A Mixed-Methods Examination of Modern Feminist Identity

Jaclyn Siegel, The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor: Calogero, Rachel M., The University of Western Ontario
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Psychology
© Jaclyn Siegel 2021

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd

Part of the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7805

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca.
Abstract

Gender inequality remains a pressing social issue around the world. Due to recent social movements, feminism has become a part of the cultural zeitgeist, and an increasing number of people have begun identifying as feminists in recent years. However, many modern feminists maintain a sense of ambivalence about the movement and their place within it. This ambivalence is difficult to study because the tools designed to evaluate feminist attitudes and identity do not capture this or other important and common aspects of modern feminist identity, such as fear of stigma, solidarity with other feminists, and competence to engage in feminist activism. Given that modern feminism is not well-understood by psychological researchers, I conducted six studies to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of measures of feminist identity and attitudes over the past fifty years. In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews with 26 women and nonbinary feminist-identified people to develop a framework for understanding the areas in which these individuals felt uncertain or ambivalent about their beliefs and identities. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a new measure of feminist social identity (the Feminist Social Identity Scale) that evaluates six distinct components of modern feminist identity: four aligned identity subscales (Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) and two ambivalent identity subscales (Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). In Study 3, I provide evidence of structural (exploratory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent and discriminant validity) for the FSIS. In Study 4, I provide additional evidence of structural (confirmatory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent validity) for the measure. In Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s external validity (convergent validity, known-groups validity, incremental validity, criterion validity). In Study 6, I engaged in reflexive thematic analysis to analyze interviews with 28 men about their experiences adopting a feminist identity, and the ways their identities as feminists have shifted and grown over time. Taken together, this dissertation reflects a series of studies geared at understanding the ways that feminist identities are negotiated in the present cultural context.
Keywords

Psychology, social movements, feminism, collective action, identity, scale development
Summary for Lay Audience

Feminism refers to the movement to end sexist oppression. While most people support the goals of the feminist movement, the stigma surrounding feminism has deterred many from identifying themselves as feminists to other people. However, as feminism has become mainstream, more people than ever are calling themselves feminists. This would seem like a welcome step forward for the feminist movement; yet, many people who call themselves feminists maintain ambivalent feelings about the feminist movement and their place within it, which may reduce their willingness to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist identity. This dissertation examines feminist identity ambivalence and its consequences. In Study 1, I analyzed existing measures of feminist identity and attitudes to determine the appropriateness of these tools for studying modern feminism. In Study 2, I interviewed 26 women and nonbinary people who identify as feminists to develop a better understanding of the domains of ambivalence within their feminist identities. This analysis led to the new theoretical development of a framework for understanding ambivalent feminist identity, and its downstream effects on mental body-related attitudes and feminist activism. In Studies 3 through 5, I developed and tested a new measure of feminist identity, which contains subscales to evaluate both aligned (i.e., feminist beliefs, competence as a feminist, solidarity with other feminists, and centrality of feminist identity) and ambivalent (i.e., fear of experiencing stigma for being a feminist, uncertainty about feminist identity) aspects of feminist identity. These studies revealed that the scale is reliable, valid, related to other constructs related to feminist identity, and can help to predict behaviours of interest above other commonly-used measures of gender attitudes. Finally, in Study 6, I interviewed 28 men who identify as feminists to understand how their feminist identities develop and grow over time. Overall, these six studies help to update the field’s understanding of modern feminism as it is lived and experienced by people across the gender spectrum.
Co-Authorship Statement

Chapter 2 was previously published in the journal *Sex Roles*. This chapter was co-authored with Dr. Rachel Calogero.
Acknowledgments

There are numerous people I would like to thank for their encouragement and support during my doctoral studies. This dissertation is the product of kindhearted mentorship, patient friendship, and deep love.

Of course, this project would not have been possible without the consistent guidance and nurturance of my PhD advisor, Dr. Rachel Calogero. From day one, Rachel supported my growth and development as a critical and creative scholar, and her kindness and generosity during moments of distress helped me through some of the most challenging times during graduate school. I entered this program because I knew that Rachel would challenge and change me as a scholar, but I could not have possibly known how much she would also challenge and change me as a person. Rachel taught me what compassionate, feminist mentorship looks like, and I hope to pass this on to my own students someday. I must also thank my master’s thesis supervisor, Dr. Katina Sawyer, whose continued support during my doctoral studies served as a guiding light during dark times of this journey. It is because of Katina’s teaching that I developed a keen interest in the psychology of gender, and it is because of Katina’s encouragement that I realized my potential to contribute to this field. Our monthly phone calls, even years after I completed my master’s degree, were a frequent source of joy throughout this process.

