Canadian Action for Zero Nuclear Weapons

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Canadian Action for Zero Nuclear Weapons

Briefing paper for conference
“Practical Steps to Zero Nuclear Weapons”

Sponsored by the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, the Canadian Pugwash Group, Physicians for Global Survival, Project Ploughshares, and World Federalist Movement - Canada.

Ottawa, January 25-26, 2010
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“Twenty years after the end of the Cold War there are at least 23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined blast capacity equivalent to 150,000 Hiroshima bombs. The US and Russia together have over 22,000, and France, the UK, China, India, Pakistan and Israel around 1,000 between them. Nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the US and Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on dangerously high alert, ready to be launched immediately – within a decision window of just 4-8 minutes for each president – in the event of perceived attack. The command and control systems of the Cold War years were repeatedly strained by mistakes and false alarms. With more nuclear-armed states now, and more system vulnerabilities, the near miracle of no nuclear exchange cannot continue in perpetuity.”

– Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009

A. The Obama Moment

1. A new moment in the long struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons has opened up for the international community. With both US and Russian leadership seriously committed to nuclear disarmament negotiations, a new opportunity exists to make substantive reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, halt proliferation and set the world on an irreversible path to zero nuclear weapons. President Barack Obama’s initiative in convening an unprecedented summit meeting of the United Nations Security Council devoted to the nuclear weapons issue has given new hope to the world. The obstacles still to be overcome in reducing nuclear dangers must not be underestimated. Nonetheless, the climate is bright in which to solidify progress at the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

2. In his seminal April 5, 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama said: “The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. …Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has
gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound[s]. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold…. [A]s the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we can.’

3. Calls for achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world have continued to pour in from other quarters as well. In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon put his nuclear disarmament proposals in a broad context: “There can be no development without peace and no peace without development. Disarmament can provide the means for both. ‘We the peoples’ have the legitimate right to challenge the leaders of the international community by asking these questions: What are you doing to eliminate nuclear weapons? How will you fund your fight against poverty? How will we finance mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and the protection of our environment? These are global goods that every government and every individual in the world should strive to achieve together in the spirit of renewed multilateralism…. Disarmament can help lead the way to a renewed multilateralism and that is why I have made it a number one priority.”

4. The historic UN Security Council Summit held September 24, 2009 added momentum to the drive for a nuclear weapons-free world. In their statements, heads of state embraced the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan said, “The vision of a world without nuclear weapons proposed by President Obama this April has encouraged and inspired people around the world. It is high time for us to take action.” Resolution 1887 adopted by the Summit reflects the agenda laid out by President Obama and some key NPT commitments. While the resolution contains no innovations on disarmament, it references the NPT’s disarmament obligation and the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conference outcomes; endorses U.S.-Russian negotiations on nuclear arms reductions; calls for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
into force and commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT); and comprehensively sets forth safety and non-proliferation measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear weapons catastrophe.

5. During preparations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and in framing the wider agenda to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world, states can draw on a well developed set of commitments and proposals, reinforced and elaborated in 2009. They include the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for disarmament; draft recommendations of the 2009 NPT PrepCom; UN General Assembly resolutions – Renewed Determination, New Agenda, Nuclear Disarmament (Non-Aligned Movement), and others; UN Security Council Resolution 1887; the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for disarmament, highlighting the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention and a Security Council summit on nuclear disarmament; reports of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; and proposals of civil society groups, campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero and the Middle Powers Initiative and its Article VI Forum launched in the wake of the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference. Through the Article VI Forum, MPI identified seven priorities for the NPT review process: verified reduction of nuclear forces, standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting), negotiation of a FMCT, bringing the CTBT into force, strengthened negative security assurances, regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply, and improved NPT governance. Those measures warrant priority, and they are integrated into the analysis and recommendations of this Briefing Paper.

B. Canada’s Responsibilities

6. Canada has an important history of active support for nuclear disarmament, even though there have always been strong elements of ambivalence in Canadian disarmament policy. In recent years, certainly at the highest levels of government, ambivalence seems to have turned to indifference. The government has certainly not rejected Canadian policy in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons, but neither has it championed it at this new moment of opportunity. The government has committed up to $1-billion over 10 years to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which conducts such work as securing nuclear materials, redirecting weapons scientists to employment in
civilian fields, and ensuring the non-proliferation of biological agents. While a necessary work to thwart terrorism, this is principally a non-proliferation initiative, not nuclear disarmament.

7. Canada has also previously advanced proposals for starting negotiations for an FMCT and for shoring up the disarmament institutional infrastructure. Canada’s effort to strengthen the NPT’s institutional and accountability mechanisms are an important contribution. To this work, Canada must now add strong support for President Obama’s initiatives to make substantive progress on nuclear disarmament. To make headway will require Canadian leadership that has the courage of its formal policy declarations, supplemented by a coherent strategy and a diplomatic offensive to gather a credible supporting coalition of likeminded States. Canada’s chairmanship of the G8 and G20 meetings in 2010 affords a valuable opportunity for advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda just as Canada should be doing in NATO meetings.

8. The first priority now needs to be a clear decision to reassert Canadian disarmament diplomacy. It is urgent that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister find early and prominent opportunities to publicly address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

C. Ending NATO Incoherence

9. The time has come for Canada to work diligently to end the incoherence between NATO’s nuclear weapons policies and the NPT commitments of all NATO countries. In 1999, Canada did make such an effort, but it came to naught because of the intransigencies of the NATO nuclear powers (the US, the UK, and France). But, with the Obama initiatives, the climate today is entirely different.

