The Cave and The Stars: On the People and Democracy of Non-Philosophy

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Abstract

This monograph dissertation explores the work of François Laruelle and the democratic nature of his non-philosophy. In four separate chapters, this dissertation argues for identifying non-philosophy as the introduction of democracy into thought and seeks to instantiate a necessary theoretical delimitation for its programme, which explores the relationships between people, thought, and power. Chapter One analyzes previous philosophical frameworks from thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, and Louis Althusser on their respective stances toward philosophy’s role for people. Chapter Two investigates the work of François Laruelle for the past fifty years as the development of non-philosophy or “human philosophy.” Chapter Three situates Laruelle’s 1980 essay, “Homo ex machina,” alongside philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze to lay out the stakes for emancipation from the destining of humanity under the existing dominant relations between technology, power, and biopolitics. Lastly, Chapter Four envisions the transfiguration of non-philosophy from human philosophy into a tool for human emancipation by inventing new non-political means, such as non-politics, the en-emic paradigm, futural democracy, and the generic will. If non-philosophy is the introduction of peace and democracy into thought, investigating the people and their rule or power is a necessary step toward inventing the future.

Keywords: non-philosophy, political theory, democracy, continental philosophy, deconstruction, humanism, philosophical anthropology, François Laruelle, Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, Louis Althusser, Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Jacques Derrida, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche.
François Laruelle has referred to his over fifty-year project, non-philosophy, as introducing democracy into thought. The slogan, “Man is not made for philosophy, but philosophy for man,” should speak to this project, but it is never so apparent to readers. Several studies about non-philosophy have been conducted in recent years, yet very few reflect on democracy. This dissertation argues that for any discussion about democracy concerning non-philosophy, there must be an analysis of who the people are (demos, “people” in Greek) and what they do in their power (kratos, “power” in Greek). The following work has four significant chapters that explore the dynamic relationship between philosophy, humanity, and power. Furthermore, it serves as an introduction and an extension of non-philosophy for future research and practice. The first chapter analyzes the work of thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, and Louis Althusser in their respective approaches to what role philosophy plays for people. The second chapter dedicates itself to thoroughly investigating François Laruelle’s non-philosophy as “human philosophy.” The third chapter situates Laruelle’s 1980 essay, “Homo ex machina,” as part of a line of post-World War II thinkers concerned with the future of technologies, politics, and power over life. In some senses, Laruelle may be considered as one prophet amongst others, such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze. In the fourth and final chapter, non-philosophy is transfigured (but not transformed) from its role as a “human philosophy” towards what Karl Marx considered as “human emancipation.” As an extension of non-philosophy, this final chapter introduces the reader to non-politics and several associated terms. By rethinking the relationship of people and thought through non-philosophy, we may come up with the means to transform the world.
Acknowledgments

There is an old Peanuts strip where Linus tells Lucy he wants to be a doctor when he grows up. She scoffs at him, saying that he will not be a doctor. Her reason? Linus does not love mankind. In the last panel, Linus cries, “I love mankind, it’s people I can’t stand!!” While developing this doctoral dissertation, I have learned to love mankind and people simultaneously. To be less like Linus, and especially less like Lucy, was an actual test of humility, compassion, and self-reflection. A comic strip may be an everyday fable for the intimacy of an intellectual work such as this, but this is a work not marked by the solitude of the thinker. There are far too many people to acknowledge their influence. If you feel slighted by my forgetfulness in not naming you, please know this was not out of spite.

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Despite COVID-19 impacting a significant portion of my studies, I found and fostered meaningful relationships with my peers at the Centre. Andrew Woods was the first among many whose humour and wit welcomed me to a community of other like-minded individuals, such as Jennifer Komorowski, Chris Burke, Natalie Treviño, and Ben Maynard, among many others. My cohort further solidified that: I wish to thank Michael Bodkin, Vikram Panchmatia, Can Guven, Won Jeong, Kathryn Carney, Austin Chisholm, Deanna Aubert, Camilo Hoyos, Alexandra
Hudecki, Taylor McGoey, and Elden Yungblut. Also part of my cohort was Jacob Vangeest, whose unwavering friendship and collaborations with me have been inciteful and influential toward our future work.

Even during the pandemic, I had several occasions to host weekly reading groups via Zoom and Discord dedicated to works by François Laruelle, such as *Introduction to Non-Marxism, A Biography of Ordinary Man, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, The Concept of Non-Photography, Photo-Fiction*, and *Principles of Non-Philosophy*. My thanks go to several participants, including Noel Rosario, Sylvia Nambiar, Ada Foster, Mahbub Gani, Michael Schuyler, Nicholas Pisanelli, Evrim Bayinder, Carl Olsson, Shulamith Farhi, Indigo Chong, and Adina Blaine! I also extend my gratitude to Acid Horizon and Machinic Unconscious Happy Hour podcasts and their respective communities for the opportunity to speak of my research.

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To my peers in the field of non-philosophy, I owe a great deal to you in developing this work. Though we may disagree on several things, I hope you welcome me to join the ranks in popularizing non-philosophy in English. Thank you to Anthony Paul Smith, Rocco Gangle, Maya B. Kronic, Taylor Adkins, Alex Dubilet, Jessie Hock, Ray Brassier, Drew Burk, Jonathan Fardy, Alex Galloway, Ian James, John Ó Maoilearca, and Katerina Kolozova. I am incredibly grateful for the support from Anne-Françoise Schmid, Sophie Lesueur, Gilles Grelet, Etienne Brouzes, Sylvain Létoffé, and, undoubtedly, François Laruelle, the source of inspiration behind this work. Let’s continue to invent philosophy!

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I also wish to thank the budding community of scholars that I have had the opportunity to work with on *Oraxiom*: Bogna Konior, Michael Saunders, Yvette Granata, Alice Rekab, Benjamin Norris, Yehotal Shapira, Hannah Hopewell, and Stanimir Panayotov.

To my parents Jayne and Richard, my brothers Adam and Russell, and Luna, all of whom I miss deeply and dearly. The distance while writing and studying was heartbreaking, but the primary motivator to keep going so that someday, when this is all said and done, I can come home again.

To my loving partner, Marie Rioux. Your passion for everything you do is something I aspire to replicate. You have taught me many things, including how to be a great co-parent for our loud goofball, Huckleberry.

Thank you, each-and-every-one. *Merci, tout-un-chacun.*
Epigraphs

The Covey What does Karl Marx say about th’ Relation of Value to th’ Cost o’ Production?

Fluther (angrily) What th’ hell do I care what he says? I’m Irishman enough not to lose me head by follyin’ foreigners!

Barman Speak easy, Fluther.

The Covey It’s only waste o’ time talkin’ to you, comrade.

Fluther Don’t be comradin’ me, mate. I’d be on me last legs if I wanted you for a comrade.

Rosie (to the Covey) It seems a highly rediculous thing to hear a thing that’s only an inch or two away from a kid, swingin’ heavy words about he doesn’t know th’ meanin’ of, an’ uppishly thryin’ to down a man like Misther Fluther here, that’s well flavoured in th’ knowledge of th’ world he’s livin’ in.

Sean O’Casey, The Plough and the Stars, Act Two.

L’émancipation des humains contient à titre d’effet et non de condition, si ce n’est occasionnelle, l’émancipation de la philosophie qui n’est jamais la condition de-dernière-instance la leur.

The emancipation of humans contains as an effect – not as condition (if not, as occasional condition) – the emancipation of philosophy, which is never the condition of-the-last-instance of the emancipation of humans.

François Laruelle, “Émanciper la philosophie par la pensée quantique.”
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¹ If there is a citation to any issue of La décision philosophique, I will note wherever necessary which issue the quote appears in, and the issue number where the ‘x’ is present.


² If there is a citation to any issue of Pourquoi pas la philosophie? I will note wherever necessary which issue the quote appears in, and the issue number where the ‘x’ is present.
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Introduction

0.0. Let us begin from the beginning...

Non-Philosophy purports to be the introduction of democracy into thought. If that is the case, then who are the people (*demos*) of this democracy, and what do they do in their rule or power (*kratos*)? Such a simple question is the fundamental problematic for this dissertation, whose primary purpose is not only to provide an answer. Above all else, the dissertation strives to indicate the uniqueness of non-philosophy as a democratic practice, serving as a pathway into radical democracy that hitherto has been occluded by the object of critique: philosophical sufficiency. It is the hope that the chapters that follow demonstrate not just the necessity of non-philosophy but its pertinent theoretical programme to invent future emancipatory possibilities.

On an anecdotal note, I first became interested in non-philosophy and the work of Francois Laruelle in 2012. I was curious, confused, and often seduced by the neologisms and typographic monstrosities with hyphens and brackets, the contiguity of Laruelle with fascinating thinkers (Derrida and Deleuze, for instance), but most of all frustrated with his pertinence to maintain faith in “humanity.” As one may expect from this period, the wave of speculative realisms and new materialisms denouncing anthropocentrism and human-oriented thought left a great impression on my studies. After the many philosophical anthropologies’ and humanisms’ failed revolutions, after the Foucauldian tidal wave swept away the sandcastle of man, after the de(con)structions of the Western metaphysics of man, after the critical post-humanisms and speculative thought that sought to shift gaze from the human to animals and nonhuman intelligence, and even after varying decolonial critiques against the overrepresentation of the human – after all these, why should one retain such fidelity to this vacuous and statistical generality “man” with non-philosophy?
Approximately a decade later, after much reading, translating, and spending much of my time thinking in solitude, I am ready to speak confidently of the democratic practice of non-philosophy. I, too, have come to share my faith in people and have sought throughout this work to arm myself with Laruelle’s non-Rousseauian thought against the thousand Rousseaus who attempt to lift this mask of a figure who is nothing but an anthropoid. I believe that people can invent the means to emancipate themselves. “Emancipate”? From what? From the conditions they invented, philosophical conditions, the most vicious circles of any possible hell.

The present dissertation strives to answer several questions that each chapter deals with, such as the question above, but one central, implicit question determines the entirety of the others. This substantial question is: Why non-philosophy? Or, said otherwise, why should this programme – whose slogan is “man is not made for philosophy, but philosophy is made for man” – matter? To begin with, the claims of non-philosophy are universal: as Marx said of Capital, de te fabula narratur, so too one may say for non-philosophy. One finds the critique of philosophical sufficiency in non-philosophy, which goes so far as to determine one’s own biography and essence. It must be understood that the universality of philosophical sufficiency extends well into the political, sexual, historical, and ethical domains. Because of these extensions, it is possible and empirically verifiable to discern the philosophical discourse that underpins and governs humanity as though it were inseparable from its systems. Even in the attempts to liberate itself from dominant forms of discourse, such as the overthrow of the Same or Representation in favour of Difference, the very movement from one term to the other involves humanity as a cog towards a system’s realization.

Laruelle is a figure whose attempts at forging a weapon of last defence for generic humanity are seen most impactfully in the five human theorems stated at the start of his chief work,
A Biography of Ordinary Man. After identifying the finite human individual, “ordinary man,” as minorities, Laruelle states:

1. Man really exists and he is really distinct from the World: this thesis contradicts almost all of philosophy;
2. Man is a mystical living being condemned to action, a contemplative being doomed to practice, though he does not know why this is the case;
3. As a practical living being, man is condemned a second time, and for the same reasons, to philosophy;
4. This double condemnation organizes his destiny, and this destiny is called “World,” “History,” “Language,” “Sexuality,” “Power,” which we refer to as Authorities in general;
5. A rigorous science of ordinary man, that is, of man, is possible; a biography of the individual as Minorities and as Authorities; a theoretically justified description of the life he leads between these two poles, which are sufficient to define him.¹

Though readers may be quick to dismiss the sweeping claims Laruelle makes here, these theorems form the theoretical delimitation for non-philosophy, which requires assimilation on the reader’s part throughout its development. Ignoring these theorems, failing to address them, and even treating them as insignificant indicates a more significant problem that can also be found in the existing secondary literature. This problem concerns the programme, introducing democracy into thought at the expense of examining who the people are and what they do in their power. The People determine thought in-the-last-instance alone.

After the twenty-five centuries since the supposed birth of Western philosophy and after fifty years since the beginning of the non-philosophical rebellion, have ordinary peoples’ souls received the wings that they deserve?² The hypothetical response is in the negative for the moment. While this investigation differs significantly from existing scholarship in non-philosophy, it does not at all seek to negate whom I call Larualiens and their efforts in introducing non-philosophy.

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¹ BoOM, 1.
The chief defect of all hitherto scholarship in non-philosophy is in excess of its interpretation, in lack of its transformative and inventive capacity.

0.1. Larualiens Exist

In recent years, Laruelle’s work has been the subject of many academic discussions, from the most popularized and accessible in podcasts to the central theme of symposiums and publications. While his name has been sought by several not to become “another” big name, like ships, lighthouses, or even flotsam in the sea of metaphysics, it is ironic that Laruelle is primarily the subject of the material rather than just a support or base. Perhaps another way to say this is the irony consists in lacking a theoretical basis to determine the positive unicity of non-philosophy from others, except through negative definitions (“non-philosophy is not X,” “Laruelle does not exist,” etc.).

At the beginning of anyone’s non-philosophical journey, non-philosophers nevertheless retain the “particular doctrinal position that continues to impregnate their non-philosophical work.”3 I call “Laralien” any individual who performs non-philosophical work albeit in a fashion that requires them to make Laruelle and his development of thought a doctrine or system, aside from a programme for collective invention. A Laralien is farther from being a non-philosopher but closer to “Laruellean.” The alien is not just a play on words in Laruelle’s name and the level of estrangement that his quasi-private thought plagues on his readers or another way to render the word Étranger littered throughout his work. Laralien fundamentally describes a need to apologize for and introduce Laruelle and non-philosophy: sometimes as the same thing at worst, sometimes as indicative of an approach at best. Laraliens are not conjunctural thinkers like Laruelle, which poses a significant problem for any future development of non-philosophy. The alienation that

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3 S&U, 111.
occurs is less a positive one that appears on the surface of the doctrinal citational practice than a negative one that begets interpretation rather than implementation, application, and invention. Instead, this begetting is a continuation of the (academic) distinction between the primary, secondary, tertiary ad infinitum of commentaries begetting commentaries, footnotes begetting footnotes, a war over who said it better, the most faithful of followers to Laruelle, or as John Ó Maoilearca opines, to be more Laruellean (Larualien) than Laruelle. Towards this end, Larualiens rely on this Laruelle-support to make their claims rather than invent alongside or with him.

Whosoever wishes to be more Laruellean than Laruelle (whatever that might mean) must demonstrate more than just a comprehensive survey of Laruelle’s work. They must be able to carry on Laruelle’s non-philosophical experimental science. Furthermore, they borrow from a borrower. I call this the borrower’s problem, which Louis Althusser elsewhere touched on regarding Marx’s reproach with Feuerbach, wherein borrowing tethers the borrower to a problematic. Nevertheless, drawing from Bernard Stiegler, I note that invention and borrowing are a phenomenon of one another. In this way, it is impossible not to think of Laruelle as someone who draws inspiration and models, borrowing from other disciplines of thought to invent a non-philosophical use of them, inventing a new use that is no longer reducible to prior form. Such invention equally requires one to invent new conditions for invention, one where borrowing should not be one or even the precondition for inventive practices. This lack of invention hinders non-philosophy’s present and future work, which I find as Larualienation present in other Anglophone scholars. There are only

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6 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 64. “To consider borrowing as a phenomenon of invention and inversely, invention as borrowing, is tantamount to considering foreign influence and invention as ordinary phenomena of influence of the exterior milieu, composed of natural and technical elements issuing from the other group.”
a few that I will discuss here due to their influence on readership. I would like to demonstrate that Larualiens do not fully carry out a non-philosophical approach and instead utilize Laruelle to legitimate their discourses and use without at all carrying on a conjunctural critique. At bottom, any so-called Laruellean will need to surmount the contradiction befalling non-philosophy by their actions, as if like a transcendental illusion of own right.

Ray Brassier is one of the first Anglophone scholars to highlight the philosophical import of Laruelle’s work. His essay, “Axiomatic heresy: the non-philosophy of François Laruelle,” notes that Laruelle’s work discovers a new way of thinking, a heretical use of philosophy that “provides a philosophically dis-interested – which is to say non-normative – definition of the essence of philosophy.”⁷ Along with Laruelle and Gilles Grelet, Brassier established a series under French publisher L’Harmattan called “Nous, les sans-philosophie.” He has translated the works of philosophers such as Quentin Meillassoux and Alain Badiou and conjugates both with Laruelle and others in his book Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. The central thesis of his text is to expose that transcendental nihilism “is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity.”⁸ Brassier notes that speculative draws from a materialist or realist standpoint rather than its idealist perspectives found in German Idealist thinkers such as Hegel. Through Meillassoux, Brassier’s stance on speculation intimates that “the only way to preserve the in-itself from its idealist incorporation into the for-us without reifying it metaphysically is by realizing that what is in-itself is the contingency of the for-us, not its necessity.”⁹ It is to bypass or overcome what post-Kantian philosophy, in Meillassoux’s terms, consists of: correlationism, which comprises “disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and

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objectivity independently of one another.”" This subjectivity of post-Kantian philosophy is consistent with a dominant conception of anthropocentrism. Brassier shows that “it is no longer realism which is naive, but rather the compulsive idealism inherent in the post-critical assumption that all access to reality is necessarily circumscribed by the circle of transcendental synthesis.”

By conjugating Meillassoux, Badiou and Laruelle, Brassier seeks to think what he considers as that which is not or pure negativity without it, represented under anthropocentric and philosophical representation. Brassier draws from the work of Wilfred Sellars to distinguish between what the latter calls the manifest image and the scientific image. Brassier’s chapter-long intervention in Laruelle’s work seeks to “extract from his writings a de-phenomenologized concept of the real as ‘being-nothing’.” His criticism of Laruelle stems from aiming “not to denigrate Laruelle’s achievement…but on the contrary to dislodge a rebarbative carapace which, far from warding off misinterpretation, seems to have succeeded only in barring appreciation of his thought’s significance.” It is through Laruelle’s presumed anthropocentrism of Man as the name of the real that Brassier finds problematic. Brassier is no stranger to this at all. Because of Laruelle’s critique of philosophical decision falls short of removing anthropocentrism from his practice, Brassier claims that “the critical purchase of Laruelle’s work becomes at once much narrower and far more perspicuous: his contribution can be seen to consist in the elaboration of a coherently articulated anti-correlationist stance – but one which abjures any resort to intellectual intuition – rather than a

11 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 129.
13 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 118.
14 Ibid.
‘non-philosophy’.” Brassier sees the philosophical import of non-philosophy towards specific ends that find in non-philosophy the means to extricate that which is not from the circle of correlationism and anthropocentrism in the manifest image. Furthermore, of many of Laruelle’s works, Brassier privileges six works with distinct conjunctures and invariants.

In this instance, would it be ironic to ask that in contrast to Brassier’s claim that Laruelle conflates a particular way of philosophizing with philosophizing tout court that Brassier, in turn, conflates a particular way of non-philosophizing with non-philosophy tout court? Rather than the goals outlined in non-philosophy – to liberate thought from its enclaves and democratize it for human usage – Brassier is invested in pushing the purpose of thought to its extreme ends, to know the nothing or that which is not scientifically, i.e., without any manifest image to use Sellarsian terms. Compared to his writings on Prometheanism, which sees “that there is no reason to assume a predetermined limit to what we can achieve or to the ways in which we can transform ourselves and our world,” one can claim that Brassier’s purchase of non-philosophy for philosophical ends is nothing short of normative: it does not identify itself with the programme. Perhaps even in the Marxist claim that “the failure to change the world may not be unrelated to the failure to understand it,” one may see a lingering glimpse of Laruelle’s theoretically based real critique of the World. However, as in the example of Brassier, one can be a Larualien without having to be a non-philosopher or dedicated to non-philosophy: purchasing non-philosophy for philosophical ends is as much a Larualienation as it is an alienation of non-philosophy.

16 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 134.
17 Ibid, 120.
Jonathan Fardy, an alumnus of the Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, has written three books on Laruelle, *The Real is Radical: Marx After Laruelle, Laruelle and Art: The Aesthetics of Non-Philosophy, Laruelle and Non-Photography*. As he points out in the preface, the latter is “part reader’s guide and part commentary”\(^{20}\) for Laruelle’s books on photography. The former, by contrast, is “a meta-philosophical analysis of the aesthetics of non-aesthetics or the aesthetics of non-philosophy...[that] Laruelle’s practice of non-philosophy is fundamentally an aesthetic practice even while it is not reducible to aesthetics as defined in the standard sense.”\(^{21}\) Here, I focus on *Laruelle and Art*. While *Laruelle and Non-Photography* is a short readerly text, Fardy’s *Laruelle and Art* draws out the non-philosophical in aesthetic works such as Picasso’s *Guernica*, Duchamp’s ready-mades, and other examples in the book on art. Fardy’s work is strikingly in contrast to other approaches since Fardy seeks to show how art thinks outside of the principle of sufficient philosophy.\(^{22}\)

The non-philosophical, to Fardy, is defined as a “‘kind’ of writing that ‘looks’ philosophical but isn’t...Laruelle’s ‘clones’ look like concepts but are rendered in a style immanent to non-philosophy.”\(^{23}\) Fardy’s concern is not only the aesthetic characteristics of non-philosophically reading into art but also the identification of non-philosophy as “an art of thinking modeled on the immanent thought in art.”\(^{24}\) Throughout *Laruelle and Art*, Fardy shares insights with other secondary authors, like Galloway, and places Laruelle’s work alongside other theorists and philosophers of aesthetics, like Adorno and Barthes, and artists, like Turrell, Rauschenberg, and Anish Kapoor. However, Fardy spends too much time on what non-philosophy says and does


\(^{22}\) Ibid, xiv-xv.

\(^{23}\) Ibid, 35.

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 50.
that, in his last chapter (the most innovative approach to his study), a theory of non-aesthetics is conceived only to be concluded with a question mark. By drawing on Laruelle to make a case for a non-aesthetics, Fardy leaves his meta-(non-)philosophical analyses in suspense, not concluding and instead perpetuating “meta-non-philosophical problems that are in need of clarification.” In contrast to his concluding remarks that “younger scholars have taken the courageous step to work on unapologetically deep and transdisciplinary research projects aimed at asking the ‘big questions’ in the face of a university culture in which disciplines have largely retreated into conservative silos” and “Laruelle is part of this renewal [of theory] and that may be one of the best reasons to read and continue to read his work” (to which I am deeply sympathetic) – it is hard to renew such a theory in the face of this conservativism when maintaining the very legitimate and normative practice of “French Philosopher and X,” which Larualienation nonetheless supports, rather than making the case against theory for theory’s sake.

It is surprising that Alexander Galloway, who opens his text with “I do not claim definitive knowledge of François Laruelle. I do not present this book as full and clear exposition of Laruelle’s notoriously idiomatic endeavor,” has been taken as one of the representative Anglophonic authorities on non-philosophy. In a way, his text, Laruelle: Against the Digital, strives to highlight Laruelle’s work for his ends: it is not a book on Laruelle, but what Laruelle can do for him on the digital. Galloway’s thesis for his book is “not simply to interpret Laruelle’s existing paper trail, but further to collide Laruelle with a theme and context largely missing in his writings, the theme of digitality.” According to Galloway, this is because digitality permeates the contemporary conjuncture and shares a similar structure to philosophy and its binaries. Not just zeroes and ones,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{25}} \text{Ibid, 158.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{26}} \text{Ibid, 159.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{27}} \text{Alexander Galloway, Laruelle: Against the Digital (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), xi.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{28}} \text{Ibid, xviii. Emphases in the original.} \]
but beings and others are digital. This analog/digital split introduced by Galloway is reminiscent of the philosophical division between materialism and idealism, considering Laruelle a ‘materialist’ to support this claim.\textsuperscript{29} Galloway finds in Laruelle this withdrawal from the standard model that is extreme (like Tony Hawk or Hulk Hogan\textsuperscript{30}), an “ethos of negation, not affirmation…to slough off the very apparatus of subject formation that obliges a person to assume such a position [of minority]”\textsuperscript{31} like proletariat or queer, for instance. A quasi-quietism in Galloway’s work makes non-philosophy more of an ethical decision and questionably so. One of Galloway’s goals is pitting Laruelle alongside and in contrast to that of Alain Badiou in a post-Deleuzian theory landscape, setting up these dynamics between ethics, on the side of science (Laruelle) and politics, on the side of philosophy (Badiou), a division that Louis Althusser devises.\textsuperscript{32} One wonders why Galloway’s reaction is to make non-philosophy’s critique of philosophical sufficiency into an “ethics.” Even if his usage of Laruelle for his ends is quite interesting for its consequences in digital media studies, there are still other factors to consider. For instance, the distinction between the “event” in Badiou and the so-called “prevent” “which means two things at once: the prevent is both what comes before the event (pre-event) and what hinders the event (prevention).”\textsuperscript{33} Galloway seeks to find the means to explain Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that “We do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, xxviii.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 25.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 42.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 186. Galloway refers specifically to Althusser, “Lenin and Philosophy,” \textit{Lenin and Philosophy and other essays}, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 13. However, on 15, Althusser writes that “Everything which touches on politics may be fatal to philosophy, for philosophy lives on politics.” I take this statement from Althusser to be contradictory to Galloway’s claims over ethics here because the division itself between politics and ethics is not only philosophical but political. In other words, I argue that Galloway is confusing ‘pragmatics’, something Laruelle speaks of throughout his work, and ‘ethics’ in the political understanding of it.
\textsuperscript{33} Galloway, \textit{Laruelle}, 16.
We lack creation. *We lack resistance to the present.*"\(^{34}\) Through his conceptualization of the prevent, Galloway’s Laruelle gives resistance a new form against communication, by becoming a non-representationalist schema of inexchangeability. It may have been better to have written a work entitled “The Degauss of Philosophy,” but I would argue that for all of Galloway’s resistance to Deleuzianism, his Laruelle reads too much like Deleuze. I do not make of non-philosophy an ethics, like Galloway does. I take non-philosophy as a pragmatics removed from philosophical and worldly authorities: “[t]he real critique of unitary philosophy is above all not its becoming-real, which is only the becoming-philosophical of the real. It is its practical or pragmatic ‘abolition’.”\(^{35}\) Such is not worthy of any one philosopher, *avant le lettre*, but to empower those philosophers without philosophical and worldly authority, ordinary human beings, carrying on the transformation of the world.

Ian James’ recent text, *The Technique of Thought*, situates the works of Jean-Luc Nancy, François Laruelle, Catherine Malabou, and Bernard Stiegler alongside each other to interrogate “the way philosophy can, or should, be practiced, and with this the objects of its inquiry, its relation to other forms of knowledge, and even perhaps its ultimate aims or goals.”\(^{36}\) Drawing from the work of Ó Maoilearca, James interrogates the technique of thought after what is known as “post-Continental naturalism,” where naturalism comes to signify three commitments to: the continuum between philosophy and empirical or hard sciences, the rejection of Cartesian dualism, and epistemology as grounded and determined by the real. All these commitments align with a principle of physicalism represented by the four thinkers listed in the text’s subtitle. James

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\(^{35}\) *BoOM*, 163.

dedicates a chapter on Laruelle’s notion of generic sciences. According to James, generic sciences permit one “to understand scientific knowledge and practice in terms of an unbounded and plural field of the open sciences rather than science understood as some kind of monolith.”\textsuperscript{37} James’ overall text is an interesting overview of some of the strands in contemporary forms of philosophy and the goals of rethinking or reconfiguring naturalism in a novel practice. The difficulty with this text, however, stems from a mixture between each of these forms of thought: while each thinker, in their own right, engages in similar practices as a response to the faults of traditional naturalism, the syncretic and synthetic decision of aligning, all the while only pointing to Laruelle’s desire “to show that it is above all not a question of simply reinstating a notion of the simple givenness of scientific objectivity by way of a naive…empiricism or positivism…[but rather] nonphilosophy [\textit{sic}] in general is an experimental thought that arises from a specific experience of and within thought itself, and that gives rise to guiding hypotheses or initial axioms from which all else follows.”\textsuperscript{38} above all else, avoids what distinguishes non-philosophy from the others. What distinguishes non-philosophy from them is the generic subject doing the work in non-philosophy, not the thinking-thing or the subject determined by the thought. James’ commitment here is less that of a Larualien approach than something shared between the Larualiens and the general thought-world that they occupy: it highlights the tendency of that thought in a vein that does not liberate it from thought for thought’s sake.

Katerina Kolozova’s work responds to the question: who is the subject of non-philosophy? Three of her books approach this question in meaningful ways. \textit{Cut of the Real: Subjectivity in Poststructuralist Philosophy}, for instance, seeks “to conceive of possibilities of rethinking the real by building on the legacy of poststructuralist feminist philosophy and in particular a philosophy

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 126.  
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 127.
that is primarily grounded in the work of Judith Butler and her reappropriations of Foucault and Lacan…What is at stake here is expanding the critical possibilities of a potent feminist philosophical legacy by affirming the relevance of theoretical investigations about the effects of the real on our discursive universes.”

This book, in particular, focuses on a reading of Lacan and Laruelle that engages in a transformation of how poststructuralism and poststructuralist feminism tend to disavow of universalism and the creation of ‘bad words’: “the one and the real have come to be equated with fixedness, stability, and continuity…one implies unification and unification implies universalism, realism implies the violence of positivism, and fixedness and stability intimate the heteronormative and patriarchal essentializing of the historically conditioned gender positions.”

According to Kolozova, these words have been banned precisely because of the historicity tied to some of them, but to just toss them away implies the jettisoning of any experience of thought outside the limits of what is possible.

Kolozova’s *Cut of the Real* is her most methodical text that outlines what her two other texts do in terms of political economy, patriarchy, and humanist metaphysics. Her shorter work, *Toward a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism: Marx and Laruelle*, builds upon contemporary discussions with regards to a postcapitalist future, specifically in conversation with left-accelerationist thinkers Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams and Xenofeminism. Building alongside this, upon her stance regarding the linguistic realities of what is possible, she draws from Marx’s critique of alienation and Laruelle’s non-standard realism to critique “that the theoretical investigation of the modes of lingual construction of our realities should be conducted in a way so those realities are affirmed as exteriority…It is indispensable to do so in order to arrive to the

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40 Ibid, 79.
possibility of overcoming the dictatorship of speculation in contemporary financial capitalism, postmodern theory, and politics."41 Throughout the text, Kolozova investigates the philosophical and capitalist entwinement that occurs regarding wage labour, automation, cyborg feminism, and the subjugation of animals and humans to existing capitalist technologies.

Kolozova’s “metaphysics” here, however, need some nuance. It is with her latest text, Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals: A Non-Marxist Critique of Capital, Philosophy and Patriarchy, that Kolozova’s work meshes. Her critique of the linguistic turn continues by stating the following: “what the linguistic turn should have been in search of by trying to approach sciences and separate itself from philosophical atavism is, in fact, the exit from philosophy, not metaphysics. Metaphysical questions could be seen as clones of the experience that verges on the prelingual, stemming from that grounding bewilderment by the outsideness, by the real as the limitation to one’s self-expansion but also as an invitation to join it, an experience that invites not only philosophy but also science and art.”42 Kolozova’s notion of metaphysics is distinct from the philosophical form of metaphysics and its critique. It is because, for her, metaphysics is the conditions that, like the mode of production, are determined by the material qua physical. It is akin to what Marx had stated as the conditioning of “the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.”43 It is here that Kolozova, aligning not only with Laruelle’s non-Marxism but also Henry’s anti-Marxist reading of Marx, will highlight that metaphysics is taken literally as ‘after the physical’, which makes Laruelle’s notion of the real not

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only confused with a Lacanian register in *Cut of the Real* but also a physicalist rendering of the human-in-human with a further confused analogy with the non-human.\(^{44}\)

While I share Kolozova’s point that “politics of the non-human is indispensable for a postcapitalist vision of society and its socialist response,”\(^{45}\) I find the reduction of non-philosophy to being solely Marxist or radicalized to being Marxian *tout court* particularly limiting. Even the conception that the critique of political economy that Marx inaugurates but never fully carries out is mainly a “socialist political economy” is debatable.\(^{46}\) Indeed, some of non-philosophy’s phraseology draws from Marxist language. Still, non-philosophy also draws from Kantian, Hegelian, Spinozan, Deleuzian, Derridian, Heideggerian, Simondonian, Wittgensteinian language (and that is only the philosophical portion!). The shared commitment of Marxism and non-philosophy is indebted to human emancipation, but I find that what Marx and Laruelle have in common is a separate intellectual genealogy to be explored distinct from the adherence to the title “Marxism.”

John Ó Maoilearca has also dedicated his non-philosophical investigations, like Kolozova and James prior, to that of nonhuman philosophy. He first explored Laruelle and non-philosophy in his text, *Post-Continental Philosophy*, which sought to analyze the work of the quartet of Gilles Deleuze, Alain Badiou, Michel Henry, and François Laruelle, towards absolute or radical immanence over transcendence, that, to him, was the post-continental philosophical “wager being made…an event is unfolding in philosophical thought and that we are presently witnessing its formative outlines.”\(^{47}\) At this time, Ó Maoilearca considers non-philosophy “in a very technical sense, a pseudo-philosophy,” because appearances, according to the philosophical tradition, are

\(^{44}\) Kolozova, *Capitalism’s Holocaust of Animals*, 4.
\(^{45}\) Ibid, 20.
\(^{46}\) Ibid, 25.
the opposite of truth. He finds in Laruelle and non-philosophy this pursuit of “a unified rather than unitary theory of science and philosophy,” wherein “a unified theory will entail that philosophy is uprooted from its foundational status, it is regionalized or localized (laterally) alongside science in a more encompassing perspective.” Similar to James (who in turn drew from this text to make some of his connections apparent), there is a tendency present here to come up with a line or image of thought that is worthy of thought without engaging the problematic of the human present in Laruelle’s work. How does this fare compared to Ó Maoilearca’s more familiar text, *All Thoughts Are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy*? The goal for this text is not so much about an explicit philosophical introduction to Laruelle and non-philosophy, but rather to “approach the object tangentially, using myriad analogies and perspectives, not to represent what the thing is by averaging them out…but to instantiate how it works through the convergent movement between diverse images – always rectifying one image with another.”

The choice Ó Maoilearca makes is not without arbitrary decision, but rather artistic: following along the lines of Lars Von Trier’s *The Five Obstructions*, Ó Maoilearca demonstrates how Laruelle, like Von Trier, makes of his predecessors and their work anew under rigorous, if not ridiculous, conditions. Ó Maoilearca believes that because Von Trier is a democratizer of cinema, Laruelle can be a democratizer of thought, showing that “the non-philosophical posture” can help “understand theories of film as material parts of the Real of film…that if one materializes theory itself, then there is no point in looking for one transcendent discourse that will somehow have a privileged access to film.” The film-making process, as performance, makes material out

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48 Ibid, 137.
51 Ibid, 41.
52 Ibid, 37.
of what it cinematizes, and so too does non-philosophy according to Ó Maoilearca. However, it is the nonhuman that he focuses on, in the figure of the animal, for animals share an etymological root with animation to posit the claim “cinema thinks, monstrously.”53 How I distinguish myself from Ó Maoilearca is that the argument of the introduction towards a democracy of thought does not require that one outright state that an introduction is impossible, that it is an illusion, and to use the visual art form of cinema to introduce non-philosophy is the best means of an allusion to this experience.54 To the contrary, this does not require a list of “negatives” as sloganeering.55 It requires the struggle to invent the new conditions possible against the conditions that have, hitherto, limited such introductions, such interventions, and such mutations from coming about. Indeed, Ó Maoilearca’s own Larualienation is one that obstructs such a possibility towards that democracy: non-philosophical democracy is what becomes of people when they are no longer determinable by the thought that subjugates them, of which the equality of thought stripped of philosophical sufficiency is secondary.

Lastly, I bring attention to the work of Anthony Paul Smith, one of the first translators of Laruelle’s works. Two of his texts have been fruitful for my investigations, and I believe that some of Smith’s work has influenced Laruelle. Smith’s *A Non-Philosophical Theory of Nature: Ecologies of Thought* was published in 2013, two years prior to Laruelle’s *En dernière humanité: la nouvelle science écologique*, which was in turn translated by Smith in 2020. Smith writes in his first publication that “while the principles and practice of non-philosophy are what allows us to do this with a certain rigor and consistency, the goal…is to provide the conceptual tools necessary to think of thinking itself as ecological. Ideas about nature found in philosophy and theology can now

53 Ibid, 43.
54 Ibid, 35-37.
be treated as if they could be explored ecologically, rather than ecology requiring a philosophy or theology as such.”  

It is through ecology that Smith compliments the notion of democracy in non-philosophy as if the thoughts of ecology make up an ecology or ecosystem of thought. Where a democracy of thought seeks to only exclude the authority over thought, an ecosystem of thought “must evaluate the strength of that biodiversity within the particular ecosystem it exists within…one cannot simply discard a particular philosophy or theology on the basis of its low quotient of diversity or ‘species (of) thought’.”

Smith’s inventive approach is admirable towards amplifying democracy to the state of ecology, and, from there, reintroducing ecology into democracy.

It is with his Laruelle: A Stranger Thought that Smith shows how fruitful and philosophically fruitless non-philosophy can be: that kind of practice where Laruelle “wants to use the different philosophical analyses to do something with philosophy, without making any claim about the Real that conditions every theoretical project.”

Smith’s book is the first to introduce non-philosophy more generally. Separated in two parts, Smith focuses on the theory of the philosophical decision and non-philosophy’s style, along with the politics, science, ethics, fictioning, and gnostic heresy that come with Laruelle’s style of thought. Even if Smith agrees with Brassier on the fruitlessness of non-philosophy, we still need to tend to our garden (Voltaire), not because the future is possible, but thought determined by the real must carry on. I agree with Smith that “[in] the face of the constant harassment that comes from media-friendly images of the future, dystopian visions, and even everyday demands to constantly be worried about one’s own future, non-philosophy joins with other forms of thought that demand a future to the measure of

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57 Ibid, 60.
the human.” Smith is closest to the model I envision of an implemented non-philosophy. However, his work stalls by the interpretive gesture of exegesis, something this dissertation will end up falling under as well.

Two questions arise: is Laruelle a Larualien, and am I a Larualien? To be sure, Laruelle is neither Laruellean nor a Larualien in the same way Marx is not Marxist and Lacan is not Lacanian. Suppose we understand that non-philosophy is the emancipatory practice of liberating oneself from the thought they operate on unilaterally. In that case, the assumption that there is a univocal “Laruelleanism” is a Larualien claim, nevertheless instituting a vicious circle without any possible escape. On the other hand, I would like to consider myself a non-philosopher who, like Laruelle, identifies with humankind but not for the purposes Laruelle says and does. I learn from Laruelle, from what he says and does, in order to continue the work that he has only introduced and inaugurated.

0.2. Towards a Critique of Humanity’s Judgment

Larualiens are not non-philosophers, but those who strive to preach the Good News in ways that are for the name-of-the-Father and not non-philosophers, not ordinary people. There are slivers of kernels that the Larualien can be a non-philosopher, but they have not learned to harness it. While I draw from Laruelle, as much as anyone else influenced by his work, and I draw from non-philosophers (from the slivers of kernels of the Larualiens, as well) in this new disciplinary “construction site” that requires consistent refinement, I do not seek to extend *ad infinitum* commentaries begetting commentaries, footnotes begetting footnotes, a war of who has said it better, the most faithful of followers to Laruelle, or to be more Laruellean (Larualien) than Laruelle. Even bad faith attempts at countering his work and superseding him, “more Larualien

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59 Ibid, 173.
than Laruelle,” are examples of faithfulness towards Laruelle. Instead, I seek out human practices of non-philosophy.

Human practices of non-philosophy are faithful towards the expansion not just of non-philosophy but democratic, human realities resisted by the conditions of the conjuncture, which I discuss further below, conditions that even the Larualiens partake. In this sense alone, the transcendental axiomatic of non-philosophy, its strength and independence, has become, instead, a need to reiterate, apologize, interpret, examine, cite, and make an example of Laruelle as non-philosophy or, better yet, Laruelle and/or against X, Y, and Z as non-philosophy. At the risk of tautology, Larualiens alienate as much as Laruellelize non-philosophy at once.

Rather than doing “as” Laruelle does (whom this dissertation may be seen as an attempt to emulate, whether uncritically or without any sort of rigour), I seek to do “with” Laruelle what he has so striven to do for the past fifty years. Furthermore, I strive to inaugurate a continuation of the work, to bring new stakes against what may seem like a repetition of the material from which I borrow. However, the task is to uni-lateralize these “foreign influences” to limit any correspondence or correlation between “the people” and the exteriority considered as “philosophy” or “World.” The task concerns inventing the possibility of invention, to invent non-philosophy with or under philosophical and worldly conditions, and the invention of a new thought or subject, a generic one, who or which carries out the invention of new thoughts without negating the old.

60 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science Book V, §346, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 286-287: “The whole pose of ‘man against the world’, of man as a ‘world-negating’ principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting—the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of ‘man and world’, separated by the sublime presumption of the little word ‘and’.”

61 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 23: “We learn nothing from those who say: ‘Do as I do’. Our only teachers are those who tell us to ‘do with me’, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce.”

62 PNS, 92.
Planck’s cryptic principle, that “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it,” is equally applicable to non-philosophy’s development: what happens when Laruelle passes on, does non-philosophy die with him? If the philosophical decision continues attempting to make people – the People (of) the One – a by-product of the World, then non-philosophy does not and will not die off. These are the stakes of non-philosophy and its conjunctural way of thinking. It is a matter of a progressive theoretical analysis of how philosophy in its various forms constitutes the capital-form of and within thought and its Greco-Western humanism as the superior form of racism.

0.3. Structure of the Dissertation

There are four chapters to this dissertation. Each chapter develops on the themes found in the previous ones and requires an attentive linear reading. Rather than an analysis of philosophical anthropology and humanism alone, much of which is the subject of Laruelle’s criticism of Greco-Western philosophy, I focus on the role that philosophy serves in its “reactionary” and “revolutionary” tendencies united in its congenital idealism that assumes philosophy as a mediator to lead people to the greater good, even the Good itself. The progressive development of this dissertation identifies and elaborates upon Laruelle’s slogan, “philosophy is made for man, not man for philosophy.” Afterwards, this slogan can be uttered without contradiction and practiced without fear. Here, I seek to transfigure non-philosophy in its identification as human philosophy into a tool for human emancipation. Marx distinguishes between political and human emancipation in his criticism of Bruno Bauer’s “Zur Judenfrage” or “The Jewish Question.” As Ido de Haan has noted in his overview of the distinction:

Marx criticized Bauer for presenting a theological argument, differentiating between Jews and Christians, yet failing to reflect on the notion of ‘political emancipation’ as the separation between a public sphere of the state, and a private sphere of civil society. Marx proposed to “break with the theological formulation of the question”...and to understand the Jewish question as an expression of the “general question of the time”, namely the relation between political and human emancipation...Political emancipation, expressed first of all in the separation of Church and State, makes religion an instance of “the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of community, but the essence of difference”...Political emancipation is therefore only a halfway-house: the Hegelian ethical state remains incomplete as long as civil society is divided by both privatized religion....and by private interest....Political emancipation covered the material inequality of civil society, which only could be overcome by a truly human emancipation.  

Human emancipation as an authentic form of emancipation entails the absorption of political life within and irreducible to the real, human individual “only when [the real individual] has recognized and organized his own powers as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power.” Philosophy may be reactionary and revolutionary, but it never serves to recognize this radical demand wherein the creative power of the human individual is no longer separate from themselves. Such will be this dissertation’s guiding thread or the background hum.

Chapter 1 reflects on the attempted union of philosophy and humanity through philosophical means. I analyze the works of Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, and Louis Althusser to identify the strands of thought wherein philosophy serves in some capacity as the means to free individuals from the conditions that bog them down. Respectively, one may find this in the guiding of philosophy towards infinite tasks, the emancipation of man from the slavery of abstract labour and capital and representing the class struggle in theory. In this chapter, I pose the following question: What kind of philosophy does humanity deserve? Does humanity even need a

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philosophy? What role should philosophy play for humanity? Yet, what do we mean by “humanity” here? What kind of humanity does philosophy serve? What exactly is at stake in the relationship between philosophy and humanity? Is it possible to define humanity adequately in a philosophical fashion? Lastly, must philosophy and humanity serve one another reciprocally? I find some affinities between Husserl, Horkheimer and Althusser to what Laruelle analyzes and criticizes in his work. Still, it is not until the second chapter that I investigate the uniqueness of Laruelle’s thought as a whole.

As mentioned, Chapter 2 provides a holistic overview of the phases, concepts, and problematics grounded in Laruelle’s work throughout its over 50-year development. In five or six separate phases, non-philosophy is “human philosophy,” a radical practice or discipline of philosophy that is inalienably ordered from the subject (of) science: the identity of science (and) ordinary people or *homo sive scientia*. I pose the following questions for this chapter: What purpose does it serve to distinguish “human philosophy” or “non-philosophical humanism” (hereon abbreviated to non-humanism), that is, a genuine philosophy of man, from the varying humanisms of the Western tradition of philosophy and post-humanisms in their wake? Why does Laruelle retain a prejudiced term such as “man” for a practice that would like to present itself as “non-humanist”? What is there to learn from Laruelle’s non-philosophical humanism or human philosophy to better propose outlooks beyond the prevailing Western humanist and anthropocentric outlooks? Or does Laruelle’s work retain Eurocentrism even in the proclamation that non-philosophy provides a constant valid for generic humanity, that is, a humanity devoid of philosophical sufficiency? I analyze the varying invariants that Laruelle provides a criticism of that have barely been touched on by secondary scholarship in English, such as demo-logical difference, anthropo-logical difference, ego-xeno-logical difference, or, most recently, eco-logical
difference. The goal of non-philosophy is to emancipate the radical human or minoritarian kernel within the philosopher but also each and every one individual identified as an ordinary man to transform and invent the future. The question then is, emancipate from what?

Chapter 3 answers this question through an exegetical reading of Laruelle’s 1980 essay, “Homo ex machina.” I pose the following questions for this chapter: Why must one break from philosophical sufficiency? Why does Laruelle refer to philosophy as the superior form of biotechnology and the capital-form of thought? How does Laruelle distinguish this break, if it is at all possible, from other philosophers who deal with a similar problematic? How does the break from philosophical sufficiency correlate to questions regarding democracy? To what extent does philosophical sufficiency weaponize life – including bios and zoê, and even death – becoming what Laruelle calls bio-political parallelism? I frame this essay’s importance alongside the writings of thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze to identify the pressing need to liberate oneself from the parallelisms arising between technology, power, and biopolitics. By bridging biotechnology and the capital-form in Laruelle’s work, I seek to identify an invariant that endangers human life by and through philosophy. Laruelle’s call is to liberate or rather uni-lateralize the fatality and addressedness, the Schicksal of minorities from the progressive collapse of the State, the rise of a superior form of racism, and complete control over life within philosophy. This penultimate chapter further brings to light the call for a new framework of democracy authentically and subjectively radicalized in human experience.

Finally, Chapter 4 serves as a sort of prolegomenon to a theory of non-politics. While I juxtapose Laruelle’s approaches to democracy and fidelity to the last instance of generic humanity in an often-comparative way to other thinkers such as Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, and Jacques Derrida, it is not by mere word association to come up with a theory of a non-politics in the
singular. Such attempts were made previously, and even criticized, by scholars Lee Chien-Chang and Sophie Lesueur and ultimately developed into a radical anti-politics in Gilles Grelet’s work. Nevertheless, non-politics is irreducible to the completely Marxian reading of Laruelle’s work and instead tries to bring to the surface the non-Rousseauism present either latently or manifestly throughout. The following questions direct this chapter: What is a non-philosophical theory of human sovereignty without philosophical sufficiency? How is a critique of power that would not be of power (i.e., continuous with power) possible? How does one transform – or rather, transfigure – non-philosophy as human philosophy into – if not a tool of, at least – human emancipation itself? Towards the end of the chapter, I bring about a sort of “Laruelle contra Laruelle,” pitting the non-Rousseauian against the Nietzschean political materialist frameworks to rethink some of the bases of non-politics. As it serves as a prolegomenon to a future work on non-politics, I introduce some first terms: non-politics as first politics (without it being a prima politica), the en-demic paradigm, futural democracy, sous-vereignty, and the generic will.

