Americans. Haldimand was thus instructed, both by Carleton and the new Secretary of State, Lord Shelburne, to be prepared only to defend the province.39 During the months that followed while the terms of the peace were being decided at Paris, the secret service stood as Haldimand's first line of defense on his southern frontier.
This last phase of the Revolutionary War must have been one of both frustration and hope for Sherwood. He continued to keep a vigilant watch for any sign of American military activities which would indicate an attack on Canada, while his agents sent back encouraging tales of disaffection with Congress, the war, and the French alliance. The danger of an eleventh-hour attack could not be ignored. Captain Mathews was concerned when General Washington visited the Albany-Saratoga region in the summer of 1782. One result of this tour was that the usual sources of information which the British tapped became so apprehensive that they refused to jeopardize themselves by allowing Sherwood's agents to contact them. Under the cover of such a screen, an attack on either Canada or New York could be organized. By mid-August the French army was reported to be mustering at Philadelphia, while Washington had 6,000 troops available. Sherwood was constantly urged to find "the most effective means of gaining speedy and authentic intelligence."

One method which Sherwood frequently employed during this crucial period was to give his scouts lists of specific questions to which they would attempt to find answers while they were on their missions. These questionnaires revealed a good deal about the British frame of mind in this latter stage of the war. A typical example was the list which Sherwood drew up for
one of his men, John Savage, late in October 1782:

Where is Washington's army stationed, and in what number?
Where are the French troops, and in what number?
What is the present disposition of the populace to the French?
What is the present disposition of the populace to a reunion with Great Britain?
What number of French shipping on the American coast and where stationed?
What French shipping have been lately taken on the coast?
Have the southern militia been lately called together, and for what purpose?
Have the northern militia been lately called together, and for what purpose?
What is the disposition of the populace of Massachusetts?
What is the disposition of the other states towards Vermont?
What is conjectured to be Washington's intentions with his army?
In what manner are the Rebel troops clothed, provisioned and paid?\textsuperscript{43}

Savage's responses to these questions revealed that the enemy was having considerable difficulty with both civilian and military morale, a discovery which might have afforded the British some comfort.\textsuperscript{44} On the other hand, a successful campaign into Canada might well heal the divisions which were developing in the American republic.

Sherwood's resident agents also played a useful role. One in particular was Luke Knowlton, a representative in Congress of Cumberland County, New York, who had the reputation of being a Whig, but was actually a British sympathizer and spy.\textsuperscript{45} Cumberland County formed the southeastern corner of Vermont which New York still
claimed, so that Knowlton was in a good position to observe the temper not only of New York, but most of New England as well. In September 1782 he sent Sherwood a report which verified the latter observations of John Savage and other observers: the war and its attendant heavy taxation weighed heavily on the New Englanders, and there was much popular unrest, particularly in western Massachusetts. Congress, he declared, was accused of hiding the facts of peace negotiations with the British from its own people who feared that the French alliance might delay the coming of peace. Most significantly, Knowlton felt that this climate of dissatisfaction should be exploited by the use of pamphlets and newspapers. Certainly, the situation provided an excellent opportunity for a clever propagandist. British thinking, however, was not geared for such offensive operations of the pen with peace on the immediate horizon. Neither Sherwood nor anyone else tried to develop Knowlton's suggestion. During the last months of the war, the British secret service on the northern frontier was to remain essentially a defensive operation.

Earlier in the war, and especially before the British surrender at Yorktown, the secret service had been involved in schemes of kidnapping and sabotage. These projects were generally unco-ordinated efforts which, even if successful, would have done little material damage to the American cause. Sherwood had
tentatively suggested the kidnapping of three of Vermont's most prominent men - Governor Thomas Chittenden, Jacob Bayley, and Ebenezer Allen - as early as August 1780. It was Sherwood's contention that if these men were taken, Vermont could be more easily brought into line and returned to the fold of the British Empire. This plan was never implemented, but a year later in August 1781, the British did attempt to seize a prominent New Yorker, General Philip Schuyler, at his home in Albany.

Captain Mathews had authorized this undertaking on July 4, 1781 when he had written to Sherwood that General Haldimand had received from Sherwood's co-worker, George Smyth "the names of several persons, the most obnoxious to the friends of Government in the neighbourhood of Albany, and the most zealous supporters of Rebellion whom he thinks it is probable by small parties to carry off." The party in question was to be commanded by Captain John Myers, one of Smyth's scouts. Schuyler had been warned that there was a plot to seize him, and was thus prepared when Myers's party attacked his house one night early in August. He had posted a guard of six men, and when Myers's men began exchanging shots with them, Schuyler and his family retired to the second floor of the house. He then fired his pistol through a window and called out directions to a fictitious relief force, trying to create the impression that the house was surrounded by
friendly troops. 50 Myers took three of the guards captive and withdrew, reporting his failure to capture Schuyler to Smyth at St. Johns on August 17. 51

By August 1781 the negotiations with Vermont were well advanced. Indeed, during that month, Justus Sherwood and George Smyth were conferring with Major Joseph Fay, the latest of the Vermont Council's series of agents during that protracted affair. Edward Jessup, the famous Loyalist soldier, ingenuously suggested to Haldimand that he would be prepared to kidnap Ethan Allen if such an action would expedite the Vermont situation. Jessup had been in contact with a man named Samuel Rose, a Tory who lived in Allen's neighbourhood and from whom Sherwood had previously gathered information. With Rose as a guide, Jessup proposed that the seizure of Allen could be effected with a group of four or five men. Jessup did emphasize that if Haldimand disapproved of the plan, it should be forgotten and never mentioned again. 52 With the Vermont question hanging in the balance and with the British feverishly negotiating with the Allen faction to bring their state back to British rule, Jessup's scheme was obviously out of the question. As its author requested, the matter was never again raised.

The Vermont question was responsible, however, for a kidnapping plot which was launched against Jacob Bayley of Newbury, a man of influence in the Connecticut
Valley who opposed the Allens and their apparent efforts to come to terms with the British.\(^53\) The first plot to seize Bayley originated with George Smyth and Colonel Barry St. Leger in August 1781. Azariah Pritchard, a colourful and ambitious scout, was dispatched to carry out this task, but was intercepted by Sherwood who did not feel that the time for such an action was propitious. A Vermont flag-of-truce party headed by Joseph Fay was at that time off the Loyal Block House, and Sherwood feared that an attack on a man of Bayley's reputation might have a negative effect on the negotiations.\(^54\) The operation was thus postponed, and was subsequently attempted the following June with Pritchard once again entrusted with the mission.

The attempt to carry off Jacob Bayley was an even greater failure than the plot against Schuyler. Bayley was not at home when Pritchard's party arrived at his house.\(^55\) Pritchard, always ready to assume credit for success and equally reluctant to shoulder the blame for failure, declared that the mission had been undermined by one of his own men, Joseph White, who was supposed to have been familiar with Bayley's movements.\(^56\) The real reason for the failure however appeared to lie with another man, Thomas Johnson, a native of Newbury who had been captured by the British early in 1781 and had subsequently been paroled when he volunteered to act the role of a British agent. According to Chilton
Williamson, Johnson was "a rebel among rebels, a loyalist among loyalists."\(^57\) Johnson was aware of what was afoot, and warned his neighbour through a message which declared that "the Philistines are upon you."\(^58\) Bayley was apparently familiar enough with the Old Testament to recognize his similarity to Samson, and abandoned his home with some haste to avoid capture.

Justus Sherwood and George Smyth did not completely abandon the thought of kidnapping prominent rebels after the failure of the raid against Bayley's house. They had developed a plan to seize the notorious American scout, Major Benjamin Whitcomb, but were ordered not to proceed with their scheme while Sir Guy Carleton was communicating with Congress.\(^59\) The plot against Whitcomb was thus shelved.

The principal operation of sabotage which the British secret service tried to carry out was no more successful than the kidnapping schemes. In November 1781 Smyth reported that the Americans were building a 74-gun ship of the line at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which was destined to be commanded by the dashing naval hero of the *Bonhomme Richard*, John Paul Jones. Smyth declared that he had two men who were prepared to attempt to burn the ship.\(^60\) The two would-be incendiaries subsequently went to Portsmouth, managed to obtain jobs in the shipyard, and even met Jones himself. By early August 1782 they decided that the vessel, which was to
be called the America, would be ready for launching within eight weeks, and that they would have time to report back to Canada before they attempted to burn her. They used the excuse that they were going to Boston for back wages and they felt certain that no one suspected them. John Paul Jones was suspicious, however, of a plot against his ship. He arranged for a nightly guard of carpenters whom he paid personally, as the state of New Hampshire refused to assume the financial responsibility. Jones also hired two ship builders to direct the guard, and took personal command of the operation every third night until the America was launched. He was most apprehensive about British frigates sending raiding parties ashore, "for mysterious boats rowed by men with muffled oars were reported to have been seen in the Piscataqua River." In these tense circumstances the British agents were unable to perform their task and the America was duly launched on November 5, 1782.

Another aspect of secret service work was counterespionage. As early as July 1781 Mathews was instructing Sherwood and Smyth to find out who the enemy agents in Canada were, a problem complicated by the presence of so many Loyalist fugitives, particularly around Montreal. It was relatively simple for a rebel agent to claim to be a Loyalist, and to use this cover while gathering information. George Smyth discovered that a Mrs. Cheshire
in Montreal was supposedly providing information and lodging to American agents. Smyth subsequently sent a party of men—"three cunning fellows"—to seek out Mrs. Cheshire, and to pretend to be recent arrivals from New England. These "militia counterspys" were suitably equipped with old clothes, Yankee firelocks, Vermont and Connecticut bills, and a forged letter from Jacob Bayley to add authenticity to their disguise. At about the same time, one of Sherwood's scouts, Mathias Snetzinger, discovered through friends in Schenectady the identities of three men connected with Mrs. Cheshire. In a later letter Sherwood noted that the men were named Knowles, Malcolm, and Phillips, and that all three were skilled workmen, carrying on the trades of shoemaker, breechesmaker, and carpenter respectively. In late November 1781 the trio was arrested, and Haldimand requested specific written proof of their guilt. Sherwood raised the question with Snetzinger, who felt certain that he could obtain such proof through his contacts in Schenectady.

The question of personnel for the secret service brought its own peculiar problems. The service was constantly short of men, and George Smyth expressed his disgust that so many Loyalists felt no desire to serve the British cause beyond the negative step of consuming government stores: "There are a number of active and able body'd beef devourers here (at St. Johns), eating
up the King's Royal Bounty." Smyth wished that he could employ a few such drones. Sherwood too experienced problems of a shortage of competent labour as well as difficulties with supplies.

The question of sufficient labour to maintain both the secret service and the Loyal Block House was a chronic one. Early in May 1782 Sherwood had applied to the engineer at Isle-aux-Noix for a party of sawyers and additional tools to construct outbuildings and boats at his post. He received a rude shock when, instead of having his request granted, he was instructed to send ten woodcutters to St. Johns and between fifteen and twenty such men to General de Riedesel at Sorel. Sherwood responded by sending a copy of his roster to de Riedesel, indicating that his command consisted of fifty privates, five corporals, four sergeants, and two ensigns - sixty-one men - of whom only fifteen were present at the post and fit for duty. To Mathews he declared: "Nor have I yet been able to procure a farthing of pay for any labour done here, although I have paid above £20 out of my own private purse to pacify the clamour of the men." The efficient Captain Mathews took up the matter with General Haldimand: "I laid the state of your garrison before His Excellency, which proved the impossibility of your answering the requisitions for wood cutters - that matter will be arranged to your wish."
If the small garrison at the Loyal Block House did complain from time to time, they probably had some justification. Edward Jessup, several of whose men were serving under Sherwood, took up their need for supplies, especially warm clothes, during the first winter of operation. On February 14, 1782 Jessup reported that Sherwood required blankets, coats, caps, mitts, leggings and mocassins for twenty men. He urged that these items be sent as: "I think no post can require those things more than this as we are obliged to keep up a constant round of scouts." Sherwood's own correspondence frequently mentioned such needed items as a stove and pipe, andirons, a set of fire shovel and tongs, candles, butter, mocassins and treacle for spruce beer. The latter was a necessity, he declared, for the men got little rum and "they are very tenacious of their beer." A lack of medical supplies was a further problem, as Sherwood noted when one of his men fell on the ice and broke his collar bone: "Corpl Welch who pretends to know something of surgery has sett it, but we have nothing to apply to it; I wish we could have a few medicines order'd here, Welch could administer them; and it is cruel when we have a man sick or lame which is often the case that we have nothing for his relief."

While supplies were obviously a problem, Haldimand was not unreceptive to Sherwood's plight. In April 1782
he approved a plan of Sherwood's to construct additional boats, and sent pitch and nails directly to the Loyal Block House. He also urged Sherwood to purchase canoes if his men knew how to use them.79 A year later, Mathews suggested that Sherwood send to Montreal for ten pounds of good tea and as much chocolate and coffee, and to send a pound or so to the wives of correspondents occasionally.80 As the war was then practically over, this policy was never carried out, which was perhaps just as well. Some of Sherwood's more dissatisfied men would certainly have resented carrying a package of luxuries on their missions, when they themselves were being neglected.

The flow of supplies also could run both ways. At Isle-aux-Noix in May 1781 some of Sherwood's men captured a young bull moose, which Justus offered to send to Quebec if Haldimand wanted it.81 About eighteen months later Sherwood reported that he could buy "two or three barrels of good wild honey" at East Bay for 7d a pound "in case His Excellency wants it for his use."82

More important than the lack of supplies was the irregularity with which the men were paid. Involved as they were in highly dangerous work, they were also located in a forward and relatively exposed position. The problem was compounded by the watchful governor in Quebec who sometimes felt that his officers in the
secret service were extravagant in their management of expenses. Early in 1782 Captain Mathews wrote to Smyth and Sherwood that Haldimand was surprised and displeased "at the vast expense you have incurred on that service by paying such high wages to persons regularly subsisted and provisioned by Government." Haldimand felt also that agents were being slack, and that in future gratuities should only be paid to those who had performed especially well. Smyth in particular experienced continuing financial difficulties at St. Johns, as his correspondence attests. At the end of the war the doctor assured Haldimand that he and Sherwood had acted properly in their handling of secret service funds. Smyth had earlier had a disagreement with one of his agents, David Breakenridge, whom he declared was busy gathering evidence against Sherwood and himself to prove them "infamous cheats." No evidence exists that Justus Sherwood, either through malice or ignorance, misappropriated secret service funds. Doctor Smyth's record is not quite as clear: he appeared to be in almost constant need of funds and Breakenridge's accusation was leveled specifically at him rather than at Sherwood. Perhaps Doctor Smyth mentioned Sherwood's name in his defense of his own record because he knew that Haldimand thought well of Justus.

Sherwood did, of course, have his own financial problems with his various scouts. Late in 1782 one
particular scout, Eli Hawley, whom Sherwood described as "a hearty active young man about 23 or 24 years of age."\(^{87}\) demanded a salary of two shillings and sixpence a day as a steady pension, plus a dollar a day when he was carrying dispatches to New York to Sir Guy Carleton.\(^{88}\) Hawley had just been given fifty dollars for a mission and was apparently unhappy about it, while another scout, Joseph Wright, had spent forty-nine days on a mission and was demanding two shillings and sixpence a day for his efforts.\(^{89}\) In the face of these demands, Mathews urged a flexible stand: Wright and Hawley should be given a certain sum, to be decided by Sherwood, for each trip into the colonies or Vermont, even if it exceeded what was usually paid for such work, in the hope that it would make them more zealous.\(^{90}\) Sherwood ultimately decided to offer Hawley £20 per New York trip and Wright £4 plus expenses for going to Vermont.\(^{91}\) Good men did not come cheaply in the secret service.

Indeed reliable men were not easy to find for this work. Sherwood discovered this fact early in 1781 when he was organizing a party of scouts for the Scotch Patent in south-central Vermont: "I thought to have had one George Camels...to go on this party who from his knowledge & connexions in that neighbourhood could have been more useful than any other man, but he has found means to excuse himself just at the moment he was wanted & expected there."\(^{92}\) Desertion was another aspect of
this same problem. In November 1782 three men, John Hackerboom, John Gibbs, and William Mcallen deserted while on scouting duties.\textsuperscript{93} Sherwood was perplexed by their actions, describing Hackerboom as a man with "much apparent honesty & good simple humour" while Gibbs and McAllen were "eager agreeable fellows."\textsuperscript{94} Shortly after this, a British scouting party raised their superiors' ire by attending a public dance in Arlington, Vermont, immediately next door to Governor Chittenden's home. The incident was particularly unsavoury as one of the party, a sergeant, Moses Hurlbert, was drunk and was openly recruiting among the astonished Vermonters.\textsuperscript{95} Considering the delicate relationship between the British and Vermont at that time, such an incident was especially unfortunate.

Sherwood was also taxed by the desertion problem in another manner when he was called upon to evaluate suggestions of potential unreliability among his men. In December 1782 a scout, Nathan Brown, reported seeing in Arlington a deserter from Major James Rogers' corps named Ellsworth. The latter declared that if he were pardoned, he would return and take up his duties and would show his gratitude by naming about twenty men from Rogers' and Jessup's corps who would likely desert. He specifically named four of Sherwood's men, Corporal Miller, Adam Vandershyder, John Bradford, and Levi Dunton. Sherwood was quick to defend his men: Bradford
and Dunton were deserters from the Continental Army, but they had done their jobs at the Loyal Block House conscientiously and had had several opportunities to desert if they had indeed sought such a chance. As for Miller and Vandershyder, Sherwood declared that they were "two men who have always been employed on the secret service scouts and have not only conducted (themselves) prudently and faithfully, but with much zeal."96 As a good officer should, Sherwood was prepared to defend his subordinates when their records were favourable, and when the source of the charge against them was questionable.

Unfortunately, however, several of the Loyalist scouts which Sherwood and Smyth employed did leave a good deal to be desired. One prominent example was Joseph Bettys, a former Whig from Ballston, New York, whom Lorenzo Sabine described as "a shrewd, intelligent, daring and bad man." Sabine further declared that Bettys was a person to whom pity and mercy were foreign feelings, and that his career in the British service "was marked by almost every enormity that can disgrace a human being."97 One such incident occurred in August 1781 when Bettys kidnapped a young woman named Lagrange from Norman's Kill near Albany and carried her back to St. Johns. Three of the four men in Bettys' party subsequently deserted, and Bettys himself had no intelligence to report.98 Doctor Smyth was justifiably upset by this
dereliction of duty, and took steps to handle the situation as he reported to Mathews: "He is now confin'd to the garrison for refusing to deliver up his Desdamona, who he has secreted. Should this Dame be sent back, I think he would not be long after her which would ruin many of His Majesty's loyal subjects." 99

Despite his unreliability, Bettys continued to be used on scouting parties until April 1782 when he was captured by the Americans and taken to Albany. Also captured was another British scout, John Parker, who, like Bettys had an unsavoury reputation with the enemy. 100 Justus Sherwood was very concerned for their safety, and wrote to one of his agents in Albany to try to arrange an exchange. 101 A flag of truce was to be sent to effect such an arrangement, but Sherwood was concerned because he lacked the essential equipment for such a delicate mission: "I have no drum. I am fearful the perfidious Rebels will make an excuse for detaining the Sergt. and party that I shall send." 102

He need not have worried about the niceties of diplomacy, as Bettys and Parker were hanged as traitors in Albany on May 2, drawing a cry of anguish from George Smyth: "Does our humanity to prisoners deserve this...? Or shall we ever have it in our power to retaliate?" 103 Sherwood's usual sense of humanity temporarily deserted him, and he considered executing a prisoner in reprisal. 104 On mature reflection, he decided against such an act,
winning a word of praise from Mathews for his restraint.\textsuperscript{105}

If Joseph Bettys was the most indiscreet of the British secret service scouts on the northern frontier, he was by no means alone. Roger Stevens, a man whom both Sherwood and Smyth employed, arrived in Quebec City in February 1782, and within two days of his arrival the whole town knew of his mission. Mathews described the process of this breach of security to Doctor Smyth and urged both he and Sherwood to do everything in their power to stress the absolute necessity for silence and discretion:

\begin{quote}
It is easy to trace the source of this unpardonable conduct -- Mr. Stevens and other messengers arrive. The inquisitive and impertinent flock round them for news, they sit down together to pass the evening, and over their glass make the business they have been upon, the topic of conversation -- from thence they retire to their homes and renew the subject with their wives and families, and by the first Post or Express, it is conveyed all over the country, no matter whether by friends or enemies, the effect is the same.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

As a general rule, Sherwood did feel that Stevens was one of his better scouts. The latter had spent the entire month of January 1782 in Vermont and had returned with valuable intelligence.\textsuperscript{107} He subsequently suggested that he should use his brother Abel, who was resident in Vermont and could contact known friends of Government.\textsuperscript{108} Sherwood accepted the plan whereby Stevens would meet his brother once a month and collect information from him while he was on secret service work in Vermont. To
avoid detection, the brothers would meet at different places each month. Sherwood noted on May 15 that Stevens was on his way to Springfield, Hartford, Rhode Island, and Boston and would visit his brother en route. By December, however, Sherwood was having second thoughts about the scheme and about both the brothers. Abel, he noted, produced very little information for the gratuities which he was receiving. Sherwood was also disturbed by the man's indiscretion, and felt that he claimed to know much more than he apparently did. Roger, on the other hand, had been "a brave soldier, zealous for His Majesty's Service" in the past, although Sherwood felt that since the incident in Quebec City, he had been "too much governed by sinister views." Doctor Smyth held Roger Stevens in very low esteem, declaring: "In short, he has neither abilities nor economy, (and), he is too weak to be entrusted with anything of the least importance."

Another aspect of difficulties with secret service personnel was the matter of disputes between the scouts themselves. The focal point of one such dispute was Benjamin Patterson, a Tory from Coos County, New Hampshire who was working for Sherwood by August 1781 at the Loyal Block House. Initially, Sherwood thought well of the man, but by early 1782 he was changing his opinion. Patterson, he felt, was employing untrustworthy sources of information while on his scouts, as well as squandering precious supplies. In May, an
incident occurred which really did place Patterson's usefulness in doubt. Patterson had been feuding with Joseph White, another of Sherwood's scouts, who had claimed that Patterson had actually been an avowed Whig in Coos and had only fled to the British because he had been involved in a dishonest land transaction.115 Patterson subsequently intercepted White while the latter was on a scout to the Connecticut River, fired on him, arrested his guide, and told him that he had verbal orders from Captain Sherwood to return White's party to the Blockhouse. Sherwood observed that Patterson had been questioning White's men before they had set out, and had directly asked Sherwood himself where White was going.116 The whole affair cast doubt on Patterson's judgment and on his honesty. It may have been that he felt that White was going back to Coos to collect evidence against him.

Patterson attempted to defend his behaviour in a long, rambling, incoherent report in which spelling, grammar, and punctuation were non-existent. His plea was that certain individuals were against him and were trying to ruin him, and that he did not have a friend in the whole province of Quebec who would support him. He claimed that he was a genuine Loyalist, and that he had much to lose should the Rebellion succeed.117 Rather surprisingly, Doctor Smyth did feel a sense of pity for the troubled Patterson, and suggested that his
extraordinary conduct might have proceeded "from a pique or a jealousy." Despite Patterson's claim of having no friends, eight Loyalist soldiers, including three sergeants, swore in a deposition at St. Johns on July 28 that he was a good and loyal comrade-in-arms. Patterson seems to have been a rather pathetic character, an insecure bungler desperately searching for a scapegoat, essentially well-meaning but ignorant and incapable of performing the demanding tasks of the secret service.

One of the most energetic and at the same time disappointing scouts under Sherwood's command was Azariah Pritchard. This man was originally from Derby, Connecticut and had performed valuable work early in the Revolutionary War when he had transported at least 160 Loyalists from his native province to British-held Long Island. In the final analysis, however, Pritchard was most decidedly a man with an eye for the main chance, even if his seizure of such an opportunity was detrimental to the cause he served. During the summer of 1782 Pritchard was guilty of indiscreet behaviour while on a mission and destroyed the cover and security of a resident British agent. By November of that year Sherwood discovered that Pritchard was encouraging New England, New York and Vermont traders to come to Canada to do business, even though Haldimand had specifically forbidden such economic intercourse. Doctor Smyth reported that Pritchard was pocketing money which should have gone to the resident agents.
Pritchard himself was always very anxious to be absent from the Loyal Block House on missions, raising suspicions as to his activities. As early as June 1782 Pritchard had suggested that he lead an expedition into Coos County in northern New Hampshire and establish a blockhouse on the Connecticut River. Such an independent command would certainly have greatly aided any scheme he might have had for developing an illicit trade with the enemy.

Pritchard's opportunism came strongly to the fore early in November 1782. On that occasion, he reported having seen fourteen French engineers at Fort Ticonderoga, and requested permission to remain in the neighbourhood to try and capture them. Pritchard was well aware that Haldimand was fearful of the possibility of an attack on Canada, and believed that a report of enemy activity at Ticonderoga would provide him with a fine excuse for staying down country. Neither Mathews nor Sherwood were prepared to believe this report, however, and Sherwood dispatched a party to Ticonderoga, ostensibly to reinforce Pritchard, but in actuality to check his story. The reinforcing party, led by Ensign Elijah Bottum, who was Justus's brother-in-law, reported that there were no French engineers at Ticonderoga, and that all French troops had gone to Boston to be transported back to Europe. Pritchard, whom Doctor Smyth believed had been swayed by self-interest into vice, was reported to be "much cast down" as the evidence mounted against
him.127 His unsuitability for the secret service was fully revealed when two Vermonters appeared at the Loyal Block House with some beef which they wanted to sell in Canada. They blandly assured Sherwood that Pritchard had advised them to make the journey.128 As a result of these actions, Pritchard was not used again on any mission after November 1782.

The secret service was obviously badly hampered by such individuals as Bettys, Stevens, Patterson, and Pritchard. There were, of course, some very good men associated with the service: Eli Hawley, whom Sherwood described as "a very active discreet young man," and Joseph Wright, whose "stability, secrecy, and knowledge of the ruling men in Vermont..." made him extremely valuable.129 Another trustworthy scout was Corporal David Crowfoot, who played a major role as a courier in the negotiations with Vermont. Following the Pritchard scandal, Sherwood assured one of his resident agents in Vermont that only men of the calibre of Wright, Crowfoot, and Hawley would be used in his neighbourhood.130

One of Sherwood's best scouts in the latter stage of the war was John Savage, a young Vermont Tory who had been exchanged and arrived at the Loyal Block House in August 1782.131 Both Sherwood and Smyth were impressed with him, and Mathews duly told them that Haldimand approved of their using him on secret service work.132 Savage soon repaid their faith in him. By the end of
October Sherwood was reporting that Savage had developed a "constant communication to New York and to Washington's army which he thinks so well established as to enable him to furnish His Excellency with direct and authentic intelligence once a month (over) the ensuing winter...."\textsuperscript{133} Besides this achievement, Savage also brought back information about the desire for trade with Canada and the unpopularity of both Congress and the French Alliance.\textsuperscript{134} During the winter Savage continued his good work, giving Sherwood no reason for regretting having taken him into the service. In March 1783 the often-harrassed commandant of the Loyal Block House heartily praised the recruit: "Mr. Savage is wholly bent on doing Govt. service, in which I think he appears to be the most sincerely zealous man I have ever met with from the Colonies."\textsuperscript{135}

The resident agents, men like Luke Knowlton, Elnathan Mervin, Colonel Peter Olcott of Norwich, Vermont,\textsuperscript{136} and Judge Samuel Welles, a wealthy former Massachusetts resident who had moved to Vermont,\textsuperscript{137} formed a basic source of information for the British. One notorious cuckoo in this Tory nest was the smooth-talking Thomas Johnson of Newbury, Vermont.

Thomas Johnson was literally drafted into the British service. He was a substantial citizen known for his support of the Revolutionary cause. In April 1776 he had traced a path for a military road from
Newbury to St. Johns in what he hoped would be the first step in the conquest of Canada. He later participated in the Saratoga campaign. Nonetheless, he counted a number of Tories among his friends and business associates, and his capture by the British was predicated on the assumption that he could be persuaded to transfer his allegiance. The ubiquitous Azariah Pritchard seized Johnson at Peacham, Vermont, on February 18, 1781, and brought him back to St. Johns where Sherwood interrogated him and subsequently moved him to Isle-aux-Noix.

Sherwood’s initial impression of Johnson was favourable. The two men had conferred over a bottle of wine, and the prisoner had related his service to Congress and his apparent subsequent disillusionment when the British offer of home rule in 1778 had been refused. Eastern Vermont, he told Sherwood, would opt for neutrality, and Johnson promised to help bring this about if he was permitted to return home. Sherwood confided to Mathews that his involuntary guest was a “very sensible honest man.” Mathews urged Sherwood to cultivate Johnson and gain his confidence without letting Johnson gain his. Sherwood invited Johnson to share his quarters, provided better provisions for him, and gave him permission to go hunting. When they chatted over meals or over a glass, the game of wits between them continued.

Sherwood tried to gain Johnson’s confidence by
telling him "secrets" which would be harmless to the British cause. He declared that Haldimand was very interested in him, and subsequently read a letter from the governor, leaving out and skipping over vital information, and blaming his faltering on Captain Mathews' writing. He periodically tested Johnson by damning Congress and Washington to see how his subject would respond. Johnson would start to rise to the bait, then would remember where he was, and would deftly declare that he would give his life and fortune for the Crown, just so long as he did not actually have to take up arms against his countrymen. He declared himself to be strongly opposed to Jacob Bayley, an admission which he perhaps hoped would make him more desirable to the British who felt that Bayley was a major stumbling block in the Vermont negotiations. The contest of wits continued until early June when Johnson was removed to Trois-Rivières. He was ultimately paroled in October with the understanding that he would act as a resident British agent in Newbury.

In actual fact Thomas Johnson was a double agent. He gave the British useless information, material which they could have easily gained from other sources. By October 1782 it was clear to Sherwood that his former guest was a very suspicious character, particularly when one scout suggested that it was indeed Johnson who had warned Jacob Bayley, his supposed enemy, of the
British plot to seize him. Sherwood noted in the spring of 1783 that Johnson was unaware that the British knew of his treachery, and he should thus still be courted, perhaps as a channel of false information to the enemy. Johnson was certainly in contact with the Americans; he regularly sent information which he received from the British to Captain Ebenezer Webster, the father of Daniel Webster. He also visited General Washington in 1782, and reported what had happened to him in Canada. Of his former host at St. Johns and Isle-aux-Noix, it was reported that "he did not like Capt. Sherwood, for he was of a Dam--d jealous disposition (sic) that he had told him, Sherwood, more than a thousand lies to make him believe he was a convert to the King, etc., etc." Of a different temper entirely was the letter of thanks which he wrote to Sherwood on his return to Newbury: "I am under obligation to a knowledge (sic) the kind treatment that I received from you and from Mrs. Sherwood while I was indulged in living in your Family and being under your particular care and direction." A double agent must be prepared to be flexible.

The problems of the secret service were not limited to wages, conditions, and personnel. The service was hampered by a division of command which caused many problems for Justus Sherwood. Early in January 1781 Sherwood had moved from St. Johns to Isle-aux-Noix,
about twelve miles to the south, where he was to await word from and carry on negotiations with the Vermonters, as well as obtain intelligence from Albany. He was to report directly to Major Alexander Dundas, the commander at Isle-aux-Noix, an arrangement which pleased him: "I am happy to find that Major Dundas has a clear and just idea of the situation of the Colonies & disposition of the people in general... (and) I feel myself in every respect perfectly happy and am persuaded that my task... will be very easy and agreeable." 152 This contented state of mind was to be shattered in a few days when Sherwood became involved in a conflict with Colonel Barry St. Leger.

The dispute with St. Leger, the commander of the unsuccessful British invasion of the Mohawk Valley in 1777, might be interpreted as a typical example of the hidebound military mind in action. It may also be seen as an illustration of the lack of organization within the secret service and the keen competition which existed for the service of able-bodied men. St. Leger, in command at St. Johns, instructed Sherwood that no parties were to leave for the Colonies without his permission. 153 He then told Sherwood to provide six scouts for the engineer, Captain William Twiss. 154 Sherwood replied that he had but six scouts at Isle-aux-Noix, and that Dundas had arranged for three of them to leave shortly on a mission, while the other three would
be departing within six or eight days.\textsuperscript{155} St. Leger's response is a classic example of an eighteenth-century Colonel Blimp in action:

Pray sir, do you conceive me a cypher sent here to furnish men and equipments for subordinate officers to make use of them, or do you conceive me so incompetent, as not to be able to judge of the utility of a scout or the propriety of the orders given for its conduct? I must beg leave to observe that the General has sent you to assist me with your local knowledge and to serve as an index for the pointing out of proper people to execute his commands, and not to govern me. I will suffer no scout to leave...for the Colonies without my participation when there is both time and opportunity for communication. Scouts for the security of a private post are left to the discretion of the commander of it. Scouts of publick service are left to the direction of the officer of the District. If this scout were of the planning of Major Dundas, it would have been natural to suppose he would have told me of it yesterday, as I flatter myself he neither holds my understanding or person in contempt.\textsuperscript{156}

Sherwood was justifiably upset by the pompous tone of St. Leger's letter, and in letters both to the Colonel and to Mathews, he pleaded that he really was short of men and was genuinely interested only in the good of the service.\textsuperscript{157} Mathews wrote back two encouraging letters, saying that Haldimand was perfectly satisfied with Sherwood's conduct, and was certain that he had not intended to offend St. Leger.\textsuperscript{158} On June 18 Sherwood's position in the secret service was strengthened and clarified, and a month later St. Leger capitulated. Impressed, he declared, by Sherwood's "zeal for the
service and abilities to form schemes for furtherance of it, I leave to your discretion the sending out of parties as you shall think expedient, without the tedious necessity of a previous communication with me." A major hurdle had been cleared, but another one almost immediately appeared in the presence of Doctor George Smyth.

