Algorithmic Hypnosis

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Abstract

This thesis is about futures which are inscribed in the present. It is about the past determining the future and the future determining the present. It is also about artificial intelligence, algorithmic learning and the politics of mediums as they curate our sense of time. Today’s landscape is curated by algorithmic machines that are quickly taking over all aspects of social relations. Looking at media-theorist Wendy H.K. Chun’s analysis of homophily (i.e., love of sameness; commonality), I observe the regionality of standard critiques of capital and feel out new modes of resistance which do away with the discourse of the “commons” so very prevalent in philosophical critiques of political economy and technology. Turning to thinkers like Wendy H.K. Chun, Sylvia Wynter, Alexander Galloway, Bernard Stiegler and Françoise Laruelle, I look at how the politics of commonality are embedded in the technologies which surround us, both in the mainstream as well as in critical thought.

Keywords: Algorithmic Culture, Media Theory, Homophily, Decolonial Studies
Summary for Lay Audiences

Today’s landscape is curated by algorithmic machines that are quickly taking over all aspects of social organization. The chapter ‘Algorithmic Forces’ will outline media-theorist Wendy H.K. Chun’s concept of homophily (i.e., love of sameness) and draw on theorists of artificial intelligence and political economy through this conceptual term to outline problematics over algorithmic technologies spanning across analog and digital history. In the following chapter I discuss how one’s sense of time, of past and future, is curated by technologies available in people’s environment. In media studies there is increasing interest in the colonial and heteropatriarchal understandings of our socio-technical milieus both in the neoliberal mainstream as well the space of critique. Looking at time a bit suspiciously, I suggest that time as it is presented through standard philosophy is curated by its technology of philosophizing, which remains algorithmic or stratified under historical protocols that tabulate resistive thought. To summon resistive forces against the hyper-organizational mechanisms of the present is to reject the curated set of choices given to us in determining the future. What is being curated by capital is the sense of time or futurity, and even in the space of critique, there are still algorithmic tendencies that draw false commonalities or correlations which mirror rather than oppose the mainstream flows of power. This paper considers algorithmic thought in all its forms.
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary for Lay Audiences</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Approach</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithmic Forces</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal Hypnosis</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithmic Critique</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Introduction**

This thesis is about the comforting illusions of pessimism. It is about futures which are inscribed in the present. It is about the past determining the future and the future determining the present. It is also about artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic language, and the politics of the mediums.

Today’s landscape is curated by algorithmic information machines that are quickly taking over all aspects of social relations. The first chapter of this thesis will outline media-theorist Wendy H.K. Chun’s concept of “homophily” (i.e., love of sameness) and corral other theories of AI through this conceptual term. In so describing the setting of the modern techno-industrial landscape, I observe how one may understand the accelerationist tendencies of capitalism and feel out new modes of resistance unrecognized in standard academic critique and communication.

The consequence of a techno-industrial algorithmic landscape is a near-definite AI future, what I will in the second chapter refer to as having a “hypnotic” effect on one’s sense of time about the formation and trajectory of culture. As Walter Benjamin notes in *On the Concept of History*: “this disenchanted those who fell prey to the future, who sought advice from the soothsayers.”[1] The central question of the thesis is how one may create radical futures using the modes of communing available in the present against the totalizing surveillance of technology. The “soothsayers” are not just the ideological figures in the popular, but academia itself—those who philosophize resistance. This thesis argues that the soothsaying faculties that propose alternate paths to resistance remain inadequate unless they recognize the algorithmic modes of thought which are enmeshed in the cultural protocols that harness this rebellious energy. It is not

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enough to describe the modern epoch, but rather the central question becomes how to change these modes, how to resist the present, and with which tools?

The second half of the thesis, *Algorithmic Critique*, stretches the history of “homophily” further using Alexander Galloway’s concept of the ‘interface’ from *The Interface Effect* (2012) and the ‘digital’ from *Laruelle: Against the Digital* (2014) and ‘protocol’ from *Protocol* (2006). I extend Chun’s conceptual history of correlation network science to the beginnings of Western philosophy to demonstrate that the practice of *homophily* is found not only in network data science or the scientific infrastructure of AI machines, but present in forms of social critique as well—what I will refer to as ‘philosophy’. Philosophy, which has tasked itself with the act of critiquing and *psychoanalyzing* problems in society is to be viewed as inaugurating the tradition of social diagnosis and treatment—later developed into psychoanalysis and the critiques of political economy in professional academia. Here I use philosophy in a general sense to locate the space of critique which has historically aligned against the movements of power, technology and culture, and I use psychoanalysis in a literary sense. By doing this, I suggest that any kind of philosophy that seeks to critique the issues of machine learning, a developed form of code language that brings fully automated data organizational labour closer to the present, must contend with its own algorithmic tendencies and reimagine the tools of philosophizing against robotic ways of thinking. This critique is nearing the proposition of what François Laruelle refers to as ‘non-philosophy’ or ‘non-standard philosophy’, a kind of philosophy that refrains from enacting a philosophical dualism that fissures the real and the abstract/philosophical real and privileging the latter’s reality against the former.

Karl Marx’s critique of political economy must be appreciated in this regard for attempting a breakaway from the idealist occupation of philosophy by developing a science of history
that opens the system to revolutionary action or systemic change. Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology* (1846) write that “the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men – the language of real life.”\(^2\) Even still, Marx’s critique of ahistorical philosophy and idealist philosophy of history\(^3\) relies on a correlative concept of history which preserves the trajectory that philosophy initiated and critical philosophy vessels. To counteract this, I extend Marx’s thoughts on history by focusing not on the theory of alienation but on his concept of historical *revolution*, wherein history is viewed a process of difference or *creation* rather than pure description or reflection.\(^4\) This understanding of time as moments of creative forces will counteract limitations in critiques of political economy of AI and techno-sciences which I hold remain psychoanalytic, philosophical and representational by observing the materiality of philosophizing as a technical object rather than a given feature of life.

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\(^3\) Marx (1994) *Early Political Writings: A Contribution to the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy*. pp. 62: Marx notes “As the ancient peoples went through their pre-history in imagination, in *mythology*, so we Germans have gone through our post-history in thought, in *philosophy*. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being its historical contemporaries.”.

\(^4\) Marx and Engels (1992) *The Communist Manifesto*. pp. 71: …Marx writes that the petit-bourgeois socialist concept of critique understands the historical becoming of class antagonisms but shrewdly adheres to a pessimistic concept of historical overdetermination, perhaps due to the vested interests of their own class position. Since action is a threat to this class position, they are fruitful in their analysis of the history of production to explain the present but sterile in their proposed course of action/struggle; of creating alternate futures: “Historical action is to yield to their personal inventive action, historically created conditions of emancipation to fantastic ones, and the gradual, spontaneous class-organisation of the proletariat to an organisation of society specially contrived by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans.”
Theoretical Approach

Oftentimes it is critical philosophy that levies a critique of trends in the mainstream culture. An interest in artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic culture and automation is burgeoning in media studies and cultural studies across various camps. This tendency can be observed from the liberal transhumanism (human oriented AI ethics) of Oxford University’s Nick Bostrom which levies existential risk with the rise of autonomous forms of governance, to the critique of political economy found through the works of Maurizio Lazaratto, Nick Dyer-Witheford and Nick Srnicek. Alex Williams and Srnicek in #ACCELERATE MANIFESTO for an Accelerationist Politics (2013) argue for a politics that “unleashes latent productive forces. In [the accelerationist] project, the material platform of neoliberalism does not need to be destroyed. It needs to be repurposed towards common ends.” Asking what “common” means is a complicated question when considering the swathes of academic arguments over identity and phenomenological difference. From decolonial to feminist to queer understandings of difference, the formulations of difference—of the non-common and non-universal—cannot neatly be overcome in machinic criticisms against algorithmic data culture without challenging the material infrastructure that both machinic criticism and criticisms of identity formulate themselves through.

Theories of machinic capital espoused by Nick Srnicek, Nick-Dyer Witheford et. al., and Maurizio Lazzarato attempt to overcome the semiotic/linguistic analysis of identity by turning towards a machinic view of the processes of capitalism and economy. To briefly visit Maurizio Lazzarato’s Governing by Debt (2015), the author argues against the linguistic turn in phi-

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5 Srnicek & Williams (2013) CriticalLegalThinking.com
losophy in light of the emerging non-linguistic, gestural and haptic forms of control in the debt economy. Lazzarato writes:

Contrary then, to what adherents of the linguistic-turn and Lacanians might think, language does not play a central role in post-Fordist capitalism. Like communications and consumption, production does not act on subjectivity primarily or exclusive through language.\(^6\)

The flows of machinic capitalism as well as the systems of debt and mathematization of human value through various algorithmic machines of decisional governance call for a theory against purely linguistic forms of identity and phenomenological subjectivity. It is to call for a non-human objectivity that supersede many of the identity issues raised during the linguistic turn in philosophy and psychoanalysis (but also found in race, queer and feminism studies). This theory of the non-subject, non-phenomenological, non-anthropocentric sees the dominating forces of power as machinic production reproduces through behavioural protocols that formulate not only the way subjects become docile bodies but how the historical becoming of subjectivity itself is formulated. As Félix Guattari in an interview observes:

But the way such political situations work is not traditional either. It doesn't happen through social communication, through discourse, programs, or reference to Great Authors. It has gone over to the side of reflexes, to collective sensibility, to systems of nonverbal expression. Children and adolescents are not aware of their becoming, at least not predominantly in terms of meaningful discourse. They use what I call "a-signifying systems": music, clothing, the body, behaviors as signs of mutual recognition, as well as machinic systems of all kinds.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Guattari (2009) *Soft Subversion* pp. 139-140
Guattari provides a prescient analysis of control and behavioural conditioning that is even more amplified in today’s mechanically/algorithmically indexed media culture. From curated content online to “ambient AI” projects to forms of algorithmic decision-making in influential sectors like the stock exchange and credit systems—people’s behaviour are becoming less tuned by state institutions and more by capital forces like social media, recreational industries as well as economic models of governing which are determined via the mathematical flows of money exchange (debt, credit scores, mortgage quotes, etc.). Power and control are not only dispensed by centralized institutions of the state (i.e., schools, civic institutions, religion, hospitals, prisons) but exercised through the haptic rhythms of capital which often present themselves as innocuous everyday objects and commodities. The machines of capitalism can be big things like non governmental institutions but also very simple and subtle things that transgress institutional prerogatives—like code and written language.

Nick Srnicek in Platform Capitalism (2016) argues that data is the new oil and mechanisms of capital power are quickly treating data as both commodity and resource. Srnicek argues:

Capital has turned to data as one way to maintain economic growth and vitality in the face of a sluggish production sector. The platform has emerged as a new business model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data, and with this shift we have seen the rise of large monopolistic firms.

Companies are increasingly relying on the generation and commodification of data which employ algorithmically data curating machines to inform top-down decisions. The commodifica-

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8 Srnicek (2016) Platform Capitalism. Srnicek writes: “A key argument of this chapter is that in the twenty-first century advanced capitalism came to be centred upon extracting and using a particular kind of raw material: data.” pp. 28
9Ibid., pp. 11.
tion of data then directly feeds into large governing decisional models that are now informing, predicting, and disciplining consumer behaviour and social practices. Moreover, this method of data collection informs decisions to create feedback loops that end up profiting from retained engagement. What is being observed by Srnicek is not simply that capital is advancing to a platform model,¹⁰ that sees data extraction and production as the new mode of production, but because the nature of data is decisional—it sees the realization of perhaps Marx’s nightmare, the realization that with these data analytic machines (now becoming automated through machine learning) the human might not be the last person to make decisions about its fate. Sure, companies still are owned by human beings, but even human seats of power like CEOships are dependent on the CEO’s ability to meet profit incentives informed by consumer data analytics. Even if Jeff Bezos has run Amazon since its inception, much of his decisions are not his own but informed by huge data analytic teams that instruct his leadership choices. His engagement with the stock market is informed by aggregated data predictions which are becoming increasingly more precise with the introduction of AI and machine learning technology. Here the human (Bezos) is merely a fleshy conduit for data analytics which analyze recorded consumer behaviour and provide predictions to meet higher profit incentives. The structure of the company utilizes algorithmic data modeling to make decisions through the CEO, irrespective of the CEO’s subjective morals, opinions or values. This might be analogous to when Lazzarato illustrates that industrial/commercial capital has moved from M-C-M’ (money is exchanged for commodity which is exchanged for more money) to M-M’ (money is exchanged for more money). What data analytics have introduced in a novel way, distinct from traditional machines of

¹⁰Ibid.
Srnicek writes: “the new business model that eventually emerged is a powerful new type of firm: the platform. 10 Often arising out of internal needs to handle data, platforms became an efficient way to monopolise, extract, analyse, and use the increasingly large amounts of data that were being recorded.” pp. 29
capital, is the capacity to provide decisions based on pattern data sets. Data is money and now money is data. What Srnicek’s book alludes to with the formulation of platform capitalism as the new prime mode of production is a non-human capitalism, one that instrumentalizes the human to make decisions based on the protocol set by the previous disciplinary rhythms of the economy. There is little chance that a CEO’s decisions will vastly differ from the prescriptions of consumer data analytics. Now that platforms have “data extraction built into its DNA, as a model that enables other services and goods and technologies to be built on top of it, as a model that demands more users in order to gain network effects, and as a digitally based medium that makes recording and storage simple”. The introduction of automated decision-making machines like AI not only collect data, but they open up new data sets previously imperceptible by human intellectual labour. What seems to be gestured towards in Srnicek’s book is a posthuman form of governance which sees the human as intermediary between machines of data collection that influence how surplus extraction takes place and introduces new modes of surplus extraction.

Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikkola Kjøsen and James Steinhoff in *Inhuman Power* (2019) turn to a speculative posthumanism where the machinic forces of capital which have traditionally extracted value from human labour to reproduce the money-form (M-M') might see even the erasure of the human in terms of non-human “fixed capital” and human labour powered “variable-capital” 12. Here humans are lurching away from being “variable-capital” and

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11 Ibid., pp. 49.
12 Dyer-Witheford et. al., (2019) *Inhuman Power*

Dyer-Witheford et. al., write: “What we term the major line of Marx’s machine analysis unfolds in the first volume *Capital*. In this account, machines, along with other equipment, buildings and raw materials, are ‘constant, fixed’ capital. This is contrasted with the ‘variable’ capital of human labour. This distinction between ‘fixed’ and ‘variable’ capital rests on the basic proposition that it is only human labour that creates value within capitalism: the machine, however gargantuan its powers seem relative to those of humans, can only act as a supplement or force-amplifier to the essential, human activity, increasing its efficiency, albeit by manifold times. Machinery, which has itself been built by humans, is ‘dead labour.’” pp. 15-16
towards a “fixed capital” economic classification, or towards an economic model that sees our species as dispensable and even obsolete as climate change caused by capital forces, automation and algorithmic machines promise to overcome the fleshy limitations of human labour into automated labour or posthuman value creation. In the non-human model presented by Dyer-Witheford et. al., humans are becoming “fixed-capital” which was previously occupied for machines (contrary to Marx’s concept of the machines special role as “dead labour”). This model sees the primacy of algorithmic and capitalist machinery which is now quickly usurping rational-decision because of machine-learning’s capacity to draw wider nets of patterned data and inform predictive decisions at a level more advanced than allowed by human thinking labour. Dyer-Witheford et. al., write:

Latent in Marx’s account of capital’s increasing mechanization is the idea that the positions of worker (initially the main, value creating actor) and the machine (at first the worker’s power-amplifying supplement) invert. The worker, who at the handicraft stage was the subject of the labour process, becomes an automaton of repetitive, repeated motions, responding to automatic machinery rather than using it; the automatic machinery has become the subject of the labour process.\(^{13}\)

Marx’s categorization of machines as dead labour becomes blurred when humans shed their subjectivity as they experience repeated interactions with the machineries of work and society. The human becomes through this symbiotic process another labouring machine which is toiling away alongside other machines (irrespective of their human status) to produce surplus value (M-M\(^{'}\)).

\(^{13}\) Ibid., pp. 17

Dyer-Witheford et. al., write: “ML-driven AI, developed in part in response to the crisis of capitalist globalization, is placing on the horizon possibilities that resemble those in Marx’s visions of capitalism’s machinic extremes. The ‘Fragment on Machines’ and the ‘Results of the Immediate Process of Production’ are recto and verso of one page, a page that speaks both of machine power liberating humanity from capital, and of a capital rendered autonomous from humanity.” pp.18
Which is not to argue that human subjectivity is something to be saved, rather, it is to be overcome in the development out of capitalism as the powers that be formulate subjectivity by ideologically supplanting a desire for an ego or recognition. This construction of desire by the state and now institutions and companies is done through the process of alienation which formulates a subject-object (human-machine) divide historically rather than as a given feature of life because capital makes use of them in a specific, anti-human way. Technologies in themselves are neutral, but only affect culture under certain socio-technical conditions. Dyer-Witheford et. al., turn to a post-humanist critique of political economy to explore the process of variable-capital/human-labour turning into fixed-capital/dead-labour and traditionally dead labour turned into agential forces (i.e., machines, AI, automation). This is not to argue that AI machines will be conscious in the same way as human beings—this would be too anthropocentric—the purpose here is to see how little conscious subjectivity is required to curate decisions from everyday interactions to top-down policymaking and governance. Dyer-Witheford et. al. call upon the work of neo-cybernetic thinker Nick Land to argue that “what is at stake in the emergence of AI when [Land] declares that if such a process is emancipatory, what it emancipates is not a ‘human species, who reaches species-being to emancipate human individuals’, but only the ‘means of production’ themselves”.

In such a scenario, human beings are merely mediating a process of machinic liberation—and the future of capitalism may be one that does away with the human species and introduces instead proletarianized machines struggling against bourgeois machines. Dyer-Witheford et. al., go on to write: “If AI approaches or attains the horizon of singularity, the vistas

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Dyer-Witheford et. al., write: “Generalized ambient intelligence is one way AI could become part of the general conditions of production. If achieved, it would constitute a radical change to the technological milieu of capital, particularly if the AI which becomes ambient has ML capacities for perception and cognition. What would it be like if not only human knowledge and skills were transmuted into dead labour, but if dead labour gained the fundamental capacities for perceiving and cognizing that humans have historically monopolized?” pp. 58

15 Ibid., pp. 157
that open up are not therefore those of inevitable capitalist collapse, but rather of the elevation of machine capital as a literally automatic subject autonomous from human beings”.

Srnicek and Lazzarato et. al. approach a non-human philosophy or non-subjectivist forms of philosophy that seek to do away with problems over phenomenological, linguistic and identity difference to observe the non-subjective machinic flows of capitalism which formulate the affective experiences of difference. This is to overcome an analysis of the historical rhythms of discoursal power, but moreover the general rhythms of haptic or ambient capitalism which instructs through non-verbal gestures that, recalling Felix Guattari, supersedes standard disciplinary institutions in favour of a voluntary submission to mechanical, non-human power. This is to go against the subject-object bifurcation and see the human from the perspective of the material base—as objects in symbiotic co-evolution with other objects in equal relationality.

Dyer-Witheford’s book shares affinity with a form of pessimist thought which challenges the various ideas that see the human in sharp distinction from the non-human –drawing from Marx a general ambivalence towards a fully automated post-work socialism. This pessimist thought is best espoused by philosopher Ray Brassier in his work Nihil Unbound (2007). In this book Brassier provides a philosophical framework that helps thwart emancipatory politics based on philosophical anthropocentrism. This is done through an assault on what he refers to as correlationism or theories of the human’s primacy to structure experience/action (Immanuel Kant) towards a theory of phenomenological meaning-making (Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein) all the way up to the linguistic turn most politically pronounced in French structuralist philosophy (Deleuze, Derrida). Brassier, borrowing from the work of Quentin Meillassoux, argues that Kant inaugurates the tradition of correlationism. The idea is that “philosophy has

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16 Ibid., pp. 29
sought to account for science’s Copernican turn by invoking a correlation which makes being orbit around thinking, in what effectively amounts to a Ptolemaic counter-revolution”. Correlationism then is the idea that the human is the prime mediator in the world, endowed with the special conditions of reasoning (Kant) or consciousness and complex language (Husserl, Hedeigger, Wittgenstein, Derrida). Against this prominent view, Brassier poses a philosophy of nihilism and or a non-human philosophy that sees thought as temporally finite, and the world beyond the human (traditionally assumed to be the inaccessible noumenal) as the engine that formulates thought’s existence and eventual non-existence. This kind of physicalism provides some interesting ontological breaks that theorists like Lazzarato, Srnicek and Dyer-Witheford et. al., explore in their machinic view of capital in the present and distant future. This way of imaging capitalist dominance sees capitalism as driven by non-human algorithmic forces which can bring on the extinction of the human. All three thinkers prescribe a somewhat accelerationist model to envision the speculative extremes of machinic capital. Brassier writes that Kantian correlationism (the reasoning mind’s mediation in world-making) has developed into formulations of experiential philosophies of life (Heidegger, Wittgenstein) and remains dominant throughout the linguistic turn. Brassier, taking from Meillassoux, prescribes a return to a pre-Kantian, enlightenment era philosophy of science. The natural sciences, for Brassier and Meillassoux can deliver “ancestral statements” about the pre-human which indicates thought’s temporal becoming and unbecoming.

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...Immanuel Kant declared that his introduction of transcendental idealism via the synthetic-apriori (the perceivable world is structured by the reasoning faculties of the human mind) was the Copernican revolution in philosophy but Brassier and Meillassoux argue that this primacy given to the human being returns to a Ptolemaic anthropocentrism. 

18 Ibid. Brassier writes: “The correlationist defence indulges in an illegitimate extrapolation from temporality as condition for experience to temporality as condition for the various non-experiential phenomena described by science, including physical-cosmological time itself. But this is already to assume precisely what the correlationist objection to the realist interpretation of the ancestral statement sought to demonstrate – namely, that scientific phenomena, ancestral
Even machinic theorists like Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and post-structural linguistic theorists like Jacques Derrida preserve the primacy of thought and misrecognize the possibility of human extinction by attempting to formulate a philosophy by drawing an ontology of thoughts geographical/cosmological/temporal relationality with the non-human. This is demonstrated through Brassier’s reading of philosopher François Laruelle who argues that philosophy and philosophies of difference enact a ‘philosophical decision’ which separates the real from the transcendent philosophical image provided by a person. Brassier writes of Laruelle’s non-philosophical project:

Non-philosophy puts philosophy as such (deconstruction included) to one side – puts it in its place or objectifies it, so to speak (as we shall see, this is partly what Laruelle means by ‘unilateralization’) – by showing how the decisional complex of transcendence, immanence, and the transcendental is ultimately determined by the unobjectifiable immanence which Laruelle identifies with ‘the real’.”

“Philosophy” or reflection itself is not a process by which the subject endlessly paints the real events as they come—but even the object of philosophy is temporal and finite and is not a given feature of life. As Brassier quotes from Laruelle the real “is the phenomenon as already-manifest or manifest-without-manifestation, the phenomenon-without-phenomenality, rather than the phenomenon which is posited and presupposed as manifest in accordance with the transcendental synthesis of manifest and manifestation.” From this conception Brassier pushes for a theoretical non-philosophical model that attempts to see the universe as independent of or otherwise, are merely abstractions which derive whatever sense they have from some supposedly more primary dimension of experience.” pp. 62

Here is a criticism of both phenomenological and Kantian concepts of time as subjectively (either via the individual or via the species) constructed. The realist objection sees ancestral (pre-human) statements providing a non-subjective view of cosmic time, irrespective of perception or thought.

19 Ibid., pp. 127
the human and *indifferent* to the speculations of the human. Hence philosophers of standard materialism (standard Marxism) as well as philosophies of difference (Derrida’s supplemental reading of the metaphysics of presence through a process of différance and Deleuze’s ontology of time and space as difference/repetition) attempt to propose a monopolistic thought-image to master the univocity of the real via the recognition of the void of the real. Laruelle, according to Brassier would argue that this is not possible even when speaking of difference because it enacts the philosophical decision to monopolize the presentation of difference:

Real of the last-instance is not simply material, for ‘materiality’, whether ontico-empirical or ontological-metaphysical, Being Nothing continues to be posited and presupposed within the ambit of decision. Thus the real as last-instance cannot be ontologically specified.\(^ {21} \)

This is not a Kantian reversion back into separating the world from the knowable to the unknowable (phenomena/noumena) but to say that any philosophy including Kantian meta-philosophy which attempts to separate and name this law of subject-object division provides a primacy to the philosophical animal (human) to make the incision between the phenomenological and noumenal (the real). Laruelle makes it clear that his non-standard philosophy is participating in the principle of *insufficient* philosophy—it is not the totality of thinking about this but just as insufficient in its attempt to instantiate the real. Jonathan Fardy in *Laruelle and Art* (2019) writes that “Democratic thought begins for Laruelle with the axiom that all thought is equally insufficient to grasp the Real. This is not relativism. It is a principled position that respects the equal insufficiency of thought to grasp the Real.”\(^ {22} \) This is to see philosophizing and human thought as an object in the world rather than the equal mirror of it. One recognizes that

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\(^ {22} \) Fardy (2019) *Laruelle and Art.* pp. 103
most of the universe lives in noumenal space, and the dialectic between phenomena/noumenal is too anthropologically narcissistic because it auto-posit human phenomena’s importance in equality with the world. To draw a balanced relationality between the human (phenomena) and the world as it is without human thought (noumena) is to elevate the human’s importance in equal relation to the non-human cosmos but this equal relation is philosophically grounded rather than grounded in the real. Pushing back against something like Deleuze and Guattari’s schizo-analysis, Laruelle would challenge the practice of becoming-other or the dissolution of the ego (i.e., into the univocal desiring-machines) via the philosophical method or material interface because an ontology of relationality itself gives a representation of life which monopolizes or reterritorializes rather than understands the other by projecting an ontology of hyper-relationality, correlations or cosmic commonality. Laruelle’s non-philosophy is moving towards a praxis of non-relationality, a non-human way of thinking that brackets philosophizing by making it into a geo-historic technical event rather than a given fact of life. Rather, thinking is more of a spectrum, wherein human consciousness is one of many forms of instantiating the real in a spectrum of expression. Of course, the “human” refers to the biological difference between species and things but also a history of the uses and abuses of this particular signifier within the Western tradition.

Why is Laruelle important to the discussion of AI, criticisms of machinic capital and machinic criticism? Because as theorists of autonomist capital position themselves away from discourse critique, towards machinic critique of governance (Lazzarato) and the material implications of immaterial work/data economies (Srnicek), and even see in this process the possibility of human obsolescence (Dyer-Witheford et. al.) the underlying philosophical attempt is at a non-philosophy which views “‘philosophizing” as a finite event in the cosmos. Do they suc-
ceed? Here I would disagree because not only does this form of machinic criticism read non-anthropocentric philosophy too materially but does not appreciate the complex nature of humanity as a geo-historical category.

The epiphenomenalism proposed by Brassier through Laruelle’s non-philosophy attempts to locate thought from the perspective of the Real or cosmological lack-of-thought, to look at thought as temporally finite or an object in the world. The problem in Brassier is to equate thought with philosophy. This problem is elucidated by the self-referential signifiers of legitimate thought and illegitimate “non-thought”. Hence this paper will ask: can one look at human thought without philosophy? Can humans look at human thought without being blinded by philosophy, through a critique of the self-referential technology of writing which takes written expression as synonymous and sufficient with thought; can we understand the chain of signifiers that have equated thought and philosophy as geo-specific, cultural, racial? Here the paper will explore beyond merely the non-human political implications of thinking and non-thinking—to an understanding that even within the domain of “human thought” a spectrum exists, then asking whether this spectrum is a matter of the contents of thought or the mediums of thought?

Theorist Rocco Gangle argues that to democratize thought via non-standard philosophy is to refrain from the philosophical decision which separates the real from the philosophically abstracted image of the real. However, philosophical reflection is equated with the totali-

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23 Rocco Gangle (2012) “Laruelle and Ordinary Life” from Laruelle and Non-Philosophy Gangle writes: “non-philosophy is or can be ethico-political in a certain still-to-be-determined sense, a sense itself available only as real-in-the-last-instance, or ordinary.” pp. 62

24 Ibid., Gangle adds: “Instead of constituting a multilateral and differentiated fight over the world, philosophy may be treated as the unilateral identity of the world. More than just being an a priori presupposition of interpretative and argumentative struggle, the very idea of the world as a universal container and court of judgement for such differences is
ty of human thought and *the human itself* without locating how this specific regional kind of thinking is materialized. Jonathan Fardy writes that “for Laruelle, every philosophy since Plato that has taken the image as untrustworthy is itself to be taken with suspicion for its constitutive blindness to its own image-making or onto-photographical orientation”. How do Laruelle and Brassier separate their non-human or non-standard philosophy, how then does non-standard philosophy of the non-human (philosophy of nihilism) become non-correlational or non-representational?

