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Hinan: To Remember, or To Forget?

Collective memory and reconciliation in Guatemala and Rwanda

Tamara Hinan

The expression “never again” has been used repeatedly following mass atrocities of the twentieth century, most notably the Holocaust (Sanford 2009:26). “Never again” represents the international commitment that no population will ever again be subjected to the horrors of genocide. The Spanish translation of the expression, Nunca Más, was the title of the Argentinean Truth Commission in the 1980s (Sanford 2009:26). “Never again” appeared following the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Important sites become commemorative memorials, where individuals go to pay their respects to the victims. These sites include the preserved concentration camp at Auschwitz, and the small, brick church of Ntarama in Rwanda, containing skeletal remains of many of the estimated 5,000 Tutsi slaughtered at the site during the genocide, (Buckley-Zistel 2006:132). Similar memorials exist elsewhere, including a small block of stone on the edge of the Plaza Mayor in Guatemala City, with the words “A los heroes anónimos de la paz” chiseled into the side, meaning “to those anonymous heroes of peace” (Smith 2001:59). And yet, time after time, “again” continues to arrive. This attempt to preserve the past seems to be for naught. With such seemingly futile attempts at commemoration as a part of the reconciliation process, one begins to question what role memory plays in the healing process in a post-conflict society.

This paper will examine the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Guatemala and Rwanda, and the impact of memory upon the rebuilding process. Having both experienced violent conflict, and having taken opposing approaches to the role of memory within the reconstruction process, Guatemala and Rwanda establish the necessity of memory in community reconstruction. Memory plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction, as it aids the establishment of a collective memory, which in turn contributes to the creation of cultural identity, and the establishment of a narrative of truth, both of which are necessary in the rebuilding process.

La Violencia – Mass Atrocity in Guatemala

For nearly three-and-a-half decades between 1962 and 1996, the civilian population of Guatemala suffered severe violations of human rights at the hands of the military (CEH 1999:2). The Commission for Historical Clarification (abbreviated from its Spanish name to CEH) was a Truth Commission established to investigate the atrocities...
committed between 1962 and the final signing of the Peace Agreement in 1996. The conflict had approximately 45,000 victims, over half of whom were summarily executed. The commission estimated that “the number of persons killed or disappeared as a result of the fratricidal confrontation reached a total of two hundred thousand” (CEH 1999:2). Another 1.5 million were displaced, either internally or as refugees to Mexico (Smith 2001:62). Since 83% of the victims belonged to the ethnic Maya population, the final CEH report labelled the atrocities as genocide against the Maya (Manz 2002:293). The CEH (1999:39) asserts that the Maya were targeted because of their ethnicity, the conflict thereby constituting genocide according to the Genocide Convention of the United Nations (1948 Article II). The convention defines genocide as, “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.”

The causes of mass atrocity within any society are complex and the causes of La Violencia are no exception. In Guatemala, the roots of the conflict extend at least to the Proclamation of Independence in 1821, with the creation of an authoritarian state that protected state assets and promoted the development of an elite minority (Manz 2002:294). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the socio-economic gap between the impoverished and the wealthy continued to grow, increasing racial and ethnic divisions between white Guatemalans and indigenous groups (CEH 1999:4; Warren 1993:26). In 2001, nearly 60% of the population of Guatemala, classified as the “rural poor,” were members of the indigenous population (Smith 2001:62). Because of the extreme class division within the society, the state used violence to maintain control of the society whenever the population protested for economic or political change (CEH 1999:8). Conflict began between guerrilla armed forces and the state sponsored militia, and rapidly changed into a systematic targeting of civilian peasant communities by the militia under the guise of seeking members and supporters of the guerrilla movement. This targeting was an attempt to force political support from members of the vulnerable indigenous communities (CEH 1999:8).

During La Violencia, the Maya suffered a litany of human rights abuses. These abuses included killings, disappearances, rape, and forced displacement. Moreover, judicial processes were highly influenced by the military, thus preventing the judiciary from investigating, trying, or prosecuting such abuses (CEH 1999:10).

