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Earning and Caring: Porter Lecture

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Earning and Caring

Abstract: This paper speaks especially to the family dimensions of equal opportunity. Defining families through the activities of earning and caring, I first consider family change along with explanations based on structural and cultural factors. I then make the case that equal opportunity by gender has progressed considerably in education, while there are persistent inequalities in unpaid work, and the inequalities in paid work can often be related to those in unpaid work. By focussing on family models and the world of work, we see that various models co-exist, but that several policies are based on the breadwinner model. The paper finishes with reflections on policy that would de-link gender and caring.

Following on the tradition of John Porter (1921-1979), I focus here on issues of equality of opportunity, by considering especially the family side of these questions. I start by making the case that “earning and caring” are the important dimensions of families that we should be studying. I then look at family change, and build a theoretical understanding based on economic and cultural factors, or what Hamilton (1978) has called “patriarchy and capitalism.” I then look at gender and associated differentials in the public world of education and work, but focus more on the association of gender and caring, a topic that has been called a “stalled revolution.” In reflecting further on slow gender change, I suggest that we need to pay attention to matters of economic dependency and symbolic display in families. The consideration of family models and the world of work suggests that policy should seek to de-link gender and caring.

Defining families

Defining families is a minefield. This can be observed by looking at the Cairo conference on Population and Development, and the Beijing International Conference on Women. These conferences might have elaborated some consensus thinking with regard to families, but that proved impossible. At the heart of the problem is not only the diversity of families, but also the conflicting orientations at the policy level. On the one hand, there is interest to support or empower families, as a way of supporting individuals and children in particular. But sometimes policy needs to support the removal of individuals from families, when these are oppressive or abusive toward their members.

There has been a tendency to define families through relationships and through sentiment. In its broadest definition, Statistics Canada speaks of people related by marriage or blood. We tend to think of sentiment as the inner side of families, as what holds them together and makes them unique and special. But family relationships have become very difficult to define, or at least there is debate regarding what kind of relationships constitute families, and the focus on sentiment can leave us blind to the negatives associated with families. There is not much research on the public opinion of what constitutes families. My sense is that people living alone resent the label of a non-family household, and they often see themselves as being in a family situation. For instance, a French survey found that for persons who were single at ages 21-44, at

least a quarter were in a serious relationship (Leridon and Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1994: 51). They were not living with someone, but they considered that they were in a relationship. As another example, the concept of step-parent or step-child is often given a stronger reality on the part of sociologists than on the part of the persons who live these relationships, and who often think of each other on a first name basis (McLanahan, 2000). The Dutch have asked respondents whether they consider specific relationships to be families (Knijn, 2000). In response to a question “What do you mean by a family,” besides couples with children, 96% saw “a man and a woman cohabiting with children” as constituting a family, as did 81% for “two men living with an adopted child,” and 81% for two women living together with a child of one of them.” There was lesser recognition of families in the situation of “married partners without children,” at 56% and only 43% for “cohabiting partners without children.”

Rather than defining families through relationships and sentiment, several authors have come to define families through activities. In some early censuses, families, or households, were defined as *the people who regularly eat out of the same pot*. In effect, eating is an important activity, as is preparing the food; sharing food is a crucial part of caring, as is earning a living and sometimes home production in order to purchase or obtain food and the other essentials of life. We see this focus on activities in the lovely book by DeVault (1991) on Feeding the family, and in the frequently quoted The Second Shift by Hochschild (1989). Smith (1997) has also used these concepts when she speaks of families as “coordinating the uncoordinated.” In everyday life, we each have our individual physical and social trajectories, it is family that brings us together at specific times and places. I also like Smith’s view that, at least when there are children, separation and divorce do not mark the end of relationships, but their moving into a new stage.

Thus families can usefully be defined around the activities of earning and caring, or the sharing in earning and caring. In important regards, families are people who manage together the central life-maintaining activities of earning a living and caring for each other. At least families that do not succeed to earn a living and care for each other are under significant stress. Thus, in the General Social Survey on families, we should probably pay less attention to the “frequency of visits and telephone contact,” and pay more attention to the financial transfers and the caring activities, within and across households. We also should pay less attention to the specific nature of relationships or forms of families, and more attention to the earning and caring links across individuals who form families.

Family change: the 2nd demographic transition

The concept of the second demographic transition provides a useful context within which to study family change over the past 40 years. If the first transition, from about 1870 to 1945, brought smaller families, the change from about 1960 to the present is especially marked by increased flexibility in marital relationships (Lesthaeghe, 1995; Beaujot, 2000a: 85-96). The first transition involved a change in the economic costs and benefits of children, along with a cultural environment that made it more appropriate to control family size. The second transition is marked by a greater flexibility in the entry and exit from relationships, as manifest especially

through cohabitation and divorce.

There is considerable similarity in the timing of the second transition in a number of Western countries. Lesthaeghe (1995) proposes that it is useful to consider three stages in this second transition. The **first stage**, from about 1960 to 1970 involved the end of the baby boom, the end of the trend toward younger ages at marriage, and the beginning of the rise in divorces. The **second stage** from 1970 to 1985 saw the growth of common law unions and eventually of children in cohabiting unions. The **third stage** since 1985 includes a plateau in divorce, an increase in post-marital cohabitation (and consequently a decline in re-marriage), and a plateau in fertility due in part to higher proportions of births after age thirty. There are clearly cultural differences in the extent to which given groups have completed the second demographic transition. For instance, cultural factors played a significant role in the delay of the first transition among the French population of Canada, which underwent pronounced change in the 1960s as the completion of the first transition coincided with the beginning of the second. By the 1990s, the population of Quebec was more advanced than that of Ontario in several aspects of the second demographic transition (Beaujot, 2000b).

---Table 1 about here---

Table 1 presents some statistics that capture these trends for Canada as a whole. In terms of the first stage, the average **births** per woman, as measured by the total fertility rate, reached a peak of 3.9 in 1957, and declined to 2.2 by 1971. The median **age at first marriage** declined over this century to reach a low of just over 21 years for brides and 23 years for grooms in the early 1970s, then increased to ages 26 and 28 for women and men respectively by 1996. The law permitting **divorces** on grounds other than adultery dates only from 1968. Per 100,000 married couples, there were under 200 divorces in each year over the period 1951-1966 compared to 1000 in 1976 and 1130 in 1996. While there had been a long term increase in separation and divorce, we can speak of a substantial jump starting in the 1960s. Although most marriages remain intact until death, the substantial increase in separations means that marriage is no longer defined as lasting forever.

