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Shifting Notions of Citizenship in the Netherlands: exploring cultural citizenship and the politics of belonging through neighbourhood spaces in Rotterdam

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Anthropology

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Shifting Notions of Citizenship in the Netherlands: exploring cultural citizenship
and the politics of belonging through neighbourhood spaces in Rotterdam

(Spine title: Shifting Notions of Citizenship in the Netherlands)
(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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and the politics of belonging through neighbourhood spaces in Rotterdam**

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ABSTRACT

Notions of citizenship in the Netherlands are increasingly shifting away from liberal models of civic citizenship that, in theory, promote diversity, pluralism and multicultural understandings of citizenship and are moving, instead, towards a monocultural and assimilationist understanding of national identity and belonging. This trend, known in the literature as the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ constitutes the primary topic of this project.

In this dissertation, I argue that official and populist discourses concerning non-western Muslim immigrants in Dutch society today work to inscribe difference onto “foreign” (“allochthonous”) residents of the Netherlands while upholding an idealized notion of “Dutch identity”. My research revealed that it was not just government-sponsored integration programs that reproduced dominant understandings of belonging or difference through integration activities, but also the everyday discursive practices of Dutch “natives” (called “autochthons”) who, at times inadvertently, reproduce exclusionary notions of national identity and belonging.

My ethnographic research, based in three different neighbourhoods in Rotterdam (Bergpolder, Liskwartier, and Nieuwe Westen), revealed how local and national discourses of belonging are expressed in everyday practices. Although other scholars have explored immigrants’ integration and the politics of belonging in the Netherlands, this project makes a contribution by exploring ideas of belonging using space as an entry point for analysis, paying particular attention to how individuals use, access, and understand neighbourhood public places. Using Ryan Centner’s concept of ‘spatial capital’, I argue that “autochthonous” individuals are more spatially privileged in their

ability to define and design public places in the neighbourhood than individuals who would be perceived as “allochthonous”. Contrary to the declared objectives of official citizenship “tests” and integration programs, the process itself reproduces boundaries and differences between “autochthons” and “allochthons”.

Keywords: belonging, integration, citizenship, everyday spatial practices, Dutch national identity, ‘spatial capital’, Rotterdam, the Netherlands

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Dedication

This project is dedicated to those I lost during its process: Valerie; Lloyd; and Agnes. The lessons you all gave in bravery and perseverance were invaluable and allowed me to complete this lifelong dream. Thank you.

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**INTRODUCTION:
NEGOTIATING BELONGING TO THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY OF THE NETHERLANDS**

In 2009, I met Hendrikk, a retired Dutch anthropologist who moved to the Netherlands in 1957 from Indonesia, a former Dutch colony. For years he worked with the municipal government of Rotterdam, designing immigration policies for the city. As the father of three and husband to a municipal politician, Hendrikk was involved in numerous community projects and local political activities. Although he has lived elsewhere in the Netherlands, he and his wife settled in Rotterdam 30 years ago and they have no intention to move from this diverse and ever-changing city. During one of our interviews, he told me an interesting story.

A few months earlier, he and his wife had taken the tram into the city-center. The tram was very busy and there were no seats available until two young Turkish men offered their seats up. They proceeded to strike up a conversation with Hendrikk and his wife. One of the young men asked Hendrikk's wife: "We've seen you on the television before, haven't we?" to which his wife agreed, having been involved in a dramatic political story concerning Rotterdam's finance minister just a few months before, explaining her role as the party spokesperson to the press. Their conversation eventually came to the question of belonging. One of the young men asked: "So what do you think? Are we Dutch, or not?" to which Hendrikk responded, "Well, of course, why not?" The young man's question and Hendrikk's response illustrate the dominant discourse of national belonging in the Netherlands which draws a distinction between Dutch 'natives' and those perceived as 'foreigners' living in the country.

Hendrijk went on to express his views concerning the importance of belonging and its current representations in the popular media by saying:

They (the young men) were born here and have grown up here, but the media gives them the idea that they are not welcomed here. I think that is why they were asking us for confirmation ‘Do you think we are Dutch, or not?’

Hendrijk’s account suggests that larger social and political narratives, present in the media and in the political sphere, have influenced the ways in which individuals who are non-European immigrants or their descendants see themselves in relation to a Dutch ‘majority’¹.

Hendrijk’s encounter with the Turkish men in the tram has to be placed in its historical context. In the last two decades, when national boundaries were said to be dissolving, in practice, Europe became “Fortress Europe” tightening and securitizing its borders against immigrants and asylum seekers, and has witnessed a re-inscription of national borders, and the rise of conservative political trends and Islamophobia. Unsurprisingly, citizenship rights in liberal democracies and the more subjective question of national belonging have shifted. In the Netherlands, as in other European countries, “culture” has emerged as a euphemism to distinguish “us”, meaning white, Christian Europeans, from “them”. Dutch sociologists Jan Willem Duyvendak, Menno Hurenkamp, and Evelien Tonkens (2010) have argued, in this context, that the ‘cultural integration’ of individuals into Dutch society now takes precedence over their ‘socio-economic

¹ The terms the ‘majority community’ or ‘moral majority’ are used by Dutch sociologist, Jan Willem Duyvendak, to denote those citizens and residents who are thought to be a part of a majority group of citizens known as “the Dutch” who have a collective progressive and liberal set of values and norms (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009). I acknowledge that this term is problematic because the idea of a ‘majority’ is connected to modernist politics of governing bodies over their citizens through the manufacturing of a ‘naturalized governance’ that limits contestations against said governing bodies (Shore and Wright 1997, 24). It is also problematic for its assumption of ‘progressiveness’ which automatically assumes the backwardness of those who do not fall within this group. The use of this term in my own work is problematized as the ethnographic examples show how the ‘moral majority’ has dissenting, subjective interpretations despite contemporary political understandings.

integration'. Duyvendak et.al call this phenomenon the *culturalization of citizenship* which they define as “a process in which more meaning is attached to cultural participation (in terms of norms, values, practices, and traditions), either as an alternative or in addition to citizenship as rights and socioeconomic participation” (2010: 237). Dutch scholar Willem Schinkel has also argued that discourses concerning integration policy for immigrants in the Netherlands today are best categorised as ‘culturalist’. He believes, however, that the shift in understanding citizenship is best described as the *moralization of citizenship* which effectively works to exclude those individuals who do not live up to the ideals associated with Dutch identity and who fail to meet the criterion of ‘active citizenship’ (2008). In a later publication, Schinkel and van Houdt describe moral citizenship as “an extra-judicial normative concept of what the good citizen is and/or should be” (2010: 698).

In the context of this dissertation, I understand citizenship as a concept that changes over time. Croucher defines it as a “socio-political formation of belonging that draws upon nationhood and ethnicity for its content” (2004: 193). Turner on the other hand proposed that the definition of citizenship includes not just a connection to rights and obligations toward the nation-state but also ideas of cultural norms and practices of belonging to the wider community (van de Veer 2002: 97). Ideally, liberal democratic systems are supposed to promote civic citizenship or civic nationalism that are based on the principles of equality and individual freedoms and rights, in contrast to ethnic nationalism and other xenophobic forms, which privilege a particular culture, religion, or an “ethnic” group over another.

When looking at how ideas of citizenship today unite or divide citizens of the Netherlands, however, it is clear that civic citizenship is giving way to a Eurocentric ideal based on what is dubbed by many scholars and officials as “cultural citizenship”. Schinkel argues that it is non-western immigrants² and Muslims who are predominantly identified as lacking cultural integration and therefore are seen to exist on the ‘periphery’ of society (2008; van den Berg and Schinkel 2009). Dutch researchers at the University of Amsterdam –Duyvendak, Tonkens, and Peter Geschiere – describe this cultural understanding of citizenship as a “restorative” response in the wake of global and national stresses that have left understandings of “Dutch identity” uncertain. This restorative response identifies new citizens (such as recently-landed immigrants) as being left out from the imagined community³ of the Netherlands and in need of integration (Duyvendak et al. 2010; Hurenkamp et al. 2011; Tonkens and Hurenkamp 2011). According to the authors, those identified as outsiders are thus unable to find a way to belong to the majority community and to feel at home in the country where they reside.

In my own work, I have also found evidence that supports a *culturalist* turn in citizenship that takes perceived “Dutch” characteristics as a marker of one’s belonging to the imagined community of the Dutch “nation”. I argue that larger social and political discourses, which at times are overtly racist and prejudiced, are reproduced through the mundane practices of everyday life. As I considered the government-led initiatives to

² Non-western immigrants are defined by the Dutch national statistical bureau, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) as those immigrants who were born, or have one parent who was born in Turkey, Africa (referring predominantly to immigrants from Morocco), Latin America, and Asia (with the exception of Indonesia and Japan) (2011).

³ The imagined community refers to Benedict Anderson’s (1991) definition of the “nation” which he defined as an ‘imagined political community’ where individuals imagine their connection between one another through “deep, horizontal comradeship” (6-7). I use this definition of the “nation” because it highlights the social construction of this political entity. As Mitchell (2000) argues, social understandings of the “nation” can be politically forged (Hague 2004: 20).

integrate (and, at times, assimilate) non-western immigrants and Dutch Muslims, it became evident that everyday actions of ordinary citizens also reproduce, at times inadvertently, exclusive understandings of Dutch belonging⁴. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the processes of culturalizing citizenship through the actions of government officials and “native” residents of Rotterdam.

Rotterdam is an ideal site in which to conduct research on belonging and the politics of “Dutch” identity, since it is one of the most diverse, poorest, and historically politically-conservative cities in the Netherlands (one only has to remember that Rotterdam was the stomping ground for Pim Fortuyn⁵). The ethnographic material for this dissertation was collected in 2009 and 2010. I used ‘the neighbourhood’ as an entry point for my analysis and conducted research in three different neighbourhoods. Two neighbourhoods, called Bergpolder and Liskwartier, were located in Rotterdam North and the other, called Nieuwe Westen (New West) in Delfshaven was located in the city centre. I chose the first two neighbourhoods because they had a diverse population. Furthermore, Bergpolder was part of a list of ‘problematic neighbourhoods’ for which it received increased funding for social and integration programs. Although these neighbourhoods were quite diverse, I also conducted research in Nieuwe Westen, Delfshaven where immigrants were the majority population and which was known as one

⁴ This question of belonging has been explored by other scholars like Ooscar Verkaaik (2010), Willem Schinkel (2008, 2010, 2011), Marnie Bjornson (2007), and Peter Geschiere (2009).

⁵ Fortuyn was the first politician to take an open stance against non-western immigration and what he saw to be conservative values in Islamic rhetoric. Fortuyn was murdered for his views by a “native” citizen of the Netherlands who viewed Fortuyn’s politics as too brutal and stigmatizing.

of the most problematic neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, in terms of what government officials regarded as low levels of social cohesion, safety, and security⁶.

In these neighbourhoods, I had opportunity to observe how exclusionary distinctions between the Dutch and “non-native” Others are expressed through, and inscribed in, space. I considered, for example, how exclusionary notions of belonging are enacted through: 1) the securitization of particular neighbourhoods and groups; 2) behaviours implicitly or explicitly promoted or discouraged in public places; and 3) mundane spatial practices, like gardening. In analyzing these practices, this dissertation sheds light on the ways in which dominant constructions of Dutch identity, perceptions of ‘active citizenship’, and understandings of belonging fit in within the trend of culturalizing citizenship in the Netherlands.

Background Context

I was interested in conducting research in the Netherlands because my mother was born there, and, for a time, lived in the southern province of Maastricht. Although I did not learn the Dutch language while growing up, the Netherlands held a particular fascination for me throughout my life. While I completed my Masters at the University of Sussex in Brighton, England in 2004, I began to read news stories of social unrest in the Netherlands that quite surprised me. I had perceived the Netherlands as a land of tolerance, typified by the legality of soft drugs, prostitution, and euthanasia. I had pictured it as a quiet landscape with windmills slowly rotating against the backdrop of lush green polders.

⁶ My approach follows that of other anthropologists who have previously demonstrated the importance of neighbourhoods in forming community and individual identities and (re)producing social difference (Billig 2005, Bestor 2010, Engle Merry 2010, Low 2010).

Yet, 2004 was a year of turmoil for the Dutch, as one of their ‘own’, Theo van Gogh, was murdered by an Islamic extremist, who was born and raised in the Netherlands. According to the frenzy of news reports, Mohammed Bouyeri had killed van Gogh for his role as director of a film that criticised what the film-maker believed was the Quran’s views on women. Subsequent news stories spoke of this event resulting from ineffective integration politics and representative of the lack of social unity and cohesion across different communities living in the Netherlands (van der Veer 2006). This act, and others leading up to it (see Chapter 1), were seen to signal the presence of a community of outsiders, officially categorized as “allochthons” (literally ‘foreigners’) by Dutch authorities, who lived alongside the so-called “autochthons” (literally ‘natives’) population, but not as part of one cohesive community. The murder of van Gogh was thought of as the culmination of a series of happenings that signalled the worsening state of separation among the Dutch population and the ‘last straw’ for those Dutch who still supported a multicultural approach to integration for the country’s immigrants (Buruma 2006). From this point on, everyday life changed for the “allochthonous” population and for those residing in urban centers where the majority of this population lives.

In response to such events, the government changed its integration approach to be more assimilative, capitalising on this moment to tighten immigration standards and methods of naturalization that had steadily grown more strict since the late 1990s. Furthermore, after the murder of van Gogh, definitions of this outsider community were more explicitly outlined not only in the rhetoric of Dutch officials but in the everyday language of ordinary citizens (cf. Penninx 2006). There emerged a hierarchy of immigrants distinguished according to their level of integration. There were those

immigrants from previous colonies who were seen as being sufficiently integrated because they spoke Dutch well and their children mixed freely with the white, “Dutch” children. Then there were those immigrants from Turkey and Morocco whose general inability to speak Dutch marked their inadequate integration into the economic, social, and political spheres of Dutch society, and who were seen to predominantly socialize within their own communities (Duyvendak et al. 2009a: 15). Here, Turkish and Moroccan background was not considered the leading factor in negatively affecting this group’s failure to meet Dutch standards of integration. Instead, the majority of this ‘problematic’ population were primarily identified as Muslims (van den Berg and Schinkel 2009). This religious identity became the most significant attribute associated with perceived difference vis-à-vis the “autochthonous” community by politicians and policy makers alike because Muslims are perceived to have divided loyalties that stops them from fully integrating into the progressive ‘moral majority’ of the Netherlands (Allievi 2006; Sunier 2009b).

In the name of tolerance then, the Dutch are intolerant of certain ‘cultural’ differences. Whether it be through imams who denounce homosexuality, a lifestyle choice that has come to signify tolerance in the Netherlands (Mepschen et al. 2010), or through the perceived oppression of Dutch Muslim women, signified by their wearing of headscarves in the ‘free’ open public places of urban city spaces throughout the Netherlands (Moors 2003), in popular consciousness, Islam has largely come to be viewed as essentially fanatical, and Muslims as potentially violent. Since the 1970s, religious identity has increasingly gone out of favour among the majority of “Dutch” inhabitants (van der Veer 2006). The fact that the majority of past integration programs

used Islamic institutions as a means for integration is lost on many ordinary citizens and is a fact that is often ignored by Dutch officials (Entzinger 2006).

Literature Review

When discussing the politics of belonging in the context of the Netherlands today, I am inevitably talking about social labels or identity categories such as citizen and immigrant, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, and ‘native’ and ‘foreigner’ in the Dutch context. My understanding of ‘identity’ here aligns with other social scientists who regard identity as a social *construction* as opposed to something that is primordial or essential (cf. Eriksen 2002, Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 13, Hall 1997, Massey 2004). The process of identity construction is embedded in power formations and relations of inequalities within larger economic structures and specific discursive fields (Sunier 2005: 322). Many scholars have argued that identity is created in relation to other individuals; in this manner, the process of creating one’s ‘self’, automatically creates an ‘other’ (cf. Said 2000, Hall 1997, Baumann and Gingrich 2004). As argued by Stuart Hall, in a culturally diverse or pluralistic society, any difference deemed significant by the majority population usually results in the creation of binary categories of “us” and “them” (1997: 229). In the Netherlands, Muslim immigrants have come to be seen by many as the source of all Dutch societal problems, and are thus categorized as the ultimate ‘other’ in relation to the Dutch “us” (van der Valk 2002, van Bruinessen 2006, Sunier 2005, Lechner 2008). This dichotomy, however, ignores the ways in which these categories have changed over time.

Instead, I understand identity formation as a process that is not singular or something which happens in isolation, but as a relational process involving other

individuals and larger social, cultural, political, gendered, “ethnic”, and historical perceptions of oneself in relation to others, and as a process that is ever changing (Soysal 1997, Abu-Lughod 1991), at once chosen and imposed. This literature allows me to see the constructed nature of identity in a manner that allows for the possibility of contestation and change. It further allows me to understand the construction of national identity in the Netherlands as an ongoing process which, in the current political context, and for the reasons mentioned above, is becoming sharply fixed around specific “Dutch” traits.

The Dutch cabinet defined an individual with “Dutch identity” as someone who was an ‘active citizen’ and has a “‘Dutch’ and liberal acculturation” (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010: 700). According to Schinkel, the requirements of such ‘acculturation’ include: speaking the language; completing education; gaining income; contributing to the economic welfare of the state; raising one’s children in a Dutch manner; and ensuring one’s own (and one’s children’s) ‘curiosity’ about the Dutch culture (2008: 24). That is, one’s identification as “Dutch” is based on an understanding of *citizenship* that is defined in cultural and moral terms. In highlighting these determinants for integration, “autochthonous” Dutch culture and behaviour are normalised and represent the standard against which “allochthonous” behaviours are measured, and in this case understood as being deviant and problematic (ibid; see also Roggeband and Verloo 2007).

Peter Geschiere (2009) has argued that categories of “allochthons” or ‘foreigners’ and “autochthons” or ‘natives’ have gained increasing social purchase⁷ in the

⁷ With regard to the use of the “allochthon” and “autochthon” terms, there is a growing disfavour with the use of these terms among politicians and social scientists. Scholars have requested that social scientists not use these terms because it oversimplifies a very complex group of individuals and glosses over a very complicated issue. I agree that the use of these terms is problematic; however, these terms came to

Netherlands (see also Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). These discourses are often bred and maintained in the popular imagination through what he sees to be the growing exclusionary politics and support for right-wing political parties since the year 2000. These fears and exclusion of the “allochthon” community were exacerbated by the marginalisation of these people’s place in relation to the Dutch “nation” (2009: 37). One result of this, as noted above, has been a drive on the part of Dutch integration authorities at the national and municipal levels to increase efforts to integrate, and at times assimilate, “allochthonous” residents into Dutch society.

Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) argue that citizenship and nation-building processes result in a quest to understand belonging, which instead of creating a sense of certainty among ‘native’ populations, increases levels of uncertainty. These processes tend to negatively and disproportionately focus on immigrants as outsiders in an attempt to delineate insider status. Evidence of this in the Netherlands can be seen in Essed and Trienekens’ recent report (2008) on news coverage in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2005. According to Essed and Trienekens, in the mid-nineties, the focus of news stories about multiculturalism (which included the themes of immigration and non-western immigrants) was on discrimination against immigrants, in a general sense. From 1999 until 2002, however, media attention turned to the criminality of immigrants and the rise of asylum claims. Between 2002 and 2005, there was a steep increase in the number of articles concerning (perceived) cultural differences and integration of immigrants, a theme that coincided with a focus on Muslim extremism in and outside of the

represent the lines by which ‘difference’ was marked. My interlocutors would often use these terms when defining themselves, not necessarily with negative connotations, but as a way to describe their social and cultural understandings of societal positioning and contexts. In this dissertation, I use these terms because dismissing these terms altogether would ignore the importance placed on these categories and their role as social frames (Goffman 1974) of perception among my interlocutors.

Netherlands. Trends in language shifted away from ‘asylum seekers’ toward perceptions of immigrants’ ethnic origins and to the more all-encompassing “allochthon” category. News coverage of “allochthons” peaked in 2002 until the category of Muslims eclipsed it. According to the authors, 54 percent of news articles in 2005 discussed Muslims and questioned their place in a ‘liberal’ and ‘multicultural society’⁸.

In a report released in 2008, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) found that “Muslims of the Netherlands have been the subject of stereotyping, stigmatising and sometimes outright racist political discourse and of biased media portrayal and have been disproportionately targeted by security and other policies” (36-37). While these negative accounts coexist with other accounts that provide a more diverse, balanced, and positive representation of ethnic minorities, there is a persistent negative representation in the press and on the television (van der Valk 2002: 7). The accumulated result of these discourses creates what Hall defines as a “regime of representation”, that is, an entire collection of imagery and visual effects through which difference is represented at any one historical moment (Hall 1997:232). This negative and homogenised view of Islam and Muslims fosters the perception of a radical difference between the Dutch majority on one hand and Muslim immigrants on the other (Silverstein 2005).

In the Netherlands, the politics of belonging must also be contextualized within the global trend of Islamophobia, defined as the fear of Muslims and vilification of Islam (Werbner 2005) which has become commonplace in ‘the global North’ (cf. Asad 2003, Said 2001, Sunier 2009b). Within Europe today, the banning of minarets, the prohibition

⁸ The idea of the Netherlands as a multicultural society has been debated by Dutch scholars. For most, the idea of Dutch multiculturalism could be better described as disassociation in the past, and, more recently, as assimilation for non-western immigrants (see Vink 2007 and de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2008).

of *burqas* in public (all in the name of protecting the ‘liberal’ values of Europe) signal the trend towards intolerance vis-à-vis Muslims. Within the Netherlands, “good Muslims” and “good immigrants” are often judged by their willingness to participate in local events as a means to demonstrate their level of integration in Dutch society (Kaya 2009). This idea of participation is related to understandings of active citizenship (cf. Putnam 2007). Those who do not participate, then, are seen to have other loyalties. For the “native” Dutch, participation in the public sphere (in civil society) is a positive attribute, but is not a requirement for belonging; in other words, they belong because of who they are, not because of anything they contribute to society. In contrast, immigrants and especially Muslims have to show evidence of their belonging, measured by the attribute described earlier as “active citizenship”. Participation in local community events, or the lack thereof, for example, was one way in which “native” residents of the neighbourhoods where I worked could establish and confirm their integration into the broader community. As other social scientists (Modood and Kastoryano 2006: 171, Vijver et al. 2007) have found, immigrants are often asked to conform when in public spaces, which points to the significance of carrying out ethnographic work in public places in my own research.

As argued by Adrienne L. Burk (2010) in her recent ethnography of the process and effect of erecting women’s monuments in Vancouver’s public parks, it is important to consider how a public space functions in order to understand how exclusions are internalized by those who experience these spaces (Burk 2010: 92-93). She looks at how both physical exclusions in public parks (e.g. bylaws or arrest), as well as exclusion through more subtle means (e.g. refused service or harassment), influence one’s use and perception of that space over time. Burk goes on to argue that:

Public space is profoundly implicated in the process of “othering”, that is, of defining not only what (and who) is dominant, but what (and who) is deviant, and holding these elements in a hierarchical tension centered on the illusion of agreement about social norms of non-disturbance (2010: 93).

Burk’s approach to public places is instructive for my study as it shows how different individuals might come to understand one another through their use of, and experiences in, places that provide opportunities for interaction among them. Her approach is informed by Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), who argues that the interaction between individuals in space (and with the space itself) valorizes certain relationships between people in particular places, which in turn creates particular understandings about how one *should* use/act in a particular shop, café, open park, or sidewalk (2010: 93). Over time, these “consensuses” are shared among individuals who use that space. Neither Burk nor Lefebvre argue that these consensuses cannot change over time, but instead provide a framework by which to analyse how certain individuals’ understandings of public places are privileged over others.

In my research, I consider how language, the practices of bodily comportment in space, and public participation in the community were used to identify difference among members of Rotterdam’s population. These became telltale factors as to one’s place within the imagined community of the Dutch “nation”. It was through my investigation of behaviour modelled in public places that I was able to explore the manner in which the Dutch government and “native” residents impose a cultural understanding of citizenship.

Spatial Practices and the Politics of Belonging

My theoretical perspective draws on Michel de Certeau’s focus on everyday spatial practices and Lefebvre’s ideas on the social production of space. During my

research, I explored how individuals establish and imagine the connections among themselves, the larger understandings of cultural identity, and the place they were in, by paying attention to their 'spatial practices'. By spatial practices, I mean those practices by which people construct or define place. Here, I followed Certeau's focus on the practices of 'everyday life' and on how people "produce" the spaces they inhabit by insinuating their own intentions and desires onto those spaces usually designed by others (1984). For example, as de Certeau shows, through their choice in direction to a destination, their unique style of walk, and their selection of important places along the way, pedestrians create their own space in the city. I find de Certeau's focus on the everyday practices of ordinary people, rather than just on the practices of those who are in charge of creating and enforcing behaviours in space, valuable, because it resonates with anthropologists' interest in how ordinary people experience and negotiate structures in everyday life.

De Certeau's theories about spatial practice are also useful because he acknowledges the differential power of individuals over space. De Certeau argues that dominant space is formally shaped by "strategies" of the "strong": the architects, city planners, and government officials of a city, who have 'formal authority' over space (1984: xix, 117). These dominant understandings of space and their intended use, however, can be resisted at certain times by the creative use of that space (what de Certeau calls "tactics") by the "weak" (1984:xiv). De Certeau argued that while on the surface these tactical actions might appear to be conforming to the strategies of those in power, they are, in fact, attempts at consuming space in a more individualised manner (1984:xiv). Despite these creative incursions in space, de Certeau does not believe that

the “weak” can actually challenge the authority of the “strong” because the “weak” lack official authority and power over space (1984: xix).

De Certeau’s theory of space has been criticised for the rigidity of his categories of the “strong” and the “weak”, for his failure to consider the effect that interplay or feedback between these two groups would have on the outcome of spatial practices, and for the antagonistic relationship he presumes to be the case between these groups. While de Certeau’s binary perspective is somewhat limited, his understanding of how individuals are placed within a larger spectrum of weaker and stronger positions allows me to better understand the potential social hierarchies that influence individuals’ interactions in place, and their potential influence over that place. In my study it seemed useful, for example, to distinguish between those with ‘official power’ over space (Dutch authorities) and the role that ordinary citizens, the “autochthons”, could play. De Certeau’s ideas are also useful because of his attention to how individuals, regardless of their social dominance, can “subvert” dominant understandings of space. Here, I am referring to ways in which Muslim immigrants are seen to challenge Dutch dominance through their behaviour or appearance in public space in ways that denote their religious, cultural, and social difference (see Chapter 4; cf. Sunier 2005, van Bruinessen 2005). This is an important avenue for anthropological research, however, this project focuses more on the processes associated with the culturalization of citizenship from the “autochthonous” perspective.

Henri Lefebvre’s concept of space is also instructive when looking at the composition of space. In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre argues that the analysis of space should include three interrelated (and simultaneous) aspects of space that he calls

the spatial triad: first, spatial practices (*perceived space*); second, the representation of space (*conceived space*); third, representational space (*lived space*) (1991[1974]:33).

Lefebvre's *perceived space* can be understood as representing the material aspects of space (physical space), which aid or deter a person's sense of location and the manner in which a person behaves (Merrifield 2006:110). Lefebvre's *conceived space* represents the dominant space in society as it is conceived through symbols, codifications and abstract representations. Like Michel de Certeau, Lefebvre argued that the primary creators of this space are scientists, planners, urbanists, etc. who play a significant role in providing official knowledge and understanding of how space ought to be used (1991:38-39; 41). Lefebvre's *lived space* represents "the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users'" (1991:39). According to Lefebvre, lived space is alive and fluid (*ibid*), and it is also a space where individuality, deviation and diversity are produced and reproduced (Watkins 2005:213).

Lefebvre's spatial triad allows one to envision the possible interconnections and feedback between the practices of everyday users, dominant representations and understandings of space, and the physical make-up and construction of particular places. In this sense it provokes one to consider the power dynamics involved in the production of space without assuming *a priori* that power rests with any one actor. Lefebvre, like de Certeau, invites me to recognize the way in which those marginalized groups within Dutch society assert their individuality and "difference" on dominant space. Yet, unlike de Certeau who over celebrates these "subversive" acts, Lefebvre forces me to make room for the difference that access to formal authority and material resources makes in asserting one's understandings of space. Ultimately, as will be shown throughout this

dissertation, the power to change, influence, and control space in the Netherlands today remains with those urban planners, government officials, and “autochthonous” individuals who have a monopoly on cultural and material capital.

Another theorist that I have found helpful is Pierre Bourdieu. In an *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1998[1977]), Bourdieu demonstrates the importance of individuals’ ad hoc decisions, tactics, and strategies, which he believed were based on socialized dispositions that could neither prescribe nor predetermine individuals’ actions. Using this approach, Bourdieu provides a dual focus for everyday events: one that acknowledges societal and environmental influences on human action, and the other, on the ways in which humans (through their daily practices) reproduce, change, and transform larger social structures, relationships, social understandings, and the environment itself. In this way, Bourdieu’s everyday practices, like Lefebvre’s understanding of space, explore the interaction between human agency and larger material, social, political, economic, and historical frameworks.

Concerning one’s position within society, Bourdieu sees class and social inequality as the product of four types of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic (Webb 2002). Symbolic capital is the form that the other capitals (economic, cultural and social) take when they are perceived and recognized by others as legitimate (van den Berg 2011: 504). In this way, class and social inequality are not only based on political and economic structures but also on cultural tastes and social networks. Those that have access to such capital, through their successful portrayal of tastes and access to social connections (which include the ability to convince others of these capacities), are the individuals who most likely decide what is valued among particular social groupings

(ibid). I argue that like social, cultural, and economic capital that are linked to Dutch citizenship, having “spatial capital” is also important to facilitate community belonging.

Ryan Centner uses the concept of spatial capital to discuss how dot-commers, whom he regards as the privileged class in San Francisco during the dot-com boom, are able to use and exert privilege to shape places in everyday life (2008). Centner’s work focuses on how these individuals were able to enact “a much more geographically free-ranging engagement with the city” (2008: 294). Centner’s theory of place-making shows how *the privileged* (those rich with social, cultural, and economic capital) are able to access and ‘take place’ (the spatialized form of symbolic capital). This finding was reiterated in my own investigations of spatial practices in the neighbourhood.

Centner’s work is also instructive because, like my own, he uses both elements of Lefebvre’s spatial triad (lived, conceived and perceived spaces) and Bourdieu’s elements of capital and habitus in his analysis of everyday practices. For Centner, acquiring spatial capital entails using other forms of capital (social, cultural and economic), as displayed through a particular ‘habitus’ (which could also be seen as Lefebvre’s “lived space”), which enables particular claims on material space (Lefebvre’s “perceived space”), that must then be recognized as a legitimate claim to that space (2008: 197-198). The use of space in relation to one’s social, cultural, and economic position, is central to my investigation.

Methodology

In line with the standards of anthropological research, I conducted fieldwork for a period of 12 months in Rotterdam, Netherlands (Bernard 2006). I began my research by

approaching one of the neighbourhood centres in Rotterdam North, the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) and asking if I could volunteer and participate in weekday activities. Here, I was able to volunteer as a bicycling instructor and a homework leader, and I gave English lessons to residents living in the local community. I conducted participant observation on a weekly basis during Dutch language programmes, scheduled coffee times, arts and crafts workshops, holiday celebrations and ‘women’s hours’. This centre was also used to give citizenship courses, which I attended once a week, and was the meeting spot for a committee of residents and officials who took ‘walk-about’s around the neighbourhood to surmise its level of safety and security. Although I relied on some contacts that I had made during my preliminary fieldwork trip, the majority of people I worked with during this research I met through my explorations of the neighbourhood and my participation in local events.

In addition to the neighbourhood center, there was another office where neighbourhood affairs were coordinated by community workers (*Opbouw* workers⁹) who were employed by the district government, which also became an important place for me. Here, I was able to join the neighbourhood committee for Liskwartier, the heritage group for the Hofbogen (defunct) train line, the planning committee for the Independence Day celebration, and the residents’ committee for the gentrification project in Bergpolder South. This office was located around the corner from where I lived and thus became a ‘check-in’ spot throughout the week.

⁹ These employees have a support role that focuses on bettering the quality of life in a neighborhood or district (territorial) for targeted groups (categorical). These workers also seek to develop and maintain a high quality of services and good relationships among residents, pertinent institutions, and companies. See What is Opbouwwerk at: <http://www.movisie.nl/smartsite.dws?id=116493>.

As a foreigner myself, albeit a “western immigrant”, I was allowed insight into some of the official integration processes. These activities included language courses and immigration appointments. For example, on two occasions I had to present myself to the ‘Aliens Police’ upon my arrival in Rotterdam in order to extend the duration of my visa. As mentioned above, I was able to participate in citizenship classes that provided a different insight into my ‘expat’ language courses. During these and other associated activities, I was able to explore how educational facilities prepared citizenship candidates for the use of public places, and learned which places had particular kinds of behaviour ascribed to them. I was also able to discuss with the instructors and other students their experiences of the integration system and how these services have changed in relation to changing social and political processes, for example, how immigration policies have changed over the last decade.

In total I conducted 82 interviews, of which 54 were tape recorded. These sessions ran between 45 minutes and three and a half hours. During these interviews, I used non-standardized, open-ended methods which allowed for the interviewees to take the lead in determining the path of our conversations, albeit revolving around the themes of my study. These interviews shed light on individuals’ experience with, and understandings of, “Dutch identity”, “allochthon” versus “autochthon” categories, and prescribed behaviour in public places, among many other things. I also conducted group interviews on two occasions with the women from my conversation circle and with a separate language class.

In addition to my interviews and the time I spent at organized activities, I explored the environment to document place names and areas of significance for locals

(through presence), and take note of daily interactions and happenings within the neighbourhood and Rotterdam on the whole. In order to explore how alternative uses and meanings of place are created, I asked certain participants to identify places of significance and explain why these places were more important than others.

It is important to understand that while I spent my days in the field with so-called “allochthonous” individuals - mainly women in the local integration courses, language courses, providing homework lessons for “allochthonous” children (that were often a lesson in Dutch language for myself) or English lessons for a group of second-generation Turkish young women - the majority of my interviews occurred with those who would be considered “autochthonous”. Thus, while my participant observation was predominantly spent as an immigrant among other “foreigners”, the majority of my formal interviews, although not all by any means, were carried out with so-called “autochthonous” individuals. This follows up on calls for more “autochthonous” based research in the Netherlands (Sunier 2009a) and can also be partly explained by my position as a woman who, while a “foreigner”, was not seen to fit the “non-native” mold in the Netherlands.

Organization of the Thesis

In chapter 1, I provide a historical overview of Rotterdam which evolved into an important urban center largely focused on its harbor, and the subsequent urban renewal projects. Exploring urban planning projects and policies is important to understand how they change over time and shape the creation and understanding of neighbourhood spaces. In this historical overview, I also incorporate an outline of immigration and citizenship policies (both national and municipal) to trace the shift from diversity and

multicultural models towards “cultural citizenship.” The history of Rotterdam’s urban planning is interconnected to its past immigration policies, both of which shed light on the use and meaning of urban public space by various segments of the population, including those considered Dutch “autochthons” and those non-western “allochthons”.

Chapter 2 looks at government initiated integration measures and citizenship requirements for “allochthonous” individuals. Using the examples of citizenship courses at the local neighbourhood centre, as well as integration programs on public streets in problematic neighbourhoods, this chapter examines how difference is created by programs that try to discipline students into appropriate public behaviours.

Chapter 3 looks at how particular places in the neighbourhood are created, usually by facilitating the active participation of “autochthonous” individuals, while excluding “allochthons” from the process itself, due to the way programs have been designed and implemented. The chapter challenges the notion ‘active citizenship’ and participation, by closely examining how programs usually result in exclusion and not social cohesion.

Chapter 4 explores how security and safety programs in Rotterdam map undesirable difference onto certain spaces (“allochthonous” neighbourhoods) and populations (“allochthonous” youth). It further investigates official initiatives to “civilize” these populations and territories.

Chapter 5 continues to consider the reproduction of cultural difference in the Netherlands but approaches the subject through a consideration of stereotypical “Dutch” spatial practices, such as biking and the use of urban gardens in front of one’s house. This chapter investigates the role of these perceived “Dutch” traits in the creation of an understanding of cultural citizenship. This chapter also explores the ways in which

“autochthonous” individuals reproduce dominant understandings of “allochthonous” difference and design exclusive spaces for their own community.

Chapter 6 situates the insights from the previous chapters into the context of the Dutch debate concerning the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. This chapter draws attention to the importance of spatial aspects in this debate. It also explores the uses of ‘spatial capital’ as a means to rearticulate the connection between “nation”, space, and identity toward a more inclusive understanding of ‘citizenship’ and belonging to imagined community of the Netherlands.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND DESIGNING PLACES AND DESIGNER PEOPLE

In Rotterdam, non-western immigrants constitute 37 percent of the population, and like Amsterdam, over 50 percent of Rotterdam's population was born outside of the Netherlands (this includes non-western immigrants as well as western and other EU workers) (COS 2011a). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the category of non-western immigrants refers mainly to those individuals of Moroccan and Turkish background and to a lesser extent, Antilleans. As such, Rotterdam is an important and appropriate site to conduct research on citizenship and national belonging, especially since the city has a conservative political history, where political parties and trends have used the presence of immigrants to mobilize around what they perceive to be an authentic Dutch national identity and culture.

This chapter provides background knowledge about Rotterdam's physical and demographic changes since the Second World War (WWII). It argues that public spaces are designed to create and accommodate certain actions, behaviours and identities. As such, people who are seen as "different" and do not belong in these public places are taught, disciplined and/or pressed to conform to prevailing norms. Non-western immigrants in particular receive much attention from government and civil servants who attempt to shape their demeanour in public places. But first it is necessary to provide a brief overview of Rotterdam's history of urban renewal projects since WWII, and to outline changes in immigration policies since the 1970s. The policies addressed here are those that influence and target non-western immigrants, to illuminate how certain identity categories and discourses emerged and developed over the last 60 years.

Designing Place: a history of Rotterdam's built space

Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague are the four largest cities in the Netherlands, and all are located in the western part of the country. Taken together, these four cities form an urban network known as 'the Randstad' and are often grouped together by policy makers, because most of the population live in them and experience similar urban problems.

Rotterdam was established in the 13th century as a settlement built around the dam of the river Rotte. Between 1880 and 1914, Rotterdam developed its harbour to become the largest in all of Europe and throughout the world (van Ostaaijen 2010: 73). By the start of the 20th century, employment in Rotterdam's port had attracted over 300,000 residents to the city (ibid). Even prior to this dramatic population growth, the municipality struggled to meet the needs of its ever-growing population. Residents of the city-center often found themselves living in slum-style housing and in overcrowded, dilapidated houses with absentee or neglectful landlords (ibid).

On May 14, 1940, during WWII, Rotterdam suffered huge structural damage (in addition to human losses) when German forces bombed the harbour and razed much of the city-centre to the ground. As a result of the bombardment, approximately one thousand residents were killed and 78 thousand were made homeless (van Ostaaijen 2010: 73). In addition, roughly seven thousand commercial and industrial buildings were destroyed. Following liberation in 1945, Rotterdam's leaders focused on rebuilding the economic infrastructure through the regeneration and industrialisation of its harbour (ibid). In addition, urban planners reconstructed Rotterdam's city centre where retail

enterprises were built along a square grid and who designed wide roadways to accommodate the increasing number of cars in the city (van Ostaaijen 2010: 74).

From 1945 until the 1970s, Rotterdam's government addressed housing shortages produced first by the war, and later, by growing migration (both internal - rural to urban, and external - transnational movements); in addition to these shortages, maintenance and renovation of existing poor quality housing also became important (KEI 2011 a). Much of the housing built to fill these shortages were rental apartments in both low- and high-rise buildings, controlled by housing corporations that were subsidized by the government. These housing blocks were composed of cheap and quick prefabricated materials that were similar in architectural design on the outside and inside (ibid). During this initial design stage, the architectural approach to building renewal saw these housing blocks erected around local facilities that further incorporated green and public places. Typically these homes would be rented by people with less financial means, such as immigrants and their families.