Aftermath

The impact of La Violencia on Guatemalan society is extensive and ongoing. It permeates all facets of the society, from the highest level of the judiciary to the poorest peasants in the most isolated communities in the country (CEH 1999:2). In the long-term, the conflict was extremely detrimental to the identity of the Maya people.

During the 1970s, guerrilla forces gained support throughout the highland regions near the border with Mexico, especially theIxil area in the Quiché province, which was mainly populated by the Maya (Manz 2002:295). The military entered the area with the intent to “terrorize, or, if need be, annihilate the Mayan community” (Manz 2002:298), and as a result, massacres in Ixil Maya communities were frequent and brutal. The survivors were condemned to silence, out of fear for their lives and fled to neighbouring provinces or into Mexico. Both those who left and those who remained felt obligated to hide their culture. They were “obliged to conceal their ethnic identity, manifested externally in their language and dress” (CEH 1999:88). The Maya were disallowed from practicing Catholicism, saw the destruction of many important cultural and spiritual centers, and were viciously persecuted for demonstrating any semblance of their indigenous social structure. Although these characteristics do not fall under the umbrella of genocide found in the Genocide Convention, they do meet the definition of ‘cultural genocide’ established by Raphaël Lemkin, historian, upon whose writing the Convention itself was founded. Cultural genocide is defined as the elimination, or attempt at elimination of a local language, national spirit, or “cultural activities” (Lemkin 2002:30). The Maya were subject to genocide at the hands of the state of Guatemala.
Genocide in Rwanda

Whereas the genocide in Guatemala occurred over thirty years, the genocide in Rwanda spanned 100 days, beginning in April of 1994. Nevertheless, in those 100 days, the name ‘Rwanda’ became synonymous with the modern connotation of the word “genocide”. Over 800,000 individuals were slaughtered in just over three months, and another two million took refuge in neighboring countries to escape the violence that pitted Rwandan against Rwandan (Magnarella 2002:311).

The political situation preceding the genocide in Rwanda originated in the remnants of the country’s colonization. In the late nineteenth century, Germany, and later Belgium, had colonial authority over Rwanda, and exploited what were previously informal racial categories upon Rwandan society: the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa (Straus 2007:124). It is important to note, that these social categories are not tribes, clans, or ethnic groups. In Rwanda, Scott Straus (2007:124) observed that, “Hutu and Tutsi intermarry; they belong to the same clans; they live in the same regions; they speak the same language; and they practice the same religions.” The colonial authority initially based group membership upon appearance, with members of the Tutsi group having features more closely resembling their European occupiers (Straus 2007:125). As a result, the Tutsi were deemed the “ruling elite”, given authority over the nation, and supported financially by Belgium. Throughout the twentieth century, these categories imposed by the colonial powers, became a significant source of tension (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:166).

The Tutsi held governing power in Rwanda until April 6th 1994, when the plane carrying Hutu president Habyarimana was shot down. Subsequently, extremist Hutu forces overtook the government, thereby controlling the National Guard and the army, and proceeded to attempt elimination of the entire Tutsi population, and all moderate Hutu from Rwanda (Magnarella 2001:313). In July, with the arrival of the rebel army the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) composed primarily of Tutsi who had escaped to Uganda, a peace agreement was reached. A shaky coalition government then formed, with the RPF sharing power over Rwanda with several other political parties (Magnarella 2001:314).

