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The Question of Opium: Money, Morality and Japan's Transimperial Participation in Opium Regulation, 1868 – 1925

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Abstract: ‘The Opium Question’ was not a question, but rather it framed the issue of the under-regulated production, trade and consumption of opium in Asia throughout the nineteenth century. How did opium contribute to Japan’s imperial expansion? Furthermore, how did Japan learn from other imperial powers and use non-state epistemic knowledge to learn to expand its empire? Historians of drugs often use the term prohibition in relation to illicit drugs, when I argue that we should be discussing their regulation. Meiji Japan was faced with the issue of Chinese imperial subjects who were also dependent on opium. As part of the transimperial discourse on ‘The Opium Question’, Japan learned from other imperial powers like China, the United States and Britain, and learned from other powers how to modernize and expand its empire into the twentieth century.

Keywords: Japan, opium, transimperial, Historic East Asia, imperialism, international organizations, moral reform, medical missionary, United States, Britain, China, transnational information exchange, epistemic information exchange

Summary for Lay Audience: ‘The Opium Question’ was a way for nations to address the problem of opium and its use around the world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Much like ‘the opioid crisis’ today, ‘The Opium Question’ was meant to provide a reference for those nations and groups who were discussing the problem. Japan followed both sides of the debate, and in their home islands of Japan proper, they did not allow any recreational use of the drug. As it conquered imperial territories however, they found that many new Chinese subjects were using opium recreationally. The Japanese imperial government did not know how to regulate opium in a way that would not cause tens of thousands on people in their territories of Formosa (Taiwan), the Kwantung Leased Territory in China and imperial Korea from being denied opium and entering sudden withdrawal. Drawing on the experiences of other imperial states like Britain, China and the United States, Japan participated in international conferences of experts who gathered to discuss ‘The Opium Question’ and work to resolve the issue of the drug.

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This thesis is dedicated to all of the people past and present who struggle with substance use, and who have lost their struggle. We remember you.

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Introduction

Why are some drugs illegal, while other substances that alter our body and brain chemistry, and have intoxicating effects legal? My motivation to research and write on the history of international drug regulation comes partly from a desire to find out more about a subject that still makes headlines today, and also for me to try to understand why we draw imaginary lines around some substances and not others. We often see the question of legality as the primary factor when discussing drugs. I work with populations who have or have had substance use disorder (also known by its older term addiction). As I work within a harm reduction setting, where we do not stigmatize people who use substances, and we definitely do not judge them, what led us to making the world of drugs one focused on legal and moral questions when we have other ways of approaching this complex issue? I am hoping that my thesis will help readers understand that there is more to illegal drugs than the law, and that the question of regulation is a very complex one that has been discussed for nearly two centuries in the modern era.

Historically, the drug opium is often linked to China, even though it was used, traded, regulated and prohibited globally by the early twentieth century. China's connection to the drug came about because during the nineteenth century the British Empire, represented at first by the British East India Company (or the Company) and later by the British colonial government in India, promoted the growth of the opium poppy *Papaver somniferum* throughout India for export mainly to China. The intent of this promotion was to produce opium to be sold at auction to private merchants. The resulting cycle of production and sale of opium to those merchants, who then smuggled the drug into neighbouring China and elsewhere, caused a dramatic disruption in what international relations specialists call Historic East Asia.

As a theoretical framework, Historic East Asia was a unipolar hierarchy of transnational entanglements, as opposed to the Western framework, which was sovereignty-based, according to more recent international relations theorists.[1] The focus of my thesis will not be the Western-centric modern system, dubbed the "Westphalian system," it was "a set of recognizably modern European states," or in other words, this system was the structure of modern Europe according to modern international relations specialists.[2] The Westphalian system of modern Europe differed from the Historic East Asian framework, because the Historic East Asian system was more stable than Western hegemonic states. Westphalian states were relatively short lived compared to the top Asian hegemon, China. Therefore, the Historic East Asian interstate relational framework was much different and resulted in two millennia of Chinese hegemony.[3]

The hegemonic model of Historic East Asia is not adequately studied by historians of international relations and theoretical frameworks like power-transition theory and realist theories that focus on balances of power, to name just two theoretical models, rely too often on European models.[4] The topic of modernization, Japan's technological and general modernization in the 1930s and 1940s "had very little to do with westernization."[5] Japan broke its isolation, and entered into the world-system in 1853 with the arrival of American Commodore Matthew Perry, whose arrival had been forewarned in a required Dutch report, known as a *Fūsetsusho*, so

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[1] David C. Kang, "International Relations Theory and East Asian History: An Overview," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, (Vol. 13, Issue 2, 2013): 183-184. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-east-asian-studies/article/international-relations-theory-and-east-asian-history-an-overview/A64F6FCFA2DE64757046F21EABE22762. Accessed March 13, 2024.

[2] Andrew J. Coe and Scott Wolford, "East Asian History and International Relations," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events That Shaped the Modern International Order*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020, online edition): 263. DOI: 10.1017/9781108807401, Accessed May 29, 2023.

[3] Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang, "Introduction," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events That Shaped the Modern International Order*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020, online edition): 9. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108807401, Accessed May 29, 2023.

[4] Haggard and Kang, "Introduction," in *East Asia in the World*, 3-4.

[5] Fosco Mariani, "Japan, the essential modernizer," in *Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History*, Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (Eds.), (London UK and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988): 47.

the pre-Meiji Bakufu government was aware of his impending arrival.[6] Even before that time, some Japanese scholars had interacted with Europeans, mainly Dutch merchants, and had adopted aspects of Dutch culture and learning. The most obvious difference between the structures of Historic East Asia and the Westphalian System was the fact that in the East, the hegemonic system had one dominant member for close to two thousand years, which was China. The Westphalian system was multipolar or bipolar, with more equally sized state units, unlike Historic East Asia's hierarchical structure.[7]

Japan in the Historic East Asia period was affiliated with China from either the Qin/Han dynasties between 221 BCE and 220 CE, or possibly from the Sui-Tang dynasty between 589 and 907 CE.[8] It is incorrect to say that Japan was directly subject to China as a tributary relationship that was accepted within a "closed system" that was institutionalized, with social roles of the member states were accepted and invested by the hegemon on both land and at sea.[9] Japan was an exception within this system, as its membership began possibly as early as centuries B.C.E. and pre-dating the Historic East Asian system, though after 1548 and the transition in China from the Ming to the Qing dynasty, Japan's participation as tributary state came to an end.[10] Because the Japanese did not accept the legitimacy of the Qing as the ruling power, they repeatedly rebuked any diplomatic overtures from China. This made Japan unique in its severance of relations with China compared to nations like Vietnam or Korea, whose tributary relationships had been severed by China as a diplomatic move to cooperate with France

[6] Alistair D. Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration: Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009): 25-26.
[7] Haggard and Kang, "Introduction," in *East Asia in the World*, 8.
[8] Haggard and Kang, "Introduction," in *East Asia in the World*, 8.
[9] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History and International Relations," 265-266.
[10] Nguyen Thi My Hanh, "Japanese Tributary Activity to China and Regional Connections," *East Asia*, (Springer Nature, Issue 40, 2023): 379. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09410-y. Accessed June 4, 2024.

and Japan as concessions concluding the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.[11] This was the historic system that was challenged by the Western imperialists, which for China has been generally accepted by historians as the two Opium Wars of 1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860.[12]

This thesis will examine many layers of overlapping history, both at the nation-state, trans-imperial and transnational levels. The subject of it is opium and its circulation around Asia and later more globally through complex processes and networks. Circulation can mean more than just movement of an item or idea, and things like commodities, and even ideas "often have to be changed to be moved, or they change because they move."[13] Opium on its own was not the desired end product, and those entities collecting, processing, transporting and ultimately selling opium were interested in its conversion into money.

As it expanded into Asia as an imperial power, Japan learned that controlling the production and sale of opium and products made from it were profitable when a monopoly was in place run by the ruling government. Notably, the framework of state-monopoly set up by the East India Company would be copied by both Asian and Western nations within a continuum of opium regulation as the volume and trade of the drug increased. I will argue that calling the regulation of opium and other drugs 'prohibition' is wrong, and that nations both in the East and West used or considered the state-monopoly model at some point, which was the dominant model to opium regulation within the continuum.

At other points in time, states utilized state-monopolies, outright prohibition and other elements of the continuum simultaneously into the twentieth century. Alongside official

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[11] Hanh, "Japanese Tributary Activity," 378-379.
[12] Haggard and Kang, "Introduction," in *East Asia in the World*, 8.; see also Hunt Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1999): Chapter 10: Legacies of the Opium Trade, 185-194 and *passim*.; Julia Lovell, *The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China*, (Basingstoke and Oxford, UK: Picador, 2011): Chapter 1: Opium and China provides an analysis of the danger that British companies posed to China before the First Opium War, 17-38.
[13] Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 62.

channels of regulation and economic control, moral reformers also worked to restrict and even stop the trade and use of opium. In Western countries, reform groups' discourse was dominated by Christian morality, while alternately in Asia, anti-opium groups from China and Japan for example were motivated by nationalism. Despite international commissions and a League of Nations convention, Meiji and later Imperial Japan would be an active participant in discussions of regulation on one side while also maintaining profitable monopolies in its colonies and enforcing prohibition in the Japanese Home Islands on the other. Compared to other nations that took either a legal approach through prohibition, or a medical approach through treatment and regulation, Japan engaged in both, resulting in its unique development as a nation in modern East Asia.

Historic East Asia and the West

Although the Historic East Asian hegemonic system was overall more stable, there were at times challenges to China's position as hegemon historically, and Kenneth Swope argues that the nations neighbouring China and who might have participated in the tribute system "were well aware of the possibilities and the limitations inherent in the tributary order."[14] In the sixteenth century, the Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi had unified the Japanese islands in 1590, and then sought to ally himself with the Korean Chosŏn dynasty to overthrow the Chinese emperor.[15] When the Koreans refused to support, Hideyoshi invaded Korea with around 150,000 troops and made quick advances through the island.[16] Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Ming emperor Wanli had been working on a Chinese military buildup, and the resulting war was fought on

[14] Kenneth M. Swope, "Ming Grand Strategy during the Great East Asian War, 1592-1598," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events that Shaped the Modern International Order*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020: 115. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108807401. Accessed May 29, 2023.
[15] Swope, "Ming Grand Strategy," 108-109.
[16] Swope, "Ming Grand Strategy," 109.

Korean soil between 1592 and 1597, and involved over 300,000 combatants.[17] Known in Korea as the Imjin War, it is also known as the Campaigns of 1592 and 1597 in Japan, or as the First Great Eastern War.[18] Although what motivated Hideyoshi to this invasion of mainland Asia is debated, from megalomania to the desire to reform the Asian economic and trade structures, the point is that Historic East Asia, while more stable at times than the Westphalian nations, still had its wars and conflicts over power.[19]

Prior to the nineteenth century traders from European states like Portugal, arrived in Asia and found "a flourishing world-economy" and therefore the Western traders simply began participating in that pre-existing economy.[20] The presence of European traders in Asia between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries constituted a connection of world-economies that brought desired commodities to Europe and silver coin to Asia. These connections were mostly maritime, however some countries like Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal had some success establishing colonial settlements in Asia on land.[21] These private merchants, representing their home countries, became a first point of contact between the East and West in any significant way. The merchants represented both a public and private "corporate personality" and was one instance of an alternative to the early modern absolutist nation-state.[22] The "division between *public* and *private* was blurred or entirely lacking" when it came to early modern company-

[17] Swope, "Ming Grand Strategy," 109.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011): 331. URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb31242.0001.001, Accessed April 27, 2023.
[21] Wallerstein, *The Modern World System I*, 330.
[22] Philip J. Stern, *The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in Inda,* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011): 9. DOI: https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195393736.002.0003. Accessed December 21, 2023.

states.[23] Therefore, these companies were the vanguard of so many European empires, and company-states were also uniquely European creations.[24] Therefore, where Europeans saw the opportunity for increased profit, the Asian nations saw new customers, purchasing products that would have been purchased by someone, regardless of where the buyers came from.

The place of Japan within this system, as having left the Chinese tributary system and resistant to contact with the West, was until the nineteenth century an outwardly isolationist nation. From the seventeenth century to the nineteenth, Japan under the feudal Bakufu government system practiced *sakoku*, or national isolation.[25] How then did Japan enter the world-system and become not just an active member, but in a relatively short amount of time, an imperial power? There were three possible roots of modern Japanese nationalism. There was a renewed religious devotion to the Emperor. Secondly, there was the idea that Japan's destiny was a heaven ordained mission, and thirdly the Japanese nation possessed a unique virtue, sourced from the familial connection of every Japanese person, as a "natural goodness."[26] Based in the Shinto religion, this natural goodness was called *kiyoki kokoro*, or "cleanliness of heart." Japanese morality after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was grounded in the idea that purity of self and of mind were the keys to morality, and not actions.[27] Therefore, Meiji Japanese morality was intent, even if others found the actions done from that intent to be wrong, evil or otherwise undesirable. This concept is similar to the idea of American exceptionalism and manifest

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[23] Andrew Phillips and J.C. Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire: How Company-States Made the Modern World*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020): 3. DOI: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780691206202/html. Accessed December 19, 2023.
[24] Phillips and Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire*, 4.
[25] Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, "Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty. China's Lessons for Bakumatsu Japan," *Monumenta Nipponica*, (Vol. 47, Issue 1, Spring 1992): 1. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2385356. Accessed December 9, 2023.
[26] Richard Storry, *The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1957, 1973): 3-4.
[27] Storry, *The Double Patriots*, 4.

destiny, whereby American's intent was liberty and freedom, even if the actions they took to achieve the intents were violent or considered evil by the people being acted on.

Although the structure of government and the nation of Japan were fundamentally changed in 1868, historians of Japan place the origins of the thought and culture that nurtured this change in the 1830s, and sometimes back further to the end of the eighteenth century.[28] Adopting and adapting learning, religion, political structures, and even the concept of "civilized" versus "barbarian" peoples was an integral part of Japan's development within Historic East Asia. From the late sixteenth century, it was not a direct participant in the tributary system, though its primary cultural exemplar was still often China.[29] In the late eighteenth century Japan was experiencing internal economic challenges, which led to Japanese scholars looking to Western learning to re-ignite its stagnant economy. An early Japanese political economist Honda Toshiaki argued in an essay in 1798 that Japan needed four things to help boost its economy: the manufacture of explosives for military and civil purposes, the development of mining as an export commodity, a Japanese merchant marine to market Japanese products abroad and supply Japan with goods, and finally he proposed an end to Japanese isolationism in favour of colonial expansion.[30] It would take Japan sixty years to finally open itself up to global trade when it opened formal diplomatic and trade relations with the United States in 1858.

Ten years later, in 1868, an alliance led by two prominent Japanese feudal samurai families, the Satsuma and Chōshū clans, overthrew the ruling Tokugawa Shōgunate with the

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[28] H.D. Harootunian, "Late Tokugawa culture and thought," in Marius B. Jansen (Ed.) *The Emergence of Meiji Japan*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 53-54. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174428.003. Accessed May 29, 2023.
[29] John L. Hennessey, *Rule by Association: Japan in the Global Trans-Imperial Culture, 1868-1912*, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden, 2018): 55. URL: https://lnu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1182986/FULLTEXT01.pdf. Accessed March 13, 2024.
[30] Harootunian, "Late Tokugawa culture and thought," 117-118.

intention of restoring the Emperor Meiji, a restoration of *ōsei fukko*, or "ancient kingly rule."[31] Historians of Japan have described the Meiji Restoration in different ways according to their own analytical frameworks. Some have described the Restoration as "a workable synthesis of new and old, East and West", though it has also been described as "the forced march to modernization," by which is meant Westernization.[32]

The Meiji Restoration was not a complete overhaul, or a transition to modernity, and it was more of a Japanese style adaptation. This adaptation was "a readiness to try new methods and push ahead with them boldly, coupled with a tenacious adherence to traditional ideals and virtues."[33] The Meiji Restoration was also "a programme of political, social and economic modernisation – or "Westernisation", where the West was emulated in the new national structure."[34] It was in the end "an energetic, though selective, adoption of foreign modes and practices."[35] For Japan, its political restoration of the Meiji emperor, and the end of its isolation were done with more agency and self-determination compared to China and its forced entry into the world-system due to war and imposed, unfair treaties. Japan was making a conscious decision to enter the transimperial sphere as it developed as a nation-state, interacting economically, diplomatically and culturally with other nations, both in Asia and further abroad.

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[31] Robert Hellyer and Harald Fuess, "Introduction," in Robert Hellyer and Harald Fuess (Eds.) *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 1. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/meiji-restoration/0148474A073A6988AD4D6E4C15323AD8. Accessed May 29, 2023.
[32] Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*, Wm. Theodore de Bary (Ed.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958): 639-640. URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb06049.0001.001. Accessed November 30, 2023.
[33] Tsunoda, De Bary, and Keene, *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*, 640.
[34] Richard Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia 1894-1943*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979): 15.
[35] Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West*, 15.

This allowed for the rapid imperialization that made it part of the transimperial group dominated by Western nation-states.[36]

More recently, revision of the traditional views on the Meiji Restoration have re-examined both its impact on Japanese politics and on its place in the world. The historian Alistair D. Swayle argues that his interpretation of the Meiji Restoration is not conventional, as he saw it as a very localized *coup d'état* that was neither democratizing nor liberalizing, and set Japan on an uncertain trajectory.[37] The uncertainty of Japan's future was supported by the historian Kazuhiro Takii, who argued that while a legislative assembly of sorts was established quite quickly in Meiji Japan in January 1869, the *Kōshigo* was set up mainly to make laws for the new political system rather than serve as a full-fledged parliament.[38] The process was not easy for the Meiji government, with political crises in 1873 and 1881 that delayed the passage of a founding set of laws. The constitution and supporting laws to flesh out the Japanese polity, along with supporting ministries, institutions and systems known collectively as called *kuni no katachi* (shape of the nation). It was finally passed in 1881 with the goal being a constitutional monarchy led by a legislative assembly, and the constitution was finally established in February 1889.[39]

Where Takii differs from Swayle is in relation to the impact that the Meiji Restoration had on Japan, with Swayle's argument that the Restoration was conservative and did not bring

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[36] Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnosuke Takahashi, "Introduction: Framing Japan's Historiography into the Transnational Approach," in Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnosuke Takahashi (Eds.) *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016): 8.
[37] Swayle. *The Meiji Restoration,* 8.
[38] Takii Kazuhiro, "The Meiji Restoration as a Constitutional Revolution," in Masayuki Yamauchi and Yuichi Hosoya (Eds.), Keith Krulak (Trans.), *Modern Japan's Place in World History: From Meiji to Reiwa*, (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd., 2019 (Japanese Edition), 2023 (English Edition): 3. URL: https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-19-9593-4. Accessed May 29, 2023.
[39] Takii, "The Meiji Restoration as a Constitutional Revolution," 7-8.

Western style democracy or radical reorganization of the Japanese polity.[40] Takii argues that the restructuring amounted to "a constitutional revolution" that spanned twenty years to its final conclusion.[41] While the specific mechanics and results of the Meiji Restoration are debatable, the impact of the ending of the Tokugawa Shōgunate and the structural changes made within Meiji Japan were instrumental in its entry into the world-system. Japan's ability to negotiate its own entry into the world from its centuries of isolation, and its rapid militarization and industrialization were aided by its adoption of a modern Western form of constitution and political system.

Morals and Morality: 'The Opium Question'

The focus of this thesis is Japan, and how it managed opium, its sale and use as it developed from an isolated island into an empire within the global world-system and participated in transnational meetings and sharing ideas. I will study Japan as a transnational nation-state, as it interacted with and then became an active member in the opium trade. Another theme in this thesis is morality, and I will ask what power did it hold within the opium issue? How did nations grapple with its morality in the face of people's dependence on the drug and the tempting revenue that could be made through taxes, tariffs and government monopolies? The historian Carl Trocki argued in 1990 that "Asian historians of every ideological persuasion, even the Marxists, have failed to approach the opium question seriously."[42] His model in looking at the British colony of Singapore was to look not just at the production and import statistics, but rather how opium functioned in the social, economic and cultural life of the colony. Often, historians of drugs and drug control systems use the term prohibition in the same context as regulation,

[40] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 9.
[41] Takii, "The Meiji Restoration as a Constitutional Revolution," 9.
[42] Carl A. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990): 6. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501746352/html. Accessed June 6, 2023.

which is an error. Prohibition has a place within the regulatory framework of drugs; however, I will argue that regulations were a continuum, with prohibition at one of the far ends of the regulatory continuum, and when it was in place, negated nearly all other regulatory measures.

As an investigative framework, the term prohibition is used by historians of drugs when regulation would be more appropriate. Part of my argument is that prohibition is not a catch-all, and that often when a scholar invokes prohibition, they should rather use the term regulation and define what regulatory measures were being applied in a certain historical context. This approach is more complex, but results in a more granulated structure of analysis of the global study of drugs in general, and opium more specifically. David Bello argues that in the early nineteenth century prohibition of opium in both Qing China and British occupied India failed not because of a Chinese lack of modernization or Westernization, but that both places lacked strong central administrative structures and were unable to adequately enforce prohibition laws and policies.[43] Therefore, prohibition was not a viable subject of study, and Bello further argues that even by 1890, it was effectively impossible to enforce opium prohibitions in colonial India.[44]

A clue to why the word prohibition has often been used appears in the historian Ian Tyrrell's argument that in the 1920s, the American moral reformers attempted to export the idea of prohibition of not just alcohol, the most commonly associated substance with prohibition, but also narcotics and other drugs, on a global scale.[45] It is therefore not surprising that prohibition has become a part of the history of drugs lexicon, even if the historical context was more complex than simply making a substance illegal and leaving it at that.

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[43] David Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire: Drug Prohibition in the Chinese Interior, 1729-1850*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005): 59.
[44] Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire*, 59-60.
[45] Ian Tyrrell, *Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral Empire,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010): 230. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781400836635/html. Accessed September 7, 2023.

The ethical context of the nations involved in the first commissions on opium regulation was varied, often by nation-state. American and British medical missionaries were more religiously informed concerning opium use, whereas China and Japan were more nationalistic and secular in their anti-opium stance. Although the physical, imperial imprint of the United States as an empire in Asia was limited compared to the British, especially in India, Tyrrell argues that a major part of the American empire of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was neither economic nor territorial, and rather was a "cultural hegemony" promulgated by a group he collectively calls "moral reformers."[46] He defines cultural hegemony as "the exercise of power under a shared moral and political order in which that power is the subject of multilateral contestation among nations and classes."[47]

Tyrell shows how especially from the 1880s to around 1900 evangelical movements toured the United States with the intent of finding volunteers to evangelize globally, their final goal being "to carve their own distinctive contribution and press new patterns upon transnational missionary activity in the wider colonial world.[48] The historian Diana Kim adds political and economic elements in her analysis of the impact of the British opium trade on China and reformer activity. She demonstrates how British anti-opium reformers, which would fall into Tyrell's category of moral reformers, compared the opium trade "to the trans-Atlantic slave trade in terms of its immorality and toll on human lives."[49]

Although the moral connection between the United States and Britain went back to the beginning of the nineteenth century concerning their work and influence in Asia, the impact they

[46] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World, 3*.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 50-51.
[49] Diana Kim, *Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition across Southeast Asia*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2020): 65. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780691199696/html. Accessed June 6, 2023.

had in their home countries was different, as we will explore in Chapter 2. Anne L. Foster goes beyond the simply Christianizing goal of American missionaries, arguing that American missionaries were also involved in Americanizing Asian populations along with their conversion efforts.[50] She shows how the French colonial authorities in French Indo-China (modern day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) believed that American missionaries were working to spread American values throughout Asia by converting individual locals and sending them to the United States for religious education, to the point where Vietnamese people exposed to evangelizing were "linking the missionary message to American political values."[51] While the American missions worked closely with British missionary anti-opium groups, the political motivations of American evangelists fell under suspicion as their activities and presence increased through the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries.

Without a history of religious moralizing in Historic East Asia, anti-opium groups in China and Japan were much more secular and often motivated by nationalism rather than religion. In China, the earliest modern reactions to recreational opium use was a law proclaiming prohibition in the Qing Empire. In 1729, the regional military commander Su Mingliang, stationed in Guangdong province, China, reported on the high level of opium smuggling in that southwest province, and recommended that the imperial government prohibit the trafficking rather than the recreational consumption of opium.[52] Although the widespread smuggling of opium into China and the two Opium Wars fought between China, Britian and France, resulted in unequal treaties at the expense of Chinese autonomy and hegemony, the need to restrict smuggling into China was a new concept even in the eighteenth century. Coe and

[50] Anne L. Foster, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010): 77.
[51] Foster, *Projections of Power*, 77-78.
[52] Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire*, *116*.

Wolford argue that external threats and challenges to China's hegemonic power were almost unknown in Historic East Asia, especially compared to Europe, where challenges to sovereignty were constant commonplace occurrences.[53] Throughout the nineteenth century, anti-opium sentiment was mainly expressed through prohibition laws, which were seldom obeyed or enforced. David Bello notes that the prohibition statutes of 1813 took the step of prohibiting the smoking of opium, along with stricter and geographically expanded statutes, and Bello argues that the Qing state also hoped that it could appeal to the morals of the Europeans smuggling the drug into China.[54] The smugglers were neither sympathetic nor obedient to either the appeal or the statute.

Organized anti-opium reformers from within China would not emerge until the late nineteenth century, at which point China as the Historic East Asian hegemon had essentially been dismantled. David Kang argues that despite older realist arguments that larger, more powerful states often exploit less powerful states, he argues that hierarchical inter-state relations were often successful because the states respected each others positions and power within the hierarchy, and the more powerful state, in this case China, did not always exploit smaller states.[55] The situation by the early twentieth century was that Britian, by producing and selling opium for export from India to China, was exploiting China in a capitalist and materialist fashion that was rather unusual within the Historic East Asian model. It therefore must have taken China as a society time to catch up to this and organize anti-opium reform groups along national lines.

Even in China, where many millions of people were suffering with opium dependence, the lure of profit was strong. In the late nineteenth century, "the profit motive [in

[53] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History and International Relations," 267.
[54] Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire*, 121.
[55] Kang, "International Relations Theory and East Asian History," 187-188.

China]…dwarfed any movement toward opium reform" when the Qing government moved to replace the internal *likin* tax with one more integrated, which would have undermined the underground opium trade in China in the 1890s.[56] By 1906, we see the formation of The Fujian Anti-Opium Society in that province. The society was therefore in place when the Chinese imperial government issued yet another edict prohibiting opium, though this time the imperial court had a timeline and plan to suppress and slowly phase out opium use in China.[57] This edict, unlike previous prohibition laws going back to 1729, would be more successful due to a growing class of young, nationally minded bureaucrats like Tang Shaoyi, who was not only a rising star in the Qing diplomatic corps, but had also given up using opium around 1900 as a form of nationalistic pride.[58] Driving this nationalism was the growing belief after 1895 that opium represented attempted "racial extinction" or *miezhong* by imperialist white people who were creating "selfish addicts [in China] who lacked the will to stand up for their country."[59] For China, 'The Opium Question' was a case of nationalism rather than religion or morality.

In Japan, anti-opium reformers also approached the issue with a racial theory, however their racial theory involved a now debunked Western theoretical framework: social Darwinism. The Chinese diplomat Tang was justified in fearing for the national survival of China, and the historian Miriam Kingsberg argues that the first crisis of Japanese political legitimacy was

[56] William O. Walker III, *Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954*, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991): 12.
[57] Joyce A. Madancy, "Poppies, Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Nationalism and State Leadership in the Anti-Opium Crusade in Fujian, 1906-1916," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Eds.), *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000): 230-231.
[58] Steffen Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow: From Asian Revolt to Global Drug Control*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018): 192. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.4159/9780674916227/html. Accessed August 1, 2023.
[59] Frank Dikötter, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun. *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004): 94-95.

