Women in the Canadian Armed Forces: At Home and Abroad

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Gender, Sexuality & Women's Studies

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Abstract

Most Canadians consider peacekeeping to be an important part of the country’s identity. Since its heyday in the 1960s to the 1990s, when Canada was one of the world’s largest contributors of “blue helmets,” its reputation as a peacekeeping nation has been diminished by scandals and the failure of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in countries such as Somalia and Rwanda. However, with the election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015, the Liberal majority government promised to re-engage Canada in peacekeeping—a promise that also entails increasing the involvement of women in peacekeeping missions. My doctoral research project identifies opportunities and constraints for Canadian women’s participation in UN PKOs through 40 in-depth interviews with women who have served in PKOs (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali and South Sudan). Although a few Canadian scholars have provided critical theoretical perspectives on peacekeeping, to date no primary research has been conducted to understand the grounded opportunities and constraints faced by Canadian women serving in UN PKOs. Since the majority of personnel deployed on UN PKOs are uniformed, women’s experiences in peacekeeping cannot be understood without also examining their experiences in the Canadian Armed Forces. As such, my research questions look at the experiences of women in the CAF at home and abroad: What are the opportunities and constraints experienced by women in the CAF? What motivates Canadian women to participate in PKOs? Do they consider their contributions to PKOs to be different from those of male peacekeepers? How does gender identity trouble, reinforce, or contradict objectives of PKOs? Through thematic analysis of qualitative data collected from interviews and triangulation with existing literature on gender and peacekeeping, my doctoral dissertation attempts to provide answers to these questions. My findings point broadly to the importance of not relying on operational effectiveness arguments for improving the representation of women in militarized institutions. People of all genders deserve to serve in the Canadian Armed Forces and in PKOs for intrinsic reasons of equity and fairness, not because they can improve these deeply masculinist and hierarchical institutions solely by their presence. By engaging intersectionally with gender, my research also identified the ways in which class, race, sexual orientation, education, language, and place of origin influence the identities of Canadian peacekeepers. My findings reinforce the importance of paying more nuanced attention to such markers of identity in
policies aimed at diversifying the CAF and PKOs. I sought ethics approval for my doctoral research from Western University and the Department of National Defence (DND). I hope my findings will inform gender equality and culture change policies within the Canadian Armed Forces and in UN PKOs.
Lay Summary

Most Canadians consider peacekeeping to be an important part of the country’s identity. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau promised to re-engage Canada in peacekeeping—a promise that also entails increasing the involvement of women in peacekeeping operations (PKOs).

My doctoral research project identifies opportunities and constraints for Canadian women’s participation in UN PKOs through 40 in-depth interviews with women who have served in PKOs (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Mali and South Sudan). Peacekeeping experiences cannot be understood without also examining women’s experiences in the Canadian Armed Forces. As such, my research questions look at the experiences of women in the CAF at home and abroad: What are the opportunities and constraints experienced by women in the CAF? What motivates Canadian women to participate in PKOs? Do they consider their contributions to PKOs to be different from those of male peacekeepers? How does gender identity trouble, reinforce, or contradict objectives of PKOs? Through thematic analysis of qualitative data collected from interviews and triangulation with existing literature on gender and peacekeeping, my doctoral dissertation attempts to provide answers to these questions.
Keywords

Peacekeeping; women; gender; Canadian Armed Forces; Women, Peace and Security; Canada; Feminist Foreign Policy
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I am immensely grateful to the participants in this research for opening up to me and sharing with me some of their most intimate moments of joy, loss, hope, fear, and frustration. Also, for many of them trusting me with information about themselves that could have put them at risk of retaliation or ostracization but feeling a deep sense of duty and desire to share their experiences with the intent to improve the conditions for the women ahead of them.

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Chief Professional Culture Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIAP</td>
<td>Feminist International Assistance Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSS</td>
<td>Feminist security studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBA+</td>
<td>Gender based analysis plus</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>MOWIP</td>
<td>Measuring opportunities for women in peacekeeping</td>
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<td>MST</td>
<td>Military Sexual Trauma</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation and abuse</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and gender-based violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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Chapter 1

1 Introduction

1.1 Research questions and objectives

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Canada was one of the world’s largest contributors of blue helmets. Since then, Canada’s reputation as a peacekeeping nation has been diminished by scandals and the failure of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in countries such as Somalia and Rwanda although many Canadians still consider peacekeeping to be intricately connected to Canada’s collective identity (Carroll, 2016). However, with the election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015, the Liberal majority government promised to re-engage Canada in peacekeeping—a promise that also entails increasing the involvement of women in peacekeeping missions, namely through $15 million invested in the Elsie Initiative. Announced in 2017, the Elsie Initiative’s objective is to recruit, train, and promote female military and police personnel for UN PKOs. Further commitments for women’s participation were also set forth in the Feminist International Assistance Policy, and Canada’s promise to uphold UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) through its 2017 National Action Plan. The Elsie Initiative’s central aim is to improve operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. It assumes not only that increasing the number of women in PKOs will counter mounting evidence of sexual abuse or exploitation (SEA) committed by male peacekeepers but also that victims of sexual violence will be more comfortable speaking to and being protected by female peacekeepers. By having a “civilizing effect” on their male colleagues, the presence of female peacekeepers was assumed to lead to lower levels of SEA (Jennings, 2011).

A review of interdisciplinary literature on gender and violence provides no empirical evidence to support the assumption that women are inherently more peaceful than men, nor that they can defuse or prevent male violence through their presence. However, these widely prevalent assumptions have acquired the status of truism in PKOs without any verification and despite significant empirical evidence to the contrary (Baruah, 2017). For example, based on her research in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cohen
(2013) found that women’s presence in small or large numbers does not have any influence upon men’s behavior in situations of armed conflict. When faced with similar constraints and pressures, women are as capable of perpetrating SEA as their male peers. Although neither women nor men are natural perpetrators of violence or abuse, there is evidence to suggest that under certain conditions, such as during conflict, individuals of any gender may be prone to such behaviors (ibid.).

Adding small numbers of women to masculinist institutions is often assumed to be an effective means of addressing systemic societal challenges such as gender-based violence despite much contradictory evidence (Jennings, 2011, Henry, 2012). Von Hlatky (2017) emphasizes this when she argues that although increasing Canadian women’s participation in peacekeeping is a goal worth pursuing, “we will get there faster if we do not rely on the women we are trying to recruit to improve operational outcomes and transform troubled institutions.” Much evidence exists to suggest that general motivations for women seeking careers in military or police services leading to deployment on PKOs mirror those of men’s (including stable jobs, decent salaries, benefits, opportunities to challenge themselves, travel), though this has rarely been cited as justification for supporting women’s participation in PKOs by the architects of UNSCR 1325 or by countries like Canada with systemic support initiatives (Baruah, 2017).

Beyond questioning widely endorsed assumptions about what women contribute to PKOs, several researchers have urged reflection on the fact that “militarized peacekeeping” is itself an oxymoron (Baruah, 2017; Henry 2012). They have questioned the sole reliance on militaries to secure peace, critiquing UN peacekeeping as an industry with colonial and imperialist underpinnings (Razack, 2004). An overwhelming majority of past and present UN PKOs are in the Global South, and very few have been successful in building lasting peace. Countries from the Global South contribute far more troops to PKOs than countries in the Global North, but UN peacekeeping continues to be commonly heralded as a security “innovation” pioneered and operationalized by the latter (Henry, 2012).

My doctoral research project identifies the opportunities and constraints for Canadian women’s participation in UN PKOs through 40 in-depth interviews with women who are
current or former CAF members and have served in previous PKOs (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Mali, South Sudan). Although a few Canadian scholars have provided critical theoretical perspectives on peacekeeping (Razack, 2004; Whitworth, 2004), to date no primary research has been conducted to understand the grounded opportunities and constraints faced by Canadian women serving in UN PKOs. Since the majority of personnel deployed on UN PKOs are uniformed, women’s experiences in peacekeeping cannot be understood without examining their experiences in the CAF. What are the opportunities and constraints experienced by women in the CAF? What motivates Canadian women to participate in PKOs? Do they consider their contributions to PKOs to be different from those of male peacekeepers? How does gender identity trouble, reinforce, or contradict objectives of PKOs? Through thematic analysis from qualitative data collected from interviews as well as triangulation with existing research on women in the armed forces and in peacekeeping, my doctoral research provides substantial insight into these questions. Findings from my research provide empirical evidence about the opportunities and constraints faced by women in the CAF, their experiences on PKOs alongside the specific contributions they make to PKOs. These findings illuminate the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of increasing women’s participation in PKOs in order to improve operational effectiveness, especially when many women continue to experience challenges in their work environments at home. My research also unpacks the ways in which race, sexual orientation, and language influence the intersectional identities of women peacekeepers, highlighting such markers of identity within policies aimed at diversifying PKOs.

1.2 Background and context

In the following sections, I will discuss some of the background and the context in which discussions and debates on gender and peacekeeping unfold. Explaining how the Elsie Initiative, UNSCR 1325, the WPS agenda (and the National Action Plans that attempt to operationalize the WPS agenda) all fit into Canada’s foreign policy priorities will also help elucidate the timeliness and relevance of my doctoral research project.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 has been hailed as foundational for addressing gendered inequality, exclusion, and violence as a result of conflict. The resolution marks the beginning of “a policy framework that seeks to respond effectively to the complex array of challenges related to gender equality identified by decades of feminist scholarship and by activists, advocates, and academics alike” (George and Shepherd, 2016, 300). Passed on October 31, 2000, the resolution builds on, and aims to mainstream, commitments set forth in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action through four pillars: participation, prevention, protection, and relief and recovery. UNSCR 1325 calls for the increased participation of women in peace processes, the protection of women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, the prevention of violence against women, and the need to address international crises through a lens of gender equality. UNSCR 1325 provides the foundation for the WPS agenda accomplished via nine subsequent resolutions: 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2009); 1960 (2010); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015); 2467 (2019) and 2493 (2019). These resolutions recognize sexual violence as a weapon and tactic of war, make calls to address conflict related sexual violence, emphasize women’s participation in all stages of peace processes, highlight the importance of collaboration with civil society, and call for increased funding for gender responsive programs.

Feminist scholars and activists hoped UNSCR 1325 would have transformative potential, yet many have been critical of the resolution. There has been much discussion on the positive and problematic aspects of the resolution (Gibbings, 2011; Harrington, 2011; Hudson, 2017; Pratt, 2013; Puechghuirbal, 2010; Tryggestad, 2009). Hudson (2017), for example, argues that from a liberal-feminist perspective, UNSCR 1325 comprised an important shift in global security thinking and provided an opportunity for local women to invoke international WPS norms in their peace work. However, Basini and Ryan (2016) argue that WPS has been operationalized in bureaucratic and technocratic ways whereas there are countless examples of local organizations operationalizing elements of UNSCR 1325 without knowing about the resolution, suggesting that women do not need
the international community to tell them what to prioritize (401). Broadly speaking, the WPS agenda pays no attention to cultural and ethnic differences or diversity and some critics believe that UNSCR 1325 has been used as a policy mechanism to maintain control over less powerful actors in global politics by using women’s rights in an imperialist manner to serve international development and security interests (Basu, 2016). Basu (2016) challenges the notion that the Global South is a passive recipient of policies developed elsewhere and argues that governments in the Global South have contributed to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in at least two ways: by adopting National Action Plans (NAPs) and contributing uniformed personnel in peacekeeping operations.

Beyond ignoring cultural difference and diversity, UNSCR 1325 has also been criticized for reproducing harmful gender essentialisms, gendered expectations, and placing the onus on women to address issues of global security through their “natural” peacefulness, especially since the resolution refrains from providing structural solutions to challenge the status quo. Adding women to masculinist institutions is insufficient as a means to achieve gender equality. A resolution based on essentialist assumptions about men and women reproduces existing gender hierarchies and leaves out many intersectional gender experiences. For example, silence on homophobic and transphobic violence is a result of the heteronormative assumptions embedded in the framing of WPS (Hagen, 2016). Women with disabilities also do not see their concerns represented anywhere in the WPS agenda (Ortoleva, 2017).

In addition to reproducing gender essentialisms and leaving out many intersectional gender experiences, UNSCR 1325 does not cement any clear targets, indicators, or benchmarks to measure progress (Barrow, 2016, 250-251). As such, there is an implementation gap where words are not met with sufficient actions. For example, while women’s participation in peacekeeping has marginally increased since UNSCR 1325, we still do not have data on what women are tasked with while they are deployed and the roles that they undertake (Kirby and Shepherd, 2016, 375). Kirby and Shepherd (2016) argue,
The mere presence of women on any given mission is not as important as what positions they hold, how their presence alters gender practices in situations, whether a gender perspective (itself not synonymous with ‘women’) is integral to mission activities, and how these elements interact with the wider context of conflict and its resolution… This qualification goes directly to the distinction between gender balancing—increasing the number of women in a given role, in a way that approaches parity—and gender mainstreaming—integrating a gender perspective into the activities of an organization, thereby institutionalizing an understanding of the myriad ways in which gender matters (375-376).

The WPS’s approach to gender equality is typical of an ‘add women and stir’ approach where underlying conditions and structural constraints remain unaltered, and success is measured by increasing women’s numbers. In order for the implementation gap to be addressed, WPS must go beyond this approach.

UN member states have shown their commitment to UNSCR 1325 through the implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs) in which governments identify their priorities and responsibilities and commit to operationalizing and implementing WPS. True (2016) contends that NAPs are not ends in themselves and that the successes and shortcomings of NAPs must be interrogated for the same reasons that the WPS agenda has been criticized.

1.2.2 National Action Plans on Women, Peace, and Security

The UN defines a NAP as:

A document that details the actions that a government is currently taking, and those initiatives that it will undertake within a given time frame, in order to meet the obligations set out in all of the WPS resolutions. (Popovic, Lyytikainen, and Barr, 2010 in Hudson, 2017, 6)

As of October 2022, 104 UN member states (54%) have adopted WPS NAPs and some countries are on their second or third versions (WILPF, 2022). There are also 11 Regional Action Plans, such as the one of the African Union and European Union (ibid). Denmark
was the first country to launch a NAP in 2005 and Cote d'Ivoire was the first post-conlict country to adopt a plan in 2007. The most recent countries to adopt NAPs in 2022 are Kazakhstan and Morocco. Russia and China are the only two permanent Security Council members that have not drafted NAPs and have not made any WPS commitments, despite their part authorship of UNSCR 1325. WILPF (2022) also reports that 33% of NAPs are currently outdated, having expired in 2021 or before. NAPs vary in form and focus from country to country. George and Shepherd (2016) argue that NAPs are shaped by material, historical, socio-cultural, and even ideological priorities.

NAPs also vary by length and how they are organized as well as who was involved in their creation and implementation, in what they emphasize as priority areas and how much funding they dedicate to WPS (Fritz et al., 2011). According to Coomaraswamy (2015), high-impact NAPs are expected to have the following: strong leadership and effective coordination; inclusive design processes; costing and allocated budgets for implementation; monitoring and evaluation; and flexibility to adapt to emerging situations (241). Coomaraswamy (2015) argues that evidence points to stronger outcomes for NAPs that are coordinated by high-level ministries, such as a Ministry of Defense or Foreign Affairs, rather than a Ministry of Gender or Women so that the plan is mainstreamed across departments and central to issues of peace and security more broadly. The participation of civil society organizations and academic institutions along with citizens in implementing countries should iteratively occur at the design stage, during implementation, and through the review of the plans to better localize NAPs. Predictable and sustainable financing is an absolute prerequisite for the realization of NAPs, including plans for institutional audits to identify gaps (Coomaraswamy, 2015, 246). For monitoring and evaluation, NAPs must have clear benchmarks and targets that help measure progress on their implementation and improve reporting. Political will is also essential to implement a successful NAP (True (2016) notes this failure in the cases of China and Russia).

A few studies have analyzed various NAPs, how they frame key issues, and how they are problematic. Hudson (2017) analyzed the NAPs of four African countries: Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Uganda. She found a slippage between gender and women in the
plans where gender was treated as synonymous with sex (13). Of course, this is hardly surprising given that UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda also treat women, gender, and sex almost synonymously. Failing to differentiate between gender and sex makes invisible socially constructed hierarchies between masculinities and femininities. It also invisibilizes diversity between women’s experiences and how gender intersects with other identity markers like race, class, and sexual orientation. Further, “women and girls” are lumped together in many NAPs as a uniformly vulnerable group, a construction Enloe (2014) calls “womenandchildren.” This conflation essentializes and reinforces the vulnerability of both women and children, infantilizes women, and denies any possibility of the vulnerability of men and boys during conflict (Hudson, 2017, 14). Hudson’s (2017) study also notes the hierarchy of priorities where combating sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is at the apex. While some of the plans she analyzes mention other gendered harms and violence, such as the lack of material needs and economic deprivation, SGBV is most prioritized, and women are almost entirely framed as victims of male (sexual) violence (Hudson, 2017, 21).

Shepherd (2016) analyzed the plans of six countries that she argues are highly militarized as they are among the largest military spenders in the world and have sent troops to fight in Afghanistan. They include Australia, Georgia, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. She found that the NAPs of these countries locate insecurity outside of their territorial borders but present themselves as security experts with tools to remedy these concerns. She argues that the NAPs of these countries reproduce a world where “problems occur ‘elsewhere’ but solutions can be found ‘here’” (325). NAPs with a solely outward focus apply gender mainstreaming in their work with conflict-affected developing countries without acknowledging the insecurity that women experience within their own borders (True, 2016, 312).

Dunn (2014) argues that Australia’s NAP is solely outward facing and lacks inward reflection on pressing domestic issues. She argues that the NAP fails to take into account Indigenous-settler relations and that it “maintains a position of denial of conflict status to matters termed ‘domestic’ or ‘internal’ to the state, regardless of the level of violence involved” (286). She suggests that the WPS agenda is an opportunity for Australia to
localize their NAP with a focus on Indigenous-settler relations and acknowledge the country’s racist history. She suggests that while one remedy might be to add Indigenous women’s concerns to the existing Australian NAP, this strategy would do little to address the systemic injustices against Indigenous people. Therefore, she urges a rewriting of the NAP to integrate into its structure the recognition of historic and ongoing violence against Indigenous people with a particular focus on Indigenous women (294). Aggestam et al. (2019) suggest that countries like Canada and Sweden can similarly be criticized for “not sufficiently matching their care for distant other women living in conflict or poverty-struck zones with an empathetic commitment to their own Indigenous or marginalized refugee population” (32).

1.2.3 Canada’s National Action Plan

Canada developed its first NAP in 2010, a decade after adopting UNSCR 1325. True (2016) calls an uptake of NAPs during this time the ‘period effect’ where states only perceived the importance of the WPS agenda after the global meeting reviewing its progress (312). Feminist analysis of Canada’s first NAP points to its overall deficits. The most prominent criticism is that the NAP lacked targets and budget allocations, and included no civil society engagement in its creation or implementation (Tiessen and Tuckey, 2014; Woroniuk and Minnings, 2014). Canada’s first NAP was one of the shortest when compared to all other countries, and it did not have proper formatting, even lacking a title page. These deficits demonstrate the ad hoc nature of the plan and the lack of attention and care taken to prepare it. The 2010 NAP progress reports, on the other hand, were excessively long. They were also made available very late. They were criticized for being overly generalized and lacking any specific or detailed information, limiting their usefulness as a result (Tiessen and Tuckey, 2014).

Tiessen (2015) argues that due to political pressure from the Conservative federal government, Global Affairs Canada removed references to gender equality and replaced them with references to equality between men and women in Canada’s first NAP. She argues that the focus was on the empowerment of women and girls, not on the “needs and issues that coalesce between women, men, boys and girls in situations of conflict” (ibid.). Focusing only on women, instead of gender, conflates gender issues with women’s issues
The 2010 NAP also heavily essentialized women and homogenized women as a vulnerable group. This infantilizing framing of women in security discourse is incompatible with addressing the “deeply entrenched social and cultural values and practices that affect gender power relations” (ibid., 96). There were only two references to gender throughout the 14-page document, both pertaining to international agreements, and 33 mentions of the need for protecting women (ibid.). According to Tiessen (2015), the consequence of making sweeping generalizations about the gendered vulnerability of women is that women are then not perceived as having agency and thus ignored within the peacebuilding process (98).

Canada developed a second NAP in 2017 and it addresses many of the criticisms aimed at the first NAP. The plan emphasizes gender equality, draws on academic literature, and mentions gender numerous times throughout (93 mentions of gender compared to 6 mentions of protection). It also provides clear definitions of terms throughout, including gender. While the 2010 NAP was overwhelmingly concerned with the protection of women, the 2017 NAP is focused on the prevention of the gendered consequences of conflict. There are five objectives of the 2017 NAP: increase women’s participation in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict state building; prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers and other international personnel; promote and protect women’s and girls’ human rights and gender equality in fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings; uphold women’s sexual rights and reproductive health; and strengthen the capacity of peace operations to advance the WPS agenda.

Global Affairs Canada and the Women, Peace, and Security Network-Canada (WPSN-C) organized consultations on the development of the 2017 NAP, including discussions on progress, challenges, global good practices, and key issues (Woroniuk, 2018). The 2017 plan states that it aims to capture the spirit of “Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy that includes its Feminist International Assistance Policy and Defence Policy” (Government of Canada, 2017b, ii). The plan is signed by several ministers including: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of the Status of Women. The following lead partners support the plan: Global Affairs Canada, the
Department of National Defence (DND), the CAF, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Four supporting partners include: Public Safety Canada, Status of Women Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Department of Justice. All of the lead and supporting partners prepared departmental implementation plans that included how they will operationalize WPS in their specific contexts and all departments release annual progress reports that track their commitments to the NAP.

Canada’s 2017 NAP stresses that women have “vital roles in establishing and maintaining peace” and must be involved in conflict prevention and peacemaking in order to achieve global peace and security (ibid.). This instrumentalist focus is the biggest weakness of the 2017 NAP. The plan almost exclusively uses operational-effectiveness claims and arguments to justify increasing women’s participation. Even though it states that advancing gender equality is “both the right and the smart thing to do” (ibid., 16), the focus almost entirely appears to be on the latter. The plan makes the following claims:

The path to peace needs empowered women because:

- Where women are included in peace processes, peace is more enduring
- Where women are included in the economy, economic growth is greater
- Where women are included in governance, states are more stable
- Where women are included in security, everyone is safer
- Where gender equality is upheld, societies are more peaceful (ibid., i).

We can see that from the very outset, the plan intends to increase women’s participation to meet global security needs. Rights-based arguments are limited throughout the document. The overwhelming focus is on how women can improve operational effectiveness. For example, the NAP states, “Canada knows that investing in gender equality and the rights of women and girls, is the most effective way to reduce poverty and inequality and to prevent conflict and achieve peace” (ibid., 4). Women and girls are almost always included as a means to an end.

Jenkins (2018) notes that instrumentalizing women’s participation through the 2017 NAP results in the implication that “women are engaged in peace and security because of their distinctive contribution, and if they fail, it is because they were not effective” (6). She
argues that women should be full and equal participants because they have a right to the same opportunities as men, not because of what can be gained from their participation. Just as expectations of women are too high, unrealistic, and unjust, Jenkins (2018) notes that, the expectations for men are too low (6). While the plan makes a brief mention of the involvement of men and boys as equal partners, it continues to evoke gendered stereotypes of women as peacemakers.

The 2017 NAP states that today’s status quo is marked by “unequal power relations and discriminatory social norms, practices and legal systems” (i). It acknowledges a disconnect between words and actions on WPS issues and the need to “transform gender relations and empower women” (ibid.,2). It also acknowledges that women and girls face “multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination based on other identity factors such as ethnicity, race, religion, age, sexual orientation and ability” that are exacerbated during conflict (ibid4), though robust strategies to ameliorate these intersectional discriminations are absent.

A comparison of Canada’s 2017 NAP alongside the criteria laid out by Coomaraswamy (2015) for high-impact NAPs demonstrates that Canada’s plan fares relatively well. In terms of leadership, coordination, and inclusive design, the plan includes the voices of civil society, specifically through the WPSN-C, a network of over 80 Canadian non-governmental organizations and individuals committed to promoting and monitoring Canada’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1325. The 2017 NAP was given high-level attention through the involvement of multiple Ministers, lead partners, and supporting partners. The plan specifies that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of the WPS agenda and thus the intention is to mainstream WPS and promote a whole-of-government approach to WPS implementation. The plan also incorporates monitoring and evaluation through progress reports. The greatest shortcoming of the 2017 NAP is a lack of robust budgeting towards WPS. The plan mentions commitments of $150 million towards the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), $150 million in funding to local women’s organizations, and $650 million of funding for sexual and reproductive health and rights. However, little country- or program-specific information is mentioned.
Canada’s 2017 NAP would fit neatly into Shepherd’s (2016) analysis of NAPs produced by highly militarized countries because Canada currently ranks 14th globally in military spending (SIPRI, 2019) and has sent more than 40,000 CAF members to serve in Afghanistan between 2001–2014 (Veterans Affairs Canada). The 2017 NAP states that it is part of a “whole of government approach to our engagement in fragile, conflict, and post-conflict settings” (ii). Thus, the plan states clearly that its primary purpose is to offer support to other countries. The NAP acknowledges domestic issues within Canada but remains primarily outward facing. There is significant emphasis on civil society (in Canada) and women’s grassroots peace organizations (abroad). This is consistent with Shepherd’s (2016) argument that WPS issues can be found ‘out there’ but solutions and expertise can be found ‘here’.

The 2017 NAP includes a section called Canada’s Own Challenges: Learning from our Experience. This section mentions Canada’s efforts to recruit more women into the CAF as well as address sexual misconduct in the CAF, stating that these are examples of the “interconnectedness between the WPS agenda and what we do at home… to lead by example” (9). The Deschamps (2015) report, and more recently the Arbour (2022) report, found serious concerns in how the CAF has dealt with sexual misconduct in its ranks and preventing harm to its members. Deschamps (2015) found the CAF to be a hostile sexualized environment with substantial underreporting of sexual harassment and assault based on fear of negative repercussions. It identified that reporting processes and procedures are overly complex, place pressure on victims, and do not yield appropriate results. Arbour (2022) found that little has changed since then. Even Operation Honour, the CAF mission to eliminate sexual misbehavior within the military (touted as a source of pride in Canada’s NAP), has been dubbed “Operation Hop on Her” by many military members, making a mockery of the attempt to eliminate violence against women within Canada’s own ranks (Taber, 2017).

The 2017 NAP section on Canada’s own challenges also mentions the intersecting discrimination and violence against Indigenous women and girls, based on “gender, race, socioeconomic status and other identity factors, as well as underlying historic causes - in particular the legacy of colonialism and the devastation caused by the residential school
system” (4). The plan details a commitment to a renewed relationship with Indigenous people, an acceptance of the Calls to Action of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), an intention to adopt the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), and the establishment of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). After acknowledging persistent challenges with providing adequate housing, education, and drinking water for Indigenous people, the NAP affirms the government’s intention is to achieve “true reconciliation with First Nations, Inuit and Metis” (ibid.,5). This section seems promising, and it is important that the NAP acknowledges the legacy of colonialism and residential schools and recognizes the pressing concerns Indigenous people face in Canada. However, the potential of these statements is undone when the plan states, “Canada’s learning experience with the consequences of colonialism and the continued challenges faced by First Nations, Inuit, and Metis will help improve Canada’s capacity to respond to challenges faced by women and girls abroad” (ibid.). Canada thus lazily and inexplicably leverages systemic injustices towards Indigenous people to mark its expertise in addressing issues related to the WPS agenda. As per Dunn’s (2014) analysis on how the Australian NAP fails to reconcile Indigenous-settler relations, Canada has made the same mistake.

One of the greatest risks of the 2017 NAP’s section on Canada’s own challenges is the portrayal of Canada “the good,” as described by Howell (2005), because the NAP obscures Canada’s “violent actions abroad as well as histories of marginalization in Canada” (49). Howell (2005) explains that by presenting as “peaceful, tolerant and orderly,” Canada fails to acknowledge pressing domestic issues including: women’s poverty, the situation of Indigenous people, and the struggles of newcomers (57). She argues further that Canada’s sense of altruism abroad neglects taking accountability for Canada’s support for the “US-led capitalist world order” (58). This point neatly ties into Canada’s continued failure to meet the UN target for Official Development Aid (ODA) of 0.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2018, Canada fared poorly by only contributing 0.28 percent of its GDP to ODA even while touting its new Feminist International Assistance Plan (FIAP) (CIDP, 2019). While Canada’s 2017 NAP has significantly improved from its first iteration in 2010, blind spots remain throughout the main plan as well as in departmental implementation plans and progress reports.
When it comes to progress reports, the 2017 NAP reporting is weak. It is very vague, and objectives are rated as either ‘on track’ or ‘mostly on track’ with few, general examples of new developments. For example, under Objective 1 (increasing the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, resolution, and state building), the report states that Canada is ‘on track’ and provides examples such as: “In Mali, Canadian financial support resulted in hundreds of women gaining increased leadership and peace building skills” (Government of Canada, 2018, 11). The use of soft metrics without further details of implementation or impact exemplifies the vagueness of the report and limits its utility in measuring progress or impact.

1.2.4 The Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) implementation of Canada’s NAP on WPS

In contrast to the problematic lack of detail throughout much of the 2017 NAP, departmental implementation plans for all partners are more specific. The implementation plan for the DND and the CAF recognizes how armed conflict affects women, men, girls, and boys in different ways. The plan centers women and girls by incorporating gendered perspectives into policies, training, education, and operations (CNC/CAF, 2017). Commensurate with the DND and CAF’s stated commitment to the NAP, gender equality is enmeshed throughout Canada’s newest defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. Priority activities in the DND/CAF implementation plan (2017) revolve around the themes of governance, training and education, accountability, recruitment and retention, and the integration of women into operations (DND/CAF, 2017, 10). Some examples of activities include: mandatory completion of the online GBA+ introduction course by all CAF members, establishment of a GBA+ director, monitoring the number of gender advisors, and monitoring the number of diversity action plan tasks completed. For instance, the target for recruitment of women into the CAF is 1% annually towards a goal of 25% by 2026 (ibid., 15). However, this target does not account for the roles women are recruited for. Currently, women represent less than three percent of the combat arms and only 0.8 percent of infantry soldiers (CAF, 2019). Like the 2017 NAP, DND/CAF implementation plan commitments are rooted in instrumentality:
Women’s participation is vital to achieving and sustaining peace and has tangible impact on the operational effectiveness of our forces. Women broaden the range of skills and capacities among all categories of personnel, improve the delivery of peace and security tasks, enhance situational awareness and early warning by facilitating outreach to women in communities, and improve a military force’s accessibility, credibility, and effectiveness in working among local populations (DND/CAF, 2017, 6).

While the commitment may, albeit instrumentally, pay lip service to gender equality, these claims also have no empirical evidence supporting them. It is essential for the government of Canada to lead by example when developing and implementing Canada’s next NAP in 2023 and to improve the next plan by taking into account its gaps, blind spots, and shortcomings of the 2017 NAP.

In May and June 2022, the WPSN-C organized a series of activities to gather Canadian civil society input to help inform Canada’s third NAP. Their report includes eight core thematic areas that Canadian civil society would like to see in Canada’s next NAP, including: strengthening feminist goals and approaches; making policy coherence a priority; strengthening the domestic WPS agenda; refocusing on peace; bringing a feminist lens to security; dedicating resources to each objective, indicator, and activity; strengthening links with NGOs in conflict-affected countries; and strengthening accountability and reporting (WPSN-C, 2022). With regard to the CAF, the report mentions immediately implementing the recommendations from the Arbour (2022) report and the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination report (2022), ensuring the CAF is a safe work environment for everyone, strengthening culture change at the CAF, engaging with veterans and CAF members, and increasing women’s representation in the CAF and on UN peacekeeping missions (ibid.). It is clear that civil society expects more from Canada’s third NAP and we will see how civil society input is incorporated into the next NAP in 2023. It is critical that Canada’s third NAP use the language of gender equality for reasons of equity and move beyond instrumentalizing women, especially if Canada wants a coherent feminist foreign policy.
1.2.5 **Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy**

Until recently, efforts to address gender inequality have primarily remained on the periphery of international relations and Canadian foreign policy. However, in 2017, Trudeau’s Liberal government adopted a feminist approach to international relations and foreign policy articulated via vehicles and actions such as the Feminist International Assistance Policy (FIAP), its second NAP on WPS, announcing the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations, creating a gender equity council at the 2018 G7 presidency, hosting the first ever meeting of female foreign ministers, including gender protections in free trade agreements, and appointing a new Ambassador for WPS (Chapnick, 2019). These initiatives appear progressive, and should be lauded, but also need to be examined carefully. Canada should not be declared a feminist nation without nuanced analyses of the feminist potential of these policies and their potential for the transformation of gender inequality.

The Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, a European research and advocacy think-tank encouraging a feminist approach to foreign policy, defines a feminist foreign policy in the following way:

A Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) is a political framework centered around the wellbeing of marginalized people and invokes processes of self-reflection regarding foreign policy’s hierarchical global stems. FFP takes a step outside the black box approach of traditional foreign policy thinking and its focus on military force, violence, and domination by offering an alternate and intersectional rethinking of security from the viewpoint of the most vulnerable. It is a multidimensional policy framework that aims to elevate women’s and marginalized groups’ experiences and agency to scrutinize the destructive forces of patriarchy, colonization, heteronormativity, capitalism, racism, imperialism and militarism.

Canada’s feminist aspirations emerge at a time of increased political momentum regarding gender and what has been termed a “feminist turn in foreign policy.” This turn includes Sweden adopting a feminist foreign policy in 2014 and Mexico in 2020 (France
and Luxemburg intend to follow suit; Cadesky, 2020). Prior to Trudeau’s ambitious feminist vision of the past few years, there was skepticism from scholars and practitioners on whether Canadian foreign policy and feminism had any common ground (Sjolander, et al., 2003).