When Doctor Smyth had first arrived at the Loyal Block House in July 1781, Sherwood had been very pleased to have him as a partner and confidant in the arduous negotiations with Vermont. Smyth, however, was also to participate in the secret service, a natural development given his background in the Fort Edward-Albany area, and his contacts in that region. Early in August Mathews specifically directed that all incoming scouts should report to Sherwood and Smyth at the Loyal Block House. They in turn would report to Haldimand at Quebec. In order to keep such important officers as St. Leger or General de Riedesel, the commander at Sorel, in a pleasant frame of mind, Sherwood and Smyth were instructed to provide them with any information they sought, so long as such a disclosure was not detrimental to the service. Until the end of 1781 Sherwood and Smyth appeared to work closely and amicably. However, early in 1782 Sherwood returned to the Loyal Block House without Smyth who remained in St. Johns. Mathews explained to Smyth that in future, all scouts would be
sent from Sherwood's post, but he earnestly hoped that the two men would continue to co-operate in forwarding the secret service and would not permit personal feelings to interfere with their work. 162

The division of command which placed Smyth in a subordinate position in St. Johns was apparently not to the doctor's liking. Possibly as a test of the structure of command, Smyth sent out a mission to Albany headed by Captain John Myers. On his way south, Myers stopped at Pointe-au-Fer, the first major British post on Lake Champlain, but he did not stop at the Loyal Block House. Sherwood felt slighted by this omission, but Mathews told him not to be so sensitive. Obviously, he added, Myers should have stopped at the Loyal Block House to report his mission to Sherwood, but unless the latter had specific orders for him, it did not really matter. 163 At the same time, Mathews again strongly urged Smyth to co-operate with his colleague. 164

To assuage Sherwood's feelings and to let Smyth know how Haldimand felt, Mathews emphasized Sherwood's independent and senior position in the service:

His Excellency desires you will never hesitate to send out upon any service that may require immediate execution, all men you shall think necessary, of whatever Corps they belong to...His Excellency's orders will at all times cover you from any displeasure your doing a thing of the kind without his authority might occasion. 165
At the same time, Mathews strongly urged Sherwood not to permit friction to occur: "The General has taken such pains to conciliate and keep all jarring intentions to the service...at a distance that it is cruel and vicious to oppose his views."166 Sherwood replied that as far as he was concerned, there was no problem between Smyth and himself: "mutual harmony and goodwill does actually subsist between the Doctor and me. Not only from our respect for His Excellency's commands, but from true principles of candid, undisclosed and mutual friendship."167

Divisions, however, continued to manifest themselves. In June 1782 Mathews wrote a private letter to Smyth in which he deplored the "unworthy jealousy" which still afflicted the service.168 Two months later Sherwood wrote "of the disputes & jealousys at St. Johns," which led "incoming parties of Loyalists...to believe that the service is carried on by juntos and partys at variance, such for instance as Pritchard's and Patterson's party - Sherwood's and Smyth's etc."169 On March 4, 1783 Sherwood indicated that all was still not well when he wrote privately to Mathews, saying that it was better if he sent his reports to Haldimand via Smyth at St. Johns to avoid "uneasiness."170

In a conflict of this nature, from which Haldimand suffered as he desperately needed intelligence during the uncertain post-Yorktown period, both Sherwood and
Smyth were probably to blame. It does seem, however, that Smyth was the more guilty. The doctor's health was poor, he was frequently cantankerous, his son was still a prisoner in Albany for a period after his escape, and he obviously felt that he was not receiving his due. He never specifically attacked Sherwood in his correspondence, but there was frequently an edginess when he spoke of this younger man who had been put in a position superior to his own. Smyth seems to have had delusions of his own cleverness and importance. He concluded one of his official letters to Mathews with the odd statement: "Orient intelligence is of no weight, and Black Birds spray upon my branches in the South." Mathews was not amused with his whimsey. On another occasion, Smyth reported on a mysterious Captain Tisdall who had sought him out and was very anxious to correspond with him, the suggestion being that Tisdall was an enemy agent who was seeking contact with an important British official. Perhaps the best example of Smyth's character was a letter which he wrote to Mathews in September 1784:

Through me the secret service was carried on, and if it was not for me, not three out of the numbers that corresponded with us would afford or assist us with intelligence. This is notoriously known to him who has the merit of my indefatigable endeavours. I wish no man ill; nor do I envy any man for his happiness, but lament myself for not being taken a little more notice of at a time
when I most need it; and when, I think, my past services deserve it. Captain Sherwood told me from time to time that His Excellency, the Commander in Chief, had promised him that after the war, he would make us independent, and fully reward us for our attention to the business we was (sic) employed in. It may be that I have been sufficiently rewarded, and so I am if beggary and a loss of property be my stipendiary.173

Justus Sherwood's position in the secret service was essentially an executive one, particularly after June 1781. To some degree, he combined the offices of paymaster, quartermaster, chief of scouts, and post commander of the Loyal Block House, and he did his best with meagre resources to run the secret service efficiently in his quarter. The conditions under which he operated were difficult, but he appears to have approached his tasks with dedication and fairness. He was aware of the pressures under which his men worked, and tried to support them where he could. He spoke up for the drunken Moses Hurlbert, whom he called "a very loyal brave fellow (who) has been several times prisoner & suffer'd much in seven years service for Gov't."174 He was also very much involved in the negotiations with Vermont, so that his work in co-ordinating the secret service could not command his full attention. Nor could he forget that he was first and foremost a soldier, a fact brought forcefully home to him in February 1783 when one of his scouts reported an enemy force of 800
men gathering under Colonel Marinus Willett at Albany, reportedly for an attack against the British posts on Lake Champlain. For a few days the Loyal Block House was in a turmoil as Sherwood prepared to meet the attack. By the end of the month, however, he received word that Oswego was to be the target of this eleventh-hour American effort. Willett's subsequent attack on that post failed, and Oswego, like the Loyal Block House itself, remained in British hands until the settlement concluded by John Jay and Lord Grenville in 1794. For a brief period the war in its most brutal form had once again come close to Sherwood. But the end of the conflict was near, and by May 1783 the approaching peace would bring forth new challenges, opportunities, and problems.
FOOTNOTES

1Talman, *Narratives*, 399, Sherwood's memorial.

2PAC: B179-1, 6-8, Mathews to Sherwood, January 11, 1781.


4Michigan History Collection, X, 432, Haldimand to Germain, September 17, 1780.


6Ibid., 652.

7PAC: B179-1, 52, Haldimand to Sherwood, June 18, 1781.

8Ibid., B176, 142, Sherwood to Mathews, July 1, 1781.

9Ibid., B179-1, 62, Mathews to Sherwood, July 19, 1781.

10Ibid., B176, 143, Sherwood to Mathews, July 1, 1781.

11Ibid., 144.

12Ibid., B176, 151, Sherwood to Mathews, July 13, 1781.


14PAC: B176, 155, Sherwood to Mathews, July 14, 1781.

15Ibid., B179-1, 63, Mathews to Sherwood, July 19, 1781. No evidence exists that Mathews wrote a separate letter to Smyth assuring him that he was to be in a superior position to Sherwood.

16Ibid., B179-1, 177-80, Mathews to Sherwood, February 2, 1782.

17Ibid., B177, 21-22, Sherwood to Mathews, January 30, 1782.

19Ibid., B177, 48-49, General order by Justus Sherwood to all his agents, February 14, 1782.

20Ibid., B177, 60-62, George Smyth to Mathews, February 20, 1782.

21Ibid., B177, 52-54, Smyth to Mathews, February 15, 1782.

22Ibid., B179-1, 200-01, Mathews to Smyth, February 25, 1782.

23Ibid., B177, 79-80, Corporal Snetzinger's Report, February 24, 1782.

24Ibid., B177, 96, Sherwood to Mathews, March 2, 1782.

25Ibid., B177, 117-19, Smyth to Mathews, March 9, 1782.

26Ibid., B177, 123-24, Report of "Plain Truth" (Elnathan Merwin), March 10, 1782.

27Ibid., B177, 148-51, Thomas Sherwood's Report, March 22, 1782.


30Joseph Hawley to Caleb Strong, June 24, 1782, as cited by Taylor, Western Massachusetts, 118.

31PAC: B179-1, 233, Mathews to Sherwood, April 15, 1782.

32Ibid., B177, 252-53, Sherwood to Colonel Asa Porter, May 1, 1782. Colonel Porter of Haverhill, New Hampshire was one of Sherwood's resident agents.

33Writings of George Washington, "Plan of Campaign, 1 May, 1782" IX, 497-505 as cited by Gustave Lanctot,

34 PAC: B177, 187-91, a scout's report on Private John Bullard, April 14, 1782.


36 Ibid., B177, 220, John Lyttle's Report, April 26, 1782.

37 Ibid., B177, 219, Lyttle's Report, April 26, 1782.

38 Ibid., Series Q, Colonial Office Records, Haldimand to Shelburne, July 17, 1782.

39 Ibid., B50, 164-67, Shelburne to Haldimand, April 20, 1782.

40 Ibid., B177, 537-38, Solomon Wilson (a resident agent) to Sherwood & Smyth, October 15, 1782, provides an example of the sort of report the British were receiving at this stage of the war.

41 Ibid., B179-2, 59, Mathews to Sherwood, August 19, 1782.

42 Ibid., B179-2, 60-63, Mathews to Sherwood, August 22, 1782.

43 Ibid., B177, 550, Queries posed by Justus Sherwood to scout John Savage, October 27, 1782.

44 Ibid., B178, 426-29, Savage's answers to questions, undated report.

45 Pell, Ethan Allen, 196.


47 Ibid., B182, 245-47, Sherwood to Brigadier-General Powell, August 24, 1780.

48 Ibid., B179-1, 57, Mathews to Sherwood, July 4, 1781.
New York Public Library: Schuyler Papers, John McKenstrey to Philip Schuyler, August 5, 1781.


Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 111.

PAC: B176, 179-81, Sherwood to Mathews, August 3, 1781.

Tbid., B177, 365-66, Sherwood to Mathews, June 19, 1782.

Tbid., B177, 367-70, Azariah Pritchard's Report, June 21, 1782.

Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 111.

Charles Miner Thompson, Independent Vermont (Boston, 1942), 441-42.

PAC: B177, 371-72, Smyth to Mathews, June 22, 1782. B179-2, 36-37, Mathews to Smyth, July 1, 1782. Whitcomb's exploits, which included kidnapping British officers, are described in Kenneth Roberts, Rabble in Arms (New York, 1933).

PAC: B176, 335, Smyth to Mathews, November 10, 1781.

Tbid., B177, 442-45, Sherwood to Mathews, August 17, 1782.

Lincoln Lorenz, John Paul Jones: fighter for freedom and glory (Annapolis, 1943), 494.

64 PAC: B179-1, 65, Mathews to Sherwood, July 19, 1781.

65 Ibid., B176, 293-95, Smyth to Mathews, September 29, 1781.

66 Ibid., B176, 331, Smyth to Mathews, November 7, 1781.

67 Ibid., B176, 369-71, Sherwood to Mathews, December 28, 1781.


69 Ibid., B176, 369-71, Sherwood to Mathews, December 28, 1781.

70 Ibid., B176, 295, Smyth to Mathews, September 29, 1781.

71 Ibid., B177, 289-91, Sherwood to Mathews, May 15, 1782.

72 Ibid., B177, 282, Weekly State of the Loyal Block House, May 12, 1782.

73 Ibid., B177, 291, Sherwood to Mathews, May 15, 1782.

74 Ibid., B179-2, 16, Mathews to Sherwood, May 21, 1782.

75 Ibid., B161, 399, Edward Jessup to Mathews, February 14, 1782.

76 Ibid., B179-1, 197, Mathews to Sherwood, February 18, 1782, B177, 556, Sherwood to Mathews, October 27, 1782, B177, 608-10, Sherwood to Nairne, November 27, 1782.

77 Ibid., B178, 64, Sherwood to Mathews, February 2, 1783.

78 Ibid., B161, 474, Sherwood to Nairne, December 31, 1782.

79 Ibid., B179-1, 226, Mathews to Sherwood, April 7, 1782.
80. Ibid., B179-2, 246, Mathews to Sherwood, March 31, 1783.

81. Ibid., B176, 95, Sherwood to Mathews, May 18, 1781.

82. Ibid., B177, 560, Sherwood to Mathews, October 29, 1782.

83. Ibid., B179-1, 213, Mathews to Smyth & Sherwood, March 14, 1782.

84. Ibid., B178, 251-52, Smyth to Mathews, September 5, 1783.

85. Ibid., B178, 249, Smyth to Mathews, August 28, 1783.

86. Ibid., B178, 117, Smyth to Mathews, March 3, 1783: "Money is much wanted; and as its (sic) likely Parties must be sent out shortly and in the spring, I wish you'd please to move His Excellency for a warrant." Smyth's letters were filled with such demands, whereas Sherwood very rarely directly requested funds.

87. Ibid., B178, 36, Sherwood to Mathews, January 16, 1783.

88. Ibid., B177, 651-55, Sherwood to Mathews, December 28, 1782.

89. Ibid., B177, 641-50, Sherwood to Mathews, December 27, 1782.

90. Ibid., B179-2, 162-69, Mathews to Sherwood, January 9, 1783.

91. Ibid., B178, 36, Sherwood to Mathews, January 16, 1783.

92. Ibid., B176, 41, Sherwood to Mathews, February 6, 1783.

93. Ibid., B161, 463, Sherwood to Nairne, November 29, 1782.

94. Ibid., B161, 469-71, Sherwood to Nairne, December 22, 1782.
95Ibid., B178, 15-16, Thomas Smyth to Mathews, January 8, 1783.

96Ibid., B161, 474-76, Sherwood to Nairne, December 31, 1782.

97Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution (2 vols., Boston, 1864), I, 228.


100Ibid., B179-2, 8-9, Mathews to Smyth, May 7, 1782. See also: Sabine, Biographical Sketches, II, 149 in which Parker is accused of having murdered a Whig named Shew near Ballston in the autumn of 1780.

101PAC: B178, 405, undated inquiry from Justus Sherwood to agent in Albany regarding fate of Bettys.

102Ibid., B177, 289, Sherwood to Mathews, May 15, 1782.

103Ibid., B177, 286-87, Smyth to Mathews, May 14, 1782.

104Ibid., B177, 303-06, Sherwood to Mathews, May 19, 1782.

105Ibid., B179-2, 15-16, Mathews to Sherwood, May 21, 1782.

106Ibid., B179-1, 185-86, Mathews to Smyth, February 14, 1782.

107Ibid., B177, 19-21, Sherwood to Mathews, January 30, 1782.


110*ibid.*, B177, 289-91, Sherwood to Mathews, May 15, 1782.

111*ibid.*, B177, 625-26, Sherwood to Mathews, December 9, 1782.

112*ibid.*, B177, 633, Smyth to Mathews, December 14, 1782.

113*ibid.*, B176, 239, Sherwood to Mathews, August 19, 1781.

114*ibid.*, B177, 33-34, Sherwood to Mathews, February 7, 1782.


116*ibid.*, B177, 310-14, Sherwood to Mathews, May 23, 1782.

117*ibid.*, B177, 360-62, Benjamin Patterson to Mathews, June 17, 1782.

118*ibid.*, B177, 328, Smyth to Mathews, June 1, 1782.

119*ibid.*, B177, 402-03, Sworn statement by Zach: Baldwin, Abner Barlow, Levi Sylvester, Charles Brown, Peter Taylor (Serj.), Levi Barnum (Serj.), Adonijah Gillet, and Ziba Philips (Serj.) in favour of Benjamin Patterson, July 28, 1782.


121PAC: B179-2, 49, Mathews to Smyth, July 25, 1782.

122This problem will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

123PAC: B177, 623-24, Smyth to Mathews, December 7, 1782.

124*ibid.*, B177, 367-70, Azariah Pritchard's Report to Mathews, June 21, 1782.
125 *Tbid.*, B137, 347-48, Sherwood to de Riedesel, November 12, 1782.

126 *Tbid.*, B177, 614-17, Sherwood to Mathews, November 29, 1782.

127 *Tbid.*, B177, 606-07, Smyth to Mathews, November 27, 1782.

128 *Tbid.*, B177, 610, Sherwood to Nairne, November 27, 1782.

129 *Tbid.*, B177, 604-05, Sherwood to Mathews, November 26, 1782.

130 *Tbid.*, B177, 640, Sherwood to Jacob Lansing, November 28, 1782.

131 *Tbid.*, B177, 467-72, Sherwood & Smyth to Mathews, August 28, 1782.


133 *Tbid.*, B177, 554-55, Sherwood to Mathews, October 27, 1782.

134 *Tbid.*, B177, 558-60, Sherwood to Mathews, October 29, 1782.


137 *Tbid.*, 84.


139 *VHS Collections, IV, The Upper Connecticut, II*, (Montpelier, 1943), 87.


141 Vermont Historical Society: Allen Papers, Add. Mss. 21840, fols. 3-3b, Sherwood to Mathews, March 13, 1781.
142 PAC: B179-1, 15-17, Mathews to Sherwood, March 19, 1781.

143 *Wells, Newbury*, 386.

144 PAC: B176, 58-60, Sherwood to Mathews, no date.


149 *Hill, Eastern Vermont*, 668-69.

150 PAC: B178, 132, Sherwood to Mathews, March 13, 1781.

151 *VHS, The Upper Connecticut*, 129.

152 PAC: B176, 28, Sherwood to Mathews, January 10, 1781.


158 *Ibid.*, B179-1, 10-11, Mathews to Sherwood,
January 29, 1781. B179-1, 12, Mathews to Sherwood, February 1, 1781.


172 *Ibid.*, B177, 104-12, Smyth to Mathews, March 6, 1782.


175 Ibid., B162, 15-17, Sherwood to Nairne, February 23, 1783.

176 Ibid., B178, 104, "Plain Truth" to Sherwood, March 2, 1783.
CHAPTER V

THE VERMONT NEGOTIATIONS - FROM CASTLETON TO ISLE-AUX-NOIX

The Sherwood mission to Vermont in the fall of 1780 was the ultimate result of a scheme which had been maturing for some time. Vermont had taken matters into her own hands in January 1777 when, guided by the Allens and their allies, she had declared herself independent of all outside authority, whether emanating from London, Albany, Portsmouth, Boston, or Philadelphia.¹ The newly-independent state did send troops to participate in the campaign which ended in Burgoyne's surrender, but generally Vermont regarded her neighbours with distrust. As long as both New York and New Hampshire claimed Vermont, the latter would almost certainly be barred from membership in the American Union. The possibility even existed of Vermont being attacked by Congressional troops.

Vermont's conspicuous weakness thus left the state open for overtures from the British, an opportunity which Lord George Germain was able to see as early as March 1779:

"The separation of the inhabitants of the country they style Verdmont (sic) from the provinces in which it was formerly included, is a circumstance of which I should hope much advantage might be made by discreet management."² Germain, in writing to the British commander-in-chief in New York,

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Sir Henry Clinton, declared that there could be no objection to offering the Vermonters the status of a separate province under the British flag, with a guarantee of land titles to every settler who took the oath of allegiance. The question remained as to how to implement such a plan and communicate it to the men who held political sway over the Green Mountains.

During the summer of 1779 Clinton did apparently contact Ethan Allen who proposed to raise 4,000 men, attack Albany, and then fall back on either Canada or New York. Nothing came of this scheme, however, and Haldimand who had been skeptical of the practicality of Germain's idea from the beginning, declared to Clinton that no trust could be placed in Allen. Even if the latter did raise the troops which he had promised, Haldimand did not want him to bring them to Canada for fear that they might remain as conquerors.

Never daunted, Sir Henry Clinton now attempted to reach the Vermonters through a prominent Virginian Loyalist, Colonel Beverley Robinson of the Loyal American Regiment. Colonel Robinson was noted for such clandestine activities, and was also involved in the British plot to win over Benedict Arnold. On March 30, 1780, Robinson wrote to Ethan Allen declaring that he understood that Allen and most of Vermont opposed "ye wild and chimerical scheme of ye Americans...and that you would willingly assist in uniting America again to Great Britain, and restoring that
happy Constitution we have so wantonly and unadvisedly destroyed. 6 The Virginian also hinted that a reunion would mean a separate government for Vermont, with a local militia headed by "such officers as you recommend," thus appealing to Ethan's well-developed sense of self-interest. Robinson urged Allen to communicate any ideas he might have on the subject if he was interested. All communication would be kept secret, and if Allen was not satisfied with what the British had to offer, the whole matter would be forgotten. This letter was carried to Arlington in July by a British courier disguised as a farmer. 7 When no reply was forthcoming, Robinson sent a second and shorter letter in February 1781 repeating his request for Allen's view on the matter of bringing Vermont back under the British flag. 8 Allen, fearing that Congressional agents knew he had received these unsolicited letters from the enemy stronghold of New York, and also suspicious of British intentions, decided to use the opportunity to his own best advantage. As he held the rank of colonel in the Continental army as well as being major-general of the Vermont militia, he had to proceed carefully. Early in March, the Robinson letters were delivered to Samuel Huntington, the president of Congress, with a covering letter from Allen, grandiloquently avowing his good intentions and his determination to defend Vermont's independence:

I am as resolutely determined to defend
the independence of Vermont as Congress are that of the United States and rather than fail will retire with hardy Green Mountain Boys into the desolate caverns of the mountains and wage war with humanity at large.9

Ethan Allen's blunt defense of Vermont's position would have come as no surprise to Huntington. During the previous summer, the governor of Vermont, Thomas Chittenden, had attempted to educate Congress on what he conceived to be the reality of his state's situation. Vermont, declared Chittenden, was fully independent and was "at liberty to offer or accept terms of cessation of hostilities with Great Britain without the approbation of any other man or body of men...."10 Chittenden thus served notice that Vermont was not beyond negotiating with the common enemy to gain her ends. If genuine negotiations were to be carried on, however, a more effective method had to be developed than the dangerous expedient of correspondence. Whatever merit there may have been in the Robinson letters, Allen would almost certainly have been foolish to rise immediately to the bait which was offered in them. Ethan Allen, Thomas Chittenden and many of the leading men of Vermont were undoubtedly prepared to hear what bounties the British government would bestow upon them if they returned to their former allegiance, but they were naturally unwilling to have Congress document their conversation and bring the force of the Continental Army down upon them. Ira Allen did not overstate the case when he observed:
"The business was necessarily of a private nature; nothing could be written with safety to Vermont...."\textsuperscript{11} 

In attempting to win over Ethan Allen, the British were actually appealing to a small but dominant clique within the state of Vermont. This clique included, besides Ethan and Ira Allen, the Fays, Jonas and Joseph of Bennington, the Brownsons of Sunderland, Samuel and Moses Robinson, Samuel Safford and John Fassett.\textsuperscript{12} These men, leaders in the movement to create an independent Vermont, were all from west of the Green Mountains, and were regarded with suspicion by the majority of settlers on the eastern side of the mountains in the Connecticut Valley. The latter felt that the Allen group was a grasping cabal which was out to mold Vermont to suit its own ends.\textsuperscript{13} If they learned that the Allens and their friends were holding secret negotiations with the British, their suspicions and hostility would increase. It was therefore necessary to keep not only Congress and the neighbouring states in ignorance of any conversations with the enemy, but also to keep the overwhelming majority of Vermonters in that state as well.

By September 1780 rumours of Vermont's willingness to discuss terms with the British were fairly common along the northern frontier.\textsuperscript{14} Justus Sherwood from his post at St. Johns was certainly well aware of this development and was making his first tentative effort to try to exploit it.\textsuperscript{15} On August 24 Sherwood sent a secret
messenger to a known Loyalist named Hawkins in Kingsbury, New York, not far from the southern Vermont frontier. Hawkins was instructed to get in touch with Ethan Allen, to let him know that the British were indeed prepared to grant Vermont separate status within the Empire, and that negotiations to effect this desirable result should be opened as soon as possible. Governor Haldimand had given his blessing to the scheme. Sherwood urged Hawkins to be prudent: "Pray be secret, penetrating and active in this affair and you may expect a most ample reward from His Excellency..." Unfortunately Hawkins had not been secretive enough in disguising his views from his republican neighbors, and had been arrested and taken to Albany as a prisoner before Sherwood's messenger could reach him. The agent was able to confirm Vermont's feeling of disenchantment with Congress, however, as well as to report that many New Yorkers near the Vermont border were desirous of joining Vermont if that state was able to arrange a satisfactory settlement with the British. Justus Sherwood had apparently reached another watershed in his life; if anyone was to carry the message to Ethan Allen, perhaps he himself should be that man. On October 26, 1780, accompanied by seven men, Sherwood started on his mission behind the enemy's lines.

In certain respects Sherwood was an ideal choice for this dangerous undertaking. He was familiar both with Vermont and its governing clique from his pre-war
days as a Green Mountain Boy. He was sufficiently realistic to observe that it would have been much easier to have achieved the goal of separating Vermont from the rebellious colonies if the project had been initiated at the beginning of the Revolutionary War. Passions had been aroused in the meantime, and Vermont blood had been shed during the Burgoyne campaign, to the detriment of any diplomatic effort now. However, Sherwood had not lived in Vermont for four years in complete isolation: if Haldimand was prepared to recognize and protect the Vermonter's land claims, as taken out under New Hampshire patents, and if the leading men of Vermont could be rewarded with commissions in the British service, there was still a chance that the King's authority could be voluntarily restored in the Green Mountains. Sherwood thus expressed his willingness to assist this project with a statement which, while it reflected his patriotism, also displayed a certain grasp of realpolitik: "I should be exceedingly happy to be in some manner instrumental in bringing these deluded people to their right senses and the allegiance they owe their sovereign which I think may be done by buying their leaders." 19 Such forthright frankness appealed to Governor Haldimand. He was aware both of Sherwood's talents and his frustration at not playing a larger part in the war, and he was prepared to give the energetic young man his chance: "Your abilities and moderation, joined to the character I
understand you have always borne in that country, togeth
ether with the attachment you have manifested to your na
tural sovereign and his Government, makes you a fit per
son to negotiate and bring about this desirable re
conciliation, which cannot fail of being highly accep
table to the King, and of the greatest importance to
the happiness of those concerned."20

Haldimand and Sherwood were well aware that their sche
me had to be presented in a subtle fashion only to those Ve
rmon leaders who, from fear of New York and hope of
personal advantage, might be prepared to accept the pro
tection of the British flag. Governor Chittenden pro
vided the opportunity by offering to establish a cartel or agreement whereby Vermont and Great Britain might exchange prisoners of war.21 The British seized this chance to establish a link with the Vermonters for once the cartel had been arranged, it could then be used as a covering operation for more serious matters.22 The Sherwood mission would also follow in the wake of a British raid against the country between Lakes Champlain and George, which would seek to destroy enemy supplies in that area and to co-operate with Sir John Johnson, who would push eastward from Oswego and raid the Mohawk Valley.23 Vermont also felt the effects of this operation as a party of British-led Indians swept up the Onion River Valley and burned the settlement at Royalton, inflicting severe damage to homes, barns, and
livestock on the northern frontier. Such a display of force was timely in emphasizing Vermont's relative helplessness, and the desirability of listening to what the British had to offer.24

Sherwood's official instructions regarding the cartel were signed by Major Christopher Carleton who commanded the British naval force on Lake Champlain and who was responsible for conveying Sherwood's party down the Lake. Armed with dispatches to Chittenden and Ethan Allen, Sherwood set off for Vermont from Crown Point at seven o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1780. Two days later, accompanied by four men, Sherwood appeared under a flag of truce at Castleton in southwestern Vermont, where Ethan Allen was in command. On the morning of October 29, after breakfast with his hosts, Sherwood appeared before Ethan Allen and ten of his field officers and stated his official business.25 Allen decided that he wanted to discuss Sherwood's instructions with him privately, and thus begged the indulgence of his officers. With the consent of the latter, the two men retired and took a walk together through the neighbouring woods. As far as is known, they had not shared one another's company for well over five years, and a great deal had happened since their last meeting.

Allen left no record of his conversation on this occasion, but Sherwood faithfully maintained a journal of the entire mission. After some preliminary talk,
during which the two former associates may well have exchanged personal information, Justus Sherwood finally made his move. Ethan Allen was probably not too surprised by what his one-time comrade had to offer, although he prefaced his remarks by saying that he would be involved in "no Dam'd Arnold Plan," a reference to the recent treachery of Benedict Arnold. Sherwood replied that he regarded his proposal as being of "a very honourable nature," but that if Allen should think ill of it, he hoped that he could presume upon their former friendship that Allen would not expose him. After some thought on the subject, Allen agreed to this condition, and Sherwood then launched his attempt to return the Green Mountain State to the British Empire:

I then proceeded to tell him that Genl. Haldimand was no stranger (to) their disputes with the other states respecting jurisdiction & that His Excellency was perfectly well inform'd of all that had lately pass'd between Congress & Vermont & of the fix'd intentions of Congress never to their being a separate state, that from Genl. Allen's common character, His Excellency Genl. Haldimand conceived he was a man of too much good sense & solid reason, not to realize that Congress was only duping them & waited for a favourable opportunity to crush them and that this was a proper time for them to cast off the Congress yoke & resume their former allegiance to the King of Great Britain, by doing which they would secure to themselves those privileges they had so long contended for with New York.26

A recent biographer of Ethan Allen, Charles Jellison, has suggested that what Sherwood put forward
on that day was very close to being a "Dam'd Arnold Plan," and that by agreeing to listen to such a scheme, Allen was bordering on treason.\textsuperscript{27} Ethan himself would have justified his actions on the grounds that he was acting for the independent republic of Vermont, and was attempting to safeguard her best interests rather than those of the United States. Despite his periodic displays of bombast, Allen was enough of a man of the world to realize that Vermont was politically divided and militarily weak, and had to use every opportunity presented to her to maintain her frail independence. On the occasion in question he merely told Sherwood that the British offer would receive "very serious consideration," not because of any advancement which the British might be prepared to offer to Allen personally which "had not the weight of a straw with him," but because it "Materially ...concern(ed) the whole people of Vermont, whose libertys & propertys for a number of years past...(were) much dearer to him than his own life." Sherwood urged the acceptance of the offer, assuring Allen that "it was not from any selfish motives of my own but the tender sentiments of regard and friendship which I felt for the people of Vermont that induced me to wish them to accept of those proposals..."\textsuperscript{28} Both men sounded very noble, but both may well have had ulterior motives. Allen knew that his considerable holdings of Vermont lands would be worthless if New York won the day, while Sherwood
perhaps saw his own Vermont lands being returned to him if he could guide the infant republic back to its "proper allegiance." In fairness to Sherwood, no evidence exists that such a promise was ever made to him by Haldimand or anyone else, although the act of February 1779 which had officially banished the Tories was repealed on November 8, 1780, just a few days after the historic Castleton meeting.29

The two men did not reveal the details of their conversation to Allen's officers, and agreed to say that Sherwood had discussed only the cartel with Allen and had sought his assistance in putting these proposals before the Vermont Council.30 Allen's officers apparently accepted this explanation and were quite prepared to see the establishment of an arrangement for the exchange of prisoners between Vermont and Great Britain, including a truce while the exchange was carried out. Sherwood personally pledged that no further offensive operations would be carried on on Lake Champlain or against the northern frontier of New York, a pledge made necessary by the suspicions of the Vermonters that the British might attack New York while negotiating with them. The Vermonters themselves had plans to annex that part of New York which lay between Lake Champlain and the Mohawk and Hudson rivers as part of their republic, and were therefore especially interested in keeping that region quiet until they could make their move. A truce covering
the New York frontier had not been included in the original proposal, but Sherwood, ever the flexible negotiator, agreed to the point, knowing that the raid which the British had made into that country shortly before his departure would probably end activity in that quarter until the following year.\(^\text{31}\) Such a pledge would also help to allay any continuing suspicions which the Vermonters might still harbour.

On October 30, the day following Sherwood's initial meeting with Allen, the two men conferred further privately on the real purpose of Sherwood's mission. Sherwood offered to show Allen specific written proposals which he had brought with him, but Allen declared that the time was not propitious for such action. A further meeting would have to take place at some future time, and Ethan then proposed to send his brother, Colonel Ira Allen and young Major Joseph Fay, two men he felt he could trust, to carry on the negotiations. Ethan Allen, a pretty fair manager of men, made Sherwood's job even more difficult than it was by refusing to take a direct part in the affair himself, and by declaring that Ira Allen and Fay would be told only that Vermont was negotiating for neutrality.\(^\text{32}\) Ethan declared that such a step was necessary, as his own people might "cut off his head" if they suspected that he wanted to throw Vermont's lot in with Britain's.\(^\text{33}\) It would be necessary to educate the Vermont populace on the whole question.
Allen confided to Sherwood that he was heartily sick of the war and wished once more "to enjoy the sweets of peace and devote himself to his Philosophical studys." His enemies, especially New York, would not permit him such peace, and Congress would never permit Vermont to take her rightful place within the new American nation. The philosopher therefore was prepared once again to play the warrior, if necessary: "Vermont will declare herself a neutral power free and independent of any other power on Earth and will invite all people to a free trade with her." If Congress reacted in a hostile fashion, Allen would raise a force, invade New York, and seize Albany. He expected support from the militia of Berkshire County in western Massachusetts, which he felt was sympathetic to Vermont. If his gamble failed and he was driven from Albany, he would ask help from Canada, and hoped that General Haldimand might see fit to send him 20,000 men. Sherwood must have realized that such an undertaking on Haldimand's part was extremely unlikely, but doubtless felt that it was better to let Allen have his full say, state all his hopes and fears, and then eventually get down to the details in later bargaining. It would seem that General Allen was re-viving the old Burgoyne concept of invasion of the northern colonies, a plan which the British would never resurrect after the disaster at Saratoga. Allen concluded by outlining in general terms what he would
expect from the British if Vermont's return to the Empire was to come about: command of his own Vermont troops, independence from any other colony, the privileges of home rule as offered to the colonies by the Carlisle Commission in 1778, and the recognition of the land patents taken out under New Hampshire. But if Congress should receive Vermont as a full partner in the new nation, then the negotiations would be broken off and kept secret by both sides.37

On all these points, Haldimand was to prove his willingness to be generous, possibly because of a genuine sympathy with the Vermonters' situation, or perhaps because he felt that Congress would never accede to Vermont's will, and thus would necessarily limit the latter's choice. Allen's trump card lay not so much in these conditions as in the method of bringing about the reconciliation which Sherwood so desired: time would be required to educate the Vermonters, and therefore the British would have to be patient. Although Sherwood did not then realize it, this problem would be raised time and time again throughout the negotiations and would try his patience in a manner which only Job could possibly appreciate. It seemed as far as the Vermonters were concerned, it was never the right time.

Sherwood's mission was now over, and he was faced with the dangerous and difficult journey back to Canada. His return was hampered by nature - three snow storms
and the beginning of the freeze-up of Lake Champlain seriously limited his movements, while the hostility of the people gave him some bad moments. This hostility was fanned by Ethan Allen's cousin, Major Ebenezer Allen, who started a false rumour that a party of twenty Indians had been sighted at Pitsford, and that Major Carleton was landing a force of regulars at East Bay. Sherwood was placed under the guard of two sentries, and experienced some harrowing moments until Ebenezer Allen's story was discredited. Governor Thomas Chittenden, however, gave express orders that Sherwood was to be treated with all the respect due to an officer under a flag of truce, but it did appear at times as if he were a hostage. For three days on the return journey, he was accompanied by Colonel Ira Allen and Major Joseph Fay, who were to continue the negotiations and establish the cartel, but then these two men turned back a few miles north of East Bay promising to come on to St. Johns when the ice on the lake became thicker and safer for travel. Sherwood, more strongly motivated than either of his erstwhile companions, pushed on, sending his cutter to Ticonderoga while he and one of his men went back to Skenesboro for provisions. They obtained five bushels of corn and thirty pounds of pork to supplement their rations before rejoining the rest of their party. These supplies had to be distributed very carefully, as Sherwood subsequently added to his party a group of ten Loyalists including
several women who had been four days without provisions. A settler, Peter Walker, subsequently billed the Vermont government for the use of his wagon which Sherwood employed to carry his party to Ticonderoga.38 The party finally arrived at St. Johns on the morning of November 26 where Sherwood delivered his dispatches to Major Carleton.39 Two days later Sherwood and Carleton departed for Quebec so that the former could confer directly with the governor.