Japan's victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.[60] She further argues that Japan, as a nation in touch with Western learning, used universal Social Darwinist language to label the Chinese as racially inferior due to their widespread dependence on opium, which in turn boosted Japan's own nationalistic policies.[61] These so-called "moral entrepreneurs" became involved in bringing a "civilized" approach to Japan's newly acquired colonial possession of Formosa (modern Taiwan), which was populated by hundreds of thousands of opium dependant Chinese subjects.[62] Japan's success in keeping recreational use of opium in its Home Islands strictly controlled meant that it did not know how to deal with acquiring so many new colonial subjects who were also recreational and dependent users of opium.

Japan in general, and the Meiji Government specifically, adopted only certain strands of Western learning, including Social Darwinism. These particularist strands were "not Western culture *per se*…but the particular Western culture of the mid and late nineteenth century."[63] The most influential Western scholar in late nineteenth century Japanese intellectual circles was Herbert Spencer, whose theories helped form Meiji Japanese educational, historical, economic and social thinking and policy in universities and government, and invoked the idea of survival of the fittest in human terms.[64] Spencerian Social Darwinism, and the idea of Japanese racial superiority over the Chinese nation of opium addicts became policy and entered Japanese culture, especially after 1895 when Japan expanded its empire beyond the island of Hokkaido to include formerly Chinese territories and Chinese colonial subjects.

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[60] Miriam Kingsberg, *Moral Nation: Modern Japan and Narcotics in Global History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013): 3.
[61] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 3.
[62] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 4.
[63] Julia Adeney Thomas, "Naturalizing Nationhood: Ideology and Practice in Early Twentieth-Century Japan," in Sharon A. Minichiello (Ed.), *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998): 116-117. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780824863159/html. Accessed April 19, 2023.
[64] Julia Adeney Thomas, "Naturalizing Nationhood," 117.

'The Opium Question', a term used from the time of the First Opium War in 1839 to well into the twentieth century, presented different answers for different nation states, and for different trans-national groups concerned with the issue of opium. The West was more religiously informed, and by the 1920s American reformers were entangled with both local alcohol temperance and prohibition advocates, and were also exporting those American anti-alcohol and anti-narcotic values abroad.[65] In Asia, the anti-opium movements in China and Japan were almost entirely secular, and were nationalist movements in nature. China's Opium Question was one of resisting Western, white imperial entanglements and oppression by the twentieth century, and for Japan the Question was one of racial superiority and emulating those Western imperialists who wished to subjugate China. Japan's goal was similar to the West, but their motivations were different.

These varying motivations inform what I argue is the Opium Regulation Continuum. Often, historians of drugs and drug policy speak simply of prohibition, which is wrong. Prohibition is the final step in the continuum, and it is usually a legal remedy to 'The Opium Question', and it results in increased smuggling, puts stresses on legal systems and criminalizes substance use rather than treats it medically or socially.[66]

The legal approach of prohibition has been the dominant discourse of drug regulation for at least two centuries, but it really became a global and transnational discourse after the first International Opium Convention meeting in Shanghai, China in 1909. This thesis will help contribute to transimperial studies, which Paul Kramer argues was understudied in the early

[65]Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 230-231.
[66] Mike Jay, Maziyar Ghiabi, Xun Zhou and Elizabeth K. Gray, "Head to Head: Has a War on Drugs Ever Been Won?" in *History Today*, (September 2022, Vol. 72, Issue 9): 8-10. Jay and Zhou discuss more specifically the effects of 'prohibition' in Asia and Britain, while Ghiabi discusses the Arab and South American contexts, and Gray the American.

twenty-first century in the context of U.S. colonialism. He argues that "study of U.S. colonialism draws upon theoretical insights developed in the critical study of other empires [and that] the field has not yet explored the interconnections between empires."[67] There has been increased study of modern inter-imperial connections, though there is always more to be done, as is evident in my study of the transnational commissions and conventions examined in this thesis.

While prohibition was the dominant discourse, many core and imperial nations continued to operate semi-controlled state-monopolies whereby the governing state, many times an imperial power like Japan, Britain and the United States, controlled the supply and distribution of opium in a commercial monopolist capacity, and collected large profits from those monopolies. The Meiji government made the connection between the abundant supply and low price of foreign opium and that it could be exploited for great profit by an imperial, state monopolist as early as the 1870s.[68] Because the International Opium Commission was not empowered to create policy in the form of a Convention, the final recommendations were not binding, leaving the Japanese colonial authorities to continue collecting opium revenues while still attempting to regulate the trade in its colonies after 1909.

Alongside the legal and regulatory approaches of the regulation continuum, transnational groups like medical missionaries also engaged in medical approaches to opium dependence. In Japan, the Bakufu regime, which preceded the Meiji, "combined over time 'Japanese medicine' and 'Chinese medicine', with their Buddhist and Taoist connotations. They integrated therapeutic, magical and divination practices into their medical approaches."[69] There was a

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[67] Paul Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *The Journal of American History*, (Vol. 88, Issue 4, March 2002): 1317. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2700600. Accessed April 29, 2024.
[68] Bob Tadashi Wakabaiashi, "Opium in Late-Edo to Meiji Eyes," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Eds.), *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): 67.
[69] Éric Seizelet, "Corps impéreial, corps souffrant au Japon," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaire*, (January-March, 2019, T. 66e, No. 1) : 29. Translated from French by the author.

movement by the new Meiji government to take the traditional Sino-Japanese medical system and Westernize it, though Seizelet also argues that there was some debate as to whether Western medicine should become the medicine of the emperor in the palace.[70] Like its rapid entry into the transnational sphere and industrialization, Japan was also faced with the question of modernizing its medical system.

China had been both an influence on Japan with its own ancient medical system, and Chinese doctors had been receiving training from medical missions at missionary hospitals since the conclusion of the Second Opium War in 1860, allowing an expansion of missionary hospitals deeper into China under the Treaty of Tientsin.[71] As the Western medicine hospitals expanded into China, so too did the education of indigenous Chinese, aided by translations into the Chinese language of key Western medical texts that had begun even earlier in the 1840s.[72] While it is not surprising that Japan embraced Western medicine in its modernization process that also included Western science, industrialization and military development, the fact that Western medicine was also being taken up in China is a little more surprising. Western medicine would inform much of Japan's work on 'The Opium Question' as it concerned breaking the dependence of its newly-acquired Chinese subjects.

The medical question of opium, although not part of the continuum, always ran alongside it, even into the twenty-first century. The legacy of the International Opium Commission and later Conventions is legal, and I propose a model for the continuum that includes the elements of taxation, state-monopolies and policies of gradual reduction in opium smokers. In the below

[70] Seizelet, "Corps impérial," 29.
[71] Youheng Zhang, "Exploring 19th-century Medical Mission in China: Forging Modern Roots of Chinese Medicine," *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies*, (Vol. 79, Issue 1, January 1 2023): 2. DOI: https://doi.org/10.4102/hts.v79i1.8784. Accessed December 17, 2023.
[72] Zhang, "Exploring 19th-cuentry Medical Missions," 2-3; 4-5.

graphic, the left side represents more lenient or non-existent opium regulation policies, and I believe this helps show that until a state reached full and aggressive prohibition, that parts of the continuum could and were used simultaneously.



Figure Int.1 - Regulation can take many forms before reaching the point of full prohibition.

The issue was not prohibition, which many historians of drugs use too frequently to discuss regulation, and I argue that regulation is a much more appropriate term. In the article "Has a War on Drugs Ever been Won?" the historian of drugs Mike Jay quotes The Iron Law of Prohibition as coined by the activist Richard Cowen in 1986 that encapsulates The Opium Question succinctly, that "The harder the enforcement, the harder the drugs."[73]

How did nation-states grapple with the transnational and international nature of regulating narcotics? To answer this, I will subject The Opium Question to transnational analysis. By analysing Japan in a transnational approach, "we can study how interdependencies and interconnections unfolded within, against or beyond the roadblocks and incentives that derived from nationally produced orders."[74] What this means is that we can see how Japan, as it was opened up to the wider world from its isolation, learned, adapted, grew and interacted within a wider space beyond just the Japanese Home Islands. This learning was part of a transimperial way of learning, which historian Frank Schumacher argues was a way for nations to engage in

[73] Jay et al. "Has a War on Drugs Ever been Won?", 8.
[74] Pierre-Yves Saunier, *Transnational History*, 7.

"transformative processes" through "perceived national shortcomings."[75] This method of learning was important for Japan, which was engaged in rapid modernization from the middle of the nineteenth century.

This learning had begun even before Japan expanded imperially. The Meiji Restoration was a complete change in the Japanese polity, though some resisted it. Bakufu Japan had also resisted migration either out of or into Japan, though in the Meiji Era complex connections began to form through the Japanese colonies to Asia and other parts of the world. Cultural exchanges like Japan's close relationship with Germany was a way to modernize Japanese medicine and expose Germans to new markets and students.[76]

Japan's experience as a transnational state also allowed it to participate on equal footing with Western nation-states as experts within the transnational sphere. Rodogno, Struck and Vogel argue that the transnational sphere can mean many things, such as international organizations, gatherings of experts like conferences, international congresses, publications and specialist journals.[77] Japan rapidly became a leader industrially, militarily and scientifically, and as such was an original delegate at the first International Opium Commission meeting in Shanghai in 1909. Such meetings of experts were a new creation of the transnational sphere, and after the First World War and the creation of the League of Nations, these organizations evolved and became more formalized and institutionalized.[78]

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[75] Frank Schumacher, "Embedded Empire: The United States and Colonialism," *Journal of Modern European History*, (Vol. 14, No. 2, The Imperial Cloud, 2016): 204. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26266236. Accessed June 24, 2024.
[76] Iacobelli et al. "Introduction," in Iacobelli et al. (Eds.), *Transnational Japan as History*, 11.
[77] Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck and Jakob Vogel, "Introduction," in Davide Rodogno et al. (Eds.) *Shaping the Transnational Sphere: Experts, Networks and Issues from the 1840s to the 1930s*, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015): 2. URL: https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=1644347. Accessed April 26, 2024.
[78] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in Davide Rodogno et al. (Eds.) *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 10.

The following chapters will touch all of the points of regulation in Figure 1, beginning in the middle with the state monopolies. Chapter 1 will look at the first opium monopolist, the company-state of the British East India Company. We will see how it succeeded in pivoting the structure of its tea monopoly in Britain to the opium monopoly in Asia beginning in the late eighteenth century. It will also look at the presence of the East India Company in Asia and the historic socio-political structure of that continent.

Chapter 2 will then look to the new and emerging imperial states, the United States of America and Japan, and how they became entangled into the changing structure of East Asia as the historic hegemon China lost its preferred status due to wars and imperialist ambitions led by Britain. Chapter 2 will also examine American morality and the impact that moral reformers made on its imperial expansion and how that morality informed one of the first large-scale studies of The Opium Question in Asia, the Philippine Opium Commission of 1906.

Chapter 3 will look at the role played by anti-opium moral crusaders and advocates, either religiously informed, medically informed, or a combination of the two in the form of medical missionaries. This chapter will also examine the role of Japan as it interacted on the international opium regulation meeting organized by an American religious moral reformer in the form of the International Opium Commission, held in Shanghai in 1909. The Commission, although not binding, was one of the first globally organized meetings to discuss the issue of inter and transnational regulation of harmful drugs.

The Shanghai Commission was what Pierre-Yves Saunier defines as a ""configuration" of individual and collective actors investing time, energy and social, economic or cultural resources in the establishment, maintenance and use of connections.".[79] These transnational

[79] Saunier is quoted in Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in Davide Rodogno et al. (Eds.) *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 6.

meetings over the nineteenth and through the twentieth century resulted in "patterns of interaction and a common discourse that serve as the basis of agreement, disagreement or even misunderstanding around notions, categories, processes or world views," and were important in the development of global communications networks, cooperation and at times disagreement on matters that transcended national borders.[80]

Finally, Chapter 4 will examine the legacy of the Commission in the form of the two International Opium Conventions, held in the Hague in 1912 and Geneva in 1925, and how Japan negotiated these meetings while at the same time being engaged as a state opium monopoly and scientific leader investigating dependence on opium and how to treat it medically. Sadly, there is not a happy ending to this process. The disruption caused by the Great War only led to Japan developing a home-grown industry manufacturing morphine, a semi-synthetic opiate, and an industry manufacturing hypodermic syringes to administer the drug. Despite outwardly showing willingness to regulate and eventually prohibit opium and opiates in its imperial territories, Japan had become addicted itself to the revenue gained by the state-monopoly system. I will conclude by showing how elements of the Regulation Continuum continue today, along with the ancestor of the International Opium Convention, and how my work can help those forming drug policy today can avoid repeating errors of the past.

[80] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in Davide Rodogno et al. (Eds.) *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 6.

Chapter 1 – The Opium Question

In 1914, the Scottish diplomat to China Sir Alexander Hosie published two volumes on his travels through that country. His trip had a special purpose, as he had been sent there by the Indian Colonial government to assess the growth of the opium poppy *Papaver somniferum*, which he declared that "no repressive measures were in force, and the probability was that extensive poppy cultivation was the rule, not the exception" in certain areas of China.[1] Hosie had joined the British consular service to China in 1876, and in that role had travelled throughout the country promoting Britain's interests, especially in terms of trade. It was this specialized knowledge that qualified him as Britain's representative at the International Opium Commission in 1909, and following that, to travel through China's main opium producing regions in 1910 and 1911 to observe the enforcement of regulations limiting the growth of the opium poppy in that country's primary opium producing regions.[2] Hosie was part of a global network of experts who "exchanged information, fields of specialization" and after attending transnational conferences and meetings returned to their home countries they "attempted to put this knowledge and know-how into practice."[3] The International Opium Commission was one of many transnational meetings predating the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 that brought experts together in the spirit of the League, with the end goal of the Commission being to help regulate both national, internal politics and transnational politics through treaties and agreements to regulate the production, transportation and sale of opium and the products derived from it.[4]

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[1] Sir Alexander Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy*, (London: G. Philip & Son, 1914), Vol. I, 42.
[2] "Hosie, Sir Alexander (1853-1925)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online*, W.E. Soothill, revised by K.D. Reynolds. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/34005. Accessed Sept. 29, 2023.
[3] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 2.
[4] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 4.

Opium use became a global issue throughout the nineteenth century. In China in 1906, approximately 16.2 million people smoked opium daily in that country, representing approximately 3.6% of the total population and around 6% of the adult population.[5] How did opium become so ubiquitous, to the extent that nation-states were passing laws regulating the narcotic and its derivatives? Moreover, why was the need of regulation growing beyond the borders of nation-states as well? These questions can be partially answered by what the historian David T. Courtwright calls "the European distribution engine," which was an important determinant of which drugs became globally consumed versus those that did not.[6]

A main engine of the European distribution network into Asia was the English, later British, East India Company (The Company). The Company was focused on trade in Asia, and initially it was not interested in empire-building. Its main competitor, the Dutch *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, or VOC, desired a monopoly of European trade in Asia and pursued this goal aggressively.[7] These companies were extra-national entities, and according to historian Philip J. Stern, were not confined to national boundaries. In the case of The Company it existed "on its own terms, neither tethered to supposedly broader national histories nor as an imitation, extension, or reflection of the national state."[8] Therefore, these early modern corporations acted like political administrations, while also engaging in trade designed to profit both the parent nation-state and the employees and shareholders of the corporations. In the case of The Company, its distance from the centre of power in Britain meant that it needed self-government and internal regulation by necessity and design in order to maintain order, much like the distance

[5] David T. Courtwright, *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World*, (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 33-34.
[6] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 53-54, 56.
[7] Stern, *The Company-State*, 6-7.
[8] Stern, *The Company-State*, 6.

experienced by the early American colonies self-governing in North America was also a necessity.[9]

The resulting corporate-political bodies became points of contact, or connections, between Europe and Asia, leading to increasing entanglements. Called the "company-state", a term coined by Stern, The British East India Company and VOC were European innovations, and were unlike other imperially-minded entities in Asia like the Ottomans or the expansionist Qing Dynasty of China.[10] Contrasting Stern's benign description of the EIC, the philosopher Tony Lynch argues that as The Company's presence increased and became entangled in Indian politics and economy, it became an economic predator in its role as a neoliberal corporation.[11] Lynch's analysis centred on the 1770 famine in Bengal State, India. He argues that the famine was preventable due to both The Company's forced alteration of crop production from foodstuffs to opium, and the Company's bulk purchasing of grain as a way to manipulate prices.[12] Therefore, The Company profited at the expense of approximately ten million Bengalis who died of starvation.[13] The manipulation of supply and demand of products by The Company was also applied shortly thereafter to opium, as it faced economic struggles and the need to balance trade with China.

The balance of trade between China and Britain was skewed in China's favour throughout the eighteenth century, as Britain purchased vast quantities of one psychoactive commodity: tea. Courtwright outlines several determinants of why some psychoactive substances became commodities and others did not. The reasons include the shelf-life of

[9] Stern, *The Company-State*, 10.
[10] On the company-state, see Stern, *The Company-State*, especially his definition in the *Introduction*, 3-16. The European invention argument is from Phillips and Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire*, 4.
[11] Tony Lynch, "Understanding Neoliberal Agency: The British East India Company", *Social Alternatives*, (Maroochydore DC, QLD Australia, Vol. 37 No. 4, 2018), 21.
[12] Lynch, "Understanding Neoliberal Agency," 22.
[13] Lynch, "Understanding Neoliberal Agency", 21.

substances, their feasibility of shipping over long distances, cost, and presumably profit margins, though Courtwright does not mention the last point. The non-material and cultural reason behind determining suitable drugs for development and export was religion.[14] Although the religious consideration is not applied to substances imported into Christian Europe, Courtwright does not address the fact that in the case of opium, the target market of The Company was not in the West, nor was it Christian. In the late eighteenth century, the East India Company was working to market Indian opium to that country's neighbour, China, as a way to offset Britain's imports of Chinese tea.

As Britain, through its agent The East India Company, worked to correct this trade imbalance, I argue that the Company experimented with, and then perfected a template whereby it could generate large profits from opium sales, while at the same time mitigating its financial risk in the process. This template of the state opium monopoly would be duplicated by the early twentieth century in many states in East Asia, including other colonial powers like the United States and Japan.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the empires of Britain and China became entangled and fought wars due to trade, within the context of the trade commodity opium. While colonial histories have often focused on the West, comprised of Western Europe and the United States, global, transnational and post-colonial historians are working to move focus away from the West to examine other global historical systems, such as the East. Social, political, economic and even cultural factors differed when comparing the Westphalian system to Historic East Asia. Coe and Wolford argue that "the particular kind of order that pertained in HEA [Historic East Asia] was distinct: its promotion of Sinicization of culture, autocracy in domestic politics, hierarchy in

[14] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 56.

international politics, and strict regulation of commerce" were somewhat different from the mixed economies of the Westphalian system favoured especially by Britain and the United States.[15] Although the West was autocratic and inequitable, hierarches between kingdoms did not exist in the same manner as the hierarchic structure of Historic East Asia. As Marc-William Palen argues, the economy of the nineteenth-century United States was not as free and laissez-faire are historians often purport, and that free-trade versus nationalist protectionism were hotly debated throughout the nineteenth-century United States and Britain.[16] Both nations emerged from this debate with different outcomes, with Britain pursuing free trade and the United States pursing nationalist protectionism into the twentieth century.[17]

The Company, China and Opium

The story of the relationship between the British Empire, through its agent the East India Company, and the Chinese Empire, is shaped by the commodification and export of opium from British India to China. The East India Company engaged, according to Lynch, a "politically-sanctioned twinned ambition – opening, then dominating markets."[18] This market ambition of the East India Company brought two empires into contact through trade. This entanglement was not as simple a matter as signing a trade agreement. The factors that led to the Company flooding China with opium by the nineteenth century had their roots in trade between the two empires in the eighteenth century and began with a trade imbalance.

This imbalance was due to high demand by the British for Chinese tea in the eighteenth century. China was the main producer of tea as a commodity, and its availability increased due to The Company importing it directly from its port in Canton, China to Britain as a benefit of its

[15] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History and International Relations," 268.
[16] Palen, *The 'Conspiracy' of Free Trade*, 267-268.
[17] Palen, *The 'Conspiracy of Free Trade*, 268.
[18] Lynch, "Understanding Neoliberal Agency", 22.

monopoly in Asia.[19] This process, as the historical sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein argued, was part of the expansion of European nations into new "zones" of trade, which were being forced into the growing world-economy.[20] He further argued that these zones of expansion were never willingly incorporated into the world-system or world-economy. It was European expansionism which drew formerly external arenas (which were countries outside of the world-economy) into it, thereby transitioning them into a "periphery" zone of the world-economy.[21] Like Lynch's approach of entering markets by neoliberal agents like The Company, the external arenas were prime targets for this transition. Ironically, the beginning of the entanglement of Britain and China appeared more the opposite, where China's power lay in its tea supply, and Britain was at the economic mercy of China.

The trade imbalance between the two countries lay not in the fact that China had what Britain wanted, which was tea, but that Britain was forced to pay for shipments of tea with Spanish-Mexican silver dollars, the only currency that China would accept.[22] By 1785, Britain imported an estimated 15 million pounds (around 6.8 million kg.) of tea per year from China, on which the British government levied a 100% import tax.[23] The trade imbalance between Britain at one end of the trade route, and India and China at the other, was noted in a report on the British East India Company's accounts written in 1792 by Mr. Anderson and Mr. Baring. Because the report contains both revenues and projections at high levels, the company officials did not provide detailed inventories for the most part. One official does note the trade imbalance between Europe and Asia, lamenting that

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[19] Courtright, *Forces of Habit*, 22.
[20] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System III: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s-1840s*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 129.
[21] Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System III*, 129.
[22] W. Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, *The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another*, (Napierville, IL: Sourcebooks Inc., 2002), 21.
[23] Hanes and Sanello, *The Opium Wars*, 20.

> From eighteen to nineteen thousand Tons of Shipping they must send annually to China, of which they cannot fill up one Quarter until the Consumption of European Goods increases in that Country, they therefore can by ordering the ships to touch in India on their Way to China, deliver annually 14000 Tons almost Freight free, for from India to China, the Commander or Merchants will in general with pleasure pay their Demurrage[24] for the Liberty of filling those up.[25]

Therefore, the tea travelling in Company ships from China to Britain outweighed the amount of goods travelling from Britain back to Asia for sale in those countries.

Just a few years prior to this, in 1780, the Company had been at risk of bankruptcy. It was in that year that the Company attempted its first shipments of opium to China, as an experiment to help balance trade between it and Britain. Opium was already a modestly profitable commodity for The Company, despite China's legislation prohibiting opium in that country for recreational use in 1729. The trade of opium between 1729 and 1780 was therefore very restricted and limited to about 200 chests per year (c. 26,800 lb/12,181 kg), strictly for medicinal purposes.[26] The opium was received by specially licenced Chinese merchants who were allowed to trade with foreigners in opium. These merchants, the "foreign emporiums", or *yanghang* or *hang*, traded with the British East India Company, and were also responsible for controlling foreign traders as well in the limited space of a beach in Guangzhou.[27] The Qing government essentially allowed the *hang* merchants to self-regulate the trade.

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[24] "demurrage" used in this context is a maritime commercial term concerning the detention or delay of a shipper on a vessel or other conveyance longer than a time agreed upon, for which a payment is made in compensation for this time. See: *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "demurrage (*n.*)," July 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/4197619508.
[25] Mr. Anderson, Mr. Baring, *Statements relative to the trade between Europe, India and China in general and the English East India Company's trade in particular*, (Adam Matthew, British Library Add. MSS 13818), URL: https://www.china.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/Add%20MS%2013818, Accessed July 17, 2023, 10 verso – 10 recto.
[26] Dikötter, Laamann and Xun, *Narcotic Culture*, 36.
[27] Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire*, 33-34.

During this period, the focus of the British was stability rather that profitability in order to ensure a steady supply of tea being shipped to Britain.[28] Those 200 chests would increase to 1,000 chests by 1767, no doubt with the help of the *hang* merchants, and it was a profitable commodity up to the slump in 1780.[29] The Company was slowly bringing China into the European world-system, and the Qing government would most likely have been aware of how Britain, through its agent the East India Company, had taken over large swathes of India as a peripheral part of its empire. Wallerstein describes this takeover as the company's "unconstrained combination of political and economic control."[30] China would have witnessed the East India Company's opening up of India, one of the "previously protected or independent realms of human interaction for commodified exploitation," and feared that it was next on The Company's imperial agenda.[31] Japan would experience this same anxiety over colonization by Western powers throughout the nineteenth century, up until it signed the treaty with the United States in 1854.

The Company was near bankruptcy in 1780 due to interruptions in transfer payments from Britain due to the American revolution, piracy, and a scarcity of Spanish dollars due to Spain's support of the American revolutionaries. [32] Wars in general also contributed to the near economic collapse of the company. Therefore, in 1780 two ships disguised as warships, and thus not supposed to be carrying cargo, set sail for China with a load of contraband opium to sell. The shipment was sold at a loss to the *hang* merchant Sinqua, who in turn was only able to sell 15% of the opium in China, with the remainder being sold abroad around the South China Sea.[33]

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[28] Bello, *Opium and the Limits of Empire*, 33.
[29] Rev. Eric Lewis, *Black Opium: An account of a "morally indefensible' trade in "this horrible drug*," (London & Edinburgh, Marshall Brothers, Ltd., Publihers, 1910, 18.
[30] Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System III*, 139.
[31] Lynch, "Understanding Neoliberal Agency," 21.
[32] Dikötter, Laamann and Xun, *Narcotic Culture*, 37
[33] *Ibid.*

Another shipment of contraband opium was sent to China by the British East India Company governor Warren Hastings on two ships, with a total of 3,450 chests of opium at 170 lb./77 kg. each. One ship was taken by French privateers, while the other escaped to the Portuguese port city of Macao, where Chinese merchants refused to purchase the opium due to their fear of the prohibition law. The opium was finally offloaded at a price of $340 (Spanish dollars) per chest, a loss of $160 per chest.[34] Not counting the lost ship and its cargo, and assuming that the chests were divided evenly between the ships, the lost revenue from the one ship alone amounted to $276,000, or approximately £69,000. The demand for opium, meaning the level of demand and dependence on the drug, was not high in China at that time. The East India Company had a problem with its product, with the prohibition of recreational smoked opium, and with the fact that it was losing money on the drug in China. There had to be a close examination of what they were selling, and how to increase demand if they were to begin balancing trade with China.

In addition to the entanglements of the opium and tea trades at this time was a more universal commodity, the Spanish, or Mexican, silver dollar. China required payment in cash for its tea, in the Spanish silver dollar, or *Carolus*. At this time, Japan also used the "silver standard," only converting to the more global "gold standard" in 1897, and China would not convert until 1930.[35] A change in British law in 1784 placed stress on the tea trade imbalance even further with the passage of the *Commutation Act*,[36]

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[34] Hanes and Sanello, *Opium Wars*, 21.
[35] Sugihara, "The Economy Since 1800," 172.
[36] Danby Pickering, *The Statutes at Large, From Magna Charta to the End of the Eleventh Parliament of Great Britain,* Anno *1761. Continued*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, Vol. XXXIV Part II, 1783), pages 562-586 in this volume. The legislative citation for this act is 24 Geo. III, c. 38, the official title being *An act for repealing the several duties on tea, and for granting to his Majesty other duties in lieu thereof; and also several duties on inhabited houses; and upon the importation of cocoa nuts and coffee; and for repealing the inland duties of excise thereon*. Shortened to the *Commutation Act*

which was passed as a way for the British government to combat tea smuggling into Britain. Under section five of the act, The Company was required to maintain a steady supply of tea for Britian, to maintain a year's worth of tea in its warehouses, to hold four public auctions a year spaced equally, and to sell tea at a reasonable mark-up and with no reserve bids.[37] This put immense pressure on The Company to maintain stable supplies in Britain of tea after 1784, and they needed to pay for it with silver dollars.