0.4. On the Title

Before turning to Chapter 1, I would like to provide the reader with the reason as to why this dissertation is titled “The Cave and the Stars.” The title derives from Sean O’Casey’s The Plough and the Stars, a play that Christopher Murray notes is O’Casey’s play that “most ambitiously addresses the human comedy at the point where violent public events suddenly transform it into tragedy.”\(^{66}\) The choice of this title is of no coincidence, however. It is mentioned by Anne-Françoise Schmid, Laruelle’s wife, to be a text he cites occasionally.\(^{67}\) As a satirical play

\(^{67}\) Anne-Françoise Schmid, “A Mood for Philosophy,” Labyrinth 19.2 (Winter 2017), 15. “François has made the serpentine line live again in philosophy within his first published work, Phénomène et Différence…One can find it everywhere, in his whole work, and it is the dynamic of his latest work: The Last Humanity…where ecology, habitually reduced to horizontal movements of the planet, finds its vertical dimension. François cites from time to time the Irish
about the 1916 rebellion presented ten years after, O’Casey criticizes the nationalist ideals and principles as abandoning the poor, resulting in riots following its first production at the Abbey Theatre in 1926.

It was not until the second act, as recounted by Murray, where the character Rosie Redmond, a prostitute, is juxtaposed alongside the voice of the nationalist movement, wherein “the words of Pádraic Pearse used by the Figure in the Window were recognized, and the contrast between their high-mindedness and the low life and vulgarity of the working-class characters in the pub became increasingly obvious.”68 Such a juxtaposition may be seen between philosophy and humanity in its destining from the cave to the stars, a type of dramaturgical analogy from the pages of a play to the epic introduced in Laruelle’s ultimate work, Tétralogos. If O’Casey’s “apotheosis” were to be found in The Plough and the Stars, it would be a sure mistake to refer to Laruelle’s critique of humanity’s judgment as apotheotic. Even crafting a nightmare of a term such as “apoanthropoeitic” would be a disgrace. No philosophy can save us, not more than a god. What is to be done with philosophy then? This dissertation aspires to answer that question.

writer Seán O’Casey’s The Plough and the Stars as a way to remind us that he is the son of a farmer who became a philosopher and as a title that he transforms into “From the Cave to the Stars” according to the serpentine line.”

Chapter 1 - On the Unity of Philosophy and Humanity

“When philosophy and life are confused, we no longer know whether we are interested in philosophy because it is life, or whether we care about life because it is philosophy.”

Levinas, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”

1.0. Introduction: The Antinomy of Philosophy and Humanity

While many examine the relationship between philosophy and humanity, my dissertation examines it antinomically. Philosophy aspires not only to correspond with humanity as its self-reflection: it also seeks to guide, emancipate, educate, even tyrannically rule over humanity. One may question what is so troubling that philosophy stands in as a guardian for humanity and against what forces. Or what is more concerning, against humanity itself. It is here one may see an irreconcilable relationship between philosophy and humanity. In varying ways, humanity is at odds with philosophy and its ideals, and thus must be directed and governed by it. This dissertation argues it is not humanity that is incompatible with philosophy; instead, it is philosophy that is incompatible with humanity. Among the four questions Kant posed in his lectures on logic, “What can I know, what ought I to do, what may I hope,” it is the fourth, “What is man or what is the human being,” to which all the other questions are related. Grounding philosophy in anthropology

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poses significant problems for a metaphysical definition of humanity. Above all, it is a matter of whether or not such a definition indeed corresponds to humanity as a supposedly philosophizing species.

The following questions serve as a problematic. What kind of philosophy does humanity deserve? Does humanity even need a philosophy? What role should philosophy play for humanity? Yet, what do we mean by “humanity” here? What kind of humanity does philosophy serve? What exactly is at stake in the relationship between philosophy and humanity? Is it possible to define humanity adequately in a philosophical fashion? Lastly, must philosophy and humanity serve one another reciprocally? In this chapter, I offer responses serving as a foundation from which the notions “human philosophy” and “human emancipation” will arise in the later parts of this dissertation.

This chapter examines instances of the relationship between philosophy and humanity proposed by early and mid-20th-century European thinkers. I first investigate the spiritual discontent experienced by European humanity and its crises as described by transcendental phenomenologist Edmund Husserl in his famous 1935 Vienna Lecture. I then analyze the essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” by the Frankfurt School theorist Max Horkheimer. Lastly, I turn to Louis Althusser’s central claim philosophy represents the class struggle in theory by investigating his programmatic essay, “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and Ideological Struggle.” In each thinker’s arguments, philosophy serves a purpose for humanity: whether it is to uplift a general malaise in spirit, to overcome an all-encompassing politico-economic and philosophical constraint, or above all to unify with people or a movement against the powers that be, philosophy is in humanity’s service. In turn, though, it is up to the people to uphold their end of the bargain to fulfill the ideals of philosophy.
This chapter highlights the following problematic: the relationship between philosophy and humanity is undoubtedly incompatible, but this incompatibility should not lead to an impasse for a theoretical solution. As argued, the non-philosophy conceptualized by François Laruelle and defined as “human philosophy” offers the theoretical solution to the aporias left unquestioned internally to philosophy itself.

1.1. Husserl and Philosophy as Self-Reflection of Mankind

In his *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Edmund Husserl recognizes a “crisis” unfolding at the turn of the century indicated not with “the scientific character of the sciences but rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence.”

Instead of aiming for a genuine sense of humanity, the sciences turned towards “prosperity.” After World War I, philosophers and scientists posed existential questions concerning the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of human existence, abstracting everything from the subjective towards hard objectivity. In the warp and weft of games of power, when the life of humanity spurs science, Husserl focuses on the problematic at play in his famous 1935 Vienna Lecture, writing the following:

Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense, and well-being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment?

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5 Ibid, 7.
Husserl explores the deeply rooted presupposition at the heart of the philosophical spirit inhabiting the existing positivistic and humanistic sciences. This presupposition promotes universal knowledge. The problems of fact and reason, in turn, complicate life as metaphysical. Husserl investigates what the struggle for the meaning of humanity consists of, claiming it is equally spiritual and physical. To Husserl, recognizing this struggle is the task of vital philosophies. The lecture’s responsibility is to decide upon

whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reasoning, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature—whether this telos, then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such, its entelechy.6

Husserl’s analysis of the crisis reckons with the destiny of humanity and man as a rational animal in a rational civilization directed towards human universal knowledge. The lecture focuses on European humanity, a people supposedly bound to their true potential.7 While Husserl upholds a Eurocentric worldview, his investigation dedicates itself to understanding what he considers the “inborn” essence of European humanity, which has hitherto been naïve and lazy in its self-analysis. For Husserl, philosophers are “functionaries of mankind.”8 Therefore, the vital task is the necessity to reflect historically and critically what philosophy must do.

Husserl’s lecture begins by espousing philosophy’s function in the teleological development of European humanity. Starting with an analogy regarding the relationship between the life sciences and the body, Husserl envisages how the human spirit and the human body interact in connection to the horizon of thought in the humanistic sciences. “Life,” following Husserl’s

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6 Ibid, 15.
7 Ibid, 16.
8 Ibid, 17.
understanding, “signifies purposeful life accomplishing spiritual products…creating culture in the unity of a historical development.”

Husserl recognizes “life” within a multitude of existing humanistic disciplines. It relates to the overarching diagnostic of the spiritual crisis of Europe as such. Distinguishing between the objective, hard or natural sciences, and the subjective, humanistic disciplines, Husserl argues an analysis of the human spirit, including its body, cannot be determined through existing sciences: “what if the whole way of thinking that manifests itself in the foregoing presentation rested on portentous prejudices and, in its effects, itself shared in the responsibility for the European sickness?”

Husserl focuses on an overarching Europe-problem constituting a world-representation of the surrounding environment. This spiritual structure is within both European humanity and its historical life. Europe is understood less as a geographical locus on the globe but “the unity of a spiritual life, activity, creation, with all its ends, interests, cares, and endeavors, with its products of purposeful activity, institutions, organizations.”

Husserl is concerned with understanding the spiritual shape or physicality of Europe. According to Husserl, what is immanent to Europe, its telos, can and must be discerned from a universal standpoint of humanity taking on a new form

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9 Ibid, 270. This is useful when exploring Henry’s deployment of the term in his study of the self-negation of life by way of barbarism elsewhere. See Michel Henry, Barbarism, trans. Scott Davidson (London: Continuum, 2012). Henry unites Husserl’s definition of life as praxis with Marx’s framework of the materialist conception of history, defined in the phrase “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.” See Chapter 3 below for reflections on Henry.

10 Husserl, The Crisis, 272.

11 Ibid, 273.

12 In the original German, “spiritual shape of Europe” is “die geistige Gestalt Europas.” See Edmund Husserl, Husserliana Band VI: Die Krisis Der Europäischen Wissenschaften Und Die Transzendentale Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 318. The use of Gestalt and its connection to spirituality here is affine with what Husserl elsewhere calls figural moments. These moments are the ways in which “sensuously unifying characters…serve as signs of plurality…[serving] as points d’appui for the signitively mediated cognition of plurality as such, and of plurality of the kind in question.” One can conceive of figural moments, for example, as a school of fish or a herd of elephants, as a way of recognizing the organization of parts as unified in a whole. Placed in the context of the spiritual shape of Europe, it is key to recognize the plurality of the European peoples to be spiritually united. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, vol.2, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge, 1970), 291-292.
that “seeks to live, and only can live, in the free shaping of its existence, its historical life, through
ideas of reason, through infinite tasks.”\textsuperscript{13}

Echoing Nietzsche’s “monumental history” wherein “the great moments in the struggles
of individuals form links in one single chain; that they combine to form a mountain range of
humankind through the millennia,”\textsuperscript{14} Husserl’s framework demonstrates the binding of peoples
through spiritual relations, albeit more oceanic than mountainous.\textsuperscript{15} Husserl argues there is a
kinship internal to European nations transcending their national differences. The uniqueness of the
European peoples, Husserl says, is also possibly recognized in peoples of civilizations, and can
“hold sway throughout all the changing shapes of Europe and accords to them [other civilizations]
the sense of a development toward an ideal shape of life and being as an eternal pole.”\textsuperscript{16} Concerned
with people’s spiritual unities, Husserl focuses on a universal humanity realized within the spiritual
telos of European people. Though it has its birthplace, which is not geographical but practical, one
has an attitude concerning the surrounding world. For the Ancient Greeks, the attitude was
philosophy, “nothing other than universal science, science of the universe, of the all-encompassing
unity of all that is.”\textsuperscript{17} For Husserl, there is something primordial to Europe within the practice of
philosophy. As a “rigorous science,” that is, towards the development of higher theoretical ends,
philosophy contains a cultural relationship with the self and its environs. The evolutionary and
historical development between philosophy and humanity follows a zigzag movement following
the creation of a new man and a reconstruction of the thought itself towards something integral,

\textsuperscript{13} The Crisis, 274.
\textsuperscript{15} Husserl, The Crisis, 274: “mankind appears as a single life of men and peoples bound together by only spiritual relations, with a plenitude of human and cultural types which nevertheless flowingly interpenetrate one another. It is like a sea, in which men and peoples are the fleetingly formed, changing, and then disappearing waves, some with richer, more complicated ripples, other with more primitive.”
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 275.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 276.
such as the common cultural spirit.\textsuperscript{18} The products can define a cultural spirit and forms these products take on, from the artisanal to the higher, philosophical forms, and what is lower on the cultural level can subsequently be serviced as material for higher, superior levels of ideality.

Husserl suggests that “science” “signifies the idea of an infinity of tasks, of which at any time a finite number have been disposed of and are retained as persisting validities.”\textsuperscript{19} Science helps direct peoples towards the ideal, a mutual infinite reality. Extrascientific culture, anything outside of philosophy as a rigorous science, is consistent with man in finitude, not of man in the infinitely distant. If infinity is guiding science and, therefore, humanity is directed towards the true and the good as the realization of Greek philosophy, scientific culture is the “revolutionization of the whole culture,”\textsuperscript{20} making a significant break from the finite constraints. These constraints form a people’s historical and cultural attitude, which is nothing but the “habitually fixed style of willing life comprising directions of the will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, the cultural accomplishments whose total style is thereby determined.”\textsuperscript{21} Suppose European humanity inherits something from the Greek cosmological universality of its attitude. In that case, it is the role \textit{theōria} (or contemplation) plays concerning contemplating the surrounding world, thus becoming a norm for Greek society. The new crisis entices investigations into what

\begin{itemize}
\item The zigzag movement is a theme present in the work contemporary philosopher, Serge Valdinoci and his own theory called europanalysis. This theory is contemporaneous with Laruelle’s own, indebted to Husserl’s work to find an immanent psychic unity that precedes Europe-philosophy. Crises for Valdinoci follow the path of torsions, distortions, and retorsions that integrate the previous moments toward an integral thought. See Valdinoci, \textit{Vers une méthode d’europanalyse} (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), 279-295. Valdinoci claims that the zigzag (283) “is the unity of ‘construction-deconstruction’, both unique and reiterated, figuring and disfiguring within the same movement,” indicating a to-and-fro movement that starts from a root that is immanent to its development. The zigzag movement is spoken about in \textit{The Crisis}, 58, where Husserl writes: “The understanding of the beginnings is to be gained fully only by starting with science as given in its present-day form, looking back at its development. But in the absence of an understanding of the \textit{beginnings} the development is mute as a \textit{development of meaning}. Thus we have no other choice than to proceed forward and backward in a zigzag pattern; the one must help the other in an interplay.”
\item Husserl, \textit{The Crisis}, 278.
\item Ibid, 279.
\item Ibid, 280.
\end{itemize}
may be the new norm or the new attitude lacking or missing in European humanity. The norm grounds all possible attitudes as a sort of ‘natural’ or fundamental attitude from which these attitudes emerge. Husserl’s focal point characterizes the fundamental attitude and the direction this attitude led towards. The “world” is a universal horizon a peoples direct themselves towards, either as an end or means. This “world” is always bound to a finite thematic insignificant for a universal reorientation and is doomed to a limited periodicity. There are two possibilities for which the genuine attitude can attain something beyond this periodicity:

One is that the interests of the new attitude are meant to serve the natural interests of life or, what is in essence the same thing, natural praxis. In this case the new attitude is itself a practical one. This can have a sense similar to that of the practical attitude of the politician…who in his praxis would serve the praxis of all…This, of course, still belongs to the sphere of the natural attitude, which is essentially differentiated according to the different types of community members and is in fact one thing for those who govern the community and another for the “citizens”…But in any case the analogy makes it understandable that the universality of a practical attitude, now related to the whole world, by no means need imply an interest and a concern with all the details or all the particular totalities within the world…But in addition to the higher-level practical attitude…there exists yet another essential possibility for altering the general natural attitude, namely, the theoretical attitude…The theoretical attitude, though it is again a vocational attitude, is totally unpractical…it is based on a voluntary epochē of all natural praxis, including the higher-level praxis that serves the natural sphere.22

These two possibilities, found in the distinction and even unity between practice and theory, should not be severed from each other as if they were two unrelated spheres of a culture. A third possibility introduced by Husserl is the synthesis of these two possibilities where theōria is no longer reducible to this indifferent sphere higher from natural praxis. This possibility is a unity or a universal closed sphere under the epochē (the suspension or bracketing of assumptions) of all praxis called on “to serve mankind in a new way, mankind which, in its concrete existence, lives first and always in the natural sphere.”23 Furthermore, this service results in a new praxis inclusive

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22 Ibid, 282.
23 Ibid, 283.
“of the universal critique of all life and all life-goals, all cultural products and systems that have already arisen out of the life of man; and thus it also becomes a critique of mankind itself and of the values which guide it explicitly or implicitly.”

This unity of theory and praxis embraces the Greek ideal of *paideia*: the person’s education to become the ideal member of society. It elevates humanity through this framework and transforms the old humanity into a new one “made capable of an absolute self-responsibility on the basis of absolute theoretical insights.” Husserl thus makes a proper break in connection to what may be the “religious-mythical attitude” to break away from to constitute a higher, scientific level of understanding.

The religious-mythical viewpoint recognizes how one perceives the world as practically and theoretically valid. The mythical aspect is defined less by elements typified by mythology (such as gods, demons, or fates), as it is where man’s destiny “depends mediately or immediately upon the way in which they hold sway,” wherein a control of the knowledge, its spread and access is governed by a select few of functionaries. This knowledge seeks to coalesce into a single, unified order of power presiding over all events in the world. It is a type of theodicy in which happiness nevertheless prevails over evil regardless of all the bad that happens. While the religious-mythical may give rise to certain scientific viewpoints and can be used practically towards those ends, perhaps even being preserved by the scientific (i.e., Greco-European philosophy), these perspectives remain constrained by the religious-mythical and can never escape that designation. By sharp contrast, when the “theoretical” attitude arises via spectatorship of the philosopher’s wonder, it demonstrates a partially active though non-participatory subject who receives the world without being caught up in its fates designed in advance. The philosopher is

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 284.
“gripped by the passion of a world-view and world-knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but pure theōria.” 27 While this arises in Greek humanity, Husserl is interested in analyzing what motivates the transformation from spectatorship in wonder to genuine theōria mediated by the contrast between the idea and episteme and how this cultivates from the Greek to its higher, European level of humanity. This cultivation is seen through the transformation from philosophy as passive wonder to philosophy as a rigorous science concerned with developing the world-representation into an accurate representation of the world itself. The ascent to pure theōria is the consistent development of theoretical knowledge upon the previous theoretical knowledge as an infinite task, and it is up to the philosopher to take on this task to break away from the finitude constraining their life and world.

It is the philosopher’s life that Husserl ideally sees as the vocation for a new humanity where each person is involved in the movement of philosophy’s scientific evolution. The critical importance of Husserl’s lecture, as George Heffernan notes, is how philosophers assume the responsibility as functionaries of humanity as a deeply existential concern that is as much a personal as a professional character, especially for Husserl during the rise of Nazi Germany. 28 Husserl writes the following:

Through isolated personalities like Thales, etc., there arises thus a new humanity: men who [live] the philosophical life, who create philosophy in the manner of a vocation as a new sort of cultural configuration. Understandably a correspondingly new sort of communalization arises. These ideal structures of theōria are concurrently lived through and taken over without any difficulty by others who reproduce the process of understanding and production. Without any difficulty they lead to cooperate work, mutual help through

28 See George Heffernan, “The Concept of Krisis in Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, in Husserl Studies 33, no. 3 (2017): 229-257. Heffernan underscores the varying events in Husserl’s life, such as the stripping of his teaching license with the passing of the Nuremberg Race Laws in 1935, the same year as the lecture, and points to an overarching spiritual discontent experienced on the part of the Jewish philosopher stripped of his humanity in the face of a developing barbarism.
mutual critique. Even the outsiders, the nonphilosophers [NB: not in Laruelle’s sense – JRS], become aware of this peculiar sort of activity. Through sympathetic understanding they either become philosophers themselves or, if they are otherwise vocationally too occupied, they learn from philosophers. Thus philosophy spreads in a twofold manner, as the broadening vocational community of philosophers and as a concurrently broadening community movement of education [Bildung]. But this is also the source of the subsequently so fateful internal division of the folk-unity into the educated and the uneducated…Unlike all other cultural works, philosophy is not a movement of interest which is bound to the soil of the national tradition. Aliens, too, learn to understand it and generally take part in the immense cultural transformation which radiates out from philosophy.29

It is this characterization of the new and future humanity Husserl aspires to recognize as peculiar to European philosophy as the genuine scientific worldview. It is through philosophy itself that there arises a twofold spiritual effect. On the one hand, philosophy engages the philosopher’s theoretical attitude, which is critical to the world surrounding them through their stance towards it. Their “resolve [is] not to accept unquestioningly any pregiven opinion or tradition so that he can inquire, in respect to the whole traditionally pregiven universe, after what is true in itself, an ideality.”30 Such a posture is not reducible to the cognitive and knowing, but the entirety of culture and the spiritual life, resulting in an ultimate transformation from the empirical to the ideal. The standards of everyday life are, therefore, subject to scrutiny towards the ideal. On the other hand, it concerns how everyday life practices transform with this new stance exerted by the philosopher. These two parts synthesize into an ideal humanity and the culture’s calling of this community. Philosophy becomes less a tradition bound to a mythical worldview finitely dictating humanity but an infinite task fortifying a community of truth-seekers, a type of philosophical democracy:

Philosophical knowledge of the world creates not only those particular sorts of results but also a human posture which immediately intervenes in the whole remainder of practical life with all its demands and ends, the ends of the historical tradition in which one is brought up and which receive their validity from this source. A new and intimate

29 Husserl, The Crisis, 286.
30 Ibid.
community...develops among men, men who live for philosophy, bound together in their devotion to ideas, which not only are useful to all but belong to all identically. Necessarily there develops a communal activity of a particular sort, that of working with one another and for one another, offering one another helpful criticism, through which there arises a pure and unconditioned truth-validity as common property. In addition, this interest has a natural tendency to propagate itself through the sympathetic understanding [by others] of what is sought and accomplished in it; there is a tendency, then, for more and more still nonphilosophical persons to be drawn into the community of philosophers.\textsuperscript{31}

Education then becomes the bedrock for this spread of an international community of philosophers, a people who carry on life towards the development of ideas as a stronger fortress against any powers that be on the scale of national boundaries. What was once foreign to one another becomes increasingly recognizable as a scientific community of people who commonly seek out the universal critical stance: the universal science (or \textit{mathesis universalis}) genuine to truth and its fortification. European humanity embraces this ideal in essence as its spiritual shape and can entice humanity – through “domination”\textsuperscript{32} – to embody this ideal for the infinite tasks ahead, and the one infinite task requires further elucidation: the freedom of universal theoretical reflection encompassing not only all ideals but the universe of all ideals.

Husserl then places his attention towards an objection that may concern the ideals of the Enlightenment and whether the crisis of European humanity enroots itself in these ideals. This concern is addressed solely because the rationality that guided the Greeks until German Idealism requires continuous rectification towards self-reflection. While reason is inherent to man as a rational animal, philosophy for Husserl represents “a new stage of human nature and its reason.”\textsuperscript{33} The European humanity Husserl envisions as overcoming the crisis inherent within it is one where a universal, genuine philosophy not only represents this European spiritual life but is the infinite task guiding the humanity of the future. This genuine philosophy is not a historical accident but an

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 287.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, 289.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 290.
ideal aspired to through its attempts. Any existing philosophy is successful in its realization of this infinite task. Philosophers must engage in a mutual connection towards this totality of infinity, insofar as they are not one-sided and isolated from each other in a world in need of self-reflection. Philosophers do begin one-sidedly, although the result in this genuine humanity is not one-sided but multifaceted. The high regard objectivism casts over subjectivism, for example, plays a dominant role in limiting a more elevated stage for self-reflexivity, resulting in an ossified naturalism. Thus, in a way, it harkens back to this finite constraint of the pre-theoretical, the pre-philosophical, or the mythical. It is a matter of reconsidering how the subjectivity said of a people informs and actively partakes in the theoretical objectivism standing over and above it. To break away from this naturalization, one must, according to Husserl, take into consideration the role philosophy represents in the spiritual development of a people:

Philosophy sees in the world the universe of what is, and the world becomes the objective world as opposed to representations of the world, those which vary according to nation or individual subject; thus truth becomes objective truth. In this way philosophy begins as cosmology; it is first…directed in its theoretical interest toward corporeal nature, since, after all, everything given in space-time has in any case, at least at its basis, the existential formula of corporeity. Men and animals are not merely bodies, but in the orientation toward the surrounding world they appear as something with bodily existence and thus as realities ordered within universal space-time. In this sense all psychic occurrences, those of the particular ego, such as experiencing, thinking, willing, have a certain objectivity. The life of the community, that of families, peoples, etc., then seems to be resolved into that of particular individuals as psychophysical objects; the spiritual interrelation of psychophysical causality lacks a purely spiritual continuity; physical nature is everywhere involved.34

To discover infinity, one would need to move beyond the homogenized nature in the divisibility of particularity of space-time or finitude. For Husserl, the idealizations of magnitudes, measures, and numbers advanced from the finitude of nature entail the finding of infinity: “From the art of surveying comes geometry, from the art of numbers arithmetic, from everyday mechanics

34 Ibid, 292-293.
mathematical mechanics, etc.”35 Based on these advancements of idealization, from the physically finite to the infinite itself, the scientific has its internal unity with peoples’ spirituality represented by the philosophies of their time. Husserl demonstrates that these idealizations – in a significant historical development – result in the successful symptomatic realizations represented by key figures (Democritus, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, onwards) who bring about spiritual transformations of humanity. Again, the philosopher acts as a spiritual functionary even in the face of rampant objectivism as a crisis.

The crisis European peoples experience in this modern age involves the sciences’ lack of spirituality and excess objectivism.36 The separation of objectivism into an ossified reality marks the complete repudiation of the surrounding lifeworld, including the researcher’s spiritual involvement in this lifeworld. Such innovations are undoubtedly spiritual achievements of humanity. Still, the separation takes precedence, leading to disappointment and even an existential fear for the non-existence of a community of united people. Husserl emphatically highlights this critical point of the overarching objectivism at the expense of the spirit:

[Everywhere], in our time, the burning need for an understanding of the spirit announces itself; and lack of clarity about the methodical and material relation between the natural sciences and the humanistic disciplines has become almost unbearable…. [The] situation can never improve so long as the objectivism arising out of a natural attitude toward the surrounding world is not seen through in its naïveté and so long as the recognition has not emerged that the dualistic view of the world, in which nature and spirit are to count as realities in a similar sense, though one is built on the other causally, is a mistake. In all seriousness, I think that an objective science of the spirit, an objective theory of the soul…has never existed and will never exist. The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, exists in itself and for itself, is self-sufficient; and in its self-sufficiency, and only in this way, it can be treated truly rationally, truly and from the ground up scientifically…The spirit is by its essence capable of practicing self-knowledge, and as scientific spirit it is capable of practicing scientific self-knowledge, and this in an iterative way…Only when the spirit

36 These include such revolutionary accounts like Einstein’s theory of relativity or Gestalt psychology. Ibid, 295.
returns from its naïve external orientation to itself, and remains with itself and purely with itself, can it be sufficient unto itself.\textsuperscript{37}

Husserl provides an example of this concerning the development of his transcendental phenomenology. His philosophy seeks to overcome the objectivism still lingering within the psychological experience of the natural world. Rather than the subjective experience limited to the natural world, it is the inverse with transcendental phenomenology: “nature is itself drawn into the spiritual sphere,” and the ego “is then no longer an isolated thing alongside other such things in a pregiven world.”\textsuperscript{38} Transcendental phenomenology offers the possibility of the spirit qua spirit to engage with nature towards an infinite task seeking to develop a unity between science and spirit for spirit’s evolution.

As such, the crisis of the European peoples concerns their spiritual identity in connection to the advancements of and toward science in its genuineness. It is not only the breakdown of the lifeworld into an ossified objectivism, reifying the destiny of European peoples. It is a crisis to recognize the development of “the concept of Europe as the historical teleology of the infinite goals of reason.”\textsuperscript{39} If philosophy does not become recognized as “mankind’s self-reflection,”\textsuperscript{40} then it may fall into a barbarism as the self-negation of life against life itself, limiting Europe’s rebirth towards spiritual self-sufficiency for the immortality of spiritual refinement.

1.2. Horkheimer and the Emancipatory Project of Critical Theory

Nevertheless, transcendental phenomenology has its own internal limitations it cannot circumvent by itself, including its conceptions of theory, the philosopher’s role, and towards what

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\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 296-297.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 298.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 299.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Taken from a title of an essay in Appendix IV of \textit{The Crisis}, “Philosophy as Mankind’s Self-Reflection; the Self-Realization of Reason,” 335-341.
\end{itemize}
ends infinite tasks are directed. Like Husserl, Max Horkheimer recognizes the role of the theorist or philosopher to be a spiritual functionary for humanity. Horkheimer takes a necessary step to incorporate Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in developing a more critical and emancipatory project called critical theory. By staging the conflict between what is known as traditional theory and Horkheimer’s preferred critical theory, one may discern the transformation of the intellectual’s role and theory in serving people toward specific ends. The singular goal of critical theory, as Max Horkheimer notes in the postscript to his influential essay “Traditional and Critical Theory,” is the emancipation of man from the slavery of the logic of abstract labour dominating through the begetting of capital or the process of self-valorizing value. Following from the sociological account of Max Weber and Karl Marx’s critique of political economy, this slavery is constituted by both what Gyorgi Lukács considers as the manipulation of rationalization borne of the logic of reification and what Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno later call, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, instrumental reason: the privileging of the objective fact and bureaucratic thinking prevailing over the subjective commodified into cultural products of mass consumption. Having been a student of Husserl during his tenure at the University of Freiburg, one can argue, as Habip Türker states, that Horkheimer’s critical theory is an anticipated result of transcendental phenomenology. Horkheimer finds fault in Husserl’s perspective consistent with what he terms traditional theory, not only because Husserl’s own Cartesian imbued work, whereby the ego exists independent of history, but equally the normative idea that the facts must correspond with the theory. In a turn of irony, perhaps, Husserl represents the apex of traditional theory, and a critical theory may help further break away from the naturalism finding itself within the guiding towards

infinite tasks. Written ten years before *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer’s essay and the subsequent postscript are part of a rich tradition concerned with the role of theory in connection to human emancipation, stemming from the Stoics, the Epicureans, Rousseau, Kant, and Marx. Horkheimer stages the limits between what may be considered the traditional conception of theory in contrast to the preferred critical conception of theory, superseding the traditional form, and is constantly developing its theoretical breadth.

Beginning with the question, what is “theory,” Horkheimer states that for the majority of researchers, whether in the hard or natural sciences or the formal or human sciences, theory encompasses “the sum-total of propositions about a subject, the propositions being so linked with each other that a few are basic and the rest derive from these.” ⁴³ The more the propositions are consonant with the basic ones, the more the validity and harmony of the theory in its employment. If the relationship between theory and facts is not parsimonious, then the theory may be considered inadequate (or, if one takes the side of Hegel, “so much the worse for the facts” ⁴⁴). The theory is changeable, whereas experience and the facts are assumed to be immutable. The traditional conception of theory ascends from the logic of deductive reasoning, finding its origin in Descartes’ *Discourse on Method*, and has its finality aspiring towards being “a universal systematic science, not limited to any particular subject matter but embracing all possible objects.” ⁴⁵ Because theories strive towards this universality in the traditional conception, all the parts composing the whole must unite harmoniously without contradictions, superfluity, and dogmatism. The varying divisions within the sciences operate in the same fashion, yet as Husserl remarks above, the natural and hard sciences often lead the advance. Though the divergences between fact-collecting and

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fact-deriving theories may be great in the varying disciplines, the difference does not lie in the ways of thinking.

Sociology is no different from this traditional conception of theory. Finding the forefathers of this discipline (such as Tönnies, Durkheim, and Weber) victim to this traditional conception, Horkheimer’s diagnosis of the limitations of the traditional conception of theory infiltrates sociology with the relationship between the concept and the fact to be subsumed within it, writing:

There can be no doubt, in fact, that the various schools of sociology have an identical conception of theory and that it is the same as theory in the natural sciences. Empirically oriented sociologists have the same idea of what a fully elaborated theory should be as their theoretically oriented brethren. The former, indeed, are persuaded that in view of the complexity of social problems and the present state of science any concern with general principles must be regarded as indolent and idle. If theoretical work is to be done, it must be done with an eye unwaveringly on the facts; there can be no thought in the foreseeable future of comprehensive theoretical statements…What they object to is not so much theory as such but theories spun out of their heads by men who have no personal experience of the problems of an experimental science.46

As such, the traditional conception of theory and the essence of theory solely correspond to the empirical investigation set by order of hypotheses. Of course, technological advancements developed during the rise of bourgeois rationalization aid in mending the gap between theory and facts, revolutionizing the bedrocks of society. Yet, as Horkheimer observes, this “conception of theory was absolutized, as though it were grounded in the inner nature of knowledge as such or justified in some other ahistorical way, and thus it became a reified, ideological category.”47 When they ossify themselves into (and as) the tradition, these theoretical discoveries forget their real, social, and material basis from which they emerge: the historical context they respond to in a dialectical fashion. Horkheimer recognizes that the theoretician finds themselves confronted with the influences immanent to the historical conjuncture, in combat on multiple fronts inclusive of

46 Ibid, 191.
the internal makeup of the division of labour and its mode of production, and the superstructural relations amongst politics, law, religion, education, and so on.

Horkheimer analyzes that this conception of scientific activity is inseparable from how a society operates, irreducible to one sector or another. Rather, it is the “result of all the work done in the various sectors of production.” While the process of production itself unifies towards the end of self-sufficient capital accumulation under the capitalist mode of production, it is, if not totally, at least almost affine with how scientific knowledge operates in its traditional conception. Whatever directs towards a unifying end is, in turn, considered “productive.” As Horkheimer writes:

“Production” means the “creative sovereignty of thought.” For any datum it must be possible to deduce all its determinations from theoretical systems and ultimately from mathematics; thus all finite magnitudes may be derived from the concept of the infinitely small by way of the infinitesimal calculus, and this process is precisely their “production.” The ideal to be striven for is a unitary system of science which, in the sense just described, will be all-powerful. Since everything about the object is reduced to conceptual determinations, the end-result of such theoretical work is that nothing is to be regarded as material and stable. The determinative, ordering, unifying function is the sole foundation for all else, and towards it all human effort is directed. Production is production of unity, and production is itself the product.

Said otherwise, such a concerted effort towards an all-encompassing unity is found not only in the capitalist mode of production but equally and almost inseparably from the factor of how particular disciplines share this basis in the traditional practice of theory. As it is a prevailing way of organizing knowledge, this bourgeois and traditional perspective is unable to overcome this need to be autonomous without, in turn, subsuming parts into its whole. Horkheimer suggests a “radical

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49 Ibid, 198.
reconsideration, not of the scientist alone, but of the knowing individual as such”\textsuperscript{50} is necessary to dramatically change this perspective.

Horkheimer provides a historical materialist account of the individual subject’s involvement in their activity as “a product of the activity of society as a whole.”\textsuperscript{51} As such, it draws out the theoretico-philosophical consequences resulting in the dialectical relationship between the individual and society. While the individual subject may bear the mark of passive and active on the level of the everyday and gregarious for sense-perception, for society, another active subject, these oppositions do not hold. The dialectic between individual and society is asymmetrical in the bourgeois mode of production: “the activity of society is blind and concrete, that of individuals abstract and conscious.”\textsuperscript{52} This abstract yet conscious account of the individual’s subjectivity is itself best formulated by Kant’s philosophy as self-reflexive, which requires a concept formed by the transcendental subject to be consciously judged by reasoning with the manifold of sensations. Kant provides the inauguration of the “critical” outlook desired by Horkheimer, but even then, it is in contradiction. People may collaborate in society, guided by reason to work together and determine their rationality. Still, rationality or intellectual work is “alienated from them, and the whole process with all its waste of work-power and human life, and with its wars and all its senseless wretchedness, seems to be an unchangeable force of nature, a fate beyond man’s control.”\textsuperscript{53} It is with Hegel the previous contradictions that arose were brought to a higher level of abstraction, though once more on a deeply “private assertion,” according to Horkheimer, whereby

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, 199.  
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 200.  
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 204.
“a personal peace treaty between the philosopher and an inhuman world” is written up almost in advance by the universal subject of absolute Spirit.\textsuperscript{54}

Turning from the subject of the individual to the subject of society, Horkheimer analyzes how much of this level of abstraction is at work in social activity. Echoing Marx and Engels’ declaration, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas,”\textsuperscript{55} the ideas of this account of individual subjectivity inform much of the intellectual division of labour for the rise of bourgeois society. Yet, simultaneously, they have waned in the rise of globalized liberalism, indicated by how the international community, the State and economy are all intertwined by being less invested in fostering the cultivation of thought than with cultivating power through war and industry. This operation of the liberalist society demonstrates the exercise of traditional theory:

\begin{quote}
[T]he critical examination of data with the aid of an inherited apparatus of concepts and judgments which is still operative in even the simplest minds, as well as the interaction between facts and theoretical forms that goes on in daily professional activity. In this intellectual work the needs and goals, the experiences and skills, the customs and tendencies of the contemporary form of human existence have all played their part. Like a material tool of production, it represents potentially an element not only of the contemporary cultural totality but of a more just, more differentiated, more harmoniously organized one as well.\textsuperscript{56}
\end{quote}

Within the shell of this barbarous society, a more human (and not solely humane) society can emerge beyond how, to use Adorno’s phrase, “the ontology of the wrong state of things,”\textsuperscript{57} can find its ultimate subversion: the transformation of the world as such.

“Critical” activity is understood as a human activity that takes society as its object of analysis. It is akin to the critique of political economy inaugurated by Marx than the idealist approach exemplified by Kant’s critiques. Human emancipation vis-à-vis critical theory is not

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\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 205.
\end{paracol}
reducible to the better functioning of all elements in the existing order, but to be above all “suspicious of the very categories of better, useful, appropriate, productive, and valuable, as these are understood in the present order, and refuses to take them as nonscientific presuppositions about which one can do nothing.”\textsuperscript{58} The existing opposition between the individual and the social totality serves as a basis for understanding that people “experience the fact that society is comparable to nonhuman natural processes, to pure mechanisms, because cultural forms which are supported by war and oppression are not the creations of a unified, self-conscious will. That world is not their own but the world of capital.”\textsuperscript{59} Horkheimer finds that the world of capital is the apotheosis of unreason, lacking the reason and the real basis for true, human emancipation. Traditional theory cannot allow this emancipation’s possibility and reality to occur insofar as its conceptual systems bog it down, and the ideological-naturalist and bourgeois frameworks informing the theoretician’s standpoint are assumed to be outside of the opposition between the individual and society. Provided with how critical theory understands the individual as self-conflicted, it would be irrational and nonhuman, indeed, inhuman, to submit to the unreason and inhumanity of the world of capital. As such, critical theory offers a theory of the subject that not only supersedes the existing bourgeois and idealist philosophies of the subject but provides a definite concept of the subject freed of the prevailing Cartesian framework pervading existing traditional theory:

Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated individual nor a sum-total of individuals. Its subject is rather a definite individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature. The subject is no mathematical point like the ego of bourgeois philosophy; his activity is the construction of the social present. Furthermore, the thinking subject is not the place where knowledge and object coincide, nor consequently the starting-point for attaining absolute knowledge. Such an illusion about the thinking subject, under which idealism has lived since Descartes, is ideology in

\textsuperscript{58} Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” 207.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 207-208.
the strict sense, for in it the limited freedom of the bourgeois individual puts on the illusory form of perfect freedom and autonomy.⁶⁰

Thinking in its traditional deployment is assumed as an activity separate from the work process of society as a whole. Regardless, it is dependent on and within this process that informs philosophy and religion, being in the hands of a select few laying control over the majority. Once thinking has become conscious of its connectedness to society, then the critical activity may supersede the traditional function it serves. The transition from traditional to critical theory is also the transition of the philosopher strictly as a functionary of humanity to being in the service of man’s emancipation from slavery. Therefore, a pragmatic dimension to critical theory arises from the concern that thinking serves. Following Marx and Engels, that concern is “necessarily generated in the proletariat.”⁶¹ The precarity constituting the lived reality and conditions of the proletariat, the conditions that serve production tout court, is the realm of dominant unreason. That does not mean that the generative conditions of the proletariat provide adequate knowledge or standpoint for the establishment of the transformation of society.⁶² If the proletariat’s standpoint alone served as a basis for this critical theory, then it would be no different from the existing sciences that take

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⁶⁰ Ibid, 211.
⁶¹ Ibid, 213.
⁶² This is a point that contemporary Marxian scholars such as Moishe Postone and Michael Heinrich advance against what they consider to be “traditional Marxism” and “worldview Marxism” in their works respectively. For Postone in his Time, Labor, And Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), traditional Marxism refers to “all theoretical approaches that analyze capitalism from the standpoint of labor and characterize that society essentially in terms of class relations, structured by private ownership of the means of production and a market-regulated economy” (7). Likewise, connecting to the critique of political economy’s discussion concerning commodity fetishism, Heinrich in his An Introduction To The Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012) notes the following: “In bourgeois society, people’s spontaneous consciousness succumbs to the fetishism of the commodity and money. The rationality of their behavior is always a sort of rationality within the framework set by commodity production. If the intentions of social actors…are made the point of departure of analysis…, then that which individuals ‘don’t know’, the framework that preconditions their thought and activity, is blanked out of the analysis from the very start. Proceeding from this consideration, not only can we criticize a considerable portion of the foundations of bourgeois economics and sociology but also a popular argument of worldview Marxism: namely that there exists a social subject (the working class), which, on the basis of its particular position in bourgeois society, possesses a special ability to see through social relationships” (78-79).
one class as its standpoint, becoming nothing more than a social psychology. Furthermore, it would continue the traditional theory by applying it to the proletariat. In stark contrast, critical theory would arise in “forming a dynamic unity with the oppressed class, so that [the theoretician’s] presentation of societal conditions is not merely an expression of the concrete historical situation but also a force within it to stimulate change.”63 The theoretician is an intermediary between the object of study (society as a whole) and its determinant cause (the individual), carrying out ruthless criticism against the status quo and the residual elements of the traditional within their theory. The present troubles of unreason urge the thinker to act towards unveiling the mystery of unreason as if it were a transcendental illusion. This new conception of society, freed from the unreason, inhumanity, and mute compulsion of the world of capital, does not emerge *nolens volens* as if through struggle alone. It also requires the inventive capacity of the theoretician to envision the future. Even if the traditional conception of theory is subject to criticism, it constitutes a basis for which critical theory must set its aims: “If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the eating here is still in the future.”64

The role of the intellectual takes on a new task concerning the transition from traditional to critical theory. In the traditional framework, the intelligentsia class derives from their education or discipline, not from their class position by way of income nor from the content of their observations, including the spiritual functionary Husserl saw in the figure of the philosopher. For critical theory, the tension between the intelligentsia and being in the service of an oppressed humanity is at the forefront of their interrogation. It is in struggle against the liberal conception of mind that institutes a division of labour in these relationships. This conception of mind, as Horkheimer argues, has “only one truth, and the positive attributes of honest, internal consistency,

64 Ibid, 220-221.
reasonableness, and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness may not be attributed in the same sense to any other theory and practice.”

As such, the critical theoretician takes on a vanguardist position not reducible to the academic disciplinarian but one informed by the practical knowledge of the masses, whose standpoint prefigures a defence against the universal subsumption of the world of capital. It is this distinct way of the intellectual that also informs the logical unfolding of their respective theories. While both traditional theory and critical theory develop from the abstract to the concrete, the former logical development is bound to the definition of “universal concepts under which all facts in the field in question are to be subsumed,” with changes being nothing but an accidental occurrence demonstrating the inadequacy of previous knowledge. By contrast, the critical theoretical approach, all the while beginning from abstract determinations (for Marx, this was his form-analysis in the critique of political economy by way of the commodity-form, the value-form, and the money-form), finds its result as always concomitant “from a radical analysis, guided by concern for the future, of the historical process.”

Said otherwise, the deduction of the logical development, along with the vanguardist position of the critical theoretician, is always rooted in a historical materialist approach: to construct a theory accounting for a thoroughgoing existential analysis of human emancipation. While both traditional and critical theory may have a similar theoretical development (from the abstract to the concrete), the former follows from a logical necessity, whereas the latter follows from real necessity. Logical necessity is the basis for which all concepts must be uniform to the field in question, while real necessity is the basis for which all concepts are to be determined in the last instance by the real life of people.

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65 Ibid, 222.
66 Ibid, 224.
67 Ibid, 225.
The critical theoretical approach attempts to grasp the unity of theory and practice within thought, all the while towards real necessity. This necessity is poorly understood and even restrained within the bourgeois and traditional perspective, which attends to a disinterested spectator à la Kant and the dualism of subject/object inaugurated by Cartesian metaphysics. In this way, Horkheimer’s approach cultivates what Marx elsewhere referred to as the *ad hominem* of theory: theory must grip the masses and become a material force weaponized against the status quo:

The idea of a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution, is beyond the grasp of a mentality typified by such a dualism. If scholars do not merely think about such a dualism but really take it seriously, they cannot act independently. In keeping with their own way of thinking, they can put into practice only what the closed causal system of reality determines them to do, or they count only as individual units in a statistic for which the individual unit really has no significance. As rational beings they are helpless and isolated. The realization that such a state of affairs exists is indeed a step towards changing it, but unfortunately the situation enters bourgeois awareness only in a metaphysical, ahistorical shape. In the form of a faith in the unchangeableness of the social structure it dominates the present. Reflecting on themselves men see themselves only as onlookers, passive participants in a mighty process which may be foreseen but not modified. Necessity for them refers not to events which man masters to his own purposes but only to events which he anticipates as probable. Where the interconnection of willing and thinking, thought and action is admitted as in many sectors of the most recent sociology, it is seen only as adding to the objective complexity which the observer must take into account. The thinker must relate all the theories which are proposed to the practical attitudes and social strata which they reflect. But he removes himself from the affair; he has no concern except—science.\(^{68}\)

From this basis, the critical conception of theory must circumvent to prevail against the generalized hostility towards theory that sees no possibility of transformation from ever being realized. The traditional conception of theory is an ideological stumbling block toward emancipation. It needs to shake off the yoke of the dogmatic thinking existing internally to its logic. The transformation occurs when “mankind will for the first time be a conscious subject and actively determine its own

\(^{68}\) Ibid, 231-232.
way of life.”\textsuperscript{69} Critical theory is the manifestation of the active participation of the theoretician in the real necessity for humanity to realize its emancipation. Without further development towards this approach, traditional theory will lapse into regression and continue to subordinate its subjects. To Horkheimer, critical theory “is not simply the theory of emancipation; it is the practice of it as well.”\textsuperscript{70} Nevertheless, critical theory is not stable with a single substance summing up its doctrine, for much like the process of history, there is a dialectical development that determines the theory. Concerning this evolutionary account, the foundation of the theory does not transform but adapts to reflect the conditions as adequately as possible without furthering the traditional bases.

In sum, while the traditional conception of theory is welcomed into this new promising perspective, assuring the preservation of developed knowledge, and even further evolving it, the critical theory is concerned with expanding knowledge once there is an abolition of the present affairs concerning the traditional practice. Critical theory abolishes the prevailing tendency of the false or ideological identification of the individual outside of society. For Horkheimer, human emancipation is an experiment to be tested so as to be accepted amongst these existing practices: “To strive for a state of affairs in which there will be no exploitation or oppression, in which an all-embracing subject, namely self-aware mankind, exists, and in which it is possible to speak of a unified theoretical creation and a thinking that transcends individuals—to strive for all this is not yet to bring it to pass.”\textsuperscript{71} In the face of a growing barbarism where the force of unreason is dominant in the world of capital, a human community both contemporary and future can arise only once “particular judgments about what is human acquire their correct meaning.”\textsuperscript{72} The abolition of the injustice ailing society through critical theory is not whatsoever “productive”: this sense of

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, 233. 
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 241. 
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, 242.
productivity has been the utmost preference towards the abundance of capital which is the secession from humanity. Any theory that deems itself “critical” is worthy of the name when it is guided towards human emancipation.

1.3. Althusser and Philosophy as the Representation of the Class Struggle in Theory

Though there are rare remarks regarding the Frankfurt School in his work, Louis Althusser may lump Horkheimer’s definition of critical theory among the ranks of Marxist philosophers who “reduced…to disguising themselves – disguising Marx as Husserl, Marx as Hegel, Marx as the ethical and humanist Young Marx – at the risk of some day taking the masks for the reality.”