Justus Sherwood's journal, which recorded his day-to-day activities on his mission, provided little insight into the writer's thoughts. Sherwood evidently felt that he should confine himself to the bare facts, and remained stolidly objective throughout, relenting only slightly when mentioning the possibility of physical danger to himself at the hands of some of the "crabbed and insulting" Vermonters. From a personal point of view, the mission must surely have given him some satisfaction. He had ventured into enemy country where he had been proscribed by name less than two years earlier. His true mission would have been sufficient cause for his arrest, trial, and execution as a spy; indeed the unhappy Major John André had been hanged for his part in the Benedict Arnold affair just before Sherwood's departure for Castleton, and the thought of that execution could hardly have been comforting to the ex-Vermonter just as Arnold's example was unappealing to
Ethan Allen.

In certain respects, the mission appeared to have been a success for Sherwood; he had made contact with Ethan Allen and had set the wheels in motion which might eventually lead to Vermont's return to British rule. Allen could have refused to consider such a possibility and sent his erstwhile associate back to Canada either empty-handed or armed with a useless cartel. That he did not do so attests more to the sharpness of his own mind than it does to Sherwood's skill as a diplomat. Justus had nevertheless had the courage to seize the opportunity and would now try to employ it to his own side's advantage. The mission to Castleton had opened new doors for him, doors which had been shut since the decimation of the Queen's Loyal Rangers at Bennington and the loss of his men to Captain McKay. For the balance of the war, Justus Sherwood would be motivated and stimulated by being in the forefront of the clandestine struggle for the future of the Green Mountain State.

Ethan Allen was undoubtedly correct when he suggested the wisdom of cloaking in secrecy the dealings between Vermont and the British. While Sherwood was still in Vermont, George Clinton, the revolutionary governor of New York, reported to George Washington that he had reason to suspect "an unwarrantable communication" between Allen "and the enemy at St. Johns."
In an attempt to allay such suspicions, Governor Thomas Chittenden wrote directly to Clinton, asking the latter to give up any claims which New York presumed to hold over Vermont, and proposing a "solid union" against any British invasion from Quebec. The latter suggestion was well-timed, considering the activities of the British in the Mohawk Valley and Lake George area during that October. Chittenden subsequently wrote to Governors Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut and John Hancock of Massachusetts emphasizing the same point. He did not write to Governor Meshech Weare of New Hampshire, perhaps because the latter did not lie directly in the path of a British invasion from Canada, but more likely because Weare refused to recognize Chittenden as the governor of an independent Vermont. Vermont, Chittenden declared, wanted only what was her due; she had supplied her neighbours with men and material aid, and it would be a poor reward if, at the end of the war, she was attacked by them. Chittenden appealed to Vermont's neighbours to surrender their claim to the Green Mountains, and to join the Vermonters in a mutual defense against the British. If they failed to do so and the British did launch an attack against the northern states, Vermont, poor in manpower and resources might well "be under the disagreeable necessity" of making the best terms with the invader that she could. Chittenden did not specifically say so, but it must have been obvious to
Clinton, Trumbull, and Hancock that if Vermont collapsed, their own frontiers would be even more open to attack than they presently were. The Vermont governor was thus serving a subtle notice to his neighbours that his state might be compelled by circumstance to take a step which had been partially forced on Vermont by their greed. While Chittenden was employed in protecting Vermont from the American states which surrounded her, Ethan Allen was occupied with assuring the British of Vermont's good intentions in the matter of the cartel. Taking a militant note which differed sharply from the friendly attitude which Chittenden had professed toward New York, Allen regretted that the truce which he and Sherwood had discussed included that state and declared: "It is the last of the kind that I shall ever propose...on their behalf."45

At the conclusion of his mission, Justus Sherwood had reported directly to Haldimand at Quebec and, during his stay in the capital, subsequently received more specific instructions on how he was to handle the delicate negotiations with the Vermonters. Before Sherwood's arrival Haldimand had not been confident of the success of the scheme, and had reported to Lord George Germain that the people of Vermont were so deceitful that he despaired of ever bringing them back under the British flag.46 Sherwood's report may have changed his mind, for in his instructions to Justus on
December 20, he radiated good will to the Vermonters:
"I always regretted the measures which were taken by
the government of New York, and felt compassion for the
unhappy people who were the objects of them." Haldimand declared further that the people who had settled
Vermont had fought valiantly against the French and
obviously would not have separated themselves from
England had their properties been secured to them. In
these circumstances, Haldimand was prepared to be gener-
ous to "a brave and unhappy people" and would treat with
them as "a soldier unpracticed in deceit and chicane." Certainly, if Haldimand had any lingering doubts about
the intentions and the integrity of Vermont's leaders
at this time, he did not reveal them to Sherwood. He
might have been well advised to do so, thus tempering
Sherwood's own enthusiasm and making him more hard-headed
and realistic in the difficult days which lay ahead.

Haldimand's terms were indeed generous. Vermont
was to be offered separate status within the Empire with
"every prerogative and immunity which is promised to the
other provinces in the Proclamation of the King's
Commissioners." As soon as Vermont declared either
its neutrality or its desire to return to British rule,
a force of at least 3,000 troops would be dispatched to
the foot of Lake Champlain to help to defend that new
status. Furthermore, Haldimand was prepared to cease
negotiations immediately and to keep all past proceedings
secret if Vermont should be successful in gaining entry to the American Union.\textsuperscript{51} If Vermont should accept his other terms, Haldimand would encourage her to raise two battalions of ten companies each, which would be commanded by Messrs. Allen and Chittenden or anyone else whom the governor and council desired. As a further inducement, Sherwood could let it be known that "gratuities suitable to their merits" would be offered to those "who shall exert themselves in promoting the happy reunion."\textsuperscript{52} As practical measures to avoid the suspicions of rabid patriots both inside and outside Vermont, the negotiations would be kept secret, the truce would not be continued, and no trade would be granted between Vermont and Quebec.\textsuperscript{53} Haldimand's attitude may have been influenced by his genuine admiration for the hardy men and women of the Green Mountains; he certainly went to some pains to stress this point.\textsuperscript{54} He did mention to Sherwood that he assumed that eventually the rebelling colonies would return to British rule, and Vermont might well provide the wedge which would precipitate that movement.\textsuperscript{55}

On December 30 Haldimand notified Governor Thomas Chittenden that he was ready to settle the details of the proposed cartel.\textsuperscript{56} The place for these discussions would be Isle-aux-Noix on the Richelieu River and the British commissioners would be Major Alexander Dundas of the 34th Regiment and Captain Justus Sherwood.\textsuperscript{57} Chittenden
signified his willingness, saying that Ira Allen and Joseph Fay had already attempted to reach Canada via Lake Champlain the previous November and had been stopped by the ice. As soon as possible, Chittenden promised to send two suitable negotiators, Joseph Fay and another prominent young Vermonter, Major Isaac Clarke, to establish the cartel. Clarke, Chittenden's son-in-law, played a minor role in the earlier proceedings when he carried a flag to Major Carleton at Crown Point after the Castleton meeting.

For the first half of 1781 Justus Sherwood spent most of his time on Isle-aux-Noix, a marshy, low-lying island about twelve miles south of St. Johns. He was now more than ever involved with organizing and sending out scouting parties, both to Vermont and to her neighbours, to gather information which he reported to Captain Mathews. The impending meeting with the Vermont commissioners must have weighed heavily on his mind as the winter progressed. During the first week of February, a scout named John Jackson returned to Isle-aux-Noix with a discouraging report of travelling conditions in southern Vermont: "From Jackson's account of the lakes and the slow progress of his party, I am very much afraid it will be some time before we hear any news from that part of the country." Sherwood's pessimism was apparently justified. On February 12 Fay and Clarke started north on their diplomatic mission, but were
again checked by the unstable condition of the ice on Lake Champlain at Split Rock and were unable to proceed further. Sherwood was unaware of this development, but he was becoming increasingly suspicious of his erstwhile friends. On February 19 he wrote Mathews: "I am as jealous of Allen and his party and as sensible of their inherent deceit as any man can be, and you may assure His Excellency, General Haldimand, that I will be on my guard when the commissioners arrive (and) I will cautiously watch all their words and actions." Justus was troubled as well by other problems. Late in January, a trusted courier, Corporal David Crowfoot, had been dispatched directly to Ethan Allen, and Sherwood had since heard nothing from him. Crowfoot was not a man of great penetration, but Sherwood regarded him as a scrupulously honest fellow who would report exactly what Allen told him. Reports from other agents were not encouraging. One had heard that Allen had demanded of Congress that the latter either recognize Vermont's neutrality or place in Ethan's eager hands a force large enough to conquer Canada. Three other agents found great enthusiasm in the New York countryside between Saratoga and Cambridge for union with Vermont, because it was strongly rumoured that the latter was on the verge of making peace with Great Britain. A number of families along the New York-Vermont border were moving into Vermont as a result of these rumours.
Recruiting of potential Loyalists for the King's service had dropped off sharply as people spoke of the impending settlement and the blessed peace which it would bring. Sherwood must have been dismayed that the secret negotiations with Vermont had apparently become so well known. His suspicion of Vermont's motives would increase accordingly as he awaited Crowfoot's return.

The faithful Crowfoot did eventually return safely to Isle-aux-Noix in March. The story which he told left Sherwood more on edge than ever as to the eventual outcome of the Vermont question. Crowfoot had made his way to Arlington where he had sought out the well-known friend of the British cause, Elnathan Merwin ("Plain Truth"). Merwin introduced Crowfoot to a man named Hard who was to act as a go-between with Ethan Allen. Hard was apparently a friend of Allen who would not attract suspicion by visiting him. Through Hard, Crowfoot was informed that Allen was a man of honour who would keep his word, and who hoped that the British were honourable as well. He and Vermont were both tired of fighting and desired peace above all. There was little in these sentiments that had not been included in the discussions which Sherwood and Allen had had the previous October. Ethan Allen was playing his game carefully and was prepared to reveal nothing of substance to Sherwood. If he had wished to confuse and demoralize Justus, he had certainly succeeded. Frustration and
uncertainty were apparent in a note which Sherwood appended to Crowfoot's report: "The above report puts me in suspense between hope and fear for (perhaps) Allen is sincere and matters are drawing to a favourable conclusion much faster than I ever expected. Or is he a most subtle designing fellow? I am not able to determine which."68

The leading men of Vermont may have been slow in following up the discussions which Sherwood and Ethan Allen had initiated at Castleton, but they did not waste their time during the winter of 1781. In February Vermont laid claim to a slice of New Hampshire along a line twenty miles east of the Connecticut River. This claim was subsequently legalized and justified by conventions held in Charlestown and Cornish, New Hampshire, at which the citizens of this region agreed to be annexed to Vermont.69 In similar fashion, the Vermonters also claimed that part of New York which lay north of the Massachusetts border and east of the Hudson River on a line north to the 45th parallel and followed up this move with a convention at Cambridge on May 15.70 From a practical point of view, Vermont had a good deal to offer to these areas which she was attempting to sweep into her small fold. If she was able to negotiate a separate settlement with the British, she could offer these former New Hampshire and New York settlers the blessings of peace and the lower taxes which would
accompany such a development. William Smith, former chief justice of New York and himself a holder of large Vermont tracts under New York patent, had his own sources of information in Vermont which told him that this action by the "Crafty Mountaineers" was a result of "the sanguine discovery" that "there will be no stability in any compact with their High Mightinesses of Philadelphia."71 Vermont had certainly hurled down the gauntlet. On March 10 Ira Allen officially notified Congress of Vermont's intentions and included a copy of the Articles of Union which bound the new territories to Vermont. Ethan Allen did his share to keep a potential enemy off guard; on March 9 he transmitted Beverley Robinson's letters to him to Congress, and declared truthfully, if unethically, that these were the only written communications he had had from the common enemy.72

Vermont's acquisition of these new territories was more than a simple land-grab. The Connecticut Valley towns of New Hampshire welcomed union with Vermont as they felt isolated from the distant center of power in their own state. Many of these people favoured the concept of a separate state incorporating the towns on both banks of the Connecticut, but union with Vermont was the next best thing. Eastern Vermont desired this union to strengthen its own hand against the Allen clique from the Bennington-Arlington-Sunderland area west of the mountains.73 The Allens and their friends agreed to the
eastern union, but were anxious to balance it by the addition of the New York territory which they hoped to dominate politically. The fact that the western union included known Tory strongholds in the area north of Albany strengthened the belief of the easterners that the Allens were preparing to return the state to British rule.

It was against this turbulent backdrop of events that the long-awaited second round of Sherwood's negotiations with Vermont was to take place. Perhaps because of these events, Chittenden decided to send Ira, the shrewd and calculating younger brother of Ethan Allen who had been a leading architect of Vermont's independence, in place of the youthful Fay. Charles Jellison has questioned Chittenden's choice: "Here was an exceedingly delicate enterprise that required plenty of faith and trust on the part of both sides, and Ira, with his strong odor of intrigue and duplicity, was hardly the man to inspire either." Nevertheless, on April 26 Chittenden notified Haldimand that Ira Allen and Isaac Clarke would be on their way "with full and ample powers to negotiate the within proposed cartel with any gentleman or gentlemen your Excellency has or may appoint and authorize for that business."

Thomas Chittenden had suggested that the condition of the ice on Lake Champlain had kept his commissioners from completing their journey to Canada in February.
Sherwood's own scouts had also reported the difficulty of travelling conditions to the southward. The winter had certainly been a very severe one, having arrived in November while Sherwood was still in Vermont. In December the Green Mountains had been buried in a heavy snowfall which had slowed life down considerably and had kept it running at a relatively leisurely pace until early May.\textsuperscript{77} The Vermonters might thus blame the weather for their own tardiness in following up the initial Sherwood-Allen meeting. With the coming of spring, however, such an excuse would no longer be credible. Sherwood's long wait finally came to an end on May 7 when Ira Allen arrived at Isle-aux-Noix.\textsuperscript{78}

Justus Sherwood was obviously on edge as the next vital stage of the negotiations was about to begin. He had waited five months for this moment, and now that it had arrived, he found himself seized with doubts of his own ability to fulfil the role which was expected of him: "I find it will be very difficult for me to act in such a manner (sic) as to prevent jealousy and cannot help expressing a wish that His Excellency...could find Major Dundas a proper person to act with me."\textsuperscript{79} Sherwood's dedication to the project of reclaiming Vermont was considerable, and he may have felt that his own passions would overcome him and destroy him as a negotiator. Major Dundas, Sherwood's companion in these negotiations, was aware only that a cartel was
being arranged and knew nothing of the real purpose behind Allen's mission. Sherwood thus had shouldered the whole responsibility for the Vermont affair and he suddenly found it extremely onerous. Haldimand, in order to maintain absolute secrecy and give the Vermonters no excuse for further delay, did not want Dundas to be a party to the negotiations. This arrangement was not an auspicious beginning from the British point of view, especially when the opponent on the other side of the table was as able as Ira Allen. Ira would lead his hosts a merry chase before he returned to Vermont.

If Thomas Chittenden had sent the younger Allen to Isle-aux-Noix to play a delaying game and confuse the British, then he had indeed chosen wisely. Ira immediately realized that Dundas and Sherwood were not "both on one footing", and he moved to exploit this breach which the enemy had unwittingly provided for him. On May 8, one day after his arrival at the negotiation site, he dispatched a letter to Haldimand in which he outlined his state's position with regard to both the cartel and the question of reunion, casually adding that he was embarrassed that Dundas knew nothing about the latter.80 His comment sounded innocent, but Ira must have known that this letter would create problems for his security-conscious hosts and would perhaps foment distrust between Sherwood and Dundas which could be exploited later on during the negotiations. In his
History of Vermont. Ira later recorded the incident in laconic fashion, giving no hint of the "embarrassment" which had supposedly seized him at Isle-aux-Noix. 81

Allen's arrival as the sole commissioner from Governor Chittenden was in itself a bit of a surprise, as Isaac Clarke was to have accompanied him. Allen brushed off the matter by saying that Clarke had been indisposed, and so he had come alone with full powers to act on behalf of Vermont. He then proceeded to hand over written proposals for the cartel to Dundas and presented Sherwood with his letter to Haldimand. 82 Sherwood then asked if Allen had any proposals to make with regard to Vermont's neutrality or return to British rule, and was shattered to find that he did not. The time, Allen observed, was not yet ripe. Most Vermonter still desired admission to the American Union, and would only be prepared to accept any other alternative when they had been flatly and decisively refused by Congress. In the interim, Chittenden, Ethan Allen and others on the Vermont Council friendly to the idea of neutrality, would work toward educating the people to accept this step. The cartel would provide a good cover for further discussion on the subject. As far as Ira Allen was concerned, that was as much as he had been authorized to say. Once the cartel had been arranged, he would retire to Vermont immediately to report to his government. 83

Sherwood was furious that after five months the
Vermonters had no more to offer than this, and he tackled Allen directly.

I have in the closest manner endeavoured to prevail on Mr. Allen to make some overtures to the General on behalf of V-t, but my endeavours have hitherto been ineffectual and he has such a cautious & suspicious kind of reserve in all his conduct that I must confess it gives me too much reason to fear that the whole drift of his journey here is to alarm Congress into a compliance with their demands. 84

On May 10, two days after the discussions began, Sherwood and Allen took a walk together on Isle-aux-Noix. Justus perhaps remembered the value of his confidential stroll with Ethan Allen the previous October, and hoped that a similar opportunity would wring some further admission from Ira. Sherwood must have suspected that the younger Allen really did have something more to tell him and might be less hesitant in privacy. An incident had already occurred which seemed to indicate that Allen might be having difficulties within his own party. A lieutenant, Simeon Lyman, whom Justus described as "a downright illiterate zealous-pated Yanky," had accompanied Allen in command of the Vermont escort and had proved "a very great embarrassment" to both Allen and Sherwood, to the extent that both men desired his removal from the post to a nearby British ship for the duration of the session. 85 Lieutenant Lyman was undoubtedly suspicious of Allen, and wanted to keep a close check upon him. The relative safety and privacy of the walk did not,
however, bring forth anything new or startling from Allen. Sherwood spoke of having a "close and warm" conference with the Vermonter whom he found to be "cautious and intricate," and unwilling to elaborate any further than he had done before. With some exasperation, Sherwood pointed out that Vermont now had a glorious opportunity to establish itself under the protection of British rule and to assure itself peace, prosperity, and liberty. General Haldimand, he added, had already conceded everything which the people of the New Hampshire Grants could possibly desire. This probe struck home, for Allen replied that Haldimand had not given them the right to choose their own governor, a privilege which they would not easily surrender, and which they regarded as part of their Connecticut heritage. Vermont's immediate desire was for neutrality, though Allen did feel that at the conclusion of the war his state would have to submit to one side or the other. It would do so, he assured Sherwood, only if it received its own free charter, and if this condition was not met, the Vermonters "would retire to the mountains, turn savages, and fight the Devil, Hell, and Human Nature at large."86 Both Ethan and Ira Allen were fond of such sensational rhetoric. Justus was not to be frightened by such grandiloquence, however, and told Allen that while Congress might be impressed by this sort of puerile bombast, General Haldimand would not be. Thus rebuffed,
Ira Allen dusted off basically the same arguments which Ethan had used at Castleton, a change in tactics which did little to improve Sherwood's temper.

Faced with a deteriorating situation in his relations with Allen and seeing his hopes fading for a speedy reunion, Justus Sherwood took a direct step. If Ira Allen was unprepared to make some proposals to Haldimand on the great question before them, then let him state in writing why he was unprepared to do so. Allen agreed to do this, but having done so, he refused to sign the document. Sherwood told him that Haldimand would interpret such a step as a scheme on Allen's part to buy time against the false hope that Congress would eventually admit Vermont, an interpretation which was probably correct. Allen replied that Sherwood had put words in his mouth, that the reasons sounded like proposals and that he would be damned if he would sign them. The long-suffering Justus suggested that he reword his reasons to his satisfaction. Allen made some revisions, but still refused to sign the document, claiming that he would make no commitment on Vermont's part until the state legislature met in June when the two new unions would be represented for the first time. He then declared that he wanted a copy of Haldimand's instructions to Sherwood to lay before Governor Chitten- den, General Allen, and part of the Council as proof of the British Governor's good intentions. Sherwood was
naturally hesitant to comply, and wrote to Quebec for guidance. Haldimand, remembering the fate of the Robinson letters, was unwilling to allow a copy of his instructions to be surrendered for fear that it might be handed over to Congress as proof of Vermont's ardent and genuine desire to become the fourteenth state of the American Union.

For Justus Sherwood the whole session had been a most tiring and frustrating one. Sherwood could not understand why Vermont did not seize the opportunity which Haldimand had offered. In his correspondence with Haldimand's secretary, Captain Mathews, Justus let his anger and aggravations flow freely: "I have omitted nothing in my power to carry into execution His Excellency's commands to me respecting V----t, have placed everything in the clearest view to A---n, and used every argument that I could suggest." He spoke of Allen's "dark and intricate manner" in dealing with a matter which, as far as Sherwood could see, was so obviously weighted in Vermont's favour by "the most humane, frank and generous manner" of "one of His Majesty's oldest and ablest generals." Allen's behaviour caused Sherwood to view him "sometimes...with contempt and always with suspicion." And yet Justus was prepared to grasp at any straw: "sometimes I am inclined from Allen's discourse to hope and almost believe that they are endeavouring to prepare for a reunion; to this, I
suppose, I am somewhat inclined by my anxious desire that it be so." In such a manner did Sherwood pinpoint his own greatest weakness in these negotiations. He was so emotionally committed to their success that he undermined his own position. He was so convinced of the benificence of the British offer that he really ignored the position of his adversary. He failed to see that a British Vermont might well be attacked by her neighbours, and that General Haldimand would be able to do little to assist her.

Nevertheless Sherwood did feel by now that he understood what the crafty Vermonters were trying to do—they were attempting to play each side off against the other. If a British army swept into the Green Mountains, the other rebelling colonies, as much to protect their own interests as anything else, would rally to Vermont's side, while "on the other hand, should Congress invade them, they could easily be admitted to a union with Britain at the latest hour—which they would, at the last extremity, choose as the least of two evils." Justus thus realized that Vermont was basically trying to keep her options open, but he bitterly resented the fact that apparently he and Haldimand were cat's-paws in this game of power politics. It is certainly possible to sympathize with him, and yet one might wonder how another person who was more objective in his view, who was less emotionally involved with the issue, might have
handled the situation. Justus Sherwood had proven his bravery, sincerity, and dedication, but these very qualities were now something of a handicap in the difficult field of diplomacy.

Increasingly convinced of the duplicity of Allen and the leading men of Vermont and cautioned by Mathews to be circumspect, Sherwood attacked their attitude on the cartel. The whole business was a sham, he declared, a mere excuse to have Allen come to Canada and thus frighten Congress into admitting Vermont. Allen had brought no list of British prisoners with him, and had mentioned orally that Vermont held only eight British soldiers - two officers and six privates. The Vermonter stood his ground, however, when this figure was questioned and observed that prisoners who had originally been taken by Vermont forces and had been handed over to other states would be returned and exchanged. Sherwood might have replied that such a transfer would be unlikely in the face of Vermont's delicate relations with her neighbours, but he held his peace. Allen continued his arguments by reminding his host that the cartel was, after all, primarily a means to keep the door open for further negotiations and thus no decision need be made immediately. He repeated that he was not empowered to offer other terms, and that if General Haldimand was upset, that was unfortunate but it was the result of a situation which was beyond his powers to rectify. If Haldimand should
express his vexation by invading Vermont, Allen snorted, then the Green Mountain Boys "would fight them all by G-d & they had already got pretty well prepared for whatever might happen...."\textsuperscript{92} Allen also expressed a strong desire to see Haldimand personally in order to make sure that he did indeed have the authority to treat with Vermont. Ira then followed up this piece of studied insolence by criticizing the British Parliament for not devoting more time to Vermont and for not having passed any legislation in the latter's favour. Thus goaded, Sherwood replied that Parliament had more important things to do than to consider the fate of a small and insignificant state such as Vermont. If that was so, Allen observed, then Parliament's attitude would have to change before any sort of permanent union between Vermont and Great Britain could be considered.\textsuperscript{93} Allen was now badgering his host unmercifully and the unhappy Sherwood was certainly feeling the pressure. In a rather pathetic note at the end of one of his letters, Sherwood sighed: "I wish Maj. Dundas (or some other gentleman) were with me in this perplexing and shuffling business."\textsuperscript{94}

On May 12, after two days of bitter wrangling, Allen changed his tactics. It seemed that he was now controlling the pace of the negotiations and had decided that the time had come to offer Sherwood some hope. In the course of "a long & very friendly conference," Allen described the addition of the new territories at the
expense of New York and New Hampshire, and intimated that many of the people in these areas were Tories who would certainly favour a reunion. He also went to some lengths to convince Sherwood that many of the prominent men in the Grants desired to bring about this reunion and that, to this end, they could raise a force of 10,000 men. This latter development would be most unlikely, given Vermont's lack of manpower, but Sherwood concluded the day in a much happier frame of mind: 'I beg leave to observe that from Col. Allen's latest conversation I have some small degree of hope that those deluded people will yet see their errors & take measures to save themselves from ruin before it is too late.' 95 Allen continued during the days which followed to reinforce Sherwood's rising expectations by stressing Vermont's distaste for Congress and the sincerity of the state's leading men. For the one-time Green Mountain Boy, such words were very sweet indeed and nourished his desire to be the instrument of Vermont's redemption. In a private letter to Captain Mathews, Sherwood reaffirmed his own commitment: 'I freely confess I have nothing so much at heart as reclaiming that people, many of whom were once very dear to me.' 96

In response to Sherwood's plea, General Haldimand promptly provided him with a new colleague, Major Richard Lernoult, the adjutant general, who was briefed and sent to Isle-aux-Noix to buttress the British team. Justus would now have someone in whom he could confide, who
could share the weight of responsibility, and who could perhaps take a more objective view of the proceedings. In the interests of secrecy, however, Major Dundas was still to remain outside the negotiations, completely unaware that this meeting was for anything more than the purpose of setting up the cartel. This arrangement created more difficulties for Sherwood, but Haldimand was determined that the Vermonters should have no cause for accusing the British of carelessness in keeping the negotiations under wraps. Therefore, Lernoult could assist Sherwood, but "all this must pass between yourselves and you must be as little together as possible that Major D----- may not suspect you." 97 As a result of this situation, Sherwood's relationship with Dundas was naturally a difficult one. At one point, Sherwood complained in a private letter that as all his official correspondence had to pass through Dundas's hands before it was sent to Quebec, it was very difficult for him to relay information on the progress of his secret conversations with Allen. 98 Sherwood was temperamentally unsuited for his present job, and the conditions which were imposed upon him by the nature of the operation did nothing to facilitate matters for him.

Ira Allen had been quick to discover this chink in his adversary's armour and he had wasted no time in exploiting it by sending the letter to Haldimand in which he expressed his "embarrassment" at the admittedly
odd arrangement whereby Dundas was to be excluded from any discussion concerning Vermont's reunion with Great Britain. The man who was truly embarrassed and flustered was Justus Sherwood. He felt that Allen had been treating him all along with contempt, as if he were a mere underling of no importance. His sensitivity showed when he angrily declared "that Mr. Allen and the best of his present connections thought my acquaintance and friendship worth cultivating before I declared against their unlawful proceedings." Allen had also referred to having "conversed freely with Captain Sherwood and hope this will make way for some (thing) further...." Dundas, when he read the letter which was mistakenly shown him by Lernoult, naturally wondered what these conversations were about, but he felt that it was all some scheme of Allen's who was, after all, the envoy of "a cunning artful designing people." Justus, although held blameless by Dundas, now felt himself to be firmly on the horns of a dilemma. Dundas with just cause might distrust him, and perhaps even Haldimand might wonder exactly what had transpired between the two former friends in their secret conversations. In an attempt to satisfy both Dundas and Mathews, Justus told a white lie in a letter to the latter which the former would read before it was sent to Quebec: "I know my own sincerity and uprightness and I hope you will not doubt it for I do assure you upon my honour
that I have not had any kind of conversation of moment or worthy of notice but what I have communicated to the Major (Dundas) and you...."102

Justus Sherwood's letters during the last days of Ira Allen's stay at Isle-aux-Noix indicate that John and Hanna Sherwood had not raised a disciple of Niccolò Machiavelli. The Dundas affair, which was really a product of Haldimand's orders and Allen's cunning, threw the unhappy Justus into a mood of deep despondency. "For God's sake, what can I do?" he wrote in despair to Mathews. "I am obliged to put a face on my nature and act a deceitful part with my friend as well as my foes. I am certain I have this day told two of the most palpable lyes that I ever told in the course of my life by positively denying when examined by Maj. D----s that I had ever seen A---n's letter to the general or had ever sent or rec'd any letters myself but what I had shewn to him. How could I do otherwise than deny it consistent with his Excellency's positive order to me? Have I done my duty or not, I entreat you to tell me freely."103 While awaiting Mathews' reply, Sherwood may well have despaired of his future and wondered what would become of him. Certainly this round of diplomatic dealings had been an uncomfortable experience. Fortunately, General Haldimand did not repudiate Sherwood; rather he backed him to the hilt. In a private letter, Sherwood was assured that he had Haldimand's support and that
Allen's letter meant nothing. Allen himself had betrayed the secrecy of the negotiations by doing what he did. It should have been obvious to Allen why Sherwood and Dundas had different orders, and his "embarrassment" on this score branded him either as a meddling villain or an incompetent fool. In a public letter which Dundas would see, Haldimand lauded Sherwood's loyalty and zeal for the service, and attributed any other misunderstanding to "your anxiety to come at a knowledge of matters that might tend to take advantage of Government...."

By the time these comforting letters arrived, Allen had already returned to Vermont. Sherwood thus concluded his dealings with Ira in a state of mind that must have been considerably distracted, a victim of his own conscience and the perverse conditions under which he was compelled to operate. It was unfortunate that he apparently did not realize that Major Dundas bore him no ill will.

Justus Sherwood might have reflected later that he was not the only victim to be sacrificed on the impromptu altar of power politics at Isle-aux-Noix. The cartel itself, the ostensible reason for Allen's mission, was temporarily scrapped by Haldimand's order. By May 21 the humane but hard-headed governor in Quebec had decided that the Vermonters were stalling, and should not be encouraged to waste his time or that of his officers. Allen professed to great disappointment at Haldimand's decision, and declared that Vermont was still interested.
in a cartel for prisoner exchange. He pledged his support to the sending of commissioners to continue the negotiations as soon as they could be appointed by the Vermont government. This could not be before July 20 as the Assembly, including representatives from the former New Hampshire and New York territories, would not meet until June. He wistfully noted that his failure to establish a cartel would discourage the Loyalists of Vermont.\textsuperscript{107} In actual fact, the fate of the cartel probably did not upset Allen especially, although it might induce some of his foes in the Assembly to ask specifically why it had not been granted. Haldimand, influenced by Sherwood's hopeful attitude on the possibility of Vermont's reunion, urged that the "Vermontese" should continue to be encouraged to return "to their Allegiance, either from a sense of their error or a view to their interest."\textsuperscript{108} Sherwood remained confident of the sincerity of Allen and the feasibility of the whole scheme: "I can only observe on my part that Col. Allen appears to me very sincere and exceedingly anxious to convey his ideas in such a manner as may be clearly understood without any deception."\textsuperscript{109} After the difficult time which he had had with Allen, that statement surely reveals how incredibly optimistic Justus was capable of being. Thus, although little had been accomplished of a tangible nature when Allen left Isle-aux-Noix on May 25, both parties were agreed that it was to their interest to
continue the negotiations at a future date in the summer.

Despite his apparent optimism, Sherwood was still tortured with inner doubts. On the day of Allen's departure, Sherwood confessed to Lernoult that he was still almost as much at a loss about the outcome of the affair as he had been earlier. He reviewed Allen's mercurial tactics over the eighteen difficult days which had passed since his arrival, and concluded that even if Allen was sincere, he could probably do little more than bring Vermont to neutrality. Sherwood spoke of the "unmerited honour" which Haldimand had done him in placing him in charge of the negotiations, and he obviously felt that he had failed his trust. He had worked very conscientiously, but he had expected too much and had revealed himself to be temperamentally unsuited for the task before him. He had proven his inability to play a lone hand and would henceforth always share the responsibility of the negotiations with another agent. Sherwood did not lack a certain toughness of mind on occasions; he could and did threaten Vermont with force. His weakness was a lack of consistency, so hopeful was he that Vermont would voluntarily see the error of her ways. Ira Allen was certainly clever enough to be able to read this hope in Sherwood's eyes and play upon it for its full value. According to Frederic Van der Water, Allen had "completely overcome the original hostilities
and suspicions of an extremely intelligent man."

He had gained valuable time for Vermont to consolidate her new territories and continue her quest for admission into the Union, and he had succeeded in keeping the British option open. He could also be quite certain that as long as he and his friends were dealing with Sherwood, that option would be kept open. Others might tire of the game and decide that it was over, but Justus would keep doggedly playing as long as even a whisper of a chance of victory remained.

2. WCL: Sir Henry Clinton Papers, Germain to Clinton, March 3, 1779.

3. PAC: Bl47, 85, Clinton to Haldimand, September 9, 1779.

4. Ibid., Bl47, 221, Haldimand to Clinton, August 13, 1780.


10. PAC: Bl75, 26-36, Chittenden to Huntington, July 25, 1780.


15. Ibid., Bl61, 107-10, Sherwood to Brigadier-General Powell, August 12, 1780.
16 Ibid., B182, 248-49, Sherwood to Mr. Hawkins, August 24, 1780.

17 Ibid., B182, 264, Samuel Sherwood's report to Justus Sherwood, September 23, 1780.

18 Ibid., B176, 14, Justus Sherwood's Journal of his mission to Castleton.

19 Ibid., B161, 109-10, Sherwood to Powell, August 12, 1780.


21 PAC: B175, 150, Chittenden to Haldimand, September 27, 1780.


23 Ibid., B135, 131, Haldimand to Powell, September 17, 1780.


25 PAC: B176, 320-21, Sherwood to Major Christopher Carleton, October 29, 1780.


27 Charles Jellison, Ethan Allen, Frontier Rebel (Syracuse, 1969), 256.


29 Mary Greene Nye (ed.), State Papers of Vermont, VI, Sequestration, Confiscation and sale of Estates, (Montpelier, 1941), 38.

30 PAC: B176, 17, Sherwood's Journal.

31 Ibid., 17

32 Ibid., 18.

33 Ibid., 19.


38 Mary Nye (ed.), *State Papers, VI*, 359.

39 *PAC*: 22-25.


41 *WCL*: Henry Clinton Papers, Chittenden to George Clinton, November 22, 1780.