China had little interest in British goods, and the Company report draws attention to the large amount of British silver coin being exported to China as payment for tea. They write that "The Export of Silver has not yet been touched upon, this hitherto the most consequential of all European Exports when we include the Quantity sent to China."[38] The majority of the eighteenth century had involved British silver coinage, in the form of Mexican or Spanish silver dollars, to pay for Chinese tea. Between 1710 and 1759 Britain imported around £26 million worth of Chinese tea compared to China having imported just £9 million in goods from Britain, thus causing the trade imbalance.[39]

The loss of the American colonies, its trade and its silver in the 1770s meant that Britain needed to find new sources of Spanish dollars, or some other commodity, to pay for tea. This is not to say that the revenues and profits gained by the Company were at significant risk. Rather, the supply of silver dollars as a more universal commodity was at risk of drying up after the American colonies separated from Britain. In spite of the separation of the U.S., The *Commutation Act* of 1784 appears to have improved the income of the Company, according to Anderson and Baring's *Statement*. In 1783 the

[37] Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H. Mui, "The Commutation Act and the Teas Trade in Britiain 1784-1793", *The Economic History Review*, Vol. 16 Issue 2, 1963, 234-235.
[38] Anderson and Baring, *Statements*, 10 recto – 11 verso.
[39] Hanes III and Sanello, *Opium Wars,* 20.

Company shipped 24,847 tons (25,245 tonnes) of goods from China to Europe, with gross sales of £3,974,458.

The next paragraph suggests that this sum is for the year 1786, since the *Act* was passed in 1786, and the report corrects the year as "the 4 Years ending in 1790 or after the full operation of the Act," which would mean the *Act* did not take effect fiscally until 1787.[40] When they reported on profits, they provided an average net profit of £108,806 per year for the six years before the *Act*, and an average net profit of £423,947 per year for the four years accounted for in the *Statement* up to 1790.[41] The Company, therefore, was turning a profit, and its biggest challenge seems to be that it was lacking in cash to pay for the suddenly increased amounts of tea required under the legislation.

The Company's fiscal situation had improved by 1790, and at the same time it had learned a harsh lesson from the loss of the two opium smuggling ships. The other challenge to selling opium for non-medicinal purposes was that recreational, smoked opium had only recently been taken up by the Chinese in the province of Szechuan (Sichuan) in the mid-eighteenth century, and its recreational use was not yet widespread.[42] This would change by the nineteenth century as opium use by smoking spread throughout China, in part due to the supply of opium that would soon start arriving in Chinese treaty ports being used by European merchants.

Before the widespread production and sale of Indian opium to China, The Company produced opium from Indian poppies was of a quality and narcotic strength that appealed to Chinese smokers. Through the nineteenth century, Indian opium would be an incredibly

[40] Anderson and Baring, *Statements*, 76 recto.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] F.S. Turner, *British Opium Policy and its Results to India and China*, (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1876), 131-2.

profitable commodity for the Company, providing a balance of trade in favour of Britain.[43] From their experience with the passing of the *Commutation Act* in 1786, which was passed to not only reduce the amount of smuggling of tea into Britain, while also bringing revenue to the government through import duties, the Company saw that their method of importing tea to Britain would serve as a useful template for sales of opium in India.[44] As the historian and sociologist respectively Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H. Mui argued in their paper "The Commutation Act and the Tea Trade in Britain, 1784-1793", the lowering of duties on imported tea and the Company's monopoly being restricted by this legislation, while increasing profits, may have upset Company officials because of its perceived limitations on what should have been a more freely exercised monopoly. Despite perceived restrictions on its monopoly, Hoh-Cheung and Mui show that The Company shipped over one hundred million pounds more tea between 1783-4 to 1792-3 than it had in the decade previous.[45] The question now was, as written in Anderson and Baring's *Statement*, was how to pay for all of this tea and to maintain a sufficient supply of it in Britain as required by the *Commutation Act*?

The East India Company had learned the value of having monopolies through its trade in tea, and therefore they applied the same approach to the production and sales of opium. After learning the risks of smuggling with the loss of cargo of the drug and two ships, the Company oversaw production and then sold opium in India to merchants by auction, in a very similar way to their tea auctions held every quarter in Britain.[46] Opium, like tea, was sold by the chest, and the biggest difference was that opium was sold

[43] Dikötter et al., *Narcotic Culture,* 84-5.
[44] On the *Commutation Act* and how its reduced import duties curtailed smuggling, see Hoh-Cheung and Lorna H. Mui, "William Pitt and the Enforcement of the Commutation Act, 1784-1788," *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 76., No. 300, Jul. 1961, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press), 448-9.
[45] Hoh-Cheung and Lui, "The Commutation Act and the Tea Trade," 236-7.
[46] See Hoh-Cheung and Lui, "The Commutation Act and the Tea Trade," *passim* and 243-244 describing the sale by the chest of tea in Britain.

directly in India to private merchants, to be smuggled into China. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, opium was not widely consumed in China, even though the Company saw its production and sale as an opportunity to balance Britain's tea trade with China.

China's use of opium as a recreational drug, as opposed to its purely medicinal use, was slow to be taken up, despite its later widespread use. Opium imports to Britain for all uses was exponentially more than what was smuggled into China. In 1802, the amount consumed in Canton, which was Britain's designated port for trading ships to dock, was 3,000 chests (one chest was approximately 150 lbs./68 kg.), or 180 metric tonnes (around 177 imperial tons), versus 100 metric tonnes (around 98.5 imperial tons) of Turkish opium that was imported into Britain per year up to 1839.[47] This comparison is an issue, however, as it discusses merely one port, Canton, versus the total imported into the entire island of Britain. The above also fails to account for smuggled opium, making those amounts incorrect. The historian David Owen said that "In 1799 about two thousand chest of monopoly opium were being imported into Macao, but in previous years, before the Bengal supply had been restricted, annual shipments occasionally exceeded four thousand."[48] Smugglers would rarely have kept records such as the records kept for tariff and taxation purposes, which makes estimating smuggling numbers notoriously difficult.

Owen also argues that the opium trade expanded greatly after 1821, suggesting that both the supply and demand in China were increasing.[49] This assertion is supported

[47] Dikötter *et al.*, *Narcotic Culture*, 40.
[48] David Edward Owen, *British Opium Policy in China and India*, (United States: Archon Books, 1968 unabridged edition; original edition New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934), 62-63.
[49] Owen, *British Opium Policy*, 62.

by Bengal opium sales by the Company in the early nineteenth century. As Figure 1. shows, there was a large increase in opium sales revenue from Bengal opium in 1820-1821, which supports Owen's argument.



Figure 1.1 - Bengal opium costs, revenues, and profits between the years 1808-1809 and 1821-1822. Source: Source: Henry St. George Tucker, A Review of the Financial Situation of the East India Company in 1824, (London: Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, Leadenhall Street, 1825), 54-55.

This graph also show that with highly increased revenue and profits from Bengal opium sales, the actual cost of production stayed quite stable, and the profitability of opium to the Company by increased margins.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the Company increased its production and sale of opium by auction in India. The problem became so pervasive that Britain and France would fight wars with China over the drug. As opium permeated deeper into Chinese territory, supplied first by the Company and later supplied by indigenous Chinese farmers, tensions mounted between the two empires to the point where open war was engaged. The First Opium War was fought between Britain and China between 1839 and 1842, and the second fought between 1856 and 1860, this time including France on the side of the British. The two Opium Wars will receive only minor attention here, however

a concept that was developed during the First Opium War would help define the issue of opium use, dependence and eventual regulation. Much like the modern use of 'the opioid crisis' to define the complicated social, medical and legal problem of opioid use, in the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century the problem of opium was defined as 'The Opium Question.'[50]

Unequal Treaties And 'The Opium Question'

Although 'The Opium Question' would define the issue of opium use, monopolies and dependence up to the early twentieth century, the issue itself was global in scale. The phrase was used in many English-speaking nations to define the complex issue that was opium. The phrase itself entered print literature around the same time as the First Opium War, which began in 1839. One of the earlier uses of the phrase, the anonymous writer of a short article that appeared in *The Champion* entitled "The Opium Question" was written in November 1839 and stated that "the Chinese Government are quite sincere in their determination to put an end to the trade in opium."[51] Unfortunately for the Chinese, they would be unsuccessful in ending the opium trade both in the form of smuggling into China and domestic opium production, in the nineteenth century. After the conclusion of two wars with Britain over the drug, they would be subjected to heavy-handed and to the Chinese unfair treaties that favoured the British.

Until the conclusion of the First Opium War in 1842, foreign presence in China was extremely limited, especially for major trading partners Great Britain and the United States. European and U.S. traders were only allowed to reside in one part of Guangzhou

[50] Anonymous, "The Opium Question," *The Champion*, (London, England: Vol. III, Issue 164, Sunday, Nov. 3, 1839): 4. This is one of the earlier references to "the opium question" and coincided with the beginning of the First Opium War.
[51] Anon. "The Opium Question," 4.

(Canton) between the months of October and January, considered the "trading months."[52] This did not entirely stop missionaries from engaging in clandestine evangelizing in Asia, but The Company refused to carry missionaries on its ships due to their disruptive behaviour in India.[53] Canton, located in southern China, was a designated port for Western and U.S. traders, and had been a major Chinese port for centuries before the arrival of Western merchants.[54] Canton represented a place with many crossings and interactions, and by the early nineteenth-century, European "East India" companies from Denmark, Austria, Sweden, France, the Netherlands as well as Britain were operating during the trading season.[55] After its separation from Britain, American merchants, traders and missionaries also scrambled to join the lucrative China trade, creating a place of cultural, social and economic inter-crossings with each other and with some selected Chinese merchants.[56] While China enjoyed the income from Western trade, they preferred to contain the possible influence of the West in Chinese culture and society which is called by historians "The Canton System."[57]

The First Opium War changed the dynamic of the global relationship of containment previously enforced by the Chinese government regarding foreign merchants operating in Canton. The First Opium War was precipitated by a staunch example of a secular anti-opium

[52] Kristin Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste: Robert Morrison, the British East India Company, and Early Missionary and Merchant Negotiations in Guangzhou, China," *Journal of World History*, (Vol. 32, Issue 4, Dec. 1, 2021, University of Hawai'I Press): 584.
[53] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste," 585.
[54] Leonard Blussé, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008): 51-52.
[55] Blussé, *Visible Cities*, 52.
[56] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distate," 586 argues for the American scramble for Chinese trade and conversion; Blussé, *Visible Cities*, 52-53 discusses the interconnections of Western traders, in the form discussed by Werner and Zimmermann in "Histoire Croisée," 38 on intermixing and the fact that cultures and societies emerge from such interconnections in new forms that can be studied historically.
[57] Blussé, *Visible Cities*, 52.

reformer, the Chinese official Lin Tse-hsu (also spelled as Lin Zexu), who in 1839 was sent to the port at Canton (Guandong) as a special envoy of the emperor to help stop the smuggling of opium into China through the port.[58] As part of a political faction known as the Spring Purificationists, Lin used several tactics to dissuade the British to stop smuggling opium, among them the economic incentive of the British surrendering illegal opium with the promise of continued access to the tea trade, and also to appeal to the foreigners moral sensibilities, which Lin and other Spring Purificationists felt was lacking in the ruling Qing government.[59]

Lin began by blockading of opium warehouses until all illegal opium was handed over. When this failed to work, he took the more extreme measure of burning 20,000 chests of opium surrendered by the British smuggler Charles Elliott at the village of Humen in May 1839, and still this did not settle the dispute. Lin was unable to either stop the smuggling trade nor prevent an all-out war with Britain over the drug.[60] The lure of profit and the strength of the British navy were too much, and the First Opium War would be fought at the instigation of the British beginning in 1840 and would end in 1842.[61] The conclusion of that war and the treaty imposed on China would cause issues concerning opium for decades to come.

The British victory in the First Opium War and the subsequent Treaty of Nanking was meant to open China to Western trade and stop the aforementioned "Canton System."[62] The Treaty of Nanking and subsequent treaties signed between Britain and China have been memorialized by Chinese scholars as the "unequal treaties" because the terms that ended the two Opium Wars were heavily in favour of the British.[63] For the Chinese, the Opium Wars and the

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[58] Lovell, *The Opium War,* 58-59.
[59] James M. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992): 131.
[60] Lovell, *The Opium War*, 69.
[61] Lovell, *The Opium War,* 109-110.
[62] Mark Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon: Britain's Opium Wars with China, 1839-1860*, (Stroud, UK: Fonthill Media Ltd., 2008): 138.
[63] Lovell, *The Opium War,* 321.

unequal treaties represented "diplomatic defeats", "a humiliation to the country" and "branded the iron hoofprint of imperialism on the bodies of our people."[64] While those sentiments were written by Chinese scholars in the 1930s, the harm that the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties signed with Britain caused left a lasting psychological imprint.

One issue the Chinese had with the unequal treaties was Britain's Queen Victoria assuming that she was equal to the Chinese emperor in the imperial hierarchy. This assumption contributed to China's hatred of the unequal treaties and was an affront to Chinese culture within the Historic East Asian system. The Treaty of Nanking, which concluded the First Opium War and was signed on the 29th of August, 1842, included a statement which placed the Queen on an equal footing to the Chinese Emperor. The preamble calls the treaty "between Us and Our Good Brother The Emperor of China," treating the two rulers as equals.[65]

The humiliation to the Chinese of the treaty was aggravated by the imposition of reparations to Britain of $21 million dollars, most likely Spanish silver dollars, though it is not specified, in Articles IV to VII.[66] The strict control formerly asserted by the Chinese imperial government concerning Canton as a treaty port was weakened by forcing the Emperor to allow "British Subjects, with their families and establishments," be "allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai."[67] The aim of the treaty was to end the strict "Canton System" and to allow increased trade and more permanent settlement by Westerners in China.[68]

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[64] Quotes from Chinese scholars on the history of The Opium Wars, in
[65] in Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*, "The Treaty of Nanking," Appendix IV: 231.
[66] Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*: 232-233.
[67] Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*, Article II: 232.
[68] Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*: 138.

The unequal treaties disrupted the Historic East Asian system with the West in the form of Britain enforcing Western rules of international relations against the historic hegemon in the region. China, as the "hub" and subsidiary nations paying tribute to it, and to each other, as the "spokes" of a wheel of hierarchical relationships, had the disrupting British interrupting the traditional interstate power structure.[69] The aftermath of this disruption, and how Japan fit into the now disrupted Historic East Asian system in relation to the opium trade is discussed in the next chapter. In a continent where trade was strictly regulated and controlled through the tribute system, the disruptions and vacuums left open by the opening of trade in China was not unnoticed by Japan. Also, internal political changes in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century created opportunities for that country that had not previously been considered.

Outside of state entanglements, individuals and non-state groups also had agency and discourse within the issue of recreational opium use and dependence. 'The Opium Question' entered the anti-opium culture and was used to describe the complex nature of recreational or illicit opium use, smuggling and the repercussions that came with dependence on the drug. Its origin as a cultural reference appears to have coincided with the First Opium War and was still being used into the 1920s. It was originally used specifically in the context of the confiscation by Chinese officials in Canton of British contraband opium. After the First Opium War, it was used more by opponents or anti-opium activists as a way to discuss the issue of recreational opium use, smuggling and dependence.

Another early publication that focused on China within a global context was *The Chinese Repository*, published between 1832 and 1851. The publication had a religious as well as

[69] The "hub and spoke" model is argued by Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History and International Relations," 265; the disruption of this system of hierarchies is discussed by Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang. "Introduction," *passim.*

cultural purpose and as the publication wrapped up in 1851, the editorial said "Its main design has been to collect and present to the public the most authentic and valuable information respecting China and the adjacent countries, therewith to induce its readers to take a well-informed and increasing interest in all that pertains to their welfare."[70] Besides bringing knowledge of China to a global readership, the publishers of the *Repository* also brought Christianity in, which was impossible before the First Opium War. The editors state that changes that took place in China "have been especially momentous in all that relates to the propagation of Christianity, removing the serious penalties before attached to its profession."[71] As evangelists operating in China up to 1851, the *Repository* was just one publication that advocated for greater control and regulation of opium.

An interpretation of the opium question appeared in *The Chinese Repository* in 1845 in an article that speculated on the possibility of a second Opium War between Britain and China. The writer (not identified) says that "the opium question may be again agitated. In England it most surely will be, in its *moral*, if not in its political bearings."[72] Therefore, the writer assigns both political as well as moral significance to the question. The presence of evangelical Christians in China was a fairly new phenomenon.

Japan's role in the opium trade and in transnational discussions was not yet unfolding. The transition from the feudal Bakufu government and the restoration of the Meiji Emperor was integral to Japan taking advantage of opportunities left by China's weakening influence and power within East Asia. Japan learned about the opium monopoly, and took to heart the poor

[70] Elijah Coleman Bridgman and S. Wells Williams, *General Index of Subjects Contained in the Twenty Volumes of the Chinese Repository: With An Arranged List of the Articles*, (No Publisher Listed: Canton, 1851): "Editorial Notice" unpaginated.
[71] *Ibid.*
[72] *Ibid.*

treatment by Britain of China. We have thus far seen how the opium monopoly system was used by the British East India Company against China, the resistance of China against the illegal opium trade, and how it failed to stop the inflow of illegal opium. In the wake of the Opium Wars, this system that had successfully operated for so long was breaking down under pressure from the West to open trade and for Asia to enter the world-economic system through the commodity of opium.

The opponents of opium wished to see the drug regulated and controlled and referred to this problem as 'The Opium Question' and the question would serve religious, medical and moral interests in their criticism of the state monopoly system. The next chapter will show how two newer empires in Asia, the United States and Japan, approached imperialism differently. Japan modernized very rapidly in the Meiji period industrially, scientifically, militarily and imperially as it expanded its territories first within its home islands, and then to the mainland of Asia. Another influential nation in the twentieth century transnational discussions on opium, the United States, took a cultural approach to imperialism in Asia, preferring to use its moral influence in addressing The Opium Question rather than engaging in a British-style monopoly system.

Chapter 2 – Japan and the Philippine Opium Commission

When the United States acquired the Philippines from Spain in 1898, it inherited a system of lucrative revenue in the form of the Spanish colonial-era opium farm, which was a licencing system used by various colonial and independent nations throughout East Asia in the nineteenth century.[1] The 1890s were a period of decline and collapse of the previous opium farming system due to global economic changes that affected commodity prices as the world transitioned from a commercial to an industrial economy.[2] The opium farming system was already on the decline in East Asia, though the Philippine colonial government's decision was also fuelled by strong advocacy by U.S. based anti-opium reformers.[3] One method used by the U.S. colonial governor William Howard Taft was the formation of the Philippine Opium Commission, which published its report in 1905.

The committee was tasked with travelling to various Asian nations to gather information on how other countries, whether colonial occupations or free nations, were dealing with 'The Opium Question.' The importance of their work was stated in the report: "The Philippine Committee feels that in however small a degree, yet at least in some measure it has made a contribution to what is one of the gravest, if not the gravest moral problems of the Orient."[4] The use of the word 'moral' demonstrates the influence of the anti-opium reform groups which were active in the United States and which were also spreading their influence through the U.S. global

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[1] Daniel J.P. Wertz, "Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism: Opium Politics in the Colonial Philippines, 1898-1925," *Modern Asian Studies*, (Vol. 47, Issue 2): 468-469. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23359828. Accessed February 26, 2024.
[2] Carl Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990): 183. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501746352/html. Accessed June 6, 2023.
[3] Wertz, "Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism," 473.
[4] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein and the Rule, Ordinances and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hongkong, Saigon, Singapore, Burmah, Java and the Philippine Islande,* (Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, 1905): 12.

empire. As the Philippine opium farming system was set to be revised by legislation in 1903, groups like the International Reform Bureau petitioned Washington against the farming system. The U.S. federal government could not easily ignore the vocal moralism against opium, considering the role they had played in electing then-President Theodore Roosevelt.[5]

Japan's development as imperial power in East Asia saw a similar development as the United States in the early twentieth century. The first treaty between Japan and the U.S. was signed in 1858, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan, which took place in 1868, was part of Japan's self-determination regarding its entrance into the world-system. Previous to then, Japan had limited contact with the rest of the world for several centuries. Despite pressure from many Western nations to open itself to trade, Japan could afford to be more calculating compared to the experience of China and the unequal treaties as to whom it opened up. This is evidence of its long history of self-determination in spite of the strong cultural influence of China going back to ancient times. Like other nations and colonies in East Asia, Japan learned by the end of the nineteenth century that state-monopolies in colonies were profitable and helped colonial governments finance their operations as compared to the collapses that had been making opium revenues unpredictable since 1880.[6] Historian Carl Trocki shows how two "sizeable troughs in the economic cycles" in the form of economic recessions in 1891 and 1892 and then a deeper recession between 1903 and 1907 affected the East Asia region, making steady opium state-monopoly revenues more important to the bottom lines of colonial budgets.[7] Japan had bypassed the opium farm system and engaged directly in the state-monopoly system after gaining possession of Formosa.

[5] Wertz, "Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism," 478.
[6] Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 183-184.
[7] Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 188-189.

The State-Monopoly System

The British opium monopoly in different forms led to the erosion of Chinese hegemony and power in East Asia through the nineteenth century. As the power of the East India Company as a company-state declined due to its non-commercial administrative responsibilities in India, the British state took over as beneficiary of the proceeds of the opium trade going to China.[8] The Company was replaced as administrators in 1858 in the aftermath of the "great Indian rebellion" (also known as the Indian Mutiny) by the passage of *The Act for the Good Government of India, 1858*.[9]

Although The Company had not invented the opium monopoly, it had brought it into the world of the capitalist commodity economy, which connected opium to the established tea trade, and The Company was able to take over the existing *diwani* market control system after 1765 in the states of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.[10] From 1785, The Company controlled all opium production after the East India Company Department of Inspection argued that monopoly would ensure "perfect & uniform for public sale."[11] Therefore, by the time the British colonial government of India took over from The Company in 1858, the company-state had a system whereby the state could simply take over the monopoly operation. The monopoly system was not entirely water tight, as Gunnel Cederlöf argues, that in parts of India like Bhutan and Assam, small-time merchants smuggled salt, tobacco, sugar and opium into those states in small canoes.[12] The issue for The Company worsened in 1813 when it lost its trade monopoly,

[8] Phillips and Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire*, 112.
[9] Mahendra Prasad Singh and Krishna Murari, "Constitutional Development in Colonial India," in Himanshu Roy and Jawaid Alam (Eds.), *A History of Colonial India*, (Abingdon, UK and New York, NY: Routledge India, 2021): 96. DOI: https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.4324/9781003246510. Accessed June 4, 2024.
[10] Gunnel Cederlöf, "Poor Man's Crop: Evading Opium Monopoly," *Modern Asian Studies*, (Volume 53, Issue 2, 2019): 636. DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X17001093. Accessed November 3, 2022.
[11] Quoted in Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, 37.
[12] Cederlöf, "Poor Man's Crop," 653.

including opium, with the exception of its production in Bengal. The Malwa variety of opium was opened to free trade, though administrative controls of ports and coastlines in India ensured that export taxes were levied on the outgoing opium.[13]

Britain's takeover of India as a colony from the East India Company in relation to the opium trade was facilitated by the unofficial legalization of the opium trade through the unequal Treaty of Tientsin and the accompanying Convention of Peking, which opened up China even further to British merchants, traders and missionaries after its signing in 1858.[14] Article VIII of the Treaty of Tientsin allowed Christianity in China and protected "Persons teaching it [the Christian religion], or professing it," who were also "entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities" while "peaceably pursuing their calling."[15] Article III of the treaty also considered the Chinese Emperor and Queen Victoria as equals, which violated the historic hierarchical structure of international power relations in East Asia. Any British "Ambassador, Minister, or other Diplomatic Agent" was guaranteed to "not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the Sovereign of an independent nation," and was placed "on a footing of equality with that of China."[16] The traditional and ancient imperial power structure of East Asia was being eroded by Britain, and the Chinese were not in a position to prevent it.

With the British government becoming more directly involved in Asian political and mercantile affairs, the days of the East India Company were numbered. Economic downturn in the 1840s, coupled with speculation of commodities led to many bankruptcies of Company agency houses in both Britain and India.[17] One function of imperial expansion was the quest for

[13] Dikötter et al. *Narcotic Culture*, 23.
[14] Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*, 217.
[15] "Treaty of Tientsin", in Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*, 245.
[16] "Treaty of Tientsin", in Simner, *The Lion and the Dragon*, 244.
[17] Anthony Webster, *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790-1860*, (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2009): 129-130.

profit, which could be used to pay for colonial administration as well as to be sent back to the core ruling nation. It was a challenge for colonial administrations to balance revenue with administrative costs, and if a company-state "lost sight of their commercial motives…risked jeopardizing their very existence through excessive military spending and conquests," then the colony risked bankruptcy.[18] The East India Company was forced to wrap up its operations after the passage of an "Indian bill" through the British parliament in 1858 after having had its monopolies taken away and its ability to trade severely diminished by the government.[19] The collapse of the Company meant that the British colonial government in India took over administration of the colony.

The historian David Courtwright outlined the impact that the opening of the Chinese market, along with the opening of a free market in opium production and importation had in China. With the British government in India establishing a state-monopoly after 1858, Courtwright argued that the sale of opium accounted for approximately one-seventh of the total revenue for British India.[20] Even though the revenue from opium for the British in paying for colonial government was lucrative, "opium was a much debated source of colonial revenue, but not necessarily destined to become an object of prohibition."[21]

The unequal treaty ending the Second Opium War created the *de facto* legalization of opium in China. That country imported around 6 million lbs. (around 2.7 million kg.) in 1839, and by 1879 it imported around 15 million lbs. (around 6.8 million kg.) at its peak in 1879.[22] Also in 1879, Courtwright says that China itself was producing around 32 million lbs. (around

[18] Phillips and Sharman, *Outsourcing Empire*, 114.
[19] This was quoted from the London *Times* in *The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*, (New York: Vol. 39 Issue 3, September 1, 1858): 394.
[20] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 34.
[21] Kim, Diana S., *Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition across Southeast Asia*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020): 35.
[22] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 35.

14.5 million kg.) within its own borders.[23] Therefore, not only were the British authorities the monopolists of opium production and sales, China itself was producing twice the amount of opium as was being produced in India.

While much of East Asia was engaged in opening trade with the West, and opium a major commodity being traded, Japan in the nineteenth century was not yet participating in this new trade. Opium "played a pivotal role in building colonial states and the emergence of capitalism throughout Southeast Asia," and Japan would become a major importer and distributor of the drug by the early twentieth century.[24]

Japan was not as forthcoming in allowing Britain to impose what Immanuel Wallerstein called "free-trade imperialism" as it had in China.[25] Japan was more in control of its internal trade and economic development. Despite still being essentially a military polity in the 1850s, its transition from segmented, military districts to a centralized government was done more on its own terms than was the case for China. Being an island, Japan was harder to invade, and the internal policies of the Tokugawa regime had severely restricted foreign trade and even contact with foreigners save a few Dutch traders allowed to dock in Nagasaki since the end of the sixteenth century.[26] After 1641, Chinese traders were also given limited access to Japan at the same port, and by the early nineteenth century, Dutch language and culture, and even clandestine German visitors, were beginning to erode the isolationist policy that Japan had maintained for two hundred years.[27] The First Opium War was for Japan "nothing short of a cataclysm for the Japanese elite" because the defeat of the hegemon China was a disruption of the *status quo* of

[23] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 35.
[24] Kim, *Empires of Vice*, 32.
[25] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789-1914*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011): 121.
[26] Maraini, "Japan, the essential modernizer," 49.
[27] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration,* 24-25.

Historic East Asia.[28] The ruling pre-Meiji Bakufu government was careful to control the dissemination of information about the Chinese defeat for this reason.[29] Information about the interactions of imperial powers flowed around Asia, as it did around Europe, and the repercussions of the unequal treaties imposed on China by Britain made Japan take notice.

