No Shillelagh: The Life, Journalism And Politics Of Timothy Warren Anglin

William Melville Baker

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NO SHILLELAGH: THE LIFE
JOURNALISM AND POLITICS OF
TIMOTHY WARREN ANGLIN

by
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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Timothy Warren Anglin was an Irish Catholic spokesman in Canada during the second half of the nineteenth century. Given his long career as a newspaperman and as a practising politician, Anglin's influence on the Irish Catholic community in British North America was considerable. The basic thrust of his leadership was towards constitutional and non-violent redress of grievances as the title No Shillelagh is meant to suggest. Since one national characteristic of Canadians is supposed to be moderation, the fact that a leader of the potentially most obstreperous group ever to settle in Canada should espouse such a doctrine is not without significance.

Anglin's journey along the path to Canadianism was not without its roadblocks and detours. Indeed, Anglin was a man of three countries -- Ireland, New Brunswick and Canada -- each with its time-period in his life. Chapters 1 and 2 cover the first period -- from his birth in 1822 until his arrival in New Brunswick in 1849 -- and provide the background necessary for an understanding of Anglin's subsequent career. His Irish upbringing meant that Anglin came to New Brunswick with more anti-British and more democratic principles than the British North American norm. The existing situation in New Brunswick at mid-century showed the necessity of an Irish Catholic leader who could mediate the differences between Irish Catholics and the rest of the community.

The second period of Anglin's life -- the New Brunswick era from 1849 to 1867 -- is the subject of Chapters 3 to 9 and deals with Anglin establishing himself as lay leader of New Brunswick Irish Catholics and becoming a significant political figure in the province. The Confederation period is the time when Anglin's footprints lie clearest on the shifting sands
of the historical record. The fact that Anglin lost his battle against Confederation does not make the story less instructive. Such an examination demonstrates, among other things, that Confederation was made of hard and even dirty politics as much as of a grand and glorious vision. As well, the theme of Canadian history since Confederation being one of a struggle for survival, a study of Anglin's reasons for opposing Confederation yields insight into the reasons why that struggle has been so difficult. Finally, a study of Anglin's life shows that although Anglin foresaw some of the difficulties a united British North America would face, it was that new nation which won Anglin's loyalty. The fact that this happened to an original anti-Confederate demonstrates that while the new nation of Canada had its problems, its strength was considerable.

The third section -- Chapters 10 to 16 -- attempts to assess Anglin's life during the period 1867 to 1896. What emerges is the fact that although Anglin was by no means an unimportant individual in Canada during the period, his real significance is as an example of several types: as a New Brunswick anti-Confederate adjusting to the new order of Confederation; as a Dominion politician-editor viewing both the domestic development of Canada and her changing position in external affairs; as an Irish Catholic spokesman deeply involved in relevant questions such as the New Brunswick schools controversy; as a Speaker of the House of Commons trying to make an accommodation between his well-known political disputatiousness and the supposed neutrality of the Speaker's chair; and as a 'has been' politician who had the misfortune, from the point of view of historical prominence, to live long after his political career had gone into decline.
PREFACE

In 1965 Professor Alan Wilson suggested to Canadian historians certain directions which they might follow in the field of biography. Despite the poverty of studies in other fields, he maintained that biographical studies could still shed considerable light on Canadian history in general and ought not to be abandoned. What he urged was that Canadian biographical studies needed to get away from a heavy concentration on first rank WASP politicians and be broadened to include artists, businessmen, second and third rank politicians, leaders of ethnic groups, and so forth.¹ The dissertation here presented is one response to such a call.

Timothy Warren Anglin was an Irish Catholic spokesman in Canada during the second half of the nineteenth century. Studies of Canadian Irish Catholic leaders have been few except for works on D'Arcy McGee. One reason for this paucity of material is the fact that by and large Irish Catholics have found an acceptable niche in Canadian society based on acculturation or assimilation in most ways except in the area of religion.² In contrast to their religious compatriots the French Canadians, Irish Catholic Canadians have only preserved, and indeed only wanted to preserve, their religious distinctiveness and have not maintained any significant cultural particularity. In the case of Irish Catholics, the Canadian 'tossed salad' has been more like the proverbial 'melting pot'. In order to understand this important development it is surely worthwhile to examine the career of Anglin, one of the major Irish Catholic leaders during the period in which the pattern of Irish Catholic attitudes and behaviour was being established in British North America. He was not as
spectacular as McGee but it may be that given Anglin's much longer connection with British North America both as a newspaperman and as a practising politician, his influence was just as great. The basic thrust of his leadership was towards constitutional and non-violent redress of grievances as the title *No Shillelagh* is meant to suggest. Since one national characteristic of Canadians is supposed to be moderation, the fact that a leader of the potentially most obstreperous group ever to settle in Canada should espouse such a doctrine is not without significance.

Anglin was not born a ready-made 'Canadian.' His journey along the path to Canadianism was not without its roadblocks and detours. Indeed, Anglin was a man of three countries -- Ireland, New Brunswick and Canada -- each with its time-period in his life. Chapters 1 and 2 cover the first period -- from his birth in 1822 until his arrival in New Brunswick in 1849 -- and attempt to provide the background necessary for an understanding of Anglin's career in British North America. His Irish upbringing meant that Anglin came to New Brunswick with more anti-British and somewhat more democratic principles than the British North American norm. The existing situation in New Brunswick at the time of Anglin's arrival showed the necessity of an Irish Catholic leader who could mediate the differences between Irish Catholics and the rest of the community.

The second period of Anglin's life -- the New Brunswick era from 1849 to 1867 -- is the subject of Chapters 3 to 9 and deals with Anglin establishing himself as lay leader of New Brunswick Irish Catholics and becoming a significant political figure in the province. The Confederation period is the time when Anglin's footprints lie clearest on the shifting sands of
the historical record. The fact that Anglin lost his battle against Confederation does not make the story less instructive, for as S. F. Wise has suggested, there is much to be learned from the 'losers' of history. Such an examination demonstrates, among other things, that Confederation was made of hard and even dirty politics as much as of a grand and glorious vision. As well, the theme of Canadian history since Confederation being one of a struggle for survival, a study of Anglin's reasons for opposing Confederation yields insight into the reasons why that struggle has been so difficult. Finally, a study of Anglin's life shows that although Anglin foresaw some of the difficulties a united British North America would face, it was that new nation which won Anglin's loyalty. The fact that this happened to an original anti-Confederate is significant in demonstrating that while the new nation of Canada had its problems, its strength was considerable.

The third section -- Chapters 10 to 16 -- attempts to assess Anglin's life during the period 1867 to 1896. What emerges is the fact that although Anglin was by no means an unimportant individual in Canada during the period, his real significance is as an example of several types: as a New Brunswick anti-Confederate adjusting to the new order of Confederation; as a Dominion politician-editor viewing both the domestic development of Canada and her changing position in external affairs; as an Irish Catholic spokesman deeply involved in relevant questions such as the New Brunswick school controversy; as a Speaker of the House of Commons trying to make an accommodation between his well-known political disputatiousness and the supposed neutrality of the Speaker's chair; and as a 'has been' politician who had the misfortune, from the point of view of historical prominence, to live long after his political career had gone into
To subsume Anglin's entire life under these divisions and categories would be to make rigid a flowing pattern. A man's life cannot be so neatly dissected and labelled. To do so would remove much of the fascination of Anglin's career, the fascination which involved me in the study in the first place. That interest has been sustained by a legion of teachers, students, colleagues, librarians and archivists who, directly or indirectly, have aided and facilitated the preparation of this dissertation. To my parents who have both read and made useful comments on sections of the thesis, and to my wife who keeps me on the straight and narrow and who has made valuable suggestions on the thesis as well as assisting in proof-reading, I acknowledge my debt. To the Province of Ontario and the Canada Council I wish to express my appreciation for financial assistance. Finally, to my research director, Professor D. G. G. Kerr, I direct my greatest vote of thanks. His unfailing willingness to assist my endeavour in any way possible and his judicious comments upon my work have been of incalculable value and are greatly appreciated.

FOOTNOTES

1 A. Wilson, "Forgotten Men of Canadian History," The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1965, pp. 71-86.
2 M. J. Herskovits, Acculturation: A Study of Culture Contact (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958), p. 10, defines acculturation as comprehending "those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups." Assimilation is therefore not synonymous with but may be phase of acculturation.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Certificate of Examination .................................................. ii
ABSTRACT ........................................................................ iii
PREFACE ............................................................................. v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................. ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................. x
CHAPTER 1 - The Irish Background ........................................... 1
CHAPTER 2 - Arrival in New Brunswick ..................................... 23
CHAPTER 3 - Acclimatization: 1849-1857 ................................... 52
CHAPTER 4 - New Brunswick Politician and Patriot: 1857-1861 .... 86
CHAPTER 5 - North Atlantic Neighbours: 1861-1863 ............... 116
CHAPTER 6 - Anti-Confederation: From Theory to Practice: 1864 . 148
CHAPTER 7 - The Battle Won: The Election of 1865 ............... 173
CHAPTER 8 - Executive Councillor: 1865 ................................. 202
CHAPTER 9 - The War Lost: 1865-1867 ................................. 240
CHAPTER 10 - Adjusting to the New Era: 1867-1872 .............. 286
CHAPTER 11 - 'Godless' Schools and Party Politics: 1872-1874 .... 332
CHAPTER 12 - First Commoner: 1874-1878 .............................. 374
CHAPTER 13 - Perspectives: 1874-1878 .................................. 416
CHAPTER 14 - End of an Era: 1878-1883 ................................. 451
CHAPTER 15 - Last Chance: 1883-1887 .................................. 489
CHAPTER 16 - Worldly Travail and the Ultimate Escape: 1887-1896 . 516
APPENDICES ...................................................................... 543
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................. 564
VITA .................................................................................. xi
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

C.H.R. - Canadian Historical Review
C.O. - Colonial Office
N.B.M.A. - New Brunswick Museum Archives
P.A.C. - Public Archives of Canada
P.A.N.B. - Public Archives of New Brunswick
P.A.O. - Public Archives of Ontario
S.J.R.L. - St. John Regional Library
U.N.B.A. - University of New Brunswick Archives
CHAPTER 1

The Irish Background

Timothy Warren Anglin was born on August 31, 1822, to Francis Anglin and his wife, the former Anne (Joanna) Warren. The Anglin family had long been residents of the little town of Clonakilty, situated along the southern coast of Ireland twenty-five miles from Cork city in county Cork. Apparently Timothy's great grandfather, Francis M. Anglin (1736-1793) had owned an undetermined amount of property in and around Clonakilty. Jeremiah Anglin (d. 1799), Timothy's grandfather, had retained this property and as well, had built several rows of houses in his home town. Timothy's father (d. 1875), succeeded to the land in Clonakilty, affectionately called Myrtle Grove, which apparently included a large house and about eighty-six cottages. Moreover, Francis for many years had been an officer in the civil service of the East India Company, a position not unusual for the sons of Irish families of some repute. Timothy's mother was the daughter of Timothy Warren and Isabel Haliburton. Her paternal grandfather had been the agent for Hyde Estates near Fermoy in Cork county. Her mother's father had been Captain Haliburton of Hollandside, Lothian, Scotland, who had come to Ireland as Commander of Revenue Police. Into this family Timothy Warren Anglin was born. Obviously, it was not a typical peasant Irish family. On the other hand, being born a Roman Catholic meant that he was unlike most Irish residents of similar social and economic standing. It is quite possible, in fact, that the family had not always been Catholic. It is at least curious that in spite of the fact that the name Anglin and its modifications (Anglen, Anglim, Hanglin and even O'Hanglin) are seldom found outside Cork county (or traceable to this source) there now
reside in Canada two Anglin clans one of which has descended from a
William Anglin, a Methodist who came to Kingston from county Cork in
1843. It is also interesting to note that although Timothy's birth is
recorded in the books of the Roman Catholic Church at Clonakilty no sim-
ilar record appears for the birth or marriage of any of his ancestors.
Conversion to Catholicism in an area where the overwhelming majority of
residents were of this faith would not have been too unusual. If such
conversion had taken place among one branch of the Anglin family it
could be interpreted as a return to the fold for is it not possible that
Saint Anglinus (d. 768?), the tenth abbot of the Benedictine monastery
of Stavelot-Malmedy in Belgium, was of the same family?

I

The Ireland into which Timothy Anglin was born and in which he grew
up was no utopia. No one growing up in such a place at such a time
could fail to be marked for life and to understand both Anglin and the
Irishmen of British North America for whom he was to be a spokesman, an
understanding of this background is essential.

On January 1, 1801, an event of enormous importance had taken place
— the Act of Union between Ireland and England became operative.
The two countries were made one, the economy of Ireland was assimil-
ated into the economy of England, the Irish Parliament at Dublin
disappeared and the Parliament at Westminster henceforth legislated
for both countries. The Union failed to produce the results which some had expected of it.
Catholic emancipation had not followed immediately — in fact it had tak-
en years of strenuous agitation led by Daniel O'Connell before emancip-
ation was won in 1829. Union had not brought an influx of capital to
Ireland and the wiping away of tariff barriers had resulted in Ireland
becoming a dumping ground for English goods. Free trade also meant
that Irish industry found itself unable to compete with the larger, better financed and longer established British industries. As a result, with the exception of the north-east, Irish industry steadily declined until "by the thirties the south of Ireland was strewn with industrial wreckage in the shape of unemployed artisans and decaying factories." The difficult aspect of this situation from an economic point of view was that Ireland needed industry to support its rapidly growing population, for agriculture was not capable of supporting the mass of people at anything more than a subsistence level. Unfortunately, the alternative to eking out a meagre existence -- emigration -- did not appeal to the clannish residents of the Catholic south and west.

Irish dependence on agriculture set the stage for the tragedy that has become known as the Great Famine. Prevalent agricultural practices were incredibly inefficient and backward. The waste and carelessness involved were notorious. No incentive to improvement was provided by a system in which the benefit of any improvements went to the landlord not the tenant who made them. High rents were the rule in a country in which agriculture was virtually the only means of existence. This caused extensive subdivision and subletting and in turn led to cultivation of food-stuffs which had a high yield compared to land required; notably the potato.

Subdivision and the potato created (if for the moment they helped to solve) Ireland's major problem, the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. The Irish labourer or small farmer, once he had secured his holding, threw up a rude cabin and managed to exist on a diet of potatoes and milk or potatoes and water. Such a low standard of living led to early marriages and large families, and in spite of emigration and disease the population rose from about five million in 1800 to over eight million in 1840. The picture which pre-famine Ireland presented was not inspiring. One traveller, Gustave de la Bonniniere de Beaumont, was especially struck
with Ireland's plight:

I have seen the Indian in his forests and the negro in his irons, and I believed, in pitying their plight, that I saw the lowest ebb of human misery; but I did not then know the degree of poverty to be found in Ireland. Like the Indian, the Irishman is poor and naked; but he lives in the midst of a society which enjoys luxury and honours wealth ... The Indian retains a certain independence which has its attraction and a dignity of its own. Poverty-stricken and hungry he may be, but he is free in his desert places; and the feeling that he enjoys this liberty blunts the edge of his sufferings. But the Irishman undergoes the same deprivations without enjoying the same liberty, he is subjected to regulations: he dies of hunger. He is governed by laws; a sad condition, which combines the vices of civilization with those of primitive life. Today the Irishman enjoys neither the freedom of the savage nor the bread of servitude.\textsuperscript{13}

The condition of Ireland was almost universally recognized as being unsatisfactory and yet almost nothing was done to improve the situation.

The suggestions made for improvement inevitably involved the initiative of either the government or the Irish landowners; but the former was "timid", as was fully seen during the Famine, and the latter were "inert and inefficient". In short the first half century of the Union saw a great economic decline in Ireland and put her more completely at the mercy of providence and the British government. This is not too surprising when one considers that the purpose of the Union "was not to assist and improve Ireland but to bring her more completely into subjection" in order that the French-aided rebellion of '98 would not recur. The Union brought little but misery to Ireland, a fact that Anglin and other Irishmen retained in their memories wherever they went.

The abysmal economic organization of Ireland gave rise to large-scale social inequalities maintained, no doubt, by the elite, but accepted by the majority. In fact, William Thackeray, the novelist, was moved to state: "They respect rank in England -- the people seem almost to adore it here." Social pretentions were held by almost everyone above the
peasant class:

It was said that in Ireland every man until you came down to your shoemaker was an esquire, and that every tradesman sent a son to the university "to become a gentleman". And it was noticed how in country towns the local landowners looked down "with sovereign contempt" on business people.17

But the main division in society was quite straightforward if M. de Beaumont is to be believed: there were the rich and there were the poor.

In Ireland the traveller sees magnificent castles and wretched cabins: but no house which stands midway between the palaces of the great and the hovels of the indigent, for in this country there are only rich and poor.18

From the peasants' point of view this judgment had considerable validity: but from Anglin's it was an oversimplification. He fitted into neither category.

The religious division of the country followed the same lines as socio-economic divisions. The bulk of the peasant population outside Ulster was Catholic, while the landowners tended to be Protestant, largely Church of England, a fact which further alienated the tenant from his landlord. The bond between the Irish Catholic layman and his clergyman was exceptionally close.

Both had suffered severely for their faith, and the parish clergy drawn mainly from the farming class were by economic circumstances doubly identified with their laity. They were maintained by the voluntary offerings of their parishioners, and their income level, though it freed them from cramping peasant poverty, was not high enough to cut them off socially from their flocks.19

The background and life of the parish priests led them to take an interest in political affairs. Indeed, given the fact that the major political issue in Ireland in the 1820's was Catholic Emancipation, it was almost inevitable that clerical influence became a familiar feature of Irish politics, a tradition which easily transferred itself across the Atlantic. In other ways pre-Emancipation days had an influence. In
the era when his religion had been illegal, the Irish Catholic had got used to attending illegal meetings and protecting his priest from the law. On top of this, many Irishmen had found that almost the only means of protection from ruthless ejection from the land was through extra-legal procedures of which intimidation was the most prevalent. Resort to illegal force, due to the inadequacies of the Irish system, became a not altogether unfamiliar feature of Irish life and the emigration of large numbers of Irishmen to British North America threatened to disrupt established patterns of law and order. Emancipation was undoubtedly a great victory for Catholics but it is questionable whether it aided many individual Irishmen. The change could have a direct effect only on the lives of the more educated and affluent members of the Catholic community for it merely removed legal disabilities not the social and economic difficulties which Irish Catholics faced. There was no question that an ambitious young Irishman, such as Anglin, still faced serious obstacles because of his religion.

Above all, the victory of Catholic Emancipation seemed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the leadership and methods of the 'Liberator',

Daniel O'Connell.

O'Connell invented constitutional agitation, the voice of the people, the march of opinion. He demonstrated the possibility, in a democratic parliamentary constitution, of carrying through revolutionary changes by evolutionary methods ... His basic theory [was] that there is no political change which cannot be brought about by the force of opinion, by peaceful and democratic organization ...

By the 1840's, however, it was becoming apparent that O'Connell's leadership and perhaps his methods were unsuitable for the new question of the day - Repeal of the Union - and although he still held the centre of the stage until his death in 1847, new and bolder men and ideas were making their appearance. As shall be seen, both were to be found in the Young
Ireland movement. Nevertheless, Timothy Anglin was powerfully influenced by O'Connell and many years later spoke of him in reverential terms. Throughout his entire career in British North America, Anglin's political philosophy paralleled the views of the Irish hero of his boyhood. Yet he too recognized that whereas O'Connell's greatest triumph had been Catholic Emancipation, his greatest failure was his Repeal agitation.

The particular environment of Anglin's youth was that of the Clonakilty area. This was the Ireland of his life and it had certain features peculiar to itself. Clonakilty, along with Bandon and two other towns, had been built by Sir Richard Boyle in the early seventeenth century as a frontier town "to hold the settled country against the Irish of West Carberry (Co. Cork) and Kerry."

The town itself was a Corporate Town and was "situate upon a dangerous and inconvenient Bay ..." Fishing was becoming an increasingly important part of Clonakilty's economy by the 1830's as the home linen manufacture was rapidly declining. But there is little doubt that the town, having a population of nearly 4,000 in 1841, was a dying settlement with little hope of revival. Nor was Clonakilty likely to become the educational capital of Ireland. In fact, almost one-half of the inhabitants of the town five years of age or older could neither read nor write, a level worse than three-quarters of the Irish towns of 2,000 inhabitants or more. Nevertheless, the endowed grammar school in the town, Kearney's Classical School, provided a good education for the more fortunate youngsters that attended it, such as Anglin and his friend, J. Boyle Travers. But they and their friends were privileged citizens of the town.

From the preceding survey of certain aspects of pre-Famine Ireland, it can easily be seen that Timothy Warren Anglin was by no means a typical Irishman. He was not a member of the peasant class, nor was his family
of wealthy landowner status. True, the Anglins had some land with a number of tenants on it but compared to many landowners of Ireland they were neither wealthy nor socially prestigious. They were also Catholics. In a sense, therefore, Timothy had very different formative influences than most of his fellow residents of Ireland. He would have acquired some of the social conservatism of the upper class. His education, his plans to be a lawyer and his future prospects of taking over his father's holdings in Clonakilty would have put him a great distance from the viewpoint of the peasantry. On the other hand, his alienation from the upper class, by reason of his economic, social and religious status, would have made it impossible for him to hold the same attitudes as the truly elite. Indeed, Anglin's position mid-way between the upper and lower classes was typical of many reformers in Western civilization in the nineteenth century. The complexity of the thought of these men is partly explained by the fact that their experience had taught them to be rabid revolutionaries in some areas, timid reformers in some, and positive reactionaries in others. Timothy Anglin's career showed similar traits. Yet at the beginning of 1845 his future must have seemed bright. Contentment with his lot in life rather than desire for a radical change in it seems likely. However unsatisfactory Ireland's political, economic and social condition before 1845, it could be tolerated by more affluent families such as the Anglins. This was changed by the Great Famine, the calamity which altered even more lives than it took.

II

The most hard-hearted of individuals could not have been unaffected had he resided in Ireland during the last half of the fifth decade of the nineteenth century. The continual failure and destruction by rot of the
potato crop in these years meant that horrible scenes of human destruct-
ion were manifold. The statistics themselves tell the terrible story.
The natural increase between 1841 and 1851 should have resulted in a
population of over nine million. Yet the figure for the latter date was
6,552,385. While one million may be calculated to have emigrated, the
rest must be accounted for by deaths and a lowered birth rate. Starva-
tion was recorded as the cause of death in 21,770 cases between 1846 and
1851, while hundreds of thousands died from fever, dysentery and other
famine diseases (hunger being a contributory cause in many cases).
The coastal area of Cork county showed a population decrease of over
thirty per-cent, Clonakilty having about seven hundred fewer residents
in 1851 than had been the case in '41. Conditions throughout Cork
were especially bad and Clonakilty was one of the places very hard hit
in 1845, the first of the famine years. Things got so bad in Anglin's
home town that in 1846 a deputation was formed to bring the plight of the
inhabitants to the attention of the authorities.

A deputation from the magistrates of Clonakilty, consisting of the
Rev. Mr. Townsend, the rector, and John O'Hea, Esq., waited on the
Lord Lieutenant on the 5th of October. They stated that they were
deputed by the clergy of all denominations, the magistrates, the
gentry, and the people of the district, to lay before Government the
utter desolation caused by the destruction of the potato crop; the
poor having been for some time past living on cabbage leaves and food
of that description. They pressed upon his Excellency the urgent
necessity for sending an immediate supply of provisions into the
locality. The magistrates, they stated, had directed them to say
that they would not be responsible for the peace of the district, if
such a supply as would check the exorbitant price of meal were not
sent forthwith. 31

While the situation was far from perfect after this, Clonakilty did not
suffer to the same extent as other areas. Relief works of drainage were
commenced and although they prevented neither violence nor starvation,
they were of considerable help in alleviating distress. Moreover,
Clonakilty was one of the few places which escaped the cholera epidemic which swept through Ireland during the years of the Great Famine. The situation further west in the county was much worse. N. M. Cummins, a justice of the peace who held some land in that area felt that he ought to see if the reports emanating from this region were correct and on visiting the area he sent to Wellington a letter which contained the following:

[On reaching the spot I was surprised to find the wretched hamlet deserted. I entered some of the hovels to ascertain the cause, and the scenes that presented themselves were such as no tongue or pen can convey the slightest idea of. In the first, six famished and ghastly skeletons, to all appearance dead, were huddled in a corner on some filthy straw, their sole covering what seemed a ragged horsecloth and their wretched legs hanging about, naked above the knees. I approached in horror, and found by a low moaning they were alive, they were in fever — four children, a woman, and what once had been a man ... [T]he same morning the police opened a house on the adjoining lands, which was observed shut for many days, and two frozen corpses were found lying upon the mud floor half devoured by the rats. A mother, herself in fever, was seen the same day to drag out the corpse of her child, a girl about twelve, perfectly naked; and leave it half covered with stones. In another house ... the dispensary doctor found seven wretches lying, unable to move, under the same cloak — one had been dead for many hours but the others were unable to move either themselves or the corpse.]

The truly horrifying aspect of the Famine was that prior to death the victims became thoroughly dehumanized. Hunger and sickness turned them into zombies feeling nothing. There was no joy or laughter but even more frightening, there were few tears. A man and his wife could die next to each other, but as utter strangers, so drained of human feelings had they become. This tragic scene did not end with the coming of spring in 1847.

The horrors of the winter of 1846 to 1847 were re-enacted in the two winters which followed. Persons refused relief for one reason or another were later found dead from starvation, or else, demented, attempted suicide. Burials without coffins were again common. Horse and ass flesh was eaten in counties Galway and Roscommon. Dogs fed on the corpses of the dead and the dogs, in turn, were eaten by the starving people. Crime increased under the stress of hunger.
Girls were driven to prostitution and attacks on property were frequent. Ships off the west coast were plundered by fishermen who went as far as twelve miles from the coast to board the ships. In defence of one sheep stealer, a resident magistrate gave sworn testimony that the man's wife was so deranged with hunger that she had eaten the flesh off the legs of one of her own children dead with fever.36

Many such circumstances, more or less horrible, were to be found in the Clonakilty vicinity and Timothy Anglin saw the human destruction surrounding him.

The Great Famine was not completely class conscious. True, first the paupers starved, were stricken with yellow fever, were ejected for non-payment of rent from the small patches of land which were growing nothing but rotting potatoes. Eventually, however, many landowners, whether they treated their tenants with compassion or simply as figures in a business enterprise, ran into financial difficulties, were stricken with fever, or both. Many family fortunes were ruined by the Great Famine although for every one of these, thousands died in the unhappy Ireland of the latter 1840's. Anglin himself struggled during the Famine "to save from ruin the property on which his relatives depended for support, and from which he had hoped to derive the means of pursuing the professional career for which he had been preparing ..." But this task proved to be impossible and the Anglin family fortune gradually diminished until it became obvious that Timothy could not expect to receive support from this source. Anglin, however, remained in his home town doing what he could for the people and even became a teacher in the town. He must have been a good teacher in many ways for he had a dynamic and interesting personality and "possessed a good English education, had a liberal acquaintance with the Latin language, and considerable knowledge of English and foreign contemporary politics." It is not known what
kind of landlords the Anglins were during the Famine but it must be sur-
mised that the proximity of the tenants and landlord, the identity of
religion, and the lengthy residence of the Anglins in Clonakilty would
have made them compassionate. Indeed, despite the fact that Irish land-
lordism was one of the real problems in the Irish economic system, there
were a number of 'good' landlords during the Famine.

The success of the soup kitchens depended largely on the continued
charity of individuals. Many landowners, though greatly impoverished
by the inability of their tenants to pay their rents, assisted them
in every possible way and denied themselves all luxuries during the
crisis. On them fell the burden of work on local committees, as well
as the duty of subscribing to the funds of the local bodies. They
were frequently poor law guardians, and large estates sometimes ex-
tended into several relief districts and multiplied the calls on the
owner's time and income. The non-residence of many landowners made
the position of the resident landlords more difficult; though they
supported the tenants on their own estates they were still liable
for assessment for the maintenance of the poor of the estates of
absentee neighbours. Many landlords acted as local almoners, wrote
petitions to benevolent societies and met daily many persons begging
for assistance. 39

Individual charity, however generous, could not cope with the magnit-
ude of the problem presented by the Famine. Government intervention on
a large scale was required. This did not occur, and the reasons ascribed
have been varied. An extreme charge is that England was carrying out a
policy of genocide:

In the known facts of this business, there is justification for the
view that the Government policy, under which over a million died, and
over a million emigrated in five years, was a deliberate policy of
extermination, in pursuance of English political advantage, so as to
ensure Ireland remaining indefinitely and powerlessly under England's
control ... It is difficult otherwise to explain it, difficult to ex-
plain why, when the extent of the visitation was known and it was
known that people were dying like flies, all formal rules and prin-
ciples were not thrown aside and the food grown in the country retained
in the country. 40

A milder assessment is that the Government was a victim of the prevalent
conceptions of government and economics — the laissez faire philosophy.

The state, in the mid-nineteenth century, was struggling to adjust
itself to the demands of a new world, which was anxious to throw off the bonds of state paternalism and yet was slowly becoming conscious of the social obligations of the community to its members. Russell, then, had to reach a compromise between economic theories and the social reality, but it was a compromise that could satisfy few ... 41

Yet statesmen cannot hide behind abstract theories when the existence of human beings is at stake and although it is important to note that "Lord John Russell and his colleagues were not animated by ill-will or hatred towards the Irish people," they are to be criticized for their timidity and the complete insufficiency of their action. Timothy Anglin made such criticism in no uncertain terms when he wrote about the Famine in later years. The condemnation of the British Government, in its milder form, stands.

Even if England be acquitted of deliberate policy in the matter, it cannot be acquitted of its responsibility for the fact. It had abolished the Irish Parliament, and it professed to regard England and Ireland as one Kingdom, and the Westminster Parliament as the Parliament of that whole Kingdom, responsible for the welfare of the Irish people equally well with the English. But no Englishman, and no English statesman in particular, looked, in his heart, upon Ireland and the Irish, as any other than a conquered country and a subject, inferior people, all whose concerns were properly to be subordinated to the interest and advantage of the English people. 44

The failure of the Government to meet the challenge presented by the Famine had far-reaching effects in the years which followed aside from the emigration from and deaths in Ireland. Many Irishmen became enveloped in a virulent hatred of England whether they resided in their native land or the new world. Few Irishmen who had suffered during the Famine could thereafter fully admire or love British parliamentary institutions or its statesmen. When thousands of Irishmen emigrated to British North America, their attitude towards Britain posed a potential threat to the imperial connection. As for Ireland itself, Irishmen became convinced that some form of self-government was necessary. This was certainly true of Anglin, although he directed his antagonism towards the Union
rather than England per se and hoped that Ireland and the Empire could part as friends. In regard to political philosophy, the Famine influenced different people in different ways. Some became dogmatic doctrinaires. To Anglin the Famine seemed to teach the opposite lesson. Throughout his life in British North America he spoke of and acted upon a belief that concrete action and results were far more important than grandiose schemes and fine-sounding theories. After all, Anglin claimed, the Famine had not been prevented, or at least greatly alleviated, because the members of the British Government, "adhering in the most bigoted, stupid manner, to what they believed to be sound political economy, obstinately refused to interfere with the course of commerce."

III

Such economic disaster elicited a political response. The 1840's saw the appearance of new men on the political scene, all of whom wished to further Daniel O'Connell's campaign for Repeal of the Union. These young men, such as Thomas O. Davis (whose premature death in 1845 was greatly mourned), Charles Gavan Duffy, W. J. O'Neill Daunt, John Dillon, Michael Doheny, and later individuals such as William Smith O'Brien, Thomas Francis Meagher, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, and John Mitchel formed an informal group known as Young Ireland which had the Dublin newspaper, The Nation, as its mouthpiece and to which most contributed. Some of this group were Protestants, while the Catholics, if not anti-clerical, had no desire to make Young Ireland a Catholic movement in the tradition of the Emancipation campaign. At first the Young Irishers worked in harness with the Repeal Association but as time went on this 'ginger group' became more and more estranged from the organization especially when Daniel O'Connell passed on his leadership to his son John towards the end of his life.
On top of this, Catholic authorities were growing unhappy with the Nation's attitude towards a number of education controversies such as its apparent support of non-denominational colleges. John O'Connell sided with the hierarchy and the breach was made more complete. The result of this growing divergence of views led, in the summer of 1846, to the withdrawal of the Young Irelanders from the Repeal Association. The immediate cause of this withdrawal was the unwillingness of Young Ireland to accept the doctrine that physical force should never be resorted to under any circumstances (it was a very esoteric argument, for the Young Irelanders had no plans for rebellion and fully expected to proceed by constitutional means). The real reason for the division had not been the particular issue but simply because John O'Connell and his supporters on the one hand and the Young Irelanders on the other, could not get along. The Catholic hierarchy showed in no uncertain terms that their sympathies were with the Repeal Association. Bishop Higgins of Armagh proudly, if erroneously, claimed that "we have no physical force men in this diocese. Neither have we, thank God, any schoolboy philosophers, false and sanguinary Repealers or Voltairean newspapers."

The Young Ireland secessionists, under the leadership of Smith O'Brien, were able to garner some support for their newly-formed organization, the Irish Confederation, but political bickering amongst repealers and the Famine itself had so drained the country that its inhabitants had little interest or faith left in political agitation. Also, the disapproval of Young Ireland by the Catholic hierarchy was immensely damaging. These factors plus the failure of the Young Irelanders to make any impression on the country in the general election of 1847, led some members of the Confederation to conclude that non-constitutional methods would soon
have to be used. Two such men were James Fintan Lalor and John Mitchel, both of whom offered radical solutions to the problem of Ireland. The ideas of these men, though of considerable intrinsic interest and of great importance in future Irish nationalist thought, had little support even within the Young Ireland movement.

The Confederation, in February 1848, adopted, on Smith O'Brien's advice, a series of resolutions which effectively enunciated a policy based primarily on a parliamentary campaign, and which specifically dissociated the movement from the methods dear to Mitchel; resistance to the exactions of the landlords and refusal to pay the poor rates.

Yet by 1848 the condition of the Irish Confederation was not good and the time was ripe for increased radicalism. The futility of constitutional agitation seemed apparent and Young Ireland found itself drawn to the radical ideas of Mitchel and others. As the Confederation became more radical and bold, the authorities decided to nip in the bud any possibility of armed revolt, or at least force the hand of those who would be likely to lead such a movement. During July, 1848, the British parliament rushed through a series of stringent regulations, one of which declared "that membership of a political club would be regarded as a sufficient reason for arresting any person following the suspension of habeas corpus."

This rapid series of acts forced the leaders of Young Ireland to scatter into the countryside where last-ditch attempts were made to mobilize the people and to resist the British regulations and authorities. But the people were already fully engaged in a combat with the Famine and wanted no other battles on their hands at the moment. Despite their impossible position, the Young Irelanders had no choice but to proceed with their attempts to arouse the country, unless they wished to make an ignominious capitulation to the authorities. But the country was so drained of spirit and the Confederation so weak in public support that by the
end of July the "rebellion" was over. The tragicomic skirmish at Ballingarry in county Tipperary was the first and last act of the actual insurrection. Here, under the leadership of O'Brien, a dozen men armed with firearms or pikes and perhaps a couple of hundred unarmed men from the district (undoubtedly many of them hoping to obtain food) established headquarters in and around the house of the Widow McCormack. The village priest called on the rebels to desist and disperse, advice which many followed. Thus the result of the pitched battle between the Irish police and those that remained was a foregone conclusion. Arrests followed quickly and the rebellion was overcome. Swift and strong action by the authorities, the Catholic hierarchy's disapproval of armed force, and the utter destitution of the peasants had made a successful rebellion an impossibility.

IV

What role did Timothy Warren Anglin play in these political events? The answer appears to be -- none! Although it was often stated during his lifetime (and the tradition has been continued to the present day) that Anglin had been a Young Irelander, a rebel of '48 and had even been one of those present at the battle at Ballingarry, there is no evidence to support this contention. In fact, the Freeman, the newspaper which Anglin later owned and edited in New Brunswick, specifically stated that he had never been within fifty miles of Ballingarry in his life and that he had not escaped from Ireland for the simple reason that "there never was any reason why he should seek to escape from any person, thing or power whatever."

Mr. Anglin lived in his native town during the whole of the years 1847 and 1848, and until the Easter Monday of 1849 when, with the full knowledge of the whole town, he left it on the top of the mail coach —
in presence of the towns-people, magistrates and police, merchants and mechanics, to take ship at Queenstown for St. John, N.B. 59

Independent evidence seems to show that the Freeman was telling the truth. Throughout the many pages of Gavan Duffy's Four Years of Irish History 1845-1849, a multitude of names of both important and insignificant men in the Young Ireland movement appear, but never is the name Anglin mentioned. The same statement is true of the other books covering this period of Irish history. Then too, Dublin was the centre of political agitation, and although Cork city was the site of some Confederate activities, it would seem very likely that Clonakilty was isolated from these movements.

Finally, the fact that Anglin came to a British colony would indicate that he had no fear of British authorities and did not object to living under British rule. The suggestion that Anglin was a rebel of '48 must, therefore, be rejected.

But if it must be assumed that Anglin was not involved in the Young Irelanders' revolt this does not mean that he did not sympathize with them. Later in his life he called O'Brien "as noble, honourable, pure-hearted a patriot as ever lived ..." Anglin also stated in a parliamentary speech in 1866 that he could not condemn the men who, in the terrible conditions that existed in Ireland in 1848, had taken steps which they felt would improve the situation. He may have disapproved of the stance of the Nation on the question of education, but he agreed with Young Ireland's goal of independence for Ireland. Being a critical observer rather than an activist was a trait which Timothy displayed more than once during his career.

When the Famine struck Ireland many of her sons found that they could no longer live in the country and a great flood of over one million Irishmen bid a heart-rending farewell to their homeland. Timothy Anglin
was one of these, although he remained in Ireland much later than most of the emigrants, for he did not depart until the spring of 1849. The precise reasons for his emigration are not known as no correspondence between Timothy and his father or mother who remained in Ireland has come to light. But depart he did, leaving behind him great mass suffering and shattered personal dreams. Yet surely the new world would bring better things; surely new vistas would be opened to him; surely he would be able to recover from the blow that fate in the form of the Famine had dealt him.
FOOTNOTES

1 As well as the biographical sources mentioned in the bibliography, see C. M. Rowan, "Timothy Warren Anglin, Journalist and Politician Portraying New Brunswick's Reaction to Confederation During the Years 1867-1872" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 1953), and the Morning Freeman (St. John, New Brunswick), May 19, 1866.
6 In fact, the town of Bandon, a dozen miles from Clonakilty, once had been largely Protestant but by 1845 had become mostly Catholic (see A. Nicholson, Ireland's Welcome to the Stranger, or An Excursion Through Ireland, in 1844 & 1845. For the Purpose of Personally Investigating the Condition of the Poor (New York: Baker and Scribner, 1847), p.272).
8 Woodham-Smith, op. cit., p. 15.
9 Ibid., p. 16.
11 In curious contrast, in the more prosperous Ulster region where the linen industry had not suffered destruction, there was a much higher rate of emigration during the pre-Famine years (see W. F. Adams, Ireland and Irish Emigration to the New World From 1815 to the Famine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), p. 188).
12 McDowell, op. cit., p. 37.
15 This attitude was shown in a 1799 letter from Edward Cooke, the Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle, to Viscount Castlereagh (see P. S. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland Under the Union 1801 to 1922 (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 379).
16 Quoted in Adams, op. cit., p. 8.
17 McDowell, op. cit., p. 40. Several times during her trip in Ireland, Asenath Nicholson found her American countrymen being criticized for failing to maintain distinction of rank such as following the dishonourable practice of eating with their servants (see Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 31 and 262-263).
18 Quoted in Mansergh, op. cit., p. 25.
19 McDowell, op. cit., p. 31.
21 Woodham-Smith, op. cit., p. 28.
23 Freeman, Aug. 5, 1875; and Globe (Toronto), June 6, 1883.
24 T. W. Freeman, Ireland: Its Physical, Historical, Social and Economic

26 Fishermen were perhaps even worse off than Irish agricultural peasants since their potato supply was seldom adequate if the fishing was bad (see Adams, op. cit., pp. 20-21).


30 Ibid., p. 260; and Census of Ireland, 1851 Part IV: Report on Ages and Education, p. 75.


32 Material on the Clonakilty public works projects may be found in British Parliamentary Papers: Subject Set on Famine (Ireland) (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1968), VI, 96-97, 413 and 513; and VII, 38-39; and Woodham-Smith, op. cit., p. 141. In the week ending Feb. 27, 1847, sixty children and thirty adults died "from want of sustenance" in the priest's parish of Clonakilty which comprised some 13,000 persons (see British Parliamentary Papers - Subject Set on Famine (Ireland), VII, 181).

33 Indicated on map included in the "Report of the Commissioners of Health, Ireland, on the Epidemics of 1846 to 1850," in ibid., VIII, between 442 and 443.


35 John Mitchel in the Nation, June 19, 1847, quoted in O'Hegarty, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

36 O'Neill, art. cit., p. 252.


38 Ibid. These characteristics and this training also suited him for journalism and politics, the careers which he eventually adopted.


40 O'Hegarty, op. cit., p. 328.


42 Ibid., p. 152.

43 New Brunswick Courier (St. John), Sept. 30, 1856; Freeman, Dec. 7, 1858; and Tribune (Toronto) Nov. 4, 1885.

44 O'Hegarty, op. cit., p. 328.

45 Freeman, Oct. 25, 1864; and March 3, 1866.

46 Tribune, Nov. 4, 1885.


48 Ibid., p. 33.

49 Quoted in ibid., pp. 80-81. The last reference was, of course, to the Nation.

50 Gwynn, op. cit., p. 129.

51 For the political views of Lalor see ibid., pp. 130-132; G. G.


54 The downtrodden state of the peasantry was not understood by those, like Lalor and Mitchel, who envisaged a peasant uprising (see Duffy, *op. cit.*, pp. 476-477).


56 Both Smith O'Brien and D'Arcy McGee, among others, felt that the opposition of the Catholic clergy had caused the collapse of the insurrection (see Gwynn, *op. cit.*, p. 234; and T. P. Slattery, *The Assassination of D'Arcy McGee* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1968), p. 27).


59 Freeman, May 19, 1866.


61 Freeman, July 12, 1864.

CHAPTER 2
Arrival in New Brunswick

Anglin emigrated to St. John, 1 New Brunswick, undoubtedly travelling with better accommodations than most other Irish Catholic emigrants. He and his fellow travellers may have thought that they had left destruction, violence and death behind them. But only a few weeks after his arrival in St. John, Anglin was disabused of this idea. On July 12, 1849, the Orange parade exploded into a full-scale battle, the magistrates having disappeared in fear of being called upon to perform their duty. Firearms appeared on both sides. Some deaths occurred as well as many grievous injuries before order was restored. The seriousness of this upheaval "aroused the mass of the citizens of St. John to a sense of the enormous evil of such displays, and for some years after, the Mayor duly notified the public that if such processions were attempted, he would put them down." 2 With an incident like this to welcome him, Anglin may have felt that leaving Ireland was not going to be much of a change.

Indeed, in many ways the colony to which Anglin came in 1849 was not unlike the quasi-colony he had left behind. New Brunswick, despite the tenderness of its years in comparison with Ireland, faced similar problems. The New Brunswick economy seemed to be teetering on the brink of failure; provincial politics were in a state of gross uncertainty compounded by an almost complete lack of public interest in political affairs; and her social order was being gravely threatened by religious antagonisms and disturbances arising from economic conditions. Despite these and numerous other similarities between old Ireland and the colony that had once had the name 'New Ireland' suggested for it, 3 they were
much less relevant to the immigrant than the differences. It is necessary, therefore, to present a brief analysis of New Brunswick life at the time of Anglin's arrival with special emphasis on those aspects which bear directly on his future interests in the province.

I

Geographically, New Brunswick does not form a compact entity. Its relatively small area is divided into at least four great physiographic regions\(^4\) and is drained by two large river systems, the St. John and the Miramichi, as well as by six or seven other important rivers. When it is noticed that about three-fifths of New Brunswick is bounded by water, it becomes quite obvious that particularly in an age of 'wind and sail', geography militated against the development of a dominant centre for New Brunswick life. Anglin's adopted city of St. John, it is true, had certain advantages and could and did exercise great influence on south-central New Brunswick by means of its grand river system. But St. John, it must be remembered, by sea is closer to New York than to Bathurst on Chaleur Bay.\(^5\) New Brunswick communities were for the most part easily accessible by sea and therefore, were not as dependent upon great distribution centres, as were the Canadian communities on Montreal and Toronto. The eyes of New Brunswickers were turned outward towards the sea -- to London, Liverpool and Manchester, to Boston, Portland and New York, and in some cases to Halifax -- rather than inward to the land. In fact, besides the incessant rivalry between St. John and Halifax, towns such as Fredericton and St. Stephens were continually pecking away at St. John's dominance even within south-western New Brunswick. In the region known as the North Shore, Chatham-
Newcastle succeeded in establishing a sphere of influence, but found effective competition being provided by Bathurst. The outcome of this was that at mid-century New Brunswick lacked the influence of a great metropolitan centre around which the entire life of the province revolved, an influence which Professor J. M. S. Careless has shown was so very important in shaping British American history. St. John had not been able to extend its influence to the North Shore to any meaningful extent and thus New Brunswick found itself divided into two large areas: the North Shore and the south-central region, and both of these had several fundamental subdivisions. As a result, few residents thought about the problems of the colony as a whole and consequently there was virtually no feeling of unity, nothing that might be termed 'colonial nationalism'.

Geographic features were one determining factor in New Brunswick's development. A second was the economic system of the province. When the colony had been founded, it had been expected that agriculture and fishing would be the main sources of employment. This was not an unrealistic expectation for New Brunswick had some fairly good soil around the rivers and at the headwaters of the Bay of Fundy which might have produced good crops despite the fact that only one-third to two-fifths of New Brunswick has a frost-free period of one hundred days. Various 'experts' always claimed that the colony could at least be agriculturally self-sufficient. The fisheries also promised good returns not only along the North Shore, but also in the Bay of Fundy and the rivers of the province. But, although both of these economic activities were undertaken their scale was limited. The reason for this was the rapid ascension of the forest industries to economic dominance in the province. These industries were the staple on which New Brunswick placed her reliance
to the detriment and even the exclusion of other phases of her economy.

The development of the timber trade followed a clearly discernible pattern.

First came the mastng trade, with modest quantities exported to France before the Conquest, and a growing trade under the British. After 1795, New Brunswick was the major British supply centre for masts. During the Napoleonic Wars, square timber -- especially white pine -- came to assume the dominant position. From the 1820's shipbuilding increased in importance, coupled with development of the square timber and deal trades. Finally, in the late 1840's, deals and sawn lumber began to eclipse square timber as the major export item. 10

Statistics tell the story as well as words can. For example, the number of saw mills in New Brunswick increased from 229 in 1831 to 640 in 1845, the number of persons employed in these mills having risen from 3,798 to 8,400. 11 The same trend was shown in the shipbuilding industry although violent fluctuations in production were evident. Lumbering itself employed annually about 8,000 men. 12

By mid-century wood and its products formed the bulk of the New Brunswick economy, comprising seventy-eight percent of the total exports of the colony in 1855. 13 "No other colony in British North America was so totally committed to the trade. No other colony reaped such riches, no other colony suffered such misery from it." 14

The problem of staple production is that other elements of economic life tend to be overlooked and underdeveloped. Concentration on the product which finds a ready export market frequently subordinates the whole economy to its demands and such was the case in the St. John Valley.

Agriculture was dependent on lumbering for markets as well as actually
participating in the enterprise itself. Shipbuilding had evolved around it a host of secondary occupations which were definitely dependent on it for their continued existence. Even financial institutions, banks and insurance companies drew capital from, and were closely related to, these activities.  

The influence of the timber trade on the retardation of agriculture was particularly noticeable and was a subject of lamentation whenever difficulties arose in the timber trade, a trade subject to violent fluctuations between great prosperity and depression.

This great deficiency in the supply of the necessaries of life arises from the timber trade, which sends a large part of the population away from the fields into the forests, and the low state of agriculture, now managed with a lack of its most necessary elements, skill and labour.

Anglin was later to find himself in agreement with such an assessment, but the lure of the timber trade won the hearts of New Brunswickers.

The lumberer, fond as the Indian of the free air and untrammelled life of the woods, receiving high wages, living on the finest flour, and enjoying long seasons of holiday, looked down upon the slavish agricultural drudge who toiled the year long on his few acres of land, with little beyond his comfortable maintenance to show as the fruit of his yearly labour. The young and adventurous among the province-born men were tempted into what was considered a higher and more manly, as well as a more remunerative line of life; many of the hardiest of the emigrants, as they arrived, followed their example: and thus not only was the progress of farming discouraged and retarded, but a belief began to prevail that the colony was unfitted for agricultural pursuits. The occasional large sums of money made by it induced also vast numbers of the farmers themselves to engage in lumbering ... gradually to involve themselves in debts, and to tie up their farms by mortgages to the merchants who furnished the supplies which their life in the woods required.

As well as its effect on farming, the timber trade had other distinct influences. The trade until mid-century at least, was closely tied in with the colonial system as the main markets for New Brunswick's produce were found in Britain. This colonial mentality may account, in part, for the lack of political interest shown by most New Brunswickers. Even more important was the influence of lumbering on the social life of the
colony. The timber trade promoted instability in the lives of the inhabitants and seems to have been a factor in the low level of education in the province. The rather amoral behaviour patterns and high level of liquor consumption which typified New Brunswick are also partially explained by the isolated, vigorous and at times dangerous life of the lumberman. The timber trade gave the province an almost carnival-like atmosphere.

New Brunswick, from the Napoleonic Wars to the end of Reciprocity, lived in an atmosphere approximately that of an extended gold rush, a favoured few growing rich, the majority constantly teetering on the brink of ruin, but all blinded by the dazzle of potential success.  

While the timber trade prospered the colony was happy. But the fears aroused by Britain's adoption of free trade, which meant that New Brunswick timber would no longer receive preferential treatment in the British market, caused a great depression in the provincial economy in the late forties. Provincial revenue declined from over £110,000 in 1847 to less than £85,000 in 1850. Between 1845 and 1850 the value of imports dropped over twenty-five percent and exports showed large declines. Even agriculture seemed to be getting back at provincial residents for its neglect as the potato blight made an appearance in the latter half of the decade.  

These threatening circumstances made New Brunswickers look around for solutions to their problems. The British Government had abandoned them, or so they felt, and they turned their eyes to their neighbours on the North American continent, the other British colonies and the United States. A movement towards intercolonial free trade made some advances although only with Nova Scotia was this fully achieved by 1849. At the same time, intercolonial railway projects were receiving considerable
attention. In 1847 the New Brunswick Assembly voted a loan of £50,000 to the St. Andrews and Quebec Railway and the following year undertook extensive obligations on behalf of a projected line from Shediac to St. John.\textsuperscript{24} It was hoped by the St. John merchants that this latter railway would form part of the proposed connection between Halifax and Quebec. But the surveyor, Major William Robinson, had suggested a route following the North Shore of New Brunswick. Thus by the time of Anglin's arrival in the province, the debate over what railways should be built, and where, had begun. In 1849 the Quebec to Halifax line was shelved for the time-being because the British Government would not lend sufficient support to the project. But the idea of connecting St. John to Portland, Maine, was already gaining support in the commercial capital of the province.\textsuperscript{25}

New Brunswick's interest in the United States shown in the matter of railways was to be seen on a much broader scale. Although the idea of annexation of the province to the United States never really had much support in New Brunswick, it was never stronger than when Anglin arrived. With schemes of intercolonial co-operation proving rather unfruitful, New Brunswickers looked to the United States to provide the economic relief they needed. Reciprocity was the panacea that was sought, although the United States was in no hurry to grant this boon to British North America. Indeed it was felt that failure to obtain reciprocity would force the colonies to seek admittance to the American Union.\textsuperscript{26} This assessment had some validity for just as in Ireland, in New Brunswick continued hard times made drastic solutions more thinkable. In St. John, an interestingly anonymous Reform Club was founded. It included a number of city businessmen, and its policy called for annexation if
reciprocity with the United States could not be achieved. George Fenety, the editor of the St. John Morning News, took up the cause in print and continued to discuss annexation even after the Reform Club became moribund, as it quickly did. But support for the policy of annexation was not forthcoming from the bulk of New Brunswick residents.

This country is said to be much affected with the passion of Annexation. I did not meet with any at St. Andrews whose professed inclinations lay that way, though one might expect that the neighbourhood of the State of Maine would inoculate the discontented and the lovers of change with that form of political disease. But the residents explain its existence in another way. Most of the immigrants who come here are of the poorer class of Irish, from the county of Cork. It is with these men, and from Ireland -- so at least the descendants of the Scotch and English settlers, and of the old loyalists, say -- that the disaffection to England has been mainly imported.27

Yet in the summer of 1849, annexation was a topic of conversation and thought.28

Annexation, reciprocity, free trade, railways -- these were the question of the day in 1849. These topics formed a major part of public affairs in New Brunswick for years thereafter. Timothy Warren Anglin was to have his say about all of them.

While a territory's social order is inevitably connected to the physiographic and economic organization of the region, demographic history also plays a significant role in shaping a country and its inhabitants. This was clearly the case with New Brunswick, the province of the Loyalists par excellence, as Professor Chester Martin put it.29 There had been some English settlement before the coming of the Loyalists but these inhabitants were largely swamped by the Loyalist inundation. The Loyalists took over the south-western part of the colony, and they and their descendants retained control of it for half a century and more. On the North Shore the Acadians lived a placid life based on fishing and
farming, a life almost completely detached from the rest of the province. This geographic and economic isolation was reinforced by the fact that their religion disqualified them from the franchise until 1810 and not until 1830 were Catholics allowed to hold political office in New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{30} Understandably, the Acadians took little interest in affairs outside their own locality even after they received political rights and by mid-nineteenth century their influence remained rather minor.\textsuperscript{31} These two main groups -- the Loyalists and the Acadians -- formed the base upon which New Brunswick's population was built. To this base other groups, such as the Irish Catholics, were added. At mid-century the population of New Brunswick stood at 193,800, of which there were over 4,000 more males than females. Fully one-quarter of the residents were between the ages of twenty-one and forty.\textsuperscript{32} Settlement was concentrated along the Bay of Fundy, the North Shore and the banks of various rivers which led into the interior. The only inland town of any size was the provincial capital, Fredericton. The Church of Rome already had the largest number of adherents of any single organization in the province, but the Protestants, taken together, formed a considerable majority.\textsuperscript{33}

From its earliest days, New Brunswick's social order had been a curious mixture and it became ever more complex:

A province of contradictions, such was New Brunswick; of old-world nostalgias, new-world attitudes, of lost causes and new hopes, of Harvard refinement and lumberjack crudity ...\textsuperscript{34}

It was also a province of staid Anglicanism and theatrical Baptistism; a province of sedate Loyalist descendants, rash, improvident merchants and poor bewildered and rather unruly immigrants. In general terms, New Brunswick society at mid-century was 'rough'. A territory of
lumbermen, who loved to demolish rum in great quantities, could scarcely have been otherwise. It was also an egalitarian society in many ways, as one traveller found out.

The driver and his passengers, the hired and the hirer, and the humblest wayfarer who may desire to dine when your dinner is ready, sit down together. We had ordered our own meal today in our own sitting-room, but we found ourselves, after a time, seated side by side with ill-appointed lumberers, in fustian jackets, without anyone, except myself, appearing even to feel that there was anything out of rule in such intrusion. We were close to the boundary of the country where all men are born free and equal.

Yet it was not to be expected that a British colony, and a Loyalist one at that, would accept such social levelling without challenge. In typically British North American fashion a real battle was waged between two social ideals.

There is a constant struggle between the aristocratic principle and the spirit of freedom and equality characteristic of the Americans. Persons who have risen from lower ranks, and have arrived at affluence, are apt to overrate their importance; and such as have advantages of birth and education are frequently supercilious. It is to be regretted that, from these causes, endless bickerings and jealousies arise, and society is divided into small circles and parties ...

A social elite did exist and continued to wield considerable influence.

The elements of the best society in St. John, Fredericton, and the smaller towns are very respectable: the principal officers of the Government mix freely, but unanimously, in the same circles. In the best classes, there is a due regard to politeness, courtesy and a decorum. Persons of rank and some degree of eminence, are however, looked upon as forming a kind of aristocracy, which always maintains its superiority above the inferior orders, who eagerly aspire to the society they condemn as being unjustly exclusive. The medium ranks are generally stiff and ceremonious: yet their kindness is unalloyed by ostentation, and their hospitality, when bestowed, is extravagant.

Nevertheless, even if the old elites had maintained some of their prestige, the wealthy merchants and businessmen were making rapid gains on the social plane and threatened to supersede the old aristocrats. Thus a fluid social structure in Anglin's adopted country presented
him with a much better opportunity for advancement than the land of his birth.

II

The social, economic and geographic features of New Brunswick are key factors in explaining the political history of the province. Right from the beginning of the colony's history, a 'government' party had existed. A select group of Loyalists had received the plums of office in New Brunswick and they and their descendants and relatives dominated New Brunswick life for at least half a century. They formed the first 'government' party. While this group formed a Family Compact at least as striking as that of Upper Canada, it did not meet the type of opposition encountered in the inland colony. This is partially explained by the fact that the Compact was very skilful in snuffing out opposition either by persuasion and patronage or by vigorous 'strong-arm' tactics. Both methods were employed shortly after New Brunswick became a separate colony in 1784. From these beginnings, a pattern was imprinted on New Brunswick politics, a pattern which remained until Confederation and after.

Another factor involved in explaining the apparent lack of opposition to the Government is that the Government itself allowed a great deal of disunity within its ranks. The various interests could carry on their struggle for power within what was virtually a one-party system. At any given time, a clear cleavage between Government supporters and the Opposition could be discerned, but these divisions seldom solidified and the situation remained fluid. One observer's claim was merely a slight overstatement:

It would not be a difficult task to notice briefly the prevailing
political opinions of any one particular time; but these and their advocates are so liable to change, that the description would scarcely apply to a single season, and in the succeeding year it would be useless. 41

Indeed, the first half-century of New Brunswick politics had strong similarities to the political organization of eighteenth century Britain. The 'connection' of family, friends and business associates, was the most basic political unit. The same type of men, usually of Loyalist background and Church of England faith, took part in the official life of the colony, and partly because of this there was no basic conflict of ideology. The Government was far more a coalition of factions trading concessions than a unified party following a definite course of action. But the members of the Government at least had the unifying force of being in office and in control of patronage. The Opposition, on the other hand, had no real existence other than in name. It consisted of small factions each with its own purposes to serve and the various groups had little basis of agreement except common opposition to the Government. Even this was not usually so fundamental that the Government could not purchase support by concessions of one form or other. Nor was there a feeling that it was dishonourable to accept a position from a Government to which one had recently offered strenuous opposition. Actually, in most cases, the discontent of opposition factions stemmed from the fact that they were out of office and were therefore deprived of the patronage that went with office rather than from any fundamental disagreement with the policies and actions of the Government. Then too, the extreme localism of the province, the isolation of many of its inhabitants, and a low level of public political interest made it difficult for province-wide parties to form. The real struggles took place on the local level. Under such conditions it is not surprising
that New Brunswick had no 'grass roots' reform party comparable to those of Nova Scotia and the Canadas.

A further factor which explains the unique political development of New Brunswick is the influence of the timber trade and the relationship of the 'government' party to it. It is logical, and indeed has been shown,\textsuperscript{42} that a ruling elite can maintain its grasp on power if it meets the needs, especially the economic needs, of the community. Indeed, this is the normal condition of political power. For many years the New Brunswick elite had succeeded in meeting these needs, mainly by refraining from interfering with the rapid and wasteful exploitation of the provincial forests. Only when this practice was threatened in the 1830's did a significant political struggle ensue.\textsuperscript{43} Even then a party system did not develop because there was a virtual consensus amongst influential timber merchants, politicians, and the public at large that the House of Assembly, the representative of the province, should obtain control of the crown lands upon which timber-cutting took place. Even the members of the Executive Council who sided with the representatives of Colonial Office policy accepted defeat with relative equanimity for their careers did not wholly depend on winning that particular contest. The upshot of the complex and interesting struggle over crown lands was the victory of the New Brunswick Assembly in 1837, the year of rebellion in the Canadas. Certain new men were called into the charmed circle of the Executive Council but basically the traditional pattern of New Brunswick politics was re-established with the political elite more or less extensively modified. The real victor of 1837 was the Assembly, for it retained and extended its power of the purse.

The system used in the legislature for the appropriation of money not
only contributed to the lack of party development in New Brunswick but also limited the power of the Executive Council.

The essential quality of New Brunswick government was that of a democracy, direct and unrefined in character, based upon an intimate relationship between the member of the house of assembly and his constituents. The general revenues of the province were indirectly raised by imposts on imported goods, but directly apportioned by the house of assembly to the constituencies ... Over the years the assembly had worked out a system by which a committee of appropriations consisting of one member from each county, divided the estimated available sum of money among the constituencies. When this difficult labour was accomplished, the members for each constituency would meet together and apportion their assignment to the projects, jobs, and worthy individuals requiring attention ... The member of the house of assembly thus became a miniature prime minister or chancellor of the exchequer for his own constituency or particular section of it. He controlled the disbursement of the public moneys expended in his own region. This power was emphasized by the fact that there were no municipal incorporations to which the people could turn for local improvements. Each community had long since learned to set vital store by the quality of its representative at Fredericton and the influence he could exert upon the apportionment of the public funds.44

The local assemblyman had no inclination to give up his financial power to an unified and responsible executive. This system may not have been responsible government in what has come to be the accepted meaning of the term, but at least the executive had very little to be irresponsible about. New Brunswick was happy, at least, for the time being, with her constitutional position.

The party which won the smashing triumph for reform in 1837 in large part became the reactionary party; and the final goal of responsible government was obscured for nearly twenty years amid the rivalries of parochial politics. The merchant politicians who held seats in an all-powerful legislature were not disposed to surrender direct control of the rich prize which they had won to the executive, whether the executive possessed their confidence or not.45

During the 1840's some halting advances were made towards responsible government and several proponents of the system, notably Lemuel A. Wilmot and Charles Fisher, made their voices heard. Nevertheless, when it became the decided policy of the mother country to institute the British
system of cabinet government in the North American colonies, there was a
great deal of confusion in New Brunswick as to its meaning and appli-
cation. Thus when Sir Edmund Head arrived in the province in 1848
as lieutenant-governor, charged with the responsibility of instituting
the new system, he found his task a difficult one. There was no party
system and therefore the executive he succeeded in establishing was
a coalition as almost all previous governments had been. The 'depart-
mental' system was begun, but the control of financial expenditure was
retained by the Assembly. Responsible government had not yet been
achieved.

When Anglin arrived in 1849 then, the colony had acquired certain politi-
cal characteristics. The party system was underdeveloped if not non-
existant. The political emphasis was on the practical rather than the
theoretical. Power, patronage and personalities rather than policies
and productivity were the pivotal points of New Brunswick politics. It
remained to be seen what the Irishman from Clonakilty would do to the
politics of the province and what they would do to him.

III

At the bottom of New Brunswick's political and socio-economic ladder
were Anglin's compatriots, the immigrant Irish. Diseased and destitute,
thousands of them had arrived in the province in the late forties. As
they were to become the followers of Anglin and his newspaper an analysis
of their condition and experience upon arrival in the province would be
justified. But their story is important in its own right and deserves
to be told.

The problems encountered in 1846 were bad enough, but in 1847 a flood
of Irish immigration descended upon St. John. For a cost of £10 (provisions included) a man could escape from Cork to New Brunswick, and thousands took advantage of this opportunity. During 1847 over seventeen thousand persons came to this colony, the overwhelming majority being Irish. A large number were Corkonians while many came from Sligo, Galway and Londonderry. As might be expected most of these new arrivals landed penniless and became an immediate and heavy burden upon the province. In preparation for this the Assembly had increased its direct and indirect grants for relief, but the province was not expecting such a large number of immigrants and the amounts were insufficient. About half of those who landed in New Brunswick went on to the United States in search of work, in many cases leaving their families behind as a burden upon the province. Employment within the colony was very difficult to find.

Among those who remained, the able-bodied labourers were so few that at a time when the ports of the province were crowded with immigrants the rate of wages was unusually high and continued to advance. The settlers in the province were unwilling to take into their establishments men who knew nothing whatever of agriculture, who had to be taught even the simplest form of labour, and who, at the same time, brought with them of seeds of a most dangerous pestilence. This pestilence was, of course, the fever which the Irish had carried with them from the old country. It was just as deadly in the new world as in Ireland. Of the 17,074 persons who embarked for New Brunswick in 1847, 823 died on the voyage, 697 in quarantine and 595 in the hospitals, making a total of 2,115. On board ship the emigrant often faced difficulties because regulations were not kept. Moses Perley, the Immigration Agent, prosecuted many ship masters for breaches of the Passenger Act, one of these being the master of the Bloomfield:

In this case, it clearly appeared that no bread or biscuit whatever
was put on board for passengers use, although the Act requires that one-half of the supply of provisions shall consist of those articles; and it further appeared, that the water was of bad quality, and was contained in insufficient and leaky vessels.  

If one escaped death on the voyage, one found that conditions were not all that much better when one landed in St. John. To prevent the spread of disease, all immigrant ships were required to land at Partridge Island just outside the harbour of St. John. There, a medical inspection took place. The Island rapidly became a hell-hole of suffering and death as the diseased infected the healthy and medical assistance was unable to cope with the magnitude of the problem. By the end of June the authorities became aware that all was not well on the Island. "You will please inform His Excellency that I visited the Quarantine Station on Saturday afternoon and found the arrangements on the Island not in the most satisfactory state," was the manner in which Perley's substitute reported it to the Provincial Secretary. A letter of the same date from the same source to the mayor of St. John, though somewhat lengthy, gives a good account of the problems that had already come into existence.

Doctor Harding informed me that there was upwards of five hundred souls then on the Island sick, with the exception of a small number convalescent, & some few that were landed in health, for the purpose of facilitating the cleansing and release of some vessels on board of which there has been much disease.

In addition to the Hospitals, all the military tents were filled, also some large tents formed by sails put up by the Master and crews of some vessels in Quarantine. If there was increased accomodation [sic] for the reception of passengers on the Island, they could sooner be relieved from the vessels, and in all probability prevent the spread of disease on board, which appears to go on with more rapidity after the arrival of the vessels at anchor than during the passage, this may be accounted for in some measure I suppose by the ventilation being less in a stationary vessel than in one underway ... The Doctor stated to me that he had requested that an additional number of Tents might be sent to the Station some time since, but none had been forwarded, and that ten or fifteen more would be a great accomodation now.

There is also required wood for fuel, the want of which has induced the Passengers to carry off and burn the fences around the grass
fields of Mr. Reed by which he will be greatly injured in the loss of grass that he usually cuts for the support of his cows during the winter.

There was also a deficiency of straw for the people to lie on, and I much fear if there should be a continuance of dry weather, there will be a want of water, which can only be remedied by sending down casks and have them supplied by the water boat, to attempt sinking wells on the Island now would be too tedious.

Doctor Harding stated to me that the two Medical Gentlemen sent down to his assistance were both ill with fever, that Doctor W. Harding was improving, but that Doctor Collins, he much feared would not survive his attack. Now it appears to me if additional medical assistance was necessary at the time those Gentlemen went there it is more important now, as there is more sickness on the Island and the probability of an increase on the arrival of the vessels that are on the way.

I would suggest that there should be at the Landing some person in charge to prevent persons from landing or leaving the Island improperly at present time there is no one in charge for this purpose.

In calling the attention of Your Worship to the foregoing remarks, I do it for the purpose of giving information, not of complaint, for I am fully convinced that there is every disposition and that everything has been done, by the Common Council and also, by the Commissioners of the Alms House, that circumstances would permit for the convenience and accommodation of the unfortunate Emigrants ...

Conditions on the Island went from very bad to totally unacceptable.

Dr. Collins, only twenty-three years old, gave his life in the effort to save others. A report submitted late in the summer to the Lieutenant Governor showed that things on the Island had rampaged completely out of control. Because coffins could not be constructed quickly enough, up to forty bodies had been tossed into the same grave. With a southerly wind a stench of death hung over St. John as so many bodies were buried with little earth-covering. A heavy rain would displace enough of this earth that pieces of the clothing of the corpses could be seen. Virtual starvation was the cause of death in some cases and no doubt was a contributing factor in many other instances.

Food, water, living accommodations, medical facilities, supervision and supplies; all these necessities were in very short supply and therefore of poor quality. Organization and direction on the Island was virtually
non-existent. The immigrants were too weak to do much for themselves and native New Brunswickers desired nothing more than to steer clear of the pestilential Island.

Conditions on the Island were worse than in the Alms House hospital on the mainland, but even here Death was carrying everything before him. Almost one-third of the entire number admitted to the Alms House in 1847 were from county Cork, while Sligo and Galway together contributed another third. Anglin was to find many Corkonians in St. John, but too many of them had found a permanent resting place in the city -- the burial ground.

It is not surprising that the old inhabitants of the province had little love for the newcomers. While sympathy was shown towards them on an individual basis, the Irish had meant almost nothing but trouble for the colonists. Irish immigration had brought with it the threat of disease, had been a strain on the purse of the colony, and had introduced a turbulent element, foreign in religion and customs, to the community. For his part, the Irish immigrant had little to be thankful for. Here he was in a strange country, weak with hunger, unemployed, and surrounded by strange and rather unfriendly inhabitants. It must have seemed that suffering was an Irishman's fate. The new world atmosphere perpetuated and emphasized certain Irish traits.

The so-called Irish temperament is a mixture of flaming ego, hot temper, stubbornness, great personal charm and warmth, and a wit that shines through adversity. An irresponsible buoyancy, a vivacious spirit, a kindliness and tolerance for the common frailties of men, a feeling that "it is time enough to bid the devil good morning when you meet him!" are character traits... "His hand is rash, his heart is warm"... Quick to anger and quick to forgive; frequently duped but never frightened; generous, hospitable, and loyal... Irish experience had taught Irishmen that life was not pleasant and they
had developed a profoundly pessimistic attitude towards the world and its affairs. They brought this cultural baggage with them to the new world and saw little to disabuse them of their pessimism.

Filthy homes, wretched working conditions, and constant hunger mocked the merchants' optimism, and bred, instead, the identical pessimism ... as in Ireland. On both sides of the Atlantic, Irish experience generated a brooding recognition that human relationships were transient, subject to the ever-threatening intervention of impersonal evils ... Both as peasants whose anxious livelihood derived from the capricious soil, and as cogs in an unpredictable industrial machine, they were victims of incalculable influences beyond their control. For those who met it so frequently in their own experience, untimely disaster, even death, was normal, a part of life accepted without complaint, indeed, without even the need for explanation.65

Such deep pessimism made the Irishman politically conservative at heart and profoundly religious. Having lost faith in earthly improvement he turned to religion for consolation, that religion being, for the bulk of the Irish immigrants, the faith of the Church of Rome. Fervent attachment to the Catholic Church made the Irish even more conservative politically, for with the exception of a few months in 1848 the Church had fought radicalism everywhere and continued to do so. As well, of course, there was a persistent antagonism between Catholicism and Protestantism.

Catholicism, by its theology at least was intolerant. It denied

the liberty of each man to be of what religion he pleases, or of none ... for no religion that has any self-respect can acknowledge that one has the right to be of any religion he chooses. No man has or can have a religious or moral right to be of any religion but the true religion ... Every religion by its very nature is intolerant of every other, and condems itself, if it is not.66

Such a statement could have been made by many a Protestant theologian.

In fact, Protestants were partly to blame for Irish Catholic exclusiveness and wariness.

The Irish ... segregated in their murky slums, in their lowly occupations, and their dread of losing religion, never ceased to anticipate harsh treatment from strangers or to distrust unknown ways. Centuries of struggles had engendered an acute wariness of Protestant, of Protestant friendship, and of Protestant assistance that too often masked proselytization with the guise of benevolence.67
On religious, cultural, economic, political and social grounds, differences between the Irish immigrants and New Brunswickers existed. It is not to be wondered at if these led to verbal, and at times physical, disagreements.

The province did not have to wait very long before the latter type of disturbance took place. On the Twelfth of July, 1847, Orangemen and Irish Catholics had rioted in St. John and Fredericton, resulting in loss of life and the calling in of troops. Even more serious upheavals took place in the lumber town of Woodstock. Here it appeared that a number of adventurous lumbermen in the area came to town to help out the Orangemen and get in a few licks against competitors in the labour market. For several days the town was run by mob-rule, the magistrates obviously unwilling to take strong action and showing a distinct lack of sympathy for Irish Catholics. The following year it was accepted without question that there would be further riots. It was therefore almost to be expected that the Orange parade in St. John on the 12th in 1849 would result in an outbreak of violence. This expectation was fulfilled and Timothy Anglin, who had just arrived in the city a short time before, was an interested observer.

IV

There were many inhabitants of St. John who had sober thoughts in the aftermath of the riot. One of them was Timothy Anglin. In the Morning News of July 18th a letter was printed over the initials "J. A.", which in fact was Anglin. The letter was lengthy but well-written and interesting -- characteristics that were to be typical -- and very impressive to certain elements of the St. John community. The author of the letter
depreciated sectarian strife and implored men to co-operate for the good of the country. He claimed that one benefit of the Great Famine had been that because it had affected all men alike, Protestants and Catholics, landlords and merchants, mechanics and peasants, all had drawn together to combat the problem at hand.

But, amidst all this suffering and desolation, there was one source of consolation; and many began to think that what seemed so awful a visitation of the Almighty in his wrath, might prove, in his hands, a means to work out the greatest good. For the good, the wise, and the charitable of every class in Society, forgetting everything that had so long divided them, united heart and soul to work for the relief of their suffering countrymen. The Catholic Priests and the Protestant Rectors struggled together, might and main, to succour and relieve their afflicted people, never stopping to ask if this man were a Catholic, or that a Protestant. Those insane and contemptible feuds that had so long divided and weakened the people, and delivered them as it were bound hand and foot, to be dealt with by their Alien Government as it pleased, were now looked back with regret by men who had once engaged in them earnestly. Irishmen began at length to see that if they wished to save their country, the union of all classes and of all religion was necessary and everything seemed to promise that this was all but effected.

If an old, established country such as Ireland found that the common good required co-operation between people, how much more did a new, undeveloped territory like New Brunswick require it? Obviously New Brunswick needed such harmony, Anglin iterated in putting forward the Catholic viewpoint concerning the riot. The city authorities, he claimed, were culpable for allowing things to get out of hand. The easiest remedy would have been to disallow the Orange procession or at least to prevent it from going through an Irish Catholic section of town known as York Point. Failure to do this and failure to make proper use of the troops available had led almost inevitably to violence. The Catholics had not been blameless and should have ignored the insult offered them, as many did, but the Orangemen should not have been allowed to try them so. In criticizing the authorities the letter directed attention
to the results of the riot on the Catholic community of St. John.

All confidence in the authorities is lost, more especially by the humble men of the Catholic party, who took no part in the late fight, because they wished to show an example of christian charity and forgiveness, and because they believed that the authorities would preserve the peace. Many of these now look on these same authorities as partizans, and literally regret that they did not stand by their friends in the hour of danger.

The difficulty with such a situation was that all members of the Irish Catholic community would be alienated from the society in which they were now living, and an alienated segment of society has no respect for the laws and institutions of said society. Anglin was therefore warning the authorities that unless they evinced a different spirit towards Catholics, difficulties were bound to ensue. Thus at the outset of Anglin's career in New Brunswick he assumed a role of leadership for the Irish Catholics. He had publicized the Catholic viewpoint and at the same time had indicated that it was reform not rebellion that he was interested in. He had told New Brunswick that if it wished to have Irish Catholics respect its institutions and obey its laws then it had to meet more of their needs and give the benefits of its society to them. Failure to do so would mean that the peace-loving and moderate men of the Irish Catholic community would lose all influence and lawless and more radical elements would gain the ascendancy. The methods of leadership which Anglin used throughout his career can be glimpsed in this letter to the News. He was outspoken enough in his censure of the authorities to merit the support of the Irish Catholics, but at the same time it was sufficiently apparent to the authorities that what he wished was the pacification of the Irish community and so they were willing to listen to his criticism and take some action to rectify the situation. As long as an individual is able to maintain his prestige
in both camps this is a fairly effective means of leadership. It is not, however, a method likely to bring its practitioner much personal popularity because it very often entails the criticism of the persons being addressed. For a group such as the Irish Catholics in a society such as New Brunswick, it was perhaps the only type of leadership likely to produce results desired, in the long run, by all. Anglin was admirably suited for such leadership, for although he was a staunch Irish Catholic, and thus a natural leader of his fellow immigrants, his educational attainments and his socio-economic background made him almost acceptable to those in authority in New Brunswick.

This letter was Anglin's introduction to journalism and it may well be taken to express his philosophy at the beginning of his career. The fairness of its approach and its conciliatory manner won the attention of St. John and before long the anonymous letter-writer was unmasked. A number of the supporters of the so-called Liberal party liked what they had seen and were willing to support this young man in establishing a newspaper. Anglin, despite his ignorance of the newspaper business, was willing to accept this support along with that, presumably, of Catholic leaders in the community. Despite Anglin's qualifications for leadership, his rapid -- indeed meteoric -- rise to prominence and the tone of his letter to the News lead one to suspect that his leap to leadership was not wholly fortuitous. Indeed it seems quite possible that Anglin had been 'imported' to quarterback the 'Fighting Irish' of St. John. Whatever the case, there was no denying that Anglin's ascension from anonymity was rapid. Only nine days after his letter appeared in the News, the same paper carried an advertisement which was the prospectus for a newspaper called the Freeman. This statement claimed
that the Irish did not possess the position in the community to which
numbers and 'respectability' entitled them.

In the Executive Council, in the House of Assembly, even in the Com-
mon Council of the City they are unrepresented. In fact such is the
unprotected position of a certain class of Irishmen in this City at
present, and so little influence do they possess in its magisterial
and police departments, that they seem to have very slight security
indeed for either their lives or their properties.74

What was needed was a means whereby the Irish could unite and make their
voice heard and weight felt. Anglin promised that his newspaper, the
Freeman, would supply this need. On August 4th, the first issue of this
new paper made its appearance. The News, which had acted as a sort of
foster-father, welcomed it to the newspaper world of New Brunswick:

This [the Freeman] is the title of a paper recently started in this
City, to advocate Catholic and Irish interests. Its Editor is Mr. J.
Warren Anglin. The articles are exceedingly well written, and in a
good tone of spirit. The descendants of Ireland in this City will
now have what they never had before to represent them -- viz: a
talented and respectably conducted journal; and they ought to give it
their best support.75

Even if the News did not know the first initial in Anglin's name, it was
a flattering reception for his newspaper to receive.

With the founding of the Freeman, Anglin entered an occupation which he
was to follow for the next forty years. Of course, in 1849 he could not
have realized that. In 1849, becoming a newspaper editor represented an
opportunity to present the Irish Catholic viewpoint to the New Brunswick
populace. It also provided an opportunity to earn the leadership of the
Irish Catholic community in New Brunswick.
FOOTNOTES

1 This spelling, used in the newspapers, has been followed throughout, instead of the spelling -- Saint John -- used by most present-day residents of the city.

2 "A" (perhaps Anglin) to Editor, July 31, 1857, in the New Era (Montreal), Aug. 4, 1857. The author of the letter claimed that the riot turned emigrants away from New Brunswick permanently. Another account of the riot is to be found in J. F. W. Johnston, Notes on North America: Agricultural, Economical and Social (Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood and Sons, 1851), II, 143.


7 A more detailed study of the influence of geographic factors is found in Whitelaw, op. cit., pp. 9-24.

8 Putnam, op. cit., p. 79.


11 Gesner, op. cit., p. 298.

12 Ibid., p. 292.

13 Cross, op. cit., p. 68.

14 Ibid., p. 81.


16 Gesner, op. cit., p. 256. Gesner saw that lumbering had many advantages, particularly the fact that the industry opened up the country and provided the province with a large revenue (see ibid., p. 238).

17 Freeman, Oct. 18, 1878.


20 Cross, op. cit., p. 112.

21 P. A. C., C. O. 193, New Brunswick Blue Books of Statistics, XXX (1847), 15; XXXIII (1850), 16; XXVIII (1845), 167; and XXXIII (1850), 128 and 133. Exports from the city of St. John declined from over
£810,000 in 1846 to £588,466 only two years later (see Johnston, op. cit., I, 40).
22 P. A. C., Sir Edmund Head Papers, IV, Head to Sir George Cornwall Lewis, July 2, 1849.
27 Johnston, op. cit., II, 153. Johnston's lack of sympathy with the Irish runs throughout his writings. There is a great deal of evidence showing that it was discontent of merchants not Irishmen that lay behind the small annexation agitation in the province.
33 P. A. C., C. O. 193, XXXIII (1850), 113.
37 Gesner, op. cit., p. 328.
38 Ibid.
39 MacNutt, op. cit., pp. 49-53. This book provides the best detailed account of political developments in New Brunswick that is available. To cite just one example of long-lived political power, Jonathan Odell and his son held the office of Provincial Secretary for no less than sixty consecutive years.
40 Ibid., pp. 52 and 58-62.
41 Gesner, op. cit., p. 337.
44 MacNutt, New Brunswick ..., p. 226.
45 MacNutt, art. cit., pp. 64-65.
46 A number of examples of this lack of understanding are found in Kerr, op. cit., p. 28.
47 A detailed analysis of the formation of the 1848 executive is given in ibid., pp. 27-36.
48 P. A. C., C. O. 384, LXXIX, 42.
49 Ibid., pp. 185-186 (Eight General Report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, May 17, 1848, pp. 36-37). One feature of this emigration was that it was much more evenly distributed between male and female than the Irish emigration to Canada.
51 C. O. 193, New Brunswick Blue Books of Statistics, XXX (1847), 18. Indirect relief was provided by increasing the amounts to be spent on building roads. Expenses incurred from the care of the sick and destitute were defrayed by the British Government after pressure for this had arisen in New Brunswick (see C. O. 384, LXXXI, 174 (Eight ... Report of the ... Emigration Commissioners ... 1848, p. 15)).
52 C. O. 384, LXXXI, 175 (Eight ... Report of the ... Emigration Commissioners ... 1848, p. 17); and P. A. N. B., New Brunswick Executive Council Papers, XXXI, 216-217, Sir William M. G. Colebrooke to Earl Grey, July 2, 1847.
53 C. O. 384, LXXXI, 175 (Eight ... Report of the ... Emigration Commissioners ... 1848, p. 17).
54 Ibid., p. 174.
56 Ibid., XXXI, 185, Isaac Woodward to Saunders, June 28, 1847.
57 Ibid., XXXI, 187-190, Woodward to John R. Partelow, June 28, 1847, enclosed in Woodward to Saunders, June 28, 1847.
58 W. K. Reynolds, "The Year of the Fever," The New Brunswick Magazine, I (1898), 208. The death of Collins might have opened the way, so to speak, for another Catholic doctor, Anglin's friend, Boyle Travers.
59 New Brunswick Executive Council Papers, XXXII, 827-840 (Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor to enquire into the state of Emigrants upon Partridge Island and at the Alms House, Sept. 6, 1847). There is an interesting reply by a committee of the St. John Common Council to this report in ibid., XXXII, 846-854.
60 Reynolds, art. cit., p. 211.
61 New Brunswick Executive Council Papers, XXXII, 828.
62 Ibid., XXXII, 837-840.
66 Quoted in ibid., p. 130.
67 Ibid., p. 161.
68 New Brunswick Executive Council Papers, CXXII, 101-110, Colebrooke to Grey, July 31, 1847.
69 Ibid., CXXII, 179-180, Carleton County Magistrates Report, July 14, 1847.
70 Head Papers, III, Head to Lt. Col. Brown, [May 13-16?], 1847.
71 Quoted in the New Freeman (St. John), Jan. 6, 1900.
72 Ibid.
73 Apparently it was Boyle Travers who suggested the name of the paper (see New Freeman, Jan. 6, 1900). It was an interesting choice. Dublin's Freeman had been, according to Gavan Duffy, "the organ of the commercial class -- a class who desire what is right and just as far as they understand it, but who are commonly deficient in imagination and political faith and easily alarmed by novelty or enthusiasm." (see G. Duffy, Four Years of Irish History 1845-1849: A Sequel to "Young Ireland" (London: Cassell, Petter, Galpin and Co., 1883), p. 297). A more recent analysis claims that during the first half of the nineteenth century it was a "solid and respectable daily concentrating on advertisements. At no time during this period was it influential." (see B. Inglis, "The Press," Social Life in Ireland 1800-45, ed. R. B. McDowell (Dublin: Colm O Lochlainn, 1957), p. 105). In the new world another Freeman already existed, Freeman's Journal and Catholic Register of New York city. It was the mouthpiece of Bishop (later Archbishop) John Hughes, the vigorous 'defender' of Catholic rights in the United States (see R. A. Billington, The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860: A Study in the Origins of American Nativism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books Inc., 1964), p. 146).
74 Morning News (St. John), July 27, 1849.
75 Ibid., Aug. 20, 1849.
CHAPTER 3

Acclimatization: 1849-1857

The greatest challenge facing Anglin upon coming to New Brunswick was to acclimatize himself to his new environment and to earn himself a position of respect in these surroundings. The theme of acclimatization involves an analysis of Anglin establishing himself as a force in New Brunswick, the nature of this position and the ways in which this was accomplished, as far as can be judged in the absence of a file of the Freeman between 1849 and 1857. The most important means used by Anglin to entrench and elevate himself in the province was his mouthpiece, the Freeman. Still, obviously important to Anglin's position and the nature of his acclimatization was the condition of the Irish community and its leaders within New Brunswick society, for the simple reason that Anglin's status cannot be divorced from the status of the group. His position was also related to issues because status, especially for a newspaper editor, was intimately connected with effectiveness in discussing important questions, particularly political issues. While a complete assessment of the varied aspects of Anglin's acclimatization between 1849 and 1857 cannot be made while reliance must be placed on quotations from the Freeman in other papers and on other glimpses of the man which appeared from time to time, enough information remains for at least an impressionistic account of the man and his role during those years.

I

Despite the fact that there are fewer than a dozen issues of the Freeman available today for the period prior to 1858, evidence in other newspapers shows that the circulation and influence of the Freeman spread
rapidly throughout New Brunswick although Anglin, who does not seem to have been an extremely good businessman, did not make much money from it. The Freeman could even boast that Gavan Duffy's Nation had quoted from it.\textsuperscript{1} However, all was not a bed of roses for the Freeman, and failure of a number of his subscribers to pay their debts caused the paper to fold in November, 1850, an occasion which gave provincial newspapers an opportunity to assess Anglin and his newspaper. The Courier, a fairly temperate and neutral paper, regretted its demise:

He should have been supported not only by his own countrymen, but also by the rest of the community, as his paper has been well conducted, his language moderate and his reporting generally considered very correct. We sincerely wish he may be more fortunate in his next undertaking.\textsuperscript{2}

Apparently there was enough similar feeling in the province that Anglin was able to resume publication in February of the following year. This time he called his paper, which was to be published three times a week,\textsuperscript{3} the Morning Freeman. This organization was obviously successful for the Freeman made a regular tri-weekly appearance in New Brunswick for the next quarter of a century.

By means of this newspaper, Anglin quickly made himself known in St. John and throughout the province. It did not take Anglin very long to become embroiled in controversy with various newspapers and personages. In May, 1851, for example, he was accused by the acting Police Magistrate of Portland, Henry G. Simonds, of willfully perverting the facts in connection with a court case.\textsuperscript{4} The Magistrate's outspoken antagonism towards Anglin tended to show that the Freeman's doubts of the court's objectivity in dealing with somewhat unruly firemen -- doubtless Irishmen -- were probably correct.\textsuperscript{5}

One of the newspaper jobs that kept Anglin busy was his reporting. He
had an amazing memory, apparently being able to sit and listen to a meeting, taking nary a note and yet the account in the *Freeman* would be a full and accurate report "not only of the nouns used by the speakers but the adjectives qualifying them." The result was that given Anglin's interest in what was going on in the community, he attended and reported on almost all of the meetings of note that were held in St. John. He was there for many of the Common Council meetings, present for a very large number of court cases, and in attendance for most special meetings or lectures held in the city. Before long, other newspapers, particularly the *Courier*, began to rely upon the accounts furnished by the *Freeman*. Reports of fires, thefts, beatings and mishaps were usually quoted from this source. During the period under discussion Anglin spent a month or two of the year in Fredericton reporting the debates in the Assembly. In 1852 he was paid by a number of St. John merchants to provide the city with reports of legislative proceedings which were printed in various city newspapers. In subsequent years Anglin was present listening to the speeches of the members of the Assembly and reporting them. This gave him almost as much knowledge of political affairs in the province as if he had been an elected member and he was not reticent to put this knowledge to use and express his views on New Brunswick politics.

In debating with the editors of other newspapers, Anglin quickly developed a skill that was unsurpassed in the province. One early example of this was the occasion on which the *Freeman* replied to an assault by a Fredericton paper, the *New Brunswicker*:

The attacks on the *Freeman* we generally passed unnoticed, regarding them as the emanation of a mind ill at ease and ranking with the sense of public contempt and scorn well deserved and richly earned. These ebullitions, the public ... knew how to estimate at the proper value, and while they gratified the *New Brunswicker*, they were
otherwise harmless. It is hardly fair in the writer, however, to make this present attack on the English language and endeavour to pervert the meaning of words in such a way. What has he to do with such words as — Onward, Progress, Justice, Honesty, Truth and the Rights of the People. If he is incapable of understanding their meaning he should cease to use them. 9

Obviously, Anglin's language was not always geared towards making friends and at times his enthusiasm carried him to great extremes, such as the occasion he claimed that "it would not be more absurd to discuss Temperance in a grog shop, Honesty with a receiver of stolen goods, or Chastity in a brothel, than to enter on a religious controversy with the Chronicle." 10 Vigorous writing of this type made Anglin's name well-known — if not always liked — throughout New Brunswick.

II

While the Freeman was establishing itself in St. John, the Irish community it represented was struggling to do the same. In terms of numbers the Irish had done quite well. There was an Irish Catholic element in almost every county of the province but the largest concentration was in St. John. Even the most conservative estimate would have to suggest that Irish Catholics formed a third of the population of St. John city and county and if the exact percentage could be determined it would probably be considerably higher. But numbers did not ensure the Irish a comfortable position within New Brunswick society. 11

The process of acculturation of any immigrant group is always difficult. That of Irish Catholics was particularly so. Many immigrant groups have not had one advantage that the Irish had — that of speaking the same language as the majority group. 12 But while this had some undoubted advantages it also had its difficulties. In most cases an immigrant having to learn to speak a language also picks up the thought processes
and cultural baggage of the majority almost by osmosis. The Irish were not forced to go through this purging process and in one sense this made acculturation even more difficult than that of foreign-language groups. It has already been shown that the Irish had a vastly different approach to and philosophy of life than the natives of the province. The question that remains to be asked is: What acculturation patterns developed in St. John in the decade after the coming of the Famine Irish?\textsuperscript{13}

Irish experience in the new world was not discontinuous with that of the old, but rather a quite successful attempt to retain peasant socio-cultural values. Almost all characteristics displayed by Irishmen in North America can also be seen in the land from which they came. Certainly violence, lawlessness, drunkenness and poverty were far from unknown in Ireland. Even the tendency of the Irish to gravitate towards the urban centres can be attributed to Irish peasant social organization and communal spirit.\textsuperscript{14}

The distances, the wildness, but above all the physical and social isolation taken for granted by Canadian farmers overwhelmed the Irish peasant. Used to constant companionship in large social groups he was appalled by the isolation imposed by the structure of Canadian agriculture, and apparently found it impossible, in a rural situation, to recreate his traditional pattern of life. His response was to flee the countryside and reestablish the essentials of the old social structure in an urban setting.\textsuperscript{15}

Work in railway gangs and lumber camps was not all that different from work in the harvesting groups which had been common in Ireland, particularly in the south and west from whence came the large bulk of immigrants. Finally, the 'rough and ready' tactics to which the Irish frequently resorted in order to make economic gains, was "traceable to a situation in which his relations with outsiders [including landowners] the Irishman made his own law or got none."
The violence, characteristic of the famine immigrants among themselves and directed at others, indicates not massive social disorganization but the persistence of a social order.\textsuperscript{16}

The existence of a sub-society within a society was evident in St. John in the period 1847-1857 and beyond. From the beginning the Irish had been segregated from the rest of the community and this pattern continued. In the organizations of the city Irish Catholics were conspicuous by their absence. The only exceptions to this general rule occurred if the individual in question had long been a resident of the province or if he had particular qualifications meriting attention. But even a person like Anglin, who was better educated than most inhabitants of St. John, was not to be found on executive committees for such groups as the Mechanics' Institute -- a middle class organization which presented lectures on a wide variety of subjects -- or the Early Closing Association of St. John -- which had already won most of its desires regarding hours of business and by 1857 was really more of a club than anything else.

Even the St. Patrick's Society of St. John was isolated from the Catholic natives of the Emerald Isle. In fact the names of those on the executive for 1857 lead one to suspect that even their Irish blood was not unmixed. The President was Robert Armstrong; John A. Morrison was the Vice-President; John Magee and William Hutchinson filled the offices of Treasurer and Secretary respectively; and the Committee of Charity was composed of Thomas Parks, William F. Smith and Alexander Adams.\textsuperscript{17} As a result, Irish Catholics formed their own organization, the Irish Friendly Society.\textsuperscript{18} By and large the Irish Catholic community was separate from the rest of the community. No doubt this was partly by choice and partly by necessity.

The attitude displayed in the province towards Anglin's compatriots was
mixed. The News accused the Colonial Advocate of bigotry towards Catholics and stated that this "ought to be frowned down by every liberal minded man in the country."\(^{19}\) The Reporter in the capital city was less sympathetic:

If ever there was a Town suffering under the infliction imposed by the dregs of a criminal-pauper population, that town is Fredericton ... Drunkeness [sic], that great source of general evil, but especially of seduction, and debauchery, has entailed upon us a large number of persons of all ages and sexes, who maintain themselves by the commission of crimes too indecent to be named, or in the event of being committed, lie upon our hands for support in the jail or Alms House -- The Law, if we have any law -- is inadequate for their punishment. We tell our Legislators, that this state of things must not continue to the end of another session. We must have a law to enable the Mayor of the City to send those pests to the Provincial Penitentiary, where they must cease from their foul practices for a time, and work for their living, instead of the indiscriminate plunder which they now raise from the public.\(^{20}\)

While the above is unquestionably an overstatement in regard to the Irish, it does indicate that they were living in poor conditions. The tales of murder, robbery, drunkenness, wife beating and other forms of anti-social and illegal behavior were frequent. The Freeman made a concerted effort to cover the court cases in St. John, partly, no doubt, to ensure that justice was done, but mainly in order to preach to the Irish the folly and sinfulness of such activities. Again, this was part of Anglin's job of being an Irish representative. He had to 'improve' the Irish Catholics in order to make more legitimate his demands for increased recognition and rights for them. There was a good deal of 'improvement' that could be made. The Irish tradition of violence and lawlessness was not easily overcome, as Edmund Head noted in commenting that many Irishmen felt that it was "an ungracious and disgraceful act to assist in handing a man over to Justice."\(^{21}\) The Freeman most certainly did not share that opinion. It supported the forces of law and
order, but by no means uncritically.

For Irish misbehaviour there were mitigating circumstances. Their living conditions were deplorable. Overcrowding, poverty, disease and lack of sanitation were almost as typical of Irish ghettos in St. John as they had been in Ireland. Such conditions meant that when the cholera again visited St. John in 1854 its weight was felt most strongly by the Irish, and it seems logical to assume that the majority of the 1,500 to 2,000 who then perished were of this extraction. The cholera produced more 'stringent' regulations and thenceforth "no pigs, and not more than two cows," could be kept on any city premises. Bad conditions occasionally led the Irish to take matters into their own hands very much in the Irish peasant tradition. In 1855, for instance, Mr. Cushing, the owner of saw mills near the city, insisted that his men work a ten-and-a-half hour day despite the workers' desire to work only ten. He told them in true capitalistic style that if they didn't like the terms they could quit. Some of the workers succumbed to the logic of his argument and went back to work. Others left.

Those who left went round to the other Mills, and to the wharves, and succeeded in mustering a gang of some 60 or 70 rowdies. They then went to Mr. Cushing's Mills and demanded him to shut down his saws. On his refusing, they knocked down him and his son, beat several of the men, and endeavoured to drive out all who were working there. In this, however, they failed. On Saturday night last a volley of seven shots was fired into the sleeping apartment of Mr. Cushing's men, evidently aimed for the beds, as several of the shots passed close to the heads of those who were sleeping there. There can be no doubt but the murderous attack was made by the same party who attacked the Mills. It is satisfactory to know that the rascals are all known, and that lists of their names having been furnished to other employers, they will be obliged to seek employment elsewhere.

It was a classic example of pre-union labour strife.

The Irish of St. John showed great versatility in their ability to find ways of knocking heads with somebody. One thing that was always popular
with Irishmen in the new world were fire companies. These were volunteer organizations which aside from providing a useful service for the community were also social clubs for its members. The volunteers had companionship, some prestige in the community, a few parades and parties each year, and the excitement that fire-fighting could provide. The fourth company of St. John was Irish and its members were energetic and enthusiastic. As an example of the comradeship of the Irish and of the *Freeman*'s attitude towards the authorities and to law and order, an incident which occurred in 1853 is admirable. The fourth company was helping to subdue a blaze when an altercation broke out and several firemen were arrested. The *Freeman* delved into the story and made its report:

As far as we can learn, John Callaghan was charged with having endeavoured to break through the line of the Fire Police, and on being prevented became excited. When he was arrested an attempt was made to rescue him and it is said that the Police Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police were both struck. It is certain that at one time there seemed great reason to apprehend a disturbance and but for the assistance of a body of Soldiers the Police would hardly have succeeded in getting the men to the Watch House. It is said that Callaghan, who had worked hard at the fire, did little to cause his arrest and that the consciousness of this it was that excited his comrades. However this may be, they were wrong in attempting a rescue.26

The contribution of Irish Catholics to New Brunswick was by no means entirely of a destructive nature. It was they who provided much of the muscle which was necessary for the New Brunswick economy. Even within St. John, they provided the city with one of its most distinguished buildings, the Cathedral. Timothy Anglin was one of those selected to serve on the Building Committee which was to solicit funds for this edifice, just as he had been on the committee of four who had been named to frame a welcoming address to Thomas Louis Connolly who became Bishop of the province in 1852.27 In sundry other ways the Irish were
making a positive contribution. Yet they were still an isolated portion of the community. It was to take much longer than a single decade for the Irish Catholics of New Brunswick to become acculturized. Until this occurred they needed a spokesman.

During the 1850's Hibernians had two champions, one old, one new. William End was the first of these, Anglin the second. End is unfortunately an almost unknown figure in New Brunswick history but not the less fascinating because of it. A community of Irish Catholics had been established on the Miramichi in the 1820's and End had quickly risen to its leadership in spite of being a Protestant. In a very stormy election he had won the constituency of Gloucester in 1830 and for years thereafter championed the interests of his Irish and Acadian supporters. He gained the reputation for being a rather quick-tempered and odd individual, but this reputation may have been the result of his democratic proclivities and social background. His pugnacity was shown on one occasion in Boston when an American lawyer called him names. The lawyer soon found that he had tangled with the wrong person as he was forced to withdraw from the scene on account of nasal congestion caused by Mr. End's fist. End was talented in many ways aside from his pugilistic skill. He was a gifted public speaker; a writer effective enough to undertake the editorship of the Fredericton Head Quarters for a time in 1857; a lawyer skilful enough to have an office in Boston; and respectable enough to be considered as a mayoralty candidate for Fredericton in 1856, to be President of the St. Patrick's Society of the capital in the same year, and even to be named by one newspaper as the leader of the Opposition in the Assembly in 1857. End's career is particularly interesting in the light of that of Anglin. The former had
started off as a reformer but by 1833 he had become so alienated from them that he threw his support to the other side. The champion of radical and new ideas thus found himself a lonely champion of the royal prerogative. Anglin was to find himself in much the same position in 1856. End became somewhat of a 'loose fish' in the sea of New Brunswick politics, speaking boldly on many issues but finding a home in no political faction. One applauded him when he attacked one's political enemies but gave him no quarter when he argued on the other side of the case. In the 1850 session of the legislature he had voted against the Shediac to St. John Railway and the News of April 26 passed judgment on him.

It was only a fortnight since, that we hailed Mr. End, as an addition to the radical body guard; he spoke so valiantly upon our Colonial rights and sufferings ... But he turns out to be a viper; or half man, half fox; too crotchety to depend upon from one debate to another. He is as active as a flee [sic] ... and just as hard to catch.

Anglin was to be subject to similar charges before his career was over.

While in the North Shore End held an entrenched position, Anglin was just establishing himself in St. John. The Freeman brought him considerable prestige and with it he quickly filled the leadership vacuum in St. John. No sooner had he nicely established the Freeman than he accepted one of the vice-president positions in the St. John Roman Catholic Total Abstinence Relief Society along with W. H. Needham, the St. John Alderman and politician of note, who was later to join with Anglin in the newspaper struggle against Confederation. Timothy was re-elected in 1850 but by the next year he was not even on the executive committee, a fact which likely indicated that he was no longer an active member of the organization. Aside from his association with this Society and with the Cathedral building committee, Anglin was caught up in the
railway fever that swept St. John in 1850. On August 15, a meeting was held in St. John to receive the reports of the delegates to the Portland convention where tentative plans had been drafted for the building of the European and North American Railway which was to connect Portland (and points east and south) with Shediac by way of St. John. At this meeting Anglin was named one of the two secretaries appointed to keep track of proceedings. By September, he had been prevailed upon to act as one of four who were to solicit subscriptions for the Railway in Queen's Ward. In fact, he himself was one of the original stockholders in the Company along with almost every other notable in St. John. The fact that he had expended both his time and money, accounts, in part, for the interest which Anglin always took in the project.

After 1850 Anglin's name does not appear in any of the lists of the executives or members of the various organizations in the city, with the exception of the work for his Church. The reasons for this are not known and can hardly even be guessed at. No doubt his newspaper kept him very busy especially after it became a tri-weekly in February of 1851. It is also quite feasible that bachelor Timothy did not wish to spend all his leisure time in male company. An item which appeared in the News of December 2, 1853, lends credence to these hypotheses.

*Nabbed at Last!* -- One of our cotemporaries, to whom we proposed a short time since, a series of topics to write upon, has, since Saturday last, been turning one subject -- that of Bachelors -- to a very practical, and we hope it will turn out useful account. After all, we have not hinted to him in vain, and we shall expect a large slice of wedding cake for having been the means of stirring his courage up to the sticking point. Our friend will now have a place to spend his evenings besides in the Printing Office. We shall have some capital editorials after this. But how the deuce is it, that the event has not been announced? What's the lady's name? Come tell us about it.

The lady's name was Margaret O'Regan, and the newlyweds, along with the
bride's sister, resided on Peter's street. The marriage came to a tragic end, when on June 2, 1855, Margaret died.\(^39\) Death had become a large part of life for Timothy Anglin. No children had been born to the couple and this may have been a blessing as the editor had his hands full without having sole responsibility for the upbringing of a child.

### III

The main issues which faced New Brunswick, and therefore Anglin and his Freeman, at mid-century, were the issues of railways, reciprocity, annexation and British North American co-operation.\(^40\) All of these subjects arose from the economic difficulties of the province and as times improved, concern about all but railways waned. And times did improve. British free trade did not ruin the province as so many prophets of doom had forecast. Even as early as February of 1850 the Courier recognized this fact:

> [J]udging from the number of vessels at present constructing in this Province, (many of them of a superior description) it does not appear as if those engaged in that line of business were about to be ruined yet ... \(^41\)

By late 1852 things were truly on the upswing. The Freeman in noting this, urged "prudence, caution and economy" and the paying off of the city debt, upon city officials.\(^42\) By the late autumn of 1853 the Freeman was complaining that the city was not large enough to accommodate its inhabitants and was urging businessmen to take up the challenge and the opportunity which became even greater during the boom years in which the Reciprocity Treaty was in force.\(^43\)

The agitation in favor of annexation was never very formidable in the province of the Loyalists. Lieutenant Governor Head, certainly nobody's fool, dismissed annexationist and independence sentiments:
'Annexation' for the most part represents nothing but the desire of access to the markets of the United States & 'independence' expresses a feeling that they are neglected by Great Britain & a conviction that the connection is not valued by the Mother Country.\textsuperscript{44}

The News seemed to verify this assessment:

\textit{Independence} is the word that ought to be used by all who expect to gain anything by the asking. Texas first secured her independence before she knocked for admission into the Union; and if Canada and New Brunswick expect to gain any commercial advantages with the neighbouring Republic, they must pursue the same course. But this independence must be gained by diplomacy, and not by artillery ...\textsuperscript{45}

Most New Brunswick newspapers did not agree with the sentiments of Fenety, the editor of the News, and would not seriously listen to any arguments in favour of annexation.\textsuperscript{46} The editor of the Freeman, as might have been expected from a recent arrival from Ireland, and connected with the News and the reformers of St. John, was more willing to keep an open mind on the subject. In response to Grey's despatch to Elgin concerning the Annexation Manifesto of Canada,\textsuperscript{47} Anglin wrote:

Unless they (the ministry) declare it treason to assert what every one knows to be free [undoubtedly a typographical error -- the word surely was "true"], that as States of the Union, these Provinces would enjoy a prosperity to which, as Provinces, they must ever be strangers. It is difficult to tell whether this extraordinary Dispatch [sic] is more remarkable for the insolence and tyranny it displays, or for the folly and absurdity, at which men cannot forbear to smile. In truth it is a precious specimen of the wisdom, the justice, and the moderation of this paternal government, to which place men and pensioners can feel such unbounded loyalty.\textsuperscript{48}

Obviously the Irish experience had not failed to make an impression on the man from Clonakilty. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Freeman seldom made comments of an anti-imperial nature. Other newspapers frequently made reference to the attitude of the News but not about Anglin's paper. Had there been anything to complain about they would have remained quiet.

British North American Union received somewhat greater consideration in
New Brunswick and the New Brunswick Colonial Association put forward this possibility although reciprocity was its main goal. The Head Quarters and the Courier gave cautious support to the idea. The News was willing to consider the proposal but was concerned lest it was used as "a mere bait thrown out to catch gudgeons -- a Tory manoeuvre," which would lead men's attention away from more important questions such as colonial independence. Anglin's views on the question at the time are not known but it would seem likely that he would not be wildly enthusiastic about the idea. Probably his position was much like that of the News. In any case there is nothing to indicate that in his later opposition to union he was being inconsistent with any previous position on the question.

In regard to reciprocity and railways there is little to indicate the Freeman's position in regard to the former. One must suppose, however, that given Anglin's belief that New Brunswick's economic future lay in increased trade with the United States and his propagation of the doctrine of free trade, that he was in favour of the legislation from the very beginning. Certainly he was an advocate of its benefits in later years, and prior to its negotiation he ridiculed the idea that the United States had nothing to offer as adequate compensation for allowing Americans into the inshore fisheries.

It would not be too far-fetched to say that discussion about railways took up almost as much room in provincial newspapers as all other subjects combined. These discussions were extremely complex, tortuous, confusingly intermingled with the politics of the province, and, if the truth be told, very tedious. In brief, there were two main possibilities for the province. An intercolonial railway could be built which would
connect New Brunswick with Canada on the one hand and Nova Scotia on the other. An alternate line was one which would link up the province with the United States. These two projects were not necessarily mutually exclusive as it was possible that parts of both lines could run on the same tracks. However competition developed because the North Shore was not willing to see the St. John Valley reap all the benefits of the iron horse. Nor were British authorities anxious to help build an Intercolonial Railway, which was to be used in emergencies as a military highway, that was not as far away from the American border as possible. On the other hand any scheme which did not provide for railway connection for the St. John Valley would meet with tremendous opposition from the southern and western counties. As a result of colonial confusion and British uninterest, the plan for an Intercolonial fell through, and the European and North American -- the grandiose name given to the line which was to connect Portland, Maine and Shediac, New Brunswick -- was delayed.

The *Freeman*, as a proponent of St. John interests, naturally enough supported the European and North American line above all others, if a choice had to be made. Aside from more general considerations Anglin had expended both his time and money on this venture. As well, the construction of this railway would provide work for many Irish labourers looking for jobs around St. John. Anglin was so concerned about the E. & N. A. Railway (as the *Freeman* frequently called it), that he was most unsympathetic to anything that seemed to put barriers in its way. He was always happy to see work on the line proceeding and continually prodded the Government to make even greater efforts. The completion of the E. & N. A. quickly became one of the most important planks in the *Freeman*'s politico-economic program.
IV

Railways may have been potent sources of division in New Brunswick particularly by the mid 1850's, but in the early part of the decade party differentiation, if it can be dignified by labelling it such, was on somewhat more ideological grounds. For purposes of simplicity, one could stretch a generalization to its utmost limit and say that there were reformers in the province; reformers who wished to see the complete introduction of Responsible Government, including the diminution of the power of the Colonial Office as represented by the Lieutenant Governor. The difficulties faced by the Lieutenant Governor, Sir Edmund Head, in his attempt to introduce responsible government into the province were legion. Yet Head's poor opinion of colonial politicians led him to underestimate their capabilities for running their own affairs. He, in fact, assumed the actual leadership of the Government by forming a coalition administration under his guidance. This may have been a necessary evil, but in a sense it was a denial of the very principles he was trying to promote. The means used very often change the goal and in this case the pattern of dependence on the Governor was not broken. He did not force provincial politicians to bear the weight of responsibility as Elgin did in Canada by signing the Rebellion Losses Bill.

The great difficulty with Head's coalition Government was that its members all had widely divergent ideas and therefore the administration had no clearly defined policy. In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, the administration managed to revamp itself after the 1850 election and carried on in power until the election of 1854.

The News was the most outspoken exponent of reform principles when Anglin arrived on the scene and it is significant that it was to this
paper that Anglin sent his letter of July, 1849. By natural inclination the Freeman sided with the reformers and it did not take long for the newspaper wars of New Brunswick to confirm its position. Anglin's unequivocal attitude towards the administration came out early in August, 1851. The occasion was the astounding news that two of the supposed opponents of the Government had taken office in it. John H. Gray and Robert D. Wilmot were the 'turncoats'. This caused a tremendous storm of protest from the Courier and the News. Even the Reporter of Fredericton showed disapproval but intimatated that this was what might be expected from St. John representatives. As Wilmot had accepted the office of Surveyor General he was forced to appear before the electors of St. John County in a by-election. The Freeman took a most decided stand on the issue. He accused Gray and Wilmot of "political corruption, treachery, and baseness," and made a strong appeal to the electors:

They have just been guilty of the highest crimes that representatives of the people can commit; they have sold you and betrayed you for their own aggrandisement [sic]; and they have now the hardihood, the daring to put forward one of their number to try if you will be so besotted as to approve of their conduct. That conduct was a deep injury and foul wrong to you and to the liberal cause; but this is a downright insult ... to your honesty as men and electors.

There was little doubt as to the political sympathies of Timothy Anglin. During the reign of the coalition, the Freeman acted as a critic of the Government and was somewhat of a financial watchdog as seen in one ironic comment made during the 1853 session:

Some of those meddling fellows, now prying into the public accounts and giving fair and easy people so much annoyance, will perhaps endeavour to find out how it is that the item Executive Councillors, their expenses, amounts to £456 13s. 4d., for neither we nor our readers can understand it.

In short, the Freeman was a good opposition organ.

The election of 1854 brought about a change of Government. Charles
Fisher, a reformer, was called upon to form the administration and he succeeded in procuring the services of Tilley, John M. Johnson, W. H. Steeves, Albert J. Smith, James Brown, and Ritchie (despite his violent objection to Fisher accepting a position in the coalition of 1848)\(^7\). The *Freeman* had not been more favourably impressed with Fisher than had Ritchie, and for a reform newspaper was very hard on him:

> He has already declared his perfect readiness to be bought, and bought he will be, if the price can only be agreed upon.\(^7\)

Perhaps it was the *Freeman*’s opposition to Fisher personally that accounts for the fact that no Catholic was named to the Executive Council. That such a position was expected was indicated in the non-confidence motion of R. B. Cutler in the fall session of 1854 when he claimed that the Government had not observed a promise made to him that a Catholic would receive a cabinet position.\(^7\) In any case, the establishment of the new Government certainly did not meet with the whole-hearted approval of the *Freeman* despite staunch opposition to its predecessor. Anglin began to find himself in a very peculiar position in regard to the politics of the province.

For a time the *Freeman* seemed to waver in its support. It became more unhappy with the so-called Liberals but it was still leagues away from the so-called Tories. Anglin became aware that the former would do little more for Catholics than had the latter. By May, 1855, he was complaining that amongst the names of a batch of new appointments, no Roman Catholic was to be found.\(^7\) Late in 1855, the *Freeman* took very perfunctory notice of the appointment of Charles Watters, a Catholic, to the executive.\(^7\) Anglin was also becoming discontented with Government railway policy.\(^7\) Yet throughout 1855, or at least until the
autumn, the Freeman could not be classified as being in the opposition camp. Even in January of 1856, the Fredericton newspapers assumed that the Freeman was basically on the side of the Government.76 Other things were involved, but the real issue which, with all of its ramifications, turned Anglin more and more against the Government and finally caused his break with it, was prohibition.

V

New Brunswickers liked their booze. In the quarter ending June 30, 1851, 11,396 gallons of rum; 7,378 of gin; and 1,183 of whiskey, was imported into the province which had a population of about two hundred thousand.77 Such a grand capacity for the 'hard stuff' led to its abuse, and during the fifties efforts were made to curb its consumption. The result was the rise of the temperance movement in New Brunswick.78 There was a strong moral and religious spirit associated with the temperance agitation, but unfortunately a religious division tended to develop on this issue. There were undoubtedly many Catholics who followed the precepts of the great Cork temperance advocate, Father Mathew, and abhorred the results of excessive drinking. But the large mass of the poverty-stricken, at whom the temperance crusade was aimed, both in the United States and New Brunswick, were Irish Catholics. As a result a prejudice against the Irish grew out of the movement as evangelical and puritanical Protestantism became associated with it. This religious overtone was especially true in New Brunswick as the following letter written to Tilley by a temperance crusader indicated:

... I hope that through my [Indecipherable] and lectures and letters [Hi]e will continue to work on the minds of many who are remiss in duty and stir them up, so that a great harvest may be reaped by and by, and such a healthy public sentiment in favor of the Bible view of the
Temperance question may be aroused, as will result in the complete sweep of the spoiler Alcohol and the liquor traffic, and the drinking customs and usages from the earth. Please remember me specially when you pray. I feel my utter helplessness and hopelessness without a constant working of God within me.  

Largely because of the overtones of the temperance movement, but no doubt partly because the Irish cherished their mug of poteen, the Irish Catholic became opposed to it. The agitation in favour of prohibition seemed discriminatory and another Protestant 'ploy' to 'dish' the Catholics.

