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by

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1. **Introduction**

This note derives the appropriate generalization of the Rawlsian welfare function to cases involving uncertainty. Under axioms due to Samuelson [5], it is shown that the attitudes toward risk and inequality can be essentially independent. However, if a plausible postulate due to Harsanyi [2] is additionally imposed, "infinite risk aversion" is implied. This dramatizes the role of this postulate in linking the attitudes towards risk and inequality.

2. **Formulation of the Problem**

Consider a gamble involving a finite number of distributions of income to the N members of society. Such "simple gamble" may be written

\[ \mathcal{E} = \{(c^1_i, p_i), \ldots ,(c^n_i, p_i); \, i = 1, \ldots , N\} \]

where the distribution of income

\[ \{c^j_i\} = (c^j_1, \ldots , c^j_n) \]

obtains with probability \( p_i > 0, \) and

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i = 1 \]

(A more general formulation would involve a general probability distribution. This would necessitate more sophisticated analysis but does not add essential content.) It will also be convenient to define

\[ \mathcal{E}_i = \{(c^1_i, p_i), \ldots ,(c^n_i, p_i)\} \, i = 1, \ldots , N \]

which is the probability distribution of income from the point of view of the \( i \)th individual.
A "compound gamble" is a gamble where the outcomes are, in turn, gambles. Such a gamble will be written

\[ \tilde{b} = \{(\tilde{c}_1, q_1), \ldots, (\tilde{c}_m, q_m)\} \]

and can be reduced to an "associated simple gamble" with certain outcomes. In fact, "compound gambles" will be taken simply to be abbreviations for the "associated simple gamble" (see Samuelson [5]).

Denote then the set of all "simple gambles" involving a finite number of income distributions as \( \mathcal{U} \). It is desired to find a preference ordering, \( \prec \), defined on \( \mathcal{U} \) in such a way that

\[ \{([c_i],1)\} \prec \{([d_i],1)\} \]

if and only if

\[ \min_{i} c_i \leq \min_{i} d_i \]

that is, such that the preference ordering reduces to the Rawlsian case under certainty.

The axioms needed for "consistency" of the ordering are from Samuelson [5].

**Axiom 1** (Completeness) The preference ordering \( \prec \) is a complete ordering of \( \mathcal{U} \), which is continuous in the probabilities.

**Axiom 2** (Independence) If

\[ \tilde{c}^j \sim \tilde{d}^j \quad \text{where} \]

\[ \tilde{c}^j, \tilde{d}^j \in \mathcal{U}, \quad j = 1, \ldots, m \]

(and \( \tilde{c} \sim \tilde{d} \) means \( \tilde{c} < \tilde{d} \) and \( \tilde{d} < \tilde{c} \))

then
\[(c^1,q_1),\ldots,(c^m,q_m) \sim (d^1,q_1),\ldots,(d^m,q_m)\]

where \(q_i > 0\), \(\sum_{i=1}^{m} q_i = 1\) are any probabilities generated independently of the outcomes of the \(\tilde{c}^j\) and \(\tilde{d}^j\).

3. Generalization of the Rawlsian Criterion

Consider now two arbitrary members of \(\mathcal{H}\),

\[\tilde{c} = \{(c^1_i, p_i),\ldots,(c^n_i, p_n)\}\]

and

\[\tilde{d} = \{(d^1_i, q_i),\ldots,(d^m_i, q_m)\}\]

Since a Rawlsian criterion holds under certainty,

\[(c^1_i,1) \sim \min_{i} c^1_i, 1\]

and

\[\{d^1_i, 1\} \sim \min_{i} d^1_i, 1\]

That is, there is indifference between any distribution of income and a distribution assigning everyone the minimum income of the first distribution. Hence by Axioms 1 and 2,

\[\tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d} \text{ if and only if } \tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d}\]

where

\[\tilde{c} = \{(\min_{i} c^1_i, p_i),\ldots,(\min_{i} c^n_i, p_n)\}\]

and

\[\tilde{d} = \{(\min_{i} d^1_i, q_i),\ldots,(\min_{i} d^m_i, q_m)\}\]

Thus the comparison between \(\tilde{c}\) and \(\tilde{d}\) is equivalent to the comparison between gambles involving only equal distributions of income, \(\tilde{c}\) and \(\tilde{d}\), respectively.
Denote the subset of \( \mathcal{U} \) which contains all such gambles as \( C \). Given Axioms 1 and 2, the expected utility theorem holds on \( C \). (See Samuelson [5].)

Hence \( \tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d} \) if and only if

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j W(\min_i c_i^j) \geq \sum_{j=1}^{m} q_j W(\min_i d_i^j)
\]

for some welfare function \( W(\cdot) \) expressing an arbitrary attitude towards risk per se. In other words,

**Theorem 1.** For any two gambles in \( \mathcal{U} \), \( \tilde{c} \) and \( \tilde{d} \) say, \( \tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d} \) if and only if

\[
E \min_i W(\tilde{c}_i) \geq E \min_i W(\tilde{d}_i).
\]

Hence this is the desired (unique) extension of the Rawlsian criterion to include uncertainty.