Due to the recession in the 1970s and the mechanization and industrialization of the harbour operations and fishing industries in the early 1980s, 80 percent of employees associated with the harbour lost their jobs. This event raised the number of unemployed from 15,000 in 1970 to 50,000 people in the mid-1980s (van Ostaaijen 2010: 74). Guest labourers from Turkey and Morocco were among those hardest hit during the recession, and unemployment rates among non-western immigrants were higher than any other immigrant or native group (van Liempt and Veldboer 2009: 89). The Dutch actively recruited 'guest workers' (*gastarbeiders*) from Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Morocco who could immigrate to the Netherlands first and then apply for work permits after they had

landed (Doomernik 2004: 32). At this point in time, the Dutch attitude towards these guest workers was one of economic necessity and of temporality. These guest workers were expected to come in, work, and then return to their respective homelands once the employee shortages were over (Vink 2007: 339). Despite worldwide events such as the 1973 Oil crisis, which shook the Dutch economy and decreased employment opportunities, the Netherlands continued to accept workers and even began accommodating the unification of their families. Unemployment continued to be an endemic problem in Rotterdam throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Thus, economic recovery and the revitalization of urban districts remained a priority for the Dutch government (as it had been since WWII).

In 1995, the government introduced the Major Cities Policy (*Grotestedenbelied*) that focussed on improving the physical, economic, and social aspects of urban neighbourhoods. Changes were made to Rotterdam's housing and public areas, while economic approaches sought to increase employment and entrepreneurship opportunities in the city (Burgers 2009: 133). With regard to the social aspect, social scientists measured and addressed perceived 'social cohesion' problems of areas with high concentrations of immigrants (ibid). As with earlier government initiatives, it was thought that physical and economic improvements in the neighbourhoods would not take hold in the community unless problematic social situations were also addressed. In this way, physical renewal was thought to be a step toward a better quality of life through the creation of a more defined physical infrastructure and with extra attention given to bolstering social cohesion in distressed areas (Burgers 2009: 134).

Dutch geographers Ronald van Kempen and Gideon Bolt have argued that the concept of social cohesion is rarely defined in Dutch policy literature despite its popularity among national policy makers¹⁰ (2009). These authors acknowledge the various uses and definitions associated with the term ‘social cohesion’ but define this concept as the “glue holding society together” as a result of bottom-up processes whereby residents make social contacts with other like-minded residents who come to feel as part of a communal group in a particular area (458). According to the authors, Dutch policy makers have used the term in relation to ‘social mixing’ among members of diverse groups (whether economic, social or cultural groupings) with the intent to solve problems associated with at risk neighbourhoods with homogeneous populations¹¹.

The quality of life in most post-war neighbourhoods, according to a the Knowledge Centre for Urban Planning (*Kenniscentrum Stedelijke Vernieuwing* or KEI¹², was (and remains) “threatened by unpopular site design, (excess) pollution, social insecurity, the disappearance of neighbourhood (local) shops, (and an increase in) crime, vandalism, addiction to drugs or alcohol, and social tensions between different (ethnic) groups” (KEI 2011a). As a result, the demographic trend in neighbourhoods with high levels of subsidized housing was the out-migration of middle and upper income households to surrounding suburban areas, where one can find larger housing stock and

¹⁰ They argue that the lack of clarity concerning this term makes achieving goals of increased sociability in the neighbourhood, very difficult (van Kempen and Bolt 2009).

¹¹ According to Dutch policy makers, social mixing was thought to bolster positive social outcomes, such as: “social cohesion, social mobility opportunities, more social capital, better services, less crimes, an improved neighbourhood reputation, and more residential stability”(ibid: 460). More recent neighbourhood integration policies, however, have focused on the potential negative consequences of residential segregation on the integration of minority ethnic groups. These initiatives tend to advocate for the assimilation of minorities (van Kempen and Bolt 2009: 464, 471; see below).

¹² Created in 2000, KEI is a non-profit organisation which seeks to collect and disseminate historical and contemporary information on Dutch urban renewal projects. This organisation is funded in part by the Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning as well as by private institutions.

“liveability” in the neighbourhood (ibid). The government believed that if urban neighbourhoods were renewed to the satisfaction of these residents, then their out-migration to the suburbs would slow down, and those upper and middle class residents who stayed behind could (better) take care of the area and increase the level of social cohesion in the neighbourhood (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009: 61; see chapter 3).

Following the implementation of the Major Cities Policy, the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM) turned its attention to former industrial sites (e.g. harbours) while continuing to work on post-war neighbourhoods (KEI 2011a). Officials at VROM continued their three-pronged efforts of improving the physical, economic, and social aspects of the city, with the release of the New Urban Renewal Policy document in 1997. The authors of this document concluded that to combat (middle and upper class) urban out-migration, planners needed to increase the number of the more expensive, owner-occupied residences through construction, renovation, or amalgamation of existing housing stock into larger dwellings (ibid). Thus, reconstruction efforts during the late 1990s identified households according to level of income in order to create economically-mixed neighbourhoods (ibid).

In addition to these changes, the policy advocated using a neighbourhood approach (*wijkaanpak*), according to which the neighbourhood would be used as the unit by which to implement policies. This focus on the neighbourhood began in 1999 under the ‘Vision 2010’ document (van Ostaaijen 2010: 76). This approach divided up city-wide projects into area-specific problems that allowed district managers and government officials to implement creative solutions to localized problems. According to a flyer outlining the neighbourhood approach, this program sought to “strengthen the economy

and social cohesion and (improve) ... neighbourhoods and (the) living environment” (ibid). Underpinning the official discourse concerning distressed areas was the assumption that physical (lack of care of one’s neighbourhood, for example) and economic problems were due to the absence of social cohesion. These areas typically had high turn-over rates of residents, low social mobility, low income levels, and ethnic segregation and social isolation from larger society.

In 2000, VROM published a new policy document entitled: ‘What People Want, Where People Live’ (KEI 2011 a). This policy focused on providing ‘quality’ as opposed to ‘quantity’ accommodations, and consequently, the Ministry switched its approach to incorporate the entire ‘residential environment’ (ibid). Thus, renovation to a neighbourhood included improvements not only to housing stock, but also to public green spaces and local shops. It sought to increase employment opportunities, social participation programs, and various amenities such as sport facilities and neighbourhood centres (ibid).

In 2002, VROM (which is a national-level ministry) established 56 ‘priority neighbourhoods’ that would receive accelerated support for urban renewal programs and which sought to stimulate social and economic welfare (KEI 2011b). This program was implemented nationwide and incorporated such tools as: ‘impulse teams’ in which experts were sent to areas deemed to be in need; a handbook of methods for determining renewal demands that outlined achievable projects and their implementation; and facilitation schemes to encourage partnerships among various stakeholders in the community (for networking purposes) (KEI 2011a). As it turned out, Rotterdam had the most priority neighbourhoods out of all other cities within the Netherlands.

Despite these efforts and throughout the early 2000s, policies directed at urban renewal were bogged down in bureaucracy and lacking in effective implementation. Even VROM Minister Kamp was only half-hearted about the success of the 56 neighbourhood program, as is evident in his words: “Tackling the run-down areas is a long-term process. One should not expect miracles in a year. People should feel a healthy anger and ask what they would like to change in their (own) neighbourhood. Then something will happen” (KEI 2011b). In order to combat growing discontent, Rotterdam’s government began focusing on quantifiable results such as building 3000 houses every year (van Ostaaijen 2010: 134, 142).

In addition to inefficiency, the issue of safety became increasingly severe. From 2002 and onward, urban planning began to focus on increasing the level of safety in urban neighbourhoods and upping the number of police in those spaces known for criminal activity (such as drug trafficking), or other problems, such as the (mis)use of public places (see Chapter 4).

In 2007, the next VROM Minister, Vogelaar, established *Krachtwijken* or ‘empowerment neighbourhoods’. *Krachtwijken*¹³ were a group of 40 neighbourhoods (some of which overlapped from the previous 56 problematic districts) that were set to receive additional funding from the government with the goal of increasing liveability and educational attainment levels, decreasing unemployment rates, cracking down on safety concerns, and monitoring how children were being raised through schools and integration programs (KEI 2011a). These neighbourhoods were also popularly known as *Vogelaarwijken* (after the Minister), or more disturbingly, *achterstadswijken* or ‘backward neighbourhoods’.

¹³ *Krachtwijken* denotes more than one problem neighbourhood, while *Krachtwijk* is just one.

In general, Krachtwijks were those neighbourhoods with an abundance of lower income residents and social housing; there were few ‘liveable spaces’ (such as green or child-friendly spaces); and typically, a sizeable immigrant population (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009: 62). As such, Krachtwijk funds were used to address issues of integration of immigrant residents, whose lack of Dutch cultural knowledge and language skills was thought to be negatively influencing the level of social cohesion, and thus, the state of liveability (Bergpolder en Liskwartier 2011a).

The area where I conducted the majority of my fieldwork, Bergpolder, is one such Krachtwijk. Bergpolder is a district in northern Rotterdam that received its name from the polder¹⁴ it was built upon during the early 1930s, polder ‘Berg’ (KEI 2011c). The neighbourhood is easily accessible to the city center and is in the immediate vicinity of one of Rotterdam’s busiest highways, the A20. Bergpolder is sandwiched between the neighbourhoods of Blijdorp and Liskwartier and is situated just north of the much larger Old North (*Oude Noorden*), which like Bergpolder, is a designated Krachtwijk.

Bergpolder has three notable landmarks: the Bergpolderflat (designed by van Tijen in 1933) known for its unique ‘gallery apartment’ style design; the sport center/swimming pool that is in the style of ‘New Building’; and the Hofplein viaduct (KEI 2011c). The Hofplein viaduct is a 1.9 kilometre train line that was constructed in 1908 and runs through the heart of Rotterdam North (ibid). Under the viaduct, there are archways (called *bogen*), which are used by artists and entrepreneurs as business spaces. The Hofplein viaduct used to transport passengers from Rotterdam to the North Sea in The Hague, and was one of the first electric railways in the Netherlands (Project Bureau Hofbogen). As of August 2010, the line and its stations were closed down, although there

¹⁴ A polder is a piece of low-lying land reclaimed from the sea and protected by dikes

are plans to renovate both the top platform and the archways underneath the tracks.

During my time in Rotterdam there were many groups and events dedicated to planning out the future of this large building and throughway into the city centre.

In terms of housing, the majority of housing stock in Bergpolder is privately owned; there are, however, social housing apartments that are owned by Vestia (25 percent of the 4700 available subsidized housing) (KEI 2011c). Vestia is a private housing corporation, which is a company that provides cheap, clean and well-made accommodation for individuals who could not otherwise afford such housing, called social housing (ibid). Housing corporations were once government-owned associations but are now privately-run businesses that must answer to government officials; despite this, their mandate remains the provision of affordable accommodation for those most in need in the Netherlands. Rotterdam has the highest number of social-housing accommodations in the Netherlands.

The majority of this social housing was built during the construction boom of the 1960s and 1970s in a ‘trap house’ design (KEI 2011c). Trap houses share one staircase with anywhere between two and four different apartments (on the second floor) and with an apartment on either side of the staircase on the ground floor. This type of housing was created for lower to middle class families, whereas more expensive single-family dwellings can be found in the next district to the east, Blijdorp.

There are approximately 7600 residents who live in Bergpolder and since much of the housing stock is quite small, the area is largely populated by students, young single professionals or senior citizens. Demographic evidence shows that 49.2 percent of the population was between the ages of 20 and 34 in 2010 (COS 2011b). According to

Rotterdam's Centre for Research and Statistics (COS), the largest demographic group in Bergpolder are the native Dutch at 58 percent, followed by other European and western immigrants at 15 percent (2011b). The Turkish and Moroccan populations comprise a total of ten percent of the neighbourhood's population, while the Surinamese community comprises six percent (ibid). Despite its diversity, social integration among individuals is not thought to be a problem (KEI 2011c).

With regard to other measures, such as safety, Bergpolder has rapidly shed its status as a 'threatened neighbourhood' and in 2003 (and ever since) became a 'safe haven' according to the yearly safety index (Rotterdam Safety 2009; also see Chapter 4). While the majority of Krachtwijken are designated as such due to issues of safety or social cohesion, Bergpolder was designated on account of its smaller housing stock, the state of disrepair to those privately-owned houses, and the fact that the neighbourhood borders a highway which brings noise and air pollution to the inhabitants. On the whole, satisfaction with living in the neighbourhood stands at 89 percent of residents, due largely to the decrease in instances of drug-related violence, destruction, and general nuisance (ibid).

According to the latest City Vision 2030 (*Stads Visie*) plan released in 2010, politicians and city planners wish to see Bergpolder increase the gentrification of its privately owned housing (KEI 2011c). As with previous urban planning initiatives, the City Vision sought to encourage middleclass residents to settle in Bergpolder in order to diversify areas with a majority of low income households; it is thought that higher income residents will enhance the social and economic circumstances of those lower income residents. Despite research that showed such renewal schemes were not

necessarily successful, Dutch urban planners continue in this vein of urban gentrification projects (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009; Musterd and Pinkster 2009).

With Krachtwijk neighbourhoods, there is a certain amount of funding put aside for social programming in the neighbourhood, to boost income levels and broaden individuals' social networks. The economic stability of residents and immigrants' upward socioeconomic mobility are thought to generate social, economic and political capital (whether through having more time, more people to help, more knowledge, etc.). In turn, these programs are believed to create a more active and productive citizenry in Dutch society. In recent years, this programming has taken on an assimilative approach, especially in Rotterdam which has the most social interventionist programs of all Dutch cities (Duyvendak et al. 2009a: 17). As introduced in the previous chapter, non-western immigrant communities are seen to be *the* community that lags behind in economic, social and political life (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2008; Duyvendak et al. 2009b). Thus, much of the social programming in the area of Bergpolder sought to increase levels of social cohesion. To discuss Bergpolder's social programs and their effects, it is necessary to contextualize these within the larger history of immigration policies, and the programs and methods that have the integration of immigrants as their ultimate aim.

Overview of national and municipal policies for non-western immigration

Rotterdam has a long history of labour immigration because of the employment opportunities provided by its harbour. The first group of immigrants to settle in Rotterdam in the 1960s came from Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy. In the 1970s, a large group of Yugoslavian immigrants moved to Rotterdam to work in the harbour's

metal industry. Although peaking during the mid-1970s, immigration from Morocco began in the early 1960s because of the political unrest in Morocco and after the Algerian border was closed due to the Algerian War of Independence (Kaya 2009: 126). As a result, immigrants turned to the Netherlands and other western European countries for seasonal labour opportunities (ibid). At the same time, the Dutch began actively recruiting unskilled labour from Turkey to fill manual labour positions in Rotterdam and throughout the Netherlands. Immigration from Turkey and Morocco, however, was meant to be 'circular' in which so-called guest labourers would return home after their employment opportunities were over. Yet, this circular immigration became 'normal immigration' as labourers brought their families to settle in the Netherlands (Kaya 2009: 127).

According to a report created by Rotterdam's Department of Social and Cultural Affairs entitled, *Changing Policies on Immigrants in Rotterdam*, there are four identifiable immigration policy phases beginning in the 1970s and up until 2001 (Veenman 2001). This report concerns policies that affect non-western immigrants because of their perceived sluggish social and economic integration. These phases include (but are not mutually exclusive as they are a synthesis of past and contemporary policies): (1) an accommodating policy until 1978, (2) an anti-deprivation policy from 1978 until 1989, (3) a citizenship policy from 1989 until 1998, (4) a diversity policy from 1998 until 2001 (Veenman 2001: 9). I address each one in turn.

In order to prepare for the eventual return of the guest workers to Turkey and Morocco, the Dutch government encouraged non-western immigrants to maintain their unique cultural identities through the *accommodation policy*. This policy supported the

creation of social work agencies that used national funds to help facilitate inter-cultural networks (Veenman 2001:9). This act was in line with, although not officially included in, the Dutch pillarization (*verzuiling*) system.

The pillarization system in the Netherlands was in place from 1917 until 1960s, in which the state funded various civic organizations run through religious institutions and ideological organizations (or pillars). During this time, people's everyday lives were informed by their membership in a particular religious or political pillar through separate (state-funded) schools, hospitals, social support agencies, newspapers, trade unions, political parties, and media outlets. These pillars historically consisted of Catholics, Protestants, as well as socialists, liberals and humanists. During its height, leaders or representatives from each respective pillar worked together on communal issues; however, ordinary citizens would often work, socialize, and frequent businesses that were run by members of their own pillar community. This segregated lifestyle was best known through the Dutch maxims "living apart together" (Entzinger 2006: 124) and "good fences make good neighbours" (Kaya 2009: 118).

Pillarization went out of fashion in the 1960s, due to its inherent paternalism and the growing tendency in Dutch society towards secularisation of the public sphere (Entzinger 2006: 124). Despite this, the government continued to fund immigrants' organisations based on religious and ethno-cultural categories well into the 1980s. It was thought that like the Protestant and Catholic institutions in the past, Muslim organisations would eventually dissolve into liberal individualism (Kaya 2009: 120); however, immigration officials now argue that this form of accommodation reinforced

segmentation of the community as Islamic communities are having trouble integrating into the larger society.

The government used other measures by which to facilitate integration for non-western communities. This included asking employers to provide adequate housing for their employees, providing access to free healthcare, as well as education for the children in these communities in their 'native tongue' (Entzinger 2006:123-4). As mentioned above, the economic recession following the oil crisis of 1973 resulted in a restructuring of low-skilled manual labourer into jobs requiring qualifications that the average 'guest worker' did not have. Many of the guest workers found themselves laid off, and unemployment in Rotterdam increased from eight percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1995 (Veenman 2001: 5). Despite the high unemployment rates, immigrants continued to settle in Rotterdam.

Before the 1970s, the immigrant population in Rotterdam constituted approximately one to two percent of the entire population. However, the percentage of immigrants living in Rotterdam swiftly increased; in 1975, six percent of the population were identified as immigrants, which jumped to 20 percent in 1985, and 30 percent in 1990 (Veenman 2001: 4). Tensions associated with these demographic changes mounted, and in 1972 certain neighbourhoods in Rotterdam experienced race riots directed at visible minorities (van Ostaaijen 2010: 80). With the rapid increase of immigrants settling in Rotterdam from the late 1970s onwards, immigration policy accordingly also changed.

In response to growing immigration, Rotterdam authorities tried to limit the number of immigrants living in a particular area. This was based on the assumption that

high concentrations of “ethnic” groups increased anxiety in the larger society over a perceived threat that immigrants posed to the ‘Dutch way of life’ in low income zones. This attempt, however, was thwarted by the national government due to its discriminatory nature and because it violated the Dutch Constitution (Veenman 2001:10). At the time, Rotterdam officials were still working under a national immigration agenda and therefore, their only recourse was to request that national level officials adopt a more restrictive immigration policy (ibid).

In 1978, Rotterdam’s municipal authorities released the *Immigrants in Rotterdam* policy, or what they called the *anti-deprivation policy* (Veenman 2001: 10). This policy continued to work toward solving socio-economic imbalances according to national standards. Throughout this decade, however, Rotterdam sought to develop its own immigration policy and program independently from the national immigration agenda (Veenman 2001: 10-11). In the view of the municipal authorities, social solidarity in the city was diminishing, and it was therefore necessary to encourage immigrants to become socially and politically involved at the municipal level (Veenman 2001: 11). To this end, Rotterdam passed a law in 1979 allowing immigrants to campaign and vote in municipal elections as long as they had lived in Rotterdam for at least five years.

In 1979, the Advisory Council for (national) Government Policy (WRR) released a report called *Ethnic Minorities* which it submitted to the national authorities. The Council confirmed that guest workers and their families were in fact not returning to their home country as originally intended. This report supported the creation of ‘social work’ policies that would facilitate the integration of those minorities who were perceived to be “anti-social”. Such socialising policies were used in the past on post-WWII immigrants

from Indonesia who were seen to be lacking Dutch morals and not contributing economically or politically to Dutch society (Kaya 2009:128). Examples of such policies included family education where men of “anti-social families” were trained how to be on time for work, show respect to their superiors, and recognize their place within the social hierarchy, while women were taught how to cook Dutch dishes, raise children, and keep house (ibid).

The national government acted upon the WRR’s report and in 1983, the Minister of the Interior released the *Ethnic Minorities Policy*. The overall purpose of this policy was to create “a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities for their development” (Entzinger 2003: 63). Informally, this policy supported individuals’ identification with their cultural or “ethnic” identities while concurrently promoting their integration into society (ibid).

It is important to note that the *Ethnic Minorities Policy* was the first time that the government labelled certain minority populations according to their perceived “ethnic” affiliations and as a state responsibility (Entzinger 2003: 62). Based on this directive, municipalities focused on socially deprived areas in the Randstad where large numbers of immigrants had settled (Veenman 2001:6). The overarching drive of this policy was to facilitate the inclusion of ethnic minorities, both western and non-western immigrants alike, into Dutch society, conceived as a multicultural society (Entzinger 2003:68).

On the national level, immigrant communities were seen to be integrating well because they were taking advantage of the cultural support programs and thus supporting the multicultural agenda. Yet, despite municipal efforts for skill retraining and

employment within the city, the socioeconomic situation of immigrants remained largely the same throughout the early 1980s, due to the down-sizing of industries that provided manual job opportunities. In 1988, Rotterdam published *The Memorandum on Policies toward Minorities in the 1990s* that sought to influence the upcoming WRR report submitted to the national government in 1989.

The WRR's report stated that their original report had put too much emphasis on multicultural policies and not enough stress upon promoting participation and involvement of individual immigrants in civil society. The previous policy was seen to encourage immigrants' dependence on public support programs, such as welfare, that perpetuated a cycle of marginality (Entzinger 2003: 70), as well as promoting conservative religious identities that were hindering immigrants from integrating (Kaya 2009: 129). Instead, the Council recommended that more emphasis be put on education, employment policies, and Dutch language training courses so as to better facilitate ethnic minorities' integration and participation in Dutch society (Entzinger 2003: 70). In this council package, culture was relegated to the private life and a stronger emphasis was put on "nationality", a discourse that had been submerged since World War II. According to Buruma (2006), nationalism was a taboo topic because it was linked to nationalistic (Nazi) projects of WWII and Dutch complicity in sending Dutch Jews to Nazi extermination camps (19). Therefore, comments that could be interpreted as being nationalistic or racist were not yet common in everyday language.

During the 1990s on the national level, the report termed *Allochtonenbeleid* (Immigration Policy) introduced a new classification of ethnic minority groups. It was at this time that Statistics Netherlands (CBS) first made the distinction between "western"

and “non-western” migrants. The act of classifying certain immigrant groups as more problematic than others – since non-western immigrants were most often associated with being the least integrated or having the lowest socio-economic and educational standing – further contributed to the rising discontent associated with increased immigration and in particular the increased number of non-western immigrants who moved to the Netherlands through family reunification policies (Entzinger 2003:70).

Politicians picked up on this thread of discontent and began to discuss the more controversial aspects of immigration in political rhetoric. Frits Bolkestein, at the time parliamentary leader of the neo-liberal conservative, centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), argued that Islamic and “Dutch” (read: “Western”) values were innately incompatible (Moors 2009: 395 n.). He instead suggested that “[i]mmigrants should adapt to the dominant cultural pattern and observe the existing rules wherever these clash(ed) with their own cultural background” (Entzinger 2003:71). Muslims living in the Netherlands were becoming more and more visible due to the increasing number of Muslim immigrants and following events such as, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Rushdie Affair of 1989, and the Gulf War in 1990 (Kaya 2009: 120-121).

When Bolkestein first voiced his suspicions about the threat of Islamic values to ‘Dutch secular liberal values’, he was made out to be a fear-monger and a racist (Buruma 2006: 29-30). Yet, much to the surprise of many left-wing politicians, Bolkestein’s views struck a chord with the Dutch populous. As it turned out, there was a silent majority who supported his views and this resulted in a change of political trends (Entzinger 2003:71-2). His arguments triggered a public debate on the national level concerning the presumed

incompatibility of Islam and “Western values” (Entzinger 2006: 126). This undercurrent was made apparent in the 1994 parliamentary elections when for the first time in almost a century, the Christian Democrats, who were the largest supporters of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, were defeated. The incoming coalition of Labour (PvdA), Liberals (VVD), and Democrats (D66), were able to shift integration gears away from respecting cultural diversity toward promoting immigrants’ participation in society (that would bring non-western immigrants into contact with Dutch values) as was evident in the changing immigration policies that drew a more assimilative approach to integration (ibid).

One of the most significant changes to come from this change in the political climate was the institution of the Integration Policy in 1994 (*Contourennota integratiebeleid etnische minderheden* from now on referred to as the *Contourennota*), which replaced the 1983 Ethnic Minorities document. The *Contourennota* emphasised immigrants’ required civic participation rather than the importance of maintaining their cultural diversity (Entzinger 2006: 126). Until this point, discussions of integration were thought off-limits in Dutch politics (Entzinger 2003: 72). Yet, the *Contourennota* focused on integration as the key term for its immigration policies. Integration was defined as “[a] process of leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Entzinger 2003: 72). In essence, this Integration Policy shifted the onus of integration away from the government onto ordinary citizens (ibid). Notably, this process emphasized the active involvement of the Dutch majority population as well as immigrants (ibid). Therefore, integration according to the *Contourennota* was not a one-sided affair but rather a two-way process (Entzinger 2003: 73).

The *Contourennota* also initiated several new policies. According to the Citizenship of Newcomers Law (*Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers or WIN*), introduced in 1998, all non-European (non-western) immigrants had to report to local authorities on arrival in order to determine whether or not they had to attend language and civic education courses that were available free-of-charge (Entzinger 2003: 77). If new immigrants did not go for an interview they could be fined up to €2269 (ibid). These policies sought not only to teach immigrants Dutch, but also provide them with knowledge about ‘Dutch ways’ (Kaya 2009: 131). This law went a step further than other integration laws, as it made a ‘social contract’ between the local council and the immigrants themselves. While the local government had to provide settlement programs that facilitated workplace and educational opportunities, immigrants were obliged to follow the program in its entirety or risk losing their benefits, such as welfare (ibid). Thus, while the onus for integration was on immigrants, the state continued to play the role of enforcer in integration facilities.

The emphasis of the *citizenship policy* phase was for individual citizens to build an independent existence. Ensuing policies included rewarding those who were thought to be sufficiently integrated (often finding a job was enough). Likewise, individuals were sanctioned if they displayed undesirable behaviours, for example, being anti-social, being unemployed, or if they were thought to engage in criminal activity (Veenman 2001: 13). Failure of the previous anti-deprivation policy was thought to be the fault of using a soft-handed (multicultural) approach by the central government (ibid). To this end, integration and immigration officials in Rotterdam’s municipal government continued to lobby for decentralized agenda for social reform.

The fallout from these policies (on both national and municipal levels) was mixed. Statistically, the children of immigrants were doing better in school and had a lower drop-out rate than previous generations (Entzinger 2006: 126-7). As Phalet et al. notes, surveys conducted in Rotterdam at the end of the 1990s, however, found that Turkish and Moroccan youth did not identify with the Netherlands as a place where they 'belonged' (Entzinger 2003: 75). Thus, policies to increase social cohesion among residents were not having their intended effect. This perceived distancing between "western" and "non-western" communities was evident in the phenomenon of 'white flight' from both residential areas and schools, that is, the out-migration of Dutch majority residents (the majority of whom had white skin colour) that was seen as an indication of decreasing inter-"ethnic" contact among Dutch communities living in urban areas (van Duin et al. 2011: 2). In the annual report on poverty released in 1996, 15 of 30 Dutch neighbourhoods where most people were on welfare, and which also had the highest proportion of immigrants, were situated in Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 2010: 81).

In 1998 after the release of the Effective Immigrant Policy (*Effectief Allochtonenebeleid*), the final stage of policy was launched, that of *diversity*. The policy of diversity meant that social programs were now also seen as the responsibility of civil society; for example, government authorities asked businesses to hire immigrants in order to draw 'ethnic' clientele. This law was based on the assumption that following compulsory education, newcomers would find paid work, and social-cultural integration would then ensue (Kaya 2009: 132). In review, however, these integration policies were evaluated as unsuccessful by the government, which marked the second set of integration politics that failed (ibid).

In January of 2000, Paul Scheffer (a Labour Party ideologue) wrote an article entitled “The Multicultural Drama” (*Het multiculturele drama*) in the *NRC Handelsblad*, a popular and respected national newspaper (Moors 2009: 395 n.). In his article, Scheffer argued that Dutch politicians’ indifference toward increasing Muslim immigration would end in disaster, which he saw exemplified in the growing numbers of alienated Muslim communities who were living in ethnic enclaves (Buruma 2006: 126-128). This ‘drama’ concerned the creation of a disaffected ‘ethnic underclass’, as he described it, that did not feel connected to the Netherlands and were reluctant or incapable of integrating into Dutch society (Kaya 2009:133). Scheffer argued that the Islamic religion was not flexible enough to allow its faithful followers to integrate into a liberal Dutch society (Buruma 2006: 30). He also believed that the previous governments were wrong to hand citizenship over to foreigners without considering whether or not they could actually achieve it (Buruma 2006: 53,125-128). He believed that this situation would eventually lead to the destabilization of the social cohesion in Dutch society. Scheffer lobbied for a more assimilative minority policy to ensure that immigrants had a keen sense of the Dutch culture and history (Entzinger 2006: 128). This pro-nationalist cultural approach later became the popular understanding of what was necessary for minorities’ integration (Kaya 2009: 133).

Scheffer managed to center the integration debate on a choice between the rights of immigrants to hold onto their cultural identities or the rights of Dutch culture. As a result, the left wing political parties (who supported multicultural agendas) were made out to be traitors to the Dutch people as they championed the cultural rights of immigrants over their own. While Scheffer’s views were not universally accepted – he

was criticised for viewing Muslims and immigrants as homogeneous and unchanging groups – his views did start a public debate which later influenced integration and immigration policies (Entzinger 2006: 129). Therefore, what started as a reframing of liberal versus conservative values addressed in Bolkestein’s article in 1991, approximately ten years later became a matter of whose “culture” should take precedence. Over the last decade, however, public interest in issues of immigration, Islam, and social integration intensified due to the attention these topics received from politicians and due to deteriorating economic conditions of non-western Muslim immigrants in particular.

In 2000, the percentage of non-western residents in Rotterdam reached 41 percent; the largest growing populations were Turkish and Moroccans who were lumped together as one ‘Muslim population’. Although the overall percentage of unemployment declined in the 2000s, and in 2010 sat at approximately five percent in Rotterdam (CBS 2011c), immigrants were disproportionally represented in welfare and unemployment statistics, constituting over 50 percent of all recipients (CBS 2011b). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States exacerbated feelings of hostility towards Muslims as a global “war on terror” began. This anti-terror discourse shifted the diverse array of media discourses about Islam worldwide toward a more homogenized stereotype of Muslim fanaticism (Brown 2006). It was in this darkening climate that Pim Fortuyn stepped forward into the political spotlight.

A professor of sociology at the University of Groningen, Fortuyn was better known for his anti-Islamic columns in the weekly newspaper, *Elsevier* (Entzinger 2006: 129). Fortuyn became the leader of Liveable Netherlands (*Leefbaar Nederland*), a

conservative party established in 1999, and was an influential member of Liveable Rotterdam (*Leefbaar Rotterdam*), a similar municipal-level party, established in 2001. Fortuyn's political program was directed against bureaucracy or what he thought of as the leftist elite who looked after their own interests while ignoring the concerns of the "common Dutch people", as well as against the institution of immigration, especially due to what he considered the failure of Muslim integration (Buruma 2006:39). Fortuyn believed that Islam was fundamentally opposed to Dutch liberal and sexual politics, against equality for women, and prejudiced against homosexuals (van de Veer 2006: 115). Fortuyn used his flamboyant style, political savvy and magnetic charisma to shake up the humdrum of Dutch politics.

Liveable Netherlands was set to run in the national elections in May 2002 and Liveable Rotterdam in the March 2002 municipal elections. Fortuyn's views dominated both party agendas, which focused on: improved safety policies; stricter immigration and integration approaches (and open debate about such subjects); greater accountability of politicians and civil servants; and increased citizens' input in policy making (van Ostaaijen 2010: 101). Fortuyn's national and municipal platforms were much the same (ibid). Yet in February of 2002, Fortuyn was quoted in an interview saying that he "wanted to remove the ban on discrimination from the Constitution and close the border for Muslim immigration" (van Ostaaijen 2010: 107). For this, Liveable Netherlands fired him as party leader. Fortuyn went on to form his own party to run in the national elections called List Pim Fortuyn (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). He agreed to adhere to Liveable Rotterdam's election program and thus, remained an influential party member for the fast-approaching March elections.

In the municipal election, Liveable Rotterdam won 35 percent of the votes, of which 97 percent were for Fortuyn himself (van Ostaaijen 2010: 147). The party won 17 seats in the municipal council, and although other political parties formed a coalition to reach a majority coalition, the impressive showing of Fortuyn shocked Rotterdam politicians and Netherlanders alike (ibid). Despite their initial negative reaction to Fortuyn's win, the major political parties decided that working with Liveable Rotterdam was the only democratic option as his and his party's views represented a large proportion of residents' wishes (van Ostaaijen 2010: 148).

Leading up to the national elections (to be held in May of that year), Fortuyn's party List Pim Fortuyn was projected to take 38 of the 150 seats in parliament (van Ostaaijen 2010: 161). Then, on May 6, 2002, just nine days before the election, an environmental and animal rights activist shot and killed Fortuyn as he left a Rotterdam radio studio. In the days following, temporary make-shift memorials sprang up at the murder site, around Rotterdam, and throughout the Netherlands as outpourings of sentiment both decrying the act and supporting Fortuyn's politics (van Ostaaijen 2010: 161, Stengs 2007). A condolence registry was set up at Rotterdam city hall that eventually collected approximately 65 thousand names. It was apparent that Fortuyn's murder reverberated politically and socially throughout the entire country. It was at this point that Fortuyn became an icon for the 'freedom of speech' that soon became an important Dutch value in this politically unstable climate.

Despite the loss of its leader, Fortuyn's party (LPF) won 16 seats of 150 seats after receiving 17 percent of the votes. This made the LPF the second largest party in the government and marked the first time in over a century that a populist party had a

significant number of seats (the 2nd most seats) in the Dutch parliament (van de Veer 2006: 115). Without Fortuyn, the party fell after only 87 days; however, the incorporation of Fortuyn's parties in politics marked a change in public opinion towards Dutch national ideals and attitudes toward diversity. At a time when national identity was thought to be slowly eroding and being replaced by European, corporate, and global identities, Fortuyn provided an outlet for this sense of national belonging and confusion. As Buruma succinctly states:

To a confused people, afraid of being swamped by immigrants and worried that pan-European or global institutions were rapidly taking over their lives, Fortuyn promised a way back to simpler times, when, to paraphrase the late Queen Wilhelmina, we were still ourselves, when everyone was white, and upstanding Dutchmen were in control of the nation's destiny (Buruma 2006: 47).

Fortuyn also provided a visible target for societal angst: Muslims and non-western immigrants. In a famous interview, he remarked that, "the Netherlands was full" (Buruma 2006: 53). This same remark spoken earlier by a different Parliamentary Member had resulted in his dismissal from his party and from the Dutch parliament. By breaking the social taboo on speaking out against Muslims and Islam, Fortuyn was creating an outlet in which people were "allowed" to voice their frustrations with the growing migrant population (ibid).

Fortuyn's electoral win could also be attributed to the growing public frustration with Dutch politicians. Since 1994, elections had resulted in a left-right coalition, which in turn resulted in a stagnation of policymaking and a general distaste for public authorities. Fortuyn's platform of attacking the elite and singling out Muslim immigrants made him a man of action, and a welcome change from the usual template of Dutch politicians. After the January 2003 elections, the newly elected government, led by Jan

Peter Balkenende of the Christian Democrats, remained true to Fortuyn's agenda as Balkenende sought to curtail immigration and develop stricter integration strategies (Lechner 2008: 136). This government also paradoxically wanted the mutual respect for minorities to be based on fundamental Dutch norms and values (ibid). It is at this point that immigrants were officially portrayed as responsible for their lack of integration into Dutch society (Entzinger 2006: 131).

Following these political upheavals, many of the integration policies became more restrictive. As noted by Smeets, the new minister of integration, Rita Verdonk, stated that Dutch citizenship involved speaking the Dutch language and observing basic Dutch norms (Lechner 2008:163). Therefore, the Dutch language was deemed an important factor in promoting social cohesion and national belonging. To this end, the government discontinued all minority language programs in Dutch schools. Recent non-western immigrants were required to enrol and pay for civic integration courses and then pass a test in order to receive permanent residency permits. Although the citizenship courses (*inburgering*) were not new (see WIN courses above), under the new system they were no longer free and immigrants themselves had to bear some of the costs (Doomernik 2010: 7). Measures such as having to take courses, longer wait periods before obtaining citizenship, making family reunification difficult, and generally increasing costs associated with obtaining legal status in the Netherlands (as is the case now in most other European countries), work to discourage immigration and asylum applications to the Netherlands and other European countries on the one hand, and limits immigration to those who can afford it, that is, upper classes, on the other.

In 2006, the government passed the Civic Integration Abroad Act (*Wet Inburgering Buitenland*). This act restricted immigration through family unification by making persons apply for a residency permit to take the civic integration exam from their home country. Furthermore, the exam, information package, and permit costs a significant amount of money, at least €1200, which must be paid before the person ever steps foot on Dutch soil (Vink 2007: 346). These measures disproportionately affected immigrants from Morocco, Turkey and the Antilles Islands. For example, as of 2007, new immigrants (newcomers), old immigrants (oldcomers), and imams have to attend citizenship courses (see Chapter 2).

In addition to courses on civic integration, the government attempted to discontinue migration policies allowing for family reunification and/or obtaining citizenship through marriage. This was after a report was released, which found that 75 percent of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims living in the Netherlands returned home to marry and then brought their spouses back with them to the Netherlands (van Selm 2005). Therefore, policies were established that only allowed people above a certain income level to bring spouses from abroad. Furthermore, regulations were dissolved that required employers to report the number of minority employees working at their establishments (Lechner 2008:163-4).

The murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004 exacerbated the growing hostility toward immigrants and Muslims and fundamentally changed the relationships among Dutch natives and those Dutch of Arab or Turkish background and of the Islamic faith (see van de Veer 2006: 111; Buruma 2006: 7). The debate about the Muslim presence in the Netherlands has since maintained a high level of energy.

According to recent studies, the Dutch majority believe that some immigrants, but more specifically Muslims, have other loyalties than to the Dutch “nation” and regard this as the source of their incompatibility (van Bruinessen 2006: 21; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 11). Officially, this was reflected in the parliamentary cabinet which distanced itself from multiculturalism and the so-called paternalistic approach to its minorities (Vink 2007: 346).

After the murder of Van Gogh, certain policies were introduced that, according to the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), were in direct violation of human rights policies. The Municipality of Rotterdam gained permission from the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment to ban people from living in certain neighbourhoods within Rotterdam. This policy, called the Urban Areas (Special Measures) Act, allowed municipal authorities to ban persons who do not have an income from employment from residing in what are already seen as disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The Equal Treatment Commission (*Commissie Gelijke Behandeling*, CGB) found that although this policy is only used as a last resort and for a temporary period, it indirectly discriminates against residents of Turkish and Moroccan origin (ECRI 2008: 23).

Furthermore, the ECRI stated that the nation-wide racial profiling has become one of the Netherlands’ most serious offences as evinced, for example, in their Reference Index for members of the Antillean population (*Verwijsindex Antillianen*, VIA). Set up under the auspices of tracking the Antillean population who were thought to be avoiding registration with the authorities and who are thought to have a tendency to be transient once in the Netherlands, this indexing system was set up to allow the educational, care

and support services, the courts, and the police, to identify Antillean youth (ECRI 2008:25). Officially, this index provides Dutch authorities with a clear link between the criminal justice system and the Antilleans; yet, according to the ECRI, this index is discriminatory (2008:25). There are many more securitization tactics utilized by the police that directly and disproportionately affect young Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean youth; I will discuss and analyse these in greater detail in Chapter 4.