Some criticism emerges from the “ultra-left” remarks in Althusser’s response to the 1965 symposium on Socialist Humanism organized by Erich Fromm. Regardless, both Althusser and Horkheimer are critical of Husserl. Whereas the latter finds Husserl retaining yet nevertheless being the apex of traditional theory, the former finds him among the many post-Kantian thinkers as a philosopher of bourgeois ideology. If something distinguishes Althusser from Husserl and Horkheimer, then it concerns what role philosophy plays. For Althusser, it is not about guiding or emancipating man but representing. In this representation, Althusser is involved in a theoretical anti-humanism, a position that recognizes how humanism functions nevertheless as an ideology. One may argue that within the supposed ultra-left perspective of critical theory, an ideological conception of humanity remains utopian, not scientific, as Althusser proposes.

In the 1968 interview, “Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon,” Louis Althusser declares in one of four theses concerning the relationship of philosophy to science and politics, philosophy represents the class struggle in theory. The theses recognize philosophy as a world outlook within

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the superstructural domain alongside the religious, legal, and political and its tendential antagonism by representing either bourgeois or proletarian outlooks, with idealism and materialism respectively representing these outlooks. For Althusser, the domain of theory, which one may understand as the realm and the ideologies encompassing both the practice of science or knowledge and its practitioners, represents these worldviews. Philosophy, therefore, represents the two tendencies in antagonism, the class struggle, within the domain of theory, harkening back to Kant’s claim that philosophy is a *Kampfplatz* or battleground. Nevertheless, there is no philosophy without sciences. Philosophy’s stake realizes itself through a science toward definitive knowledge of the world, and it is here that one may discern the representation of class struggle representation. According to Althusser, Marx founds a new science by opening a new scientific continent of History alongside others (Thales opened Mathematics, and Galileo opened Physics) upon which one philosophy rests: dialectical materialism. By “scientific continent,” we may understand this as a metaphor for eventful seismic shifts or discoveries through exploration within the theoretical realm via epistemological breaks occurring alongside political situations and the embodiment of their practitioners (See Figure 1 from *On the Reproduction Of Capitalism* in the Appendix). These ruptures and discoveries bring new fault lines, boundaries, and frontiers, presenting difficulty for orienting thought. There is always a philosophy grounded by this opening of a new scientific continent (with Mathematics, it was Plato’s philosophy, and with Physics, Descartes’ philosophy), as there are always political events that stir as conjunctural support for articulating the scientific event. It is also with Marx’s science that one can know what philosophy is: the interpretation of the world. Althusser’s insight into the necessity of philosophy to represent the proletariat is the subject of this study insofar as it connects to the perspectives shared by both Horkheimer and Husserl concerning philosophy’s role in its relationship with humanity.
An exploration of these four theses appears in the essay “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation: Ideology and Ideological Struggle,” featured in Philosophy and The Spontaneous Philosophy of The Scientists. The essay provides “the theoretical principles that found and guide the practice of Communists in the domain of theory and ideology.” Althusser begins by marking the difference between utopian and scientific, determining Marx’s doctrine as scientific. By “utopian” socialism, Althusser indicates it “proposes socialist goals for human action, yet which is based on non-scientific principles, deriving from religious, moral or juridical, i.e. ideological, principles.” Utopian principles derive from existing ideological tendencies belonging to the dominant bourgeois world outlooks without truly being realized based on means no longer reducible to these outlooks. Althusser provides examples of this by the varying authors preceding Marx, ultimately recapitulating the argument presented in Engels’ pamphlet, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific:

[In] the economic domain, the workers’ co-operatives of Owen, the phalanstery of Fourier’s disciples, Proudhon’s people’s bank; in the political domain, moral education and reform – if not the Head of State’s conversion to socialism. In constructing an ideological representation of the ends as well as the means of socialism, utopian socialist doctrines are, as Marx clearly showed, prisoners of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois economic, juridical, moral and political principles. That is why they cannot really break with the bourgeois system, they cannot be genuinely revolutionary. They remain anarchist or reformist. Content, in fact, to oppose the bourgeois politico-economic system with bourgeois (moral, juridical) principles, they are trapped – whether they like it or not – within the bourgeois system. They can never break out towards revolution.

By contrast, “scientific” doctrines are indicated by the source that it rests upon as distinct from the utopian derivation of bourgeois categories opposed against itself. In this case, scientific socialism is the “scientific knowledge of the totality of the existing bourgeois system, its politico-economic

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76 Ibid.
77 Ibid, 3-4.
as well as its ideological systems.”

Not content with opposing bourgeois categories against itself toward a critique, the scientific critique criticizes the totality of the ensemble. It articulates itself upon the varying levels or instances organized within this ensemble. Through and immanent to this knowledge, one may discern the objectives genuinely bound to socialism as superseding the capitalist mode of production. The scientific is a knowledge that guides its actors to change the world through forms of ideological struggle. In a way, scientific socialist doctrines are inventions directed by discovering what reinforces the bourgeois constraints even the utopian perspective cannot escape from: the economy as the determinant in the last instance. Citing Lenin’s adage, “without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement,” it is the revolutionary theory of the scientific socialist doctrine that can allow for a transformative account leading to forms of organization that hitherto the capitalist and ideological formations restrain by dictating the world.

To Althusser, two scientific disciplines result from Marx’s scientific doctrine: Historical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism. Whereas the former provides the science of history, the latter is the philosophy of Marxism proper. As the science of history or science of modes of production throughout history, historical materialism provides a theoretical explanation of “the organic totality that every social formation arising from a determinate mode of production constitutes.” The organic totality is determined in the last instance by the economic level, which unifies all other levels and explains their relative autonomy in relation to the economy. Even though Capital is incomplete in its analyses, Marx offers and inaugurates a theoretical account of the capitalist mode of production as constituted by its economic level. Still, it certainly goes

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78 Ibid, 4.
beyond the economic alone. *Capital* touches on the political, ideological, and legal consequences articulated under the capitalist mode of production. By contrast, although it is a scientifico-philosophical development not created by Marx, Dialectical Materialism’s foundations are latent in some of his writings and matured by Engels and later Lenin. Dialectical Materialism is a theory of the history and evolution of knowledge distinct from other models in the history of thought, such as the theory of the cogito, the *a priori* forms of the human mind, or a theory of absolute knowing. All these theories of knowing, to Althusser, are pre-scientific or ideological. A dialectical account of materialism would allow for the real relations of man to the economic and political to transform into a more substantial knowledge of the world at large. Althusser notes materialism has a twofold effective expression of this relationship: “(1) the *distinction between the real and its knowledge* (distinction of reality), correlative of a correspondence (adequacy) between knowledge and its object (correspondence of knowledge); and (2) the *primacy of the real over its knowledge, or the primacy of being over thought.*”81 Historical Materialism and Dialectical Materialism present the uniqueness of Marx’s philosophy and science. They provide a richer account of the real processes underlying the history of the modes of production and the history of theories of knowledge.

The conjunctural environs surrounding the possibility of both materialisms to exist inform their theory. Two questions are then possibly raised: Why does historical materialism necessarily entail dialectical materialism, and what is the proper function of the latter? For the first consequence, Althusser notes the process of the development of human thought where “the foundation of an important new science has always more or less overturned and renewed existing philosophy.”82 As noted above concerning scientific continents, Althusser demonstrates the to-

81 Ibid, 9.
82 Ibid, 10.
and-fro relationship between science and philosophy: Greek mathematics entailed Platonic philosophy, modern physics after Galileo entailed Cartesian metaphysics and Newton entailed Kantian Transcendental Idealism, and the greater developments in mathematics and even psychology entailed the Transcendental Phenomenology of Husserl. To Althusser, Marx occupies a privileged space as being “compelled, by an implacable logic, to found a radically new philosophy, because he was the first to have thought scientifically the reality of history, which all other philosophies were incapable of doing.”\textsuperscript{83} In this instance, Marx is the first – or rather, is amongst the first – to have introduced philosophies to their social role in history. In due part, philosophies, whether classical or modern, idealist or materialist, were incapable of understanding or theorizing this history and largely their history with sciences and practices as a whole. With Marx’s theory of history, Althusser notes, it is impossible for philosophy to ignore this relationship, and thus had to entail the development of a new philosophy respective to this science.

By means of a theoretical revolution [philosophy] had to become a new philosophy, capable of thinking – in philosophy itself – its real relation to history, as well as its relation to the truth. The old philosophies of consciousness, of the transcendental subject – just like the dogmatic philosophies of absolute knowledge – were no longer possible philosophically. A new philosophy was necessary, one capable of thinking the \textit{historical insertion} of philosophy in history, its real relation to scientific and social practices (political, economic, ideological), while taking account of the \textit{knowledge-relation} it maintains with its object. It is this theoretical necessity that gave birth to dialectical materialism…Other transformations in philosophy were always based upon either the ideological negation of the reality of history, its sublimation in God (Plato, Descartes, Leibniz), or an \textit{ideological} conception of history as the realization of philosophy itself (Kant, Hegel, Husserl): they were never able to attain the reality of history, which they always misunderstood or left aside.\textsuperscript{84}

As such, much like the other sciences, historical materialism entailed its philosophy in dialectical materialism. For Althusser, Lenin’s \textit{Materialism and Empirio-Criticism} demonstrates the significance of dialectical materialism as a philosophy. No longer does philosophy serve as an

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 10-11.
isolated practice gatekept by experts, as Lenin “showed that philosophy always played a fundamental theoretical role in the constitution and development of knowledge, and that Marxist philosophy simply resumed this role on its own account, but with means that were, in principle, infinitely purer and more fertile.” 85 There is a role that philosophy plays in cultivating the development of knowledge, yet there lay ideological constraints surrounding and immanent to this development. Engels demonstrates that the scientist does have a philosophy by their side. Still, it depends on which one: either it is an ideology constraining the scientist to ends synonymous with the existing social order, or it is a philosophy allowing for the freedom of the thinker within the scientist to master their relations in the world. A science never receives its philosophy purely freed of ideology: “When a science is in the process of being born, there is a risk that it will put the ideology in which it is steeped into the service of its bad habits.” 86 The call for partisanship in philosophy, “the refusal of all ideology, and the precise consciousness of the theory of scientificity,” 87 is what is at stake concerning the exigent role dialectical materialism plays within and against the ideologies prevailing in the existing sciences and philosophies as an “adoption of a scientific position on philosophy.” 88

However, this brings to light what may be considered the utmost epistemological concern for Althusser: what exactly entails a science, and what criterion must one utilize to discern its scientificity? What does it mean for Marx’s materialism, with its twofold expression in historical and dialectical materialism, to be scientific with its claims to have the primacy of the real or being over thought, on the one hand, and the respective correspondence of the knowledge of the real or being as adequate to the real? According to Althusser, science does not emerge as a set of facts or

85 Ibid, 11.
86 Ibid, 12.
87 Ibid, 13.
88 Ibid.
truths, nor is it irreducible to a dogmatic or empiricist conception of science. Science is neither a finished development of investigation nor a natural reflection of the real. Science is instead the real complex process of the production of knowledges. The correct idea of science necessarily relies on the essence of science and the conditions of the production of knowledge; it is, above all, to know how science is produced, how it develops, and how to ensure its further correction and development by way of the duty one takes on in its development. Firstly, science is produced “by an immense, specific theoretical labour, by an irreplaceable, extremely long, arduous and difficult theoretical practice.”

Citing Marx’s claim there is no royal road to science, the theoretical practice Althusser envisions is specified with the task of producing an adequate concept correlative to its object and must distinguish itself from already existent practices. Theoretical practice develops science and can “on no account be replaced by other practices.” Furthermore, it cannot be reducible to a spontaneous conception, as if a science was solely possible from the source-condition without outside influence.

Provided by the example of the vulgar claim that Marxism is a “proletarian science,” Althusser indicates that intellectuals representing and have represented the development of Marxism, or its science introduced the contents of the science to serve the interests of the working class as if “from without,” that is, introduced into proletarian practice as one of the conditions for the development. A science cannot be constituted from experience alone, as it requires the materials and the knowledge from outside experience to be directed by the interests it serves. Secondly, knowing how science develops is also necessary. These developments draw from the discoveries it makes in its investigations. Marx inaugurates a science that necessitates its

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89 Ibid, 14.
90 Ibid, 15.
continuous development in its principles rather than as something completed in its edifice. It is
from Lenin that Althusser notes four major themes indicative of this development:

1. In the theoretical domain, Marx gave us the ‘foundation stone’ and ‘guiding principles’ – i.e. the basis theoretical principles of a theory – *which absolutely must be developed.*
2. This theoretical development is a *duty* of all socialists *vis-à-vis* their science, failing which they would be remiss in their obligation towards socialism itself.
3. It is necessary to develop not only theory in general but also *particular applications,* according to the specific nature of each concrete case.
4. This defence and development of Marxist science presupposes both the greatest firmness against all who want to lead us back to a theoretical condition short of Marx’s scientific principles, and a real *freedom of criticism and scientific research* for those who want to go beyond, exercised on the basis of the theoretical principles of Marx – an indispensable freedom for the life of Marxist science, as for any science.\(^91\)

New knowledges of science are a pure necessity towards making discoveries and maintaining its lively development. Philosophy alone does not suffice for the development of a scientific discipline, so dialectical materialism is secondary to historical materialism, which leads the way in rectifying the theoretical representation of philosophy for science. Some developments followed historical materialism, such as Lenin’s theory of imperialism as the highest form of capitalism. Still, the theoretical effects of which dialectical materialism should follow are not always adequate for the problems faced from then on (Althusser’s example is the transition between complex modes of production often faced by Third World countries and the socialist mode of production). Thirdly, there is the role or the duty of Communists in this science’s development, that is, who constitutes or composes the formation of the theoretical practice. Althusser indicates four conditions to fulfill this duty, but much like the development through discoveries, they must develop contingently upon those discoveries. According to Althusser, theoretical research relates to a zone composed by the theoretical formation in the following ways.

For a science to be able to develop, it is first of all necessary to have a correct idea of the nature of science and, in particular, of the means by which it develops, and therefore of all

\(^{91}\) Ibid, 18.
the real conditions of its development. It is necessary to assure these conditions and, in particular, to recognize – theoretically and practically – the irreplaceable role of scientific practice in the development of science. It is necessary then, clearly, to define our theory of science, to reject all dogmatic and empiricist interpretations, and to make a precise conception of science prevail intellectually and practically. It is also necessary practically to assure the conditions of scientific freedom required by theoretical research, to provide the material means of this freedom (organizations, theoretical reviews, etc.). Finally, the real conditions of scientific or theoretical research in the domain of Marxism itself must be created.92

These real conditions correspond with institutions and parties (or the Party itself), which can indicate the ‘partisanship’ mentioned above concerning the partisanship in philosophy. Lastly, there are two reasons for this development of science by way of the duty of Communists, historical and theoretical reasons. The historical reason for this may be somewhat apparent to readers, relating to the constraints and events occurring since the 1917 Russian Revolution. Still, it engages the economic, political, and ideological fronts concerning the forms of transition happening since then. There is an uneven development amongst these forms of transition in different countries, whether already engaged or in the development into socialism. Still, these problems on all fronts converge toward the future of socialism and its theoretical development. The second reason, the theoretical reason, is precisely found in the dogmatic blockage of intellectual development by way of the ‘cult of personality’: “If the politics of the ‘cult’ did not compromise the development of the material bases of socialism, it did, for many years, literally sacrifice and block all development of Marxist-Leninist theory; it effectively ignored all the indispensable conditions for theoretical reflection and research and, with the suspicion it cast on any theoretical novelty, dealt a very serious blow in practice to the freedom of scientific research and to all discovery.”93 With that said, Althusser underscores the significance of theoretical development, which has become lagging

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92 Ibid, 19.
93 Ibid, 21.
behind the historical developments, and in any case, without theoretical development, disaster and defeat in the face of ideology is met.

Ideology receives its conceptual content and identity from a scientific viewpoint. There is an opposition between scientific theory and ideological theory, which includes the utopian as much as bourgeois ideals. Whether or not there was a break in Marx, whether it was epistemological or practical, from the ‘young’, humanist Feuerbachian perspective he upheld to the ‘mature’ perspective comprising a theoretical anti-humanism, is an argument present in Althusser’s work not recapitulated here. For Althusser, this break from ideology displays the order a science develops: “not only does ideology precede every science, but ideology survives after the constitution of science, and despite its existence.” Althusser advances and clarifies the notion of a “material ideology,” which involves the social reality encompassing the political and economic struggle within an ideological struggle. Doing so provides a particular representation and knowledge of this struggle’s real underlying. Ideology plays a double role to Althusser: on the one hand, it relates to knowledge, and on the other hand, it relates to society. In the epistemological realm, it concerns a represented objective reality. In the societal realm, it is the composition or form of this objective reality, indicated by the encompassing term “structure,” which is reducible to the economic relations of production and political class relations. In the superstructural realm (inclusive of the religious, legal, moral, political, and philosophical), ideological activity is rooted in itself. While ideology contains some aspects of knowledge and representation that are or may be true, they are not themselves true representations of this reality they represent because “they are always integrated into, and subject to, a total system of such representations, a system in principle oriented and distorted, a system dominated by a false conception of the world or of the

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94 Ibid, 22.
domain of objects under consideration.” Furthermore, due to the everyday workings of the division of labour installed under capitalist relations, the duties and labours one partakes in are all guided by a dominant representation presented in the given society by this superstructural relation. Thus, a definitively genuine scientific practice struggles against this ideological constraint. Because ideology permeates all activities and practices, it is subsequently “indistinguishable from their [people’s] ‘lived experience’, and every unmediated analysis of the ‘lived’ is profoundly marked by the themes of ideological obviousness.” As such, ideology is imperceivable qua ideology, but as the representation of the world as it is, yet Althusser remarks it is quite possible to analyze this representation as an object of study through five characteristics.

Firstly, ideology is divisible into specific regions, each relatively autonomous. As mentioned earlier, since it takes root in the superstructural realm, ideology can be constituted by a religion, a morality, a law, a politics, an aesthetics, or a philosophy. Each one is historically observable and can evolve in levels of dominance over other regions. Secondly, ideology exists even as unthought within theoretical forms and systems. Philosophy, for instance, is the highest level to theorize ideology for Althusser because philosophy “constitutes the laboratory of theoretical abstraction, born of ideology, but itself treated as theory.” Althusser indicates we cannot leave the critique of ideology alone to philosophers, for the theory of ideology extends well beyond the realm of the highest level of theory into practices. Thirdly, it is necessary to indicate what exactly the function of ideology serves: the assurance of the domination of one class over others. Like the ‘noble lie’ of Socrates, ideology may be presented as the common bond amongst people, only to serve the better interests of a dominant class to rule and for the dominated class to

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95 Ibid, 24.
96 Ibid, 25.
97 Ibid, 27.
accept as the natural way of life. Fourthly, Althusser touches on how ideology is a falsehood, a supposed representation of the real distorted to maintain the order of a social system so that the structure and its mechanisms ossify the determination of the ideology. Said otherwise, there is a certain representation of the real that is not a true mirror of the real but is an impression upon the real itself instituted as an illusion that seems almost impossible to unveil or lift. This illusion does not represent an error that is rectifiable by a genuine science replacing it in its entirety. Therefore, the scientific truth emerges as a break within the dominant bourgeois ideology. Insofar as there exist varying ideological tendencies, not only reducible to the bourgeois but also to the petty-bourgeois and proletariat, these are subordinate ideologies within the dominant schema. Therefore, the dominant ideology is a bedrock for its transformation into science. Nevertheless, as indicated by Marx’s reflections on the Paris Commune (“the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes”98), it is not just simply a matter of receiving science from without drawn from bourgeois ideology the means of their emancipation.

Althusser then investigates the union of Marxism with the working-class movement. Three cardinal principles are conceivable in this union. The first principle highlights the importation of a theoretical doctrine outside of the working-class into the working-class. Historically, the mid-19th-century working-class movements were bound to utopian ideologies that could not escape this vicious circle. For Althusser, Marx introduces this foundation of a new science and philosophy for the working class discovered on a change of theoretical terrain outside of these ideologies but struggling for its peculiar independence from existing ideological practices. The second principle follows the historical union between the working-class movement to adopt this imported method. Of course, the working-class existed well before Marxism and does not depend on the theory to

provide its means of existence. Still, it is the adoption of this imported doctrine that saw the development of the theory in its practical implementation. The adoption of Marxism allowed the working-class to exercise and recognize the objective knowledge of society and provide itself with the identity of its existence, to comprehend its revolutionary role. The third principle concerns the long ideological struggle to maintain and fortify the base through education and formation, which is what the concluding portion of Althusser’s essay pertains to. While existing forms of struggle on the political and economic front concern the working-class movement, Althusser’s concern highlights the importance of ideological struggle alongside these other struggles. Ideological struggle is not independent but caught up within the economic and political struggle. As ideology historically constitutes an inner realm of ideas in the struggle for hegemonic domination over others, as the often-cited line from Marx and Engels, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”\textsuperscript{99} indicates, ideological struggle “involves a conflict between convictions, beliefs, and representations of the world.”\textsuperscript{100} Ideological struggle occurs solely within the realm of ideology, of course, but it is here too that it must be imported from this realm directly into the experience of the working-class, an intervention into the direct governing of the working-class movement against itself assumed by ideology’s theoretical formation. For a union between the working-class movement and science to exist, the link and conflict between ideological struggle and theoretical formation serves as the basis for transforming existing ideology amongst the working-class and the world as a whole. Althusser summarizes this conflict as the following:

\textit{Ideological struggle can be defined as struggled waged in the objective domain of ideology, against the domination of bourgeois ideology, for the transformation of existing ideology (the ideology of the working class, the ideology of the classes which may become its allies), in a way that serves the objective interests of the working-class movement in a struggle for revolution, and then in its struggle for the construction of socialism. Ideological struggle is a struggle in ideology; to be conducted on a correct theoretical basis, it presupposes}

\textsuperscript{99} Marx and Engels, \textit{The German Ideology}, 67.
\textsuperscript{100} Althusser, “Theory…” 36.
knowledge of Marx’s scientific theory as its absolute condition – it presupposes, then, *theoretical formation*. These two links…while both decisive, are thus not on the same plane; they imply a relation of domination and dependence. It is *theoretical formation* that governs ideological struggle, that is the theoretical and practical foundation of ideological struggle…This is why it is necessary, from the theoretical perspective, to insist at once on the *distinction in principle* between *theoretical formation* and *ideological struggle*, and on the *priority in principle* of *theoretical formation* over ideological struggle.  

The theoretical formation serves as a basis for the totality of Marxist theory, which includes the conclusions of historical materialism and dialectical materialism, the theoretical principles, and an assimilation, adoption, and importation of the theory into the working-class movement’s own experience. It is an education the masses need to invent the means of their emancipation then. Turning to Spinoza, Althusser states a science of conclusions is not a science, but a genuine science contains both premises and conclusions in the movement of demonstration, endowing one another with movement to carry out the completed movement. Thus, Marxism is recognizable as a science both fortifying its theoretical formation to produce the “greatest possible number of militants…to affirm a fundamental truth which makes sense only if it takes a *concrete form*, if a *real and fruitful bond* is created in both directions.”  

1.4. From Philosophy to Non-Philosophy

Each one of the above thinkers (Husserl, Horkheimer, and Althusser) deals with the problematic concerning the relationship between philosophy and humanity, the role philosophy and philosophers play as stewards for one humanity or another. In Husserl, the philosopher is a spiritual functionary guiding humanity (in particular, European humanity, whose roots extend from Greek society) towards its spiritual ascent and directed towards infinite tasks to push back crises for philosophy to be the self-reflection of humanity. In Horkheimer, critical theory serves as a

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101 Ibid, 38.
102 Ibid, 41.
weapon to emancipate humanity from the slavery of abstract labour and capitalism, recognizing traditional theory, inclusive of Husserl’s perspective as well, mires through its presuppositions that require a significant paradigm change. Lastly, in Althusser, there is a recognition of philosophy to represent the class struggle in theory, and such a stance requires one to take partisanship within philosophy to struggle against the ideological, political, and economic formations at root within thought. As indicated in each, people supposedly need philosophy to guide, emancipate, and represent them. What kind of thought would eliminate the need for philosophy to direct and make people change and, instead, have people direct and govern their guiding, emancipation, and representation?

Like each of the above thinkers, François Laruelle’s goal is to invent a thought valid for generic humanity that seeks to free people from the all-encompassing nature of philosophical sufficiency. Like Husserl, Laruelle sees philosophy in whatever form has always guided and aided in the spiritual development of a peoples from getting out of a crisis. Like Horkheimer, there is a desire to utilize and invent a practice in the service of humanity to free people from a holistic servitude. Like Althusser, Laruelle recognizes there is a necessary break from an ideological framework ossifying philosophy itself that only a science can develop a theory and critique of as a representative or partisan. Unlike all of them, however, the constant to invent is not reducible to an existing philosophical model, nor is it, for that matter, invented as if from without to be imported back into a real movement. Laruelle claims that humanity does not need to identify with any philosophy to be free. Instead, it is philosophy determined in the last instance by humanity. Humanity is not a philosophizing species. On the contrary, humanity is philosophically

103 The subsequent chapters will provide a thorough investigation into the themes, concepts, and problems present in Laruelle’s work.
unintelligible, undefinable, and undecidable in its essence, being able to make philosophy “human” insofar as it is no longer alien to lived experience.

Laruelle calls his programmatic vision of humanity – the real unphilosophizable – non-philosophy or, much later on (with means inspired by quantum physics and its approach to go “beyond the standard model” of physics) non-standard philosophy. Laruelle repeatedly stresses that non-philosophy is not philosophy in the quotidian sense nor a philosophy of the no or non-. Non-Philosophy is not a negation, destruction, or even a deconstruction of philosophy, all of which are philosophical and meta-philosophical operations already happening within philosophical practice. Though this has a rather negative way of defining the practice, a positive practice arises from non-philosophy. For Laruelle, “non-philosophy is a practice of philosophy that is heteronomous to it [philosophy] but no longer heteronomous to man – whereas philosophy’s spontaneous practice is autonomous for itself and heteronomous to man.”

The non- of non-philosophy draws inspiration from non-Euclidean geometry, which is not a negation but a mutation of Euclidean geometry through Nikolai Lobachevsky’s achievement. For over fifty years, non-philosophy has transformed from being a “science of philosophy” or “first science” relating to the real or the human, a science as an experimental treatment of philosophy as material, index, or symbolic support, to a unified theory of science (or regional thoughts, such as ethics or politics)

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104 P&NP, 10.
105 Ibid, 106-107: “Perhaps it is understood more clearly why the expression ‘non-philosophy’ must be interpreted with the intention that distinguishes, for example, between the ‘non-Euclidean’ style and the ‘Euclidean’ style in geometry. This formula is just as metaphorical as that of the ‘Copernican Revolution’. And perhaps less so if it is accepted that, in this formulation, it is no longer a simple, analogical and non-paradigmatic transference from a scientific revolution to the interior of philosophy’s supposed autonomy, as is the case with Kant…If there is a transference, then it takes place in science alone, from a particular form of the latter – ‘non-Euclidean’ geometries – to its essence of science. And by all accounts, metaphor for metaphor, we shall require…a ‘Lobachevskian’ and Riemannian metaphor…Greco-contemporary thought, i.e., ‘philosophy’, is so to speak ‘Euclidean’ because it is founded upon a supposition of unity, unicity and sufficiency which seem obvious to it but which is no longer obvious for us.”
and philosophy (the fundamental) and is now identifies itself as a generic science indirectly uniting or fusing science and philosophy under scientific condition. On the one hand, it is a transcendental science whose cause is not reducible to Being or the Logos, but what Laruelle considers as the One in the non-philosophical sense as the utmost real or indivisible object: man. Whereas in many philosophies, in the Neo-Platonists and Badiou, for instance, the One is identifiable as Unity or synonymous with Being or the Other, non-philosophy identifies the One as man or as radically “individual” without a reciprocal or dialectical relationship with philosophy. Every relation has a division and reversible causality between one thing (the cause) and another (the effect). On the other hand, it is an empirical science working upon the occasional materials provided by philosophies and sciences, along with other regions of thought (ethics, politics, religion, etc.). This re-configuration operates towards inventing statements or thoughts that are more adequate representations of the real (man or humanity) than philosophical sufficiency, which obfuscates with the prevailing Greco-Western categories defining man. In some senses, one may argue that non-philosophy is like a reprisal of the mathesis universalis envisioned by Husserl, the critical conception of theory in Horkheimer, and the scientific break in Althusser from an ideology (here, philosophical sufficiency). Although there are some family resemblances between these approaches and much more (such as Deleuzian, Derridian, Heideggerian, Kantian, Henryan, and Wittgensteinian programmes, to name a few), the theoretical and pragmatic approach Laruelle inaugurates has a unique conceptual vocabulary concerned with a description of the real relationship of humanity and philosophy. Non-Philosophy is not a reorganization of thought returning to some pre-established harmony with its desire to “humanize” thought. The “humanization,” or rather “humanification” of thought,106 consists in providing the real

phenomenal meaning to the term “determination in the last instance,” as a unilateral causality Marxism is unable to provide without re-instituting a dialectic in its causal relationship. If, for Althusser, philosophy represents the class struggle in theory, Laruelle’s non-philosophy responds by introducing democracy into thought: the power of people to determine and order thought.

There is a sense of radical humility in Laruelle’s non-philosophical practice. The often-invoked quote by Laruelle, “Laruelle does not exist,” is used to emphasize how Laruelle is not just another big-name thinker of French continental philosophy boasting their importance in the pantheon of Great Thinkers like Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger, or Badiou. On the one hand, it recognizes the irreducibility of Laruelle’s invention to both pre-existing models identifying themselves with some universal or another (such as Power, History, the Text, etc.) and the assumed generality of “the” philosophy. On the other hand, this humility is also irreducible to being imported from something outside, as if it must return inwardly. Instead, I would like to emphasize something different in the same response where this idea of the supposed non-existence of Laruelle: “[Non-Philosophy is] still what I have written insofar as I identify myself with humankind. While philosophy identifies with the philosophical tradition, myself, I back away from that identification: it’s simply humankind.”

What is this humankind or generic humanity? To Laruelle, generic humanity involves the sedentary and the nomadic, the dwellers and the navigators, the earthbound and the extra-terrestrial, and the popular masses and the migratory flows indifferently. Though generic humanity may involve European humanity and the proletarian masses enslaved by the logic of capital alongside the diasporic, a universal humanity

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107 François Laruelle and interviewers, “Non-Philosophy, Weapon of Last Defence,” in L&NP, 244. Emphases in original.
108 PNS, 34.
exists as Strangers or Foreigners [Étrangers] without a philosophical anthropology enrooted by or to realize a telos.

Laruelle makes the claim that non-philosophy is itself human philosophy.\textsuperscript{109} Human philosophy is not a matter of making philosophy free for anyone to use \textit{nolens volens}. It requires a radical critique of the internal limitations of Greco-worldly philosophy in its sufficiency to determine humanity. According to Laruelle,

Passing from Greco-worldly philosophy to “human philosophy” is not an \textit{anthropo-logical} subjectification, but is to make of thought the simple, infinite, unlimited but scientifically founded representation of man’s essence as subject (of) science. What is opposed to spontaneous philosophical Appearance…is the production of a (\textit{non-})philosophical “subjective” Appearance, \textit{by and for man, where it is philosophy that has to identify with man rather than the other way around}. Non-philosophy is the authentic, not alienated, concept of “popular philosophy” and of anti-vulgarization. The traditionally highest usage of language, its usage-of-logos, its philosophical pragmatics, is its \textit{exploitation} in accordance with a set of decisions or restrictive \textit{a priori}s that form the capital of the logos. A non-philosophical pragmatics lifts this limitation, redistributes the available material according to a rule which is no longer that of economy or rarity, and therefore distributes it to every man. Philosophy can only really become “for all” or “popular” by becoming non-philosophy.\textsuperscript{110}

The concern is to draw out what I consider overlooked in non-philosophy’s identity as human philosophy and its correlation to what Laruelle later calls non-humanism. Non-Humanism is first introduced in the 1995 book \textit{Théorie des Étrangers}, though it is arguably latent in writings concerning human philosophy and permeates Laruelle’s entire corpus. Non-Humanism is in contrast to the principle of sufficient humanism, which seeks to define man according to existing philosophical predicates without elucidating the real essence of man immanent to man: “Humanism is what the philosopher thinks of man, not what man thinks (of) himself.”\textsuperscript{111} Suppose one states outright that there is an antinomy between philosophy and humanity, as our problematic

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{P&NP}, 28.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{TdE}, 106.
is concerned with. It is non-philosophy that brings about one solution to this problematic uniquely. The quasi-Spinozan statement *homo sive scientia*, that is, man or science, summarizes the solution. *Homo sive scientia* argues for overturning the principle of sufficient philosophy, which operates not only as the necessity but as the destiny of people to be determinable by philosophy. Laruelle argues ordinary man is the science of the World.\textsuperscript{112} This dissertation is concerned with articulating why that is the case. The immanent unity of man and science in non-philosophy offers a radical response to the question concerning the real relationship between philosophy and humanity. The next chapter deals with the basic concepts of non-philosophy and its development throughout Laruelle’s work for over fifty years, from the 1970s up to recent years.

\textsuperscript{112} *BoOM*, 83.
Chapter 2 - Non-Philosophy is Human Philosophy: On Laruelle’s Non-Humanism

“…philosophy is made for man, not man for philosophy.”¹
François Laruelle

2.0. Introduction: Entering the Alleyway

In the growing secondary and tertiary scholarship that draws inspiration from his work, François Laruelle does not budge in affirming non-philosophy as the a priori defence of humanity. Despite all that, the very notion of “human” in his “human philosophy” and even “the human” or “man” as such is at stake between the detractors and even some proponents of Laruelle’s work. What purpose does it serve to distinguish “human philosophy” or “non-philosophical humanism” (hereon abbreviated to non-humanism), that is, a genuine philosophy of man,² from the varying humanisms of the Western tradition of philosophy and post-humanisms in their wake?³ Why does Laruelle retain a prejudiced term such as “man” for a practice that would like to present itself as “non-humanist”? What is there to learn from Laruelle’s non-philosophical humanism or human philosophy to better propose outlooks beyond Western humanist and anthropocentric outlooks? Or does Laruelle’s work retain Eurocentrism even in the proclamation that non-philosophy provides a constant valid for generic humanity, that is, a humanity devoid of philosophical sufficiency?

¹ P&NP, 247; PoD, xvii.
² P&NP, 200.
³ Philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Paul Sartre, make up the varying tendencies of the dominant framework of humanism. Post-humanism can either be understood as the critique of the anthropocentrism present in these dominant perspectives towards perspectives that are extra-human and ecological, with thinkers such as Rosi Braidotti, Donna Haraway, and David Roden, sharing a similar tendency; or it can be understood as recognizing the limits and margins of humanism. These extend from the critique of the Eurocentric bases of humanism and the contradictions that are present within its practice, from thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, and Sylvia Wynter. They also extend in intra-philosophical criticism from thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Martin Heidegger.
I argue it is impossible to understand non-philosophy without explaining what “human philosophy” or “non-humanism” entails. If, according to Laruelle, humanism is what the philosopher thinks of man, not what man thinks (of) himself, it is then necessary to grapple with what it means for man to “think (of) himself” for one to understand human philosophy and non-humanism. Humanism is a set of images of human beings nevertheless bound to a philosophical invariant I analyze throughout this chapter: anthropo-logical difference. Anthropo-logical difference is introduced in *A Biography of Ordinary Man* as a structuring matrix that knows only “the inhuman, the sub-human, the all-too-human, the over-human, but philosophy does not know the human. It only knows man by encircling them in prefixes or question marks.” Furthermore, in *Éthique de l’Étranger*, Laruelle provides a far more complex response to Heidegger’s definition of metaphysics. Whereas for Heidegger, onto-theology constitutes the entirety of Western metaphysics as the unity of ontology and theology, Laruelle argues the most complete definition is onto-anthropo-theology, the unity of man, theology, and ontology. There is no genuine description of the human being without this invariant relationship between metaphysics and humanity. Non-humanism or human philosophy seeks to disrupt that invariant relationship by expressing an irreversible order that ensues from man prior to philosophical predication to invent a philosophy determined by and for man. It is not humanity that is made for philosophy. It is philosophy that is made by and for man.

In this chapter, I explore human philosophy and its concepts and themes through the trajectory of Laruelle’s writings over the past fifty years. Split into five separate periods of his

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4 *TdE*, 106.
5 *BoOM*, 4. Translation slightly modified.
7 *EdE*, 295.
work (named Philosophie I-V), each period of Laruelle’s work builds upon the previous ones, though in a way towards the invention of new forms of thought irreducible to varying philosophically overdetermined practices. However, each one of Laruelle’s theoretical inventions is such that their novelty is inseparable from humanity. While non-philosophy is a practice of thought that seeks to sever itself from philosophical sufficiency that accounts for new relations to the world to arise outside of existing philosophical practice, an investigation into the identity of non-philosophy as human philosophy is utmost necessary. Numerous scholars, such as Juan Diego Blanco, Ray Brassier, Hugues Choplin, Jonathan Fardy, Alexander R. Galloway, Ian James, Katerina Kolozova, Sophie Lesueur, John Ó Maoilearca, Anthony Paul Smith, and Glenn Wallis, each in their own way, have investigated the movements of the inventive approaches by providing an overview of Laruelle’s corpus. Others have also developed Laruelle’s approach, providing advancements independent of the accounts presented in his works. Furthermore, several edited

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9 Thinkers such as Hugues Choplin, Lee Chien-Chang, Danilo di Manno de Almeida, Erik Del Bufalo, Sion Elbaz, Patrick Fontaine, Jacques Fradin, Patrice Guillaumaud, Gilles Grelet, Gilbert Hottois, Gilbert Kieffer, Gérard Kponsou, Didier Moulinier, Philippe Petit, Jean-Luc Rannou, Anne-Françoise Schmid, and Serge Valdinoci have all in one way or another been involved with Laruelle’s work and expanding on it in various ways.
volumes\textsuperscript{10} and academic journals\textsuperscript{11} have resulted from the popularity and curiosity that Laruelle’s work evokes. Yet what remains desirable in these approaches is analyzing the human philosophy and non-humanism Laruelle inaugurates.

In this chapter, I define non-philosophy as human philosophy, what it entails, and how one should understand it. Along the way, I analyze some basic concepts, themes, and schematics specific to non-philosophy’s practice that would bolster its identity as the “philosophy of man” or “non-humanism.” Lastly, through the distinct periods of Laruelle’s work, I explain the significance of non-philosophy as human philosophy as indicative of his singular idea in the form of what he calls programmatic messianism or the critique of humanity’s judgment.\textsuperscript{12} I would like to demonstrate how, throughout Laruelle’s work, we must rethink the relationship of philosophy and humanity on bases irreducible to existing philosophical practice.

2.1. The evolution of Laruelle’s Real Critique of Humanity’s Judgment

A study into the multiple invariants in Laruelle’s writings allows for a greater appreciation of the introduction to human philosophy and non-humanism. As my dissertation pertains to people and democracy, one may place these invariants under a category or matrix called demo-logical difference. Laruelle introduces this invariant category in *Pourquoi pas la philosophie?* 4 as the matrix that relates the essence of people (the *demos*) with the *ontologos*, always mediating the people within a philosophically intelligible relation to philosophy as its Other. With that said,


\textsuperscript{12} *FDTH*, 31; *TdE*, 18-19.
throughout this holistic overview of Laruelle’s work, I analyze each of the invariants appearing as a continuation of demo-logical difference such as anthropo-logical difference in *A Biography of Ordinary Man* and *Théorie des Étrangers* (the mediation between the essence of man and philosophical intelligibility), ego-xeno-logical difference from *Théorie des Étrangers* (the structuring matrix of the relations between oneself and another, between the Ego and the Xenos, under philosophy), and eco-logical difference from *The Last Humanity* (the relationship between man, animal, and plant, and other living beings within philosophy). The development of demo-logical difference is seen most prominently in the periods Philosophie II and Philosophie III. However, one may argue that the literature in Philosophie IV and V also engages it by way of the non-theological use of messianism present in the notion Humaneity (a portmanteau of deity or the Godhead and human, but in no way a deification of the human\(^\text{13}\)) and the notion of anthropo-quantum difference present in *Tétralogos*.


François Laruelle’s ambitious project of a non-philosophical pragmatics of philosophy spans over fifty years of writings. Each of his writings fit under five periods titled Philosophie I to Philosophie V. The first period, Philosophie I, has rarely been explored. Still, it has been described by Laruelle as being situated under the authority of Philosophical Sufficiency, a principle higher than Sufficient Reason articulating the viewpoint that everything is philosophizable. In his Philosophie III book, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, Laruelle notes that Philosophie I (circa 1970 to circa 1980)

placed itself under the authority of the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy but already sought to put certain themes to work; themes that would only find their definitive form, a transformed form, in Philosophy III: the individual, its identity and its multiplicity, a

\(^{13}\) *MNP*, 106: “To distinguish Man-in-Man and anthropology, the ‘negative’ Real and positive reality, we imitate Eckhart by sometimes saying ‘Humaneity’ rather than ‘humanity’ and sometimes ‘Uneity’ rather than the One with his very conceptually different distinction of the super-essential Deity and the positive God.”
transcendental and productive experience of thought, the theoretical domination of philosophy, the attempt to construct a problematic rivaling that of Marx, though mainly on Nietzschean terrain and with Nietzschean means.¹⁴

Four of the five books that form this period indicate the Nietzschean thematic. The first of the five, however, *Phénomène et différence: essai sur l’ontologie de Ravaisson* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971) draws specifically from Félix Ravaisson’s work to indicate him as “the most Nietzschean of the line of pre-Bergsonians.”¹⁵ Although a separate book from the four others, this work is a fundamental underpinning of Laruelle’s thought. According to Anne-Françoise Schmid, the notion of the *serpentine line* (or *figura serpentinata*) is found almost everywhere latently in Laruelle’s work.¹⁶ Aspects from Laruelle’s reading of Ravaisson are thus nuanced in non-philosophy. In particular, when Ravaisson writes that philosophy “must collect the wreckages of these masterpieces, purify them of alterations that the course of time made them suffer, to bring them then together, to illuminate one by the other, to interpret them following their genuine meaning, and finally liberate the principle that takes form and figure there,”¹⁷ the reader may see that non-philosophy, in its cloning of philosophical statements, echoes this claim of taking the wrecks and debris of masterpieces and transforming them from these ruins into novelty. Laruelle’s Ravaisson argues against Heidegger: whereas the latter recognized how onto-theology constitutes Western metaphysics, that is, “the still unthought unity of the essential nature of metaphysics” between

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¹⁴ *PoNP*, 33.
¹⁵ *PD*, 9. “Despite his blandness, his unbearable and barely modern sweetness, Ravaisson is the most Nietzschean of the line of pre-Bergsonians, such at least I have implemented, seeking affirmation and positivity within the reclamation of the sensible concrete, expression within the manifestation of the absolute, and even – pushing re-interpretation beyond reasonable limits – something like the eternal return within the serpentine circularity which forms the essence of life and grace: the eternal return of grace and beauty…”
¹⁶ Anne-Françoise Schmid, “A Mood for Philosophy,” *Labyrinth* 19.2 (Winter 2017), 15. “François has made the serpentine line live again in philosophy within his first published work, *Phénomène et Différence*…One can find it everywhere, in his whole work, and it is the dynamic of his latest work: *The Last Humanity*…where ecology, habitually reduced to horizontal movements of the planet, finds its vertical dimension. François cites from time to time the Irish writer Seán O’Casey’s *The Plough and the Stars* as a way to remind us that he is the son of a farmer who became a philosopher and as a title that he transforms into “From the Cave to the Stars” according to the serpentine line.”
¹⁷ Cited in *PD*, 45-46.

Smith 54
ontology and theology,\textsuperscript{18} the former upholds onto-theo-phony, “the primacy of the aesthetic modes of expression, painting, and sculpture, at the expense of the explanation of meaning”\textsuperscript{19} as the manifestation of Being. Laruelle finds in Ravaisson the figure of the philosopher-artist who, in their aesthetic activity, makes all parts of a whole work in reciprocal participation to create a world or a non-transcendental cosmology.\textsuperscript{20}

As mentioned above, the thematic of Philosophie I indicates a Nietzschean perspective. Yet what, or rather, \textit{which one} is Nietzschean?\textsuperscript{21} According to Laruelle, it is a doubly incongruous philosophical and political question to ask. Firstly, one cannot define “Nietzsche” under a philosophical belonging designed with themes and doctrines. Secondly, identifying which one is Nietzschean would make an ideal use of his work for ends that do not respect the criterion of Nietzsche-thought. The four major books of this period convey this thematic: \textit{Machines textuelles: déconstruction et le libido-d’écriture} (Paris: Seuil, 1976), \textit{Le déclin de l’écriture} (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1977), \textit{Nietzsche contre Heidegger: thèses pour une politique nietzschéenne} (Paris: Payot, 1977), and \textit{Au-delà du principe de pouvoir} (Paris: Payot, 1978).\textsuperscript{22} These four books present interpretations of Nietzsche with the express purpose of bringing about a fusion of Deleuzean metaphysics of Difference with the différance of Derridean deconstruction in the form of Différance. By doing so, Laruelle crafts Nietzschean politics that challenge existing forms of

\textsuperscript{18} Heidegger, \textit{Identity and Difference}, 55.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{PD}, 42. It is here that one may find a similarity of Ravaisson and Nietzsche in the personage of the philosopher-artist.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{PD}, 223.
\textsuperscript{21} A possible translation of the sixth and seventh chapters of \textit{Nietzsche contre Heidegger}, “Qu’est-ce qui est «Nietzschéen »?” (67-83). Such a decision is informed by Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche who identifies the difference between “what” or “what is it” (\textit{qu’est-ce que}) and “which one” (\textit{qui}). See Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 76-77.
\textsuperscript{22} I would title each respectively as the following: \textit{Textual Machines: Deconstruction and the Libido-of-Writing}, \textit{The Twilight of Writing}, \textit{Nietzsche Contra Heidegger: Theses Towards a Nietzschean Politics}, and \textit{Beyond the Power Principle}. For the purposes of the dissertation, I have chosen to retain the original titles and to follow the legend from the apparatus present above: \textit{MT, DE, NcH}, and \textit{APP}. I have chosen the more poetic “Twilight” over “Decline” for \textit{Le déclin de l’écriture}, which is a playful French tongue-twister, to connote the Nietzschean content of the book itself and to create an English tongue-twister of my own.
political practices and forms of the knowledge of power (such as hermeneutics of power, whether it be the juridical, biblical, philosophical, etc. means of interpretation) that the engine of Différance, rather than Hegelian contradiction, generates. According to Laruelle, it is Nietzsche who – alongside Plato, Galileo, and Marx (according to Althusser) – *invents* (not discovers) the scientific Continent of Politics. Between Marxist politics and Nietzschean politics, Laruelle states three theses:

**Thesis 4:** Marx discovers the Continent of History, but Nietzsche invents the Continent of Politics, a Break distinct from the Marxist one because it is specifically political both by its object and its conditions, and that it implicates a new definition of politics.

**Thesis 5:** As a theoretical-practical process, Marxism produces a secondary political benefit; as a process of production, Nietzsche-thought is the only one to produce a primary political benefit.

**Thesis 6:** Marx grounds the practical representation of politics and the relations of power, Nietzsche invents the production of specifically political agents. Marxism subordinates production to practice, but, with the inverse hierarchy, Nietzsche invents the theoretical instrument necessary for the exploration of the Continent of Politics.²³

According to Laruelle, Nietzsche provides a new materialist perspective no longer grounded in the materiality of matter assumed as sensuousness and practice, which is still a classically metaphysical enterprise comprised as a Nietzsche-thought. The materialism of Nietzsche-thought expresses itself through a libidinal materiality as the machinic motor determining thought and how thought and the text function.²⁴ It is a materialism of power and desire that allows for a new theory of politics and its quadripartite (rebellion/mastery, fascism/revolution) to arise, a point where power is no longer reducible to dominant or reactive power but where an anti-political power unsettles the Greco-Western significations of the presence of power.