The Meiji Restoration and Japan's Role in Asia

Japan experienced a change in its political structure and governance in 1868 known as the Meiji Restoration. Japan had for a long time resisted extensive commercial relationships with the West, and instead kept Western imperial powers at a distance. On July 8th, 1853, Japan became entangled with an up-and-coming nation with which it shared an ocean, the United States of America. The arrival of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry's small fleet of ships just south of the Japanese capital Edo (modern day Tokyo), known as the "Black Ships" to history, represented contact between Japan and a foreign power that had not been seen since the mid-seventeenth century.[30] Policies of physical and cultural isolation from other nations, especially Western nations up to the arrival of Perry had nonetheless made some Japanese scholars eager to study Western subjects, especially medicine, optics, metallurgy and military studies.[31] After the restriction on foreign presence in Japan after 1641, there had remained a small outpost for primarily Dutch and Chinese ships to dock at the Port of Dejima.[32] Contact between the Japanese and outsiders had been very limited, though not entirely absent, and Perry's arrival would in time cause a regime change in Japan, its rapid modernization, and also its expansion into the Pacific Ocean as an imperial power.

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[28] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration,* 25.
[29] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration, 25*-26.
[30] Maraini, "Japan, the essential modernizer," 49-50.
[31] Maraini, "Japan, the essential modernizer," 50; Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 27.
[32] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 24.

To say that Japan's modernization was rapid is an understatement. After contact with Perry in 1854 and then with the reformed government of the Meiji, traditional knowledge in Japan was shunned in favour of modern, Western thought, especially in "science, ways of making, doing [and] managing things came into immediate fashion."[33] Before the 1850s, some teaching of modern Western knowledge had been taking place. Two programs of Dutch Studies had been established in the 1830s. The first, Ito Gemboku's, was opened in 1833 and focused on medical and military certifications.[34] The second, run by Ogata Kōan, also taught Dutch studies, though it is unclear what programs were taught.[35] Although these were only two schools, Maraini argues that Western knowledge was in demand, had been brought to Japan, and he cites the study of Western anatomy in the 1770s, which was a contrast to traditionally practiced Chinese medicine in Japan.[36]

In the mid-nineteenth century, Dutch was studied to the extent that when Perry and several officers put to shore in Japan on a small landing craft, a Japanese envoy sent to meet them declared in his only phrase known in English that "I can only speak Dutch", and luckily Perry's entourage included a Dutch speaker.[37] Although Perry's arrival in Japan is considered the formal point at which Japan was opened to the world, some argue that his arrival was actually just a catalyst for events that had been decades in the making.[38] The assertive approach of the United States and arrival of Perry's steam ships was mishandled by the Bakufu government. Because the ships were visible from Japan's largest city, their arrival could not be suppressed or

[33] Maraini, "Japan, the essential modernizer," 50.
[34] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 27.
[35] *Ibid.* 27.
[36] Maraini, "Japan, the essential modernizer," 50.
[37] Alex Dudden, "Matthew Perry in Japan, 1852-1854," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events That Shaped the Modern International Order*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020, online edition), DOI: 10.1017/9781108807401: 188-189. Accessed May 29, 2023.
[38] Dudden, "Matthew Perry in Japan," 193.

controlled by Japanese officials, which made it almost necessary for the government to engage with the foreigners.[39]was the fact that the United States had remained neutral in the conflicts between Britain and China, especially considering that 1858 was also the date that Britain forced the Treaty of Tientsin on China, one of the last of the unequal treaties.[40] Japan did not wish to be forced into the same inequity as had been imposed on China.

The treaties resulting from Perry's visit, the "Treaty of Kanagawa," signed in 1854, and the "Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan" (known as the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, or the Harris treaty), was signed in 1858.[41] The United States was favoured over Britain, whose violence towards the hegemon China made the United States a less threatening ally to form trade and diplomatic relations with.[42] The two treaties were slightly more even handed and equitable than the unequal treaties had been between Britain and China, and demonstrates how Japan had more agency than did China in negotiating its 'opening' to a foreign power.[43]

Despite this agency, Kanagawa treaty allowed for an American representative to be present in one of the Japanese treaty ports, Simoda, while there was no allowance of a Japanese consul in the United States.[44] Moreover, in anticipation of Japan entering into similar agreements with other nations, Article IX required that if Japan was to "grant to any other nation or nations privileges and advantages which are not herein granted to the United States and the

[39] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 28.
[40] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 30.
[41] "Treaty of Kanagawa,", (New Haven, CT: The Avalon Project, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), URL: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/japan002.asp, Accessed December 10, 2023; "Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan", Tanaka Akihiko (Trans.), in *Kyujoyakuisan, Dai 1 kan, Kakkokunobu, Dai 1 bu*, (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations), URL: https://worldjpn.net/documents/texts/pw/18580729.T1E.html, Accessed Dec. 11, 2023.
[42] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 24.
[43] "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," *passim*.
[44] "Treaty of Kanagawa," Article XI.

citizens thereof, that these same privileges and advantages shall be granted likewise to the United States and to the citizens thereof without any consultation or delay."[45] Again, there appears no reciprocation on the part of the American side to Japan.

Although more equitable, there were comparisons between the "Treaty of Amity and Commerce" and the unequal treaties imposed on China by Britain. Article III outlined the ports to be opened to American ship traffic, on a schedule from 1859 to 1863, mirrored the opening of Chinese treaty ports to the British after the two Opium Wars.[46] Article III also limited the export of rice and wheat from Japan on American ships as commodities, however these foodstuffs were available to purchase by Americans residing or in port in Japan. This was presumably due to Japan's limited agricultural production, being an island nation. Article IV outlined duties that were due to the Japanese government, while Article V allowed for foreign coin to be used and valued in Japan, and allowed for the Japanese to become familiar with exchange rates, which would not have been needed previously.[47]

Items which contrast with the unequal treaties, and to the benefit of Japan, were also included. Article II promised that "The President of the United States, at the request of the Japanese government, will act as a friendly mediator in such matters of difference, as may arise, between the government of Japan and any European power."[48] This article is significant, as it suggests that the United States did not consider itself part of the European sphere of influence and rather saw itself in the role as arbiter or interlocutor between East and West. Another important element in Article II is the offer of the United States to "render friendly aid and assistance, to such Japanese vessels, as they may meet on the high seas; so far as can be done,

[45] "Treaty of Kanagawa," Article IX.
[46] "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," Article III.
[47] "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," Articles IV and V.
[48] "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," Article II.

without a breach of neutrality," which is something that was not included in the unequal treaties that concluded the Opium Wars. Despite these gestures of friendship, the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce gave the United States "most-favoured-nation" status, while the United States was not obliged to return this recognition to Japan.[49] The perception of this treaty within Japan eroded the people's confidence in the ruling Tokugawa shogunate.

Even though the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was agreed to by both the U.S. President's representative to the Empire of Japan Townsend Harris, and the Japanese representatives of the "Tycoon of Japan (also called the Shogun)[50] Ino-oo-ye, Prince of Sinana, and Iwasay, Prince of Higo", internal opposition to the opening of the island to foreign trade and relations was strong.[51] This period of Japanese history, after Perry's mission but before the Meiji Restoration in 1868, was a period of dissention and financial downturn, as was experienced globally, and for Britain with the final wrapping up of the British East India Company.[52]

The administrators of Japan became split into two opposing sides; on one side were the conservative seclusionists, who were against foreigners and the opening of trade, and the more progressive side, who were tasked with planning trade and interacting with foreigners.[53] There were essentially two options for Japan, to either resist foreign nations trying to bring it into the modern world-system of global trade through war and armed resistance, or to appease the mostly

[49] Masaki Nakabayashi, "The rise of a Japanese fiscal state," in Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick K. O'Brien with Francisco Comín (Eds.), *The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500-1914*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 387-388.
[50] Maruyama Masao, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," Ivan Morris (Trans.) in *Modern Japanese Politics, Expanded Edition*, Ivan Morris (Ed.), (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1969): 4. Maruyama and Morris translate the role of Shōgun as "Tycoon", the political leader, and Tennō as Mikado, who was the spiritual sovereign.
[51] "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," preamble.
[52] Preface to Yokoi Shōnan's "Kokuze Sanron. The Three Major Problems of State Policy," D.Y. Kiyauchi, (Trans.), *Monumenta Nipponica*, (Sofia University: Volume 23, Issue 1-2, 1968): URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2383111, 156-157. Accessed Dec. 12, 2023.
[53] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 30.

Western nations wanting to open Japan to trade. Since even the staunch conservatives and seclusionists knew that Japan was at that time unable to militarily resist Western incursions, they knew that the alternative was appeasement as a way to avoid the military humiliations that had recently been imposed on China by Britain.[54]

The decade of the 1860s has been called "Japan's decade of conflict" because although the Meiji Restoration restored the Emperor to the ruling position in Japan, the act of the restoration happened quickly, and the 1860s were a violent time for the country, with around 30,000 deaths over the decade.[55] In 1860, the samurai, Confucian scholar and later Meiji reformer Yokoi Shōnan envisioned a way for Japan to participate more in the global market, with government support and a role for both peasants and the samurai. Yokoi understood that in Japan, ruling meant that "trust and loyalty to both the samurai and the commoners is the basis of rulership, the sages have explained that these teachings are not possible without material means."[56] Financial stability for Yokoi would lead to social and political stability. He also argued that "it is widely known that improving the economic well-



Figure 2.1 - Portrait of Yokoi Shōnan, Confucian scholar and Shogunal official in his formal samurai outfit. (Date unknown) Source: Tokyo: National Diet Library, Japan. URL: https://www.ndl.go.jp/portrait/e/datas/345/, Accessed Dec. 14, 2023.

[54] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 30.
[55] Hellyer and Fuess, "Introduction," in *The Meiji Restoration,* 1, 6.
[56] Yokoi, "Kokuze Sanron," 164.

being of samurai and commoners is the urgent problem of today, the policy of economic aid is based on financial measures."[57] For an academic like Yokoi, a stable economy was key to the future success of Japan.

The economic downturns of the 1840s and 1850s saw a reversal by the 1860s, and coincided late in that decade with the increased pressure on the existing Bakufu government system in Japan. The 1860s were a period of rapid global economic integration, and with a treaty in place with the United States, Japan was becoming part of the global economy.[58] Furthermore, the American Civil War helped boost Japan's economy as an alternative source to slave-grown cotton from the United States.[59]

While Yokoi believed that a central government should be responsible for issuing paper bills of exchange, he warned that a ruling government issuing paper currency needed to be vigilant about oversupply. He concluded that Japan's entry into a global economy was a good thing, saying that "so long as there are goods, they can be sold to foreign countries. To be able to convert paper currency into hard money…is the benefit derived from opening up foreign trade."[60] Global trade benefitted Japan in 1864, where its most valuable export was cotton to Britain, caused by the disruption of the U.S. Civil War.[61] Between 1840 and 1900, Japan's export value in global trade would rise from 0% in 1840, to 0.6% in 1860, 1.7% in 1880, and finally 4.2% in 1900, indicating a steady increase that not only generated income for the government, but also for producers, merchants and other commercial operators on the island.[62]

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[57] *Ibid.*
[58] Mark Metzler, "Japan and the World Conjuncture of 1866," in Robert Hellyer and Harald Fuess (Eds.) *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 16.
[59] Metzler, "Japan and the World Conjuncture," 17.
[60] Yokoi, "Kokuze Sanron," 165.
[61] Metzler, "Japan and the World Conjunction," 17.
[62] Kaoru Sugihara, "The Economy since 1800," 173.

The Meiji Restoration happened quickly, and re-structured the entire political, military and social structures of Japan. It was at the same time a reformation or a renovation (*isshin*), but also called a "revival of ancient kingly rule" (*ōsei fukko*), which suggests that Japan was being returned to a previous time with a different social, political and military structure.[63] The idea that the Meiji Restoration was a democratizing or liberalizing event has also been challenged, with evidence that it was actually a local *coup d'état* with an uncertain trajectory. In the end it was conservative and not progressive.[64] Japan existed in a local system separate from the Western, European system of sovereignty and greater equality, and instead was part of a hierarchy, with China at the time located at the top of the hierarchical structure.[65] Although the top hegemon, China's influence was not always absolute in Japan.

Within Historic East Asia, these disruptions were normally cases of internal conflict weakening the hegemon, and resulting in interstate aggression.[66] A historic example was the collapse of the T'ang Dynasty in China in the tenth century, which emboldened Vietnam to fight for its independence and expel all Chinese from its territory.[67] This is also what allowed Japan to not just reform its entire governmental system, it also broke out of the existing hierarchy as a result of China's weakness and instability.[68] The modern restructuring under the Meiji along its own agenda was not a new concept. One example of ancient Japanese individualism help illustrate this point. In the seventh century C.E., Japan's Yamato government adopted a centralized political system based on the system of T'ang China. This imitation is very much in

[63] Mark Ravina, "Locally Ancient and Globally Modern: Restoration Discourse and the Tensions of Modernity," in Robert Hellyer and Harald Fuess (Eds.), *The Meiji Restoration: Japan as a Global Nation*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 212.
[64] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 8-9.
[65] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History," 269.
[66] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History," 275.
[67] Coe and Wolford, "East Asian History," 275-276
[68] Haggard and Kang, "Introduction," *East Asia in the World*, 14.

line with Historical East Asia where China was the example that other countries followed. The unusual and perhaps unique Japanese adaptation was the creation of a layer of political rule called *daijokan*, or a "council of great government."[69] In an act of what could perhaps be called Japanese exceptionalism, the creation of *daijokan* was wholly independent of the otherwise careful adoption of the T'ang political structure, and this layer of bureaucracy served as an intermediary or point of contact between the bureaucracy and the Emperor.[70] We even see parallels between the creation of *daijokan* and the adoption of a more Western political structure after the Meiji Restoration.[71]

In 1871, the Imperial Japanese government centralized its authority by eliminating the 260 feudal divisions and centralized authority in Edo (Tokyo), so that all administration was universally applied rather than divided across multiple small feudal domains.[72] The result was an unprecedented centralization of power into a national administration, and although it was backed up by the military, one centralized government located in a new capital represented a modern style of government in the nineteenth century.[73] This constitutionalism was a result of the rise of global nationalism that saw the Japanese constitution as a close copy of the German constitution.[74] This is an example of transimperial knowledge exchange, however the fact that Japan's constitution so closely resembled the German one is indicative of Japan's desire to become one of the imperial powers globally.[75]

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[69] Maruyama Masao, "The structure of Matsurigoto," in *Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History: Essays in memory of Richard Storry*, Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (Eds.), (London, UK: Athlone Press, 1988): 38.
[70] Maruyama, "The structure of Matsurigoto," 38-39.
[71] Maruyama, "The structure of Matsurigoto," 38.
[72] Nakabayashi, "Rise of a Japanese fiscal state," 388.
[73] Swayle, *The Meiji Restoration*, 65.
[74] Kazuhiro, *The Meiji Constitution*, x, xii-xiii.
[75] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 204.

Another unique element of Japan's entry into the world-system was its industrialization. Rather than start with light industry or focus on commodity production, the Meiji government started out by building heavy industry. Militarily, it also modernized quickly, because in 1873 Japan created a modern conscripted army and navy with modern, Western weapons.[76] Even so, Japan's modernized navy was outdated and as late as 1873 its tonnage did not equal even one French man-of-war and was sorely lacking in trained naval officers, especially engineers.[77] The goal of Meiji Japan was to model their army on France, while they modelled their modern navy on Britain. This resulted in the British Royal navy helping train modern naval officers with what was called the "Douglas Mission" in 1873.[78] Japan was setting its own course and writing its own rules in the modern world-system, while at the same time engaging in transimperial discourse. This made its future morality and adaptation to 'The Opium Question' in its imperial possession of Formosa not that surprising.

The United States in Asia: The Moral Empire

Almost as soon as the Thirteen Colonies seceded from Great Britain and became these United States of America, merchant ships from the United States were being outfitted to sail to East Asia with the goal of engaging in trade, especially with the Asian hegemon China.[79] One of these early, and very successful trading houses was Russell & Company, which began trading in China in 1818, and operated throughout the nineteenth century.[80] Just as the British East India Company had learned in the eighteenth century, Russel & Company learned in the nineteenth:

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[76] Dudden, "Matthew Perry in Japan," 197-198.
[77] Kiyoshi Ikeda, "The Douglas Mission and British Influence on the Japanese Navy," in Sue Henny and Jean-Pierre Lehmann (Eds.), *Themes and Theories in Modern Japanese History*, (London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1988): 172.
[78] Kiyoshi, "The Douglas Mission," 172-173.
[79] Gregory Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy: Theodore Roosevelt and China, 1901-1909*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015): 1.
[80] Sibing He, *Russell and Company, 1818-1891: America's Trade and Diplomacy in Nineteenth-Century China*, (Unpub. Ph.D. Diss, Miami University, Oxford, OH, 1997): 8.

that there was little demand for American goods in China, and there was much demand for Chinese tea in America.[81]

As Russell & Company expanded, they began using British bills of exchange, an early form of paper currency, obtained in London in exchange for in-demand American goods in Britain. They also discovered as early as 1805 that they could purchase opium in Smyrna, Turkey, for trade at Canton for tea.[82] Smuggling increased, and after the British East India Company's loss of its monopoly in 1834, United States merchants actively joined the opium smuggling business.[83] In 1842, a U.S. naval officer, Commodore Kearney, found ships belonging to Russell & Company sailing under American flags smuggling opium from India to Canton, a practice that Kearney found immoral, and which he tried to stop, with no success.[84] Like so many other merchants, the lure of profit from opium was too great, with little official American presence, and Chinese officials being lax in enforcing anti-opium laws.[85] By 1858, approximately one-fifth of the opium being smuggled into Shanghai was being done on American ships.[86] The merchants of the United States were following a similar path already taken by the British, in a trade that had been opened up to all nations in the first half of the nineteenth century.

If the first half of the nineteenth century was focused on commercial expansion for the United States, the second half, as argued by Ian Tyrrell, was informed by what he calls "moral reformers," who sought to convert and culturally influence the globe in Christian morals and values.[87] The United States did develop an empire before the First World War, and although it

[81] He, *Russell and Company*, 90-91.
[82] He, *Russell and Company*, 96-97.
[83] Owen, *British Opium Policy*, 206.
[84] Owen, *British Opium Policy*, 206-207.
[85] He, *Russell and Company*, 98-99.
[86] Owen, *British Opium Policy*, 208.
[87] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World,* 4-5.

differed from some models of European empires, the U.S. was involved in expanding its territory beyond North America throughout the nineteenth century.[88] This spread of U.S. territory also saw it as a transnational imperial power, whereby its participation was informed strongly by U.S. based "moral expansionism" that acted as a quasi-imperial power alongside the territorial empire.[89] Japan also became part of this transimperial discourse as participants in the Philippine Opium Commission investigations, and later as participants in the international opium commission and convention meetings into the 1920s.

Historian Paul Kramer provides an alternative definition of United States imperialism in the nineteenth century. He sees it as an analytical tool rather than a more concrete construction, and this approach is shared by the historian Emily Conroy-Krutz. She borrows Kramer's idea of imperialism as a flexible term, used to think about and analyze unequal power dynamics. She argues that Christian imperialists hoped instead to make the people they preached to and converted to Christianity as "equal member's of Christ's family" and to release them from the exploitation that they believed the colonized suffered under.[90]

If Historic East Asia was one type of hierarchy, Conroy-Krutz continues by saying that Anglo-U.S. missionaries saw civilization as the top of its own form of societal and cultural hierarchy, embodied in Western nation-states like the U.S. and Britain. Christian evangelists believed that evangelism and conversion among so-called less civilized societies in Asia, Africa and the as-yet unsettled areas of the Americas could become civilized through Christianity.[91]

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[88] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 2-3.
[89] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 5.
[90] Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2015): 10. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501701047/html. Accessed May 27, 2024.
[91] Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism*, 29, 30.

As a participant in transimperial knowledge exchange of the second half of the nineteenth century into the twentieth, the United States is important to consider, especially as it organized the first Shanghai Opium Commission meeting in 1909.[92] It also serves as a useful model as comparison to the Japanese empire that also expanded through the nineteenth century. Studying United States imperialism is a useful analytical structure for other societies because of its varied forms of empire and its ubiquitous presence globally by the twentieth century.[93] Although there is some question on the nature of the U.S. empire, the United States was already an experienced colonizer by the time it expanded into Asia. The first U.S. empire was "the long and contested incorporation of continental [North American] territory based on settlement colonialism."[94] As a form of empire, settler colonialism is disruptive in a different way from overlordship and economic exploitation and extraction. In the first wave of U.S. colonialism into western North America, missionaries took a more hybrid approach, which was both civilizing through Christianity and infused the indigenous population. Examples include the Choctaw and Cherokee nations, which were "civilized" by Christian settlers.[95] This combination of settler-missionary and settler-colonist method would be reproduced elsewhere, most notably in the Sandwich Islands (Hawai'i) by 1860.[96] The use of Christianity as imperialism shows some of the diversity that Kramer cites as the varied imperialisms used over time by the United States.

The Japanese understood from their European learning that they were at risk of imperial oppression. Furthermore, the unequal status of Japan in their treaties with the United States meant that Japan was considered inferior by its new trading partner, though the United States as a

[92] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 204.
[93] Paul Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World," *The American Historical Review*, (Vol. 116, No. 5, Dec. 2011): 1349. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23309640. Accessed April 29, 2024.
[94] Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions and Anglo-Saxons," 1316.
[95] Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism*, 104.
[96] *Ibid.*

partner was preferred to Britain at that time.[97] In this context of the coming rise of U.S. moral empire building, Japan was justified in its concern about inequality, but practical in its acceptance of a treaty with the United States. By the first years of the twentieth century, the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt considered Japan as a Westernized power, to be an example of Asian civility and thus an anchor used to keep Asia stable through the changes taking place with China's place as hegemon in question.[98] The United States now saw Japan as the key Western and Westernized ally in Asia.

Within the context of opium regulation, the United States as imperial power in the Philippines is a key player. The U.S. presence in the Philippines involved military occupation, administration and enforcement of law. It was also fertile ground for the moral empire, which influenced the creation of the Philippine Opium Commission in 1903. The Philippine Opium Commission served as both a precursor and a template for the International Opium Commission held in Shanghai in February 1909, which was organized and chaired by one of the Philippine Opium Commissioners, Bishop Charles H. Brent.

Like the experience of Commodore Kearney in China in the 1840s, the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 led to what Tyrrell calls "a series of contradictions that exposed it [American drug policy in the Philippines] to the wrath of evangelicals."[99] The importance of opium in the Philippines to moral reformers was such that "American missionaries and other idealistic imperialists deeply wanted to shoulder the 'white man's burden'…using the Philippines as a springboard to international reform and shaping American colonialism and internationalism" as the U.S. empire expanded globally.[100] Its expansion into Asia was another stage in of the U.S.

[97] Dudden, "Matthew Perry in Japan," 199.
[98] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 197.
[99] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 146.
[100] Wertz, "Idealism, Imperialism and Internationalism," 470.

empire that had begun with its spread west in North America and continued to grow under the influence of the religious, moral reformers.

That wrath of the evangelicals is evident in a news story from the *Outlook*, an evangelical magazine published in New York City. The writer, commenting on the proposed government-controlled state-monopoly system, says that "All monopolies are seriously objectionable. Monopolies granted and guaranteed by government is doubly objectionable. Monopoly in a vice [opium] granted and guaranteed by government is trebly objectionable."[101] Morally, the writer also objects to the racial divide of the monopoly, which proposed licencing of opium only to Chinese residents. The writer continues, saying that opium "is condemned by all medical authorities, and is strongly protested against by the best class of Chinamen [sic.], the race for whose indulgence the proposed license of opium traffic in the Philippines is to be established."[102] The moral reformers, being a strong presence in both the Philippines and at home in the United States used their power and persuasion to resist the idea of a government monopoly in the Philippines.

The question of a Philippine opium monopoly came about in 1899, the year after the United States' conquest of the Philippines from Spain. The U.S. Army under General Henry Ware Lawton was marching north, accompanied by around 300 Chinese labourers, possibly in response to the Philippine declaration of independence in the last weeks of the Spanish-U.S. War. The resulting U.S. occupation of the Philippines and lack of acknowledgement of Philippine independence in 1898 resulted in the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902.[103] The labourers,

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[101] Anon. "Opium Traffic in the Philippines," *Outlook,* (New York: Vol. 74, Issue 8, Jun. 20, 1903): 437. URL: https://www.lib.uwo.ca/cgi-bin/ezpauthn.cgi?url=http://search.proquest.com/magazines/servian-slaughter/docview/136603140/se-2. Accessed: Nov. 18, 2023.
[102] Anon. "Opium Traffic in the Philippines," 437.
[103] Andrew Yeo, "Philippine National Independence, 1898-1904," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.), *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events that Shaped the Modern International Order*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 206. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108807401. Accessed May 29, 2023.

on the march and unable to purchase the opium to which they were dependant all began going into withdrawal. Gen. Lawton ordered an aide to procure opium in Manila to be smoked by the Chinese workers.[104]

At issue was the morality of the occupying United States government in the Philippines supplying residents of that island with opium. This experience was the first time Gen. Lawton had been aware of opium being issued as a ration.[105] Furthermore, this demonstrated the disconnect between moral reformers back in Washington arguing for prohibition in theory versus the real condition of opium dependence being an issue that required the attention of front-line U.S. administrators.

Under Spanish rule, opium had been regulated under the opium farm system, which the U.S. administration quickly replaced with a tariff on opium imports.[106] Opium farming was developed over the nineteenth century and Carl Trocki argues that with the British, in this case in Singapore, used the opium farm system to capitalize opium due to the continued lack of specie in Asia. This placed them into the role of opium wholesalers who used local agents as retailers and thus introduced Singapore into the colonial capitalist world-system.[107] The farmer in this relationship was the *kongsi*, which was "a ritual community of single men who had ventured from their homelands to seek their fortunes among the "barbarians" of the South Seas."[108] European colonial administrations in other parts of Southeast Asia used similar systems, whereby the European administrators could auction[109], tender or appoint farmers to control the processing,

[104] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 148.
[105] *Ibid.*
[106] Wertz, "Idealism, Imperialism and Internationalism," 469.
[107] Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 51-52.
[108] Trocki, *Opium and Empire*, 3.
[109] Carl Trocki, "Drugs, Taxes and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Eds.), *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000): 81.

distribution and retail sales of opium in the colony.[110] The U.S. had no desire to continue the opium farming system, which led them to embark on the Philippine Opium Commission as a way to gather local knowledge on how to control opium use and distribution.

Therefore, the purpose of the Philippine Opium Commission was to not find out how to prohibit the drug, but how to regulate it while still reaping the financial reward in a form of balance of harm versus profit.[111] The Commission members were all involved in the imperial U.S. administration in the Philippines. Major Edward C. Carter was an army surgeon and Commissioner of Public Health. The Right Reverend C.H. Brent was serving as the Bishop of the Philippines. Finally, the sole Filipino member was Dr. José Albert, who was a working physician in the occupied Philippines.[112]

In his letter of instruction to the three commission members, then governor of the island William Howard Taft requested that the commission travel to various locales around the Philippines to determine how the opium question was handled. In her book on the history of the U.S. war on drugs, Anne L. Foster argues that the members of the commission believed that opium was no more dangerous a substance to Asians than alcohol was to whites, and Foster further states that the commission report has helped shape American drug policy to the present day.[113]

Governor William Howard Taft mandated to the commission that

> Your committee will visit Japan, Formosa [Taiwan], Shanghai, Hongkong, Saigon, Singapore, Java, and Upper and Lower Burmah [sic.], and inform yourselves concerning the laws governing the importation, sale, and use of opium in force in those countries and cities, the operation and effect of the laws in restraining or encouraging the use of the drug, the estimated number of users of the drug, the value of the monopoly concession if there be such a concession, and its increase or

[110] Kim, *Empires of Vice*, 32-33.
[111] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 212.
[112] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report,* 1.
[113] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 38-39.