Martin Heidegger argues that philosophy is that which reflects, thinks, cares/makes meaning out of Being or the movements of life. Jacques Derrida would argue that being is formulated by a chain of self-referential processes rooted in the materiality of language (being is deferred or constructed by language via a process of difference). Bernard Stiegler in *Time and Technics 2* (would argue that humans thinks-*with* a series of technical objects (including language) which have quite a bit of influence in structuring memory and curating cultural phenomena (Being does not necessitate temporality but objects in Being formulate temporalities) a process he calls “tertiary memory”.

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26 Heidegger (1968) *What is Called Thinking?*

From the introduction: “For Heidegger thinking is a response on our part to a call which issues from the nature of things, from Being itself. To be able to think does not wholly depend on our will and wish, though much does depend on whether we prepare ourselves to hear that call to think when it comes and respond to it in the appropriate manner. Thinking is determined by that which is to be thought as well as by him who thinks. It involves not only man's receptivity to Being but also Being's receptivity to man.” pp. xxii

27 Derrida (1968) *Différance.*

Derrida writes: “Différance is temporization, différance as spacing…The sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself, the present thing, “thing” here standing equally for meaning or referent. The sign represents the present in its absence.” pp. 9


Stiegler goes on to write: “For Heidegger thinking is a response on our part to a call which issues from the nature of things, from Being itself. To be able to think does not wholly depend on our wilH and wish, though much does depend on whether we prepare ourselves to hear that call to think when it conies and respond to it in the appropriate
ing discourse but providing the addition that languages are one of many “technical objects”.

This idea is borrowed from Gilbert Simondon’s concepts of individuation, transduction and technical objects. Individuation is a process which sees technical objects transduce through other technical objects and the structures around them\(^{29}\). Objects can be things, terrain, institutions, historical practices, philosophies, concepts events and living beings. Not to be mistaken for Heidegger’s “present-in-hand” or “ready-at-hand”— concepts which see people’s embeddedness within the flow of time in interaction with tools, rather the technical objects formulate the user and reformulate the physical composition of the user itself—their brain, neural structure, bodily composite \(^{30}\). There is not quite the same master-slave relationship between technical objects and users.

More influence is allotted to objects and objecthood than in Heidegger’s case, who sees the quite different separation between the living and tools—seeing in living beings a separation from the non-living tools. Ekin Erkan in Laruelle Qua Stiegler: On Non-Marxism and the Transindividuation (2019) writes:

Qua Simondon, Stiegler’s transindividual is psychosocial, for it is within our technical-artefactual “reality that the individuated being transports with him, this charge of being for future individuations.” Transindividual memory transits across individuals and

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\(^{29}\) Simondon (2020) Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information. Simondon writes: “[Transduction] can be used to think the different domains of individuation: it applies to all cases wherein an individuation is realized, manifesting the genesis of a web of rapports founded on the being.” pp. 14

\(^{30}\) Engelland (20) Heidegger and the Human Difference. “Heidegger’s contention that humans differ from other animals stems from his belief that the human environment must differ in kind from the environment of other animals. He argues that the human environment is the world of language and truth, an environment that peculiarly makes possible truthful activities, such as biology. But the ability to be open to truth cannot be a feature of human biology without making such pursuits as biology, mathematics, and philosophy a biological function of a certain species, Homo sapiens. To deny the human difference amounts to species relativism and leaves the normativity of truth unexplained. To reconcile Heidegger’s thesis concerning human uniqueness with the Darwinian insight into common ancestry, I amplify a distinction occasionally made by Heidegger between condition and cause.” pp. 176
generations, engaging within the cross-generational social sphere of protosocial non-verbal encoding: it is this synthesis and its relationship with the transduction between the subject’s elementary “vital” force and the collective that can serve as an alternative.”

Here objects must be thought of as forms of energy transference (individuation via transduction) rather than mediums which refer to solid, immobile things in the world, but rather as always undergoing the process of individuation. In the case of human societies, the transference of memories, of the things that happened in the past to inform the future, is a technical process that happens materially in things like writing, code and other symbolic significations. What might be necessary is a political economy of the sign or a “science of the word” as Sylvia Wynter argues borrowing from Aimé Césaire\(^\text{31}\) who saw narratives as affective material technology rather than a system of semiotics which mediates or represents things. This is to see language and the problems of the linguistic turn as problems of technological power rather than discoursal power. Here, language as a world-making technology that nudges and organizes phenomena, shaping how people think (and how people think about thinking) and move forward is adopted in favour against problems of semiotic representationalism. Thinking is to be divorced from writing or speaking to be determined-in-the-last-instance\(^\text{32}\) as an appearance of the real but not constituted as the totality or the finality of the real. A human that is not pre-determined by the technology of philosophical writing must see philosophizing as a material formation or curated set of technical assemblages (i.e., the materiality of textuality gives rise to

\(^{31}\) McKittrick (2015) *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis*. Wynter argues: “Such a science would be defined by the fact that the study of the Word would now determine the study of nature. The implication is this: the study of nature, in this context, will now be specifically a study of the implementing bios agency of the human brain.” pp. 26-27

\(^{32}\) Fardy (2019) *Larryelle and Art*. Fardy writes of Laruelle: “To pose the Real as determinant is to conceptualize the Real nonetheless and to determine its nature as precisely what is determinant in the last instance” pp. 148
philosophy—philosophy is not the technical object but rather a specific formation of writing and inscription) that sustain histories of power into the present and onto the future. Not in a Foucauldian diagram that draws a duality between institutions and subjects but as free-flowing affective signals that are enmeshed with other mediums of control in capital (i.e., mathematics, data indexing, popular media).

Maurizio Lazzarato challenges the discourse criticisms in philosophy by turning towards the urgency of finance capital and algorithmic forces that nudge and control individual subjectivity to draw profit under a specific social machinery. Yet the linguistic turn enabled many of the non-hegemonic subaltern or minorities to see themselves as philosophizing subjects (non-philosophy aside, this was at a historical time a good thing). The urgency of non-human forces curtailed under capitalism is urgent, but too often the desire for speculative materialism or a machinic theory of the non-human does not respect the historical conception of the human as a product of a historical technology as well. To posit thinking vs. cosmological nihilism and even to dissolve these binaries is to take the “human” as a given or master signification that refers to a unified species with a specific identity (thinking/expressing conscious reflection) separated from geo-historical clashes. Is this a return to semiotics, phenomenology, or discourse analysis? Not quite, as what I suggest is a cybernetic or technological view of language (language as a

Lazarato makes it clear that it is not only algorithmic machines that drive the exploitation of labour (they are not evil-in-themselves) in finance capital but the politics of a specific social machinery which supervise and incentivize the prerogatives of algorithmic machines. Lazzaratto writes: “Computational machines might accelerate the capitalist social machine, bolster the repetitive function of production, consumption and appropriation thorough technological automatism, but there is a difference between the two types of repetition…the changes in axioms that took place during the transition from Fordism to neoliberalism or during the 2007 crisis and its “governance” (austerity, reduced state budgets, etc.) derive not from algorithms but from the capitalist social machine, and therefore, a specific politics” pp. 203-204

But to this problem, I ask which social machinery is prevalent? Is it, as Lazzaratto and the other economists of this paper argue, neoliberal modes of production or, as Slyvia Wynter argues economism itself that is driving the colonial forces of algorithmic machines and the monopolization of human identity? Which is to say, that first social machinery sees the human as an economic being (which exists in both capital as well as economist critiques of capital) rather than a narrativizing being.
material force of control rather than a representational medium that is separable from its structural/linguistic functions and its materiality) so that one may draw a flat ontology between mathematical algorithmic devices and linguistic critique (both as affective technologies that curate the possible pathways for desire to flow). Geoffrey Winthrop-Young writes of media theorist Friedrich Kittler’s addition to standard discourse analysis:

Once you can record, replay and transcribe speech, language is no longer a compliant medium that encodes human thought at our beck and call. Nor is it a neutral conduit facilitating the transfer of ideas between consciousnesses. Instead, it is a data stream that runs according to its own rules and systematically erodes the traditional boundaries between message and noise. We do not speak language; we are spoken by it; and so-called meaningful communication is an arrangement of units that precede meaning.\textsuperscript{34}

What are language’s rules? Are they semiotic or rather the formation of racial, heteronormative and ablest means of ownership over the modes of signifying? This way of linguistic analysis sees language as a technology or in cybernetic terms, a signal which might have its own force unless curtailed by human supervision. Moving towards a machinic criticism of capital via a post-institutional, neoliberal, economic analysis of power must still contend with the fact that the algorithmic technology that drive things like finance capital is based on \textit{code}—on a linguistic protocol that automate decisions across time and space. The question becomes how does one communicative technology (academic critique) thwart the prevailing linguistic machinery of artificial intelligence? In many instances of the neo-accelerationists or posthuman political economy, the problems with linguistic or semiology represent problems with meaning and subjectivity when what they really want to stress the urgency of machinic forces and see language

\textsuperscript{34} Winthrop-Young (2015) \textit{Discourse, Media, Cultural Techniques: The Complexity of Kittler}, pp. 456
as a product of state/capital powers that discipline resistive desires through technology. Is this asking thinkers of machinic capital to solve too much (e.g., discrimination, colonialism, hetero-patriarchy, etc.)? Not really, since posthuman political economy nevertheless employ “human” discourse to account for the trajectory of the entire species by ignoring their own positionality in the geo-historic structure of the present—this I argue is only enabled by the materials of philosophizing. It is not enough to say that machinic capital will colonize spaces, because in many ways the discourse of machinic posthumanism colonizes resistance itself by casting the net of the commons or “human” against inhuman powers (machines). Which is to say that this form of economic critique takes as a given, the “human,” as a fixed referent which does not have racial, gendered and sexual differences.

Let us briefly make a distinction between approaches to non-human philosophy: ‘Machinic non-humanism’ espoused by autonomists like Lazzarato, Srnicek and Dyer-Witheford et. al., and philosophers like Brassier and Laruelle see non-human philosophy as imagining climate and machinic forces as curtailed by capital forces. And then a ‘literal non-human philosophy’, which I will argue is best espoused by theorist Sylvia Wynter. In interviews with Katherine McKittrick, Wynter argues that the naming of the “human” seeks to name and own the common “we”—the “we” of the entire species of the human. In Homo Narrans and the Science of the Word: Toward a Caribbean Radical Imagination (2018), theorist Bedour Alagraa writes:

Man’s overrepresentation renders opaque what is at the core of human life and sociality. This core, according to Wynter, includes two expressions: the human as storytelling (homo narrans) and the human as praxis, both of which acknowledge that who we are is hybridly human, biology and culture, bios and mythois.35

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Here, the human as *homo narrans* posits the human as a hybrid between *bios* and *mythos*, wherein the biological trajectory of the human is shaped by the language models people prescribe themselves. Wynter argues that this practice is the invocation of the “referent-we”\(^\text{36}\) whereby one group speaks for the entirety through the construction of certain terms like “human” or “man”.

Machinic non-human philosophy locates the non-human in relation to living-object distinctions—but hermeneutic non-human philosophy sees the human itself as a formulation of power, not in an institutional sense as Foucault might have suggested, but by way of racial, gendered and heteronormative overdetermination (one geographic group signifies for the totality of the species). To speak about the ramifications of posthumanism yields two camps. One is standard, literal non-human Marxism which regards human finitude in a language that universalizes the human for the purpose of Marxian critique against parasitic capital machinery (Lazzarato, Srnicek and Dyer-Witheford et. al.). Another is Wynter’s analysis of the signifier “human” itself as a semiotic technology that eludes to a signified that does not actually exist. Standard, literal non-human Marxism might lose some of its critical potential when it speaks for every worker and sees emancipatory politics through the rendering of people as *homo-economical* or economical beings.

Wynter’s brand of posthumanism should not simply be seen as a return to structuralist theories of language because the question becomes (with Derrida, Stiegler and Simondon in

\(^{36}\) McKittrick (2015) *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis.* Wynter notes: “How can we be enabled to come to mind about the well-being or ill-being of those inhabiting worlds outside that of our normatively politically liberal democratic referent- we of *homo-oecomicus* rather than to continue, as we reflexively do, to mind about only the well-being of the above *referent*-we, as the one to which we, as hegemonically secular middle-class/bourgeois academics belong?” pp. 44
mind) how mythoi influence bios? A flat ontological view of both bios and mythoi might view mythos as a technology or material signaling, not conceptual language. Mythoi is not so much about the stories one tells (content) but through which tools stories are told. The human commonality neo-accelerationist movement invoke to write against the failures of local politics is not a new development in political praxis prescribed by the West but rather an algorithmic reorganization/reformulation of a certain form of Marxist praxis which has become the prerogative of failed Marxists revolutions that seek to reterritorialize even resistive thought by invoking the referent-worker or referent-proletariat discourse. Wynter articulates standard white Marxism’s appeal to “common” politics via economical views of human praxis:

Who were we, then, to doubt?! Indeed, as many of us were to do for many years, including Marxist feminists, we would attempt to theoretically fit all our existentially experienced issues—in my case, that to which we give the name of race—onto the Procrustean bed of Marx’s mode of economic production paradigm and its all-encompassing “mirror of production.”

Philosophy may be seen as a technical object, but philosophy does not live in philosophy-space, it is an object in the world presented through material practice. Philosophizing is protocolled by the material and haptic rhythms of writing and its historical protocol in drawing a common praxis. When one writer of coming from a place of hegemonic difference writes, they are ultimate...

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McKittrick notes: Wynter illuminates the limitations of Marxism and, in doing so, draws attention to the ways in which all (Western and Westernized) anti-capitalist and antieconomic critiques, with their sole focus on one form of (economically driven labor) oppression, cannot comprehensively attend to the interrelatedness of our colonial-global predicaments” pp. 39

Denise Ferreira da Silva on Wynter “In the colonial matrix, the legitimizing discourse encompasses authority, gender and sexuality, knowledge and subjectivity, authority and economic organization. In short, Wynter shows us that the Marxist analysis focuses on economic organization, while the pieza frame and the colonial matrix focus on the layered workings of colonial praxis—with the “cultural model” of Europeanness overriding (although not erasing) the perspective of those it marginalizes.” pp. 115
mately made to represent their people even if their personal experiences have a myriad of inter-
sectional identities that do not reflect the group they are speaking for. Inclusionary politics 
through written representationalism or machinic representationalism is looked upon affectively 
(as a material/haptic means of control) rather than a means of representational liberational poli-
tics. Why is this important—what is the political angle? The political angle reveals a binary be-
tween academic criticism (written) and the forces of capital (hyper-rationalization/algorithmic 
culture) which collapses that difference but also allows for a multiplicity against these binaries. 
The binaries of writing and thought is collapsed by reformulating the former as materially ex-
pressed through the former. Not in a strictly pharmacological way (technology as sometimes a 
cure/poison), as queer media theorist Marcel O’Gorman in *Revisiting the Pharmakon: Why Me-
dia Theory Needs Queer Theory* (2022) notes:

In terms of the history of technics, one could say that repetitive technical tasks, which 
are central to Stiegler’s conception of techno genesis, are not neutral. Rather, they can-
not be disconnected from gender, class, race, and other contexts.  

Media theorists such as Safiya Noble and Wendy H.K. Chun attempt to problematize the cor-
relative impulses within data curation and algorithmic decision-making. Chun argues that such 
forms of correlative groupings based on “like-ness” ultimately conjure digital neighborhoods 
that remain segregated across the strata of other neighborhoods which have much more eco-
nomic power in the network of demographic clusters. Both Noble and Chun use the example of 
internet search engines and machine learning power data organization tools to demonstrate that 
the political segregation of the past carry through the technologies of the present and future. In 
*Queering Homophily* (2018) Chun writes:

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Homophily grounds network growth and dynamics, by fostering and predicting the likelihood of ties. Homophily—now a “commonsense” concept that slips between effect and cause—assumes and creates segregation; it presumes consensus and similarity within local clusters, making segregation a default characteristic of network neighborhoods. In valorizing “voluntary” actions, even as it troubles simple notions of “peer influence” and contagion, it erases historical contingencies, institutional discrimination, and economic realities.39

This thesis is an attempt to pay attention and resituate the material forms that capture difference and resistance both in AI as well as the space where AI criticism takes place. The goal is to return the question of digital segregation back into the analog, back into the landscape of professional, institutionally curated writing which seeks to outwardly divide itself from capital in order to critique capital. Here writing is not to be looked upon as a representational form of mediating between the subject and object, but rather the very machinery that formulates capital and critical subjectivity alongside more contemporary, algorithmic, or haptic machines of control.

Contemporary theory seeks to decolonize itself without changing the means of thought production. Yet, once a critique proclaims itself as ‘post-colonial’ or ‘decolonial’ it is at once regulated and sorted into the genealogy of post-colonial literature based on the principles of likeness and institutional clustering and correlation, the machine of philosophy sorts it to particulars as a means of control. This sorting is then hierarchized under a matrix of importance usually based on a theory’s degree of applicability or common usefulness—the philosophy that speaks to the most common elements of life will cease knowledge-power. Of course, capital funds all of this and it is in capital’s interest to cascade the disunity of the human with more

39 Chun (2018) Queering Homophily. pp. 77
Pressing issues facing the entire species like machinic capitalism and ecology. But both machinic capitalism and ecology cannot be understanding without being sensitive to the racial and sexual desire in critical thinking.

Standard critiques of political economy, accelerationists included, seem to stifle this problem and speak on behalf of the entire human race by arguing in terms of “the common” in which those not in ownership of the means of production are uncritically seen as labouring human beings. What about the non-labouring disabled person, the person in prison, the person working for unpaid wages—social stratifications which must be considered under racial lenses? These differences are a few examples that should hold the labouring human signifier in suspect. What is demanded in this paper is the end of commons-based accelerationist critique as well as the end of the decolonial representationalism which is thought to be possible through the very means by which hegemonic power is universalized; in writing. Just as AI powered CCTV cameras misrecognize non-white bodies—the medium of professional thinking i.e. academic writing is just as enmeshed in the politics of the gaze and surveillance. The question is not about recognition, diversification, or inclusion under the commons to produce praxis. Rather focus is shifted to the technology, the medium or the mode of producing the awareness of difference, where praxis is thought possible only conceptually, to be enacted by the masses, the readers. The academic gaze supervises via the organization of networks into hierarchies of visibility based on historical antecedents of power—like YouTube. How could one decolonize AI and AI-studies with the very mediums of coloniality? With the inclusion of decolonial thinkers who have participated in the colonial technology of writing themselves to represent their communities and exercise this very act of colonization? The point is not to make CCTV surveillance
technology less racist or heteronormative but challenge its ahistorical appearance in the world by making it into an object and finite technology.

The comforting illusion of accelerationist pessimism is not only a sense of futility in the face of capitalism’s comfort which is corrupting the (western) human race. Rather the pessimism is reproduced via the trance of representing this medium: that the medium of writing can take a picture of this erasure. In this process, difference is misrecognized for the all-encompassing labouring human. Yet in the same breath the inclusive logic of difference as suggested by Chun and Noble amongst swathes of colonial and queer thinkers also misrecognizes the representational politics seethed in the act of philosophizing (i.e., one member of a marginalized community writes on behalf of that community).

Taking aside Marshall McLuhan’s liberal-Christian tendencies, his idea that “the medium is the message”\textsuperscript{40} resonates even through the lens of revolutionary politics. This project will look at “the medium” as a \textit{mode of production} as opposed to \textit{content}, which supervenes as political discourse but remains blind to the continuance of the same historical mode of production that has always failed to create emancipatory action. One might say that conceptual resistance is the political supervening of the same mode of production. The mode of production of resistance, critique, remains the same regardless of a shift in inclusionary politics.

Pessimism in-the-last-instance arises in a form of anti-philosophy not a non-philosophy of the non-Kantian; the non-human. The comfort of pessimism is the written formulation of human finitude and the post-human. To do without a comforting pessimism and approach a nihilistic practice of pessimism or a philosophy of indifference is to see written philosophy as approaching the same finitude it ascribes to the human, a technical object rather than the ink that

\textsuperscript{40} McLuhan (1994) \textit{Understanding Media: Extensions of Man}. pp. 7
can capture the real through its monopolization of what it means to think, critique and deconstruct. Thought is to be separated from philosophy and dialectical writing. Only then is a true nihilism of the pre-human and post-human enacted, when one overcomes the value of written philosophy, of equal dialectical exchange between the reader and writer, between master and slave and between audience and performer. A desire to craft a perfect language, a perfect use of the form of writing to represent the Real, to critique representation itself (i.e., post-structuralism) or to critique philosophy (Laruelle) cannot be delivered by writing which houses the history of white, male, European and heteronormative consciousness in its DNA. To ask for this form to evolve as the times do, is to repeat the inclusionary politics of many capital institutions (it changes content but retains the medium of production) that draw a historical equality based on principles of colonial-material extension. The process of such an evolution can only look like, at first, a destruction or letting go.

Philosophical realism, non-human philosophy, philosophy of nihilism or non-standard philosophy are effective in pointing out the objecthood of human reflection and thought but their praxis or means of articulation repeat the problems of standard philosophy not by way of content (their content, they argue, is in rebellion against standard philosophy) but the tools of thought still remain the same and are not as rebellious as claimed but rather take writing as a given means of expression/thinking and the praxis of insufficient philosophy as totally synthesizable in one medium of expression.

The problem of philosophy is not that it makes what Laruelle calls a “philosophical decision: but this decision is made for inaugurated thinkers who come to philosophy under the context of colonialism and sexism, it is an involuntary decision of the systems of this technical object (i.e, writing about the Real). How is this involuntary decision placed by capital forces, as in the
case of Deleuze’s control society, wherein one engages in fascistic flows of inscription and control voluntarily? This involuntary decision is mistaking the total plane of thought with the tools of thought and engaging in this medium of thought and seeing in it a transcendental potential that other capital means of relations (e.g., music, film, etc.) are unable to satisfy. But can we briefly consider that writing itself is a capitalist means of formulating phenomenological subjectivity and providing subjection and later subjugation via the disciplinary mechanisms of institutional writing to fix grammar/sense/logical expression that aligns with previous valid forms of written resistance? To use philosophy against philosophy, as Laruelle does, is to meander along and elongate the bridge between reactionary politics and a rebellious politics which overcomes philosophy from the outside, from a truly non-human (speaking of Wynter’s European humanism) way of thinking. It is not possible to see the post-post-modern state of philosophy via a theory of non-relationality or dissociative philosophy without recognizing that even a non-philosophical practice still attempts colonial relationality or reterritorialization by means of a medium, philosophical writing, which exists to colonizes phenomenological difference by the false promise of recognition and representation.

Really the tools of writing might be autonomous and evolving irrespective of the human. They might be instead be just as influenced by machinic capital, by algorithmic data interfacing as they are by the so called human touch or sentimentality. Ekin Erkan in Laruelle Qua Stiegler: On Non-Marxism and the Transindividual writes:

Laruelle’s engagement with perception is not directed by moving through appearance, or representation, but, instead, testing how perception is, in fact, a ‘mathematical mode
of organization and a presentation of the data’ that occurs through super-positioning ‘at least two heterogeneous, conceptual, and artistic data.\textsuperscript{41}

If mathematical thinking has invaded scientific speculation since the age of Newton, what is to say that mathematical protocols do not formulate \textit{algo-rhythms} of thought indexing in critical philosophy as well? Hence a completely non-human view of the technology of writing might see its co-evolution with mathematical forms of data indexing and organization (e.g., databases, libraries, Google, now ChatGPT).

I do not call for optimism in light of the comforts of pessimism! I call for an entirely uncomfortable pessimism—one that does not allow relationality to be easily drawn via speculative materialism of the non-human Real through the cult of mastery (i.e., and its technological interface of master signifiers) that formulates the technological prerogatives of bourgeois/Eurocentric writing (philosophizing). Fardy writes that non-standard Marxism “identifies standard philosophy with capital. Non-Marxism’s aim is to emancipate raw materials and practices from standard philosophy’s acquisitive domination”\textsuperscript{42} Laruelle still relies on the concepts and raw materials of philosophy and sees in a rejection of these concepts as a meta-stance. But what if I take the stance of someone ignorant towards the genealogy of philosophy altogether? Would that regulate my ignorance as a sign of anti-philosophy? Philosophical ignorance is much more common than the commonality philosophers and non-philosophers ascribe to their own vocation. In the beginning the word formulated the world, and the world then is said to be mirrored in the word. Is the word semiotic or representational? Not quite, as Guattari reminded us earlier, technologies are not institutional dispensed but now flow freely within the larger, haptic rhythms of capital. These words that are not genealogically free but are rooted in a material history then must not be mis-

\textsuperscript{41} Erkaan (2019) \textit{Laruelle Qua Stiegler: On Non-Marxism and the Transindividual}. pp. 55
\textsuperscript{42} Fardy (2019) \textit{Laruelle and Art}. pp. 95
taken as the total repository of life and resistive critique, as being able to represent things (even by way of differed meaning) but as one of many mediums which may constitute thought or de-construction. But in academic theory, the word is the mouthpiece of the soul—it is what categorizes and universalizes the human. Sure, institutional philosophy has entertained art-practises in its institutional space—but these forms are always subordinate to writing, the prime medium of philosophizing—the former are only accessories to a larger written summation yet-to-come. The validity of word-making is already provided as a given in equal reference to constitute what it means to “think”. Hence for Laruelle’s philosophical decision, there is generally an assumption that this decision is voluntary. But minoritarian communities are given words and such philosophical decisions are made involuntarily, they do not choose to make these decisions!

Cannot words change, evolve and meet the needs of an ever-globalizing field and hence reclaimed by non-normative bodies? Of course. This does not necessarily entail that words stick to themselves or retain their word-hood but rather co-evolve symbiotically with other mediums in the process of formulating new means of interfacing people’s spatial-temporalities. So many of our ready-to-hand mediums are being owned by corporate platforms. The privatization of affective technologies like Spotify (sound), YouTube and Netflix (video) make it hard to believe that a turn-to-art form of praxis will be practical since these mediums are so heavily owned and curated by capital in the same way that writing is. To look outside of these algorithmically curated mediums is not to look for transcendental answers but rather see immanence and the historical past as the repository or database of hibernating memories cascaded by the temporally reterritorializing powers of capital/coloniality. Non-hegemonic mediums must be grappled with to re-waken the churning engine of history which often suffocates non-hegemonic means of expression (expression here is synonymous with life) into forced forgetfulness so that the flow of time
may be unified under colonial/capital/heteropatriarchal imaginings. If each medium contains tertiary memories, then engaging with other mediums (and eventually creating new mediums of resistive memory and future movement) is sought. For written philosophy, then, a strategic silence is prescribed in no way as a means of an anti-philosophy but as a praxis towards other-philosophy. When speaking of the non-human or cosmological processes, the problem of *cosmotechincs* or non-human communication and the hierarchy of power organizing these communicative apparatuses is unavoidable. It is not to say that non-written philosophizing is equal to written standard philosophy, but rather to say that non-written philosophizing be lotted powers that have the potential to crush and overcome standard *written* philosophy and in so doing standard-philosophy. This cannot take the same form that Laruelle’s non-philosophy does because of Laruelle’s general whiteness and re-animation of the post-structuralist desire for the capturing of difference (Laruelle does not escape the problem of philosophizing he attributes to Derrida, Deleuze and Alain Badiou). The dismissal of anti-philosophy is understandable, yet a bit naïve when one sees clearly that for Laruelle (and Brassier) thinking is always equated with written philosophy rather than seeing that this image of thought excludes expression and practices outside of standard philosophy as nonsensical or emotive/affective (not serious philosophy) because they are not recorded in the canon of professionalized philosophizing. But are these assumptions not coded for a specific group and the division of the labour of philosophizing a cultural specific phenomena? Here, “philosophy” or “thought” is taken as the *referent-we* attribution to all humankind, and to save philosophy from anti-philosophy is of the utmost importance because for these thinkers it means to save critical thinking itself instead of a *specific* or *insufficient* form of critical thinking. This medium of analysis or methodological technology of non-philosophy also has its own pharmakon or good aspects and bad aspects—it democratizes philosophy into an an-
archical state of influence. Influencer culture now is revealed to be the game that theory plays; it seeks to unify, totalize thought and gain influence in the culture through thought domination. Laruelle’s praxis is then held suspect for being unable to formulate concepts that reach outside of the traps of philosophical thought in its raw materiality, in the genological ethnicities that standard-philosophical writing vessels. Which is not to beckon for a naïve anti-philosophy (Laruelle warns against this) but to see that the plane of immanence and its semiotic references will be fixed and involuntarily disciplinary as long as philosophizing is practiced through one medium but speaks in the place for all mediums expression (i.e., it seeks the master signifier or transcendental signified).

