Questioning the Global Scaling Up of Low-fee Private Schooling: The Nexus between Business, Philanthropy and PPPs

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Prachi Srivastava

1. The LFP Sector: The Second-Wave

In view of generally accepted claims of poor state sector quality in many countries of the Global South, the low-fee private sector has often been posited as 'the poor's best chance' (Tooley, 2000) against broader concerns of the state's fundamental duty to provide basic education to all (Watkins, 2004). The initial emergence of the low-fee private sector and its subsequent evolution into an attractive sector for business backed by domestic and international corporate investment, holds an important and divisive place as we enter the post-2015 era in global education.

As I have discussed elsewhere (Srivastava, 2013), at the beginning of the international Education for All (EFA) movement, the emergence of the low-fee private sector was dismissed in high-level policy circles, and by academics and right to education advocates as an atomised phenomenon, fragmented and insufficient in scope to warrant concerted study. This was in view of more pressing EFA goals to ensure, quite rightly, that all children are able to access free basic education. However, what first seemed like small, disconnected, individual schools 'mushrooming' in specific contexts where there was little or poor quality state provision, has taken root as a phenomenon, purportedly of scale, backed by corporate actors, particularly in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

This has attracted widespread attention as part of a broader trend of privatisation of and in education, and quite unlike dismissals of the past, has reached the highest levels of global education policy-makers, influencers, and advocates. For example, the UNESCO Education for All Global Monitoring Report began including a section on low-fee private schooling since the 2009 report. Global civil society actors such as the Right to Education Project, the Soros Open Society Foundations, and the Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been spurred into developing a human rights framework for private sector engagement in education. The most vehement criticism has come from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education who has referred to the existence of corporate-backed schools and providers in education as being indicative of ‘abusive practices’ (United Nations, 2014) of the private sector, calling on states to sanction them:

89. By definition, business is profit-oriented. Education is all the more attractive since it denotes a certain respectability, which can be projected to disguise business interests, fraudulent practices and corruption [...]  
90. As regulators, States must sanction abusive practices by private education establishments (United Nations, 2014)

Given the earlier dismissive response of the academic and global policy community, the urgency expressed to examine the potential centrality of the sector as inimical to equitable access to education for all in just a decade, is remarkable. In essence, we are
entering a ‘second-wave’ in our understandings and analyses of the low-fee private sector; as is the sector, of its evolution.

I argue that the second wave sees a shift from ‘one-off mom-and-pop teaching shops’ in schooling micro-ecosystems (e.g. individual villages, slum communities, and urban neighbourhoods), to their coexistence with corporate-backed school chains and service providers. These chains operate as part of a micro-system within themselves across geographical boundaries beyond the local (e.g. across districts, cities, regions, and countries). The entry of ‘big’ corporate capital, both domestic and international, and the emergence of an ecosystem of allied service providers for this sector (e.g. education microfinance institutions; rating systems; scripted curriculum delivery systems; education technology providers (low- and high-tech), etc.), many of which are also corporate-backed or run, are markers of institutional evolution (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Thus, though the scale and reach of the low-fee private sector may not be as grand and wide as the operators purport, the second wave is strongly entrenched within increased corporate engagement, business practice, and commercialisation. And this warrants serious attention.

The second wave seems comprised of at least three intertwining and enabling trends, resulting in the emergence of corporate-backed low-fee private school chains and service providers in the Global South. Of these, this chapter will focus on the first two, in the main:

(1) Mobilizing discourse and filtering evidence — in particular, morphing the metaphor of the market to illogical consequence

(2) The opening up of domestic formal education spaces through state-sanctioned public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements, and framing mental models accepting of the discourse of ‘partnership’

(3) Increasingly opaque, intertwined, and complex sets of ‘new/non-traditional’ non-state private actors operating in education in the Global South, with direct or arm’s length corporate connections that operate by blurring the lines between ‘doing business’, profit-making, and ‘doing good’ (Olmedo, 2013)

These arguments are posited against three caveats. Firstly, claims of ‘scale’ purported by the corporate-backed low-fee private sector should not be taken at face value. In fact, when we examine the reach and numbers of some of the most publicised chains, we find the total numbers to be miniscule as a proportion of state provision.