> decrease year by year, and the causes therefor; the amount of opium smuggled into the city or country, the method of its use, whether by smoking, eating, drinking or hypodermic injection, the effect of the use of the drug on the different races, and, in general, all facts shown by the experience of the governments of the countries and cities named above.[114]

The mandate was a lot, especially considering that Gov. Taft asked that they complete their field interviews within four months of their commission. Also, as Foster noted concerning this structure informing American drug policy, the focus is on the legal question of opium, its smuggling, volumes of consumption and monetary values. There is nothing in the mandate asking about addiction treatment, health care or other social programs aimed at helping people stop their dependence on the drug. It is very much a legal and economic mandate.

My examination of the Philippine Opium Commission report will focus mainly on Japan and its then colony Formosa (modern day Taiwan). Japan had acquired the island as part of the settlement with China at the conclusion of the first Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Before the Japanese takeover, the Chinese officials ruling the island had found opium to be incredibly lucrative, both from customs duties on opium imports, as well as the internal Chinese taxes called *likin*, and between 1887 and 1892, opium revenue from these two sources accounted for over 50% of its total revenue.[115] Therefore, opium in Taiwan was a profitable venture for the island.

From an international relations perspective, Seo-Hyun Park argues that the war was not simply between the two nations of China and Japan, it also involved other international actors Britain, France, Germany, and the United States and she says in particular Russia as well.[116] The

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[114] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 53.
[115] John M. Jennings, *The Opium Empire: Japanese imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.): 19.
[116] Seo-Hyun Park, "The Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895," in Stephen Haggard and David C. Kang (Eds.). *East Asia in the World: Twelve Events That Shaped the Modern International Order*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020): 225, online edition. DOI: 10.1017/9781108807401, Accessed May 29, 2023.

war was also caused by instability of the hierarchical structure of Historical East Asia. Japan was emboldened by its increasing economic strength and professional, modern military.[117] Japan was determined to enter global commercial and international relations on its own terms by learning from other nations past mistakes and successes. Japan made a change in approach to both its own internal structure and how it interacted outside of Japan. The historian Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi argues that Japan's changes in the Meiji era changed "from passivity in plenitude at home to aggressive acquisitiveness abroad" which were "central to the emergence of modern Japan."[118]

From Wakabayashi's description of Japanese colonial ambitions, their position as the new rulers of Taiwan as found by the Philippine Opium Commission presented a contradiction. The Philippine Opium Commission's report was "the first time in which any attempt has been made to collate the opium legislation of a number of countries where the use of the drug is dealt with as a matter of large concern."[119] In considering its options, the Commission addressed approaches to regulation such as high tariffs, the "local option", which is not defined, farming of opium poppies as self-regulating, prohibition (only if implemented slowly), and the fifth option, government monopoly.[120]

Their recommendation contained thirteen parts, and included measures such as an immediate, strict government monopoly, prohibition after three years, that only males over twenty-one years of age could obtain government opium smoking licences (with violators subject to fines or imprisonment), that opium licence holders could not hold Philippine public

[117] *Ibid.*
[118] Bob Tasashi Wakabayashi, "From Peril to Profit: Opium in Late-Edo to Meiji Eyes," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Eds.), *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000.): 56.
[119] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 12.
[120] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 45-47.

office, the outlawing of opium dens, called "fumatories" in the report, and the outlawing of the cultivation of the opium poppy *Papaver somniferum* in the islands.[121] There are several items that were also proactive and progressive in the recommendations. Section 5 carries the note that "no distinction has been made among the various nationalities which reside in these islands, as it is believed that the interests of equity and justice are thus best subserved."[122] Also, Section 9 directed that "in the public schools of the Philippine Islands shall be taught the evil and debasing results of the opium habit," which in a way foreshadowed First Lady Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" anti-drug campaign of the 1980s in classrooms in the United States.[123] Section 5 especially was in contradiction to the Japanese responses from the Commission transcripts, since most Japanese respondents denied that opium was used by any Japanese citizens residing outside of Japan at all.

The Island of Formosa, which had been occupied by Japan since 1895, was also governed by a strict government monopoly, and both the colonial government and officials in the Japanese home islands were unanimous in their responses in the belief that no Japanese people smoked or used opium. In their interview with Mr. T. Ando, the former Japanese Consul stationed in Hawai'i, the Commission asked:

Q. "Is the use of opium considered a disgrace among the Japanese people?"
A. Mr. T. Ando: "Yes. It is considered a disgrace. We had some fear that the Japanese in Formosa would acquire the habit from the Chinese; however, I do not believe that a single Japanese in that island uses it, although I cannot safetly [sic.] say. At least, I do not think so."[124]

The fear of opium in the Japanese home islands was ingrained into the Japanese cultural mind, just like foreign invasion. When Mr. Ando was asked about that cultural fear in Japan, he said

[121] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 47-48.
[122] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 47.
[123] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 106-108.
[124] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 58.

"The Japanese government was afraid of having an opium war such as China had. The Japanese believe that the origin of the trouble and disorder prevailing in China is due to opium. The Japanese immediately took measures to prohibit the importation of opium into Nagasaki, which was the only port open at that time[125], and entirely kept it out." The challenge of the growing Japanese empire was that areas they were occupying, like the American experience in the Philippines, already had a history and culture of opium smoking and smuggling.

The U.S. and Filipino Commissioners appear to have had a favourable impression of the Japanese model in Formosa. By seeing the Philippine Opium Commission as a form of exchange of imperial powers, the commissioners were gathering knowledge from other neighbour nations to learn how to run the Philippines in a profitable way, with a cooperative native population. The historian Paul D. Barclay argues that the Japanese in Formosa aspired to run the colony at a profit by investing in administrative and social necessities like censuses, land surveys and by paying to settle accounts with the island's elites of the former regime.[126] Part of the Japanese revenue stream was its government run opium monopoly, which helped the colony run at a profit.

When they interviewed Dr. Shimpei Goto, the Vice-Governor of Formosa, who stated that the purpose of the opium monopoly was "to derive a [sic.] revenue and to reduce gradually the number of smokers. The latter purpose is accomplished in several ways, as, by educational measures, charitable institutions, sanitary improvement, etc."[127] On the question of morality of the opium monopoly, Mr. T. Iwai, the Japanese Director of the Bureau of Monopolies was asked:

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[125] He is not clear as to what "that time" was specifically, perhaps the six or seven years ago he mentioned previously, meaning around 1896 or 1897.
[126] Paul D. Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874-1945*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2018): 13. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt2204r2t. Accessed April 5, 2024.
[127] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 59.

Q. "What I wanted to ask is whether it [growing opium poppies on Formosa] would not have a bad moral effect on the people?"
A. Mr. Iwai: "No. If opium smoking were allowed without restriction to everybody, it would be bad; but since it is not, I do not think that the effect would be bad."[128]

Therefore, it appears as if the morals and practices of the Japanese colonial government was serving as the template of how to morally regulate opium in occupied areas in which opium use was already embedded, while making a profit at the same time.

In his role as administrator, Gotō had also helped co-ordinate public safety by establishing a Japanese approach to an originally Chinese system of local control of both criminality and for tax collection purposes, the *baojia*.[129] Called the *hokō* system by the Japanese, this system helped Japanese colonial police forces in Formosa not just maintain public order by mutual accountability, it was also used to help gradually suppress opium use by the Chinese Formosans.

By 1898, Gotō had set up a public hospital and a medical college to deal with the diseases of the sub-tropical island.[130] In that same year, he also implemented the *hokō* (*baojia*) registration system on Formosa so "the Japanese could exert control" on the island.[131]
As a form of social control, the modified Japanese *hokō* system was applied only to ethnic Chinese Formosans with the goal to "enforce their [colonial Japanese administrators] public health programs, to combat epidemics, and to prevent the spread of contagious diseases" and to "erradicate [sic.] opium smoking."[132] This is another example of Japan adopting a foreign

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[128] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 62.
[129] Mo Tian, "The *Baojia* System as Institutional Control in Manchukuo under Japanese Rule (1932-45)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, (Vol. 59, No. 4 (2016)): 532. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26426388. Accessed August 9, 2024.
[130] John J. Metzler, *Taiwan's Transformation: 1895 to the Present*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): 11. URL: http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=4775465. Accessed August 9, 2024.
[131] *Ibid.*
[132] Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Eds.), *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): 216. URL: https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1515/9780691213873-009. Accessed August 9, 2024.

method and adapting to suit its own needs. Given Gotō's experience as a medical doctor focusing on public hygiene, the use of *hokō* as not just legal but medical surveillance was another novel use of the system. By 1903 Gotō's *hokō* system had registered 500,000 households on Formosa "involving a web of control and obligation."[133] The *hokō* system was part of Japan's colonial framework on Formosa.

Japan had been isolated for centuries, and with the arrival of Commodore Perry combined with the weakening self-assurance of the former ruling Bakufu government helped change that isolation. The "Meiji oligarchy" needed to create an "official nationalism" based not on old, pre-shogunate ancient culture, but rather on reformist measures of nineteenth century Western nations like Hohenzollern Germany.[134] Japanese isolation meant that their society was homogenous, evident in the near-universal response to the Philippine Opium Commission's question about whether many or any Japanese people used opium recreationally.[135] Mr. K. Kumagai, the Chief Official in Charge of Formosan Affairs with the Department of Home Affairs was asked:

"Q. Has there been any evidence of a tendency among the Japanese in Formosa to use opium?
A. There has been no such tendency observed."[136]

When Mr. Ando, the former Consul to Hawai'i was asked:

"Q. Do the Japanese never smoke opium?
A. Mr. Ando: Never. I think I can safely say that."[137]

Even Dr. Goto, the Vice-Governor of Formosa admitted that "two Japanese have violated the opium law thus far. Their purpose in smoking was not vicious, it was merely a curious desire to

[133] Metzler, *Taiwan's Transformation*, 12.
[134] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised Edition*, (London and Brooklyn: Verso, 1983 and 2016): 94-95.
[135] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 95-96.
[136] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 57.
[137] Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 58.

try it." This suggests that for the Japanese opium was merely a curiosity for a very tiny minority and was not a problem overall. One of the themes of the Japanese interviewees is that while opium use was not a Japanese problem, it was definitely a Chinese problem. The relationship between Japan and China had changed from a superior and inferior relationship as it was in the Historical East Asian period, to one of more uncertainty, where Japan had more latitude and agency over its own affairs.

Japan as an Asian imperial nation was becoming part of the world-system with the goal of increasing its imperial holdings in emulation of European nations and the United States, preferring the role of colonizer as opposed to being colonized. After seeing the damage and devastation caused in China, Japan was motivated to learn and to form transnational connections with other empires and to learn from successes and failures of other empires. The process of entering the world-system, or international market, was at times violent, and most often it was done unwillingly, but with more self-determination and agency than had been afforded China. Maruyama argues that Chinese and Japanese national consciousness – or nationalism – arose when those countries "reacted against the corporate pressure of European power surging in from outside."[138] Because China, and also India, had been forcibly pulled into the European world-system, Japan had learned to both look to Europe for learning, technology and trade, while at the same time exercising caution about how it interacted with the West.

Japan by the 1850s realized that pressure to open itself up from centuries of isolation was inevitable. A main variable was whether it did this voluntarily through treaties, or if it was forced by outside military intervention. With the assertive advances by Commodore Perry and his Black Ships, Japan chose the former, even though the Black Ships were designed to

[138] Maruyama, Masao, "Nationalism in Japan: Its Theoretical Background and Prospects," Ivan Morris (Trans.), in Ivan Morris (Ed.) *Modern Japanese Politics, Expanded Edition*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1969): 139.

intimidate them into action. As the United States expanded their empire further into Asia with the acquisition of the Philippines, along with its expanded trade on the continent, epistemic exchanges allowed the to learn from local nations how they operated within the local opium culture as they dealt with opium use in the Philippines. Despite the U.S. administrators denying their debt to the previous Spanish imperial rulers, the U.S. administration still had things to learn, like opium regulation.[139]

The U.S. directed Philippine Opium Commission shared and participated in cultural exchange with colonial administrators in Formosa, which formed a transnational connection and information exchange between two Asian imperial powers. The fact that both Japan and the United States also contributed troops during the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 is further evidence that the two nations shared similar goals. Japan, being nearest to the site of the rebellion due to its concession in Tianjin negotiated in 1898, was able to contribute the most number of foreign troops to suppress the rebellion and help maintain the Qing Dynasty.[140] The United States sent 3,500 troops to Beijing of the total 20,000 troops, which also showed that the United States was equally interested in maintaining existing empires in Asia.[141]

[139] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 221.
[140] Kobayashi, "Drug Operations by Resident Japanese," 155.
[141] Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy*, 26.

Chapter 3 – The International Opium Commission

In his opening remarks to the International Opium Commission held in Shanghai, China, between February 1st and February 26th, 1909, His Excellency Tuan Fang, the Viceroy of the current Emperor Liangkiang, remarked that "I am convinced that the countries of the world recognize the benevolence and philanthropy which have led to the gathering of the present Conference in the interests of civilization, and I may state that the people of our whole empire are most grateful for it."[1] Opium had become a global problem over the nineteenth century, manufactured and distributed by imperial actors with little to no oversight or repercussion. The problem, framed as 'The Opium Question', had finally become a burden not just for China, but in many nations of the world.

This chapter focuses on two empires and their actions and reactions to the opium question within the context of larger international meetings on opium. Japan and the United States were now imperial powers in Asia. As these two imperial powers learned how to administer their colonies, they had to learn the social, legal and economic approaches to the drug. They adopted local epistemic knowledge from both native cultures like China, and imperial ones like Britain. Japan and the United States were learning how to operate within established opium economies and societies. Britain, was also a relative newcomer, and had become a mercantile entity of some influence only from the late eighteenth century. This mercantile activity helped commodify opium. China, the historical hegemon of Historic East Asia, was suffering damage due to the wide production and distribution of opium both smuggled into the country and produced often illegally domestically. The two newer empires would use methods already tested

[1] International Opium Commission, *Report of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China, February 1 to February 26, 1909*, (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News & Herald Ltd., 1909): 9.

by the two older ones, and find that the benefits of both monopoly and morality served each of their needs well.

The International Opium Commission was not a spontaneous occurrence, and it was the result of much activism and writing throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The moral reformer groups that opposed opium, or at the very least discussed its effects and harms on the human body and mind, were motivated by several factors. These groups were composed of reformers, both religious and secular, medical professionals, both secular and religious, and in China and Japan, nationalist reformers.

Medicine, Morals and 'The Opium Question'

The religious moralism against opium was perhaps the oldest of the reformist movements related to the opium trade. The man considered to be the first evangelist missionary to travel to China, the British Rev. Robert Morrison, was forced to create the British-American missionary network before he even stepped foot in China. The British East India Company refused to transport missionaries to Asia due to their disruptive behaviour in India directed at native Indian religious practices, so the Company both refused to transport missionaries until 1813 and even after. It also kept missionaries at arms length in Asia.[2] In her article on Rev. Morrison, Kristin Bayer supports Ian Tyrrell's argument that American evangelizing took place rapidly in the 1870s, but does not acknowledge the fact that British-American evangelical networking began many decades earlier in the early nineteenth century.[3]

The Rev. Morrison travelled to New York from Britain in April, 1807 and while there he began networking with American missionaries anxious to also spread the Christian word in China.[4] Such was the nature of transnational networking and exchange that Morrison made his

[2] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste," 584-585.
[3] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste," 587-588; Tyrrell, "Reforming the World," 14-15.
[4] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste," 586-587.

first trip to China on an American merchant ship, posing as an American, and supported by American missionaries at his secret missionary operation in Guangzhou, China.[5] Morrison's travel through the United States, the work he did there encouraging U.S. based evangelical missionaries to travel to Asia, and finally his travel there show that missionary work was being done far earlier than Tyrrell's dates of the 1880s and 1890s as the expansion of the U.S. moral reform "footprint."[6] Morrison was a human connector, bringing British anti-opium morality and evangelism to the United States, and then proceeding to Asia to evangelize and to help address 'The Opium Question.'[7]

Anti-opium reformers were active in Britain as well, though British missionaries' experience with the Company can perhaps explain why missionary reformers were kept out of political consideration for so long in Britain. One reformer, the Rev. A.S. Thelwall, a British theologian, wrote on the opium trade in 1839 and argued against the trade because "The honour and welfare of this Country [Great Britain], and the interests of Religion and humanity, seemed all to be most seriously concerned."[8] Thelwall also addressed "the progress of religion" in the Eastern empire, probably referring to India, and how there had been much "success of Christian Missions among the countless multitudes of Eastern Asia, and even on the commercial interests of the merchants and Manufacturers of Great Britain."[9] This demonstrates how missionary work in both Europe and Asia could stay connected even at such a great distance.

Writing over seventy years after Thelwall, another religious advocate against opium the Rev. Eric Lewis in 1910 called Britain's continued opium trade with China "Our Thrice-Confessed National Sin" in reference to the fact that the British parliament had three times called

[5] Bayer, "Desire, Disguise, and Distaste," 587-588.
[6] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 4.
[7] Saunier, *Transnational History*, 36.
[8] Rev. A.S. Thelwall, *The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China*, (London: Wm. H. Allen and Co., 1839: 2.
[9] Thelwall, *The Iniquities of the Opium Trade with China*, 168-169.

the opium issue "morally indefensible."[10] The immorality of the opium trade was a common theme in the religious anti-opium movement. The religious reformers, which included evangelicals like the Quakers, became an increasingly vocal group throughout the nineteenth century.[11]

F.S. Turner was a British former member of the Medical Missionary Society, and was also Secretary of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade. In 1876 he addressed British versus Asian morality concerning opium in his book on British opium policy that "the moral sense of heathens [in India] would be strong enough to compel the cessation of a system which the moral sense of Christians permits!"[12] Turner also equated the Chinese addiction to opium to Britain's addiction to the Indian opium revenue, and that "Our British government has run a course parallel with that of the Chinese opium-smoker. He begins with a few whiffs, very pleasant, very refreshing, suggesting no thought of peril. Presently, he is consuming his three or four pipes every day, and then a sudden qualm seizes him."[13] The result of Turner's metaphor is that soon the opium smoker, like the British government, was unable to give up either addictive substance, opium or money, to the point where "there is no longer a thought of relinquishing it."[14] The temptation of state monopolies, and the East India Company monopoly that preceded them, became an addiction for the governments running them.

The nineteenth century also saw the rise of "internationalism" from the U.S. reformer perspective. This internationalism "depended not only on the fact of nationalism but also on the ability of some powers to exert influence over others to extend higher standards of conduct between humans."[15] There were U.S. based reformer movements like that of Turner, who as a

[10] Lewis, *Black Opium. passim*.
[11] Owen, *British Opium Policy*, 229-230.
[12] Turner, *British Opium Policy*, 161.
[13] Turner, *British Opium Policy*, 163.
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 13.

member of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade critiqued British opium policy. The American International Reform Bureau worked to critique American policies and practices that violated "Protestant evangelical causes" such as opium use.[16] Founded in 1895 by the Rev. Dr. Wilbur Crafts, the Bureau used organized methods to lobby the government like petitions, direct lobbying of representatives and systematic canvassing using telephone and city directories.[17]

Unlike in Britain, where evangelical reformers seemed to be less influential politically, Rev. Dr. Crafts wrote about the influence that the Bureau had on lawmaking, right up to the presidency. The Gillet-Lodge Bill, which was passed in 1902, was meant to "prohibit the sale of liquor, opium and firearms by American traders in the islands of the Pacific, having no civilized government."[18] Such was the influence of the International Reform Bureau that the missionary who had fought for this bill, Dr. John G. Paton, who had appealed for so long on behalf of the Bureau that President Theodore Roosevelt gave the Bureau the pen with which he had signed the bill.[19] The American moral lobby appeared to have more influence within the circles of power than did their British counterparts.

The United States experienced a dilemma in their debates on the issue regarding opium in the Philippines in March 1905. At the United States Senate Committee on the Philippines, Secretary William Howard Taft argued against the insertion of a provision of a state-monopoly style system for "confirmed "opium sots"" of Chinese residents of the Philippines over 21 years of age for three years, to allow for a gradual reduction in illicit opium use.[20] Taft argued that the

[16] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 123.
[17] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 123-124.
[18] Rev. Wilbur F. Crafts, Ph.D., *Patriotic Studies of a Quarter Century of Moral Legislation in Congress*, (Washington, DC: International Reform Bureau, 1911): 37. URL: https://llmc-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/docDisplay5.aspx?set=40318&volume=0001&part=001.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] Crafts, *Patriotic Studies*, 230.

Philippine Opium Commission had yet to publish its findings. American moral reformers were more determined to prohibit opium outright than their British. While the U.S. presence in the Philippines had experienced the effects of sudden withdrawal from opium among its Chinese labourers shortly after its acquisition of the islands (see Chapter 2), they more than any other state at the Shanghai Commission meeting would favour the prohibition of opium as an immediate solution to 'The Opium Question.'

Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, 'The Opium Question' was also addressed by Western medical professionals. This is not to say that Asian nations did not also practice their own brand of traditional and Western medicine, which will be addressed in the next chapter. The clinical aspects of secular accounts on opium are a contrast to the more emotionally charged treatises of the religious anti-opium reformers. An account published in the prestigious British medical journal *The Lancet* in 1839 reads partly like a post-mortem report and partly like a personal account.

Written by a Dr. J. Johnston Kelso from Lisburn, Northern Ireland and titled "Medical Jurisprudence. Poisoning with Opium Cases," Dr. Kelso described two cases of opium poisoning, one case being his own experience with the drug.[21] The first case was that of a medical student who had died of apparent opium poisoning. Dr. Kelso described the deceased in the hours prior to his death, plus a detailed report of the autopsy, such as his observations of the deceased's external body, heart, head, abdomen and a chemical analysis.[22] There was also a moral piece to the report, as Dr. Kelso noted that in the evening prior to the student's death, he

[21] J. Johnston Kelso, M.D., "Medical Jurisprudence. Poisoning With Opium. Cases.," *The Lancet*, (Vol. 32 Issue 838, Originally published as Vol. 2 Issue 838): 924-927.
[22] Kelso, "Poisoning with Opium," 924-925.

had been ”passing the evening with a brace of ladies, characters of light fame, with whom he had been drinking of ardent spirits pretty freely.”[23]

The second case was that of Dr. Kelso himself, after he was afflicted by chest pain and expectoration of “muco-purulent sputa,” suggesting some form of pneumonia, bronchitis or other chest infection.[24] He reported that he self-prescribed “between half a grain and five-eights, the quantity which I usually prescribe at first, of the hydrochlorate of morphia, enveloped in a little chewed bread,” to help with his affliction. He then slept, but around midnight he awoke with his headache gone, but with “a sense of giddiness, with some oppression at the precordia [suggesting a tightness of the chest], slight sickness at stomach, and (the idea of which haunted me during the active effects of the poison, like a grim demon), a singular dread of impending annihilation.”[25] This very personal account contrasts greatly with the first case described by Kelso, due to the personal nature of his poisoning. The first case of the medical student was clinical, and the second case, that of Kelso himself, depicting his personal feelings and experiences. This personal experience with opium is often if not always absent from missionary and medical missionary accounts, due to the paternalistic, moralizing attitudes of the writers, even secular ones.

Combining the clinical, medical approach to opium with that of the religiously motivated moralizing of the anti-opium reformers was the hybrid position of the medical missionary. Sponsored by missionary societies in the West, the medical missionary served as both physical and spiritual healer outside of Christian countries. The combination of medical practitioner and missionary constituted an intermediate role within a circuit whereby Western religion and

[23] Kelso, “Poisoning with Opium,” 924.
[24] Kelso, “Poisoning with Opium,” 925.
[25] Kelso, “Poisoning with Opium,” 925-926.

medicine were transported to Asia using Western money with the intention to help people medically and to save their souls religiously.[26]

The founder of the first medical missionary society was the American physician and theologian Dr. Peter Parker, who had graduated from Yale University Medical School in 1834 with both an M.D. degree and as an ordained Presbyterian minister.[27] Theron Kue-Hing Young argues that the two functions of missionary and physician were only combined in 1835 with Parker.[28] In the manifesto written by Parker, and his colleagues Thomas Colledge and Elijah Bridgman founding the *Medical Missionary Society* in China, the men wrote that the purpose of their work would be:

> The good effects that seem likely to be produced by medical practice among the Chinese, especially as tending to bring about a more social and friendly intercourse between them and foreigners, as well as to diffuse the arts and sciences of Europe and America, and in the end introduce the Gospel of our Saviour in place of the pitiable superstitions by which their minds are now governed, it was resolved to attempt the foundation of a society to be called the Medical Missionary Society in China.[29]

Again, this establishment of the first medical mission in China in 1835 pushes back Tyrrell's dates of the 1880s and 1890s by several decades.

Another piece of evidence in favour of the early date for the beginnings of the Western moral network in Asia is found in the memoir of another medical missionary, Dr. William Lockhart. Lockhart was a British medical missionary, and had passed his medical exams in London in 1833-1834, and in 1839 left with his colleague Dr. Medhurst for Canton, China.[30] In

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[26] Saunier, *Transnational History*, 44.
[27] Theron Kue-Hing Young, "A Conflict of Professions: The Medical Missionary in China, 1835-1890," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, (Vol. 47, No. 3, (May-June 1973)): 250, 253. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44450132. Accessed: December 15, 2023.
[28] Young, "A Conflict of Professions," 250.
[29] Quoted in Young, "A Conflict of Professions," 250-251; the original manifesto was published in the *Chinese Repository* (Canton), 1836, 5: 370-372.
[30] Henri Cordier, "Nécrologie: William Lockhart Lo Wei-lin," *T'oung Pao*, (Vol. 7, No. 3, 1896): 275. Translated from French by the author.

his memoir on his work in China that was autobiographical, ethnographic and anthropological in content, Lockhart argued that physicians like Parker, who were both doctors and ministers, were not efficient in their medical work. He wrote:

> that whenever the work has failed in eliciting the goodwill and sympathy of the natives, it has resulted from the medical missionary not making his hospital his chief work, giving to it his most earnest strength, and doing his work with sufficient energy. It is for this reason I urgently advise that the medical missionary be strictly a layman, for as a layman he can do all teaching and preaching that he has opportunity and ability for.[31]

Lockhart quotes from a pamphlet, a "History of the Medical Missionary Society" published in Macao in 1843, which also argued, that the *Society* existed "to encourage the practice of medicine among the Chinese; to extend to them some of those benefits which science, patient investigation, and the ever-kindling light of discovery have conferred upon ourselves."[32] Therefore, from Lockhart's perspective, there was a third purpose to the medical missionary endeavour, which was to teach the Chinese techniques of modern, Western medicine.

In addition to bringing Western medicine to China, the medical missionaries brought the challenges of the Chinese people to the West as another instance of information exchange designed to sell the need for missionary support by donors from the West. Dr. Parker, whose medical missionary work was disrupted by the first Opium War in 1839 to 1842, visited the United States and then Europe through the 1840s and 1850s to promote Chinese medical missions, to raise funds, and he even met with the American president and addressed Congress.[33]

During his time away from China, Parker toured medical schools, seminaries and gave public lectures in the United States before travelling to France and the United Kingdom to

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[31] William Lockhart, M.D., *The Medical Missionary in China; A Narrative of Twenty Years' Experience*, (London: Hurst and Blackstreet, Publishers, Successors to Henry Colburn, 13, Great Marlborough Street, 1861), vi. URL: https://www.empire.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/The%20Medical%20Missionary%20in%20China#Snippits. Accessed October 26, 2022.
[32] Lockhart, *The Medical Missionary in China*, 134.
[33] Young, "A Conflict of Professions," 264.

promote medical missions in China.[34] This early networking, as we would call it today, undoubtedly shaped later relationships not only between missionaries and the American government, but also the networks between and among Western Christian missions. Dr. Lockhart even acknowledged the work of Mr. Olyphant, the American merchant who transported Morrison to China in 1807.[35] Lockhart also wrote a tribute to Olyphant given by Parker, who described his fellow American as "that distinguished merchant and Christian."[36] A network was already formed by the Second Opium War in the late 1850s among the missionaries of the West as they worked to save lives and souls in China.