Ultimately, I propose what Laruelle represses—anti-philosophy towards a philosophy of trans-medial multiplicity. Which is not to be seen as anti-thinking but to question why intellectual history has equated the signifier “philosophy” with thinking in a universalized category that subsumes the entire human race (in an effort to understand the non-human) under the characteristic of a philosophizing species. The brand of anti-philosophy I propose is to be read literally with philosophy’s cultural etymology in mind (anti-philosophy but not anti-thinking). To be anti-philosophy is not to be anti-thinking but to resist the curated mediums that present themselves as exhaustible of human expression and reflection; it is to express the anti-Greek, anti-Judeo-Christian-Islamic, anti-white, anti-male, anti-straight in total disassociation with protocols of thinking that come out of this tradition. This is still not transcendental because references towards these other-ways-of-feeling/thinking exist in non-standard history; in the absences of standard-history. Non-philosophy sees itself but never does anything illegal, it is too comfortable in its proposed philosophy of nihilism when the true nihilist will always be silent rather than write about anti-philosophy (which Laruelle warns is another meta-philosophy). This might be
the failure of many anti-philosophers (Wittgenstein) who propose a philosophical silence but fail to do what they prescribe. To embody a real non-correlationist stance towards a non-philosophy, one must recognize that yes, a move away from the subjectivist, semiotic representationalism is needed but this cannot be done through a medium that is so colonially tainted and always repeats standard genealogies of intellectual power (i.e., the canon of European, male philosophy). Not only because of the political economy of the sign, of written language, but its hubris in attempting to formulate the post-and-pre philosophy ultimately reveals its gesture towards relationality as coloniality. This is not to police those who do write. It is a call for silence towards the written form which must be entertained as a valid form of praxis so that new communication forms might emerge, a real non-philosophy instead of a non-philosophy that only speaks to specific, regional participants. Perhaps to study the world and do science it is necessary to bracket the world using written words. But what needs to also be bracketed is the written form itself. The discourse of all philosophical, academic writers is geo-located, and therefore the theorists of machinic capitalism cannot deny that their own writing is influenced by hyper-rationalist, correlationist language which guide and curate their praxis via certain historical biases in the machine of writing in effort to seize resistive power (i.e., the language of the commons, of the “human,” as well of non-human critique) by drawing dualisms between worker and capital, worker and machine. I argue, then, that the significant question arising here is whether philosophical thought, recognizing its own place as an object in the world objectified in written language, should decide to enact a novel refrain from philosophizing via a specific medium to enact a non-philosophy of deaccelerationist indifference rather than surplus reproduction. After all, the cosmos is for the most part, silent.
Algorithmic Forces

This first section is an attempt to understand the constellation of AI research beginning with media theorist Wendy Hui Kyong Chun’s outline of “homophily” in Discriminating Data (2021). Chun historicizes homophily, or “social networks as a means to dissolve the masses into neighborhoods”43 to show that racial, class and gender biases present in today’s algorithmic terrain arise from a kind of correlative data science, homophily, that shares a history with mechanisms of social governmentality and early 20th century psychoanalysis and eugenics. Chun historically contextualizes the scientific protocols that power unsupervised cluster analysis tools like machine learning to demonstrate that automated organizing machines vessel a history of social and sexual control. Discriminating Data draws historical roots to the scientific infrastructure of machine learning by demonstrating the use of correlative data science in early 20th century psychoanalysis, urban planning, and eugenics.44 Chun observes the evolution of the logic of homophilic organization which today cluster and correlate online user behaviour, traits, and preferences to create mutual clusters that group communities but also, at the same time, “naturalize discrimination”45 by predicting, mirroring and quite often accelerating a history of hostile tribalism and identity politics across analog and digital planes; across the analog past and digital future. Ultimately, I read Chun as providing a psychoanalysis of the machinery of network science (psychoanalyzing the psychoanalytic machine) informed by the post-structural critique of identity and difference as well as semiotic representationalism. Alexander Galloway argues that HTML code sequences, engines and software are a form of “protocol,”46 a material description

43 Chun (2021) Discriminating Data, pp.82
44 Ibid., pp. 180:
Chun makes an important distinction: “psychoanalysis promises (however elusively) to help patients deal with their neuroses whereas corporate data analytics seeks to profit from them.”
45 Ibid., pp.103
of a rule-based processor arising out of linguistic code. Hence machine learning is not an entity, it does not have content, and it is not a form in the static sense but it constitutes a lively agential role in shaping human behaviour through its formation of code.

Chun points out that the presence of network science, *homophily*, glides across digital and pre-digital planes. I read Chun as providing a conceptual history of the protocol undercutting information curational machines like artificial intelligence and machine learning as they are used by the techno-industrial complexes of today. To be sure, the flaws of curational AI which mediate an increasingly wider range of social relations have been investigated before Chun’s *Discriminating Data*. Works such as *Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism* (2018) by Safiya Noble, *Platform Capitalism* (2017) by Nick Srnicek and *Inhuman Power* (2019) by Nick Dyer-Witheford, Atle Mikola Kjosen and James Steinhoff have garnered attention for their socio-economic analysis of mediating technologies like digital AI platforms which shield specific ideological and material incentives behind their perceived social value in providing commercial and industrial services. Safiya Noble’s book traces the racial and gender biases in Google’s search engine by looking at the systems-bias problem at the site of production. Noble observes in Google’s search engine a projection of the biases seeded in the search engine’s producers: often middle to upper class, white, male coders, and businesspeople⁴⁷. *Platform Capitalism* (2017) by Nick Srnicek approaches the problem of data mediation by observing that Silicon Valley types and their financial constituents are also developing new mechanisms of producing value (i.e., a new era of production a la Fordism) by developing employment apps that shift traditional forms of labor (e.g., employer/employee power hierarchy, 9-5) into the age of self-managing and precarious labor (i.e., “you are your own boss”, short-term

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⁴⁷Noble (2018) *Algorithms of Oppression* pp. 185 “neoliberal political and economic environment has profited tremendously from misinformation and mischaracterization of communities, with a range of consequences for the most disenfranchised and marginalized among us.”
contract labor). Srnicek argues that such an evolution in the mode of production is indicated by the wide adoption of platforming media interfaces like Amazon and Uber to mediate between customer/labourer to usher in a world of economic precarity where jobs and services become self-managing but also non-committal. What is underlining the symptoms that authors like Noble and Srnicek have outlined is the primacy of automated decision-making machines in organizing/mediating social interactions and value creation. Although thematically it seems like they address difference spheres of algorithmic culture, both author’s works embody, for this paper, the turn towards problematizing the relational mediums that assemble, organize and separate social interactions (i.e., discriminatory algorithms, and exploitive platforms). Chun’s book is keen to point out and surmise that the technology being developed is not just the platform model, or algorithms/code in a linguistic-specific sense, but really is the practice of a specific techno-science, of homophily, which governs the function of search engines, employment apps and industrial data management to correlate likeness (and in its ghostly shadow, difference) between user behaviour, services, information, and other users.

Chun’s key contribution to the discussion of AI and machine learning is the insertion of homophilic correlative science into a history of psychoanalytic and eugenic practices found in the early 20th century albeit today in mutated form. Although the specific interests of Platform Capitalism and Algorithms of Oppression seem different, they both embody an analysis of the means of interfacing social relationships in the digital present vis-a-vis a critique of neoliberalism, an economic system that incentivizes certain power relations between races and

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49 Chun (2021) Discriminating Data pp. 186

Chun writes that “the links between facial recognition technology and eugenics are not only thematic or aspirational, but also methodological. They are rooted in eugenic methods, such as linear discriminant analysis, developed in the early twentieth century to discriminate between classes and races of people.” Illustrating here the mechanisms of facial recognition which power homophilic data science in apps like Facebook, Tinder and Google images, but also for governmental functions like crime-prediction, digital profiling, and urban planning/segregation.
genders by solidifying economic class relations. Both observe a change in the means of social interfacing (e.g., platform capitalism, algorithmic culture) yet also a continuance of the issues of the past (i.e., exploitation, the production of discrimination). Srnicek and Noble see in digital development the amplification of the problems of neoliberalism by paying attention to the mediums of social influence and synthesizing the biases in the machines to the ownership of this software.

Chun’s *Discriminating Data* presents the concept of *homophily* to historize the algorithmic protocols spread across today’s socio-technical milieu. Chun writes that “ideology is a communicational event, in which response = recognition”\(^{50}\) to expose the mechanisms of control that organize social relations in algorithmic technology. These technologies are found in the most advanced data networking protocols such as artificial intelligence, deep learning and machine learning which are most commonly used in social media curation, governmental policy-making and healthcare. The exploration of *homophily* draws a genealogy of algorithmic code to explain why algorithmic protocols which are designed to observe new patterns imperceptible to the human quite frequently end up reproducing the discriminatory stratifications of the very human past. Chun on *homophily*:

How do you show you ‘love’ your own? By running from and pushing away others. Not surprisingly, the term ‘homophily’ stems from mid-twentieth-century analyses of white residents’ attitudes toward biracial public housing in the United States. There are deep ties between ‘homophily’ and ‘segregation,’ a term it seeks to displace (community and racism are two others). Homophily has been deployed to destabilize norms and polarize the ambivalent: to create clusters of individuals, whose angry similarity and overwhelm-

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\(^{50}\) Ibid., pp. 181
ing attraction to their common object of hatred both repel them from one another and glue them together.\(^{51}\)

The algorithmic technology that informs homophily is composed of patterning data sets based on principles of “likeness,” “commonality,” “friendships”. Chun explains that principles of patterning data out of likeness persists in the code building blocks of today’s data network science. The author roots this data patterning in early 20th century urban planning, which informed how people organized themselves, lived and reproduced. Using social media to demonstrate the problem of homophily, Chun writes that “to ‘recognize’ is to identify ‘something that has been known before.’ It is to perceive someone or something as the same as someone or something previously encountered or known, or to ‘identify from knowledge of appearance or character, especially by means of some distinctive feature’.” (228) Distinction, anomalies, or difference is demonstrated through Chun’s description of data network science to be captured by state, institutional and capital enterprises which enact control through people’s voluntary engagement with their socio-technical milieu. Chun writes that “if recognition is identification that has been reciprocated—either by a human or machine—it is also separation and division. Identifications are ‘co-relations’ that reveal both similarities and differences.” \(^{52}\) Digital infrastructures that group data for various purposes (i.e., providing content, distributing resources, risk-analysis, profit driven data-analytics) work to corral seemingly different data sets into groups or patterns which supplant/reveal correlations.

What is wrong with homophily and algorithmic patterning? Chun notes that homophily and the network science which vessels are used to identify “users who deviate from the norm, the

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\(^{51}\) Ibid., pp. 240

\(^{52}\) Ibid., pp. 229
mean, the common denominator with fellow members of their neighborhoods.” This hypersensitivity towards anomalous or rebel data sets is the process by which data organizing machines account for difference by re-assimilating these anomalous nodes into a cluster of correlative estimates (taken haphazardly as causal equalities) which end up homogenizing true difference. If you are different from the protocols of prevalent groups, the mechanisms of homophilic network science attempt to lure your risky difference through the process of recognition and clustering via representation. Recognition and representation go hand in hand when it comes to accounting for rebel data sets through a voluntary or decentralized view of control because it allows every rebel to check themselves into the organizational machinery that feeds and learns more from their difference whilst simultaneously disciplining/organizing them into groups by playing cupid with users and data sets and having one rebel data set make friends with other rebels but also homogenizing this friendship through reactionary or colonial forms of inferential correlation/organization rather than a true solidarity amongst rebels data sets as unreconcilably different/anomalous.

The general methodology in Discriminating Data is to historize tools of the digital present via a genealogy of code language as a psychoanalytic or disciplinary tool which cannot be separated from its historical production. Chun writes:

Control systems were first called ‘servo-mechanisms.’ ‘master’ and ‘slave’ functions and circuits riddle computers. This master-slave relation goes beyond computers to media more generally. Communications theorist Marshall McLuhan’s framing of media as the ‘extensions of man’ equated slaves, staples, and media: some humans were ‘men’ and others their extensions.\(^{54}\)

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53 Ibid., pp. 160
54 Ibid., pp. 15
The methodology presented in discriminating data is to observe code and digital infrastructure as a historically predetermined by colonial and heteropatriarchal forces. Social relations and digital curation are intrinsically linked now and even though this is an obvious statement its implication on one’s sense of historical time and futurity is not fully appreciated. When Marshall McLuhan categorizes media as extensions of man, he presents a view by which technology might extend man towards the future. Chun’s work shows us how to read code language as one does literary and symbolic artifacts, but always as materially encoded with the history of colonial and heteropatriarchal values that are re-emulate the past into futures by mechanisms of disciplinary grouping. Not as an extension of man but to show that “man” itself is rooted via the ownership of its signifier in geographical infrastructure or homophilic clusters that materially separate man from the other and the mechanisms through which the other regulates their own identity. Through “homophily” one might see that a genealogy of code is rooted in understanding how people utilize code, as a subordinate tool, as an extension, rather than something quite agential and equally capable of taking us backwards as we think it might be extending us forward. Not in the sense that one rejects the technological present, but to recognize that digitality, data and the networked present are historically formed and temporal linearity itself is a function of geographic or regional homophilic clusters that posit clustered concepts of the future as common goals or promise a digital fix to the human past.

Srnicek’s Platform Capitalism (2016) and Safiya Noble’s Algorithms of Oppression (2018) draw closer to a contemporary critique of modern political economy (which has become a critique of media; of algorithmic culture) by prescribing close attention to the form of algorithmic and platforming software. Chun synthesizes disparate theories found in works like Algorithms of Oppression and Platform Capitalism by looking at the new materiality of algo-
rithms that is quickly manifesting its problematics within inter-disciplinary studies of media. This materiality is neither focused on the material of code alone as it exists independently inside mathematics and computer science nor is it an anthropology of computation as it has been built—but really it is the process by which programming language coincides with the development of a new scientific protocol, network science, that is now of interest (i.e., \textit{homophily}). Yet, the temporal event of this network-science phenomena or tactic is not a result of the linear progression of the history of technology, but rather the return of perhaps a much older means of control.

What platforms like Google search engines, Uber and facial recognition software have in common are not only that they are materially incentivized to replicate biases stemming from production but also that together they drive their commodities under the larger supervision of \textit{homophilic} network science which directs even the producers of this technology to emulate forms of control. One sees their common lineage not only in the material building blocks of code language, but rather how these things are assembled to perform a specific scientific action. Which is not simply just an assemblage of code, but an assemblage of these codes into a scientific method (i.e., a form of computer science informed by \textit{homophilic} data-science). Computer science is then unraveled through Chun’s book to harbor the prerogative to dominate over the old science—the pre-computerized analog urban-planning science\textsuperscript{55} that segregated cities and supervised sexual preference.\textsuperscript{56} Here, it is understood that the science of clus-

\textsuperscript{55} Chun (2021) \textit{Discriminating Data}. pp. 24
Chun writes “homophily, the principle that similarity breeds connection,” a term which originates from “studies of U.S. residential segregation and white flight.”

\textsuperscript{56} Chun (2021) \textit{Discriminating Data}.
Chun writes: “Homophily has been deployed to destabilize norms and polarize the ambivalent: to create clusters of individuals, whose angry similarity and overwhelming attraction to their common object of hatred both repel them from one another and glue them together.” pp. 240
tering and correlating data sets ultimately emulates the digital clusters and segregationist echo-chambers of digital life. Instead of the radical departure promised by the superficially democratic internet, this form of network science has ensured that the racism, sexism, and classism of the pre-digital past seeps into the digital present, replicating itself and reoccurring. This past is echoed through the invisible machines that power everyday life today, but such technologies like machine learning and AI which operate without fixed corporal bodies also cultivate the image of the future. Here the activity of data prediction that arises from the homophilic data correlation which informs action in increasingly industries where AI’s use is imminent like medicine and government policy-making will solidify these neighborhood clusters based on forged identity (i.e., detecting likelihood of crime rates in certain neighbourhoods, diagnosing diseases based on genomic or behavioural patterns) into the infrastructure of the online topology that mediates social relations. Chun in referencing Lacanian/Freudian neo-psychoanalyst thinker Diana Fuss notes that “if recognition is identification that has been reciprocated—either by the human or machine—it is also separation and division. Identifications are ‘co-relations’ that reveal both similarities and differences”⁵⁷. The former is providing a meta-psychoanalytic critique of political economy borrowed from Lacan/Freud by suggesting that homophily forges identity and establishes correlative unity between patterned likeness which creates difference to profit from this discrimination. The emergence of digital enclaves in incel culture as well as the algorithms driving Tinder dating apps are shown to be using the unifying clustering network science found in commercial and public services of facial recognition and government policy-making, to name a few examples.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 229
Another kind of critique posits the consequences of artificial intelligence on the state of labour and its implication on humanity. Nick Dyer-Witheford et al.’s *Inhuman Power: The Future of Capitalism* (2019) look at the ramifications of the AI fueled shift in the mode of value production today (i.e., data as money). The authors conclude their book contemplating the possibility of Artificial General Intelligence\(^5^8\) and taking from this seemingly inevitable development in the capitalist mode of production that:

Humanity would become a ‘legacy system’, outdated hardware unsuitable for running the inverted world of capital. The status of humans in such a situation might be comparable to the current status of wild animals, tolerated on the fringes of capital so long as they do not detract from valorization, or so long as they are not usable as raw material in production processes. In contrast to the malice of the machines in the *Terminator* series, in this scenario humans would simply no longer be of interest to capital.\(^5^9\)

The scenario described above argues that the machinery of capital (embodied through its historic-specific mode of production: the age of automated labour) enslaves its own kind, rendering the class struggle between humans against humans or humans against the machines of their own making obsolete. This is a fascinating insight that provides a futurist conception to the metapsychoanalytic critique proposed by Wendy H.K. Chun’s concept of *homophily*. Such a critique of liberal political economy suggests that the process of value production extends beyond the temporal existence of human civilization. The power of *homophily*, the basic science grounding

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“AGIs would, in other words, be slaves.”

The authors propose a non-anthropocentric view of artificial general intelligence. A conception that does not rely on AI having human-like consciousness, but AGI’s identity as dynamically labouring and self-generating machines. In such a scenario “the class struggle would thus continue, but with generally intelligent machines filling up the rank and file and also personifying capital” (pp. 140) leaving the future of proletariat between the machinery of capital and the proletarianization of advanced labouring AI machines.

\(^{5^9}\) Ibid, pp. 144
algorithmic tools from narrow-AI, machine learning and AGI, may outlive its application in human temporalities. Here I locate the ultimate end-scenario of the politics of homophily, wherein the mechanisms homophilic social interfacing portends the extinction of humans.

When I initially began my research on algorithmic culture, I had intended to write a futurist work about the state of labour in algorithmic culture as it launches one to the future. Dyer-Witheford et al.’s Inhuman Power does much of this already. Given this, I was left to re-examine my own contributions to the field of algorithmic culture studies. In corraling these rich descriptions of the culture today, from Wendy Chun’s work on homophily and its roots in segregationist echo chambered clusters, to Safiya Noble and Nick Srnicek’s work on algorithmic discrimination and modes of production of the present, I found that the underlying methodology that connected these works, including Dyer-Witherford’s futurist work on non-human autonomy, as they described the spatialization of AI and algorithmic machinery, is a concept of time as an ideological apparatus. Hence, I read these thinkers through an understanding of how the discriminatory past is immanent in the present and how it came to be and, as Dyer-Witheford et al. speculate—where it is going. Here the concern is not with spatiality (i.e., how and where algorithms colonialize people) as I had initially thought, but with temporality. The following chapter outlines the effects of algorithmic culture under this light. I observe what the collective assemblage of AI produces with the aid of Bernard Stiegler’s Technics and Time 2: Disorientation (1998). Instead of a standard Marxist analysis of modes of production and proletarianization, which Dyer-Witheford et al. have already done with precision and clarity, I look to how algorithmic, homophilic machines collectively produce time in their own image as they territorialize social relations.
Temporal Hypnosis

The machinic account of labour understands labour beyond human production where labour is envisioned as an ecological relationality cohabitating with the human. Machinic labour recognizes that the machinery of AI has already colonialized the mediating space of ecological relationality (human to human interaction, human to non-human interaction) to create a historical stage or the ideology of the AI-age (i.e., digital age, algorithmic culture, platform capitalism, transhumanism). As Bernard Stiegler writes, “what we today call “real time” is industrial time, the industrial production of time by the programming industries whose products suspend all traditional programs.” As Srnicek and Noble argue, the industry of today is algorithmic culture or platform capitalism, powered by the network science of homophily. Its chief production, as I will argue through Stiegler’s Technics and Time 2, is time. The phenomenological affect that is produced by this time production is the hypnotic rhythm of one’s temporality, wherein the machinic form of AI hijack temporal situatedness. If the consequence of homophilic data science is the production of difference through identity politics and the allure of recognition, then the output of these machines is not simply to create value through extraction and the exploitation of human labour, but also the ideological formation of a specific machinic temporality. But not so accountable by traditional phenomenology, this form of phenomenological temporality is subject-less and object-less, the agential role of ideology is not a matter of the person encountering propaganda or the content power dispensed by hegemonic powers but rather a procedure rooted in the interaction, whereby the subject loses itself to the object and the object becomes the phenomenological subject. This is not an argument about the deterministic aspects of specific modes of production (i.e., surplus data production for AI) to determine the future but rather to say that each

mode of production formulates ideology before propaganda is even dispensed. Such an ideology occurs not from the inside out or outside-in but in the moments of encounter, via what Alexander Galloway could call a ‘protocol’\(^{61}\) that habituates behaviour through interaction and thereafter formulates future behavioural protocols.

The mode of production and the mode of relation are entwined, they influence one another in such a way that ideology is the mode of production, and one’s conceptions of the past, present, and future are formulated out of their interaction with historical developments in modes of production. Hence the mode of production produces modes of relationality (between humans and also non-humans) but also modes of relationality reproduce modes of production; cementing ideology. For example, it is not so much about what content one watches on a website like YouTube but rather the fact that one watches these things through YouTube’s algorithm or algorithmic technologies that curate which videos the user sees out of the billions of views uploaded each day on the website. Hence, the viewer is not being fed ideology through the content but rather their tactile interaction with the digital infrastructure (i.e., applied computer science, code engineering, user interface) establishes and affirms ideological protocol.

One can understand how the modern state of machinery, of algorithmic production, hijacks the interpretive meaning of Marx’s theory of post-capitalist automation and in many cases remains faithful to the historic-techno-specific understanding of the modernity espoused in Marx’s time. The authors read Marx grappling with technology, and through the addition of a non-human productive analytic they can envision the agential role of machinery in today’s algo-

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Galloway writes: “To help understand the concept of computer protocols, consider the analogy of the highway system. Many different combinations of roads are available to a person driving from point A to point B. However, en route one is compelled to stop at red lights, stay between the white lines, follow a reasonably direct path, and so on. These conventional rules that govern the set of possible behavior patterns within a heterogeneous system are what computer scientists call protocol. Thus, protocol is a technique for achieving voluntary regulation within a contingent environment” pp. 7
rithmic topology. As Dyer-Witheford et al. point out, there is a general interpretive ambiguity in Marx over the position of machines. In the same breath, future post-capitalist imaginings of socialism ambiguously rely on technology to break free from the organistic spread of the capital modes of production (i.e., intensification of imminent contradictions). The authors illustrate the ambiguity by writing:

‘Fragment on Machines’ in Marx’s Grundrisse, which from the 1970s on has been seen as an extraordinary anticipation of high-technology capital. In introduction: AI-capital, the ‘Fragment’, Marx envisaged capital making vast techno-scientific achievements by mobilizing the ‘general intellect’. This enables it to reach a level of automation that, while not eliminating human labour entirely, reduces and relegates it to the peripheral position of supervising a mainly machinic process. This might seem the final triumph of capital over its troublesome working class, but Marx in the ‘Fragment’ presented it as a pyrrhic victory. By removing the necessity to base production on wage-labour (and hence liquidating the possibility of basing consumption on waged income), it undermines value, i.e. the whole basis of capital’s social organization. Automation inadvertently subverts capital by abolishing work.

Although the authors do not claim to “predict the future”, the analysis against this ambivalence, the prediction, remains a speculatively futurist possibility, where the doomed scenario

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62 Dyer-Witheford et al. (2019) Inhuman Power. The authors write: “Marx described this as the tendency for capital to increase its ‘organic composition’, that is to say, the proportion of constant (machines, buildings and raw materials) compared to variable capital (labour).” Pp. 17. Later writing: “what would it be like if not only human knowledge and skills were transmuted into dead labour, but if dead labour gained the fundamental capacities for perceiving and cognizing that humans have historically monopolized? Perception and cognition would, like electrification, become ubiquitous and mundane properties of things in general.” Pp. 58

63 Ibid., pp. 19
64 Ibid., pp. 58
against this ambiguous reading of machinery foresees automation used to permanently sup-
plant the logic of proletarianization into the posthuman future.

The analysis of liberal theories of labour demands a rejuvenation through the opening of
the non-human productive element. I propose a concept of machinic production and history-
making already illustrated by Dyer-Witheford et al.’s *Inhuman Power*, Bernard Stiegler’s *Tech-
nics and Time* 2 (1998) and even earlier insinuated in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s con-
cept of “desiring-production” 65 from *Anti-Oedipus* (1977). D&G write that “there is no such
thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and cou-
ples the machines together” 66. D&G’s non-human, machinic view of political economy is signif-
icantly different from classic theories of labour because the object of their study is redirected
away from human labour and towards the formal, relational composition of human and non-
human labouring flows to understand machinic labour and cosmic production. It is not entirely a
deviation of political economical analysis because it still places the historical form of labour (i.e.,
work, creation, production, desire as production, artifice) as the central force that situates social
relations through its mediating technologies. Yet it is a nuanced approach to the classical under-
standing of how history produces itself. As Stiegler writes in supporting the machinic production
of temporality: “the future—which is ‘the task of thinking’—is in the thinking of (by) tech-
nics.”67 I suggest that the productive flows of machinery make historical periods and that the
constellation of technology in the present, as it is phenomenologically apparent, canvasses the
image of the present and prophesizes future praxis. The goal of this non-human (i.e., seeing ma-

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65 Deleuze and Guattari (1977) *Anti-Oedipus*. pp.1
66 Ibid. pp.9
chinery as equally complicit in inscribing the conditions of the present) critique of political economy is to postulate the concept of history, and its trifurcation of the past, present and future—as itself a machinic system that produces ideology, or the ideology of presence, through its spatial metastasizing across the culture. Friedrich Nietzsche writes in *Untimately Meditations* (1873):

> History becomes pure, sovereign science would be for mankind a sort of conclusion of life and a settling of accounts with it. The study of history is something salutary and fruitful for the future only as the attendant of a mighty new current of life, of an evolving culture for example, that is to say only when it is dominated and directed by a higher force and does not itself dominate and direct.\(^{68}\)

As machine learning grows spatially throughout the cultural arena, the productive activity of this matrix of AI powered technology is what is seen as a historical paradigm and a protocol for the future that is perceived to be absolutely certain as the past is seen from this present assemblage of technology to be rigidly determined (i.e., “human evolution was all building up to this”, “this specific mode of the present was inevitable”).

A temporal critique of political economy is to suggest that paradigmatic movements in history are themselves to be analyzed through the ire of techno-criticism. History is to be viewed as a supervening assemblage of technical objects rather than a transcendental/teleological plane which forms social interactions. If it was the latter, history would be in service of human development/liberal progressivism, but if the former, historical regionality becomes a supervening idea that arises from the material assemblage of memory-producing technologies and is just as malleable as its productive mediums allow. Stiegler reads the semiotic deferral of memory and time in Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance when he writes “technics is a surface of différé-

\(^{68}\) Nietzsche (1997) “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” from *Untimately Meditations*. pp. 67
rance, an instrumental mirror reflecting time as differentiation, differing, as deferred” 69. From this understanding of time as différence and différence as recurring technological encounters and habituation, the critique of identity clustering is refocused to viewing how relational tools like algorithmic technology forge difference.

Just as the technology of the clock structures the temporal understanding of one’s day, I use Stiegler’s mention of the clock as a time-producing technology “‘capturing’ space and time”70 to propose a concept of hypnosis as it pertains to the discussion of time and technics. The larger technological mechanism that dictates the owners of this technology is the techne of history itself. To clarify, “a historical stage” or the “historical present” will be in this paper what Louis Althusser refers to as an “ideology”71 where the techno-semantic organization of various entities/classes/objects prescribe an interpretive meaning (ideology) that presents a specific hegemonic discourse (i.e., technological determinism, the image of time). To illustrate the materiality of ideology I view this material ideology (note that the hypnotist’s use of a medium to sustain the vibe or trance of control) as the process of temporal hypnosis.