Aftermath

Focusing on the impact of atrocity on culture, the effect of genocide upon the Rwandan society has several defining features that differentiate it from the aftermath of La Violencia. The first difference is the scope of the death toll, and in the participation of the general population in the atrocities. Straus (2007:130) estimates that the number of individuals directly involved in killings during the genocide was between 175,000 and 210,000 individuals, constituting between seven and eight percent of the adult population. With such a clear distinction between “hunter” and “hunted”, the polarization between groups was high following the atrocities. A second feature was the fact that not only did intergroup killing occur, but also intra-group killing. Hutu extremists killed moderate Hutu, suspecting them of supporting the Tutsi government, making Rwanda a unique case of genocide (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:176). Furthermore, Hutu refugees, and civilians within Rwanda itself, were treated very differently during and following the genocide. The differentiation in treatment is based upon the assumption that “only Hutu have blood on their hands, and only Tutsi blood” (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007: 178). Not only did extremist Hutu kill other Hutu, Tutsi rebel forces fought back, targeting all Hutu. Moreover, post-conflict justice in Rwanda has only punished Hutu perpetrators, absolving Tutsi of crimes committed during the genocide, from petty theft to murder (Straus 2007:130).

Theoretical applications of memory

The functionality and flaws of memory have been long studied and well documented. In the classic children’s tale Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll wrote, “It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards” (1865:190). Similarly, Sigmund Freud used the metaphor of archaeology to illustrate the functionality of memory, describing memory as being buried in layers beneath the present (Lambek and Antze 1996:xii). The study of memory in the social sciences has significantly increased in the past twenty years, changing the meaning of the term and
its application to the variety of disciplines (Berliner 2005:198). In one such field, that of post-conflict reconstruction, Joanna Quinn (2004:426) asserts, “a society must pass through several stages in its quest to right the wrongs of the past. These stages include memory and remembering, forgiveness . . . and acknowledgement.” Gail Weldon posits that, while fostering remembrance and acknowledgement can have a positive impact on healing a post-conflict society, it can also further complicate the situation by creating an atmosphere of mistrust, a fear of revenge, and tension between those who want to remember and those who wish to forget (2003:56).

While there are many theories and applications of the theory of memory, there are three main concepts of importance in examining the post-conflict impact of memory in communal healing and the rebuilding of societies. The first is the theory of collective memory, the second is the concept of identity, and the third is the question of truth. The subsequent section will establish the parameters of each of these categories, as applicable post-genocide models of Guatemala and Rwanda.

**Collective Memory**

Maurice Halbwachs coined the term **collective memory** in 1925, defining it as a shared memory, constructed by the group to whom it belongs (Halbwachs 1992:100). Mary Douglas (1986:69) argues, “a society or a culture can remember and forget.” David Berliner (2005) defines collective memory as “the memory of society, and its ability to reproduce itself through time.” French historian Pierre Nora (1989) combines these definitions by separating collective memory into three categories: archive memory, duty memory, and distance memory.

In the modern era, memory is labelled as archival, because its primary purpose has become a means of preserving history (Nora 1989:13). Conversely, duty memory is the idea that remembrance has become an obligation for individuals to recapture and recognize the past (Nora 1989:14). Finally, Nora (1989:16) asserts that there is a discontinuity in modern society between the past and the present, due in part to the idea of societal progress, and the attempt to make the present more than a recycled version of the past.

Both Rwanda and Guatemala have attempted to apply a collective narrative to their rebuilding process. However, the societies have taken vastly different approaches, emphasizing forgetting in Rwanda, and remembering in Guatemala, and thus have experienced varying degrees of success.

**Collective memory and Rwanda**

While the establishment of a collective memory can aid in the reconstruction of a post-conflict society, it can just as easily be a hindrance to post-conflict reconstruction. Quinn (2004:405) presents the idea of **failed memory** in a post-conflict society as the failure “to actively pursue the process of remembering... and [the suppression of] many of the horrors which took place.”

Rwanda experienced failed memory through the experience of chosen amnesia, whereby not only was the society encouraged by the government to forget, but forgetting was also employed by the general population as a strategy to cope with their daily lives (Buckley-Zistel 2006:134). Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006:134) defines **chosen amnesia** as when “a traumatic event is deliberately excluded from the discourse in order to prevent a sense of closure.” In the case of Rwanda, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa individuals have continued to live in close proximity to one another since the end of atrocities. As the genocide pitted neighbours, even family members, against one another, it is impossible to eliminate the presence of the opposing ethnic groups from one’s life. One survivor said, “...recently, a big genocidaire was released from prison. He had killed here at Ntamara church. The first time I met him again was at Sunday mass” (Buckley-Zistel 2006:142). Since a large segment of society was implicated in the genocide, and the necessity of coexistence, chosen amnesia has been legislated by the government to become a coping strategy to allow Rwandans to continue their daily lives without being consumed by the anger and frustration of having to regularly encounter the ‘other’.