Under the leadership of Tilley the Sons of Temperance grew by leaps and bounds. By 1855 there was one Grand Division and almost one hundred subordinate divisions in New Brunswick. In the early years of the decade there had been attempts made to discourage the consumption of alcohol, but these had failed for a variety of reasons. In 1855, however, a private bill prohibiting the importation or production of liquor except for medicinal purposes, passed the Assembly and to the surprise of most, the Legislative Council as well. The whole affair was really quite unusual. Tilley, the Provincial Secretary, put forward a bill which would curtail provincial income without making any provision for making up for this loss. Three members of the executive opposed the bill throughout its progress through the legislature, and yet accepted that it was a private bill -- despite the fact that it had to affect the Government since it involved finances and required enforcement -- and so declined to advise Lieutenant Governor Manners-Sutton not to assent to the bill. The members of the legislature had apparently shown more hypocrisy than anything else when they had voted for the bill. The Head Quarters claimed that of the twenty-two supporters of the bill, fourteen were in the habit of imbibing, some of them to excess. Apparently one had even "built up his courage" before making his speech. Finally, the
law was allowed to go into effect without having the backing of the populace, and on this issue such a situation was likely to cause far more difficulties than it could possibly solve.

The reaction of the press to this legislation was generally one of disapproval. The Courier worried that the legislation if unenforceable would "do more to increase drinking, and produce more ill feeling and crime, than if the whole trade were entirely thrown open." It advocated, however, that the law be obeyed because it was the law. The News was sure that the measure would prove inoperative and would stir up bitter feeling and strife. But neither of these papers placed any blame upon the administration for the law. The Headquarters, as might be expected, was not so lenient. It termed the law "the offspring of folly and deceit -- or rather of insanity and the meanest and most detestable hypocrisy," and placed responsibility for it on the shoulders of the Government. Of all the newspapers the Freeman was the most outspoken in its opposition. After presenting to its readers the terms of the bill, it proceeded to assess it:

These are the principal features of a Bill, the most arbitrary and tyrannical conceived in modern times, destroying the sanctity of the domicile, rendering the habeas corpus a nullity and investing Justices (ignorant, fanatical, or unprincipled as they may be) and their myrmidons with a degree of power and authority never before entrusted to any Magistrates or officers in any part of the British empire, not under martial law.

Undoubtedly Anglin felt that it was impossible to exhort his compatriots to be law-abiding citizens when the legislature passed such absurd laws and the Government allowed them to be put into force.

In assessing Anglin's motives for so vigorous a condemnation of the legislation and the Government, one must include personal factors as well as the general fact that Irish Catholics did not like prohibition.
One might suggest that Anglin opposed the liquor law for fear of losing lucrative advertising contracts from liquor interests. This view might have some merit although Anglin claimed that by his stance, the Freeman lost not only Government advertising but also that of St. John businessmen whose party feeling prevailed over "their good sense." Such calculations probably did not overly concern Anglin.

It is not the first nor the twentieth time that I have deliberately risked the loss of money and friends and lost them for the sake of maintaining what my reason tells me is the course of justice and truth. The man who would hesitate to do so is unworthy of being a journalist.90

To Anglin, prohibition was simply a most serious question of principle in politics.

It is an utter fallacy to say that the Prohibitory Law is not politics. It is political in the highest sense of the word: for everything that effects the State is political and the success or defeat of any particular parties is not politics of a minor and less important sort. The Prohibitory Bill I must regard as the introduction of a most unwarrantable kind of Legislation that would prescribe to the public at the will of the minority [sic] what they should eat and drink and wear and how they should worship. The end is unquestionably good but the end does not justify the means: for if it did then whenever the majority of the people or of the Legislature thought Mormonism or Spiritualism to be the only true religion they might with as good reason compel us all to take a plurality of wives or profess a belief in Spirit Rappings ... Once admit Legislation of this kind to be indulged in and there can be no limit to it but the will of the majority or the forbearance of the minority.91

The Liquor Law did not work. Its regulations were sporadically applied in most of the province and the Gleaner, the Miramichi newspaper, claimed that the only difference before and after the law went into effect was that before liquor dealers had paid money into the county treasury and after they paid nothing.92 This was not the case in St. John for here the court cases were many. Cases were presented that seemed to be extremely petty and to work a great deal of hardship upon the lowly offender. A great deal of ill-feeling arose and an agitation for the repeal of
the law gained strength daily. By March, 1856, the Freeman was in favour of the repeal of the bill even if the offices of the Colonial Secretary had to be used. The News disapproved of such an idea:

We knew that he [the Freeman] was a Liberal, and in favor of "local Parliaments" and self government, and like ourselves opposed to the flippancy and dictation of a Colonial Secretary. Yet, we find him supporting the principle ... of going down upon our knees to ask the Colonial Secretary to interpose his authority and prevent the Liquor Law going into effect. We were opposed to the Law, but far more opposed to the miserable spirit of crying to "Mammy" to save us.93 Anglin was beginning to look like another William End.

The 1856 session of the New Brunswick legislature met in a mood of tenseness. Long debates, factionalism, and disorderliness typified its proceedings. The Courier claimed that "a spectator is liable to imagine that he is at times in the vicinity of a bedlam, so strongly are the proceedings characterized with disorder."94 In such an atmosphere rational consideration of the defects of the Liquor Law could not take place and End's motion for repeal was not carried nor were any modifications made to the legislation. The colony seemed on the verge of chaos and shortly after the House rose from its labours Manners-Sutton gave the Executive Council a choice: either enforce the law or remove it from the statute books. He advised an immediate election as the only solution to the existing state of affairs. The Council did not accept the view that the act was wholly inoperative and advised the Governor that if it proved unsatisfactory after what they considered to be a fair trial, then the existing legislature would repeal it. They would not advise a dissolution. This was not acceptable to the Governor and when he dissolved the parliament the executive felt obliged to hand in their resignations. A new executive was quickly sworn in and the election was on.95

As might be expected Manners-Sutton's action aroused a good deal of
debate as to its constitutionality and propriety. The vast majority of New Brunswick newspapers disapproved, many sympathizing with the desire to rid the province of the problems created by the Liquor Law, but feeling that this did not warrant the Governor's exercise of the prerogative.\textsuperscript{96} The \textit{Freeman} did not agree with this reasoning and in supporting the Governor broke all ties with the former Government and rose to the defense of the new, despite the fact that it contained some of the very men to whom it had been most opposed a short time before. The \textit{Freeman} argued that the Governor had acted constitutionally and that the conditions created by the Liquor Act required the Governor's action.\textsuperscript{97} Anglin gave a temperate analysis of the issues at stake and effectively defended the Governor. He boiled the problem down to a straightforward proposition:

[...] those who regard the Law as wrong in principle, injurious in its effects, and in every way an enormous and intolerable evil, are now called upon to say whether they shall willingly consent to the continuation and aggravation of this evil; or whether the Governor, in affording them an opportunity of getting rid of it, has done wrong because the existing state of things does not warrant this exercise of the prerogative.\textsuperscript{98}

There seems little doubt, however, that Anglin would have felt more comfortable arguing on the other side of the question. The fact that he was not, shows the isolated position which the Catholics of New Brunswick had come to occupy. Certainly, it did not take long for such former allies as the \textit{News} and \textit{Courier} to attack the \textit{Freeman} with extraordinary vigour.\textsuperscript{99}

The 1856 election results legitimized the action of the Governor as far as this could be done. An overwhelming majority of members returned were pledged to vote for repeal of the Liquor Law. It seems probable that the \textit{Freeman}'s influence was strongly felt as the Government candidates swept the St. John electoral districts, even Tilley being defeated.\textsuperscript{100}
But a Government that had been elected to repeal the Liquor Law found its existence most precarious once this had been taken care of. Afterwards, there was little to prevent assemblymen from going in various directions.

In the meantime Anglin's relations with his former allies rapidly deteriorated. A robust game of charge and counter-charge developed between the *Courier* and the *Freeman*. The *News* and the *Reporter* also had their say, the latter paper suggesting at one point that Anglin wait until he was appointed to the new office of "Inquisitor General to the Government" before proceeding to judge the *Reporter*. "One of Them", in a letter to the *Courier* published on December 20, 1856, compared Anglin to a snake:

The *Freeman* will remember quite well that some members of the Liberal party saw this adder when he was frozen, and, taking pity, assisted him into life; but, when natural strength returned, his original nature was fully developed in stinging his benefactors. They were then obliged, in self-defence, to put him away from them; his subscription and advertising lists bear evidence of this. Some saw the creature's propensities, and heard him hiss long ago: while others hoped on, almost against hope, until recent events fully satisfied them that no forbearance would ever alter the creature's nature.

It was easy to see that Anglin was not the most popular man in the colony. It was at this time that the stories of his supposed involvement in the Irish Rebellion of 1848 began to circulate and also complaints about the critical attitude he had taken towards the Crimean War were bandied about. But Anglin was not one who needed much sympathy. He was making considerable money from Government advertisements. A number of gentlemen presented him with a purse of £100 as a New Year's gift for 1857. In any case, he could hand out abuse with the best of them and usually managed to get the better of his opponents. Also, although it was part of the process that maintained the isolation of the Irish
community of New Brunswick, the charges laid against him probably enhanced his prestige with that group. One thing that Anglin was sensitive about, however, was being labelled a Tory.\textsuperscript{108} He reacted strongly to this 'accusation', as he felt that not he had changed but rather his opponents. But since they still retained the label of Liberal, he was forced to take the twin tacks of saying that there were really no true parties in the province, and that the Liberals were not really true liberals and did not merit the name.\textsuperscript{109} In retrospect one can see that he was correct, but at the time it seemed to be a weak argument.

Thus by the time that the 1856 session of parliament rolled around the Freeman was firmly committed to the Government and thoroughly alienated from the Smashers, as the Freeman and other Government papers called the Liberals. By the end of March the Government was in such a moribund state that it was forced to dissolve the Assembly and call an election.\textsuperscript{110} The result of this appeal to the people was in favour of the Smashers as they rolled to victory returning twenty-six of their supporters compared to fifteen supporters of the Government.\textsuperscript{111} The election had, however, indicated that Anglin's opposition to the Government coincided with the views of other Irish Catholics of St. John. The Irish Friendly Society of that place had passed a resolution in support of the Government candidates.\textsuperscript{112}

VI

Political developments at mid-decade were significant for a number of reasons. Politically, Anglin and the Irish Catholics were 'out in the cold'. Mutual opposition between the Irish and the Government gave rise to religious division and sectarian strife, something that no well-intentioned individual really wanted. Political bitterness spilled over into
the areas of social intercourse and communications remained strained. Suspicion, mistrust and hatred were the result. For this state of affairs Tilley and Anglin, to take the leaders of the two sides in the province, were both to blame -- and both felt some detrimental effects. Tilley had made a serious mistake in allowing his temperance opinions to get the better of his political judgment. The lack of sensitivity shown towards Catholic sensibilities on this question must weigh heavily in any assessment of his political acumen and religious tolerance. On the other hand Anglin made the more serious error due to the fact that the Catholics were more vulnerable. The province could be ruled without Catholic approval. Anglin failed to realize the great harm he would be doing the Catholics if by his leadership Catholics should find themselves isolated from the Government. If he did realize this and still proceeded to cut himself off from the Liberals he cannot be given much credit for foresight. To be sure, the leader of any group must protect its rights -- but he must also avoid pressure from the group to adopt a policy which might turn out to be a dead-end street. At the least, he must make sure that he can retrace his steps and unlock the gate at the other end, if the need arises. Anglin, unfortunately for himself and for others, plunged headlong into the avenue slamming the gate behind him. Together, Tilley and Anglin probably could have controlled the politics of New Brunswick for forty years. In a sense they did in any case, but had there been co-operation rather than antagonism between them, New Brunswick's development would have taken place in a much less rancorous atmosphere, which in turn would have meant that more energy would have been available to develop the resources and facilities of the province. Fortunately, not all Protestants followed Tilley; equally
Fortunately not all Catholics supported Anglin.

Nevertheless, it was clear that Anglin, whether always wise or not, had in less than a decade established himself as the spokesman for New Brunswick Irish Catholics. His newspaper, the Freeman, had become a household word in the province. His acclimatization had been rapid and very successful. Timothy Anglin had made himself a power to be reckoned with and as such he assured for himself an important role in the vital pre-Confederation decade.
FOOTNOTES

1 Nation (Dublin), quoted in Morning News (St. John), Sept. 23, 1850.
2 New Brunswick Courier (St. John), Nov. 2, 1850. The News of November 4, 1850, expressed similar sentiments.
3 Courier, Feb. 8, 1851.
4 Simonds to Editors, May 29, 1851 in Courier, May 31, 1851.
5 It is noteworthy that about one week after Simonds' letter, Jacob Allen, "whose health prevented him for a time from attending to the active duties of the office of Police Magistrate in Portland," resumed his post (see Courier, June 7, 1851).
7 News, Dec. 26, 1851, and Jan. 9, 1852; and Courier, Jan. 10, 1852. Before this arrangement was made, Anglin had handed in a tender for reporting and publishing the Debates. As well, he had apparently made arrangements with Mr. Simpson, another printer, to do some of the reporting if Simpson received the contract. Despite the fact that Anglin's tender seemed to be the lowest made, Simpson's was the one accepted. Moreover, after John H. Gray had indicated to Simpson his disapproval of Anglin, the latter was not even employed as one of Simpson's reporters. The Assembly's discussion of these peculiar transactions produced considerable lively debate and indicated that Anglin was already a significant factor in New Brunswick politics. In the long run Anglin had the last laugh, for when the reporter who was to supply Simpson with an account of proceedings fell down on the job, due partly to illness, Anglin's reports were used to supply the deficiency. For this he eventually received £20. See New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, 1852, pp. viii and 8-16; and News, Apr. 13, 1855.
8 See News, March 23, 1855; and Courier, July 26, 1856; and Feb. 21, 1857.
9 Freeman, no date, quoted in Courier, Nov. 22, 1851.
10 Freeman, June 1, 1852, quoted in News, June 2, 1852.
11 The 1851 Census for New Brunswick, as reprinted in Canada: Census, 1870-71, does not give break-downs according to place of birth, ethnic background, or religion. Therefore one can only make estimates from New Brunswick: Census, 1861, an Appendix to New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Journals, 1862 and from the 1871 Canadian Census. A detailed break-down of Albert ward in St. John shows that the number of Irish Catholics may well be higher than the statistics show (see P.A.C., New Brunswick, Local Records, Census, 1861).
12 There were few Irishmen who could speak only gaelic.
13 The full answer to this query will perhaps never be given due to the lack of source material on which the answer could be based. Certainly this presentation cannot hope to do more than make a few suggestions and generalizations based on a variety of facts gleaned from St. John newspapers.
the word "flee" in a loose way for it is doubtful that many famine Irish ever got into the countryside except as members of labour crews with no alternative but to return to the city when the job was finished. Despite this flaw, Duncan's article has been very influential in determining the views of the present author on the retention of Irish socio-cultural patterns in the new world.

16 Ibid., p. 15.
17 The Merchants' & Farmers' Almanack for 1857 (St. John: William L. Avery, 1856), p. 27. On Dec. 3, 1859, the Freeman was moved to state that the St. Patrick's Society of St. John "is not regarded or recognized by the Irish of St. John as the exponent of their opinions or feelings".
18 The date of the founding of the Irish Friendly Society is not known. The Society's president in 1859 was Anglin's friend, Dr. Boyle Travers (see Freeman, Feb. 10, 1859).
19 News, June 7, 1850. The Courier also took a reasonably friendly attitude (see Courier, Nov. 23, 1850).
20 New Brunswick Reporter and Fredericton Advertiser (Fredericton), Aug. 23, 1850.
21 P.A.C., Sir Edmund Head Papers, III, Head to Col. Clarke, Feb. 21, 1854.
22 See, for example, the Flaglor case reported in Courier, May 24, 1856 (the information had been taken from the Freeman). One can only hope that Irish conditions in St. John were not as bad as those of the city of Quebec if the picture presented by C. J. Lever, Confessions of Con. Creggan: The Irish Gil Blas (London: Wm. S. Orr and Co., n. d. [1849]), I, 216-240, is anywhere near the truth.
25 Head Quarters (Fredericton), May 10, 1855.
27 See Freeman, n. d., quoted in Courier, Nov. 27, 1852; and Courier, Sept. 4, 1852.
30 Head Quarters, Oct. 12, 1853.
33 Courier, Oct. 20, 1849. It seems most likely that Needham was not a Catholic himself (see Freeman, March 4, 1869).
34 Courier, Oct. 5, 1850 and Oct. 11, 1851.
36 Courier, Sept. 21, 1850.
Passed 15th and 28th March, 1851, pp. 3-5.
38 The words "cotemporary" and "contemporary" seem to have been used interchangeably in the 1850's in the New Brunswick press depending upon the whim of the writer. The former was more usual in the earlier period but as the decade wore on the "n" was usually added.
39 Anglin Family Scrapbook; and C. Ward, op. cit., p. 160. Curiously enough New Brunswick newspapers made no mention of her death. This indicates one of two things: either the date given is incorrect or news of the Irish Catholic community did not reach the ears of reporters and editors.
40 A thorough analysis of these issues on what might be termed the 'official' level is to be found in D. G. G. Kerr, Sir Edmund Head: A Scholarly Governor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954), pp. 48-54 and 83-116. See also D. F. MacMillan, "Federation and Annexation Sentiment in New Brunswick, 1848-51" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 1961).
41 Courier, Feb. 16, 1850. See also ibid., June 15, 1850.
42 Freeman, n.d., quoted in ibid., Dec. 18, 1852. The Freeman's financial conservatism was again shown in a quotation which appeared in the Head Quarters, Oct. 4, 1854, concerning a run on the banks.
44 Head to Grey, Sept. 15, 1849, quoted in Kerr, op. cit., p. 53.
45 News, July 20, 1849. It was not until July 2, 1852 that the News came out definitely in favour of annexation.
46 Reporter, Aug. 3 and Nov. 2, 1849; and Courier, Aug. 4, 1849, and March 23, 1850.
47 Earl Grey to Lord Elgin, Jan. 9, 1850, reprinted in News, Feb. 11, 1850. This was known as the "gag despatch".
49 In fact it would appear that the Association never adopted union as a plank in its platform due to disagreements over the relationship such a creation would have with Great Britain. See Courier, Aug. 4, 11, and 25 and Sept. 15, 1849. The Association died a quiet death and just disappeared from sight.
50 Head Quarters, Sept. 12, 1849; and Courier, May 25, 1850.
51 News, Aug. 8, 1849.
52 Freeman, Apr. 12, 1853.
53 Analyses of railway building in New Brunswick in this period are to be found in the following works: MacNutt, op. cit., pp. 325-29, 334-39 and 379-382; and A. W. Bailey, "Railways in New Brunswick, 1827-1867" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 1955), pp. 45-150.
54 Courier, Feb. 8, 1851.
55 Ibid., Aug. 2 and Dec. 13, 1851; and Feb. 21, 1852. See also Head Papers, III, Head to Joseph Howe, Sept. 20 and Dec. 19, 1851; and Head to Sir J. Harvey, Dec. 2, 1851.
56 Head Papers, III, Head to E. B. Chandler, Dec. 16, 1851; and Courier, July 12 and Aug. 2, 1851.
57 Freeman, Sept. 23, 1851; and Ibid., Oct. 13, 1851, quoted in Reporter,
Oct. 21, 1853.
58 Head Quarters, Nov. 21, 1855; Freeman, n.d., quoted in Courier, Oct. 25, 1856; and Courier, Jan. 10, 1857.
60 Head Papers, IV, Head to Lewis, March 2, 1850, and March 31, June 4, and Nov. 4, 1851. Head's successors had what was probably an even worse opinion of colonial politicians (see J. K. Chapman, 'The Opinions of Lt. Govs. Manners-Sutton and Gordon Respecting New Brunswick Politics and Politicians, 1854-1867" (unpublished manuscript, University of New Brunswick Archives, 1955)).
61 J. Hannay, History of New Brunswick, II, 133-134.
62 The politics of New Brunswick between 1848 and 1854 are covered in MacNutt, op. cit., pp. 315-352.
63 Gray claimed he joined the Government in order to promote the interests of the European and North American Railway (see Gray to Freeholders of the City and County of St. John, Aug. 2, 1851, in Courier, Aug. 2, 1851).
64 Courier, Aug. 2, 1851; and News, Aug. 4, 1851.
65 Reporter, Aug. 8, 1851.
66 Four other representatives of St. John -- Charles Simonds, W. J. Ritchie, S. L. Tilley and W. H. Needham -- vowed to resign if the electors showed, by electing Wilmot, that they had lost the confidence of their constituents (see Simonds et al to the Electors of the City and County of St. John, Aug. 5, 1851, in Courier, Aug. 9, 1851).
67 Freeman, Sept. 20, 1851.
68 Wilmot was easily re-elected (see Courier, Oct. 25, 1851). Ritchie, Tilley and Simonds immediately resigned but Needham did not honour his pledge and in the long run lost much respect in the community (see Hannay, op. cit., II, 152-153).
70 MacNutt, op. cit., pp. 356-357.
71 Freeman, n.d., quoted in Reporter, July 6, 1854.
72 Head Quarters, Nov. 1, 1854.
73 Ibid., May 9, 1855.
74 Head Quarters, Dec. 5, 1855.
75 Ibid., Nov. 21, 1855.
76 Reporter, Jan. 25, 1856; and Head Quarters, Jan. 30, 1856.
77 Courier, Sept. 6, 1851.
79 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection)
     James A. Davidson to Tilley, Sept. 22, 1858.
81 Head Papers, III, Head to Beverly Robinson, Dec. 16, 1851 and Head to Chandler, Apr. 9, 1852; IV, Head to Lewis, Apr. 4, 1854; Courier, Dec. 3, 1853 and Jan. 21, 1854; Freeman, n.d., quoted in News, May 17 and July 26, 1854; and Freeman, n.d., quoted in Courier, June 17, 1854.
82 Chapman, art. cit., pp. 53-54. The Governor would have acted on such advice.
83 Head Quarters, Dec. 26, 1855. See also Hannay, op. cit., II, 175-176.

Those opposed to the Governor's action were six St. John papers -- Courier, Observer, Presbyterian, News, Telegraph and Religious Intelligencer -- and seven others -- St. Stephen's Patriot, Woodstock Journal, Carleton Sentinel, Westmorland Times, Fredericton Reporter, Provincialist and Miramichi Gleaner. Those defending the Governor were few -- Freeman, New Brunswicker, Chronicle, Head Quarters and St. Andrew's Standard. These lists are taken from the Gleaner, June 14, 1856.

William End used almost identical language in defending the Governor (see Courier, July 26, 1856).

The vote on the repeal was thirty-eight to two (see Gleaner, July 26, 1856).

See also "Watchman" to Editors, Oct. 21, 1856, in Courier, Nov. 1, 1856.

News, July 18 and Oct. 10, 1856; Head Quarters, June 13, 1855; and Courier, Sept. 6 and 13, 1856.

Freeman, March 6, 1860.

Courier, Jan. 3, 1857.

Freeman, June 20, 1856, quoted in News, 1856; and Courier, June 28, 1856.

Head Quarters, Feb. 4, 1857; Courier, Oct. 11 and 18, 1856; and ibid., Feb. 28 and May 2, 1857; and Reporter, Oct. 10 and Nov. 28, 1856.

Courier, March 28, 1857.

Ibid., May 16, 1857.

Freeman, Apr. 23, 1857, quoted in News, Apr. 27, 1857. Even with this support, Gray and Wilmot were the only two of the six St. John representatives who were elected to support the Government.
CHAPTER 4

New Brunswick Politician and Patriot: 1857-1861

Anglin's acclimatization did not end in 1857 but it did enter a different phase. The events of 1856 and 1857 had been a significant turning point in New Brunswick politics and in Anglin's career. It was as though he had flown from the nest and was now on his own. In the half-decade that followed he strengthened his political wings. His main platform was the Freeman and its predominant policy was opposition to the Smashers. In 1861 he became a full-fledged politician by winning a seat in the New Brunswick House of Assembly. But Anglin became more than just a provincial politician during the years 1857 to 1861. He also became a New Brunswick patriot.

I

With the Smashers back in power, Anglin resumed his familiar role as an opposition journalist. Aside from the fact that his newspaper no longer received any patronage he did not mind being in this position. In fact he probably preferred it, for attack, he thought, was "much easier and more pleasant" than defense. With the Smashers in power the Freeman found plenty of things to attack.

One reason for Anglin's opposition to the new Government of Charles Fisher and Leonard Tilley was its tendency to adopt anti-Catholic attitudes. It was not surprising that it did, for the Smashers lived in a general atmosphere of religious discord which existed in New Brunswick, and throughout much of the English-speaking world for that matter. This religious antagonism which poisoned the political and social atmosphere of New Brunswick was seen most clearly in a controversy which centred
around Judge Lemuel A. Wilmot and Anglin.\(^3\)

Wilmot, the former leader of the 'Reformers', was a Wesleyan Methodist of the fervent stripe. Unfortunately, his zeal sometimes outdistanced his discretion and common-sense. The particular conflict between Wilmot and Anglin had its origin in a speech made by the Judge before the Bible Society in St. John. During the course of his dissertation he told a story of a Catholic boy residing in Miramichi who had been caught reading a Bible. According to the story, the boy's father had remonstrated with him and when he refused to cease his reading, a priest had been summoned. The latter had also failed to convince the boy and eventually the lad had been tied to a tree and whipped until the priest became exhausted. The boy, despite this punishment, had stuck to his decision that he would read the Bible and about all the priest could say was that it was mighty difficult to beat the Protestant out of him. The boy had then escaped, come to Fredericton, become a devout Methodist, and told the Judge and others his story. This, briefly, was the tale that Wilmot related to his audience.\(^4\) Interestingly enough the story was expurgated from the report of speeches published in the Church Witness.\(^5\)

It was almost by accident that things went further than this. Early in July, 1858, while combatting a slanderous report about some Pennsylvania priest, the Freeman had stated that such a report was not surprising while even within New Brunswick a Judge had told a similarly anti-Catholic story about a Miramichi priest. Shortly thereafter Father Egan, a Catholic clergyman in Miramichi, wrote to the Freeman referring to its comment, and called upon the Judge to give names, dates and other details relating to the case. "[T]hat a Judge should forget his exalted position, and bear false witness against his neighbour," the priest wrote, "is not to be tamely endured".\(^6\) As far as the Freeman was concerned if Wilmot
failed to produce names, dates and proofs, he would stand guilty of slan-
der or worse. Anglin sent a copy of Father Egan's letter and the
Freeman's comments to the Judge and waited for a reply or for some comm-
unication from Wilmot to appear in another journal.

Anglin waited for over a month. Wilmot did not break silence. Finally,
the Freeman could wait no longer and made a devastating analysis. Ordin-
arly, said Anglin, a Judge should not rush into print, but this was an
exception. "For a man holding the position of Judge to tell such a story,"
the Freeman claimed, "... and then, when challenged to the proof, to pre-
tend any discussion of the subject as below his dignity, is the very acme
of the ridiculous." Ample time had been given the Judge to prove his
assertion; he had not; and the conclusion must be that it was a lie.

Indeed, a lie more damaging could scarcely have been spoken.

A lie more injurious to the character of a clergyman may easily be
invented; but this lie was used to beget in his audience a hatred of
Priests, as a set of brutal tyrants; a contempt for all Catholics, as
grovelling slaves; and a hostility to Catholicity, as a debasing, de-
grading, enslaving system ... It is almost impossible to conceive with
what feelings those who believed this story must have regarded Catholics.
Certainly they could not regard them as a people entitled to equal
rights and privileges with themselves; or as a people capable of being
free.

The Judge had been a disgrace to the Bench. However, the whole affair
might accomplish some good, the Freeman concluded, for if those who had
believed the Judge's story saw that it was untrue, they might in future
be less credulous of stories told them on no authority at all.9

The issue did not end at this point, however. Although Wilmot himself
never attempted to back up his story with facts, some of the newspapers
defended him. Their was a weak defence. The best they could come up
with was that he had told the story, perhaps with a little colour added,
as the boy had told it, but that now the boy had emigrated to Canada and
had come under the control of the priests once again. As the Freeman pointed out, this merely meant, even if true, that the Judge had repeated rather than invented a lie. This proved either the stupidity of the Judge or his willingness to repeat something which with his legal experience he ought to have questioned and thereby discovered its falsity. Finally, before the Bible Society on January 13, 1859, Wilmot took the floor. Everyone expected him to vindicate himself, or at least make the attempt, and acting on this presumption Anglin sought and received the permission of his ecclesiastical superior to attend the meeting. Wilmot made a fiery speech but it was a distinct failure.

The utmost he could say was to appeal to God he had never spoken what he did not believe to be true, and his whole defence was a furious tirade about the fires of Smithfield, St. Bartholemew's massacre, and such like topics. He did not dare to assert that the story was true, or to attempt to prove it true by giving what any one would receive as proof ... [N]either did he act as a Christian gentleman would act under such circumstances, and having failed to obtain during the long twelve-months proof of the truth of the story; having indeed, as was to be inferred from the way he put it, become satisfied that it was not true, retract the story and apologise for having been betrayed into such an error.11

The breach between the Methodist Judge and the Catholic editor thus opened was never healed.

Religious antagonism, such as that seen in the Wilmot-Anglin controversy, spilled over into the political life of the country. From Anglin's point of view, at least, the Smashers showed distinct 'WASP' characteristics. Perhaps their attitude was a transfer of the discrimination which they, as Dissenters, had received from the Anglican establishment at the beginning of their political careers. Perhaps their religious beliefs led them into anti-Catholicism. Perhaps political exigencies led them to this. Whatever the case, it was a fact with which Anglin and the other New Brunswick Catholics had to deal. Fortunately, anti-
Catholicism was not as noticeable amongst the political leaders as amongst
some of their back-room supporters, such as John Boyd, whose letters to
Tilley often included outbursts such as the following:

You heard something of a Protestant boy having been stolen out of
the Protestant Orphan Asylum by the Papists; well he has escaped from
the Papists, and that is all I can tell you at present; but when the
affair is finished it will be a history of Popery in N.B. and how it
has been done, that will astonish you. 12

Poor Boyd was always seeing Catholic plots at work in the province,
13 Anglin being one of the chief agents. Ignorant bigotry is not pleas-
ant to see but at least it is understandable. Calculating religious
feelings for political purposes is also understandable but is even more
objectionable. But this is what George Fenety of the News did for Tilley's
perusal on at least one occasion. Fenety's conclusion was that in order
to undercut any move of the Tories to raise a Protestant cry, the Govern-
ment ought to do all it could to satisfy "the reasonable Protestant wishes
of the people." "It is," he continued, "too soon in the day to talk of
throwing down the gauntlet and bidding defiance to the Catholics (what-
ever we may think of them) ..." Tilley's own views are not clear. On
one hand, one of Tilley's Catholic correspondents pulled no punches in
accusing Tilley of granting land to some other person because that in-
dividual was an Orangeman and the correspondent was a Catholic. 15
On the other hand there is evidence to show that Tilley tried to ensure that
Catholics received some of the patronage in the gift of the Government.
Tilley does not seem to have been a bigot himself and yet he never seems
to have taken a stand against the anti-Catholicism of others. Perhaps
he was living Mark Twain's silent lie.

The Freeman was interested in exposing and denouncing the basic anti-
Catholic principles upon which the Government operated. Often, the
Freeman propounded, these were not particularly obvious; but they were effective nonetheless.

It is a pity the Know-Nothings of the United States do not learn a lesson from their brethren in New Brunswick, and instead of stupidly seeking an odious law to exclude all foreigners from the right to vote until after a 21 year residence, seek and obtain a registration law such as ours, which would enable them as the great secret organisation of the country effectually to exclude the vast majority of the foreigners obnoxious to them, and all the "penniless" who are not of their party. 17

Of course the clearest test of the Government's attitude towards Catholics was the amount of patronage which Catholics received. The Freeman pointed out that it was so small that even the most bigoted and intolerant could not be dissatisfied. Catholics, Anglin demonstrated, were almost completely excluded from positions of importance by the Know-Nothing Government of New Brunswick. The Freeman even claimed that Catholics did not fear the rise of a Protestant Alliance because they had so little to lose in a political sense that threats to take away that which they had, were simply laughable.

Although the darkness of religious antagonism hung over New Brunswick like a cloud, the light of tolerance could not be extinguished. One might claim that by continually harping on the abundance of anti-Catholicism in New Brunswick, Anglin did little to remove the cloud from the sky. Yet perhaps by pointing out the problem to the community at large he helped to raise a wind which could blow some of the cloud away. In fact, this was already occurring and the Freeman's forecast was for sunny skies ahead.

The Province no longer suffers as it once did, from religious feuds, and although trial by jury is not yet what it should be, and although the Reporter and its associates do all in their power occasionally to revive religious frenzy, we have full confidence that the good sense of the people will prevail, and that whatever may be the temporary effects of unprincipled scoundrels, who from time to time seek to prostitute religion in the service of party, the feelings which true
religion always excites will prevail more and more each day, and as people know each other better, kindness and good-will will more and more take the place of senseless hatred and animosities, so injurious to the best interests of all the people.\textsuperscript{20}

The policy of the Government towards Catholics was only one reason that Anglin opposed the Smashers. He found many others. Not only was the Government a Know-Nothing administration, iterated the \textit{Freeman}, it was also a Do-Nothing one. Over and over again Anglin insisted that the Government was not accomplishing anything of significance for the province and that its whole policy was simply to keep itself in office and enjoy its position. There was much validity to his accusations. Once the issue of responsible government had been settled, the Government devoted itself to the practice of politics. Patronage was the name of the game and politicians, newspaper editors and other personages scrambled over each other for the richest prizes. It was not surprising therefore, that Anglin continually denounced the Government for corruption, extravagance, mismanagement, and all other forms of financial sin. In 1861 the \textit{Freeman} struck gold when it was proved that Fisher had been guilty of gross misconduct in regard to Crown Lands and several other members of the Government, including Tilley, had been implicated. Although the \textit{Freeman} mined the issue for all it was worth, the Government escaped fairly easily by making Fisher the scapegoat for everyone concerned. He was forced to resign, leaving Tilley as the undisputed king of the hill.

But if the \textit{Freeman} found little about the Government to commend, it considered their opponents in the Assembly little better. True, Anglin did reject the charge that opposition to the Government was equivalent to supporting the Family Compact and even claimed that the Government was establishing its own Compact. But he thought that the men in the Assembly who opposed the Government were generally a weak lot who were no more
concerned with the welfare of the country than the Smashers.\textsuperscript{28} Obviously the \textit{Freeman} considered the political system to be inadequate. A change was needed.

The change must be complete. It will be well if not only the party now dominant, but the whole system which curses the Province, be got rid of at once and for ever, and that at length men be selected to govern the country, who are really honest, really intelligent, and really independent; men who will not be the slaves of any faction that may style itself a political party, for no other reason than that it is desirous of putting out or keeping out another clique which also styles itself a party.\textsuperscript{29}

Similar statements had been made in New Brunswick twenty years before and were in the tenacious tradition of non-party politics of the province. It was clear that Anglin could find a comfortable home in neither of the two so-called parties.

The \textit{Freeman} may not have been enamoured with their opponents but the Smashers bore the brunt of its criticism and to many of the Government supporters, Anglin rapidly became public enemy number one. For example, T. B. Barker, Tilley's business associate, thought Anglin "a miserable \textsuperscript{30} lying scoundrel!", who "ought to be horsewhipped like a dog." Comments in the press also showed that Anglin was becoming recognized as a major political figure in the province. Such recognition was not without justification for he had worked hard to earn it.

II

The building of political power is not simply a matter of taking strong stands on certain issues. The process involves the creation of the more mundane but equally important foundation upon which the politician may stand. Some use their business or professional contacts and power to build this foundation. The \textit{Freeman} was the means used by Anglin. By the end of the first decade of the \textit{Freeman}'s existence there was no doubting
that it had won for itself a place in the community. Its pages were filled to the brim with news both local and international; its editorials were of a very high calibre — Anglin seldom being bested in any argument; its commentary on a wide variety of issues showed a high degree of learning for a public newspaper; and its management was relatively efficient. Indeed during the first decade of its life the Freeman had grown in stature, if not necessarily wisdom, and in favour with some men and the Catholic Church in New Brunswick, if not necessarily God.

Glimpses of the inner workings of the Freeman are remarkably scarce. On several occasions Anglin stated very clearly that all editorials were written by himself save only very brief notices when he was away from St. John, and even here the evidence seems to suggest that he usually left a few editorials for his printer. The circulation of the Freeman in terms of numbers is a question to which no clear answer can be given. The Freeman did not publicize the size of its circulation, which must have fluctuated greatly, although on a couple of occasions during the period it boasted of having sold more than 4000 copies. This number would have been quite unusual, however, for the Freeman faced the competition of two other papers on the mornings it was published. As well, Anglin adopted a system in 1858 which was not geared to enlarging the number of papers sold. The new organization instituted a strict cash-in-advance policy for subscriptions and offered inducements for forming clubs. This resulted in a lowering in the number of papers sold but Anglin found no reason to complain of his new policy. It was a more efficient operation. Besides, it seems certain that no paper had a wider circulation throughout the province at large. It was the life-blood of the Catholic community in every nook and cranny of New Brunswick. But the Freeman was
also Anglin's podium. From it he could reach the New Brunswick populace. By 1861 the number of persons in New Brunswick who had not heard the name of Anglin or his Freeman could probably have been counted on the fingers of one hand.

Anglin did not rely completely on the Freeman's influence to combat the Government and to build his own political power. He was aware that elections are frequently won and lost long before election day irrespective of issues for if electoral lists were 'cooked' the result was a foregone conclusion. In Anglin's view this was exactly what the Smashers tried to do in St. John. They had control of the machinery and did their utmost to remove those electors whom they suspected of opposing the Government and to give every possible benefit of the doubt to any Smasher supporters. Against this Anglin waged a strenuous annual campaign. He made a standing offer to help any qualified person to be placed on the lists; gave great publicity to everything connected with the lists and their revision; and exhorted those who were entitled to a vote to make sure their names were on the lists. His efforts were not sufficient to overcome all apathy of citizens nor did he succeed in upsetting all the work of the Smashers, yet they were not entirely in vain. His campaign made the assessors and compilers of the electoral lists more wary and his words and aid to those left off the lists did a good deal to make the people more aware of their rights and better able to exercise them. To top it all off, Anglin was able to prevent the Smashers from getting complete political control of the St. John electorate and thus facilitated his own political ambitions.

Anglin's work on electoral lists fitted in well with his political philosophy. He favoured not only the ballot but also universal manhood
suffrage.

For our own part, we have never yet been able to find any reason why the possession, real or nominal, of a few pounds more, should make one citizen better than another, or give him more legal and political rights. Every man in the community is compelled to submit to the laws made by the Legislature and to pay in full his share of the taxes or duties they impose, and there is no good reason, and there can be none why the people should be classified into a law-making class, and a class who must have no voice in making the laws they have to obey, or determining the burdens they have to bear. Still less can there be any reason why the distinction should be based on money, and the line of demarcation be an arbitrary one to twist in and out according as such men as Mr. Jordan may think it proper to confer or take away the franchise by declaring a man worth a few pounds more or less. 39

In urging this the Freeman was once again swimming against the Smasher stream. British North American Liberals were never radical democrats especially after they had reached the seats of power. The Freeman objected to the growing desire evidenced amongst the Smashers to restrict the franchise. "They call themselves Liberals," it stated, "and in the name of liberty would establish a privileged class which, if possible, should be for the greater part composed of their own adherents, no means being spared that could possibly promote such a result." While admitting that democracy was not perfect, Anglin, in true frontier spirit, claimed that nothing else was suitable in North America.

Democracy, it is true, has many errors and faults and crimes to account for; but in this country what form of government not democratic is at all tolerable? Is it to be endured that we are to have a governing class here, and a class that must submit to such laws as the governing class choose to impose? That men like the editor of the Reporter, the Messrs. Fisher, or our own Assessors, are to determine who are to constitute the governing class; to say to this man, you have not "soul enough," and to that, you have not "a common interest in the community?" and although you are intelligent, sober, industrious, and a good citizen; though your whole life has been devoted to a trade or pursuit beneficial to the country, and although, moreover, you have as large an income and as much property as that other man whom we permit to vote, we will exclude you, and merely because we think proper to do so? Yet such are the principles these Liberals now openly advocate, and even the Ballot they would, if possible, do away with, because it protects the working man from the undue influence of his employer; the poor man from the vindictiveness of his creditor. 41
Yes, said Anglin, the vote was a right which all men of the province ought to possess. But it was a precious right and carried with it serious responsibilities.

The right to vote, and by voting to take part in the government of the country, in the making of its laws, and raising and expending the revenue, is the greatest political right any man can possess, and he who disregards it is not fit to be a citizen of a free country.42

If one wished to be cynical one could say that Anglin's espousal of democratic principles was just a means of enhancing his political prestige. While there is an element of truth in this assessment in that it was connected with his general denunciation of the Government, it would be inadequate as a general conclusion. The fact was that the main group to which universal suffrage and other democratic ideas would appeal would be those who did not and could not, under existing regulations, possess the vote. If anything, such ideas would detract from the popularity of their promoter amongst the very people who had the power to elect him.

The real test of Anglin's political power came when he stood for election. His first venture into this field came in 1860 when he ran for an aldermanic seat on the St. John Common Council in King's ward. The way the Freeman told it, its editor had been approached by a number of the residents and had been pressed to run. He had tried to dissuade them and only after they had appealed to his sense of duty did he give his reluctant assent. He warned them that the Smashers and their hangers-on would do all in their power to defeat him and that a religious cry would be raised. This was exactly what occurred, said the Freeman, and accounted for his defeat by a three to two margin. It was not an auspicious beginning for a political career.

Anglin's opportunity to revenge this defeat came a year later when the life of the New Brunswick Assembly came to an end. The Freeman's burial
notice was cruel.

It is gone! and the whole Province experiences an ineffable sense of relief. It is gone! may no country ever look upon its like again. It is gone! sunk in infamy unfathomable, and its memory will ever be loathed and abhorred [sic] by good men. It is gone! but it has left behind it a mess of corruption and pollution which it will require all the energy of the good and wise to get rid of; which if not got rid of at once will taint the political atmosphere for many years to come.44

On May 9th, the Freeman published Anglin's card to the electors of the county of St. John announcing his candidacy. It proclaimed that his political opinions and principles were well known and that, if elected, his aim would be to put these principles into practice, and to "secure for the country an honest, energetic, prudent and economical administration of public affairs." He would run - but under what label? The answer to this question was not decided for some time. What happened was that a clique of the Conservative party in St. John got together at an unpublicized meeting - a "hole-and-corner" meeting Anglin later called it - and drafted a Conservative slate of candidates for the city and county constituencies. Anglin had expected to be nominated as one of the ticket on account of the services he had provided for the Conservatives during the five previous years. But this did not occur and he was left out in the cold along with S. R. Thomson. He would have to run as an independent. But then this was not unfitting as all along the Freeman had exhorted the New Brunswick electors to "choose without regard to party men of honour and character who hold the political opinions of which they approve."

The unsatisfactory nature of the Conservative ticket resulted in a slate of eleven candidates for the four seats available for the county of St. John - four Liberals, four Conservatives and three independents. It was really even more confusing than this would indicate for on nomination
day strange things occurred. One Robert Douglas nominated not only R. D. Wilmot, one of the Conservative candidates but also John Jordan, a member of the Smasher ticket. Robert Keltie nominated John Gray, a Conservative, and S. R. Thomson, who was running as an independent. With things like this happening only one thing was clear about St. John politics—they were complex and confusing. Anglin knew enough of its politics to take at least one important precaution. In the King's ward election the year before, a number of placards and handbills had been circulated purporting to come from Anglin and exhorting Catholics to vote for one of their own. Anglin had not, in fact, issued them and he considered the whole thing to be a plot by his opponents to bring out a Protestant reaction. The plot had succeeded then; he did not want the same thing to happen a year later and took appropriate steps:

Mr. Anglin also wishes to state that, in order to prevent the possibility of misrepresentation, he will not issue any handbills or placards, and to warn the public that if any be issued in his name they will be spurious and fraudulent.

Detailed evidence on the campaign in St. John is not available. The Freeman placed itself under a self-imposed censorship while its editor was a candidate. In any case the result was the important thing and when the political dust cleared Anglin had polled the second highest number of votes of the eleven candidates, gaining sweet revenge in King's ward where he led the field by a large margin. Taking the other three seats for the county were Smashers, a fact which meant that two very important Conservative leaders, John Gray and Robert Wilmot, were left at home. What accounted for Anglin's victory? Undoubtedly the publicity which the Freeman had brought him was an important factor. Probably many Conservatives felt they owed him a vote for his past services. Unquestionably the Catholic vote helped him. But there was another factor
involved. The electors recognized that he was capable, hard-working and intelligent. One could find fault with his ideas but not with the character of the man himself. And so Anglin was to join nineteen other new faces in the New Brunswick Assembly for the 1862 Session. But he would be on the opposition side of the House, for the Smashers had managed to grasp the reins of power once again. Nevertheless, St. John was to find Anglin a conscientious and useful representative.

III

The constituency which Anglin represented in the Assembly until 1866 and in which he resided for a third of a century had a number of interesting characteristics. For St. John the first half of the sixties brought prosperity never matched thereafter. This was in large part a result of the demands of the American market and the difficulties faced by American competitors, during the Civil War years. It was, however, an unnatural prosperity, for the Civil War could not last forever. When it ended the province was to face renewed and even more aggressive economic competition. In the meantime, St. John, as the centre of the provincial shipping and shipbuilding industries and the import-export trade, was very prosperous.

The trade in or use of New Brunswick's chief staple, that is, wood or wood products, was the focal point of St. John's economic life. The shore near the mouth of the St. John River was lined with timber-ponds, booms and shipyards, and the various companies employed a large percentage of the labouring population of the city, although certain small industries, such as tanneries and iron foundries competed in the labour market with the large lumber and shipbuilding firms. Shipbuilding, concentrated in metropolitan St. John, reached a peak in 1863 and 1864 never matched
in the history of the province (except in the phenomenal year of 1854). Every day on his way to and from the Freeman office, which was only a stone's throw from the harbour, Anglin would have seen the ships setting sail or docking and have talked to the sailors.

By the 1860's Anglin's adopted city had made considerable strides along the road of 'progress'. It was the fourth largest city in British North America and its metropolitan area contained nearly one-fifth of the 252,047 people of New Brunswick. The rocky hills of the city had been partially cut down and smoothed out, although complete levelling was an impossible task. An inadequate but nevertheless useful water-supply system had been started in the 1840's and by the mid-sixties Anglin could walk home after an evening at the office on main streets, lighted by gas lamps.

By this time plans had even been made for a "People's Street Railway Company". More than a dozen churches of various denominations, a poorhouse, two hospitals, many schools, a Mechanics' Institute, and several banks, were only a few of the buildings and institutions to be found in St. John. Some of the wooden structures that had been destroyed by the disastrous fires which plagued the city, had been replaced with solidly-built brick buildings, but it remained a city dependent on wood for the shelter and livelihood of its residents.

Material progress there had been, but cultural and social aspects of the city's life were not forgotten. As an editor of a newspaper, Anglin was cognizant of these developments and he took pains to give them coverage.

Judged by its cultural activities, as seen in the columns of the Freeman, St. John had developed considerably and yet lagged far behind American centres such as Boston. Societies such as the Irish Friendly Society, St. Patrick's Society, the Agricultural and Horticultural Society and the
Total Abstinence Society, to name only a few, provided a core to many of the social activities of the city. Lectures, discussions, excursions and festivals were some of the events sponsored and promoted by various religious and secular societies. Among the most popular events supported by these organizations were "Monster Pic-Nics" which sometimes drew up to four thousand people. Occasionally a circus would come to the city to the enjoyment of children of all ages. Excursion trains and pleasure cruises, advertised in the Freeman, offered a person an enjoyable day in the country or a relaxing cruise on a steam boat for a cost of twenty-five cents or less. The railroads also provided fairly inexpensive transportation to the numerous agricultural shows and country fairs, where a great variety of crafts and amusements could be found, from corn-pickle and quilt displays to side shows and tug-of-war contests.

Sports, one of the more interesting sides of cultural life, were also covered in Anglin's Freeman, though not in a formal sense. Horse and boat races were popular events (perhaps because of the considerable amounts of money wagered on them). The pedestrian sport of walking had a brief upsurge in popularity in New Brunswick at this time. Challenges and claims of superiority rang out from every side and curious spectators came out to see these men passing the day by walking. The fad was shortlived however, as the authorities moved in to stop some of the more brutal contests. A very unusual sporting event was announced in the Freeman early in 1863. A speed skater was to race a horse pulling a cutter over the smooth ice of a nearby pond. Skating, in fact, was the most popular winter sport, aside from drinking contests. The city had built a skating rink and one of the few patents taken out in New Brunswick during these years was one "for fastening skates to boots." Archery and shooting contests were
popular events and were usually included in the attractions offered at the agricultural shows.

For those who did not wish to be as physically active, the columns of the Freeman showed that St. John provided a considerable amount of musical, theatrical, literary and intellectual stimulation. One could obtain singing and piano lessons, purchase musical instruments and attend musical concerts at the Lyceum or the Mechanics Institute. Sacred music and secular offerings by such groups as the Christy Minstrels provided inspiration to the musically-inclined residents of the city. The Colman family, for instance, originally from Boston and hired by the Catholic Cathedral to provide music, gave excellent public concerts which included works by Mozart and Haydn. The number and sophistication of the plays presented in St. John by various travelling or amateur companies were continually improving. At the Lyceum, as well as the masterpieces of Shakespeare, one could see such plays as "Nick of the Woods" or "Paddy Miles' Boy". Lectures were given at the Mechanics' Institute on history, medicine, politics or almost any subject imaginable. St. John contained a library, although the number of books inside it could be matched by the private libraries of most present-day university professors. However, books on history, literature, science as well as the popular novels of Dickens could be found therein. In spite of this and the numerous lectures on literature from visiting personages, literary activity in St. John was as lacking as in the rest of New Brunswick. Apparently, the only copyright taken out in New Brunswick for the ten years preceding Confederation was A view of St. John by J. W. Gray.

It is interesting to note that the Freeman's reports of the various plays, lectures and concerts were usually not very critical. Complimentary reviews
such as the following were common: "THE LYCEUM — The Octoroon drew a
crowded house on Monday evening and it was repeated on Tuesday evening.
It was brought out in capital style and the acting was almost without
exception excellent." One might think that the city was so happy to
obtain people who would give this type of entertainment that quality was
not of prime importance. The city was not such a prominent cultural cen-
tre that newspapers could afford to be overly critical or perhaps the travel-
ing companies and lecturers would not return.

The Freeman not only reported St. John's cultural life, it was part of
it. Along with seven other city papers, it defended St. John from verbal
attack and made St. John the provincial centre for organizing and mould-
ing public opinion. At that time newspapers were the most basic source
of information on all topics as the printed word was the only means of
mass news communication. Newspapers formulated the topics of discussion
which then percolated down through the levels of society, often by word
of mouth, to the lowest orders in the economic, social and political sense.
The overwhelming interest of the Freeman and other papers, was in political
affairs, but frequent reports of mutinies, murder cases and so forth indi-
cates that there was an audience in St. John for the unfortunate and mor-
bid side of human events then as now.

One did not need to go outside St. John to find examples of human suffer-
ing. The Freeman's accounts of the police court of St. John show that it
did a very active business dealing with drunks, vagrants and those charged
with thievery, illegal sale of liquor, abusive language and swearing, or
assault. Some of the cases were pathetic:

James Mullin, 60, an old offender, found lying drunk in a hall in
Canterbury-street, with his pockets full of potatoes, was discharged,
on condition of going to the country, which he promised to do as soon
as he got his boots half-Soled.
One fourteen year old, who had been found robbing a shop where he had
gathered an orange, some cigars and two bottles of liquor as his loot,
was found guilty and sentenced to twelve months in the penitentiary.
The incidence of arrests of the young among the cases brought before the
police court was so high that thirty was the average age of the defend-
ants. Over half the total number of those arrested were deemed "to
belong to Ireland". There were many places in St. John where one could
get into trouble with the law. There was "in the city 9 Billiard Saloons,
2 Bowling Saloons, 20 Gambling Houses, 65 Beer Shops, 280 Licensed Taverns
and 37 Houses of ill fame." Anglin was concerned about this situation.

There is the terrible fact staring the moral and respectable in the
face, that in this city are a number of "haunts of infamy and abodes
of crime," to which resort swarms of young men and old, who drink and
gamble and brawl night after night, and especially on Saturday nights;
to whom religion is an entire stranger; whose knowledge of the Divinity
is only such as enables them to blaspheme his name; whose respect for
society and the laws is merely a dread of policemen and the watch-house;
who are so reckless, so hardened, so depraved, or so ignorant, that
even when the violent death of one of their companions has been the
result of their "scrimmage" or their "row", they see in it nothing to
be ashamed of, nothing to be sorry for ...

With typical mid-Victorian moral concepts, Anglin attempted to steer read-
ers of the Freeman towards the good life by publishing notices such as
the following:

ANOTHER DREADFUL WARNING - Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the night of
January first, Margaret Howe, a woman of the town, was found dead in
her bed in the house of Mrs. Matthews, who keeps one of the most not-
orious of the Sheffield-street dens. On the first night of the new
year this wretched creature was, without a moment's warning summoned
to her great account.

By the 1860's St. John had passed far beyond the pioneer stage of urban
development. It was relatively 'advanced' in economic, social and cult-
ural terms, with the problems as well as the benefits which such 'progress'
entailed. To Anglin it was home, and for better or for worse it was a
community with these characteristics and attributes which he represented
in the New Brunswick House of Assembly.

IV

The election had shown that the people of St. John and the province had come to accept Anglin just as he had come to accept the province. But between 1857 and 1861 Anglin's acceptance of his adopted land grew into something more—it became patriotism. He became a New Brunswicker. The Freeman did not come out in big bold letters announcing that its editor was now a New Brunswick patriot. This only became clear when Anglin dealt with a variety of issues, such as colonization schemes and the imperial connection.

Anglin's attitude towards his city of residence was rather anomalous. For while he supported its interests, he was also one of the most vocal proponents of workers moving from the city to become independent farmers on the land. Irish Catholics did not usually become farmers; rather, they tended to become urban wage-earners. Anglin disapproved of this situation. In the first place he was not enamoured with the economic organization of the province. It was too speculative, too unbalanced. Unhealthy expansion and a heavy reliance on exports had led to a high level of imports and a lack of agricultural development and self-reliance. One would think, said the Freeman, that the province would learn from its times of adversity, but it did not.

For after all what are those good times, for the coming of which we all pine and sigh? Are they times then the vast majority will betake them to the woods, not to prepare logs for the market, but to carve out farms; when business will be healthy, sound and prosperous; when the progress of the country will be steady and unvarying; when few will seem to grow suddenly rich, and none who are industrious, honest, and sober, need want? Not a bit of it. The whole community long for a return of unbounded Bank credits, wild speculations, an abundance of paper money, nominal high prices and high wages, begetting extravagance, and often dissipated habits, and all the vast inflation which every one knows must be followed by collapse, but during which every
one hopes that he at least will secure a fortune. 79

What could be done about this situation? The Freeman advised the industrious, sober and frugal members of the labouring class to leave the cities and seek independence by building farms in the wilderness. Early in 1860, under the guidance of Dr. Sweeny, soon to become Bishop of St. John, and with the strong support of the Freeman, a movement was set on foot which resulted in the creation of a Colonization Society. The Society was to organize settlement colonies within the province, a task which involved prodding Government authorities into doing their duty and beating timber speculators to the best lands. The Society would enable those who did not possess much money to take up farming; would provide a means whereby the loneliness of the forest could be overcome; and would give to the community a school, roads and a priest - something that was much less easily done in sporadic and unplanned settlement. Anglin was in full support of the movement, but he realized that it faced serious difficulties.

But in point of fact the first great want that is felt - the very first obstacle in the way of achieving all success - is the want of such desire to own, possess and cultivate the land. With an infatuation that can scarcely be accounted for, thousands of men cling to the wretched life of the towns and cities, their casual employment, their fluctuating wages, their miserable lodgings, scanty food, insufficient fuel and ragged clothes, their filth and abominations and vices with as much tenacity as if these alone rendered life desirable; as if the free air of the country were poison, and labour in the woods and fields were the greatest slavery.

The settlement schemes were not overwhelmingly successful but they were by no means a failure. Before long there were several colonies established, the one at Johnville, Carleton county, apparently being the most successful. Throughout the years the Freeman gave progress reports and continually urged urban workers to go to the agricultural settlements and work to achieve a respectable and independent position.
What, one might ask, does Anglin's support of a colonization scheme have to do with provincial patriotism? In the first place it is apparent that he felt the province was worthy of being settled. But he went further than this. He proclaimed that New Brunswick offered as promising a field for prospective settlers as anywhere in North America. It was almost incomprehensible, the Freeman stated, "that a country so near to Europe, so accessible, so well watered, so fertile, has remained unsettled," while at great expense and trouble settlers had worked their way to the American West. In New Brunswick the farmer paid "no rents, no tithes, no grinding exactions of any kind." He owned his land and everything on or in it. And, he was as independent as any man in any country could be. The province promised much to a settler, the Freeman claimed.

Thus we offer to all compelled to leave their own country in search of a home a healthy climate, fertile lands, free institutions, and competence and independence in means and in spirit to all industrious, intelligent, sober settlers; and all this in a country nearer to Europe than any part of the United States.

There was, however, a type of man that the Freeman did not wish to encourage to come to New Brunswick.

Men whose only ambition is to drudge in a factory, or a mill, or a hotel; to do the scavenger work of the streets, to earn a day's wages in the service of others, and live in filthy lanes and alleys, and losing all spirit and sense of religion and even of manliness, become willingly the dregs of society, had better perhaps go to New York or any of the large cities, or if they are there now to stay there, for the settler's life is not for such as them. They could not enjoy its independence or wait its slow and certain returns.

But genuine settlers would be welcomed by the Colonization Society, would be given aid in obtaining rapid possession of land and be helped in getting a good start. Need one say more about the connection between Anglin's support for a colonization scheme and provincial patriotism? His writing was so effective, in fact, that one of the Freeman's series on settlement, probably that of 1860, was reprinted in pamphlet form and distributed
throughout the British Isles. Anglin had become a publicist for the province.

Finally, it was when the *Freeman* discussed the question of the imperial connection that Anglin gave the clearest indication of his commitment to New Brunswick. Anglin's initial attitude towards Great Britain had been determined by his Irish experience. Yet in the colony of New Brunswick he found his views modifying and compartmentalizing. For New Brunswick, but not for Ireland, the imperial connection was not detrimental. But the connection was deemed good not for itself but because it was serviceable to New Brunswick. In short, Anglin's viewpoint was a form of New Brunswick patriotism. Anglin showed greater understanding of Britain's position than did many of his contemporaries. He admitted the justice of Britain's abolition of remaining timber duties in 1860, for he could see "no reason why the people of England should continue to impose a duty merely beneficial to the Colonies." He could also see the necessity and legitimacy of British military withdrawal from the North American colonies. After all, he pointed out, these provinces were virtually independent and contributed nothing to England's treasury. It was not that he found the British tie unbearable or even undesirable, however. In fact, in criticizing the New Brunswick Assembly when it had quibbled over the amount of money that ought to be spent during the visit of the Prince of Wales in 1860, he confessed that his attitude towards the connection had changed since his Irish days.

We have never been accused of any excess of what in New Brunswick is called loyalty; we have never professed an intensity of attachment to her Majesty's person, or to her crown and dignity. When the power exercised in her name is oppressive and tyrannical, we never hesitate to denounce it, and there was a time when, in another country, we heartily desired its utter overthrow; but in this Province, where the people now enjoy so full a share of civil and religious liberty, where the Crown is the symbol of liberty and order and justice, founded on law, and there is no longer any wrong, save of the people's own doing, or any tyranny but such as we ourselves create for one another, the head
of the Government is surely entitled to more than empty professions, even from those who have been warmest in asserting the people's rights, and when, for the first time in the history of the Continent, the heir apparent visits the trans-atlantic empire of which he is one day to be sovereign, the Province so boastful of its loyalty, the Province which owes so much to the empire, should not show itself to the world a petty huckster, calculating the profits on the little venture; a Barnum considering the propriety of investing a few hundreds in the rarest kind of peep show.91

Yes, said Anglin, there was a value to the imperial connection. The British North American provinces were not ready for independence, it would be too great a burden for them to carry, "and such a degree of the responsibilities of independence as is thus forced upon them, will scarcely excite the spirit necessary to retain it, and may degenerate into mere licentiousness, for we are not a people ready to make great sacrifices in any cause." To those who apprehended that British colonists had no freedom, as many Americans believed, Anglin replied in a way which showed his attitude towards New Brunswick very clearly.

They are much mistaken who because this is called a British Colony or Province fancy it to be a mere dependency, whose people enjoy no liberty or rights. The dependence indeed is in all respects merely nominal, and in return we enjoy the protection of an army and navy that cost us nothing. We pay no tribute to England in any shape; we elect our own Legislature who make our own laws, raise and expend our own revenue, and in nearly all really essential matters we do just as we please. We have no established church; no privileged aristocracy; in theory every man is equal to his neighbour, and in practice the only real distinctions are those which talent or merit creates. We enjoy as much individual liberty as the people of the United States and much greater freedom from license and disorder.93

But if the British tie was no bother and had some advantages, it was foolish to think that the mother country could, would or ought to do much for New Brunswick. The idea of representation in an Imperial Parliament was chimerical and if put into practice would do more harm than good, Anglin said, while pointing out what Ireland had got out of its representation. The North American colonies had to rely on themselves not look to fanciful panaceas.
The Provinces want population and capital — but above all, and before all, population — and more than this neither England nor all the countries of Europe combined can possibly give us; the rest we must earn or secure for ourselves. Even capital we could surely amass, had we an industrious frugal population, proportioned in numbers to our extent of territory and resources. Trade, commerce, manufactures, agriculture, fisheries, must be our own work. No nation can confer liberty on another; it is essentially an article of home production, of domestic manufacture, which there is nothing to prevent our having and enjoying to the full in this country if we choose.

Such comments might not have been made by a typical Loyalist New Brunswicker but they represented a genuine commitment to the province nonetheless. A New Brunswick patriot in practice and in thought — that was what Anglin had become.
FOOTNOTES

1 Freeman, n.d., quoted in New Brunswick Courier (St. John), May 16, 1857.
4 Freeman, Aug. 10 and Sept. 16, 1858.
5 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1858.
6 Michael Egan to Editor, July 14, 1858, in Freeman, Aug. 10, 1858.
7 Freeman, Aug. 10, 1858.
8 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1858. Apparently the Judge returned the copy of the Freeman, indicating that he had received it and, presumably, had noted its contents.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., Oct. 19 and Dec. 11, 1858. The identity of the boy remained very shadowy at best.
11 Ibid., Jan. 15, 1859. Wilmot's comments at this meeting and at a lecture shortly thereafter caused Bishop Connolly to write two extremely long letters in rebuttal. These letters were published in the Freeman, Jan. 22 and 29, 1859. See also ibid., Jan. 25, and Feb. 1, 1859.
12 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection), Boyd to Tilley, May 24, 1858. Boyd was a successful St. John merchant of Irish Protestant background and a fervent supporter of Tilley. He became a Canadian Senator in 1879. See The Canadian Parliamentary Companion and Annual Register, 1881, ed. C.H. Mackintosh (Ottawa: Citizen Printing and Publishing Co., 1881), pp. 94-95.
13 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, Dec. 3, 1858.
14 Ibid., Fenety to Tilley, Jan. 12, 1858.
15 Ibid., T. O'Keleher to Tilley, Aug. 14, 1860.
16 Ibid., John Cudlip to Tilley, Jan. 14, 1859.
17 Freeman, July 16, 1858.
18 Ibid., Oct. 5, 1858; Feb. 1 and Aug. 20, 1859; Jan. 31, Feb. 23, June 30 and July 12, 1860; and March 2, 1861.
19 Ibid., Feb. 1, 1859. Anglin was not as unconcerned about the possibility of a Protestant Alliance as this might suggest (see ibid., Oct. 5, 1858).
20 Ibid., Feb. 23, 1860. See also ibid., Jan. 17, 1861.
21 Ibid., June 27, 1858; Nov. 11, 1858; Jan. 28, Feb. 9 and 16, Apr. 3, 1860; and Feb. 12, 1861. G. E. Fenety of the News was also concerned with the paucity of Government measures (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Fenety to Tilley, Aug. 9, 1858 and Oct. 12, 1860).
22 By 1857 the initiation of money grants had been surrendered by the Assembly to the Executive Council (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Tilley to Gentlemen of Secretary's Office, Sept. 5, 1857).
University of New Brunswick, 1954). It is to be expected that the Doctoral dissertation of Carl Wallace, a biographical study of Tilley, will contain much information about and an analysis of the political organization of New Brunswick at this time.

24 A large proportion of the material in Uncatalogued Tilley Papers deals with patronage. The connection between a number of the newspapers and the Government (patronage playing an important role) may be glimpsed in *ibid.*, C. N. Skinner to Tilley, June 24, 1858; G. E. Fenety to Tilley, Aug. 9, 1858; R. Woodrow to Tilley, Aug. 14 and 28, 1858; E. Willis to Tilley, May 4, 1859; E. Miller to Tilley, Nov. 18, 1859; Fenety to Tilley, March 5, 1860; Skinner to Tilley March 19, 1861; J. Dusen to Tilley, Feb. 5, 1862; and J. Boyd to Tilley, March 10, 1864. See also *Freeman*, July 6, 1858.

25 *Freeman*, Nov. 11, 1858; and Feb. 25, March 3 and 8, June 23, 1860.
26 *Ibid.*, Feb. 26 and 28; March 2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 16, 19, and 26; and Apr. 9 and 25, 1861. See also U.N.B.A., Peter Mitchell Papers, Mitchell to John Haws, March 15 and 16, 1861; and Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Executive Council to Lieutenant Governor Manners-Sutton, March 30, 1861.

27 *Freeman*, July 10, 1858; and Jan. 9 and Apr. 12, 1859.
28 *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 16 and 25; and Apr. 3 and 19, 1860. See also Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, March 30, 1861.

29 *Freeman*, June 28, 1860. Further information on Anglin's non-party position can be found in *ibid.*, March 1, June 23, July 7 and 21, and Dec. 8, 1860.

30 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Barker to Tilley, Sept. 3, 1858.
31 *Ibid.*, Barker to Tilley, Nov. 17, 1859. Further material on the significance of Anglin as an opponent of the Government is to be found in *ibid.*, Barker to Tilley, Jan. 14, Sept. 27, 1858; and March 15, 1860; and Boyd to Tilley, Nov. 21, 1859; and Feb. 5, 1861.

33 *Freeman*, Sept. 18, 1858; and Feb. 9, 1861.
34 *Morning News* (St. John), Nov. 20, 1857; and *Freeman*, March 16, 1861.
35 *News*, Nov. 20, 1857. Because of this the *News* was convinced that the *Freeman*'s circulation could not exceed 800.

36 *Freeman*, Jan. 8, 1859. At times Anglin had trouble with the Post Office in getting his papers delivered (see *Freeman*, March 14, 1861).
37 At one time there was a plan afoot for Anglin to edit a purely religious paper as well as the *Freeman* (see U.N.B.A., Bishop James Rogers Papers, Bishop John Sweeney to Rogers, Dec. 16, 1860). Nothing materialized from these plans.
38 *Freeman*, Sept. 18, Oct. 19, 21, 26, 28 and 30, Nov. 2 and 4, 1858; Jan. 6 and Sept. 1, 1859; Sept. 4 and 27 and Nov. 15, 1860.
39 *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1860. See also *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1859; Dec. 4, 1860; and July 2, 1861.

40 On prevailing British North American attitudes towards democracy see B. W. Hodgins, "Attitudes Toward Democracy During the Pre-Confederation Decade" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Queen's University, 1955).
42 Freeman, Sept. 27, 1860.
43 Ibid., Apr. 5, 1860. Interestingly enough King's ward had over fifty per-cent Catholics (see 1861 Census figures in Freeman, March 1, 1861), but it is unlikely that they comprised anywhere close to one-half of the electors. There is some evidence to show the Government's interest in the election (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, D. B. Stevens to Tilley, telegram, Apr. 3, 1860; and C. Watters to Tilley, Apr. 12, 1860).
44 Freeman, Apr. 13, 1861.
45 News, May 17 and 22, and June 3, 1861; Freeman, May 18 and 21, 1861; and Mitchell Papers, H. Jack to Mitchell, May 18, 1861. It is interesting that on nomination day, Thomson was nominated by Dr. Travers and J. G. Campbell, both of whom were close friends of Anglin (see Freeman, June 4, 1861).
46 Freeman, May 21, 1861. See also Ibid., Apr. 13 and May 7, 1861.
47 Ibid., June 4, 1861.
48 Ibid., Apr. 5, 1860.
49 Ibid., May 21, 1861.
50 Ibid., June 4, 1861.
51 Ibid., June 8, 1861.
52 The News, June 7, 1861, gave these three reasons for his success.
53 For various assessments of the expected numerical strength of the Government in the new House see News, June 24, 1861; and Freeman, June 25 and July 11, 1861.
54 "Even as late as 1864 imports to Saint John were more than 78% of the total imports into New Brunswick" (W. M. Whitelaw, The Maritimes and Canada Before Confederation (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 63).
57 Freeman, Sept. 27, 1864; and New Brunswick: Census, 1861, p. 101.
59 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
60 A. Harvey (ed.), The Year Book and Almanac of Canada for 1867 (Montreal: John Lowe and Co. 1866), p. 34.
61 Freeman, Aug. 17, 1865.
62 Who won this race, or even whether it actually took place, is not known.
63 Harvey, op. cit., p. 61.
64 Freeman, Apr. 25, 1865.
65 Ibid., Apr. 29, 1862.
66 Ibid., July 18, 1863.
67 Harvey, op. cit., p. 62.
68 Freeman, July 23, 1863.
69 Ibid., Jan. 18 and Aug. 5, 1862.
70 Ibid., March 2, 1865.
71 Ibid., Sept. 10, 1863.
72 Ibid., May 31, 1862.
73 Ibid., June 14, 1864. A breakdown, according to age of the cases brought before the court in 1863 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Defendant</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>between 12 and 17</td>
<td>34</td>
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between 17 and 20 113
" 20 and 30 177
" 30 and 40 492
" 40 and 50 233
" 50 and 60 145
" 60 and 70 60
" 70 and 80 11
over 80 4

74 "Chief of Police Report," quoted in Freeman, June 14, 1864. There were 2,503 arrests in 1863. Of these 800 belonged to New Brunswick
131 " " England
1,326 " " Ireland
92 " " Scotland
13 " " Wales
54 " " The United States
3 " " Canada
68 " " Nova Scotia
1 " " The West Indies
6 " " France
7 " " Norway

75 "Chief of Police Report," quoted in Freeman, June 14, 1864.
76 Freeman, Nov. 20, 1858.
77 Ibid., Jan. 6, 1863.
79 Freeman, Dec. 14, 1858.
80 Ibid., Nov. 29, 1859.
82 Ibid., Feb. 2 and 16, and June 7, 1860; and Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Sweeney to Tilley, Nov. 10, 1863.
83 Freeman, Feb. 2 and 23, 1860.
84 Ibid., Feb. 2, 1860. In the discussion of the question a good deal of general material on Irish urban living conditions emerged (see also ibid., Jan. 21, 1860). The belief that rural settlement would be morally uplifting and that the cities were cess-pools of iniquity full of bad examples, was a strong motivating factor for both Dr. Sweeney and Anglin (see ibid., Jan. 21 and Feb. 2, 1860).
85 Freeman, June 7 and Aug. 2, 1860; July 25, 1861; and Sept. 9, 1862.
86 Ibid., Oct. 17, 1867; Oct. 7, 1869; July 5, 1870; and Oct. 21, 1875.
87 Ibid., Jan. 22, 1861. See also ibid., Nov. 6, 1860.
88 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1869.
89 Ibid., Feb. 25, 1860.
90 Ibid., June 12, 1860. Anglin's changing views on this question were determined, in part, by the fact that he felt Britain was causing the problem with the United States and that therefore she should bear the responsibility.
91 Ibid., March 22, 1860.
92 Ibid., June 12, 1860.
93 Ibid., Jan. 22, 1861. See also ibid., Sept. 26, 1861. When dealing with provincial politics the Freeman did not think that "distinctions" always rested on merit.
94 Ibid., Aug. 23, 1860.
CHAPTER 5

North Atlantic Neighbours: 1861-1863

Despite his New Brunswick patriotism, Anglin was viewed with suspicion in the House of Assembly. Even Lieutenant Governor Arthur Gordon had heard rumours which he passed along to the Colonial Secretary:

... Mr. T. Anglin, is an able man and good speaker. His antecedents, however, can hardly be said to be in his favour, as he was actively engaged in treason in Ireland, from which country he fled in 1848, after having actually, as I am told, formed one of the small number of those who were with Mr. S. O'Brien in Widow McCormick's [sic] cabbage garden. 1

As far as Anglin's Irish career was concerned, Gordon's opinion was based, of course, on heresay not fact. But the Lieutenant Governor was right in believing that Anglin had ability. From the beginning he was a thorn in the side of the Government. He played a very large role in Assembly discussion especially on financial matters and his sharp eye for irregularities prevented the Executive Council from becoming complacent. As well, he kept the columns of the Freeman filled with reports from Fredericton, over the signature "Al".

Anglin's efforts were recognized by his opponents. Some supporters of the Government felt that he had assumed the leadership of the opposition forces, but did not find this particularly disturbing:

I am pleased to find that your opposition is headed by Anglin & Co - so long as you can keep these men in the opposition I think you need not fear any overturns. 3

Yet underlying such sentiments was a recognition that Anglin was a force to be reckoned with. This attitude emerged quite clearly in a letter written by Anglin's old antagonist, John Boyd, never one to mask his true feelings:

But if Anglin returns to St. John without having upset the Govt. or fastened upon you the charges he has so long, and so shamefully made, then he will indeed be weak, and the laughing stock, and scorn of all here. Give him rope as you say, but then hang him high up, that the
whole Province may see the great big vulgar lantern jawed Paddy in his true native deformity.\footnote{4} The 1862 session passed smoothly enough, despite the worries of the Government that Charles Fisher was going to make an attempt to overthrow it. It was not, however, a happy time for Tilley, as his wife, Julia, after a lingering illness, died near the end of March. In contrast, Anglin had seldom been in a more auspicious position. His happiness was made more complete on September 25th, when he married Ellen, the daughter of Alexander McTavish, J. P. Even the early hour of the ceremony – 6 a.m. – did not prevent the Cathedral from being filled to overflowing. After the wedding mass had been performed by the Bishop, assisted by the Rev. John Quinn and the Rev. William Foley, the couple had left for a honeymoon in New England. At this stage of Anglin's career, when his influence and power were greater than they had ever been before, the political and economic life of the province was becoming increasingly involved in wider relationships. The dominant influence was the American Civil War. But this also had repercussions on relationships with the mother country and with the rest of British North America. In viewing New Brunswick's North Atlantic neighbours, Anglin found his provincial patriotism strengthened all the more.

One defining characteristic of British North Americans was their anti-Americanism of a variety of kinds. To most Irish Catholic emigrants, the United States was an earthly utopia and the hope of the world. As one might expect, Anglin's attitude was a mixture of the two views of the United States, as befitted an Irish Catholic British North American. He was not as antagonistic towards the United States as were some colonists;
but he was most keenly aware of its defects.

The Freeman's view of the United States was far from favourable. The paper was critical of the high rate of crime and immorality in American society, concluding on one occasion that such a society was "rotten beyond all conception." Anglin's impression of American politicians was almost as bad as that he held of those of New Brunswick. In noticing the Presidential election in November, 1860, for example, Anglin stated that "a few months hence it will be found that it matters little to any but the office seekers who is elected." The Freeman was so blinded by its preconceptions regarding American politics that it could not credit the gathering storm-clouds. It claimed that the noise from the United States was just the cries of ousted office-holders magnified by an irresponsible press:

There is not the slightest danger of the Union; not the slightest probability of any one's doing anything to emperil [sic] it seriously. The country long since determined that there should be no more slave territory; that determination has now received such force and effect, as a Presidential election can give, and there the matter will rest. Any aggression on the rights of slaveholders in the Slave States is not apprehended by any one.

This excessively optimistic view was modified by the end of the year, but Anglin retained a poor opinion of American politics and society.

The people of the North are fanatical and easily excited by the thousands of preachers whose theology is politics, and with whom popular excitement, manufactured to suit their purposes, is the most glorious manifestation of the Grace of God and of the Working of the Spirit. But neither the fanaticism of the people, nor the eloquence of the preachers, nor the efforts of the German and other Atheist Socialists who have on their part done so much to produce this excitement, can resist the influence of the dollar, the real Yankee Almighty. The people of the North, with few exceptions, care little for the slaves, and in this agitation, as in so many others, their great desire was to force their opinions on others, and enjoy that kind of tyranny ever so dear to fanatics; but when they find that it can in this instance be indulged in only with the loss of their manufacturing and mercantile interests, and to the ruin of merchants, manufacturers, and artizans, they will very soon grow tired of it.
Throughout January and February the *Freeman* continued to trust that a full scale war would not break out. Anglin had no desire to see the Union split apart. When war actually commenced the *Freeman* blamed Lincoln and his administration for provoking the conflict when both sides seemed to be calming down. Anglin recognized that the causes of the war were numerous but placed greatest emphasis on the failure of politicians to deal with a soluble problem and the fanaticism which existed in both the North and the South.

The *Freeman* has always been opposed to Slavery and the extension of Slavery, but it has no sympathy with those fanatics and knaves, who, in the name of abolition, have laboured so successfully to plunge their country into all the horrors of civil war; and while it declares that the action of the Secessionists is not justified — by the circumstances, it does not hesitate to say that the Southerners have been much provoked, and have had many wrongs and indignities to endure.\(^\text{14}\)

The *Freeman* foresees a long drawn-out war and the end of the Union *de facto* if not necessarily *de jure*:

In all probability no human efforts can ever repair the Union, which has been so wantonly shattered. Conquest could not restore the old Union. For even if the North could conquer the South, then there would be, instead of a union of equal Sovereign States, a conquering and dominant section dictating terms, and a conquered and subject section compelled to yield to such dictation.\(^\text{15}\)

As the war got under way the *Freeman* retained its critical attitude towards the North. It legitimately claimed that the news emanating from the United States was unreliable and it saw that voices of moderation were being drowned out.

The press, the platform, and the pulpit are all in full blast, labouring in this dreadful work, and for the present moderate men are forced to observe a silence which is their only safeguard. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are at an end. North or South no one dares to express any opinion disagreeable to the Sovereign mob.\(^\text{16}\)

For a man of Anglin's independent and argumentative temperament such a state of affairs would have been completely unacceptable. Anglin thought another deplorable result of the war was the likelihood of the North
maintaining a large standing army. In the eyes of the Freeman such a 17
development would pose a grave threat to liberty in the Republic.
Moreover, the militarization of the American people was disturbing and
foreboding.

One of the most important changes is that the people are fast be-
coming a nation of soldiers, imbued with a military spirit which
assuredly will not die when this war between North and South is settled ...
They have allowed their President to assume a degree of power
such as no constitutional monarch ever possessed. They have raised a
vast army. They feel the want of a powerful navy ...

With a revenue, an army, and a navy, and power centralized and con-
centrated, the United States, though individuals may find the way to
competency more difficult than formerly, will, if it do not now incur
a debt so enormous as to be overwhelming, become infinitely more form-
idable to other nations in ten years than it would have been a century
hence in the ordinary course of events ...

In 1870 the United States will be a very different country from what
it was in 1860. Its people, their institutions, manners customs, ideas;
their memories and aspirations, their ambition, and their means of sat-
исfying it, will all have undergone a mighty change.18

The Freeman, in company with a large segment of the British North American
press, denounced the deterioration of American government under corrupt
politicians and mob rule:

The miserable party of fanatics and swindlers who now unfortunately
hold office and form the Government in the United States, are hurrying
the country into the condition of the worst of despoticisms – that in
which mob law is supreme – the Government being but the instruments
and agents of the madness and follies of the mob; the mob in its turn
being the ministers and blind dupes of their chiefs. Under such a
Government liberty perishes, reason is silent, and the public good is
sacrificed to the reckless ambition or the sordid avarice of a few.19

Yet while the Freeman found much to criticize it found no cause for re-
joicing in the difficulties of the United States. In fact it ridiculed
those residents of the province who had been staunch abolitionists before
the outbreak of the war but upon its commencement had rapidly turned to
support the South because of the commercial opportunities which the div-
ision of the Union seemed to promise. Anglin, in contrast, claimed
that only by taking a narrow and erroneous view could one think that any
true benefit could come from the difficulties and sufferings of neighbours. He believed that the demolition of the United States would be a tragedy for the entire world. It can thus be seen that Anglin's attitudes towards the Civil War and the United States were very complex. This ambivalence was not restricted to the Freeman. Indeed in its love-hate attitude towards the American nation it was very much within the main-stream of British North American thought.

Prior to the Civil War, many British North Americans adopted a rather lackadaisical stance on the question of the imperial connection. It had not seemed all that important then. But as the United States emerged as a centre of unrest in the North Atlantic community, and in particular a threat to the British North American colonies, this attitude was revised. British North Americans were forcefully reminded that their colonial status was of significance to them. In Anglin's case, the influence of the Civil War caused a modification of his earlier views on the imperial connection. But this shift was one of emphasis rather than content, for his attitude was still determined by his New Brunswick patriotism.

One aspect of the Civil War which was of great consequence to British North Americans, was the effect it had on Anglo-American relations. As early as September, 1861, the Freeman noted that Britain was becoming worried about the cotton shortage caused by the Northern blockade of Southern ports. Tension between Britain and the North mounted, resulting in the sending of troops to the North American colonies. In November, 1861, a British mail packet, the Trent, was stopped on the high seas and two Southern commissioners, James Mason and John Slidell, were removed by a ship of the Union navy. This, of course, was a grave affront to British dignity and a breach of international law. It appeared almost
certain that war between the North and Britain would be the result.

Almost all of the papers in British North America were united in criticize American conduct and surprisingly, some of the most decided expressions of opinion emanated from the Freeman. It stated that the affair had been a grave infringement of the maritime rights of the world's greatest naval power and that it was an outrage previously unequalled. Anglin felt sure that Britain would take strong action and that a first-class quarrel was inevitable unless British fear of French power had a paralyzing effect. There was no question where the sympathies of the Irish Catholic New Brunswicker lay. If it came to blows he would not be found supporting the Yankees. New Brunswick was not another Ireland.

In this case England cannot fail to do what the circumstances imperatively demand without incurring not only a loss of dignity and honour, but what is of far more consequence in these degenerate days a loss of prestige and influence which must inevitably lead to other and greater losses, and to an immediate decline in her rank and position as a naval power.

For once John Boyd was not poles apart even though his attitude to Anglin remained constant:

The Yankees need a rubbing down, and sad as it would be, I would not say - it serves them right. Anglin is very rabid on the subject, as indeed are all our papers.

The Freeman, however, was far from desiring a war. Indeed Anglin's was a voice of reason in tumultuous mid-December when Britain demanded the release of Mason and Slidell and it appeared unlikely that the Union Government would be able to go against the wishes of the American press and people, swallow its pride and accede to this demand. In the lead editorial of the December 17 issue, entitled "Common Sense", the Freeman accepted the justness of the British demand and recognized the difficulties faced by the American Government. It queried whether the colonists were really anxious to shoulder the responsibilities and horrors of war.
Most of all it cautioned its readers:

[Let us, by our acts and words, prove that if there must be a war, it will, as far as we are concerned, at all events, be a war for the maintenance of the right and not for the indulgence of senseless hatreds and rabid animosities. While there is a chance of accommodation let us show that we wish an accommodation to be made on such terms, that while it vindicates the honour of England, it shall wound the self respect of our neighbours as little as possible. Under all circumstances let us remember that taunts, and threats, and insults tarnish most deeply the character of those who use them, and that in the most important crisis the most valuable article is "Common Sense".

Fortunately, war was averted. The weakness of its position forced the American Government to eat 'humble pie'. Nevertheless a highly disquieting atmosphere continued and caused Anglin to write a comprehensive analysis of North American affairs on the last day of the year. He began by pointing out the absurdity of imperial authorities calculating that the provinces were capable of defending themselves with the aid of a small number of British troops, and that they could instantly field and maintain an army of fifty thousand, to be increased, if necessary, to perhaps two hundred thousand. To the Freeman it was ridiculous to suppose that struggling colonies, lacking capital and a compact population, could even come close to achieving this. In fact, Anglin was convinced that all of Canada down to Quebec could be captured in a fortnight by a surprise American attack. But this would be a fruitless conquest unless the Americans could also be victorious at sea.

While the fleets of England were supreme at sea, it would be of little use for the Americans to capture a few towns or overrun a wilderness country.

Consideration of the defence of the provinces was important because, claimed the Freeman, war had not been averted but only postponed. The basic cause of conflict – the cotton shortage – had not been removed, and the United States would seize the first favourable opportunity to wipe out the humiliation suffered. In the hope, however, of avoiding
such an occurrence, Anglin attempted to remove what he considered to be one of the underlying factors involved in Anglo-American confrontation. This was a misapprehension, existing in the United States, of the attitudes of British North Americans. Despite the numerous ties that bound the American and provincial peoples together, the latter would resist any American aggression. The Americans did not seem to grasp the fact that British North Americans had no desire to be incorporated into the American republic.

The people of the United States hold obstinately to the idea that these Provinces enjoy no freedom, and pine for the liberty which annexation to the United States would give. They seem incapable of learning that an immense change has taken place in our condition during a few years; that we now enjoy, to an almost unlimited extent, the right of self government; that our connection with England, except in an hour of danger ... is merely nominal; that we pay not one penny of tribute to the Imperial Government, directly or indirectly; that we are not bound to furnish a single man for her army or navy; that we make our own laws, levy our own taxes and expend the proceeds as we choose, and that although the want of larger markets prevents the development of our manufacturing skill and energy, and we are in consequence often blamed for want of enterprise, when the real want is want of a market, we have no fault to find with England on that score, as she claims no preferences or privileges for her productions, and imposes no restrictions on our trade. To suppose then that the Provinces are as dissatisfied as when a few persons strove to rule them arbitrarily in the name of the Imperial Government, is indeed an erroneous idea, and this the Yankee will discover to their cost should they ever attempt to build up any scheme of conquest upon it.

The Freeman was not sure how the people of Canada West would react, especially when it considered what it supposed to be Yankee spirit and Yankee notions prevalent amongst them, but it concluded that if they were properly organized and given positions of responsibility they would prove loyal. The French Canadians, without question, Anglin felt, were opposed to annexation. They were not about to gamble their rights and privileges in the American melting pot. Finally, the British Americans most frequently thought to be anti-British were the Irish. Anglin's reply was eloquent testimony to the falsity of this assumption.
It is also an erroneous idea, that the "Irish population," because they detest a bad and odious Government in Ireland, must necessarily be disloyal to a good and beneficent Government in these Provinces because it is called by the same name. The majority of them have friends and relatives in the Union, and they owe to America for all it has done for the Irish exiles a debt of gratitude, which even Know Nothing absurdities and violence could not make them wholly forget. No part of the population is bound by so many ties to the people of the United States, and none would be more reluctant to engage in a quarrel with them; none more determined to take no part in any aggression; but they too know their duty, and they have never yet been found unfaithful to the Government that protected or to the flag that sheltered them. Semper et ubique fideles, they will not be found in these Provinces to forfeit their glorious motto nobly earned, and even those who would willingly at an hour's notice peril life and limb in the cause of Irish freedom, will show that the same sense of justice and love of right which in Ireland would make them rebels makes them conservatives in these Provinces. They value the blessings of liberty, sustained and regulated by law, and tho' bearing no ill will towards the Americans, entertaining no wish to see the great Republic weakened or humbled, they know their duty to the country in which they live and of whose people they are truly an integral part, and knowing it will perform it.

Because Americans held misconceptions about British North America and because Anglo-American relations remained touchy, Anglin was concerned about the question of defence. Prior to the Civil War, Anglin had acquiesced in British military withdrawal from North America. He retained his belief that for England the connection was unprofitable and that British North Americans had no right to complain, though much to regret, if the mother country broke the tie. On the other hand, he rejected the argument that the colonies were not jeopardized by their connection with Britain. British North Americans were not looking for trouble with their neighbours to the south.

If there be a quarrel at all it will not originate in anything that immediately concerns these Provinces, but in the necessity of keeping five millions of the people of England from starving. In their present condition the United States can have no wish to provoke hostilities with England, and England on her side will avoid war with the United States as long as possible; but should she ever go to war with them it will be for her own sake and not for ours.25

Were the colonies independent they could determine their own policies
towards the United States and "by prudence, moderation, and fair play ... possibly avoid a quarrel for many years to come." The point was that since Britain was causing the problem with the United States, she ought to bear the responsibility.

If England chooses to sever the connection it is for us to submit with all patience and do the best we can to protect and take care of ourselves; but while we form part of the Empire England must and will do all she can to protect our soil — not indeed for our sake but for her own. He was telling imperial authorities something with which most Canadians came to agree in the next six decades — that the mother country could not have the sole right to determine imperial policy and yet expect colonists to bear the responsibility for and burdens of that policy. In Anglin's eyes, that was an impossible half-way house. Still, it was clear that Anglin favoured the retention of the British connection. Equally obvious was the fact that Anglin viewed the connection through a 'Made in New Brunswick' pair of glasses.

II

Under the impact of the Civil War, the Imperial Government became more willing to provide financial backing for that long-discussed venture, the Intercolonial Railway. In 1862 an agreement acceptable to all parties concerned seemed to have been reached. New Brunswick was to pay three and one-half twelfths of the total cost and the selection of route was to be left to the imperial authorities. The issue of railways was to prove significant for several reasons. It demonstrated Anglin's attitude towards New Brunswick's North American neighbours. It emerged as the most important political question of 1863 and typified Anglin's representation of the interests of his constituency. Perhaps most important of all, it was the precursor of and prelude to the Confederation debates
which were to follow. The political alignment reached in New Brunswick on the railway issue was almost identical to that later seen in the Confederation struggle.

Anglin failed to pass immediate judgment on the 1862 initiative. The Freeman sat back and said it would wait until the final arrangements were before the public before it made any pronouncements. It promised, however, not to hinder the Intercolonial if fair terms could be reached.

John Boyd found Anglin's 'wait-and-see' attitude rather amusing:

It is great fun to watch Anglin's course now, he writes that until the scheme of the Railroad is before the People fully, he will offer no opinion, how different his course would have been had he not been an M.P.P. he has now to curb his tongue, besides he saw in Canada his friend D'Arcy Magee who has told him what he had better do. Anglin is wonderfully tame since he married his young wife, the effect upon the mind of the body is wonderfully exemplified in his case.

By the end of 1862 the terms of the agreement were placed before the public and the Freeman began its assessment.

Anglin was unhappy that the choice of route had been left to imperial authorities. He was sure that Britain would naturally choose the route farthest away from the Maine border, for to her the Intercolonial Railway should be a military connection, a fast, safe route for the transportation of British soldiers to Canada in case of a winter crisis when the St. Lawrence River was closed. To Britain, Anglin maintained, commercial interests were of secondary importance. The Canadas, too, wanted the North Shore route. They had three objects in view:

[T]hey want to provide a communication with the Atlantic and with Great Britain, in case of war with the United States, which recent events have proved not at all impossible; they want to satisfy Lower Canada, which taxed for the Railroads and Canals of Upper Canada, has hitherto been much neglected; and they want to render the branch of the Grand Trunk extending to Rivière de Loup more profitable ... than it has been.

Nova Scotia also preferred the North Shore route in order to make Halifax
the focal point of communication between British North America and Europe and to get the trade of Canada and the North Shore of New Brunswick.

With such united views outside the province, accompanied by the support of the North Shore within, it was apparent that the North Shore route was sure to be selected, at the expense, of course, of St. John. Anglin was determined that the North Shore route should not be chosen if the Intercolonial were to be built. It would cost more than New Brunswick could afford to pay considering that it would not be commercially profitable. Freight would still travel the cheapest routes - to Portland, New York, and Boston and up the St. Lawrence. There was no sense in opening up lands for settlement "when we have already more available lands than we can get settlers for ..." The military road, detrimental to St. John, in terms of its metropolitan competition with Halifax, did not even give corresponding advantages to any town of the North Shore, because the freight trade that would exist would be a winter trade and no North Shore port was accessible in winter. In any case, the military benefits of such a route would go to Canada, not to New Brunswick. The central route, through much of the uninhabited area of New Brunswick, had many of the same drawbacks. As well it was not really a military route, the short section near the Maine border being the weak link in the chain. It would, however, give St. John a better chance to compete with Halifax for the freight trade that did result and would use part of New Brunswick's existing track, the European and North American Railway. This route, nevertheless, would be very costly and would actually be mortgaging the present "for the benefit of a people who may one day settle in the wilderness in the centre of the Province." As far as the Freeman was concerned, the St. John Valley route was best for New Brunswick. This route, connecting
with the St. Andrews and Quebec Railway in such a way as to come close to Fredericton and leaving only a few miles to be built to the Maine frontier, would unify the railway system of New Brunswick and be the best possible commercial route. It would give New Brunswick connections with the United States as well as with Canada. True, it would not be as good for military purposes in time of actual warfare, nor would it open up much wilderness land for settlement. Even this route might not be a paying proposition. But, Anglin felt, it would come much closer to paying its way than either of the other routes. Indeed, because it would use the roads which were already in existence, it would be cheaper to build even though it was the longest route. Finally, the interests of St. John would be served and this was only fair since it was responsible for more than one-quarter of the revenue of the province, held most of the industry of the province and nearly one-fifth of its quarter million inhabitants. If St. John were seriously hurt, so New Brunswick as a whole would be injured and find its revenues insufficient to meet existing and future liabilities.

Of the three routes the Freeman had made a choice. Yet it was first necessary to determine whether New Brunswick could afford "to incur this additional debt for the purpose of building a railroad anywhere." Anglin had doubts which were shared by Gordon, the Lieutenant Governor, and by A. J. Smith, who had resigned his position as Attorney General in October, 1862, on the grounds that careful management of expenditures was needed and that the Intercolonial Railway, "if accomplished, must largely increase taxation which ... the people are unable and unwilling to bear." Finances were the crux of the matter. Anglin was sure New Brunswick could get a better deal. Not only should the route be defined and not be left
up to the Imperial Government, but also Canada, which stood in much greater need of the Intercolonial, should assume a greater portion of the expense. It was not that Anglin did not want railway connections with Canada. Indeed, he asserted that railway links with Canada and with the United States were very desirable. But the country must be able to pay for them and the St. John Valley route for the Intercolonial in combination with Western Extension of the European and North American Railway was the least expensive railway policy possible.

The initial and most important phase of this policy was Western Extension. This was to be the commercial road, the one that would tap the rich American market for trans-shipment to Europe and keep the profits of the large food-stuff importing business largely within the boundaries of the province. If the St. John Valley route was not to be chosen for the Intercolonial, then Western Extension must be built first. Anglin probably felt that this might force the Intercolonial to be built via the St. John Valley route. There was, in Anglin's mind, no necessary competition between the two links. Both were desirable and ultimately both ought to be built. New Brunswick needed a connection with Maine for economic purposes and with Canada to help tie British North America together. In Anglin's eyes, the former was the most important to the welfare of New Brunswick at the moment.

On January 31, 1863, the Freeman asserted that the action of the Canadian Government, in refusing the sinking fund which imperial authorities had made a sine qua non of an imperial guarantee for the necessary loan, had been fatal to the Intercolonial Railway negotiations. Yet Anglin soon became aware that the New Brunswick Government was about to put forward an Intercolonial Railway Bill in the next session of Parliament. Gordon and Tilley were also aware that the Canadian Government, as then constituted, was unlikely to carry out the arrangements agreed upon at Quebec.
Notwithstanding, they decided to plunge ahead.

Mr. Tilley and myself are however decidedly of opinion that the wisest & best course to follow both as regards the honour and credit of this Province & the prospect of the ultimate completion of the road, is to persevere in perfecting the arrangements on the part of N.B. by effecting the necessary legislation and no legitimate step will be left unresorted to which may have a tendency to effect that object. 50

Although the 1863 session began on February 12th, the Government did not bring forward its Intercolonial Railway Bill until the end of March. The reason for this seems to have been that the Government wanted some freedom to manoeuvre, on the question of route, during a St. John county by-election. The effort was successful in returning John Gray, the former Conservative spokesman, as a supporter of the Smashers' Intercolonial Railway policy. 51

In the House of Assembly, Anglin, Smith and J. W. Cudlip led the assault on the Government scheme. On Thursday, April 2, and again on Saturday, Anglin spoke on the railway question, a speech of some six hours. The Fredericton Head Quarters' account of this verbal marathon reported that near the beginning Anglin had stated:

that he, and he was sure that every hon. member there, was desirous to preserve British connection, for the simple and obvious reason, if for no higher consideration, that it was profitable to them, because under it they enjoyed more freedom than they could under any other flag. They were all desirous also that the British North American Colonies should be joined in one great nation; such an union was likely to occur some time; and the railway might tend to cement them together.

On the other hand, he continued, the cost to New Brunswick of a military road would be far greater than was warranted. "He did not think they were called upon to pay so much for the defence of Canada." Furthermore, "was it not 'going it blind' with a vengeance to pass a Bill before they knew what route the road would take, or how many miles of railway would have to be constructed?" He asserted that the estimated costs of the railway were far below what was likely and that "all the traffic along the line in the Province would not bring four-fifths of the working expenses."
He accepted the fact that railways were important but not so important that such things as costs and benefits could be ignored. As well, he felt that the American war had caused unusual prosperity in New Brunswick and warned against undertaking financial burdens based on the assumption that such an economic boom would continue. Anglin also verbalized the Freeman's view that since the colonies had had nothing to do with the Trent crisis nor with Anglo-American animosity, Britain should largely pay for imperial defence. Taking the full blast of war, should any erupt, was enough responsibility for the colonies to undertake at present. During the course of this very able and comprehensive speech Anglin also pointed out,

at immense length (showing a very remarkable research into forbidding details, and the power and capacity of his memory,) the insuperable difficulties in the way of this railway as a paying concern, from the competition it would meet from the Great Western, Grand Trunk, and Portland lines.

Finally, Anglin did not believe that the present scheme was the best, or the last offer that New Brunswick would receive.

It was a very remarkable speech in a country where "to be a member of the Legislature is ... almost considered prima facie evidence, unless the contrary be known, that the individual possesses neither the habits nor education of a Gentleman." But the efforts of Anglin and the others failed and the Intercolonial Railway Bill passed into law in New Brunswick. Tilley owned, however, that the battle had been one of the hardest he had ever fought.

III

In Canada, no action was being taken on the Intercolonial. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, attempting to stir some life into this moribund subject, visited the Maritimes in the summer of 1863. McGee's connection with the Maritimes
and T. W. Anglin had been lengthy if not particularly close. In 1851, McGee, then a resident of Boston, had spoken to a meeting of supporters of the European and North American Railway in Portland, Maine. In 1856 he had visited St. John and lectured at that time. His summer visits to the Maritimes became frequent, partly, no doubt, to visit his relatives in St. John. The link between McGee and Anglin was less clear, or at least less public. As it is unlikely that Anglin was directly involved in the Irish Rebellion of 1848, it is a very remote possibility that they knew each other in Ireland. After McGee's visit to St. John in 1856, however, it was quite clear that he had made Anglin's acquaintance and had bought his version of New Brunswick politics. In 1857, after McGee had established the New Era in Montreal, it appears probable that that paper's New Brunswick correspondent who signed himself "A", was Anglin. In his own paper, Anglin lauded McGee when it was first learned that the latter intended to run for election. By 1859, however, the Freeman had become critical of McGee's position on representation in the Canadian Assembly, fearing that he was playing into the hands of George Brown who, Anglin thought, was threatening the rights and privileges of French Canadians and the independence of Lower Canada. Nevertheless, the Freeman still gave McGee a warm welcome when he came to St. John to give a series of lectures in the summer of 1859. In 1861, the Freeman was still speaking well of McGee and if John Boyd is to be believed, Timothy visited McGee in the fall of 1862. From the evidence that exists, therefore, there is nothing to indicate that any serious animosity existed between the leading Irish Catholic representatives in British North America when McGee came to St. John in 1863. The discussion that took place at that time between these two was tremendously interesting and significant.
It provided an excellent expression of Anglin's political philosophy and attitudes towards New Brunswick's North American neighbours.

At the Mechanics Institute on Tuesday, July 28, 1863, McGee gave a lecture on "The Inter-Colonial Railway in Relation to the Future of British America". While Anglin sat on the platform with other dignitaries, McGee, in his usual poetic way, expressed his vision of a united British North America distinct from the United States. He termed the great republican experiment in the United States a virtual failure. He asserted that liberty and authority had to be properly weighted in a constitution and that the weakness of the principle of authority in the republican institutions of the United States, was responsible for the defects of American society. He pointed out the danger of annexation and gave his opinion that the imperial connection was "little more than the allegiance which we pay the Sovereign ..." He advocated union "to fix forever the monarchical character of our institutions," to "give us nationality," to increase immigration, and to obtain greater military security against the American menace. McGee, of course, was one of the foremost proponents of the Intercolonial Railway and he felt that the Railway was closely connected with the idea of union. The line would break down inter-provincial ignorance and increase intercolonial commercial exchange as well as provide an important defensive work for the colonies.

During the next three weeks, the Freeman contained long and detailed discussions of the many aspects of McGee's speech. Anglin began with McGee's assertion that republicanism in the United States had proved a failure.

He was right when he said that liberty and authority are parts of the same thing; that without authority the Government can have no stability, no strength to do its work, the people can not have complete freedom; but he was wrong, decidedly wrong, when he stated that this wholesome authority is the attribute of any particular form of Government; wrong
when he asserted that the republican institutions of U. States have proved a failure as compared with the monarchies of Europe — even with those that are or are called constitutional.66

The Freeman believed that the picture McGee had painted of the United States was "coloured far too darkly". It did not think that the irreligion, vice and crime of the United States was much worse, if any, than that of the great cities of Europe. McGee had missed the point.

Social evils and vicious habits are not the effects of any form of Government, but are caused by a want of religious training or religious feeling, or by the malign influence of what seems to be religion while it is but a pander to human pride and self-righteousness ... Even the want of reverence for age, for authority, for religion is not a distinguishing evil of republican governments ... The state of society, the condition and circumstances of the country, the unparalleled prosperity of the people, the unsettled nature of their religious ideas and principles — all these may, and perhaps do tend to make the people more vicious, and to weaken the social ties; but they would have the same effect, whatever was the form of government.67

The Freeman's criticism of McGee's speech continued along the same lines in the next issue. Anglin asserted that republicanism was not responsible for the Civil War. Monarchy or any other form of government could not have prevented the economic struggle which many claimed to be its cause.

Nor could another system of government have dealt any more effectively with the two great evils that monarchical England had left behind in 1783; a "fierce bitter intolerant fanaticism which in England had brought a King to the block" in the North, and in the South "the slavery of colour as the basis of the social fabric ... " Furthermore, Anglin asserted, no matter what the form of government, the part of an empire or combination of states which feels itself harmed by a union with a stronger and domineering power will strive for separation and independence whenever the opportunity presents itself. Finally, the Freeman could not agree that the Civil War was worse than the wars that the monarchies of Europe had been perpetually engaged in.
Is it, in the opinion of any sensible man, worse that a people should be convulsed by such a question as slavery, or that a majority of the States and people of a Great Republic should be determined at any cost to maintain the unity of a country which nature has made one than that a country should be desolated by wars of succession?  

Anglin backed up his arguments with a multitude of examples drawn from his liberal education and reading of history to show that other forms of government had had as many problems, if not more, than the republican institutions of the United States. In the next issue, after giving many examples to confirm his case, Anglin concluded:

We think we have shown that neither the tyranny of public opinion nor of the mob is peculiar to the Democratic Republic, and that the mere form of Constitutional Government affords no positive security for the rights, property or liberty of the individual.

Anglin was not propagandizing for republicanism in particular, although in his open-minded approach to republicanism he was unlike most of his fellow-residents of British North America. He did not think the American system perfect and indeed preferred the British cabinet system, although there too he saw abuses that needed correction. He was simply trying to prove that the attitude of the people in a country was far more important than constitutional forms.

It is not merely by the existing laws or by any written form of constitution, much less is it by exceptional circumstances alone that we are to judge the value and worth of what we — perhaps erroneously — call the institutions of a country. Judged by such a standard, what a monstrous machine of oppression and injustice would not the Constitutional Monarchy of Great Britain sometimes have seemed. We must rather seek the spirit that pervades the people and finds expression in their laws and customs. What is this British Constitution of which we boast? Who can define it or tell what are its limits? It is not alone in the laws which now exist or in the forms in which it now works that its value and efficiency consist. These may be all modified or changed ... the "authority!" and prerogative of the monarch extended or abridged, and still we would extol the British Constitution. In its very pliancy and elasticity, in its capacity to be moulded to any shape some find the greatest merit of this Constitution; but in fact, and indeed, it would be as worthless as any other form of Government, definite or indefinite, if the spirit of freedom and order and good government did not pervade the people as a whole, if they did not know how to reconcile the largest measure of individual liberty and of personal
rights with a profound respect for "authority" and "laws". 73

This was not a startlingly new discovery in the realm of political philosophy but it was convincingly argued. It recognized the complexities of life and politics and refused to accept McGee's facile assertion that the form of government was the most important factor in shaping the life of the country. It was basically a conservative philosophy of politics and far from the stereotype of the radical Irishman. It asserted that happiness could be achieved within the existing system and that the religious life of individuals was very important for the well-being of society as a whole. Indeed, earlier in the year, Anglin had claimed that:

No agencies or means merely human can controul [sic] or subdue, much less quite extinguish the evil tendencies, the corrupt inclinations of human nature. Neither will civilization do it ... To controul [sic] human nature is a supernatural work which can only be accomplished by supernatural means. 74

In their own way, Anglin's views were just as conservative and dogmatic as McGee's. Perhaps as significant as any difference in the content of their political philosophies was a difference in style between the two men. You could almost see this in their faces; McGee's bold eyes and rather surly thin mouth compared to Anglin's fleshy cheeks and lips and small eyes tucked away behind a pair of glasses. Anglin's was the more placid and confident appearance while McGee's visage had an unsettled, almost haunted look to it. 75 McGee was always the theatrical flamboyant actor in politics who could be carried to extremes by the virtuosity of his own performance. Anglin was more reserved, almost stolid, and it took a great deal to ruffle his feathers. It was McGee who moved from place to place and from job to job throughout his life; Anglin who resided in St. John editing the Freeman for a third of a century. It was McGee who had participated in the Rebellion of 1848 and whose life was prematurely
ended by an assassin's bullet in the streets of Ottawa; Anglin who never participated in rebellion and died in his bed at the age of seventy-four. The difference in temperament accounts, in part at least, for the difference in their lives and political ideology.

When Anglin turned from an analysis of McGee's political philosophy to the subject of British North American Union, he again found himself in disagreement with the Irish visitor. Since 1858 Anglin had voiced his scepticism about the practicability, necessity and advantages of such a union, particularly if the imperial tie were to be maintained. He did acknowledge that if either mother country or colonies determined to break the connection, "then this union would become a necessity ... " But the issue had not concerned him very much. He felt union had little to commend it under existing conditions. It was a dream for sometime in the future, not a matter of present practical politics. Had the Civil War not intruded he probably would have been right. As it was, during the early sixties, as a result of the New Brunswick situation, the Civil War and the railway question, Anglin's ideas, brought together in answer to McGee, were refined and clarified on the eve of the great Confederation debates.

Timothy Anglin was a practical man. He dealt with facts not dreams. He had little patience with those for whom "no flight of fancy is too wild, no exaggeration of facts too gross, no hyperbole too absurd," when speaking about a union of the provinces. "If you could believe these men," which Anglin did not, "the mere act of union would give us military and naval strength, would bring us a population, would develop our resources, bring mines and minerals to light, secure to us the trade of the Great West, and direct through the magnificent valleys of the St. John, the St.
Lawrence, &c., &c., the tide of travel from Europe to Asia.\textsuperscript{80} This was too great a strain on credibility as far as Anglin was concerned.

Can any of our plain, practical, common sense readers understand how the Union of the Provinces and the transfer of our representatives to Ottawa, would confer such wonderful advantages on our farmers, and fishermen, and miners, and shipbuilders, and lumberers? We confess we never could discover how, by such means, such wondrous results were to be attained.\textsuperscript{81}

Anglin believed that a British North American nation was desirable as a future goal and had stated this in the House of Assembly in April. It was obvious, however, to Anglin, that the time for union had not arrived.

The greatest impediment was the lack of population in British North America. The fact that it held as many people as had the Thirteen Colonies nearly a century earlier was not a fair comparison, for the Thirteen Colonies were not faced with the threat of an overpowering neighbour in 1783 as British America was in 1863. Anglin was sure that,

\textsuperscript{82} no Federal or Legislative Union can bring the people who inhabit these vast countries more closely together, or fill up the great wilderness intervals with a new population ... It would not bring us more people and more capital, and population and capital are what we want most.\textsuperscript{83}

The reason that union would not bring greater immigration was that this could not remove the impression that the United States was the best place to go to gain an honest independence. Union would confer no benefits on New Brunswick's farmers or fishermen because free trade existed with Canada in farm and fish products. The lumbermen and shipbuilders of the province would only find that Canada remained their great rival. Anglin feared that New Brunswick's already neglected roads, bridges and harbours would fall into a worse state "when we had to petition that great Assembly for our own money?" \textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, Anglin had no sympathy with those who argued that by creating a larger country and enlarging the scope for public men, the country would become better known and consequently people and
capital would flow in. He believed that having a 'big' name would not help economically. He had nothing but distaste for those men for whom it was not distinction enough "to be known merely as inhabitants of British America as subjects of the British Empire ..." He demanded no "new nationality".

On the subject of defence and its relation to the union question, Anglin was decisive indeed. As an initial premise, he recognized that the United States was "no longer a peaceable, non-aggressive country, without fleet or standing army, devoted to money making and internal improvement."

An Anglo-American war was no longer impossible. His second premise was that any union must be a large if not complete step towards independence from Britain. A corollary to the proposition of independence was that any country worthy of independence must be prepared to make sacrifices for its preservation and since it is assumed that in union is strength, it was felt that a union of the provinces would make British America stronger and more formidable. Anglin disagreed. If the provinces were entirely independent, he argued, and war broke out between the United States and England, the provinces might escape invasion. Yet, in this state of independence, the provinces could expect no aid from Britain if they themselves quarrelled with the United States.

Standing then all alone, with no reason to hope for any aid from England, with no balance of power, in principle or in fact, on this continent, we would be dependent entirely on the justice, the honesty, and the moderation of our neighbours. As well, in a state of independence the amount of protection, both for physical and financial reasons, would actually be less than that provided by the Imperial Government. Suppose, however, complete independence from Britain was not achieved by the consummation of British North American Union. Suppose the provinces remained connected to England "either as
subjects of the British Crown, or as bound by an alliance, offensive and defensive, and by all the ties of good will and mutual interest ..."

If war came in this situation, all the great towns of British North America would be simultaneously threatened. One province could not offer aid to another.

All any of the Provinces could do, they could do far more effectively co-operating with the military and naval power of England, and subordinate to it, than by any attempt at united, independent action ...

If we were independent, perhaps the United States would never assail our independence; but a union of the Provinces would not increase our strength to repel the attacks, did they assail us, and it would not enable us to co-operate more effectually with Great Britain, if we were still to form part of the empire. 91

In concluding the discussion of McGee's lecture Anglin gave his opinion of the condition of the provinces and the immediate task that lay before their public men. He appealed to his fellow provincials not to be rushed into union.

These Provinces are now as free as any country can be, as independent as our circumstances and position will permit. Our people are happy and contented, industrious and enterprising, their trade unrestricted and untrammled, except where their own tariffs create restrictions which they can remove when they please. Let us not, to gratify the cravings of any selfish or wild ambition, sacrifice or emperil [sic] any of those advantages by any act of our own, and retard our progress by assuming the burdens of Court extravagence [sic] and standing armies. The time will come, perhaps soon, when a union will be practicable and advisable; when the vast wilderness which now separates [sic] us will have disappeared, to make way for farms and villages and towns, stretching in an unbroken line from the Atlantic to the great Lakes, and far beyond them, and from the United States frontier far into the Hudson's Bay country, and we shall all be one people in reality. We do not remain in status quo ... We are progressing steadily and constantly. Every new road that is opened, every new clearance that is made, every new house that is built is another step in the steady progress to this great end, and the humblest backwoodsman is doing more to build up this great country than the orator who would substitute fancy for fact, or the politician who believes that statesmanship consists in aiming at the impossible, or in essaying to do by legislation what can only be done by strong hands, directed by wise heads. The true work of the real statesman in these Provinces to-day is not to indulge in wild visions or to weigh down the energies of the people by imposing on them burdens far beyond their power that he may carry out some extravagant scheme, but to labour patiently, prudently, removing, when possible, all difficulties in the way of the merchant and manufacturer, increasing
all the facilities for opening up new districts for settlement, and new fields for enterprise, building new bye [sic] roads and great roads and Railroads wherever they are required, as fast as the means of the people will permit, indulging in no chimeras and fancies at the public expense, and not making the gratification of his own vanity, and avarice the chief object of his ambition. He must know much ought to be done at each period, and so much and no more should he attempt. Anglin's was a legitimate and sensible position. In it there was nothing that could be construed as disloyal to the Empire. On the contrary, he saw the value of the imperial connection and wished to see it maintained. The most that can be claimed is that in his willingness to remain in a colonial position, he was being irresponsible. He was not even taking a truly anti-union stance. He thought union advisable, but this was for the future not the present. It was as though building a British North American nation was akin to building a small wooden house. The foundations had already been laid. At this point there were two construction methods one could follow. One could do the framing and then put on the roof before finishing the walls. This construction method saves the workers from getting wet while completing the building, but the entire structure is vulnerable to major disasters. Those who desire to see the shape of the house as quickly as possible prefer this method even though the building is not really habitable for some time after its basic form has been determined. The second method is to build the walls each as a separate unit and then fit the completed walls together before putting on the roof. Using this technique means that much planning and work is done before the shape of the building can actually be seen. But the time period in which the structure as a whole is highly vulnerable is very short. Also, the house can be lived in shortly after the walls have been erected. Anglin preferred the latter method. Solid walls had to be built before the roof of union could be placed over the entire structure. In his view it was
better to get a little wet while the walls were being built and erected than to have a fine roof which gave no protection against the possibility of serious storms causing the whole building to collapse because the walls were not completed. It was not to be forgotten that it was a stormy season in Anglo-American relations. Then too, the workmen who were building the walls could sleep nights in the friendly mansion of Great Britain until the structure was completed. There they would be safe.
FOOTNOTES

1 P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 31, 1862. Coming from Gordon this assessment was really quite complimentary. He once called George Brown "the most dangerous and unscrupulous demagogue in British North America" (see P.A.C., Edward Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 15, 1865).
2 Freeman, Apr. 24, 1862.
3 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection), T.B. Hanington to Tilley, March 3, 1862. Even Tilley, on one occasion, recognized Anglin as the leader of the opposition (see Freeman, March 18, 1862).
4 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, March 14, 1862.
5 Ibid., T. B. Barker to Tilley, Feb. 20, 1862.
6 Ibid., G. E. Fenety to Tilley, March 27, 1862.
7 Morning News (St. John), Sept. 26, 1862; and Freeman, Sept. 27, 1862.
8 Freeman, Apr. 30, 1859. See also ibid., Oct. 27, 1859.
9 Ibid., Nov. 6, 1860.
10 Ibid., Nov. 13, 1860.
11 Ibid., Dec. 20, 1860.
13 Ibid., Dec. 20, 1860.
14 Ibid., May 21, 1861. This attitude towards the abolitionists paralleled Irish American views (see C. Wittke, The Irish in America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), pp. 125-134).
16 Freeman, Apr. 25, 1861. See also ibid., Apr. 9 and 18, and Sept. 10, 1861.
17 Ibid., May 2, 1861.
18 Ibid., Jan. 25, 1862.
19 Ibid., Aug. 31, 1861. See also ibid., July 20, 1861.
20 Ibid., Apr. 25, 1861.
21 Ibid., Apr. 27, 1861. The Freeman still maintained that the Union could not be preserved by conquest.
22 Ibid., Nov. 19 and 21, 1861.
23 Ibid., Dec. 7, 1861. See also ibid., Nov. 30, 1861.
24 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, Nov. 27, 1861.
25 On the Freeman's views on the defence question see especially the issues of June 24, and Aug. 5, 7 and 12, 1862.
26 Freeman, Sept. 21, 1861.
27 Ibid., Aug. 7, 1862.
28 Ibid.
by the Canadian Government.