The medical missions spread rapidly after the 1830s, with British and American medical missionary societies establishing and running many hospitals around China. In 1887, Dr. J.L. Maxwell described a typical Chinese mission hospital, located "in the heart of that city…with its consulting room and dispensary for out-patients and its wards for in-patients, the latter crowded with men and women who have come in to be treated, and who are living at their own charges. Still better, it shows you these people…listening wilfully to the Word of Life."[37]

From its beginning in 1835 with Dr. Parker, medical missionary hospitals had only grown to six by 1863, though by 1887 when Maxwell was writing, there were approximately thirty medical mission hospitals run by British missionaries and twenty American hospitals, with around sixty medical labourers, "Including ladies", as Maxwell felt appropriate to point out.[38] At that time, he continued, there were six hospitals operating in Canton Province, five in Fukien, two in Formosa, four in Shantung, and he laments that there are six provinces in China with no

[34] *Ibid.*
[35] Lockhart, *The Medical Missionary in China*, 174.
[36] Lockhart, *The Medical Missionary in China*, 174.
[37] Dr. J.L. Maxwell, "Medical Missions in China," *Medical Missions at Home and Abroad*, New Series, Vol. I. October, 1885 – October, 1887, (London: T. Ogilvie Smith, 14 Paternoster Square): 245.
[38] Maxwell, "Medical Missions in China," 245-246.

medical missionary or hospital.[39] These hospitals, being centred in cities, with moralistic practitioners preaching gospel as well as healing, inevitably took on the task of helping people dependant on opium to break their dependence on the drug. (See Fig. 3.1).

Fig. 3. 1 – The London Missionary Society Hospital at Tientsin (Tien-Tsin) c. 1886, northern China. Source: Medical Missions at Home and Abroad, *Vol. 1, New Series, 1887. p. 87. URL: https://www.empire.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/Medical%20Missions%20at%20Home%20and%20Abroad%20Vol%201. Accessed October 26, 2022.*

Since Dr. Lockhart was one of the earlier medical missionaries in China, and given the fact that he spent forty years of his career there, his memoir of his work in China is illuminating. This example of "pre-packaged knowledge" for people who were interested in experiencing far away places without the means to do so included descriptions from Lockhart of cities, food, culture, dress and customs of the Chinese people and nation.[40] He also dedicated an entire chapter to opium, entitled "Remarks on the Opium Question" as a way to bring the problem of opium in China to Western readers.[41] It was missionary proselytizing like this that encouraged Britain to eventually study the issue of opium in its empire, though nothing came of the

[39] Maxwell, "Medical Missions in China," 246.
[40] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 213-214.
[41] Lockhart, *The Medical Missionary in China*, Chapter XIV, 383-404.

substantial seven volume *Royal Commission on Opium*, published in 1894-1895.[42] It did however elicit a medical missionary response to the treatment of 'The Opium Question' in China by British missionaries living there.

Written by London Missionary Society member Arnold Foster, *The Report of the Royal Commission on Opium Compared With the Evidence From China That was Submitted to The Commission: An Examination And An Appeal* used the commission report on China to critique the "pro-opium evidence" recorded by the commission. Foster argued that "none but pro-opium evidence has received serious attention of the Commission."[43] He quoted the Secretary of State for India, Lord Kimberley, who admitted that "the Anti-Opium agitation in this country [Great Britain], [was] already serious, and likely to be yet more formidable in a new House of Commons", suggesting that anti-opium sentiment was reaching the ears of the politicians in power but that their sentiments were not abating the opium trade.[44] In 1880, the British Prime Minister Gladstone had personally opposed the continued opium revenue in India, though anti-opium lobbying had failed to convince parliamentarians between 1880 and 1891 to restrict or stop the trade, despite their efforts slowly gaining increased public support.[45]

It was that increasing public support that would help encourage Britain and other state-monopoly actors to meet to discuss the damage that the opium trade was doing. While the missionaries like Foster, and their American counterparts were advocating for total prohibition of the opium trade, state actors like Britain were actively engaged in the state-monopoly template within the regulation continuum that they had helped create, and that other nations like Japan had successfully reproduced this model in Formosa after 1895. The U.S. administration in the

[42] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 23.
[43] Arnold Foster, *The Report of the Royal Commission on Opium Compared With the Evidence From China That was Submitted to The Commission: An Examination And An Appeal*, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1898): 3. URL: https://archive-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/details/b2439810x/page/n1/mode/2up. Accessed: May 9, 2023.
[44] Foster, *The Report of the Royal Commission*, 5.
[45] Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, 178-179.

Philippines had also considered it, though the missionary lobby there was much more influential than in Britain, and had more of a direct influence on American policy. Britain, unlike the United States, was more highly influenced by the merchants selling opium in China. Japan was a relative newcomer, though as already discussed, it was rapidly catching up to its Western counterparts in the form of industrialization, medicine, military science and imperialism.

The International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909

The International Opium Commission (Shanghai Opium Commission), held in Shanghai, China between February 1st and February 26th, 1909, was one of many international gatherings that had gathered in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to discuss varied issues of global or transnational importance like mail delivery and cholera.[46] These types of meetings allowed for transimperial information exchange, and involved the creation of the "transnational sphere" as a place where new ideas could be discussed and questions asked and answered concerning issues of transnational concern.[47] This need for some level of international consensus was necessary, because even if one state outlawed opium or some other substance, in the case especially of opium, it was so plentiful that smuggling would be the inevitable result if there was demand.

Such was the case of the U.S. occupied Philippines, which passed essentially a state-monopoly act in 1905, which outlawed any private opium enterprises there, but was rather a futile piece of legislation due to its unilateral nature.[48] The need was for greater inter-state participation and agreement, whereby states that were producing and marketing opium wholesale

[46] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 42.
[47] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 2.
[48] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Policy Analysis and Research Branch, *A Century of International Drug Control*, Sandeep Chawla (Ed.), (Vienna: United Nations, 2009): 31. URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf. Accessed: March 11, 2023.

could reduce and eventually stop production. The problem was that outright prohibition normally led to smuggling, which then moved the opium trade outside of legal, legislative and political channels into illicit ones. In 1905 the U.S. administration in the Philippines proposed an alternative to a state-monopoly. This monopoly would have required a lot of planning for only three years duration, so instead of a state-monopoly, it raised tariffs on opium instead for those three years before the trade would finally be stopped except for medical use.[49]

Like many attempts at prohibition of something that people both enjoy and can become dependant on, the rates of arrest of smugglers, seizure of contraband opium and the number of people entering into rehabilitation from their dependence was quite high, which Anne L. Foster argues was expected, and also helped to encourage more interimperial discussion over opium.[50] The majority of the empire-states involved in the opium trade preferred regulation over prohibition, Japan among them, and that left the U.S. and China in the minority.

Part of the interimperial discussion that took place was led by the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. The "Open Door Policy" of the United States towards China was proposed by then-Secretary of State John Hay in a series of memoranda in 1899-1900.[51] The Open Door policy was inherited by President Theodore Roosevelt, and fit in with his expansionist policies by acknowledging spheres of influence of Western powers, as well as China and Japan, while at the same time trying to help China maintain its territorial integrity.[52] The goal of the United States with the Open Door Policy toward China was both to open that country to American exports, while at the same time allowing China to retain its sovereignty.[53]

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[49] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 41.
[50] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs,* 41.
[51] Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, "Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900," *Milestones: 1899-1913* (Website), United States Department of State. URL: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china. Accessed: January 9, 2024.
[52] Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy*, xiv.
[53] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 183.

Although contradictory in nature, the Open Door Policy aligned with Roosevelt's policies, but there was not overwhelming support for expansionism at home because many Americans in the 1890s had strong sentiments against China due to their interactions with immigrant Chinese labourers, which was not a full picture of China.[54] By the time Theodore Roosevelt took office, attitudes were more mixed, however the American attitude was a dislike for the Chinese as a people. The other attitude was one of sympathy and the paternalistic belief that the U.S. could help lead beleaguered China to recovery after its suffering due to opium and the unequal treaties.[55]

Japan had vested interest in the Open Door Policy, with its imperial interests in Formosa from the settlement of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, and would also soon acquire the Kwantung Leased Territory (KLT) after its short war with the Russian Empire in 1904-1905.[56] Japan being included in the Open Door Policy alongside American, British and other Western states shows how it was not seen as an 'other' by the West, but rather as a fellow imperialist and hegemon alongside China and the West despite it being a previously isolated Asian nation. Japan's acquisition of the KLT was significant because it was territory held from mainland China, and not an island like Formosa. Japan would hold the KLT until its fall in 1945.[57]

Japan's possession of the KLT also meant that it acquired the South Manchurian Railway and its connection to the Russian railway system. This significance will be discussed in Chapter 4 as it related to the opium and morphine trades. Despite its modern army, growing industry and even imperial holdings, in the early twentieth century Japan remained "economically subordinate

[54] Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy*, 33-34.
[55] Moore, *Defining and Defending the Open Door Policy,* 35.
[56] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 29.
[57] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 29-30.

to the West."[58] This subordination also saw Japanese emigrants known as *tairiku rōnin* or "continental masterless samurai" who lacked both capital and opportunities in Japan, finding easy money could be made on mainland Asia, especially China.[59]

Therefore, even before 1909 and the Shanghai Opium Commission, there had been slow movements towards greater interimperial agreements on trade that would help facilitate the later efforts to regulate opium. Even with the American prohibition in the Philippines that fully took effect in 1908, other nations were becoming more interested in regulating the opium trade. Britain, despite the refusal of Parliament to end the opium trade in Asia after increasing pressure from British anti-opium lobbying and an exhaustive Royal Commission report recommended the abolition of the opium trade, the anti-opium Liberal Party victory in 1906 meant that policies would be introduced to begin restricting the Indo-Chinese opium trade.[60] The groundwork for the phasing out of the trade had really begun with the Royal Commission, which ran to 2,500 pages and included the testimony of 723 witnesses.

On an transimperial level, Britain and China had been negotiating on the issue of tariffs and *likin* internal taxation, and the Chinese had won concessions on this in the Chefoo Convention of 1876. An article was later added in 1885 giving China greater revenue on imported opium.[61] This move was not entirely altruistic, due to the fact that over the nineteenth century China had developed a robust economy of native poppy cultivation and opium production, which increased the supply and reduced the price and demand of foreign opium in China.[62]

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[58] Kobayashi Motohiro, "Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin," in Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Eds.), *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952,* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000): 155.
[59] *Ibid.*
[60] United Nations, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 31.
[61] Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade, 179*-180.
[62] United Nations, *A Century of International Drug Control*, 31-32.

In China, the ability to regain some control over the opium supply and distribution with the British in the late nineteenth century was bolstered in 1906 by the Chinese Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, who issued an edict for prohibition through gradual reductions in opium production and supply over ten years, along with reduced British participation in the Chinese opium market over those same ten years.[63]

Fig. 3. 2 The Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi of China, Nicknamed "The Great Buddha" in her later reign. Source: "Milestones: 1899-1913, Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900", United States Office of the Historian, State Department. URL: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china. Accessed March 18, 2024.

The details were that China would presumably reduce its internal opium cultivation and production by 10% per year for ten years, while the British Colonial government in India would do the same, supported in China by the Empress Dowager's edict and in Britain by the passage of a resolution with overwhelming support condemning the opium trade as "morally indefensible."[64] The edict, coupled with the British agreement to reduce production and supported by the passing of its parliamentary resolution, appears to have been effective. Opium production in China itself declined by 37% between 1906 and 1908, though that was a reduction in production, and there were approximately 13,000,000 opium smokers in China, out of a population of 400,000,000 people. This represented 3.25% of the total population who were regular users of the drug.[65] This bilateral agreement and more equal treaties demonstrate how the late Qing Empire had finally conceded to Britain that they were equal parties diplomatically, unlike the attitude of superiority

[63] Thomas D. Reins, "Reform, Nationalism and Internationalism: The Opium Suppression Movement in China and the Anglo-American Influence, 1900-1908," *Modern Asian Studies*, Feb. 1991, Vol. 25, No. 1: 102. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/312671. Accessed October 22, 2022.
[64] Trocki, *Opium and Empire,* 210.
[65] Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade,* 182.

of the Qing rulers towards Britain in the late Historic East Asia period.[66] The Sino-British agreements were a start, however a global consensus was still needed.



Fig. 3. 3 "Bishop Charles G. [sic.] Brent." U.S. Bishop of the Philippines. photo c. 1900-1909. Source: Southeast Asia Visions: John M. Echols Collection, Cornell University Library. URL: https://library-artstor-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/#/asset/CORNELL_ECHOLS_1039407786. Accessed January 6, 2024.

The International Opium Commission was convened at the request of one of the commissioners of the aforementioned Philippine Opium Commission, the Bishop of the Philippines Rev. Charles H. Brent in a letter to then President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906.[67] Brent himself was a transnational figure. Born in Newcastle, Ontario, Canada, he attended the University of Toronto, and then after two years teaching he received his holy orders in 1887, then moved to Buffalo, New York to work as an Episcopal minister. He served as Bishop of the Philippines from 1901 to 1917.[68]

Brent's motivation to address the opium question in Asia is debatable. While many sources cite Brent's desire to regulate, and eventually prohibit opium for recreational purposes, he was not at first convinced of the harm of opium recreationally. In his entry in the *American National Biography*, the author states that "Perhaps Brent's most conspicuous effort in the Philippines was his work to abolish the opium trade."[69] Ian Tyrrell describes Brent's attitude to opium use as

[66] Norman Smith, *Intoxicating Manchuria: Alcohol, Opium, and Culture in China's Northeast*, (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 2012): 17. URL: https://books-scholarsportal-info.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/uri/ebooks/ebooks3/upress/2013-08-25/1/9780774824309. Accessed April 24, 2023.
[67] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 62.
[68] Lindsley, "Brent, Charles Henry," *American National Biography*, Published online 2000. URL:https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.0800176. Accessed September 8, 2023.
[69] Lindsley, "Brent, Charles Henry," https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.0800176.

"one of the sternest opponents of opium among the missionaries and yet a man not associated with the evangelical wing of his church."[70] Diana Kim places Brent, from an American point of view, as "situated in the Progressive era political climate sympathetic to anti-opium reforms," a framework he would inevitably bring to the Shanghai Commission as its Chief Commissioner.[71]

Anne L. Foster has revised these previous descriptions, stating that before he embarked on the work of the Philippine Opium Commission in 1903, Brent was sceptical of the need for opium regulation, believing that "opium consumption was no worse for Asians than alcohol for whites."[72] After participating in the Philippine Opium Commission, Brent became a convert to the need for increased opium restriction, with Foster arguing that the end goal of the Shanghai Commission in 1909 was the outright prohibition of opium globally, except for medical use.[73]

The Shanghai Opium Commission was convened for the first time on February 1st, 1909 at the Palace Hotel in Shanghai, and was greeted by Viceroy Tuan Fang.[74] In his opening address, the Viceroy thanked the international community for its concern for China, and recognizing the damage being done due to widespread opium use there, and Tuan appealed for a global approach and international cooperation in regards to opium regulation. He said:

> I may be permitted to express my belief that this Conference will be principally guided by feelings of reason, benevolence and philanthropy in its desire to eradicate a poison and a bane to mankind. This being universally recognized, it becomes us to put aside all prejudices of nationality and race, and be guided solely by that world-wide philanthropy and enlightenment which have brought about this International Conference.[75]

Tuan also referenced the issue of outright prohibition of opium, which he argued would not be effective, which China had previously discovered from the earliest legal prohibitions on opium

[70] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 153.
[71] Kim, *Empires of Vice*, 67.
[72] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 38-39.
[73] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 43.
[74] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 9.
[75] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 9.

dating back to 1729. He spoke of the state-monopoly system, whereby governments could control the supply and licencing of opium and thus gain valuable statistics on the users, the amounts being consumed and slowly reduce opium consumption over time, much like the bilateral agreement China had entered with Britain in 1906, and a system that Tuan says China had never used.[76]

Included in Tuan's list of colonies and dependant states was Formosa, Japan's colony acquired from China in 1895. He contrasts China with imperial-states like Formosa, the Philippines and Java (Indonesia) as using the state monopoly system, yet "China alone has not yet put into actual force," which is a critique of other imperial states and their policies.[77] It also demonstrates how Japan as an imperial power was legitimized by other imperialists and had been accepted by China as a reality because in the early twentieth century, colonization was legally accepted under international law.[78]

In his opening address of the First Session, held on February 1st, Bishop Brent framed the challenge they faced as nations of the world were uniting to discuss the problem of opium. Brent invoked 'The Opium Question', saying that "The question that brings us together – the opium question – is an extremely difficult one and I think the very first thing that all of us should do it frankly to recognize the fact and openly admit it."[79] Brent's desired approach to answering 'The Opium Question' was "to study this question in its every aspect – moral, economical, and commercial, diplomatic also," which demonstrates the multiple facets that the delegate countries faced both in their discussions, and which they would bring back home after the meeting. This helps demonstrate the need to consider 'The Opium Question' as a continuum and not simply as

[76] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 9-10.
[77] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 9.
[78] Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea,* 8, 28-29.
[79] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 11.

prohibition. The most glaring omission of Brent's aspects is the question of medical approaches, theories and treatments of opium dependence. The medical aspect as an accompaniment to the regulation continuum will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

He also qualified the structure and purpose of the meeting, namely that it was a Commission, and not a Conference. Brent specified that this could be referenced back to and contrasted by the permanent Commissions as enumerated in the Second Hague Conference held in 1907. Called by Russia, The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were part of the trend of transnational and transimperial discourse that pre-dated the League of Nations and helped initiate discussions among states outside of and including the West, like the representatives from Asia at the Shanghai Opium Commission.[80] In the Third Session, Brent further clarified the roles of the delegates, and the scope of the Shanghai Opium Commission. None of the delegates were officially diplomatic representatives of their countries, "neither Envoys Extraordinary nor Ministers Plenipotentiary," and therefore any decisions, ratifications or remedies decided on at the conclusion of the Commission were not binding to the attending states.[81] The Commission was a discussion, with final resolutions to be drawn and used, or not, by the participating states after the conclusion of the meeting.

Besides the United States and China, the other participating nations were Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam. The Japanese delegation was comprised of His Excellency Tsunejiro Miyaoka, Councillor of Embassy in His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Diplomatic Service as Chief Commissioner, Dr. Y. Tahara, the Director of the Imperial Hygienic Laboratory in Tokyo, and Dr.

[80] Stanislas Jeannesson, "The International Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907," *Encyclopédie d'histoire numérique de l'Europe*, (Online: Université Sorbonne, 2020), URL: https://ehne.fr/en/node/12230. Accessed: December 11, 2023.
[81] *Report of the International Opium Commission Vol. I*, 15.

T. Takaki, the Director of the Medical School and Chief of the Sanitary Bureau of the Government of Formosa and Mr. Keizo Yokoyama, the Chancellor of the Imperial Japanese Consulate-General in Shanghai.[82]

The fact that Japan sent not one, but two medical doctors to the Commission is significant. Many of the other nations had sent diplomats, politicians, civil servants and a statistician in the form of J.L. Chalmers, who held the rank of Third Civil Rank in China as Acting Statistical Secretary, Inspectorate Staff for the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs. Also in the Chinese delegation was Dr. Hsu Hua-Ching, the President of the Army Medical College and Expectant Taotai of Chihli.[83] There was also an American medical doctor, Dr. Hamilton Wright, who would also write on the Commission in the media after it concluded. The other exception to the strictly professional government and diplomatic delegates was the Commission president, Bishop Charles Brent, who had trained and been ordained as an Anglican minister at the University of Toronto in Canada before moving to the United States.[84] Most nations had an appointed position of Chief Commissioner for their respective countries, and four Secretaries were approved by the delegates, including Mr. Yokoyama. The other three were men from the United States, Persia and France.[85] The representation of the delegate nations was heavily legal, diplomatic and interested, as Bishop Brent had stated, in facts, figures, laws and interrogating each other on opium use in each others' countries and colonial possessions.

Japan was a more recent newcomer to the imperialist club, having been isolated for so long up to the mid nineteenth century and having expanded imperially beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. While there is general agreement that Japan after the Meiji Restoration was

[82] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. I*, 5.
[83] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. I,* 5.
[84] Elliot Lindsley, "Brent, Charles Henry." https://doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.0800176.
[85] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. I, 22*.

anxious to Westernize, Japan's deeply embedded culture also meant that it tended to reform on its own terms while engaged in cultural borrowing, as it had done with Chinese culture.[86] The fact that Japan assigned two of their four delegates as medical doctors represents what could be termed Japanese exceptionalism, whereby the Japanese desire to integrate itself into the West was being done with its own terms and objectives in mind, in this case medical. Another unique class of people in Meiji Japan were what Miriam Kingsberg argues were the "moral entrepreneurs", who were "a steadily widening cohort of socially engaged government officials and professionals, including cultural producers, the media, businessmen (and women), law enforcement, scientists, doctors and others" who were becoming actively engaged in standardizing and enforcing national norms and values in Meiji Japan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[87]

This wide swath of moralists were different from the religiously motivated temperance moralizers and reformers of the United States and Great Britain, and were not focused on regaining nationalism and culture on the same level as Chinese reformers, who were secular, middle class actors working collectively to maintain their version of a moral Japan in Western and Asian eyes. There were also so-called "secular missionaries" working in Asia from the United States, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, starting in 1923, though the presence of Western secular reformers was sparse before this period.[88]

Japanese moral entrepreneurs were helping to define and address Japan's approaches to 'The Opium Question', however those approaches differed depending on whether they were applied to the Japanese Home Islands or to their colonial possessions. Hennessy argues that

[86] See Hennessy, *Rule by Association*, 11-13; Specifically on Japan's entanglement with the West and Chinese living in Japan concerning morality and opium see Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 13-16.
[87] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 2.
[88] Foster, *Projections of Power*, 80-81.

Japan's colonialism began not with its acquisition of Formosa in 1895, but rather it dated back to near the end of the Tokugawa era as it competed with Russia in both 1799-1821 and 1855-1858, when Japan felt threatened by Russia over the island of Hokkaido.[89] Hennessy further argues that the Tokugawa forced Japanese culture, dress and habits on the residents of Hokkaido. That force was complicated by that regime's strict feudal system, as it needed to determine where the native Ainu people of Hokkaido "fit in" to Tokugawa Japanese society.[90]

For Hennessy, 1868 and the Meiji use of Hokkaido as an example of its role as colonizer and not a place to be colonized altered Japanese colonial history, making it a concurrent event along with the building of the new Meiji State.[91] Hennessy's argument then pushes back slightly older arguments, like Sharon A. Minichiello, who stated that Japan's colonial possession of Formosa gave Japan the confidence to exert political control of Korea in 1905 and completely annex it in 1910, which she argues represented Japan's imperial "takeoff point."[92] This is relevant within the context of the Shanghai Commission, because with Japan's imperial acquisitions, its approaches to opium regulation were being taken seriously, and its methods were being evaluated alongside Western, Asian and Arab nations.

Many of the delegate countries presented extant laws regulating or outright prohibiting opium, and presented data on imports, exports, usage, demographics of users, licensees and even arrests and other enforcement measures. They also shared a similar statement about invoking outright, immediate prohibition of opium, that it would cause sudden and undue suffering. This is an example of collaboration of nation-states and empires, though this form of collaboration

[89] Hennessy, *Rule by Association*, 58.
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] Hennessy, *Rule by Association*, 60.
[92] Sharon A. Minichiello, "Introduction," in Sharon A. Minichiello (Ed.), *Japan's Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy, 1900-1930*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998): 5. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780824863159/html. Accessed April 19, 2023.

must not be wholly idealized. Since meetings like the Shanghai Opium Commission were still informed and guided by their own domestic policies, the information exchanged could be just that, information to be gathered, discussed and agreed upon, and then put on a shelf.[93] The wording against outright prohibition demonstrated that many of the individual states represented at the Shanghai Opium Commission were not ready to stop the trade in the near future. The competing motivations that permeated the Asian states and colonies were the desire to prohibit opium for all uses except medical on one side, and the desire to continue the revenue stream that state-monopolies brought into a state or colony on the other.

Other states realized that sudden prohibition was dangerous and would cause undue suffering. Two of the biggest players in the opium market, both legal and illicit, were China and Great Britain. Although Britain refused to discuss any previous treaties on the suppression or increased regulation of opium, including the Ten Year Agreement it had signed with China in 1907, even when directly asked by other delegates.[94] Britain only hinted at the agreement in the conclusion of the report, lamenting the financial impact on colonial India due to "the readiness of India to co-operate actively in China's new policy," to which it meant the Ten Year Agreement.[95]

Britain acted like it was a benevolent participant rather than an active party to the Agreement. It is not entirely clear why Britain refused to discuss its bilateral agreement with China on gradually reducing the opium produced and shipped to China. The policy, regardless, was a gradual reduction in opium availability, with China even adopting an opium smoking licencing system based on the Japanese system in Formosa.[96] Neither the Chinese nor the British mentioned their Ten Year Agreement in either of their reports to the Shanghai Commission.

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[93] Rodogno et a. "Introduction," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 3-4.
[94] H. Richard Firman, *Narcodiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996): 9. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.7591/9781501734717/html. Accessed December 29, 2022.
[95] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 191.
[96] Walker, *Opium and Foreign Policy*, 14.

Other delegates reported similar, gradual reduction strategies. On their report on French Indo-China, the French delegation reported that it had "taken measures, as of the previous year, to have a progressive suppression of opium use in Indo-China, and its effects [on the population]."[97] The report of the Siamese government also cited its aim to "ultimately suppress the use of opium but to attain the desired end the line of policy to be followed must be carefully considered and very thorough investigation made into the matter, before venturing on experiments that might prove disastrous to the revenue of the State without making any progress towards the suppression of the vice."[98] Although a more conservative approach, this quote says what many states were thinking (with the exception perhaps of the United States): that the revenue from opium was too important to instantly stop its circulation around Asia.

The Japanese report shows how seriously Japan took The Opium Question in its home islands, while also working on suppression policies in its imperial possessions. The outright prohibition of opium in the Japanese home islands began in the Tokugawa era, and the Japanese report states that "the opening of the Meiji era the prohibition [of opium] became still more strict."[99] As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the Japanese knowledge of the Opium Wars between Great Britain and China had made Japan justifiably afraid of foreign contact and the damage that opium could do. The success of the Japanese home island prohibition was due to "A strict control having, as has been stated above, been exercised over opium smoking by the issue of a national prohibition against it before the people at large knew anything of the nature of opium."[100]

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[97] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 123. The original French says: "*des mesures prises, depuis l'année dernière, pour la suppression progressive de l'usage de l'opium en Indo-Chine, et de leur effet."*
[98] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 329.
[99] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 250.
[100] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 251.

In discovering the extent of opium use in Formosa after 1895, the Japanese report stated that "the habit which was confirmed under the Chinese rule was not, when the island became Japanese territory, to be immediately got rid of, and the policy of gradual suppression was accordingly adopted."[101] Again, the Japanese successfully maintained a strict policy of prohibition at home, one of the few places in Asia to do so. Like the United States and its takeover of the Philippines, Japan was also suddenly faced with 'The Opium Question' as it expanded its imperial possessions beyond Hokkaido.