42 *Ibid.*, Chittenden to Trumbull, December 12, 1780; Chittenden to Hancock, December 12, 1780.

43 *Pell, Ethan Allen*, 149.

44 *WCL*: Henry Clinton Papers, Chittenden to Trumbull, December 12, 1780.

45 *PAC*: B175, 61, Ethan Allen to Major Carleton, November 24, 1780.

46 *PAC*: Q 17-2, 731, Haldimand to Germain, November 1780.

47 *WCL*: Henry Clinton Papers, Haldimand to Sherwood, December 20, 1780. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.

48 *PAC*: B179-1, 3, Mathews to Sherwood, December 20, 1780.


50 *WCL*: Henry Clinton Papers, Haldimand to Sherwood, December 20, 1780. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.

51 *PAC*: B179-1, 4, Mathews to Sherwood, December 20, 1780.
Tbid., 5.


54 Tbid., Haldimand to Sherwood, December 20, 1780.

55 Tbid.


57 PAC: B175, 165, Haldimand to Chittenden, December 30, 1780.

58 Tbid., B175, 69, Chittenden to Haldimand, January 1, 1781.


60 PAC: B135, 172, Haldimand to St. Leger, January 1, 1781.

61 Tbid., B176, 41, Sherwood to Mathews, February 6, 1781.

62 Tbid., B175, 70, Chittenden to Haldimand, April 26, 1781.


64 PAC: B182, 320, Sherwood to Mathews, March 1781.


68 Tbid., B182, 323, Sherwood to Mathews, March 1781.

69 Tbid., B175, 75, Ira Allen to Samuel Huntingdon, March 10, 1781. Also WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, "Articles
of Union agreed upon between the Committee of the Legislature of the State of Vermont and the Committee of the Convention of the New Hampshire Grants at Windsor in February 1781." Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.

70Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 102.


72PAC: B175, 74, Ethan Allen to Samuel Huntington, March 9, 1781.

73Williamson, Vermont in Quandary, 100-01.

74Van de Water, Reluctant Republic, 266.

75Jellison, Frontier Rebel, 275.

76PAC: B175, 70, Chittenden to Haldimand, April 26, 1781.

77Jellison, Frontier Rebel, 259.


79Ibid., B176, 71, Sherwood to Mathews, May 7, 1781.

80Ibid., B175, 79-80, Ira Allen to Haldimand, May 8, 1781.

81VHS Collections, I, 421, Ira Allen's History of Vermont.


84PAC: B180, 20, Sherwood to Mathews, May 9, 1781.

85Ibid., B176, 84, Sherwood to Mathews, May 11, 1781.
86 Ibid., B176, 97, Sherwood's Journal. Also, WCL: Sir Henry Clinton Papers - "Substance of what passed in conference with Col. Ira Allen between the 8th and 25th of May, 1781." Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.


88 Ibid.


91 Ibid.

92 PAC: B176, 84-86, Sherwood to Mathews, May 11, 1781.


95 PAC: B176, 89-90, Sherwood to Mathews, May 15, 1781.

96 Ibid., B176, 92, Sherwood to Mathews, May 16, 1781.

97 Ibid., B179-1, 29, Mathews to Sherwood, May 11, 1781.

98 Ibid., B176, 91, Sherwood to Mathews, May 16, 1781.

99 Ibid., B175, 79-80, Ira Allen to Haldimand, May 8, 1781.

100 Ibid., B176, 111-12, Sherwood to Mathews, May 22, 1781.


107 *WCL* : Henry Clinton Papers, Sherwood to Lernoult, May 22, 1781.


CHAPTER VI

CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS - THE INFLUENCE OF YORKTOWN

General Haldimand was well aware that Sherwood's morale was flagging in the wake of Ira Allen's departure from Isle-aux-Noix, and so he moved to bolster his confidence and to assure his hard-working subordinate that his efforts were appreciated. Justus responded with warmth and respect:

Your private letter of 31st May expressing in so kind & agreeable a manner His Excellency's gracious approbation of my conduct with the flag (ineffectual as it has been) gives me, you may be sure, more real pleasure and satisfaction than I can find suitable words to express, or than anything in this world can equal, except the accomplishment of the business which I was instructed with & which I am not without hope may yet in some measure (if not in full) be effected.  

In further recognition of a difficult task conscientiously performed, Sherwood received permission to go to St. Johns to see his wife and family. Sarah Sherwood's health had been poor, and Justus was most appreciative of the opportunity to see her. From St. Johns Sherwood proceeded directly to Quebec where Haldimand further displayed his trust in him by placing him in charge of all scouting activities for secret service work in the Lake Champlain area. In order to carry out this function, he was to establish the Loyal
Block House as soon as possible. This post would serve as Sherwood's headquarters, both for the secret service and a relatively secluded location to carry on further talks with Vermont. Sherwood's immediate problem was finding able-bodied men to build the post as well as keeping his scouting parties up to strength. He returned from Quebec to Dutchman's Farm via the Loyalist refugee camps of Machiche and Verchères, where he attempted to recruit labourers. On June 30 he arrived at the site of his future post with an assorted collection of 23 labourers. For the moment, the disappointment of May was forgotten as Sherwood and his men settled down to the task of constructing the blockhouse.

Haldimand had decided that the British team in the new round of negotiations should be enlarged and strengthened on a permanent basis so as to avoid the strain on Sherwood which had occurred in May. Major Richard Lernoult had acted as a temporary diplomat, but his ill health prevented him from continuing in that position. Thus, a permanent replacement to assist Justus had to be found. Haldimand's choice was Doctor George Smyth, who had recently escaped from Albany and had made his way on foot to St. Johns. Sherwood subsequently met Smyth at St. Johns on his way from Quebec to Dutchman's Farm and was most favourably impressed both by the man's "merit & zeal for His Majesty's Service," and by his knowledge of Vermont.
Smyth proceeded to Quebec where Haldimand interviewed him and approved him for work both on the Vermont questions and in the secret service. The final decision of whether he would work with Sherwood was left to the latter. Justus, pleased to have found so apparently compatible a colleague, gladly gave his assent.\textsuperscript{9}

Sherwood's whole position had thus been considerably reinforced for the impending diplomatic battle with the Vermonters. He had been given a vote of confidence in the handling of the secret service, as well as the task of constructing a new post which he would command, and a capable assistant. Furthermore, his agents reported that the Vermont Assembly at Windsor had voted overwhelmimgly, with but two negative votes, to continue the negotiations with Haldimand.\textsuperscript{10} At the beginning of June Sherwood had been very skeptical of the whole affair, and had suggested that Ethan Allen might be trying to lure a British army from Canada into an ambush in the Green Mountains. A grateful Congress might then be prepared to receive Vermont as the fourteenth star in the American constellation.\textsuperscript{11} Sherwood's correspondence for the six weeks that followed contained little material which related directly to the Vermont situation, and no doubt reflected his preoccupation with other developments.

The Vermonters in the interim were preparing to send Ira Allen to Philadelphia to take up their plea once more with Congress. Allen's certificate to Congress
specifically mentioned the British interest in reclaiming Vermont and declared that the latter was "purporting an intention of this state's becoming a British province. ...This we consider a political proceeding to prevent the British forces from invading this state...."12 There seems to be no question that a seat in Congress was Vermont's primary goal. As the summer wore on, Vermont's attention was increasingly concentrated on the military fortunes of the two sides which competed with varying degrees of ardour for her favour. Lord Cornwallis's campaign in the southern colonies became the arena of the greatest interest. As early as the first week of July, Lord George Germain could write with unusual perception that: "If we succeed to the southward, I shall not be afraid of a failure in our negotiations with the people of Vermont...."13 The wily men of the Green Mountains would see the forces of Congress and their French ally crushed; would realize that America's chances of success were negligible; and would hasten to be the first prodigals to return home. Should Cornwallis be defeated, the Vermonters' stand at the conference table would almost certainly be a good deal more resolute. To a large degree, Sherwood's own success or failure was bound up with a British army which was operating in Virginia several hundred miles south of the Loyal Block House.

The intelligence which Sherwood's agents had been
able to gather had on the whole been of a discouraging nature. One report quoted a member of the Assembly who declared that if Vermont could not settle with General Haldimand on its own terms, then it would use the negotiations to gain the time needed to raise sufficient forces to oppose him. Another report confirmed that the Vermon ters had raised a force of 450 men, and expected to raise 700 more for garrison duty at Skanesboro, Castleton, and Rutland. The mood of the people was by no means unanimous on the final status which Vermont should seek. Despite an earlier report that the Assembly favoured continuing the negotiations, it was now apparent that there was considerable opposition to the idea.

Chittenden and Ethan Allen had been censored by the Assembly for carrying on talks with the British without its knowledge and it demanded to see all the papers which Ira Allen had brought from Canada. Furthermore, Ethan Allen had been removed from his command of the Vermont militia and had been replaced by Samuel Safford, "a zealous Rebel" who was not a party to the reunion question. The situation thus posed two questions to Sherwood, Smyth, and Haldimand: were the Allens and their friends sincere, and if they were, would they prove to have enough influence to effect the desired reunion? Even as the next round of negotiations was about to begin, Sherwood and Smyth were in the process of sending parties of scouts to the Albany region and
to the Connecticut Valley in an attempt to clarify their opponents' position. 16

Ira Allen had promised that another flag of truce would be sent to the British on Lake Champlain in July, and on the twentieth of that month, young Joseph Fay, the newly appointed Commissary of Prisoners, arrived at Crown Point "with powers & instructions for a further negotiation." 17 Fay had brought 36 prisoners to be exchanged, although no formal cartel had been agreed upon, and he was fairly bursting with energy and enthusiasm. Sherwood, disappointed at Vermont's choice of envoy - "He is young in everything but rebellion" - and still hard at work on the blockhouse, as well as studying reports from his agents, allowed Fay to wait for eight days before acknowledging his presence. 18 Fay's enthusiasm began to sour, and after four days he wrote an irate note asking why no one had come to meet him at Crown Point. 19 Sherwood duly apologized for the delay which he attributed to having to await orders from Quebec. In actual fact, Justus was disturbed that Ira Allen had not come himself to continue the negotiations. 20

Allen did send a letter to Sherwood with Fay which the young man delivered when he eventually arrived at the Loyal Block House. Sherwood read the letter, and almost immediately began to display the same ambivalence and indecisiveness which had marked his performance at Isle-aux-Noix in May. Allen declared that he would be
making proposals before Congress in August which he knew would be refused, and that this refusal would help prepare Vermont for a return to George III. Sherwood confessed that he was "perplexed" and felt that the "apparent studied stile" of the letter did not appear to be "the undisguised sentiments of an honest heart." In the next breath, he declared that Allen's statement that many Vermonters came from Connecticut and would prefer a government similar to the one which that colony had enjoyed was "a stronger appearance of sincerity than all the other parts of his letter put together." Justus continued by saying how heavily the whole affair weighed upon him, that it gave him "more trouble and perplexity in mind" than anything he had undertaken in a long time. His final comment, on the eve of serious negotiations with Fay, indicated a dangerous lack of confidence in his own ability:

I hope in God that my conduct will not be displeasing to the General, but I shall not feel my mind at ease till you are so kind as to inform me whether it is or not.21

Ira Allen would no doubt have been well satisfied by the mental confusion which his letter had caused in his less devious foe. There was no need for Allen to waste his valuable time in parleys with Sherwood if one letter could create such havoc in a man whose work had been lauded and whose position had been strengthened since the last round of negotiations. Joseph Fay's job
had thus been rendered easier as a result of Allen's opening salvo against the British defenses. In the meantime, Ira, accompanied by Jonas Fay and Bezaleel Woodward representing the eastern union, could go to Philadelphia to seek the admission of an expanded Vermont into the American republic.22

The negotiations began in earnest on August 9 on board the Royal George, a ship of the British Lake Champlain squadron which served as a temporary location for the talks in lieu of the unfinished blockhouse. Fay had been primarily concerned with the question of the prisoners, and had no written instructions with regard to reunion. He attributed this lack of specific orders to the fact that the Allens and Chittenden did not feel that the majority of members in the assembly would have supported such a move, but he assured his hosts that these leading men were working tirelessly to prepare Vermont for that happy occasion. Sherwood found Fay to be "candid, sincere, and open without reserve," and wrote an official dispatch on their interview which portrayed the young Vermonter in glowing terms. The tone of the document is such that one is tempted to suspect that Sherwood may have permitted Fay to see it, thus giving him a noble image to live up to, and placing him under a moral restraint. This sort of stratagem would have worked very effectively against Justus himself, and the latter may have felt that it would have a
favourable effect on Fay:

I...shall only observe further that my knowledge of the Major's veracity and strict sentiments of honour in his private character forbids me to harbour the most distant thought that he could possibly be capable...(of using) the least deceit with General Haldimand, much less to act so unlike a gentleman, a soldier or Christian, as he must, if the Governor, Council and leading men of V-----t are not now seriously and studiously making every possible effort to effect the much-wished Union.23

Within admittedly narrow confines, Justus Sherwood was capable of playing a wily diplomatic game. Unfortunately, his ploy would only have been truly successful against a man of his own inclination and temperament, and the Vermonters were clever enough never to send anyone of that description.

The prisoner exchange had taken place on August 8 with much complaining from Mr. Fay. He had been upset by the British refusal to include prisoners from "greater Vermont" - the eastern and western extensions of the state. He also wanted a permanent cartel for the future. He was irked as well that while the British prisoners Vermont was handing over were in good shape and indeed had received some money for work which they had done while in captivity, the Vermonters whom the British returned were in very poor condition from long confinement.24 Sherwood refuted this point when he recognized one of the supposedly well-treated captives from Vermont, Major Joseph Wright from Peters' Corps. Wright had been
"an active, sensible, & loyal man" who, as a result of his experience, now displayed "the insipid enthusiasm of a shaking Quaker." In Sherwood's view the exchange was hardly a fair one when such a shambling wreck of a man was the sort of a specimen in whom Vermont so piously trafficked.25 The incident itself may have had some shock value for Sherwood, who in the days that followed showed real spirit in the battle of wits. In this process, he was aided by Doctor Smyth who openly remarked that he suspected Fay "of some Yankey trick."26 Haldimand also had buttressed the position of his diplomatic team at Dutchman's Farm by saying that if Vermont now refused the terms offered to them, there would be no further negotiations.27

On August 10 Joseph Fay faced the full wrath of this British storm of indignation which followed in the wake of the prisoner exchange and the discovery that his instructions were so limited. Fay's position was a difficult one: he could offer his hosts no more palatable fare than his assurance that the leading men of his state were indeed pro-British and were working for reunion. He repeatedly assured Sherwood and Smyth that Haldimand's generosity and patience were very highly regarded in the Green Mountains, and he seemed genuinely distressed that he could bring no positive token of that appreciation with him.28 Sherwood was definitely suspicious of the young envoy: "He professes
so much honesty accompanied with so many sincere gestures that he rather seems to overact." When confronted with the possibility that negotiations would be terminated if reunion did not now become a reality, Fay urgently pleaded "in the most solemn terms" that diplomatic channels be kept open until November, when it would be possible for Vermont to effect a return to British rule. The whole structure of his argument sounded tediously familiar to Sherwood, who noted that Allen had promised such a development for July: "To us it appears that they wish to have two strings to their bow that they may choose the strongest which they are not able to determine till it is better known how Mr. Washington succeeds in the present campaign." It seemed apparent that Vermont, lacking in manpower but strong in determination and gall, would spin out the summer and fall months by various diplomatic ruses until she had decided which side was the stronger and could defend her from the other.29

The two sides had thus reached an impasse. The normal tactics of reasonably friendly persuasion had failed for the moment, inducing George Smyth to embark on a new tack with the maddeningly opaque Fay. On August 13 Smyth took the Vermonter aside and accused him of being an agent of the duplicity which Smyth felt was synonymous with the practise of the art of politics in the Green Mountains. If Fay was a "Harbinger
of Evil" who had come north simply to "amuse" supposedly credulous and easy-going British agents, then "his wife should be deprived of a husband, & his children of a father." Fay probably guessed that Smyth was bluffing, and blandly replied that he was acting with honour.\textsuperscript{30} Two days later, Sherwood reverted to gentler methods when he reminded Fay of Haldimand's candour in dealing with Vermont and suggested that such honesty should be reciprocated. Fay ingenuously replied that he could appreciate the general's impatience, but that Haldimand simply was not acquainted with the necessary delays which were involved in educating public opinion.\textsuperscript{31} Baffled at every turn, the two British agents sent out parties of spies to southern Vermont to attempt to verify what Fay had declared. By August 17 one such patrol had returned with news that did give the Vermonter's words some credibility: arms magazines were being established only at Bennington and Castleton; the leading men were apparently in favour of reunion, but the general populace was still hostile to the idea.\textsuperscript{32} Another agent did report that a number of Vermonters were joining the Albany militia, but Fay fervently denied this assertion.\textsuperscript{33} Haldimand urged his representatives to keep stressing to Fay that Vermont was playing a dangerous game, that his generous offer would probably not be made again, and that the peace-makers at Vienna would almost certainly ignore Vermont if that state continued
to attempt an independent existence. 34 Catherine the Great of Russia and Joseph II of Austria had initiated peace talks early in 1781, and Haldimand was undoubtedly correct when he suggested that the powers of Europe would pay little heed to the tiny Green Mountain republic. 35 Fay, however, continued to be apologetic, affable, and cool-headed. Having held his ground thus far, he elected to open his own offensive during the last few days of his mission in order to convince Sherwood, Smyth, and if possible General Haldimand, of his absolute sincerity. If he succeeded, Vermont would be able to keep her options open at least until October when the state assembly reconvened.

As far as Justus Sherwood was concerned, Joseph Fay did his work reasonably well. By August 18 Sherwood was convinced of Fay's sincerity, but he was also equally convinced that the leading men of Vermont were almost entirely impelled by self-interest rather than loyalty in their apparent affection for the British cause. These leaders, Sherwood noted savagely, were men of base character who were of no consequence in Vermont "until they made themselves popular in the present rebellion by actions at which a man of honour & integrity would revolt." In the heat of the moment and of his own disappointment, Sherwood perhaps forgot that he had once been associated with some of these very men whom he now so freely condemned. Based on his intelligence
reports and from what Fay had said, Justus estimated that possibly two-fifths of the Vermont populace might be induced to accept reunion either through a genuine loyalty or, more likely, through an appeal to their self-interest. The remainder, he felt, were "Mad Rebels" who lived close to a state of anarchy and whose volatile tempers and demands terrorized their leaders into silence. Such a situation was hardly encouraging, but Sherwood still did feel that Vermont should not be abandoned. Any further negotiations would have to emphasize strongly the advantages which Vermont would gain. Sherwood may not have been pleased about the turn of events, but at least they did seem to clarify the issue for him, and bring out in him again that streak of pragmatism which had led him earlier to suggest that Vermont's leaders could be bought.

George Smyth appeared to be fairly hopeful following the conference with Fay. Smyth interviewed Fay again on August 17 and came away convinced both of the latter's sincerity and of the genuinely pro-British sentiment of the Allens and Chittenden. A day later, Smyth was not quite so sure, and was obviously unwilling to commit himself absolutely one way or another for fear of being wrong and risking Haldimand's displeasure. Smyth emphasized how much he wanted to believe that Fay was sincere, displaying a weakness similar to that which Sherwood had revealed in May at Isle-aux-Noix. A
complicating factor for Smyth was his apparent desire to prove his mettle; he was, after all, a relative novice in the diplomatic game, and there might have been lingering doubts in Quebec about his ability and perhaps even his loyalty. During these negotiations, Smyth twice thanked Haldimand for his support, and on one occasion observed: "I am happy to find so willing & hearty an assistant as Captain Sherwood."39 In actual fact, Smyth was Sherwood's assistant, a condition to which the former Albany resident had agreed before he left Quebec to join Sherwood at Dutchman's Farm. His comment may have been entirely innocent, or it might have indicated Smyth's desire to supplant Sherwood.

On August 21 Fay departed for home, still cheerfully predicting eventual success for the whole project of reunion.40 He took with him a copy of Haldimand's public letter of August 16 to his two representatives which outlined the British position in clear and unambiguous terms: Vermont had been most decently and gently dealt with until now, and she must be prepared to accept the British terms or face the consequences.41 Fay could with all candour volunteer to place this letter before his government with the suggestion that perhaps the hint of force contained therein might hasten the work of conversion to the British cause. On the other hand, Fay may have known, and almost certainly his superiors did know, that Haldimand's letter was
something of a bluff. There was only a small British force in Canada; furthermore this force was virtually paralyzed through a serious lack of supplies. A plague of caterpillars had destroyed almost all the hay and a good part of the grain in the St. Lawrence Valley.\textsuperscript{42} The British were counting heavily on the success of Lord Cornwallis.

Because of these circumstances, Haldimand was prepared to be both optimistic and generous in his final reaction to the Fay mission. It appeared as if there was indeed a considerable pro-British party in Vermont who would feel that Haldimand's offer was too good to refuse. Allen and Fay had been so zealous in their correspondence; perhaps they represented but the tip of an iceberg of a massive Loyalist sentiment in the old New Hampshire Grants. The circumstances dictated a change of policy; Vermont would be given a further breathing space in order to educate its dedicated Whigs. Fay had promised to meet with Sherwood and Smyth on September 5 at Skenesboro to report on the Vermont reaction to his mission and to Haldimand's letter. The governor gave his blessing to the undertaking, although he cautioned the two men to be wary and to take a small guard of active and resolute men with them.\textsuperscript{43}

Shortly after Fay's departure, Sherwood, who had certainly been under considerable pressure, suffered a breakdown in his health. He left the blockhouse in
the command of a lieutenant with a guard of sixteen men, and made his way to his family at St. Johns. Several days of rest and relaxation did not cure his affliction, which he described as "a disagreeable headache & numbness." At about the same time, Smyth was also complaining of "an acute pain in my stomach." Despite their physical discomfort, the two men received orders on September 7 to proceed south immediately with eighteen prisoners to Mount Independence to meet with Joseph Fay or some other suitable Vermont agent. The prisoners would provide a cover for this next vital stage of the negotiations, as the earlier group of captives had done. Sherwood regretted that his health was not better, but did not seem in any particular trepidation at the approaching mission. Smyth, however, was displaying signs of nervousness which he covered by a gaudy show of bravado. When Haldimand first mentioned his concern as to the safety of his agents, Smyth blustered that he was not afraid of any pernicious Yankee alive:

Four times have I escaped their persecuting vengeance, & if I should fall a sacrifice at this time (which I can scarcely think I will), be it so. I'm inured to their wrath, & if I should die by their hands, I wish I may retain fortitude enough in my last agonies to laugh at their cruelty.

A few days later, Smyth calmly compared his possible fate to that of Major André. He then dramatically reversed his field and declared that if there was the least sign of trouble, he would go no further than East
Bay. In any case, he would go no further south than the Loyal Block House unless the Vermonters sent over a hostage. Doctor Smyth was obviously a somewhat mercurial fellow. A week before he and Sherwood received their orders, Smyth had heard in a very round-about fashion that fourteen cannons had been fired at Bennington to celebrate Vermont's acceptance into the Union. Smyth knew that Ira Allen had been to Philadelphia in August to present Vermont's case before Congress, and he at once leapt to conclusions: "Are we duped? Are we deceived? My former suspicions with these circumstances goad me...I wish fire and sword would soon take place." Smyth's motives may have sprung from several sources - a continuing desire to prove his worth, a sincere and effervescent patriotism, or a brazen attempt to cover his own anxiety - but his inconsistent temperament and his apparent ill health did not make him an ideal companion for Justus Sherwood on the dangerous trip to Skenesboro.

The journey down Lake Champlain was a trying one, as contrary winds held up the British agents. When they reached Crown Point on September 11, they discovered that the Vermont flag of truce had been at that post and had already left for Skenesboro. Sherwood and Smyth immediately dispatched a party to overtake the flag and bring it back. This undertaking was successfully carried out, and the two officers in command of the flag, a Captain
Cook and a Lieutenant Powers, were invited on board the British vessel which had brought the two negotiators from Canada. The four men sat down for a chat "over a friendly glass," and Sherwood and Smyth discovered that Ira Allen, Joseph Fay, and Isaac Clarke were awaiting them at Skene'sboro with plans to take them inland to Pawlet where a house had been prepared for their reception. This scheme struck a negative note with Sherwood who could see it as just one more ploy to gain time. Pawlet was located a good thirty miles into the Grants. Why should such elaborate preparations be made for the conducting of business which, Sherwood felt, could easily be concluded in an hour? Did this hospitality not shield at worst some evil design against the British agents, and at best signify an effort "to detain us until or near winter?" Still suffering from ill health and with their doubts strengthened by this latest development, the British commissioners decided to be difficult. They would not go beyond Mount Independence and they urged Fay to meet them at that point. After three days of waiting with no word from the Vermonters, Sherwood began to get very edgy and irritable. He and Smyth were alarmed to discover Vermont scouts skulking around their camp, and so they moved to the relative safety afforded by nearby Fort Ticonderoga. This waiting game began to play on Sherwood's nerves as he saw his supplies diminish and his health continued to bother
him. Captain Cook did nothing to ease his tensions when he remarked that most people in Vermont knew nothing of the negotiations with the British and attributed such rumours as they heard on the subject to the work of Vermont's foes in the claiming states. Sherwood was convinced that the leading men had indeed been deceitful and he hoped that Haldimand would not be held back from dealing harshly with them by any false hope which he might entertain about this particular mission. All the evidence, he concluded, seemed to indicate that the objects of their diplomacy might well be "Equivocating faithless Yankee scoundrels."\(^5\) At this crucial point, Ira Allen and Joseph Fay suddenly sprang into action at Skenesboro to revive the flagging hopes and again allay the suspicions of their tormented British counterparts: "We have to inform you we are at this place waiting your arrival & are furnished with instructions from the Gov'r in writing to negotiate business with you relative to a change of government & are possessed of every paper respecting the proceedings of Congress with the agents of Vermont...."\(^5\) With the will of the wisp of a British Vermont once more dancing before them, Sherwood and Smyth again pulled themselves together, choked down their personal feelings, and headed for Skenesboro for what gave every promise of being a decisive meeting with the representatives of the Vermont government.

The conference at Skenesboro held on September 20
produced one new suggestion by the Vermonters for bringing their troublesome state back to British rule. Ira Allen and Joseph Fay thought that it would be useful if Haldimand issued a proclamation which would include the terms which were to be offered to Vermont, and thus establish in the minds of the people a definite and viable alternative to membership in the American Union. Such a proclamation could be drawn up and held in readiness until the most propitious moment for its release. This moment would probably arise after the next session of the state legislature had convened, by which time, Allen felt, Congress would almost certainly have rebuffed the overtures which he had made to it in August.55 Sherwood was delighted with this turn of events which seemed to offer concrete proof of the sincerity of Vermont's leaders. He then posed a series of questions on the proclamation idea, and Fay and Allen answered them all smoothly and in a manner highly satisfying to the dedicated former Vermonter. The two men assured Sherwood that Governor Chittenden and his Council agreed with the proposal, and that it seemed likely that the Assembly and people would accept it if such charter privileges as those formerly granted to Connecticut were included in the proclamation. They also declared that such an action would give the Loyalists of Vermont encouragement, and would, in effect, persuade them to act as agents in cultivating favour for the idea among their
uncommitted neighbours. Sherwood asked if the proclamation would not have the effect of alarming Congress and compelling it to admit Vermont under the latter's terms. The Articles of Confederation, he was told, virtually made such an abrupt about-face impossible. Even if the proclamation was rejected, the Vermonters claimed, all would not be lost. Those who were pro-British would certainly remain so, and others might eventually be swayed by such a generous offer.\textsuperscript{56} During this interview Sherwood did most of the talking for the British side, as George Smyth had hurt his leg on landing at Skanesboro and was rather more cantankerous than usual. He was, however, complimentary about his comrade's methods: "The circumspection used by Captain Sherwood & his political interrogations during this interview are worthy of notice."\textsuperscript{57} Following the conclusion of the meeting, the British party departed immediately for Canada. The ailing Smyth was left at St. Johns, while Sherwood proceeded directly to Quebec to report to Haldimand.

As late as September 27 General Haldimand had been expressing serious doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with Vermont. The state's leaders sounded encouraging enough, but, in Haldimand's opinion, it appeared as if they were parroting syllable by syllable what the Loyalists among them were saying. In the general's view, Vermont needed a taste of the iron fist,
and he intended to dispatch a strong detachment to
Crown Point about October 1 to put some pressure on the
recently-convened Vermont Assembly.58 Sherwood's subse-
quent arrival in Quebec with his optimistic report
altered Haldimand's opinion and "almost if not entirely
removed my suspicions of Allen's party."59 The suggested
proclamation was drawn up on October 5, providing generous
terms for Vermont's return.

Seven conditions were promised to the maverick
republic: she would become an independent province,
subject to no other government in America; she would
receive all the rights and privileges which had been
promised by the King's Commissioners in 1778; she would
receive a charter similar to that of Connecticut; the
east and west unions would be confirmed as well as all
lands originally granted under New Hampshire patent;
there would be free trade with Canada; Vermont would be
protected by British troops; and Vermont regiments would
be endowed with the rights and privileges enjoyed by
other Loyalist American troops. Haldimand then declared
that if Vermont now rejected this offer, she alone would
be responsible for the "Melancholy Consequences" which
would follow.60 One more vital step remained: the
carrying of the proclamation to Vermont and its publica-
tion in that state. In that step lay the Allens' last
trump card, as only they and their friends would know
when that proper time would arrive. It was now October
and winter would soon be returning to the Grants, making the dissemination of Haldimand's terms an almost impossible project. At the Skanesboro conference, Allen and Fay had slyly suggested that the reunion could probably not be effected until the spring of 1782. By October 11 Sherwood was at St. Johns and was ready to depart the following day for Crown Point to await Allen's messenger, who would carry the proclamation to Vermont. In a superficial sense, Justus Sherwood's greatest project, one in which he had put much of his own good honest heart, seemed on the point of completion. In reality, however, Sherwood's spirits were low as he prepared to depart for Crown Point. Disquieting rumours and personal problems were very much in the forefront of his thoughts and the next few days would do nothing to relieve his anxiety.

Even before he left St. Johns, Sherwood had heard unfavourable reports about the progress of Lord Cornwallis in Virginia, and he realized fully what an adverse effect such reports would have on Vermont public opinion. If Cornwallis were beaten, Haldimand's proclamation would look suspiciously like a diplomatic maneuver launched in desperation in the wake of a military defeat. The Whig faction in Vermont would be certain to interpret it in such a light, and to label Haldimand's magnanimous terms as the empty gestures of a cringing whipped tyrant. A few days later while Sherwood was waiting at Crown Point,
Ira Allen sent him a letter which confirmed this gloomy opinion. Ira went out of his way to emphasize on this occasion that in no circumstances should the proclamation be forwarded; not only were known rebels energetically celebrating the first vague reports of the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, but as well there were many strange faces in the recently convened Assembly. Allen pleaded for yet more patience from the British side while he cultivated these newcomers, a project which would be complicated by the large number of spies from other states who were now active in Vermont. Sherwood could do little more than wait and hope.

This period of waiting was made more difficult by other problems. Sherwood's health was still very poor, a condition under which he had apparently been labouring for some time. On October 10 he had declared to Mathews: "I am sorry that I have to inform you that my health is no better but rather worse than when I parted with you (at Quebec)." On his arrival at Crown Point, Sherwood had interviewed one of his agents, Andrew Rikely, who had just returned from Albany. Rikely reported that the presence of St. Leger and 2,000 troops at Crown Point early in October, in accordance with Haldimand's instructions, had caused quite a stir in the New York capital, and that General John Stark and his 400 men were preparing to withdraw from the town to avoid capture in the event that St. Leger moved against Albany. Any
pleasure which Sherwood might have derived from this intelligence was dissipated by the knowledge that Thomas Loveless, one of his best agents, had been hanged at Stark's orders. Sherwood fumed in impotent rage at "this barbarous murder of my worthy friend" by "those inhuman butchers" and spoke darkly of revenge against American prisoners. Justus was clearly a distraught and unhappy man, tormented on all sides, and facing the prospect that one of his fondest dreams which had come so close to reality was slipping away from him.

Yet another problem had raised its head during this difficult time, a problem directly related to Sherwood's own personality. At the time of the Skeneboro meeting in September, prisoners of war had been exchanged as they had been earlier. It was somewhat ironic that the cartel, never officially established, did seem to operate anyway, although on an ad hoc basis. On the occasion of this particular exchange, George Smyth, with Sherwood's permission, tried to arrange a scheme whereby the Vermonters would obtain the release from Albany of Smyth's son Terrence, and place his name on the list of prisoners to be exchanged. To make room for him, a bona fide prisoner of war would be dropped from the list. This arrangement would be carried out at the next exchange. When Haldimand discovered this plan, he was most unhappy with his agents on two grounds: they were in no circumstances to exchange
prisoners taken by the Continental Army until the latter lived up to terms which had been included in the capitulation of the Cedars. The latter referred to the surrender of an American force just west of Montreal in the spring of 1776. The captured soldiers had been paroled and had subsequently broken their paroles. Haldimand also expressed dismay that Smyth, with Sherwood's support, would place personal considerations ahead of the good of the service.67 Both Sherwood and Smyth were extremely contrite and both apologized profusely to Haldimand. In his letter of apology, Justus urged Mathews to offer Smyth a word of condolence as the latter's health was very fragile, and he feared that the worry and remorse of the incident might weaken the unhappy doctor further.68 The whole scheme was clearly contrary to explicit orders and provided one more example of Justus Sherwood letting his heart lead him. As he waited at Crown Point, he might well have reflected how much that gallant but foolish gesture had cost him in terms of his superior's regard.

By October 22 Sherwood had moved from Crown Point to Ticonderoga, from which place a letter was dispatched the following day to Chittenden and his Council. With some justification, Sherwood was getting more and more anxious and he specifically asked when someone with authority from Vermont would come to take the proclamation.69 In ordinary circumstances Justus might have been prepared to invest a few more days of his time on
such a vital project, but he was not in good health and his anxiety caused him to take an unwise step. On October 23, with permission from St. Leger at Crown Point, Sherwood dispatched a party to Mount Independence to intercept a Vermont scout and compel him to carry his letter to Chittenden. A party of six Vermonters, a sergeant and five men, was duly captured, but not before the sergeant, Archelaus Tupper, had been shot and killed by a member of the British party. Sherwood thus had five potential couriers who had been acquired at the price of one dead sergeant. This unplanned and untimely death could have been a disastrous blunder. Sherwood made the best of it by releasing the five men with the sergeant's possessions, his own letter to Chittenden, and a letter from St. Leger apologizing for the whole mishap. Vermonters who did not realize what was going on wondered why a British officer should apologize for the death of an enemy soldier. Sherwood later reported with some relief that the incident had not caused any great difficulty and that Vermont was apparently flattered by St. Leger's concern. This result in itself was surely indicative of the situation; if the Vermonters had desired an excuse to sever negotiations, they could have seized on the death of the unfortunate Tupper. With winter coming on, however, and the fate of Cornwallis still a matter of conjecture, they could afford to be magnanimous. Nature and the
fortunes of war would ultimately decide the issue.