30 **Freeman**, May 20, 1862.

31 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, Nov. 10, 1862. It would appear from this letter that the Anglins' honeymoon trip took them to Canada.

32 **Freeman**, Jan. 6 and 13, 1863. That Anglin's analysis was correct is shown in U.N.B.A., Lord Stanmore (Arthur Gordon) Papers, Newcastle to Gordon, May 31, 1862; and P.A.C., Duke of Newcastle (Henry Pelham-Clinton) Papers, Gordon to Newcastle, June 23, 1862.

33 **Freeman**, Jan. 13, 1863.

34 Ibid.

35 Tilley had already turned from a policy of utilizing existing lines in New Brunswick — Shediac to St. John and St. Andrews to Woodstock — to an acceptance of the "central" line (see Newcastle Papers, Gordon to Newcastle, July 6, 1862).

36 **Freeman**, Jan. 17, 1863.

37 Ibid.

38 In a letter to the **Freeman** of March 10, 1863, "A Looker On", asserted that "in a war with a country possessed of a large cavalry force ... a Military Railway is among the things with which we could dispense; or, at least, it is not so necessary to us that we should be justified in contracting a heavy debt for its construction."


40 Ibid., Jan. 20, 1863.

41 The North Shore route was 470 miles long, the Central route was 418 miles long of which 22 were already built, and the St. John Valley route was 533 miles long of which 163 miles were built, although extensive work would be required on the St. Andrews and Quebec line (see Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle, Nov. 25, 1861).

42 **Freeman**, Jan. 22, 1863.

43 Ibid., Jan. 27, 1863.

44 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle, May 6, 1862. See also Newcastle Papers, Gordon to Newcastle, Sept. 1, 1862.


46 **Freeman**, Aug. 25, 1864.


48 Ibid., Feb. 7, 1863.


50 Ibid.

51 Gray had been one of the most faithful supporters of the Intercolonial for many years (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, T. B. Barker to Tilley, Dec. 1, 1858). It would appear that some sort of rapprochement between Tilley and Gray was taking place before this by-election. In September, 1862, Tilley urged that Gray be appointed as a Commissioner of Fisheries (see Newcastle Papers, Gordon to Newcastle, Sept. 12, 1862). Anglin was convinced that the Government had withheld its Bill until the by-election was over because it knew that the people of St. John would not support it (see **Freeman**, March 24, 1863). The subsequent agitation for Western Extension indicates that Anglin may well have been correct in thinking that the residents of St. John had been misled during the by-election.

52 Quoted in **Freeman**, Apr. 11 and 14, 1863.
Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle, Dec. 31, 1862. Gordon, from his aristocratic viewpoint can not be expected to have seen the good qualities of New Brunswick's public men. Yet a number of these men, such as Anglin, were capable of penetrating analysis and grasp of issues. The ruggedness and bitterness of New Brunswick politics ought not prevent one from recognizing this.

P.A.C., Joseph Howe Papers, III, Tilley to Howe, Apr. 13, 1863.

New Brunswick Courier (St. John), Aug. 30, 1851.

News, Aug. 22, 1856.


The story that Anglin was on his way to join McGee in Canada when he arrived in St. John in 1849 (see W. S. MacNutt, New Brunswick: A History, 1784-1867 (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1963), p. 378) is highly unlikely. For one thing, McGee was not in Canada until 1857.


Freeman, June 14 and July 16, 1859.

Ibid., Aug. 4, 16, 18 and 20, and Sept. 1, 1859.

Freeman, Dec. 10, 1861.

See above, footnote 31.

A very full report of this lecture was given in the Freeman, July 30, 1863. McGee's ideas, more fully expressed, explained and combined, can be found in the excellent work by R. B. Burns, "D'Arcy McGee and the New Nationality" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Carleton University, 1966).

Freeman, Aug. 1, 1863.

Ibid.

Ibid., Aug. 3, 1863. Anglin had previously drawn attention to the deleterious effects of the 'puritan spirit' in the United States (see ibid., Aug. 9, 1862).

Ibid.

Ibid., Aug. 6, 1863. See also Ibid., Oct. 1, 1861.


Freeman, Aug. 8, 1863; and Apr. 15, 1865.

Ibid., Aug. 8, 1863. Anglin also defended republicanism against a number of other charges McGee had made.

Ibid., June 9, 1863.

Interestingly enough, both men had fringe beards and wavy hair which flipped up when it met the ears like a pair of wings. McGee's picture may be found in D. G. Creighton, The Road to Confederation: The Emergence of Canada, 1863-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1964), between pp. 212 and 213. Pictures of Anglin are located in the Globe (Toronto), May 9, 1896; and the New Freeman (St. John), Jan. 6, 1900.

Anglin's calm response to name-calling from Attorney General John M. Johnson in the 1864 session of the New Brunswick Assembly moved one assemblyman to comment, "Who would have thought that an Irishman would stand so much and not show fight" (see Freeman, March 8, 1864; and Daily Evening Globe (St. John), March 4, 1864).

Freeman, Oct. 9 and 28, and Nov. 18, 1858; Sept. 1, 1859; and Nov. 22, 1860. The last-mentioned of these was the occasion of Charles Tupper's speech in St. John (see his Recollections of Sixty Years (New York: Funk
78 Freeman, Oct. 28, 1858.
79 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1863.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 The Freeman had argued the other side of the question in its discussion of Maritime Union on May 10, 1862.
86 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1863.
87 Ibid., Aug. 15, 1863.
88 Ibid., Nov. 22, 1860.
89 Ibid., Aug. 15, 1863.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
CHAPTER 6

Anti-Confederation: From Theory to Practice: 1864

Unfortunately for Anglin's construction plans, the landlords were not happy operating a boarding house.¹ Imperial authorities did not want the responsibility of defending the colonies. Edward Cardwell, the new Colonial Secretary, felt that Britain faced too many threats to have her forces scattered throughout the world and was looking for an honourable way to bring them home.² A second resident of the imperial mansion was unhappy for another reason. Lieutenant Governor Arthur Gordon was disgusted with what he considered to be the degraded politics and politicians of New Brunswick.³ To cure the political problems of the Atlantic colonies, he advocated "the union of this Province with those adjoining it."⁴ During 1863 and early 1864 his advocacy of Maritime Union seemed to achieve results and in the three provinces, resolutions were passed in the respective legislatures, agreeing to send delegates to a conference to discuss union. Anglin discussed the subject rarely and the one time he did, he merely said that Maritime Union seemed to be a good idea and that he supported the concept.⁵ But the Freeman did not proceed to forward a case for Maritime Union. Most other Maritimers displayed similar uninterest and the subject almost dropped from sight in the spring of 1864. No conference was arranged and none but Gordon seemed to care.⁶ The real issue which concerned Anglin and other Maritimers in the winter of 1864 was not Maritime Union, but that almost perpetual issue, railways. Nevertheless, the British desire to find some means of reducing its military commitments and the proposal of a Maritime Union conference were to bear fruit before the year was out. The railway issue was also part of the complex puzzle which when pieced together formed a proposal for
British North American Union.

I

Anglin's interest in railway developments had not diminished since the Intercolonial Railway Bill had passed the New Brunswick Assembly in 1863. As he had foreseen, the Intercolonial did not proceed. Canada decided that a survey for the line should be made but belatedly repudiated the 1862 arrangements. As the Intercolonial Railway fell on evil days, New Brunswick turned its eyes from Canada to the United States. The European and North American Railway, a solidly-built line, ran only from Shediac to St. John. It was felt that if this line were to be extended to the Maine boundary it would become very profitable. St. John, the centre of New Brunswick's economic life, was very much interested in Western Extension and in the autumn of 1863 the agitation in its favour was renewed. Gordon disapproved of Western Extension as he felt that it would make New Brunswick "a mere dependency of the State of Maine." Apparently his Executive Council shared his views, but men like Tilley were not the type to stand directly against public opinion. Call it astute politics or subterfuge, the Government papers began to come out in favour of Western Extension and early in January a committee was formed for Western Extension. Containing such men as C. N. Skinner, the Smasher member from the county of St. John, William Wright and J. V. Troop, prominent shipbuilders in St. John, and Rev. Mr. Elder, the editor of the Colonial Presbyterian, the committee appeared to be run by the Government. No doubt these men sincerely wanted Western Extension to be built and were not purposely attempting to subvert the line. Yet many of them had come to support Western Extension only when it seemed most unlikely that the Intercolonial could be built.
Your statement that the majority of those who signed the Western Extension Petition are advocates of the Inter Colonial Scheme is entirely Correct. There is no change in the opinions of the vast majority here, who sent John H. Gray to vote for that measure, from that time. The only change is that the men who were against all Railroad extension, now favour Western Extension, just as they would favour anything, that would as they think, upset the Present Government. All the men of thought and action who supported the Inter Colonial still support it: they signed the other Petition because they believed the Western extension was all that was left to them: because they supposed Canada would not carry out her agreement. Now when they see that Canada has awoke to a sense of her responsibility and is disposed to go on, they say at once: we must meet them.\textsuperscript{11}

As can be seen from Boyd's letter, the men in control of the Western Extension committee would do nothing to embarrass the Government. This was to be very important, for Western Extension was capable of causing Tilley's party considerable difficulty.

As the 1864 session approached, the Tilley Government was on the horns of a dilemma. There was apparently little chance of getting the Intercolonial and the demand for Western Extension was strong. Yet the Intercolonial Railway Act was still in force in New Brunswick.\textsuperscript{12} As well, there was pressure from C. J. Brydges, the general manager of the Grand Trunk Railway, to 'keep the faith'. He claimed that if New Brunswick remained true, this fact would help promote a change of feeling in Canada.\textsuperscript{13} He also gave his opinion that if the Intercolonial scheme failed to be adopted, British financiers would help New Brunswick connect her railway system with Maine.\textsuperscript{14} This would give her access to Canada by means of the Grand Trunk. Other pressures from Canada not to abandon the Intercolonial,\textsuperscript{15} and the knowledge that his friends had a good grip on the real machinery of the Western Extension movement, led Tilley to decide upon his course of action. The Government put forward its famous 'Lobster Bill'.\textsuperscript{16} This Act provided that the Intercolonial Railway Act would be binding for another year. If that period expired,
the province would pay £20,000 a year for an indefinite number of years
to anyone undertaking to build a line to Canada, provided the Government
approved of the project. As well, for various lines within the province,
the Act provided a subsidy of $10,000 a mile. So many were projected
that the province would have had almost as many lines as a lobster has
legs -- hence the name 'Lobster Bill'.

Anglin was impressed, but not favourably.

It was the great Railroad building day of the New Brunswick Assembly
and Bills for railways, almost everywhere, were passed.

This was the great day's work surely. Seriously and solemnly at first,
with much earnestness too; afterwards with jeers and laughter and fun
and jokes, the House played one farce after another, passing Bills
which ... will for years to come be monuments to the folly and reck-
lessness of the majority of the Assembly. One saving clause they did
put to all the Bills. It was that unless operations were commenced
within two years, and unless the roads were built within five years,
the Bill expire.17

Anglin was understandably angry. This was not sure and stable progress
but reckless extravagance. He charged the Government with purchasing
support by allowing all bills introduced by those who supported the
Government measure, to pass "no matter how they conflicted with public
policy or with the general interests."18 The editor of the Freeman fought
the Government scheme all along, opposing the Bill in the votes on
various amendments, but to no avail.19 He did, however, support a motion
to provide for a survey to be taken for Western Extension.

Mr. Anglin said he had opposed the Government Bill because he knew
it to be a mere bubble, and because he knew it to be the same, he
would vote for the resolution which provided the only advance towards
Western Extension which it was possible in the present temper of the
House to obtain this session. The survey, if entrusted to competent
parties and judiciously carried out, would afford them such information
as would enable them to deal properly with the question next session ...20

He wanted Western Extension, but he suspected that the Government had
added insult to injury by incorporating a company which was incapable, and perhaps not even in earnest, to build the line.\textsuperscript{21} Despite his scepticism he promised that:

If they could only contrive to build the Railroad, we should be too happy to confess that much of what we have said of the character of the whole proceeding ... was unfounded and a mistake.\textsuperscript{22}

This was mere newspaper talk. In theory he may not have wished to cause trouble for the Company, but he could not refrain from taking an occasional 'swipe' at what he felt was such a Smasher-oriented organization.

As June came and went, the Western Extension Company floundered. The Common Council of St. John failed to make a financial contribution and the businessmen of the city did not exactly fight each other to take up shares.\textsuperscript{23}

II

It was at this point -- when railways and Maritime Union were at a standstill -- that the Canadians entered the picture. On their own volition and at their own expense, they had earlier sent Sir Sandford Fleming to survey for the Intercolonial Railway.\textsuperscript{24} Then, as every student of Canadian history knows, political deadlock finally forced the formation of the 'Great Coalition' in Canada at the end of June, 1864.\textsuperscript{25} The program on which this coalition was based was British North American Union. Apparently, however, the Canadian Government had planned to send a delegation under the leadership of McGee to the Maritime Union conference even before the amazing coalition was formed.\textsuperscript{26} As early as June 4, 1864, the \textit{Freeman} announced:

The Canadian Premier has stated that his Government have applied to the Governments of the Lower Provinces to confer with the Canadian Government on the subject of a Union of the Provinces, the object of the Canadian Government being to put an end to the present state of affairs in Canada, which is almost a deadlock, neither party having
strength to govern the country, and anarchy and confusion, financial difficulties and troubles of all kinds being apprehended.

On the very day the new coalition Government took office a despatch was sent to the Maritime Provinces asking if Canada could send delegates to the approaching conference on Maritime Union. The Canadian interest forced the unprepared Maritime provinces to make plans for a conference which only the Canadians believed was going to take place. Hurriedly, it was set for the first of September at Charlottetown. Canada was to be allowed to send delegates but only in an unofficial capacity. As this series of vital events unfolded during the summer and early autumn of 1864, Anglin was thoroughly involved. He was an active participant in some of these events, but on all of them he had to express his views publicly week by week.

Anglin's initial reaction to the Canadian intrusion was one of annoyance. As far as he was concerned, the Canadians were responsible for their own problems and should not call on the Lower Provinces to 'bail them out.' He did not want to be a party to any attempt to crush the French Canadians "between the upper and the nether mill stone" of Upper Canada and the Lower Provinces. He had, however, a sanctimonious word of advice:

Moderation, prudence, a regard in word and deed for the rights and feelings of one another, economy -- in a word common sense is all they require to get rid of all their difficulties. But if they will plunge deeper they must not hope to drag us down with them.

Anglin feared that the scheme of union was simply a means whereby politicians could cling to office. He felt certain, however, that the people would have a voice in so important a question.

Anglin recognized that forces in favour of union were at work. The political difficulties of Canada had been the occasion of the new agi-
tation for union; but in Britain, it was quickly recognized that in union was to be found the best opportunity to get rid of a great deal of the defence load. The Imperial Government had seized upon the opportunity provided by the union agitation to prepare "the way virtually to get rid of the care of this part of the Empire ..." The Freeman strongly disapproved of the 'peace at any price' policy being spouted by the London papers which voiced the opinions of the Manchester school of politicians. It sharply rejected any plan which would so change the relations of the provinces with the Empire "as to assume a state of quasi independence which would throw on them a disproportionate share of the burdens of the Empire, and instead of conferring any advantage would deprive them of very many of those which the connection with the Empire now confers." Anglin also saw that defence, union and the Intercolonial Railway were all connected. If a union was to be effected an Intercolonial would have to be built, and if imperial authorities had anything to do with this, it would be built by the military route, the North Shore. As has already been seen, Anglin disagreed with the policy of building such a minimally useful defensive work which would cost so much money and bring so little in the way of commercial returns. He disagreed too with the opinions prevalent in Britain that the colonies should basically look after their own defence. He was sure that they could not provide an adequate defensive system and would run into financial ruin if they attempted it. The colonies could help in many ways but the Imperial Government should bear the responsibility of what, after all, was imperial defence, for the colonies had no 'say' in imperial foreign policy. The imperial organization provided the best framework, according to Anglin, of allowing the provinces to mature. "Quasi inde-
pendence" could lead to annexation. Finally, the Irish-born editor disagreed with the policy of union for the present, whatever form it might take. The provinces simply were not prepared to take such a large step. Furthermore, New Brunswick, for one, did not wish to take such a step. It was content, or so it seemed to Anglin.35

His attitude was plain to see during the visit of a group of Canadians to New Brunswick at the beginning of August. In conjunction with the interest in union, a Canadian delegation led by McGee and made up of politicians, members of the press and an array of businessmen, had decided to accept an invitation of the St. John Chamber of Commerce to visit New Brunswick. This invitation had previously been declined, "but the sudden replatrage which unites Cartier and George Brown, and the wish to find favour for the new policy of a Federation make a visit to the Lower Provinces now desirable."36 The Canadians were well-treated and, in turn, favourably impressed the inhabitants of New Brunswick.37 A similar visit of Americans, mainly from the State of Maine, followed on the heels of the Canadian visit. Anglin could not fathom the purpose of either visit. In some sense, he felt, the Canadian and American visits were demonstrations in favour of the Intercolonial Railway on one hand, and on the other, in favour of Western Extension.38 But these attempts to impress others with New Brunswick was, in Anglin's eyes, very foolish.

What good is ever to arise from others thinking well, or speaking well, or writing well of this country we can never discover; but many think that much good will, somehow or other, arise from it ... and they are willing to spend money, and time, and labour in endeavouring to create amongst English, or Canadians, or Yankees the idea that New Brunswick is a finer, and better, and more prosperous country than they ever imagined.39

It was during the Canadian visit that Anglin made an innocent statement which later, having been misquoted, caused him much grief. Anglin, as
a member of the New Brunswick Assembly, had attended a dinner given in
honour of the Canadian visitors. The speakers at that banquet had
made frequent allusions to union but had been careful not to convert the
dinner into a political demonstration. Then John Gray stood up to pro-
pose a toast and made a strong speech in favour of union. Anglin feared
that Gray would actually propose a toast to the union of the provinces.
At this point the editor of the Freeman turned to the gentleman beside
him and stated that if such a toast were put he would protest, and if
his protest did not avail, he would leave the room. The toast, fortu-
nately for the tranquillity of the dinner, was made to the "Sister
Provinces" or something equally noncommittal. By this time, however,
Anglin's fighting Irish had been aroused and when persistently called
upon to make a speech he rose to say a few words. He began by making it
clear that not all had come to the dinner to make a demonstration in
favour of union. He stated that he and many others had come simply to
welcome the Canadians and show them kindness and hospitality. What fol-
lowed was best reported by the Freeman:

But as Mr. Gray had chosen to introduce and discuss the question of
a Union, he must say that in his opinion the time for a Union had
not yet arrived, and he then proceeded to argue briefly that the
people of the Provinces are too widely separated; that the physical
obstacles still to be overcome are too many; that a Union in our
present circumstances would not be strength but weakness, and that
even if all these objections were removed, we should proceed with
the greatest care and caution lest we make a mistake that may be
irremediable. He argued also that the demand for a Union for [the]
purpose of defence was absurd, inasmuch as we now are united with
and through the Imperial government, which in case of trouble would
take control [sic] of all the military power of the Provinces, and
would direct it as wisely and efficiently as any Provincial General
Government. He went so far and spoke so strongly, that it [was]
necessary to add, as nearly as we can recollect, the following words,
"But he did not wish them to suppose from what he had said that he
was absolutely opposed to a Union of the Provinces at any time or on
any terms. He believed that ultimately the destiny of these Pro-
vinces must be either to drift into annexation with the United
States -" Here he was interrupted by a storm of yells and hisses
from a part of the company. When he succeeded in making himself heard above the uproar, he completed the alternative by adding: "- or to form one great Union or Confederation of some sort." He then went on further to say that he wondered that men who talked so much of loyalty did not believe that it was honour and glory enough to belong to the British Empire, and that they thought it would be more glorious to belong to a North American nation, &c. 41

During the stormy campaigns which followed his words were twisted by his opponents to the assertion that he had stated that Union or annexation must take place within a few years. The addition of the words, "within a few years," made a great deal of difference. Anglin's prognostication had not been for the immediate future. By adding this short phrase, his opponents were to make Anglin look like a fool, a liar, or an annexationist when he opposed Confederation. He was none of these, but it was by no means an unsuccessful attempt to make Anglin appear inconsistent. Nevertheless, it was a ridiculous and almost dishonest interpretation of what Anglin's position had been and remained.

Anglin viewed the approach of the Charlottetown Conference with suspicion. He had little confidence in New Brunswick's representatives. He did not think that Gray could be classed as an opposition member of the delegation, as some were asserting, and while he accepted E. B. Chandler as such, Anglin claimed that this elderly lawyer no longer took much part in party strife. As for Gray's opinions on union, the Freeman felt that he would prefer "the scheme that seems most vast and comprehensive." Tilley would do "whatever he believes most pleasing to the Colonial Office, to which it is notorious he is now looking for some great reward." 42 Johnson, on the other hand, would "hardly consent, in his sober moments, to be snuffed out ..." Anglin agreed with the 'closed-doors' policy of the Conference for he recognized that the vastness of the subject which the delegates were to consider was a great enough problem without the
speech-making that public deliberations would have encouraged. Yet he also asserted that the Conference had no real powers and that anything that was agreed upon must be submitted both to the people of New Brunswick for judgment and to the legislature for assent.

Four days after the Charlottetown Conference adjourned at St. John on September 16, the Freeman began a series of articles on the subject of union. Anglin recognized that the question was the most important ever to have risen during his career in New Brunswick and knew that a great effort would have to be made to combat the idea of an immediate British North American Union.

Using a brand-new set of type for the newspaper, Anglin discussed some of the topics the delegates had spoken of when in St. John. They had frequently talked about loyalty and on this subject Anglin was sure that they did not understand either themselves or what they were talking about. On the one hand they talked about loyalty to the British Empire and on the other about forming a great North American nation. The manner in which the delegates talked of forming a great nation led him to suspect that they thought separation from the British Empire was at hand and that they believed this desirable. Should union and quasi-independence come about, Anglin stated, "we may by a perversion of terms still call ourselves British subjects, but we would be only allies, bound ... by terms most disadvantageous to us." Anglin also had an answer for those in the provinces who felt that something must be done because a party in Britain wished to be rid of its colonial defence burden:

It does seem the very height of folly if we desire the connexion [sic] with Great Britain maintained to play into the hands of that party, and by a vain exhibition of strength, which is not real,
enable them to say to the tax payers of Great Britain "these Provinces are now fully able to protect themselves, and the Minister who would expend, in providing them with fortresses and garrisons, the money wrung from your hard earnings, is unworthy of your confidence." This sort of argument, it is said, has now much force. The advocates of a Union would increase its strength immensely.

It is of much importance to these Colonies that Great Britain maintains an army and a navy here for their defence. It is quite time enough to part with that army and navy when we can not help it; quite time enough to prepare another force to take their place when Great Britain tells us we must do so.49

The Empire could organize colonial defence far better than could any central government and it was the unity of the Empire rather than the unity of British North America from whence strength came. The number of men available for service would not be magically increased by union. In fact, it was just the opposite, for if union took place, colonial rather than imperial forces would be the principals in any fighting. Besides, the cost of maintaining a standing army was a frightening if not horrifying thought.

England's quarrels with America would be ours, and not only would the battle be fought on our soil, but we must place in the field Mr. Cartier's 200,000 men to fight that battle, keeping the rest of Mr. Brown's 500,000 in reserve, and expend all our money, all our means, and all our strength, in a quarrel in which, perhaps, we had no especial interest, in which, were we merely in alliance with Great Britain, we should never have engaged, in which, were we Provinces as we now are, we would be expected to do no more than our fair share.50

In concluding the opening salvo of his anti-union campaign, Anglin once again stated one of his fundamental propositions:

The people of this Province are at present prosperous and happy, and have no desire of change. Only some of the politicians are dissatisfied [sic] or discontented because they want a larger arena for the display of their talents and abilities, or perhaps because they sincerely imagine that such a change as they contemplate would be beneficial to the Province.51

In following issues Anglin surveyed the financial side of union. Trade between Canada and New Brunswick was negligible. Assuming that "no
legal enactments to force unnatural trade" would be made, New Brunswickers would still buy their food-stuff from the United States and Canadians would still send their dry goods and other articles via the St. Lawrence River or to New York, Portland and Boston. There was a simple reason for this. These were the most economical means of doing business. Anglin was quite sure that the Intercolonial Railway would not draw trade away from the cheaper routes unless "the exploded Protectionist Principles" were instituted. He was equally sure that Canada would not accept the burdens of protection merely to force trade between Canada and the Maritimes. Even if Canada were willing to do this and "if the new nation would put an end to the Reciprocity Treaty, and charge such a duty on American flour brought to St. John as would be more than equal to all the additional freight," New Brunswick would pay much more for the bread-stuff they used and the people of Canada West would get less for the bread-stuff they sold. As far as manufactures were concerned, the Lower Provinces did not have a great advantage as many assumed. Anglin disagreed with Tilley who once stated: "We are in the Lower Provinces a manufacturing people to a large extent, and we would, to the whole of British America, occupy the same position that Massachusetts does to the United States." Anglin must have thought that Tilley had never left St. John in his entire life. Even if the inter-provincial duties were removed, Maritime manufacturers would not receive great benefits. Canada had water power even more abundantly that the Maritimes and labour just as cheap. Anglin realized the obvious fact that the law of comparative advantage would determine which manufacturing concerns would survive and grow.

Some manufacturers better adapted to our position and circumstances
may grow to immense proportions, such as they can never reach while
their only market is our own Province; but many others would be
immediately extinguished in the competition with the manufactures of
Canada, which have the advantages of being long established, of
having larger capital, and a larger home market -- for a market
within a radius of three or four hundred miles, is after all a home
market, as compared with a market seven hundred or a thousand miles
away.56

As well, the main staple of New Brunswick being lumber and shipbuilding,
Canada and New Brunswick were and would remain competitors. Nearly all
manufacturers of New Brunswick had to import raw materials in whole or
in part and it seemed that New Brunswick had few comparative advantages.57
If the economic change was to be so beneficial why had it not already
been accomplished by a zollverein or by intercolonial free trade? Just
as the Intercolonial Railway could be built without union commercial
relations could be changed without union if such would be advantageous
to the parties concerned. The final economic reason for Anglin's oppo-
sition to union fitted in with his position as a spokesman for the in-
terests of St. John. It was his considered opinion that the city would
not be able to protect its interests should a union take place. Then,
the general good of British North America would have to take precedence
over the interests of St. John.58 Western Extension would not be built --
at least not until the Intercolonial Railway along the North Shore route
had been completed. The building of the Intercolonial along this route
would build up Halifax to the detriment of St. John.59 Anglin was proud
of his adopted city and did not want to see its light dimmed by union.

In opposing union, Anglin was compelled to defend himself from the charge
of the Government press that he was opposing union because he was "un-
willing to be found rowing in the same boat with the Government."60 There
was probably some truth to the accusation, but on the other hand Anglin
actually exhibited more consistency in his attitude to union than many
of the Government organs. Anglin, for instance, had always been sus-
picious of Canada, especially of the Clear Grits of Upper Canada, where-
as the Government papers had waxed hot and cold depending on the state
of the Intercolonial Railway.61 He had always felt that Lower Canada
was much neglected, especially in the economic sphere, and that Upper
Canada would not hesitate to take advantage of anyone if it could bene-
fit thereby.62 The Freeman was convinced that Upper Canada supported
union because it wished to control British America.63 It also pointed
out later that "the people of New Brunswick have been taught to look
upon Canadian politicians as the most perfidious and treacherous of all
politicians".64 A great deal of this teaching had been done by the
Government papers after the Canadians drew back from the Intercolonial
Railway agreement; now these papers were saying that the Canadians were
trustworthy. On top of all this, Anglin felt that the Canadians were
very extravagant, not only in plans for economic development but also in
parliamentary organization. Salaries paid elected members were far
higher than those paid in New Brunswick and the ministers had a number
of unnecessary assistants. As far as the Irish editor was concerned:

The assimilation of our system to this [the Canadian system] may
answer office-seekers, but we doubt much if it would be for the
interest of the people, who would have to pay all these salaries,
contingent expenses, &c., &c.65

On October 29, 1864, while the delegates to the Quebec Conference vis-
ited Montreal after the completion of their labours, Anglin set out in
clear terms what his immediate objects would be. It had been announced
that the Quebec scheme would not be submitted to the people for judgment;
it would simply be passed or rejected by the provincial legislatures.66
Anglin strongly disagreed with this. When he learned that the scheme
itself would not even be made public until it was introduced in the legis-
slatures, his anger exploded.

This is clearly a conspiracy to defraud and cheat the people out of the right to determine for themselves whether this Union shall now take place.67

Anglin demanded that the Quebec Resolutions should immediately be made known in order to give time for consideration and reflection. After this the legislature should be dissolved and an election be held on the question of union.68

Thus before the exact terms of the proposed union were made known, Anglin had set the lines of his attack and defence. It was a basically anti-union plan. The details of the Quebec Resolutions were important but they would have had to be impossibly favourable to New Brunswick to make any difference to Anglin's position. Union, as far as he was concerned, was a dream of the future not the plan of the present. His views, especially those on the Empire and defence, might be termed narrow-minded and selfish. But then, whose thoughts and actions at the time of Confederation could not be so defined? One reason George Brown supported Confederation was that this was the way to get 'rep by pop'. He thought that the constitutional arrangements had done wonders. "French Canadianism entirely extinguished," he wrote to his wife on October 27, 1864.69 Cardwell, Gordon, Galt, McGee -- all had purposes to serve that were not unselshfish. Anglin's selfishness had at least the merit of familiarity. The imperial organization had worked. The new one might not.

III

As the details of the Quebec Resolutions leaked to the press by way of the public speeches of the delegates to the Conference and sundry other
methods, Anglin and his allies, particularly A. J. Smith, prepared to
give Tilley, Gray and the others a warm reception. It was known, for
instance, that New Brunswick was to elect only fifteen members to an
Assembly of 207. Anglin did not doubt that fifteen men "of whom some
would always be mere office-seekers, could do little to ensure the wel-
fare of this Province - to get - for instance - St. John made a terminus
of the Intercolonial Railway, or to secure the construction of the Rail-
road to the United States ..." He had read the Canadian Government
papers which had given an unofficial but, in fact, rather good outline
of the Quebec plan. Anglin was not enamoured.

It is absurd to speak of such a Union as is thus described as a
Confederation. It is in truth a Legislative Union, and the local
Legislatures will be useless, cumbersome, expensive machinery, which
no one will desire to see retained ... If this Union must be, it
would be better to abolish the local Legislatures at once in ap-
pearance as well as in reality than to set up such expensive shams.

Thus when the New Brunswick delegates landed in St. John on November 7, they found opposition to union rearing its head in many places. Within
two weeks Tilley was forced to conclude that "the feeling in New Bk. is
at present decidedly adverse ..."

On November 15, the Freeman was able to achieve the first of its three-
point program when it published the Quebec Resolutions. Anglin lit
into them with all his might. He stated that by the acceptance of such
a scheme "we will by our own act surrender up to the Imperial Parliament
all the rights and privileges we now enjoy, hereafter to hold and enjoy
all rights of self-government, not as inherent in ourselves, but as gifts
from the Imperial Parliament, and by virtue of Imperial Statute." Anglin ferociously termed this "unadulterated Toryism such as was known
in Canada before the rebellion." He did not object to the principle
of 'rep by pop' in theory, but in practice when he saw how it would insure
the dominance of Upper Canada, he thought it malicious. Representation by population, he asserted, was not equitable when distinct communities with distinct interests existed and Anglin, of course, believed that such communities made up British North America.

We are not one people with Canada, and no laws of Imperial or local Legislatures can in an instant make us one. Between our principal centres of population and the nearest of the large towns of Canada, hundreds of miles of wilderness, scarcely dotted with a few settlements, intervene. The channels of their trade do not pass through our territory, nor ours through theirs. We are, and for many years we must remain, distinct communities, with many interests either conflicting or not common. With Nova Scotia, great part of which is within sight of this City, with which we now do a large trade, a real union may be possible. A union with Canada can not in our day be such an amalgamation that we will cease to consider ourselves or to be different communities; that we will take the same view of all the measures of the General Parliament as the people of Canada West will take; that we will have no special interests to protect or care for. If this be true, and this we are satisfied few will attempt to controvert, then what will the people of this Province say to the arrangement that we are to be represented according to population in the General Parliament ... 78

Anglin obviously subscribed to the view that you cannot manufacture nationalism. It must grow of its own accord. Anglin's advice to his readers was to consider carefully not only the Quebec Resolutions but also to ask first of all if union of any kind would bring them any great positive good, otherwise unobtainable. It was obvious to Anglin that under union, increased taxation would be inevitable. Unless this was compensated by some great good it was not worth the risk of finding that union was harmful to their interests and yet being unable to do anything about it. 79 Anglin's Irish past still haunted him and he exhorted the people, through the use of the power of public opinion, "to compel the Government to submit the question of Union directly and immediately to the people themselves." 80

On November 17, "the greatest political failure ever witnessed in New Brunswick," 81 took place. Tilley and Gray spoke at the Mechanics Insti-
tute to a huge but silently hostile crowd. The purpose which this meeting was to serve had already been accomplished by the publication of the Quebec Resolutions. Instead of outlining the scheme itself they were forced to answer the objections to it which Anglin and others had voiced and their efforts were very weak. Gray resorted to name-calling as he accused Anglin of inconsistency on the basis of his statement at the dinner of the Canadian visitors in August of 1864.82 He also stated that England would soon withdraw her support from British North America and that union was not only expedient but necessary. Tilley's speech contained very little except the astonishing assertion that taxes would not be raised.83

The Freeman found Tilley's financial statement unsatisfactory and bluntly said so.84 To this, Tilley reacted strongly. He wrote a letter to the editor of the Daily Evening Globe challenging Anglin to speak for one half of an hour at the Tilley-Gray meeting to be held on November 22.85 He did not, however, have the courtesy to send a copy of this letter to Anglin let alone send him a personal invitation.86 Anglin, in a long public letter to the people of St. John, stated why such a challenge was to be refused.87 In brief he did not think the terms fair and was afraid of being tricked. Furthermore he did not want to make the discussion a personal quarrel between Tilley and himself for in this way Tilley's friends who now doubted the wisdom of the union policy would 'return to the fold'. Anglin did, however, make an honest counter-offer. He stated that Tilley could, if he wished, write articles to the Freeman, and they could be as long as he desired. All would be published. In making this offer Anglin managed to escape from the trap that Tilley had laid for him. Tilley, however, was not an editor. Nor was he about to assist
Anglin in the sale of his newspaper and at the second Tilley-Gray meeting in St. John, he stated that anything he chose to publish would be given to the papers that advocated Confederation. The Colonial Presbyterian best summed up this squabble:

The challenge to discuss on the platform with a member of the Government, a great constitutional question, which had never been submitted to the Legislature of New Brunswick, was one of doubtful propriety. It might result in a spectacle that would minister to vulgar curiosity or partizan gratification, but it would hardly advance the public interest. Then Mr. Anglin is not popular; this is no doubt, partly his own fault, but it arises from the intolerance of the devotees who worship at the shrine of the greater political deities. The former are not content to hear and refute Mr. Anglin or the Freeman... but they use denunciation and physical force. This spirit was manifested in a striking manner at the dinner given to the Canadian delegates, when Mr. Anglin, who spoke at a point near where we sat, was interrupted in the utterance of an unobjectionable sentiment... Mr. Anglin, therefore, would have had no chance of a fair hearing on the proposed debate. But then again even if he had, he could not, in readiness and aptness of financial illustration and argument, cope for a singule [sic] moment with Mr. Tilley. The editor of the Freeman can write a strong editorial, but Mr. Tilley shines in the arena of debate.88

Perhaps Anglin could not have stood up to the financial arguments of Tilley in a public debate but he gave blow for blow in the columns of the Freeman. In very long, amazingly detailed and cogent articles, Anglin poured scorn on the arguments and figures of Tilley in issue after issue. He was not trying to 'pull the wool' over the eyes of anyone. He cautioned his readers:

We want this to be thoroughly impressed on the minds of our readers. We want them to think of what we have said and to be satisfied that we are right; that in retaining or withdrawing our territorial revenues and export duty, we are little favoured, the other Provinces on their part doing the same; that in getting 80 cents a head, even if it were out of the $3 we now pay, we do not get a fair share; that the $63,000 a year is mere delusion, and that if this scheme be accomplished [sic] 'Western Extension' will be postponed for at least another generation.89

It was not long before these articles had won the attention of the editor of the Colonial Presbyterian, the very man who had assumed that Tilley
was the master of financial questions, and he urged the *News*, the chief
Government organ in St. John, to deal with the "weighty facts and figures
advanced by the *Freeman* ..."90 The main reason for the discrepancy of
interpretation on financial matters between Anglin and the Confederates
was that they disagreed as to whether 1863 and 1864 were good, bad, or
typical years. The Confederates felt that the economy of New Brunswick
and its revenues would continue to rise whereas Anglin was much more
cautious. He thought that these years were ones of extreme prosperity
that might not continue. He based his calculations on more typical
years in the New Brunswick economy such as those before the Civil War
or 1862 when the initial depression of the Civil War had passed in New
Brunswick but before the American war-time demand had created a rather
artificial boom in New Brunswick. This difference in starting point
had a great influence on how Anglin and the Confederates felt the Quebec
scheme would work. Anglin believed that New Brunswick was foolish to
enter into financial agreements which assumed that the elevated status
of the provincial economy would continue. Then too, Anglin felt that
the Confederates had estimated too low the cost of such things as the
Intercolonial Railway and defence expenditure.91 He took delight in
showing the discrepancies between the estimates of Tilley and other
Confederates such as Galt and A. G. Archibald.92 In short, the *Freeman*
was far from out of its depth on financial matters. Even Anglin's arch
enemy, Judge Wilmot, tacitly recognized Anglin's effectiveness. He
advised Tilley not to put too much emphasis on "the financial adjust-
ment" and concentrate more on the "great future" aspects of Confeder-
ation.93 By the last day of 1864, the *Freeman* could claim, with some
show of reason, that "Mr. Tilley has most signally failed."
FOOTNOTES

1 Material showing prevalent opinions in Great Britain concerning the
colonies and imperial defence is to be found in J. S. Galbraith, "Myths
of the 'Little England' Era," American Historical Review, LXVII (1961),
34-48; P. Knaplund, "Gladstone's Views on British Colonial Policy,"
C.H.R., IV (1923), 304-315; C. P. Stacey, "Lord Monck and the Canadian
Nation," Dalhousie Review, XIV (1934), 190; D. M. L. Farr, Great Britain
and Confederation (Ottawa: The Centennial Commission, 1967); and D. M. L.
Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 1867-1887 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1955), pp. 3-27. The significance of the defence ques-
tion in changing British attitudes has been shown in C. P. Stacey,
185-189; and C. P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871 (rev.

2 On Cardwell's views and his role in Confederation, see P. B. Waite,

3 Material on Gordon's attitudes to the politics and society of New
Brunswick is found in W. M. Whitelaw, The Maritimes and Canada Before
Confederation (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 185-187;
Gordon Respecting New Brunswick Politics and Politicians, 1854-1867";
P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon
to Newcastle, Oct. 29, 1861; Dec. 31, 1862; and March 12, 1864 (enclosing
an account of the Johnson-Anglin altercation); P.A.C., Duke of Newcastle
(Henry Pelham-Clinton) Papers, Gordon to Newcastle, Jan. 20, 1862;
and U.N.B.A., Lord Stanmore (Arthur Gordon) Papers, Gordon to Samuel
Wilberforce (Bishop of Oxford), March 16, 1862.

4 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle, Dec. 31,
1862. The two preceding Lieutenant Governors, Head and Manners-Sutton,
had both, at one time or another, supported the idea of Maritime Union
(see Whitelaw, op. cit., pp. 113-116, 119-121, 131-132, and 144-146).

5 Freeman, May 10, 1862.

6 On the history of Maritime Union during this period see J. M. Beck,
The History of Maritime Union: A Study in Frustration (Fredericton:
Maritime Union Study, 1969), pp. 9-19; and P. B. Waite, The Life and
Times of Confederation, 1864-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto

7 See Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle,
Aug. 29 and Sept. 28, 1863; and P.A.C., Canada, Governor General's Of-
Fice, Telegrams, I, Lord Monck to Gordon, Oct. 1, 1863. Gordon wrote a
very strong reply to Monck's news that the Canadians regarded the arrange-
ments made for the Intercolonial in September of 1862 as having been
terminated on the return of the Canadian delegates from Britain in Jan-
uary, 1863 (see Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to

8 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to Newcastle, Nov. 9,
1863.

9 Ibid.

10 Freeman, Nov. 24, 1863; and Jan. 14, 1864.

11 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection),
John Boyd to Tilley, March 10, 1864.

12 P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor, Despatches Received, XLIV,
Newcastle to Gordon, March 5, 1864.
13 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, C. J. Brydges to Tilley, Feb. 13, 1864.
14 Ibid., Brydges to Tilley, Jan. 22, 1864.
15 Ibid., H. J. Hubertas to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 17, 1864; and U.N.B.A.,
16 In similar circumstances, the Government of Nova Scotia proposed to
repeal its legislation of 1863.
17 Freeman, Apr. 12, 1864.
18 Ibid.
20 Freeman, Apr. 12, 1864.
21 Ibid., Apr. 26, 1864.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., June 4 and 21, 1864.
24 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Gordon to C. H. Doyle, Oct. 29,
1863; and Despatches Received, XLIV, Monck to Gordon, Feb. 20, 1864.
25 A concise account of the formation of the Great Coalition is P. G. Cor-
nell, The Great Coalition (Ottawa: The Canadian Historical Association,
1966).
26 Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), McGee to Tilley, May 9, 1864. See also McGee
to E. Watkin, June 8, 1864, quoted in R. B. Burns, "D'Arcy McGee and
the New Nationality" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Carleton Uni-
27 Despatches Received, XLIV, Monck to Cole, June 30, 1864.
28 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXII, Cole to George Dundas,
July 25, 1864.
29 Ibid., LXII, Cole to Monck, July 12, 1864.
30 Freeman, June 4, 1864.
31 Ibid., June 28, 1864.
32 Ibid., Aug. 25, 1864.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
36 Ibid., July 5, 1864.
37 P. B. Waite, op. cit., p. 66.
38 Freeman, Aug. 27, 1864.
39 Ibid., Aug. 23, 1864. This statement conflicts with his earlier atti-
dute that immigrants did not come to New Brunswick because they had
incorrect impressions of it.
40 Ibid., Nov. 19, 1864.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1864. In fact, in 1860 at least, Tilley had not been
overly enthusiastic about the idea of British North American Union.
He recognized the difficulties in the way of its accomplishment and
claimed that a great deal of investigation and negotiation would be re-
quired. Interestingly enough, he favoured a legislative rather than a
federal union, but realized the storm of opposition that would result
from such a plan (see N.B.M.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Tilley
to Charles Lindsey, Sept. 4, 1860).
43 Freeman, Sept. 3, 1864.
44 Ibid.
46 Anglin stated that nearly four million copies of the Freeman had been
printed with the old metal (see Freeman, Sept. 17, 1864).
47 Ibid., Sept. 20, 1864.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The numbers mentioned pointed out the discrepancies of the exorbitant estimates of British North American military strength.
Ibid.
Ibid., Sept. 24, 1864.
Ibid. In the 1862 session of the House of Assembly, Anglin had voted against tariff increases (see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Journal, 1862, p. 214 (Apr. 2)).
Freeman, Sept. 24, 1864.
Freeman, Sept. 24, 1864.
Ibid., Oct. 1, 1864.
Ibid., Oct. 22, 1864.
Ibid., Jan. 15, 1863.
Quoted in ibid., Oct. 1, 1864.
Ibid., May 8, 1862.
Ibid., Jan. 13 and 15, 1863.
Ibid., Oct. 14, 1865. George Brown himself believed that Upper Canadians had "all the advantages" in the Quebec Resolutions, but that it was "a very serious matter for the Maritime provinces ..." (see P.A.C., George Brown Papers, Brown to Anne Brown, March 4, 1863).
Freeman, Feb. 18, 1865.
Ibid., Oct. 15, 1864.
Ibid., Oct. 22, 1864.
Ibid., Nov. 3, 1864.
Ibid., October 29, 1864. It is quite true to say that not everyone in 1864 thought it necessary to submit the scheme to public vote. To many this would have seemed to be following a vile democratic and republican course of action incompatible with contemporary British practice. Historians, however, should not assume that this interpretation is the only valid one to the exclusion of the views held by Anglin and many others. Both views were valid in the British North America of 1864.
Brown Papers, Brown to Anne Brown, Oct. 27, 1864.
This was assuming that Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island with their thirteen members would join the union.
Freeman, Nov. 1, 1864.
Ibid., Nov. 3, 1864.
P.A.C., Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt Papers, Tilley to Gault (sic), Nov. 11, 1864.
Ibid., Tilley to Gault (sic), Nov. 20, 1864.
They had previously been published in the Charlottetown Monitor on Nov. 10, 1864.
Freeman, Nov. 15, 1864.
Ibid.
Ibid. An indication of the state of intercolonial communications is found in the fact that the most recent Canadian newspaper Brown could find in Halifax was ten days old (see Brown Papers, Brown to Anne Brown, Sept. 12, 1864).
Freeman, Nov. 15, 1864.
Ibid., Nov. 17, 1864.
Ibid., Nov. 19, 1864.
82 Ibid. Anglin stood up at the meeting and answered these charges.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Reprinted in ibid., Nov. 22, 1864.
86 Ibid.
87 As this letter is a good example of Anglin's political skill, it has been reproduced in full in Appendix I.
88 Quoted in Freeman, Nov. 26, 1864. The Presbyterian also stated that Anglin and the Freeman were treated shabbily by the press of New Brunswick. See also Freeman, Dec. 1, 1864, in which the Fredericton Head Quarters is quoted as approving of Anglin's offer.
89 Freeman, Nov. 22, 1864.
90 Quoted in ibid., Dec. 3, 1864.
91 Freeman, Dec. 6, 1864.
92 Ibid., Dec. 15, 1864.
93 Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), Wilmot to Tilley, Dec. 9, 1864.
CHAPTER 7

The Battle Won: The Election of 1865

Anglin could not have known, as the new year dawned, that it was to be the most eventful year of his entire life. But he must have realized that it would be a busy one, for an election on the issue of Confederation was in the offing.

Before Tilley's return from Quebec, Anglin had been sceptical that the union question would be submitted to the people unless Confederation could not find a majority in the existing Assembly. Tilley quickly found that it did not and public pressure forced him first to promise "that if there were any question as to the opinion of the people on the subject [of union], then they would refer it to the people themselves to settle at the polls," and then to begrudgingly agree that the issue "would not be pressed upon the attention of the House, until after the General Election next year ... "

Still, by the end of 1864, it was not clear whether the 1865 session would precede or follow dissolution of the House. The chances of an immediate election brightened when G. L. Hatheway resigned from the Government early in 1865. The Executive Council met on January 19th and then decided, though not without considerable difference of opinion, that a prompt dissolution should take place. Anglin was not as gleeful as one might suppose when the news was announced. True, this was the final goal of the program he had outlined on October 29th, but Anglin seldom found things the Smashers did very commendable. He correctly divined that the Government had found that it would be in a minority in the Assembly, but he falsely accused it of having been preparing, in secret, for an election, without letting the people of New Brunswick know of the impending dissolution.
Mr. Tilley, and those who work with him, resolved that the country should be taken by surprise; that no more information than they now possess should be afforded to the people, and that no opportunity of organization and combination should be afforded to the Opposition. 8

Nevertheless, Anglin made it quite clear what the issue of the election should be:

Confederation or no Confederation, that should be the one and only question now raised, as it is the one question which will be settled at this election. Personal feelings, private regards, even party considerations should at this great crisis be set aside or postponed. 9

The prospects for the anti-Confederates appeared good. In A. J. Smith, G. L. Hatheway, J. C. Allen, R. D. Wilmot, Anglin and others, the Antis found leadership and strength despite the fact that some opposed the Quebec Resolutions for opposite reasons than others. In fact this meant that Tilley was trapped in a pincer. If he said that under the Quebec Resolutions the central government would have virtually all the power, he alienated those, like Smith and Anglin, who wished New Brunswick to remain largely independent of Canada. If he proclaimed that the province would retain almost all its powers, Allen and Wilmot would see in this a reason for opposing Confederation. Still, Tilley had one hope to cling to, a thought provided by John Boyd.

May you succeed, and I am convinced you will in the end, were it for no other reason, than this. Anglin is opposed to you - he never succeeds in opposing you. 10 11

I

The election campaign of 1865 ranged far and wide and Anglin and his allies attacked the Confederates on a number of grounds. In the highly important sphere of economics, Anglin waged a hard fight. The general economic climate in New Brunswick was not good. The first four months of 1865 showed a drop of nearly twenty-five per cent on the revenue collected at St. John. The returns from the European and North American
Railway had slumped. By April 13, 1865, it was announced that only half as many ships were being built in St. John as had been under construction at the same time in 1864. With both the Civil War, which gave a large carrying trade to New Brunswick, and the Reciprocity Treaty rapidly coming to an end, there were dark clouds on the economic horizon. The Confederates claimed that they could blow them away. The Antis claimed that they could do a better job in this department even though Anglin felt that the weather forecasters had raised the expectations of the people unreasonably high. After all, the sun does not always shine. Both sides had a dream to sell in 1865 and the people had a choice. Neither dream was capable of realization in New Brunswick.

On particular economic issues Anglin and Smith asked questions. Why had intercolonial free trade not been obtained before this if it was to be so beneficial? In supplying their own answer they pointed out that Tilley had used the infant industry argument two years before and that he had prevented New Brunswick from achieving free trade with Canada in 1862. Their implication was that intercolonial free trade could be attained without union. In this belief, of course, Anglin was overly sanguine. What about reciprocity — did its impending abrogation mean that New Brunswick was forced to look to British North American Union as the Confederates were arguing? Gray had even gone so far as to state that "the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty would be the greatest boon to this Province; the greatest blessing that could be conferred on us; the greatest source of wealth we could have were we Confederated." Anglin could not credit such a statement:

Can any one imagine a man in his sound senses making such a declaration at this time of day? He travelled so far in the opposite direction as to suggest obliquely
that the union proposals might be the cause of the abrogation of reciprocity. He thought that the United States now looked upon the Quebec Resolutions as an attempt on the part of British North America to take advantage of the Reciprocity Treaty and that consequently the United States had resolved to remove this threat.

As one might expect, railways were the most important economic aspect of the question. For the Confederates, Western Extension had emerged as a real problem in November and December of 1864. Tilley saw that "a majority of the People of St. John are very anxious to have that line constructed ..." As well, a large number, especially in the eastern part of New Brunswick, desired immediate connection by rail with Nova Scotia. Tilley recognized his difficulty. He knew that demands would be made in the Assembly, should one meet before the election, for additional government aid for these lines, or even that they be undertaken as government works. Unfortunately for Tilley, "neither of these steps can be taken under our arrangement at Quebec as our debt would be immense beyond what we are permitted to incur ..." Macdonald had urged Tilley not to do anything in relation to railways and while this may have been advisable from the Canadian viewpoint, it was a heavy burden for the Confederates of New Brunswick to carry. Tilley attempted to put some life into the Western Extension Company, but Anglin was highly sceptical about the effort. "We hope he will succeed in getting us real Western Extension — and no sham," Anglin wrote. Perhaps he was justified in being doubtful, for Tilley knew not only that no more governmental aid could be given Western Extension, but also that he had to combat a development he thought harmful to the prospects of the Confederates.

I see a combination forming between the friends of Western extension, and the Anti-federation men. The former with the [expectation?] of
forcing terms, the latter with the hope of defeating the Union Measure. This is a powerful combination that must be broken up in some manner. 25

In fact the difficulties presented by Western Extension were one reason Tilley later gave for calling an election prior to meeting the legislature.

[The friends of Western Extension who are mostly the enemies of Confederation asserted that with the facilities thus provided no roads would be built, and were demanding that they should be undertaken as Government Works — seeing that this could not be done under Federation they would not only oppose that measure but would have embarrassed the Govt. by submitting a proposition, calling upon them to assume these Railways as Govt. Works, knowing that the members of the Government must oppose it, and in doing so, Watters & myself would lose the Confidence of our Constituents. 26]

This passage merits closer attention than it has usually received. While the historian does not usually have to worry about the punctuation of the letters he reads, in this case it is very important to note that there is no comma after "Extension". If there were, it could be claimed that "friends of Western Extension" was synonymous with "enemies of Confederation". But Tilley was not equating the anti-Confederates with the proponents of Western Extension. He could not have thought this even for a moment, when such men as William Wright, John Boyd, William and Thomas Parks, and a host of other political friends were members of the Company. He himself would not have admitted that he was not a friend of Western Extension. What he was stating was his belief that there were some men who supported Western Extension because they opposed Confederation and saw in the railway controversy a way to embarrass the Government and work against Confederation. They were "mostly the enemies of Confederation", rather than the "friends of Western Extension", as far as Tilley could see. He knew that Anglin and other Antis would make use of the issue by showing that the line could not be built under the 'Facility Act', or 'Lobster Bill', by the existing Company given the terms of the Quebec
scheme. This would have been a severe embarrassment to the Government, as Tilley recognized. Consequently, it was a powerful reason for calling an election before it was made clear in the legislature that the Confederates would do no more for Western Extension than they had already done. In the passage quoted, he was accusing the Antis of using Western Extension as a stick with which to beat the Government. He was not saying that all proponents of the line were opponents of Confederation.

Anglin wielded the club effectively. Throughout 1864 he had felt that Western Extension would not be built under the terms of the 'Lobster Bill'. By January 12, 1865, he had become convinced that it would not be built except as a government work. The Smashers, Anglin asserted, had failed in their most recent agitation to get a company to build Western Extension. Anglin knew that the Government could not promise to build Western Extension as a public work because of the financial terms of the Quebec Resolutions and yet construction as a government work seemed to be the only way to get the job done. As far as Anglin was concerned the time was ripe. It first had to be ascertained that the province could bear the additional expenditure without running into bankruptcy but Anglin felt that there was probably no worry on this score as the revenues had greatly increased in 1864 and he assumed that the provincial coffers had considerable money with which the line could be built. If the Confederation scheme were successful, on the other hand, Western Extension would be long postponed. Anglin was so sure of his stand, that on nomination day in St. John he apparently stated "that Western Extension could never be built under the present scheme, and that it must be built as a government work; and that ... he would go for Western Extension forthwith, and oppose any Government that was not willing to adopt it as a government work, and
if the Government to be formed did not do it, or attempted to trifle with it, he would endeavour to turn them out." Yet he had also stated in the Assembly in 1864 that he would not make a demand for instant government action on Western Extension if the financial situation of New Brunswick would not stand such an expenditure. He still accepted this view but as far as he could judge from his position outside the Government the financial position of New Brunswick was excellent. Thus, by the 1865 election, Anglin had become known as the most prominent proponent of building Western Extension as a government work. With the failure of the Government-inspired agitation for Western Extension in late 1864, the Smashers could only resort to unsupported assertions and personal attacks. These were not successful and the Antis made their point. There is little doubt that those who wished to see Western Extension built and were strongly attached neither to the Smashers nor to private enterprise on all occasions, would have turned to Anglin and his allies in 1865.

Nor did the Intercolonial Railway work entirely for the benefit of the Confederates. Tilley could not state which route the Intercolonial would follow and the exasperated but poetically-uninspired G. L. Hatheway demanded:

Mr. Tilley will you stop your puffing and blowing
And tell us which way the railway is going.

Anglin was convinced, as long he had been, that the Intercolonial would be built by the North Shore route and that this would be detrimental to the interests of St. John. The vagueness of the scheme may have aided in the election of Gray in 1863, but by 1865, St. John, at least, was aroused. It would not accept such an indefinite scheme as a reason for uniting with Canada. The final blow came in the middle of February when a Quebec paper arrived in New Brunswick containing the discussions on
union in Canada. Macdonald, in answer to a question by Luther Holton, had asserted that the guarantee of the Intercolonial would not be part of the constitution. It had also been rumoured, but not reported, that he had said that there would be no imperial legislation on the Intercolonial. It was the latter that aroused great anxiety in New Brunswick. Tilley fired off a note to Macdonald about the problem and bluntly proclaimed that no delegate from New Brunswick would consent to union unless the Railway was guaranteed by imperial legislation. He demanded that Macdonald send a telegram to rectify the problem he had inadvertently created. Macdonald did so, but the damage already done to the cause of Confederation in New Brunswick was too extensive to patch up before the election.

The economic confrontation was a highly important aspect of the 1865 election campaign, but significant squirmishes flared up elsewhere on the battle-field and Anglin ran hither and yon bolstering and giving leadership to the Anti forces. When Tilley stated that amendments would be made to the Quebec Resolutions if they were not satisfactory, Anglin quoted Macdonald as stating that the Resolutions must be accepted in their entirety as they were in the nature of a treaty. Furthermore, the Civil War served as an example to Anglin. He did not agree with the right of Southern secession but many New Brunswickers did. As a consequence, the Irish Anti asked the rhetorical question:

Is there any clause in the Confederation Scheme now before the people giving the right to any of the Lower Provinces to do likewise at any future period?

Macdonald would have shuddered at the thought. Tilley's assertion that he wanted the greatest possible time for the discussion of the union question met with ridicule. After all, Anglin stated, it was Tilley who had withheld the Quebec scheme from the people and who had agreed to the
plan to introduce the Resolutions to the legislature without going to 
the people. It was Tilley who had chosen the time of the elections. 
These and many more specific attacks on the Confederates and their scheme 
added up to a striking condemnation of Confederation that was not with-
out its effect. In fact, by the middle of January, Tilley received a 
note from a correspondent who remarked "that all great measures of im-
provement, are carried out more by means of side issues, or an undertow, 
or prejudice, than upon the intrinsic merits of such ..." Even Anglin's 
 vociferous rival, John Boyd, recognized the difficulties the Confederates 
faced: "We have a big fight before us, and we must not leave a stone un-
turned."

Above all, perhaps, the question of defence and the imperial connection 
was most significant. Anglin had nothing new to say on this topic and 
he simply restated his position. He still did not believe that the im-
perial connection was a mere alliance or that England, "which is wasting 
so much blood in New Zealand to subdue the Maoris whom the injustice of 
the Colonists has driven to arms," would, "in these Provinces, do nothing 
unless we consented to do what these Delegates have chosen to agree we 
ought to do." He again showed the ridiculous situation the new nation 
would be in should a state of quasi-independence be achieved. It would 
have no say in the making of war or peace and yet could not be neutral 
in a war between the United States and Great Britain. He re-affirmed 
his view that Confederation was a step towards the entire separation from 
the Empire. Anglin wanted to maintain the imperial connection. He had 
no interest in the plan of the *Carleton Sentinel* for union with the New 
England States. This was an indulgence in "fancies".

The group Anglin had always sought to represent and which might have
been expected to follow his leadership was the Irish Catholic population of New Brunswick. Certainly his *Freeman* circulated widely amongst them and they gave it rapt attention. Undoubtedly many of them shared Anglin's Irish-bred fear of a union with a larger power. Probably they agreed with Anglin's distrust of George Brown and the Clear Grits. In short, no doubt Anglin's influence on their views was large. It was not that he told Catholics to vote against Confederation on religious grounds. Indeed, he claimed that if Confederation were good for a Protestant it was good for a Catholic. There was no differentiation between the two groups in the realm of politics. Politics were not to be determined by religious denomination but by intelligence and conscience. He once bluntly told a reader who urged Catholics to unite to get better treatment from the Government, that place-hunting was demoralizing and that Catholics "should feel a pride in being able to say that, however others have bartered and sold their influence at elections, they at all events have been actuated rather by a regard for the general interests than by any desire to exalt themselves individually or collectively, or to degrade any others." Anglin was also astute enough to recognize that any union amongst Catholics would bring about counter-combinations. Catholics had grievances but uniting in a great political movement was not the method of removing them. Unfortunately, circumstances and personality did not always allow Anglin to follow his own good advice.

Anglin's influence amongst New Brunswick Catholics was not unchallenged. One counter-influence was provided by Charles Watters, a Catholic, a member of the Smasher Government, and Tilley's running mate in St. John. But Watters was not the source of Government strength he might have been. In the first place he was not especially popular with some of Tilley's
supporters. Secondly, he must have had doubts about Confederation for he was very slow in coming forward on the question. As late as February, 1865, John Boyd asked Tilley why Watters had not "come out like a man". Eventually Watters came around and began to pull his weight. Still, his challenge to Anglin's authority amongst New Brunswick Irish Catholics was woefully weak. Tilley himself had attempted to undermine Anglin's influence. Shortly after returning from Quebec he had visited Dr. Sweeny, the Bishop of St. John, and attempted to win him over to Confederation. He thought he had been successful and that at least the Bishop would not become involved in the election in opposition to Confederation. From Canada came another challenge to Anglin in the form of three packages of pamphlets from D'Arcy McGee in aid of the Confederate cause. But the greatest threat to Anglin's influence came from the highest Catholic ecclesiastical authority in the Maritimes, Dr. Thomas L. Connolly, the Archbishop of Halifax. At the beginning of January, Connolly wrote to the editor of the Halifax Morning Chronicle in favour of British North American Union. As far as the Archbishop was concerned, the choice before the people of British North America was annexation to the United States or the maintenance of the British tie. Because Catholics were much worse off in the United States, he claimed, he exhorted them to support Confederation. The Confederates rejoiced in the Archbishop's letter:

I have not seen anything for a long time pleases me so much as Dr. Connolly's letter, it is so opportune, and falls with such crushing weight on Anglin, who tries even to be witty at the Arch Bishop's expense. Anglin thought Connelly's propositions ridiculous. To him the choice was either to accept Confederation and the inevitable breaking of imperial ties or to remain as they were. He had no respect for the Archbishop's views and termed them "empty and feeble." Anglin had, or at least
claimed, some clerical backing in New Brunswick for his condemnation of
the views held by Dr. Connolly, for he stated that the New Brunswick
priests and the Bishop of St. John were opposed to Confederation. This,
Anglin claimed, was of no consequence:

In politics Bishops and Priests and Protestant Clergymen are as other
men. The Archbishop's letter may, however, have helped Anglin in that it pre-
vented the News and the Religious Intelligencer, in particular, from ach-
ieving very much by trying to excite denominational and sectarian strife.
While Connolly, McGee, Watters and Tilley may have had some weight amongst
New Brunswick Irish Catholics, it is clear that even their combined in-
fluence could not knock Anglin off his pedestal. The Freeman was what
Irish Catholics and many others were listening to.

No amount of newspaper discussion could carry an election without a good
deal of political organization. Anglin had not overlooked this. Back in
September, 1864, the list of St. John electors had been drawn up. Accord-
ing to his traditional practice, Anglin exhorted individuals who were
qualified to be electors to be sure to see that their names were put on
the list. He told those who feared that their taxes would go up as a
consequence of becoming an elector, not to worry. It was, Anglin stated,
a very slight rise. The Freeman office was the central meeting place for
many of those who wished to have the rights of electors, and Anglin and
his staff aided them in gaining their wishes. The late summer of 1864
must have been a particularly busy time for Anglin for, if the News is
to be believed, he, single-handed and with consummate skill, succeeded
in adding 296 illegal votes to the Portland list alone. This repres-
ented almost one-half of the voters of Portland!

The consequence of the work of Anglin and the Freeman, along with the
efforts of other anti-Confederates, was seen in the election results. The elections did not take place simultaneously. They began in Kent on February 28 and ended in Queen's in the third week of March. It was obvious that once a trend emerged, it was likely to have a snowball effect. By the time of the St. John elections the score stood: Antis - six, Confederates - two. St. John would make or break the election.

There were two constituencies covering the St. John region. The county of St. John constituency did not exclude the city, but the constituency of the city of St. John did exclude the rest of the county. Still, the campaigns for both were one and the same, even though the vote in the county took place on the Friday, March 13, and that of the city the following day. Anglin, of course was again a candidate for the county. Others on the Anti ticket were J. W. Cudlip, - the staunch opponent of the 'Lobster Bill' - R. D. Wilmot - the ambitious cousin of Anglin's arch-enemy Judge Wilmot - and J. Coram - an Alderman on the St. John Common Council whose main claim to fame was that he had been the Orangeman who had played King William in the procession which had led to the riot of 1849. Politics had united two representatives of the Orange and the Green for the time being at least. Opposing this impressive array were John Gray, C. N. Skinner - one of the present members of the Assembly and who was to become secretary of the Western Extension Company - J. Quinton - another Alderman - and C. N. Scovil. In the city, Tilley and Charles Watters faced A. R. Wetmore - who was to become the first premier of New Brunswick after Confederation - and J. V. Troop - of the large shipping and shipbuilding enterprise in the city, Troop and Son. For the Confederates the results were disastrous. Of the six seats available, all were won by anti-Confederates.
Combined with a victory for the Antis in A. J. Smith's constituency of Westmorland, the St. John results clinched the defeat of Confederation. The elections in the other ridings were anti-climactic and served merely to increase the huge anti-Confederate victory. Of the forty-one members of the Assembly, somewhere between six and twelve representatives returned were deemed to be in favour of Confederation. Only in the counties of Carleton, Albert and Sunbury, all very small, could the Confederates claim any real victory over their opponents. In Restigouche all the candidates favoured Confederation and in Northumberland only one Anti, Richard Hutchison, ran, and he was elected over John Johnson. Every man in the Assembly who had represented New Brunswick at the Quebec Conference had been defeated. While both the Confederate newspaper, the Telegraph, and the Freeman played games with statistics, anyone who looked at the county to county vote and at the composition of the Assembly could see that the election was an overwhelming Anti victory. The Lieutenant Governor was shocked:

I was aware that the public sentiment of the Province was opposed to Confederation; but I was by no means prepared for such a result ...

II

What had caused such a startling result? The answers supplied at the time were numerous and varied. Gordon thought that the length of time the Government had been in office weakened its strength and its appeal to the voters. He also felt that the rejection of the scheme in Prince Edward Island and the knowledge that it was likely to be defeated in Nova Scotia had done damage in New Brunswick. Finally, Gordon believed, there was the fact that New Brunswickers distrusted the Canadians who had betrayed them in the past. He firmly denied that his own antagonism to the scheme
had been of any significance in the election for the simple reason that only a very small number of people had known his views. Charles Fisher, on the other hand, in an almost illegible letter to Macdonald, placed much of the blame on Gordon's shoulders. He hoped that the rumours that Gordon was to resign were true and termed him "a miserable little animal at best." Tilley also tended to think ill of Gordon's role but eventually magnanimously acknowledged that "certainly he was not the cause of the failure." Tilley attributed defeat in St. John to the Western Extension issue and what he considered to be an almost unanimous vote of Roman Catholics against Confederation. In the other counties, he felt, the united vote of Catholics were the main reason for defeat. Had the Catholic vote been divided, the Confederates would have carried nearly every seat. J. H. Gray was also of the opinion that the Catholic electors of St. John, led by their Bishop and clergy, went against the scheme "almost to a man". Also, Gray wrote, the banking interests of St. John, fearful of losing their monopoly to Canadian competition, used their influence with many businesses to help defeat Confederation. On the other hand, he felt that the intelligent classes, the manufacturing interests, the shopkeepers and most of the merchants of St. John had favoured the scheme. "[B]ut in the Rural districts where they were unable to Comprehend the vastness of the subject - and where the most unmitigated falsehoods" were told, the Confederates were overwhelmed. Gray did not agree with the statement of McGee to the effect that the election had been "a fair stand-up fight of Yankee interests on the one side and British interests on the other."

It is a mistake to suppose as I have seen mentioned by your papers - that American gold - or American parties were active or were used in bringing about our defeat. Beyond the Expression of individual opinion I dont [sic] think they took any part.
In spite of the glee with which the American Consul in St. John greeted the election results, Gray was probably correct, for the existing Western Extension Company, as has already been shown, was far more closely connected to the Smasher party than to their opponents. American capitalists had little to gain by Western Extension being built as a government work as Anglin was urging. These capitalists would have preferred to have the road built by a company in which their capital could be put to use. Nor ought it be forgotten that it was John A. Poor himself who was working with the reactivated Smasher-inspired Western Extension Company in January of 1865 and Anglin had severely criticized Poor's "kite-flying" plans. Unquestionably, large sums of money were used on both sides, but how much of it was Canadian on the side of the Confederates or Nova Scotian and American on the side of the Antis is impossible to determine.

Anglin's own view was that the election had simply been a great rejection of Confederation. The Lieutenant Governor, the Freeman asserted, had "never interfered in any way or manner or degree in the great contest ... Governor Gordon understands his duty too well to take rank under the banners of any Provincial party on any question." Nor did Anglin accept the argument that it was the ignorant and parochial vote of the country areas that had 'killed' the Confederates. He quashed this notion, at least for the readers of the Freeman, by pointing out that the Antis had carried every city and large town almost without exception.

The aspect of the 1865 election which, from the point of view of Anglin's life at least, was most significant, was the emotion-charged issue of clerical influence and the Catholic vote. It has already been seen that Tilley and Gray felt that this was a terribly important factor in explaining the
Confederate defeat. Gray was particularly outspoken on the subject, although it is worthy of note that he made most of the issue in a letter to George Brown. He claimed that the Catholic vote was all part of a plan.

They voted like a flock of sheep. Out of a thousand votes in this City & County upwards of 950 ... [were] Against Confedn. It would be absurd to suppose - that this was because they understood the question - There are no 950 men in creation whose minds would necessarily arrive at one conclusion on a secular question - because they were of the same creed - but for years past the Bishops and Priests of the R.C. Church in this Province have been struggling to make their denomination an Element in the Governing Power - not fragmentary as every individual in a state constitutes a part of the Governing power - but distinct combined - a power An element which can dictate - Thus in this Case throughout the whole Province In each County - the Catholic body as a body have voted in one way - and have thus effected their great object - that of establishing not only their power - but the belief of its Existence - This I consider to have been their great object - and having attained that object - they are just as likely on another occasion to be in favor of Confederation as against it.

Hitherto in this Province their Bishops and leading men have considered that they did not hold either socially or politically the influence and position they ought to hold - That attained - first - the interest of the Province will be next - No one can or ought to object to any man holding place position or power on account of his Religion. And a Roman Catholic possessing intelligence and a stake in the Country is entitled to as much Consideration as a man of any other creed - but it becomes a terrific power for evil or good - if masses without education and intelligence can be moved one way or the other as they might be directed by an [assertion?] of spiritual authority -

Early in the campaign, Tilley's correspondents drew his attention to the attitudes of the Catholics. C. N. Skinner, for example, had been told that the Catholics would not vote for Tilley even if Watters were his running mate. He was convinced, however, that "a very large proportion of the protestants will support the scheme in this City." If the Confederates had difficulty, the Antis did not escape scot-free. The cooperation of Anglin and Coram in the Anti cause created problems for both Orange and Green. On the one hand, "the Orangemen are in a dilemma [sic];" on the other, "it was amusing to see the Scowl on the faces of the Papists as King Wm. Coram spoke ... " But soon after the election results began
to trickle in, the Confederates began to complain of clerical influence. They told strange and wonderful stories of Catholic clergymen refusing to give sacraments to those who supported Confederation and of other like atrocities. They accused the Bishop of St. John of supporting, even from the pulpit, the editor of the Freeman. There was also the suggestion that the gentleman "...", who had written to the Freeman frequently during the election campaign, was a clergymen, perhaps even Dr. Sweeny himself. Anglin did not have a great deal to say about "...", but even if he had been a clergymen, his letters seem to have been quite anonymous. Anglin pointed out, on the other hand, that thousands of Dr. Connolly's letters had been printed and distributed as well as the regular issues of those religious papers, the Presbyterian and the Religious Intelligencer. This clerical influence was all right as far as the Confederates were concerned, Anglin complained, but even a small amount used on the other side was, to them, intolerable. He flatly denied that any priest threatened to refuse "religious ordinances":

No priest dare make such a threat, and if any were mad enough to make it, no Catholic would regard it, as every Catholic knows that the priest is as much bound by the laws of his Church as is the layman, and that punishment would surely follow so great an abuse of his position.

In answer to the charge that he had been supported from the pulpit, Anglin had a marvellous reply:

We do know that we attended Mass at the Cathedral every Sunday for months past, and the only allusion we ever heard to the elections was a short sermon on the subject of bribery, in which the Congregation were told that the man who sold his vote at an election committed a grievous offence against Society and against God; but in which not one word was said to show what were the preacher's views on the question at issue. If the Editor of the Presbyterian thinks that such a sermon was calculated to sustain Mr. Anglin, then we must admit that we are proud of being so sustained.

All other charges of clerical influence Anglin either ignored or denied, just as he denied the rumour that Americans had spent $100,000 on the New
Brunswick elections.101

The position of the Catholic hierarchy in New Brunswick on the Confederation question is of considerable interest in analyzing the 1865 election. Archbishop Connolly, of course, was an outspoken proponent of Confederation. Bishop Rogers of Chatham also favoured the scheme but did not consider it "judicious" to give public support. 102 Throughout his life, Bishop Sweeny seems to have avoided rather than sought public involvement in politics unlike either Connolly or Rogers. It would have been rather out of character for him to have taken a strong open stand in 1865. His sympathies, it would appear, were with the Antis. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to support the rumour, which Tilley had reported, that the Bishop had sent letters to the priests calling on them to oppose Confederation. 103 That Sweeny would have done this, in opposition to the well-publicized views of his superior, Connolly, is unlikely. While its possibility exists, just as it is possible that Bishop Rogers wrote to the priests in the lower part of Gloucester on behalf of Confederation as Peter Mitchell had requested, 104 the fact remains that all of these priests must have known the opinion of the highest Catholic authority in the Maritime provinces, the Archbishop. If there were any clerical influence involved in the Catholic vote in 1865, it seems safe to claim that it resulted from the convictions of individual priests rather than the concerted efforts of the hierarchy. Neither of the two New Brunswick Bishops gave public support either for or against Confederation. Had they done so, they might have been accused of clerical interference. That they should have been accused of using clerical influence when they did a remarkably good job of keeping their opinions quiet, seems very odd. The Confederates — and too frequently the historians of Confederation — were flipping a strange
coin: heads we win; tails you lose.

What was certainly not involved was a conspiracy among the Catholic hierarchy to build a solid Catholic bloc vote, as Gray had suggested. That would have been impossible given the hierarchy's divergent views. Shortly after the election, in fact, Connolly wrote a letter to Sweeny which gives the lie to Gray's contention:

All public and private accounts from New Brunswick agreed in stating that the Catholic Bishop and priests of that region stopped at nothing to oppose Confederation. They went en masse along with the people to the hustings, harangued them in the streets, etc. Our friend Charlie sent a letter over here stating that the Catholics went as a body to the hustings. I am glad for all our sakes that this is an exaggeration.

Tilley could not and ought not to have expected better from the Catholic body when in chosing [sic] so many delegates he seemed to ignore their existence altogether ... It is absolutely necessary that we should never again unite on politics except where mother Church and Catholic education is at stake.105

But had the Catholics united in the 1865 election? A close analysis of the election results in St. John county, where there was an especially large Irish Catholic population, indicates that the Catholics were much more divided in their vote than the Confederates believed. St. John is a particularly good example, for it was there that Gray and Tilley thought they saw the bloc Catholic vote; it was there that Sweeny might have been expected to wield his greatest influence if he had in fact interfered in the election; and it was there that Anglin had run and won. If the assertions of Tilley and Gray had been correct, it would be logical to expect that the percentage of anti-Confederate vote should be correlated in some way to the percentage of Catholics in a particular area. In other words, the larger the number of Catholics, the larger the number of anti-Confederate votes, on a percentage basis. This does not, in fact, prove to be the case. Compare, for example the electoral subdivisions of Duke's and King's. In both cases the Anti vote was 51.4 per cent of
the total. But in Duke's, the Catholic population made up 28.1 per cent, and in King's, Catholics formed 65.9 per cent of total population. Over twice as many Catholics in an electoral subdivision had resulted in no difference in percentage vote. This is merely one example which could be given to demonstrate the fact that it cannot be proven that the Catholics voted as a bloc in the 1865 election. It seems very unlikely that they did, even though it may be possible to explain away the statistics. But given the fact that voting was not public, and that the statistics did not prove their case, the assertions of Tilley and Gray were irresponsible and incorrect. One can only hope that it was an honest mistake and not a case in which the wish was father to the thought. In the light of the tactics resorted to before the end of the year by the Confederates, it was a doubly unfortunate misconception. In defence of Tilley and Gray, on the other hand, one would be justified in saying that while they had grossly over exaggerated, there was a grain of truth to their claims. The Catholic vote had certainly not hurt the Antis. In every electoral subdivision in which Catholics formed more than one third of the population, a majority of votes were cast for the Antis. But this is about as far as one can go.

On a province-wide basis, a survey of the statistics indicate that while Catholic voters may have had a tendency to vote for the Antis, it was not a bloc vote. The exception to this generalization is the Acadian vote. In Westmorland, for instance, the Acadian vote was overwhelmingly in favour of Smith and the other anti-Confederate candidates. David Wark, one of Tilley's correspondents, had recognized the Acadian attitude well before the election took place.

Our French population are the great difficulty. The dread of taxation and the circumstances of several of the priests being unfavorable [sic]
to it produces an effect difficult to be overcome and would render it unsafe for a candidate to avow himself even if so disposed. 107

While Wark's analysis of the reasons for Acadian opposition may not have been the full story, the significance of their vote in Westmorland cannot be denied. The same was true of Victoria. Acadian attitudes may also have been responsible for the fact that the strongest candidates in Kent and Gloucester chose to oppose Confederation in 1865. This may not have been the whole story, however, for in Northumberland, sandwiched between the latter counties, the Acadian vote had absolutely nothing to do with Hutchison's victory along with three pro-Confederates. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Antis owed a great deal to their Acadian supporters.

The conclusions one must draw on the issue of the Catholic vote are three-fold. There was no attempt on the part of the hierarchy to mold a bloc Catholic vote. Secondly, the whole idea of a monolithic response by New Brunswick Roman Catholics to Confederation, is erroneous. Finally, there is little question that one of the major reasons for whatever uniformity there was to the Catholic, especially the Irish Catholic, vote, was Timothy Anglin. He had become the unchallenged lay leader of New Brunswick's Irish Catholics by means of his newspaper, the Freeman. It was the only well-known newspaper in New Brunswick that was edited by a Catholic and it had a wide and fairly large circulation amongst the Catholic population. But whether Catholic or Protestant, anyone who had read the Freeman since the summer of 1863 could not have helped, without great effort, but become a staunch anti-Confederate. Anglin, because his newspaper was read and quoted especially amongst the Catholic population, did not need to make many speeches. The Freeman spoke for him.

Anglin and the Antis had won the battle of the 1865 elections. But the
Confederation wars did not end there. The Confederates analyzed the situation and prepared for a renewed campaign. Tilley was optimistic and thought the situation would change in the not far distant future. Accordingly, he set about constructing a province-wide association, probably that organization known as the British American Association, and urging the judicious use of imperial pressure to influence the population of New Brunswick. He had always claimed that he needed more time to prepare and 'educate' the inhabitants of New Brunswick. Now he had it.

John Gray was not as content. Indeed, he felt quite sorry for himself; so much so that he was ready to pick up his bags and move to Canada if he could find a position with somebody there. He had been looking forward to the visit to England in the summer with the delegation so much, but now, as he said, "alas poor Yorrick [sic]." In a letter to Galt Gray did not hesitate, however, to say that the defeat was only temporary and that what was most needed was a strong expression of opinion from the British Government. Indeed, Gray felt that it would not be a bad idea for the Imperial Government to pass an act on the basis of the Quebec Resolutions which would allow the provinces to join when they were able. Gray was actually willing to skirt the whole problem of getting the electors or legislature of New Brunswick to approve the scheme:

It seems absurd that the petty jealousies of small Communities should be allowed to stand in the way of a great measure of Imperial Policy - and operate to defeat the future welfare of the Whole of British N. America.

Anglin did not fear great repercussions from across the Atlantic. He approvingly copied a short passage from the Acadian Recorder which, when asked what the imperial authorities would say about the rejection of Confederation, replied:

Why they may disapprove of the course pursued by the Lower Provinces;
they may call it short-sighted and narrow; but they will respect their unanimity and defer to the tenacity of their affection for their time-honored constitutions and peculiar interests.114

As events proved, this was a naive hope.
FOOTNOTES

1 Freeman, Nov. 5, 1864.
2 At least this is the reason he gave Macdonald in accounting for promising an election (see P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Macdonald, Nov. 23, 1864).
3 Freeman, Nov. 19, 1864.
4 Morning Telegraph (St. John), Nov. 25, 1864.
5 P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LX111, Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 30, 1865; and Freeman, Jan. 5, 1865. See also Gordon to Hatheway, Jan. 6, 1865; and Hatheway to Gordon, Jan. 6, 1865; both letters quoted in Freeman, Jan. 28, 1865.
7 Freeman, Jan. 24, 1865.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection), Boyd to Tilley, Sept. 28, 1864.
12 P.A.C., New Brunswick Government Gazette, XX111, Jan. 25 and June 7, 1865.
13 Freeman, Feb. 9, March 18 and Apr. 6, 1865.
14 Ibid., Apr. 13, 1865.
15 Ibid., Jan. 5, 1865.
17 Freeman, Feb. 9, 1865.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., Jan. 14 and 28, 1865.
20 P.A.C., Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt Papers, Tilley to Gault (sic), Dec. 26, 1864.
21 Ibid.
22 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Macdonald to Tilley, Nov. 14, 1864; N.B.M.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Galt to Tilley, Dec. 21, 1864; and Galt Papers, Tilley to Gault (sic), Dec. 26, 1864.
23 Freeman, Dec. 10, 1864.
24 Ibid.
25 Galt Papers, Tilley to Gault (sic), Dec. 26, 1864.
26 Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Galt, undated.
27 Government Gazette, XXII, May 11, 1864.
28 The only other possible interpretation of the quotation, one which
seems quite unlikely, is that Tilley was saying that his political
friends who were members of the Company, were not sincere in their sup-
port of Western Extension.
29 Freeman, Nov. 24 and Dec. 13, 1864; and Jan. 12 and 21, 1865.
30 Ibid., Jan. 28, 1865.
31 Ibid.
32 Morning News (St. John), May 8, 1865.
33 For example, Tilley falsely accused Anglin of having stated in the
1864 session that he would refuse to go along with any measure for build-
ing Western Extension as a government work (see Freeman, Feb. 7, 1865).
34 See A. G. Bailey,"Railways and the Confederation Issue in New Brunswick,
35 Quoted in MacNutt, op. cit., p. 428.
36 Freeman, Nov. 15, 1864.
37 D. G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald, Vol. 1: The Young Politician
38 Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Macdonald, Feb. 13, 1865. Charles
Tupper assured Tilley that the Intercolonial Railway would "undoubtedly
be guaranteed by Imperial act ..." (see U.N.B.A., Sir Samuel Leonard
Tilley Papers, Tupper to Tilley, Telegram, Feb. 14, 1865).
39 Freeman, Feb. 16, 1865.
40 Ibid.
41 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, S. T. Gore to Tilley, Jan. 17, 1865.
42 Ibid., Boyd to Tilley, Feb. ?, 1865.
43 Freeman, Jan. 21, 1865.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid., Jan. 12, 1865.
47 Ibid., May 3, 1866.
48 Ibid., Jan. 9, 1864.
49 Ibid.
50 J. R. McCready, wrote Tilley to say that although he had "no great
regard" for Watters, he preferred to see him in the Government rather
than Anglin (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, McCready to Tilley, Feb.
15, 1865).
51 Ibid., Boyd to Tilley, Feb. ?, 1865.
52 See ibid., Watters to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 16, 1865.
53 Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Galt, undated.
54 Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), McGee to Chief Clerk of the Provincial Sec-
retary's Office, Feb. 28, 1865. One package was to be sent to Tilley,
the second to Peter Mitchell and the last to Charles Watters.
55 On Connolly's views on and role in Confederation see D. B. Flemming,
"Archbishop Thomas L. Connolly: Godfather of Confederation" (unpublished
essay presented at the annual meeting of La Societe-Canadienne d'Histoire
56 Reprinted in Freeman, Jan. 17, 1865.
57 Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), Thomas Connolly Jr. to Tilley, Jan. 23, 1865
(this Connolly was a Catholic priest, but not the Archbishop). See also
Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), David Wark to Tilley, Jan. 19, 1865.
58 Freeman, Jan. 17, 1865.
59 Ibid., Feb. 9, 1865.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., Jan. 12 and March 18, 1865. The News, according to Anglin, had used the bogey of Fenianism in an effort to excite sectarian strife.
62 Freeman, Sept. 3, 1864.
63 Ibid., Oct. 5, 1864.
68 Hannay, op. cit., II, 232.
69 The 1865 election results are given in Appendix II.
70 Hannay, op. cit., II, 235.
71 New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), March 31, 1865. The Freeman put the number of pro-Confederates at eleven (see Freeman, March 30, 1865). Gordon stated the total to be nine (see Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, March 27, 1865).
72 Restigouche was a terribly isolated region. John McMillan, during the 1865 campaign, was most concerned with the fact that there was no clergyman within one hundred and fifty miles who was allowed to solemnize marriage (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, McMillan to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 16, 1865). Its isolation may have been the reason for Tilley turning down the opportunity of running in Restigouche after his defeat in St. John (see ibid., W. W. Caldwell to Tilley, March 10, 1865; and Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), P. Mitchell to Tilley, telegram, March 9, 1865).
73 Johnson was sick during the campaign (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, J. M. Johnson to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 14, 1865).
74 The Telegraph had claimed that there was only a majority of 455 in opposition to Confederation (see Telegraph, n.d., quoted in News, March 29, 1865). It had made this calculation by counting the vote cast for the highest candidate where the "straight ticket" was run and striking "an average" where there was little opposition and many candidates. It conveniently counted Hutchison of Northumberland as a Confederate, which in itself subtracted 1197 votes from the anti-Confederate side of the ledger and gave them to Confederates. The Telegraph was not content with giving the Antis credit for no votes in Northumberland and so added on a little more than a thousand to the pro-Confederate vote for this county. The Telegraph put the figure for the Confederate vote in Northumberland at 2256 but the total number of electors who voted was 1961 (see P.A.C., C.O. 193, New Brunswick Blue Books of Statistics, XLVIII (1865), 55). In answer to the Telegraph, Anglin also played the numbers game. He omitted the votes in Kent and Northumberland, which was fair enough. But he made a mistake in copying the Carleton vote, counted Beveridge of Victoria as an Anti and on top of this made a couple of errors in calculation. Then, by adding all the votes cast for all candidates on both sides he came up with the news that the majority of votes in favour of the Antis was 18,759 (see Freeman, March 30, 1865).
75 A fair analysis would show that the Antis received something close to sixty per cent of the total vote cast.
76 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, March 6, 1865.
77 Ibid., Gordon to Cardwell, March 13, 1865. That there was some validity
to this assessment is indicated in a letter Tilley had received from a supporter in February: "[W]e do not think that all the members of the Government are like yourself and my friends and myself think that you ought to reorganize the Government then there would be a chance of men of greater ability to get in." (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Delancey Tompkins to Tilley, Feb. 2, 1865).

79 P.A.C., Edward Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, March 13, 1865.  
80 Ibid., Gordon to Cardwell, May 22, 1865.  He added the significant statement: "Mr. Tilley was fully satisfied ... " On Gordon's attitude to and role in Confederation see Chapman, art. cit.
82 Galt Papers, Tilley to Galt, May 13, 1865.  See also Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Tilley to Gordon, May 17, 1865; and Tilley Papers (P.A.C.), Galt to Tilley, June 3, 1865.
83 Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Galt, undated.
84 Macdonald Papers, LI, Gray to Macdonald, March 13, 1865.  See also P.A.C., George Brown Papers, Gray to Brown, March 27, 1865.  Gray might have reached his opinion of the outlying areas on the basis of the views of such Smasher politicians as Samuel McCready (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, McCready to Tilley, Feb. 11, 1865).
85 Quoted in Creighton, ... Macdonald ..., I, 407.
86 Galt Papers, Gray to Gault (sic), Apr. 9, 1865.
87 P.A.C., Despatches From United States Consuls in St. John, New Brunswick, J. Howard to W. Seward, March 11, 1865.  Howard thought that there was a "strong undercurrent in this community in favor of annexation to the United States."
88 There were, of course, a few Antis (eg. J. V. Troop) in the Company.  But the bulk of the members of the corporation were sympathetic to the Smashers (see Government Gazette, XXII, May 11, 1864).
89 Freeman, Jan. 21, 1865.  Proof of Poor's co-operation with the Company is found in Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), E. R. Burpee to Tilley, Nov. 29, 1864.
90 It was later claimed by their opponents, that the Antis had spent $16,000 during the St. John elections (see Telegraph, June 12, 1866).
91 Freeman, March 18, 1865.
92 Ibid., May 23, 1865.
93 Brown Papers, Gray to Brown, March 27, 1865.
94 Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), Skinner to Tilley, Dec. 19, 1864.
95 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Skinner to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 13, 1865.
96 Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), S. L. Peters to Tilley, Jan. 16, 1865.
97 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, Feb. 18, 1865.  It is possible that Tilley called on Cartier to get the Quebec Bishops to write to their brethren in New Brunswick (see Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.), Cartier to Tilley, telegram, Feb. 17, 1865).
98 Freeman, March 21, 1865.
99 Ibid., March 25, 1865.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., March 23, 1865.
102 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Mitchell to Tilley, Jan. 30, 1865.
103 Macdonald Papers, Tilley to Galt, undated.
104 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Mitchell to Tilley, Jan. 30, 1865.
105 U.N.B.A., Bishop John Sweeney Papers, Connolly to Sweeney, March 15, 1865. The Archbishop made several comments about Anglin in this letter.
106 See Appendix III for this analysis.
107 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Wark to Tilley, Feb. 10, 1865.
108 The significance of the Acadian vote makes one realize, once again, the need for a scholarly historical work on the Acadians which would, among other things, make clear their role in the history of New Brunswick and Canada during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The attitude of the Acadians towards Confederation may provide an index of the attitude of French Canadians towards the same. It is, at any rate, a factor that is usually ignored in attempting to assess the latter.
109 Macdonald Papers, II, Tilley to Galt, undated.
110 Galt Papers, Tilley to Gault (sic), Apr. 22, 1865.
111 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Tilley to Gordon, enclosed in Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 30, 1865. See also Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Tilley to Gordon, May 17, 1865.
112 Macdonald Papers, Ll, Gray to Macdonald, March 13, 1865. See also Brown Papers, Gray to Brown, March 27, 1865.
113 Galt Papers, Gray to Gault (sic), Apr. 9, 1865.
114 Freeman, March 18, 1865.
CHAPTER 8

Executive Councillor: 1865

At the beginning of April, 1865, Anglin's attention was diverted from politics. Undoubtedly he was pre-occupied with the birth of his first child, Francis Alexander. Timothy, at forty-two, was taking on the responsibilities of parenthood at an age when many men had had their last child and some men were becoming grandfathers. His young family was to cause Anglin no little anxiety in later years, but in April, 1865, pride must have been Anglin's major emotion. His stake in his adopted home was growing ever greater; his son was a native-born British North American.

The birth of Frank had prevented Anglin from going to Fredericton to be sworn in as an Executive Councillor. The Lieutenant Governor had first given Hatheway the opportunity to form a Government but, as expected, he declined. Gordon then turned to Smith and Wilmot, "two prominent members of the H. of Assembly, who may be considered to represent the two different sections of which the Anticonfederate party is composed;" those who thought that no union should take place, and those who felt that a more complete union of British North America was required. Forming a Government was not all that simple a task, for as Anglin later said, "it is not every day you find parties who have been opposed to one another for years, brought together to labor for the protection of the country."

Still, Gordon, at least, found the results quite impressive:

On the whole, the personnel of the new Gov't. is an improvement on that of the previous Council. A decided majority of it's [sic] members are men of undoubted honesty; and 2 or 3 of their number are educated gentlemen. There is no man among them of the natural abilities of Mr. Tilley, but on the other hand there is no man so utterly incapable & inefficient as were some members of my late Ex. Council.
In spite of the Government's apparent strength, however, Gordon recognized that this appearance was somewhat superficial. Aside from the basic split in attitudes towards the Quebec Resolutions, Gordon doubted that "an Irish rebel [Anglin] and one of the least estimable members of the late Govt. [Hatheway]" would be sufficient to enable the Government "to retain the favour of the democracy ... " Gordon also reported that neither Allen nor Wilmot would long remain in office as Allen was to be appointed to the Bench as soon as the Chief Justice resigned and Wilmot "intends to appropriate the vacant Sinecure Office of Auditor General."

These two were the strongest advocates within the Executive Council of a closer union with Canada than the Quebec Resolutions provided.

The selection of Anglin to the Executive Council was particularly interesting. To be sure he had been one of the most important, perhaps the most important anti-Confederate. But his position in New Brunswick had long been a controversial one and his presence in the cabinet was certain to draw abnormal criticism. Indeed, the Religious Intelligencer complained that his appointment was "an imposition on, and an insult to every loyal protestant subject of Her Majesty in this Province." Nevertheless it would have been almost impossible to form an Executive Council without Anglin being included. Not only had he been a bulwark of strength on the Confederation issue, but also his talents and conscientious attention to duties were expected to serve the Government well. "Mr. Anglin is above mediocrity as a writer," wrote one retired politician in assessing the prospects of the new Government," and will be found useful, not only as an adviser of prudent measures, but as a literary critic, in preparing such documents as require to be carefully and correctly written." In fact, the real question was not whether he merited a position on the
cabinet but whether Anglin would accept one. At least, Anglin later claimed that he had never expected a position and when it was pushed on him he had initially said that as a public journalist he could render the Government more assistance outside the cabinet than in it. Eventually, however, it had been agreed that he would become an Executive Councillor but not hold a departmental office—a Minister without Portfolio to use contemporary phraseology.

Why had Anglin received no departmental office? Why had Wilmot received no office either? Tilley thought that it indicated fear of defeat in the elections which taking a departmental office would necessitate. This hypothesis has some merit, especially in Wilmot's case, but it is not the whole story. Certainly the other members of the Government were not afraid of bringing on a by-election in St. John as both Wilmot and Anglin had been offered the prestigious office of the Provincial Secretary.

Anglin himself never said why he refused to take this or the other offices offered him. Perhaps he did not want another election contest—after all that would cost money. Perhaps he did not wish to become bogged down in Fredericton with departmental business leaving the Freeman languishing in St. John. In any case he received neither the responsibilities nor salary and prestige of departmental office.

In the absence of extensive documentary evidence it is difficult to generalize about Anglin's role as an Executive Councillor. As all political leaders must, he concerned himself with matters of patronage and was especially disturbed by the feeling that sprang up that the Government was neglecting its friends. He thought that "no further cause for such a cry should be given if possible." He also played a significant part in looking after the details of Government business, particularly in St.
John. With his cabinet colleagues, as with others, Anglin was not a 'hale-fellow well-met'. Provincial Secretary Gillmor, for example, mentioned that he really had wished to have a confidential chat with Anglin but that he had "hesitated to break the ice" since Anglin was usually so reserved. In fact, Anglin remained somewhat of a loner throughout his career and never seems to have attempted to make political acquaintances into intimate confidants or personal friends. He did not normally write long letters to maintain political communications as did so many politicians of the day. Nor did he have numerous confidential conversations with A. J. Smith, as Gillmor had assumed. Yet his lack of close contact with his colleagues did not mean he had no influence. Far from it. Gillmor had been especially impressed with Anglin, thinking that he was moderate in his demands and quite unassuming, "much more so than many would be with your talent and influence ..." As far as the Provincial Secretary was concerned, Anglin and Smith, because of their experience, "and other qualifications which must always give men influence," had more weight at cabinet meetings than any two others. As a working member of the Government, Anglin seems to have been a valuable addition. But as a prime target for attacks on the Government, Anglin was a detriment.

II

The abuse Anglin's presence drew upon the anti-Confederate Government was only one of its problems. In a remarkably short period of time it went from strength to weakness as though acids were gnawing at its vitals. There were many problems with which the Antis were confronted, some large, some small, but all aiding in the destruction of the Government. In the field of economics, the pressure of circumstances weighed heavily on the Antis. Notice of the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty had
been given by the American Government in the spring of 1865 and Canada refused to consider the alternative of intercolonial free trade unless it was accompanied by political union. On top of this, the anti-Confederate Government took office shortly after an economic depression became clearly noticeable in New Brunswick. Money was scarce and capital investments and new business enterprises were nowhere to be found. Railway and import revenues remained on a low ebb until the summer. Another great blow to the Government was the fact that the provincial treasury was virtually empty. The Tilley Government had boasted of a large surplus for 1864 but it seemed that all this had been wiped out by the beginning of April.

The new Government now had to reorganize expenditure to come more in line with revenue and the chances of a Government taking on such a large work as Western Extension, with only four-fifths the revenue of the year before, were extremely poor. Obviously Anglin's commitment to build Western Extension as a public work would involve either Anglin or the Government in serious difficulty. Lowered revenues also meant drastic cuts in the budget even though the demands for greater expenditure on Western Extension and defence were now incessant. The Government decided to 'go slow' and to try to establish a more stable growth rate which would not lead to great rises and declines in revenue from one year to another. It was for this reason that the Government decided to raise money by popular loans instead of borrowing it from the great financing establishments. But controlling provincial expenditure did not win much applause in New Brunswick. The inhabitants were used to grandiose schemes and were not prepared for the conservatism necessitated by financial difficulties.

The Antis found another irrepressible enemy in the non-elective branch of the legislature, the Legislative Council. One of Anglin's pet projects
in the 1865 session was a Reformatory Bill which would have allowed Catholics to establish Reform Schools, though almost entirely at their own expense. This Bill, which was a partial answer, at least, to a crying need in St. John, was passed by the Assembly after an amendment. But the Legislative Council, dominated by Confederates, voted seven to five in favour of postponing the Bill. It also threw out the Marriage License Law and a bill for ending the political nature of the office of Postmaster General. Anglin's anger was uncontrollable.

The opponents of the Government, the advocates of Confederation, the men who long to see the free people of this Province driven or dragged or tricked into Confederation, have begun to "thank God that we have a House of Lords;" that a body of men, many of whom have purchased their seats by the vilest and most hateful services venal politicians could render to a Government, and who are still desirous to see the party to whom they owe their seats restored to power, act in utter disregard of public opinion and of the public interest, impede the course of legislation and obstruct the public business. The greatest disintegrating force which faced the Government, however, was neither economic circumstances nor parliamentary obstacles, but the issue of loyalty. This was an issue which was to involve Anglin most acutely and went far to determine the fate of the Anti Government. One phase of this issue was the attitude adopted by the British Government and its representative in New Brunswick, Arthur Gordon, towards the Government and its policy on Confederation. If British authorities opposed the anti-Confederate Government and pushed Confederation, it was clear that the Antis' opponents could make opposition to union appear as disloyalty to the British Empire. On such an issue, Anglin would be a particularly vulnerable target because of his Irish background and rumoured rebellion in 1848.

On the other side of the Atlantic, influences were indeed at work which would help the Confederates. While there were some, such as young Robert
Cecil, later to become Conservative Prime Minister, who understood the situation from the Anti's viewpoint, few British politicians felt this way. Lord John Russell, for instance, was willing to consider coercion. Edward Cardwell and the Colonial Office were prepared to 'apply the screws'. They resolved to make things miserable for the new Government and to undercut it whenever possible. At the very beginning of April, Cardwell suggested that Gordon work to get the pro-unionists in New Brunswick to cooperate with those who were already in favour of the Quebec scheme. He made it clear that there was no possibility of his support for a re-agitation of the Maritime Union question. He applied pressure over the question of defence.

I wish you would unofficially and prudently urge upon your Ministers that while England is very willing to exert herself for the defence of her Colonies - she expects them to exert themselves. You might I think convince N. B. that she must not expect England to be satisfied long with things as they are. Cardwell claimed that he wanted "to avoid all appearance of undue pressure, or of dictation," but that New Brunswick was entirely dependent on Britain for defence and therefore could not "assume to be independent of the wishes & opinions of Gt. B." To arguments used by Anglin and others, he put forward a different viewpoint.

It is easy for provincial orators to say that Gt. Britain wants the Confederation in order that her own burdens may be lightened. They would show more patriotism & more philosophy if they reasoned thus, "the country which takes so much interest in this scheme, which will render our defence easier & more effectual, shows that she is in earnest about our defences. We should have less reliance on her steadfastness & sincerity, if she seemed less anxious about us." With shallow arguments like this it is small wonder that Anglin felt that Britain was simply trying to escape her defence burden. Still, the pressure created on the defence question resulted in the Government supporting an improved militia law and a tripling of money spent for the training.
of the militia. Yet imperial authorities remained unhappy even with this rate of progress. Hastings Doyle considered the $30,000 voted "totally inadequate to meet the requirements for instructing a large body of Militia in the Province of New Brunswick ..." The opposition press in New Brunswick also complained, not because too little, but because too much was being spent on the militia. Yet, Anglin pointed out, these same papers were the ones who were charging the Antis with disloyalty to the Empire. It was not that Anglin enjoyed setting aside such a sum for defence. He thought it was a larger amount than they could afford, "if they could otherwise help themselves," and while he voted in favour of the resolution, "he would rather have seen the amount expended on the Bye [sic] Roads." Yet the desire to go great lengths to satisfy imperial authorities was a powerful force on Anglin and the province.

From the very beginning the imperial representative in New Brunswick made it clear that he was looking for ways to upset the new administration. He attempted to divide the Government between the pro-unionists and the "isolationists". He promised to put an end to the renewed agitation for Maritime Union. He informed his Executive Council that he would dissolve parliament as soon as it became apparent that Confederation could be carried. On the same day that the new Government was formed, Gordon requested that Tilley be allowed to retain the rank and precedence of an Executive Councillor. In fact, Gordon, at the time when the negotiations for office among the Antis were going on, was keeping Tilley informed of these developments. One must consider it rather unusual, to say the least, to find a Lieutenant Governor divulging confidential information about one political party to the leader of another. Keeping Tilley as an Executive Councillor, presumably, was to enable Gordon to
consult with his former Provincial Secretary. In May such an interview took place. Tilley and Gordon planned their strategy. It was decided that they would remain quiescent until November, "and then to undertake the commencement of a systematic organization for the purpose of effecting a change in public opinion." Tilley intended to make use of his position in the Temperance Societies of New Brunswick for this purpose. The intended plan was to flood the legislature with petitions and if it did not then take action, Gordon would dissolve the parliament. The one thing to which Gordon did turn a deaf ear, was Tilley's alleged suggestion that Confederation could be carried by money - £10,000 or £15,000 more than the $40,000 the Confederates had spent in the recent elections.

It was clear, therefore, that British authorities both in Britain and New Brunswick were not about to accept the voice of the electors as a final decision on the question of union. On June 24th, Cardwell sent a very strongly-worded despatch to Gordon which made this quite clear. It amounted to an appeal to loyalty and became a milestone in the campaign for Confederation in New Brunswick. In part, it stated:

You will at the same time express the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it is an object much to be desired that all the British North American Colonies should agree to unite in one Government. In the territorial extent of Canada, and in the maritime and commercial enterprise of the Lower Provinces Her Majesty's Government see the elements of power, which only require to be combined in order to secure for the provinces which shall possess them all, a place among the most considerable Communities of the World. In the spirit of loyalty to the British Crown, of attachment to British connection, and of love for British Institutions, by which all the Provinces are animated alike, - Her Majesty's Government recognize the bond by which all may be combined under one Government. Such an union seems to Her Majesty's Government to recommend itself to the Provinces on many grounds of moral and material advantage, - as giving a well founded prospect of improved Administration and increased prosperity. But there is one consideration which Her Majesty's Government feel it more especially their duty to press upon the Legislature of [New Brunswick]. Looking to the determination which this Country has ever exhibited to regard the defence of the Colonies as a matter of Imperial concern, - the Colonies must recognize a right and even acknowledge an obligation
incumbent on the Home Government to urge with earnestness and just authority the measures which they consider to be most expedient on the part of the Colonies with a view to their own defence. Nor can it be doubtful that the Provinces of British North America are incapable, when separate and divided from each other, of making those just and sufficient preparations for national defence, which would be easily undertaken by a Province uniting in itself all the population and all the provinces of the whole. 51

This despatch was the answer to the suggestions of Gray and Tilley that the influence of the Imperial Government would aid the Confederate cause. It was not, apparently, "undue influence".

Anglin must have felt differently. The Colonial Office was hitting the anti-Confederates on the chin and rabbit-punching them at the same time. They were unwilling punching bags and the incessant pounding from all sides made them more self-assertive. In the middle of May the Executive Council sent a gentle reminder to Cardwell via Gordon, "to inform the Secretary of State for the Colonies how entirely the scheme has been rejected by the people of this Province ..." 52 When this failed to produce any change of attitude, the Government, hoping that the British Government would not deliberately defy the wishes of the inhabitants of New Brunswick, felt that misinformation about the election must have been spread throughout England by the Canadian delegates who were, the Freeman thought, "working to enslave the people of the Maritime Provinces." Consequently, the Antis resolved to send delegates to England to give the correct information and so change Cardwell's opinion. While Smith and Allen, the two delegates, were in England finding out that "Her Majesty's Government can give no countenance to any proposals which would tend to delay the Confederation of all the Provinces," the Executive Council and Gordon were preparing a reply to Cardwell's despatch of the twenty-fourth of June.

Anglin realized that the issue of loyalty was rapidly rising to prominence
in New Brunswick and he confidently iterated that New Brunswickers knew what real loyalty meant.

They know that loyalty does not require them to yield obedience to the dictates of Canadian Delegates, or even of a Colonial Secretary; that to maintain their rights is the true loyalty of a free people. Anglin trusted that the New Brunswick delegates would correct the impressions of Cardwell on the state of feeling in the Lower Provinces and as well would impress upon him that any attempt at coercion or pressure of any kind would engender a "universal feeling of indignation and a spirit of resistance". The people of New Brunswick, Anglin insisted, were determined to maintain the right of self-government and saw 'proper means' in a different light than did Downing Street. The Freeman also rejected the assertion that to find fault with Cardwell's despatch was disloyal. The St. John Journal and other papers had made this claim on the basis that Cardwell spoke in the Queen's name in a literal sense. Anglin knew more about political practice than to be duped by such tactics and again spoke for the people of New Brunswick.

They know that as Provincialists they have their constitutional rights, just as the people of England themselves have constitutional rights; that these rights do not depend on the mere whim or caprice of a Colonial Secretary, but that they are based on the principles of immutable justice, and supported by the love and veneration of a free people; and that when these rights are attacked by an Imperial Minister or a Provincial Minister, it is a duty we owe to the country and to the throne to defend them by all proper and constitutional means.

On July 12, the Executive Council sent a Minute to the Lieutenant Governor in answer to Cardwell's despatch of June 24. While containing numerous acknowledgments of the 'due weight' which Cardwell's views ought to carry, the Minute rejected those views. It suggested that the Quebec scheme had not been a plan of fusion but the means whereby the Canadas could be divided to overcome sectional difficulties. It stated the belief that
union along the lines of the Quebec Resolutions would bring no "moral or material advantage" to either New Brunswick or the Empire. In fact, the Minute claimed, union would tend towards the loosening of imperial ties. It concluded with the opinion that New Brunswickers had the right to determine their fate, else self government meant nothing. The Minute was signed by all members of the Executive Council except Smith and Allen who were, of course, in England. The Intelligencer stated that this memorandum was tantamount to disloyalty. It accused Anglin of writing the Minute of July 12. Anglin did not answer this charge immediately; but he did point out that all the Executive Council present had signed and were therefore responsible for it. Eight months later, however, in the House of Assembly, Anglin was able to tell the whole story.

Anglin took opportunity when Smith was interrupted by Wilmot to explain that all the passages in the famous Memorandum of Council which Fisher and the newspapers had so violently assailed - which it was said were written by no gentleman, but a mean, low fellow - which were said to be an insult to the Queen and an outrage to the people - were written, not by him (Anglin), but by the Governor himself; while the loyal paragraphs and others were written by Anglin, and some others by Odell, and he believes Wilmot.

He explained the whole process by which it was prepared. Wilmot was the one who finally compiled all the Council agreed to adopt and he was authorized by the others to put their names to it.

He explained also that the changes demanded by their friends were postponed by the urgent request of the Governor, who persuaded them, through Mr. Smith, that it would seriously affect the chances of the success of the delegation if he must write to the Colonial Office that such changes were made. For the good of the great cause they consented to the delay, and not because they truckled to the Governor. 65

Anglin's role in this is quite clear. He wished to assert that in opposing Confederation there was no disloyalty to the Empire. He hoped to urge imperial authorities into an acceptance of New Brunswick's position, by appealing to their sense of fair play and their sympathy for the constitutional rights of British subjects under responsible government. He was attempting to win over Cardwell, as he realized that if it became
obvious that the British Government persisted in its course of urging
Confederation with all the means at its disposal, the anti-Confederates
would be in a very bad position in the province of the Loyalists "par
excellence." But Britain was not prepared to allow opposition to
Confederation. Cardwell's reply to the memorandum of the Executive Council
showed that. The anti-Confederates ran up against a stone wall and
they began to look for some means of escape from the predicament in which
they found themselves.

One such attempt was made near the end of August. Anglin and Hatheway
quietly slipped away to Quebec. Fisher, in his virtually illegible hand-
writing, warned Galt that they were coming to see if better terms could
be obtained, especially on the issues of representation and finances,
and advised the Canadians to put Anglin and the Antis in a false position
if at all possible. There is no doubt that the two New Brunswick Antis
went to Quebec to see how the ground lay. Exactly what they did is
unknown, but it is likely that they had discussions with some of the lead-
ers in the Canadian parliament. It is known that they talked with Cartier
and had an interview with Lord Monck. As well, Hatheway and Anglin
were given a lunch at Quebec which was attended by the political hierarchy
of Canada, including Macdonald. Anglin, as stubbornly forthright as
ever, used the occasion to clarify the incorrect impressions which were
prevalent in Canada concerning the New Brunswick elections. It was an
excellent speech which clearly outlined Anglin's position but it was a
wasted effort. Those present at the banquet may have been impressed by
the speaker but they could not sympathize with his cause. Confederation
was the determined policy of Canada and it would not be changed because
of Anglin or New Brunswick.
Another trip by a New Brunswick Executive Councillor late in the summer of 1865, showed that all was not well within anti-Confederate ranks. In Quebec, the Confederate Council of Trade, consisting of representatives of the British North American colonies, met, and R. D. Wilmot went as the representative of New Brunswick. The Council drew up plans for the campaign to maintain or regain the Reciprocity Treaty. A very significant side-effect of this journey by Wilmot was that this was the final cause of the split between Wilmot and the anti-unionists. Wilmot had always been at an opposite pole to Anglin in his opposition to Confederation. Undoubtedly Wilmot found it hard to work with Anglin and probably found that compared to Smith and Anglin, he carried little weight in the Executive Council. Whatever the cause, and it must be remembered that he did not receive the Audit office he had apparently expected, Wilmot became the enemy within the walls of the anti-Confederate castle.

In London, Canada West, he told Canadians to bide their time; that vast numbers in New Brunswick were opposed to the Quebec Resolutions but were in favour of union. Shortly thereafter he repudiated the Minute of Council of July 12. Anglin had no sympathy with Wilmot. He stated that Wilmot, if the reports of his actions were correct, was mistaken; New Brunswick did not want union. The Freeman claimed it could not believe that Wilmot would so "debase" himself as to sign a document which he believed to be untrue and then turn "traitor" on all his colleagues. Privately, he thought that Wilmot ought to be tossed out of the Government.

That continued pressure from imperial authorities was gouging large holes in the defences of the anti-Confederates was plain to see. The British Government's extreme desire for Confederation was also most obvious. New Brunswickers were not unimpressed by this display of support for union and
the time rapidly approached when another appeal to the electorate would yield a far different result. But the British attitude towards Confederation was only one part of the loyalty issue. The other phase began to emerge seriously in the autumn of 1865, by which time events in the United States had made Fenianism a difficulty for British North Americans. In New Brunswick this problem became a part of the loyalty issue in conjunction with and even more important than imperial opinions on Confederation. On such a question Anglin quickly became the centre of attention.

III

The Fenian Society was a strange and complex organization. Its main object was the liberation of Ireland from Britain; its chosen means - physical force.

This Fenian Brotherhood, organized in April, 1859, could be defined as an organized body of men devoted to a system of political, financial, and military action on the part of the Irishmen of America, aiding and co-operating with an allied body of revolutionists in the British Isles, for the purpose of gaining the independence of Ireland.

Most of the Fenians had been born in Ireland. But strangely enough, the centre of their strength was not in Ireland but in the United States where operations could be carried out with a minimum of secrecy. Not surprisingly, the position of the Fenians in the North Atlantic Triangle was very confusing. On the one hand they lived in the United States; many of them were American citizens; a great number had fought for the North in the Civil War; and most felt that the United States was the natural ally of Irish attempts for independence - after all, the United States was the successful Ireland of North America in the sense that it had fought for and won independence from Britain. On the other hand a considerable number were actually British subjects residing in the United States; and many still owed primary allegiance not to the United States
but to Ireland, as Thomas D'Arcy McGee pointed out.

This very Fenian organization in the United States, what does it really prove, but that the Irish are still an alien population, camped but not settled in America, with foreign hopes and aspirations unshared by the people among whom they live? If their new country was their true country, would they find time and money to spare in the construction of imaginary Republics beyond seas? If their leaders were real rulers at Washington, would they be playing at governments ... 84

By no means all Irish Catholics supported the Fenians. While the organization was in some sense the spiritual descendant of 'Young Ireland', the earlier movement had espoused physical force only as a last desperate effort to avert complete disaster. The Fenians began with the premise of force. Consequently, most of the Young Irelanders disapproved of the new organization.

The opposition facing the Brotherhood was summarized by John O'Mahony in an address to the Chicago Convention. "Newspapers published in Ireland of the effete school of constitutional agitation ... The Moral Force deluders of the Irish people ... Those would-be O'Connellites ... The Irish Revolutionary party of '48 - the Young Irelanders" were all active opponents.86

The reliance on force was not the only reason for Young Ireland's disapproval of Fenianism. The former could not find much affinity in the social make-up of the latter movement.

The members of the Brotherhood were from the peasant class - day laborers and servant girls. Its leaders and organizers, save those that were professional revolutionists, must come from this class. The average local leader of the movement, therefore was ignorant and incompetent with no grasp upon the tremendousness of the task of dismembering the world's greatest empire. As it was not a movement seeking to solve peaceably the great Irish problems of the day, it did not attract the best of the Irish thinkers.87

Understandably, the Fenians were looked upon as levellers by substantial Irish Americans and the remnants of the Young Ireland movement. Anglin was certainly substantial and he had sympathized with the Young Irelanders. It was doubtful, therefore, that he would have given whole-hearted approval to Fenianism. There was another force leading Anglin away from the Fenians.
The hierarchy and most of the priests of the Catholic Church, both in the United States and in Ireland, denounced the Brotherhood. They took this position because the Fenians were a "secret, oath-bound and revolutionary society", and because it was felt that the organization was anti-clerical and atheistic. The movement which fell so afoul of Church authorities could not expect to receive very much support from Timothy Anglin.