As suggested by Quinn’s hypothesis (2004), Rwandan society has experienced failed memory, as they have failed to develop a collective narrative in their reluctance to pursue the process of remembering. The government believes that the development of a collective memory would be
detrimental to the daily lives of many Rwandans, and would have the potential to further divide the society.

A second failure in Rwanda to develop a collective narrative is evident through what Buckley-Zistel (2003) terms forced memory. In Rwanda, “the deliberate, public rewriting of history is part of the government’s effort to unite the country” (Buckley-Zistel 2006:133). In this case, the new administration appears to be attempting to justify the Tutsi minority rule by de-emphasizing the importance of ethnicity within the society (Buckley-Zistel 2006:133). A public ban exists upon public references to ethnicity, leaving just one ethnic group in its place, the “Banyarwanda”, or “Rwandans” (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:180). However, it is not possible to forget, or to erase the longstanding suffering due to ethnic divisions. Instead, the creation of such a new narrative by governmental decree provides it with legitimacy. Many Rwandans, both Tutsi and Hutu, feel as if they are being forced into forgiving, when they have no desire to do so (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:180).

Extremely relevant to post-conflict Rwanda, Paul Ricoeur (1996:8) presents the problem of the “other”. Ricoeur explains that the “other” threatens the preservation one’s own identity. In Rwanda, the legislated inability to speak openly of ‘otherness’ has further threatened identity. The rewriting of history by the government has prevented young Rwandans from engaging in open, critical dialogue about the conditions that perpetuated the genocide, as well as discussions of identity within the safety of the education system. This creates the potential for a resurgence of the conditions that caused the genocide in 1994, as it makes it difficult for citizens to recover from the atrocities that occurred and thus allows pre-existing tensions to grow again (Freedman et. al. 2008:685). Fifteen years later, fears of resurgence are still prevalent within the society. One survivor said, “Cohabitation is peaceful, since we don’t dare to attack each other,” as Rwandans face severe penalties should they oppose the government-approved narrative (Buckley-Zistel 2006:144).

Furthermore, many individuals involved in the original conflict in Rwanda have transposed the fight between Hutu and Tutsi to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The perpetual instability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, stemming from the same roots that caused the genocide, demonstrates the continued prevalence of ethnic tensions. However, the government-constructed narrative of forgetting and national unity in Rwanda has had the desired impact – the genocide, its origins, and its consequences are no longer discussed. However, the attempts to forget have impeded the society from moving forward from the atrocities (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:186).

Collective memory and Guatemala

In contrast, observations of Guatemala display more success in the country’s approach to developing and preserving collective memory following La Violencia. The most visible example is the CEH, itself. The CEH was established in June of 1994, following negotiations between the government, and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), an “umbrella group of insurgent forces” (Manz 2002:293). Its mandate was threefold:

1) “To clarify ... the human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the armed confrontation that caused suffering among the Guatemalan people;

2) To prepare a report that will contain the findings of the investigations carried out;

3) To formulate specific recommendations to encourage peace and national harmony in Guatemala. The Commission shall recommend, in particular, measures to preserve the memory of the victims…” (CEH 1999:Prologue).

The goal of preserving the memories of the victims is presented explicitly in the mandate of the CEH itself, expressing the desire to tell the stories of the victims. Although the final report of the Truth Commission itself was not widely available in Guatemala at the time, sections were used by popular media, television, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, and was subsequently a highly contentious subject within the society (Oglesby 2007:79). In the wake of the restoration of order, both North American and Latin American anthropologists have conducted fieldwork in the country. This has allowed the dissemination of information from the report throughout the world (Manz 2002:292). Forensic anthropologists have
worked with local communities to exhume massacre burial sites, and to identify the victims, allowing closure for their families still seeking answers decades later. This closure is especially important in Guatemala, as “many Maya have expressed the need to reconcile themselves with the dead before they can begin to reconcile themselves with the living” (Sieder 2001:194). Similar forensic work has also occurred in Rwanda (Koff 2004).