The ECRI also cited those laws that were lobbied for by politicians yet never actually passed, as exacerbating an already tense situation by creating unnecessary discrimination and stigmatisation towards Muslims and the Turkish and Moroccan communities (2008: 35). One example of these lobbied-for laws was Rita Verdonk's attempt to ban the *burqa*, a piece of Muslim clothing for women, in public (BBC 2006)¹⁵. While this law did not initially come to fruition, the ideology behind it, the discrimination, and the singling out of Muslim minorities adds to the anti-Muslim and anti-migrant discourses in the Netherlands today.

The lobbying to pass these bills is an example of a larger trend in Dutch politics in how politicians voice their opinions about controversial issues (Moors 2009: 395). Old liberal models, such as multiculturalism, have been dismissed as being too politically correct and relegated to the "old world" of politics (ECRI 2008:34). Racist and xenophobic expressions have become more commonplace in the political debate, which in turn has made an impact on public debates and opinion (ibid). Freedom of expression, which is now championed as a pillar of Dutch democratic society, has in effect brought about the right to deliberately offend others. The ECRI also stated that politicians and policy makers were complicit in their active use and passive acceptance of this general

¹⁵ This ban has just been passed by the government (September 23, 2011). See more below.

trend. This can be seen in their use of such terms as “allochthon” as a catch-all expression for “the Other” in both political and public debate. The ECRI believes that this labelling will hinder the possibility of providing a constructive ground on which members of the Dutch majority, Muslims, and non-western immigrant communities, could begin meaningful dialogue (2008: 35). The ECRI concluded that the role of political discourse was crucial in determining the situation of Muslims living in the Netherlands today (2008: 37).

Evidence of prejudice among the public can be seen in the upsurge in youth hate groups such as the Lonsdale group who were responsible for anti-Islamic activities, and the Hofstad group, a militant Islamic group to which Mohammed Bouyeri was claimed to belong. There has also been a dramatic increase in hate propaganda over the Internet from pro-Muslims and anti-Muslim groups and from pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist or anti-Dutch groups (ECRI 2008: 38). Xenophobic and racist discourses are also expressed in animosities and schisms among individuals and groups in the Netherlands. According to the Ethno-barometer project conducted in 2005, which sought to understand the relationship between the Dutch “majority” and the Muslim “minority” communities, there was already a perceived disconnect between members of these groups about what was expected with regard to integrating or tolerating cultural diversity (van Bruinessen 2006: 19-21). While these racist and xenophobic discourses resonate variously across the Netherlands, debates concerning immigration trends and the integration of Muslim immigrants influence everyday relations among the general populace (Lechner 2008, Margry and Roodenburg 2007).

These events and trends raise questions as to why so much emphasis is directed against those of Muslim faith, and why an 'Islamic way of life' is often positioned as being antithetical to the 'Dutch way of life'. In raising this question, however, one must not only look to the resulting Islamophobia but also, to the ensuing trend of a growing focus on nationalism and a Dutch identity.

Following the death of Fortuyn, pro-nationalist parties have dominated the Dutch political sphere, such as Rita Verdonk's (short-lived) *Trots op Nederland* (Proud of the Netherlands) and Geert Wilders' (more successful) *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (Party for Freedom). This time was also marked by political volatility as Dutch voters were brought back to the polls in 2003, 2004, 2006, and most recently 2010, following the collapse of the government in all instances. The media and popular opinion of the time centered on discussions around democratic renewal, civic nationalism, economic liberalism and discussions that have led to restrictive measures against immigration, integration and criminal behaviour (Vossen 2010: 22). This nationalistic trend was even evident on the supra-national level when the Netherlanders voted against the European Constitution in 2005 and against Romania and Bulgaria's acceptance into the European Union (BBC 2011). The situation of the Netherlands has since become more tense as it struggles, as with the rest of Europe, through an economic downturn that has spurred on ever-growing support for more conservative national level policies and political parties.

The most notable, inflammatory, and nationalistic politician in Dutch politics today is Geert Wilders. Starting in the VVD party, Wilders left due to the Party's position on allowing Turkey into the European Union. Wilders then began his own party, the Freedom Party (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV), whose main political platforms were

stopping what he perceived as the Islamification of Dutch culture and the expansion of the European Union, and fighting what he identified as the ineffective and out-of-touch left-leaning progressive elite in Parliament. Wilders' main issue with these progressive elite was their "cultural and moral relativism" that resulted in the weakening of "Western liberal ideals" and an ignorance of the threat of Islamification to the Netherlands, which he saw as a threat to all of "Western Civilization" (Vossen 2010: 27-28).

Like Fortuyn, Wilders was thought to be a passing trend; however, his multiplatform party and constant media presence have helped him make great political gains in both municipal and national elections (Vossen 2010). In the latest election in 2010, the PVV won 12 percent of the votes making it the fourth largest party. The coalition between the PVV and right-leaning parties led many left-leaning politicians and media commentators to question the future of tolerance in the Netherlands (Zimmerman 2011). Already there is evidence that immigration policies are becoming stricter.

In June 2011, Minister of the Interior Piet Hein Donner presented a *Memorandum on Integration* which stated that the government believed Dutch society, and the values that it was based upon, should be central to future integration policies (Government of the Netherlands 2011). The memorandum went on to state that people wishing to live in the Netherlands were expected to contribute to "social cohesion" and demonstrate their citizenship and their involvement in civil society. According to the Minister, this change in policy direction is justified because the same requirements are demanded of the Netherlands' "own" citizens, thus providing a model for a hierarchy between "us" and "them" and where not all citizens are deemed equally 'authentic' or "autochthonous". With this change of course, the government is distancing itself from the "relativism

embedded in the model of the multicultural society” (ibid). In so doing, the national government believed that integration policies needed to promote a mandatory, unified Dutch character in order to prevent the threat of “fragmentation and segregation in society” (ibid). The alternative, according to the Minister, is that “*no-one* would feel at home in the Netherlands” (ibid, emphasis added). This Memorandum implies many things, first, that “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” communities are indeed separate groups and second, that the Netherlands is a mono-cultural society where only “autochthonous” values and characteristics are acceptable and are something that should be restored and/or protected. Third, this Memorandum contends that the Netherlands is a place where increasing diversity creates a sense of non-belonging for the “autochthonous” majority community (as was implied in the statement that if fragmentation was not stopped, then no-one would feel at home), which is a phenomenon that the government intends to correct. The memorandum went on to state:

[t]hat integration was officially “not the responsibility of the public authorities but rather of those who decided to settle in the Netherlands”. In so doing, every citizen was expected to ‘contribute’ to Dutch society by taking responsibility for their subsistence, for their living environment and for society as a whole. For instance, immigrants are expected to learn the language and learn about Dutch society (Government of the Netherlands 2011).

There is no doubt then, that “allochthonous” individuals are expected to assimilate into Dutch society, not just as a means for belonging to the majority community, but as something expected of them in return for their being allowed to live in the Netherlands. In this way, assimilating “Dutch cultural values” is no longer a choice for “allochthonous” individuals. Such a project had never before been so obviously stated by the government.

This memorandum outlined future changes in the citizenship and integration policies which included: the Civic Integration Act will be amended and made more rigorous; grants and measures for the integration of specific groups will be terminated and incorporated in general integration policy; a bill dealing with the prevention of forced marriage will be made a priority; a bill will be introduced to ban face coverings in public; a common agenda for modern citizenship will be drawn up in cooperation with municipalities, civil society organisations, and citizens.

Following in France's footsteps, the first move to banning face coverings in all public places was recently made by the Dutch Council of Ministers on September 16, 2011 (Moors 2011). This draft Bill still has to go through certain political and legal bodies, however, many believe that this Bill will pass. Slated to begin in January 2013, the bill will prohibit covering one's face in public as a 'matter of public order'.

According to Minister Donner, "face-veiling is contrary to the character and customs of public life in the Netherland where we should be able to recognize each other's faces". Annelies Moors, an anthropologist at the University of Amsterdam, argues that Minister Donner's understandings of face-covering and customs of public life in the Netherlands highlights the importance of being identifiable as well as one's ability to participate in open communication. Minister Donner went on to cite that 'veiling of the face' was particularly problematic because it was "contrary to the principle of equity between men and women since women were only required to wear a face-veil" (Moors 2011). Minister Donner argued that this ban was not an infringement against freedom of religion because the government interprets the veil as a 'regional style of dress' rather than a religious

practice (as was the reasoning of French president Sarkozy when he banned the *burqa* in France in 2009).

Moors convincingly argues that this ban raises questions concerning the supposed separation of state and religious institution, what legal grounds the state has to decide acceptable clothing for its citizens, and what this might mean for other inhabitants in future enactments of this Bill (2011). Although this ban is somewhat ambiguous in terms of its implementation, it is obvious that the target is Muslim women's behaviour and bodily comportment in public places. Although these latest changes occurred after I left the field, the ethnographic data provided in this dissertation demonstrates a lead up to this direction in policy in the everyday lives of individuals in Rotterdam.

As is evident from the aforementioned policies, there is a trend to regulate and assimilate those immigrants who are seen to oppose the 'Dutch way of life'. By not dealing with underlying socioeconomic inequalities, which arguably result from larger global and capitalist disparities, the failure to integrate into Dutch society is blamed solely on immigrants' inadequacies and renders them the scapegoats of a struggling economy and as failures of increasingly unbalanced integration policies. In this context, the Netherlands is not an exception as more and more European countries have begun to redefine their national identity, for example, the statement of a secular identity when France banned the wearing of the *burqa* in public or when Switzerland banned the presence of all minarets. Although the Netherlands has a specific history and trajectory, it follows the larger European trend in securitization, racialization, and criminalization of immigrants in general (cf. Silverstein 2005). In addition to the systematic differentiation of non-western Muslims, the redesign of physical spaces and developing understandings

of which behaviours are considered appropriate in particular spaces give evidence of a project that defines what it means to be “Dutch” today. Within this context, this dissertation explores the specific manifestations of this trend within the Netherlands.

In the following chapters, I demonstrate how a focus on assimilating those individuals who are perceived of as ‘different’ in Dutch society, serves to reconfirm who belongs to a “Dutch” community in the Netherlands today and how citizenship is increasingly defined according to cultural attributes.

CHAPTER 2: RESHAPING “ALLOCHTHON” BEHAVIOUR FOR “DUTCH” PUBLIC SPACES

In this chapter, I will explore the educational methods used by municipal-level government officials to teach “allochthonous” individuals how to act in public places. The educational programs expose an underlying assumption that to be accepted into the national community, one must conduct oneself as the “Dutch” do. “Dutch”, a term, like “European”, is their loaded with cultural biases and interpretations to mean adopting another “culture” by speaking the Dutch language, wearing a particular style of clothing, expressing one’s beliefs in the private and not the public domain (mostly if one is Muslim), and generally showing signs that one has learned and accepted public conduct and demeanour that may be viewed as liberal. This is a sign of a shifting trend away from the ideas of civic citizenship in liberal democracies, where diversity in language, “cultural”, “ethnic”, or religious background and public expressions of these were considered a testimony of the principle of *jus soli* (law of the land) in contrast with *jus sanguinis* (right of blood) or ethnic nationalism. Cultural understandings of citizenship diverge from ethnic definitions nationalism, however, these understandings mirror their conservative trend to homogenise and purify the “nation” from other “cultures”.

In the following, I explore integration courses, street-level behavioural programs, as well as a good-manners program for schools with a high number of “allochthonous” students. These instances are instructive as they show how individuals who are perceived to be “allochthonous” are taught to function in Dutch public places. This education underscores the idea that “allochthons” are a different and separate community and therefore have to be inducted into “Dutch” behaviours in order to belong, or at least publicly conform to the Dutch “nation”.

While in the field, I attended integration courses called *Inburgering* (literally: citizenship) courses, at the local neighbourhood centre, the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (*Bergpolder Buurt Centrum*). On one occasion, the class was taken on an outing to an *Inburgering* theatrical performance. This production was created and put on specifically for inburgering groups all around the country and on the day we attended, there were other groups present from Rotterdam. Of all the students in my class, I was the first to arrive at the central library, which also houses a theatre. Within ten minutes, other classmates joined me and we waited together for our teacher, Hilde, to arrive. Hilde had asked the class to arrive at a certain time before the play so that everyone could practice ordering a coffee from the local cafe; however, we were not given the chance because we spent the minutes before the play outside waiting for the rest of our classmates who never showed up. Hilde was open in telling us how disappointed she was: “It’s part of the curriculum. They should be here”, she said.

Despite their absence, we eventually filed into the lobby of the theatre and waited while the actors of the play began to hand out evaluation forms to all the teachers. Seeing both Hilde and myself among a group that was largely comprised of women wearing headscarves, I was mistaken for a teacher and was also given an evaluation form. I looked at Hilde who said: “Ah well, it will be useful for your research”. During the classes, Hilde treated me as any other student, yet outside of these classes she often took the time to discuss topics important to my research, such as integration.

The play was comprised of a number of different scenes portraying ‘typical’ Dutch habits, and touched on current and heated debates surrounding integration and immigration in the Netherlands. The play began with a scene of a Dutch birthday party in

which attendees sat in a circle and waited for their hostess to provide them with coffee and cake, as they made awkward attempts at small talk¹⁶. Suddenly, a loud siren went off indicating that there was a breach in the dikes surrounding the city. Between other intermittent scenes where the actors rode bikes, had discussions about the equality between men and women, and vociferously cleaned their houses, the actors continued to come back to the birthday party scene that eventually ended in a mass evacuation to avoid a sinking Netherlands. Much to the chagrin of the students watching the play, the Dutch (who were now refugees) were turned away at every entry port and border. The reasons used for their rejection from other lands were the same reasons used in the past by Dutch politicians against the entrance of refugees and immigrants to the Netherlands. For instance, when they arrived at a bordering country, the immigration officer greeted them saying: "Oh you'd like to come in? No problem at all! Do you have your visa (*blijfsvergunning*) ready? Oh you don't? Well, sorry chump you can't come in!" When they arrive at the shores of the next country, they are asked: "Do you come from that land where that man said 'Full is Full'¹⁷?" "Yes!" responded all the refugees, happy to be recognised as Dutch citizens. "Sorry", said the actor who was playing the immigration officer, "Full is Full!"

When I spoke with one of the actors from this play, Evelien, at a later point in time, she described the thrust of the play that she and her company created:

There are a lot of Dutch people who are not very nice and not very welcoming to newcomers. So in our plays, we always put one or two people in there who say strange things about the moustaches or the *niqab*. One of the images from the 70s

¹⁶ This is a joke on the typical, yet old-fashioned "Dutch" manner to celebrate birthday parties, which is seen to be somewhat boring and largely centred on prescribed rules of etiquette.

¹⁷ The 'Full is Full' slogan came from the Central Democratic (CD) Party in the Netherlands, which is a right-leaning political party, in reference to their political platform based on decreasing immigration and putting an end to multicultural policies.

is that if you were an immigrant, then you had a moustache. But we also always have a person in the play who says something nice about them (immigrants) as well. For example, in the play that I did yesterday, I play a not very nice woman and so one of the things that I say is, ‘everything that they (allochthons) buy, you know the big cars, the nice houses, they do it from my tax money!’ and then Jan Willem (another actor) says ‘Yeah, but they pay taxes as well’. So we (the company) try to strike a balance between people who say not nice things and others who say nice things so that they (the visiting students) can see, well there are people who say mean things but also people who speak in favour of ‘us’ as well.

What we’re trying to say is that ‘we’ (as Dutch people) don’t have all the answers, we don’t have this whole *inburgering* thing figured out, so it is just as difficult for us as it is for them (the students). The most important thing with this play was to create humour to make people laugh. We all (the actors involved in the play) believe that when you have a problem and it’s taken too seriously and made to be scary, then no one opens their mouth to talk about it.

Evelien’s description concerning the point of this play and the theatrical enactments of “typical” Dutch scenes, reinforce an essentialist view of Dutch national “culture”, which to a large extent are informed by emphasizing a distinction between this group and *the* “allochthons”. Although the playwrights acknowledge the everyday prejudice levelled against “allochthonous” individuals, they make no apologies, and only state that not everyone acts negatively toward “allochthons”. Evelien’s solution for “allochthons” to dialogue with “autochthons” presupposes their ability to have such a dialogue on an equal footing; this ignores the power imbalances among these individuals where “allochthons” have less resources and opportunities than “autochthons”. The residual sentiment from this play is that there is a divide between ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ populations.

The theatrical production was one of a series of events that were planned in tandem with the *inburgering* lessons. The intention was to provide students with practical knowledge about their city, for example, learning where the library was, and to place students in situations that were thought to be atypical of “allochthonous” individuals,

such as watching a play in a theatre or ordering coffee in a Dutch café. These lessons belied a presumption about “allochthon” ignorance, and were meant to encourage students to adopt “Dutch culture and norms”, especially in how to act in public places, so that they might later participate socially and economically in society. Embedded in such integration-related activities is the idea that “allochthonous” individuals must become visibly active in Dutch society, which would signal that they have overcome language barriers and social or economic constraints.

These programs that instruct and teach about the assumed typical “Dutch” cultural life are strictly directed at non-western immigrants who are thought to be inadequately integrating into Dutch society. Yet, inburgering courses are informative in other ways: they not only provide specific tutelage on appropriate public behaviours, but also insist that students come into public places, an act which has the intention of physically inserting them into Dutch society. The following are further examples related to the integration courses given in Bergpolder.

Inburgering courses in Bergpolder

According to Rotterdam’s *What is Inburgering* website produced in 2007, inburgering denotes ‘participation’ and thus necessitates the ability to read, write, and understand the Dutch language. The website also states that inburgering will teach students how to live together in Rotterdam and throughout the Netherlands. Students are selected to attend inburgering courses if their economic status is deemed a hindrance for participating in society, for example, if they are on unemployment for an extended period of time. This selection also depends on whether their cultural values are regarded as similar or adoptable to that of the Netherlands; for example, Japanese immigrants are

counted as ‘western immigrants’ because they are assumed to be effective contributors to the economic life of the Netherlands (CBS 2011). In addition, individuals are asked to attend courses if they are parents or educators of children and regarded as lacking the necessary knowledge to raise children in a way that will guarantee their integration into Dutch society (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010: 707).

Since January 1st 2007, integration policies oblige the aforementioned individuals who are living in the Netherlands to speak Dutch and understand how to live within the Netherlands. As part of the process for naturalization and integration in the Netherlands, immigrants and refugees must pass a test which requires that they have sufficient knowledge of the Dutch language, history, and culture. According to an affiliated city website entitled “*It begins with language*”, there are three groups of individuals who must undergo such training: ‘new comers’, ‘old comers’ and spiritual ministers (*hetbegintmettaal.nl*). Newcomers are defined as those who are immigrating from outside Europe, who do not have a Dutch passport and are between the ages of 16 and 65. Old-comers are between the ages of 16 and 65, do not have a Dutch passport, have lived in the Netherlands for eight years or less, and do not have any Dutch education. Lastly, spiritual leaders such as imams, pastors, hospital chaplains, rabbis, or those working in religious education, humanistic counselling, pastoral or missionary work are all required to take inburgering courses in addition to the above guidelines. Such stipulations mark those students seen to be in need of instruction concerning Dutch cultural norms as being different from the rest of Dutch society. These courses, by their very existence, highlight the presence of an “autochthonous culture” which students must learn.

The tests for naturalization consist of two parts: a national exam and a practical exam. The national exam is standardised and consists of knowledge concerning Dutch society, being able to repeat Dutch phrases, and an electronic practical exam. The practical exams are conducted using role play techniques where students carry on a simulated interview or a short discussion, for example have a parent/teacher meeting concerning the progress of their child in school. These exams take approximately two hours for the price of € 399, according to Ooverburggen, one of the inburgering providers in Rotterdam.

In addition to writing exams for the practical portion of inburgering, students must complete a portfolio that documents 20 different experiences (witnessed by appropriate signators) that highlight various inburgering proficiencies. The choices of portfolios include: citizenship, work, education, health and child welfare, social participation, and entrepreneurship. Proficiencies addressed in the work portfolio include, but are not limited to: acquiring personal insurances (e.g. asking questions from a provider); housing (e.g. paying one's rent, acknowledging the need to conserve energy, cleaning up one's property); education (e.g. signing up for further training); contact with neighbours in the area (e.g. introducing oneself, inviting a neighbour over, responding to an invitation, speaking with the neighbour concerning an issue and possible solutions, apologising to the neighbour for something that the student has done wrong); searching for work; specific work techniques (e.g. writing up a client complaint); work-customer service (e.g. discussing performance review); work-care and wellness (e.g. reading and understanding texts about health, hygiene and safe working practices). The final interview to assess one's portfolio takes approximately 1 hour and costs € 169.

The integration courses that I attended were run three days a week out of the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Center (*Bergpolder Buurt Centrum*, the BNC). I joined these lessons in January and stayed until June, when these courses broke for summer holiday. As mentioned above, my instructor was Hilde, a 30-something, blonde haired, soft-spoken woman who was well-liked by all her students. She led courses in Rotterdam and Dordrecht, in both day and evening programs, through a company called Ooverbruggen, which is one of the seven private companies allowed to provide inburgering services in Rotterdam. Hilde used various teaching techniques to cover the material in the textbook and was known for adhering to the strict rule of speaking Dutch at all times.

While in class, students practiced writing exams and worked through the content of the Inburgering textbook. In my own classes we followed a textbook entitled *Welcome in the Netherlands: knowledge for Dutch society for the inburgering exams* (Gathier 2008). This book covered material about situations one might encounter in everyday life and how students can and should react to them. On the whole, there was a lot of practical information in the book; for example, steps on how to open a bank account or how to set up a parent-teacher meeting at your child's school. Important to this chapter's themes, the book also included sections that outlined acceptable and desired behaviours in public places. Below is an excerpt from the section *Living in the Netherlands* in a sub-section entitled *Keeping your house and garden beautiful*:

Most Dutch people think that it is important that their house and garden keep a good appearance. They care for the following things: There is a certain maintenance done on the house; for example, that the house is painted; that the outside of their house looks clean, for example, that their windows are clean. That the garbage is put in the trashcans; for example, that there is no garbage in front of the house or in the garden (Gathier 2008: 88).

Or, in the section *Society in the Netherlands*, there is a subsection on *Bodily contact in public places*:

If two people are in love, they often have bodily contact with one another in public spaces. They walk, for example, hand in hand or with arms wrapped around each other on the street. Some people in love kiss one another in public. Also, you can see two men or two women holding hands in public in the Netherlands. Younger people have more bodily contact in public spaces than older people (Gathier 2008: 179).

While these directions on how to keep one's house or how lovers may behave in public may appear innocuous, they concurrently direct individuals on how to act in public places. In so doing, these directives identify contrary behaviour, for example, having an unkempt garden or negatively reacting to kissing in public, as conflicting or in disagreement with the prevailing cultural norms.

Other examples in the book tackle social values and relationships, emphasizing that the family unit is not as important in the Netherlands as it is in Turkey or Africa, and teaching the participants how to relate to and behave with neighbours and friends. It also instructs them indirectly on how the Dutch spend their free time and with whom. For example, in the section *The people in the Netherlands*:

The family is not as important in the Netherlands as it is, for example in Turkey or Africa. Many people do not see their brothers or sisters for months at a time. Sometimes, they see their brothers and sisters only on their birthdays. Friends are, for many Dutch people, just as important as family. They often do many nice things with their friends, for example, walking or eating together. Dutch people usually have good contact with their neighbours. Neighbours help each other with small things. They give for example, water the plants if you go away on vacation. Or they lend things to you, for example, coffee. Or they watch your children. If you're new to a neighbourhood, you must make acquaintances (Gathier 2008: 43).

Furthermore, in the section entitled, *Development of your children*, "allochthon" parents are educated on how to raise their own children according to the Dutch way:

Children must learn many things. They do not learn everything at school but also at home and outside. At each life stage they must again learn new things. A 0-4

year old learns for example, to speak, a 4-6 year old learns to bicycle, and a 6-12 year old learns to swim in the Netherlands. If your child learns new things, it is good for their development (Gathier 2008:132).

The above excerpts are predominantly directed at Turks and Moroccans, or individuals of “Eastern cultures”, who supposedly spend too much time with family, and because they are Muslims, they are therefore assumed to be against homosexuality. It is also noteworthy that emphasis is placed upon taking part in one’s local community, for example when the text states that one should help their neighbour and make acquaintances in the neighbourhood; in so doing, this directive promotes active citizenship. In general, individuals are directed to use and spend time in public spaces, for example, to teach their children how to cycle and swim at a young age. These activities are understood and allocated to a list identifying typical “Dutch” ways, the knowledge of which must be imparted to those wishing to become legitimate citizens.

Hilde, nevertheless could sense the content did not exactly fit her real experience, which was apparent when she said:

That book is a disadvantage because it’s not all correct. In the lessons, there are certain standards presented as being commonplace, for example, informing the students when Queen’s Day is and that’s good. But for example, the book also discusses the ways in which Dutch people live, like ‘all Dutch people eat at 6 o’clock’. Those sorts of things are so different from one individual to the next. For example, I do not eat at 6 o’clock like the book says but at 8 o’clock in the evening. Therefore people learn things that are simply not correct.

Having said that though, I think the book teaches some important lessons, such as (self) dignity, acceptance of homosexuality, and the discussion over different aspects of culture.

Although Hilde feels as though some lessons in the text are unrepresentative her comments do reflect the stereotypical view that “allochthons” lack the supposedly “Dutch” values such as tolerance and equality, and the ultimate purpose therefore was to integrate them by teaching them such values. Furthermore, the choices of where and how

these courses were provided were also significant in promoting this objective. According to Hilde:

We originally operated these courses out of a small room in the local mosque (the mosque is a part of the Iskender Cultural Center and Mosque in Bergpolder South, near the BNC) three days a week. We had to move though because the room where we had these classes had no windows and because we were always interrupted by calls to prayer. We arrived for the lessons at 1 o'clock in the afternoon and by 2:20, the prayers started. We couldn't do anything for the next half an hour because it was so loud and that went on every class! So I asked if we could take the loud speaker out of the room and they always said "yes" but it was never actually taken away. So I could not give good lessons. What I think is not nice about giving *inburgering* lessons in a mosque is that there was no Dutch being spoken in the place. Secondly, we were working in a women's only space so no men were allowed to come in. So for the women, in my eyes, it is much harder to acculturate. Some women were in the courses for over 2 years (the regular timing is 3, 6, 12, or 18 months) because of how much harder being in the Mosque made it to learn. I thought, this is not good, they must learn how to participate, work, intern, speak Dutch, and what to do when they encounter men. If they don't do these things then they haven't really integrated.

So, I asked my boss to move locations. What eventually happened is that I moved the group from the Mosque to join another smaller group already taking place in the BNC. The BNC was also ideal because they had computers there and some of the exams are on computers. In the Mosque there is nothing like this so I thought, I must let them see that. There were enough advantages to move there for sure.

From the way in which these lessons were provided, it is apparent that one of the key intentions of *inburgering* lessons is to bring a particular type of individual 'out' into a public space that is not overtly religious, where they speak Dutch and interact with the opposite sex. Furthermore, Hilde's reason for moving these courses signals that mosques are not a "Dutch" space as per the reasons stated above, and are therefore unsuitable for integration purposes.

In my class, there were Turkish and Moroccan women who had come to the Netherlands with their husbands almost 30 years ago as well as some 20 year-olds who had come to the Netherlands within the last 5 years. In addition to this group, there were

two women from the Cape Verde Islands, one in her 60s and the other in her 30s, both of whom immigrated to the Netherlands on economic visas and, due to length of residency, had become permanent citizens¹⁸. When I asked the women who attended the conversation circle¹⁹ at the local neighbourhood centre why it was they were choosing to learn Dutch after some had lived in the Netherlands for well over 10 years, Samira, a woman in her 30s, replied: “Well, I would have done it before but the system is so hard to understand.” Hasna, a woman in her 40s said: “The rules change all the time. I never know what I’m supposed to do.”

The overall response to the lessons in Bergpolder was varied. For most of the students in my class, these lessons were just a means to an end, that is, acquiring a visa, or the first step toward other kinds of education. In general, students’ reactions toward the program were not negative but rather, of genuine interest and appreciation of time spent with the other students. I was present on two occasions when students who were already-graduated visited the class ‘just to spend time’. Both visitors said that they found the courses cozy and friendly (*gezellig*). As mentioned above, these classes also proved useful to network and socialize with one another and obtain practical information. For example, the students were quite happy one day to learn from one of their classmates that there was a doctor in the area who would speak Turkish with you; a rare occurrence as there were few Turkish-speaking doctors in Rotterdam.

In order to better understand how students perceived these lessons, I set up an interview with one of the previously graduated students, Virun, at her home. Virun had

¹⁸ Rotterdam has a larger Cape Verdean population than all other major Dutch cities due to the availability of port and harbour jobs, which were filled by workers from these Islands.

¹⁹ Participating in this conversation circle is a means to gain participation credits that can be used toward one’s inburgering credit.

moved to Rotterdam from Pakistan with her husband over 20 years ago and had four children: two girls and two boys. Although she attended lessons in the BNC, she lived in Old North, the adjacent neighbourhood to Bergpolder where she and her family rented a house. The passage below is taken from my field notes because our session was not digitally recorded at her request. The field note entry states:

Virun met me at the door and warmly invited me in. As we toured around her apartment, which housed her four children and the room of her estranged husband, she spoke about the accomplishments of her children and showed me their pictures and integration certificates. Following this, we sat on her balcony and were sipping tea and chatting. Then, Virun went and collected an expanding folder from the living room. In this folder were all the certificates that Virun had earned as an 'old comer' during her inburgering process. Virun went through all the various activities that she had been a part of since coming to the Netherlands in 1991. Starting at the BNC, she completed the inburgering and language courses. Following this, Virun did additional training as a homecare worker although she never ended up using this diploma. Between 2004 and 2005, Virun completed further examinations necessary for old comers because the integration regulations had changed since she first arrived. She proudly pulled out each document to show me in addition to her participation documents, which included thank you cards from her children's schools for the time she spent volunteering as a lunchtime supervisor. (...)

As we continued to speak about our experiences with the immigration bureau, Virun's two youngest daughters came home from school. Surprised to find someone they did not recognise visiting their mother, they asked who I was. I told them that I was from Canada and how long I had been there for. They exclaimed that my Dutch was really good for someone who hadn't been here for that long. 'Unlike my mother who still speaks as if she arrived here only a couple of months ago' they joked. As they left to walk back into the city centre, Virun laughed and said to me, 'I know they tease me but they also tell me how proud they are of me'.

From the above experience, it is apparent that these courses became important for Virun for personal reasons and enabled her to engage with various organizations in Rotterdam. As the discussion continued, however, Virun spoke of an experience that demonstrated how citizenship programming influenced her experiences of the integration process. The field note entry states:

In the folder, I also caught a glimpse of a mediation request addressed to Virun. Virun eventually moved onto this sheet and in an exasperated tone, discussed her experience with who she believed to be a racist social worker. According to Virun, this social worker thought that Virun could be doing more to find a job despite her efforts. This social worker took it upon herself to address Virun's unemployment situation, which called for mediation between herself, the social worker, and a placement centre. The social worker requested that Virun be put on a different integration trajectory so that she could successfully find a job. Virun explained that despite repeated attempts at trying to enter the workforce, raising a family at that point interfered with her ability to find part-time employment. 'There was simply no time Jennifer!' she exclaimed. Ultimately, Virun received other financial resources so that she did not have to find work while raising her young children. Virun was also unimpressed that the social worker and the placement service representative were badgering her to find a job when her husband, who had been unemployed for years, was left to do nothing at home.

The point that can be drawn out from Virun's experiences is that participants in the inburgering system can use these courses and experiences for their own means. Even if individual experiences do not align with official expectations regarding emancipation and social and economic integration into Dutch society, these courses are nonetheless found to be useful by participants. Despite the paternalistic approach²⁰ of integration measures, as can be seen in Virun's experiences with the social worker, these activities provided more than just integration for their students (cf. van den Berg 2011).

Like Virun, Abida had four children and had lived in the Netherlands for over 20 years. Abida had completed the course work of her integration and was at the time volunteering at the cycling lessons for a number of weeks to acquire participation credits for her portfolio. She spoke about how her role in these lessons made her feel:

When at first I couldn't cycle, my children were often embarrassed because their friends and their parents would often arrive at destinations using bicycles while we did not. However, during one of the national holidays, Abida's daughters came with her to the bicycling lessons. They were still embarrassed until they saw

²⁰ Paternalism, according to Donald van de Veer, can be described as the "interference with the autonomy of another for that person's good" (Martínéz Novo 2006: 150). Van de Veer describes projects of paternalism as being unjustified because they construct the other, in this case non-western Muslims and immigrants, as inferior, incompetent, and show a general lack of respect for them.

me on the bicycle and heard everybody there cheering me on saying ‘Oh, look at her go! Your mother is doing great!’ From then on I heard them telling their friends and other people what a good cyclist I was. I know they think that I do a good job and now with helping to teach these lessons, they are even prouder.

Abida’s use for integration courses, like Virun’s, was not to become an active citizen but for her children’s recognition. It is also interesting to note that although these programs are meant to create a greater sense of belonging to society at large, in actual fact, it could be argued that there is a greater connection made with the other students. There is little to suggest that these classes, and their content, foster deeper senses of belonging to the majority population in the Netherlands. Instead, and as found by scholars such as Marnie Bjornson (2007) and Oskar Verkaaik (2010), integration courses work to reinforce a sense of difference for those students who take part, not only because they are singled out as lacking such knowledge and being in need of such education, but because such courses reinforce connections among a community that is already defined as ‘outsiders’.

Upon completion, however, it is questionable as to whether or not participants in such lessons will be fully accepted as equal citizens, due to the biases found in the larger society and the meanings attached to an ‘active’ citizen. The fact that the integration process will never be complete for certain individuals is evident through the variety of integration measures available, such as those culturalizing measures directed at “allochthonous” youth, who are thought to not to receive the “proper” Dutch upbringing that would foster a “Dutch” identity (see also, Chapter 4).

How to make a proper citizen? Step one: start young

In April 2010, *Welzijn Noord* (Wellness North) a wellness association that worked with local schools to coordinate activities associated with *Week van Goed Fatsoen* or

Week of Good Morals. The primary directive of this organisation is “[t]he promotion of social cohesion between different communities and strengthening the social infrastructure” (Welzijnnoord Rotterdam 2008). This project was coordinated with the local school in Liskwartier²¹. Although this particular school has Catholic designation, it is generally identified as a black school²² (*zwarte scholen*) because the majority are “allochthons” and many of them Muslims. So-called black schools are provided extra funding and resources to combat the issues that are presumed to exist in a school that must spend extra time acclimatizing students to the Dutch culture and language (cf. Vedder 2006). The particular activity associated with Good Morals week consisted of a type of treasure hunt where children walked around to nine different spots within the neighbourhood in order to identify a violation of decent public behaviour (acted out by volunteers such as myself), which they had to politely correct. At each station, the children would collect a piece of a puzzle that would allow them to collect a prize at the end. The theme throughout the activity was ‘decency toward others in public spaces’ to teach children proper moral behaviours in public place. This activity is unique for its easily identifiable goal to socialise youth according to a specific moral order, and on how to address other individuals in public spaces.

My job as a volunteer for this event was to sit on an open plane and speak loudly on a mobile phone. As I acted out my particular offence, the students got my attention and gave me advice on my behaviour. In general, I was told that I should be more

²¹ Liskwartier is a neighbourhood in Rotterdam North and like Bergpolder, it has approximately 7500 residents of which over 50 percent are identified as “autochthonous”, the majority of which are between the ages of 20 and 45 (COS 2011b). In general, Liskwartier is a quiet residential area and is popularly known as having more affluent residents than Bergpolder. These neighbourhoods border each other. See Appendix 1 for map of Liskwartier and Bergpolder.

²² A black school (*Zwarte School*) is a school where over 50% of the students are “allochthons”, that is, where the majority of students have at least one parent who has emigrated from a non-western country to the Netherlands.

respectful of my public surroundings because I am not the only user of this particular public space. It so happened, although I was not directed to, that I placed myself in front of a large sign board which described “no shouting” as one of the playground rules. My placement under the board garnered comments from various students and their leaders, such as “Hey lady, can’t you see? Can’t you read what the board says?”

It is interesting to see which manners were identified as being important enough to highlight by the organizers and supported by the local school as I was not privy to how the ‘offences’ were created. The children had to do the following when seeing other asocial behaviours in order to get a piece of the puzzle (that was the goal of the game):

1. Tell someone that leaving his or her dog's poop in the middle of a walking bridge was unacceptable.
2. Help someone who has dropped their groceries pick them up (without laughing at them - not laughing was a specific requirement).
3. Stop someone from littering.
4. Stop someone from crossing the street on a red light.
5. Help someone cross the street who is unsure of how to navigate the traffic of bikes, cars, trams, etc.
6. Stop someone from riding his or her bike on the sidewalk.
7. Stop someone from vandalising the bus shelter.
8. Help someone who cannot speak Dutch very well with a question.
9. Ask nicely and act politely in order to receive a candy treat.

As is evident from the above list, the themes of the manners ranged from safety in public streets (crossing the street), to criminal acts (vandalism), to public nuisance (dog poop and speaking too loudly) in addition to helping those who cannot speak the Dutch language. They also included respecting one’s elders and helping those who were less fortunate. The activity worked to discipline and mold these children’s behaviour in Dutch public spaces.

What is important to note here is that activities such as these feed into the notion that “allochthonous” children are different and are not receiving the ‘proper education of

Dutch moral standards' in the home (van Bruinessen 2006: 12). This phenomenon was a popular narrative recounted to me throughout my research, which stated that Moroccan and Turkish youth have a 'lack of warmth' at home, meaning that there was a lack of direction, parenting, or family atmosphere that could be seen as love or loving relationship (Müller 2002). It is also a paradoxical notion given that the stereotype is that these cultures spend too much time or focus on the family (as described in the textbook) at the expense of public participation. Policy makers believe that this lack of warmth contributes to young people's misbehaviour and their inability to integrate into Dutch society effectively, which in turn disconnects them from the Dutch "nation". Since parents are often blamed in this Dutch-centric view they have become targets of disciplinary action so that it can be assured that they will be able to raise children who become 'active' Dutch citizens. To reach this group, city officials have taken 'Dutch cultural education' to the streets.

*It's your neighbourhood, so it's your call!*²³

This idea of moral deficiencies as a specific immigrant problem is also supported by the '*Mensen maken de stad*' program (MMdS or People making the city), a program that is described as "an assertive social policy: MMdS is a program in which residents are mobilized and encouraged to promote greater social cohesion in their street" (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006: 3). The MMdS program involves a series of meetings between community workers (*Opbouw* workers) and residents of particular neighbourhoods and

²³ This is a slogan from the communication campaign for MMdS "Het is jouw wijk dus jij mag het zeggen!" which was used in many cities. This slogan is surrounded by pictures of people helping other people (for example, pushing a wheelchair, receiving a ball from a police officer, two men in Islamic dress talking, caring for the environment, among other things).

streets who agree to enact (by signing a contract) certain behaviours while on the street. The municipality selects streets that are to be involved according to their low standing on the Safety Index, which is an indicator of crime statistics, police reports and individuals' feelings of safety. This is a particularly intensive project with respect to time and dedication on both the side of the community workers as well as participating residents.

The creation of MMdS in 2002-2003 was Rotterdam's next step in taking an active approach in its efforts to clean up the streets in both a physical and security respect. MMdS was based on a program called 'Opzoomer Mee!²⁴' that sought to increase social integration and increase profits in the local economy. Opzoomer projects began in the 1980s and were designed to improve the quality of life in disadvantaged areas without direct government involvement²⁵.