While the question of the dead sergeant was still hanging in the balance, Sherwood continued to fret at Ticonderoga. On October 27 he suggested to Haldimand that "a trusty & intelligent person" be sent directly to Ira Allen to find out what course Vermont intended to follow.73 It was apparent that Sherwood was still not a well man, that he was very discouraged about the reception the proclamation was likely to receive, and he wanted nothing more than the opportunity to retire to the comparative comfort and safety of St. Johns. Haldimand, through his hard-working secretary, Captain Mathews, urged caution and patience. The general could well understand the Vermonters' reluctance to commit themselves in the present circumstances, and suggested that Chittenden and his Council would have to be extremely enthusiastic Tories to be willing to accept the proclamation while conditions remained so unsettled.74 In his heart, Justus must have recognized the wisdom of this counsel. Ira Allen wrote to him on November 2 urging the same point, and Sherwood frequently mentioned the importance of "how matters turn at Chesapeake" in his own letters.75 Until the fate of Cornwallis did become clear, there seemed little point in keeping Sherwood at Ticonderoga. Before his departure, however, Justus did have one major interview with a Vermont scout, Colonel Ebenezer Walbridge, on November 4 at Skenesboro.
Walbridge, following Ira Allen's orders, could offer the discouraged Sherwood little that he did not already know. The Vermonter professed to being favourably impressed by the proclamation and stressed how fervently pro-British the leading men of his state had been until the unhappy news from Virginia had arrived. If Haldimand could but find the patience to wait until the spring, his generosity might yet be rewarded. Sherwood was then told, partly by Walbridge, but mostly by his officers whom he found to be "scandalously haughty," that the British were defeated not only in America, but also in the West Indies and the English Channel as well. The latter two defeats were the products of imagination or wishful thinking, but Justus could not have known that. Walbridge had spoken of these developments in a "modest doubtful manner," but his officers were under no such restraint and they succeeded in making Sherwood most uncomfortable. The conference with Walbridge simply confirmed Sherwood's fears and underlined the sterility of his mission.\(^76\) He returned to Ticonderoga and by November 16, he was back in St. Johns. Even his return journey had been unfortunate, for he noted that he had been "constantly struggling in a small leaky boat against a strong head wind."\(^77\) Such a craft on Lake Champlain in November would have been trying for any man, and for a sick and discouraged one, it must have been a constant torment.
In view of the uncertain state of Britain's military position in Virginia, General Haldimand withdrew the proclamation and it was never published. The only particle of success which Justus Sherwood drew from this whole affair was Haldimand's encouragement of a continued secret correspondence with the Allens, an arrangement which would last until the spring of 1783. For Justus himself, his apparent failure to be the instrument of destiny struck him hard. Hampered by cunning opponents, the need to operate in complete secrecy, his own indifferent health, his inability to carry the strain of the negotiations alone, and, above all, his emotional involvement with the question to an unhealthy degree, he emerged from the Vermont intrigue a bitter and discouraged man. The supreme irony lay in the fact that he might have succeeded had Cornwallis succeeded, but he had absolutely no control over the fate of the latter. If the British army in Virginia had not met with disaster at Yorktown, Sherwood's Vermont opponents might still have eluded him by various devices, but their job would have been made much more difficult. As it was, the Vermonters could still keep their options open into 1782. Cornwallis's defeat seemed to strengthen their hand while it threatened to destroy Sherwood's. Justus sadly remarked shortly after his return from Skene'sboro and Ticonderoga:

I very much fear that any further negotiation with Vermont will be
but time and labour lost; except affairs take a more favourable turn to the southward. I am almost persuaded that our adverse fortune in that part is the only obstacle now in the way & am truly unhappy that anything should prevent so great a good to that people as their return to their allegiance might have been to them. 80

Sherwood's bewilderment is understandable, and the motives of his opponents have been discussed and questioned ever since the climax of that crucial year of 1781, when Lord Cornwallis surrendered his besieged army at Yorktown to the tune of "The World Turned Upside Down." The traditional view is that the wily Vermonters, weak, threatened, divided amongst themselves, held off the forces of the British Empire on the northern frontier by guile until Washington, Lafayette, and Admiral De Grasse could combine successfully against Cornwallis. By such tactics Vermont not only saved herself from invasion, but protected her American neighbours as well. This view also assumes that the Allens and their friends genuinely desired that Vermont should join the American Union, and in good time, ten years later, she did so. Charles Jellison has gone sharply against cherished Vermont tradition by suggesting in his biography of Ethan Allen that the latter and his friends were traitors to the United States and that from the summer of 1781 on they were sincere in their efforts to effect reunion with Great Britain. 81

Jellison's argument is intriguing, and at the very least, it should set in motion a re-examination of
past interpretations. Certain facts do stand out: the Continental Army did represent a threat to Vermont. Sherwood's old associate from Sunderland, Eli Brownson, had gone to General Washington in the summer of 1781 to see if he could arrange an exchange for his brother Gideon, who was a prisoner in Canada. Washington not only refused to try to arrange the exchange, but pointedly told Brownson that if the Vermonter did not cease their negotiations with the British, they could expect to be invaded by Continental forces.\(^{82}\) Furthermore, when Ira Allen, Jonas Fay, and Bezaleel Woodward presented their request for admission to Congress in August 1781, they asked for the entry of "greater Vermont," a condition which they must have known would be refused.\(^{83}\) Only a month later, Ira Allen and Joseph Fay not only put forward the idea that Haldimand issue a generous proclamation; they also suggested what should be included in it.\(^{84}\) A possible hint as to the way the Vermonter were thinking may be contained in Ira Allen's statement at Isle-aux-Noix in May: that after the war, his state would have to submit to one side or the other. Until that day arrived, the Vermonter wanted to keep their options open and join the side which could offer them the most.

The year had been a tiring and frustrating one for Sherwood, but it did conclude on one positive note. He had been trying for some time to build up his com-
pany, and had received guarded approval from Mathews for recruiting among Loyalists in the colonies. With his many other duties, however, the recruiting of the company always remained very much a secondary matter. Early in September, Mathews had written to say that as Peters' corps had never really recovered from the Saratoga campaign, it was likely to be disbanded. Haldimand was prepared in this case to give Sherwood a company in the second battalion of Sir John Johnson's Royal Regiment of New York, or, if he preferred, a company in a new provincial corps which was being formed. Sherwood displayed both modesty and diplomacy by saying that he would be pleased with either position. As a result, on November 19, he became a captain in a new corps, an amalgamation of several smaller bodies of provincial troops, but primarily those of Peters and Edward Jessup, to be commanded by the latter and called the Loyal Rangers or Jessup's Rangers. In certain respects this was merely a matter of administration, for Sherwood remained at the Loyal Block House and rarely ever saw his regiment. He was, however, now on a more solid footing: Peters had fallen into Haldimand's bad graces over a question of back pay and had been reduced to a captaincy in Jessup's Rangers. Jessup himself was well-respected, and Justus liked him personally, calling him "my worthy & indefatigable friend." Finally, he would no longer have to concern himself with the problem of
recruiting and could concentrate all his attentions on his work during the final difficult months of the war.
FOOTNOTES

1 PAC: B176, 128, Sherwood to Mathews, June 5, 1781.

2 Ibid., B176, 127, Sherwood to Mathews, June 5, 1781.

3 Ibid., B179-1, 52, Haldimand to Sherwood, June 18, 1781.

4 Ibid., B176, 136-37, Sherwood to Mathews, June 24, 1781.

5 Ibid., B176, 142, Sherwood to Mathews, July 1, 1781.

6 Ibid., B176, 155, Sherwood to Mathews, July 14, 1781.

7 Ibid., B176, 131-33, George Smyth to Haldimand, June 15, 1781.

8 Ibid., B176, 138, Sherwood to Mathews, June 25, 1781.

9 Ibid., B176, 155, Sherwood to Mathews, July 14, 1781.

10 Ibid., B176, 144, Sherwood to Mathews, July 1, 1781.

11 Ibid., B176, 125-26, Sherwood to Mathews, June 2, 1781.

12 Crockett, Vermont, I, 339.

13 VHS Collections, II, 140.

14 WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, "Report of the Party sent to learn the report of the Rebel flag - June, 1781." Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.

15 PAC: B176, 172-73, Mr. Botum's Report, July 21, 1781.

17. Ibid., B176, 163, Joseph Fay to Sherwood, July 20, 1781.

18. Ibid., B176, 183-84, Sherwood to Mathews, July 29, 1781.

19. Ibid., B176, 178, Fay to Sherwood, July 24, 1781.

20. Ibid., B176, 182, Sherwood to Fay, July 28, 1781.


23. VHS: Allen Papers, Add. Mss. 21840, fos. 44b-45, Sherwood to Mathews, August 9, 1781.

24. PAC: B175, 101-03, Fay to Haldimand, August 9, 1781.

25. Ibid., B176, 205-06, Sherwood to Mathews, August 9, 1781.

26. Ibid., B176, 202-03, Smyth to Mathews, August 9, 1781.

27. Ibid., B179-1, 79-80, Mathews to Sherwood, August 4, 1781.

28. WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, Fay to Haldimand, August 9, 1781. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, September 27, 1781.

29. PAC: B176, 207-08, Sherwood to Mathews, August 10, 1781.

30. Ibid., B176, 217-18, Smyth to Mathews, August 14, 1781.

31. Ibid., B176, 220-21, Sherwood to Mathews, August 15, 1781.
32 Ibid., B176, 225, Smyth to Mathews, August 17, 1781.


34 WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, Haldimand to Sherwood & Smyth, August 16, 1781. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, September 27, 1781.


36 PAC: B176, 231-32, Sherwood to Mathews, August 18, 1781.

37 Ibid., B176, 226, Smyth to Mathews, August 17, 1781.

38 Ibid., B176, 230, Smyth to Mathews, August 18, 1781.

39 Ibid., B176, 218, Smyth to Mathews, August 14, 1781.

40 Ibid., B176, 245-46, Sherwood & Smyth to Mathews, August 24, 1781.

41 WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, Haldimand to Sherwood & Smyth, August 16, 1781. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, September 27, 1781.

42 Ibid., Haldimand to Clinton, August 2, 1781.

43 PAC: B179-1, 107-09, Mathews to Smyth, August 23, 1781; B179-1, 110-12, Mathews to Sherwood, August 23, 1781; B179-1, 113-15, Mathews to Smyth, August 30, 1781.

44 Ibid., B176, 251-52, Sherwood to Mathews, August 26, 1781.


46 Ibid., B176, 271, Smyth to Mathews, September 4, 1781.

47 Ibid., B132, 149, Dundas to Sherwood, September 7, 1781.
48 Ibid., B176, 255, Smyth to Mathews, August 26, 1781.

49 Ibid., B176, 270-71, Smyth to Mathews, September 4, 1781.


51 PAC: B176, 278-80, Sherwood to Mathews, September 12, 1781.

52 Ibid., B175, 133, Sherwood & Smyth to Fay, September 11, 1781.

53 Ibid., B176, 280-81, Sherwood to Mathews, September 16, 1781.

54 Ibid., B175, 136, Ira Allen & Joseph Fay to Sherwood & Smyth, September 16, 1781.

55 Ibid., B175, 137-38, Allen & Fay to Sherwood & Smyth, September 20, 1781.

56 Ibid., B175, 139-40, Sherwood's questions to Fay & Allen and their answers, September 20, 1781.

57 Ibid., B176, 291-92, Smyth to Mathews, September 25, 1781.

58 WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, Haldimand to Clinton, September 27, 1781.

59 Ibid., Haldimand to Clinton, October 1, 1781.

60 PAC: B179-1, 135-38, Haldimand's Proclamation to Vermont, October 5, 1781.

61 Ibid., B175, 141-43, Sherwood to Mathews, September 30, 1781.

62 Ibid., B176, 307-08, Sherwood to Mathews, October 11, 1781.

63 Ibid., B175, 152-55, Ira Allen to Sherwood, October 20, 1781.


70 PAC: B176, 322-25, Smyth to Mathews, October 31, 1781.


72 PAC: B176, 326-27, Sherwood to Mathews, November 2, 1781.


75 WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, Ira Allen to Sherwood, November 2, 1781. Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, November 15, 1781.

76 GBL: Allen Papers, Sherwood's Journal, Interview with Walbridge, November 4, 1781.

77 PAC: B176, 354, Sherwood to Mathews, November 11, 1781.

78 *Ibid.*, B179-1, 139, Note by Mathews, December 1, 1781.

80Tbid., B176, 355-56, Sherwood to Haldimand, November 17, 1781.

81Charles Jellison, Frontier Rebel, 278.


83WCL: Henry Clinton Papers, "Minutes of the Continental Congress, August 20, 1781." Enclosure in Haldimand to Clinton, September 27, 1781.

84Van de Water, Reluctant Republic, 282.

85PAC: B179-1, 17, Mathews to Sherwood, March 19, 1781.

86Tbid., B179-1, 116-17, Mathews to Sherwood, September 3, 1781.


88PAC: B177, 625-28, Sherwood to Mathews, December 9, 1782.

89Stuart, "Jessup's Rangers," 45.

90PAC: B176, 61, Sherwood to Mathews, March 24, 1781.
CHAPTER VII

REUNION OR TRADE?

By the beginning of February 1782 Justus Sherwood's worst fears concerning the fate of Lord Cornwallis had been officially confirmed.¹ Justus had been at St. Johns with his family for the first few days of the new year before proceeding south to the Loyal Block House where he was to spend the winter.² He spent most of the month of January sifting through intelligence reports which gave conflicting views of what had happened at Yorktown. The indecisive news which his agents brought him through the deep snow of Vermont heightened his optimism. Tories in the rebelling colonies were fervently denying that Cornwallis had been taken, and Sherwood found some comfort in their views. One report which did speak of the surrender was based on articles in Boston newspapers which Sherwood contemptuously dismissed as nothing more than Whiggish propaganda.³

At the same time, the reports from Vermont were quite encouraging. Three agents reported from separate missions that popular opinion in Vermont favoured neutrality, and that most Vermonters, faced with the choice of New York or Great Britain as a master, would choose the latter.⁴ This seemed rather surprising, given the gloomy predictions that prevailed while

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Cornwallis's fate was still a matter of conjecture. On January 30 Sherwood was prepared to admit that perhaps the British army in Virginia had come to grief, but that all was not necessarily lost in his own quarter:

Not withstanding these unfavourable appearances, the friends of Government in this country be not disheartened, but still entertain hopes from the universal dislike the Americans have of the French troops on account of their religion, and from the enormous taxes or duties which Congress have lately put on tea, rum, sugar, bread, meal and wearing apparel. This occasions mobs and club fighting in almost every part of America. Tax collectors are baited, followed, yelled at. Cattle are killed rather than being seized for taxes, and where they are seized for taxes, anyone who has the gall to bid for them is immediately knocked down and severely beaten. And all this occurs in spite of the jubilation over the victory at Yorktown.5

To a man of Justus Sherwood's political beliefs, such anarchy appeared to be an inevitable result of revolution against authority. Sherwood naturally viewed this apparent confusion with relish, for surely the sensible Vermonters would not choose to involve themselves in such chaos. Furthermore, Vermont's flirtation with the British was not unknown by her republican neighbours, who viewed this development with alarm. Should that alarm take the form of an assault on Vermont, the latter would be forced into British arms. This essentially cheerful view was not shared by Haldimand, who was apprehensive of an American assault on Canada via the upper Connecticut Valley. Such an attack could capitalize
on the confidence generated by Yorktown, and sweep down on Quebec City before British reinforcements could arrive in the spring. In this mood Haldimand regarded the ambivalent Vermonters with a jaundiced eye, but still urged Sherwood to maintain his correspondence with the Allens.

Early in February 1782 young Terrence Smyth managed to escape from Albany and made his way to relative safety at Arlington in Vermont. Both his father and Justus Sherwood were concerned about having him duly exchanged as a prisoner from Vermont. However, while he remained at Arlington, young Smyth did provide the British with a valuable extra set of eyes and ears. He spoke with Ethan Allen, who maintained that he could return Vermont to the fold of the empire within two months if he could be assured of a British force to hold off the common American enemy. Allen stressed the great distrust which the other rebellious colonies felt for Vermont. As if to emphasize this tense situation, a group of New Yorkers attacked Bennington, drawing a threat from Allen of a retaliatory raid on Albany. Sherwood decided that the time had arrived to exert some pressure of his own, and on February 13, Corporal Crowfoot and two men were dispatched to Castleton to carry a letter to Ethan Allen. Sherwood and Smyth were both aware that Ira Allen and Joseph Fay were again in Philadelphia pleading Vermont's case, and this knowledge undoubtedly made Justus somewhat
anxious. His enthusiasm of January had declined by late February as he reported to Mathews: "It is difficult at present even to judge of the effect the late unfortunate event (Yorktown) may have on Vermont. It may incline Congress to comply with her demands with a view of uniting and strengthening the northern frontiers or they may make use of the present favourable opportunity to subject Vermont entirely."11 This was sound thinking which underscored the point that, in the long run, the American victory at Yorktown might prove to be Vermont's undoing.

Corporal Crowfoot's mission nearly ended in disaster and did little to clarify the Vermont situation for Sherwood. Crowfoot did see Ethan Allen and received the usual statements of good faith and sincerity. On his return, however, Crowfoot was captured by an American patrol. The British agent behaved very calmly and managed to destroy his dispatches. He subsequently escaped, and by April 1 he had reported to Sherwood at the Loyal Block House.12 Justus was upset and perplexed by this incident which suggested bad faith on Allen's part, but Haldimand assured him that it was in British interests to maintain the correspondence.13

Both Haldimand and Sherwood were becoming increasingly suspicious of the Vermonters again. Sherwood's man in Arlington had reported that Fay and Allen had convinced Congress of their sincerity, had offered
to drop their extravagant eastern and western claims, and had admitted to the negotiations with the British which they labelled a sham. A later report, untrue as it turned out, that the two Vermont envoys had been put in irons in Philadelphia was regarded by Sherwood as a further charade to disguise their "meditated treachery." Haldimand agreed, but felt that appearances should be kept up and the correspondence continued. For Sherwood, this would mean merely writing persuasive letters at the Loyal Block House which a courier would then carry south to the Allens. It was clear by this time that Justus no longer regarded the Vermont mission in the same naive and enthusiastic manner that he had even six months earlier. He was quite content to let written pleas go where he had formerly gone himself at considerable risk to life and limb. Haldimand probably felt that the Vermont question was not worth the risk of Sherwood's life, and was content to give the Vermonters an occasional reminder of the opportunities which their stubbornness was costing them. Like a woman who sees that the ardour of one of her chief suitors is flagging, the Allens realized by the summer of 1782 that they would have to do a little encouraging of their own if they wanted to keep their British option open.

Shortly after Crowfoot's return, Sherwood dispatched a second secret letter into Vermont, addressed
this time to Ira Allen. The document itself combined an assumption of gentlemanly honour with a recognition of the hard facts of Vermont's delicate situation. Sherwood stressed his concern for the well-being and security of his former associates and assured them that General Haldimand fully shared his feelings. The benevolent Haldimand was still empowered with all the authority required to readmit Vermont to the Empire with her eastern and western unions intact, and to provide financial and military rewards for her leaders. This former point was of some significance, as Vermont, prodded by Isaac Tichenor, one of the most prominent opponents of the Allens in the Assembly, repudiated her claims to the unions early in 1782. In a conspiratorial tone, Justus advised Ira: "I must hint that your only method now left is to lose no time in reclaiming the new unions; then throw off the mask and lay the whole before your assembly and council." Justus was shrewdly pointing out to his correspondent that the British were prepared to accept a "greater Vermont" while the cautious, parsimonious, and constitutionally handicapped Congress was not. One more string was thus added to the British bow. Sherwood concluded his letter with an appeal to their former friendship, as well as to Allen's sense of honour. As in the case of his warm comments to Haldimand on Joseph Fay's character, Justus Sherwood may be seen in this situation appealing to those instincts.
which would have touched his own sense of honour had he been in Ira Allen's place: "I need not tell you how much my future reputation, especially with his Excellency, depends on bringing the negotiations to maturity, or if that can't be done in being able to satisfy him that the failure is not owing to any neglect of yours." 18

The whole Vermont question during these early months of 1782 was complicated by the reports of Franco-American preparations for an assault on Canada, either by the Champlain or Connecticut Valley routes. 19 If such an attack came, Vermont would stand directly in its path, and it was of some concern to the British which way the Vermonters would turn. In 1777 many of them had fought against Burgoyne's army which was properly regarded as an invader of Vermont's soil. Would they similarly resist if Washington and Lafayette moved northward across the Grants? Justus Sherwood was convinced that force was a primary factor where Vermont was concerned. Early in April he expressed the opinion that the Allens and the Fays, both Joseph and his father Jonas the keeper of the Catamount Tavern in Bennington, could be useful to the British if a sufficient force could be sent to protect them. 20 Shortly before this, while Sherwood had been fretting over the fate of Crowfoot, he had been prepared to see British troops dispatched to Vermont to punish the "cursed hypocrisy and
deceit" of the latter by burning Castleton, Rutland and several other settlements. Sherwood had not, however, suddenly become a latter-day Attila. He had played the gentle suitor for a considerable time, and he was now, after many frustrations, considering, at least on paper, the advantages or perhaps the satisfaction of rape. In the final analysis, he admitted to Mathews, British aims would probably best be served for the moment by a policy of leniency and a show of negotiation. There was always the chance that such methods might succeed with the coy Vermonters. If they failed, Sherwood suggested that, in any case, they would undoubtedly have the effect of lulling the foe into a false sense of security which would keep him quiet until Haldimand had gathered sufficient force to crush him. This suggestion was far removed from Sherwood's idealistic hopes for his former friends in 1780 and 1781. His original optimism had become a victim of the exigencies of war.

One major factor behind Justus Sherwood's new bitterness toward Vermont was the fact that, despite his having known the Allens and the Fays before the war and his having dealt with them personally in the course of the negotiations, he really did not know any of them well enough to be able to predict their actions. Sherwood's agents were frequently instructed to obtain the opinions of these men or to offer their own views, as in the case of Elnathan Merwin, the British agent in
Arlington. Sherwood must have experienced a good deal of frustration on this score, for his presumed knowledge of the Vermont leaders was a prime reason for Haldimand's faith in his judgment. Matters were complicated further by an apparent breakdown in communications. On April 6 Sherwood had expressed a longing to hear from the Allens, and predicted that within eight days, his wish would be fulfilled. Unfortunately it was not, and at the end of April he was prepared to send a third letter into the Grants. He was temporarily frustrated in this project by his inability to find a suitable boat to carry his courier, prompting him to remark: "A fatality seems to alter every attempt of late on our part to treat with that treacherous race, the Vermonters." At St. Johns, George Smyth echoed Sherwood's opinion, calling the people of the Grants a "perfidious race," and accusing Allen and Fay of treachery. Smyth also felt that the Vermonters could only be persuaded by the sword: "A sudden attack upon their frontiers would give some satisfaction and perhaps put them into such confusion as might dismay them for the present."26

Despite their aggressive sentiments, Sherwood and Smyth did co-operate late in April in composing a letter to Ira Allen and Joseph Fay which exuded reason and fervent desires for a peaceful settlement. Haldimand, the Vermonters were told, was always ready to negotiate, and to treat them justly and well. If the defeat of
Cornwallis made Vermont's return politically impossible. Haldimand would understand, and would end all negotiations. A major part of the letter stressed the enthusiasm and the honour which Sherwood and Smyth credited to their opponents, and urged them to live up to this high standard and to do nothing to jeopardize the possible success of the negotiations. Sherwood's use of moral pressure again came to the fore:

We are assured your sentiments of honour are too delicate to admit of this, when in your power to prevent it, and that from your knowledge of business, you will readily conceive how painful such apprehensions might be to an honest soldier, honoured with the confidence of his general, in a matter of so great importance. We therefore still flatter ourselves that you will not suffer anything to be wanting on your side to bring it to a just and happy conclusion, or if that cannot be done, to give to us such permanent and well-founded reasons as may enable us to satisfy his Excellency, not only of our veracity, but likewise yours.27

The leaders of Vermont, no longer protected by the convenient heavy snowfall of the winter, responded to the Sherwood-Smyth correspondence on three levels. Joseph Fay wrote a sharp note on the subject of prisoners in which he mentioned that Vermont had twelve British prisoners, and that he hoped an exchange could be arranged without what he considered to be the usual bad faith which the British had displayed in the past. He concluded his note on a particularly crusty tone which is all the more extraordinary when one considers that
no cartel had ever been officially established: "I expect you will give credit for the number now sent you...and that you immediately send out all the prisoners belonging to this state. Nothing short of your compliance herewith will satisfy." Sherwood had previously advocated that a prisoner exchange be maintained with Vermont as a gesture of good will, and Fay may have been aware of his willingness in this matter. One of Sherwood's junior officers, Ensign Elijah Bottum, was sent early in June with forty-two Vermonters to Skeneboro where an exchange was duly made. On this occasion, Terrence Smyth was exchanged for a Vermont lieutenant named Dunning. Isaac Clarke, who conducted Vermont's side of this business, proved to be considerably more diplomatic than Fay; he praised Bottum's work, and slyly suggested that two Yorkers from the western union who were being held in Canada should be included in the next exchange. Such a move, Clarke reasoned, would demonstrate the generosity of both Vermont and Great Britain.

The two other levels of response were of a more diplomatic nature. Ira Allen and Joseph Fay promised that the two British negotiators would be visited at the end of May by "a gentleman of undoubted veracity who is well acquainted with all and every of the particulars in your letters" and who would proceed from them to General Haldimand in Quebec. Although
the man's identity was not revealed, one might reasonably suppose that Ethan Allen was to be this mysterious envoy. Ethan gave some credence to such a supposition by forwarding a pair of undated letters to Haldimand and to Sherwood early in May. These letters were the first in a series of cryptic communications which would flow northward to Canada until the end of the Revolutionary War. Ethan wrote these letters in a disguised hand and he employed no punctuation whatsoever so as to confuse any American agent who might intercept them. He may have achieved his purpose, but he also confused Sherwood and Smyth, and he has created havoc among later students who have attempted to decipher his meaning and his intent. Like the Delphic oracle, Ethan may have sought to make his pronouncements too vague to be definitely interpreted either one way or another, and thus susceptible of being taken as the reader wished. The use of such a stratagem seems fairly clear: the British, if they so desired, would read into Ethan's letters whatever they wanted, and thus would keep open Vermont's northern option. Ethan's letter to Sherwood declared at one point:

Should your cause prove more successful
your wishes may yet be satisfied a small people cant (sic) oppose great many you
know our situation and we are as anxious
as ever to bring matters to a happy issue.34

For their part, Ira Allen and Joseph Fay concluded their letter by saying that they would continue this correspondence
no further, as it was dangerous to them, and they urged Sherwood and Smyth not to send any more couriers for the moment. The negotiations would remain at a standstill until Vermont's agent arrived at the Loyal Block House.

By May 19 two of Sherwood's agents, Corporal Crowfoot and Joseph Wright, formerly of Peters' Corps, had returned from Arlington. Sherwood felt from their reports that Vermont was again moving in the right direction, and that the Allens, the Fays, Thomas Chittenden and their friends would do all they could to effect the reunion. The major problem would be the Bennington mob headed by Colonels Seth Warner and Samuel Herrick. Sherwood noted wistfully: "I wish those two rascals could be put nicely out of the way." A few days later during a brief visit to St. Johns, Sherwood discussed the problem with Smyth, and the two men considered the feasibility of kidnapping Herrick. They decided against such a step until they had had further word from the Allens, as they had no desire to rouse the ire of the Benningtonites. Sherwood had been favourably impressed with the treatment which both Ethan and Ira Allen had accorded to Crowfoot. The latter had hidden himself in the woods near Arlington where both Allens had visited him with many expressions and gestures of good will, including money and provisions for his return journey. Ira Allen had even invoked God's blessing upon his mission and his safe return, and had
sent his own best compliments to Sherwood and Smyth.\textsuperscript{38} The Allens were working hard and under some pressure in these post-Yorktown days both to keep the British interested and to allay the suspicions of the Whigs in their midst. Early in June Governor Chittenden had been threatened by a mob led by Herrick, who wanted to know why all the British prisoners had been handed back to the enemy. Before Chittenden had angrily ordered the mob to disperse, he and Ethan Allen had both been called traitors and Tories.\textsuperscript{39} With such a mood prevalent among the more unruly element of the population, one can appreciate the reluctance of the leading men to carry on their clandestine correspondence. Despite this situation, both Sherwood and Smyth were anxious for a conference with Ethan Allen which, they felt, should clarify Vermont's position once and for all.\textsuperscript{40}

The American victory at Yorktown had had a negative effect on the Vermont negotiations as far as the British were concerned. If Britain did decide to let her rebelling colonies go, and the fall of Lord North's government seemed to indicate that such a development was possible, Vermont would not desire to be thrown in with what was left of the Empire in North America. On the other hand, if Britain rebounded from this setback with new energy and vigour and held on to her colonies, then, declared Ethan Allen, Vermont would be most content "to take a government under the King."\textsuperscript{41} The
news of Admiral Rodney's victory over the French in the West Indies arrived at the Loyal Block House early in May, and stirred Justus Sherwood's hopes anew. He hoped this reverse would undo some of the damage which Cornwallis's surrender had done, and initiate a process whereby "Justice may yet take place in the punishment of French perfidy & American ingratitude." By mid-June Sherwood was still anxiously speculating that Rodney's triumph might serve as an effective counterweight in the diplomatic scale. A number of copies of the Antigua Gazette describing the British victory had arrived in Quebec, and Haldimand was anxious that Sherwood and Smyth should have their agents distribute them in Vermont and in the other colonies.

Justus was also concerned about Ethan Allen, as he had not heard from him in over a month. An undated letter from Allen finally did reach Sherwood late in June which told him little other than that Ethan was concerned about keeping the negotiations a secret: "they have reported that certain principle (sic) men in a certain district of country by name are in secret confederacy, such blabs may expose your best friends, for God's sake, yours, and ours, be careful for the future...." Of much greater significance was a letter dated June 16 which Allen sent directly to Haldimand. This document contained the most unambiguous statement made by any of the Vermont leaders during these
long drawn-out negotiations. Allen affirmed and defended Vermont's neutrality, expressed his interest in meeting Haldimand personally, and closed with a pledge which has perplexed historians ever since: "I shall do everything in my power to render this state a British Province." 46

It is interesting that Ethan Allen chose to proffer this assurance not to his former friend Justus Sherwood, but to General Haldimand. It appears that, whatever his other motives may have been, Allen was going over Sherwood's head directly to his superior. The knowledge of this must have been bitter to Sherwood who had laboured so long in a tangle of ambiguous phrases. Allen may have felt that such a gesture to Haldimand was necessary to secure ultimately for Vermont the right to trade with Quebec, although brothers Ira and Levi were more actively concerned with such matters. By the end of the year, the trade question would arise as a major problem in the fragile Vermont-Canada relationship, and Ethan Allen, with his eye for the main chance, may simply have been getting his bid in early. It was surely significant that Haldimand did not appear to be very excited by this move on Allen's part. The general was convinced that this was Vermont's last chance to return, and that time was decidedly on the British side. 47

Despite his statement that he would send no more letters, Ira Allen did write Sherwood an ambiguity
rivaling his brother's at the end of July. Ira had nothing new to offer, and in a roundabout manner, he simply repeated much of what had been said before: Vermont was still interested, and everything depended on time, the fortunes of war, and the need for secrecy. Two of Sherwood's agents, Jacob Lansing and James Breakenridge, had turned up some interesting developments in the meantime which seemed far more promising than anything which the apparently sterile correspondence with the Allens had produced. During the first week of August, Sherwood took these two men to Quebec to report directly to Haldimand on the Vermont situation. On August 8, after conferring with his superior on the basis of the information which Lansing and Breakenridge had gathered, Sherwood dispatched what in some respects was his strongest appeal yet to the evasive Ethan Allen.

In the spring of 1782 Haldimand, on the advice of Germain, had considered resurrecting his proclamation of October 1781. Ethan Allen's letter of June 16 may have pushed him further in that direction, but the most interesting piece of news was that brought by Lansing who had reported to Haldimand on July 11. The agent declared that Chittenden and Ethan Allen would almost certainly welcome a secret treaty with Great Britain which would return Vermont to British rule, and which could be made public when 4,000 British troops and a large quantity of supplies for the Vermont militia had
been sent to the Green Mountains. Lansing's authorization for making this daring offer on Vermont's part was not really clear, and this consideration doubtlessly stayed Haldimand's hand. For Lansing himself said: "Although I am not authorized to make this proposition... they (Chittenden and his council) have...promised to abide by any engagements I shall enter into for them." 52 Breakenridge was not so extravagant in his report, although he did feel that the moment for decisive action was close at hand. The people of Vermont had long appreciated Haldimand's clemency toward them and "I sincerely believe they will most readily and cheerfully acquiesce in any measure your Excellency shall recommend, for the furtherance of a reunion, providing the same can be adopted in such a manner as not to expose them to the destructive rage of the neighboring colonies." 53 At the same time, George Smyth reported from St. Johns that "the people of Vermont are altering fast and wish to be soon united with Canada." 54 The moment seemed auspicious; Haldimand did not have the troops or the supplies to offer to Vermont, but he could give them one positive token of his good faith by declaring an armistice. When Sherwood wrote to Ethan Allen from Quebec, the proposed cessation of hostilities on Vermont's frontiers was his major weapon.

Justus Sherwood's appeal to his former colleague marked the zenith of his involvement with the Vermont
question during the year 1782. From Sherwood's restricted point of view, it appeared that the puzzle was finally resolving itself; Rodney's victory over De Grasse, the hostility of Vermont's neighbours to her independence, the chaos and confusion which marked the domestic affairs of those neighbours, and the continued friendly and patient attitude of Haldimand, culminating in his offer of an armistice, surely left Vermont with no option at all. Sherwood allowed his strong personal feelings to flow more freely than at any time since Yorktown, as he assured Allen that he was warmed by "your confidence in me, and feeling myself too much interested for my beloved country and friends." The pragmatist did reappear briefly and rather blandly when Justus warned his correspondent that Haldimand had placed great faith in Vermont's leading men, "and let me tell you if they deceive him, they will not only abuse the greatest humanity and sincerity that ever was possessed by man, but will lose in him the best friend they ever had." 55

Such a threat sounds painfully inadequate when compared with that which a force at Crown Point might have exerted. By this time the Vermont leaders were probably totally immune to the subtleties of Sherwood's moral appeals.