The internal history of the Fenian Brotherhood is far too complex to be dealt with here. Suffice it to say that after the Civil War ended, the movement assumed a significance it had not had before. But the British Government realized this and in September of 1865, the authorities swooped down upon the office of the Dublin organ of the Fenians, the Irish People, and collected a number of documents which were later used to make further arrests. As the home movement seemed to be held in check, the American Fenians grew restive. Under these circumstances the Fenians exhibited the refractory characteristics which have plagued so many Irish movements in the past. Within the Brotherhood a split developed which blossomed forth at the Fenian convention held in October, 1865.

The bone of contention was the problem as to what was the best method of starting the next affray for the independence of Ireland. One faction, led by O'Mahony and backed by Stephens, wanted to foster a second rising in Ireland. The other faction, led by Roberts and Sweeney, wanted to begin the affray by an invasion of Canada. 91

It was thought that if Canada were captured, it could be used as a base for the freeing of Ireland. The scheme may have been wild but the threat was taken seriously in British North America, for there it was felt that the American Government would do little to prevent Fenian attacks. The Fenians, many of whom had fought in the Civil War, were well-armed and had several experienced military leaders. In short, the Fenians appeared to pose a potentially dangerous threat to British North America. By
December, the division within the Fenian ranks had become very wide and two rival organizations were set up. It remained to be seen what problems they would cause.

There was a difference between the Irish of British North America and the United States. The Irish Catholics of the Republic, in the main, had an almost unadulterated hatred of Britain. The opinions of the colonial Irish were more confused. Where Ireland was concerned, most Irish Catholics in British North America had little but condemnation for the British administration. But where British North America was concerned, the Irish Catholic residents therein saw the advantages and benefits of the British connection. Irish Catholics in British North America tended to compartmentalize their attitudes towards the British tie. For Ireland it was no good and should be ended; for the colonies it was useful and ought to be maintained. Those who felt that British rule was bad everywhere, if ever they came to the Maritimes or Canada, were under no compulsion to remain. They either learned to accept British rule or they went to the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that there was little support for Fenianism amongst the British North American Irish. The latter, with their experience in the new world with responsible government, generally favoured constitutional agitation to redress the wrongs of Ireland. Even the very small number of colonial Irish who actively supported the Fenians, supported the branch of that organization which apparently wished to restrict its armed movements to Ireland and leave British North America alone. After all, British North America was now the home of the colonial Irishmen. Very few wished to see it attacked. As for Anglin, he was a New Brunswicker now, and happy to be so. It is highly unlikely that he could have been connected
with the Fenian organization.

When one examines Anglin's attitudes towards Fenianism it can be seen that he underplayed Fenianism for a long time. This may be accounted for, in part, by the fact that he, along with everyone else, was bewildered by the conduct of the Fenians. He always seemed to be more concerned with Fenianism in Ireland than in the United States. It was in the homeland that the real movement had to take place if the Fenians were to accomplish anything. Then too, it cannot be over-emphasized that it was not until the autumn of 1865 that it became apparent that there was a possibility that the Fenians might attack British North America. Comments made before this time must be seen in a different light than those made after. Anglin agreed with the object the Fenian Society was trying to achieve—greater freedom for Ireland. He sympathized with the plight of Ireland; he was less sure about the means the Fenians planned to use to alleviate this condition. In 1863, the *Freeman* stated:

> Whatever may be thought of the wisdom, the propriety, or the feasability [sic] of such a scheme [*the establishment of the absolute independence of Ireland by physical force*] for the regeneration of Ireland, it must be admitted that constitutional agitation has failed to elevate the condition of the people, and that the cessation of constitutional agitation has not been followed by any of the benefits which, according to English politicians and journalists, were to in [sic] on the country when agitation ceased. If we are to judge it by its fruits, the Government of Ireland is one of the worst in Europe. In no other country are the majority of the people compelled to support a Church Establishment for the benefit of a small minority. No other country is so afflicted with the curse of Absentee and Alien Landlords. In no other country has the taxation been doubled within the last twenty years—nearly all the taxes being taken out of the country to be spent elsewhere—while during the same period the harvests have been deficient and the population has been diminishing...

Revolution is always a fearful, often a wicked thing, and the views of these Fenians may be visionary, their hopes may be baseless; some may think their intentions wicked and their schemes rash and wild; but those who approved of revolution in Tuscany and Parma must at least admit that the grievances which the Fenians would redress are unparalleled in their enormity, even if the means by which they would redress them should not meet with approval.95
By 1865, Anglin showed a greater distaste for the Fenians but had not brought himself to make an unequivocal denunciation of them. As far as Fenianism in New Brunswick was concerned, Anglin was sure that no Fenians resided in the province. He felt that the press was using the Fenian bogy to excite religious animosity for political purposes, a course of action which Anglin always denounced in strong terms. His advice to those talking about Fenianism was to name those who were Fenians and "nip the evil in the bud." He doubted that any names could be furnished and he was correct.

Anglin knew the history of Irish insurrection too well to become overly excited about the threat posed by this new organization and treated it with more contempt than concern. In September of 1865 he was saying that the Irish Fenians were very weak and silly and that it was unlikely that they would rise. That Fenianism had created a problem in Anglo-American relations Anglin did see. When British officials took strong action against the Irish Fenians, the Freeman stated:

"England cannot so suddenly have conceived any fears of an insurrection so wholly improbable. Perhaps she has concluded that it is impolitic to leave Mr. Seward any longer in possession of so powerful a diplomatic weapon, and that by showing the Fenians themselves the utter hopelessness of their cause, she would extinguish this new organization of Irish discontent. Perhaps she has come to the conclusion ... that moral influences are not sufficient to overcome it ..."

As well, authorities in Ireland were not only to blame for conditions in the country, but also, the Freeman suspected, they had, because of their anti-Catholic bias, connived with the Fenians.

Anglin's feelings towards the Fenians in the early period were formed by a sympathy for an attempt to improve Irish conditions but this was as far as his recognition of the 'rightness' of Fenianism went. To him the Fenians were far too strongly and universally condemned for atheism
and too often disapproved of by the Catholic Church to be acceptable. Then too, Anglin was far too much of a social and political conservative to desire a policy of revolution. Yet he did not openly condemn the Society. This was probably because as the leader of the Irish Catholics in New Brunswick he deemed it advisable to say as little as possible about the subject. In this way no Irish Catholics would become alienated. On top of this Anglin sincerely felt that the Fenian menace was grossly exaggerated and was not a serious threat, certainly not to New Brunswick. Indeed there was no thought at this time that the Fenians would attack elsewhere than in Ireland and Anglin may have felt it was foolish to introduce such a touchy 'foreign' issue into New Brunswick politics. Anglin recognized that Fenianism could only hurt him and he resolved to keep the issue as dormant as possible.

By the autumn of 1865 it became obvious that the Confederate opposition was not going to keep this topic quiet. They began to keep a sharp eye on Fenian developments for the issue was just too good for the Confederates to overlook. Here was an illegal organization, composed largely of Catholic Irishmen, which wanted to throw off the British connection by violent means. It was a simple mental step to forge a link between Fenianism and the New Brunswick Irish Catholics and thereby brand them with disloyalty. What would be the political utility of this for the Confederates? It would polarize the views of the Protestant majority of New Brunswick in favour of Confederation since it was assumed that the Irish Catholics had opposed it in the 1865 elections. It would be a marvellous means of undermining Anglin's political power and through him, the power of the Government. Thus four distinct entities - Roman Catholics, anti-Confederates, Fenians and Timothy Anglin - became inextricably inter-
connected in the pro-Confederation campaign. It was to be a tremendously successful campaign for loyalty and Confederation against Fenian-sympathizing, anti-Confederate Catholics led by Anglin. The first occasion on which this tactic played a major role was during the York by-election of November, 1865.

IV

In September, 1865, the Chief Justice of New Brunswick, Sir James Carter, resigned. The most senior of the three Supreme Court judges, Robert Parker, was elevated to the Chief Justiceship and J. C. Allen resigned his post as Attorney General in order to take a place on the bench as Puisne Judge. A. J. Smith took over Allen's position as Attorney General. Two elections were thus necessitated. In York a by-election would have to be held to fill the vacancy left by the elevation of Allen, and in Westmorland Smith would have to go to the electorate to confirm his assumption of the office of Attorney General. No opposition was offered to Smith in Westmorland and he was duly returned. It was a different proposition in York. There the Confederates decided to test public opinion and Tilley immediately wrote to Macdonald about financial aid for a campaign which turned out to be very expensive. Charles Fisher, who had once been described by the Duke of Newcastle as "the worst public man in British America," but who was an accomplished politician, was the opposition candidate and John Pickard was nominated on the Government side. Pickard came out flatly against the Quebec Resolutions. He was an Orangeman, but he hoped to pick up many Catholic votes because of the support given him by Anglin and the Freeman. For his part, Fisher decided to ignore the six hundred Catholic voters and concentrate on arousing the Protestant and British feeling of the remaining 3100 voters. It was a disreputable
and slanderous campaign but it was successful. Using Timothy Warren
Anglin as a symbol, Fisher accused the Government of disloyalty, of fav-
ouring annexation and of apologizing for Fenianism. After making the
link between Anglin and the Government — "The Presbyterian ... calls on
the Presbyterians of York to elect Mr. Fisher because Mr. Anglin is a
member of the Government ... " — the papers supporting Fisher spewed
forth vituperation and slander in copious amounts. The Reporter printed
incredible letters about Anglin in its columns of which the following is
merely one example:

His abominable sympathy with the Fenians; his shamefully disloyal
sentiments, which he takes no pains to conceal; his unfortunate
antecedents, in which he glories; his abuse of Protestant Ministers
of the Gospel (especially of the Rev. Mr. McLeod, the Minister in
whose church Mr. Pickard — a candidate for York — worships); his old
diatribes against the Bible Society, Judge Wilmot, the Masons, and
almost every respectable loyal association or public man; all those
things rise up in judgment against him, and have the effect of making
him disliked and despised on every side. As a matter of course the
Government suffer by all this ... By the way the Fenian flag would
seem to be the Government flag; the Freeman — the organ of the Govern-
ment — hoists no other. 112

The Reporter’s editor himself reduced the issue of the election to simple
terms:

The reckoning day is at hand. Monday next will decide whether Mr.
Anglin is to rule this Province, or this Province to rule Mr. Anglin;
whether loyalty or Fenianism is the chief power in the land. 113

The reason for Anglin’s ‘attack’ upon Mr. McLeod becomes clear when it
is pointed out that he was the editor of the Religious Intelligencer,
a paper which made comments such as the following:

Fenianism is Roman Catholic movement. There may be a few other mad
spirits identified with it, but it is emphatically a conception of
Rome, its origin is in the intense hatred which Romanism inspires
against British Protestantism and British freedom. 114

The News was not to be outdone in its abuse of Anglin:

Mr. Fisher would represent Mr. Pickard as precisely what he is —
the protege, in the present crisis, of Mr. Anglin, who is the Fenian
apologist, the circulator of defamatory articles against the British Government, the advocate of isolation which he himself has declared would lead to annexation to the States.\footnote{115}

While there is a most unfortunate gap in the file of the *Freeman* between November 2 and November 21, it is evident that Anglin and others realized what was going on. The *Head Quarters* told its readers that Fisher and Company had had "the insolence, impudence, and brazen assurance" to assert that a vote for Pickard would be a vote for Anglin and Fenianism; "a vote (to use Fisher's rigmarole) 'against British connection, British freedom, British law, British constitution, and British Christianity.'"

The Halifax *Recorder* thought the anti-Anglin campaign reminiscent of a Nova Scotia movement of a few years back:

> The people of York were warned against this Roman Catholic Fenian monster in language as loud, and canting and frothy, and effectual as that which Mr. McCully coined for the Protestant Alliance a few years ago to frighten the fools in Nova Scotia, and induce them to believe that they would be murdered in their beds by the 'Papists'.\footnote{117}

Strangely enough in such an important election, the issue of Confederation was almost completely ignored. Fisher himself made a unique electoral promise to oppose any scheme of union which might be introduced into the existing parliament by the Antis, an indication that he felt there was some possibility of the Government reversing its stand. As far as Anglin was concerned, Fisher's pledge made him an opponent of Confederation and meant that his election did not indicate a swing in public opinion towards Confederation. Even the Lieutenant Governor thought this pledge strange and "inconsistent". Gordon expected Fisher to win but not because of Confederation.

Great pains have been taken to make the contest depend on rather local questions affecting the county of York than on the broad issue of Confederation. Mr. Fisher has long represented this county, and a feeling of regret at his exclusion from the House of Assembly prevails among many who are opposed to confederation, but who look on the question as being practically settled, in so far as this Province is concerned,
by the late general election, and desire on other grounds to see Mr. Fisher restored to public life.\textsuperscript{121}

The truth of this statement is confirmed in a letter to the editor of the \textit{Reporter} from "Anti", who proclaimed the issue of Confederation settled and thought York should elect Fisher because he was the best man to represent York's railway interests.

Local issues played their part in the York by-election but the most important factor was the loyalty cry raised by Fisher and directed against Anglin. "Anglin, Fisher announced with patriotic conviction, was the avowed enemy of worthy Orangemen, of pious Protestants, of faithful British subjects, of devoted United Empire Loyalists, of the sons and grandsons of the York volunteers, Queen's Rangers, and other heroes of the American Revolution." Fisher's campaign was thoroughly disreputable; but it was eminently successful. Fisher polled 1927 votes while Pickard received only 124.

The Confederates had discovered the way to win an election. With the Colonial Office refusing to co-operate with the anti-Confederate Government of New Brunswick and undermining it whenever possible, the Confederates in New Brunswick had found that they could win by playing down the issue of Confederation and using the loyalty cry and the Fenian bogey which resulted in an anti-Catholic campaign. With improved organization and Canadian money, the supporters of the Quebec Resolutions now had little fear of a new election. Gordon was quite correct when he asserted that "it cannot ... be doubted that the election of Mr. Fisher rather perhaps by its effect elsewhere than by its own intrinsic importance is a decided step towards the accomplishment of the Federal Union of the British North American Provinces." The Confederates listened closely to the lesson that the York election taught. They did not forget it.
On the same day that Gordon reported to Cardwell the results of the York by-election, he also notified the Colonial Secretary of the resignation of T. W. Anglin from the Executive Council. Were these two events connected? The Reporter certainly thought so:

It is possible that the Government, finding it difficult to continue in power while he was included in their ranks, determined to get rid of him, and so by inuendoes and otherwise, induced the hon. gentleman, seeing his presence was disagreeable, to withdraw. Or on the other hand it is just as likely that, admitting he was a weakness to the party, he has slipped behind the scenes, where he continues to pull the political wires for the Government.126

The by-election was indeed involved in Anglin's resignation, not as the cause of it, but rather in its timing. The real reason for his resignation was the great bugbear of New Brunswick politics, the railway question.

V

The difficulties facing Western Extension were legion. In the first place the Government could not afford to undertake it as a government work in spite of Anglin's election pledge. Secondly, the Western Extension Company, still dominated by Tilley's friends such as William Parks and Charles Skinner, the President and Secretary of the Company respectively, was in a position to make life difficult for the Government. It held a charter and would not relinquish this to the Government. Then too, the Company was not very energetic in its attempts to get the line built. Parks had gone to Britain, before the 1865 elections, in order to raise funds for Western Extension. The first curious thing he did upon his arrival in Britain was to mark time:

When I arrived here I soon found there was a strong feeling in favour of Confederation, I therefore thought it not advisable to say much on Railway matters untill [sic] I would hear the fate of the Elections.127

After the results were known, he visited Edward Watkin, the British railway magnate who had once been the president of the Grand Trunk. Watkin's
view was definite if not cheery:

I saw Mr. Parks and told him that it was utterly impossible to lend a shilling for any public work in New Brunswick in the face of her refusal of Confederation, and he agreed with me that it was a fatal step, and that it was no use his even opening his papers. 128

Parks did indeed agree:

This being my own impression I will therefore leave Mr. Anglin and his Colegues [sic] to Build Western Extension. 129

And at this, Parks gave up his quest for British financial support. He would never have made a good mailman.

The issue of Western Extension did not immediately render false Anglin's position in the Government. He was still sure that only as a public work would the line be built. Anglin asserted that he stood by his election pledges, but that only he, not the Government, was to be bound by them. This was logical enough, for the anti-Confederate Government had not been formed when he had made these pledges. Nor did he feel compelled to resign his position in the Executive Council for it was not yet clear what the Government's position would be. The Western Extension Company had not yet given up its charter, and nothing could be done until this occurred.

By the middle of June, the opposition papers were stating that the Western Extension Company had found new life. Anglin expressed grave doubt about the ability of this Company to build the road under the terms of the 'Lobster Act', and suggested that the majority of the committee members of the Company were more anxious to embarrass the Government than to complete the line. He was willing, however, to accept the Government's policy of seeing whether this Company had the necessary ability to build the road. After all, the legislation of the year before was still on the books. The brief upsurge of the Company fell flat when the St. John Common Council refused to invest $400,000 in stock and it was then
reported that the Company had agreed to surrender its charter. But John A. Poor, the Portland, Maine, railway magnate, had accepted the terms offered by the Company and, as far as can be ascertained, the charter was never surrendered. In reply to the supporters of Confederation both in Canada and in Great Britain who regarded efforts in favour of Western Extension as annexation movements in disguise, the Freeman said that this impression was erroneous but was something that New Brunswickers ought to note.

We must be very stupid if we do not learn from this whether the conspirators in this Province and their friends are sincere in their agitation about Western Extension, and whether the interests of St. John are likely to be safe in the hands of men whose chiefs tell the Imperial Government that the efforts in favour of Western Extension are efforts in favour of annexation.

Throughout the summer, Western Extension remained in a state of suspended animation, most members of the Government hoping that the Company could arrange to commence construction.

Early in September, however, things began to happen. The Evening Globe announced that the Government had given its acceptance to the European and North American Railway Company and the Maine Company for the building of Western Extension. The Freeman doubted this fact, even after Skinner, the Secretary of the Company, in a letter to the "Citizens of Saint John", re-asserted that the Company's offer had been accepted under the terms of the Facility Act and stated that only $80,000 was required. It was apparent that Anglin did not know all that was going on in regard to Western Extension. What in fact had happened was that A. J. Smith, without the knowledge of the Executive Council as a whole, had negotiated with Skinner and signed an agreement with him. Though not authorized to take such action, Smith had virtually determined the Government's policy on Western Extension. There is no doubt that Anglin would have accepted this policy
had he had confidence in the Company. But he did not. He was convinced that no company could be formed that would actually build the road. It became obvious that Anglin would have to resign if the Executive Council acquiesced in Smith's agreement with the Company, an agreement which members of the Executive Council only became aware of when it became public knowledge. Anglin knew he would have to resign. In fact by October he had already adopted a policy of passive silence at Council meetings, giving his opinions only when asked, but doing nothing to commit himself to the policy the Government was adopting towards Western Extension. Still, the Council had not formally accepted Smith's contract with the Company and there was some doubt that the Company could raise even the small amount required to fulfil the contract. Until these things occurred, Anglin decided to remain in the cabinet. His reasons for delaying his resignation were two. First, it would be foolish to resign if it turned out that the Company could not fulfil the bargain or if by some miracle the Executive Council turned it down. Secondly, there were two by-elections impending and he did not want to give encouragement to the Confederate opposition. Also, it may be that the urgings of Provincial Secretary Gillmor not to resign, had some effect. But he had to make his attitude on the Government's policy on Western Extension clear to his friends and readers of the Freeman.

The track he chose to follow was therefore a very difficult one. As it turned out his tightrope act served little purpose. True, Smith met no opposition in Westmorland, but Fisher's use of Anglin as a target in York showed that his presence in the cabinet was a mixed blessing for the Antis. Indeed, Anglin later claimed that he saw what the use of his name was accomplishing in York and in conversation with Smith had said: "you know
best whether the proceedings of the Western Extension Company are such
as to satisfy you; if they are, I must leave you, and you might as well
have the benefit of my absence;" but Smith, apparently, had refused to
knuckle under to the pressure of the anti-Catholic cry being raised in
York. A couple of days after the York by-election, the Western Extension
Company turned the first sod for the line, and the next day Anglin wrote
a lengthy letter of resignation to Gordon, giving a history of the Govern-
ment's handling of the problem of Western Extension and his reasons for
resigning.

Anglin disagreed with his colleagues over the competency of the Company
to build Western Extension, but he still remained a strong supporter of
the Government's stand against Confederation. If he thought that the
Government was trifling with Western Extension at least he did not feel
compelled to fulfil his election pledge to work for the Government's
destruction. On the contrary, he felt that he would be at least as use-
ful to the Government outside the cabinet as within it. From the
Freeman's point of view it was a much better arrangement. Anglin now
had greater freedom as an editor and could more easily defend himself
against the multiple attacks that were being made on him. He probably
hoped that his resignation would remove the foundation of the Confederates'
anti-Catholic campaign which had been so successful in the York election.
In any case, it must have been a relief for Anglin to resign, if the
Globe's description of the treatment he had received, is correct.

... Mr. Anglin was in the Government for only a few months, and during
that time subjected to a course of persecution from an unscrupulous
press and by Mr. Tilley himself, in season and out of season, by day-
light and by dark, in the House of Assembly and out of it, in the lobbies,
in the galleries, in the hotels, at the street corners, behind porches,
in Canada, in England, by sleeping and by waking, - a course that was
humiliating to his own manhood ...
With his resignation Anglin terminated the only cabinet post he ever held during his career. As a working member of the cabinet he seems to have been very competent and conscientious and his knowledge and efficiency seem to have merited similar positions in the future. But he was a controversial figure, a fact which his months as Executive Councillor amply demonstrated. His roles as newspaper editor and as leader of the Irish Catholics meant that he brought weaknesses as well as strengths to the Government in which he was included. His short term as Executive Councillor may also have been the apogee of his political power. Certainly the next few months saw its rapid decline and although he managed to recover, he was always known thereafter as one of the old defeated anti-Confederates. One thing is clear. If Anglin thought that the attacks on him would diminish after he resigned, he was sadly mistaken. He was just too useful a target.
FOOTNOTES

1 Frank Anglin ultimately became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada (1924-1933).
2 Freeman, Apr. 4, 1865.
4 Tilley considered that those who thought that the central government was to be given too much power under the Quebec Resolutions, had been the most formidable in the election (see ibid., Gordon to Cardwell, May 22, 1865).
5 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 95 (Apr. 5). See also P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection), Gordon to Tilley, March 30, 1865; and Mitchell to Tilley, March 31, 1865.
6 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Apr. 10, 1865. On this despatch Gordon gave his opinion of each of the members of the new Executive Council. Of Anglin he said: "he evinces great bitterness and acrimony of feeling." The composition of the cabinet was as follows: A. J. Smith - President of the Council; J. C. Allen - Attorney General; A. H. Gillmor - Provincial Secretary; Bliss Botsford - Surveyor General; W. H. Odell - Postmaster General; G. L. Hatheway - Chief Commissioner of the Board of Works; R. D. Wilmot, T. W. Anglin and Richard Hutchinson - all without departmental office (see J. Hannay, History of New Brunswick (St. John: John A. Bowes, 1909), II, 237).
8 Ibid., LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Apr. 10, 1865.
9 Quoted in Freeman, Apr. 8, 1865.
11 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 95 (Apr. 5).
12 P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Galt, undated. See also Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, T. W. Bliss (?) to Tilley, March 8, 1865.
13 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Gordon to Tilley, March 30, 1865.
14 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 95 (Apr. 5). The New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton) was of the opinion that Anglin and Wilmot had vied so furiously for the office of Provincial Secretary that a substitute had to be selected. The Freeman denied the veracity of this assertion (see Freeman, Apr. 11, 1865).
15 Freeman, June 6, 1876.
16 It seems likely that there would have been no contest as Tilley and Gordon had agreed that there was to be no immediate reagitation of the question of union and in the other by-elections no opposition was offered to the Government. Had there been a contest it seems doubtful that the electors of St. John would have defeated an Executive Councillor.
17 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Oct. 9, 1865. See also ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Sept. 27, 1865. Anglin was concerned that outspoken political opponents were not relieved of their public offices (see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 98 (Apr. 6)).
18 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), June 13, Oct. 9 and 12, and Nov. 6, 1865. It was a good thing he did take an interest in such things as there were some shocking examples of poor administration. On one occasion Anglin found that the secretaries in the office of Public
Institutions had had to borrow money on their own account from friends to pay overdue bills (see ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Oct. 9, 1865). Anglin, as Executive Councillor, was a commissioner of the Provincial Penitentiary, of the Lunatic Asylum and of the Bay of Fundy lights (see P.A.C., New Brunswick Government Gazette, XXIII, Apr. 5, 1865).

19 Gillmor Papers, Gillmor to Anglin, Oct. 10, 1865.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.; and ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Oct. 12, 1865.
22 Ibid., Gillmor to Anglin, Oct. 10, 1865.
23 Freeman, Apr. 18, 1865. See also New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 99 (Apr. 6).
25 Freeman, June 27, 1865.
26 Ibid., June 1, 1865. For Anglin's speeches on the subject in the Assembly, see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1865, pp. 85-86 (May 22).
28 Freeman, June 3, 1865.
29 Ibid., June 6 and 8, 1865.
30 Ibid., June 6, 1865.
31 N.B.M.A., Confederation Papers, R. T. Cecil to G. M. Campbell, Apr. 30, 1865, enclosed in Campbell to J. C. Allen, May 27, 1865.
33 P.A.C., Edward Cardwell Papers, Cardwell to Gordon, Apr. 1, 1865.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., Cardwell to Gordon, May 13, 1865. See also P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor's Despatches Received, XLV, Cardwell to Gordon, Apr. 12, 1865.
36 Cardwell Papers, Cardwell to Gordon, May 13, 1865.
37 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, July 3, 1865; and J. L. Muir, "The New Brunswick Militia, 1787-1867," Dalhousie Review, XLIV (1964), 337. During Gordon's governorship militia expenditure had risen from $2,000 to $10,000 per year even prior to 1865 (see Lieutenant Governor's Despatches Received, XLVI, Hastings Doyle to Gordon, Aug. 30, 1865).
38 Lieutenant Governor's Despatches Received, XLVI, Doyle to Gordon, Aug. 30, 1865.
39 Freeman, July 15, 1865.
42 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1865, p. 66 (May 17).
44 Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, June 5, 1865. There was, in any case, little enthusiasm in New Brunswick for the project of Maritime Union.
46 Ibid., LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Apr. 8, 1865. See also Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Gillmor to Tilley, May 30, 1865.
47 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Gordon to Tilley, March 30, 1865.
49 Ibid.
50 Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, June 5, 1865.
51 Ibid., Cardwell to Gordon, June 24, 1865.
52 P.A.C., Sir Alexander Tillock Galt Papers, Gray to Gault (sic), Apr. 9, 1865; and Tilley to Gault (sic), Apr. 22, 1865.
54 Freeman, May 20, 1865.
55 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, June 20, 1865.
56 John Boyd felt that Anglin would have liked to go, but that "there would be a risk in the O'Regan coming out" (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, June 1, 1865).
57 Lieutenant Governor's Despatches Received, XLV, Cardwell to Gordon, July 28, 1865. On the mission of Smith and Allen, see U.N.B.A., Lord Stanmore (Arthur Gordon) Papers, Smith to Gordon, July 7, 1865; Cardwell to Lord John Russell, Aug. 15, 1865, quoted in Creighton, ... Macdonald ..., I, 423; P.A.N.B., Gillmor Papers, Smith to Gillmor (sic), July 7 and Aug. 5, 1865; and ibid., Allen to Gillmor, July 22, 1865.
58 Freeman, June 15, 1865.
59 Ibid., July 8, 1865.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., July 11, 1865.
62 Ibid.
63 See Appendix IV.
64 Freeman, Sept. 2, 1865.
65 Freeman, Apr. 17, 1866. Professor Creighton recognizes that there are certain statements in the Minute that echoed Gordon's words of earlier letters to Cardwell. But Creighton also suggests that the external proof for the assertion that Gordon was one of the principal authors - the statement of Anglin - is not good enough, for Anglin was "not a very credible witness" (see D. G. Creighton, The Road to Confederation: The Emergence of Canada, 1863-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1964), p. 294). This aspersion on Anglin's character has no basis. Anglin made his statement in the House of Assembly and neither Wilmot nor anyone else present at the Council meeting nor a Gordon-directed member disputed Anglin's veracity (see Freeman, Apr. 19, 1866). The internal evidence of the Minute verifying the delineation Anglin made between the passages he wrote and the rest, is conclusive. One segment of the memorandum talked about the Quebec scheme being separation rather than fusion as Gordon had done so often in the past. Anglin once again spoke of New Brunswick's loyalty, and of his interpretation that British North American Union would bring about the disruption of the Empire. He again mentioned the fact that New Brunswick wanted no closer connection with Canada than that provided by the imperial tie.
67 Lieutenant Governor's Despatches Received, XLV, Cardwell to Gordon, Aug. 4, 1865.
68 Galt Papers, Fisher to Gault (sic), Aug. 17, 1865. Fisher called Anglin a "thorougb Jesuit" and accused him of disloyalty to the Empire.
69 Montreal Herald, quoted in Freeman, Sept. 5, 1865. See also
Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Boyd to Tilley, Aug. 28, 1865.
71 Cardwell Papers, Cardwell to Gordon, Sept. 15 and Oct. 12, 1865.
Monck informed them that no substantial amendments could be made to the
Quebec Resolutions.
72 Herald, quoted in Freeman, Sept. 5, 1865.
73 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, J. Cole to Monck, Sept. 8,
1865.
74 See N. M. Rogers, "The Confederate Council of Trade," C.H.R., VII (1926),
277-286.
75 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 98 (Apr. 6).
76 Freeman, Oct. 5, 1865.
77 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1865.
78 Ibid., Oct. 3, 1865.
79 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1865.
80 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Oct. 9, 1865.
81 There are a number of works on the Fenians. Probably the best book
on the subject is W. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States:
P. S. O'Hegarty, A History of Ireland Under the Union 1801 to 1922
(London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952), pp. 411-454, has a good deal on
Fenianism in Ireland. An interesting exception to the tendency to study
Fenianism solely within national bounds is B. Jenkins, Fenians and Anglo-
American Relations during Reconstruction (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1969). An article well worth reading is C. P. Stacey,
"Fenianism and the Rise of National Feeling at the Time of Confederation,"
C.H.R., XII (1931), 238-261. Other useful material can be found in works
mentioned in the bibliography.
82 D'Arcy, op. cit., p. 15.
83 The question of naturalization and inalienable citizenship was still
undecided at this time.
84 T. D. Mcgee, The Irish Position in British and in Republican North
America: A Letter to the Editors of the Irish Press Irrespective of
85 In 1864, O'Mahony mentioned that Young Irelanders such as Mitchel,
Meagher, Dillon, O'Gorman, Martin and Smith O'Brien would have nothing
to do with Fenianism (see D'Arcy, op. cit., p. 26). Of course, McGee
could be added to this list.
86 L. Winkler, "The Fenian Movement and Anglo-American Diplomacy in the
Reconstruction Period" (unpublished Master's dissertation, New York
University, 1936), p. 11.
87 C. L. King, "The Fenian Movement," The University of Colorado Studies,
VI (1909), 189.
89 Winkler, op. cit., p. 11. See also C. Wittke, The Irish in America
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956), p. 96; and E. R.
Norman, The Catholic Church and Ireland in the Age of Rebellion, 1859-
January 12, 1870, the Fenian Brotherhood was condemned by name by the
Vatican. Some Fenians claimed, on technical grounds, that the Brother-
hood was not a secret society (see D. Ryan, The Fenian Chief: A Bio-
91-92).
90 King, art. cit., p. 195.
91 Ibid., p. 196.
95 Freeman, Nov. 21, 1863. See also ibid., Apr. 28, 1859; and Jan. 12 and May 9, 1861.
96 Ibid., Jan. 12, 1865.
97 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1865.
98 Ibid., Sept. 28, 1865.
99 Ibid.
100 Wexford Citizen, quoted in ibid., Dec. 5, 1865.
101 Freeman, Sept. 26, 1865.
102 See Morning Journal (St. John), n.d., quoted in Freeman, Sept. 26, 1865.
103 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Cole to Cardwell, Sept. 21, 1865. Smith had suggested Wetmore for the Attorney Generalship. Anglin later stated that he was the first to oppose such a nomination on the ground that Wetmore lacked experience (see Freeman, Apr. 10, 1866).
105 Macdonald Papers, LI, Tilley to Macdonald, Sept. 13, 1865. It was decided that the "monies" to Tilley would be handled through C. J. Brydges, the railway man (see Galt Papers, Macdonald to Galt, Sept. 24, 1865). On the cost of the election see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Fisher to Tilley, Nov. 8, 1865; and C. Perley to Tilley, Nov. 9, 1865. Fisher claimed that the other side had spent more than he had. Anglin estimated that about $1200 had been sent from St. John to aid Pickard but thought that in York "it was I suppose regarded as a mere trifle" (see Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmou (sic), Nov. 6, 1865).
106 Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, Nov. 20, 1865.
107 Freeman, Oct. 21, 1865.
108 According to Professor Bailey, this was accomplished by running a Catholic candidate on the same ticket with Pickard and having him withdraw on nomination day (see A. G. Bailey, "The Basis and Persistence of Opposition to Confederation in New Brunswick," C.H.R., XXIII (1942), 392). However, Pickard was the Freeman's choice a week before Fisher's candidacy was even announced and it mentioned no third candidate.
109 Macdonald Papers, Fisher to Macdonald, Nov. 11, 1865.
110 Daily Evening Globe (St. John), Nov. 7, 1865; Reporter, Nov. 3, 1865; Head Quarters (Fredericton), Nov. 15, 1865; and Freeman, Oct. 31, 1865; and Apr. 3, 1866.
111 Freeman, Oct. 31, 1865.
112 "Gordon" to the Editor, Oct. 31, 1865, in the Reporter, Nov. 3, 1865. See also the letters of "Frewill" and "F", which appeared in the same issue.
113 Reporter, Nov. 3, 1865.
114 Quoted in Head Quarters, Nov. 15, 1865.
115 Morning News (St. John), Nov. 3, 1865.
116 Head Quarters, Nov. 15, 1865. See also ibid., Nov. 8, 1865, in which attention was drawn to the anti-Catholic aspect of the campaign.
117 Quoted in ibid., Nov. 15, 1865.
118 Freeman, Oct. 31, 1865.
119 Ibid., Nov. 23, 1865.
120 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Nov. 20, 1865.
121 Ibid., LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Nov. 6, 1865.
122 Quoted in Freeman, Oct. 31, 1865.
123 Creighton, Road to Confederation, p. 320.
124 Globe, Nov. 7, 1865. Fisher later claimed that he had not called Anglin a traitor nor made other vicious attacks on him (see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 104 (Apr. 7). Newspaper and other evidence indicates that this denial was a baldfaced lie (see Gillmor Papers, Gillmor to Anglin, Nov. 11, 1865).
125 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Nov. 20, 1865.
126 Reporter, Nov. 17, 1865.
127 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, William Parks to Tilley, Apr. 1, 1865.
128 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, E. W. Watkin to Tilley, March 30, 1865.
129 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Parks to Tilley, Apr. 1, 1865.
130 Freeman, May 11, 1865.
131 Ibid., May 4, 1865.
132 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1865, p. 145 (June 6).
133 Freeman, June 15, 1865.
134 Ibid., June 17, 1865.
135 Ibid., May 6, 1865.
136 Ibid., June 22 and 24, 1865.
137 Ibid., June 17, 1865. It is possible that the Government never asked the Company to relinquish its charter.
138 Ibid., July 4, 1865. Interestingly enough, the American Consul in St. John thought Western Extension, particularly if built with private capital, would be a good first step towards annexation (see P.A.C., Despatches From United States Consuls in St. John, New Brunswick, J. Howard to W. Seward, Sept. 27, 1865).
139 See, for example, Gillmor Papers, Allen to Gillmor, July 22, 1865.
140 Quoted in Freeman, Sept. 12, 1865.
141 Quoted in Freeman, Sept. 14, 1865.
142 Freeman, Oct. 12, 1865.
143 The information in this paragraph comes from Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (sic), Oct. 9 and 12, and Nov. 14, 1865; and ibid., Gillmor to Anglin, Oct. 10 and Nov. 11, 1865. The outlines of these developments can also be surmised from the comments of the Freeman.
144 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 103 (Apr. 7).
145 Anglin's letter of resignation is reproduced in Appendix V. It is especially significant for four reasons: 1) it shows the difficulty of Anglin's position in regard to the railway question; 2) it indicates the depth of analysis Anglin was capable of making; 3) it shows that Anglin held a mild form of anti-Americanism; and 4) it gives an insight into the internal workings of the anti-Confederate Government.
146 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Nov. 20, 1865; and Freeman, Nov. 23, 1865. John Cudlip, another member from the county of St. John, took Anglin's position on the Executive Council.
147 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (sic), Oct. 12 and Nov. 14, 1865.
148 Freeman, Jan. 4, 1866.
149 Globe, July 26, 1867.
CHAPTER 9
The War Lost: 1865-1867

I

Anglin had long been viewed by the opposition papers as a powerful force within the anti-Confederate Government. His resignation did not greatly change their opinion; Anglin's influence was now merely more insidious for he continued "to pull the political wires for the Government."\(^1\) To Anglin, opposition journals gave the nickname "The Dictator" and as an example of this power they pointed to the appointment of William J. Ritchie as Chief Justice after the death of Sir James Parker on November 24, 1865.\(^2\) "His death just now," Anglin had written ten days before, "would embarrass the government very much."\(^3\) This assessment was correct, for filling the position was not an easy task. Apparently, A. J. Smith was for a time prepared to take the office himself, but as Parker lingered on his death bed, Smith had found that his political friends would not agree to his "desertion."\(^4\) His refusal left the choice between Lemuel Allen Wilmot and Ritchie, the two senior judges of the Supreme Court. Wilmot, though a cousin of R. D. Wilmot, had spoken in favour of Confederation in 1865. He had even turned a speech in court into a pro-Confederate harangue.\(^5\) Anglin also denounced him for his attack on Catholicism a few years back.\(^6\) On the other hand, Ritchie was known to be an Anti and his legal reputation was far above that of Wilmot, if the assessment of Gordon and the Freeman was correct.\(^7\) The difficulty was that Wilmot was the more senior of the two. Despite this, Ritchie was named Chief Justice.\(^8\) At this turn of events the opposition felt or feigned outrage. The Telegraph, for one, was extremely bitter:

The Government, feeling their weakness, will not venture to brave
Mr. Anglin's wrath by awarding to Justice Wilmot the honor to which he is fairly entitled: they will sacrifice the loyal, Christian man, to appease the disloyal, contemptible intrigant. They will do an act of injustice in the hope of obtaining a few months' reprieve from political death, rather than the act of manliness and fair play which the country is expecting at their hands. We have no hesitation in asserting that the intrigues which will lead to any other than Justice Wilmot receiving the Chief Justiceship ... will be regarded by the country as demonstrating, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the Government of the Province is again in the hands of Mr. Anglin -- that the Government has bowed its neck to the yoke of 'the Dictator'.

Anglin was quick to answer. He pointed out that the Government had already proven that it did not dread him by rejecting his opinion on Western Extension. But he felt very strongly about Judge Wilmot:

We are almost sorry that we cannot accept the high compliment the Telegraph pays Mr. Anglin. We could almost wish it were true that the very proper treatment he has received was due to Mr. Anglin's influence.

It is clear that if Anglin's nickname was an exaggeration, the Confederates were correct in thinking that Anglin's influence was felt by the Government. In fact, it was almost as though Anglin had not resigned but become an Executive Councillor who never attended Council meetings. As he told the Provincial Secretary shortly after his resignation, his services were still at the disposal of the Government.

I am sorry that I have had to part with you and sorry that you attach undue importance to my resigning. I do not think that the step I have taken will weaken you much and I am satisfied that it must disconcert the plans and schemes of our opponents and that out of the government I can give you as much support as I could in it. My opinion on any subject that may demand consideration will always be at your service.

In numerous minor political matters he fulfilled this pledge; but in his knowledge of and advice on the most important Government affairs one can see not only his attitude towards a deteriorating situation but also his true significance in Government circles after his resignation.

At the time of his resignation Anglin suspected that certain 'plotting'
was going on. George Brown had come to New Brunswick in mid-November, ostensibly on a trade mission, but mainly, as Anglin suspected, to see how plans for Confederation were shaping up. The Irish Catholic leader called on the leader of the Clear Grits in an attempt to find out "what was brewing." "We tried strength for an hour or so," Anglin reported, "and he was almost victor." About all he could surmise from his talk with Brown was that some secret plotting was going on and that the Lieutenant Governor, Arthur Gordon, was involved. With this unknown threat facing the Antis, Anglin warned Gillmor, the Provincial Secretary, to prepare for the onslaught.

They have been trying Smith and he seems disposed to temporize. I had a talk with him last night. I wished he should understand exactly where Wilmot -- who seems to be the agent of this new scheme -- would be found, that he may be on his guard. We are beset on all sides and much depends on Smith and you. I can only serve as an auxiliary but you may depend on my doing all I can. Smith promises to let me know on his return how matters stand. I hope he will be prudent and do nothing to weaken his position.

Anglin's supposition that plans were being drafted for the achievement of Confederation, was correct. By the beginning of December, Gordon had completed arrangements. His view was that the anti-Confederate Government had become so weakened, demoralized and unpopular, that it could be persuaded to go for some revised plan of union since "the most determined isolationist Mr. Anglin is no longer a member of the Government." Even Smith, Gordon stated, was talking about union. Gordon therefore intended, if possible, to get the existing Government to sponsor the union resolutions in the Assembly and if there defeated to call an election. The Lieutenant Governor was aware of the dangers of this course of action and tried to plan for meeting those that should arise:

It may be asked whether there is no danger lest the apparent acquiescence of the Government in an Union policy should only be
affected for the purpose of producing delay, and under cover of objections in detail to defeat the scheme by continual procrastination. Against this danger I propose to guard by compelling the adoption of a decided policy when the time for the assembly of the Legislature draws near. I then propose to submit to my Council the draft of a paragraph, in my speech from the throne, in which I intend to invite both branches of the Legislature again seriously to consider the question of an union of the B.N.A. Provinces, and shall express a hope that such an Union will speedily be accomplished. If my Government are content to adopt such language all difficulty is at an end, and the resolutions will be adopted by both houses with trifling opposition. If on the contrary my Council as a body decline to make themselves responsible for the enunciation of such sentiments the time will I think have arrived at which a change of Government may be effected, and a dissolution tried.  

Gordon expected some of the Executive Council to accept these terms and others to refuse and resign. A coalition, of sorts, would then be formed and Confederation would triumph. This plan quickly won the approval of George Brown and Lord Monck and they told the New Brunswick supporters of Confederation to trust Gordon and made preparations for a possible election.  

At this crucial time the anti-Confederates began to show further signs of their internal dissension. For example, in December, A. R. Wetmore, the member for St. John city, decided to change sides. He claimed that the opinion of his constituency had changed. However, as a couple of months before he had been refused positions both as Attorney General and as a judge, it is possible that it was this that had led him to examine the opinion of his constituency and may have influenced his analysis of that opinion. Another lingering problem was Wilmot's role in the cabinet. For some time now it had been clear that Wilmot was not in agreement with the Government's policy on Confederation. But it did not become clear whether he would resign or the Government change its policy. Nevertheless, Wilmot's power within the Government was no match for that of Smith, even after the resignation of Anglin. On the first
day of 1866, it was announced that Smith would be New Brunswick's representative when reciprocity discussions took place in Washington. Wilmot had represented the province on the reciprocity question at Quebec during the summer and he had expected to make this second trip. Along with the recent slight to his cousin the Judge, this made him very angry. It was rumoured that he had handed in his resignation.\(^{19}\) As far as Anglin was concerned, Wilmot's resignation was past due. If Wilmot disagreed with the Minute of July 12 he should not have signed it but should have resigned.\(^ {20}\) The Government could do without Wilmot just as it had got along without Anglin.\(^ {21}\) "His only strength," Anglin had written back in November without realizing its significance, "would be in a renewal of the No Popery cry."\(^ {22}\) However, Gordon chose not to accept Wilmot's resignation at that time.

Smith's trip to Washington was fruitless, as Anglin had expected.\(^ {23}\) The United States simply was not interested in reciprocity.\(^ {24}\) The conference did afford the Canadians an opportunity to work on Smith, but their efforts also availed little:

> We hammered away at Smith about Confederation all the time - but I must admit with little result.\(^ {25}\)

While Smith was away, however, interesting developments were taking place in New Brunswick. Gordon was trying to carry out his plan concerning the throne speech and coupling this with Wilmot's letter of resignation. Anglin advised great caution about the speech from the throne. A few injudicious words, he thought, could seriously weaken the Antis' position.

> If you can not again speak out plainly and unequivocally in condemnation of the Scheme and the whole idea of Confederation the best plan in my opinion would be to make the Speech absolutely non committal merely informing the Legislature that all despatches &c. will be laid before them.\(^ {26}\)

The tactics to be followed were highly important. He could not approve
of Smith's idea of temporizing, as Anglin called it. Still, while he did not like, he was willing to consider, Gillmor's suggestion to detach the Government from policies introduced into the Assembly, perhaps by making Confederation an open question.

Your idea would not be a bad one perhaps if nothing better could be done. It would be rather an unconstitutional mode of proceeding and under ordinary circumstances totally inadmissible [sic] in my opinion: but if the Imperial Govt by their agent threaten the very constitution itself and will not be satisfied with the expression of the public will given in the constitutional way and we can not resist the pressure why it would be their fault not ours if this new method were adopted. It was a favourite scheme of some of the advocates of a Prohibitory Law at one time. Perhaps the Governor who is now so completely in the hands of the Schemers would not be satisfied even with that. I hate chicanery and trickery but at present I do almost think that a little finesse would be pardonable when we have so many and such unscrupulous enemies to deal with.

The Government's real problem, Anglin was convinced, was the Lieutenant Governor. The Irish editor thought Gordon's conduct disgraceful and wanted to ensure that if the anti-Confederates were dismissed they would be able to publicize that conduct.

Should a break up take place we must at all events be able to tell the whole story so that the public may understand all about it and how we were hampered and thwarted by His Excellency under the guise of friendship and how he got us into all this difficulty acting the whole time in concert with the very Mr. Tilley whom in conversation with some of us he so much affected to despise. Of course it will not do to ask permission to tell this in so many words: but permission to explain the cause of the trouble can not be refused and that involves everything.

Anglin vowed that if Gordon played "traitor", "I will skin him as I never yet skinned recreant and deceiver." Articles in the Freeman contained such thinly disguised warnings to Gordon that the Lieutenant Governor wrote a private note to Anglin protesting that there would be no dissolution of the House before it met. Anglin's reply made his position quite clear and in effect warned Gordon to watch his step.

If it would not be presuming to [sic] far now that I am not one of
your Excellency's Advisers, I would assure you that Mr. Wilmot's extraordinary course does not meet with the approval even of his oldest and most staunch personal friends in St. John ... Whatever may be said to the contrary, I can assure your Excellency that in St. John there is no reaction, no change of opinion. The people think that it would be an outrage to force them into a new election so soon after they have so solemnly deliberately and emphatically pronounced judgement on the great question submitted to them by your Excellency's late advisers; but if an election must come, they are quite determined to fight to the last. I hope most sincerely that when an election does occur no party will have any cause or even plausible pretext for dragging your name before the public, and discussing your conduct or your motives.33

While attempting to forestall Gordon's moves, Anglin was also trying to stiffen the anti-Confederate backbone. What was necessary, he thought, was to "look the enemy in the face, confront him boldly and never show any symptom of want of hope or want of courage."34 Unfortunately for the Antis, this was a tall order.

When Smith returned from Washington, with no Reciprocity Treaty in his pocket, Gordon confronted him with a very stiff proposition. Wilmot had handed in his resignation. Gordon demanded that Smith accept a policy of union or he would refuse to accept Wilmot's resignation. This would force Smith himself to resign. Gordon expected that the break with Wilmot made it probable that Smith and his followers would not deviate from the policy they had originally professed and that this would make a change of Government almost certain. To meet this possibility, Gordon had found the core of a new administration under the leadership of Peter Mitchell and Wilmot "with the cordial support and concurrence of Tilley ..."35 But Smith, surprisingly enough, met Gordon's demands, although later developments indicated that the two men had differing opinions about the nature and scope of the agreement. The Executive Council agreed with Smith's decision and Smith was allowed one week to consult his friends before giving Gordon his final answer.36 In the
meantime Wilmot's resignation was accepted and the Government won a little breathing space. Nevertheless Gordon did not completely trust his Attorney General.

I am confident that Mr. Smith wishes to adopt the course above described, in acceding to which at all he certainly makes great sacrifices, and lays himself open to reproach from those who have been his warmest supporters, but I see also that if he is unable to induce his followers to accept the change, he will not scruple to avow that his own opinions have undergone no change and that he is still prepared to continue his opposition to the Quebec Scheme of Federation.

One of those supporters with whom Smith consulted was unquestionably Timothy Anglin. Even more certain was Anglin's opposition to Confederation. He was willing to accept the submission to the Assembly of Cardwell's despatches and other documents or propositions emanating from the Imperial Government or the "sister colonies", "common courtesy requiring that the most careful consideration should be given to any propositions from such quarters." But to go further and make more positive commitments, Anglin would not accept. Nevertheless, when Smith returned to Gordon after his week's consultation with friends, he told the Lieutenant Governor that the party was generally willing to accept the course he had consented to pursue. Gordon was highly pleased.

This decision of my Government enables me confidently to assert that, whatever be their own fate, & I consider their retention of office under the circumstances very doubtful, the Confederation Scheme will, in a few weeks be acceded to by this province, and I beg to congratulate H.M. Govt. on the success of an object the attainment of which they have so decidedly desired.

The Lieutenant Governor was premature. What he did not realize was that the Antis were capable of playing politics as skilfully as anyone else involved in the Confederation struggle. It would appear that Gordon had spoken to Smith in general terms and that Smith was perfectly happy to allow the Lieutenant Governor to deceive himself. As far as can be as-
certained, Smith never agreed to support Confederation. His plan seems to have been to allow the subject of union to be introduced into the Assembly for discussion but certainly not to promote it. At least this is what "the Dictator" thought.

On March 8, Parliament met and listened to the speech from the throne. It contained a paragraph stating "the deliberate opinion" of the British Government that a union was desirable. On March 12, the debate on the reply to the throne speech commenced. Charles Fisher moved a want of confidence motion. He declared that the Government had taken insufficient precautions against the Fenian danger. For almost a month the debate dragged on but the Government was able to proceed with a number of other bills by starting the daily sessions at 11 a.m. rather than 2 p.m. But part of almost every day was spent in discussing Fisher's want of confidence motion and it remained a hot topic of debate. Whether Smith wanted the debate prolonged is a moot point, but it is probable that he and his Government, seeing that otherwise the session was progressing favourably, were not particularly concerned about Fisher's motion. They still held a good majority in the Assembly and they may not have been very anxious to rush into a discussion of union for then it would become obvious the direction in which the Government was heading. The likely direction was shown in the proposed reply to the throne speech. It agreed on union in the abstract and then stated:

But in any scheme for a Union of the British North American Colonies which may be proposed, it is, in the opinion of this House, absolutely essential that full protection should be afforded to the rights and interests of the people of this Province; and no measure which fails to obtain these objects should be tolerated.

Anglin agreed with this proposed reply, especially with its assertion that in any union the rights and interests of New Brunswickers would have
to be safeguarded. As for Fisher's amendment, the editor of the Freeman felt that this was tying up the machinery of government, thus retarding the business of the province. On April 5 and for the next two days Anglin got his opportunity to speak in reply to that amendment. As it turned out, it was a 'swan song' performance. During this speech he touched on a great number of topics covering the history of the past year. He gave a great deal of information on the inner workings of the Executive Council. He told how the Government had been formed. He spoke at length on the appointment of Ritchie and about Judge Wilmot. He complained of the pressure put on the Government by Cardwell who, Anglin was sure, was the mouthpiece of Canadian politicians. He explained and defended the famous Council memorandum of July 12th. He complained that the Smasher Government had left only $9,000 to the credit of the Province, the Post Office account overdue and the Crown Lands in a horrible mess. He talked of union as being an old idea but the Quebec scheme as being a new one:

[It was an attempt to graft a new branch on the old stock; but it wouldn't grow; and if they ever did succeed in setting it, it would produce nothing but fungi and rottenness.]

He spoke of the York election, of his visit to Quebec and of the anti-Catholic campaign being run by the Confederates. He defended himself against the charge of disloyalty, claiming that the advocates of Confederation "found they could not appeal to the common sense of the people with any chance of success; they, therefore, appealed to the passions and prejudices of the people to do their work." He announced he would oppose the Government should it try to pass a scheme of Confederation through the Assembly. He spoke of a multitude of other things but ended on a most fitting note when in answer to the question whether he was opposed to all
political union with Canada, he stated:

I do not believe at the present time a political union of any kind can be formed with Canada which would be a benefit to the people of this Province. I do not know of any one opposed to union in the abstract, but my impression is that the time has not arrived for any kind of union, and I will oppose it to the last. At present the Provinces are distinct communities with conflicting interests, and the Quebec Scheme does not reconcile them, and the difficulties can only be overcome by sacrificing the Lower Provinces altogether.55

From April 7, when Anglin concluded his speech, to April 16, events moved swiftly. At the same time as a band of Fenians made threatening gestures on the New Brunswick border, Gordon forced the resignation of the anti-Confederate Government and brought in Mitchell, Tilley, Fisher, Wilmot and Co.56 Thus Anglin was given his opportunity to "skin" the Governor. His first effort, made in the House of Assembly just before the House was prorogued on April 16, was to give detailed information about the Minute of July 12, showing that the sections of it which were being attacked as disloyal were those written by the Governor. Prior to April, cabinet secrecy and a respect for Gordon's integrity had kept Anglin silent, in spite of the barbs thrown at him. But now, Anglin claimed, Gordon had become the head of a provincial faction by his "unconstitutional" conduct.57 Anglin's main attack, however, was made in his usual manner, in the pages of the Freeman.

We always believed that the Governor meant well; but his ideas of right and wrong are to some extent peculiarly his own. He acts as if he were raised to an immense height above all mere Provincialists, and as if our leading politicians were as mere pawns in a game of chess, to be moved and worked at his will and pleasure. We do not think that he would wilfully do wrong, knowing it to be wrong; but he is one of those men who never can be made to believe that anything they wish to do can possibly be wrong. No doubt he was sincere in wishing to support Mr. Smith; but the moment he decided on getting rid of him he regarded neither the principles of the constitution nor the rights of the people.58

Of course, Anglin felt, this subversion of responsible government was closely
linked with the scheme of union and now he used the terms "anti-Constitutionalists," "Canadian imperialists" and "foes of Responsible Government" to designate the party led by Tilley. All these terms were apparently synonymous to "Confederates" and Anglin tried to show this to his readers. But little could be gained from the constitutional issue, as Anglin and other Antis were to find in the election campaign which followed in the wake of prorogation. The electors saw that the Antis had been treated unjustly but, more important, they saw just how great was the support for Confederation which British officials were willing to give. Anglin tried to raise the cry of 'responsible government' but New Brunswickers were not listening very closely. Their ears had become attuned to the tribal war-cry of 'loyalty'.

II

Since his resignation from the cabinet Anglin had continued to fight rearguard action on the two flanks of the loyalty issue. From the Colonial Office, Anglin had taken enough. It would not listen to reason; therefore it would have to be opposed.

This is freedom and self-government with a vengeance, when the people of these Provinces must consent to change their constitution merely because a colonial minister who knows nothing about them desires it, and to be governed, not according to their own well understood wishes but according to the wishes of a Mr. Cardwell as interpreted by Messrs. Brown, Cartier, McCully and Company.59

He asserted that Cardwell neither was nor spoke for the Queen or people of England. Opposing Confederation ought to be considered no more disloyal than opposition to the Reform Bill which was then getting attention in England.60 As time went on, Anglin developed these themes.

The few politicians in England who are earnestly in favour of the Confederation Scheme, are, we believe ... still more earnestly desirous
of seeing the connection between the Empire and the Provinces either wholly severed, or so loosened, that the Provinces could be cast off at any moment, and they endeavour to promote Confederation entirely with the view of placing these Provinces in that position. The advocates of the scheme on this side of the Atlantic make very laboured and very boisterous professions of loyalty and devotion to the Empire and the Throne; but occasionally, as when in the pride of their hearts and when flushed with hopes of success they talk of a "new nationality" of our being "on the very threshold of independence," &c., &c., they expose their real feelings. 61

Anglin found it very hard to equate the disintegration of the Empire with loyalty to it. To him, loyalty consisted in maintaining the existing imperial connection. Yet Anglin could not get around the fact that the Imperial Government, whether for good reasons or bad, supported Confederation. The Antis were branded, though most unjustly, with disloyalty. There was nothing, short of unconditional surrender, they could do about it.

Still, it was the second phase of the loyalty question, the Fenian issue, which most closely involved Anglin. The York election showed that connecting Fenianism with Anglin, Catholicism and the Antis was a most efficacious technique for the Confederates and they were not about to let the issue slip from public attention. The Confederates believed that Catholics had voted unanimously against Confederation in 1865 and they resolved that should another election ensue the Catholic vote would be offset by a greatly increased Protestant vote. One way of accomplishing this goal was to organize an anti-Catholic campaign which would appeal to religious and 'loyal' sympathies amongst Protestants. The key figure in this campaign was Anglin, and the made-to-measure issue was Fenianism.

Shortly after the York election a curious incident occurred. 62 A cheque made out to H.C. T.W. Anglin for fifty-one dollars was found near the Freeman office by one of the children of Mr. Leitch of the Post Office.
Anglin could not remember receiving such a cheque, nor could the clerk who kept the Freeman's accounts find any record of it on the books. The Freeman told the rest of the story:

On more careful examination, however, we readily discovered what it meant. The cabalistic letters H.C. which at first we did not notice, explained it all. Some ruffians in the pay of the Canadian conspirators, resolved to manufacture evidence of the existence of Fenianism in the Province -- as no evidence can otherwise be found -- and flying at high game determined to fasten on Mr. Anglin the suspicion of being what, in the slang of the Fenians, is called a Head Centre.63

This must certainly have been a bogus cheque. There was only one Head Centre for North America.64 As well, it is ridiculous to suppose that cheques which would have to go through a public bank would have contained such an obvious things as "H.C." on them. Furthermore, this cheque, had it been legitimate, would not have been left lying around on the streets for anyone to pick up. It may not have been the Confederates who had attempted to 'frame' Anglin but if the strong party warfare which existed in New Brunswick is any indication, this was by no means impossible. Anglin concluded this sorry episode with a bitter question:

How can any respectable man cling to a party whose favorite [sic] weapons are bribery, corruption, perjury, forgery and falsehood.65

The Fenian scare began to assume large proportions early in December and Gordon made preparations to "ensure the security of the frontier."66 At the same time a scare in St. John saw panic spread throughout the city.67 There were only rumours to excite the citizens but these were enough to cause considerable confusion. However, this excitement died down quickly and Gordon sent a letter to the Mayor of St. John saying that there was no cause for alarm either at present or in the future. In his opinion border raids were possible but an attack on St. John was highly unlikely.68 The Freeman felt the same way. The Fenians, Anglin asserted, were too
weak for a full-scale attack and no "mere plundering party will venture
to attack St. John ... "69 But Anglin recognized that such a scare would,
and in fact, did lead to anti-Catholic expressions in the opposition press
and in order to counteract this made a very eloquent statement of Catholic
loyalty.

The Catholics who have chosen this Province as their home regard it
as truly their country, in whose welfare they are as deeply interested
as any other class of its inhabitants. They have done as much as any
others to develope [sic] its resources, promote its prosperity and
increase its wealth. In attachment to its free institutions, in ready
and cheerful obedience to its wise, equitable and beneficent laws, and
in honest and faithful allegiance to its Government, they yield to no
class of Her Majesty's subjects. A better form of government they
could not desire, and even if no higher or better motives influenced
them, they assuredly would be as ready as others to protect the pro-
erty which many of them have acquired by many years of incessant toil
and strict frugality. Irish Catholics, semper et ubique fideles, are
loyal in this Province, for the best of all reasons -- because loyalty
here is reason and justice and common sense; is love of liberty and of
independence, and the French Catholics are quite as loyal as the Irish.70

Other Catholics felt as did Anglin. "One Who Knows" wrote to the Freeman
stating that "if the Fenians do pay us a visit, it will be seen that
Catholics will be amongst the foremost to repel them, or any foe ... "71
But such protestations availed little. Protestant forces were being
marshalled, as George Ryan, a King's county politician, saw.

I do not look for an election so soon as you predict yet everything
appears to be working admirably this Fenian raid that is causing so
much excitement now is no harm to our cause though the resignation
of Anglin robs it of half its beauty.

I believe the time is not far distant where the contest at the polls
will be Protestant and Catholic instead of formerly liberal & Tory ... 72

Anglin was not the only one who saw the anti-Catholic campaign building
within New Brunswick. Gordon, too, was aware of it and rapidly took steps
to overcome these religious antagonisms. In several speeches he made "a
strong protest against prejudices so pernicious to the harmony and well
being of the province, and which I fear some parties for political objects
and from selfish motives are not disinclined to foster."73 The Archbishop of Halifax also tried to lend a hand. In a public letter to Gordon he stated that Catholics had nothing to gain from annexation to the United States and even less reason to support "that pitiable knot of knaves and fools," the Fenians. "From their success we have nothing to expect but bloodshed, rapine, and anarchy, and the overthrow of God's religion -- for all this is inscribed in their banners."74 For their efforts to promote harmony and to emphasize Catholic loyalty, Gordon and the Archbishop received very little credit and considerable abuse. The Religious Intelligencer thought that Gordon's speeches and Connolly's letter were of a very "anti-Protestant character" and, of course, connected this with Anglin.

It may be that his Excellency considered the great body of Catholics in this Province worthy of being vindicated from the character naturally attached to them in consequence of the well-known disloyal and Fenian sentiments of their tri-weekly organ, and the annexation proclivities and sympathies of its protege.75

In fact, anti-Anglin attacks became very widespread and were neatly connected with anti-Catholic or anti-Government sentiments. The Reporter accused the Executive Council of holding meetings in St. John because Anglin was close, thereby giving him "a better opportunity of pulling the Government wires."76 A pattern was forming. The Confederates accused Anglin of being a Fenian sympathizer and thus blackened all Catholics.77 At the same time they accused Anglin of being the real power of the anti-Confederate Government and thus branded the Government with disloyalty. As part of this campaign the Confederates ignored Archbishop Connolly's letter or the significant parts of it. It would not do to give publicity to such a prominent Catholic who was in favour of Confederation for it would tend to defeat the Confederate argument that Catholics were disloyal and opposed to Confederation. This was an understandable but inconsistent
course of action. The very same newspapers which now ignored the letter had been among the first to print and distribute the Archbishop's earlier letter during the election campaign of 1865.\textsuperscript{78}

Not all Protestants accepted the equation that the Catholics and their lay leader were disloyal. On New Year's day a very touching presentation took place. A gold watch and chain was then presented to Anglin by a committee of his Protestant supporters for his "consistent and honourable course as a politician," and specifically for his "untiring and intelligent opposition to Canadian Confederation."\textsuperscript{79} Anglin was deeply appreciative and in his response he revealed his opinions on religion and politics.

It is, I believe, the gift of my Protestant friends exclusively, and I value it all the more on that account, not because I esteem my Catholic friends less or my Protestant friends more, but because it is a proof that all the efforts to excite suspicion and jealousies and ill feelings amongst us, made by those who are so eager to destroy the independence [sic] of the Province, have utterly failed. Standing together, shoulder to shoulder, at the late general elections, we achieved a glorious triumph and saved the country. If we still cherish the feelings that then animated us all; if we act on the principle that, however much we may differ in religious opinions, we can unite in the political arena and work together honestly and earnestly for the welfare of our common country, if we agree to differ on all minor subjects and do not allow unfounded suspicions to be excited amongst us by those who despair of gaining their ends by fair means, we will, should the contest ever be renewed, win a more easy and even more glorious victory than the last.\textsuperscript{80}

Anglin's hopes were to prove excessively optimistic. Even the gift ceremony was capable of various interpretations. John Boyd considered that many Antis had been annoyed by this presentation since they were not willing to have Anglin as "their recognised [sic] Leader."\textsuperscript{81}

The watch presentation was a bright spot in Anglin's life but it did not relieve the deep gloom that was rapidly descending. The Confederates would not let up. The \textit{News} and the \textit{Intelligencer}, in particular, were
trying to arouse religious animosity, and it would appear that they were being encouraged to do this by Confederate leaders. The Intelligencer calmly asserted:

It cannot be disguised that a large portion of the people have lost confidence in 'a class' of their fellow subjects, and this, mainly owing to the disloyal character of that portion of the press which has represented them; and the people have lost confidence in the Government to which they look for protection and defence, because they have no confidence in the party or press that mainly supports and defends the Government.

Anglin saw the method in this Confederate madness.

The Confederate party despair of winning by any means that could be deemed honourable. They have almost abandoned argument, and for some time past their papers have laboured with all their might to create in the Protestant portion of the population a suspicion and dislike of the Catholic portion ... If those persons could establish a Protestant party as they try to do, and get all Protestants to join it, and to follow the Confederate leaders blindly, the whole fight would be fought, and a Confederation victory would be inevitable.

Anglin, therefore, was forced to defend himself and his fellow Catholics not only for personal and religious reasons, but also on political grounds. Unless Anglin could overcome the disloyalty cry, the Antis were doomed should another election arise.

Anglin denied that a Catholic party existed in New Brunswick, as the Intelligencer had charged, for, he stated, "there is no reason why there should be either a Catholic party or a Protestant party in this happy country, where all churches and denominations are equal in the eye of the law." He denied that he had ever attempted to 'dictate' to the Government and also rejected the idea that the Catholics controlled the Government. He scorned the suggestion that the votes of Catholics were controlled from the altar by the clergy. The reason for the strong Catholic vote for the Antis at the last election had been, Anglin asserted, not because of religion but because "the majority of them, like the majority of the
whole people, believed the Quebec Scheme would ruin the Province ... 

He might have added that, in large part, it was by means of the columns of the Freeman that they had so believed. Anglin continued to claim that the Fenians were not really a great menace and that the Irish of New Brunswick were not responsible for the Irish outside the province. He pointed out the truism that if the Catholics of New Brunswick were disloyal then the conquest of the province would be an easy task. Finally, he asserted that it was insulting to New Brunswick to suggest that she could not defend herself against "unorganized rabble" such as the Fenians. 

During these difficulties, Anglin did not turn his back on Ireland. He re-asserted that Ireland was in a very downtrodden condition and for this he blamed the Union of 1801. To Anglin, the Irish experience simply proved that union could involve a smaller partner in serious difficulties. His feeling for the land of his birth was shown near the end of his Assembly speech on Fisher's want of confidence motion, when he talked about Fenianism and Ireland. The Evening Globe's report of that part of the speech shows why Anglin was held in high esteem by his fellow Irishmen in New Brunswick.

He believed the Fenians were a mad and reckless body of men, who did not know what they were about, and with them he had no sympathy, but in regard to the movements of 1847-8, he said he could scarcely speak impartially without strong feelings. Speaking with much emotion, he said he could shut his eyes and look back to his native village in Ireland, and see his countrymen dying by hundreds of starvation; after selling their little effects, at a great sacrifice, to procure the little food to prolong their lives, they crowded into the town, and at the street corners and nooks, huddled together and died of sheer starvation, -- now a child expired in its mother's arms, then a woman; and again, a strong man, worn away to a skeleton, departed. When he looked back and saw these groups, sitting on a lock of straw, with nothing but tattered rags to protect them from the winds of heaven, he would be less than a man and an Irishman, to speak harshly of the men who took steps which they believed would remedy this state of things. During the hon. gentleman's remarks on this point, his feelings overcame him, and more than once he had to suspend his language, while the falling of a pin might have been heard in the remotest corner of the building. The Fenian party knew little or
nothing of these things, and could not remedy them, if they now existed. He then spoke of the loyalty and honor of Irishmen under every flag, and of their determination to assist in defending this Province against any attacks that may be made upon it; and characterized the attempts of those who stirred up religious strife in this Province, in this time of danger, as treason of the worst kind; for now it should be the object of every man to unite people of all denominations.\textsuperscript{92}

Anglin had had his moment. The occasions when complete silence descended upon the Assembly were few and far between. It had obviously been a sincere statement of his beliefs and feelings but it was all too easy for his enemies to take advantage of his candor.\textsuperscript{93} They continued to pound away at his alleged Fenian sympathies and connections during the election campaign that followed the change in Government.

III

The Antis started the election campaign at a great disadvantage. While the anti-Confederates had been wrestling Gordon for control of the helm of the New Brunswick ship of state, the Confederates had taken over the engine room. In September and October of 1865, for example, they had re-adjusted the balance of the electorate in St. John particularly in the hotly contested Portland area. The \textit{Freeman} stated that 118 had been disfranchised and another 178 had gained the vote for the first time.\textsuperscript{94} The leader of this action was a Mr. Forbes who, according to Anglin, worked for the British American Association, a pro-Confederate body.\textsuperscript{95} Whether Forbes was working for this Association or not is immaterial for he was certainly attempting to promote the interests of the Confederates and he was successful in his task. The supposed efforts of Anglin in 1864 were undone. Thus by the time the House dissolved in 1866, the Confederates had little to fear. Because they had formed the Executive Council at the time of dissolution, they were able to control the timing of elections to suit
themselves. Tilley expected a hard fight but, he confided to Macdonald, "the Election in this Province can be made certain if the means are used." Macdonald made sure that "the monies" were available for Tilley and his associates. For their part, the Antis received only a small amount of financial aid from their allies in Nova Scotia. The Confederates also managed to overcome a problem they had faced in the 1865 elections. Then, the Quebec scheme had hindered rather than aided them. In 1866 they began to talk about terms better than the Quebec plan, in spite of Macdonald's stricture on this point. They also avoided another difficulty in which they had found themselves when the plan was first announced -- i.e. the right of the people to vote on such an important change in the constitution.

The speakers on Monday evening seemed to throw the Governor and the Quebec Scheme overboard, because they know both to be so much disliked by the people. Mr. Tilley indeed was very cautious. He would not cling to the Quebec Scheme if better terms could be got, which of course may mean that if we can not do better he would force that on us.

Mitchell went much further in his promises. The Freeman quoted him as saying:

We are willing to appoint delegates to meet with others from the respective Provinces interested, to go to the Imperial Government and discuss the matter fairly there, -- such a delegation to be composed of both parties; and lastly, we are willing to submit the whole scheme thus matured to the people of this Province.

Anglin scorned these promises. He claimed that their fulfillment was highly unlikely. They were "chaff by which wise birds will not be caught." As events showed, these were, as Anglin prophesied, election promises which were not carried out. But the fact that the Confederates were not proclaiming the Quebec Resolutions as their scheme was an adroit political move on their part. All the criticisms of the Antis against the Quebec plan were thus bypassed. Anglin and his allies had little to attack except the very vagueness of the program of the New Brunswick Confederates. This
they did.

Now that scheme is abandoned, at least in words. The men who once extolled it so highly now admit that better terms may be got; but instead of going to work to arrange these better terms, and then submitting them to the people for their consideration and judgment, they ask that the people shall abdicate fully and completely all their rights and privileges, and place in the hands of the very men who were parties to the concoction of that Quebec Scheme, full power to make a new Scheme, which shall bind the people irreversibly and forever.104

The Confederates were not wholly responsible for their excellent electoral position. They received considerable aid from economic circumstances. New Brunswick as a whole had recovered from its depression in trade and this recovery brought the revenues of the province to almost exactly the same level as 1863.105 In other words, 1865 had been one of New Brunswick's better years. Unfortunately for the Antis, however, 1864 had been a phenomenally successful year and it appeared that the economy was slipping. The people of New Brunswick were therefore unhappy. The lucrative shipping trade caused by the Civil War had ended and capital was difficult to find. Many felt that something had to be done to improve the economic base of New Brunswick and turned to Confederation in desperation. Aiding this was the fact that Tilley was now favouring a low tariff policy and was claiming that a low tariff would be put into effect after union.106 On more specific economic matters, the anti-Confederates had been failures. As Anglin had prophesied, the Western Extension project begun in November crawled along at a snail's pace.107 For a change, railway policy became a secondary issue in New Brunswick politics as neither party was able to take advantage of the desire for Western Extension. The Antis would garner no votes on this issue in 1866. Similarly, the anti-Confederate Government had failed to obtain a renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty. As well, they had been able to secure neither British North American free trade nor the Intercolonial Railway, both of which they had claimed were attainable without union.
These goals were theoretically possible of achievement, but in terms of practical politics, New Brunswick would have had to get the support of the other provinces. The Confederates in Canada and Nova Scotia had not been willing to give this support. In fact, about the only issue which Anglin and the other Antis could successfully exploit was the conduct of the Lieutenant Governor. Time and again the Freeman complained of the unconstitutional actions of Gordon and tried to promote itself as the defender of responsible government. Indeed, Anglin attempted to turn this issue into the Antis' form of the loyalty issue. The Antis, he proclaimed, were the true loyalists, the defenders of the rights of New Brunswickers against subversion from outside. But the pressure in New Brunswick to conform had become too great. Events were moving so rapidly and a subtle psychological change took place in New Brunswickers. Steadily, but non-rationally, a pattern formed in the minds of these colonials. Confederation began to mean loyalty to the Empire, prevention of annexation and a new lease on the economic life of the province. They were not exactly happy about Confederation but their resistance to such a change had run out. Unlike the year before they were willing to gamble in 1866. They were in a mood to dream and the Confederates provided them with the opportunity.

Though other issues were important, 'loyalty' was by far the most significant in the elections of 1866. The loyalty campaign, in conjunction with an anti-Catholic campaign, had been commenced long before the spring of 1866, but it was then that they became most intense and most effective. At the very time that Gordon forced the resignation of the Smith Government, a number of Fenians gathered at Eastport, a town in Maine on the southernmost part of the New Brunswick border. Nothing had materialized from the various Fenian scares during the winter, yet in the first week of April
a small band of O'Mahony Fenians, led by B. Doron Killian, arrived, apparently ready to 'do business.' What had happened was that in February, 1866, habeas corpus had been suspended in Ireland. It was 1848 all over again. All suspected persons were incarcerated. For the time being, at least, it seemed most unlikely that there would be any effective Fenian movements made in Ireland. This chain of events caused the prestige of the more radical Roberts-Sweeney faction to rise in the United States; this, in turn, caused the O'Mahony branch, under the urgings of Killian, to take up the idea of an attack upon British North America, in spite of its earlier position on this question. It was, however, to be a raid, a diversion, which might lead, so the Fenians hoped, to an Anglo-American war. O'Mahony may have felt it was worth trying on these grounds. It is possible, however, that he did not approve of the raid. It may have been merely a Killian caper. In any case, these Fenians wandered around the border, came to Calais, and made a comic-opera attack on Indian Island before they gave up and dispersed. The action of United States' officials put an effective end to these brief escapades. They had done virtually no military damage but they had very nearly wiped out the anti-Confederates' chances of success. The Fenians had spoken against Confederation and had released the following statement to the citizens of New Brunswick:

Republican institutions have become a necessity to the peace and prosperity of your Province. English policy, represented in the obnoxious project of Confederation is making its last efforts to bind you in effete forms of Monarchism.

Anglin did not appreciate this 'help' of the Fenians in fighting Confederation. In reference to a speech which Killian had made in Eastport in which he had opposed Confederation, Anglin stated:

If Mr. Killian were in the pay of the Canadians, and Mr. D'Arcy McGee himself wrote his speech for him, he could not have said anything better suited to the purposes of the Canadian party.
Anglin was very suspicious that this Fenian appearance was no accident and as time went on he became more forthright in his accusations.

The sole hope, the only reliance of the foes of Responsible Government, and of the people's rights is the Fenians. Without the aid of the Fenians they know they can do nothing. We have already drawn attention to the remarkable coincidence that although the telegrams had been silent about the Fenians for some weeks, the bands under Killian began to make their appearance just about the time that the Governor and his backstairs counsellors concluded to trample the rights of the people under foot. The declaration of Killian to Mr. M.-- of the Telegraph that he knew long before what pranks the Governor was about to play, and the assertions of Major Sinnott to others of our newspaper correspondents that he knew what was coming, &c., were not more significant than Killian's declaring at his public meetings that he would not allow Confederation to be carried, a declaration which he knew well was calculated to help the Confederates, a declaration [for] which, we doubt not, he was paid by the Canadian party for making.118

Anglin could not understand the Fenian activity unless they were serving some political purpose. There were too many unanswered questions for there to be any other explanation, unless the Fenians were simply madmen.

The movements of the Fenians on our frontier are quite inexplicable. The O'Mahony Fenians repudiated the idea of invading the Provinces, and ridiculed the proposition made by General Sweeny; yet we find that the small bands now collected at Eastport and the neighborhood [sic] belong to that faction and that they are under the immediate control of the redoubtable B. D. Killian himself, once an intimate friend of the Hon. T. D. McGee and his associate in the management of the American Celt, a rabid anti-British journal, now the right-hand man of O'Mahony and some time ago accused of furnishing information to the Canadian Government for a consideration.119

Anglin asserted that the Fenians were not serious about attacking New Brunswick. It was all a sham. The Fenians, he stated, talked loud and often, a contradiction to the rapidity and secrecy that would have characterized a real movement. When the Intelligencer claimed that the Fenian menace simply showed the necessity of Confederation, the Freeman turned the tables.

If those Fenians are on the frontier to do the work of any party in this Province, is it not natural that they would say and do what the party whom they sought to assist wished and directed, or at least what would be best calculated to help that party?
Is it not very plain that all they say and do is, in the belief of the *Intelligencer* and its fellows, calculated to aid the Canadian party, the foes of Responsible Government and of the people?^120

The conclusion drawn was clear. Killian was doing the work of the Confederates, "and in all probability" they had "a full knowledge of what he is doing."^121 In Anglin's mind this Fenian agitation was possibly connected with Thomas D'Arcy McGee. After all Killian had worked for McGee at one time.^122 McGee's knowledge of and contact with the Fenian Society was nearly unexcelled in British North America. Then too, he was a strong advocate of Confederation and the proponent of the "new nationality."

Surely, Anglin thought, both the motive and the opportunity resided with McGee.^123 Anglin found support for this view from the Boston *Herald* which stated:

> Many leading politicians in Montreal believe that an alliance for mutual benefit exists between B. Doron Killian and Darcy [sic] McGee. The late movement at Eastport is by these gentlemen ascribed to McGee; the motive being to further the Confederation of the Provinces. They profess to find confirmation of this view in the recent speech of Killian, in which he stated that the Fenians would break up confederation. If such was Killian's real motive, it is argued the means adopted to compass it have been singularly ill chosen. Nothing could influence the Province more in favor of confederation than the present threatening attitude of the Fenian hosts.^124

It was not that Anglin ignored the possibility of a Fenian attack on this account but he was by no means hysterical.

> [C]ontemptible as they may seem, let us be prepared to give them so warm a reception, if they dare to desecrate our soil, that those who escape shall never want to come to New Brunswick again.^125

Today, the accusations of Anglin may seem disreputable. So they were, for they were based on suspicion not fact. Nevertheless, one can understand why Anglin would have these suspicions. His experience had shown that there was very little to which the Confederates would not resort. Also, like the Confederates, Anglin was fighting a political war. Consciously or
subconsciously he was striving to find something to improve the bad posi-
tion the Antis were in. What he came up with, in effect, was his own dis-
loyalty cry against the Confederates. On top of this, it was not easy for
Anglin to accept the abuse he was receiving without striking back. The
News called him a "cowardly cabbage garden traitor" in reference to his
alleged action in 1848.\textsuperscript{126} Other sorts of name-calling were evident but
the most persistent charge of the Confederate newspapers was that Anglin
was in league with the Fenians through association. They accused Anglin of
having relatives among the Fenians who had gathered at Eastport. They
became so obsessed with finding out who Anglin's relatives were, that the
Freeman finally made a statement about General Sinnott,\textsuperscript{127} a former resi-
dent of New Brunswick, and a Mr. Warren,\textsuperscript{128} both of whom had been prominent
Fenians at Eastport. Of Sinnott, the Freeman stated that he was "neither
relative, connexion [sic], friend or acquaintance," of Anglin.\textsuperscript{129} Anglin
did admit that the man called Warren might possibly be a young relative of
his but if so he had not corresponded with him for several years and in
Anglin's last letter "he warned him to have nothing to do with the foolish
Fenian movement ... "\textsuperscript{130} This, however, did not stop the accusations and
insinuations of rival newspapers.

Were there grounds for the Confederates' apparent concern? Was Anglin the
leader of a nest of vipers desirous of turning on their neighbours and their
adopted country? Whether or not Fenianism existed in New Brunswick is by no
means an unimportant question. It would be surprising if none whatever
existed. It is interesting, however, that although a good deal is known
about the small number of Fenians in Toronto and Montreal, almost nothing
has come to light about any organization in St. John, where the largest
group of Irish Catholics resided, except rumours.\textsuperscript{131} Certainly there were
some of these. In November, 1865, McGee warned the authorities that "St. John for its proximity to Boston, & from what he hears, requires watching ... "132 In March of the next year, the Lieutenant Governor was to be found writing to the St. John Chief of Police warning him to expect trouble. He suspected that agents were in the city and gave him permission to open the mail of a man named Mullin and other suspicious characters.133 The Police Chief's reply was most interesting for obviously he was the person most closely acquainted with the situation in St. John and had five detectives on the payroll at the time.134 He considered that there was no Fenian organization in the city.135 A month later, however, there were renewed rumours. The military commander at St. Andrews then reported that an informant who had infiltrated Fenian meetings claimed that the Brotherhood had organizations in St. John, St. Andrews, and St. Stephen.136 On the very day that this report was made, there appeared in St. John "numerous printed placards calling on [the] province to strike for an independent Republic."137 Three days earlier it had been announced that a number of Fenians had passed through Bangor on their way to establish Fenian circles in New Brunswick.138 This may have been the cause of the brief flurry of activity in St. John, but the movement, if such it can be called, died very quickly. The Irish Catholics, from all the information which can be obtained, gave almost no support to the Brotherhood in its attempts to attack New Brunswick. As for the theory that Anglin may have been involved, it is virtually impossible to imagine that he would have risked his position in New Brunswick to give support to such a hare-brained scheme. He had far too much to lose.

The anti-Catholic campaign continued unabated. A traditionally anti-Catholic organization, the Orange Lodge of New Brunswick declared in favour
of Confederation. The Orangemen had made a connection between the anti-
Confederates and the Fenians and stressed their own 'loyalty' to the British
connection. Anglin did not accuse them of exciting religious animosity but
of being victimized.

It is a calumny against the Orangemen to say that they are the party
who seek to excite prejudices against the Catholics. The Orangemen, like
the Catholics, are the distinct victims of the clique who desire to sell
the country ... and who ... strive ... to set Protestant against Catholic,
and to dupe and deceive all parties.  

The Freeman was hopeful that the appeal to religious antagonisms would be
unsuccessful. "We are all one people;" it stated, "our interests are
identical, and neither Catholics or [sic] Protestants are such fools at this
time of day as 'to burn themselves that they may scald their neighbours."

It was a forlorn hope. In St. George, for example, Gillmour's son reported
that the people thought all Catholics were Fenians.

One offshoot of the Confederates' anti-Catholic campaign was their atti-
tude towards the Catholic hierarchy. As they had ignored the letter of
Archbishop Connolly in favour of Confederation so they ignored similar views
of Bishop Colin Mackinnon of Arichat (Cape Breton) and for the same reason.

As far as Anglin was concerned, the Confederates were carrying out a plot to
set Catholic against Protestant and to brand Catholics with disloyalty.

One of Tilley's Queen's county correspondents certainly ascribed to this
equation.

I have noticed lately, a most determined and bitter hostility, by every
Roman Catholic voter. This I ascribe, whether justly or not, to the
Fenian Sympathy. This hostility you know is capable of becoming very
formidable, and I believe now, that the Confederates, may make up their
minds to encounter an almost unanimous Catholic Vote against them. In
fact, the obstinacy and prejudice of some, and the interested motives of
others, will constitute an opposition, which the friends and supporters
of the measures, would scarcely believe to exist.

But while the Confederates did not openly publicize the efforts of Catholic
personages to promote their cause, they were actually running a two-pronged campaign. There were behind-the-scene influences at work within Catholic ranks favourable to union. Within the Catholic hierarchy efforts were made to change Bishop Sweeny's opinion. Bishop Edward Horan of Kingston, in response to a plea for assistance from Macdonald, was involved in one of these attempts.\(^{145}\) Then, in late April of 1866, Archbishop Connolly held a party at which a number of his friends were invited to meet Sweeny and Rogers. McCully reported that "Archbishop Connolly spared no pains ... in softening down Sweenys [sic] prejudices ..." McCully went on to suggest to Tilley that he drop in on the Bishop and placate him as much as possible.\(^{146}\) With this pressure, it became rather likely that Sweeny would have kept his opinions, if they remained unchanged, very much to himself. Apparently, there were also efforts made to use the priests amongst the French-speaking Catholics to promote Confederation, but to little avail.\(^{147}\) Nevertheless the Confederates were trying to have their cake and eat it too -- and they were quite successful. At the same time they were running a public campaign with a strong anti-Catholic flavour they were quietly appealing to the Catholic hierarchy for support -- and getting it! Bishop Rogers of Chatham came out in favour of Confederation in public letters to L. P. W. DesBrisay and J. M. Johnson.\(^{148}\) Anglin ridiculed Rogers' arguments and thus started a lengthy paper war between Anglin and the Bishop which lasted until the elections were over.\(^{149}\) Their debate did little credit to either man but did show most clearly the non-monolithic nature of Catholic views on politics in New Brunswick.\(^{150}\) It also demonstrated that the Confederates were burning the candle at both ends. In most of New Brunswick they were arousing Protestant sentiment against Catholics but in the eastern counties, where the Catholics were the largest religious group, the Confederates
were trying to appeal to the Catholics.151

Very little went well for Anglin in the 1866 election campaign. He was criticized and vilified. He was made the butt of sarcasm and scorn. Despite all this he fought valiantly, if little less vituperatively than his opponents, for what he thought right. In St. John itself, the tide was running out for Anglin and the Antis. Back in February Anglin had recognized that "the shameless cooking of the St. John election lists," would make things difficult for the Antis.152 But the Confederates were not about to take any chances and they left no stone unturned. The use made of the Fenian scare and of ultra Protestantism was quite evident. D. G. Perkins urged Tilley to hold the elections as soon as possible, "while the Finian [sic] troubles are fresh in the minds of the people."153 William Elder, formerly a Presbyterian clergyman and now the editor of the St. John Journal, was worried that Wilmot, the renegade from the Antis, might not campaign for Confederation.

I hear that Mr. Wilmot is averse to coming out. As he is the favorite [sic] of the Orangemen he really must come, & canvass the County.154

Wilmot took the field. At Tilley's request, the St. John Volunteers were returned from the border in time for the St. John elections. It was considered that a majority of them favoured Confederation.155

In speeches in Northumberland, Kent and St. John, and in the pages of the Freeman Anglin fought the battle.156 Time and again he pointed out what the Confederates were doing.

The policy of the Confederate party of late seems to be to insult the Catholics of the Province in every imaginable way. They pretend to regard them all or nearly all as Fenians ready to join in any treasonable attempts to overthrow British supremacy in the Provinces ... they resort to insinuations well calculated to poison the minds of those who do not know what manner of men they are.157
He accused the Confederates and their lackeys of being "a set of unscrupu-
alous partizans, who themselves have neither religion, honour, nor honesty, 
who strive to trade in the strong religious feelings and prejudices of 
others, and to destroy the confidence and good will which, fortunately for 
the Province, exists between Catholics and Protestants ... "158 Anglin's 
apprehensions, though exaggerated, no doubt partially for political pur-
poses, were not based on a figment of his imagination. Various newspapers 
were running an anti-Catholic campaign in the service of the Confederates. 
The Religious Intelligencer, for instance, stated that "the vehement oppo-
sition to this measure [Confederation] by the Catholic party in New Brun-
wick, the 'Sons of Liberty' in Canada and the Fenian Brotherhood in the 
United States, is beginning to be pretty well understood, and is having the 
effect of waking up the loyal feeling of the people of the Provinces."159 
By the eve of the elections the Intelligencer had come so far in this line 
of thought that it had apparently found a simple solution to the Fenian 
difficulties.

Whether we shall be overrun and ultimately swallowed up by Fenianism, 
is more to be decided by the loyal electors of the Province with their 
ballots at the polls, than by the volunteers who are doing their duty in 
arms on the border, to defend our homes and our lives.160

All Anglin's efforts to combat this line of attack were failures. A change 
had come over New Brunswick during the year and self-satisfaction had given 
way to fears and anxieties amongst the inhabitants of the province. Although 
it was not rational, New Brunswickers honestly felt that in voting for 
Tilley and the Confederates and against Anglin and the Antis, they were 
showing their loyalty and were saving the country from those who wished to 
destroy British rule.161 They did not stop to concern themselves with the 
policy of Confederation. By 1866 the pressure applied by the Colonial Office
combined with the Fenian scare to make New Brunswickers willing to 'knuckle under'. They knew they were loyal subjects and wanted to prove it. The victims, though actually as loyal as any other group, were the anti-Confederates. The Confederates were willing to take advantage of this feeling of loyalty for a political object despite the fact that such a campaign would revive religious and ethnic antagonism in New Brunswick. This technique was extremely successful, whatever else might be thought of it. The Fenian raid on Canada at the beginning of June considerably aided the Confederates in New Brunswick and combined with a plethora of other issues to swamp the anti-Confederates.\textsuperscript{162} The forces led by Tilley swept into power winning thirty-three of the forty-one seats in the House of Assembly.\textsuperscript{163} In only three counties were Antis victorious and in all three there was a large Acadian population.\textsuperscript{164} As in 1865, the Acadians voted against Confederation. To look at the Irish Catholic vote, once again the county of St. John must be analyzed.\textsuperscript{165} And once again, the statistics fail to prove very much on this question. Certainly the Antis did somewhat better in those areas in which the Catholic population formed a third or more of the total. But the pattern has many anomalies. In King's, an area in which Catholics made up over sixty-five per cent of the population, the Antis failed to gain even forty-two per cent of the vote. What is striking is the fact that the decline of votes for the Antis was consistent throughout the entire constituency. Here, the pattern is almost perfect. In no electoral sub-division did the anti-Confederate vote decline by less than eight per cent. The sub-divisions with large numbers of Catholics showed just as large a percentage decrease as the rest. Apparently both Catholics and Protestants felt the pressure of the loyalty issue. Strange as it might have seemed to many Confederate politicians, many Catholics found themselves
under the same influences as their Protestant neighbours.

The Confederates throughout British North America were jubilant with the electoral results; none more so than Jonathan McCully of Nova Scotia.

Bravo! Bravo! Well done for St. John. All the Saints in the Calendar must have been on your side, this time. If it were not that a better man must have given way I could almost wish after all that Anglin had been returned. But the punishment as it is, is perhaps greater than he can bear and what he misses by not being returned Rogers is supplying. Well what a triumph! You have not only beaten the enemy man, you have beaten yourselves. Who would have anticipated such a triumph and with such majorities.166

Anglin's old antagonist, the Religious Intelligencer, touted the victory as that of "loyal Protestant and British sentiment which has been so nobly declared at the polls ... "167 Anglin probably thought otherwise. From his point of view the 'conspirators' had won.

IV

Anglin and everyone else knew that the struggle for Confederation was very significant. In retrospect it can be seen that it had an importance which contemporaries could hardly have realized. Without New Brunswick, the Atlantic provinces would never have joined Confederation. Had this union been postponed in the mid-1860's, it might have been postponed indefinitely. What this would have led to remains in the realm of speculation, but it is clear that the achievement of Confederation in New Brunswick is one of the most important landmarks in the history of the Canadian nation. It may also tell us about the bases on which Confederation was founded -- part of the historical identity of the Canadian nation.

One might wax moralistic about the struggle for Confederation in New Brunswick, as Anglin most certainly did. It was true that the anti-Confederate Government had been treated with no consideration. From the
Colonial Office had emanated the desire to bring about the defeat of the Antis in order that Confederation might be carried. The means used to promote this can hardly be deemed within the spirit of the system of responsible government. Gordon too, violated this spirit, not only in April, 1866, but during the entire term of office of the Government. Few other Governments have been told by a representative of the crown that as soon as the opportunity presented itself he would dismiss the Government, even if it held a majority in the Assembly. It was also true that the victorious Confederates had used means which cannot be deemed honourable. They had aroused and used men's prejudices and passions against fellow-citizens. They had labelled honest men as traitors and had made an entire group of people appear as an enemy to the majority within New Brunswick. Of course, Anglin ignored the fact that neither he nor the Antis had been all that fair or totally honourable themselves. After all, the game was politics, and as Machiavelli pointed out long ago, ordinary concepts of morality are perhaps not all that relevant in that game. What the tactics which the Confederates were forced to use did show was that British North America was not a compact entity in the 1860's. This in turn, makes one wonder whether Anglin's contention that the time had not come for the provinces to unite, was correct. The difficulties which Canada experienced in the nineteenth century in merely maintaining her existence makes one wonder still more.

Indeed, in his original criticism of Confederation Anglin had been correct on many counts. By no stretch of the imagination was Canada a unified country until at least thirty years after Confederation. It was not railways that made Canada a cohesive entity, it was population, and it took many years, if it has even today, for the new country to fill in the vast
stretches of land between populated sections. Canada very nearly did not maintain an independent existence and at times Anglin's fears that a premature union might preclude any future and solid British North American union, seemed to be all too real. Especially during the 1880's it appeared as though Canada were going to disintegrate and be annexed by the United States. Fortunately, this did not happen. But even its possibility would have been extremely remote had the imperial connection been maintained as it had existed before Confederation. Anglin was correct in his belief that the imperial organization was the best protection that British North America could obtain, if it were to be protected at all. Had the provinces not accepted Confederation, Britain might have refused to defend British North America, but such British action would have been most unlikely. In his belief that the acceptance of Confederation was simply playing into the hands of the Manchester School, Anglin was again largely correct. No less a person than Galt was forced to agree with Anglin's assertion that Confederation would do little to preserve the British connection.

I am more than ever disappointed at the tone of feeling here as to the Colonies. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that they want to get rid of us. They have a servile fear of the United States and would rather give us up than defend us, or incur the risk of war with that country. Day by Day I am more oppressed with the sense of responsibility of maintaining a connection undesired here and which exposes us to such peril at home ... But I doubt much whether Confederation will save us from Annexation.

Even in his assertion that the people had the right to pronounce upon any contemplated change in the constitution of the country, Anglin could hardly be called wrong. His was the voice of the future on this issue whereas the belief that only parliament need be consulted on such an important issue, was the voice of the past. Indeed the points on which Anglin was correct were virtually innumerable.
Let it not be thought, however, that Anglin was completely right. His Irish upbringing had given him a phobia about union which made him set preconditions which were virtually impossible to obtain. He did not recognize the advantages that union would bring. He did not see, for instance, that within Confederation, New Brunswick would have a partial insurance policy against the economic disasters that had struck that province periodically. One can also perhaps criticize Anglin's tendency to provincialism but as has been shown, this was closely connected with his vision of the larger destiny of British North America. Only from a centralist nationalist point of view can loyalty to one's province be termed 'bad'. Perhaps the greatest weakness of Anglin's argument was his suggestion that the time for union had not arrived. That view may have had a good deal of validity, but if he supported the concept of union, as he claimed he did, he ought to have seen that at no point in time would conditions for union be perfect. His attitude really amounted to: 'What therefore God hath rent asunder, let not man join together'!

Strangely enough, perhaps, Anglin accepted the defeat of 1866. He saw that further struggle would be in vain and in the year between the election and July 1, 1867, the Freeman's campaign against Confederation was half-hearted. Although Anglin's spirits rose occasionally, he realized that it was futile to hope that the consummation of Confederation could be prevented. He suspected that the London Conference would merely "harmonize the [Quebec] Scheme with the views of the representatives of the Maritime Provinces, and yet not alter or modify anything ..." While this is not exactly what happened, it is a reasonable generalization of what did. Resignedly and unhappily Anglin resolved to accept Confederation. But his acceptance was tempered by bitter memories and he welcomed the proclamation
of the British North America Act with these in mind.

Yesterday at 12 o'clock, noon, we became Canadians, by Act of Parliament.

Let us be duly thankful.

For the people, the good they were promised or the evil with which they were threatened, are all yet in the immediate future.

For the politicians, the elysium for which they longed was opened weeks ago. 173

Anglin quickly adapted to the change of political environment. The walls of the building, which was to be known as Canada, were very weak and incomplete. Good carpenters were required and Anglin was willing to continue his work, despite the fact that he had lost the struggle over whether the roof or the walls should be completed first. The shiny roof of union gleamed from afar in the sunlight but a close examination showed that the building was far from complete. Anglin did not want the building to collapse and he threw himself into the work of construction. He did not want to see the same thing happen to the new country as had happened to New Brunswick. For New Brunswick had, in Anglin's view, expired, and the Freeman gave it a decent burial. On June 15, 1867 it carried the following obituary notice:

Died, - at her late residence in the City of Fredericton, on the 20th day of May last, from the effects of an accident which she received in April, 1866, and which she bore with a patient resignation to the will of Providence, the Province of New Brunswick, in the 83rd year of her age.

Yet even while building the coffin, Anglin, the political carpenter, was becoming interested in the house that was being built for the new Dominion of Canada.
FOOTNOTES

1 New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), Nov. 17, 1865.
2 Freeman, Nov. 25, 1865.
4 P.A.C., George Brown Papers, Gordon to Brown, Dec. 21, 1865. Undoubtedly Anglin was one of those "friends" (see Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Nov. 14, 1865).
5 Freeman, Jan. 17 and Dec. 2, 1865.
6 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 97 (Apr. 6).
7 P.A.C., New Brunswick, Lieutenant Governor's Correspondence, Duplicate Despatches, Gordon to Cardwell, Dec. 4, 1865; and Freeman, Dec. 2 and 5, 1865.
9 Quoted in Freeman, Dec. 2, 1865. For more of the same see P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection), R. B. Cutler to T. Hanford, Dec. 2, 1865, enclosed in Hanford to Tilley, Dec. 2, 1865; Charles Connell to Tilley, Dec. 5, 1865; S. J. Gore to Tilley, Dec. 5, 1865; and A. R. McClelan to Tilley, Dec. 15, 1865.
10 Freeman, Dec. 2, 1865.
11 Ibid., Dec. 5, 1865.
12 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Nov. 14, 1865.
14 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Nov. 14, 1865.
15 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Dec. 4, 1865. One reason Gordon suggested for the unpopularity of the Government was its refusal "to act with the injustice and partiality required by their supporters."
16 Ibid. Gordon stated that some of the opposition, who wanted power even more than union, clamoured for an immediate dissolution.
18 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, E. Willis to Tilley, Dec. 4, 1865; News quoted in Freeman, Dec. 21, 1865; and Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Nov. 14, 1865. Anglin strenuously opposed Wetmore becoming Attorney General because of his lack of experience (see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 95 (Apr. 5)).
19 Freeman, Jan. 11, 1866. See also Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 14, 1866.
20 Freeman, Jan. 11, 1866.
21 Ibid., Jan. 20, 1866.
22 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Nov. 6, 1865.
23 Ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Jan. 15, 1866.
24 U.N.B.A., Lord Stanmore (Arthur Gordon) Papers, F. W. A. Bruce to Gordon, Aug. 25, 1865. See also the printed Report of the Conferences between the Colonial Delegation and the Committee of Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, found in Macdonald Papers, CXLV.
25 Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Galt to Tilley, Feb. 13, 1866.
26 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), undated [January ?, 1866].
27 Ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 9, 1866.
28 Unfortunately, Gillmor's exact scheme is not known and can be surmised only in part from Anglin's letter to him (see ibid., Anglin to Gillmour, Feb. 10, 1866).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 9, 1866.
32 Ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 13, 1866; and John W. Cudlip to Gillmor, Feb. 13, 1866. Anglin divulged the contents of this note to both Gillmor and Cudlip (who had replaced Anglin on the Executive Council) in spite of it being a private letter, a fact which showed that Anglin was no more trustworthy than anyone else in keeping private information to himself when it would be useful to his party.
33 Cardwell Papers, Anglin to Gordon, Feb. 15, 1866, enclosed in Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 20, 1866.
34 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 9, 1866.
35 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 12, 1866. The opposition was fully conversant with developments (see N.B.M.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Fisher to Tilley, Feb. 10, 1866; U.N.B.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Tilley to Rev. E. McLeod, Feb. 14, 1866; and P.A.C., Correspondence of the Military Secretary of the Commander of the Forces: Fenian Correspondence, CLXXXVI A, Mitchell to Gordon, Feb. 1, 1866). Gordon reported his movements to Lord Monck (see P.A.C., Canada, Governor General's Office, Telegrams, II, Gordon to Monck, two telegrams, Feb. 16, 1866). The big four of Gordon, Wilmot, Tilley and Mitchell had agreed that it would be best to meet the existing legislature even if a dissolution followed.
36 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 21, 1866.
37 Freeman, Feb. 22, 1866.
38 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 21, 1866.
39 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 10, 1866. See also ibid., Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 19, 1866.
40 Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, March 5, 1866.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., LXIII, Gordon to Cardwell, Feb. 12 and 21, 1866.
43 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 104 (Apr. 7).
48 They could not, it seems, have ended the discussion at all without the acquiescence of the opposition. On this point Professor MacNutt states that "at any time" Smith "could have brought closure to the debate ..." (see MacNutt, op. cit., p. 445). The present writer contacted Professor MacNutt about this passage and in a letter dated August 23, 1967, he replied that the word closure "was used in the more figurative and general sense." It appears to the present writer that as there was no closure rule to be invoked, the opposition could have filibustered as long as they wished.
Quoted in Freeman, March 13, 1866.

Freeman, March 13, 1866.

Ibid., Apr. 10, 1866.

As there was a problem involving the official reporters, it is necessary to consult the St. John Daily Evening Globe's account which was copied by the Freeman, Apr. 10 and 12, 1866, as well as New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, pp. 94-105 (Apr. 5-7).

Freeman, Apr. 12, 1866.

New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 103 (Apr. 7).

Ibid., p. 105 (Apr. 7).


Freeman, Apr. 17, 19 and 24, 1866.

Ibid., Apr. 24, 1866.

Ibid., Nov. 23, 1865.

Ibid., Jan. 25 and Feb. 13, 1866.

Ibid., Jan. 2, 1866.

Ibid., Nov. 25, 1866.

Ibid.


Freeman, Nov. 25, 1865.

Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Sir F. Bruce, Dec. 2, 1865. This was in response to Bruce's warning (see Stanmore Papers, Bruce to Gordon, Dec. 2, 1865).

Freeman, Dec. 9, 1865.

Ibid.

Ibid. Anglin was unhappy that the officials of the city did not let the citizens know exactly what was happening.

Ibid., Dec. 12, 1865.

Ibid., Dec. 30, 1865.

Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, Ryan to Tilley, Dec. 7, 1865.


Ibid., LXIII, Connolly to Gordon, enclosed in Gordon to Cardwell, Jan. 15, 1866. This letter was reprinted, after being toned down according to the Archbishop's request (see Correspondence of Military Secretary ..., CLXXXVIA, Connolly to Gordon, telegram, Jan. 4, 1866), in many newspapers and as Appendix II of T. D. McGee's The Irish Position in British and in Republican North America: A Letter to the Editors of the Irish Press Irrespective of Party (Montreal: M. Longmoore and Co., 1866).

Quoted in Freeman, Jan. 20, 1866.

Quoted in Freeman, Jan. 4, 1866.

Freeman, Jan. 20, 1866.
78 Ibid., Jan. 11, 1866.
79 Quoted in ibid., Jan. 4, 1866.
80 Quoted in Freeman, Jan. 4, 1866.
81 Gillmor Papers, Boyd to Gillmor, Jan. 9, 1866.
82 See News and Intelligencer, quoted in Freeman, Jan. 23 and 30, 1866.
In this context it is interesting to note that Tilley was writing to the editor of the Religious Intelligencer, suggesting that he copy certain "Fenian articles in the 'Globe' ...." (see Tilley Papers (U.N.B.A.)
Tilley to McLeod, Feb. 14, 1866). This letter is about the only evidence that exists showing that Tilley himself actively promoted the Fenian-
anti-Catholic campaign. There is, however, a good deal of circumstantial
evidence.
83 Quoted in Freeman, March 24, 1866.
84 Freeman, Jan. 30, 1866. See also ibid., Feb. 20, 1866.
85 Ibid., Jan. 30, 1866.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., Jan. 20, 1866.
88 Ibid., Feb. 3 and 6, 1866.
89 Ibid., Feb. 3, 1866.
90 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1866.
91 Ibid., Jan. 11, 1866.
92 Quoted in Freeman, Apr. 12, 1866.
93 There is some confusion about whether Anglin was talking about Fenians or
Young Irelanders when he said he could not speak harshly about them. The
official Debates suggest that he was talking about Fenians (see New Bruns-
wick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1866, p. 105 (Apr. 7) ) and the
Morning Telegraph (St. John) was of the same opinion (see Telegraph,
May 22, 1866). The Globe's account, which the Freeman copied, suggests
that he was referring to the Young Irelanders (see Freeman, Apr. 12, 1866).
It would seem highly unlikely that Anglin would have committed political
suicide by voicing sympathy for the Fenians. In later years he denied
that he ever said "that he could not find it in his heart to say any-
thing against the Fenians" (see Freeman, Aug. 19, 1882). In the course of
the official report of Anglin's speech, the official reporter, J. Marche,
apologized for failing to do justice to Anglin's speech (see New Bruns-
94 Freeman, Sept. 26, 1866.
95 Ibid., Oct. 5, 1866. Forbes denied that he had anything to do with the
British American Association.
96 Charles Fisher had been anxious for this to be the case (see Macdonald
Papers, Fisher to Macdonald, Feb. 21, 1866).
97 Ibid., LI, Tilley to Macdonald, Apr. 20, 1866.
(Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1956), p. 435. The Freeman
claimed that the Confederates spent $50,000 in St. John alone. (see
Freeman, July 14, 1866).
99 Citizen (Halifax), June 2, 1866; and Judge Patterson, "Joseph Howe and
the Anti-Confederation League," Dalhousie Review, X (1930-1), 400-401.
100 Macdonald Papers, DXI, Macdonald to Mitchell, Apr. 10, 1866.
101 Freeman, Apr. 26, 1866.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., May 19, 1866. See also ibid., May 5, 1866.
The revenue in 1863 had been $844,894.55; in 1864 had been $1,060,815.85; and in 1865 had been $840,390.21 (see New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Journal, 1864, p. 150; ... Journal, 1865, p. 150; and ... Journal, 1866, p. 158).

Freeman, March 1, 1866. Anglin ridiculed this claim. He felt confident that Canada had no intention whatsoever of lowering the tariff.

Ibid, Nov. 23 and Dec. 5 and 16, 1865; and May 10, 1866.

There was some concern among the Confederates that Gordon had given the Antis an exploitable issue. See Brown Papers, Monck to Brown, May 17, 1866; and Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), D. L. Manning to Tilley, Apr. 19, 1866.

Freeman, Apr. 12, 1866.


Gordon estimated the number of Fenians at between 2,000 and 3,000 (see Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to General Doyle, Dec. 22, 1865). H. A. Davis thinks this estimate about five times too high (see H. A. Davis, "The Fenian Raid on New Brunswick," C.H.R., XXXVI (1955), 322).


After the raid, O'Mahony dismissed Killian from his post of Financial Secretary of the Brotherhood "for disobedience of orders, and for inaugurating movements calculated to injure and defeat the Brotherhood" (see The Irish American (New York), May 19, 1866). See also Macdonald Papers, LVII, Monck to Macdonald, Apr. 16, 1866; and Drafts of Secret and Confidential Despatches ..., I, E. M. Archibald to the Earl of Clarendon, Apr. 17, 1866.

The best account of this entire episode is to be found in Davis, art. cit., pp. 316-334. The most useful documentary material, not all of which was used by Davis, is as follows: Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, Gordon to Doyle, Apr. 15 and May 5, 1866; and Gordon to Cardwell, Apr. 18 and 20, 1866; P.A.C., British Military and Naval Records, Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Fenian Raids, MDCLXXII, Gordon to Doyle, telegram, Apr. 10, 1866; Correspondence of Military Secretary ..., CLXXXVI A, D. Wetmore to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 8, 1866; Colonel Cole to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 8, 1866; Colonel Anderson to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 8, 1866; ? Robinson (manager of telegraph office) to Captain Hallowes, telegram, Apr. 8, 1866; T. Anderson to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 11, 1866; Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Inches to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 16, 1866; and Robert Ker to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 17, 1866; and Drafts of Secret and Confidential Despatches ..., I, Archibald to Clarendon, March 3, 1866; and Archibald to Clarendon, Apr. 17, 1866. The last document is the most interesting and comprehensive of the lot.

The present writer has collected material on American attitudes towards the Fenians and hopes to continue this research in the future.

Quoted in Davis, art. cit., p. 322.

Freeman, Apr. 21, 1866.

Ibid., May 3, 1866. Le Pays (Montreal), 22 mai, 1866, quoted this article from the Freeman. H. Senior, "Quebec and the Fenians," Canadian Historical Review XLVIII (1967), 33, quotes Le Pays but does not indicate that it originally came from the Freeman. It goes without saying that the material a newspaper editor writes and the material he quotes are two different things.
119 Freeman, Apr. 21, 1866.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. The Freeman did not change its views about this in later years (see ibid., Nov. 23, 1869).
122 Killian, in 1854, had been a writer for the American Celt, a New York paper of which McGee was the editor and proprietor (see T. P. Slattery, The Assassination of D'Arcy McGee (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1968), p. 34).
123 From the evidence that is available there is nothing to substantiate Anglin's charges that the Confederates, either in Canada or in New Brunswick were in some way connected with the Fenian agitation. Yet it is not entirely impossible. The Fenian leaders were always being accused by members of the Society of selling secrets and services and the organization itself was always low in funds because of the extravagance of its leaders. The present writer thinks it most unlikely that Anglin's accusations are correct. The corollary to this is that if the Fenians were sincere in opposing Confederation they were complete fools. It is likely, however, that these Fenians really did not care one way or the other about Confederation. Their raid on New Brunswick was probably simply an effort to win support for the O'Mahony faction. As for McGee, every student of Canadian history has heard of his outspoken stand against Fenianism -- a stand that probably cost him his life. O'Mahony, in his anger at Killian, suspected that his lieutenant was in league with McGee; but this is inadequate and highly suspect evidence (see Drafts of Secret and Confidential Despatches ..., I, Archibald to Clarendon, Apr. 17, 1866). It is beyond the realms of imagination that McGee could have had enough skill and duplicity to have carried out such a program while writing and speaking so vehemently against the Brotherhood. Two excellent examples of his private convictions, which departed in no way from his public views, are found in P.A.C., James Moylan Papers, McGee to Moylan, Oct. 27, 1865; and P.A.C., Charles Murphy Papers, McGee to A. M. Sullivan (editor of the Dublin Nation), June 25, 1866.
124 Quoted in the Freeman, May 3, 1866. The Evening Globe also had serious suspicions. See quote in the Freeman, May 19, 1866.
125 Freeman, May 5, 1866.
126 Quoted in ibid., May 12, 1866.
128 On Colonel John Warren see ibid., p. 425.
129 Freeman, Apr. 28, 1866.
130 Ibid. Anglin concluded by saying that no matter what the case, he was only responsible for his own actions not those of others.
132 Stanmore Papers, Sir J. Michel to Gordon, Nov. 15, 1865.
133 Ibid., Gordon to J. R. Marshall, March 14, 1866; and Gordon to Howe (Post Master, St. John), March 14, 1866.
134 This came to light in the financial account for "unforeseen expenses" presented for 1866 and 1867 to the New Brunswick Assembly (see Freeman, March 7, 1868).
135 Ibid., Marshall to Gordon, March 16, 1866.
Correspondence of Military Secretary ..., CLXXXVIA, T. Anderson to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 15, 1866. While this information is not necessarily incorrect, it is true that correspondence dealing with Fenians is full of erroneous information given by various informants.

Ibid., CLXXXVIA, Colonel Cole to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 15, 1866.

Ibid., CLXXXVIA, S. H. Dale to Gordon, telegram, Apr. 12, 1866.

Freeman, May 15, 1866. This had been pre-arranged by Fisher and Macdonald (see Macdonald Papers, IX, Macdonald to Fisher, March 24, 1865).

Freeman, March 10, 1866. The Lieutenant Governor was not so lenient in his assessment. He claimed that the "vile Orange press" was raising an anti-Catholic cry for nothing but "temporary political advantage" (see Stanmore Papers, Gordon to ?, undated; and Cardwell Papers, Gordon to Cardwell, March 12, 1866).

Freeman, May 15, 1866.

Gillmor, papers, D. Gillmor to Gillmor, March 15, 1866.

Freeman, April 24 and May 1, 1866. Of course, the Freeman disagreed with the Bishop.

Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), H. A. Vandenburg to Tilley, April 25, 1866.


Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, McCully to Tilley, April 27, 1866.

Ibid., John McMillan to Tilley, Oct. 4, 1865; and T. W. Bliss to Tilley, May 14, 1866.

Quoted in Freeman, May 26, 1866.

Freeman, May 26, 29 and 31; and June 9, 1866.

Rogers recognized that Anglin was viewed as the chief exponent of Catholic opinion in New Brunswick (see Rogers to J. M. Johnson, May 22, 1866, quoted in Freeman, May 26, 1866). Archbishop Connolly strongly approved of Rogers' controversy with Anglin (see U.N.B.A., Bishop James Rogers Papers, Connolly to Rogers, Oct. 16, 1866).

Freeman, May 1, 1866.

Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Feb. 9, 1866.

Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), Perkins to Tilley, April 26, 1866.

Ibid., Elder to Tilley, May 8, 1866.

Correspondence of Military Secretary, CLXXXVIA, Doyle to Gordon, telegram, May 9, 1866; Anderson to Gordon, telegram, May 24, 1866; and Doyle to Gordon, telegram, May 29, 1866: and Miscellaneous Records Relating to the Fenian Raids, MDCLXXII, Gordon to Doyle, May 25, 1866. Colonel Anderson thought that the Volunteers were about equally divided in their opinion.

In Richibucto, Anglin was struck on the forehead with an egg. His reaction was interesting - i.e. "He continued to speak as if nothing had happened for a few moments ..." (see Freeman, May 26, 1866).

Freeman, Jan. 20, 1866. See also ibid., Jan. 6, 23 and 30, Feb. 3 and 27, March 1 and 10, and Apr. 24, 1866.

Ibid., March 10, 1866.

Quoted in ibid., Jan. 20, 1866.

Quoted in ibid., May 22, 1866.