Turning to the second stage, **cohabiting** unions were not specifically enumerated in the 1976 Census, but births to non-married women were increasing substantially in the 1970s, giving an indirect measure of common-law unions. By 1986, most tabulations on families were treating cohabitations as marriages. The 1996 Census determined that 13.7 per cent of couples were cohabiting. The 1995 General Social Survey found that among persons born between 1951 and 1970, two out of five have lived in a cohabiting union, and over half of first unions taking place since 1985 have been cohabitations rather than marriages (Dumas and Bélanger, 1997: 135, 139). The proportion of births occurring to women who are **not married**, most of whom are cohabiting, increased from 9 per cent in 1971 to 37 per cent in 1996. At first cohabitation was seen as mostly affecting pre-marital relationships, but we now see that it has also affected post-marital relationships, along with marital relationships themselves. In effect, along with separation and divorce, it is a key indicator of family change.

For the third stage, we find that by 1990, half of divorced persons aged 30-39, and more than a third of those aged 40-49, were in **cohabiting** relationships (Dumas and Péron, 1992: 50). There is relatively stable fertility, between 1.7 to 1.5 births per woman over the whole period 1977 to 1998, but the proportion of the total fertility rate to women aged **30 and over** has increased from 24.9 per cent in 1976 to 40.2 per cent in 1998.

These changes in births, marriage, cohabitation and divorce have brought fewer children, but also a higher proportion of children who are not living with both biological parents. In particular, lone-parent families as a proportion of all families with children increased from 11.4 in 1961 to 22.3 in 1996. Compared to men, women are less likely to be living in a relationship, and they are more likely to be living with children. Both of these differences present economic disadvantages for women, and for children.

These data also confirm the uniqueness of the 1950s as a period between the two transitions. Not only was this the peak of the **baby boom**, but it was also a period of **marriage rush**, as marriage occurred at young ages and high proportions of persons married at least once in their lives. It has been described as a "golden age of the family," where many families corresponded to the new ideal of domesticity, especially in the suburbs, and consequently there was less variability (Skolnick, 1987: 6-16).

Subsequent research has made it clear that not all was ideal in this golden age. Isolated housewives in particular experienced the "problem with no name" (Freidan, 1963: 15). Since the task of maintaining the home had been assigned to women, men became less competent at the social skills needed to nourish and maintain relationships (Goldscheider and Waite, 1991: 19). The idealism of the time also introduced blinkers regarding some realities of family life, including violence and abuse. Given a general denial that such things could ever occur in families, there was little recourse for the victims of violence. There was also a lack of autonomy, especially for women, to pursue routes other than the accepted path (Veevers, 1980). Childless couples were considered selfish, single persons were seen as deviants, working mothers were considered to be harming their children, single women who became pregnant were required either to marry or to give up the child for adoption in order to preserve the integrity of the family. For instance, in the 1950s four out of five Americans described persons who did not marry as neurotic, selfish or immoral (Kersten and Kersten, 1991; Wilson, 1990: 99). In hindsight, we can observe that there were pent-up problems that were preparing the way for the second transition starting in the 1960s.

Family change: delay of life course transitions

We can speak of family change in terms of greater looseness in the entry and exit from relationships, and thus the importance of separation and cohabitation as indicators of this change. We can also speak of a shift in the average timing of family events, toward later ages. For childbearing, the first transition saw a reduction of births at older ages, but the second transition has involved a tempo shift or a delay of births to older ages.

There are similar delays in several other family events. Using data from the 1995 General Social Survey, Ravanera and her colleagues found rather uniform patterns in the median ages at which various family life course events have occurred (Ravanera and Rajulton, 1996; Ravanera et al., 1998a and 1998b). Over the birth cohorts 1916-20 to 1941-45 there is a general **downward** trend in the age at home leaving, first marriage, first birth, last birth and home leaving of the children. Conversely, the subsequent cohorts have experienced an **upward** trend. In the cohorts of the 1920s to 1940s, the tendency was not only to marry early, but over a relatively narrow range of ages.

The delays in these life course events may be interpreted as a longer period of adolescence, which Côté and Allahaar (1994) have called a Generation on Hold. But the delays also reflect the needs of both men and women to put off the entry into relationships, and especially childbearing, until they are better able to handle the trade-offs between investing in themselves and investing in reproduction. That is, there are trade-offs in the timing of the various life course transitions, with advantages to both early and late patterns. Early childbearing ensures that there will be childbearing and early departures from the parental home ensure that the child has somehow become independent. However, those who have children later are able to invest longer in themselves before investing in the next generation, and they are able to have higher quality children. Similarly, later home leaving can enable better transfers from parents, and the potential to establish more effective self-sufficiency of children.

In effect, Lochhead (2000) finds that delayed childbearing is more pronounced among women who have university education, and that there are increasing income differentials to the disadvantage of younger first-time mothers, even in two-parent families. Using data from the United States, Martin (2000) finds that delayed childbearers, who tend to have more education, are increasingly likely to raise their children in intact marriages, while early childbearers are more likely to raise children outside of marriage. Canadian data also indicate that women under 30 who are formerly married are much more likely to have children than those who are single, cohabiting or married (Ravanera, 1995: 18). From the point of view of children, Bianchi (2000) speaks of a possible bifurcation of models, with one group taking advantage of parental investment from both mothers and fathers, and the other where fathers are more likely to be absent and mothers do not have adequate time and resources to invest in children. Children born from mature parents are more likely to have the advantages of a mother with more human capital, along with the presence of a father in a dual-income family, which contrasts with the greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those who parent early.

Family change: structural and cultural explanations

As in other areas of sociology, it is possible to get some mileage by starting with structural and cultural perspectives. I have always liked Hamilton's (1978) title, The Liberation of women: a study of patriarchy and capitalism as a means of highlighting these theoretical questions.

The long term changes in the family are related to societal changes, especially changes in

economic structures. We can speak of structural differentiation, and de-institutionalization, through which families have become less central to the organization of society and to the lives of individuals (Harris, 1983). This reduced role allows for more flexibility in family arrangements and fewer constraints on family behaviour. For instance, the growth of wage labour for the young undermined parental authority and removed the barriers to early marriage. Note that in some other areas of life there have emerged more constraints on behaviour, for instance with regard to smoking in public places, throwing out garbage, or sexually abusive behaviour at work. That is, not all areas of life have seen the diminished constraints on individual behaviour that we have seen in the family area.

In terms of the more recent transformations, the structural explanation pays attention to the shift to a **service economy** which increased the demand for women's involvement in paid work (Chafetz and Hagan, 1996). Until the 1960s, the division of labour encouraged a reciprocal state of dependency between the sexes. The expansion that occurred in the labour market as of the 1960s involved especially jobs that might be seen as extensions of women's unpaid work, particularly in clerical work, teaching, nursing and other services. This put pressure on women to postpone marriage as they extended their period of education and invested in their work lives. For both young women and young men, marriage became less important as a means of structuring their relationships and understandings, and consequently cohabitation became an alternative. Women became less dependent on marriage, making divorce and cohabitation more feasible alternatives for both sexes. Focussing on men, Mintz (1998) observes not only the long term disappearance of patriarchal families based on father-son bonds, but especially the demise of the family wage and consequently the decline in the material basis of male familial authority.