In the practice of hypnosis, as it has been traditionally practiced, the clock is used to lull the patient in a trance of focus and subservience to the meditative swaying of that medium by the hypnotist. I suggest that the effect produced by algorithmic culture is hypnotic, but such an effect is not purely a question of the production of value as Nick Dyer-Witheford and Nick Srnicek

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70 Ibid., pp. 220
Stiegler writes: “The visible thus orders the entire analysis of time, as if presence were better guaranteed through optics than through the voice. But should we not on the contrary question the fact that the ‘originary temporal field’ is always already taken in instrumental objectivities, particularly from the perspective of the primary/secondary connection; as photographic lens, the visual clock “capturing” space and time with a single click, all at the same instant [alles im selben Augenblick]?”
…Althusser writes: “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (pp. 153) and “Ideology has a material existence” (pp. 155).
write of AI production and *Platform Capitalism*, or the historical becoming of the discriminatory past as Safiya Noble and Wendy Chun illustrate through an analysis of present technologies—the issue is over the question of time and how these technologies mediate the past and future in the ideological event of the present. How the coming to be of the discriminatory network science of *homophily* invades from past into the future, and more creatively, how these technologies of the present reshape one’s cognition of the two temporalities. This contrasts with Martin Heidegger’s liberal concept of agency and time, wherein time is primarily regulated by the self’s finitude (Dasein as *time*), but rather, through Derrida and Stiegler, one sees that the passage of time is negotiated through the constellation of communicative mediums that structure the regionalities of memory and memory’s path into the present future. A minor point, but still important for the current discussion of time and the imagining of resistive futures. As such a temporal view of algorithmic time-making does not suggest that temporality is dictated by subjective death but produced by the machinic artifice that situates the human’s concept of the past and future.

Taking from Stiegler’s reading of Derrida, I suggest that the past and future are inscribed within the present through the mediums that communicate these temporalities. These mediums structure the inscriptions of historical memory and future speculation. Hence the past and future are not so distant but are intersecting and being inscribed through the mediums of communication and representation. In the first chapter, the mainstream mechanisms of the present, algorithmic communication—produces a hypnotic effect on the past and future. The protocol of *homophily*, or algorithmic network science, is quickly usurping the way image/video communication, data informatics, peer-to-peer messaging is being organized through algorithmic network science, to foresee patterns and predict future outcomes.
In the way that the printing press was the means of dispensing the written form *en masse*, machine learning may be seen as providing this same paradigmatic role in history. This role of machine learning is the unification of modes of relationality with modes of production or the achievement of inscriptive machinery that automate production. The Fordist mode of production could not have been enabled without its technologies that constituted its relegation of time. There is the industrial machinery that bends and joins metals for making cars but adjacent to these machines was the spread of a tacit mode of relation, or mode of inscription: the clock which dictated the workday. However, just as the written form was used to dispense certain content (e.g., the spread of Lutheranism through the printing press), what is more primordially dispensed is the form of social communication itself (i.e., the spread of the written form itself; the spread of code). One might look at modern machine learning technology’s usage in highly intelligent search engines like ChatGPT and its expected adoption in public sectors to initiate this universalized adoption, whether doctors that might utilize search engines to aggregate diagnostics data, or policing institutions that seek informatics on crime rates/likelihood. At the heart of AI technology is the methodology of *homophily* which informs prediction. Yet, *homophily* is just a reassembling of existing data into different clusters, into different forms of the same networked structure.

The liberal use of *homophily* has been for prediction. Yet, as Chun’s work demonstrates, such predictive technologies only reformulate the past into the present in no way that deviates or breaks from the linearity of historical discrimination (i.e., this thwarts conceptions of the internet as a freeing platform with revolutionary potential). In the case of labour, which is the focus of

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72 Stiegler (2009) *Technics and Time* 2

Stiegler writes that “The advent of printing is thus a major transformation of the orthographic epoch of the already-there, clearly showing that it must be differentiated from other periods. One could, moreover, relate this specific event in the history of humans and writing, the appearance of printing, to the birth of modern philosophy, as analysts of the emergence of Protestantism have not failed to suggest” pp. 79

The latter section of this quote “…to the birth of modern philosophy” will be explored more thoroughly in the last section of this paper.

> Machine learning does not represent an increase in artificial general intelligence of the kind that could substitute machines for all aspects of human cognition, but rather one particular aspect of intelligence: prediction. We define prediction in the statistical sense of using existing data to fill in missing information.\(^\text{73}\)

Hence machine learning is not only a network science protocol, or a labour protocol (means of production), but rather its use function in a sense is *prediction*. The neural net technology can re-assemble data in rapid speed and complexity beyond the labouring capacities of the human to determine new data sets. These AI protocols aid in decision-making across the board, across their uses in data curation.

Yet, as the thinkers of the first chapter make clear, much of these “new data sets” just re-organize the politics of the past, even intensifying these social relations to extreme levels. From this, what is the collective cluster of advanced AI (narrow, of course, in light of the potentials of AGI)? Agarwal et. al. go on to write:

> We have started to see this type of automation in environments where machine learning techniques are applied to mimic human decision-making. For example, a machine fitted with sensors is trained by observing the choices made by a human operator. With sufficient observations, the machine learns to predict what action a human would take given different sensory inputs.\(^\text{74}\)

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\(^{74}\) Ibid., pp. 37
Is this a call for the inhuman power (i.e., machinic power) of the algorithmic machines to regulate human bodies? Such theories still place the focus on algorithmic technology’s spatial adoption and how it influences human bodies. Yet, what is the implication of these prediction machines on time?

The process of neighbor-hooding correlative data clusters already implies an ontology of history, wherein history is not quite teleologically forwards or backwards, but the present is an assembled locus that mirrors the past into the future, but more interestingly, the future into the past. Not only does the past inform the future (in this intersection known as the present) but the assemblage structure of the present, the way the past is presented to be oriented towards the future, colours the mode of recollecting the past. Not only does the future make itself out of the past, but quite often the concepts of the future repaint the memory or narrative meaning of the past. Chun’s discussion of linear history in which the human problems of the old are assimilated in the digital age is an effective summation of political economy which indicates a way into psychoanalysis. But what is not specifically acknowledged is how the formulation of algorithmic automation has recontextualized the contents of the past to justify its expansion into all arenas of life in the future. The spatial colonization of AI machines has constructed the historical stage, or the affect of present time. On a machinic scale, the desire that is created out of the assemblage of AI tools in the emerging present is the image of the present as linearly teleological, as the “age of x” or “x culture” (e.g., algorithmic culture, homophilic culture, AI mode of production, digital age). This stadial concept of the present grants the affect or emotional outlook of the future a kind of certainty and absoluteness that frames a specific means of producing historical development through the aggregate of this technological ecosystem (solidified by the retrospect revisionism of the past to make the present legible). The assemblage of AI prediction machinery stretch-

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75 Chun. (2021) Discriminating Data, pp. 105-107
ing across the spatiality of human interrelations informs a temporal trajectory that posits its own machinic form as the prime agent of the future. This ironically also metastasizes this technology across the spatiality of the culture by supplanting its presence in future imaging/imaginings of the world, hardening into the brains of our species as something one cannot live without, predicting the future of the species in its own machinic image.

This is the formation of the present as gathered by the machinic hypnosis of the tools that most, taking from Deleuze and Guattari here, “reterritorialize”\(^76\) the cultural and industrial arenas of the historical present. This historical constellation of technology in cultural studies is brought together to contextualize machine learning’s semiotic history or evolutionary chain of logical/computational technologies that are quickly producing—or in its own nomenclature “predicting”—the cultural mythoi of the historical present and shaping the future (e.g., “digital era”, “information age,” milestones in cultural development) by implicating the concept of the future through its spatial colonialization within the culture (i.e., today conceptualized as ‘algorithmic culture’) through its spread under the pretense of industrial efficiency. Machine learning is not only a genre-specific tool, but a general algorithmic protocol\(^77\) that allows AI to germinate across a widening plane of human interaction because of its self-instructing capacities and its ability to draw deeper sites of correlative knowledge and perform calculative labour in exponential speed. Artificial Intelligence is stretching across the cultural ecology and gaining traction through machine learning based engines like deep-learning which perform algorithmic protocols while learning from growing sets of data to correlate patterns or what Chun reveals to be the neighbor-

\(^{76}\) Deleuze & Guattari (1991) *What is Philosophy?* Pp. 68

“In capitalism, capital or property is reterritorialized, ceases to be landed, and is reterritorialized on the means of production; whereas labor becomes “abstract” labor, reterritorialized in wages: this is why Marx not only speaks of capital and labor but feels the need to draw up some true psychosocial type.”


Galloway diagrams early HTML protocols as “a set of recommendations and rules that outline specific technical standards.” This definition still holds for machine learning, albeit machine learning performs this ask through self-instruction and auto-generated rule-sets and task-methods.
hoarding politics of *homophily* separating the whole into chambers of self-regulation and re-inscribing the post-modern state of difference into all arenas of life. From social media, to governance, to warfare and medical health, the auto-learning engine of machine learning software sets the protocol for the new way of interfacing social and object relations. One observes machine learning’s fluid adoptive potential rippling across swathes of data-driven industries in both consumer culture and public services such as healthcare and governance. Much of these genre-specific sectors are adopting the same formal language of algorithmic interfacing—from Instagram content curation to art-making (e.g., Dall-e, DeepDream), brain tumour detection, to informing public policy and automating drones for the military. What does this wide acceptance of machine learning mean for cultural studies and more specifically the study of political economy?

In the language of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, this is the point where the molar machinery compound to territorialize the molecular relational structure. D&G describe the molar as “collective formations comprising singularities distributed haphazardly” where in the present case the techne of machine learning has inserted itself in the cultural milieu. The constellation of social institutions that adopt machine learning for data analytics collectively matrix a “rhizome” or a holistic web that “connects any point to any other point” through the adoption of this technology across all fields that require higher-order automated data organization—which is quickly becoming a universal demand as the entropic nature of interactions supersede the capabilities of people to organize them on their own. This rhizomatic emergence of algorithmic cul-

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79 Deleuze and Guattari (1983) *Anti-Oedipus*. pp. 1

80 Deleuze & Guattari (1987) “Introduction: Rhizome” from *A Thousand Plateaus*. pp. 21
ture may be territorializing the molecular level, or a level that semiotically interweaves the disparate arenas of AI and machine learning implementation through a trans-domain congruency of their material protocol\textsuperscript{81}. In the most literal but lucid example, one observes the necessity of machine learning technology to power the computation devices that grant access to the cascading unravelling of quantum physics\textsuperscript{82}. Here, even the anthropological big-history of physics (i.e., history of universe, history of matter through the dissection of the present condition of the universe) requires techne or means of linguistic mediation to make legible and presentable the history of the pre-Anthropocene.

The non-human concept of history is not explicitly acknowledged in Wendy Chun’s exposition of the algorithmic age through her investigation of homophily. The recognition of dynamic history, where this perceived novel stadial development in human technology colours ones understanding of “analog” organizational methods of the past. Whereas Chun’s analysis is psychoanalytical, as the goal of Discriminating Data is to demonstrate how the political economy of machine learning protocol the production of desire and identity\textsuperscript{83} through predictive organizational technology, invoking Lacanian psychoanalysis into the theory of algorithmic homophily to explain how personal and group identity (i.e., digital neighborhoods) is distinguished by the clustering of machine learning technology. A clustering that simultaneously carves the segregated borders of future digital neighborhoods and ensures the future through personal and group iden-

\textsuperscript{81}Deleuze & Guattari (1983) Anti-Oedipus pp. 88
D&G write: “...in a molecular and pure multiplicity, where the partial objects, the "boxes," the "vessels" all have their positive determinations and enter into aberrant communication following a transversal that runs through the whole work; an immense flow that each partial object produces and cuts again, reproduces and cuts at the same time.”


\textsuperscript{83}Chun (2021) Discriminating Data pp. 158: [next page]
Chun writes that search engines “seek to influence user behavior by collecting individuals and items into similarity-based neighborhoods. By using historical data to anticipate “user wants,” they limit choice and amplify past trends in the name of efficiency and desire.” Here the exposition of a Lacanian form of analysis informs Chun’s strongest critiques which unravel the ideological attribution of individual and society identity (pp. 181) through these data management and curational technologies.
ty and difference (e.g., right-wing echo chambers, left-wing echo-chambers). I then try to extend Chun’s humanist psychoanalytic argument over the culture of algorithmic homophily that informs the production of desire into the language of desiring-production. What is the effect of this widening ring of machine learning tools across disparate fields in the culture? What is the productive result of the overflowing growth of this technology? Together, the assemblage, i.e., the constellation of AI, machine learning tools, etcetera form the concept of the historical present, and in the same gesture, colour the past and future. D&G write that “desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being”\textsuperscript{84}, in an extension of the psychoanalytic concept of lack as becoming the site for productive desire. Through Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of humanistic psychoanalysis, I open Chun’s criticism to address a non-human psychoanalysis that does not try to describe the mechanism of desire through the exploitation of lack but open the grounds for a new critique of political economy that may account for hypnotic ideology that arises out of form, but truly overcomes the paranoid fascist account of the future that runs rampant in cultural theory about AI (i.e., accelerationism; white Marxism).

The universalization of AI algorithms molds its own historical stage because the age of AI is presented as the emerging or next stadial development in human evolution (and by some accounts, extinction)—the naming of the age of information, the post-anthropocentric or posthuman. I want to make it clear that there is a crucial mistake in accepting this interpretive narrative of the growing matrices of AI and machine learning driven industries prima facie. In Deleuze and Guattari’s own terms it is a “paranoid”\textsuperscript{85} fascist type wherein this perspective of the present cannibalizes the orientation through totalizing a specific image of historical progress with

\textsuperscript{84} Deleuze & Guattari (1983) \textit{Anti-Oedipus} pp. 27 27
\textsuperscript{85} Deleuze & Guattari (1983) \textit{Anti-Oedipus}. pp. 22
a specific teleological future. This closes the possibility for revolutionary reimagination of the past through a Nietzschean forgetfulness. It is precisely ideology, and in my phrasing temporal hypnosis, that manifests through the flows of capital’s new mode of production.

This globalization/colonization of the hyper-capitalist ecologyformulates historical situatedness with absolute certainty and re-historizes the past and future in its machinic image. Machine learning’s fluid generality allows it to encompass fields of human, non-human and object relationality in such a way that its agential primacy is being leveraged over even those considered bourgeois agents. Some theorists have equated the technological singularity between capital and its modes of production (machinery/computation today), arguing that capital is itself an organismic computational system that learns and reproduces itself through predictive curation, the only hope being that out of the accelerated intensification of these immanent contradictions may arise Socialism. Or as Dyer-Witheford et al. propose, taking from Nick Land’s accelerationist conclusion of the imminent contradictions of capital, could such a case even be too optimistic—could capital and its modes of production simply intensify and do away with the human class struggle altogether? This is probably correct, seeing how things are going right now. In such a case of accelerationism, who really bears the burden of this process of acceleration? If one totally adopts the machinic view of capital, where the only bourgeois class is the organistic machinery of capital itself, then everyone (including intellectual labourers) become the proletariat. But does this class also suffer in this rapid process of accelerationism in the same way as the global south proletariat, who are still in many ways stuck with doing the non-intellectual labour to feed and

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86 Nietzsche (1997) “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” from *Unimately Meditations*. pp. 120
...Land writes of accelerationism: “reaching an escape velocity of self-reinforcing machinic intelligence propagation, the forces of production are going for the revolution on their own”
88 Dyer-Witheford et al. (2019) *Inhuman Power*
The authors write that “Nick Land’s (2014) compelling vision of an unstoppable AI-capital ascendancy omits the possibility that the competitive dynamics of the world market result in the mutual destruction of contending cybernetic capitals.” Pp. 153
provide the energy for their northern exploiters? Do they have the intellectual capital to safeguard themselves as those of the North have, is their capacity to engage in this future-speculation of immanent doom even recognized? The machinic view of capital may be useful in so many ways for providing illustrious descriptive power to the flows of capital, but it does not provide an account of revolution or revolutionary future-making because it utilizes the logic of capitalism itself under the guise of immanence. Sourcing praxis in history is to recognize, again, that much of the fruits of historical insights are buried or reterritorialized by colonial and heteronormative powers. To look away from white European thought is not to invoke a slave morality or but to trust the opening of the past as one reorients what technics of the present, they choose to paint the future with.

Taking from Nikolai Chernyshevsky, I ask “what is to be done?” What can the species composed of outdated sinewy, sacks of blood and guts do about their projected extinction, in the present, before this extinction takes place? Not to pose a question beckoning for easy answers, but to say that if this is the trajectory of things as they are seen for the future, the present also loses its luster and as Derrida and Stiegler point out, such projections of the future are negotiated in the present, the latter itself a locus of intersecting temporalities, and such a affirmative take on the future almost invites such a future. Here again I observe a focus on theories of alienation (what I will refer to as philosophical psychoanalysis) rather than gestures towards revolution. The past itself becomes in service of this future speculation—speculations that are inscribed within the plane of the present (not the actual future, but the future as it seems now). As Alia Al-Saji, taking from Frantz Fanon, writes in *Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closer of the Past* (2013):

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89 Chernyshevsky (1886) *What is to be Done?* This book was obviously inspirational for another titular figure, who found himself asking the same question during a time where the state of bourgeois intelligentsia seemed hopelessly crippled by the failures of academic resistance.
Thus Fanon perceives a field of possibility structured according to the past possibles of an absent other. As past, these possibilities lose their contingency and virtuality; they become factual and necessary, the routes to their realization fixed. More precisely, the field of possibility loses its playfulness and imaginary variability.\(^{90}\)

Al-Saji’s reading of Fanon posits a concept of “racialized time”, which remains relevant to the discussion of algorithmic culture because not only does the technology in the mainstream usurps the users of this technology (quickly becoming everywhere that capital reigns), but this machinery also colonializes the spaces of resistance (academia, philosophical speculation, future prediction).

In a reflexive awareness, even theorists of these technologies adopt the ideological temporalities that dictate some strong flirtation with human extinction but remaining mute about what can be done in the immediate present. Which is not to say that human extinction is impossible (it is \textit{very much} possible) but rather to ask what effect such futurist speculation draws into the present as it is being inscribed with near certainty.

Does the minority or the global proletariat have a participatory role in making this long-futurist projection? When authors of this theoretical ilk propose that claim, are they not colonized themselves by this machinic formation of their futures, futures that become everyone’s future? A speculative future that drags along with them the rest of the world? Sylvia Wynter’s concept of the \textit{“referent-we”}\(^{91}\) comes to mind, as a means of addressing this genre-specific futurist vision through the universalizing pronouns of the “us” or “we” or “humanity”.

\(^{90}\) Al-Saji (2013) \textit{Too Late: Racialized Time and the Closure of the Past}

\(^{91}\) McKittrick (2015) \textit{Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis} pp. 7

Wynter in the interview argues: “but the struggle to make change is difficult within our present system of knowledge; the struggle can, and has, reproduced practices that profit from marginalization and thus posit that emancipation involves reaching for the referent- we of Man. Thus, “yours in the intellectual struggle” bears witness to the practice of sharing words and letters while also drawing attention to the possibilities that storytelling and wording bring.”
There must be a space of possibility in the impossible, where the image of the impossible breaks from the present, an image that must come from outside of the core, outside of the apparent image of history provided by the tools of history making. Is it too gushy to write of the impossible? Not exactly, as my argument that the hegemony that is produced by this assemblage of technological tools (i.e., the conceptual hegemony of technological determinism) forecloses the space between certainty and impossibility. It is of course true what the climate scientists are saying, in the same way that the AI-ification of every-thing is almost certain, but the act of praxis must consider the binding certainty of this view of the present housed in the language of the present’s most promising tools as itself the biggest threat towards praxis. In the same way post-Fordist capitalism was designated and named a historical stage through the assemblage of the period’s most prevalent productive tools (cars, means of mass production), one might observe the current age as the age of information, but more precisely automated information, an age of non-human production of epistemology. How is one to respond to this in light of Chun’s outline of this algorithmic network science rhizome seeded by a sea of automated prediction tool applications that inform the historical present and hypnosis of a hopeless future? How is one to avoid the usurping of the human’s need for capital to create value, as Nick Dyer-Witheford et al. portend with the intensification of the AI mode of production in the speculative future?

There must be a sense of disfiguring history and tossing aside the past and present to create a space for radical futures, or a concept of freedom that gives way to non-accelerationist forms of thought. Such is the concept of a post-mondialization, French for globalization, a kind of critique of political economy outlined in Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Creation of History or Globalization (2003). Nancy notes of the mondialized present as a world that has “lost its capacity to
form a world”\textsuperscript{92}. This fracturing of world, the matrix of difference that has been more acknowledged in 20\textsuperscript{th} century philosophy rides on the coat-tails of ideologies of difference as a diagram of the \textit{classificatory} logic of capital (i.e., division of labour, class difference, exchange is different from use, individuals are different from others, human is different from non-human). Such fractured globalization is presented for this argument as a sociological symptom of this perceived echo chamber culture—an effect delivered by the homophilic neighborhood clustering most recently instantiated in machine learning software. Stiegler may be seen supporting this view when writing: “and yet such a differentiation is the opening of a crisis and of an impossible critique, out of a technological communitization of the already-there which inaugurate new instrumental conditions of access”\textsuperscript{93}.

Marx is noted by Nancy to have anticipated this shift following the withdrawal of a Christian/moral telos of the world and into a conception of capital accumulation based on the value of the commodity-form. Nancy writes that Marx anticipated “an exit from representation”\textsuperscript{94} after the death of God, the death of the moral framing of pre-life, life, and the afterlife. Nancy notes that “revolution is nothing other than the accession of this global connection to consciousness and through it the liberation of value as the real value of our common producing”\textsuperscript{95}. Take the commodity-form bifurcating use-value and exchange-value. Commodity fetishism is this commodity-form itself, it is the picture of the world based on a dialectic of exchange-value and use-value, it is the antinomy of the form of value that composes the binary Boolean structure of capitalism’s ideological software. Nancy notes that “in a sense, philosophy after Kant was

\textsuperscript{92} Nancy (2003) \textit{The Creation of the World or Globalization}. pp. 34
\textsuperscript{93} Stiegler (2009) \textit{Technics and Time} 2. pp. 41.
\textsuperscript{94} Nancy (2003) \textit{The Creation of the World or Globalization}. pp. 43
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., pp. 36
continuously the thought of an experience of the impossible”\textsuperscript{96}. The former writes of Marxist’s epicurean solution out of the nihilism of capital, that:

Enjoyment does not give an account of itself. It is in this actuality without reason or end (no doubt the "free labor" of which Marx spoke) that value can be incommensurable, unable to be evaluated, to the point of no longer being a "value" and becoming what the German calls \textit{Würde}, beyond the \textit{Wert}, and which we translate as ‘dignity’\textsuperscript{97}.

Marx is read here as attempting a way out of the commodity form, a way out of the capital form of value—a mode of critique that imminently struggles with the historical present to push time, to create a something else than what is instructed by the present assemblage of tools that affirm a hegemonic certainty or diagram the form of praxis. Marx’s historical materialism is not quite the subject \textit{participating} in the determinations of time but rather the subject struggling to create time, to push history, to \textit{create} history through its immanent materiality, its tools.

Hence, one must always remember that Marx was a writer and not a revolutionary in the image of a boots-on-the ground mercenary. Marx’s boots were firmly on the page, of language and communication. His materiality is rooted in \textit{language}, in his poetics. The source of his own struggle is a struggle against the language-games that frame the base and an attempt to use the materiality of the political superstructure (the language-game of capital) to directly access the real base (as comprehension, world-forming, capturing the flowing plenitude of possibility that this dynamic base of history allows). As has been noted, the base for Nancy is this free-associating \textit{mondialisation}, of change. Nancy asserts that this act of revolution “is a question of owning up to the present.”\textsuperscript{98} Making Marx’s communism the recognition of \textit{material process}, the owning up to nihilism, of the finitude knowledge that people can act in, “what is called praxis,

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp. 65
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 38
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., pp. 35
that is to say, meaning.”\textsuperscript{99} In pushing into view this “presence,” Heidegger perhaps unveiled this picture more clearly than Marx but the former’s influence was quickly usurped by Jacques Derrida, who sided more with a Nietzschean call for historical forgetfulness or affirmative rootlessness and revealed that even in this presence “nothing presents itself”\textsuperscript{100}. Hence to seize the means of the present is also, at the same time, to create the past and future out of nothing or the \textit{ghosts} of the past or forms of mediums that have been pushed to invisibility without bringing them into visibility through an orientalist perspective (by colonizing them with another technology). Looking through a media lens, these ghosts can only be accessed through non-hegemonic mediation. Here Nancy is a good deconstructionist, who reads Marx along with Hegel and Heidegger in light of a possibly metamorphic nature of the logic of the base, i.e., the movements of unconscious class struggle. Nancy writes that “The commodity form, which is the fetishized form of value must dissolve itself, sublimate or destroy itself—in any case revolutionize itself, whatever its exact concept-in its true form. Which is not only the creation of value but value as creation.”\textsuperscript{101} This \textit{value as creation} is rooted in the \textit{telos} undercutting even a reading of Marx that sees socialism as the recognition of use-value, or revolution out of the commodity form, wherein this understanding of socialism under non-humanist considerations assumes you are created because you are useful and that the creation of this use-value goes somewhere (i.e., transcending the biological finitude of the human through principles of practical use, of self-employment or self-discipline)\textsuperscript{102}. But in overcoming the antinomies found within the commodity-form, of use-

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., pp. 54
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 72
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp. 36
\textsuperscript{102} Nietzsche. (1967) \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals}, pp. 64-74; Nietzsche writes of the creditor/debtor relationship being a transcendental one between the individual and Christian community. Where the affect of guilt arises after feeling that one owes their production to the other (i.e., creditor, community, God). This is also sociologically echoed in Max Weber’s \textit{The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism} (1905), where the concept of work designates one’s spatial position in a theological life after death. Hence one feels they own more work in protestant
value and exchange value, might use-value take upon another form, another means of expression in post-capitalist utopian thought?

Nancy writes that “in creation, a growth grows from nothing and this nothing takes care of itself, cultivates its growth, the ex nihilo is the genuine formulation of a radical materialism, that is to say, precisely, without roots” 103. Here trying to conceptualize a concept of political economy without telos, without the promise of utopia and the predictive solutions informed by the past, that is seeded in the tools of the peripheral present but rather utopia based on historical deviance that reconceptualizes discourse of the present. What Nancy requires is a communism without Christianity, where one can seize the means of creation, not of redistribution, but the means of forming the world104. Nancy, in opposing this Christian (i.e., human as partly divine) theological/teleological reading of Marx concludes:

Creation ‘makes’ with ‘nothing,’ because it makes nothing that is the order of a substrate: what it "makes" is history and relation, and in this sense it is no thing nor comes from anything. It is thus not a question any longer of a "making" but of a "being," but only in the sense that this being is nothing but the meaning of history or of the relation in which it is engaged.105

The criticism of Chun’s political economy-informed psychoanalysis of prediction machines is its failure to provide a creative alternative outside of the tool-form of an AI future.