²³ NcH, 21.
²⁴ DE, 8.
It is through the two practices of political materialism and machinic materialism that Laruelle seeks to complete and resolve the problems posited by historical materialism and dialectical materialism respectively that they could not solve. Political Materialism, on the one hand, is a “general analytic of power” that results from the “major Nietzschean discovery that power is no longer a generically or specifically qualified object within the element of an indifferent generality [that poses power as] no longer a set of secondary properties of a global or specific object (the State, the person, the People, class) or a homo politicus [and] it cannot draw its possibility within a fundamental ontology which would claim to be politically neutral.”25 Machinic Materialism, on the other hand, has “the philosophical generality [for object] in which it poses the relations of matter and the ‘machinic’ syntaxes cannot mask [dissimuler] the duality (duplicity) of its objects and the problem of their necessary hierarchy.”26 Both happen within and without philosophy, political or otherwise, for what is latent (vis-à-vis the machinic or différantial) is within the manifest (the affected or the Same) but cannot be extricated through the manifest. In this way, the machinic is the proper causality of this analysis which expresses an early yet philosophically riddled form of unilaterality: “We ‘oppose’ to [Dialectical Materialism] a theoretical-instinctual apparatus, both theoretical and material (its unity is precisely différantial rather than ‘contradictory’) which has the property of always being universal and partial, ‘general’ and ‘minoritarian’ at the same time: both the multiplicity of possible theoretico-libidinal positions and one position in this multiplicity.”27 Because political materialism and machinic materialism are substituted for historical materialism and dialectical materialism, respectively, Laruelle also displaces Marxism’s terminology of forces and relations of production to forces and relations of production to forces and relations of

25 *APP*, 23.
26 *NcH*, 32-33.
27 *DdE*, 14.
power. The forces are no longer reducible to technical machinery, land, and labour but to the machinic and libidinal materiality, whereas the relations of power deal with the relations between the Power Principle and its Beyond.  

Having Différence and the Other as the genetic engine of power, rather than the contradiction and Being, inverts the hierarchy from the manifest and the surface level appearances of power towards its desiring, libidinal latent power, its sense or meaning [sens] as the determinant in the last instance. At a later time, Laruelle disavows this period of thought, not for the sole purpose of it being reducible to the principle of sufficient philosophy; instead, he signs the name Nietzsche as this period as indicative of stato-minoritarian thought. Indeed, as the above quote from *Le déclin de l’écriture* notes, by expressing both the multiplicity of possible positions and one position in this multiplicity, the circularity and impossibility of radically breaking the ties that bind the human with the world required a change of posture. Différence, with its duplicitous and latent power, became no different than the contradiction that sublated and subsumed the differences and identities into a unity. Yet the underlying factor that drives Laruelle’s work from

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28 I will return to this in Chapter 4 while dealing with the transition from political materialism to the en-demic.

29 *BoOM*, 39-40. “‘Stato-minoritarian’ thought, Nietzschean and postmodern, already distinguishes factual minorities – defined by criteria of culture, language, history, sex – and minorities as continuous multiplicities, as reciprocal differences relative to one another, as differends that cannot be inscribed within the social fabric and on known political chessboards, but that still form exceptional and fluid regularities. From this point of view, we would call minoritarian, or, more precisely, ‘stato-minoritarian’, ‘the individual who is the entire chain’ (Nietzsche), the singular case that is identical – without mediation – to a regularity, or that ‘makes law’ from its singularity as differend…. [Minorities] are not experienced as continuous parts of the State or the social body, as sequences taken from the regularity of laws or as limits in the continuum of games of power; they are only organized from the outside under the generalities of the State, the Nation, Constitutions, Laws, Languages, Cultures…[Eliminating] them is useless if the Authoritarian Ideal in the form of a ‘beyond’ of Authorities is retained. There is a minoritarian amphibology that derives from the amphibology found in dominant, Greco-unitary thought: it is condemned to remake minorities as a beyond of power, a beyond of the power principle. This is the contemporary solution whose arguments come from Freud, Nietzsche, Heidegger, the great seducers of the individual as such: the beyond of power remains in the web of power that merely has been loosened. Beyond of… a Greek and Jewish form of the question, a form of unitary compromise. The beyond is the Other, the real-as-Other, or the Unconscious of…, the Other is always the other of…the Same, the Identical, the State, the World, the Greek – without which it is nothing.”
hereon is the problem that frames *Machines textuelles*: “how does one draw new effects from the transcendental without oneself being ‘ein transzendentaler Philosoph’…?”  

2.1.2. Philosophie II (~1980-1990)

Philosophie I implemented several themes that would become mature over time in Philosophie II and Philosophie III. As indicated in *En tant qu’un*, there exists a continuity of problems (is a specific thought of the individual possible, how to assure thought’s rigour and reality, and how to dominate philosophy theoretically) and a discontinuity of solutions from the thought of the Other or Différance to the One qua One or ordinary man. It is through Nietzsche, aligned with the philosophies of difference, that Laruelle can conceive of these forms of materialisms proper to this period (Machinic and Political Materialism). However, it is Nietzsche who Laruelle needed to break from to instantiate his conception of non-philosophy. In 1981’s *Le principe de minorité*, Laruelle opens with the following problematic posed with the underlying general form:

Can we define parts before the Whole and independently from the Whole? Differences before their repetition and independent from the Idea, the Logos, and Being? Minorities before the State and independent from the State. The entity or the being [l’étant] before Being and independently from Being? Can we think events before their placement in history, subjects before objects and deprived of objectivity? Time without temporality? Singularities or multiplicities before any universal and independently from a universal? Etc. We do not respond to each of these questions in particular. We strive to elaborate a matrix which is valid for these types of questions and a matrix of responses that philosophy may hope to bring them. Therefore, the point is to establish a theory, in the strict sense of these terms, *of the essence of multiplicities* and, thereby, to reprise on new bases the oldest problems of truth, being, the absolute and the relative, transcendence, the method of philosophical thought, etc.  

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30 *MT*, 10.  
31 *EtQU*, 22-23.  
32 *PdM*, 5.
This problematic forms the theoretical bedrock for the central theme that constitutes Philosophie II (from circa 1980 to circa 1990): ordinary man exists really and independently of the World, and a science of ordinary man constitutes ordinary man as an object against the predominant poverty of both philosophy and the human sciences. This book presents a significant breakthrough in Laruelle’s thought but still proposes the idea of multiplicities as beyond the continua that Laruelle argues strives to be independent and before. In other words, although the One presented here is unreflected [irréfléchi] and non-thetic to the mixture and blend that it forms with these generalizing universals, the One still portrays itself as an Other to Being. This “step beyond” [pas au-delà] required a breakthrough, inaugurated with A Biography of Ordinary Man. As a “treatise of Human Solitudes,” Biography strives to ground a rigorous science of humanity, not only as necessary but also as possible. Biography states that the human of the Human Sciences (in the sense of the humanities, such as anthropology) entangles with philosophy. Greco-unitary prejudices over humanity express themselves through the generalizing universals or Authorities to which humanity is subjugated (History, Sexuality, Race, Language, Power, etc.). According to Laruelle, it is necessary to no longer base a science of people on these Greek prejudices like Being and the Logos. It is also possible to develop an immanent description, a science of the experience of the individual qua individual as undivided solely on the condition of demonstrating that the One is the unity of science and human, a One that is no longer Greek but a finite experience that even the naming of the “One” can be represented provisionally. The ordinary human, or minorities qua

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33 As a note for the reader, Laruelle uses l’homme. In an interview, he notes that while he chooses the word “man” as dependent on the old humanism, “we must say that there are terms within philosophy which are particularly loaded. I take account of that. There’s still a strategy within non-philosophy: everything is indifferent but because there is a material, or the possible choice between two materials, there is necessarily a strategy.” Cited from “V’là d’la théorie! Entretien avec François Laruelle précédé d’une note introductive par Gilles Grelet,” in Cahiers de la Torpille 4 (March 2000), 110. Wherever I use “man” in the text, it is following Laruelle’s approach, and to note the strategy he strives to carry out is one that the reader must assimilate.
minorities, minorities that are not stato-minoritarian, requires a theoretical defence, and this book presents the basis for that defence. Rather than the One being beyond Being or beyond the World and authorities, it is Being, the World and authorities that are beyond the One. I argue that Biography is the fundamental work for any non-philosopher.

*A Biography of Ordinary Man* strives to take man or the human entity as distinct from and independent of the World, History, Language, Sexuality, Power, and Philosophy, all these generalizing universals that come to be named Authorities that form peoples’ destinies as something always philosophizable. In *Biography of Ordinary Man*, philosophical sufficiency is both a counter-mythology and counter-sophistry with Greco-unitary prejudices.34 The Greek component of the Greco-unitary prejudice has two variants: the Heraclitean (for any one thing, there must be a coinciding opposite, the unity of contraries) and the Parmenidean (the same is for being as for thinking). The unitary aspect is the assumed inseparability of the real, the human, with the world through difference, contradiction, or structure as mediating principles. In *Biography*, Laruelle strives to break from the Greco-unitary conjuncture as a dominant paradigm for thinking with five human theorems that he outlines:

1. Man really exists and is really distinct from the World: this thesis contradicts almost all of philosophy;
2. Man is a mystical living being condemned to action, a contemplative being doomed to practice, though they do not know why this is the case;
3. As a practical living being, man is condemned a second time, and for the same reasons, to philosophy;
4. This double condemnation organizes their destiny, and this destiny is called ‘World’, ‘History’, ‘Language’, ‘Sexuality’, ‘Power’, which we refer to as Authorities in general;
5. A rigorous science of ordinary man, that is, a rigorous science of man is possible: a biography of the individual as Minorities and as Authorities; a theoretically justified

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34 *BoOM*, 6: “The human insufficiency of the Sciences of Man is a theoretical insufficiency. We have spoken, against common sense, about the theoretical carelessness of philosophy. The deficit in *theoria* is not actually specific to these weak and inconsistent sciences. It comes first of all from Greek ontological prejudices, which prohibited the simultaneous unfolding of the essence of theory and the essence of man, and which produced a mere counter-mythology or a counter-sophistry, ‘philosophy’, instead of a phenomenally rigorous and positive science of man.” Emphases mine.
description of the life they lead between these two poles, which are sufficient to define
them.\textsuperscript{35}

Equally, there is another dominant conjuncture that Laruelle later concerns himself with, known
as the Greco-Judaic. One may express this conjuncture by differentiating between Identity and
Difference under philosophical sufficiency in two distinct examples: “Take care of being as a
whole” (ontology or metaphysics) and “Be the guardian of the Other man as your brother” (Judaic
thought). According to Laruelle, both statements forget radical Identity qua Identity (the real of
the One as indivisible, irreducible to the Principle of Identity and the metaphysics of the One)
through displacing it either through Being or the Other.\textsuperscript{36} In both the Greco-unitary and the Greco-
Judaic, the human identity is considered an opposite, the Other, on the mode of Being, and co-
extensive with the World. The point for non-philosophy is to radically think the human identity as
that which really exists before and independent from the World, History, Language, Power,
Sexuality, and the State.

Instead, the human entity is an unreflected experience that comes to occupy the
transcendental term, the One, with the power to determine these authorities in the last instance
alone.\textsuperscript{37} “Ordinary” is stripped of its philosophical fetishism, typified by the gregarious, the
commonplace, the healthy understanding, the vulgar, the everyday, and so on. The ordinary is an
inalienable essence that people draw from themselves, contrasted with the anthropoid or android

\textsuperscript{35} BoOM, 1. Translation modified.
\textsuperscript{36} EtQU, 118: “Several imperatives are possible that define a specific way of thinking each. Examples are: ‘Take care
of being as a whole’ (→ ontology or metaphysics) and ‘Be the guardian of the Other man like your brother’ (→ Judaic
thought). What type of thought can determine the imperative, ‘Think Identity qua Identity or Identity independently
of Being’?...This is what we will here seek under the name of ‘science’ or ‘sciences themselves’…”
\textsuperscript{37} Determination in the last instance is articulated throughout Laruelle’s oeuvre as a specific causality, neither a present
cause (as in the four metaphysical causes: efficient, material, formal, and final), nor an absent cause (as in Althusser’s
statement “the hour of the last instance never comes”), nor a combination of the two. Though appropriated from the
Marxist tradition, determination in the last instance is the transcendental causality that ensues from the One and is
irreversible and undivided, its determination being solely an immanent, unreflective causality upon the object it is
determining without reciprocal or reversible, bilateral relations to arise.
images of man that philosophy projects.\textsuperscript{38} It is also the “real possibility of all orders” as an ordinality higher, more powerful than the principles of Reason.\textsuperscript{39} What is essential when concerning these terms is that they are irreducible to existing and dominant forms of practice, borrowed solely as provisional or occasional material to construct new theories adequate to the One in the last instance alone.\textsuperscript{40} “Transcendental” signifies a thought or technology that relates itself to the real as the cause of its theory. \textit{Biography} introduces the matrix that blends the destiny of people with these Authorities: The Greco-unitary conjuncture is what \textit{Biography} responds to, taking on the form of both Heraclitus’ unity of opposites or contraries and Nietzsche’s statement “the struggles of individuals form links in one single chain.”\textsuperscript{41} As Philosophie II’s conjunctural dominant paradigm, Greco-unitary thought strives to make parts, differences, minorities, and being co-extensive with, inseparable from, and the opposite of the Whole, repetition, the State, and Being.

During this period to support his claims, Laruelle self-publishes journals entitled \textit{Pourquoi pas la philosophie ?}, with six issues encompassing that period of his writing from 1983-1985.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{BoOM}, 5, 7, 158, 177, 182.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid, 122-123.
\textsuperscript{40} This is highlighted by Laruelle in his debate with Luc Ferry in \textit{LDP9} (October 1989), where he states the following on 59: “One has the right to change the meaning of words if one says how they change them.” Science and transcendental, or even ‘transcendental science’, come to take on new senses and meanings by means of the non-philosophical approach insofar as it concerns an internal or immanent practice as \textit{a priori}, having absolute precedence over philosophical and traditional practices of thought. Such a precedence requires the laying out of axiomatic rules, procedures, and conditions, and, as such, a decision radically autonomous with respect to philosophy, now relegated to the realm of an object or material to experiment upon as occasional material. For more detail on this claim, the reader is recommended to read the introduction to \textit{Tol}, 1-30, with special attention to 13-17.
\textsuperscript{42} The first issue, “Descartes, mission terminée, retour impossible” (April 1983) is a critique of the \textit{Critique de la raison aléatoire} by Jean-René Vernes (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1982), presenting an alternative \textit{aleatory critique of reason}. The second, “Les crimes de l’histoire de la philosophie” (October 1983) describes how philosophy is paralyzed by a philosophical decision by the history of philosophy to which maintains a conservative yet reifying enterprise of philosophy as such, and is as much a critical commentary on the work of Martial Guéroult and his \textit{Dianoématic} series on the history of the history of philosophy and the philosophy of the history of philosophy from 1979-1984. The third, “Théorie de la Décision Philosophique” (February 1984), provides the three dimensions (real, effective, and possible) of the philosophical decision over itself and the unitary paradigm that it instantiates. The fourth issue, “Le philosophe sans qualités” (October 1984), will be one of the main sources for my development and continuation of
Whereas Biography provides the first systematic and mature elaboration of what came prior in Le principe de minorité and its problematic, it is in the fourth issue of Laruelle’s self-published journal where the term anthropo-logical difference takes on a political dimension: demo-logical difference. This fourth issue, titled “Le philosophe sans qualités,” devotes itself to the critique of “popular philosophy,” where the Greek dominant model of thought can hold two statements together that are contradictory, one from Plato, and the other from an anonymous author: “Philosophy…the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude”\textsuperscript{43} and “Philosophy must be made by all.” Demo-logical difference is understood as the common matrix between philosophy and the simultaneous impossibilization of the multitude to become philosophers and its pedagogical, procreative possibilization of the multitude to be and become philosophers, “ruling the relations of the people \textit{and} philosophy, \textit{insofar as these are precisely relations} or that there is, among the \textit{demos} and \textit{ontologos}, both distinction and unity.”\textsuperscript{44} Demo-logical difference is the unity without mediation between the people and ontology. Demo-logical difference is the broadest invariant between the people \textit{and} philosophy governing philosophy and the people though under philosophical authority. There arises a question regarding the role to which one can experience the people and, above all, the individual of the human without being structured by demo-logical and anthropo-logical difference:

In philosophy such that it is done and thought on the Greco-unitary mode, namely as the dominant mode, was there ever another law of relations – another \textit{law of relation} (in all senses of the word) between the people and philosophy than demo-logical difference? Was


\textsuperscript{44} \textit{PPP4}, 7.
there a law programming another thing among them than relations, namely as modes of
conflictual unity with interminable exchanges? When philosophy wants itself to be
“popular” and when it throws a gaze towards the people, has it done another thing than
“introducing” people to philosophy? And the people, at least when they were guilty to
believe that philosophy was necessary for them, have they done another thing than wanting
to introduce themselves “into” philosophy? The people know the service door: pedagogy.
Precisely because it is unitary, and because unitary philosophy has always been a pedagogy
is a sufficient condition concerning what it is at stake: pedagogy is the essence of demo-
logical difference, what remains of it despite everything of mediation, and without this
essence neither unitary philosophy nor the people such that philosophy imagines and forms
them cannot “introduce” and adjust each other to one another, and they cannot reciprocally
determine one another. The people are, are not, can become, must become – philosophers.
Philosophy is, is not, can become, must become – popular. One perceives that it is this
Demo-logical Ideal, one with the Greco-Western style, will push out by way of offspring:
Philosophy for all! Culture for all! Philosophy as culture! It is universal paideia become
the essence of history.45

Demo-logical difference not only overdetermines the people with qualities that exist in relation to
and blended with the Authorities mentioned above, but it also overdetermines philosophy, such
that the dominant paradigm forcibly inserts these individuals practicing and being introduced to
the practice towards the production and reproduction of the paradigm ad infinitum. In the dominant
paradigm, the People are treated as the Other of philosophy: not only as the voice of the people to
listen to but, in exchange, to teach them. This invariant is seen even in Marxist-Leninist
vanguardism and the Maoist mass line. How is one to solve the riddle of this demo-philosophical
amphibology to constitute non-philosophy as “the authentic, not alienated, concept of ‘popular
philosophy’ and of anti-vulgarization” that “lifts the limitation [of traditional and dominant
philosophy], redistributes the available material according to a rule which is no longer that of
economy or rarity, and therefore distributes it to every man”?46 It is to begin with the following
premise: the People are outside of the question and their essence as such, as Multitudes, are the
only experience of the real as undivided that we have as multitudo transcendentalis, purged of any

46 P&NP, 28.
reference to politico-sociological or philosophical empiricity. Instead, Laruelle speaks of the People or Peoples (of) the One to indicate the non-thetic or non-autopositionality of individuals as the determinant in the last instance of the relations of the World. These peoples act upon the World without, in turn, the World acting upon them.

Following Biography and these journals, Laruelle publishes Philosophies of Difference, a critical introduction to the philosophies of difference (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Derrida). There, Laruelle settles accounts with his erstwhile contemporaries of the thinkers of Difference and performs a self-criticism of what happened prior with the syntax of Difference and its entanglement with finitude, and, from there, real, or absolute finitude with the philosophical determination of finitude. After Philosophies of Difference comes the book, Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, outlining the rules of the research programme towards communitarian philosophical invention and democratization.47 En tant qu’un is a collection of essays, interviews, lectures, and unpublished writings that fundamentally introduces non-philosophy to philosophers and to ordinary people who may be interested in philosophy and affected by philosophical sufficiency. Afterwards, ending Philosophie II, is the Theory of Identities, presenting the definition of science stripped of philosophical sufficiency or what Laruelle calls epistemo-logical difference, and the invention of what Laruelle calls artificial philosophy (akin to Artificial Intelligence, and pronounced APhi like AI). The image of the fractal introduced in this book provides a new image of thought as a scientific model no longer grounded in philosophical sufficiency but scientific adequacy, that everything outside of the One is chaos, seeking to conceive of fractals “no longer

47 P&NP, 239. “Democracy and peace cannot enter among the philosophers unless they give up identifying with philosophy and unless they experience themselves as subjects (of) science practicing philosophy under the codes of non-philosophy. If it is accepted that the veritable ‘common sense’ is that of science – ‘ordinary’ sense rather – and if it is no longer founded on the transcendence of historical and political authorities and on the transcendence of philosophical authorities, then one can imagine a ‘reconciliation’ of this communitarian sense of thought through non-philosophy.”
[as] objects of ‘nature’ but of knowledge or of theory, and above all they form a novel theoretical tool, adapted at last to the disciplines of language (philosophy, poetry, literature) and no longer only to geometrical and perceived forms (physical phenomena of turbulence, cartography, painting, photography, etc.).”

Lastly, it is my opinion that the recently published manuscript, *Le nouvel esprit technologique* (*NET*), is a part of this period of thought, for Laruelle engages with philosophies of technics and technology, from Martin Heidegger to Gilbert Simondon and Gilbert Hottois. It is in this book that Laruelle notes that philosophy is itself a technology (or techno-logy, the parallelism of technics and the *logos*) that is unable to really critique the technologism that scientism and philosophy itself propagates: “A philosophical critique of Technological Reason is therefore not more than a means in our problem which is of a global evaluation of the philosophical and technological posture in general. Even though numerous works of the ‘philosophy of technics’ exist, there is nearly nothing on the general problem of what philosophy can and cannot do regarding technics.” Its placement may not be at the tail-end of Philosophie II, for two concluding essays were published in 1980 and 1983, respectively. Both of these essays are significant, as noted in the next chapter. Also during this time, Laruelle directed a collection with Aubier entitled *RES: L’invention philosophique*, which includes his *En tant qu’un* and a number of works from colleagues like Gilbert Hottois (*Le signe et la technique: la philosophie à l’épreuve de la technique*, 1984), Abel Jeannière (*Les fins du monde*, 1987), Serge Valdinoci (*Introduction dans l’europanalyse, ou Krisis 2: transformer la phénoménologie de Husserl pour fonder la...*).

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48 *ToI*, xx.
49 *NET*, 70.
philosophie, 1990), and Gilbert Simondon (L’individuation psychique et collective: à la lumière des notions de forme, information, potentiel et métastabilité, 1989).

2.1.3. Philosophie III (~1990-2000)

It is with Philosophie III that these terms receive a further maturation, primarily in the publication of 1995’s Théorie des Étrangers and accompanied by two essays that precede this text from the third issue Laruelle’s other co-edited journal, La décision philosophique: “Abstract for a Human Science of Philosophy.” The third wave of non-philosophy properly implements non-philosophy towards “regional” areas of knowledge, introducing the notion of the unified theory. Principles of Non-Philosophy, for some time, was considered the magnum opus of Laruelle’s work. The Principles serve as a comprehensive, if not summative, account of non-philosophy’s development and form this period’s centrepiece. Three such books that flank the Principles – Théorie des Étrangers, Éthique de l’Étranger, and Introduction to Non-Marxism – each apply a complex set of unified theories of philosophy and science (or a regional thought such as politics and psychoanalysis in Théorie, or ethics in Éthique, or Marxism’s materialisms and science in Non-Marxism). Each of them also serves as quasi-applications of what non-philosophy can do, with the Principles as more of a support or base for the theoretical implementations of each book. What is significant in this period of thought is not only the unified theory but equally the operation of cloning. Cloning expresses the object or occasion’s identity as seen in-One; the occasion is like a parent-cell cloned through “the general mechanism of induction and deduction of progress in non-philosophy, and assumes philosophical materials and their relative autonomy.” In other words, cloning carries on philosophy without negating it, providing it with a new life as given its identity. With the ability to extract the genetic code of philosophy, the presentation of identity is

52 PoNP, 252.
inverted: no longer does philosophy present an identity to the human, but the human, the being-foreclosed, gives the identity of philosophy.

The personage of the Stranger-subject is a significant theme in this period as the subject (of) the human or humanity. The Stranger is the chosen translation of the French word, Étranger, which may mean Foreigner or Stranger. Still, it evokes the image, as later noted in Anti-Badiou, of the sans-papiers, and, as such, the subject of the Stranger is an identity-without-identification. Further still, the Stranger is much closer to the transcendental idiot and the radical poor. Using these personae requires nuances that will seem like an idealization or even a romanticization of undocumented immigrants as ‘free’. In Théorie des Étrangers, Laruelle notes that the antinomy of philosophy and democracy and the antinomy of philosophy and the question of the Other traps the Stranger. On the one hand:

philosophy excepts itself – undoubtedly partially or provisionally, but this exception is constitutive – from its objects to the benefit of its discourse, or from its discourse to the benefit of its act. Thus, philosophy is at once anti-democratic and super-democratic and oscillates around a concept of democracy that it does not succeed in fixing rigorously and realistically: in its identity. The philosophical subject of the democratic enunciation only falls very provisionally and partially under the conditions which define the stated democracy. Man is divided between the philosopher, who states the democratic ideal of ‘equality’, and the man who is the object of the ideal who cannot claim to be the author of this discourse or can only claim to appropriate it through delegation by the philosopher. Even when it is of a philosophico-political origin or when equality is not ordered to identity but dissolves into difference, democracy assumes that man is inequal to themselves even in the affirmation of their equality or that a part of man remains ‘minor’. Democracy is a ‘sought’ and problematic concept, aporetic at worst, resolved at best within an unlimited becoming-democracy which continues to pose on man the bar of anti-democracy and non-identity and to refuse to man that man can from side to side or in identity access democracy.53

Here, between the philosopher and humanity, democracy is understood as a mixture between philosophy and the discourse on politics. Democracy is sought but never established because

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53 TdE, 12.
philosophy bars access to democracy to humanity. One must be mediated and governed by philosophy to lay claim to an essence of power and the reign of people. To Laruelle, when the philosophico-political origin defines democracy, it is not resituated to its identity, the demos. Likewise, as with the invariant demo-logical difference mentioned above, the people must and cannot be identified by philosophy in return. This leads to, on the other hand, the second antinomy, which is the inseparable problem of democracy and the Stranger:

[If] man finds their real essence in the absolutely undivided immanence and experiences themselves [s’êprouvant] as such from a given-without-givenness, if man is neither “individual” nor “subject,” neither “consciousness” nor “unconscious,” but what, to say quickly, we will call vision-in-man or in-Ego, a neither “subjective” nor “objectivated” I [Moi] but an I immanent (to) oneself, therefore man is no longer divided [partagé] between an I and an Other, the Other no longer exterior or interior and exterior to the I, but the immanent I also exists itself but without ‘exiting’ from itself in a new structure of the Stranger – the I Stranger-exists. If this I-in-I is real and defines every man, even ‘the-strangers’, if the I-in-I is the guarantee that each man enjoys without partition a radical identity that can no longer be refused to man, therefore this same I can also be called under certain conditions, or ‘additional’ conditions, a Stranger…It is to no longer divide identity and the stranger state [l’état d’étranger] between two individuals or two people where one is subject and the other is not, or even where one affects the other and inhibits them as a Forbidden [Interdit]: each man fully enjoys a radical identity and, for this very reason, is ‘gifted’ with Stranger-existing. The Stranger is no longer ‘the others’; in a sense, the Stranger is ‘I’ but on condition of now understanding this I-in-I as a quasi-infrastructure and the Stranger as the quasi-superstructure in which they exist. The formula, ‘we are all strangers’ ceases from being an unthought slogan: it receives a theoretical pertinence on condition of disbarring it from this little skeleton-key word of philosophy, ‘all’, and to substitute identity of an ‘each-and-every-one’ [tout-un-chacun] or flawless immanence which henceforth defines ‘real’ or ‘ordinary man’.

At any rate, the Stranger occupies a presence as the subject or existent of the I or Ego, the Real, as the “quasi-superstructure” of radical immanence. It is an existence not on the mode of subjective, ontological, and worldly existence, but an existence grounded in-One. Thus, this notion of the Stranger-subject allows for a conditional freedom where each-and-every-one as undivided experiences themselves in a way that no longer must be filtered through an alienating abstraction

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54 Ibid, 13.
or delegation by the philosopher. *Théorie des Étrangers* concerns itself with the Greco-Judaic contemporary conjuncture, which seeks to think this Stranger as the Other of the I. The maturation proceeds with two frameworks: non-humanism and vision-in-man, and a significant critique of the framework of anthropo-logical (or demo-logical) difference and what Laruelle calls ego-xeno-logical difference.

Ego-xeno-logical difference is described by Laruelle as “the matrix, just as much as the a priori, of the different types of relation that common sense, carried out by philosophy, could have imagined among the I and the Other,”\(^{55}\) where both are thus inscribed “within a transcendent or third element, a common ether or space of representation that we can call their auto-position.”\(^{56}\) To contest against ego-xeno-logical difference, which constitutes the overarching thematic of intersubjectivity, between the Ego or I and an Other, Laruelle introduces vision-in-man, which concerns the Ego or the Self, including the Other whose essence is in-One rather than alienated in Being, is neither “subjective” nor “objective” but “immanent (to) oneself, where it is no longer divided between an I and an Other, and the Other is no longer exterior or interior and exterior to the I, but the immanent I also itself exists without ‘exiting’ from itself, in a new structure of the Stranger – one exists-as-Stranger [il-existe-Étranger].”\(^{57}\) Vision-in-man is a change of terrain that allows for a radically autonomous existence irreducible, inalienable, and unexchangeable with the existing conditions of philosophy. It is this approach to existing-as-Stranger that Laruelle also seeks to condense all of this into the following formula: *I and the Stranger, we are identical in the last instance alone.* Such a stance is the introduction to non-humanism, which allows a significant break from vision-in-philosophy, wherein ego-xeno-logical difference comes to constitute the

\(^{55}\) *TdE*, 116.

\(^{56}\) Ibid, 120.

\(^{57}\) Ibid, 13.
relations between an I and an Other with both an interior and interior and exterior relationship that is at once a xenophobia and xenophilia. Such an instantiation clarifies that vision-in-man or non-humanism does not replace ego-xeno-logical difference by a xenocentrism.\textsuperscript{58} Non-Humanism does not appear in great detail within \textit{Théorie des Étrangers}, although the definition of it provided there is as follows:

The ensemble of these new perspectives over man constitutes a sort of “non-humanism” rather than an anti-humanism, a science of man more universal than any philosophy and capable of integrating philosophy as a simple metalanguage without authority then, pragmatically, as the apriori of any experience. Critical and juridical humanism, to take up this example, is henceforth one decision among others, proximally subject to its particularly current function-symptom, a representation which asks to be “rectified” and inserted into a knowledge destined to describe vision-in-man itself in-the-last-instance. The resultant non-humanism is the ensemble of rigorous knowledges relating themselves to the Ego and the Stranger and is not the negation of humanism...Humanism is a restrictive thought of man that we know is subtended by a unitary postulate that only one science can suspend and this postulate is formulated thus: to man is necessarily associated once and each time only one humanist thesis – once and each time only one decision. A science of men is grounded on the suspension of this postulate, which is not necessary for the being of man, and substitutes the unitary postulate with another one: to man who is just man does not necessarily correspond any particular humanist decision; or rather, an infinity of decisions corresponds to man as contingent that some could especially be called “humanist.”\textsuperscript{59}

Vision-in-man also complicates matters with regards to distinguishing itself from vision-in-philosophy. Much like vision-in-One, which is “vision of the One in the One and therefore vision of the World and of Philosophy in the One,”\textsuperscript{60} vision-in-man is a paradigmatic approach towards seeking an experience of man and the Real as radically immanent to themselves and distinct from philosophy and the World. Vision-in-man is the attempt to bring “peace and democracy that both [philosophy and the World] have not yet ever known [and] a new ‘logic’ of the relations of philosophy and the Human Sciences rather than a philosophical logic of them.”\textsuperscript{61} Non-Humanism

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 148.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 110.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{P&NP}, 34.
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{TdE}, 25.
and vision-in-man are how the formula, *Homo sive scientia* (parodying Spinoza’s *Deus sive natura*), can be uttered without irony or contradiction. It is in the essay “Abstract for a Human Science of Philosophy” that six grounding transcendental axioms provide the significance of vision-in-man in opposition to vision-in-philosophy, and of the six, it is the fifth I find most important:

1) In vision-in-philosophy, man is a mode or an attribute of another thing and lived in this other thing. In vision-in-man, man experiences themselves in and through themselves and all the rest is a mode of man – in the last instance alone.

2) In vision-in-philosophy, the proper is also improper for itself. Philosophy is the hatred of the Proper and, therefore, self-hatred in the last instance. In vision-in-man, man is the Proper who precedes appropriation and who makes everything a mode of the Proper to the closest “last instance.”

3) In vision-in-philosophy, the proper are universal essences and attributes of another thing or rather inessential properties. In vision-in-man, the proper are essential lived experiences rather than attributes of another thing.

4) In vision-in-philosophy, man is divided for man. In vision-in-man, man is One or is one man for man. Whosoever is truly not one man is truly not one man either. [a parody of Leibniz – JRS]

5) In vision-in-philosophy, man is eagle and serpent, orchid and wasp, god and wolf for man. In vision-in-man, wolf and god, eagle and serpent are men for man in the last instance.

6) In vision-in-philosophy, man is seized by a becoming-concept, a becoming-category, and becoming-idea. In vision-in-man, man is without becoming; man is stronger than the becoming-category or becoming-concept of man that man affects in the last instance.  

The fifth axiom requires attention because it returns as a problematic for *The Last Humanity: The New Ecological Science*, and it constitutes the bedrock for Laruelle’s non-humanism. Furthermore, it allows for what is most radical of this democracy when it concerns People (of) the One. Along with the unitary postulate that dictates the correspondence of man with a humanist thesis, one may argue that even posthumanism maintains correspondence with ego-xeno-logical difference, demo-logical difference, and vision-in-philosophy without conceiving of the radical autonomy to these apparent “others of man.” Instead, if wolf and god, eagle and serpent, orchid and wasp are men for

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62 “Abrégé d’une science humaine de philosophie,” in LDP 3, 105-106.
man, then they “are” – as existents – identical in the last instance alone. Identical does not mean they are the same. The unitary-philosophical understanding of the identical is the synthesis between the Same and the Other, to which ego-xeno-logical difference abides.

The Stranger plays a much more thematic role in the Éthique, for ethics cannot solve the problems regarding the crime against humanity according to Laruelle: “Every attempt to philosophically justify the statement ‘the crime against humanity’, superseding its neutral kernel towards an ethical interpretation, making it the object of a judgment of interdiction or even authorization, will lead to hesitations and indecisions of the antithetical, without being perceived if the crime remains the fact of the philosopher or being perceived if it is the fact of the victim who identifies the crime and is detached from it. As a philosopher, we have the possibility to choose between the philosopher and the victim, but as a victim, we no longer have this choice that has become useless, but the choice forced-in-the-last-instance of in-crminating philosophy.”

The conjuncture of Éthique is the rise of ethics in an intensified technological milieu structured by Etho-techno-logical Difference as designating a contemporary form of the ethico-philosophical mixture of morals, laws, and ethics under varying forms (Greco-Judaic, for instance). The Stranger here is subject to the structuring of the world by ethics, not solely philosophical but theological, technological, and biological as well. It is through the development of non-ethics as first ethics (an inversion of Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy) that changes the terrain of thought from radical evil to radical misfortune [malheur], evil understood solely as the thought-world and ethics being nothing but evil from the standpoint of the Stranger.

*Introduction to Non-Marxism,* alongside the essay “Non-Philosophy as Heresy,” provides the systematic if not comprehensive outlook of philosophy as the capital-form of and within

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63 *EdE,* 17.
thought. Due to its response to a particular conjuncture, non-Marxism requires it to be stronger axiomatic yet independent and autonomous from Marxism, which has failed historically and philosophically as a means to radically transform the World. By introducing the in-One and democracy, non-Marxism introduces an experience of a new kind for Marxism to engage with and in non-philosophy. Non-Marxism does not regress into Marxism because it requires a stronger, autonomous, and independent axiomatic that needs a universal conjuncture that can only be so through the means of axioms that are radically not intuitive, or at least without any historico-economic content, assumed to be determinant...Non-Marxism’s conjuncture is the combination of Marxism and its failure that is irreducible to one of its terms: and in another form, the combination...of capitalism and philosophy within the concept of capital-world or even thought-world whose famous ‘history’ is no longer anything more than one of its modes.\(^4\)

According to Laruelle, non-Marxism takes Marxism as a model or symptomatic approach to develop a theory that accounts for the failure of Marxism to transform the world. It draws from problems internal to varying philosophies that provide interpretations of Marx and Marxism, such as Étienne Balibar on the transindividual, Louis Althusser on the science/ideology division, Jacques Bidet on the notion of the metastructure, Jacques Derrida’s spectres, Michel Henry’s notion of auto-affective life and his reading of Marx, and so on.

During this time, Laruelle begins editing a second publishing collection known as “The Library of Non-Philosophy” (Bibliothèque de non-philosophie) with Paris publisher Éditions Kimé which not only includes Théorie des Étrangers and Éthique de l’Étranger but volumes from the Non-Philosophie Collectif (Dictionary of Non-Philosophy, Discipline hérétique, and La non-philosophie des contemporains) and manuscripts by students and researchers interested in non-philosophy and the work of Laruelle, engaging in themes such as psychoanalysis, aesthetics, decolonial theory, phenomenology, comparative accounts of Laruelle with Deleuze, Lacan,

\(^4\) ItNM, 17.
Levinas, and so on. Indeed, Laruelle humbly attests that “we have chosen to throw all of our available weapons in the battle or, in the game, fold all of our cards, abandoning this construction site to the interest, or disinterest of young researchers – for their spirit of invention as much as their courage.”

2.1.4. Philosophie IV (~2000-2007)

The penultimate period of Laruelle’s thought, Philosophie IV, pertains to the areas that continue from Éthique into broader themes that share common intersections with other periods of his thought: religion and Christology, mysticism, gnosis, victimology, and heresy. Future Christ, Intellectuals and Power (published originally as L’ultime honneur des intellectuels), and Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy are the three works translated from this period.

During this time, Laruelle also started a publishing collection with his students, Gilles Grelet and Ray Brassier, called “Nous, les sans-philosophie”, with publisher L’Harmattan. These ‘red books’ are militant in spirit and include reflections dealing with economics, politics, and rebellion. The fourth still-untranslated book of this period, Mystique non-philosophique à l’usage des contemporains, is published in this collection. Along with Future Christ, it forms two parts of a triptych dedicated to writing a new biography of ordinary humans as the Future-in-person or ordinary messiahs. Even in a penultimate sense, all these works pertain to something eschatological, the ultimata and the end or limit to the sufficiency of philosophy and the World.

65 TdE, 18.
66 The translated title of S&U is a misleading title and should be read as Struggle and Utopia at the End of Philosophical Times. The implication of this is explained on 15 where Laruelle writes: “The phrase ‘end of philosophical times’ is not a new version of the ‘end of philosophy’ or the ‘end of history’, themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries.” Translation slightly modified. The program of the book strives to liberate the sense of the future from the emprise of philosophical sufficiency, dedicating one chapter (though as a quasi-détournement of L’Internationale) to the demand: let us make a tabula rasa of the future.
the Gnostic’s hated image of it. The triptych of works making up this period is summed up in Philosophie V’s *Christo-Fiction*, though with very new material to work from (generic and quantum). Even though this period heavily invests itself in themes around Christology and religion, gnostic heresy and the millenarian, the themes are not truly alien from the development of Laruelle’s thought in other periods. However, I believe that due to the striking influence of Gilles Grelet, even in *Struggle and Utopia*, presented significant challenges to Laruelle. As Anthony Paul Smith notes in his translator’s introduction to *Struggle and Utopia*:

Addressing the ‘Grelet variant’ of non-philosophy, which Laruelle calls non-religion, is a way of addressing critiques leveled at non-philosophy in general and so is an act of self-criticism and correction…One must have a taste for gnosis, this critique goes, rather than gnosis being a particularly powerful form of thought. What Laruelle tries to show in this text is that the material is never arbitrary and indeed can be highly important for the development of non-philosophy. But gnosis, for Laruelle, or any other religious material, can never be sufficient regardless of how important it may be in the development of non-philosophy. And in the way that religion has historically set traps for human beings, like philosophy, it is philosophy for Laruelle that may be used as a weapon of defense against its violence, and religion used as a weapon of defense against the violence of philosophy: one must struggle on two fronts.67

Smith highlights here the fundamental underpinning of Philosophie IV’s writings: that philosophy and religion may originally be harassing and violent weapons that require a transformation into tools, or even a priori weapons of defence, against these forces.68 Unlike what may be expected by some theological interpreters, and a-theological and atheistic readers as well, Laruelle’s invocation of Christ and the Christic alongside heresy, mysticism, the theological, and so on, does not have to do with some Christocentric and hyper-religious “all are one in the body of Christ.” Rather, Laruelle’s use is to combat these suggestions. According to Laruelle, Christ is a first name (that is, contingent and alterable unlike a proper name) of the One, the Real, or humankind; they are

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67 *S&U*, xxii-xxiii.
68 If one may say, it recalls Isaiah 2:4, “They will beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks.”
starting points for what may consider itself a non-theology or non-religion that Grelet himself invents, though on a terrain that Laruelle (perhaps, though it is uncertain) jokingly considers “parricide”:

> [it] only takes place once or within one sole meaning…Plato introduce the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non)religion or (non)art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious ressentiment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense.”

In essence, this period, even if cut short with four books defining it, proved to be a challenge for developing Laruelle’s work in non-philosophy. However, it laid the groundwork for the development of L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale (ONPhI), an international organization and archive of students, researchers, translators, and interlocutors involved with the development and continuation of non-philosophy. The mission statement from 2009 by Laruelle highlights the ambitious need to rethink the work of non-philosophy, writing:

> Yet, we must possess the key to spectral invention and look towards science. The difficulty of the non-philosophical imperative is obvious: how do we supersede the Platonic aporias of philosophical knowledge? Why not go towards a certain term already practiced elsewhere, to philosophies “without” work, the works of a certain non-acting? Can we imagine non-philosophers who would put their energy towards inventing their powerlessness to invent? After all, why shouldn’t we make our powerlessness a work or a doctrine? By definition, it does not belong to us to solely formulate a generic imperative (indeed, recipes), but we do not either want to despair rebel wills – that would be an ideal of politics. We must seek models in other practices, sciences, literature, science-fiction. There is a minimum of procedures or means to get started: erstwhile breaks or interstices of philosophy, current excesses, ludic aspects, bricolages, parallel philosophies of today. The ideal is obviously to introduce a certain rigor of rules, and to provide an example of reflection on the conditions of invention. But perhaps if the term non-philosophy poses too many problems, producing too much dread or grins, then “non-standard philosophy” would be just as meaningful and more open but still on the basis of a closure or a decidedly inevitable “no.”

Thus, the generic imperative concerns the role of invention, the borrowing of means from other disciplines, and then invent new conditions and new tools for thought. With this, Laruelle turns from non-philosophy proper to the development of non-standard philosophy, constituting the last part of his work, Philosophie V.

2.1.5. Philosophie V (~2010-present)

The last period of Laruelle’s development, Philosophie V, starts with producing non-standard philosophy and the envisioning, in Tétralogs, of a forced philosophy. Before I close with Tétralogs, I will begin with the general theme of several writings of this period: Introduction aux sciences génériques, Philosophie non-standard, Anti-Badiou, General Theory of Victims, Christo-Fiction, and The Last Humanity. Part of this period, as well, is Théologie clandestine pour les sans-religion, published in 2019 though, as is noted by Anne-Françoise Schmid in her foreword to the English translation, it may date from 2012, which would put this book in Philosophie V.\(^{71}\) Given that one chapter, “Dualysis of the Trinity,”\(^{72}\) is initially present as a subsection in Mystique,\(^{73}\) I would place the writing of Théologie closer to Mystique, 2007 or 2008.

Introduction aux sciences génériques is one of the first times that Laruelle concerns himself with the concept of the generic, applied here as a means to describe “a type of sciences or knowledges [connaissances] sufficiently neutral and deprived of particularity able to add themselves to other more determined sciences and co-operate with them, transforming them without destroying or negating their scientific character.”\(^{74}\) Generic here is not signified by its everyday and vulgar conception, but rather is something “immanent and heteronomous to

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\(^{71}\) CT, xi.

\(^{72}\) TC, 127-140.

\(^{73}\) MNP, 201-204.

\(^{74}\) IaSG, 9.
philosophy [that must] facilitate its rapprochement with capitalism.” Furthermore, it no longer abides typical distributions of metaphysics – between general/special, fundamental/regional, and science/philosophy – but is carried out by another distribution: the generic and the epistemo-logical mixture, of which all the distributions within metaphysics are subject to, an argument found earlier in *Theory of Identities*. Therefore, the generic no longer concerns itself as a predicate but rather a constant or a symptom, with its history within philosophy as opposite to the universal, global, singular and particular (Feuerbach, the young Hegelians, and Kierkegaard against Hegel, for instance) and as an extreme case of commodity fetishism: the marked-down, discounted or unbranded commodity that serves as a convenience. Laruelle strives to liberate the generic constant for a new type of practice for scientists called generic sciences to present themselves. Generic sciences are freed not only from philosophical sufficiency or scientific spontaneity but, above all, from capitalism’s exploitation of science and research, whether that be for research and design departments or war and imperialism, and perhaps they can find themselves elsewhere situated in non-scientific forms such as generic humanities. The generic of generic sciences undergoes a dualysis (that is, a dual analysis of both the content of philosophical statements and its transformation into a non-philosophically adequate formulation) from Feuerbach’s notion of man’s *Gattungswesen*, that is, species-being, as well as Marx’s initiation towards a unification of science and philosophy. It is also in this work that Laruelle provides a basis for democracy of-the-last-instance to be identified with communism, only “if the ‘common’ of communism was understood as the generic, if communism was understood as the generic constant of history.”

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75 Ibid, 32.
76 Ibid, 89.
77 Ibid, 99.
Turning to the second magnum opus of his career, *Philosophie non-standard* builds upon themes present in the previous book but includes another dimension hinted at earlier in his thought but never entirely elaborated on until here: quantum theory. As Laruelle reminds his readers, the quantum employed in his book and elsewhere merely serves as “another use of the quantum which will leave physicists at best uncomfortable.” It is not a direct intervention within quantum physics. Still, it draws from quantum physics an inspiration that was once a metaphor, though now maintained as part of that consistent theme throughout his work: to utilize theories without oneself being or becoming subjugated by the borrowed thought. This book presents a fundamentally new dictionary of terms employed that allow the reader to situate themselves within the unfolding presentation, including terms like superposition, wave, and particle, immanental, unilateral complementarity, the in-person, idempotence and the portmanteau idemmanence, non-commutability, vector and vectorial, futurity, and the oraxiom. All of these terms factor into the other four translated books of this period, each in their own right dealing with themes that amplify what Laruelle calls non-standard philosophy: “to distinguish it from philosophy as the standard model of thought and therefore from itself.” Thus, non-standard philosophy is always in a process of undoing its sufficiency and standardization so that once-each-time it is generic and yet weakened or superposed to a quantum state.

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78 *BoOM*, 15-16. “The transcendental theory of individuals has a second shared characteristic, this time with a particular empirical science, which, even if it is a mere metaphor, could give philosophers a better way into this project. It is quantum mechanics, and its foundation in objects, let us say particles, which qualitatively and by definition escape from the earlier modes of visibility and objectivation specific to classical mechanics and thermodynamics.”

79 *PNS*, 11.

80 Ibid, 71. “Whence, the diverse designations: the ones material like ‘generic science of philosophy’ (philosophy is animated by a transcendental operation and nevertheless accessible by a science and a critique of the quantum type) and as ‘generic quantum’ – this forms a unique science for two objects; the others more formal like ‘non-philosophy’ (elucidating the real or radical, non-ontological immanence which is so by its principle) and like ‘non-standard philosophy’ (to distinguish it from philosophy as the standard model of thought and therefore from itself).”
These themes become applied in the other books of this period: the quantum opposed to the mathematical in Anti-Badiou, the algebraic and idempotent “representation” or a priori defence of victims in General Theory of Victims (continuing on themes present in Éthique), the superposition and under-determination of the Man-Animal-Plant system for ecology in The Last Humanity, and, to conclude the triptych of Christology, the development of a generic science “in-Christ” (read along the lines of the in-One and not the macroscopic-historical and theological deployments of Christ) with quantum principles in Christo-Fiction.