There have been countless informal mentors who have championed my progress and achievement during this time, as well. In particular, I would like to thank my collaborators - Dr. Asia Eaton, Dr. Tomi-Ann Roberts, Dr. Afroditi Pina, Dr. Tracy Tylka, Dr. RaeAnn Anderson, Dr. Ginny Ramseyer-Winter, Dr. Lorne Campbell, Dr. Taryn Myers, Dr. Tara Mitchell, Dr. Danielle Slakoff, Dr. Marita Cooper, Dr. Lisa Anderson, Dr. Erin Reilly, Dr. Angela Meadows, and several others - for working with me to establish myself in this field. These incredible, renowned scholars took me under their wings, despite the fact that it was not a part of their job to do so. I would like to thank them all for their patience and grace. Of course, thank you also to Dr. Aaron Blashill, with whom I will be working for the next few years, for taking a chance on me.
Supportive friendship has similarly been critical during this time. Thank you to Rose Friel, Erin Hughes, Dr. Raechel Soicher, Bethany Hynes, Christine Gruenbauer, Eric Techiman, Alison Butler, Hailey Hill, and Mikaela Beijbom for keeping me happy over the last four years. This experience has not been an easy one, and I truly do not know what I would have done without late nights playing trivia, baseball games, Zoom coffee dates, musicals, and movie nights. Thank you also to Dr. Lynne Zarbatany for inviting me to Christmas dinners and musicals, and to Brendon Samuels for all his help with my transition to San Diego. I would also like to thank Davis Born for his affection, motivation, patience, and care while I was writing this dissertation. Thank goodness for this man and his kind heart.

I would be remiss if I did not thank my family for all their support during my time as a graduate student. To my aunts Lisa and Mary, thank you for your endless love and warmth. I was not able to travel back to New Jersey often during my doctoral studies, but I knew I always had a cup of tea waiting at your homes when I did. To my brother, thank you for sending approximately one million photos of your dog to me. It sounds silly, but they really made me feel less alone during times that were difficult and lonely. To my Grandma Lenihan, thank you for calling every Tuesday to discuss The Bachelor franchise with me, and for always making sure I kept my head in the books. And to everyone else, thank you for always being there to support me in big and small ways.