Deleuze and Guattari a few years before Nancy write in What is Philosophy? (1991) that a radical “deterritorialization of such a plane does not preclude reterritorialization but posits it as

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103 Ibid., 51
104 Ibid., pp. 52
105 Ibid., pp. 70
the creation of a future new earth”\textsuperscript{106}. Conceptualizing a future means to reinvigorate the present schemata away from the continuance of doom that is seeded in the structure of techno-science that no amount of humanist psychoanalytic book therapy will address or adequately resolve. A revolutionary socialism that hacks the concept of the digital future might then postulate a multiplicity of metaphysical speculations about alternative-capital that will break the hegemonic wax mold of the technocratic present by reterritorializing the space of ecology that AI has usurped into spontaneous and non-capitalist forms of imagining labour beyond its humanist teleology (i.e., non-human aesthetics). Katerina Kolozava in her book \textit{Towards a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism} (2015) stipulates that:

Marx argues that ‘alienation’ is the product of philosophy, or the product of abstraction’s domination and silencing of the ‘physical and sensuous’ (the real and praxis). Thus, his project decidedly consists in transcending or exiting philosophy. However, the proposal for the reconciliation of the mutually estranged notions and realities of “nature” and “man” posits questions as overwhelming as why is the universe created and as stubborn as why is there death, or is there a God? These questions are not necessarily philosophical. They are, nonetheless, metaphysical. \textsuperscript{107} 

Here a proposition of \textit{metaphysics without philosophy} requires a delineation from metaphysics and philosophy. The vocation of philosophy, genre-specifically Western philosophy, seeks to ground a universalizable logic, a temporal-historical coherence, that ultimately must be shed if one is to face history not as the site of transcendental becoming towards-something-certain but merely productive emergence that oscillates and fixes historical potentialities or future potentials. Algorithmic hypnosis attempts to discipline and stabilize historic trajectories by presenting linear

\textsuperscript{106} Deleuze (1991) “Geophilosophy” from \textit{What is Philosophy?}. pp. 88
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., pp. 9
narratives of time based on the conditions of the “present” and through deconstruction, this ideological ontology of presence is revealed to be really a locus of absences. Nancy writes:

Metaphysical history is history thought as *physics*: as ‘natural history,’ to use this old expression in which precisely ‘history’ did yet have the meaning of a process but of a ‘collection’. The truth of this history was that in the end, it denied itself as history by becoming nature.\(^{108}\)

Here the metaphysics that is inaugurated by philosophy, specifically the Greeks, is historicized and regulated into the expanse of a transcendental plane that takes the ideological image of nature and fixes “natural” determinism. This tendency seen through the Nietzschean lens has only evolved from the Greek philosophical concept into a moral theory of ontology (i.e, monotheism to liberal humanism), then into science and technology (Foucault). Through this designated philosophical outlook, history, which accounts for the image of the present (itself intersecting the past and present) is constructed through the Western technological trance of philosophy which will be tentatively referred to as western metaphysics. As Nancy contextualizes this specifically philosophical metaphysics of the west as that which “betrays history, because history, if it designates anything, designates above all non-being and noncompletion of itself”\(^{109}\). The major teleological structures of Western thought, with Socrates as its oedipal father, is that which seeks to automate pedagogy through Plato’s invocation of dualism (i.e., master-slave, teacher-student, smart-dumb) because the technology of the ontology of forms doubles as an ideology of social organization and *learning*. The western philosophical metaphysics of reason is “auto-initiating and thus auto-finite or auto-finalized”\(^{110}\) as it treats its own technological assemblage for viewing nature as *nature*, as the Reason reasoning itself to its natural conclusion (which Western philos-


\(^{109}\) Ibid., pp. 78

\(^{110}\) Ibid., pp. 78
ophers have ironically interpreted to be a way out of bodily finitude and into transcendental infinitude. Machine learning is the contemporary spread of this “auto-initiating” and “auto-finalized” form of technology that models the past and future in its own image, where the bodily finitude of human knowledge is supposedly overcome by this advanced technology of mathematical or logocentric protocols. I propose that machine learning and AI tools dispense a specific ideology of social mediation that in their most subtle sequence informs the certainty of the future and moreover curates future-praxis in its own image. But first, the democratization of philosophy outside of vocational demarcations of Plato and, for example, German philosophers, must be outlined as practicing and projecting this specific means of thinking that seeks to own metaphysics. Here metaphysics can be broadly thought of that linguistic space that houses the past and future context of the present. I argue that this ‘specific means of thinking’ is the understanding of philosophizing as a vocation and metaphysics as the commodity of this vocation through Alexander Galloway and François Laruelle—ultimately that this specific form of non-human labouring technology (i.e., algorithmic culture) has usurped even the vocation of philosophizing from the human (i.e., algorithmic critique). In the final section, I suggest that one might obtain radical recourse by stripping the vocational element of philosophy and thus freeing metaphysics from the commodity-form as means of radical historicism and trying to see futures that do not guarantee the certainty of this techno-specific means of forming social relations. Which is to root metaphysics not in contents within philosophy, but freeing metaphysics or speculative temporality from the mediums of its historic expression/repression.

The machinic production of pedagogy in the current period of decentralization is initiated by machine learning technologies to auto-protocol a genre-specific means of data prediction that carries over the past into the future, and moreover ensure that Western technology is the an-
tidote to the problems of alienated labour and alienated bodies, to the problems of its own formulation. One could read Marx, as Laruelle, Nancy and later Katerina Kolozova do as trying to break from this reliance on the meta-assembling discourse of standard philosophy which is seen as being inaugurated by Plato and cradled all the way up to Hegel’s conception of Spirit’s lurch towards self-knowing through dialectics. Kolozova in *Towards a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism* (2015) affirms this critique of idealism/rationalism as a techne-critique when she finishes her essay arguing that “if technology is to play a role in the process of the democratization of society, or society’s progress toward its general emancipation, democratization of the dialogue on the social and political aspects of technology is necessary”\textsuperscript{111}. Here, the social and political aspects of technology must be addressed in the way Chun does with machine learning and *homophily*, but without the philosophical certainty or auto-finitizing of linear history. The machinic system that is not acknowledged is a hidden one that frames the discussion—the machinery of historical linearity prevents Chun’s psychoanalysis from conceptualizing radical breaks or a praxis that seeks to absolve this image of infinite exploitation of lack. I conclude with another quote from *What is Philosophy?* where Deleuze surmises arguments made above about the historicizing effects of a technology colonizing the present:

> If philosophy is reterritorialized on the concept, it does not find the condition for this in the present form of the democratic State or in a cogito of communication that is even more dubious than that of reflection. We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the *present*\textsuperscript{112}.

Kolozova affirms this when she finishes her essay writing that “if technology is to play a role in the process of the democratization of society, or society’s progress toward its general emancipa-

\textsuperscript{111} Kolozova (2015) *Towards a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism*. pp. 8

\textsuperscript{112} Deleuze (1991) “Geophilosophy” from *What is Philosophy*. pp. 108
tion, democratization of the dialogue on the social and political aspects of technology is necessary”\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{113} Kolozova (2015) \textit{Towards a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism}. pp. 8
Algorithmic Critique

Wendy H.K. Chun historicizes digital homophily or “social networks as a means to dissolve the masses into ‘neighborhoods’”\(^\text{114}\) alongside its cultural antecedents in urban planning and social network sciences that predate homophily’s application in digital data organization. The author demonstrates this evolution of homophily as it threads across analog and digital history by outlining how the algorithmic patterning of data in the culture today has absorbed and accelerated the racial, gender and class discrimination of the pre-digital age. Yet, are these clustered neighborhoods limited to the digital present, and as Chun demonstrates, dated to racialized urban planning? I argue that such homophilic clusters reveal themselves even in the spaces of resistance. And as my argument about the closing of the future illustrated in the middle chapter, as this algorithmic critique metastasize spatially, it will conceal the future in its own image—preventing radical future-making.

I propose that all forms of critique will remain sterile and un-radical if the mediums of critique do not change. Chun concludes her book by calling for “modes of living that do not give up on the past or the future”\(^\text{115}\) extending the discussion through Glen Coutland’s cybernetic reading of Frantz Fanon. The author hints at this statement earlier in Discriminating Data by reciting Frederic Jameson’s call for “socialist art” or cognitive mapping as a means of forging resistant futures outside of the neoliberal determinations that shape the identity politics of recognition embodied by algorithmic technologies.

This is the solution that I wish to extend in this paper albeit with caveats that heavily criticize academic reimaginings of praxis and future world-making to thwart the effects temporal hypnosis found across digital and analog technology. Why do I do this? Because although

\(^{114}\) Ibid., pp.82
\(^{115}\) Chun (2021) Discriminating Data. pp. 215
Chun’s criticism of standard psychoanalysis (with homophilic network science being its ‘bastard child’\textsuperscript{116}) is exceptionally lucid in its exposition, the most important aspect in Chun’s work remains missing and only hinted at (i.e., “socialist art”). The ‘socialist art’ of future-making that Chun and Jameson call upon is a ghostly figure shadowing \textit{Discriminating Data}. Not only Chun’s book but virtually all the works mentioned hitherto in this thesis leave the canvas of future action as an after-thought or suggestion after their historicizing and analysis is conducted. Dyer-Witheford et al. only devote one short section on “Communist AI” in an attempt at answering the central problem of \textit{what is to be done}?\textsuperscript{117} due to a lack of critical theory that even give shape to the effects of algorithmic culture. But with these descriptive analyzes, what is the means of resistance going forward for the human? With these threats of algorithmic culture outlined by these media theorists, the central question does not become what these algorithms do or will do, but what can one do to resist the cloistering of the future.

This thesis will similarly engage in this historization of algorithmic critique displayed by the above-mentioned works but remain similarly fruitless in performing the resistance itself. Demonstrating in reflexive form that no resistive action against the totalizing algorithmic forces is possible within a medium itself hypnotized by algorithmic thinking – which is perhaps the hidden claim of my thesis. Through this paradox I hope to convey the trap of hegemonic algorithmic language, of both mathematical algorithms \textit{and} analog, written algorithmic language that houses philosophical critique. I do so to expose the gatekeeping of critical language in both algorithmic culture but similarly in the resistive space of academic critiques of this culture, because there is no escaping algorithmic hypnosis without acknowledging the academy’s own hypnosis, rooted in

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., pp. 26

Chun argues that homophilic network science has assumed the role of psychoanalytic therapy which manifest to users of AI technology as the formation of love, community, friendships but in the same breath drawing borders of division.

\textsuperscript{117} Dyer-Witheford (2019) \textit{Inhuman Power}. Pp. 149-162
the written language that houses philosophy. Philosophy and its tools of expression is algorithmic and psychoanalytic, due to its descriptive affect and endless creation of difference through the allure of recognition or authenticity. When people attempt a grand narrative of the human and non-human, they touch these machines using the extensions of a certain practice of thought (philosophy) housed in a specific medium (writing). When writing about AI and technics under the context of capital’s colonial forces—one is encountering another technology with a genre-specific technology.

Whereas Chun used homophily to perform a machinic psychoanalysis of data curational AI, I turn this psychoanalysis back to the space that it came from: to the academic institutions that produce such criticism. Is homophily the fault of human nature/tribalism? I feel as though this liberal view is unaware of the mediums that regulate and create pockets of difference. I locate homophily in the mediums of philosophy itself (i.e., the aggregation of specific areas of knowledge into a totalizing knowledge). Looking even more materially at the problem, in the medium that has housed philosophy—in the production of alphabetics. Of course, there are layers to the homophilic machine of academic critique. There is the book, the printing press, the libraries that house books, online databases and now ever emergent AI search engines like ChatGPT, which certainly change the nature of research in an unsurprising convergence between capital forces and academic critique (in the same way Google-style search engines have been adopted to organize academic databases and conduct research). In such a way, can it not be noted that the project of critique (and it is endless) just reproduces its own commodity, with its own fields and academic readers and groups and specialists? And through this clustering of identity, does this not stifle criticism and perpetuate homophilic tribalism, echo chambers, which create often-times petty arguments about hermeneutics (in the humanities, at least) as though it were a
phallus measuring contest between oedipal authorities of thought and their followers? How, in these material conditions of academia is one expected to achieve or even near the solidarity that someone like Marx demands? Moreover, the project of the academic institution is the same project of AI machines which seek to survey and organize input data to create surplus data out of user behaviour, that is creation perhaps in the sense Deleuze and Guattari call philosophy as the creation of concepts. Yet this creation quickly veers towards surplus creation to the point of excess banality. It tells one what is wrong and creates beautiful concepts that say everything but do nothing, as Marx was astute to point out (whether he embodies this is another matter, and frankly, unimportant to this paper), it drowns in this descriptive exposition. A beautifully endless project yielding more and more surplus language and philosophy that simultaneously eclipse other modes of communing. On the meta-level, what is more present is not just the algorithmic nature of philosophy but the medium in which it is housed—in written language. It is not only that the ethnicities of writing(s) form an obviously colonial language, but the very form of writing itself is colonial and algorithmically automated.

Whereas the mainstream culture has adopted the Weberian rational language of code and algorithmic language, academic critique is even more atavistic in its attempts at resisting the colonialization of code-language. Hence in Max Weber’s *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1994), one sees a parallel between the burgeoning of capitalism in service of an ethic of extreme calculability/rationalization in unison with the development of the printing press which ushered in the mass reading of the bible (the rise of Lutheranism/Protestantism). The limitations of textual exposition trap itself in the endless task of conveying and negotiating

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“Now the peculiar modern Western form of capitalism has been, at first sight, strongly influenced by the development of technical possibilities. Its rationality is to-day essentially dependent on the calculability of the most important technical factors” (pp. xxxvii)  
119 Ibid. pp. 39-51
meaning—mistaking this process as an act of resistance. Jacques Derrida’s critique of Rousseau’s representational view of written language as subordinate to the phenomenological immediacy of speech is noteworthy for demonstrating but also falls short. In *Of Grammatology* (1971), Derrida critiques phenomenological immediacy by observing instead the technology of writing, a “supplemental” technology, which negotiates the communication and ultimately the meaning of phenomenology\(^{120}\). Bernard Stiegler adds the reading of supplemental meaning as a function of technology or writing as technology in *Time and Technics II*:

This ethnocentrism consists of simultaneously understanding alphabetic writing as being “in itself and for itself the most intelligent” and of relegating it “out of the full word.” This is a logocentrism that concurrently debases writing in general in the face of a *logos* understood as *phone*, and elevates alphabetic writing as being the best, the least bad, or of nearly-not writing. From there, grammatology will go on to assert that speech is “always already writing,” though must endure the mourning of presence: thought must endure the mourning of presence. Archi-writing is the logic of originary supplementary, the thought of the non-originality as deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence. But how would it be possible not to reject writing without privileging a certain kind of writing—which phonologically conceals itself behind the voice?\(^{121}\)

Here Derrida does away with phenomenological immediacy or presence but simultaneously privileges the written form against a multiplicity of other forms of communicating outside of this binary. This leads him towards a practice of deconstruction or “aporia”\(^{122}\) which sees his own pro-

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\(^{120}\) Derrida (1976) *Of Grammatology* “...That Dangerous Supplement”

“Through this sequence of supplements, a necessity is announced: that of an infinite chain, ineluctably multiplying the supplementary mediations that produce the sense of the very thing they defer: the mirage of the thing itself, of immediate presence, of originary perception. Immediacy is derived. That all begins through the intermediary is what is indeed "inconceivable [to reason].” pp.157


\(^{122}\) Derrida (1993) *Aporias*. pp. 78:
ject of deconstruction as endless, a veiled preservation of the vocation of philosophizing with the understanding that it is conducted through a means of communication; through the technology of supplemental writing. Louis Althusser recounts Vladimir Lenin’s position in *Letter to Gorky* (1908): “their way of ‘philosophizing’ is to expend fortunes of intelligence and subtlety for no other purpose than to *ruminate in philosophy*”\(^{123}\).

There remains a paradoxical faith in these post-structuralist philosophers, a faith in the word to structure experience and critique experience. What is taken for granted is the pre-computational algorithm that is alphabetical language—of its power and tyranny to correlate and critique meaning. The paradox that emerges is the product of the philosopher’s eye turning in on itself and trying to simultaneously see with the organs they aim to critique. For example, in critiquing the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic value of the “the word”, the philosopher is secretly forced to believe in its powers to elucidate or obtain recognition/freedom. But the word, and its assembling institutions (i.e., print publishing, libraries, religions, academia) itself is a technology, with genre-specific\(^{124}\) localities that sustains a history inseparable from the strengthening of capital.

In its shadows are means of communicating that have been eclipsed either via the charge of anti-intellectualism, ahistoricism or, in the case of Derrida—the equalization of phonocentric culture into the chains of signification. But in Derrida’s criticism, in his assessment of speech as writing, does he not colonize the multiplicities of signifying gestures into a specific form of signification—into writing? Wittgenstein says of language that each is a “form of life”,\(^{125}\) does this

\(^{123}\) Althusser (1971) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. pp. 31
\(^{124}\) McKittrick (2014) *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis* ...[next page]

...I borrow this term ‘genre-specific’ from Katherine McKittrick’s interviews with Sylvia Wynter ‘genre-specific (ethno-class)’ pp. 17

\[^{123}\text{What appears to be refused is the pure possibility of cutting off. Among border, closure, and demarcation, who would be able to cut this braid in which I have let myself be taken and that I am going to leave here? Leaving it open or fraying it at each of its ends, let us describe the three twisting movements that keep it open and ultimately interminable, in other words without end.}\]
equality between modes of signification under the common denominator of signifiers (which for Derrida is tacitly understood as all being a form of text, more specifically writing) allow for the socio-cultural differences in the use of these signifiers to be felt and understood? Another version of this is seen in mathematically oriented theorists burgeon today, who ground the universally denominated signifier (quite different from a transcendental signified) into the logic of mathematical/algorithmic expression leaving little room for the multiplicities of other forms of communications that are forgotten (via a kind of linguistic genocide) in the process of historic-cultural memory archival. This secures lateral movements in cultural analysis and critique, yes, but is not quite as radical as recognizing potentials beyond the duopolies of genre-specific written/mathematical structuring of experience and in the case of this paper, resistance. Not to look for a “common denominator” which encapsulates what writing does not but opening the field of expression without trying to make that that process through an ontology of the supplement.

Would it not be just as easy to claim that writing is a form of hieroglyphic and carry on Of Grammatology with the latter denomination instead of the former? But Derrida does the opposite, by arguing that hieroglyphics, and scientific language are all texts (ignoring the genre-specific regionality of the word “text”) to make the larger point of the non-existence of the transcendental signified. In so doing, Derrida sticking to his own regionality and roots in the European academic tradition, represses the desire to render the non-written signifiers into the written,

…” And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” pp. 11


…Abstract: “This dissertation will present a mathematically informed interpretation of a classically romantic literary-theoretic thesis: that a work of literature can aesthetically communicate an ineffably complex holistic understanding of the real world, which we might call the work’s ‘aesthetic meaning.’ Drawing on a generalization of ‘deep learning’ ("artificial intuition") systems and on elementary algorithmic information theory, we describe a kind or aspect of aesthetic meaning—‘ambient meaning’—that may have a special resonance with Modernist and avant-garde approaches to aesthetic meaning, as well as with the concepts of aesthetically sophisticated cultural-materialist literary theory of the kind that critics like Sianne Ngai or Raymond Williams practice.”
perhaps for the sake of his predominately middle/upper-class, well-read audience in academic philosophy who may better understand the grammatological and technological structures that inform the concept of truth. This was marvelous for Derrida’s time, but it still ignores how the so-called non-written signifiers are used and to which degree their subtle implementation in non-Western cultures are understood differently from the way writing is understood in the West as a form of emancipation (but now more clearly seen as a form of identitarian, homophilic identity clustering/form of domination and surveillance). The equality between all signifiers as writing or text is to be held suspect because it privileges the textual form as the common denominator that corral different modes of technologically coded expression under the larger/universal purview of “text” or “sign” (as evidenced by Derrida’s performative writing style in Of Grammatology). Yet it is only in the West that such a form of signifier, the all-universalizing word “text” or “writing” is allotted the chief dominion in drawing the bridge towards political/linguistic emancipation.

Chun asks us to produce socialist art. Nietzsche in The Gay Science (1982) famously asks of philosophers: “can they dance?” 127. But did Nietzsche dance? Is it possible for anyone to critique the contemporary algorithmic landscape through alternative means of bodily resistance, gestural communication, bodily struggle, musical communication or dance without the written form to validate its power as a signifier? Is this permitted in the space of academia with equal importance and audiences as the written kind of thinking? It has only been entertained by some thinkers with the intent to subordinate the powers of these extraneous mediums to the larger,

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127 Nietzsche (1994) The Gay Sciences: Nietzsche writes: “Faced with a scholarly book— We do not belong to those who have ideas only among books. when stimulated by books. It is our habit to think outdoors-walking, leaping. climbing. dancing. preferably on lonely mountains or near the sea where even the trails become thoughtful. Our first questions about the value of a book, of a human being. or a musical composition are: Can they walk? Even more, can they dance?... Every scholarly book also mirrors a soul that has become crooked; every craft makes crooked.” pp. 322
more legitimate project of written language. Yet, such a medium has a history that for this paper is held in even more suspect than the terrain of mainstream, mathematical culture.

Many of the post-Nietzscheans, particularly Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, see Nietzsche’s call to dance as a call for a more sensuous, poetic philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (1996) describe philosophy as “the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane”\(^{128}\), emphasizing the creative role of philosophy to conjure ideas amongst the expanding and contracting “horizon” of immanence. Recall the theory fiction of post-Deleuzian philosophers like Nick Land, whose *Fanged Noumena* (2011) is a textual riddle, embodying an era of theory-fiction where the vocation of philosophy was innovated through the adoption of a writing style that territorialized non-logocentric\(^{129}\) forms of writing (i.e., fiction). But is this enough? To be a poet philosopher still grounds the medium of written communication (i.e., quite often in the style and language of global bourgeois colonizers) as the means of communing meaningfully and intelligently. Such a position is not a call to anti-intellectualism but rather questions the exclusive role oral and written language is provided in expressing intellect and social critique. What is up for argument is not that speech subordinates language but that both speech and language subordinate other forms of communicating (here is a case for the politics of communicative multiplicity rather than duality).

As academic philosophy learns more of the detrimental effects of this new code-language, of algorithmic culture, the institution chooses instead to bury its feet deeper into its conservative roots—in written language—yielding this tool of supposed resistance as if it cannot do anything but develop more language games and points of petty conflict over description and

\(^{128}\) Deleuze & Guattari (1996) *What is Philosophy?* Pp. 36


Dastur reads Derrida challenging the standard immediacy of phenomenological presence that grounded traditional philosophies of Truth (i.e., grandfathered by Plato and Aristotle) via a deconstruction of the “metaphysics of presence” (pp. 47). This displaces phenomenological immediacies of time, between the past, present and future.
hermeneutic parsing. But is not written language itself an algorithmic code: pattern recognition homophily of the pre-computational, pre-network science era? If the politics of identity in algorithmic culture is the exploitation of recognition and authenticity, as Chun points out, then the correlative traps of homophily stretch long before 20th century psychoanalysis and eugenics and are fundamental to even the space of critique that attempts to deconstruct the political problems of the mainstream. In written language, and its democratization through the printing press, one finds an earlier analog/digital split than that observed in the rise and proliferation of computational language. Reusing Stiegler regarding institutions that organize and disseminate the word such as the printing press, the author states that “one could, moreover, relate this specific event in the history of humans and writing, the appearance of printing, to the birth of modern philosophy”\(^{130}\).

Such other forms have historically been downplayed by members of the ruling/intellectual class under the greater credence of hieroglyphics, oration, poetics and now mass-distributed tombs of written work. Such an intellectual class not only produces reformative critique but also enables intellectual fascist from ceasing modern industry. There is little divide between the humanities, social sciences and STEM (science, technology, engineering, medicine) under the analysis of knowledge production and the politics of knowledge. It is not enough to argue that those in the social sciences or humanities are in opposition to some of the fascists produced by their STEM counterparts because they write against them. When the STEM students come into power they ultimately retreat to forms of philosophizing, reactionary or critical and usually the former, The dream of Elon Musk’s SpaceX project is to extend human life against the threat of human extinction and Google and Facebook’s desire to amass, curate and reproduce data networks ultimately references back to old philosophical models informed by humanism and

\(^{130}\) Stiegler (2009) *Technics and Time* pp. 79
general ideations that liberal economy serves the human. To preserve human life for Elon Musk, to enlarge its knowledge in the case of Google or to extend social relations in the case of Facebook all speak towards Kantian principles of understanding and human thought as the primary agent of cosmic evolution. Distancing the ‘academy’ from the ‘company’ or the ‘government’ is to ignore the necessity of students who are into workers for these very political forces within an ethnic-gender-class informed strata of job allocation. This is a simple point, the harder problem is recognizing that even formulating a Marxist, techno-psychoanalytic, post-structuralist, decolonial, feminist or queer critique of the contemporary movements of fascism (white boss, male boss, straight boss, rich boss) merely express change on the level of content but relies on the same mode of producing knowledge through the legal boundaries of the thought-world. Whereby one party does not give false promises of future-change via the use of pre-revolutionary structures (e.g., leaders, philosophers, police state) to then emancipate the masses (e.g., socialism).

François Laruelle in attempting a break from the philosophical colonialization of resistance writes in *Introduction to Non-Marxism*:

> Even to be an empiricist or critical, at least if the philosopher carries out a complete analysis of his practice, an analysis without appeal, it is necessary to break (with) a preliminary continuity.\(^{131}\)

Laruelle’s criticism of standard philosophical Marxism attempts to rid Marxism’s theoretical universality via philosophizing dialectical materialism as representational of historical materialism. When arguing that philosophers should change the world, this question is born out of the history of philosophy and has significance within this history because it sees in philosophy a worthwhile project that needs practical application, but it then simultaneously colonizes the rest of the world and refurbishes the intersectional struggles of the egos under the larger schemata of

\(^{131}\) Laruelle (2012) *Introduction to Non-Marxism* pp. 35
dialectical materialism (e.g., problems of race and gender being understood under the larger, universal umbrella of labour and class struggle). Yet it must be noted that Marxists might also have a criticism of Laruelle’s individual practice of non-philosophy and the theorizing of Laruelle in the wake of his work. Vladimir Lenin in What is to be Done? (1998) writes:

Meanwhile, Marxist books were published one after another, Marxist journals and newspapers were founded, nearly everyone became a Marxist, Marxists were flattered, Marxists were courted, and the book publishers rejoiced at the extraordinary, ready sale of Marxist literature.132

Are we then to expect of non-philosophy and non-marxism, non-marxist books published one after another, non-philosophy journals so that non-philosophy may be courted so that book publishers rejoice at the extraordinary, ready sale of non-marxist literature? Laruelle’s call for a democratic non-philosophy, a non-Marxism, will still retain the mode of producing knowledge without? In both cases Leninism and Laruellism remain thought fascists, one a revolutionary one is a thinker—not recognizing in their own philosophy an algorithmically curated catalogue of references. For Lenin the reference to future governance is a police state reminiscent of capital and for Laruelle the reference for non-philosophy is the history of philosophy he seeks to revolutionize. Strategic silence or a means of refraining from producing through this homophilic cluster is to abandon the historical continuity of philosophy or its attempts to be reformed by way of diversification or ontologies of alterity.

Nietzsche was clever in calling upon music and dance as goals of new philosophy. Yet if he really believed in such mediums, he would have made the music and danced the dance, without the philosophical desire to linguistically possess these mediums through the primacy of his own chosen medium, of philosophy and the written word. For these thinkers, philosophy and

philology were always privileged as the only legitimate means of communicating and critique, no matter how critical they were of the petty contents of its form. All compassion towards the racialized, poor, gendered, non-anthropocentric minorities whom critical philosophers seek to liberate wanes or loses steam when the minority earnestly declares that they do not know or do not care about reading and writing. This is a matter of political legitimacy within the plane of communication; wherein standard, academic philosophy is only able to make meager strides in reforming its own means of expression—remaining wholly complacent in mistaking baby steps as revolutionary leaps.

Alexander Galloway’s concept of the ‘interface effect’ (2012) to outline the homophilic “interface” of philosophy by suggesting that even when philosophy does away with its chief concern with truth it reveals itself as another correlative ruse—as media. Philosophy is the content of writing but as it relates to the classic notions of true, justifiable knowledge that polices other sub-disciplines, but remains itself policed by algorithmic forces intrinsic to its own means of expression. A means of resisting the present, resisting temporal hypnotism for praxis, one must recognize the effect of the instruction of philosophizing as it stands and as it lingers in even the best critics of philosophy.

Galloway argues that “interfaces themselves are effects, in that they bring about transformations in material states”133. This move of describing the process rather than identifying entities (interface as verb vs. interface noun) is done to demonstrate the temporal movement. This is a crucial distinction, as this paper’s use of the word “interface” must not be mistaken as mean-


Galloway writes: “interface as a general mode of mediation...these many interfaces, are the subject of analysis not so much to explain what they are, but to show that the social field itself constitutes a grand interface, an interface between subject and world, between surface and source, and between critique and the objects of criticism.” pp. 54

“While this analog-digital polarity is thorny in itself, we must be particularly attentive given the current discussion, as the topic of the analogical has already been broached in Chun’s description of the internal modeling of software as something like ideology-in-code.” Pp. 58
ing that tools are entities or fixed ontological particularities. Rather these tools, along with their users, are evolving assemblages that grow temporally by mating with other tools across a plane of techné. The interface effect is used to describe the functional movement that is made possible by technological tools in one’s periphery. Galloway’s interface effect attempts to unify or deconstruct the historical and functional separation between the analog and digital, between doors and computers. The case of machine learning must, then, be recontextualized under this mosaic temporality, as an interface that is both historic and spatially connected with other interfaces. Moreover, Galloway’s interfaces attempt a deconstruction of mediums of the analog and mediums thought to be of the digital. If the interface allows spatio-temporal movement from one point to the other, then this becomes a general theory of information exchange and mediation. The interfaces of this paper are AI yes, but with Galloway one is able to observe the medial interfaces that are seeded in the space of algorithmic critique: in philosophy. This can be done by analyzing Galloway’s *Laruelle: Against the Digital* (2014), where he employs Laruelle to open the grounds for “the digital” and notices this digital interface at the root of the academy, in Plato and his intellectual progeny (i.e., history of philosophy)\(^\text{134}\). This thesis will meld Galloway’s thoughts on analog and digital and observe, not just the contents of philosophy but look at the mechanisms that house philosophizing to demonstrate that there are subtle digitalities in analog mediums. Using the above discussion on writing as technology provided by Stiegler and Derrida, I will contend that no overcoming of what Galloway argues is philosophy’s digital mediation will be made possible without investigating the technology that grounds philosophy.