Dutch sociologists Justus Uitermark and Jan Willem Duyvendak (from the introduction) argue that the MMdS program operates as a "school for active citizenship" that informs "abstract ideals, such as citizenship, participation, diversity" (2006: 3). It was thought that Rotterdam faced an extraordinary challenge in regard to social integration of its citizens to which the 'street approach' was used to address these areas where citizens were not actively taking care of their environment. Areas typically identified as in need of social regeneration were located in neighbourhoods that had high turnover rates, social problems such as public nuisance, and where the collective care for the public spaces was absent, namely '*achterstadswijken*' (literally: backwards neighbourhoods) that became *Krachtwijken* (2006: 4). The report's authors note that:

²⁴ Opzoomer refers to neighbourhood initiatives initiated by residents of Opzoomer Street, in Rotterdam, who took it upon themselves to better the sociability and liveability of their street (see Chapter 5).

²⁵ The exclusion of the governmental representative comes from the healthy distrust and scepticism of politicians in Dutch society (see Chapter 1 and 4 for further discussion of this popular distrust).

In such a situation, it is not worth it for individual residents (or even dangerous for them) to speak with others about indecent behaviour, cleaning up the environment, or organising a party for the neighbourhood. These areas are likely on the verge of sliding into a *hot spot* (area where more social and security intervention is necessary) that creates a feeling of collective distrust (2006: 4-5).

In this way, this assertive social policy sought to provide services that would foster active citizenship where concern about the social and physical environment of the street became normalized and where neighbours automatically greeted each other and avoided creating any nuisance and littering in the streets (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006: 5). As noted by the authors, “At its core, MMdS is about residents behaving as good citizens in the public domain and in this way, the government ensures that good citizenship is sanctioned and cultivated” (ibid). The immediate focus of the program, therefore, is restoring social cohesion and fostering ‘active citizenship’, especially in those neighbourhoods that have a problem with safety (cf. Litjens, Hammenga and Propper 2010).

Uitermark and Duyvendak’s (2006) report is filled with phrases such as ‘backward neighbourhoods’ (*achterstadswijken*), denoting inferiority, and in contrast to progressive, clean, and safe neighbourhoods; features of which presumably describe the neighbourhood’s inhabitants as well. Unsurprisingly, the residents in backwards neighbourhoods areas are, more often than not, predominantly “allochthonous” (CBS 2010: 140). This report is also interesting because of the language it uses with respect to citizenship. The authors argue that citizenship debates in the Netherlands occur chiefly on the national level but that these debates should be brought down to what they call ‘street-citizenship’ (*straatburgerschap*) and that it is difficult for ‘non-active citizens’ or what they term ‘citizens from backwards neighbourhoods’ to take part in national debates concerning Dutch identity and belonging because they are already too busy with their

‘everyday problems’ and have few skills by which to do so (8). Like Duyvendak’s later discussion of the culturalization of citizenship, local acts of active participation are thought to provide “allochthonous” residents with a sense of belonging to the “nation” and to provide their loyalty to the Dutch “nation” and to the “autochthonous” residents. Through this new street citizenship program, ordinary residents are encouraged to become active citizens; this, in turn will create bonds and social contacts among them (2006: 9). Thus, the street is seen as the place where individuals are able to show their allegiance and loyalty to the larger nation.

The street approach also emphasizes the role of neighbours in helping non-participants fully integrate into Dutch society, placing responsibility on the shoulders of ordinary individuals in reinforcing the conceptions of how to use a particular local space that is linked to a national-space in its bid to create *active citizens*. The following is a description from a local community worker concerning the everyday activities associated with this program.

The local community worker, Karim, was one of the main MMdS facilitators in Liskwartier. Karim was one of three community workers (*Opbouw* workers) who worked in Rotterdam North (funded through the municipal government) and who has led numerous social cohesion and integration projects over the last 13 years. Karim was proud of his dual nationalities, Moroccan and Dutch²⁶, and was well liked in the community because he was often around and could speak to most Moroccan residents who did not speak fluent Dutch. The following is a conversation we had concerning the MMdS project:

²⁶ It is unknown how long Dutch citizens will be able to keep dual passports as Geert Wilders seeks to put an end to it (see http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2010/10/new_government_to_face_its_fir.php).

Karim D.: the MMdS is a very intensive project. It is organised through the municipal government, those in 'Opzoomer mee' and Opbouwwerk (the organisation that employs him). A number of streets are chosen, for example in this neighbourhood, Liskwartier, we have two streets, Street A and Street B (...). You begin with interviewing people on the street by calling on them at their house and asking them if you can ask them a list of questions. We ask questions such as: How long have you lived in your street? Is it nice in your street? Do you have contact with the other neighbours? Is the contact in your street just like a greeting, or do you have them over for coffee?

Then you take all the information that you get from the street and try to figure out what the street 'needs'. After this initial period, you hold a couple of meetings (*straat afspraak*) with the residents to which the neighbours must come. Before you start anything, you must have interviewed at least 50% of neighbours from the street. So if there are 100 inhabitants, you must have 50 interviews. You must also collect their signatures as well because this binds them to taking part in the program. So yeah, it is very intensive process and it takes a lot of time.

We conduct interviews both during the day and at night. Luckily, there is always another worker with you. You both walk around in the midday and make plans with the residents about when they would be available to have a meeting with you. Then with your schedule, you go around and visit the residents one-by-one. You have to go in the evenings because, you know, people also work and you have to get to them as well. As you get the interviews and collect the signatures from the residents, then you extend an invitation to your contact at the municipal government (*deelgemeente*) and have a meeting with them to discuss the understanding of the residents and what you think should happen. Then you select point people (*gangmakers*) from the street, about 4, and they become the contact persons from the street (to both he and the neighbours) and with them you can initiate street activities. With these people you do activities in the street and give them the supporting funds for these activities. In the first year you give them 1000 Euros and in the second year, they can get 500 Euros. The whole process lasts for about two years. And then one year after that, you continue to speak with the residents, with the municipal government and with the people from Opzoomer mee, about whether they are satisfied and they can continue receiving funding (from Opzoomer) for activities if necessary (...). It is a very good method, but also very intensive.

Jennifer Long: Does it work?

KD: In some streets it works very well because the point people are enthusiastic and make good contact people in the street. Then you see that some residents become more active, for example, they become point persons who set up new activities on their own. They can write the letters themselves, call on other neighbours by themselves, etc. So yes, in some streets it works well.

On other streets, however, there are more troubles and in these streets and I have to work harder to find out what it takes to get people involved. (...) For example, in Street A, the residents have taken up all the organizing roles themselves. It helps that they have the same background and so it works well. However, in Street B, it is a very different street and so it is difficult. There is enough interest in the program but the residents are more individually-oriented and have little contact with one another. So this sort of street is in need of more attention and so I have to work harder to help that growth happen.

Despite the heavy workload and demands on both his and the residents' time, Karim went on to say that the MMdS program was a good method overall for reaching residents because it did not focus on one particular group, such as "allochthons", but instead, approached each resident of a given area. In this way, Karim believed that neighbourhood problems were community problems and not just the cause of one particular group. According to Karim, this program had a contagious effect: "the idea with the neighbourhood approach is that it transforms not only the street, but the next street, and the next, and so on until the whole neighbourhood has changed". Thus, despite the somewhat problematic rhetoric of the MMdS program, according to Karim's experiences it was one of the more inclusive social integration programs.

Karim's conclusions were seconded by a resident of Old North, a neighbourhood bordering both Liskwartier and Bergpolder in Rotterdam North. This neighbourhood, like Bergpolder, is a *Krachtwijk* and has a mixed income population; however, it has a majority of non-western "allochthon" residents. This resident, Kurt, had lived in Old North for over 15 years and spent much of his time photographing local events and participating in projects in Rotterdam North. Kurt's experiences with the MMdS program include his attendance at one of the preliminary meetings that he described in the following terms:

There were 50 people of different ages (there). There were more immigrants than natives there, and many women who wore headscarves. It was such a mixed group and I think it was a good reflection of the residents who live here in the district because there are more immigrants than natives living in Old North. I thought that the presence of many foreigners was a success for the organization.

We had to divide into groups of eight to ten people and sit around tables. We began to introduce ourselves. There were very different people: uneducated, educated, unmarried mothers, children, students, traditional Muslim men and seniors. Every table received a list of questions that we had to discuss as a group, and ours was: what is most dear for you in your life that you always want to keep? The second question on our sheet was: what did you dream that you wish to come true? When we spoke together there was a lot of respect and curiosity of the habits and customs of each other. Everyone was open to others opinion. (...) It's so wonderful that almost everyone went and spoke about very personal stories about their own lives and the changes they have experienced.

I had never before experienced such an evening and found it very surprising. Normally you do not speak so openly and honestly with an unfamiliar person about your life but almost everyone expressed their views. Only the older traditional Muslim man had little to say. He did however speak about the fact that his family means everything to him and that he would find it terrible if he ever lost his photographs and papers of his family. Then a Muslim woman was again very open and talked about her diary how she now began to write columns and ambitions of starting to publish. She is studying social work now. We listened to each other and asked questions. It was fun and educational. You become a bit optimistic if people are so open and honest about their experiences!

This event is pictured below in a photograph taken by Kurt himself:



Photo of 'Dag van Dialoog' (with permission of the photographer)

Kurt, like Karim, found positive aspects to participating in these events despite their arguably paternalistic approach. In discussions that I had with other community workers, however, I was also told that the MMdS process was at times “forced upon certain residents because they are perceived to live in a disadvantaged area” and that these residents are targeted because “they do not want to take part in such social-bonding projects”. This feeling was also present in some of the adjectives that Karim used to describe the program, such as ‘intensive’, and when he described how he must involve at least 50 percent of the residents on the street, a standard which is set by the government and not by the voluntary participation of residents. Thus, it is apparent that there are a variety of responses and experiences of this program. Yet, the very existence of such intensive programming points to the fact that government authorities believe there to be insufficient cohesion among these mixed communities. Although the authorities hope to directly influence the behaviours of those who are involved in the meeting process, they have instituted other instruments used to influence individuals who did not participate in these meetings, that is, through public signage.

In addition to the meetings, when walking onto an MMdS street, one would encounter an MMdS board at the top and bottom of every street. The boards are located approximately 6 feet up the wall and are affixed to the end lot. An example of what is on this board can be seen in the photo below. Below is typical of MMdS boards:



Photo of MMdS board (from straatjuten.nl)

Translated, this text reads: Neighbours of Aegidiusstraat (name of the street)

1. We greet each other like good neighbours
 2. We heartily welcome new residents
 3. We find it nice to meet one another and therefore we organise two events per year
 4. The (open) plane is for everyone: we leave no mess behind and after 8pm is it quiet
- ...and let's speak to one another about this!**

MMdS boards include any rules of behaviour that the neighbours and community workers approve of, and are tailored to the perceived needs of the street. During my fieldwork, I saw signs that included such rules as: 'we will clean up after ourselves', 'we will play football (soccer) with a plastic ball', 'we will look at one another while speaking with them' 'we will work toward making a greener street' and 'we will speak with one another in a nice manner'.

According to the aforementioned report, the boards are the most concrete manifestation of the MMdS program (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006:18). The point of having these boards, as emphasized by the authors, is the fact that it makes the residents responsible for others' behaviours in their street (as well as their own), in addition to making the street a place where the residents feel responsible for overseeing behaviours. It is also the case that policy makers hope to create a space where inhabitants will *belong*,

“for example, visitors to the Square Joseph are told by the sign that it is ‘our square’. In streets and squares, there are signs with rules (that are meant to be) subtle reminders that nuisance or visiting criminals will not be tolerated and not go unnoticed” (ibid). The authors believe, however, that it is not the sign itself that produces more watchful and active citizens, but rather, the “process whereby a group of residents take responsibility and make others accountable for their (own) actions, and to be accountable to the police, the district, the corporation, and Roteb (the company that employs Rotterdam’s rubbish collectors and street cleaners)”, is what is of importance (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006:18).

Despite the fact that these boards are made through a participatory process, it is remarkable to see such transparent direction outlining the ‘ideal behaviour’ to be enacted while in the public places of the street. As per Lefebvre’s understandings, these directions would reproduce the conceived ideas of space, that is, how the creators and maintainers of public spaces wish it to be used. Needless to say these rules are not always followed; for example, on a street in Liskwartier that had an MMdS sign, there was an issue with teenage boys hanging around on street benches after dark (in violation of the quiet atmosphere after 10 pm).

In addition to these boards, there are also ‘greeting zones’ put in place in 2003 by one of the political parties (Green Left, *Groen Links*) in Rotterdam. These signs have a big waving hand on them with supporting text stating: ‘greeting is allowed’. The purpose of these boards is to encourage residents to say hello to one another. It was thought that the act of saying hello to a fellow neighbour in the street would create a more positive atmosphere and decrease anonymity between neighbours: “If the residents of a street get

to know each other, people will look after each other (in the right sense of the word) and take care of their neighbourhood” (Lelieveldt 2008: 327). Lelieveldt (2008) argues that these signs have worked to improve the overall situation on the street between neighbours; yet, he does not question the accompanying governmentality of designing behaviour in space. Although the residents on participating streets create their own unique boards to suit their specific street’s needs, the boards and the program itself still follow the larger understanding that residents should have social relationships with other residents on the street in order to increase active citizenship.

Boards outlining proper behaviour seem to be a popular approach as a municipally funded community organization, Welzijn Noord (the organisation that facilitated ‘The Week of Good Morals’ in Liskwartier), also made boards outlining proper behaviour for children. Following their presentation to the local school, these boards were fastened to the wall across the street from the school.



Photo of ‘Welcome in Liskwartier’ Board

Below the pictures on these plaques are phrases that translate (from left to right): we greet each other; we care for our neighbourhood; a promise is a promise; we talk our arguments out; we listen to one another; and we speak to each other like we wish to be

spoken to. The emphasis on outlining behaviour in public places is evident. Like the MMdS signs, these boards were located in ‘backward’ areas, that is, areas with large “allochthonous” youth populations. The similarity between the content of these signs is also apparent as both focus inter-group cohesion; for example, in the top-left and bottom-right pictures, one figure is wearing a headscarf while the other lacks notable denominational or cultural symbols. There is not much information concerning whether or not these signs achieve their respective goals (cf. Lelieveldt 2006; Stokkom and Toenders 2010) but as has been shown in this sub-section, there is a trend in social programming supported by the government to regulate behaviour in public place that is largely directed at “allochthonous” individuals. This can be seen to be in line with the integration program associated with the immigration of “allochthonous” individuals into Dutch society.

Consequently, these signs also reinforce the understanding of difference among the residents of the neighbourhood through the focus upon particular set of appropriate “Dutch” behaviours that are to be followed by everyone. Furthermore, the fact that MMdS programs and programs such as the ‘Week of the Good Morals’ are featured largely in ‘backwards neighbourhoods’ reiterates the difference of residents within these area, the largest number of whom are “allochthonous” individuals.

In this chapter, I have argued that integration courses and certain neighbourhood programs teach a set of “Dutch” cultural attributes that “allochthonous” individuals are expected to follow while in public space. These integration programs and educational avenues promote a cultural understanding of ‘active citizenship’ that strays from previous conceptions of citizenship in earlier decades (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, it is clear that

these programs and those individuals who are involved with them (whether they are officials or scholars who work to design such courses or the teachers who provide lessons at the neighbourhood level) place more responsibility on “allochthons” to prove their worth as citizens and their willingness to adopt “Dutch” cultural ways.

The very existence of such courses and the peculiar selection of students highlight “allochthons” and “allochthonous” behaviour as unacceptable and identify “autochthons” and “Dutch” culture as (automatically) acceptable, regardless of the context. The trajectory of such education, and their underlying discourses, reflect a growing populist conservatism in the Netherlands that projects a need to *protect* the Dutch “culture” against the threat posed by outsiders and to *diffuse* one set of “Dutch” ideals to those who are marked as different, instead of living in a pluralistic society, for example. This direction indicates a narrowing of the vision of tolerance in the Netherlands where more essentialized and homogenized models for society are fanning the rhetoric that differentiates between “us” and “them”.

The experiences addressed in this chapter bring together two threads for future discussion in the coming chapters: first, there remains a disparity between how certain people use public places and how neighbourhood and district government (Rotterdam North) workers believe these places should be used. This is evident through the numerous programs that are directed at improving behaviour and social relationships in neighbourhood spaces. The second theme that resonates in future chapters is the connection between being an ‘active citizen’ and the act of participation. As we saw above, in order to be an active citizen in the rhetoric of integration education, one had to participate in Dutch society. It is thought that actively involving residents in the

neighbourhood will provide the opportunity to 'bridge different cultures' (Welzijnnoord Rotterdam 2008). What will come to the fore in the next chapter is that the participation process emphasizes the perception that "allochthonous" individuals do not participate enough and are not active citizens, and are thus different from "autochthons"; however, this status can be ameliorated by behaving like "autochthons" in public spaces. Therefore, the programs are designed for different populations along lines of "allochthon" and "autochthon".

CHAPTER 3:
“IT’S ALL ABOUT WHO YOU KNOW!” CREATING NEIGHBOURHOOD PUBLIC PLACES

In this chapter, I will explore the process of creating public spaces through government-led initiatives as well as through “autochthon”-led initiatives in order to demonstrate how understandings of “Dutch” culture and how being an ‘active citizen’ are accepted attributes of Dutch national identity. According to Lefebvre, it is urban planners and city officials who design and define the rules of how individuals should be using public places (1991 [1974]: 33). This was also the case in Dutch urban planning policy until the release of the Major Cities Policy in 1995, which not only sought to renew vast areas of Rotterdam’s post-WWII housing, but also incorporated *social* renewal programs through the active involvement of citizens, companies, and institutions in urban renewal projects (Priemus 2005: 6). This direction of incorporating ordinary citizens into urban renewal intensified following Pim Fortuyn’s popularity in the polls in 2001. Following up on one of Fortuyn’s most popular political contentions (that is, that something had to be done about the considerable gap that existed between the political elite and their citizenry), officials began to open up avenues for participation to gather residents’ ideas and critical views on government-led projects. This approach evidently worked as can be seen from the growing role of residents in the urban restructuring process. This “participatory” approach aimed at creating social ties among residents in the neighbourhood and was thought to be more successful with resident input than with those ventures that had been instituted ‘from above’ (cf. Priemus 2005; van Beckhoven et al. 2009b).

During my fieldwork, I observed ordinary citizens taking part in renewal projects for the public places of their neighbourhood, for example, in the conservation of neighbourhood gardens, or in more large-scale development that sought to gentrify entire

neighbourhood areas. While there remained some scepticism as to the extent to which their opinions mattered, residents willingly participated in meetings, information nights, and focus groups in order to provide their input and feedback to the planning authorities. Yet, from the very beginning of my research, it was apparent that the majority of individuals who participated in the feedback process for neighbourhood projects (that I was involved with), were people who would be described as “autochthonous” residents.

For example, at one of my very first meetings concerning the government-led renewal project of the southern blocks of Bergpolder, I mentioned to Albert, a man attending the meeting, that there did not seem to be many residents from the neighbourhood itself. This was evident because Bergpolder South (*Bergpolder Zuid*) has a demographically mixed population²⁷, yet, aside from the representatives from Iskender, the local Turkish Cultural Centre and Mosque, there were few individuals from this community. The man with whom I was speaking, Albert, was in his early 20s and was finishing his studies at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. He did not live in Rotterdam North but instead worked as an intern for the housing corporation Vestia²⁸, which owns and is in charge of renovating not only the buildings in the area but also, the affected environment. He was knowledgeable about the project because the renewal project of Bergpolder South was his assignment while he was interning there. In response to my observation about the mix of attendees, or lack thereof, he said: “Now that is something you can do with your research. If you can figure out how to gather the

²⁷ There are no statistics outlining the exact numbers of “allochthonous” vs. “autochthonous” residents in Bergpolder South. Instead, I refer to Chapter 1’s demographic information that states that Bergpolder has an above national average of residents who are categorised as non-western “allochthonous” individuals that is 36 percent (as opposed to the national average of 11 percent) (Bergpolder en Liskwartier 2011b). From my own observations, the majority of “allochthonous” residents live in the Bergpolder South area.

²⁸ Vestia is a housing corporation that provides cheap, clean, and well-made accommodation for individuals who could not otherwise afford such housing, see below.

opinions of the “allochthonous” residents, then everyone would be happy. That is what everyone wants to know!” According to Albert, the “allochthonous” residents of the area did not typically participate in the gatherings concerning the future construction of their own neighbourhood, and Albert felt that housing corporations had little recourse when he stated:

What are you going to do about it? If we say to them (“autochthonous” residents), “Oh sorry, we appreciate you coming out but we’d rather have the opinions of the allochthonous residents”, then you’re not being fair to them because they are here and they want to participate. And truthfully, you’d have no one left to get feedback from (if you asked them to leave), because you don’t see a lot of allochthon at these meetings. So, you (speaking for the housing corporation) take what you can get.

As argued by van de Wijdeven and Hendriks (2009), the Dutch meeting-room culture, as they call it, is “biased toward white, highly educated, male participants” (125). This organization style was apparent throughout the Bergpolder South. The participatory events, for example, were formal, beginning with a presentation about the project after which participants raised questions and made comments. These meetings were held at the district government office building and typically were scheduled after six o’clock in the evening. This style of participation platform arguably appeals to, and is only available to, a certain number of residents who are available at this time of day and who feel at ease in this setting. In line with van de Wijdeven and Hendriks (2009), I argue that the design and environment created for the feedback process influence which individuals were able to participate in neighbourhood projects. This is an important factor in the everyday politics of belonging; as my research argues, participating in one’s neighbourhood is a feature of active citizenry and a factor in belonging to the majority. This connection had

resounding effects for the “allochthon” population who were perceived as not participating enough in the community.

Being a Good Neighbour: renewing Bergpolder South

Bergpolder South is located in the borough of Rotterdam North and includes areas of both Bergpolder and Liskwartier.



Map of Bergpolder South (available at: <http://www.rotterdam.nl/bp3738>)

As outlined in Chapter 1, the Minister of Housing, Districts and Integration designated Bergpolder as a neighbourhood in need of attention known as a *Krachtwijk* in 2007. Bergpolder was added to the list of problematic neighbourhoods because it had a high turnover rate of inhabitants (thought to be a result of the small housing units found in this neighbourhood); moderate air quality (due to its location next to a major highway); small, cluttered streets that were thought to be dirty and often disturbed by nuisances such as car break-ins; as well as a limited supply of social facilities such as opportunities for sports, art, and culture. Due to these issues and the fact that the federal government stopped financing WWII renewal schemes for Rotterdam (for which Bergpolder received funding) around the same time, the municipal and district government with Vestia

decided to address the current state of Bergpolder South through urban renewal (Master Plan Bergpolder Zuid/South [MPBZ] 2011: 15).

Vestia released the Master Plan for Bergpolder South (*Masterplan Bergpolder Zuid*, MPBZ) in May 2011 that provided an in-depth account of projects that were slated for completion in the year 2020. One example of these renovation projects involves converting many of the smaller two and three bedroom apartments, that comprised 80 percent of the housing stock available in Bergpolder, into larger single-family dwellings (MPBZ 2011: 29, 39). Urban planners thought that by providing bigger houses, students, entrepreneurs, and young families would be able to stay in Bergpolder instead of moving out of the neighbourhood; this plan aimed to slow the high turnover rate of residents.

Attention will also be given to public buildings and outdoor public parks and open spaces as the master plan proposed to tear down some housing blocks in order to make way for green spaces and small gardens for current residents (2011:21, 93-96). According to the planners, by creating a more 'liveable' environment, more residents would be willing to stay in the area and take care of their neighbourhood (2011: 17, 19). To date, housing and government officials in charge of the neighbourhood renovation have built an underground parking garage to address the issue of street congestion in the neighbourhood by lessening the number of cars on the street²⁹. At the moment, financial aspects are being finalized before more renovations are scheduled.

Additional controls that influenced the planning process included heritage services in Rotterdam, which declared protective status for certain buildings and architectural styles in the area, for example, renovation of the facade of certain houses

²⁹ This project was one of the preliminary developments leading up to larger regeneration plans, which was completed at the end of 2010.

must remain at the same height (MPBZ 2011). One such protected structure is the Hofplein Line (*Hofplein Lijn*). This 1.9 km long viaduct runs through the eastern border of this area. Closed in August of 2010, this defunct railway line (more specifically the archways under the raised viaduct) and its adjoining stations will be left intact and renovated in order to provide space for small shops, support services, and cultural centers for the community (MPBZ 2011: 31, 35, 53, 63, 65). Future building projects for this space include expanding the number of spaces found under the archways that have been converted into shops and transforming the track space into either a cycling path or a walking route to the city centre (for more information about the Hofplein Line see below). In this way, the planning committee hoped to boost local economic infrastructure and make Bergpolder an attractive area for ‘creative’ urban residents, such as artists (MPBZ 2011: 19).

Diversifying the housing stock in post-WWII neighbourhoods is typical of contemporary urban renewal projects because the housing stock of this era was built in a period of housing shortage resulting in cheap and quick constructions made from prefabricated materials that produced a similar design on the outside and inside. According to van Kempen et al. (2009), homogeneity of the housing stock does not allow residents to remain within a single area because they are forced to move out to either expand or downsize (271). In areas with cheap and smaller housing, like Bergpolder South, there is generally a high turnover rate of individuals because those with the financial capacity to live in larger dwellings move out of the neighbourhood, leaving behind a more homogeneous population of those with less financial resources. This demographic is problematic according to Dutch city officials and urban planners because

it is believed that this population will have lower levels of civic engagement and little opportunity to better their social and economic circumstances due to decreased 'bridging' ties among residents.

Using Granovetter's (1973) and Putnam's (2000) work on civic engagement and social connections among diverse urban communities, van Kempen et al. (2009) define bonding ties as relationships between people where not much 'new information' is exchanged and thought to be typical of ties between members of the same economic or social group; whereas bridging ties refer to relationships where much 'world-wide information' is exchanged between members of different economic and social groups, for example, employment opportunities or the dissemination of social norms (270).

Kleinhans et al. (2007), who conducted their research in the Netherlands, found that individuals with higher incomes, higher education levels, and who lived in single-family dwellings had the highest level of social capital in the neighbourhood (1058).

Furthermore, in this model, middle- and upper-class residents are thought to be good role-models for the lower-classes, increase social capital in the area, and improve the social contact and cohesion of the area (van Kempen et al. 2009: 271). Thus, having fewer higher classes of residents in any neighbourhood is thought to decrease the opportunities to create bridging connections for the lower classes. Fewer bridging ties are thought to lead to lower levels of sociability and liveability in a neighbourhood and decreasing opportunities for lower class residents to improve their levels of social, cultural, and economic capital (ibid).

Concerning civic engagement, van Steden et al.'s research in the Netherlands showed that middle-class residents are more inclined to be civically engaged and to take

care of their neighbourhood (2011). According to such a view, having a homogeneous population will lead to decreased civic engagement among the population, which in turn leads to more social and physical problems in the neighbourhood. This view is echoed by Putnam (1995), who noted that:

For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial stock of social capital. In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved (67).

Networks among various social and economic groups within the population are thought to garner a more collective outlook and provide a framework that supports future collaborations among residents (ibid).

Recent research, however, has pointed out that the vast majority of middle-class residents living in mixed neighbourhoods tend to have closer relationships with those residents in the same economic class as themselves, regardless of other social or cultural attributes (Bolt et al. 2008; Musterd and Pinkster 2009; van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009). Van Beckhoven and van Kempen (2003) sum up this phenomenon succinctly: “people in neighbourhoods seem to live alongside each other, not together” (871).

Despite this, the Dutch authorities continue to operate and create urban planning schemes based on the assumption that urban renewal projects should work to bond middle and upper class residents to urban neighbourhoods so that they will introduce their lower-class neighbours to larger social networks that will eventually improve the lower-class’ access to educational and employment opportunities and access to the “right kind of social capital” (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009:63). Using Bourdieu’s theory of capital (1986), and in line with my own use of such terms in this dissertation, the authors defined

social capital as “resources that are accessible through social contacts, social networks, reciprocity, norms and trust” (1070; see introduction for my own definition). This model of creating mixed neighbourhoods assumes that marginalized individuals only need extra social and cultural capital in order to be successful in Dutch society. This approach camouflages structural inequalities between ‘native’ Dutch and immigrants, which the majority of those with the highest level of social, cultural, and economic capital are “autochthonous” residents³⁰. To further explore this dimension, I will now provide an overview of Vestia’s participatory process for the Bergpolder South project.

Participating in Bergpolder South

Vestia and the district government, who are in charge of the Bergpolder South renovation project, determined that they had been successful in getting feedback from residents through an extensive feedback and participation process (MPBZ 2011: 117). According to the Master Plan, Vestia and the government ensured they had contact with local stakeholders who included: business owners, neighbourhood groups, and residents (MPBZ 2011:19). This participation process began with five ‘resident evenings’ (*bewoners avonden*) between February and April 2010, where planners laid out their

³⁰ According the Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 2010 report on integration, “non-western immigrants have substantially lower incomes than natives and western immigrants, which applies to non-western immigrants in both the first and second generation” (107; cf. Lautenbach and Otten 2007). According to this report, the average annual income in 2008 for ‘natives’ (“autochthonous” individuals) reached 25,000 Euros (108). The average income for those individuals identified as non-western “allochthon” was only 18,000 Euros, per household, per year (ibid). Furthermore, nearly half of non-western “allochthonous” families had an income in the lowest income bracket while only six percent of autochthonous families did (110). This report also found that Turkish and Moroccan incomes raised the *least* throughout their lives and that they were more likely *not* to advance throughout their careers (109). Overall, of the non-western “allochthonous” groups, Moroccan’s continued to be the lowest-earning group and the Surinamese the highest earning; both outcomes are said to depend on their employment status (110).

initial drawings and requested feedback from attendees as new versions of the plan were developed (2011: 113).

Overall, the Master Plan stated that respondents wished to see an increase in the number of green spaces in the area and renovation of degenerated buildings that had already been mostly empty for a number of years (MPBZ 2011:117). Further, residents wanted the character of the area to remain the same; more specifically, it was mentioned that residents wanted to maintain the “mixed character” of the neighbourhood (this was most often interpreted as the perceived social, cultural, and economic mix), in addition to building in line with the pre-war architecture that already dominated the area. Finally, residents agreed that the Hofplein Line should be developed into something that benefited the entire neighbourhood community (ibid).

From my own experiences at these events, participants at these evenings were a diverse group, in terms of their age, occupation, and income. What follows is a brief profile of some of the more frequent attendees at these meetings. Hendrijk is a retired government employee who wrote municipal policies on immigration during the 1970s and 1980s and who lives on the Bergsingel (a street with upscale housing and water canal); he leads the Neighbourhood Organisation of Liskwartier (BOL). Josephine is a retired lecturer from the Technical University of Delft, who was active in city renewal projects in the Jordaan in Amsterdam. She lives on the Bergselaan, another street with owned housing and tall trees, and is the head of the Friends of the Hofbogen³¹ workgroup (*Vrienden van de Hofbogen* or VH). Josephine also substituted for Hendrijk, when he was away as the head of BOL. Caroline is a Bergpolder resident in her late forties who is also

³¹ Hofbogen denotes the archways underneath the Hofplein Line and therefore, this group works in tandem with other groups dedicated to the planning of the Hofplein viaduct.

a member of the BOL, the VH workgroup, the multicultural choir group (*Multikulticor*), and the Bergpolder Theatrical Group. Reni is around 20 years of age, and a resident of Old North whose parents were born outside the Netherlands in South America. He completed a semester of his Master's degree in Canada. He works at an indie cinema in Rotterdam and volunteered for the International Film Festival when it came to Rotterdam. Reni is interested in the Bergpolder South project because one of the plans for the defunct *Bergweg* station (located in Bergpolder) is to establish an independent film theatre, called Northern Cinema (*Noorder Bioscoop*). Willem, a mid-sixties photographic journalist, is active in his own neighbourhood of Old North (bordering Bergpolder and Liskwartier) in addition to volunteering for the VH and the Northern Cinema project. Piet is a new homeowner to Bergpolder, in his early 30s, who works as the editor for the neighbourhood newspaper (*Het Bolwerk*) and as a contract photographic journalist for other Rotterdam North newspapers. Lastly, Ertrugul is a 22 year-old whose parents immigrated to the Netherlands from Turkey. Ertrugul has recently become a member of the Neighbourhood Organisation of Bergpolder (that works out of the same office as the BOL in Liskwartier) and works as a volunteer for Willpower Works (*Wilskrachtwerk*), a volunteer placement agency that facilitates programming at the BNC, and other centers around Rotterdam. With the exception of Reni and Ertugrul, who would be considered well-integrated "allochthons", the most active participants were "autochthons".

These evenings typically began with an introductory speech or presentation and broke off into smaller groups where workers explained the maps and charts that were laid out on tables. Participants were asked to make notes that were then attached to the documents themselves or written on a page of chart paper so that all attendees could see

them and comment on each other's feedback as well as the plan itself. Within a couple of weeks, summaries of the participants' feedback were sent out (via email) in preparation for the next event or meeting. These evenings were held in a couple of different locations, for example in the local government building, the defunct railway station of the Hofplein Line (MPBZ 2011: 115). In order to advertise these nights, letters, information papers, and fliers were distributed to the addresses in the affected area and advertisements were sent out around the district and distributed on the public squares on the week leading up to the meetings.

In addition to these resident evenings, Vestia and the district government invited residents to join a consulting group (*klankbord groep*), which began in June 2010. This group was created to provide more in-depth feedback about the process of the master plan with representatives of the government and housing corporation (MPBZ 2011: 113). I myself was able to attend some of the meetings of the consulting group in June and July. Planners also held debate weeks where residents could come by and discuss the current plan (first in June and then in October 2010). The stakeholders also held a 'Mirror Evening' in September where residents could answer the question: "have we heard you correctly?" This meeting was held in response to certain negative feelings concerning the direction of the planning process felt within the community. Finally, there was a closing debate where residents were presented with the latest draft of the Master Plan before it was finalised (MPBZ 2011: 117).

The decision was made to host an additional meeting to encourage "allochthonous" participation. Representatives from the local Turkish, Iskender Cultural Center and Mosque, located in Bergpolder South, had requested that the meetings take

place outside the time of Ramadan and a meeting was held at the centre in late 2010. In hosting a meeting at the local cultural center and mosque, it was thought that a more diverse crowd would attend. Jacco, Bergpolder's government director, was quoted in a local publication as saying,

It is too bad that the people who are participating in the meetings do not really reflect the residents (who live in the area). To involve everyone, we have had one of the meetings in the building where the mosque is located. At this event, more attendees had diverse backgrounds (Via Vestia, Winter 2010: 4).

The extra effort on behalf of the organizers to collect more representative feedback concerning neighbourhood renovations is notable and speaks to the importance of diversity for district government employees; however, this approach also highlights "allochthonous" difference at the same time that it seeks to incorporate 'their' feedback. Jacco's comments are also interesting because he connects the space of the meeting as a method to reach residents from the area who are largely perceived as "allochthonous" individuals. As stated in previous chapters, there is a strong perception that "allochthonous" individuals are also identified as Muslims. These individuals are also the group that are often described as not participating in neighbourhood events and in Dutch society in general, as was the perceived outcome of the meeting held in the mosque.

Importantly, despite what appears to be an enormous effort at collecting residents' opinions, residents critiqued the planners because it was thought that the plans for the neighbourhood were already completed and that the advice from these participation platforms was not actually used by any of the planners. The authors of the final Master Plan document stated that "residents were always clearly informed of the particular purpose of the evening or the conversation" and that throughout the entire process, it was always clear to the participants that while their participation was appreciated, "the

decision (of the future project) rests with the parties who are planning it, namely Vestia Rotterdam Noord (the Rotterdam North section of Vestia) and the district government of Rotterdam North” (MPBZ 2011:117).

To better understand the process whereby the views of the residents were supposedly incorporated into the plans for Bergpolder South, I spoke with Anton who worked in the district government offices and was the liaison between the district government and Vestia. I asked Anton, who almost always attended the planning meetings, why it was so important for the housing corporation and the government to collect input from residents to which he said, “If you renovate a street, it’s a good idea if you get the cooperation of those who live there! Of course!” and continued:

The government is becoming more aware that residents have knowledge about what is going on here in the neighbourhood. In my other work, for example, we were renovating around another light-rail train line that runs from Gouda to the coast (Noord Wijk) via Leiden. One evening, I had a meeting with local people about this project as I was hired to facilitate that meeting. There was a woman there and at one point, she pointed to the maps that we had open on the table and said “What you have drawn here (pointing to the plan) is *not* possible”. “No”, we said, “look here, it is possible” and they measured the distances and concluded that their calculations were right. She said, “No, you see I walk here every morning with my dog and there is a shop there. Every morning, a truck comes by and does a turnaround in this area. Trucks use this space in this way all the time so what you have planned here will make that impossible”. This bit of knowledge is something that we wouldn’t have known otherwise because we don’t live there. Residents give you insight into how exactly people behave and react in that space.

It is obvious that Anton finds residents’ knowledge both useful and insightful. Thus, allowing residents to participate from Anton’s point of view is not just a political ‘trick’ to appease the voters but is something that makes the process of renovating a neighbourhood easier. I then asked him to speak about residents’ feedback in response to the Bergpolder South project.

Anton: In the Bergpolder project, we have the sounding board group and we ask the people their opinions on everything. (...) This is important because it is not only on the final revision of the plan that they're asked about but they are asked about the process itself. It doesn't mean that what they say, we'll do, but what they say, will indeed contribute to the planning process. But in order to do this, you have to be very clear at the beginning about what the participants are able to give feedback to you about, because there are simply some things that you cannot ask the people about.

JL: What sort of things can you *not* ask them about?

A: Well, for example, there will be some buildings that will be torn down because they are so old and it would be far more expensive to renovate than to just tear them down. You cannot ask the tenants of that building "Well, what do you think about that?" (i.e. Can we do this?) because the tenants will of course say "No!" In the end, the cost of the renovations are paid by the owners of the buildings, so sometimes you have to decide with the owners, in this case, Vestia. But, the important thing is that you are clear from the beginning in terms of what role people can play in participating.

It is important to note the caveat that Anton makes in regard to the final decision when he states that at times 'one must defer to those who are paying for the renovations or own the buildings', and his allusion to asking residents certain questions that may ignore some of their deepest issues with a particular plan. Residents' participation is also at the behest of the government and stakeholders, that is, these parties decide to what extent and at what times residents can be involved in the planning process (van Beckhoven et al. 2009 a: 220). It appears that, in line with de Certeau's understanding of how public spaces are designed, and rules for usage conceived, the ultimate power (the final say) still lies within the hands of the urban planners and government officials of this project, or "the strong".

Regarding this specific regeneration project, I spoke to a few individuals who were extremely unhappy with the projected plans due to the unclear or condemned state of their own houses. One such woman, Sylvie, lives in an apartment in a building that is currently waiting for a plan to be assigned to it; however, as she states below, she

believes that her building will eventually be torn down. At the time of this discussion, in early February 2010, residents had just received the initial ‘Ambition Document’ that discussed proposed plans for the area. Sylvie, a woman in her early 40s, would be identified as an “autochthonous” individual having parents who were both born and raised in the Netherlands; however, her husband, who was born in Africa and who immigrated to the Netherlands, would be identified as “allochthonous” and therefore, any children that they might have would also be categorised as “allochthonous”. The following are Sylvie’s experiences with the Bergpolder South gentrification project:

In this building here (where she lives), some apartments are privately owned, like mine, while others are owned by Vestia. (...) So, I went to Vestia and asked if we could work together to maintain the building and keep it in the right shape. You see, when I moved here, I saw a lot of things that could be fixed up and I thought that if all the owners would work together on projects, at the same time, then things would look better and happen more easily. For example, if the frames around the windows need painting then they could all be painted at the same time because it’s cheaper to buy all the materials and the building will look well taken care of, if all the frames are renewed at the same time. (...)

But Vestia does not want to maintain its apartments in this building. Instead, Vestia plans to tear down this building and put up newer, larger houses. They are doing this in order to get new people in the area; by new people, I mean rich people because this area is filled with the singles, elderly, or couples with only one child and if that family wants to expand then they have to move out of the neighbourhood to find a bigger house. On the whole, the residents living here have lower incomes because they’re working only part-time and studying, or are working at their first job, or whatever and so the overall income of the neighbourhood is low. So, that is what it’s all about. Vestia and maybe even the government, or at least some of the politicians, want more rich people in the area so that they can come here and spend their money. This of course is good for the shop owners here because they will get clients but for the rest of us...I don’t know.