The **cultural explanations** focus on what is happening within families, on the understanding that people have regarding family questions. Burgess et al. (1963) spoke of a movement from institution to companionship, or Farber (1964) from orderly replacement of generations to permanent availability, or Scanzoni and Scanzoni (1976) from instrumental to expressive relationships. As is well recognized, relationships based on companionship are less stable than those based on division of labour. Relationships are not maintained as institutions, but as a “project de couple” (Roussel, 1979), or as a “pure relationship” (Giddens, 1991). In Le fin de la famille moderne, Dagenais (2000) also describes the post-modern family as high in individual and humanistic values.

Lesthaeghe (1995) has proposed that it is possible to identify two somewhat separable cultural transformations in terms of family, intimate behaviour and children, with the second corresponding to the second demographic transition. He notes that several authors have proposed these themes. For instance, in The Making of the Modern Family, Shorter (1975) identifies two **sexual revolutions**. The first revolution involved young people making their own personal choices for marriage partners, and consequently the removal of the barriers to marriage that had previously been placed by parents and society. However, this first revolution was based on “one true love” that was expected to last a lifetime. The second sexual revolution accentuated the sexual aspects of mate selection and introduced experimentation with eroticism along with the possibility of sex without love. Eventually, sexual gratification was seen as indispensable for

unions.

There are also two **contraceptive revolutions**. The first transition occurred before modern methods of contraception. These were inefficient methods, including abstinence and non-coital sex. This first contraceptive revolution occurred quietly, in the privacy of individual couples who sought to stop childbearing after they had the desired number of children. The second contraceptive revolution involved efficient methods, principally the pill and sterilization. This was far from a quiet revolution in the privacy of married couples. In particular, it liberated pre-marital sexual activities from the concerns of pregnancy, and allowed people to enter relationships earlier. Efficient contraception also permitted the postponement of births and strong control over the timing of children. For couples, perhaps nothing has changed as much since the early 1960s as the degree of control over childbearing. For the non-married, there was a significant reduction in the risks of sexual expression. In both cases, the links between sexuality, marital life and reproduction have been broken.

Ariès (1980) also speaks of two transitions in the relative priority given to **children and adults**. The first transition centred on children, with strong parental investments in child quality. Earlier, children seemed to be present for the benefit of parents, but later parents came to spoil their children in the sense of giving them more than they could ever expect in return (Caldwell, 1976). Similarly, while many things had previously competed for a mother's attention, maternal love came to put children's well-being second to none, and motherhood even emerged as a full-time vocation (Shorter, 1975; Stone, 1977; Garfield, 1990: 37). The second transition involves a move to adult-centred preoccupations involving self-fulfilment and the quality of the dyadic relation between partners. There is a shift in values and norms from family or child-centred orientations toward more self-centred pursuits (Ariès, 1980; Lesthaeghe, 1983; Roussel, 1987). In particular, the second transition involves a weakening of the normative consensus that marriage and childbearing are integral parts of the adult role. Instead, children are largely viewed as a means through which adults can receive affective gratification and blossom as individuals (Romaniuc, 1984: 64). Of course, some have concluded that children can also interfere with this affective individualism. While children remain important for most people, they are no longer so important as to be impediments to parental divorce, and subsequent self-fulfilment in other relationships.

Lesthaeghe (1995) further identifies two transitions in terms of individual **autonomy and political control**. The period until 1950 involved enhanced institutional control, first by the church through the reform movements and then by the state through an extension of its power over individual lives. As the study of prevalent values indicates, the more recent period has involved a resistance to external institutional authority. There were the student movements of the 1960s, the second wave of feminism in the 1970s, and the decline of deference of the 1980s. In regard to the latter, Nevitte (1996: 226) finds that in 1980 some 53 percent of Canadians thought that "tolerance and respect for other people" was an important "quality which children should be encouraged to learn at home." By 1990, 80 percent of respondents choose tolerance as a key value for children to learn. In the twelve countries surveyed in the 1980 and 1990 World Values Survey, there were increases over the period in the value placed on egalitarianism in both husband/wife and parent/child relationships (Nevitte, 1996: 280). For women in particular,

asymmetric gender roles are questioned as limitations on both achievement and self-fulfilment.

Clearly, family change has much to do with gender. In order to highlight these gender questions, the next sections adopt categories proposed by Jean-Claude Chesnais (1987) to the effect that moving toward gender equality involves equal opportunity (1) in education, (2) in the labour force and (3) in everyday life.

Gender and education

It is not hard to demonstrate that there has been much change in terms of gender and education. In 1960 only a quarter of post-secondary students were women, now 56% are women. Table 2 shows degrees, diplomas and certificates granted by field of study and sex for the period 1970 to 1995, separating the undergraduate and graduate levels. In several fields, women have become the majority. At the undergraduate level, there are two areas where women remain in the minority: in engineering and applied sciences the progress is slow such that only 21% of degrees were granted to women in 1995, and in mathematics/physical sciences we might speak of proportions that are stalled at some 30% women since 1980.

—Table 2 about here—

Without considering all the reasons for this change or lack of change, part of the explanation may relate to the extent to which various professions have become family friendly. When there are few women in a field, as in engineering or physical sciences, there may be less pressure to adopt family friendly provisions. Thus a circularity may exist wherein certain professions are slow at adopting family friendly orientations because the workers are mostly men, which in turn discourages women from entering the field. In other fields like education or health, where women have become the majority, the workers may have sought benefits that made more accommodations between family and work (Ranson, 1998).

Gender and work

The labour force participation patterns of women and men have become more similar, but there remain differences in levels and intensity (Beaujot, 2000a: 144). The employment/population ratios have become more similar, with women's rate representing 63.4% of men's rate in 1980 and 82.2% in 2000 (Table 3). A greater proportion of women are working part-time, but part-time work is also increasing for men. Consequently, the full-time employment to population ratios have also converged. For instance, at ages 25-44 the full-time employment to population ratio was reduced for men from 88.4% in 1980 to 82.7% in 2000. For women, this ratio increased from 44.4% to 59.2%. At the same time, the full-time hours have not converged, representing 44.0 hours for men and 39.4 hours for women in 2000. The earnings ratios are on a converging path, but the differences remain large.

—Table 3 about here---

There is both continuity and change, depending on the indicator. In 1976, women comprised only 40% of managers and professionals (white collar workers), compared to over half in 1996 (Beaujot, 2000a: 147). On the other hand, while women are 45% of the labour force, they comprise only 12% of “power jobs” (corporate officer positions in Canada’s 560 largest corporations) and only 3.4% of “clout positions” (executive vice-presidents and chief executive officers in these largest corporations) (Church, 2000).

Earnings ratios are less pronounced at younger ages. At ages 25-34, the 1998 hourly earnings ratio of women was 92% of that of men if they were single, and 96% if they were unionized workers (Galarneau and Earl, 1999: 26). While marital status and parental status have come to play lesser roles, they continue to operate in opposite directions in the lives of men and women. That is, for women, being married and having children reduces the labour force participation, but for men being married and having children increases the labour force participation. Consequently, the smallest sex differences are for persons who are single without children and the largest differences are for the married with children (Beaujot, 1995).

