A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis

Erika Simpson
Political Science, simpson@uwo.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Citation of this paper:
Political Science Publications. 65.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub/65
A 1994 BLUEPRINT FOR A
CANADIAN AND MULTINATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE
AT CFB CORNWALLIS

A COMMITMENT TO REGIONAL, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Prepared for the
Province of Nova Scotia
by
Common Security Consultants
January 1994
Training for UN service is of particular importance. Such training — military or para-military or civilian — should have a certain uniformity in all countries likely to participate in peace-keeping operations. It should take into account the training requirements of individual units. It should include a substantial content of United Nations philosophy. Personnel of all categories should be educated in the aims and purposes of the United Nations, in its political methods and administrative procedures, in the significance of the peacekeeping role. This is particularly true for the soldiers of all ranks,...In the tasks of separating armies, supervising truce lines or calming hostile factions, the United Nations soldier will be frequently called upon to exert a mediating rather than a military influence.


And the Liberal Party feels the time for such a centre has come. Liberals feel the time has come because with the end of the Cold War the United Nations has signalled its intention to become more active in stabilizing conflicts through peacekeeping operations. The Liberal Party supports the UN’s resolve in this area. We also feel that peacekeeping should rank higher on the list of Canada’s defence priorities in terms of budget, personnel and infrastructure. Independent studies have supported the Cornwallis Committee’s claim that CFB Cornwallis could serve well in this regard. It not only has impressive training facilities, it is ideally situated to serve as a staging area for international peacekeeping troops.

Accordingly, at our February 1992 National Policy Convention we adopted a resolution calling for an increase in support for the UN and the establishment in Canada of a Peacekeeping Training Centre for both Canadian and non-Canadian troops at CFB Cornwallis.

The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, September 1, 1993
The Action Plan:
Establishing CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre

Peacekeeping is the dominant Canadian defence activity of the 1990s. The challenges our military and civilian peacekeepers face are often hazardous and increasingly complex. They deserve the best preparation Canada can offer.

The United Nations General Assembly has called on member states to establish regional and national peacekeeping training centres. Last year the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs considered this request and recommended that Canada establish a permanent peacekeeping training centre urging as well that appropriate training be provided to all ranks and reserves.

The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party of Canada are committed to establishing a permanent Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis.

This is an opportunity for Canada to consolidate its role as the world leader in peacekeeping. As Prime Minister Chretien confirmed last year, "the time for such a centre has come."
In 1991, Nova Scotia developed the first comprehensive plan for peacekeeping training. This plan calls for the cost-effective conversion of CFB Cornwallis. This initiative has earned widespread support as a contribution to regional, national and international security.

The Cornwallis training base has the required facilities, support services and sufficient space. Its proximity to Canadian Forces air, naval and land support makes it conducive to joint peacekeeping training. The Liberal Party supports this site as an excellent opportunity to convert defence training infrastructure to serve Canadian and United Nations objectives.

The strategic and economic grounds for CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre are detailed once again in this report: "A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis".

It is important for the safety and confidence of the Canadians who represent our country, and it is important for Canada’s international reputation, that advance training for UN operations begin as quickly as possible at a dedicated peacekeeping training centre. CFB Cornwallis can be operational as Canada’s peacekeeping training centre within six months.
This initiative reflects the long-term vision and commitment to internationalism that inspired peacekeeping and continues to inspire Canadians.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Action Plan: Establishing CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commitment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Support and Potential</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nato</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1994 Peacekeeping Forecast: Continuous Demand</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada in Peacekeeping: Recognizing the Obligation to Prepare Professionally</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFB Cornwallis: A Cost-Effective Conversion of Existing Defence Infrastructure</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ANNEXES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annex</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>The 1991 Proposal and The 1992 Blueprint</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Annual Peacekeeping Training Activities</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>The Organizational Structure</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Personnel Requirements</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>General Peacekeeping Training Programme</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Officer Peacekeeping Training Programme</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Other-Rank and Reserve Peacekeeping Training Programme</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training Program</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Civilian Peacekeeping Training Program</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Areas of Instruction</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Overview of the Scandinavian Peacekeeping Training Programme and Training Centres</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Training for UN service is of particular importance. Such training — military or para-military or civilian — should have a certain uniformity in all countries likely to participate in peace-keeping operations. It should take into account the training requirements of individual units. It should include a substantial content of United Nations philosophy. Personnel of all categories should be educated in the aims and purposes of the United Nations, in its political methods and administrative procedures, in the significance of the peacekeeping role. This is particularly true for the soldiers of all ranks,...In the tasks of separating armies, supervising truce lines or calming hostile factions, the United Nations soldier will be frequently called upon to exert a mediatory rather than a military influence.


And the Liberal Party feels the time for such a centre has come. Liberals feel the time has come because with the end of the Cold War the United Nations has signalled its intention to become more active in stabilizing conflicts through peacekeeping operations. The Liberal Party supports the UN’s resolve in this area. We also feel that peacekeeping should rank higher on the list of Canada’s defence priorities in terms of budget, personnel and infrastructure. Independent studies have supported the Cornwallis Committee’s claim that CFB Cornwallis could serve well in this regard. It not only has impressive training facilities, it is ideally situated to serve as a staging area for international peacekeeping troops.

Accordingly, at our February 1992 National Policy Convention we adopted a resolution calling for an increase in support for the UN and the establishment in Canada of a Peacekeeping Training Centre for both Canadian and non-Canadian troops at CFB Cornwallis.

The Right Honourable Jean Chretien, September 1, 1993
The Action Plan: Establishing CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre

Peacekeeping is the dominant Canadian defence activity of the 1990s. The challenges our military and civilian peacekeepers face are often hazardous and increasingly complex. They deserve the best preparation Canada can offer.

The United Nations General Assembly has called on member states to establish regional and national peacekeeping training centres. Last year the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs considered this request and recommended that Canada establish a permanent peacekeeping training centre urging as well that appropriate training be provided to all ranks and reserves.

The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party of Canada are committed to establishing a permanent Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis.

This is an opportunity for Canada to consolidate its role as the world leader in peacekeeping. As Prime Minister Chretien confirmed last year, "the time for such a centre has come."
In 1991, Nova Scotia developed the first comprehensive plan for peacekeeping training. This plan calls for the cost-effective conversion of CFB Cornwallis. This initiative has earned widespread support as a contribution to regional, national and international security.

The Cornwallis training base has the required facilities, support services and sufficient space. Its proximity to Canadian Forces air, naval and land support makes it conducive to joint peacekeeping training. The Liberal Party supports this site as an excellent opportunity to convert defence training infrastructure to serve Canadian and United Nations objectives.

The strategic and economic grounds for CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre are detailed once again in this report: "A 1994 Blueprint for a Canadian and Multinational Peacekeeping Training Centre at CFB Cornwallis".

It is important for the safety and confidence of the Canadians who represent our country, and it is important for Canada’s international reputation, that advance training for UN operations begin as quickly as possible at a dedicated peacekeeping training centre. CFB Cornwallis can be operational as Canada’s peacekeeping training centre within six months.
This initiative reflects the long-term vision and commitment to internationalism that inspired peacekeeping and continues to inspire Canadians.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Action Plan: Establishing CFB Cornwallis as Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre  

i

The Commitment  

1

International Support and Potential  
United Nations  
Nato  

5  
5  
10

The 1994 Peacekeeping Forecast: Continuous Demand  

15

Canada in Peacekeeping: Recognizing the Obligation to Prepare Professionally  

18

CFB Cornwallis: A Cost-Effective Conversion of Existing Defence Infrastructure  
Location  
Facilities  
Current Status  

19  
19  
22  
24

Conclusion  

28
ANNEXES


Annex B: The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities

Annex C: Annual Peacekeeping Training Activities

Annex D: The Organizational Structure

Annex E: Personnel Requirements

Annex F: Curriculum

Annex G: General Peacekeeping Training Programme

Annex H: Officer Peacekeeping Training Programme

Annex I: Other-Rank and Reserve Peacekeeping Training Programme

Annex J: Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training Program

Annex K: Civilian Peacekeeping Training Program

Annex L: Areas of Instruction

Annex M: Overview of the Scandinavian Peacekeeping Training Programme and Training Centres
The Commitment

Prime Minister Chretien and the Liberal Party of Canada have stated their commitment to increase support for the United Nations and peacekeeping, and to establish a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis. The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party have endorsed Cornwallis as a worthy contribution to Canadian foreign and defence policy and as a means to ensure regional socio-economic stability through the conversion of existing defence infrastructure to new priority tasks such as peacekeeping training.

At the 1992 Liberal National Policy Convention it was resolved that "the Liberal Party of Canada support the establishment in Canada of a Centre for International Peacekeeping at CFB Cornwallis to train both Canadians and non-Canadians in the art of running peacekeeping operations..." (Priority Resolution 29C, Hull, February 1992)

The Liberal Foreign Policy Handbook released in 1993 outlined the broad foundations upon which a progressive defence policy would be developed. Third on the list of multilateral commitments was the provision of "peacekeeping training, supply and staging centres at CFB Lahr, Germany and CFB Cornwallis, Nova Scotia and, possibly other Canadian sites."
This handbook also recognized a commitment to help military bases respond to changing public policy. Among the measures cited in the Liberal defence programme was "the conversion of Canadian military bases to alternate uses, such as peacekeeping training." (Ottawa, May 25, 1993)

On the occasion of the unveiling of the peacekeeping monument in Ottawa, Liberal Leader Jean Chretien affirmed the support of the Liberal Party for the development of CFB Cornwallis as a regional peacekeeping training centre and staging site for the western hemisphere. ("Statement On Europe and Peacekeeping", October 8, 1992) The Prime Minister's support for the establishment of a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training and staging base at CFB Cornwallis was reaffirmed in his September 1993 letter to Nova Scotians in the surrounding region. Questioning Prime Minister Campbell's complete U-turn on the issue of establishing a peacekeeping training centre at the Base, he wrote, "the Liberal Party feels the time for such a centre has come". (Correspondence, September 1, 1993)

The recent parliamentary review of peacekeeping arrived at a similar conclusion. Last year, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs also recommended that a permanent peacekeeping training centre be established in Canada.
Among the related recommendations in their report were:

- that Canada prepare to commit itself to expanded roles in UN peacekeeping and make peacekeeping a high priority role for the Canadian Forces;

- that DND extend the period of intensive training given to reservists immediately prior to their deployment in a UN operation from 90 days to at least 120 days;

- that DND conduct a complete evaluation of its peacekeeping training needs and of possible ways of improving training in light of recent operations, and make its findings public; and that this evaluation should be carried out by DND personnel in conjunction with outside experts;

- that the preparation given to military personnel prior to their deployment in a UN operation:
  a. be provided on a more systematic basis;
  b. be improved to make personnel more sensitive to different cultures, customs, and practices of local populations;
  c. be improved to ensure that all military personnel in units which may be deployed in UN operations receive better training in conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation.

(The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993)

Public and political support for the development of a peacekeeping training centre is widespread. In 1992, the report of the Citizen’s Inquiry into Peace and Security recommended that “Canada should respond to the UN request for institutionalized peacekeeping training by offering to establish a peacekeeper training centre in Canada for the use of Canadian

Other organizations have also advised the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre for all ranks, reserves and civilians. (National Capital Region Branch, United Nations Association of Canada, Ottawa, December 1993)

Similarly, The Canadian Women's Budget stated that "the unprecedented demand for well-trained peacekeepers calls for the establishment of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis in Nova Scotia." As their report acknowledged, "this would provide a tangible yet cost-effective contribution to the UN, which has asked member states to develop national and regional peacekeeping training centres." (Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Ottawa, 1993)

The Prime Minister, the Liberal Party of Canada, the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, as well as numerous other organizations support the establishment of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre. Many now recognize the obligation to prepare professionally for UN peacekeeping operations. Whereas a peacekeeping training centre would be an important contribution to the United Nations and the international community, it is also essential for Canada and the Canadian Forces.
International Support and Potential

United Nations

In June 1991, the unprecedented international demand for peacekeepers and new peacekeeping skills prompted the United Nations Committee of 34 -- the Special Committee on Peacekeeping -- to encourage member states to develop regional and national peacekeeping training centres. Canada was one of six countries on this UN Special Committee which co-sponsored these recommendations encouraging:

- Member States with national or regional training programmes to provide access to those programmes, as appropriate, to other interested Member States;

- All Member States conducting training in peacekeeping to include cross-cultural education in existing training programmes;

- All Member States to organize their own national training programmes and consider the establishment of regional and national training centres, and all Member States to promote co-operation between them. ("Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations In All Their Aspects", A/46/254, June 18, 1991)

These recommendations were subsequently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1991. Member states were explicitly encouraged "to organize their own national training programmes, and
consider the establishment of regional and national training centres" and urged to "promote co-operation between them". (UN General Assembly, A/RES/46/48, December 9, 1991)

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali recommended that "arrangements be reviewed and improved for training peacekeeping personnel -- civilian, police, or military -- using the varied capabilities of Member State Governments, of non-governmental organizations and the facilities of the Secretariat". (UN, An Agenda for Peace, June 1992)

In response to the 1991 Cornwallis proposal, United Nations Under-Secretary General Michael Doo Kingue wrote that, "...now is the opportune time to establish peacekeeping training centres as part of future collective security arrangements and regional co-operations. I consider your proposal to establish a peacekeeping training centre extremely important and hopefully, it will encourage other countries to do the same." (Correspondence, January 12, 1992)

A number of other member states have accepted the challenge and taken steps to institutionalize peacekeeping training programmes. The Swedes, Finns, Norwegians, Danes and Austrians have conducted appropriate training programmes at established peacekeeping training centres for some time.
More recently, countries such as Poland, Australia, Argentina, Nigeria, Hungary and the Czech Republic have indicated they will be developing peacekeeping training centres.

In 1992, American President George Bush also announced to the UN General Assembly that the United States would convert one of its basic training centres at Fort Dix to assist with multinational peacekeeping training and field exercises. Among the key points noted in the President’s speech were that:

- If multinational units are to work together, they must train together...multinational planning; training; field exercises will be needed."

- These efforts should link up with regional organizations;

-We must change our national institutions if we are to change our international relations; and,

- Training plainly is key.
(Speech to UN General Assembly, September 22, 1992)

Many UN troop contributors recognize that the skills developed for war must now be supplemented with specific peacekeeping skills. It is increasingly understood that training programmes developed for the mid-to-high intensity combat operations envisaged throughout the Cold War need to be revised for UN peacekeeping.
Peacekeeping training has recently been described as a 'growth industry'. There are now 75 member states contributing troops and personnel to UN operations. As Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary-General and a pioneer of peacekeeping tactics wrote, "existence of such a training centre for the countries of the Western hemisphere could be a great advantage at a time when there is going to be increasing demand for peacekeeping contingents from a far wider range of countries than hitherto." (Correspondence, August 28, 1991) A number of these countries have already expressed an interest in acquiring peacekeeping briefings and information on training from Canada. In the last several years the list includes Japan, Germany, Russia, Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, France, Poland, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, Zimbabwe, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Romania, Bulgaria, Cuba, and South Africa.