It was hoped that a prisoner exchange to be conducted early in September might bring forth some positive response from the Vermonters, but it did not. Sherwood accompanied by George Smyth, even went as far south as
Crown Point on that occasion in the hope of meeting Ethan Allen or some other Vermont dignitary. Indeed, the whole question of prisoners was taking on an aspect which boded trouble for the future. Ira Allen had written another confusing letter to Sherwood on August 10 in which he mentioned that he would like to see an ardent Yorker Whig, Captain Simeon Smith, included in the next exchange. This was the second time that such a suggestion had emanated from a Vermont source. Allen also let it be known that General Washington, who distrusted Vermont because of her suspected relations with the enemy, was interested in exchanging prisoners with Vermont, and by so doing recovering Continental prisoners being held in Canada. Such a maneuver would have defeated the British intention of refusing to exchange captives with the Americans and would have made Vermont a clearing house of sorts. Nothing ever came of this idea, but the British were naturally suspicious of Vermont's intentions. Haldimand was very disappointed that his gesture had not produced something more tangible; as late as October 31, he was lamenting over "the long silence of the Vermonters."

That silence was finally broken by a cheerful and sanguine letter from Ethan Allen, dated October 16 and received at Quebec early in November. Allen declared that Vermont would be back in the Empire at that moment, "was it not for the colonies." George Washington, Allen
felt, was the prime villain of this piece as far as the Vermonters were concerned: "he is, under the curtain, their avowed enemy, and considering his power, they have more to fear from him than all the rest of America."
The vast majority of Vermonters wanted to avoid membership in the American Union so as to preserve themselves from the burden of the enormous Continental debt. The message between the lines seemed to appeal for a British force to protect Vermont from the vengeance of the Continental Army. At this point, of course, Allen and Haldimand were at cross purposes. The Vermonters, for their own safety, would not declare for Britain until their defense could be assured; Haldimand did not have the necessary troops in hand, and wanted the Vermonters to make their declaration on the basis of what Britain could offer them in the long run, particularly in the matter of trade. In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine the two sides ever really finding suitable common ground. But Justus Sherwood continued, as he had done for two years, to attempt to discover that ground and to bring the whole question to a happy conclusion.

Haldimand's generosity in establishing an armistice brought another major problem to the fore: trade. Many individual Vermonters assumed that now that the fighting was over, the British would welcome their goods at St. Johns, Montreal, and Quebec. As early as July, two
hopeful Vermonters had appeared at Quebec with horses to sell in exchange for rum and salt. They had been sent back with the statement that trade would be opened only when Vermont had returned to British rule. Ethan Allen had advised Sherwood and Haldimand that he was temporarily against the establishment of trade even after the armistice, for fear that such a move would provide Washington with the excuse he needed to descend on Vermont. Haldimand was prepared to support this embargo, although he did express a willingness to open a limited trade in beef by the spring of 1783 to those Vermonters who were both well-disposed and hard-pressed. The Allens and the Fays were quick to press their own desires for trade once the war ended, and it may have been that they advocated an embargo earlier simply to serve their own ends and prevent fellow Vermonters from taking advantage of a chaotic situation. The problem as far as Justus Sherwood was concerned centered on the fact that when trade-hungry Vermonters pushed northward to Canada, the first British post which they encountered was the Loyal Block House. Sherwood thus found himself with the thankless task of having to turn these people back.

One instance of dealing with such people occurred in the case of the Reverend Mr. Ranna Cossitt and Squire Benjamin Sumner of Claremont, New Hampshire, who somehow bypassed the frontier posts and made their way directly
to Quebec. Mathews interviewed them there, and then sent them back to the Loyal Block House, where Sherwood also talked with them. Justus found a kindred spirit in Mr. Cossitt, a minister of the Church of England who was convinced that the Revolution was the work of the Non-Conformist fanatics of New England. Sherwood liked this man who professed interest in bringing his Tory-minded flock to Canada. Cossitt's concern with trade seemed minimal, although he did express a desire to go to Montreal to buy religious books and some clothing. Justus found him to be an amiable and enthusiastic man of God who was perhaps somewhat gullible. Mathews had been disturbed to learn that both men knew all about the supposedly secret negotiations with the British.

Sherwood found Sumner to be somewhat more worldly than his companion. He judged the squire to be a shrewd, cunning man who was basically loyal, but would probably not let that loyalty interfere with the furtherance of his private interests. His assessment was remarkably accurate; Sumner was a large landholder who had hovered on the fringe of Toryism since 1775, and who would have been prepared to swing in the direction which was most profitable to him. In contrast, Cossitt was a devotedly loyal Tory. At Quebec, both Cossitt and Sumner had declared that they represented a friend of Benedict Arnold, General Roger Enos, Ira Allen's future father-in-law who was familiar with the negotiations, and who
was prepared to march 700 Loyalists to Canada if land could be found for them. Sumner had subsequently mentioned that he wanted a grant of land on Lake Memphremagog for the settlement of Loyalists, a request which Haldimand refused. The Reverend Mr. Cossitt spoke in unfavourable terms of the free-thinking and free-wheeling Ethan Allen, although Allen subsequently endorsed both Sumner and Cossitt as good men. It seems clear that the pair had come to Canada on their own and were probably looking for land. Sherwood assumed that they were Allen agents, and made a point of telling both Ethan and Ira to provide their people with some token in future. By December 28, after a sojourn of seven weeks behind the British lines, Cossitt and Sumner went home. They had achieved little, but they had provided Justus Sherwood with the sort of experience which he would undergo frequently until he left the Loyal Block House in May 1783. At one point, they had suggested that it would be beneficial to have one of Sherwood's agents permanently domiciled on the Connecticut River during the winter, an idea which the self-seeking Azariah Pritchard may have induced them to put forward. Justus could see no advantage in such an arrangement, but did agree to the less complicated expedient of maintaining a correspondence with Sumner.

Sherwood's difficulties with the trade question were to some degree a result of the intrigues of Azariah
Pritchard. In at least two cases, Pritchard encouraged people interested in trading with Canada, and induced them to make the journey north. The British agent probably benefited from this process in some way himself. A suggestion has been made that some of these traders actually carried goods for Pritchard who would buy them relatively cheaply in depression-ridden New England, and sell them in Canada at a considerable profit. He may even have been instrumental in persuading Cossitt and Sumner to go to Quebec, as Sumner had specifically suggested Pritchard as the resident agent on the Connecticut River. On October 30 two men from Norwich, Connecticut, arrived at the Loyal Block House. Sherwood interviewed the pair and learned that they were interested in settling in Vermont, and were anxious to know if that state had established trade with Canada. One of the men, Nathaniel Wales, claimed to be a friend of George Smyth, and felt that this relationship should open all official doors behind the British lines for him. Sherwood did not like Wales, whom he privately called a "jockey" and a "sharper." The other man, Benjamin Brewster, seemed to be a harmless fellow who was under the influence of Wales. Both men had crossed the path of the ubiquitous Pritchard: "They say they met Captain Pritchard on the Lake, & understood from him that they could purchase beaver furr (sic) at Montreal at one dollar a pound,
and that they could trade in Canada without any difficulty, from which they seem to think my detaining them is an ill-natured action of my own.**80** Wales subsequently wrote to Smyth who assured Mathews that the man was indeed what he claimed to be, a loyal friend to Government.**81** Sherwood would not permit Wales and Brewster to go to St. Johns to see Smyth until Haldimand officially permitted such a move.**82** In the interim, Sherwood was obliged to house and feed Wales and Brewster at the Loyal Block House, a development which irritated Justus as he saw the two interlopers depleting his small supply of government stores.**83** They were ultimately refused passage to St. Johns and Wales returned home in disgust.**84** The presence of such questionable visitors did not provide ideal conditions under which to try to continue negotiations with the Vermonter or maintain a center for the secret service.

Another instance of this trying problem involved two Vermonter named Nichols and Holmes who arrived in late November at Sherwood's post with a quantity of beef to sell. Pritchard had not only advised the two men to come, but they had actually made the trip from Crown Point to Grande Isle in a government boat under the auspices of another of Sherwood's men, Corporal Welch. Sherwood was livid with rage at their effrontery, and spent an entire night pacing the blockhouse in an agony of frustration. The unfortunate Welch was immediately
placed under arrest, and his two passengers were confined. Sherwood was determined to check this incipient illegal trade before it grew to flood proportions, and he assured Mathews: "I shall not permit these two sharpers to sell or give an ounce of their beef here, nor suffer it to be made use of, on any pretense whatever." Nichols and Holmes were predictably very annoyed at this summary treatment. They declared that they had been assured that they could trade in Canada, that they were both stout Loyalists, and that they had no intention of returning home with their beef.

Sherwood was faced with a dilemma in the handling of this matter. He had no desire to alienate individual Vermonters if he could help it; indeed he wanted to encourage whenever possible those who were favourably disposed to the British. At the same time he did have his orders, which were based on what the Vermont leaders supposedly desired. He also discovered that some of the beef belonged to one of his own men, Corporal Cornelius Miller, whom Sherwood described as "a very active useful man in the service." Justus sought permission for Miller to sell his beef to government stores, a concession which was granted. The matter of Corporal Welch was solved by a court martial over which Sherwood presided at the blockhouse on December 7. Welch was exonerated and the blame for the incident was placed on Pritchard. Sherwood also interviewed Nichols and
Holmes separately, and decided on the basis of their statements to release the former and send him back to Vermont. Haldimand was initially annoyed because Sherwood had acted without orders. Justus explained that Nichols had disowned any claim to the beef, and had accused Pritchard of luring him into the secret service with a promise of one hundred guineas if he reported to the Loyal Block House. Nichols, Justus shrewdly noted, was "a blabling (sic) weak fellow," essentially loyal but basically useless. If he was released, he might incidentally serve as a propagandist for the British cause among his neighbours. By December 2 Nichols was heading south toward Crown Point, while Holmes remained under restraint at the blockhouse.

A few days after Nichols's departure, Sherwood made up his mind about what to do with Holmes and his beef. The latter, with Haldimand's blessing, was sunk in Lake Champlain to the west of the Loyal Block House, with the whole garrison being turned out to witness the event. It was Sherwood's hope that this action would serve as a salutary example to other would-be traders. Holmes himself was transferred to Isle-aux-Noix. The luckless Vermonter put a good face on his situation and convinced Sherwood that he bore no ill will to anyone except Pritchard. Justus even went so far as to suggest that Holmes be released, a step which Haldimand felt might not be wise. Holmes had lost a considerable
investment in the icy waters of Lake Champlain, and he might prove bitter and resentful when he returned to Vermont. The question of compensation for the beef was raised; Sherwood felt that no restitution could be made to Holmes from government funds, as such an act would seem to reflect on Haldimand's and his own judgment. If anyone should reimburse Holmes, it should be the scoundrel Pritchard. As late as mid-February 1783, Holmes was still at Isle-aux-Noix, and Sherwood and Smyth recommended that he remain there until his character could be more thoroughly assessed. Smyth in particular was convinced that Holmes had been a prominent rebel in Bennington who had taken a special delight in tormenting Tories. Two of Sherwood's agents, Roger Stevens and Luke Knowlton, refuted this view, while a former Tory prisoner at Bennington, Edward Abbott, supported it. Sherwood tended to be sympathetic with Holmes and regretted having to tell him that he could not be released. It was most unfortunate for Holmes that he had a questionable reputation, and, unlike Nichols, seemed to be a man of some purpose. His former companion had been lightly dismissed as "a dam'd fool & a conceited blockhead."

Throughout that final winter of the war Justus Sherwood frequently had to deal with other problems relating to trade. On the night of January 2, 1783, a party of six men headed by one Captain Samuel Weatherby
of Charlestown, New Hampshire, arrived at the Loyal Block House with nearly two hundred pairs of shoes. Sherwood sympathized with the man and found his politics to be of the right sort, but he had no choice but to send him back. Weatherby's men deserted him, and on January 27, he set out for New Hampshire accompanied only by a servant. The two men were laden down with shoes, and were forced to leave most of their wares with one of Sherwood's men, who promised to hold them until spring. On at least three other occasions late in the winter, Sherwood turned back parties of hopeful traders. One of these instances did give him some satisfaction as he had the pleasure of refusing an old tormentor in the person of Colonel Ebenezer Allen:

"This is the same Allen who treated me so very ill when I was on the first flag. It is so painful to me to see him that I can hardly treat him with common civility."

By April the news of the war's end placed Sherwood in a very difficult position. Increasing numbers of traders were coming northward, some of whom still professed loyalty to a defeated cause, but many more arrogantly flaunted their newly-won independence in Sherwood's face. Justus declared that he was hard-pressed to keep his garrison from attacking these people:

They haughtily boast that they are independent, that this is their ground & that they shall have possession of it by the middle of May, etc., etc. And when I refuse to let them proceed to
trade in Canada, they reply that it will not be a month before they will trade, and no thanks to me, and that they will take good care that no dam'd Tory shall have the lyberty of trading from the country here or from Canada, into the country, that they will soon have a marchent (sic) of their own in this Block House, etc., etc. I con- sidered those expressions as the mad sallies of vulgar fools, which would soon subside, until I saw the Act against the Loyalists in the enclosed papers, but that fully convinces me, that it is the general spirit of the Whigs throughout America.106

Sherwood's reaction to this situation partly reflected the natural bitterness of the adherent of a lost cause, but it surely represented as well the frustration involved in a difficult and thankless task. What Justus was doing, after all, was following a policy expressly designed to assist Vermont and to smooth the way for her return to her rightful sovereign. By the spring of 1783 Sherwood must have wondered with considerable justification if his efforts had not all been for nothing.

The project of reclaiming Vermont had not been forgotten during the last six months of the war, although the Allens frequently gave the impression that they were really more interested in other things. In November 1782 Ira Allen complained to Sherwood and Smyth about alleged raids which their Loyalist scouts were making on apple trees which Allen had planted on the Onion River.107 Four months later, Ira was writing to Sherwood in a conspiratorial tone asking if Justus could arrange a loan of ten thousand guineas for him
in Montreal at 6% interest. If this loan could be brought about, Ira would arrange for Justus to receive a good farm. Ethan also had his mind on material matters, and was not above using his relationship with Sherwood to forward them. Late in April 1783 he urged Justus to encourage the settlement of Loyalists in Quebec near the Vermont border, and also to support the idea of settling Loyalists still in the United States on the rich virgin land of northern Vermont. Such a policy, Allen confided, would place a potent pro-British force within Vermont and thus eventually bring about the reunion into which so much time and effort had been devoted. These lands upon which Ethan proposed settling the Loyalists were, as one might expect, Allen lands. In a similar vein of strong self-interest, Ira Allen and Joseph Fay wrote to Sherwood at the end of May. The two entrepreneurs presumed upon their wartime friendship with Sherwood to put in a good word for them with Haldimand to permit them to supply beef and other fresh provisions to the British troops in Canada. The task of at least exhibiting a semblance of interest in rejoining the British Empire during these final months of hostilities fell primarily to Ethan Allen, who continued to maintain a correspondence with Sherwood.

Ethan performed this task in his usual competent fashion. He convinced Luke Knowlton, who made his way to the Loyal Block House early in January 1783, of his
own sincere attachment to the British cause.¹¹¹ This information reinforced Sherwood's own feelings on the subject: "I cannot believe Mr. Chittenden & the Allens deceitful, their constant perseverance, their candid friendly treatment and advice to Mr. Knowlton & other established friends; and indeed, their public actions & speeches are to me strong arguments in their favour."¹¹² Haldimand shared Sherwood's feeling, but felt that the times were too unsettled for any step to be taken on either side.¹¹³ The implication seemed to be that the groundwork had been successfully laid, that lines of communication and trust had been established between Quebec and Vermont and that one day, all this hard work and sacrifice might indeed eventually see a return of Vermont to Britain's waiting arms. In the meantime, Haldimand would continue to maintain confidence in Allen, and Sherwood would continue to write to him in a discreet fashion.¹¹⁴

In February 1783 both Ethan Allen and Sherwood received a bad scare when the concentration of Colonel Marinus Willett's force at Albany was reported. Ethan felt that Congress was at last moving against Vermont, and wrote a panicky note to Sherwood saying that if such an attack did come, he hoped it would be postponed until after the ice was out of Lake Champlain.¹¹⁵ It might be suggested that if the attack had been launched against Vermont, the reluctant republic might have called for
British naval and military aid, and thus have taken the final step to reunion. For his part, Justus was worried that Canada might be the American target, and that the attacking force would sweep down Lake Champlain and overrun his feeble little post with a minimum of effort.116 In the final analysis, neither man need have worried, as in fact Oswego was the objective of this effort, an unsuccessful eleventh-hour attempt before the war ended to expel the British from one of the several strategic forts which they held on the western borders of the new-born American republic.117

On March 10 Sherwood received the unhappy and unwelcome news that the colonies had indeed been granted independence. He had complained of poor health the day before, but this fresh intelligence roused him from his state of torpor to record his feelings:

I have during this contest encountered many difficulties and changes with cheerfulness (sic), being always supported by my confidence in His Majesty's arms, and my own consciousness of the justice of his cause; but if independence is in fact granted, we have no other consolation left than the consciousness of having endeavored to do our duty for I think no Loyalist of principle & spirit can ever endure the thought of going back to live under the imperious laws of a Washington & his minions.118

Of immediate concern was the effect which American independence would have on Vermont. Sherwood noted that Ethan Allen was determined to do nothing for the
moment respecting political matters.\textsuperscript{119} Ethan did suggest to Haldimand that Vermont might be recognized as a British province in the peace treaty, but Haldimand rejected the idea as impractical.\textsuperscript{120} Allen probably had realized that he would do so, and thus cleverly purchased a little more good will at no cost. At the same time, Allen's move may have been motivated by fear; with the war now over, might not Washington take the opportunity to subdue Vermont? Indeed, Ethan even had to consider a troublesome minority within the state who wanted to continue fighting the British.\textsuperscript{121} It was therefore still to Vermont's advantage to keep the door to the north at least partially open.

Haldimand and Sherwood continued to play the diplomatic game, although they now introduced a new stratagem: their sympathy for Vermont remained strong, but the present unsettled state of things made any reunion impossible for the moment.\textsuperscript{122} The British were not prepared to commit themselves to Vermont's defense and thus run the risk of starting the war over again. As Haldimand and Sherwood backed away from their now well-established policy in respect to Vermont, Ethan Allen moved in to fill the vacuum which they had left: "Your Excellency may rest assured that the cabinet of this state have absolutely determined by no means to be connected with them (the states of the American republic); but at all events to be annexed to Canada and become
a Royal Government...." Sherwood shrewdly analyzed his former associate's new enthusiasm as a reaction to the fear of Vermont's neighbours that the Green Mountain State might indeed hoist the British flag. Once that fear had dissipated, Vermont would almost certainly be invited into the Union. For that reason, Sherwood favoured Allen's idea of having Vermont recognized as British in the eventual peace settlement.124

Ethan Allen's final word on the subject to Justus Sherwood came in a letter written on April 18 "at a tavern in Manchester half over seas." Ethan, presumably fortified by distilled spirits, bravely announced that Vermont would strike out on her own, remembering her friends, watching her enemies, and above all, keeping "Independent of Indepeendency." He fervently promised that Vermont would not "Confederate with Congress" under any circumstances, and vaguely hinted that "our friends... will produce something by and by."125 Having thus announced his course, Allen subsequently attempted to enlist Sherwood's aid in settling northern Vermont. Justus declared that it had been Haldimand's policy to discourage settlement west of the Green Mountains and north of Otter Creek, and the arrival of peace did not change that situation, Allen's impeccable Loyalist sentiments notwithstanding.126

For Justus Sherwood the Vermont question was now to become a matter of history, for he was called to new
duties. On May 5 Sherwood was summoned to Quebec to assist in settling the homeless Loyalists in what remained of British North America. The Vermont negotiations had been a bitter experience for the dedicated Justus who had invested so much of himself in this unsuccessful venture. Some of the problems which he had encountered were basically products of his own personality; his faith in moral arguments and, perhaps most important, his deep personal wish to see Vermont return to the Empire had tended to blind him to the realities of the situation and allow his unscrupulous opponents to outflank him. Other stumbling blocks of the negotiations such as the relative British weakness on the northern frontier and the bargaining skills and delaying tactics of his antagonists, were factors over which he had little control. In the final analysis, Justus Sherwood, if outwitted, at least emerged from the experience with his honour unscathed, despite his occasional lapses into Machiavellianism. The hardships, danger, and hard work which he had endured in a lost cause would serve him well on the banks of the upper St. Lawrence in Augusta Township, where he would eventually settle after he had performed further services for the Crown. Time was to enable him to look back on the fruitless Vermont negotiations as having been "conducted with probity and candour on both sides."
FOOTNOTES

1. PAC: B179-1, 177, Mathews to Sherwood, February 2, 1782.

2. PAC: B179-1, 165-66, Mathews to Sherwood, December 27, 1781; B177, 2, Sherwood to Mathews January 2, 1782.

3. PAC: B177, 13-14, Sherwood to Mathews, January 20, 1782.

4. Ibid., 15-17, Sherwood to Mathews, January 20, 1782.

5. Ibid., 21-22, Sherwood to Mathews, January 30, 1782.

6. Ibid., 252-53, Sherwood to Colonel Porter, May 1, 1782.

7. PAC: B179-1, 221-23, Mathews to Sherwood, March 31, 1782.

8. PAC: B177, 28-29, Sherwood to Mathews, February 6, 1782.


10. Ibid., 42-43, Sherwood to Mathews, February 13, 1782.

11. Ibid., 69, Sherwood to Mathews, February 22, 1782.

12. Ibid., 175-76, Corporal Crowfoot's Report, April 5, 1782.

13. Ibid., 144, Sherwood to Mathews, March 22, 1782; B179-1, 224-26, Mathews to Sherwood, April 7, 1782.


15. Ibid., 142, Sherwood to Mathews, March 18, 1782.

16. PAC: B179-1, 221-23, Mathews to Sherwood, March 31, 1782.
17 Williamson, *Vermont in Quandary*, 113.

18 PAC: B178, 460-62, Sherwood to Ira Allen (undated).

19 PAC: B177, 48-49, Justus Sherwood's General Order to his agents, February 14, 1782.

20 PAC: B177, 181-82, Sherwood to Mathews, April 6, 1782.

21 Ibid., 167, Sherwood to Mathews, March 28, 1782.

22 Ibid., 162, Sherwood to Mathews, March 28, 1782.

23 Ibid., 209-10, Sherwood to Merwin, April 24, 1782.

24 Ibid., 181-82, Sherwood to Mathews, April 6, 1782.

25 Ibid., 213, Sherwood to Mathews, April 26, 1782.

26 Ibid., 229, Smyth to Mathews, April 28, 1782.

27 PAC: B179-1, 2-5, Sherwood & Smyth to Ira Allen & Joseph Fay, April 1782.

28 PAC: B177, 272-73, Joseph Fay to Sherwood & Smyth, May 9, 1782.

29 Ibid., 181-82, Sherwood to Mathews, April 6, 1782.

30 Ibid., 332, Sherwood to Ensign Bottom, June 2, 1782.

31 Ibid., 343-44, Isaac Clarke to Sherwood, June 9, 1782.

32 Ibid., 277-78, Ira Allen & Joseph Fay to Sherwood & Smyth, May 9, 1782.

33 Ibid., 264-65, Ethan Allen to Haldimand, received in Quebec on May 8, 1782.

34 Ibid., 266-67, Ethan Allen to Sherwood & Smyth, received May 8, 1782.


36 Ibid., 303-06, Sherwood to Mathews, May 19, 1782.
37 Ibid., 329-31, Smyth to Mathews, June 1, 1782.
38 Ibid., 305-06, Sherwood to Mathews, May 19, 1782.
39 Ibid., 349-51, Sherwood to Mathews, June 13, 1782.
40 Ibid., 348, Smyth to Mathews, June 12, 1782.
41 Ibid., 264-65, Ethan Allen to Haldimand, received May 8, 1782.
42 Ibid., 276, Sherwood to Haldimand, May 9, 1782.
43 PAC: B179-2, 27-29, Mathews to Sherwood, June 17, 1782.
44 PAC: B177, 364, Sherwood to Mathews, June 19, 1782.
46 PAC: B177, 354-56, Ethan Allen to Haldimand, June 16, 1782.
47 PAC: B179-2, 31-34, Mathews to Sherwood, June 20, 1782.
48 PAC: B177, 404-05, Ira Allen to Sherwood, July 31, 1782.
49 PAC: B179-2, 50-51, Mathews to Smyth, August 8, 1782.
50 PAC: B177, 428-31, Sherwood to Ethan Allen, August 8, 1782.
51 PAC: B179-1, 227-30, Mathews to Sherwood, April 10, 1782.
52 PAC: B177, 380-86, Jacob Lansing to Haldimand, July 11, 1782.
53 Ibid., 415-16, James Breakenridge to Haldimand, August 2, 1782.
54 Ibid., 417-18, Smyth to Mathews, August 3, 1782.
Tbid., 428-31, Sherwood to Ethan Allen, August 8, 1782.

Tbid., 476-78, Smyth to Mathews, September 7, 1782.

Tbid., 435, Ira Allen to Sherwood & Smyth, August 10, 1782.

Tbid., 433-34, Smyth to Mathews, August 9, 1782.

PAC: B179-2, 98, Mathews to Sherwood, October 31, 1782.


PAC: B175, 300-03, Sherwood & Smyth to Ethan Allen, November 29, 1782.


PAC: B179-2, 120-21, Mathews to Smyth, November 21, 1782.


PAC: B179-2, 99-101, Mathews to Sherwood, November 2, 1782; Wilbur, Ira Allen, I, 529; Thompson, Independent Vermont, 469.

PAC: B179-2, 132-34, Mathews to Sherwood, December 2, 1782.

GBL: Allen Papers, Ethan Allen to Sherwood & Smyth, December 20, 1782.

PAC: B177, 637-39, Sherwood & Smyth to Ira Allen, December 28, 1782.
72 Ibid., 641-50, Sherwood to Mathews, December 28, 1782.

73 PAC: B179-2, 162-69, Mathews to Sherwood, January 9, 1783.

74 PAC: B177, 565, Sherwood to Smyth, October 30, 1782; B177, 610, Sherwood to Major Nairne, November 27, 1782.


76 PAC: B177, 649, Sherwood to Mathews, December 28, 1782.

77 Ibid., 565, Sherwood to Mathews, October 30, 1782.

78 Ibid., 573-74, Nathaniel Wales to Smyth, October 30, 1782.

79 Ibid., 587, Sherwood to Mathews, November 12, 1782.

80 Ibid., 565, Sherwood to Mathews, October 30, 1782.

81 Ibid., 580-81, Smyth to Mathews, November 6, 1782.

82 Ibid., 561, Sherwood to Smyth, October 30, 1782.

83 Ibid., 587, Sherwood to Mathews, November 12, 1782.

84 PAC: B179-2, 118, Mathews to Sherwood, November 11, 1782.

85 PAC: B177, 601-05, Sherwood to Mathews, November 26, 1782.

86 PAC: B177, 610, Sherwood to Nairne, November 27, 1782.

87 Ibid., 608, Sherwood to Nairne, November 27, 1782.

88 PAC: B179, 135-38, Mathews to Sherwood, December 5, 1782.

89 PAC: B161, 464-65, "Proceedings of Court of Enquiry held at the Loyal Block House 7th December 1782 by order
of Major Nairne, on Corpl Welch for taking into his boat at Crown Point, without orders, two men belonging to Vermont with a Quantity of Beef for market & bringing them & it to this Post."

90PAC: B177, 620-22, Smyth to Mathews, December 4, 1782.

91PAC: B179-2, 147, Mathews to Sherwood, December 19, 1782.


93Ibid., 618-19, Sherwood to Mathews, December 1, 1782.

94Ibid., 629-31, Sherwood to Mathews, December 14, 1782.


96PAC: B179-2, 158-59, Mathews to Sherwood, January 2, 1783.

97PAC: B178, 41-42, Sherwood to Mathews, January 24, 1783.

98Ibid., 71-75, Smyth to Mathews, February 2, 1783.

99Ibid., 349, Nairne to Sherwood (undated).

100PAC: B138, 125-26, Sherwood to de Riedesel, February 24, 1783; B178, 43, Roger Stevens to Sherwood, January 25, 1783; Ibid., 93-96, Sherwood to Mathews, February 25, 1783; Ibid., 102, Statement of Edward Abbott, March 1, 1783.

101Ibid., 93-96, Sherwood to Mathews, February 25, 1783.

102PAC: B177, 638, Sherwood & Smyth to Ira Allen, December 28, 1782.

103PAC: B178, 6-10, Sherwood to Mathews, January 3, 1783.
of Major Nairne, on Corpl Welch for taking into his boat at Crown Point, without orders, two men belonging to Vermont with a Quantity of Beef for market & bringing them & it to this Post."

90PAC: B177, 620-22, Smyth to Mathews, December 4, 1782.

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93Ibid., 618-19, Sherwood to Mathews, December 1, 1782.

94Ibid., 629-31, Sherwood to Mathews, December 14, 1782.


96PAC: B179-2, 158-59, Mathews to Sherwood, January 2, 1783.

97PAC: B178, 41-42, Sherwood to Mathews, January 24, 1783.

98Ibid., 71-75, Smyth to Mathews, February 2, 1783.

99Ibid., 349, Nairne to Sherwood (undated).

100PAC: B138, 125-26, Sherwood to de Riedesel, February 24, 1783; B178, 43, Roger Stevens to Sherwood, January 25, 1783; Ibid., 93-96, Sherwood to Mathews, February 25, 1783; Ibid., 102, Statement of Edward Abbott, March 1, 1783.

101Ibid., 93-96, Sherwood to Mathews, February 25, 1783.

102PAC: B177, 638, Sherwood & Smyth to Ira Allen, December 28, 1782.

103PAC: B178, 6-10, Sherwood to Mathews, January 3, 1783.
104. Ibid., 44-45, Sherwood to Mathews, January 27, 1783.

105. Ibid., 133, Sherwood to Mathews, March 14, 1783.

106. Ibid., 187-88, Sherwood to Mathews, April 27, 1783.

107. VHS: Allen Papers, Add. Mss. 21835, fol. 139, Sherwood & Smyth to Ira Allen, November 30, 1782.

108. PAC: B178, 363-64, Ira Allen to Sherwood, March 24, 1783.

109. Ibid., 185-86, Sherwood to Mathews, April 27, 1783.

110. PAC: B175, 200-1, Ira Allen & Joseph Fay to Sherwood, May 29, 1783.


112. Ibid., 35, Sherwood to Mathews, January 16, 1783.


114. Ibid., 192-94, Mathews to Sherwood, February 10, 1783.

115. PAC: B178, 50-51, Ethan Allen to Sherwood & Smyth, January 1783.


117. Ibid., 106-7, Sherwood to de Riedesel, February 19, 1783.

118. PAC: B178, 120, Sherwood to Mathews, March 10, 1783.

119. Ibid., 121.

120. PAC: B179-2, 237-41, Mathews to Sherwood, March 20, 1783.

121. PAC: B178, 122-23, Samuel Wright's Report, March 10, 1783.
122 PAC: B179-2, 239, Mathews to Sherwood, March 20, 1783.


124 PAC: B178, 162-64, Sherwood to Mathews, April 10, 1783.

125 Ibid., 173, Ethan Allen to Sherwood & Knowlton, April 18, 1783.


127 Ibid., 260, Mathews to Sherwood, May 5, 1783.

128 Wilbur, Ira Allen, II, 60.
CHAPTER VIII

SETTLING THE LOYALISTS

The end of the Revolutionary War brought the necessity for a decision about what appeared to be a bleak and uncertain future. Justus Sherwood would play a substantial role in organizing and overseeing the settlement of the Loyalists, but he was also naturally interested in his own situation as well. In April 1783 he wrote a private letter to Captain Mathews, asking for his opinion "of the country about Gaspy & the Bay Chalures" as a possible location, not only for his own family, but also "for all those faithful fellows whom I have so long employ'd in the secret service line, and who naturally look to me for assistance." If the Gaspé region was unsatisfactory, Sherwood added, he would be prepared to look for vacant land on the southern frontier of Canada.¹

Sherwood's interest in land was a natural one, given the nature of the expanding frontier in the times during which he lived. He had been involved in land transactions in Connecticut and Vermont, and had subsequently put aside his career as a farmer and land speculator with the coming of war. Now he was prepared to renew his former interests once again, in the company of many other Loyalists. Sherwood's continuing interest in land would be a major theme of the balance of his life,
as it was for most of his contemporaries.

Land was the topic of discussion when Doctor Smyth visited the Loyal Block House early in May. The two men decided that they could never return to the United States, and Smyth subsequently wrote to Mathews that he and Sherwood would like a vacant tract of land whereon they could settle their friends and acquaintances, and thus establish a stable and loyal community. As he would do in the case of justifying the secret service expenses, Smyth brought Sherwood's name into this letter almost, it would seem, to strengthen his own case. Smyth was certainly aware that Haldimand thought well of Sherwood, and although it must have galled him to do it, he probably felt that he stood a better chance of success if Justus was associated with his plea.

The response from Mathews was hardly encouraging: "It will be difficult, my good friend, to find as much land whereon to build a cabbin & Potatoe Garden...for there is not a vacant acre in the Province (worth having) for which there are not 50 applications lodged in the secretary's office." He would, however, do what he could for them. Smyth replied by saying that he would really much prefer to return to his native Ireland and had little interest in Canadian land: "Whatever I wrote respecting the land was at the particular desire of the Captain which I comply'd with to serve him." This may have been so, but seems rather unlikely,
given the apparent uneasiness which had developed between the two men in the conduct of the secret service and Smyth's feeling that his work was not appreciated as fully as it should have been. A further example may be seen in the doctor's correspondence later in the year when he ponderously put forward a claim for advice and compensation, concluding hopefully: "Could not Captain Sherwood and myself (be) recommended to some office by His Excellency, in the Manny (sic) plans which the Definitive Treaty will exhibit?" Sherwood, the supposed co-beneficiary of these appeals, never sent similar letters to Quebec in support of them.

Justus Sherwood was not slow, however, to push his own cause when it came time to parcel out land. In March 1784, having spent three weeks of the previous fall exploring the upper St. Lawrence and thus being aware of where the choice land was located, he petitioned for three lots on the banks of Mill Creek in the second township in what would ultimately be Glengarry County. His request combined personal and community interest, for the land was poor, but the location was well suited for a saw mill which would soon be turning out boards for the local inhabitants. His request was apparently unsuccessful, but it does indicate that Sherwood's experienced eye for land had not suffered since 1776.

Sorel, located at the juncture of the Richelieu and St. Lawrence, was another site which Justus felt
had potential. A number of Loyalists were familiar with Sorel from the war years and, with a party of refugees recently arrived from New York, were anxious to form a permanent settlement there.\textsuperscript{7} In May 1784 Sherwood requested the privilege of drawing both a town lot and a sixty-acre farm lot as well. He declared that he would attempt to improve these lots, although he doubted that he would ever live in Sorel.\textsuperscript{8} Haldimand agreed to let Sherwood draw a single lot when the time came.\textsuperscript{9}

The immediate problem in the spring of 1783, however, was not mill sites or town sites, but the fate of the Sherwood family. In a private letter to Sherwood, Mathews declared that Haldimand felt that Justus should remove himself completely from the Vermont area. The United States was likely to be in considerable internal turmoil for some years to come, and this state of affairs would be especially prevalent in Vermont. Therefore, Sherwood should proceed immediately to Quebec, and from there to the Baie des Chaleurs "there fully to inform yourself of the advantages and disadvantages of the situation; the number of, and the persons most proper to be settled there." Justus was to turn the command of the Loyal Block House over to Doctor Smyth, and then make his way to Isle-aux-Noix where a small vessel would be ready to transport him to Quebec.\textsuperscript{10}

The next few days were spent in preparation for the trip and in performing a few routine duties connected
with the secret service. Sherwood did request that his wife be permitted to go to Bennington to visit her parents while he went to Gaspé. In the end, however, Sarah and the children accompanied Justus to Quebec.