Galloway argues: “In Laruelle the one is the real. Yet even in being real the one remains firmly autonomous both from philosophy and from Being. The one is radically immanent, meaning that it is absolutely nonconvertible with anything whatsoever. It never goes outside of itself to form a relation with anything. The one has nothing to do with existence, understood in its strict etymological sense of ‘being out of,’ because the one is not ‘being’ and nor is it ‘out of ‘ anything.” pp. 5
The case of artificial intelligence and its recent developmental milestones in machine learning calls for a loose genealogy across analog and digital language-games, across computer science and mathematics, across mathematics and other languages, across logic, politics, poetics and so on. What this allows for is an interdisciplinary conception of the movement of mathematical thinking. Tracing its sporadic evolutionary production and reproduction will allow one to explain its effects in the present. Neural nets that bedrock machine learning today share metaphorical references to the brain (i.e., biology), self-extending learning models based on code (i.e., language/scientific protocols)\textsuperscript{135} and, as political theorists have informed us, to the political (i.e., interfacing racism, sexism, ableism, classism, etc.). This is only to address the spatial genealogy of machine learning \textit{today}. A temporal evolutionary tree coupled with this mosaic diagram of machine learning’s cultural composition devolves the discussion to the origins of thought before the division of labor in professional thinking regulated the business of mathematical models to just mathematics—of computational technology to just computer science and the political to just politics. These divisions occur sporadically and are only inferred in the present; there are no definitive periods that mark themselves as significant paradigms because of the interfaces’ cohabitation and temporal interdependence with other interfaces. Let one take prima facie the linear philosophical genealogy presented to root modern thought and draw a history of computation beyond Ada Lovelace, Charles Babbage and Alan Turing, a history that cohabitates with the general implications on the philosophy of mathematical form.

Mathematics, like any language, has its codependent roots. Whether it is discovered or essential, people’s development of mathematics cohabitates with disciplines like philosophy, economics, politics and geography. Math historian Cosette Crisan, writing on the codification of

arithmetic and geometry, suggests that people’s “preoccupation with measuring land performing calculations related to taxation and commerce signalled the beginning of what was to become one of the major areas of the discipline of mathematics”\(^\text{136}\). The early origins of mathematics being used as a teachable instrument developed succinctly with the advancement of the first empires and civilization, whereby mathematical speculation was first recorded in text as a material medium one can pass along across space and time. Crisan notes that “a profound change occurred in the nature and approach to mathematics with the contributions of Greek scholars, as they made a distinction between the practical arithmetic of everyday life and the higher pursuit of mathematics and logic for solving purely abstract problems”\(^\text{137}\). What were these problems?

Greek mathematics gained prominence after the development of geometry and city-state power as well as its proximity to Egyptian and Babylonian civilization. The ethnic-material ancestry of the English word “mathematics” is known to originate from the Greek *mathēmatike teknē*\(^\text{138}\) (direct translation: mathematical science), it is the most written about origin story one can investigate when looking at the genealogy of applied logic under the current hegemony. Peripheral metaphors like *menthere* “to care,” *manthanein* “to learn,” (e.g., *polymath*) situate math further as occupying amorphous disciplinary borders beyond the image it occupies today as the means of solving specific tasks in closed industrial spaces with narrow prerogatives. One observes already the encroachment of a purely mathematical system of learning, of machinic learning opening the boarders of the politics of computation as companies like Meta use machine learning software to manage a constellation of apps that regulate a plethora of social interactions.

\(^{136}\) Crisan (2021) “Mathematics” from *What Should Schools Teach?: Disciplines, subjects and the pursuit of truth*. pp. 236

\(^{137}\) Ibid. pp. 237

\(^{138}\) “Mathematic (n.).” n.d., Online Etymology Dictionary
The fulcrum point in the Greeks, or the retroactively perceived turning point between practical mathematics and speculative mathematics simultaneously hid a political gesture; it is the use of mathematical organization to ground politics—an early political science. Ekin Erkan, in a paper comparing François Laruelle and Bernard Stiegler, writes that the ‘philosophical decision’ is that event “which ‘is determinant of the Real’ and, consequently, ‘hallucinates’ material-idealistic instantiations of the Real.” Erkan, quoting from Laruelle, posits that “philosophy symptomatically reduces the Real to an object that stands outside a subject,” as the philosophical decision determines what is determinant of the Real. The philosophical decision makes itself the conduit and image of the Real, it posits a representational/correlational interface that separates the human from the object. This problem of dualism (transcendental philosophy, Kantian correlationism) is Laruelle’s charge against philosophers who must employ the techné of their philosophy to bring others into recognizing the reality of this techné, into making the techné an episteme. In Plato, the form of the Good is invisible yet self-sufficient to motivate action and govern future societies because it is proven to be self-sufficient through Socratic negation and the demonstration of mathematical correctness. Hence Plato is seen as one of the first to speculate future worlds/utopianism via the tools of philosophical criticism (Socratic method; theory of forms). In such a case, let us investigate the latter, the medium that bridges the fallibility of human society to the society of reason governed by philosopher kings in the Republic. Laruelle in Intellectuals and Power (2014) reads Nietzsche’s theory of power against the philosopher-figure originating in Greece:

A force can only encroach on another force in order to dominate it. This is an abuse of power over knowledge or knowledge as an abuse of power – all Foucault’s orchestration. But it’s al-
ready very visible in its Greek origins: philosophical transcendence contains something like hubris, something excessive; this is that gesture of overcoming that still lives in the intellectuals who intervene in public debates and try to transcend those debates.\textsuperscript{141}

Here, intellectuals who “intervene in public debates and try to transcend those debates” are the Socratics (and later Platonists) who attempt to transcend perspectival multiplicity through the mathematical language-game of logos. Plato’s attempt to mitigate Heraclitan and Protagorean flux/epistemological multiplicity through Pythagorean geometry is emblematic of this Greek invention of logical ontology. Moreover, Pythagoras’ mathematical religiosity is resolved in Plato through the assimilation of the philosophy of one-ness displayed in Parmenides. It is this point where Plato pushes mathematics into logos, into a meta-organizing machine that automates contingent experiences. This is accomplished through the noble lie, the conception, or the non-conception of the form of the Good through the promise of logos. Machine learning technology, then, is an evolution of an attempt to objectify (smoothing out perspectival contingency) complex analog spatial-temporal relations by relying on a self-instructing inferential model to cluster or organize all patterns of interaction. The logos’ unification with mathematical speculation married with theories of utopian governing may be viewed as the first political uses of mathematics, as well as the first mathematical uses of politics.

Plato enacts Laruelle’s philosophical decision by leaping towards the answers and totalizing this speculation into political action (the move from Parmenides to Republic), by speculating transcendental forms in mathematical philosophy, by making the medium of logos and dialectic its own teleological end (i.e., logos infers the Good, the Good justifies logos). To be clear, mathematics is posited as in the divided line, but it is the last point which Plato has words for; the Good always remains a secret unnamed end. Plato’s political gesture is to affirm this interface as

\textsuperscript{141} Laruelle (2014) Intellectuals and Power. pp. 14
the general medium of practical mathematics and as proof of a door towards the Good. This paradoxical gesture reveals itself in the middle of *Republic* (360 BC) with the introduction of the noble lie\textsuperscript{142}.

The noble lie is equally the conception of the form of the Good as well as a promise of the *logos* to guide others towards the social Good. What is the logos, for Plato? It is the promise of logocentric thought to be obtained through dialectical questioning. It is important to note that in the same passage, Plato records Socrates delegating poetry and prose to the lower, imitative space of mythology, of mimesis, clarified through the divided line analogy\textsuperscript{143}. Yet his presentation of the logos is undeniably poetic because it relies on the noble lie to garner social agreement to infer the Good (understanding) through its most proximate tool: mathematics (i.e., concepts). Immediately after elucidating the noble lie, Plato provides an account of the soul as the *medium* of recollection, of the Good, and then prescribes a system of healthy society (the community of souls in harmony with the Good) in Books IV-VI. The logos is used to govern through recollection a lack of true knowledge, by dismissing everything before Platonic dualism as, at best, concepts and at worst, as myth. Plato relies on the medium of the dialectic to ground knowledge and representation, between the empirical contingency of Protagoras/Heraclitus and the intelligibly unifying oneness of Parmenides—between contingency and necessity. The concept of mediation is one such that both implies unity and division seesawed by the discretion of an external mediator.

Plato’s divided line attempts to ground logos and dialect as such a medium that ushers the subject of contingent experience into universal praxis. The logos, the mediating interface between animality and the Forms, is Plato’s mental software update, so to speak, that draws a line

\textsuperscript{142} Plato. *The Republic*. Book III 414e–15c

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. pp. (509d–511e)
towards the noble Good. It is for Plato a meta language game that interfaces healthy movement towards direct knowledge. Plato’s political intentions are nursed in this gesture as it then simultaneously provides his own class credence by outlining a system of governance lead by *philosopher kings* in the ideal Republic. Here, Laruelle’s concept of the “philosophical decision” is committed by Plato to render a political imperative for the philosopher figure.

Mathematics can only be presented through the political concept of the noble lie because the form of the Good is something one *does not wholly know yet* but whose existence is known and will be socially obtained with the tools of dialectics. Plato’s famous proof in *Meno* is presented when Socrates calls on a slave to demonstrate geometry. However, one might ask if it would be possible for the slave to demonstrate to Socrates the validity of geometry to really drill home the point of the soul as recollecting true knowledge. This scenario is not entertained in *Meno*, as the slave boy does not have the instructional language, the mediums or rhetorical interface of truth to draw out these internal truths. Yet Plato takes this as a validation of the possibility for true and social universal knowledge via the interface of geometry precisely because it was recollected through Socratic midwifery in subjects who do not have the linguistic tools to access geometry—this justifies the pedagogical system that inaugurates the practice of intellectual nurturing between aristocrats and the masses.

Erkan writes that “philosophy is aligned with both ‘fictionalization’ and fractured synthesis, as it cannot adequately conceptualize the univocity of the superposition of the Real without dividing it along terms of intelligibility - Identity and Difference”\(^{146}\). Only the philosopher kings can lord the keys to the proposed meta-language-game (dialectic, logos) that supervise minor interfaces towards the ideal state. The slave boy, through the persuasion of his owners, has no

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\(^{144}\) Plato, *The Republic*. Book VI 484a-502c

\(^{145}\) Plato (380) *Meno*. 84a-86e

choice but to perform the mathematical task, the example proving math intrinsically sheaths the social organizational structure Plato lives in and emboldens through his metaphysics. Plato takes this as proof of validating his project, wherein geometry is one such higher-order conceptual medium that vessels the proofs needed to justify political power. This instrumentalization of other bodies to act as a conduit for the language-game of logos will culminate at the end of Part 1 by applying the metaphor to the creation of computational machines to perform mathematics that organize human interaction.

Plato’s insertion, the noble lie, is the promise of the logos, the promise that it can envision and ground an episteme of a future *kallipolis*. The origins of speculative mathematics (a science not yet a science) is born out of a marriage between mathematics and social organization (Neoplatonism). The creation of platonic epistemology (i.e., a theory of knowledge based on metaphysics) can only work if the medium provides direct access to natural processes. Plato achieves this by placing the logocentric interface of his philosophy in, borrowing a phrase from Giorgio Agamben, a ‘state of exception’ from other mimetic language games. Through the marriage of math and ethics, the union of metaphysics and social praxis, Plato also ensured a state that society ought to desire, one based on perfect auto-management through formal rationality. This yearning for mathematical direct access to knowledge is demonstrated by the Socratic method and speculated through Plato and later codified into an early science of logic by Aristotle. Plato foreshadows monotheistic thought by outlining a systematized metaphysics of dualism between animality and a mysterious Good (ethics based on logos, later god, later moral reason). He does this not by naming the form of the Good, but by puppeteering Socrates to draw out the lack of a universal, immutable, and eternal account of this Good through negative questioning.

\[147\] Agamben (2005) *State of Exception*.
through the trumping of one question in lieu of an invisible answer using the medium of dialectic exchange.

To sum up, this interlude on Plato is meant to demonstrate the digital interfaces present in the past, particularly in the Greeks. A type of algorithmic politics that has portended the creation of computer science through the marriage between code and hardware engineering. This challenges the notion of the analog and digital or ancient and modern divide, as there were forms of digitality and algorithmic thought influencing social relations even in the Greek period. It is only now that we have machinic bodies that perform function-driven tasks, but the ability of meta-information organizing tools to politically influence urban planning and sexual supervision (i.e., Plato’s view of the guardians) were long present in Plato before their material instantiation today in mainstream capitalist culture. Galloway, in his book on Laruelle, writes:

The digital means the one dividing in two. The heart of the digital lies in metaphysics and its adjacent philosophical systems, most important dialectics. The digital arrives in Western philosophy with Socrates and Plato, for this is the time when dialectical metaphysics experiences its most complete original expression148.

The metaphysics of dualism in its various disguises after Plato is always the mediating division of the Parmenidian One into binaries. Such is the point in which algorithmic meta-management tools inspired after the logos (logic, mathematics, science, applied science, computation) become self-justifying ends to promote a specific mode of social organization (directed at the tool’s maximal reproduction and the preservation of the tool’s wielder). However, as Michael Silk explains using interwoven quotes from Nietzsche Contra Wagner (1889):

Socrates understood that the whole world had need of him? his expedient, his cure, his personal knack of self preservation ‘The instincts want to play the tyrant; we must invent an anti-tyrant

that is stronger’. The chosen ‘anti-tyrant’ is rational thought itself, which is now "taken to be a saviour," such that all other mental activity must defer to it, and yet "the fanaticism with which the whole of Greek cogitation applies itself to rationality betrays a state of emergency: there was danger, there was only one choice: either perish or be absurdly rational’ And standing back, now, from this Socratic particular, Nietzsche seeks to expose the rationalist-moralist universal.\textsuperscript{149}

In making the interface of the logos a stable identity/metaphysic, this collapses all difference into a fascistic set that attempts to automate the supervision of social interactions. Plato has inaugurated this wave in Western thought by mistaking human identity with rationality and rationality as the preferred endpoint of humanity. In Galloway’s translation of \textit{The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication} (2010), Laruelle writes:

> It is not a question of introducing the notion of the secret into philosophy, but rather to introduce philosophy to the secret and to the hermetic experience of truth, and in so doing to overturn the presuppositions, the ends, the style, and the operations of philosophy: to let the philosophers in on the secret.\textsuperscript{150}

The decadence that affirmed platonic hubris is positing the logos, or the interface of rationality as part of a larger intellectual project that oversees all other social interfaces (i.e., a \textit{philosophy}). By first separating the media-form (logos, dialectic) as a conduit between subjective experience and objective knowledge or subjective finitude and objective immortality. The lie remains noble in as much as the media-form of logos is successfully affirmed and demonstrated, which is framed by the political position of teachers and learners, between state and the subject. Yet this nobility is also a lie because it is the philosopher who introduces this media-form, only naturalizing it after the fact by demonstrating its efficiency and using this logical proof to then \textit{monopolize} other forms of interfacial communication across cognitive and bodily planes. Politics, art, ethics, biol-

\textsuperscript{149} Silk (2004) \textit{Nietzsche, Decedence and the Greeks}. pp. 597
\textsuperscript{150} Laruelle (2020) \textit{The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication}
ogy all now fall under the lordship of philosophy (the invisible meta-thought). This is also salient if one reads history backwards, as the advancement of grounding Plato as the point in which the premodern became modern thought is only possible through the colonial spread of Alexander the Great who was taught by Plato’s student, Aristotle.

Immanuel Kant repeats this problem of philosophical dualism and hence commits to the representationalism/correlationism interfacial model inaugurated by Plato through the former’s conception of the *synthetic-apriori*. The means by which the subject accesses the object is not logos for Kant, but moral imperatives conducted through reason and observing empirical experiences and interfacing these findings through universalized ethical/logical powers of Human judgement. Kant is perhaps read today as saving philosophy against the mechanical and deterministic outlook of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Isaac Newton and is heralded for devising a system that accounts for human subjectivity, what is felt as ethical freedom, through practical reason by demarcating the limits of reason through the noumena/phenomena distinction. But Kant here replaces the logos with another language game: the interface of the mind and reason. He does so to “save philosophy” or provide a way towards human freedom, towards a “new” ethics to ultimately position society towards the cosmopolitan/kingdom of ends. However, Kant’s vocational self-preservation reveals itself in the middle of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). The third chapter of the second section of the *CPR “Architectonic of Pure Reason”*\(^\text{151}\) elucidates the vocation of the philosopher. Kant writes that:

> From this point of view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason … The mathematician, the naturalist, the logician are only artists of reason, however eminent the former may be in rational

\(^{151}\) Kant (1781) *Critique of Pure Reason*. pp. 691-701
cognitions and however much progress the latter may have made in philosophical cognition. There is still a teacher in the ideal, who controls all of these and uses them as tools to advance the essential ends of human reason. Him alone we must call the philosopher.\textsuperscript{152}

The philosopher’s position is salvaged and now tasked with the job of conduiting the medium of transcendent ideals (universal) like freedom through the interface of synthetic-apriori judgements that unify phenomenological experiences with objective ethical judgements. What is this tool? It is again the invisible tool of philosophizing and disciplinary organization, of producing surplus thought with moral imperatives towards freedom and so on. Kant democratizes human freedom for all rational minds, but also retains the philosopher’s role as the shepherd of human freedom because it is the philosopher who governs the artists (scientists included) and sets the boundaries for their free speculation in line with the goal towards the kingdom of ends. The philosopher is the meta-interface that unifies synthetic engagement through science and art with the moral imperatives. As Nietzsche writes of Kant’s discovery: “Kant asked himself: how are synthetic judgements \textit{a priori} possible? – and what, really, did he answer? \textit{By means of a faculty}”\textsuperscript{153} demonstrating that the wordplay of \textit{faculty} imminently lends itself to justifying philosophy’ vocational legitimacy. This thesis does not try to develop a form therapy in which people may reconnect with Being from the distractions of modern ratio-technological tools as classical phenomenology frequently advises with little political clarity. I argue that this kind of criticism inevitably leads to philosophizing, to further speculative philosophizing that does not escape the Cartesian dualism it sets out to critique. Galloway writes of Laruelle’s view of philosophizing:

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid. pp. 694-695
\textsuperscript{153} Nietzsche (2003) \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, “On the Prejudices of Philosophers”. pp. 41
The philosophical decision refers to the decision, made willingly or unwillingly, Laruelle argues, by all philosophy and all philosophers, to reflect on any-thing whatsoever. Likewise the principle of sufficient philosophy refers to the privilege of doing such a thing, the privilege to relate to anything whatsoever. With the swagger of its privilege, philosophy brazenly assumes that there can be a philosophy of being, a philosophy of art, a philosophy of sport, a philosophy of everything under the sun. 154

The politicians of intelligence (philosophers) seek to capture this imminently non-intellectual ontological base of the real by identifying it in themselves or in others through the weaponizing of the human and non-human dualism inaugurated by philosophy. Machine learning in this instance is the total democratization of this philosophical medium, wherein the attribution of intelligence is happening on the universal and atomic level as people objectify themselves through adopting the logic of this digital historicity by engaging in the democratization of information curated through machine learning. Notice here the potential for machine learning driven programs like ChatGPT to enable everyone to become programmers.

Hence it is not philosophy that democratizes itself, but rather capitalism that democratizes philosophy. The trickle-down logic of philosophy and pedagogy is fantastical, as Laruelle points out but does not embody. The fantasy is believing that those at the top (i.e., the wise, the learned, academics) will master the even wiser, learned, English, French and German academics (as it is in critical theory today) and dispense this knowledge en mass to eventually, just maybe, give power to the poor, racialized, gendered, queer, etc. Or have things become so pointless that such a delusion is not even entertained? Is the homophilic clustering and neighbor-hooding of philosophy and the written word just another means of finding likeminded smart individuals who share a similar burden that highly educated folks share—a burden that is not complex or the ru-

minations of private genius, but rather just plain unintelligible to others outside of their echo chambers? Is this just another politically over-legitimized (and over-funded) medium for friendships, and by way of homophilic logic, a means to otherizing those outside of the academic space? How then is one supposed to break from the temporal hypnosis within an analog space that is inherently composed of difference and intellectual hostility, with each academic defending a philosophy of their own research?

How is this in no way different from swiping through TikTok? Swiping through books merely as a means of knowledge hoarding, of content hoarding, and doing exactly what with this accumulation? Adding to the structure of knowledge that has historically oppressed, misrepresented and killed “non-legitimate” forms of thoughtful expression? Functional mathematics and written language are both culprits of the waking death felt by those in the periphery of these monopolizing language protocols.

Ray Brassier in summing up Laruelle’s concept of “non-philosophy” writes in Axiomatic Hersey (2003):

Where philosophical revolution involves a reformation of philosophy for the ultimate benefit of philosophy itself – and a philosophical stake in what philosophy should be doing – heresy involves a use of philosophy in the absence of any philosophically vested interest in providing a normative definition of philosophy”155

Here is an argument about the monopolizing tendencies in philosophy to surveil thought and totalize this tendency into the immanence. In the same breath, Plato grounded his theory in a governmental policy (by way of noble lie).

This thesis demonstrates some problems in both Deleuzian influenced accelerationist thought (i.e., Nick Land, Nick Dyer-Witheford et. al.,) but also Ray Brassier’s Laruellian theory

of non-human/non-philosophical thought. Seeing in both the traps of philosophy recursively treating its history as the history of the rest of the world—and even in its critical presentation (i.e., Brassier, Laruelle) recognizing an impulse towards reviving the ghosts of philosophy to finally kill philosophy. Laruelle is stuck inbetween past and future means of communication, remaining disciplinarily radical (i.e., critique of standard philosophy), but also textually conservative in presenting his radicalism—he speaks of dancing but does not dance. Will his radicality remain textual in the genre-specific language games of European thought? Is this really that radical? Who is he convincing here? Other English/French/German philosophers? The German and French traditions have run out of steam, the entirety of the West has crippled itself with its chief production: the word. Here the hypnotizing trance of minor reformations in thought remain sterile because they do not speak to the world in a language that the global world understands. If Laruelle introduces democracy into thought\(^{156}\), it is in the image of Greco-Roman concept of republicanism and representationalism as the etymology of democracy suggests. The criticism still relies on the linguistic algorithms that are culturally located, radical in European philosophy, but wholly conservative in global cultural. How is it possible to escape the temporal hypnotism and formulate radical action from this way of thinking which claims to thwart Platonic thought-policing, and eventual governmental policing, but remains immanently self-referential to this regional critique of philosophy, seeing in philosophy (Plato to Kant to Marx to Heidegger) and the philosophies of difference (Nietzsche, Derrida, and Deleuze) the authoritarian figures of the canon, the great cultural synthesizes of the pain and toil of those who feel misplaced by the eyes of power and its speculative medium; the written language and its bureaucratic housekeepers maintaining language’s non-complicit status? From the eyes of the stranger, the stranger to philoso-

\(^{156}\) Maoilearca (2015) *All Thoughts Are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy*, pp. 3
Laruelle (2013) *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, pp. 48
phy, it does not matter because the stranger does not differentiate the philosopher as doing radical philosophy or fascistic polemics, but rather sees both kinds of writers addicted to the same medium, the same community and subset.

If it were not for Laruelle’s early associations with the cluster of influential French celebrities like Althusser, Foucault and Deleuze, would the poetics of his thought be platformed with such (minor as it is) influence over presenting a future model of praxis? Here the colonial aspects of the history of philosophy monopolize its own resistance chiefly in the work of Laruelle. In reading this, could it be assumed that my criticism performs the non-philosophy, by destabilizing the totalitarian tendencies of philosophy by defacing the founder/owner of non-philosophy, veiled in Laruelle’s canonization of philosophy? NO! Because to say that this is non-philosophy is to grant authority to my thought(s) through his, and the algorithmic institution of thought will always champion the more legitimate authority who has associated with celebrities of 20th century philosophy and chairs the intuitions of their making. Ultimately the recognition task of philosophy of writing is just as algorithmic as anything else, it does not see individual thought, but bodies yet-to-be filled with legitimate genealogies and language families that are hegemonically validated. The “legitimated authority” arises out of the organizational medium of thought, in the French philosopher’s (and French philosophies) power to monopolize the language of resistance against the totalization of European philosophy into a system (non-system?!), but such a system as a corporeal essence, it is contained in a book, in a repository, in a country, in a continent which envelope the hypnotizing protocol of praxis against the forces of capital seen in the contemporary industrial interest in developing automated languages.

Laruelle reader Ray Brassier in *Nihil Unbound* (2007) attempts reformations within philosophy by reconciling analytic philosophy and critical theory to outdo the correlation problem
inaugurated by Kant’s dualistic separation of the thing-in-itself and the noumena\textsuperscript{157}, a symptom of the representational/real divide inaugurated by standard philosophy. I inject the previous discussion on linguistic technology opened by Stiegler and Derrida, observing in Laruelle’s work the technologies of algorithmic thought affirmed rather than radicalized. As Laruelle argues of Marx:

He did not understand it as a specification of more universal axioms, the theoretical sense of which has not been laid out. He only discovered it inside, not only of this or that philosophy (this is the materialist break), but inside the primacy of philosophy, which subsists within the break. Non-Marxism only grasps the ‘principle’ of a universal theory, the axioms and theorems of which can later be specified in the restricted conditions of the thought-world.\textsuperscript{158}

Certainly, the same could be said of Laruelle, who envisions the historical thought of the non-philosophy within his own rigid homophily, replicating the problems of immanent criticism and dialectical materialism in Marx.

Cutting way from the lustre of Brassier’s technical writing, can one ask if this is even original? Has Lenin not already haphazardly performed this critique in his criticism of Berkeley

\textsuperscript{157} Brassier (2007) \textit{Nihil Unbound} \\
Brassier concludes: “In becoming equal to it, philosophy achieves a binding of extinction, through which the will to know is finally rendered commensurate with the in-itself. This binding coincides with the objectification of thinking understood as the adequation without correspondence between the objective reality of extinction and the subjective knowledge of the trauma to which it gives rise. It is this adequation that constitutes the truth of extinction. But to acknowledge this truth, the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction.” pp. 239

This conclusion is supported by Brassier’s reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s \textit{After Finitude}:

“For correlationism secures the transcendental divide between the real and the ideal only at the cost of turning being into the correlate of thought.” pp. 94

\textsuperscript{158} Laruelle (2000) Introduction to Non-Marxism. pp. 31
in *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism*? This is not a thesis arguing for Leninism, but if non-philosophy is real, then traditionally non-philosophers (demarcated as fascists and reactionaries by the ire of academics) must be taken seriously as *philosophizing* in the immanent plane of influence. As Althusser writes of Lenin’s view that “philosophy represents the class struggle,” I suggest that through this understanding, one must look at the mechanisms of this representation, of the linguistic apparatuses that enable this representation—how does critical philosophy “represent” this class struggle, and more importantly which tools enable this representational/real divide? Even more so, are the uses of phrases like “aboriginal thought,” “ancestry” to posit Brassier’s theory of noumenal speculation not rooted in the practices of many Ojibwe and Anishinaabe cultures colonial appropriation of both their land but also their power of expression? And the few who do express this colonial other-ness from the outside of standard philosophical genealogies are bound by the politics of representationalism, wherein one person is made to represent their people’s struggle via institutional tokenism enabled through the mass-printing of literature (a means of making phenomology into a universal via the technics of reading, comprehending and writing). Moreover these representatives or scholars must be made instrumentalized or legible to institutional powers and arranged within the genealogical continuity of western philosophers, as Brassier does, to envision a coherent practice that may be applicable to the hegemons of thought and capital. In so doing, Brassier completely uproots the form of this prac-

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159 Lenin (2010) *Collected Works of Vladimir Lenin Vol 14*: Lenin writes through reading Engels: “In the first place, it is not true that Engels ‘is producing a refutation of the thing-in-itself’. Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the Kantian ungraspable (or unknowable) thing-in-itself.” pp. 102

160 Althusser (1971) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. pp. 65

161 Brassier (2007) *Nihil Unbound.* Brassier borrows “ancestry” from his reading of Quentin Meillassoux (pp. 58); “aboriginal death” (238) Brassier is of course using these terms to refer to philosophical concepts different from the indigenous use, but deconstructing his language and intentional/non-intentional slips provides a window into the uncited inspirations of the work which penetrate the veil of his linguistic style that so often remains obfuscated through the performance of philosophical rigour.
tice from its materiality in order to fit the philosophical model, in order to represent a way out of philosophical humanism as a more inclusive or common reaction to nihilism (i.e., existential scientism). Natural sciences through Brassier and Meillassoux are now thought to be doing an alchemic, ancestral science \(^{162}\) which unveil traces of the pre-human and speculate the human’s ephemeral residence in the cosmos. But this is a reformation of the practice of science, a more existential understanding of science that negates Heidegger’s anti-scientism\(^ {163}\), it perhaps inaugurates science back into philosophy but at the same time ignores the institutional barriers to practicing valid science and the historical one-sideness of scientists. It is not so much about providing credit to indigenous thought or Lenin but recognizing that in each instance, a failure to change the mode of knowledge production is inaugurated when one mode of knowledge production takes the content of another mode of knowledge production but leaves out the differences in means or material process by which this knowledge is arrived towards—it takes the symbolic meaning of ancestry but refrains from seeing its practice as ritualistic/mythic/ephemeral. In so doing, Brassier’s criticism challenges standard-philosophy by historicizing thought as ephemeral in the cosmos but it still endorses a standard-science (i.e., enlightenment science), that utilizes the same means of conducting alchemic speculation through the use of mathematical and written speculation. Could one take Brassier’s and Laruelle’s idea of a non-standard philosophy, turning towards the non-anthropocentric speculative powers of science, to then challenge standard-science, non-standard means of ancestral and post-human speculation? Certainly this would require challenging the givenness of mathematics and the written form in physics, chemistry, biology to infer about the world. Could science be then a form of dance, an *artistic experimentation* that is not so gatekept by its own history of knowledge and class divisions? A Marxist science

\(^{162}\) Brassier (2012) *Nihil Unbound.*
Brassier writes: “Natural science produces ancestral statements” pp. 49

\(^{163}\) Ibid., pp. 50
that does not treat its own mode of production as an eternal way of learning about the non-anthropocentric?