The negative Anglin influence was significant. It was stated after the election that Charlotte had shown it would have no "Warren Anglinism" (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, ? Nellillier (?) to J. G. Stevens, n.d.). In Victoria, Anglin's influence was apparently more helpful to the Antis. One report had it that a priest had told his parishioners "that Anglin had done more for the Catholic Church than all the Bishops in the Provinces and that they the people must vote the Anti ticket" (see
Tilley Papers (N.B.M.A.), B. Beveridge to Tilley, June 7, 1866).
162 Freeman, June 2 and 5, 1866. See also Correspondence of Military Secretary ..., CLXXXVIA, Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Inches to Gordon, May 23, 1866.
163 See Appendix VI.
164 The Confederates blamed clerical influence for their failure (see Uncatalogued Tilley Papers, J. Steadman to Tilley, May 12, 1866; and W. Gilbert to Tilley, June 13, 1866).
165 See Appendix VII.
166 Tilley Papers, (N.B.M.A.), McCully to Tilley, June 8, 1866. See also ibid., E. B. Chandler to Tilley, June 9, 1866.
167 Quoted in Freeman, June 16, 1866.
168 P.A.C., Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt Papers, Galt to Amy Galt, Jan. 14, 1867.
169 Gillmor Papers, A. J. Smith to Gillmor, June 31, 1866.
170 Anglin did suggest to Albert Smith that he write to Lord Carnarvon "setting forth the means & agencies employed at the last Election ..." (see P.A.C., Joseph Howe Papers, IV, Smith to Howe, Nov. 6, 1866).
171 Freeman, Nov. 17, 1866. See also ibid., July 26, 1866; and Feb. 9, 1867.
172 Ibid., March 5, 1867. Anglin did not approve of the constitutional provision which allowed for the appointment of more senators in case of a deadlock between the House of Commons and the Senate (see ibid., Feb. 28, 1867).
173 Ibid., July 2, 1867.
CHAPTER 10

Adjusting to the New Era: 1867-1872

For Anglin and the new Dominion of Canada, the years from 1867 to 1872 were a tremendously important formative period. As D'Arcy McGee told the Montreal Literary Club in November, 1867: "It is usual to say of ourselves, Gentlemen, that we are entering on a new era. It may be so, or it may be only the mirage of an era painted on an exhalation of self-opinion." The early years of Confederation required a good deal of re-adjustment by many people; none more so than Anglin. Not only did the new regime demand from all Maritimers comparatively more of this adaptation than from the residents of the old province of Canada, but Anglin had been an anti-Confederate as well. He had resolved to accept the situation but it remained to be seen exactly what he meant by this. Certainly, he was suspect to the Confederates of New Brunswick. On top of this was the fact that Irish Catholics were in great public disfavour in British North America - even greater than usual - as a result of the Fenian disturbances.

Readjustment there indeed would have to be. Anglin had so many questions which demanded an answer. Where, in an age of increasing irreligion and politics of "iron and blood", was the world going? What position was Canada to occupy in the North Atlantic world? Would she in fact be able to expand from sea to sea? What position would New Brunswick and St. John hold within the Dominion? What was to be the basis of political organization and how would parties develop? What was to be the part played by the Irish Catholic community in British North America? What role was Anglin himself to play in the events which alone could give the real answer to these questions? In short, the first years of Confederation were another period of acclimatization for Anglin. Canada was to emerge as
the third country of his life. He had left Ireland in 1849 and in his eyes New Brunswick had become defunct in 1867. He was left with the new Dominion of Canada.

I

The first indication that Anglin was willing to shift his viewpoint to the new Canadian scene was his decision to become a candidate in the 1867 general election. Ever since his defeat of 1866, Anglin had stated that he had no intention of being forced into public life again. In making such statements Anglin was no more disingenuous than the thousands of other politicians who have made similar statements since time immemorial. They amount to salve for the psyche of politicians; rarely do they have any real significance. Undoubtedly Anglin desired to remain in political life. The problem was to find a constituency which would elect him. The 1866 debacle showed that he could not count on St. John. Fortuitously, at some time between his defeat and May of the following year the North Shore constituency of Gloucester had presented him with a numerous signed requisition to stand for election. In June of 1867 it was announced that he had accepted the call.

Anglin's political interest in Gloucester was long-standing. In 1860 an effort had been made by both Catholic Bishops of New Brunswick to secure the Gloucester riding for Anglin. In 1862 the House of Assembly learned that some of Anglin's friends in Gloucester had urged him to become a candidate for the county. Then, of course, he had run for St. John, but by 1867 he was willing to answer Gloucester's call. The political organization of Gloucester was quite unstable. In the 1866 election campaign the Antis had been represented by Robert Young and John Meahan. William End, the old political war-horse, had favoured Confederation but
had not carried his convictions to the point of standing for election. 8

End, a Confederate, was unlikely to support Anglin. Young and Meahan
were better prospects to perform this task and, in fact, both had signed
the initial requisition presented to Anglin. Moreover, Young wrote to
Father Paquet of Caraquet that he would work hard for Anglin’s election.

Long before Mr. A. came to this decision I made up my mind not to
offer, and I might add, that I partly decided not to interfere in
the approaching contest; but when I reflect upon the fact that the
Battle will be fought between my old political Friends (to whom I owe
my present position) and my political opponents, I feel that it is
next to impossible for me to remain neutral. I would be worse than
ungrateful if I were to turn my back upon friends who have done so
much for me, and if I can with the least shadow of consistency, having
a due regard for the interests of this section of the Province, support
Mr. Anglin, I shall cheerfully do so.

It will require a strong pull, a long pull, and a pull together to return Mr. A. I feel satisfied that every nerve will be strained by
the Government and the Bathurst House to keep him out, but if he suc-
ceeds the victory will be all the greater. 10

On top of this, Anglin appeared to have won the support of Paquet, the
Catholic Vicar General, and many priests, despite Anglin’s recent squabble
with Bishop Rogers. In fact, Anglin’s candidacy was probably a perfect
example of historical nemesis. Bishop Rogers’ quiet efforts on Anglin’s
behalf after 1860 had resulted in Anglin running in the Bishop’s diocese
with the support of Catholic priests at a time when Anglin was persona
non grata to the Bishop. A further complicating factor was the Acadian
population. At first glance it might seem surprising that a county in
which French-speaking Acadians made up two-thirds of the population would
consider electing an English-speaking Irishman, even if he were a Catholic.

There were several factors involved. The Acadians had attempted to sur-
vive by avoiding ‘civilization’, and they passively refused to play major
roles in provincial politics or great commercial schemes. Such inacti-
vity left a vaccuum which others filled—the Irishman, William End, being
the first to do so in Gloucester. Anglin was in a good position to move
into that vacuum by 1867. He was a prominent Catholic spokesman who had agreed with the Acadian tendency to oppose Confederation. Moreover, Anglin and the Freeman had always appeared as a friend of the Acadian people. He seemed genuinely concerned that they were heading into oblivion unless they made some accommodation with 'progress'.

To save themselves from evil influences, the French in these Provinces must as soon as possible have their own merchants, professional men, \textit{and} literati; they must extend their possession of the soil, acquire a proper knowledge of agriculture, and in a word take a position equal in all respects to the best. They can not remain a simple, primitive peasantry, - their retirement and seclusion are coming to an end; they must be ready to meet the world on equal terms, or they must eventually lose their distinct existence as a people.\textsuperscript{14}

Not everyone would agree with this analysis, but few would deny its basic concern for the welfare of the Acadian nationality. Anglin's greatest problem was the fact that he could not speak French, even though he had been one of those who had voted in the New Brunswick Assembly in favour of having the \textit{Debates} published in that language. This was no minor obstacle but it was not insurmountable. By and large, the fact that Gloucester was an Acadian county was no great threat to Anglin's electoral prospects.

There were three main issues or themes in the 1867 election in New Brunswick. All three were far from being clear-cut and in each case the defensive tactic followed was merely to side-step the issue rather than meet it head-on. The issues are not mutually exclusive but as there are certain differences in emphasis they may be divided as follows: the issue of the results of Confederation; the issue of the position to be taken regarding the federal administration; and the issue of the route of the Intercolonial Railway.

By the 1867 election campaign Anglin was claiming that the falsity of the promises of the Confederates had already been demonstrated. He kept
saying 'I told you so,' as the economy of New Brunswick failed to improve substantially in the year after the 1866 election had ensured Confederation. He proclaimed that Confederation "will not and can not do the good, or any material portion of the good so many foolishly expected from it."

The promises of the Smashers had not been fulfilled and the Freeman hoped that the electorate had learned a lesson.

The people will no longer listen to such cheats, but knowing, will punish them as they deserve at the approaching elections. He who once deceives will not be again trusted.17

The most typical response of the Government papers to this rather unfair criticism was to say nothing. When they did reply they quite legitimately asserted that Confederation had not proved to be a failure simply because "new manufactories do not spring up among us in a night, like mushrooms 18..." The Smasher papers, like good boxers, side-stepped even the most furious blows on this topic directed by the Freeman.

This situation was exactly reversed on the issue of party politics. What position ought one to take regarding the two Canadian parties which would form the basic political structure of the new Dominion? On the one hand, Smasher papers such as the News and the Journal put forward the argument found elsewhere in the Dominion; that union was in jeopardy unless unionists -- i.e. supporters of the administration -- were elected to Ottawa. Anglin and the Freeman, seconded by the Evening Globe, challenged this argument on the grounds that when the Union Bill passed the British parliament the question had been fully settled. As much as the Antis might still dislike the plan of union, Anglin asserted, they had realized the futility of further appeal to England and they had resolved to make the best of a bad deal. The former Antis agreed to give union a fair trial.
Confederation is now law, and we are bound to obey and submit … We are bound to do all we can to make it as beneficial or as little hurtful as possible.20

As for Canadian party politics, Anglin thought an independent posture towards them would be best.

The people of this Province generally care little for either of the parties which existed in Canada before the coalition so fatal to the Maritime Provinces, and which now promise to be revived in one shape or another, and they ought to have learned by this time that little value should be attached to any party name or designation. It matters little whether men call themselves Liberals or Conservatives, Clear Grits or Tories; but it is of much importance to know what the men who seek to rule over us are, what their principles are, and how much reliance is to be placed on their professions and promises. This Province has already lost enough by blind adherence to party, and to individuals void of principle and mere incarnations of party spirit … The people will not, therefore, be easily induced to send representatives to Ottawa to become mere hangers-on of a party. They ought to prefer men who, while willing to work with any party (no matter what its appellation) that was disposed to do what was just and fair, would above all feel bound to guard the interests of this Province, and who may be relied upon never to sacrifice the interests of their constituents for the sake of party. It would be folly indeed to send desperate party men, who from force of circumstances must attach themselves to a party which may be doomed to destruction.21

The fact that Anglin would not make a firm commitment to support the administration tended to throw him into the camp of the opposition. The News and the Religious Intelligencer thought that Anglin, along with Brown and Howe, hoped to upset Macdonald and form a Government. To this suggestion Anglin rather immodestly declared that he was "by no means in unison with Mr. Brown or Mr. Howe and he may find it quite impossible to unite with either of them as leader of a political party."22

Still, because the Smashers were closely linked to the coalition Government in Ottawa, Anglin's antagonism to Tilley and Co. naturally tended to be directed against the Macdonald administration. In a lengthy editorial on July 13, the Freeman came the closest it, or any other New Brunswick paper, ever came to making an election proclamation during the 1867 campaign. Anglin began by asserting that those who sought to rule
the country "should be able to say something more in their own behalf than that they have been Union men ..." The Dominion, he continued, must have a policy and those who have assumed the reins of Government should outline this policy to the electorate. What was to be done about the tariff and about reciprocity; what about canal extension and the opening of the Northwest? What route was the Intercolonial Railway to follow and what was to be done about defence? Anglin called upon the Government to declare itself on all these issues. The newspapers supporting the administration refused to be baited and kept quiet. Enunciating a policy could not help the Government's cause. Anyone who had read the Freeman knew that its editor favoured low tariffs and reciprocity with the United States. He would also know that Anglin opposed extravagant expenditures in advance of the country's ability to pay and knew therefore that he would preach a 'go-slow' policy regarding the opening of the Northwest and canal extension. The same went for defence expenditures. As for the route of the Intercolonial Railway, this was the third major issue in the election campaign.

The Railway route question was a most embarrassing one for Anglin. Back in 1863 he had favoured the St. John Valley route for the Intercolonial, should such a line be built. His opinion had been based on two premises which were no longer valid. Firstly, in his early stand on this issue the assumption was that the country with which one ought to be concerned was New Brunswick - not all of British North America. Confederation had changed this. Now all of the Dominion was of concern to the public men of New Brunswick, although they - and Anglin at least as much as any - frequently forgot this. The second factor involved was that Anglin had been terribly concerned to have Western Extension built. Having an
Intercolonial built by the western route would have accomplished this as well as unified the existing railways in the southern and western regions of New Brunswick. By June, 1867, however, the building of Western Extension in the very near future seemed to be assured. A changing situation meant that Anglin would feel little reticence to change his views on the route of the Intercolonial, especially if political expediency demanded it. On June 4, 1867, the Freeman stated that any North Shore representative who did not support that route would be "a traitor to those who have trusted in him ..." Obviously, Anglin was willing to go for the North Shore route if Gloucester elected him. In spite of charges of inconsistency, to which he failed to make wholly convincing replies, Anglin kept this commitment. It was a necessary political manoeuvre because it was simply a sine qua non that every candidate for election support the route which would bring the most benefits to his particular constituency.

The campaign in Gloucester presented many problems to Anglin. John Meahan, in spite of his earlier support for Anglin's candidacy, decided to take the field against him. This change of stance had undoubtedly been encouraged by Peter Mitchell, the Smasher leader on the North Shore. At the same time Robert Young had proved "worse than ungrateful" and led his powerful family in opposition to Anglin. Senator Ferguson, the influential Bathurst lumber baron, lent his support to the anti-Anglin forces, as did Dr. Robitaille, a representative of one of the Quebec ridings who attempted to influence the Acadian vote. Even Archbishop Connolly came out against Anglin accusing him of being "a Priest hunter and a reviler of the Catholic clergy ..." It was perhaps fortunate for Anglin that his second opponent amongst the Catholic hierarchy,
Bishop Rogers, was absent from the province during the election for had he been there, he would have opposed the newspaperman. In spite of all the influence brought to bear against him, Anglin won a resounding victory, polling 1,061 votes to Meahan's 671. The Freeman recorded its editor's triumph.

The chief contest in this Province took place in the County of Gloucester, where the Privy Council and their partizans made the greatest conceivable efforts to defeat Mr. Anglin. Nothing that could possibly be done was left undone; nothing that the most practised skill could divine was left untried. All that ledger influence could do; all that intimidation and bribery could do was done, and all served but to render the triumph of the people the more signal and glorious. It was indeed a glorious triumph. Anglin could not but have felt that the new Dominion would find a place for him - and perhaps he for it - as he returned to St. John with the applause of the crowds that greeted him at Newcastle and Chatham, in Kent and Westmorland and at the St. John railway station, ringing in his ears.

II

In 1867 there were several Irish Catholic leaders in British North America. The most famous was Thomas D'Arcy McGee; the New Brunswick champion was Timothy Anglin. By this time the divergence of opinion between the two was fairly long-standing. There seems to have been little accommodation since McGee's speech in St. John in the summer of 1863; the speech which the Freeman had thoroughly dissected and destroyed. Then and also after McGee's famous Wexford speech of May 15, 1865, Anglin had objected to what he considered McGee's slurs on the character of the American Irish. What had really angered McGee, however, were the insinuations and accusations in regard to the Fenian raid on New Brunswick which appeared in the Freeman. He wrote an angry letter demanding that Anglin prove or retract three specific points which had been raised: 1) that he (McGee) and Killian
had been business partners; 2) the suspicion that they were still work-
ing together; and 3) that McGee fled to America with a price on his head
in 1848. With no little bravado he concluded:

Stand forth then, Mr. Anglin, and make good your words or eat them,
or else stand convicted of slandering an absent man, for the sake of
promoting your anti-union ends and purposes.37

The real if not the literal truth of the first and third charges were
easily proven but on the second point Anglin had a good deal more dif-
ficulty. His proof here was notable by its absence:

Mr. Killian's mission to Eastport rendered great services to the
cause of Confederation, of which Mr. McGee is a prominent advocate.
So far, whether by previous agreement or not, they worked together.38

In the days that followed, the controversy continued heatedly with the
Freeman becoming almost slanderous.

[He] became a politician without principle, willing to sell
his talents to any party that chose to purchase, and trading in the
influence which his eloquence and his previous history gave him amongst
the Irishmen of Canada.39

It was obvious that there was no love lost between the two men. In the
following year the Freeman avoided no opportunity to take McGee to task.

One of the most important things over which Anglin and McGee differed
in approach if not more profoundly was the Fenian Society. McGee's way
of dealing with the Fenians, as is so well known to students of Canadian
history, was to denounce them, publicly, vociferously and totally. If
he offended tender Irish Catholic sensibilities this was unfortunate but
could not be avoided. Anglin's approach was quite different. He felt
that McGee was berating those he was attempting to influence and defaming
his own countrymen,

sometimes by admitting with mock reluctance that they were almost as
bad as their worst enemies described them; sometimes by impertinently
advising them with an air of the greatest imaginable kindness and solic-
itude not unmixed with a large share of condescension not to do some-
thing or other which only their most bitter enemies ever imagined them
capable of doing.42

Anglin gave McGee no credit for the prevention of the spread of Fenianism.

We believe that Mr. McGee did absolutely nothing to prevent the spread of Fenianism in Canada, because his language on that subject, uttered to please his patrons, was always calculated to irritate and provoke rather than to persuade. If Fenianism made little way amongst Irishmen in Canada it was we believe because their own good sense and their own knowledge of the duty they owed to the country of their adoption stood in the way ... 43

Anglin, in contrast to the outbursts of McGee, took a rather more quiet approach. Appeal to a man's better nature and he was likely to respond favourably. Anglin certainly had no wish to promote Fenianism in British North America. Fenian attacks upon the British colonies were completely unjustified and "ought to be resisted with all the force and energy of which we are capable ... " But Anglin, as has been seen, had some sympathy with the ultimate goal for which the Fenians strove, if not the methods used. He attempted to honestly assess the movement, despite the suspicion which surrounded the author of any comments about the Fenians which were not wholly condemnatory.

[T]he Fenians, however wrong and foolish their purposes may be, do not aim at wholesale robbery and plunder. They believe that English rule is ruinous to Ireland, and that a complete revolution is the only means by which Ireland can be made what she ought to be. To effect such a revolution the mass of the Fenians have proved that they are willing to make great pecuniary sacrifices, to grapple openly with one of the strongest powers of the world, and to expose themselves to almost certain destruction.45

Perhaps the arrest of his Fenian cousin, John Warren, in Ireland in the late spring of 1867 was one of the factors which made Anglin unwilling to denounce Fenianism in all places and at all times, although the Freeman expressed its regret that Warren's "patriotism and devotion to a noble sentiment" should be "so misdirected". The entire issue was one for which Anglin had to compartmentalize his attitudes: the Fenians were bad in and for British North America; outside, they might not be the worst
thing that had ever happened to Ireland—it was unlikely that they would succeed in their foolish schemes in Ireland, but perhaps it was better than doing nothing. This was a different approach than that adopted by McGee. It was also one which met with greater approval from the Irish Catholic population of the new Dominion.

Both men undoubtedly realized that the other posed a threat to his position in the Irish community. Certainly, it was expected that there would be a good deal of competition between the two men after July, 1867, for the leadership of the Irish Catholics throughout the Dominion. The contest promised to arouse some interest:

For it will be pleasant by and by to watch the meeting of Mr. McGee and Mr. Anglin on the floors of the Parliament Chamber. It will be an agreeable pastime, now and then, to see the Hon. little McGee intellectually spin round the Hon. large Anglin on his head, with his feet pointing toward the zenith.  

The 1867 session began in Ottawa early in November. No one who wanted to arrange for decent accommodations could think of arriving late, but then no one would have wanted to miss the opening of the first parliament of the new Dominion. On his way to the remote lumbering city Anglin paused in Montreal long enough to take in a concert held by the St. Patrick's Society of that city. This was no accident. The Society had rejected McGee's leadership and McGee's opponent in the violent 1867 election, Bernard Devlin, was president. Undoubtedly as a snub to McGee, an invitation had been sent to Anglin, Joseph Howe and Patrick Power to attend the organization's annual concert. The usual time for the concert—January—had even been changed in order to suit the convenience of the invited guests. Not unnaturally the Society expected more from their guests than their mere presence. Instead of singing for their dinner, they would have to speechify for their music. Anglin was not prepared for
this. His address was very halting and apologetic at the beginning. But as he went along he warmed up to the gathering. He told his audience about his political stance - no fixed party position but willing to give Confederation his best efforts. Then he told them something about the Irish Catholic community of New Brunswick - their trials and tribulations, the prejudices with which they met and the way in which he believed these ought to be overcome.

The only way to meet this opposition is to live it down - to do what is right and leave it to time to satisfy the honest portion of our fellow-citizens that we are not what they believe and represent us to be, but that we are sincerely desirous to prove ourselves, in every private and public act, to be good citizens and subjects.

By this time Anglin was working on all cylinders and he proceeded to make what might be termed a political manifesto to the Irish Catholics of the new Dominion. It was not by hiding the fact that they were Irish that they would advance. They ought not to be ashamed of the old country nor its history. It would be by living as Irishmen ought to live that they would win the confidence of the rest of the people. Anglin pointed out that it was the Irish who did much of the work - a great deal of the hard work - which was promoting the economic growth of the country. He exhorted his fellows not to look outside for help; the Irish would have to build themselves up. If they failed to rise to a position equal to others it would be their own fault. The Irish must prove they were worthy. Anglin knew that this would not be easy especially under existing circumstances but do it they must.

There never was a time in the history of the Irish people when their position was one of such exceeding difficulty as it is at the present moment. We are charged with being disloyal - with being traitors to our country. It is said we cannot be trusted, and though we enjoy the protection of this country and eat of its bread we are traitors at heart. You know that is a vile calumny - a lie. We know what we owe to the country ... It is our duty to do what is right, and let us make up our minds to do it, and then we will receive the applause of
the wise and good. We know the Government of this country is the most benign and just that ever existed, and we know that we owe to this Government unbounded and unqualified allegiance. We should therefore do our duty to our country, our fellow-citizens, and our families, and then take what comes as a matter of course.

It was quite a speech. It invoked the better instincts of his Irish listeners. It was fully in line with the speaker's practice of attempting to 'improve' the Irish while fighting for their rights. It was also an indication that Anglin would not hesitate to contest even on McGee's old stamping-grounds the leadership of the Irish Catholic community.

In the Commons, Anglin was not anxious to take a prominent role before becoming thoroughly acquainted with procedures in the House. McGee did not allow him this luxury. The throne speech debate, dominated by Nova Scotians, had nearly come to an end by November 14. Early that evening, however, McGee had risen in the House and in a speech which even Anglin admitted contained "some beautiful passages", reviewed the situation in Nova Scotia at length, proceeded thence to New Brunswick in the course of which he attacked Anglin, though not by name, and concluded by making charges of Fenianism against a portion of the Montreal Irish.

He claimed among other things, that at the concert which Howe and Anglin had attended in Montreal ten days before, the St. Patrick's Society had honoured the names of several Fenian leaders. The speech forced Anglin to his feet where he remained for an hour and a half answering McGee. He dealt at length with the "vile and infamous means" by which the Confederates had succeeded in New Brunswick. He spoke of many other things as well, but perhaps most important was his defence of the Irish of New Brunswick and Montreal "from the calumnies first insinuated and afterwards openly hurled at them by the member for Montreal West." The speech, at least according to one source friendly to Anglin, created a considerable
sensation and made the Government unhappy with McGee, for Anglin's counter-attack had produced a "stronger anti-Confederate sentiment than anything yet said." In the first clash of the two Irish Catholics on the floor of the Commons Anglin had given as good as he had received. He might even claim a victory:

It might not be amiss to state that Mr. McGee, although the assailant, left the House some time after Mr. Anglin began his reply to him, and some were malicious enough to say he ran away. Anglin and McGee did not agree on very many things by 1868. But curiously enough it was on one of these rare notes of harmony that their volatile relationship ended. On April 3, Macdonald had proposed in the House that a section of the oath of allegiance for members of parliament which was obnoxious to Catholics be struck out. First McGee expressed his gratification. Anglin followed with similar sentiments. Four days later McGee was dead.

The assassination of McGee placed Anglin in an incredibly difficult position. He had been making very harsh criticisms of the man who now lay dead. The criticisms had been made seriously - Anglin believed that McGee had been wrong in his whole approach and in his accusations. Anglin couldn't retract these honest beliefs. But there seemed to be little doubt that one or more Fenians had been responsible for the foul deed. Understandably, then, Anglin was rather reticent to talk or write about McGee personally. He tended to concentrate on other details of the tragedy, but there was no doubt about his horror, as his report to the Freeman showed.

The dreadful, the appalling crime of this morning is already known all over this Continent, and, perhaps, all over Europe and everywhere the blood of honest men runs cold as they hear of this most deliberate and most atrocious murder. It would be impossible to believe human nature so degraded, so debased to the level, not of the brute beasts, but of the fiends, did we not know that such crimes are too often
perpetrated by fiends wearing the human form. There was nothing said or done by the victim that could palliate or even account for the murder. There was no wrong to be avenged, no gain to be secured, no conceivable end to be attained, and yet the assassin must have watched night after night, dogging his steps, and waiting for the fatal opportunity, which came at last. Fenianism, of course, will be blamed for this great crime, and in no other way does it seem possible to account for it. As is well known Mr. McGee frequently denounced Fenianism and the Fenians, in language certainly not too severe or too bitter, if applied to such ruffians as this cold-blooded assassin, who, it may be, found such denunciations a pretext for satisfying his thirst for human blood.

A few hours before, and the Commons of the Dominion listened to a Speech, which, although for the greater part a thrice told tale, commanded their attention, and now the brain then teeming with thought, richly stored with learning, and quickened by a genius rarely surpassed, is at rest, and the tongue, so eloquent, is silenced for ever.

In the Commons that day Anglin was brief as he spoke on behalf of the Irish of New Brunswick and the Dominion. He acknowledged his embarrassment at the fact that the deed was undoubtedly the work of an organization of Irishmen - not, he trusted, of Irishmen belonging to the Dominion.

It is an outrage that will probably have a great effect on the future of this country. None of us can realize its effects yet. The shock is too recent, and some of us can on this occasion give vent to the feelings which overmaster us. Perhaps, after all, this is the highest tribute which we can pay to the man who has gone from amongst us.

Undoubtedly Anglin must have prayed that it had been none of his words of denunciation of McGee that had triggered the deranged mind of the assassin. At the same time the words he had written three months before in the Freeman must have come back to him - "Fenianism continues to be one of the most puzzling, tantalising, troublesome, and unintelligible of combinations." Perhaps he even began to question whether he ought to have been so sanguine about the contentedness and stability of the Canadian Irish. With McGee's death the entire Irish Catholic community came into disrepute and Anglin himself was again accused of playing fast and loose with Fenianism. But even in these days Anglin betrayed neither his principles nor the Irish community he led. He was one of the courageous
few who questioned the treatment Whelan, the accused murderer, was re-
ceiving in the name of justice.

In assessing Anglin's life as a whole the death of McGee was an im-
portant watershed. While McGee was alive Anglin had an undoubtedly able
opponent. Had he lived there seems little doubt that McGee would have
been a foil by which Anglin might have risen to much greater heights than
he did. There was already good indications that Irish Catholics through-
out the Dominion were beginning to look upon Anglin with favour while
McGee was in growing disrepute. With McGee's death this changed. The
Irish community were now in disgrace and being their leader was no asset.
Moreover, Irish Catholics seemed to react to McGee's death by withdrawing
from politics. From 1868 to 1872 there were few occasions on which the
Irish Catholic community of Canada were involved in politics as a distinct
group. This was quite acceptable to Anglin for, as he had stated in
Montreal and elsewhere, he believed that Irish Catholic politics ought
not to be isolated from more general principles. But he always maintained
that this was a two-way street. While the Irish were 'living down' their
reputation, the rest of the community had to stop discriminating against
them. Anglin appealed for racial tolerance in the new Dominion.

If this Dominion is ever to be as great, and strong, and powerful
as its founders anticipate ... all these old-world feuds must be for-
gotten, and all its people must work together harmoniously to promote
its prosperity and consolidate its strength, no sect, or denomination,
or association seeking to degrade, to pull down or keep down any other,
but each working earnestly and zealously for the elevation and aggran-
disement of all.

The Freeman was convinced that Irish Catholics did not receive this kind
of justice in Canada. The aftermath of the Fenian raids, the suspension
of habeas corpus in 1867, the imprisonment of Irishmen after McGee's
murder for months on end without charges being laid nor being brought to
trial, the systematic exclusion of Irish Catholics from office, and the ill treatment meted out to those Irishmen who tried to work their way into positions of influence, all showed to the Freeman that discrimination existed. On such issues Anglin was willing to speak out in opposition. Still, he saw no need to undertake an aggressive campaign for Irish Catholic rights. Indeed, the half-decade after the assassination of McGee produced little evidence to dispute Anglin's belief that through effort and right-living the Irish would eventually achieve a reasonable position in Canadian life. Thus while Anglin thought the condition of Irish Catholics in Canada far from perfect, he believed it was improving and was better than the situation in the United States. In his role as an Irish Catholic spokesman, Anglin found little cause to be unhappy with Confederation. But then he had not opposed Confederation on the basis of it being bad for Irish Catholics in isolation from the rest of the community.

III

One main reason for Anglin's opposition to Confederation had been his fears about what would happen to New Brunswick. Developments between 1867 and 1872 showed that he had been a true prophet on many counts. Even the first session of parliament showed the New Brunswick representatives what it meant to be a small minority in the Commons. With the exception of Tilley, who sided with his Government, and three absent members, all of the New Brunswick representatives voted against placing a duty on imported flour. Their action was to no avail; the duty was accepted. While opposing such "increases of taxation" by means of the tariff, Anglin remained stoical - or perhaps fatalistic. These things were not so much the fault of the administration "as the consequence of Confederation itself". The position of the spokesmen of the Lower Provinces became
painfully obvious.

[S]ometimes for days together a stranger would hear nothing to induce him to suspect that the Lower Provinces have lately been united to the Upper ... It is easy to observe that when the case of the Lower Provinces is brought up, those who speak of it are endured as if it were a great effort of courtesy — not to listen to them, for few do listen — but to allow them to speak. The true business of Parliament, the great majority seem to think, is whatever relates more especially to the Upper and greater Provinces, in the present, the future or the past.72

Anglin fought a rearguard action throughout the session attempting to act as a financial watchdog. Civil service salaries, projected expen-
ditures on the acquisition of the Northwest, the tariff, and other matters came under his scrutiny. He was a most conscientious parliamentarian and earned the $1157.40 he received for his work and travelling expenses for the lengthy first session. There was a particular reason for Anglin's faithful attendance. It would have been rather difficult for "T.W.A." to send to the Freeman his daily reports of proceedings in the House had its author not been present. Still, other legislators did not take their duties as seriously as did Anglin, as the following account of going into the Committee of the Whole indicates.

Some half a dozen or a dozen members gather around the clerk's table, and the clauses of the bill are passed one by one in rapid succession; while the rest of the members, who have not escaped to the saloon, amuse themselves in various ways, somewhat after the manner of irre-
pressible school boys in the absence of the teacher. Some few, more staid and sober than the rest, settle down in their seats in the hope that they may be allowed to pen a letter or perchance read an article in their local paper. Unfortunate man! vain hope! A huge paper ball, thrown from some skilful hand in the rear, scatters pen, ink and paper in rude confusion over the desk, while a seat cushion or a formidable blue book from another quarter comes thundering down upon the worthy member's head, sending his ideas in a hurly burly race after his writing material, and arousing within him the spirit of retaliation. And thus the sport commences. Paper balls, blue books, bills, private and public, cushions, hats and caps of all styles, are brought into requisition, and are sent whirling through the room in every direction.74

In the sessions which followed, New Brunswick found the 1867-68 example repeated time and again. In 1870, for instance, the tariff was again
raised in spite of opposition from the majority of New Brunswick's representatives. Anglin was absolutely livid about such impositions.

The murder at length is out. All disguise is thrown off, and Confederation appears before the people of New Brunswick in its true colours. For them all men must now see that it means more taxation and more debt; more debt and more taxation in the worst, most oppressive and most vexatious form, and less of public advantage or public service in any form. 75

There is no question that New Brunswick, especially the St. John Valley, had a difficult time in these years. In part this was due to the fact that the province never fully recovered from the 'depression' caused by the end of the Civil War. In part it was a result of changing technology which was rendering obsolete the wooden shipbuilding industry. Some of St. John's problems were caused by the selection of the North Shore route for the Intercolonial Railway, although the virtual completion of Western Extension in 1869 offset this to some extent. Moreover, the better-established Montreal banks and financial institutions began to infiltrate into the sphere which prior to Confederation St. John had controlled throughout much of the province. In fact, while not the main reason for New Brunswick's economic problems, Confederation was a contributing factor. The tariff on food-stuffs, for example, was particularly hard on New Brunswick.

Disillusionment with Confederation set in rapidly in New Brunswick. The people had been led to believe that union would solve their economic problems; obviously, it did not. As early as January 4, 1868, the Freeman could quote a number of newspapers which had supported Confederation and were already less than pleased. In the 1869 meeting of the provincial legislature, John Cudlip moved a resolution expressing the view that it would be wise for the House to consider whether the province should seek entrance into the American Union. Unhappiness with Confederation reached
a peak in New Brunswick in 1870 and 1871. Even many of the Confederate journals voiced their discontent. Anglin's reaction to all of this was rather interesting. He did not agree with those who blamed the Upper Canadians in a direct way. He claimed that it was not that they wished to harm the Lower Provinces or to do them an injustice but simply because the Maritimes did not have the political power to protect their interests.

And as Legislatures and Governments are all essentially selfish, we may always expect to see the influence of Ontario, its wants and wishes regulate the policy of the Dominion, internal and external, at least quite as much as they now do. He also rejected the theory, which some New Brunswick papers proposed, that the province's difficulties were the result of bad administration. Anglin was sure that they were inherent in Confederation itself; a change of the men in power would make little difference. What could be done about this situation? Was repeal of union the solution? What about annexation to the United States? These were two possibilities that some were talking about. Anglin supported neither. He claimed he would play no role in working up an agitation for these purposes. He had committed himself to give Confederation and the administration a fair trial and was not going to be accused of obstruction:

If Confederation fail, it will not be through any fault of Mr. Anglin's. If those who took this Province into Confederation are to be relieved in any degree from the responsibility that they owe the people, it shall not be by any act of his.

On the other hand he felt there was no virtue in ignoring conditions:

It is much wiser and more manly to take the facts and circumstances as they are, weigh and understand them thoroughly, discover if possible what is best to be done, and then set to work earnestly and resolutely to do it.

As for solutions the Freeman offered none. Irresponsibly, perhaps, but understandably, Anglin considered that such solutions should come from those who had brought New Brunswick to such a pass - the Confederates.
He preached a doctrine of quietism, at least for the moment, partly to

give an honest and reasonable trial to union, and partly because he was

not about to throw away his meal ticket. After all, he was down on record

as saying that New Brunswick would not prosper under Confederation; events

were proving him correct and he had a marvellous time saying 'I told you

so'. But there was little that could be done now. The people had cho-

sen badly but they had chosen and they would have to pay the penalty.

There was no going back now.

[I]t is no use to wriggle under the yoke which they must carry, or to

believe that any change in its adjustment can make it very much less

burdensome or less galling.  

Anglin found another reason for accepting the new federal government

at Ottawa. He could place no faith or hope in the men who formed the

New Brunswick administration. The Freeman considered them "weak in char-

acter" and lacking in ability whether legislative, administrative or par-

liamentary. When it was rumoured that Judge L. A. Wilmot was to be

appointed Lieutenant Governor of the province, the Freeman hoped that the

provincial government would not be so totally degraded by such a burden.

This is not the time, when perils surround us on all sides, to place

a rash, swaggering, conceited and empty-pated man, whose only merit

is that he has a loud voice and can string words together, in a position

of such great responsibility. It certainly is not the time to offer

a gross insult to nearly one half the population of the whole Dominion.

But the appointment was made and Anglin's interest in provincial politics

became somewhat perfunctory. The only hope for improvement, he seemed

to be saying, was the parliament in Ottawa.

Anglin's viewpoint regarding various aspects of New Brunswick's position

under the new regime provides a number of clues as to his attitude towards

the new Dominion. Anglin had vowed to give Confederation a try. There

is no question that he meant this sincerely and carried out his promise
as he thought best. But perhaps it was also a convenient explanation
for his activities. He had been, after all, a staunch and sincere anti-
Confederate. He could not just turn around to his followers one day and
say that he now accepted and supported the new state of affairs. His
'fair trial' proclamations performed a face-saving role even if this was
subconscious on Anglin's part. Not that he was really very happy with
the state of affairs in New Brunswick. No provincial resident could have
been. But even here Anglin saw some bright spots on the horizon by the
end of the period under discussion. It was almost as though he recognized,
again subconsciously, that things might have been worse and were not quite
as bad as he had expected them to be. The impotence of New Brunswick in
the parliament at Ottawa was a matter of considerable concern. However,
it is interesting to note that Anglin was the most active member of the
Commons from the province with one or two possible exceptions. Over and
over again, in spite of some of his comments, he showed his de facto
acceptance of the new system by his involvement with it. Underlying all
his complaints and criticisms was the belief that something could be done
to alleviate the situation through political means. However, he saw little
hope that improvement would result from any action of the provincial gov-
ernment. This being Anglin's view it is not surprising that he placed a
great emphasis on the federal parliament. This was the place where New
Brunswick might be able to save herself. Thus, in the various areas which
related to New Brunswick's position in the Dominion, there is an under-
lying current which indicates that Anglin was truly accepting the new regime.
It may have been an unhappy acquiescence and one which never failed to
point out the difficulties that Confederation had brought about, but it
was a basic acceptance that changes would take place within the system
at least for the time being. His very opposition to much of what was transpiring was part of his acceptance.

IV

Anglin looked at developments from various viewpoints. He looked at them as an Irish leader and as a New Brunswick politician. But he also saw them from the perspective of a significant political and newspaper figure of the new Dominion concerned with its consolidation and expansion and its position in the North Atlantic community. This third perspective was at least as important as the other two in determining Anglin's attitude towards the Canadian nation.

Anglin's attitude towards the pacification of Nova Scotia was quite predictable. He completely sympathized with Nova Scotian "efforts to be free," for there was no question in his mind that they were ill used. There was almost as little question that they would not be able to do anything about it. Imperial authorities would not countenance any great disturbance of the scheme they had so whole-heartedly supported. Furthermore, Nova Scotians could expect little help from New Brunswick Antis in a fight for repeal. Certainly, Anglin declared, they would get none from him. Still, he was definitely not enamoured with Confederation, as indicated by the Freeman after the failure of Nova Scotia's appeal to Britain.

Begotten of deceit and selfishness, cradled in falsehood, nursed in treachery, fed on lies, Confederation it seems cannot exist without a plentiful supply of untruth. It would have been enough to refuse what Nova Scotia asked for some reason of Imperial policy, real or pretended; but this would not have been consistent with the whole course of Confederation. Falsehood is essential to its very being, and so the petitioners were mocked and insulted ...

What will Nova Scotia, thus robbed, insulted, outraged now do? We can not tell. The News advises that she should now submit, and calls submission loyalty, patriotism, wisdom. This is to counsel the traveller who, betrayed by his guide, has been knocked down by highwaymen,
beaten, robbed of his purse and watch, spat upon, reviled and insulted, to lie quiet and bear it all meekly, lest he be beaten more, and his clothes also be taken from him. This may be good advice, but it is such advice as few men care to follow even when resistance is utterly hopeless.96

But Nova Scotia, under Howe's leadership, did choose to submit especially after Macdonald offered the province better financial terms. To this Anglin was not opposed but, at the same time, he stated, New Brunswick "should be ready to claim what she is entitled to - taking into account 97 revenue as well as population."

Canadian acquisition of the Northwest was another story. To this Anglin was opposed, at least for the present. In the first place it was premature 98 to take such a step. The New Brunswick Confederates had always stated or intimated that acquisition of the Northwest would not take place for some time and certainly not before the Dominion was fully organized, its revenue greatly expanded and the Intercolonial built. But even in the first session of Parliament it appeared that the acquisition would take 99 place in the very near future. To this Anglin was opposed but, he stated, there was little that could be done about it now. Confederation had been for the benefit of the Upper Canadians and they could not be prevented from "carrying such measures as they deemed essential to their welfare." 100 By the session of 1869, Anglin had come to a partial acceptance of the acquisition. One might as well get on with the experiment in nation building.

It is just as well now that the whole system should be tried out fully and fairly, and as speedily as possible, and that no difficulties should be placed in the way of the Government in its efforts to complete the Confederacy, that so the experiment may be tested to the utmost, and under the most favourable circumstances conceivable. If it is to succeed, it would be a great misfortune that its success was retarded or diminished by any mistaken efforts of those who have no faith in its success. If it is to fail, it would be well that there should be no room to doubt that it failed because success was in the very nature of things impossible, and was not in any degree owing to the opposition
of those who from the first believed it must fail.\textsuperscript{101}

There was, however, one aspect of the arrangements that disturbed Anglin.

At this time of day, and in this part of the world, no community, large or small, will very long endure an arbitrary government of any kind or form. The proposed Government for the North West is merely provisional, and it is to [be] presumed will not be maintained for any great length of time.\textsuperscript{102}

As is well-known the residents of the Red River colony were not willing to live under this form of government for any length of time whatever. With the organization of the Metis and Indians in the Northwest in the summer and autumn of 1869 Anglin could see that trouble was brewing and the \textit{Freeman} urged the Government to adopt a "just, kind and conciliatory" policy towards them. To have a war with thousands of Indians and half-breeds in that remote region would be dangerous, foolish and unjust.

It was not a problem that could be given the short-shrift that the \textit{Freeman} felt some of the Upper Canadian papers were giving it. The situation deteriorated. Anglin was severely critical of the premature action of the incumbent Governor, McDougall; he approved of the terms of the Bill of Rights drafted by the provisional government claiming that they were little different to those that the residents of New Brunswick would demand under similar circumstances; and he denied the assertion that the difficulties were "denominational". The \textit{Freeman} considered that the most important thing to avoid was the shedding of blood. If this happened no one could even guess the repercussions:

If blood be once shed, and especially, if Riel come victorious out of the contest, the chances of ever annexing that country to the Dominion will be almost utterly destroyed. How far the war thus commenced may extend – how much of blood and money it may cost – how far it may affect the very existence of this Dominion – no man can tell.\textsuperscript{109}

Fortunately Anglin was not to find out the answers to these questions for a major battle did not take place. The Manitoba troubles were eventually worked out and 'order' was restored. Anglin doubted the advisability of
establishing the 'little' province of Manitoba. He felt that because its size was so limited, the area, for a long time to come, would be controlled politically by the Metis. This would lead new settlers to take up other lands "and thus the state of things to which many now ob-
ject would become perpetual and this Province would continue to differ in population, manners, customs and probably in laws from all the Prov-
inces surrounding it." The creation of Manitoba along with the pac-
ification of Nova Scotia did point out one lesson to the Freeman:

So far, disaffection and resistance, constitutional or armed, has been successful in this Dominion. Not that New Brunswick could adopt these tactics very effectively - she had already made her bargain.

If Anglin opposed the acquisition of the Northwest as premature and as likely to be of no benefit to the Maritimes, it is not surprising to find that he was against the annexation of British Columbia for the same reasons. In his view, there was no immediate necessity for this step unless the Pacific colony was willing to come into Confederation on fair terms. As far as Anglin was concerned, the terms, both politically and economically, were ridiculous. The cost of the railway alone would probably ruin the country. It had enough problems without under-
taking such an enormous financial burden. All in all, Anglin concluded, it was a very poor bargain especially for the Lower Provinces. They would pay a goodly share but reap few benefits.

With the consolidation and expansion of the new Dominion to 1872, Anglin was not entirely satisfied. He considered that mistakes were being made and that the country was being far too heavily burdened. Yet this was not a rejection of Confederation but actually an acceptance of it. He was concerned that overburdening the country would result in its destruction
and if he had rejected the new country he would have cared about neither. One might say that he was becoming Canadian in his outlook. Certainly this was true of his attitude towards the development of Canada's position in the North Atlantic community between 1867 and 1872.

In the late sixties Britain was withdrawing from the North American continent as honourably as possible. Anglin had been correct in his view that Confederation was simply one stage of this withdrawal. But he did not realize, and it is indeed a very difficult concept to grasp, that British retirement did much to secure Canadian safety while maintaining a link, less tangible to be sure, but a link nonetheless, with the Empire. Canada became safe by becoming militarily defenceless against the United States. By posing no threat to the United States, Canada provided for her defence. In this case the best defence proved to be no offence.

Such a truth was almost impossible to foresee at the time and Anglin was certainly no soothsayer on this question. Underlying Anglin's views was his belief that without British military support Canada could not oppose the armed might of the United States. The Confederation debates had heard a good deal of nonsense spoken about the defence question. Anglin felt sure that the Dominion could not and ought not support a vast military force to replace the vacuum left by Britain.

The people of the Dominion are, it is true, quite ready to do their duty to the Empire; but they are not quite willing that the country shall be made one vast camp, and that all their energies and all their means shall be devoted for all time to the creation and maintenance of an armed force.\footnote{117}

While Anglin was not anxious to spend large amounts of Canadian money on defence, he was not nearly so niggardly with the resources of the British taxpayer. To his dismay, however, he saw that British military withdrawal would proceed despite Canadian desires, as he had always said it would
if Confederation were accepted. 118

We do not wish the troops to be withdrawn. The chief benefit the connection with Great Britain now confers upon us is that she furnishes us with an army and navy which cost us nothing, but bring us a good deal of money in return. Nevertheless we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the troops are leaving. 119

There was no question in his mind that this was throwing Canada into a position of independence.

The truth is that the British Government have felt ever since the great military strength of the United States became manifest, that their military occupation of these Provinces was one of the two great weaknesses of the Empire. They could not withdraw their troops without dishonour when danger was imminent, or while the Alabama claims were unsettled, but the Alabama claims they have resolved to settle on almost any terms despite all their former protestations, and when that is done, and the new Confederacy, whose silly boastings are encouraged, can be said to be able to stand alone, then indeed will the broad door of independence, on whose threshold we now stand, be thrown wide open, and it may be will even be forced to enter. 120

Within the next ten or twenty years, he claimed, it would be decided "whether we are to remain part of the British Empire in name, or be independent, or be absorbed by the neighbouring Union." 121 The transplanted Irish Catholic was not very sympathetic towards the British position on the question. At times his strictures amounted to a charge of cowardice, or at least, of shirking its responsibilities. The slowness of Britain's withdrawal was simply a face-saving device by which it would be claimed 122 that colonists desired independence. While able to criticize, Anglin was not able to make positive suggestions. He claimed that the real responsibility for providing and preparing for the future rested with those 123 who had brought about Confederation. The real reason for Anglin's neutrality on this issue was probably not any ideological principle but simply because he did not know what course ought to be followed. He did not want annexation 124 but had always held the opinion that independence must lead to it - and independence was quickly approaching. The alternative that some were suggesting - Imperial Federation - Anglin considered
to be utopian and a "mere chimera".  

By the beginning of 1870 the situation seemed to have changed. The American armies had been disbanded and British panic to escape the North American continent subsided although the withdrawal continued. At the same time Anglin's views began to change and clarify. In a sense it was a return to his earlier position formulated during the Confederation debates that a quasi-independent Canada would reap the drawbacks of the imperial connection but few compensating benefits. The aftermath of the Fenian raids of 1870 must have jogged Anglin's memory of his earlier contention.

While we complain that because of our connection with the Empire and Great Britain's neglect of its obligations to us, we are compelled to bear, almost alone and unaided, the brunt of the Fenian quarrel, which is essentially Imperial and in no special sense ours — and while we contend that it is the duty of the Empire to establish order and good government in the Red River country, which was until lately, if it is not at this moment, absolutely independent of Canada — the Times tells us that the people of England permit their Government to do the little they are doing only because they hope that they are soon to be rid of these North American questions; that the functions of British troops, and the expenditure of British money, and the responsibility of the British Parliament, will cease when the work of Confederation has been completed and Great Britain may honourably declare that we shall regulate our internal affairs with no interference whatever from the Empire — those internal affairs comprising, as it seems, Fenian invasions, Red River rebellions &c.  

Shortly after noting this British attitude, Anglin proceeded to draw the obvious conclusion that if removal of British military support would somehow make Canada safer from American attack, then "a separation in name as well as in fact would still more effectually remove any such temptation."

While the British flag floats in this Dominion, and while it is known to the world as British territory, its invasion will always be inevitable in case of a war between Great Britain and the United States. Lord Granville is mistaken if he imagines that Great Britain can evade or avoid the disgrace of having her territory overrun by removing her troops beyond the reach of the armies of the United States, and leaving Canada alone to bear the brunt of a contest not her own.  

Obviously there were two solutions to this state of affairs. The first,
continued British military presence in Canada, seemed impossible given prevailing British policy and attitudes. The second, independence, was a distinct possibility, but the danger that annexation to the United States might be the logical conclusion seemed equally possible. There was, however, a third solution. Suppose the United States and Great Britain were able to come to an agreement of the issues that divided the two countries and established an *entente cordiale*. Would this not make Canada safe?

Anglin first heard that a High Commission was to meet in Washington to resolve Anglo-American differences on his way to Ottawa for the 1871 session. His initial reaction was a fear that Canadian interests would be sacrificed. Unquestionably, Anglin felt, the negotiations would be a very significant factor in deciding the future of the imperial tie.

If Great Britain negotiates respecting our rights but to surrender them, about our interests but to sacrifice them, and appoints our leading politician one of the High Commissioners but to make us seem to assent to our own loss and humiliation, the connection will no longer serve to protect our rights, promote our rights, or gratify our feelings. If, however, these gloomy anticipations should prove unfounded, and Great Britain should once more prove herself a true protector of her colonies, the advocates of Independence may be forced to regard their theory as Utopian.

It would be necessary for Canada to watch over its own interests very carefully. Immediately after terms of the Treaty of Washington were made public, Anglin took a stand from which, unlike many other public men, he never wavered. He acknowledged that Anglo-American amity was greatly to be desired:

Every one must have desired to see the questions at issue between the two countries settled on fair terms. Most persons would be willing to sacrifice much in order to obtain such a settlement. War between Great Britain and the United States would be most disastrous, no matter who came off nominally victorious. For these Provinces, such a war would be fraught with utter ruin, and we are therefore particularly interested in doing all that could reasonably be expected of us to avert so frightful a calamity.
But why, the Freeman continued, should Canadians be the victims of imperial policy - why should they give up everything and receive nothing in return? It was not even that a lasting peace had been secured, Anglin claimed, but merely a "hollow truce". For this meagre return "the honour of the British Empire and the dearest rights and most valuable privileges of the Dominion of Canada" had been sacrificed.

It gives everything the Americans could possibly have demanded, except the absolute transfer of all British Sovereignty on this Continent ...

He had little faith that the stipulation that the Treaty would be submitted to the Canadian parliament would mean very much. In its present servile state and properly manipulated, parliament would do "anything the Colonial Office insist they shall do".

From this powerful indictment of the Treaty Anglin refused to budge. He recognized that war would be a frightful alternative but he thought that this was neither the inevitable nor probable consequence of the rejection of the Treaty in its present form, though it was a possibility. He accepted the appeal and the validity of the argument that Canada ought not to stand in the way of a great international agreement between the two countries which had the most influence on Canada. He admitted that that factor merited most serious consideration:

[Although] we condemn the Treaty as most unjust to us, we do say that we should seriously consider and carefully weigh the consequences that must follow the rejection of those portions of the Treaty which have been referred to us; because we do think that it is of very great importance to maintain peace and friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States; because we do believe that that peace would be gravely endangered by the rejection of this Treaty; and because we do not desire Independence, and do not believe this country to be yet fit to assume the burdens which Independence must necessarily impose.

Even though these considerations had due weight in Anglin's mind he could not bring himself to accept the Treaty. Acceptance of it would be a greater betrayal of Canadian interests than rejection. Then too, Britain was
carrying out the final phase of its withdrawal from North America during the fall of 1871. Canada would soon have to face the American colossus alone in any case.

Soldiers gone, fortresses dismantled, armories, arsenals and magazines emptied of their contents, what remains to bind us to the Empire but that the Imperial Government appoints a Governor whom the Dominion pays, claims the right of annulling the most solemn decisions of the Canadian Parliament, disposes of our territorial rights to conciliate the United States and exercises some of the rights of sovereignty without giving the protection which the Sovereign is always bound to afford. If the connection means to us constant sacrifices on our part without any corresponding benefit, if it means to Great Britain an increase of responsibility and danger without any compensating advantages how long will the connection last? 135

If this was to be the case why then sacrifice Canadian rights in the hope of maintaining a connection which could not last? Not surprisingly, Anglin spoke and voted against the Treaty of Washington when it came before the Commons in 1872. His views counted for little, however, for much in the manner that Anglin had said would be the case, the Treaty was accepted. The Freeman remained convinced that no real compensation would result from this action.

If any persons really entertained the idea that our sacrifice of our interests for the sake of the Empire and a Bribe [the loan guarantee which Macdonald had succeeded in winning from the British Government] is calculated to win either respect, admiration or thankfulness for us from the people of England, or to strengthen the connection between the country and the Empire, the delusion will soon be dispelled. 137

By 1872, therefore, Anglin was pessimistic about the longevity and value of the imperial connection. His views had followed an interesting but logical progression. In his opposition to Confederation he had seen that the weakening of the British tie would be the inevitable result, and had opposed the scheme on that ground. But at the same time he had seen that a quasi-independent nation might be in a more perilous position than one which was independent. In the five years after 1867 his views had vacillated back and forth, not knowing if the imperial tie could be
saved, not sure whether if it could it would be useful to do so. But by 1872 it was clear that Anglin had become a nationalist of some variety. In fact, he had always viewed the imperial tie through rational rather than emotional eyes. What good was the connection doing for British North Americans? - this was the question he had always asked. On the other hand he did not wish to join the United States. There was more of an emotional ingredient in this attitude but again it was based in large part on his reason. What he was left with was a patriotism towards his land of birth and his land of adoption. Since Confederation the latter was no longer New Brunswick but the larger entity, Canada. In time, and actually fairly easily, Anglin transferred his loyalty to Canada. By 1872 he was coming to decisions on external affairs at least, from a purely Canadian viewpoint. It was not the first time, and certainly not the last, that a person found his Canadian patriotism in dealing with the people of other nations. Anglin might not have approved of the development of the North Atlantic community in these years and found many occasions to twit the arguments of those who had supported Confederation in order to preserve the British connection, but when all was said and done, Canada was what he was left with. The debate on the Treaty of Washington showed that he had come to realize this fact. He had become committed to Canada.

V

Based on the theory that happy men do not foment revolution, the final means of judging Anglin's attitude towards the new Dominion as it developed, is an examination of his personal condition. Anglin had gone to Ottawa in 1867 thinking "how unpleasant and even worse it will be to leave family and home and business for months and live so far away ... " On arriving there, he found the place busy and crowded, suitable lodgings
being hard to find "at any price". Accommodations in the House of Commons were just as difficult. Anglin would have preferred to sit upon the cross-benches or a place "below the gangway" such as existed in the English Parliament, but in Ottawa there was no comparable place. In fact, some anonymous personage had already taken the liberty of assigning seats to the more prominent incoming members. Anglin had been given a seat behind the Rouge leader, A. A. Dorion, on the end of the second row closest to the Speaker. The adjoining seat was to be filled by Albert Smith. Subsequent developments showed that this was not an inappropriate position for Anglin.

After Confederation, as is well known, the Government had a much easier time in forming party ties than their opponents. This was partly due to the simple fact that the Government had to govern the country. This was a positive task and required at least a minimum of unity and also provided the patronage which aided this unity. In contrast, the opposition had no real purpose to serve by becoming a unified group. Opposition to the Government could be as vigorously prosecuted without unity. Nevertheless, the divergent elements of the opposition, under the leadership of the largest group, the Ontario Reformers who looked to George Brown and his Globe for leadership, gradually built up common links and began to realize that to overthrow the Macdonald regime greater co-operation would be required.

The attitude Anglin had displayed towards parties in the 1867 election did not change overnight. Despite the recognition that Anglin was certainly no thick-and-thin ally of the Government, even the New Brunswick press did not think it too wild to assume in the summer of 1868 that if Tilley resigned from the cabinet Anglin would take his place. In fact
it was stated at that time that Anglin's words of opposition to the Government were meaningless and that in reality he was hoping to win a cabinet post. Of course, Anglin denied this accusation but one might be sceptical of his protestation. There was no reason for him to have refused such an offer. As 1868 wore on into 1869 the Freeman's position changed little. It continued to criticize various writings of the organ of the Ontario Grits, the Toronto Globe. When the Globe appeared to be balking at the expenditure for the Intercolonial Railway, the Freeman was quick to sound a warning: "If this is the political morality of the Globe, and of the party for whom it speaks, they certainly need expect little aid from the Lower Provinces." But if Anglin did not agree with the Grits he was most certainly not a Government supporter. In the sessions from 1867 to 1870 he voted against the Government over half the time and with increasing regularity.

1870 brought important developments. For one thing Anglin's wife and possibly their young family, by this time two boys and a girl, were in Ottawa for at least part of the session. Undoubtedly this made Anglin feel more at home in the capital so far from St. John. Moreover, during the session of that year attempts were made to unify the opposition elements in the Commons. Obviously, Anglin could not be overlooked in the search for talent and by November the Globe was to be found defending Anglin's honour and intimating that he was worthy of entering a Reform cabinet should one be formed. Only one year before the Globe had labelled the Freeman as a ministerial paper. Still, Anglin was not an easy fish to land. In December, 1870, Anglin was to be found writing to Sir John A. Macdonald about patronage for a political friend. It may be that Anglin was attempting to see if Macdonald could make him a good
offer before leaping on the Reform bandwagon, although the language of the letter would tend to dispute this interpretation. In any case the Prime Minister was convinced that Anglin's position had already been defined by the Globe. On top of this, if one is to believe Macdonald's own words, he considered Anglin to be disloyal and an annexationist.

His belated answer to Anglin was blunt if not downright insulting. "My principle is," he stated, "reward your friends and do not buy your enemies."

From this point on Anglin gravitated slowly but surely towards the Reformers, though he did not hesitate to argue with the great Globe on matters of concern to New Brunswick. In October of 1871 Anglin wrote what appears to be his first letter to Alexander Mackenzie. It concerned itself mainly with answering a business enquiry Mackenzie had made but it went on to give advice on certain political matters. The 1872 session of parliament, with its two great issues of the Treaty of Washington and New Brunswick schools moved Anglin even further into the Reform camp, and a letter he wrote to Mackenzie after the 1872 election showed very clearly which side he had been pulling for. Thus by 1872 Anglin had gone far to acclimatize himself to the Canadian party system. By that time he had adjusted himself to Ottawa and the House of Commons. And much as he would have hated to admit it, the fact that he was a prominent member of the House of Commons helped him to think kindly towards the new regime.

On other levels his life was quite satisfactory as well. His family was expanding quite nicely. His financial condition is difficult to assess but it would appear that he was above the poverty line and had enough surplus to be a stockholder in the Commercial Bank of St. John.
the number of dinners he attended and the number of toasts to which he was asked to reply during the period, it would seem that either he was becoming acceptable to St. John society or he was one of the few that could hold his drinks. Probably there was a little bit of both involved. One strange aspect concerning Anglin's social life is that he apparently took almost no role in any club or organization in St. John. In fact, with the exception of his activities during his first year or two in the city and occasional committees connected with the Cathedral, Anglin's name never comes up as a member of the executive even of such organizations as the Irish Friendly Society. There may be several explanations for this. Anglin was a conscientious editor of a morning newspaper. This meant, of course, that many evenings were spent looking after the Freeman. Also, one cannot but think that politics, religion and family took up any spare time the Freeman did not consume. The final explanation was that he did not need personal membership in many of these groups for the simple reason that he could exercise influence and keep abreast of developments through his friends and employees. John O'Brien was a good example. He was a young employee in the Freeman office and held numerous executive positions in various organizations, especially temperance movements, before his tragic death in 1873 at the age of twenty-three.

During this period Anglin was having considerable success with the Freeman. The newspaper suffered in quality while he was in Ottawa for he did not give free rein to his assistants while he was away. Consequently there were few editorials worthy of note for a couple of months each year. On the other hand the readers of the Freeman had first-hand reports from the House of Commons. There were the usual problems with
the Post Office not delivering papers to places at a distance from St. John, but the circulation of the Freeman seemed to show a considerable increase during the period. In February, 1871, the Freeman was available for sale at eleven places in St. John and vicinity and five other places in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Twelve months later it was selling at sixteen spots in and around the city and three places outside. As well, subscribers were to be found throughout the province. While no exact circulation figures are available the Freeman was prosperous enough for Anglin to buy new type in 1872. At the same time the Freeman expanded from seven to eight columns on each of its four pages.

Yes, things were going rather well for Anglin. He had even been found not guilty in a libel suit which a Mr. James G. Forbes had brought against him. The editor had been backed by an "Anglin Libel Suit Expenses Fund" committee and the jury which even contained several Masons had decided that the freedom of the press gave room for the material which Anglin had printed about strange proceedings of the St. John Common Council concerning ferry matters in the harbour. Thus in personal as well as in other matters Anglin must have thought that the Confederation experiment was worth continuing. When all aspects of his life during the first five years of the New Dominion are considered it seems certain that the Irish Catholic anti-Confederate had come to terms with the new regime. He did not like all aspects of it but there was little reason for him to wish for another state of affairs given the fact that a return to previous conditions was impossible. He had given Confederation a 'fair trial' and had not found it entirely wanting.
FOOTNOTES

2 Freeman, June 12 and Nov. 24, 1866; and March 12, 1867.
3 Gleaner (Miramichi-Chatham), June 29, 1867. The author has been unable to find the exact date of the requisition to Anglin. By June of 1867 the invitation apparently had been offered to him "some time ago" (see R. Young to the Very Rev. J. M. Paquet, V.G., June 24, 1867, quoted in Freeman, Dec. 28, 1867). The Freeman of August 31, 1867, stated that the offer had been made "early in 1866". A more detailed coverage of the federal election in New Brunswick is given in W. M. Baker, "T. W. Anglin and the Federal Election of 1867 in New Brunswick" (unpublished History 554 paper, University of Western Ontario, 1968).
4 Gleaner, May 9, 1857; and Freeman, Oct. 2, 1860.
5 Roman Catholic Diocese of St. John Archives, Bishop John Sweeney Papers, James Rogers to Sweeney, Oct. 30, 1860. Rogers wanted to have Anglin represent Gloucester but when he found that the local priests had some of their own favourites, he thought that "it might be considered indecent in me, a comparative stranger in the Province, to become too urgent in political matters so soon after my appointment." He decided to work quietly on the matter.
6 Freeman, Apr. 24, 1862.
7 The incredible complexity of Gloucester politics is perfectly illustrated in "A Committee Man" to Editor, Jan. 17, 1868, in Freeman, Jan. 23, 1868.
8 Gleaner, June 16, 1866.
9 Freeman, Sept. 26, 1867.
10 Young to Paquet, June 24, 1867, quoted in Freeman, Dec. 28, 1867.
11 Freeman, Aug. 29, 1867.
12 Canada: Census, 1870-71, I, 320.
13 See, for example, Freeman, May 1, 1860.
14 Freeman, Feb. 9, 1861.
15 P.A.C., Sir John Thompson Papers, XXVIII, Anglin to Thompson, July 5, 1882; New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1862, p. 36 (Feb. 19, 1862). There is some possibility that Anglin may have been able to understand spoken French to some extent and it seems likely that he was able to read the language. When it was announced that classes of instruction in French were beginning in St. John in the fall of 1868, the Freeman commented that "a knowledge of French is always a great advantage, whatever may be a man's profession or occupation, and now that we are all Canadians by act of Parliament it has become almost a necessity" (see Freeman, Oct. 6, 1868).
16 Ibid., Sept. 3, 1867. See also ibid., Aug. 3, 1867.
17 Ibid., Aug. 22, 1867.
18 Morning News (St. John), Aug. 5, 1867.
19 News, July 10 and 31, and Aug. 21, 1867; and the Morning Telegraph (St. John), Aug. 26, 1867. See also the New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), Aug. 2, 1867. It is interesting that the News, Sept. 20, 1867, thought that Joseph Howe should be given a cabinet post.
20 Freeman, June 29, 1867. See also ibid., Apr. 13 and July 13, 1867; Globe, July 10 and 19, 1867; and Head Quarters (Fredericton), July 3, 1867. Anglin himself had attended a ball in Fredericton on July 1st, although he curiously denied that it was a Confederation ball (see Reporter, July 5, 1867; and Freeman, July 11, 1867).
21 Freeman, Apr. 11, 1867.
22 News, July 31, 1867, quoted in Freeman, Aug. 1, 1867; and Religious Intelligencer, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Aug. 3, 1867.
23 Freeman, Aug. 3, 1867.
24 Ibid., June 4, 1867. See also Ibid., May 21, 1867.
25 Ibid., June 4, 1867.
26 The charges of inconsistency are found in the News, July 5 and July 8, 1867 and the Reporter, July 12, 1867.
27 See, for example, Freeman, July 4 and 9, 1867.
28 Ibid., Sept. 26, 1867. See also Globe, Aug. 12, 1867.
29 Ibid., Sept. 26, 1867 — Young's change of heart seems to have stemmed from an expected appointment to the Legislative Council.
30 Freeman, Aug. 27, and Sept. 26, 1867.
31 Ibid., Sept. 12, 1867.
33 Freeman, Sept. 21, 1867.
34 Ibid., Sept. 26, 1867.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., Nov. 25, 1865. For the Wexford speech see Slattery, op. cit., pp. 285-292. A typescript copy of the speech taken from a report in the Dublin Evening Mail is to be found in P.A.C., James Moylan Papers, pp. 14341-14347. McGee himself, in an afterthought, recognized that he might have been excessively severe "on the Irish demagogues in the Atlantic Cities" (see Slattery, op. cit., p. 291).
37 McGee to Anglin, June 1, 1866, in News, June 8, 1866, quoted in Freeman, June 12, 1866.
38 Freeman, June 12, 1866. On the first charge see also Ibid., June 16, 1866. In support of the third charge Anglin claimed that McGee had escaped from Ireland disguised as a Catholic priest. His source of information had been McGee's own statement made on one occasion in St. John. See also T. P. Slattery, op. cit., pp. 34 and 330.
39 Freeman, June 26, 1866.
40 Freeman, Oct. 4, 9 and 16, and Dec. 6, 1866.
42 Freeman, Aug. 6, 1867. One of McGee's biographers states that in his hostility to Fenianism, McGee made "some errors of judgment and minor mistakes of taste ..." (see I. Skelton, The Life of Thomas D'Arcy McGee (Gardenvale, Canada: Garden City Press, 1925), p. 462).
43 Freeman, Aug. 6, 1867. This was in response to a eulogistic letter written on McGee's behalf by Archbishop Connolly.
44 Ibid., March 23, 1867.
45 Ibid. See also Ibid., March 12 and June 11, 1867. There was, apparently, a growing accommodation between the Irish Fenians and the Catholic clergy, in Ireland about this time (see E. R. Norman, The Catholic Church and Ireland in the Age of Rebellion 1859-1873 (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1965), pp. 124-125).
46 Freeman, June 15, 1867.
47 On Irish Canadian attitudes towards Fenianism and McGee see H. Senior,

48 News, March 11, 1867, quoted in Freeman, March 12, 1867.
50 P.A.C., Joseph Howe Papers, Wm. Binhin (?) to Howe, Oct. 10, 1867.
51 The account of the speech which follows is taken from the Freeman, Nov. 12, 1867.
52 Globe, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Jan. 4, 1868.
53 "T.W.A.", Nov. 15, 1867, in Freeman, Nov. 21, 1867.
55 The speech is reported in "T.W.A.", Nov. 15, 1867, in Freeman, Nov. 21, 1867. See also Slattery, op. cit., p. 429; and J. Young, Public Men and Public Life in Canada (Toronto: William Briggs, 1912), II, 44.
56 Globe, Nov. 15, 1867, quoted in Freeman, Nov. 16, 1867.
57 "T.W.A.", Nov. 15, 1867, in Freeman, Nov. 21, 1867. The St. Patrick's Society of Montreal passed a motion of appreciation to Anglin for his defence of the Irish of Montreal (see Slattery, op. cit., p. 429). McGee's charges against the Society resulted in his expulsion from its membership (see ibid., pp. 434-436; and Freeman, Feb. 6, 8, 11 and 20, 1868). To Anglin, sitting back in St. John during the recess of the premier session at Ottawa, McGee's charges were ridiculous. Had there been any real threat in Montreal which McGee knew about, surely the suspects ought to and would have been arrested. McGee, Anglin felt, was simply a culminating of the Irish people (see Freeman, Feb. 6, 1868).
58 "T.W.A.", Apr. 4, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 11, 1868.
59 "T.W.A.", Apr. 7, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 14, 1868. A Fenian newspaper, the Irish People (New York) execrated the deed and claimed it was unjust to connect the murderer with the Fenian movement (see Freeman, Apr. 30, 1868).
61 Freeman, Jan. 7, 1868. Anglin's views on Fenianism during the first three months of 1868 remained about the same as they had been previously (see ibid., Feb. 8 and 18, 1868; and "T.W.A.", March 30, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 7, 1868).
62 Canadian Freeman (Toronto), Apr. 30, 1868.
63 "T.W.A.", Apr. 15, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 21, 1868; and "T.W.A.", Apr. 16, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 23, 1868.
64 Even the 1870 Fenian raids brought forth a similar response from the Irish Catholic community as from the rest of Canadian society. The Freeman, for example, denounced the raids as a "mad and wicked enterprise" (see Freeman, May 31, 1870).
65 Ibid., Aug. 13, 1868.
66 The case of Rev. McMahon, a Catholic priest who had been imprisoned after the Fenian raid of 1866 although the evidence had not been conclusive, brought Anglin to his feet in the House of Commons in 1869 to bring forward the Irish Catholic point of view. He did this in spite of the fact that he knew his remarks would be misrepresented and bring abuse and obloquy upon his head. It was his duty as an Irish Catholic spokesman (see "T.W.A.", May 7, 1869, in Freeman, May 13, 1869).
67 Freeman, Dec. 5, 1867.
68 Ibid., Nov. 5, 1868.
69 Ibid., July 15 and 18, 1871.
70 "T.W.A.", Dec. 15, 1867, in Freeman, Dec. 24, 1867.
72 Freeman, May 5, 1868.
73 P.A.C., House of Commons Sessional Records, I.
74 Freeman, May 19, 1868. Other examples of frivolity in parliament in these early years are to be found in "T.W.A.", June 21, 1869, in Freeman, July 1, 1869; and "T.W.A.", Apr. 29, 1873, in Freeman, May 8, 1873.
75 "T.W.A.", Apr. 8, 1870, in Freeman, Apr. 16, 1870.
76 Emigration from New Brunswick was the most notable indication of these conditions (see Freeman, Oct. 12, 1867).
77 Ibid., Oct. 28, 1869. As the representative of Gloucester, Anglin was not perturbed about the selection of the North Shore route (see "T.W.A.", March 26, 1868, in Freeman, Apr. 4, 1868; and Freeman, Oct. 20, 1868).
78 J. R. Petrie, The Regional Economy of New Brunswick (A Study Prepared for the Committee on Reconstruction, 1944), p. 107. In November, 1868, for example, the Commercial Bank was forced to close its doors (see Freeman, Nov. 12, 1868). The population of St. John in 1871 stood only 1,500 higher than it had been in 1861 (see Canada: Census, 1870-71, I, 428).
79 See Freeman, Jan. 25, Feb. 4 and 22, March 12 and May 12, 1868; and Telegraph, Feb. 11, 1868.
80 See also Freeman, Jan. 14, 1868; Rogers Papers, Bishop Sweeny to Rogers, Jan. 27, 1868; and Telegraph, Feb. 29, 1868, quoted in Freeman, March 3, 1868.
81 Freeman, March 20, 1869.
82 See, for example, the Reporter, Apr. 15, 1870; and the Daily Telegraph and Morning Journal, June 22, 1870. The latter paper was a combination of the two formerly separate papers indicated in the title.
83 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1868.
84 Ibid., July 16, 1868.
85 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1868. See also ibid., Jan. 11, 1868. There are several documents in the Howe Papers showing the existence of a repeal movement in New Brunswick. On Anglin's views of Oudlip's resolution see Freeman, March 20, 1869.
86 Ibid., July 6, 1869.
87 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1868.
88 See ibid., Jan. 31, July 6 and 8, Oct. 7 and Nov. 7, 1871.
89 Ibid., Jan. 11, 1868. See also ibid., July 3, 1869.
90 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1867.
91 Freeman, Feb. 4, 1868. See also ibid., Oct. 29, 1867 and July 25, 1868. Peter Mitchell recognized that the Catholics were unhappy with Wilmot's appointment (see P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, CCXXXIX, Mitchell to Macdonald, Dec. 30, 1868). Wilmot returned Anglin's antagonism in full measure. In 1871, for example, he devoted considerable time to abusing Anglin in two speeches made at the grand opening of Western Extension (see Freeman, Oct. 24, 1871).
92 Ibid., Feb. 4, 1868. See also ibid., March 5, June 20, and Aug. 8, 1868.
93 "T.W.A.", Nov. 15, 1867, in Freeman, Nov. 21, 1867.
94 Freeman, March 5 and June 20, 1868.
95 Ibid., Feb. 4, 1868. See also Ibid., Aug. 8, 1868.
96 Ibid., June 20, 1868. The Freeman felt that Howe acted the traitor in accepting Confederation and a seat in the Government. What else he could have done it did not say (see Freeman, Aug. 8 and 11, 1868).
97 Ibid., Dec. 17, 1868. Anglin was absent from Ottawa when the votes on the Nova Scotian question were taken. He had, however, spoken in support of the Government's position on the second reading of the Bill (see Ibid., June 29, 1869).
98 "T.W.A.", May 29, 1869, in Freeman, June 5, 1869.
99 Freeman, Dec. 5, 1867.
100 "T.W.A.", Dec. 12, 1867, in Freeman, Dec. 21, 1867.
101 "T.W.A.", May 28, 1869, in Freeman, June 3, 1869.
102 Freeman, June 15, 1869.
103 Ibid., Sept. 16, 1869.
104 See Ibid., Sept. 16, Nov. 16 and 25, and Dec. 2, 1869.
105 Ibid., Nov. 25, 1869.
106 Ibid., Dec. 21, 1869.
107 Ibid., Jan. 6, 1870.
108 Ibid., Jan. 8 (incorrectly dated Jan. 11 on editorial page), 1870.
109 "T.W.A.", March 3, 1870, in Freeman, March 15, 1870. See "T.W.A.", March 4, 1870 in Freeman, March 15, 1870, in which Anglin criticizes the attitude shown by the Toronto Globe. See also Freeman, Apr. 23, 1870.
110 Freeman, May 7, 1870.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., Aug. 12, 1869.
113 "T.W.A.", March 31, 1871, in Freeman, Apr. 11, 1871.
114 Ibid. See also Freeman, Jan. 26, 1871.
115 Ibid., Jan. 26, 1871. See also "T.W.A.", March 31, 1871, in Freeman, Apr. 11, 1871; and Freeman, May 4, 1872.
116 Freeman, May 7, 1872.
117 Freeman, Feb. 6, 1868. See also P.A.N.B., Arthur Hill Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmorr (sic), Oct. 24, 1867; and "T.W.A.", May 8, 1868, in Freeman, May 16, 1868.
118 It seems likely that British withdrawal would have taken place even if Confederation had failed. See also Freeman, Nov. 26, 1868.
119 Ibid., July 16, 1868.
120 Ibid., Oct. 22, 1868. See also Ibid., Nov. 10, 1868.
121 Ibid., Feb. 6, 1868. See also Ibid., June 3, 1869.
122 Ibid., June 12, 1869. See also Ibid., June 22 and July 31, 1869.
In Anglin's eyes British failure to protect Canadian fisheries against American encroachments was the best and most concrete example of Britain's unwillingness to meet her responsibilities (see Ibid., Aug. 25, 1868; and Feb. 25 and Oct. 26, 1869).
123 Ibid., July 31, 1869.
124 See, for example, Ibid., Nov. 24, 1870.
125 Ibid., Nov. 18, 1869. See also Ibid., Aug. 10 and Sept. 14, 1869.
126 Ibid., Feb. 26, 1870.
127 Ibid., June 23, 1870.
128 Ibid., July 12, 1870.
130 Freeman, March 2, 1871.
131 Ibid., May 11, 1871.
132 Ibid., May 18, 1871.
133 Ibid., June 3, 1871.
134 Ibid., June 13, 1871. See also ibid., July 11, 1871. Obviously, Anglin was not entirely consistent in his views on what the result of a Canadian rejection of the Treaty would be.

135 Ibid., Nov. 18, 1871.

136 "T.W.A.", May 8, 1872, in Freeman, May 23, 1872; and "T.W.A.", May 17, 1872, in Freeman, June 4, 1872. See also Canada: Parliamentary Debates, 1872, pp. 606-620 (May 16).

137 Freeman, May 23, 1872.

138 It would have been more accurate to have seen Confederation as a symptom rather than a cause of British withdrawal.

139 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), Oct. 24, 1867.

140 "T.W.A.", Nov. 6, 1867, in Freeman, Nov. 14, 1867.

141 Globe, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Jan. 4, 1868.

142 Freeman, Oct. 15, 1867; and the Globe (Toronto), n.d., quoted in Freeman, Nov. 16, 1867.


144 Two of the more interesting letters dealing with the organization of the Reformers in these early years are P.A.C., Alexander Mackenzie Papers, Mackenzie to Brown, Nov. 8, 1867; and ibid., Brown to Mackenzie, Aug. 20, 1869.

145 Freeman, March 14, 1868.

146 Ibid., July 25, 1868.

147 Telegraph, Aug. 4, 1868. The Telegraph stated that Macdonald had invited Anglin to dine with him during the session, a device Macdonald employed to retain his supporters and to win independents to his side.

148 Freeman, Aug. 6, 1868.

149 Ibid., Apr. 15, 1869. See also ibid., Oct. 31 and Nov. 7, 1868.

150 The statistics to prove this assertion have been compiled by the author from Canada: House of Commons, Journals, 1867-8 to Journals, 1870.

151 This is surmised from the fact that Prince Arthur danced with Mrs. Anglin, among others, at a levee on the night of February 25 (see Freeman, March 1, 1870).


153 Globe (Toronto), Nov. 29, 1870. See also Morning News (St. John), Dec. 5, 1870; and the Freeman, Dec. 6, 1870.

154 Freeman, Nov. 4, 1869.


157 Macdonald Letterbooks, XV, Macdonald to Anglin, Jan. 10, 1871.

158 At the same time the Grits began to make a more direct appeal to Catholics. (see Mackenzie Papers, Brown to John O'Donohue et.al., March 9, 1871). A pamphlet printed in 1872, undoubtedly for purposes of the election, was devoted to the proposition that Irish Catholics were not
receiving a fair deal (especially in terms of patronage) from the Tories and urged that the Reformers be given an opportunity to do better (see J.L.F. O'Hanly, The Political Standing of Irish Catholics in Canada: A Critical Analysis of its Causes, With Suggestions for its Amelioration (Ottawa: N.P., 1872). O'Hanly claimed, for example, that Anglin was fully capable of filling a cabinet position.

159 Freeman, Nov. 2, 1871.
160 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, Oct. 24, 1871. During Anglin's political career his correspondence with Mackenzie seems to have been rather sporadic.
161 Ibid., Anglin to Mackenzie, Sept. 6, 1872. He mentioned at the end of the letter that he had received a note from Blake.
162 At least he spoke at a meeting of the stockholders (see Freeman, Nov. 4, 1869).
163 In 1869 and 1871 he attended the St. Andrews Society dinner. (see Freeman, Dec. 2, 1869, and Dec. 2, 1871). In 1869 he was at a drunken celebration of the opening of Western Extension (see Freeman, Dec. 4, 1869). In 1872 he attended a dinner held by the Sons of Temperance. Presumably the contents of the glasses at this affair were non-alcoholic (see Freeman, Jan. 27, 1872).
164 Ibid., Aug. 28, 1873.
165 Ibid., May 12, 1870; and Apr. 9, 1872.
166 Ibid., Feb. 18, 1871. At times the Freeman had been available in only four or five places.
167 Ibid., Feb. 1, 1872.
168 One suspects that the circulation fluctuated a great deal.
169 Freeman, Apr. 20, 1872.
170 Ibid., Jan. 18 and 22, and Feb. 22, 1872. The article in question had appeared on December 17, 1870.
CHAPTER 11

'Godless' Schools and Party Politics: 1872-1874

The issue which broke the general serenity of Anglin's life in the early 1870's was the New Brunswick schools question. A century ago the education problem was one major arena in which the Catholic Church in the western world fought the forces of secularism, Protestantism and all the other "isms" which it felt were arrayed against it. The famous Syllabus of Errors of 1864 had condemned education which ignored Catholic faith, the authority of the Church, and regarded as its sole, or at least its primary aim, knowledge of nature and the ends of secular society. To Catholics, therefore, the system of education was of immense importance.

Education has always been an important means of passing on traditions and faith to children. Recognizing this fact, the Catholic Church has always utilized education as a means of conveying morality and instructing communicants in the intricate tenets of Catholicism. Control of the education of Catholic children has meant for the Church an opportunity to place its doctrines into social context for young Catholics, and allows them to give sufficient scope and outlook to their religion when applying its principles to everyday life. This control of education is particularly essential when the society at large is in a state of flux, when society is undergoing a period of transformation of goals, or subject to a new form of mobility. If the variability of religious antagonism is added, the Church's demand for educational control becomes more urgent.

Western society was indeed in a state of flux. The transformation which was taking place in the second half of the nineteenth century was that which changed society into the highly secular twentieth century in which we live. Strangely enough, however, there was a good deal of religious antagonism which accompanied and in fact accounted for much of this development. The Protestant attitude towards education in North America was very different from that of their Roman Catholic neighbours. With the exception of a segment of the Church of England the former were
largely in favour of common schools to which the children of all denominations would go. The theory was that this would promote harmony within the community and integrate or assimilate segregated elements. Protestants did not adopt the Catholic attitude towards clerical control of education for the simple reason that the Protestant churches were controlled by the laity not the clergy. Finally, there was a fundamental difference between Protestants and Catholics in their attitude to the concept of a 'common Christianity'. To Protestants there were certain basic underlying beliefs which united all Christians no matter what particular Church they attended. Catholics could not accept this hypothesis - Protestants were heretics - and asserted that Protestantism was not merely a different form of the Christian faith equally acceptable in the eyes of God. Thus even when the Protestant majority was willing to allow religion to enter the common schools it could not be acceptable to Catholics. Disagreeing on fundamental principles in their approaches to education, Catholic and Protestant were destined to be at odds when the issue arose in New Brunswick.

I

Anglin agreed whole-heartedly with the stand of the Catholic Church. The state could provide for the teaching of the three 'r's, the Freeman declared early in 1860, but this was not education. True education - "to bring people up the standard which the law of God requires" - was left to some other body or institution. In the same article Anglin called into question the validity of the growing view that direct taxation would be the solution to educational problems. Such a plan might be efficacious in providing for larger and better school buildings, better books and better teachers, "but after all, the positive result of this is but
reading, writing, arithmetic, &c., -- not education; the negative results may be very disastrous." Ten months later the Freeman returned to those who supported such assessment principle and wondered why it was assumed that money collected by parish officials would do more than any other money. He questioned another underlying assumption as well, a questioning which betrayed his natural Irish distrust of the state.

They assume that the great majority of parents in the Province have no proper regard for the welfare of their children, no desire to see them educated, and that the only effectual means of inducing them to send their children to school is the compelling them to pay by direct taxation for the support of schools and teachers, as the anxiety to get value for the money they paid would be a stronger incentive than either affection or duty has proved or ever will prove with a people who, according to these theorists, are essentially selfish, care for nothing but money, and are totally regardless of their children, of whom the State should take immediate and special controul [sic] in order that they do not suffer from the guilty apathy and negligence of those whose duty it is to provide for their minds as well as their bodies.

While today Anglin's attitude towards education seems to be cavalier it was by no means unusual at a time when school attendance was not compulsory. Besides, the Irish and American examples made him wary of common schools which so frequently turned into machines of proselytism.

At the time of Confederation the structure of the educational system of New Brunswick was far from clear. The basis of the system was an 1858 Act which had left a great deal of the decision-making power to local authorities. Efforts at the time to make provincial education entirely secular had failed because of aggressive arch-Protestant influences. The irony of this was that while the Bible was accepted in the schools, provision was also made for Catholics -- "the Bible, when read in Parish Schools by Roman Catholic children shall, if required by their parents or guardians, be the Douay version ..."

Within the framework of this Act and under the leadership of Bishop Sweeny, Catholic
educational facilities grew markedly, a growth which the Freeman took pains to publicize. Catholic leaders were not afraid to ask for increased financial aid from the province. In 1862 Sweeny in private and Anglin in public both made such a request, with Anglin suggesting in the Assembly that denominational grants which had grown up year by year "should be regulated by some consistent method". Had this been adopted New Brunswick would have had the equivalent of a separate school system. But Anglin did not push the issue, probably because he feared arousing anti-Catholic antagonism in the legislature. Failure to achieve this, or at least legal clarification of the Catholic position did not seem particularly important at this time. The actual working of the system in practice was reasonably acceptable.

The schools question played no role in the Confederation struggle in New Brunswick. It was not until after the 1866 elections, at the London Conference, that Archbishop Connolly attempted to improve Catholic education rights in the Maritimes. His efforts, however, were a failure, as Tilley's letter to the reverend editor of the Religious Intelligencer indicated.

Denominational schools can only be established in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick by the vote of the Local Legislature, as for Canada, we have allowed their delegates to arrange matters to suit themselves. As well as indicating the regional, if not necessarily the compact nature of the Confederation agreement, this statement showed that Tilley did not consider that denominational schools were in existence in his native province. Anglin's interpretation of the situation at the time of Confederation was much less clear, as a Freeman editorial of over seven thousand words indicated. In this article which appeared on August 8, just a month after the Dominion had become a legal entity, Anglin regretted
that the Catholic minorities did not have the same rights held by the
Protestants of Quebec. Certainly in New Brunswick he claimed the situ-
ation was not all that it ought to be.

We all know what the state of the Catholic minority is here; how
studiously their wishes have been disregarded; how little of right
or justice they have ever enjoyed; and how grossly they were insulted
when, a few years ago, in reply to the expression, in the very mildest
manner, of their desire to have a separate school system introduced,
as far as practicable, the law was so altered as to require in ef-
fect that every school in the Province must be a Protestant school;
that in every school receiving public assistance the Bible must be
read daily. It was graciously conceded to Catholic prejudice that
they may use a Douay Bible, but then it must be without note or com-
ment. No such edition of the Bible has yet been printed. The law
was obsolete almost as soon as it received the assent; but the in-
tolerance, the bigotry and the insolence which caused it to be passed
are not less palpable.

Obviously, in 1867 Anglin recognized that the intention of the 1858
School Law had not been to create Catholic schools much less to give
them permanent public support (which would have made them separate
schools). True, special grants for Catholic schools had from time to
time been wrung from the Government, but even these niggardly sums had
aroused great antagonism amongst some segments of the Protestant popu-
lation. Strangely enough Anglin seemed to ignore his writing about the
1858 Law when he came to examine the situation under the B.N.A. Act.
Section 93 of that Act specifically states that only rights and privi-
leges for denominational schools which were in existence "by law" at the
time of the union would be safeguarded. Anglin seems to have become con-
fused between what was lawful because it was not illegal and what was
lawful because it had legally been declared so. On the one hand he
recognized that no Act had ever declared denominational schools legal;
on the other, he was convinced that the fact that the existing Catholic
schools received legislative grants and were never declared unlawful
under the terms of the 1858 Act, made those schools legal under the law.
In any case such a conception led him to make a statement which events were shortly to disprove.

The Confederation Act does one thing at all events. It secures to the minority the paltry grants they have hitherto received and such other rights and privileges as they have been permitted to enjoy, and no change can be made in the law without their consent. This enables them to draw attention to the defects of the existing law and to agitate for an amendment of that law without incurring the risk of losing the little held by what was little better than sufferance. When four or five years ago they asked for an amendment, they brought on themselves new insults and indignities. Now they can boldly appeal to whatever of honesty, good sense and fair play exists in the country.

The Freeman went on to appeal, in moderate tones, for understanding for the Catholic position on the education question, and then put forward its plan for solving the problem.

Let us all go to work in earnest and in the honest spirit of fair play to make the law what it ought to be, and we can succeed in effecting vast improvements. Let it be open to any denomination that chooses to establish schools where it can, under supervision and control [sic] of the Board of Education, the minimum number of pupils in each case to be fixed by the Board according to circumstances, and not according to any arbitrary rule. Let the Board insist that the secular education shall in these, as in all other schools, be fully up to the standard it deems necessary; but let it stop there and interfere no further nor attempt to meddle with the religious education of the pupils. In districts where no more than one efficient school can be maintained, care should be taken that the faith of no pupil should be tampered with; that the feelings of none should be hurt; that the school should be equally free and acceptable to all.

After a paragraph devoted to the necessity of improving the educational facilities in the Acadian areas of the province, Anglin ended his epic editorial on a hopeful note.

We can have a good School law - at least a much better school law and school system than we now have if we will only all go to work in earnest and in good faith. The system - if such it can be called - of special grants, so objectionable to many, can be swept away with the approbation of all. We can have our youth better educated than at present and know that the State pays only a fixed sum for each pupil it causes to be instructed and that it receives in the secular education given to each full value for its expenditure.

The first indication that a new school law would be presented to New
Brunswick appeared early in 1870 when a draft Bill was published. In three extremely long articles the Freeman presented a "synopsis" of the chief terms of the projected legislation. Non-sectarianism was not a part of the Bill and the Freeman's objections were to the great power which would be held by the Board of Education and the Superintendent and more especially to the main principle of the Bill - direct taxation. While the Bill was not presented in the 1870 session, it was clear that it soon would be. In the summer of 1870, however, the Freeman detected a new note being introduced into the question.

The News is trying to get up an agitation on the School Question, in order to enable the Local Government to reorganize or to cover themselves, when they fall, with a decent cloak.

Once again, the Freeman suspected, religion was to be used for political ends in New Brunswick. Anglin asserted that the News was attempting to arouse a controversy about separate schools. He claimed that Catholics had such schools and they were in no way inferior to any others in the province. While feeling that injustice was done them in the matter of grants, and while appealing to the public's sense of justice, Catholics, along with the many other groups in the province which supported separate schools of one form or another, were quiet "and almost passive" at the moment. But the News now was advocating common schools which "would bestow on Protestant and Catholic children precisely the same privileges, and would interfere with the faith and rights of neither."

The Freeman thought such a view was ludicrous.

Now a school must be either Catholic or Protestant, or Godless or Infidel. The News does not tell us which of these it will design to impose upon the people. We know it would not tolerate Catholic schools. We suppose it would not openly avow itself an advocate of Infidel schools. We will not pretend to say whether it is an advocate of Protestant or of Godless schools. The latter would be most unacceptable to many sincere, earnest Protestants. Catholics, of course, could not be expected to be content with either, even though
the News may think they should.\textsuperscript{18}

There were at least two things wrong with such a system. In the first place, the majority could not justly determine the conscientious convictions of a minority.\textsuperscript{19} Secondly, he felt that the state should keep its hands off education after secular instruction has been supervised and paid for.\textsuperscript{20} Following this brief flurry in the summer of 1870, a lull followed. It was but the lull before the storm.

The Government which met the New Brunswick Assembly in 1871 was weak, but shortly after the session began, a most unexpected coalition took place between George King and G. L. Hatheway. The base on which this Government had been founded was a commitment to the School Bill\textsuperscript{21} and it was brought forward with little delay. At first, opposition to the 1871 Act was concentrated on the taxation principle and therefore was not centred around the Roman Catholic population except for the fact that the Freeman had always been one of the major sceptics of this system. As the debate in the Assembly continued, however, it became apparent that a non-sectarian clause would be added to the Bill. Fear of this happening led to a deluge of twenty-two petitions in favour of denominational schools pouring in on the legislature. But these petitioners were completely ignored. Apparently the view of 5,281 persons representing a Catholic population composing two-fifths of the provincial total, meant nothing to the legislators.\textsuperscript{22} On May 5 a new section to the proposed Act was passed twenty-five to ten; section 60 declared that "all Schools conducted under the provisions of this Act shall be non-sectarian." To the Freeman this was the final blow. The Bill had been bad enough before, giving, as it did, immense power to the Board of Education which was to be composed of the Lieutenant Governor, Executive Councillors,
the President of the University of New Brunswick, and the Superintendent of Education. In men such as Governor Wilmot and George King, the Freeman could place little trust that justice would be done to the Catholic population. But the Freeman objected even more strenuously to any move which would have forced non-sectarian schools upon Catholics. It claimed that what newspapers like the Religious Intelligencer claimed to be freedom of conscience was a very strange freedom.

Its conscience cannot be satisfied with merely being left at liberty to think and judge and speak and act for itself; it must also have the right to harass, oppress and outrage others.

Catholics did not want anything outrageous, Anglin stated, just fair play.

All the Catholic petitions ask is that they be allowed to employ in support of their Schools the money which the advocates of the new system say they shall pay by way of direct taxation, and they are willing that the State shall exercise the strictest supervision over their Schools in all that relates to secular education: the only education which the State professes to give; the only education for which it professes to raise money by taxation.

Anglin was becoming quite bitter. He believed that the whole issue had arisen because the provincial politicians knew that an anti-Catholic campaign was a means of strengthening their position with the electors and would remove the sting of increased taxation. Anglin knew what would happen if the issue became a straight Catholic-Protestant division and tried to argue that the contest of the day was not between Protestantism and Catholicism but between "Christianity and Rationalism and Infidelity in all its phases."

For the propagation of Infidelity no better engine could be devised than the Common School system which excludes religion altogether and puts it out of view, thus inevitably creating in the minds of the young the impression that religion is of little or no importance in the real business of life, and leading to indifference and latitudinarianism out of which Infidelity is sure to grow in most cases. This the advocates of the system must know if they know anything of human nature, anything of the history of the world, anything of what is passing around them wherever they turn. But even though they
know it yet in their demonical eagerness to "undermine the Catholic religion" they are willing to endanger all religion to play false to Christianity and to serve under the banners of its great enemy.27

The lines were drawn. But as the Bill did not go into effect until the beginning of 1872 there was little to be gained in a public campaign during the summer and fall of 1871. In fact, during November and December Bishop Sweeny attempted to make accommodations to the new system but the authorities refused to adopt any of his suggestions which would have enabled the Catholic schools in the city to operate under the new Law.28

On January 1, 1872, the Act Relating to Common Schools came into effect. Efforts to make the Law acceptable to Catholics had failed. It was either submit or fight. To the Freeman there was no choice involved.

They will use every means their constitution places within their reach to obtain redress. They will never cease to proclaim the people of the other Provinces the great wrong done to them; never cease to expose before the world the truculent bigotry of which they are the victims; never cease to appeal to the justice and sense of fair play of the truly liberal and enlightened amongst the people of this Province, and ultimately they know religion and justice will triumph. The struggle may be long, the wrong done them may for a time be rendered more intolerable; but they are not the people to be deterred by difficulties or wearied into indifference by the length and the apparent hopelessness of a contest in which their duty to God and their children requires them to engage.

There is little room to doubt the course the Catholics of the Province will take. In all the cities and towns they have within a few years erected by unparalleled efforts and sacrifices educational establishments incomparably superior to those which received a much more liberal allowance of State aid. In these establishments their children were receiving a sound religious and secular education from societies of men and women who devoted themselves to this arduous work for the love of God. These schools they will continue to maintain ... In the country districts they will do the best they can, according to the circumstances of each locality, to make the School Act as innocuous as possible.29

Maintaining Catholic schools meant, of course, that Catholics would have to support them above and beyond the compulsory taxation for the common schools, and the Freeman pointed out what it considered to be the inequity
of this double taxation.

We are for free education - freedom in the true sense of the word. The people who are compelled to pay tribute to others who happen to be stronger are not free; the people who are permitted to exercise an admitted right only under a penalty are not free; the country in which such things are done is not free.30

The issue, therefore, was whether Catholics would be forced to support a school system of which they disapproved.31 By April, 1872, it was clear that the school system was not operating very successfully. The report laid before the Assembly at that time showed that while 731 school districts had complied with the terms of the Law, no fewer than 571 districts had not.32

In the meantime the Catholics of New Brunswick had looked outside the province for assistance. As early as June, 1871, two petitions had arrived in Ottawa requesting that the New Brunswick School Act be disallowed.33 Both petitions used the term "Separate Schools" to designate the Catholic schools which were in existence in New Brunswick at the time. This was an unfortunate mistake, for the term meant something entirely different to Canadians than the petitioners intended. From the very beginning the Minister of Justice, Sir John A. Macdonald, must have considered the claims of the New Brunswick Catholics highly pretentious and erroneous. From a Canadian viewpoint the New Brunswick school system had never given any recognition or support to separate schools. It was a bad start for the Catholic cause and one which may have had continuing repercussions. On October 5, Anglin himself appealed to Macdonald. He asked him to read an article which had appeared in that day's Freeman entitled "Is the School Law Valid?"34 The argument used by the Freeman was very complex. It claimed that one section of the 1858 Act had in effect provided that the schools should be, as far as possible, religious and denominational. That section had stated:
Every Teacher shall take diligent care, and exert his best endeavours to impress on the minds of the children committed to his care, the principles of Christianity, morality and justice, and a sacred regard to truth and honesty ... but no pupil shall be required to read or study in or from any religious book, or join in any act of devotion objected to by his parents or guardians; and the Board of Education shall, by regulation, secure to all children whose parents or guardians do not object to it, the reading of the Bible in Parish Schools - and the Bible, when read by Roman Catholic children shall, if required by their parents or guardians, be the Douay version, without note or comment.

Anglin argued that it was nonsense to claim that Christian principles could be impressed upon the minds of children without teaching them the doctrines of some denomination. Then too, he asserted, the old Act, by putting in clauses for the protection of the minority in the district, recognized that religious instruction would not merely be oral but also accepted that "religious books calculated to assist the teacher in impressing the principles of Christianity and a love of the Christian virtues on the minds of his pupils" might be used. Similarly the Act contemplated "that there shall be in the Parish Schools acts of devotion at stated times and not merely such prayers and acts as pupils of all denominations may be expected to participate in without objection, but such prayers and acts as many properly be objected to by the parents of a minority of the pupils." This all proved that the New Brunswick school system had been denominational.

The school in which Christian principles - that is Christian doctrines - are impressed upon the minds of the pupils; in which due care is taken to imbue the pupils with the spirit of Christianity and to create in them a love of Christian principle: in which text books and leading [sic] books of a religious character, such as the parents of the minority may reasonably object to on conscientious grounds are used regularly and by authority of law, in which prayers and acts of devotion of what we may call a denominational character are used by authority of law - that school must assuredly be a denominational school - Catholic, Protestant, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist, as the people of the district in which it is established belong to one denomination or another.

In fact there were hundreds of Parish Schools receiving normal state
grants throughout the province in which the Catholic Catechism was taught, Catholic books read and Catholic devotions practiced. The Act of 1871 prevented all this and therefore by the terms of section 93 of the B.N.A. Act was illegal and ought to be disallowed.

The case had been well-argued although it was open to dispute and was certainly not universally accepted. It was based on the letter of the law and was open to the charge of being a semantical argument which did not accurately represent the underlying thesis of the Act of 1858. For one reason or another, those who were called upon to pass judgment on the legality of the 1871 legislation gave the argument short shrift. They were only willing to accept explicit not implicit recognition of denominational schools in New Brunswick at the time of Confederation. This most certainly was Macdonald's views as he gave no heed to Anglin's contentions. Macdonald would not recommend that the Act be disallowed either on grounds of unconstitutionality or that it detrimentally affected the interests of the Dominion in general.35

If Macdonald would not take action, perhaps the House of Commons would. On April 29, 1872, Auguste Renaud, the French-born farmer from Kent county, moved a resolution asking that all papers relating to the New Brunswick school question be presented to the House. Anglin took the opportunity to make a very lengthy speech "to enable," as he said, "the House to understand fully the case these papers would present." He analyzed the situation under the 1858 Act and demonstrated the legality of Catholic schools under this Law. He then gave the history of the question in detail. For the special benefit of Quebec representatives, he spoke of the unjust position in which the Acadian areas of New Brunswick were placed not only by the 1871 Act but by the continual failure
of the province to provide a teachers' training school for French-speaking teachers. He spoke in justification of religious education and concluded by appealing, on behalf of the Catholics of New Brunswick, "to the French inhabitants of Quebec, to Catholics of all nationalities in every Province of the Dominion and to all sincere, liberal, fair-minded Protestants for sympathy and aid in the life and death struggle in which they have been compelled to engage." Anglin's speech not only was the most significant of those made at the time but also stated what he wanted to say on the question. When the issue arose again, after the requested return had been made, he had little left to add.

The Commons debate resumed on May 20 when John Costigan, the Irish Catholic representative for Victoria county in New Brunswick, moved a resolution asking that the Governor disallow the New Brunswick Common Schools Act of 1871. Anglin's role in the debate on this day was not as prominent as it had been three weeks before. Why this was so may partly be explained in the fact that Anglin had given his views earlier, but also it seems probable that the New Brunswick Catholic representatives had deemed it advisable for supporters of the administration, that is, Costigan and Renaud, to present any motions on the issue. Still, Anglin's participation in the debate was far from insignificant. As he told Bishop Rogers, his main object had been to show "that the legal question as to the constitutionality of the Act was not the only or the most important question this Dominion govrt were called upon to settle and in deciding that a law so unjust & oppressive and insulting should be left to its operation they were recreant to the duty imposed upon them by the constitution." Two days later Anglin was obliged to write to the Bishop again to explain the various developments that had taken place. He reported that support for Costigan's motion was great
amongst the Quebec members for reasons of political popularity and that some aid might also be forthcoming from Ontario men. The Government, he claimed, was much embarrassed by the question especially since Sir George Cartier and Hector Langevin had spoken against the resolution. In the debate the representative from Gloucester had paid special attention to the former and recognized that he had probably made Sir George his bitter enemy for life "by my endeavour to put his share of the responsibility for our sufferings in its true light." After the debate a Government whip had been sent to Costigan and promised that if Costigan would consent to an amendment the Government would carry out that amendment in good faith. The exact wording of the amendment was not clear to Anglin, but at the minimum he thought that it would request the Queen to place New Brunswick Catholics in as good a position as before the passage of the 1871 Act. There was also some talk that the amendment would go further and put them in a position comparable to the minority of Quebec. Apparently, however, it was difficult to know exactly on whom to count in the House -- "many of those who professed to be with us would gladly avail themselves of any pretext for deserting us" -- and Anglin would only agree to consider the amendment if Sir John would promise, either publicly to the House or privately in writing to Costigan, "to make an honest endeavour to get the Imperial Legislation which the amendment would ask for ..." The actual amendment proposed by P.-J.-O. Chauveau, the Premier and Minister of Education in Quebec, did not entirely satisfy Anglin. He doubted that an amendment which called for a change of the B.N.A. Act to provide for minority educational rights at the time of Union "to the same extent as if such rights, advantages and privileges had been then duly
established by law," was sufficiently clear. Nevertheless Anglin concluded, Chauveau's amendment probably ought to be accepted. "It would be better to get that than nothing," he reported, "as at all events it would give us a basis for future action, but it is not as explicit as it should be." But before Chauveau's motion of May 22 could be fully debated, Albert Smith asked that the New Brunswick members be given time to consult together. A week's adjournment was granted.

Events moved swiftly. On May 25, Tilley handed in his resignation because he feared complete political destruction if he supported or even remained silent on Chauveau's amendment. His attitude was supported by the other Protestant representatives of New Brunswick. Led by Smith, they held several meetings and prepared a protest which was aided by a mounting agitation in New Brunswick and in Nova Scotia, for Chauveau's amendment applied to both provinces. On May 28, Anglin learned that the Government was about to break its agreement with the Catholic representatives of New Brunswick. The promise to support Chauveau's motion would not be kept; another amendment would be proposed. In order to prepare for this Cartier had a meeting of his supporters in his home, at which time he apparently was able to win sufficient if grudging support for the Government's plan. The Rouges, on the other hand, agreed to give full support to Costigan, Renaud and Anglin. Even the Grit caucus decided to assist them as far as possible while keeping a keen eye out to ensure that Macdonald would not be able to take advantage of what they said or did.

By the evening of May 29 the manoeuvrings had been completed and it was time for the debate to resume. A. J. Smith spoke first. He argued that the School Bill was legal in all respects, but he laid emphasis
upon the constitutional question in another sense. He claimed that Chauveau's amendment would change the constitution without the consent of one of the parties to that compact, New Brunswick.

He said that the Canadian Parliament being strong may coerce and crush and whip into submission the Province of New Brunswick which is weak and feeble, but they could not destroy the spirit of resistance which the passage of this resolution would excite ...

What would be legitimate, however, would be an expression of regret that the Act had been passed. Other speeches followed, among them Costigan's cry of betrayal by the Government. Anglin's speech, despite sickness caused by having to bottle up so much excitement inside himself, was the most passionate of all once he had reiterated at some length many of the points he had made in his earlier efforts. In particular, he took up Smith's argument.

When Mr. Smith appealed to the House to spare the majority, did not the House know that the minority were ground to dust by the majority? He said that the House might coerce the majority; did not the majority coerce the helpless Catholics? - that the House might crush the majority; did not the majority at that very moment ruthless crush to the ground the Catholic minority? - that the House might whip the people of New Brunswick into submission; did not that same majority now wield the whip most relentlessly, deaf to the cries and remonstrances of their Catholic victims? ... [W]hen they now whined for what was called their rights, was it not the right once so loudly claimed by slave-owners - the right to wallop their own niggers without let or hindrance? He appealed on behalf of those who were indeed weak, who were indeed powerless, who were indeed suffering. He did not ask for them any privileges, any right to injure or offend, to rob or oppress others, but plain, simple, manifest justice, the right to use their own money to give that education to their own children which they conscientiously believe it to be their duty to give.

As the debate continued, Edward Blake and Alexander Mackenzie proposed that the case be submitted to the British Law Officers and, if possible, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Eventually the votes were taken. Chauveau's motion was lost 34 to 126; Colby's amendment expressing regret that the Act was unsatisfactory to a number of New
Brunswickers and hoping that the Law would be amended "to remove any just grounds of discontent that may now exist", passed 117 to 42; and finally, the House accepted Mackenzie's motion in favour of seeking legal opinion from across the ocean. Those voting against Colby's resolution included Anglin, who, along with a number of others, considered that it was simply mockery for such a motion to be addressed to men like Wilmot and Hatheway.46

Obviously the issue of Catholic schools had not yet been solved. Yet some headway had been made. Almost all the speeches in the Commons had indicated disapproval of the situation in New Brunswick and the weight of public opinion might have some influence with provincial politicians and editors. At any rate it provided a base upon which further appeals might be made to Ottawa.47 Nevertheless, in June the time period in which the School Act might have been disallowed expired.48

II

In the meantime the issue was proving to be of political use not only to provincial politicians but to Anglin himself. An election was to be held in the summer of 1872 and there were indications that Anglin might expect formidable opposition in Gloucester. One possible contender, and a worthy one too, was Kennedy F. Burns, a provincial representative for the constituency, a prominent Catholic, and a successful businessman to boot. He wrote to Bishop Rogers, Anglin's old antagonist at the time of Confederation, to enquire whether his candidacy would meet with the Bishop's approval. The Bishop's reply was most interesting. He acknowledged the clash of opinion which had occurred in 1866 and admitted that he could not have recommended Anglin to the electors of Gloucester in the 1867 election had he been in the province at the time. However,
the letter went on to say that Anglin was performing capital service for Catholics in the matter of New Brunswick schools. Therefore, he did not wish to lose Anglin's services in the Commons, especially considering the fact that the present Dominion Government could not claim gratitude for its role on the question. "Such being the present state of things," the Catholic dignitary announced, "I would not like to see Mr. Anglin opposed by any respectable Catholic whom I esteem in the coming election for the Dominion Parliament."\(^49\) In order that there be no misunderstanding about his present attitude towards Anglin, the Bishop circulated copies of this letter to the priests in the county.\(^50\) In a Catholic county like Gloucester Anglin's election was assured. Thereafter, the hatchet was buried and for the next decade correspondence between Anglin and Rogers was frequent. During the 1872 election campaign Anglin refused to mix publicly party politics and the schools question. "... I felt it to be my duty," he said, "to hold myself aloof from all party movements lest anyone should be able to say that I wished to make the School question subserve the interests of my party."\(^51\) One might think that it was as much for the sake of the Liberals as for the sake of the question that Anglin wished to keep the two separate. As for Anglin's own candidacy in Gloucester, he did not manage to escape a contest, as he had hoped, but he received 1436 of the 1777 ballots cast.\(^52\)

The elections out of the way, Anglin was able to turn to other things. Perhaps most important was the fact that he had to revive the *Freeman*. "It had," he confided to Bishop Rogers, "become very flat and stale during my long absence. There is now so much competition in the business that it requires the closest attention to keep a newspaper fairly up in public estimation." He could not afford to let the *Freeman* go down "even for the
chance of attaining political distinction."\textsuperscript{53} Circulation figures from an 1873 newspaper directory show that Anglin did indeed have worries. His weekly edition had about 600 subscribers while the tri-weekly had 720. Even given the probability that the circulation of the \textit{Freeman} fluctuated greatly, these were sorry figures compared to those of the \textit{News} and \textit{Telegraph} which claimed a circulation of 5,000 and 8,000 respectively for their weekly editions alone.\textsuperscript{54} It was also possible now to return to the schools issue.

The 1871 Act required financial support. In many places in the province, however, the necessary assessments had not been made. In St. John, Anglin felt, they had been made illegally. The \textit{Freeman} advised those who opposed the 'Godless' schools not to pay that part of their assessment which went to those schools.\textsuperscript{55} The \textit{News} was outraged at such a proposal\textsuperscript{56} but the \textit{Freeman} persisted. The upshot of this was legal cases which soon reached the level of the New Brunswick Supreme Court. At the same time, of course, the cases of the federal and provincial governments and the Catholics of New Brunswick were being prepared for submission to the British Law Officers according to Mackenzie's motion in the Commons. In preparing the Catholic case in both instances, Anglin played a significant role. At times he found it very difficult to convince others of the correctness of his views. In an October letter to Bishop Rogers he confessed that he was finding it almost impossible to persuade even the lawyers presenting the Catholic case that "denominational" schools had existed under the old system. But he was not a quitter.

I hope to succeed in hammering this plain truth into the heads of lawyers judges and legislators sooner or later but I find it hard work. I argue this point tomorrow again as well as I am able to do in a newspaper article which to be read at all must not be too long. I suppose I shall have to return to it many times.\textsuperscript{57}
True to his word he printed his article -- "What is a Denominational School?" -- the next day. His views had not changed from the year before.

The case was really quite simple, he argued.

A school in which the teacher and pupils are Catholic; in which the work of each day is opened and closed with prayers peculiarly Catholic; in which the Catholic Catechism is daily taught; in which the class books are those published by Catholic authority, almost every page of these books inculcating some Catholic doctrine or presenting some Catholic idea -- is not such school Catholic -- denominational?

These schools had been perfectly legal; had operated as Parish Schools; and, as such, had received the provincial grant provided by the 1858 Act for these schools. New Brunswick Catholics claimed neither separate nor dissentient schools; they claimed merely the rights they had held as denominational schools. By depriving Catholics of lawful rights held under the earlier Law, the 1871 Act was illegal under the terms of the B.N.A. Act.

If Denominational Schools authorised by law and receiving Provincial aid by virtue of law existed in this Province at the time of the Union the present School Act is wholly invalid. Such schools did exist.\(^58\)

The legal machinery lurched slowly forward. In November Macdonald wrote to Sweeny directing the Bishop to send to him any comments he might wish to make on the case for transmission to the Law Officers. In preparing the Catholic case Anglin played an integral part, working very closely with Mr. Duff, the lawyer retained by the Bishop. Not surprisingly, the case finally submitted was in large part the one that the Freeman had argued for the preceding year. Yet, as Anglin explained to Bishop Rogers, Duff felt that something was lacking in the argument.

Mr. Duff thinks it would be well in order to prove that the right the perpetuation of which we now claim is no abstract right dug out of the old law to serve our present purpose but that it was an actual living right which we fully enjoyed in practice.\(^59\)
Details and facts were required and while Anglin requested that Rogers obtain the necessary information from the priests in his diocese, the Irish editor must have realized that all this would take time and delay the Catholic submission. He was to find out later how unfortunate this was for the Catholic case. On the other hand the New Brunswick Government managed to get its submission in by February, 1873. When Anglin saw these arguments, he was pleased.

We are quite delighted with it. We believed that our case is so strong that a decision in our favour must be had; but we know how apt the most impartial and painstaking are to be deceived when they look long and intently on one side of any case and hear nothing of what is to be said on the other, and we confess that we therefore looked with some anxiety for the case on the other side.

We have got it, and we repeat we are delighted with it. It is as feeble and as flimsy as we could have wished it to be.60

Anglin's only difficulty was that judges did not agree with him. In the appeal test case brought before the New Brunswick Supreme Court, the judges decided that the 1871 School Law was constitutional although it would not state its views on the legality of assessments.61 The Freeman's analysis of this decision was one of restrained disapproval.

A careful analysis will show that the judgment really rests on the assumption that there can be and there are "principles of Christianity which are of general application, interfering with the peculiar religious views of none; doctrines, precepts and practices which all Christian people hold in common, and which are not the dogmatic teaching or tenets of a particular denomination or sect."

Upon this egregious fallacy, we repeat, the judgment does in reality wholly rest.62

But it was clear that if it came down to this question, Anglin and the New Brunswick Catholics would never win their case in front of non-Catholic judges.

When Anglin arrived in Ottawa for the 1873 session of the Commons where the next stage of the battle on New Brunswick schools was to take place, he was in an unhappy mood. Less than a fortnight before, personal tragedy
had struck. On the twenty-second of February, at half-past two o'clock in the morning, the Anglins' youngest daughter, Maggie, died at the age of fifteen months and fifteen days. Only half an hour later their other daughter, Mary Ellen, nearly four, closed her eyes in death. Both had had whooping cough and on the fatal Friday night they had gone into a rapid decline. It was a catastrophe hard to accept.

The blow it pleased Providence to allow to fall upon us was very severe and it will be long before we cease to feel its bitter effects although we strive to submit as we should to God's Holy Will.

What was even worse was that this made not two but three dead Anglin children, for sometime in late 1872 or early 1873 an infant son had died. In their mourning, the Anglins did not, of course, attend the social functions of Ottawa during the 1873 session. In fact, everything seemed to be conspiring against Anglin to make his life miserable. Even the train carrying the M.P.s to Ottawa had been involved in an accident. All this made Anglin rather crotchety and he took out his frustrations on his employees at the Freeman office back in St. John who could not read his atrocious writing and consequently made mistakes in copying the reports of "T.W.A."

In this solemn, ill-tempered mood, Anglin turned with a vengeance to his work. There were several special issues which aroused his concern. The first, of course, was the schools question.