I now turn to The Last Humanity, which comprises a conjugation of the distinct periods of Philosophie IV (the introduction of the themes of gnosis, heresy, and messianity) and Philosophie V (the introduction to non-standard philosophy and the introduction and implementation of the generic and the quantum). This unique approach seeks out a “ messianic ecology” irreducible to existing practices of ecology and philosophy’s involvement in ecology. The turn to ecology seems somewhat surprising, provided by Laruelle’s focus solely on humanity, one species that has endangered itself and others. However, it makes much more sense when considering the object of criticism in the work: ecologically different, a break from the anthropological difference mentioned above. This invariant impacts not only humans but also animals and plants, making up a type of “MAP (man-animal-plant) system” The goal of The Last Humanity is to introduce a verticality in ecology which it had not previously had save for a horizontal, biocentric conception of all living things deemed as “vulgar ecology” in the framework of ecologically different. According to Laruelle:

Traditional ecology’s foundations are differential and naturalistic, enclosed within ecological difference, they go back at least to Aristotle and continue to legitimize its political fury that plays out across the media. The irritating criticism of ecological ‘movements’ and the little bit of thought that is hidden there in its well-known ‘empathy’ is hardly sufficient. It would still be necessary to update the possibility of ecology inscribing itself within the immanence of life in these three paradigmatic forms: human, animal, and plant. As well as
being necessary to elucidate the deadly and protective role that humans play in this ecological triangle. The mass of unclear assumptions is justified by a theoretical bric-à-brac, by almost philosophical considerations, and by the usual kinds of ignorance that philosophy devoted to the World’s inertia, maintained in all good conscience. However embedded the eco-logical difference may be, however varied its modalities and dimensions, it is itself destined to be auto-erasing as a structure. It shows little real amplitude and effective work, preferring to speculate on technology, Being, the climate, and the exploitation of nature. Reduced to the denunciation of the devastating relationships between humans and animals in the arena of plants and the Earth’s climate, to the problems of humanity’s survival, it [i.e., eco-logical difference] fuels media, political, and ideological unrest, which the greatest speculations can hardly struggle against, those concerning man and his Being-in-the-world, on the body and mind, on matter and memory. Laruelle finds that ecology is growing in competition with philosophy (the already dominant capital-form of and within thought) striving to be austere, regulatory, and promising a better life against capitalism just as much as it is a growing force of capitalism (such as “green capitalism”). Instead, for Laruelle, ecology provides no positive project if eco-logical difference still hinders it. Further still, despite attempts to criticize humanism and anthropocentrism latent within ecology, eco-logical difference maintains what Laruelle considers as the principle of anthropic sufficiency, the idea that man alone suffices to think the future of humanity vis-à-vis the blending of man and the eco-logos. Such an approach is to transform eco-logical difference dependent on the last humanity as the only real of the last instance without this invariant, which attempts to resolve the growing antinomy between philosophy and ecology. An approach regarding man-in-person or ordinary man as the determining factor of this new ecology is not without fears that this would be another repetition of anthropocentrism. Concerning the beginning, middle, and end of an order regarding how one must be able to conceive this “new” ecological approach, Laruelle writes:

What philosophy does the Earth deserve (if it has had one, up until now) that has not been borrowed from and destined for heaven, where it has stored its treasures? Let us take up the problem from the beginning in the form of a first axiom. The beginning is also the middle and the end for a living thing that touches on philosophy as well as ecology, on

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81 TLH, 19.
science as well as art, on religion as well as politics. This living thing that is more cumbersome than the others – both in terms of its banality and its way of wanting to interfere in everything – is probably man. Let us assume that man is the only one of the living who cannot reconcile himself to being the first or the last between them, but either the before-the-first by way of excess over priority, or the after-the-last by way of defect or collapse. These are two ways of making a certain exception to the common order of things. This state claimed by the living human, generically sexed, by which it under-determines the rest of creation, is what is called the clone, not in any biological sense, but in its humanity of-the-last-instance or as we will say “in-the-last-humanity.” … It is true that after-the-first and before-the-last are not very seductive and arouse only a few thoughts. The last judgments belong to the clone by right because the clone is for the first and last time a prior-priority before the priority of animals, plants, and minerals, or it is after-the-last-humanity or after-ultimacy for the first and last time and so after animals and plants (perhaps its immortality).^2

Here, both verticality and ordinality are introduced into ecology to carry out a weakening or degrowth of the power of philosophy over ecology and a degrowth of ecology through a system where all living things are variables in a matrix known as in-the-last-humanity. The order of the prior-to-priority of humanity does not imply anthropocentrism; instead, it allows for us, that is, the “we, humans” of non-philosophy, to first carry out these experiments upon ourselves prior to engaging with other living species so that they receive not the same treatment but one cognizant of their autonomy as One and not the Other (of) Man. This matrix is supported by two theses, infrastructural-quantum on the one hand and superstructural-generic on the other hand. The first, parodied from the Young Marx, is “man is an animal that makes animality human,” or even “man is a plant that humanizes plantness, man is an earthly being that humanizes the earth,” but the thesis can be inverted “only on the condition that the products of these variables are lowered to the state of becomings, conjugating the two terms of the statement.”^3 Man, animal, and plant are not fixed essences. Rather, they are non-commutative becomings determined-in-the-last-humanity that

^2 TLH, 2-3. Translation slightly modified.
^3 Ibid, 6-7.
are conjugable in an aleatory fashion. Previously, when conceived by way of vision-in-philosophy or by vision-in-ecology, the three living beings are seen either in opposition, in difference, in contradiction, or exchangeable with one another: as fixed. Commutativity is the property where the result does not change itself if one changes the order of variables. Non-commutativity, by contrast, shows how the order matters in distinct operations. Mathematically, both commutativity and non-commutativity can is demonstrable respectively: \( 2 + 4 = 4 + 2 \), but \( 2 - 4 \neq 4 - 2 \). By proposing that man, animal, and plant are non-commutative becomings, these variables are generically unified (and not biologically, philosophically, or ecologically unified) in-the-last-humanity where one formulation such as “man is an animal that makes animality human” is not commutative with “the animal is a man that makes humanity animal.”

In-the-last-humanity is not only a change in terrain but a seismic shift that alters the three dimensions that couple ecology and philosophy: the Earth, the World, and the Universe. The second thesis is rather lengthy: “the aleatory subject produced by the quantum process of the infrastructure, whether man or animal, masculine or feminine, is now indexed to the universal form of objectivity that is no longer the World but the Universe as a dimension of superposition, and so forms a generic clone that exceeds the World through this indexing.”

84 These clones are ordinary messiahs in the same way that ordinary is to be understood above. Both statements describe a matrixial process that has three phrases: 1) the aleatory under quantum means, 2) the difference between quantum-and-generic under distinct dimensions (the Earth, the World, or the Universe), and 3) the cloning through the generic as unintelligible to the existing orders of ecology and philosophy, the World and the Earth, but theoretically intelligible through the Universe with both philosophical and ecological supports. These generic clones (not only man but animal and plant,

84 Ibid, 8.
even the mineral and the elemental, to include) are the last humanity that fill the Universe as a superposition binding each clone as One, as if they were monads deprived of a monadology.\textsuperscript{85} To Laruelle, the Universe is the \textit{cogito} of the clones by which each One can and must be able to say “I think the Universe, therefore I am a clone.”\textsuperscript{86} Where vision-in-man legitimates the ordinary law that eagle and serpent, orchid and wasp, god and wolf are men for man, the in-the-last-humanity orders a democracy where each One is a member of the People (of) the One.

It is with \textit{Tétralogos} that all Laruelle’s work culminates in the development of a philo-musical composition, a chorus of philosophers in a thought-architecture called Reminiscience, a portmanteau of Plato’s anamnesis and science. \textit{Tétralogos} contains four books, each pertaining to the development of this philo-music but includes the development of a forced philosophy. By forced philosophy, Laruelle intends to introduce forcing (as in Paul J. Cohen’s work) with philosophy as a function of humanity (for philosophy is nothing but a human invention) on the scale of the Universe and no longer the World:

[We] must elaborate a new complex causality which justifies both the autonomy of philosophy ceasing from being in the mirror of mathematics and the World and its ‘forced’ as much as ultimate submission to the Universe as the object of the quantum. Therefore, the point is rather to limit [philosophy’s] spontaneous claims towards the domination that it bears as a principle of sufficiency and to give it another principle which would also be subjection, but of a subjection that is both more concrete and more liberating of its genuine autonomy. In the meantime, we will have begun by subtracting this new forced causality proper to philosophy in its simple generalization on a psychological basis and even on a basis which would be genericity. Paradoxically, this double intervention of the hermeneutico-set-theoretical on the one hand [as in Badiou’s work], and the quantum on the other hand as the real determination, will allow us to save philosophy by showing that its mechanism can be that of forcing and not that of a banal empirico-transcendental faculty…To autonomize the force of philosophy and to make it provincial through its submission to the Universe rather than the World like phenomenology does, such is the initial double paradox which must liberate it from the dominant yoke of mathematics and

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{PdM}, 6: “That individuals would be the ultimate constituents of reality, before Being, before the World, before History and before the State, that there was, to say it in classical terms, absolutely dispersed monads deprived of monadology, reason or a universal, is a thesis that only makes sense if the \textit{immediate givens of multiplicities} exist beyond the possible techniques of their production.”

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{TLH}, 11.
order it to quantum physics. We shall call “Reminiscence” in the narrow sense this time or “forced philosophy” this new use of philosophy drawn from the non-Newtonian but quantum conception of relations of the Universe and the World-as-site of philosophy and relations of philosophy and genericity.87

Forced philosophy is at once a non-standard philosophy that must be non-philosophically conceivable. It may seem impossible, but its development is one within human powers to conceive of, according to Laruelle. Tétralogos, as a philo-musical composition, an opera of philosophies, is significant as it may be the last work Laruelle will ever write, aside from the unpublished manuscripts like Théologie clandestine or NET have been. The book concludes with a coda reflecting on his whole oeuvre, a journey which started from his dissertation defence when Clémence Ramnoux, one of the jurors, said to him, “you wanted to make music with concepts.”88 Indeed, he has done much more than that in this tetralogy; what is left is to make these concepts resonate with an unheard-of, insonorous beauty.

2.2. To Introduce Peace and Democracy into Thought

The reader may now see what non-philosophy is in response to the multiple invariant matrices criticized throughout Laruelle’s corpus. Laruelle states, “non-philosophy is a practice of philosophy that is heteronomous to it [philosophy] but no longer heteronomous to man – whereas philosophy’s spontaneous practice is autonomous for itself and heteronomous to man.”89 Non-Philosophy is a practice of philosophy autonomously invented and implemented by humanity who are not reducible to philosophy and the prevailing principle of philosophical sufficiency: the idea that everything is, can, and must be philosophizable. Non-Philosophy is neither philosophy in its traditional or disciplinary sense nor a philosophy of the no or non-. Furthermore, non-philosophy is not a negation, nor a destruction a deconstruction of philosophy, all of which are philosophical

87 T, 250-251.
88 T, 595.
89 P&NP, 10.
operations and repetitions that happen within philosophical practices in *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy*:

Non-Philosophy is the authentic, not alienated, concept of ‘popular philosophy’ and of anti-vulgarization. The traditionally highest usage of language, its usage-of-logos, its philosophical pragmatics, is its *exploitation* in accordance with a set of decisions or restrictive *a priori*s that form the capital of the *logos*. A non-philosophical pragmatics lifts this limitation, redistributes the available material according to a rule which is no longer that of economy or rarity, and therefore distributes it to every man. Philosophy can only really become ‘for all’ or ‘popular’ by becoming non-philosophy.\(^{90}\)

Non-Philosophy, according to Laruelle, is a discipline that institutes a democratic order for thought determined by the People (of) the One. Here, the sense of a human philosophy begins to take form.

For many years, non-philosophy has transformed or mutated. It starts as a “science of philosophy” or “first or transcendental science” (in the sense of *mathesis transcendentalis*) in relation to the real or the human as an experimental treatment of philosophy as occasional material, index, or symbolic support. In the period known as Philosophie III, non-philosophy becomes a unified theory of science (or regional thoughts, such as ethics or politics) and philosophy (the fundamental). After the publication of *Philosophie non-standard* and the introduction to the generic quantum framework, non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy identifies as a generic science that indirectly unites or fuses science and philosophy under scientific condition. It is important to note that non-philosophy and its notion of science are not immediate. They must be discovered and invented under philosophical conditions to fulfill a complete transformation of the general relations one has with the world and thought, including: the founding of a transcendental axiomatic, the cloning or extraction of a “genetic code” to provide an occasional materiality of thought de-potentialized of its sufficiency, the discovery of the real or the human that radically precedes philosophy under its existing conditions in varying conjunctures, and the invention of

\(^{90}\) *P&NP*, 28.
new non-philosophical statements and practices from philosophical, worldly, and meta-human material.

Non-Philosophy is rigorously distinct from philosophy as the fundamental science of Being (ontology) and the sciences that derive from philosophy, such as the human sciences in which philosophy’s definition of the human has informed. It is as much biographical as it is scientific: it is biographical insofar as it comes to describe its real object, the human, through the various universals that seek to treat people as the opposite or difference co-extensive with the World (such as Language, History, Sexuality, and Power), and it is scientific because it is naïve, descriptive, and anterior to the object it experiments upon: philosophy and the World. Philosophy cannot be a science of the World or itself because of its circular nature that seeks to encompass not only itself but the World, other thoughts, and the real. One may refer to the World as the biography of philosophy.91

Non-Philosophy takes on some philosophical characteristics though shorn of their auto-posting and self-sufficiency. For instance, akin to Hegel’s formula that substance is subject, it is here that science is subject. Much like historical materialism, non-philosophy fuses theory and the masses under theory and where determination in the last instance consists of the unity of the Productive Forces and the Relations of Production but where the Forces structure and organize the conditions of society. And similar to Badiou’s placement of philosophy under generic conditions, Laruelle’s non-philosophy puts philosophy under scientific conditions where science becomes and is the determinant condition in the last instance.92

91 Anne-Françoise Schmid, Muriel Mambrini-Doudet and Armand Hatchuel, “Une nouvelle logique de l’interdisciplinarité,” Nouvelles perspectives en sciences sociales 7, no.1 (October 2011), 119: “One work on the history of projective geometry proposes the idea that the concept of ‘space’ is perhaps not the object of geometry, but its ‘biography’, as, we’ll add, the World could be the biography of philosophy.”
92 PNS, 114.
The non- of non-philosophy draws inspiration from non-Euclidean geometry, which is not a negation but a generalization of Euclidean geometry through Lobachevsky’s achievement. The comparison arises specifically on the relationship between how the parallel postulate or Playfair’s axiom in Euclidean geometry (i.e., in a two-dimensional plane with a given line and a point lying outside of the line, one and only one line is drawn through the point that does not intersect the given line) with the principle of philosophical sufficiency and the association of the philosophical decision to one phenomenon and one phenomenon alone, akin to Heraclitus’ unity-of-contraries (“for a given term there corresponds one contrary term and one alone”). For this multiplicity of fictions now freed from philosophical sufficiency, a non-Heraclitean postulate can (and has been) crafted: “For whichever phenomenon, one should be able to propose a multiplicity of equivalent interpretations, a multiplicity which is not simply unitary but “dualitary” and such that it escapes from the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, an infinity of equivalent philosophical decisions for the same phenomenon.” This equality strips bare the philosophical sufficiency of any philosophical statement. With this infinity of equivalent philosophical decisions, the field of possibilities, all of which are non-sufficient and contingent, is opened up and liberated from the Greco-unitary or Greco-Judaic dominancy of philosophy. Likewise, the introduction to non-standard philosophy as a new name for non-philosophy draws inspiration from contemporary

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93 P&NP, 106-107: “Perhaps it is understood more clearly why the expression ‘non-philosophy’ must be interpreted with the intention that distinguishes, for example, between the ‘non-Euclidean’ style and the ‘Euclidean’ style in geometry. This formula is just as metaphorical as that of the ‘Copernican Revolution’. And perhaps less so if it is accepted that, in this formulation, it is no longer a simple, analogical and non-paradigmatic transference from a scientific revolution to the interior of philosophy’s supposed autonomy, as is the case with Kant...If there is a transference, then it takes place in science alone, from a particular form of the latter – ‘non-Euclidean’ geometries – to its essence of science. And by all accounts, metaphor for metaphor, we shall require...a ‘Lobachevskian’ and Riemannian metaphor...Greco-contemporary thought, i.e., ‘philosophy’, is so to speak ‘Euclidean’ because it is founded upon a supposition of unity, unicity and sufficiency which seem obvious to it but which is no longer obvious for us.”

94 P&NP, 104.

95 P&NP, 107.
experimental physics’ attempt to go beyond the standard model in particle physics for phenomena left unaccounted for. Suppose the Greco-unitary model is the standard model that does not go beyond itself by oscillating between Greek and Jewish interpretations. In that case, non-standard philosophy is how philosophy can go beyond the existing limitations for phenomena it has not been able to account for.

While the non-Euclidean inspiration of non-philosophy strives to liberate itself from being solely metaphorical, philosophy is and becomes not solely a discipline or thought. Philosophy is the capital-form of and within thought. This statement describes the internal macrostructural extraction, exploitation, and valorization of the ‘regionality’ of thoughts (such as aesthetics, science, ethics, politics, etc.), treated as regional to philosophy and what Laruelle terms the One, the real, or humankind. While Laruelle focuses particularly on how philosophical thought harasses humans through its division of labour and marketplace, I argue in the third chapter that the capital-form aligns with how Karl Marx describes capital as coming into the world with blood and dirt dripping from head to toe and from every pore: with ideology, violence, and mute compulsion. However, Marxism broadly, as pointed out by Laruelle, cannot rigorously comprehend these statements according to its concepts of philosophy, capital, and science.

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96 FdH, “Non-Philosophy as Heresy,” 264-265: “We all know that philosophy is not any thought whatsoever, that it is partially contingent, no doubt – but that it has found out how to acquire a necessity and a universality that completely surpasses its practical, institutional or geo-philosophical (‘occidental’) limitations. But why this universality and this necessity? We do not know, any more than we can really explain the universality and necessity of capitalism. An important theoretical step along the path of this explanation is taken when Marx discovers the correlation of the universal commodity structure and the division of labour that spans history. Perhaps it is possible to take a similar step in philosophy, when we note that it has essential the same internal macro-structure as capitalism, and that ‘Philosophical Decision’, under which we formalize the philosophical gesture, is the correlation of a universal structure of exchange between notions and a divided unity that participates in this exchange, yet exceeds and appropriates it.”


98 EtQU, 200. Marx, as Laruelle argues in ItNM (28), “poorly understood…the radical meaning of the new theoretical genre that he came close to,” in this case a unified theory of science and philosophy which appears to take on a limited form due to Marxism’s various ways of interpreting Marx’s method.
Suppose philosophy – broadly the dominant practice imposed by the invariants that Laruelle calls conjunctural, such as the Greco-unitary and Greco-Judaic paradigms of thought – comes to encompass and exploit the relations that one has with the world. What is to be done with philosophy? Non-Philosophy as human philosophy strives to invert the relations of philosophy to the real, to man: “it is the ‘non-’ addressed to philosophy by mankind, who is the presupposed that philosophy cannot get rid of.” The One (interchangeably yet with identical power the real, often with a capital R when drawing upon Lacanian material, or humanity or People, or at times in Philosophie III, the Ego) is a radically immanent cause (or later, strictly the immanental) undivided, unreflected, foreclosed, and not in and not convertible with Being and the Other (and the Other of Being or being qua entity). The One is the real condition or cause that grounds any possibility, determining in the last instance any possibility. “Real” must be understood as radically unalterable in contradistinction to the artificial, which is infinitely alterable; if Laruelle argues that the human is the real, then one may understand that this means the human qua One is indivisible, inalienable, and inconvertible. Any theory in the non-philosophical paradigm determined by the One in the last instance alone may be called “transcendental.” Laruelle’s use of the transcendental is not the transcendental in the Kantian sense, that which conditions all knowledge “which deals not so much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this manner is to be possible a priori.” Rather, the transcendental employed by Laruelle is an attempt to adequately think the autonomy [Selbständigkeit] of the One purged of transcendence and convertibility with

99 NPP, “A New Presentation of Non-Philosophy,” 133.
100 While the reader will note the slippage of terms I translate from Laruelle’s use of l’homme, which can be translated as man, humanity, mankind, humankind, etc., my implementation here will be People in the next few chapters. This is for two reasons. The first is that my dissertation is focused on democracy and defining who the People of non-philosophy are as the People (of) the One. The second is that some secondary Anglophone scholarship do not discuss the People (of) the One and thus skew the programme of non-philosophy from its emancipatory potential. Wherever I cite from Laruelle in existing translations and following the conventions of these translations, I stick to “man” or “human” however it may arise in these translations.
any parallelism such as the empirico-transcendental (Kant, Foucault). It is the attempt rather to
ground the transcendent correlate (for example, philosophy) in the last instance within and
inseparable from the One. Yet the terms used to describe this foreclosed nature are provisional
‘first names’, not proper names of the radically immanent in-One, as is the case with Life in the
work of Michel Henry or the topological plane of immanence as it is in Gilles Deleuze. They are
contingent first names, or better yet prototypes because non-philosophy strives to describe
adequately and inseparably from the real of the last instance. As Laruelle states clearly, “there is
no philosophy without the task of determining the real through thought,” and non-philosophy
seeks to invert this order: the real determines thought, not the other way around.

Non-Philosophy may also be identifiable as a counter-philosophy, anti-philosophy, or even
hypo-philosophy stripped of what Laruelle has termed the “Principle of Sufficient Philosophy”: a
Principle higher than Sufficient Reason, it is the uncompromising faith that “everything is
philosophizable.” According to Laruelle, philosophy in its dominant unitary practice strives to be
a fundamental science (as in the sense of ontology) that decides on its ‘regional’ sources that it
draws from (as in a philosophy of science, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of aesthetics, a
philosophy of history, etc.) and deciding on the real or the human, but deciding on itself, too. Every
philosophy represents a meta-/anti-/“non-“ philosophy to another philosophy. This invariant
operation, known as Philosophical Decision, provides Philosophical Sufficiency its life source, for
philosophy intervenes in all forms of thought and, subsequently, general relations of the world,
including imagination. The Philosophical Decision operates through two forms of fractional
matrices, the one which is a decision in lack, the other in excess: on the one hand, a 2/3 fractional
matrix, where a Dyad (for example, the difference or distance between the signifier and the

signified) requires the One as a ‘term’ to complete its lack; on the other hand, a 3/2 matrix, a synthesis between the One and the Dyad but is transcendent to the Dyad, termed auto-positing (or any auto-operation, like auto-givenness, auto-circularity, auto-validation, etc.), which capitalizes on a surplus-value of meaning, truth, and existence.

Non-Philosophy proposes a change of terrain that occurs no longer from within philosophy but within the One by experimentally acting upon philosophy as a simple material, support, occasion, ‘vector’, symptom, index, or symbol (terms that retain the same sense as something transcendent to the One) to invent new forms of thought that do not enter back into the philosophical. As such, non-philosophy is often describable as a scientific experimentation on philosophical decisions to invent non-philosophical statements liberated from philosophical sufficiency. Laruelle provides the following way of describing this science of philosophy in *En tant qu’un*:

1. Philosophy is the *capital* within thought, the *capital-form* of our general relations to the World; an autonomous generalized form of socio-economic capital;
2. It is impossible to struggle against capital in general, in the restrained or broadened sense, by means drawn from capital, by philosophical means or means neighbouring the philosophical: politics, ethics, etc.; it is impossible, in general, to struggle against capital which is the whole of possible struggle. It is impossible to struggle against philosophy, philosophy being the whole of possible mastery, the Universal Master;
3. By contrast, a *science* of capital – of philosophy, of universal mastery – is possible, and this science contains a *suspension* or a reduction of philosophical mastery, but in no way a mastery of mastery. There is a “politics” – a democracy – immanent to science, the only one which, without entering into struggle with philosophical capital, can suspend and limit the universality of its order.
4. The science of philosophy – of capital within thought – does not treat philosophy as an object, thus again on the philosophical mode – which follows from what has been said – but treats it, under the condition of this suspension, as a *material*, an *index* and a *support* for a process of knowledge [connaissance] more universal and adequate to this a-philosophical or un-objective real that we call the One.103

103 *EtQU*, 82.
Laruelle refers to science as nothing but an experience of thought that ruptures with some form of prevailing myth, drawing inspiration from Althusser’s notion of science as breaking away from an ideology: “Plato with mathematics as a science of the heavens, Galileo with physics as science of nature, Freud with psychoanalysis as science of the individual imaginary,” and even Marx with the continent of History with historical materialism and Nietzsche with the continent of Politics. Laruelle’s notion of science constitutes a rupture with philosophy as the counter-mythos myth-maker, as stated above, for there has not been a notion of science not imbued and not correlated with philosophy. The notion of science is indebted to Althusser to an extent, for science, according to Althusser, is the break from the ideological (pre-scientific) description of the field where theory is constituted, such as what has been mentioned above with Plato with mathematics, Galileo with physics, Freud with psychoanalysis, Marx with historical materialism, and Nietzsche with political materialism. For all that, the science of non-philosophy is and cannot ruminante upon tautological and limited conceptions of science, as Althusser envisions with Marxist theory. Althusser’s notion of a break between science and ideology is but a symptom of what non-philosophy’s science entails. For instance, in Introduction to Non-Marxism, Laruelle writes that non-Marxist theory

as a transcendental science, determined in-the-last-instance by the Real, is a theory and pragmatic of a thought-world and the necessary resistance against this theory and pragmatics is assured by philosophy. The object and its ‘ideological’ resistance, which is more accurately unitary and worldly, are partially identical [with] the second enveloping the first.

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104 CF, 162. Laruelle adds, “Christ with the underdetermining placing under condition of those world-thoughts that are religions and what remains of them in their theological structure.”
106 NcH and APP address these concerns of the Continent of Politics.
107 See for instance Louis Althusser, “The Philosophical Conjuncture and Marxist Theoretical Research (26 June 1966),” in The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings, ed. François Matheron, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2003), 10: “The basic task of Marxist theory, its strategic task, has Marxist theory for its object…that Marxist theory has to know exactly what it is as a theory, and to know exactly what point it has reached in its development, in order to know what kind of theoretical work it must and can accomplish.”
108 ItNM, 92.
Non-Philosophy strives to adequately describe and establish a theory contingent upon the real object in the last instance alone. Furthermore, non-philosophy strives to liberate empirical sciences from the philosophical decision, just as much as liberating philosophy from its auto-decisional activity. It does so by being at once a transcendental science, that is, it relates itself to the real (i.e., people) that conditions its thinking, and an empirical science, insofar as it takes philosophical statements (i.e., meta-human statements, for instance in *Théorie des Étrangers*) as empirical data and material to invent then new means of representing reality that the existing conjunctural conditions have limited. According to Laruelle in *Theory of Identities*, science is subject to a triple division of intellectual labour inaugurated by Plato up to Heidegger:

1. One admits that science produces knowledges, but denies it thinks. To science, knowledges without thought; to philosophy, authentic thought, the one that necessarily needs knowledges, but that, on the other hand, founds them, legitimates them, and simultaneously supplies their genealogy and their critique. “Science does not think”; it “dreams,” it only dreams thought in the very operation of knowledge.
2. There is an absolute, unique, and self-founded science – first philosophy as ontology or logic – and empirical sciences, which are multiple and contingent through their object; they produce strictly relative knowledges. Philosophy divides the concept of science after having separated knowledge and thought.
3. To philosophy, Being [*Être*] or the authentic and total real; to science, not even being [*étant*], but the properties of being or the facts; the object of knowledge is now what is divided. 109

The scientific break from philosophy that recognizes this break is radically immanent (to) itself and not constituted by or regresses towards a continuum 110 is the rectification of science’s independent way of thinking anterior to the philosophical decision. This anteriority is neither spatially nor temporally ‘before’. Instead, this anteriority to philosophical decision starts by

109 *ToI*, 34.
110 *PoD*, 124. “What then could be the invariant of these syntaxes? It is necessarily the matrix: continuum/break, relation/break, etc., *where the break is in turn a new continuum, every continuum representing a break for another continuum*, etc. ... Continuity does not exclude the break, to the contrary, and the break requires reciprocally a continuum.” Translation modified.
“[relating] phenomena to their Identity as their cause-of-the-last-instance and does so by means of the theoretical representation (of) this cause. A science is the theoretical knowledge not of phenomena, but of their cause (the Identity of the real) by means of the ‘occasion’ of these phenomena.”¹¹¹ In other words, science independently and autonomously thinks according to and indivisibly so from this last-instance of the Real, utilizing the symptoms or ‘occasions’ to describe and theoretically represent this cause. The scientific posture that Laruelle implements is a transcendental – or, in Philosophie V’s parlance, immanent – science, which is neither philosophical nor reducible to the empirical under philosophical conditions. Rather, it is a kind of thought-science, a science that experiments and treats philosophical thought as a material towards a theoretical and adequate representation of the real as transcendental or the presupposed (without presupposition). Indeed, there are variants of thought-X, such as thought-art and thought-music. Laruelle conceives of People qua One as inseparable and indistinguishable from science, so much so that he strives to use the non-Spinozan formulation Homo sive Scientia (man or science) without paradox from time to time to express this experience of thought and knowledge (of) oneself akin to gnosis. To Laruelle, ordinary man (is) science, somewhat akin to how Henry refers to life as a knowledge. In A Biography of Ordinary Man, for instance, Laruelle notes that “[ordinary man]…is this science of Universals and Totalities,”¹¹² wherein the ordinary human is nothing more than a subject who is a knowledge in the sense of scientia but a subject who is not a thinking thing (as in the Cogito). Therefore, a universal humanity, to Laruelle, merits the name “Transcendental Idiot”¹¹³ or, at other times, the radical poor. The effects of this thought-science are not felt in the

¹¹¹ Tol, 63. Translation modified.
¹¹² BoOM, 83.
¹¹³ TdE, 73. “The being of man is already real before being realized; given (to) oneself within an immanence which escapes from all intuition, always objectivating or simply donational. Man is the reality and therefore the immanent legitimacy of this so-called ‘philosophical misunderstanding’ which Husserl spoke of concerning transcendental realism, that he would otherwise confound, like any consequent idealist, with a mixed realism, as much transcendent as immanent. Man is therefore more than a simple philosophical misunderstanding and an incomprehension of critical
World or philosophy, or rather their combination known as the thought-world, but *in-One* and inseparable from it. These effects become weak provisional constructs known as fictions.¹¹⁴ A fiction’s weakness is due to its destination: a fiction does not have a power of the World or philosophy, but a radically impoverished power (of) the One that is *for* the World and *for* philosophy.

What does non-philosophy do if it has no effect in the World or philosophy? It is this specific power and causality of uni-*lateralization* which suspends and determines *in-the-last-instance* an exclusion from the continuum it works upon and transforming in a very literal sense: changing the form and appearance of the object (the World, philosophy) without having to be transformed or converted in the act of transformation. Uni-*lateralization* is not a levelling of power into an equal and flat space, but rather is how the World is determinable as a ‘side’ of the One (and not one-sidedness). Through the undivided causality known as determination-*in-the-last-instance*, it allows to enact uni-*lateralization*. Determination-*in-the-last-instance* has its roots in Marxism, though is provided its full content utilized in non-philosophy as “[containing] the novel meaning of a unilateral – non-reciprocal or non-reversible – determination”¹¹⁵ that starts from the One, and according to the One, towards the World and philosophy without return. It is describable as undivided or an individual causality in the literal sense¹¹⁶ for it does not end up splitting, contradicting, making a difference or structuring with the World. The World and philosophy solely become ‘occasional causes’ and the only side (laterality) that function as mere support and

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¹¹⁴ It is somewhat similar to Hans Vaihinger’s implementation of fiction as a term. In *The Philosophy of ‘As If’*, fictions are described as “a mere auxiliary construct, a circuitous approach, a scaffolding afterwards to be demolished” (88) with a purpose towards invention.

¹¹⁵ *BoOM*, 33.

¹¹⁶ *EtQU*, 244. “The real is the individual. I interpret the individual as *undivided* literally. The proper of man is to feel and know themselves as undivided. This irreducible sentiment is the foundation of their existence, their seat.”
material with a relative autonomy. The One, through uni-lateralization, can *phenomenalize* the World without phenomenology “if it appears and only if it appears”\(^{117}\) *not from* the World itself but *from* the One. Recall that the One is not a side, topos, or plane. The determination-in-the-last-instance is the proper causality of the One, a causality neither present such as the formal, material, effective, and final causes, nor is it an absent cause as Althusserian Marxism proclaims that the “the lonely hour of the last instance never comes.”\(^{118}\) Nor again is the last-instance a unity of the two, for the last-instance is a cause-of-and-in-the-One (the hyphens utilized here typographically to indicate the inseparability of the cause from the One) where it acts (upon) the World or philosophy without any reaction (the brackets utilized here also typographically suspend, in a fashion akin to Sartre’s understanding of Husserl’s *epochē* in *Being and Nothingness*). From there, a description of the non-relation of relation and non-relation between philosophy and non-philosophy and the method of this non-relation’s construction: unilateral duality and dualysis. The latter is a two-pronged form of analysis performed *at once* that describes the one-sided relation (unilateral) that philosophy is between its relation and non-relation to the non-philosophical (here, understood in terms of philosophy, in the form of Difference, for instance); a unilateral duality results to describe and discern the philosophical decision as one Dyad (of relation and non-relation) determined in the last instance by a non-relation (the One) which is foreclosed and indifferent to the Dyad.

The last concept is the *effect* of the determination-in-the-last-instance known as *force-(de)-pensée*, which has been translated as force-(of)-thought, but here, I want to render it idiomatically as thought(-)power. Thought(-)power determines any thought, whether philosophy, science, or other regional thoughts in the last instance alone. *Force-(de)-pensée* has its link to *force de travail*,

\(^{117}\) *BoOM*, 77.

\(^{118}\) Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” in *For Marx*, 113.
what would be translated in English as ‘labour-power’, and Althusser, too, has a conception of *thought-power* in his writings.\(^{119}\) Here, in stark contrast to Althusser’s thought-power as an indication of how knowledge and wisdom constitute the determinate reality in some implementation of the *power* that undergirds and sold by the worker or the ‘private individual’, thought(-)power is an inalienable and non-commodifiable action that works upon its materials towards production without being exhausted or even sold in exchange with the production of knowledge and wisdom towards its ends. It is also an irreversible force as an effect exerted by the One but does not return to the One. Written in the less idiomatic fashion, the ‘power-(of)-thought’ or ‘force-(of)-thought’ is inseparable yet not determined by thought, acting upon it. Instead, the uni-lateral action of thought(-)power is the effect (without reciprocity) of the People (of) the One upon the World and philosophy, the whole superstructure and the relations that constitute them as our understanding of the World, to transform this totality into quasi-productive forces to invent the future of humanity as One.

Laruelle’s non-philosophical programme, emancipatory claims, and the desire to defend the human profoundly impact his readers. If for Marx, Feuerbach represented the brook of fire [den Feuer-bach] as the only road towards truth and freedom, the Purgatory of present times,\(^{120}\) Laruelle represents the alleyway [la ruelle] towards democracy and peace on the future Continent

\(^{119}\) Althusser, “From *Capital* to Marx’s Philosophy,” in *Reading Capital*, 41-42: “When Marx tells us that the production process of knowledge, and hence that of its object, as distinct from the real object which it is its precise aim to appropriate in the ‘mode’ of knowledge, takes place entirely in knowledge, in the ‘head’ or in thought, he is not for one second falling into an idealism of consciousness, mind or thought, for the ‘thought’ we are discussing here is not a faculty of a transcendental subject or absolute consciousness confronted by the real world as *matter*, nor is this thought a faculty of a psychological subject, although human individuals are its agents. This thought is the historically constituted system of an *apparatus of thought*, founded on and articulated to natural and social reality…This determinate reality is what defines the roles and functions of the ‘thought’ of particular individuals, who can only ‘think’ the ‘problems’ already actually or potentially posed; hence it is also what sets to work their ‘thought power’, in the way that the structure of an economic mode of production sets to work the labour-power of its immediate producers, but according to its own peculiar mode.”

of Humanity. This chapter analyzed Laruelle’s overarching programmatic vision in the form of non-philosophy as human philosophy or non-humanism. In the next chapter, I turn to an exegesis concerning Laruelle’s essay “Homo ex machina,” juxtaposing it alongside Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology,” Michel Henry’s Barbarism, Michel Foucault’s “The Right of Death and Power Over Life,” and Gilles Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control.” I argue that “Homo ex machina” is an important piece to analyze concerning human philosophy and democracy.
Chapter 3 - Homo ex machina: Towards the Human Emancipation from Philosophical Sufficiency

“The existence of Authorities, the practice of the State, the interminable process of History, etc., all these things are part of an illusion about what man is, part of the pretention to make of man a homo ex machina (publica).”

3.0. Introduction: How Does One Become Machine-Man?

In the previous chapter, I explored the overarching framework of François Laruelle’s declaration that non-philosophy is human philosophy. I analyzed the invariants presented within his corpus, such as demo-logical difference, anthropo-logical difference, ego-xeno-logical difference, and eco-logical difference. Each of these invariants expresses the inextricable relationship between humanity and philosophy in the complete expression of metaphysics as onto-anthropo-theo-logy. It has led us to question whether humans must emancipate themselves from philosophical sufficiency, the subject matter of this chapter. As we head toward our concluding arguments, I would like to focus on several unanswered questions. Why must one break from philosophical sufficiency? Why does Laruelle refer to philosophy as the superior form of biotechnology and the capital-form of thought? How does Laruelle distinguish this break, if it is at all possible, from other philosophers who deal with a similar problematic? How does the break from philosophical sufficiency correlate to questions regarding democracy? To what extent does philosophical sufficiency weaponize life – including bios and zoë, and even death – becoming what Laruelle calls bio-political parallelism? Such questions will be our line of inquiry while analyzing the works of thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze, all of whom have dealt with the relationships between the political, the

1 BoOM, 85.
technological, and the philosophical and their entanglement with life. Following these perspectives, I provide an exegesis of Laruelle’s 1980 essay, “Homo ex machina,” republished in *Le nouvel esprit technologique*, as the basis for the human emancipation from philosophical sufficiency and its weaponization of life and power, towards radical democracy within the bounds of the people alone. I argue that Laruelle’s essay and the framing of philosophy as the superior form of biotechnology pose challenges in envisioning what may ultimately differentiate non-philosophy as human philosophy from philosophy *tout court*.

### 3.0.1. Philosophy as Capital-Form of Thought

I would like to begin by underscoring what Laruelle means when he declares that philosophy is both the superior form of biotechnology and the capital-form of thought. While the latter is explicit in terms of how philosophy receives a surplus-value from other regions of thought (such as in *Introduction aux sciences génériques* and the investigation into epistemological surplus-value) or the exploitation of the language and thought of man, it is desirable here to connect it to the former statement in biotechnology. Concerning Laruelle’s work, the unification of capital and philosophy requires more than being thought of as sharing an all-encompassing sufficiency wherein everything is a phenomenon of philosophy and capitalism. In addition, it must also recognize what Marx meant when capital comes into the world “dripping from head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt.” One may speak of the mute compulsion and impersonal domination that follows from the declaration that philosophy is the capital-form of thought unless

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2 *IaSG*, 31-32.
3 *P&NP*, 247.
4 *ItNM*, 165-166.
the very blood and dirt of every pore is recognizable in its biotechnological ensemble. Moreover, suppose it is a matter of trying to emancipate the human from within the philosopher’s mind. In that case, one may be also able to speak about how Marx’s vision of the general intellect in the so-called “Fragment on Machines” in the Grundrisse, wherein all products of human industry are “organs of the human brain, created by the human hand,”⁷ can in turn be weaponized forms of abstraction in the hands of philosophers. This weaponization too can be seen with philosophy in its prevailing Greco-Western formation. Laruelle argues that philosophy tends to dismember the essence of man with a type of surgery known as the Philosophical Decision. Among the six great invariant traits of the structure of the Philosophical Decision, Laruelle writes the following:

Philosophy submits the essence of man to its teleology, claims to intervene within it and change it according to the essence of Being or the ends of thought. Philosophy is the superior form of biotechnology: it presents itself as the superior, “transcendental” technical object of the government and transformation of living beings. Like biotechnologies, philosophy hacks [taille] into human identity, deciding whether it is wolf or god; eagle or sheep; master or slave; sovereign or subject; soul or body; understanding or intuition. Philosophy does not stop revolutionizing the seat of man, worrying it, rendering it problematic, etc.⁸

The last chapter investigated such a perspective regarding philosophy as a transcendental technology. Yet here, I would like to integrate this discussion of philosophy as biotechnology in its connection to capital in its non-philosophical and non-Marxist deployment. What I want to make clear is that because philosophy “hacks” or “carves into” human identity, it is no different from the production of an ideal subject to carry out the exercise of production and reproduction in society, to exploit and alienate them into mute compulsion via impersonal forces of domination.

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Furthermore, regarding the *Introduction to Non-Marxism*, Laruelle provides the basis for a more thorough analysis of the statement “philosophy is the capital-form of thought.” By unifying both capitalism and philosophy in the conceptual identity known as “thought-world,” Laruelle seeks to impose a radical transformation of the inherent philosophical aspects of Marxism that inform both its science (historical materialism) and philosophy (dialectical materialism). Laruelle states that Marx’s conception of man is inherently philosophical vis-à-vis anthropo-logical difference:

Man’s essence is found in his distinction from animals and this distinction resides within the *productions of his means of existence*. This is not an animal…political or otherwise, the specificity of man is within the dissociation of the subject and the attribute as well as within the introduction of the middle term of production, [the] production not of existence, but of the *means* of existence…[It] is still the generality “man” that produces it, the means are that of socio-natural existence, and finally the whole of the definition sinks into a technological naturalism, a biotechnologism since we know that this emergence is the consequence of the “physical organization” of man. The inspired theory of the real infrastructure remains in escheat, unused, or flattened onto an Aristotelian naturalism combined with an idealist and Hegelian autoposition of practice. Marx interiorized practice within the sensible and material subject assumed given and does not radicalize his idea of the “production of the means of existence” against the utilitarian conception of the usage of tools and means.⁹

Because it is no different from a philosophical anthropology, especially when philosophy and capitalism are unified, Marxism may be incapable of radically transforming the (thought-)world if its categories are part and parcel of it. This incapacity also goes for the revolutionary subject of the proletariat who is produced by and is the undertaker for capitalism through its immiseration, plunder, law, blood, and fire. If, according to Amy Allen following Bernard Williams, Marx’s genealogy combines both a subversive and vindicatory strand that is more so “embedded in a longer vindicatory historical arc that, while avoiding crude teleologies and strong claims to

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⁹ *ItNM*, 151-152. Emphases in original.
unilinearity, nonetheless maintains a kind of necessity claim for its genealogical object,”\textsuperscript{10} then Laruelle’s non-Marxist unification of philosophy and capitalism sets itself as a vindicatory genealogy to such an extent that the minoritarian or ordinary man – as will be discussed below – is the real critique of all biotechnologies.

Simultaneously, I would like to incorporate Nietzsche’s discussion of the emergence of the human animal through mnemotechnics in \textit{The Genealogy of Morals}. The mnemotechnical emergence of man brings to light some underlying connections between Laruelle’s essay and the thinkers mentioned above. We must understand mnemotechnics as the technology or technical object that aids in memory. For Nietzsche, pain is the most powerful of all mnemotechnics and writes the following, serving as our point of departure:

“How does one create a memory for the human animal? How does one go about to impress anything on that partly dull, partly flighty human intelligence—that incarnation of forgetfulness—so as to make it stick?” As we might well imagine, the means used in solving this age-old problem have been far from delicate; in fact, there is perhaps nothing more terrible in man’s earliest history than his mnemotechnics. “A thing is branded on the memory to make it stay there; only what goes on hurting will stick” — this is one of the oldest and, unfortunately, one of the most enduring psychological axioms…[Wherever] on earth one still finds solemnity, gravity, secrecy, somber hues in the life of an individual or a nation, one also senses a residuum of that terror with which men must formerly have promised, pledged, vouched. It is the past…that seems to surge up whenever we turn serious. Whenever man has thought it necessary to create memory for himself, his effort has been attended with torture, blood, sacrifice. The ghastliest sacrifices and pledges…the most repulsive mutilations…the cruelest rituals in every religious cult…all these have their origin in that instinct which divined pain to be the strongest aid to mnemonics…The poorer the memory of mankind has been, the more terrible have been its customs.\textsuperscript{11}

Following this insight, Nandita Biswas Mellamphy proposes the characterization of the “human” due to the mnemotechnical.\textsuperscript{12} I would like to add that this has consequences, particularly in the

\textsuperscript{10} Amy Allen, “Dripping With Blood and Dirt From Head to Toe: Marx’s Genealogy of Capitalism in \textit{Capital, Volume 1},” \textit{The Monist} 105 (2022): 472.


\textsuperscript{12} Nandita Biswas Mellamphy, \textit{The Three Stigmata of Friedrich Nietzsche: Political Physiology in the Age of Nihilism} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
supposed forgetting of the One in the non-philosophical sense. For Laruelle, the “forgetting of the One” is irreducible to the forgetting of Being as it is in Heidegger. The forgetting of the One is the ineradicable and specific belief of the World to have truly forgotten the One. Said otherwise, the hallucinated repression denies the essence of the One and constitutes the Unitary Ideal discussed in the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{13}

Bringing together these elements in connection to philosophy as biotechnology, discussions regarding the victim, human experimentation, the crime against humanity, etc., can be brought to light in a way that demonstrates the need to break from philosophical sufficiency. What is the harm in claiming that “everything is philosophizable” – that is the question. The harm, I argue, is in the creation of what Marx once referred to as the “disposable industrial reserve army…a mass of human material always ready for exploitation by capital in the interests of capital’s own changing valorization requirements.”\textsuperscript{14} For Laruelle and non-philosophy in general, the statement that philosophy is the capital-form of thought and the superior form of biotechnology finds its real content in the overexploitation of the human being into being nothing more than a cog of a State-machine: \textit{homo ex machina}.

3.1. Heidegger and Technics

Martin Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” problematizes the relationship between technology and humanity, the opening up of the “free relationship” of “our human existence to the essence of technology.”\textsuperscript{15} The major point of Heidegger’s interrogation is the statement, “the essence of technology is not itself technological.” There are two ways of understanding the essence of technology from this: it is, on the one hand, a means to an end in

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{BoOM}, 101.
\textsuperscript{14} Marx, \textit{Capital vol. 1}, 784.
terms of the instrumentality of technology, and on the other hand, a human activity qua technē. “The current conception of technology,” Heidegger notes, “can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology.”\(^{16}\) Said otherwise, there is no technological definition of the essence of technology except for how it currently exists in its instrumentalization and humanized relationship. However, the massive instrumentalization of technology “conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology…The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent as technology threatens to slip from human control.”\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, because the instrumental definition of technology demonstrates itself as a means to an end, it shows a metaphysical relationship to technology concerning causality and the four (present) causes (final, efficient, material, and formal). These four causes are modes of occasioning, that is, to let things that are not present arrive into presencing. The four causes are a bringing-forth [Hervorbringen] that allows the concealed to be revealed by the truth. The essence of technology, as a way of revealing, concerns everything, for it may reveal what ultimately, according to Heraclitus, loves to hide: nature or physis. When Heidegger turns his attention to the etymology of technology related to technē, poiēsis, and epistēmē, this revealing becomes more evident. Being a mode of revealing and bringing-forth, technē “reveals whatever does not bring itself and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another.”\(^{18}\)

According to Heidegger, modern technology advances these concerns to such a disturbing height that it “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”\(^{19}\) Modern technology furthermore challenges nature into setting it up to be en-framed by treating it as standing-reserve [Bestand], standing-by for its use secured by its

\(^{16}\) Ibid, 5.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
\(^{18}\) Ibid, 13.
\(^{19}\) Ibid, 14.
setting-upon. This act of unconcealment distorts the original implication of technē insofar as “everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering.”

To Heidegger, through the anthropological conception of technology, man can accomplish and succeed in the revelation of the real qua nature as standing-reserve. Man is the one who can exploit nature through unconcealing. Yet man is caught up in this very situation: “If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does man not himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve?”