Among couples with children under 16, there were dual-earners in 36% of cases in 1961 compared to 62% in 1997 (Marshall, 1998: 10). There are also more cases of wives earning more than their husbands; among husband-wife families with employment income, 25% had wives with higher income in 1993, compared to 11% in 1967 (Crompton and Geran, 1995). In a third of these cases, the wives were sole earners. However, in the combined average incomes of husbands and wives, wives contributed 16.2% in 1970 and 30.5% in 1990 (Rashid, 1994: 9). Even when wives worked full-year full-time, their average income only comprised 40% of average family income. When husbands have incomes over \$30,000, the likelihood of the wife working no longer drops off as the husband’s income increases (Rashid, 1994: 16, 17). At the same time, when husbands are under 40 years of age, the incomes of husbands are lower in dual-earner than one-earner families (Oderkirk et al., 1994).

Equal opportunity in education has largely arrived, and it has also advanced in terms of work, but this is complicated by family questions. It is by looking at paid and unpaid work together that we can get a better sense of the situation.

Gender and everyday life

In their book entitled Lives of their own: the individualization of women’s lives, Jones and his co-authors (1990) see a change toward greater alternatives and flexibility in women’s lives. On the other hand, Duffy and her co-authors (1989) entitle their book, Few choices: women, work and family. If the choice is to *work full-time*, that often comes with time stress, especially when there are young children. The *housekeeper* alternative presents the disadvantage of isolation and low status, The intermediate alternative of *part-time work* can lead to a lack of seniority and few work benefits.

We have much poorer statistics on unpaid work than on education and paid work, making it difficult to measure change. Nonetheless, change can be implied by comparing two articles in the

Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology. Based on a 1971 time use study in Vancouver, Meissner et al. (1975) entitled their article "No exit for wives: sexual division of labour and the cumulation of household demands." Qualitative quotes illustrate men's attitudes wives as co-providers (Meissner et al., 1975: 438-439):

A forklift driver in his mid-fifties, whose wife works two days a week as a switchboard operator (three children, aged 13 to 22), had this to say on the conditions of sharing housework: "If a woman **has** to work, then the husband and wife should share the housework, but if it isn't necessary for her to work then she should consider looking after the house first. It isn't necessary for her to work in the first place. She's doing this for herself and to satisfy herself, where the man has to work to keep the house going."

A manager in his mid-thirties whose wife is a full-time housewife (three children, aged 7 to 14), on the hypothetical question of his wife taking a job: "I wouldn't stand in her way, if that's what she wanted to do, but fortunately for me she doesn't want to do that. My wife's first priority should be the family and the home as long as I am able to provide for the family."

A lawyer in his late forties whose wife has just quit a part-time professional job because the double burden was too much (three children, aged 15 to 19), about the sharing of housework: "If the guy comes home completely beat because he's got a job of much more pressure and his wife has a job because she's bored with the housework, this gives her a lift and she's more up to doing the housework."

These attitudes now appear rather archaic, as do those of men in Flin Flon Manitoba in the mid-1970s, captured so well by Luxton's (1980) title, More than a labour of love. In contrast Bernier et al. (1996) entitled their Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology study "Le travail domestique: tendances à la déséxisation et à la complexification." Based on data from Sudbury in 1993-94, the analysis of domestic work by age, education, occupation and the relative income of spouses, suggests to these authors that women's paid work was a "trump card" against their exploitation through domestic work. Looking toward the future, Bernier and her co-authors propose that greater labour force participation, along with fewer children, should further reduce the gender differences in housework. The contrast is highest in the qualitative parts of the studies from Vancouver in 1971 and Sudbury in 1993-94. While the Meissner study concludes that there is "no exit for wives," Bernier et al. note a reduction of the inequality in the sharing of domestic work across various types of couples. Based on their data from Hamilton in 1984, Livingstone and Asner (1996) find that the gender differences in domestic work are lowest in professional dual-earner couples who are intermediate in the class structure.

Besides these local surveys, we now have three national level time-use surveys, for 1986, 1992 and 1998. These are based on time-use diaries where respondents are asked to indicate their activity over a specific 24-hour day. This measures only the main activity for given times of the day. That is, double tasking is not measured, nor the intensity of the activity, nor the extent to which the respondent takes responsibility for a given task. When responsibility for domestic

tasks is studied, it clearly shows that women absorb the chief responsibility for the main domestic tasks (Beaujot, 2000a: 215), but such tabulations typically do not pay attention to the relative responsibility of men for earning or paid work. The advantage of time-use calendars is that time provides a common metric, especially for measuring both paid and unpaid work. There are also advantages to recording the specific activities performed over the day, rather than having respondents estimate the time spent on given activities, or their share of the responsibility for given tasks. Since there is considerable variation from day to day for specific respondents, averages for categories of the population can be more useful than multivariate analyses based on individual responses.

While much more detail is available, it is useful to divide the total 24-hour day for each respondent into four categories. Time use in *paid work* here includes driving to and from work, and it also includes time spent in education. *Unpaid work* is all other work, including housework, child care and even volunteer work, performed as a main activity at given times of the day. These two together can be called *total productive time*. In contrast, the other two categories are down time: *personal care* including sleeping and caring for oneself, along with *leisure and free time* which includes active and passive forms of leisure.

All three surveys show an important result: for the total population aged 15 and over, the average productive time of men and women is very similar. In 1998, the average was exactly the same at 7.8 hours per day over a seven day week, for women and men (Figure 1). The asymmetry is in terms of the division of this time into the paid and unpaid components. Nonetheless, there has been some convergence (Table 4). As would be expected, women's time in paid work as a percent of men's time in paid work has increased from 60% in 1986, to 65% in 1992, and 68% in 1998. Conversely, men's time in unpaid work as a percent of women's time in unpaid work has also changed from 46% in 1986, to 58% in 1992, and 61% in 1998. In 1986 we could say that men did a third and women two-thirds of unpaid work, or women did twice as much as men. This generalization is no longer true, with men doing 61% as much unpaid work as women, and women doing 68% as much paid work as men.

—Figure 1 and Table 4 about here—

Marital status and the presence of children influence the total time in productive activities and the distribution into paid and unpaid components (Table 5). At ages 25-44 in 1998, the greatest gender symmetry can be observed for those who are unmarried (neither married nor cohabiting) with no children. In this category, there is less than an hour of difference between men and women in the average hours per day in each of paid and unpaid work. Compared to the category of unmarried without children, married without children increases the total productive time for both men and women, but it also brings more asymmetry, with the increase being in the category of paid work for men and unpaid work for women. Children further increase the total productive time for both sexes, but this increase is all in the unpaid work category, and especially for women.