The assessment cases in New Brunswick which had relied upon the legality of the mode of assessment -- rather than the 1871 School Law itself -- had in many cases been favourable to Catholics who had refused to pay the school tax. This led the New Brunswick Assembly to pass new regulations about these taxes which would have applied retroactively. Anglin was not dismayed by these new regulations. They would provide a means of bringing up the subject on the floor of the Commons, he confided to Bishop Rogers.
The Local Legislature and Government are I find pursuing a course which will enable us fairly to bring the subject up. They are trying to make their system a more perfect engine of oppression. I hope their bigotry or rather I think their very base and corrupt desire to pander to the bigotry of others and to make use of it for their own support, will urge them to pass their Bills in amendment and their Bills to make good their assessments of last year within a few days. If they do I think I can fairly demand that the Dominion Govrnt shall not allow Acts of the Local Legislature to go into operation which essentially alter the position of the parties to the suit brought at the instance of the House of Commons and still pending. The moment these Bills have become Acts of the Legislature I will move for them.70

He was also encouraged by the apparently more determined attitude of the Quebec members, especially the newly-elected ones.71 But the Government, he was sure, desired that such an embarrassing question not be agitated. Its members would argue that no action ought to be taken until the Privy Council had made a decision on an appeal case which was to come before it.72

On Thursday, April 3rd, Anglin moved for copies of all Acts passed in the recent session of the New Brunswick Legislature, but drew attention to the new regulations relating to schools. He urged the Government to obtain copies of this legislation and stated that it might be necessary to ask the House to request that the Governor General disallow the legislation.73 Compliance with this request could not be instantaneous. In the meantime the New Brunswick school papers were tabled in the House on April 15. It was shown therein how the British Law Officers had viewed the case. It was also shown how the Canadian Government had handled the whole affair. Before even inviting either party in New Brunswick to send remarks on the Ottawa Government's case, Macdonald had forwarded that case to the Law Officers via the Colonial Office. Without waiting for further information the Law Officers had, by the end of November, 1872, concurred with Macdonald's opinion,74 "and this they base mainly, if not entirely,"
Anglin complained, "upon the assumption that the Catholics believed the School Act to be unconstitutional because they formerly received Special Grants for Schools, of which they have been deprived since the passing of the Act of 1871." The Law Officers had asserted that the 1871 School Act was *intra vires* and that no appeal to the Governor General and the Dominion parliament for remedial legislation would be proper. When the comments of the New Brunswick Government were sent to Ottawa, they too were transmitted and the Law Officers, of course, reiterated their opinion. Finally, the Catholic case was forwarded to the Colonial Office, but it was not even submitted to the Law Officers. Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, thought it useless to further trouble the Law Officers unless the Canadian Government made a special request. Only on March 13th, the day after Honore' Mercier had moved that the relevant papers be tabled, was such a request made. This was done just for its political utility, apparently, as no one expected that the Law Officers would change their minds now. "The probability that any argument would cause the Law Officers to change an opinion twice given," the *Freeman* concluded, "seems very small." 75

On April 17, Anglin asked Macdonald if he had received copies of the New Brunswick Acts. Macdonald replied in the negative. This seemed strange as he had promised two weeks before that he would make a special request. "T.W.A." considered this sheer neglect and evasion. 76 As the New Brunswick schools agitation continued, it must have become clear to Bishops Rogers and Sweeny, who were in reality the directors of the campaign, that Anglin was not the best man to lead efforts in the Commons. Undoubtedly they desired his assistance especially in organizing things behind the scenes, but undoubtedly the Bishops were coming to the
conclusion that it would be better to work through a supporter of the Government, such as John Costigan, than through Anglin, a prominent opposition M.P. whose strenuous forwarding of the question in the House could not fail to have the appearance of party antagonism. Certainly Anglin was not reticent to use the schools question as a whip to lash the Government. On the other hand he probably realized that it would be better if he took a back seat on such matters as formulating resolutions. After all, he could still speak to them. In any case, from this point in time, others carried the ball in the House of Commons with Anglin in the role of a playing coach.

On May 5, Macdonald at last brought down the legislation passed in the recent session of the New Brunswick parliament. About a week before this, Bishop Sweeny had gone to Montreal undoubtedly to confer with the Quebec hierarchy. It was reported to Costigan by Hector Langevin, Cartier's successor, that Sweeny did not wish the question pushed. When Costigan sought confirmation of this information, the Bishop replied by coming to Ottawa. There, he managed to win promises of support from the Rouges and even the Grit leader, Alexander Mackenzie, whom Anglin had introduced to the Bishop. But Sweeny could get no satisfaction either from the Catholic supporters of the Government or from their spiritual superiors in Quebec and returned to St. John leaving affairs in a state of uncertainty. The inability of the Bishop of St. John to make satisfactory arrangements for political action made things very difficult for Anglin and Costigan. It had been understood that they should not take any further steps as Dr. Sweeny felt that it was politic to wait until the next session. Therefore, Anglin stated, he did not feel he could even move that the assessment legislation be disallowed. He was willing to do whatever the
Bishops thought best although he admitted that it would be personally embarrassing to allow the matter to slide by. He was convinced, too, that some of those who had frightened Sweeney would be forced to help if the question were pushed to a vote. Most important of all, however, Anglin recognized, was that the active co-operation of the Quebec Bishops be secured. Without that the prospects were dismal -- "when so many Catholics play us so false it is hard to work effectually." 79

A second Sweeney visit to Ottawa proved just as unsuccessful as the first but this time he pushed Costigan to move that the tax laws be vetoed. 80 On May 14, Costigan moved the necessary resolution and the debate moved into high gear. Anglin's speech was made for the special benefit of three visitors in the House, George King and two other members of the New Brunswick Government. Macdonald made the question a quasi-open one. Anglin believed that this was done in the hope that the Grits would thereby be deprived of a pretext for voting for the resolution, and he feared that this ploy would be successful. Yet when the vote came the Grits did not desert Anglin and his cause. Nor did the Rouges. Most important of all, nor did the Blues. It was a great victory. 81 Excitedly, Anglin telegraphed the news to Rogers:

Resolution disallowance School acts last session carried - majority thirty-four. 82

This turn of events placed Macdonald in a very ticklish position. As the Freeman put it, "Sir John is now bound to advise the Governor to do that which, he says, will tear our Constitution to tatters, &c." 83 Macdonald's way out was to advise the Governor General to apply to Her Majesty's Government for instructions. 84 As a sop to New Brunswick Catholics he promised to ask parliament for an appropriation to defray the
expenses of an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. 85
While Macdonald thought the action of the House of Commons was out of
order, Anglin returned the sentiment. He considered Macdonald's position
to be entirely unconstitutional. The Government, Anglin claimed, was
responsible for the actions of the Governor. Moreover, Macdonald's
rationale was weak for the power of disallowance was not a matter of pre-
rogative, it was a power conferred by statute -- the B.N.A. Act. If the
Government could not, in good conscience, carry out the wishes of the
Commons, then it should resign.

They take no such position, but pretending to guard the Constitution
they abdicate their own constitutional position as the advisers of the
Governor; invite unconstitutional action on the part of His Excellency,
and trying to steer a middle course they give cause of offence to all
parties, satisfying none ... 86

Of course, if the Commons had been willing, it could have voted down the
Government for failure to carry out its wishes. The Government could
have been overthrown. But, as Anglin told Bishop Rogers, the Quebec
Bishops "for some reason I can not understand or even imagine" did not use
their influence amongst the Quebec representatives at Ottawa. Anglin was
certainly unimaginative if he really could not discover the reason for
this. The Catholic hierarchy of Quebec had long favoured the Conservatives
and now the younger brother of the Bishop of Rimouski, Hector Langevin,
was Macdonald's lieutenant in Quebec. The Bishops were not anxious to turn
out the Government. In fact, they strongly urged that no further action
be taken on the question for the present. Anglin was perturbed:

This of course prevents our moving and indeed we could not hope to move
successfully when in all probability Mr. Langevin who has worked against
us with all his power is armed with similar telegrams which would seem
to justify the Government Catholics in opposing any resolution we may
move. I hope their Lordships' decision will prove to be for the best,
but it is hard when victory seemed so certainly within reach to have
it thus snatched away. The resolution which seemed so glorious a
triumph will now have no practical effect.87

The Quebec hierarchy had saved Macdonald at the eleventh hour and with the end of the 1873 session passed the best chance of New Brunswick Catholics receiving redress of grievances from the House of Commons.

III

The New Brunswick schools question had disrupted the Government to no small degree during the 1873 session. For the Conservatives there was another most disconcerting issue raised in the same session. That issue was the Canadian Pacific Railway scandal.88

On April 2, the Commons had rejected a proposal that an enquiry be made into Lucius Huntington's charges over the Pacific Railway. Anglin's report to the Freeman had not been sparing in its criticism and spoke of men sacrificing honour, character, honesty and reputation in support of the Government.89 On April 17, James MacDonald, the Pictou member, rose in the House and condemned the Freeman's article. MacDonald read the articles on the floor of the House and then moved "that the articles are a false, scandalous and malicious libel, and a high contempt of the privileges and authority of Parliament." There was little question that the Freeman's report had been excessive. Equally, there was little question that on occasion reports in other papers were at least as strong. It is unlikely that if Anglin had been a less important and less vocal critic of the Government, the libel charges would have been made. In most particulars the debate which followed MacDonald's motion was unexceptional. Anglin was attacked by the premier, Charles Tupper and others and was defended by the Liberal leaders, Mackenzie, Huntington and David Mills. The one interesting incident occurred when Anglin rose and the Speaker asked the
House that he be allowed to make an explanation. But after consulting with some of his allies for a few moments, Anglin resumed his seat and maintained silence. His political friends obviously knew Anglin’s headstrong nature and urged him to keep his seat before he made any remarks which might put him in serious trouble. The resolution passed by a majority of twenty-five but no move was made to expel Anglin from the House. Indeed the Government had failed in its real purpose. Had it been possible to goad Anglin into making an outburst in the House, he might well have been expelled. As it was, MacDonald’s action had only drawn attention to the power of the Freeman’s writing and aroused much sympathy for one who seemed to be the victim of oppression by the Government majority.  

The first session of the second Dominion parliament saw the beginning of Anglin’s involvement with the issue of the Pacific Scandal, but not the end. During the summer which followed, Anglin time and again wrote about the subject in the Freeman. Mackenzie was grateful. "Your articles," he said, "are being copied in our Western papers and are doing an excellent service."  

On another level, Anglin was finding the going difficult. It is exceedingly difficult to get anything done here now as there is no political organization through which to work. The people opposed to the govt are much dispirited because of their many defeats and I can not very well take an open part in working matters up lest our enemies should make use of it. I set to work at once however and I hope the result will be a rousing public meeting and pass resolutions demanding an immediate Parliamentary Enquiry &c. ... The feeling here is very general and intense but our friends are afraid of failure and I do not think that many of the Government supporters will openly unite with us. If I can get the machinery in order and fairly at work I do not despair of having a large meeting. I think if we have it will force our friend Isaac Burpee who I am told is now shaky to do what is right. He wants some such influence much. Palmer and Domville are hopelessly corrupt and unprincipled and have no hope of gain but from the men now in office. If we succeed I will telegraph a brief report of the meeting to the Globe but as yet nothing should be said of it as I may fail to work matters up,  

He did not get a fair chance to tackle the problem. Further family tragedy
descended. Mrs. Dwyer, the sister of Mrs. Anglin, died in Halifax on August 5th. Naturally, Anglin went to the Nova Scotian capital for the funeral services and by the time he returned, there was barely time to leave the *Freeman* in working order and proceed to Ottawa. In Ottawa, parliament was immediately prorogued despite the strenuous efforts of the opposition. This group then adjourned to a committee room where a number of fiery speeches condemning the Government were made. While others held the spotlight at this meeting, there was no question that Anglin had played an important role in the agitation over the Pacific Scandal. Indeed over the past years he had earned a prominent place in the ranks of the opposition and when the downfall of the Macdonald Government came in early November it seemed probable that the new cabinet which Alexander Mackenzie had been called upon to form, would contain the man whose life had begun half a century before in a little town along the southern coast of Ireland.

When the membership of the new administration was announced, however, Isaac Burpee and Albert Smith appeared as the two New Brunswick cabinet representatives. That is exactly what they were -- New Brunswick representatives. They had been chosen by a caucus of New Brunswick members who were willing to support the Government, and they had forced their selections upon Mackenzie. Anglin was unhappy with this turn of events. Expressing his views in the *Freeman* he stated that Mackenzie would have been wiser to have selected "the most able and reliable of those who worked with him" and presented the cabinet as a *fait accompli*. Such a cabinet would have been supported in the House of Commons without much difficulty. But why had the New Brunswickers in Ottawa not chosen Anglin? The answer to this question is that Anglin's role in the school question had made him too hot to touch. The representatives claimed that public opinion in
New Brunswick would not support a Government in which Anglin was a member. Quite probably this was a thin veneer for either personal ambitions or an anti-Catholic bias or both. In any case they notified Mackenzie that if Anglin were chosen they would not support his Government. Mackenzie himself desired to take Anglin into the inner circle. "I would have been glad," he confided to Brown, "to have Anglin in but I could not pacify N Brunswick and had to have him out of the arrangement for the present."

This, in the same letter in which he complained of Irish Catholic pressure for patronage, stating that he was tempted "to tell them to go to Jericho -- I can hardly stop there." The New Brunswick press was most surprised to find that Anglin had not been named. While one must be wary of political ends which the various newspapers had to serve, the consensus was that Anglin had been ill-used. Even the News made this clear.

Mr. Anglin had an unmistakable claim to a seat in the new Cabinet. There are very few men in it of equal ability, and only two or three men of equal service to the late Opposition. We have always been at political warfare with Mr. Anglin, and probably always shall be. But for all that, we must say that he has received the worst of treatment from the men whom he has served so zealously.

The New Dominion and True Humorist, on the other hand, after suggesting that "Anglin(g) should have been Minister of Fisheries," showed that the Ottawa members may not have been very far wrong in their assessment of public opinion.

The fact is, if Mr. Anglin could be trusted, his mental endowments, which we acknowledge are of a superior order, would have ensured him a position in the Council of the country long ago, but he is too bigoted in his religious views to have any voice in our Government.

Whatever was said the fact remained that Anglin had not been offered a cabinet post.

The tale of Anglin's discontent and the attempts made to pacify him are best portrayed in a lengthy letter he sent to Bishop Rogers. The
first part of the letter gave the basic story of his exclusion from office.

It continued:

He [Mackenzie] then offered me the Speakership of the Senate. This is a very dignified and easy position. The pay is $4000 besides the pay as member handsome furnished apartments in the Parliament Buildings with light fuel and servants free and a seat in the Senate for life if I chose to retain it. Some would think the position take it all in all more desirable than a seat in the government as after the Session there is little to be done and all that is necessary can be done in a few days. But if I accepted this I must abandon all charge of the School question and seem to desert and perhaps in fact desert those who have a right to expect that I shall continue with them in this great struggle for our rights. I therefore peremptorily refused the offer.

Anglin went on to relate that he had learned from questions asked by D. A. Macdonald during an interview that the schools question was the real reason that the Maritimers did not want Anglin on the cabinet.

Afterwards, Mr. Ferris and Mr. Charles Burpee came to me to protest that they were not actuated by any personal feeling but that the excitement caused by the School question and my relation to that question prompted them and that on this alone they had based their objections. I told them I was very sorry to hear this as I had hoped that their objections were merely personal but as they had taken this course then the policy of the govrnt as declared by the formation was No Popery and Common Schools as far as New Brunswick was concerned and that if they chose to pay more regard to the wishes of forty or fifty thousand Protestant bigots whom they represented than to the just claims of all the Catholics of New Brunswick and indeed of the Dominion they must only take the consequence, and I warned them that unless the School question were speedily settled the government must fall.

If Anglin was too hot to handle within the Government he was even more dangerous in opposition, and further efforts were made to placate him.

Since that Mr. D. A. Macdonald Mr. Huntington and others have come to me on behalf of the govrnt asking me to name anything in the gift of the govrnt which I would wish to take. Besides the Speakership of the Senate the Chief Commissionership of the Railways was suggested. My answer was invariably that from a govrnt formed on such a basis I could accept nothing for myself and that I must continue to press the claims of the Catholics for justice whenever opportunity served. I was so pressed that in the end I felt forced to say that all these offers intimated that I sought only some pecuniary advantage and that if the sop were large enough I would be willing to put my principles in my pocket and desert those whom I had led to trust in me and to look
to me for such aid as an honest independent member of Parliament could
give and that though perhaps not so meant they were really insults and
pained me very much.

Mr. Blake since called on me to say in tones of great sincerity how
disgusted he was at the bigotry of these men and at the necessity of
yielding to it for a time. Mr. Mackenzie I know feels deeply grieved
by the matter and all the Ontario Liberals - the Grits - are loud in
their expression of disappointment and disgust and I am sure they are
sincere: nevertheless as I told everyone who spoke to me the policy of
the Government is as far as it affects us "No Popery" and if a seat
were offered me tomorrow I could not accept it without a distinct
positive agreement that the School question should be settled satis-
factorily, within a given time. I would not have exacted such a con-
dition before their hostile policy was declared in the formation but
have been willing to wait a reasonable time until the Govrnt had become
strong enough as I believe they might have become to disregard the
bigotry of the N. Brunswick cliques. From the changed tone of all
parties I think I see reason to hope that my action will tend to bring
about a satisfactory settlement more rapidly than if I had joined the
government.

Anglin was not perfectly happy about being forced to forego position and
monetary reward for the sake of New Brunswick schools, especially as there
was doubt in his mind whether it was now possible to agitate successfully
the question in the House of Commons. Anglin's letter to Rogers ended on
this note.

I hope your lordship will approve of the course I have taken though
I must confess that I do not see the way to victory very clearly and
that since the Quebec Bishops so unfortunately stayed our hands last
Spring I have never been able to determine what course could be taken
to lead directly or circuitously to the goal. Still I feel that while
the war continues it would be baseness on my part to escape from the
field and seek my own individual profit and aggrandisement.

The effort to give Anglin some reward for his services to the new Govern-
ment proceeded. Mackenzie gave him personal assurance that some patronage
appointments Anglin had requested would be looked after. It was also
taken for granted that the Freeman would become the Government's chief
organ in New Brunswick, a role which promised support for the newspaper
in the future. At the same time Anglin became a stockholder and a
director in the Royal Canadian Insurance Company, whose president was
John Young, the prominent Liberal M.P. from Montreal West. Anglin's appointment to the local Board of Directors had come from the general Board of the company rather than election by the local stockholders.\textsuperscript{105} Finally, sometime before the new year, Mackenzie made another offer. This time he suggested that if Anglin agreed, the Speakership of the House of Commons would be available.\textsuperscript{106}

Anglin's failure to receive a cabinet post and his discontent with the Government's apparent position on the schools question did not, however, lead Anglin to oppose the Government. Throughout the late fall and early winter of 1873-74 the \textit{Freeman} consistently supported the Mackenzie administration\textsuperscript{107} and gave it strenuous support during the January, 1874, general election. Anglin rationalized that a Reform victory would aid in the schools campaign.

I think it would be folly for us to quarrel with them if we can avoid it. The leading men are pledged by their votes of last Session to do all in their power to obtain justice for the Catholics of this Province and to that we should try to hold them even if thereby we only secure their help at the next Local Elections. Dr. Sweeney is afraid that the Govrnt will be too strong and that if so strong they may treat us unfairly. They certainly cannot treat us more unfairly if they are strong than they are ever compelled to do under the pressure from the New Brunswick members, I can hardly imagine that we can suffer from their being relieved from that pressure and therefore I am inclined to think that it will be to our benefit to have them stronger than they are at present if they are to exist at all.\textsuperscript{108}

Anglin's own re-election was the easiest contest he had ever encountered. He won by acclamation.\textsuperscript{109} When the House of Commons met on March 26, 1874, it seconded his constituents' confidence by naming him Speaker.\textsuperscript{110}

Anglin's acceptance of the Speakership raises a question of motive. Had he put his "principles in his pocket" and sought his "own individual profit and aggrandisement"? Had some agreement been reached on the schools question? What was the explanation for his course of action? In later
years Onésiphore Turgeon claimed that Anglin in his Gloucester election victory speech had promised "qu'il n'accepterait aucun poste dans le gouvernement, aucune position d'honneur ou d'émolument quelconque avant d'avoir réglé la question des Écoles à la satisfaction de la minorité catholique du Nouveau-Brunswick". As no newspaper account of this speech seems to be available today there is no direct contemporary evidence to support or disprove Turgeon's statement. Yet other evidence suggests that Turgeon's memory had played tricks on him. By the time Anglin was returned for Gloucester, Mackenzie's offer had been in his hands for at least a month. It is probable that he had already made up his mind to accept the position and in any case it is most unlikely that he would have made such a statement had he any inclination whatever to take the post. One suspects then that Turgeon must have misconstrued Anglin's actual remarks. But Anglin himself had said in November that he "could accept nothing" for himself for he had to continue to press Catholic claims on the schools issue. In order for him to accept a post one of two things had to happen. Either the question had to be settled, or the directors of the agitation -- the New Brunswick Bishops -- had to relieve Anglin of his leadership responsibilities in Ottawa on the issue. The first possibility did not materialize, although Mackenzie showed evidence of a helpful attitude. What had happened was that Rogers and Sweeny had both urged Anglin to accept the position offered him. Indeed, the Bishops had already begun to relieve Anglin of leadership responsibilities during the 1873 session. As well, Anglin had convinced himself that his acceptance would not really hurt the case of the New Brunswick Catholics to any appreciable extent.

I have accepted the Speakership which I told you Dr. Sweeny wished
very much I should take and which your lordship also thought it well I should take. It may be that as you and my friends say I should be able to do more in that position than I would as an independent member. It may be that my seeming to stand aside will help to a settlement of our School question. At all events should it be necessary I can resign at any moment and go back to my old place and thus do my share in the fight.

Some of this may have been a form of self-hypnosis in order to justify his action, for Anglin's hard line on the schools question and his denunciation of the Conservatives' proceedings had made it a very ticklish question for Anglin when party fortunes changed. Nevertheless the statement likely contained a good deal of truth. It is quite probable that the Bishops recognized that Anglin merited some recompense for his parliamentary labours and did not want to see him give up a glorious opportunity for advancement. There were others, such as John Costigan, who could carry on the fight. Then too the Bishops may have thought that Anglin's type of political leadership -- of the persistent and rather vociferous variety -- was not called for at the present stage of the game. Anglin, they felt, would be able to do more for the cause as Speaker, even though, or perhaps because, his voice would be silenced. Of course, if circumstances required it, he could always resign. All things considered then, one cannot agree with Turgeon's assessment that in accepting the Speakership, Anglin was betraying New Brunswick Catholics. If he was, he was doing so with the Bishops' permission and under their urgings. Anglin thus became the first and only Speaker of the House of Commons to come from New Brunswick.
1 There are several useful accounts of the New Brunswick schools question which treat the subject from a wider perspective than the present account, which must concentrate on Anglin's role, can. The predetermined outlook and heavy reliance on secondary sources makes the account in C. B. Sissons, Church and State in Canadian Education: An Historical Study (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1959), pp. 227-243, barely adequate. J. Hannay, History of New Brunswick (St. John: John A. Bowes, 1909), II, 295-317, has some merit despite its age but has been superseded by K. F. C. MacNaughton, The Development of the Theory and Practice of Education in New Brunswick 1784-1900 ("University of New Brunswick Historical Studies," No. 1; Fredericton: University of New Brunswick, 1947), pp. 187-222. The account in D. Argue, "The Separate School Question in New Brunswick" (unpublished Master's dissertation, Carleton University, 1967) is well done but contains little new material. The most interesting of all writing on the topic and one which has shed much new light on the question by making use of material in the Catholic Archives of St. John and Chatham (now Bathurst) is to be found in P. M. Toner, "The New Brunswick Separate Schools Issue 1864-1876" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University of New Brunswick, 1967). See also P. M. Toner, "The New Brunswick Schools Question" (unpublished essay presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Catholic Historical Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, June 5, 1970). Despite the impression given in many accounts, the use of the French language was not really an issue at the time. In fact the regulations of the Board of Education showed that there was no intention of eliminating the use of French in public schools in New Brunswick (see M. H. Hody, "The Development of the Bilingual Schools of New Brunswick" (unpublished Doctor of Education dissertation, University of Toronto, 1964), p. 54; and M. Hody, "The Anglicizing Common Schools Act of 1871: A Study in Folklore," La Société Historique Acadienne, XI (1968), 347-349. The question was one of religion not one of language and it was Irish Catholics -- Anglin and Costigan and Bishops Rogers and Sweeney -- who led the agitation.


3 Toner, op. cit., p. 1.


6 Freeman, Jan. 28, 1860.

7 Ibid., Nov. 1, 1860.


Papers (uncatalogued collection), C. N. Skinner to Tilley, Jan. 9, 1858; and ibid., G. E. Fenety to Tilley, Jan. 12, 1858.
10 The Law Relating to Parish Schools in New Brunswick, 1858, p. 7.
12 Onésophile Turgeon, the Gloucester M.P. from 1900 to 1922 and long-time Senator, mentions this fact and somewhat unfairly places blame on Anglin for failing to bring up the subject in the New Brunswick Assembly (see O. Turgeon, Un Tribut à la Race Acadienne: Mémoires, 1871-1927 (Montreal: G. Ducharme, 1928), p. 23). As has been seen Anglin had brought up the issue in 1862. Moreover, he was not a member of the Assembly which met after the 1866 election had shown that Confederation was a 'fixed fact' and it was only the B.N.A. Act which made the legal situation of Catholic education of significance.
13 See Toner, op. cit., pp. 22-28 for the story of Archbishop Connolly's efforts in this regard. Connolly was so anxious to win educational rights for the Catholics of Nova Scotia akin to those of the Protestant and Catholic minorities of Canada East and Canada West respectively, that he was willing to virtually guarantee "nearly every Catholic vote in the Province" if Tupper arranged for such educational changes (see P.A.C., Sir Charles Tupper Papers, III, Connolly to Tupper, Wednesday [April 10, 1867]).
14 U.N.B.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Tilley to E. McLeod, Jan. 4, 1867.
15 Freeman, Jan. 20, 22 and 25, 1870.
16 Ibid., July 16, 1870.
17 Morning News (St. John), n.d., quoted in ibid.
18 Freeman, July 16, 1870.
19 Ibid., Aug. 16, 1866.
20 Ibid., July 16, 1870.
21 MacNaughton, op. cit., p. 188.
22 Ibid., p. 191. Counter petitions, numerous signed, were also in evidence.
23 Freeman, Apr. 20 and 22, 1871.
24 Ibid., Apr. 22, 1871.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., May 4, 1871.
27 Ibid., May 6, 1871.
29 Freeman, Jan. 6, 1872. Further comments on Catholic efforts to promote the cause of education in the province are found in ibid., May 2, 1871; and Feb. 3, and March 23, 1872.
30 Ibid., Feb. 3, 1872. See also March 21, 1872.
31 Ibid., Feb. 20, 1872.
32 Ibid., Apr. 6, 1872.
33 Canada: Sessional Papers, 1872, No. 36, pp. 1-2 and 6-7.
35 Canada: Sessional Papers, 1872, No. 36, pp. 2-4. See also Freeman, Feb. 1, 1872; and Toner, op. cit., pp. 41-44.
37 "T.W.A." May 21, 1872, in Freeman, June 6, 1872.
39 Freeman, May 25, 1872.
40 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 22, 1872 (with a postscript on May 23). The letter requested that the Bishop telegraph his views in order that they might be acted upon.
41 Freeman, May 25, 1872.
43 Freeman, May 25, 28 and 30, 1872.
44 The information in this paragraph has been gleaned from "T.W.A.", May 38 and 30, in Freeman, June 13 and 15, 1872; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 30, 1872.
45 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, July 1, 1872.
46 "T.W.A.", May 28 and 30, in Freeman, June 13 and 15, 1872.
47 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 30, 1872; and Freeman, June 1, 1872. See also Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, July 1, 1872; and Freeman, July 2, 1872.
48 Freeman, June 25, 1872. Of course, the Bill could still be declared to be unconstitutional and therefore illegal by judicial decision.
49 Rogers Papers, Rogers to Burns, May 9, 1872.
50 Ibid., Rogers to Rev. T. F. Barry, May 15, 1872.
51 Ibid., Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 13, 1872.
52 Anglin's reports to Rogers on political developments in the constituency are found in Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 20 and July 12, 1872.
53 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 13, 1872.
54 American Newspaper Directory (New York: Geo. P. Rowell and Co., 1873), p. 226. These figures are certainly open to a good deal of scepticism.
55 Freeman, July 4, 1872. The assessment lists showed that Anglin was not a wealthy man (see Ibid., July 6, 1872).
56 News, July 5, 1872.
57 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Oct. 21, 1872.
58 Freeman, Oct. 22, 1872.
59 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Nov. 19 and Dec. 15, 1872.
60 Freeman, Feb. 8, 1873.
61 Canada: Sessional Papers, 1873, No. 44, pp. 66-84. Judges Allen and Weldon had stated that the question was a legitimate subject for remedial legislation by the Canadian parliament (see Freeman, Feb. 22, 1873).
62 Freeman, Feb. 20, 1873.
63 Ibid., Feb. 25, 1873.
64 News, Feb. 24, 1873.
65 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 13, 1873.
66 It would seem likely that the child was either born dead or survived for only a very short time.
67 "T.W.A.", March 14, 1873, in Freeman, March 20, 1873.
68 "T.W.A.", March 4, 1873, in Freeman, March 8, 1873.
69 "T.W.A.", March 25, 1873, in Freeman, Apr. 1, 1873.
70 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 13, 1873. Henry Maher of Portland had appealed his school taxes to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the grounds that the 1871 Act was unconstitutional (see Canada: Sessional Papers, 1873, No. 44, p. 64).
71 The question of New Brunswick schools had been more significant in Quebec than in New Brunswick itself in the 1872 elections (see Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 13, 1872).
72 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 13, 1873.
73 Globe (Toronto), n.d., quoted in Freeman, Apr. 10, 1873.
74 Canada: Sessional Papers, 1873, No. 44, p. 63.
75 Freeman, Apr. 17, 1873; and "T.W.A.", Apr. 17, 1873, in Freeman, Apr. 22, 1873. The Law Officers did not change their views.
76 "T.W.A.", Apr. 18, 1873, in Freeman, Apr. 25, 1873.
77 P.A.C., John Costigan Papers, Costigan to Sweeny, Apr. 28, 1873.
78 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 5, 1873.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., Sweeny to Rogers, May 12, 1873.
81 Ibid., Anglin to Rogers, May 16, 1873; Freeman, May 15 and 17, 1873; "T.W.A.", May 15, 1873, in Freeman, May 24, 1873.
82 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, telegram, May 15, 1873.
83 "T.W.A.", May 15, 1873, in Freeman, May 24, 1873.
84 P.A.C., Lord Kimberley Papers, Dufferin to Kimberley, May 16, 1873. See also P.A.C., Canada: Governor General's Office, Telegrams, 1862-1883, V, Dufferin to Kimberley, May 17, 1873; and Kimberley Papers, Dufferin to Kimberley, May 29, 1873.
85 Freeman, May 24, 1873. There was a great deal of pressure on Macdonald from the Maritime Protestants on this question. Their reaction to the resolution of May 14 had been swift and furious. See News, May 16, 1873; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 20, 1873.
86 Freeman, May 24, 1873. See also ibid., May 20 and June 14, 1873. Kimberley agreed with Dufferin's right to take this course. Edward Blake took up the constitutional question and in 1875 gave notice of a resolution to clarify ministerial responsibility in cases of disallowance (see W. R. Graham, "Liberal Nationalism in the Eighteen Seventies," Canadian Historical Association Report, 1946, pp. 116-117).
87 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, May 20, 1873. Two decades later Bishop Rogers placed full blame on the decision of the Quebec Bishops (see Toner, op. cit., pp. 83-84).
88 There are many accounts of this famous debate in Canadian history. Two which tell the story in detail, but from very different perspectives are D. C. Thomson, Alexander Mackenzie: Clear Grit (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1960), pp. 146-168; and D. G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald, Vol. II: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1955), pp. 129-179.
89 "T.W.A.", Apr. 3, 1873, in Freeman, Apr. 12, 1873.
90 "T.W.A.", Apr. 18, 1873, in Freeman, Apr. 25, 1873; Freeman, Apr. 19, 1873; and "T.W.A.", Apr. 22, in Freeman, Apr. 29, 1873.
91 P.A.C., Alexander Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to Anglin, July 29, 1873.
92 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, Aug. 1, 1873. In this letter Anglin was not as sanguine as Mackenzie seemed to be. He felt that Macdonald could still maintain a majority. Mackenzie had requested Anglin to have printed, circulated and presented to the Governor General, petitions asking that parliament not be prorogued immediately at its meeting in August (see Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to J. Pickard, July 25, 1873).
93 Morning Chronicle (Halifax), Aug. 7, 1873; and Freeman, Aug. 7, 1873.
94 Mackenzie had personally urged Anglin to attend (see Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to Anglin, Aug. 1, 1873).
95 Freeman, Aug. 16 and 19, 1873.
96 "T.W.A.", Nov. 5, 1873, in Freeman, Nov. 11, 1873. The same was true

97 Freeman, Nov. 13, 1873.
98 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Nov. 21, 1873.
99 P.A.C., George Brown Papers, IX, Mackenzie to Brown, Nov. 13, 1873. Mackenzie had made efforts to change the views of the New Brunswickers regarding Anglin (see Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Nov. 21, 1873). Even in a letter to Charles Burpee (Isaac's uncle), Mackenzie recognized the justice of Anglin's claim to a cabinet seat, and stated that he had told him that when circumstances changed, "we would all be willing to do him justice" (see Mackenzie Letterbooks, III, Mackenzie to Burpee, Feb. 4, 1874).

100 News, Nov. 12, 1873. See also ibid., Nov. 6 and Dec. 1, 1873; Le Moniteur Acadien (Shediac), Nov. 6 and 13, 1873; and New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), Nov. 19, 1873.
101 New Dominion and True Humorist (St. John), Nov. 15, 1873. See also ibid., Nov. 29, 1873, and Jan. 10, 1874.
102 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Nov. 21, 1873.
103 Mackenzie Letterbooks, III, Mackenzie to Anglin, Nov. 12, 1873.
104 News, Nov. 17, 1873.
105 Freeman, Nov. 18, 1873.
106 "Letters of ... Mackenzie to ... Jones ... " Mackenzie to Jones, Jan. 6, 1874. The letter does not make it absolutely clear but it also appears that Mackenzie had offered to Anglin the first cabinet position available.

107 Freeman, Dec. 9, 1873; and Jan. 6 and 8, 1874.
108 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Jan. 2, 1874.
109 Bishop Rogers had given his support to Anglin (and to Peter Mitchell) once again (see Rogers Papers, J. Sivewright to Rogers, Jan. 24, 1874; and Rogers to Sivewright, Jan. 27, 1874). John Costigan had solicited and received support from both Bishops (see Costigan Papers, I, Sweeney to Costigan, Jan. 18, 1874; and Rogers to Costigan, Jan. 20, 1874).
110 Freeman, March 28, 1874; and Scrapbook Hansard, 1874, p. 1 (March 26).
111 Turgeon, op. cit., p. 20.
112 Mackenzie Letterbooks, III, Mackenzie to Father Quin, Jan. 3, 1874.
113 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 6, 1874. Not all New Brunswick priests agreed with their Bishops in thinking that Anglin ought to become Speaker (see Costigan Papers, Rev. James Quin to Costigan, Apr. 2, 1874).
CHAPTER 12
First Commoner: 1874-1878

From 1874 to 1878, Ottawa was a second home for the Anglin family. In those days the Speaker had housekeeping quarters in the parliament buildings. The result of this arrangement was that Mary Margaret, the Anglins' seventh child, became, on April 3, 1876, the only person ever known to have been born in the parliament buildings of Canada. Mrs. Anglin, like her husband, was energetic and talented. Her family duties did not prevent her from becoming an accomplished amateur actress and singer, an opinion to which Lady Dufferin herself ascribed after viewing a performance of the 'Maire of St. Brieux' on March 31, 1875. Indeed, the head of the household was having to make way for the accomplishments not only of his wife but also of his two oldest boys who were showing that the good educational atmosphere in the Anglin home was rubbing off. Frank, the oldest, seemed to be particularly adept and he stood at the top of his group in the Christian Brothers' School in 1874. Arthur also did well but found his competition tougher. Both boys, interestingly enough, stood first in their respective classes for 'good conduct'. A year later their records were not quite as good but still sufficiently so that Frank was allowed to give a declamation on "There is no such word as fail". His father could have given him help with that topic. In fact, with the exception of the black memory of three dead children and a fire which destroyed their St. John house and almost all of their belongings in September, 1874, these were good years for the Anglin family. Above all, they could point to its head as being the Speaker of the House of Commons. In March of 1874 it was not known what kind of Speaker he would make. But Anglin himself must have reflected at times about the irony of the
situation. Here was he, an old anti-Confederate, the First Commoner of the Dominion of Canada.

I

The first task of the 1874 session was, of course, to name Anglin as Speaker. Normally the election of the Speaker is a very perfunctory sort of thing but in 1874 this was not quite the case. After Anglin had taken the Speaker's chair, Sir John Macdonald rose to express his surprise that Luther Hamilton Holton, a prominent Liberal, had not been made Speaker because of his interest in and knowledge of parliamentary procedure, although the Tory leader did acknowledge that Anglin's industriousness and intelligence ought to make him a satisfactory Speaker. Macdonald did not suggest that Anglin's well-known political partizanship or even his editing of a public newspaper, made him unsuitable for the position. After all Anglin had shown an independence of mind on many questions which had come before the Commons before. There was no reason to doubt seriously the newly-elected Speaker's vow that he hoped "to prove himself worthy of the honour by acting and conducting the debates with the strictest impartiality and regard for the rules of the House." Although no one really disputed Anglin's capacity to fill the office, comments made by observers off the floor of the House were more critical. The New Brunswick Reporter, for example, thought it "strange ... that the man who a few months ago was publicly censured for insulting the dignity of Parliament, should now be raised to the position of First Commoner, and conservator of that very dignity which he outraged so recently." Perhaps more important criticism came from the Ottawa correspondent of the Canadian Illustrated News who pointed out that a just ground for complaint was the fact that Anglin knew no French.
The 1874 session gave Anglin a baptism of fire. From its beginning
the name of Louis Riel caused great turmoil. In the first place, Riel
had come to Ottawa before the session and taken the necessary oaths for
elected members of the Commons. Fortunately for Anglin, the Speaker had
played no part in this as Mr. Patrick, the Clerk of the House, administered
these oaths in his private office. Riel's 'audacity' roused the temper
of Mackenzie Bowell, the Orange leader. With A. J. Clarke, the Attorney
General of Manitoba as his prize witness, Bowell attempted to prove to
the House that Riel was a fugitive from justice and therefore ought to
be expelled from the Commons, in spite of the fact that he had never oc-
cupied his seat. To maintain order and to keep the examination within
proper bounds was a very difficult task and Anglin's fledgling efforts
were not entirely successful. His decisions certainly did not make Bowell
very happy, although the latter did not carry his opposition to the point
of dividing the House on the Speaker's ruling. But even Holton took ex-
ception to one of Anglin's decisions because of the Speaker's failure to
make clear what he was saying. In fact, as the investigation dragged on
and as members began to question the point of it all and to desire that
it end, Anglin was forced to turn the problem over to Holton and A.-A.
Dorion for them to decide. Perhaps Anglin was not as incompetent as this
might appear, for they could not come up with a solution either and both
the inquiry and the debate went on. Still, Anglin was not very impres-
sive.

If any test of the new Speaker's ability was required, it was given
last week. I believe few men in his position were ever in so tight a
predicament as he was, during the rambling interrogatory of Attorney
General Clarke relative to the Riel business. If Mr. Anglin were an
angel, he could not help remembering that he only lately was a partisan
and a pretty bitter one at that. Hence, spite of himself, he felt
strongly in the matter and could not help showing it. Mr. Bowell was
a thorn in his side. If the member for Hastings had been a Government
man, and acted precisely as he did, Mr. Anglin would have had no trouble. But Mr. Bowell happens to be a determined Oppositionist, and there ... was the root of the whole trouble.\textsuperscript{12}

Anglin himself admitted his initial inadequacy.

I was really quite unprepared for the discharge of the duties as it was the one position in public life which I never dreamt of occupying but I have endeavoured by hard work to make myself acquainted with the duties and by endeavouring always to do what is right I hope to deserve the approval of all whose esteem is worth having.\textsuperscript{13}

His efforts bore fruit towards the end of the first session and carried over for subsequent meetings of parliament. During the 1875 and 1876 sessions Anglin's decisions as Speaker were much more conclusive and authoritative. Because they were more firmly based in parliamentary practice, which Anglin learned to cite chapter and verse, there was little disputing of them. In fact, Anglin often carried his display of knowledge to extremes.

A ruling should be brief, clear as crystal and final as fate. One superfluous sentence spoils its effect. Mr. Anglin utters many superfluous sentences ... He explains, expostulates, may even argues from his seat.\textsuperscript{16}

Generally speaking, he allowed a free rein to debate giving considerable latitude for discussion, even of his own rulings. One might have thought that Anglin, whose strongly-held views had been so notable, would have been a far from impartial Speaker. He certainly tended to side with the Government but he was not particularly noted for partisanship. Charles Tupper and John Macdonald, on separate occasions, accused him of unfairness in his rulings but these were momentary outbursts and were silenced by Anglin's citation of constitutional authority and profession of honourable intentions. Interestingly enough, in the Macdonald incident, it was the Minister of Finance, Richard Cartwright, whose speech Anglin interrupted in order to enforce the disputed ruling. Changes to parliamentary practice and procedure made by Anglin during his Speakership
were few. Perhaps the only significant modification was the decision taken in 1876 to receive petitions for the raising or lowering of taxes or duties or for granting bounties, provided that the petitioners were not personally interested to the extent that the profits of such a requested change would be confined virtually to themselves. In fact, Anglin found the job rather tedious and uninteresting. As he later related, "I had always regarded the Speakership as most irksome and unpleasant, and with my habits ... accustomed as I was to take an active part in the business of the House – I felt the occupancy of the Chair would be for me a particularly unpleasant position." By and large, however, Anglin made an acceptable, if not brilliant Speaker.

The duties of the Speaker did not end when he left the chair for the day. He was responsible for expenditures made for the House of Commons in much the same way as ministers were in charge of the expenses of their departments. Like most cabinet ministers he often felt the pressure which control of patronage brought; pressure from such notables as John Joseph Lynch, the Catholic Archbishop of Toronto, and Edward Blake; pressure so great that he could not find room even to employ one of his own constituents. Although irregularities in the service of the House were supposed to be reported to him, Anglin found out that he would have to do some checking of his own when in 1876 Mackenzie Bowell complained of extra clerks who drew salary and did nothing. Anglin claimed that this was surprising news and explained that he and the Commissioners of Internal Economy had done their best to reduce expenditure while maintaining efficiency. Anglin did indeed make such efforts while he was Speaker and his vigilence seemed to increase with the passage of time. In the 1878 session he checked up on some clerks, found them "disporting about"
on the streets, and fired them forthwith. On the other hand, he was no heartless taskmaster for those who did a good job such as H. Hartney, one of the clerks of the House. "Why is it," Anglin queried in a letter written from St. John, "that you do not take a few weeks holidays and escape from the dreadful heat of Ottawa. You attend so assiduously to your duties that you certainly are entitled to some recreation. I would be glad to learn that you have so arranged matters as to be able to get away for a time."

The final and to some members of the Commons the most important task of the Speaker was that he be a host during the session. Anglin, along with most of the new ministers, proved to be a 'liberal' entertainer and there were no complaints on this score. In fact, some complained that the numerous and varied entertainments were too lavish and profuse.

II

Anglin's Speakership was complicated by the fact that this was not the only phase of his life. He was the representative for Gloucester, a prominent Liberal, a newspaper editor and an Irish Catholic leader as well.

As the representative for Gloucester and as one in whom the Government had confidence he was looked to for patronage. Anglin was not reticent to press the claims of his political supporters and friends in response to their pressure upon him. Indeed, most of the letters which passed between Anglin and Mackenzie in these years dealt with patronage matters. The most lucrative source of patronage in Gloucester at this time was, of course, the Intercolonial Railway. Anglin felt that his supporters ought to get the available jobs in their own vicinity but few had experience in the work for which they were to be hired. Mackenzie promised Anglin that he had directed Charles Brydges, the General Superintendent
of Government Railways, to accept the nominations of the friends of the 
Government if the nominees were qualified. But Anglin did not place much 
faith in Brydges and the Premier had to urge upon doubting Timothy that 
the Superintendent "certainly does not in any way desire to favour your 
31 opponents or mine ... " Anglin was not convinced and he continued to 
bother Mackenzie about railway appointees; pestering which brought a sharp 
response.

Now it would be as absurd to nominate men who had no experience, 
however respectable, to manage a Railway as it would be to send a 
ploughman into your office to set type. It is impossible that, in the 
public interest, I can force inexperienced men upon the Railway Manager, 
and I can scarcely help thinking that you are somewhat unreasonable 
in expecting that I should do so. Every man that is wanted in the 
neighbourhood will be appointed from those you may name, if able to 
do the work. What more can I do? 32

Two months later, however, Mackenzie was forced to apologize to Anglin 
for difficulties incurred over labourers for the Railway. He stated that 
he had been unable to do anything because Brydges could not be reached. 
The sort of problem Anglin faced was not unusual for a politician, as he 
related to Bishop Rogers.

I paid a very short visit to Bathurst before the grand opening of 
the Railroad. I stayed but one day there. The object of my visit 
was to force Mr. Brydges to appoint some of our people to the petty 
offices of the road. I had much difficulty in getting anything done 
and it was only after a long and rather [annoying?] correspondence 
with Mr. Brydges and Mr. Smith (the Minister) and afterwards with Mr. 
Mackenzie and three trips to Moncton to see Mr. Brydges and my going 
to Bathurst that I succeeded even so far. The determination of the 
officials to manage everything to suit themselves and their own friends 
is very great and practice enables them to represent all they do as 
done through a sense of duty. The worst of it is that while I am doing 
all I possibly can to obtain justice for our friends the greater part 
of the army of office seekers remain dissatisfied and some persons 
work incessantly to create the impression that I could do a great deal 
more if I pleased and that if anyone in Gloucester is now without a 
[indecipherable] sinecure the fault is entirely mine. But all this 
is to be expected. 34

As a member of the Reform party it was apparent during these years that 
Anglin lost little of his prestige. Mackenzie's correspondence shows
that he thought Anglin a significant personage and while the dour Scot and self-righteous Irishman were not 'bosom buddies' their relationship was more than strictly professional. Each man respected the other and confided political information to him. In fact Anglin's position in the Reform party accounts for the fact that his name continued to pop up as a possible recipient of a cabinet post or some position other than that of Speaker. Possibly Anglin was interested in such a change. At least, he was opposed to the practice that was rapidly becoming a political law, that of allotting cabinet representation according to a regional quota system. He contended that the most able and influential men of the country ought to be selected and that if the existing system were strictly maintained "a perfect union of the Provinces and identity of feeling must be almost impossible." In any case, in October, 1876, Isaac Burpee begrudgingly offered his resignation in a letter which implies that he expected Anglin to be given the position. A year later, A. J. Smith offered his resignation, having heard a rumour that Anglin was to join the Government and thinking that this might be a good idea as in view of the approaching election it would be well to win as much Catholic support as possible. Smith thought Anglin's accession to the cabinet "would bring a considerable element of strength ... " While such a move seemed logical, particularly in the summer of 1877 when Anglin had resigned the Speakership for reasons which will be examined hereafter, it was not made. It is difficult to know why it was not except for the fact that neither Anglin nor Mackenzie wanted to give the opposition the satisfaction of saying that they had forced the Government to drop its Speaker.

The lack of the Speaker's impartiality in matters of behind-the-scene party politics, was seen in full public view in the columns of the Freeman.
Of all the Speaker's of the Canadian House of Commons, Anglin was the only one to have been an active journalist. Obviously, this made the supposed impartiality of the Speaker on political matters, pure artificiality, and leads one to think that the conception of impartiality a century ago was rather different to the view popular today. Through his newspaper, the Freeman, Speaker Anglin made his views known far and wide, becoming subject to criticism on the floor of the House even while he was in the chair. In its columns he continued to give the Mackenzie Government his seal of approval. The Freeman remained one of the strong arms of the Government although it did not hesitate to show independence from the administration, individual Reformers or the chief party organ, the Toronto Globe, on certain points. The Government's establishment of a military school, for example, came as an "unpleasant surprise" to the Freeman.

The probability of our engaging in war seemed, at the most, very remote; indeed many scout the idea that Canada need ever go to war at all; yet here was strong proof that we are likely, at no distant day, to pass from the volunteer and militia system to the establishment and maintenance of a standing army, for which officers must be educated as soon as possible.42

By and large, however, Anglin found little to oppose and much to support. He realized, however, that the accomplishments of the Government were not as numerous as might have been desired for propaganda purposes.

The programme of the Dominion Government [for 1875] is now before the country. It is not very lengthy, probably because the men now in power do not believe that excessive legislation and good government are synonymous [sic]. The Government, the Freeman claimed, ought to be judged on its administrative ability rather than on its legislation. On major issues such as tariff policy, the Freeman could accept no deviation from party policy. For one thing, it was Maritime politicians like Anglin that kept the
Government treading the straight and narrow path of a revenue rather than a protective tariff.

Finally, Anglin was an Irish Catholic leader. It was probably fortunate for him that there were rather few issues during this period which directly concerned Irish Catholics. True, Anglin wrote to the Minister of Justice in two judicial cases where an Irishman was involved. And to be sure, events in and about Ireland continued to occupy Anglin's attention. In 1872, for example, he felt himself obliged to write a series of lengthy but remarkably learned articles for the *Freeman* combating the interpretation of Irish and Catholic history which the eminent historian, James Anthony Froude, had expounded while lecturing in the United States. In Canada itself it was of considerable concern to Irish Catholics that although they numbered perhaps one-seventh of the population of the Dominion only seven had been elected to a federal House of 206 members. Such an anomaly ought to be corrected "if only," said the *Freeman*, "to give so sensitive a people substantial proof that they enjoy perfect, civil and political equality in this country, practically as well as theoretically." Part of the problem was that in no constituency did Irish Catholics hold the majority of the votes and in many places a hearty prejudice against them made it most difficult to get an Irish Catholic elected. What was the answer to this problem? A form of proportional representation might help, thought the *Freeman*, but its support for this scheme was lukewarm. Putting pressure on party leaders was no real answer for they did about the best they could considering the attitude "of the more ignorant and prejudiced who unfortunately form so large a proportion of the rank and file of both parties." In any case group politics were not normally advisable.
The cause must be weighty and important indeed, and the necessity great and manifest which would justify the dividing up of the Canadian body politic, so that instead of the people with interests in common we should become a set of associations, Catholic and Protestant, Irish, English, French and Scotch. 50

The only answer which the Freeman could offer was the solution that time alone could bring — a change in attitude.

It would be indeed a great change for the better if, when only political questions are at issue, the constituencies would not stop to ask what the religious tenets of any candidate were, and if a Catholic candidate could reasonably hope to gain the confidence of a Protestant majority by proving that his aims were high and statesmanlike and his tone lofty. 51

The views Anglin had expressed in front of the St. Patrick's Society of Montreal in 1867 obviously had not changed much. None of the issues which related to Anglin as an Irish Catholic leader created any problem for Anglin as Mr. Speaker except one — the New Brunswick schools question.

III

The schools question is the best example of Anglin's difficulty in being both Speaker and politician-editor with a strong interest in a particular issue. While the schools question can be legitimately viewed from this angle, in the context of Anglin's life as a whole, it would be erroneous to give it such a narrow focus. After all, the question of Catholic schools involved Anglin long before and long after he was Speaker of the House of Commons.

Between the end of the 1873 session and the beginning of the 1874 session, Anglin viewed, participated in, and reported on developments on the issue. During the summer and fall of 1873, local authorities in New Brunswick had stepped up their campaign to collect unpaid school taxes, even before Lord Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, decided in late June that the assessment acts were legal and that the House of Commons had no power to
Refusal to pay was met with seizure of property followed by public auction. Officials were particularly zealous in cases of prominent Catholic leaders. Anglin had twelve reams of printing paper confiscated while his friend Dr. Travers lost a family carriage. Things were carried to extremes, however, when Father Michaud, a St. John priest, was arrested in broad daylight on Prince William Street, one of the main thoroughfares in the city. He had failed to pay a sum of $4.80, an amount which the Freeman claimed could have been obtained by seizing books or other property. For a time violence threatened to erupt, but when Michaud's tax was paid anonymously, the city quieted, but not without a residue of bitterness.

Yet there were also some developments which seemed more encouraging. Perhaps most important in the long run was the fact that Father Dunphy, the parish priest in Carleton, just across the river from St. John, had managed to come to an acceptable compromise with the trustees. It was agreed that the teachers in the Catholic Boys' School would be Catholics, selected and approved by Father Dunphy; books to which he objected would not be used; and religious instruction would be given every day after a fixed hour. In other respects the School would be the same as other common schools. This compromise pointed the way out of the educational quagmire in which the province had been placed. Unfortunately, the problem was more complex elsewhere. In St. John itself Bishop Sweeny was especially concerned to retain the excellent services of the Christian Brothers, but this, apparently, no Board of Trustees could grant under the existing regulations. In any case the St. John trustees had refused to give any substantial concessions when the Bishop had approached them in the fall of 1871 and there was no reason to think that they would be more amenable.
now. In late September another encouraging development took place. Bishop Sweeny, without having to take the initiative, met with members
of the provincial Government to discuss the problem. While nothing
was solved the fact remained that a few steps, hesitant and faltering
to be sure, but steps nonetheless, had been taken along the path of con-
ciliation. During this period the Freeman cautioned those Catholics whose
temper was wearing thin not to go beyond constitutional tactics.

Those who wish to see justice done must address themselves to the good
sense of their Protestant neighbours and endeavour to satisfy them
that they have been grossly deceived by those whose statements they
have too readily accepted as true, and to show them that Catholics
ask only what is fair and right, and what all Protestants who value
religion should freely accord.

To further this object the Freeman continued to enunciate the Catholic
position in as clear and concise language as possible.

As Anglin took the Speaker's chair in the Commons his attitude towards
action in the House on the schools question became more conservative.
He now owed something to the party which had placed him in his seat and
he acted in much the same way as had Cartier, and Langevin when the in-
terests of their party had been at stake. John Costigan and L.-F.-R.
Masson, of course, were not concerned that the Government might be em-
barrassed and pushed forward the issue with vigour. Because Anglin was
no longer available for the parliamentary battle, Costigan took over undisputed leadership of the question in the Commons and he wanted to press
the question in spite of the fact that the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council had not yet handed down its decision. Anglin's influence, felt
behind the scenes, was still considerable. In his view, the fact that
New Brunswick Catholics had accepted the $5,000 grant to cover expenses
in their appeal to the Judicial Committee obligated them to take no action
in the Commons before the result of the suit was known. Moreover, he
claimed, it was unfair of Masson to blame the Government for not giving effect to the Commons' resolution calling for disallowance of the assessment acts. The Colonial Secretary, Anglin pointed out, had declared that the Commons had no right to take such action, and while Anglin believed that Lord Kimberley was entirely wrong in his interpretation of the constitution, one could not expect the Governor General to immediately act in complete disregard of the instructions he had sought at the urging of Macdonald. The situation would have to be clarified. Bishop Sweeney agreed with Anglin. He came to the conclusion that walking softly was the prudent course to take and he wrote to Costigan that he ought to consult with friends in Ottawa "especially Mr. Anglin who, with yourself, has the best knowledge of our position ..." He feared that pressing the issue in the Commons under the circumstances might alienate support. Better to wait until the Judicial Committee had spoken. Costigan dutifully dropped the matter in the House.

In the interim between the 1874 and 1875 sessions of parliament, several significant developments occurred. In the first place, the 1874 New Brunswick provincial election proved that Catholics would not be able to improve their position in this manner, as federal politicians had often suggested. The Freeman considered thirty-six of the forty-one elected members to be No Popery men "pledged to refuse justice to the Catholics of the Province." Hard on the heels of this electoral defeat were further disheartening developments for the opponents of the New Brunswick school system. In a nice move to collect school taxes, these were now lumped together with regular taxes. This meant that those who did not wish to push matters to extremes paid the whole sum. Those who refused to pay school taxes now had to refuse to pay everything, a fact calculated
to remove any sympathy which Protestants had shown the previous year.

But even this became unnecessary when the Judicial Committee dismissed the Catholic case.

The unfortunate incident which demonstrated the impossible situation existing in New Brunswick occurred in Anglin's own constituency in the small Acadian fishing-village of Caraquet. There, early in 1875, a tiny minority of English-speaking Protestant residents led by Robert Young, one of Anglin's old opponents and at the time a member of the appointed Legislative Council, attempted to override the decision of the majority and establish a school which would have involved taxing the inhabitants. Not surprisingly, trouble erupted. The accounts of what actually happened at this point are very conflicting, depending on which side of the fence the reporter sat. One side, friendly to the Government, claimed that the Acadians had rioted, beaten up one person and terrorized others including Young's wife. Another version stated that a crowd of people, disturbed with the actions of the minority, had gone to the leaders of that minority to remonstrate with them and to get them to sign a paper which had been prepared on school matters. The crowd had acted orderly on the whole, although one or two accidents had happened because of many persons attempting to squeeze into a small building to escape the cold. In any case, even at worst, the amount of actual violence which had occurred was rather slight. Unfortunately the story did not end here. Sheriff Vail went to Caraquet and made several arrests and while this was not appreciated it was accepted peaceably. But a couple of days after the initial disturbance, however, an armed band of strangers from Newcastle, some seventy miles away, descended upon the community and began to make arrests left and right. Confusion was the order of the day and a number of men gathered
at the house of Andrew Albert. They may have merely been trying to escape from the net this force was casting; or they may have had intentions of offering opposition. In either case, they took their weapons with them. Events took their fatal course. One of the Newcastle men was shot when he poked his head into the loft where the men were hiding. In the squirmish which followed, one of the Acadians received a wound from which he died the next day, while another of those in the loft received a less serious wound. All the rest were arrested. The unfortunate incident was a rude awakening to all New Brunswick. Anglin, as was to be expected, claimed that it showed the necessity for the Government to make amendments to the school laws to make the system acceptable to Catholics. He deplored the shedding of blood but felt that one had to distinguish between the unruly few and the law-abiding many. And in the eyes of the editor of the Freeman the real violence had been perpetrated by the enactment of unacceptable school legislation. Other New Brunswickers agreed with Anglin in thinking that something simply had to be done. Possibly something might now be done within the province. It was certain that efforts would be made in the House of Commons.

With the schools question in such a state Anglin was in an awkward position when the House met for the 1875 session. Ought he not resign the Speakership and voice his views in the Commons? Interestingly enough, nowhere did the suggestion even arise. Perhaps no one ever thought of it although it seemed to be a logical step. On the other hand, most of the reasons which had led to Anglin's acceptance of the office still held true. In any case the possibility that his resignation could have played a decisive role is very small. It is probable that he could still do more good behind the scenes.
Anglin was working at this. He had gathered impressions of the mood of the House and the political situation and had passed these along to Bishop Sweeny. He advised him that it was likely that any reluctant Quebec representatives could be coerced in view of the fact that local elections in Quebec were approaching. Through them the Government might be forced along the path. Anglin had also arranged interviews between a Catholic dignitary in Ottawa, Dr. O'Connor, and cabinet ministers but both Anglin and O'Connor recognized that the Government was most anxious to keep the question off the floor of the Commons. Both men agreed that Sweeny would have to be sent for and that prelate reluctantly came to Ottawa. Sweeny's canvass was little more successful than his earlier ones. At Anglin's direction he too saw the premier but again no arrangement was made. The Bishop even found several Catholic supporters of the Government urging him not to take any action but he pressed on in his effort to gain support in any case. Sweeny had full confidence in Anglin. In writing to Costigan on January 25, 1875, urging him to push the matter of New Brunswick schools, he advised consultation with Anglin. Apparently Costigan was doubtful of the course Sweeny suggested, for Sweeny had to write again three weeks later reiterating his view that there was nothing to lose. One thing he was willing to forego, however.

I requested you in my letter to consult with Mr. Anglin, on account of his intimate knowledge of every circumstance regarding the vexed question in this Province, but I suppose, from what you say in your letter, that his position and occupations as Speaker will prevent him from taking an active part in the matter. What was evident from this comment was not that Anglin could play no role, but rather that Costigan would have nothing to do with him. The two Irish Catholic New Brunswickers were on different sides of the political fence and Costigan was not about to give his competitor a part to play.
On the evening of March 8th, Costigan presented a motion that an address be presented to the Queen praying for an amendment to the B.N.A. Act to the effect that Catholics in New Brunswick be granted the same educational rights as the minorities in Ontario and Quebec. The debate which followed produced nothing new and was adjourned, though not without some opposition. The consensus seemed to be that had Costigan's motion come to a vote on that evening it would have passed. The Government did not want this to happen and had been able to have the House adjourned. For the next two days the supporters of the Government met and hammered out a compromise. It was agreed that Mackenzie would move an amendment "to satisfy those who are opposed to any change being made in the constitution," and M. Cauchon would add further amendment "resolving to try the last means left us of obtaining relief short of the action of the Imperial Parliament." In final form the first amendment expressed the opinion that imperial legislation on the Canadian constitution "would be an infraction of the Provincial Constitutions, and that it would be inexpedient and fraught with danger to the autonomy of each of the Provinces for this House to invite such Legislation." The second amendment requested that the Colby motion of 1872 be brought to the attention of Her Majesty praying that she would use her influence with the New Brunswick legislature to bring about modifications which would remove grounds of discontent. Difficulties arose about the exact meaning of Mackenzie's resolution. Did its acceptance mean that hereafter the House would reject any attempt to have the constitution changed? Anglin claimed that such was not the case and he stated that Mackenzie had assured his supporters on this point. Because of uncertainty on the question, however, many M.P.s consulted with Bishop Sweeny, but he was as uncertain as they. He thought Cauchon's
amendment useful and perhaps the best that could be expected under the circumstances but there were such conflicting reports about the Mackenzie amendment that he was in a quandry. "He told them in effect," Anglin later reported to Bishop Rogers, "that if the resolutions taken together would not preclude future action he thought it would be better to accept them but to consent to nothing that would fetter their future action."

Anglin himself had advised the Bishop to take this course, but when the Mackenzie and Cauchon amendments were brought forward on the floor of the House it was still unclear what the Bishop's position was. Costigan moved for an adjournment in order that consideration might be given to the amendments. This the Government refused to concede. Consequently Costigan and other opponents of the Government opposed the proposed amendments on the ground that Mackenzie's precluded any further appeals to the Commons. Catholic supporters of the Government took the other side. Catholic M.P.s were split along party lines and the Government carried the day. Party politics were undoubtedly involved but as well it was a case in which men differed in their attempt to carry out the Bishop's wishes. After the passage of these amendments, a motion was made to appoint a committee to draft an address to the Queen. Costigan moved an amendment which would have instructed the committee to end the address with an assertion of the right of the Commons to seek amendment of the B.N.A. Act if satisfactory results did not follow present action. The amendment was objected to and Anglin must have wished that someone else was in the Speaker's chair. Obviously he wanted to keep open the possibility of further action by the House. Yet was not such an amendment unnecessary? Would it not create great difficulty for the Government? Was it not also a substantive change from the motion? His decision, as difficult as it may have been, was clear.
The House has ordered an Address within a certain scope, and I do not think it is competent now to make a motion asking the House to depart from the Resolution which it has just affirmed.84

The entire episode showed the weakness of both the position and the political leadership of Bishop Sweeny. It also showed the surprising strength and ingenuity of the Liberal Government even when Blake was not a cabinet minister. The Macdonald Government had not escaped from a very similar situation as effectively two years before. Anglin was reasonably pleased. In the first place the passage of Costigan's resolution "would accomplish little unless the govrnt earnestly endeavoured to induce the Home govrnt to give them effect," and it was clear that this could not be expected. With the passage of the amendments, however, a large majority of the new House of Commons had expressed its sympathy with New Brunswick Catholics "and if the Queen's intercession failed and her advice was ignored the Parliament which had gone so far could not consistently refuse to go further and assist us in wrestling Justice from those who disregarded all considerations but the gratification of their own bigotry."85 As for the Queen's intervention, Anglin was pessimistic that this would have any salutary effect for reasons he explained in a letter to Archbishop Lynch of Toronto with whom he was later to become well-acquainted.

I try to hope that the action of the House of Commons will lead to a settlement of our School question but I fear that it will not. You really can have no idea of the intensity of the ignorance of the majority of the people of N. Brunswick or the density of their conceited ignorance. The white [cloaked?] gentry control the masses at will and raise the No Popery cry as often as they please. When that is raised reason is blind and justice is forgotten and the one passionate desire of the masses is to trample Pope and Popery in the dust.86

If Anglin thought that nothing could be accomplished on the provincial level, he was wrong. During the summer of 1875, Kennedy Burns, M.P.P. for Gloucester, and a small band of legislative associates approached the provincial Government with a set of propositions.
They asked that members of religious teaching orders be accepted on the certificate of their Superior; that children be allowed to attend schools outside their own district; that books prescribed by the Board of Education but found to contain objectionable passages would not be compulsory and would be replaced; and that religious instruction be allowed after school hours and that regular school hours be shortened in order that such instruction might be given. The Government's answer was long delayed and when it did come it was unclear what would be the practical results for Catholics. Firstly, the Christian Brothers and Sisters of Charity would not have to attend teachers' training school but they would be required to undergo examination before receiving their license. Whether such examination could be taken at their place of residence was not specified. The second point — attendance at schools outside the district — was left up to the local trustees. Books containing objectionable passages were to be edited rather than replaced. Finally, the Government expressed its view that depending on local circumstances — i.e. in Catholic-owned schools — it would be possible to give religious instruction after school hours, although it made no mention of shortened school hours. Further than that the Government could not go.

It is obvious that if the Trustees be required to allow the teachers to give denominational instruction after school to the pupils assembled for public purposes under the authority of the School Act, the direct tendency of such a provision would be to render the selection and appointment of teachers a matter to be determined rather by their denominational views than their fitness to discharge the specified duties required of them, during school hours.88

What all this actually meant could only be determined by the multitude of local trustees. The Government's stand had thrown much of the responsibility on the trustees and while this was not as acceptable to Catholics as an agreement on a province-wide basis would have been, at least the
way was cleared for more arrangements such as had been made in Carleton
a couple of years before. This, however, would take time.

In the meantime the Commons' resolutions had been submitted to the
Colonial Secretary and Anglin urged Blake to do all that could be done.
"The despatch expressing the Queen's wishes car. not be too strong," Anglin
told the Minister of Justice, "and it should if possible be sustained by
private instructions conveyed to the Local Government." By September
Anglin was anxiously seeking information about the state of the case from
Mackenzie. The premier could only state that Lord Carnarvon had delayed
his reply for some reason unknown to him. He had, he assured Anglin,
done his duty in the matter.

I may say that I had a very full explanation with Lord Carnarvon
about your difficulties in New Brunswick and our position in Ontario,
and I suggested to him that I thought the Local Govt. would defer a
good deal to a warm expression of opinion from the Imperial Government
on the subject. My impression, from what he said, is that he would
act on this suggestion; but he was very guarded in expressing himself.90

By late November Anglin had still not heard what Carnarvon's response had
been and again wrote to Mackenzie. In time the former stone mason replied
and sent him a copy of Carnarvon's despatch, dated October 18, "in con-
fidence". The despatch virtually prohibited any future appeal for con-
stitutional change on the question. Mackenzie informed Anglin of the
decision in as factual and as sugar-coated a manner as he could.

You will observe that he [Carnarvon] takes very decided ground on the
subject of Provincial rights in regard to the educational system, and
that he does not feel himself at liberty even to advise Her Majesty
to recommend anything to the local authorities, but expresses his own
strong hope that the majority may be disposed to adopt such modific-
tations of existing rules as may render them less unacceptable to those
who from conscientious reasons felt themselves obliged to protest against
the system now in force. This of course gives the weight of the opin-
ton of the British Govt. against the system as now worked; though I
cannot judge what effect it may have upon your local legislators.93

Anglin was not pleased. If the expression of sympathy had been in the
Queen's name rather than in Lord Carnarvon's it might have done some good. As it was, he told Bishop Rogers in sending him a copy of the confidential despatch, the provincial Government would just laugh at it.

The situation had now become desperate. No hope of redress from the federal Government could be entertained. Anglin confessed that he was at a loss to know what should be done next. All avenues seemed to be closed off. He could only hope that Bishops Sweeney and Rogers would be able to come up with some viable plan of action. The Bishops did the only thing they could; they gave up the fight on a province-wide basis. Early in January, Bishop Rogers announced this change in a bitter letter sent to the priests in his diocese. No longer was the establishment of schools under the School Law to be opposed. In each district Catholics were to strive for the best terms they could obtain.

The problem was not resolved immediately. Even as late as December, 1876, Bishop Sweeney's carriage was once more seized for nonpayment of taxes. Not until March, 1877, were the Catholic schools of St. John finally placed under the control of the Board of School Trustees, under conditions which the Sisters of Charity would, but the Christian Brothers would not accept. The Brothers, who had done so much for education in St. John, were forced to leave the province because their Superior would not accept their being examined by the Board of Education before being given a license, even if such examination took place at their own house. In other respects the agreement reached was reasonably acceptable to Catholics. Once St. John had settled, other areas which had not yet reached a solution, rapidly followed. At last the question was settled — settled, according to Bishop Rogers, "by utter defeat on our part with everything lost except honour."
Was the failure of New Brunswick Catholics to receive redress of grievances on the education issue Anglin's fault? Had he betrayed the Catholic cause by playing party politics or by accepting an office which prevented him from wielding a weapon on the Ottawa battlefield? It seems difficult to find Anglin guilty on this charge. As was everyone else involved, Anglin was influenced by personal and party motives. But his freedom of action was severely limited. The House of Commons was a political arena and one had to play the game if one wished to do very much. Sometimes one's opponents were too strong to win a real victory. Nevertheless, what is perhaps more surprising than the fact that the Commons failed to pass coercive legislation for New Brunswick, is the overwhelming moral support Anglin, Costigan and the others were able to win in the House. Catholics could not blame Anglin for his efforts prior to his acceptance of the Speakership, but what about then? The question can be answered by asking another - would things have been much different if he had stepped down from the post as First Commoner? Probably not. In working quietly behind the scenes, he was wielding about as much influence with the Government as he could. Had he resigned, he probably would merely have isolated himself from the Government and done the cause of Catholic schools little good. No, Anglin did not betray that cause. But because it could be argued that he had, Anglin found the Speakership a drawback. It was difficult to appear as the champion of Irish Catholics while in the Speaker's chair.

IV

There was another significant problem which demonstrated the difficulty of Anglin being Speaker and a politician-newspaperman at the same time. The issue was the matter of Post Office printing.
The whole question had its origin in the fact that the Macdonald administration had had Post Office printing for the Maritime provinces done at or through newspaper offices in that region. When the new Government came to power in 1873, the Postmaster General, D. A. Macdonald, took away this patronage from the papers that had held it and gave it to papers which had supported the Reformers. He had at first directed that two-thirds of New Brunswick printing for the Post Office be sent to the Freeman and the remainder to the office of the Evening Globe. Shortly after, apparently on his own decision and for reasons of efficiency and convenience, he had directed that all the New Brunswick work be sent to the Freeman. For the next two years this practice had been continued, to the tune of $8,000 in 1874 and $10,000 in 1875. When Lucius Seth Huntington became Postmaster General late in 1875, he had become aware of what he considered to be an anomalous situation, drew it to the attention of the cabinet and subsequently directed that no more printing be done at the Freeman office and that henceforth all Post Office printing would be done under contract in Ottawa.

It seemed logical to assume that the Freeman had entered into an agreement or contract with a Government department and that therefore for over two years Anglin had been violating the Independence of Parliament Act. It also seemed logical to think that the Freeman had been given this patronage in order to propitiate Anglin for not receiving a cabinet seat and to make up the difference between the amount of money he would have made as a cabinet minister and that made by the Speaker. In the summer of 1874, in fact, the News had given publicity to these very assumptions. In response the Freeman denied that Anglin was doing anything in violation of the Independence of Parliament Act, but placed its main reliance on an
argument which may have been important but was somewhat beside the point — i.e. that there was little profit in the work. The Freeman's defence was weak. Its editor may have been convinced that he was not violating the Independence of Parliament Act, but his conscience must have told him that his position was correct only legally. Six years before he had been quite righteous about such matters.

The Act to preserve the Independence of Parliament, which was passed at the close of the Session, is very far from being what it ought to be were the real object the exclusion from the House of Commons of all persons who, through the action or connivance of the Government, receive a share of the public revenues. 104

By the fall of 1876, the Freeman had beefed up its case. It charged its antagonists, the News and the Telegraph, with simple jealousy; but it also began to place greater emphasis on the fact that no bargain or contract had ever been made. No corrupt bribing had been going on nor had any contract or agreement been made. Had such contract existed, claimed the Freeman, "the Government would not so summarily have transferred it all to Ottawa ... "

The issue did not reach serious proportions in the House of Commons until 1877. That session was long and bitterly fought and Anglin did not help matters by his continual interruptions and long explanations, at times almost entering into debate. It was a very difficult session to handle and on one occasion Macdonald accused the Speaker of cheating the opponents of the Government out of their rights. Two days later, on April 7, 1877, Mackenzie Bowell moved an amendment to going into Supply that it was "inexpedient and improper" for the Government to enter into "agreement or contract" by which public funds were to be paid to a member of parliament, naming Anglin as the one who had so contravened the Independence of Parliament Act. That the amendment was directed as much against the Government as against the Speaker is unquestionable. At any
time charges that Anglin had violated the Act could have been brought before the Committee on Privileges and Elections. But by moving the aforementioned amendment, the Liberal-Conservatives were able to attack the Government without, on the one hand, giving Anglin an opportunity to explain anything, and on the other, without allowing the Government to move a sub-amendment as this was impossible when the House was going into Supply. The Government responded by indicating that they would not regard the amendment, even if passed, as a want of confidence motion, but merely as a censure of the Speaker. Sir John A. Macdonald then proceeded to berate the Government for attempting to shield themselves by the sacrifice of Anglin, whom he eulogized for the dignity and impartiality with which he had presided over the House. Macdonald was after bigger game than just Anglin. He wanted to bag the entire Government.

In the debate in the House on Bowell's amendment, Macdonald, Blake, Mackenzie, Huntington, Costigan - all had their say; almost everyone but the man most directly involved, Timothy Anglin. No one in the House seemed much concerned with what they did to Anglin's name. The Tories were out to blast the Grits and the Government was out to protect itself. Anglin was caught in the crossfire. When the amendment was defeated the question was referred to the Committee of Privileges and Elections. Ten years later, Anglin claimed that this had been done at his suggestion and in order to clear his name. It gave him an opportunity to have his say at any rate.

In giving evidence before the committee, Anglin, with Mackenzie's prior permission, went into considerable detail about his relations with the premier and the Government during the time that the administration had been formed. He did so to refute the charges that the printing had been compensation for not receiving a seat on the cabinet. He claimed he had
advised Mackenzie at that time that he had no claims upon the Government but that he had confidence in it and would give it a general support.

There was not a single word said during all that time [when the ministry was being formed and Anglin was being sounded on certain questions] about my getting any benefit or advantage from the change in the Government, or of my getting any compensation for not becoming a member of the Government. There was never a word said or a syllable breathed about it, nor do I believe that it entered the mind of any man to suggest or think of such a thing. I know that it did not enter my mind; I never thought or dreamt of it.

He denied that any contract or anything even resembling a contract had ever been made. D. A. Macdonald had simply informed Anglin that the Post Office printing for New Brunswick was to be sent to the Freeman. Anglin claimed he had not solicited this printing and had accepted Macdonald's information as a matter of course and had merely thanked him.

There was nothing said that any ingenuity could possibly convert into the semblance of a contract or agreement. I did not imagine that the Postmaster General was bound in the slightest degree to send me any work he pleased to withhold, or that I was bound to do any work he sent. I did not imagine at all when he told me this that there was in this transaction or would be in it the slightest violation of the Independence of Parliament Act.

Whether the other members of the cabinet had known about these dealings Anglin did not know, but he presumed they did as it was a perfectly open transaction. In general, his testimony continued, his business man had looked after the matter although on one occasion he had gone to the Post Office Department as a favour to him, and had signed some papers and receipts in his own name. He denied any knowledge of the paper, with the words "per agreement" scrawled in an anonymous hand, which had been introduced as evidence. No agreement, he insisted, had been made. Work came to his office from day to day "without my ever knowing that a single order would succeed it or not." And, in fact, one day the orders did stop "without a word of warning being given me by the Government ..."

The care with which Anglin had acted was most apparent when a minor
disagreement about prices came to light during the enquiry. Apparently the Inspector in St. John had informed Anglin's business manager that the prices he had charged were too high and this information had been relayed to Anglin. Anglin, according to his story before the Committee of Privileges and Elections, had advised his foreman to be very careful not to overcharge, and the latter had replied that he had not - that his prices were fair. The Inspector had then got in touch with the Department in Ottawa and had eventually received from there a schedule of prices. Anglin's man had asked his boss for advice but Anglin left the matter to his assistant saying that he was no judge of the question at issue. Within a couple of days his business man indicated that he had examined the price list and had found it to be fair. He said that the Inspector wished to know if Anglin would agree to such a schedule. Anglin gave his foreman strict orders.

I said to him, "Take care and do not, on my behalf, agree to anything; simply state to the Inspector that you have examined the scale of prices, and that you think them fair and reasonable." If this did not amount to an agreement it was at least an understanding in regard to prices. Yet this was not the same as having a contract or an agreement that work would come to the Freeman office. Anglin delved into other aspects of the case and then proceeded to deal with the law and precedents. He showed that according to the decision reached in 1864 in the Russell election case, he had not concluded an agreement or contract with the Government. He pointed out that there were a number of gentlemen who had sat in the Commons since Confederation who had been intimately connected with newspapers receiving government advertising. Nothing had ever been said to indicate the illegality of this, Anglin claimed.

These things, I have no doubt, had their influence on my mind, so far as to cause me never to suspect for a moment, that I was committing
any violation of the Independence of Parliament Act; and as I knew that I had done nothing dishonourable, I never really felt that there was anything to be ashamed or afraid of in this transaction; I never thought that the work was sent to me because I happened to be a member of Parliament. I was satisfied that if I ceased to be a member of Parliament the work would have been sent to me, and I believe that under such circumstances I could possibly in a great many cases have insisted upon getting what my foreman said were more reasonable prices than were allowed. Of course my position as a member of Parliament would prevent me at all interfering between him and the Department in matters of that kind.

Anglin concluded his statement by summarizing his position and ended on the following note:

Whether it was expedient or inexpedient that this work should be done by a Member of Parliament is, I think another question altogether. I would be myself prepared to say, I think, that if I had an opportunity of voting on the question now - having had more time to give to the consideration of it - I would vote that it is inexpedient, and I do not know but that I would not go so far as to say it is improper. But as to there being anything improper in it under the circumstances, as they existed, this never occurred to me; there was nothing dishonourable or dishonest in the transaction ... 114

Anglin's legal position was good; his moral position was not. To accept his statement that he had not thought that he had violated either the letter or the spirit of the Independence of Parliament Act is most difficult. In the extraordinary care he took to maintain his legal position on the question, one can see that he realized that he was treading on dangerous ground. The fact that others had done almost exactly the same thing could not excuse him. He had spoken in high moral terms and had judged others by this standard; if one is to judge him by his own standard he must be condemned. One cannot but think that he realized that he was standing on the letter of the law rather than on right and justice. As for the possibility that the printing had been given to the Freeman as partial recompense for Anglin's exclusion from the cabinet, one can only say that it is difficult to assess. It seems clear that Anglin did not solicit it directly, nor did the matter enter his correspondence with
Blake and Mackenzie. Why should the Freeman rather than the Evening Globe have received the printing? The answer to this question must rest on the reason for initially giving the Freeman two-thirds and the Globe one-third of the printing, for it seems logical that once it was decided to centralize all the Post Office printing for the province at one source it would go to the place that was already doing the majority of it. Was it just an accident? Was it because the Postmaster General was a Catholic? Was it because the Freeman had rendered more valuable service to the Liberal cause than had the Globe? Or was it because Anglin had not received a cabinet post? The most reasonable hypothesis might be stated as follows: Postmaster General Macdonald, being a Catholic and undoubtedly aware that it was 'Protestant bigotry' on the New Brunswick schools question which kept Anglin out of the cabinet, sympathized with Anglin and when the opportunity presented itself for him to do something for the editor of the Freeman he did so on his own initiative, neither Anglin nor the Government being directly involved. That the printing did promote Anglin's acceptance of the Government seems likely, however, and so the interpretation comes full circle.

Fortunately for the country and the purity of parliament, but unfortunately for Timothy Anglin, the Committee of Privileges and Elections decided to reverse practice and precedent. Following Blake's lead, which irked Anglin, it found that despite the fact that precedent existed and that Anglin had acted in accordance with it, "said precedent and practice are erroneous, and that according to a true construction of the Act for securing the Independence of Parliament, the transactions in question did constitute disqualifying contracts." His election, the committee declared, was void. But for Anglin's sake and the sake of the smooth
functioning of the Commons, this report was not brought down to the House until the session ended. Anglin claimed that he had not been a party to this arrangement. It had been agreed to by the committee and Sir John Macdonald, Anglin iterated, and Macdonald had simply played a "petty trick" when he demanded that the report be read when it was laid before the House just when the session was ending. Still, it had not been read, and therefore, Anglin believed, it had no legal validity for the time-being. To prove to the public that he was still Speaker, he had used Brydges's special railway car to transport he and his family from Ottawa. However, he knew it was essential to resign his post and seek re-election in Gloucester before the next session met, at which time he could be re-elected Speaker.

Opposition to Anglin's re-election in Gloucester was more vociferous than he had ever encountered before. Anglin thought it was "in some respects the most unpleasant election I ever ran or took part in ..."

Yet a strenuous five-week campaign enabled Anglin to overcome the forces of Robert Young, disappointed office seekers (and even some office holders), and a nationalist oriented segment of the Acadian population. Anglin was re-elected by a majority of over 200 votes over his opponent, Onésiphore Turgeon. Anglin was now set to be re-elected Speaker, or so he thought.

Early in January, 1878, however, Mackenzie wrote to Anglin notifying him that the Clerk of the House, Mr. Patrick, was doubtful whether he could allow Anglin's name to be put forward for renomination to the Speakership. The problem seemed to be that Patrick was convinced that the Speaker had to announce the results of special elections and that therefore another person would first have to be elected Speaker in order that the Gloucester results could be announced. Mackenzie had pointed out a counter-argument
and Patrick consulted one of the constitutional experts of the day, Sir Erskine May. May's advice had been cautious but to Mackenzie's mind, May had been inclined to think that Anglin could be re-elected. Mackenzie thought that Patrick would draw this inference but he confided to Anglin that he feared "that he may consult a gentleman who will certainly give advice in the opposite direction (I mean Sir J. M.)." Anglin's response to this information was to forward his own case. The main thrust of his argument was that according to Canadian practice the Clerk could administer the oath; anyone who had taken the oath and had been duly elected could sit in the House; and anyone who legitimately held a seat in the House could not be restricted from any of its privileges. He then proceeded to give a number of precedents which showed that his argument was solid. Nor did it hurt his cause that Luther Holton and George Brown agreed that he had a right to stand for re-election. Mackenzie was therefore well prepared when Sir John objected to Anglin's nomination for Speaker. The Conservative leader found his arguments were no match for those of his fellow Scotsman and although the issue was pushed to a vote, Anglin was re-elected by 116 to 53. Anglin thus became the only Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons to be unseated for corrupt practices and to be re-elected during the life of a single parliament.

V

Anglin had mentioned in his evidence before the Committee of Privileges and Elections that he had found the Speaker's chair rather confining as he was used to taking a prominent role in debate. It would appear that he decided not to be completely silenced during the 1878 session. The discussion which drew him out was the Scott Act which provided for local option on the issue of prohibition. As far as he was concerned
the only antidote for drunkeness, was religion, "which alone can elevate, purify and strengthen the soul of man and enable him to overcome his evil propensities ... " Prohibitory legislation was unworkable and unjust, Anglin believed, and the experiment in New Brunswick twenty years before had proven this. It was not surprising, therefore, that Anglin should oppose the Scott Act but the manner in which he did so was most surprising. As soon as the House had resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, Anglin stepped around the Clerk's table and told the ministerial benches he had something to say about the Bill.

The face, flushed with feeling, the voice trembling with passion, and the aggressive attitude, sent a thrill of expectation through the House, and the silence was intense. He continued, raising his voice and looking angrily towards the Premier:

"I regard it as of the most injurious and pernicious character that can possibly be conceived, and also of the most tyrannical character."

Yes, he said, tyranny more gross than this had never been attempted. No one had the right to tell another what he could eat, drink or wear. The Bill would be productive of great evil — riot, tumult, and confusion — and on top of it all would cause the Government to suffer. It was quite a speech. Obviously he felt strongly about the question but one must think that part of his over-reaction was caused by the strangeness of his position. He had not partaken in debate before this while Speaker. Nevertheless, the whole ministry was made extremely uncomfortable and rather angry by this outburst. But Anglin had ruffled feathers before and he would do so again. At least no one could say that he was a tame follower of the Government. Anglin's first incursion into debate when the Commons was in Committee of the Whole did not deter him from doing it once again the following day. On this occasion, however, he merely suggested that a Bill for the Better Prevention of Violence be stiffened by allowing shops and houses to be searched for weapons. The suggestion
was, with modifications, accepted. For the Speaker to discuss issues brought to the floor of the House was highly unusual procedure and Anglin refrained from doing this during the rest of the session. Still, these two speeches probably relieved Anglin from some of the boredom the session was giving him.

He could not correctly say, however, that the conclusion to the session was boring. On the last day of the third parliament of Canada, while the Commons were waiting for the Black Rod to summon them to the Senate, Donald Smith got into a heated argument with Charles Tupper and Sir John Macdonald. Anglin, seeing no prospect of silence, signalled the Sergeant-at-Arms to admit the Black Rod. Smith kept on talking until the Black Rod interrupted him. No sooner had the House been informed of His Excellency's 'pleasure' than Macdonald cried, "Donald Smith is the biggest liar in Canada." Smith replied in kind and as both sides spilled out onto the floor of the House the prospect of blows seemed so great that Anglin ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to clear the way and arrest the men involved. But they were pulled apart and as they had not yet been named, no arrests were made. After the Speaker, Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms and a handful of members left the House, the tumult continued, peace being maintained only through the hard work of the Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms.

It was a fitting prelude for the battle to follow - the 1878 general election. Anglin knew that he retained the title of Speaker until the next parliament opened. He may well have suspected that he would never again have to preside over a debate in the House of Commons. What he could not have known or suspected when he left Ottawa on May 15, was that he was leaving the most significant office he would ever fill in his career.
FOOTNOTES

1 A sixth child, Timothy Warren, was born in St. John on October 9, 1873. As has been seen, the third, fourth and fifth child had died.
3 Freeman, July 14, 1874.
4 Ibid., July 8, 1875.
5 Anglin had been in Gloucester. His wife and some of the children had gone to St. Stephen and the male servant and "one of the younger members of the family" were left in charge (see Freeman, Sept. 26, 1874). Anglin's insurance coverage was estimated to be $14,000 (see Morning News (St. John), Sept. 25, 1874), but Anglin still confided to Bishop Rogers that his loss was much greater than that for which he had coverage (see U.N.B.A., Bishop James Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 2, 1874.)
6 Canada: Scrapbook Hansard, 1874, p. 1 (March 26). Holton denied that he had turned down the Speakership but thanked Macdonald for his expression of confidence. He then assured the House that Anglin would be a capable person.
7 Ibid.
8 New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), Feb. 25, 1874.
9 "Chaudiere", Apr. 4, 1874, in Canadian Illustrated News (Montreal), Apr. 11, 1874. This became painfully obvious in 1877 when Anglin was forced to admit that he could not read the opening prayers to the House in French because his attempt to do so would be "ludicrous" (see Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877, p. 94 (Feb. 19)).
11 Canada: Scrapbook Hansard, 1874, pp. 7-8 and 15-16 (March 31 and Apr. 9).
12 "Chaudiere", Apr. 18, 1874, in Canadian Illustrated News, Apr. 18, 1874.
14 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1876, pp. 601-602 (March 13).
15 Though see ibid., pp. 288-290 (Feb. 28).
16 "Chaudiere", Apr. 18, 1874, in Canadian Illustrated News, Apr. 18, 1874. "Chaudiere" noted that Holton seemed to take "a little malicious delight" in rescuing the Speaker at the beginning of the 1874 session. Holton's one-upsmanship continued in subsequent sessions but Anglin soon became an expert as Holton (see, for example, Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877, pp. 875-876 (March 21)).
18 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1874, p. 56 (Apr. 27); and ... Debates, 1877, pp. 1171-1174 (Apr. 5).
19 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877, p. 1178 (Apr. 5).
21 Freeman, March 29, 1877; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Apr. 4,
1878.
22 Quoted in W. F. Dawson, Procedure in The Canadian House of Commons (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 80. This was part of Anglin's testimony before the Committee on Privileges and Elections in 1877.
23 Anglin later acknowledged that he followed the apparently traditional practice of appointing those nominated by members of his party (see Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880, p. 1030-1032 (Apr. 2)).
24 Lynch Papers, Anglin to Lynch, March 25, 1875; and P.A.O., Edward Blake Letterbooks, IV, Blake to Mr. Speaker, Feb. 17, 1876; IX, Blake to Anglin, Dec. 28, 1876; IX, Blake to Anglin, Jan. 15, 1877.
26 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1876, p. 1148 (Apr. 8).
27 P.A.C., House of Commons Sessional Records, H. Hartney to Anglin and reply, Apr.11, 1876; Anglin to A. Patrick, Apr. 13, 1876; Anglin to Hartney, Apr. 14, 1876; Anglin to Hartney, July 14, 1876; Anglin to Hartney, Aug. 10, 1876; Anglin to Hartney, Oct. 9, 1876; Anglin to Hartney, Nov. 8, 1876; and Anglin to Patrick, Feb. 28, 1877. See also P.A.C., Alexander Mackenzie Letterbooks, III, W. Buckingham to Anglin, June 10, 1874.
28 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880, pp. 1030-1031 (Apr. 2).
29 House of Commons Sessional Records, Anglin to Hartney, Aug. 10, 1876.
31 Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to Anglin, Sept. 28, 1875.
32 Ibid., IV, Mackenzie to Anglin, Oct. 14, 1875.
33 Ibid., V, Mackenzie to Anglin, Dec. 6, 1875.
34 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 6, 1875. On patronage matters, see also ibid., Anglin to Rogers, March 6, 1874; Mackenzie Letterbooks, IV, Mackenzie to Anglin, May 26, June 14 and Oct. 7, 1875; ibid., V, Buckingham to Anglin, Feb. 16 and March 29, 1876; ibid., VIII, Buckingham to Anglin, Oct. 22 and 31, 1877; Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, July 25, 1877; and Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (sic), June 23, 1874; and ibid., Anglin to Gillmor (sic), July 16, 1875. Apparently Anglin was quite successful in obtaining positions for his friends in the St. John area (see Freeman, May 23 and May 30, 1876).
35 See, for example, Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to Anglin, Sept. 28, 1875. The same could be said about Blake and Anglin (see Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 25, 1875; and Blake Letterbooks, Blake to Anglin, Sept. 23, 1876). In regard to the problem Blake presented to the Mackenzie administration, Anglin attempted to be a bridge over troubled waters (see Freeman, Feb. 17 and Oct. 10, 1874; ibid., May 25, 1875; Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 25, 1875; and Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (sic), July 14, 1875).
36 Much to Mackenzie's embarrassment on the occasion that Anglin passed on information which Mackenzie had assumed would be kept confidential (see Mackenzie Letterbooks, Buckingham to John O'Donohoe, June 5, 1874).
37 Freeman, Sept. 8, 1874. As the Freeman was simply commenting on an article which had appeared in the Toronto Globe, it is rather unlikely that Anglin had deep-seated personal political objectives in mind. The Times, Apr. 1, 1875, mentioned the rumour that Anglin was about to resign the Speakership and take the office of Accountant under the new Insolvency Act for the Maritime Provinces.
39 Ibid., Smith to Mackenzie, Sept. 23, 1877. It may also have been this subject about which Archbishop Connolly had spoken to Mackenzie during the summer. In any case Connolly apparently had been trying to promote Anglin's welfare (see Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 2, 1877).
39A Charles Marcl who was Speaker from 1909 to 1911, had been a journalist but does not appear to have been actively involved in newspaper work while he was Speaker (see J. K. Johnson (ed.), The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1867 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), pp. 350-351).
40 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877, pp. 1267-1274 (Apr. 9).
41 Freeman, Apr. 4, 1874; and March 11, 1875.
42 Ibid., June 6, 1874. A further exposition of Anglin's views on proper organization for the defence of the country is found in ibid., May 27, 1876.
43 Ibid., Feb. 9, 1875.
44 Blake Letterbooks, IX, Blake to Anglin, Sept. 23 and Dec. 26, 1876, and Jan. 9, 1877. The issue of whether W. B. O'Donoghue, the Irishman involved in the Riel uprising of 1869-70 and later with the Fenian invasion of Manitoba, should receive an amnesty, aroused some interest amongst Irish Canadians (see Freeman, Apr. 1, 1876, and Nov. 29, 1877).
45 Freeman, second and third week of November, 1872; Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 15, 1872. Froude's views were, of course, also challenged in the United States (see J. Bland, Hibernian Crusade: The Story of the Catholic Total Abstinence Union of America (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951), p. 73). On January 7th, 1873, the Freeman refuted Goldwin Smith's arguments concerning Ireland and its history.
46 Freeman, March 27, 1877.
47 Ibid., June 5, 1877.
48 Ibid., March 27, 1877.
49 Ibid., June 5, 1877.
50 Ibid., June 19, 1877.
51 Ibid., June 5, 1877.
53 Freeman, Sept. 20, 1873. George W. Day, the editor of the New Dominion and True Humorist bought the printing paper (see Freeman, Sept. 25, 1873).
54 Freeman, July 31 and Aug. 2, 1873; and News, Aug. 1, 1873.
55 Freeman, July 5, 1873.
56 Ibid., Sept. 30 and Oct. 11, 1873; Ibid., Jan. 6, 1874; and News, Dec. 17 and 18, 1873. The meeting may have been the result of the mission of Macdonald's henchman, L.-F.-R. Masson, to patch up the schools difficulty, win Bishop Sweeney's approval and alleviate the federal Government of a very difficult problem (see Toner, op. cit., p. 91).
57 Freeman, Jan. 15, 1874. See also Ibid., Feb. 26, 1874.
58 Ibid., March 24, 1874.
59 P.A.C., John Costigan Papers, Costigan to Sweeney, May 3, 1874.
60 Freeman, May 23, 1874.
61 Ibid., Apr. 9, 1874.
62 Costigan Papers, Sweeney to Costigan, May 7, 1874; and Ibid., Sweeney to Costigan, telegram, May 20, 1874.
63 Special despatch to Evening Globe (St. John), May 20, 1874, quoted in Freeman, May 21, 1874.
66 Ibid., July 4, 1874.
67 New Brunswick School Act: The Argument before the Privy Council of Great Britain in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, July 17, 1874: Maker vs. the Town Council of the Town of Portland. See also Freeman, July 18, 1874.
68 Freeman, Jan. 19 and 30, 1875.
69 Ibid., Jan. 30 and Feb. 2, 1875. The provincial Government was shown in a very bad light in the resulting trials. It packed juries and it used every other trick it could, many illegal as it turned out, in an attempt to justify having sent armed men to the district. Its efforts were largely in vain and those arrested after the initial outbreak in Gloucester were merely found guilty of illegal assembly. By and large, it was shown that newspaper reports of events had been wild exaggerations, as the Freeman had surmised at the time. An initial verdict of "wilful murder" with a recommendation for mercy against those involved in the squirmish in which the Newcastle man had been shot, was quashed by the New Brunswick Supreme Court. Information on the various trials is found in Freeman, Sept. 9 and 11, Oct. 7, Nov. 9, and Dec. 9, 1875; ibid., June 29 and July 1, 1876; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 6, 10 and 27, 1875.
70 Freeman, Feb. 11, 1875.
71 Evening Globe Feb. 1, 1875, quoted in Freeman, Feb. 2, 1875. The Globe, along with the Freeman, felt that the Government was using the religio-educational issue to obscure its incompetence and keep itself in power.
72 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875.
73 Costigan Papers, Sweeney to Costigan, Jan. 25, 1875.
74 Ibid., Sweeney to Costigan, Feb. 12, 1875. Costigan may have been sore at what he might have construed as betrayal by the Bishop and the Freeman's criticism in the previous session.
75 Canada: House of Commons, Journals, 1875, p. 179. An indication of Protestant reaction in New Brunswick to Costigan's resolution is found in Gillmor Papers, John Boyd to Gillmor, March 6, 1875.
76 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875; P.A.C., George Brown Papers, Brown to Anne Brown, March 9, 1875; and Freeman, March 16, 1875.
77 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875; and Freeman, March 16, 1875.
78 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875.
79 Freeman, March 16, 1875.
80 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875. If he had done this, Mackenzie certainly was not guaranteeing his support should it become a matter of changing the constitution. In a letter to the persistent Father Quin he had given no encouragement to that idea; claimed that such a change could not be made "without the consent of every party to the compact"; and doubted that Quebec and even Ontario would accept such a modification (see Mackenzie Letterbook, IV, Mackenzie to Quin, Jan. 18, 1875).
81 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875. Back in St. John, Sweeny reported to his parishioners that if the appeal to the Queen did not succeed, the case could be carried to the Commons once again (see Freeman, May 4, 1875).

82 Freeman, March 18, 1875.

83 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875. It is apparent that Catholic Conservatives, such as Costigan, felt that the Bishop was not in favour of the Liberal amendments (see Costigan Papers, Masson to Costigan, July 16, 1877). Anglin's own position is well-outlined in the Freeman's defence of Bernard Devlin (see Freeman, March 29, 1875).

84 Canada: House of Commons, Journals, 1875, pp. 202-203.

85 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, March 28, 1875. Anglin was disappointed that both New Brunswick cabinet ministers, especially Smith, had been in opposition to the Catholic requests for "justice".

86 Lynch Papers, Anglin to Lynch, March 25, 1875.

87 Freeman, Apr. 17, 1875. It seems likely that these propositions were modified as negotiations proceeded (see ibid., Aug. 14, 1875).

88 Ibid., Aug. 14, 1875.

89 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 25, 1875.

90 Mackenzie Letterbooks, IV, Mackenzie to Anglin, Oct. 7, 1875.

91 Printed in Canada: House of Commons, Journals, 1876, p. 55; and in Freeman, Feb. 15, 1876.

92 Undoubtedly, this was exactly what Mackenzie wanted.

93 Mackenzie Letterbooks, V, Mackenzie to Anglin, Dec. 6, 1875.

94 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 10, 1875. Anglin still tried to make use of it nevertheless (see Freeman, Feb. 17, 1876).

95 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Dec. 10 and 27, 1875; and ibid., Anglin to Anglin, Jan. 18, 1876.

96 Ibid., circular letter from Rogers to the priests in his diocese, Jan. 7, 1876.

97 Freeman, March 24, 27 and 29, and May 3, 1877.

98 Ibid., Apr. 3 and May 12, 1877. Negotiations in Fredericton, however, failed in August (see Freeman, Aug. 30, 1877).

99 Rogers Papers, Rogers to Anglin, May 8, 1877.

100 Freeman, Apr. 26, 1877. A copy of the evidence given before the Committee of Privileges and Elections was reprinted in the Apr. 24 and 26, 1877, issues of the Freeman (it may also be found in Canada: House of Commons, Journals, 1877, Appendix No. 8., First Report of the Select Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections). Footnote references to these two dates of the Freeman relate to this evidence.

101 Canada Sessional Papers, 1877, No. 59, pp. 5-6. In Nova Scotia the same centralization practice was followed, the Citizen receiving the lion's share. The reason for the large increase in Post Office expenditures during these years is that considerable reorganization of post offices was taking place "in order to assimilate them in accordance with the other parts of the Dominion ... " (see Freeman, Apr. 26, 1877).

102 Freeman, Apr. 14, 1877. A lengthy report of the debate in the House of Commons of April 7 and 9, 1877, was given in the Freeman, Apr. 12 and 14, 1877 (see also Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877, pp. 1222-1316). Footnote references to these two dates of the Freeman relate to this debate. It is interesting, but perhaps not especially relevant, to note that at the same time that Huntington was taking away Post Office printing from the Freeman, Anglin was publicly objecting to Huntington's stand against the Catholic Church.
103 *News*, July 3 and 8, 1874; and *Freeman*, July 4, 7, 9, 25 and 28, 1874.
104 *Freeman*, June 6, 1868.
105 *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 1876. See also *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 14, 19 and 21, 1876; and *News*, Sept. 11, 1876.
106 Bowell had brought up the question in the House the year before but had not made much use of it (see *Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1876*, pp. 837-838 (March 24)).
107 *Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877*, p. 1830 (Apr. 25).
108 *Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1877*, p. 1171 (Apr. 5). See also *ibid.*, pp. 470 (March 5) and 485 (March 5).
110 *Collingwood Bulletin*, Feb. 3, 1887.
111 *Freeman*, Apr. 24, 1877.
113 Anglin was called back before the committee to name names. He did so, choosing only those individuals no longer in the House and therefore no longer liable under the law.
114 *Freeman*, Apr. 24, 1877.
115 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (*sic*), May 7, 1877. Gillmor had been about the only man who had taken pains to stick up for Anglin (see *ibid.*, Gillmor to MacKenzie, Apr. 19, 1877).
116 *Freeman*, May 1 and 3, 1877. There were a number of others who were affected by the decision of the committee (see *ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1877; Young, *op. cit.*, II, 271-272; Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87; and de Kiewiet, *op. cit.*, Dufferin to Carnarvon, Apr. 19, 1877, p. 345).
117 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (*sic*), May 7, 1877.
119 *Freeman*, Aug. 3, 1875.
120 Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (*sic*), July 11, 1877; Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, July 9, 1877; MacKenzie Papers, Anglin to MacKenzie, July 25, 1877. Anglin took steps after the election to have several of the most conspicuous of his opponents who were also office-holders fired (see *ibid.*).
122 Because the 1877 Great Fire of St. John destroyed the *Freeman* office and because Anglin was tied up in Gloucester, no issues of the *Freeman* were published between June 19 and Aug. 19, 1877. Thus what one might expect to be the best source on the election is non-existent. One interesting aspect of the election is that the Government took no part in the contest and did not even communicate with Anglin (see Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmor (*sic*), July 11, 1877).

124 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, Jan. 9, 1878.
125 Ibid., Holton to Mackenzie, Jan. 19, 1878; and Brown to Mackenzie, Feb. 2, 1878.
126 Montreal Herald, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Feb. 12, 1878. See also Freeman, Feb. 13, 1878.
127 Freeman, Apr. 24, 1877.
128 See Dawson, op. cit., p. 66; Thomson, op. cit., pp. 326-327; and Buckingham, op. cit., pp. 460-469.
129 Freeman, Jan. 21, 1878.
130 Ibid., Apr. 30, 1878. See also ibid., March 21, 1878.
131 Daily Sun (St. John), Sept. 5, 1878. See also Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1878, pp. 2402-2404 (May 3).
132 Sun, Sept. 5, 1878. This account presents an amusing picture of the reactions of Mackenzie, Blake, Cartwright et al.
133 Freeman, May 6, 1878; and Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1878, p. 2499 (May 4). The Bill was geared to overcome a deplorable situation which had developed in Montreal.
134 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Apr. 4, 1878.
135 Freeman, May 11, 1878.
136 Ibid., May 16, 1878.
CHAPTER 13

Perspectives: 1874-1878

Certain issues which arose between 1874 and 1878 were not particularly relevant to Anglin as Speaker but were certainly important to Anglin in other aspects of his life - as a Canadian, as an Irishman, as a Catholic, as a politician, and, of course, as a human being whose children would be heir to the world he and his generation left behind. His views on these issues, shaped in part by increasing age and high position, evidenced a rather conservative political philosophy. Far from being a radical departure from the earlier phases of Anglin's life, however, it was a natural evolution. But the years from 1874 to 1878 proved conclusively that Anglin was a man with 'No Shillelagh'.

I

In the first place, Anglin was writing another chapter in a mythical autobiography, "The Making of a Canadian". The country formed in 1867 was gradually winning his heart. By 1872, as has already been seen, Anglin had come to accept the new regime of Confederation. This acceptance did not diminish as time went on. Even the New Brunswick school question did much to make Ottawa rather than Fredericton the prime object of his patriotism. The passage of time also aided this development so that in 1877 when Anglin learned that some persons were attempting to establish a "Canadian National Society" in Montreal he printed the following statement in his Freeman:

We have already in this pretty well organized Dominion a national society to which all Canadians do actually and really belong, and this is the only Canadian National Society that can exist in Canada. To call any other association than the Canadian people, so organized, a Canadian National Society, is a misnomer.¹

416
Canada's power to produce patriotism and loyalty was being shown in the actions and attitudes of this Irish Catholic editor, as it was in the lives of countless others. The ingredient of anti-Americanism, of the non-vociferous variety, was part of this patriotism or at least demonstrated it. Annexation was unthinkable. The Government of the United States, the *Freeman* claimed, had for some years been "the most wasteful, extravagant, and in many respects the most inefficient perhaps in the world."² Annexation to the United States would now bring few material benefits and many troubles and burdens, "and there are few thinking men who would prefer the constitution and form of government to our own ... "³ Even Canada's position in the Empire had become acceptable to Anglin. By 1872 and the passage of the Treaty of Washington he had been convinced that there was little chance that the imperial connection could be maintained in its existing form. Yet it soon became apparent that a new trend away from separatist sentiments was beginning to make its appearance in Britain.⁴ Anglin, though initially considering this change to be motivated by selfish reasons, welcomed it. True, he acknowledged, Canada's position in the Empire when logically considered, did seem anomalous.⁵ Yet in practice "it suits us and our present position pretty well" and Canadians desired no change for the present at least.⁶ Contrary to his expectations, but quite to his liking, the imperial connection strengthened immeasurably in the years following the Treaty of Washington.

The people of Canada ... are at this moment more devotedly attached to the Empire than ever they were, because they know that as part of the Empire they enjoy all the liberty it is possible for them to enjoy in their present circumstances, because they prefer the form of government and political institutions under which they can enjoy so much liberty to all other forms of government, and because the Empire, while it protects them without cost, places no obstacle in the way of their prosperity. England, on the other hand, desires to retain Canada because it gratifies her pride of empire, because she
sympathizes with a people who are of her own nearest kindred, and because the connection costs her nothing, and is materially beneficial, the colonist being the best customers for her manufacturers.

Above all, the connection provided some protection against the United States for Anglin was not convinced that Canada had nothing to fear from that quarter. "The ambition of powerful peoples," he wrote, "the exigencies of political parties, the folly or frenzy of rulers or legislatures have caused war in the past and will cause wars in the future, and Republics are by no means the least insolent or aggressive." The fact that such a comment was in radical contradiction to his statements where defence expenditures were concerned did not seem to bother him. All in all Anglin was fairly happy with his adopted country. If only sectarian strife could be eliminated.

II

As was natural for an Irish Catholic, Anglin had always disapproved of the Orange Society, its incorporation, and its Twelfth of July marches. None of the latter had taken place in St. John since the fatal confrontation of 1849 and for the most part peace and relative harmony had prevailed in the city. In 1876, however, the Orangemen, under the leadership of Edward Willis, a member of the provincial Assembly and the editor of the News, decided to march. The Freeman expressed its disapproval and asked Orangemen to change their mind.

Since that terrible conflict at York Point 27 years ago no demonstration of this kind has ever been made in St. John. The memory of that dreadful day had almost died away, and although there have been many exhibitions of religious intolerance at elections and in other ways, nothing has been done to provoke ill feeling on any side, and blessed peace has prevailed all around. We hope that the Orangemen, if they ever entertained any such idea, will, for the sake of the public peace, and to prove their kindly feelings and good will towards their neighbours, abandon it. They would thus achieve a greater triumph than any marching in procession can afford them, and earn the thanks
of all their fellow citizens.\textsuperscript{9}

To this, the \textit{News} reacted angrily, telling its readers that the \textit{Freeman's}
words constituted a threat to Orangemen, and suggested the \textit{Freeman}
"address its counsels not to the men who have no intention of breaking
it [the peace], but to the parties whom it may suspect of violent pur-
poses."\textsuperscript{10} Anglin denied that his words could be construed as a threat.
The \textit{Freeman}, he said, had always discountenanced public processions
especially those insulting or offensive to a segment of the population.
The Irish Catholics of St. John had not had St. Patrick Day parades and
even the Catholic Temperance Societies had been persuaded by the Bishop
to take the shortest route and carry no banners as they proceeded to the
Cathedral. Catholics had not given any offense to anyone; why should
they be subjected to any? For there was, whether Orangemen realized it
or not, a very deep insult involved in the celebration of the Twelfth,
claimed the \textit{Freeman}. It was the celebration of a defeat of Irish Catho-
lics -- a defeat "which deprived the Catholics of whatever religious and
civil rights were left them after a struggle of centuries; took away
what remained of their properties, and made them paupers, aliens, Helots
in their own country ..." In view of this the \textit{Freeman} could only
reiterate its position:

\begin{quote}
Should the necessity be forced upon us, we shall do all in our power
to induce those to whom such processions are an offence to prove
themselves good citizens, peaceful, forbearing, patient and law-
abiding, but at present we appeal to the Orangemen and beg of them to
show that they can forego, for the general good, and for the sake of
peace, harmony, and good will, any gratification such an exhibition
may, under other circumstances, afford them.
Let us have peace.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

But Willis and his Orangemen would listen to neither the \textit{Freeman} nor
the Mayor nor the Sheriff.\textsuperscript{12} Under these circumstances the \textit{Freeman}
proved as good as its word. "It now becomes the duty of well disposed citizens of all classes and denominations," it propounded, "to do all in their power to preserve the peace." In most serious tones it urged Catholics to ignore the insult which was offered them and warned that even a single small incident could lead to riot and tumult. Not only should the steady, quiet and orderly keep a guard upon themselves and their families, but also they should use all their influence with the more excitable and easily provoked members of the community and if possible to induce them to keep out of the way completely. In conclusion the Freeman gave its Catholic followers a challenge; a challenge to turn the other cheek.

It will be a great triumph for the Catholics of St. John if on that day no man or woman or boy bearing the name of Catholic interfere in any way with the procession and excite ill feeling as it deserves. Every Catholic householder, every well educated Catholic young man, every Catholic who respects his religion and who wishes to prove that he knows what his duty to the country is, and that he means to do it, will on that day and on all preceding days do all in his power to allay irritation, to calm excitement and to preserve the peace. 13

Despite the abuse it received from the News, 14 the Freeman reiterated its advice on the day before the march and passionately urged that peace reign supreme. 15

Amazingly, peace was almost entirely maintained. The only casualties suffered were two leg wounds -- one an innocent bystander shot by a stray Orange bullet, the other an Orangeman who blasted his own leg in his haste to draw his revolver out of his pocket. Apparently the only Irish Catholic arrested, but even then only held briefly, was Ellen Cain, an old apple woman, who threw a chunk of wood and then tried to get at Willis. There were other incidents some more amusing than others but considering the occasion everything passed off quite quietly. Little thanks, however, was due to the marchers. Most of them had proceeded on
their way armed with revolvers and seemed very quick to use them. The parade route chosen had gone through York Point, an area almost entirely populated with Catholics; where the streets were very narrow; and where twenty-seven years earlier lives had been lost and men had been maimed. Above all, the attitude taken by Willis's News to the potential danger the parade had posed to the peace of the community was really quite incredible:

There was not the ghost of a chance that any attempt would be made to deter them [the Orangemen] from marching over the route they had chosen. It was foreseen, of course, that individual quarrels might arise during the day; that it might become necessary to arrest, kick or shoot some misguided disturber of the peace; that an individual in the procession might be injured by accident or shot by a concealed murderer, but what of that? Are men to listen to the voice of cowardice, to give up their cherished rights (and abstaining, under menace, from exercising a right is giving it up) because a head may be broken?17

Obviously the News was no longer the same paper to which Anglin had written in 1849 after the disaster at York Point.

The Freeman was duly thankful that peace had been preserved:

Thank God those people were patient; that they respected the laws of the country, themselves and their religion, and treated this demonstration precisely as they should always treat all such demonstrations.

In fact, it claimed, the march had even brought some good, although the injury of two men, the insult to Catholics and the general anxiety were too high a price to pay. Nevertheless the parade had shown two things. It had demonstrated that Catholics "could rise superior to ... insults and provocation, and conduct themselves so peaceably and calmly as to win the admiration and respect of their fellow citizens." Secondly, the poor turnout of marchers had shown "that few of the Orangemen of the city and Portland approved of the demonstration, sympathized with the Grand Master, or wished to revive old quarrels and causes of difference, or to
offend or annoy their Catholic neighbours." Anglin had cause to be proud. He had not wielded any influence amongst Irish Catholics or the other residents of St. John in 1849. By 1876 he had exercised considerable influence for a long time. He had always advised moderation, legality and non-violence. To his leadership, not only during June and July of 1876 but also during the many long years in which he had instilled his philosophy in his followers, can be ascribed one of the major factors which made the results of Orange parades in St. John in 1849 and in 1876 so different.

III

If religio-ethnic conflict seemed to have declined somewhat, there was a new form of group antagonism emerging in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. This new antagonism also involved Irish Catholics and their leaders. The problems created by industrialization and the strife between capital and labour opened up the whole area of social justice as it never had been before. Labour organization and social action were, in fact, two parts of the same puzzle and an individual's attitude on one was often reflected in the other.

As an industrial society emerged in North America, primarily in the United States, it became obvious that everything was not for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Surely, many began to think, it was not necessary to have unemployment, filthy and disease-ridden tenement houses, at times virtual starvation, sixteen-hour work days, and unsafe working conditions, in the midst of so much wealth. Was the solution to these problems to be found in labour unions? American Catholic leaders gave an uncertain answer to this question. On the one
hand the mass of American Catholics were wage-earning immigrants and stood to gain from advances made by unions. On the other hand, because they were a religious minority they were subject to prejudice and it seemed necessary to make some efforts to mollify the majority. It was a matter of learning how to "champion the cause of the poor without endangering the public interest or the common good," and to "oppose socialism without negating or ignoring the claims of social reform." 19

Anglin was no social reformer. As a puritanical moralist of the Catholic faith he was not very sympathetic to the foibles of human nature. And perhaps the Irish Famine had showed him that it was useless to have very much compassion for the unfortunate when there was little that one could do for them. Therefore the Freeman showed little pity for the customers whom the St. John Police Court served. Corporal punishment for crime raised no humanitarian scruples in Anglin, his attitude being that it 'served 'em right'. 20 On the other hand Anglin always supported the annual campaigns to provide winter relief for the destitute or money for orphanages. 21 He also spoke about the Lazaretto at Tracadie and urged that "if it was possible to rid this country of it [leprosy], no pains or expense should be spared to effect that object." 22 But these and similar examples of Anglin's concern for social justice were overshadowed by his retention of a laissez faire philosophy. It may seem surprising that a man who had witnessed the Irish Famine at close quarters should accept a conservative economic ideology; nevertheless it was so.

In America we are nearly all hard-working toilers; comparatively few are wealthy, and comparatively few who are industrious, sober and frugal are condemned to live in penury, in dark cellars or crowded tenements. We would wish to see the men who work, the wealth producers, enjoying their full share of the world's work, and we would be sorry to see the capitalists increasing their wealth by grinding the faces of the poor, or overtaxing the muscles or brain of the
working man, or depriving him, through the force of law or usage or of circumstances, of fair remuneration for his labour; but this idea that the condition of the working classes can be improved by pulling down all who are called wealthy to their own or any other level, is most dangerous to society, and to the best interests of the working men themselves.\textsuperscript{22A}

Still, despite his commitment to a \textit{laissez faire} economic philosophy, he did not allow this to overcome his sympathy with the efforts of workers to improve their position. Unlike so many other editors, he did not find it necessary to oppose labour organizations.