Modern technology has no unique human handiwork, even if man advances technology. Nevertheless, the bound relationship traps man in an ordered sense of revealing, enchaining man and nature to the ends of modern technology. This enchainment is called Enframing [Ge-stell], “the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man…to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve.”

Enframing is both the setting upon through challenge and demand, and the presenting through unconcealment. Modern technology presents nothing more than the instrumentalized “metaphysics” of modern science, which is not concerned with the truth but “sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance…[ordering] its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.”

Enframing does not exceed human activity. It does not “happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man.”

20 Ibid, 17.
21 Ibid, 18.
23 Ibid, 21.
Here, Heidegger emphasizes the relationship between destiny, history, and freedom in connection to Enframing. If Enframing ordains destining as that which sends forth, the envisioning of human freedom is disturbed. Heidegger writes the following concerning freedom:

Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, i.e., of the revealed. It is to the happening of revealing, i.e., of truth, that freedom stands in the closest and most intimate kinship. All revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees—the mystery—is concealed and always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the open, goes into the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of the open consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint of mere laws. Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a revealing upon its way.25

In the context of modern technology and Enframing, the original essence of freedom is reducible to standing-reserve and given a fate that is itself inseparable from that ordering. The endangerment of man is possible by this course since man is this being, according to Heidegger, who mediates the unconcealment of concealed truth through revelation. As Heidegger emphasizes, the essence of man is no longer encounterable to man himself except through the mode of Enframing.26 One may understand Enframing as danger and destining, and the essence of technology, not the technology itself, is the danger when ordered to the logic of standing-reserve.

Yet, there is still hope, as Heidegger draws from Hölderlin’s verse: “But where the danger is, grows / The saving power also.” In this way, Heidegger suggests that the saving power is endemic to the danger. Enframing “cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all lighting-up of every revealing, all appearing of truth.”27 Within Enframing contains a saving power, but not everything technological is universally bound to Enframing. The endurance qua essencing of technology via Enframing is also a granting even if Enframing challenges-forth. This granting is the saving power

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26 Ibid, 27.
27 Ibid, 28.
for man as the mediator for truth through revealing, bringing man “into the highest dignity of his essence,”28 because man is never nothing but man.29 Through the threat of endangerment in Enframing, surrendering his essence can bring to light man’s highest dignity as a mediator for truth. Questioning is the operation that problematizes this possibility from coming to pass, for it is one of the higher philosophical operations that allow one to build a way forward as a “piety of thought.”30 Questioning also fosters the saving power to be realized even amid danger, wherein “the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth.”31 Art is also in the realm of technē as bringing-forth. This questioning finds itself in the arena of art because it is, “on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.”32 Amid Enframing as the essence of technology as extreme danger, there is the saving power of art, which also shares the same root as the essence of technology.

3.2. Henry and Barbarism

Likewise, for Michel Henry, barbarism constitutes life’s self-negation and the ruination of culture. By “life,” Henry is not concerned with the biological or the vitalist notion of it as in Bergson or Darwin, but rather something correlative to that of Husserl’s lifeworld and Marx and Engels’ materialist conception of history via the statement “it is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.”33 Life is instead this “incessant movement of self-transformation and self-fulfillment,” inextricably bound to culture, which is the “self-

28 Ibid, 32.
29 Ibid, 31: “For there is no such thing as a man who, solely of himself, is only man.”
30 Ibid, 35.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
transformation of life.”34 More fully, life to Henry “feels and experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it that would be experienced or felt”35 and is irreducible to an object of scientific knowledge. In sum, life is subjective knowledge that determines objective knowledge, not the other way around. With that said, there is a connectedness between Henry’s concern for barbarism and Heidegger’s concern for the becoming-standing-reserve of nature: with the rise and normalization of the Galilean science of nature, barbarism ensues from the ossifying objectivism of subjective life. This ossification is similar to what was analyzed previously with Edmund Husserl’s Crisis. However, according to Henry, it takes on a more insidious nature with barbarism as the self-negation of life. Suppose the knowledge of life is irreducible to the knowledge of consciousness and science and found within the realm of praxis. In that case, the theory of barbarism itself is an analytic account of “the regression of fulfillment of life and the end put to fulfillment.”36 Whereas Enframing served as a problematic for Heidegger, barbarism through Galilean science is the belief that the theory of consciousness and science is the only knowledge of the world that we may have and thus binds life and the knowledge of life – that is, praxis – within and inseparable from its grip. Furthermore, as art was the solution to the problem to the all-encompassing Enframing for both are in the radical root as the saving power and danger for Heidegger, it is only within life that the solution to the problem of its growing barbarism as the “flight from oneself” is realized and possible to destroy.

Through technology, the growing barbarism of Galilean science is analyzable in its solitude. Science, to Henry, is an abstraction from sensibility, which is simultaneously an abstraction from life. As an abstraction from sensibility and life, science as the representation of

36 Ibid, 19.
nature ignores life in its sensation and reality. To Henry, it is the very difference between mind and body, to what is lacking in life or is dead and what is alive, “that which experiences itself and revealing itself to oneself in this mute experience of oneself.”

It is not only the difference maintained between science and life, but science, according to Henry, seeks to eliminate this difference. As Henry cautions:

This reduction of the lifeworld to the world of science can only be prohibited by a thought that can grasp the lifeworld in its specificity…in its irreducibility to the world and to any possible world. The lifeworld is a sensible world, and sensible-being ultimately resides outside of the world, in life itself. Sensible qualities are always only the objectification and thus the re-presentation of an impression whose impressional-being is the auto-impression, that is, absolute subjectivity of life.

Similar to Laruelle’s claim about the principle of philosophical sufficiency (“everything is philosophizable”), life’s abstraction by techno-science or the Galilean science renders all knowledge, including subjective knowledge, reducible to scientific knowledge. By contrast to the existing practices of phenomenology, which, to Henry, is caught up in a diametrically opposed position that “takes the opposite course from Galilean science and carries out a questioning back from the world of science to the lifeworld and then from it to the consciousness of the world,” Henry’s analysis ensues and is inseparably immanent to the lifeworld without abstraction.

In this way, science is not alone and never exists in its solitude, except when it acts as if it were alone, thus becoming technology. According to Henry, technology “is a set of operations and transformations that become possible through science and its theoretical knowledge, to the exclusion of any reference to the lifeworld and life itself.” Technology is often interpretable, as it was with Heidegger, to be towards anthropological ends and instrumentality, and these

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37 Ibid, 40.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid, 41.
40 Ibid, 42-43.
interpretations are rightfully statable when a great change occurs worldwide. Technology for Henry is not in the interests of life but has a means of its specificity and constitute themselves as the “end.” Technology spontaneously gives rise to an auto-development with no governance outside of it. Like Heidegger, Henry engages the original essence of technē insofar as it is connected not with art but knowledge in the form of “know-how.” Modern technology may abstract from life, but there is an original “know-how” in the form of praxis that is immanent and is life itself. For Henry, the original auto-affected ipseity of life determines its technē: the human body. The body is a singular and individual (qua undivided) experience of auto-affection itself. Henry writes:

The original essence of technē is the whole system formed by my body in movement and effort. My immanent Body is absolutely subjective and absolutely alive – the organic body that exerts itself and bends under its effort…The radically immanent subjective Body in which I stand as the fundamental “I Can” has such difficulty that I am the task of making the Earth give way and move back…The “tool” is originally nothing but an extension of the immanent subjective Body. It is thus a part of the organic body…The tool is detached from nature in order to be delivered over to the initiative of the Body and put to use by it.41

It is here that Henry introduces some terminology regarding the innermost fixedness of the body and nature through “co-belonging” (copropriation) and “bodily-ownness” (Corpspropriation). The former is the joining of the two in the limitation of life. In contrast, the latter is the real and original condition of co-belonging, the a priori of life-determination. For Henry, the transformation of the world is the realization of bodily-ownness and the world is nothing but the correlate of this movement of life and praxis.

The challenge arises when one has to represent this praxis from its subjective lived experience to that of its objectivity. Life may be alterable by its representation in two forms: the abstraction of action outside of life and the breaking of the immanent unity of the organic body

41 Ibid, 45.
into elements such as “cause,” “effect,” “means,” and “ends.” Technology is the means to realize the displacement of life outside of itself into a surer solitude that threatens life in its expression. Unless it coincides in terms of bodily-ownness, techne and technology as such are the expression of life. Insofar as technology now transforms action from subjective into objective, that is, from life in its immanence into the nonhuman mechanization of life at large of its physical movements for industry, it becomes crucial to recognize that the objective is no longer living and no longer life itself, that action becomes unintelligible to life. This new ontological reality is not life but economic reality, a subversion of bodily-ownness towards the self-valorization of value and surplus-value extraction. It only emerges through the development of technology and the regulation of action via science’s objectification. As a complete subversion of life-determination, scientific knowledge’s regulation of action has three major consequences: 1) objective knowledge concerns the consciousness of objects abstracted from the sensible lifeworld, 2) it no longer coincides with action, and 3) it cannot be an objective knowledge of action because action itself is not objective but subjective. From the lifeworld and consciousness difference emerges the acting and knowing difference.

Action is no longer anything but a sort of empirical curiosity, the “action” by which the scientist moves his or her eyeballs or turns the pages of his or her book. Or, it slips from view and is not even taken into consideration, and thus it is nothing. Knowledge, by contrast, is everything. Its correlate is all objective processes...The knowledge of science...now defines the knowledge of techne, instead of the knowledge of life.42

From here, a problematic ensues for Henry. The major stake is how modern technology is conceivable and intelligible if and only if action resides in praxis, if techne is the condition of possibility of action, and if the essence of praxis is inseparable and is life itself. It is through the action of the human being to carry out this transformation. It is, therefore, a self-negation: “Only

42 Ibid, 49-50.
someone who has hands and eyes in the sense of a radically immanent power of grasping and seeing, only a being originally constituted in oneself as a subjective and living Body.”43 Whereas the robot and the mechanical cog are the realization of a mechanistic set of orders, the human being decides to realize and act in their perversion of subjective processes. Even if the subjectivity cannot be entirely abstractable from the praxis of life, Henry maintains that despite the growing barbarism, bodily-ownness is the radical root. Still, the technical and objective forces of the machine replaces bodily-ownness, with the body merely an intervening cog.

Science through technology objectifies action in terms of motions, movements, desired outcomes, etc., for the roles that devices play in realizing a system’s fidelity. “Technology,” Henry says, “is nothing but this [material] nature, a nature whose regulations are known…nature without the human being. It is abstract nature, reduced to itself, delivered over to itself, exalting and expressing itself on its own.”44 Technology is the realization of barbarism, the replacement of culture and life through the regulation of action, measuring human life and bodily-ownness to its modalities by life’s self-negation through an economic telos. The telos of life breaks down by the enrootment of technology and barbarism for the pursuit of value.

Henry continues his analyses elsewhere with a view towards the collapse of communism and the devaluation of the individual in his From Communism to Capitalism. Henry’s stance is a thought of Marx-without-Marxology or Marxism: much of what Henry inherits from Marx is about the subjectivity underlying the productive force of the living individual but considers Marxism to share “a family resemblance to the fascism that it has shouted itself hoarse to denounce throughout its history.”45 To Henry, fascism is the devaluation of the living individual and shares a politics

43 Ibid, 50.
44 Ibid, 52.
towards extinguishing life. Furthermore, vitalism negates the analysis of the living individual as this doctrine is the “monstrous reduction of life to a blind and menacing power”\textsuperscript{46} vis-à-vis its relationship to rationalism. Life is the vital force without vitalism, without the light of reason to manifest it. Still, it is through techno-capitalism and its fascist technologies that life and the living individual are driven towards death. To bridge Marx’s comment about the genesis of capital as emerging with blood and dirt from every pore with Henry’s analysis of techno-capitalism, I will refer to the chapter “The Empire of Death: The Technological-Economic World,” as it is the one chapter in \textit{From Communism to Capitalism} that fully demonstrates Henry’s reading of Marx-without-Marxology.

Following the economic law of the decrease in necessary labour time with the increase of surplus-labour and surplus-value by increasing labour productivity, Henry states that it is only realizable if related to its genesis in the production of use-values. Subsistence outside of an economy consists of life’s solitude with itself to survive, and it is without the condition of life results ultimately in its opposite with death: “with the inability to produce what is absolutely necessary would immediately signify death.”\textsuperscript{47} Upon the introduction of technology as part of the process of production, a gap or distance emerges, the gap between real needs and the ability to produce. “Civilization,” to Henry, is the nomination of the gap, and it is widened significantly in techno-capitalism. Henry notes, “the more this economic world unfolds with its increasingly sophisticated system of equivalents…the more obscure the source [i.e., life] from which they proceed becomes.”\textsuperscript{48} With that said, Henry proceeds with a critique of productivity insofar as it is not only the creative capacity of life in its subjectivity towards civilization and culture but, rather,

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, 115.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, 79.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, 80.
its objectivity that becomes quantified and augmented through technology. Subjectivity in living labour no longer plays a primary role in the development and innovation of useful products, only serving as the means to provide efficiency to the process overall.

Here, Henry focuses on an “extraordinary event” that occurs with capitalism, an event that marks a “true turning point in the history of humanity and the beginning of modernity” \(^49\) – surplus-value. As not only a fact but the Archi-fact of this event, Henry’s analysis of surplus-value demonstrates how it becomes the guiding principle of capitalism, for certain. However, the greater implication arises in its ties to technology, becoming a Galilean Archi-fact. Recall above that Galilean science is the binding of life with science, the inseparability of life and science. Here, living labour is inverted from being the subjective foundation of the real process of production with tools and raw material as secondarized extensions into the geometrized knowledge of the material world indistinguishable from tools and raw material. Henry writes:

Instead of being produced in the life of individuals and instead of putting into play the powers that they experience internally, this action—or what continues to be wrongly identified by this term—subsequently occurs before the regard of thought. It occurs as a set of objective processes that are analogous to natural processes. These natural processes—physical, electro-magnetic, chemical, biological, or others like them—will come to define the being of action, instead of and in place of the living, suffering, and acting subjectivity of human beings. This ontological displacement is also a phenomenological displacement. It is once and the same movement that produces the substitution of objective natural movements for the subjective action of living individuals and conjointly produces the substitution of objective and rational knowledge of the material world for an invisible and felt inner experience that life has of itself at every moment and is its own subjectivity. \(^50\)

Said otherwise, it is the inversion and displacement of what were merely extensions of subjective life into life as the extension, alongside productive forces, of the objective rationalizing knowledge. Whereas the subjectivity of life has its knowledge endemic and immanent to itself, modern technology, and capital through the self-begetting of surplus-value effectively eliminates

\(^49\) Ibid, 82.
\(^50\) Ibid, 83.
the division between the labour and production processes. Or moreover, the division is transformative into the same movement, yet to the exclusion of life and subjectivity entirely. Whereas traditional technology, whereby tools are secondary and extensions to life, is the coinciding of activity with life, modern technology inverts this order towards instrumentality and the radical “unemployment” of life. In its unemployment, life is severed from production but saved by technology: “the world of technology offers palliatives—television in developed countries, and vodka or some other narcotic in developing countries—or both at the same time.”

Nevertheless, Henry’s attention is now on the economic process. Here, Henry discusses Marx’s distinction between living labour and social or abstract labour. The dual character of labour corresponds to the twofold character of commodities: living labour may be identified as concrete labour which produces use-values, whereas abstract labour produces exchange-values or, better yet, value. From this distinction, one can ascertain and realize that value emerges from labour only based on abstract labour, devoid of its subjectivity. Yet in Henry’s view, he argues that there is a non-economic origin of the economy residing in life: the forces of life “produce economic phenomena in a metaphysical sense before they are determined in the economic world where they will emerge at the same time as life.” The elimination of subjectivity and the increase of objectivity corresponds to the increase of abstract labour, surplus-labour and surplus-value, a thesis that follows from the economic law stated above. With this correspondence rises the internal impossibility of capitalism in its elimination of subjectivity, akin to the hypothesis concerning the tendency for the rate of profit to fall:

[The] gradual elimination of living labor from the real process of production signifies its increasing inability to produce value…the transformation of the internal structure of the

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51 Ibid, 85.
52 Ibid, 86.
real process of production, as a result of modern technology, implies the underlying impossibility of the economic process.\textsuperscript{53}

If the economic process is begotten from the process of life, as Henry argues, then how can it circumvent its impossibility? Through the invention of exchange-value, life is abstracted and, in abstraction, generates value that begets itself. The abstraction itself is a duplication or reproduction of life for the economy, not life itself. Henry argues “living labor and it alone [can] produce value and thus produce the increase of value that defines capitalism,”\textsuperscript{54} harkening back to the image that Marx gives of capital as dead labour, its vampire-like existence thriving off living labour.

Now, how does all this connect to the overarching event of techno-capitalism as such? Henry states that it is through capitalism that the development of technology is made more manifest. Still, it requires the augmentation of labour to eliminate its complete liveliness in subjectivity. Therefore, through automation and the machine, there is a diminishment of necessary labour, that is, living labour in its subjective fashioning and the production of surplus-value realizable with this elimination.\textsuperscript{55} Techno-capitalism’s existence is predicable on the dwindling of exploitation in its moral sense because of the elimination of living labour. However, as Henry contends, this development of technology is not inherent to capitalism itself but to technology itself qua Galilean science as the increasing abstraction of subjective life into quantification and

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 87.

\textsuperscript{55} Gilbert Simondon would criticize the separation of the machine from the “human”/living domain as indicative of a privileging of natural life over technical life. In \textit{On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects}, trans. Cecile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2017), Simondon refers to technical life as “existing at the same level as a being that takes charge of the relation between [machines], capable of being coupled, simultaneously or successively, with several machines…Man as technician does not perform this function prior to the manufacture of machines, but during their operation. He fulfills the function of the present, and maintains the correlation because his life consists of the rhythm of the machines that surround him and that he connects to one another” (140). Here, one may argue that the machinic elements found in the work of Gilles Deleuze and Laruelle’s earliest writings writ large: the inseparability of man from the machine.
objectivity. As Henry observes, Galilean science informs capitalism because “this extreme development of instrumental technological devices in the real process of production can indeed be called for by the imperative of development; it can only be introduced because Galilean science already made it possible.” Yet, these technological developments also resound the death knell of capitalism:

Increasingly deprived of living labor and of the subjective force of life, the real process becomes unable to create exchange value, money, and capital. It becomes unable to support an economic process that is only constituted of values. With the gradual disappearance of these values, it too is in effect deprived of its own substance. When subjectivity is excluded from the real process, this is what becomes impossible in the economic process: its very existence.

Ultimately, while one contradiction arises from the dissociation from concrete, living and subjective labour and abstract, dead, and objective labour, the major contradiction extends to what was said previously in Barbarism: the self-negation of life through technology. This self-negation is a crisis not generated by capitalism alone but by techno-science as well, intensified by the fusion of techno-capitalism. Henry argues that with automation, there is no exchange-value produced, just unlimited use-values without subjectivity. Use is always a use for someone, but when subjectivity is withered away, the use of use-value takes on a new definition: whereas with traditional technology, use was purposeful towards the individual’s subsistence, Galilean techno-science transforms use towards the technological process itself, towards the generation of new machines. It is with this that Henry pithily remarks:

A process of production whose operation is reduced to the functioning of a material device and whose product is only constituted of the objective and material elements of this device—this is a process in which nothing remains of life; this is a dead process.

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57 Henry, From Communism to Capitalism, 89.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 92.
If, for Henry, Marxism has a theoretical negation of the living individual in its regimes and in its principles towards fascism, techno-capitalism is nothing but the practical negation or extinction of life. Techno-capitalism may lead to its decline, but as long as there is life according to Henry, purely subjective life irreducible to vitalism, its downfall is predicable upon eliminating this life.

3.3. Foucault and Technologies of Power over Life

By turning to Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, our investigation turns from technology recognized as the objectification of nature and life to the technology of power over life. By “technology of power,” Foucault means the very organizations that direct the conduct of humanity towards an end. These organizations can be envisioned through concrete institutions, as Foucault analyzes with penal power, sovereign power, disciplinary power, and so on. In a comprehensive sense, a technology of power is an “art of government” or governmentality, which is understandable in three ways, according to Foucault:

First…I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second…I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses…[and] to the development of a series of knowledges. Finally…I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth century and was gradually “governmentalized.”

This three-fold definition of governmentality will serve as a point of departure for understanding the technology of power over life, that is, biopolitics. The first volume of The History of Sexuality concludes with an analysis of the transition from sovereign power to bio-power: the transition from

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the right to take life or let live to the right to live and let die. This transition is also explored in the final lecture of “Society Must Be Defended.” Therefore, I will turn to both of these instances to better extract the significance of biopolitics as a technology of power over life.

Whereas the first volume of The History of Sexuality pertains to introducing Foucault’s archaeology of the assumption of sexuality’s repression in terms of power and/or discourse, the overarching thematic that links this work to the technology of power is present in its fifth part: “Right of Death and Power Over Life.” Towards the middle of this chapter, Foucault indicates that the rise of biopower serves as the backdrop for how one is to understand the significance of sex as a matter of politics, and my focus here will solely be on this backdrop. As was the case in Discipline and Punish, Foucault’s concern is the transition from sovereign power, the right to decide life and death, to bio-power, to invest in one’s life. Sovereign power is exercised by taking life or letting live and is, in this instance, “a right of seizure: of things, times, bodies, and ultimately life itself…[culminating] in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.”61 By contrast, bio-power is neither the opposite of sovereign power, its correction, nor even its superior form of power. Even if bio-power follows a long trail of bloodshed, it is exercised in fostering life and/or disallowing it based on the life of a society, no longer in the name of the sovereign. This new organization is a type of technical operation to “[generate] forces, making them grow, and ordering them”62 solely towards life-administration or “defending” society. Foucault writes the following to articulate the historical circumstances that specify the disciplinary period of power and distinguishes it from sovereign power:

[Starting] in the seventeenth century, this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles—the first

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62 Ibid.
to be formed, it—centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatamo-politics of the human body. The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population. The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed. The setting up, in the course of the classical age, of this great bipolar technology—anatomic and biological, individualizing and specifying, directed toward the performances of the body, with attention to the processes of life—characterize a power whose highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and through.63

In sum, these twin forces between disciplining the body via anatamo-politics and regulating life via bio-politics constitute this new era of the administration of the body. It is an era of bio-power wherein “numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations”64 arose.

Foucault observes that bio-power emerges with the development of the capitalist mode of production. Without bio-power as a backdrop, it would be impossible to have the processes of production be operable. Bio-power requires both the productive forces and life (nevertheless inseparable from these forces) to be optimal for economic production. Institutions also help prop up the bio-political rule over economic production as they all operate “in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them.”65 These institutions are well known and find alignment in Althusser’s analyses of the ideological state apparatuses: the family, the army, the school, the police, but above all the clinic and administration of life. However, distinct from Althusser, ideology is not an oppressive material force for Foucault, as

63 Ibid, 139
64 Ibid, 140.
65 Ibid, 141.
there is a biological force over the historical forces, and a circular relationship arose between the two. The Bubonic Plague, for instance, is one dramatic instance where biology prevails over history, analyzed elsewhere in *Discipline and Punish* in the chapter on “Panopticism.” Nevertheless, for Foucault, “biological existence was reflected in political existence” for the first time when the human being’s life became the object of control, power, and knowledge:

Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed optimally.

Bio-power is the rule exercised upon the living over their life, wherein the relationship between knowledge and power sought to hold sway over and towards the transformation of human life. One may say that this is the moment where Nietzsche’s pejorative definition of man as the “human animal” finds its humanity and humaneness against its animality, but for Foucault, man is this animal “whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.” Yet bio-power’s development had a profound impact on the law, transforming it from the might of the sword to the regulatory norm. Power transformed from the deathly force of the sovereign and spectacularizing of bloodshed to the coding and legislation of life to become more acceptable, more “humane.”

However, this has profound implications for the politics of life and the human body, the “rights” of man in view of society. For Foucault, this is not a return to some theological assumption of the rights of man in the eyes of God or a sovereign figure, but the rights of man, the right to life, on a political terrain that does not derive from the sovereign whatsoever. Instead, this is a transfer

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66 And one may add, in the contemporary moment, COVID-19.
67 Foucault, *History of Sexuality 1*, 142.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid, 143.
from the symbolics of blood via war to the analytics of sexuality via the norm, wherein life itself,
not death, became the central issue of politics.

The “right” to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and
beyond all the oppressions or “alienations,” the “right” to rediscover what one is and all
that one can be, this “right”…was the political response to all these new procedures of
power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{70}

From here, Foucault concludes his perspective with a reflection upon the decision to write \textit{The
History of Sexuality} and the political implications, harkening back to the opening refrain of “We
Other Victorians.”

Nevertheless, the analysis of bio-power is continued further in the final lecture of \textit{“Society
Must Be Defended”} from March 17, 1976. This lecture focuses on a major consequence of bio-
power, briefly analyzed in the final portion of the first volume: racism. Though the symbolics of
blood found itself taken up in racial purity as something of a return to a myth of racial superiority,
it is rather with the biologization of race in a statist formation that intervenes “at the level of body,
conduct, health, and everyday life”\textsuperscript{71} that bio-power is most intensive. Foucault poses a set of
questions for his audience in this final lecture to highlight the point where racism intervenes within
bio-power:

If it is true that the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and that disciplinary
or regulatory disciplinary is on the advance, how will the power to kill and the function of
murder operate in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its
objective? How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve
life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate
for failings? How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, to call
for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill, and to expose not only its enemies
but its own citizens to the risk of death? Given that this power’s objective is essentially to
make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be
exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 145.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, 149.
\textsuperscript{72} Foucault, \textit{“Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976}, trans. David Macey (New
York: Picador, 2003), 254.
Undoubtedly, racism operates historically in other formations and was not invented at this time in history. Still, it is with bio-power that racism is the basic mechanism of power, according to Foucault. Racism, to Foucault, is “a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control, the break between what must live and what must die.” This break is fundamental, as it institutes a fragmentation and hierarchization of the biologization of life, the first of two functions of racism. The second function relates to war: “If you want to live, the other must die.” Once more, racism does not arise from war, but its relationship to war in bio-power is made distinct in terms of the death of the inferior race that makes life “purer.” Bio-power, in its racist interventions, is irreducible to war and politics, but to a biological formation as a threat to and for one given population, that is, “the” population. And it is above all that, with this biopolitical formation of a normalizing society, “race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable.” Racism justifies murder as an exercise of bio-power by way of the State, and it serves as the precondition for any formation of power that seeks to exercise the right to kill. Killing, above all, is not just murder as such. As Foucault notes, it includes indirect murder: “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.”

3.4. Deleuze and Control Societies

According to Foucault, it is through war and colonization that racism develops and activates in the bio-political formation. Yet the greater challenge is to implement its all-

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73 Ibid.
74 Ibid, 255.
75 Ibid, 256.
76 Ibid.
77 Two other notable figures who reflect on this relationship are Achille Mbembe and Giorgio Agamben. Mbembe particularly analyzes the instrumentalization of power towards human destruction through racism, coloniality, and war in his reflections on necropolitics. Furthermore, Agamben rectifies and progresses Foucault’s own analytic of biopolitics to incorporate the classical distinction instituted by Aristotle between \textit{bios} and \textit{zoe}, that is, political life of
encompassing control. In his “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” Gilles Deleuze analyzes the historical, logical, and programmatic mechanisms at hand from the transition to disciplinary society as such to the societies of control. This transition includes a transformation from apparatuses in the Althusserian and Foucauldian sense to that of systems and circuits. Furthermore, it is the transformation of the individual in the sense of one’s identity being indivisible to the individual, a consistent fracturing of identity, and the datafication of masses. After World War II, as Deleuze notes, the disciplinary society of Foucault’s analyses is on the way to being replaced by societies of control. In the ever-shifting landscape of control societies, all previous forms of enclosure by way of disciplinary society, such as the prison, the hospital, the school, and the family, are undergoing transformations that historically account for a new administration over life. Deleuze refers to control in the following fashion:

“Control” is the name proposed by Burroughs to characterize the new monster, and Foucault sees it fast approaching. Paul Virilio too is constantly analyzing the ultrarapid forms of apparently free-floating control that are taking over from the old disciplines at work within the time scales of closed systems. It’s not a question of amazing pharmaceutical products, nuclear technology, and genetic engineering, even though these will play their part in the new process. It’s not a question of asking whether the old or new system is harsher or more bearable, because there’s a conflict in each between the ways they free and enslave us. With the breakdown of the hospital as a site of confinement, for instance, community psychiatry, day hospitals, and home care initially presented new freedoms, while at the same time contributing to mechanisms of control as rigorous as the harshest confinement. It’s not a question of worrying or of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons.78

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What were once enclosures are now in crisis because they are as freeing spaces as they are harsh confinements, becoming a zone of indiscernibility that recognizes how control gradually exercises itself.

The logical implications of the transition from discipline to control are analyzable from here. On the one hand, disciplinary enclosure is analogical in the sense of the analog (i.e., a continuous signal in analogousness with another quantity), and, on the other hand, control is digital (i.e., a signal of discrete quantities that can be manipulated and transferred). On the one hand, enclosures are moulds. On the other hand, controls are modulations: the difference is between the ideal model and the idealizing model that is self-continuous in its mutations. Deleuze points to how the factory model, for instance, transforms into its corporative business model. Whereas “factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint convenience of a management…” corporate businesses, by contrast, are “constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each within himself.” Beyond corporatization, control is an interminable process of “universal transmutation.” Whereas in disciplinary society, one goes from one enclosure to another, control societies have a continuous process of metastability. Disciplinary society maintains individuals and masses. Control societies maintain dividuals and stocks or banks [banques]. The icon of the disciplinary society is the old mole, and the icon of the control societies is the snake. This difference is equally about predatory behaviour as it is about the environment that one is in: “Disciplinary man produced energy in discrete amounts, while

80 Deleuze, “Postscript,” 179.
81 Ibid.
control man undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits.”82 Deleuze then reflects on the varying technologies of any given society. The technology of simple machines organized sovereign society, and the logic of thermodynamics organized disciplinary society. For control societies, information technology organizes the social form that goes beyond the previous forms of capitalism in its disciplinary formation. Through colonization, production becomes outsourced to the Third World, according to Deleuze, and capitalism has taken on the corporate nature of dispersiveness of service and activities. To Deleuze, “it’s a capitalism no longer directed toward production, but toward products, that is, toward sales or markets.”83 Whereas disciplinary society sought a long-standing fostering of the individual, control is short-term with the creation of the indebted man. With the rise of this new form of capitalism, some factors have not changed, as “capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming shantytowns and ghettos.”84

Lastly, Deleuze focuses on the programmatic nature of control societies. Their mechanism is the tagging of the dividual identity, like that of an ID card that a computer can control to allow one to access a space or not at any time of day. Control mechanisms may borrow elements from previous societies, such as sovereign societies and disciplinary societies, but the novelty of control is recognizable in transforming previous enclosures into systems. The non-exhaustive list that Deleuze provides is the prison system, the school system, the hospital system, and the business system. The one thing that unites all of them is this new dominating system that codes, tags, manipulates, and divides the human identity to ends that serve this programme. In other words, it

82 Ibid, 180.
83 Ibid, 181.
84 Ibid.
becomes almost impossible to think of the human identity as inseparable from the machines, the topological machinic definition that appears elsewhere in Deleuze’s words:

Machine, machinism, ‘machinic’: this does not mean either mechanical or organic. Mechanics is a system of closer and closer connections between dependent terms. The machine by contrast is a ‘proximity’ grouping between independent and heterogeneous terms (topological proximity is itself independent of distance or contiguity). What defines a machine assemblage is the shift of a centre of gravity along an abstract line…It may be said that that machine, in this sense, points to the unity of a machine operator. But this is wrong: the machine operator is present in the machine, ‘in the centre of gravity’, or rather of speed, which goes through him…one should not say that the machine cannot make some movement that only man is capable of making, but on the contrary that man is incapable of making this movement except as part of a certain machine.\footnote{Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, \textit{Dialogues II}, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 104. Emphases mine.}

It is here that even in his agreement with Foucault that man is a sand-drawn face at the edge of the sea, Deleuze’s control societies introduce the inseparability and indiscernibility of man and machine: “Is it not commonplace nowadays to say that the forces of man have already entered into a relation with the forces of information technology and their third-generation machines, which together create something other than man, indivisible ‘man-machine’ systems?”\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Foucault}, trans. Séan Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 89.} In other words, has man become a machine, and has the machine become a man?

3.5. Laruelle and the Super-machinic

Having reflected on Heidegger, Henry, Foucault and Deleuze, I now turn to Laruelle’s essay “Homo ex machina.” The main basis of comparison from Laruelle with the others is the relationship between bio-politics, power, technology, and humanity. It is important to recall from earlier that for Laruelle, philosophy is the superior form of biotechnology. Throughout his writings, Laruelle often refers to philosophy as a kind of machine and technology. I will reflect on the refrain in this essay and elsewhere as the machine-man coupling or circuit. The machine-man coupling appears from as early as Philosophie II up to Philosophie V. The coupling itself appears
as a self-critique of some of the formulations of the machinic promoted in Philosophie I, especially in *Le déclin de l’écriture*. The invention of machinic materialism, when it is opposed to dialectical materialism, demonstrates that it is both universal and partial, general and minoritarian at the same time, being “both the multiplicity of possible theorectico-libidinal positions and *one* position in this multiplicity.”

The machine-man coupling appears as early as *Le principe de minorité* in the published writings. There, Laruelle recognizes that the object of criticism, the hyletic continuum, or in *Biography* the unitary illusion, sustains the fundamental theses of Nietzscheanism that Laruelle sought to break from. These would be the continuous multiplicities, as opposed to the unary multiplicities or parts independent and prior to the whole, that make up the ultimate avatar of “Machine-Man” in the sense of La Mettrie. According to Laruelle:

> Perhaps one will have recognized within the constitution of this Hyletic Continuum what is essential to the Nietzschean position. It carries to its perfection the logico-transcendental and synthetic tendency contained within Kantianism. Nietzsche’s three or four fundamental theses (the identity of the force and the differential *relation*; the identity of the force and the subject of the force; the identity of the force and its effects, etc.) grounds an absolute hyletics that remains the hyletic form of absolute idealism. It is on this line [or bloodline – JRS] that we find the ultimate avatar of Machine-Man, an obviously non-mechanistic avatar, the avatar of the generalized industrial machine and the man-cog (in a non-metaphorical sense), the avatar of ‘desiring-machines’, the ‘machinic’ as the synthesis of hyletic syntheses, re-affirmation of the affirmation of relations of force, etc., as continuous minorities.

Such a stance informs Laruelle’s theory of technē: “*technē* is not the technical object, it is the power-*and*-powerlessness of the *and*, the association and the articulation of the diffèrant-differing of contraries, the auto-affective technics of the *and*, *co-* and the *simul* – the superior form of technics.”

In *Philosophy and Non-Philosophy*, Laruelle refers to the philosophical decision as a

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87 *DdE*, 14.
88 *PdM*, 87: “The Hyletic Continuum, or the reduction that produces it, is the infinite identity, to a near difference, of contraries, in particular becoming and Being.”
89 *PdM*, 79.
90 Ibid, 169.
machine “that ‘runs’ to the infinite or the unlimited,”91 and refers to it elsewhere, in his debate with Luc Ferry, as akin to that of a car: “philosophy is a machine that functions and needs to function interminably…in the sense where a car runs on gas.”92 And the machine-man couple also appears in Éthique de l’Étranger, when Laruelle introduces the formulation of the force (of) the law [force (de) loi], an organon that strives to radically transform the downfall of existing forms of ethics that determine goals, values and ends that are incompatible with humanity.93 The essay “Homo ex machina” unites the themes discussed by the thinkers mentioned above: the technological instrumentalization of nature and life, biopower, and control societies. The recently published manuscript, Le nouvel esprit technologique (NET), includes material that arguably can be placed in the period between Philosophie I and Philosophie II. One can posit that such an argument appears in the final chapter of the book, “De l’éthique en milieu technologique intense,” which includes two separate essays, “Homo ex machina” and “Etho-techno-logie.”94

The major thesis of Le nouvel esprit technologique is to renew the understanding of the essence of science that has hitherto been embedded and inseparable from technological reason and its relationship with philosophy. Four theses direct the work and allow for an overarching approach to the NET: “1) The NET is not confounded with the technological side of phenomena alone; 2) The relationship between the technological and science is that there is something fundamental or specific within the phenomenon of the NET; 3) We must renounce the theoretical facilities of the false concept ‘techno-science’; and 4) Technological Idealism is developed on the grounds of a non-elaboration of scientific thought.”95 To Laruelle, however, technics carries distinct meanings

91 P&NP, 36.
92 LD9, 60.
93 EdE, 335-336.
94 The latter essay has been translated by Alyosha Edlebi as “Etho-techno-logy: Of Ethics in an Intense Technological Milieu,” in Qui Parle 21, no.2 (Spring/Summer 2013), 157-167. For the purposes of this section, I will be referring to NET with my own translations.
95 NET, 9-11.
and uses that together manifest “a certain tendency that completes one another and saturating them…[by] designating the action of a subject, then this activity and also its auxiliary means, then all of this and also its goal, etc.” However, this tendency abides the law of a vicious circle between the four causes (efficient, final, material, and formal) of Western metaphysics and the technē itself, an amphibology that arises between technē and logos. According to Laruelle, it is “impossible to define the ‘Technical’ otherwise than through a looping procedure that is the first yet barely manifest appearance of the correlation of technē and logos.” One may now turn to the notion of technology, which I follow from Laruelle’s definition in NET as “this supplement of the logos – knowledge, science or philosophy, it is impossible to distinguish or nuance it at the moment – which manifests the implicit or repressed logos which would assume the Technical [le Technique] in any way, and which is here drawn from its forgetting and staged by the Technical at the same time that Technology stages the Technical.” Further, technology is distinguished by five distinct approaches, each corresponding to a metaphysical causality that nevertheless imbricates how one understands the technical, technics, and technology in relation to science and philosophy:

1) Rhetoric: the production of a discourse, its rhetorical and grammatical regime, its artificial nature (acuity, caution, cheating, the necessary ruses for art); hence the specific circles (discourse on the art-of-discourse, but also the artificial discourse and finally the false science of words); and a dominant interpretation of technological in terms of formal causality;

2) An explanation and inventory of terms of an art; a nomenclature and technical terminology proper to a domain (up to the end of the 19th century). It still remains of the order of discourse without reaching science; but it assures a triple passage: from the arts of speech towards all of the arts; from the rhetorical artifice to “technical” arts; from one art (the discourse) to arts (the technical arts, necessarily plural). Hence, a dominant interpretation of the technological in terms of formal causality;

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96 Ibid, 14.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
3) A theory of nature and the division of the arts and sciences (since 1600...). It confirms its plural and encyclopedic, but it is still hardly a science;

4) A scientific description of the divisions of knowledge and the sciences. More than a discourse, this is henceforth a discipline that wants to be scientific, and has science and above all the trades as an object: it is a descriptive, comparatist and functional discipline (Johann Beckmann, 1777) or even an experimental and quasi-physical discipline (Christian Wolff, 1728). It announces the future study of the specific operations of labour and industry but remains within the bounds of a dominant interpretation of the Technological in terms of material causality (science of the transformation of materials and “natural products”) and efficient causality (science of the production of objects);

5) The application or the investment of the sciences in the arts, the trades and, more generally, in activities and processes. This narrow and strong sense, proper to the Anglo-Saxon world, makes more clearly manifest the techno-logical circle and at any rate justifies what this word speaks of as much the technical things themselves as their scientific description.99

Through this, an undivided correlation of technē and logos, known as Techno-logical Difference, arises, which realizes or implements a telos proper to the history of one philosophy: Western thought. One of the three major identifications of the NET as a whole constitutes the auto-encompassing nature of Western thought as a discourse, an object, and a discourse of the object.100

It is this auto-encompassing nature that one Philosophical Decision reigns triumphant in elaborating the inseparability of techne and logos: Laruelle cites the topological definition of the machine provided by Deleuze in his dialogues with Claire Parnet. Laruelle considers this definition as “the most complete, the most accomplished that ‘Western metaphysics’ can give of technology – and that it can give of itself consequently (the auto-interpretation of technology as ‘absolute technology’).101 The topological definition of the machine serves as Laruelle’s point of departure towards his Critique of Technological Reason: man is inalienable in the machine or technics, man is not a piece of the machine, and above all, man is not in the machine. It is this theoretical approach

99 Ibid, 15-16.
100 Ibid, 54.
101 Ibid, 59.
that Laruelle strives to extend his critique to the automato-logical images of man, not only as the point of departure for Laruelle’s critique present in \textit{NET} but principally the guiding framework and constant throughout his entire corpus.

Despite the focus on “Homo ex machina,” I argue that the latter essay, “Etho-techno-logie,” is more indicative of a break. Laruelle closes the essay with what resembles the opening problematic of \textit{Le principe de minorité}. He writes the following:

To what conditions, which would neither be illusory nor regressive, is it immediately possible to break Ethico-Ethological Difference? Firstly, it appears as unavoidable, as encompassing, and precisely as inhibitive of any decision beyond or below ethology, as Ontico-Ontological Difference where, here and there, it claims to make a bond and mesh with us. However, the task is clearly defined: it is useless and presumptuous to seek in the Greco-Western ethical grounds any such solution. Everything is already there – with the philosophical decision itself – as consummated and gone. If ethics, namely the possibility of an emancipatory decision of the individual, a decision that would be their own, is possible, it won’t be findable in the field of Ethico-Ontological Difference, namely in the idea of a correlation of the individual \textit{and} the rule and within the reciprocal subjugation of the two. However, how do we break the anthropologico-ethical, ethico-ethological mixture? How do we liberate the individual from the Law and make the Law a sphere of exercise which will no longer be the enslavement of man? Is a form of thought possible (and does the word “possible” still make sense here?) which no longer proceeds through mixture and, among others, through difference, synthesis and correlation? Is a thought possible that would be capable of thinking the individual through their essence alone and this essence before any universal or any law? Is it possible to think the essence of the individual before any correlation with a rule, a city, a nature, a state, and a technology? And if this thought did exist, \textit{unseen by principle of Greco-Western metaphysics, undoubtedly too immediate to be perceived by it}…will the remainderless destruction of the primacy and auto-position of Ethico-Ethological Difference not be the condition for a liberation of ethics itself that finally escapes from its becoming-ethological? This is decidedly another history and undoubtedly something other than a history still…\cite{102 NET, 192-193}

This problematic line of questioning is no different from some of the questions that open \textit{Le principe de minorité}. As this essay closes \textit{NET}, these essays in this book are decidedly part of the break from the principle of philosophical sufficiency, the idea that everything is philosophizable. This break is significant for two reasons. On the one hand, it allows the reader and those interested...
in Laruelle’s theoretical development of non-philosophy to find a basis for a conjunctural description of why one must break from philosophical sufficiency. On the other hand, focusing solely on the essay “Homo ex machina,” I am interested in investigating what may be known as the tradition or traditions of the Man-Machine circuit that constitutes a change of terrain for philosophy and the theory of history, which is important for this dissertation. Not only is there one tradition of this Man-Machine circuit, but for Laruelle, there are two, perhaps three: “they arise as soon as philosophy, which is customary of doing so, breaks away from objects of knowledge and the history of ideas, and substitute another breakaway, the breakaway of the *epochs of power* or the *techno-political modes of production of man*.”¹⁰³ For Laruelle, this second and third tradition of Man-Machine must be explored and understood. This third tradition constitutes a significant point of departure for any thought toward human emancipation.

The first tradition, Laruelle notes, starts with Descartes by constituting a combination of a physical and technical composition of man (anatomy and physical-medical descriptions as well) with the metaphysical, creationist model: “man as the creature of the technician and man as the automaton of God.”¹⁰⁴ The second tradition arises with Nietzsche and his *The Genealogy of Morals*, finding its bloodlines traced back to the origins of the *polis* and the horizons of the relations of power. The third finally comes about as a strictly “Nietzschean” perspective, which is machinic rather than mechanical, including active and reactive domestication, breeding [*dressage*], and discipline. The machinic basis, the latter, is to be explained by the means of what Laruelle calls elsewhere the Greco-unitary conjuncture in works such as *A Biography of Ordinary Man*. The first and second are not in opposition, for they both maintain a techno-political basis and effects of knowledge. Still, the distinction arises on their physical metaphysical knowledges of

¹⁰³ Ibid, 155.
¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 155-156.
man and the second’s deeper genealogical approach in the “human sciences.” A broader, true
distinction between the Cartesian man and Nietzsche’s man is to be discovered internally to the
arrangements of these techno-political bases and their effects on knowledge:

It is not that one would be traced from the simple machines of the time and the other finally
given their humanity. The first was full of the humanity that the time was capable of
conceiving and the second was full of the inhumanity that the new clinic, psychiatry, and
psychology have communicated with it – social machines which carry on power otherwise
than physical and technical machines, but not less effectively. Nor is it that the first is
related to mechanisms as to a metaphor while the second would really interiorize the
seizures of social power. There is nothing less metaphorical than the metaphor, one such
relation does not stop the flow of power or could only suspend it to revive it better. The
only criteria are internal to powers themselves, internal to the modality of their
arrangements.\textsuperscript{105}

Here, Laruelle introduces the term \textit{macropolitics} of power. It includes micropolitics, which is but
one mode of determined production immanent to macropolitics, and it is onto-theo-politics par
excellence insofar as it “combines the creative and annihilating power of the sovereign with the
technical power of the constructor of automata and forms with both a unique flow of power.”\textsuperscript{106}

Macropolitics includes struggle and debt as an infinite process that measures this techno-political
mode of production. However, it is this power of the \textit{and} Nietzsche mocked in \textit{The Gay Science}\textsuperscript{107}
that becomes the unique, singular chain\textsuperscript{108} of Man \textit{and} Machine, constituting the third tradition of
Man-Machine. As distinct from Descartes and Nietzsche and their respective Man-Machine
traditions, Laruelle argues that the Nietzschean qua machinic tradition includes but distinguishes

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid, 157.
  \item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid, 158.
of man as a ‘world-negating’ principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the
end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting—the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come
home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of ‘man and world’, separated
by the sublime presumption of the little word ‘and’.”
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 97: “That the great moments in the struggles of individuals form links in
one single chain; that they combine to form a mountain range of humankind through the millennia; that for me the
highest point of such a long-since-past moment is still alive, bright, and great—this is the fundamental thought in the
belief in humanity that expresses itself in the demand for a \textit{monumental} history.”
\end{itemize}
itself from these two traditions by highlighting how “the machine is no longer only one side of the relation, it is first within the and itself, within the correlation of terms.”\textsuperscript{109} As macropolitical, this third epoch of the techno-political mode of production of Man-Machine constitutes a broader consequence that makes of the economic, the legal, the scientific, the penal, and political, all parts or cogs in a super-machine that are combined altogether through articulations of breaks and continuities that synthesize life and the machine itself. However, this last epoch does not destroy man or the agent as much as their separation from machines, and there arises a becoming-machine of man and a becoming-man of the machine. Invoking Chaplin’s film Modern Times, Laruelle says we must remake this modern film for the times to come: “a wheel functions like the Tramp’s arm, an arm functions like a cog alternatively. The Tramp only emerges from the machine full of parts and cogs, starting as an immigrant and post-industrial nomad and becomes a man of the human and industrial sciences, emerging from the process in the state of Cartesian mechanics.”\textsuperscript{110}

From there, Laruelle introduces what he calls bio-political parallelism. Laruelle’s bio-political parallelism is the coinciding and inseparability of life and power, not the power over life. In contrast to affirmative biopolitics, according to the works of Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Roberto Esposito, which may be summarizable as the reclamation of life-affirming biopolitics from its life-negating power in the forms of fascism or totalitarianism,\textsuperscript{111} one must understand biopolitical parallelism not solely as the coinciding and inseparability, but equally as the synthesis of life and power, which affirmative biopolitics itself cannot escape. It should be clear that Laruelle

\textsuperscript{109} NET, 159. In an essay by Mark Halsey, “Ecology and Machinic Thought,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 10, no.3 (2005), 33-55, the Nietzschean qua machinic is understood as “view[ing] the world in terms of an incessant mutability or flux” (34), and it is with Nietzsche that the ontological divide between subject and object is dissolved, with both being involved in a process or flow rather than a static unity. For Laruelle, the connective and as a correlation between man and machine is the identification of the machinic process.