**Note:** This rules out another apparent generalization,

\[
\min_i E W(\tilde{c}_i)
\]

which is, in fact, inconsistent with Axiom 2, as the following example shows. Take two people, and,

\[
c_i^1 = 0 \quad i = 1
\]

\[
= 1 \quad i = 2
\]

and \( c_i^2 = 0 \) \( i = 2 \)

\[
= 1 \quad i = 1
\]

Axiom 2 implies

\[
\{(c_i^1, \frac{1}{2}), (c_i^2, \frac{1}{2}) \} \succ \{(0, 1)\}
\]

However,

\[
\min_i E W(\tilde{c}_i) = \frac{1}{2}(W(0) + W(1)) > W(0),
\]

which is a contradiction.
4. An "Individualistic" Postulate

Suppose now that, if two gambles are indifferent from the point of view of every individual, then they are indifferent from the social point of view. (This is "Postulate c" of Harsanyi [2].) In other words,

Postulate 1 If \( \tilde{c}_i \) and \( \tilde{d}_i \) involve the same outcomes with the same probabilities for \( i = 1, \ldots, N \), then \( \tilde{c} \sim \tilde{d} \).

Although this postulate has a plausible ring to it, it contradicts the existence of the welfare function, \( W(\cdot) \), as the following simple example shows. Take

\[
\begin{align*}
c_1^1 &= 0 & i &= 1 \\
&= 1 & i &= 2 \\
c_1^2 &= 1 & i &= 1 \\
&= 0 & i &= 2
\end{align*}
\]

and \( p_1 = p_2 = \frac{1}{2} \). Take on the other hand

\[
\begin{align*}
d_1^1 &= 0 & i &= 1, 2 \\
d_1^2 &= 1 & i &= 1, 2
\end{align*}
\]

and \( q_1 = q_2 = \frac{1}{2} \). Postulate 1 requires indifference between \( \tilde{c} \) and \( \tilde{d} \). However

\[
E \min_i W(\tilde{c}_i) = W(0)
\]

whereas

\[
E \min_i W(\tilde{d}_i) = \frac{1}{2}(W(0) + W(1))
\]

However, if the requirement of continuity in the probabilities is modified to apply only for

\[
p_i > 0 \text{ for all } i,
\]

then there is a criterion satisfying the abbreviated Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Postulate 1.
Theorem 2. Under the above conditions, \( \tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d} \) if and only if \( \min_{i,j} c_{i} \geq \min_{i,j} d_{i} \).

That is, the criterion reduces to the lowest income received by anyone in any outcome.

Proof  By Axiom 2, as in Section 3,
\[ \tilde{c} \sim \tilde{c} \]
and this is independent of the number of people involved. Consider then an approximation for \( \tilde{c} \),
\[
\tilde{c}(N) = \{([c_{1}], \frac{1}{N}), \ldots, ([c_{N}], \frac{1}{N})\}
\]
where, arbitrarily,
\[ c_{1} \leq c_{2}, \ldots, \leq c_{N} \]

By Postulate 1,
\[ \tilde{c}(N) \sim \tilde{c}^{1}(N) \]
where \( \tilde{c}^{1}(N) \) is obtained by rearranging outcomes in such a way that person \( i \) receives \( c_{i} \) in outcome \( i \), and other income assignments preserve the personal probability distributions of income. Finally, by reapplication of Axiom 2,
\[ \tilde{c}(N) \sim \{([\min_{i,j} c_{i}], 1)\} \]
and similarly,
\[ \tilde{d}(N) \sim \{([\min_{i,j} d_{i}], 1)\} \]

By the modified assumption of continuity, then, \( \tilde{c} \succ \tilde{d} \) if and only if
\[ \min_{i,j} c_{i} \geq \min_{i,j} d_{i} . \]

Q.E.D.
Note 1: The attitude to risk here is analogous to the "minimax loss" criterion of statistics (see DeGroot [1], for example). It is continuous if

\[ p_i > 0 \quad \text{for all } i, \]

being constant, in fact. It is not continuous generally when

\[ p_i = 0 \]

due to the worst possibility might change.

Note 2: With a more general probability distribution, the criterion would become

\[ \text{ess inf } \left( \inf_{s} c_{i}^{s} \right) \]

where \( s \) parametrizes "states of the world" (see Rudin [4]).
FOOTNOTE

1A fully Rawlsian criterion would involve a lexicographic ordering. (See Rawls [3].) This is analytically intractable, but unlikely to be operationally different than the simplified criterion used here.

2In other words, \( c^1 = c^2 = \ldots = c^r \), so that \( r_i/N \) approximates the probability of this outcome. A similar approximation holds for other outcomes.

REFERENCES