The early development of unionism in St. John is a notable feature of that city's history.\textsuperscript{23} Perhaps most notable of all is that trade unions were allowed to operate in the city with little public opposition until the 1870's.\textsuperscript{24} One reason for this was that until this decade the New Brunswick economy was expanding in spite of periodic and disastrous depressions. Secondly, the industrial revolution had barely begun before that time and the conflict between capital and labour was scarcely developed. All a clerk in Newcastle wanted in 1859, for example, were some public holidays other than those on Sundays. Then he would be able to shoot rabbits.\textsuperscript{25}

Even before the conflicts of the seventies Anglin had taken a moderate stand on labour disputes. In 1862, for example, labourers on the St. Andrews Railway, angry because they had not received their wages for some time, tore up several miles of rails, destroyed some expensive bridges, took possession of part of the line and refused to allow trains to be run. Troops were rushed to the scene and the matter was quickly settled. The \textit{Freeman}'s conclusion spread the blame.

It has often been stated that the labourers on portions of this road had much cause to complain of the manner in which they were dealt with. It is to be regretted when men who have been wronged do not find a better way of seeking redress than the destruction of property,
and rioting almost amounting to insurrection, such as no country can
tolerate, no matter how deserving of sympathy in other respects the
rioters may be.\textsuperscript{26}

As for strikes, they were not usually advisable.

Strikes are always objectionable, because of the loss of time and
money they cause, and of the ill feeling which they too often en-
gender, and they should never be resorted to except in the last
extremity -- when right is clearly on the side of the workmen, and
all other means of getting justice have been tried in vain.\textsuperscript{27}

This attitude was in line with Anglin's general approach to political
leadership -- urge those in authority to be just and attempt to keep
those he led or influenced moderate and law-abiding. In a very real
sense Anglin's position on labour disputes was an important part of his
effort to be an Irish Catholic leader. After all, the labouring class of
St. John was composed largely of Irish Catholics. The names of those on
the executive and Board of Directors of the very powerful Labourers'
Benevolent Association were overwhelmingly Irish.\textsuperscript{28} As the sole organ
of Irish Catholics in St. John many of the labour organizations looked to
the \textbf{Freeman} for support. It was there that some of the meetings of
labour organizations were announced and it was there the unions sent
notices defending their position in times of trouble. Anglin willingly
published such notices and seemed genuinely interested in hearing both
sides of the case. He did not, however, give a blanket approval for
everything the unions did. Nevertheless of all the St. John papers the
\textbf{Freeman} showed the most consistent sympathy and understanding of the
position of the unions.\textsuperscript{29} Nor were Anglin's views static. If anything
he developed a more liberal attitude as time went on. In 1869, for
example, the \textbf{Freeman} condemned the non-violent attempt of the Society of
St. Crispin to force an employer to dismiss a worker who was not a mem-
ber of the Society. This, the \textbf{Freeman} felt would be a negation of
personal liberty unbecoming to North America. The Society had no right to prevent a man from getting employment on terms of his own choosing.\(^{30}\) By 1875, however, Anglin was less outspoken in his criticism of organized labour's attempt to force employers to hire only union men. It was in dealing with specific disputes as they arose that Anglin came to this position.

The first of these disputes emerged in the spring of 1874. In March of that year the workers in the steam saw mills met in Carleton and formed the Millmen's Protective Union. The first draft of their constitution contained some rather militant by-laws concerning wages and working with non-union men. The Freeman could not consent to such by-laws and it sought to moderate the worker's stand.

We have always maintained that men, who work with their hands or brains have a right to get the very highest price they can get for their labour, and the right to combine peaceably, and to co-operate legitimately in any effort to raise or keep up the rate of wages; but, we must say, that these laws seem calculated to take all control of property out of the hands of those who now think they own it. If the owner of a mill has no right to say, what men he shall employ, or what men he shall dismiss, what wages he is to pay for any kind or sort of work, or on what days his mill shall work or shall be idle, his ownership and control of his property must be merely nominal. We desire to see the millmen get the very highest wages the trade can possibly pay, but we hope that they will be moderate and reasonable in their demands, and not substitute a tyranny of the workmen for a tyranny of the employers such as at one time existed. They should remember also that although the work of loading must be done in the harbour the work of sawing may be done anywhere up the river or on its tributaries, and that they are nearly as much interested in keeping the business in St. John as the mill owners themselves.\(^{31}\)

The Freeman's arguments may have had some influence with the men, for the Union's constitution, as finally adopted on April 6th, was considerably more moderate.\(^{32}\) Unfortunately this did not end the difficulties. The mill owners took counter-measures against the organization, showing, in the words of the Freeman, "that they can resort to measures quite as
extreme in their character as any of which the men are accused, having, it is said, discharged a number of hands merely because they belonged to the Association." The owners went further than this and organized themselves into a "Lumbermen's Exchange" to counteract the efforts of the union. The Freeman preached moderation and hoped that difficulties between employers and employed would be resolved amicably and that "neither of the parties to the present dispute will do anything calculated to prevent this result being arrived at." The employers were not to follow the Freeman's advice for they wanted to wipe out the union not to be moderate and conciliatory. Consequently, they subscribed no less than $23,000, to be used to give protection to non-union workers and to bring workers in from Maine. The Lumber Exchange also formally agreed not to employ union members. In direct contrast, the millmen were busy deleting the only section of their constitution which had the slightest bite to it; spoke in condemnation of those men who had gone as a group to several mills in an attempt to induce the workers to join the Association; and virtually resolved themselves into a purely benevolent organization.

The union had been smashed and it was only a matter of time before the workers came to terms with the mill owners. The Freeman seemed to draw some conclusions from this struggle. In the first place the workers may have been wrong in their militancy, but, the action of their employers had shown what they were up against. The Freeman found the attitude of the other papers of St. John anomalous.

The papers announce that the mill owners of the city and neighborhood refuse to employ men belonging to the Millmen's Society, and have not a word to say in disapproval of such a course. If the workmen combine they are accused of a desire to injure their employers and ruin the trade of the port, but it is entirely different when a body of capitalists unite to deprive a large number of poor men of their only means of earning a livelihood.
It was apparent that if another conflict between capital and labour arose Anglin might be more understanding, if not approving, of tough labour tactics, providing that they were legal and non-violent.

Such a conflict arose in the winter and spring of 1874-75. Of all the labour organizations in St. John the Labourers' Benevolent Society, a union of stevedores, was probably the most prominent and powerful. Yet the fall and winter of 1874-75 were very hard and great unemployment meant that the very survival of the union was in doubt. Some men, with the encouragement of employers, now turned away from the union and found work without its sanction.\textsuperscript{38} The \textit{Freeman}'s advice to the Society, under the circumstances, was to take a step backward.

If the times become as dull as many anticipate the labourers will find it difficult to keep their society together. They should carefully revise their rules at a season like this, or cut out and amend everything that tends to create hostility to their society, or that bears with undue hardship on any of the members. We know nothing of the merits of their differences with Mr. McDermott, and can not pretend to say who is right or wrong; but the fact that he can now work in defiance of the society and of its regulations seems to prove that these regulations impose restrictions which are found oppressive. It certainly shows that the society is not as strong as it was a short time ago, and that great prudence and moderation are required to enable it to renew its strength.\textsuperscript{39}

In this time of trouble, the Freeman defended the Society against what it felt was "most unjustifiable attacks" made by the \textit{News}. Anglin indicated that the \textit{News}' attitude stemmed from the fact that few of the labourers were electors and none contributed much to the support of newspapers, "and therefore it is safe to abuse and vilify them, and help those who would compel them to accept starvation wages and hold a position worse than that of serfs."\textsuperscript{40} The worker, Anglin wrote, was as justified in seeking the highest price for his labour as merchants are in seeking the highest price for their goods. The Society had laid down
what it felt to be a fair price but had stuck to this and had not attempted
to take advantage of special situations when the employers were at a dis-
advantage. Stevedores merited a higher rate of pay, the Freeman stated,
because their work was not steady. But while defending the Society the
Freeman was not trying to encourage men to become or remain urban
labourers. They could do better.

They could go into the country, settle on good lands, and work every
day for themselves, and they and their children would be much better
off at the end of seven years than if wages were kept at $3 for every
day they could get work in ships.\textsuperscript{41}

In spite of his own life-style and occupation Anglin still paid homage
to the old ideal of the independent, sturdy farmer.

The Labourers' Association managed to survive the winter; some of those
poor sheep who had strayed were allowed to return to the fold; and by
March the organization felt strong enough to set $3 a day as the rate of
wages for the coming season.\textsuperscript{42} But there were still a group of men, led
by the aforementioned Mr. McDermott, which presented a challenge to the
Society. Several members of the Society met this challenge with a resort
to assault. The Freeman deplored such action and trusted that the
offenders would be duly punished. Yet it denied that the Society as a
whole should be blamed for the viciousness of the few. "The members of
the Society as a body," the Freeman commented, "are disposed to be peace-
able, and are, we believe, determined on obtaining what they consider
their just rights in a just and lawful manner."\textsuperscript{43} Of course the incident
aroused antagonism to the union in St. John and the Freeman hoped that
the Society would learn from this experience.

The Society will learn from all this, we hope, that they must be
most cautious and prudent, not only determined to be peaceful and law
abiding as a body, and to respect the rights of others but also most
careful to prevent, as far as possible, all disorderly conduct or
threatening language or foolish talk on the part of the members of their society, expelling any whom they fail to control in this respect ... 44

The labour difficulties did not end here. At the end of April, the Society decided to go on strike in an attempt to have only union men employed on all ships in the harbour. At a joint meeting of the Lumber Exchange and the Board of Trade the employers decided to resist this demand and employed the same tactics which had proved so successful against the Millmen the year before. This time $100,000 was subscribed.45 Much the same sequence of events occurred, the main difference being that this time the union was not wiped out. The Society did not win by any means but it did manage to get a tacit agreement from the shippers not to employ non-Society men on ships at which union men were engaged.46 One could say that the two sides had fought each other to a stalemate. The Freeman's position on all this was somewhat different to what it had been even the year before. It did not now pass judgment on the morality of strike action taken by the Society. It looked at the question from a different perspective this time. Instead of asserting the rights of employers and workers to make mutually acceptable terms, the Freeman now pointed out that union members had a perfect right to refuse work. Besides, said the Freeman, such action was legal and "we do not know that we have any right to advise the labourers any more than to advise the merchants or to meddle in their affairs."47 The Society might find that it was making a mistake and suffer the consequences, but that was its decision. It was unfortunate, however, that labour disputes could not be settled peacefully, that the business of the port was paralyzed and that hundreds of men were losing wages which they could ill afford to lose. It was regrettable, Anglin thought, that both sides showed a disposition
to push things too far.\textsuperscript{48}

While Anglin's views on labour conflicts had not changed radically, they had modified somewhat and had shifted in emphasis.\textsuperscript{49} In 1869 he had stated:

Here, as much as in any part of the world, the supply and demand regulate themselves in this respect (the over- or under-abundance of labour), and usually in favour of labour.\textsuperscript{50}

By the end of 1877 he was singing in another key:

The best mode of establishing and maintaining the proper relations between capital and labour has not yet been discovered, or if it has there is still much to prevent its proper working. The law of demand and supply left to work unaided, has not worked quite satisfactorily.\textsuperscript{51}

The key to Anglin's approach to labour disputes could be summed up in one word -- harmony. The central theme running throughout the Freeman's analysis was that both sides in the conflict ought to be moderate, conciliatory and, of course, law-abiding. The significance of Anglin's position is difficult to assess. On the one hand the Freeman was the recognized mouthpiece of New Brunswick Irish Catholics and in general the St. John unions did steer away from radical labour politics. On the other hand the Freeman was by no means fully acquainted with developments amongst the workers and gave almost as little coverage to ordinary occurrences in this field as the other papers. Yet one cannot but think that the voice of the Freeman would have meant a good deal to the labourers. It was the one paper likely to give a fair hearing to the workers and give publicity to their side, and its editor was the only Irish Catholic of recognized political stature in the city. He also had the ear of the Bishop and often represented the latter's views -- a fact of some importance to Irish Catholics who were closely attached to their Church -- and if Anglin advised moderation it seems likely that the advice would
be given serious consideration. When one reflects that moderation is one attribute which Canadians are reputed to have, Anglin's attitude is of some significance. In attempting to promote moderation and harmony he proved himself to be a 'good Canadian'.

IV

In his attempt to promote harmony in society Anglin became deeply disturbed about the growth of certain trends in the world. While he was able to come to terms with one of these new developments -- labour organization -- he fought with fervour against others. He did not like the look of the society he saw emerging and so he became increasingly conservative and moralistic in his outlook. It was a case of a man growing older but less able to cope with a changing world.

Evidence of Anglin's changing outlook came in 1874 and 1875 during which time the Freeman began to carry a far larger number of accounts of foeticide, atrocious murders, rapes, weird divorce cases, abortions, violent crimes and anything else which its editor considered depravity. It became less sympathetic towards the poor souls whom circumstances had trapped and became more completely condemnatory. Why did the change take place at this time? Three partial answers might be given. In the first place Anglin was getting older; but perhaps more important was the fact that he was pretty well established by now. After all he was Speaker. Secondly, he often used these examples of depravity and immorality to prove that common schools did not do much to elevate mankind. The schools question was, of course, still a significant issue in 1874-75. Finally, it became increasingly apparent during the 1870's that throughout the world Catholicism was facing a great challenge.
Socialism, Red Republicanism, Communism -- they were all the same to Anglin or nearly so\textsuperscript{52} -- presented one of the gravest threats in Anglin's eyes. "They appear to be actuated above all," the \textit{Freeman} iterated in regard to the Red Republicans in France, "by a fiendish hatred of Christianity, and their hatred of social order, as constituted on the Christian basis, is almost as intense."\textsuperscript{53} Anglin most certainly did not agree with communist philosophy which originated, he assured his readers, "with crazy theorists and idle worthless fellows, who never want to work ..."\textsuperscript{54} Obviously such men would be incapable of discovering a workable system and experience had demonstrated this.

Their ideas of government, whenever an attempt is made to put them in practice, lead only to the wildest confusion, the destruction of life and property, a state of frenzy in the mobs which hold power, and a paralysis of the people at large.\textsuperscript{55} Anglin could not accept a theory which, to his mind, denied to "ability, industry and self-denial ... the rewards now attainable." It was almost unthinkable on the soil of North America and yet even here it was making headway.\textsuperscript{56} How was socialism's advance to be checked?

Will severe and stringent laws, energetically administered, and severe penalties, rigorously enforced, check this wide-spread evil? It is not probable that Socialism can be checked in its progress by such means. Religion is the only effectual means of eradicating all evil which exists at all, only because men's minds are diseased, and a false philosophy, which panders to all the baser passions and feeds intellectual pride, persuades men that there is no God to whom they must answer for their thoughts as well as their actions, and that happiness consists only in what this world can give. The monarchs, the aristocracies, the governments, have all laboured systematically to destroy religion, have treated it as a superstition, and taught the unthinking and the vicious to despise and detest it, so that for the present religion can do little amongst the classes which furnish recruits to Socialism. The secret societies are the chief agencies by which revolution and irreligion do their deadly work, and the governments foster the secret societies, may some of them are to-day the creatures of the secret societies. Godless schools are the shops in which the Devil most successfully prepares the minds of a rising generation for the reception of Socialist ideas, and all the governments favour Godless schools and universities. Europe is indeed in
a sad way, but it is not yet prepared to do what is necessary for the extirpation of Socialism.\footnote{37}

To Anglin, Christianity not only faced a grave threat from socialism but was the only effective way of combatting the latter. It was a 'full-circle' argument and in the background one can hear Karl Marx intoning -- "religion is the opium of the people."

Scientism -- the religion of science based on the premise that there is no truth to be found other than that which can be explained and proven by scientific methodology -- was another 'ism' which Anglin rejected. Even more directly than socialism did scientism confront Christianity. Anglin's response to the challenge was perhaps more blunt but not essentially different to that of contemporary theologians.

The profound ignorance of the scientists, as they are called, immensely surpasses their knowledge. Their experiments, and observations, and calculations, all show them ... how little they know, how much even of that which comes under their observation is beyond their comprehension, and how useless it is to attempt to penetrate by any mere effort of human reason the infinite and invisible. He sees a power manifested, and he strives in vain to ascertain by his own finite powers what that power is.

\footnote{58} He will not allow God Himself to tell him anything of His nature or His attributes. Only what the human mind can learn by the exercise of his own feeble powers will he accept as truth, and so he gropes his way, stumbling now into one ditch and then into another, growing more puzzled and bewildered at every step ... How deplorable it is to see man thus using against God the reason and other faculties with which God has endowed him and endeavouring to find in the wonders of creation proof that there is no Creator, and in the perfection of His laws proof that there is no eternal Lawgiver.

Once again the inculcation of true religious values was the only way of combatting the ignorance of scientism and rationalism.

There is no question that Anglin viewed events and developments in the world through religious eyes. He was at a complete loss to account for the conduct of four Indians on Vancouver Island who had turned themselves in to the authorities for crimes committed ten years before. "They are,"
the Freeman pointed out in bewilderment, "still heathens."59 In support of the position of the Catholic Church, Anglin argued against divorce "not only because it is subversive of what many believe to be the Christian doctrine regarding marriage, but because it attacks the family which is the very foundation of our political as well as our social system."60 By 1877, the editor of the Freeman had come to a conclusion.

It is now generally admitted that the great struggle, in which nearly the whole world is engaged, is the contest between Christianity and Infidelity.61

It was not that Anglin had not felt prior to this that religion ought to play a large role in the life of society and individuals,62 but during the 1870's it became a more and more prominent feature of his thought.

V

If the struggle of the age was between Christianity and Infidelity, it was obvious that one of the battle-grounds would be the political arena. If the battle was to be fought in the political arena it was obvious that spokesmen for the sacred and for the secular would become involved. If spokesmen for the sacred and the secular were involved it was obvious that there would ensue a debate about the issues of church and state in general and the role of clerics in politics in specific. Such a debate did indeed develop in Canada during the Mackenzie regime and given Anglin's views about the direction in which the world was heading, one is well on the way towards an understanding of his stand in the debate. In general he rejected any attempt to further weaken the influence of religion in society. On the other hand he was committed to the Liberal party and did not wish to see its influence weakened. In the 1870's it was not always easy to combine the two. Anglin's attempt to do so resulted in a very
interesting and rather unique position -- the position of a Catholic Liberal.63

As far as the issue of clerics in politics was concerned, Anglin had made several comments at the time of the Confederation struggles. Clergymen, whether Catholic or Protestant, had as much right, he said, to discuss political questions, to express their views and to vote, as anyone else.64 Yet in politics they were just as other men.65

If clergymen choose to refrain from any expression of opinion on political subjects, they may act prudently; but if they prefer to exercise their undoubted right to speak, write, argue and vote, we shall never join in any objection to their doing so. But when they exhibit themselves as violent and even unscrupulous partisans who stick at nothing to help their party, then indeed all good men may well be grieved and offended.66

One was certainly free to disagree with Bishops and priests, said the Freeman a few months after his great 1866 conflict with Bishop Rogers, on political matters, while still feeling great respect for them personally, reverence for their sacred office and character, and esteem for their devotion, zeal and virtues.67 As to the Protestant fear that priests were using the threat of refusal of religious ordinances to anyone who voted against their wishes, the Freeman was complacent.

No priest dare make such a threat, and if any were mad enough to make it, no Catholic would regard it, as every Catholic knows that the priest is as much bound by the laws of his Church as is the layman, and that punishment would surely follow so great an abuse of his position.68

At the same time, however, Anglin agreed that Catholics "hold themselves absolutely bound by the decision of the Pope in all matters of doctrine and Church discipline, and obey his decrees in all such matters faithfully."69 Unfortunately, the line between religious and political matters became blurred in the decade following Confederation. The emphasis but not the actual content of Anglin's argument began to shift from the
right of Catholics to disagree with their priests on political questions to the right of clerics to participate in political matters.

In the decade after Confederation it became quite clear that Anglin was in the confidence of Bishops Sweeny and Rogers. The close communications he kept with both of them on the schools question is sufficient proof of this statement. There is, however, further proof in an 1872 incident which indicates the real intimacy of Anglin with Catholic affairs in New Brunswick. In that year Father H. McGuick, a priest in Kent county, became restive and unhappy in the priesthood and in his unhappiness did a number of things which caused trouble for the Catholic Church. The Church took action against McGuick; he reacted; a trial took place; and Bishop Rogers wrote a public defence of the Church. During the conflict McGuick had sent several letters to the Freeman for publication. Obviously the first place the priesthood turned was to Anglin and his paper. But Anglin returned McGuick's letters "and wrote him a very quiet remonstrance appealing to his love for the Church and his dislike of scandal..." This advice had fallen upon deaf ears, but it is highly interesting that it had been given at all. When McGuick continued to press his case it became necessary to consider whether all or part of Rogers' statement ought to be published in pamphlet form. Anglin discussed the question with Bishop Sweeny, the senior of the two New Brunswick Bishops. Sweeny wished to leave the decision of what should be included to Anglin himself, an attitude which showed the Bishop's confidence in Anglin even on matters very closely related to the Church. The entire episode had shown the very unique position which the layman Anglin and his newspaper held within the inner circles of the Catholic Church in New Brunswick. A man with such intimate acquaintance with the
clergy of New Brunswick, with whom co-operation and moderation seemed to be the rule, was not likely to see any reason to wish to restrict the influence of clerics. And, of course, 'clerical influence' had greatly aided Anglin's election in 1872 and 1874.

It was not in New Brunswick but rather in Quebec that the question of clerical influence became a major issue. The details of the conflict, which began as a family quarrel between two sections of the Church in Quebec, are numerous, complex, and, fortunately, easily available elsewhere. Inextricably intermingled with the issue of clerical influence was the omnipresent issue of party politics. One who professed to be a good Catholic and a good Liberal faced opposition from two directions. On the one hand it was claimed that one could not be a good Catholic and be a Liberal; on the other it was claimed that a good Liberal ought to oppose clerical interference in politics. Anglin's response to this double-barrelled barrage defined what it meant to him to be a Catholic Liberal.

The Freeman's initial pronouncement came in the summer of 1875 after the St. John Globe, in what it undoubtedly felt was in the interests of the Liberals, strenuously criticized the supposed action of the Catholic clergy of Quebec during the 1874 election. The Freeman's reply began by recognizing that many clergymen in Quebec had supported the Conservatives. The Freeman believed that in taking this stand they were mistaken "and that they now appear to the rest of the Dominion as supporters of a set of men who have notoriously been guilty of the most gross and flagrant corruption ..." Yet their reasons for so doing, though greatly mistaken, had been honourable.

[They had] confounded the Liberals of Quebec with the Liberals of
France, Italy and Germany, and thought they saw proof of the justice of their views in the articles of the Witness, and the letters of Mr. Joseph Doutre, and the Guibord case, and many other articles, speeches, and proceedings of men who, unfortunately for the Liberal party in Quebec, profess to belong to that party.

What the priests had done -- was that so wrong?

It may be that the great majority of them are Conservative, but surely that is no crime. It may be that many of them expressed their opinions freely, and even took an active part on what we believe to be the wrong side; but surely that was no crime.

Even the charge that priests had threatened to refuse religious rites had been made in only a few cases. No, concluded the Freeman, it was not by attempting to restrict the rights of priests that the Liberals would win the support of the people of Quebec.

They must prove by their acts and language that they are just, honest, upright, fearless and truly Liberal in the best sense of the word, and that they have no sympathy with the infidel party who in Europe disgrace the name of Liberal by warring bitterly against all true liberty, against society and against God. This the ravings of the Witness and others must render difficult, but we hope it is not impossible. 75

For such a pronouncement, the Freeman was labelled an ultramontane organ.

To the Freeman it was an unwelcome label for it claimed that it was merely a modern anti-Catholic epithet. It had first been used, Anglin told his readers, in France and was later revived in Germany by Bismarck who persecuted those priests who chose to obey God rather than man. The use of the word was simply an attempt to divide Catholics by saying that some were disloyal to the country because they were loyal to the pope and as such were enemies of all political liberty and progress. To the Freeman there was no such true division, or at least this is what it told the Toronto Globe in one of the most severe 'dressing downs' that paper ever received from a friendly source.

It is a mistake, let us tell the Globe, a serious mistake, to imagine that there are any number of Catholics who may be distinguished
from other Catholics by the name of Ultramontanes; it is a serious error to assume that the Quebec Tory papers or any other papers have authority to speak for Catholics as Catholics, or that the political opinions or acts of one priest or half a dozen priests are to be regarded as the conduct or opinion of the Catholic church. It is more wise, fair and prudent to treat Catholics in politics precisely as others are treated. The Globe would not be willing that the Protestants of Ontario should be held responsible for all that the Leader and other papers of that class chose to say in the interest of their party. Yet it would hold the Catholics of Quebec responsible for what the Minerve and its associates say. If the Globe looked at facts instead of at the electioneering articles in the Quebec Tory papers, it would not find anything to justify warning against the thrusting forward of special claims or pretensions or the exhibition of an aggressive spirit. We believe that the Globe means to be fair and just, but it should not allow itself to be carried away by senseless cries. And it should be more careful in the use of language when describing the state of parties in Quebec. The word Ultramontane it should eschew altogether.76

If the utterances of the Globe showed that the position of the Catholic Church was misunderstood, Bishop Bourget's pastoral letter of February, 1876, showed that the Liberal party in Canada was equally misunderstood. For the Bishop of Montreal, the Freeman said, the word 'Liberal' had the same effect as did the word 'Ultramontane' on many Protestants. With the comments which the Bishop had made about Liberal Catholicism and Liberalism as it existed in Europe, Anglin completely agreed. Those men were enemies of Christianity. But, he asserted, there were few such men in Canada and the danger they posed was minute. The Bishop had not so thought and had viewed the Reform or Liberal party of the Dominion as most closely resembling the Liberals of Europe and as proof had pointed to a recent inflammatory speech made by Lucius Seth Huntington, the Liberal hero of the Pacific Scandal and Postmaster General.77 To Anglin, however, even if Huntington had really meant "what his language undoubtedly expresses," one man's opinion did not the Government's position make. For its part the Freeman's position was quite clear.

If Mr. Huntington's speech, as understood by the Bishop, and let us
add, the *Freeman*, expressed the views of the Liberal party, then, assuredly, would it be the duty not only of all good Catholics, but of all who value as they should good government and social order, to do all they could to deprive that party of the power to do such mischief as the Bishop believes is threatened. So also, if the ravings of the Montreal *Witness* could be regarded as any more than the utterances of a little set of bigots and fanatics, Catholics should take the alarm. But in no respect have the party in this country called Liberal as yet shown any disposition to meddle in ecclesiastical matters, to persecute or oppress the Catholic Church, or to diminish the liberties it now enjoys. Through the Premier, the chief, and the mouthpiece of the party, they have recently declared in favour of equal rights for all, and a total abstention from interference with religious institutions of any and of all denominations. Catholics who prize their religion above all else, who would make any sacrifice to maintain the freedom of their Church and the rights of its episcopacy undiminished, knowing both the political parties more intimately perhaps, than the Bishop of Montreal can know them, are satisfied that the freedom and the rights of the Catholic Church, of Catholics, and of all others in Canada, are at least quite as safe under the present Government as they ever were or ever will be under a Government called Conservative -- in short that they are perfectly safe.\(^78\)

One of the real difficulties in the whole problem, complained the *Freeman*, was that there was a great deal of misapprehension amongst Catholics\(^79\) as well as Protestants concerning the relationship between Catholics and their ecclesiastical superiors. The relationship was not so unusual, according to the *Freeman*.

In religious matters they owe and pay them due obedience. In all matters they owe and pay them reverence and respect. In what are ordinarily called political questions they are as free to think, judge and act for themselves as Protestants should be. In political contests, as in all the affairs of life, men are bound to do what is right, to act in conformity with the will of God and to observe his law. This applies to Protestants as to Catholics, and within this, which must be for all the limit of liberty -- beyond which all is license -- the Catholic is quite as free to think and judge for himself as others are.\(^80\)

Obviously, however, this was too simplistic an explanation, for even the *Freeman* realized that religious matters did not always stay outside the political arena. Yet despite this flaw and the fact that adjustments would have to be made in practice, the statement was essentially true and worth stating and following.
The question did not end here however. The following winter the Freeman found itself obliged to meet the two-pronged attack once again. It took to task the Montreal Herald, a Liberal organ, in even more stringent terms than it had dealt with the Toronto Globe. Anglin was convinced that the course the Herald was following, its "attacks" upon the Catholic priests and upon their freedom of speech, would destroy the Liberal party in Quebec.\(^{81}\) Again the Freeman found it necessary to defend the Liberal party against charges that it was anti-Catholic,\(^{82}\) a task made rather difficult by the utterances of the Herald. The Herald and others of its ilk did not speak for the party as a whole, Anglin claimed, even if they spoke for one section of it -- the misguided section. But then the Conservative party contained such people as well. Once again the Freeman had to explain Catholic doctrine. It was not a correct assumption, it explained, that a priest might, at his caprice, and in the interests of a particular party or candidate, threaten to refuse the sacraments to those who voted contrary to his wishes. "[T]he refusal of sacraments," the Freeman informed those readers who did not know, "is a penalty imposed not by the caprice of a priest, but by law -- the law of the church ..." To allow the state to say when the refusal of sacraments was acceptable and when it was not, was inadmissible.\(^{83}\)

Throughout the entire discussion on the issue of clerical influence Anglin was in favour of allowing the priest the right to express his own opinions. He rejected any attempt to limit this freedom:

Surely if a priest thinks that to vote for a particular candidate is to vote against religion and society, and therefore is a sin, he should be at liberty to say so, precisely as a Free Trader or Protectionist is at liberty to say, that the man who votes for a candidate holding Protectionist or Free Trade principles will do injury to the country and to himself.\(^{84}\)
The clergyman had a right and a duty to identify and condemn what was unlawful and sinful, Anglin claimed. In conjunction with the Freeman's stand that Catholics had no more to fear from the Liberal party than from the Conservatives, its editor rejected anything that tended to throw all elements of a particular religious group into one party. Catholics should not always act together in politics. They should take sides on political grounds. The development of political parties along religious lines was not only unnecessary, it would also prove disastrous.

A division of the people into hostile political camps, in which all or nearly all, on one side would be Protestants and on the other Catholics, would lead to the most deplorable results, and inflict incalculable injury on the whole people.

While defending the political rights of clerics, Anglin was attacked from another direction. He was accused of having ulterior motives for supporting the Liberal party. Surely, cried Conservative papers such as the Nouveau Monde of Montreal and the Times of Moncton, a man who opposed the Globe, the Herald, the ideas of Huntington -- the list went on -- on such an important issue, ought not to support the Government party.

The Times thought it obvious why he continued to do so and that this would become crystal clear "when some of the higher permanent offices in the gift of the Government came to be distributed among the most faithful of the followers." There was some point to this analysis for Anglin was doing himself no harm by remaining within Liberal ranks. The fact that he was one of the few Liberals that held the support of the Catholic clergy and hierarchy, seemed to augur well for his political career. Yet the flaw in the argument was that it contained two contradictory assumptions: firstly, that all Catholics who supported the right of clerics to participate in politics ought to oppose the Liberals; secondly, that Liberals would still feel obliged to try to retain or gain Catholic
support by giving patronage to Catholics. The possibility of Anglin leaving the Liberal party was very remote; he could only try to make the party conform with his image of what it should be. Although Anglin may have been putting blinkers over his eyes in some cases, he sincerely believed that the Liberals did not pose a greater threat to the Church than did the Conservatives. In practice he had found this to be true. His belief that religious groupings should not form the basis of political parties also seems genuine. In fact, Canada has been fortunate that he and others like him did so think, for one must agree with his analysis that had the two great religious groups become politically isolated, each within one party, the results would have been disastrous for the country.

The issue of clerical influence hit very close to home as far as Anglin was concerned during the Gloucester by-election in 1877. Anglin's elections in 1872 and 1874 had been facilitated by the public support of Bishop Rogers. Anglin sought to secure this support once again in 1877. The Bishop's private response was eulogistic towards Anglin personally but, from Anglin's point of view, unsatisfactory in other respects. "Whether any suitable action could be taken by me in the event of an election," Rogers proclaimed, "I am really doubtful." He proceeded to tell Anglin that although he took little interest in party politics "my sympathy and judgment were ever in favor of the pro-Confederation party," and intimated that the now dormant schools question had been the reason he had supported Anglin in the earlier elections. He was also concerned about the matter of clerical influence.

But with the recent court decisions against what they call undue clerical influence in elections, it probably would be impolitic, if not really detrimental to the candidate whom the clergy would support, for them (the clergy) to take any part in the contest - for it would give a pretext to opponents to seek to nullify the election, if the clergy's candidate were successful.
In short, the Bishop concluded, "these reasons I fear must necessarily force me to confine my action to simple good wishes for your success, should a contest be forced upon you." 89

Anglin was distressed with this response to his plea for assistance. He asked the Bishop to reconsider. 90 For the Bishop to say nothing after having supported him in the two previous elections would be viewed by many as repudiation. He claimed that the court decisions on the question of undue influence had not made it illegal for clerics "to say that they think a candidate entitled to election either for what he has done in the past or for what there is reason to believe he will do in the future ..." He urged the Bishop to at least let it be known to the priests of the county that he had the Bishop's approval for past conduct and best wishes for present election. "This is not too much to ask," Anglin concluded, "and this I hope you will not refuse." Rogers' response to Anglin's second request was of some assistance but was far from what Anglin would have liked. On June 24th he wrote a pastoral letter which explained his attitude to elections and politics and while showing that he would not publicly support either candidate in Gloucester, it certainly indicated that he was not repudiating Anglin. In fact one passage which suggested that a man with ability and experience should be elected, was of distinct advantage to Anglin, for his opponent, Turgeon, had no legislative experience. 91 Finally, the Bishop did not prevent the priests from supporting Anglin and most of them did so.

Strangely enough, Rogers' careful movements did not satisfy Turgeon. After his defeat he claimed that several priests had used undue influence against him and he went to the city of Quebec to discuss the matter with his friends there, eventually bringing it to the attention of Bishop
Conroy,\textsuperscript{92} the papal delegate sent to Quebec to look into the strife which was disturbing the Church in that province. As clerical influence was one of the issues at stake, he was well-acquainted with the problem. Interestingly enough, Anglin had conversed with the Bishop on the subject several times.\textsuperscript{93} Conroy advised Turgeon to consult with his own Bishop and warned Rogers to be very careful in any reply he might make to him. Rogers acted on his advice and proceeded gingerly. He pointed out to Turgeon that he understood that some of the priests had voted for him. The reply satisfied Turgeon and he carried his charges no further.\textsuperscript{94} Yet if Bishop Rogers had been concerned about the charge of undue influence before, how much more so now and in the future? With political unrest mounting in Gloucester, the changing attitude of Bishop Rogers was ominous for Anglin's electoral future.
FOOTNOTES

1 Freeman, Nov. 20, 1877.
2 Ibid., Apr. 25, 1876.
3 Ibid., Dec. 4, 1877.
4 Ibid., Nov. 19, 1872.
5 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1874; and June 27, 1876.
6 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1874. The Freeman was, however, critical of British
imperialism in Asia (see ibid., June 24, 1875).
7 Ibid., Nov. 25, 1875.
8 Ibid., June 27, 1872; Feb. 24, 1874; and Feb. 5 and July 22 and 25,
1878.
9 Ibid., May 30, 1876.
10 Morning News (St. John), May 31, 1876, quoted in Freeman, June 1,
1876.
11 Freeman, June 1, 1876.
12 Ibid., June 22, 1876. The Freeman all along felt that Willis was
trying to gain political strength from the agitation.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., June 24, 1876.
15 Ibid., July 11, 1876.
16 Ibid., July 13 and 15, 1876.
17 News, July 14, 1876, quoted in Freeman, July 15, 1876. The Freeman
legitimately pointed out that Willis was assuming that on July 12
nobody but Orangemen had any rights.
18 Freeman, July 15, 1876.
19 A. I. Abell, American Catholicism and Social Action: A Search for
Social Justice 1865 to 1950 (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1963), pp. 7-8. See also ibid., pp. 26 and 47.
20 Freeman, June 7, 1870.
21 In fact he considered that private charity was about all that was
required in this area of social welfare (see ibid., July 17, 1869;
and Dec. 21, 1875).
22 New Brunswick: House of Assembly, Debates, 1862, p. 38 (March 8).
22A Freeman, July 15, 1872.
Brunswick 1813-1890" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University
of New Brunswick, 1968).
24 Ibid., p. 33.
25 P.A.C., Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers (uncatalogued collection),
"One of Them" to Tilley, Dec. 26, 1859.
26 Freeman, Oct. 23, 1862.
27 Ibid., Aug. 10, 1867. See also ibid., Nov. 27, 1866.
28 Freeman, Feb. 22, 1870. This was also true of the Shipwrights'
Union (see ibid., Jan. 9, 1875).
29 This judgment is confirmed in Rice, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
30 Freeman, Apr. 17, 1869. See also ibid., June 14, 1870.
31 Ibid., March 14, 1874.
32 Ibid., Apr. 9, 1874.
33 Ibid., Apr. 25, 1874.
34 Ibid., Apr. 30, and May 14, 1874.
36 Ibid., May 7 and 14, 1874. As far as one can tell it would seem that
the millmen's organization was completely wiped out by the actions of
the employers.

37 Ibid., May 2, 1874.
38 Ibid., Nov. 5, 1874.
39 Ibid., Oct. 31, 1874.
40 Ibid., Nov. 12, 1874.
41 Ibid., Nov. 10, 1874.
42 Ibid., March 11, 1875. The Society decided, within a few weeks, that
it would reduce its wage-rate demands to $2 a day. (see ibid., Apr. 6
and 8, 1875).
43 Ibid., Apr. 1, 1875.
44 Ibid., Apr. 29, 1875.
45 Ibid., May 1, 1875.
46 Ibid., May 29 and June 17, 1875. The detailed story of this conflict,
which nearly led to a general strike, is one of the more interesting
incidents in the early history of Canadian labour movements. Much infor-
mation can be found in ibid., May 4, 6, 8 and 15, 1875, as well as in
the issues previously noted.
47 Ibid., May 6, 1875.
48 Ibid., May 4, 1875.
49 Further indications of Anglin's views on this question are given in
ibid., Aug. 10, 24 and 26, and Dec. 21, 1875; Apr. 18, 1876; and Feb. 6,
1877.
50 Ibid., Apr. 17, 1869.
51 Ibid., Dec. 21, 1877.
52 Ibid., June 1, 1871.
53 Ibid., Nov. 12, 1870.
54 Ibid., Aug. 22, 1878.
55 Ibid., Oct. 13, 1877.
56 Ibid., Apr. 30, 1878.
57 Ibid., June 8, 1878.
58 Ibid., Dec. 16, 1875. See also ibid., Oct. 7, 1876; and Dec. 11, 1877.
This was one issue on which Anglin's old antagonist, Judge L. A. Wilmot,
agreed with him (see J. Lathem, The Hon. Judge Wilmot: A Biographical
Sketch (rev. ed.; Toronto: Methodist Book and Publishing House, 1881),
59 Freeman, Aug. 1, 1872.
60 Ibid., Jan. 25, 1877. The Freeman had become involved in the question
of divorce when the Toronto Globe argued in favour of a liberalization of
the divorce laws. Anglin claimed that this would lead to many social
evils (see Freeman, Jan. 13, 1877) - to which the Globe replied on Jan.
22, 1877. See also "T.W.A.", May 7, 1868, in Freeman, May 16, 1868;
and Freeman, Nov. 3, 1868.
61 Freeman, Jan. 23, 1877. Anglin viewed the Jews as one of the most
formidable agents of infidelity (see ibid., Feb. 25, 1873; July 28, 1874;
and July 1, 1875).
62 See, for example, ibid., Jan. 8 and 12, 1861; and March 16, 1869.
63 Not to be confused with a Liberal Catholic.
64 Freeman, June 19, 1866. Anglin often pointed out Protestants' double
standard on the issue of clerical influence. See, for example, ibid.,
March 21, 1865.
65 Ibid., Feb. 9, 1865.
66 Ibid., June 19, 1866.
67 Ibid., Nov. 15, 1866.
68 Ibid., March 25, 1865.
Ibid., July 30, 1868.
70 One suspects that the greater volume of letters between Anglin and Rogers may be accounted for in the fact that Anglin could easily have had personal conversations with Sweeny in St. John.
71 Barnes's New Brunswick Almanack, 1871 (St. John: Barnes and Co., n.d.), p. 84. Kent was in Rogers' diocese.
72 U.N.B.A., Bishop James Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, July 1, 1872.
73 Ibid., Anglin to Rogers, July 12, 1872. Anglin wisely refused to accept the responsibility and threw the decision back to Rogers (see ibid., Anglin to Rogers, July 12, 1872). In regard to the publication of the pamphlet see also ibid., Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 13, and Oct. 21, 1872.
75 Freeman, July 27, 1875.
76 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1876. For other criticisms of the Globe, see Freeman, Jan. 27, 1876; and Sept. 25 and Nov. 15, 1877.
77 Willison, op. cit., I, 264-268. Patrick Power had written to Huntington and the latter had replied that he had not directed his remarks against the Catholic Church as a whole (see ibid., I, 268-269). The Freeman was willing to accept Huntington's explanation although it felt its original words were all too clear (see Freeman, Feb. 15, 1876).
78 Freeman, Feb. 15, 1876. Mackenzie's speech in the House of Commons had been guarded (see Willison, op. cit., I, 269-277). There is evidence, however, of Mackenzie's real feelings in a letter to Blake in which he said: "If the liberal R. Catholics are trampled down by the Clerical despotism the protestant wire fence will not long defend liberty of thought and action or protestant rights in Quebec (see P.A.O., Edward Blake Papers, Mackenzie to Blake, Sept. 28, 1875). On the same day he wrote to Blake in this tone he wrote to Anglin in a tone which implied a quite different attitude to the question of ultramontanism (see Mackenzie Letterbooks, I, Mackenzie to Anglin, Sept. 28, 1875). The Freeman claimed that it was the Conservatives who labelled the Liberals as anti-Catholic, in order to gain political advantage (see Freeman, Jan. 20, 1876; and Jan. 24, 1878). The Freeman of Feb. 26, 1876 dismissed the views of Sir A. T. Galt (see Willison, op. cit., I, 277-281) as those of an ex-Conservative and claimed that Liberals should not be held accountable for his attitude.
80 Freeman, March 28, 1876. See also ibid., Nov. 15, 1877.
81 Ibid., Dec. 2, 19 and 23, 1876; and Jan. 2 and Apr. 10, 1877.
82 Ibid., Jan. 2 and 20, 1877.
83 Ibid., Feb. 10 and March 6, 1877. See also ibid., March 8, 1877.
Ibid., March 17, 1877. See also Ibid., Nov. 30, 1876.

85 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1877. This issue of the Freeman applauded Laurier's defence of Liberalism (see Wade, op. cit., I, 362-367; Willison, I, 315-347; and J. Schull, Laurier: The First Canadian (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1965), pp. 113-122) in fitting Canadian Liberalism into the British rather than the European tradition, but it proclaimed that the speech was weak in its defence of the right and duty of clerics to speak out on moral and ethical matters.

86 Freeman, Nov. 15, 1877. See also Ibid., Jan. 29 and Dec. 23, 1876; and June 14 and Sept. 27, 1877.

87 Ibid., Jan. 2, Nov. 9 and 21, 1877.

88 Moncton Daily Times, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Nov. 21, 1877.

89 Rogers Papers, Rogers to Anglin, May 8, 1877.

90 Ibid., Anglin to Rogers, May 10, 1877.

91 Pastoral Letter of Bishop Rogers, June 24, 1877, reprinted in Freeman, Sept. 5 (incorrectly dated Sept. 7 on p. 1 and Sept. 4 on p. 2), 1877. This letter even won accolades from the Montreal Herald (see Freeman, Sept. 20, 1877).


93 Mackenzie Papers, A. G. Jones to Mackenzie, May 25, 1877; and Anglin to Mackenzie, July 23, 1877. Anglin thought that the delegate's visit would do much good (see Ibid., Anglin to Mackenzie, July 23, 1877; and Lynch Papers, Anglin to Lynch, May 6, 1878). See also Freeman, June 27, 1878.

94 On the entire question see Turgeon, op. cit., pp. 39-45; Rogers Papers, R. Young to Rev. T. Allard, July 26, 1877, enclosed in Young to Rogers, July 26, 1877; Conroy to Rogers, July 27 and Aug. 2, 1877; and Anglin to Rogers, Sept. 2, 1877; and Freeman, Sept. 5 (incorrectly dated Sept. 7 on p. 1 and Sept. 4 on p. 2), 1877, which has copies of Turgeon to Rogers, July 27, 1877, and Rogers to Turgeon, July 30, 1877, along with the Pastoral Letter of June 24, 1877.
Anglin's by-election in 1877 probably saved him from meeting opposition in the general election of 1878. After all, they were only a year apart. With Anglin having little to do in Gloucester, his main role during the election was as a newspaper editor. So important a cog in the Government machine was the Freeman, that Isaac Burpee, the Minister of Customs, spent $500 in circulating upwards of 25,000 copies during the two weeks preceding the election. ¹ Day in and day out the Freeman provided the best support for the Government which could be found in the province and Anglin devoted almost all his energies to writing. He turned down invitations to speak in western Ontario, eastern Nova Scotia and the Island on the grounds that it was unbecoming for the Speaker to go about "stumping" the country.² An 1877 letter to the premier indicated that fear of embarrassment may also have contributed to his reticence.

I do not quite understand what you say of the expectations of some friends who desire to see me out west. Is it that they wish me to hold meetings on my own account on a small scale after yours are all over - a sort of side show following not accompanying the great show - an exhibition of some special monstrosities &c? I do not see how I could very well undertake an engagement of that kind even if we had no doubt as to its propriety and expediency.³

Apparently he did not consider outspoken articles in the Freeman to be equally unbecoming. In the columns of the Freeman he harped away on the most significant issue of that election, the tariff,⁴ and kept up a bold front despite his private recognition that the Reformers were not in very good shape.⁵ However, most New Brunswickers agreed with his opposition to the Conservative tariff policy. When the ballots were counted,
supporters of the Mackenzie Government numbered ten, opponents five, and one "doubtful." But New Brunswick was not typical of the feeling of the country. "New Brunswick alone among the faithless stood faithful. 'Among the faithless, faithful only it.'" -- was the way a forlorn Alexander Mackenzie put it. Throughout the country at large the Government had suffered a resounding defeat. Anglin commiserated with his leader.

I feel that I ought to say something but I really hardly know what to say so stunned and stupefied am I by this great disaster. It is hard enough on rich men like Smith and Jones and Burpee who have little to regret on personal or pecuniary grounds. To poor men like you and me who have not worked for money and who have saved nothing the blow must necessarily be more severe no matter how patriotic and unselfish we may wish and strive to be.

As difficult as the adjustment might be there were even more ominous words emanating from Bishop Rogers. True, the prelate had congratulated Anglin on his personal victory, but he had then proceeded to speak his mind on party politics. He came down on the side of Macdonald's forces, even rejecting Anglin's comments on protection. The school question was over and done with and the Bishop could now give rein to his strong predilections in favour of the Tories. "I only write the above," he told Anglin, "in all candor and sincere friendship to you - friendship on account of your personal merits of every kind, not on account of, but in spite of the side of political questions and parties you advocated." Undoubtedly Anglin the man cherished this friendship but he was not a mere man -- he was also a politician and a politician needs votes. How long could he rely upon the Bishop for effective support under these circumstances?

II

When a Government is defeated at an election it is usual that its resignation is not handed in immediately. In the interim period appointments of one kind or another are made and desks are cleared for their new occupants.
In other words the Government acts as its own executor and puts its affairs in order before giving up the ghost. This was what happened in 1878. Anglin was one of those who advised Mackenzie to follow this course as there were several things that he wanted taken care of. The main favour he sought and received was an already promised grant to the nuns who looked after the Tracadie Lazaretto. Potentially more dangerous to Anglin was Mackenzie's apparent inclination to call an early session of parliament in an attempt to force the Conservatives to put their program into effect quickly. Anglin's opposition to such a plan was both personal and political.

The idea of calling an early meeting of Parliament appears to me objectionable on many grounds. There is no necessity whatever to justify it. The trouble to the members of the House and the cost to the country would be considerable and you could not hope to force your opponents to early action by such means as they could reasonably plead that they are entitled to time to form a government, to get their elections over and to prepare their grand scheme of readjustment. They would merely vote you out and then adjourn to the usual time of meeting in February. If the public service were in such a state as to demand an early meeting the case would be different but as it is not the victors would no doubt pretend to regard such a mode of proceeding as an attempt on your part to embarrass your opponents no matter what the cost to the country. I can not see what we could hope to gain by that course ... An early calling of Parliament would cut off my pay as Speaker and this I could ill afford to lose as I have spent large sums in keeping up the Freeman for the last year in order that it may do the good work at the Elections which it has done but I would not of course ask you to alter any decision you may arrive at on that account if I saw that anything could be gained by the country or by the party from an early summoning of Parliament.

Mackenzie decided simply to resign and did so on October 9. Anglin, however, was still Speaker until the House met and chose another. He was de jure but what about de facto? Did he retain his powers of leadership over and appointment of House of Commons officials as a 'lame-duck' Speaker?

Anglin had sought advice on this question. The answers he received
indicated that he did indeed possess his powers until parliament met "and that the precedents favour your exercise of it." Unfortunately, however, these views emanated from neither constitutional experts nor the incoming Government. Anglin was being advised, in the main, by Mackenzie, and a defeated premier was not the best source to rely upon on such a question. Yet Anglin accepted this advice after giving the matter considerable study and coming to the conclusion that he did indeed have the power. His views might have made little difference had the issue remained theoretical. But it did not. In the first place two positions in the translators' office had been rendered vacant when two officials resigned to contest seats in the election. Shortly after the election, Anglin wrote to Alfred Patrick, the Clerk of the House, asking information about the situation and for suggestions as to what should be done. Patrick replied that it was essential that one appointment be made sometime before the meeting of the House in order that the new man might familiarize himself with the duties of his position. A report from the chief translator, Mr. Coursolles, in reply to an inquiry from Patrick, also recommended filling the important post of French translator of Votes and Proceedings -- advice eventually adopted by Anglin -- but that since this would leave his ranks two short it would be of "pressing necessity" to fill them too. With three appointments to make Anglin decided that a trip to Ottawa would be in order and accordingly he went to the capital in the second week of November. While there Anglin studied the qualifications of the persons whose names were being considered, and by the middle of the month the selections had been named and the successful men were notified that their appointments would begin on January 1st. On November 22nd Anglin wrote to Patrick notifying him that he had been informed that the work in the
translation department had fallen into arrears and that the appointments should be made immediately. Four days later the Clerk informed Anglin that the men would commence their new duties on December 1st. So far so good. But then Sir John was yet to be heard from. On December 2nd, he made his views known. Hartney had gone to him on that day requesting his signature to a warrant for money. Sir John did so and then, with a sure knowledge of the power of the purse, told Hartney to inform Patrick that Anglin's recent appointments were not to be recognized. Patrick, not wanting to jeopardize his position, had dutifully informed the appointees when they arrived on the 3rd that they were not to be employed after all. Not surprisingly, Anglin was upset, and he wasted little time in writing to the Clerk.

I have just received your letter of December 4th, and I write at once to protest against the interference of the Privy Council or any members of it in the administration of the Department of which as Speaker of the House of Commons I am the head, and to call on you formally not to recognize the authority which, as I learn from your letter, Sir John A. Macdonald has usurped; to undo whatever you have done by his instructions, and hereafter to act only upon the instructions given you by the Speaker. I know that your position is extremely delicate, but I feel it to be my duty to maintain as far as in me lies the privileges and the independence of the House of Commons.

Patrick's reply to this communication indicated quite clearly that he had thought that Anglin did legally retain the power of appointment, but now he feared for his job and hoped that Anglin could do something to get him out of the position he was in. On December 18th the Speaker wrote once again suggesting certain economies but leaving these up to new Commission of Internal Revenue. He also exonerated the Clerk from responsibility, claiming that if Sir John had objections he should have directed them to the Speaker rather than placing the Clerk in such an embarrassing position. By the day before Christmas, Patrick was toeing the Macdonald party line
about the powers of the Speaker and seemed to claim the right to make 
provisional appointments under the circumstances. Anglin disagreed, of 
course, and told Patrick to pay no attention to Sir John's commands. Even 
here, however, the matter did not end. In January Anglin attempted to 
have promotions made in the Department of Private Bills to fill a vacancy 
created by the death of the brother of the Clerk. Anglin's plan was 
simple -- promote the three members of the department and make other 
adjustments to take up the slack rather than make a new appointment. But 
ev en he must have known that this arrangement would not likely be accepted, 
and it was not. A Mr. Moffatt, a Tupper protégé claimed the Freeman, had 
been put in the other Patrick's position, thus putting him in charge of 
men who had done the work for several years to everyone's satisfaction.

This was the position of affairs when the House met in 1879. Anglin 
was not re-elected Speaker, to no one's surprise. But shortly after the 
session got under way the member from Gloucester brought up the question 
of the powers of the Speaker during an interregnum. He outlined the tale 
of the appointments to the House. He explained that he had looked into 
the question of his powers thoroughly and had found no British precedents, 
for there the Commissioners for the Internal Economy of the House had 
authority. In Canada they possessed no such powers. He explained that 
the Statute of 1868 was fragmentary and inadequate to cover the case, but 
that it had stated that the man who is Speaker at the end of a parliament 
should continue to be Speaker for the purposes of that Act until a suc-
cessor is named. The same Act gave the Speaker the power to appoint an 
Accountant and to suspend or dismiss any or all of the officials during 
an interregnum. Anglin argued that such powers implied the right to make 
appointments -- "it can not be imagined that the Speaker should have the
power after a dissolution to dismiss officers whose work could not be left undone without serious detriment to the public service and yet have no power to provide that that work should be done. Clearly no one else has the least authority to appoint or employ any one to do that work."
The question was of some importance he concluded, for was this not an infringement on the rights of the Speaker by the executive and therefore a challenge to the privileges of the House which the Speaker represented? If ministers were to have this power, a Bill should be passed saying so.\textsuperscript{17}

The premier rose from his seat in the House to answer the ex-Speaker. In brief, his view was that no one had the power of appointment. The Speaker's powers in such circumstances were severely limited and the right to dismiss did not mean the right to appoint. The Speaker retained certain limited powers by the Internal Economy Act just to keep things working. Aside from this, when a Parliament died, its Speaker did also. The appointments of Anglin had been made illegally and were therefore void. It would be unfair to "fetter" his successor in this way. But, Macdonald concluded, while the Act was not very clear and would be clarified, it would not be "by clothing a defunct official with power." James Cockburn, the first Speaker of the Commons, followed his leader and testified that the Liberals had warned him not to fill a position which had become vacant during the winter of 1873-74.\textsuperscript{18} In any case, he said, the appointing power of the Speaker at such a time was dormant. After this, a few more speeches were made, but the debate just petered out.\textsuperscript{19}

Anglin's course of action in the matter of appointments was fairly typical of his handling of intricate political issues. There is little question that legally he had a case. The advice he had received and his own study had led him to that position. That is one side of the story.
The other side is that he was far from being a modest man. In many cases this was a good thing, for it allowed him to stand up to those who naturally assumed that an Irish Catholic was an inferior creature and it forced him to live up to the very high standards he had set for himself. Yet at times his egotism and stubbornness led him to make things difficult on himself. The appointments were one such occasion. Anglin claimed to be only concerned with the smooth and efficient functioning of the House, and in fact there is much one can say in support of this contention. Yet surely, one might suggest, it would have been wise to have consulted with the new Government before making these appointments. Anglin may have thought of doing such a thing but it is unlikely. The Speaker, he claimed, should not be so much "the creature and slave of party as to be influenced in the discharge of his duty by the manner in which the elections happen to go." \(^20\) To consult with the Government would be to diminish the independence of the Speaker. This was part of it, but the other factor which shows up in Anglin's second batch of promotions made in January after his November ones had been quashed, was his stubbornness, his eye for party advantage, but at the same time a very strong commitment to what he felt was a principle. He knew that the promotions would not be accepted -- not that they were in any way foolish, but because he was making them and that his mode of procedure created no position to be filled by a Tory office-seeker. While performing this futile task, he was fulfilling what he considered to be his duty as Speaker -- protecting the office from outside encroachment. It had to be done if only for the record, for failing to do so might have been construed as acceptance of the slap received from Macdonald early in December. As for the party advantage which might be gained, Anglin undoubtedly realized that if the issue could be presented
as an overbearing executive encroaching upon the rights of the Speaker, and thereby those of the House, it had some potential. Yet when it came to bringing the question up on the floor of the House, it can not be said that he went overboard in his party antagonism. But it is almost unquestionable that party politics had a good deal to do with the whole question. Had not Macdonald himself told Anglin that the best policy was to reward your friends, not your enemies? He had not listened to Anglin's views on patronage; why should Anglin solicit his?

There was one other thing to clear up before Anglin could say a final good-bye to the Speakership. Even Macdonald had recognized that Anglin had been the Speaker, at least in name, until another was chosen, and he had incurred expenses on account of this fact. His trip to Ottawa in November had been on House business and his visit to Halifax to greet the new Governor General, Lord Lorne, and the Princess Louise, had been in an official capacity. Such things were one of the reasons that the Speaker was paid. At least, he was paid until the end of 1878. But to his chagrin he found that the Deputy Minister had given his opinion that he was not entitled to any pay for January and thirteen days in February -- about $500. Not surprisingly Anglin brought the question to the floor of the House claiming that his predecessors had always been paid until the election of their successors. James McDonald notified him that the matter was being considered and that justice would be done. Anglin must have got his money as he never again introduced the question in the House. It must have been nice to leave the Speakership on and with such a happy note.

III

Leaving the Speaker's seat must have seemed like release from prison for Anglin. He was opinionated, argumentative and loquacious. As Speaker he
could seldom give rein to these predelictions but during the following four sessions, he made up for lost time. During the life of the fourth parliament of Canada, Anglin was without question one of the most significant members of the opposition. He had always attended the sittings well and his years as Speaker had accustomed him to being in the House most of the time. Given his other traits of character and many years of experience in the House, his excellent attendance made his name appear time and time again in the Debates. He was often to be found questioning the statements of other speakers or interjecting with differing opinions. He spoke on all issues both large and small and seemed to delight in combing financial statements for errors. Perhaps the partial cause of the latter was that Tilley was Minister of Finance and as the sessions went on it became clear that Tilley and Anglin were in a separate category from their fellow New Brunswickers when it came to effectiveness in the House. Anglin's major speeches, such as those on his and other Liberals' pet hates, the National Policy and the Canadian Pacific Railway, were gargantuan affairs. Incredibly detailed, full of figures, yet containing much real meat, they were effective even if they justified the stricture passed by one contemporary upon their speaker.

[An forcible but diffuse speaker, who made long excursions into the by-ways of his argument, seldom delivering a speech within bounds suitable to the time of those whose temporal span is fixed at three score and ten, and whose patience is only good.]

A measure of Anglin's significance in the Commons' debates can be seen in the fact that it took one and a-half columns to index under his name in the official Debates for 1879. Only four men — Macdonald, Mackenzie, Tupper and Mills — required more space, while Tilley, Cartwright and Holton required about the same or slightly less. By the last session,
held in 1882, this pattern was still holding up although Anglin was not quite so prominent according to this rough test. Anglin's skill at debate, sitting up there in the second row to the Speaker's left, playing middle linebacker behind the big front six of the Liberals -- Laurier, Huntington, A. J. Smith, Cartwright, MacKenzie, and Holton -- was more than acceptable. He was quite good at repartee but seldom was he very witty in his remarks. But then neither was the Freeman. In any case Mackenzie was most pleased with his Irish colleague. "Anglin did capital work all through the session speaking and writing," he confided to Alfred Jones after the end of the 1879 Session.

The debates showed how important Anglin was within Liberal circles. In fact, Anglin and the party were increasingly growing closer together. His efforts on behalf of the party became ever more complete although there was always a part of him that remained independent. Anglin and Isaac Burpee exchanged weekly visits in St. John to discuss matters. During 1881 he was called upon to use his influence in the Maritimes. Early in January he spoke in Halifax in an attempt to arouse opposition to the C.P.R. contract; in June he stumped Pictou constituency in Nova Scotia in aid of the Liberal candidate in a by-election which drew Tupper out in aid of the Government candidate -- the Liberal lost; and during the summer he spoke on several occasions in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia in conjunction with Blake's visit to the Maritimes. Anglin was one of the major personages consulted on a new plan adopted by the Liberals at the beginning of the 1882 Session which divided the labour of "assailing the Government". By whatever test one wishes to make it is undeniable that Anglin held an elevated position within Liberal ranks. To the London Advertiser there was "perhaps no man in Parliament more capable of
discussing public questions than Mr. Anglin ... "34

There was a particular type of 'public question' which was of special concern to Anglin. He was not simply a Liberal politician and newspaperman; he was also an Irish Catholic spokesman. As such he had duties to perform both inside and outside the House of Commons. Some questions which arose in the House of Commons concerned Catholics but were not peculiarly Irish Catholic issues, the Deceased Wife's Sister Marriage Bill being one example. On such issues Anglin attempted to ascertain the opinion of the New Brunswick Bishops or at least to present arguments in accord with Catholic teaching, of which his knowledge was more than just perfunctory.35

Anglin's style of leadership outside the Commons was seen on the occasion of the visit of the Governor General and Princess Louise to St. John in the summer of 1879. Prior to the visit a reception committee was set up and Anglin was one of a large number named to it.36 A meeting of this committee took place and plans for the reception were considered. Much of the discussion centred around the question as to whether there should be a procession and if so what kind. For some time those present debated back and forth whether or not the Orange Society should be invited. Eventually it came to a vote whether a procession should be held at all and the majority favoured having one. At this point Anglin rose and asked the indulgence of the meeting. He stated that he had remained silent until this point as he wished the Protestant gentlemen to settle the question themselves and he had hoped that they would do so satisfactorily. But now, he continued, it seemed very likely that the Orange Society was to take part in the procession. The *Freeman* recorded the rest of his brief speech.
He bore no ill will towards that Society or any of its members, but it was a Society established for the exclusion of Catholics from the enjoyment of those rights and liberties to which they are entitled as British subjects. This has often been denied of late, but nevertheless it is believed by many, and to these the presence of that body in the procession would be offensive. The Mayor [who was chairing the meeting] said Mr. Anglin was out of order. Mr. Anglin replied that he had asked the indulgence of the meeting, and had only a few words to add. He could not accept any share of the responsibility, direct or indirect, of inviting the Orange Society to take part in the procession, or of assigning them a place in it. He spoke only for himself, and the societies, whose members are Catholics, would of course judge for themselves, and act upon their own judgment; but he thought it very improbable that any of those societies would take part in the procession were a place in it given to the Orange Society. No matter what the decision of the Committee may be, he felt assured that the Catholics of the city would do all in their power to show due respect to the Governor-General and Her Royal Highness the Princess Louise when they visit St. John.

What a magnificent wet blanket! And what a veto power! Needless to say a sub-committee which met the following day decided that a trades' procession would be more suitable and later even this was given up as impractical.37

Anglin's main method of championing the Irish cause, however, had never been in such meetings, but rather on his own private platform, the Freeman. Anglin had always made a conscientious effort to give the Irish news to the readers of the Freeman. He did this for two reasons. In the first place many of his readers were Irish and he knew that they craved news from home. In the second place it was a subject as dear to him as it was to most other native Irishmen living in America. Towards Ireland and her people Anglin cherished a deep emotional commitment. Canada was his home now; but he did not forsake the land of his birth in his heart. In interpreting Irish developments for his readers, Anglin operated on four basic premises. He firmly believed that conditions in Ireland were bad, often deplorable. That the Irish and Ireland were unjustly treated was the second tenet of belief. Thirdly, he was convinced that the news
reporting where Ireland was concerned was very misleading. Finally, he asserted that the Irish were basically law-abiding and peaceful citizens. But such a list, while useful in simplifying matters, takes away the vibrancy of the Freeman's writing on the question. In fact, the best writing which appeared in the Freeman in these years was concerned with Irish matters. On one occasion, for example, he presented a rather atypical definition of "agrarian outrages."

The Freeman does not deny the prevalence of agrarian outrages in Ireland. For many centuries they have been only too numerous. Again and again were the lands of Ireland confiscated, and their true owners driven to the mountains and to the woods for shelter. Again and again did thousands of those so robbed die of hunger. Spenser, we believe it is who describes the condition of the people who, after one of those great outrages in the south of Ireland, may be seen crawling to the road sides from the bogs and woods, and dying while they strove to eat the grass and weeds. In later times these outrages changed their character somewhat, and became "evictions". Then, when a landlord, wishing to evade the payment of tithes, or believing pasturage more profitable, or preferring large farms, or desiring to gratify some whim, wished to depopulate a country side, the law enabled him to work his will, and scores, and, in some cases, hundreds of families were driven away to make room for cattle. In the year of the great famine the working of the poor law, introduced a short time previous, stimulated the landlords to clear their lands of people whom they treated as human vermin; advantage was taken of the loss of crops and the impossibility of paying all the rent due to sweep the people off the land. Hundreds of thousands who should have received kind treatment and help when afflicted by Providence were then cast on the road side to perish, by the landlords and the landlords' law. To-day in many places similar outrages are threatened ... Oh yes! agrarian outrages are, unfortunately, prevalent in Ireland. On the other side there have been offences - outrages also, which are in themselves utterly indefensible, but those who know the country and its laws, and how those laws have been used, must devoutly thank God, who alone could enable so many to bear patiently the grievous wrongs they have endured, that so few of the oppressed sought or desired revenge.

During the late 1870's and early 1880's there was renewed agitation in Ireland for reform. Two factors were involved but they were by no means mutually exclusive. On the one hand there was a drive to change the land system so that it would be more just and serviceable to the needs of Irishmen. On the other there was a renewed attempt to win some
form of self-government for the country. Anglin's attitude towards the national and land agitation evolved at a pace paralleling developments in Ireland. In general, both the movements in Ireland and Anglin's attitude became more radical with the passage of time. But Anglin was never in the revolutionary vanguard. He supported the more moderate movements in Ireland which nevertheless had the support of the Irish people. In 1874 that movement was Isaac Butt's Home Rule agitation. After Butt's death in 1879, the leader Ireland was left with was Charles Stewart Parnell. Anglin had always been a bit apprehensive of Parnell and his obstructionist tactics. He was not quite cautious or orthodox enough for Anglin's liking. But at least he was better than a person like O'Donovan Rossa, whose third wife was Anglin's third cousin, who though an enthusiast was mistaken in planning violence. As for the agrarian tactics involved -- non-payment of rent -- Anglin believed that while they were not morally wrong, they might be questioned because of the likelihood of swift repression. The problem in Ireland was that even non-violent tactics were dangerous.

Passive resistance by a whole people is a powerful means of obtaining justice if the struggle be maintained prudently and for a sufficient time, but we remember that the passive resistance offered to the collection of tithes in O'Connell's time led to the massacres at Bathcormac and other places, and we are afraid that those who control the military force in Ireland to-day would be ready to use that force in a similar way on pretexts quite as trivial. We remember also that during that agitation some crimes were committed on the side of the people which, although not unprovoked, were indefensible, and we know that the landlords have in their hands ... the terrible power of eviction, a power they have never shown a reluctance to use. We hesitate, therefore, to express any approval of the present agitation when it seems to pass beyond the holding of meetings to state the grievances which exist, and to demand their remedy, and we regard with much apprehension the course of those who, taking a place in the front rank, indulge in the use of strong language ...

Yet during 1881 and 1882, as coercion was once again applied to Ireland,
the Freeman moved further to the left. The logic of events forced Anglin, as it forced the people and leaders of Ireland, into more radical lines of thinking. Still, this was a defensive reaction. Individual or collective acts of violence could not be condoned, but how could one condemn the Irish people for standing up for their rights and for justice? Anglin could not.

Anglin's views on Irish politics had an impact upon his political life in Canada, but not always in directions which one might assume. Anglin tended to compartmentalize his attitude towards the British Government, as has been mentioned before. Although he firmly believed that the link with Britain, as it existed, was almost wholly detrimental to Ireland, this did not mean that in the Canadian context England was the enemy. Irish Catholics in Canada might be underrepresented in political life, malign by the statistical lies of police reports, and suffer other forms of prejudice, but, the Freeman claimed, they were at least as well off in Canada as elsewhere.

Irish Catholics complain, and not without reason, that in Canada they are systematically excluded from public positions, and that their religion, and their nationality, often prove obstacles to their success; but they are mistaken if they suppose that in this respect the Irish Catholics in the United States are more favoured, and in some respects Catholics are treated with greater injustice than in Great Britain itself or any of its colonies.

This was one of the reasons that the Canadian Irish were thoroughly loyal, with only an occasional exception, to the Dominion while still remaining loyal to the land of their birth. Was there nothing that Canadian Irish could do to aid their suffering brethren in Ireland? Anglin thought there was.

One effort which provided effective relief were collections which were taken up throughout the country. The Irish of St. John did not have much
money to spare after the disastrous fire of 1877 and the lack of work in
the city, but they did their part. One collection made at the three
Catholic churches in St. John and environs realized over $2,000, a goodly
chunk of the $9,000 New Brunswick raised in 1880.\textsuperscript{54} But perhaps the
House of Commons could also be persuaded to make a contribution. At the
instigation of John Gostigan\textsuperscript{55} the Government announced their intention
of making a donation. As soon as he heard this Anglin rose to his feet
urging the Government to act quickly and showing, by reference to some
of his own experiences in the Great Famine, the necessity of immediate
action.\textsuperscript{56} Not until a week later, however, did the matter come to the
floor of the House. Macdonald announced that $100,000 would be sent for
the relief of the famine victims of Ireland. Anglin's was the first
major speech in reply. He acknowledged that he was rather disappointed
that the amount was so small as he had hoped that the £50,000 sterling
sum that had been mentioned would be the figure.

I was led, by the language of the [Throne] Speech, to expect that a
larger amount than this would have been voted for the relief of Ireland
by this Parliament. We are asked to give, not out of our poverty, but
out of our abundance, for the relief of people, hundreds of thousands
of whom have, for many weeks, been on the very verge of starvation,
and who are to-day suffering from the want of food. It was to be the
gift of a great nation, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
to another nation forming part of the same Empire, whose people are
the kith and kin of a large number of the people of this Dominion, and
for whom we feel all the sympathy we possibly could feel for a kindred
suffering people.

But then he admitted that it would be ungracious for "one who, though a
Canadian, still regards himself as an Irishman," to complain of any gift
"that is graciously offered ... " He was, however, concerned about the
disposal of the money. He supposed that it was impossible to bypass the
Colonial Secretary, but he hoped that the money would be accompanied by
the suggestion that it be passed on to the Mansion House Committee.\textsuperscript{57}
Unfortunately this was not done and as things turned out Anglin’s fears were justified. Very little of the money was spent on actually feeding the hungry. It was gobbled up in building a few piers, providing fishing boats and buying a small amount of seed. This was all very well, said the Freeman, but it was not the purpose for which the money had been voted. The British Government should be looking after these other things.\textsuperscript{58}

The Irish question came up again in the 1882 session -- the pre-election session as it turned out. Once again it was John Costigan who seemed to be leading the show. On March 6th he notified Macdonald of his intention to introduce resolutions supporting Home Rule for Ireland.\textsuperscript{59} He told the premier that he would take the earliest opportunity of submitting them for his perusal and that suggestions "calculated to make it acceptable to yourself and colleagues thereby ensuring its adoption by the House," would be cheerfully received.\textsuperscript{60} The background of the resolutions which Costigan submitted to Macdonald was very interesting. Costigan had approached all the Irish members of parliament and had invited them to attend meetings to draft resolutions. In Anglin’s case it had been rather difficult as the two New Brunswickers had not been on speaking terms for some days, but he had done so. "He was invited to our meeting," Costigan later said, "and from his well-known ability and prominence we had him named upon our committee to frame these resolutions." But Anglin neither came to the meetings nor served on the committee.\textsuperscript{61} Why Anglin would have refused is a difficult question to answer. Undoubtedly his personal antagonism towards Costigan had something to do with it; perhaps he wanted to take no chance that the Tories would use the issue to take advantage; unquestionably he knew that Edward Blake was preparing resolutions on the question\textsuperscript{62} and he probably wished to co-operate with his leader just as
Costigan did with Macdonald; and possibly he felt that such a committee could never draft resolutions to his liking or if it did, that the Government would not give them the necessary support. In fact, looking at the question from all angles, Anglin probably thought that he had nothing to lose by staying aloof. If the resolutions adopted by the committee were satisfactory he could support them; if not, he could attempt to amend or oppose them. In any case his freedom of movement would not be curtailed. It was not a very heroic course of action but it may have been politic.

Macdonald found Costigan's resolutions too strong and he amended them, or as Blake said, he emasculated them. He also made arrangements with Costigan that the resolutions should be moved while the House was going into Supply thereby precluding the possibility of amendments. The resolutions as they now stood, began by professing that the Canadian Irish were amongst the most loyal and contented of Her Majesty's subjects. It went on to say that because of the discontent in Ireland, Irish emigrants shied away from Canada on account of their "feelings of estrangement towards the Imperial Government." It expressed the view that Canada could not afford to lose such a large proportion of emigrants and hoped that as Canada had prospered under a federal system, some form of the latter would be extended to Ireland "if consistent with the integrity and well being of the Empire, and if the rights and status of the minority are fully protected and secured ..." The Irish would then become happy and would not hesitate to emigrate to Canada. The final clause expressed the hope "that the time has come when Your Majesty's clemency may without injury to the interests of the United Kingdom be extended to those persons, who are now imprisoned in Ireland charged with political offences only, and the inestimable blessing of personal liberty restored to them."
When these resolutions were introduced on April 20th no one stood to speak for some time. At last Blake rose and gave a long and really quite magnificent speech which expressed disappointment with the resolutions, and detailed Irish rather than Canadian reasons for granting Home Rule.65 Macdonald and others followed Blake. Towards the end of the debate Anglin arose. "Mr. Speaker," he said, "I find, Sir, that it is entirely unnecessary for me to make a speech on this subject." It was a good thing, for he proceeded not to make a speech for something close to an hour. He made some "corrections" of errors that had been made by previous speakers. But his main points were three in number. He thought that if the House felt that Ireland was entitled to Home Rule it should say so simply and directly without the 'ifs' and 'buts' which the resolutions contained. He disliked that part which called into doubt the good faith of the Irish people by saying that is hoped certain things would be done "if the rights of the minority are fully protected". The Protestant minority, he claimed, had always been treated well.66 Finally, he very much disliked the last clause because in asking for clemency one assumed guilt. All the imprisoned wished and all that anyone should wish was that they received a fair trial. But he would certainly support the resolutions even if they were somewhat defective. He was most pleased to see one thing, he said, just before sitting down.

I am glad to find that a better sense of the condition of things in Ireland is prevailing; I am glad to find, as the hon. member for Vancouver (Mr. Bumster) said, that prejudices which came with the mother's milk are gradually disappearing. We are learning to appreciate and understand each other more thoroughly, and to find that if one man is a Protestant and another is a Catholic, one an Episcopal and another a Presbyterian, it matters little, that every man should act and think for himself, and that notwithstanding these differences we ought to combine in all that relates to us as a people, by having one heart, one mind, one thought, and one vote.67
As 'cabin'd and crib'd' as these resolutions were they did not sit lightly with the Colonial Secretary and the British Government. The timing was very bad for only four days after the Senate had passed the resolutions, Lord Cavendish, the new Chief Secretary for Ireland, and his Secretary, Thomas Burke, were murdered by a gang of Invincibles, a new extremist movement which had adopted assassination as a method of winning Irish freedom. Lord Kimberley politely told Canadians that it was not their place to be petitioning on Irish affairs. Privately, he was less polite.

The people of this country have shown wonderful calmness under immense provocation, but they are not in a temper to be trifled with by anglers for Irish votes at elections for Colonial Legislatures. To the Freeman this response was flatly ridiculous. As imperial subjects, Canadians had an interest in the good government of the entire Empire. Of more particular concern was the emigration difficulty. And surely Canada had a right to speak out on a problem which had more than once caused armed clashes on her border, many an anxious moment and considerable expenditure of money. Finally, Canada had a right to speak from its experience on the benefits which a federal system could bring. Under the circumstances, however, there would be no reform for Ireland for a few years at least. The assassinations had ensured that. But Anglin did not have too much time to think about Irish politics as the spring of 1882 wore on into summer. He was fighting for his political life.

IV

The Home Rule question had shown that Costigan had risen to become a rival of Anglin for Irish Catholic leadership. Their rivalry went back at least as far as the New Brunswick schools question but it was not until the late seventies and early eighties that Costigan emerged as a serious
challenge to Anglin's position in the Irish Catholic community. In 1877 Costigan had accused Anglin of dereliction of duty on the schools question both in the House of Commons and during the Gloucester by-election. January 14, 1881, saw their first major confrontation in the House of Commons. The exchange was not particularly edifying but it did serve notice that Costigan had been a political apprentice long enough; from now on he would strive to be a leader. Macdonald was not one to overlook such a performance. He was probably even more impressed with the co-operation Costigan gave him on the Home Rule question a year later. Finally, in April, 1882, Tilley received a letter from four New Brunswick Catholics -- G. A. Girouard, the M.P. for Kent; Costigan; P. A. Landry, the most prominent of all the Acadians and Commissioner of Public Works in the Fraser Government of New Brunswick; and Anglin's old foe, Onésiphore Turgeon. They requested that a Catholic be appointed to the federal cabinet seat which had been vacant since R. D. Wilmot had resigned in 1880 to become Lieutenant Governor. If this were done, they claimed, the Conservatives would take Victoria, Kent and Gloucester. Gloucester? defeat Anglin? -- both Tilley and Macdonald relished the thought. On May 23, 1882, John Costigan became Minister of Inland Revenue. What would the repercussions on Anglin be? The newly established Fredericton Conservative paper, the Capital, gave the question an answer.

We are disposed to think that his appointment will seriously effect Mr. Anglin's following in this Province. Our Irish people are singularly loyal to their leaders, as a general rule, and no man knows this better than Mr. Anglin; but if leaders persist in striving to lead people where they do not want to go, they must take the consequences. The Irish voters are beginning to see that if they wait till they have Mr. Anglin to represent them in the Cabinet they will have to wait a long time ... 

Even more ominous for Anglin's political future was the public congratulatory note sent to Costigan by Bishop Rogers. In part it read:
Again tendering you my felicitations and best wishes for your success in your new office, and the assurance of my sympathy and good will towards the Government of which you are now a member and of which you were in the past a faithful supporter.77

In the Conservative cause, Bishop Rogers was not so chary of 'clerical influence'. If anyone had not known Rogers' political views before, they were certainly no secret now.

Aside from the competition that Costigan was offering there was another factor which was undercutting Anglin's political strength. Gloucester was overwhelmingly Acadian and during the late seventies and early eighties an Acadian nationalism began to sprout amongst the French-speaking inhabitants of the Maritimes.78 Unfortunately for Anglin, this led before long to antagonism between the two major groups of Catholics in New Brunswick, the Acadians and the Irish.79 For Anglin this was especially unfortunate because although he had never championed the Acadians as he had the Irish, he had always spoken well of his French co-religionists, had supported their efforts at self-improvement, and had treated them justly.80 But the victims of nationalism have been many. At least in Anglin's case it was only his political life that was at stake.

By the time the 1882 election rolled around there was little question that Anglin's hold on Gloucester was rather tenuous. His annual visit to the constituency had never been enough to do all the political fence mending that needed to be done.81 That opposition to Anglin was increasing could be seen in a resolution passed by the Gloucester Municipal Council on January 21, 1881, in support of the C.P.R. contract which Anglin had denounced:

[W]e consider it behooves every honest, loyal, lover of his country to give his warm support to the Government in this matter and frustrate the objects of factious opponents who are only trifling with the best interests of the country.82
What happened within the ranks of the Liberal-Conservative party in Gloucester in 1882 is not exactly clear. Two men -- K. F. Burns, who had been involved in provincial politics and had been awaiting a good opportunity to defeat Anglin ever since 1872, and Turgeon, Anglin's opponent in 1877 -- ran as Government candidates. What is even more interesting is the fact that both of them made trips to Ottawa just before the campaign got under way in earnest. One possible explanation for there being two opponents for Anglin is simply that neither Burns nor Turgeon would withdraw from the race. But it seems probable that there was a complicated plan afoot to defeat Anglin. This theory would have it that Anglin's support was such that if his opponent was French-speaking, Anglin could take some of the Acadian vote while obtaining the solid support of the English. The same, in reverse, would be true if Anglin faced an English opponent.

In this emergency keen Conservative managers concluded that their best chance would be in a three-cornered election, with a French candidate to take off a section of Mr. Anglin's French vote. Mr. Turgeon was ready to take the field as an independent, and thus the contest was run. The personal and business influence of Mr. Burns gave him a good start, and it soon became apparent that Mr. Anglin was likely to be beaten. Then came a stampede of his supporters to Mr. Burns. It was not quite as simple as that. Turgeon was not consciously a party to this plan. But he knew that a three-cornered contest would be of great aid to Burns and he did not drop out of the race. Lest the theory of a Conservative scheme to defeat Anglin seem too far-fetched it is noteworthy that it has confirmation from the Conservative side. In 1888 T. DesBrisay wrote to Tilley in support of his claim for a seat on the Senate. He claimed he had served the party well and refreshed Tilley's memory a little.

In 1880 (I think) you will recollect that in your Private Office in
Ottawa you asked my opinion on the State of Gloucester politically
and I unfolded to you my "Plan of Campaign" for the coming Election
which was adopted by the Government or Conservative Party and Mr.
Anglin was distanced ... 86

Anglin's weakness was shown by the silence which greeted his arrival
at Bathurst. 87 His organization was in a deplorable state. 88 Prior to
this election the local priests had named his canvassers but this time
they seemed reticent to act. 89 In fact, things had so changed that John
Sivewright, who had been the secretary of Anglin's election committee in
1874, was now one of Burns' chief supporters. 90 Burns concentrated on
promises which he claimed Anglin had not fulfilled; on the view that the
county should elect one of its own residents; on Anglin's apparent failure
to promote the projected Caraquet Railway; and, of course, urged the
electors to vote for the candidate of the party which would unquestionably
win the election and continue to form the Government. 91 On top of this
Burns' career in the New Brunswick Assembly had met with approval.
Moreover, he was "the greatest employer of labor in Gloucester," 92 and
Anglin claimed Burns had run his business for the last four years for the
purpose of catching votes. 93 He had money and both Turgeon and Anglin
claimed he used it freely. 94 For his part, Turgeon was being aided by
public letters and telegrams from Sir Hector Langevin, a fact which shows
that if there was not some Conservative plan of campaign afoot there was
considerable competition within the Conservative cabinet. 95 Anglin made
a valiant attempt to defend his record and rescue his seat but things were
out of hand. 96 Bishop Rogers was of little help. Anglin had approached
the Bishop on his way to Gloucester and had asked for a word of approval.
Rogers' reply to this request had been an open letter to the Rt. Rev.
T. F. Barry. In this letter he had expressed his warm admiration for
Anglin's merits and made the statement that he would "regret his absence
from the House of Commons ..." However, he did acknowledge that his political sympathies lay with the party to which Anglin was opposed and he concluded his letter by saying that each elector should vote "for the Candidate of his own free choice, according to his own free conscience and for which he is accountable to God." In short, the letter offered anything but unqualified support for Anglin. The result of polling was an ignominious defeat for Anglin at the hands of Burns. Even Turgeon chalked up more votes.

The reactions to Anglin's defeat were varied. Tilley did not gloat; he merely commented that, combined with that of Smith, Anglin's defeat was a great blow to the opposition party. Alfred Jones felt more sorry for Anglin than any of the other Liberal leaders who had gone down to defeat, and the list was formidable. The Sun considered that the defeat of Smith and Anglin marked the end of an epoch in New Brunswick political history. John Thompson, although a Conservative, felt strongly enough to write Anglin a note expressing his regret. And an anonymous correspondent of Macdonald's felt that he should do a generous deed and offer an appointment to Anglin. Anglin's own reaction was one of disappointment. Despite the signs of impending defeat it still came as somewhat of a shock and surprise. Yet he resolved to make the best of it.

I hope to find in the happiness of home and in more constant association with my family from which of late I have been too much separated compensation for the loss of public position and political honours and consideration which I never valued very highly.

V

Anglin's political career was not the only thing that had gone into decline by the 1880's. The 1881 Census showed that New Brunswick's 'Golden Age of Wood, Wind and Sail' had come to a close. The pages of
the Freeman carried the contemporary story of this decline. To Anglin some of the causes were easy to discern. Confederation in the first place, and the National Policy in the second, were the culprits. It may have been pleasant for Anglin to say 'I told you so' and this he did frequently. It is always nice to be proved correct. But it was rather meagre recompense for the fact that his very correctness meant that the prospects for the Freeman were growing ever more dim. For the industrial decline of St. John meant that there were fewer jobs for Irish Catholic labourers to fill, and that even the more prosperous Catholics had little money with which they could support Anglin's paper.

Back in 1877 the Freeman's office and its contents had been destroyed in the Great Fire of June 20, only the account books, subscription list and a few files of the Freeman being saved. But at this very moment, his by-election committee in Gloucester put in an urgent call for his presence and he had been forced to leave St. John without making any arrangements about the paper. With the publication of the Freeman unavoidably suspended, Anglin decided to take a little extra time in making preparations for its re-appearance. It was to have a different business organization and it was to be a daily.

It had been difficult for Anglin to control the Freeman while he had been in Ottawa several months of the year and when he became Speaker it became impossible for him to send reports of parliamentary debates over the initials "T.W.A.". Nevertheless it is clear that he continued to send the lead editorials, some of which were really reports of debates but others, perhaps most, dealt with particular topics which came up in debate. By 1877 the Freeman seemed to have overcome some of its difficulties. The delay of news from Ottawa became much shorter. Either mail
service had improved or Anglin had taken to sending his lengthy articles by telegram. Before this time there had always been a great deal of difference in the Freeman while Anglin was in Ottawa but in 1877 the change was not particularly noticeable. Anglin's evidence given before the Committee of Privileges and Elections had also shown that by this time Anglin's involvement in the business side of the newspaper was minimal. It seemed feasible, then, that Anglin might give up in name as well as in fact the business side of the operation and concentrate on editorial writing for a daily edition. But it would not be an easy thing to do as Anglin confided to Bishop Rogers:

I have not yet succeeded in making any arrangements for getting the Freeman under way but I hope it will soon appear again. The difficulties in the way are considerable. Owing to the extraordinary opposition in the business developed of late years by the extraneous support given to other papers by Railway speculators willing to spend freely to promote their schemes and by political partizans willing to purchase support for their friends the cost of publication was greatly increased and the revenue diminished or kept down. The devotion of so much space in the Freeman for so long a time to the School question hurt its circulation even with Catholics - perhaps quite as much with them as with others and the late Parliamentary decision prevents my publishing a single government advertisement. The fire was so destructive that I saved nothing of the plant or stock and my insurance is scarcely sufficient to pay for a new press. I have some idea of putting the publishing part of the business in the hands of young men who I think could work it up again and make the property valuable continuing myself the chief editorship so that the paper would lose none of its usefulness. The general ruin caused by the fire which has crippled nearly all the leading Catholics of the city makes this more difficult than it would have been if I alone had suffered. The Catholics of this Province I suppose could not afford to lose the Freeman altogether yet to tell the truth they have never done much to support it.109

Not until August 29th, 1877, did the first edition of the daily Freeman appear. It had taken over two months to make all the arrangements, to obtain a new printing press, type and other necessities. The change in business management had indeed taken place.110 Anglin was now on a salary apparently, for the Freeman claimed that in any work done in its office
"the editor of the Freeman has no pecuniary interest whatever."\textsuperscript{111} By November things were back to normal among the St. John newspapers.

The St. John Freeman seems to possess a faculty of exciting most intense combative ness in the breasts of its city contemporaries. Before the great fire every second editorial article in most of the other papers was devoted to the Freeman. For several weeks after the fire, the latter journal did not appear, and there was a lull in the references to it. Suddenly it took its place again; and now there is nothing but Freeman once more. We have looked over the issues of the F. and detected nought in its pages that would excite the ire of anybody; but lo! and behold! next morning's papers would be full of the Freeman and its apparently innocent, but always straightforward utterances. What is the mystery?\textsuperscript{112}

The effort to rejuvenate the Freeman was no great success. The Freeman lasted as a daily for a little over a year -- long enough to be of great service in the 1878 election. On November 2nd, 1878, it announced that it would be discontinued although the Weekly Freeman would be published as usual. Shortly after, the Freeman's office was moved to a different and, presumably, less spacious location.\textsuperscript{113} At the same time it printed a prospectus for the following year and urged its friends to make an effort to extend its circulation.\textsuperscript{114} Even Bishop Sweeny got into the act and urged his parishioners not to allow the Weekly Freeman to follow the same path as the tri-weekly and daily editions.\textsuperscript{115} But this did not seem to help a great deal. On many occasions the Freeman had to appeal to its subscribers to pay their debts.\textsuperscript{116} Its yearly prospectus always included the hope that its readers would increase its circulation by their efforts.\textsuperscript{117} But by 1881 the Freeman's circulation was only 750, compared to such figures as 4,000 for the daily edition of the Evening Globe and 5,000 and 3,800 for the weekly editions of the Telegraph and the News respectively.\textsuperscript{118}

This was not surprising for papers like the News and the Sun contained many more showy advertisements and presented a much more modern face to their readers than did the Freeman. Yet the editorials of the Freeman
were head and shoulders above those of its rivals. They contained thought and commitment and they always had something to say. Their length was their one great fault. What all this boiled down to was that the newspaper business, like many other facets of the Canadian economy and society, was becoming more complex. The age of the one-man newspaper was very nearly at an end. Organization and specialization were the things required now. Even after his electoral defeat Anglin was able to do little for the Freeman. Some of the New Brunswick Liberals scraped up enough money to pay him a salary, but the paper simply was not a paying concern. On May 12th, 1883, the Freeman announced that its editor of over thirty years was severing his tie with the paper.

Anglin was going to Toronto. He was going to be another to travel the well-worn path from the Maritimes to Ontario. There were no longer many reasons, aside from sentiment, for him to remain in St. John. His political career in New Brunswick seemed to have come to an end and the Freeman was gasping its last breaths. He was bored. Giving occasional lectures to the Irish Friendly Society and to the New Brunswick Total Abstinence Union did little to relieve this feeling. No, St. John seemed to have little use for his talents any more and he resolved to sell his house and take his family, which had been increased by three (a girl and two boys) since he had left the Speakership, to a place where prospects looked brighter.

He was not to leave the city unheralded and unsung, however. A silent departure would not have been appropriate for a man who had been such an integral part of the city's life for a third of its one hundred year existence. The two receptions which were held in his honour were fitting comments on his career. On May 9th, there was a large meeting of
Catholics at St. Malachi's Hall in order to present Anglin with an address thanking him for the services he had performed for them and wishing him well in his future endeavours. Bishop Sweeny himself took the chair and expressed his view that there was no public man in the Dominion for whom he had more respect. The following evening the Liberals of St. John held a farewell banquet for him. A Catholic reception and a Liberal banquet -- how appropriate.

But perhaps most fitting of all was the fact that the News devoted its lead editorial article to Anglin's departure. The News -- the very paper in which Anglin's anonymous letter had appeared in 1849; the News -- the paper in which the Freeman's first prospectus had been carried; the News -- which for so many years had been on the other side of the political fence. Its article acknowledged that Anglin, though not having the genial temperament of most Irishmen, had served the Irish Catholic community to the best of his ability. It did not know what the future held for him but it did know that it would miss him.

We are among those who regret the removal of Mr. Anglin from St. John. He had grown to be quite an institution here. We shall miss him greatly as a journalist. It is true we have often been in conflict with him. But for all that we are sorry to lose him. He has his peculiarities of temperament, sentiment and manner, and these may render his path in the future, as it has more or less in the past, somewhat difficult to travel. There can, however, be no question as to his ability, and it is many-sided. He has a strong intellect, a clear and simple style as a writer, is a fluent and forcible speaker. He acquitted himself well in the Commons Speakership. He is fitted to make his mark anywhere.
FOOTNOTES

1 P.A.C., Alexander Mackenzie Papers, Burpee to Mackenzie, June 20, 1879. Burpee had asked A. J. Smith to split the cost but the latter had claimed he could not afford it.


6 Freeman, Sept. 18 and 19, 1878; New Brunswick Reporter (Fredericton), Sept. 18, 1878; Le Moniteur Acadien (Shediac), Sept. 19, 1878; and Daily Sun (St. John), Sept. 23, 1878.


8 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, Sept. 21, 1878.

9 Rogers Papers, Rogers to Anglin, Sept. 27, 1878.


12 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, Sept. 27, 1878.

13 The procedure today is that Speakers "are removed automatically by the dissolution of the House over which they have presided" (see W. F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian House of Commons (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 67).

14 Mackenzie Letterbooks, II, Buckingham to Anglin, Oct. 3, 1878. See also ibid., II, Buckingham to Anglin, Oct. 8, 1878. There was also some question as to the means of providing working expenses for the House of Commons' civil service (see P.A.C., House of Commons Sessional Records, Anglin to Hartney, Sept. 24 and Oct. 4, 1878).


16 The account which follows is based on the Toronto Globe's summary of the correspondence on the question of Anglin's appointments laid before the House of Commons and quoted in Freeman, March 1, 1879. See also Freeman, Dec. 14, 1878 and Feb. 22, 1879; J. E. Collins, Canada Under the Administration of Lord Lorne (Toronto: Rose Publishing Company, 1884), pp. 109-111; and P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, CCCLIV, Patrick to Macdonald, Jan. 22, 1879.

17 "Dominion Parliament", Feb. 18, 1879, in Freeman, Feb. 22, 1879; and Freeman, March 1, 1879.

18 Mackenzie replied that this had been done as it had been decided to do away with the vacant office.

1879. It appears that the Speaker's powers during an interregnum have never been clarified. In the last two decades, however, it has become usual to make at least the more important appointments of parliamentary employees on the basis of competitive examinations. Thus the problem of the patronage power of a 'lame-duck' Speaker is not likely to become an issue in the future. Professor W. F. Dawson of the University of Western Ontario has been kind enough to supply information on this constitutional question.
20 Freeman, March 1, 1879.
23 For Anglin's speeches on the tariff see "Dominion Parliament", Apr. 9, 1879, in Freeman, Apr. 12, 1879; and Hansard report of Anglin's speech quoted in Freeman, May 17, 1879; "Dominion Parliament", Apr. 9, 1880, in Freeman, Apr. 17, 1880; and Hansard report of Anglin's speech quoted in Freeman, June 12 and 19, 1880. For his speeches on the C.P.R. see Hansard report of Anglin's speech quoted in Freeman, July 24 and 31, 1880; "Dominion Parliament", Dec. 21, 1880, in Freeman, Dec. 25, 1880; and Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880-81, pp. 196-204 (Dec. 1).
25 Blake required nearly twice as much space as his nearest rival -- Sir John A. -- to index under his name (6 1/5 columns). From Macdonald (3 4/5) through Tupper (3 1/4), Langevin (2 3/4), Mackenzie (2 1/2), Cartwright (2 1/3), Tilley and Mills (2 1/4 each), one finally reached Anglin (2).
26 Freeman, Feb. 22, 1879.
28 Anglin took a neutral position, publicly at least, on the rift in Liberal ranks which resulted in the resignation of Mackenzie and the elevation of Blake to the leadership of the party (see Freeman, May 8 and 29, 1880).
29 Mackenzie Papers, Burpee to Mackenzie, Jan. 18, 1880.
31 Freeman, June 18 and 25, 1881.
32 Ibid., Aug. 6 and 27, 1881.
33 P.A.O., Edward Blake Papers, Mackenzie to Blake, Feb. 23, 1882. Anglin's suggestions for this attack are found in Ibid., Anglin to Blake, Jan. 9, 1882.
34 Quoted in Freeman, May 3, 1879.
35 On Anglin and the Deceased Wife's Sister Marriage question see Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Feb. 28, March 6, 15 and 19, Apr. 1, and May 4, 1880; and Feb. 21, 1882; Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880, pp. 303-305 (Feb. 27); and "Dominion Parliament", March 4, 1880, in Freeman, March 13, 1880.
36 Freeman, July 19, 1879.
37 Ibid., July 26, 1879.
38 For confirmation of these attitudes see Freeman, Sept. 8, 1877; Oct. 11 and 18, Nov. 15 and 22, and Dec. 13 and 27, 1879; and June 5, July 10, Aug. 14 and Nov. 6 and 13, 1880; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Nov. 26, 1880.
Freeman, Dec. 27, 1879.
41 Freeman, Feb. 24, Apr. 14 and July 28, 1874.
42 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1877; and Jan. 17, Nov. 16, and Dec. 14 and 21, 1878.
43 This information was contained in a letter to the author from P. M. Toner, Nov. 4, 1969.
44 Freeman, Sept. 25, 1878.
46 Ibid., Oct. 11 and 18, Nov. 22 and Dec. 13, 1879; and Oct. 2, 1880.
48 A detailed account of Anglin's attitude in these years may be traced in Freeman, Nov. 27, 1880; Jan. 1, 15 and 29, Feb. 5 and 12, March 5, Apr. 2, 23 and 30, June 4 and 11, July 2, Oct. 15 and 29, and Nov. 19, 1881; and Feb. 11 and 25, 1882.
49 See Ibid., Oct. 2 and 7, and Nov. 16, 1878; Jan. 17, 1880; and July 15 and Oct. 7, 1882.
50 Ibid., Jan. 10, 1880; and Jan. 6 and 13, and Feb. 17, 1883.
51 Ibid., Feb. 8, 1879. See also Ibid., May 24, 1879.
52 Ibid., June 14, 1879; and Nov. 18, 1882.
53 Ibid., Apr. 2, 1881.
54 Ibid., Jan. 17, Feb. 14 and Apr. 24, 1880. The St. John branch of the National Land League, which was never terribly prominent, was established late in 1880, and made contributions for Irish relief which were forwarded through the editor of the Boston Pilot (see Freeman, Aug. 7 and Dec. 25, 1880; and Jan. 8, 1881).
57 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880, pp. 126-127 (Feb. 20); and Freeman, Feb. 28, 1880.
58 Freeman, May 22, 1880. Anglin brought the matter to the floor of the House in the 1880-81 session (see "Dominion Parliament", Dec. 20, 1880, in Freeman, Dec. 25, 1880; and "Dominion Parliament", March 4, 1881, in Freeman, March 12, 1881). Most of the correspondence on the subject is contained in Canada, Sessional Papers, 1880-81, No. 207.
and W. S. MacNutt, Days of Lorne (Fredericton: Brunswick Press, 1955), pp. 162-166. In a letter to Lord Lorne, Macdonald claimed that Costigan forced his hand in the first place by telling Macdonald that if he (Costigan) were not allowed to introduce resolutions, then Anglin would. Moreover, the premier defended introducing the revised resolutions when going into Supply on the ground that if it had been possible to move an amendment, Anglin would have introduced one which would have brought in the original resolutions (see Macdonald to Lorne, May 2, 1882, quoted in J. Pope, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921), pp. 287-289. In stating all this Macdonald was simply playing politics and using supposed pressure from Anglin to make it appear that the Government had moderated the resolutions as much as was possible. Macdonald knew, probably better than anyone else, the political value of passing such resolutions but he didn't want to appear as a calculating politician to Lord Lorne and British officials and so made rather free use of an Anglin 'threat'. Professor MacNutt's account errs when it asserts that Anglin was the leading light in the Irish caucus (see MacNutt, op. cit., p. 164). Anglin did not even attend their meetings. Moreover, the present writer has found no evidence to confirm MacNutt's assertion that in 1881 Anglin "had been deterred from introducing resolutions of a violent nature in favour of Home Rule" (see ibid., p. 163). Anglin's critical comments in the 1881 session of the Commons related to the 1880 gift of Canada to Ireland (see Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1881, pp. 1218-1220 (March 4)).

60 Macdonald Papers, CCVI, Costigan to Macdonald, March 6, 1882.
61 Sun, May 30, 1882; Fredericton Evening Capital, June 10, 1882; and Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1882, p. 1066 (Apr. 20). Senator Power had been the only Reformer to attend the meetings throughout and on one occasion Costigan had requested Anglin's assistance by way of the Senator.
62 Freeman, Apr. 29, 1882. It seems likely that Anglin would have aided Blake in this task.
63 Pope, Memoirs of...Macdonald, pp. 228-229; Pope, Correspondence of...Macdonald, Macdonald to Lorne, May 2, 1882, pp. 287-289; and Freeman, Apr. 29, 1882.
64 Freeman, Apr. 29, 1882.
65 The Freeman, Apr. 1, 1882, had criticized the original resolutions of the committee for detailing only "selfish" reasons for Home Rule.
66 John Wallace, who represented York constituency in New Brunswick, scored a debating point by mentioning that it had not been long since Anglin had wanted protection for the minority of New Brunswick (see Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1882, p. 1066 (Apr. 20)).
67 Ibid., pp. 1060-1065 (Apr. 20); and Freeman, Apr. 29, 1882. See also ibid., Apr. 1, 1882.
68 O'Hegarty, op. cit., pp. 514-515; and Horrall, op. cit., p. 18. The Freeman, along with nearly all Irish newspapers, deplored the murders (see Freeman, May 27, 1882; and March 3 and 31, 1883).
70 P.A.C., Lord Kimberley Papers, Kimberley to Lorne, May 11, 1882. See also ibid., Lorne to Kimberley, Apr. 22, 1882; Kimberley to Lorne, May 25, 1882; and Kimberley to Queen Victoria, June 8, 1882. Kimberley's attitude was the sort which doomed any hopes of Imperial Federation.
71 Freeman, May 6, July 15 and Aug. 5, 1882.
73 Canada: House of Commons, Debates, 1880-81, pp. 483-485 (Jan. 14); and Freeman, Jan. 22, 1881. In 1877, of course, Anglin had been Speaker and therefore was unable to reply to Costigan.
74 P.A.C., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, Girouard et al. to Tilley, Apr. 18, 1882.
75 Sun, May 25, 1882.
76 Capital, May 25, 1882.
77 Rogers to Costigan, May 23, 1882, quoted in Sun, June 7, 1882.
78 G. Cormier "The Acadian Outlook (II)," French Canada Today, ed. C. F. MacRae (Sackville, N. B.: Mount Allison University Publication No. 6, 1961), pp. 28-29; M.-A. Savoie, "Varieties of Nationalism (I) The Acadians: A Dynamic Minority," French Canada Today, p. 81; and Poynter, op. cit., pp. 109-112. The disabilities under which Acadians laboured partially account for the rise of Acadian nationalism. Imagine, for example, being sentenced to death in a language which one did not understand without a translation being made. Yet this happened to two persons at Bathurst in September, 1874 (see Freeman, Sept. 8, 1874).
80 See, for example, Freeman, Oct. 14, 1878; June 19, 1880; and July 23, 1881.
81 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Aug. 28, 1879.
82 Quoted in Poynter, op. cit., p. 139. See also Freeman, Jan. 29, 1881.
83 Chatham Advance, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Apr. 22, 1882; and Advance, n.d., quoted in Freeman, May 6, 1882. See also Freeman, May 20, 1882.
85 Turgeon, op. cit., p. 49.
86 Tilley Papers (P.A.C.), DesBrisay to Tilley, Nov. 5, 1888.
87 Sun, May 27, 1882.
88 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, July 4, 1882.
89 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 28, 1882.
90 Ibid., Sivewright to Rogers, Jan. 24, 1874; and Sun, May 30, 1882.
91 Sun, May 23 and 26, 1882. See also Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, July 4, 1882.
92 Capital, May 11, 1882.
93 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 27 and July 4, 1882.
94 Turgeon, op. cit., pp. 52 and 54-56; Freeman, June 24, 1882; Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 24 and 28, 1882; and Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 27 and July 4, 1882. Both Anglin and Turgeon were convinced that the election could have been set aside on grounds of bribery and corruption. Turgeon pressed charges but these were not upheld (see Toronto Globe, Oct. 25, 1883).
95 Turgeon, op. cit., p. 51; Freeman, June 24, 1882; Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 12, 1882; and Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 27 and July 4, 1882. Anglin was convinced that Langevin had been largely responsible for working up the feeling that Acadians should have a French-speaking representative.
96 Freeman, June 3, 1882; Sun, June 16, 1882; and Advance, n.d., quoted in Freeman, June 17, 1882. 97 Rogers to Barry, May 26, 1882, quoted in Freeman, June 10, 1882. The Freeman also published a French translation. Anglin found that Vicar General Barry still did not wish to take any action on his behalf. Anglin wrote to the Bishop telling him this, obviously hoping that Rogers would do something more (see Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 1 and 28, 1882). 98 Macdonald Papers, CCLXXXVII, Tilley to Macdonald, June 25, 1882. He also claimed that the opposition Anglin was being given in Gloucester had brought out Bishop Sweeney and nearly all Irish Catholics against him (Tilley) in St. John. 99 Blake Papers, Jones to Blake, June 23, 1882. Cartwright, Mills, Huntington, Smith, Jones, Laird and Iaflamme, as well as Anglin, had been defeated (see O. D. Skelton, Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965), I, 74). Of these the Dominion Annual Register rated only Cartwright, Huntington, Mills and Anglin as men who were "not easily replaced" (see H. J. Morgan (ed.), The Dominion Annual Register and Review, 1882 (Toronto: Hunter, Rose and Co., 1883), p. 121). 100 Sun, June 21, 1882. 101 P.A.C., Sir John Thompson Papers, XXVIII, Anglin to Thompson, July 5, 1882. See also ibid., XXVII, Anglin to Thompson, July 31, 1882. 102 Macdonald Papers, CCLXXXV, Part 2, Anonymous to Macdonald, June 28, 1882. The letter had a St. John postmark and stated that "Though young the writer will soon prove a useful friend". 103 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, June 27, 1882; ibid., I. Burpee to Blake, July 18, 1882; and Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 24, 1882. 104 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 24, 1882. There was no possibility of opening a seat for him (see Blake Papers, I. Burpee to Blake, June 25 and July 18, 1882). Anglin doubted that he could take Gloucester even if Burns' election was voided (see Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, July 4, 1882). 105 Compare Canada: Census, 1870-71 with Canada: Census, 1880-81. 106 See, for example, Freeman, March 6, 1875; March 30, 1876; Jan. 27 and 30, 1877; Sept. 24, 1878; March 22, May 31, June 7, and Nov. 15, 1879; Jan. 3, 1880; and Apr. 30 and May 7, 1881. Other less biased writers accept the view that Confederation and the N.P. probably had a detrimental effect upon the development of the St. John Valley (see W. A. Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1964), pp. 34-35; Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 15 and 20; and J. R. Petrie, The Regional Economy of New Brunswick (A Study Prepared for the Committee on Reconstruction, 1944), p. 398. 107 The fire was a terrible conflagration which destroyed almost all of the business section of the city. See G. Stewart, The Story of the Great Fire in St. John, N. B. June 20th, 1877 (Toronto: Belford Brothers, Publishers, 1877); and R. H. Conwell, History of the Great Fire in St. John (Boston: B. B. Russell, 1877). See also Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, June 21, 1877. 108 Mackenzie Papers, Anglin to Mackenzie, July 23, 1877. 109 Rogers Papers, July 9, 1877. 110 There is no question that this resulted from the decision of the Committee of Privileges and Elections (see P.A.N.B., Arthur Hill Gillmor Papers, Anglin to Gillmour (sic), July 11, 1877).
111 Freeman, Oct. 20, 1877. The edition of Aug. 29 had explained why the publication of the Freeman had been delayed and what the new arrangements were.

112 Acadian Recorder (Halifax), n.d., quoted in Freeman, Nov. 9, 1877.

113 Freeman, Dec. 7, 1878.

114 Ibid.

115 Sun, Jan. 29, 1879; and Freeman, Feb. 8, 1879. Plans to have Anglin publish a strictly Catholic paper had just fallen through (see Rogers Papers, Sweeney to Rogers, Jan. 11, 1879).

116 See, for example, Freeman, June 21, 1879.

117 Ibid., Dec. 6, 1879; Dec. 4, 1880; Dec. 31, 1881; and Dec. 16, 1882.

118 American Newspaper Annual, 1881 (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer and Son, 1881), p. 315. One would be justified in accepting the accuracy of these figures only with some scepticism.

119 Blake Papers, I. Burpee to Blake, June 25 and July 18, 1882.

120 Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Feb. 26, 1883.

121 Without Anglin, the Freeman was even flatter than it had been and its ultimate demise came on Aug. 2, 1884. On Jan. 6, 1900, the New Freeman, a Catholic paper, was begun in St. John. Its name was in commemoration of Anglin's paper and it has been published to this day.

122 Freeman, Dec. 3, 1881; ibid., Nov. 25, 1882; Sun, Dec. 8, 1881; ibid., Dec. 11, 1882; and News, Dec. 9, 1881.

123 Freeman, May 19, 1883. The advertisement was still in the paper when the Freeman folded on Aug. 2, 1884.


125 Anglin left on May 11, 1883. Exactly one week later celebrations were held in honour of the 100th birthday of the founding of the city.

126 Freeman, May 12, 1883.

127 Evening Globe, May 11, 1883, quoted in Freeman, May 19, 1883. At first it had been intended to hold a non-partisan affair but then the organizers thought that it would be wiser to give Anglin the opportunity to speak freely. Still, the list was fairly extensive, including Bishop Sweeney, General Warner (the American Consul), Sheriff Harding, Mayor Jones, Wm. Elder, J. V. Ellis and G. McLeod. Isaac Burpee sent his regrets.

128 News, May 11, 1883. Other New Brunswick papers paid some tribute to Anglin as he departed (see Capital, May 10, 1883; and Sun, May 12, 1883). Interestingly enough the Moniteur Acadien merely stated that he was leaving the province.
CHAPTER 15

Last Chance: 1883-1887

I

Anglin's reasons for moving to Toronto were several. In the first place, to move from St. John to Toronto in 1883 was to move from stultifying stagnation to seething expansion. Anglin found it congenial to come to "a growing thriving place where although it has a share of business difficulties the people generally are full of confidence in the future and there is little of that despondency which one meets everywhere in St. John." Toronto afforded a promising field of opportunity for Anglin and his sons. Undoubtedly the comparison of his position in St. John in 1883 with the possibilities offered by Toronto, was a powerful inducement for Anglin to pick up stakes in the city where he had lived over half his life. But there were more concrete reasons for his removal. His importation into Ontario seems to have been part of a grand strategy, developed by Edward Blake, to woo the Ontario Irish Catholic vote to the federal Liberals. The Liberal party required an Irish Catholic spokesman who might make sufficient appeal to his Ontario compatriots to return to the fold of the Reform party - their 'natural' home from which they had been estranged for twenty-five years, or so the Liberals believed. Ontario Catholics supported the provincial Liberal administration of Oliver Mowat; surely they would support the federal party if they had an eminent Irish Catholic leader to speak for the Liberals. Anglin, the Liberals hoped, would be such a man. He was still a prominent Liberal and carried the prestige of being an ex-Speaker. On paper, the plan sounded good; in practice, obstacles to the success of the plan were insuperable. The Liberals did not come right out and openly avow their strategy, but the
Toronto Mail, although an anti-Reform paper, was right on target when it asserted that Anglin had been brought to Ontario to assume the leadership of Ontario Irish Catholics within the federal Liberal party. The means to be used to achieve this end were familiar and natural to Anglin. He was to be a newspaper writer.

In the first place, Anglin was to take over the Toronto Tribune, a Catholic weekly which had been founded in 1874. Like most of the religious press it had never been very prominent but it did have a history of dabbling in politics and by 1876 had come to support the Liberals. It was perfectly suited to Liberal strategy. Blake realized this and in February, 1883, he sent out a "Strictly Private and Confidential" circular to leading Liberals in Ontario and undoubtedly spoke personally to M.P.s in Ottawa about his plans for bringing Anglin to Toronto to take over the Tribune. In his circular Blake stated that at his request Anglin had agreed to take charge of the paper "provided moderate & satisfactory financial arrangements" could be arranged. Blake then requested financial support for the endeavour over a five year period. He made perfectly clear that the project was a political not a commercial investment:

I do not propose the subscription as a profitable pecuniary investment, tho' my hope is that under Mr. Anglin's management the paper will in time become a fair property but I propose it to you as a friend of the Party in view of the obvious and great political advantages which it presents.

This appeal to political philanthropy received an adequate response and Anglin packed his bags. However, the Tribune was a Catholic paper as well as a Liberal one and even before leaving St. John Anglin was reminded by the receipt of a letter from Bishop John Walsh of London, Ontario, that the push of the party would be balanced by the pull of the Church. While welcoming the news that Anglin was coming to Ontario the Bishop
did relate that "so called Catholic" newspapers whose "Catholicity was but the sugar-coating to the political nostrums which for base sordid motives they administered to their readers," had created havoc and dis-sension amongst Catholics because of their political partisanship. Not that the Bishop expected Anglin to produce such a paper—not at all; he just wished to offer some friendly advice:

Of course a Catholic journalist can honestly espouse the cause of a political party but he ought, methinks, hold himself perfectly free to differ from it and even to break with it when even in his opinion and especially in the judgement of the Bishops that party would favour measures inimical to Catholic interests or would refuse to do justice to the reasonable claims & the just rights of our Catholic people.

In the middle of May, 1883, Anglin took over the reins of the Tribune.

As useful as Anglin's labours on the Tribune might be to the party, the Liberals did not consider that his considerable energies would be utilized to capacity merely overseeing a puny weekly paper when there was a giant Liberal daily paper that needed help, the Toronto Globe. The Globe was one of the great success stories of nineteenth century Ontario Liberalism. Even the death of its founder, George Brown, in 1880, had not seriously disrupted its fortunes, and by 1882 the Globe could boast of an average weekly circulation of over 50,000. A paper of this magnitude was no one man show. A myriad of typesetters, office boys, reporters and editors were required and the pen of an experienced Liberal journalist could be put to good use. Thus Anglin became an editorial contributor to the Globe. And while Anglin was employing his talents for the Liberal cause, everyone expected that whenever the opportunity arose the Liberals would try to find a seat in the House of Commons for him.

II

If Anglin had reason to be pleased with the send-off St. John gave
him, he was overwhelmed with his reception in Toronto. Arriving in Ontario's metropolis on May 15, he checked into the Rossin Hotel which advertised itself as being the largest in Ontario with "thoroughly first-class appointments, large corridors, lofty ceilings, spacious, clean, and well ventilated rooms, detached and en suite, polite and attentive employees in every department, together with unexcelled cuisine ... "

In these palatial surroundings Anglin soon met such visitors as Oliver Mowat, the Liberal premier of Ontario, and two of his top lieutenants, Arthur S. Hardy and Christopher F. Fraser. Other gentlemen dropped in to see him, Anglin reported to Blake, including a most surprising call by Goldwin Smith whom the Freeman had termed "a glum, gruesome, gloomy man, who hates any one who ever slights or displeases him ..." But Anglin did not spend all his time in his hotel room. He went to the Tribune office to arrange things and had a talk with John Cameron, the editor-in-chief of the Globe. In fact he agreed to furnish an article to the Globe the day after he arrived, but had to beg off when things became too hectic and hoped that Cameron would not form a bad opinion of him as a worker on these grounds. Anglin also went out to St. John's Grove to see John Joseph Lynch, the Catholic Archbishop of Toronto, and was well received. "I promised to go out often to see him," Anglin related. If one could judge by his first two days in the city, Anglin was going to be busier than ever in Toronto.