In Japanese Formosa, 'The Opium Question' could be answered with a policy of gradual suppression, and not prohibition. The Japanese delegates report acknowledged the fact that opium is habit forming, and that for long-time smokers of opium, it may be impossible to rehabilitate them to complete abstinence. Finally, a sudden prohibition would likely cause an alienation of the Formosans newly under Japanese rule, and would have made fighting a faction of Chinese rebels on the island specifically, and colonial administration in general, more difficult.[102] The administrators had already disrupted Indigenous Formosan residents by creating a dividing line to enclose certain settlements of ethnic Formosans, however they also adopted local customs such as the practice of "wet diplomacy", which involved the sharing of saliva via a shared alcoholic drink as a way to show trust and to form personal bonds between Formosans and the occupying Japanese.[103]

The Japanese solution to its opium dependent subjects was "to adopt the policy of gradually suppressing opium-smoking and to establish a system which would grant only to those who had been too long addicted to opium to be cured of the habit a licence permitting them to

[101] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 251.
[102] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 267.
[103] Barclay, *Outcasts of Empire*, 44, 46 and the photograph on 45.

purchase and smoke opium paste."[104] This policy of distribution only to licensees would only be effective if "the importation of raw opium and manufacture of opium paste were made Government enterprises," so "it was at the same time decided to establish an opium monopoly system."[105] Unlike many of the other delegate reports, Japan provided a chapter on "The Treatment of Chronic Smokers", in which it presented statistics on medical efforts to suppress the opium habit.[106]

Furthermore, the licencing system on Formosa allowed the Japanese government to collect vast demographic statistics on the age of smokers, genders, and other social and economic factors. They also stated that "The Government recognised long ago the necessity of studying the medical treatment of chronic smokers, which was taken up for investigation by a special committee of the Central Board of Health…a committee for the Investigation of Endemic and Infectious Diseases in 1901."[107] Concerning Formosa, the Japanese delegation reported statistics of opium use only among Formosan Chinese, suggesting that the indigenous Formosans who lived in rural areas of the island did not have a problem with opium dependence.[108] Therefore, Japan's application of medical science to interrogate 'The Opium Question' was not a new one, and in the next chapter we will examine the medical responses and approaches to opium dependence treatment.

The International Opium Commission in Shanghai was for one American delegate, Dr. Hamilton Wright, "The Recent Anti-Opium Movement", which he argued was the result of the

[104] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 267.
[105] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 267.
[106] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, Chapter VIII, 279-281.
[107] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 279.
[108] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. II*, 270-272. These statistics specify that "Formosan Chinese" only were licenced, and do not mention indigenous Formosans being issued licences or having a dependency.

American occupation of the Philippines, and "gave new life to the anti-opium movement."[109] Part of that movement included the nine resolutions that resulted from the meetings and reports of the delegate countries. The first resolution called for the delegate nations to recognize "the unswerving sincerity of the Government of China in their efforts to eradicate the production and consumption of Opium," which was supported by the growing public anti-opium reformers in China.[110] The second resolution spoke to the non-binding nature of the Commission, and the desire of each delegate group to "move its own Government to take measures for the gradual suppression of the practice of Opium smoking in its own territories and possessions, with due regard to the varying circumstances of each country concerned."[111] Therefore, even with the desire to reduce opium use to medicinal only and eradicate recreational use of opium, the delegates were not at the point of using the word prohibition, a habit again that modern historians of drugs are quick to adopt. Resolution three did mention prohibition, however it was also modified as "prohibition or for careful regulation."[112]

Two other items stand out as significant with the benefit of hindsight. Resolution five warns of the increasing and "unrestricted manufacture, sale and distribution of Morphine" constituting "a grave danger, and the Morphine habit shows signs of spreading."[113] Section six also acknowledges the shortcomings of the Shanghai Commission's investigative reach, and that as a reporting body "is not constituted in such a manner as to permit the investigation from a scientific point of view of Anti-Opium remedies and of the properties and effects of Opium and its products."[114] These two items in particular will be discussed further in Chapter 4, and as has

[109] Dr. Hamilton Wright, "The International Opium Commission," *The American Journal of International Law*, (Volume 3, Issue 3, July 1909): 669. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2186686. Accessed December 29, 2022.
[110] The nine resolutions are all found in *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. I*, 84.
[111] *Ibid.*
[112] *Ibid.*
[113] *Report of the International Opium Commission*, *Vol. I*, 84.
[114] *Ibid.*

been discussed in this chapter, Japan was already investigating and applying medical and scientific methods to the treatment of opium dependence.

The next chapter begins with an examination of the implementation of the Shanghai Commission's resolutions as taken in two particular states, the United States and Britain, and will discuss the different approaches taken by each nation. In this context, Japan was applying both the British and American approaches to its own opium policies, while also engaging deeply in methods to treat and help dependency on opium among its growing colonial Chinese populations. The next chapter also examines the medical approaches taken broadly, as both accepted medicine, and less reputable patent medicine as ways to approach The Opium Question.

Chapter 4 – The Global Opium Question

With the International Opium Commission concluded in Shanghai, delegates were free to return to their home countries to present the recommendations made at the meeting. This chapter will look at the aftermath of the Shanghai meeting, the subsequent meetings on opium that took place in Europe, and how as the global attitude to opium tightened regulations, Japan increased its production and distribution of opium and other addictive substances.

In November 1909 the *New York Times* published an article with an alarmist title: "AMERICA REBUKED. British Government Rejects Resolution regulating Traffic In Opium."[1] The article reports that the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey announced that Britain was rejecting the American resolutions agreed to at the International Opium Commission held in Shanghai in February of that year. The resolutions that Britain rejected were the third resolution of the Shanghai Opium Commission that restricted opium sales for medical use only. They also rejected the second resolution proposed by the U.S. delegation, but which did not make the final agreement which asked all nations to find replacements for "opium revenue, and by sacrificing dual agreements and obsolete treaties.".[2]

While the first resolution corresponds to the final Resolution Three, the British, as mentioned in Chapter Three, refused to discuss their bilateral treaty with China at the Shanghai Commission in 1909. The fact that they were willing to participate in a Convention, which was more binding than a Commission, will be discussed in this chapter. Also, the routes taken by the participating nations to the Conventions of 1912 and 1924-1925 were different.

[1] *New York Times*, November 27th, 1909, New York, NY: 16. URL: http://www.proquest.com/docview/96941942/abstract/19E889352E7D4FD0PQ/1. Accessed December 13, 2022.
[2] *International Opium Commission*, Vol. I, 46-47. And *New York Times*, November 27th, 16.

Japan made its own way regarding opium in its imperial possessions, and imperial officials created a state-monopoly along the lines of the original company-state monopolies of the nineteenth century. Japan saw the dependency of its imperial citizens as an opportunity to conduct scientific research on one side, while collecting revenues and controlling the supply and administration of opium in its colonies of Formosa, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and by 1910 imperial Korea on the other. The information gained by Japanese scientists and medical doctors was beneficial in reducing opium use in Japan's empire, though the paradox of the gradual reduction in opium use in Asia was offset by the dependency of colonial administrations on the revenue that opium brought. Japan was not alone in this attitude, however it was the only nation in Asia to have successfully implemented and maintained a policy of total prohibition in its home islands, while also running a state-monopoly in its empire.

The Aftermath of the Shanghai Opium Commission, 1909

Despite the challenges of bringing so many nation-states together with the goal of agreeing to common regulatory approaches, the delegate nations were planning for a Convention almost as soon as the Shanghai Commission had concluded at the end of February, 1909. The next transnational step was the International Opium Convention, held in the Hague between 1911 and 1912. The result of this Convention was a more binding set of agreements known as the Hague Opium Convention, or just the Hague Convention, which was signed on January 23rd, 1912.[3] The First Hague Convention was one of three agreements resulting from meetings of various nations between December 1911 and June 1914, ending with the Third International

[3] Although both the Shanghai Commission and the subsequent three Hague Conventions pre-date the formation of the League of Nations, the agreements are archived with the United Nations. The Convention is published in United Nations Treaty Collection, League of Nations, "Chapter VI: Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Part 2. International Opium Convention, The Hague, 23 January, 1912," *Treaty Series*, Vol. 8: 187.

Opium Conference. The process was then interrupted as the First World War was fought between many of the participating nations in the Opium Convention meetings.

Although the war would disrupt international meetings and continued work on regulating global opium supply routes, Japan took the opportunity of the disruption caused by the war to improve and develop its own national supplies of not just opium, but other semi-synthetic opiate products like morphine, codeine, and a new type of drug spreading globally, the stimulant cocaine. The First World War interrupted Japan's supply of the new opiate morphine, which it acquired mainly from Europe. Japanese domestic production of drugs ironically increased after the conclusion of the International Opium Commission meeting in 1909, despite Japan's participation in the meetings.

This increased domestic production helped Japan develop its own supply of morphine, and the tools to administer it, mainly the hypodermic syringe and needle, or cannula. Even as the Shanghai Commission meetings closed, other nations were also moving towards the more refined substances in the form of morphine and cocaine, which made losing access to raw opium less of a burden. The move to these new, processed substances was not purely financial, as medical scientists in Japan and elsewhere were looking to opiates like morphine and codeine as possible aids in combatting dependence and helping people dependant on opium to quit the drug.

The efforts to form epistemic consensus on the regulation of opium and its derivatives was a success in terms of international cooperation among imperial powers, nation-states and between the East-West divide. The historian Akira Iriye attempts to fill the "scholarly void" of too few histories and studies on international organizations, which my thesis will hopefully contribute to as well in the context of international opium regulation.[4] The work that has been

[4] Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002): 1. URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb90009.0001.001. Accessed April 26, 2024.

done on international organizations he says has mostly been done within the discipline of international relations, which due to their focus on more recent and modern organizations is missing historicization by professional historians.[5] Historicization work is being done on international organizations, and on the specialists who attended and participated in them. Many of these transnational meetings began in the mid-nineteenth century to "overcome the problems caused by rapid industrialization and social change; scientific and technical experts became agents of the emergence of a transnational, or in some cases, supranational consciousness."[6]

Iriye argues that more historical contextualization is needed so that as our world continues to globalize and more transnational and international connections are made we can better understand not just global and transnational issues, but understand global efforts in the past to solve them, and to even critique aspects of globalization itself.[7] In this thesis, I have partly been piecing together the global issue of unregulated opium use, the dependence on governments on the revenue from it, and how nations came together to address 'The Opium Question' in the early twentieth century. I have used Japan as a form of case study on its actions withing this transnational space and how it contributed to a global issue.

The International Opium Commission of 1909, and the subsequent Hague Opium Conventions that met between 1911 and 1914 satisfy Akira Iriye's first category of transnational organization because this was a meeting sanctioned by and represented by experts on behalf of independent and colonial governments.[8] The other grouping for Iriye was the non-governmental organization, of which we could include the medical missionary societies, however Iriye wrongly excludes religious affiliated organizations in her second, non-governmental organization

[5] Iriye, *Global Community*, 4.
[6] Rodogno et al. "Introduction,"
[7] Iriye, *Global Communities*, 196-197.
[8] Iriye, *Global Community,* 1-2.

category. They are, he says, "a voluntary nonstate, nonprofit, nonreligious, and nonmilitary association", which in the context of cultural exchange, religion is a cultural construct, therefore should be included.[9] A more open definition of cultural exchange would be more effective, since from the early nineteenth century we have seen the British and American medical missionary societies exchanging culture not only with each other, but also within Asia. Moreover, the university educated ministers would fit the criteria as an expert within the context of expert transnational cultural exchanges.

One person of note is Bishop Charles Brent, who was not only university educated, but also became an expert on opium practice and policy in Asia as part of his work on the Philippine Opium Commission. He was instrumental in not just organizing the Shanghai Opium Commission, but with his earlier work on the Philippine Opium Commission he "identified, located, acquired, stored , interpreted and communicated" his findings as a transnational specialist studying opium policies.[10] These organizations continued to administer care to people dependent on opium and its derivatives, and after the Shanghai Commission, a new class of medical professionals were on the rise, especially in Japan: the medical scientists who were working on new ways to help break people's dependence on opium and opiates.

Besides the rise in what would today be called addictions medicine, delegate nations began considering the resolutions agreed to at the Shanghai Commission meeting. Britain, had refused to discuss its bilateral treaty of gradual suppression of opium production with China at the Shanghai Opium Commission meeting. The British government followed up on the agreement however by sending the diplomat, botanist and Shanghai Opium Commission delegate Sir Alexander Hosie to China to assess the level of opium still being grown there. In his two

[9] Iriye, *Global Community*, 2.
[10] Schumacher, "Embedded Empire," 203.

volume book on his travels through China (quoted at the beginning of Chapter 1), Hosie stated that the book was "not a history of the Opium Question, nor does it deal with the evils which attend the abuse of the drug."[11] His goal rather was to assess "the extent of poppy-cultivation in those provinces which had hitherto been the chief centres of opium production."[12] The provinces he toured were Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Szechuan (Sichuan), Yünnan and Kueichou (Kweichow).[13]

Hosie reported that the treaty to suppress opium between China and Britain was having an effect. He provided information from a report from the Governor of Shensi Province sent by telegraph and the report was also printed in the *Peking Daily News*. The Governor said that the area of land in his province under poppy cultivation was reduced from 530,000 *mou* (one *mou* is around 1/6 of an English acre, so around 88,333 acres or 35,748 ha.) to 372,695 *mou* (62,115 acres/25,138 ha.), a reduction of around 30% in that province.[14] The report also claimed to have "cured 568,055 *habitués* of the opium couch, and are treating 370,036 persons" at 404 refuges in the province.[15]

These reductions in opium production and consumption indicate progress, considering that the ruler of China up to 1908, the Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi, had been a conservative and autocratic ruler through her long reign that began in the early 1860s.[16] Nicknamed 'Old Buddha' in her later years, the Empress Dowager was an opium smoker herself, though she pragmatically had agreed to the treaty with Britain, and presumably was aware of the Shanghai Commission

[11] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy, Vol. I*, Preface.
[12] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy, Vol. I*, Preface.
[13] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy*, *Vol. II*, Appendix II, 232.
[14] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy*, *Vol. II*, Appendix II, 242.
[15] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy*, *Vol. II*, Appendix II, 243.
[16] Janin, *The India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century*, 188.

before her death.[17] In 1911, just a year before the end of the Qing Dynasty, and dynastic rule in China, Hosie was able to show progress from the Chinese in the suppression of opium use.

Hosie's trip through China qualifies him as a transnational "intermediary" who belonged to a class of "go-betweens and brokers…and operated in-between large social and political constructions."[18] In this case, Hosie's long career as a British diplomat in China meant he had both the experience and knowledge of the local terrain, culture and language to travel and assess the level of opium poppy growth in the above-named provinces of China. Hosie also had Chinese connections, and on his arrival in Shansi, he was met by "the Principal of the Imperial University and his wife – old friends – awaiting me, as well as the carriage of His Excellency Tin Pao-ch'üan, Governor of the province," who also met with Hosie on the 6th and 7th of May, 1909 to discuss the governor's success in suppressing opium poppy cultivation.[19]

It was through connections like this that Hosie was able to collect the data above on the reduction in opium poppy cultivation and the treatment of the *habitués* of opium via telegraph from the Governor of Shensi. Hosie was the intermediary between the nations of China and Great Britain, a Scotsman by birth who had become a cultural relay and interpreter. In the most basic definition, Hosie was a traveller. His familiarity of China and his personal connections with administrators there allowed him to join the "discussion" about what China was doing regarding its internal 'Opium Question', while he travelled China observing "characteristics, position and roles in order to create transnational linkages."[20]

Hosie's service in China had begun in 1876, and he retired in 1912, which had allowed him to travel to every one of China's twenty-two provinces except Xinjiang, making him a

[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Saunier, *Transnational History*, 36.
[19] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy, Vol. I*, 4.
[20] Saunier, *Transnational History*, 37.

seasoned expert on China.[21] Despite his familiarity and comfort in the country, he still felt like an outsider or an other. He described his inner feelings when staying at a hovel in the hamlet of Chin-so-kuan, which he shared with a detained highwayman. Like the prisoner, Hosie felt like he was "not a prisoner in chains; but the foreign traveller in the interior of China is always a prisoner. He can never escape observation, and his every movement is watched and criticized."[22] Although well connected in China, Hosie was still an outsider, and his experience changed the traditional positionality of finding the voice of the colonized, whose stories are often not available in archives or other records.[23] In Hosie's case, he was the transnational traveller with a specific purpose on this voyage through China.

Besides Western cultural intermediaries, there were also cultural transfers from Japan to China. Japan's growing educational influence was growing as well in 1911. Another traveller in China, Edwin John Dingle, estimated that prior to 1911, upwards of 20,000 Chinese scholars had been studying in Tokyo, though that number had dropped by February 1911.[24] The reason for the migration to Tokyo was, according to Dingle, "because Japan is the most convenient country wherein to acquire Western knowledge. The new learning, the new learning – they *must* have the new learning!"[25]

Japan had adopted this new learning not only for impractical scholarly pursuits, because part of the new learning acquired by late Tokugawa and then Meiji officials was also highly pragmatic as government officials appropriated and translated into Japanese international Western legal terminology. This helped Japanese officials engage in discourse with other

[21] Soothill and Reynolds, "Hosie, Sir Alexander," *ODNB*.
[22] Hosie, *On the Trail of the Opium Poppy, Vol. I*, 49.
[23] Hennessey, *Rule by Association*, 33.
[24] Edwin John Dingle, *Across China on Foot: Life in the Interior and the Reform Movement*, (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1911): 70. URL: http://archive.org/details/acrosschinaonfo00dinggoog. Accessed May 9, 2023.
[25] Dingle, *Across China on Foot*, 70.

imperial powers in the *lingua franca* of those powers.[26] Japan was able to acquire epistemic knowledge of the West though its commission of the Iwakura Embassy, led by ambassador extraordinary Iwakara Tomomi and others who toured Western nations in order to learn about the law of nations.[27] By learning and adopting this language, Japan was able to participate in the power politics of the day to discuss matters with other sovereign and independent nations. Though, this alone "did not make Japan imperialist."[28] Rather, adopting this set of terminology allowed Japan to speak the same language with others. Therefore, while Japan was able to become a hegemon of education in Asia, it also adopted new learning for negotiating its own way into the transnational and transimperial spheres.

Japan was also hegemon concerning military development according to Dingle. He outlines China's rapid military development, and states that "China is now endeavouring to walk the ground which led Japan to greatness among the nations – she takes Japan as her pattern."[29] This emulation of China towards Japan shows how Japan had now become the hegemon, at the top of the hierarchy. Below, we will examine how Japan's progress in scientific and medical technology helped to prolong the opium question as the drug took new forms and different vectors of administration.

Chinese students in the early twentieth century who studied in Japan would have been exposed to Japan's strict government opium monopoly not just in the home islands, but also in Formosa, and became a possible approach for China to use to reduce the damage being done by excessive opium use.[30] As mentioned in Chapter 3, Asian reform movements around opium were more motivated by nationalism and were secular in nature by the twentieth century. By the early

[26] Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 28.
[27] Takii, *The Meiji Constitution*, 1-3.
[28] Dudden, *Japan's Colonization of Korea*, 28, 29.
[29] Dingle, *Across China on Foot,* 232.
[30] Walker, *Opium and Foreign Policy*, 14.

twentieth century Chinese anti-opium advocates were borrowing the discourse of the earlier, missionary advocates who had protested government monopolies and the opium evil.[31]

Racial theory of the day informed the Chinese anti-opium advocates, and they equated imperialism with opium. It was believed that the elimination of opium in China was the only way for that nation to be revived.[32] Sadly, the association of China with opium led to racially motivated legislation and attitudes by the West and Japan that subjected Chinese migrants and imperial subjects to discrimination, partly caused by the drive to create anti-opium legislation that went as far as outright prohibition.

The International Opium Conventions, also called the Hague Conventions, were signed on January 23rd, 1912, and were the formalization of the Shanghai Commission resolutions from 1909. There were two subsequent meetings of the Hague Convention, held from the 1st to the 9th of July, 1913, and the final set of meetings took place from the 15th to the 25th of June, 1914.

One of the noteworthy aspects of the Hague Conventions was the expansion of the substances being discussed. While opium had been the sole focus of the Shanghai Commission, the Hague Conventions now included the newer substances of morphine (which is derived from opium), and cocaine.[33] Another noteworthy inclusion was the request by the Convention delegates to

> "direct the Universal Postal Union:
> (1) To the urgency of regulating the transmission through the post of raw opium;
> (2) To the urgency of regulating as far as possible the transmission through the post of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts and other substances referred to in Article 14 of the Convention;
> (3) To the necessity of Prohibiting the transmission of prepared opium through the post.[34]

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[31] Dikötter et al., *Narcotic Culture*, 108-109.
[32] Dikötter et al., *Narcotic Culture*, 109.
[33] League of Nations, "International Opium Convention," in *Treaty Series Vol. 8*, (Geneva: United Nations Treaty Series, 1923): 189. URL: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIV.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-2&chapter=6&Temp=mtdsg4&clang=_en. Accessed January 16, 2023.
[34] "International Opium Convention," 212-213.

The International Postal Union was another body that had emerged from the "heyday of internationalism within the emerging transnational sphere." As a body that brought nation-states together within the context of smuggling of illicit drugs, the International Postal Union was also involved in receiving and transporting illegal drugs.[35] As a tool for the regulation and prohibition of drugs, the Postal Union overall presented a means to help the Convention establish common rules in favour of shared interests. In the interest of nations that were being negatively harmed by opium and as is evident from the Convention, the postal services were also being used in the transportation of newly emerging drugs as well.[36]

In relation to the scientific advancements that were part of the transnational sphere and industrialization, the inclusion of new forms of drugs is significant to changes that had been occurring before and during the Shanghai Commission. Like in 1909 where agreements like the Sino-British opium reduction agreement was coming into effect, and the Americans had succeeded in organizing the Shanghai Commission, the years 1911 and 1912 saw the final collapse of the Qing Dynasty in China, and the collapse of dynastic rule completely in favour of republican rule in 1912. This aligned with the expansion of Japan's pharmaceutical industry and what has been called "history's most spectacular relapse."[37] The new substances, mainly morphine, an opiate, and cocaine, were increasingly used with another medical development, the syringe and hypodermic needle. The resulting "needle culture" fit in well culturally in China due to the ancient Chinese medical practice of acupuncture.[38]

In the context of opium dependency, morphine was considered as a possible treatment for opium smoking dependency in the late Qing Dynasty by medical missionaries anxious to help

[35] Rodogno et al., *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 8.
[36] Iriye, *Global Community*, 10.
[37] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 183-184.
[38] Dikötter et al. *Narcotic Culture*, 174.

break Chinese smokers of their dependence on opium.[39] Unfortunately, in the wake of the treaty to reduce production of opium with Britain in 1907 and the Shanghai Commission of 1909, morphine provided a useful substitute for smokers to turn to. Courtwright argues that where opium's potency was greatly variable depending on the soil chemistry and climate of where the poppies were grown, and the fact that opium was often adulterated, or "sophisticated" with such things as licorice and lead, isolated morphine was a pure alkaloid and was therefore more predictable.[40]

Morphine as a substance had been isolated in Germany by the pharmacist Friedrich Sertürner between 1803 and 1805, and later produced and marketed by the pharmaceutical company of Heinrich Emanuel Merck in 1827.[41] This meant that later in the nineteenth century, when Japanese medical students began travelling to Germany to study medicine, it is likely they were taught about the benefits of morphine and the hypodermic syringe as a part of their medical education. This in turn would have been taught by German physicians teaching at newly formed medical schools in Japan as well.

There were strong connections between Japan and Germany in the context of the transferral of medical knowledge as epistemic knowledge, along the lines of the knowledge of the law of nations. The Japanese-German connection removed "such limitations [being the limitations of the nation-state and nation-state hierarchies] by criss-crossing the national boundaries of Germany and Japan and by paying attention to the active connections, flow of ideas, and movements of people between the two countries."[42] It is perhaps for this reason that

[39] Dikötter et al. *Narcotic Culture*, 121-122.
[40] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 36-37.
[41] Courtwright, *Forces of Habit*, 36.
[42] Hoi-eun Kim, *Doctors of Empire: Medical and Cultural Encounters Between Imperial Germany and Meiji Japan,"* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014): 8. URL: https://books-scholarsportal-info.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/uri/ebooks/ebooks3/utpress/2014-09-29/1/9781442660472. Accessed March 25, 2024.

the Philippine Opium Commission, which interviewed the German trained Dr. Gotō Shinpei, declared that the Japanese occupied Island of Formosa's approach to opium "took the shape of a regulative system looking toward the gradual suppression of the use of opium. It might be termed progressive prohibition and stands unique among all the laws that came under the observation of the Committee."[43] As we have seen with the discussions at the Shanghai Commission meetings, the idea of gradual suppression was a key goal of the delegates as another option instead of the American desire for immediate prohibition.

Despite the transnational meetings finding some common ground regarding the gradual suppression of opium outwardly, there is evidence that some delegate nations desired to maintain some form of illicit opium, opiate and cocaine trade in a system that now connected European manufacturers with Asia. The question of whether or not the Hague Convention would take place at all was posed by members of the British Board of Trade in a handwritten memorandum dated July 14th, 1911. Signed by "The President" and addressed to Mr. Tennant, the memo mentions "that a large proportion of our [Britain's] trade in cocaine is via Germany to Burma and India", showing that the British were now dealing and trans-shipping cocaine through Europe to Asia.[44]

The doubt over the Convention is expressed when the writer states that "the proposed conference at the Hague was indefinitely postponed owing to the attitude of Germany, Japan & Portugal & partly also that that of France."[45] The writer is also concerned about the possible prohibition of morphine and cocaine, which would affect British revenues and which he argued

[43] Kim, *Doctors of Empire,* 4-5; Philippine Opium Commission, *Report*, 18. For the interview with Dr. Gotō, see the Philippine Opium Commission *Report* pages 59-62.
[44] International Opium Conferences 1911-1915, BT 11/14 B, (Adam Matthew Digital, July 14 and 17, 1911. archived 1919): 2-3. URL: https://www.globalcommodities.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/BT_11_14_B. Accessed December 14, 2023.
[45] *Ibid.*

could not be a "reproach" against British manufacturing chemists. The chemist manufacturer in his example was the firm of Burroughs Wellcome & Co., "whose entire trade is probably of the character which would alone be legalized", showing that there was some doubt.[46]

Walker also questions Japan's level of trust regarding both Chinese and American intentions towards the Hague Convention, though he does not specify why that was so, nor does the writer of the memo.[47] In a typed memorandum also dated July 17th, 1911, The President is cautious on the idea of prohibition, stating in point 3 (a) that "We should have to prohibit the importation of cocaine into this country from abroad, and there is just the chance that this might lead to reprisals."[48]

While Britain was developing its cocaine trade, the Board also reported on Britain's morphine manufacturing trade. The writer, only known as "G.S." on August 19th, 1911 proudly exclaimed that "the English morphia is recognised as being the best in the world. Makers here are proud of their pre-eminence in the matter of quality."[49] Those makers, according to the report, were Messrs. Wink & Co., Messrs. Macfarlan & Co. and Messrs. T. and H. Smith, which accounted for a very small cohort of manufacturing chemists in Britain. G.S. states that this makes "it extremely easy to effective control the trade should an Agreement on the point of control [regulation or prohibition] be an outcome of any International Conference.[50]

One of the owners of Wink & Co. confirmed that his firm did export morphine to both China and Japan, though he stated that most of their inventory was shipped to Germany, as that country was the major distributor of morphia to Europe. A limitation of transnational agreements of this nature is also evident, where G.S. states that the German firm Messrs. Merck

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[46] *Ibid.*
[47] Walker, *Opium and Foreign Policy*, 17.
[48] BT 11/14 B, 4.
[49] "The East and Various Drugs," BT 11/14 B, 8-9.
[50] *Ibid.*

of Darmstadt were Germany's biggest manufacturer and distributor of drugs, though by that point they no longer manufactured morphia on their own. Because of this, manufacturing chemists like Wink & Co. and Macfarlan "would have the very strongest objection indeed to our Government joining in any international undertaking which did not include Germany."[51] This argument was because once in German hands, morphia and cocaine were then being exported from Germany into Asia. In this scenario the writer cites the Great Eastern Railway, which presumably could then be shipped via further eastern railways like the Siberian and Chinese railway systems. As we will see below, Japan was engaged in exactly this practice, purchasing morphine from Germany, which engaged in illicit sales. Despite its criticisms of the German-Japanese relationship, Britain was also selling morphine directly to Japan.