On May 29 the Sherwoods departed from the capital on the brig St. Peter, and on June 7 they arrived at the home of Captain Hugh O'Hara of Gaspé. The latter, "a trustworthy sensible man," acted as their host for the duration of their visit, and personally guided Justus along the Gaspé coast.

Sherwood spent five weeks touring the coast from Gaspé, around the Baie des Chaleurs to the Miscou Islands and to the mouth of the Miramichi River. It was on this tour of inspection that his flair for evaluating land was put to the test. He noted such features as the quality of the soil, the nature of the vegetation, the climate, the natural harbours, and the value of the fisheries, both fresh and salt water. While he cited some negative points - the poor harbour at Port Daniel and the sandy soil at the mouth of the Miramichi - he was generally impressed by what he saw, and it was apparent that he felt that this area, with assistance from the government, would have real potential as a fishery. He estimated that the Gaspé and Baie des Chaleurs coasts could support seventeen hundred families, the majority involved in fishing while the rest would raise foodstuffs to be consumed locally. He did note significantly the presence of "a few designing traders,"
Channel Islanders who kept the fishermen of the Baie des Chaleurs in constant economic thralldom, and that if the region was to progress, these people would have to be eliminated. He was particularly impressed by Paspébiac on the north shore of the bay with its excellent harbour and good soil "for wheat or any kind of English grain." He subsequently mentioned this area to Edward Jessup who petitioned Haldimand the following spring for two hundred acres there for himself and for Sherwood.

This optimistic report moved Haldimand, who in any event favoured settling the Loyalists in the Maritime region, to encourage settlement on the Gaspé coast during the summer and fall of 1784. The result was disappointing as only four hundred and six people responded to the offer of land in that distant quarter. Relatively few Loyalists in Quebec would have been fishermen by training and many would have felt that the Gaspé region was too isolated. Those who did go for the most part became fishermen and farmers, with a small number in the crafts and trade. Not too surprisingly, the great majority settled at Paspébiac.

Sherwood ultimately arrived back in Quebec on August 12 and spent several days editing and organizing his journal of the Gaspé trip, which he submitted to General Haldimand with a covering letter on August 23. While he was in Quebec, he apparently received verbal
orders from Haldimand with regard to his next assign-
ment, which was to assist Deputy Surveyor-General John
Collins in exploring and surveying the land around
Fort Cataraqui at the eastern end of Lake Ontario for
Loyalist settlement. Sherwood was almost certainly told
as well that land would be distributed according to
military rank - 1,000 acres for a field officer ranging
down to 100 for a private\(^\text{19}\) - but that this land would
be drawn by lots, thus insuring absolute fairness as to
who got the best land.

Sherwood left Quebec a few days later, and arrived
in St. Johns on September 4, where he heard that the
Loyalist troops at Isle-aux-Noix and the Loyal Block
House were grumbling. He immediately visited these
posts, assembled the men "and informed them fully with
the preparations His Excellency is making to settle
them all comfortably at Catarockur (sic)." The men,
he reported, seemed satisfied by his explanation, and
were especially pleased with the idea of drawing their
own lots.\(^\text{20}\) Having thus acted in the capacity of a
public relations officer, Justus awaited orders to go
to Montreal to join Collins.

The Deputy Surveyor-General finally arrived in
Montreal on September 18 after conferring with Haldimand
in Quebec on how the survey was to be conducted. Sherwood
had awaited his arrival impatiently and was obviously
anxious to be off to Cataraqui. He had two officers
with him, Lieutenant Solomon Johns of the King's Rangers and Ensign Elijah Bottum, who had participated in the secret service. Perhaps because he had had nearly two weeks of idleness, a situation to which he was unaccustomed, Sherwood had developed some interesting ideas about the survey. He proposed to keep one of his young officers in the forest at all times, exploring tracts of country fifty miles deep and twenty miles wide. By this method, "I hope & believe Mr. Collins will be able when he returns to give His Excellency a more accurate account of that country in general than he has ever yet had."21 Collins was duly impressed, as he later reported to Haldimand that Sherwood and his officers had been "constantly employed" during the three weeks they had been at Cataraqui.22

The trip from Montreal to Cataraqui took almost two weeks, due, as Collins put it, to "excessive bad weather."23 Before leaving Montreal, Sherwood had spent more than £10 on provisions - cheese, butter, fresh beef and vegetables, and spirits - in order to make the voyage as pleasant as possible.24 He also kept a journal as was his custom on such occasions, and he noted the quality of the land, the type of vegetation, and potential mill sites as the party made its way toward Cataraqui.25 His experienced eye observed that the Thousand Islands, an outcropping of the vast
Laurentian Shield, were generally barren and rocky.26

By October 14 he felt that he had seen enough of this country to attempt to describe it to Mathews:

(I) can only inform you that we found a tract of the best land I ever saw lying at the west end of the Lake St. Francis and extending westerly by near 20 miles above Oswagacha (sic), then begins very broken land which continues to Catarocqui - one township extending six miles west from Catarocqui will be tolerable good land (vizt. 12 miles west of Catarocqui) which continues to the Bay of Quinty, a sufficient quantity of good land for six townships; this tract I have explored myself; and have this day sent it. Johns & Ens. Bottum to explore the country 30 miles back from the Lake from Catarocqui to the Bay Quinty. ... The climate here is very mild & good, and I think the Loyalists may be the happiest people in America by settling this country from Long Sou to Bay Quinty.27

Without detracting either from Sherwood's enthusiasm or the natural beauty of the Kingston region, it should perhaps be noted that Justus saw this country at a choice time of year when the mild autumnal weather and colourful turning leaves would present a most attractive picture. Nonetheless, this one-time farmer in Connecticut and Vermont with a keen appreciation of good land obviously very much enjoyed the three weeks which he spent on the upper St. Lawrence and Bay of Quinte. He and his men did little surveying - Collins discovered on their arrival at Cataracqui that the land which was to be surveyed into townships had not yet been purchased from the Mississauga Indians28 - so the
whole time was spent exploring with Justus himself frequently participating. His journal for October 15 states:

I went with two men in a bark canoe up Stoney Creek with an intention to find its source, this stream is very pure water, and so rapid that we were many times oblig'd to wade to our knees & draw the canoe for an hour at a time. We proceeded up in this manner a day and a half which brou't us about 6 miles north from the Lake; for one mile from the mouth of this creek the land is broken and stoney, but then begins delightful land, and as far up as we went equally in quality to the Long Sou.29

By November 23 Sherwood was back in Montreal after what must have been a leisurely return from Cataraqui. Two of his men had remained at the latter post by their own request.30 On the return trip, the Sherwood party stopped at Oswegatchie, the post on the south shore of the St. Lawrence at present-day Ogdensburg which the British retained until 1796, where they purchased a bushel of potatoes to augment their supplies.31 Justus had noted in his journal on the trip upriver that Lieutenant Johns had discovered a large creek at the head of the Long Sault Rapids, and that about two miles up this creek was "a very convenient place & falls for mills, surrounded by a fine grove of pine and white oak timber."32 This description sounds very similar to the one which Justus applied to the three lots of the second township for which he petitioned the following March. Some of the time on his return to
Montreal was probably spent exploring that site further.

After filing a brief report to Mathews in which he noted with pleasure that Johns and Bottum had "very much exerted themselves in exploring the country which lys above Catarocqui and north of Quinty Bay," Sherwood made his way to St. Johns to await further orders.\textsuperscript{33} During the next few days he worked on his account book from the Loyal Block House in attempt to clear up his accounts for the secret service.\textsuperscript{34} His work was brought to a halt, however, by a fever which greatly weakened him and prevented him from doing any sort of labour.\textsuperscript{35} His malady was diagnosed as small pox, and by December 9, Doctor Smyth was reporting that he was dangerously ill.\textsuperscript{36} Ten days later his fever had broken and Smyth could write: "Captain Sherwood continues still in the small pox, and thank God, is now out of danger."\textsuperscript{37}

The disease took its toll of the rest of the Sherwood family as well. Two of the children, Diana and one of the boys, were afflicted, as well as Sarah. By the end of February 1784 Justus reported that the children were recovering, but that his wife was still in such a critical condition that he did not dare to leave her side.\textsuperscript{38} Robert Mathews, who had recently been promoted to the rank of Major, was undoubtedly sympathetic, but with plans under way to settle and provision the Loyalists at Cataraqui, felt that family problems could not interfere with the pressing matters at hand. On March 4
he wrote to Sherwood that the latter was to attempt to buy wheat seed, corn, vegetables and milch cows in Vermont for the new settlements and that if his wife's illness prevented him from performing that chore, he should appoint a reliable substitute to undertake the business.39

The secret service continued to operate through these post-war months, though at a much more relaxed pace than it had previously. Haldimand was concerned about the Loyalists who were still in the American republic and wanted a steady supply of Albany newspapers throughout the winter of 1783-84.40 On December 20 Sherwood was sufficiently recovered from the small pox that he could organize, with George Smyth's assistance, a plan whereby Smyth's youngest son and Ensign Bottum could send intelligence to Canada through Vermont. Young Smyth was favourably regarded by Thomas Chittenden, the Allens, and the Fays and could thus safely live in Vermont. Bottum, under the pretense of visiting his parents at Shaftsbury, could contact him and carry back newspapers and other current news.41 Sherwood's correspondence during the winter periodically mentioned small items of information with regard to life in the new republic which were reported to him. In May 1784 Sherwood and Smyth drew £79 17s to pay off various outstanding debts from the service whose activities were at last drawing to a close.42
Sherwood's most immediate problem in the late winter and spring of 1784 involved a group of maverick Loyalists who, against Governor Haldimand's wishes, wanted to settle on Missisquoi Bay at the north end of Lake Champlain. Lord North had recommended that these lands and the whole area east of the Richelieu known as the Eastern Townships, be opened to Loyalist settlement, but Haldimand was firmly opposed to such a policy. He feared that the lack of a natural physical boundary line between this region and the American republic would encourage smuggling, and would also make for frequent quarrels between the Loyalists and their former neighbors. He also felt that the Eastern Townships should be preserved for the expanding French-Canadian population of the increasingly overcrowded seigneuries along the St. Lawrence. Prominent in this effort to undermine Haldimand's plans were several officers from the King's Rangers, Lieutenant John Ruiter and his brother Philip, Lieutenant Christian Wehr, and Ensign Conrad Best, as well as some names which would have been especially familiar to Sherwood: Colonel John Peters, Captain John W. Myers and Captain Azariah Pritchard.

By February 1784 Peters and Myers had both applied for grants of land on Missisquoi Bay and had been refused. Sherwood, concerned for his wife and still not very strong himself, was content to note on February 24 that most Loyalists were happy enough to settle on
the St. Lawrence, and that the majority of the Missisquoi group had given up their stated object. His optimism was short-lived, for a few days later he reported that a settlement had been established at Missisquoi by Myers, Pritchard, John Ruiter, Christian Wehr and Conrad Best, who declared that nothing but superior force would drive them out.

The motives of the Missisquoi settlers were questionable, and certainly Haldimand suspected that their choice was dictated by a desire for a good location for smuggling rather than any sentiments for good farming land. One method which the Missisquoi party used to raise support among the Loyalists was to suggest that Cataracquy was too remote, while Missisquoi was much closer to established markets. Sherwood circulated a public letter refuting this point at St. Johns, Dutchman's Point, Pointe-au-Fer, and at Missisquoi Bay itself. He also dispatched two men, Caleb Closson and Oliver Sweet of the Loyal Rangers, to report directly on the situation at Missisquoi. The two men discovered that eleven settlers were established on the east side of the Bay near Pike River; that they claimed they had purchased their land legally from an elderly gentleman in St. Johns, James Robertson; and that they had no intention of moving. As the unauthorized settlement was very close to the frontier, there was some question as to whether it was not actually located
on Vermont soil. Mathews declared that this would be determined, and if the settlement proved to be outside British jurisdiction, the settlers would be told they would receive no more government provisions; on the other hand, if they were on British soil, they would be asked to "immediately desist." 53

Lieutenant William Buckley of the 29th Regiment was ordered to Missisquoi Bay to investigate the situation. He found the Loyalist community to be on British soil and reported accordingly. The leaders of the community refused to move, and dug in their heels even more resolutely when Captain Pritchard, having sold off his share of the Robertson land, severed his connection with the squatters and subsequently denounced them. 54 Pritchard had probably decided that Haldimand was not going to surrender on the Missisquoi issue, and that he should bow out while he had the opportunity. The clever and controversial former soldier, spy, entrepreneur, and land speculator retired to the Baie des Chaleurs where, not surprisingly, he became a leading figure in the Loyalist community at Passébiac. 55

Justus Sherwood had initially opposed the Missisquoi group out of loyalty to Haldimand, but by the end of April he had another reason: their propaganda was having an effect on the Loyalists whom he was attempting to organize and provision at St. Johns for the trip westward to the new townships along the Saint Lawrence.
His health was still poor, and he was working hard in an effort to get seed and other supplies for the settlers. On April 22 he commented on Christian Wehr's further petition to Haldimand for land on Missisquoi and mentioned as well the efforts of two men, Doctor Isaac Moseley and Captain Ross, to persuade Loyalists to settle on a seigneury which they had acquired at Yamaska on the north shore of the St. Lawrence. With some exasperation, Sherwood declared: "In short if we are not soon removed from this cursed place (St. Johns), every intention for the good and union of the Loyalists will be counteracted by underhand(ed) designing fellows." 56

A few days later, Sherwood wrote again, declaring that: "I am exceedingly unhealthy at present which I believe is not a little owing to the perplexity of mind." In the main body of his letter, he unburdened himself as he had so often done to Robert Mathews, and his frustration clearly showed:

It is not in my power to describe to you the many artful measures taken to dissuade the people from settling at Cataracqui. It is industriously reported that the Indians have protested against that settlement and have already kill'd & sculp'd (sic) several Loyalists - that the Mohawks are to have all the land worth settling in that country, that the people will have no security for their lands, or provisions, but will be liable to be deprived of both at any time. 57

That all the charges mentioned in this brief description of the new townships in the west were blatant
lies was of no solace to Sherwood, that sensitive, artless man whom Ira Allen had so skillfully toyed with at Isle-aux-Noix three years earlier. Sherwood's deep and sincere feeling of frustration on that occasion, both in the manner in which he had had to conduct the negotiations and the infuriating way that Allen had behaved, was paralleled again in this situation. In 1781 Justus Sherwood had fervently believed that Vermont's only true path could be the one which led it back to the British fold; undoubtedly Germain, Clinton, and perhaps even Haldimand would have been amused by his tremendous enthusiasm and sincere partisan zeal. Now in 1784 Sherwood faced a similar situation; obviously the right and proper path was to settle the Loyalist refugees on the untouched land to the west of the last seigneur in Quebec. To oppose such a policy was to do the devil's work, and the very thought upset Sherwood whose health admittedly was still fragile. It was an outstanding characteristic of Sherwood that when he was convinced of the correctness of a policy, he followed it with dogged determination and devotion. He was an excellent follower, but as a leader he was hampered by his inability to compromise.

Sherwood's temper was further taxed by a petition which was drawn up in Quebec on April 24 and circulated among the Loyalists at Machiche, Sorel, St. Johns, and Missisquoi Bay. The petition denounced Haldimand's efforts to settle the Cataraqui and Chaleur Bay regions;
declared that the displaced friends of Government had the right to establish themselves where they wished and still receive provisions; and suggested that the proper step for the Loyalists was to settle on the seigneuries of Quebec where land, tools, and markets were readily available. Azariah Pritchard, still known as something of a rebel, had been approached by Captain Ross of Yamaska, and asked to take a copy of the petition to St. Johns. Pritchard had refused, but had obtained a copy of the document and had subsequently given it to Sherwood, thus perhaps hoping to be forgiven for some of his previous actions. Sherwood was convinced that the handwriting and spelling of the petition were those of his former commander, John Peters. The diction, he declared, was partly the work of Peters and partly someone else. The other party was probably Doctor Isaac Moseley, formerly of New York, who had recently arrived in the province and had acquired part ownership in the seigneury at Yamaska. On May 12 Sherwood and Smyth spoke to Moseley and were convinced that he and Peters were "very busily employed in poisoning the minds of the Loyalists and using every means to draw off their attention from the Crown Lands."

The role of John Peters in this affair merits some attention. Peters had had a serious disagreement with Haldimand over a matter of back pay, and had been very unhappy when he had been reduced in rank from a lieutenant
colonel to a captain in Edward Jessup's Corps in November 1781. Sherwood's loyalty to Haldimand would not have endeared him to Peters, and probably added to the latter's feeling that the world was passing him by. Peters had written to Sherwood's former friend and associate in Vermont, Major Timothy Brownson, in which he spoke sneeringly of Sherwood and his apparent good fortune in the British service, while he complained of his own ill luck. The letter was a strange one, marked by a whining tone and filled with self-pity. Peters was a sick, dispirited, broken man. His part in upsetting Haldimand's plans was probably motivated by spite and hope of personal gain, but as early as April Edward Jessup was warning Mathews of his activities. A number of prominent seigneurs were promoting the unrest among the Loyalists in the hope that they would choose to settle on the seigneuries rather than go to Cataraqui. The weak and impecunious Peters, himself a noted Loyalist, thus provided the plotters with a respectable front for their operation.

The seigneurs involved in this plot were mostly of British stock and included such names as Cochrane, Bliss, and Campbell, as well as the two gentlemen of Yamaska, Ross and Moseley. Their motives for settling the Loyalists on the seigneuries of the St. Lawrence were essentially selfish, as they wished to increase the British population of the province and reverse what were to them the more odious aspects of the Quebec Act:
"it was for their interest to settle their own lands with the Loyalists, that the lands and terms offered by Government pointed out nothing but chains of slavery, that there was nothing but oppression in this Province, that the liberty of the press is taken from us and we need never expect to enjoy in this province the usual privileges of British subjects." 66 Sherwood noted with disgust that Isaac Moseley was a major leader in this scheme, but that there were people all over the province who were attempting to undermine Haldimand's work. Justus felt that the best move would be to order the Loyalists to their destination immediately, before the seeds of discontent had time to spread further. 67

Haldimand's difficulties with the Loyalists should have provided a warning of future troubles, for it was apparent that at least some of these refugees of the American Revolution were not about to acquiesce silently to the wishes of their governor. By May 1784 an alliance had developed between the embattled Loyalists of Missisquoi and some of the seigneurs which could have provided serious problems for Sherwood, Jessup, Sir John Johnson and others who were involved with the settlements in the Cataracaqui region. On May 24, however, the majority of the Loyalists were gathered at Sorel for their journey to the west, and they subsequently embarked quietly and without disturbance. 68 For Sherwood, the coming of embarkation day must have been a relief, for once the Loyalists arrived at the site of
their future homes on the upper St. Lawrence, they would be far too busy to have any time to scheme and they would be well removed from the pernicious influence of the seigneurs.

The land to which the Loyalists travelled in May 1784 had been surveyed into nine townships running west along the St. Lawrence from Point-au-Baudet, the western boundary of the last seigneury. Five additional townships had been established west of Cataraqui on the Bay of Quinte, in the area which Sherwood had explored the previous autumn. The first township was called Lake Township and became the nucleus for a Scottish Catholic community. The next five townships, originally numbered one to five, were to be settled by the first battalion of Sir John Johnson's Royal Regiment of New York, while Edward Jessup's Corps would be given the sixth, seventh, and eighth townships. Land would be technically granted to settlers under seigneurial tenure, as the area in question was still under the jurisdiction of the province of Quebec, but the quit rents, so obnoxious to many people of American background, would be remitted for a period of ten years. The townships were not laid out like the river-front seigneuries of Quebec, but rather were surveyed into rectangles of nine miles by twelve miles, and subsequently subdivided into lots of equal size divided at regular intervals between parallel concession roads.
The land was to be apportioned according to military rank, with field officers receiving 1,000 acres, captains 700 acres, staff officers, subalterns, and warrant officers 500 acres, non-commissioned officers 200 acres, and privates 100 acres. As well, every non-combatant family head would receive 100 acres, while all family members of both military and non-military connection would receive 50 acres. Since the best land fronted on the river, lots would be chosen by each applicant drawing a lot out of a hat. This democratic procedure appealed to many Loyalists, but was regarded with disfavour by Sir John Johnson and other officers. It was to be a source of difficulty for some time to come.

During the months which preceded the movement of the Loyalists to the west, Sherwood had been involved with the problem of acquiring supplies of food and seed for the prospective settlers. It was certainly a point in General Haldimand's favour that he was anxious to do all that he could for the Loyalist refugees, despite the difficulties which a minority of them created for him. At the same time, the propaganda against western settlement had to be stifled, and this could best be done through a liberal policy to the Loyalists. Early in March 1784 Mathews wrote to Sherwood urging the need for 1,000 bushels of seed wheat, 100 to 150 bushels of Indian corn, as well as smaller quantities of turnip, cabbage, carrot, and onion seed, and milch cows, and
suggested that all these might be obtained in Vermont. Such a purchase, of course, was not to suggest that regular trade was to be established with the still-independent republic. Sherwood replied that the Mohawk Valley, so recently scourged by the men of Butler's and Johnson's Corps, would be a better place to obtain wheat seed. Once the Mohawk wheat crop had been harvested, seed could be sent to the Loyalist settlements via Oswego, another of the posts inside American territory which the British retained until 1796. Apart from the advantage of proximity which the Mohawk region held over Vermont, the grain of the former area would be cleaner and better for planting. Haldimand, after further consultation, agreed with Justus, and decided to obtain the Loyalists' wheat seed supply through Oswego. Thus ironically the Mohawk Valley became the granary of its former persecutors.

Vermont was not, however, to be ignored as a source of supplies, possibly because the Richelieu-Champlain route offered a natural highway for trade between the Green Mountains and Canada. The Vermonters were also anxious for trade on a regularly established basis, and a few purchases from them would encourage their interest and perhaps yet persuade them to abandon their independence and seek British protection. Ensign Botum was duly sent to Vermont to purchase 150 bushels of Indian corn which he would receive at Chimney Point
on Lake Champlain as soon as the ice would permit. Sherwood had also been approached by two Yankee drovers who offered to deliver a herd of 300 cattle to Oswego for twenty dollars a head. Haldimand approved of this scheme, but, because of a shortage of cash on hand which precluded the granting of any advance, he instructed Sherwood to have the men drive the cattle to Oswego where they would be paid in full.

Lack of ready cash and the rising price of all types of seed were problems which compounded Sherwood's difficulties in the month before the removal to the new townships. On April 22 Ensign Thomas Sherwood was dispatched to Arlington to purchase seed corn. Justus authorized his cousin to pay as much as four shillings a bushel, a price which he realized was very high, but was necessitated by the scarcity of bread. Ensign Sherwood's mission was reasonably successful, and by May 26 he was in Montreal with a small supply of corn seed, as well as seeds of turnip, red and white clover, and foxtail. He had only been able to purchase modest quantities of these seeds, and had been compelled to pay a high price for them.

In order to provide funds for the purchase of supplies, to pay off outstanding debts from the secret service, and furnish relief for needy Loyalists, Justus was dipping heavily into his cash reserves. By the time he was preparing to leave Montreal for the new
townships, he reported to Mathews that he had spent $9 of his own money on the needs of poor families who were accompanying him, and he hoped that he would be reimbursed. He also expressed the wish that he might receive his back pay.\textsuperscript{85} The latter was half the pay which he had formerly received as a provincial captain during the war years, and would have amounted to 9 shillings per day.\textsuperscript{86} Mathews replied with a draft for the expenses which he had incurred, and instructed him to send all further charges to Stephen De Lancey, the Inspector of Loyalists.\textsuperscript{87} No reference was made to the question of back pay, and Sherwood was to suffer from a severe lack of funds during the months which followed. On July 2 he wrote plaintively that: "no man can need money more than I do at present...."\textsuperscript{88} It was a common plight, as General Haldimand stretched public funds and resources to their limits in an effort to help as many people as possible.

During his brief stay at Montreal at the end of May, Sherwood made a request which was indicative of British thinking at that time on the state of affairs in the American republic. A number of Loyalists were reported to have gathered at Saratoga with their cattle, and they wanted permission for two engineers to build a road from Fort George to Oswegatchie to permit them to drive their herd to the British lines.\textsuperscript{89} Such a road, which admittedly would have been more like a trail, would have skirted the Adirondacks and would have been located
entirely within American territory. As Sir John Johnson had been placed in charge of the new settlements, Mathews suggested that Sherwood ask him for permission for the two engineers to mark the road. If, however, Sir John was not present, "you may yourself send them, but with very particular instructions not to say, or do, any thing that can give cause for offence." Apparently, neither Sherwood nor Mathews considered the marking of the road itself as a possible insult to the newly born nation to the south.

During the month of June Sherwood was involved in the laying out of a town plot in the seventh township of the north bank of the St. Lawrence across from Oswegatchie, an undertaking for which he had been commissioned a deputy surveyor under Major Samuel Holland. He had also been invested with the right to administer oaths of loyalty, and could thus prepare the way for settlers to take their land. Sherwood had previously entertained thoughts of settling on the Bay of Quinté, but now decided to establish his homestead in this settlement which he was so instrumental in starting:

"I have taken my farm at this place nearly opposite Oswagocha (sic); and three of the small town lots - any farm is tolerable good, and I don't know but I am as well sattisfy'd as I could have been in any place except (township) no. 2 at the mouth of Quinty Bay." The settlement was originally called Newtown, perhaps an
echo of his birthplace, although by September it was
being called New Oswegatchie.

The problems which Sherwood encountered in the
establishment of New Oswegatchie revolved around shortages
of seeds and tools as well as cutbacks in the government
ration of vital foodstuffs. Wheat seed was in short
supply, so Justus arranged to purchase 300 bushels of
good wheat at five shillings a bushel from the Lake
Champlain area. If this grain could not be purchased
with public money, he proposed to buy 100 bushels on his
own credit and distribute it to needy families in the
community. By the end of July, tools for gardening
and construction were urgently needed – 340 hoes, 400
bush hooks, 12 grindstones, 71 knives, 6 whip saws, 6
crosscut saws, and all the nails and glass which could
be spared. By mid-September Sherwood was still com-
plaining about the lack of tools for his people; they
had no blacksmith or carpenter tools, no whip saws,
and the axes with which they had originally been equipped
were now beginning to fail.

The question of inadequate rations was another
aspect of life in New Oswegatchie during the summer of
1784. The original schedule of rations had been not
ungenerous – one pound of flour and one pound of beef
or twelve ounces of pork per adult per day with children
under the age of ten on half rations. The enormous
demands placed upon this schedule forced a reduction
in July which Sherwood felt would have a dispiriting effect on the community. He reported that the settlers found it impossible to work as hard as they were compelled to do on so little food, and that they had no milk, butter, or vegetables, nor fresh meat or fish except that which they could procure from the forest or the river. General Haldimand, always anxious to please the Loyalists, increased the rations of peas, flour, and pork early in August. News of this happy development arrived at New Oswegatchie on September 17 and Sherwood wasted no time in announcing the result of Haldimand's beneficence to the grateful settlers.

During the course of the Revolutionary War, Loyalist officers had competed with one another for manpower. Now they competed for the precious tools and supplies for their fledgling communities. Early in July Major John Ross, the commandant at Cataracaqui, complained that the Loyalists in his region were short of everything, and hinted that the settlers down river had purloined supplies destined for the Quinté area. He particularly named Sherwood as being rumoured to have taken off more than his share of axes and hoes when a shipment of supplies had stopped at Oswegatchie. It is a measure of the esteem in which General Haldimand held Sherwood that Major Mathews never wrote to Justus to ask him to explain the situation. In a letter to Sir John Johnson, Mathews did mention Ross's accusation and
concluded: "His Excellency (is) unwilling to think that Captain Sherwood has the inclination or would presume to do anything so hurtful to the settlements in general...."103 The matter rested there, and no further rumours circulated which touched Justus personally.

As he had done so often before, Justus Sherwood committed himself to the project at hand with all the resources he could muster. In mid-July he reported that he had been at work every day on the townsite since his arrival there on June 5, and he had not yet spent a single day on his own affairs. His health was still a hindrance to him and added to the fatigue which piled upon him as a result of his onerous responsibilities and duties.104 These were increased when Edward Jessup became ill and the responsibility of reporting on the progress of the community fell entirely on Sherwood.105 By mid-October Justus had been able to do nothing about improving his own land and was thus compelled to wait until the following year to bring his family up the river to their new home. The settlement itself had made some progress, but had, in the last analysis, been unable to obtain the vital wheat seed to plant in the rough fields from which the forest had been so painstakingly cleared. Thus, for the winter of 1784-85, New Oswegatchie would be extremely dependent on government rations.106
Sherwood spent that winter in St. Johns, although he was anxious to move his family either to Lachine or Coteau-du-Lac in preparation for the move to New Oswegatchie in the spring. The long-awaited move to the first permanent home the Sherwoods had known since August 1776 finally took place, and Sarah and the children were settled on lot number nine, about two miles upriver from the present site of Prescott, Ontario. Accompanying the family was a Negro slave, Caesar Congo, who carried young Livius Peters Sherwood and his cousin, Adiel Sherwood, Thomas Sherwood's son, up the Long Sault Rapids on his strong back. Caesar, who according to Adiel Sherwood, was "a stout young man" was subsequently sold by Justus to Ensign Elijah Bottem, who kept him for twenty years, and then gave him his freedom. Caesar then married a free black woman and lived in Brockville until his death many years later.

The presence of Caesar Congo with the Sherwood family underscores the fact that a number of Loyalists brought their slaves with them to their new homes on the St. Lawrence. No evidence exists to explain how the Sherwoods acquired Caesar, and it may have been that he was primarily a house slave for Sarah's convenience. However, during his continued surveying activities in the back concessions during the summer and autumn of 1785, Justus did use two Negro slaves whom he owned and for whose use he charged the government one shilling and
sixpence per day. 112

Apart from building his own cabin and working on his farm, Sherwood's main activities during most of 1785 were continued surveying and granting of land to those who were prepared to take an oath of loyalty. Between June 1 and September 30 he spent nine days employed as a deputy surveyor in the sixth, seventh, and eighth townships, for which work he received 43, 7s 6d. 113 He saw to it that his men were well-equipped to cope with the rugged life of the back concessions, as his expense account included three axes, a grindstone, and twenty-one gallons of rum. 114

By the fall of 1785 Justus Sherwood was at last established with his family in the settlement in which he remained until his death in 1798. His major services to the Crown were now behind him, and he could spend the next few years devoting himself both to his family and his community. He could also see to it that the Crown, to which he had given so much during and immediately after the Revolutionary War, would in return give him all that was his due. This latter quest and his continued sense of public duty at the local level which had first manifested itself more than ten years earlier in Vermont were major concerns for his final years.
FOOTNOTES

1. PAC: Bl78, 177, Sherwood to Mathews, April 19, 1783.

2. Ibid., Bl78, 199-200, Smyth to Mathews, May 7, 1783.

3. Ibid., Bl79-2, 267-69, Mathews to Smyth, May 12, 1783.

4. Ibid., Bl78, 201-2, Smyth to Mathews, May 20, 1783.

5. Ibid., Bl78, 317-18, Smyth to Mathews, November 25, 1783. The "Definitive Treaty" refers to the Treaty of Paris which had been signed on September 3, 1783, officially terminating the Revolutionary War.

6. Ibid., B162, 205, Sherwood to Mathews, March 13, 1784.


10. Ibid., Bl78, 194-96, Mathews to Sherwood, May 5, 1783.


12. PAC: Bl78, 197, Sherwood to Mathews, May 6, 1783.


14. Ibid., B169, 6, "Extracts from my Journal of my trip from Quebec to Gaspy Bay, Chaleurs, Merimichi."

15. Ibid., 6-14.
16 PAC: B162, 246, Edward Jessup to Mathews, April 15, 1784.


18 PAC: B169, 5, Sherwood to Haldimand, August 23, 1783.


20 PAC: B127, 331-32, Sherwood to Mathews, September 6, 1783.

21 Ibid., B178, 260, Sherwood to Mathews, September 18, 1783.

22 Ibid., B124, 46, Collins to Haldimand, November 3, 1783.

23 Ibid., B124, 45, Collins to Haldimand, October 2, 1783.

24 PAC: Public Accounts, RGI, EI5A, XXVII, "Sherwood's account for party of 2 officers, 9 men and himself to explore & help survey the lands for settling the Loyalists."