—Table 5 about here—

It is noteworthy that, except for lone parents, the average time in total productive activity is very similar between men and women within these categories of marital and parental status for the population aged 25-44. Nonetheless, both marriage and children, but especially children, bring change in the direction of greater complementary or specialization. The further consideration of the work status confirms that women make greater adjustments for changing family situations, but men also do more unpaid work when there are young children (Beaujot, 2000a: 211). As Kempeneers (1992) had observed through looking at work interruptions, women carry more of the responsibility for the necessary accommodations between production and reproduction.

The stalled revolution?

It is useful to contrast two explanations of the division of paid and unpaid work. Becker (1981) basically proposes that specialization is more efficient, and consequently, in a given household, at most one person would be both in the labour market and in domestic production. Hartmann (1984) attributes the division of work to men's exploitation of women's labour, within patriarchy. Both of these authors were looking at the situation of American families in the 1950s or 1960s, and neither saw much potential for change. Both theories, it seems to me, are over-deterministic. Becker was wrong in concluding that efficiency would be the prime consideration, while Hartmann was wrong in suggesting that men would not accommodate to the presence of children and the partner's paid work time.

At stake are questions of both dependency and gender display (Brines, 1994). Durkheim (1960 [1893]: 60) had elevated dependency to a universal principal, suggesting that without a division of labour, marriages would be transient. He saw complementary roles as a basis for holding families together, and thought that if we "permit the sexual division of labour to recede below a certain level ... conjugal society would eventually subsist in sexual relations preeminently ephemeral." The concept of "gender display" suggests instead a cultural basis on which men and women differ, with men being threatened in their very masculinity by doing domestic work. Given the powerful economic and cultural questions underlying the complementary roles model, it is understandable that gender change in the area of domestic work has been slow.

Nonetheless, there are powerful economic and cultural forces pushing in the opposite direction, especially women's labour market opportunities, and the cultural interest in greater equality by gender. Thus, in his article on "The future of fatherhood," Coltrane (1995) observes various pressures for change, including economic ones with more time in paid work by wives and greater commitment to women as full-time providers, and cultural questions like new ideals of sharing, less rigid gender attitudes, and men taking pride in their ability to do domestic work and being involved fathers. Other life course changes are pushing in the same direction, with more sharing associated with cohabitation, remarriage and later births, where women are in a better position to negotiate the division of costs. The breadwinner/ homemaker form of division of paid and unpaid work made more sense when domestic production was a full-time job, with large families and few support services.

Family models and the world of work

The study of family models has paid much attention to the transition from a breadwinner model to dual-earner families. Thus it is important to analyse the extent of accommodation between families and the world of work.

When the focus is on domestic work, the literature is prone to conclude that the change has been from the homemaking model to women having a double burden. That is, the change in women's labour force participation has not been accompanied by an equal change in the division of unpaid work, giving women a second shift. While these are clearly important family models, they can mask other distinctions and changes with regard to the division of paid and unpaid work. In particular, there has been a tendency to ignore the remaining differential involvement of husbands and wives in paid work, and to conclude too readily that the lack of change in men's unpaid work implies a second shift in the sense of women having more total (paid plus unpaid) work than men. Sullivan (2000) observes that concepts such as double burden, second shift or stalled revolution have contributed to the understanding of the division of domestic work and related issues of power, but these ideas correspond to a "no change" model that tends to ignore the potential for and possibilities of change. On the basis of American data from 1965 and 1998, Sayer (2002) finds that the relation between time-use and gender has changed since the 1960s. Men have increased their time in core nonmarket tasks (cooking, cleaning, and daily child care), marriage increases housework for both women and men, and both married mothers and married fathers of young children are putting in a second shift of work. She concludes that nonmarket work may be shifting from representing gender subordination to representing family caring.

Besides the double burden, it is useful to contrast a Durkheim/Parsons/Becker model based on *complementary* roles associated with differential responsibility for instrumental and expressive activities, and a *companionship or collaborative* model. Companionship refers to the relationship being held together through expressive activities. In a collaborative model, men and women are collaborating in providing and caring roles; if there are children it may be seen as co-providing and co-parenting. Goldscheider and Waite (1991) have expressed these ideas about family models in their title New families, No families? That is, they contrast old families based on complementary roles to new families where activities are shared. Similarly, Conway (1997) speaks of a "joyous funeral" for the patriarchal family based on complementary roles. Depending on the relative opportunity structure of women and men, the collaborative model provides insurance against the inability or unwillingness of the breadwinner to provide for (especially former) spouse and children.

While the definitions are not totally clear, it is important to address the empirical question of the relative predominance of various family models. In the breadwinner or neo-traditional arrangement, the man takes more responsibility for paid work and the woman for unpaid work. In the double burden, both are equally involved in paid work but the women does more of the unpaid work. By not observing the relative amount of paid work done by men and women, much research is unable to distinguish between neo-traditional and second shift arrangements (Becker and Williams, 1999). The focus on averages at the aggregate level, either for all couples, or for dual-earner couples, does not permit a consideration of cases of "new families" where the unpaid work is more equally divided, or situations where men work significantly

longer hours than women.

In identifying the collaborative model, several authors have adopted at 40/60 split as marking an equal division. Schwartz (1994) used this 40/60 split of labour and responsibility to identify what she called “peer couples.” Nock (2001) defines “marriages of equally dependent spouses” as those where neither spouse earns less than 40 percent of total family earnings. Looking only at two-earner couples, Feree (1991) identifies the “two-housekeeper” model as the wife doing less than 60 percent and the husband more than 40% of the housework. Similarly, Sullivan (2000) defines egalitarian couples as those where the woman does less than 60% of the overall domestic work time.

In my earlier work, couples were identified as doing the same amount of either paid or unpaid work if they were within four hours of each other in one week (Beaujot, 2000a: 224-226; Beaujot and Liu, 2001a). Four hours, or slightly more than a half hour per day, is a fairly stringent measure because it comprises only 15% of total weekly paid or unpaid work. In the present analysis, a relative share was used. The 40/60 split that others have adopted is rather generous, because the person doing the larger amount can be doing as much as 50% more than the person doing the smaller amount. Instead, Table 6 uses the range of 45% to 55% of the couple total on a given type of work as “same,” while under 45% is doing less than the spouse, and over 55% is doing more than the spouse.

—Table 6 about here---

The data used here are from the weekly estimates of the time-use survey, where we have estimates for both the respondent and their spouse. These estimates adopt a less inclusive definition of paid and unpaid work, there is also more estimation error, and there is significant non-response especially for the questions regarding the spouse, but the measures have the advantage of enabling comparisons within couples. The questions concerned the total weekly time spent in paid work, domestic work, household maintenance, and child care, for the respondent and their spouse. These separate measures have been collapsed into the two categories of weekly paid and unpaid work.