The day after his arrival in Toronto, the Globe announced that Anglin was to receive a more formal welcome to the city. A complimentary banquet was to be given him. The dinner which took place on June 5th at the Rossin House, attracted some 250 persons, mainly Liberal supporters, who were willing to pay the two dollar ticket fee. Amongst this galaxy
of Ontario Liberal stars were Blake, Mowat and Fraser, all of whom, as previously announced, gave addresses to the gathering. They welcomed Anglin to Toronto and Ontario, eulogized him as was the custom on such occasions — and wished him well in his new environment. But the evening was Anglin's and despite the bias of the Globe there is little doubt that it was correct when it claimed that "none who heard him could help but feeling that in him the Liberal party of the West has received an addi-
18 tion of immense value." After expressing his surprise at seeing such a large crowd turn out to welcome a virtual stranger into their midst, he took the opportunity to introduce himself, in effect, to his audience and to tell them why he was a Liberal. He stated that although he had been a Liberal all his life, though he had from his boyhood admired the teachings of Daniel O'Connell, though he had regarded the Liberal party "as the party under whose influence the greatest measure of civil and religious liberty could be attained," he had not entered the House of Commons in 1867 very well disposed to the Liberal party of Ontario. After all he had been an anti-Confederate and the Ontario Grits had been prominent supporters of the Confederation movement. But as he had resolved to accept Confederation and to make the best of the situation he had found himself "almost insensibly drawn into the ranks of the Liberal party." Why? He had found that the Liberal party was the party of principle and "pure devotion to country." The Liberals had shown this strength of character whether in or out of office.

They believe that government should be for the good of the whole people; that justice, truth, and right ought to be the guiding motives in every public transaction, as in every act of private life; and that under no circumstances would the people be justified in swerving a hair's breadth from those principles.

He predicted a great future for the Liberal party so long as religious
and ethnic prejudices were banished forever.

It is absolutely necessary that we stand together upon the basis of equal rights, and perfect justice, and thorough fair-play between denomination and denomination, between race and race, between sect and sect, that we may be in reality as we are in name, one Canadian people.

Anglin did not doubt this would be accomplished but he did express a fear that the grand reception he had received indicated that more was expected of him than it was in his power to perform. He promised, however, to work hard and to do his best. He also proclaimed his intention of becoming a good Ontarian.

... I shall endeavour as one of the people of this Province to be as earnest and zealous in maintaining and defending its rights against aggression from any quarter, and in endeavouring to promote every interest as far as in my power lies, as I believe I was in the Province of New Brunswick.

Once again Anglin showed the same willingness and ability to adapt to changing conditions that he had demonstrated in becoming a New Brunswick patriot in the 1850's, in accepting Confederation, and in espousing the North Shore route for the Intercolonial when he became a candidate for Gloucester in 1867. The speech staked Anglin's claim to the position of Ontario Liberal leader of Irish Catholics. It also introduced a hint of scepticism about how much he would be able to accomplish.

While the Liberals proclaimed the dinner a great success, this opinion was not universal; nor was the reception of Anglin in Toronto one of total friendliness. The Mail dragged forward all the old stories which might damage his reputation - his supposed Fenian connections in 1866, his "libellous" Freeman article of 1873, the violation of the Independence 20 Act of Parliament Act and so on. As far as the Anglin banquet was concerned, D. L. Macpherson assured Sir John Macdonald that it was merely a gathering of "place-men and place-hunters" although Anglin's speech showed
"that he intends to create all the mischief and disturbance in his power."21

The most interesting, though highly inaccurate, critical commentary on
the banquet, however, was found in the Mail of June 6th, simply entitled
"The Anglin Dinner":

THE ANGLIN DINNER

(Respectfully dedicated to the delighted hosts who did themselves
the honour to entertain a man who is, perhaps, not quite a traitor,
but a very representative Grit.)

A Kestrel hustled out of his nest,
Was kindly invited out to the West,
By the kites and crows, and others like those,
Who wanted an ally against their foes.
And to celebrate their complete alliance,
And to bid the enemy stout defiance,
They got up a feast of assorted scraps
With a motley crowd of queer-looking chaps;
Birds of all feathers, and various smells,
Sixpenny statesmen and half-guinea swells,
On the edge of reluctant society danglin',
All to do honour to Timothy Anglin.

II.

A Bird called "Blake" with a streak of Vulture,
Quite free from ornithological culture,
Whom Timothy cursed from claws to pate
When he turned him out in seventy-eight,
Was present to toast and praise the Pope
(Instead of the family wish for a rope),
And to offer a bone that (without invention)
Would not be exactly a bone of contention
To the immigrant Kestrel out of a Job,
And ready 'most anyone's shilling to fob;
And thus they hoped to prevent a janglin'
Of notes at the dinner for Timothy Anglin.

III.

An Owl called "Mowat" was there that night
Much to the Kestrel's dear delight;
For the Owl had screeched at the Kestrel's tribe,
And the latter had bought him with a bribe;
They hated each other, but that was nought,
For one was sold and the other bought,
And each to each was the dearest brother
For one was just as base as the other.
So "Mowat" was just as civil as "Blake"
For the featherless Kestrel's pauper-sake;
And all of them joined in maulin' and manglin'
The feast in honour of Timothy Anglin.

IV.

They cursed the Pope, and they blessed the Pope;
(So nobody can object, we hope)
They quite forgot to honour the Queen,
For Timothy hates a loyal scene;
Blake gave some things from the "Rights of Man,"
Edgar some verses that wouldn't scan;
And Cook had recently stumbled across a
"Bully good thing of O'Donovan Rossa!";
They shouted when they began to stagger
For all good fellows who bear the dagger;
They drank in honour of dynamite;
They cursed the Union out of sight;
And under the table, too full for wranglin',
They finished the feast for Timothy Anglin.22

That Anglin should receive a hostile welcome from one segment of the
Toronto community was not surprising for he had become involved in polit-
ical affairs in the city with amazing alacrity. Anglin had always been
concerned with Government corruption and he seems to have struck dirt at
the beginning of June, 1883. In the Globe of June 1st an article appeared
under the title "A SECOND PACIFIC SCANDAL" in jumbo-size print. This
was the not very famous "Section B" or "Shields" scandal. What the article
did, as the Globe said the following day, was to impeach "the Government
of the Dominion before the people of Canada of having been guilty of traf-
ficking with public contractors to procure election funds, and of having
proposed and arranged to reward the contractors by improper concessions."

That Anglin had been the leading scandal monger was evidenced in the fact
that John Shields, the contractor implicated, initiated, on June 15, a
libel suit against Anglin, along with J. D. Edgar and the Globe Printing
Company. Shields had threatened this earlier, but had received not
an apology but a contemptuous reply from the Globe.

Let Mr. Shields, let any member of the firm of contractors, let the
Premier of Canada himself bring and prosecute an action of libel
against The Globe for our disclosures of yesterday, and we promise to unearth a foul and reeking nest of corruption that will justify an hundredfold every word we uttered.26

When the writ was actually served the Globe maintained its bold front. It wanted the case brought forward speedily and the opportunity to examine various politicians and contractors under oath. This was never done. In fact the case was never prosecuted at all. But it was not until January, 1884, that the case was dismissed "for want of prosecution with all costs to be paid by the plaintiff," and by that time the season for making political hay from the issue had long since passed. Stifling discussion on such topics was exactly what the Government wanted as can be seen in Macdonald's letter to Senator John O'Donohoe the day after the Globe had printed an article questioning the reasons for O'Donohoe not receiving a cabinet portfolio. "The article is obviously Anglin's," Macdonald wrote: "It was written for the purpose of drawing you into a discussion & you ought not to be 'drawn'." It was plain that Anglin had settled at Toronto very quickly and was making his presence felt.

III

A major difficulty in tracing the life and influence of Anglin after he moved to Toronto is presented by available sources. In the first place issues of the Tribune which have been preserved for the period between 1883 and its demise in 1887 are few and far between. Secondly, one can never be certain which one of the editorial contributors to the Globe wrote a particular article which appeared in that paper. The footprints of an individual in a large joint enterprise are faint and difficult to discover. Still, it is certain that Anglin's influence on the Globe was considerable. What makes this clear is the modified attitude the Globe adopted between 1883 and 1887 towards Roman Catholics on the
various questions that arose. Only between 1883 and 1887 did the *Globe* show a strong positive sympathy towards Catholics during the decade of the 1880's. Of course, Anglin was not solely responsible for this, for the *Globe's* employment of him showed that at the beginning of the period, the Board of Directors wanted his views. Nevertheless, the Board only supplied the opportunity for Anglin to wield an influence. That he did so was a measure of his capabilities and persuasive powers.

One way in which Anglin seems to have made his mark on the *Globe's* policy related to the matter of clerical influence. In 1876 Anglin had felt compelled to criticize the *Globe's* attitude on this matter. By 1884 the *Globe's* articles on clerical influence in politics, were so closely in accord with Anglin's known views that he may well have written them himself. Another occasion on which Anglin's voice was at least listened to in the offices of the *Globe* was in the aftermath of the North-West Rebellion.

The general outline of the division of views on the North-West Rebellion and its aftermath is well-known to students of Canadian history and need not be elaborated. The *Globe's* interpretation was politically vicious but culturally moderate. Not without reason it blamed Government neglect, incompetence and corruption for the Rebellion. Still, it argued that the Rebellion had not been justified despite the provocation, and agreed that the supremacy of the law had to be maintained in the Northwest. This position placed the *Globe* in a corner when it came to expressing a view on what should be done with the leader of the Rebellion, Louis Riel. As recently as July 10, 1883, it had referred to Riel as an unpunished "murderer". During the summer and autumn of 1885 the *Globe's* position on the fate of Riel was patently ambiguous, never more so than when it
protested that its views were clear and unchanged.

The position of The Globe on Riel's case is the same to-day as it was on the day the sentence was passed, and it has not varied a hair's-breadth in the meantime. Our position is that Riel's crimes deserve death, but that the man responsible for the corruption and mismanagement which made those crimes possible and almost inevitable, would himself commit a hideous crime if he executed his victim. Such nebulosity can be explained in the fact that The Globe wished to gain political advantage whether Riel was executed or not. It can also be accounted for in the fact that Ontario Liberals were in total disagreement on the issue of Riel's fate.

Among the forces pushing the Globe away from a desire for Riel's head and towards a sympathetic understanding of French Canadian attitudes was Timothy Anglin. This can be determined by an examination of the extant files of the Tribune for the summer and fall of 1885. Like the Globe, the Tribune found fault with the government of the Northwest and blamed Macdonald for the Rebellion. But the Tribune went further and argued that Riel's death sentence should not be carried out. This it did as early as August 12th and it did not change its view. Anglin's reasons for taking this stance were that the execution of Riel would stem from feelings of revenge rather than from a sense of justice. Moreover the Metis had had undoubted grievances and their uprising had been "neither wanton nor unprovoked, and the Half Breeds, knowing little of the world, thought they were fighting for their homes, their lands, and the rights of themselves and their children." For the provocation given some allowance ought to be made. Nor did public policy require the execution.

It is not necessary in order to overawe the Metis or the Indians to restore peace or to prevent another insurrection. It may not be well indeed to give him his liberty lest he again abuse it. Probably public opinion is that he should be punished severely. Were he confined in a penitentiary or an asylum for criminal lunatics he would soon be forgotten.
In fact public policy as well as justice demanded that he not be hanged. He would become a martyr, Anglin argued; regarded as a sacrifice "to satiate the rancor and race hatreds of the majority." An executed Riel would prove to be a greater problem than he ever had been alive, the Tribune warned.

Undoubtedly political considerations played some role in determining Anglin's convictions on this subject. The Mail was certain of that.

With them [Anglin and J. D. Edgar] it is purely and solely and unqualifiedly a question of plunder, for which they are ready to sell not merely the reputation of the party they temporarily control, but the highest and best interests of Canada. Yet Anglin did not wait to see how the political land lay before making a pronouncement on Riel's case. In fact he expected that the Government would not allow the execution to be carried out. His attitude was consistent throughout, even if he had some difficulty in getting the Globe to come fully into line immediately. Sympathy for the Metis and compassion for Riel came almost as naturally to Anglin as to French Canadians. After all, did not the Metis, French Canadians and Irish Catholics have something in common? Were they not all 'downtrodden' groups? Anglin's Irish background led him to believe "that men do not run all the risks and danger of rebellion for mere amusement; that the man who risks life and property in rebellion must think that he has grievances and that they are intolerable." This was a long step towards commuting Riel's sentence before the case was even examined. The sympathy Anglin displayed towards immiserated people in the case of the Metis was seen even more clearly in his lifelong concern with the Irish question.

If Anglin was more a pressure than the determiner of the Globe's policy on the North-West Rebellion and Riel, it seems safe to assume that he moulded the basic shape of the Globe's position on the Irish question.
Such an assertion can be verified by comparing the views expressed by the *Globe* during the period with those propounded by Anglin in his own name. Publicly, Anglin made his attitudes known through the *Tribune and* speeches made at various Irish nationalist meetings in Ontario. His prominence in such meetings showed that he was still a significant spokesman for Irish Canadians, a fact which Governor General Lorne had recognized in 1883. Before leaving Canada at the end of his term of office, Lord Lorne had requested of Anglin and John Costigan that they each submit a memorandum of their views on how the Irish situation could be improved. Both replies were extremely interesting though quite different in many ways, and Anglin's eighteen-page submission in what he admitted was "wretched writing", provides a comprehensive analysis of his opinions on the Irish question. He began by suggesting that the reason the various remedial Irish measures had failed to reconcile the Irish to the existing form of government, was that such legislation had been withheld too long and when conceded had been too scanty. In essence, Anglin claimed, the solution to the Irish problem was a matter of an entire shift in emphasis.

If the Imperial government really desire to put an end to all ill feeling to all desire of separation and to the agitation so often renewed and to establish perfect good will and harmony between the two peoples they must strive to ascertain rather how much of self government and how much of legislative independence can be allowed to Ireland, with safety to the Empire than how little will serve to keep Ireland quiet for a time.

He went on to suggest that Repeal of the Union, the old program of O'Connell and the Young Irelanders, would be an admirable solution; but knowing that Repeal had been relegated to the graveyard of deceased political ideas, he passed on to a discussion of Home Rule. He was in favour of Home Rule in the fullest sense. He foresaw some difficulties in the
division of financial resources and in regard to what the imperial parliament would do with purely English or Scottish affairs. However, Anglin was confident that these matters could be worked out. As for questions which were of greater concern to most British politicians, the rights of the Protestant minority of Ireland and property rights, Anglin was extremely confident. There were no grounds for Irish Protestants to be fearful, for Irish Catholics had always treated the minority justly. On the property question, Anglin asserted that "The Irish are in reality a Conservative people and hold the rights of property sacred." In accord with his dictum that Ireland ought to receive the largest possible degree of self government, Anglin believed that the Irish legislature should possess wide powers.

The Irish Legislature must have the right to deal fully with everything essentially Irish with civil rights and property in the fullest sense, with education municipal affairs with the relations of landlord and tenant and all other questions affecting the tenure transfer and transmission of property with the construction and management of Railroads and all public works and improvements within the Island or on its coast saving only the Imperial authority with respect to works of defence &c.

To Anglin there were two reasons for granting Home Rule. In the first place it was a matter of simple justice to Ireland. In the second place a contented Ireland would be a source of strength to the Empire rather than the source of weakness which her discontented state made her. "The great object," Anglin declared, "should be to make the Union of the two countries the union of two free peoples contented with their position, neither feeling in any sense subject to or dependant [sic] on the other."

What impact did Anglin's views have on the policy of the Globe? A year before Anglin came to Toronto, the Globe had referred to "an ignorant priesthood and professional agitators" in Ireland and had asserted that conceding Home Rule to Ireland would result in "civil war, anarchy, and
the oppression of minorities". In contrast, between 1883 and 1887 the Globe's opinions on Irish affairs were virtually identical to the known views of Anglin, not only in interpretation but occasionally even in actual wording. During these years it was a whole-hearted supporter of Home Rule and an earnest defender of the character of the Irish people against slurs cast by Goldwin Smith and others. In dozens of articles the Globe argued in favour of Home Rule on a variety of grounds: that it would be good for Canada as it would promote better relations with the United States by removing the reason for Irish American antagonism towards Great Britain and her Empire; that Home Rule would not be separation of Ireland from Britain but rather would promote harmony between the two islands; that even if one were convinced that Home Rule would harm Britain - which the Globe thought an erroneous belief - Ireland still had the right to rule herself. On matters of practical politics the Globe opposed the new technique of assassination; gave general but not uncritical support to Parnell; and approved of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886. Despite the defeat of that Bill in Britain and what the Globe felt was treachery in Ottawa on the Home Rule question, the Liberal organ remained optimistic about the future of Home Rule well towards the end of 1886. In 1887, with the newly elected Conservative Government in Great Britain reverting to a policy of coercion, the Globe's optimism turned to pessimism, although it continued to support the concept of Home Rule. In short, the Globe voiced the views of Timothy Warren Anglin on the Irish question.

IV

While writing for the Globe consumed a good deal of Anglin's time, his chief avocation was the Tribune. It was not an easy task, he confessed
to his old friend, Bishop Sweeny. Not only did he "get up" the paper almost single-handed, but he also had to try to build up its circulation. By March, 1884, he had succeeded in turning the paper into a twice-weekly. Five months later he was forcefully reminded of the vulnerability of small newspapers when the Freeman announced that it had published its last issue. Another five months and this was even more obvious when Blake felt constrained to send out a private circular informing friends of the Liberal party about the condition of the Tribune. The paper needed financial support despite the fact that of the second half of his annual guaranteed salary, Anglin had already applied part of it to running expenses and was willing to use the other part for the same purpose. No less than $2,500 was required to cover the deficit for the next eighteen months. Somehow enough backing must have been found, for the Tribune continued publication. Yet its problems were not solved, and early in 1886, Blake wrote to Mowat stating that the Liberal and Catholic paper needed further support to the tune of at least $600. In return for such support, Anglin had promised to use much of his salary to pay off existing debts and to keep the paper afloat at least until after the Ontario and federal elections had taken place provided that they occurred within sixteen months. All in all things were not very encouraging where the Tribune was concerned as Anglin's letter to Sweeny in the fall of 1886 indicated.

I think I told you before that the Tribune is not doing as well as it should because the business people even the ultra Liberals do not wish to advertise in a weekly paper. I have to suffer nearly all the loss as my agreement is with a Limited Liability Company whose members think they contributed enough before my time. Few others can be found to render any assistance. Could I receive all I was promised from that source I would soon be out of difficulties but much is due to me there that I suppose I never will get. Anglin's personal financial difficulties fortunately did not match the
Tribune's problems. Anglin had never been a rich man but he was well above the poverty line in 1883. Sometime during his St. John days, he had managed to buy some debentures which yielded about $800 in interest each year. Also, there was his house in St. John, and had he been able to sell it there is little doubt that pecuniary problems would not have been very pressing. Failure to find a buyer forced Anglin to borrow $1100 from Bishop Sweeny when he decided to move to Toronto. Partly for the sake of convenience and partly as security, Anglin left his debentures in the hands of the Bishop. On settling in Toronto, Anglin found his position to be far from rosy. His indebtedness turned out to be greater than he had anticipated - greater than the amount Sweeny had lent him - and Anglin requested that the interest coupons of his debentures be applied to these debts rather than to the one he owed the Bishop. During the next four years Anglin struggled to get out of debt. It was not an easy task, he told Sweeny, for "college fees[,] school fees[,] clothing and food for so large a family consume nearly all I can earn."

Moreover, the cost of living was not getting less, especially in Toronto, as Anglin found out when he rented a house - "It is neither large nor pretentious but the rent including taxes and allowance for furniture is $525." Nevertheless, by May, 1887, he had whittled his debt to Dr. Sweeny down to $127.87 and had not been forced to cash in his debentures.

Perhaps the brightest of any side of Anglin's life was his family circle. Everyone's health was good. The two oldest boys, Frank and Arthur were doing well in their educational endeavours at St. Mary's College, a Jesuit institution in Montreal. Frank received his degree in January of 1885 and immediately went into Blake's law office for a three-year period before trying his Bar examinations. With five younger children running
around the house, the presence of Frank and Arthur in Montreal did not exactly leave the Anglin home empty.

V

While Anglin was kept busy with his journalism, his family, attendance at public functions and speeches at non-political gatherings, it was expected that he would become an active politician as well as a political journalist. For a time after moving to Toronto, Anglin was at the forefront of affairs. Liberal leaders in Ottawa missed him at first and there were rumours that a seat in the Commons would be found for him. From late 1883 to September, 1884, he went about Ontario speaking at various Liberal meetings, but his prominence waned rapidly. He was given good receptions and listened to, but he failed to implant himself into the hearts and minds of Ontario Liberals. He may be a Liberal, they seemed to be saying, but he is a stranger and a Catholic at that. He received no seat in the Commons. His initial effort to become a practicing politician in Ontario had met with no success.

How successful Anglin was in bringing Irish Catholics into the Liberal fold is difficult to assess. Certainly the provincial Conservatives were having their problems with the Irish Catholics of Ontario and despite strenuous efforts in the 1883 Ontario election they had failed to disturb Mowat’s appeal to Catholics. On the federal level Macdonald was having his difficulties. In one of his periodic letters of resignation from the cabinet, John Costigan complained that opposition within the cabinet itself prevented the equal treatment of Irish Catholics in all phases of life—i.e. in matters of patronage. In fact, by September, 1886, D’Alton McCarthy, no fool but undoubtedly myopic where Catholics were concerned, considered that the Conservatives would gain no more than
half of the Irish Catholic vote they had received in 1882. The Home
Rule question had something to do with the shift, McCarthy asserted, but
Blake's speeches and the Riel affair entered in. For whatever role
the Globe and the Tribune played in turning Irish Catholics towards the
federal Liberals, Anglin must receive much of the praise or blame. But
could this trend towards the Liberals be translated into votes in a fed-
eral election? Apparently not. In the 1887 election Irish Catholics
tended to vote for Macdonald, as they had for years. Anglin had not
accomplished what the Liberals had hoped he could. But Anglin had warned
them not to expect miracles.

For many years elections had been mighty important events for Anglin;
they provided a test of his prominence and the effectiveness of his work
since the last appeal to the polls. The 1887 election was no different.
Throughout 1886 the Liberals, along with the Conservatives, made prepara-
tions for the federal election which they knew must be called soon. Can-
didates had to be selected, voters lists scrutinized, party workers organ-
ized and a myriad of other tasks had to be performed. In Simcoe North,
a constituency which stretched from Barrie to Collingwood, the Liberal
organization was in sad shape. The area which composed the constituency
in 1887 was a Conservative stronghold made even more Tory by the pre-
eminence of its resident representative, D'Alton McCarthy. As there was
little likelihood that a Liberal candidate could win the constituency,
the party organization was virtually moribund. Perhaps for the same
reason, North Simcoe Liberals were willing to have an outsider carry the
party banner — even a Catholic outsider. In April, 1886, a convention
of North Simcoe Liberals unanimously nominated Timothy Warren Anglin as
Reform candidate at the next federal election.
Anglin was not particularly pleased about the offer. He was sceptical about the chances of success and he refrained from accepting the nomination immediately. He wanted Reform leaders to take the responsibility of making the decision. Not until parliament had been dissolved on January 15th, 1887, and Blake had urged him to accept the nomination as there was no alternative constituency available, did Anglin definitely accept North Simcoe's offer. This long delay made a bad situation even worse. Why should Reformers of North Simcoe put themselves out very much in a hopeless situation for a man who had shown such reticence to be their standard-bearer?

The North Simcoe campaign really opened on January 24th when Anglin and Blake held a meeting in the town hall in Barrie. As was natural, Anglin echoed the views of the Globe (or perhaps vice versa). He began his speech by condemning the course of the Toronto Mail in raising an anti-Catholic cry. Then he dealt with certain questions relating to alleged Catholic influence. But he passed rapidly from these topics to a field in which he loved to roam. This was, of course, the financial mismanagement of the country. He fiercely attacked the "most reckless extravagance that ever disgraced a government" and claimed that the Tories had "not only been wasteful but corrupt beyond all parliamentary precedent." Following the line of argument found in the Globe he contrasted the small rise in expenditures under Mackenzie to the rapid increase under the Conservatives. Now expenditures exceeded revenues. "They say this was caused by the war," Anglin was reported as saying; "But who caused the war - " At this point a heckler yelled: "Riel". Anglin swiftly squelched this claim. "Riel! Why Riel would have had no more influence in this country than the man who has just used his name ... if
Sir John and Sir David Macpherson had not given him the power by their missgovernment of the North-west." This was the typical Globe position based on an effective but rather unfair set of equations:

Had there been no neglect, there would have been no rebellion;
If no rebellion, no arrest;
If no arrest, no trial;
If no trial, no condemnation;
If no condemnation, no execution.
They, therefore, who are responsible for the first are responsible for every link in that fatal chain. 91

After dealing at length with government finances and drawing the conclusion that jobbery and extravagance accounted for a large part of the rise of expenditures, Anglin concluded his speech. Anglin's debut in Simcoe North was no startling success. It was a competent but rather dry speech. He had given the people nothing to get excited about except perhaps a feeling of revulsion for Tory financial management. But that was an old story. "In our view," the Tory Northern Advance of Barrie stated, "the meeting was a failure so far as aiding Mr. Anglin in his way to the House of Commons." Even a friendly newspaper could not have been more accurate.

Despite this setback and the hopelessness of the cause, Anglin continued his campaign throughout the constituency during the following month. There was no doubting his vigour and effort as he addressed no fewer than thirty-two meetings during the campaign. But McCarthy's workers followed him around and gave him no peace at meetings. In the meantime McCarthy was not straining himself. He was letting his machine do the bulk of the work and relying on his record and personal popularity. Only once did he step on the stage in North Simcoe during the campaign but that occasion was a tremendous success. His speech dealt solely with the North-West Rebellion and its aftermath and was a brilliant rebuttal
to the Globe. With so many strikes against him, Anglin had no chance of winning. The final tally was McCarthy - 2,362, Anglin - 2,033. Anglin could gain little solace from the fact that he had done no worse than the 1882 Reform candidate. Nor was he pleased with the Liberal party.

I expected that the party would find me a constituency in which there was a reasonable prospect of success. They appeared to feel very little interest in the matter and certainly took no trouble about it. Mr. Blake was very indifferent or very powerless. He allowed himself very easily I think to be persuaded by those whom he usually consults that the chance in North Simcoe were [sic] fair ... For Anglin the election ended on a pathetic note. He had carried on an exhausting and vigorous campaign. The burden of work had fallen on his shoulders rather than on those of local Reformers. Did they appreciate his effort? Apparently not. The Northern Advance, which might be expected to have criticized local Grits whenever possible, reported that these men had allowed Anglin to go to the railway station after his defeat, unattended, carrying his own grip sack. Whether this be the whole truth or not, there is no doubt that the North Simcoe election had been a severely disillusioning experience for Anglin. It was a feeling to which he would become accustomed.
FOOTNOTES

1 Compare Canada: Census of 1880-81 with Canada: Census of 1890-91 for
an indication of the different rates of expansion between St. John and
Toronto. On Toronto's growth see also C. S. Clark, Of Toronto The Good.
A Social Study. The Queen City of Canada as it is (Montreal: The Toronto
1-2; D. C. Masters, The Rise of Toronto 1850-1890 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1947), pp. 165-207; and the relevant sections in P. G.
Goheen, Victorian Toronto, 1850 to 1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago

2 Roman Catholic Diocese of St. John Archives, Bishop John Sweeny Papers,
Anglin to Sweeny, Nov. 23, 1883; and Apr. 24 and Nov. 4, 1884.

3 George Brown to John O'Donohue et al., March 9, 1871, clipping from
Globe in P.A.G., Alexander Mackenzie Papers, pp. 178-179. There was
considerable validity to the Reformer's interpretation. Prior to about
1858 Irish Catholics had leaned towards the Liberals (see F. A. Walker,
"The Political Opinion of Upper Canadian Catholics," Canadian Catholic
Historical Association Report. 1955, pp. 75-86).

4 Toronto Daily Mail, June 1, 1886.

5 Freeman (St. John), Sept. 3, 1874.

6 Ibid., Sept. 28 and Dec. 5, 1876.

7 P.A.O., Edward Blake Papers, draft of a circular, Feb. 7, 1883. See
also P.A.O., Sir James David Edgar Papers, Blake to Edgar, Feb. 17, 1883.

8 Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Toronto Archives, Archbishop John Walsh
Papers, Walsh to Anglin, March 30, 1883.

9 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, May 16, 1883.

10 Information about the editorial arrangement of the Globe during the
1880's is sparse and very general. From 1882 to 1890 John Cameron was
editor-in-chief while the chief editorial writer for much of the period
was apparently E. W. Thomson (see M. O. Hammond and H. Charlesworth,
"History of the Globe" (unpublished manuscript in the Globe and Mail
Library), pp. 128 and 153). Tidbits of information on this subject are
found elsewhere in this manuscript and in E. W. Thomson in The Transcript
(Boston, n.d.), in the Frank Yeigh cuttings in the possession of Professor
J. M. S. Careless of the University of Toronto.

11 Globe (Toronto), May 8 and 16, 1883.

12 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, May 16, 1883.

13 Freeman, June 7, 1879.

14 Blake Papers, Anglin to Blake, May 16, 1883.

15 Globe, May 28, June 4 and 6, 1883; and H. J. Morgan (ed.), The Dominion
Annual Register and Review, 1883 (Toronto: Hunter, Rose and Co., 1884),
pp. 169. Goldwin Smith declined to attend since he felt it was a party
gathering (see Globe, June 6 and 8, 1883). The dinner was an opportunity
for Ontario Liberals to have an affair and might have been held even if
Anglin's arrival had not provided an occasion.

16 Globe, June 4, 1883.

17 A report of their speeches which dealt with current political questions
can be found in the Globe, June 8, 1883. In speaking of Anglin, Blake
referred to his "judicious, calm, temperate spirit" and "sound judgment".

18 Globe, June 6, 1883.

19 A report of Anglin's speech is found in the Globe, June 6, 1883.
20 *Mail*, June 2, 5, 6 and 7, 1883. See also *Globe*, June 7, 1883; and
*Freeman*, June 16, 1883.
21 P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, CCIL, D. L. Macpherson
to Macdonald, June 6, 1883.
22 The factual inaccuracies in the poem are legion. For example a toast
to the Queen was given at the beginning of the festivities; Cook did
not even attend the banquet; and Irish affairs, to which several lines
in the last stanza refer, were not mentioned (see *Globe*, June 6 and 8,
1883).
23 On the initial phase of the 'exposure' of this scandal see especially
*Globe*, June 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, 1883; *Mail*, June 2, 1883; and *Freeman,
June 9, 1883.
24 *Globe*, June 16 and Nov. 28, 1883. Anglin's authorship of the article
is assumed in Shields' letter to the *Mail* which appeared in the issue
of June 2, 1883.
25 *Globe*, June 2 and 7, 1883.
29 P.A.C., John O'Donohoe Papers, Macdonald to O'Donohoe, June 30, 1883.
30 K. W. K. McNaught, *"The Globe and Canadian Liberalism 1880-1890"
122-164.
31 McNaught suggests that the change of policy after 1887 was a result
of the Liberal defeat in the 1887 election and the resignation of Blake
32 *Freeman*, Jan. 18 and 27, and Sept. 25, 1876; and Nov. 15, 1877.
33 *Globe*, Apr. 10, 1884; and Oct. 20, 1885.
34 See, for example, McNaught, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-164; O. D. Skelton,
*Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart
Ltd., 1963), I, 77-98; G. F. G. Stanley, *The Birth of Western Canada:
A History of the Riel Rebellions* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1963), pp. 380-407; D. A. Kubesh, *'Ontario Press Reaction to the North-
west Rebellion of 1885,'* *Documentary Problems in Canadian History*, Vol.
II: *Post-Confederation*, ed. J. M. Bumsted (Georgetown, Ontario: Irwin-
Dorsey Limited, 1969), pp. 95-128; M. Wade, *The French Canadians, 1760-
1967* (rev. ed., Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968), I, 416-421; and
P. B. Waite, *Canada 1874-1896: Arduous Destiny* (Toronto: McClelland and
dealing with the Rebellion contains considerable new and revealing in-
formation.
35 *Globe*, Sept. 7, 25 and 27, and Nov. 16, 1883; Feb. 26, 1884; and Feb.
26, March 24, 25 and 27, Apr. 1, Aug. 3, and Nov. 21, 1885.
14, 1885; and March 10, 1886.
38 A motion brought before the House of Commons expressing regret that
Riel had been executed split English-speaking Liberals down the middle.
Twenty-six supported the motion; twenty-three opposed it (see Waite,
*op. cit.*, p. 173).
39 Despite a number of missing issues there is an adequate file of the
*Tribune* for the period between July 1, 1885 and Jan. 6, 1886, in P.A.O.
40 *Tribune*, July 11 and 29, 1885.
42 Ibid., Oct. 28, 1885.
43 Ibid. Anglin was quite convinced that Riel was insane.
44 Ibid., Aug. 12, 1885. The Tribune, Nov. 21, 1885, asserted that Riel would not have been hung had Scott not been executed in 1870.
47 Tribune, Aug. 12, 1885.
48 Ibid. Defence lawyers prefer jurymen of historically oppressed ethnic or religious groups rather than Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Other Irish Catholic papers, such as the Montreal Post, the Canadian Freeman, the Irish Canadian and the Catholic Record, joined the Tribune in denouncing Riel's execution (see Tribune, Nov. 25, 1885).
50 P.A.C., Lord Lorne Papers, Lorne to Anglin, June 8, 1883; and Lorne to Costigan, June 8, 1883.
51 Lorne Papers, Anglin to Lorne, June 12, 1883; and Costigan to Lorne, June 18, 1883. Lord Lorne transmitted the submissions to William Ewart Gladstone, the British Prime Minister (see ibid., Lorne to Gladstone, July 20, 1883). The most interesting difference in the views of Anglin and Costigan stemmed from the different attitude held by the two political parties to which they belonged towards the Canadian constitution. Costigan, a member of the centralist Conservative party, agreed with Home Rule but also the necessity of an imperial veto over Irish legislation. Anglin, as a Provincial Rights Liberal, saw little need for such veto power and if it existed at all it should approximate the American President's weak veto power. Lord Lorne did not agree with either of the submissions and seemed to think that Canadian and American experience showed the necessity of keeping the central power strong and not giving any subordinate legislature sufficient power to threaten the central authority (see Marquis of Lorne, "Canadian Home Rule," Contemporary Review (Nov. 1883), pp. 637-643; Globe, Nov. 13 and 14, 1883; and ibid., Jan. 7, 1886).
52 At least this is what the Mail, Nov. 5, 1884, quotes the Globe as having said a year and a half previously.
53 The Globe's reply to Smith is found in the issue of June 29, 1883 (see also Tribune, n.d., quoted in Freeman, Oct. 27, 1883). One would be remiss if one failed to note that Blake's influence within Liberal ranks on Irish matters was undoubtedly very considerable.
55 Ibid., Sept. 14 and Oct. 10, 1883; Nov. 23, 1885; and March 11 and Oct. 1, 1886.
56 Ibid., Sept. 20, 1883; March 28, 1884; and Jan. 8 and March 9, 1886.
57 Ibid., March 3 and 31, and Aug. 2, 1883; and July 4, 1885.
58 Ibid., July 10, 1883; and Aug. 28, Sept. 3 and Dec. 2 and 15, 1885.
59 Ibid., Apr. 10 and 12 and June 9, 1886.
60 Ibid., May 6, 7 and 8, and Sept. 21, 1886.
61 Ibid., June 9, July 10 and Sept. 10, 1886.
62 Ibid., March 9 and 30, and Apr. 4, 5, 8, 15, 18, 22, 25 and 27, 1887.
63 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 22, 1883.
64 Globe, March 14, 1884.
65 Freeman, Aug. 2, 1884.
66 Blake Papers, draft of a circular, Jan. 6, 1885.
67 Ibid., Blake to Mowat, Jan. 23, 1886.
68 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 15, 1886. When the Tribune again became a weekly is not known. It had still been a twice-weekly at the beginning of 1886.
69 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, May 10, 1887.
70 As late as November, 1884, Anglin had not been able to sell or lease his house in St. John (see ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 4, 1884).
71 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 22, 1883.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. Fortunately for Anglin, Bishop Sweeney always took a pretty lenient and friendly attitude on these matters.
74 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Apr. 16, 1885.
75 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 22, 1883.
76 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, May 10, 1887. This amount was an interest rate of six per cent on the loans Sweeney had made to Anglin. The story of Anglin's finances in these years can be traced in more detail in ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 22, 1883; Apr. 24, May 3 and Nov. 4, 1884; Apr. 16, 1885; May 28, June 7 and Nov. 15, 1886; and May 10, 1887.
77 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeney, Nov. 4, 1884; and Apr. 16, 1885. Frank received his degree from the University of Ottawa.
78 Anglin attended many Catholic functions, such as graduation exercises of De La Salle and dedication ceremonies (see Globe, June 28, 1883; and May 31, June 24, 25 and 26, and Dec. 12, 1884; and Tribune, July 1 and 4, and Sept. 16, 1885). At the 1884 banquet of the "Provincial University at Toronto", Anglin replied to the toast to the Press. The man who offered the toast was John King who had a nine-year-old son at home, William Lyon Mackenzie King (see Globe, Feb. 16, 1884).
80 Globe, Dec. 12 and 13, 1883; May 10, June 12, 13, 18, 21, 26 and 30, July 5, 30 and 31, and Sept. 3, 20 and 22, 1884.
81 P.A.O., John O'Donohoe Papers, Macdonald to O'Donohoe, July 4 and Aug. 9, 1882. During the campaign, William Meredith, the provincial Conservative leader, attempted to appeal to Irish Catholics in the widely circulated pamphlet entitled "Facts for the Irish Electors" (see W. S. Wallace, "Political History 1867-1912," Canada and Its Provinces, ed. A. Shortt and A. G. Doughty (Toronto: Glasgow, Brook and Co., 1914), XVII, 165-166).
82 Macdonald Papers, CCVI, Costigan to Macdonald, Feb. 18, 1884. The resignation was withdrawn twenty-four hours later (see ibid., CCVI, Costigan to Macdonald, Feb. 25, 1884). Macdonald was sensitive (in both meanings of the word) about Irish Catholic patronage and his attitude was one of begrudging concession (see Lorne Papers, Macdonald to Lorne, May 3 and July 28, 1882; and O'Donohoe Papers, Macdonald to O'Donohoe, Sept. 12, 1884).
83 Macdonald Papers, LXVI, McCarthy to Macdonald, Sept. 11, 1886.
McCarthy thought something should be done to appeal to Protestant voters to make good the loss.


85 A general account of the 1887 election is found in J. I. Cooper, "The Canadian General Election of 1887" (unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1933). Anglin's role in the election in relation to the general conditions of the time has been given detailed study in W. M. Baker, "The Federal Election of 1887 in Simcoe North: D'Alton McCarthy versus Timothy Warren Anglin" (unpublished History 554 paper, University of Western Ontario, 1968).

86 *Globe*, Apr. 17, 1886.

87 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, May 28, June 7 and Nov. 15, 1886.

88 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeny, Apr. 11, 1887. In December, 1886, Anglin had made a speech in Halifax and at the time it was rumoured that he might become a candidate in that constituency (see *Daily Evening Globe* (St. John), Dec. 15, 1886).

89 *Globe* (Toronto), Jan. 26, 1887; and *Northern Advance* (Barrie), Jan. 27, 1887. Quotations which follow are from the Globe's report.

90 The *Mail's* attitude towards French Canadians and Catholics in general in the aftermath of the North-West Rebellion and the paper's relationship to the Conservatives is discussed in most of the works cited in footnote 75. See also Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-11, 16-19 and 25-26.

91 *Globe*, Jan. 27, 1887.

92 *Advance*, Jan. 27, 1887.

93 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Apr. 11, 1887.

94 *Advance*, Feb. 3 and 17, 1887.

95 The speech was reprinted in full in the *Daily Standard* (Toronto), Feb. 7 and 8, 1887. The *Standard* was the Conservatives' campaign journal.

96 See appendix in Baker, *op. cit*.

97 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Apr. 11, 1887.

98 *Advance*, March 3, 1887.
CHAPTER 16

Worldly Travail and the Ultimate Escape: 1887–1896

I

The year 1887 was a major turning point in Timothy Anglin's life. The Liberal defeat in the election meant several things for Anglin. It meant that federal Liberals would have no offices to fill nor patronage to disburse. Neither a cabinet seat nor a Senate appointment awaited Anglin for his years of faithful service. More important, his personal loss in Simcoe North and the inability of the Liberals to make gains in Ontario confirmed what was already pretty clear. It was evident that Anglin could not win the Ontario Irish Catholics to the federal Liberals. It was much too much to expect that his presence in Ontario could achieve a miracle when conditions were not ripe for such an endeavour. Yet a political party which has just suffered defeat is not the most gracious and understanding organization known to mankind; it wants change even if this involves lopping off a few heads. 1887 saw the abandonment of the whole effort initiated by Blake in 1883 to win the Ontario Catholics through Anglin. For Anglin the guillotine completed its work within the year.

Blake was not unmindful of Anglin's work for the Liberal party. He undoubtedly felt somewhat responsible for Anglin's position in Ontario since he had been the one who had persuaded him to move from St. John. In any case Blake tried to obtain a Commons seat for Anglin shortly after the election results were known. Blake had been more successful in the election than most Liberals. The leader of the party had run both in West Durham and West Bruce and had won both. Of course, he could not sit for both and therefore he wished to open the safer of the two, West Bruce, to Anglin, the party having failed to elect any representative.
Irish Catholics in Ontario. "Under these circumstances," Blake wrote

to a Lucknow Liberal,

it has been suggested to me that it would be my duty, in the interest
of the party, to endeavour to secure a seat for a representative Irish
Catholic in the person of Mr. Anglin, who gallantly fought North Simcoe
under very disadvantageous circumstances. He is our most prominent
Irish Catholic and has, as you know, a deservedly high Dominion rep-
utation. His personal character, his staunch fidelity to Liberal
principles, his knowledge of public affairs and his ability, all com-
bine to make him a man whom any constituency ought to be proud to
choose.1

But even the leader's endorsement did not guarantee nomination. Indeed
the safest constituencies were often the most chary of accepting outsiders.

Anglin did not get the nomination. He recognized his chances of ever
representing an Ontario constituency seemed most unlikely.

If Ontario Liberals were unwilling to give support to Anglin as a poli-
tician it is not surprising that they were unwilling to give further fi-
nancial support to his newspaper, the Tribune. The tale of its demise
entered Anglin's letter of woe to his old friend, Bishop Sweeny.

You are aware I suppose that the Tribune has gone down. It never
paid its way. As usual many of my subscribers were remiss and many
did not pay at all. The mode of doing business here is much more ex-
pensive than in St. John as much canvassing is necessary. The business
people of Toronto could not be induced to advertise in the Tribune
sufficiently and although many of the businessmen are Reformers we
got no business from anyone through political sympathy. I made ex-
traordinary exertions to keep it alive until after the elections in-
curring considerable personal responsibility. Its failure reduces our
income considerably. I hope matters will mend somehow but the outlook
just now is rather gloomy.2

Anglin's prospects went from bad to worse. Blake's illness and resig-
nation removed from the leadership of the Liberal party the man who had
concerned himself with Anglin's fate, while Richard Cartwright's assump-
tion of supremacy amongst Ontario Liberals under Laurier's leadership
brought into the centre of party circles a man who was itching to take
bold steps in terms of policy and personnel. Before long Cartwright's
influence was felt at the *Globe* and that paper began to support the policy of Commercial Union or Unrestricted Reciprocity with the United States. With such a change in policy Anglin was probably in full agreement.

But Cartwright had other ideas which did not suit Anglin as well. The Kingston war-horse was not satisfied with the *Globe's* editorial page. As early as the summer of 1886 he had complained that the paper lacked "a vigorous slashing writer of the Farrer or Shepherd [sic] type," and indicated that Edward Farrer would be willing to come over from the *Mail*. Obviously under the new Ontario Liberal captain some of the crew of the good ship *Globe* were expendable. Anglin's agreement with the *Globe* expired late in 1887 and was not renewed. "The Liberal party have not treated me very well," Anglin lamented. For the first time in thirty-seven years, since the winter of 1850-51, Anglin found himself without a newspaper in which he could express himself. The pen which for nearly four decades had written so much on so many topics no longer had a home.

By the end of 1887, therefore, the hopes Anglin had cherished when he came to Toronto in 1883 had been shattered. He had not made good. He was further away from the House of Commons than he had ever been and the Liberals did not even want to make use of his years of writing experience. 1887 completed the five-year transformation of Anglin from a minor political deity into a major political has-been. Had the Liberals been in office in Ottawa Anglin would have become a Senator at the very least. But they were not and he did not. Until his death in 1896 he was forced to climb on a treadmill of job-hunting, short-term work and more job-seeking. Never again was he able to clamber back onto the political merry-go-round from which he had been jostled.

But a man's life, like history in a broader context, displays continuity
amidst change. Anglin's was no exception. He had always been interested in politics; this did not change. He had always been concerned with the role of the Catholic Church and religion in society; he did not lose this concern. He had always been solicitous about Irish affairs; this continued.

II

Leaving the Globe did not end Anglin's concern for or efforts on behalf of the Irish cause. As is well-known, things were far from smooth for the Home Rule forces. The messy Parnell-O'Shea divorce suit in 1890 caused a split in the Irish parliamentary party and the difficulty was compounded when Gladstone published a letter which "sufficiently, though obscurely, indicated that unless the Irish party changed its leader, he would himself cease to lead the liberals," and some Irish representatives demanded Parnell's retirement on the basis of Gladstone's letter. In all of these proceedings of the Irish parliamentary party Anglin found much to make him feel "grieved and ashamed". He agreed with the Bishops that Parnell could no longer be given support and was convinced that Parnell's failure to retire was "selfish and shameless". Once again the difficulty was that the Irish cause was the real victim.

Parnell must go but there is danger that personal animosities will spring out of this struggle and that not only the party but the Irish people will be split into factions. All the brawlers and hare brained enthusiasts whom it has always been so difficult to keep within bounds seem disposed to do all they can to strengthen Parnell's hands treating this as merely a question as to the attitude which the Irish party should hold towards the English Liberals.11

Yes Anglin retained his concern for Irish affairs. In 1892 he wrote an article for a short-lived periodical, The Lake Magazine, on the Home Rule question, interpreting Irish history from a Home Ruler's point of view as well as refuting the arguments which had been put forward in opposition
to Home Rule. That he was still a significant member of the Irish
National League in Canada was indicated by his selection in the summer
of 1892 to a committee of that organization to welcome Edward Blake back
from Ireland. As late as April, 1893, he gave a speech in favour of
Home Rule in his old stamping ground of St. John. No, Anglin did not
forget the land of his birth even as he approached his death.

If Anglin remained involved with the Irish question, he was even more
cconcerned with Catholic questions. Throughout his life he had always
been a devout Catholic and a prominent member of the flock. He had often
attended Catholic functions as a leading layman and he continued to do
so after his North Simcoe defeat. At banquets, at corner-stone laying
ceremonies, and at Catholic school graduation exercises, Anglin was to
be found. He was also honoured by being called upon to write the chapter
on Bishop Lynch in a jubilee volume celebrating the fiftieth anniversary
of the archdiocese of Toronto.

The particular Catholic issue with which Anglin had long been intimately
connected was the school question. In April, 1888, he found himself
called into service once again. He was asked by Archbishop Lynch to stand
for election to the Toronto Separate School Board. The background to this
election and the issues involved are complex and as they have been thor-
oughly discussed elsewhere they need not be examined at length. Briefly,
the problem was that there was a movement to have voting for separate
school trustees by secret ballot rather than the system of open voting
which was in use. Supporting the ballot were a group of Catholics who
wished to increase the authority of the laity in running the schools
seconded by non-Catholics who wished to reduce the power of the Catholic
hierarchy in any sphere. Opposed to it were the hierarchy and, it would
appear, a majority of Catholics, on the ground that the ballot was the thin edge of the wedge which would eventually deprive separate schools of their religious nature. The issue became very heated in Toronto when a position on the Separate School Board became vacant as a result of the death of the trustee for St. Andrew's Ward. Opposed to the ballot candidate stood the Archbishop's candidate Timothy Anglin. Not only had Lynch requested that Anglin stand for election but he supported his nominee with all the force at his command. In a letter to the priests in St. Andrew's Ward which was published in the Mail the Archbishop proclaimed that to vote for a "non-practical Catholic" - i.e. Anglin's opponent - was a sin and "a crime before God and man". Anglin won the election 170 to 75. He remained a trustee until 1893.

It may be thought that Anglin's candidacy for the anti-ballot forces was a negation of his principles. Certainly he was criticized on these grounds.

He is bidding farewell to Liberalism by championing reaction in an offensive form, and is setting an example of subservience to ecclesiastical domination which on this continent and at this age it is sad to behold. Was Anglin swallowing his principles as he so often accused others of doing? A case could be assembled to give an affirmative answer. For example, he had supported the ballot thirty years before. But an affirmative answer would have to omit Anglin's well-defined views on the rights of the Catholic Church and hierarchy especially in the realm of education. In his actions at the time of the New Brunswick schools question he had taken pains to act in accord with the views of Bishops Sweeney and Rogers. In his mind, Catholic schools, by virtue of their very Catholicity, must give large scope for the influence of the hierarchy. Then too it may be that Anglin felt the same as "Catholic" who wrote to
the *Mail* proclaiming that Catholics were not opposed to the ballot in principle but rather that in the particular circumstances the ballot agitation was connected to a rebellion against the authority of the Church. Even in his support of the ballot many years before, Anglin had been writing about secular political affairs and separate schools were a religious matter. This was the crux of the problem. At the heart of the argument of those who claimed Anglin was giving up his liberal principles was their belief that schools belonged to Caesar. To Anglin this was an area where secular liberalism had no validity.

That a man so involved in separate school matters should have been concerned about developments in Manitoba in the 1890's is not surprising. As early as 1876 Anglin had been concerned about possible attempts in Manitoba to create a purely non-sectarian system of public schools and to make the use of English texts compulsory. At that time, he felt confident that the constitution and the common sense of Canadians would prevent such an attempt of a clique "to tyrannize over the French population". By the summer of 1892 it was clear that neither the constitution nor the Canadian people were doing much to prevent this. What brought Anglin to the fore at this time was a long article from a St. John correspondent in the *Empire*. The author argued that a harmonious accommodation could be reached in Manitoba and the example he based his argument upon was the New Brunswick case of two decades before. He claimed that everyone was now happy with the educational system of New Brunswick in spite of initial Catholic fears and opposition to the School Act of 1871 and vowed that Bishop Sweeney did not wish to return to the old system even if he could. In relating the story of this harmonious adjustment, the *Empire*'s correspondent singled out Sweeney and John Boyd for commendation and Anglin
for condemnation. To the writer Anglin was simply "a politician first, last, and all the time [who] had nothing to gain for his party by making peace and did not figure extensively in the transaction." Anglin's letter of reply to the Empire fairly bristled. He clearly intimated that the Empire's correspondent had been none other than Boyd himself and stated that if Torontonians knew the writer as well as did the residents of St. John, the article would bear little weight in their minds. They would have known, for example, that the writer had failed to mention certain important facts such as the strenuous attempts made by Catholics to make arrangements to work within the system while retaining at least "the minimum of religious freedom" when the 1871 Act went into operation. Anglin proceeded in this way to present a widely different and more accurate interpretation of the New Brunswick schools question than the one which the Empire's St. John correspondent had given. One point Anglin stressed was "how unjust it is to represent the Bishop of St. John as less earnest and less zealous than he really was in his efforts to obtain justice for his people ..." He totally rejected the assertion that New Brunswick Catholics were content with their educational system. True they did not agitate the question at present, but "they wait and watch in silence for the change in public opinion and sentiment, which they hope will bring them relief ..." Catholics of Manitoba, Anglin warned, should be under no illusions about the position of New Brunswick Catholics and should not rely upon the "plausible, crafty and delusive statements" of the Empire's correspondent. As one might expect, the Empire's comment on Anglin's letter was that his words were "to be sincerely regretted by those who desire to see peace and harmony prevailing between different elements in the community." More important to Anglin than the Empire's view
was the fact that Bishop Sweeny himself approved of his letter.29

Shortly after this exchange, Anglin's article "The School Question in 30
Manitoba" was published in the *Lake*. Much of this was a rather schol-
arly and legalistic analysis of the decision of the Judicial Committee 31
of the Privy Council in support of the Manitoba School Act, but Anglin 32
could not keep heat out of his writing if he tried. He found the Judicial 33
Committee's decision and reasoning quite unsatisfactory. For example, 34
while the Committee had recognized the natural right of the parent to 35
direct and control the education of his child, it had not thought that 36
compulsory taxation for nonsectarian national schools was inconsistent 37
with the establishment and maintenance of denominational schools. To 38
Anglin this seemed odd.

To the ordinary comprehension it seems that a law which requires a 39
man to contribute to the support of a school to which he cannot con- 40
scientiously send his child does seriously infringe upon and impair 41
that natural right.31

The greatest problem with the Committee's decision was that their judg-
ment seemed to imply that the Manitoba Act did not prejudicially affect 42
any right or privilege enjoyed at the time of union. If this was the 43
interpretation then Anglin did not see that the minority had any grounds 44
to appeal for remedial legislation by the federal government, although 45
he hoped that Sir John Thompson's view that a remedial act would be valid 46
would prove correct. In Anglin's eyes it would be a grave miscarriage 47
of justice if Manitoba Catholics could not receive redress. It had been 48
the clear intention of Parliament to establish denominational schools 49
with constitutional guarantee at the time of Manitoba's entry into the 50
union. If that intention had not been adequately expressed in legis-
lation then it was the moral responsibility of the Canadian parliament 51
to rectify its mistake.
Every one who sincerely desires to see Canada respected and honoured will say that the faith so pledged should be held inviolate.\textsuperscript{34}

Unless this were done Canada could not expect anything except more bad publicity which had long hindered the progress of the country.

The impression that Canada is a country in which sectarian rancour is ever burning fiercely, in which the majority are ever seeking to oppress and humiliate the minority, in which this hideous passion constantly seeks gratification in offensive demonstrations and violent words, in the destruction of property, in street riots and bloodshed, has been of incalculable injury to this country in the past by turning away from it the vast majority of ... immigrants ... \textsuperscript{35}

Anglin's old employer, the \textit{Globe}, found fault with his analysis on several points and attacked his main premise. "We do not see," it stated, "how a system of free non-sectarian education can be described as an 'infringement on religious liberty and conscience[!]...'" It was an old problem. Protestants either could not see or would not admit the validity of the Catholic viewpoint. All Anglin could do, in his letter of reply, was to reiterate that position.

[Religious liberty and freedom of conscience cannot exist if any one class of persons can assume and exercise the power to determine for all others what is an infringement of religious liberty. As between man and man, the very essence of religious liberty is that each shall decide for himself what he is bound in conscience to do or not to do. I may add, perhaps, that to render a school or a set of schools absolutely "non-sectarian," as the saying goes, is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, and that even if this were done such schools would not satisfy the consciences of parents who believe that religion should be inculcated in schools and that the practical observance of religious duties should be inculcated in schools as well as at home, that careful training and the proper cultivation of sentiment and feeling, the religious or, as some would say, the moral sense, are more necessary than any instruction, literary or scientific, can possibly be.\textsuperscript{37}

While Anglin does not appear to have entered into public controversy again on the problem of Manitoba schools, it was not that he had lost interest in the question in general. The February, 1894, edition of \textit{The Catholic World}, an American periodical, carried a long article in which Anglin boosted the Ontario school system. It gave a detailed analysis
of the historical evolution of the separate school system of Ontario and came to the conclusion that rather than bringing strife and disorder, separate schools had brought peace and harmony. This had long been his conviction. One did not need a single school system for national harmony to be promoted.

To say that it is necessary to the welfare of a country that it should have but one school system, and that in all its schools the same religion or no religion should be taught, is tantamount to saying that a country should have but one church or no church at all. To the end of his life Anglin's conviction in the rightness of separate schools remained as firm a tenet of belief as the rightness of Home Rule for Ireland.

III

Between 1888 and his death in 1896, Anglin's foremost concern was to find suitable employment. Not until May, 1895, did he find a permanent position. For seven long years he appealed to all possible sources for jobs but managed only to obtain temporary positions under the Ontario Government. About the only compensating factors about this period at the end of Anglin's life were the advances made by his family and the interest and value of much of the work he did obtain.

Job-seeking began shortly after the North Simcoe defeat and the demise of the Tribune.

The Archbishop is kindly interesting himself and urging Mr. Mowat to provide something. I hope he will be successful as it is not pleasant to feel that you are going back ever so little every day. The great problem was that provincial appointments under the control of the Government almost always had to go to the nominees of the provincial Liberal representatives. The one place that a position could be found for Anglin was on special commissions and in December, 1887, just as his
agreement with the Globe was coming to an end, Anglin reported to Bishop Sweeny that he had been appointed chairman of a Commission on Municipal Institutions. This commission, perhaps a response to a suggestion made by the Globe two years earlier, was appointed to collect information from other provinces and countries with respect to their municipal systems keeping the Ontario case in mind. It was to be a fact-finding commission. The commissioners, Anglin, C. F. B. Johnston and W. Houston, presented two Reports, the First Report on March 16, 1888, and the much longer Second Report on December 20th of the same year. Both reports were stamped with the Anglin trademark by their thoroughness and comprehensiveness. It was quite apparent that the commission had done its job diligently and vigorously and their efforts were not in vain. The 1892 Assessment Act of Ontario (55V. c.48) undoubtedly owed much to the work of the commission and The Municipal Amendment Act of 1900 (63V. c.33) "was largely based on the findings of the Commissioners."

Anglin's work on the Municipal Commission was interrupted by another job which Mowat had found for him. On July 2nd, 1888, Anglin left Toronto for Cincinnati where he remained more than four months as commissioner in charge of Ontario's mineral display at the Centennial Exposition of the Ohio Valley. Through blistering heat, suffocating smog, and the blaring of bands from the nearby band stand, Anglin remained at his post from 10 a.m. till 8 p.m. one boring dinnerless day after another. Fortunately, Ontario's exhibit was good and Anglin was convinced that it had been a successful enterprise, both in terms of promoting the investment of capital and in opening new markets for Ontario's minerals. As has happened so often before and since, Anglin found his patriotic pride stimulated by contact with Americans.
It required much effort, indeed, to convince many of this class ["mere sight-seers"], otherwise well informed and intelligent, that Canada occupies so much of this continent that is valuable, that we have so many million acres of fertile lands, that those acres are more productive than the rich lands of the Ohio Valley, that the climate is not of Arctic severity, and above all, that we possess such boundless mineral wealth in Ontario and that all those rich specimens came from that Province. 49

He did not even think that any of the eminent American speakers he heard, such as Rutherford B. Hayes, several State Governors and sundry other 50 politicians, equalled Canada's best men. That such patriotic sentiments could be expressed by a former anti-Confederate and one who had been sceptical, at best, about the westward expansion of Canada, casts doubt upon the assertion that during the first two decades after 1867 "truly 51 national sentiments had apparently declined in strength."

Anglin's attitude towards the work supplied by the Ontario Government during 1888 was mixed. It was better than being idle but he wished he had something more permanent. "Looking to a government for employment is a poor business at best and I often feel humiliated enough," he wrote Bishop Sweeny, "but I can not help myself and I suppose I should rather 52 feel thankful for having thus far done so well." That he should have, for what followed was much worse.

In fact, for a year and a half nothing followed at all. His prestige dropped so much that at a Laurier meeting in Toronto in the autumn of 1889, he was not among the many notables who sat on the platform but merely the first-mentioned in the Globe's report of those noted in the audience. Four months later Ontario's Lieutenant Governor was inquiring if Anglin had the right to retain the prefix "Honourable" before his name. Things got so bad that Mrs. Anglin felt compelled to write privately, without her husband's knowledge, she said, to Sir John A. Macdonald himself, asking the prime minister to appoint Anglin to a position. Her letter was
pathetic.

I would scarcely venture to appeal to you, were I not encouraged by the generosity & impartiality you have shown in recent appointments of men who were not regarded as your political supporters. It is also painful to me to add my name to the list of office-hunters by whom I suppose you are continually beset — unfortunately circumstances warrant me in asking you to consider my husband in the appointment of the Collector of Customs for Toronto. Our anticipations in removing to this city have not been realized. Mr. Anglin has had for the last two years only temporary employment of an uncertain character. We are glad to have even that — although I can see that anxiety for the future is telling against my husband. We have also several children still to educate and provide for — these are my motives in appealing to you — and considering the twenty-five years Mr. Anglin spent in working conscientiously, as he thought, for the good of his country he has some claim, but it is almost too much to ask such recognition from you.

Christian kindness to one less fortunate than you have been, may however, have its weight.55

She really should have known that it was entirely too much to expect. Macdonald had indicated his policy on patronage to Anglin himself long ago — "reward your friends and do not buy your enemies." Yet Anglin's wife made one more effort later the same year. This time the position she wanted for her husband, a position she was sure he would accept, was an appointment to the Senate. But this appeal was likewise in vain.

Undoubtedly it was with a profound sense of relief Anglin greeted the news in the summer of 1890 that he had been appointed to a five-man Prison and Reformatory Commission for Ontario and was to be its Secretary. From July until the commission's report was submitted in April of 1891, Anglin was kept busy. He looked up information on European prison systems; corresponded with governments outside Ontario; travelled with and questioned alongside the other commissioners on their visits to the United States and to various parts of Ontario; attended the Cincinnati Congress of the National Prison Association on behalf of the commission; and wrote the draft of the report submitted to the Lieutenant-Governor. It was an important report — one which "merits recognition as one of the outstanding
documents in the literature of social welfare in Canada." From Anglin's viewpoint it was a topic in which he had long been interested, but more important, it was a job.

By June, 1891, it was back to the pen in an attempt to secure Timothy employment. This time its wielder was Frank Anglin, the eldest of the Anglin brood. His appeal was directed to the new king-maker in Ottawa and a man who might be expected, through regard for Anglin as a man and as a fellow Catholic, to show sympathy — the man being, of course, Sir John Thompson. Timothy was still unaware, apparently, that such efforts were being made on his behalf. As well, there was the fact, which Frank Anglin freely admitted, that his father's political views remained un-
changed. Thompson's reply was not encouraging. Once again the Ontario Liberal Government came to the rescue on August 19th by appointing Anglin to a commission. But it was an insignificant posting which merely pro-
vided a short-lived reprieve. Still, he was not destitute. He was still receiving dividend coupons, though somewhat diminished, on his St. John bonds in the spring of 1892.

By August, 1892, Anglin decided to try a different means of gaining employment. He had never lost his interest in politics although his pub-
lic role had been severely restricted since 1887. There was some sug-
gestion that he ought to have come forward as a candidate in St. John in 1891, but his only role in that election was to make a speech in Montreal as a personal favour to his friend, Edmund Guérin. The fact that Laurier spoke at the same meeting was undoubtedly an added inducement to take the trip to Montreal. But he continued to be an informed observer of the Canadian political scene giving Bishop Sweeny the benefit of his thoughts on the 1890 Ontario election, the 1891 federal contest, the struggle for place within the Conservative party as Macdonald lay on his death-bed
and the Quebec and federal aspects of the scandals revealed in 1891. It was thus a natural thing for Anglin to desire to return to Ottawa.

Anglin thought he saw his opportunity when Edouard Léger, M.P. for Kent, New Brunswick, died. Upon hearing this Anglin immediately wrote to Bishops Rogers and Sweeney asking for their active support.

My position at present renders it very desirable in a merely personal point of view that I should if possible obtain a seat in the House of Commons and it would be much better in every way that I should not be under an obligation for such seat to any political party but should be absolutely free to take such course as duty and the interests of Catholicity may require. It was my good fortune while in Parliament to be free to do always what I thought right as I never owed anything to party and this position gave me an amount of influence I could not otherwise have enjoyed. The decision in the Manitoba School case may lead to serious complications in the near future and even to a breaking up of the old parties neither of which is very coherent just now. Should trouble arise or should any questions gravely affecting Catholic interests come up for discussion in Parliament would it not be well that the Catholics of New Brunswick had some one authorized to speak for them who knew something more of such subjects than is known by any of the present representatives of Catholic constituencies in that Province?

Catholic interests in the largest sense seem to be but poorly represented in the present House of Commons. Sir John Thompson is the only one in the House of Commons capable of dealing with any grave Catholic question even tolerably well and he appears to be in an awkward position now.

But while I think that is of some importance, from a Catholic point of view that I should return to Parliament I do not wish to put out of view the fact that I am impelled very largely by reasons purely personal to solicit your assistance in being elected for Kent. Anglin wanted the Bishops to give the word to the priests who were then to get up requisitions for Anglin's candidacy. In this way it might be possible to create such a ground-swell of support as to render a convention unnecessary. In other words Anglin wanted to re-create the situation of 1867. This time, however, Bishop Rogers was on the spot rather than in Europe and Anglin learned to his sorrow from Dr. Sweeney that the difficulties were almost insuperable. It is most unlikely that Rogers was willing to help Anglin, a Reformer, in his endeavour. But also, it had been a decade since Anglin had resided in New Brunswick and even then
he had been connected with St. John and Gloucester, not Kent. It may have been hard for Anglin to have realized it, but he was past his prime. On August 31st, he entered the eighth decade of his life.

April 24th, 1893, saw another commission of which Anglin was a member, 70 hand in its report. The Municipal Taxation Commission had been established in response to the agitation aroused by the 1892 Assessment Act which had asserted that real and personal property were equally liable for assessment for municipal purposes. The commission was a fact-finding one and while its findings were not wholly without pointers as to the direction legislation should follow, it presented no recommendations. This may have been the reason for a lengthy Supplement presented by Anglin. Also, the fact that the main Report was not well-written may indicate that Anglin did not draft it and was forced to express his views in a separate submission. In any case Anglin's twenty-two page Supplement comes closer to drawing conclusions than does the factual main Report. What Anglin's submission amounted to was a rejection of Henry George's theory of the Single Tax; a reiteration of his conviction that real estate assessment should be calculated on the actual value of the property rather than a percentage of that value; a recognition that the problem of devising a system which would adequately tax personal property had not been solved; and a defence of the exemption of certain classes of property - such as religious and charitable institutions, city property, provincial and federal property - from taxation in the Ontario Act. This was all done with considerable erudition, Anglin displaying a knowledge not only of the work of contemporary political economists but also of the taxations systems of the Roman, Turkish and Egyptian empires.

Anglin may have been getting older but he showed at the Liberal
convention of 1893 that he had retained an independent mind and was not afraid to speak it. The tenth and last policy resolution introduced very, very late in the evening at the last session of the convention was one in favour of going to the Canadian people with a plebiscite on the question of prohibition. Those in favour of the resolution asserted that it was time for the country to go for something more than the principle of local option. Those delegates who had remained this late in the evening were anxious to conclude the session and cries of "carried, carried" were heard. Anglin would have none of this. He spoke against the resolution in at least as strong terms as he had opposed the Scott Act of 1878 when he stepped down from the Speaker’s chair to enter the debate. He objected to the resolution on grounds of party expediency, for, he argued, the plebiscite really was tacit support for prohibition and he thought that the Liberal party should not become known as a prohibition party. Nor did he think that prohibition was the best means of promoting temperance. This had been proven by New Brunswick’s experience many years before.

I opposed Prohibition thirty-five years ago, and I feel to-day as strongly as I did then that I am as true a friend of the temperance cause as those who have forced this resolution upon the Committee, and ten thousand times a better friend of the Liberal party and the Liberal cause.

If the resolution passed he refused to be bound by it.

No set of men have the right, because they happen to be a majority, to prescribe what other men shall or shall not eat or drink or wear, and no legislature has a right to prohibit, under penalties, that which is not evil or criminal or sinful in itself.

The resolution passed but at least Anglin had the satisfaction of letting the convention know what he thought of it.

After 1893 Anglin almost disappeared from sight. In the summer of 1894 he wrote several letters to Thompson asking to be appointed to a federal
commission on reformatories which he assumed was to be established. But he had read the signs incorrectly. No commission was to be named.

It was a repeat performance of Anglin's request in the summer of 1892 to be placed on a prison's commission. It had not materialized either.

Yet Anglin did not throw in the sponge. In February, 1895, he was earnestly soliciting Laurier's support in an effort to secure the Liberal nomination for South Renfrew. Someone else wanted exactly the same thing — but that someone had a problem about which he wrote to Laurier.

... I learn with some surprise to-day that my father is thinking of running if nominated and that he has thought also of South-Renfrew. I most certainly cannot allow myself to be put in such opposition to him in any way. He fully deserves anything that the Reform party can do for him. He has — I have not — claims upon the party. So that if his candidature should be acceptable to the party — and if it is felt that his nomination will be in the best interests of the party — I am of course out of the field. But if the need be for a young man as I have been told and if it is thought that my candidature will be a greater source of strength I am content to do what in me lies. I cannot and will not in any way stand in my father's light in the matter — but if he is not considered available or suitable — then I am ready to do my best — I leave the matter in your hands.

That someone else was none other than Anglin's own son, Frank.

As this occurrence signified, Anglin's family had been growing up. Margaret, for example, had gone to New York in 1892 to study dramatic art after her mother had scraped up the money by secretly selling some prize lace flounces. Anglin seems to have had more interest in the careers of his two eldest boys than in the younger children for his letters to Bishop Sweeny seldom mention the others. But perhaps it was just that they had not yet had time to establish a career for themselves. With Frank and Arthur, Anglin was well-pleased.

They are both good boys thank God and never cause us any trouble or uneasiness. If they do not succeed the fault I am satisfied will not be theirs.

They did succeed. Arthur followed his elder brother into the legal
profession and established himself in the well-known firm of Blake, Lash 81 and Cassells. In 1894 he married the daughter of Justice Falconbridge of the Ontario Supreme Court. But it was the oldest boy, Francis or Frank, whose career was the most meteoric. He passed his Bar examinations early in 1888 and never looked back. He became a partner in a law firm with a prominent Toronto Catholic, D. A. O'Sullivan, and when that gentle-
man died in 1892 he became the senior partner in a new firm, Anglin and 82 Minty. In the same year his father announced to Sweeny Frank's forth-
coming marriage to a Miss Fraser and added:

His income is not yet as large as I hope it will become but he is very industrious and attentive to business and has big expectations which I hope will be realized in good time. 83

Frank was following in his father's footsteps in more ways than industri-
ousness. He was assuming all the attributes of a 'representative Irish 84 Catholic'. He was a soloist at St. Michael's Cathedral; he wrote letters 85 to newspapers and politicians in opposition to the McCarthyites; he 86 made speeches about "The Irish in Canada"; and he urged the return of 87 separate schools to Manitoba Catholics. Like father, like son — in most ways. But while Anglin senior's career was on the wane; Frank's was on the rise. In 1895 the two lines met and crossed. Frank, not 88 Timothy, received Laurier's blessing in the South Renfrew constituency. The twenty-nine year old chip had outgrown the seventy-two year old block.

IV

Undoubtedly this blow to old Timothy's pride must have smarted for a time. But could he really have wished it to be otherwise? Did not the incident signify that the Anglin clan had a young vigorous new leader who could fill the footsteps of his predecessor? And could he not be proud of the fact that his son had esteemed his father so much that he
had patterned his life along very similar lines? This was nothing to be ashamed about or sorry for! That the old should be replaced by the young is a law of nature.

This was really the end of Timothy Warren Anglin's career. In May, 1895, he was made Chief Clerk of the Surrogate Court of Ontario, the influence of Frank and Arthur probably being a factor in the appointment. Late that same year he saw service on a Citizen's Committee for Toronto which drafted a report on municipal reform. But in April, 1896, he became ill. At the beginning of May he seemed to rally and on the afternoon of Saturday, May 2nd, he went out for a drive, visiting the residence of Frank. That night he slept well until about 3:30 a.m. when he was stricken with a seizure caused by the formation of a blood clot on the brain. Mrs. Anglin roused the members of the family present in the house and they went to his bedside. Within fifteen minutes of the seizure it was all over.

Timothy Warren Anglin was dead.

Funeral services were held on the Wednesday. Pall-bearers were Oliver Mowat, atoning for the fact that his announcement that he would enter the Laurier cabinet the formation of which the electors would shortly make necessary, vastly overshadowed the news of Anglin's death in Monday's Globe; Dr. B. Travers, Anglin's old friend who had encouraged him nearly half a century before to leave Ireland and start anew in St. John; as well as Sir Frank Smith, Justice Falconbridge, Commander Law representing the Lieutenant-Governor, Eugene O'Keefe, B. B. Hughes and, of all people, Goldwin Smith. The Globe's eulogy was most kind.

Mr. Anglin was a widely-read man, especially in the field of constitutional law and Parliamentary lore, and his decisions from the Speaker's chair have now all the force of honored precedents. Naturally grave and dignified in bearing, he was in more than one way fitted to discharge the duties of the first Commoner.

While stalwart in his political beliefs, he nevertheless took care
to be moderate and fair in his course towards political antagonists, and we may feel sure that he left no enemies behind him. As a writer he was well-informed, ready and weighty, and in that role did not forget that we can controvert the opinions of those who honestly differ from us without hitting below the belt. He was a devout member of his church and was esteemed and trusted by all within its fold, and indeed leaves a record for integrity, high attainments and strict observance of a high code of conduct that marks the best citizenship.\textsuperscript{91}

This was very nice and largely true, but somehow one cannot but think that when Anglin had written about George Brown's death in 1880 he had written his own epitaph as well.

[H]e remained to the end the same straightforward politician, the same uncompromising advocate of the right that he had always been, modifying his views only when reason and experience convinced him that they were more or less erroneous, and changing his course only so far as was necessary to keep it in harmony with his convictions ... What he thought he said or wrote always - perhaps too strongly or too bitterly when the heat of the contests in which he was so long engaged affected his judgment - but never obscurely or uncertainly ... His position as the proprietor and editor of a great newspaper sometimes embarrassed him as a politician, because, while others enquired and hesitated, he was absolutely forced to form his opinion quickly, to express it plainly, and to sustain it vigorously, aiming only at what was right, and regardless of mere expediency.\textsuperscript{92}

V

Of what significance was Anglin's life and career within the context of Canadian history? Obviously he had been involved in a wide variety of issues which concerned British North Americans during the second half of the nineteenth century. Equally obvious is the fact that he did not control the course of events, for Anglin rather consistently championed losing causes -- 'losing causes' at least from the imperfect perspective of the present. He was typical, however, of an important segment of Canadian society, a segment whose presence contributed to the conservative nature of that society.

Anglin's conservatism was evidenced in his role as an Irish Catholic leader. While he always remained sufficiently loyal to the aspirations
of Irish nationalism in the homeland to merit the respect and leadership of the Canadian Irish, his 'No Shillelagh' policy in Canada was a factor in the acculturation of the Irish community. Whether the leadership of men like Anglin was responsible for this, or whether the Irish, given proper conditions, were more conservative and law-abiding than they are often portrayed as being, is a moot point. Anglin's leadership would have been impossible had his assessment of the Irish been incorrect and he continually claimed that the Irish were much better people than others were willing to concede. On the other hand, Irish Catholics needed leaders who could convince the community at large of the 'good citizenship' of the Canadian Irish. Anglin did not succeed in removing all hostility towards Irish Catholics, but it was clear to most people that he posed no revolutionary threat to established society in Canada. Moreover, those who became acquainted with Anglin or his work were made aware that Irishmen were not necessarily an inferior breed. But how can the impact of such things be gauged? How does one accurately assess a causal factor which can only be discussed in terms of 'what might have been'? One knows that the importance of Anglin's political ideology of 'No Shillelagh' can never be measured precisely. But one also recognizes that it must have been a significant factor in the development of Canada. Anglin's own life itself showed that his outlook and approach led to acculturation and patriotism.

Finally, was Anglin a success or a failure? The question has as many answers as the number of perspectives brought to bear. Throughout his life he was conscientious, hard-working and competent in almost all of his endeavours -- as newspaperman, as politician, as Irish leader and Catholic spokesman, as Speaker, as commissioner. But he did not rise
to the heights of brilliance. He was a man to be respected for his capabilities, determination, uprightness and diligence. But there was a coldness and arrogance in his character which detracted from the influence his talents would otherwise have commanded. He was an Alexander MacKenzie, not a Sir John A. Macdonald. Moreover, even more than MacKenzie, Anglin was a 'loser'. Still, while Anglin cannot be considered a total success, he cannot be labelled a failure either, especially if one judges success in terms of fame. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Anglin's name was known and his words heard or read throughout much of British North America. Many Canadians came to respect Anglin and his opinions. His influence on his fellow citizens and adopted country was not inconsiderable. Anglin himself could not have considered his life a failure. He had firmly established his children in Canada by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of "Canada's century." He had lived an eventful, interesting and not unpleasant or unfulfilling life. What more is success?
FOOTNOTES

1 P.A.O., Edward Blake Papers, Blake to James Somerville, Feb. 24, 1887. Blake had encountered this for some time (see P.A.O., Sir James David Edgar Papers, Blake to Edgar, May 15, 1882).
3 Roman Catholic Diocese of St. John Archives, Bishop John Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Apr. 11, 1887.
4 Ibid.
6 Although Liberals later tried to differentiate between Commercial Union and Unrestricted Reciprocity, the Globe frequently used the terms interchangeably in 1887 (see, for example, Globe, Aug. 1, 1887).
7 See Freeman, July 12, 1879.
8 Edgar Papers, Cartwright to Edgar, Aug. 9, 1886. Cartwright was undoubtedly referring to E. E. Sheppard, the editor of the News (Toronto) from 1883 to 1887.
9 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Dec. 12, 1887.
11 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Dec. 6, 1890.
13 Toronto World, Aug. 20, 1892, in Blake Papers, scrapbook 36, p. 1. See also Catholic Weekly Review (Toronto), Sept. 24, 1892.
14 Daily Sun (St. John), Apr. 7, 1893; and Daily Evening Globe (St. John), Apr. 7, 1893. In the course of his speech he indicated that he had spoken on the same topic in St. John four years earlier.
15 Globe, Oct. 11 and 15, 1887; and Catholic Weekly Review, Jan. 4, 1890; Apr. 18, 1891; and Feb. 27, March 5, and July 2 and 30, 1892.
18 Quoted in Walker, op. cit., p. 78.
19 Reports in the Catholic Weekly Review indicate that he was a trustee in July, 1892, but not in January, 1893.
20 Mail, Apr. 20, 1888.
21 Freeman, Jan. 6, 1859, quoted above on p. 96.
22 Walker, op. cit., p. 80.
23 The literature on the Manitoba school question is extensive. The introduction, documents and bibliography in L. Clark (ed.), The Manitoba School Question: Majority Rule or Minority Rights? (Toronto: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1968) are very useful.
24 Freeman, Nov. 28, 1876.
25 Empire (Toronto), Aug. 20, 1892.
26 Ibid.
27 Anglin to Editor, Aug. 22, 1892, in Empire, Aug. 25, 1892.
28 Empire, Aug. 25, 1892. The Empire stated that Anglin's assumption that Boyd had written the article was quite incorrect.
29 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Sept. 5, 1892. Anglin remained convinced that Boyd was responsible for the article even if he had not written it himself.
31 Ibid., p. 73.
32 Ibid., p. 79. See also Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Sept. 5, 1892. In the Brophy case the Judicial Committee declared that Catholic rights had indeed been affected prejudicially and that an appeal to Ottawa for remedial legislation was in order (see Clark, op. cit., pp. 116-117).
33 Anglin, art. cit., p. 74.
34 Ibid., p. 75.
35 Ibid., p. 79. Anglin recognized that this impression was partly a result of exaggerated reports but he also felt that it was not without some validity (see Anglin to Editor, Aug. 29, 1892, in Globe, Aug. 30, 1892).
36 Globe, Aug. 29, 1892.
37 Anglin to Editor, Aug. 29, 1892, in Globe, Aug. 30, 1892 and reprinted in Catholic Weekly Review, Sept. 10, 1892. The letter also dealt with other aspects of the Globe's criticism.
38 T. W. Anglin, "How Canada Solves the Problem We Shirk," Catholic World, LVIII (Feb., 1894), 609-627. The article was mistitled for it dealt almost exclusively with Ontario.
39 Ibid., p. 624.
40 Ibid., p. 625.
41 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, May 10, 1887.
42 Ibid. See also ibid., Anglin to Sweeny, Dec. 12, 1887.
43 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeny, Dec. 12, 1887.
44 Globe, Oct. 16, 1885.
45 First Report of the Commission on Municipal Institutions (Ontario, Sessional Papers, 1888, No. 42). The report was supposed to have been given by the beginning of February (see Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Dec. 12, 1887).
47 Comment in finding aid in P.A.O.
49 Ontario's Exhibit ..., p. 6.
50 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, Dec. 7, 1888.
52 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, May 21, 1888.
54 N.B.M.A., Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley Papers, F. C. Law to Tilley, Jan. 28, 1890. Tilley replied that according to New Brunswick custom Anglin had the right although he thought the custom inadvisable (see P.A.C., Miscellaneous Collections 1865-1969, Tilley to Law, Jan. 31, 1889). Law's notation on this letter was that neither pre-Confederation ministers nor an ex-Speaker of the House of Commons had any right to be styled "Honourable". Law was correct as apparently Lord Monck's 1868 suggestion that the Speakers of the two Houses should be sworn in as Privy Councillors and thus retain the title of "Hon." for life, had never been acted upon (see Monck to Macdonald, Sept. 2, 1868, quoted in J. Pope, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 73).
55 P.A.C., Sir John Alexander Macdonald Papers, CDLXXIII, Mrs. E. Anglin to Macdonald, May 6, 1889. In a postscript she enjoined Macdonald to strict secrecy "as not even my husband is aware of my effort to render his life a less anxious one." No reply from Macdonald could be found.
56 Macdonald Letterbooks, XV, Macdonald to Anglin, Jan. 10, 1871.
57 Macdonald Papers, XXI, Mrs. E. Anglin to Macdonald, Dec. 9 and 14, 1889; and LXIX, Macdonald to Mrs. E. Anglin, Dec. 13, 1889.
58 The information given regarding the Prison Commission and Anglin's role on it has been gleaned from the 799 page Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Prison and Reformatory System of Ontario, 1891 (Ontario, Sessional Papers, 1891, No. 18); and P.A.C., Sir John Thompson Papers, Anglin to Thompson, July 16 and Aug. 4 and 20, 1894. While Anglin was Secretary, the Commission also had a stenographer who recorded the evidence presented.
60 Thompson Papers, CXXXI, Frank Anglin to Thompson, June 26, 1891; and CXXXII, Frank Anglin to Thompson, July 6, 1891. As to the assertions of Frank and Mrs. Anglin that Timothy knew nothing of their appeals is it possible that Timothy was a Henry II?
61 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire Into the Claims Made by the Township of Proton to certain sums of money payable as alleged to that municipality under the Act 16 Vict. Cap. 159, Sec. 14 (Ontario: Sessional Papers, 1892, No. 89).
62 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, June 6, 1892. Anglin's financial solvency indicates that money was coming from somewhere. Probably he had been able to sell his St. John house and perhaps his two oldest boys were contributing to the family coffers.
63 Ibid., Anglin to Sweeny, Feb. 14, 1891.
64 Thompson Papers, Frank Anglin to Thompson, July 6, 1891.
65 Globe, Feb. 18, 1891.
66 Sweeny Papers, Anglin to Sweeny, June 9, 1890; and Feb. 14, June 4 and Dec. 4, 1891. Though it was certainly not a political function, it is interesting to note that Anglin was one of twelve pall bearers at Alexander Mackenzie's funeral on April 20, 1892 (see W. Buckingham and G. W. Ross, The Hon. Alexander Mackenzie: His Life and Times (Toronto: The Rose Publishing Co. Ltd., 1892), p. 641).
67 U.N.B.A., Bishop James Rogers Papers, Anglin to Rogers, Aug. 8, 1892. See also Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Aug. 8 and Sept. 5, 1892.
68 To Sweeney, Anglin stated that quick action along these lines would prevent the Government from putting their machine into gear (see Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Aug. 8, 1892).
69 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Sept. 5, 1892.
71 Anglin's rejection of George's theories was in line with contemporary Catholic thinking (see Catholic Weekly Review, July 16, 1887; and A. I. Abell, American Catholicism and Social Action: A Search for Social Justice (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), pp. 61-89).
72 Anglin had written Laurier suggesting that if he did not wish to chair the convention "perhaps as the only ex-speaker of the House of Commons in the party I would be next best" (see P.A.C., Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers, VII, Anglin to Laurier, June 5, 1893). The post went to Oliver Mowat.
74 Thompson Papers, CCXV, Anglin to Thompson, July 16, 1894; CCXVII, Anglin to Thompson, Aug. 4, 1894; and CCXVIII, Anglin to Thompson, Aug. 20, 1894.
75 Ibid., CCLXX, Thompson to Anglin, July 30 and Aug. 21, 1894.
76 Ibid., CLVIII, Mrs. E. Anglin to Thompson, July 9, 1892; and CCLVI, Thompson to Mrs. T. W. Anglin, July 12, 1892.
77 Laurier Papers, IX, Anglin to Laurier, Feb. 16, 21 and 26, 1895.
78 Ibid., F. A. Anglin to Laurier, Feb. 16, 1895. See also ibid., F. A. Anglin to Laurier, Feb. 23, 1895.
79 M. Englin, "My Margaret Anglin Story," Atlantic Advocate, LIII (March, 1963), 47. One might surmise that the trip Anglin and his wife took to New York in 1892 was to make arrangements for Margaret and see her safely established (see Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, June 6, 1892).
80 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, Dec. 12, 1887.
81 This is apparent by the names given on the firm's letterhead (see, for example, Blake Papers, Blake to J. S. Willison, Feb. 23, 1892).
82 Catholic Weekly Review, March 16, 1889; Sept. 17 and Nov. 26, 1892. Timothy Anglin was a pall bearer at O'Sullivan's funeral (see ibid., Sept. 17, 1892).
83 Sweeney Papers, Anglin to Sweeney, June 6, 1892.
84 Catholic Weekly Review, June 13, 1891.
85 Thompson Papers, LXXXIII, Frank Anglin to Thompson, March 28, 1889; and CCXXXVIII, Thompson to Frank Anglin, Apr. 2, 1889. Thompson's letter indicated that Frank had written a letter to the Empire.
86 Catholic Weekly Review, March 28, 1891.
87 Laurier Papers, Frank Anglin to Laurier, undated (but must have been at the beginning of March, 1895), March 26 and Apr. 5, 1895. In these letters the emphasis was on the political expediency of supporting remedial legislation if necessary. Frank was convinced of the benefits of Catholic education (see Hon. Mr. Justice Anglin, Catholic Education in Canada in its Relation to the Civil Authority (Toronto: Catholic
Register and Canadian Extension, 1910), p. 3). See also F. Anglin to Editor, March 23, 1895, in Globe, March 26, 1895.
88 Laurier Papers, Frank Anglin to Laurier, Feb. 27, 1895. Apparently Frank did not get the Liberal nomination in any case, for he did not run against the victorious Conservative candidate in 1896.
89 Globe, May 4, 1896.
90 S.J.R.L., Raymond Scrapbooks, XIV, 28. One must assume that a typographical error had been made in giving the name of one of the pall bearers as "Goodwin Smith".
91 Globe, May 5, 1896.
92 Freeman, May 15, 1880.
Appendix I

T. W. Anglin to the People of the City and County of St. John,

November 22, 1864.

The letter was published in the Freeman, Nov. 22, 1864.

I should perhaps feel flattered that the Prime Minister of this Province, the great financier of his party, has thus challenged me to enter the political arena and fight him with weapons of his own chosing [sic]. But the great question at issue is too momentous to allow personal consideration to have any influence, and although if I consulted merely my own feelings and impulses I should be inclined to accept the challenge, unfair and preposterous as are its terms; although I believe that it would be impossible so to deal in one half hour, and that the fourth half hour of the evening, with a subject of "such magnitude," of which Messrs. Tiley [sic] and Gray were unable "in the short space of two hours and a half to give more than a summary," as to show that the scheme adopted by the delegates would be disadvantageous to the people of this Province, yet I think the duty I owe to you and indeed to the whole people of the Province imperatively demands that I should decline to accept this challenge.

Messrs. Tilley and Gray, self-constituted delegates, have assumed the responsibility of agreeing to this scheme on behalf of this Province, and of persuading the Legislature (or people) of the Province to adopt it definitively. I have assumed no responsibility whatever further than that of expressing my opinion on the subject, and showing the reasons on which my opinion is based. Personally I have no more interest in this matter than any other person living in this Province, and making a livelihood by the business he does in it. A Government paper says that a better opportunity was never offered to any rising man than this challenge offers to me to make myself "the leader of a great opposition party:" but I have never sought or wished to become the leader of any party. If I have laboured to put Mr. Tilley and his colleagues out of office, it has been because I thought they misgoverned the country, not because I had any desire to get the office and salary of any of them. I told you at the hustings after you elected me one of your representatives that I was not looking for office, and I tell you the same now.

I dwell on this point because I believe the main object of this challenge is to create the impression, false and absurd as it would be, that this great question in which all the people are so deeply interested, is somehow or other a question between Mr. Tilley and myself. If this impression could be created; if the people who attend the meeting of this evening could be induced to regard the proceedings as a mere tilting match between Mr. Tilley and me, the natural consequence would be that the great majority of his old friends, who now disapprove of his scheme, would again rally to his side, and in the heat of party feelings the interests of the country may be forgotten. I could never forgive myself if, by the indulgence of my pride or vanity or self-regard, I gave Mr.
Tilley and his abettors the chance to play such a game, and divert public attention from the one great question which should now absorb it.

Mr. Tilley's objects in writing and publishing this challenge -- of which by the way I received no copy -- were obviously these.

To attract a large meeting on this evening, the experience of Thursday evening having shown that without some special attraction it was not probable that so many persons would again attend any of the meetings the delegates may call.

To overwhelm me if I attended with statements, calculations, and figures of which I had never before heard, or if this were not possible, as I think it would not be, at all events to confuse the audience with such masses of figures as no audience, even if they were all trained accountants, could follow or understand, and so give his supporters a pretext for declaring that he was triumphant, and that all the arguments against the scheme were fallacious.

Worse than this to make the matter appear merely as a dispute between himself and me; perhaps to irritate my friends and excite his own, and so inflame the public mind that the calm, temperate consideration of the question which he professes to desire, would no longer be possible.

Or on the other hand if I refused to accept his challenge to be able to say that I was afraid to meet him face to face; that I knew my arguments and figures would not bear investigation and exposure.

I am not afraid to meet him, but I am very much afraid of having false issues raised on this occasion, on which, as far as I am personally concerned, I only wish to be put out of sight altogether, having no personal interests to promote, and no personal antagonisms with anyone.

If Mr. Tilley wishes to discuss this great question really on its merits, and in the calm and dispassionate manner, of which he spoke on Thursday evening, the best mode he can adopt is to publish his arguments and figures. Lengthy financial statements and calculations can not be properly understood when merely heard at a public meeting -- certainly not so well as when a man, sitting by his own fireside, takes up his paper and calmly and quietly reads those statements and examines their merits, comparing one passage with another, and so determining which is correct. Mr. Tilley seems to attach much importance to the arguments and statements of the Freeman. If he wishes to meet those statements, to contradict and refute them -- if he can -- and to be assured that all those who read what I write on the subject shall also read what he has to say he is welcome to publish all he chooses to say on this subject in the Freeman. I do not offer him one half column for every four I occupy. He is welcome to write just as much and as often as he pleases, and I pledge myself that if on any occasion want of space or any other cause prevent my article and his from appearing together, that I will give place to him.
Appendix II

Results of the New Brunswick Election of 1865.

The following results have been compiled from various sources, the most important being the Freeman and the News. The number of votes shown may be slightly inaccurate or incomplete and because party affiliations were frequently not very clear the charts cannot be considered one hundred per cent accurate. (E) denotes those successful in being elected to the Assembly.

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<td>MAR. 16</td>
<td>McMILLAN</td>
<td>379(E)</td>
<td>Confederate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DESBRISAY</td>
<td>289(E)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BARBARIE</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MONTGOMERY</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland</td>
<td>Mar. 18</td>
<td>Williston</td>
<td>1,228(E)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sutton</td>
<td>1,063(E)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kerr</td>
<td>1,124(E)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hawes</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Howe</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hutchison</td>
<td>1,197(E)</td>
<td>Anti-Confederate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's</td>
<td>Mar. 27</td>
<td>Perkins</td>
<td>904(E)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Bailey</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Babbitt</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>Confederate</td>
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Appendix III

Roman Catholic Population and the Anti-Confederate Vote: St. John County, 1865.

The percentage of Catholics within an electoral subdivision has been computed on the basis of the 1871 Census. The percentage of the vote cast against Confederation within the subdivisions was computed using the figures which appeared in the Freeman on March 4, 1865. To simplify matters it was considered advisable to use a single set of figures for the basis of comparison, and therefore the candidate for each party who stood third for his respective party was selected (Coram for the Antis and Skinner for the Confederates).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of Catholics</th>
<th>% Anti vote</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Martins</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carleton</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke's</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonds</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King's</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When these figures are placed on a chart, their significance becomes clearer. The unbroken line represents the percentage of Catholics in a particular subdivision, while the dotted line stands for the percentage of votes cast within the same subdivision for the anti-Confederate candidate. If there is to be a positive correlation between Catholics and anti-Confederation voting, both lines should follow the same pattern. Since the subdivision with the lowest percentage of Catholics
has been put first and the rest arranged in ascending order, there would have to be a similar upward trend in the line showing the percentage of the vote cast for the Anti candidate. As the chart shows, this is not the case, and the conclusion that must be drawn is that there is no simple, direct, positive correlation between the Catholic population and the anti-Confederate vote.
Appendix IV

Minute of the Executive Council, July 12, 1865.

The Minute is to be found in Lieutenant Governor's Letter Books, LXIII, enclosed in Gordon to Cardwell, July 15, 1865. The passages written by Anglin, according to the Freeman of April 23, 1867, have been enclosed by brackets ( ).

May it please Your Excellency

The Ex. Council in Committee have had under consideration a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 24th June lately communicated to them by Your Ex.

From the language of this despatch it would be natural to infer that it related to some scheme for effecting an entire Legislative and Administrative Union of the B.N.A. Provs., which has not yet been made public; but words used in the concluding paragraph, taken in connection with various other circumstances, lead the Committee to conclude that it is intended to refer to the Resolutions in favor [sic] of a Federation of the various Provinces of B.N.A. agreed to by the Canadian Parl. at its last Session. (These resolutions have already been submitted to the people of New Brunswick at the time, and in the manner which the advocates of the scheme themselves selected. The Legislature was dissolved, and the people were enabled to pronounce their decision on this most important subject, in the regular Constitutional mode, and, after ample consideration, refused, by an overwhelming majority to adopt the scheme; not because it was novel, as Mr. Cardwell has been led to suppose, but because they were unable to discover anything in it that gave promise of either moral or material advantage to the Empire or to themselves, or that it afforded a prospect of improved administration or increased prosperity.

The spirit of loyalty which has always animated the people of New Brunswick; and of which they have, on many occasions, given proof, is still as ardent as ever; and whenever it becomes necessary, they are prepared to place all their means and resources at the absolute disposal of the Imperial Government; but they cannot believe that the contemplated confederation would either increase their strength, or render it more available.

A large majority of the people of this Province are opposed to any closer political connection with Canada than that afforded by the tie of a common allegiance to the British Crown, and consider that such a Union would have a decided tendency to weaken that dependance [sic] on the British Empire which they so highly prize, and would lead to the neglect and injury of their local interests; in which opinion the Committee believe that the people of the other Maritime Provs. fully concur; but,
even those who desire a Union, must fail to discover, in the resolutions adopted at Quebec any provision whatever for the accomplishment of a fusion which in the words of Mr. Cardwell's despatch would unite in one Govt. all the B.N.A. Provs., and form a Province uniting in itself all the population and all the resources of the whole.)

The Committee, of course, cannot suppose that the Brit. Govt. share the ignorance with regard to the history and character of the Federal scheme which appears to prevail among the British public, and which induces the "Times"newspaper of 20th June, to observe that "the two Canadas have put aside their ancient jealousies, and are ready to meet in a common Legislature," in apparent forgetfulness of the fact that they have so met for the last five and twenty years, and very probably without any consciousness on the part of the writer of the article that the jealousies between the Canadas, said to have been put aside, are avowedly the cause of the late proposal, and that its authors in the event of its failure are pledged to restore to Upper and Lower Canada a great measure of the local independence surrendered them in 1840.

The resolutions agreed to by the leading Canadian politicians in the month of June 1864 as the basis of the formation of the existing Cabinet, and adopted solely under the pressure of local exigencies contain the statement that, "on consideration of the steps most advisable for the final settlement of sectional difficulties, the remedy must be sought in the adoption of the federal principle," and provide that, if such negotiations [sic] were unsuccessful, they would be "prepared to pledge themselves to legislation during the next session of Parliament, for the purpose of remedying existing difficulties, by introducing the federal principle for Canada alone."

It is perfectly clear that "the existing difficulties" were the motive and groundwork of the scheme, and that the Federal Union was only sought as a means of separating the Canadas; a separation which the Canadian Govt. are pledged in all events immediately to effect, a fact which, perhaps, sufficiently accounts for the eagerness with which they seek to force its immediate adoption upon unwilling communities, for they are well aware that, did the plan avowedly contemplate only the separation of the Canadas, it would be impossible even speciously to present it to the Imperial Govt. as in any manner a scheme of Union.

(Mr. Cardwell is perfectly right in supposing that the views and wishes of Great Britain are entitled to great weight; and they will ever be received with respectful attention in this Province; but the Committee feel certain that, if there be one view with regard to the Colonies which is more clearly and distinctly held than another by Her Majesty's Govt. and the people of England; if there be one wish on their part with respect to which there can be neither hesitation nor doubt, it is, that the people of this Province, and the others enjoying, through the wise liberality of England, parliamentary institutions and free self government, should act in reference to their own affairs as seems to themselves most consistent with their duty to their Sovereign, and most conducive to their own interests.)
To confer on this Province a right of self Government would have been a mockery if, in consequence of its claims to deference as a protector, the wish of the Mother Country was in all cases to be followed, whenever expressed, whatever the opinion of those to whom the power of judging has been solemnly entrusted by the Sovereign and Legislature of Great Britain, and who, being on the spot, and fully conversant with the subject considered themselves not unable to judge with respect to their own affairs. (When a wish is expressed by Her Majesty's Govt., it will be received with that deference which is due to suggestions emanating from so high a source, and will be considered with an anxious desire to meet the views of Her Majesty's advisers; but, if such views shd. unfortunately not coincide with the views of those on whom alone the responsibility of action in the Province falls, the Committee feel assured that Her Majesty's Government will expect and desire that the Government of this Province should act according to their own convictions of right, and in conformity with the sentiments of the people they represent.)
Appendix V

Anglin's Letter of Resignation.

The letter is located in P.A.N.B., Executive Council Papers, Anglin to Gordon, November 10, 1865. Anglin later wrote to Gordon requesting "that the passage relating to the dismissals from office should be expunged ..." (see ibid., Anglin to Gordon, Nov. 21, 1865). Under Smith's urgings, Anglin had agreed to request this because if the letter were made public it might embarrass the Government. The section in question, halfway through the letter, has been placed within brackets ( ).

May it Please Your Excellency,

I beg leave to render my resignation of the seat I hold in the Executive Council and of the other offices which I hold as a member of the Executive, and to explain why I feel it to be my duty to take this course.

When this Government was formed I distinctly understood that the construction of the Railroad from St. John to the State of Maine frontier was to be undertaken as a Government work, as soon as practicable. This policy was clearly avowed in Your Excellency's speech at the opening of the Legislature in which you said that "Works for the completion and extension of the European and North American Railway from the frontier of N. Scotia to that of the U. States will be undertaken as soon as practicable". But meantime the Company formed some time before for the accomplishment of this work had shown some signs of vitality and it was asserted on their behalf that if they were allowed the full time given by their charter they could comply with the requirements of the Facility Bill. It was deemed advisable to await the result of any efforts they may make lest the Government should appear to act in disregard of any rights the Company possessed and therefore Your Excellency added to the declaration of the policy of the Government the further declaration that "any immediate steps in this direction appear to be precluded by existing legislation".

It was said from time to time that the Company made propositions of various kinds to the government at one time tendering a conditional surrender of their charter. Of all this I knew nothing more than I learned from the newspapers until Mr. Cudlip read in his place in the Assembly a letter on the subject which he had received from some one who wrote on behalf of the Company: but in season and out of season I repeatedly urged on my colleagues in the Council the importance nay the necessity of setting to work in earnest to prepare for commencing active operations at an early day. I was sorry to find the majority reluctant to deal with this
matter boldly and promptly and apparently desirous of finding some mode of evading a difficulty which they appeared to think insuperable.

The friends of Western Extension at length grew tired of what seemed to be the timidity and indecision of the Government and as all parties by this time despaired of seeing the road built by a company Mr Cudlip on the sixth of June introduced a resolution requiring the government to proceed forthwith with the construction of this road if no company was prepared to proceed with the work "without delay" and on the following day this resolution passed by a vote of 24 to 13 six members of the government voting in the majority.

The evening of that very day saw the company at work with renewed energy. Some of the directors accompanied by Mr John A. Poor president of the E & N.A.R. Company of Maine arrived in Fredericton with new proposals to which I listened attentively. He proposed to undertake the whole work if in addition to the subsidy promised by the Province and the amount subscribed in St. John, the city of St. John would subscribe $400,000. The rest of the money he calculated he would raise by the sale of the Company's Bonds. He did not even pretend that he or any persons whom he had authority to represent would subscribe for a single share of the Company's Stock or furnish a single dollar capital.

The representatives of the City and County of St. John saw nothing in this scheme that gave promise of success and they refused to introduce a Bill to authorize the Common Council to take Stock and at a meeting of the St. John Common Council held some time after the majority refused to take Stock in the undertaking on the terms proposed.

It would occupy Your Excellency's attention to little purpose were I to detail all the subsequent proceedings of the Company. Before Mr. Poor left St. John I believe he signed a contract binding the Company he represented and which had then no capital and scarcely had any existence to build the road if the Company raised $200,000 in Stock subscriptions.

For some time after this little was heard of the Company, but as Mr. Smith and Mr. Allen were absent on the business of the Province I could not very well expect the Government to take any steps towards carrying out the wishes of the House of Assembly as expressed by their resolution. I never ceased however to urge upon them the importance of commencing the work and to warn them of the injury that must be caused by unnecessary delay.

At a meeting of the Council held in St. John soon after the return of the delegates I one day found upon the table a number of papers relating to the affairs of the Railway Company which I read with much interest. I was astonished soon after to learn from the President of the Council that these were submitted by the Company as the proof that they possessed sufficient capital - as the law requires - and I was still more astonished to perceive that several of my colleagues had already made up their minds to accept them as sufficient proof and when I asserted that these papers afforded conclusive proof that the Company had not
sufficient capital and attempted to show this by arguing from the documents themselves the President of the Council told me in effect that my opinions were prejudiced.

These papers were the contract between Mr. Poor and the St. John Company of which I shall be at more particularly hereafter, a certificate or statement signed by several persons of good standing in Boston and a document which at the time I believed to be a copy of the contract between the Maine Company and Messrs. Pierce and Blaisdell contractors for railway building. I afterwards learned from the newspapers that the contract was not signed at that time at all and that this was but the draft of a contract or the copy of a draft. There was no list of subscribers to stock that I saw.

The contract signed by Mr. Poor on behalf of the Maine Company and Mr. Parks on behalf of the St. John Company provided that the St. John Company should contribute $200,000 in short subscribers all the balance of the stock computed at two million dollars - the Provincial subsidy making up the balance of the estimated cost of the funds. The Maine Company at the same time stipulated that they shall have the right to issue Bonds to the extent of two million dollars which shall be a lien on the road nor do I think that there is any limitation as to the time and manner in which those Bonds shall be issued.

This then was the whole capital of the Company - a subscription of some $140,000 in St. John of which not one dollar had yet been paid and of which I was satisfied a great part could not be collected and the subscription of Mr. John A. Poor as President of a Company in Maine which admittedly had no capital at all for two million dollars more. This I was called upon to declare in the words of the Law "sufficient capital". This I was asked to accept as a sufficient "guarantee of the ability" of this Company to complete this work.

I refused and I told my colleagues distinctly that I regarded these documents as conclusive proof that the Company had not sufficient capital and that I could not and would not take any share of the responsibility of accepting them as proofs that they had sufficient capital.

The Certificate of which I made certain, merely stated that the parties whose names were attached knew that negotiations of some sort were going on with Railroad Companies in N. England and that they were satisfied the effort to build the road would be successful: but it gave no particulars: it was not a certificate that money had been paid in or even that Stock had been subscribed by parties known to them to be solvent. As a document to guide the Executive in deciding on so important a matter it was utterly worthless. But even if it afforded ample proof that the means were provided for the construction of the Maine portion of the road it would still be of small value as proof that our portion of the road could be built by our Company. It was however but a vague expression of opinion which may prove to be groundless.

The contract with Messrs. Pierce and Blaisdell is also worthy of notice. They agreed to build the road in the State of Maine for $30,000 a
mile U.S. currency, but for the N. Brunswick portion of the road the cost of which Mr. Burpee estimated at $30,000 a mile fully equipped, they are to get $35,000 per mile in gold or its equivalent and for this they are to build merely the roadway without Station houses tanks turn tables or any of the other indispensable appurtenances of a Railroad and of course without rolling stock and they are to be paid as the work progresses one half in cash and one half in the Bonds of the Company at 85 per cent.

Nothing was done at this meeting of the Council and on the following day I absented myself as I saw that my colleagues were determined to entrust the work to the Company on these terms and I did not wish to take even a negative part in proceedings of which I so entirely disapproved. In the evening however on receiving a message from the President of the Council I again attended. Only four other members of the Council were then in town. Mr. Wilmot had left for Quebec. Mr. Hutchison had gone home. I repeated what I had said on the previous day that I could not regard the St. John Subscription List for $140,000 and Mr. Poor's subscription for two millions as sufficient capital and I stated what I believed must be the result if the Company were allowed to commence the work on such terms. I argued that even the contractors for the work required that $200,000 cash subscription should be raised here before they begin the work. It was then proposed and resolved that the Company be informed that when they had raised a bona fide subscription of $200,000 the Government would accept this as sufficient guarantee of their ability &c. From this also I dissented as I could not believe such a capital sufficient.

I now felt that under ordinary circumstances it would be my duty to resign the Government having on so important a matter acted in a manner I so much disapproved of: but with the great question of Confederation still unsettled I hesitated. My resignation may create the impression that the Government was breaking up and thus may give renewed confidence and hope to those who were laboring for what I believe to be the ruin of the Country. Besides I felt satisfied that the Company could never raise the amount required by individual subscriptions and if they failed it would perhaps be well that I remained in the Council to urge it anew to commence with the work as a Government undertaking. (I had had some cause of dissatisfaction before - chiefly that many of the most bitter partizans of the defeated party were retained in office to the great detriment of the public since as I believed, and I thought I would bear this also as long as possible that as far as I was concerned the advocates of the Quebec Scheme should have no opportunity of carrying out their designs.)

The Company tried to raise subscriptions and as anticipated were unable to raise the amount required. They then applied to the Common Council and that body much to my surprise without taking the pains to ascertain the real position of the Company agreed to ask power from the Legislature at its next Session to take Stock to the amount of $60,000.

The Executive again met in Fredericton. This was the last meeting held before Your Excellency's return to the Province. Previous to the meeting Mr. Smith when in St. John asked me to examine the list of subscribers
which he had got. I told him I could have nothing to do with this matter. In Council the subject was talked of and it was stated that Mr. Cudlip had examined this new list of subscribers, the doubtful names it was said had all been struck out and had declared the parties were all able to pay the amount of their subscription. It seemed to be the general understanding that the subscription as it now stood including the conditional subscription of the Common Council should be deemed sufficient, but as far as I am aware no formal motion or order was made and when His Excellency the Administrator of the Government afterwards made some enquiries on the subject I understood Mr. Smith to say that the Council regarded the subscription as satisfactory but that no order would be made as the contract with the Queen would be submitted at the next meeting for approval. On the Saturday following Mr. Smith told me in St. John that Mr. Skinner was then preparing the contract.

On the following Monday morning to my amazement I saw it announced in the papers with all the air of authority that the Government had signed a contract or passed a Minute of Council approving of the contract - the papers could not tell exactly what, but something that gave the contract of the work. I was disposed at first to make light of this especially when I remembered that a few weeks before the Company through their Secretary published a statement about the affairs of the Company which from the papers submitted to the Council I knew to be absolutely untrue. The papers continued to discuss this matter and at length the Evening Globe published a paper signed A. J. Smith declaring in very formal style that the Governor in Council do approve &c. of the contract. I need not tell Your Excellency that the Governor in Council in Session on Wednesday and Thursday could not possibly have seen much less approved of a document which was not drawn up until the following Saturday. Nor had Mr. Smith received any authority to assume the functions of the Governor in Council as he must have done if that document be not spurious.

The Company seemed to make little progress. They held meetings in Bangor and passed resolutions but they raised little money and there seemed no prospect of their being able to meet the conditions of the contract with Messrs. Pierce and Blaisdell. At one time it was reported and believed that the bubble had collapsed. I had made no secret of my intention to resign. Almost immediately after the meeting of Council held in Fredericton in October I wrote to that effect to the Provincial Secretary and at an interview I had with the Attorney General after his election I told him that if the Company went on with the work I must resign. He tried to satisfy me that the contract affords ample security to the Province but contracts of this kind never have been and they never can be strictly enforced by the Government of this Province.

Yielding to the persuasions of my friends I deferred sending in my resignation until the work had actually begun. Many thought that the Company having failed so completely in their efforts to raise money would at the last abandon the undertaking and this for a time seemed probable as it was not until yesterday - the 9th. of November - they turned the first sod and by their contract they were bound to commence actual work on or before the tenth. No preparations for such commencement can be seen anywhere I believe: but I hear from the papers that the
Attorney General attended at the ceremony of turning the sod and that he afterwards at a luncheon declared he had full confidence in the ability of the Company, I can not therefore any longer postpone, with honour to myself or without violating the principles of Responsible Government and doing grievous wrong to my constituents, the surrender of my place in the Executive.

I do this, not because as some seem to suppose, I am absolutely opposed to allowing the Company to build the road, but because -

I can not persuade myself that with a capital at most of $200,000 the Company can complete this work.

My firm conviction is that the Company will never finish the road. It will answer the purposes of the political manoeuvres who are the main promoters of the Company if so much be done as will prevent any Legislative action in the matter next Session and will keep the road in their hands until the period arrives when in their opinion or their hope a new election will give this Province to Canada free of the debt which it would bear if Western Extension were carried on as a Government work. But if Mr. Poor and his associates by the sale of Bonds or otherwise, can raise more money than is required for keeping up a mere show of progress, still I believe that eventually and at no very distant day the Company having exhausted its slender resources and its unfounded credit must break down, and then the Govt. must step in and take the road with all its encumbrances, whatever be the conditions of the contract. The Government now so eager to avoid the trouble of doing this work themselves, so ready to believe that the Company has capital sufficient and can build the road, although the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming, will not be very prompt to avail themselves of the powers given them by the contract to take possession of the works - the very thing they must wish not to have - as when they do take possession they can not refuse to pay the debts on the road when almost every merchant shopkeeper and mechanic on this side of the Province will be the creditors, the Bonds will be a lien on the road, the Company will sell them at 85 in half payment for work the price for which seems to be exorbitant. How will it be when they want to sell them for cash and can issue without limit or restraint to the amount of two million dollars?

If this road do not ultimately cost the Province much more than it would if now undertaken as a Government work I am much mistaken, and moreover I am concerned that the completion of the work will be much delayed if indeed it be not indefinitely postponed.

And if I could believe that this Company will complete the work I would much object to their getting control of it on such terms. By the contract with the Maine Company the road is to be held and worked by that Company for a long period - ninety nine years if I remember correctly and they pay for it a rent equal to six per cent on the cost less the Provincial Subsidy. But as all the money except the $200,000 is to be raised in the States this means in effect that if the road be built the Americans will have the absolute control of it on condition only that they pay $12,000 a year to the St. John Company. At one of the Bangor meetings
one of the speakers said that Bangor must have control of the road and so she will if it be built by this Company - absolute control of it, charging what rates of freight she pleases, making what difference in the cost of transit and in the convenience of transit she chooses in favour of herself: making if she pleases the cost of transporting a barrel of flour from Bangor less than that of transporting it from St. John or the cost of transporting a million of shingles to Bangor less, and the trouble to the owner and the delay on the road much less. The American Company will have entire control of the road and it is not too much to dread that they will use it to divert trade from St. John to Bangor.

The Company too will be absolutely owners of the rolling stock and should a difficulty with the U. States ever unfortunately arise we may find this road of great use to our neighbours and worse than useless to us.

Another and I think a very important reason should prevent our giving control of this road to an American Company. Whenever the much talked of Intercolonial railroad is built it is of the utmost importance to the whole Province that it should run directly to the harbour of St. John so that we may derive some benefit from the trade it may bring. Were this road by the Douglas Valley owned by the Government, with the branch to Fredericton - or even by N. Brunswick Companies it would in all probability form part of the Intercolonial road, as when only that portion from Riviere Du Loup to Woodstock - if the frontier line were adopted or if as is probable the central line were preferred then only that portion from Riviere Du Loup to Fredericton would remain to be built and thus the trade would beyond doubt be secured for our own Province. But if the Intercolonial road be built as a national work and for purposes of defense it is manifest that neither the Imperial Government nor indeed the Canadian Government could consent that so important a portion of the road should be controlled by Americans. From the [indecipherable] to the mode in which money must be raised if raised at all the Americans even if we could suppose them disposed to act magnanimously must to save themselves demand a price for the road far exceeding the amount which a continuation of the Central line to [indecipherable] or Moncton would cost and in all probability this would be preferred and the Canadian trade whatever it may be would be lost for ever to our sea ports while Fredericton would lose all chance of direct communication with Canada.

I am aware that the law empowers the St. John Company thus to barter away the contract of the road, but I must think that the Government should have refused to give possession of the work to a Company which in order to procure means to make even a pretence of going to work is compelled in its desperation to make such a bargain.

I have the honour to remain
Your Excellency's Most Obedt. Servt.
T. W. Anglin

Hon. A. H. Gordon C.M.G.
Lieut Governor
&. &. &.
Appendix VI

Results of the New Brunswick Election of 1866.

The following results have been compiled from the files of the *Freeman* and the *News*. In several cases the results are incomplete. (E) denotes those successful in being elected to the Assembly.

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<td>TILLEY</td>
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Appendix VII

Roman Catholic Population and the Anti-Confederate Vote: St. John County, 1866.

The percentage of Catholics within an electoral subdivision has been computed on the basis of the 1871 Census. The percentage of the vote cast against Confederation within these subdivisions was computed using the figures which appeared in the Freeman on June 7, 1866. Once again it was deemed advisable to use a single set of figures for the basis of comparison since the electors voted 'the ticket' almost without exception. The individuals chosen this time are the ones who stood lowest for their respective party (Wilmot for the Confederates and Anglin for the Antis). The amount of percentage decline from 1865 (1865 percentage minus 1866 percentage) is also given.

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<th>% of Catholics</th>
<th>% Anti vote</th>
<th>Amount of % decline from 1865</th>
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<tr>
<td>St. Martins</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carleton</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen's</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duke's</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>57.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simonds</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>52.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
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<td>King's</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>41.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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In chart form the statistics appear as follows. The unbroken line represents the percentage of Catholics in a particular subdivision arranged in ascending order. The dotted line stands for the percentage of votes cast within the same subdivision for the anti-Confederate candidate in 1866. The line with crosses is the Anti vote in 1865 and is given for
purposes of comparison.
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2. Articles

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