26 Ibid., 26.

27 PAC: B178, 311-12, Sherwood to Mathews, October 14, 1783.

28 Ibid., B124, 45, Collins to Haldimand, October 2, 1783.

29 Cruikshank, Settlement of the United Empire Loyalists, Sherwood's Journal, 27.

30 PAC: B178, 316, Sherwood to Mathews, November 23, 1783.
31 PAC: RGI, E15A, XXVII, "Sherwood's Account."


33 PAC: B178, 316, Sherwood to Mathews, November 23, 1783.

34 VHS: Film 37, "Justus Sherwood's Account Book at Loyal Block House, 1783-84, compiled by Sherwood in December 1783."

35 PAC: B178, 320, Sherwood to Mathews, December 6, 1783.

36 Ibid., B178, 321-22, Smyth to Mathews, December 9, 1783.

37 Ibid., B178, 323, Smyth to Mathews, December 9, 1783.

38 Ibid., B178, 274, Sherwood to Mathews, February 24, 1784.

39 Ibid., B65, 2-6, Mathews to Sherwood, March 4, 1784.

40 Ibid., B179-2, 301-2, Mathews to Sherwood, December 15, 1783.

41 Ibid., B178, 324-25, Smyth to Mathews, December 20, 1783.

42 Ibid., B178, 309, Sherwood to Mathews, May 20, 1784.


47 PAC: B178, 274-75, Sherwood to Mathews, February 24, 1784.
48 Ibid., B162, 190, Sherwood to Mathews, March 1, 1784.

49 Ibid., B63, 91, Mathews to Myers, February 16, 1784.

50 Ibid., B63, 119-22, Mathews to Sherwood, March 8, 1784.

51 Ibid., B162, 200-4, Sherwood to Mathews, March 12, 1784.

52 Ibid., B162, 210, Report of Caleb Clossen and Oliver Sweet, March 18, 1784.

53 Ibid., B63, 137-38, Mathews to Sherwood, March 22, 1784.


55 Siebert, "Gaspé Peninsula," 405-6.

56 PAC: B178, 285, Sherwood to Mathews, April 22, 1784.

57 Ibid., B162, 271-72, Sherwood to Mathews, May 1, 1784.

58 Ibid., B178, 189-291, A Petition to the Loyalists, April 24, 1784.


60 Ibid., B178, 293, Sherwood to Mathews, May 13, 1784.

61 Ibid., B178, 292, Sherwood and Smyth to Mathews, May 13, 1784.


63 PAC: B178, 276-78, Peters to Brownson, February 24, 1784.

64 Ibid., B162, 235-36, Jessup to Mathews, April 5, 1784.

66. Ibid., B178, 293, Sherwood to Mathews, May 13, 1784.

67. Ibid., B178, 294, Sherwood to Mathews, May 13, 1784.

68. Lampee, "Missisquoi Loyalists," 130.


72. Burt, The Old Province of Quebec, II, 92.


76. PAC: B65, 2-6, Mathews to Sherwood, March 4, 1784.

77. Ibid., B162, 200-4, Sherwood to Mathews, March 12, 1784.

78. Ibid., B63, 137-39, Mathews to Sherwood, March 22, 1784.

79. Ibid., B162, 220, Sherwood to Mathews, March 26, 1784.

80. Ibid., B162, 200-4, Sherwood to Mathews, March 12, 1784.

81. Ibid., B63, 181-83, Mathews to Sherwood, April 5, 1784.
82 Ibid., B178, 284, Sherwood to Mathews, April 22, 1784.

83 Ibid., B162, 299-300, Sherwood to Mathews, May 26, 1784.

84 Ibid., B178, 284, Sherwood to Mathews, April 22, 1784.

85 Ibid., B162, 299-300, Sherwood to Mathews, May 26, 1784.


88 Ibid., B162, 330, Sherwood to Mathews, July 2, 1784.

89 Ibid., B162, 299-300, Sherwood to Mathews, May 26, 1784.


91 PAO: Justus Sherwood's original notebook no. 375, transcribed by R. M. Lewis from Survey Record, Department of Lands & Forests.

92 PAC: Public Accounts, RG4, AI, XXVII, 8716. The date of his commission was May 18, 1784.

93 PAC: B162, 330, Sherwood to Mathews, July 2, 1784.

94 Ibid., B162, 329-30, Sherwood to Mathews, July 2, 1784.

95 Ibid., B162, 339-41, Sherwood to Mathews, July 23, 1784.


97 Ibid., B162, 367-68, Sherwood to Mathews, September 18, 1784.


100 Ibid., B64, 122-23, Mathews to Sherwood, August 5, 1784.

101 Ibid., B162, 367, Sherwood to Mathews, September 19, 1784.


103 Ibid., B64, 66, Mathews to Sir John Johnson, July 19, 1784.

104 Ibid., B162, 336, Sherwood to Mathews, July 15, 1784.

105 Ibid., B162, 339, Sherwood to Mathews, July 23, 1784.

106 Ibid., B162, 381, Sherwood to Holland, October 17, 1784.


108 Jackson, *Sherwood*, 57; also, PAO: Sherwood's original notebook no. 375 lists the numbers of his plots of land.


112 PAC: Public Accounts, RGI, EI5A, XXVIII, Cataracaui, October 24, 1785, Wages for assisting surveying party.
113 *Ibid.*, Oswegatchie, November 12, 1785, account for work done as Deputy Surveyor.

CHAPTER IX

THE FINAL YEARS

The British government compensated those Americans who had supported it during the Revolutionary War in three ways: grants of land; issues of food, seed, and tools; and direct compensation for property losses suffered in the rebelling colonies. The commissioners appointed to hear the Loyalist claims were to sit in Halifax, but a protest was subsequently made that many of the western Quebec Loyalists who were not men of substance would thus be unable to put forward their cases.¹ As a result, the commissioners, Thomas Dundas and Jeremiah Pemberton, came to Montreal after their Halifax and Saint John hearings to judge the claims of the settlers of the new western settlements.

Justus Sherwood appeared before Commissioner Pemberton on August 13, 1787, bearing a letter from General Haldimand which testified to his having been "confidentially employed in secret service of importance," as well as a parcel of damaged and faded deeds to land which he had acquired in Vermont. Pemberton noted that the deeds appeared "to correspond with the acct. given by claimt. on his first examination," a reference to a petition which Justus had submitted earlier.² That particular memorial had listed Justus's losses at
£1,209 18s 6d.³ Apparently, the commissioners were not prepared to accept so large a claim, and Sherwood ultimately submitted a more modest one. On November 20 he claimed a loss, including both land and personal property, of £229, which was accepted. His claim for compensation for the loss of 1,000 acres of wild land on the Susquehanna was disallowed for want of cultivation and because his title to it was not clear.⁴

Despite his impressive lists of confiscated holdings in Vermont, Sherwood did continue to own land in that state after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. A modern scholar, Wallace Brown, has observed that many states were remarkably quick in adopting a lenient policy to the Loyalists, and Sherwood's case to some degree would support his thesis.⁵ On November 8, 1786, Justus sold 200 acres of land on Otter Creek in New Haven Township to his brother-in-law Simon Bottum for $200.⁶ Nor did this sale completely liquidate his Vermont property, for on February 10, 1801, three years after his death, his son, Livius Peters, sold Simon Bottum 150 acres in New Haven Township for $150.⁷ This latter land was known as "adventurer's lot Number 23," and doubtless was acquired by Justus during his days as a Green Mountain Boy. In his claims to the commissioners, he mentioned having owned only 50 acres in New Haven which he described as "a good river lot."⁸ In reality, he owned 400 acres, 150 of which he quietly
retained until his death, perhaps in the vain hope that Vermont might yet be drawn back into the Empire.

While the commissioners were hearing claims at Montreal during 1787 and 1788, Sherwood frequently appeared before them as a witness to the credibility of other Loyalists. Between July 3 and July 6, 1787, he spoke on behalf of Roger Stevens, Jeremiah French, and Samuel Rose, all of whom had served the British cause in one way or another, as well as a former neighbour from New Haven, Abner Woolcott, whom he described as an "industrious man" who had entered the King's service in 1777. Early in 1788 he supported two more claimants, Asa Landon and William Leahy Jr., both of whom had seen military service. On March 3 he was in Montreal once again to testify for Moses Hurlburt, the former sergeant, whose wife was dying at Oswegatchie and could not be left. He also supported the claim of Enoch Mallory who had served under him, and whom he described as "always a good soldier & a good man."

Justus Sherwood had played a prominent role in the establishment of the seventh township along the upper St. Lawrence, now called Augusta Township, and he continued to be prominent in its affairs after 1784. In the spring of 1785 Justus was named to the Legislative Council of Quebec for the Montreal district. One year later, on May 4, 1786, he headed a road committee whose duty it was to report on the condition of roads in the
township. In December of that same year, he was signatory to a petition requesting that the settlers be able to hold their land under the familiar English freehold system rather than under the unpopular seigneurial system. His name appeared again in November 1787 attached to a public letter to Deputy-Surveyor John Collins, requesting the latter to represent to Lord Dorchester, the new governor in Quebec, "the necessity of a civil Establishment under the English Constitution in these new settlements." The Loyalists were not especially happy with the conditions which the Quebec Act imposed on them, especially the system of feudal tenure, and Sherwood was thus instrumental in expressing their discontent.

Lord Dorchester visited the western settlements in the early fall of 1788, and was convinced that he needed to establish a local authority to oversee the granting of land to new arrivals in the province. He then divided the western part of the province into four districts - Luneburg, Mecklenburg, Nassau, and Hesse - and appointed leading citizens from each district to form a land board. The board's duties were to assign 200 acres of land to applicants who had taken the oath of allegiance, and to recommend whatever further land they felt an applicant should receive. On September 11, 1788, John Collins wrote to Deputy-Surveyor Patrick McNiff stating that six men had been named to the Luneburg
land board. Justus Sherwood was among this trusted group. Sherwood served on the land board for the rest of the period that the western districts remained under the direct jurisdiction of the old province of Quebec. After the division of the province following the passage of the Canada Constitution Act of 1791, he was appointed to the new equivalent body in Upper Canada, the land board for the counties of Grenville and Leeds.

During the 1790s Justus continued his prominent role in local affairs. In 1790 he was appointed as a trustee to oversee construction of a church which was to be completed by January 1791. Trustees were to "employ workmen and carry on the work in the most advantageous and expeditious manner after the best of their judgment." The result was the Blue Church, a small Anglican Church located on the riverfront just west of Prescott. The location was not to everyone's satisfaction, as an irate letter from a settler in New Johnstown, several miles east of Prescott, attests. The unhappy worshipper, Rosseter Boyle, declared in February 1795 that Sherwood and other trustees had collected money for a church, but that he had heard nothing further of the matter. Boyle felt that the church should have been built within sight of his own house, and he pompously requested that Lieutenant-Governor John Simcoe's secretary, Major E. B. Littlehales, look into the question.
The settlers of Augusta Township were predominantly Anglican, so there was little evidence of religious friction in the early years of the community. The lack of Church of England clergy did, however, create a problem. In the fall of 1785 forty-four family heads held a town meeting at Oswegatchie to discuss the matter. The crux of the problem was that the man who had been serving the spiritual needs of the community, the Rev. John Bryan, was not properly ordained, a discovery which Edward Jessup announced to the meeting. Bryan was replaced briefly by the Rev. J. C. Ogden, but as he had been ordained in the Protestant Episcopal Church in the American republic he was not considered an appropriate shepherd for this Loyalist flock. The problem was temporarily solved when the Rev. John Stuart of Kingston, one of only two ordained Anglican churchmen in the province, occasionally came to New Oswegatchie for services.

The Loyalists reflected their American background in their concern for education, and Justus Sherwood was in the forefront of this movement. In 1787 Sherwood signed a petition asking for government assistance in establishing a school in each district - New Johnstown in the old sixth concession, New Oswegatchie, Cataracqui, and Niagara - "for the purpose of teaching English, Latin, Arithmetic and Mathematics." Shortly thereafter, a private school was established at Maitland.
grammar schools did not come into existence until after the Acts of 1807 and 1816 which established eight district schools and provided for their support through public funds.26

Sherwood's public service also included the office of justice of the peace to which he had been appointed in 1784.27 Following the establishment of Upper Canada with English common law, the local justices were put in a position of considerable importance. Local government was carried on by these magistrates meeting in the Court of Quarter Sessions. Town meetings similar to the one held at Oswegatchie were permitted in order to satisfy democratic tendencies among the people, but virtually all power remained with the Court of Quarter Sessions.28 An example may be seen from a session which was held at New Johnstown on April 13, 1796 before Justus Sherwood and fellow justices William Fraser, William Buell, Samuel Wright, and Samuel Anderson. The case in question involved the accepting of Alexander Campbell as Registrar for the counties of Dundas, Grenville, and Leeds. Campbell brought with him four citizens to attest to his worth; these latter were accepted by the Court and were jointly and severally bound in the sum of £1000 Quebec currency.29

The wheels of local government did not always run smoothly, as Sherwood discovered in the spring of 1795. On May 2 Sherwood and nine other magistrates addressed
a letter to William Chewett, the senior surveyor of the eastern district of Upper Canada. The problem revolved around the fact that the magistrates had chosen a site in New Johnstown for a jail and court house, had subsequently invested £200 of public money in the project, and had even laid a foundation for the building. All of this work had been done supposedly with the approval of Lieutenant-Governor John Simcoe, but now the latter rejected the site, claiming the land was needed for other purposes. The magistrates tried diplomatically to extricate themselves from the situation: "If...the ground on which the Gaol is now placed should be found necessary for Government's use, another of the same dimensions and value on any convenient site in the Town will satisfy the District in exchange for the one now building."30

Sherwood's actions as a justice of the peace did not always meet with universal approval. In January 1792 two men were arrested in Augusta Township on the charge of having attempted to burn the fort at Oswegatchie. Sherwood had issued the warrant for their arrest, but he subsequently released them on bail. The hardheaded John Munro, formerly of Shaftsbury but now a resident of Upper Canada and, like Sherwood, a land board member, bitterly complained to Legislative Councillor Hugh Finlay in Quebec:
I have the pleasure to inform you that the prisoners are not of the Corps of Loyalists. The one has been a Continental Soldier, who came into this province while Justice Sherwood was authorized to grant lands under instructions from General Haldimand, and that notwithstanding the inhabitants making objections to his being admitted as a settler, Mr. Sherwood admitted him, and gave him 100 acres of land. Am further informed that he has admitted several suspicious characters, who have not been qualified, in his neighbourhood.³¹

Munro's action may have been the genuine anger of the Loyalist at the apparent gentle treatment which former foes of dubious character were receiving, or it may perhaps have been sparked by the memory of twenty years earlier when Sherwood had been one of Remember Baker's rescuers at Arlington. In any event, the incident does indicate a sense of fair play in Justus Sherwood and a willingness to forget the bitterness of the past war.

The position of trust which Justus Sherwood had earned in his community may be seen from an incident which occurred early in 1796. On this occasion Sherwood and Thomas Fraser, William Fraser's brother, were deputized to go to Kingston with the temporary land certificates which had been granted to settlers when they first took their land, and to exchange them for permanent deeds. Thomas Fraser noted that they had been appointed and authorized "by a great number of the inhabitants of the Countys of Dundas and Grenville and Leeds to carry their certificates and get their deeds."
Their mission was premature, however, as the deeds were not yet ready for presentation, and the two emissaries decided to put off any further trips to Kingston until the opening of navigation.\textsuperscript{32}

Justus Sherwood's contributions to his community were, on the whole, on the local level. Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Jackson has stated that Sherwood was "one of the early members of the Assembly of Upper Canada, which then met at Newark, now Niagara-on-the-Lake."\textsuperscript{33} It would be satisfying to be able to round out an account of his distinguished career by including this information, but unfortunately, it is not true. Sherwood was never a member of either the first or second assemblies of Upper Canada, the only ones which sat before his death. His home riding, Grenville County, was represented by Ephraim Jones, a member of a highly respected Loyalist family, in the first assembly which sat from 1792 to 1796. Edward Jessup represented Grenville in the second assembly.\textsuperscript{34}

The fact that Justus Sherwood continued to hold land in Vermont after 1783 has already been noted. Sherwood's connections with Vermont and her leading men were maintained in other instances as well. In the late 1780's Justus wrote to Levi Allen, the younger brother of Ethan and Ira who had settled at St. Johns as a Loyalist, warning him to make sure that his business with Vermont was always conducted legitimately. "I
believe," Sherwood noted, "you may soon accumulate a competent fortune in trade at St. Johns, but I caution you as a friend to observe strictly the Regulations and Rules of this province respecting trade...."35 Early in 1794, when an Anglo-American war threatened to erupt over the issues of the continued British occupation of the western posts and British maritime spoilations against American commerce, Ira Allen used his old association with Justus to effect a truce along the Vermont-Quebec border. Vermont had joined the American Union in 1791, and thus could no longer hide behind the veil of neutrality as she had done in the late years of the Revolutionary War. The truce would have restrained both sides from launching raiding parties, and was achieved through the influence of Hugh Finlay and the commander of the Canadian militia on the Vermont border, Colonel Writer, as well as that of Sherwood.36 On this occasion, Justus wrote a brief letter of warm reassurance to Ira in which he spoke of their past and present friendship and the close ties which existed between Vermont and Canada.37

Sherwood's Vermont connections may be seen in yet another area, the granting of Upper Canadian land. On March 3, 1793, Justus was one of four petitioners who requested a sizable tract of land comprising two townships along the west bank of the Rideau River and the lakes of the same name. His co-petitioners were Roger
Stevens, Joseph Fay and Samuel Safford, the latter two being from Vermont. Sherwood followed up the petition with a letter to Major Littlehales in which he described his partners in this venture as "men of property & character (who) have influence & interest in Vermont and the neighbouring states, sufficient to enable them to bring great numbers of settlers from that country...." As Simcoe's generous policy of granting land to well-intentioned American settlers was based on attracting just the sort of people Sherwood described, it was not too surprising that Justus wrote of them as he did. This plea was followed on April 16 by another petition which referred vaguely to "certain tracts of the waste lands of the Crown in sundry parts of the Province, amounting to thirty townships." This considerable request was launched by all the original petitioners except Roger Stevens, and now included some impeccable Loyalist names: the brothers Fraser, Thomas and William, John Munro, and Joel Stone, the founder of Gananoque. Despite the impressive list of petitioners and the efforts of Thomas Fraser who personally presented the appeal to Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe, the petition was turned down. Its failure does not diminish the fact that Justus Sherwood was prepared to help his old associates from Vermont to gain a foothold in Upper Canada.

The petitions indicate another aspect of Sherwood's
life: his continuing consuming interest in land. This interest was a natural one for a farmer, and it was one which Justus shared with most of his fellow Loyalists. Lord Dorchester increased the bounty of land in 1788 for "all reduced officers without distinction of corps..." which meant that Justus, as a half-pay captain, was entitled to 3,000 acres.41 After Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe's proclamation of February 1792, which promised a minimum of 200 acres to the incoming settler and bonuses of land to those who encouraged further settlement, the opportunity for profits from land was increased.42

During 1791 the land committee of the province of Quebec twice made sizable grants to Sherwood. On August 15 that body noted that Justus had received 1,000 acres and still was entitled to a further grant of 2,000 acres which they gave him.43 On December 9 the same committee granted Sherwood and seven other half-pay provincial officers specific lands in the township of Oxford on the Rideau River for which they had previously petitioned.44 After the establishment of Upper Canada, Justus continued his quest for further grants of crown land from the Simcoe administration.

The petitions for land which Sherwood put forward during the Simcoe years may be divided into two categories. In most cases, his appeal was simply one of many in a consortium which was requesting a very large grant, as was the case in the spring of 1793. On other
occasions, he petitioned alone, describing land which he had obviously personally explored and whose potential he recognized. In May 1794 he requested "eight hundred acres of land, the same to be on each side of the first creek, next to the rear of the Township of Young, which empties into the Great Gannanoqui Lake."45 The description of the land indicates why it had aroused Sherwood's interest, for the creek would be an ideal mill site. Unfortunately, Justus did not exploit his advantage with sufficient speed, and a year later, he found himself fighting a rival claimant for this valuable land. His opponent in this clash was Abel Stevens, the brother of Roger Stevens, who had provided Justus with information during the latter months of the war. Abel approached the problem with considerable energy and aggressiveness: he moved a number of Baptist families onto the land and threatened to move them off if his claim to 1,000 acres "including the rapid between two small lakes on the s. west Quarter of (the Township of) Bastard" was not recognized. He also pleaded that he had already constructed a mill on the rapids, and was thus in effect presenting the government with a fait accompli. Sherwood replied that Stevens and his settlers were obviously on his land and were thus his tenants. Simcoe and his council decided to attempt a compromise, and proposed that each claimant receive "a separate fall on the Gannanoqui water."46
Abel Stevens had apparently stolen a march on Justus Sherwood by improving the site in question before Sherwood himself had followed up his original claim. Justus had other interests and responsibilities and had perhaps been lax in this instance. The Surveyor-General subsequently examined the situation, and his report strengthened the council's decision to effect a compromise:

It now appears that those lands which Stephens (sic) has occupied come within the granted twp., but two years having elapsed since the order of survey and no assignments having issued from the Surveyor's office, the Lieut.-Gov. & Council are of opinion that Abel Stevens and his associates should be confirmed in their present improvement.47

The decision must have been a disappointment for Sherwood whose claim to the disputed land had been established through a Land Board certificate dated June 25, 1794.48 The incident was not a typical one in Justus's case, for he tended to push his pursuit of land with energy and enthusiasm. William Chewett reported in October 1792 that a grist mill belonging to Sherwood had been built on front lot 26 in Augusta Township, a lot which incidentally belonged to Ensign Bottom.49 A later report stated that Sherwood had claimed the eastern half of a lot in the first concession of Elizabethtown Township, the township located immediately west of Augusta.50 As a general rule, Justus was not a retiring or shy individual when it came to claiming or
improving land.

In such instances where he petitioned for land grants with other Loyalists, Justus frequently co-operated with his cousin, Thomas Sherwood, who had also settled on the upper St. Lawrence. In June 1794 the two Sherwoods requested special recognition for their efforts in settling twenty-two families in Leeds County. They had each received 200 acres in compensation for their colonizing efforts, but they shrewdly noted that similar endeavours in Lower Canada, where the Eastern Townships were now officially being opened to settlement, had been rewarded with as much as 1,200 acres. Having informed Simcoe and his council of the apparent generosity which the Lower Canada land board displayed, the Sherwoods concluded: "Petitioners therefore pray that their case may be taken into consideration, and grant them such a quantity of lands...as may appear meet." The council, unfortunately, was unmoved by their request.51

The last major petition which Justus Sherwood put forward occurred in August 1795 when, accompanied once again by Thomas, as well as William and Thomas Fraser, Peter Drummond, and two of the noted Jones family, Ephraim and Solomon, a request was made for a very sizable grant of 30,000 acres along the east bank of the Rideau River in Grenville and Leeds counties. The request was tabled to await a report by the Surveyor-General, and had not been acted upon by the time of
Sherwood's death three years later. However, on July 8, 1796, the government of Upper Canada did specifically recommend that Justus should receive whatever military lands might still be due him, and instructed the Surveyor-General accordingly.

The public affairs of Justus Sherwood during these years in Augusta Township are reasonably easy to trace and document, but Sherwood the private citizen has left very few vestiges. No personal correspondence illuminates such difficult and poignant events as the tragic "hungry year" of the late 1780s, when the dole of supplies had been stopped and when there were widespread crop failures. Nor has Sherwood anywhere recorded his reaction to Lord Dorchester's attempt in 1789 to confer the "mark of honour" on the Loyalists - the right to place the initials "U. E. L." after their names to signify their support of and sacrifice for a united empire. Many Loyalists resented Lieutenant-Governor Simcoe's plans to encourage the migration of the stable and essentially loyal elements in the United States to settle in Upper Canada, but Sherwood would almost certainly have favoured such a policy for reasons which combined altruism and pragmatism. Justus was not a man who bore a grudge against his former neighbours, as the dealings with the Vermonters and his handling of the Oswegatchie arsonists indicate. He would also have appreciated the fact that the influx of American settlers
would increase the value of his land, and would provide opportunities, as his 1794 petition with Thomas Sherwood suggests, to obtain even more crown lands for himself.

The Sherwood family, neglected during the hectic war and post-war years, reaffirmed its place in Justus's affections. On February 13, 1789, Justus and Sarah baptised their fourth and fifth children, Sarah and Harriet, at St. Andrew's Church in Williamstown, the closest place of worship at that time to their residence. Sarah and Harriet appear to have been the last additions to the family.

Although the town of New Oswegatchie never really developed beyond a rudimentary stage, Sherwood could gain some satisfaction from the fact that a number of the men who had shared the dangers and the hardships of the secret service with him were now his neighbours. John Bradford, Nathan Brown, Caleb Closson, and Oliver Sweet, as well as Ensign Elijah Bottum, all settled in Augusta Township. Another familiar name was Elnathan Merwin, whose son, Justus Sherwood Merwin, born in 1785, became a respected figure in Prescott, the village which grew up to the east of the New Oswegatchie settlement. Justus Sherwood Merwin became one of the first trustees of the Blue Church burying ground.

The Sherwood dwelling, at least during the years immediately after 1785, was probably of a simple and rustic nature, similar to the description which J. F.
Pringle provides in his pioneer history of the Lunenburg district:

These houses were small, the largest not more than 20 feet by 15, built of round logs notched at the corners and laid one upon another to a height of seven or eight feet. The roof was made of elm bark, and an opening for a door and one for a window was cut, the floor was made of split logs, the hearth of flat stones, the chimney of field stone laid up with clay for mortar as high as the walls, above which it was made of small round sticks plastered with clay; the spaces between the logs were "chinked" with small pieces of wood and daubed with clay. . . . the window was fitted . . . with a rough sash, and four lights of glass seven and a half inches by eight and a half. . . .

A member of the Vermont Historical Society, Roy L. Gale, in a brief article on Justus Sherwood in 1955, referred to the Sherwood home as being called "Maitland" and being located two miles east of Brockville. A picture of a very substantial homestead accompanied this description. While it is conceivable that Justus might perhaps have lived in such a house during the 1790s, it is more likely that the house in question belonged to Livius Peters Sherwood and was built at a later date.

Sherwood's business affairs brought him occasionally into contact with one of the most famous merchant-politicians of the province, Richard Cartwright. On November 26, 1795, Cartwright instructed a client, James Laing, to collect between £27 and £30 from Sherwood by February 1, 1796 for goods which the latter had purchased from the Cartwright store at Kingston. During the following May, Justus sent two bags of snuff to Cartwright
which the latter credited to his account. Sherwood also requested writing paper, a commodity which was frequently in short supply in a frontier community, and was told: "There is not a quire of writing paper to be had in all the Place."60 This deficiency, while it no doubt frustrated the literate Justus, is doubly annoying when one reflects how it limits any modern knowledge of Sherwood's Augusta years.

A man active in public service is bound to receive criticism, and Sherwood was apparently no exception, as the cases of Rossetter Boyle and John Munro indicate. In one case, however, Justus took a man, Samuel Adams, to court for slander and ultimately, after more than two years of postponements and delays, won a judgment of £500 and court costs. The case lasted from January 1792 to April 1794, when Adams attempted unsuccessfully to appeal the decision. The whole process was tedious and time-consuming, and Justus must have been relieved when it finally came to an end.61

It may be presumed that Sherwood's principal economic activity after 1785 was farming, with lumbering also providing some remuneration. The soil of the upper St. Lawrence was generally good, as Sherwood himself had noted in 1783. Eight years later, a Scottish traveller, Patrick Campbell, described the land upon which Sherwood's friend, William Fraser, had settled in Dundas County: "The soil is a clay loam, with three or four inches of
rich mold, black as jet on the top, (the) average return of grain was twenty fold at least." As the forest growth was cleared away from this fertile land, the lumber thus produced could be shipped to Great Britain via Quebec. As early as December 1786, one of the petitions which Sherwood had signed on behalf of his fellow settlers had requested that Vermont timber not be permitted the same benefits in the British market as that cut on Canadian soil, as the latter provided the Loyalists with a major source of their income.

It was while on a trip to Quebec on a raft of logs in the summer of 1798 that Justus Sherwood met his untimely death. He was drowned in the St. Lawrence at Trois-Rivières. It may be that his body was never recovered, for no record of his burial exists at either the Blue Church near Prescott nor among the records of the Church of England parish at Trois-Rivières.

Of the family which Justus Sherwood left, Livius Peters became the most prominent. His subsequent career combined the law and politics very effectively: Speaker of the Assembly of Upper Canada by 1821, judge on the Court of King's Bench from 1825 to 1839, member in good standing of the "Family Compact", and ultimately speaker of the Legislative Council during the administration of Lord Sydenham (1839-1841). Samuel Sherwood moved to Montreal where he practised law, and then subsequently removed to the United States. Very little
is known about Samuel, and there is some confusion surrounding him created by the fact that another Loyalist of the same name did settle in Prescott. Diana Sherwood married Samuel Smales, and subsequently received two separate grants of land amounting to 786 acres. Sarah Sherwood, Justus's widow, remained in Augusta Township for a few years. On June 10, 1800, she purchased the east half of lot no. 20 in the township. She subsequently moved to Montreal, and by 1805 her former home was being used as a school. Sarah remained in Montreal until her death on August 19, 1818.

The name of Justus Sherwood is not particularly well known in the annals of the restless times in which he lived, and yet he obviously made a significant contribution to the cause and the beliefs which he embraced. Those who have familiarized themselves with his career have generally found him to have been an attractive and honourable man. Frederic F. Van de Water, the popular Vermont historian, portrayed Sherwood in the pre-war period as a well-spoken, sober Green Mountain Boy who was "a stripe higher than his accomplices." When one considers that his "accomplices" were such renowned Vermont folk heroes as Ethan Allen, Seth Warner, and Remember Baker, this is high praise indeed. Another Vermonter, Louise E. Koier, has characterized Justus as a patient and devoted man who, in his protracted negotiations with the Allen clique, spared Vermont from
the horrors of war. Benjamin H. Hill called Sherwood "a gentleman noted for the humanity which he uniformly displayed towards those whom the fortunes of war placed in his power." Oscar E. Bredenberg, a hard-working amateur historian of the Champlain Valley who purchased Dutchman's Point in 1953 and there constructed a model of the Loyal Block House, has called Justus "a remarkable man (and) one of the real founders of Canada." One of the finest tributes has come from Vermont historian Henry Steele Wardner, who especially admired Sherwood's coolness during his initial meeting with Ethan Allen:

Search Vermont history as you will and cling as tightly as you choose to the schoolbook ideas of the "Tories" of the Revolution, you will have to look far for an example of courage of a higher order than that displayed by Justus Sherwood, the Loyalist and former Green Mountain Boy, in those interviews at Castleton and elsewhere in the autumn of 1780.

It is difficult not to agree with these judgments, and the best that one can do is perhaps to qualify them slightly. There can be no questioning Sherwood's loyalty to the British cause or to his community after the war. He served both with considerable devotion. His essential sense of humanity was another quality which stood out. His affection for his family was also strong, although it tended to be overshadowed by the great demands which were made upon him by his secret service duties and by community affairs. His sense of loyalty was something deep within himself which occasionally revealed itself
fleetingly in his public letters, but which he never specifically attempted to describe or categorize. He had qualities of leadership which, from his days in New Haven until his death, gave him a prominent place among his fellows. These qualities, a devotion to principles and a dedication to hard work, were offset by his stubbornness in questions demanding compromise. There was much that was positive about this good, gentle man, and yet one must remember that, like all men, Justus Sherwood did have his weaknesses.

His greatest weakness was a corollary to his greatest strength. It was his inability to remain emotionally detached from the problems which he attempted to solve. To Justus, it seems, there could be no shades of grey on such vital questions as Vermont's rejoining the Empire or the decision to settle the Loyalists on the upper St. Lawrence. His inability to compromise with those who did not share his views was undoubtedly his greatest personal liability. And yet despite this stubborn streak, he was able to show compassion and forget old hatreds.

His attitude to land must also be noted if one is to portray Justus Sherwood, as Oliver Cromwell reportedly wished to be, "warts and all." Sherwood seems to have been a natural land speculator from the days of his early manhood. His dealings in land in Connecticut, Vermont, and most especially in Upper Canada bear this out.
Particularly in his later years, he was not at all hesitant to exploit every conceivable avenue open to him which provided an opportunity to acquire more land. Of course, many others on both sides of the Canadian-American border were engaging in the same sort of activity. The era of the American Revolution was very much a time of an expanding frontier, and the fraternity of land speculators included practically everyone from the governor's mansion to the most humble homestead.

Justus Sherwood thus does appear to be something of a man of contradictions, perhaps more complex and less simplistic than some authors have portrayed him. Here was a man who could at once be dedicated, stubborn yet indecisive, compassionate yet occasionally harsh, pragmatic, grasping and yet hopelessly altruistic in his worldly affairs. Yet one does find that even with his apparent inconsistencies, the whole man is, on balance, an admirable figure. Such may perhaps be the biased verdict of a sympathetic biographer, but one who has consciously tried to avoid the usual pitfalls of identifying too closely with his subject. Justus Sherwood emerges from the records of his career as a man and a leader, blessed and cursed by his own convictions and interests, no plaster saint, but certainly a notable figure of his times. The Canadian Sherwood family descended from him through Livius Peters have every reason to remember his name with pride.
In a broader sense, Justus Sherwood may be seen as a fairly typical Loyalist leader of early Upper Canada. His role in public life emphasized the efforts of the Loyalists to direct the affairs of their community and to make of Upper Canada a staunchly loyal province. Justus did not, of course, choose to go far beyond the local level, but his son Livius took up the challenge, and his grandsons, Henry and George Sherwood, continued the family tradition of public service. In the matter of acquiring land, Justus could not compare with the "Lake Erie Baron", Thomas Talbot, but his extremely healthy interest in this activity was representative of those who had served the Crown and now expected their reward. His attitude to his former associates in Vermont belied the popular characterization of the Yankee-hating Tory, and underscored the fact that there were indeed Loyalists who, for one reason or another, maintained their connections with their former homeland. The Tory tradition of Upper Canada owes a great deal of its strength to the American invasions and subsequent depredations which occurred during the War of 1812, and Justus was not alive at that time to have his sense of loyalism revitalized. Like many of his fellow Loyalists, his strong sense of purpose translated itself into positive action to benefit his sovereign, his province, and himself. It was men like Justus Sherwood who were determined to create a new British province in North America who were the true founders of Upper
Canada. That they combined the public interest with self-interest is undeniable, but the opportunity was present for them to grasp, and they did so.
FOOTNOTES

1 Talman, Narratives, xxiv-xxv.


3 Talman, Narratives, 398-400.


7 Ibid., IV, 31.

8 Talman, Narratives, 400.


11 Ibid., Pt. I, 469-70.

12 Ibid., 470.

13 Quebec Gazette, May 12, 1785.

14 PAO: Justus Sherwood's Original notebook no. 375, "Return of settlers, New Oswegatchie, Augusta Township, 1784-87."

15 Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (eds.), Documents relating to the constitutional history of Canada (2 vols., Ottawa, 1918), II, 945-46.
16 Quebec Gazette, February 28, 1788.


19 Ibid., 131-32.

20 Ibid., 210.

21 Original paper in possession of Miss Barbara Jones of Prescott, cited in Eula C. Lapp, To Their Heirs Forever, 183-84.


25 McKenzie, Leeds and Grenville, 94.

26 Craig, Upper Canada, 54-55.


31 Cruikshank, Correspondence of Simcoe, I, 103.

32 PAO: Crown Land Papers, Thomas Fraser to David W. Smith, February 4, 1796.
33. Jackson, Sherwood, 57.

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APPENDIX

The problem of researching the life of Justus Sherwood was complicated by the fact that he had a namesake whose life and career closely paralleled his own. The other Justus Sherwood was born on February 14, 1742 in the colony of New York, and subsequently settled at Cortland Manor in Westchester County. He joined the King's forces in the Revolutionary War and served until the end of that conflict in 1783. At that time he was in British-occupied New York City where his name appeared on two Loyalist petitions. When the British evacuated New York, he moved to New Brunswick with his wife Sarah and settled at French Village. He died at Hampton on January 28, 1826, and was buried in the Anglican cemetery at Lakeside. He has frequently been confused with the Justus Sherwood of Augusta Township. Even Sir Arthur Percy Sherwood, the latter's great grandson, spoke of his great grandfather having settled in New Brunswick. (See: New Brunswick Museum: Abstracts of Petitions of King's County; New Brunswick Museum: Markham Scrapbook, 38-39; Muriel Demill Raymond, John De Mill - His Ancestors and Descendants, 80; Andrew Sherwood, Daniel L. Sherwood and His Paternal Ancestors (Portland, Ore., 1929), 129; Public Archives of Ontario, Second Report, 1904, 697-99, 819-20.)