To date, the practice has been for several officers to take turns travelling to these countries to present short seminars overviewing DND's general philosophy on peacekeeping and how Canadian Forces mount, maintain, and prepare for missions. Whereas these peacekeeping briefings and seminars are popular among select Canadian officers, they provide only limited guidance to other UN troop contributors. Conversely, the approach taken by several UN member states with peacekeeping training centres is to provide foreign military personnel with direct access and the
opportunity to participate in their comprehensive training programmes. It is worth noting that in recent years, the foreign demand for access has exceeded the available space at these centres. [An overview of the Scandinavian Peacekeeping Training Programme and Training Centres is in Annex M.]

It should be understood, however, that there is little prospect of arranging direct United Nations funding for the development or operation of a Canadian or multinational peacekeeping training centre. Whereas the Department of National Defence should retain primary responsibility for Canada’s defence training infrastructure and programmes, user fees could be charged to foreign clients. In this regard, there is a significant new prospect. As UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Anan writes:

If we are to surmount the frustrations of delay, structure and scale, if we are to rise to the challenge which renewed interest and widened mandates present us, we will need the means to do so...The sheer size and complexity of peacekeeping operations makes it imperative to explore new avenues of cooperation with regional organizations such as NATO. (NATO Review, vol.41, no.5, October 93)
NATO

The new focus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on peacekeeping has also prompted considerable interest in peacekeeping training. Within the past several months there have been numerous NATO initiatives to explore options for practical cooperation in joint peacekeeping training: the development of new courses, training materials, field programmes; and joint multinational peacekeeping training exercises. The alliance’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is now planning large-scale training programmes and peacekeeping exercises.

Among the general conclusions of the recent NACC peacekeeping seminar in Denmark were that:

- a profound understanding of basic peacekeeping values is necessary to be able to cope appropriately with the challenges of any peace support operation;

- new and more complex operations require more military training than traditional peacekeeping missions;

- specific peacekeeping education and training is needed for all types of operations and all types of armies;

- a need exists for international cooperation on unit and joint training;

- cooperation must aim at common procedures to form the basis of national training;
international cooperation on staff training is a necessity. (NATO Press Release M-NACC-2 (93) 73, Annex III, December 3, 1993)

NATO leaders recently declared that they would also work to assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations. To promote closer cooperation and interoperability they proposed peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. (NATO Communique, M-1 (94) 3, January 11, 1994)

Over the past forty years, NATO members have devoted enormous military and financial resources to joint training, simulations, and exercises. Several allies are relatively new to peacekeeping and capable of paying for professional training. Regular UN troop contributors have an obligation as well as an opportunity in providing this service.

Canada has long had a Military Training and Assistance Programme (MTAP) which provides NATO members and others with the use of our defence training facilities and resources. For example, American paratroops, German tank crews and the air crews of various NATO allies have routinely trained at Canadian bases. The user fees accumulated through the MTAP have helped to cover the expenses of several defence training establishments. Once again, Canada has the opportunity to host joint multinational training and exercises.
Funding arrangements for this training could be negotiated through the MTAP to help defer the costs of operating and maintaining Canada’s peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis.

As military experience has repeatedly demonstrated, if units and larger contingents are to work together effectively in joint or multinational operations they must occasionally train together. In a statement to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Canadian Ambassador Frechette asked:

> How do we forge large and cohesive field operations out of many diverse contingents with varying military traditions? We need to develop and then maintain uniform and high standards for these UN peacekeeping operations. The credibility of the United Nations and its effectiveness depend on it. The task is urgent. (New York, April 19, 1993)

Multinational training has the potential to provide numerous positive results. As the quality and technical competence of UN peacekeepers often varies, standardized training and exercises would help to encourage better communication, cooperation and cultural understanding. Aside from helping to develop the large cadre of professional peacekeepers necessary for the missions of the future, many regard joint training as the key to integrating national contingents into a unified peacekeeping force. The experience of working together in simulated operational settings would also provide both military and civilian contingents from various countries
with a clearer understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities. As the Honourable Barnett Danson, former Minister of National Defence wrote in 1991:

Accepting students and instructors from other countries could achieve two goals. Obviously, we would be equipping others to become peacekeepers, but we would also be educating participants about the merits of this special and beneficial intervention in a nation's affairs. Thus, they might well be instrumental in having their countries seek such a solution when threatened. At the very least they would be invaluable in helping our peacekeepers learn about the various cultures and political environments in which they might be called upon to serve. (Globe and Mail, June 5, 1991)

Other internationally recognized authorities with experience commanding UN operations support the development of a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre as an asset to Canada and as a contribution to the United Nations and the international community. Several note, moreover, that Canada has the experience and the necessary resources, as well as an obligation, to share these with other UN contributors. As Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, former special advisor to the UN Secretary General, Commander UNEF II and Chief of Staff UNEF I writes, "such a training centre should not only be for Canadians who are invited to almost all of the missions, but for other countries especially those who lack the ability and resources to organize such a training establishment. I not only wish to endorse your project, but urge Canadians to support it." (Correspondence, August 30, 1991)
In summary, it is evident that there is United Nations support for the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres -- preferably centres that facilitate cooperation between UN member states. It is also apparent that there is international demand for peacekeeping training as well as a potential opportunity to host multinational peacekeeping training programmes and exercises.

Yet it should be recognized that the extent to which a Canadian training centre attracts foreign interest will likely be determined by initial evaluations of the training programme. To ensure international demand, this training programme must be seen to be of the highest calibre and useful to other nations.
The 1994 Peacekeeping Forecast: Continuous Demand

Over the past six years, there has been a dramatic increase in the demand for United Nations peacekeeping. Of the 33 peacekeeping operations mounted by the UN since its inception, 20 have been established since 1988.

The scale of UN peacekeeping operations is also unprecedented. Whereas in 1987, there were approximately 10,000 military peacekeepers in the field; by 1993, there were nearly 70,000. These increases in military personnel parallel the rise in large multi-dimensional operations involving increasing numbers of civilian peacekeepers. Last year alone, approximately 10,000 civilian peacekeepers were deployed to various UN operations.

The character and scope of peacekeeping operations has also recently evolved from the traditional military operation, entrusted to maintain calm on the front lines of warring nation states, through to "second generation" peacekeeping dealing with conflicts within nations, and on to what has been described as a "third generation" of peacekeeping, entailing the restoration of order through a combination of direct military operations, humanitarian relief efforts, reconciliation, and the rehabilitation of political and economic institutions.
Recent UN operations have entailed diverse assignments involving traditional peacekeeping as well as complicated, often dangerous military operations, election-monitoring, policing, border patrol, sanctions enforcement, civil- administration, and disaster relief. The expanding scope of peacekeeping has also bolstered the demand for new capabilities and improved training.

More and more member states are participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the past year, 75 nations contributed peacekeeping personnel to the United Nations -- roughly three times as many participating countries as there were a decade ago. Many of these new troop contributors lack the experience and skills of the traditional troop contributors.

While this expansion of demand, scale, scope and participation can be expected to level off, peacekeeping will likely remain the international community's principal mechanism for dealing with violent conflict in the post-Cold War era. Our defence officials acknowledge that "peacekeeping as an instrument of conflict resolution will play a pre-eminent role in the emerging international system." (Bremner & Snell, Canadian Defence Quarterly, August 1992)
The major challenge now is to generate the institutional arrangements to prepare both Canada and other UN member states for this role. We can provide a model for the future and a model for others.
Canada in Peacekeeping: Recognizing The Obligation to Prepare Professionally

Peacekeeping has rapidly emerged as the dominant Canadian defence activity of the 1990s. Participation in United Nations peacekeeping now accounts for over eighty percent of the active duty operations of the Canadian Forces.

Since 1988, when peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Canada has contributed to all 20 missions mounted by the UN. The demand for Canadian peacekeepers has been unprecedented. Last year, approximately 4,700 Canadian peacekeepers were deployed to 15 diverse UN operations. Since it is necessary to rotate personnel every six months, nearly 9,000 Canadian peacekeepers were active in peacekeeping service.

Canadian peacekeepers are now deployed to 16 UN missions worldwide. Over the next decade, our regular forces, reserves and civilians will be engaged in an array of diverse peacekeeping assignments. In short, we can anticipate considerable long-term demand for well-trained peacekeepers.
CFB Cornwallis: A Cost-Effective Conversion of Existing Defence Infrastructure

Location

CFB Cornwallis is situated in Southwestern Nova Scotia. Located on the shores of the Annapolis Basin, the base is approximately 15 kilometres east of Digby and 15 kilometres west of Annapolis Royal and Fort Anne. Military air transport is available within 80 kilometres at CFB Greenwood. The Halifax International Airport is approximately 225 kilometres to the east. Direct access to the Eastern United States is available through the Yarmouth airport. This base is a fifteen minute drive from the ferry to St. John, New Brunswick. Cornwallis is also served by an all-weather, limited-access highway from Halifax.

The Cornwallis site has advantages:

- proximity to the airbase at CFB Greenwood, the land base at CFB Gagetown and the naval base at CFB Halifax would facilitate tri-service peacekeeping training;

- the geo-strategic location offers rapid deployment to operations in the Middle East, Central America, Eastern Europe and Africa;

- Dalhousie University (Halifax), Acadia University (Wolfville), University of New Brunswick (Fredericton) and Universite Ste. Anne (Pointe-de-l’Eglise) will provide resources and expertise;
- the base offers a semi-isolated training environment;

- the relatively temperate climate of the Western Annapolis Valley offers the potential to conduct year-round training outdoors;

- there is a wide range of accessible terrain in the immediate area;

- most of the required training facilities, resources and support services are already in place;

- the surrounding communities depend upon and support the military presence; peacekeeping training and exercises in the surrounding area would be welcomed.

Cornwallis provides an ideal setting for a multinational peacekeeping training centre. Aside from the scenic site, the surrounding area is of considerable historic importance. Canada’s oldest settlement, the Habitation in Port Royal, is roughly 5 kilometres across the Annapolis Basin. Among the area’s noted recreational attractions are: a nearby Provincial Theme Park and Wildlife Park; Kejimkujik National Park; the Annapolis Theatre, Historic Gardens, and farmer’s market; the Digby scallop fleet; numerous historic sites; whale-watching and sea-bass fishing; as well as golf and tennis facilities. The nearby Digby Pines is widely regarded as an excellent resort and conference centre.
Location of CFB Cornwallis in relation to the headquarters of the United Nations, Canadian National Defence and Mobile Command.
Facilities

CFB Cornwallis has sufficient barrack space and mess facilities to accommodate the proposed peacekeeping training centre. Renovations were recently completed on several large blocks of junior and senior rank quarters. Aside from a capacity to host over 1,000 peacekeeping trainees, this base has approximately 100 officer suites available for training centre staff and visiting officers. The Cornwallis Base Development Book lists the life expectancy on most of the required facilities as between the years 2010 and 2015.

A number of class rooms, seminar rooms and two theatres are available for instructional purposes. There is also adequate drill and storage space in a number of large halls and hangars. These facilities could be used to stage and prepare future operations.

A full range of health and hygiene services are provided at the base hospital. Among the available recreational facilities are: three olympic-size swimming pools; two baseball fields; three soccer fields; three tennis courts; a large gymnasium; a curling rink; a hockey rink; a bowling alley; and two recreation centres, one with a five-hundred-seat theatre.
Two obstacle courses and a small-arms firing range are located on the 650-acre base. An additional firing range on a 3,000 acre site is located within fifteen kilometres at Granville Ferry.

Cornwallis has the capacity to host the sort of 'urban warfare training centre' that the Department of National Defence has paid to use for peacekeeping training at Fort Ord and Fort Pendleton, California. Those with expertise in establishing this type of training resource have already expressed an interest in locating such a centre either on or adjacent to the Cornwallis base. The Canadian Forces and several police departments are also interested in having access to such a facility.

Some sources have suggested that a peacekeeping training centre will require additional land for field exercises and simulations. Of the 650 acres comprising the Cornwallis base, approximately 350 unused acres might be used for these training exercises. Additional land is also available in the immediate region at a relatively low cost.
Current Status

CFB Cornwallis is a Canadian Forces tri-service training centre. It was developed fifty years ago as HMCS Cornwallis and initially tasked to naval training. Its primary contemporary role has been to conduct basic training for Canadian recruits. HMCS Acadia, a large sea-cadet camp, is run on site in the summer. The base is also used for naval reserve and militia training.

Up until 1991, Cornwallis employed 1,100 military staff and civilian personnel to train approximately 4,000 recruits annually. Recruit enrolment is projected to drop to 900 trainees in 1994; sea cadet enrolment will likely remain at 1,400; and there will be approximately 700 naval reserve trainees.

Peacekeeping training would be an appropriate complement to the other ongoing defence training activities. The successful conversion of this base to the task is widely supported by the community.

The centre’s development requires a modest capital outlay incurred over a period of years. Minimal capital cost will be needed to commence operations at the centre. Only with the further development of a multinational training centre at the base would additional capital expenditure be required.
At this time, Cornwallis has sufficient personnel in its support staff to maintain the new training centre. For example, there is a base administrative staff, an engineering department, a transport department, a fire department, a full range of hospital and dental staff, sufficient base equipment and stores personnel, cooks, and mess workers. Whereas there will be a requirement for a number of new instructors and trainers at this centre, the majority of these personnel can be drawn from within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. This training centre is unlikely to entail a major investment in new personnel.

The Canadian peacekeeping training centre could be in operation within six months. Among the specific Cornwallis facilities that could now be assigned to the peacekeeping training centre are:

- two wings of Academic Building no 1 (Korea Hall) #10
- officer’s quarters #31-1
- junior and senior ranks quarters #31-2
- barrack blocks #s: 34-1, 34-2, 34-3, 34-5, 34-6, 34-7, 34-8
- block 34-9 (as faculty offices)
- block 34-10 (as administrative offices)
- drill hangar #95
Identification of the facilities is shown on the site lay-out of CFB Cornwallis on the next page.

The further development of a multinational training centre will entail additional requirements and expense. These will depend upon a needs-analysis which meets the tasks that the peacekeeping training centre at Cornwallis will perform.

In summary, CFB Cornwallis exceeds all the necessary criteria cited for a peacekeeping training centre. The proposed location provides a number of unique advantages. Few locations offer better access to Canadian Forces support. As the required facilities and personnel services are already in place, this base will be cost-effectively converted into a Canadian peacekeeping training centre.
Conclusion

Canada’s defence priorities will be changing in 1994 to meet the emerging demands of peacekeeping.

Whereas Canadian Forces have extensive peacekeeping experience, it is apparent that current peacekeeping training efforts urgently need to be modernized and assigned to a dedicated defence training centre. General-purpose combat training must be supplemented with advance general peacekeeping training and mission-specific training.

There is widespread support for such an initiative. The United Nations has encouraged member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party of Canada have expressed their support for the establishment of a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has also called for the development of a permanent Canadian peacekeeping training centre and advised that appropriate training be provided to all ranks and reserves. These recommendations call for positive action on Nova Scotia’s plan to establish a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis.
CFB Cornwallis has been widely identified as an appropriate location to host a Canadian peacekeeping training centre. This base has the required facilities and sufficient space. Its proximity to Canadian Forces air, naval and land support is conducive to joint peacekeeping training. In addition, this proximity provides the potential to stage future peacekeeping operations. A new peacekeeping training programme would complement assigned recruit, sea-cadet and reserve training programmes.

The success of the United Nations and peacekeeping will be partially determined by the extent to which member states institutionalize appropriate supportive arrangements. The federal government now has a unique and cost-effective opportunity to convert defence training infrastructure at CFB Cornwallis to serve acknowledged Canadian and United Nations objectives. In the words of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson:

Are we to go from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act? (1957)

Overall, there are sound strategic and economic grounds for converting CFB Cornwallis into a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre. This has the potential to be an important contribution to regional, national and international security.
The development of Canada's peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis would reflect the long-term vision and commitment to internationalism that inspired peacekeeping. As Prime Minister Chretien has recognized: "the time for such a centre has come."
Recent UN operations have entailed diverse assignments involving traditional peacekeeping as well as complicated, often dangerous military operations, election-monitoring, policing, border patrol, sanctions enforcement, civil administration, and disaster relief. The expanding scope of peacekeeping has also bolstered the demand for new capabilities and improved training.

More and more member states are participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the past year, 75 nations contributed peacekeeping personnel to the United Nations -- roughly three times as many participating countries as there were a decade ago. Many of these new troop contributors lack the experience and skills of the traditional troop contributors.

While this expansion of demand, scale, scope and participation can be expected to level off, peacekeeping will likely remain the international community's principal mechanism for dealing with violent conflict in the post-Cold War era. Our defence officials acknowledge that "peacekeeping as an instrument of conflict resolution will play a pre-eminent role in the emerging international system." (Bremner & Snell, Canadian Defence Quarterly, August 1992)
The major challenge now is to generate the institutional arrangements to prepare both Canada and other UN member states for this role. We can provide a model for the future and a model for others.
Canada in Peacekeeping: Recognizing The Obligation to Prepare Professionally

Peacekeeping has rapidly emerged as the dominant Canadian defence activity of the 1990s. Participation in United Nations peacekeeping now accounts for over eighty percent of the active duty operations of the Canadian Forces.

Since 1988, when peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Canada has contributed to all 20 missions mounted by the UN. The demand for Canadian peacekeepers has been unprecedented. Last year, approximately 4,700 Canadian peacekeepers were deployed to 15 diverse UN operations. Since it is necessary to rotate personnel every six months, nearly 9,000 Canadian peacekeepers were active in peacekeeping service.

Canadian peacekeepers are now deployed to 16 UN missions worldwide. Over the next decade, our regular forces, reserves and civilians will be engaged in an array of diverse peacekeeping assignments. In short, we can anticipate considerable long-term demand for well-trained peacekeepers.
CFB Cornwallis: A Cost-Effective Conversion of Existing Defence Infrastructure

Location

CFB Cornwallis is situated in Southwestern Nova Scotia. Located on the shores of the Annapolis Basin, the base is approximately 15 kilometres east of Digby and 15 kilometres west of Annapolis Royal and Fort Anne. Military air transport is available within 80 kilometres at CFB Greenwood. The Halifax International Airport is approximately 225 kilometres to the east. Direct access to the Eastern United States is available through the Yarmouth airport. This base is a fifteen minute drive from the ferry to St. John, New Brunswick. Cornwallis is also served by an all-weather, limited-access highway from Halifax.

The Cornwallis site has advantages:

- proximity to the airbase at CFB Greenwood, the land base at CFB Gagetown and the naval base at CFB Halifax would facilitate tri-service peacekeeping training;

- the geo-strategic location offers rapid deployment to operations in the Middle East, Central America, Eastern Europe and Africa;

- Dalhousie University (Halifax), Acadia University (Wolfville), University of New Brunswick (Fredericton) and Université Ste. Anne (Pointe-de-l’Eglise) will provide resources and expertise;
- the base offers a semi-isolated training environment;

- the relatively temperate climate of the Western Annapolis Valley offers the potential to conduct year-round training outdoors;

- there is a wide range of accessible terrain in the immediate area;

- most of the required training facilities, resources and support services are already in place;

- the surrounding communities depend upon and support the military presence; peacekeeping training and exercises in the surrounding area would be welcomed.

Cornwallis provides an ideal setting for a multinational peacekeeping training centre. Aside from the scenic site, the surrounding area is of considerable historic importance. Canada’s oldest settlement, the Habitation in Port Royal, is roughly 5 kilometres across the Annapolis Basin. Among the area’s noted recreational attractions are: a nearby Provincial Theme Park and Wildlife Park; Kejimkujik National Park; the Annapolis Theatre, Historic Gardens, and farmer’s market; the Digby scallop fleet; numerous historic sites; whale-watching and sea-bass fishing; as well as golf and tennis facilities. The nearby Digby Pines is widely regarded as an excellent resort and conference centre.
Location of CFB Cornwallis in relation to the headquarters of the United Nations, Canadian National Defence and Mobile Command.
Facilities

CFB Cornwallis has sufficient barrack space and mess facilities to accommodate the proposed peacekeeping training centre. Renovations were recently completed on several large blocks of junior and senior rank quarters. Aside from a capacity to host over 1,000 peacekeeping trainees, this base has approximately 100 officer suites available for training centre staff and visiting officers. The Cornwallis Base Development Book lists the life expectancy on most of the required facilities as between the years 2010 and 2015.

A number of class rooms, seminar rooms and two theatres are available for instructional purposes. There is also adequate drill and storage space in a number of large halls and hangars. These facilities could be used to stage and prepare future operations.

A full range of health and hygiene services are provided at the base hospital. Among the available recreational facilities are: three olympic-size swimming pools; two baseball fields; three soccer fields; three tennis courts; a large gymnasium; a curling rink; a hockey rink; a bowling alley; and two recreation centres, one with a five-hundred-seat theatre.
Two obstacle courses and a small-arms firing range are located on the 650-acre base. An additional firing range on a 3,000 acre site is located within fifteen kilometres at Granville Ferry.

Cornwallis has the capacity to host the sort of 'urban warfare training centre' that the Department of National Defence has paid to use for peacekeeping training at Fort Ord and Fort Pendleton, California. Those with expertise in establishing this type of training resource have already expressed an interest in locating such a centre either on or adjacent to the Cornwallis base. The Canadian Forces and several police departments are also interested in having access to such a facility.

Some sources have suggested that a peacekeeping training centre will require additional land for field exercises and simulations. Of the 650 acres comprising the Cornwallis base, approximately 350 unused acres might be used for these training exercises. Additional land is also available in the immediate region at a relatively low cost.
Current Status

CFB Cornwallis is a Canadian Forces tri-service training centre. It was developed fifty years ago as HMCS Cornwallis and initially tasked to naval training. Its primary contemporary role has been to conduct basic training for Canadian recruits. HMCS Acadia, a large sea-cadet camp, is run on site in the summer. The base is also used for naval reserve and militia training.

Up until 1991, Cornwallis employed 1,100 military staff and civilian personnel to train approximately 4,000 recruits annually. Recruit enrolment is projected to drop to 900 trainees in 1994; sea cadet enrolment will likely remain at 1,400; and there will be approximately 700 naval reserve trainees.

Peacekeeping training would be an appropriate complement to the other ongoing defence training activities. The successful conversion of this base to the task is widely supported by the community.

The centre’s development requires a modest capital outlay incurred over a period of years. Minimal capital cost will be needed to commence operations at the centre. Only with the further development of a multinational training centre at the base would additional capital expenditure be required.
At this time, Cornwallis has sufficient personnel in its support staff to maintain the new training centre. For example, there is a base administrative staff, an engineering department, a transport department, a fire department, a full range of hospital and dental staff, sufficient base equipment and stores personnel, cooks, and mess workers. Whereas there will be a requirement for a number of new instructors and trainers at this centre, the majority of these personnel can be drawn from within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. This training centre is unlikely to entail a major investment in new personnel.

The Canadian peacekeeping training centre could be in operation within six months. Among the specific Cornwallis facilities that could now be assigned to the peacekeeping training centre are:

- two wings of Academic Building no 1 (Korea Hall) #10
- officer’s quarters #31-1
- junior and senior ranks quarters #31-2
- barrack blocks #s: 34-1, 34-2, 34-3, 34-5, 34-6, 34-7, 34-8
- block 34-9 (as faculty offices)
- block 34-10 (as administrative offices)
- drill hangar #95
Identification of the facilities is shown on the site lay-out of CFB Cornwallis on the next page.

The further development of a multinational training centre will entail additional requirements and expense. These will depend upon a needs-analysis which meets the tasks that the peacekeeping training centre at Cornwallis will perform.

In summary, CFB Cornwallis exceeds all the necessary criteria cited for a peacekeeping training centre. The proposed location provides a number of unique advantages. Few locations offer better access to Canadian Forces support. As the required facilities and personnel services are already in place, this base will be cost-effectively converted into a Canadian peacekeeping training centre.
Conclusion

Canada's defence priorities will be changing in 1994 to meet the emerging demands of peacekeeping.

Whereas Canadian Forces have extensive peacekeeping experience, it is apparent that current peacekeeping training efforts urgently need to be modernized and assigned to a dedicated defence training centre. General-purpose combat training must be supplemented with advance general peacekeeping training and mission-specific training.

There is widespread support for such an initiative. The United Nations has encouraged member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. The Prime Minister and the Liberal Party of Canada have expressed their support for the establishment of a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs has also called for the development of a permanent Canadian peacekeeping training centre and advised that appropriate training be provided to all ranks and reserves. These recommendations call for positive action on Nova Scotia's plan to establish a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis.
CFB Cornwallis has been widely identified as an appropriate location to host a Canadian peacekeeping training centre. This base has the required facilities and sufficient space. Its proximity to Canadian Forces air, naval and land support is conducive to joint peacekeeping training. In addition, this proximity provides the potential to stage future peacekeeping operations. A new peacekeeping training programme would complement assigned recruit, sea-cadet and reserve training programmes.

The success of the United Nations and peacekeeping will be partially determined by the extent to which member states institutionalize appropriate supportive arrangements. The federal government now has a unique and cost-effective opportunity to convert defence training infrastructure at CFB Cornwallis to serve acknowledged Canadian and United Nations objectives. In the words of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson:

Are we to go from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act? (1957)

Overall, there are sound strategic and economic grounds for converting CFB Cornwallis into a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre. This has the potential to be an important contribution to regional, national and international security.
The development of Canada's peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis would reflect the long-term vision and commitment to internationalism that inspired peacekeeping. As Prime Minister Chretien has recognized: "the time for such a centre has come."
ANNEXES

The Premier of Nova Scotia presented the proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre" to the Prime Minister of Canada in September 1991. The proposal recommended that this training base be double-tasked and assigned responsibility to train Canadian Forces, multinational forces and civilians for future peacekeeping operations. An expanded peacekeeping training programme was suggested as a means of supplementing sea-cadet training, reserve training, and the traditional, albeit reduced, recruit training programme at CFB Cornwallis.

The proposal coincided with renewed hope for a 'new world order' and the Government's announcement that Canadian Forces would be reduced to an overall strength of 76,000. It was apparent that some of the defence resources required by the Cold War could be cost-effectively converted to support other Canadian defence priorities. This initiative was a locally developed response to the challenge of defence down-sizing, one that sought to ensure cooperation with all levels of government in the search for a viable alternative to an otherwise difficult situation.

With the renaissance of the United Nations and peacekeeping, internationally recognized experts urged that a higher priority be accorded to peacekeeping training and that Canada develop a peacekeeping training
centre. Whereas Canadians had established a solid reputation for their longstanding commitment to peacekeeping, the proposal noted that the Department of National Defence had yet to develop an institutionalized peacekeeping training programme or assign this task to a dedicated training centre. As the scope of UN operations was expanding to include diverse peacekeeping assignments and new tasks, the need for both general and specialized peacekeeping training was widely recognized.

Upon the invitation of the former Prime Minister, the Province of Nova Scotia developed the follow-up report "CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence" which was presented to the federal government in March 1992. Expanding upon the 1991 proposal, the Blueprint:

- overviewed the international demand for peacekeeping and peacekeeping training;

- documented the Canadian requirement for an institutionalized peacekeeping training centre;

- outlined the proposed centre’s organizational structure; annual training activities; potential participants; and a curriculum of general and specialized training programmes for officers, other ranks, and civilians;

- established the personnel and infrastructure requirements of a proposed peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis;
demonstrated the advantages of CFB Cornwallis as the appropriate location for a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre; and,

reviewed the successful precedent established by those Scandinavian countries which have already developed UN peacekeeping training centres;

In the 1992 Blueprint, consideration was also accorded to preparing for the unprecedented number of new peacekeeping missions, the growing number of new troop contributors, and the expanding array of peacekeeping tasks.

On December 30, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote that the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis could not be effected. After consultations and what was described as a "meticulous study by peacekeeping experts", it was concluded that there was neither a need for such a training centre nor United Nation's support for such an initiative. (Correspondence, December 30, 1992)

This position was reiterated in February 1993 by then Defence Minister Kim Campbell who stated that "a peacekeeping training centre is a wonderful idea for most people who do not know anything about peacekeeping. I have had discussions with senior members of the Canadian military who are a bit perplexed as to what you would teach
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn't close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia's proposal in DND's 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence".
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn’t close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia’s proposal in DND’s 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence").
ANNEX B: The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities

Canadian peacekeepers are engaged in very important UN assignments worldwide. Over the past forty years, our regular forces and reserves have performed admirably in many diverse operations earning distinction and a solid reputation for their military professionalism.

We are now confronted by traditional peacekeeping tasks as well as another generation of UN operations -- operations that involve new methods, require new skills, and entail new partners. We can retain a high standard and a solid reputation for professionalism in this field -- but not by resting on past laurels nor by subscribing to outdated practices.

Our current defence training programme was designed in an earlier period to focus on the mid-to-high intensity combat operations envisaged throughout the Cold War. The emphasis has shifted, somewhat, to the development of general-purpose combat capability. Peacekeeping training is deemed to be a very low priority and related efforts are limited. Two short courses are provided for select officers while formed units receive mission-specific training and briefings at their various bases across the country once they have been assigned to a particular operation.
The Department of National Defence has yet to develop a modern, institutionalized peacekeeping training programme. As a result, the Canadian Forces training efforts for UN operations are frequently described as ad hoc, inconsistent and entailing risks.

Defence officials initially responded to the Cornwallis proposal arguing that Canadian Forces are military professionals and, as such, require little, if any additional training for peacekeeping. The military training provided for war -- general-purpose combat capability -- is argued to be sufficient training for peacekeeping. However, as one senior official acknowledged in 1991, "this line is the department's 'sales-job'; it entails risks but serves to protect a number of departmental priorities." Several of the risks have since become apparent.

Over the past two years, senior officials have been repeatedly forced to defend their reliance on general-purpose combat training and decentralized mission-specific briefings. Whereas the 'sales-job' has been institutionalized and accepted by some personnel, others are losing confidence in the training and leadership now provided.

Unfortunately, a cadre of senior officers continue to regard peacekeeping as a low-priority, ancillary role of the Canadian Forces. Training for UN peacekeeping operations is seen by some as an unnecessary departure from
professional soldiering and the traditional emphasis in training on combat-arms skills. This position is reflected in the words of Major-General Lewis Mackenzie who stated in 1993 that "I think we're unanimous in the military that there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 12, 1993)

The Cornwallis initiative is, therefore, viewed by sectors within DND as a challenge to longstanding defence priorities; a threat to the conservative defence constituency; and a potential drain on both time and available resources. This has prompted some senior officials to 'close ranks' and warn Canadian Forces personnel against voicing support for additional peacekeeping training and the development of a training centre.

As a result, DND's review of the 1992 Blueprint appears to have been conducted as a response to a perceived challenge; not as an objective assessment of an initiative that might serve mutual interests. Defence officials concluded this review arguing that:

Ultimately, the key issue is whether the CF need a peacekeeping training centre. The DND view remains that there is no need to substitute a centralized system of training for peacekeeping to replace the mainly decentralized training now conducted. Our training now produces a good peacekeeper, and there is no reason, either domestic or international, to centralize it.

(Directorate of International Policy, DND, September 1992)

[For a thorough assessment of this paper see "A Response to

There is, however, no longer a consensus within either the Canadian Forces or DND that the current system of training for peacekeeping is adequate.

Four steps will be essential if Canada is to retain a high standard and solid reputation for professionalism in this field. First, it needs to be recognized that current DND/CF peacekeeping training efforts must be improved; second, that all peacekeepers require general peacekeeping training as well as mission-specific training for UN operations; third, that recent efforts to improve training have been minimal and will not remedy the problems inherent in the de-centralized approach to training; and finally, this task must be assigned to an expert staff at a dedicated defence training centre.

---

1. DND/CF Peacekeeping Training Efforts Must Be Improved.

Recent events as well as departmental studies and evaluations prepared over the past three years indicate that there are serious problems inherent in present methods and related training efforts.
For example, a 1991 staff paper prepared within DND's Directorate of Peacekeeping for General de Chastelain states that:

There has been in the Canadian Forces a prevailing attitude that we need do very little in the way of preparation of our peacekeepers because of the basic military skills already learned. Unfortunately, this attitude is causing difficulties in competing with other peacekeeping contributors which are paying attention to the expressed wishes of the UN, and which are gradually upgrading their peacekeeping skills. The result is that a Scandinavian Reserve Officer, who receives a grounding in the subjects listed in the UN Training Guidelines could easily be a more knowledgeable, more sophisticated peacekeeper, at the start of his tour of UN duty, than his Canadian counterpart. If we resist acceptance of the Guidelines for refresher trg as well as for knowledge specifically related to UN staff work, such as mission orientation and negotiating skills, we will begin to fall behind. Trg must be given an appropriate priority. Attempts to downgrade the need for training for UN duty in order to save resources will only lead to a deterioration of our overall contribution. ("Peacekeeping Training--Staff Paper", 4500-1, DPKO 4, July 8, 1991, pp. 2-3)

Another short report on training prepared by the former Director of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that, "the comparison of Canadian training [for UN duties] with that of other countries is not always favorable for Canada." This Colonel writes that, "it is apparent to many who have served with a peacekeeping mission that some Canadian officers arrive for their mission unprepared mentally to accept the methods and idiosyncracies of other systems/nations."
Canadians are known as complainers, with an attitude of superiority based in part on a lack of knowledge". ("Peacekeeping Training Officers", 4500-1, February 1991, p. 2)

In 1991, the Special Peacekeeping Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reported that Canada’s peacekeeping training efforts were not effective. As this Brigadier-General wrote, "the training of our personnel selected for UN operations is not well managed as a CF-wide task. Most training activities are ad hoc and, with a few exceptions, occur only due to the initiative of field commanders." The Advisor conceded that in the ONUCA operation, both the Spanish and Venezuelan contingents "were quite superior to the Canadian contingent, when compared across the board". Among the wide range of concerns cited in his report were: the organization of peacekeeping training; the lack of directed training packages; the need to authorize responsibility for training; the need to establish training criteria and standards; the need to improve selection processes; and the requirement for special training for both officers and other-ranks. The Special Peacekeeping Advisor concluded with a strong recommendation for a review of Canadian peacekeeping training. ("Peacekeeping Review", 1850 -1/90, SPA/DCDS, January 23, 1991, pp. 9-14)
As one of those tasked with training Canadian personnel for a specific UN operation recently stated:

We are sending unqualified people to do qualified jobs. I am sorry to put it that way, but...we don't have enough training when it's time to get jobs like this done...There's never enough time. It would help if we had our own training centre. ("Canadian peacekeepers unqualified, says expert", The Chronicle-Herald, April 11, 1992)

The 1992 NDHQ program evaluation on peacekeeping also reports that while conventional military skills must be the first priority, troops need an overlay of special peacekeeping skills. This survey evaluation confirmed that, "various sources had commented on the shortfalls and inconsistencies of the training ranging from UN Headquarters to the national level. It was also noted that, in the modern environment of peacekeeping, training deficiencies could eventually lead to serious failures in operations." Again, it was noted that "peacekeeping matters are covered only briefly, if at all, in the curricula at staff colleges and some CF schools."(1258-77 DGPE, June 30, 1992, pp.253-256)

Reports from Commanders of Canadian peacekeeping contingents continue to document problems arising as a result of inadequate preparation and training.
Among the concerns frequently cited by UN veterans and officers are:

- the absence of peacemaking courses, seminars or instruction in the regular training programme of the Canadian Forces as well as in Canadian military colleges;

- the lack of a focal point for training or responsible peacekeeping training organization. Training for UN operations has yet to be incorporated into the Canadian Forces Training System or into the regular training of personnel. As a result, Canadian formed units now receive little, if any, advance preparation for UN assignments prior to mission-specific briefings;

- the lack of training in areas such as conflict analysis and conflict resolution. While it has been recognized that problems in the field should, where possible, be quickly resolved prior to escalation, insufficient attention has been accorded to providing the appropriate skills;

- assignment briefings and debriefings have been frequently overlooked, thus diminishing the potential store of 'lessens learned'. Moreover, there have been numerous occasions when Canadian personnel have been deployed to peacekeeping assignments without adequate information on the mission area, the conflict or their responsibilities as part of a UN force;

- the shortcomings in the current selection and review process. Attention should be accorded to determining those officers and other ranks appropriate for UN service;

- the risk of 'falling behind' those countries that provide peacekeeping contingents with general and specialized training programmes. While emphasizing professional military skills and a high level of proficiency in the related areas of
communications and logistics, there is a concern DND has failed to consolidate the expertise derived from experience in the majority of peacekeeping operations to date. The current emphasis in preparing Canadian personnel for UN service is merely on providing administrative guidelines and a basic acquaintance with the mission.

The extent to which peacekeeping training efforts continue to be downplayed is indicated by a closer examination of current programmes: the contingency training of Canada’s UN Stand-By Force tends to focus on combat operations and not on peacekeeping skills; the replacement/reinforcement/rotation training course tends to be for one mission (UNDOF) and, as is also the case for Military Observer Training, much of the emphasis throughout the week-long programme is accorded to hasty briefings and administrative requirements, not training.

DND’s curricula do not cover all necessary subjects nor do existing courses cover topics related to peacekeeping in sufficient depth. To cite examples from the officer’s training courses for Cyprus, for UNDOF, and for observers, some of relevant subjects are included, but the time spent on each general category averages well under two hours. For example, courses in important areas such as conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation are not yet routinely provided and have only recently been conducted in a few experimental exercises. As one of those responsible for
a pilot project on mediation training writes, "This is an area which deserves some attention, as soldiers face increasingly risky peacekeeping environments in the future...Eventually a common clearing-house for this sort of information should be established, to permit units to prepare for missions quickly and efficiently." (Major D.M. Last, "Training Officers to Mediate", April 1992, p.2) In some cases, DND only provides a briefing package which suggests recommended readings, placing the onus on the individual to be prepared. On a range of complex and important topics, personnel now occasionally receive a number of short seminars but seldom a thorough assessment and understanding of their mission and their role.

Overall, it is clear that DND has yet to develop an effective peacekeeping training programme. Priority is accorded to general military training, particularly combat-arms skills. Mission-specific training is now provided when time permits and when there is a will. This essential training, however, all too often consists of make-shift courses and briefings with the onus on the quick development of operational readiness. It tends to be conducted in an ad hoc manner with little support from experts; few established training standards; and insufficient consideration of UN peacekeeping skills and responsibilities.
It is evident that there are serious problems inherent in DND’s current system of preparation and training for UN missions. A number of these problems stem from the 'sales job' of military professionalism and the specious claim that no special training is required for the peacekeeping soldier. This is not a sound military practice.

2. All Peacekeepers Require General and Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training.

Training is a strong determinant of performance. Soldiers must train for the task assigned and this is particularly the case when the task may have 'life and death' or international implications. As their performance not only reflects upon Canada, but also upon the United Nations, peacekeepers must be well-prepared to manage situations which could have high stakes and serious political consequences.

Professional soldiers who have been trained to fight and to pursue victory aggressively against an enemy may find it difficult to adjust their attitude and behaviour to the equally demanding requirements of peacekeeping. While combat arms skills are a prerequisite, so too is appropriate professional training for peaceful third-party intervention. Last year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that:
The Canadian Forces have been adamant that training as a soldier to use force is precisely the training needed to be a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it. 
*(Meeting New Challenges: Canada’s Response To A New Generation Of Peacekeeping, February, 1993)*

Mediation training is essential to instill confidence, to perform effectively and to ensure that small problems do not escalate. Moreover, it is important not only for officers, but also for other ranks, reserves and even civilian peacekeepers. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence last year, it is essential that all ranks receive the necessary understanding and skills:

> In a peacekeeping operation, it is important to appreciate that negotiation and mediation often take place at all levels, even at the lowest levels of military representation and at the most isolated outposts. Experience has taught that incidents that are not resolved effectively at this lowest level, or in soldiers terms "at the sharp end", have the potential for rapid escalation and a high probability of resulting in a serious outbreak of hostilities. 
*(The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993)*

Professional military skills must be supplemented with professional peacekeeping skills. Many recognize that these skills are not synonymous.
Frederich Hessel of the Austrian Ministry of Defence acknowledges that their peacekeeping training centre "focuses on skills needed by UN soldiers which are often diametrically opposed to the ordinary military training which a soldier receives." (Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1991)

Experience has demonstrated that well-trained soldiers have both the organization and numerous capabilities often required in UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly evident, however, that this task also calls for different skills and significant adjustments in approach and action from those developed in combat training. It should be understood that these skills are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory. General combat training must simply be supplemented with general peacekeeping training. Effecting such a change will require a new training programme and a new training system.

All peacekeepers have responsibilities and all ranks deserve adequate training. A comprehensive four-week course of general peacekeeping training for all ranks would provide the basic skills and understanding required in UN operations. With the background provided in the four-week general training course, soldiers and units would be well prepared to move on to either specialized training courses or mission-specific training.
Another advantage provided by advance preparation is that personnel provided with a general training programme for UN peacekeeping would likely require a shorter refresher devoted to upgrading routine skills once assigned to a particular mission. As a result, the time allocated to mission-specific training might be shortened thereby facilitating a more rapid deployment. Such training will be all the more essential if Canadian Forces are to participate effectively in new tasks such as preventive deployment called for in the UN Agenda for Peace.

General peacekeeping training as well as appropriate mission-specific training will also be increasingly important for Canadian Reserves. This is essential as Canada is now moving away from an all-professional armed force towards a total force entailing the integration of more reserves than regular land forces into our defence effort. The Department of National Defence is already deploying a considerable number of reserves to various UN operations. In some serving battalions, reserves have constituted up to one-half of the Canadian contingent. As these are not full-time military professionals, concerns have been expressed as to the adequacy of their preparation and training. To date, the practice has been to use volunteers who, upon notice of an assignment, review general military training, particularly combat arms skills, and then proceed into a period of mission-specific training with their assigned units.
The new reliance on the reserves to fulfill UN peacekeeping duties clearly calls for advance peacekeeping training, a more structured training environment, standardized courses, and strict selection procedures.

The use of Canadian reserves in UN peacekeeping has prompted questions as to how they can be cost-effectively provided with adequate training.

Consider the example of the 350 Nova Scotian militia initially selected to serve in UNPROFOR: first they were sent from their home province to Gagetown, New Brunswick to review combat-arms skills; then they were flown to Winnipeg to join their assigned infantry unit; together they were sent to California for training at Fort Ord; then they returned to Winnipeg and some were flown back across the country prior to final staging for deployment. Apparently, there are considerable shortcomings, as well as considerable costs, with the current approach to training Canadian reserves for peacekeeping.

Recent UN operations have also been characterized by the frequent use of civilian peacekeeping contingents. As the UN Secretary-General noted in An Agenda for Peace, "increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military."
The trend toward deploying civilians, as well as large multi-dimensional operations involving both military and civilian contingents, is expected to continue. As previously noted, these operations have also demonstrated the need for appropriate training and joint exercises to clarify the various roles and responsibilities of civilian and military participants.

Current efforts to prepare Canada’s civilian peacekeepers are now limited to several short courses and briefings managed as the need arises by the UN, the Department of External Affairs, CIDA, the RCMP, Elections Canada, and several non-governmental organizations. Canada is well positioned to host a peacekeeping training programme for civilians at a dedicated centre. To date, Austria and Sweden are the only countries providing such a service.

Among the areas that warrant civilian peacekeeping training courses are: human rights work; democratic development; election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; civil administration and rehabilitation; refugee work; policing and customs; as well as conflict management and problem-solving. Consideration could also be devoted to the new roles of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace building'. Experience has demonstrated that appropriate time must be allocated for civilian training.
As noted in the Austrian training program for civilian peacekeeping "a high quality training programme needs a minimum of four weeks". (ASPR, Stadtschlaining, March 1993)

Whereas it is recommended that civilian peacekeeping training requirements be incorporated into the planning and development of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre, the short-term priority must be on improving Canadian Forces training for UN operations.


Since the Cornwallis plan was initially presented, a few steps have been taken to rectify deficiencies, as cited in the reports of the Special Peacekeeping Advisor and the Director of Peacekeeping Operations.

The 1991 UN Guidelines have been circulated, although some officers indicate they are not widely adhered to in training. And, although it is important to ensure that Canadian training is improved to meet the requirements set forth by the UN, it should be recognized that many member states have already institutionalized peacekeeping training programmes which exceed the standards called for in the UN Guidelines.
DND also authorized a short pilot course on negotiation that prompted a follow-up study on negotiation and mediation in peacekeeping. A new Canadian manual to guide peacekeeping training is being drafted and should shortly be available. One officer is developing a new curriculum to include the study of peacekeeping in Canadian Staff Colleges; another is preparing instructions and a curriculum to be used in the training of formed units.

The Directorate of Peacekeeping [formerly DPKO and now J3PK] is also attempting to improve training but it is ill-equipped and under-staffed to consolidate the lessons learned and the knowledge derived from Canada’s extensive experience in UN operations. Five officers are currently assigned to this Directorate. Their primary task is to coordinate all national activities related to the deployment, maintenance, and withdrawal of Canadian commitments in support of peacekeeping operations worldwide. As they now manage an enormous peacekeeping effort, insufficient resources and time are available to consolidate the lessons learned, to evaluate performance, to brief and debrief, and to effectively modernize Canadian training. Although there is a concern that immediate control over training be retained by those currently assigned the task, a few options are being reviewed.
A number of officers within DND are promoting the development of a small peacekeeping centre or privatized peacekeeping college with limited responsibility to train select officers. By training these officers under the auspices of a privatized institute, it is suggested that the appropriate knowledge and skills will be passed on by word-of-mouth through mission-specific training at the various units.

Providing excellent training to future trainers and officers must be a high priority. However, the very limited nature of this proposed option would do little to enhance the prospect of hosting joint peacekeeping exercises, large-scale simulations, and the training of Canadian or multinational formed units. It is also unlikely that a training programme for officers only would suffice to rectify the numerous problems cited in DND’s own reports on peacekeeping training. Whereas this small-scale approach might have been a valid option in the early 1980s, when UN peacekeeping was an occasional assignment, the UN General Assembly is asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. By comparison, it is doubtful that this option would be viewed domestically or internationally as a serious contribution to the United Nations or peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now Canada’s dominant defence activity. To assign this training task to a small centre or privatized college would be viewed as a negligent deferral of responsibility.
Training Canadian Forces personnel for UN operations is, and should remain, the obligation of the Department of National Defence.

In response to the report of the 1993 Military Board of Inquiry into Somalia, the former Chief of Defence Staff reaffirmed his support for the ongoing reliance upon general-purpose combat training but recommended that sufficient time be scheduled to conduct mission-specific training for the entire deployment group. He also called for a review of peacekeeping doctrine and asked that guidelines be developed to assess the effectiveness of mission-specific training for such operations. (DND, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol. XII, August 28, 93) Within four months, however, the new Minister of National Defence announced another inquiry into alleged violations of UN policy in the former Yugoslavia.

It is apparent that recent refinements by DND to current training practices are inadequate, if not superficial. It could be argued that they constitute more of a political diversion to retain the status-quo than a concentrated effort to improve Canadian peacekeeping training. The serious problems that have been cited in DND reports -- problems that are confirmed by other officers and veterans -- will not be easily remedied or fixed by half-measures such as a new course or manual. Whereas some units and commanders have developed better training procedures than others, the problems are systemic.
4. A Dedicated Peacekeeping Training Centre is Required.

Decentralized training will not suffice to prepare Canadian peacekeepers adequately for future UN commitments. The practice of decentralized peacekeeping training was developed in an earlier period when peacekeeping was less of a priority and only an occasional assignment. In 1994, United Nations peacekeeping can no longer be viewed as a secondary activity requiring minimal and last-minute preparations.

Decentralized training for peacekeeping is conducted in the various home units at bases across the country. This training is seldom supervised by peacekeeping experts and not yet conducted according to a uniform standard. The training varies from unit to unit and remains at the discretion of individual commanders. As specific training for UN operations is not accorded a high priority, it is taken seriously by some units and neglected by others. To cite one example, the officer in charge of Force Mobile Command is assigned responsibility for the training of personnel, units and formations within the Command. Yet a recent DND report acknowledges, "FMC does not have a specific training policy, nor has it issued direction for training for peacekeeping operations." As the author of this report writes, "the lack of direction and guidance by
FMCHQ creates the possibility of inconsistent training and preparations from one contingent to the next". Furthermore, this report on training policy states that "during the course of the Review a search of all policy documents and information gathered in interviews revealed a lack of direction to Commands in the area of training policy and standards in the preparation of units for peacekeeping duty". ("DND Final Report", April 15, 1992, pp. 124-125, 39)

The Special Peacekeeping Advisor also noted the limitations of decentralized training in his review of the options for training replacement personnel. As he wrote:

A centralized CF training centre for deploying personnel using standard training packages in one location has considerable merit, and has been used successfully in CFB Montreal for Op DANACA. Alternatively, course packages could be sent to despatching bases, however, it is probable that this will give an inconsistent and operationally unsatisfactory product.


Many of the problems cited in DND’s reports on peacekeeping training appear to be directly related to the decentralized system. The decentralized approach clearly limits the support that might be provided by established experts and a permanent training staff. By decentralizing peacekeeping training, it remains an ad hoc, low-priority task.
As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs:

A few detractors have finally conceded that our personnel might need to do more peacekeeping training as long as it can be done within individual units at decentralized locations across the country. They like this decentralized idea because it really means occasional training—fragmented and up to the discretion of the unit commander. Decentralized training is de-emphasized training. It does not lead to advanced standardized training. DND’s own reports have indicated that the lack of guidance in such an approach creates the possibility of inconsistent and deficient training. Decentralized training can too easily become a way of doing business as usual, of paying only lip service to the UN’s request. (SCONDVA, Issue No.42, March 30, 1993, p. 8)

Moreover, among Canadian defence tasks, decentralized training is almost unique to peacekeeping. Training for most defence activities is assigned to a training school at a specific base. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Beattie stated:

If you want an important job done well, do it the way Canadian forces have routinely done it for their other priority tasks: develop a training centre. We have land combat training centres, maritime training centres, basic training centres, flight training centres, engineering schools, schools for administration and logistics and so on. It is time DND developed a peacekeeping training centre. (Ibid., p. 9)
Canadian Forces personnel and units routinely travel to dedicated defence training centres in both Canada and the United States for instruction and exercises related to a particular defence commitment. A dedicated peacekeeping training centre in Canada would provide the following advantages:

- peacekeeping training would be established as a priority task;

- a dedicated staff of specialists and trainers would ensure quality control over both the training and the selection of peacekeepers;

- a supportive training environment would restore confidence and help participants understand their required skills, roles, and responsibilities;

- the public and the government would be assured that Canadian Forces are not only well prepared for UN operations but also capable of other potential low-intensity operations such as providing aid to the civil power and domestic constabulary services;

- it would provide an opportunity to run controlled simulations and joint exercises;

- it would facilitate research into peacekeeping and conflict de-escalation as well as help consolidate the lessons learned from field exercises, simulations, and previous operational experience;
- internationally accepted doctrine, strategy, and standard operating procedures might be refined in both the contingency planning and training for future operations;

- operations might be mounted or staged out of this centre immediately after mission-specific training thus reducing considerable transportation costs;

- other UN member states and NATO allies would have access to a dedicated facility and modern training programme; and,

- it would demonstrate Canada's enduring commitment to the United Nations and peacekeeping.

DND reports prepared over the last three years have also outlined other reasons and criteria for establishing such a training facility. Under the heading "Establishing a Training Centre", one officer writes that, "in order to maintain, and even more so, improve on current standards, there must be a tri-service center for peacekeeping operations. This center of excellence would handle all DAG (departure assistance groups) duties and act as a repository for corporate knowledge from the field." The author cites the following reasons for a permanent centre:

- peacekeeping is a tri-service commitment, however, many naval and air bases cannot provide the specialist indoctrination and equipment;

- individual commands have their own centres of excellence; e.g., Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax;
- dedicated staff are on call to coordinate contingencies and can routinely analyse lessons learned from field reports (a field reporting system must be instituted to capture experience and share them);

- other nations will increasingly compete with Canada for 'market share'—a dedicated centre is the only way to raise standards;

- a dedicated centre could run specialized briefings for reserves and hence open up an extremely valuable experience and morale boosting opportunity to them. ("Establishing A Training Centre", Annex B to After Action Report, Peacekeeping Officers CRSE, May 15, 1991)

Another 1991 staff paper prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff suggests the following criteria for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre:

- it must be a lodger unit on a Base that can provide quarters (up to 110) and lecture facilities;

- the centre should be a national unit with no bias towards Army, Navy, Air Force or ADM Mat;

- the Centre should be established to provide year-round service, including contingency training and maintenance of the training library. The staff must include expertise (experienced) from each major mission area...;

- must be a bilingual unit; and

The Premier of Nova Scotia presented the proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre" to the Prime Minister of Canada in September 1991. The proposal recommended that this training base be double-tasked and assigned responsibility to train Canadian Forces, multinational forces and civilians for future peacekeeping operations. An expanded peacekeeping training programme was suggested as a means of supplementing sea-cadet training, reserve training, and the traditional, albeit reduced, recruit training programme at CFB Cornwallis.

The proposal coincided with renewed hope for a 'new world order' and the Government's announcement that Canadian Forces would be reduced to an overall strength of 76,000. It was apparent that some of the defence resources required by the Cold War could be cost-effectively converted to support other Canadian defence priorities. This initiative was a locally developed response to the challenge of defence down-sizing, one that sought to ensure cooperation with all levels of government in the search for a viable alternative to an otherwise difficult situation.

With the renaissance of the United Nations and peacekeeping, internationally recognized experts urged that a higher priority be accorded to peacekeeping training and that Canada develop a peacekeeping training
centre. Whereas Canadians had established a solid reputation for their longstanding commitment to peacekeeping, the proposal noted that the Department of National Defence had yet to develop an institutionalized peacekeeping training programme or assign this task to a dedicated training centre. As the scope of UN operations was expanding to include diverse peacekeeping assignments and new tasks, the need for both general and specialized peacekeeping training was widely recognized.

Upon the invitation of the former Prime Minister, the Province of Nova Scotia developed the follow-up report "CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence" which was presented to the federal government in March 1992. Expanding upon the 1991 proposal, the Blueprint:

- overviewed the international demand for peacekeeping and peacekeeping training;

- documented the Canadian requirement for an institutionalized peacekeeping training centre;

- outlined the proposed centre's organizational structure; annual training activities; potential participants; and a curriculum of general and specialized training programmes for officers, other ranks, and civilians;

- established the personnel and infrastructure requirements of a proposed peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis;
- demonstrated the advantages of CFB Cornwallis as the appropriate location for a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre; and,

- reviewed the successful precedent established by those Scandinavian countries which have already developed UN peacekeeping training centres;

In the 1992 Blueprint, consideration was also accorded to preparing for the unprecedented number of new peacekeeping missions, the growing number of new troop contributors, and the expanding array of peacekeeping tasks.

On December 30, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote that the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre at CFB Cornwallis could not be effected. After consultations and what was described as a "meticulous study by peacekeeping experts", it was concluded that there was neither a need for such a training centre nor United Nation’s support for such an initiative. (Correspondence, December 30, 1992)

This position was reiterated in February 1993 by then Defence Minister Kim Campbell who stated that "a peacekeeping training centre is a wonderful idea for most people who do not know anything about peacekeeping. I have had discussions with senior members of the Canadian military who are a bit perplexed as to what you would teach
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn't close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia’s proposal in DND’s 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence".
people but the normal skills of a good combat ready military." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 16, 1993)

Within six months, however, the new Prime Minister, retracted stating that she "certainly wouldn't close the door on the idea at all". Accordingly, on September 21, 1993, Prime Minister Campbell directed her Minister of National Defence to review the concept of establishing a peacekeeping training centre." (Correspondence, September 21, 1993)

Apparently, serious consideration had not been accorded to the Province of Nova Scotia's proposal in DND's 1992 "meticulous study". Nor evidently, was serious consideration given to the United Nations General Assembly resolution asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres.

A wide range of related events and reports over the past two years have confirmed the rationale presented in the 1991 proposal "CFB Cornwallis: Canada's Peacekeeping Training Centre" and the 1992 "Blueprint for a Peacekeeping Training Centre of Excellence".
ANNEX B: The Training Problem: Moving Four Steps Beyond the Sales Job, Outdated Practices and Priorities

Canadian peacekeepers are engaged in very important UN assignments worldwide. Over the past forty years, our regular forces and reserves have performed admirably in many diverse operations earning distinction and a solid reputation for their military professionalism.

We are now confronted by traditional peacekeeping tasks as well as another generation of UN operations -- operations that involve new methods, require new skills, and entail new partners. We can retain a high standard and a solid reputation for professionalism in this field -- but not by resting on past laurels nor by subscribing to outdated practices.

Our current defence training programme was designed in an earlier period to focus on the mid-to-high intensity combat operations envisaged throughout the Cold War. The emphasis has shifted, somewhat, to the development of general-purpose combat capability. Peacekeeping training is deemed to be a very low priority and related efforts are limited. Two short courses are provided for select officers while formed units receive mission-specific training and briefings at their various bases across the country once they have been assigned to a particular operation.
The Department of National Defence has yet to develop a modern, institutionalized peacekeeping training programme. As a result, the Canadian Forces training efforts for UN operations are frequently described as ad hoc, inconsistent and entailing risks.

Defence officials initially responded to the Cornwallis proposal arguing that Canadian Forces are military professionals and, as such, require little, if any additional training for peacekeeping. The military training provided for war -- general-purpose combat capability -- is argued to be sufficient training for peacekeeping. However, as one senior official acknowledged in 1991, "this line is the department’s 'sales-job'; it entails risks but serves to protect a number of departmental priorities." Several of the risks have since become apparent.

Over the past two years, senior officials have been repeatedly forced to defend their reliance on general-purpose combat training and decentralized mission-specific briefings. Whereas the 'sales-job' has been institutionalized and accepted by some personnel, others are losing confidence in the training and leadership now provided.

Unfortunately, a cadre of senior officers continue to regard peacekeeping as a low-priority, ancillary role of the Canadian Forces. Training for UN peacekeeping operations is seen by some as an unnecessary departure from
professional soldiering and the traditional emphasis in training on combat-arms skills. This position is reflected in the words of Major-General Lewis Mackenzie who stated in 1993 that "I think we're unanimous in the military that there is no special training (required) for the peacekeeping soldier." (The Chronicle-Herald, February 12, 1993)

The Cornwallis initiative is, therefore, viewed by sectors within DND as a challenge to longstanding defence priorities; a threat to the conservative defence constituency; and a potential drain on both time and available resources. This has prompted some senior officials to 'close ranks' and warn Canadian Forces personnel against voicing support for additional peacekeeping training and the development of a training centre.

As a result, DND's review of the 1992 Blueprint appears to have been conducted as a response to a perceived challenge; not as an objective assessment of an initiative that might serve mutual interests. Defence officials concluded this review arguing that:

Ultimately, the key issue is whether the CF need a peacekeeping training centre. The DND view remains that there is no need to substitute a centralized system of training for peacekeeping to replace the mainly decentralized training now conducted. Our training now produces a good peacekeeper, and there is no reason, either domestic or international, to centralize it. (Directorate of International Policy, DND, September 1992)

[For a thorough assessment of this paper see "A Response to]
the Review Prepared By DI POL, DND regarding the Province of Nova Scotia’s report, ’CFB Cornwallis: A Blueprint...’", May 1993]

There is, however, no longer a consensus within either the Canadian Forces or DND that the current system of training for peacekeeping is adequate.

Four steps will be essential if Canada is to retain a high standard and solid reputation for professionalism in this field. First, it needs to be recognized that current DND/CF peacekeeping training efforts must be improved; second, that all peacekeepers require general peacekeeping training as well as mission-specific training for UN operations; third, that recent efforts to improve training have been minimal and will not remedy the problems inherent in the de-centralized approach to training; and finally, this task must be assigned to an expert staff at a dedicated defence training centre.

1. DND/CF Peacekeeping Training Efforts Must Be Improved.

Recent events as well as departmental studies and evaluations prepared over the past three years indicate that there are serious problems inherent in present methods and related training efforts.
For example, a 1991 staff paper prepared within DND’s Directorate of Peacekeeping for General de Chastelain states that:

There has been in the Canadian Forces a prevailing attitude that we need do very little in the way of preparation of our peacekeepers because of the basic military skills already learned. Unfortunately, this attitude is causing difficulties in competing with other peacekeeping contributors which are paying attention to the expressed wishes of the UN, and which are gradually upgrading their peacekeeping skills. The result is that a Scandinavian Reserve Officer, who receives a grounding in the subjects listed in the UN Training Guidelines could easily be a more knowledgeable, more sophisticated peacekeeper, at the start of his tour of UN duty, than his Canadian counterpart. If we resist acceptance of the Guidelines for refresher trg as well as for knowledge specifically related to UN staff work, such as mission orientation and negotiating skills, we will begin to fall behind. Trg must be given an appropriate priority. Attempts to downgrade the need for training for UN duty in order to save resources will only lead to a deterioration of our overall contribution. ("Peacekeeping Training—Staff Paper", 4500-1, DPKO 4, July 8, 1991, pp. 2-3)

Another short report on training prepared by the former Director of Peacekeeping Operations acknowledges that, "the comparison of Canadian training [for UN duties] with that of other countries is not always favorable for Canada." This Colonel writes that, "it is apparent to many who have served with a peacekeeping mission that some Canadian officers arrive for their mission unprepared mentally to accept the methods and idiosyncracies of other systems/nations."
Canadians are known as complainers, with an attitude of superiority based in part on a lack of knowledge". ("Peacekeeping Training Officers", 4500-1, February 1991, p. 2)

In 1991, the Special Peacekeeping Advisor to the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff reported that Canada's peacekeeping training efforts were not effective. As this Brigadier-General wrote, "the training of our personnel selected for UN operations is not well managed as a CF-wide task. Most training activities are ad hoc and, with a few exceptions, occur only due to the initiative of field commanders." The Advisor conceded that in the ONUCA operation, both the Spanish and Venezuelan contingents "were quite superior to the Canadian contingent, when compared across the board". Among the wide range of concerns cited in his report were: the organization of peacekeeping training; the lack of directed training packages; the need to authorize responsibility for training; the need to establish training criteria and standards; the need to improve selection processes; and the requirement for special training for both officers and other-ranks. The Special Peacekeeping Advisor concluded with a strong recommendation for a review of Canadian peacekeeping training. ("Peacekeeping Review", 1850-1/90, SPA/DCDS, January 23, 1991, pp. 9-14)
As one of those tasked with training Canadian personnel for a specific UN operation recently stated:

We are sending unqualified people to do qualified jobs. I am sorry to put it that way, but...we don’t have enough training when it’s time to get jobs like this done...There’s never enough time. It would help if we had our own training centre. ("Canadian peacekeepers unqualified, says expert", The Chronicle-Herald, April 11, 1992)

The 1992 NDHQ program evaluation on peacekeeping also reports that while conventional military skills must be the first priority, troops need an overlay of special peacekeeping skills. This survey evaluation confirmed that, "various sources had commented on the shortfalls and inconsistencies of the training ranging from UN Headquarters to the national level. It was also noted that, in the modern environment of peacekeeping, training deficiencies could eventually lead to serious failures in operations." Again, it was noted that "peacekeeping matters are covered only briefly, if at all, in the curricula at staff colleges and some CF schools." (1258-77 DGPE, June 30, 1992, pp.253-256)

Reports from Commanders of Canadian peacekeeping contingents continue to document problems arising as a result of inadequate preparation and training.
Among the concerns frequently cited by UN veterans and officers are:

- the absence of peackeeping courses, seminars or instruction in the regular training programme of the Canadian Forces as well as in Canadian military colleges;

- the lack of a focal point for training or responsible peackeeping training organization. Training for UN operations has yet to be incorporated into the Canadian Forces Training System or into the regular training of personnel. As a result, Canadian formed units now receive little, if any, advance preparation for UN assignments prior to mission-specific briefings;

- the lack of training in areas such as conflict analysis and conflict resolution. While it has been recognized that problems in the field should, where possible, be quickly resolved prior to escalation, insufficient attention has been accorded to providing the appropriate skills;

- assignment briefings and debriefings have been frequently overlooked, thus diminishing the potential store of 'lessons learned'. Moreover, there have been numerous occasions when Canadian personnel have been deployed to peackeeping assignments without adequate information on the mission area, the conflict or their responsibilities as part of a UN force;

- the shortcomings in the current selection and review process. Attention should be accorded to determining those officers and other ranks appropriate for UN service;

- the risk of 'falling behind' those countries that provide peackeeping contingents with general and specialized training programmes. While emphasizing professional military skills and a high level of proficiency in the related areas of
communications and logistics, there is a concern DND has failed to consolidate the expertise derived from experience in the majority of peacekeeping operations to date. The current emphasis in preparing Canadian personnel for UN service is merely on providing administrative guidelines and a basic acquaintance with the mission.

The extent to which peacekeeping training efforts continue to be downplayed is indicated by a closer examination of current programmes: the contingency training of Canada’s UN Stand-By Force tends to focus on combat operations and not on peacekeeping skills; the replacement/reinforcement/rotation training course tends to be for one mission (UNDOF) and, as is also the case for Military Observer Training, much of the emphasis throughout the week-long programme is accorded to hasty briefings and administrative requirements, not training.

DND’s curricula do not cover all necessary subjects nor do existing courses cover topics related to peacekeeping in sufficient depth. To cite examples from the officer’s training courses for Cyprus, for UNDOF, and for observers, some of relevant subjects are included, but the time spent on each general category averages well under two hours. For example, courses in important areas such as conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation are not yet routinely provided and have only recently been conducted in a few experimental exercises. As one of those responsible for
a pilot project on mediation training writes, "This is an area which deserves some attention, as soldiers face increasingly risky peacekeeping environments in the future...Eventually a common clearing-house for this sort of information should be established, to permit units to prepare for missions quickly and efficiently." (Major D.M. Last, "Training Officers to Mediate", April 1992, p.2) In some cases, DND only provides a briefing package which suggests recommended readings, placing the onus on the individual to be prepared. On a range of complex and important topics, personnel now occasionally receive a number of short seminars but seldom a thorough assessment and understanding of their mission and their role.

Overall, it is clear that DND has yet to develop an effective peacekeeping training programme. Priority is accorded to general military training, particularly combat-arms skills. Mission-specific training is now provided when time permits and when there is a will. This essential training, however, all too often consists of make-shift courses and briefings with the onus on the quick development of operational readiness. It tends to be conducted in an ad hoc manner with little support from experts; few established training standards; and insufficient consideration of UN peacekeeping skills and responsibilities.
It is evident that there are serious problems inherent in DND’s current system of preparation and training for UN missions. A number of these problems stem from the 'sales job' of military professionalism and the specious claim that no special training is required for the peacekeeping soldier. This is not a sound military practice.

2. All Peacekeepers Require General and Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training.

Training is a strong determinant of performance. Soldiers must train for the task assigned and this is particularly the case when the task may have 'life and death' or international implications. As their performance not only reflects upon Canada, but also upon the United Nations, peacekeepers must be well-prepared to manage situations which could have high stakes and serious political consequences.

Professional soldiers who have been trained to fight and to pursue victory aggressively against an enemy may find it difficult to adjust their attitude and behaviour to the equally demanding requirements of peacekeeping. While combat arms skills are a prerequisite, so too is appropriate professional training for peaceful third-party intervention. Last year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs reported that:

45
The Canadian Forces have been adamant that training as a soldier to use force is precisely the training needed to be a good peacekeeper. But mediation is not a soldierly skill; it is not warlike or militaristic. It is the opposite of those attributes. Especially with soldiers trained for war, it needs to be encouraged and stimulated: they need training in it.

(Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response To A New Generation Of Peacekeeping, February, 1993)

Mediation training is essential to instill confidence, to perform effectively and to ensure that small problems do not escalate. Moreover, it is important not only for officers, but also for other ranks, reserves and even civilian peacekeepers. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence last year, it is essential that all ranks receive the necessary understanding and skills:

In a peacekeeping operation, it is important to appreciate that negotiation and mediation often take place at all levels, even at the lowest levels of military representation and at the most isolated outposts. Experience has taught that incidents that are not resolved effectively at this lowest level, or in soldiers terms "at the sharp end", have the potential for rapid escalation and a high probability of resulting in a serious outbreak of hostilities.

(The Dilemmas of a Committed Peacekeeper: Canada and the Renewal of Peacekeeping, June 1993)

Professional military skills must be supplemented with professional peacekeeping skills. Many recognize that these skills are not synonymous.
Frederich Hessel of the Austrian Ministry of Defence acknowledges that their peacekeeping training centre "focuses on skills needed by UN soldiers which are often diametrically opposed to the ordinary military training which a soldier receives." (Peacekeeping and International Relations, May/June 1991)

Experience has demonstrated that well-trained soldiers have both the organization and numerous capabilities often required in UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly evident, however, that this task also calls for different skills and significant adjustments in approach and action from those developed in combat training. It should be understood that these skills are by no means mutually exclusive or contradictory. General combat training must simply be supplemented with general peacekeeping training. Effecting such a change will require a new training programme and a new training system.

All peacekeepers have responsibilities and all ranks deserve adequate training. A comprehensive four-week course of general peacekeeping training for all ranks would provide the basic skills and understanding required in UN operations. With the background provided in the four-week general training course, soldiers and units would be well prepared to move on to either specialized training courses or mission-specific training.
Another advantage provided by advance preparation is that personnel provided with a general training programme for UN peacekeeping would likely require a shorter refresher devoted to upgrading routine skills once assigned to a particular mission. As a result, the time allocated to mission-specific training might be shortened thereby facilitating a more rapid deployment. Such training will be all the more essential if Canadian Forces are to participate effectively in new tasks such as preventive deployment called for in the UN Agenda for Peace.

General peacekeeping training as well as appropriate mission-specific training will also be increasingly important for Canadian Reserves. This is essential as Canada is now moving away from an all-professional armed force towards a total force entailing the integration of more reserves than regular land forces into our defence effort. The Department of National Defence is already deploying a considerable number of reserves to various UN operations. In some serving battalions, reserves have constituted up to one-half of the Canadian contingent. As these are not full-time military professionals, concerns have been expressed as to the adequacy of their preparation and training. To date, the practice has been to use volunteers who, upon notice of an assignment, review general military training, particularly combat arms skills, and then proceed into a period of mission-specific training with their assigned units.
The new reliance on the reserves to fulfill UN peacekeeping duties clearly calls for advance peacekeeping training, a more structured training environment, standardized courses, and strict selection procedures.

The use of Canadian reserves in UN peacekeeping has prompted questions as to how they can be cost-effectively provided with adequate training. Consider the example of the 350 Nova Scotian militia initially selected to serve in UNPROFOR: first they were sent from their home province to Gagetown, New Brunswick to review combat-arms skills; then they were flown to Winnipeg to join their assigned infantry unit; together they were sent to California for training at Fort Ord; then they returned to Winnipeg and some were flown back across the country prior to final staging for deployment. Apparently, there are considerable shortcomings, as well as considerable costs, with the current approach to training Canadian reserves for peacekeeping.

Recent UN operations have also been characterized by the frequent use of civilian peacekeeping contingents. As the UN Secretary-General noted in An Agenda for Peace, "increasingly, peacekeeping requires that civilian political officers, human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists and police play as central a role as the military."
The trend toward deploying civilians, as well as large multi-dimensional operations involving both military and civilian contingents, is expected to continue. As previously noted, these operations have also demonstrated the need for appropriate training and joint exercises to clarify the various roles and responsibilities of civilian and military participants.

Current efforts to prepare Canada’s civilian peacekeepers are now limited to several short courses and briefings managed as the need arises by the UN, the Department of External Affairs, CIDA, the RCMP, Elections Canada, and several non-governmental organizations. Canada is well positioned to host a peacekeeping training programme for civilians at a dedicated centre. To date, Austria and Sweden are the only countries providing such a service.

Among the areas that warrant civilian peacekeeping training courses are: human rights work; democratic development; election monitoring; humanitarian assistance; civil administration and rehabilitation; refugee work; policing and customs; as well as conflict management and problem-solving. Consideration could also be devoted to the new roles of 'preventive diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace building'. Experience has demonstrated that appropriate time must be allocated for civilian training.
As noted in the Austrian training program for civilian peacekeeping "a high quality training programme needs a minimum of four weeks". (ASPR, Stadtschlaining, March 1993)

Whereas it is recommended that civilian peacekeeping training requirements be incorporated into the planning and development of a Canadian peacekeeping training centre, the short-term priority must be on improving Canadian Forces training for UN operations.


Since the Cornwallis plan was initially presented, a few steps have been taken to rectify deficiencies, as cited in the reports of the Special Peacekeeping Advisor and the Director of Peacekeeping Operations.

The 1991 UN Guidelines have been circulated, although some officers indicate they are not widely adhered to in training. And, although it is important to ensure that Canadian training is improved to meet the requirements set forth by the UN, it should be recognized that many member states have already institutionalized peacekeeping training programmes which exceed the standards called for in the UN Guidelines.
DND also authorized a short pilot course on negotiation that prompted a follow-up study on negotiation and mediation in peacekeeping. A new Canadian manual to guide peacekeeping training is being drafted and should shortly be available. One officer is developing a new curriculum to include the study of peacekeeping in Canadian Staff Colleges; another is preparing instructions and a curriculum to be used in the training of formed units.

The Directorate of Peacekeeping [formerly DPKO and now J3PK] is also attempting to improve training but it is ill-equipped and under-staffed to consolidate the lessons learned and the knowledge derived from Canada's extensive experience in UN operations. Five officers are currently assigned to this Directorate. Their primary task is to coordinate all national activities related to the deployment, maintenance, and withdrawal of Canadian commitments in support of peacekeeping operations worldwide. As they now manage an enormous peacekeeping effort, insufficient resources and time are available to consolidate the lessons learned, to evaluate performance, to brief and debrief, and to effectively modernize Canadian training. Although there is a concern that immediate control over training be retained by those currently assigned the task, a few options are being reviewed.
A number of officers within DND are promoting the development of a small peacekeeping centre or privatized peacekeeping college with limited responsibility to train select officers. By training these officers under the auspices of a privatized institute, it is suggested that the appropriate knowledge and skills will be passed on by word-of-mouth through mission-specific training at the various units.

Providing excellent training to future trainers and officers must be a high priority. However, the very limited nature of this proposed option would do little to enhance the prospect of hosting joint peacekeeping exercises, large-scale simulations, and the training of Canadian or multinational formed units. It is also unlikely that a training programme for officers only would suffice to rectify the numerous problems cited in DND’s own reports on peacekeeping training. Whereas this small-scale approach might have been a valid option in the early 1980s, when UN peacekeeping was an occasional assignment, the UN General Assembly is asking member states to consider the establishment of regional and national peacekeeping training centres. By comparison, it is doubtful that this option would be viewed domestically or internationally as a serious contribution to the United Nations or peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is now Canada’s dominant defence activity. To assign this training task to a small centre or privatized college would be viewed as a negligent deferral of responsibility.
Training Canadian Forces personnel for UN operations is, and should remain, the obligation of the Department of National Defence.

In response to the report of the 1993 Military Board of Inquiry into Somalia, the former Chief of Defence Staff reaffirmed his support for the ongoing reliance upon general-purpose combat training but recommended that sufficient time be scheduled to conduct mission-specific training for the entire deployment group. He also called for a review of peacekeeping doctrine and asked that guidelines be developed to assess the effectiveness of mission-specific training for such operations. (DND, Board of Inquiry, Phase I, Vol.XII, August 28, 93) Within four months, however, the new Minister of National Defence announced another inquiry into alleged violations of UN policy in the former Yugoslavia.

It is apparent that recent refinements by DND to current training practices are inadequate, if not superficial. It could be argued that they constitute more of a political diversion to retain the status-quo than a concentrated effort to improve Canadian peacekeeping training. The serious problems that have been cited in DND reports -- problems that are confirmed by other officers and veterans -- will not be easily remedied or fixed by half-measures such as a new course or manual. Whereas some units and commanders have developed better training procedures than others, the problems are systemic.
4. A Dedicated Peacekeeping Training Centre is Required.

Decentralized training will not suffice to prepare Canadian peacekeepers adequately for future UN commitments. The practice of decentralized peacekeeping training was developed in an earlier period when peacekeeping was less of a priority and only an occasional assignment. In 1994, United Nations peacekeeping can no longer be viewed as a secondary activity requiring minimal and last-minute preparations.

Decentralized training for peacekeeping is conducted in the various home units at bases across the country. This training is seldom supervised by peacekeeping experts and not yet conducted according to a uniform standard. The training varies from unit to unit and remains at the discretion of individual commanders. As specific training for UN operations is not accorded a high priority, it is taken seriously by some units and neglected by others. To cite one example, the officer in charge of Force Mobile Command is assigned responsibility for the training of personnel, units and formations within the Command. Yet a recent DND report acknowledges, "FMC does not have a specific training policy, nor has it issued direction for training for peacekeeping operations." As the author of this report writes, "the lack of direction and guidance by
FMCHQ creates the possibility of inconsistent training and preparations
from one contingent to the next". Furthermore, this report on training
policy states that "during the course of the Review a search of all policy
documents and information gathered in interviews revealed a lack of
direction to Commands in the area of training policy and standards in the
preparation of units for peacekeeping duty". ("DND Final Report", April
15, 1992, pp. 124-125, 39)

The Special Peacekeeping Advisor also noted the limitations of
decentralized training in his review of the options for training replacement
personnel. As he wrote:

A centralized CF training centre for deploying personnel
using standard training packages in one location has
considerable merit, and has been used successfully in CFB
Montreal for Op DANACA. Alternatively, course packages
could be sent to despatching bases, however, it is probable
that this will give an inconsistent and operationally
unsatisfactory product.
11)

Many of the problems cited in DND's reports on peacekeeping training
appear to be directly related to the decentralized system. The decentralized
approach clearly limits the support that might be provided by established
experts and a permanent training staff. By decentralizing peacekeeping
training, it remains an ad hoc, low-priority task.
As Brigadier-General (ret.) Clayton Beattie informed the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs:

A few detractors have finally conceded that our personnel might need to do more peacekeeping training as long as it can be done within individual units at decentralized locations across the country. They like this decentralized idea because it really means occasional training—fragmented and up to the discretion of the unit commander. Decentralized training is de-emphasized training. It does not lead to advanced standardized training. DND’s own reports have indicated that the lack of guidance in such an approach creates the possibility of inconsistent and deficient training. Decentralized training can too easily become a way of doing business as usual, of paying only lip service to the UN’s request. (SCONDVA, Issue No.42, March 30, 1993, p. 8)

Moreover, among Canadian defence tasks, decentralized training is almost unique to peacekeeping. Training for most defence activities is assigned to a training school at a specific base. As Brigadier-General (ret.) Beattie stated:

If you want an important job done well, do it the way Canadian forces have routinely done it for their other priority tasks: develop a training centre. We have land combat training centres, maritime training centres, basic training centres, flight training centres, engineering schools, schools for administration and logistics and so on. It is time DND developed a peacekeeping training centre. (Ibid., p. 9)
Canadian Forces personnel and units routinely travel to dedicated defence training centres in both Canada and the United States for instruction and exercises related to a particular defence commitment. A dedicated peacekeeping training centre in Canada would provide the following advantages:

- peacekeeping training would be established as a priority task;

- a dedicated staff of specialists and trainers would ensure quality control over both the training and the selection of peacekeepers;

- a supportive training environment would restore confidence and help participants understand their required skills, roles, and responsibilities;

- the public and the government would be assured that Canadian Forces are not only well prepared for UN operations but also capable of other potential low-intensity operations such as providing aid to the civil power and domestic constabulary services;

- it would provide an opportunity to run controlled simulations and joint exercises;

- it would facilitate research into peacekeeping and conflict de-escalation as well as help consolidate the lessons learned from field exercises, simulations, and previous operational experience;
- internationally accepted doctrine, strategy, and standard operating procedures might be refined in both the contingency planning and training for future operations;

- operations might be mounted or staged out of this centre immediately after mission-specific training thus reducing considerable transportation costs;

- other UN member states and NATO allies would have access to a dedicated facility and modern training programme; and,

- it would demonstrate Canada’s enduring commitment to the United Nations and peacekeeping.

DND reports prepared over the last three years have also outlined other reasons and criteria for establishing such a training facility. Under the heading "Establishing a Training Centre", one officer writes that, "in order to maintain, and even more so, improve on current standards, there must be a tri-service center for peacekeeping operations. This center of excellence would handle all DAG (departure assistance groups) duties and act as a repository for corporate knowledge from the field." The author cites the following reasons for a permanent centre:

- peacekeeping is a tri-service commitment, however, many naval and air bases cannot provide the specialist indoctrination and equipment;

- individual commands have their own centres of excellence; e.g., Maritime Warfare Centre in Halifax;
- dedicated staff are on call to coordinate contingencies and can routinely analyse lessons learned from field reports (a field reporting system must be instituted to capture experience and share them);

- other nations will increasingly compete with Canada for 'market share'--a dedicated centre is the only way to raise standards;

- a dedicated centre could run specialized briefings for reserves and hence open up an extremely valuable experience and morale boosting opportunity to them.


Another 1991 staff paper prepared for the Chief of Defence Staff suggests the following criteria for the establishment of a peacekeeping training centre:

- it must be a lodger unit on a Base that can provide quarters (up to 110) and lecture facilities;

- the centre should be a national unit with no bias towards Army, Navy, Air Force or ADM Mat;

- the Centre should be established to provide year-round service, including contingency training and maintenance of the training library. The staff must include expertise (experienced) from each major mission area...;

- must be a bilingual unit; and
- location should be close to NDHQ for maximum benefit.
("Peacekeeping Training—Staff Paper", 4500-1 (DPKO 4),
Annex E, National Peacekeeping Centre July 8, 1991, pp. E1-
E2)

This 1991 report acknowledged that "the concept of a National Centre for
Peacekeeping is sound." As noted, "it would be cost-effective if there is to
be any dramatic increase to the number of peacekeeping missions to which
Canada contributes." The increases have been dramatic.
ANNEX C: Annual Peacekeeping Training Activities

The annual activities projected for the Cornwallis peacekeeping training centre would revolve around a number of general and specialized training programmes:

a) General Peacekeeping Training Programme
   - four week training programme for all ranks
b) 2 Officer Training Programmes
   - two week supplement to general peacekeeping training
   - approximately 50 officers per course
c) 12 Other Rank and Reserve Training Programmes
   - one week supplement to general peacekeeping training
   - approximately 120 participants per course
d) 2-4 Mission-Specific Training Programmes
   - two-to-four week duration
   - up to a battalion (720) per course
e) Civilian Training Programmes
   - two-to-four week duration
   - approximately 50 participants per course
Aside from the course work and instruction associated with each training programme, additional activity can be anticipated in areas such as training exercises and simulations, exchange programmes with foreign participants and visiting lecturers, and the research projects of the training centre staff. In conjunction with the operation of a peacekeeping training centre at Cornwallis, high-level seminars and international peacekeeping conferences can also be accommodated at the nearby Digby Pines.

An annual scheduling plan for the various training programmes is depicted in the chart on the next page. The chart also indicates the other ongoing training activities currently assigned to CFB Cornwallis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td><strong>PEACEKEEPING TRAINING</strong>&lt;br&gt;Two 6 week Officer Training Programmes&lt;br&gt;Approximately 60 officers per programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Twelve 4 week Other Rank Training Programmes. Approximately 120 soldiers per programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>An array of 4 week Civilian Training Programmes. Approximately 60 participants per programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Company - Battalion Mission Training&lt;br&gt;Two week Refresher courses for up to 720 participants in unspecified periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Annual Peacekeeping Conference&lt;br&gt;One week each May or October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td><strong>RECRUIT TRAINING</strong>&lt;br&gt;10 week Recruit Training courses for 890 recruits projected in 1994.&lt;br&gt;Unspecified training periods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td><strong>SEA CADETS / HMCS ACADIA</strong>&lt;br&gt;7 week Sea Cadet Programme.&lt;br&gt;Approximately 1,400 cadets in a summer training period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td><strong>RESERVE TRAINING</strong>&lt;br&gt;6 week Reserve Programme&lt;br&gt;Training for 675 naval reserves projected in summer 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX D: The Organizational Structure

A new peacekeeping training centre will comprise the third training 'school' assigned to CFB Cornwallis. Responsibility for the day-to-day administrative support of this centre could be delegated to Canadian Forces Training System. The Base Commander of CFB Cornwallis can provide appropriate facilities and support staff to the new centre. Operational control of the peacekeeping training centre would likely rest with Force Mobile Command and the Commander of Land Forces Atlantic Area. The overall development of this training centre will require the cooperation of the Directorate of Peacekeeping in National Defence Headquarters. To ensure air and naval support in future inter-service peacekeeping training exercises, a co-operative relationship should also be established with liaison officers in Maritime Command and Air Command.

The development of military and civilian peacekeeping training programmes will also call for the participation of officials in the Department of External Affairs, the RCMP, Elections Canada, CIDA, and those representing related non-governmental organizations.

[An organizational structure for the new training centre is outlined on the following page.]
ANNEX E: Personnel Requirements

The organizational structure provides a guide to the personnel requirements of the new training centre. As peacekeeping training will require a higher priority status, it will be essential to assign a dedicated individual at the rank of Brigadier-General to command this centre. In addition to the Commandant, there will be a need for: a Director of the Instructional Branch; a Director of the Administrative Branch; a Director of Research and Development; and a Director of Logistics. These four positions would be best assigned to officers at the rank of Major and Lieutenant-Colonel. Although the directors may be tasked with teaching responsibilities, there will be a requirement for 8-10 additional instructors or lecturers. These personnel can be drawn from officers with considerable experience in peacekeeping, from the current Directorate of Peacekeeping, from Training Systems, and from several universities with related expertise. [The Areas of Instruction at the proposed Peacekeeping Training Centre are outlined in Annex L.] The new centre will also need an administrative staff, several technicians, and a librarian.
To summarize, the peacekeeping training centre will require a high ranking commander, approximately four directors, twelve instructors, and fifteen administrators/technicians. As previously noted, the majority of these individuals will be from within the Canadian Forces. Experts in fields such as conflict resolution, area studies, and international affairs can be drawn as the need arises from universities in the surrounding region.
ANNEX F: Curriculum

Distinct courses of instruction will be required for officers as well as for other-ranks, reservists and civilians who are to serve in UN operations. Briefings and lectures must be accompanied with appropriate field training and simulations.

The training programme for all ranks and civilians should generally consist of: information concerning the United Nations and peacekeeping operations; political and security considerations; information on the responsibilities and tasks of a UN peacekeeper; briefings on the conditions under which UN service is performed; and training for the role likely to be assigned.

An emphasis in each programme must be accorded to: the lessons learned from previous operations; the techniques and requirements of current operations; survival and first-aid training; and the development of conflict resolution skills in mediation and negotiation. It is imperative that all-ranks learn basic communication skills and develop a rudimentary understanding of how to de-escalate and resolve various conflicts.
Consideration will also have to be devoted to: how positive peacekeeping attitudes and relations are developed; how participants adapt to their new assignment and status as a member of a multinational UN force; how they are expected to interact with fellow peacekeepers from foreign contingents; and how to respect the customs and habits of the local population. [A general training programme for all ranks is outlined in Annex G.]

Moreover, with this general foundation, it is possible to address the specific requirements of a particular mission and/or, the special training requirements of the United Nations and the Department of National Defence.

For example, the advanced Officer Training Programme would require more detailed attention to topics such as the United Nations system, UN command and control procedures, mission planning, administration, and logistics. After the first six weeks of the officer programme, trainees could be directed to courses specifically designed to prepare Military Observers or UN Staff Officers. [An Officer Training Programme is outlined in Annex H.]
In the shorter training programme for Other Ranks, a higher priority can be accorded to topics such as fieldcraft and basic peacekeeping techniques. All trainees should be familiar with the daily routines of patrolling a UN buffer zone and manning an observation post or checkpoint. The curriculum will include courses in UN communications, area supervision, and minefield clearance. [An Other Rank and Reserve Training Programme is outlined in Annex I.]

The two-week Mission Training Programme should provide: up-to-date intelligence briefings on the peacekeeping environment; information pertaining to the political, socio-economic, and cultural factors underlying the conflict; knowledge of security, climatic and topographical conditions in the area; basic language skills; a thorough review of peacekeeping responsibilities; and training and practice in assigned tasks. [A Mission-Specific Training Programme is outlined in Annex J.]

The Civilian Programme will place an emphasis on developing the specialized skills necessary for UN service. Short training programmes can be prepared for those participating in operations involving tasks such as election-monitoring, policing, and disaster relief. Basic courses in survival training, communications, and first-aid are recommended. [A Civilian Training Programme is outlined in Annex K.]
The length of each training programme was determined by estimating the time required to teach the requisite topics and sub-topics, as well as the time needed to conduct simulation and field exercises. An annual independent needs-analysis would help to guide both the training programme and the development of the training centre.

Consideration should also be accorded to facilitating foreign participation and attracting international clients. In particular, there is likely to be considerable foreign interest in specialized Canadian courses in areas such as peacekeeping logistics, communications, and engineering.
ANNEX G: General Peacekeeping Training Programme
(A four-week training programme for all ranks.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>SUB-TOPICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the United Nations</td>
<td>-UN System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-UN Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-UN Agenda for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-UN Security Decision-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Co-operative Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-International Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>-Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>-Peacemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Pre-Emptive Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Service: A Peacekeeper’s</td>
<td>-Peacekeeping Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles and Responsibilities</td>
<td>-Conduct &amp; Co-operation in the Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The Constabulary Ethos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Impartiality &amp; Neutrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Cultural Sensitivity Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Interacting in a Multinational Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mission Security and Defence | -Policies with Regard to the Use of Force  
-Review of Emergency Procedures  
-Use of Small Arms & Anti-Tank Weapons  
-Use of Non-Lethal Defences  
-NBCD Review |
| Communications | -UN Reporting Procedures  
-Voice Communications Procedures  
-Radio Operation & Maintenance |
| Transport | -Operation & Maintenance of Four Wheel Drive Vehicles  
-Operation & Maintenance of Armoured Personnel Carriers  
-Operations Involving Air & Helicopter Support |
| Co-operation with Related Agencies | -Coordination of Military & Civilian Activities (i.e. UNCIVPOL, Red Cross, Red Crescent, UNHCR, UNDP, etc.) |
| Fieldcraft | -Survival Techniques  
-Map Reading  
-Navigation  
-Bivouacing  
-Camp Kit  
-Use & Maintenance of Field Equipment  
-Preparation of Food  
-Water Purification |
ANNEX G: General Peacekeeping Training Programme continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping Studies</th>
<th>-Major Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Aid</td>
<td>-Preventive Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Emergency First-Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-CPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Triage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Treatment of Wounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Administration</td>
<td>-Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines</td>
<td>-Travel Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Medical Arrangements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX H: Officer Peacekeeping Training Programme
(A two-week training programme supplementing the General Training Programme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>SUB-TOPICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Command and Control Structures</td>
<td>-UNHQ Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Office for Special Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Field Operations Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Office of Programme Planning, Budget &amp; Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Force Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Military Logistics Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Observer Group HQs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Mission HQs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Service: Officer Roles and</td>
<td>-Military Force Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>-Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Battalion Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Field Staff Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Member of a Formed Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-UN Military Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>-UN Mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Canadian Commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Mission Update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Intelligence Briefing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Review of the Dispute &amp; Parties to the Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission and Area Studies</td>
<td>-Assessment of Political, Social,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religious, Economic &amp; Cultural Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Review of Topographical, Climatic &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX H: Officer Peacekeeping Training Programme continued...

| Potential Future Operations | -Conflict Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-Projected Scenarios &amp; Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Officer Responsibilities in the Field | -Reporting Procedures
|                             | -Leadership
|                             | -Maintaining Morale
|                             | -Conduct Promoting Co-operation & Confidence-Building
|                             | -Establishing Guidelines for Non-Offensive Defence Structures
|                             | -Tactical & Psychological
|                             | Demands on a Battalion
|                             | -Conduct & Physical Fitness of Forces in the Field
|                             | -Impartiality
|                             | -Coordinating Relations Between UN Civilian Agencies & UN Forces
|                             | -Diplomacy
|                             | -Media Relations
| Simulation Exercises        | -Hypothetical Planning, Deployment & Establishment of Operations |
| Research Project            | -Applied Studies & Assignments    |
| Course Debriefing and Evaluation |                                 |
ANNEX I: Other Rank and Reserve Peacekeeping Training Programme
(One week supplementing the General Training Programme.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>SUB-TOPICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applied Peacekeeping Tasks and Techniques</td>
<td>-Patrolling (i.e. Vehicle, Border, Night &amp; Foot patrol)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Methods of Reporting &amp; Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Establishing &amp; Maintaining Buffer Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Demilitarized Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Mobile &amp; Static Observation Posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Ceasefire Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Demarcation Lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Construction of Road Blocks, Protective Shelters &amp; Fortified Bunkers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Exercises</td>
<td>-Joint Operations including Armoured Personnel Carriers &amp; Soft-skin Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Refresher Training with Support Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Distribution of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Protection of Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Convoy Duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation Exercises</td>
<td>-Managing Local Disputes within a Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Reporting on Breach of a Ceasefire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course Debriefing and Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX J: Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training Programme
(A two-to-four week refresher training and mission familiarization
programme taken prior to deployment. The General Training Programme
is a prerequisite to Mission-Specific Training.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>SUB-TOPICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Introduction to the Mission and Mandate | -Mission Objectives  
-Mission Organization  
-Status of Forces Agreement  
-UN Force Participants  
-Contingent Assignment  
-Command & Control Structure  
-Standing Operational Procedures  
-The Field Support System |
| Overview of the Conflict     | -Comprehensive Review of the Parties to the Dispute  
-Overview of the Political, Social, Religious, Economic & Cultural Factors Underlying the Conflict |
| Environmental Assessment     | -Topographical & Climatological Conditions |
| Intelligence Briefing        | -Threat Assessment  
-Common Problems in the Mission Area |
| Language Training            | -Daily |
| Physical Training            | -Daily |
| Equipment Preparation        | -Issue Kit  
-Familiarization, Operation, Maintenance & Shipping of Required Equipment |
ANNEX J: Mission-Specific Peacekeeping Training Programme continued...

| UN and Canadian Regulations | -Pay & Allowances
|                          | -Dependents
|                          | -Passports & Visas
|                          | -Insurance
|                          | -Vaccinations
|                          | -Medical & Dental Envelope
| Unit, Company & Battalion Training in Assigned Tasks | -Review & Practice of Communication, Transportation, Patrolling, Observation, Reporting & Security Procedures
| Simulation Exercises      |  |
| Course Debriefing         |  |
ANNEX K: Civilian Peacekeeping Training Programme
(A two-to-four week training programme for civilians.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>SUB-TOPICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to the United Nations</td>
<td>- UN System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- UN Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- UN Security Decision-Making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cooperative Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- International Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>- Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>- Peacemaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Verification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Election Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Humanitarian Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disaster Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada's Role in UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>- Overview of Past &amp; Present Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Canadian Policy &amp; Criteria for Participation in Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of Civilian UN</td>
<td>- ONUCA, UNFICYP,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>UNCIVPOL, UNGOMAP,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNTEA, UNSF, UNTAG,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNIKOM, ONUSAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX K: Civilian Peacekeeping Training Programme continued...

| Introduction to the Mission and Mandate | -Mission Objectives  
| -Mission Organization  
| -Participants  
| -Assignment  
| -Command & Control Structure  
| -The Field Support System  
| Area Studies and Environmental Assessment | -Topographical & Climatological Conditions  
| Conflict Analysis | -Review of Parties to the Dispute  
| -Overview of the Political, Social, Religious, Economic & Cultural Factors Underlying the Conflict  
| Regional Security Considerations | -Threat Assessment  
| -Common & Projected Problems in the Mission Area  
| Conflict Resolution | -Mediation & Negotiation Skills  
| Civilian Specialist Training: Election Monitoring | -Organization Control  
| -Special UN Guidelines  
| -Monitoring & Patrolling  
| -Observation & Reporting  
| Civilian Specialist Training: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief | -Training for a Range of Tasks from Food & Medicine Dispensing to Well Drilling, Refugee Assistance, Provision of Shelter, Emergency First-Aid and Search & Rescue Operations  
| -Psychological Conditioning  
| -Training in the Operation & Maintenance of Equipment  

82
ANNEX K: Civilian Peacekeeping Training Programme continued...

| Communications       | -UN Reporting Procedures  
|                      | -Voice Communications Procedures  
|                      | -Radio Operation & Maintenance  
| Transport            | -Operation, Maintenance & Emergency Repair of Field Vehicles/Four Wheel Drive Vehicles  
| Cooperation with Related Agencies | -Coordination of Civilian & Military Activities (i.e. UNCIVPOL, UNHRC, UNDP, Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.)  
| Fieldcraft           | -Survival Techniques  
|                      | -Map Reading & Navigation  
|                      | -Bivouacing  
|                      | -Camp Kit  
|                      | -Use and Maintenance of Field Equipment  
|                      | -Preparation of Food  
|                      | -Water Purification  
| Language Training    | -Daily  
| Regulations and Administration (UN and Canadian) | -Support  
|                      | -Pay & Allowances  
|                      | -Travel Arrangements  
|                      | -Passports & Visas  
|                      | -Dependents  
|                      | -Insurance  
|                      | -Vaccinations  
|                      | -Medical & Dental Envelope  
| Course Debriefing and Evaluation |
# ANNEX L: Areas of Instruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Instruction</th>
<th>Type of Instructor</th>
<th>Preferred Training and Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-experience at UN and field HQs &amp; in a variety of peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Historian</td>
<td>-academic qualifications, preferably military experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-managerial experience in various operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mounting Operations &amp; Force Structure Planning</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-extensive experience in mission planning &amp; staging operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-logistician with lecturing ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-expertise in establishing global theatre &amp; unit communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX L continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Instruction</th>
<th>Type of Instructor</th>
<th>Preferred Training and Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Techniques of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>-extensive experience in different types of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Exercises &amp;</td>
<td>Co-ordinator</td>
<td>-ability to organize exercises &amp; simulations in co-ordination with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulations</td>
<td></td>
<td>researcher(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>Specialist; Academic</td>
<td>-knowledge of world politics &amp; areas of actual or potential conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Studies</td>
<td>Specialist</td>
<td>-comparative politics expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>Diplomat or senior</td>
<td>-experienced negotiator &amp; mediator with expertise in conflict management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>officer (ret.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Language Training</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>-ability to co-ordinate language training &amp; laboratories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX L continued...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Instruction</th>
<th>Type of Instructor</th>
<th>Preferred Training and Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Functions</td>
<td>Coordinator</td>
<td>- experience as a civilian peacekeeper (i.e., member of RCMP, Elections Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine, First-Aid &amp;</td>
<td>Medical officer</td>
<td>- teaching ability in areas of tropical medicine, first-aid &amp; survival techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival Techniques</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX M: OVERVIEW OF THE SCANDINAVIAN
PEACEKEEPING TRAINING PROGRAMME AND TRAINING CENTRES

Four Scandinavian countries provide special training programmes for United Nations service and peacekeeping. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway have distinct training programmes and training centres with specialized areas of expertise and responsibility.

These training programmes supplement normal conscript, NCO, and officer training. Individuals who volunteer to be part of the Nordic United Nations Stand-By Forces must have already completed their national service which ranges from approximately eight to fifteen months of military training.

The time and scope allocated for additional peacekeeping training varies somewhat among the Nordic countries. For example, training for UN service in Denmark and Finland is approximately six weeks for officers and NCOs and five weeks for other ranks, while in Norway and Sweden basic peacekeeping training is conducted over a three to four-week period.
The aim of these basic peacekeeping training programmes is to provide participants with a comprehensive understanding of UN service as well as the particular requirements and conditions of their assignment. For example, the general training programme for all ranks consists of:
- information concerning the United Nations and peacekeeping operations;
- knowledge of the climatic and topographical conditions in the mission area as well as political, cultural, and religious considerations;
- information on the responsibilities and tasks of a UN peacekeeper;
- briefings on the conditions under which UN service is performed;
- training for the role assigned in the organization of a Nordic stand-by unit.

The Nordic countries cooperate annually to provide additional training to a select number of officers and NCOs. This cooperation helps to develop the special skills and international teamwork required in UN operations. Sweden hosts a course for staff officers; Norway, a course for logistics and movement control (transport); Denmark, a course for military police personnel; and Finland, a course for military observers. The average length of each course is roughly three weeks. The training is provided by officers and visiting experts. In recent years, these courses have been opened up to participants from other countries.
Each of the four national peacekeeping training programmes is assigned to a training centre. Of the four centres, the Swedish and Finnish UN Training Centres appear to be the most advanced.

The Swedish UN Training Centre (UNTC) is located at Almnas on a military base that is double-tasked to the SVEA Engineer Regiment. The Engineering Regiment provides the UNTC with many of the necessary resources (i.e., facilities, equipment, and catering).

The UNTC has its own administrative building, separate living quarters for men and women, as well as educational facilities specially adapted to UN activities. In terms of organization, it comprises the director, an operations centre, an administrative department, and a training department. The permanent staff of 12-15 officers is reinforced by guest lecturers and specialists. Supportive functions include a UN depot, a UN cash office, and hospital facilities. The UNTC also has special field training facilities such as observation posts, check points, and field living quarters.

Aside from being the training base for the Swedish UN Stand-By Battalion and the Staff Officers course, the UNTC also hosts training for a Swedish Disaster Relief Unit, a civilian police course, and a training programme for female peacekeepers.
Each year, approximately 3,200 individuals are trained at the Swedish UNTC. The range of participants includes senior military officers, young soldiers, civil servants, and foreign military guests. A former commander of the Swedish UNTC acknowledged that this facility is always full and used to its capacity.

The Finnish UN Training Centre is located at Niinisalo on a military base double-tasked to the Satakunta Artillery Regiment. Aside from the normal facilities of a military base which were initially provided by the Artillery Regiment, special facilities have been developed to meet peacekeeping training requirements. These include a 50-bed officer hotel, an operations centre, special class rooms with audio-visual resources, and a language laboratory. The drilling terrain spans roughly 40 kilometres and provides a useful resource for peacekeeping exercises and simulations.

The commanding officer of the Finnish UN training centre oversees four sections responsible for personnel, mobilization and training, communications, and logistics. This UNTC has a staff of roughly 35 officers and civilian employees. Each year they organize three recruiting rounds which screen approximately 6,000 applicants for UN peacekeeping service. Of these applicants, only 1,000 are selected to undergo the general peacekeeping training programme. Finnish peacekeepers are also provided with rotation traininga policy which ensures that new units are
gradually integrated into UN operations after on-site training and service with veteran units.

In addition to providing general and specialist peacekeeping training for their own armed forces, the Finnish UNTC hosts 3 three-week military observer courses annually. Among the non-Nordic countries sending participants to these observer training courses are the United States, Austria, Ireland, Poland, the UK, Russia, Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland. To date, there has been no charge for foreign participants beyond accommodation, meals, and personal expenses. But as the Finnish UNTC has recently come under pressure with numerous requests to train foreign participants, they are considering expansion and additional courses. To date, however, the Finns have stipulated that their courses are primarily to serve the requirements of Nordic UN Stand-By Forces. No effort has been made to attract foreign participants or to market this peacekeeping training programme.

The Norwegian Peacekeeping Training Programme is conducted at Gordammun, 50 kilometres north of Oslo. This base is not regarded as a distinct UN training centre but as a military camp that is frequently used for a variety of exercises and training purposes. Norwegian officials acknowledge, however, that they are now considering the development of a permanent UN peacekeeping training centre.
The Norwegian Fourth Regiment is responsible for co-ordinating 2-3 peacekeeping training programmes annually. The average length of the regular training programme is one month. Norwegian officers also undergo six weeks of specific training for peacekeeping. As previously noted, Norway hosts four-week courses on peacekeeping logistics and movement control (transport).

Denmark maintains a peacekeeping training centre for its UN Stand-By Forces at Jagerspriesse. Approximately 1,000 Danish trainees are selected annually for this training programme. Candidates are considered only after undergoing a twelve-month period of preliminary military training.

Another Danish programme which prepares Nordic officers for service as UN military police is held at Aalborg. This course is open to a limited number of foreign participants. Danish officers also receive courses in peacekeeping at their Junior and Senior Staff Officer Colleges. In the near future, the Aalberg facility is expected to host a peacekeeping training programme for civilian police.

While Jagerspriesse has specific facilities for peacekeeping training, both it and Aalborg are also double-tasked to other military activities. Initially, the Swedish and Finnish armed forces were opposed to the establishment of these peacekeeping training programmes.
Yet as military officials from these countries now attest, the programmes hosted at these UN centres quickly became very popular.

Overall, the Scandinavian peacekeeping training system is widely recognized as the most advanced in the world. This system appears to be both cost-efficient and successful. Their UN Stand-By Forces have been praised for their peacekeeping professionalism.

The Scandinavian training programmes focus on the skills and requirements of UN service. Aside from the general peacekeeping training programme for all ranks, they conduct special officer courses and mission training courses. Within their training centres, there is a consensus that peacekeeping training is clearly distinct from the ordinary military training which a soldier receives. As the emphasis in UN service is on cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes, it is understood that professional soldiers require additional training when they make the transition to UN peacekeeper.
The Scandinavian training programmes are characterized by extensive mutual co-operation. Each country has developed a distinct area of specialization and expertise. Whereas there is much to be learned from each of their four training programmes and training centres, it would be inappropriate for Canada to emulate or model a new centre or programme on any one of these four examples.

These four Nordic nations have a combined population that is roughly equivalent to Canada’s. With larger professional armed forces and more participants in more peacekeeping operations, Canada is well positioned to develop a peacekeeping training centre that builds upon the combined strengths of the Scandinavian system.