Secondly, the corporate-backed low-fee private sector does not operate equally across all areas of the Global South. As a concerted business venture with desired results on investment, we see the emergence of this second wave primarily in middle-income countries with significant ‘buzz’ around the engine of economic growth. India, with its relatively stable political climate and as one of the top five largest world economies, is a favoured location.

Finally, the act of ‘doing good’ may be broadly termed ‘philanthropic’, but is of a nature quite different from traditional non-profit grant-making philanthropies in the ‘business
of charity’. Many of the non-state actors (e.g. venture philanthropies, social entrepreneurship firms, corporate social responsibility units, etc.) involved with the diffusion of corporate-backed low-fee private school chains and their allied service providers operate with mental models framed by and the modalities of the ‘business of making money’ with an added offshoot of ‘doing good’. This is similar to Ball and Olmedo’s (2011) characterisation of ‘creative capitalism’, or ‘an approach where governments, businesses, and nonprofits work together to stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can make a profit, or gain recognition, doing work that eases the world’s inequities’ (Microsoft, 2008 qtd. in Ball & Olmedo, 2011, p. 84).

2. Morphing the Metaphor of the Market and Filtering Evidence

The emergence of the second wave of the evolution of the low-fee private sector and its research is linked to strong enabling discourse that ‘morphs’ (Cowen, 2009) the metaphor of the market and filters evidence. A number of recent reviews raise queries about the low-fee private sector, and point to inconclusive evidence on relative achievement, inputs, and affordability (see Day et al., 2014; McLaughlin, 2013; Srivastava, 2013). Overlooked work includes that of influential low-fee private sector advocate and investor, James Tooley, and his colleagues’ own scholarly and refereed published research which is technical in tone and, when closely read, reveals important nuances.

On relative achievement, their work in Kenya and India showed that private school students did not universally achieve better results in every subject, taking account of background variables (Dixon et al., 2013; Tooley et al., 2010). On equity concerns, their work in Nigeria and India showed that the most disadvantaged, described as orphans, migrants, and financially unstable families, could not afford the ‘low’ fees charged (Tooley & Dixon, 2005b). Finally, their work revealed education corruption at the highest levels, showing that such schools in India gained recognition through bribery (Tooley & Dixon, 2005a). These findings are similar to results of other studies in contexts including Ghana, India, Nigeria, Malawi, and Pakistan, among others (e.g. Akaguri, 2011; Chudgar & Quin, 2012; Fennell & Malik, 2012; Härmä, 2009; 2011; Ohara, 2013; Rose, 2005; Rose & Adelabu, 2007; Srivastava, 2007; 2008).

Despite much contrary research evidence, including that from his own work, Tooley’s ‘catchy’ journalistic commentary, grey and informal reports, and book on his ‘personal journey’ into the ‘education of the poor’ (Tooley, 2009) have been highly publicised. This work has caught the attention of high-level policy circles and networks of non-state private actors. Nambissan and Ball’s (2010) detailed analysis suggests that this is a result of Tooley and his network’s ‘policy entrepreneurship’ ‘par excellence’ on school choice and the low-fee private sector in deep and far-reaching transnational networks.

Recommendations include establishing public and private voucher schemes, education service companies for school improvement and accreditation, education microcredit/loan companies, and ‘the liberalisation of the regulatory environment regarding private…schools making a surplus’ (Tooley & Dixon, 2003, p. 22), acknowledging that this may, in fact, be illegal. These have inspired many second-wave low-fee private sector players to act. Examples referring to Tooley’s work in particular,
include India’s Centre for Civil Society advocating state-subsidised vouchers to access low-fee private schools; Gray Matters India creating a school performance system for ‘affordable private schools’; co-founder of Omega Schools, Ken Donkoh to start a chain in Ghana (eventually in collaboration with Tooley); IDP Foundation’s Rising Schools Program, a micro-credit initiative for the sector in Ghana.

The decided enthusiasm about the low-fee sector is not based in sentiment alone. It is imbied with the motivation to actively create a global market for the corporate-backed low-fee private sector. This is helped by extending the metaphor of the market and the reach of its ‘Three Musketeers’ — branding, competition, and profit: ‘Assisting the market in the creation of educational brand names...is another possible area for outside action—for philanthropy, investment, and aid if required to satisfy investors of the viability of the market’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 260).

The potential for investors to capitalise on establishing branded chains and services to the sector, with a focus on replication and standardisation, is key. Tooley asserts, ‘school chains with names such as EasyLearn or Virgin Opportunity could be as reliable as, say, Sainsbury’s or Boots’ (Wilby, 2013). Bridge International Academies, purportedly the world’s largest chain of low-fee nursery and primary schools, bills itself as ‘the Starbucks’ of schools in developing countries (Olopade, 2013).

In this idealised market, ‘competition would be a chief spur’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 261). Unbranded or unchained schools ‘could suffer or go out of business’ (Tooley, 2009, p. 261), or others could ‘soon enter the market establishing competing brand names’ (p. 261). There is little consideration for what would happen to children in instances where they are attending schools that close and others do not step in to fill the gap.

The profitability of low-fee private schools even as relatively small, single operations by individuals without the backing of ‘big’ capital, was noted early on: ‘running a school even for low-income families was potentially a profitable undertaking, with estimated profits of about 25% in the year of [school] recognition’ (Tooley & Dixon, 2003, p. 19). The profitability of scaling up the sector did not go unnoticed. In 2012, Pearson, owner of the Financial Times, and the world’s largest educational publisher, launched the Pearson Affordable Learning Fund (PALF), a $15 million fund to invest in the low-fee private sector across Asia and Africa (Tran, 2012). PALF has quite possibly, and with speed, become the most influential player in supporting the scaling up of the corporate-backed low-fee private sector. ‘In January 2015 we [PALF] announced Pearson will invest a further $50 million over the next 3 years’ (PALF, 2015, website). Michael Barber, PALF’s Chief Education Advisor, and reportedly ‘an old friend’ of Tooley’s (Wilby, 2013), stated in an interview on BBC HardTalk: ‘It’s absolutely for profit. But get this right—it’s important to demonstrate profit because we want other investors to come in (Barber qtd. in. Riep, 2014, p. 264). As Riep (2014) notes, in the early attempts to create a market in this sector, demonstrating profitability is key to attracting investment.

For those with interests in the corporate-backed low-fee sector and for advocates of increased private provision, the impetus to draw big capital into the fold is a welcome development. Acknowledged state sector dysfunctions in many countries are proposed as the impetus to expand the low-fee private sector, rather than actively injecting capital
to improve the state sector. For example, Michael Barber asserts: ‘The question every education leader needs to answer is: ‘How do we get every child in this district, city, state, province or country a good education as soon as possible?’ Low-cost private education is an important part of the answer, in almost every country in the developing world’ (PALF, website, 2015).

However, the current discourse framing the development of the low-fee private sector morphs the metaphor of the market to such degree that there is little consideration of whether the claim to a fundamental right and the provision of a social good to the economically and socially disadvantaged are really comparable to middle-class supermarkets, pharmacies, and coffee shops. Even Milton Friedman, the revered champion of the marketization of education, concede the role of the state in ensuring basic education for all. He noted two peculiarities of education as a good, which add to the complications of treating markets in education as pure competitive markets.

The first was related to what he termed, ‘neighbourhood effects’. These are ‘circumstances under which the action of one individual imposes significant costs on other individuals for which it is not feasible to make him[her] compensate them, or yields significant gains to other individuals for which it is not feasible to make them compensate him[her]’ (Friedman, 1962, pp. 85-86). In other words, education has social consequences beyond the individual. The effect, for example, of choices made by one group of parents at a specific point in time that lead to school closures can have resounding effects for other children in the present, and for future children. This can lead to deleterious effects on society.

The second was termed as the ‘paternalistic concern for children and other irresponsible individuals’ (Friedman, 1962, p. 86). There is the need for the state to be involved in education (particularly in developing countries) where schooling may not be universal, making it compulsory to some minimal level, and enforcing that compulsion to uphold children’s right to education. In addition, there may be equity concerns regarding mechanisms that disproportionately benefit relatively advantaged groups.

Nonetheless, the corporate-backed expansion of the second-wave of the low-fee private sector, sometimes with the financial support of bilateral agencies and multilateral development banks exists (e.g. Bridge International Academies). This is despite inconclusive evidence and amidst calls against profiteering and, in certain cases, is in contravention of legal frameworks. Bridge International Academies, which receives funding from the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the CDC (the UK’s development finance institution), openly admits it: ‘Technically, we’re breaking the law’, as stated by Chief Strategy Officer Shannon May in an interview with the Times Education Supplement (Exley, 2013).

The primary strategy for keeping costs ‘low’ across the sector is the common practice of hiring teachers at below the minimum wage, or in most cases, certainly below the teacher’s state salary scale (e.g. India, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, etc.). This is against labour laws. There are laws against the commercialisation of schools and running schools for a profit (e.g. India). There are additional concerns that such operators may
receive undue taxation benefit and in the acquisition of land at much below market rates in certain contexts (e.g. Pakistan; India). Despite this, the scaling up of the corporate-backed sector is enabled by the tacit and willing involvement of government and international agencies through the mental models and modalities of partnership.

3. **Scaling Up: Tacit ‘Partnerships’ and PPP Modalities**

The involvement of certain non-state private actors, corporate actors, in particular, may be more immediately explained by a commercial motive. However, scaling up the corporate-backed low-fee private sector is many times tacitly, but also explicitly, enabled by national governments and supported by bilateral and multilateral agencies, most recently, under the modalities of PPPs and the discourse of ‘partnership’.

The argument here resists the idea that the second wave of the low-fee private sector naturally evolved as the result of default due to state sector dysfunction. While areas of consensus between sympathisers and critics of the low-fee sector are few, as the first wave of low-fee private sector studies emerged, both groups seemed to initially agree that spontaneous, ‘de-facto privatization’ of education emerged because of state failure (Tooley & Dixon, 2006); a response that ‘grew by default rather than design’ (Rose, 2003, p. 80). I contend that there has been inadequate provision of state schooling in many contexts but, privatisation (or slices of privatisation), which may once have been a default strategy, is becoming the strategy of design. This is specifically the case with PPP modalities, which in particular, have enabled the evolution of the second wave of the low-fee private sector, keeping the centrality of partnership discourse in mind.

Partnership constitutes the education buzzword *du jour*. Cornwall (2007) explains: ‘buzzwords gain their purchase and power through their vague and euphemistic qualities, their capacity to embrace a multitude of possible meanings, and their normative resonance’ (p. 472). Their ability to signify what is *en vogue* is ensconced within a logic of taken-for-grantedness and can ‘cloud meanings...through a language of evasion’ (Cornwall, 2010, p. 3). Currently, ‘partnership’ is as ‘ubiquitous as *community*, evoking much the same warm mutuality’ (Cornwall, 2007, p. 475). But, it is precisely its ubiquity that renders ‘partnership’ ‘a floating empty signifier' (Burgos, 2004).

In an attempt to more radically define the term, Pickard (2007) suggests that: ‘*partnership* denotes a special relationship between equal participants, or yes, partners, who enjoy a distinctive bond of trust, a shared analysis of existing conditions in society, and thus in general a common orientation of what needs to be done *to construct a more just, equitable, and democratic world*’ (p. 575, emphasis added). However, the social justice ideal mentioned above is conspicuously missing from most discussions in favour of the vagaries of partnership as ‘a universal – almost a neutral – value upon which all specific agents and governments in general, would agree’ (Burgos, 2004, p. 58).

I argue that the seemingly convivial mutuality of the term ‘partnership’ obscures the fundamentally altered mode of governance under PPP modalities, particularly with the introduction of new/non-traditional (and for-profit) non-state private actors in education. While the partnership discourse normatively neutralises the involvement of profit-motivated actors in particular, state-sanctioned PPP modalities may insert them...
in complex, opaque, and intertwined arrangements, in which the motivations of individual actors may not resonate. Despite this, the notion of mutuality persists. This notion of mutuality enables PPP modalities to be legitimised in spite of lessons from countries with longer histories of PPP-friendly institutional frameworks that large-scale PPP arrangements are riskier for the public sector as there are fewer actors to bear the risk, but also that they operate with vested interests against those of the public’s, can lead to more complicated regulatory frameworks not less, and that they have the potential of becoming ‘abusive’ if the stronger partner dominates (Coulson 2005; van Marrewijk et al., 2008).

India, Pakistan, and Uganda are examples of countries that have instituted PPP arrangements relatively recently for non-state actors (including, in some cases, private entrepreneurs or ‘edupreneurs’, corporates, and international organisations) to take over the management, operation, and establishment of schools. Words such as ‘nurture’, ‘encourage’, and ‘facilitate’ are repeatedly used in government documents to outline desired action regarding PPPs and the involvement of non-state actors. These arrangements and the accompanying discourse fuel evolution of the second wave of the low-fee private sector by design, not default.

In 2007, Uganda’s Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) adopted a PPP policy to universalise secondary education. In the MOES vision, PPPs are positioned as vehicles through which quality education can be achieved (MOES, no date, section ‘The Department’s Mission and Vision’). A PPP programme has been launched with the aim of: ‘Identifying private schools to partner with government in implementing USE [universal secondary education]’ (MOES, no date, section ‘Programmes’). This has enabled external non-state actors to set up schools in Uganda and apply for state funding.

In Pakistan, the Sindh Education Foundation launched the ‘Promoting Private Schooling in Rural Sindh Project’ in 2008, designed in collaboration with the World Bank. The scheme aims to support 1000 new private schools in underserved areas in 10 districts (Sindh Education Foundation, no date, p. 7). ‘Entrepreneurs’ are invited to establish lower-fee private schools in rural areas but are barred from charging tuition fees to students. Schools are meant to receive a subsidy of Rs. 350/month/boy and Rs. 450/month/girl enrolled. This model is predated by the Punjab Education Foundation’s Foundation Assisted School programme which runs along similar lines (Punjab Education Foundation, 2014).1 Recently, the All Private School Management Association appealed to the government to view low-fee schools in Sindh outside the scheme as necessary partners in expanding education access. It asked for government grants to fund these private schools to ‘salvage their crumbling’ finances (The International News, 2014), as they were unsustainable without them.

My analysis of India’s Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Five Year Development Plans showed that the broader macro-planning process successively facilitated PPPs in education, and decreased the role for the state in education financing, management, and

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1 The Sindh Education Foundation and the Punjab Education Foundation were established by the government as semi-autonomous and autonomous institutions, respectively.
regulation (Srivastava 2010; Srivastava et al., 2013). Verger and Vanderkaaij (2012) provide a compelling analysis in the Indian context of the use of PPPs as political instruments of ‘reform’. This is despite the limited role officially accorded to the private sector in the Government of India’s Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Education for All) programme, which focused on expanding state provision since 2000. Under an unspecified ‘PPP mode’, the PPP discourse has been sufficiently broadened to allow a range of actors with different motives to enter the schooling space. This has included opening up the sector to private companies under their philanthropic arms to start/run low-fee private schools, including a host of international non-state actors.

Positioning low-fee private schools as PPP initiatives is a notable shift in policy discourse and practice, which should not go amiss. In the countries cited above, traditional models that could be likened to public-private arrangements before the term was en vogue did not include the possibility of corporations or individual ‘entrepreneurs’ running schools, or schools running for a profit. Instead, these were usually community-run, or run by a charity, religious order, or trust (e.g. private-aided schools, madrasas, missionary schools, etc.) under very different regulatory environments and compulsions.

In the first wave of research on the low-fee private sector, the language of PPPs was neither used to describe low-fee private schools, nor were such schools thus conceptualised. Conversely, until very recently, none of the research on low-fee private schools (including Tooley’s) positioned them as PPPs. It focused instead on their for-profit or unregulated/unrecognised nature which fell outside the regulatory framework of most countries. In essence, the ‘PPP creep’ in the low-fee private sector normalises and encourages the expansion of a sector that, until recently, was seen as usurping state regulation, and in certain contexts, still does.

4. Scaling Up (?)

As is apparent from the discussion thus far, evidence of initiatives on the second wave of the sector is nascent. Available information is fragmented and opaque, and concentrated in a small range of countries in the Global South, and on a relatively small number of actors. This makes it difficult to map the evolution of the sector, its size, and to draw broad conclusions. Nonetheless, a few notable examples are presented here. For the purposes of this discussion, and given its influence, we focus on PALF, specifically on its portfolio of education chains (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Stated Scale</th>
<th>Published Fees</th>
<th>Estimated Fees as Proportion of Min Wage/ Unskilled Wage*</th>
<th>Organisational Links*</th>
<th>Type of Linked Actor*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APEC Schools</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>13 schools</td>
<td>Grade 7: P 24,850/yr</td>
<td>Grade 7 &amp; 8: 15%</td>
<td>Ayala Corporation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Grade 8: P 25,350/yr</td>
<td>Grades 9-12: N/A but likely higher</td>
<td>PALF</td>
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<td>(holding company)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Avanti Learning</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>12 centres</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Echoing Green</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centres</td>
<td>private tuition</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 stand-alone</td>
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<td>Draper Richards</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>centres; 7 in-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Foundation</td>
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<td>Pan IIT Alumni</td>
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<td>UnLtd India</td>
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<td>-Social enterprise/impact investment</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- Not-for-profit
- Personal investors
According to Pearson’s earlier website, it ‘makes minority equity investments in for profit companies to meet a growing demand for affordable education services’ (Pearson PLC, 2012, para 1). As mentioned above, as of January 2015, Pearson announced a further $50 million investment in addition to its initial $12 million over the next three years. According to PALF, ‘This is a testament to Pearson’s commitment to educate children in the developing world and brings our total assets under management to $80 m[illion].’

PALF has a portfolio of 10 investments in what it calls ‘affordable education services’, more specifically, in chains and ancillary service providers. Of these, six are school chains from pre-school to secondary, and one is a chain of private tuition centres focusing on secondary school exam preparation. The remaining three are investments in education technology and learning materials.2 Geographically, four of the investments

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2 These are Zaya (India) ‘“LabKit” solution [which] includes ClassCloud, an adaptive learning platform that can store and deliver digital content in both online and offline environments’ and ‘End-to-end solution that includes tablets pre-loaded with curriculum content, a classroom projector, a Wifi router, content storage, teacher training, and a classroom management tool’; Experifun (India) providing science experiments and
are in India, and the rest are spread out in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, and Tanzania. Crucially, what constitutes ‘affordable learning’ for PALF is neither precisely defined, nor consistently applied, as a cursory look at the fees charged by its chain operators reveals.

Of these, Omega Schools and Bridge Academies International are best known. In 2008, while a student, Ken Donkoh, a native of Ghana, and previously an employee of the World Bank and IFC approached Tooley with a business plan (Riep, 2014). As relayed by Donkoh and Tooley to me in personal communications, Omega started with the investment of personal capital, until PALF took a stake in Omega Schools in 2013. This allowed the chain to expand to 38 schools and reportedly to 20,000 students. In 2013, Tooley predicted 100 schools with 50,000 students by 2014 (Wilby, 2013). This does not seemed to have materialised at the time of writing, and may point to the potential limits of scalability.

As of June 2012, Pearson is reported to have invested in Bridge. Its ‘Academy-in-a-Box’ approach is marketed as having ‘re-engineered the entire lifecycle of basic education, leveraging data, technology, and scale’ to keep quality up and prices low (Bridge International Academies, 2013a). From its first academy in 2009 in Kenya, Bridge had 359 schools in 2014, and plans to expand to Uganda and Nigeria in 2015. According to the Omidyar Network, one of its investors, Bridge plans to operate in at least 12 countries across Sub-Saharan African and India, and have more than 10 million students by 2023 (Omidyar Network, no date).