Sylvie, who self-identifies as an individual who has low income, believes that she will be one of the individuals sent out of the neighbourhood to make way for middle and upper class residents, if she, and others like her, are unable to afford the cost of the newer larger

housing. This move will influence residents with lower incomes more because this group is more often dependent on social housing due to their financial situation (van der Waal and Burgers 2009: 31).

Sylvie believes that Vestia is letting the state of the surrounding apartments in her building deteriorate, so that in the future the private owners will have no choice but to sell and move away. Sylvie described her past dealings with Vestia to me:

I have two reports right now and both reports state that the building is in good condition, the roof is new and it is okay. The building is not new, it was built in 1938, but it is still in good condition. So now, three year later (it is now 2010), Vestia cannot tell me that the condition of the building is so bad that they have to tear it down. You know?

I tried to make contact with the Vestia to go and work together. I even spoke with the minister when she came in 2008. At that time, we had started the *Krachtwijk* and as residents we were allowed to bring them our ideas about the area. I brought forth the idea that the housing corporations and the owners of the private houses should work together to regenerate the area. I said this to them, the minister and the director of Vestia, who were both in front of my house when I was speaking with them. Both said, "What a great idea!" and it was a nice talk. And after that, I tried to get contact with them again, many times, so that we could work together but I only got negative responses.

So instead, I asked Vestia to get a copy of the upcoming maintenance jobs planned for the apartments in my building. But they said: "Yeah, but working together is difficult because the house owners have their own schedules for maintenance and so it's difficult to co-operate" but in the meantime, I've already spoken to the other owners and they have already agreed to participate in the whole plan! So I wondered, what is going on?

In the above quote, Sylvie describes her lack of trust in the housing corporation which evolved from her attempt to have the building maintained as a whole. Despite her misgivings, Sylvie continued to work with Vestia to create, with other selected volunteers and residents, the ambition document. She said:

After that, I received an invitation to consult on the ambition document with Vestia and some other residents and stakeholders of the area. So we all had interviews and they created a document with all of our ideas for the

neighbourhood. When I finally read the ambition document, there was one plan (at the time there were various planned options for the area) to tear down the whole area and replace it with new larger houses in order to attract new, richer, people in the area! In one of the plans, the spot where my house used to be was instead a green field! (...)

When a woman from Vestia called a little while later to fill me in on the progress of the Master Document, I asked her, “Do you know what the plans are for my part of the street (my building)?” and she said, “Yes, Vestia is going to tear it down”. I said, “Excuse me, but Vestia cannot just tear down my house without my permission!” To which she said, “Oh no, no, they haven’t bought all the units yet, but they’re working on it.” And I said to myself, I don’t believe this, how can this be? (...)

So I thought then that I have to send the minister a letter about what is going on here because it was only last year that the minister and the director of Vestia North were in front of my house, agreeing that it *was* a good idea to renovate and not tear down my building. Then, not one year later, the same organisation *is* planning to tear my house down. That is not right! That is not cooperation! Instead, I got chased away! And that is the strange thing. If you’re a citizen who is trying to make the area better, you take your time to attend meetings, talk with people, organise things, etc. And then you learn that these plans are not about you and the people who are living there, but about the people who have money. Money is the issue because the housing corporation and the government want to have more money in the area. So I am currently in this situation and I don’t know what’s going to happen.

Sylvie went on to contact the Minister who sent a letter to Vestia and who promised to keep an eye on the situation should Sylvie feel the need to contact him again. She then received a call from a Vestia representative who stated that Vestia was in fact not going to tear down her housing block. Despite this assurance, Sylvie remains sceptical of Vestia’s plans as she has heard other rumours in the neighbourhood of her block being torn down to make way for larger houses. In the meantime, Sylvie started her own campaign to save her building and created a short document outlining what repairs she has done to her own apartment since the beginning stages of the redevelopment project in the area. This document also outlines what Vestia has *not* done to upkeep their apartments in the building. Her booklet convincingly portrays the lack of upkeep of the

Vestia apartments including the fact that Vestia-owned apartments are no longer being rented out, but are instead allowed to remain empty. Without tenants, Sylvie believes these apartments will fall further into disrepair and weaken her chances of keeping her apartment in a deteriorating building.

Sylvie feels as though she can no longer work with Vestia but continued to work through the Minister who was in charge of the housing portfolio for Rotterdam. According to the Master Plan, the plans for Sylvie's building remained unclear and she was dissatisfied with the participation process surrounding this regeneration project. "What is the point?" she said to me when I asked why she no longer came to the information or debate evenings, "they don't listen to me anyways."

It is evident from Sylvie's experiences that those stakeholders who were financially supporting the venture have the most power when it came to having the final say. Conversely, in a recent (Winter 2010) renter's magazine distributed by Vestia, there was an article about the Bergpolder South renovation project. In it, Rien Tuk of the Vestia Corporation, who worked with the focus group (*klankbord groep*), said that he "regret(s) the fact that residents (of Bergpolder South) are left out of participating in some of the (resident input) meetings" and comments further:

Many people shrug their shoulders when they hear about future plans for the area, but later when they read that there is a possibility that their houses will be demolished, they protest. We make efforts to bring everyone out. I even call people because having local residents involved makes a difference (Via Vestia, Winter 2010: 4)

Sylvie would most likely not agree with Mr. Tuk's comments as she took part (in the beginning stages and up until approximately July 2010) in these focus group sessions and other resident participation events and platforms. Her position as an individual residing in

this district, although supposedly of importance to official stakeholders, was not seen by her to be a position of power. Yet, not everyone was as dissatisfied as Sylvie with the participation process.

As outlined in the Master Plan of Bergpolder Zuid, stakeholders created a Sounding Board Group (*Klankbord Groep*) that met with officials from the government and from Vestia in order to give feedback on the various versions of the plan leading up to the Master document, as well as on the participation and planning process as they experienced it. During the group's second meeting in June 2010, the majority of the attendees, who happened to live outside the neighbourhood and who would be categorised as "autochthonous", discussed the fact that the majority of participants who were present that evening were not actually from the affected area and debated whether or not this was an issue. Individuals' responses included "Well, we're here, why don't our opinions count?" as well as "individuals who do not have higher levels of education will not come to these meetings because they have other, more pressing problems to work on, like maybe they're working right now or making sure that their children are doing their homework!" Another attendee, Maureen said, "Look, if they're not going to show up to these meetings, then why do we have to accommodate them?" Despite their hesitations, attendees were open to trying new tactics to get more participants from the affected area involved, but agreed that the opinions of those present, who had made the choice to participate and who felt that they too would be affected by these renovations because of their proximity to Bergpolder South (all participants lived in Rotterdam North), would also count toward the decision making process. Residents agreed that despite the potentially negative effects that these renovations could have on certain

residents of the area (for example, if they had to move out of the neighbourhood), Bergpolder South was indeed in desperate need of renovation. This need for change in the area was confirmed by one of the attendees when he said,

Regardless, there is a need for some changes to happen in the area. Although it may affect some people negatively (as in forcing some to move away) overall these renovations can be a good thing because really, it can get quite dirty around those stair-houses³²!

After this meeting, I set up an interview with Maureen who lived in Bergpolder but outside of the proposed renovation area. Maureen said that she participated in the sounding board group because one of her close neighbours was also taking part and because “it’s rather fun to be a part of the whole process”. She participated in the planning process despite feeling suspicious of the inner-workings of Vestia and the district government. Her apprehensions were a result of working with officials from both of these sectors over the last 15 years in order to lobby for the upkeep of her own building. Although she only owns one of the apartments in the housing block, the building itself was plagued by an unsound foundation that created a 50 cm difference in elevation from one side to the other. She lobbied for its renovation to be paid for by the local government and eventually won. During our interview, I asked her to elaborate on her comments at the meeting earlier in the week:

I’m not a racist but I think that there are often *autochthons* who want to do everything for the *allochthon*. The original *allochthon* came as guest workers and they needed to be taken care of. But now you have the second and third generations who have their own children, who can speak Dutch, who go to school here, and who can do things for themselves and for their parents. But here in the Netherlands, there is a bit too much care taken for the *allochthon* at least in these second and third generations. We all have the same possibilities; they are *autochthon* but they are called (treated as) *allochthon*. (...)

³² Stair houses or *trap huizen* are colloquially known as social housing that is cheap to rent and overcrowded. These three-to-four storey buildings have one single stairway, hence, their name.

You see this also with the sounding board group. The man from the *Iskender* Mosque came to the first meeting but then he didn't come again. It is a fact that everyone can come to these meetings because everyone is welcome, but that is not what happens. In my opinion, there is more done for the *allochthon* now than the *autochthon*, and by this I mean the older people. That frustrates me! I do not see them (allochthonous community) as a subordinated/disadvantaged group (*achtergestelde groep*), seriously not. (...)

In this sort of area (Bergpolder), there are probably more *allochthon* than *autochthon* residents and maybe that's why there is such a focus on including them in the planning process; but this (hand-holding) approach is taken throughout all the Netherlands - to provide and do a lot for these *allochthon*.

Maureen's usage of the terms "autochthon" and "allochthon" indicates that she saw these groups as being separate and distinct communities, and that she herself belonged to the "autochthonous" community. According to Maureen, such programs and attitudes to help "allochthons" are paternalistic and unnecessary because second and third generations have integrated and therefore, she assumes, they should be able to function in Dutch society without government assistance. Furthermore, in her opinion, this paternalism is not serving "allochthons" but in fact, disadvantages the "autochthonous" population who are, according to Maureen, in need of more support. Finally, Maureen believed that despite having the opportunity and the ability to take part in the participation platforms, "allochthonous" chose not to take part.

It is important to examine the underlying causes that hinder "allochthons" from participating in programs and having worked and interviewed women living in the neighbourhood, I found that the neighbourhood meetings and information sessions were, more often than not, scheduled in the evening, which made attending these events possible for only a certain group of people. When I asked participants in the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Center (BNC) conversation group why they had not attended the Debate Week about Bergpolder South, Amaa, a mother with three young boys (one older and two

younger twin boys) who had a good grasp of the Dutch language responded, “Okay, I could go. But then who would take care of my children?” Similarly, Zefra, who had just started as a volunteer for Willpower Works and who provided the coffee and tea during visiting hours, but whose Dutch was still at an intermediate stage, said, “They speak Dutch so quickly. I can’t follow their conversations.” Zefra often participates in neighbourhood activities, however, only those activities that take place in the daytime. As a widowed, single mother of one son, whose husband died suddenly after she and her baby arrived in the Netherlands, Zefra attends integration courses twice a week and programs held at the neighbourhood centre two other days of the week (in addition to Arabic courses at her mosque). Despite being active during the day in both private and neighbourhood events, I did not see her at any evening events or information sessions for the Bergpolder South renewal project or other events at that time.

It became apparent that the majority of individuals who attended events scheduled in the evening were residents who would be considered “autochthonous” and that the majority of individuals who participated in daytime activities run-out of the BNC, would be categorised as “allochthonous”. These latter activities included integration programs (see Chapter 2 for more details). Thus, the idea that some individuals do not participate is not entirely correct, because participation varies according to the particular day, time, place, or event. Consequently, those who did not work were able to attend daytime events, whereas those who worked during the day were limited in their daytime availability. These findings are supported by Bolt et al. (2008) and Musterd and Pinkster’s (2009) research that saw neighbourhood interaction occurring among members of the same social community and economic class.

The “allochthonous” residents, who were the majority population in this area, were not as involved in the renovation planning process as “autochthonous” residents were, even though they participated in other activities and events. The general non-participation of “allochthonous” residents lead to the creation of a physical environment and its intended uses by those living outside the environment and in so doing, excluded these residents from the creation process of that space and the conception of its uses. Despite all the events and discourses surrounding participation, the extent to which these processes in fact influence the Master Plan is questionable. Importantly, however, it was the act of participating itself that became a significant factor when describing and aligning oneself to particular communities or groups in the neighbourhood (for example, Sylvie as a low-income resident) or in the Dutch “nation” (for example, Maureen as an “autochthon”).

It is also important to investigate civic engagement in resident-led or bottom-up initiatives that seek to influence the physical and conceived spaces of the neighbourhood, in order to understand how such participatory acts influence understandings of “us” and “them” and understandings of civic engagement.

‘Working it’ in the Community

The Hofplein Line has been introduced in this chapter as a 1.9 km long defunct light-rail train line that is protected as a heritage site (as of January 2010). The track runs above the street through Bergpolder and Liskwartier, making spaces available underneath the archways to house small businesses and community centers like the BNC. Although plans are in the development stage, the most popular plans (as learned through the

participation process) aim to turn the top of the railway track into either a green park or a cycling pathway to the city center and to rent out all the archways to small business owners. Before anything happens, however, financial hurdles must be overcome for any large scale development to take place. As it stands, four different housing corporations own various parts of the Hofplein line; Vestia owns the part in Bergpolder.

The outcome of the Hofplein Line is of interest to my research because of its potential to redesign the public spaces in the neighbourhood. If a green pathway is realised on the top of the rail line, then this will produce a different space – one that perceivably prioritises nature and the environment – than if it is renewed into a cycling route for cyclists – a space that would prioritise transportation. If the structure and its adjoining buildings are torn down, however, the structures or spaces built in its place would also greatly influence the neighbourhood.

Vestia has created a group to work on the future plans for the Hofplein Line and station, called the Hofbogen BV. However, there is another group, ‘The Friends of the Hofbogen’ (*Vrienden van de Hofbogen*, or VH) that is a residents’ initiative. The VH seeks to participate in the planning process of the Hofplein archway spaces, train line, and station by vocalising the wishes of the Rotterdam North residents for this structure. The VH holds monthly and at times bi-monthly meetings at the neighbourhood center of Liskwartier concerning the plans for this structure. Attendees at these meetings are often residents who are already busy with other projects in the neighbourhood and who often volunteer to participate. As was found in many of my other ethnographic experiences, the majority of attendees at these meetings were “autochthonous” individuals. Josephine, a

resident of Liskwartier, is the leader of this initiative and who was also one of the frequent attendees of the Bergpolder South project.

Josephine is a retired architecture professor from the Delft University of Technology who now spends much of her time coordinating events and rallying for the redevelopment of the Hofbogen. In addition to this, Josephine is part-time chairperson of the Neighbourhood Organisation of Liskwartier (*Bewonersorganisatie Liskwartier* or BOL) and could often be found at the local neighbourhood office. While in the field, I attended many VH meetings, a roundtable discussion, and a lecture that were all organised by Josephine and the VH committee.

Josephine's connections in the community (and beyond) were evident through the location of these events, the number and prestige of attendees, and amount of media coverage from local and district press houses. For example, the roundtable in January 2010 was held in the newly renovated Hofplein Station which solely discussed the future plans of the Hofplein Line³³. With the help of the VH, Josephine published a 'Chronicle of the Hofplein Line' that outlined the history and potential future plans for the train line, which she presented to Rotterdam's Minister of Finance at this meeting. Furthermore, the second meeting held in June 2010 was a presentation of architectural plans for the Hofplein Station from students at The Hague University (*de Haagse Hogeschool*); these students have a working budget to design a film house and a cafe in the empty station (*Vrienden van de Hofpleinlijn* 2010). This second lecture was also held in the Station and Rotterdam's Minister of Finance and various planning authorities from the Hofbogen BV, the development bureau, and Vestia, were in attendance. Most recently, in October 2010,

³³ I attended few other "bottom-up" initiatives that received such attention from the politicians and neighbourhood authorities.

the VH held a lecture with cultural historian Wijnand Galema (owner of Wijnand Galema Architectural History) and Hugo Priemus (Emeritus Professor from the Delft University of Technology) concerning the renewal process and in particular, what steps should be taken to incorporate all parties' input in the planning process.

I had numerous conversations and interviews with Josephine and was a part of both committees that she led or had a significant role in. During our first interview, I asked Josephine why it was that she became involved with the development process of the Hofplein Line, to which she answered:

I wanted to do something for the neighbourhood and for the poorer people. For those who cannot do everything by themselves. A good way to do this is by forming a group. There is a book called, "*Samen Staan We Sterk*" which means 'together we stand strong'. That is what I wanted to do. This group (HV) then is not only about achieving concrete goals but bringing people together during the process of sorting things out. That's one of my passions.

I focussed on the Hofbogen specifically because before I retired, I took a trip to Paris to look at a similar construction, the park, in Paris. I hadn't been there before and I was amazed by it. I thought we should have it here with the Hofbogen! That was 2001 and since that time I have been interested in the Hofbogen. For a long time we tried to make contact with the project management bureau. Their response was, "Well, why do you want to participate? If things don't turn out then everyone will be disappointed afterwards. So what is it that you want from us?" "Well", I said, "I would like to have contact and coordinate events together", to which they did not respond very enthusiastically.

For many years we tried to have more involvement from the community and we had some activities but it was really when Laurent (the social community worker for Liskwartier) had the idea to have a party in the neighbourhood that introduced and focussed on the Hofbogen, that everyone from the neighbourhood and from the district government became very interested. All at once, it was a success! It went very well and now I am happy.

There is so much to do now and with the development of Bergpolder South, for example, certain parts of the Hofplein Line might be boarded up and torn down by the housing corporation. Although the district government has said that we should conserve what is beautiful and what has unique qualities. And so that neighbourhood, which is next door to the Hofbogen, has a lot to do with it. And

so I feel as though we also have to have a voice in those proceedings and so we have a lot to do.

Vestia also wants to tear things down and make something new. Every time they want to plan something new, it is always for the more affluent people despite the fact that they say that the neighbourhood should become more mixed. Planning schemes are usually only made for the middle to upper class people and so I have a lot of work to do! (She emphasized her point by slamming her fist on the table)

Josephine believes she is working 'for the people' in order to bring beauty and a more liveable atmosphere to Bergpolder and Liskwartier. The fact that she states that these development projects are often steered toward the middle and upper classes, of which she is a member, is important as she sees herself as an advocate for the lower classes. The above quote, however, does not convey how much work Josephine put into getting the Hofplein Lijn to be a part of the local political agenda.

As mentioned above, Josephine and members of this group were present at almost every debate and information session that Vestia and the local government held concerning the Bergpolder South project. Their presence was felt by all who attended these meetings as the Hofbogen was a topic addressed at every event. Josephine, and at times her colleague Caroline, gave presentations at other neighbourhood events, such as the political cafes³⁴ (in both 2010 and 2011) and the New Years' party. Josephine was also present and set up information stalls during numerous community events, including: Queen's Day celebration (April 30), Independence Day (May 5), and any events held at the Hofplein Station throughout the year, for example, the Northern Cinema weekend event and the March break children's camp. Furthermore, the BOL had the Hofbogen as one of their agenda points and the Bergpolder neighbourhood organisation is also working together with the VH. These two neighbourhood organisations are by far the two

³⁴ Political Cafe (*Politiek Café*) were evenings organised by various neighbourhood organisations where politicians from the district government office weighed in on local issues and projects.

most active neighbourhood organisations in the region of Rotterdam North and as such, this project influenced everyone in the region.

It was apparent that other Bergpolder residents found the Hofplein project important as they voluntarily mentioned it when speaking about impending plans for the neighbourhood, saying such things as “The Hofbogen is the heart of Rotterdam North” and “It is a structure that has many possibilities, all of which will really liven up the area. There is nothing to do here at the moment.” It got to the point, however, that members outside the organisation became somewhat tired of hearing about the Hofplein line since actual developments of the Line and Stations were still years away due to the unclear financial situation. Other interviewees mentioned, “What is the point of taking up our time to discuss this now because there is no money available? It’s all talk and nothing is actually done!” and “That’s all we hear about now - the Hofplein! I agree it’s important but it’s not the only thing that is important in this area.” Importantly, however, this particular project receives the attention it does due to the work of Josephine and the VH, and possibly Josephine’s willingness to take things to the next level, for example by taking legal action.

At another point in time, Josephine became worried about the direction of the Bergpolder South renewal project when some initial drawings of the Master Plan came out that depicted certain parts of the Line as demolished. To this end, Josephine tried to acquire the newest and yet-to-be released version of the Master Plan but was stymied by individuals at the corporation who would not make the plan available to any resident ahead of the scheduled date. In response, Josephine hired a lawyer who drafted a letter that was then sent to Vestia’s Bergpolder South planners stating that she would take legal

action if they did not immediately produce the latest version of the plan to her (and her group). At the time Josephine thought that the plans were already ready, but that maybe they did not support keeping the Hofplein Line as one intact structure, which was her preference. The result of this legal action was that Josephine was allowed to view the plans at the local district government office that Vestia shares, where she learned that there were no plans to demolish the Hofplein at that time.

When I interviewed the neighbourhood director of Rotterdam North, he mentioned that individuals like Josephine were the neighbourhood's "provocateurs" and that these individuals were "absolutely necessary for the participation process, as they kept bureaucratic officials 'on their toes' and the cogs of large corporations and the government churning". Thus, while Josephine's methods were at times unique (as I did not experience any other similar case during my fieldwork), they were still within the lines of 'acceptable behaviour' with regard to civic engagement in the participation process.

The case of Josephine's position in society and her ability to facilitate her own vision of the future for the neighbourhood can be illuminated by Talja Blokland's (2008) discussion of a community gardening project in a neighbourhood in New Haven, Connecticut. Blokland's ethnographic study looked at how middle-class residents living outside a neighbourhood (with higher levels of social capital than the residents living within the neighbourhood), facilitated gardening projects in ghettoized neighbourhoods according to their own understandings of what the community needed (2008). These gardening projects were facilitated using the contacts and resources (social and economic capital) of the middle-class project leaders; however, they ended up having little input

from the local residents³⁵. Blokland concludes that instead of challenging understandings of differences within the neighbourhood, boundaries were reproduced between the two communities (2008: 167).

Like Blokland's work, Josephine's Hofplein Line project reinforced the idea of difference along the "allochthon/autochthon" divide. This was evident when looking at the usual participants in Josephine's events and her VH group who were largely "autochthonous" residents living outside of Bergpolder South. Josephine's participation structure exacerbated this phenomenon because it followed the format of the Bergpolder South renewal process, which arguably appeals to only a partial group of the affected community, that is, government bureaucrats, urban designers from Vestia and largely white, upper and middle class residents. In so doing, Josephine and the members of her group had more input and control over the future plans of the neighbourhood than the neighbourhood's residents themselves.

A similar phenomenon of privileging those with resources (capital) can be seen in the activities of a neighbourhood group in Liskwartier, called 'Neighbourhood Kids'³⁶ which facilitated children's activities. This group hosts festivities for residents of the neighbourhood throughout the year, for example, their celebration of the national holiday of Queen's Day.

The Queen's Day celebration held during my research took place on April 30 2010 in Liskwartier. This event was planned for the entire community and was a popular event with high attendance. Before the event, members of the Neighbourhood Kids'

³⁵ Lower-income residents joined the project in the hope of taking advantage of the middle-class resident's resources (for example, her social networks). Blokland found that the lower income residents stopped their involvement with the project once it became apparent that the interest of the middle-class facilitator only went as far as provision of gardening space.

³⁶ pseudonym

board distributed flyers around Liskwartier and hung up posters in day care centers, schools, and community centers weeks in advance. The following is a brief excerpt from my field diary on Queen's Day concerning my impression of the festivities as led by the Neighbourhood Kids group. The field notes state:

We arrived at around 12.30pm at the Bergselaan around Lislein (a low-traffic set of streets with larger sidewalks located in an affluent area of Liskwartier) and went to look at the 'queen' who was already out, addressing the crowd from a fourth floor balcony. This balcony looked onto the Bergselaan, at a corner where the stage and the flea market met. The Queen thanked the crowd for celebrating her day and wished everyone a joyous Queen's Day celebration. The attendance was surely affected by the rain because there were only about 50 people there in the morning. By the afternoon, however, as I was biking off to my next appointment, there must have been over 400 hundred people spilling out into the more busy streets! (...) The majority of attendees were family groups with children, and white. There was a different sort of atmosphere here compared to the flea markets in the centre of town (where I had just come from) because people were greeting one another and saying hello. It was friendlier and more personal although I didn't know too many of the people there. The stalls, where people were selling their wares, were also quite different. Along the Bergselaan, there were local businesses that set up small stalls in addition to residents who were just selling second-hand stuff. There was even a wine maker with samples who was dressed in an apron and starched shirt! Overall, I got a sense that this area, bedecked with flags and all things orange and the colours of the Dutch flag, was more 'high-class'. There was also a sense of imbibing from the local bar, which is located kitty-corner to the festivities, although their music was drowned out by the music on the stage. Although I have been told that this event is quite a 'white' event, as attended by "autochthonous" individuals, I did see some "allochthonous" people, but they were definitely the minority of attendees.

Neighbourhood Kids was started by a group of mothers who lived in Liskwartier.

I met with one of them, Valerie, who had settled in Liskwartier with her husband and three children. Their family takes part in Opzoomer activities (see chapter 5) and those events hosted by Neighbourhood Kids. I asked her to describe her involvement with this group, and she said,

We started two years ago with a group of friends who lived close together in the neighbourhood (...). We were moms that thought that the neighbourhood was missing things for kids to do. We would get these flyers from the other activities

(that are funded and organised by the district government and their associated groups) and they're always kind of ... feeble ... you know, like the opening of the football field (across from the BNC), there was hardly anything happening there. What was happening started late and there was nothing clearly marked for what to do or what was going to happen. We thought, "We can do better than that". (...)

When we started our group, we got some money with the *Krachtwijk* funding (to publicly celebrate holidays, two-to-three times a year) and now we're funded through the kid-friendly neighbourhood project (*kiwi*)³⁷. There are twelve neighbourhoods in that initiative, I believe, and there is money available. A group can get 2,500 Euros for one event from the *kiwi* pot. It was hard at first (to get the funds) but after the first successful event, they gave it again willingly from then on. (...) [T]here are little pots of money everywhere. You just have to know how to work the system. (...)

This year, I also asked Rabobank (a bank in the Netherlands) to sponsor our local initiatives as well because they do that. I filled in a form and within a week we got called to come and talk to them. I brought in my portfolio with all my pictures and things that we'd done and we were chosen. We received 1,500 Euros from them and apparently we won out of a big group of people who wanted the money. They were only going to give us 1,000 but after speaking to me, they gave us the whole 1,500. So yeah it was great! And there are other funds as well, for example the Orange funds (*Oranje Fonds*) and other national programs but you have to be a foundation in order to get those; hence, why we're going to become a foundation this year. So yeah, once my job becomes a little less hectic, maybe after the summertime I'm going to start applying for those things too. So we'll get more money.

In this excerpt, Valerie's ease with the bureaucracy of funding and community support is evident through her social connections and network and her knowledge of how the system works; the latter of which is apparent through the selection of her group's application by the funding committee and her ability to persuade funders to provide her with the total amount of her requested funding.

³⁷ Liskwartier has an initiative to make itself a more child-friendly neighbourhood by the year 2014. Projects in this program concern curbing traffic around grade schools and improving the behaviour of parents and children. This project is made available through the Kid-friendly Neighbourhoods (*Kindvriendelijke wijk*) and the municipal action plan for Traffic and Transport (*Verkeer en Vervoer*).

I then asked Valerie how she was able to learn all of this, as she works in a different sector and originally did not have much experience in fund raising, to which she replied:

A family friend of mine owns his own foundation and does the same sort of neighbourhood stuff as we do. He also lives in Liskwartier. He has turned his own fundraising into his actual job, like an advice bureau, and he says that he would like to work with us. So, we're starting to know which players can give us money, or help us, or not.

Valerie's knowledge of the system and her social network are vital factors to her success as the Neighbourhood Kids fundraiser. In addition to the family friend who is a fundraising specialist, she told me how Neighbourhood Kids hired a graphic artist to create the fliers for all of their events. These fliers have a distinctive design and are attractive because they are colourful, interesting (there is always a gimmick on each flier, for example, cutting out a snowflake to hang on one's Christmas tree for their Christmas lights tour), and made of good quality cardboard. It is important to point this out because Valerie believed that these advertisements influenced the success of their events and attracted a particular kind of attendee.

When I asked her about the attendees to her events, she said,

We happen to cater to the highly-educated, autochthones that live in close-by urban neighbourhoods. That wasn't our intention but yeah, that's who we're typically reaching out to with these events. Like, ask yourself how many *hoofddoekjes* (head scarves, meaning women perceived to be Muslims) did you see at our event (the Queen's Day celebration)? One? Maybe two?

Valerie went on to explain a specific instance when she collected money for the Neighbourhood Kids' Queen's Day celebration by integrating certain ideals important to the district government's social planning agenda, that is, the incorporation of

“allochthonous” residents for the sake of building tolerance (for diversity) in the community,

One of the things that we did with the Queen’s Day celebration, because our funding was getting cut off (from the Krachtwijk funding), was we invited a theatre group called Siberia to come for part of the day and do a work shop. This activity fell into the category of ‘*help the poor allochthon*’ at the district government (*gemeente*) and they ended up paying 2000 Euros (for the theatre group to come) and then they gave us another 1000 that filled our budget (downfall). (...) The workshop itself was not very successful, that is, not many children went to it. But we did it to get the money because at this point, we know how to work the system. The government will put on events and spend 5000 Euros but they are not very well attended! I mean look at the Independence Day celebration (which she identifies as a multicultural celebration). It doesn’t do well because it’s only a holiday (a day off work) every five years! I mean, I work, so why would you think that people would actually turn out?

There is this idea that the government can only support the “allochthon”, and that they only make the events for them. For example, there was a swimming event every year, at the local swimming pool. We get this flier and the advertisement says “the goal of this event is to promote swimming for, and in quotes “allochthonous” kids. And I think “Why do you have to mention *allochthon*? Why are you shutting (the rest of) us out? Why can’t it just be for *all* kids?”

It is evident that Valerie knew how to ‘work the system’ to achieve her funding goal by aligning her project within a fundable government framework, which highlighted integration. Despite catering to such themes, however, the Neighbourhood Kids’ event did not foster interaction among “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” individuals, as Valerie makes note of above. While these events did not involve or cater to “allochthonous” individuals, it is important to note that in principle, they were open to all residents and as I myself experienced, these events had an air of enjoyment and welcome. From her above discussion and from her (mis)use of such funding, however, the Neighbourhood Kids’ events are intended to for an “autochthonous” audience.

In addition to rather exclusive attendance, the Neighbourhood Kids’ use of neighbourhood public places as a means to celebrate the Dutch Monarch invokes a

history and tradition associated with “Dutchness”. Decorating the street with the colour orange and Dutch flags, and seeing a sizeable group of white “autochthonous” individuals only emphasizes the meaning of this event and reinforces the boundaries between those who belong to their heritage and who remain on its fringes.

Valerie’s frustration at what she perceives to be the favouring of “allochthonous” individuals in the neighbourhood is evident. She later commented on the district government’s push for integration and why it might not work, when she said,

There is no point to try and make communities integrate together, really. In this neighbourhood the biggest barrier (for bringing individuals from perceived different communities together) is educational level and economic factors. I mean if they (“allochthonous” community) were white, we still wouldn’t integrate with them. Don’t get me wrong, integration is a really great thing and I really want the allochthonous community to come to Neighbourhood Kids’ events, especially to Queen’s Day, but it just doesn’t *happen*. We’ve (the board) decided that it’s okay because integration is not actually our goal. Our goal is to have a nice event that people like, and we’ve reached that goal.

It is important to note that Valerie defines “allochthons” as non-western immigrants and Muslims (the latter, according to her reference concerning headscarves) which aligns with the popular understanding of “allochthon”. Although she uses this term to distinguish a particular group of people (of which she is not a part), Valerie problematizes the government’s approach to integration when she said,

I really think that since Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, I’ve noticed a big change. There is more segregation between *allochthons* and *autochthons*. I think part of it is a protest against the stamp (the allochthonous stamp) that is put on these people. For example, people hear that we’re raising our children bilingually, and for English ‘that’s fine.’ But if we were teaching them Turkish, then it would not be okay. They think ‘it’s horrible, you’re not integrated, and you’re not doing the right thing’.

The NRC every week has a magazine and there was this Dutch researcher, he looked at the ‘problem of integration’. He found that the problem has a lot to do with the education level because the white people in the city are generally really highly educated and the allochthon are not - and that’s the problem. If you look at

Dutch emigrants, when they move away to France or Germany, they live with each other in Dutch-colonies and they have their own shops and speak Dutch to each other. So for the Dutch, it is okay not to integrate, but for others not to integrate here, is not okay. I don't understand that. It's extremely hypocritical.

I think that because the (allochthonous) children are getting their Dutch lessons at school that the situation is getting better. But then you get these parties like PVV and VVD who want to send the allochthonous children to school earlier than the other students. That's great but these parties want the families to pay for the extra education. Well, where are they going to get the money for that? It's so crazy that the government has the money for things like street parties, but they don't have money for things like that? That is really strange.

Maureen and Valerie's comments are a few of the many that I heard throughout my research concerning integration. While Maureen critiqued what she perceived to be the biased support of immigrants over "autochthonous" individuals, Valerie was critical of the ways in which local government officials imposed such programs on the local communities that highlighted what she saw as the divide along "allochthonous" and "autochthonous" lines. Notably, both practices were seen to ostracize the "autochthonous" community. From my experiences in general, there was a sense that the integration approach by the government was flawed, expensive, inefficient, and to a point, unnecessary. While I found that many of the people I met would often differentiate between "us" and "them" (categories that are applied differently by every individual as was evident from Maureen's understanding of "allochthonous" that only included the first generation of guest workers) in everyday conversations, this differentiation was more often used to identify and categorise a community, rather than speak in an outright racist or prejudiced manner; for example, when people spoke about their 'one Turkish neighbour who spoke good Dutch and looked after their yard when they were away'. In other cases, the category "allochthon" was used negatively, usually drawing on stereotypes or criticizing practices associated with "allochthons", such as Dutch Turkish

and Moroccans marrying and bringing spouses back from ‘the home country’ (that is, Turkey or Morocco³⁸). Thus, it was the perceived reluctance to integrate or lack of participation in Dutch society that most often prompted individuals’ need to differentiate between “us” and “them”.

In this chapter, I discussed how residents of neighbourhoods, government officials, urban planners, and other individuals and institutions engaged in community-based projects, influenced the creation, allocation, and use of public places in Bergpolder and Liskwartier. Throughout this chapter, it became apparent that the process of creating and using public places in the neighbourhood contributed to the exclusion of “allochthonous” individuals because the participation process responded best to “autochthonous” residents, who were members of the middle and upper classes. This is important because the opinions of lower class individuals who lived in diverse neighbourhoods, such as Bergpolder and Liskwartier, were not represented in these processes and therefore, were also not represented in the conception of space, itself.

Although diversity of participants remained an important theme within government-led neighbourhood projects, participation from “allochthonous” residents was not achieved. Furthermore, while the integration of residents was an important rhetoric for government officials, it was not always a priority in neighbour-led initiatives. This unequal participation contributes to the view that “allochthonous” individuals do not participate enough in the community, that is, they are “inactive citizens”. Such initiatives show how being an ‘active citizen’ is an accepted attributes of “Dutch” culture. This

³⁸ This practice is seen as problematic because the spouses, mainly women, do not speak Dutch and are thought to be unfit to raise the next generation of children in the Netherlands, in ways that facilitate their integration (see Putting ‘import brides’ to the Dutchness Test. Available at: <http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2270070.ece>).

narrative of the importance of participation is complicated by the larger question concerning the influence of participants on the gentrification process, however, it is significant that this narrative designated particular groups as participating more often than others.

I will continue to explore the underlying causes of the government's focus on the "allochthonous" community by examining policing tactics in public places on the part of government authorities. Research for this next chapter was conducted in a different neighbourhood that had a majority of "allochthonous" residents and was known for high crime rates.

CHAPTER 4: EXPERIENCING SAFETY AND SECURITY PROGRAMS IN ROTTERDAM'S HIGH RISK NEIGHBOURHOODS

The following is an exploration into the public safety and security measures that influence what are considered Rotterdam's high risk (unsafe) areas. It has already been argued by social scientists (van Swaaningen 2005, 2007, 2008; van Ostaaijen 2010: 118; cf. Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006; Eijkman 2010) and a European commission (ECRI 2008) that certain public safety policies in Rotterdam create stigma against targeted communities. In this chapter, I focus on how this stigmatization is inscribed into physical space and expressed through individuals' interactions with one another and use of specific public spaces.

What becomes apparent through this investigation of public safety measures is that there are certain individuals, in certain neighbourhoods, who are more policed than others. Those who are most often policed are "allochthonous" individuals. Neighbourhoods with high concentrations of "allochthonous" populations are under more scrutiny by authorities and have more programs aimed at generating civility among inhabitants. Some of this attention is due to the fact that the majority of "allochthonous" individuals have lower than average incomes. Areas with inhabitants of lower income in general are afflicted by higher levels of crime and thus extra policing measures or social programming in such areas are not uncommon. As I will show below, however, the types of policing and social programming in these areas enforce a particular kind of *moralistic* law that promotes some behaviour and discourages others. Specifically, the types of behaviours favoured in public spaces reinforce "Dutch" norms and reject behaviours associated with "allochthonous" individuals and in particular "allochthonous" youth. In

Rotterdam, “allochthonous” male youths are typically identified as misbehaving or misappropriating public spaces. For example, young Moroccan and Antillean youths are identified as the most problematic individuals toward other Dutch citizens and the Dutch way of life (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Stengs 2007, and Mepschen et al. 2010: 970, van Swaeningen 2007). There is much done by Dutch authorities to control these and other “allochthonous” youths in order to provide them with the appropriate tools to cope within a society where many of them have been born and/or raised, but are not thought to belong to the Dutch majority. The following is an account of individuals’ experiences with some of these extraordinary security measures. I first provide a brief description of the community where I conducted this particular research, followed by an overview of some of Rotterdam’s more extraordinary policing tactics in the public domain. I use preventative searches (*preventief fouilleren*) in Delfshaven as a case study for exploring individuals’ experiences of security and safety in Rotterdam³⁹.

Neighbourhood: Nieuwe Westen - Delfshaven

Nieuwe Westen (New West) is a neighbourhood located closer to the city centre, in the borough of Delfshaven. As of 2010⁴⁰, there were approximately 18,962 inhabitants living in Nieuwe Westen, 72 percent of which were identified as “allochthonous”. Twenty-three percent of housing in this neighbourhood was social housing (subsidized housing) and the percentage of inhabitants with lower income was approximately 60 percent and the number of unemployed was ten percent (well above the city average).

³⁹ As briefly mentioned above, Rotterdam is a useful site in which to conduct research on policing and security tactics because it has become famous around the country for its tough-on-crime approach; these aggressive tactics have earned the moniker ‘the Rotterdam Approach’ (*Rotterdamse Aanpak*), which is used to describe when a city gets tough on crime.

⁴⁰ The following statistical information is found at: <http://www.cos.nl/stadsgetalen/cijfers.php?bn=24>

According to the Safety Index of 2010 (which measures the level of safety from the previous year, 2009), Nieuwe Westen scored a 5.3, landing it in the ‘threatened’ category. It remains one of the six problem neighbourhoods that will receive special attention in the 2010- 2014 safety action plan (for more information on the safety index, read below).

Although I conducted the majority of my work in the neighbourhoods of Bergpolder and Liskwartier, their status as ‘safe’ neighbourhoods left few avenues by which to explore some of the more controversial policies of policing individuals in the public domain. For this reason, I also conducted research in the threatened neighbourhood(s) of ‘Delfshaven’⁴¹ where I was able to speak with policing authorities (including police as well as other public and private security forces) in addition to those individuals who experience measures of security, their friends, and families.