\textsuperscript{110} NET, 161.

does not favour bio-political parallelism, as will be apparent in the following pages. To Laruelle, a theory of the distinct epochs of power that have overlapped with the Man-Machine circuit allows for a description and an evaluation of the bio-politics of the future, arguably the conjuncture that we currently inhabit as the supermachinic intensification of the World. For Laruelle, this overlapping between Man-Machine and bio-political parallelism has coincided with distinct formulations both in the history of thought and in power:

There is a classical bio-technē that remains a bio-logos even in the very exclusion of a strictly ‘biological’ perspective in the contemporary sense over the body; a micropolitical bio-technē that serves as a perspective – not for a method, of course, but as the political arrangement, the machine of power coordinating and organizing them at its level – for the methods, theories, and the experimental labour of cellular biology for example. And, finally, a bio-politics that is not only the historical a priori of the great syntheses that arouse, overlap, and blend each other according to varying proportions (experimentation on living matter, the theory of information and the computerized [informatique] reduction of the living and power over the living) but a new formation that includes the critique of the current political investments of biology…to better steal their “supermachinic” element and bring about their completion and perfection.112

In mind, Laruelle takes the above theory of the universal cog (the becoming-machine of man, the becoming-man of the machine) as the schema of the super-machinic, the third Nietzschean era of Man-Machine still to-come, but it is, above all, a mode of a more general synthesis between matter and the Idea.113 The very continuum of power in bio-political parallelism is constituted by its ‘contrary’ in life, however simultaneous or identical and parallel it is with power. To Laruelle, this parallelism between life and power shows that life is as much a hyletic flow in which power is but a mode of or break [coupure] as power is a hyletic flow wherein life is a break that “before being power over living bodies power continuously secretes or produces simultaneously biological and

112 Ibid, 163.
113 This is a criticism shared by Gilbert Simondon regarding the hylomorphic schema introduced in Ancient philosophy which is identified implicit, adequate coupling of matter and form. See *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 184.
political bodies, inscribing life and its effects in the effects of power: bodies are not neutral or indifferent substrata upon which ‘layered’ institutional forms of domination and qualities are erected but life is a means for power and reciprocally." The bio-politics of the future, or the super-machinic, is a unique continuum where a reciprocal and alternating vicious circle erects a power play between life and power that is more reproductive than productive. Laruelle strives to institute a stance that resembles “non-Euclidean geometry,” which may help confirm this parallelism between life and power to de-vivify [dé-vivialiser] life and power, to de-vitalize politics and de-politicize life, but in no way to de-potentialize both life and power.

The super-machinic carries on the various relations of power that arise in the distinct epochs of techno-politics and the overlapping with the Man-Machine circuit co-extensive with these epochs. However, the bio-politics of the future, where power and life are parallel with one another, institutes a pure becoming that is “an infinite becoming bio-political of organisms and institutions that together arrange themselves towards a new constellation on condition to lose their ancient forms.” This infinite becoming points to the indiscernible parallelism of power and life. To Laruelle, it is “a becoming that does not start from a given figure of power or particular biological properties, nor does it end somewhere in the recognition of ‘results’ or ultimate facts.”

According to varying Greco-dominant philosophies, life is the name for Being or the essence, wherein life is definable as simultaneously the flow or self-constituted continuous becoming and a break from the flow. Laruelle cites various thinkers, such as Plotinus, Hegel, Nietzsche, Bergson and Husserl, and their respective ways of constituting life: the One’s emanation and a static moment of the One; the becoming of contraries and one of these contraries; the will to power and one of its modes; the élan vital and the organism; the flow of transcendental consciousness and a

114 NET, 164.
115 Ibid, 165-166.
psycho-natural determination. In each approach, life is simultaneous with itself in the sense of Being and a mode or part that is empirical or the ontic being. Because biology is determinable regarding this constitutive amphiboly between Being and being, the flow and the part of the flow, the bio-political continuum is the consistent investment and disinvestment from the analysis of the living. Biology is only exacerbated with the super-machinic, for the theory of the universal cog that Laruelle explores seeks to describe it as a blending of the grasp over life that contains nearly the whole history of philosophy: “the ‘germ’, the mechanisms, the stimulus and the reflex arc, Gestalt, the ‘system’, information, encoding, structure, and the complements of the innate and the acquired…[blending] in various but always vicious proportions biological information and the techno-political project.”116 It is in this schema of the bio-politics of the future, the super-machinic, that everything constitutive of heterogeneity, materiality, continuity, and becoming are blended, so much so that Man-and-Machine are inseparable and ideologies, such as leftism and fascism, become inscribed in this process due to one of constitutive unity of contraries (the innate and the acquired) becoming indiscernible. The super-machinic is and has become a transcendental episteme that Laruelle thought was a bio-technē still to be born. The super-machinic selects philosophemes throughout the history of philosophy (from the above-listed thinkers but, equally, those associated with the Man-Machine circuitry for whom Laruelle cites such as Plato, the Stoics, Descartes, Leibniz, and La Mettrie) and, as well, select and weds the techniques, experiments and results of biology within an immediate relation with the continuum. Biology and the biological field of experimentation over life is not closed but provisionally so employing a biological pertinence solely grounded by the infinite bio-political becoming, a whole blended appearance of onto-theo-biology, constituting its implementation of justice, law, and culture. The super-

machinic, to Laruelle, couples life-as-power and power-as-living, reconciled under a form of bio-engineering that corresponds to the super-machinic, assuring this simultaneity as the a priori constitutive “of an omnipotent, intensive vitality that is more and more rigorously subjugating itself, and a continuous and ramified power like life.”\textsuperscript{117} It constitutes the fourth reign of life to Laruelle, not reducible to ecological and biological reigns of life between the vegetal, the animal, the crystalline, nor even something out of science fiction: it benefits from the selected aspects from the vegetal, the animal and the human, and the crystalline, towards the self-domination of humanity over itself, becoming “the superior form of racism against everyday lesser racism, and not only racism as superior life…”\textsuperscript{118}

To Laruelle, there are two ‘bloodlines’ [lignées] that define and divide the concept of experimentation under the bio-political continuum: either experimentation in the everyday sense as something with guidelines for theoretical, technical, and ethical use or experimentation that has become the rule over life as an object, no longer obeying any criteria, be it moral or scientific except its own. The latter forms the bio-politics to come, one in which transvaluates the existing ordinary practices of experimentation but, equally, transvaluates the fascistic forms of experimentation, for they also conserve claims to scientific and moral criteria. It is this bio-politics that is known as universal bio-politics, a pure bio-political genius [génie] that humanity exercises upon itself through bio-engineering: “the bio-politics of the future does not know, at least for itself, an instance of reality of the living body, a principle of the scientific and ethical reality of life, but it immanently plans within the continuous thread of its experimental drives its implantation within the intimacy of life.”\textsuperscript{119} Here, what is constitutive of experimentation over life, or even the life of

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, 170. \\
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid, 170-171. \\
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 172.
\end{flushright}
man, under super-industrial conditions stops being something of an ideological, that is, philosophically imbued, accident of biology but rather the essence of man under these conditions. Man carrying out their experimentations upon themselves was something Nietzsche himself, for whom Laruelle cites later on in this piece, saw as desirable: “We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs.” Man is the bio-political genius or daimon who is both subject and object to this experimentation. However, doing so confuses man within and bound to the relations of power, integrating them as a super-anthropological continuum with its own rule upon itself.

If all economic, political, and biological, etc., conditions of existence can serve as means, the point is not to reproduce any type of existing human, but the only type of human capable of supporting and connecting within a new regularity all the variations or divisions that affect the Relations of Power where they are woven, integrating, and relativizing them within a ‘super-anthropological’ continuum. In relation to the deviations of its fascistic forms, pure bio-politics is a deviancy so generalized that it reconstitutes its deviancy into the immanent rule.

It becomes impossible to distinguish with regards to reproducing this type of human that can support and connect these Relations of Power with any type of human that carries out its experimentation upon themselves, forcing life to become a political and legal problem that is one with machinic couplings and techno-politics. This super-machinic paradigm’s techno-legal or biocratic regime creates the last figure of the Man-Machine circuit, the “human” type par excellence, one that “aggregates all possible subjectivity of history.” The emerging super-machinic subjectivity may abandon or transvaluate its past, fascistic, aristocratic, psychological and sociological narcissisms. Still, it is the superior I that enchains the becoming-man of the machine and the becoming-machine of man to the State, all one single chain universally bound by

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121 *NET*, 173.
122 Ibid, 175.
a cog entangled in these relations. From there, a programme of the bio-politics of the future is visible. The programme itself fundamentally supplants capitalism by destroying the weakest forms of state and society and seeking to become the superior form of all that is. The universal cog sets itself up as that which forms a new, superior chain that chains itself and all the others towards that of a universal subjugation – the universal as subjugation. It is, to Laruelle, a “bio-engineering of a new style, responsible with destroying the median and fascistic forms of racism, its ‘racial’, ‘national’, and ‘imperialist’ forms, but one that only empties the sewers of history better to create the superior ‘race’ of men-machine couplings.”

It is in this way that even in dissolving the old forms in which inferiority maintains its domination, there will remain something that is beyond that aggregates all under a superior biocracy, one in which “men,” the only ones who are capable of supporting and connecting themselves to the Relations of Power and selecting and experimenting on themselves, “receive their absolute existence through and for the State-machine, a reciprocal fusion or incorporation that would be in a form that Hegel himself would not have dared to dream.”

The bio-politics of the future, the super-machinic conjuncture, is the ultimate epoch of power, according to Laruelle. It can hardly reflect the future since it maintains a resemblance and relationship with the inhumanity of the past. It is the epoch of becoming as such, where the destiny to “become what one is” is shaped through and for the biocracy that is as much a biodicy as an onto-theo-politico-dicy. To Laruelle, it is a Cratesis Universalis: “a dissolution of all the median forms of power, among others fascism and racism, but one that reconstitutes with this dissolution the superior form of universal mastery…[an] epoch contains the virtualities of a bio-political genius who will abandon their current, techno-economic and capitalist forms to become a genuine

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123 Ibid, 177.
124 Ibid.
engineering of domination that will finally find its power and rule within itself.” Said otherwise, the law upon which this super-machinic continuum exercises upon itself, which is equally super-human and inhuman, is one in which the continuum subjugates itself as some form of universal mastery as a new vicious circle that seemingly is impossible to break from without reinstituting another break from within this continuum. Then, how can it break from this continuity without establishing a break as another weapon for this universal subjugation and domination? Laruelle suggests here that the superior racism of all that is can only be perceived and justified from a “perspective” that makes up or defines an essence that is otherwise than this intra-historical continuum, the techno-bio-political super-machinic, and the superior form of man in this greater subjugation: minorities. These minorities “will no longer be defined as the object of a bio-technê or the ingenuity – the addressedness [habilité] (Schicksal) – of Being, could finally surmount the bio-political parallelism and subtract life, its liveliness and viviality, from this naturalist and political mixture of life and power called vitality, the perhaps unusable heart of racism.” In detail, what this last sentence states is precisely the desire for minorities, here and elsewhere, defined no longer by the blends they form with the State and the universal authorities (Language, Power, Sexuality, History, and the World), to carry out a real critique of these bio-politics of the future to free themselves from this bio-political parallelism through the subtraction of life from the mixture of life and power. This subtraction will later be known as uni-lateralization, demonstrated powerfully in A Biography of Ordinary Man. In contrast to being entirely against technology in a

125 Ibid, 178.
126 Ibid, 178-179. For the translation of habilité and Schicksal, I have resorted to Jacques Derrida’s Psyche: Inventions of the Other vol. 1, “My chances,” ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth G. Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 366, where Derrida writes: “Along the way, two values of destination superimpose themselves upon each other, that of the address or place of destination and that of destiny (Schicksal), the dimension and direction of that which is dispatched, sent, geschickt. (One of the meanings of adresse in French — skillfulness [habilité] — also translates the word Geschick.)” Here, I take Laruelle’s use of Schicksal to be less about skillfulness as Derrida implies but, rather, something akin to addressedness in Geschick like that of a calling or vocation that is implanted upon oneself as a destiny.
humanist outlook, something that Heidegger nevertheless falls victim to in “The Question Concerning Technology,” the point is to establish a unilateral and irreversible border between ordinary man and technology.

What Laruelle describes in this essay is precisely how to envision his major problematic: what is to be done to emancipate humans from philosophical sufficiency? In the earliest decades of the 21st century, the super-machinic is the reality, the rule, and the power that governs within itself the very tendencies to couple life and power, to make them parallel each other, to break and constitute a continuum of each other. Still, the very power humanity exercises itself as co-constituted by philosophy as the capital-form of thought and its own superior form of racism. If Deleuze notes that “we need both creativity and a people,”127 what is this creativity and what kind of people? The next chapter will envision what I call non-politics, the en-demic paradigm, futural democracy, sous-vereignty, and the generic will in their relationship to democracy and the critique of crato-logical parallelism.

127 Deleuze, “Control and Becoming,” in Negotiations, 176.
Chapter 4 - Radical Democracy Within the Bounds of the People Alone: From Human Philosophy to Human Emancipation

“As Determination in the last instance, the People do not have ‘to do philosophy’. They must determine it, to be its real condition (of possibility) but in the last instance alone….”

4.0. Introduction: The Transfiguration of Non-Philosophy

Throughout this dissertation, I have set forth on a path toward radically deconstructing the relationship between philosophy and humanity. I started with the insight that philosophy is incompatible with humanity, signalled by the fact that when it claims to know humanity, philosophers do not know it as it is but rather as they would like it to be, to paraphrase Spinoza. In the first chapter, I explored varying approaches to the relationship philosophy has with its goals directed toward humanity. I drew upon thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, and Louis Althusser, all of whom have dealt with how philosophy appears as guiding humanity towards infinite tasks, striving to emancipate humanity from the laws of capital and abstract labour, and representing the class struggle in theoretical formations respectively. In the second chapter, I analyzed the work of François Laruelle, who offers a parallel approach to these thinkers by envisioning non-philosophy’s role as human philosophy or non-humanism. This chapter further demonstrates Laruelle’s steadfast conviction that man is not made for philosophy, but philosophy is made for man. In the third chapter, I also placed Laruelle in conversation with Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze to interrogate the fabrication of humanity through technological, political, and philosophical means. The chapter concluded with the prospect

1 *PPP4*, 84.
of how minorities – ordinary people who are not homines ex machina – determine Authorities in the last instance alone via the logic of uni-lateralization.

In this final chapter, I bring attention to the logic of uni-lateralization to relay it back to another outlook that has been implicit from the start: the radical independence of generic humanity without philosophical sufficiency, including the sufficiency of non-philosophy as human philosophy. The following questions will form the problematic of this chapter: What is a non-philosophical theory of human sovereignty without philosophical sufficiency? How is a critique of power that would not be of power (i.e., continuous with power) possible? How does one transform – or rather, transfigure – non-philosophy as human philosophy into – if not a tool of, at least – human emancipation itself? I argue this seen in the outlook of what Laruelle conceives as the “Democracy of Strangers”: as a zero-degree (of) power, this democracy concerns the People (of) the One who have primacy-without-priority over thought and its entanglement with power. Therefore, this chapter does not introduce a political critique of reason or a critique of political reason – as will be argued, both lead to a pleonasm – but rather the introduction of democracy as en-demic or un-power, the real critique of onto-theo-politics, polito-logical, or crato-logical parallelism. Moreover, while drawing upon Laruelle’s earliest writings on politics and his engagement with democracy as such, my intention is not to provide solely exegeses and interpretations. Of utmost importance is to enact analogously what Michel Henry decried of the Marxologists of his day with scholarly expositions and regimes in the face of human deprivation³ towards the Laruelleans (or, better yet, Larualiens): tearing non-philosophy from the philosopher and giving it to the one who does not ask for it, ordinary man.⁴

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⁴ BoOM, 162.
In this chapter, I provide the basis for what may be considered a transcendental science of power. By transcendental science (or *mathesis transcendentalis*) of power, I mean a theory that is an adequate reflection (of) the real qua One, determined in the last instance by it, that is the measure of itself and the categories of power by way of onto-theo-politics, polito-logical difference, and/or crato-logical parallelism. It may be better to identify this transcendental science as a unified theory of philosophy and politics, but the framework which this science “that relates itself to knowledges of objects rather than to objects themselves” requires elucidation. I introduce alongside this transcendental science the terms that assist in its development: non-politics as first politics, the endemic paradigm, futural democracy, *sous*-vereignty, and generic will.

These terms are cloned and dualyzed from thinkers who are contemporaries of Laruelle, such as Jacques Rancière on the genealogy of archipolitics to metapolitics, Alain Badiou on the democratic emblem and democratic materialism, and Jacques Derrida and democracy to come. Nevertheless, I also attempt to mutate Laruelle’s earliest writings from Philosophie I in its political materialist formation to transfigure non-philosophy as human philosophy into a tool for human emancipation. Although it may occupy and displace the positions of historical materialism and the dialectic that informs it, political materialism’s machinic framework suffers from the same congenital defect of the former: “the belief that a particular philosophy…was adapted to the liberation of man,” in this case, rebellion and revolution under the guise of Nietzsche against Mastery and Fascism. Therefore, the transcendental science of power provides the real phenomenal content of political materialism when stripped of its machinic functioning. Moreover, as will be demonstrated, the generic will is how thought(-)power can find further fortification as the organon of non-philosophy. Suppose non-philosophy draws its resource from Rousseau’s

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5 *PoNP*, 70.

6 *ItNM*, 14.
general will. In that case, a genuinely transcendental science of power must rigorously invent the conditions to “force” people to be free from philosophical sufficiency.

4.1. From Metapolitics to Non-Politics as First Politics

We begin by analyzing the relationship between politics and philosophy through cratological parallelism. Jacques Rancière is one thinker who has investigated such a relationship involved in “political philosophy,” that is, “the name of an encounter – and a polemical encounter at that – in which the paradox or scandal of politics exposes itself: its lack of any proper foundation.”

Politics is to be understood, according to Rancière, as the encounter between the police and equality and their respective logics. Whereas the logic of equality evokes an isonomic distribution of being-together of equal subjects in the face of the law (“you must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey it…you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you”), the logic of police is the embodiment and personification of the law, the governing logic of the space of appearance, to use Arendt’s phrase. Police logic is irreducible to the state apparatus or policing in the sense of disciplining (such as in Foucault). Still, it is rather the logic that governs the appearance of disciplinariness, “a configuration of occupations and the properties of the spaces where these occupations are distributed.”

In the encounter between equality and the police, politics and political activity is rendered as that which

is always a mode of expression that undoes the perceivable divisions of the police order by implementing a basically heterogeneous assumption, that of a part of those who have no part, an assumption that, at the end of the day, itself demonstrates the sheer contingency of the order, the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.

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8 Ibid, 16.
9 Ibid, 29.
10 Ibid, 30.
Said otherwise, politics is the very site at which the heterogeneous logics of police and equality confront the autonomy and heteronomy of their relations, especially if one must be considered the equal of the person ordering them. We may be able to couple Rancière’s insight into politics and democracy with what Laruelle calls ego-xeno-logical difference, whereby the relations between oneself and another (even the Other) are determinable by the philosophical authority of the superior man: the philosopher-king par excellence. However, that is not what I will discuss in this instance. Instead, I seek to provide the basis for what we may call a non-politics or first politics in distinction from the archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics that Rancière outlines. I start with Rancière’s division between the two to provide the uni-lateral politics that de-rives from the People (of) the One.

To begin, Rancière analyzes the differentiation between the politics in truth and politics in and of people, political philosophy and democracy, wherein the former attempts to eliminate the difference and eliminate politics. It is as if substituting politics with philosophy is the superior form of politics. As Rancière notes, “the basis of the politics of the philosophers is the identity of the principle of politics as an activity with that of the police.” According to Rancière, Plato divides the concept of politics into two: politeia and politeiai. Not only is it a division between democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny, but it is also the division between the inner community united towards the Good (politeia) and the outer, multiple discordant groups (politeiai). The politeia or Republic of philosophers, according to Rancière, is “the exact identity of politics and the police.” By identifying politics with the police, political philosophy offers a solution to eliminating politics from the part of those who have no part, the demos, who have a “poor” image of mixed combinations or an inferior imitation of its sole superiority in the image of the true. There are three

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11 Ibid, 63.  
12 Ibid, 64.
figures of political philosophy that Rancière identifies in this tradition: archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics. The figures that align with these movements are Plato, Aristotle, and Marx.

Archipolitics serves as a paradigm through the noble lie presented in the third book of *The Republic* of the three races and three metals of their blood. It is a means by which the hierarchy of head over stomach maintains itself, the philosopher-kings over the people-artisans who participate in the community “only on condition of not interfering in the affairs of the community in any way.” The *demos* cannot intervene in constructing the community towards ensuring its fortification over time, ensured by the *politeia*’s spirit of the law (the living *logos* of the *nomos*). In other words, the *demos*, as this radical exteriority of the multiple, became “freer” – less of who they are – by submitting to the philosopher’s moderation (*sôphrosunê*). One may summarize archipolitics as follows:

The order of the *politeia* thus presupposes the lack of any vacuum, saturation of the space and time of the community. The rule of law is also the disappearance of what is consubstantial to the law’s mode of being wherever politics exists: the exteriority of writing. The republic is that community in which the law (the *nomos*) exists as living logos: as the ethos (morality, ways of being, character) of the community and of each of its members; as the occupation of the workers; as the tune playing in everyone’s heads and the movements spontaneously animating their bodies; as the spiritual nourishment (*trophê*) that automatically turns their minds toward a certain cast (*tropos*) of behavior and thought. The republic is a system of tropisms. The politics of the philosophers does not begin, as the righteous would have us believe, with the law. It begins with the spirit of the law. The cosmos order Plato’s invention, which is just as much an archipolitics as an archipolicing. The substitution for republic over democracy, the inner community towards the good or just and its unification with certain sciences (such as mathematics) sought to harmonize all individuals to one end.

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13 Ibid, 66.
14 Ibid, 67.
From Plato’s archipolitics is derived Aristotle’s parapolitics. Suppose archipolitics ultimately eliminates the difference between the demos and the philosopher by ensuring the equality of all philosophers for its city of beauty. In that case, parapolitics seeks to reconcile two contradictory logics: the rule of the best and the greatest good of equality. Whereas with Plato the *demos* cannot effectively partake in any involvement in the inner community, Aristotle’s approach sought to include what was excluded by “transforming the actors and forms of action of the political conflict into the parts and forms of distribution of the policing apparatus.” The organization of parapolitics overlaps, rather than eliminates, what Plato saw as conflict, organized solely around the relationship between the offices (*arkhaï*) and the sovereign figure (*kurion*). Rancière notes that parapolitics is “this centering of political thought on the place and mode of allocation of the *arkhaï* by which a regime defines itself in exercising a certain *kurion*.“ While parapolitics is the response to the identification of politics with police logic in archipolitics, there arises a greater paradox about the one who dominates in governance and must retain authority over other parts of the whole. One resolves the paradox by inverting it:

> Since any government, through its own natural law, creates the sedition that will overthrow it, each government ought to go against its own law. Or rather, it ought to discover its true law, the law common to all governments: such a law urges it to keep going and to go against the grain in order to do so, using whatever means may ensure the safeguarding of all governments and with it, the city they govern.

To demonstrate the capacity of this true law, introducing the intermediate as the basis for which politics is to be made common amongst disparate classes is necessary. It is the ideal framework for apportioning equal basis amongst the poor and the rich in this neither/nor space. Parapolitics does not end at Aristotle, however, finding its apex in modern thinkers such as Hobbes and

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15 Ibid, 72.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, 73.
Rousseau. For Hobbes, this was the division between a people against a multitude under the king’s sovereignty. For Rousseau, it was the sovereignty of the people’s general will. A further transformation of the relationship between philosophy and politics was necessary, and metapolitics serves as the basis for recognizing what is inherent in this relationship still unspoken: “a radical surplus of injustice or inequality in relation to what politics puts forward as justice or equality.”

Rancière’s definition of metapolitics is radically opposed to political philosophy insofar as political philosophy is the basis by which philosophy unites with politics vis-à-vis archipolitics. Metapolitics argues therefore that the real essence or truth of politics is itself “beneath or behind” politics:

Metapolitics is the exercise of this particular truth, one no longer found facing democratic factuality as the good model confronting the fatal simulacrum, but as the secret of life and death, coiled at the very heart of any manifestation of politics. Metapolitics is the discourse on the falseness of politics that splits every political manifestation of dispute, in order to prove its ignorance of its own truth by marking, every time, the gap between names and things, the gap between enunciation of some logos of the people, of man or of the citizenry and the account that is made of this, the gap that reveals a fundamental injustice, itself identical with a constitutive lie.

Rancière finds metapolitics at work in Marx’s distinction between political and human emancipation in “On The Jewish Question,” a work that Rancière argues unifies Hobbes with Rousseau concerning the hidden “man” of civil society masked by political representation. It is also at work with the terms proletariat and class insofar as Marx “turns a political category into the concept of the untruth of politics.” Whereas archipolitics sought to identify politics with the police, metapolitics identifies politics as police, as a constitutive lie that is the truth of politics seen beyond (hence meta) the political. What Marx called ideology is the analyzed object of what Rancière calls metapolitics: because metapolitics analyzes the gap between the name and the thing,

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18 Ibid, 81.
19 Ibid, 82.
20 Ibid, 84.
ideology, too, is the name of this gap “between words and things, the conceptual connector that organizes the junctions and disjunctions between the components of the modern political apparatus.”21 Yet instead of eliminating the ideological wrong, metapolitics thrives off it, which is to say, “it is not to contradict appearances but, on the contrary, to confirm them.”22 Rancière understands that there are shortcomings to metapolitics as well. For instance, metapolitics “wedges the relationship it creates between appearance and reality over all forms of dispute of the people,”23 and, simultaneously, for this dispute to be made legible, metapolitics needed “to reconfigure the relationships between the visible and the visible…between ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying that operate on behalf of the workers and their words.”24 In a quasi-“Theses on Feuerbach” fashion, Rancière declares: “Metapolitics interpreted the forms of the democratic gap as symptoms of untruth. But it has not itself ceased being reinterpreted, offering matter and form for other ways of playing the gap and obliterating it.”25

Now, instead of an ultra-politics that would “attempt to depoliticize conflict by way of bringing it to an extreme via the direct militarization of politics,”26 non-politics is another name for first politics that just as much de-philosophizes politics as de-politicizes philosophy, or rather their union in crato-logical parallelism. Non-Politics is not a supplementary politics to the existing forms of politics referred to above. Rather, it is a politics uni-lateralized in an order that ensues from the last instance of the People (of) the One. Laruelle has not crafted a non-politics as first politics, only a non-philosophy as first science27 breaking from epistemo-logical difference and a

21 Ibid, 85.
22 Ibid, 88.
23 Ibid, 90.
24 Ibid.
27 Cf. Tol and PoNP.
non-ethics as first ethics\textsuperscript{28} breaking from etho-techno-logical difference. He has also only identified man’s “non-political” given as Stranger.\textsuperscript{29} Nevertheless, it is up to us to provide the basis and articulation for what a non-politics, rather than the non-political, entails. In the work of Lee Chien-Chang, for instance, a great deal of attention is given to the non-political in Laruelle’s relationship to thinkers such as Rousseau, Nietzsche, Freud, and Lacan. Still, the major problem is neither a “non-political” conception of democracy nor a plural non-politics.\textsuperscript{30} It is rather the elucidation of a non-politics proper in the singular.

If, for Rancière, the fundamental denegation of politics of the people is in the relationship between politics and philosophy or the philosopher, then the task of non-politics is to unify political power and philosophical wisdom in-the-last-instance alone, that is, in the People (of) the One. Is this a return to archipolitics or an inversion of it? In the fifth book of \textit{The Republic}, Socrates declares that unless philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers – unless political power and philosophical wisdom unite – the troubles will remain for society and humanity.\textsuperscript{31} Non-Politics is not the return to this archipolitics that does nothing but linger in all forms of politics. Nor is it a return to a parapolitics that seeks the union of both the best and the equal, nor, lastly, of a post-metapolitics that seeks to discern this hidden reality of man masked by political representations. It restores the power of people who precede the difference between people and the sovereign or superior man par excellence in the form of the philosopher. By unifying political power and philosophical wisdom in-the-last-instance, non-politics offers the dualysis of power that is determined by the People (of) the One.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{28} Cf. \textit{EdE}.
\bibitem{29} \textit{TdE}, 132.
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Why is non-politics also a “first” politics? What Laruelle provides us is a transcendental ordinality that ensues from the last instance as prior to the priority, but a last instance that has primacy-without-priority. First” is both the sense of an ordinal and the axiomatic derived on the order of the One as that which precedes well before the order. Therefore, first is to be understood as a priority-without-primacy. Laruelle says “first science” is unlike “first philosophy.” In the latter, “priority is also a primacy, hierarchy or domination, as such susceptible to a reversal and dis-order.” Said otherwise, a first science is a thought that precedes the mixture of primacy and priority found in first philosophy. In Theory of Identities, non-philosophy identifies as both transcendental science and first science. In contrast, in Principles of Non-Philosophy, first science is the unified theory of science and philosophy broken from epistemo-logical difference. There is also the identification of non-ethics as first ethics in Éthique de l’Étranger. While inverting Lévinas’ framework of ethics as first philosophy, that is, philosophy is dependent upon a prior ethical relation with the Other’s recognition, non-ethics as first ethics entails that it is “a priori and radically uni-versal in a new sense or for philosophical ethics in the plural themselves.” Laruelle further elaborates regarding the priority of non-ethics as first ethics writing:

1) for which, on the one hand, radical misfortune is the essence(-)without-essence [l’essence (de) sans-essence] of man or their being-foreclosed to any philosophy and ethics; 2) for which, on the other hand, as a “first name,” “misfortune” is also a non-conceptual symbol determined in-the-last-instance by this essence (of) man; 3) for which its subject, as an other-Stranger or a Neighbour, represents “man” in their identity-of-the-last-instance, that is, in their duality with regard to the ethico-philosophical instance that is unitary. 

Lastly, there is the notion of a “first technology,” which elsewhere defines itself as a “science that proceeds from hypothesis, but within a transcendental or real use in-the-last-instance of it” in terms

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32 PoNP, 41.
33 EdE, 25.
34 Ibid.
of the unified theory of philosophy and technical objects or techno-logical difference. With all this said, we can craft another way of envisioning non-politics as first politics only realizable in a paradigm without the parallelism of politics, philosophy, and power (crato-logical or polito-logical parallelism).

This transcendental order ensues from the People (of) the One who have primacy or prior-to-priority over thought and, therefore, well before the politics they determine. Suppose the goal is to introduce democracy into thought. In that case, non-politics as first politics is how the effective policing order of philosophical authority and its coupling with power, its world-form, are secondarized without eliminating them tout court. Instead, they are rendered inert of their pretense over the real, with a non-politics serving as a uni-lateral “back of the hand” that protects the essence of people from alienability, instituting a “no-man’s land” or void between the One and the world.

As Laruelle notes:

It is therefore not the Stranger who enters by breaking into a centered and closed World, it is the World that from the outset is reduced to the state of simple occasional cause for the givenness of the Stranger. It is not the State or politics that forms a body relevant to a physics or a biology, encompassing the Stranger and integrating them with more or less force and success; it is the Stranger who since always has displaced and as unilateralized from its void the State, reduced to “resisting.” It is not the body that occupies a physical or social void, it is the body that makes its non-autopositional void the measure of everything: the Stranger is index sui – undoubtedly less than the Ego – and the measure of the State as the Stranger is the measure of universal democratic discourse and, thereby, political discourse. Rather than a “marginal” conception of the Stranger, it is a matter of an “occasionalist” conception of Society, the City, and the State. Rather than a sought democracy that exalts crushed yet resistant Minorities, it is a matter of a positive democracy that utilizes secondarized Authorities.

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36 TdE, 159.
Non-Politics is another name for democracy if understood as a first politics when it is exerted from
the People (of) the One in their primacy or prior-to-priority, when the power of people is
inseparable from people who are separated-without-separation from the World.

Suppose metapolitics serves as the basis for unveiling the hidden reality under and within
the political representation. In that case, non-politics does not unveil but renders accessible the
world of politics and philosophy to the foreclosed, inalienable and undivided unary multiplicities
in a non-reciprocal relationship. Against the thousand Rousseaus that still prevail in metapolitics,
Laruelle introduces a non-Rousseauism. Man is not this hidden figure whose essence is eradicable
in the same way that the meaning of Being has been forgotten, but rather is ignored or repressed
by philosophical sufficiency to be thought really, that is, without the mask-mixture of
philosophical anthropoids. Non-Rousseauism is, of course, not a negation of Rousseau’s work.
Still, it is a theoretical utilization of Rousseau’s work toward identifying the identity of science
and the identity of man:

The principle of the general science of people is that the identity of science and the identity
of man are “the same thing,” that man is not a philosophical animal but rather, with some
nuances, a man (of) science.\(^\text{37}\)

Recall that Laruelle’s project is to unify man and science in the quasi-Spinozan statement, *homo
sive scientia*. Rather than a supplementary “political science,” non-politics is grounded upon the
identity of man (and) science, which is itself non-political. Yet here lies a difficult discernment:
how does one distinguish between the non-political and non-politics? Is non-politics already non-
political? For Laruelle, the non-political is man(-or-)science, but non-politics in the singular may
be called human politics insofar as man(-or-)science is the cause and instance or authority that
determines this relation to politics that is not a political relation in-the-last-instance alone. Rather

\(^{37}\) Ibid, 98.
than a partitioning or distribution of the sensible, the authority of man(-or-)science is not policing, nor is it “humanizing” in the humanist and philosophico-anthropological sense; it is a “humanification” of the sensible.\textsuperscript{38}

Lastly, to the part with no part, the poor and the demos excluded from the political community of logos as both speech and ac/count, is introduced to the Stranger or radical poor to pass “from absolute poverty (the philosophical loss of philosophy) to radical poverty as non-philosophical loss of philosophy.”\textsuperscript{39} The part with no part in the political community is the Other to the philosopher, the philosopher’s poor, if you will, recognized by subtraction into genericity. Still, the Stranger is the one who each and every One (qua man-in-person) \textit{is} as existent or subject devoid of worldly predicates, making it impossible to recognize that radical human kernel through philosophical means. Man-in-person and minoritarians are parts that exist before and independently of the Whole and the State, taking their existence from themselves rather than from the political community that excludes them. The part with no part may not have any partaking in any form of politics. Yet in non-politics, they are the determining force whose authority-without-authority excludes authoritarian universals from metaphysics and political philosophy, reciprocally determining in return.

By formulating what ensues from the One as non-politics or first politics, as a democratic force, it is now a matter of envisioning \textit{where} this essence is receivable. Turning to Alain Badiou’s critique of parliamentary democracy, democratic materialism, and \textit{homo democraticus}, we may be able to invent a new paradigm that is indicative of a militant, insurrectional practice aligned with non-politics: un-power or, better still, the en-demic.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{AB}, 230.
4.2. From Democratic Materialism and the Materialist Dialectic to the En-Demic Paradigm

Badiou and Laruelle are no strangers to conflict. Contrary to Benjamin Noys’ claim, one cannot stage the two in terms of a “narcissism of small differences.”

Rather, I’d like to suggest that there is a great difference. What is rather understated about the difference between Badiou and Laruelle is how the human plays a part in their respective works. While in contrast to democratic materialism that states “there are only bodies and languages,” Badiou adds the materialist dialectical stance of the exception of truths and their immanence. Furthermore, the human in Badiou plays a “function” for generic truth procedures, be it love, politics, art, or science: “indeterminate x’s [the immanence of truths themselves – JRS] constitute the domain, or the virtuality, of the humanity function, and as far as a truth procedure transfixes them, the humanity function localizes them in its turn.”

Laruelle recognizes that Badiou’s exception of truths is an oppositional philosophical addition into these “onlys,” positing the human exception instead which is irreducible to philosophy. After all, Badiou posits that “wherever a human collective is working in the direction of equality, the conditions are met for everyone to be a philosopher.” Further still, Badiou’s criticism of democratic materialism is in the fact that “it is impossible to possess a concept of what is ‘human’ without dealing with the (eternal, ideal) inhumanity which authorizes man to incorporate himself into the present under the sign of the trace of what changes.”

With that said, we may be able to add that philosophy, insofar as it is the unity of bodies, languages, and truths alone, is this superior inhumanity that “commands humanity to

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43 *GToV*, 21.
exceed its being-there,” becoming nothing more than the subjects or supports, be they obscure, faithful, or reactive, of truths and evental traces.

The argument for non-philosophy has always been that philosophy is to be made for man, rather than man for philosophy. Democracy may be the object mocked by Badiou in the form of capitol-parliamentarism, but Laruelle provides the identity of democracy of-the-last-instance with communism:

Man-in-person is the generic equality of the Unequal Ones [Inégaux] who determine-in-the-last-equality the inequalities that form the fabric of history and who transform these inequalities. Equality is never effective as the world is the world of dissimilitudo, but equality is real and transforms the relations that are always relations of inequality, making them lose their sufficiency without necessarily destroying them. Democracy of-the-last-instance could very well after all be called “communism” and subtract the latter from any historical precipitation as much as spontaneism – if the “common” of communism was understood as the generic, if communism was understood as the generic constant of history.

The democracy of-the-last-instance may be called communism, but it still falls victim to the democratic emblem ruthlessly criticized by Badiou. Yet it is only through Badiou’s criticism that one may realize a democratic paradigm that is truly immanent to – or better yet, (to) – people, that is, en-demic. This analysis will explore this term further following a reading of Badiou’s criticism.

Badiou says democracy “remains the dominant emblem of contemporary political society.” By democracy here, Badiou refers to the parliamentary and/or electoral systems upheld through citizen participation. The point of his essay is to displace the very dominancy of democracy where “everyone” (tout le monde) is a democrat, and the world (le monde) is subject to democracy. The world for Badiou is this “other” world where war, deprivation, and death hold sway as the business of democracy. To be freed of this other world, one needs to be “integrated”

46 Ibid.
into the democratic lifestyle, a type of “cave” from which one exits. It is as though the only basis for democracy is to recognize that, parodying Lacan on the signifier, a democrat represents everyone for another democrat. Badiou’s cynicism is writ large here:

To be admitted, and perhaps on some distant day greeted, one requires training in democracy at home, long hours of arduous toil before the notion of coming to the real world can even be entertained. Study your integration manual, the good little democrat’s handbook, in the intervals between bursts of lead, landings by humanitarian paratroopers, famine, and disease! You’ve got a stiff exam ahead of you and still no guarantee that you won’t find the passage from the false world to the “real” one blocked. Democracy? Sure. But reserved for democrats, you understand. Globalization of the world? Certainly, but only when those outside finally prove they deserve to come inside.49

Overall, Badiou is concerned with how if democracy is supposed to represent the whole world and it is not the real world after all, then rather than promoting an equal basis of participation, democracy is the contestation of the world as such under the stewardship of an oligarchy. Badiou offers his problematic: “what conditions must a territory meet before it can present itself speciously as part of tout le monde under the democratic emblem….of what objective space, of what settled collectivity, is democracy the democracy?”50 With no surprise, Badiou returns to Plato, who is not unique in his approach, with Lenin and Lin Piao being supplementary figures with the same criticism of democracy. The return to Plato is analogous to how democracy is unable to save or be saved, despite Plato’s aristocratic perspective.

To Badiou, Plato retains two theses at once with the constitution of the subject, homo democraticus: “1) the democratic world isn’t really a world; 2) the only thing that constitutes the democratic subject is pleasure, or more precisely, pleasure-seeking behavior.”51 One may assert that the capitalo-parliamentary structure informs this hedonism that Badiou elsewhere defines as “the tendentially unique mode of politics, the only one to combine economic efficacy (thus the

49 Ibid, 7.
50 Ibid, 8.
51 Ibid, 9.
profit of the owners) and popular consensus.”52 Yet there is still the question of the world, which is the first thesis. The only way that a world is made legible, says Badiou, is what there is qua appearing of its truths: “every world is capable of producing its own truth within itself.”53 If the world of democracy is not a real world insofar as it cannot produce its truth within itself, then what is the untruth of democracy? In the sense of equality wherein everything is equal to everything else, an anarchic equality that, for Badiou, “translates seamlessly…into the monetary principle, the universal equivalency or fungibility that bars any possibility of real difference.”54 As universal equivalency is nothing more than an abstract quantification of reality, it is always substitutable without difference, and the world of democracy, not being a world, is instead “an ‘anarchic’ whirl of eidola.”55

The democratic subject or homo democraticus, though being defined by the hedonism instilled by this anarchy, is the embodiment of an idolized youth that is simultaneously distrusting towards its zeal. Like the fountain of youth, the democratic emblem perpetuates circulation and valorization by enslaving subjectivity to a timelessness where democratic man “balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn.”56 Representative democracy, in this way, results in despotism and tyranny, and in turning to youth, it restricts time and motion. Therefore, it restricts politics, that is, “subjective mastery (the mastery of thought and praxis).”57 The real opposition to

55 Ibid, 11.
democracy qua capitalo-parliamentarianism is and will be “the force in the breast of the assembled and active people driving the State and its laws to extinction.”\(^58\)

Therefore, what Badiou finds of utmost importance is the allegiance of a people or demos without democracy who are irreducible to democrats yet still bound to Plato’s worldview of an aristocracy for everybody. However, this way of thinking to Badiou is “just a way of formulating the highest aspiration of communism.”\(^59\) Yet this leads us to what we will discuss shortly: going back to what democracy means. To Badiou, democracy means:

> the power of peoples over their own existence. Politics immanent in the people and the withering away, in the open process, of the State. From that perspective, we will only ever be true democrats, integral to the historic life of peoples, when we become communists again. Roads to that future are gradually becoming visible even now.\(^60\)

The important takeaway from Badiou is a politics immanent in the people who are the determinant in the last instance of power, the State, and its condition for its downfall. I now discuss these politics immanent (to) the people (of) the One: the en-demic.

To Badiou’s politics immanent in the people we oppose a theory of the en-demic. I call en-demic the inalienable power of people or the People (of) the One irreversibly exercised upon the World. Neither innate nor acquired, the en-demic is a portmanteau, a monster of both Anglophone and Francophone design, a knowingly false etymological invention to indicate what is within people and inseparable from people. Conceptually and typographically, the \(en\)- indicates this immanence, taking on some family resemblances with the in-itself and immanence more generally, but, more importantly, the \(en\) of the vision-in-One or vision-in-man \([vision-en-Un,\ vision-en-homme]\), related to the \(endon\), the Greek word for the internal. The en-demic is the specific paradigm of what is within people, taking on a different stance to that of the moral law within

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 14.
\(^{59}\) Ibid, 15.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
oneself, such as in Kant. Rather, it is the power lived within a people that determines powers outside them. The en-demic paradigm strives to edify a unique axiom that displays the true inalienable power of the People (of) the One: *no-one-in-person knows what one (One) can do*. In French, this statement reads as *personne-en-personne ne sait ce que l’on (l’Un) peut faire*. When one defines the axiom in a manner that respects the radical autonomy of the People (of) the One, it provides a twofold postulation. On the one hand, people are, in fact, imperceptible to their power, that is, uni-laterally determining the power that is their own without a reciprocal relation. Further, on the other hand, when one grants an identity to Greco-unitary philosophy, that is, to define it as *it is* undivided within this realist-formalist framework, it too cannot impede or alienate this power on its behest (such as the Power Principle).

The en-demic is the untapped human potential that Laruelle and others in their way (for example, Henry and auto-affective Life, Bergson and the *élan vital*, Nietzsche and the Will to Power, and Marx and labour-power) sought to discover that were, in some way or another, coupled and united with philosophy. The en-demic is a *prototype* of what can also be called *un-power*. Un-power is equally a portmanteau but more palatable for existing non-philosophical practices that seek to remove the human quality of the real or the One without speaking of the People (of) the One. I would like to first focus on what un-power is and why the en-demic is a prototype of un-power before engaging more into the theoretical symptoms present in the history of philosophy and non-philosophical terminology. Un-power is a re-translation of what Laruelle calls *impouvoir* in *Le principe de minorité*. One can translate this as unpower or powerlessness, but it is in *Le principe de minorité* that one encounters an interesting formulation:

If transcendental truth – insofar as it enjoys an absolute autonomy in relation to “scientific” or “moral” truth – is the element of the rule of thought, it requires that the method be held within the limits of a thought that is no longer constituted nor even a thinking or constituting thought, a thought that is no longer in any case relative in turn to what it
conditions, that stands below the “fact” of Being, and even more so below the fact of reason in which it must rather seek the internal possibility outside of it. The anti-idealist mutation of the method is its becoming-immanence, but a non-ideal immanence, still a thing other than a “transvaluation” that would leave it if not in the ideal immanence of Being, at least the immanence of the “Same” and “Repetition,” the immanence of the Whole as Repetition. The interest of simply thinking thought requires that it be content with penetrating the internal life of this power – of this “impower” perhaps – through “its original germs” as Kant would say concerning the true of reason. 61

I would like to emphasize here that impower is constitutive of the internal life of this power – that is, the non-ideal and radical immanence of a power and its inalienability to be displaced and divided within some other ideal immanence like Being or the Same. Translating impouvoir as unpower or powerlessness leaves out the possibility of reading this in a way that recognizes this power’s radical autonomy. Such an impower would read as a mutation of a radically immanent power that is inseparable from itself, even through “its original germs,” and requires a new formulation: un-power. Un-power, in contrast to a negative power or powerlessness, provides not just a negative connotation (with un-) but, equally, the One (l’Un), an unreflected transcendental experience in-itself that is non-thetic or non-positional (of) oneself. Read in a way that would sound familiar to Larualiens: such a power is in-One and inalienable, indivisible, and not at all a power of the World – un-power is a power (of) the One.

What will then be of curiosity is why the en-demic is a prototype of un-power. “Prototype” is perhaps the more “technical”-sounding form of what Laruelle and collaborators call a “first name,” the “symbolic element of transcendental axiomatics formed on the basis of a philosophical concept and entering into the constitution of the axioms that describe the One.” 62 Said otherwise, first names describe the One utilizing philosophical concepts as determined in-the-last-instance by the One, and their placement is first in relation to this last-instance, contingent and pragmatically

62 DoNP, 62.
utilized as de-potentialized of their sufficiency. Suppose one were to think of the prototype as akin to the first name. In that case, it serves as a basis for its prior-to-full-scale implementation that can be constitutive no longer of people in the empirico-ideal sense of “humans” vis-à-vis anthropocentrism and humanism. What is en-demic is the prototype or first name of un-power. The en-demic cannot be either innate or acquired. This power is not something one is born with, along with attributes that are assignable to the essence of people (people are not rational animals, for instance); nor is this power adaptable through experience; nor is it a mixture between the innate and the acquired.

*The en-demic can and must be discovered and established as an axiom on its terrain: the essence of the People (of) the One.* Greco-unitary philosophy and the Power Principle, including the invariants demo-logical difference and crato-logical parallelism, structure our global relations towards understanding who we are and what we are capable of plus a universal blended with these qualities. That said, it is *possible* to indicate that these conditions are themselves *innate*: one is born into philosophy and power endowed with whatever qualities that the World, the Power Principle, politics, and so on, envision what one is capable of. However, to concede that it is innate is to condemn oneself to the perpetuation of the vicious circle that is the constitutive *paideia* and machine of the philosophical decision. Instead, erecting the en-demic as an axiom or principle not opposed to the Power Principle, or that of a principle *within or beyond* the Power Principle as Laruelle in his early writings suggested, would allow to transform this supposed and possible condemnation of the innate to the status of the acquired, an acquired with *occasional causality or radical contingency*. By contrast, we do not discover the en-demic within or beyond the Power Principle. We may discover the en-demic *under* philosophical conditions, but within the essence of the People (of) the One. In this discovery, however, one may invent an axiomatic so that demo-
logical difference, crato-logical parallelism, Greco-unitary philosophy and the Power Principle receive an identity as they are.