Compared to one’s spouse, one could be doing more, less or the same amount of each of paid and unpaid work. It is of interest to first observe that there are couples in each of the cells of this three-by-three table (Table 6). From these nine categories, it is possible to suggest three types of work arrangements. In the traditional or **complementary roles** model, one person does more paid work and the other more unpaid work, and it is also useful to observe the sub-category of cases where it is the man who does more unpaid work and less paid work. In the **double burden**, a given person does the same amount (or even more) paid work, and more unpaid work. Here again, the double burden can be on the part of women or men. We can classify persons in a **collaborative** or more egalitarian model where both do the same amount of unpaid work. While this gives predominance to unpaid work in defining an egalitarian model, it does correspond to the literature on unpaid work, and it is possible to further specify the specific cases where spouses are doing similar hours of each of paid and unpaid work.

The dominant category, amounting to 57% in 1992 and 54% in 1998, are couples where one spends more time at paid work and the other spends more time at unpaid work. Within this complementary roles model, there are 7% of the cases in 1992 and 10% in 1998 showing the man doing more unpaid work and the woman doing more paid work. The second largest category is the double burden where typically a given person is doing the same amount of paid work but more unpaid work. This corresponds to 31% of the sample in 1992 and 33% in 1998; in 25% of these cases in 1992 and 30% in 1998 it was men who had the double burden. The remaining 12% of the sample in 1992 and 13% in 1998 can be called a collaborative model, including 4.7% in 1992 and 5.7% in 1998 where they do the same amount of both paid and unpaid work. As indicated, the comparisons between 1992 and 1998 show only slight change, but this tends to be in the direction of somewhat greater symmetry, with slight reduction in complementary roles and a greater proportion of men among persons with a double burden.

Further analysis suggests that the traditional model is most common when they are not both employed full-time, for older respondents, and when there are children under five years of age (Beaujot and Liu, 2001a). The double burden is most common when both are employed full-time, in older couples, and when the children are aged 5-18. The egalitarian model is most common at younger ages, when both are employed full-time, and for couples with children. Contrary to expectations, the egalitarian model is not more common in couples without children, though the traditional model does systematically increase with the number of children.

These family models are related to the changes in the work world, especially the growth of the service sector, larger proportions of non-standard jobs, more equal opportunity by gender, and employment/ population ratios that are at an all time high. It could be argued that this greater supply of workers relative to the population, including various kinds of workers with family responsibilities, has been one of the factors bringing change in the nature of work, including what has been called non-standard work (part-time, temporary, multiple jobs, own-account self-employment, etc). In some regards there is less security at work, but there is also more variety in the types of work, and a higher proportion of workers relative to the population. Presser (1998) proposes that this greater supply of workers of various types is one of the factors underlying a 24 hour economy, which permits a certain accommodation between family and work through part-time work, shifts, and longer hours for retail services. That is, the 24 hour economy, with associated growth of non-standard employment, includes changes at work, in families, and in the relations between family and work.

Policy thoughts

Policy probably needs to work at three fronts. It is important to seek to achieve more individual self sufficiency. It is also important to have families that look after individuals, and it is important to have a broader social safety net. As in any difficult policy area, there are contradictions. In particular, the encouragement of families to look after individuals can undermine the self-sufficiency of the person who takes the largest responsibility for this care. Becker (1981) sees marriage laws as existing to protect women who have specialized in unpaid work. But might we structure policy in order to discourage dependency on the part of adults, and

thus focus family policy toward children, who are necessarily dependent.

The complexity of policy derives in part because various family models co-exist. Clearly, there needs to be support for those who have lived their lives under the assumptions of the breadwinner or neo-traditional patterns. At the same time, it is my thesis that the de-gendering of caring activities is important to achieving equality of opportunity. Thus there is need both to support persons who have been disadvantaged through the breadwinner model, and to promote a more egalitarian family model that includes greater common ground between women and men in family activities.

There is clearly some basis for “new families” including policies like the Ontario Family Law Reform Act which already in 1978 spoke of couples sharing equally in the responsibility for their children. However, in many regards, there is resistance to letting women and men into domains that are considered to belong to the other gender. This is seen in paid work, with glass ceilings and the rarity of cases where women have authority over men (Clement and Myles, 1994). It is also seen within the home, where women can have difficulty allowing men to take responsibility in their domain. At stake are not only questions of paid and unpaid work, but the sense of mastery and indebtedness that may come from carrying a larger part of the burden (Lennon and Rosenfeld, 1992). These turf questions may especially apply within specific occupations and types of domestic work, and they may even apply to sub-areas of academic disciplines. There is need to think of ways of opening up these domains to the other sex, of men accepting that women may have different ways of supervising, and women accepting that men may have different standards of domestic work. Can we look toward a world where caring is just as important as earning, and where women and men let each other into both spheres?

Without doing justice to the whole domain of family policy, I will focus here on avenues that might help with regard to the de-linking of gender and caring. One problem is that many policies are based on a family wage model, which promotes dependency of one spouse on the other rather than self-sufficiency. Clearly, the family wage model gives the dependent spouse a greater share in the responsibility for caring. In particular, it would seem that a policy model that wanted to increase the common ground in terms of dependence and self-sufficiency of women and men would seek to put aside family benefits from employment along with spousal deductions in income tax, it would put aside widowhood benefits in pensions when the breadwinner dies, as well as alimony and pension splitting when the breadwinner separates, and it would seek to ensure joint custody of children. All of these things, from family benefits, to taxation, to pension splitting are based on a breadwinner model where one spouse is economically dependent on the other. It is interesting, for instance, that Sweden has never had pension splitting, it has the default condition of joint custody, and it did away with widow's pensions for those who married since 1989. A series of Swedish policies are based on the assumption that adults should be independent rather than dependent.

But even Sweden has not gone far enough in terms of policies that would promote the model of a collaborative family where men and women share both providing and caring responsibilities. In particular, Sweden has strong occupational segregation, and women are much more likely than

men to work part-time. There needs to be a better division of the leaves and part-time work that are associated with young children.

Henripin (2000) provides an interesting illustration of the contradictions associated with family benefits when these are applied to two-earner families. Based on a family wage model, family benefits seek to support the homemaker/ mother and the widow who is left behind. But widowhood benefits are now seen as rights that apply to the pensioner and their spouse, regardless of the spouse having been a housekeeper. Let us take two men who had the same career, but one of their spouses was a mother and homemaker, while the other worked in the labour market and had no children. If these two women die, the widowhood benefits apply to the spouse from the two-earner family, while his colleague who raised children receives no such benefits.

How should policies be structured in a two-worker family model? Some have proposed that the community should absorb the caring activities, so that women would not have a double burden. Duffy and Pupo (1996) call these “family friendly communities,” that hark back to extended families, communes, or tribal communities where children were raised in common. From the 1988 National Child Care Survey and various other surveys of attitudes regarding care of infants and very young children, there appears to be considerable interest on the part of parents to absorb the main responsibility through leaves and part-time work (Beaujot, 1997, Ghalam, 1997).