Who is Brassier speaking to here, who is he trying to convince, and to what use is his philosophy/non-philosophy for practice other than auto legitimizing that speculative materialism has value? More importantly, who is he speaking in the place of? Again, this is not a psychoanalytical take on Brassier the author, but rather Brassiere’s engagement with philosophical thought ultimately controls and segregates what is read and who is spoken to. Brassier is attempting to convince the philosophers to get back on board with natural sciences and convince natural scientists that they are indeed philosophizing—all of which does not speak to unintelligent ego of the masses who are alienated by both standard-science and standard-philosophy, but really to the thought leaders of both philosophy and science.

In the same way YouTube videos are curated around certain power structures\textsuperscript{164}, one must ask how the mechanisms of publishing and academic content curation placed Laruelle’s content into the purview of the researcher attempting to invent futures. In the logic of content curational AI which power mainstream search engines like Google and YouTube: if you like Nietzsche, Derrida and Deleuze, then you will also like Alain Badiou, Laruelle and so on.

It seems that Laruelle is attempting a breakaway from Marxism but stumbles in inventing a means of expression that does not cannibalize non-legitimate thought. Yet, all that is introduced is surplus language, more mystical terms like the entrancing “non” or “decision-at-the-last instance” (inspired from Marx and Althusser) which would require a whole doctorate in philosophy to semantically grasp to the thinker’s satisfaction. Is one able to even see outside of the algorithmic temporality of philosophy’s past, of the academic institution that that this discipline birthed, housed and spoiled? Would it be possible to perform this resistance when the content of

\textsuperscript{164} Noble (2018) \textit{Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines Reinforce Racism}
Laruelle’s philosophy validates itself as radical, but it uses conservative tools of resistance (i.e., academic publishing, books, the word) that ultimately thwart his influence in the culture at-large? Laruelle is perhaps the last French philosopher to “be in on the secret” without himself relinquishing the tendency to philosophize the private language of his regionally localized thinking and protecting this thought into the world arguing that non-philosophy, as having already been performed outside of the space of philosophy. It might be true that it is performed in this way, but can Laruelle himself even recognize these extra-linguistic performances? He is poorly read in such extra-philosophical mediums.

Laruelle is stuck believing that the future means of communication will remain disciplinarily radical (i.e., immanent critiques of philosophy), yet he remains algorithmically contained when presenting his radicalism—he speaks of dancing but does not dance. Will his radicality remain textual in the genre-specific language games of European thought. Is this really that radical? Who is he convincing here? Other English/French/German philosophers? Through which tool does Laruellism or non-philosophy adherents source this non-philosophy but through the algorithmically curated language, itself informed by specific ethno-class-gender histories. And in the shadow of his language’s chains of signific are those language(s) or ways of being that are not included. Enacting a politics of inclusion itself through the speculative gaze of writing also disregards modes of philosophizing. To enact a Larueillian refrain from philosophizing is yes, to denounce of the mythic concepts of universalizable humanism, of but also to refrain from seeking in writing the perfect form of writing and seeing in philosophy an imperfect role in thinking. Homophilic organization will always couple the philosopher with the philosopher, cloning what could have been a non-philosopher to enlarge the hoarding of philosophical information and create through this self-sufficient means of inscription, what is referred to in a too exclusive way as
“thinking”. To seek new forms of philosophizing/thinking is not to develop new content within a language but see in what is seemingly a universal (i.e., writing and mathematics) modes of expression a particular moment in evolution and space in expression.

If Laruelle introduces democracy into thought\textsuperscript{165}, it is in the image of Greco-Roman concept of republicanism and representationalism as the etymology of democracy suggests. Yet this two-dimensional separation between identity and representation, between the real and the image philosophy provides of the real, is exactly what Laruelle resists. Can Laruelle’s non-philosophy transcend this problem without appealing to the same words that furnish his intellectual genealogical family, an algorithmic way of thought organization that does not universalize? Probably not, and the answer although hinted at by Laruelle may not be possible for him. Alexander Galloway in an essay entitled “Laruelle, Anti-Capitalist” writes:

Unlike post-structuralists, Laruelle does not acknowledge a system of mutual co-construction between self and other. Instead, he develops an ontological platform that, while leaving room for certain kinds of causality and relation, radically denies exchange in any form whatsoever.\textsuperscript{166}

Non-philosophy might be exercised in a way totally unfamiliar to Laruelle and even his intellectual inspirations. The denial of exchange, whereby no ontology is permitted to universalize the ‘common’ via philosophising, including post-structural philosophising of difference, ultimately indicates different modes of praxis for everyone. Some may need to enact the philosophical refrain whilst others are to be embolden by the lack, by affirming their particularity without ap-

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\textsuperscript{165} Maoilearca (2015) *All Thoughts are Equal: Laruelle and Non-Human Philosophy*

“Non-philosophy aspires to bring democracy into thought, because what it says is that philosophy—the discipline that posits itself exclusively as the power to think at the highest level—does not have a monopoly on thinking” pp. 3

\textsuperscript{166} Galloway (2012) “Laruelle, Anti-Capitalist” in *Laruelle and Non-Philosophy*. pp. 194
pealing to a universal philosophical attempt. Yet this affirmation of particularity, of the ego cannot be exercised through language because the medium of the written theory is birthed in the space of the commons, the text that speaks from the particular and represents the universal. Here the mechanisms of representation is a mirror of the mechanisms of recognition, whereby the writer seeks to represent for a reader who may be seen in recognition of the represented perspective. The non-philosopher may see in standard philosophy algorithmic tendencies, seeing in the machine of perfect, rational writing the same algorithmic curation as the ones found in technology like YouTube search algorithms. The philosopher-writer takes this task as a noble profession but in a way colonizes even the spaces of resistance. Even in writing of difference and perspectival alterity, as the post-structuralist try, the philosopher-writer puts themselves as representations of their community, at once affirming their particular community but always misrepresenting, misrecognizing the amorphous intersectionality of each member of that community.

Laruelle’s denunciation of semantic representationalism following Deleuze and Guattari’s monist project disregards the materially of its language itself in the business of word-making and word-dispensing. The desire to get it right with this medium, to overcome philosophies of difference by denouncing them a philosophy, a philosophy that recognizes difference always ends up creating more philosophy, through one’s own medium does not recognize the hypnotic effects of the medium and its lure towards philosophy. In such a case, hypnosis exists at the point in which one believes that difference can be captured through philosophy (Laruelle’s criticism) but to reorient Laruelle’s thought to analyze history of materiality, standard philosophy lives in the written form of Eurocentric genealogy and cannot see outside itself through its own tools. When the stranger to philosophy writes they enter a hypnotic time, a time separated from the real but of the historicized real or the philosophical concept of life, more critically looked
upon it reveals itself to be *specific* time, and one’s thinking is molded into the interface of this specific trajectory of way of future-determining via the genealogical past (the citation of other authors) which remains hegemonically skewed towards certain nationalities, races, genders, and political orientation by the business of academia.

Here, non-philosophy’s claims to democracy yet still relies on the intuitional forces of state and capital powers that discipline children into believing in the hierarchy of language games (i.e., mathematics, philosophy, literature) exists and certain major critiques towards. In the fascistic realm, algorithmic computer science and techno-industrial production, but in the philosophical realm, literature which has its own form of techno-industrial production. Non-philosophy cannot be expressed within the comforting faculties of the school setting but seek to disrupt this medium of thought-construction. A ceasing of the means of production of thought may require that the mode of production changes, the medium through which thought is validated will not remain the same after non-philosophers come into the picture.

Is this a call for irrationality or the end of thought? Perhaps for some, as by Laruelle’s own views of a non-philosophy of democratic non-exchangeability must posit that people’s praxis will not be the same, and in many ways the enacting of this praxis will come together as an imperfect mess, and for some Laruelle’s non-philosophy will mean a strategic philosophical silence, whereas others who have been regulated to the non-intellectual class of artists or brutes will be not only be elevated to the podium of thought but also destroying the mechanisms that mediate and separate the podium and the chair, the stage and the audience, the speaker and their representative masses.

Laruelle criticism still relies on the linguistic algorithms that are culturally located, radical within post-20th century continental philosophy, but wholly a clone of the history it seeks to
overcome through the algorithmic processing of the same data, the same ‘findings’ in different assemblages. To the stranger of philosophy, Laruelle is writing books they will not read. The people will refuse Laruelle on the basis of his chosen medium, a medium that is the pinnacle of intellectual elitism and the favorite tool of the bourgeois in separating the smart from the stupid, the thinking from the non-thinking.

How is it possible to escape the temporal hypnotism, in formulating radical action from this thought that claims to thwart Platonic thought-policing, and eventual governmental policing, carrying all the way to Marx\textsuperscript{167} for Laruelle, but remains immanently self-referential to this regional critique of philosophy, seeing in philosophy (Plato to Kant to Marx to Heidegger) and the philosophies of difference (Nietzsche, Derrida, and Deleuze) the authoritarian figures of the canon, the great cultural synthesizes of the pain and toil of those who feel misplaced by the eyes of power and its speculative medium, academia? The politics of citation are not trivial here, as such a politics imply the algorithmic organization of ones thinking, and more importantly the capacity to imagine future-praxis and to do away with the algorithmically self-referential clones of standard philosophy. The politics of citations are not trivial here, as such a politics imply the algorithmic organization of their intellectual neighborhood, and more importantly their capacity to imagine future-praxis and to do away with the algorithmic silo all together.

Laruelle might be correct in criticizing the immanent critique found in Marxism, but his own way out remains immanent to the local regionality of the former’s own comeuppance, of the history of western thought. Similarly, his chief reader, Ray Brassier’s \textit{Nihil Unbound} attempts

\textsuperscript{167} Laruelle (2015) \textit{Introduction to Non-Marxism}. Laruelle writes: “Even if philosophy is only one of Marxism's "aspects," it is only repressed by materialism. It is philosophy not only through its Hegelian references, the most apparent, but much more profoundly through its repressed Platonic roots, and remembered only recently-we will return to this issue” pp. 31 “The philosophical history of Marxism is that of a war of appropriation, of idealist reconquest, while its real history is that of its failure, its violence and what is undoubtedly joined with it, its theoretical incompleteness that motivates philosophical desire.” pp. 34
minor reformations within philosophy by reconciling analytic philosophy (i.e., Sellers, Churchlands, etc.) and critical theory to outdo the correlation problem inaugurated by Kant’s dualistic separation of the phenomenal and the noumenon\(^{168}\). Cutting way from the lustre of Brassier’s technical writing, can one ask if this is even original? Has Lenin not already haphazardly performed this critique in his criticism of Berkeley in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*\(^{169}\)? This is not a thesis arguing for Leninism, but if non-philosophy is real, then traditionally non-philosophers (demarcated as fascists and reactionaries by the ire of academics) must be taken seriously as *philosophizing* in the immanent plane of influence. Similar to how Althusser writes of Lenin’s view that “philosophy *represents* the class struggle,”\(^{170}\) I suggest that through this understanding, one must look at the mechanisms of this representation, of the linguistic apparatuses that enable this representation—how does critical philosophy “represent” this class struggle, with which tools? Even more so, are the uses of phrases like “aboriginal thought,” “ancestry”\(^{171}\) to posit Brassier’s theory of noumenal speculation not rooted in the practices of many indigenous

\(^{168}\) Brassier (2007) *Nihil Unbound*

Brassier concludes: “In becoming equal to it, philosophy achieves a binding of extinction, through which the will to know is finally rendered commensurate with the in-itself. This binding coincides with the objectification of thinking understood as the adequation without correspondence between the objective reality of extinction and the subjective …knowledge of the trauma to which it gives rise. It is this adequation that constitutes the truth of extinction. But to acknowledge this truth, the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction.” pp. 239

This conclusion is supported by his reading of Quentin Meillassoux’s *After Finitude*:

“For correlationism secures the transcendental divide between the real and the ideal only at the cost of turning being into the correlate of thought.” Pp. 94


Lenin writes in reading Engels: “In the first place, it is not true that Engels “is producing a refutation of the thing-in-itself”. Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the Kantian ungraspable (or unknowable) thing-in-itself.” pp. 102

\(^{170}\) Althusser (1971) *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. pp. 65

\(^{171}\) Brassier (2007) *Nihil Unbound*.

...Brassier borrows “ancestry” from his reading of Quentin Meillassoux (pp. 58); “aboriginal death” (238) Brassier is of course using these terms to refer to philosophical concepts different from their indigenous use, but deconstructing his language and intentional/non-intentional slips provides a window into the uncited inspirations of the work which penetrate the veil of his linguistic style that so often remains obfuscated through philosophical rigour.
cultures who do not share the same means of scientific exploration to arrive at ancestral claims through the same marriage between mathematics and written speculation which have been central tools in western science. Brassier writes:

For once we have put science and philosophy on an equal footing before the real it becomes necessary to insist that there is no possible compromise between the claims of correlationism [philosophy] and the ancestral claims of science: if correlationism is true, science’s ancestral claims are false; if the latter are true, correlationism is false.\(^{172}\)

Not to get too Foucauldian here but how is an appeal to an enlightenment science upending the numerous instances of science’s practices in the everyday which the problems of data science as illustrated by Chun and Noble demonstrate are in unison with capital subjugation. Brassier appeals to the history of great scientific discoveries like the Copernican revolution but to look at science through a proletarian lens one might see that in its everyday uses science is not always speculatively enriching but inseparable from political life. One could see science through a Simondonian sense, as an object-practise that does not have moral qualities but is only curtailed by human interaction. To pit science and philosophy against each other as Brassier has done via a dialectic between science and philosophy is to again see this duality as the only means of ancestral speculation and cosmic engagement. A reflexive science which sees both science and philosophy sees not a need for a science of philosophy but a science of the word. As Sylvia Wynter argues:

It is therefore the above circularly reinforcing—seemingly no-way-out-\textit{Catch}-22 situation of our contemporary secular Western and Westernized world system, in its now globally and trans-nationally economically homogenized capitalist neoliberal and corporate financial bourgeoisie ruling class (\textit{homo oeconomicus}) configuration—that we must now all

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\(^{172}\) Brassier (2007) \textit{Nihil Unbound.} pp. 63
confront. While it is precisely such a way out that Aime Cesaire’s proposed hybrid science of the Word (the mythoi), in its simultaneous interaction with nature (the bios, the brain), whose new paradigm not only provides a cognitive opening onto our Western and Westernized bourgeoisie-Darwinian-chartered word/code/descriptive statement, together with its status quo system of learning, truths of solidarity, and overall genre-specific episteme, but at the same time, also powerfully deconstructs that biocentric word’s homo oeconomicus’s claim to the monopoly of humanity.\textsuperscript{173}

Laruelle is attempting a breakaway from Marxism but stumbles in inventing a means of expression that does not cannibalize non-legitimate thought by ignoring the genre-specific interfaces (i.e., writing, continental philosophy) of his regional background. All that is introduced is surplus language, more mystical terms like the entrancing “non” or “decision-at-the-last instance” (refurnished from Althusser and Marx) which would require a whole doctorate in philosophy to semantically grasp to the thinkers satisfaction. Is one able to even see outside of the algorithmic temporality of philosophy’s past, of the academic institution that that this discipline birthed, housed and spoiled? Would it be possible to perform this resistance when the content of Laruelle’s philosophy validates itself as radical, but it uses conservative tools of resistance (i.e., academic publishing, books, the word) that ultimately thwart his influence in the culture at-large?

Laruelle is perhaps the last French philosopher to “be in on the secret”\textsuperscript{174} without himself relinquishing the tendency to philosophize the private language of his regionally localized means of critiquing its own canon and projecting this thought into the world arguing that non-philosophy

\textsuperscript{174} Laruelle (2010) Truth According to Hermes. Theorums and The Secret and Communication pp. 4

Laruelle writes: “It is not a question of introducing the notion of the secret into philosophy, but rather to introduce philosophy to the secret and to the hermetic experience of truth, and in so doing to overturn the presuppositions, the ends, the style, and the operations of philosophy: to let the philosophers in on the secret, to substitute for the hermeneuts and the hermetologists in general a new group whom we shall call the ‘hermeticians,’ that is, finite or ordinary individuals and as such subjects (of) the rigorous science of truth”.
is imminent to the democratization of thinking, but more importantly its means of expressing will be textual. It might be true that it is performed in this way, but can Laruelle himself even recognize these extra-linguistic performances? He is poorly read in such extra-philosophical mediums.

In the same way YouTube videos are curated around certain power structures, one must ask how the mechanisms of publishing, academic content curation placed Laruelle’s content into the purview of the researcher attempting to invent futures. In the logic of content curational AI which power mainstream search engines like Google: if you like Nietzsche, Derrida and Deleuze, then you will also like Badiou, Laruelle and so on. In academic spaces of colonial resistance, for example queer politics, if you like Judith Butler, you will also like Jack Halberstam, José Esteban Munoz and so on. In such a case, the mechanisms of recognized suffering is the task of the humanities today, and in so doing, it clusters and neatly organizers thinkers via the logic of capitalism to serve small roles in the machinic institution that will always favour the thinker with more cultural influence. Such a process is even more harmful to the colonized/gendered/queer than the white middle-class student. To inaugurate the former into this system that provides them with a legitimated voice via institution influence at the same time clusters them and incarcerates them into the space of their supposed identity. Here the political problems of Hegelian psychoanalysis are reverberating in the present state of the humanities and the medium through which this Hegelian psychoanalysis that grounds the politics of identity and recognition, and difference through the academic discourse.

Frequently what is sought are the bodies of the marginalized to fill the colonized/gendered/queer roles in order so that their phenomenological experiences may help the larger project of academic knowledge making and trickling this knowledge down to the culture.

en masse. But through this medium of auto-clustering and homophilic infrastructure, one is regulated through the algorithmic processes of capital (division of labour; the queer thinker, the race thinker, the gender thinker, etc.) and tucked away into a space where they must compete for classroom participation/reader subscribers to secure influence and seek resistive power. Such a politics of representationalism is exploitive because those thinkers are now heralded as representatives for their ilk and must speak in place of their ilk. More importantly, it is exploitive at the moment of expression, at the moment their resistive energies are funneled into the hegemony of written language which does not serve them but rather the institution which makes their thought palatable and revolutionarily benign in a way that the average middle-class reader can digest.

The purpose of this last section was intentionally to straw-man François Laruelle and make him emblematic of the algorithmic hypnosis that is placed at the core of ‘radical thought’. My contention is that non-philosophy is only accessible through extra-philosophical/capitalist materiality of communication to circumvent the panoptic surveillance systems of colonial brutality which are found both in mathematically driven algorithms of the digital present, but subtly enunciated in the space of its criticism. How does one critique the written language with written language? It is not worthwhile. Because this is the case, one must be totally nihilistic about the forms of Human expression. Where Brassier speaks of philosophy as the speculative realization of human extinction, I argue that algorithmic philosophy is the speculative imaging of formal extinction, the extinction of its own project delivered through Platonic dialogue, and in the modern post-printing press epoch, through the various permutation of the word as it is recorded materially. Of the machinic forms that house speculation, of the monopolizing materiality of genre-
specific technologies of expression which reflexively moulds one’s thinking and hypnotize them in the algorithms of thought.
Conclusion

Wendy H.K. Chun writes that “to prevent the AI apocalypse,”¹⁷⁶ we need to live in the time of ‘potential history,’ in which we coexist with others, both living and dead…we need ”machine unlearning.”¹⁷⁷ My thesis began with a discussion on machine learning yet ended up dissecting the machine of learning. AI and Machine learning’s infrastructural references are always immanently sourced. Neural network’s use of the signifiers rooted in human biology (i.e., technology inspired by the learning mechanisms of the human brain) reveal that algorithms are not new phenomenon but repetitions of traditional modes of learning accelerated temporally and spatially across more minute aspects of social communing. And as the Human is a historical construction, one ought to observe AI not as a brand-new thing but rather the same thing repeated, albeit in a new form; but with the same problems and the promise of post-humanist criticism.

Critical post-humanist studies are rooted in the most humanistic disciplinary media-forms and cannot see beyond oscillation between mathematically informed written-work or written-work informed mathematized thought. AI is a different mode of social relationality, but at the same time a repetition of past ways of thinking and organization. It is both a philosophizing-machine and a time-machine that makes real and present the systems of dominance of a speculative future. The accelerationism of standard object-oriented philosophy only sees in their philosophers the tacit transcendental law or thinking protocol of materialism. Moreover, a meta criticism of this via Brassier overcomes accelerationists not by showing that machines will indeed kill humankind, but by showing that the way non-human forces think and operate might look nothing like the human—that an equal exchangeability between human and non-human drives via Kantian rational-subjectivity (privileging human subjectivity) assumes the primacy and im-

¹⁷⁶ Chun (2021) Discriminating Data pp. 254
¹⁷⁷ Ibid.
mortality of the human mind. However, this paper tries to argue that although re-introducing Kant to take him down might be a legitimate persuasive tactic towards homophilies of power (e.g., analytic, continental philosophy) in the thought world, as soon as one engages with the genealogical history of this philosophy it can only speak to that particular hegemony of thought. Brassier’s argument also misunderstands the material relationship to the printing press and protocols of knowledge dissemination specific to the global powers (now being imperialistically disseminated) which bedrock Kantian epistemology. Hence the non-transcendental materialism of Brassier is effective within the genealogy of Western thought leading up to Deleuze\textsuperscript{178}, but this academic thought still remains bureaucratic because it only fixes internal problems of thought but does not question how these problems materially arise—not due to being real problems but via institutional pedagogical mechanisms which formulates surplus thought-problems in order to derive institutional value. The extinction of the human in Brassier is poetically used to negate anthropocentric articulations of drives because the human’s will to know, or philosophizing impulse, imposes this ontology to the non-human, and sees things as something like a ‘will to power’ as Nietzsche does in everything non-human as well.

Brassier, in philosophizing against philosophical correlations demonstrates a faith in meaning, a faith in sensibility by parsing this dialogue through writing \textit{about the failures of philosophical meaning making}. Not only does his criticism separate thought from the practice of writing (as Kant does) with the latter in a state of exception but it replicates the practice of dialectical exchange through algorithmically curated thought-leaders within his homophilic organization of thought. This means not that he must simply diversify his thought but recognize that

\textsuperscript{178} Brassier (2012) \textit{Nihilism Unbound}. Brassier writes: “Deleuze’s vitalism – characterizes the relation between death and time as a locus for the production of temporal difference: death is not the cancellation of vital difference, but rather its expressive intensification”. pp. 222.
thinking is not solely constitutive of writing and philosophy (although they may seem inseparable at this current juncture). Hence the call is to involve different modes of thought-production that are not incarcerated by the genealogies and homophilies of written thought. Written thought often seeks to represent the cultural sentiment but always leaves the individual workers of that culture misrepresented, it is too despotic.

One ought to seek out non-Human modes of communication which have been erased from the colonizing duopoly of the written and mathematicized form. We cannot seek resistance without observing in ourselves the tools of extension that reflexively structure cognition and thought. To merely diversify one’s readings is to still have faith in the written form to represent diversity and represent once-cascaded histories of communication. More so, it betrays faith in the republican topology of representational democracy. These chains of signification are a means of translation, a means of looking into the past with the tools of the present. But such tools may themselves be constructing futures in their own image, as seeing the invention of the future as written representation and world-making via word-making. A form that is quite often algorithmic, machinic and representational.

A rejection of the two forces presented, algorithmic forces and algorithmic critique, is to introduce a true multiplicity of resistive expression. As Derrida reminds us, the truth of experiential subjectivity is constituted by the techné that structure experience. But the rise of money and exchange in any culture produces written surplus. It is a kind of hypocrisy to speculate on the non-human or non-anthropocentric without reflexively criticizing the fact that the tools of speculation are being taken for granted and prolong the weaponization of homophilic writing.

To the tools of philosophizing is to sees in them the tool of mass-produced thought production and policing—an ideological impasse rather than emancipatory practice. In such a case,
a non-engagement with the history of philosophy may be required to avoid cloning and repeating the problems of the past into the present: but one cannot do this by renewing the faith in the written word to preserve *ad nauseum* the surplus of that same thing which criticizes bourgeois thought through the very mediums which are so prized, cultivated, and weaponized within Western culture such as the algorithmic and written form. A truly radically imminent philosophy recognizes the ephemera of cultural memory and sees in this ephemera a growing flux of tools of speculation but also the allowing to die of certain tools. It is not a matter of reforming the content of philosophy into non-standard philosophy but revolutionizing the ground through which philosophy is legitimated, learned and reproduced.

The hypnotizing trance of writing is in believing that it can capture the event of human finitude, and non-human plenitude in the present and avoid the same problems of standard-philosophy without seeing in the philosophical tool a history of gate-keeping and othering. In the written form there is an intrinsic play that is irrespective of fictional or non-fictional content. A beginning, middle and most importantly, an *end*. Much could be said on for the bourgeois obsession with the origin myth, but what is the tendency to portend futures, endings and speculate finitude? It is a desire of the author subject? Or rather is it the desire of the machinery of written language to provide itself a finitude, an end of language in the fashion of a machinic death-drive which the trance of academic writing (i.e., philosophy) (mis)takes to be the end of all people..

Although this paper is structured in dialectical form, I argue for a total *rejection*, not a synthesis of algorithmic forces and algorithmic critique. Here, I enact the refrain from the “philosophical decision” but in the same way toss aside Laruelle to leave room for non-philosophers to

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179 In Chapter 7 Section 26 of Karl Marx’s *Capital*, the myth of so-called primitive accumulation is exposed as the founding myth of liberal, bourgeois society, the notion that at some point or historical moment there was some ‘equal start’ between individuals, obfuscating the reality of brutal historical class war in the establishment of class hierarchy. One can view even the most primordial origin myths, such as the biblical Adam and Eve thrown from paradise as extensions of this ideological tendency.
arise. The point here being that I agree with Laruelle’s criticism of the Platonic incision of the Real into the philosophical image and the world as it is given. But I also observe that his strand of non-philosophy does exactly this by inviting surplus language about this process—crafting a never-ending bridge that proposes to shift philosophers to non-philosophers when really it keeps them meandering through this process. Laruelle’s diagnosis might be correct but the means of enacting this non-philosophy is not through more text. A refrain is best expressed through an indifferent silence.