Of course, this project – and everything I do – is for my mom. This was her dream for me, too. Losing my mom – my best friend, my cheerleader, and my rock – during graduate school was the hardest thing I hope I will ever have to go through. There were several times when I wanted to quit this program, to go home, to stop stretching myself to reach for the stars. But before she died, my mom told me to never, ever settle and to never, ever give up on my dreams. I didn’t settle, and I didn’t give up. I hope that she can see this, and I hope it makes her proud.
# Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii
Summary for Lay Audience ........................................................................................................ iv
Co-Authorship Statement .............................................................................................................. v
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ vi
Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... viii
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. xii
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................... xiii
List of Appendices ......................................................................................................................... xiv
Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................... 1
  1 Literature Review ....................................................................................................................... 1
    1.1 Feminism: Past and Presence ............................................................................................. 2
    1.2 Feminism Today .................................................................................................................. 5
    1.3 Feminist Identification and the Complications of Labelling ............................................. 7
    1.4 Existing Models of Feminist Identity ............................................................................... 11
    1.5 “Feminist” as a Social (Collective) Identity .................................................................... 12
    1.6 Feminist Social Identity and Mental Heath ................................................................. 16
    1.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................................... 21
  2 Study 1: Critical Review of Existing Measures of Feminist Attitudes and Identity ... 21
    2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 21
    2.2 Method ............................................................................................................................ 23
    2.3 Measures of Feminist Identity ....................................................................................... 1
      2.3.1 Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale ......................................................................... 1
      2.3.2 Feminist Identity Scale ............................................................................................ 2
      2.3.3 Feminist Identity Development Scale ..................................................................... 4
      2.3.4 Feminist Identity Composite ................................................................................... 6
      2.3.5 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale .................................................................... 8
      2.3.6 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale ...................................................................... 10
    2.4 Measures of Feminist Attitudes ....................................................................................... 11
      2.4.1 Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale ............................................................... 11
      2.4.2 Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale ....................... 13
2.4.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale .................................................. 14
2.4.4 Feminist Perspectives Scale ............................................................................ 17
   Feminist Perspectives Scale-4 .............................................................................. 19
2.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 21
   2.5.1 Recommendations for Using Existing Measures ........................................ 23
   2.5.2 Recommendations for the Next Generation of Measures ............................ 25
Chapter 3 .................................................................................................................. 30
3 Study 2: A Grounded Theory Analysis of Young Women and Nonbinary Individuals
   Navigating Ambivalent Feminist Identities ............................................................ 30
   3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 30
   3.2 Method ............................................................................................................. 32
      3.2.1 Participants .............................................................................................. 32
      3.2.2 Procedure ............................................................................................... 33
      3.2.3 Addressing Social Positions .................................................................... 35
   3.3 Results ............................................................................................................. 39
      3.3.1 Domains of Ambivalence ....................................................................... 41
      3.3.2 Body-Related Attitudes and Involvement in Feminist Activism ............... 54
   3.4 Discussion ....................................................................................................... 60
   3.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 61
Chapter 4 .................................................................................................................. 62
4 Study 3: Initial Development and Validation of the Feminist Social Identity Scale
   (FSIS) ..................................................................................................................... 62
   4.1 Expert Review .................................................................................................. 64
   4.2 Q-Sort Task ..................................................................................................... 65
   4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis .......................................................................... 69
      4.3.1 Method ..................................................................................................... 69
      4.3.2 Procedure ............................................................................................... 72
   4.4 Results .......................................................................................................... 72
      4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses .............................................................................. 72
      4.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis .................................................................. 73
      4.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis .................................................................. 79
      4.4.4 Means and Standard Deviations ............................................................. 81
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.4.5 Convergent and Discriminant Validity</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Discussion</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Study 4: Further Confirmation of Factor Structure of FSIS and Links with Gender-Related Attitudes and Norms</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Method</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.1 Participants</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.2 Materials</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1.3 Procedure</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Results</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1 Preliminary Analyses</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3 Bivariate Correlations</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 Discussion</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1 Limitations and Next Steps</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2 Conclusion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Study 5: Further Examination of External Validity of the FSIS with Gender and Racial Behaviours</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Introduction</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.1 Feminist Identity and Feminist Activism: Tests of Convergent, Incremental, and Criterion Validity</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.2 Feminist Identity and Anti-Racism: Tests of Convergent and Incremental Validity</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1.3 Feminist Identity and the Importance of Labelling: Testing Known-Groups Validity</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Method</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1 Participants and Procedure</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2 Materials</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Results</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1-6: Convergent, Criterion, and Incremental Validity ................................................................. 125
6.3.2 Tests of Hypotheses 7-10: Convergent and Incremental Validity .......... 129
6.3.3 Tests of Hypotheses 11 and 12: Known-Groups Validity ................. 130
6.4 Discussion .................................................................................................................................................................................. 132
Chapter 7 ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 137
7 Study 6: Feminist Identity Development and Growth in Cisgender Men ........ 137
  7.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................. 137
  7.2 Method .................................................................................................................................................................................... 139
    7.2.1 Participants and Procedure .................................................................................................................................... 139
    7.2.2 Positionality and Analytic Method ............................................................................................................................. 143
  7.3 Results .................................................................................................................................................................................... 144
    7.3.1 Diverse Feminist Foundations ................................................................................................................................. 150
    7.3.2 Turning Points ............................................................................................................................................................. 153
    7.3.3 Evaluation and (Un)learning .................................................................................................................................. 155
    7.3.4 Taking Action ............................................................................................................................................................. 158
    7.3.5 Feedback ...................................................................................................................................................................... 161
  7.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................................................................................... 162
    7.4.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research .............. 165
  7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 166
Chapter 8 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 168
8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................................... 168
  8.1 Review of Studies ................................................................................................................................................................. 168
  8.2 Implications and Future Directions ..................................................... 171
  8.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 174
References ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 175
Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................................................................................................................ 214
List of Tables