In contrast to the situation in Rwanda, where the genocide has gone virtually unacknowledged and remains outside of collective consciousness, rebuilding efforts in Guatemala have permitted the “accretion of marginalized voices” (Sanford 2009:21). Victoria Sanford (2009) collected victim testimony of the atrocities, similar to those collected during the CEH. Sanford asserts (2009:21), “[t]estimonies portray the experience of the narrators as agents of collective memory and identity.” The individuals who provide their testimony have an urgent need to have their stories told, and the memories they seek to tell still hold a significant influence over their actions.

Moreover, villagers from Santa Maria Tzejá in the Ixil territory have undertaken a theatrical project entitled There Is Nothing Concealed That Will Not Be Discovered (Matthew 10:26), in which they enact and testify to the atrocities suffered by their village at the hands of the military. The performers are the Maya villagers themselves, allowing them both the opportunity to have their stories heard, but also to mourn the losses they suffered (Manz 2002:303). Recoeur (1996) refers to this mourning as the act of reconciliation with loss, and the acknowledgement of memory.

Identity

The second crucial application of memory to analyzing post-conflict societies is the intrinsic link between memory and individual or group identity. Ricoeur (1999:8) asserts that identity is difficult to preserve, and is linked through sameness, the ‘other’, and the establishment of collective memory. Collective identity, which is rooted in the past, is passed on from generation to generation. However, as a result, traumatic and violent events can have a shaping effect upon identity (Ricoeur 1996:8), and there is the concern that collective identity can become shaped by past occurrences of trauma (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:181).

Similarly, the strong tie between memory and identity is visible through the desire of minority groups to form, or reaffirm, their own social identities. Nora (2002:5) argues that this reaffirmation is a result of three types of decolonization in the twentieth century. The first is an international decolonization, stemming from the rehabilitation of memories through the disappearance of colonial powers. The second, a domestic decolonization, whereby the community wishes to reaffirm their memory in front of their former oppressors. The third type of decolonization is an ideological one, resulting from the liberation of peoples from the false or manipulated memories obtained under occupying political regimes.

Rwanda has experienced significant difficulty in re-establishing a collective identity (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:167). There are two primary reasons for this failure: the inability for memory to transcend traditional Hutu-Tutsi ethnic borders, and the creation of tensions between portions of the society who wish to remember and those who do not.

While factual accounts of events are generally not disputed (such as the shooting down of the President’s plane in Rwanda April 6th, 1994), the social and moral implications of memories of past atrocities are not able to transcend the barriers established by ethnic groups, even when those “ethnic groups” have been reportedly disbanded by governmental policy. Memory, history, and social identity vary between groups, as does the definition of the truth. Furthermore, individuals responsible for, or complicit in, acts of genocide can be found within all ethnic groups. Thus, the governmental policy eliminating the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa labels within Rwandan society is doomed to fail. It is not possible to establish a new identity without acknowledgement of the history and memories of individuals (Lemarchand and Niwese 2007:167-168). The unwillingness of the Tutsi government to prosecute Tutsi individuals guilty of crimes during the genocide demonstrates the continued presence of ethnic divisions, even if they only exist below the surface.
Secondly, memory failed to establish identity in Rwanda because of conflicting perspectives among members of the society, regarding the act of remembrance itself. The politics of remembrance and commemoration themselves cause difficulties. April 7th has been established as a national day of mourning within Rwanda, yet even on that day, the past is never discussed (Buckley-Zistel 2006:133). Although physical memorials have been erected, there is disagreement regarding the presence of these memorials. Memorials act as a physical representation of events within one’s daily life (Mayo 1993:58). However, in Rwanda, not only do the citizens have little desire to remember, the question of who should be commemorated also raises significant disagreement. Hutu groups feel underrepresented in commemorative projects, and Tutsi groups have little interest in including the Hutu in their commemorations (Buckley-Zistel 2006:135). Instead of reconciling the society, acts of remembrance and commemoration in Rwanda actually cause more dissention and division (Buckley-Zistel 2006:132).