Canadian foreign policy and feminism were previously quite “disparate subjects” (ibid.). Foreign policy was traditionally understood as “concerned with explaining the behavior of those who have the capability to exercise supreme political authority over a given set of issues areas [state security, defence, diplomacy, economic policy], for a given people, in a given territory” and feminists scholars have tried to offer feminist critiques of issues related to the Canadian state and its actions and policies (ibid., 5). Some of their fundamental questions included: what is a Canadian? What is foreign? How do we distinguish between what is outside and what is inside Canada? (ibid., 5–7). A feminist analysis of Canadian foreign policy begins with illuminating what happens when starting from the vantage point of women, beyond superficial “adding women and stirring” (ibid., 7–8). Feminist foreign policy requires a complete transformation and reimagining of how foreign policy is done (Aggestam et al., 2019). It requires tackling the root causes of inequality that include sexism and patriarchy, racism and white privilege, and homophobia and heteronormativity.

Trudeau made headlines in 2015 for his commitment to appointing women to half of federal cabinet positions and naming women to key ministerial positions (most recently, naming Anita Anand as Minister of Defence in 2021). When asked why he committed to these actions, Trudeau replied, “because it’s 2015,” signaling that it was high time that gender equality became a core value of the Canadian government (Tiessen and Swan, 2018, 188). Gender equality, then, is a central tenet of Canada’s foreign policy, and an obvious departure from Harper’s previous erasure of it. However, issues remain even in the Liberal operationalization of gender equality, beginning with criticisms of “business as usual” with a feminist flair and the contradictions of Canada calling its foreign policy feminist while continuing to supply military equipment to Saudi Arabia, which has an abhorrent track record on women’s rights (Tiessen and Swan, 2018; Vucetic, 2017). Vucetic (2017) accuses Canada of being a “feminist arms dealer.”
Oxfam Canada’s (2022) feminist scorecard calls on Canada to be more transformative in its approach to gender equality and to raise its aspirations for achieving women’s empowerment. Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy Working Group (2021), a collection of civil society organizations, have called for discussions on demilitarization and disarmament as a key area in Canada’s feminist turn. Other criticisms of Trudeau’s feminist aspirations include weak and tokenized approaches to gender mainstreaming, essentialism, and a failure to take masculinities into consideration (Tiessen and Swan, 2018, 197).

UNSCR 1325, the basis of the WPS agenda, undergirds Canada feminist foreign policy commitments, including its 2017 NAP on WPS and the Elsie Initiative. It is in this context, the “feminist turn” in Canada’s foreign policy, that my research is situated. Understanding the backdrop against which UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda were established by the UN, and which in turn motivated Canada’s NAP and the Elsie Initiative, is critical for appreciating the contributions this doctoral research project makes to Canadian military studies, foreign policy, and international relations. It is a context that prioritizes women’s increased representation but continues to view women’s inclusion as a means to an end.

1.3 Overview of chapters

The research I conducted with 40 Canadian women who are current or former CAF members that deployed on PKOs can be weaved into Canada’s WPS agenda and Canada’s Feminist Foreign Policy because achieving gender equality must begin by knowing and understanding the opportunities and constraints that women experience in a given context. In this case, the context is the CAF and UN PKOs. In chapter 2, I outline the methodological approach I adopted to pursue this research and the methods I used to collect data on women’s experiences in the CAF and on PKOs. In Chapters 3 and 4, I synthesize the debates in the literature on women’s experiences in the CAF and on gender in PKOs respectively. Findings from my primary research appear in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

In Chapter 5, I document women’s overall experiences in the CAF. Notable in this chapter are the experiences of women who identify as sexual minorities or who are
racialized. Chapter 5 also provides insights into the ways in which the persistence of traditional gender roles and division of labour within the household continue to hinder women’s professional success in the CAF. Chapter 6 is dedicated to the topic of sexual misconduct in the CAF. This topic been prominent in recent Canadian news due to serious allegations against CAF’s highest levels of leadership and was identified repeatedly by participants as a cause of severe professional, physical, emotional, and social harm. While not all participants identified having experienced sexual misconduct, all of them knew someone who did. A whole chapter is dedicated to this one challenge as the data that emerged on the topic, including an analysis of the numerous reports and recommendations that have accumulated over the past several years, was vast and nuanced. It is critical to center lived experience when thinking about policy recommendations to improve or transform CAF culture with respect to eliminating sexual misconduct.

The third findings chapter, Chapter 7, focuses exclusively on women’s experiences while deployed on UN peacekeeping operations. My findings reveal that military women have a complicated relationship with peacekeeping; they respect some of its ideological tenets while disagreeing profoundly with others. My findings reveal that peacekeeping poses logistical and safety challenges for women, but that some women believe that they can and do contribute to the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation and provides suggestions for future research, including research that explores how men can contribute to gender equality in a highly masculinized work environment like the CAF.
Chapter 2

2 Methods and Methodology

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present my conceptual methodological approach to this research as well as the methods I used to collect the data that informed my doctoral research project. I situate my approach in the fields of feminist security studies and feminist international relations that challenge what is deemed important in the traditional field of international relations by taking seriously the lived experiences of women, especially in spaces of hegemonic masculinity, such as the military. I outline the process I undertook to acquire ethics approval, both from my institution and the CAF and DND. I describe my recruitment process and the structure of my interviews. I then outline thematic analysis and situate myself in relation to this research topic and the research participants. I conclude with some basic characteristics of the research participants and discuss ethical considerations with regard to both navigating sensitive topics and confidential disclosures shared by respondents as well as, in some instances, problematic comments made, or perspectives shared, by some respondents.

2.2 Methodological Approach: Interviewing Military Women

For this research project, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 40 women who were current or former members of the CAF and had deployed on peacekeeping operations (PKOs). I also had the opportunity to interview two additional women who were deployed abroad for peace operations from their respective police departments (P11, P12). These women reached out to me as they felt that they had valuable experiences to contribute to this research project, however, their interviews are not part of the data explored in this dissertation as a larger sample of women in the police would be required to explore themes based on their experiences. While out of scope for this research project, investigating the experiences of women police officers is a necessary and rich line of inquiry for future studies.
I approached my interviews from the perspective of feminist security studies (FSS) and feminist international relations (IR) to answer Enloe’s (2014; 2019) guiding question in these fields, “Where are the women?” Feminist IR scholars have challenged what is considered “high politics,” problematizing security and gender in traditional spaces such as the military and diplomacy as well as spaces that are considered more ‘ordinary’ such as sex tourism and women’s peace movements (Blanchard, 2003; Enloe, 1989; 2014, Steans, 1998; Sylvester, 2002; Tickner, 1992). Feminist scholars have interrupted and problematized topics that have typically been in the male domain (Tickner, 1992, 28) including: human rights (Lloyd, 2007), human security (Marhia, 2013; Nussbaum, 2000), war and militarization (Cohn et al., 2005; Parpart, 2010, Runyan and Peterson, 2014), sexual violence in conflict (Aroussi, 2017; Skjelsbaek, 2006), gender in international law (Buss, 2014; Mertus, 2004; Oosterveld, 2014), and militarized masculinity (Connell, 2016; Duncanson, 2009; Lane, 2017; Whitworth, 2004). There is also an emerging body of feminist work on women’s roles before, during, and after conflict, including: women as combatants and perpetrators of violence (Cohen, 2013; Coulter, 2008; Siphokazi, 2015; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007), girl soldiers (Haer, 2017; Mazurana et al, 2002), and women as peace activists (Goksel, 2018; Hernandez and Ortega, 2017; Lawson and Flomo, 2020; Mama, 2012; Shadmi, 2000; Sharoni, 2012).

Most importantly, feminist scholars have made connections between women’s everyday lived experiences and international security, which has been a transformative addition to the traditional field of IR. Within international relations, security traditionally revolves around nation-states with a focus on the military and warfare (Blanchard, 2003, Olonisakin et al., 2015). Blanchard (2003) outlines four pivotal contributions made by feminist security studies: the recovery of women’s experiences and investigation into their invisibility in international theory; the questioning of the extent to which women are secured by state protection in war and peace; contesting discourses where women are solely linked with peace; and moving beyond just adding women to troubling gender, including masculinity, in security discourse (1290).

FSS and feminist IR have molded my perceptions and curiosities while studying women in the military. Traditional military studies, similar to the field of international relations,
“perpetuates dominant ideas about militaries, what they are for, and how they should work” and takes a “de-personalized approach… removed from the level of people and their everyday interactions” (Baker et al., 2016, 142). Gray (2016) explains that high level strategic concepts are talked about “as if they have nothing to do with people, as if they could exist independently of our own beliefs and actions. In addition, we talk about these concepts as if they are un-gendered” (Baker et al.,142). A feminist perspective on the military, on the other hand, takes everyday experiences seriously, along with gendered performances, and looks at larger structures and strategic concepts as gendered (ibid.). By examining the experiences of women in the CAF using FSS and feminist IR frameworks, valuable insight can be gained into the gendered underpinnings of security in Canada.

While there is no one “feminist” way of doing research, I was guided by the work of Tickner (2006) who outlines four methodological perspectives that guide feminist research methodologies. First, Tickner argues that feminist research has a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why as well as the importance of noticing which questions do not get asked (22). In my project, rather than assuming women are contributing to operational effectiveness based on anecdotal evidence, I was interested in hearing from my participants what they thought of these claims and whether they are worthwhile and believed to be true. I was also interested in how the tenets of UNSCR 1325 trickle down to women “on the ground” and what this looks like with regard to norm distortion, a term von Hlatky (2022) uses to argue that the original intentions of a norm get distorted as the norm is taken up by institutions, in this case WPS in Canada and the UN. Second, Tickner argues that feminist research is useful to women (and men) and can be used to improve women’s lives (25). I try to center all aspects of women’s experiences, including their everyday experiences of care work to understand whether their needs are addressed. Third, Tickner emphasizes the centrality of reflexivity and subjectivity of the researcher (27). She argues that this works to increase the objectivity of the research, in contrast to positivist traditions. Fourth, Tickner identifies feminist commitments to knowledge as emancipation (28). By this, she argues that knowledge production is always political and should be linked to action and social change. I
accomplish this through policy recommendations to improve the work environment for women in the CAF and on UN PKOs.

The experiences shared by participants in this study are a counter-narrative to state-centric IR. Rather than traditional positivist security perspectives, which aim to establish an authoritative narrative, my feminist approach to this research has the ability to capture a variety of concerns and events (Wibben, 2011, 100). For example, meta-critiques of peacekeeping argue that peacekeepers from the West have little reason to intervene within conflicts in the developing world, or do so out of self-interest (Lipson, 2007). However, women’s experiences reveal that they too experience a deep sense of insecurity while deployed on so-called peace operations, making their involvement more complex and nuanced. Similarly, while there is significant attention paid to women like Lieutenant-General Jennie Carignan, one of the highest-ranking women in the CAF and the first and only woman from a combat arms occupation to rise to the general officer rank level, her experience is not universal or representative of the average woman in the CAF. By focusing too much on exceptional women like Carignan, we can miss a lot about the opportunities and struggles experienced by most women in the CAF. The same would be true if we only focused on exceptional men.

In my research, I follow a feminist research ethic that requires attention to the power of knowledge; boundaries, marginalizations and silences; relationships and their power differentials and our own situatedness as researchers (Ackerly and True, 2008, 695). As an intervention, learning about the experiences of women in peacekeeping and in the CAF more broadly, “is a rich starting point for deconstructing the male as norm typical of that institution” (Kronsell, 2006, 118). As Kronsell (2006, 128) states, women in institutions of hegemonic masculinity are an “extremely important source of knowledge” and that knowledge generated from the experience of even only a few women in these institutions has “transformative potential that ought to be taken seriously.” Employing FSS and feminist IR frameworks allows for this transformative knowledge from participants to deepen understandings of women’s unique experiences in the CAF and peacekeeping.
2.3 Methods in Practice

2.3.1 Procedural Ethics Approval

Ethics approval for this research was received from the Non-medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) at Western University (Appendix G). Prior to participation, all participants were provided with letters of information explaining the purpose and methods of my research and their roles and rights. All participants provided written or verbal consent to participate in this project and were ensured confidentiality. Confidentiality was crucial in this study as many participants expressed concerns about speaking out, even if what they shared was not controversial or reflecting negatively on the CAF. One participant stated, “I feel torn saying this as I feel like I’m betraying my organization. I know this [study] is sanctioned by my organization but I do feel like I’m riding out and shouldn’t be saying these things” (P27).

The CAF is unique and exceptional in some ways as it has national significance as the only institution wielding legitimate force from the state. As such, CAF members’ relationship with the institution they work for is different than typical relationships workers have with employers. On numerous occasions, participants referred to the CAF as a “family.” Likewise, the CAF is one of few “total institutions” where members often live, work, eat, and access healthcare on bases (Davies, 1989). Goffman theorized total institutions as departing from basic social arrangements because most members are treated alike, required to do the same things together, and where there is a system of officials that impose rules on the majority (ibid.). Being in a total institution like the CAF results in a deep sense of loyalty to the institution. In this sense, it was unsurprising that some participants felt that if they spoke poorly about the CAF, it was a betrayal.

Likewise, many participants confidentially shared intimate experiences of discomfort, discrimination, and sexual misconduct that they were worried may be attributed to them or those who caused them harm. It is for this reason that the data I present is devoid of most identity markers. I have only included a list of participant numbers (P1, P2, P3, and so on), and identified whether participants are current or former members, and if they have deployed to one or more overseas missions (Appendix A). As women’s representation in the CAF, and in some occupations in particular, is marginal, de-
identifying much of my data is crucial to protect the women who shared their stories with me.

In order to maximize the credibility of my research, I also sought and received ethics approval through the Social Sciences Research Review Board (SSRRB) at the DND/CAF (Appendix H). While I could have carried out this research by sharing my call for participants within my own network, seeking ethics approval from DND/CAF enabled me to formally disseminate my call for participants within DND/CAF. In order to conduct research under the SSRRB, institutional research ethics board approval (i.e. from Western University) had to be granted first. Likewise, an agreement between the research supervisor and the SSRRB must be signed, and the researcher must secure a DND/CAF sponsor. The sponsor is expected to confirm that the project is of interest and value to the DND/CAF and to provide administrative or logistical support to the project and ensure the research is carried out in compliance with DND/CAF policies. Most importantly, the sponsor is responsible for disseminating the call for participants by sending invitation e-mails and distributing invitation letters to members of the CAF. Thus, seeking ethics approval from both Western University and from DND/CAF was necessary to ensure institutional support from DND/CAF for this research project as well as strong participation from current CAF members.

2.3.2 Participant Recruitment

Both the NMREB (Western) and SSRRB (DND/CAF) approved my research poster, social media poster and e-mail script for recruitment. My research poster briefly explained the purpose of the study, who can participate, why they should participate, and how. The poster explicitly stated that participants must be over 18, socially identify as a woman, be a Canadian citizen, and have been deployed overseas on any past or present UN or NATO PKOs. I began by posting the call for participants on my personal social media accounts. I then sent it to the WPSN-C membership list, as I knew that there were some members interested in topics on gender in the DND/CAF. The WPSN-C is a network of Canadian non-governmental organizations and individuals committed to promoting and monitoring the efforts of the Government of Canada to implement and support the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace, and
Security. I have been a member of the WPSN-C for several years and have participated in their events, including contributing to reports on Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security; therefore, I was familiar with their distribution channels. I conducted 15 interviews with participants who I attracted in this manner and through snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). The remaining 25 interviews were conducted after my DND/CAF sponsor sent out the call for participants internally within CAF. Some of these participants responded directly to this call, several heard about the study from a friend (snowball sampling), and yet others told me that they saw the call for participants on Facebook in closed groups for military members where it was shared by existing group members without my direction. The participants who told their chain of command that they would like to participate in this research project were allowed to use paid work time in order to participate in the interview, but most women participated on their own time.

2.3.3 Interview Structure

The semi-structured interviews took place between June and October 2020 and most of the interviews lasted approximately 1-1.5 hours. Three participants had two interviews each, lasting between 1-2 hours, due to time constraints or having more to share than the time afforded by an initial two-hour timeframe. While conducting the interviews, I used an in-depth interview guide that I created where I outlined themes, key questions, and probing questions (Appendix B). A few of my research participants requested the interview guide prior to the interview in order to prepare and know what to expect but a majority did not. My research questions remained the same throughout the process, but I added additional probes after learning more from my first few interviewees.

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, all of my interviews were conducted by phone or via video call on Zoom. However, the SSRRB recommended I consistently conduct interviews by phone or video call due to the logistical and security barriers of meeting my participants in their places of work, for example on military bases. Zoom has proven to offer some advantages for qualitative interviewing for reasons of rapport (compared to telephone or e-mail), convenience, simplicity, and user-friendliness (compared to other videoconferencing platforms) (Archibald et al., 2019, 4). In terms of convenience, Zoom
can facilitate greater access to geographically distant participants and in turn, results in cost-effectiveness (ibid.) Likewise, there were also numerous disadvantages to using zoom, including technical issues and difficulty connecting (such as low Internet bandwidth, problems with webcam and microphone functionality) (ibid., 5).

Shannon (2022, 8) conducted interviews with sexual trauma survivors through Skype and she argues that this increased survivor agency during the interview process because her participants felt more choice and control. More concretely, participants in an online environment can choose to show themselves on camera, use audio-only, and/or switch back and forth if they want to; choices they would not have in face-to-face interviews (ibid.). I conducted a quarter of my interviews over the phone either because this was the preferred method of communication by the participant or because of technical issues that did not permit use of Zoom from either the participants’ end or mine. While there are some criticisms that telephone interviews are not especially conducive in building rapport, it can also be understood as a participant-centered tool as there is a degree of comfort for participants who can be interviewed in familiar, comfortable settings and can dictate the course and direction of the interview (Trier-Bieniek, 2012, 642).

In many ways, interviewing on the phone, and even more so on Zoom, was both advantageous and challenging. It was challenging mostly due to connectivity issues. However, for better or worse, it was also relatively intimate as both my participants and I were typically at home and could hear background noises of our everyday lives (children, dogs, renovations). In some ways this was one way to build rapport (for example, showing one another our pets) and it was also distracting when we were interrupted (for example, by my children, by participants’ children, by neighbors cutting grass, etc.).

Many of my interviews began with conversations about why I was doing this research and what I was hoping to get out of it. Some participants were even interested in what I would like to do in the future and how the research will be shared. Several participants seemed uncertain what my motivations were to do this work and a couple of them admitted that they were concerned that I was “anti-men” or that I was interested in making the CAF look bad. It took some reassuring that this was not the case and that I
was interested in their experiences, positive or negative, while serving in the CAF and especially when deploying on PKOs. Some of the participants were even concerned that they did not have much to offer for my research project as their experiences were positive. I reassured these participants that I was not looking for horror stories about the military but that I was interested in all stories, including those that demonstrate the CAF can be a rewarding work environment.

2.3.4 Thematic Analysis

I relied on Braun and Clarke’s (2006) conceptualization of thematic analysis for data analysis. They define thematic analysis as a method for “identifying, analysing and reporting patters (themes) within data” (79). They assert that thematic analysis “minimally organizes and describes your data set in (rich) detail… and interprets various aspects of the research topic” (ibid). They explain that a theme captures “something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (82). However, as this is a qualitative study, a theme or topic repeating itself more often than others do not necessarily mean the theme itself is more important than others that participants may have been hesitant to share. As such, from my data, we can learn from similar experiences shared by many participants as well as the experiences of only a few, or even from the experiences of a sole participant. I identified themes using an inductive approach where I coded data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame or my “analytic preconceptions” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, 83). Further, I approached my data from a constructionist perspective that “does not seek to focus on motivation or individual psychologies, but instead seeks to theorize the sociocultural contexts, and structural conditions, that enable the individual accounts provided” (ibid., 85). Braun and Clarke (2006) provide six phases of thematic analysis:

1. Familiarizing yourself with your data
2. Generating initial codes
3. Searching for themes
4. Reviewing themes
5. Defining and naming themes
6. Producing the report
I read and re-read my interview transcripts numerous times to search for meanings and patterns in order to generate lists of ideas about what was in the data and what was interesting about it. I then manually organized these ideas into groups and did not use coding software. I made use of mind-maps, tables, and hundreds of post-it notes to do this work and to organize the relationship between ideas (codes) and themes, emerging with the core themes that are discussed in this dissertation. Although generalizability, in the more universal sense of the term, was not an objective of my research, it was possible for me to arrive at certain generalizable conclusions based on triangulation between my primary (interview) data and secondary data (literature review) that helped to build internal consistency, validity, and reliability of my work. However, unlike more positivist traditions that seek to come up with generalizable findings that can be applied to other times, places, and people, I was interested in thick description: rich, detailed accounts of my participants’ experiences (Bryman et al., 2012).

2.3.5 Positionality

Several participants were curious about what motivated my interest in the research topic and whether I had any connection to the CAF, either through work or through family. Many participants were inspired to join the CAF as they had a close family member in the forces and were curious if I was a military wife or military child, if not a CAF member. To some of their surprise, I explained that this research was motivated by discussions with my supervisor on Trudeau’s announcement of the Elsie Initiative and the problematic logic underpinning the desire to increase the representation of women. As such, while the participants and I all identify as women, there were several instances where it was quite obvious to them that I was an outsider and that we had, at least on a surface level, little in common. However, all of them were thrilled that I was curious and interested in their experiences. One of the participants even suggested that I should go on tour with her unit. While this would be a nearly impossible undertaking from the perspective of attaining ethics approval, it would be an illuminating experience to conduct ethnographic work in military spaces. During the interviews, several women told me about the pride they feel in their careers and how they hope that women and girls recognize they can do anything boys and men can do. When this topic arose, I told some
of the participants the story of how my then 5-year-old daughter pointed out to me that I did not come to a complete stop at a four way stop sign and my reaction, jokingly, was, “what are you, a cop?!” To my dismay, she responded, “of course not, I’m a girl.” As a feminist, this response was shocking and unexpected and solidified to me the importance of representing women in non-traditional careers. Of course, representation is not enough and adding more women to masculinized institutions without structural reform to render them inclusive and safe work environments is insufficient. Representation is nonetheless important to demonstrate that people of all genders belong in these spaces and to foster meaningful change to support women in non-traditional careers. This story resonated with many participants who then shared their thoughts on why they wanted to participate in the research project, namely, to improve conditions for women who are in the CAF and for the next generations of service members by sharing the challenges they experienced alongside the successes they have achieved.

My position as an outsider to the CAF also meant that I had a great deal of learning to undertake, especially with regard to military jargon, lingo, and slang (for example, getting a job on “civvy street” means transitioning to a civilian career). Saber (2018) describes how military jargon serves several functions for service members, including bonding and humour. As a civilian, I was not privy to this knowledge and this exposed the “civil-military divide” between myself and the participants (Baker et al., 2016, 147). In the first several interviews, I asked many clarification questions as participants took for granted that I may not know their “military speak.” Again, all participants were happy to help me understand and teach me what I did not know.

2.4 Who are the participants?

Out of the 40 military women that I interviewed, 26 women were current CAF members, and 14 women were former CAF members (some were retired and some moved on to other careers). The participants’ experience with the CAF spanned a large period of time, from a couple of retired members who joined prior to women’s official integration in 1989, to the newest participant who joined the CAF only a couple of years prior to her interview with me. The PKOs the women were deployed to included Central and South America, Europe, and Africa in countries that included Bosnia, Haiti, South Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali, among others. Several of the PKOs that research participants deployed to had so few women throughout the duration of their mandate that mentioning them by name would risk compromising participant confidentiality. Nearly half of the participants also deployed to combat missions in Afghanistan, and several others deployed on other non-peacekeeping missions as well (including training and humanitarian missions). Participants represented a wide variety of traditional occupations such as, but not limited to, medical and administrative occupations and supply technicians. There were also several who worked in non-traditional CAF occupations, including in combat arms branches (infantry, artillery and armoured). Most of the research participants were members of the regular force but some were also in the reserves. The participants also represented a range of ranks within the CAF, including junior non-commissioned members such as corporals, senior non-commissioned members, and junior and senior officers. Participants came from all three CAF environments: the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force. A majority of the participants were white women and only four participants self-identified as Indigenous or racialized women. A few women were sexual minorities, and several were Francophone. During the interviews, 18 women disclosed having experienced sexual misconduct while serving and 22 participants did not. More than half of the participants were mothers.

2.5 Ethical Considerations

Beyond gaining approval from Western’s NMREB and DND/CAF’s SSRRB, conducting this research required other ethical considerations. While my research questions were not inherently sensitive in nature, recalling past events that may have been difficult or even traumatizing was not easy for all participants. While I am not suggesting the participants who disclosed experiences of sexual misconduct identify with having trauma, common responses of participants that are female trauma survivors include heightened anxiety before the interview, becoming emotional during the interview, and having strong emotional responses after the interview (Shannon, 2022, 4). However, there is a distinction between evoking emotion from participants and re-traumatization and one way that this is differentiated is with the presence of control in recalling a given situation.
(ibid., 5). This was a priority for me when discussing sensitive topics with my research participants. I made it clear to the participants that there was no pressure or expectation for them to answer questions with which they felt uncomfortable or simply wanted to avoid. I offered participants the ability to skip questions or stop the interviews all together should they feel uncomfortable. It was critical that the participants felt safe when recounting their experiences. A large component of ensuring safety was giving participants ample time to answer questions and consider their responses, demonstrating empathy with their experiences, and ensuring their confidentiality above all else.

Similar to what Basham (2016) explains, respondents also shared stories and perspectives that I found problematic, including racist, sexist, and homophobic views (Baker et al., 2016, 149). I was conflicted on whether to intervene by challenging these assumptions or to carry on with the interview. I often chose to do the latter and carry on with the interview as my role as a researcher was to learn, gather data, and interpret it later. There were instances where I interjected when respondents made what I felt were problematic statements or comments. I asked participants to explain them further in order to generate productive but non-combative conversation. This was generally well received, and the participants and I had respectful dialogues, even if we may have disagreed. This exemplifies, as Basham explains, “just how deeply personal research is” (ibid., 150). Some of the participants ended our interviews by saying that the past couple of hours felt like “therapy.” As someone who worked as a counsellor in a local violence against women shelter and abused women’s advocacy organization for several years, I was not surprised by these comments, as most women do not have the opportunity to simply talk about what they experience to an attentive listener. By no means did I play the role of a counsellor but, talking about their experiences, good or bad, felt relieving to many participants and having someone interested in what they were sharing felt validating. While research methods of all kinds have their limitations, the methods, processes, and ethical guidelines described in this chapter enabled me to generate the empirical evidence I needed to write this dissertation.
Chapter 3

3 Women in the Canadian Armed Forces

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides some background and context for the experiences of Canadian women in the CAF. I begin by discussing women’s integration into the CAF and how ‘adding women’ into the Canadian military has been framed. In some parts of this chapter, I will include the ideas and experiences of research participants who served in the CAF during the time of gender integration, as shared with me during our interviews. Following this, I discuss how understanding gender as a social construct is imperative when thinking through militarized masculinity and femininity and how these concepts shape our understandings of what it means to be a woman soldier.

3.1.1 Data on women serving in the CAF

Eichler writes that “when it comes to women and combat, Canada is both typical and exceptional” as it has a long history of excluding women from the combat arms while also being one of the first Western countries to open all occupations to women (Eichler, 2013, 257). The full inclusion of women in the armed forces has been deemed a “profound transformation not only of the armed forces but gender relations more widely” (King, 2015, 380). The Canadian Armed Forces is comprised of approximately 68,000 Regular Force and 27,000 Reserve Force members with a budget of $18.9 billion in 2016–2017. Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure and Engaged, commits to increasing female personnel by 3500 for the regular force (to a total of 71,500) and by 1500 for Reserve Force members (to a total of 30,000). It also commits to increasing defence spending to $32.7 billion by 2026-2027.

The increase in funding is to support the CAF with force size and equipment to achieve “excellence across the full spectrum of military operations, from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to peacekeeping, to combat” (DND/CAF, 2017, 11). Women currently comprise 15.8 percent of the Regular Force and 16.6 percent of the Primary Reserves, the combined average of which is 16 percent (DND and CAF, 2020). Only 2.7% of women
in the Regular Force are in the combat arms, which include infantry, artillery and armored (the comparable figure for Reserve women is 6.2%) (DND and CAF, 2018). Most women are employed in the Navy, followed by the Air Force, and the Army (20.6 percent, 19.8 percent, and 13.5 percent respectively) (Canadian Armed Forces, 2020).

While the overarching CAF mission is to “detect, deter and defend against threats” (DND/CAF, 2017, 17), one of the core focal points of Canada’s new defence policy is diversity and inclusion where the CAF aims to increase the proportion of women in the military by 1 percent annually to achieve 25 percent representation by 2026. The CAF aims to reflect, “the diversity of the country we defend. We need a military that looks like Canada” (DND/CAF, 2017, 20). As such, attracting, recruiting, and retaining more women, as well as promoting women into senior leadership positions, is key. However, the CAF’s goals and programs to increase its diversity are leveraged to optimize the effectiveness of CAF rather than reflecting a commitment to equity, diversity, or inclusion. The CAF writes, “embracing diversity will enhance military operational effectiveness by drawing on all of the strengths of Canada’s population” including a range of “cultural, linguistic, gender, age and other unique attributes” (23). Increasing women’s participation in the CAF is aimed at tapping into the skillset of half of Canada’s population, fostering new and different ways of thinking, and strengthening military capabilities for the purposes of operational effectiveness (Waruszynski, 2019, 25).

### 3.2 Gender integration: A historical overview

Feminists have historically been divided on the topic of whether and how women soldiers should participate in the military. Some feminists have been opposed to women in combat roles due to a general pacifist stance in relation to war (Peach, 1997, 100). This stance was often based on essentialist views of women having “a different moral voice, one based on caring, compassion, rationality and responsibility to others” (ibid.). These arguments associate women with peace, not war. Women are expected to give life and not take it. On the other hand, the exclusion of women from the military has been argued to uphold and maintain patriarchy (ibid.). Ethical principles of justice, legal rights, equality, and basic fairness are the basis for advocacy to include women in the military (ibid.). These perspectives purport women cannot be considered full citizens and attain
full legal and social equality with men unless they share similar duties to the nation (ibid.). Other feminists and pacifists contend that since war entails violence, men should not have to go into combat either. But they simultaneously argue that if anyone has to go into combat, women should not be excluded. Within the deeply flawed current structures of state security, women had at least two compelling reasons for wanting the ban on combat service lifted. First, they were already being thrust into combat situations such as accompanying patrols in Afghanistan, putting themselves and other soldiers at greater risk because they had not been trained in combat skills. Second, since combat experience is often a prerequisite for command jobs, women were being denied an equal opportunity to advance to the higher echelons of their chosen profession in the armed forces, and other areas of public service, such as the highest civilian political offices, which also value and valorize combat experience (Runyan and Peterson, 2014).

Women have served the Canadian military since 1885 in civilian capacities or as nurses (Waruszynski, 2019, 26). It was not until 1941 that women-only support units were established, though they were quickly disbanded in 1946. In 1951, women began serving in mixed units, albeit in support roles. At that time, women were ineligible to serve if they got married or became pregnant. This restriction was lifted in 1971. Women’s service was also capped at 1500 members in the 1960s and 1970s, roughly equivalent to one percent of the total number of forces (Hogenbirk, 2017, 369). By the time WWII began, there was a recognition that women could fill a number of military roles in order for men to fill more physically demanding combat roles (Lane, 2020).

As a result of feminist activists and the women’s movement in the 1960s, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1967–1970) was given the mandate to report on the status of women in Canada and steps that might be taken by the federal government to ensure equal opportunities for women in Canadian society. The final report made several recommendations for the CAF on inclusion and discrimination including opening all trades to women. In 1978, the Canadian Human Rights Act was passed, bringing further external pressure on the CAF to eliminate discrimination based on sex.

This pressure was heightened with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985. As a
result, the CAF issued administrative orders to open all units and occupations to female members, but still reiterated its justification for the exclusion of women in some occupations and units until 1989, when the Human Rights Tribunal ruled that women must be fully integrated into all roles, except service on submarines. The Tribunal also ruled that gender-free selection standards be developed, and that integration should occur with due speed and be subject to monitoring (Gautreau, 2014, 8). Taber (2000) argues that women’s integration was not initiated from inside the CAF but came from “external pressure such as the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, the Canadian Human Rights Act, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and a Human Rights Tribunal (HRT) decision” (23). The CAF’s justification for resisting gender integration was on the basis that it would affect cohesion and morale among servicemen, thereby reducing operational effectiveness (Davis, 2009, 440). The inclusion of women was resisted by the CAF throughout trials in the late 1970s to the late 1980s that were intended to gauge women’s abilities and effect on operational effectiveness for the purpose of providing evidence that women were not capable of serving (ibid.).

A small number of participants in this study served in the armed forces before or during gender integration. They described this time as extremely chauvinistic, with widespread derogatory and sexist comments towards women, but also as chivalrous. As one participant recalled, “guys wanted to put their capes on and come save you” (P29). Prior to 1989, a participant shared that women had to have the letter W written after their rank and this practice was removed only after the increasing push for gender integration and freedom from discrimination after 1989 (P16). The purpose of the W was for women to be easily identifiable. This led to significant discrimination against women, including being overlooked for opportunities, as reported by a participant (P16). One woman recalls not being able to work in combat arms, stating “infantry units told us we would be able to guard typewriters-- that was the only infantry work we would be doing” (P8).

Another participant, who also served prior to 1989, recalled having to wear white gloves and skirts all the time, and the gendered restrictions that came with being given a weapon. She stated that while women were permitted to fire their weapons, they were then taken away, taken apart, and cleaned by someone else, as women were not thought
to be “capable of taking care of it or holding onto it” (P9). Her opinion was that women had to be twice as good as men to be thought of as equally capable. It was a widely shared opinion that the “first” women were “test cases” and that not many women wanted to be the “first ones in the door” (P9). Not only were these first women looked at with a magnifying glass to see how well (or poorly) they did, but they would also have been considered representative of all women, which was a very unjust burden. There was also resistance from female military spouses, some of whom were against women in combat and were ostensibly “filled with horror as they could not trust their spouses with women who were in the field and at sea” (P9). Not all women in the CAF wanted gender integration. One participant was curious about who pushed for integration when she stated, “We didn’t want it. It wasn’t us. Nice that we can get dirty if we want, but we didn’t want it” (P17). While women may have overwhelmingly agreed that it was about time that they were more fully integrated in the military, the idea of participating in the combat arms was unappealing to some as they “didn’t want to do grunt work, heavy work, dirty work and hanging out with dirty stinky men” (P21).

Another participant suggested that men at the time had a “subconscious fears of being emasculated” but were convinced that women should participate when reminded that “they have a mother, sisters, wives, daughters – it didn’t take them long to see” (P24). Likewise, some participants stated that both men and women were ready for gender integration. One suggested that men were increasingly frustrated by women getting paid the same but not having to go to the same places and do the same work as men, such as working on ships and digging trenches (P16). Another participant shared that she thought men were happier in the field because of the female companionship and having someone to talk to besides the other guys and saw integration as a positive step (P18).

One participant suggested that military members were divided into thirds, with one third not wanting anything to do with women, another third happy to have women around, and the last third appreciative of how diversity would benefit them in terms of conversations and friendships (P27). Another participant recounted,
I heard from the “old boys’ network” the men didn’t think the women could do it and after they had the opportunity, they excelled and did way better than the men. Senior NCOs and officers admitted they should have done this sooner as it was great. That’s when things started to go sideways with gender. It wasn’t on the female side but the male side. Guys were jealous that women took over the jobs they did before (P18).

This comment demonstrates that at least some of the resistance to the full integration of women was due to a perceived zero-sum power game where women would take away from what men were entitled to. Most women, on the other hand, had few, if any, reservations about this move and recalled feeling “ecstatic” that women were given an opportunity to get into professions they were previously not allowed to join and to do exactly the same thing men were doing without bias (P18). However, there was a shared “tokenistic feeling,” among military women especially during the trials prior to 1989. One participant recalled the trials and consistently being asked, “as a woman, what do you think?” (P20). This pressure was not welcomed since most women, like men, simply wanted to do their jobs and did not expect to represent an entire gender based on their individual experiences.

Public opinion surveys from the late 1970s to the 1980s reported mixed opinions on the integration of women into all occupations, suggesting that women would make no difference in most roles, but their presence would have a detrimental effect on operational effectiveness in combat (Winslow and Dunn, 646). Women’s presence on combat ships or inclusion as fighter pilots was viewed less favorably than women doing other work on ships or being part of air support crews (Winslow and Dunn, 646). These polls and the CAF trials from the 1970s and 1980s show that societal attitudes resisted women’s inclusion (Winslow and Dunn, 660).

Even those within the CAF who were not overtly resistant to integration did little to ensure the success of women’s integration (Dundas, 2000, 132). Collins-Dogru and Ulrich (2018) argue that those who were against women’s inclusion in combat roles in the United States believed that “women are physically weaker, that integration will harm
unit cohesion, and that leaders will lower standards to be ‘politically correct,’” all of which endangers individual soldiers and damages military effectiveness” (454). This analysis can be extended to those who did not support gender integration in the CAF despite the lack of evidence to support the notion that women undermine the effectiveness of combat units (Soules, 2020). As such, preventing women from joining and participating fully in the armed forces was a discriminatory practice and one that may have contributed to the continued low representation of women in the ranks.

Today, women in the CAF have achieved legal integration and are technically equal to their male counterparts regarding access to all occupations. On the other hand, social integration, which necessitates the full acceptance of women free from discrimination, has yet to be fully realized (Winslow and Dunn, 2002, 642). We can see this by examining the low numbers of women in the armed forces and the continued need to improve military culture, highlighted by Deschamps (2015), especially with regard to high rates of sexual misconduct where women are the majority of victims (discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7). Failing to look at social integration in greater depth risks assuming that legal integration is a fait accompli for full gender integration (von Hlatky, 2019a, 79). Making such an assumption precludes conversations around improved efforts to recruit and retain woman and provide them with a safe and meaningful work environment in the CAF.

3.3 CAF culture, doctrine, and ethos

Deschamps (2015) defines culture as:

The ways in which, over time, people who work or live within a particular organizational and institutional setting develop a shared set of understandings, which allow them to interpret and act upon the world around them…

Organizational cultures are defined both by the values they espouse and deeper, tacit assumptions that are embedded, taken-for-granted behaviours. These assumptions are usually unconscious, and so well integrated in the organizational dynamic that members of the organizational culture may not even be able to recognize or identify them (12).
These shared assumptions are passed on through socialization, including through practices such as “training practices, social events and rites of initiation” (Deschamps, 2015, 13). This is especially true in “total institutions,” such as the CAF, “where members live, work, train and socialize together within a closely regulated environment, largely set apart from the rest of society” (ibid). The visible and invisible dimensions of the CAF’s culture include professional and institutional competency; health and well-being; legitimacy and public credibility; the military experience; language; and professional conduct (Department of National Defence, 2020).

The DND also differentiates ‘culture’ from ‘climate,’ which it describes as “temporal, subjective and often subject to direct manipulation by people with power and influence” (Department of National Defence, 2020). DND argues that climate can vary and is influenced by factors such as environmental affiliation, rank and experience. The broader CAF culture therefore must shift to affect the climate. In response to the failure of Operation Honour, the CAF’s mission to prevent and respond to sexual misconduct in its ranks, CAF published The Path to Dignity and Respect. This was intended to adequately address sexual misconduct in its ranks and is deemed a strategy that addresses both culture and climate.

Unpacking the experiences of Canadian women in the military requires understanding of Canadian military doctrine. Underlying the cultural dimensions of the CAF are the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the military and military doctrine where the primary focus of the CAF is the defence of Canada and its interests, as directed by the Government of Canada (Canadian Defence Academy, 2009). Core responsibilities of CAF members include accountability, expertise, identity, and adhering to the military ethos. This requires “each individual to be held accountable for his or her performance, always acting in compliance with the law and maintaining the highest standards” (Canadian Defence Academy, 2009, 14). Secondly, as the military’s primary function is the application of military force, there are sophisticated knowledges, skills, and practical experiences necessary to develop sound judgment within a highly hierarchical organization. Thirdly, a unique collective identity is forged in the CAF, stemming from
the atypical function members perform, including the concept of “service before self” (ibid.).

Military identity, which is different from culture as it alludes to how the CAF defines its purpose, also changes temporally depending on what the military is doing. For example, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan was the “ability to engage in combat and prevail” (ibid, 20) whereas in mid-2021, a main purpose of the CAF was to support governments in the distribution of Covid-19 vaccines through Operation Vector. Military ethos “embodies the spirit that binds the profession together” and speaks to the beliefs and expectations tied to military service (ibid., 22). Military ethos principles include accepting unlimited liability, meaning that members may be ordered into harm’s way in conditions that could lead to loss of their lives; fighting spirit requiring that members strive for high levels of readiness and are willing to engage in, or support, combat operations; discipline, including self-discipline and obedience to lawful orders; teamwork with other members and non-military organizations and individuals; and physical fitness as operations on sea, land or air require the highest levels of fitness (Canadian Defence Academy, 2009, 27-29). The military ethos is expressed through military values that include duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage.

Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure and Engaged, presented a new strategy for defence whose vision included a Canada that is “strong at home, secure in North America and engaged in the world” (DND and CAF, 2017). It emphasizes that “core Canadian values” guide the CAF’s actions and for the first time, these values included inclusion, compassion, accountable governance, and respect for diversity and human rights” (61). Likewise, gender equality and the use of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+), an analytical process used to assess how diverse groups of women, men and people of all genders may experience policies, programs, and initiatives, permeates (at least on paper) nearly all of the aims of the new strategy. GBA+ is “a process for examining how various intersecting identity factors impact the effectiveness of government initiatives. It involves examining disaggregated data and research, and considering social, economic, and cultural conditions and norms” (Status of Women Canada, 2017). GBA+ encourages
being “gender transformative” and challenging harmful stereotypes so as not to perpetuate them as well as utilizing intersectionality within federal government initiatives (ibid.).

The CAF is working on updating its military ethos to include principles such as “recognizing and embracing the diversity of the team’s talents and perspectives, challenging unacceptable behaviour, and making the difficult but necessary decisions to support and champion cultural change across the organization” (Department of National Defence, 2022). This change follows the establishment of the Chief, Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC) organization in April 2021 that conducted consultations with CAF members with the aim of achieving “a more holistic approach to culture change” (ibid). CPCC was created in response to a wave of sexual misconduct allegations against CAF leadership in 2021 (discussed further in Chapter 7).

While there are negative aspects to CAF’s organizational structure, there are also positive features. Deschamps (2015) found “participants indicated that military life allows them not only to contribute to society, but also to exercise their chosen trade or profession and to have an opportunity to move up the social ladder. The CAF provides them with the comfort of a family and the benefits of a rewarding work environment” (13). Research findings for this project looked at the challenges women experienced in the military but also at the rewards or opportunities they experienced, as many of the research participants excelled in the military environment and strongly identified with the CAF’s values. Military, defence, and security-related institutions have “historically been ‘owned’ by men and occupied by men’s bodies, which has also influenced these institutions’ agendas, politics, and policies” (Kronsell, 2005, 281). Though militaries have been associated with gender stereotypes and boundaries perhaps more vividly than other institutions, the armed forces are not monolithic organizations. Before discussing militarized masculinity and militarized femininity, it is crucial to expand on the sex-gender constructs as it shapes people of all genders’ experiences while serving.
3.4 Gender and Sex

Understandings of sex and gender shape how women’s work is understood in the armed forces and the expectations and stereotypes women are exposed to. Sjoberg (2007) offers a succinct definition of sex and gender:

Biological differences between people classified as male and people classified as female can be understood as sex, and socially constituted differences between these categorized groups can be understood as gender. It is often difficult to tell which differences are biological and which are socially constructed, however… Sex is not limited to those people classified biologically as ‘male’ and ‘female’; there are persons who fall into the biological categories of asexual, intersexual, transsexual and hermaphoditic. The dynamic construction of sex and gender is generally divisible into masculinities and femininities – stereotypes, behavioral norms and rules assigned to people based on their perceived membership in sex categories. Gender, then, is not static, but a contingent and changing social fact and process (83-84).

The focus on gender integration in the CAF appears to engage with such fluid social conceptualizations of gender. Simultaneously, gender is frequently conflated with sex and it is assumed that there are only two unique and mutually exclusive categories based on biological determinism: male and female (Davis, 2009, 441). Such a conceptualization assumes that the male/female dichotomy is natural and aligned with masculinity or femininity, meaning that those who are assigned male at birth must follow the norms of masculinity. The same is true of those assigned female at birth.

Military policies restricting the participation of women reinforce gender as “a biologically determined and dichotomous category” (ibid). Davis (2009) emphasizes how the terms women and gender are often treated identically (ibid.). She argues that “the term gender sounds somewhat more neutral and objective than women and thus dissociates itself from what has been broadly understood as the strident politics of feminism” (ibid.). However, when gender is referenced, it is assumed to be about women to the point that “if the title of an activity has the word gender in it, it is quite likely that
most of those who are interested will be women rather than men, as it will be broadly perceived that if reflects perspectives of women and is therefore of interest only to women” (ibid.).

In 1995, the federal government of Canada adopted a relational concept of gender in its gender equality plan where gender-based analysis was first introduced (Davis, 444). However, feminist scholars have gone further in discussing how gender is socially constructed. Butler (1999) argues that the gender matrix sustains itself through constant rearticulation of behavioral norms designed to naturalize sex differences. Holland (2006) describes Butler’s argument as follows:

Although Butler describes gender as a potentially fluid performance, she explains that the compulsory reiteration of regulatory gender norms interpellates individuals into the ideological (and ontological) narrative of a two-sex/gender, heterosexual schema in an attempt to stabilize the gender hierarchy. The mundane enactments of gender norms (e.g. language use, dress, style, etc.) often create the illusion of “an abiding gendered self” as those performances become perceived as signifiers of a natural, unmediated, static sexual essence, an essence innate to the authentic self and represented by the material body (29).

Butler’s (2006) theory of performativity suggests that gender is produced or constructed through a “stylized repetition of acts” (179). Pendlebury (2020) expands on this theory to describe how military training through “stylized repetition (such as practicing drill on a parade ground) contributes to the generation of an abiding military identity” (167). The process of performativity assesses one as “either warrior-like (ostensibly masculine) or not” (ibid, 167). This gendered culture begins young where “boys are told to be strong, not to cry, and not to play with dolls. Girls are encouraged to show their feelings and their reinforced play reflects caring labour. In this way, girls develop a need for affiliation while boys develop a need for competitiveness” (Taber, 2005, 291).

Lane (2017) argues that the mostly-male nature of the CAF is “neither an accident nor a given, but instead the result of a potent, deliberately created mix of misogyny, homophobia, invented tradition and biological determinism” (465). She contends that
there has been overt and covert opposition to the integration of women in the CAF, especially in combat units. Integrating the Canadian military, as critics allege, has “led to its feminization… not only to the increase in the number of women serving, but also to a decline in the capacity to engage in so called real war, due to the substitution of feminine values such as compassion and cooperation for the masculine warrior qualities of toughness, competitiveness and bloodlust” (Lane, 2017, 467). The gender system in the military is maintained by the “male-as-norm” paradigm where masculinity is the expected standard, the separation of men and women into different spheres of activities (Kronsell, 2005, 284), and the hyper valuation of “warrior culture” as superior (Ashley et al., 2017, 239).

3.5 Militarized Masculinity

Militarized masculinity is the process through which both men become militarized and masculinity is privileged in military organizations (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017, 162). This concept builds on the term hegemonic masculinity, coined by Connell (Connell, 1987; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 831). Connell argues that hegemonic masculinity is the “pattern of practice (i.e. things done, not just a set of role expectations or an identity) that allowed men’s dominance over women to continue” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Hegemonic masculinity should be differentiated from other masculinities, especially subordinated ones, even though it is normative and “embodie[s]… the most honored way of being a man, it require[s] all other men to position themselves in relation to it, and it ideologically legitimate[s] the global subordination of women to men” (ibid.).

Consistent with other militaries, the CAF has a highly masculine culture where “soldiering is seen by those within and outside of the military as something that is manly, that men do naturally” (Lane, 2017, 470). While the default soldier may no longer be a man, that ideal continues to be masculine, and women who enter the forces are expected to conform to this status quo (ibid., 471). As such, essentializing soldiers as masculine calls into question the very legitimacy of the female soldier (Van Gilder, 2019, 153). The characteristics associated with soldiers, and ultimately with men, include being warriors who are physically strong and courageous, have emotional and physical stamina, tactical
skills, and are stoic (Wood and Charbonneau, 2018, 748). My findings reveal that some participants felt the need to conform to these characteristics to succeed and fit in.

Engagement in combat, one of the most prominent traits of militarized masculinity, is synonymous with power and often thought to be the most prestigious component of the military (Goldstein, 2018, 388). Accordingly, it continues to be combat roles that have the lowest representation of women. While part of the lack of women’s representation stems from women not wanting to pursue careers in the combat arms, another component of this is the structural exclusion of women, through an unwelcoming culture. Goldstein (2018) suggests that contention surrounding women entering combat is about fragile masculinity (388). She suggests that women’s success in combat roles “diminishes the privilege of those positions” (ibid., 396) precisely because they are at the apex of what militarized masculinity is and women who do succeed, or may potentially succeed, in combat threaten that hierarchy.

Masculinity within the military is “culturally specific, socially entrenched, pathological or always already there” (Henry, 2017, 187). Instead of putting the “military and masculinity (in an additive way) together, both are mutually constituting” (ibid). And the total outcome of the military-masculinity nexus is more than the sum of its parts. In this sense, gender and military culture go hand in hand. (Higate, 2003). McSally (2011) explains the gendered underpinnings that have characterized military culture:

Men take life and women give life. Men protect and women are protected. Men are strong and courageous, and women are weak and emotional. Men are responsible to the state and women to their family. Men are motivated to function in the horror of war by the thought of returning to the normalcy of the home as symbolized by mother, wife, sweetheart, and the nurses who care for them in battle (McSally, 2011 in Van Gilder, 2019, 149).

Masculine domination requires considerable effort to maintain (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005, 844). While many scholars have focused on the making of militarized masculinity, fewer have focused on the ways in which it is unmade or how it can be transformed (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017, 161). This can be applied to veterans who
transition from military to civilian life and are often conceptualized as losing part of their manhood when leaving the armed forces or sustaining injuries or disabilities, though they often adopt other masculinities (ibid). As masculine identity in the military is fluid and unstable, it must be constantly reconstituted, developed, and nurtured by the military through training and socialization (Lane, 2017, 471). Military training, or the process of militarization, socializes recruits into gendered roles of what women and men can and cannot do (Do and Samuels, 2021, 5).

While the default soldier may be masculine, perceptions of who a soldier is are changing. For example, with changes in global threats to security, such as increased cyber-conflicts, someone with cyber skills will be necessary in the military but may not consider themselves as potential CAF employees because they cannot envision themselves as traditional soldiers (Mayer, 2020, 4). It is imperative to examine how gender operates within the military in order to broaden the expectations of who is and can be a soldier.

Enloe (2016) explained that the woman soldier used to be an oxymoron (77). She continued:

By the early years of the twenty-first century, the woman soldier seemed to have become a globalized icon of the “modern woman.” She was breaking feminized taboos, entering a traditionally masculinized domain, being deployed far from home, displaying her physical strength, handling high-tech weaponry. She was defying the strictures of conventional, patriarchal femininity by proving that she could be the protector, not simply the protected—she, like a manly man, could “die for her country.” To some, the woman soldier was thereby showing that a woman could be a “first-class citizen” in her own country and a militarized “peacekeeper” around the world. (77-78).

Enloe argues that the military cannot claim to be “modern” without allowing some women to join its ranks (2016, 78). And, while women in the past were the objects of “contempt and even fear” as they upset the gendered social order, women today are there because “governments think they will enhance, not subvert, ‘national security’” (ibid.). Women do this by making up for the loss of men caused by the repeal of conscription
laws and can make up numbers that are required in times of scarcity (i.e. not enough men signing up). Women also bring more formal education than men, and they can be assigned to search women in countries like Afghanistan where cultural norms do not allow for this to be done by men (Enloe, 2016, 80). However, for women to be effective at the tasks assigned to them, they often must conform to a particular type of desirable femininity that Sjoberg (2007) calls militarized femininity.

### 3.6 Militarized Femininity

As defined by Sjoberg (2007), militarized femininity is “militarism that relies on control of femininity generally and women specifically” (84). Like masculinity, femininity also has multiple, sometimes contradictory, attributes (Kovitz, 2000). Militarized femininity is created when women are understood in particular ways, most frequently in opposition to militarized masculinity.

Sjoberg (2007) develops this concept when she discusses the portrayal of women who participated in the war on Iraq. She relies on the story of Jessica Lynch, the first American prisoner of war to be taken by the Iraqi military, along with four others. Lynch was characterized as “brave beyond her femininity (fighting) but limited by it (needing an elaborate, public rescue)” (85). She was exemplified as a glorified hero for having gone to battle but also protected as an “innocent woman” especially from the threat of being vulnerable to sexual violence (86). Her story has been used as “a symbol of American gender roles” despite the Pentagon presenting inconsistencies in her story and evidence that she was taken care of and offered medical care by Iraqis (ibid.).

Sjoberg (2007) also draws on the case of prisoner abuse by American soldiers in Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison as an example of how femininity has been weaponized to explain the abuse. Three out of the seven officers who participated in the violence, along with the commander, Janis Karpinski, were women. When first appointed as commander, newspapers ran stories about “the remarkable nature of the combination of Karpinski’s gender and her position…characterized her as a ‘caring’ woman who ‘loves’ her soldiers like her children” (Sjoberg, 2007, 87). While her maternal nature was emphasized at the beginning, she was later used as a scapegoat to “produce a new image of what happens
when women go to battle and to slow the gender integration of the military” (88). One
journalist complained that Karpinski reacted to the scandal “like a woman- whining,
making excuses and complaining that it’s not her fault” (ibid., 88). Karpinski’s failure in
Abu Ghraib, even though she claims that she had no knowledge of the torture and was
later asked to be quiet about it, was attributed to her gender, where discourse such as
“war is not women’s work” was touted (ibid.). Those who believed that Karpinski was
aware of the violence characterized her as tough, masculine, and inhuman. Many articles
questioned her sexual preference and called her a dyke or bully dyke.

Sjoberg (2007) argues that the question of whether Karpinski sleeps with women is not
what mattered. Rather, journalistic accounts implied that Karpinski was “somehow less
of a woman: less pure and therefore less female because she coordinated prisoner abuse”
(89). In this way, her depiction implicitly characterizes “real women as incapable of that
sort of violence” (89). Ultimately, Sjoberg (2007) argues that there is an ideal type of
militarized femininity that is “still feminized, still a victim and still marginalized” (92).
As such, the militarized woman is tough and vulnerable like Lynch but not violent and
masculine like Karpinski. Sjoberg elaborates:

A woman soldier, then, is a woman who can make it as a man; not because
masculine values have been questioned or changed, but instead because she
adopts those masculine values and participates with them, becoming masculine. In
this context, masculinity is based on social norms and behaviors more than on
biology. If a woman can meet the traditional requirements of masculinity while
maintaining her femininity, she is allowed to be a part of fighting a war (92).

Using Sjoberg’s (2007) conceptualization of militarized femininity, we can see the
difficult balance required of women to walk the line between fitting in as masculine, but
not being seen as too masculine to forfeit their femininity entirely. Some feminist authors
(see, for example, Runyan and Peterson, 2014) have pointed out that it is easier to justify
state-sponsored torture and terrorism if carried out by women and other
“underrepresented” groups, especially because the trope of “bad girls” (157) is already
well entrenched in public imagination.
Women represented 8.3 percent of combat positions in Canada’s mission to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2011 (Chapman and Eichler, 2014, 602). Chapman and Eichler (2014) found that the dominant representation of female combat soldiering in Canada during this time was of women as “equal and genderless warriors” (604). They argue that this is linked to the claim that the CAF is a gender-neutral institution and “Canadian military officials have repeatedly argued that gender is ‘no longer an issue’ in the military since all positions are open to women, including service on submarines and in the combat arms. As such, the military uses the equality of positions open for application as an indication of the health of gender equality in the CAF” (604). However, the idea that women are portrayed as equal and genderless warriors in Afghanistan can be contrasted with the recommendations for increasing the recruitment of women offered by the “tiger team,” which was created by the CAF and operated from 2017-2019. The tiger team was an 80-member team composed of representatives from all three CAF environments, the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group, Chief of Military Personnel, Status of Women Canada, and the Privy Council Innovation hub that produced a report written by Col. Suzanne Raby (Pugliese, 2020). The tiger team’s recommendations included making women’s skirts shorter and slimmer and creating a social media campaign with “cringeworthy” slogans like “my bling are my medals” and a video featuring a woman tossing a grenade, accompanied by the slogan “of course I throw like a girl, but I never miss” (Simkins, 2020). These ideas have been heavily criticized and were ultimately scrapped because of the skewed and insulting portrayal of women’s values and priorities, but they provide insight into how militarized femininity is understood in Canada.

Suggesting that women would be drawn to the military due to the possibility of wearing short skirts demonstrates that sexism is alive and well in the institution. While the report contained worthwhile recommendations such as addressing sexual harassment or greater deployment flexibility for single parents, it otherwise read as highly offensive and out of touch with the values and ethos of gender equality (Pugliese, 2020). It is not uncommon for military women’s concerns to be dismissed or undermined, and even their representation in the media to be sexist and trivialized. Berger and Naaman (2011) emphasize that women in the Israeli Defence Force are regularly sexualized in their military gear even as they are valorized for their “violent agency” (269). In Canada,
attention paid by the media to women in uniform usually happens only in relation to sexual misconduct (discussed further in Chapter 7). This reporting tends to focus on perpetrators of sexual misconduct or the institution of the CAF more broadly and little attention is paid to the experiences of victims, usually women, especially outside of exceptional circumstances.

Bridges and Wadham (2019) argue that “increased reporting about the experiences of women does not translate into increased representation” and that reporting on military women “spiked” in Australia after a heavily publicized sexual misconduct case (12). They also argue that this “privileges masculine interests and voice… rendering women silenced” (13). In the following chapter, I discuss the contradictions of militarized peacekeeping, Canada’s peacekeeping past and present and gender in relation to peacekeeping. While soldiering is systemically associated with masculinity, the discourse surrounding women’s increased representation in peacekeeping is more complicated but also highly gendered.
4 Peacekeeping contradictions and gendered dimensions

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I provide context explaining why peacekeeping is the site of my analysis. I discuss Canada’s peacekeeping past and contradictions within militarized peacekeeping as a global project. I also focus on how gender operates in peacekeeping with regards to “smart peacekeeping” logic and operational effectiveness claims.

Peacekeeping is a function militaries participate in globally. According to the United Nations, peacekeeping is among a range of activities undertaken by the UN to maintain international peace and security. PKOs can help facilitate democratic political processes (including free and fair elections), protect civilians, assist in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), protect human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law. Other activities may include conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding. The boundaries between these activities have become increasingly blurred and UN missions are rarely limited to one type of activity.

PKOs are guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate (United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d). The CAF conduct a variety of operations (surveillance of Canadian territory, emergency response, search and rescue, NATO assurance and deterrence measures) and peace support operations are tasked and directed by the Canadian Joint Operations Command at the request of the Government of Canada. At time of writing, the

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1 An article based on this chapter has been published in a peer-reviewed journal: Biskupski-Mujanovic, S. (2019). Smart peacekeeping: Deploying Canadian women for a better peace? International Journal, 74(3), 405-421.
CAF is conducting peace support operations, in varying capacities, in Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lebanon, Israel, Kosovo, Mali, Cyprus, and South Sudan. Peacekeeping has evolved over time. UN peacekeeping operations were initially created to contain and manage inter-state wars that had the potential to become global conflicts. However, peacekeeping has changed over time in response to violent, intra-state conflict and civil wars. Consequently, contemporary peacekeeping is often called multidimensional peacekeeping (Peace Operations Monitor, n.d). The CAF’s peace support operations encapsulate multidimensional peacekeeping that can include peacemaking and peace enforcement. Within this research, all peace support operations are referred to as peacekeeping operations (PKOs), as this continues to be the most widely used term in popular discourse, news, and media coverage.

According to the UN Department of Peace Operations, in 2020, women constituted 4.8% of military contingents and 10.9% of formed police units in UN peacekeeping missions. Since Trudeau has been in power, Canada’s participation in PKOs has ranged from 34–167 deployed uniformed personnel between 2017 and 2022 with the highest number of troops deployed to Mali in 2019 (Dorn, 2022). As of February 2022, Canada ranked 70th among UN Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and developing countries now rank as top TCCs, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and India in the top three (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2022). Both overall and Canadian figures fall short of the UN Gender Parity Strategy targets to reach 20 percent women’s representation in formed police units and 15 percent in military peacekeeping contingents by 2020. As this target has not yet been reached, the timeline has been extended to 2028.

4.2 Canada’s peacekeeping past

Since 1947, Canada has contributed over 125,000 personnel from all branches of the armed forces to global peacekeeping and was also the undisputed global leader in peacekeeping during the 1950s–1970s and beyond (Gough, 2002). This includes Canada’s participation in at least 34 UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations (Boulding, 2003, 265). Canada has been celebrating National Peacekeepers’ Day every August 9th since 2008 to memorialize the greatest single loss of Canadian lives on a peacekeeping mission, when nine peacekeepers on a UN marked Canadian transport aircraft were killed.
when their plane was shot down by Syrian missiles during a regular resupply mission in the Middle East in 1974 (Veterans Affairs Canada, 2019). Canada’s peacekeeping monument in Ottawa, *Reconciliation*, was built in 1992 to recognize and celebrate Canada’s peacekeeping role, and there are numerous other memorials and monuments to peacekeepers across Canada, including Peacekeepers’ Park in Calgary and the Peacekeepers’ Cairn in Winnipeg (Dorn, 2005, 5).

Lester B Pearson, prime minister of Canada in the 1960s and a previous president of the UN General Assembly, was the first person to use the UN Charter to create the idea of the international “Blue Helmets,” a project that earned him a Nobel Peace Prize and labeled him the father of the UN Forces. Pearson is credited with using the world’s first large-scale UN peacekeeping force to de-escalate the situation between the Western powers of the US, Great Britain, and France and the Soviet Union regarding the Suez Canal in Egypt. However, Jefferess (2009) argues that the production of Pearson as the father of peacekeeping constitutes “an example of nostalgic historical selection in the interest of producing a coherent and safe past,” and contends, citing Linda McQuaig, that Pearson became prime minister after “campaigning to accept US nuclear weapons in Canada” and advocating for the development of NATO as an “ideological and imperial project, encouraging progressive Western ideas and highlighting a positive free-market alternative to Communism” (Jefferess, 2009, 718). We should celebrate Lester B Pearson’s contributions while being critical of some aspects of his legacy.

Canada’s peacekeeping past is fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies, gendered and otherwise, highlighted by the supposed Canadian values of neutrality and doing good while simultaneously being implicated in violence and marginalization at home and abroad (Howell, 2005). The killing of Shidane Arone in Somalia in 1993 by Canadian peacekeepers illuminates the imperialist and often racist undertones of peacekeeping projects, yet the glory and pride of Canada’s peacekeeping heyday dominates collective memory. Historians Granatstein and Hillmer have remarked, “If nations must have images, it is certainly better for Canadians to think of themselves as umpires, as morality incarnate, than as mass murderers or warmongers” (cited in Harding and Kamboureli, 2009, 659). Whitworth (2004) argues that we need to better focus on how “the
introduction of peacekeeping forces has actually served to increase some local people’s insecurity rather than alleviate it,’” and points to the central contradiction in peacekeeping, which is how the vast majority of peacekeepers are soldiers, “people skilled in the arts of violence and the protection of nation and territory,” where the blue beret is supposed to be “‘benign, altruistic, neutral and capable of conflict resolution in any cultural setting, a warrior-prince-of-peace” (13).

Popularly known as the Somalia Affair, the 1993 killing of Somali Shidane Arone by the Canadian Airborne Regiment has been dubbed one of Canada’s most disgraceful moments in the international arena. Corporal Clayton Matchee and Private Kyle Brown were charged with second-degree murder for Arone’s death. Matchee was later acquitted, as he was found unfit to stand trial, and Brown was convicted of the crime. Upwards of 80 soldiers heard or saw what happened and stood by without interfering. Only seven other soldiers were charged with lesser crimes, and most were acquitted. Photos emerged of Matchee and Brown with Arone’s dying body, as well as videos of the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia spouting racist or derogatory remarks about the local population, and a hazing video of Canadian Airborne Regiment soldiers that included one soldier smeared with feces that spelled out “I love KKK” (CBC News, 1995). Ultimately, the Airborne Regiment was disbanded, and the Federal Commission of Inquiry produced a report that found that the rules of engagement had been unclear, the Canadian mission was poorly planned, there had been failures of leadership, and there were recurrent problems with military discipline (Commission on of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997). Recommendations included better evaluation of individuals’ ability for self-defence to control aggressive and impulsive behaviour; clear and comprehensive guidelines regarding prohibited racist and extremist conduct, with definitions and examples; and establishing mechanisms to ensure that peacekeeping operation members had training on local culture, history, and politics. Among the themes in the report were concerns raised about leadership, accountability, discipline, military planning, training, and rules of engagement.

Razack (2005) has worked to centre race in what happened in Somalia. She argues that there were racist undertones throughout the mission, as there have been in militarized
peacekeeping more broadly. There was a perception among First World soldiers that the peacekeeping operations in which they were serving took place on ‘‘colonial terrain—the ‘uncivilized world’ in which the natives are clearly not of the same legal and moral order as the peacekeepers” (ibid.,54). There was very little interrogation of race by the Inquiry. Nor does race come up when we speak about future peacekeeping missions. It seems impossible to watch the videos and images and hear the stories of what happened, and not conclude that racism, militarism, and masculinity were the root causes of Arone’s murder in Somalia.

Racism cannot be divorced from white privilege. As Loftsdottir (2012) argues, ‘‘The fact that ‘white’ individuals can more readily forget their own skin colour and position of power itself draws attention to the privileges associated with being categorized as white” (41). She refers to the work of Spivak in explicating how whiteness is rarely, if ever, implicated in doing harm, and argues that it has been interpreted that when Western nations intervene it tends to be for the purpose of rescuing brown women from brown men, notably seen in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (ibid.). The invisibility of whiteness can be extended to many peacekeeping missions in Africa where colonial legacies are forgotten and Western, or white, complicity is ignored. It is not enough to acknowledge that racism predicated the Airborne Regiment’s murder of Arone. Anti-racist critique, together with gender analysis, must inform current and future engagement abroad and oppressive conditions in Canada’s own backyard.

In the 2000s, Canada fell from grace in UN peacekeeping during the Conservative era of Stephen Harper, when soft power was not considered the choice instrument of foreign policy. Ironically, Harper had slightly more women deployed on peacekeeping missions than Trudeau, with 21 women deployed in 2015, compared to 18 in 2018. Trudeau and Harper differ greatly in their approach to foreign policy. Harper was less interested in “soft power” and extended Canada’s participation in Afghanistan (Cros, 2015, 102). Trudeau, on the other hand, has been less keen on engaging in war-fighting missions and has been accused of not offering enough money or support to the CAF (Lane, 2018; Rice and von Hlatky, 2018). Along with announcing the Elsie Initiative, explained in chapter one, Trudeau pledged to increase Canada’s contribution to United Nations peacekeeping
at the 2017 Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial Conference in Vancouver. He began his speech by stating:

>You know, for most Canadians peacekeeping has become rooted in a kind of nostalgia. Canada was a great peacekeeping nation once. So, we should try to do that again today (Prime Minister of Canada, 2017).

Canada’s goals for returning to peacekeeping on a larger scale have been hotly contested and Trudeau has been accused of acting solely with the interest of securing a seat at the United Nations Security Council, despite multiple failures to do so, including as recently as 2020 (Bolongaro, 2020; Carroll, 2016). In 2018, Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan and Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland announced Canada’s plans to deploy to Mali, where Canada has spent more than CAD$1 billion in foreign aid and military support over the past decade (Berthiaume, 2018). Trudeau previously acknowledged that the Canadian military has “had a troubled history” of peace in Africa, and public support for the Mali mission was low, as 162 peacekeepers had been killed there since the mission was established in 2013 (Brewster, 2018). Alluding to the complexities of multidimensional peacekeeping, former Defence Minister Sajjan stated that the Mali situation was “not the peacekeeping of the past” (ibid.). He continued to explain “we need to do our part because we cannot be secure at home if we’re not engaged in the world” (ibid.). The comments of both Trudeau and Sajjan point to the “peacekeeping myth” where Canada has a nostalgic yearning for its tradition as a peacekeeping nation (Sjolander, 2009, 79).

Canadian contributions to peacekeeping have ascribed to a sense of “world service; an altruistic desire to improve international peace and security” (Dorn, 2005, 19). This idealistic perspective understands the international system as “moral and just, one in which all nations have a say and where they work collectively to keep the peace” (ibid.). As External Affairs Minister Paul Martin Sr. declared, “We do it [peacekeeping] not for the glory but as our duty” (ibid.). This perspective is harmful as the narrative of “Canada the good” obscures histories of violence and marginalization experienced within Canada, such as the continued marginalization of Indigenous peoples, newcomers, and women
(Howell, 2005, 50). Peacekeeping presumes that states or governments can be divided into ‘abusers’ and ‘protectors’ of rights although this distinction is not always clear (Pugh, 2003, 51). Producing a normative peacekeeping culture means that less emphasis can be placed on Canada’s behavior in other respects such as its participation in arms dealing. Canada has repeatedly been among the top fifteen weapons exporters in the world, ranking sixth in 2006, just behind China (Jefferess, 2009, 711). In 2017, 60,000 Canadians worked in the arms sector that contributed over $10 billion of revenue annually (Vucetic, 2017, 510). Further, 15 percent of Canada’s military deals were with buyers with “bad or very bad human rights records” (ibid., 516). Therefore, exporting Canadian ‘values’ abroad is not just hypocritical but also a form of imperialism. Razack (2003) boldly asks, “How else can a nation, without wars and colonizing ventures outside its borders (although there are plenty of internal colonizing opportunities), prove its grown-up status and earn its place on the world stage? How else would its men know that they are men?” (208). While peacekeeping may not appear as overtly self-interested as colonialism, Cunliffe (2012) argues that there are important economic considerations at stake, including ensuring that there is little disruption caused by conflict to trade, investment, and commerce (430). These considerations motivate countries to participate in conflict abroad, even if as peacekeepers.

### 4.3 Peacekeeping contradictions

Global peacekeeping has been theorized and critiqued by scholars and practitioners alike. Adebajo (2003) describes peacekeeping as hegemonic; “A situation in which a powerful state with strong global or regional interests is able to deploy a preponderance of troops in a bid to manage a conflict and is able to convince other states to accept its leadership of the mission” (63). He continues to explain that states use peacekeeping as method to leverage the power they have in the world. For example, in MINUSMA, the peacekeeping mission in Mali, Canada deployed an Air Task Force that was responsible for medical evacuations of peacekeepers though they contributed few personnel, especially in relation to other nations most notably from the Global South.

Lipson (2007) situates peacekeeping with a framework of “organized hypocrisy” where “actors respond to norms with symbolic action, while simultaneously violating the norms
through instrumental behavior” (6). He argues that the UN’s values of “national self-determination, individual human rights, development, and peace” are sometimes incompatible with individual nations (ibid.). These values are contradictory in that multilateralism and sovereignty can be inconsistent with the prevention of genocide or the promotion of disarmament, where intervention is the acceptable norm. By appeasing to its members’ demands, especially those of the permanent Security Council, the priorities of the UN are not neutral and should not be represented as such. The UN produces “talk and decisions relating to peacekeeping — including ‘lessons learned’ reports, reports of the Secretary-General and high-level commissions, reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and relevant Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions” yet the structural issues embedded within the practice of peacekeeping continue to be unresolved (Tripodi, 2006, 213). The core principles of peacekeeping are also troubled when peacekeepers continue to commit violence against local populations despite repeated calls not to do so and policies of zero tolerance.

Peacekeeping has progressed from a focus on state security to human security, an individualistic response and ideology, even when focused on the collective (Blocq, 2010, 294). Harding and Kamboureli (2009) argue that human security “is ill-defined, for it has less to do with humanistic than with bio-political considerations” and posit that human security has “the aim to produce ‘the humans’ requiring securing” (768). The broader issues that this argument points to is how a bio-political perspective defines what it means to be human, whose life is worth protecting, and who should win a conflict and deserve humanitarian aid. Harding and Kamboureli (2009) posit that one can only imagine what is at stake if the world were to “desecuritize security” and how we would measure our progress and elitism if we did not have those who are less privileged to compare ourselves to and to rescue (769). Whitworth (2004) encourages us to consider what peacekeeping seeks to accomplish, who is pursuing securitizing these spaces and places and why. She asks, “Security for whom? Security from what?” (14).

In terms of states’ motivations for contributing to PKOs, Whitworth (2004) argues that peacekeeping makes some militaries “possible as militaries” as peacekeeping is the only outlet available to them for field mission experience and to train for combat readiness.
Peacekeeping can legitimize militaries like Canada’s, enhancing public belief that the nation is able to pursue its defence should it have to. However, Pugh (2004) argues that peacekeeping aims to “establish the values of neoliberal market economics, statism and political plurality, and thus comes to represent the ideals of global liberal governance” (41). He reiterates how peacekeeping serves an existing order, which benefits some over others, and “modern versions of peacekeeping can be considered as forms of riot control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace” (ibid.).

If inequality can be analyzed between, across, and within institutions and projects, peacekeeping presents as a very unequal and inequitable enterprise. Wealthy industrialized states are allocated two-thirds of the professional posts in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Global South leaders have voiced concerns over their marginalization within the department (Pugh, 2004, 26). Henry (2012) emphasizes how northern Security Council powers (US, Russia, China, France and UK) are most visible in the governance of peacekeeping; however, it is the Global South that contributes a majority of the troops (18). While they contribute most of the labor, peacekeepers from the Global South are not adequately recognized and most, except for China, contribute far less to the UN peacekeeping budget than Western countries. Canada was the 9th highest contributor in 2020–2021, offering 2.73 per cent of the total UN peacekeeping budget (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021).

### 4.4 Peacekeepers as perpetrators

Another glaring contradiction in peacekeeping is that peacekeepers, tasked with protecting civilians, have themselves sometimes been perpetrators of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Peacekeepers are expected to be “examples of integrity, honesty, impartiality and restraint,” yet these values are undermined when peacekeepers engage in SEA (Kolbe, 2015, 1). The Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse presents prohibitions against SEA including: sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18, regardless of the host country’s age of consent), exchange of money, employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual favors or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative
behavior and sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance (United Nations Secretariat, 2003).

Underlying these prohibitions is the understanding that they are based on inherently unequal power dynamics. The UN has taken action to address SEA allegations and established a system for receiving and disseminating information, and UN stands by a “zero tolerance” policy on SEA. Ironically, it simultaneously offers functional immunity to their personnel. Most often UN officials, including peacekeepers, are repatriated to their state of nationality and potentially prosecuted within their own justice systems (Grady, 2016, 934). Immunity, a hotly contested and criticized notion, was established in order to protect peacekeepers from the unpredictable and hostile environments in host states (Mudgeway, 2017, 1455). It is important to note that most investigations into allegations of SEA produce insufficient evidence to charge the perpetrators, if there is follow up in the troop contributing countries at all. This conundrum establishes an accountability gap where many, if not most, perpetrators go unpunished (Mudgway, 1455).

SEA committed by peacekeepers can often be attributed to the pervasive culture of militarized masculinity. Harrigton (2005) asserts that peacekeeper participation in sex trafficking is a direct result of economic asymmetry and hyper masculinity: “Hyper-masculine groups bond with each other as equal men through misogynist discourse and practice, often in the context of commercial sex, for example group visits to strip-bar-brothels where they verbally and physically degrade women and girls together” (181). The camaraderie of hyper-masculinity also works to silence women and perpetuate the ‘boys will be boys’ mentality.

The UN provides some direction to troop contributing countries on how to deal with perpetrators, yet there is little work being done to support victims of SEA. Odello and Burke (2016) question what access to justice and redress victims of peacekeeper abuse have (850). The UN offers support to victims of SEA in filing paternity and child support claims, finding local resources, and facilitating a victim assistance trust fund that finances awareness campaigns and community outreach, but not compensation (UN Conduct,
Canada has provided funding to this program with the hope that it will help regain the trust of host communities.

In 2019, a report detailed how six Canadian peacekeepers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have been found by the UN to have engaged in SEA against civilians in Haiti. Canada has sent 625 peacekeepers to Haiti since 2011. One of those perpetrators even threatened a local sex worker with his UN-issued firearm (Nosheen and Culbert, 2019). Further, in two of the six cases, Canadian officers fathered children. The mother of one of these children reported that her child is picked on at school for his biracial appearance and that other children have nicknamed him “Minustah” - the name of the UN mission in Haiti (ibid.). The following are the sanctions the officers received in Canada:

- Officer given five-day suspension.
- Sanctions pending, officer has appealed the decision.
- Officer received a nine-day suspension.
- Officer avoided sanctions by retiring.
- Officer avoided sanctions by retiring before date of disciplinary hearing.
- Case closed as home police force didn't think it had enough evidence to pursue the case (Nosheen and Culbert, 2019).

There is no question that if peacekeepers are to uphold certain values, including those of gender equality, this task must first be accomplished within national armies and police forces. Baruah (2017) justifiably asks “Why are institutions that are male-dominated and masculinist in orientation, ideology and functioning expected to behave differently when exported overseas: that is, in UN peacekeeping?” The CAF and the RCMP alike have struggled with curbing sexual misconduct at home, let alone abroad where impunity is likely to be even more entrenched. Thus, while it is important to note that not a single female peacekeeper has ever been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse on mission (Kent, 2017), it is simultaneously important to emphasize that the evidence that a small number of women peacekeepers will have a “civilizing” effect on male peacekeepers, thereby reducing the prevalence of SEA in peacekeeping operations, is extremely thin.
(Baruah, 2017). However, it appears to have acquired the status of truism in peacekeeping policy as have other unverified stereotypes about women.

4.5 Smart peacekeeping: Gender and operational effectiveness

Chant and Sweetman (2012) theorize ‘‘smart economics’’ that ‘‘rationalize ‘investing’ in women and girls for more effective development outcomes’’ (518). They argue that women’s empowerment and gender equality have been taken up as goals that make economic sense. This framework can be extended to peacekeeping, including the Elsie Initiative, where the push for women’s increased representation is not primarily about equality; it is about improving security outcomes. Women are treated as vehicles to improve operational effectiveness; their inclusion is expected to improve the underlying gender issues within the peacekeeping project in general. Chant and Sweetman (2012) argue that ‘‘it is imperative to ask whether the goal of female investment is primarily to promote gender equality and women’s ‘empowerment,’ or to facilitate development ‘on the cheap,’ and/or to promote further economic liberalization’’ (521). The logic behind ‘‘smart economics’’ is that women pick up the slack where institutions fail to do so—
institutions that are not only complicit in perpetuating assumptions about who women are and what change they can bring about, but that also, according to Raewyn Connell (in Chappell, 2010), ‘‘institutionalize definitions of femininity and masculinity, arrange gender hierarchies, construct gender cultures and define gender-appropriate jobs’’ (184). Similar logic is promoted for increasing women’s participation in peacekeeping, where institutions are rarely implicated in insecurity, and embedded discourses of power, rooted in gender and racial inequality, are rarely challenged, less so in a meaningful way. Smart economics thinking originated when gender mainstreaming picked up speed at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Chant and Sweetman (2012) argue that this perspective is ‘‘a far cry from the nuanced and subject sensitive ideas of what the empowerment of women and the attainment of gender equality actually entails’’ and falls short of addressing structural inequality and relational issues that perpetuate women’s subordination to begin with (518). Furthermore, smart economics problematically calls on those women it seeks to help to improve the conditions that
require changing. UNSCR 1325 and subsequent National Action Plans (NAPs) on Women, Peace, and Security are iterations of “smart economics” thinking, and have provided a blueprint for how countries, including Canada, can increase women’s representation in their peace support operations (discussed in chapter 1).

The dominant discourse on women and security is concerned mostly with operational effectiveness and less with the inclusion of women as an end in itself. Femininity is instrumentalized to counteract militarized masculinity in an effort to curb problems that have no simple solutions and which risk undermining the privilege of those in power. It is easier to seek out women for solutions to peace and security problems than to challenge underlying structural inequalities and exclusions related to gender and race. For this reason, operational effectiveness arguments are the most obvious iteration of smart economics thinking, or “smart peacekeeping.” Zimerman (2017) argues that we need conversations around insufficient political will and funding for gender equality, as well as,

The deep-rooted norms, structures, and value systems that privilege masculinities over femininities. . . When the focus is on women rather than power dynamics, Women, Peace, and Security issues can be construed as peripheral; something to focus on once the “important” and “urgent” work is complete (which it never is)(n.p.).

However, gender is almost entirely conflated with women within peacekeeping discourse, and none of the strategies offer transformative potential to change and improve norms and structures beyond “add women and stir.” Jennings (2011) situates the eager race to include women in greater numbers as the “operational effectiveness” argument. She argues that women are burdened with the expectation that they can better protect citizens, especially women and children, since they are less intimidating than men, and that there are practical advantages to women peacekeepers as they can search local women at checkpoints, improve intelligence gathering with the local community, and inspire women by serving as role models or mentors for other, especially local, women and girls (3-4). Most frequently, women are represented as a mechanism to fix the problem of
sexual exploitation and abuse committed by peacekeepers, by assisting victims with women’s “innate” compassionate responses; deterring their male colleagues from sexual violence by having a civilizing effect on them; and lowering the overall levels of abuse committed, since women are less likely to be perpetrators (ibid., 3) It is clear that this reasoning draws on affirmative gender essentialisms that highlight that it is not “what women do, but who they are that makes the difference” (ibid., 7). Ultimately, including women should be an intrinsic goal based on equity and fairness, not just an instrumental or “smart” target.

The conflation of gender with women only works to flatten the conversations that should be taking place about the construction of masculinity and femininity in stark opposition to one another. As gender is socially constructed and reproduced through norms and stereotypes, many of the premises upon which smart peacekeeping is based are nothing but anecdotal and lack empirical evidence. There are very few studies that include the voices of women peacekeepers, and there are none from a Canadian perspective. Some advocates for women’s increased participation use smart peacekeeping logic themselves, strategically, in order to gain buy-in from stakeholders (such as the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security). However, without knowing more about Canadian women experiences as peacekeepers, their needs, and the barriers, and opportunities they face, the conversation about gender in peacekeeping lacks an empirical basis and puts those most affected by smart peacekeeping logic in the shadows.
Chapter 5

5 Soldiers or soldierettes? Gender in the Canadian Armed Forces

In this chapter, I discuss research findings that pertain to Canadian military women’s gendered experiences in the CAF and how their intersectional identities affect these experiences. I will also discuss the challenges and opportunities women encounter in the CAF. Deployment experiences in peacekeeping cannot be divorced from broader experiences in the CAF; therefore, it is necessary to consider these before delving into peace operation-specific experiences. The following four themes will be discussed in this chapter:

1. Women continue to be burdened by gendered stereotypes in the military that make their work environment more challenging. However, these stereotypes are dynamic and constantly evolving.
2. Women in the CAF are diverse, and their experiences vary based on their social location. Intersectional experiences based on gender, sexuality, ethnicity, and other intersectional identity markers differentiate women’s experiences in unique, and often challenging or unpredictable ways.
3. Women continue to experience gendered challenges in the military environment that include work and life balance, mothering, and relationships.
4. Some women have experienced opportunities in the CAF that they attribute to their gender, which they believe have sometimes given them an advantage over their male colleagues.

5.1 Who are the women in uniform? Gendered stereotypes, (mis)perceptions and experiences

Describing gender integration, one participant suggested that the first women to enter the military when all occupations opened up for women in the late 1980s were the “first ofs” and that they were “gender benders” (P1). By this, she meant that these women were atypical, had different personalities than so-called “average” women and they were exceptional, “better, stronger and more fit” (P1). However, the same respondent emphasized that women were tokens; she felt that women had to “work twice as hard as a man to be considered as good as a man” (P10). She also believed that women would need to make up 15% of the CAF to become a vocal minority where they would be able to advocate for their gendered needs (bathrooms, equipment) but that true gender integration
would require many more women than that. Literature on the topic suggests that a critical mass of about one-third of any minority group is required to bring about meaningful change, improve the conditions of said group and minimize the effect on the token few (Ceralde and Czepiel, 2014; Kanter, 1977). However, even a small percentage of women “makes all the difference in the world because it makes gender and masculine norms visible… the presence of women calls attention to the norms of the dominant culture because women are understood to represent ‘difference’” (Kronsell, 2005, 286).

Some respondents emphasized that even when gendered essentialisms, such as women’s caring abilities and kindness, were used to justify women’s presence in the armed forces, it improved their visibility and status with military institutions and in peacekeeping (discussed further in chapter 7). Some participants did believe that women had unique skills to offer by virtue of being women, such as better decision-making skills, better abilities to diffuse tense situations and resolve conflicts (P3). Some participants felt these characteristics made women better suitable for certain roles and trades, such as administration (P16). Considering that the majority of women in the CAF are already in administrative or other support roles, this might be a self-fulfilling prophecy of women self-selecting into these roles based on gendered expectations.

One participant suggested that she was more willing to adapt to circumstances and work conditions due to the fact that she was “more of an informal leader” and “not confrontational,” making her a better leader overall (P5). She thought this benefitted her as her subordinates felt more comfortable approaching her with situations such as with mental health concerns where they felt less judged than they would have been by a male superior. The traditional military leadership style was understood as very competitive such that collaboration or shared decision-making was perceived as feminine (P22). Similar to findings from Walker (2012), these participants found that their femininity could be an advantage for them and that “a female officer (leader) should act like a woman and not a man” (28).
A few participants stated that when women were successful, they were accused of engaging in sexual favors. This may result from the fact that it was very difficult for women to otherwise fit in with the “boys club.” One participant explained:

The sad side, though, is that with guys, there was never a casting couch for them. They played golf with the boss, they were part of the smoker’s club or had BBQs, their wife was friends with boss’ wife. Affiliation was seen as separate from sexual favors, whereas with women, that was the first thing that came up (P14).

Women, of course, were generally left out of the boy’s club unless they invested significant emotional labor to be accepted. They were sometimes still hindered from inclusion as some men chose not to engage with women as equal professionals, divorced from the presumed domestic roles women play in men’s lives. In order to break free of these typologies, women found ways to become more like their male peers in order to fit in. Unfortunately, this included being confronted with, and sometimes becoming complicit in, a great deal of underlying misogyny. One participant explained:

Women in the military come from one of three categories: either you’re a slut, a bitch or a wallflower. It’s up to each woman, through her actions and deeds, to determine how she was going to be seen. I had to know ahead of time how I wanted to be seen in order to establish my reputation and career. I became one of the boys - I guess it was more of a wallflower and bitch combination- I didn’t see myself defined as any of those three (P14).

King (2015) argues that categorizing women as sluts (i.e. as sexually available) or bitches (i.e. as sexually unavailable), of which lesbians are a subcategory, has been a tool of overt discrimination and harassment against women who enter the armed forces, which was typically considered a man’s domain (381).

A great deal of work is required of women to foster and protect their honorary masculine status once they had been awarded it (King, 2016, 137). One woman felt that being left out from the activities in which her colleagues participated on the basis of her gender was a huge loss and prompted her to work harder to fit in. She stated: “I wanted to be one of
the guys- I didn’t want them to pussyfoot around me and hide stuff” (P29). Therefore, when the men in her unit invited her to a strip club, she went and she thought, “they didn’t go out behind my back and leave me behind- it’s the worst feeling” (P29). While this participant did not mention how attending a strip club as a form of masculine bonding over the sexualization of women was in itself problematic, she was prepared to participate in order to not be thought of as “less than.” Inclusion in bonding experiences like this in an organization such as the CAF are tantamount to survival.

Another strategy to be “one of the guys” was to participate in crude behavior (sexist jokes, farting) and suppress one’s feelings and emotions. Women are essentialized as being more emotional than men and crying is deemed inappropriate, even if masculine, aggressive, and violent reactions are appropriate as “crying is seen as emotion, while anger is not” (Taber, 2005, 296). In terms of emotional control, one participant stated that she did not feel that it was a masculine trait but rather a “warrior trait” (P24). This participant, who worked in a non-traditional trade, was the only one to openly subscribe to warrior thinking. She stated, “I don’t need to be masculine; I just need to be myself. I definitely don’t need to be bitchy and if it were a guy being that it wouldn’t work for him either” (P24). So, while she noticed that behaving in a way that runs contrary to stereotypes about women was an effective strategy, she did not necessarily conceptualize her behavior as masculine but rather as warrior-like. However, women have also been and often remain excluded from traditional occupations such as combat arms associated with the masculine warrior identity (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017; Lane, 2017; Wood and Charbonneau, 2018)

While the “boys club” overtly excludes women, women may do the same to one another through horizontal hostility where they scapegoat, discriminate against, or avoid engaging with each other, presumably because they are under pressure to survive in a sexist and male-dominated military culture (Meade, 2020, 49). While some women that joined in the 1970–1980s dealt with overtly abusive behavior from their female superiors, horizontal hostility continues to persist among women that joined more recently. Numerous participants shared examples of women holding grudges, being derogatory and
critical of other women, sharing gossip or name-calling, and perpetrating microaggressions against other women.

These tensions are the result of internalized misogynies and structural patriarchy wherein women mistrust other women and favor men. First, an institution that values typically masculine traits denigrates women, sometimes through violence or aggressive behaviors or attitudes. Second, with so few women in the institution, there is a heightened sense of competition and awareness of what women are doing and how they are reacting. Women’s behavior and responses to negative stimuli are monitored much more closely than men’s responses, even when behaviors like micro-aggressions or gossiping are indulged in by both genders. Last, hierarchical power dynamics embedded in military institutions, contribute to so-called “power tripping” (P26) behaviors in all personnel, regardless of gender identity.

Despite the internalized misogyny, some participants found that they shared lasting bonds with other women they had worked with in the CAF and some benefited from having women leaders who championed their careers. Military friendships are among the strongest relationships soldiers form as inclusion in a military unit creates “an uncommonly strong bond between military members” due to the “amount of time spent together, physical, and social isolation, the experience of shared risks and deprivations of deployment” (Mahat-Shamir et al., 2022, 415). This results in women seeing one another as “sisters in arms.” One participant pointed to a camaraderie she shares with other women when she said: “we all had the experience of trying to take a piss in the fields with 60lbs of gear on and trying to hover pee and getting poison ivy on our butts” (P4).

Women who worked well with other women created a network of informal power. One participant explained that women were most often gatekeepers, largely due to their concentration in support roles, and that those women were powerful and able to facilitate support when needed. Spouses of officers also wielded a lot of informal power as making them “aware of something their husband was doing at work often had much greater effect than something I could do within the system. They could be a huge ally” (P1).
The tension between internalized misogyny and complex sisterly bonds overlapped in unique ways. Yet, some women did not find that there was much connection between themselves and other women in any way, positive or negative, and that rather than a sense of sisterhood, what linked people together was “militaryhood” (P5). As such, it is inaccurate to assume that women support other women on the basis of gender alone or that they dislike one another on this basis alone. Many important friendships or mentoring relationships were between men and women and some women preferred to approach their experiences from the perspective of “genderblindness.” Often, they did not want to see gender at all and thought gendered stereotypes and expectations were ridiculous. One participant explained, “I’m sure there are a lot of men that have a kind, gentle compassionate approach to things as I’m sure there are a lot of women who are hardcore, very binary, not good listeners” (P3). Another woman said, “women and men do the same things except women have their period in the field” (P15). While just over one quarter of participants noticed gender-based advantages, discussed below, many did not and were insistent that gender-based advantages or challenges did not exist.

Other participants were concerned that a specific focus on women’s issues in the CAF means going “too far the other way” (P19). Concerns of reverse-sexism were very real for several participants who noted that they chose not to participate in women’s groups for this reason. The term feminism was mentioned several times and while a couple of women overtly identified as feminists, the term was mostly treated as a “dirty word.” One participant explained, “I’ve seen feminism in others, it even made me uncomfortable. They are in a place of feeling threatened or having to protect something before they even merited it” (P3). The fear of being sexist against men may be one reason why feminism was somewhat controversial. One participant wanted to make clear early on in the interview that she is not a feminist and she “feels like it would be a slap in the face to them [men]. I have nothing to fight for. We’ve arrived” (P41). In some contexts, the achievement of gender equality in legal terms within militaries may have motivated even feminists who fought hard on behalf of women to think of militaries as post-feminist spaces in which gender equality advocacy is no long necessary. They may dismiss the need for further gender-based analysis or interventions while remaining cognizant that
inequality and discrimination based on gender remains persistent and insidious within militaries.

Brown (2018) writes that feminism is a “bad word” or a “curse(d) word” in the military. But she also argues that many of her students at Canadian Forces College were very open to conversations about gender equality and thinking critically about what that might look like in the military. Several research participants openly identified as feminists and one stated that some men also identify with feminism: “we are like a military family and most men would be offended with the suggestion that their sisters couldn’t do something” (P42). Most CAF members, both men and women, would likely agree with the tenets of feminism, including sharing power and responsibility, even if they may not want to identify as feminists.

Gender stereotypes are based on social and cultural constructions of women and men “due to their physical, biological, sexual, cognitive and social attributes” (Cook and Weiss, 2016, 175). Militaries “make use of, rely on and perpetuate the assumptions that women and men not only can but must occupy different roles, and that the place which is right and proper for men to occupy is privileged above that of women” (ibid, 176). Women do not necessarily try to “resist or subvert the norms related to the obedience, honor, and loyalty” that they owe the military institution (Badaro, 2014, 96), though they do search for recognition. Consistent with my findings, Sasson-Levy (2001) argues that women in the Israeli military construct alternative gender identities through three practices: the mimicry of combat soldiers’ bodily and discursive practices, distancing from traditional femininity, and the trivialization of sexual harassment (11). Common coping strategies used by military women I interviewed included using foul language, wearing larger (or baggy) uniforms, putting down and distancing themselves from other women and distancing themselves from relationships with women, ignoring sexual harassment or making themselves out to be more assertive and thus protected from it.

5.2 Intersectional Identities

The themes outlined in this study are quite broad and include data gathered from women in different occupations, ranks, and military environments. However, the research
participants were also diverse in other ways, including on the basis of sexual orientation, ethnicity, language, and age. Meade (2020) argues that intersectionality, originally coined by Crenshaw (1989; 1991) in relation to the experiences of discrimination of black women rooted in both gender and race, should be applied to the military and veteran community to move beyond the superficial “we are all green” narrative (48). She argues that the military has unique structures of oppression called “military markers of difference” (48). While racism, classism, heterosexism, ethnocentrism, ableism, and ageism exist in the military, other markers of difference also include “rank, time in service, military occupational specialties, military service area, service-connected disabilities, discharge status, and… being located in urban and rural areas” (48). While Meade’s argument is motivated by and limited to the ability of diverse veterans to access services and supports, her framework can also be extended to intersectional analysis in my research.

5.2.1 Sexuality and sexual orientation

Hegemonic masculinity, or militarized masculinity, “cannot be separated from heteronormativity, since gender, sex, and sexuality are interrelated” (Van Gilder, 2019, 154). As such, sexual minorities continue to experience persistent challenges in the military. Sexuality came up multiple times throughout this research in different ways including women feeling sexualized by men, sexual misconduct, using sexuality to their advantage, or to being pegged into the category of slut or lesbian. One participant remarked:

There are women who bat their eyelashes, put their chests out and use what they’ve got to gain the advantage and those girls have a special place in hell, especially when they undercut the rest of us (P4).

Another woman shared that she believed a lot of women join the military to find a husband and that everyone who has a spouse cheats during basic training (P30). The idea that women who use their “assets” to get ahead, according to one participant, reinforces the patriarchy and misogyny in the armed forces (P4). One participant admitted using her appearance to her advantage,
I’m a great weight, have curves and am not horrific on the eyes. I don’t mean to be cocky. I’ll ask nicely and bat my eyes if I need something, and things can sometimes get done quicker (P30).

Beyond the use of sexuality as a tool to “empower” or oppress women, sexual orientation was also discussed. One participant stated, “whether we were or weren’t, we were all called lesbians” (P1). Another participant recalled being asked if she was a lesbian. When I asked her if it was the first and only time this occurred, she responded that even though she was a heterosexual woman “I’ve been a lesbian since I got in” (P38). The women who described being called a lesbian suggested that this name-calling was intended to be demeaning but the women were not particularly bothered by it and brushed it off. On the flip side, since promoting diversity has become more of a priority in the CAF, one participant said that people are paranoid that someone will find out they are gay because “if they find out you’re gay, you will be on the cover of something, like a bus, or on an inclusion committee” (P22).

Some lesbians had what one participant called “unionized” (P1). They helped one another, promoted each other, and were having relationships among themselves in the same chain of command. Some respondents emphasized that unlike gay men, lesbians were less targeted, less maligned, and not named (P1). For a man to come out as gay was more difficult than for a woman to identify as lesbian (P6). Men rejecting the traditional benefits of hetero masculinity is more threatening and cause for panic for patriarchal systems than women rejecting heteronormative norms. Likewise, lesbian women may fulfill heterosexual male sexual fantasies in a way that gay men don’t. Heterosexual men who did not fit the expected norms of dominant masculinity were also suspected of being gay: “I had a friend who was smart and liked to read books, didn’t drink, and swear. Everyone thought he was gay” (P17).

Despite the stereotypes of all military women being lesbians, there are very real consequences for women whose sexuality does not align with heteronormative expectations. Calling women lesbians, whether they were or were not, was used in a derogatory way to make women feel smaller and intended to “take your power away, re-
emphasizing that you are different” (P1). One participant who identified as queer stated that she experienced homophobia on a regular basis through “unfounded investigations, unfounded disciplinary action, unfounded administrative action, denial of permission, and denial of opportunity” (P4). At times the homophobia was not overt, “not in terms of ‘I fucking hate queers,’” but more subtle, where “they would say ‘you don’t need a phone call today, you don’t have a family’ when everyone else was in a heteronormative nuclear family” (P4). The challenges she experienced as a queer woman were well summed up when she stated, “how much emotional labor am I gonna do today to make my workspace safe for people who are like me?”

Another participant was interviewed by military police in the 1980s during the time that the armed forces were purging sexual minorities from the CAF. She recalls, “they assumed I was a lesbian because I played sports and wore no make-up even though I had a boyfriend and a kid” (P28). Between the 1950s and mid 1990s, LGBT members of the CAF, the RCMP, and the federal public service were “systematically discriminated against, harassed, and often fired as a matter of policy and sanctioned practice. In what came to be known as the LGBT purge, people were followed, interrogated, abused, and traumatized” (LGBT Purge Fund). Gay men had been severely targeted by the military since its inception, including being imprisoned or otherwise punished if found guilty of “sodomy” or “indecent assault,” to being regarded as “medically unfit for any service anywhere in any capacity” and being categorized as “psychopathic” (Levy, 2020). In the 1950s, the military enacted what was widely seen as “a witch hunt” to remove all LGBT members, justified as a threat to national security (ibid.). By the 1970s, lesbians were also targeted, despite a 1969 amendment to federal law that partially decriminalized homosexual acts (ibid.).

In the mid-1980s, the military policy of not allowing LGBT people to join the CAF was softened. People had to consent to being discharged because of their sexuality and if they refused, they faced career limitations. The policy was finally reversed in 1992 after Michelle Douglas launched a successful lawsuit against the military after being discharged for being a lesbian (ibid.). A class action lawsuit against the Canadian government for the LGBT purge was launched in 2016. Justin Trudeau formally
apologized on behalf of the Canadian government in 2017 and a settlement was reached in 2018 that included compensation, education, and memorialization efforts.

Gouliquer et al., (2018) write about the journey of a woman named Cheryl in the CAF. She was interrogated in 1983 and accused of being “a lesbian, a homosexual” (327). She stated, “The words sounded so disgusting when they pronounced them. I felt naked and like I… I was dirty. They grilled me for hours and hours, and the questions were horrible and humiliating” (327). She explained further, “I started feeling increasingly paranoid and uncomfortable around people. I’m not just talking about the lying and hiding about Sarah that I was doing. I mean that I felt like I was being excluded; No one talked to me anymore, people avoided making eye contact, and they didn’t sit with me at coffee break” (329). Cheryl’s story is unfortunately not unique. Research indicates that higher levels of mental and physical health conditions exist among LGBTQ veterans compared to their non-LGBTQ counterparts, especially suicidal ideation attributed to concealing their sexual-minority status while serving or experiencing social isolation due to lower levels of social and emotional supports (Eichler and Smith-Evans, 2018, 13-14). Beyond anti-LGBTQ policies, individual homophobic attitudes are also harmful (McNamara et al., 2021).

5.2.2 Race and other identity factors

A few of the participants in this research project were francophone women. These women found that being a Francophone was both an advantage and disadvantage for them in the CAF. A couple of participants said they thought that being Francophone was detrimental early on in their careers as they struggled fitting in to a mostly English institution, though it helped them later on when offered promotions or deployments based on their language capability (P2; P19). It was thought to be more common for Francophones to be fluently bilingual than Anglophones (P5), demonstrating that English is the dominant language despite Canada being an officially bilingual country.

Age was another identity marker that influenced women’s experiences. A couple of women noticed that they were excluded by some colleagues due to their age, especially if
they looked younger than they really were. One woman suggested that, due to her age, she felt like she was often given a look that said, “let the grown-ups talk” (P5).

One of the greatest limitations of this research was the lack of ethnic diversity among participants. Four out of 40 participants were Indigenous or racialized women. Data from 2018 shows that Indigenous people represented 2.7% of armed forces personnel and visible minorities represented 8.1% (House of Commons, 2019, 64). The CAF aims to increase the representation of these groups in order to make the institution better representative of the broader Canadian population. The Employment Equity Act was introduced in Canada in 1995 to supplement provincial Human Rights Codes in addressing inequality. The Act identifies four core groups: women, Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, and visible minorities. As a federal department, the CAF is legislatively required to establish and implement employment equity programs (Public Service Commission of Canada, 2011)

The Indigenous and racialized women who participated in this research project had diverse experiences. Only one of the four participants identified her ethnicity as a barrier in her career. In fact, she stated that her “culture” was always a greater barrier to fitting in than her gender. She stated, “there’s not as many women, but there are still always women” (P26) whereas there are not always people of color. She strongly felt like her ethnicity was one of the reasons she was did not advance in her career as much as she should have, and she thought that most visible minorities feel the same way and that an “unconscious bias” exists as well as “white privilege” (P26). She was also hesitant to name racism, stating, “If you cry racism, how will your team feel about that? It will be met with resistance… they wouldn’t agree with it” (P26). She continued: “it’s hard to speak negatively, you can go down a spiral if you speak that way and I always try to find the silver lining” (P26). This woman had a history of feeling excluded from the CAF based on her ethnicity but nonetheless espoused the “we are all green” motto when it came to choosing not to confront the problem, likely for fear of further exclusion or other social or career repercussions.
Another participant remarked that she did not feel like she experienced discrimination based on her racialized identity beyond comments about her appearance that she said did not bother her (P33). A third participant suggested that she got noticed more and stood out because she is both a woman and a visible minority. She was cognizant of these “checks in the box” but believed it did not impact what she had done in her career (P35). A fourth woman said she had never been immersed in her Indigenous culture, even prior to joining the military; after joining, she “embraced the military family” (P39). She did not believe her positionality, in terms of race or gender, benefitted her or offered her special treatment, nor did she feel discriminated against. She did, however, point out that the majority of Indigenous or visible minority personnel she knew were men and she had not interacted with many women who fit those categories (P39). As such, she emphasized that being a woman of color in the CAF is more isolating than being a man of color.

George (2020) argues that the question of diversity has increasingly been contemplated in Canada’s institutions. She argues that CAF’s 2016 Diversity Strategy, the guiding document and policy on diversity and inclusion includes:

- strong language on improving issues of representation, cultural sensitivity, and discrimination in the workplace… [but] the CAF has failed to implement a diversity strategy that is attentive to overlapping marginalities and instead has focused on the siloed nature of diversity. Goals towards inclusion have been largely about representation and demographic shifts rather than centering on the much-needed cultural shift or the lived experiences among marginalized servicemen and servicewomen (43).

George (2020) argues that marginalization faced by racialized servicewomen can be traced to the social construction of whiteness in Canada that permits white Canadians to maintain a place of privilege while excluding racialized bodies and the histories of Indigenous People (44). Canada is characterized by “colorblindness,” what George calls a “form of white supremacy constitutive of neoliberalism” (45). In reality, to deny the important differences in the treatment of women, particularly women of color, is to “suggest that everyone, regardless of social location, is equal and treated the same”
While women were considered fully integrated in the CAF in 1989, the CAF did not have an official policy on racism until 1993 (George, 2020, 47).

Racism in the CAF continues to manifest itself as colorblindness and George (2020) criticized the CAF for doing superficial work on diversity and inclusion without aiming for meaningful structural change. A source for journalist Blatchford (2019) suggested that the military has a two-tiered system: “one tier for white men and the other for woman and visible minorities” (n.p.). The lack of gender diversity has been so egregious that it has been reported that the Canadian forces “periodically closes some of its approximately 100 occupations or trades to any applicants but women” in order to meet employment equity targets (Blatchford, 2019). However, the forces are adamant that they do not impose restrictions based on gender in any occupations (ibid.) Yet reports like Blatchford’s indicate that there is resistance to diversity initiatives, especially when they are misunderstood as being about tokenism instead of merit. Beyond resistance, the Minister of National Defence Advisory Committee (2022) documented the severity of systemic racism, including anti-black and anti-Indigenous racism, discrimination, and white supremacy in the CAF. The root cause of these issues were attributed to Canada’s colonial history.

My research participants referenced other factors related to social identity that impacted their experiences in the CAF. Women who were from certain regions in Canada, mostly Eastern Canada, suggested that this offered them a different experience and perspective on their experiences. Women who were from rural areas of Canada and were exposed to people from different backgrounds for the first time when they joined CAF shared similar perspectives. A few women also considered their life experiences to have shaped their experiences in the CAF, including having had a civilian career prior to joining rather than joining straight out of high school, having experienced domestic abuse in their marriages or partnerships, and being mothers. Likewise, dealing with mental health concerns also came up as an influencing factor in women’s experiences in the CAF. One participant suggested that she was taken less seriously as a reservist than a regular force member (P15). Reservists are a volunteer force and have the discretion to serve the military or not. They have minimum expected commitments, and many have day jobs that often take
precedence over their military service. However, they continue to be immersed in the same military “subculture of special beliefs, norms and performance standards” (Catignani and Basham, 2021, 107).

5.3 Gendered challenges

Women in the military are burdened with gendered stereotypes and (mis)perceptions including navigating how their sexuality will be perceived, remaining silent about experiencing racism, building relationships with other women, resisting negative stereotypes, and embracing survivalist attitudes in order to enable them to “succeed”. These adaptations are necessary to feel accepted within established institutional structures and hierarchies. When participants were asked about their challenges, many emphasized sexual misconduct. The data that emerged on the topic of sexual misconduct was so significant that it entailed its own chapter, Chapter 7: Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces: The “Lucky Ones” and Those That Weren’t.

Most military women I interviewed agreed that gender is not the only cause of women’s marginalization or discrimination while simultaneously agreeing that it was a disadvantage their male peers did not have to contend with. One participant summed it up as:

If I was a man, it would be easier, and I would have so many opportunities. I try not to think about it. I would be taken seriously, and I’d have like 20% more time in the day, wouldn’t have to explain myself so much. People would automatically think of you for an opportunity (P22).

Many women did not think that the struggles they experienced were much different than the struggles of women in Canadian society more broadly. One participant stated, “People who join, they are not from Mars, they are from here” (P2). Approximately one quarter of research participants identified their gender as beneficial to their career trajectories and another quarter subscribed to the notion of “gender blindness,” discussed earlier. However, approximately half of the participants in this study explicitly identified gendered challenges. One woman explained that being a woman is the biggest challenge
she has experienced in her military tenure. She suggested that had I asked her about her occupation, her response would have been different (P30). She clarified by saying, “the bad thing about being female in the military is being female in the military” (P30). Many of the challenges women experienced were related to work and life balance, mothering, relationships, and the mental load of simultaneously managing different roles, responsibilities, and identities.

5.3.1 Work and life balance

Manser (2020) identifies three challenges that distinguish the military from other occupations: mobility, separation, and risk (121). As such, work and life balance became more complicated based on relocation, re-establishing community supports (child-care, new friendships), and practical tasks like changing driver’s licenses when moving between provinces. Challenges with balancing work and life were mentioned by nearly every participant in this study.

More than one-third of regular force personnel and almost two-thirds of reserve personnel are single without any dependents (Manser, 2018). The remainder has at least one dependent and/or spouse. Fifty-six percent of regular force personnel are married/common-law and 47% have children (14% of those who have children are single parents) (Manser, 2018, 5). Of male regular force personnel, 63% have at least one dependent. For female regular force personnel, 67% have at least one dependent and women retain a higher proportion of caregiver responsibilities (Manser, 2018, 7). Spanner (2017) argues that military families are

“deeply connected to, and affected by, the military on a daily basis, though they are not technically “military”. They are civilian, although not civilian in a typical sense, given that their lives and even locations are shaped by the priorities of the military. The military family calls into question the artificiality of the military-social binary in a most direct way” (484-485).

As such, the military family is a unique site of interrogation. Likewise, there is a gendered component as many women continue to bear the burden of domestic duties,
even when in purportedly equal partnerships or when they are in non-traditional occupations.

The women I interviewed identified mothering and relationships as especially difficult to manage. Participants in this study reflected a breadth of relationship statuses. Although these women were employed in a sector as male-dominated as the military, they were not free from the gendered expectations of domesticity and motherhood, as exemplified by the thread of motherhood reflected in participant interviews.

5.3.2 Mothering

More than half of the participants in this study had one or more children. Some of these women were in service couples, where both spouses are military members, others were single mothers or stepmothers. It was unanimously agreed that managing their careers along with mothering was difficult, labor intensive, and logistically challenging.

Waruszynski’s (2019) research shows that many military women have had to negotiate their desires or realities of being mothers by planning pregnancies to better accommodate their unit or leadership objectives, including by returning to work from maternity leave early to not miss career opportunities (29). Several mothers I interviewed did this too and cut their maternity leaves short for fear of the consequences their absence from active duty would have on their careers. One woman explained, “I didn’t want to be labeled as incapable, I wasn’t injured or anything. Some people wanted to be protective of me, but I did what I wanted to do” (P23). This participant felt that she was being protected against her will and she wanted to work because she knew that it was the best move for her career. Her experience, along with several other experiences discussed in this chapter, are a form of benevolent sexism where the prejudice against women includes “positive feelings or chivalry that result in inequality, mainly in the name of helping” (Blumell et al., 2019, 369).

Another woman aimed to change the stigma around maternity leave and being pregnant at work. She explained, “everyone in uniform spent time in a uterus and when I realized that, I don’t feel guilty anymore” (P27). She continued, “I’m doing my part because I’m
gonna have little possible recruits. Telling people this confronts them with their own mother” (P27). She used her status as a pregnant woman and as a mother to challenge the perspectives of her colleagues. Other women who are now retired or moved on to different civilian careers ended their military careers in order to have children. Some agreed their careers took a backseat when their children were young and became reprioritized once the children grew up (P3, P13).

Childcare was a difficult balancing act for mothers; several respondents described it as “a hassle” (P17). While some bases have childcare centers, they often do not work for women’s schedules, especially when they are assigned shift work or are on call. Without familial support, it would have been nearly impossible for some women to access childcare. Several women explained that they even had to bring their young children to work with them on occasions when they had no other option. However, the burden of figuring out and securing childcare fell almost exclusively on the shoulders of women when they were in relationships or when they shared custody of their children with the children’s father(s).

One participant pointed out that she was often asked who would take care of her kids when she was deployed and that the obvious was rarely assumed, that they were going to be taken care of by their father. She pointed to the gendered nature of this question, since a man would not be asked the same thing as it would be assumed that the children will stay in the care of their mother (P27). For many women with husbands and children at home, there was “no redistribution of tasks or roles in the household. It was just taking on more and more” (P36). Shorter deployments have sometimes been suggested as a solution to balancing gendered work-life balance constraints. However, a participant who deployed on a few shorter missions and had children explained, “I have to clean the toilet, stock the fridge, and wash the floor. It’s the last thing I do before I leave and the first things I do when I return” (P27). She explained that shorter missions, while they may be good for her children, did little to offer her any reprieve from her domestic duties and may, in fact, be a hindrance to her career progression as she was expected to “do it all” (P27).
Beyond logistical challenges related to childcare or household responsibilities, women experienced a great deal of “mom guilt.” One woman who deployed abroad and left her children with her husband stated, “sometimes I think I’m a bad mother because I put my career before them” (P26). Another said that her child “felt very loved but knew that work came first” (P28). These experiences highlight a misogynistic double standard as men are able to deploy as part of their roles as breadwinners whereas women are punished for contributing financially to their children’s well-being. The underlying expectation is that women’s contribution to child rearing must be a form of feminized care work like cleaning the house or cooking food rather than providing for the family financially. And these oppressive sexist expectations persisted even for women who were single parents, or sole or primary breadwinners for their families.

It was commonly shared with me that men had it easier and took on less domestic work than women. Only one participant explained that this was reversed in her relationship, where her husband, a former military member, enjoyed his domestic role. She stated that, due to his career accomplishments before having children, “he doesn’t have to prove to anybody that he’s tough” (P42). This comment was very interesting as it is still assumed that child rearing is a feminine task, even when done by a man who must sacrifice a portion of his masculinity in order to take it on. Broadly speaking, my findings confirmed the need for men to take on a greater share of domestic work and childcare to enable women to perform optimally in their professional lives.

Another participant explained that some of her male superiors were taking parental leaves and that this normalized the practice and set an example for others to follow suit. Perhaps there is an optimistic future ahead with the potential “erosion of toxic masculinity” (Tait, 2020, 18) as more men take on domestic roles. The emotional labor of “doing it all” was intense for many participants even when some of them recognized that they imposed these pressures on themselves. However, letting go of some expectations and letting the other parent take on more responsibilities was not easy. By assuming they are the ones who have to do all domestic and care work, some women are not making space to enable or encourage men to take charge in the home. Other authors have written extensively about the need for deeper transformation of the intra-household arena in order to
meaningfully advance gender equality. For example, Baruah (2016) notes,

The deeper political and social consciousness required for a transformation of the intra-household gender division of labor would have to be enabled informally and socially, perhaps through collective action, but not through legal sanctions or other government actions. Policy by itself cannot make men want to spend more time caregiving if carework continues to be perceived as low-status feminized work. Neither can policy require women to give up their control over care, particularly over the raising of children, if they have been socialized to believe that children are their primary responsibility (23).

The struggles military women experience with managing work and life balance are not unlike the experiences of women in the civilian population. The gendered division of labor, invisibility of domestic labor, and norms associated with motherhood are obstacles for all women. Yet militaries are “total institutions” where members are expected to have constant dedication to the organization (Davies, 1989). Military mothers may find themselves in particularly untenable situations because they are “perceived as not being able to dedicate themselves to the military while at the same time they are associated more with their family role” (Taber, 2013, 17). The mental load of domestic work is not limited to mothers alone but is undoubtedly gendered in most heterosexual relationships. Some of the challenges women faced while balancing family lives with their careers are due to internalized adherence to social expectations and men’s unwillingness to give up enough power in their relationships to make space for women to excel in demanding careers.

5.3.3 Relationships

One woman stated that having a stable relationship while employed in the CAF was “not even in the books” (P18). It was widely noted that balancing a relationship and a military career was a juggling act with highly gendered costs and consequences. Another woman remarked that “as a female it is hard to have a civilian man understand what we do and why we do it and our lifestyle… society is still at a point where it is easier and more acceptable for females to follow male spouses’ careers” (P7). This is one potential
explanation for why so many women were part of so-called “service couples”. Of all regular forces personnel posted in Canada, ten percent are married or common law with another CAF member. There are over 3200 service couples (Manser, 2018, 21). Most service couples have to make a decision about which career will be prioritized over the other, as it can be difficult to be posted together. Typically, participants reported that women’s careers take a backseat over the men’s careers. Negotiating career paths among service couples is complicated. Several women reported that their marriages to another service member ended in divorce due to the difficulties in managing such demanding careers together while balancing a family or relationship.

Being in a service couple, even while balancing the deployment and relocation needs of both partners was a struggle, was thought by several participants to be easier than being with a civilian partner. One participant explained:

If I was military married to civilian guy, and I’m being sexist now 100 percent, civilian guys are very intimidated by military women and feel very emasculated. To put their career on hold and follow me around wouldn’t fly (P40).

She continued to say, “in order to settle down and start a family I would have to find military guy, get a sperm donor or become gay- which is a joke cuz it’s not a choice” (P40). This comment underscores the importance of a partner that understands the work military women do and is open to sharing responsibilities at home. But not all women interviewed were interested in the traditional heteronormative, nuclear family. One woman stated, “I never wanted the white picket fence, the 9 to 5, or children. So, I never married a man who wanted that either” (P9). She explained that she could not have been in a relationship where she was a “leader at work and a Suzy homemaker at home” (P9).

Clearly, balancing work and life is a gendered challenge experienced by participants in this study. However, many had numerous positive experiences in the military that made these struggles worthwhile, including being exposed to leadership opportunities very early on, access to exceptional training, and having an excellent pension, medical benefits, and compensation for injuries. Women’s experiences within the armed forces are very nuanced and multi-dimensional, shifting based on time-period, occupation,
location, and identity.

5.4 Gendered Opportunities

More than one quarter of participants thought being a woman offered them advantages over their male colleagues. These opportunities may be both real and perceived, including the benefits of being offered deployments and trainings due to quotas/targets, more speaking opportunities, and additional help or support. One participant called these advantages “pink slips” because “you keep being given opportunities that the men weren’t, but you were just doing what you were told. You weren’t looking for it, you weren’t asking for it” (P1). Many participants felt uncomfortable being offered these advantages because of the perception that they were given special treatment.

5.4.1 Gender targets: A double-edged sword

Targets are “specific measurable objectives, generally set by an organisation at their own discretion, with discrete timeframes in which they are to be achieved. Consequences for not meeting a target may be set and enforced by the organisation itself and are often voluntary” (Workplace Gender Equality Agency, 2014). Quotas, on the other hand, are mandatory, specific, and time bound. They are usually set externally by a body with the authority to impose them on organisations (for example, Canadian Parliament; ibid.). Participants in this study used the terms quota and target interchangeably.

The CAF aims to reach 25% representation of women by 2026. However, targets can be a double-edged sword, since most women wanted to see “the right person in the right job” (P7) yet perceptions were that some women were “passing in front of the line” when it came to deployments, training, or promotion (P2). It was broadly shared that targets are harmful if qualified men are being turned away as a result (P3). There was little interrogation of how often qualified women were rejected based solely on their gender and how targets or quotas are now necessary as corrective measures. One participant went as far as to say that quotas set a dangerous precedent as “gender is not a skill set” (P4). This reflects a common misunderstanding of how targets or quotas work as underrepresented groups must be fully qualified before they can be hired.
Hesitancy about whether increasing women’s representation is a worthwhile goal also permeated my conversations with participants. They expressed to me that diversity, broadly, is more important that simply increasing the number of women. One participant pointed to the irony in having quotas without sufficient cultural change, when she said that they are a “door kicker” (P22). She continued, “If we can’t make them come with our fancy bus slogans and our fancy advertisements, we have to start asking ourselves why. What is going on where we can’t meet these targets? The answer is not more busses” (P22).

A few participants agreed with quotas being implemented. One argued that they are necessary since “if there are discretionary choices, leadership often chose those who look like them - then and now” (P20). Another stated, “if you build it, they will come. For gender, you have to lead with quotas” (P25). For those who did agree with quotas, there were suggestions that they should be dispersed among rank levels, especially at senior ranks. There were also suggestions that highlighting the accomplishments of women in the armed forces, mentorship groups for women, and flexibility were more important for the recruitment and retention of women than targets.

5.5 Conclusion

Women soldiers undermine assumptions about “biology, respectability, and femininity. These women thereby raised new discomforting questions about the roles, skills and privileges of men” (Enloe, 2016, 79). Despite efforts to align with legal and political goals through quotas and targets, significant work remains to be done in order to achieve gender equality in the CAF. Broad inclusion of women and the adoption of a gender perspective should be the “twin goals” of Canada’s military activities (von Hlatky, 2019b, 1). There are necessary further steps to ensure that women want to participate in the CAF and are well integrated and supported when they do. This includes a family friendly environment and a supportive and safe environment, free from sexual misconduct (Waryszynski et al., 2019, 32). Likewise, a renegotiation of gender roles within households, at work, and in society at large is critical to facilitate women’s success in the CAF. The following chapter will discuss sexual misconduct and sexual harassment
in greater depth, and Chapter 7 will unpack themes of women in the CAF on deployment, specifically in peacekeeping missions.
Chapter 6

6 Sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces: The “lucky ones” and those that weren’t

“My husband loves me, but he beats me, not both possible but you move forward and become a master at taking two things that don’t go together but putting them together” (P1).

As was discussed in the previous chapter, women conceptualize the culture at the CAF in a multitude of nuanced ways that they found both beneficial and harmful. The same is true of how women do, or do not, experience sexual misconduct in the armed forces. This quotation sets the stage for how women in the CAF conceptualized sexual misconduct in contradictory ways. By contrasting it with intimate partner violence, the quote demonstrates the complex relationship victims/survivors of sexual misconduct have with the CAF. Some respondents experienced very serious sexual assaults, many resulting in PTSD or other injuries, while others did not experience any sexual misconduct and considered themselves “lucky.” I want to note that I use both terms victim and survivor throughout this chapter as participants referred to themselves using both of these terms.

Sexual misconduct has far-reaching consequences for the CAF as an unsafe workplace environment, contributing to inequality among genders, and even contributing to sexual health problems, substance abuse, depression, and mental health issues (Hajizadeh et al., 2019). However, it must be noted that there is a clear improvement over time with regard to CAF’s sexualized environment. Many participants who joined before Operation Honour came into effect in 2015 suggest that the culture has improved, albeit with other detrimental effects for women. While the focus of my interviews was not on sexual misconduct, the topic came up very often when we discussed the challenges participants

2 An article based on this chapter has been published in a peer-reviewed journal: Biskupski-Mujanovic, S. (2022). The “lucky ones” and those that weren’t: sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal. 28 (2), 144-169.
experienced in the CAF, stereotypes that they came across and resources available for their gendered needs, including sexual harassment. At times, I also probed about this topic when military culture was brought up. This topic necessitates a separate chapter due to its prevalence in this study, and especially considering the significance of recent allegations of sexual misconduct against senior CAF leadership.

6.1 Recent allegations and apology

Accusations of sexual misconduct in the CAF have been rampant in 2021. New sexual misconduct allegations have surfaced against the CAF’s top leadership, including former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Jonathan Vance. Maclean’s, which has been leading investigative reports into the allegations at the CAF, published yet another article in 2021 detailing the culture at this time. Since February 2021, 11 senior military leaders, current and former, have been investigated for allegations of sexual misconduct or forced into retirement from the CAF (Burke and Brewster, 2021). Jonathan Vance is under investigation for his sexual relationship with Kellie Brennan, and for sending a racy e-mail to another women, both of whom were his subordinates. Burke and Brewster (2021) report that Brennan gave testimony before a parliamentary committee that Vance fathered but did not support two of her children and alleges Vance told her “he was ‘untouchable’ and that he ‘owned’ the military.” In March 2022, Vance pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice and, perhaps unsurprisingly, received a conditional discharge after repeatedly contacting Brennan by phone to persuade her to make false statements about their past relationship and to deny that they had sexual relations (Connolly, 2022).

Vance’s successor as chief of the defence staff, Admiral Art McDonald, is also being investigated by military police for an incident with a junior female crewmember aboard a warship in 2010. As the former second-in-command and the person responsible for the oversight of military policy, Michael Rouleau resigned from his post as Vice Chief of Defence Staff in June 2021 after he was seen playing golf with Vance, claiming he was just ‘checking in’ on Vance’s wellness rather than discussing the ongoing investigation. This golf game was interpreted as a public demonstration of support for Vance and read as proof that he and other leaders weren’t taking the allegations seriously (Smith, 2021). These men and several others are part of a military scandal that has never been reported
anywhere else in the world on this scale (Burke and Brewster, 2021). In response, one of the most senior women in the CAF, Eleanor Taylor, resigned, saying publicly that she was disgusted by the allegations against the highest in command (Smith, 2021).

English (2017) defines corruption as a “dishonest action that destroys people’s trust” (33). He suggests that based on the sexual misconduct allegations that led to the Deschamps report (discussed further in section 6.4), CAF leaders destroyed trust in the chain of command and their actions fit the definition of corruption. Based on the actions of Vance and Rouleau, we can assume that this mistrust has continued to escalate, and the institution has weakened due to the broken bond between the military profession and the society it serves (English, 2017, 44). As a result of this corruption, there continue to be increased calls for a separate system of military justice independent from the CAF, including in the most recent Independent Review of the National Defence Act (Fish, 2021) and the Arbour report (2022).

In April 2021, former National Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan appointed the Honourable Louise Arbour to conduct an Independent External Comprehensive Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the DND and the CAF. The aim of Arbour’s review was to look at why sexual misconduct continues despite efforts to address it, to identify barriers to reporting sexual misconduct and the adequacy of responses when reports are made, and to make recommendations on preventing and eradicating sexual harassment and misconduct. In her interim report, Arbour recommended immediately moving cases of sexual offenses at the CAF to civilian courts. Anita Anand, appointed the new Minister of Defence in October 2021, stated she would do just that. This news is welcome as research indicates that the conviction rate for sexual assault through court martial proceedings in Canada was approximately 14 percent and the conviction rate in cases in Canada’s civilian criminal court system were between 42 and 55 percent (Craig, 2020, 74). Likewise, the acquittal rate for sexual assault cases in Canada’s civilian system was 8–10 percent contrasted with 31 percent in the military legal system (ibid, 75).

Arbour’s final report made 48 recommendations, many that echo previous recommendations found in the Deschamps report (2015) and the Fish report (2021). Recommendations include a thorough review of the Royal Military Colleges,
restructuring enrollment practices and basic training, conducting more detailed assessments of candidates, narrowing the definition of sexual misconduct, more engagement with civilians on what military culture change can and should look like, and introducing an external monitor for tracking change implementation in the CAF.

On December 13, 2021, Canada offered a formal federal apology to survivors of sexual misconduct in the CAF that was presented by Anita Anand, Chief of Defence Staff Wayne Eyre, and Deputy Minister of National Defence, Jody Thomas. The apology resulted from the tireless work of victims and advocates along with a class action lawsuit, initiated in 2016–2017, by seven former CAF members against the Government of Canada alleging sexual harassment, sexual assault or discrimination based on sex, gender, gender identity or sexual orientation in connection with their military service or employment with the DND. In November 2019, the Federal Court approved a settlement agreement that provides compensation to current and former members of CAF and DND, the option to participate in a restorative engagement program for survivors to share their experience with senior CAF/DND representatives, changes to CAF policies addressing sexual misconduct, and changes to Veteran’s Affairs Canada policies on disability payments related to sexual misconduct (CAF-DND Sexual Misconduct Class Action). Separate from the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs requested an apology from the Chief of Defence Staff and the Deputy Defence Minister as soon as is reasonable (Turnbull, 2021). “Reasonable”, as it occurs, was two years later.

It’s Not Just 700, a grassroots peer support and advocacy group for Military Sexual Trauma in the CAF, wrote that the apology “brought a wide range of emotions for many” and that the words spoken by the apologizers “came across as sincere and authentic.” However, bearing in mind that the survivor community is not homogenous, many did not feel heard or included. It’s Not Just 700 also wrote,

Many of our group members have expressed that they will remain skeptical until they see tangible changes happen in the CAF/DND. An apology can go a long way in validating and truly acknowledging that real and significant harm happened, but sincere effort needs to be undertaken by the CAF and DND to
demonstrate that military sexual misconduct is not part of the Canadian military ethos and will not be accepted or ignored. All members of the CAF and DND need to continue to focus on bringing about culture change and find different avenues for restorative processes for those that have been impacted by military sexual misconduct (It’s Not Just 700, 2021).

Apologies are “a form of truth-telling; they air out the story and set the record straight after what may well be a highly contested history of wrongdoing” (MacLachlan, 2015, 445). In this regard, the apology did well. It acknowledged the abuse that took place and the reprisal and retaliation victims faced when they tried to report it. The apology also acknowledged the severe harm that the abuse caused victims and the failure of the institution to remedy the issues in an appropriate manner. However, there are gaps in the apology that should not go unnoticed. An apology should include a forward-looking element where the speaker commits to not repeating the wrongs or make a remedy (MacLachlan, 2015, 444). The apology mentions that tangible actions are needed for real and lasting change but falls short of committing to new and specific actions. Doing so would have granted the apology more legitimacy and an ability to hold CAF/DND accountable.

It is important to note that men can also be victims/survivors of sexual misconduct and women can also be perpetrators. It’s Just 700 reports that 17% of its members who survived a Military Sexual Trauma are men and 1 in 5 callers to the 24/7 sexual misconduct helpline were men (Sexual Misconduct Response Centre, 2020). One participant admitted to being guilty of sexual misconduct herself:

I’m guilty of sexual harassment too - there was a young guy who was so cute and we would tell him he had a cute ass. He seemed to like it and never told us to stop it, but I feel bad to this day. I laugh but it’s not right that we did that to him (P17).

Statistics Canada reports that the prevalence of sexual assault among women in the Regular Force was four times that of men (4.3% versus 1.1%; Cotter, 2019). Additionally, nearly 30% of women in the Regular Force experienced at least one type of
targeted sexualized or discriminatory behavior compared with 13% of men (Cotter, 2019). The apology used the language of the class action settlement, referencing members of the CAF, Veterans, current and former employees of the DND, and Staff of the Non-Public Funds that “have suffered sexual harassment, sexual assault, or discrimination based on sex, gender, gender identity and sexual orientation” (Connolly, 2021). While this language was probably intended to be as widely inclusive as possible, it missed an opportunity to engage in specificity. Considering Canada’s use of Gender-based Analysis Plus (GBA+), it would have been valuable to mention that most victims are women. The only mention of women was when Deputy Defence Minister Thomas spoke of her own experience and complicity:

In truth, I think I was afraid that if I spoke up…if I complained…if I made a fuss…then I would not be allowed to participate, that women would be considered ‘weak’, and that we couldn’t take it.

The lack of nuance about gender in the apology also invisiblized the experiences of men who were survivors. The apology also failed to point out that the overwhelming majority of sexual violence perpetrators are men, and that other groups, including LGBTQ, suffer in unique and often disproportionate ways. Neglecting this obvious fact makes solutions to the problem less visible. Certainly, culture change is essential to eliminate sexual misconduct in the CAF, but this is inextricably tied to the masculine nature of the institution and the exercise of militarized masculinity by its members. Naming the problem will help resolve it by presenting a clear course of remediation. The apology is only a starting point to address the numerous concerns outlined by women currently and previously serving in the CAF, some of which will be discussed in this chapter. Findings gathered from interviews will be woven in throughout the following sections beginning with an overview of sexual misconduct in the CAF, reporting sexual misconduct, vulnerabilities and protective factors, and investigations into sexual misconduct including the Deschamps report and Operation Honour.
6.2 What is sexual misconduct?

The CAF state that sexual misconduct “undermines trust, cohesion, confidence and morale, and thus threatens CAF operational readiness and effectiveness” and “is contrary to the values and ethical principles set out in the DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics. Sexual misconduct must never be minimized, ignored, or excused” (Defence Administrative Orders and Directives, 2020). Sexual misconduct is defined as follows:

Conduct of a sexual nature that causes or could cause harm to others, and that the person knew or ought reasonably to have known could cause harm, including:

- actions or words that devalue others on the basis of their sex, sexuality, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression;
- jokes of a sexual nature, sexual remarks, advances of a sexual nature or verbal abuse of a sexual nature in the workplace;
- harassment of a sexual nature, including initiation rites of a sexual nature;
- viewing, accessing, distributing, or displaying sexually explicit material in the workplace; and
- any Criminal Code offence of a sexual nature, including:
  - section 162 (voyeurism, i.e. surreptitiously observing or recording a person in a place where the person exposes or could expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts or could be engaged in explicit sexual activity, or distributing such a recording);
  - section 162.1 (publication, etc., of an intimate image without consent, i.e. publishing, distributing, transmitting, selling or making available an intimate image of another person without their consent, such as a visual recording in which the person depicted is nude, exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity); and
section 271 (sexual assault, i.e. engaging in any kind of sexual activity with another person without their consent) (Department of National Defence, 2021b).

Sexual misconduct can be addressed through administrative action, the military justice system (by charging an individual with a service offence), or the civilian criminal justice system if the conduct is prohibited under the Criminal Code. The CAF claims it is committed to not only preventing sexual misconduct and ensuring that all reported incidents are dealt with but also to “fully supporting victims and other CAF members who have been affected by sexual misconduct” (Defence Administrative Orders and Directives, 2020).

In 2015, Marie-Claude Gagnon created a support group for current and former military members that live with MST called It’s Just 700. The name of the group stems from how the Deschamps report “triggered much hostility towards MST survivors within existing online support groups for veterans. One argument that was often repeated attempted to minimize the problem to only the 700 individuals who contributed to that External Review” (It’s Just 700). The group provides positive peer support and information on the tools, events, and services available to members regarding MST. MST is the term used by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to refer to experiences of sexual assault or repeated, threatening sexual harassment experienced during military service. Since Canada did not have a similar term, Its Just 700 adopted the American term for its advocacy. I will use the terms sexual misconduct throughout this chapter as they are more commonly used by my research participants, but it is important to recognize that MST is a term also often used by survivors. MST perhaps more adequately describes the repercussions of having experienced sexual misconduct as the term more broadly encompasses the severity of the behaviours of sexual misconduct as well as the gravity of the outcomes for survivors.

Statistics Canada reports that in 2018, 900 Regular Force members of the CAF were victims of sexual assault in the military workplace, representing 1.6% of all Regular
Force Members (Cotter, 2019). The prevalence of sexual assault among women in the Regular Force was four times that of men (4.3% versus 1.1%). About half of all victims stated that a peer was the perpetrator. 70 percent of Regular Force members witnessed (saw or heard) or experienced sexualized or discriminatory behavior in the military workplace; the most common behaviors witnessed were sexual jokes, followed by inappropriate sexual comments and inappropriate discussion about sex life (Cotter, 2019). Nearly 30 percent of women in the Regular Force experienced at least one type of targeted sexualized or discriminatory behavior compared with 13 percent of men (Ibid). Of the 40 participants that I interviewed for this project, 18 explicitly identified having experienced some sort of sexual misconduct during their time in the CAF and 22 did not. Of the women who did not experience sexual misconduct firsthand, all knew someone who did. The types of sexual misconduct participants identified and experienced include but are not limited to sexual jokes, innuendos and denigration of women, exposure to pornography, name-calling, unwanted touching, and sexual assault (by male and female perpetrators). Those who did not experience sexual misconduct considered themselves to be “one of the lucky ones” or considered themselves to have “thick skin” where they were less “sensitive” to sexual misconduct and CAF’s sexualized environment. One participant’s comment demonstrates how some women individualized the problem:

I was one of the lucky ones. I’m stubborn and strong willed. If somebody said something to me, I would say something to them. I think it also depends on the personality of the people (P16).

Another participant stated: “I also have a thick skin- I have older brothers. As the youngest, I was exposed to all sorts of things growing up in a large family and I had more tolerance maybe” (P13). In opposition to an individualized perspective, another participant pointed to the broader cultural issues she thinks are at play in relation to sexual misconduct at the CAF when she stated,
Men join the military to protect women and children - it takes away from my [man] being here when you [woman] are here - they conquer us to reconfirm that they’re the heroes, not us (P1).

This perspective reaffirms the unequal power relations in the military due to its hierarchical nature and points to the pervasiveness of militarized masculinity, which denigrates and discriminates against women. Hyper-masculine attitudes and values coupled with ideals of dominance, competition, rank, formality, and aggression contribute to a culture of sexual misconduct (Hajizadeh et al., 2019). CAF military culture is “marked by the communal character of life in uniform, hierarchy and discipline and control…as such, members are expected to conform to military authority, culture, and tradition” (Taber, 2020, 21). The embedded ideology of the “warrior” goes hand in hand with “denigrating and discriminating against women and men who are perceived as not masculine enough” (Taber, 2018, 104). It is also characterized by the sexual objectification of women where masculinity is in opposition to and superior to femininity (Weitz, 2015). Further, sexual harassment against women in non-traditional occupations, where jobs and duties are stereotypically masculine, tend to encounter greater problems with a sexualized culture than those where women are better represented (Gill and Febbraro, 2013). A larger sample of participants would be required to determine whether women’s experiences of sexual misconduct were similar or dissimilar based on whether they were in more male-dominated occupations (for example, in combat positions) in the CAF or not.

6.3 Investigations into sexual misconduct at the CAF

After the military began integrating women into its ranks in the late 1980s, there was a wave of sexual assault cases in a culture “of unbridled promiscuity, where harassment is common, heavy drinking is a way of life, and women… are often little more than game for sexual predators” (O’Hara, 1998). While the armed forces always had sexual misconduct in their ranks, it was typically thought to be no greater than that in the civilian world, and statistics were not kept (O’Hara, 1998). However, the military differs
from the civilian world because of its hierarchical and patriarchal nature as well as its accountability to Canadians.

After O’Hara’s 1998 expose on rape in the CAF and the Somalia Affair in 1993, the Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) was enacted. One participant recalled that people used to say, with regards to SHARP training, “I know how to harass, that’s all I need to know” (P27). This directive was not sustained for long and was replaced by short-lived directives until the next investigative report by Mercier and Castonguay was published in Maclean’s in 2014 which claimed, “every day, five individuals in the Canadian military community become victims of sexual assault.” The report details instances of sexual assault and how the CAF failed victims by not offering support, intimidating women who try to come forward, or making their working lives unbearable and humiliating those who did. It was after this article that the Chief of Defence Staff launched an independent review undertaken by an External Review Authority: former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps.

A key finding from the Deschamps report (2015) was that reiterating “zero tolerance” was insufficient and there was an underlying “sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGBTQ members” (i). Further, “both men and women appear to be generally desensitized to the sexualized culture. Officers tend to excuse incidents of inappropriate conduct on the basis that the CAF is merely a reflection of civilian society” (ii). While policies on inappropriate sexual conduct existed, there was a disjunction between them and the reality of members’ experiences on the ground. The Deschamps report (2015) criticized the CAF’s mishandling of sexual misconduct cases and largely attributed this to its internal military justice system, going as far as to suggest that military members should be punished more harshly than civilians engaged in such conduct (11). Likewise, the report states:

The Canadian public has granted the CAF the right to self-govern. In some respects, this is related to the fact that Canadians hold members of the CAF to a higher standard of conduct than ordinary Canadians. This is because of the unique
role played by the CAF in Canadian society and abroad. Thus, one of the reasons for establishing an independent military justice system, separate and apart from the justice system that regulates the conduct of ordinary Canadians, is to be able to uphold these higher standards (11).

Several research participants echoed the issues raised in the Deschamps report where they compared CAF to society at large, in turn neglecting the expectation for the CAF to adhere to higher standards of conduct than ordinary civilians. One participant expressed her confidence in CAF when she stated, “we have so many rules about ethics that no one will come to harass you” (P2). Another said, “when the military knows the issues, they know that they need to be fixed and with urgency - I think ethically, that’s a very sound organization and a good stand to take” (P13). A few other participants suggested that we as a society are still doing something wrong in terms of sexual misconduct and “military members come from society - we need to get a grip on sex trafficking and pornography for things to change in the whole world” (P21). Likewise, “I don’t think it’s a CAF problem. I think it’s a global society problem” (P23).

6.4 Operation Honour: “Change is hard and it’s hard for them to change”

Operation Honour is the mission established by the CAF to address sexual misconduct in its ranks and is “the CAF’s highest institutional priority” (Department of National Defence, 2021a). Initiated in August 2016 by former CDS, General Jonathan Vance, as a response to the Deschamps report, Operation Honour was established to understand the issue of sexual misconduct, respond more decisively to incidents, support affected persons more effectively, and prevent incidents from occurring (Government of Canada, 2019). During the CDS Leadership Engagement of Operation Honour in November 2015, Vance stated, “We are an armed forces that absolutely embraces everybody- everybody! If you don the uniform, you deserve to feel 10 feet tall and bulletproof just like I do” (Government of Canada, 2019). It is quite ironic that this same man is under investigation for sexual misconduct at the time of writing this dissertation!
Operation Honour has long been criticized for its name (Taber, 2020; Varma, 2017). One participant explained that with French pronunciation Op Honour sounds like “hop on her”. She criticized the CAF for not changing the name and instead insisting that members not shorten its name and say Operation rather than Op every time they use it (P27). Taber (2020) also argues that the use of the term Operation Hop on Her was “so pervasive that, after the order was implemented, Google’s search engine would auto fill to ‘Hop on Her’ once users entered the letters ‘Operation Ho’” (35).

In 2020, the CAF came out with The Path to Dignity and Respect, its long-term strategy to address sexual misconduct and a follow up to Operation Honour after the Auditor General of Canada and an internal CAF review of Operation Honour deemed the Operation insufficient to understand and prevent inappropriate sexual behavior. The Path identifies key cultural factors in the CAF to address sexual misconduct. These include a permissive climate where sexual misconduct is ignored, minimized, or excused; gender stereotypes are pervasive; and there is low representation of women (Department of National Defence, 2020, 8).

Participants responded to Operation Honor in very different ways. One stated that she witnessed three perspectives on Operation Honour and explained them as follows:

1. Those who think Operation Honour is the best initiative that ever happened, it is meaningful, they can see changes and CAF is moving in the right direction.
2. Those who agree Operation Honour matters as they are told it matters - they do what is asked of them by the CAF but on an individual level, they may not agree. However, they do what they are asked to do, regardless of whether they buy in.
3. Those who think Operation Honour is “mission creep.” It is not the right focus and they do not believe CAF should be spending so much time and money on it. This group believes “if women can’t handle it then they shouldn’t be here - it’s a stupid, frivolous and unimportant topic” (P1).

Another participant also noticed three perspectives on Operation Honour, “there are women that are like ‘fuck yea, I’m gonna hold you accountable’, another one that’s like
‘hahaha, that wasn’t that bad’ and somewhere in the middle are women making false reports that are complicating the picture” (P4). She also spoke of “categories” of women: “those who resisted the advances of men and those who didn’t… not just the sexual advances but girls who giggled when the guys told them they have a nice ass or nice tits” (P4). We can see from these viewpoints that Operation Honour was met with several reactions, from welcoming the changes and valuing them to overt hostility against a focus on sexual misconduct. Beyond complicity with the sexualized culture, sexual misconduct is largely perceived as a women’s issue and, as a result, marginalized when it comes to military priorities. Likewise, the individualization of sexual misconduct makes it appear as a rare occurrence, as resulting from a few ‘bad apples’, and not as an institutional problem that requires structural change to eradicate.

Positive change stemming from Operation Honour was conceptualized as “making a difference” (P7) and aiding with education as “many people didn’t know they were being harassing, once they knew, they stopped, and it ended” (P9). Yet other participants believed Operation Honour caused new harms towards women. These participants reflected that “people were more afraid to open their mouths about anything” (P6) and “it’s made it harder to integrate into the team as people are uncomfortable and afraid of offending and it takes them more time to get used to you” (P15). Another participant stated, “Op Honour was making it out to be like women were out to destroy men - men thought they had to be so careful around women” (P3). Underlying the pushback against Operation Honour is resentment towards challenging the status quo, towards creating an environment where women are treated as equals and protected from unwanted sexual advances, comments, and sexual assaults.

Further, Operation Honour was understood by participants to have created fear of consequences for getting caught in sexual misconduct allegations rather than resolving the underlying cultural issues that perpetuate it. They explained: “What you want to change is not fear of impact on career but that it’s not the right thing to do” (P14) and “People are guarded and don’t say what they believe - they believe it they just don’t share it, so their behavior is changed through coercion, but their minds are not” (P31). Thinking of Operation Honour as coercive is a troublesome framing, as, in some ways, it has not
only made some men in the CAF more guarded but has also resulted in the perception that it enabled women to wield more power. One participant explained, “Op Honour gave women so much power - just making a claim, guys will get charged and have a reputation- doesn’t even matter if I was lying” (P30). Another sentiment included, “in the military, you’re guilty until proven innocent” (P37).

Despite the fear of women making false accusations and having the power to ruin men’s lives, this assumption is unfounded as research the U.S. suggests that only between 2% and 10% of sexual assaults reported to the police are deemed false (National Sexual Violence Resource Centre, 2012). However, this statistic must be put into perspective considering that only 5% of sexual assaults in Canada are even reported to the police (Department of Justice, 2019). It would be fair to presume that similar rates of sexual misconduct are not reported in the CAF. We can then understand that not only are many men concerned about false allegations, but that women too are fearful of the backlash resulting from false allegations. This of course, does not mitigate the consequences of false allegations. One participant recalled a situation like this when she stated:

There were some false accusations against a lieutenant colonel, and it destroyed his career. You may get one more rank but that’s it, you will not achieve the highest ranks. People will remember the investigation. They look at the blonde blue-eyed captain, a female, and say he must have done it (P20).

Another participant explained that due to the ostracization that results from colleagues when any sexual misconduct allegations are brought to light, “many guys would have liked to side with women, but they knew what would happen to them if they did, so [it was] easier to be one of the guys and not make waves or stand out” (P9).

We can also learn about alternative masculinities from participants’ observations that some men benefitted from Operation Honour as it offered them a “way out” when others were participating in undesirable sexualized behavior, such as going to a strip club together. A participant notes “It gave men who didn’t want to participate a way out - because they had to walk her [a colleague] back to her room or didn’t want her to be alone - gave them an excuse not to participate, guys enjoyed it more when women were
around, so they didn’t have to participate, and boys weren’t as stupid” (P1). Some men were continually weighing how much they are willing to sacrifice to uphold gender equality and ensure workplace safety versus conforming to militarized masculine ideals.

6.5 To report or not to report? Dealing with sexual misconduct

Most participants who experienced sexual misconduct shared that the perpetrators were never held to account and that their chain of command didn’t sufficiently address their disclosures. Similar to what the Maclean’s investigations and the Deschamps report determined, sometimes the chain of command was complicit through ignoring or minimizing sexual misconduct. One participant stated, “My commanding officer told me I need to be very careful and think about what you’re saying. You’re going into an occupation that demands strength of character and moral fiber” (P4). She continued to recount, “My bosses were telling me to lock the door instead of saying don’t rape the only girl [here]” (P4). This reinforces that the burden to resolve sexual misconduct falls on women, as victims, and not on male perpetrators.

Deciding whether to report an incident of sexual misconduct was not an easy choice for the participants who did so. One participant who spent years trying to hold a perpetrator accountable stated “In the end, all I wanted to do was make sure it wasn’t gonna happen to someone else. It wasn’t gonna undo my own experience” (P3). For this participant, going to court felt like re-victimization. She continued to recount, “It’s eye opening why women don’t move forward. You’re made to believe you are making it up” (P3). Further, a participant who was sexually assaulted by a member of a foreign contingent recounts her experience: “I went to the navigator, and he said if you make a formal report, your training ends and your career ends and if you don’t everything keeps going and you might get into the boarding team one day” (P4).

Instead of overt hostility, ignoring the victim or remaining silent was the most common response to disclosures made by participants. This response was not limited to men. A participant discussed how women in the same unit would not support victims of sexual misconduct as “this would have opened them up to ostracization from their coworkers. It
was better to ignore them than acknowledge and support the victims” (P9). This demonstrates that the issue of sexual misconduct is not one of a few “bad apples” but a systemic problem that requires systemic solutions as even showing solidarity with victims can result in dire consequences.

Avoiding including the chain of command and formal reporting mechanisms was also a strategy used by some, often to avoid issues that were associated with reporting. Other women had success with enacting firm boundaries and did not think they needed to escalate matters. One woman stated:

I laid down the law. That kind of language and attitude is not welcome… If you don’t lay down boundaries then you will continue to be pushed and eventually you don’t have a voice or your voice loses volume and when situations like that come up, it becomes that much more difficult to speak up. Right from the get-go I nipped that one in the bud (P3).

Emulating the men’s negative behaviors was yet another strategy to deal with sexual misconduct. One participant stated, “I started getting even: fight fire with fire. Get smaller pants cuz I don’t see your dick, oh, you don’t have one” (P4). Other examples of this strategy include becoming “more like the guys,” as exemplified here:

I can scream and slap a guy and it’s considered solved. Guys are so stupid… If I go up the chain of command they think ‘what the fuck’ but if I scream in their face, they’re like ok, never gonna happen again (P30).

However, when victims/survivors already feel violated, powerless, or intimidated, speaking up and ‘dealing with it’ is no easy feat. One participant remarked how she gained confidence over time to speak up but didn’t speak up earlier in her career. Isolation, especially early on in one’s career, or when moving to a new posting location, can also be a precursor to harassment. One woman spoke of her perpetrator: “His thing was going for people who were vulnerable in some way. I didn’t feel like I could speak out” (P15). So, while reporting a sexual misconduct or dealing with it in the moment and directly are strategies some women can utilize, not all women feel in a position where
this can be the case, especially when it comes to reporting to their own chain of command. Further, the onus being put on victims/survivors to “fix” the behavior individualizes the sexualized culture, giving the impression “that the behavior was wrong only because another member found it so” (Taber, 2020, p. 28). To cope with the sexualized environment of the CAF, women used many of the strategies mentioned above. One participant stated, “as soon as you’ve been sexualized, you’re in danger—you would try as hard as you can to be his sister, his mother, his wife and not be something that he ever thought of you at work as a sexual being” (P1). Erasing oneself as a sexual being it likely not only impossible, but an extreme tool to deal with the unwanted behaviors some participants experienced.

6.6 Royal Military College

While this research did not aim to evaluate experiences of sexual misconduct at the Royal Military College (RMC), the topic was mentioned in several interviews. A Statistics Canada report published in 2020 found that most (68%) students at Canada’s two military colleges, the RMC, and the Royal Military College St-Jean, witnessed or experienced unwanted sexualized behaviors during their studies (Maxwell, 2020). Unsurprisingly, women were more likely than men to experienced unwanted sexualized behaviors and more than six times as many women as men were sexually assaulted during their time at RMC (28% versus 4.4%). Nearly all unwanted sexualized behaviors (93%) occurred on campus and often in environments filled with people. Further, most students chose not to intervene, seek help, or take other action when witnessing sexualized or discriminatory behaviors (Maxwell, 2020). As a result of these alarming statistics, Arbour (2022) calls for a detailed review of Canada’s military colleges to address “the continuing misogynistic and discriminatory environment and the ongoing incidence of sexual misconduct” (234).

In 2015, Julie Lalonde, a sexual assault prevention educator and activist, was asked to speak to approximately 1,000 undergraduate students on the topic of sexual misconduct. She said it was the most hostile audience she ever faced. She was “whistled at, catcalled, laughed at, and openly disrespected by the officer cadets” (CBC News, 2015). More so, after going public with her experience and suggesting there is a culture of misogyny and
sexism in the CAF, she received backlash and abusive e-mails and tweets, including some telling her to kill herself. One person wrote to her, “if you are to comment about sexual harassment, you need to be able to handle it when it comes your way” (CBC News 2015). One participant, who attended the RMC at the time of these incidents, reported that the situation was not as bad as Lalonde made it out to be, minimizing the systemic culture of sexual misconduct.

Several participants who attended RMC suggested that it was more a work environment than a “normal” university due to its emphasis on four pillars: academics, leadership, athletics and physical training, and bilingualism. However, they suggested that the sexualized culture was likely similar to other university campuses. One stated, “university is university no matter which one it is. You’re a young female drinking for the first time” (P35). Another participant stated, “It’s the little things we do to protect ourselves. I know it’s civilian universities, too: go to mess in groups, send texts to let each other to know we are safe, etc.” (P32). Others explained that they witnessed hazing rituals. One participant stated that the hazings were “criminal in many respects” (P3).

While the suggestion that sexual assault or sexualized behaviors are commonplace on all campuses is true (Burczycka, 2020; Cadloff, 2021; Ogden, 2021), the specific challenge for the RMC is that it sets up young officer cadets with expectations of what CAF will or will not tolerate, scaffolding expectations of what is to come in their careers. Arbour (2022) contends “there are legitimate reasons to question the wisdom of maintaining the existence of these military colleges, as they currently exist” (232). She continues to explain the “risk that the perpetuation of a discriminatory culture at the colleges will slow down the momentum for culture change that the CAF has embarked upon” (Ibid).

6.7 Intersectional vulnerabilities and protective factors

While some women may feel like they were the “lucky ones” who did not experience sexual misconduct, others, particularly those with intersecting vulnerabilities, had vastly different experiences. One participant, who identified as queer, stated that another officer “decided me being gay meant that ‘I liked it in the ass,’ so he decided to act on that” (P4).

When the same participant was sexually assaulted, the perpetrator whispered in her ear “you just need a better man.” She experienced both misogyny and homophobia.
Participants noted that it was widely accepted that married women had it easier because they were already “spoken for” and they had husbands that would protect them (P10, P25). Single women, on the other hand, had it harder because it was assumed they were available. Being a racialized or Indigenous woman, disabled, or LGBTQ increases the likelihood of being a victim of sexual assault in both the civilian world and the CAF (Hajizadeh et al., 2019).

Deschamps (2015) lists a few examples of risk factors that increase the vulnerability of members in the CAF, women in particular, to sexual misconduct, beyond the prevailing sexualized environment. These include the use and abuse of alcohol, being younger, and relocation, which results in a loss of family or social support networks. These risk factors are exacerbated by the prevalence of sexual misconduct, the lack of trust in the chain of command, the perception that sexual misconduct is not punished in a meaningful way, and the failure to report incidents of sexual misconduct (20–21). Of the women interviewed by O’Hara (1998), “most were assaulted when they were most vulnerable, as raw recruits or recently minted privates in their late teens or early 20s—away from home for the first time, newly instilled with the fear of rank.”

Lower ranking women in the CAF reported being exposed to frequent and demeaning sexualized language (Deschamps, 2015) as a lower rank can represent higher vulnerability. One of my participants stated:

It never happened to be because 1. I am a captain and 2. I am a nurse and around women most of the time - happens more to women who are not officers or who aren’t around other women (P22).

As this comment demonstrates, women in higher ranks may report their status as a protective factor, but not always as they become so few that speaking up is even more difficult. Deschamps (2015) argues that “members appear to internalize the prevailing sexualized culture as they move up through the organization…female NCOs and higher-ranking women tend to adapt their own conduct and to adopt male attitudes in order to conform to the perceived social values of the organization” (16). We can see that the common sentiment participants shared of “you learn how to protect yourself” places the
onus on the individual and not the institution or the perpetrators of sexual misconduct. From avoiding situations with alcohol, to setting firm boundaries, to responding with similarly crude behavior, women did what they had to do to protect themselves and still experienced sexual misconduct as a result of the permissive and pervasive militarized masculine culture.

6.8 Class action settlement

There is a class action lawsuit, initiated in 2016–2017 by seven former members of the CAF against the Government of Canada, alleging sexual harassment, sexual assault or discrimination based on sex, gender, gender identity or sexual orientation in connection with their military service or employment with the DND. In November 2019, the Federal Court certified the lawsuits as class proceedings and approved a settlement agreement that provides compensation to current and former members of CAF and DND (CAF-DND Sexual Misconduct Class Action). The settlement provides financial compensation, the option to participate in a restorative engagement program for survivors to share their experience with senior CAF/DND representatives, changes to CAF policies addressing sexual misconduct, and changes to Veteran’s Affairs Canada policies on disability payments related to sexual misconduct.

Those filing claims could do so between May 2020 and November 2021. So far, 12,937 claims were received, 4,524 were approved for an initial payment or paid, and 3,331 claimants requested to participate in the Restorative Engagement Program. Many other claims are still being processed (CAF-DND Sexual Misconduct Class Action). The compensation deal is set to cost the Canadian government $900 million and individual compensation will range from $5,000–$55,000 depending on the type of sexual misconduct, harm suffered, and the number of members that submit claims (Pugliese, 2021). Several women I interviewed who experienced sexual misconduct in the CAF were part of the class action settlement or intending to become part of it. Others who experienced sexual misconduct, however, felt conflicted about benefitting from the settlement. One participant stated,
I respect those who tell their stories and am ok telling my story, but I experienced it differently, came through it ok, institutionalized, but ok. I’m ok so I don’t think the lawsuit would bring any value to me… yes, it happened, and it shouldn’t have happened, we got through it and things got better- do I need compensation for it from taxpayer dollars? No. (P28)

6.9 Conclusion

Writing about a victim of sexual harassment, O’Hara (1998) says, “Now, the woman who once tossed grenades and fired machine-guns is afraid to answer her door or go to the mall.” Sadly, being trained in “killing enemies” does not “help women respond to sexually aggressive friends, comrades, boyfriends, or husbands” (Weitz, 2015, 179). O’Hara (1998) quotes Rick MacLeod, a lawyer at the department of Veterans Affairs at the time: “The military was their family…so, in many ways, these rapes were the same thing as incest. That’s why it might be more devastating than if it happens out on civvy street” (n.p.). In terms of sexual misconduct in the CAF, one participant sums up, “There was a lot - I experienced a lot, my female colleagues experienced a lot. My male colleagues experienced it too” (P14).

We must also consider that some women felt like they sometimes enjoyed the sexually charged environment in the CAF. One participant stated,

I would get lots of sexual attention too and it didn’t always bother me. There was sexual banter with some guys, even married ones. We would always say things that happen in field, stay in field (P17).

Others suggested that given how many married couples are service couples, it is expected that some of the culture is conducive to sexualized behavior. One participant said,

I married a guy I met on deployment. We can date but not in same chain of command and we were just friends while on deployment. There are no rumors of me being a slut or anything, so it shows how far we’ve come (P35).

The topic of sexual misconduct, especially for victims/survivors is not an easy one to
discuss. There are also risks associated with discussing it, beyond confidentiality and anonymity. A couple of women were hesitant to discuss sexual misconduct at all. One explained a risk as follows:

I don’t want it to color the narrative, I find that when people talk about sexual harassment, whatever someone has accomplished is almost negated or undermined by the one or more than one incident and that becomes the defining feature of that person (P15).

Another participant explained:

The average Canadian knows pretty well nothing about the military, other than, for most women, they heard about the sexual assaults, so they think all men are pigs, you know. The military is just horrible to women, and you know, every woman in the military’s been raped and so they’re very upset by the Canadian military but that’s their entire exposure or knowledge, just sort of, you know, what’s been in the media and that kind of thing, they don’t know anybody that’s actually served, they don’t know anything about what else we do (P1).

The acknowledgement of the counter-intuitive outcomes of confronting sexual misconduct are real, and it is important for researchers to study the broader experiences of women in the CAF, including positive ones, to not negatively “color the narrative”. However, with alarming statistics and new allegations against the CAF coming out regularly, the topic clearly requires even more careful attention.

Changing the CAFs sexualized culture requires the direct engagement of senior leaders through integrating robust policies and strict implementation as well as role modeling for lower ranking men and women (Deschamps, 2015, 24; Arbour, 2022). Likewise, gender-based analysis of CAF policies and increasing the presence of women alongside removing barriers for women entering the CAF can create a more inclusive and equitable environment (Ibid.). As such, it will be interesting to observe how the Minister of Defence and CAF leadership move forward. Regardless of how new policies will trickle down into the daily operations of CAF members, the full participation of women, and of
men as allies and advocates, is required to facilitate cultural changes and foster safety moving forward. These themes in this chapter carry forward to Chapter 7 where I discuss women’s experiences on deployment to peacekeeping operations and my findings reveal that, at times, their safety and wellbeing continues to be at risk when abroad.
Chapter 7

7 Working 25 hours a day: Gendered experiences on peacekeeping operations

Collectively, the women I interviewed deployed to 20 different missions, of which 11 were considered peace support operations and will be referred to as peacekeeping operations (PKOs) throughout this chapter. The PKOs included deployments to Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, to countries that included Bosnia, Haiti, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali, among others. Nearly half of the participants also deployed to Afghanistan, Canada’s most recent war-fighting mission.

Overall, nearly all the participants in this research project noted that there was an improvement, over time, in the CAF culture towards women. One woman starkly contrasted the previous and present stage of her career, “Misogyny and homophobia are rare enough that I notice it again. It’s not the constant static that it was in the first 10 years of my career” (P4). As the findings on women’s overall experiences in the military from Chapter 6 indicate, the general sentiment was that women’s status in the CAF was not unlike women’s status in the civilian world and that work still needs to be done to achieve gender inequality. However, the justifications for increasing women’s participation in peacekeeping are based on operational effectiveness claims and thus quite different from women’s inclusion in military service overall, which was legally mandated via the Employment Equity Act of 1995. Women are thought to be better suited to peacekeeping due to gendered stereotypes and norms about who they are as women (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020; Ghittoni et al., 2018; Jennings, 2011; Valenius, 2007; Wilen, 2020), although they continue to experience challenges fitting in to the military culture at the CAF, and hence also on PKOs.

In this chapter, I will begin by discussing women’s motivations both for joining the CAF and for deploying to PKOs. I will then discuss findings from my interviews specific to deployment on PKOs along the following themes:
1. Canada’s involvement in peacekeeping is meaningful but also has inherent conflicts and contradictions.
2. As with other militarized deployments, peacekeeping poses logistical and safety challenges for military women.
3. Working with the UN in a multicultural environment poses unique challenges in terms of gender stereotyping, adding to the work women must do to fit in.
4. When women are deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in key positions, such as United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) or Military Liaison Officers (MLO), they may make unique and valuable contributions, often based on their gendered experiences, and lived realities, however, most women are not deployed in these capacities.

7.1 Motivations: Why did women join the CAF and why did they deploy?

Participants joined the CAF for several reasons. Overwhelmingly, the primary motivation for joining the CAF was financial: for secure employment, not wanting to continue on to post-secondary education, and needing a job, due to financial struggles or a lack of jobs in their place of origin (i.e. small towns with limited employment opportunities). The next most common motivation to join the CAF was inspiration from a family member in the armed forces including fathers, aunts, uncles, and siblings. Many women who joined were air cadets as youth. They were drawn to the uniforms, discipline, and opportunities that the cadets were offered, and they continued down the path of joining the air force as adults. Finally, a great number of participants wanted to join the armed forces as they were hoping to travel and experience an adventure. Many of them imagined travelling out of their places of origin, including rural or isolated areas, and stated that they always imagined travelling abroad to experience new and different cultures and meet people from outside of Canada.

Respondents expressed similar motivations for wanting to be deployed internationally as they did for joining the CAF. Several noted that there are financial incentives when deploying and additional or tax-free pay (P30, P38). One of the primary motivations to be in theatre (on the ground) is because it made participants feel like their work was more meaningful and tangible (P2). One participant stated, “I feel like it’s the only time I feel like I’m really doing my job… in Canada we analyze stuff but it’s always kinda fake but when you are deployed, it is more exciting, real situation, real life, not pretending” (P5).
A sense that the work they do on deployment is more tangible was a sentiment felt by many, as was acquiring new skill sets. Some participants felt that deployment is what they needed to get ahead and one remarked that she wanted to deploy “to legitimize command of the regiment” (P7). Another participant explained that she did not feel accepted until she was deployed (P28), and another suggested that deploying helped her career because she oversaw everything while abroad (P16).

Despite reflecting on a multitude of benefits to deployment, the perception that deployments were somehow beneficial for one’s career was not universally shared. One participant explained that she missed out on advancement courses because she deployed so frequently (P5). Another participant suggested that the greatest benefit to deploying was an “opportunity to shine” and that she became more outgoing and assertive, resulting in her being “a step above” other women (P9). In some deployment situations, participants did different work than the work they did in Canada and were tasked with more responsibility. One participant suggested that deployment “gives you a little bit of credibility” but that it is “not the days of Afghanistan - that was the cool conflict” and beyond getting a medal, she was not sure how her deployment benefitted her (P15). Yet another participant saw no benefit to her career while deployed as she got no recognition and stated, “No one knew what I did there” (P17).

Wilen and Heineken (2017) found that operational experience, be it in the combat arms or deployment on peace operations, was essential for career advancement. Considering that Canada was not participating in a combat mission at the time of this research or for several years prior, peace deployments were competitive as they were deemed the best means of acquiring necessary field experience. However, while some women were offered deployments because they were in a particular regiment or had specific skill sets, others found deployments highly competitive, and they had to advocate for themselves formally and informally to be selected. There was a great deal of excitement about going somewhere new and some participants likened deployment to being addictive like a drug (P31) and others called themselves a “tour junkie” (P24) or a “tour whore” (P4).
7.2 Canadian peacekeeping is meaningful but also contradictory

Interestingly, when participants were asked about why they wanted to deploy, almost none of them mentioned that they were drawn to peacekeeping in and of itself. However, when asked about whether peacekeeping was different from other deployments or if they attribute any special meaning to peacekeeping, there was a wealth of conversation both lauding peacekeeping as an important job for the CAF and pointing out the contradictions within peacekeeping practice and discourse.

A participant noted that the notion of being a peacekeeper has unique and special connotations for a military service member especially because the military, as an extension of foreign policy, is “not always hugs and flowers” (P4). She stated,

If you are not there to seek out and destroy an enemy it changes the entire thing you are doing - gathering info, reconnaissance, safe and secure environment - changes flavor of mission immediately…that change trickles down into everything… you feel it almost on a cellular level, the difference between offensive and I only have the right to self-defence. For a soldier, that’s a pretty fundamental shift. (P4)

She continued,

I don’t like to think of myself in trained killer mentality, but we conduct offensive operations for Canadian foreign policy and live in a country that doesn’t want to attack anyone which is great (P4).

This participant’s comment reinforces what Howell (2005) calls the narrative of “Canada the good,” a perspective shared by several participants who thought that Canada had “a responsibility to make up financial and equity gaps in the world” (P4) and to “spread Canadian values and culture to make world a more democratic place” (P36). They identified the responsibility to spread democratic values and work towards equity as a uniquely Canadian attribute. A participant referred to Canada’s role in Mali as “a flying ambulance, we were the cavalry” (P42). On a similar note, another participant explained
that as a child she thought Canadian blue berets were “superheroes” who were “saving the whole world” (P41). While she explained that she sees it differently now, she emphasized that she joined the CAF to do peacekeeping work, not to go into combat, and that participating in peacekeeping was one of the most meaningful things she has ever done (P41).

One participant praised Canada for opening all military trades to women sooner than other commonwealth countries (P7). Several others remarked on the differences between the Canadian and American armed forces. One participant stated,

I’m actually quite against force. I wouldn’t want to be in the American army - their stance is something different than what Canadians are about. I like the idea of peacekeeping as it’s something I can morally support as well (P33).

This participant continued to explain that the military ethos of duty, loyalty, and integrity is one that she values and upholds (P33). Yet another participant thought that peacekeeping was something that resonated more closely with her personal beliefs when she stated, “I have a lot to offer but I’m not a warrior. I think that should be ok. The military needs people to do the job I’m doing, and we are not all warriors” (P32). Her comment suggests that peacekeeping is, in an obvious sense, less violent than other military work, such as combat. The image of the male warrior as the apex of traditional hegemonic masculinity has historically been used to exclude women from military service, as they were not thought to fit the gendered ideal that requires physical strength and stoicism, among other masculine qualities (Lane, 2017, Val Gilder, 2019, Wood and Charbonneau, 2018).

Another participant suggested that the Liberal government is invested in the peacekeeping ideal and, “the Canadian public isn’t ready for us to be warfighters” (P1). There is conflict between what it means to be a warrior and what it means to be a peacekeeper, although both are roles occupied by CAF members. Broesder et al. (2015) illuminates these paradoxes as follows, “They should be able to both fight and build a country. They have to help and protect the local population, on one hand, and fight an enemy that may hide among the population and gets assistance from that same
population, on the other hand” (520). Although the role of a peacekeeper can be contradictory and has its limitations, many respondents to this study morally resonated with this role and expected behaviors.

In contrast, some participants found the notion of peacekeeping to be troubling. They resisted the narrative of “Canada the good” (Howell, 2005) and recognized that the peacekeeping project is not inherently innocent as it comes with its own forms of violence. One participant commented on the situation in South Sudan and stated:

For them [Sudanese people], if you lived through decades of military men raping women, burning all the crops, anyone with a uniform would look like a threat. There’s no reason why a blue hat on your head would be any different (P41).

It is ironically noted that there may be little peace to keep on many UN Missions: “it’s called peacekeeping, but bullets were flying” (P17). Participants considered Canada’s most recent peacekeeping missions as more risky than traditional peacekeeping missions that monitored ceasefires (such as Cyprus), as multidimensional peacekeeping has generally evolved to encompass more potentially dangerous roles (Coombs, 2018; Donais, 2018, Hughes, 2017). One participant pointed out that aeromedical evacuations in Mali were a “softer component” to a mission that is “combat-related” as it was a dangerous and volatile environment. She thought that the government uses the term peacekeeping because “it resonates with Canadians… there is an audience that can relate to that, to the UN… very safe… peace… peace is good, and Canada involved in peace is good” (P31). Multidimensional peacekeeping straddles the work of traditional peacekeeping and war fighting, making the peacekeeper identity a complex one for those who deploy while attempting to straddle responsibilities for upholding so-called Canadian identity and values alongside responsibilities for state-building.

Many participants also struggled with the administration and bureaucracy of the UN as an institution (P13, P14) and were not convinced the UN is making a difference where they serve (P6, P22). One woman explained that going back to communities that have already interacted with the UN demonstrates that “nothing has changed… the UN is full of empty promises” (P32). Participants were also troubled by the notion of peacekeeping and
intervention as “you go to countries that don’t want you there, but you are forced to go anyways… [you] have to go even if you don’t agree with the fact that people on this side of the world should not intervene on that side of the world” (P9). This interventionist aspect of peacekeeping has been criticized widely by scholars (Cunliffe, 2012, Razack, 2003, Whitworth, 2004).

A couple of participants pointed out the hypocrisy of how the UN does its work. One woman, who deployed to Mali, stated, “UN leadership was all political… most of those who died on peacekeeping missions were from third world nations. Medevac was there for the first world nations… all lives are not equal under the UN” (P24). Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America provide around 90 percent of all military and police personnel for UN peacekeeping but contribute only about 15 percent of the budget (of which 10 percent is from China alone; Weiss and Kuele, 2019). Malone and Thakur (2000) have explained the power discrepancies between the nations that offer troops and those that offer money as a form of racism based on whose lives are put on the line and who may be deemed more disposable (see also Henry, 2012 and Pugh, 2004).

7.3 Peacekeeping poses logistical and safety challenges for women

Several scholars have emphasized that peacekeeping may increase the insecurity of local populations rather than alleviate it (Whitworth, 2004) and research has been carried out relating to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) perpetrated by peacekeepers against local populations (Harrington, 2005; Kolbe, 2015; Mudgeway, 2017). However, we also know very little about the risks and challenges that women peacekeepers experience while deployed. There are unavoidable challenges on deployment experienced by everyone, including managing operational tasks and expectations and the difficulty of being separated from loved ones. However, women face uniquely gendered challenges logistically and in relation to their safety.

Some participants may have been hesitant to share challenges they experienced considering individual women’s actions and experiences are often seen as representative of all women, thus motivating women to dismiss some experiences as unimportant or
undeserving of attention (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020, 8). Further, it was also assumed that deployment is not supposed to be easy and there are intrinsic challenges given the job at hand that are expected to be difficult or rough. About one third of participants in this research shared the sentiment that on deployment, “everything was the same - nothing was different” (P10) and that they felt comfortable and equal to their male counterparts while deployed. Most participants expressed gendered challenges in a few areas: access to safe bathrooms, sleeping arrangements, equipment and supplies, other issues in terms of safety, and encountering negative stereotypes about women.

Participants who deployed in the 1990s and some in the early 2000s struggled with finding space for some activities and ablutions in contexts where there was clearly none set aside specifically for women. One participant stated, “this whole mission was clearly designed by men for men” (P3). These women experienced hurdles to accessing space to do what men could do without a second thought, such as bathing and sleeping. Participants would often have to wake up early to shower, before all the men (P2), be hyper vigilant about their surroundings due to men lurking around the bathrooms (P5), stay in toilet stalls to protect themselves until men left co-ed bathrooms (P6), and be exposed to explicit pornographic images of other women in bathrooms and elsewhere (P1). Beyond trouble finding privacy to go to the bathroom, be it a bush on the side of the road or a women’s bathroom, several participants were also faced with yeast and bladder infections because of unhygienic sanitary conditions, especially throughout the first decade after gender integration was mandated in the CAF.

Likewise, sleeping arrangements were a concern and challenge for women who deployed on peacekeeping operations. While some women (and men) deployed on missions or in teams that offered them greater comfort and privacy, several had to negotiate appropriate sleeping quarters while they were away. One participant, who was the only woman on her deployment, slept in her own tent but felt uncomfortable getting special treatment based on her gender and suggested that she should stay in the same tent as her male colleagues with a curtain divider for privacy. She recounted how the men thought that the idea was ridiculous as “many were uncomfortable being in close proximity and how they might explain that to their significant others back home” (P2). This demonstrates that gendered
concerns extend beyond physical spatial challenges for women but include perceptions and prejudices among both men and women about what it might mean to have men and women share sleeping space. Baldwin and Taylor (2020) discuss similar findings where women described limited or unequal accommodations for sleeping or bathing on base and difficulty accessing healthcare while deployed (8).

Supplies for deployment did not always attend to the uniquely gendered needs of women. For example, rape kits and “Plan B” emergency contraception was excluded in medicine packs. One participant said, “it is not a possibility but a probability that I might get raped” and these supplies were nothing more than “sound planning” (P41). Several participants disclosed that they were raped while deployed and did not feel like there was any recourse or justice available to them. As peacekeeping missions are international and the perpetrators were from other troop contributing nations, access to justice can be limited. While the UN is working to enforce its zero-tolerance policy on SEA, the conversation is currently focused on protecting local populations. The experiences of peacekeepers who are sexually abused during deployment has not received any attention or priority.

Access to feminine hygiene products, on the other hand, did not pose a significant barrier for women but only because they took personal responsibility for procuring supplies. All the women who I interviewed were prepared to deal with their menstrual needs by bringing enough toiletries and supplies to last them the duration of their deployment. Many were warned, including by male colleagues, that access to feminine hygiene supplies may be limited. Regarding military equipment, few women found that they faced specific gendered needs. Rather, size seemed to be a greater determining factor as to how equipment fit rather than gender. For example, “shorter people had issues with rucksacks as they are made for taller people; the same issues would apply to [shorter] men” (P5).

There is a very clear improvement in overall safety over time based on the experiences of participants who deployed before the early 2000s compared to those that deployed in the last decade. Earlier deployments were fraught with challenges as several participants found it difficult to negotiate between “walking in the boys club without being groped
and still being a value to the team” (P14). In Bosnia, during the late 1990s, for example, women were briefed about rape and rape kits and one participant explained how it bothered her that “men could do things women couldn’t” (P38). Another participant explained that the opportunity for sexual assault in the Bosnian camp was high and it was “exhausting to always think of my own safety” (P40). More recent deployments, such as Mali, had fewer gendered safety concerns. However, due to the risk to the UN camp being in an active conflict zone, the base had to be dark so as not to be targeted and one participant noticed, “it seemed like an area where the chance of rape is high” (P27). While women’s safety may have broadly improved, gendered risk is still a pressing concern as research shows that some women are “more worried for their safety within military camps and bases than on the battlefield or on patrol” (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020, 9).

To cope with the sexualized environments some women were subjected to, they used a variety of strategies to keep safe that required constant vigilance. These included partnering up, having a colleague act like a ‘big brother’ when they needed to exit a situation or be walked back to their rooms, and even avoiding leisure activities with alcohol. Some found that staying on base offered them protection, while others believed they had to stay off base to avoid feeling threatened by officers from other countries (P3). Yet others were cautioned to stay away from certain parts of a base. For example, a participant that deployed to South Sudan explained that there were “sketchy” areas that had a “high turnover of people” and “most Western militaries don’t want their women staying there” (P5). Women generally felt safer when they were deployed with other Canadians and less safe when they were the only Canadian on camp and deployed as an individual rather than as a unit.

One participant explained the lengths she must go through to protect herself that her male colleagues did not need to be conscious of. These risk mitigation strategies included paying close attention to details outside of her room, door numbers and key numbers not being labeled correctly or not matching, making sure her room number was not audibly mentioned in front of other people, letting colleagues know that if she screams something is wrong, and carrying a knife (P27). She also recalled occasions that she had to sleep
with her lights on and fully clothed “just in case”. However, this participant was clear that the risks she felt were not from her Canadian colleagues but from other UN partner nations. Considering sexual misconduct is widespread in the CAF, there may be some prejudiced underlying assumptions in her assessment of who poses risk that warrant further critique.

7.4 Heightened gender stereotyping and discrimination in the UN multicultural environment

Participants widely shared the belief, albeit largely anecdotal, that NATO member countries are more progressive regarding gender integration than non-NATO countries. In fact, so-called ‘Western allies’ were thought to be most like Canadians in the sense that working with women was not a barrier or issue for them and discrimination in this context was rarely felt. The UN environment, on the other hand, posed unique challenges for women who deployed on peace operations. In addition to the UN environment being different from working in Canada, one participant reflected “UN troops are different. They are from different countries and have different perspectives on the place of women” (P2). The way participants talked about their international colleagues suggested both potential in how diverse sets of militaries can work together and inconsistency among UN member states on what constitutes gender equality.

One participant explained that “most troops I worked with were Muslim but didn’t have any problems with women” (P2), including a commander from Bangladesh, a country where women are not allowed in the combat arms, who was very open minded and a pleasure to work with. This same participant found another commander to be challenging, an Argentinian man, who “everyday was telling me that first I have to be pretty and then I have to do my job and I have to smile, and he was running to open the door when I was going somewhere, he was looking to carry my bag” (P2). Further, according to the Argentinian commander, “before you are a soldier, you are a woman” (P2). This sentiment was entirely different from how she understood the Canadian context where “it is important to feel equal and recognized for what I am doing not how I look” (P2). While her initial presumption was the Muslim majority country of Bangladesh would be more hostile towards women, the reality was exactly the opposite. This participant was not the
only one to suggest Latin Americans were generally more resistant to women doing some of the work men have traditionally done. Another participant explained that her biggest issue was how she was viewed by colleagues from other countries where it was “unheard of for women to be in the military or only to be nurses in the military” (P20). She felt a great deal of pressure and stated that she didn’t want anyone saying, “Canada sent over a female officer, and she was terrible” (P20). This participant thought that her actions may be reflective of all Canadians or of all women, burdening her with immense pressure.

Another participant explained that when she worked with troops from other countries, such as India or Mongolia, she was met with questions that she had not faced in a professional context among her Canadian colleagues, including questions on why she was divorced and did not have any children (P5). She recognized that these questions were asked out of “genuine concern” and she viewed them from a “cultural lens” (P5). Another woman faced similar questions from partner country colleagues and explained, “they treated me not being married and not having children as a handicap, that’s how culturally significant my not being married was” (P4).

Yet other women had troubling perceptions about colleagues from other nations, specifically those in the Middle East. One woman who was deployed in the Middle East explained, “there are three genders in the Middle East: men, women, and Western women… we’re women but not really the same women” (P8). Another participant who also deployed to the Middle East stated that women “aren’t considered as important as their camels” (P16). These Islamophobic comments reveal how persistent the demonization of Muslims (particularly of Middle Eastern origin) is, including among peacekeepers, as well as how sweeping the generalizations are about the treatment and status of women in these societies.

Another participant explained that men she interacted with in South Sudan were shocked to see a woman in her role when their wives were “home cooking and taking care of the kids” (P37). While some opinions on troops from other nations were quite negative and could be construed as racist, a woman who deployed on a mission where Ethiopians were the force protection battalion had a very positive explanation on Ethiopian men’s
perspectives about women. She explained that the Ethiopian men had a great deal of respect towards women, and they believed “that if you give power to women they look after the entire community, when you give power to men, they only take care of themselves” (P41). While this perspective can be criticized as essentialist, it does suggest that these Ethiopian men revered women for their abilities to take care of their communities and that they did not consider women to not belong in PKOs.

Negative perceptions respondents shared about how others understand women in the military were not limited to troops from the Global South. While Canada often sees peacekeeping as one of the ways it can differentiate itself from its southern neighbor, the United States, one participant stated that it was clear there were no Americans in their camp in Mali, which was overwhelmingly full of Europeans, as there was “respect” and the Europeans “treat women as equal partners but in the [United] States, gender is the first thing, your body is not your own” (P4). According to Higate and Henry (2009), a peacekeeping environment results in rapt attention to peacekeepers’ nationality, intertwining with “what can best be described as ‘rumor’, ‘anecdote’, and ‘hearsay’ inflicted with ethnic and national stereotypes” (121). They also found that troops from the majority world, or developing countries, were often perceived as failing to match their first world peacekeeping peers (122). Higate and Henry (2009) argue that these stereotypes are racist and xenophobic. Some conversations with my participants elicited similar responses. For example, some participants were surprised by the professionalism of partners from Bangladesh and India and disappointed by the lack of professionalism from Latin American nations and the United States, revealing their stereotypical and prejudiced expectations of partners from South Asian countries.

Some participants who worked in mixed civilian and military environments when they deployed, such as in mission headquarters or primarily administrative roles, noticed that there were more equal gender ratios as women were better represented in these roles. Being in an environment that is more gender equal insulated some women from the challenges that are associated with being a woman on deployment (P5). There were similar findings from women who worked in occupations that had higher representations of women to begin with, such as medical occupations (P23).
An interesting finding was from a woman of color who immigrated to Canada as a child and noticed that in a multinational environment, they “don’t hold not speaking English well against them” (P26). This was a struggle she personally dealt with throughout her military service, and she thought it was refreshing to be in a context where her English was often more advanced than her colleagues, especially as she believed that having English as a second language was one of her greatest disadvantages in the CAF. Her experience was not the only one that demonstrated the benefits of operating in a multinational environment. Others appreciated the diversity and found the environment to be an excellent learning opportunity as well as a great way to make friends from other nations.

### 7.5 Women improve operational effectiveness: Or do they?

One participant noted that women were less likely to be deployed in the past as leadership made assumptions about family and childcare responsibilities and thought women would be unwilling or unable to deploy (P20). These forms of benevolent sexism appear to have been challenged given the recent uptick women of deployed on peace operations due to the UN Gender Parity Strategy, Canada’s commitment to increasing meaningful participation of women through the Elsie Initiative, and the CAF goal of increasing the representation of women to 25% of the military. Considering MINUSMA, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, was Canada’s first larger-scale mission since the 1990s and the first mission since Trudeau made promises to engage more with UN peacekeeping, one participant stated, “the expectation was that women would be the face of the mission in Mali” (P31). Another participant explained that the Elsie Initiative was limited to the policy level and has not had much effect on Canadian military women on the ground. She emphasized that the higher proportion of women in Mali was largely due to pressure to fulfill the UN quota (P5). She stated that if the military was fully committed to increasing women’s deployment, they would also be deployed to other missions in greater numbers, such as Kuwait or Latvia, and not just on PKOs (P5). Research conducted by Karim and Beardsley (2013) suggests that missions
with a lower risk have higher representations of women, revealing an adherence to norms around women’s association with peace as well as reinforcing the masculinity of combat.

Conversely, another participant suggested that the proportion of women on the Mali mission was the last consideration after focusing on qualifications and ability to deploy. She stated, “that speaks volumes right there because it means that we did have so many females even without taking it [gender] into account” (P24). She contrasted Canada’s ability to deploy so many women with the Malian Armed Forces, as the Malian government had an agreement with MINUSMA that they should have a 25% representation of women. She explained, “I thought that would be a huge challenge for Mali because they are not a culture like we are. Who’s gonna take care of the Malian children? The women do. They don’t leave their children with their husbands and go to work. It’s not something they can achieve if we can’t achieve it” (P24). Her evolutionary language when referring to Malian women was problematic and could be interpreted as colonialist (Henry, 2012 notes similar comments made respectively by Indian and Uruguayan women peacekeepers about local women in Liberia and Haiti). However, her comment also signals that Canada wants to be perceived as a positive example of gender equality in the armed forces. Unfortunately, even with an increase in the number of women that deployed to Mali, women’s representation remained at 14%, just below gender parity targets. She assumes that Canadian social norms are better able to accommodate women on deployment, as Canada is assumed to be a more gender equal society than Mali.

Her comment also suggests that UN gender mainstreaming norms cannot be transformative or “capable of changing the habitus of peacekeeping workforces and modes of operation (practices) within military teams” (Holmes, 2019, 70). It is an expectation that women who deploy on peacekeeping missions can be role models for local women to consider joining the security sector (Jennings, 2011). Yet, most Canadian women who deployed on PKOs had little contact with the local population other than support staff, such as cleaners and security guards. Most women only interacted with UN partner nations, with varying experiences (as discussed in section 7.4). This was due to
multiple factors, primarily that their roles did not expressly include contact with the local populations but also due to significant security threats that forced them to stay in camp.

Operational effectiveness arguments suggest that women uniquely contribute to peacekeeping operations, as they are kinder, gentler, more approachable, and more compassionate. However, most participants did not agree with these stereotypes. Not only did some participants struggle with the notion of women being essentialized, but they also thought it created an unfair burden for them to carry. Wilen (2020) argues that too much focus on operational effectiveness can actually contribute to gender inequality and a backlash against women on peace operations, making this added burden both unrealistic and unfair (1585). One participant explained that she thought it would be ridiculous to single out and to highlight the contributions of women because “we have estrogen and can bleed without dying” (P25). She did not feel comfortable standing out based on her gender alone. Another explained that with her gear on, “my own mother saw pictures of me, and she couldn’t see who I was with my equipment on” (P22). This suggests that gender has little resonance for interactions civilians have with peacekeepers, as gender is difficult to discern from visual cues when peacekeepers are in uniform with full equipment on. She stated “The locals were very stoic and didn’t really interact with us much. Their life in Mali is very, very hard so I don’t think they have too much thought to man or women. It might be a luxury of discrimination” (P22). As such, thinking about gender in an operational environment such as Mali seems quite pointless from this participant’s perspective, as there are greater issues at stake including matters of life and death.

Gender identity and equality being on the forefront for both Canada and the UN means that women must consider all the work required of them in an operational setting while contending with stereotypes and gendered challenges. Based on something she read in the past, a participant stated that she felt women “had to work 25 hours a day on peacekeeping missions” as they had to prove they were good enough and tough enough to be there, which are expectations men did not have imposed on them (P22). Sometimes women had to work harder than men to feel equal or recognized and many noted that their male colleagues did not take them seriously. One of the ways women could “prove
themselves” on deployment was with a show of their fitness or strength. For example, when deployed on a training mission, a participant noticed, “the 115lb and 130lb women did as well as the 200lb men, they carried their rucksacks and everything and it made us stand out in a positive way, especially to those who won’t work with women on a regular basis” (P15). Another explained that she knew she “arrived” as an equal when she beat the men on a morning run (P2), and another outlasted everyone when hiking (P3).

Another participant stated that she felt she had proved herself when the comments or jokes about the role of women ended (P3). Overall, women had to do continuous work to fit in. One participant explained that gender stereotypes put a very particular type of burden on women:

“You are supposed to put aside your own struggles and do it for the benefit of women in another country. Maybe if I was more altruistic, I would help women in another country or with this initiative, but I don’t know why I would want myself in a gendered role when I came so far to not be seen as just a woman” (P36).

While there is ample resistance to being contained within a set of gendered expectations imposed on women, some women found a sense of power and purpose in their gender as they thought it made them stand out from the men, ultimately benefitting the operation. About one third of participants believed women did contribute something different and were valuable for operational effectiveness.

How easily women chose to use traditionally feminine qualities depended on the tasks they were assigned. As one participant stated, “sometimes you are kind, sometimes not” and in her perspective it was not about gender but personality and task (P2). As one participant stipulated: “You don’t want a peaceful nice lady on a combat mission,” but a peacekeeping mission benefits from just that (P40). Another explained that “dudes that come from combat arms trades are all about closing in and destroying the enemy and that may not be what you need to do in a peacekeeping mission where you are securing food, water, safe environment for NGOs to do their work” (P4).
According to Strong, Secure and Engage, and several participants’ viewpoints, the military team overall benefits if there is a gender mix and some participants feel that women should be prioritized for peacekeeping missions as it makes operational sense. One participant stated,

We seek out people who speak Russian when we go to Ukraine and teach people to speak Spanish before they go to Mexico… deliberately seek out skill sets to make us effective on operations… we are more effective if women are on team and should go and deliberately find more women (P41).

Comparing being a woman to a skill that one acquires, such as speaking a second language, demonstrates the gender essentialism Jennings (2011) describes when she writes that it is “not what women do, but who they are that makes the difference” (19). Or as Baruah (2017) asks, “if compassion, empathy, and sensitivity to local populations is important in PKOs, why can’t men be compassionate, empathetic and sensitive? Why are these seen as attributes that only women possess?”

Another woman explained how her perspective on this matter changed over time, “Did I want to be seen as kinder and gentler? No, it would have been a weakness. But now I have grown to see it as a superpower, a force multiplier” (P20). One participant asserted that “it doesn’t matter if women are kinder and gentler because they aren’t in the infantry which is the ones who are mostly sent to peacekeeping missions… it makes no difference if the person cooking is a man or woman” (P41). Likewise, “women can come off as more caring but that is only beneficial if you work with the local population in roles such as a military liaison. If you are in headquarters, it makes no difference” (P5). Of the one-third of research participants that believed women contribute to operational-effectiveness, a majority was in positions that had contact with local populations, such as UNMOs or MLOs.

7.5.1 Trust and access

In practical terms, women peacekeepers are sometimes necessary to conduct “operations in a way that makes sense for the populations that we are serving” (P31). This includes
situations where local women may need help, but men are not culturally allowed to touch them (P31). While these kinds of situations are inevitable, accessing local populations while mindful of cultural sensitivities extends beyond logistical support. Both local women and women peacekeepers were thought to see situations differently than men, and thus, tapping into them as a resource was thought to result in “a more complete intelligence picture” as women have “a window into a network that the guys don’t have” (P14). One participant noted, “women are smart and know what’s going on in a community… may have traditional gender roles but they have information and are often not looked at as sources of intelligence” (P27). Women were thought to be able to get into sites that their male colleagues could not get into before, and to get information and build relationships that no one else could (P25).

Participants indicated they had more access to local women and men as sources of information. One participant explained, “I expected it to be easier for me to speak with women than my male colleagues, but I didn’t expect it would be so much easier for me to speak to the local men… there was no alpha male show down… they didn’t need to show me they were stronger than me” (P41). It was common for women to be perceived as less threatening than their male colleagues because the men “didn’t feel challenged” (P42), “they saw me as novelty, not a threat” (P25), and “men don’t see you as looking to win something, because of the status men have in their society, as a woman they don’t see me as a competitor, they see me as caring and stuff like that” (P2). Another woman explained,

Men tend to deescalate their own emotions when they’ve got women around. Local men will not be as emotional when dealing with women because they don’t feel as threatened by women. When they don’t feel as threatened, they won’t escalate as quickly emotionally, which will make it easier to talk to them, negotiate with them, get access to areas and information (P14).

Understanding their positionality, participants leveraged their femininity and used it to their advantage. One participant explained that this was corroborated by her other female
colleagues, “white, African, Asian, we all had same experiences and got more information” (P41).

One participant explained how she had a close colleague who she felt safest around as he was a “huge alpha male” and strikingly, he told her that he also felt safest with her as he thought she was their “most important weapon” due to her abilities to “deescalate people that wanted to kill us” (P41). She attributed this mutually beneficial relationship to gender dynamics and to their individual personalities. Participants indicated that they had an easier time building trust, including by appealing to other women as mothers: “Whip out photo of your kid and tell them you are a mother too” (P17). This participant suggested that men could do the same in their roles as dads, but another participant explained that having a shared experience with other women is the key. She explained, “If I go on UN mission, and see a pregnant woman, I will know so much more on how to help her breastfeed and other things” (P27).

7.5.2 Soft skills, prioritizing women’s issues, and acting as role models

Having shared experiences (such as pregnancy) with other women was one way that women peacekeepers got their foot in the door with local women. Beyond shared experiences, some participants thought “women have soft skills and different approaches to problems that are valuable in the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions such as military and civil cooperation or thinking through access to health and education” (P4) and that women have a “softer touch” (P38). One participant pointed out “it is hypocritical to go in there with soldiers that are white, heterosexual cis-normative men and say, ‘I can relate to you, I have empathy’” (P4). One participant provided an example of bringing unique attention to gender issues when many local women near a mission were being raped while getting firewood away from the local IDP [internally displaced persons] camp and women staff at the UN advocated for more patrols to monitor and solve the problem (P5). While men were also in favor of this solution, the women peacekeepers prioritized it. As women in most of the world continue to be primarily responsible for domestic and reproductive work, one participant believed that they “may bring these issues to the table in a professional setting when it normally wouldn’t be
considered” (P42).

The “Canada the good” (Howell, 2005) trope was evoked frequently when respondents spoke about how progressive Canada is in terms of its gender representation in the armed forces, specifically how this can set an example for other nations. One participant explained that having women in non-traditional occupations, including pilots and gunners, “opened up conversations [about] how we value this in Canada, that everyone can participate” (P31). Another participant stated, “our presence impacts nations that aren’t as integrated as us. Still far ahead of them and we can show them it isn’t the massive hurdle that they think it is” (P15). And a third participant explained the joy women found in seeing military women in leadership roles when they said to her:

‘So you’re actually in charge?’ Yes. ‘And they know you’re in charge?’ Yes. ‘And they’re ok with that?’ Yes. ‘And you’re not a wife?’ No, I’m a chief. ‘A female chief?’ They thought that was wonderful (P14).

Unsurprisingly, many women did not want to be the face of how progressive Canada is in terms of gender integration. A participant argued, “not a lot of women want to become the poster girl for women in the army, they didn’t sign up for that, they signed up to do their jobs” (P31). Women knew when they were put on display that they had to say the “right things,” which was not a desirable role. Institutional goals of improving gender equality in the CAF may not align with the additional work women have to do to fit in with the existing masculinist culture. Highlighting their gender then became not only undesirable, but potentially harmful because of backlash.

7.6 Conclusion

Research participants unanimously acknowledged that gendered stereotypes persisted on PKOs, but some women chose to use this unequal reality to their advantage. One participant explained, “I use my gender to enhance my charisma… I capitalize on the fact that as a woman I stand out more so they may be able to keep their attention better” (P5). Another stated that she stands out in “a sea of grey-haired white males,” which gives her a greater platform for being heard (P31). Conversely, women also explained that they had
to create firm boundaries as a result of gendered expectations. For example, one participant stated that the men she worked with assumed she was a good listener necessitating her telling them “I’m not their mother or their therapist” (P30). Another woman explained that she was expected to do most of the cooking in her contingent and when she got feedback it stated that she was a “good addition to the house” (P2). While she did not feel offended by this declaration, she pointed out that social norms dictate women do more domestic work and she wished that she was seen as a member of the team first. Another participant similarly explained that she created firm boundaries in this regard and that the men in her unit ended up hiring a local woman for domestic work (P3). While she established boundaries as to what gendered work she is willing to take on, domestic tasks were still not shared between the men in her unit; instead, the burden was handed over to a local woman.

The stereotype of women improving operational effectiveness is a complex issue. Most participants did not believe it to be true while some felt empowered by it. Some wholeheartedly resisted it, and some were surprised when they did not live up to the expected stereotypes. One example is a woman who said she thought interacting with local orphans would break her heart, but it didn’t. She posited, “I thought I’d get emotionally attached to children in the country more than I did and I didn’t feel emotionally invested in the children there” (P27). Another shared a similar thought when she recalled, “I thought I would feel like I need to protect them [children] as a mother but I didn’t” (P41). While caring work is primarily ascribed to women, these examples provide evidence of how these socially constructed gender roles are both internalized by women and expected by society at large. Further, most women who deploy on peacekeeping missions do not do so for the sake of maternal compassion and this should not be expected of them based solely on their gender (Alchin et al., 2018, 7). Compassion should be expected of all peacekeepers in alignment with operational goals.

Furthermore, the experiences of women are diverse and not unidimensional. A participant that deployed to South Sudan noticed that women were a significant contributor to violence in the country. She gave an example of a mother who would put a meal with food on the table for an empty chair signifying a son that she lost in the conflict and
would not feed one of her living sons until he avenges his brother’s death, believing justice can be achieved through “an eye for an eye” (P41). Her initial perception was that “women were some delicate wallflowers that needed protection and would not be the ones inciting violence or the ones to hold a grudge” (P41). This example demonstrates how stereotypes about women being peaceful protectors of life is not universally true and while many women in the CAF would not have these expectations of their female colleagues, they may have more stereotypical impressions about women of color in conflict settings in the Global South.

The salaries, benefits and other privileges and protections enjoyed by peacekeepers on PKOs, even when deployed on the same mission, depended on their sending country. Peacekeepers from NATO and OECD countries received much higher remuneration, benefits, and even access to basic services compared to those from some countries of the Global South. Of course, such non-gender-based differences could also play a huge role in how meaningfully women could make a difference on UN PKOs. One participant, deployed in the role of an MLO, recounted that she was one of two female MLOs at the time and her colleague was a woman from an African partner nation. She explained that Canadians must live on the UN camp for security reasons and their stay costs $21 per day. Her colleague, however, lived outside of the camp in a hut without running water and electricity (P32). She would bring bottles to the camp to take water out with her at the end of the day and would charge her phone on the base. This stark difference in living conditions points to material inequalities among deployed personnel, contributing not just to a divide between colleagues: “We didn’t make that deep of a connection” (P32) but also to profound differences in ability to contribute meaningfully to PKOs. For some peacekeepers from poorer countries, serving on PKOs did not alleviate their struggles for basic services and amenities that their counterparts from wealthier countries, often serving on the same UN PKO, could take for granted.

Neither women peacekeepers nor women in peacekept nations are homogenous. Henry (2012) argues that there is a popular assumption of shared sisterhood, particularly among women from the Global South. While her analysis is focused on the interactions between Indian women working as peacekeepers in Liberia and women from Uruguay working in
Haiti, similar assumptions can be extended that women across the world somehow can, or should, connect based on sex or gender alone, regardless of hierarchies during peacekeeping missions. Further, while there is limited research on peacekeeping economies, gaps remain in terms of understanding the dynamics of the intersection between gender and economic status among and between the peacekeepers that inevitably work together in the UN environment (Berber et al., 2019; Henry, 2015; Jennings, 2015).
Chapter 8

8 Conclusion and directions for future research

8.1 Introduction

The goal of this research was to document and analyze the experiences of women in the CAF who deployed on PKOs. I conducted interviews with 40 women who were current or former CAF members to explore their overall experiences within the CAF as well as on deployment to PKOs. I relied on thematic analysis to identify, analyze, and report themes within my findings.

This research was at least partially motivated by Trudeau’s announcement in 2017 of the Elsie Initiative, a project that aims to overcome the barriers to increasing women’s meaningful participation in PKOs. Peacekeeping is a gendered project “defined, conceptualized and structured in terms of a distinction between masculinity and femininity, presuming and inevitably reproducing gender differences” (Carreiras, 2010, 472). As such, peacekeeping is a rich site of analysis for gender equality. I was struck by how peacekeeping discourse unthinkingly accepts and reproduces gender essentialisms and stereotypes with nothing more than anecdotal evidence to support them. In terms of the Elsie Initiative’s efforts to increase the number of women in peacekeeping, I was interested in two questions: What motivates Canadian women to participate in PKOs? Do they consider their contributions to PKOs to be different from those of male peacekeepers?

My research is informed by feminist international relations and feminist security studies scholars who seek to understand how gender operates in masculinized spaces, including militaries, while exploring the workings of masculinity and femininity within them. Their work problematizes and interrupts male-dominated discourse and centers women’s experiences by thinking about gendered roles before, during, and after conflict as well as making connections between everyday lived experiences and human security (Blanchard, 2003; Enloe, 2014; 2019; Runyan and Peterson, 2014). In addition to the existing work of activists and scholars who elevated gender considerations within the international
relations sphere, UNSCR 1325 provides a starting point for critically investigating women’s experiences in peacekeeping (Basu, 2016; George and Shepherd, 2016; Hudson, 2017).

In Canada, the Elsie initiative was launched to demonstrate commitment to UNSCR 1325 and the WPS agenda, and to a feminist foreign policy more generally (Chapnick, 2019). However, there are criticisms that Canada’s NAPs and feminist foreign policy are not ambitious enough or transformative enough to make any sustained difference in women’s lives in global context (Aggestam et al., 2019; Cadesky, 2020; Tiessen and Swan, 2018). The contributions this doctoral research project makes to Canadian military studies, foreign policy and international relations must be appreciated in the context of these recent developments.