Now, turned against the democratic emblem, the en-demic is irreducible to both the logic of the everyone (tout le monde) of democracy qua capitalo-parliamentarianism and the logic of world(s). In the case of the former, the en-demic substitutes the all and the world of tout le monde for each-and-every-one (tout-un-chacun). In the en-demic, people can change the world and the false reality of the world of capitalo-parliamentarianism is included within this system, as both the doxa identified by Badiou and philosophy are unified in their philosophico-political relation. Likewise, in the latter’s case, worlds are secondarized and made into occasion as people do not insert themselves nor inscribed in them in advance. There is no humanity function for the en-demic, but an occasional function that is globally rendered en-demic, inseparable and determinable by people in-the-last-instance. One reveals the truth of all worlds in the en-demic, a truth not caught up in the world but in people. When placed into the context of democracy of-the-last-instance and uni-versal (non-)communism, the en-demic provides the true and radical sense of what Laruelle strives to craft in the remains of the old concept multitudo transcendentalis and the non-philosophical in-multitude:

Man is first One, which does not oppose Man to communism but gives Man in-One or in-Solitude, a solitude without relation to the one spread by the capitalist-world. This is what, then, determines it in-the-last-instance as a radical multitude of the non-proletarian. The subject is not common or collective, in-body, in-class, in-spirit, or in-faith, but falls under a multitudo transcendentalis that is the real kernel of communism at the heart of its inconsistency, or more exactly, that of which communism is the philosophical symptom at any rate, metaphysical and Platonic perhaps. Uni-versal non-communism is of course inseparable from radical democracy, a people or a multitude of subjects determined in-the-last-instance… The non-proletarians are a unique “in-multitude” – their multiplicity cannot claim itself but the One in-the-last-instance is claimed by their multitude.  

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63 ItNM, 140-141.
If non-Marxism is to be understood by the non-disciplinary slogan, “the only weapon of the poor, stripped not only of all but once and for all of the All itself, is invention,”64 the en-demic is the realization that within people alone emancipated from philosophical sufficiency, each-and-everyone can (and must) invent the future with means that are philosophically unprecedented yet humanly and wholeheartedly immanent to people. The en-demic is, in sum, when the eye has become a human eye.65

4.3. From Democracy to Come to Futural Democracy

According to Laruelle, placing non-philosophy on the same plane as deconstruction “is a very complex form of humour.”66 Indeed, the differences between deconstruction and non-philosophy, as well as the critique of Derrida, are present throughout his writings.67 Nevertheless, I would like to address here a unilateral distinction between democracy to come and futural democracy, something I have envisioned following Laruelle’s writings on futurality or a future without futuro-logos. It will be a matter of distinguishing between the to come of à venir and the avenir from the future in futur. It will also be a matter of distinguishing Derrida’s expectant perhaps of messianicity without messianism from Laruelle’s ordinary messianity as futural causality. I turn to Derrida’s chapter, “The Last of the Rogue States,” in Rogues for occasion to then genericize democracy to come into futural democracy, de-Judaizing messianicity into heretical and uni-versal, human messianity.68

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64 *AB*, 230.
66 *TdE*, 217.
68 For what it is worth, the present subsection of this chapter is the stuff of dissertations. Due to space and consideration for the remaining parts of this chapter, I will have to leave such investigations for a future work that develops on several of the themes of this chapter. As such, the following remarks are non-exhaustive and need further elaboration.
It is important to begin by understanding what exactly the to come is. For Derrida, it is the thought of the perhaps or the perhaps itself: “Unheard-of, totally new, that very experience which no metaphysician might have yet dared to think.” Likewise, as a democracy to come, it is not of the future present or a modality of the living present. The to come is a pledge or a summoning, a promise, that always keeps within it “this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated.” And finally, to Derrida, there is no deconstruction without democracy, and there is no democracy without deconstruction insofar as democracy “is the autos of deconstructive self-delimitation.” In this sense, democracy is a non-presentable concept, or as Alex Thomson notes, “an experience of the impossible” that Derrida “affirms something within democracy that does confirm the possibility of there being more democracy rather than less.” Yet it is in Rogues that Derrida provides his fullest definition of what democracy to come entails, as it is a reflection on the above-cited works.

Of the three threads that Derrida attends to regarding rogue states or États voyous, it is the first that requires the most attention. It concerns the phrase “democracy to come” regarding the relations between varying states in their use of force, usually armed force, to ensure that the strongest is right and maintains law. All democracies to come will have to attend to armed conflict

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insofar as the concept of democracy is rooted in these international relations of war and peace. One of the horizons of a democracy to come to Derrida is a post-Kantian international law of a cosmopolitical order (like institutions such as the United Nations), but this does not suffice. Cosmopolitanism is concerned with a world republic with a sovereign, not a democracy that is irreducible to sovereignty. Derrida agrees with Kant that “the majesty of people” is an “absurd expression,” yet democracy is not a state.73 To Derrida, following Walter Benjamin, democracy is the absolute “degeneration” of law, violence, and authority. Democracy to come should not be reduced to the regulative Idea according to Kant but remains and remained “the inheritance of a promise.”74 This promise bears the future into the present or here-and-now, not the existing democracy in the sense of the national or international level into the future. Democracy to come as such is insisted upon by “the absolute and unconditional urgency of the here and now that does not wait and on the structure of the promise, a promise that is kept in memory, that is handed down, inherited, claimed and taken up.”75

Derrida’s democracy to come has five focal points that constitute its concept: 1) its interminable deconstructive critique and aporetic existence, 2) the naming of the one who or what comes as event, 3) the gesture towards moving beyond sovereignty, 4) its inextricable relationship to justice, and 5) the wavering between announcement and expectation of the promise. The interminable critique of democracy in the to come “not only points to the promise but suggests that democracy will never exist, in the sense of a present existence: not because it will be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its structure.”76 This aporia shares the degenerative power

74 Ibid, 82.
75 Ibid, 85.
76 Ibid, 86.
mentioned above and its relationship with the Other that it seeks to either couple or supersede, such as a (passive) force without (active) force or heteronomy and autonomy, etc. Further still, democracy to come recognizes how democracy, among all paradigms of political power, is “the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence its chance and its fragility,” yet the challenge is to free it entirely from onto-theo-teleology, according to Derrida.

As to the second point, democracy to come recognizes another way of thinking the event, the rupturing or break from a continuity. This event is “unique, unforeseeable, without horizon, un-masterable by any ipseity or any conventional and thus consensual performativity.” The coming of the who or what from this event is similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s invocation of “the invention of a people to come” who would constitute a new earth and bring about a new creation. Nevertheless, such an irruption “should not and cannot be limited by any conditional hospitality.” This act presupposes creating a new form of democracy irreducible to sovereignty in its current functioning, thus the third point. This invention is not the invention of the event but the invention through it, insofar as existing procedures of governance are still structured by the juridico-political forms of sovereignty. Despite attempts to impose limitations on sovereignty by reference points towards universalized democratic politics, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it declares another sovereignty still within the bounds of the juridico-political. In this light, the human being is sovereign, therefore autoimmune from criticism and, as such, not subject to interminable deconstruction.

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77 Ibid, 87.
78 Ibid.
80 Derrida, Rogues, 87.
Fourthly, Derrida returns to the theme of democracy to come present in *Specters of Marx* pertaining to the inscription of “the necessity of the democracy to come not only into the axiomatic of the messianicity without messianism, the spectrality or hauntology, that this book develops, but into the singular distinction between law and justice (heterogeneous but inseparable).” Derrida’s notion of justice is not reducible to Heidegger’s notion of *dikē*, that is, the gathering and uniting of the joint and structure of fittingness; rather, justice aligns itself with “being out of joint, with the interruption of relation, with unbinding, with the infinite secret of the other.” That is to say that Derrida further recognizes that democracy and justice are inextricably bound to deconstruction insofar as the *autos* or ipseity of democracy self-delimits itself. Instead of a communitarian sense of justice that finds itself subject to the *dikē*, justice in its conjunction with democracy is in the naming of democracy and its relationship with the expression “in the name of democracy,” seeks rather to unsettle vis-à-vis solicitation the fittingness or compliance in presence or logos. Derrida cites himself from *Politics of Friendship*, emphasizing the paleonymic use of democracy insofar as it guides one to “inherit from what—forgotten, repressed, misunderstood, or unthought in the ‘old’ concept and throughout its history—would still be on the watch, giving off signs or symptoms of a stance of survival coming through all the old and tired features.” Through this paleonymic use, Derrida betrays “the heritage *in the name of* the heritage,” seeking out a new context to deconstruct the conditions of democracy and justice’s bogging down in the juridico-political.

Lastly, Derrida concludes this first thread with the fifth focal point on invoking the here and now. Democracy to come is not an announcement of what is happening or unfolding, chiefly

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81 Ibid, 88.
84 Ibid, 89, cited from *Politics of Friendship*, 104.
85 Ibid.
being withdrawn from ontological dependency and, as noted above, onto-theo-teleology. By removing the “is” as an ontological copula (i.e., with relation to existence or being), Derrida implies that this is “already political and that it is, moreover, the question of democracy.”86 In this way, there are two ways of interpreting the to come:

For “democracy to come” can hesitate endlessly, oscillate indecidentally and forever, between two possibilities: it can, on the one hand, correspond to the neutral, constative analysis of a concept…but, on the other hand, no longer satisfied to remain at the level of a neutral, constative conceptual analysis, “democracy to come” can also inscribe a performative and attempt to win conviction by suggesting support or adherence, an “and yet it is necessary to believe it,” “I believe in it, I promise, I am in on the promise and in messianic waiting, I am taking action or am at least enduring, now you do the same,” and so on. The to of the “to come” wavers between imperative injunction (call or performative) and the patient perhaps of messianicity (nonperformative exposure to what comes, to what can always not come or has already come).87

As such, the two ways of understanding the to come can also, simultaneously or in turn, be resounded in alternative succession as its opposite, becoming ironic. Yet, for Derrida, this is what democracy to come provides. The right to irony in a rhetorical sense allows for interminable deconstruction. Allowing for the right to irony may grant democracy its freedom as undecidable. Still, it allows for “the only radical possibility of deciding and of making come about (performatively), or rather of letting come about (metaperformatively), and thus of thinking what comes about or happens and who happens by, the arriving of whoever arrives.”88

In radical distinction to democracy to come, I propose the conception of futural democracy. The “futural” of futural democracy is distinct from the to-come as what is coming is not a perhaps or expected in waiting, similar to Mallarméan chance and Nietzschean chance though distinct from both.89 Yet, rather than throwing the dice as the result of not expecting the abolition of chance to

86 Ibid, 91.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid, 92.
89 In PNS (513-514), Laruelle criticizes both the Deleuzo-Nietzschean interpretation of the dicethrow which sees the affirmation of life against Mallarmé’s apparent severance “from innocence and the affirmation of chance” in which
give the future, it is the future instead or, better yet, the Future-in-person that liberates chance by not playing with dice. Futurality is a specific causality reducible to the generic framework introduced in Philosophie V writings to indicate a passageway separate from the Principle of Sufficient History, to which the to-come is subject to even in its primacy of historicity over history. In an essay entitled “Causalité futurale et messianité,” Laruelle points to five aspects that provide the generic specificity of futural causality or futurality:

1) the unilateral duality between the continuous flow of time and a particle separated from time;
2) the future as a rupturing force in relation to the representation of time as a whole;
3) the de-potentialization of the past-present relationship and its power over the future, “a force of degrowth or weakening of the domination of history over humans, the Principle of Sufficient History that Marxism is not liberated from”;
4) the inability to be traced or discerned as a trajectory within the macroscopic representation of space-time in both physics and philosophy;
5) the relationship of futurality to generic messianity as an under-coming without a Judaic expectation.

Furthermore, futurality as a specific causality – irreducible to the four present causes of metaphysics (efficient, final, material, formal) nor an absent cause as in Lacan and Althusser (lack or decentered cause as determinant of structure), nor a mixture of the two – has the goal of orienting the time of Man-in-person to transform the World. The messianity coupled with futurality is no longer on the side of marginality but uni-laterality, foreclosed to being and becoming, and the

“the dicethrow is nothing if chance and necessity are opposed in it,” (Nietzsche and Philosophy, 34) and the Badiouian-Mallarméan interpretation of “nothing will take place but the place, except, on high, perhaps, a Constellation” (Logics of Worlds, 4). To Laruelle, Deleuze and Nietzsche “drown the throwing subject into a super-object, the thrower’s operation is drowned within the result that enchains on the re-roll, and the whole is drowned within a great transcendental circle,” whereas Badiou and Mallarmé “disconnect the thrower’s operation from their result but by thinking it as transcendentally, not within the circle of a great subject-object but through a juxtaposition of the the mathematical and philosophical in torsion” (514). Instead, the dicethrow is not a result of a position, but the postural in the before-first dicethrower whose hand, as an organon, is to be deduced from generic immanence, and not in the exception of the place or a constellation nor in preference of an innocence of affirmation. To Laruelle, “measured to before-first messianity, philosophical chance obviously always arrives first but always too late” (515). The dicethrower is not a hinter-player but an ultimate before-player, one who precedes the game and the result of throwing the dice.

Other. It is just as much a non-Judaic messianity as a non-Greek irreducibility to philosophical time. As Laruelle writes:

The philosopher’s watchword has always been “remember [souviens-toi] the world,” which in reality means “let the world remember the world within you” or again “remember God,” a formula of certain Russian mystics. The non-philosopher’s watchword is only “let humans under-come [sous-venir] into the world.” It is a point which distinguishes it from philosophical immanence and quantum positivity; futurality means that immanence is orientated, that eternity is orientated and must be called “messianity.” The positive quantum-physical duality and even the philosophical-transcendental duality of time (Deleuze and even Husserl) have this common point of occupying eternity and infinity as the reversibility of time and space – the triumph of a mythical and varying anti-human paganism. Protected or defended by their generic being-foreclosed to transcendence, futurality messianically yet humanly orientates the time of Man towards the transformation of the world, the unifacialization of the Whole as Stranger to itself. What philosophy as Greek and physics cannot do, unilateral duality does: orientate itself by a messianity that makes a system with the defence of man and the attribution of the generic to human lived experience.91

One may couple the five characteristics of futurality as a specific causality with how Laruelle envisions democracy as radically non-philosophizable or undecidable. To the five points regarding the causality of futurality, corresponds the generic definition of democracy:

1) The emancipation of individuals qua people-in-person who are radically politically and philosophically undecidable;
2) The theoretical function of the politicizable serving as a means for democracy: “There is no meta-politics which is not still politics, still a philosophy; however, a reduced politics or reduced political is a meta-language for democracy”92;
3) The uni-lateral non-relation of people-in-person determining the politicizable as a “post-dicate” in-the-last-instance alone;
4) The One is the transcendental multitude who forms the ultimatum as radical immanence;
5) The pragmatics of the politicizable through the generic thought ensues from the order (of) the One.

Democracy, according to Laruelle, is unrealizable within philosophy because the idea of democracy is a decision of thought that is irreducible to the philosophical overdetermination of thought and its connection to politics and power.

91 PNS, 438-439.
More importantly, what is the role that democracy takes on? I argue that it is the generic defence of humanity. In contrast to what may be called a security principle – which may be institutions, activities of safeguarding, securitarian ideologies, and the unity of each – democracy is a generic defence which is a “more radical use of security, one that is more ‘human’, and generic truly speaking, refusing to compromise victims with their hangmen.”93 Philosophy may be the defence of man as an individual or subject. Still, to Laruelle, non-philosophy is defined “as the only defence of man as a Victim in a philosophical milieu, that is, in a globally hostile milieu because philosophy is the deficient protector and in bad faith.”94 One must understand generic defence as an Outside that protects the being-separated of humans who are the radical Inside “resistant against the very sufficiency of metaphysical chance and risk.”95 Rather than something of the autoimmunity of the sovereignty of people who determine this quasi-forcefield, we may speak of human sovereignty as rather sous-vereignty, as that which under-determines their radical generic defence.

I mentioned above that the point is to “de-Judaicize” messianity into a heretical and universal, human messianity, and now I’d like to discuss this aspect to unbind the either/both GreekJew or/and JewGreek amphibological mixture that Derrida introduces through the inhibition of Greco-logocentrism by way of Judaic alterity. We find democracy to come taken up in this debate insofar as messianicity without messianism deals with the expectant arrival of something or someone from without. I argue that this is the arrival of the Stranger as the subject (of) Universal Humanity. In distinction to Levinas, who thinks Judaism on the mode proper to it, that is, as an ethics concerning justice and responsibility towards the Other irreducible to fundamental ontology,
Derrida, according to Laruelle, seeks to ground the idiomatic mode of Judaism in a necessary yet impossible exchange with philosophy qua the Greek via inversion. Derrida institutes something of a deconstructive continuum “that elaborates itself patiently in us without us and through us outside us,”96 that is, we are incorporated in the deconstructive process without our willing, as if homo ex machina.

Even Differance forms a continuity, *topos* (Derrida’s phantasm) and *typos* (whether you want to or not, by your identifications to it, you become subject-of-deconstruction, a subject in progress). Deconstruction is the univocity of the system-of-the-Other, the Judaic plane of immanence, it exploits an infinite possibility of variations on a scheme to which this infinite possibility belongs. One part logos, something like an intra-logocentric, no longer overlooks the scene, but rather distributes itself there. But another part, the same except for the scene itself – the scene’s except-ional presence – overlooks it, forms the over- of the scene itself coextensive with its effects.97

How would it be possible to think of the Stranger, this ordinary messiah (ordinary in the sense that Laruelle employs it), separate from the Greek and the Jew, their mixture, and even the superseding synthesis of the Christian? It would be a matter of understanding the Stranger as an identity (of) man who is neither Greek nor Jew without being anti-Greek or antisemitic: a uni-versal heretic. In a chapter regarding the transition towards uni-versal heresy from Judaism as an elected identity in *Éthique de l’Étranger*, we must understand heresy as a principle uniquely investing non-ethics in the sense of the uni-lateral and “more untimely, being without-consistency, than first and last causes.”98 We must understand this untimeliness in terms of futurality and messianity, and it is now a matter of identifying the uniqueness of heresy in distinction from Judaism. Heresy as a principle recognizes the radical inseparability (of) self of man who is separated-without-separation. What is more, heresy in its purest form is irreducible to alterity “that contemporary philosophy traces cheaply either from the worldly experience of the Stranger or from the religious

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96 *PoD*, 145
97 Ibid.
98 *EdE*, 322. Emphases mine.
All-Other,"99 but rather a radical identity that is alogical who has the responsibility to transform the World. Lastly, Laruelle writes:

Pure heresy is neither Greek nor Judaic, but it is also neither anti-Greek nor anti-Jewish; on the contrary, through a system of deformations, certainly irreducible to any philosophical topology, any ‘reversal-and-displacement’, it allows the generic depotentiation of philosophy and the Judaic affect of Alterity.100

In this way, Laruelle provides a path to thinking about an identity irreducible to the games of Same and Difference, the Greek and the Jew, and their mixture forms found in philosophy, especially under the form of ego-xeno-logical difference. Ego-Xeno-Logical Difference, to recall, is a universal invariant that allows one to discern both the egophobia and xenophobia latent within Greco-philosophical categories, and a radical critique of this invariant allows us to “explain to what near unfathomable depth of our thought is inscribed the hatred of the Stranger, not of this man assumed to be facing us but Humanity – the superior form of racism, that is, the anti-humanity that every philosophy harbours.”101 The Stranger, to Laruelle, is the subject of Universal Humanity who, like the right to irony for Derrida, is a transcendental idiot, not in the sense of stupidity, but in the sense that one is not determined to be a thinking thing in relation to transcendence (such as the World, Reason, Power, History, etc.).

Taken together, we may now be able to provide five separate focal points that distinguish futural democracy from democracy to come. These five focal points can be summarized as follows: 1) the non-philosophical realization of democracy is not through interminable deconstructive labour but within and through people in the generic structure or, better yet, when it is en-demic; 2) the Stranger is the subject (of) people when they exist on a mode of the One, but they are ordinary messiahs, not a peoples to come to be invented; 3) neither reducible to the juridico-political nor

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100 Ibid, 276.
101 TdE, 127.
the politico-philosophical frameworks of sovereignty, nor even beyond sovereignty, but the invention of a sous-vereignty that under-determines in the last instance the generic defence of people; 4) rather than the here-and-now of the to-come’s affect simultaneously as interior and exterior to onto-theo-teleology yet irreducible to it, the futural is neither inside nor outside onto-theo-anthropo-teleology (or the Principle of Sufficient History) as the complete definition of the metaphysics of time, but the placing of the past-present as here-and-now under the condition and in the name of human messianity as pure heresy, not autoimmune; and 5) the programmatic emancipation of humanity from philosophical sufficiency is at the same time the lived future within the bounds of people alone.

4.4. The Generic Will: A Mutation of Non-Rousseauism and Non-Nietzscheanism

I began this chapter with many questions forming a separate problem: What is a non-philosophical theory of human sovereignty without philosophical sufficiency? How is a critique of power that would not be of power (i.e., continuous with power) possible? How does one transfigure non-philosophy as human philosophy into human emancipation itself? Of these questions, we have provided some solutions found in the varying concepts put forward: non-politics as first or human politics, the en-demic paradigm, sous-vereignty, and futural democracy. Now, it is a matter of transfiguring non-philosophy as human philosophy into human emancipation. If, according to Laruelle, non-philosophy renounces the project of the young Marx, “the becoming-world of philosophy and the becoming-philosophy of the world,” and instead pushes for the project to “transform the world that is already philosophy or philosophy that is the form of the world,”102 then what is the point of identifying non-philosophy as a human philosophy if philosophy itself is the form of the world? Should the redemptive thought itself be redeemed,

and by whom? This line of questioning is not novel, yet the implications of transforming the world and philosophy must be an effect – not the condition – of human emancipation. At the same time, we must also pose Laruelle against Laruelle, not to out-Laruelle him (whatever that might mean) or to go beyond him (also, what is this supposed to mean?); rather, it is to bring about a mutation that arises from the Nietzschean Laruelle and the non-Rousseauian Laruelle with the invention of the concept called the generic will. This term superposes or clones both the Will to Power as the pathos that effects upon other wills and the general will as the law that forces one to be free towards the express goal of liberating oneself from philosophical sufficiency and a will that de-potentiates the will to philosophy which is itself tyrannical, something that is expressed even in Nietzsche. On the one hand, we will have to interrogate the early Laruelle of Philosophie I, who provides the basis of political materialism, and the Laruelle of Philosophie II onwards, who provides a critique of polito-logical difference or parallelism. Whereas the Nietzschean period is reducible to the paradigm of the machinic, the non-Rousseauian development seeks to identify the real human essence beneath and before the philosophical admixtures as though they were a thousand masks donned upon human faces. On the other hand, our concern is with revitalizing non-philosophical militancy to be able to fully bring to term a radical critique of power in its unity with philosophy, whether one understands this unity as polito-logical difference, crato-logical parallelism, or even onto-theo-politics. What I intend to do here is to identify what political materialism in its Nietzschean-machinic formation can assist for the non-Rousseauian People (of) the One and vice versa, positioning the human paradigm against the machinic. If the first human

105 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, _Julie, or the New Heloise_, trans. Philip Stewart and Jean Vaché (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 1997), 194: “So far I have seen many masks; when shall I see men’s faces?”
theorem of non-philosophy – man really exists and is really distinct from the World\textsuperscript{106} is to be understood concretely, then we also need to understand that the political critique of reason and the critique of political reason are a pleonasm. Only a real critique grounded within the real, that is, the People (of) the One, can institute a transformation of the World. The generic will, perhaps another name for Laruelle’s thought(-)power, is the very means for this programmatic realization of the critique of humanity’s judgment to occur.

First, I would like to briefly recapitulate what Philosophie I dealt with: the two Nietzschean materialisms, machinic materialism and political materialism. Machinic materialism, on the one hand, is the proper paradigm of Philosophie I, designating the problematic of the “processes of production whose materiality is not economic, practical, or signifying, but politico-libidinal and whose law or syntax is Différance rather than contradiction.”\textsuperscript{107} On the other hand, political materialism is a kind of hermeneutical system or general analytic of power that is determinant of onto-theo-politics. Nietzsche is the one who, according to Laruelle, invents the Continent of Politics. Whereas there was a physics before Galileo, a history before Marx, and an unconscious before Freud, there was politics before Nietzsche, “but never in the pure or autonomous state, never a political epoch of history, but always a politics through mediation, delegation, yielding power and a derived causality.”\textsuperscript{108} For Laruelle, as we have already noted, both these materialisms are meant to occupy and displace the Marxist materialisms: machinic materialism is to dialectical materialism as political materialism is to historical materialism. Yet it is the Nietzschean process that reveals the Marxist concept of the relations of production to be a mask, and it is not a mask quite like the other ones, being nothing more than “the immanent reason of this game [of

\textsuperscript{106}BoOM, 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{107}DdE, 11.  \\
\textsuperscript{108}NcH, 99.}
masks]."¹⁰⁹ As the immanent reason internal to dominant power or onto-theo-politics, one must strive to think political materialism as this radically internal process that determines the classical and dominant categories of power (including Marxism and Freudianism) and leads them to their downfall or decline. More specifically, as Laruelle writes in *Au-delà du principe de pouvoir*:

Within the general economy of powers that are distributed on this [Political] Continent individuated by the Other, *generality* is precisely no longer – above all no longer – a political body of a superior degree, an originarity or fundamentality, that is, what we have called – pushing Marxism and even less good things there – an onto-theo-politics that is always encompassing in relation to its restrained effectuations (not general, but precisely global and totalizing): Class Struggle, Social Contract, General Will, Will of the Prince, Raison d’état, etc. There is no first philosophy, fundamental ontology or originary thought as soon as the point is to determine the radical political historicity of the subject, but a thought = positive 0, and experienced [*expérimentée*] in the form of multiplicity. The thought of power, if it does not want to fall back into a “first” or “fundamental” politics bearing on a political cogito (not only *homo politicus*, but class consciousness), can no longer be a foundation for…an origin of…and over…, a history of empirical forms of power. Neither a deeper, more totalizing knowledge deciding in advance, a priori, once and for all, on the meaning, for example, class-being or the ideal of the rights of man or the Relations of Power within the analytic institution or what Marxism calls the “ideological state apparatus” or the friend-enemy relation, etc. What we call “Political Materialism” is both more and less than this – that is, more and less than what historical materialism is in many of its features. Rather, it is a general writing or an immanent, plastic schema because it is always adapted to the state of forces and the described Class Struggle, which is determined by it at the same time that it determines the Class Struggle, not identifying itself with the descriptive givens except by a continuous process of fusion yet always subordinated to differance, the advance, the interval, the more and less of this schema in relation to the “empirical” political givens (classes, state power, “popular” sovereignty, etc.).¹¹⁰

Political materialism provides us with a tool to think about the designation of the “People (of) the One” as opposed to the fetishized historical generality in the form of the People. As a method, it allows for the possibility of “producing the immanent political meaning” of the fetish of People “and the possibility of [its] destruction to-come [à-venir].”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
¹¹⁰ *APP*, 94.
Suppose we must understand dominant politics as the formation of onto-theo-politics. In that case, a complete definition of metaphysics in its entanglement with power and theology, political materialism, when embedded within the machinic framework, allows for the dominant forms of power (Mastery and Fascism, for instance) to be co-extensively determinable by its Beyond, which is not a higher second principle. Rather, the power principle and its Beyond are the same principle split into two, “affirming on the one hand as co-extensive to an empirical field – here politics – governing it and regulating it without exception and, on the other hand, as determinant of this transcendental and material Field of power ‘in the last instance’.”112 The Beyond of power is a quasi-cause, to use Deleuze’s terms, that ensues from an anti?politics or un?power, with the question mark signifying the being of non-being.113 The machinic framework allows for the internality, co-extensivity, and reversible relationship of the power principle (i.e., onto-theo-politics) and its Beyond (i.e., anti?politics) except by recognizing that the latter determines the former in the last instance alone, constituting a whole general analytic or continent of thought (such as History by Marx according to Althusser) dedicated to politics as a whole.

How do we distinguish between “the People (of) the One” from the historical generality of “the People”? On the one hand, it is a matter of understanding co-extensivity in the machinic framework and dissociating the former from the *hombres ex machina* in the latter. There is a specific continuity of the People (of) the One (the en-demic), but it does not have a reciprocal and/or reversible instantiation. One may understand this continuity in the machinic framework as the only one that a subjective multiplicity can invent to give a non-dominant unity to its project of a general economy that it experiences [or experiments with, *expérimente*] flush with powers, alone resulting from the confrontation [*mise front contre front*], without the mediation of any representative generality, any *mixture*, between fractional intentions and revolutionary investments: the One of masses as the correlate of the *objet (r)*.114

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112 Ibid, 39.
113 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 64.
114 *APP*, 216. *Objet (r)*, to recapitulate, is the complex unity of the will to power and the libido as the essence of Power.
The point, therefore, is to render this continuity human rather than machinic. Suppose the machinic properly understood is the framework that is “always at the same time universal and partial, ‘general’ and ‘minoritarian’; both the multiplicity of possible theoretico-libidinal positions and one position within this multiplicity,” then the point of rendering this human would be to unilateralize the Political Continent to such an extent that the continuity of the part determines the whole without return. In that case, that is, to be made human and en-demic, the People will have to be irreducible to history and generalities and not to be the Beyond that is one with the power principle. Referring to this transcendental science as a non-Nietzschean theory of power may be better. Indeed, following Laruelle, Nietzsche invents the Continent of Politics, yet such an invention is a causal unity where “our eye and our psychology are still part of it.”¹¹⁵ Rather than a monumental history where a single chain links all struggles, this non-Nietzschean theory breaks the continuum between people and onto-theo-politics, stripping the compromise of the mixture of its power to fabricate people into its androids. The power principle – and its three Beyonds – are beyond the People (of) the One.

On the other hand, what may an en-demic theory aspire to that is recognized, if not as a political materialism, at least as a transcendental science of power? Of course, what I mean by transcendental science is defined by Laruelle as the “experience of the anteriority of its cause and from it the necessary contingency or relative autonomy of its empirical object that is no longer the result of an objectivation/decision, but the effect of a deeper asymmetrical or irreversible relation between the cause…the representation…and the materials.”¹¹⁶ By transcendental science of power, I am here providing a glimpse into what Laruelle has inaugurated but not fully carried out

¹¹⁶ *TdE*, 80.
in works such as *A Biography of Ordinary Man, Théorie des Étrangers* and the short essay, “Pour une science non-politique du pouvoir”: the real critique of power in the form of onto-theo-politics, polito-logical difference, or (which may ultimately be an entirely similar thing) crato-logical parallelism, the invariant matrix of Greco-Western politics that unites without possible separability the political or the rule and the logos. This real critique is determinable by the cause of the last instance of People (of) the One and the materials are drawn from the existent forms of power when stripped of crato-logical sufficiency. Suppose one must rigorously understand democracy’s positivity through the rule of people. In that case, the non-philosophical aspect of democracy must also pass through the real critique of crato-logical parallelism, and we may turn once more back to Philosophie I to further that relationship.

Political materialism provides the correlation of a quasi-Husserlian (Laruelle calls it the non-Husserlian) machinic form of political intentionality known as cratesis and cratema. What Laruelle retains of the phenomenological correlation can be transferred into the political: cratesis is to noesis, the intentional act, as cratema is to noema, the content, understood as the body in Philosophie I. Though these terms do not appear elsewhere reprised by Laruelle, they are pertinent especially for this transcendental science of power, because this correlation and the intention therein express a type of process that would allow for a type of “deduction” – the generic will – that irreversibly and uni-lationally (as opposed to a machinic co-relation) de-potentiates crato-logical parallelism. One must understand the syntax or correlation of cratesis and cratema in two senses:

On the side of cratesis, the *functional* quality or property of this power (of doing, saying, interpreting, eating, punishing, etc.) with its *specific* object each time cannot serve to internally define the cratesis-cratema syntax and its own contents, which it must not trace from their dominant forms. Then, and only then, this relation is the intentionality no longer of power “in general” but of the revolutionary and consequently critical *essence* of power,
that is, un?power. It is the specific intentionality of Rebellion, the way of being-towards whose active Resistance relates itself to its objects.

On the side of the cratema, the critique of dominant appearances is just as necessary. The body, in its definition of the machinic process as a “foll” [plain, in relation to the corps plein of Deleuze and Guattari and the a/e distinction of Derrida and Heidegger - JRS] body, is not an object upon which forces are exercised within a relation of mechanical causality. The body entertains with technologies of power relations of a topological type [JRS: recall the definition of the machinic in the previous chapter with Deleuze]. We now know that very far from the technical conception of power that the body is the support of inscriptions that we cannot confuse immediately with traces nor above all with representations: they are rather the finished product that, under certain conditions of social reproduction, powers invent and project from the body-process under the form of physical and ideal objects. However, to foil one last activist and objectifying interpretation of the procedures of inscription, we must recall that the Body, undoubtedly “given” as already-there for the inscriptions of power, is in reality produced, like everything, immanently yet as the limit that is both immanent and transcendent within the course of the production of fractional powers.  

Such that the syntax of cratesis-cratema in Philosophie I entertains a machinic relation of intentionality, we must be able to transfigure this into a uni-lational intentionality. This intentionality entertains relations of order ensuant and inseparable (from) the One, which one would later understand as “non-commutability.” A transcendental science of power would be able to find its cause within the cratesis without conflating or correlating it with the cratema that it would otherwise have reversibility with in the machinic. It is no longer “as if there was a reversibility of the cratesis and the cratema, or a splitting into two of the same power that simultaneously holds sometimes the role of one and sometimes the other,” but rather are identified as “the same” by way of transcendence (cratema) in immanence (cratesis) in the last instance alone.

117 APP, 178.
118 PNS, 301: “We will call noesis in the plural [noèses] the before-first superpositions or wave-functions that make up the Last Instance, and the noemata or clones the particulate material transcendences that result from the transformation by the lived wave functions of conceptual corpuscula deprived of their sufficiency. The Real alone precisely because of its superposition cannot be cloned but it has the power to clone reality. Otherwise, what can never be cloned? It is the undulatory Real qua superposable yet it alone can clone corpuscular reality. The Real is non-commutable with the object and hence no longer with the clone.”
119 APP, 179.
By retaining the uni-tax (uni-lateral syntax) of cratesis and cratema in the en-demic paradigm, we can identify the determinant cause of the last instance (the sous-vereignty of the People (of) the One) and the effect of the deduction (the secondarization and materialization of invented politics qua onto-theo-politics to invent the possibility of invention). Yet, how is such a “transcendental deduction” even possible that would render the relation between the cause and effect irreversible? Here, we develop the notion of the “generic will.” Without this development, one may not be able to identify what exactly is at stake with democracy in connection to crato-logical parallelism and the People (of) the One in connection to demo-logical difference. The generic will is irreducible to the general will, but this is not simple wordplay. Recall that by “generic,” we understand a non-positive and non-spontaneous identity that is deprived or subtracted of particularity and universality to become a space where dimensions are de-composed for fragments of these varying dimensions to be newly utilizable. In the context of the general will and the will to power, we find it necessary to define generic will as the realization that the People (of) the One are emancipated-without-emancipation. Rather than thought(-)power, deemed at once as an organon and the subject of non-philosophy, that can act upon philosophy, the generic will acts upon philosophy plus every human activity where agency is alienable in a circular relation. Therefore, the generic will is the subject and organon of the People (of) the One, not as the will of all, nor the will of One-All, but the will of each-and-every-one. Whereas Laruelle sometimes will appropriate Rousseau’s “forced to be free,” it is at best a substitution, not a mutation or genericization of popular sovereignty. The People (of) the One need to be more than the “blind

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120 "Thus, in order for the social compact to avoid being an empty formula, it tacitly entails the commitment—which alone can give force to the others—that whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body. This means merely that he will be forced to be free.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, in *Basic Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 150.

121 *S&U*, 76.
multitude” of Rousseau who are capable of “carry[ing] out on its own an enterprise as great and as difficult as a system of legislation.”122 And whereas the will to power in its machinic functioning serves as a means to topologically relate parts and wholes in unities, the power of uni-lateralization as the de-potentiation of the unitary will to philosophize is never recognizable as a will (of) the People (of) the One with primacy or before-priority. This will (of) the People (of) the One does not mean the general will whatsoever, but a non-will or “human” will that is the subject (of) the People, the cratema to the cratesis. The generic will, insofar as it is a will (of) the People (of) the One, is a will that expresses sous-vereignty over philosophy as the identity of the world. This rule is en-demic and not in-the-World, no longer subject to the warp and weft of games and relations of onto-theo-politics. A transcendental science of power allows for the invention of practices that can turn weapons into tools and means of war into means for peace.

Lastly, suppose the machinic intentionality of cratesis is the specific intentionality of rebellion. In that case, we must discuss how the People (of) the One do not need to become fascist to vanquish fascism, as in Laruelle’s second thesis concerning Nietzsche’s two politics (“Nietzsche made himself fascist to better vanquish fascism, he assumed the worst forms of Mastery to become the Rebel of it”123). As mentioned above, what Laruelle says of Marxism can be applied to his Nietzsche-thought: rebellion in the form or image of philosophy is not adaptable to human emancipation. In the machinic perspective, even if there is no radical political evil, and even if we do (not yet) inhabit the seventh circle of the hell of fascism, a rebellious postulation is possible if – and only if – it corresponds to its contrary and it alone, as it is nothing but coextensive with its internal limits in the form of anti-power and anti-politics.124 The problem with this machinic

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123 *NcH*, 9.
124 *APP*, 142.
coupling of the anti? with the dominant is that rebellion’s subjective force is inseparable from and internal to the very thing it needs to take on to lead it to its downfall, as though there is an analogous parallel postulate or Heraclitean unity-of-contraries to envision between rebellion and fascism. How does one envision rebellion to be always radically subjective, only to be authorized indirectly and negatively determined by the People (of) the One?\(^{125}\) Determination-in-the-last-instance cannot be devoid of the most ambiguous term in its content: the agency or authority of “instance.”\(^{126}\) The authority or authorization in the determination-in-the-last-instance entails the generic will to rebel (in) the World. Therefore, alongside the sous-vereignty of the People (of) the One is the determination-in-the-last-authority (against) all authorities. If it respects the en-demic paradigm, such a continuity then would not be a matter of people having to become their opposite (whatever it may be) to vanquish their oppressor or executioner better, to pass through a process that is as much humanizing as it is mechanizing. It is important to recall that the very opening lines of \textit{A Biography of Ordinary Man} are “it is right to rebel against philosophers.”\(^{127}\) The co-extensivity of rebellion and fascism in the bounds of anti?power is nothing more than an unbreakable lock of the philosopher as the superior man who has thrown away the key. It is not a matter alone of “[creating] your very own non-philosophy,”\(^{128}\) but of inventing the means of emancipation or, better said, inventing the means of emancipation is the creation of one’s non-philosophy insofar as non-philosophy is at once the transformation of the world and the a priori defence of humans.

\(^{125}\) \textit{EdE}, 373.
\(^{127}\) \textit{BoOM}, 1. Though Hock and Dubilet’s translation reads as “It is reasonable to revolt against philosophers,” the original is, “On a raison de se révolter contre les philosophes,” like the Maoist phrase “It is right to rebel against reactionaries” (“On a raison de se révolter contre les réactionnaires”).
\(^{128}\) \textit{P&NP}, 239.
If one must speak of democracy in terms of non-philosophy, it must be concerned with who the People (of) the One are and their rule, which is the determination-in-the-last-instance of onto-theo-politics by these people-without-the-World. Introducing democracy into thought is restrained if it does not identify who the people are and what they do within their power. It is always a matter of recognizing that people, or rather, we are not made for philosophy, but philosophy is made for and by us. We do not claim like Derrida, “no democracy, no deconstruction” and vice versa: “no democracy, no non-philosophy.” The people are not missing. They are right where we are.
Conclusion

I began this dissertation with the following claim: if non-philosophy is the attempt to introduce democracy into thought, then one must be able to theoretically identify and define who the people of this democracy are and what they do within their power. Doing so demonstrates the uniqueness of non-philosophy as a programme, axiomatics, and pragmatics for inventing new ways of living and thinking and the emancipation of the future within us. This dissertation aimed to revitalize discussions surrounding the work of François Laruelle concerning his ever-present critique of humanity’s judgment and how it connects to questions concerning democracy. In the four chapters following my introduction, I analyzed the stakes of the relationship between philosophy and humanity. Without this analysis, there is no right to speak of democracy in connection to non-philosophy, nor right to speak of a break or emancipation from philosophical sufficiency. My dissertation is not a continuation of philosophical anthropology or humanism by other means deemed “non-philosophical.” Rather, it is an attempt to truly bring about Laruelle’s declaration, “It is right to rebel against philosophers” (On a raison de se révolter contre les philosophes) and assume the consequences that follow. To do with Laruelle – rather than do what Laruelle does, to outdo or out-Laruelle Laruelle – is the crux of this dissertation.

The first chapter discusses the unhappy unity of humanity and philosophy. In every philosophy in the Western tradition, there appears to be the equivalent of the Platonic cave in that philosophy serves as the ladder or mediator to escape or be free from ignorance. One may see this unity in the work of thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Max Horkheimer, and Louis Althusser, though these identifications are in no way exhaustive. One may as easily find this tendency in Kant, Hegel, Marx, and even Nietzsche. I argued that it is not that humanity is incompatible with
philosophy, but rather philosophy is incompatible with humanity. This provocation is the bedrock for all my dissertation’s problematics.

With this provocation, Chapter 2 analyzed François Laruelle’s involvement in this relationship between humanity and philosophy. After all, while Laruelle sometimes refers to his non-philosophy as “human philosophy,” this chapter aimed to investigate why that must be the case. This chapter brought into discussion the development of Laruelle’s thought, from Philosophie I to Philosophie V and beyond, and the critique of major invariants within Laruelle’s work such as demo-logical difference, anthro-po-logical difference, ego-xeno-logical difference, and eco-logical difference. These invariants have hitherto been unappreciated by existing secondary writers in English and rarely discussed in French studies. One may consider this chapter non-exhaustive because, as I am writing, there are ongoing archival efforts, unearthing manuscripts that will confirm some of the findings in this dissertation, creating more problems to figure out for future researchers committed to the programme.

Chapter 3 continues with an analysis of François Laruelle’s work alongside other thinkers, such as Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze, on questions concerning the relationship between technology, power, politics, and life. While each thinker may be the subject of many dissertations or even discussed in tandem as sharing a common ground in that relationship, it is Laruelle’s essay, “Homo ex machina,” that grounds a radical critique of why one must break from philosophical sufficiency understood as the parallelism of life and power. It also allows the reader to understand the necessity of non-philosophy as a democratic act: if the power over life can include philosophical sufficiency, then we must be able to demonstrate the power of people as having primacy or prior-to-priority over philosophy; that is, to demonstrate that people determine philosophy in the last instance alone.
The fourth and final chapter concludes the analysis of the role that democracy plays in non-philosophy, seeking to carry out what Laruelle first introduces but never truly carries out to fruition: a transcendental science of power. It is here that I draw occasional support from the work of thinkers such as Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Jacques Derrida and even Laruelle’s earliest writings on political materialism to envision a radical real critique of onto-theo-politics or cratological parallelism. This chapter brought about varying perspectives that may serve as future research into what I will call non-politics as first politics. I elucidated what that meant regarding the real order instituted from the People (of) the One, which I also call the en-demic paradigm. I also envisioned what may delineate between Derrida’s democracy to come and futural democracy, a democracy whose messianic unforeseeable causality is no longer bound to sovereignty but an under-determination of power known as sous-vereignty. Lastly, I envisioned what would allow for such a “transcendental deduction” of power in the form of the generic will, a uni-lateralization of power and philosophy and their will to dominate immanent (to) the People (of) the One.

Each of these chapters sought to revitalize non-philosophy work for future implementations – not just research but practical and inventive approaches. These implementations are attempts that go well beyond the bindings of gatekept or expensive manuscripts or otherwise left for the isolated thinker. Although this dissertation continues in that respect almost hypocritically, it is not without declarations to change the circumstances and existing conditions for invention. Assuming that the time for introduction is well past and, perhaps, is always stale is to assume that one work suffices for all the others and, therefore, is not worth the pain of doing it again, even if it means doing it otherwise. This dissertation calls upon a collective investigation of the alleyway to a lived future for a city of heretics. It attempts to popularize non-philosophy to force ourselves free from our vicious circles. My future work will elaborate upon the final chapter to envision a non-politics
proper to this discipline seeking consistent refinement. The work of thinkers such as Anne-Françoise Schmid, Sophie Lesueur and Gilles Grelet point to paths that are reliant yet independent of Laruelle’s corpus, and readers can look to them to be inspired as much as I have been to think with and otherwise than Laruelle.

I am not saying that existing scholarship into non-philosophy in English and French has been fruitless. Perhaps it would be better to say that they “jumped the shark” without being too harsh for the fields that non-philosophy has found itself in dialogue with to excite the work done, be it Marxism, posthumanism, theology, film studies, ecology, media studies, and so on. Nevertheless, these dialogues have been pertinent, at least for my formation and many others, and I cannot doubt their influence. So long as there is curiosity into the development and future of non-philosophy, I will have known and demonstrated that one has not said everything – whether that is by Laruelle or the non-philosophy irreducible to him.

As I close this dissertation, I would like to return to the namesake behind the title of this work, Seán O’Casey’s *The Plough and the Stars*. To recall, Anne-Françoise Schmid referred to this play as a work that Laruelle occasionally refers to until *Tétralogos*, where he adopts it (as I do here) into *From the Cave to the Stars*. The dramaturgical aspect of Laruelle’s writing concerning the judgment of humanity is by no means a one-to-one reflection of O’Casey’s dramaturgy of the Easter Rising in Ireland in 1916. Nevertheless, the thematic and undertones of the play’s namesake, the Irish Citizen Army’s flag (The Starry Plough or *An Camchéacht*), portrays James Connolly’s own religiously inflected declaration, “The Irish people will be free when they own everything from the plough to the stars.” Although O’Casey’s play is a satirical account of the 1916 rebellion and the outcomes of Irish nationalism in service of the poor, the analogy works well regarding the betrayal of philosophers in service of generic humanity. Indeed, non-philosophy is the attempt to
introduce peace and democracy into thought by turning what was once weaponized abstraction into a tool for human emancipation, as though Laruelle took O’Casey’s principles seriously for a generic humanity that struggles to shape its destiny.
**Appendix**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Events</th>
<th>Scientific Events</th>
<th>Authors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the Macedonian Empire (end of the city-state)</td>
<td>Idea of a biological science</td>
<td>Aristotle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of the slave-holding Roman Empire; Roman Law</td>
<td>Idea of a new physics</td>
<td>The Stoics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feudalism + the first signs of a revival of Roman Law</td>
<td>Propagation of the Arab’s scientific discoveries</td>
<td>St. Thomas Aquinas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development of legal mercantile relations under the Absolute Monarchy</td>
<td>Foundation of mathematical physics by Galileo</td>
<td>Descartes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rise of the bourgeoisie; French Revolution</td>
<td>New foundation of physics by Newton</td>
<td>Kant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contradictions of the French Revolution (threat of the ‘Fourth Estate’ eliminated by Thermidor and Napoleon: Civil Law Code)</td>
<td>First approaches to a theory of history</td>
<td>Hegel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence, growth and first struggles, failures and victory of the worker’s movement</td>
<td>Science of history founded by Marx</td>
<td>Marx-Lenin (dialectical materialism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperialism (rise of the ‘petty-bourgeoisie’)</td>
<td>Axiomatization of mathematics, mathematical Logic</td>
<td>Husserl</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis of imperialism</td>
<td>Developments in technology</td>
<td>Heidegger</td>
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<tr>
<td>And so on…</td>
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**Figure 1:** A Schematic Table Representing the Conjunction of Political and Scientific Events and Associated Authors, from Louis Althusser, “What is Philosophy?” in *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014), 15.
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Select Conferences: