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Canada and the UN Security Council: New Strategies to Advance International and National Security

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War led to vastly reduced tensions between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Yet the new era has been marked by the rise of ethnic and religious disputes, as well as tendencies to resort to unilateral and isolationist measures. Such an ongoing tumult of change necessitates that traditional policies be seriously reconsidered and, perhaps, drastically reevaluated. Old ways of thinking no longer apply to the world we live in. As a country that has historically proposed new ways of thinking about international security^1, Canada is well-placed to help usher in new approaches. This article suggests some strategies that Canada could pursue while it is a member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council over the next eighteen months.^2

Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Peacekeeping

*Enhance Canada’s Peacekeeping Reputation:*  
Canada’s peacekeeping role through the UN is justifiably a great source of national pride for Canadians. In the past, peacekeeping helped develop a positive reputation for Canada. It also distinguished Canadians from Americans, who until recently did not participate in peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping allowed Canada to assert an independent role in the international arena and came to reflect distinctively Canadian values. “Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as an important part of their identity and of their country’s position on the international stage, even when peacekeeping meant little to much of the international community.”^3

Yet during the 1990s, peacekeeping became the subject of an unrelenting cross-examination by the media and the public. It became difficult to perceive Canadian peacekeepers as heroes in situations—especially with the revelation of the murder of a
Somali teen in a Canadian camp. The Liberal government under Prime Minister Jean Chretien can be faulted for having failed to get to the bottom of the imbroglio. Complicating matters further, the reputation of some members of the Department of National Defence (DND) was marred and some were accused of a cover-up. Moreover, former Defence Minister Doug Young abruptly ended an inquiry the Liberals themselves had established. What could the government do to improve the Canadian Forces’ approach to peacekeeping, and thus enhance Canada’s reputation at the UN Security Council for peacekeeping?

- The Canadian Forces’ preparations for peacekeeping are insufficient and *ad hoc*. Until recently, the Forces relied on little training and scant peacekeeping doctrine; the emphasis was upon combat-capability. The Canadian government should ensure that **all ranks of the Canadian Forces receive increased training in conflict resolution and negotiation skills** so as to help avert dangerous situations before combat skills become necessary. The more peacekeeping operations combine military and humanitarian objectives, the more combat capabilities will diminish in importance. This is not to say that Canadian peacekeepers should not receive any multi-purpose, combat-capable training. Simply that all ranks, not just officers, need more peacekeeping training.

- The Canadian government should ensure that the Defence Department **spends significantly more on peacekeeping**. The difficulties that the DND is experiencing within the current budget are not a result of the cost of peacekeeping operations. The incremental cost of such operations is $100-150 million a year—roughly the same amount as the government spends on the Air Cadet, Army Cadet, and Sea Cadet youth programmes.\(^4\)

- Other countries, including the United States, are participating more heavily in peacekeeping than in the past. If the Canadian government wishes to continue to be taken seriously at the UN, as a valued voice on the future of peacekeeping, it should **increase Canada’s current commitment to peacekeeping**, relative to the rest of the world. Canada must not rest on its laurels as other countries develop more expertise.
**Improve Canada’s Peacekeeping Training Centre:**

Canada could do more to help UN member states adjust to rapid changes in the nature of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping duties now include the monitoring and administration of elections, preventive deployment, humanitarian and human rights functions, the enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, and nation-building mandates. The burden of peacekeeping for the UN has dramatically increased over the 1990s—and Canada is well-positioned to ensure that new UN Security Council initiatives reflect this new reality. This middle power has valuable experience and knowledge that could be used to reshape the UN and other multilateral institutions in the new era. However, Canadian institutions and peacekeeping infrastructure remain much the same in Canada as they were during the Cold War, despite the explosion of new operations.

- The promising **concept of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre must be fully developed and implemented** as its original architects intended. The Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre is currently only a shell of what it could be. The Chretien government arguably implemented it purely for electoral purposes, not to make real changes to the military’s approach to peacekeeping.

- The Canadian government must ensure that the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia becomes widely regarded as **one of the best peacekeeping training centres in the world**, an invaluable resource for the Canadian Forces, Defence Department, and peacekeepers worldwide. It must become **a centre of learning for all ranks**—not just a place for officers and civilians to share peacekeeping ideas and experiences.

In the 1993 election campaign, the Liberals expressed their intent, if elected, to strengthen Canada’s leadership role in international peacekeeping. They intended to do this, in part, through a reorientation of Canadian defence policy and procurement practices to emphasize the key priority of peacekeeping. The Liberals also promised to give priority to Canadian efforts to improve the UN’s policies on peacekeeping. The government claimed to be committed to multilateralism and world citizenship through participation in peacekeeping. Over the last seven years, however, Canada’s
peacekeeping reputation has not increased but suffered from declining morale and an endless mire of questions and recrimination. There has been little, if any, progress toward these original goals.

- If the Canadian government wants to be taken seriously at the UN Security Council, it needs to act quickly to rejuvenate faith and support in the Canadian Forces by enacting a **defence policy in favour of peacekeeping and multilateralism**, not isolationism and tacit support of American unilateralism.

### Canada’s Attitude at the UN toward UN Finances

**Press UN Members to pay Dues on Time:**

The UN continues to experience a funding crisis due to member states’ failure to honour their financial obligations. Member states of the UN invest an average of $1.40 in UN peacekeeping activities for every $1000 spent on their own armed forces. For example, for every dollar that it has invested in UN peacekeeping, the United States has tended to spend over $2000 on its own military.\(^7\) In fact, the UN’s entire 1995 peacekeeping budget was less than 1 percent of the $868 billion in military spending by all the governments of the world combined.\(^8\)

Where should Canada stand on the issue of UN finances? Canada has consistently paid its regular and peacekeeping dues to the UN. It is time to press other member states to enact Article 19 of the UN Charter. This article states that a member which is in arrears for more than two years shall be barred from having a vote in the General Assembly.

- **Canada should vigorously press members of the General Assembly to enact Article 19 against recalcitrant members** of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. Although Canada is the United States’ closest ally, friendship should not blind it to the fact that the US owes approximately $1.3 billion dollars to the UN’s regular budget and the peacekeeping budget.\(^9\)

- **Canadian officials should consider threatening to halt payment for the costs of NATO enlargement** until the United States agrees to its fair share of UN spending. If high-level American officials admonish Canadians for reduced spending on
defence, Canadians should remind them of the United States’ failure to pay its UN dues.

**Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward European Security**

*Ensure Significant NATO Reform:*

Many people refer to the UN as a fifty-year old institution in need of reform. But NATO is also a middle-aged institution in need of reform. Wholesale reform will not work. Reforms must be cumulative, built gradually on existing foundations. For instance, the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the alliance is one kind of reform. The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia Founding Act are others. But NATO needs further transformation of its structures and procedures if it is to serve the common security interests of the allies and others.

- Canada’s first priority should be not to create new dividing lines. A reformed NATO, which did not aim to include the most powerful country in Europe, Russia, would be fatally flawed. The Canadian government should strive to engage NATO and Russia in an active, cooperative relationship that would form the cornerstone of a new, inclusive security structure in Europe. Canada must act quickly through the UN and other multilateral institutions, such as the G-8 and the International Monetary Fund, to invite Russia into Western security and economic structures.

- NATO’s air attack on Serbia and Kosovo has made it even more imperative that the alliance makes a supreme effort to welcome Russia into European decision-making circles. Russia has suspended all contacts with NATO and taken its soldiers in Bosnia from under NATO command. Russia’s decision to step back from involvement in NATO, within hours of the attack on the former Yugoslavia, is further indication that the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act are insufficiently attractive for Russia to remain engaged in discussions at Brussels. Russia will need more incentives and more reassurance. And Canada with its large expatriate Russian, Ukrainian, and Serbian populations is well-equipped to promote stronger ties. Through UN and NATO auspices, Canada should press the allies within NATO to reassure Russia by offering it a special relationship in NATO. Incentives could
include formally embedded consultation mechanisms, a mutual non-aggression pledge, and a promise to develop non-offensive defence systems.

It needs also to be remembered that the first round of NATO expansion took place in the spring of 1999 without widespread Russian approval. We continue to run the risk of inciting old hatreds and new insecurities. The Russian leadership remains unstable. General Alexander Lebed waits impatiently in the background. Consequently, the Canadian government should refrain from pushing for a second round of NATO enlargement. Rather than suggest that Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Baltic countries be invited into the alliance, Canada should hold-back. To urge further NATO expansion beyond Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic would contribute to the situation Canada does not want—a more paranoid and insecure Russian leadership and population. The alliance should postpone any decisions about new members to avoid further tensions with Russia, a strong opponent of the air war against Yugoslavia and of NATO expansion.

- Canada should counsel the United States and the other NATO allies to delay opening the door to further NATO enlargement until the Russian leadership considers that it is an integral part of Europe’s emerging security architecture.
- The Canadian government could also re-emphasize at the UN the objectives underlying NATO’s Article 2, which recommends in part that the allies contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations, strengthen their free institutions, promote conditions of stability and well-being, and encourage economic collaboration. The Canadian government should emphasize the ideas embodied in that article, and help transform NATO from a collective defence organization into an alliance of free and democratic nations intent upon ending East-West confrontation.
Canada’s Approach in the UN Security Council toward Asserting Sovereignty

New Ways to Assert Arctic Sovereignty:

Canadians cannot afford to sit idly by while their sovereignty in the Arctic is undermined. Yet Canada’s concept of asserting Arctic sovereignty must move away from the traditional notion of defending the North against ‘threats,’ such as the former Soviet Union, towards an emphasis on sovereignty association very broadly defined. The skies above the Arctic have decreased, not increased, in strategic significance, as have Northern waters. Canada should police its Arctic territory, skies, and waters, but the way in which the government asserts sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago needs to be re-examined.

- The Canadian government could consider purchasing a few previously-used icebreakers from Russia, ones that are capable of penetrating Arctic ice that is at least eight feet thick. According to the Canadian Coast Guard, its fleet of six icebreakers is only operational in the north during the summer months from July to November. Some second-hand non-nuclear Russian icebreakers would be able to assert effective control of Arctic waters year-round. The Canadian Coast Guard and Canadian Navy could use the icebreakers to navigate Arctic waters during the winter season, thus enhancing Arctic sovereignty in a peaceful and responsible fashion.

Some have argued that diesel submarines are essential tools to assert sovereignty. But diesel submarines promise to be an ill-considered choice. The four used British Upholder Class submarines that the Liberal government plans to acquire between 2000 and 2002 will probably have to be expensively refitted, at an additional cost of approximately $1.27 billion (Cdn), in order to extend the life of their equipment and to operate under Arctic ice. Add to that the original purchase price of $750 million and Canada has a submarine programme that may cost it more than $2 billion.

The argument that the submarines are necessary to protect Canada’s security and sovereignty underwater is less than persuasive, if not another red herring. Even at the height of the Cold War (when there was a credible threat), officials could not be sure of what was happening in all of Canada’s territorial waters, particularly in the Arctic. They had to assume that there were occasional intrusions by our allies and others. However,
these were not sufficient to undermine Canadian sovereignty or security. Even if the Upholder submarines happen to detect or intercept an intruder, Canada’s options will remain exceedingly limited. Officials might get on the ‘diplomatic horn’ and complain. They might ‘ping’ the offending submarine with sonar and ask it to leave. Or, as a last resort, they could respond with force by launching a wire-guided torpedo, risking retaliation and potential escalation. No Canadian government would consider this option in peacetime.

Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of the British Upholder submarine as a multi-purpose resource that provides the wide range of options and secondary service that was advertised. In fact, these subs will have fairly narrow operational limitations. They are of little use in waving the flag and demonstrating a presence for sovereignty protection. They are seldom helpful in search and rescue operations. They have yet to be needed in any peacekeeping mission. Further, their purported contributions to surveillance, monitoring, and fisheries protection roles can be far more cost-effectively performed by other means. The Aurora aircraft, for example, can cover considerably more territory in less time at less expense. In short, so far no one has demonstrated a compelling scenario or a convincing case for buying the submarines.\footnote{12}

- The Canadian government needs to take a more pro-active (and less expensive) approach at the UN toward asserting Arctic sovereignty and managing our territory wisely. Canada should not militarize the North, merely increase its presence there. Purchasing and operating more icebreakers in the circumpolar north, rather than refitting the diesel submarines, would be a cost-effective and peaceful method of doing so.

**Canada’s Approach at the UN toward New Security Threats and Challenges:**

**Reconsidering the Nature of the Threat:**

The UN Security Council needs to reconsider and reevaluate perceived threats to the international community. Who is threatened, by whom, and how? For a while, the fact that there was no longer a significant Soviet threat implied that security could be preserved at much lower levels of defence spending. Now the threat from Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic has led to calls, especially by some Americans, for
greater defence spending. US President Bill Clinton plans to increase the defence budget this year by hundreds of billions of dollars, in the largest hike in peacetime history.\textsuperscript{13} Most recently, the US Ambassador to Canada had the temerity to lecture Canadians about the need to increase their defence spending.\textsuperscript{14}

Rather than respond in a knee-jerk fashion to the United States’ remonstrations, Canada should implement new kinds of defence preparations that are considered vital to Canadian—and concomitantly the international community’s—concerns. The government needs to think carefully about how it will spend its defence dollars and where: Is there any need to prepare for high-intensity conflict, as Canada did during the Cold War, and still does? When and how should the country contribute to UN-sanctioned mid-intensity conflicts, such as the Gulf War? What kinds of Canadian defence preparations might be perceived as offensive and provocative, rather than defensive and necessary? Canada’s parliament has recently released a report calling for a re-examination of NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence and the New Strategic Concept.\textsuperscript{15} Many other similarly pressing security issues loom on the horizon. Questions are already being raised about how much Canada should contribute to the costs of NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{16} More defence spending may also be deemed necessary if the government decides to become deeply involved in American space initiatives and ballistic missile defence.

- The Canadian government \textbf{needs to reconsider all these sorts of questions} in light of the new types of threats and challenges the international community now faces. During its tenure as a UN Security Council member, the government should hold a \textbf{nation-wide security forum} designed to solicit all types of Canadian opinion on these sorts of important questions. Rather than sponsor intermittent conferences, where academics, graduate students, and representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations meet for a few hours at great expense due to high travel and accommodation costs, a \textbf{web-site on the Internet could be used to democratize the discussion and promote nation-wide participation}. The website could be sponsored and maintained by the Privy Council Office, in conjunction with information officers from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade and the Department of National Defence, however, it would be open to all Canadians.

For decades Canada’s assessment of the threat has been shaped and influenced by American military threat analysis. It can be argued that it is time for Canada to undertake more of its own independent military threat analysis.\(^\text{17}\)

- The government needs to institute the infrastructure and procedures necessary for Canada to **carry out its own independent threat analysis under the auspices of Canadian security institutions** such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), and the Defence Department. In conjunction with UN monitoring agencies and international watchdog institutes, Canada could unite with like-minded nations to **provide the UN Security Council with timely and accurate threat assessments based on new information** (and possibly conflicting analyses of the threat). Such alternative threat assessments might play a valuable role in ameliorating tensions and defusing arms spirals in the weeks and months preceding possible multilateral or unilateral actions, such as air strikes.

**Threats to North American Security:**

The decline of the Soviet threat has also meant that the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is no longer as important to Canadian security. Some argue that the war against illicit narcotics is ongoing, and that the Canadian military must work through NORAD to interdict drugs. To some extent, this argument serves to quell questions about the future purpose and intentions of NORAD. Nevertheless, concerns are being raised about Canada’s possible contribution to the US military’s global surveillance, warning, and communications systems.\(^\text{18}\) The government needs to be especially careful that it is not perceived to be intent upon erecting some kind of ‘Fortress America.’

- The Canadian government should **maintain its official position of nonparticipation in active missile and space-based defence programs.** Canadian officials need to
assure other countries that there is no anti-ballistic missile system in any way connected to the NORAD agreement.

- Canada should **re-emphasize its commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty** and, if it chooses to stay in NORAD over the long-term, the government must ensure that aspects of the missile defense program associated with NORAD do not violate the ABM Treaty.

**Nuclear and Conventional Challenges to Canada and the World’s Security**

*The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation:*

Fears of instability in Russia have been heightened by the ailing health of President Yeltsin, Russia’s falling ruble, the possibility of widespread food shortages, as well as the threat of political extremism. The possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands has never been greater. As Russian General Aleksandr Lebed recently told President Clinton during his visit to Moscow, Russia today faces a greater threat than in 1917 on the eve of the Russian Revolution. As Lebed warned, “the situation is worse than in 1917. Now we have huge stockpiles of poorly guarded nuclear weapons.”

Desperate conditions exist in nuclear cities and biological institutes across Russia. Moreover, weapons scientists and engineers are not being paid. The sale of nuclear weapons, materials, technology, and the flight of nuclear scientists to other countries may increase. A sharp drop in weapons research spending has left thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians in near poverty.

- Canada should work with other like-minded UN member states through the International Scientific and Technical Center (ISTC) in the former Soviet Union to **provide Russian scientists with more long-term research grants and programs that promote alternative civilian employment.**

- Canada should also propose that an **international registrar of scientists be set-up through the UN** to track the research activities of all scientists in the world. Similar to the UN Arms Registrar, cooperation would have to be voluntary (in order to preserve academic freedom). However, over time such a registrar could contribute to increased transparency, openness, and scientific security.
What can be done at the UN Security Council to further enhance Russia’s nuclear stability? Much of the problem stems from Russia’s weakness, not its strength. As the Russian Duma’s Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Defense, Alexei G. Arbatov, asserted in the spring of 1998, “Not since 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now…. If Russia’s mammoth military-industrial establishment were to collapse—a distinct possibility in the new few years—the consequences would be not less devastating than were the events of June 1941 [German invasion], and not only for Russia but for the entire world.”22 High-level American officials who have recently visited some Russian nuclear sites have also expressed strong concerns about the safety of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Adding to fears is the prospect that Russia has little time and comparatively few resources to deal with potential Year 2000 computer problems that might affect missile operations.23

- The Canadian government should contribute at least one thousand computer experts, along with substantial travel and research funds, to a large-scale UN-sponsored initiative that would deploy knowledgeable computer personnel to Russia to work on their military’s computer equipment.
- The Canadian government should also press Russia to continue to centralize control of its nuclear arsenal and consolidate nuclear weapons on Russian soil.
- More technological and monetary assistance for Russia is necessary. The US has already spent $1.6 billion to improve the safe storage of Russia’s nuclear materials, provide assistance in transporting and dismantling nuclear weapons, and create new research opportunities for Russia’s nuclear weapons specialists.24 The Canadian government should promise an additional $50 million in order to avoid a nuclear tragedy from occurring. It might also issue a challenge to other rich nations in the UN Security Council, such as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, to contribute substantial amounts.
- With like-minded nations, the government could also sponsor anti-leakage programs at Russian nuclear facilities. As a non-nuclear player, Canada would be perceived as a neutral third party genuinely interested in reducing leakage of information and nuclear materials from Russian nuclear storage and launching sites.
The Threat of Conventional Weapons Proliferation:

Canada is the seventh largest contributor in the world to the arms trade and arms trafficking. Despite the end of the Cold War, it has an over-sized military industry that promotes Canadian wares with zeal. The Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions are engaged in regional arms races. Countries like Saudia Arabia are flush with petrodollars and demand Canadian defence products. Canadian companies such as Bombardier, General Motors, and Magellan Aerospace Corporation are contributing to the worldwide arms race in acquiring conventional weapons.25

- If Canada wants to continue sponsoring important disarmament measures at the UN, it needs to actively discourage its own domestic manufacturing industries from seeking military contracts in the Asia-Pacific and Middle Eastern regions. Negative inducements could include the elimination of government subsidies and grants through the Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC), an Ottawa-based crown corporation that assists Canadian companies with export sales to foreign governments and international organizations. As well, the government needs to close loopholes that permit tax breaks for research and development for military purposes.

- Government trade missions and foreign service officers in DFAIT should also be actively discouraged from promoting significant military industry contracts overseas.

Since the 1950s Canada has become an important supplier of assemblies, components, and sub-components to arms manufacturers in the United States. Canada has moved into the development of dual-use technologies and products.

- Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy’s proposals to eliminate landmines and curtail small arms have earned Canada widespread admiration. If Canada wants to continue to be a respected proponent of disarmament and arms control initiatives at the UN, then its defence industry production and the export of dual-use technologies need to be curtailed. The Canadian government could also explore the development of a multilateral database that could serve as a tracking and early warning system for dual-use exports.26
Canada’s Approach at the UN toward Worldwide Defence Spending

**Maintain Low Levels of Defence Spending:**

To some extent Canada can justify any exhortations it makes at the UN to decrease worldwide defence spending because it has made a laudable effort to constrain its own defence expenditures. The Canadian defence budget decreased from $12.83 billion in 1991-92, to $11.97 billion in 1993-94, to $9.9 billion in 1997-98. The end of the Cold War, as well as Canada’s large debt and deficit justified these reductions. However, high-level Americans, such as the US Ambassador to Canada, are already emphasizing the need to increase overall military spending. Rather than sharply increase defence spending on capital and equipment, Canadian Cabinet Ministers should take into consideration that Canada would set a poor example which other states could follow.

- Canada’s continuing fiscal problems, and its prominent role over the next eighteen months at the UN, should constrain policy options. Increasing defence spending is **not an option for responsible policy-makers.**

For many years, Canada’s defence spending has been less than 1.5 percent of GDP. In 1997, the United States spent 3.6 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence while Canada spent 1.3 percent—approximately the same percentage as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Canadian defence lobbyists bemoan the country’s low level of spending but the European allies have similarly cut-back. In 1997, each Canadian paid $274 (US) for defence while each American paid $838. But the United States is a superpower with world-wide defence interests. Canada has a population of barely 30 million yet spends more per capita on defence than Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, and approximately the same as Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Italy.

- The government should be prepared to announce that it cannot afford to spend more on defence at the same time as social and health care programmes continue to be cut.
The Worldwide Refugee Crisis: A Threat to International Security

Share the Burden and Help Reduce the Number of Refugees:

The world’s refugee population is fast becoming a crisis of epic proportions. At present there are approximately 15 million official ‘refugees’ under the Geneva Convention and similar arrangements. In addition, there are perhaps upward of 20 million people who are not afforded the same official protection, but are ‘in refugee-like situations’. Another, even larger category is that of the ‘internally displaced,’ whose number has risen to perhaps 26 million or more—although statistics on this are uncertain.³⁰ Those who are forced to flee their homes require food and medical aid, depress the living standards of local communities, may contribute to environmental destruction, and can even encourage ethnic and cultural animosities. Most discouraging is that if regional anarchy increases, as we have seen in the Balkans, the numbers of those in flight will abruptly rise. Canada and the rest of the world community must help stem the flow and alleviate suffering.

- The Canadian government could help set up organized observer corps in countries and along borders deemed to be a potential source of refugee-producing conflict. By providing an early warning system of well-trained UN personnel, peace-promoting measures could be introduced before individuals are forced to flee their homes. Some developing countries perceive early warning as opening the door wide for Northern interference in their internal affairs. But by trying to promote humanitarian early warning, the Canadian government has been acting with foresight—at the same time as government officials have been mindful that there were UN warnings of the Rwanda disaster three years before it happened.

- Another recommendation might be for Canada to work harder through the UN to foster broad-based economic development, since the relationship of refugeeism to underdevelopment is direct and undisputed.³¹ Lessening poverty will likely reduce the number of refugees. Canada’s foreign aid budget now amounts to about 0.31 percent of the country’s economic output, down from 0.50 percent 10 years ago. Once the fifth most generous of the world’s 21 richest nations, Canada now ranks ninth. As the President of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation has stated, “Given that we want to play an international leadership role, and given how
pleased we were to be elected to the [UN] Security Council, we should put in the resources that would allow us to play that role."\(^{32}\)

- Canada could also advocate **establishing an organized system of burden sharing**, whereby all the world’s nations would contribute to supporting refugees by **allocating money to the countries that end up housing them**. Despite internal weaknesses, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the UN Human Rights Commissioner and Centre, deserve more widespread support. This would relieve pressure on the poorest of Third World countries that are often overwhelmed by refugee populations, despite their lack of resources.\(^{33}\)

**Conclusion:**

Canada has limited time and a small window of opportunity to take advantage of its prominent seat in the UN Security Council. It is highly unlikely that it will be re-elected to the position for at least another ten years (*e.g.* until at least 2010). Currently, the Liberal government under Jean Chretien is well-equipped to make important changes to national and international security, in part because it has appointed a Foreign Minister with a vision of the world as it could be, not as it is. In the tradition of many Canadian idealists before him, such as former Minister of External Affairs Howard Green and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Axworthy is seeking to strengthen the UN and work toward peace and disarmament. Not everyone will agree on the best methods and most efficient means of achieving these commonly-valued objectives. But Canada has a duty and responsibility to put forward new ideas at the UN to enhance international and national security. As Professor James Eayrs suggested over thirty years ago in *Fate and Will in Foreign Policy*:

> Force is the monopoly of the Great Powers, for all the good it does them. But Great Powers enjoy no monopoly over ideas. The foreign minister of a small state may not be able to summon a gunboat in aid of his diplomacy, to carry a big stick let alone to brandish it. But he can carry a briefcase well enough, and stock it with proposals.\(^{34}\)

2There are fifteen seats on the Council including the permanent five—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus ten elected members. In 1999, these include Argentina, Bahrain, Canada, Gambia, Gabon, Namibia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, and Slovenia.


11 Andrew McIntosh, “Submarines to come at a higher price,” *National Post*, 15 February 1999.


17 Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence, “The Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence,” January 1999, p. 53-56.


20 For example, see “Science in Russia: The diamonds in the rubble,” *The Economist*, 8 November 1997 at [http://www.istc.ru/n10.htm](http://www.istc.ru/n10.htm)


22 Center for Defense Information, *op. cit.*

24Victor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II, op. cit., and Center for Defense Information, op. cit;


29Ibid., Table 4.


31Shenstone, op. cit. p. 32.


33Michael Shenstone, op. cit. p. 32-33.

34James Eayrs, Fate and Will in Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Seven talks for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation), p. 84.