8.2 Overview of study findings

This dissertation engaged with two bodies of literature: on women in the CAF and gender in peacekeeping. Canada has been lauded as one of the first Western countries to open all occupations in the armed forces to women. Despite more than three decades of gender integration, gender discrimination and gender inequality continue to persist in the CAF. Deschamps (2015) and Arbour (2022) highlighted gender discrimination and gender inequality when conducting independent reviews on the topic of sexual misconduct in the CAF. Further, the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination (2022) reported persistent issues related to racial and ethnic discrimination in the CAF. These reports found that CAF culture requires systemic change to address sexism and racism.

A primary concern of military culture identified by feminist scholars is the reification of the warrior ideal and militarized masculinity (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017; Henry, 2017; Lane, 2017; Taber, 2022; Wood and Charbonneau, 2018). One example of this is how engagement in combat is often thought to be the most prestigious role in the military. Yet, combat arms have not just the lowest representation of women but also the most hostile climate towards women (Goldstein, 2018). This structural exclusion leading to the
lack of combat experience often prevents women from being promoted to top leadership positions.

My findings echo those of other scholars investigating the experiences of women in militaries in Canada and globally (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017; Goldstein, 2018; Henry, 2017; King, 2016; Meade, 2020; Taber, 2005; Wood and Charbonneau, 2018). Women in the CAF must contend with sexualization in the workplace and exclusion from male-dominated spaces. Some participants emphasized the heavy emotional labour they invested in order to protect their honorary masculine status once they have been awarded it, which they admitted often entailed participating in misogynistic banter and sometimes being complicit in sexism.

Difficulty maintaining work and life balance was a key finding from this research. Women continue to bear the brunt of domestic work and childcare responsibilities, regardless of the demands of their careers or how high-ranking they are in the CAF. With the exclusion of some non-traditional partnerships, most women in heterosexual relationships found that childcare was a difficult balancing act as they were the primary caretakers in their families even if their male partners were at home, and some expressed hindrance in their career progression due to the expectation of being able to “do it all” (P27). It is important to highlight that in order for equality to be achieved in the CAF, gender equality in society more broadly, and especially in the domestic sphere, is essential.

Similarly, women reflected positively on having been beneficiaries of women leaders who championed their careers, they forged lasting military friendships, seeing each other as “sisters in arms,” and they created a network of informal power that benefitted women. There were several participants who thought their gender offered them a professional advantage over their male colleagues, including being offered deployments and trainings due to quotas/targets, more speaking opportunities, and additional help or support with duties and responsibilities. However, a quarter of my research participants did not express that they faced any obstacles or opportunities based on their gender. They chose to remain “genderblind” and some thought that a focus on gender equality is not necessary
or relevant and that merit was sufficient to transcend professional challenges. Some participants even described efforts to empower women in the CAF as “reverse sexism,” because they perceived that such efforts diminished men’s professional contributions. These findings reveal that gender equality mandates within the CAF are not universally understood, accepted, or welcomed by women.

Improving the gender and ethnic diversity of the CAF to better represent Canadian society is one of the CAF’s ongoing stated priorities. This includes a special focus on increasing the representation of women by attracting, recruiting, and retaining more women, as well as promoting women into senior leadership positions (DND/CAF, 2017). The CAF’s goals of increasing women’s representation are shared by the Elsie Initiative and the United Nations Gender Parity Strategy. The problem remains that rather than a focus on gender equality per se, what these initiatives overwhelmingly focus on is attempting to improve operational effectiveness by increasing women’s representation. Jennings (2011) points out how problematic operational effectiveness arguments are and the harm they may cause women when she emphasizes, “It is not what women do, but who they are that makes the difference. Or, more precisely: the way women ‘do’ peacekeeping is inseparable from the way women peacekeepers ‘are’, which is to say, noticeably different from “normal” (men) peacekeepers” (19).

Arguments for women’s inclusion in PKOs frequently rely on essentialist notions of women as kinder, gentler, and less corrupt, placing the burden on women to make institutions better (Baldwin and Taylor, 2020; Ghittoni et al., 2018; Jennings, 2011; Valenius, 2007; Wilen, 2020). Peacekeeping is a unique site of analysis for gender stereotypes because, even though UN peacekeeping is militarized, peacekeepers are feminized in a way that is contrary to typical masculinized military and the warrior ideal. In peacekeeping, kindness, compassion, and approachability are valuable skills. However, peacekeeping is still dominated by men and a “boys will be boys” environment (Simic, 2010; Whitworth, 2004). Akin to militaries, for women to be accepted in such hyper-masculine environments, they must appear to subscribe to the same ideologies as the men or risk being ostracized, disrespected, or stigmatized. Thus, women in peacekeeping face the predicament of being considered too kind, gentle, or peaceful for
“real” militarized combat work while simultaneously often being included in PKOs based on assumptions that those exact same qualities will serve peacekeeping missions well.

Conducting this research confirmed that although peacekeeping continues to hold a special place as a Canadian value, there are growing criticisms within and beyond the CAF of the viability of militarized peacekeeping in preventing conflict and promoting peace. Regarding operational effectiveness, some participants agreed that women’s presence improves mission effectiveness in important ways, such as: gaining trust and access to local populations, prioritizing local women’s issues, and making them visible, and acting as role models to women who wish to aspire to military careers. My findings simultaneously suggest that peacekeepers, irrespective of gender, are constrained in their efforts to reach out to local populations by UN mandates, volatile political environments, socioeconomic differences, and hyper-masculine military cultures. With regard to theoretical contributions, my research highlights the differences between women’s deployment motivations and deployment experiences. While participants did not express feminist aspirations for deploying on PKOs and did not want to be singled out based on their gender, their experiences on the ground, when it came to safety concerns or how they believed they contributed to operational effectiveness, were highly gendered. Likewise, organizational, and operational processes cannot be separated as distinct: women’s experiences in the CAF are directly related to their experiences deployed on PKOs. Further, when it comes to the tenets of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming, my research has demonstrated that “adding women” is not enough and intersectionality must be at the heart of diversity strategies as gender is not always the source, or primary axis of, women’s marginalization. There are complexities when it comes to representation and numerical targets that must be reflected in policies aimed at diversifying armed forces and PKOs.

8.3 Policy recommendations

Overall, core findings from this research demonstrate that gender discrimination remains entrenched in the CAF’s everyday work environments, often compounded by discrimination based on other identity markers, such as race and sexuality.
In mid-2021, the DND created a new top-level department, led by LGen Jennie Carignan, to address sexual misconduct and racism in the CAF, the Chief Professional Conduct and Culture (CPCC), that works to unify and integrate all culture change activities across the DND and the CAF. CPCC aims to consolidate efforts to remediate and prevent further harm to DND/CAF members, including a focus on culture change that aims to set the conditions for improving the work environment for all DND/CAF members. CPCC is involved in several initiatives including expanding the services of Sexual Misconduct Response Centres (SMRC), reviewing the misconduct complaint management system, defining the framework for monitoring and evaluating culture change, publishing an updated CAF ethos, and reviewing training, among other initiatives (CPCC, 2022).

Most recently, the Arbour (2022) report offered 48 recommendations to address sexual misconduct at the CAF, including moving sexual assault offenses to civilian courts, the appointment of an external monitor to ensure recommendations are implemented, reviewing the universality of service doctrine, and reviewing military colleges, among others. In addition, the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination final report (2022) also offered 12 areas of opportunity with 43 recommendations to eliminate systemic racism and discrimination in the CAF. The Minister’s Advisory Panel report stated that over the last 20 years, reports from 41 inquiries, climate surveys, and reviews have generated 258 recommendations to address diversity, inclusion, respect, and professional conduct in the DND/CAF. Despite the high volume of recommendations, few have been carried out with “diligence and discipline” (Department of National Defence, 2022, 24).

It is clear that the DND and the CAF have an immense undertaking to organize and prioritize the hundreds of recommendations they have received over the years; the CPCC has been tasked to do much of this work. There is a risk that simply documenting the recommendations will be considered part of its culture change initiatives, representing a strategy of checking boxes to recognize or accept the recommendations while failing to yield transformative structural change.
While I agree with many of the recent recommendations made by Arbour (2022) and the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination (2022), they often do not seem to go far enough to generate transformative change. For example, the Minister’s Advisory Panel (2022) justifiably names racism and white supremacy as foundations upon which CAF and Canadian society were built, but it fails to name the CAF as an agent of the colonial state and instead situates the CAF’s failures as unintentional and coincidental in nature (Biskupski-Mujanovic et al., 2022). Further, it does not explore how power operates within the CAF and pays no attention to intersectionality in conceptualizing gender inequality. Arbour’s (2022) report continues to place the onus on women to facilitate culture change by emphasizing numerical targets for increasing women’s participation in the CAF as a top priority. Arbour (2022) also fails to critique militarized masculinity, exhibited through the warrior ideal.

My research participants reported mixed feelings about quotas and targets, often due to the misconception that gender will take priority over merit in meeting them. However, all participants agreed that increasing the presence of women in CAF is important as an end in itself. The CAF needs to redefine itself as a place where everyone is welcome, included, and valued. Culture change that is motivated by and results in inclusivity requires buy-in, especially from CAF leadership. In order to achieve buy-in, leaders need to understand why culture change is necessary (Duval-Lantoine and Imbre-Millei, 2021).

The CAF also undertook the Elsie Initiative Barrier Assessment, called Measuring Opportunities for Women in Peace Operations (MOWIP), and released the results to the public in August 2022. The CAF MOWIP assessment identified barriers to CAF women’s meaningful participation in UN PKOs and found biased deployment selection, inadequate peace operations infrastructure, and social exclusion as the most significant barriers. The MOWIP assessment found that PKO selection processes are perceived to be unfair. Most deployment selection amounts to knowing the right people, and with opportunities being shared through informal channels, such as word of mouth, women have less access to them (Office of the Assessors, 2022). Because different units submit candidates for UN deployment opportunities, and superiors ultimately decide deployment selections, women are disadvantaged as they often have fewer connections to influential
decision makers. Likewise, “there are cultures in which women are not considered equal to men and missions where women might not be treated as equals” (ibid., 21). Because women have been traditionally excluded from the “boy’s club” in the CAF, it is unsurprising that this was a barrier to deployment. Though many of the participants in this research project did not identify selection criteria as a barrier to deployment, they did identify the “boy’s club” as a barrier, which the MOWIP assessment does not overtly address.

The second barrier that ranked highly in the MOWIP is peace operations infrastructure. This includes a lack of specialized accommodations for women on missions, issues with uniforms and equipment designed for men, and inadequate access to feminine hygiene products. Likewise, there are not always women doctors on mission and there are reported difficulties accessing reproductive healthcare (Office of the Assessors, 2022, 33). While my research participants validated some of these concerns, they did not think these barriers were of high importance. They found them manageable, albeit undesirable.

The third barrier that ranked high in the MOWIP assessment was social exclusion. The primary barriers related to social exclusion include the CAF’s sexualized culture and sexual harassment (ibid., 54).

Interestingly, intrahousehold constraints were ranked low among the MOWIP assessment issue areas despite acknowledgement that traditional gender roles persist in military households (ibid., 27). Consistent with my participant responses, the assessment also acknowledged that women with children face more stigma when they deploy than men do (ibid., 28). The issue of gender roles was deemed moderately important in the MOWIP assessment as Canada has relatively good gender discrimination laws, women in the CAF can participate in combat, and the rules for deployment do not differ by gender (ibid., 49). The foremost barrier pertaining to gender roles that was identified is the widespread evidence of sexual assault and harassment in the CAF and the stereotypes that women are less capable of tactical operations and training local security forces (ibid., 50–51).

While the MOWIP assessment was an important step to understand the barriers women in the CAF face towards meaningful participation in PKOs, a key gap is the lack of nuanced
data from military personnel as the assessment was carried out through surveys and interviews were only undertaken with key decision makers. In-depth interviews with women of all ranks in the CAF would have provided a fuller data set and an opportunity to learn, in greater depth, what the barriers are. Some of my findings complement results from the MOWIP assessment, though household constraints and gender roles were reported as greater barriers in my study than selection processes and mission infrastructure. Unfortunately, there is also little connection between the CAF and the Elsie Initiative, which is outward facing in its aspirations and participants noted that it is a component of Canada’s foreign policy through Global Affairs Canada, not a project of the CAF. This suggests the grounded reality of policy originating in one location but being diffused and experienced in diverse ways in different work environments.

Considering the volume of recommendations offered by the Deschamps (2015) report, the Arbour (2022) report, and the Minister’s Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination (2022) report, along with findings from the MOWIP assessment, I am hesitant to add to the growing “graveyard of recommendations” the DND/CAF have received. As such, I would like to offer two broad suggestions to help guide efforts for military culture change, particularly gender equality, in the CAF, specifically: 1. No longer relying on operational effectiveness claims to promote women’s increased participation in peacekeeping, or the military more broadly; and 2. Increased attention to intersectionality in the CAF.

These suggestions are critical to address concerns raised throughout my study. First, recognizing that my research participants joined the CAF for several reasons, primarily financial security, undercuts the CAF’s ability to rely on operational effectiveness motivations for including women in PKOs. Participant motivations to deploy were similar but included an emphasis on applying their military skills in real life scenarios. Several participants were drawn to the appeal of being a peacekeeper and no one suggested that they wanted to deploy because they had any innate skills needed to help people in mission areas, such as being kinder, gentler, and more approachable. As such, the major justification for increasing the number of women in PKOs as it “will lead to kinder, gentler, less-abusive and more-efficient missions” did not resonate with my
research participants. In fact, there was significant resistance to such gender stereotyping and essentializing. While some agreed that women contribute unique skills, the overwhelming opinion was that women wanted to be treated equally to men and to be offered opportunities based on merit.

Gender is not a skill; nor should it be treated as such. Implying that women are better suited to particular work reinforces gendered stereotypes about women and men. Essentializing also ignores other gender-diverse people by reinforcing the lines of a strict gender binary. As such, operational effectiveness arguments effectively undermine rather than advance equity. Wilen (2020) writes: “What’s the ‘added value’ of male peacekeepers? As strange as this question may sound, that is the very same question that has been asked over the past few decades with regard to the participation of female peacekeepers” (1). She argues that there is a risk of contributing to gender inequality and fostering a pushback against women’s participation if we continue to instrumentalize women’s participation, especially since this is not an additional burden placed on male peacekeepers. Women’s participation in peacekeeping is already low and expecting women to fix systemic issues in peacekeeping environments through their presence alone is unreasonable and discriminatory.

Second, to turn the CAF’s lack of attention to intersectionality, it is crucial to understand and acknowledge that the CAF is a highly hierarchical organization and existing discrimination is rooted in racism, classism, heterosexism, ethnocentrism, ableism, and ageism. Additionally, militaries include manufactured identity and status markers that create unequal power dimensions such as rank, occupation, and time in service. My research participants were mostly white, able-bodied, and heterosexual, however, sexuality and sexual orientation, race, age, and language, were identified as bigger barriers than gender by some of my minoritized research participants. The CAF must pay more detailed and nuanced attention to intersectionality in order to achieve equity and inclusion within its ranks. The CAF must also name underlying structures of oppression, such as racism and white privilege, as root causes of the problems that contribute to the marginalization and harm experienced by some members and how those same structures benefit other members.
The experiences of women in the CAF are not universal or uniform and lived experience must receive more attention in efforts to diversify the CAF. Only by recognizing the complexity of discrimination within the CAF can meaningful structural change begin, beyond the current, superficial work being done on diversity and inclusion (George, 2020). Consistent application of GBA+ analysis to all CAF programs, policies, and activities would bring sharper focus towards intersectionality and support systemic reform where it is most urgently needed. Further, to ensure this process is as transparent as possible, the GBA+ analysis should be made public and open for input from researchers, academics, practitioners, and civilians with lived experience of gender discrimination and inequality.

8.4 Directions for future research

This study has advanced our understanding of the experiences of women in the CAF and while deployed on PKOs. An especially timely component of this research is an in-depth look at sexual misconduct in CAF’s ranks. The Arbour report (2022) found: “some CAF members are more at risk of harm, on a day-to-day basis, from their comrades than from the enemy” (9). Arbour (2022) stated that CAF culture continues to be resistant to the inclusion of women as a result of its “boy’s club” mentality. Consequently, CAF attempts at rectifying widespread sexual misconduct in its ranks have generally been unsuccessful and not enough has been done to facilitate necessary culture change, as evident from recent allegations of sexual misconduct against some men in CAF’s highest leadership positions.

The CAF has received hundreds of recommendations from internal and external reviewers in the past several years that have either not been fully implemented, or been ignored, or forgotten (Arbour, 2022, 12). Canada’s most recent defence policy, Strong, Secure and Engaged, has, as one of its core tenets, the goal to improve diversity and inclusion in CAF’s ranks, including increasing the representation of women to 25 percent. However, Arbour (2022) found that the low representation of women in the CAF is not due to a lack of interest on women’s part but, rather, that “despite legislation mandating equality, life for women in the CAF is anything but equal” (34). There is a lack of understanding of the specific type of culture change necessary to establish an environment in the CAF that is welcoming to women, in order to facilitate their meaningful representation. Feminist scholars have
criticized the laissez-faire “boys will be boys” attitude of the military. Whitworth (2004) argues that soldiers are created by “killing the woman” in them. In order to achieve the desired hegemonic masculinity of the military, identities that are considered subordinate are denigrated, including women, people of color, and sexual minorities. Feminist scholars have argued that the military must address toxic militarized masculinity, rooted in winning and holding power, in order for women to succeed (Harrington, 2005; Whitworth, 2004). As such, men must be actively involved in creating a gender equal and gender equitable CAF.

In addition to understanding the experiences of women in the CAF, it is necessary to investigate whether men in the CAF support gender equality as a valid and important goal for the CAF to aspire to. If they do, what do they see as their role in advancing gender equality in the CAF? Several research participants emphasized that gender equality in the CAF was impossible without the commitment of male CAF members. They stressed that interviewing men to learn more about their commitment to gender equality in the CAF should be an important future research objective. As such, it is critical to interview Canadian men in the CAF from diverse occupations, ranks, and ethnic, educational, and linguistic backgrounds to understand their commitment (or lack thereof) to achieving greater gender equality in the CAF.

This future research directive could make theoretical, empirical and policy contributions, including an examination of the highly masculine culture where soldiering is primarily ascribed to men (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Goldstein, 2018; Lane, 2017; Van Gilder, 2019). The research could also challenge militarized masculinity (Bulmer and Eichler, 2017, 162) by documenting how men can and do challenge the status quo and offer alternative paradigms that support gender equality. This alleviates the burden of gender equality from women towards a more balanced responsibility for systemic equity (Watson, 2015). This research could build on and extend the contributions of my doctoral research by engaging with understudied male perspectives on gender equality. As men make up the majority of the CAF, understanding their perspectives and actions is crucial to reforming the militarized masculine culture towards gender equity. As women in small numbers do not have comparable power to challenge entrenched values within institutions such as the armed forces, men are critical to achieving gender equality. Only an integrated
effort towards gender equality - one that includes men, women, and people of all genders - will lead to a transformation of the institutional culture of the CAF.

A second area for future research would be to examine the experiences, opportunities, and challenges of women in Canadian policing. Policing culture is male dominated and demonstrates traits of militarized masculinity, not unlike those seen in the CAF (Goodmark, 2015). In November 2017, a class action lawsuit alleged that the RCMP had failed to provide an environment free of gender- and sexual orientation-based harassment and discrimination for women and sexual minorities. The Federal Court approved a settlement agreement with class members in March 2020 and the federal government has set aside $100 million to compensate women who worked as civilian RCMP employees, volunteers, and students between 1974–2019. Earlier, in 2016, two class-action lawsuits were settled with the RCMP for $100 million and Commissioner Bob Paulson delivered an apology to women RCMP officers and employees who were subject to bullying, discrimination, and harassment (Bronskill, 2016). In February 2020, the Federal Court certified a new $1.1 billion class action lawsuit alleging RCMP leadership fostered and condoned an environment of systemic bullying, intimidation, and harassment (Gerster, 2020). In 2018, 84 civilian women in the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal stating that they were treated worse and paid less than male police officers (Gillis, 2018). They also alleged that they were subjected to sexist comments and humiliating hazing rituals (ibid.). These class action suits demonstrate that much more effort is required to understand and address these systemic inequities within Canadian policing. These topics emerged tangentially during my doctoral research. They are richly deserving of future research and policy attention.

Women in other non-traditional professions (where they represent less than 25% of the workforce) often face similar concerns to issues in the CAF and in policing. The barriers in construction and manufacturing, for example, include a lack of adequate information and awareness about these fields of employment, gender bias and gender stereotyping, male-biased work culture and working conditions and concerns about sexual harassment and violence against women (Baruah and Biskupski-Mujanovic, 2021). Many well-paid careers in Canada are in occupations in which women are underrepresented and in sectors
that are systemically hostile towards women. It is imperative that gender equality and inclusivity become important priorities in these sectors moving forward. As gender is relational and femininity cannot be understood without simultaneous consideration of masculinity (Olsson and Tryggestad, 3), further research into both women and men’s experiences in these organizations is required to address entrenched inequities. Finally, we must expand our conceptualization of gender equality beyond the male-female binary in order to document and understand the intersectional experiences of people of all genders.
References


Trier-Bieniek, A. (2012). Framing the telephone interview as a participant-centered tool for qualitative research: a methodological discussion. *Qualitative Research, 12*(6), 630-644.


### Appendices

#### Appendix A: List of participants

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Appendix B: Interview guide

A. Basic Information
   • Role in the Military
   • Peacekeeping Deployment(s)-Duration, Location, and position (job)

B. Experiences in the Military
   • Tell me about your experiences in the military.

   (Probes: What motivated you to join? What do/did you do in the military? What does/did your day-to-day routine look like?)

C. Experiences in Peace Support Operations
   • Tell me about your experiences in peace support operations?

   (Probes: How did you get deployed on a peace operation: did you choose this or was it assigned to you? Tell me about where you were deployed and the work environment. Did you find peace operations different from other deployments? Did you have an opportunity to interact with the host population?)

D. Challenges and Opportunities
   • Tell me about the opportunities you experienced through the military and PKO deployment? What were the greatest challenges you experienced?

   (Probes: Were your gender/biological female specific needs well met while deployed (sanitary supplies, uniforms, bathrooms)? Do you think you were given equal opportunities (training, promotion)? Do you think your experiences are similar/different than those of other women in the military and did women support other women? How did you maintain work/life balance?)

E. Gendered and Intersectional Experiences
   • How do you think identifying as /or being a woman (or female) affects the experiences you have had in the military?

   (Probes: Regarding your opportunities and challenges? Do you work with many other women? Do you perceive women’s experiences to be different or distinct from men? Do you think women are given equal opportunities? Do you think there is gender awareness in the military? Do you see many stereotypes based on gender and how do those operate?

   • How do other aspects of your identity affect your experiences in the military?

   (Probes: Your age, ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic status, (dis)ability?)
• Do you think these aspects of your identity affect your experiences in peace support operations?

(Probes: Do you think women bring different skills than men in peace support operations?)

• Are there any resources you can access to support any gender specific needs you may have?

(Probes: Does everyone in your unit have mandatory gender or diversity training? GBA+? Do you think this training is effective? Is sexual harassment reporting available to you and is it effective? Do you think quotas/targets to increase women’s representation are helpful?)
Appendix C: Letter of informed consent

Project Title: Canadian Women in Peacekeeping: Opportunities, Constraints, Continuities, and Disruptions

Principal Investigator: Dr Bipasha Baruah (Supervisor)
Department of Women’s Studies and Feminist Research, University of Western Ontario

Primary Researcher: Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic (PhD Candidate)
University of Western Ontario

Letter of Information and Consent

I am Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic, a PhD candidate working under the supervision of Dr Bipasha Baruah in the Department of Women’s Studies and Feminist Research at the University of Western Ontario, Canada. We are currently conducting a study that seeks to identify the opportunities and challenges faced by Canadian women that have been deployed on peace support operations. Canada has recently renewed its commitment to international peacekeeping with a special mission to increase the representation of women. Knowing more about women’s experiences while deployed on peace support operations can help us understand how to better support women in peace support operations.

This study is important because existing scholarship on peacekeeping focuses on operational, ideological and practical challenges. There is a gap in knowledge from peacekeepers themselves, notably women. This study would like to gather in depth experiences of women through interviews to understand women’s first-hand experiences and advocate for policy formulation that addresses women’s challenges. This study has been approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board under Project ID: 115625 and by the DND/CAF Social Science Research Review Board under approval #1899/20F.

The study uses in-depth interviews with women-identified participants who have been deployed on a mission with a peace component through the military. By this letter, you
are being invited to take part in the in-depth interview. If you agree to take part in this study, you are agreeing to be interviewed by the researcher for a maximum time of two hours. With your permission we will audio record the interview, but you may still grant the interview even if you do not wish to be audio recorded. In this case, the researcher will take down notes instead. Interview recordings would be transferred from the recorder into an external drive that is password protected. Personal identifiers such as your voice, name and location are required for audio recordings, arranging interviews and making follow-ups where necessary. The co-investigators will be the only people with access to identifiable information. Personal identifiers will be stored separately from the study data, and both will be linked by a master list, which will only be consulted when necessary. If there is any direct reference to anything you say in an interview, it will be done with a pseudonym to protect your confidentiality and the utmost care will be taken to anonymize all personal information. The information collected will be used for purposes of this study only and all data will be encrypted and stored on a password protected hard drive for a maximum of seven years after which they will be permanently deleted. Representatives of The University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board may require access to my study related records to monitor the conduct of the research.

Participating in this research means that you are 18 years or older, a Canadian citizen, and have voluntarily agreed to take part in the study. The risks associated with this study are assessed as low as it is possible that some participants may experience emotional discomfort if describing events that were difficult to experience while serving in the military. A CAF contact list will be provided, should you wish to access assistance. Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary and you have the right not to answer any questions you don’t want to answer. You also have the right to withdraw from the study at any point and there are no consequences to doing so. You may contact the co-investigator, Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic (phone # or sbiskups@uwo.ca), to request the withdrawal of your data. The information you provide will be treated with the utmost confidentiality unless it is disclosed that you plan to harm yourself or others. A copy of this letter of participation and consent will be made available to you, as well as results of the study. You do not waive any legal right by signing this consent form.
Detailed reports on the research findings will be published in journals and developed into policy briefs for policy makers and larger audiences. Findings may also be shared at relevant Canadian and international conferences that attract an audience of gender, development and security studies scholars and practitioners. You can also contact Dr Bipasha Baruah if you are interested in getting feedback on the study results.

Should you need more information, clarification of issues or verification of information, you can contact the co-investigator (Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic) or her supervisor, Dr Bipasha Baruah using the contact information below. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or the conduct of this study, you may contact The Office of Human Research Ethics (519) 661-3036, 1-844-720-9816, email: ethics@uwo.ca. This office oversees the ethical conduct of research studies and is not part of the study team. Everything that you discuss will be kept confidential.

Thank you for considering participating in this study. Please proceed to the next page if you agree to participate.

Dr Bipasha Baruah
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario

Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario

This letter is yours to keep for future reference.
Appendix D- Verbal consent form

Principal Investigator: Dr Bipasha Baruah (Supervisor)
Department of Women’s Studies and Feminist Research,
University of Western Ontario

Primary Researcher: Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic (PhD Candidate)
University of Western Ontario

Canadian Women in Peacekeeping: Opportunities, Constraints, Continuities, and Disruptions

The Letter of Information has been read to me, I have had the nature of study explained to me, and all questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I agree to participate.

Do you agree that we can audio record your interview: □ Yes □ No

Do you give permission to allow for the use of de-identifiable quotes collected from this interview? If you consent, non-identifiable quotes may be used with a pseudonym □ Yes □ No

My signature means that I have explained the study to the participant named above. I have answered all questions, and the participant has verbally consented to the interview.

Researcher’s Name____________________
Researcher’s Signature______________
Date ____________

Dr Bipasha Baruah
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario

Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario
Appendix E- Written consent form

Principal Investigator: Dr Bipasha Baruah (Supervisor)
Department of Women’s Studies and Feminist Research,
University of Western Ontario

Primary Researcher: Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic (PhD Candidate)
University of Western Ontario

Canadian Women in Peacekeeping: Opportunities, Constraints, Continuities, and Disruptions

I have read the Letter of Information, have had the nature of study explained to me, and all questions have been answered to my satisfaction and I agree to participate.

Do you agree that we can audio record your interview: □ Yes □ No

Do you give permission to allow for the use of de-identifiable quotes collected from this interview? If you consent, non-identifiable quotes may be used with a pseudonym □ Yes □ No

Participant Name _____________________
Participant Signature____________________
Date___________

My signature means that I have explained the study to the participant named above. I have answered all questions, and the participant has verbally consented to the interview.

Researcher’s Name_____________________
Researcher’s Signature_______________
Date __________

Dr Bipasha Baruah
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario

Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic
Women’s Studies and Feminist Research
The University of Western Ontario
Appendix F - Social media poster

STUDY: Canadian Women in Peacekeeping

What is the purpose of this study? To learn more about the experiences, opportunities and challenges of Canadian women who have been deployed on peace support operations through the military.

Who can participate? You must be over 18, identify as a woman, be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident and have been deployed overseas on any operation that had a peace component, such as peacemaking, peace enforcement or peace keeping. Your participation is entirely voluntary and there is no risk or harm for participating in this study. Your identity and information provided in this study will be kept confidential and only used by the researcher for the purpose of the study.

Why should you participate? Your participation will help us learn what opportunities and challenges women face in peace support operations. This knowledge will be useful for policy formulation to optimize women’s participation in peace support operations.

How can you participate? You can participate by phone or via zoom in interviews lasting up to 2 hours. Do not reply directly to this ad. Please contact the co-investigator, Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic via e-mail or phone # or Dr. Bipasha Baruah at or phone #

This study has been approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-Medical Research Ethics Board under Project ID: 115625 and by the DND/CAF Social Science Research Review Board under approval #1899/20F.
Appendix G- Western University NMREB ethics approval

Date: 12 May 2020
To: Dr. Bipasha
Bunath: Project ID:
115625

Study Title: Canadian Women in Peacekeeping: Opportunities, Constrains, Continuities, and Disruptions
Short Title: Canadian Women in Peacekeeping
Application Type: NMREB
Initial Application Review Type: Delegated
Full Board Reporting Date: June 5 2020
Date Approval Issued: 12/May/2020
REB Approval Expiry Date: 12/May/2021

Dear Dr. Bipasha,

The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board (NMREB) has reviewed and approved the WRUM application form for the above mentioned study, as of the date noted above. NMREB approval for this study remains valid until the expiry date noted above, conditional to timely submission and acceptance of NMREB Continuing Ethics Review.

This research study is to be conducted by the investigator noted above. All other required institutional approvals must also be obtained prior to the conduct of the study.

Documents Approved:

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<th>Document Name</th>
<th>Document Type</th>
<th>Document Date</th>
<th>Document Version</th>
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<tr>
<td>E-mail Script</td>
<td>Recruitment Materials</td>
<td>29/Apr/2020</td>
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<td>Interview Guide_ Key Informants</td>
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<td>Interview Guide_Women in Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>Research Poster</td>
<td>Recruitment Materials</td>
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<td>Social Media Poster</td>
<td>Recruitment Materials</td>
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<td>Verbal Consent/Assent</td>
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<td>Written_Letter of Informed Consent</td>
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No deviations from, or changes to the protocol should be initiated without prior written approval from the NMREB, except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazard(s) to study participants or when the change(s) involves only administrative or logistical aspects of the trial.

The Western University NMREB operates in compliance with the Tri-Council Policy Statement Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2), the Ontario Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA, 2004), and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario. Members of the NMREB who are named as Investigators in research studies do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on such studies when they are presented to the REB. The NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00000941.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Kelly Patterson, Research Ethics Officer on behalf of Dr. Randel Graham, NMREB Chair

*Note: This correspondence includes an electronic signature (validation and approval via an online system that is compliant with all regulations).*
Appendix G - SSRRB ethics approval

SSRRB Clearance - Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic

To: Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic

Sat 8/29/2020 1:04 PM

1 - Social Media Poster.docx
136 KB

2 - SSRRB Application_Biskup...
75 KB

3 - Written_Letter of Informe...
76 KB

4 - Interview Moderator Guid...
241 KB

2 attachments (603 KB)

University of Western Ontario

Hello Sandra,

Congratulations, the SSRRB has approved your research submission and "clean" copies of your submission documents are attached for your use.

The SSRRB approval statement for use with communication material, including invitation emails and posters and informed consent statements is:

This research has been approved by the DND/CAF Social Science Research Review Board under approval #1899/20F.

This clearance is valid until 29 August 2021. Should you require an extension or if you need to make other than minor changes to the research methodology, please contact the SSRRB at your earliest convenience.

I wish you all the best with this research project and your studies.

Cheers,
Colin
Curriculum Vitae

Name: Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic

Post-secondary Education and Degrees:

- University of Western Ontario
  London, Ontario, Canada
  2009-2012 B.A.
  The University of Western Ontario
  London, Ontario, Canada
  2016-2017 M.A.
  The University of Western Ontario
  London, Ontario, Canada
  2017-2022 Ph.D.

Honours and Awards:

- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship 2020-2022

Related Work Experience:

- Teaching Assistant The University of Western Ontario 2016-2022

Publications:


Baruah, Bipasha and Biskupski-Mujanovic, Sandra. (2021). Navigating Sticky Floors and Glass Ceilings: Barriers and Opportunities for Women’s Employment in Natural Resources Industries in Canada. Natural Resources Forum 45 (2), 183-205