Conversely, Guatemala has experienced more success at re-establishing their social identity. In addition to the peace negotiations and eventual accord, the CEH Truth Commission has been Guatemala’s main attempt at reconciling the society following the genocide of La Violencia. However, in spite of its strengths, it has been far from perfect. Plagued by a weak mandate, an unwillingness (and inability) to prosecute perpetrators using the criminal justice system, and intimidation by a still-powerful military, the CEH has endured significant criticism (Sieder 2001:201). Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties it has encountered, Guatemalan society has been able to re-establish collective identity, primarily due to the active involvement of the society in the healing process. This has permitted the reworking of social memory, and for the civilian population to challenge “the conditions of military impunity and political cultures marked by denial and fear” (Sieder 2001:201). Guatemalan society, especially the Maya, have chosen to work together to overcome decades of intimidation, fear, and silence using moral strength (Manz 2002:307).

Truth

The third and final important link between memory and rebuilding of post-conflict societies is the link between truth and memory. Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson (2002) suggest that memory creates its own truth, which may not be as accurate as the historical truth. However, since the truth narrative does not play the same role as historical truth, achieving accuracy is not the primary goal. Some experts even go so far as to suggest that the “truth” created through memory is more “truthful” than history, since it is the “truth of personal experience and individual memory” (Nora 2002:6).

Hamber and Wilson (2002:19) also assert that the importance of truth telling is that it “can create the public space for survivors to begin the process of working through a violent and conflicted history”, and that it creates its own subjective truth that can aid in the healing process of an individual. However, they are quick to note that truth telling will not reconcile a community, nor will it repair the wounded psyche of a nation. Instead, its use complements justice in order to transform memory into something concrete, to ensure that it will not recur within the society. In Guatemala, the society was able to achieve some success through the use of the CEH and its emphasis on exposing the truth. Conversely in Rwanda, because of the high prevalence of suspicion and social antagonism in many Rwandan communities, attempts to impose “collective truth telling and the restoration of social harmony” has had limited success thus far. This has occurred even in spite of the establishment a highly efficient judiciary system within the country (having had the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or ICTR, in addition to the gacaca court system) (Vandeginste 2001:245).

However, truth-telling in a post-conflict society can also be difficult, for several reasons, not the least of which is the unreliable nature of memory. This difficulty in reconciling the nature of “truth” proved to be an issue in both Rwanda, and Guatemala. The truth telling process in Guatemala was extremely lengthy (Sieder 2001:189), and, as a result, questions remain about the accuracy of the narrative in the final CEH report. Elizabeth Oglesby (2007) suggests that the CEH report oversimplifies
the causal factors of *La Violencia*, and that this oversimplification succeeded in maintaining pre-existing racial divisions within the society. Guatemala has thus done little to re-integrate indigenous peoples into their society. In Rwanda, the causal factors have been glossed over by the new government, resulting in an incomplete narrative that risks disappearing altogether if the false narrative is perpetuated to future generations (Buckley-Zistel 2006:142).

Similarly, the nature of memory itself makes it a faulty tool, prone to misinformation, incorrect recollection, and lapses (Hale 1997:817). Memories do not register all details of a particular event. Instead, a highly complex and selective process occurs to discern what is stored in memory, and what is not. Sanford (2009) reconstructed two separate testimonies of the massacre in a Maya village and discovered the reports contain inconsistencies originating from differing points of view, differing perceptions, and different interpretations of the events. Yet, it is difficult to discount or discredit either testimony, when both parties are telling what they believe to be the “truth.” While history is often discredited for being told from the perspective of the victor, memory is also unreliable to establish an objective narrative of specific events. Failure to establish this truth will mean the society will never be able to heal.