Table 1. Measures of Feminist Identity in Chronological Order ............................................. 1
Table 2. Measures of Feminist Attitudes in Chronological Order ........................................... 3
Table 3. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Identity Scales ..................................... 5
Table 4. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Attitudes Scales ................................... 6
Table 5. Demographic Information for Study 2 Participants ............................................... 36
Table 6. Coding Scheme for Study 2 ..................................................................................... 40
Table 7. Results of Q-Sort Task for Study 3 .......................................................................... 66
Table 8. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 90-item FSIS for Study 3 ....................................... 75
Table 9. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 25 Key FSIS Items for Study 3 ............................ 78
Table 10. Zero-order correlations between FSIS subscales and related constructs for Study 3 .............................................................................................................................................. 82
Table 11. Rationale for Deletion of Solidarity Items for Study 4 ....................................... 101
Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Gender-Related Attitudes for Study 4 .................................................. 105
Table 13. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Body-Image and Sexuality Attitudes for Study 4 ................................. 106
Table 14. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for Study 5 ...... 126
Table 15. Incremental Validity Tests for Study 5 ................................................................. 127
Table 16. Test of Known-Groups Validity for the FSIS for Study 5 .................................... 131
Table 17. Demographic Information for Study 6 ................................................................. 141
Table 18. List of Themes, Subthemes, and Exemplary Quotes for Study 6 ......................... 145
List of Figures

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Ambivalent Feminism ......................................................... 39
Figure 2. Scree Plot for Study 3 Data .................................................................................. 74
Figure 3. Visual Representation of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 25-item FSIS for Study 3 .................................................................................................................. 80
Figure 4. Visual Depiction of Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the 29-item FSIS for Study 4 .................................................................................................................. 102
List of Appendices

Appendix A. Final Interview Schedule for Study 2................................................................. 206
Appendix B. Initial Battery of Items Presented to Participants in Study 3.......................... 207
Appendix C. Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS)............................................................. 211
Appendix D. Final Interview Schedule for Study 6............................................................. 213
Chapter 1

1 Literature Review

In recent years, feminism has become a cornerstone of popular culture. Once regarded as a “derided and repudiated identity” (Gill, 2016, p. 611), the general public has increasingly embraced the feminist label (Ballard, 2018; Gallagher, 2019; Siegel, 2020). Inspired by feminist campaigns such as the 2017 Women’s March, the Everyday Sexism Project, and #metoo, feminism has achieved new visibility in today’s cultural climate. In fact, in a recent Pew Research study of over 1500 women, 61% of women and 40% of men reported that the term “feminist” described them “very well” or “somewhat well” (Barroso, 2020). However, once a unitary social movement with clear goals and specific agendas, the feminist movement has diversified and expanded over the past few decades, and it is unclear what is meant when people use the term “feminist” to describe themselves. Indeed, even self-identified feminists provide vastly different definitions of the term (Swirsky & Angelone, 2016). Existing measures of feminist identity are inadequate for understanding the complexity and multidimensionality of feminist social identity today (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), and the development of a new measure of feminist identity, grounded in social psychological research, is warranted.

As evidenced by the multiplicity of scales used to assess feminist identity and attitudes (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), psychologists have long been interested in the psychology of feminism and feminists. These instruments, however, do not capture the nuances of feminist social identity. In order to make more appropriate predictions about feminist identity, it is important that instruments used to measure the construct reflect people’s lived experiences of feminist identity. Similarly, most of these instruments are also derived from feminist theory, rather than social psychological theory, thereby making it difficult to test empirically-driven hypotheses derived from social psychological research.

In this dissertation, I present six mixed-method studies that explore how feminist social identity is lived and experienced by individuals across the gender spectrum, and develop
and validate the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), a new multi-dimensional measure of feminist social identity. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of extant measures of feminist attitudes and identity, highlighting these tool’s utility for understanding modern feminist identity. In Study 2, I present the results of a grounded theory analysis that elucidate the domains in which feminist serves as an ambivalent identity, one that must be reevaluated and negotiated in specific contexts, for women and nonbinary individuals. In Study 3, I outline the initial development of the FSIS, conducting tests of structural (exploratory factor analysis) and external (convergent, discriminant) validity in a large sample of adult women. In Study 4, I confirm the factor structure (confirmatory factor analysis) of the FSIS in a large sample of women and provide evidence of convergent validity with relevant measures of attitudes toward gender relations, bodies, sexuality, and romantic relationships. In Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s convergent validity, as well as incremental validity for predicting feminist and racial justice activism, and criterion validity for predicting willingness to donate to a feminist charity. Finally, in Study 6, I examine feminist identity growth in cisgender men, outlining the ways that men come to adopt a feminist identity, and the process by which that identity shifts and changes in response to new information and stigma.