Though it is premature to make definitive claims based on available information, we can, nonetheless make a number of initial observations. Firstly, it is clear that chain operators are linked to a number of various kinds of actors, included an expanded array of new/non-traditional non-state private actors, sometimes alongside government, not-for-profit, and aid agencies in complex arrangements. The relationship between the actors is opaque, their roles, and their influence on the chain operator is unclear. In many instances they are sets of investors, but not always (e.g. SPARK schools). While Bridge, the largest operator, also has the largest and most diversified sources of funding, this is not true of Omega, the second largest. Much more concerted analysis is required to make sense of the links, and to ascertain whether or to what degree each operator would be part of a network.

Secondly, claims of scale are over-zealous. It is unclear if this is a marketing ploy by chain operators to inspire confidence in attracting PALF and other investors; mobilizing discourse by PALF to gain global legitimacy; or plain naiveté and misplaced optimism. Simple observation reveals that with the exception of Bridge, the actual number of schools/centres for each operator is quite small. They constitute a miniscule proportion of total provision in these countries, as well as a miniscule proportion of public provision. Simple calculations would reveal these to be much below 1%.³ Even in Bridge’s case, coverage would constitute approximately 1.8% as a proportion of public learning materials; and Ubongo (Tanzania) ‘a social enterprise that creates interactive edutainment for learners in Africa’ geared to teaching math through ‘edutoons’ on television.

³ Estimates for Sudiksha and Avanti are difficult to provide as public data on the number of registered private tuition centres and pre-primary centres are unavailable.
provision in Kenya with 19,397 public primary schools, and less if this included the total number of primary schools.4

Thirdly, published fee rates were difficult to obtain publicly. Only APEC, Bridge, Omega, and Spark published their fees. In the case of APEC, only rates for the first two years (Grade 7 and 8) were available, even though the schools run until Grade 12. Based on APEC’s increasing fee structure between Grade 7 and 8 it would be reasonable to assume that this continues until the end of the cycle. Finally, other than in Omega’s case, it was unclear if the fees charged represented the total out-of-pocket costs households would need to pay. SPARK provided a breakdown of tuition, stationery, and registration fees, but though the uniform and meal plan were mentioned, costs were not available.

Finally, all operators frequently used terms such as ‘affordability’, ‘disadvantaged’, and ‘bottom of the pyramid’ on their promotional websites. The analysis here shows that this can be severely questioned by: (a) the paucity of information and lack of transparency on the fee structure and fee amounts; (b) any specific operationalisation of what is meant by ‘affordable’; and (c) estimates showing published fees as a proportion of local daily/minimum wage rates.

There is no universally agreed figure on what constitutes ‘affordable’ expenditure on education. Estimates here are provided as a general rule of thumb, and a more detailed cost analysis and comparisons with costs of accessing public providers would need to be conducted.5 However, as the bulk of literature on household education expenditure confirms, families in the bottom quintile are highly sensitive to income and other insecurities (i.e., health, food price shocks, seasonal migration, etc.), and are unlikely to be able to access fee-paying providers for any sustained period. It would be hard to argue that Omega Schools and SPARK, in particular, whose costs amount to 41% and 62% as a proportion of local daily/minimum wage rates per child would be affordable to this group, even if estimates included more two full-time adult workers.

This raises serious questions about how and on what basis PALF judges affordability and invests in school chains; and further, how chain operators raise money in the name of reaching disadvantaged children in the Global South. This analysis assumes urgency where public monies in such initiatives are directly invested by bilateral agencies, or where domestic governments subsidise such providers in PPP arrangements either through their own funds or through direct budgetary support offered via official development assistance. We must seriously question whether the expanded array of new/non-traditional non-state private actors in complex arrangements with non-profit, government, and international donors facilitated by PPP arrangements can lend itself to the potential capture of those spaces by actors engaged in creative capitalism who are in the ‘business of making money’, without necessarily doing the ‘good’ they purport.

References


4 Based on official data available from Kenya Primary Schools Data 2007, Kenya Open Data Initiative.

5 This may not be possible in the case of private tuition centres.