**From Memory to Healing?**

Reconciliation is crucial in a post-conflict society in order for the nation to re-establish its stability (Hamber and Wilson 2002:38). The achievement of collective memory, reconciliation, healing, and forgiveness are, in a sense, a progression, though perhaps not linear. No form of reconciliation is achievable without first using memory to process the atrocities that have occurred. Nor can any of the above be achieved through force. As was evidenced in Rwanda, forgiveness can be mandated by the government, but it creates either a false sense of forgiveness, worse, perhaps, than no forgiveness at all (Buckley-Zistel 2006:143).

The healing process for post-conflict societies does not have a simple, black and white structure. Strategies that succeed in one society may fail in another. Even within the same society, strategies successful for one group (i.e. memorialisation of Tutsi deaths in Rwanda) may exacerbate difficulties in the same society for another group (in the aforementioned case, for Hutu) (Buckley-Zistel 2006:145). However, the comparison between the aftermath of *La Violencia* in Guatemala and the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, suggests that some approaches may prove more successful than others in the healing process of a society following a genocide.

The strategies employed in Guatemala demonstrate the crucial role that memory plays in every aspect of the reconciliation process in post-conflict societies. Memory shapes identity, memory establishes a collective narrative, and within that narrative, memory ascertains truth. Conversely, the experiences in Rwanda highlight the difficulties encountered when attempting to utilize memory in the reconciliation process. While each of the aforementioned three aspects is necessary for reconciliation in a society, they each may also be detrimental to individual healing processes (Buckley-Zistel 2006:148). Active, purposeful recollection of trauma risks allowing painful memories to resurface and causes setbacks, especially in the short term. However, if individuals are not able to heal from the atrocity, the society at large will also be prevented from healing. In terms of mass violence, it is not possible to forget. Whether suppressed or acknowledged, traumatic events contribute to both individual and collective identities, and thus contribute to future actions and reactions.

**Conclusions**

To remember or to forget can be a conscious decision, reflecting the state of affairs in the society. Through the ICTR and the gacaca court system, Rwanda has arguably experienced one of the most successful, comprehensive, post-conflict justice systems. Hundreds of thousands of trials have been held, hundreds of thousands of individuals have been indicted, and hundreds of thousands more will occur in the coming years (Buckley-Zistel 2006:144).

Yet, the society has not healed, the tensions that caused the genocide to break out in 1994 still exist, and the possibility of a recurrence of the genocide is still a reasonable possibility. In fact, the atrocities
continue today, between Hutu and Tutsi in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Rosoux 2007:497). In contrast, while reconstruction remains a work in process, the utilization of a Truth Commission in the form of the CEH in Guatemala, coupled with the active participation of marginalized members of Guatemalan society in the reconciliation process.

In conclusion, the examples of Guatemala and Rwanda demonstrate the crucial role that memory plays in the healing process of a post-conflict society. They illustrate that the acknowledgement of genocide is a more effective strategy in the healing process than attempting to selectively forget. Although the healing process is long and complex, it cannot truly begin unless the willingness to remember exists (Quinn 2004:427). Failing to remember and acknowledge history can, has, and continues to cause the recurrence of genocide and other crimes against humanity, despite the global promise of “Never Again.” Those two simple words, uttered following every mass atrocity throughout the twentieth century, including Guatemala and Rwanda, are thus little more than an empty sentiment.

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Triage: Conserving Primates and Competing Interests

Arthur Klages

Competing Interests

It has become obvious to me that an academic discourse on primate conservation now needs to address two pertinent facts. First, that the major issue within discourses on primate conservation is the competing interests of the conservationists, indigenous populations, and both local and global development initiatives. This is the issue that goes to the root of the interrelated problems of deforestation, habitat destruction, and hunting of nonhuman primates for meat (Cowlishaw and Dunbar 2000:1; Peterson and Ammann 2003:1). Second, that the desires of these competing interests cannot all be satisfied (Harcourt 2000). Unfortunately, I believe the first issue does not receive enough attention, while the second is more-

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