Before moving on, it is important to define what I mean by the terms safety and security, as these terms are not self-evident in the Dutch context. While in the field, I came to understand that the terms safety and security translate into one word in Dutch, *veiligheid*, but that this term had different meanings. To understand this difference, I spoke with Wilco a mid-40s man who was the neighbourhood Director of Safety for the municipal government of Rotterdam North. Wilco worked for ten years as a Rotterdam-Rijmond police officer. He was once a resident of Rotterdam but recently decided to move into Rotterdam’s suburban area due to the constant noise and troubles of the city. According to Wilco, security can be defined as:

Something that is supposed to measure (criminal) actions and combat these actions with programs of prevention, repression, and pro-action; that is, stopping things before they become a problem by doing such things as: having more police

⁴¹ In the borough of Delfshaven, there are approximately 70, 000 inhabitants in eight different neighbourhoods: Delfshaven, Schiemond/Lloydkwartier, Oud-Mathenesse/Witte Dorp, Bospolder, Tussendijken, Nieuwe Westen, Spangen, and Middelland.

on the streets, having burglar prevention systems in stores and in houses, having cameras available for shop keepers.

Security, by Wilco's definition, is the measure of levels of threat and threatening acts and the response to them by authorities who are given the ability to respond to criminal acts or perceived threats. As will be discussed in more detail below, security threats to Rotterdammers have changed over time.

Julien van Ostaaijen (2010), a lecturer in politics and public administration in the Netherlands, whose book *Aversion and Accommodation* looks at the changing politics of safety and security in Rotterdam between 1998 and 2008, describes two kinds of safety: physical and social safety (77). Van Ostaaijen's discussion of the types of safety is useful because he breaks down safety not only into physical and social safety, but also into categories of 'subjective' and 'objective' social safety. According to van Ostaaijen, physical safety refers to protecting oneself from fire, starvation, sickness, traffic, or terrorist attacks. Social safety, on the other hand, refers to threats from technology, or from criminal elements, other than terrorist attacks, residing in the Netherlands at the time. Van Ostaaijen goes on to describe 'objective' social safety as those acts and facts that are determined by reports from police based on the number of crimes reported, cases solved, criminals arrested, and related data. Subjective safety, alternatively, refers to residents' experience of discomfort or threat at what they perceive as impoliteness, rudeness or racism in public places, or at the sight of garbage on the streets or areas of darkness as a result of non-working street lamps. According to van Ostaaijen, social safety has become important in the last decades of the 20th century and first decade of the 21st century (2010: 77-78).

Ostaaijen's safety categories resonate with my interest in how individuals create and experience space and how the design or physicality of space can influence individuals' perceptions of that space. From this point on in the chapter, when referring to safety, I will be referring to social safety in both the objective and subjective senses described.

History of Rotterdam's Security and Safety Policies

In the 1980s and 1990s there were few public safety policies in Rotterdam that diverged from other Dutch cities or other large European cities in general. On the whole, crime did not feature largely in politics until the mid-nineties when drug-related crime, prostitution and related nuisance became an issue in the neighbourhoods around the city centre. Crime prevention and public safety policies during this period were a mixture of prevention and action issued on a case-by-case basis, in addition to increasing forms of surveillance being placed around the city. According to Dutch criminologist Rene van Swaaningen (2007), Rotterdam's officials followed an 'integral' (or integrative) approach to safety that deals with crime through a multi-agency approach that addresses specific urban problems as they come along through whatever means are deemed most viable (245). This approach not only incorporates repressive measures by the police, for example, but also seeks to provide preventative methods that can be delivered through other stakeholders in civil society, such as government officials, local businesses, or neighbourhood groups (van Ostaaijen 2010: 75-77, 211-214). This integrative approach to public safety policy further incorporates fighting the *fears* of crime and *feelings of insecurity* experienced by crime victims and other Rotterdam inhabitants, as a means to

encourage community support for urban and social renewal programs in Rotterdam (van Swaaningen 2005: 291).

Despite policing efforts, Rotterdam became an increasingly unsafe city throughout the late 1990s. A survey was conducted in 1994 which found that 73 percent of citizens felt that safety was still one of the biggest issues in Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 2010:76, 213). In 1998, safety was one of the twelve top programs for which the mayor, the police and the district attorney were said to be accountable. In 1999, the mayor Ivo Opstelten (from the neo-liberal, conservative party VVD) declared that the previous safety approaches in Rotterdam failed to achieve results and that regaining safety of Rotterdam was his number-one priority (van Ostaaijen 2010: 213; van Swaaningen 2007: 244). This approach was also supported by the national government in 2001, when it asked municipal governments to develop local safety policies in addition to the national safety programming. This change in approach was most likely in response to increasing public distress regarding safety and security following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in New York, and two national events: an exploding fireworks factory in 2000 and a deadly bar fire in the small city of Volendaam near Amsterdam in 2001 (van Ostaaijen 2010: 78).

As pointed out by van Swaaningen (2007), the objectives for public safety policies of the 2000s did not diverge greatly from the previous two decades; however, the manner in which safety and security goals were set and ‘measurable outputs’ achieved was indeed different (245). The security measures of the 2000s took a more ‘social reconquest’ (*sociale herovering*) approach, which emphasized the political importance of taking a stand against civil disobedience. According to Engbersen and Snel (2006),

Rotterdam's approach to safety over the last decade was aimed at increasing 'liveability' and safety in the public domain, balancing community structures, and formulating rules of civic conduct among inhabitants (van Swaaningen 2007: 244). In general, this new approach to community safety is based on the 'rediscovery' of more aggressive security tactics that have a moralistic tenor and are less likely to respect people's personal privacy.

Following an increase in street crime and theft in the central districts of Rotterdam, in March 2001, residents banded together (through neighbourhood groups) to approach the municipality and spoke with the mayor about their safety concerns (Barendregt and van de Mheen 2009; van Ostaaijen 2010: 78). This resulted in the creation of a Five Year Safety Action Plan (FYSAP) at the end of 2001, which contained eighteen concrete safety objectives to be realised by 2006. One important development was the introduction of a 'safety index', which in 2001 identified eight (out of 63) of the most problematic districts in Rotterdam.

This safety index is determined by 'objective factors' (police-figures on registered crime), 'subjective factors' (statistics concerning feelings of victimisation), as well as 'context-figures' (ethnic composition, welfare dependency, value of houses, frequency of moving, et cetera) (hetccv.nl 2010). In general, the index considers the frequency of theft, drug nuisance, violence, burglaries, public nuisance, vandalism, traffic and cleanliness of a borough's public spaces. The index assigns a number to each district from 1 to 10 that is then divided into five categories: unsafe area (receiving a grade below 3.9), problematic area (from 3.9 to 5.0), threatened area (from 5.0 to 6.0), in need of minor attention (from 6.0 - 7.1) and a safe area (above 7.1). The safety index is used to measure

and locate security situations throughout the city, analyse and track the progress of neighbourhoods over time, and influence past and future policy directions. In the last safety index released in 2010, relating 2009 statistics, Rotterdam's overall score was 7.3. Since its creation, Rotterdam's safety rating has increased from a 6.9 rating to 7.3 rating and the number of 'safe' districts has increased from 30 to 36. Rotterdam's index has worked well enough to initiate similar indexes in cities such as Amsterdam.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Fortuyn's political platform prioritized safety in the city in the 2002 Municipal elections. Following his party's substantial win in municipal politics, the theme of safety was picked up by the then governing coalition (which did not happen to include Fortuyn's party but two center-right parties). Following his murder, the topic of public safety grew more popular in the public discourse and Rotterdam's coalition announced a new, tougher approach to public safety. The municipality's approach was to boost surveillance, lower tolerances for crimes and add more police presence on the streets of Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 2010: 115). To this end, the board in charge of implementing the Five Year Safety Action Plan (FYSAP) set goals for certain territories, for example closing down areas known for prostitution and clearing disruptive drug addicts and homeless people from all transit lines and stations (ibid: 116). The municipality also designated five "city marines" who would be paid well to work on the street and solve implementation problems at the ground level. These marines worked with large budgets and had direct access to the Mayor in order to solve the perceived problems with bureaucratic red-tape that was thought to slow down the justice process. These marines were either assigned to work in specific areas or with a perceived threatened group, such as youth (ibid: 117).

In addition to these measures that sought to speed up the implementation of the FYSAP, the board implemented a 'zero tolerance' approach to violations of existing laws and regulations. This was done despite the fact that some of the existing laws and regulations were still under debate or only approved at a municipal rather than national level (van Ostaaijen 2010: 117).

As a result, between 2002 and 2006, the police were given the authority to have a heavier hand on the streets to control such nuisances as alcohol abuse and loitering. One such controversial policy was the institution of preventative searches (*preventief fouilleren*) of individuals or automobiles for concealed weapons. These searches however can only be conducted in neighbourhoods or 'hot spots' that were designated by the Mayor and only for a limited length of time (van Swaaningen 2007: 242). By the end of 2005, more than 40,000 people had been preventatively frisked and 10,000 cars had been searched (van Ostaaijen 2010: 118).

In addition to these policing projects, the physical spaces of perceived problematic residential areas were also affected by 'hard-nosed politics'. The government focused on areas with dirt and deterioration in an attempt to literally clean the streets, using the slogan 'sweeping the streets' (van Swaaningen 2007: 245-246). In the gateways of multiple dwelling residences, entrances were sealed with steel doors to prevent entering, loitering, or drug trafficking. In one of the most problematic areas of Rotterdam, *Charlois*, 147 steel doorways were outfitted by the end of 2005 (van Ostaaijen 2010: 118). This approach followed the so-called 'broken windows' theory which supposes that a clean and well-maintained physical area will produce less social nuisances and criminality than an area with broken windows and garbage (ibid).

Although the majority of these actions were directed at the public sphere, municipal authorities did not stop there, going beyond the public domain into the private sphere of people's houses. Intervention teams consisting of police and civil servants were sent out to the homes of individuals who were thought to be engaging in criminal behaviour or causing public nuisances. After gaining permission from homeowners to enter, the team checked the dwelling and its residents for unlawful activities such as illegal occupation or residency permits. The team was also supposed to provide assistance that could help the residents improve their current situation or make them aware of the support facilities in the area (van Ostaaijen 2010: 119). By 2005, over 4000 homes were searched, 88 percent of which were thought to have problems that needed attention (ibid). These interventions were criticised because the teams targeted low income, high risk neighbourhoods and showed up with uniformed officers who were thought to intimidate residents, the majority of whom could not speak Dutch, into allowing the teams into their homes (ibid).

In the midst of these events, attention began to focus more on Rotterdam's "allochthonous" populations following a public debate concerning the results of a report released by the Statistics Netherlands (CBS). This report stated that those problematic neighbourhoods within Rotterdam would have majority populations of "allochthonous" residents by 2017 (KEI 2006). The issue with this projection was that this group had a higher presence in crime statistics, were more likely on average to be on welfare than their "autochthonous" peers, and in general thought to be poorly integrated into Dutch society. The outcome of this debate was the idea that the city had reached its tipping point (in certain neighbourhoods), which led to the release of the report *Rotterdam*

Presses On: the way to a balanced city in 2003 (van Ostaaijen 2010: 122). This report contained some controversial policies such as requiring “allochthonous” immigrants to earn 120 percent of the minimum wage in order to settle in certain neighbourhoods that already had a high concentration of “allochthonous” inhabitants. In 2006, the law colloquially known as the ‘Rotterdam Law’ was enacted which made possible some of the measures of the *Rotterdam Presses On*, such as lowering taxes for businesses, closing buildings with frequent disturbances, and demanding that certain newcomers (if it was deemed appropriate) have an income from work in order to settle in certain areas (ibid).

Targeting particular communities who were seen as problematic remained an important theme with the initiation of a series of youth programs that focus on addressing the problem of *hangjongeren*, which translates to ‘hanging-about male youths’ (van Lieshout and Aarts 2008). Youth tend to hang around in city parks or on street corners and their behaviour is seen by the police and municipal authorities as creating social nuisance for other inhabitants (Rotterdam.nl 2009 b). The associated loitering spaces are seen as gateways for drug trafficking and hotbeds for criminality in general (Baillergeau and Hoijtink 2010, Lindo 2010). Hanging around is also seen as the pastime of those who do not contribute to a working and effective society. To address those youth identified as the typical perpetrators of such activities, an action programme called the Antillean Approach was developed that involved hiring a city marine to deal exclusively with Antillean youth. All youths in this program were required to be either employed, in school or in a judiciary program (van Ostaaijen 2010: 123). A Moroccan Approach was later developed in 2008, to slow the rate of habitual criminal behaviour by providing

family coaches, homework assistants and case managers who would help Moroccan youth find work, internships, or housing (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172).

Since the initial FYSAP was released, two additional Five Year Safety Action Program (FYSAP II) have been released (one for 2006 – 2010, and one for 2010 to 2014). Most measures that were developed in the initial safety action plan were carried through, such as the Safety Steering group (consisting of the mayor – as the most important member, the police, and the district attorney), taking on territorial (e.g. security risk areas) and personal (e.g. Antillean or Moroccan) approaches, the safety index, neighbourhood city action programs, the city marines, and the hot spot approach (van Ostaaijen 2010: 166). The second FYSAP had targets such as: making 85 percent of shop owners feel safe all the time in their businesses, and raising the social safety index rating on public transport to 7.5 and at train stations to a 7.3 (ibid). Controversial policies that specifically affected public spaces (or the use thereof) during this time included establishing a 9 pm curfew for disruptive youths in one neighbourhood in Rotterdam and installing ‘mosquitoes’ in areas that were used as ‘hangout spots’ for youths, such as the shopping centre in Rotterdam south (ibid). Mosquitoes are machines that emit a high-pitch frequency that only youth can hear thereby making it uncomfortable to stay in a particular space for a long period of time.

The third FYSAP entitled “Trust in safety, participating in the city” (*Vertrouwen in veiligheid, meedoen in de stad*) focused more on the participation of citizens in increasing the level of safety in *their* city (Rotterdam.nl 2010). This follows up on a report released in 2007 entitled “City Citizenship: the motto is participation” (*Stadsburgerschap: het motto is meedoen*) in which a prior emphasis on integration (that

was seen to single out a specific part of the population, i.e. the “allochthonous” population) was replaced by the idea of participation (that was directed more generally at the overall population). This approach emphasizes the importance of participation in society. It stresses that every inhabitant has rights as well as duties, including using Dutch as the common language and upholding Western values which recognize equal rights for women and homosexuals, respect for religious difference, and reject honour killing and female circumcision (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172). What is readily identifiable in the above report is an increasing moralistic approach taken toward participation which presumes the superiority of “Western” values and practices over “Eastern” (read “allochthonous”) ones.

The 2007 report was based on the 2006 Rotterdam Code (*Rotterdam Code*), which listed seven guiding principles that every Rotterdam citizen should follow. Although largely the same, the Code explicitly highlighted using Dutch as the common language, rejecting radicalisation and extremism, and raising one’s children as *genuine* citizens (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172). It is apparent from the above lists that these rules of behaviour are based on a subjective interpretation of “Dutch” traits that distinguish “genuine” citizens from immigrants in general (hence the Dutch language requirement) and from Muslim inhabitants in particular who are presumed to be extremists who do not recognize the equal rights of women, homosexuals, etc. The focus on the ‘proper raising of children’ in creating ‘genuine citizens’ also alludes to the belief that “allochthonous” mothers do not raise children in a Dutch manner by not speaking Dutch at home or, for example, not teaching children how to ride bicycles, or look after their neighbourhoods physical appearance.

In addition to highlighting the importance of participation, the FYSAP III had the following security goals: remedying the safety situation of Oude Westen, Tarwewijk, Hillesluis and Nieuwe Westen that were designated ‘hot spots’ from 2010 – 2014; putting an end to all unsafe neighbourhoods in Rotterdam by 2020 (a target of FYSAP II that was not achieved); and increasing Rotterdam’s overall safety index score to 7.1 (Rotterdam.nl 2010). Although there has been some discussion concerning the potential effects of some of Rotterdam’s more extraordinary security measures, there is less research conducted on the perceptions and experiences of such measures (notable exceptions include van der Torre and V. Dijk 2007; Martineau 2006; Baillergeau and Hoijtink 2010).

In what follows, I explore residents’ experiences of preventative searches (other than car searches) in designated hotspot of Nieuwe Westen in Delfshaven.

Case Study: Preventative Searches (Preventief Fouilleren)

Preventative searches were originally introduced in 2002 due to the perceived rise in violent crimes with a weapon, under section 151b of the Municipal Legislation (Rotterdam.nl 2009a). As mentioned, the mayor of Rotterdam is allowed to designate certain neighbourhoods as security risk areas (*veiligheidsrisicogebieden*) for as long as they are perceived to be “at risk”. To make this decision, the mayor uses data and experiences from the police that point to perceived risk. The office of justice can designate certain periods of time when security officials (police or other designated groups) are able to open packages, search vehicles and conduct bodily searches in order to look for the presence of weapons or ammunition. In order to inform the residents of the impending search area, there are announcements in the local newspapers and in the

neighbourhood, stating that the neighbourhood has been selected for preventative searches that week.

There are three objectives of these searches: (1) securing firearms and initiating criminal prosecution against illegal handling of such weapons; (2) increasing the safety and security feelings of citizens and their trust in the police and government; (3) making illegal gun ownership less attractive (Rotterdam.nl 2009a). In 2010, the year in which I conducted research on these searches, there were four main designated security risk areas: Delfshaven, the city-centre (Centrum), Vloemhof/Hillesluis, and Rotterdam-Zuid (ibid). There were seven search periods that began in 2009 and ended in 2011 and 105 control operations (ibid). Since 2004, there has been a 33 percent decrease in the recovery of fire arms and 2,700 weapons were seized (ibid).

According to the official website, preventative searches are “fully accepted” by the majority of the population and there is “a lot” of willingness to participate in such actions (Rotterdam.nl 2009a). According to the report, 88 percent of the population feels that preventative searches improve feelings of safety and 76 percent of those searched are satisfied with their treatment by the police during these proceedings (ibid). These positive experiences are said to be the result of the precise and professional manner in which searches are carried out (ibid).

Not everyone, however, has such a positive assessment of preventative searches. My friend Carmen, a researcher from Germany who was living with her “allochthon” partner in a security risk area in Rotterdam, told me, for example, that she did not feel unsafe in her daily life until she experienced a preventative search. Carmen recounted her

experience in a blog that she and I began in order to find out more about people's experiences with these searches:

[O]ne early spring evening in 2009 (...) I strolled with a small group home from a snack bar along Vierambachtstraat (in the neighbourhood of Nieuwe Westen). All of a sudden, three police buses stopped and sealed off one (end) of the street. The police, in full attire and hands on their weapons, pushed me aside and quickly aligned a row of around 15 men along the wall of the houses on the sidewalk. This happened fast and there were hardly any words spoken except for orders. All of the men standing with hands up, legs spread and face to the wall looked, as the Dutch say, *allochthon*. Women and blond men were ignored and they walked on, most of them did not even lift their heads. The police searched, and having found nothing, left. Those who had just been searched resumed their activities.

I was stunned: First of all, because my friend (who was identified as "allochthon") was searched and I (who was identified as "autochthon") was not. I did not have a chance to help him or to know what was going on. The police man I asked only told me: *Dat mogen we doen* (we are allowed to do this) and did not seem to be inclined to tell me more. Secondly, it seemed to be normal, a known and fixed part of everyday life in this area. No resistance, no questioning... nothing. That was the first time I witnessed *preventief fouilleren* (preventive searches).

Carmen goes on to talk about how she was angered by such an event and that "they invaded my neighbourhood". As colleagues and friends, Carmen and I spent one night a week over a period of five months walking around the safety risk neighbourhoods. Our purpose was to try and learn individuals' opinions of how, if at all, these searches influenced them or whether or not these searches changed the way they used public places. What follows is a discussion of how members of the community experienced a search and arrest we both witnessed in the high-risk neighbourhood of Nieuwe Westen (in Delfshaven). The field note entry states:

Carmen and I walked down Vierambachtstraat and turned right to reach Tidemanplein. There, we hung out around the playground making a lap while looking for somewhere to sit and for individuals we could introduce ourselves to. We walked to the far end where women were sitting and sat on a bench in between some women and younger children. As a rambunctious group of young boys were running, kicking, yelling around us, we contemplated how best to

approach people when our attention (like everyone else's) was drawn to a street corner, kitty-corner from where we were sitting on the playground.

Two policemen on bikes had stopped and were searching the bags and pockets of two youths. It was apparent that the police had found something on the youths as they began radioing to arrest the young men. At this point, other youths from the area became interested in the situation and a group of about ten youths began approaching the scene. As one police agent stayed with the two offenders, the other police agent barred the approaching group of teenagers from coming closer to the scene. One of the approaching youths tried to get even closer; however, the police officer (a man) appeared angry, and while saying something to the youth, put a hand against the youth's chest to stop his advancement. Another approaching youth stepped out onto the street and started filming the scene with a mobile phone. He walked at enough distance that he wasn't intruding on the scene and shook his head and sort of sauntered around, acting defiant, as if to say "I'm going to tell on you and get you in trouble".

At this time, the two youths were handcuffed and the officers decided to make the youths kneel down on the ground (while they waited for police agents with cars to arrive and collect the youth). The two young girls sitting next to us did not like this, saying "Why do the police do that? It is not necessary. They are already handcuffed! You do not have to have them kneel down." An unmarked car arrived at the scene and three men (one with a badge around his neck) got out and stepped aggressively between the two police and the surrounding group of young men on the sidewalk. At this point the two youths were kneeling on the sidewalk with the two arresting officers in front of them, the three security men stood between this foursome, and the growing group of youths on the street corner; all parties were about a meter apart from one another. These security men were not wearing uniforms. Carmen asked the girls who these men were but they did not know, "maybe the secret police?" one of them guessed. At that moment, two police buses arrived and the original two police (on the bicycles) placed the two youths in one of the buses which then drove them away. The youths in the back of the bus smiled and waved to the group of teenagers at the corner. At this point, many individuals on this side of the plane (an open plane intended for general, public use) had come to the corner to watch what was happening. While the group of young men walked around the street corner where the event took place, most of the women and young girls remained on the plane which was slightly raised from the sidewalk and enclosed by a waist-high fence. This vantage point, as Carmen and I were also on the plane, allowed for a clear view of the events unfolding below.

After the arrest, there was a general sense of tension in the air. After the police bus with the two arrested youths had left, Carmen approached the three "undercover" police men in order to ask whether they were from the police. It was not clear since they did not wear any uniforms or badges. One of them answered her rudely, "Yes of course, don't you see? Is that not the symbol of the police?"

showing her something with the police symbol that was hanging around his neck. She answered, “No, I did not see it (as it was not readily visible from a distance), and your friends are not wearing it” pointing to the other officers who were not wearing any identification. At this point in time, however, the three men stepped back into the car and drove away. The two police officers on bicycles stayed for about five more minutes talking to the group of young males who had now taken over the street corner but eventually cycled away. After all the police figures had left, the youth from the area ‘played gangsters’ yelling to one another, calling the police names and making violent movements as if to say ‘this is what I’d do to them if they ever tried that on me...or just try and come back here!’ . Shortly thereafter the police on bikes reappeared in the plane to try to disperse the growing group of young men who had gathered as a result of the event. These groups slowly dissipated and the children who were using the playground resumed their playing.

We took the opportunity to speak to some of the other women on the playground area, who would be considered “allochthon” because they were speaking Arabic and Berber amongst themselves, and the majority of whom were wearing headscarves except for one or two young girls. I asked the women “Does that happen often?” One woman answered “No, not all the time but often enough.” I introduced Carmen and myself, and asked the ladies whether it was safe in the area. “No”, the women said collectively. Then one of the women took the lead and answered the rest of our questions while the others followed our conversation⁴²:

Woman: There is not enough police presence here to combat the youth problem. The youth do not have any upbringing. It is not just their fault, but also the parents’ fault. The parents don’t take care of them. There is drug dealing among older youth and another big problem is burglary. They even come when you are inside the apartment! (The problem is that) young people do not have anything to do here. They are bored, have nothing to do and that is why they go outside and irritate people. After 16 years of age when they do not do well at school, they have finished their education and do not have any (available) work. They stay at home or hang out outside.

Carmen: Do they conduct preventative searches here?

⁴² It is important to note that the following two conversations were not digitally recorded but that they were recalled later that night to the best of our recollection and transferred from our field notes to this dissertation. See next footnote for further details on methods of writing.

Woman: Yes, the police do preventative searches. They stand on either side of the sidewalk of one of the streets and stop everybody that wants to walk through, including women and older people. It never happened to me. When I see them I take a different street. When we meet here on the plane, we often talk about safety. (...)

Before, everything (in the neighbourhood) was safer. (But now) more police presence is needed in order to improve the situation. It is not safe for women to walk outside here at night. It is not possible. We just stay inside.

This group of “allochthonous” women reiterate the idea of “allochthonous” youths as a threat to neighbourhood safety. According to our respondents, problematic youth behaviour can be attributed to insufficient police presence, poor socioeconomic opportunities for youths, and inadequate parenting. It also seems that these women approve police searching tactics in order to combat ‘the youth problem’, despite the fact that preventative measures, such as searches, affect them as well. Lastly, it is important to note that the idea that “allochthonous” youths are criminals is not something that is propagated by policing or government officials alone but also by residents within the neighbourhood.

After speaking with the women, we thanked them and walked across the plane to the other side. There, another group of women (who were speaking Turkish and were all from one family) and two men were sitting in a circle on their own folding chairs. As we walked closer, members of the group looked up. We approached them, introduced ourselves and explained what it was that we were doing on the plane and what we were interested in learning. The woman closest to us, Jemen, answered the majority of our questions while the others listened in and commented on her answers. I began by asking if it was safe in this neighbourhood, to which she responded,

Jemen: Yes, except for a few problems: teenage boys hanging out, smoking cigarettes, smoking weed, showing their attitude to others and then intimidating the younger

boys. I have told that already to the police who were coming around asking the same questions but I feel comfortable living here. It is a nice region to live in. It is safe for women. But the problem is that the parents do not take care of the kids. There is actually a lot to do here with all kinds of activities for the kids through the school, the municipal government and the local neighbourhood center. For example, every Wednesday there is an activity here for the kids. The neighbourhood center has a social office where you can come for coffee and ask questions. (...)

Carmen: Have you ever witnessed a preventative search?

Jemen: No, I have never seen preventative searches. There should be more presence from policing authorities (*toezicht van de gemeente*). The problem is that they (motioning to the group of women that we had just come from who would typically be identified as Muslims due to their wearing headscarves and/or as Moroccans as their clothing would be popularly associated with someone who had immigrated from rural Morocco, i.e. long dresses and lengthy over coats) have 14 kids and then abandon them on street without watching over them. I don't want to point at certain people, but they have too many kids to keep them all at home. We have all lived here for a long time. He (the uncle) has lived here for 38 years now. But it's a nice place. When we come home from work and it is too hot inside, you can just fetch your chair and sit and have a chat outside. We have asked for benches to sit on (from the municipal government), hopefully they will come soon.

It is interesting to note that certain points concerning safety were brought up by both groups. Both groups agreed that the threats to security came from a lack of police presence and youths' behaviour of hanging about (while smoking, yelling, making messes and loitering) on street corners. As with the previous group, these issues were attributed to inadequate parenting of the youth. It is noteworthy that the views of this second group are again in line with the official discourses. Yet, despite the reservations of each group concerning youths' behaviour, both groups were enjoying an evening outside in the same area as the problematic youth⁴³.

⁴³ The level of safety in Rotterdam is actually often made out to be more problematic in the media than is actually perceived to be the case in the everyday lives of individuals. It is important to make note of the fact that regardless of perceptions of lack of safety, people continued to use public spaces.

These groups however disagreed on certain points when discussing the night's events and the general level of safety of the area. First, with respect to the safety of women in the neighbourhood, there seems to be a disagreement as to whether it is a safe place or not. These groups also disagreed on whether or not there were enough things for youths to do and what sorts of services were available for them. When the second group mentioned that there were activities in the neighbourhood after mentioning the problem of the youth, the speaker gave the impression that criminal or bad behaviour was a *choice* of the youth because, according to her, there were ample activities in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, while one group was more general concerning which kind of parents were at fault for their sons' behaviour, the second group pointed to Moroccan women, or possibly those perceived as Muslim women, when assigning blame for children's upbringing. This last discourse too aligns with the official narratives of the 'kinds' of mothers and sons who are in need of social and civic support (see van den Berg 2009: 173; Martineau 2006: 71, Chapter 7). Finally, on the matter of preventative searches, there was also a disagreement on their frequency, with the second group denying having witnessed them. This is somewhat baffling since a preventative search, which led to an arrest, was conducted not thirty minutes earlier on the north side of the plane (this group, however, was seated on the southern side).

These divergences of opinion are notable because they illustrate how lived experiences of safety and security on the plane are as unique as the individuals who experience them. Thus, the perception of the plane as a relatively 'safe' space by the residents (with the caveat that young "allochthonous" males were the typical source that threatened this safety) is notable because it both questions and aligns with the official

discourse regarding the plane. Experiences of the neighbourhood diverged from the official understanding of the plane in that some residents believed it to be a relatively safe space as opposed to a “threatened” one, as per the safety index. The opinions of these groups aligned with official discourses, however, in stating that those who threatened neighbourhood safety were “allochthonous” youths. The association of offending youths with “allochthonous” identity was made overt in the second discussion when Jemen explained problematic youth behaviour as the fault of Moroccan caregivers.

The above discussion is enlightening as to the experiences of security measures in one of Rotterdam’s security ‘hot spots’. However, this perspective, while important, lacks the personal experiences of those who appear to be the greatest nuisance to public safety; that is, the opinions of the youth themselves.

On another night, Carmen and I had the chance to speak with a larger group of male youths who would be identified as Moroccans and as “allochthonous” individuals. The following is an excerpt taken from our diary of that encounter⁴⁴.

Carmen and I were standing on the far end of the plane. With us was a group of approximately six male teenagers. As the conversation continued, more and more youths joined us. One youth in a white shirt answered the majority of the questions we asked and the others followed along and chimed in when they wanted to. I asked whether they felt safe on the plane and they all replied, “Yes”. One youth laughed and said, “Why should we not feel safe? We’re the ones that are supposed to be the problem!” The white-shirt youth then said “it was only people like *them* (motioning to the rest of the group) who are policed” and then hesitantly he added *allochthon*. “We are Moroccans”, another youth said. Carmen replied: “But also Dutch, right?” The teenager with the big smile responded by saying that he “was born in Rotterdam and he should not be seen as an *allochthon*”. They all nodded and one youth spoke up: “(We) are actually Dutch but *they* (that is, “autochthones”) don’t see us as *Dutch*. They don’t treat us that

⁴⁴ A note on writing: The following excerpts are again from our field notes as digitally recording our conversations with youth was not an option. Before each and every conversation that Carmen and I had on the street we explained who we were and what questions we were trying to have answered. The conversations below were written down to the best of our knowledge always after our walk-about. Both Carmen and I worked together to provide the most representative account of the situations.

way." The youth in the white shirt continued: "We have *autochthon* friends at school but (those friends) do not come here to the plane to hang out". At this point in the conversation, it was made apparent that there were no other blondes/whites on the plane besides the two of us.

Carmen then asked them if they had any encounters with the police and if so, why this happened. The problem, the youth in the white shirt said, seemed to be (the act of) hanging out in public areas. They all nodded their heads in agreement. "We are not doing anything other than hanging out and being bored but this (act) is a problem for others". Carmen asked about the frequency of preventative searches in the area. The white-shirt youth answered that he had been searched once about a year ago on this plane. "But", he said, "It doesn't happen very often here". Other youths did not agree with his statement, and responded that, in fact, this plane is searched often. They also indicated that they are searched more often on Mathenesserplein (a larger, busier intersection that has a sitting area) and on the bigger streets. Then everyone agreed that a preventative search did indeed happen on this particular plane, approximately one year ago.

When they were asked to describe it, they used words like *inval* which means invasion or intrusion. "The police came at them from all sides, blocking the ways out and cordoning off the plane. When the plane was secured, the police began an extensive body search of all the young males there." They went on to explain that there was a new beat cop in the area and he wanted to show them how tough he was. The teenagers laughed at this. The white-shirt youth then told us that his mother saw the whole thing and was convinced that he had done something criminal. It took him some time afterwards to convince her that everything was okay and that he had done nothing to provoke such a search.

The youths went on to say that the police do identity checks more often (than the searches) and that they drive by the plane in their cars, taking pictures out the window of those who are hanging around. The youth also spoke about being fined 90 Euros for hanging out in groups of more than three people in places where they were not supposed to hang out. According to them, the fine has been introduced a few months ago and was rather new. We asked them how they felt about these security controls. "They (i.e. the police) should not do any of it", they answered. "They make things worse and make us feel unwelcome."

We asked them what they would like to change in the area, if they could. As we've experienced before, at first everyone answered "nothing". But after a few seconds they mentioned how bored they are: "there is nothing to do, no work (or training) to be found". Although most of them were still in school, after school they just hang out outside, most often on this particular plane. "We would love to have more activities. At one time, representatives from the government came to us and asked us what we wanted. They promised us soccer events and other things, but nothing ever happened". At this point, one youth pointed toward a container behind us. He then explained that the local government had put games and stuff in

the container for the younger children to play with. These games were locked up until the lock oxidized. Once the lock was broken, somebody stole all the stuff inside. They (the group of youths) were taken 'in' for it by the police as they were the ones associated with crime in the area. The container program was shut down after that and no new games or toys were supplied. The youths found it ridiculous that they were taken in for the crime because "we would not have taken the stuff!" This event showed them that the police are unable to help and do not have a clue as to what is *actually* going on the plane.

The youths we spoke with were conscious of the fact that they were being singled out and marginalized by police measures as well as by the reactions of others toward them as a group (or as individuals) when in public spaces. It is evident from their statements cited above that these youths recognized that they were not believed to belong to the majority community, as per their self-identification as 'the problematic group' who are often checked by the police. It was important to note, however, that these youth felt comfortable identifying with Rotterdam as "their" city rather than with the country of the Netherlands. Throughout my research, this narrative ran through many of my conversations with "allochthonous" youth when asked about belonging to the Dutch majority (national) community.

Through the above experiences and other perceptions that I encountered during my research, it is notable that Tidemanplein was interpreted as an "allochthonous" space by both the users (when, for example, they described it as a space that their "autochthonous" friends from school would *not* come to) and by the authorities (who controlled certain behaviours in this particular public place). Furthermore, it was surprising to learn that the police would take the time to control and monitor an area that did not have a high volume of human traffic, as this plane is situated off one of the side streets of Vierambachtstraat and not along the larger streets with telephone shops or coffee shops that are seen as havens for illicit behaviour in high risk zones. According to

the youth, the innocent act of hanging around in public places was the biggest reason why they were policed. For these youths, it was a matter of having nothing else to do.

Individuals' negative experiences concerning preventative searches and interaction with police were reiterated to Carmen and I on more than one occasion. The following is an exchange that took place another night on a larger plane, Mathenesserplein off of Mathenesserlaan, which is also located in Nieuwe Westen (in the borough of Delfshaven). On this night, the plane itself was quite busy with a group of older gentlemen occupying the benches in the seating area and another group of people waiting for the bus. On the same plane, there was a pair of Dutch police agents on bicycles speaking with a couple of "allochthonous" youths outside the row of shops. We approached two young men who were off to one side and introduced ourselves as researchers who would like to know more about people's experiences of preventative searches. Carmen began by asking if the youth felt unsafe in this area to which the youth replied, "No". Then Carmen pointed out the police, who were chatting on the other side of the sidewalk, and asked if the police visit this area often. The youth, Herron, became agitated and said, "Look at them. They're doing nothing but wasting tax-payers' money! They should go back to their offices and do some *real* work. The only thing that they do is provoke (*uitlokken*) people. They provoke people and create problems". Carmen then asked him if he felt as though he can ask the police for help when he needs it and if he trusts them. He decisively said, "No." Carmen then went on to ask him about preventative searches. He answered "preventative searches happen quite often, I don't like them but there is nothing that I can do about them. This is how things are." Herron went on to tell us that the police also disperse groups regardless if there are three

individuals or less. He told us a story about one of his friends who received a €60 fine because he was just hanging around in a public space.

The potential of some of Rotterdam's security approach, including preventative searches, for creating bias, is supported by Herron's comments above and provides insight into the negative reception of some policing tactics by the local population. As a person who had experienced preventative searches first hand, Herron disliked these searches, however, he felt powerless to stop them as is evident from his comment "but there is nothing I can do about them". Other security measures that Herron experienced, such as fining groups who are congregating in public spaces, were also perceived as negative. Herron's comments are supported by the experiences of the first group of youths who had also been fined for "just hanging out". Although the first group of youths did not seem as outwardly negative toward police officers as Herron did, both cases suggest that these youths feel that certain policing measures are unjustly performed. Although none of my informants specifically called these policing practices 'racial profiling', there is evidence of police profiling Muslims, minorities and lower-income youths, the majority of whom in Rotterdam are categorised as "allochthonous", during security enforcement (ECRI 2008; Eijkman 2010).

According to the municipal government's website, by hanging around, these youths are denying others access to certain areas and creating (what the government believes to be) nuisance in these public spaces (Rotterdam.nl 2009b). The unwanted behaviour outlined on this website includes aimlessly stopping in doorways of homes or store fronts, obstructing free passage, or shouting in public, which in effect outlaws public gatherings among "allochthonous" youths. This website specifically states that

nuisance from the misuse of public spaces affects all inhabitants of Rotterdam by making them feel unsafe and it is a priority of various stakeholders in the community to address this issue.

Although a recent study by Erin Martineau (2006) suggests that hanging around in public places - whether done by white Dutch youths or “allochthonous” youths - is identified as an anti-social behaviour and thus negatively reacted upon by the authorities⁴⁵, this same research confirms that hanging around and being a nuisance is generally linked to ethnic diversity and is frequently perceived as an “allochthonous” behaviour. Martineau explains:

When I told people that I was studying the problems with *hangjongeren*, many, if not most, first assumed that I was studying ethnic minority youth, partly because problems with those youth are so much the object of academics, journalists, policy makers, and the various organs of the social welfare state (276).

Martineau goes on to write that “[t]he common linkage between ‘problem’ and ‘youth’ and ‘ethnic minority’ suggested to me that the abstract image of *hangjongeren* is often an image of non-white youth” and that the presences of these youths in public places have come to represent larger problems in integration and lax immigration policies since the 1960s (2006: 276). Although Martineau states that “[a]t the neighborhood level, most people expressed much more nuanced ideas about ethnic difference” (2006: 31), she

⁴⁵ It should be noted that Martineau’s dissertation focuses on the problematic of hanging-around in public places as a perceived result of “too much tolerance” a theme typically associated with the insufficient integration of “allochthonous” immigrants. Yet, she concludes that this stereotypical idea of the Netherlands’ exaggerated societal tolerance incorporates more than a negative association to “allochthonous” ethnic difference. Instead, Martineau believes the ‘issue’ of hanging around in public places is a criticism of social policy, an indictment of individualisation, and a desire for clear limits and self-discipline in public places (2006: 28-30). Martineau stresses that there is no one type of youth that hangs around, nor one type of adult complainant. Having stated this, Martineau acknowledges that ethnic diversity features largely into the hanging-around problematic through the stereotypical identification of “allochthonous” youths as lacking Dutch morals and values and their treatment as criminals (see Martineau 2006: Chapter 6).

provides examples of this phenomenon (that is, the association of hanging around in public places with “allochthonous” individuals) in her dissertation, where she states:

On multiple occasions, adults expressed concern that youths might be talking about them, fearing that the youth were planning to “do something” to them as they passed by; such anxieties are heightened, of course, if a foreign language is being spoken. Fears about youth and fears about ethnic minority youth resonate off each other (2006: 268).

I too found evidence of this phenomenon. When I spoke to Thaddeus, a community worker in a nearby area of Crosswijk, he told me that his biggest problem among groups in the neighbourhood was,

The (presence) of young Moroccan boys who hang around on the street corners, making noise and making a mess. They are not typically a problem but if there ever is an issue with the group, people (other residents) don’t talk to them. They just get angrier and angrier and eventually someone comes to me to complain and I have to do something about it in an official capacity.

On another occasion, I was speaking with Sabine, a woman who lived on a street close to my house. After attending a neighbourhood meeting with some other residents, we walked home a short distance and she began to tell me about her own experiences of living in the neighbourhood:

The neighbourhood had changed so much since I’ve grown up here. I appreciate the diversity but there are some things that really irk me. Sometimes, I think, the Turkish and Moroccan people who have moved to this country aren’t doing their best to integrate. And we don’t need that! Of course, this isn’t all of them that do this, but it only takes a few bad eggs to make the entire group seem like a problem. For example, my neighbour, she has had some trouble from the foreign boys (*allochthons*) who hang around in the playground here. The other day, she was walking down the sidewalk with her shopping when they started yelling and harassing her, calling her names like ‘old, fat woman’. She was very upset about it. But I wouldn’t say that it’s all allochthon, just some of them.

Sabine identifies Turkish and Moroccan families as needing to integrate in the same breath as faulting the behaviours of problematic “allochthonous” youths in public places. While it may be the case that hanging around in public places and spending time

in perceived risky or threatened areas characterizes *all* youths (see Martineau 2006), what is important to note for this chapter is that the identity of “allochthonous” youths is more often, and overwhelmingly so, connected to unacceptable public behaviours in public places. These stereotypes underpin policing strategies in high-risk neighbourhoods in Rotterdam and influence the manner in which these individuals are treated and perceived by those within the same space.

Not all stories we collected suggested discrimination against “allochthons” in preventative searches. For example, we heard stories of polite police officers that demonstrate how different and positive these searches can be. The following is another selection from our field notes, in Heemraadsplein, which is also located in Nieuwe Westen. On this occasion, it was getting late in the evening, around 10:30 pm and a storm was brewing to the east. Carmen and I were making our way back to her house to write up our notes when I saw two young men sitting on park benches within an enclosed area of the park. We approached them, introduced ourselves and what we were doing in the neighbourhood, and asked them if they felt safe in this neighbourhood (Nieuwe Westen):

The youths said “yes, we feel quite safe in this area”. After asking about preventative searches, one of the young males said that “searches happen because people carry weapons” and that “these searches are necessary...when I was searched they gave me a pamphlet about what a preventative search was, and why it was necessary. These searches are only about weapons so they are needed so that people don’t do things that are worse”.

From these and other accounts, it can be said that over the past nine years these preventative searches have led to many different experiences. These experiences most likely depend on the individual who is conducting the searches, the particular purpose of the search on that night, the individual being searched, their surroundings, and other contextual factors, at any one time. I will now turn to experiences of those who provide

and facilitate safety and security features and who try to work with the so-called *hangjongeren*.

The first story is of a youth worker, a one-time *hangjongeren* himself, whom we spoke with on Mathenesserplein. As we were still speaking with Herron, Shibal, a youth worker for the city involved with a youth foundation called *Abourakrak* walked over to us with a big smile on his face. We then had a short conversation with him. Our field notes recount:

Shibal said that he feels safe in this area and thinks that the level of safety was much better than it was before. “Before, there was a lot of prostitution and drug dealing in this area but now it is much safer. You used to see needles from intravenous drug-use all over the streets. But I don’t see that any longer”. Carmen then asked him about the preventative searches. He responded “There is no problem with it; everybody is searched, even if you’re an *Oma* (grandmother). But generally, this is a good area”.

When we asked him about the general acceptance of youths in the neighbourhood he spoke about how the elderly were scared of the youths, and that he too experienced this as a youth. He further said that this was just something to be expected from older people. He tries to encourage older people to talk to the younger generation but this does not usually happen because they are still scared. “The different groups tend to avoid each other on the street and the older people take a longer route around just to circumvent the group of youth”.

Shibal then told us that his brother is also working as a youth worker and our conversation turned to Shibal’s Moroccan background and how this affected his decision to become a youth worker. “I was born and raised in Delfshaven and this helps me connect to the youth here. It also makes my work important because I am able to connect with many of the youth (on the street) who also have Moroccan heritage”.

He made a point to tell us that on the whole, youth need more activities in order to stay out of trouble. “I am able to organise about one activity a month but in between that time there is nothing to do. People are bored and it’s a problem that they have nothing to do. I try to encourage the young people to use the neighbourhood centre but they don’t because it’s too far away from the immediate vicinity and it’s indoors, which is not preferred by the youth. But even so, these activities are still more than they had before because there was absolutely nothing before” (approximately 5-10 years ago).

The case of Shibal illustrates how, as part of Rotterdam's approach to address youth crime, members of the community (in this case not only a resident of the neighbourhood but a member of the perceived "allochthonous" community), are recruited to participate in official programs to ensure neighbourhood safety. Not surprisingly, Shibal's comments reiterate the views of the government that safety is important and the attention received by particular groups is not necessarily negative but an objective measure to fight crime (especially weapons-related crimes).

It is also interesting to note that Shibal, like some of the others we interview, blames the generation gap and miscommunication, not ethnic background, as the cause of fears over *hangjongeren*. Shibal approves of the act of preventatively searching people and further suggests that searches do not target specific groups ("even *Omas* get searched"). Thus, despite research showing that certain security measures unfairly target "allochthonous" individuals, not all "allochthons" appear to agree.

During the time spent in Nieuwe Westen, Carmen and I also had the chance to speak with other "allochthons" with official paid positions in city programs. Such was the case with young employees from the *Watch Out!* street security enforcement officers program on Hemraadsplein. *Watch Out!* officers are a group of youth who work in tandem with the police as an extra set of 'eyes and ears' on the ground and who work in addition to the other street-level security enforcement, such as *Stadswacht*⁴⁶. When speaking to these youths, they mentioned how their "ethnic" background as "allochthons"

⁴⁶ *Stadswacht*, the city guards, are not police officers but are extra security officials on the streets. Their powers include holding and searching individuals, fining individuals for infractions, using handcuffs if individuals are found in violation of the law and arresting individuals on behalf of the police. These officers guard not only the public safety but tax and environmental infractions. For more information see: <http://www.rotterdam.nl/bevoegdhedenstadswachten>.

was an important factor in their recruitment for the position⁴⁷. One of the youths stated that although he considered himself to be an “allochthon”, he had grown up as a Dutch youth (*Nederlands jongeren*) in a stereotypically “Dutch” neighbourhood. Now that they had moved to the area where they worked, however, this allowed them to know the area and the other youths. According to the young men, they were easier going on the youths’ infractions than other enforcement officers; a factor which garnered them respect in the eyes of the other youth. These young men said that this position could lead to a job in law enforcement and in the meantime, it was a good way to make money.

Like Shibal, these young men believed their heritage worked to their advantage when enforcing security and safety measures in public spaces. Despite their perceived “allochthonous” identity, these young men continued to uphold security measures that arguably target youths with perceived similar social and cultural (or “ethnic”) identities. Although they identify themselves as “allochthonous” individuals from the same neighbourhood, these men continue to use the same discourse and rhetoric to describe nuisances in public spaces (namely nuisances from the *hangjongeren*), that characterizes official discourses. Despite these youths appearing well-integrated and as ‘active citizens’ policing inappropriate “allochthonous” behaviour, their inability to carry weapons like the other enforcement officers, for example, speaks to their lower placement among the hierarchy of enforcement officers. This fact could also open up questions concerning their perceived level of integration and acceptance by both “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” communities, especially in the situation of having to police “allochthonous” behaviours in public places.

⁴⁷ The latest FYSAP from 2010 – 2014 emphasizes the role of residents in creating a more safe environment in *their own* city.

Now, turning to the official police force, on one occasion, while walking along Vierambachtstraat, Carmen and I encountered two Rotterdam-Rijmond police officers, one older, one younger. They were walking along the street and stopping to talk to different individuals and groups they met along the way. I approached them and told them about how we wanted to know more information about the measures of safety in the area. The older of the police officers began answering the questions while the younger officer stayed a step back watching the street and the individuals sitting at a bar patio not too far away. I asked them how safe he believed Nieuwe Westen to be. The older officer who had been working in the area for the 20 years echoed the opinions of others in saying that things had gotten better in terms of drugs, prostitution and violence, were no longer such an issue. Overall, the older officer believed that the preventative searches were important because they got the weapons off the street. When talking a bit about the past, he said that there were originally problems in the neighbourhood from the other waves of immigration. These waves of problematic immigrants began with the Moluccans in the 70s and the Surinamese after that, but, he said, “once they found their place in this society, they adapted well and they’re no longer having any troubles”. He went onto say that the Moroccan and Turkish youths of today were also having troubles and “finding their place in Dutch society” and went onto say that “the next wave that will have trouble will probably be the Polish and Afghanis.”

This conversation was interesting because the police agent blamed recently arrived immigrants perceived to have not adapted for most of the problems in public spaces. He acknowledged, however, that there was a process of integration and socialisation that ‘new immigrant groups’ had to go through as they found their place

within society. It appeared that the “allochthon” category for the Turkish and Moroccan groups was not a permanent label, but one that would be passed onto the next wave – whom he described as the Polish and Afghans – who were the next problematic group. In this way, it would appear that, at least from the perspective of this seasoned policeman, particular groups of “allochthonous” male youths are not innately criminal. This view is important because it is consistent with ideas of assimilation and cultural citizenship and because it suggests that identification of “allochthonous” youths with undesirable behaviours in public places is not a straightforward case of racial profiling or prejudicial perceptions. Still, as the majority of the above examples illustrate, the types of behaviours favoured in public spaces continued to reinforce “Dutch” standards, rejecting behaviours associated most often with “allochthonous” individuals, in particular, youth.

In this chapter I have argued that security and safety programs in Rotterdam like preventative searches or the fining of individuals for gathering in groups of three or more (sometimes less), reinforce a scale of belonging in public spaces that discriminates against young “allochthonous” individuals. These programs further maintain dominant conceptions of how public spaces should be used in everyday life. Security and accompanying “civilising” programs (e.g. the Moroccan or Antillean Approach) while aiming to reduce fear among the general populace, result in Moroccan, Turkish and Antillean male youths being made to feel as if they do not belong.

Although the majority of security measures and safety approaches were top-down measures instead of being community grown initiatives, individuals who worked with youth and ‘at risk’ individuals seemed to interpret the laws of securitization and safety in their own way. As evidenced by the Watch Out! youth workers, we interviewed their

reaction to public infractions would be different and more benign and less confrontational than those of the police.

The experiences addressed in this chapter bring together two threads for future discussion in the coming chapters. First, people have the choice to use space in their own way regardless of conceptions of how public spaces should be used. This is evident through the numerous programs that are directed at improving behaviour and social relationships in neighbourhood spaces; the existence of such programs belies an existence of divergence uses of such spaces. Second, it has become apparent once again that the understanding of how space should be used is inherently bound up with efforts to integrate “non-native” populations into Dutch society.

CHAPTER 5: “DUTCH” SPATIAL PRACTICES “DUTCHNESS” IN PUBLIC PLACES OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

The question of what it means to be *Dutch* has become increasingly important over the last decade in the Netherlands as political and popular discussions have drawn attention to this country’s place in the European Union and the importance of immigrant integration in the upkeep of a national “imagined community”. This trend can be seen in the creation and popularity of nationalistic political parties, for example, the *Proud of the Netherlands Party*, founded in 2007 by ex-immigration minister Rita Verdonk. The consequence of questions regarding Dutch identity was also exemplified by the passionate public debate that ensued after Dutch Princess Maxima stated, at the release of a government report entitled *Identifying with the Netherlands*, that there was “no one single Dutch identity”.

When speaking of the “Dutch nation” and “national identity”, I find it helpful to understand them through the concept of relatedness. Like Anderson’s conception of nations as imagined communities, Banks and Gingrich define a “nation” as a “discursive idiom within which concepts of relatedness are articulated” (2006: 9). Belonging to a national community provides individuals access to resources not available to others. Here, I am interested in the struggle for social, cultural, and economic resources (of the nation) and the exclusions that are enacted on the basis of a Dutch national identity.

Social scientists have explored the rise of nationalism in the Netherlands in the following contexts: the culturalization of citizenship (Schinkel 2008, 2010, 2011; Duyvendak et al. 2010); the use of autochthonous language (Ceuppens and Geschiere 2006; Geschiere 2009); the treatment of immigrants and non-Dutch practices in the public sphere (van Bruinessen 2006; van der Veer 2006, Sunier 2009b); freedom of

speech and political practice (Buruma 2006, Sunier and van Ginkle 2006); the integration of non-western immigrants (van Nieuwkerk 2004, van Horst 2007, 2008, van den Berg 2011); and the integration of the second generation allochthons (Dibbits 2007).

With regard to the inscription of nationalist sentiments in space and place, there are specific national places that foster a personal connection to the nation and in so doing, generate feelings of belonging to a national majority (cf. Billig 1995). Examples of such places in the Netherlands include: the capital city of Amsterdam; *Keukenhof* – the grounds where the annual Tulip Festival takes place; the windmills at *Kinderdijk*; and national monuments like the Royal Palace in The Hague. While these spaces are important in the sense that they provide fodder for nationalistic imagery, the practice of nationalism and the connection made to an imagined national community are also practiced in ordinary places, such as the neighbourhood. For example, on the national holiday of Queen’s Day, public places turn a shade of orange (in reference to the House of Orange-Nassau) as neighbourhood stores festoon front window displays with orange garlands and residents hang orange Holland flags on the front of their houses. As has been noted in other cases (Cerwonka 2004: 29), such individual temporary or permanent “inscriptions” on space can support ideas of nationalism and national identities that re-assert the rights of the dominant group over space within the nation (in this case, the Dutch “autochthons”).

Dutch anthropologist Oskar Verkaaik (2010) demonstrates the importance of exploring not just the abstract ideas of nationalistic sentiment but how individuals actually *practice* their nationalism in everyday life. Verkaaik looks at how the Dutch naturalisation ceremony, introduced in 2006, recreates ideas of citizenship that exclude

participating immigrants from the idea of the Dutch nation. Interestingly, he does this from the point of view not of the immigrants who are trying to become citizens and who must perform these ceremonies, but from the perspective of those who are facilitating these ceremonies. Verkaaik finds that individuals incorporate larger social and political discourses of ‘autochthonous cultures’ and ‘European civilization’ into these naturalization practices (2010: 70). In so doing, these individuals produce localised, everyday understandings of Dutch nationalism.

While there has been increasing attention given to issues of nationalism in the Netherlands, I do not want to overstate this fact as I believe it would be very hard to argue that the majority of Dutch individuals, especially those living in city centres such as Rotterdam, are particularly patriotic (see also Lechner 2008: 144). Likewise, while this study appreciates the increasing importance given to the topic of the Dutch nation in Dutch public discourse, I argue that it is more pertinent to speak in terms of ‘Dutchness’ as this term alludes to “cultural identity” and notions of belonging associated with the “culturalization of citizenship” that deserve to be examined more closely.

In her study of loitering youth in Amsterdam, Martineau (2006) describes Dutchness as a set of qualities and understood norms that work much in the same manner as Whiteness: “as with Whiteness, Dutchness is not defined; its qualities are given, it is the norm” (2006:308). Furthermore, she discusses how these qualities do not necessarily have to be named but are instead made known through the definition of whom and what are *not* to be considered *Dutch*:

Scholars of Whiteness (Frankenberg 1993, for example) argue that the power of White identity lies in the fact that its qualities are unnamed. Whiteness is what is unspoken, unmarked; the ethnic or racial other is the one labeled, for example, as “lazy,” “violent,” or “promiscuous” (2006:308).

While I have found Martineau's analysis to be useful, my research led me to reflect on how "Dutchness" is not always defined by default but rather it is associated with characteristics explicitly identified as "Dutch" and perceived to be lacking among "non-native" populations in the Netherlands. In this chapter, I will explore two acts, typically identified as Dutch dispositions, in order to better understand the process of differentiation among individuals living in and using the public places of Rotterdam North. Specifically, I will look at the acts of cycling and gardening.

Cycling to Dutchness

According to the Fiets Beraad, the centre for cycling policy in the Netherlands, bicycle use in the Netherlands is impressive (Fietsberaad Factsheet 2009:1)⁴⁸. Residents of the Netherlands put forth impressive statistics concerning cycling: 26 percent of all journeys taken in the Netherlands occur by bicycle. The next highest users in Europe are the Danes who make 19 percent of their journey on bikes (2009: 1). As for the reasons why the Dutch use bicycles, shopping and running errands top the list (22 percent), followed by education (18 percent) and everyday commuting (17 percent) (ibid.). According to their factsheet, cyclists can be "young and old, rich and poor, (on their way) to work, shop or school" (2009: 1). This factsheet goes on to note that cycling is "not a political or fashion statement" as it is attributed to "neither a high nor a low status" (2009: 4); however, it is a feature that is "highly interwoven with the Dutch culture" (2009: 2). This report also states that "immigrants often do not have a cycling tradition" and that "people of Surinamese and Antillean descent make approximately 55% fewer

⁴⁸ The following information concerning the importance of cycling in the Netherlands comes from the Fietsberaad, Fietsberaad Factsheet 1: Importance of cycling in the Netherlands, October 2009.

bicycle journeys than native Dutch; Moroccan and Turkish people even 71% and 88%” fewer trips (ibid).

According to Peter Pelzer at the 7th Cycling and Society Symposium in 2010, the Netherlands has a ‘bicycling culture’ that consists of both a material and socially-constructed dimension (2010:1). Pelzer argues that cycling is part of the Dutch ‘national habitus’⁴⁹, (2010: 2). He further argues that cycling should be viewed as a “cultural phenomenon that reflects the way in which the bicycle was used in that country to create national identification” (2010:3). Pelzer believes that the Dutch have a bicycling culture not only due to the importance that cycling takes as a means of transportation but also in terms of how the public spaces in the Netherlands are physically constructed (ibid).

After the structural damage to Rotterdam’s city centre during World War II (WWII), the centre was rebuilt to incorporate the use of cars more so than any other large city at the time in the Netherlands. City planners designed the streets in a grid-like scheme, and over the years, outfitted the majority of the larger city-centre streets with separate cycling lanes. Cyclists also benefit from other infrastructure such as bicycle traffic lights at intersections, a plethora of bicycle parking areas and rental facilities, and an underground tunnel beneath the river Rotte, made specifically for cycling transportation. As a cyclist in the city for over a year, cycling in and around Rotterdam seemed safer to me than in other cities where cyclists and automobile drivers competed for the same road space. Rotterdam’s municipal government and city planners continue to make improvements to the city’s cycling infrastructure because cycling is seen as a quick

⁴⁹ As per Pelzer’s own definition of Bourdieu’s habitus, that is, the impetus for individuals to cycle because they have grown up with bicycling and lived in a context where cycling is naturalised (2010: 2).

method of transportation that is environmentally friendly and which has positive health benefits for Rotterdam's residents (Fietsberaad.nl 2007: 3).

The average number of active cyclists in Rotterdam, however, lags behind the national average: 14 percent versus the national 26 percent (Fietsberaad.nl 2010). According to the municipal government's action plan to boost cycling for the years 2007 to 2010, the culprits for Rotterdam's low cycling rates include youths and the elderly; however, allochthonous individuals are the primary targets for cycling education and encouragement by the municipality because they comprise the largest group of non-cyclists overall with 46 percent of allochthonous individuals not cycling (Fietsberaad.nl 2007: 35-36).

In a study on mobility among 'ethnic minorities' in urban centers of the Netherlands, Harms (2006), a researcher at the Cultural and Social Planning Bureau in the Hague, concluded that immigrants are less mobile than the native Dutch and that this group rarely cycles, opting instead to take public transportation (1). The author concludes that "people of foreign origin leave the(ir) house more rarely than the ethnic Dutch" and that it is "perhaps, cultural factors, like the limited possibilities for Muslim women to go out of the house without the consent or without being accompanied by their husbands", that results in such differences in spatial behaviours, particularly when looking at Turkish and Moroccan groups (2006: 6, 7). Notwithstanding the flaws of Harm's study, his work does underscore popular understanding that allochthonous individuals are unwilling or unable to cycle. Over the past decade, this perception has become intertwined with the discourse of integration (or perceived lack thereof), which takes immigrant women as the

target for such naturalization activities as cycling lessons. These lessons are believed to serve the purpose of emancipating them through integration into Dutch society.

Cycling lessons for immigrant women in the Netherlands have been available since the 1980s, and are now supported by foundations such as the National Cycling Support Centre (*Landelijke Steunpunt Fiets*, LSF), founded in 1996 (steunpuntfiets.nl, a). According to LSF's website, cycling lessons were introduced to fulfill these women's wishes to learn how to cycle because this activity is "considered a basic need, especially for those who do not have enough money to buy and maintain a car" (ibid). The overall aim of the cycling support centre is to facilitate the "integration and emancipation of foreign women through practical support of cycling courses throughout the country" (ibid). Immigrant women who cycle are therefore thought to be more emancipated from "the backwardness" of their culture. To date, this service has supported approximately 4000 women (ibid).

In a document containing quotes from past participants that is available through the LSF website, one allochthonous cycling participant is quoted as saying "I also think I will feel more integrated on a bike," while another respondent says, "I want to learn to cycle because I am the only one walking" (steunpuntfiets.nl, b). The same document quotes the coordinator of LSF, Angela van der Kloof, who states that cycling is important because "it stimulates women to develop themselves and take part in society" and because "it also makes them more self-confident". As is evident from these citations, the act of cycling is defined as a tool of integration. It is also understood as the "Dutch" way to traverse public places.

Hendrijk, who we have heard from in the Introduction, spoke of the Dutchness of cycling as he spoke of his travels in Indonesia:

In some cultures, a bike is a poor man's method of transportation but not here in the Netherlands. Even our Queen rides her bike sometimes! In Indonesia, when I rode a bike, they thought it was very odd that white people, who they assumed were rich, were riding bikes! It's a Dutch custom. We like to ride the bicycle. There (in Indonesia), if you have any (social) status, then you ride in the motor car. But we always travelled by bicycle or we just walked. (...) This is how the Dutch people do it.

Hendrijk's words, including the reference to 'our Queen rides her bike' reproduce dominant understandings of biking as a quintessentially Dutch habit.

In what follows, I provide experiences of bicycling courses at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) where I took part in teaching cycling to women who would be considered allochthonous. These experiences show how discourses of integration and the act of cycling through public places are identified as Dutch qualities.

Cycling in Bergpolder

Cycling lessons at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) began in 2009 and were financially supported through Krachtwijk funding from the district government of Rotterdam North. The cycling lessons were listed as a 'women-only'⁵⁰ activity and the majority of attendees would be considered allochthonous women.

These lessons began at 9:30 am, every Friday morning, throughout the entire year, and in most weather (although not in icy conditions). My job as a volunteer was to teach participants how to balance, to peddle at a steady rate, and to practice how to turn and avoid objects. Once these steps are learned, the women graduated to cycling by

⁵⁰ This 'women's-only' activity draws on the perception that Muslim women would not attend events that included male non-family members. The targeted group for such lessons is non-western allochthonous women who are largely seen as being Muslims.

themselves through the park. Once confident enough in their abilities, one of the volunteers took an advanced group out onto the streets in the neighbourhood of Bergpolder to practice their knowledge of street signs and rules of the road in addition to gaining experience cycling in traffic. This was often somewhat of a tense ride as the streets were often quite busy with traffic from other cyclists and automobile drivers.

In general, the process took 10 weeks to complete and at the end, participants received a certificate of completion made available to us through the local school. This operation, while having things in common with the LSF's lessons, did not require participants to wear blue vests with large "L" for Learner (*Leerling*) and the list of cycling rules and regulations was a homemade version of common sense cycling conventions. The certificates that were provided upon one's successful completion of the lessons could be used toward the participation portion of government citizenship courses (see chapter 2).

The majority of the participants at these sessions were women between the ages of 25 and 65 years old who had immigrated from Turkey and Morocco. Other participants, who were also within the same age group, immigrated from Pakistan, Kosovo, Iraq, India, and Iran. During the lessons, it was more common to hear women on the plane speak Berber, Arabic, and Turkish rather than Dutch. These women came from a variety of family situations although the majority were mothers or grandmothers, and lived with their extended family. Few of the Friday morning participants worked. Some were in the process of taking integration courses or were students at the local Islamic university. Although the majority of these women would have been considered Muslims because they wore headscarves, their religious identity and the topic of religion did not

surface, to my knowledge, throughout the entire year. Although these women would be identified as allochthonous individuals, they had diverse backgrounds and perceptions, and of course, cycling abilities.

Besides myself, there were three other cycling instructors, two of whom ran the sessions from the beginning. Henny, in her early 40s, was an extremely busy individual. She was a mother of two children who worked full-time, was an active member of the Socialist Party in Rotterdam North, wrote articles for political magazines, and was on the board of directors for her union. Despite these commitments, Henny continued to help out with the cycling lessons because, according to her, “participating in these lessons allows me to see where the money from the policies is going”. She also said:

The Bobos (the higher-ups) say they are in touch with what is going on at the street level because they have advisors or read reports, but in actuality, they have no clue as to what’s really going on. Coming out to the biking lessons lets you know what’s really going on.

Henny first became involved with volunteering in the neighbourhood with projects located at her children’s school. Henny first started by giving basic Dutch lessons to some of the other mothers at the school, however, these activities eventually turned into cycling lessons. She described this during our interview:

One of the mothers, who wasn’t born here, said to me, “everybody here cycles”. I didn’t notice this, but they did. So then they asked me if I could give them some bicycling lessons. I gave some just to these women (the mothers of her children’s classmates) at first. I mean, I bike myself, I gave my children lessons, and then I gave lessons to a few people that were in the class. It wasn’t like we have at the BNC. (...)

Mr. Z asked me if it was possible for people to help get some bicycling lessons at the centre (Mr. Z was the director of the Moroccan Cultural Center for Rotterdam North which became the BNC in 2009). I remembered the lessons from before and thought that these classes could be very beneficial for the women and that the women really had fun when they did them. So Tienieke and I put the activity on one of the BNC activity schedules and asked people in the neighbourhood to

come out. It was not Mr. Z's thing anymore, but it has become quite famous. We started last summer, on the fourth of July 2009 and it's been about a year now and we've reached 60 or 70 women.

Henny's reason for volunteering and facilitating these lessons are a mix of personal and professional interests. As an active person in the neighbourhood, Henny revealed that she was often sought out by others to facilitate projects in the neighbourhood. She highlighted this fact when she said, "once you begin, they kind of know you, you know, and then they just keep coming back!" For Henny, cycling is something that is pleasurable for the women and is something that is asked for by the community (whether it was her participants in the Dutch class from school or Mr. Z who also lives in the neighbourhood).

In her dialogue, Henny mentions another volunteer, Tienieke, who was (and remains) the head of the volunteering organization Willpower Works. This organisation was responsible for facilitating the majority of the activities held at the neighbourhood centre. Another volunteer, Beren, was an intern for Willpower Works. Born and raised in Rotterdam and with Turkish heritage, Beren would help communicate with some of the attendees who spoke better Turkish than Dutch. The last volunteer was a man named Mert, who had immigrated to the Netherlands 23 years ago from Ankara, Turkey. Mert was the only male presence on these mornings and his job included providing refreshments and maintaining the bicycles before and after the lessons. The volunteers with whom I worked saw themselves as primarily serving the participants and catering to their expressed needs.

During one of the morning coffee breaks, I asked the women why it was that they participated in these lessons. The majority said that it was because they found it

“gezellig”. *Gezellig* is a catch-all phrase in Dutch that has no strict translation into English. It gives the sense of cosiness and also implies that one is comfortable and in the company of friends. At my prompting to elaborate, one woman, Hayat, a mother of three who lived in the neighbouring district of Old North and who was in her late 30s, said that these lessons were useful because she learned other information as well, and then elaborated: “For example, if I have a question about forms from the government or about my son’s or daughters’ report cards, then I can bring them here and ask one of the women here to help.” With this statement, Hayat waved around to the entire group that included both participants and volunteers thus implying everyone who was present. One other woman, Marie, a woman in her late 50s who immigrated to the Netherlands from the Cape Verde Islands, answered that she wanted to learn how to bicycle because “it would allow me to do my job better.” Marie works part-time as a care giver to elderly individuals throughout the city. “It would be cheaper and quicker if I don’t have to wait for tram or buses”.

On the particular day that I asked the above questions, I learned from the group that there was a concurrent information session being held at the local school where many of the participants’ children were enrolled. Henny asked why it was that they were not using those sessions as a resource as well. One of the women, Hasna, a woman who emigrated from Morocco, was in her early 40s and had four children, answered that she did not go because “the time conflicted with the bicycling lesson” to which many of the other women laughed and agreed. “Besides”, she said “we can learn just as much here”.

On yet another occasion, there was a woman there who came to the bicycling lessons, who already knew how to cycle. She stayed all day, arriving at 9:30 am with the

other participants, joining the group on the plane and finally helping bring one of the bicycles back to the garage after the lesson. When I asked her why she participated since she already knew how to cycle, she answered: “My neighbour told me to come by because it’s very *gezellig* here on Friday mornings⁵¹”.

From the above quotes, and from the general feeling that I garnered as a participant and observer in these lessons, a strong sense of community was fostered during these Friday morning sessions. In some cases, participants in the cycling lessons became volunteers for Willpower Works or joined other programs at the neighbourhood center such as the conversation circle to better their Dutch language skills (of which I was also a participant) or brought their children to the homework-help programs. Thus, these lessons succeeded in broadening women’s social networks, providing them with an additional means of transportation (a factor dependent on their access to a personal bicycle) as per the mandate of these lessons. While emancipation or integration are typically understood to be the driving force behind the funding of such programs around the country (according to the LSF website, there are over 300 lessons run through the LSF organization and these do not include the cycling lessons run by community groups such as ours), the idea of emancipation was not discussed as a motivator by the participants.

Despite the lack of interest in integration and emancipation on the part of lesson participants, it was clear that for those “autochthons” who organized and guided the classes, these were central goals. Thus, when speaking with Hendrijk about his past

⁵¹ It is important that she makes the distinction between Friday and Monday because cycling lessons are also given on Mondays, in the same space, however, with different volunteers and with a different group of participants (although if there were scheduling conflicts it was common for participants to go to the other lesson).

experiences working in social policy fields for Rotterdam's municipal government, he commented:

The bicycling lessons took a lot of time and effort. We had to arrange the bicycles, get people to teach the lessons, and other things. I arranged things more than actually taught any lessons. After a while, I thought the project had failed because I didn't see any immigrant women cycling in the area. Then one day, I saw one of the men who taught these lessons and he said that he was still giving diplomas out, but that the women did not cycle very much after the lessons had finished. To which I said "Shit! Then these women did not really understand the intention of cycling." When I heard that they were going to start bicycling lessons at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC), I said "Good! Get out there and start doing it!" because you can see the backwardness of these people who live very small lives because they don't get out. They don't know many people. The more backward the person is, the smaller their life is.

From this perspective, it was clear that the purpose of these lessons was to emancipate the participants from their backwards lifestyle and to get them (visibly) out into the neighbourhood, broadening their exposure to the world. Scholars have demonstrated that this emancipation discourse that presumes "backward" allochthonous women versus "liberated" autochthonous women in the Netherlands is popular in the mainstream media (Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Moors 2009; van den Berg and Schinkle 2009).

It was for their potential as "assimilationist tools" that biking lessons were indeed officially supported. Although the initial request for biking lessons was made by the director of what was then Moroccan Cultural Centre of Rotterdam North (later the BNC), Henny had to request funds from the municipal government to run the lessons. They were eventually supported using Krachtwijk funding and then facilitated through the neighbourhood centre and Willpower Works volunteers.

Participation in biking lessons was complicated by larger narratives concerning the importance of integration into Dutch society or the emancipation of allochthonous women. While these narratives, on the one hand, helped create the opportunity to have

these lessons by providing rationale for funding, they also indirectly influence participants' behaviour in multiple ways. For example, during my time on the plane, I often heard Tienieke reassert the integrationist mission of the classes by insisting that everyone speak Dutch during the cycling lessons and coffee breaks. She would often say, "Come on Ladies! You must speak Dutch! Speak Dutch!" On one occasion, Tienieke was approached by two of the participants, one of which was trying to translate the intentions of the other. Tienieke stopped the 'translator' in mid-sentence and said, "No, no, you" pointing to the woman who did not speak Dutch very well, "try to tell me what it is you mean in Dutch. That is what you're supposed to do here." Tienieke's insistence on the use of the Dutch language for communication during this activity, when she notes *that is what you're supposed to do here*, connects the purpose of these lessons not just with cycling but with speaking the Dutch language—both traits associated with an ideal Dutch identity

As suggested by Verkaaik (2010), it is important to understand how individuals take social and political discourses of Dutchness and practice them in everyday life as it shows how Dutchness is reproduced in everyday places of the neighbourhood. I found that Tienieke's definition of Dutchness included the ability to speak in Dutch and not to speak Turkish or Berber during neighbourhood activities. According to both her and Henny, bicycling provided new opportunities for "allochthonous" women who were thought to be lacking movement in certain ways. Regardless of intention, the actions and interactions among the volunteers and the participants reinforced notions of ideal Dutch behaviour.

Next, I will show how gardening and the appreciation of greenery in urban neighbourhoods are used in a similar way to construct notions of Dutchness and to mark the difference between natives and non-natives of the nation.

Greening of Public Places in Rotterdam's Neighbourhoods

Although images of tulips and polders⁵² are brought to mind when one thinks of the Dutch landscape, it was the availability and appeal of neighbourhood green spaces and personal gardens in the city that were of importance to the residents with whom I spoke. Gardens were often the places where I conducted interviews from early spring until late fall. I was also frequently asked to sit for a cup of tea and a biscuit on the balcony of a friend or colleague, which were almost always covered with potted plants, hanging trellises, and various other garden fixtures such as water falls, bird baths, or a Dutch garden gnome (*kabouter*).

One newspaper article entitled *Gardening in the Netherlands: "I wouldn't want to be without a garden"* (2010) alludes to the importance of gardening in the Netherlands. The author, Philip Smet, states that the Dutch spent nearly 4.2 billion Euros on garden-related products in the year 2009, which was approximately the same amount as was spent during the previous two years (2010). The author was surprised that such amounts were spent despite the poor state of the economy in the Netherlands and throughout Europe: "That means that around 570 Euros a year per household is spent on gardens and balconies (...). The economic crisis may have meant Dutch people are eating out less or booking cheaper holidays (but) they're not scrimping on their gardens" (Smet 2010). Few

⁵² A polder is a piece of low-lying land reclaimed from the sea or from a river and is protected by dikes. In general, the Dutch are world renown for their water engineering skills.

scholars, however, have taken the opportunity to pursue this area for research. In answering the question of what would make decorating one's house important to the understanding of belonging, I turned to research concerning the practice of window dressings in the Netherlands.

According to van der Horst and Messing (2006), there are significant differences in the practices of window decorating in which the 'Dutch' practice is to use lace or net curtains and/or to adorn one's windows with plants and decorations (2, 6). In their study, the authors came to the conclusion that it was not only the design of curtains but their use that signalled the type of residents who occupied the home. The practice of keeping one's curtains open throughout the day and into the evening, was related to opinions of 'decent' Dutch behaviours of tidiness, respectability, and community involvement, which were thought to be a part of "normal Dutch standards" (2006: 4). On the other hand, residents had the impression that immigrants tended to close their curtains or use 'inappropriate materials' such as bed sheets or plastic window coverings to create a defined distinction between the public and private space (*ibid*: 4-6). The researchers found that when residents covered their windows from view, their respectability was put into question by other neighbours. Those whose respectability was most often put into question were typically immigrant households. Upon further elaboration, the covering of windows was seen to be a sign of immigrants' overall lack of attachment to the immediate community and to the Netherlands at large. The researchers found that residents were identified as either 'immigrant' or 'native' according to how they dressed and used window coverings; in so doing, one's window dressings had come to indicate one's 'level' of embeddedness in society and one's aspirations for community involvement (van der Horst and Messing

2006:10). Van der Horst and Messing's findings are applicable to the act of greening urban spaces in the neighbourhood, which is also understood as a "spatial practice" that signals belonging to the Netherlands.

According to Lia Karsten, a scholar in the Geography, Planning, and Development program at the University of Amsterdam, urban gardens and street greenery are features of middle-class households. Karsten, who also did her research in Rotterdam North, writes that there: "it is quite customary to put some big pots with plants next to the front door. It is clear that these families consider the public space around their home as an extension of their private space." She adds that in this way, "Together with their neighbours they (the residents of Rotterdam North) are gradually constructing new communal spaces" (Karsten 2009: 325).

The creation of this communal space entails beautifying the immediate vicinity of one's house through such measures as "communal gardening or placing benches on sidewalks to sit and watch the kids or enjoy a drink and a chat out in front of the house" (2009: 325). Karsten goes on to describe these communal areas in wealthier neighbourhoods as typically "low-traffic, green streets with playable space" (2009:324). These spaces work to create what Karsten calls 'a friendly green appeal' (ibid), which as my research shows, is often associated with "autochthonous", more affluent, residential areas.

A resident of Bergpolder, Kaatje, described these "friendly green appeal" areas as she talked about the various physical environments to be found in different neighbourhoods of Rotterdam. She commented:

I've lived on the north side of the Bergselaan (a street that runs across the top of Rotterdam North through Liskwartier and Bergpolder) and when you cross the

small canal, there is a little area that turns into a dead end. The traffic is slow there because the families in the area made a small playground for children. There are benches there, flowers, and potted-plants everywhere. It creates such a different atmosphere. There are a lot of neighbourhoods (like this) where people come and put their chairs out and talk to each other. (...)

You know the houses are bigger there (in Liskwartier) the streets in front are rather child proof and they can go out there during the weekend to meet with their neighbours. That is a big difference between Bergpolder and Liskwartier.

In pointing out that Liskwartier, with its greenery and welcoming streets, had a different atmosphere from Bergpolder, Kaatje was reiterating what I heard many times during my research: that there were affluent streets in Liskwartier as opposed to the modest streets in Bergpolder. Neighbourhoods such as Bergpolder, and other *Krachtwijken* like it, were known to have little in the way of street greenery.

Despite its reputation as the most industrialized city in the Netherlands, Rotterdam has the most square feet of green space per resident (41m²) of any of the Randstad cities; these green spaces, however, are concentrated in several large park areas (Inbo 2007: 9-11). Certain neighbourhoods, especially those built directly after World War II, have very few green spaces. Green spaces in the neighbourhood and throughout the city are thought to add to the liveability and sociability of a neighbourhood, which is also thought to attract middle and upper-class residents (Gemeentee Rotterdam 2007: 60-61). Renewal plans throughout the city, which as we saw in Chapter 3 strive to retain higher class residents, now incorporate greening projects; for example, in the Bergpolder South project apartment buildings were being torn down to make way for garden plots for local residents (MPBZ 2010). This trend to appeal to middle-class families to stay in the city through the creation of green spaces is evident from the list of greening initiatives in

the neighbourhood supported by the district government, which included the building of sidewalk gardens.

Sidewalk gardens, or *geveltuinen*, are government sponsored gardens that are created, as the name suggests, by taking up tiles from the sidewalk against the side of one's house. This space is then filled with planting soil and surrounded by the up-lifted tiles which act as a perimeter. Although quite narrow, this bed can be used to grow flowers and shrubbery. Residents of Bergpolder and Liskwartier can sign up for such a garden through the government website or by submitting a request form that is printed in the Liskwartier's and Bergpolder's local newspaper, the *Bolwerk*. Once one's application is processed, city-works employees arrive at the house and dig out the front garden.

The government also sponsored a 'Sidewalk Garden Day' held at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Center, at which I volunteered in the spring of 2010. On this day, pre-registered residents could present themselves and collect free supplies for their gardens, for example, soil, watering cans, and plants. They also had the opportunity to ask gardening advice from those volunteers who were knowledgeable about gardening. In the neighbourhood of Bergpolder, the funding for this greening endeavour was made available through *Krachtwijk* funding (available until January 2012).

Kaatje, who described the family spaces above, was a Bergpolder resident for the last 6 years, in a house she owned by herself. Kaatje, who was in her mid-30s, would be classified as a middle-income resident. Having grown up on a farm in the countryside, she was interested in gardening and volunteered for Bergpolder's Sidewalk Garden events. In 2009, she became very involved as one of the head co-ordinators. She described her experience as follows:

Some people approached Viona (a community support worker) asking to have front gardens put in. Through another friend of mine, I eventually ended up at a Krachtwijk meeting in the neighbourhood and one of the volunteer options was to help out with a neighbourhood sidewalk garden day (*geveltuinendag*). So I signed up to help with a group of three others. My job was to get residents to sign-up and to raise awareness. I drove around the neighbourhood on this man-powered cart with a huge front bucket that was loaded with flowers in the front. I went door to door to ask residents to take part. In addition to what I was doing, our team wrote articles in the local newspaper, we put up posters in the neighbourhood, and handed out fliers.

Due to lack of interest from Bergpolder residents, however, the first sidewalk garden event was also opened up to Liskwartier residents, who apparently, gladly participated.

As Kaatje said,

The reason why we're doing this is to make Bergpolder a nicer place to live. We're paying for it through the krachtwijk funding so it should only be for Bergpolder residents (as only Bergpolder is a *Krachtwijk* neighbourhood, while Liskwartier is not). Besides, the people in Liskwartier don't need this kind of stimulation. They already have beautiful sidewalk gardens and there are more families and more people who are motivated to get out there and maintain their gardens. Here in Bergpolder, there is a lot of turnover of residents and so there isn't a lot of draw for people to maintain their houses or put in a garden to make the street and neighbourhood look nicer. So we need to get people to come and take advantage of programs like the sidewalk gardens. We need to stimulate people here!

Kaatje's comments describe the act of greening the local sidewalks and streets as a way to improve the liveability and sociability of the neighbourhood. Kaatje's recognition of Bergpolder's 'need for stimulus' reiterates popular impressions that residents there, who tend to be mostly "allochthons", need to be taught to become "active citizens". Further, Kaatje's distinction of short-term versus long-term residents was described to me on other occasions as a distinction between renters and owners (of houses) in the neighbourhood, with the latter being thought to care more about the state of their homes and the surrounding neighbourhood and who were identified as middle-class, long term residents.

The practice of greening neighbourhood spaces in Rotterdam was also supported through the municipal *Opzoomer* program. The term *Opzoomer* refers to neighbourhood initiatives originally started by the mixed income residents of Opzoomer Street in Rotterdam, who took it upon themselves to improve the sociability and liveability of their street⁵³. The residents concentrated on three areas for improvement: the insecurity of the street, the lack of green spaces, and the asocial relationships among the neighbours. Residents' projects included increasing the amount of greenery on the street by installing garden boxes along the front of residents' houses. Upon seeing the positive outcome of this street's social initiatives, the municipal government provided some financial support to the residents of Opzoomer Street, which in 1994 developed into a city-wide project.

According to the official website for *Opzoomer*, there are now over 1800 *Opzoomerstraten* (streets taking part in the program), or approximately 16 percent of the entire Rotterdam population who are active in such initiatives (opzoomerme.nl). In order to take part in the *Opzoomer* program, a resident must fill out the appropriate documentation that includes required items, budgetary plans, and interested participants. One can access these forms from the *Opzoomer* website and drop off the completed form at the local municipal government for approval⁵⁴. Street refurbishment activities sponsored through *Opzoomer* initiatives included: cleaning and greening the street; street art; creating child-friendly spaces; or increasing feelings of safety through projects that addressed physical shortcomings, e.g. adding more lighting to the street, or throwing a neighbourhood party in order to get to know one another better. The following is a

⁵³ The following information can be found in Julien van Ostaaijen's overview of *Opzoomer* activities in his work "Aversion and Accommodation" situated in Rotterdam (2010).

⁵⁴ It is important to note that the *Opzoomer* process in itself is quite involved and requires that applicants must be able to speak Dutch well enough to navigate such an online bureaucratic system.

description of an Opzoomer experience in Liskwartier that deals specifically with giving a neighbourhood space, a friendly green appeal.

Frescia is an older woman living on the Bergselaan, an affluent street in Liskwartier, and who would be considered an “autochthon”. Walking up to her doorway for our interview, I noticed large potted plants that flanked her front door and the large rose bush underneath her window which hinted at her affinity for greenery in the neighbourhood. Frescia had participated in Opzoomer activities for a number of years as was apparent from the ‘Opzoomer Star’ placed on the front of her house just beside her front door (see more below). Although Frescia and her neighbours took part in many activities supported by Opzoomer over the years, their largest project was to take over the maintenance of the treed berm⁵⁵, which divides the north side of the street from the southern side. Frescia explained:

The government no longer wanted to maintain the berm in between our street and had decided that they would prefer to pave it over. The residents on my street thought that it would be a shame to lose this green space since there isn’t much as it is. Instead, we proposed that through the Opzoomer funds that we as neighbours would take care of it. We used the Opzoomer funds to maintain the trees, cutting branches when we needed to and that kind of thing, and now we use it to replace gardening tools and other maintenance equipment. We had the idea to put a cobbled pathway in the middle of the trees where people from the street could walk and enjoy the trees. Some of my other neighbours have since made small alcoves where there are special flower beds that they’ve planted themselves and benches for sitting. It’s like a little oasis in the middle of the street. (...) On a whole, the Opzoomer funds were very useful for this project. (...) This project keeps the neighbours on the street together. It’s even become popular with the newer neighbours on the street as well.

This treed oasis, as Frescia described it, with its carved out spaces for sitting and admiring small garden plots has created the same ‘urban haven’ described by Karsten. Although the berm is a public space, and not as exclusive as one’s doorstep would be,

⁵⁵ A berm is a man-made path or strip beside a pathway or roadway.

this area served the same function by providing a space for the residents of the street which brought them together through the act of gardening. Frescia's role in the project, however, was privileged as highlighted by the presence of the Opzoomer Star outside her front door.

When travelling the streets of Bergpolder and Liskwartier, and throughout Rotterdam, I often saw an 'Opzoomer Star' (*Opzoomer Ster*) on the facade of houses that were typically overflowing with greenery, benches, potted plants and other garden features. According to the Opzoomer website, streets can apply for these stars "to make it clear that your street is willing to help create a liveable city". Any street that has previously participated in the program can apply for such a star. Once approved, neighbours can hang one of these plaques in their street and receive money to celebrate the unveiling of the star (see Opzoomer 'Star' below).



Photo A and B, Opzoomer Star (with permission by the photographer)

When I asked Frescia about what the star meant to her, she said that her Opzoomer Star was hung outside her house to mark the accomplishments of their berm project (in which she took a leading role) as judged by the goals of the overall Opzoomer program. These goals include having achieved resident participation, social cohesion, and demonstrating active citizenship. When I was speaking with Theo, who would also be

considered an “autochthon” and who was also a participant in Opzoomer greening initiatives in his own neighbourhood of Old West in the city centre, he indicated that his Opzoomer Star was meant to designate those houses that had become popular through community activities or those parts of the neighbourhood that had been brought out of ‘urban anonymity’.

From my own perspective, however, these stars seemed to be awarded to those houses that had created a particular green visual aesthetic within urban neighbourhoods as designed by government officials from the Opzoomer program and urban designers. Seen in this light, the Opzoomer Star works to further identify and privilege those spaces with “green friendly appeal” in a way that fosters feelings of exclusivity for “autochthons” or well-integrated “allochthon” residents and residential areas. Those spaces/citizens who do not receive such recognition can be perceived as not abiding by the standards of aesthetic “Dutch” taste. This is apparent in the following example.

After arriving as a guest at an acquaintance’s house in Bergpolder, I commented to the host on how nice his front garden looked. True to Karsten’s descriptions, the front door was flanked with large potted plants and a large flowering bush that grew out of the sidewalk garden set underneath the front window. In response to my compliment,

Adriaan, long-time resident of Rotterdam North and owner of the house, replied:

I spend a lot of time on my gardens because it’s such a nice thing to do as my hobby. I really wish, though, that other residents around here (in Bergpolder) would take some time and try to do things with their front gardens as well. You can tell from a mile away those houses that do not have Dutch people living in them. It brings down the value of the whole neighbourhood!

When Adriaan identified particular houses as Dutch according to whether or not they have a front garden or visible greenery, he reinforces the understanding that gardens and

greening public spaces are a part of the construct of Dutchness that differentiates between natives and non-natives of the nation.

In his discussion of domestic gardens in Vienna, Robert Rotenberg argues that gardens can be read as statements which express household and personal identities in a manner that can contest and/or demonstrate one's belonging to different classes (1999). In the same regard, Allaine Cerwonka (2004) argues that gardening practices, specifically those associated with creating native species gardens in Australia can be used to express belonging and attachment to a national "authentic" community.

Although more research is needed in order to fully understand the influence of friendly green spaces in Rotterdam North, the comments by Adriaan and others who took part in neighbourhood greening initiatives suggest that having a front garden or engaging in "greening" projects is marker of "autochthonous" status and active citizenship. As seen through the examples in this section, the green initiatives and gardening projects described in this chapter were most often taken advantage of by those with a good working knowledge of Dutch who could navigate the bureaucracy and red tape of the district government, and in so doing, impressed the importance of a Dutch style of gardening⁵⁶.

This chapter's exploration of two activities perceived to be "Dutch" characteristics - cycling through public places and decorating the outside of one's house with gardens and street greenery - demonstrates that there are standard traits by which "Dutchness" is explicitly judged by "autochthons" in Rotterdam. The spatial practices of

⁵⁶ It should be noted that there are other gardening initiatives, such as the creation of community gardens, that according to other studies (van Lieshout and Aarts 2008) in fact promote more egalitarian exchanges between "allochthons" and "autochthons" and where there seems to be more room given to the expression of "ethnic" difference.

riding bikes and keeping front gardens, the latter of which was also linked with class identity, worked to define who does, and who does not, belong to the majority community. Furthermore, “allochthonous” individuals who did not engage in such spatial practices were not considered to live up to the ideal of a good, active “Dutch” citizen. In the next chapter, spatial practices, such as the ones mentioned here, will be further contextualised in terms of current Dutch debates about the ‘culturalization of citizenship’.

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

THE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE AND PLACE IN THE DISCUSSION OF BELONGING

Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, PVV, which is one of three governing parties in the national coalition, is one of the most outspoken figureheads against immigration from ‘Muslim countries’ and what he sees as the ‘Islamification’ of the Netherlands. Both Dutch and international media outlets frequently report on Wilders’ outspokenness and his political antics. Wilders’ trial and subsequent acquittal from hate speech charges laid against him when he likened the Koran to *Mein Kampf* and Islam to Nazism (Waterfield 2011), or his call to parliament to calculate the cost of integrating non-western immigrants (Rijlaarsdam and Staal 2009), which he later estimated to be approximately six to ten billion Euros per year (Radio Worldwide Netherlands 2010) are obvious examples of his anti-immigrant and Islamophobic stances. Following the Immigration Minister’s refusal to produce specific cost analysis (Blass 2009), Wilders made a splash by calling for the Minister to be criminally charged for failing to provide such information to the public (Radio Netherlands/Expatica 2009). Most recently, in the summer of 2011, Wilders’ potential role in Anders Behring Breivik’s killing spree in Norway (as Breivik was a huge fan of Wilders) (Hochgemuth 2011), garnered him still more media attention, both positive and negative. The acceptance of his party into the national coalition had many commentators worrying that this event signalled an ‘end to tolerance’ in the Netherlands (Cendrowicz 2010). Although Wilders’ popularity could also be attributed to his fiscal and anti-European Union political stances, or to his attention to the rights of the retired generation, it is his stance on Islam and immigration that continues to hold the focus of media attention (Vossen 2010). This larger political context and social milieu shapes everyday realities

for residents and influences the national and local-level politics of belonging to the imagined community of the Netherlands. It is also this political and social context that informed this research, which considered how non-western immigrants and Muslims, known as “allochthons”, are seen as peripheral members to the majority community and how their lives are ultimately influenced by racist prejudices and ethnocentrism camouflaged as a discourse on “cultural citizenship”.

Wilders’ campaign to assimilate “allochthonous” individuals according to ‘Dutch cultural values and norms’ demonstrates how citizenship is increasingly defined according to selective idealized cultural norms. This cultural trend is a shift away from older paradigms based on pluralism and multicultural ideals, which are identified as principles of a liberal democratic society characterized also as civic nationalism, where one’s citizenship, at least in theory, implies individual rights, and where one’s “ethnic”, cultural, or religious background are deemed irrelevant. In the last decade, however, a plethora of regulations and programs pertaining to immigration and citizenship in the Netherlands have been adopted by governmental bodies, that in practice assume that the “nation”, its citizenry, and “culture” are one and the same thing, or more precisely that national identity is measured by the enactment of “Dutch” cultural traits. This trend is reflected in the notion of “cultural citizenship” used by scholars when writing about immigrants and minority groups in the Netherlands. These new requirements and demands to “act” Dutch, especially in public spaces and which are imposed on immigrants and those considered “allochthons”, lead to exclusionary practices that reinforce boundaries between “us” and “them.” These requirements ultimately promote racialized notions of citizenship and conservative nationalist sentiments as is evident in

official and popular discourse as well as in the everyday uses and meanings of public spaces by ordinary citizens.

In particular, immigrants from Turkey and Morocco, and Muslims in general, are seen as those who are most in need of being disciplined into Dutch “culture”.

Considering the increasing securitization of borders and public environments, as well as the rise of Islamophobia following September 11th in New York and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, physical and visible signs, such as clothing (especially veiling practices), render even those with citizenship, marginal and suspect, since they do not fit into a uniform or homogenized “Dutch” social and cultural landscape.

Although other scholars have explored integration and the politics of belonging concerning non-western immigrants in Rotterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands (see for example, van den Berg 2011, de Koning 2010, Sunier 2009b, van Bruinessen 2006), this project took a unique approach, which among other things, explored belonging by considering how individuals use, access, and understand public places. Drawing on Lefebvre’s theoretical approach to space, I have argued that larger social and political discourses concerning the difference and non-belonging of “allochthonous” individuals were reproduced in neighbourhood public places through government-led integration programs and urban gentrification projects. Importantly, I also found that this difference was similarly reproduced through the everyday spatial practices of ordinary “autochthonous” inhabitants.

Using spatial practices as a means to approach this question of belonging and its effect on understandings of citizenship, Chapter 2 explored government-sponsored integration programs that sought to teach “allochthonous” individuals how to

appropriately use and comport themselves while in public places. Chapter 3 looked at government-led gentrification projects and resident initiatives that sought to renovate the neighbourhood and which resulted in an understanding of “autochthonous” individuals as ideal ‘active citizens’. Chapter 4 explored how “allochthonous” youths were policed in public places due to their perceived misuse of such spaces and how they, in turn, contested such policing. This chapter further explores how an understanding of “safe” and “unsafe” public spaces connected to the distinction between “allochthons” and “autochthons”. Chapter 5 examined attempts at promoting stereotypical “Dutch” behaviours, such as bicycling and greening one’s home, that were targeted to “allochthons”. This chapter argues that these practices are yet another way in which dominant understandings of Dutchness are reinforced.

As discussed in my introduction and background chapters, this exclusionary project of citizenship was actively supported through government initiatives where citizenship education and integration programs were used to teach residents how to be ‘active citizens’ and to reinforce the importance of participating in civic society. Because such education is directed at “allochthonous” individuals alone, this education marks these individuals as different and as lacking the ability to create strong social relationships outside their established social network. Although the declared goal of such courses is to foster social cohesion among all inhabitants of the Netherlands, integration courses can come across as stigmatizing for those singled out to participate, as Hilde the integration teacher suggested.

The attempt to indoctrinate “allochthons” to adopt ‘appropriate’ behaviours and proper methods of public comportment were also found on the streets of problematic

neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. Government sponsored initiatives, such as the MMdS program, had the effect of categorizing entire streets of mostly “allochthonous” individuals as insufficiently socialized and integrated, which further marked them as ‘outsiders’ and poor participants in a “Dutch” society.

The underlying aim and political ideology of integration measures have been to assimilate particular “ethnic” and “religious” identities. This is important because although programs seeking to create social cohesion and community integration among *all* inhabitants of Rotterdam at a quick glance can appear unbiased, they are in actuality designed for “allochthonous” individuals alone.

The project to assimilate “allochthonous” individuals and behaviours was not just supported through government initiatives, however, but also through the everyday practices of “autochthonous” individuals. As argued by Florida (2002) and later confirmed in the Dutch context, there is a minority of middle-class individuals - “autochthons” - who are willing to create connections with lower income communities - of “allochthons” (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009). In my own work, for example, Tienieke and Henny’s time spent teaching “allochthonous” women how to bicycle is evidence of the fact that middle-class residents are willing to help those in ‘other’ communities. Despite the intention to serve these individuals (for example, to teach them an independent and cost effective method by which to get around the city), however, their practices, intentional or not, reinforced dominant notions of proper behaviour in public spaces that are associated with “Dutch” culture (for example, in the necessity to speak Dutch while in public places of the neighbourhood). In this way, my dissertation shows how citizens who volunteer to help integrate their fellow neighbours with the best of

intentions, may in fact contribute to reproducing the very social distinctions they are trying to dissolve. While there are other possible outcomes from such integration programming, these findings open up questions for future research that could focus on how these activities are experienced by “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” individuals alike.

The accounts depicted in this work reveal that the participation process for neighbourhood projects, activities, and groups was designed to best accommodate “autochthonous” residents. Chapter 3 focused on the creation of neighbourhood spaces and determined that “autochthonous” individuals were better able to take advantage of place-making opportunities in the neighbourhood due to the design of these events. Furthermore, through an investigation of bottom-up initiatives, for example the participation process surrounding the regeneration project of Bergpolder South or Josephine’s VH initiative, it became apparent that certain individuals knew how to ‘work the system’ and were better equipped to provide input and influence the design and conception of public places. That these knowledgeable individuals were not representative of the community that lived in the areas where these projects were to take place is significant. For example, while most residents living in Bergpolder South would be identified as “allochthonous”, the majority of those involved in participation initiatives lived outside the area and would be considered “autochthonous”. Thus, throughout this dissertation, it was found that “autochthonous” individuals had the most say over spatial projects in neighbourhood. This finding is in line with research from van de Wijdeven and Hendriks (2009) who described how community participation projects in the Netherlands worked to include only a portion of the community.

Therefore, participating in civil society and being an ‘active citizen’ were important themes throughout this dissertation and proved to be two important factors determining one’s belonging and perceived loyalty to the majority community of the Netherlands. Importantly, this research has shown that non-western immigrants and Dutch Muslims *do* in fact participate; however, they typically participate at different times and for different organizations than those individuals who are busy with neighbourhood activities (aside from integration activities). This was evident in Chapter 2 which showed that “allochthonous” participants of the Dutch language lessons may not come to the evening meetings for the Bergpolder South project, but do volunteer their time during the day at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC). It is therefore important to acknowledge the significance of ‘visible participation’ as an important factor in the politics surrounding the perceived belonging of “allochthonous” individuals to the imagined community of the “nation”.

In general, what also became apparent through my research in the neighbourhood is that despite living in close proximity, there was little *spontaneous* interaction among “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” individuals outside of, for example, designated times for integration projects in the neighbourhood center. This finding is supported by other research in the Dutch context where scholars looked at the connections among neighbours and the creation of close social bonds within particular geographic areas (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009; Musterd and Pinkster 2009; van Eijk 2010). Thus, despite the increased attention and funding provided to boost levels of social cohesion in voluntary neighbourhood activities and neighbourhood groups, for example in the case of Krachtwijk funding, there was little evidence of increased social cohesion.

My work also highlighted the fact that ordinary citizens were generally unwilling to discuss particular prejudices against “allochthonous” individuals, instead opting to discuss their displeasure with integration or diversification of their society in an abstract sense. Many conversations and experiences presented in this dissertation, however, illustrated people’s use of larger social and political discourses popularized by right-wing politicians in everyday discussions that make use of exclusionary cultural definitions of citizenship.

Finally, this dissertation illustrates alternative uses of space that suggest that “allochthonous” individuals regularly contest dominant understandings of how public space should be used (for example, when “allochthonous” youth use public street corners as a place to hang out, or when “allochthonous” women wear headscarves in public places). Therefore, despite the deployment of resources to impose dominant understandings of proper comportment in public space, my research reaffirms de Certeau’s insights that even the least powerful individuals manage to assert their own uses and understandings of space. Although discourses of difference and belonging do not prevent individuals’ innovative and creative uses and interpretations of public places, they influence one’s spatial opportunities and capabilities in space.

...

Rotterdam’s unique conservative political past and aggressive social integration policies make it an important site to explore changing notions of citizenship and how these lead to hierarchical differentiation reflected in the use and meaning of public space, between those considered authentically Dutch and Muslim and non-western immigrant populations. Although this research was conducted in specific Rotterdam

neighbourhoods, its findings have implications throughout Rotterdam and other large cities in the Netherlands. Similar trends are unravelling in other European countries, in Australia, and other industrialized western countries including in North America. My work can contribute to research projects in these societies, which use space to shed light on the xenophobic trend that sees immigrants, refugees and Muslims in general, as threatening local cultures, economics and national security.

Therefore, in addition to opening up understandings of citizenship, as proposed by Dutch sociologists as a solution to the issue of belonging in Dutch society, the ethnographic material brought forth in this project speaks to the importance of *space* as a means to find grounds for interaction and belonging. Space, its diverse uses, and meanings ascribed to it, remain an under-explored avenue by which to promote a more inclusive society, where space can provide opportunities for more inclusive belonging for the whole community. This is important because place and space has long been associated with rights and belonging to the community of the “nation” (Said 2000). The ability to influence the construction of space is a promising measure toward redefining and recreating discourses that affect one’s position, understanding, and experiences of belonging in today’s social and political climate in the Netherlands; this particular point is important when understandings how the acquisition of “spatial capital” (Centner 2008) can influence contemporary debates in the Netherlands that concern the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. Such a discussion brings together the themes of immigrant integration, citizenship, participation, and belonging in the Netherlands.

How Space Factors into Debates on the ‘Culturalization of Citizenship’

In the on-line description of their Culturalization of Citizenship research project, one of the lead researchers, Evelien Tonkens, is quoted as saying that the “culturalization (of citizenship) is not necessarily a bad thing”⁵⁷. She goes on to say:

Someone like Geert Wilders preaches a certain type of culturalization that excludes people – either you assimilate entirely, or you’re out. The left-wing parties then respond by saying: down with the culturalization of citizenship, it only leads to exclusion; we need to focus on work, education and housing. In practice, however, culturalization is much broader. People like Ahmed Aboutaleb and Ahmed Marcouch emphasise the positive aspects: culturalization offers ethnic minorities’ *access to society’s cultural capital*, allowing them to participate fully. Seen in that light, culturalization has a great deal to offer and leads to *inclusion rather than exclusion*” (van Bochove 2009, UvA website, emphasis my own).

By access to cultural capital, Tonkens is referring to the ability of those not-yet incorporated (“allochthons”) to gain cultural capital (possibly through varying forms of cultural assimilation?) in order to be included in the majority community. This appears to be a rather one-sided solution and one that is neither clearly drawn out in terms of how this can be actually achieved without assimilating to Dutch cultural ideals, nor a solution for the majority of those individuals who come to mind when the term “allochthon” is used, for example, Turkish or Moroccan immigrants who are visibly Muslim.

This latter point is evident in Tonkens’ examples of those individuals who are positive role models for such cultural capital. Tonkens uses Ahmed Aboutaleb, the mayor of Rotterdam, and Ahmed Marcouch, a Parliamentary Minister, both of whom have Moroccan heritage. It is difficult to see how these two men, who are extremely privileged individuals, are supposed to stand for the ultimate obtainment of cultural capital and as role models for such a diverse community, the majority of who are of lower socio-economic standing and who have varying levels of cultural capital in the eyes of the

⁵⁷ http://www.jwduyvendak.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=74

majority community. It seems almost hypocritical to write that culturalization is “not necessarily a bad thing” when the ‘winners’ of that culturalization will be vastly outweighed by the everyday ‘losers’ of such a campaign; a campaign that seeks to identify difference and ultimately influence one’s perceptions of themselves and others in the process. In agreement with the authors, I feel there needs to be an inclusive approach taken to citizenship; yet, the authors seem to ignore the power imbalances at play in their “solution”.

During a recent conference presentation, Tonkens and Hurenkamp note that capital is often thought to be achievable through activities where diverse individuals (“autochthonous” and “allochthonous”) work together on local projects, for example, by sweeping the streets together or by saying hello to one’s neighbour. These local forms of participation, and the social networks made through them, are generally recognized⁵⁸ by the larger community as efforts to be part of Dutch society (Hurenkamp et al. 2011: 207). The position held by Tonkens and Hurenkamp exemplifies the new understanding of citizenship, which is increasingly departing from the notion of diversity as meaning living together with difference, and towards a society where new comers are made to feel they need to assimilate “culturally” to be accepted as Dutch citizens.

In line with Duyvendak et al. (2010) and Tonkens and Hurenkamp (2011), I argue that the trend of culturalization of citizenship should be curbed because it results in the exclusion of predominantly “allochthonous” individuals. I would argue, however, that their solution (to bolster visible participation of those typically seen as “allochthonous” residents, for the purpose of gaining social and cultural capital) does not put enough

⁵⁸ It is important to note that their proposed solution takes a spatial approach in order to acquire belonging because performing these acts requires the act to be in a public space that will then include conceived uses and associated understandings of such a place.

emphasis on spatial politics, which this dissertation shows to be a significant feature in the politics of belonging and understanding of difference. I would suggest that cultural attributes of citizenship have been ‘spatialized’ and that we need to look further into spatial practices as a means to revamp understandings of citizenship.

When examining space as a factor that that influences Dutch “culture” and its citizenship project, future projects with an alternative vision could include: the deconstruction and by implication diversification of the conception of appropriate behaviours in public places; the creation of places that serve as communal spaces; and the incorporation of those existing “ethnic” and religious spaces into the *imagined Dutch landscape* and fabric of Dutch cultural identity - a process that would involve state and civil institutions working to shed off the “culture-centric” approach, to expand what it means to be “Dutch” and to become inclusive in identifying who is a Dutch citizen, thereby dismantling distinctions in between “allochthon” and “autochthon” citizens, but maintaining a vision of living together with, and not despite, the difference. Transforming understandings of the imagined Dutch landscape is an area that would benefit from future research not only for studies of spatial practices but also in research concerning integration and politics of belonging.

Changing the understanding of specifically demarcated spaces, however, does not address one’s ability to capitalize on place-making projects. In order to do this, one has to have enough capital (in the Bourdieudian sense) and, as argued by the Duyvendak et al. (2010) and Tonkens and Hurenkamp (2011), this social, cultural, and economic capital is linked to the phenomenon of the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. I argue that having “spatial capital” is also important to facilitate larger community belonging.

Ryan Centner's theory of place-making, outlined in the introduction, shows how *the privileged* are able to access and 'take place', a finding that is reiterated in my own investigations of spatial practices in the neighbourhood. Centner's view of place-making addresses how conceptualisations of space are juxtaposed with individuals' reactions and own uses and experiences of such places (2008: 196). Centner has convincingly argued that dominating space, and defining it for a particular community, is a form of making and taking that space (Centner 2010: 295).

As articulated throughout this dissertation, individuals perceived as being "autochthonous" are more spatially privileged in their ability to create and build public places in the neighbourhood than individuals who would be perceived as "allochthonous". This is due to their perceived social, cultural, economic capital which coincides with their belonging to the majority community of the "nation". Working from Centner's understanding of "spatial capital", I argue that one potential avenue to pursue in respect to the current exclusive (cultural) notion of citizenship in the Netherlands, is to bolster the ability of those 'not-yet incorporated' individuals ("allochthonous" individuals) to make neighbourhood places, for example, by diversifying the method by which resident feedback is collected. Although having "allochthonous" individuals watch over their local public places and become 'active citizens' are ways by which to gain "spatial capital", changing the ways participation is solicited and promoted and re-evaluating the understandings of the imagined Dutch landscape, are two ways in which those individuals living in the Netherlands can create a more inclusive understanding of Dutch citizenship and belonging that does not place the 'solution' at the feet of "allochthonous" individuals.

As argued by anthropologists of space and place and autochthony scholars alike (see Bender 1998; Malkki 1992; Geschiere 2006; 2009), there is a long history of associating the physical space of the nation with the imagined community of that nation. The territorialisation of the nation is a process by which people compete for power by laying claims to land and resources and become, or already are, positioned within or outside the national imagined community (Cerwonka 2004: 30). This imagined community is associated with a particular national “culture”, a phenomenon which in the Dutch case speaks to the current cultural construction of citizenship. Equal access in distributing and producing spatial capital among all residents of Rotterdam, then, addresses the issue of Duyvendak et al. (2010) who argued that local activities *should* be recognised in national projects of belonging, but who did not provide a method as to how exactly this could be accomplished.

The importance of gaining spatial capital, then, is not just in the making of place by those with privilege but in influencing the acquisition of other forms of capital, which are thought to be fostering a restorative notion of citizen in the Netherlands. By using constructivist approaches toward space, it is plausible that the connection between nation, space, and identity can be disarticulated from one another, and rearticulated toward a more inclusive understanding based on diversity and difference and not uniformity and a mono-cultural vision of society.

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2009 A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action: Real-life Expressions of Vital Citizenship in City Neighbourhoods. *In City in sight. Dutch dealings with urban change*. Duyvendak, J.W., F. Hendriks, M. van Niekerk, eds. Pp, 121-140. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

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Appendix A – Map of Liskwartier and Bergpolder

Bergpolder – in purple
Liskwartier – in Pink
Map from Google.maps



Appendix B: Ethics Approval Form



Office of Research Ethics

The University of Western Ontario
 Room 4180 Support Services Building, London, ON, Canada N6A 5C1
 Telephone: (519) 661-3036 Fax: (519) 850-2466 Email: ethics@uwo.ca
 Website: www.uwo.ca/research/ethics

Use of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. R. Farah

Review Number: 16216S

Review Date: August 07, 2009

Review Level: Full Board

Protocol Title: Negotiating National and Religious Identities in Public Spaces in the Netherlands

Department and Institution: Anthropology, University of Western Ontario

Sponsor:

Ethics Approval Date: August 07, 2009

Expiry Date: August 31, 2010

Documents Reviewed and Approved: UWO Protocol, Letter of Information and Consent.

Documents Received for Information:

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information. If you require an updated approval notice prior to that time you must request it using the UWO Updated Approval Request Form.

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the study or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the NMREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of monitor, telephone number). Expedited review of minor change(s) in ongoing studies will be considered. Subjects must receive a copy of the signed information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the NMREB:

- a) changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of the study;
- b) all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that are both serious and unexpected;
- c) new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.

If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to this office for approval.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

Chair of NMREB: Dr. Jerry Paquette

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Grace Kelly (grace.kelly@uwo.ca)	<input type="checkbox"/> Janice Sutherland (jsutherl@uwo.ca)	<input type="checkbox"/> Elizabeth Wambolt (ewambolt@uwo.ca)	<input type="checkbox"/> Denise Grafton (dgrafton@uwo.ca)

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.

cc: ORE File

Jennifer Long, PhD
Department of Anthropology
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, N6A 5C2

CURRENT POSITION

09/2011 – present **Lecturer**, Anthropology Department, The University of Western Ontario; Course: The Anthropology of Business (2nd year course);

Developed course curriculum, prepared teaching and evaluation materials. Prepared and delivered lectures. Facilitated on-line resources and discussion forums. Designed and prepared assessment tools to evaluate students' progress, including: in-class assignments, research papers, and exams.

09/ 2007 – present **PhD Candidate**, Anthropology Department, The University of Western Ontario;

Affiliations: Meertens Research Institute, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Migration & Ethnic Relations (inter-disciplinary collaborative programme). *Research Interests*: urban studies, place making and belonging, spatial politics, immigration and integration affairs, the Netherlands; Western Europe. Expected completion date: 12/2011

08/ 2011 – present **Administrative Associate (Research)**, Office of Global Health, Schulich Medicine and Dentistry, The University of Western Ontario.

EDUCATION AND SCHOLARLY AFFILIATIONS

2007 – 2011 PhD Anthropology, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada

Dissertation title: “Constructing National Identity through Space in the Netherlands: understanding the relationship between non-western Muslim immigrants and Dutch natives” (Co-supervisors: Adriana Premat and Randa Farah. Thesis defended December 2011)

2007 – 2011 Certificate for University Teaching, Teaching Support Center, University of Western Ontario (to be completed December 2011)

2009 – 2011 Guest Researcher, Meertens Institute, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Religion, Body, Media, and Heritage Dynamics seminar participation & presenter

- 2006 – 2007** Diploma in Conversational French, Sheridan Institute, Oakville, Ontario
- 2004 – 2005** M.A. Development and Social Transformation, in Anthropology, The University of Sussex, Brighton, England.
Thesis title: “The Identity Gap: How an ambiguously defined identity in policy impacts on Traveller’s experiences in Scottish education”
- 1999 – 2003** B.A. Honours, Socio-Cultural Anthropology, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

RESEARCH & TEACHING INTERESTS

Space and place, Muslim identities, immigration and integration, urban anthropology, security and safety in public places, cultural geography, the Netherlands, Europe, business anthropology

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

- 09/2007 – 04/2011 **Teaching Assistant**, Department of Anthropology, University of Western Ontario
- 01/2011 – 04/2011 Introduction to Anthropology, 1st year core course
- 09/2010 – 12/2010 Nation, Nationalism and the Politics of Identity, 3rd year course
- 01/2009 – 04/2009 Anthropology of Space and Place, 2nd year elective course
- 09/2008 – 12/2008 Cultures of the Middle East, 2nd year elective course
- 01/2008 – 04/2008 Plagues and People, 2nd year elective course
- 09/2007 – 12/2007 Towns and Cities, 2nd year elective course

Assisted instructor with class facilitation and preparatory work including evaluation and documentation. Monitored students’ attendance and participation. Held weekly office hours to aid students with course material. Prepared and delivered four guest lectures throughout three years; Taught weekly, one-hour classes for Introduction course (90 students); Technological and online support for staff and students.

- 01/2003 – 09/2004 **Customization Planner**, Customization Department, Procter and Gamble Inc. North York, Ontario, Canada
- 09/2005 – 09/2007

Execution and management of the company’s special packaging projects for deodorant, make-up, and beauty product brands. Effectively communicated with budget coordinators, brand development, and international logistic coordinators as well as external co-packing providers and creative design companies. Lead trainer of SAP (logistic database). Compiled internal monthly product reviews and external briefings concerning SAP training and creative brand initiatives.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

- 09/2009- 08/2010 Doctoral research on belonging in everyday life informing discourses on citizenship, participation and integration in

Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Research funded in part by Research Assistantship from UWO.

- 2011 Investigation into the library of Ivey case studies to determine the potential for a Business Anthropology Casebook, Ivey School of Business, The University of Western Ontario
- 2011 Radar Survey, Uncle Tom's Cabin, The University of Western Ontario, August 3rd.
- 04/2005-06/2005 M.A. research on the influence of media on the availability of educational programs with Scottish Gypsy Travellers, Edinburgh, United Kingdom.

PUBLICATIONS (all single-authored)

Long, Jennifer. 2011. "The Four Field Approach: best kept at the undergraduate level?" *Anthropology News*. Canada (ed.) Section News, National Association of Student Anthropologists (NASA). October issue

Long, Jennifer. 2011. "Moving through the City: Walking in the Shoes of an Ethnographer" *Streetnotes* 19(1): 64-88. University Library, University of California, Davis, UC Davis. Available at: <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2546r1rd#page-1>

Long, Jennifer. 2008-2009. "Politically Charged, Politically Correct: Preparing for landmines in fieldwork" *Totem* 17 (56-72). Available at: <http://anthropology.uwo.ca/TOTEM/previousissues.html>

PRESENTATIONS TO PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

- 2011 Shades of Green: articulating 'us' and 'them' through urban green space projects in Rotterdam, Netherlands" Panel: Greening Urban Spaces: articulating traces and continuities. The American Anthropological Association Annual (AAA) Meeting. Montreal, Quebec. Canada. November 16th. (forthcoming)
- 2010 A Complicated Kindness: Insiders and Outsiders in a Dutch Neighbourhood" Panel: Migratory Spaces of Inclusion and Exclusion The American Anthropological Association Annual (AAA) Meeting. New Orleans, LA. November 22nd.
- 2010 *Plein Life: Glimpses into the Everyday of City Spaces. Tales of Two Cities (and other neighbourhood stories)*. Meertens Instituut, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. June 18th.

- 2009 Fostering National Discourses through Monuments in the Netherlands” Context and Meaning VIII: Queens Graduate Art Conference. Kingston, Ontario, Canada. January 17th.
- 2008 “Politically Charged, Politically Correct: Preparing for landmines during fieldwork in the Netherlands”. The Canadian Association of Social and Cultural Anthropologists (CASCA) Annual Conference. Ottawa, ON. May 24th.

PRESENTATIONS

- 2011 Onderzoek in de buurt, lessen geleerd van onderzoek over integratie in Liskwartier en Bergpolder (Research in the Neighborhood, lessons learned from research into integration in Liskwartier and Bergpolder). Community Lecture, Neighbourhood Centre, Rotterdam, the Netherlands. May 25th.
- 2011 Negotiating Identity in Public Spaces in the Netherlands: Re-examining how the Dutch construct national and social identities between and among minority and majority populations. A look backward and forward. Seminar Series. Migration and Ethnic Relations Collaborative Program, The University of Western Ontario. London, Ontario. March 31st.
- 2010 *Graduate Life: the Later Years. How to get through the next four years. Graduate Student Series, Department of Anthropology.* The University of Western Ontario. London, Ontario. October 6th.
- 2009 Negotiating National Identity through Public Spaces in the Netherlands. Department of Anthropology Colloquium, The University of Western Ontario. London, Ontario, February 9th.
- 2008 Negotiating Identity in Public Spaces in the Netherlands: examining how the Dutch construct national and social identities between and among minority and majority populations” Seminar Series for Migration and Ethnic Relations Collaborative Program. The University of Western Ontario. London, Ontario. October 21st.

OTHER CONFERENCE ROLES

- 2011 Conference Volunteer "Taking Stock of a Turbulent Decade and Looking Ahead: Immigration to North America in 2000-2010". Western Centre for Research on Migration and Ethnic Relations, April 28-30, 2011

FUNDING

- | | |
|-----------|---|
| 2007-2011 | PhD funding 4 years at \$20,000 per year |
| 2011 | Social Science Bursary, Office of the Dean, \$500 |

2011	Regna Darnell Graduate Award for Fieldwork, \$660
2010	Western Graduate Thesis Research Award, \$850
2010	Faculty of Graduate Studies Bursary, \$850
2009	Regna Darnell Graduate Award for Fieldwork, \$500
2009	Western Graduate Thesis Research Award, \$500
2008	Regna Darnell Graduate Award for Fieldwork, \$400
2008	Graduate Scholarship in Migration & Ethnic Relations, \$2000

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

2007 – 2011	Certificate in University Teaching and Learning, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario; requirements: Graduate Student Conference on Teaching; Advanced Teaching Program (ATP) Fall 2008; Future Professor Workshop Series (10 sessions) 2008 – 2011; Teaching Mentor Program Spring 2009.
2011	Financials Training, The University of Western Ontario, September 15 th , 2011
2011	Website design, The University of Western Ontario, September 14 th , 2011
2011	Grantsmanship, The University of Western Ontario, December 7 th , 2011

TEACHING

09/2011 – 01/2012	Special Topics Course: The Anthropology of Business. ANTH 2282F/001 Enrolment: 17. *Evaluations available in 2012*
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ACADEMIC SERVICE

01/2008 – 04/2011	Assistant Editor for <i>Totem</i> , Anthropology Student Journal, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario
09/2010 – 09/2011	Co-founder and Co-president of the Western Anthropology Graduate Society (WAGS) The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
09/2008 – 09/2009	Anthropology Department PhD Representative, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario.
09/2007 – 09/2008	Society for Graduate Students Anthropology Representative, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

American Anthropology Association (AAA)
 Canadian Association of Social and Cultural Anthropologists (CA-SCA)
 Society for the Anthropology of Europe (SAE)

LANGUAGES

English (native language)

French (intermediate proficiency)

Dutch (intermediate proficiency)