I invoke what I find still the best criticism and prescription to the problems of philosophy expounded by Ludwig Wittgenstein: “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”. I add to Wittgenstein’s argument to say that the silence prescribed to philosophical language leaves space for non-philosophical language to take over and resist from the outside, to garner truly (excuse my Greek) democratic philosophies of rebellion. Not a refrain from the philosophical decision, but silence in the face of overtly confused speculation, forms of speculation that do not speak legibly to real different and instead seek to bridge hermeneutical gaps that remain internal to Greek technics. Brassier in Nihil Unbound takes the correlation problem in the post-Kantian turn as the impetus towards the liberal humanism strands of philosophy and suggests Wittgenstein and Heidegger as forerunners of theories of correlative mediation that divide

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180 Laruelle (1996) Principles of Non-Philosophy
Laruelle writes: “Extreme philosophical decisions, for example those of late Platonism, insert this into the element of transcendence as the most transcendent forms (in other respects, immanent), of the One as Unspeakable. Non-philosophy discovers another regime—immanent only—of unilaterality and definitively snatches it from empiricism by manifesting its full anti-dialectical force”. pp. 126

“Non-philosophy demands the identification of the philosophical fundamental and the regional (art, science, ethics, technology, etc.) but only in-the-last-instance, not through their immediate confusion or through the collapsing of one onto the other in conformity with the law of their philosophical association or within their ‘mixture’. It postulates the identification-in-the-last-instance, through cloning, of philosophy and of the world in a ‘world-thought’.” pp. 147

thought and reality which he holds remain anthropocentric and transcendentally humanist. Heidegger aside, I think Wittgenstein makes a much more subtle point as a theorist of tools alongside Marx, Nietzsche, Derrida, Deleuze, Stiegler and Wynter. A minor hermeneutical adjustment but perhaps one that lets us understand the act of writing and communication through his philosophy. If extinction is a fact, and if such a facticity overdetermines the representationalism of mechanist thought, then how does this motivate the act of writing about extinction? Is not the obvious response to just refrain from philosophical writing rather than explicate all the ways in which one must face the meaningful consequences of meaninglessness and thwart the liberal humanism of the post-Kantians through a meta criticism of philosophical criticism?

This would be fine if the hermeneutic canon was not so politically framed and if the hermeneutics of genealogy was not materially framed where the only citable works are by others who share homophilic likeness (mirroring material conditions in the real) in their expression of resistance through the citation of other books in their field. But can you cite a tree? These are not appropriate because such minor subjectivities do not even write much less conduct an ontology of the age. This is a mistake because the residents of ontological theory have always worked under segregationist tendencies, whereby other minor-fields will do the manual labour of identifying streams of difference but the doors that open the penthouse of metaphysics is only mortgaged to the select few who know the tradition of ontology and our post-post-modernist situation—the tradition of the ontologies of difference. Is this a call for a diversification of ontological/philosophical theorists? No, it is less ethical and more material. In providing the philosophic

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182 Brassier (2007) *Nihil Unbound* pp. 7

…Brassier writes: “Heidegger and Wittgenstein, share the conviction that the manifest image enjoys a philosophical privilege vis-à-vis the scientific image, and that the sorts of entities and processes postulated by scientific theory are in some way founded upon, or derivative of, our more ‘originary’, pre-scientific understanding, whether [next page] this be construed in terms of our ‘being-in-the-world’, or our practical engagement in ‘language-games’. From there, one may or may not decide to take the short additional step which consists in denouncing the scientific image as a cancerous excrescence of the manifest image”
language this specific meta-important privilege itself (the material of universal philosophy) misses the subtleties of the use-value of the written in minor literature and moreover reifies its privilege as the culminative perfect use of language in a given era when the written form has always been a means of monopolizing and mediating subjectivity in a political situated/legitimated way of communicating to those who value it. When one robs the value of writing it may leave the philosopher enough time to do non-philosophy.

For Brassier, to annihilate the problem of correlationism (i.e., human subjectivity demarcating the knowable), meaning and subjectivity he must refer to the history of philosophy and therefore ground his solutions via a question that he brings into the fore via the resuscitation of the history of philosophy and its potential extension and application in the globalized world. He posits this problem as an obvious one, but those outside of the ideology of the history of philosophy do not ask these questions and therefore the invocation of nihilism as emancipatory politics becomes just as useless as the problem of human meaning. Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzschean/Marxist take on the will to power\textsuperscript{183} provides a good language game to explain free-flowing, Dionysian machines moving towards intensification rather than a progressive theory of nature. Ray Brassier’s critique of this is the inclusion of the non-human into standard forms of accelerationism enabling contemporary criticism of a techno-capitalist future as being a non-human one because “thinking” does not remain eternal (anthropocentrism) but evolutionarily bound to the human experience and dying with it. Brassier’s concept of extinction inevitably initiates a non-human form of accelerationism which, contrary to its goal, in many ways preserves meaning and returns to old correlational problems of language and representation because it reinaugurates the history.

\textsuperscript{183} Deleuze (1962) \textit{Nietzsche & Philosophy}

Deleuze writes: “This is what the will to power is; the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic. The will to power is the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation. The will to power here reveals its nature as the principle of the synthesis of forces.” Pp. 50
of philosophy to take it down (i.e., Kant was mistaken but let us one more time dwell on how he was mistaken via the resurrection of him and other dead hegemons of thought in western thought). It is not so much about proving Kant wrong but rather to answer him with silence or refrain—to stop writing about him. To write about the end is to eventually stop writing.

Through Laruelle’s non-philosophy, such a progression of the philosophy of technology returns to a silence because Nietzschian-Deleuzian terms like “will to power” set a protocol that future workers in the institutional academy use to capture the attention and recognition impulses of incoming learners—and in so doing capturing this desire for recognition by curating it through the history of western thought only to reproduce the formal machinery of this thought. This is done by the naming of this “will to power” or “force” in Nietzschian/Deleuzian terms as graspable through the philosophers, arguing at once that the force is Dionysian, untameable by the human (i.e., inhuman power) but also nameable by the philosopher (i.e, Nietzsche and Deleuze). Moreover, these terms almost go without saying since such for a philosophy of vitalism: transcendental materialism, the will to power is already present in the different arenas that are also experiencing this discovery via non-legitimate forms of life experimentation in the rhizomatic criss-cross of culture. Formal art-practises like dance, painting and music are some examples that the institution of learning has already been keen to adopt although as ancillary to the more synthetical power of writing to surmise or criticize art-practices.

Circumventing an orientalist critique of an argument for extra-writing philosophizing (i.e., Derrida and Levi-Strauss) is to avoid thinking of non-writing through a romantic, othering lens and observe the ordinary worker, the labourer of a given culture as a philosophizing artist-thinker rather than taking religious, state or capital funded propagandas that identify cultural
identity based on writing/philosophizing in-the-first-instance (hieroglyphs for Egyptian Pharaohs, Vedic texts for Brahmins, Confucian texts endorsed by emperors, etc.) that makes up a specific cultures aesthetic identity to inaugurates egos into citizens. Anti-media is not so much an appeal towards artmaking (music, dancing and the like have their own hierarchical divisions grouped based on homophilic formations of power or greater/less influence), but the reduction of artmaking via form of art-experimentation or art-scienceA naïve turning towards alternative, cultures, forms of life or language also fails to see that even in those non-hegemonic arenas the mode of expression can be authoritarian, the identity of their communities developed and record-ed into historical/geographic memory by their own elites. These elites act as representatives via the election process of recognition whereby ‘the masses’ align their views, often involuntarily, with the views of the thought politician. It must be noted that either private or state-run schools fund the rearing of children and incoming learners into learning writing and mathematical sciences—this practice has more-or-less become the normal throughout the world because of things like capitalism and imperialism. In democratizing thought, eliminating the dialectical opposition between the world of thought (i.e., academia) and real-world, the value of the material that ena-bles the division, that mediates thought, is up in the air. The world of thought is in fact trans-duced by the machinery of academia (i.e., writing and code), which seizes it by virtue of a reac-tionary homophilic algorithm, its reference-network. Here I am talking about the thought-world in terms of its material, in terms of the signs and sign-forms which are filling it, rather than in a Platonic, abstract sense. A critical political economy of the sign suggests that certain forms of expression which bring people into agreement, like writing, are historical productions of their local community-fascists, therefore can never be treated as average representations of the indi-vidual egos which compose some culture.
The school remains one of the few places where a form of resistive expression against capital is thought to be exercisable without incurring financial hardship in contrast to the starving artist archetype. It is not so much that in a post-institutional stage capital one must look past the problems of linguistics and the sign for more urgent machinic forces (i.e., data, AI, machinic nudging). The task is to unravel tools such as the sign to be owned and monopolized by global powers and dispensed as a form of control technology in a post-decentralized landscape whereby resistive thinkers inaugurate themselves in this machinery of codification and identification. Perhaps more valuably, because the sign is viewed as material technology, its resistive potentials are made ephemeral and a phenomena in-the-last-instance rather than a natural given of human and non-human experience. Taking the extreme nihilistic approach, there is no clear way out of the problems of standard philosophy within these institutional mediums that have protocols or algorithms of data organization and pedagogy which always drags the philosophically oriented back to meta-Platonic problematics (i.e., one vs particular, form versus content). Is this a no-way-out scenario? Not so, as this is to again fascistically present the options dialectically (school vs capital, good institution vs bad institution) and curate the options for change as the antinomy between the good, philosophical world and the bad, reactionary world. Transitioning into a post-institutional, control society means that the operational logic of institutionally guarded language is now free-flowing across cultural arenas, and the way language is used in the institution is being equally affected by other cultural machines.

Reformative change of course does occur, and institutions change and adopt different positionalities in reaction to the flows of capital. A change in the mode of production of communication, a seizure of the mode of communication, could abolish representational/recognition institutional machines and invent new tools to invent new futures that transgress protocols of thought
organization via identity recognition. But this change cannot be performed via the dominance of one medium of expression but the co-evolution of these mediums with other mediums. Other mediums do not necessarily mean popular media—this is not an appeal to populism or anti-intellectual appeals to the public or “mainstream” (which is almost always reactionary). Music, film, social media are all exemplary artifacts of capital’s seizure of resistive communication. So where does one look for non-written, non-mathematical modes of experimentation? In the dead reverb of non-standard history. Standard history is that which is presented by textuality, leaving in its presentation the absence of dead histories or means of expression (oftentimes the result of colonial reterritorialization). As Yuk Hui writes in *Cosmotechnics* (2020):

> We should ask ourselves, however, where the position of, say, ancient Indian technology, Chinese technology or Amazonian technology is in Heidegger’s analysis? For sure, these technologies are not equivalent to modern technology, but can one assimilate or reduce them to Greek technē?... In anthropology of technology, the invention and use of tools (often covered by the terms labour or praxis) has been understood as the determining process behind hominization, convincingly demonstrated for instance by André Leroi-Gourhan. Technics has been interpreted by the latter as an extension of organs and an externalization of memory. In this interpretation, technology is anthropologically universal. This is not wrong in so far as such externalization and extension are considered as proceeding from what Leroi-Gourhan called a “technical tendency,” but we still have to explain what he called “technical facts,” which are different from region to region, and from culture to culture. What is embedded in these technical facts apart from a causal reduction to cultural difference, or even sometimes to contingency?\(^{185}\)

\(^{185}\) Hui (2020) *Cosmotechnics*. pp. 2
To seek the past without the mediation of written philosophy is to introduce multiplicity *via* reduction to cosmotechnics and approach a philosophy of the non-human by bracketing those tools that have traditionally made us human (i.e., standard languages, speech, code). Not through writing or via the hyper-relational logics of the written form (inseparable from the organizing logics of mathematical algorithms) which sees everything consumable, representational in its own image but to revive hibernating media-forms in the shadow of the colonized past and engage with them without their subordination to a write-up or synthesis.

This thesis attempts to show that such a near-certain AI future outlook on time might bring about non-anthropocentric views of human progress and technological futures but this form of future-making cannot be said to be outside a thought-locality, because such localities are based on curated likeness (i.e, those concerned by the entirety of the human race vs those concerned their particular identity groups) which always alienate those outside of its representational neighborhood in a hierarchy of economic/colonial/heteropatriarchal power. The answer may not be to enact a series of textual non-philosophical theory writing but to pay attention to how people philosophize outside of the eyes of academic power, as this power has traditionally remained dominated by historically elite or bureaucratic upper middle-class who demand a written explanation to mirror the real. It is not a call towards anti-intellectualism or fascism or a simple doing without thinking. Recapitulating historically eliminated epistemologies (i.e., eastern ritual practices; indigenous practices; etc.) will always fail, as haphazardly calling them upon the present will itself influence and colonize them. It might not even be possible to revive certain lost affective memories because the cultural memories and practices that sustain these memories into the present die forever. With that being said, the past remains a living engine of memories, always unlocking new traces even in the present as the demos resist the dominant technics of memory.
retrieval archived and reproduced of elites in societies. Ancestral statements may not be exhaustibly retrieved from a science that sees only the duopoly of mathematics and written speculation. What might be called for is an anarchical science instead of non-philosophy. Yuk Hui goes on to ask in *Cosmotechnics* (2020):

> A universal concept of technology, which is in fact a residue of the desire of a particular kind of thinking. I gave a preliminary definition of cosmotechnics as unification between the cosmic order and the moral order through technical activities, in order to suggest that technology should be re-situated in a broader reality, which enables it and also constrains it. The detachment of technology from such a reality has resulted from the desire to be universalizing and to become the ground of everything. Such a desire is made possible by the history of colonization, modernization and globalization, which, being accompanied by its history of economic growth and military expansion, has given rise to a monotechnological culture in which modern technology becomes the principle productive force and largely determines the relation between human and non-human beings, human and cosmos, and nature and culture.¹⁸⁶

To resist “modern technologies” or technologies that are present to us as capital forces and resistive expression is to look at the non-standard history and technics of recollection that enable different awareness of genealogical trace. Alia Al-Saji in *Durée* (2019) writes:

> Phenomenologically, hesitation is the interval within durée, the delay in perception, opened up in the sensorimotor schema of the body by its affective thickness and complexity; living bodies feel rather than simply react, allowing memory to flood in and differentially inform the course of action. But, ontologically, the zone of indetermination that is my hesitating body is a rhythm of durée that embodies an intensive configuration

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¹⁸⁶ Hui (2020) *Cosmotechnics*
of pastness—materialized in my habitualies actualized in my recollections, and felt in the unconscious weight of the past that pushes down upon me or buoy me up.\textsuperscript{187}

Looking at the non-human, thinking-\textit{with} involves remembering-\textit{with} the tools of memory. When we think-\textit{with} with a tool, we inherit its memories. Each tool sustains a key to genre-specific protocols or “habitualies” of historical memory which then influences the movement of \textit{bios}. To introduce inclusionary politics into writing is to a) misunderstand that those who speak of the “human” in commonality will always garner more influence via historical protocols of power b) to not change the dominant mode of expression what is hegemonically thought as “thinking” or “philosophy” is to eventually compete in a game to monopolize the commodity of first the group identity (one person made to represent for their groups) and eventually the quintessential “human”. This is because each technical object or technology sustains the memories and problematics of its historical users. Gilbert Simondon writes in \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects} (1958):

Technical thinking not only introduces means of action that are fragmentary and tied to the capacities of each object that is becoming a utensil, but also a certain reduplication of the action by technicity; a specific human action, considered with respect to its results, could have been accomplished by a specific technical functioning going through various stages; elements and moments of action have their technical analogue; an effort of attention, of memory, could have been replaced by a technical operation; technicity provides a partial equivalence to the results of action; it accentuates awareness of the action by the being who brings it to completion in the form of results; it broadcasts and objectifies the

\textsuperscript{187} Al-Saji (2019) \textit{Durée}. pp. 101
results of the action through comparison with those of the technical operation, breaking
down the action into partial results, into elementary completions.\footnote{Simondon (2011) \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects}. pp. 412-3}

Seeing in the object of philosophical writing the most developed and exhausted form of thinking, the past will never reveal its secrets but only the memories of those who have owned the means of communication of power as well as resistance. This is not purely a racial or geo-political argument but an acknowledgement that language has a bourgeois productive element, a class whose history colours the semantic-memory maps of \textit{this} medium. The point is not to escape homophily, for homophily is not by some essential nature a threat nor is it a philosophy of everything. It is rather a trait specific to the socio-technical objects – those technologies such as philosophical thought and its material semiotics which generate reference-networks. The goal here is rather to encourage a recognition of one’s own fascistic protocol towards thought-production—it is to point to one’s philosophy of the commons and particularize it without a need for a meta-theory of the One, without the need to articulate that the One is inexpressible or ought to be determined-in-the-last instance. Because this mode of expression is only legible to those readers inaugurated in Plato’s tradition of thinking and thinking along this technology of intellectual memory channelling always risks reviving Platonic problematics (e.g., One discourse, attempting to develop a meta-philosophy via set theory which accounts for the One that also excludes itself).

To dislodge technicities from the prerogatives of the social mileu is to do a comparative analysis by means of \textit{reduction} (by trying to imagine a world that might be without the tool we are addressing/critiquing-with/ Which is not to call for a “common homophily” or a more “common means” of language in light of globalization. This is another form of a capitalistic thought policing via way of commonality or universalization. This is extended to both mediums of power (hyper-rationality, algorithmic war machines, finance capital) but also mediums of critique
which does not stand apart from power but are formulated by the same rhythms it seeks to critique. As Alexander Galloway reminds us:

Laruelle does not acknowledge a system of mutual co-construction between self and other. Instead, he develops an ontological platform that, while leaving room for certain kinds of causality and relation, radically denies exchange in any form whatsoever.\(^{189}\)

The goal is not an equality of communicative exchange but a non-philosophy that is always abolishing the drive towards equal exchange\(^{190}\) in each homophilic community arranged through principles of “like-ness” or commonality. This is because principles of universal commonality, which presume a liberal mutual exchangeability between all humans will always come from a place, a specific regionality that frequently ends up colonizing the other’s resistive or active force. Hence the praxis is to disseminate the homophilic arrangement of the individual’s thinking but refrain from universalizing this praxis. For the standard philosopher a creation through negation or refrain from philosophizing commonality and even difference as philosophy (the naming and containing of alterity) is the praxis. This is not to be mistaken as a castration or demand to negate active forces but a recognition that in homophilic groups which have always seen themselves as active forces in the world lose vital intensity because the formulation of surplus-thought (i.e., dialectical exchange, speech, argumentation, getting to the bottom of things, foreign aid, charity) through surplus-writing has become sterile in its many iterations and is actually an inactive force that bureaucratically elongates the promise of change (i.e., a lurch towards ‘real’ liberalism; towards socialism). Hence the goal is not to draw more relationalities. It is true that this might seem like an argument against philosophizing, and it is, but it is not one against thinking

\(^{189}\) Galloway (2012) “Laruelle, Anti-Capitalist” in Laruelle and Non-Philosophy. pp. 194

\(^{190}\) Erkan (2010) Laruelle Qua Stiegler: On Non-Marxism and the Transindividual

Erkan writes of Laruelle’s criticism of standard philosophy:

“Standard philosophy is exploitive through the exchange-based economy of acquisition.” pp. 51
critically. To think is to *think-with* things in the world. Thinking might be conducted in ways that do not have a history of protocols that mistake group identity with the common “human”. Once one engages in a medium one inherits the history of that medium and to see outside of this history, to invent futures, the medium must itself looked upon with indifference. In the case of writing, the modern means of writing speculation will never be divorced or innovated by the inclusionary politics of a myriad of voices because many techno-affective traces of the past are erased. The protocols of writing, publishing, organization itself creates authorial identity rather than authorial identity becoming because writing engages itself with material referents that are curated. authors and writing become algorithmically reproduced, produced vis-à-vis an autogenerative protocol that does not really channel resistive energy but in many ways steal and exploit resistive energies into forms of thought which are compressed and compartmentalize by standard histories of thought. Members of communities of difference engage in resistive politics but are engaging in a technology which allows for thought or reflective psychoanalysis to be taken for granted as neutral when it is anything but. More importantly for the point of this thesis, members of non-colonial, non-patriarchal and non-bourgeois in-group become initiated in the historical rhythms and protocols that are embedded in a technology Even in Marxism(s) such as Marxist-Leninism or accelerationism there exists a performance. Is this a call to diversify Marxist literature into streams of decolonial/queer formulations? No, because any form of thought that acts from its material particularity will be compartmentalized by the machine of learning which digitally segregates minor literature against major strands of thought that presupposes the Human as a unified force against mainstream threats to the human (i.e., machines, ecology). The problem is not a lack of diversity or representation, but the technologies that materialize standard protocols of thinking and seek to draw into the commons in the same gesture as it promises an ex-
pression of phenomenological difference. Difference will not be done expressing itself so long as the general formulation of a technology exists to formulate coherent agreement. The problem is not difference or phenomenological disagreement but the platforms through which these disagreements are posed as problems that resist the unifying function of the technology. This paper could have been about set theory, or the problem of universals and particulars but this proclivity towards organizing and unifying thought into philosophical dualisms will always rear their ugly head every time one engages in the medium of this thought. The materiality of writing is racially and sexually coded—the history of its uses is encoded in the body of technology itself. The technology is not neutral but inaugurates thinkers of difference into its historical problematics which stifle rebellious impulses and rather prolong the bureaucracy of this medium by repeating the problematics of bourgeois and European standard thought. Identity politics? Sure, but not in a way that appeals to phenomenology or *ad hominem*—here is an identity politics that is embedded in the technologies of memory, learning, and grasping the past to curate the future. Algorithmic curation on the internet is merely symptomatic of a general profitability of desire, identity, and recognition. Artificial Intelligence fueled by machine learning sees this process sped up, made more labour-efficient, yet this contemporary phenomenon as it engages more with social organization merely amplifies tendencies brewing in elementary or now “old-school” forms of media that erupted from the enlightenment and industrialization. Yet, as any technology that has been around long enough, old technologies are naturalized into ontological given-ness—the equivalence of thinking and writing naturalized as common sense. But let us look at both artificial intelligence and writing to fight fascism on all fronts.

In the case of standard philosophy and its historical curation of thought-leaders/gods which algorithmically reproduce the same thinkers/the same thought powers—silence may be the
call for action. A strategic silence that is not a castration of the active impulses of resistance and power but a refrain from reproducing the same sterile impulses of pseudo-activity which only reproduce the past ways of communicating/thinking and impose it on incoming learners—making this silence not a clone of past modes of thought production but a unique refrain from philosophizing principles of common identity and praxis and orienting future non-philosophy via a scientific reduction or the philosophy of negation. This call is not the same for the minority\textsuperscript{191}, as such an active silence may bring upon active resistance on their terms, in the language of an-cestries that do not presume a unified “human” praxis in light of non-human forces. Everyone is not equal in their praxis because capital inflicts inequalities through the production of racism, sexism, homophobia, class-difference, etc; and the praxis will not remain the same across this stratum of identities because for the ego their driving force is to lose these classification systems and for some the erasure of these classification systems is to denounce colonial pedagogical means of thought-policing (to denounce standard philosophical writing). To that end, standard accelerationists cannot speak through the language of the “non-human” because the “human” itself is a spectre of their own specific class/regional making. In each case a silence is exercised in a different way—but both are active because they do something against the algorithmic protocols/rhythms of standard knowledge-production (wherein one group talks and the other listens, repeats, conforms). Hence the goal of algorithmic analysis is not to demonstrate particularity in the commons and then seek a meta-common homophily to coral everyone together but to recognize owns own homophilic silo that acts as a fascistic life-world which mistaken a universally valid means of thinking (i.e., philosophy) in ephemeral silos/groups of thinking (writing). The concern is not whether escaping homophily will yield a fascistic appeal to populism–but to rec-

\textsuperscript{191}Not representatives of minorities but each ego made to be represented.
Recognize that academic philosophy is not a mirror of the world but polices thought through a material, technical lens rather than a phenomenological one.

Recalling Wendy H.K. Chun, one must discover “modes of living that do not give up on the past or the future.”\textsuperscript{192} New media in the form of anti-media is required to circumvent the colonizing aspects of the present, which create futures that are democratically legible but also radical in their escape from algorithmic machines of control and learning. How to do this? It would be wholly contradictory to explain these new media through written speculation, only research creation or critical making can hope to perform this praxis. Not by way of monopolizing the performative practices of art and science into the larger legitimacy of linguistic philosophical speculation (i.e., the supposed perfect/true use of the written form), but by deconstructing the mode of written expression through the mediums of non-legitimated expression(s). But as is the case, where should one look for these non-legitimate expressions? Quoting from Frederic Jameson in \textit{Marxism and Historicism} (1979):

> We will no longer tend to see the past as some inert and dead object which we are called upon to resurrect, or to preserve, or to sustain, in our own living freedom; rather, the past will itself become an active agent in this process and will begin to come before us as a radically different life form [which rises up to call our own form of life into question and to pass judgement on us, and through us on the social formation in which we exist.”\textsuperscript{193}

In this way we do not abandon the historical element of historical materialism and genealogy but recognize what the dynamic modes of cognitive production (i.e., producing the artifice of memory, producing the present and future) will allow for a revolutionary excavation of mediums. Here a science of the word, or a political economy of the sign might be approached through

\textsuperscript{192} Chun (2021) \textit{Discriminating Data} pp. 215
\textsuperscript{193} Jameson (1979) \textit{Marxism and Historicism}. pp. 175
comparative analysis between non-legitimate and legitimate mediums of thinking whilst bracketing the privileged medium of critique (writing). By recognizing politically non-legible forms of thinking can one envision radical praxis because. This thesis is not arguing that everything is capital, and all resistance is capital, it just keying in on certain protocols of resistance that have been taken for granted and have now monopolized resistive thought/communication. The is not to argue for the transference of academic critique to a more popular technology like uploading theory videos on Instagram or YouTube since the landscape of these mathematically curated machines will never allow for critical philosophy to gain influence. Interviews with ideologues and Jeff Bezos will always garner more influence via logic of confirmation bias informed homophily and network science—leaving the academic video uploader only talking to other academics or likeminded friends who search for such videos. In the same way, writing has its own homophilic clusters that speak of the human which overshadow theories of the human (i.e., race theory, queer theory, feminism, etc.). The machinic concerns in light of human finitude (i.e., Srnicek, Dyer-Witheford) exhume the cultural logics of—and to this end standard or accelerationist Marxism does not approach the common praxis it seeks but rather affirms the power of writing about the commons by writing of the human as unified, economical beings under machinic capital. Which might be true but it does not allow for a praxis that recognize differences in the human, differences that are overshadowed by “referent-we” politics.

Media theorist Genaële Langlois in a public talk entitled “Textiles as Anti-Media” (2018) argues in relevance to the discussion of the written form:

Textile was one of the oldest medium of communication ever in existence and curiously enough in my field of communication and media studies that has completely been forgotten. If we look back at what McLuhan and Innis and all the Toronto School are doing a
kind of media history and would usually divide the history of media. They said well there was something called oral societies, the operation of the alphabet and then there was all the technologies after that: the printing press, analog, digital. OK. A very linear perspective I would like to question heavily and also, I would heavily question the notion of "oral societies" as societies that relied primarily on words. I would argue that actually a lot of technologies, media technologies, were used that we have either lost trace of and have forgotten. One of the things about textile and why we have forgotten about it is we don’t make textile anymore, we don’t practice it as a media making practice. We only have textiles as commodities.194

In each moment of learning something new one is always forgetting other aspects of communicating, recollecting, and feeling. Through the archeological excavation of dead mediums buried by colonial modes of relationality, one can see the revolutionary potential of this loss and imagine new forms of non-universalizing mediation, new forms of philosophizing that bear no resemblance or historical continuity or philosophical relationality with past philosophical style which always sought to reproduce itself. However, this excavation is not to be understood colonial, it is not the excavation via colonial logics the past so that it may be legible to all groups and form a universal praxis via the translating and democratizing capacity of written synthesis. If such a new medium is undermined and considered naïve by standard philosophical institutions but is accessible by those outside of their boarders, then this is a success and, in this way, it becomes anti-Platonic, it becomes anti-media. This is to say a theory of non-philosophy or an abolitionist stance towards philosophy that generates not a meta-philosophy in Laruellian anti-philosophy instead a critique of the material inscription “philosophy” from thinking. It is anti-philosophy not

anti-thought. The aim is not to usher towards a diversification of professional thinking, but the infrastructure’s dissolution via forms of strategic silence and listening, listening to the reverb of ghost mediums in their own material terms without monopolizing it through a more advanced or ‘common’ way of world making through word-making. Word-making in its highest forms always has philosophy, ontology or universalizable commonalities as its desirable ends because the mechanism of the written form is curated by socio-technical milieus that have incentivized monopolization.

Does this mean no-communication/no critique? Luddism? Silence? The problematic is not dialectical (communication vs. no-communication, critique vs no-critique)— it is not that easy. At whatever juncture philosophy is equated with thought, philosophy will participate in a dialectic — this is the ruse of philosophy, to represent thought and monopolize this binary relationship between itself and thinking\textsuperscript{195}. And in this representational, two-dimensional game, this process of monopolizing the referent tentatively known as thinking is made anthropocentric and into an exclusive category separate from gestural or general signalling. If the practice of thinking critically is deconstructive, the process by which thinking evolves and sheds its materiality is part of the process of creating new forms of praxis that negate the proclivity within this practice of written philosophy to re-simulate problematics over universals and particulars. History is obtained and curated in the present and the history of consciousness is algorithmically framed by bourgeois technology like computation and writing, but this does not gesture towards a fatalistic, anti-thinking view of future-praxis. An anti-philosophy stance towards philosophical Marxism or labour theory is to seek intensities by bracketing away philosophical writing and the history of written and algorithmic performance via acts of indifference towards the material protocols of

\textsuperscript{195} “Thinking” itself is a tentative signifier.
philosophy and its reformations or attempts at a historical continuity into the age of globalized difference.
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