10. NATO’s longtime insistence that its retention of nuclear weapons is “essential to preserve peace” is clearly out of step with the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. It is also out of step with Article VI of the NPT, the nuclear disarmament imperative as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech, UN Security Council Resolution 1887, and public declarations by a broad range of governments and individuals prominent in international security affairs. The 2009 NATO Summit advanced a timely opportunity to once again rethink and restate the Alliance’s strategic
doctrine. To aid this rethinking process, **Canada should encourage a new NATO Strategic Concept that a) welcomes and affirms the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirms NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declares that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commits NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.**

**11.** Both the rationale and the language for such a new NATO approach to nuclear weapons are readily available in the burgeoning anthology of nuclear abolition statements, as well as in the logic with which the NPT was originally constructed – namely, that nuclear weapons, far from being “essential to preserve peace,” are ultimately an unacceptable risk to humanity. The new NATO Strategic Concept should thus clearly state that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to global security. Rather than asserting that the “strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance” are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” NATO’s new Strategic Concept must reflect the new reality most recently articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s warning that “with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.” Indeed, a new NATO statement could borrow from the 2008 statement of leading US statesmen and thus also acknowledge that “without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral” toward greater insecurity.

**12.** The current Strategic Concept says that the fundamental purpose of NATO nuclear forces is “political” – without offering any clarity on how weapons can be political without also being military, and thus militarily threatening, and without recognizing that issuing nuclear threats acts as an incentive to those threatened to acquire similar nuclear threats. On this point, Canada in 1999 offered more constructive alternative language. The government’s response to a parliamentary committee report on nuclear disarmament agreed with the Committee recommendation, and thus the government of the day promised that Canada would – and now Canada should again – insist that NATO “work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.” This language found its way into Step 9[v] of the “practical disarmament steps” adopted in 2000 at the NPT Review Conference in which nuclear weapon states agreed to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the
risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.”

13. The current Strategic Concept is also at odds with the principles and intent of Articles I and II of the NPT when it emphasizes the importance of retaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for deterrence and especially to link Europe and North America. There are currently an estimated 150 to 240 nuclear weapons, all US B61 gravity bombs, held in five countries in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. All of the European countries hosting these US nuclear weapons are non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

14. The future of those tactical deployments is now under active discussion, particularly in light of the German government’s explicit call for the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory. Support is growing in Europe for the German position. The Canadian Government should support these new initiatives within Europe and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

15. Some NATO states that may support this in principle may nevertheless argue against change at this time on the grounds that the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe should be coordinated with significant reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal. And it is true that not only Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but relations with Russia on a much broader level, will be central to achieving sustainable changes within NATO. Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia has never stopped thinking of NATO as an anti-Russian institution, and the events surrounding the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 only reinforced that perception. NATO’s expansion to the east in the post-Cold War era has created further disquiet in Russia – not to mention that it has also represented the steady geographic expansion of the West’s nuclear umbrella, in clear violation of the commitment to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.”

16. It is now necessary to take up the Kissinger call for a dialogue “within NATO and with Russia, now begun by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination.” Progress toward that end will obviously
require a new kind of strategic relationship with Russia and active
eengagement with it in pursuit of reductions to its non-strategic nuclear
weapons arsenal. The huge imbalance in conventional forces between Russia
and NATO will certainly be a challenge. Russia accounts for less than 6 per
cent of world military spending, while NATO states collectively account for
more than 60 per cent. As long as Russia regards this overwhelming
conventional force as, if not necessarily an overt enemy, then a challenge to
its regional interests, it is unlikely to be amenable to significant further
reductions to its substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. This does
not mean that the denuclearization of Europe should be contingent on
Russian tactical nuclear disarmament. In fact, the removal of US nuclear
weapons from Europe would have the effect of depriving Russia of any
argument that it needs to maintain a non-strategic nuclear armoury.

17. Other concrete steps Canada can take to support the development of
a new strategic relationship with Russia are such initiatives as
upgrading the NATO-Russia Council; calling for a freeze on NATO
enlargement efforts; promoting continuing strategic dialogue between
the US and Russia in support of a new nuclear disarmament treaty; and
follow-on measures that engage other states, including China, with
nuclear weapons.

18. In short, Canada should work to forge a consensus within NATO:
that the policies of nuclear weapon states, and of NATO, should reflect
the global norm, which has existed since 1945, against the use of nuclear
weapons. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons through a global
treaty, NATO’s revised Strategic Concept should pave the way for the only
lawful and civilized stance: the total elimination of nuclear weapons. (See
Annex I: “NATO’s Strategic Concept, the NPT, and Global Zero.”)

D. From Bilateral to Multilateral Negotiations

19. Whether the United States will alter its overall strategic posture to
facilitate deeper bilateral reductions, opening the way to multilateral
reductions, remains to be seen. The Obama administration cancelled plans
for deployment of ICBM interceptor systems in Europe, but research and
development continue, and the medium-range systems to be deployed
instead may one day be given a long-range capability. One adverse sign was
the US Senate’s unanimous adoption of a provision on military spending in
2010 that bars expenditures to implement reductions pursuant to a treaty
with Russia unless the President certifies that it does not limit US “ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons.”

20. However, a hopeful sign is US and Russian support for the “Renewed Determination” resolution at the UN, which highlights the role of the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency in the process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals. It is significant that the US and Russia have committed to those principles, which are rooted in the 2000 NPT commitments. Both countries presently seek an agreement on a START replacement treaty that would limit each side to no more than 1,675 deployed strategic warheads and between 500 and 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles. Unfortunately, this would still not fundamentally alter the nuclear balance of terror between the United States and Russia.

21. The Obama administration hopes to negotiate a much more ambitious agreement that would further reduce strategic warheads, reduce non-strategic warheads, and provide, for the first time, for verification of the dismantlement of withdrawn warheads. The result would be verified limits on the entire nuclear arsenals, not just deployed strategic warheads, of both sides. When such a further agreement is reached and US and Russian arsenals are sufficiently reduced – a matter on which other states with nuclear weapons should be consulted – the stage would be set for multilateral negotiations on reductions. Canada should compliment the United States and Russia for negotiating a START replacement treaty and insist on commitments at the NPT Review Conference to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination.

E. The Trap of ‘Eventual’

22. With regard to the geopolitical underpinnings of nuclear postures in the new era the world has entered, it is particularly important that US allies convey the idea that “extended deterrence” cannot masquerade as justification for the continuing, expansive role of nuclear weapons. Alliances do not have to depend on nuclear weapons to deter aggression; non-nuclear military power is quite robust. Nor should diplomacy, “soft power,” and conflict prevention be neglected.
The argument now being advanced in the US by opponents of nuclear disarmament – that the US must maintain nuclear weapons to protect the “credibility” of its nuclear umbrella so that allied nations do not have to obtain their own nuclear weapons – is particularly insidious and will undermine Obama’s efforts to work for a nuclear weapons-free world. Similarly, the argument that the US Senate must not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty absent a guarantee that US laboratories can ensure the modernization of nuclear weapons through lab work will nullify many gains of ratifying a CTBT. Those who claim that nuclear weapons are still necessary do not usually oppose “eventual” nuclear disarmament, but they are so insistent on the modernization of nuclear weapons for “security” purposes today that they drive forward the nuclear arms race.

The world now risks falling into a security trap in which the elimination of nuclear weapons must always remain an “eventual” goal, meaning that the goal is so far over the horizon as to be meaningless. In retaining “eventual,” nuclear defenders will so solidify the justification for nuclear weapons that proliferation is bound to occur; and the more proliferation in the years and decades ahead the harder it will be to even claim that nuclear disarmament has legitimacy. The nuclear weapons cycle, 65 years old, must be broken now before a new and exceedingly dangerous spurt of nuclear proliferation takes place. It would be foolhardy to assume that President Obama’s successor will bring to the White House the same determination to steer the world to the elimination of nuclear weapons. All states now part of nuclear alliances, including Canada, should take advantage of this moment to reduce and phase out the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. The voice of Canada must be heard in these new, highly charged deliberations.

F. Preparing Now for a Nuclear Weapons Convention

The momentum in the quest for a nuclear weapons-free world has now brought the Nuclear Weapons Convention into the spotlight. Though it cannot be completed overnight, the drive to achieve it must be intensified now. The efforts of the past three decades have shown conclusively that nuclear disarmament can only be achieved comprehensively. That is what a Nuclear Weapons Convention does. It would prohibit development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons anywhere. States possessing nuclear weapons would be required to destroy
their arsenals according to a series of phases. A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which has been circulating as a UN document for several years, contains detailed provisions for national implementation and verification; establishes an international agency responsible for enforcement and dispute settlement; and proposes that there be procedures for reporting and addressing violations. Governments are, of course, the principal actors, but civil society would play an important role. The experience of many international and intergovernmental bodies would be useful. Moreover, the scientific, medical, legal, policy, and other expertise of NGOs would make them key partners in the process.

26. Every year since 1997, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution calling upon all states immediately to fulfill the disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In 2009, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 124 to 31, with 21 abstentions (Canada). Ban Ki-moon has also repeatedly lent his authority to this approach, beginning with his October 24, 2008 address, in which he stated that the model convention is a “good starting point” for negotiations to fulfill Article VI through a convention or framework of instruments.

27. At the 2009 UN Security Council Summit, several heads of states expressed support for a convention. While noting that, for the time being, the NPT “remains the core” of the regime, President Heinz Fischer stated, “Austria supports the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention equipped with a sophisticated verification mechanism.” Hu Jintao, President of China, stated, “The international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.” India has also raised its voice, most recently on September 29, 2009, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated India’s proposal for negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

28. International polls show that people around the world overwhelmingly support the proposition that all countries should sign a treaty that prohibits all nuclear weapons. This civil society position was further reflected by the NGO declaration, “Disarming for Peace and Development,” adopted at a 2009 international conference in Mexico: “Promptly commence negotiations on a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons globally within an agreed, time-bound framework.” This general support is crystallizing into specific actions. The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament presented a Parliamentary Declaration Supporting a Nuclear Weapons Convention, sparked by a cross-party group of European parliamentarians, to the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in 2009. Mayors for Peace, which lists 3,488 mayors in 134 countries, is campaigning for the implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention by 2020. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, has launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons through a convention. In Canada, nearly 500 members of the Order of Canada, the country’s highest civilian award, have taken an unprecedented action in endorsing a call for government action on a convention.

29. The sponsors of the Ottawa conference emphatically disagree with the Canadian government’s present position that it is “premature” to start work on a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’s 2009 report stated, “It is not too early to start now on further refining and developing the concepts in the model NWC…. The key to a nuclear weapons-free world is to start the preparations now, while political conditions are right, to identify the requisite legal, political, and technical elements while simultaneously undertaking parallel steps on limited measures – such as taking nuclear weapons off alert status, entry-into-force of the CTBT, negotiation of an FMCT, and such other measures as verified reductions on current nuclear stockpiles. Active movement toward a convention will act as a road map to guide and accelerate the current disarmament process. Without the start of such active work, nuclear weapons states will continue to cling to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which has led to an unsustainable two-class world of nuclear have and have-nots.

30. Further, the entry-into-force of the CTBT and the completion of an FMCT will remain in doubt if the emerging nuclear possessor states, such as India, Pakistan, North Korea, and possibly Iran perceive those measures as aimed only at limiting the major states' capabilities while preserving their predominance, rather than as part of a process of the elimination of nuclear weapons. There must be a visible intent to link the steps to the stated goal of elimination. Nuclear disarmament “steps” have been on the international agenda for decades. It is time now to work in a comprehensive manner for a nuclear weapons-free world, as US President Obama is trying to do.
31. Canada should press for the NPT Review Conference to adopt a commitment to commencement of deliberations and negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework of instruments for sustainable, verifiable, and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons. It should institute formal international consultations involving a core group of likeminded states and representatives of civil society to thoroughly explore the focus, scope, verification, and other elements relevant to a Nuclear Weapons Convention. An international contact group would be an important step forward. It should be remembered that when Canada convened an international meeting to explore the possibility of a landmines treaty, the end result was a landmines treaty.

G. Civil Society Involvement

32. The active involvement of civil society with the Canadian government in jointly examining ways to make progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda has had productive results, as the landmines issue showed. The research and public engagement work of disarmament NGOs and think tanks was formerly recognized as an important element of developing the political will to act on the particulars of the disarmament agenda. In fact, in 2003, Canada submitted a working paper to the NPT to encourage a more prominent role for civil society, and diplomats actively pursued support for the initiative. The present government has not only given up on advocacy on the matter, but has ended the longstanding practice of including civil society representatives on its delegations to the NPT Review Conferences. The government should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to NGOs by naming representatives of civil society to the Canadian delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

H. Building on Momentum

33. The sponsors of the Ottawa conference endorse the 20-point statement, “A New International Consensus on Action for Nuclear Disarmament,” proposed by the International Commission for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament for states to consider at the NPT Review Conference (Annex II of this document). These measures are at least a basis to consolidate the gains made at the 2000 Review Conference, and Canada
should work to augment them in the ways this Briefing paper has pointed out to fully respond to new opportunities.

34. Since the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference, momentum has been building for revitalizing the non-proliferation regime and setting the course for achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is now time to act decisively to turn the momentum into accomplishment. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Canada should demonstrate its commitment to seize the new hope-filled opportunity, not only to envision a world of peace and security without nuclear weapons, but to generate concrete actions to make it a reality.

I. Summary of Recommendations

i) It is urgent that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister find early and prominent opportunities to publicly address nuclear disarmament and reaffirm Canada’s commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

ii) Canada should encourage a new NATO Strategic Concept that a) welcomes and affirms the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirms NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declares that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commits NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.

iii) The Canadian Government should support new initiatives within Europe and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

iv) Other concrete steps Canada can take to support the development of a new strategic relationship with Russia are such initiatives as upgrading the NATO-Russia Council; calling for a freeze on NATO enlargement efforts; promoting continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new nuclear disarmament treaty; and follow-on measures that engage other states, including China, with nuclear weapons.
v) Canada should work to forge a consensus within NATO: that the policies of nuclear weapon states, and of NATO, should reflect the global norm, which has existed since 1945, against the use of nuclear weapons.

vi) Canada should compliment the United States and Russia for negotiating a START replacement treaty and insist on commitments at the NPT Review Conference to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination.

vii) All states now part of nuclear alliances, including Canada, should take advantage of this moment to reduce and phase out the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. The voice of Canada must be heard in these new, highly charged deliberations.

viii) Canada should press for the NPT Review Conference to adopt a commitment to commencement of deliberations and negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention or framework of instruments for sustainable, verifiable, and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons.

ix) The government should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to NGOs by naming representatives of civil society to the Canadian delegation to the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

x) At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Canada should demonstrate its commitment to seize the new hope-filled opportunity, not only to envision a world of peace and security without nuclear weapons, but to generate concrete actions to make it a reality.
Annex 1:

NATO’s Strategic Concept, the NPT, and Global Zero

1. Reconsidering the NATO Strategic Concept

2. Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s Current Strategic Concept

3. Toward an NPT-Friendly NATO Strategic Concept

4. Nuclear Forces in Europe

5. NATO and Russia

6. No-First-Use

7. Canada and the Strategic Concept Review

1. Reconsidering the NATO Strategic Concept

At the 2009 NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl the Alliance Secretary-General was asked to develop a new Strategic Concept. Member Governments called for a participatory review and the Secretary-General appointed a 12-member Group of Experts, chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to guide the process.

The current review is taking place in a new international context that holds the promise of real progress toward zero nuclear weapons; however, it is clear from discussions to date, and from the focus of the growing literature on a new Strategic Concept (NATO-SC) that the nuclear question is not receiving priority attention. Afghanistan, other regional conflict zones, asymmetric and terrorist threats, and NATO’s role as “an armed global defence and police force with serious strategic capacity”¹ are the concerns and roles that are dominating the review process.

That process, in the first and current phase, includes a series of four seminars² (two of which have now been held). In a second phase the experts will visit NATO capitals to discuss with Governments and Parliamentarians the findings from the seminars. A third and final phase will focus on
negotiating a draft Strategic Concept to be approved by Heads of Government scheduled to meet in Portugal in the autumn of 2010.³

The second of the two experts seminars held to date focused on the dominant theme, namely, NATO’s out-of-area action in an unstable world – “the challenge of new asymmetric threats, and NATO’s engagement in the Middle East and South West Asia.”⁴ The topics considered during the first seminar (see Note 2 for a brief list of all the topics identified for discussion) are most closely linked to NATO’s nuclear deployments and doctrines, and the seminar summary reports on discussions of the need for “a tailor-made deterrence” and for NATO to be “ready to operate and reinforce deterrence in a proliferation environment through missile defence and other capabilities.” Keeping in mind that this is but a summary of a much longer off-the-record discussion, it may nevertheless be instructive to note that it includes no reference to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The seminar report does acknowledge that the current Strategic Concept needs “to be reviewed in the context of nuclear policy changes”⁵ – and that, in fact, is the focus of the following discussion. It explores appropriate changes to the nuclear weapons elements of NATO’s Strategic Concept with a view to proposing a set of Alliance declarations, policies, and actions that will promote strict conformity to obligations and commitments undertaken through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that will advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

2. Nuclear Weapons in NATO’s Current Strategic Concept

Nuclear weapons are addressed in nine of the 65 paragraphs of the current NATO-SC, adopted by the Washington NATO Summit in 1999⁶: paragraph 19 describes advances in arms control and disarmament during the 1990s; paragraph 21 refers to the continued existence of “powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance,” forces which it says need to be taken into account in NATO’s strategic planning; paragraph 37 refers to Ukraine and NATO’s support for it as a non-nuclear weapon state; paragraph 42 describes US nuclear forces in Europe as “vital to the security of Europe”; paragraphs 46 and 62 through 64 set out the core NATO doctrines or “essential principles” governing nuclear weapons in Europe;⁷ and the ninth reference to nuclear weapons comes in paragraph 65, which simply notes that the Alliance’s conventional and nuclear posture “will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment.”
Though relatively brief, the nuclear weapons references in the current NATO-SC describe a clear, unambiguous commitment to the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. The document argues that, due to “the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options.” It then goes on to say, “the Alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” The NATO-SC promises that “the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe” (para 46).

Then in the main doctrinal section on nuclear forces (paras 62-64), deterrence is presented as a broad, essentially open-ended, threat to use nuclear weapons against any aggressor – including, by implication, non-nuclear weapon states. It says the purpose of nuclear weapons is to “prevent coercion and any kind of war,” and, to accomplish that, nuclear forces are given the “essential role” of “ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression” (para 62). As described in a Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) briefing paper, NATO’s policy is one that “permits the use of nuclear weapons when deemed militarily useful in virtually any circumstance.” European nuclear forces are backed up by the ultimate deterrent, i.e., “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies,” described as being “provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States” (para 62).

For the broad nuclear deterrent to be credible in the European context, says the NATO-SC, European Allies must “be involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles” and must maintain nuclear forces on European territory (para 63). Indeed, “nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe” (para 63).

The NATO-SC also emphasizes that, given NATO’s conventional advantage, “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated…are therefore extremely remote.” Nevertheless, the Alliance decided in 1999 to maintain “adequate sub-strategic forces
based in Europe” to provide “an essential link to strategic nuclear forces” and thus to reinforce the transatlantic link (para 64).

3. Toward an NPT-Friendly NATO Strategic Concept

The reference, in the report on the first Strategic Concept review seminar, to the “nuclear policy changes” that are said to help frame the current review, is not elaborated. But it is likely safe to assume that two kinds of changes were being invoked. The first is the growing concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and capabilities to more states and to non-state actors, and the second is the increasingly declared commitment by at least some NATO states, as well as by their former or traditional adversaries, to the pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons. These are inextricably linked issues, of course. Without progress toward zero, the proliferation threat grows; and without progress in limiting proliferation, the move toward zero will be stymied.

NATO’s current insistence that its retention of nuclear weapons is “essential to preserve peace” (para 46) is clearly out of sync with the second of those policy changes. It is not in step with Article VI of the NPT, the advancing nuclear disarmament imperative as articulated in President Obama’s Prague speech, the UN Security Council Resolution 1887, and the public declarations of a broad range of Governments and individuals prominent in international security affairs. But the 2009 NATO Summit created a timely opportunity to once again rethink and restate the Alliance’s strategic doctrine. It is a rethinking process that should a) welcome and affirm the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; b) confirm NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT and declare that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons; and c) commit NATO to security and arms control policies that conform to Articles I and II of the NPT and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI.

Both the rationale and the language for this new NATO approach to nuclear weapons are available in the burgeoning anthology of nuclear abolition statements, as well as in the logic on which the NPT was originally constructed – namely, that nuclear weapons, far from being “essential to preserve peace” (para 46), are ultimately an unacceptable risk to humanity. The new NATO-SC should thus quite simply state that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to security. Rather than
asserting that the “strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance” are “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies” (para 62), NATO’s new Strategic Concept must reflect the new reality articulated by Mikhail Gorbachev’s warning that “with every passing year [nuclear weapons] make our security more precarious.” Indeed, a new NATO statement could borrow from the 2008 statement by Henry Kissinger and his colleagues and thus also acknowledge that “without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral” toward greater insecurity.

With a formal acknowledgement of the risks of a nuclear-armed world, and with abolition endorsed as a strategic objective and core value, it would be understandable for NATO to note, as does the Obama nuclear abolitionist policy, that the road to abolition must be traveled by all nuclear weapon states together. The 1999 document makes this point with the acknowledgement that “the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained” (para 21). Although in 1999 the paragraph read as a rationale for the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, in a new context of abolition, that same statement becomes a compelling call for accelerated multilateral engagement in the interests of mutual disarmament.

The current Strategic Concept says that the fundamental purpose of NATO nuclear forces is “political” (para 62) – without offering any clarity on how weapons can be political without also being military, and thus militarily threatening, and without recognizing that such a military nuclear threat acts as an incentive to those threatened to retain and acquire similar nuclear threats. On this point Canada offers more constructive alternative language. The Government’s 1999 response to a Parliamentary Committee report on nuclear disarmament agreed with the Committee recommendation, and thus the Government of the day promised that Canada would – and now Canada should – insist that NATO also “work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination." It is language that found its way into Step 9[v] of the “practical disarmament steps” adopted in 2000 at the NPT Review Conference in which nuclear weapon states agreed to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination”
Two other references to nuclear weapons in the current Strategic Concept are badly dated. The discussion of arms control (para 19) is rooted in the 1990s. An update of disarmament references in a new Strategic Concept should emphasize the urgency of disarmament, declare it essential to preserving peace, and welcome a new US-Russian agreement on strategic arms reduction as setting the stage for subsequent rounds of further reductions, noting the importance of early engagement in the process by all states with nuclear weapons. The document’s reference to NATO-Ukraine relations (para 37) is also rooted in the early post-Cold War period. While it emphasizes and welcomes Ukraine’s new status as a non-nuclear weapon state, the central point behind the reference is NATO enlargement. In a new document, the issue of NATO membership should be recalibrated, not only to take account of the legitimate security fears and interests of Russia, but also to focus on the development of mutual security arrangements throughout the entire region of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, rather than the expansion of a military alliance of selected states within the region.

4. Nuclear Forces in Europe

The current Strategic Concept is also at odds with the principles and intent of the NPT when it emphasizes (in paras 42, 63, and 64) the importance of retaining tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, for deterrence and especially to link Europe and North America. There are currently estimated to be between 150 and 240 nuclear weapons, all US B61 gravity bombs, held in five countries in Europe – Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. All of the European countries hosting these US nuclear weapons are non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The future of those deployments is now under active discussion, particularly in light of the German Government’s explicit call for the removal of nuclear weapons from German territory. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had earlier written that “all remaining US nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from German territory,” and since then Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has taken up the call within the North Atlantic Council and in discussions with European allies, including Poland, a strong advocate of continued nuclear deployments in Europe. Arms Control Today reports that the German Government regards its “initiative both as a disarmament measure and a contribution to nuclear nonproliferation. ‘We want to send a
signal and fulfill our commitments under the NPT 100 percent,’’ a German Government spokesperson is quoted as saying.21

Martin Butcher’s blog, The NATO Monitor, reports that Turkey has indicated it “would not insist” that NATO maintain forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe; Italy has indicated openness to reconsidering NATO’s nuclear posture; the UK Government has agreed that the NATO nuclear posture be reviewed in the context of calls for a world without nuclear weapons; and the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway have all indicated support for the German Government’s move.22

The Canadian Government should join this initiative and publicly indicate its support for the removal of all remaining nuclear weapons (all of them non-strategic) from European soil, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

Such a measure would be especially welcomed by non-aligned states, if the concerns they express at successive NPT Review Conferences are any measure. Not only do they doubt that the presence of nuclear weapons on the territories of European non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT is essential to transatlantic solidarity, they regard the removal of nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states as essential for full compliance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. The NPT requires that “each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever [and non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to receive] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”

Germany has emphasized that the decision on the future of nuclear deployments in Europe should be a collective NATO decision rather than a series of unilateral or bilateral changes. That means the decision will require a consensus within NATO, obviously including the concurrence of Washington. Indeed, the current US Administration brings a new openness to the issue. For example, the current US Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, has a strong personal interest in nuclear disarmament and has written in support of the pursuit of global zero.23 Even the late Michael Quinlan, a British security analyst and former Permanent Secretary of Defence, while generally resisting changes to nuclear elements of NATO’s Strategic Concept, expressed doubts about the value of US nuclear weapons in Europe – “I doubt whether their permanent presence remains essential
nowadays either in military and deterrent terms or as a symbol of continuing US commitment to the security of its European allies.”24

5. NATO and Russia

Some NATO states that may support in principle the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe may nevertheless argue against change at this time on the grounds that the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe should be coordinated with significant reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal. And it is true that not only Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but relations with Russia on a much broader level, will be central to achieving sustainable changes within NATO.

Despite the end of the Cold War, Russia has never stopped thinking of NATO as an anti-Russian institution, and the events surrounding the Russia-Georgia war of 2008 only reinforced that perception.25 NATO’s expansion to the east in the post-Cold War era has created further disquiet in Russia – not to mention that it has also represented the steady geographic expansion of the West’s nuclear umbrella in clear violation of the spirit, at least, of the commitment to “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.”26

It is for such obvious reasons that, in the context of denuclearizing Europe, it will be necessary to take up the Kissinger call for a dialogue “within NATO and with Russia, now begun by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination.”27 Progress toward that end will obviously require a new kind of strategic relationship with Russia28 and active engagement with it in pursuit of reductions to its non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. The huge imbalance in conventional forces between Russia and NATO will certainly be a challenge. Russia accounts for less than 6 per cent of world military spending while NATO states collectively account for more than 60 per cent.29 As long as Russia regards this overwhelming conventional force as, if not necessarily an overt enemy, then a challenge to its regional interests, it is unlikely to be amenable to significant further reductions to its substantial arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.

That does not mean the denuclearization of Europe should be contingent on Russian tactical nuclear disarmament. In fact, Quinlan argued that the
removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe would “have the effect of depriving Russia of a pretext she has sometimes sought to exploit both for opposing NATO’s wider development and for evading the question of whether and why Russia herself need continue to maintain a non-strategic nuclear armoury that is now far larger than that of anyone else.”

A Rand Corporation study of multiple strategic options for NATO sums up the core elements of a NATO strategy to reinforce European stability: an upgrade of the NATO-Russia Council, a freeze on NATO enlargement, and the engagement of all NATO states in East-West disarmament discussions. The German diplomat Rüdiger Lüdeking calls for overall NATO leadership in a reinvigorated disarmament dialogue with Russia. Such engagement should promote continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new Treaty and follow-on disarmament measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons; promote NATO-led negotiations, perhaps in the context of the NATO-Russia Council; encourage reporting to the NPT by NATO and Russia of current holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons (aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles); encourage more detailed information through confidential exchanges on alert status, security provisions and safety features; develop new agreements on security and safety measures, deployment restrictions, and reductions; and encourage expansion of such discussions on reductions to the global level.

In the long run, of course, NATO and the West will also be served by seeking a new strategic relationship with China as well.

6. No-First-Use

It is rather striking that none of the likely threats to the security of NATO states is effectively, or even marginally, deterred by NATO’s European nuclear weapons or by its implied first-use threat. The threats that most worry NATO planners include asymmetrical attacks, terrorism, cyber attacks, WMD attacks from non-state actors, and long-range missiles. The nuclear capabilities of NATO states would clearly be a deterrent to any long-range missile threat, but the credibility of such a deterrent is not served by the deployment of US tactical weapons on European soil, nor does it require the threat of first use.

A central element of the revised Strategic Concept, in the context of a commitment to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals, should therefore be a
no-first-use commitment and a redefinition of deterrence that confines the role of nuclear arsenals to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others.

Scott Sagan draws the same conclusion regarding US policy – “the United States should, after appropriate consultation with allies, move toward adopting a nuclear-weapons no-first-use declaratory policy by stating that ‘the role of US nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear weapons use by other nuclear-weapons states against the United States, our allies, and our armed forces, and to be able to respond, with an appropriate range of nuclear retaliation options, if necessary, in the event that deterrence fails.’”34 In addition to reinforcing US and NATO support for diminishing the role of nuclear weapons, Sagan says that such a declaration could “influence both the likelihood and consequences of nuclear proliferation by helping shape global norms about reasonable and legitimate potential uses of nuclear weapons. These norms can in turn influence internal debates in new and potential nuclear-weapon states about their own nuclear doctrines or potential nuclear-weapons acquisition.”

7. Canada and the Strategic Concept Review

We encourage Canada’s active engagement in the NATO Strategic Concept review in support of changes to the Alliance’s declarations and policies that promote strict adherence to NPT obligations and commitments, and that advance the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

a) Revising the core principles of the Strategic Concept:

Encourage new language in the strategic concept to:

i) welcome and affirm the groundswell of calls for a world without nuclear weapons;

ii) confirm NATO’s commitment to the objectives of the NPT, and declare that the intent of Article VI is a world free of nuclear weapons;

iii) commit NATO to security and arms control policies that ensure full conformity to Articles I and II of the NPT (by eliminating nuclear sharing), and that are designed to achieve the nuclear disarmament promised in Article VI;
iv) declare that the elimination of nuclear weapons, not their retention, is essential to the security of NATO members;

v) pledge NATO to work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.

b) Nuclear forces out of Europe:

i) Canada should give encouragement to the efforts of European allies toward removing all remaining nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon state members of NATO, in support of longstanding international calls that all nuclear weapons be returned to the territories of the states that own them.

c) NATO relations with Russia (and China):

Canada should support the development of a new strategic relationship with Russia (and China) through initiatives such as:

i) an upgrade of the NATO-Russia Council;

ii) a freeze on NATO enlargement efforts;

iii) the engagement of all NATO states in reinvigorated East-West disarmament discussions, with a particular focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

iv) promoting a continuing strategic dialogue between the US and Russia in support of a new Treaty and follow-on measures that engage other states with nuclear weapons;

v) encouraging enhanced reporting to the NPT by NATO and Russia of current holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons (aggregate numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles);

vi) encouraging more detailed information through confidential exchanges on alert status, security provisions, and safety features;
vii) developing new agreements on security and safety measures, deployment restrictions, and reductions; and encouraging expansion of such discussions on reductions to the global level; and

viii) engaging China in relevant mutual approaches to strategic stability and nuclear disarmament.

d) No-first-use:

Canada should support a basic shift in NATO deterrence doctrine through:

i) adoption of a no-first-use commitment; and

ii) redefining the role of nuclear weapons as exclusively to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states until such time as arsenals are universally prohibited and eliminated.
Annex II

“A New International Consensus on Action for Nuclear Disarmament”¹

The States party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference in May 2010 to agree:

On the Objective: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

1. To reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

2. On the need for nuclear-armed States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to make a similar undertaking to accomplish ultimately the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and to acknowledge the universal and binding nature of the norms against testing, acquisition, and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons otherwise than for defence against nuclear attack.

On Key Building Blocks: Banning Testing and Limiting Fissile Material

3. On the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

4. On a continuing moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

¹ Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, co-Chairs (2009), pp. 153-159. WWW.ICNND.ORG.
5. On the need to maintain and increase support for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in further developing the treaty verification regime.

6. On the need to negotiate to an early conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

7. On the need for all nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapon purposes pending the conclusion of this treaty.

8. On the need for nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-armed States to make arrangements to place fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes.

On Specific Steps toward Nuclear Disarmament

9. On the need for nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to make an early commitment to not increasing their nuclear arsenals, and take whatever steps are necessary, unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, to achieve nuclear disarmament, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.

10. On the need to set as an interim objective the achievement in the medium term, as soon as possible and no later than 2025, of a world in which:

(a) the number of all nuclear weapons, of whatever size, role or deployed status, is reduced to a small fraction of those in existence in 2010;

(b) the doctrine of every State with nuclear weapons is firmly committed to no first use of them, on the basis that their sole remaining purpose is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others; and

(c) the deployment and launch-alert status of those weapons is wholly consistent with that doctrine.
11. On the particular need for leadership from, and cooperation between, those nuclear-weapon States which possess the greatest numbers of nuclear weapons in agreeing early on deep reductions, and making sustained efforts to continue such reductions for all classes of weapons.

12. On the need for all the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to make further efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and act early to prepare the ground – through studies, strategic dialogues with each other, and preparatory work in the Conference on Disarmament – for a multilateral disarmament process.

13. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to accept and announce as soon as possible a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in their security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

14. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, to as soon as possible give unequivocal negative security assurances, endorsed by the UN Security Council, that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not determined by the Security Council to be in non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

15. On the need for the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed states, to take concrete measures in relation to the operational status of nuclear weapons systems to the extent possible at each stage of the disarmament process, in particular to lengthen launch decision times and to generally reduce the risk of accident or miscalculation.

**On Transparency**

16. On the need for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States, and other nuclear-armed States, with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities, in the implementation of arms control agreements and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
On Accountability

17. To all States with significant nuclear programs making regular reports, to the relevant United Nations organs and within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the implementation of their disarmament and non-proliferation obligations and programs including, in the case of nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-armed States, on their nuclear arsenals, fissile material not required for military purposes, and delivery vehicles.

On Verification

18. To further study and development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon free world.

On Irreversibility

19. To the principle of irreversibility applying to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and other related arms control and reduction measures.

On General and Complete Disarmament

20. To reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
Endnotes for Annex I

1 This is how Senator Hugh Segal characterized NATO and the challenge of transforming NATO into an effective global security presence. Speech to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 6 October 2009. Available at David Pugliese’s Defence Watch blog, 7 October 2009.

2 Seminar topics include:
- “NATO’s core tasks and functions: the meaning of collective defence and deterrence in today’s environment; how to confront a broader spectrum of threats to our populations; NATO’s role in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.”
- “NATO as a part of a network of security actors in contributing to global civil and military crisis management and NATO’s likely tasks with a view to enhancing cooperation with international organisations and NGOs.”
- “NATO and the Euro-Atlantic security environment: NATO’s role in building security in the Euro-Atlantic area, enlargement and NATO’s partnerships including relations with Russia.”
- “Forces and capabilities, including defence planning and transformation” and “procurement at a time of increased financial constraints.”


3 Information on the process is available on a Strategic Concept section of the NATO website:


5 “Highlights from the first Strategic Concept seminar,” 16 October 2009, Luxembourg.

6 NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999,

7 NATO, “NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment,” Background,


9 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.


11 The Alliance’s Strategic Concepts have gone through successive changes. The original focused on collective operations for the territorial defence of its member territories; in the mid-1950s “massive retaliation,” including nuclear, was emphasized; in 1967 “flexible response” replaced “massive retaliation”; in 1991 there was a new emphasis on cooperation with former adversaries; and in 1999 a commitment was added to wider Euro-Atlantic peace and stability and non-Article 5 operations. The current debate is focused on further development of out-of-area operational guidelines. Throughout this evolutionary process the Alliance has always agreed on a nuclear component and affirmed nuclear deterrence. See NATO, “The Transformation of the Alliance: The Strategic Concept of the Alliance,” NATO Handbook. October 8, 2002; and Richard Hatfield. “NATO’s new strategic concept,” Defence Systems Daily, January 26, 2000, http://defence-data.com/features/fpage35.htm; and http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0203.htm.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11702171101593402.html#.


21 See note #18.


26 See Note #16.

27 See Note #13.


30 See Note #24.