While public child care needs to be part of the solution, it does not necessarily re-balance the caring activities between women and men. I have proposed that we start our public education system as of age three, following the recommendations of the Ontario Royal Commission on Learning, and also joining what has effectively been policy in France for at least twenty years. For infants, parental leaves have been extended from 26 weeks to a full year. This policy could have been structured to encourage a half year of leave per parent, using a replacement rate of 90% with a much higher maximum than is now adopted. The same could apply to part-time work. In Sweden, one parent has the right to work part-time, which typically means 30 hours per week instead of the regular 40 hours, until the child is eight years old, and the right to return to full-time work at any point. But Sweden is far from having solved the gender imbalance in work, with women overwhelmingly being the ones working part-time. How about each parent having the right to one year of part-time work, for each child, and the concomitant right to return to full-time work. Of course, part-time work associated with young children would need to come with full social benefits, as it does in Sweden.

The case of lone-parent families needs much further attention because the re-balancing of paid and unpaid work across parents is here much more complex. Comparisons across some 20 countries suggests that several approaches are needed to reduce the economic disadvantages of children in lone parent families (Beaujot and Liu, 2001b). Provisions that would discourage teenage childbearing would have their importance, as would opportunities for lone mothers to work. More important is the generosity of social expenditure applying to individuals and especially to families with low income. This analysis also makes a case for provisions such as

joint custody that encourage involvement on the part of the absent parent, and particular arrangements like advance maintenance payments when the non-custodial parent is incapacitated, along with special provisions for lone parents.

Canada does have some provisions for lone parents, especially the equivalent to married deduction in income tax, which treats the first child of a lone-parent family as a dependent spouse for purposes of tax deduction. There are also provisions that apply to low-income families, and thus more often to lone-parent families, such as child tax benefits, greater access to subsidized day care, and higher replacement rate in employment insurance for low-income families who also receive child tax benefits. There are also enforcement provisions to collect child support payments from non-resident parents who are in default. However, these provisions are pale in comparison to advance maintenance payments, or paying higher benefits to lone-mother families. For instance, in the case of lone parents, Denmark gives child benefits for one more than the actual number of children. Collecting from non-resident parents does not solve the problem when this parent is unable to pay.

As a society we have found means of accommodating for the death of parents, through life insurance and adoption, and for the economic incapacity of parents if that incapacity occurs at work, through worker's compensation, employment insurance, and the disability provisions of the Canada Pension Plan. However, we have not found means to accommodate when the incapacity occurred in other circumstances. The provisions for low-income families solve part of this problem, but advance maintenance and other specific provisions for lone parents have the advantage of state support regardless of the circumstance that makes the non-resident parent unable or unwilling to provide.

It is hard to put policy ideas into a few words. Clearly, family policy needs to relate both to families and to the labour market. My main point is that there is need for more discussion of provisions that would further modernize the family in the direction of co-providing and co-parenting, and that would provide additional state support for lone parents.

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Table 1: Summary statistics on family change, Canada, 1941-1998

	1941	1951	1961	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	1998
Total fertility rate	2.83	3.49	3.85	2.12	1.78	1.65	1.60	1.71	1.62	1.54
Adjusted TFR*	--	--	--	--	--	1.79	1.77	1.81	1.92	1.71
Median age at first marriage										
Brides	23.0	22.0	21.1	21.3	21.6	22.5	23.9	25.1	26.3	
Grooms	26.3	24.8	24.0	23.5	23.7	24.6	25.8	27.0	28.3	
Divorces per 100,00 married couples	--	180	180	600	990	1180	1302	1235	1130	1050
Common-law couples as a percent of all couples	--	--	--	--	--	6.4	8.2	11.2	13.7	
Births to non-married women as a percent of all births	4.0	3.8	4.5	9.0	10.9	14.2	18.8	28.6	36.8	
Proportion of TFR to women aged 30+	41.7	37.7	33.2	27.8	24.9	26.9	30.7	33.9	38.6	40.2
Lone parent families as a percent of all families with children	9.8	9.8	11.4	13.2	14.0	16.6	18.8	20.0	22.3	

*Based on the Bongaart and Feeney corrections for changes in tempo.

Notes: For 1941-71 births to non-married women are "illegitimate births". The 1986 divorce rate is inflated due to the timing of changes in the divorce law.

Source: Beaujot, 2000:89 and calculations by authors.

Table 2. Degrees, diplomas, and certificates granted, by field of study and sex, Canada, 1970-95

		Undergraduate			Graduate		
		Male	Female	% Female	Male	Female	% Female
Total University	1970	39,514	26,224	39.9	8,604	2,236	20.6
	1975	49,139	39,868	44.8	10,268	3,752	26.8
	1980	49,076	49,572	50.3	10,144	5,647	35.8
	1985	53,888	60,184	52.8	11,170	7,657	40.7
	1990	56,365	74,264	56.9	11,956	10,207	46.1
	1995	61,936	88,876	58.9	14,086	13,176	48.3
Education	1970	6,439	7,517	53.9	1,327	527	28.4
	1975	9,562	13,169	57.9	1,892	887	31.9
	1980	7,011	14,714	67.7	1,804	1,581	46.7
	1985	5,369	13,054	70.9	1,508	2,060	57.7
	1990	6,563	15,905	70.8	1,428	2,687	65.3
	1995	7,988	18,000	69.3	1,412	3,243	69.7
Fine/applied arts	1970	413	836	67.0	29	49	62.8
	1975	913	1,437	61.1	74	72	49.3
	1980	1,024	1,924	65.3	103	105	50.5
	1985	1,182	2,250	65.6	139	191	57.9
	1990	1,350	2,703	66.7	168	259	60.7
	1995	1,528	3,169	67.5	212	331	61.0
Humanities	1970	5,253	4,747	47.5	654	1,883	34.7
	1975	4,689	5,782	55.2	1,051	2,429	43.3
	1980	4,056	6,285	60.8	1,111	2,111	52.6
	1985	4,553	7,583	62.5	1,310	2,357	55.6
	1990	5,915	10,579	64.1	1,514	2,763	54.8
	1995	6,956	12,205	63.7	1,472	1,878	56.1
Agriculture/biological sciences	1970	2,258	1,299	36.5	634	118	15.7
	1975	3,038	2,356	43.7	554	175	24.0
	1980	2,969	2,827	48.8	590	270	31.4
	1985	2,636	2,981	53.1	637	340	34.8
	1990	3,352	4,244	55.9	712	529	42.6
	1995	3,598	5,405	60.0	801	697	46.5
Social sciences	1970	10,984	3,968	26.5	2,511	628	20.0
	1975	15,483	8,390	35.1	3,642	1,113	23.4