The resulting legislative changes at the nation-state level from the passage of the Hague Convention in January 1912 were mixed. Despite the Hague Convention being the very first global narcotic control treaty, the United States did not have national narcotic control legislation of its own.[52] Therefore, in 1914, the United States passed *The Harrison Narcotic Act*, which was that nation's first narcotic control act. Until that point, the United States had attempted to restrict Chinese immigration with the 1882 *Chinese Exclusion Act*, which was nominally tied to opium use by Chinese immigrants to the United States.[53] The greatest overlap of Whites and Chinese intermingling was within the underworld, where drugs like opium could be obtained, along with other illegal activities such as gambling and prostitution.[54] The *Harrison Narcotics Act* was the first purposely-written piece of legislation to address opium, and was promoted strongly by the American delegate to both the Shanghai and Hague meetings, Dr. Hamilton Wright.[55]

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[51] *Ibid.*
[52] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 46-47.
[53] Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 69.
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 163-164.

In the West, another piece of legislation that came from the Hague Convention was the British *Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920*. The importance of this act was such that it was printed in the *British Medical Journal* by the Home Office, allowing British physicians access and awareness of its importance and passage.[56] The *Act* reflected the expanded scope of narcotics as passed at the Hague Convention in 1912. The drugs listed included of course raw opium, but also included "Collectively referred to as Dangerous Drugs: - Medicinal opium; cocaine and ecgonine and their salts; Diamorphine (heroin) and its salts; and any preparation, admixture, extract or other substance containing one-fifth per cent., or more of morphine or one-tenth per cent. or more of more of cocaine, ecgonine, or diamorphine."[57]

The *Act* specified that possession of these narcotics required a licence from the Home Office, specifically that "Any duly qualified medical practitioner and any registered dentist is authorized by the Regulations to be in possession of and to supply dangerous drugs and (in the case of medical practitioners only) raw opium."[58] To obtain these drugs, medical practitioners and dentists had to submit, preferably in writing, a requisition to a licenced pharmacist for the drug needed, quantity, and the requestors name and details.[59]

Therefore, the British legislation was not fully prohibitive, and for the first time in Britain, put the control and care of opium, opiates and other narcotics solely in the hands of medical doctors and dentists. Britain's medical approach would end up being more in line with Japan's colonial and imperial treatment of narcotics through to the 1920s as opposed to its total prohibition, except for medical purposes, in the Home Islands.

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[56] "Dangerous Drugs Act," *British Medical Journal*, (January 13, 1923, Issue 1): 69-70. DOI: doi-org.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/10.1136/bmj.1.3237.69-a. Accessed February 11, 2023.
[57] *Dangerous Drugs Act*, I. General Provisions, *British Medical Journal*, 69.
[58] *Dangerous Drugs Act*, Section 6.
[59] *Dangerous Drugs Act*, Section 16.

Japan's Scientific Turn and The New Opiates

As the chief civil administrator in Formosa, the German educated Japanese Dr. Gotō Shinpei became head of what a "laboratory of modernity" on that island.[60] His influence as both a medical professional and scientist helped form Japan's colonial opium policy as Japan grappled with having taken possession of an island populated by many thousands of Chinese colonial subjects who were also dependent on smoked opium. He was responsible for setting up the state-monopoly system in Formosa, and despite the island's emulated approach to opium, by the 1920s the monopoly system was not as successful as Japanese authorities had hoped.[61]

Like the religiously motivated American and British anti-opium groups, and the Chinese nationalistic groups, Japan had developed "moral entrepreneurs," who developed an ideal against opium based on scientific principles of the time like Social Darwinism, the science of dependence and addiction, pharmacology, and the modern ideal that morality was a direct result of being civilized.[62] Part of this civilizing process was the concept of hygiene, or "hygienic modernity", which Japan learned from Germany. The process of imperialism and colonialism then spread this learning to Japan's colonial territories like Formosa, Kwantung and China.[63] Gotō, the new chief administrator on Formosa, had served as the director of Japan's Home Ministry's Hygiene Bureau, thus making him an ideal person to bring modern hygienic practice outside of Japan.[64]

It was not just medical knowledge and modern medical theory and practice that allowed Japan to continue its state-monopoly system. The invention of the hypodermic syringe, and the chemical isolation of morphine and heroin in the latter half of the nineteenth century provided

[60] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 21; Kim, *Doctors of Empire*, 4-5.
[61] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 22-23.
[62] Kingsberg, *Moral Nation*, 1, 5-6.
[63] Kim, *Doctors of Empire*, 12-13.
[64] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 21.

cheaper and more reliable sources of drugs that would satisfy people's dependence on opium. By the 1910s and 1920s, hypodermically applied morphine and heroin were available at specialized houses throughout China.[65] This was in large part to the medical and educational connection made decades previously between Germany and Japan. As had been hinted in the British Board of Trade memos, both Germany and Japan had been reluctant participants in the Shanghai Opium Commission and Hague Opium Conventions, Germany especially so, as it saw itself victimized and unfairly singled out due to its strong pharmaceutical industry.[66] It considered Britain a hypocrite for wanting to now initiate drug control measures and treaties at a time when Germany was becoming not just the European, but the global distributor of opiates and other narcotics like cocaine.[67]

Germany as distributor was only half of the issue. A distributor needed customers in order to operate. The First World War helped Japan grow as an Asian distributor in its own right of not just narcotics, but of the tool necessary to administer it, the hypodermic syringe. The First World War caused a global disruption in trade and transnational connections. One consequence of the war was the positive transformation of Japan's economy.

On the eve of the war Japan's economy was neither stable nor healthy, to the point where it had transitioned from a net food exporter to a net importer, costing it valuable balance in trade.[68] At the end of the war, Japan had expanded its markets, like exports of both light and heavy industry, and established trading houses and corporations like Mitsui (see Fig. 4.1) and

[65] Dikötter et al. *Narcotic Culture*, 185.
[66] Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow*, 237-238.
[67] Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow*, 238.
[68] Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West*, 100.

Mitsubishi had expanded, increasing their profits and sales due to demand during the war.[69]



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Sole Agents for Miike, Tagawa, Ida, Yamano, Hokoku, Kanada, Kishima, Mannoura, Onoura, Otsuji, Sonoda, Tsubakuro, Yoshinotani, Yoshio, Yenokibara, and other Coals.

opium,

Fig. 4. 1 An advertisement for the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha from 1905, advertising its global connections within Asia and the rest of the world. It declares it is the "Japan Sole Agents for Carnegie Steel Co., Pittsburgh; John Musgrave & Sons, [Bolton, U.K.], Platt Bros. & Co., Oldham; Vickers, Sons and Maxim, England; General Electric Co., etc., etc., etc." Source: "The Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (Mitsui & Co. in Europe and America)", The Far-Eastern Review, *(Manila, Philippines: Volume 1, Issue 8, January 1905): 3.*

Along with increased economic demand in general, Japan saw increases in its territories containing Chinese colonial subjects who were anxious to continue getting their opium, and now morphine and heroin as well. Japan also developed its own domestic pharmaceutical industry.

[69] Storry, *Japan and the Decline of the West*, 100-101.

One pioneering pharmacist, Hoshi Hajime, had studied political science at Columbia University in the United States, and then set up the Hoshi Pharmaceutical Company in 1911, where he profited from the relationship that Japan had developed with American and German pharmaceutical companies.[70] In his desire to manufacture morphine, Hoshi sourced opium from the Ottoman Empire and Persia due to its higher morphine content of around 12%, as opposed to the weaker Indian opium that was also diminishing in availability.[71] In the Kwantung Leased Territory on the Chinese mainland, Japanese traffickers were smuggling opium and narcotics into Manchuria, and the colonial Japanese government even began farming out opium and narcotic concessions to the Chinese merchant Liu Tzu-shan for $200,000 in Tsingtao in 1915.[72]

Morphine was even more profitable for Japan than opium had been. Before the British passed the *Dangerous Drugs Act* in 1920, and even into the beginning of the First World War, Britain was delivering huge amounts of morphine to Japan. Between 1912 and 1915, approximately 800,000 ounces (around 22,679,618 grams) had been delivered to Japan, Formosa, and to the Kwantung Leased Territories, totalling almost £400,000.[73] The reason for this huge quantity of morphine was not just to fuel dependence. Morphine was also considered as a possible aid for helping people wean off opium smoking. This was a form of replacement therapy, still in use today with substances like methadone and suboxone, which are opiates themselves. Hypodermically injected opiates also had the unintended effect of showing smokers that the much cheaper morphine injections could provide the same effect as smoking opium.[74] We therefore see that despite the best of intentions by medical practitioners, attempts to help people break their dependence also showed them a quicker, cheaper and just as effective

[70] Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow*, 233.
[71] Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow,* 233-234.
[72] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 53.
[73] Rimner, *Opium's Long Shadow*, 241.
[74] Dikötter et al. *Narcotic Culture*, 177-178.

substitute for the more expensive opium that they had previously smoked. The lure of money was just as habit forming for the people selling the drugs as for the people consuming them.

There are several problems surrounding transnational meetings, agreements, trade and economics. As we have seen, it is difficult for different nation-states to agree. Considering the regulation continuum, there were many approaches being proposed to answer The Opium Question. The United States was in favour of outright prohibition, except in very limited circumstances. The British took more of a medical approach, using government licensure as a form of state monopoly. Britain's *Dangerous Drugs Act* did not mention the wholesale manufacturers though, thus leaving out a significant portion of the problem. China was in favour of the slow progression towards prohibition, though foreign actors by the 1920s were limited to mostly the actions of Japan. It was difficult to enforce a policy where so much volume of illegal narcotics were entering the country, with the help of Europeans. Another ironic challenge is that transnational technology made the purchase and transportation of illegal substances much easier.

One media source that critiqued the Japanese presence and dispersal of narcotics in occupied Chinese territories was the *North-China Herald*. In an article published on September 18th, 1915, and written simply by "a Correspondent", the article details how "The trade in morphia may be described as withing certain limitations the most immediately lucrative branch of Japanese commerce."[75] It has been established that there was a second wave of smuggling into China, and that in 1915 Japan's economy was recovering. The correspondent says that morphia was being smuggled to China, and being provided to Chinese subjects in Korea. In

[75] A Correspondent, "Japan's Morphia Trade with China: A Lucrative Branch of Japanese Commerce. What the Profits Are And How Earned," *The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette*, (Sep. 18, 1915): 767. URL: https://www.proquest.com/docview/1369931169/abstract/549A0AB45E614035PQ/1. Accessed January 18, 2024.

1915, they continue, morphine was being manufactured in Formosa under government supervision, suggesting that the state-monopoly had been extended to morphia production.

This account is corroborated by an account published in 1924 by Harry A. Franck, who travelled through Formosa and saw the state camphor and opium processing plants. Another example of a transnational traveller, he said that at that time, foreigners were not allowed to tour the opium plant, suggesting that something other than strictly opium was being processed there.[76] In the beginning, the correspondent continues, morphia was imported to Japan from manufacturers in England, Germany and Austria, and was sent via the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd shipping line, a company still in operation today as the Hapag-Lloyd Company.[77] The ship borne morphia was stopped with the enactment of the Chinese opium prohibition which began on January 1st, 1909.

Despite the prohibition law in China, the correspondent describes the transnational route that morphia now took when shipped from Europe to Asia. A Japanese wholesale company based in Osaka, which was an agent of the British manufacturer based in Battersea, London (they did not name the company), in 1913 imported by registered post via Siberia around two and a half tons (2.5 metric tonnes) of muriate of morphia crystals and cubes. They also say that German manufacturing chemists like Karl Rohde and Böhringer had also begun using the Siberian postal route.

Another transnational aspect of this logistics chain was the use of the telegraph for the supplier and the purchaser to agree on pricing. The profit for the Japanese colonial government on six and a quarter tons of morphia (6.35 metric tonnes) was £840,000.[78] The endeavour was

[76] Harry A. Franck, *Glimpses of Japan and Formosa*, (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company Inc., 1924): 197. URL: http://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.173812. Accessed September 15, 2023.
[77] Their website is found here: https://www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/home.html.
[78] A Correspondent, "Japan's Morphia Trade with China," 767-768.

very profitable for the Japanese colonial government. As Figure 4.2 shows, there was an overall increase in domestic drug production after the end of the First World War through to 1921, which then steadied in the years 1922 and 1923, showing that there was still demand.



Fig. 4. 2 The effects of increased domestic Japanese pharmaceutical production as a result of disrupted supply from Europe during the First World War. Source: H. Richard Friman, Narcodiplomacy: Exporting the U.S. War on Drugs, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019): 43. Sources were from Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs, cited in 511.4A2/256 (Dec. 16, 1924); 894.114 Narcotics/N16.33 (Nov. 25, 1924).

If the First World War taught Japan anything, it was that they could establish a robust pharmaceutical industry on their own, and even supply the tool needed to administer the drugs they were producing. Despite increased regulations agreed upon at the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909, and then the Hague Opium Conventions between 1911 and 1914, Japan continued to increase rather than decrease its import and production of harmful, dependence-forming substances.

The Geneva Conference, 1925

Imperial Japan, in the words of John Hennessey, was "plotting its own course" in terms of imperial expansion. It was not merely conforming to a Western model of imperial expansion,

but it was rather a product of its time.[79] This is not to say that Japan was still isolated, as it had been for centuries prior to the arrival of Commodore Perry and the Meiji Restoration. Its close association with Germany, another latecomer to the process of imperial expansion, is evidence of that. This association was evident to contemporaries as well, with Harry Franck describing the Formosa capital Taipei "in many ways better than most Japanese cities, and an improvement on no small number of American ones."[80] Indeed, it was to Franck "in complete contrast to Chinese disorder on the other side of the channel, a Prussian exactness which Prussia never attained."[81] Franck's impression was that Imperial Japan was an improvement on Prussia.

Japan, within the Pacific world, was instrumental in creating Pacific geopolitics, due to its rapid rise in global prestige, its industrialization, its militarization and its imperial expansion. It also did not feel bound by the regulations that it had agreed to through transnational meetings and even treaties. In two memos sent between the Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Tang Tsai-Fou on May 30th, 1922, Minister Tang asked for the enforcement of

> [T]he promise of the Japanese Government, conveyed through its representative, to make the strictest possible investigation into the illicit traffic in morphine at present being carried on in the Far East; and it recommends that co-operation should be established between the Japanese authorities and the Chinese Maritime Customs, with a view to trancing the sources of contraband morphine.[82]

The memo from the Chinese Foreign Minister is supported by discrepancies in import data provided by the Japanese government concerning its morphine imports from the United States. The discrepancy was large, and the Japanese Foreign Minister agreed that between 1919 and

[79] Hennessey, *Rule by Association*, 20.
[80] Franck, *Glimpses of Japan and Formosa*, 144.
[81] *Ibid.*
[82] League of Nations, "Illicit Traffic in Morphine in the Far East," United Nations Archives, Geneva. R762-12A-21369-21369. Correspondence between His Excellency The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokio and His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, Chinese Legation, Rome. URL: https://archives.ungeneva.org/illicit-traffic-in-morphine-in-the-far-east-secretary-general-letter-to-various-governments-communicating-the-resolution-of-the-advisory-committee-on-opium-recommending-that-co-operation-should-be-established-between-the-japanese-autho/download. Accessed February 29, 2024.

1920, it imported 112,713 lbs. (51,126 kg.) more raw opium into Japan than the United States reported it exported to Japan. In the interwar era, it was likely that Japan was manufacturing its own morphine, and in this case had fabricated numbers in its report. The Japanese minister claimed that an error must have occurred and a quantity of opium had been included twice. Just like any interaction, honesty by all parties, whether it's two people or transnational discussions, is key.

In 1924 and 1925 two meetings were planned, the first in November 1924 to discuss the control of opium smoking in Asia, attended solely by Asian nations or imperial governments with territories there, like Britain. Foster says that Britain and Japan argued over Britain wanting to perform extra inspections of Japanese import certificates, which Japan disagreed with.[83] Considering the fact that in 1922, China had disputed the discrepancy of tens of thousands of pounds of raw opium imported by Japan, the British request was not unreasonable. Due to this dispute, the first meeting went long and overlapped into the second meeting, which was called to update the 1912 Hague Convention to reflect changes that had taken place in the intervening years.[84]

The second meeting, known as the Geneva Opium Conference, resulted in more argument. The U.S. delegation proposed a revision and redraft of Article 8 of the Hague Convention on smoking opium, which the British delegation believed was already a settled issue.[85] Article 8 was a clause that acknowledged that some nations were not at the point "to prohibit immediately the export of prepared opium" and placed restrictions on producers of

[83] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 48.
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] Harumi Goto-Shibata, "The International Opium Conference of 1924-25 and Japan," *Modern Asian Studies*, (Vol. 36, Issue 4, 2002): 979. URL: https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/0026749x/v36i0004/969_tioco1aj.xml. Accessed December 26, 2022.

prepared opium from exporting to signatories to the Convention, and to restrict gradually the availability of the substance.[86]

The lead American delegate, Congressman Stephen Porter, and Elizabeth Wright, widow of Dr. Hamilton Wright, both pushed aggressively for the prohibitionist article to be included in the updated Geneva Conference agreement. Two of Porter and Hamilton's proposals, the ten-year plan to end opium smoking by international treaty, and secondly the assessment by the Opium Advisory Committee, enacted by the League of Nations, would assess medicinal needs and thereby enact a "supply-restriction approach" to breaking people of dependency. These proposals only had the support of China, with the other nations deriding the two suggestions.[87] The result in the outright refusal of all nations except China to support the United States in their revisions led to both those nations leaving the Conference, and no real changes being made to the 1912 Hague Convention.

After the feelings of success and accomplishment of the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909, the delegate nations left to their home countries and brought with them resolutions to address 'The Opium Question' at home. The subsequent Hague Opium Conventions and the Geneva Opium Conference sadly saw the decline of cooperation and an overall increase in drug production and trafficking meant that Japan was merely continuing to participate in the global drug trade like so many other nations.[88] It would be nice to think that these meetings had some positive effect on the reduction of drug trafficking, however despite assembling experts and professionals in these transnational meetings, the issue of opium, among other drugs, continued to be an issue to the present day. At the transnational level, 'The Opium Question' was never truly answered. The non-state moral reformers, and nationalist reformers in China and Japan

[86] League of Nations, "International Opium Convention," 195.
[87] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 50.
[88] Jennings, *The Opium Empire*, 71.

were successful at the sub-national level, and helped inform policy and legislation at the national level. The continuation of drug smuggling globally is still missing the important transnational agreement and cooperation that are needed when addressing issues like drugs, and could also be argued in cases of environmental protection, climate change, poverty and myriad other issues needing global attention.

Conclusion – Was the Opium Question Ever Answered?

Well, it just goes to show, things are not what they seem
Please, Sister Morphine, turn my nightmares into dreams
Oh, can't you see I'm fading fast
Yeah, and that this shot will be my last?

-"Sister Morphine" by the Rolling Stones, 1971

Was The Opium Question ever answered? I say that it was not, as the final result of the 1925 Geneva Conference showed. The opium trade as a commodity began in the early modern era, and opium as a medicinal and pleasurable substance had been known for thousands of years before that. What factors made it such an issue that continues today? This thesis has been a study of economics, politics, imperialism, transnationalism and how one nation navigated these in a transnational setting. Part of the thesis has been to examine the "contemporaneous creation of a transnational sphere alongside processes of nation-building" through the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.[1] Although Rodogno et al. argue that the building of nation-states was especially a phenomenon of Western Europe, Japan qualifies as one of those nation-states that emerged in the nineteenth century and became an imperial power and part of the transnational sphere. This thesis has been multi-layered in subject, looking at how nations interacted, at how Historic East Asia transformed into part of the world-system, and how Japan rose to prominence among other nations, while at the same time profiting from a harmful narcotic drug. We have seen the perspectives of people inside Japan, and outside of it looking in, and how the actions of nations had repercussions on others. As both a national and a transnational history, and a history

[1] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 7.

of transimperial relations, I have attempted to show how one issue, that of drugs regulation, is more complex a problem than it at first seems.

I have proposed that the question of narcotics regulation is not just a question of legal or not legal, and that the issues surrounding regulation of narcotics is complex, including medical, social, economic, and political considerations. It is also, as Dikötter et al. have argued, a cultural one, in their study of Chinese smoking and needle culture. Culture, and cultural exchanges, were also factors in the information exchanged at international conferences in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 1880s to 1914 were, according to Rodogno et al., "the heyday of internationalism within the emerging transnational sphere" which led to "the proliferation of new congresses and expert-gatherings and, concomitantly, of new transnational networks and associations."[2] The first international meeting on the issue of illegal drugs, the Shanghai Opium Convention of 1909, was one of those new transnational networks, and the legacy of that meeting exists today in the form of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Its 2009 report *A Century of International Drug Control* cites the drug trade's "enormous revenues" which ensured "that there were important political and economic interests vested in continuing the trade."[3] Revenue from the sale of narcotics, especially by state monopolies, was often too tempting for states to fully give up on the trade.

From the beginning, money was a motivator for many nations, at times as addictive as the drugs people were dependent on, and Japan was no exception. Along with income to fund its modernization and its imperialism, Japan had to contend with how to define its new colonies. Hennessey says that different imperial expansions had different languages attached to them.

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[2] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 8.
[3] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *A Century of International Drug Control*, (Geneva: 2009): 7. URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf. Accessed October 19, 2023.

Hokkaido, arguably the first imperial acquisition according to Hennessey, was called "development", while the Kwantung Leased Territory was more complicated, being labelled as a client state, a protectorate and then annexation as part of Japan, but with more restricted rights than Japanese citizens.[4] These debates helped Japan grow, and to become recognized internationally as an imperial power, a part of the transimperial sphere.

The questions of power and influence have also been considered, and the varying forms that power can take. Ian Tyrrell's argument is that so-called "soft power" is imprecise; he preferred the term "cultural hegemony", which in the Asian context is reminiscent of the cultural hegemony that China held over East Asia for two millennia.[5] Other scholars like Akira Iriye and Madeleine Herren argue that soft power matters in international relations, though its impact can be difficult to measure.[6] We have seen how transnational groups like medical missionaries were able to connect with each other and with local populations with the intent to both help with opium dependence, and convert those people to Christianity. We have also seen moral reformers, and for Miriam Kingsberg, moral entrepreneurs whose work qualifies as soft power, and whose impact historically is difficult to measure as argued by Iriye and Herren. Again, some reformers were more influential than others, like the reformers in the United States who were able to push for legislation and even almost write it.

The legacy of 'The Opium Question' is woven into the discourse on the approaches we take to narcotics today. As Anne L. Foster cleverly titled her book, the war on drugs has been long. She also argues that in the American context at least, there have been many approaches to it.[7] Even before the American War on Drugs was declared, many approaches to 'The Opium

[4] Hennessey, *Rule by Association*, 23-24.
[5] Tyrrell, *Reforming the World*, 3.
[6] Rodogno et al. "Introduction," in Rodogno et al. (Eds.) *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, 2.
[7] Foster, *The Long War on Drugs*, 176.

Question' had been attempted. During the nineteenth century, medical missionaries tried to help wean dependent people off of opium medically and spiritually. Although considered at times cultural, opium smoking caused a lot of damage to a lot of people, families and cities. The meeting of minds in transnational forums to regulate and attempt to answer 'The Opium Question' relied on not just discussion and information exchanges, but the moral will to follow through on decisions at national levels. This was not a success, as we saw with the ineffective results of the Geneva Opium Convention in 1925. The consensus among the majority of delegates was to maintain the *status quo* so as to continue the financial gains to which many nation-states had become accustomed.

Did the Shanghai Opium Convention and its successors work? The continued presence of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime would suggest that there is still work to do. One clue is in the name of the UN office - crime. Medical, social and supportive policies, as opposed to criminalizing drug dependence, is an approach that is not often explored. One case study is the state of Portugal, which in 2001 decriminalized possession, the acquisition and use of small amounts of narcotics. Decriminalization is a loaded word, though as we have seen, the issue of narcotics is a complex one. As Hannah Laqueur argues, "decriminalization did not legalize drugs as is often loosely suggested" and she further argues that the consequences for the use of drugs is now administrative rather than criminal.[8] The approach for Portugal is therapeutic, and not penal, and her argument is that the decriminalization had an impact on court practices more broadly.[9] The use of the word prohibition is too simplistic, because the issue of

[8] Hannah Laqueur, "Uses and Abuses of Drug Decriminalization in Portugal," *Law & Social Inquiry*, (Vol. 40, Issue 3, Summer 2015): 747. URL: https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/08976546/v40i0003/746_uaaoddip.xml. Accessed January 10, 2023.
[9] Laqueur, "Uses and Abuses," 479.

drugs is complex, and cannot be classified simply as prohibited or not. There are more factors to it like health, mental health, trauma, social stigma and poverty.

This is not to say that societies have not approached 'The Opium Question' in ways outside of legal or punitive avenues. David Courtwright discusses "the medical turn" in the 1960s and 1970s in relation to the "second postwar heroin epidemic" that needed attention in new ways.[10] While U.S. President Kennedy, and later President Johnson, eased the legality of drug related offences, it was a medical discovery in the 1960s that changed the face of medical treatment of opiate dependency. In 1963 and 1964, two physicians, Drs. Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander tested a new long-acting opiate called methadone that was orally administered and seemed to be able to help people dependent on heroin from entering withdrawal.[11] What physicians had wanted to do to help dependency in the late nineteenth century in China with morphine was now possible with methadone. Methadone, a synthetic opiate, is still used today to help people manage withdrawal symptoms. Although there is no direct connection between morphine and methadone, the moral of the story is that when we look to history, we can often assess what worked, what did not work, and perhaps be inspired to look at issues like narcotic dependency in different perspectives.

[10] David Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001): 162. URL: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.4159/9780674029910/html. Accessed February 20, 2023.
[11] Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 163-164.

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*N.B. All effort has been made to use Japanese naming convention for Japanese authors and scholars, whereby the family name appears first, followed by the given name.

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Curriculum Vitae

EDUCATION

MA University of Western Ontario, History (In Progress) Sept. 2022 – Present
Thesis Title: ***The Question of Opium: Money, Morality and Japan's Transimperial Participation in Opium Regulation, 1868 – 1925***
Advisor: Dr. Frank Schumacher

BA (Hons.) Laurentian University, History May, 2007
Graduated *Cum laude*
Thesis: ***Challenges to the Royal Prerogative in Tudor and Stuart England***
Advisor: Dr. Janice Liedl

BA Laurentian University, Law & Justice and Sociology November 2003

TEACHING ASSISTANT EXPERIENCE

History 2401 E: Medieval Europe **Sept. 2023 – Apr. 2024**
Dr. Michael Fulton
Attending weekly undergraduate lectures, preparing and conducting weekly tutorials for 2 sessions of around 15 students each, marking 4 pieces of written work for the year (2 research paper proposals; 2 research essays)

History 2401 E: Medieval Europe **Sept. 2022 – Apr. 2023**
Dr. Michael Fulton
Attending weekly undergraduate lectures, preparing and conducting weekly tutorials for 2 sessions of around 15 students each, marking 4 pieces of written work for the year (2 research essays; 2 take home

CONFERENCE PAPERS

Canadian Society for the History of Medicine May, 2023
York University, Toronto, ON

"Empire and Opium Addiction: Finding the Voice of Addicts in 19th Century China and Britain"

VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCE

Organizing Committee, Western University History Graduate Students Conference, 2024 Oct. 2023 - Present

- Program Sub-Committee
- Drafting Call for Papers
- Drafting grading rubric for submissions and reviewing submissions

- Drafting conference program

Western University High School History Day Oct. 31, 2023

- Presented a tutorial for students "Why Do People Need to Smuggle Drugs? A Brief History of the Global Opium Trade"
- Worked with volunteers, staff and faculty to serve lunch to approximately 350 students

Western University High School History Day Nov. 1, 2022

- Presented a tutorial for students "Black Death or Covid-19?"
- Worked with volunteers, staff and faculty team to serve lunch to approximately 600 students