	1980	17,724	13,118	42.5	4,006	1,851	31.6
	1985	20,705	21,066	50.4	4,321	2,634	37.9
	1990	23,255	28,876	55.4	4,471	3,573	44.4
	1995	24,521	34,501	58.5	5,177	4,410	46.0
Engineering/applied sciences							
	1970	4,214	66	1.5	1,198	19	1.6
	1975	5,138	137	2.6	1,158	47	3.9
	1980	7,348	609	7.7	1,231	85	6.5
	1985	8,297	1,056	11.3	1,766	188	9.6
	1990	7,190	1,110	13.4	1,753	252	12.6
	1995	7,839	2,060	20.8	2,445	517	17.5
Health Professionals							
	1970	1,780	2,888	61.9	424	155	26.8
	1975	2,455	3,461	58.5	434	258	37.3
	1980	2,485	4,515	64.5	423	461	52.1
	1985	2,376	5,683	70.5	589	623	51.4
	1990	2,504	6,530	72.3	710	964	57.6
	1995	2,574	7,550	74.5	887	1,462	62.2
Mathematics/physical sciences							
	1970	3,047	643	17.4	1,245	83	6.3
	1975	3,237	897	21.7	1,098	137	11.1
	1980	3,231	1,297	28.6	959	165	14.7
	1985	5,818	2,464	29.8	1,142	300	20.8
	1990	4,930	2,057	29.4	1,424	387	21.4
	1995	5,386	2,436	31.1	1,555	502	24.4
Community College and Diplomas							
	1970-71	5,929	6,873	53.7			
	1974-75	12,100	13,100	52.0			
	1979-80	19,903	27,684	58.2			
	1984-85	26,303	32,345	55.2			
	1989-90	23,416	33,858	59.1			
	1994-95	30,288	42,260	58.3			

Notes: Total includes "unclassified" classification. Undergraduate degrees by discipline are based on University data for bachelor and first professional degrees, as well as undergraduate diplomas and certificates. Graduate data by discipline are based on masters, earned doctorates, and graduate diplomas and certificates.

Sources: Beaujot, 2000: 58-59.

Table 3. Labour force and income by sex and age, Canada 1980 and 2000

	Male	1980 Female	Female/Male (%)	Male	2000 Female	Female/Male (%)
Employment rate						
all	72.8	46.3	63.6	67.5	55.5	82.2
15-24	63.0	56.0	88.9	56.7	55.8	98.4
25-44	90.1	57.8	64.2	86.5	75.2	86.9
45+	60.8	28.4	46.7	54.0	38.7	71.7
proportion of full-time employed among all employed						
all	93.1	74.0	79.5	89.7	72.7	81.1
15-24	79.9	71.7	89.7	62.9	48.6	77.2
25-44	98.1	76.8	78.3	95.6	78.7	82.3
45+	95.4	71.4	74.9	92.3	75.2	81.5
proportion of full-time employed among population						
all	67.8	34.3	50.5	60.5	40.4	66.7
15-24	50.4	40.1	79.7	35.7	27.1	75.9
25-44	88.4	44.4	50.3	82.7	59.2	71.5
45+	58.0	20.2	34.9	49.8	29.1	58.5
average working hours of full-time employed						
all	43.2	38.4	88.9	44.0	39.4	89.5
15-24	41.8	37.9	90.7	41.3	36.0	87.2
25-44	43.6	38.4	88.1	44.1	39.4	89.3
45+	43.7	39.0	89.2	44.5	39.7	89.2
average working hours of all employed						
all	41.3	32.6	78.9	38.7	33.8	87.3
15-24	36.3	31.3	86.2	32	26.9	84.1
25-44	43.1	33.5	77.7	43.2	35.4	81.9
45+	42.5	32.7	76.9	42.6	34.8	81.7
Median after-tax income*						
all	13,027	6,058	46.5	22,260	13,985	62.8
19 and under	1,955	1,694	86.6	3,052	2,681	87.8
20-24	8,342	6,467	77.5	10,979	9,076	82.7
25-34	15,246	8,471	55.6	22,467	16,516	73.5
35-44	17,872	7,972	44.6	28,631	18,657	65.2
45-54	17,147	7,789	45.4	29,576	18,210	61.6

Note:

* in 1980 and 1996

Source:

1. Statistics Canada, no. 13-210, 1980: 59; 1996: 105.
2. Survey of Consumer Finances.
3. Labour force historical review. 2000. Statistics Canada.

Table 4. Time use of total population, by sex, Canada, 1986, 1992, 1998

Average Hours per Day in Population Aged 15+						
	1986		1992		1998	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Total productive activity	7.5	7.4	7.7	7.8	7.8	7.8
Paid work and education	5.6	3.3	5.1	3.3	5.0	3.4
Unpaid work	1.9	4.1	2.6	4.5	2.7	4.4
Personal Care	10.8	11.2	10.3	10.8	10.2	10.6
Leisure/ free time	5.7	5.3	6.0	5.5	6.0	5.6
Total	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0

Sources:

1. Beaujot, 2000: 207; Statistics Canada, 1999, No 12F0080XIE, 1999: 5.
2. General Social Survey, 1986, 1992, 1998.

Table 5. Time use of population aged 25-44 by marital and parental status, by sex, Canada, 1998

	-----Hours per day-----							
	Unmarried no children		Married no children		Married Parents		Unmarried Parents	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
<i>Total productive activity</i>	8.1	8.1	9.0	8.8	9.9	9.7	8.8	9.4
Paid work and education	6.1	5.4	6.7	5.3	6.5	3.5	5.3	3.9
Unpaid work	2.0	2.6	2.3	3.5	3.5	6.2	3.5	5.6
Personal care	9.8	10.0	9.8	10.4	9.7	10.1	9.8	10.1
Leisure/free time	6.1	5.9	5.3	4.8	4.3	4.2	5.5	4.4
Total	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0	24.0

N=4365

Note: Married includes cohabiting.

Source: Special Tabulations from the Statistics Canada, 1998 General Social Survey.


Table 6. Predominance of models of husband-wife families in terms of the relative proportion of paid and unpaid work by sex, Canada, 1992, 1998

Compare to husband, wife does	1992			1998		
	More paid	Same paid	Less paid	More paid	Same paid	Less paid
More unpaid						
Men	4.1	13.6	52.9	4.2	15.5	48.1
Women	6.5	22.2	53.4	7.3	19.0	48.9
Average	5.3	17.9	53.1	5.7	17.2	48.5
Same unpaid						
Men	2.8	5.2	7.6	1.0	6.7	7.4
Women	1.9	4.2	2.4	2.9	4.8	3.6
Average	2.4	4.7	5.0	1.9	5.7	5.5
Less unpaid						
Men	3.7	5.4	4.7	5.0	4.7	7.5
Women	4.0	2.9	2.5	5.7	4.4	3.5
Average	3.9	4.2	3.6	5.3	4.5	5.5

Note: This table excludes couples where one or both are aged 65 or over. The sample size is 3598 in 1992 and 3794 in 1998.

Source: same as Table 5

Figure 1. Relative share of time in productive activities, women and men aged 15 and over, Canada, 1998



Note: Based on averages per capita.

Source: See Table 5.