1.1 Feminism: Past and Presence

The term “feminism” has a variety of different definitions; in fact, inability to come to consensus about the definition of feminism has been regarded as a “central problem within feminist discourse” (hooks, 1984, p. 17). For the purposes of this dissertation, feminism will be defined as “a movement to end sexist oppression” (hooks, 1984, p. 28), as per seminal feminist theorist and scholar bell hooks’ definition of the term. Feminism has a long, rich history all over the world, but the last 150 years have seen the most rapid, organized feminist progress in the Western world. Most scholars conceptualize feminism as having three distinct phases, or “waves” (Kroløkke & Sørensen, 2006). The first [recognized] wave\(^1\) of feminist activism occurred roughly between the 1860s and the

\(^1\) Social activism tends to move through waves, or periods of rapid social change, followed by periods of rest. While some scholars reject the wave metaphor to describe social movements, suggesting that it
1920s. During this time, feminist activists primarily sought legal rights to vote, divorce, and own property. Following the passage of the 19th amendment in the United States and the right to vote for women in Canada, public feminist activism stalled until the second wave emerged during the 1960s to the 1980s. Second-wave feminists in the United States called attention to entrenched sexist customs and standards and procured important legal rights for women such as the Equal Pay act, reproductive rights, and Title IX; and feminists in Canada advocated for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada, which aimed to reduce gender inequality in various domains, and offered safe, legal access to reproductive control (Allford, 2019). It is important to note that, during the second wave, Black women’s voices and lived experiences were largely ignored, and many felt ostracized from mainstream feminism. Therefore, some chose to advocate for minority women’s rights under the label of “womanism” (see Walker, 2012).

The third wave of feminism is somewhat ambiguous and undefined, though it largely focused on addressing sexual harassment and gender-based oppression in their various forms. Notably, participants in the third wave prioritized separating themselves from the negative stereotypes often associated with feminists during the second wave (e.g., “bra-burners;” Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Without common goals, and with the emergence of various different streams and strains of feminism (see Henley et al., 1998), the third wave never truly gained momentum and ultimately fractioned and fissured in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Allford, 2019). However, progress continues to be made through feminist activist campaigns, which target specific problems, such as sexual harassment. These smaller movements have produced critical changes in social status for women; the third wave brought about ample feminist media, renewed attention and urgency to ending sexual violence and accessible reproductive healthcare, and women populated big screens and public offices.

Interest in feminism has surged over the past decade, yet consensus has not yet been reached about whether this resurgence reflects a renewed interest in feminism’s third wave (Thwaites, 2017), or marks the emergence of a fourth (Rivers, 2017) or even fifth promotes intergenerational divisions (Reger, 2014), it is a useful analogy for understanding the timeline of feminist activism.
wave (Frances-White, 2018) of feminist activism. As I will articulate in greater detail below, some have argued that the emphasis on individual agency, rather than collective action, among many modern feminists reflects mainstream feminism’s collusion with misogyny, and capitalism (Bean, 2007; Crispin, 2017 Levy, 2005; Zeisler, 2016).

Despite profound feminist progress over the past century, the work of feminism is not yet done. Gender inequality persists in nearly all domains of life. Notably, in the financial and economic realm, around the world, women’s income is only 63% of men’s, and women comprise only 35% of global managers (Neate, 2018). Recent research from the World Economic Forum suggests that the “gender pay gap,” or the discrepancy between women’s and men’s earnings, will not close for another 200 years (World Economic Forum, 2018). Safe, legal abortion is still not obtainable for many women (and others who are able to carry children). Domestic and intimate partner violence disproportionately affects women, and women of colour or who have low socioeconomic status are particularly vulnerable (Doyle et al., 2020). Sexual harassment remains a pervasive problem with detrimental consequences in workplaces (McLaughlin et al., 2017), and as many as one in five women will experience sexual violence while at college (Muehlenhard et al., 2017). The emergence of social media has created new forms of violence against women, including online harassment and trolling (Branch, 2019) and various forms of image-based sexual abuse (e.g., nonconsensual pornography, deepfakes; Eaton et al, 2020). Even subtle forms of sexism persist in the form of microaggressions, such as sexist humour and stereotyping, which can have a lasting detrimental impact on women’s overall well-being (Gartner, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing gender-based social inequities; domestic violence shelters have reported an uptick in calls (Mittal & Singh, 2020; Slakoff et al., 2020), and women – particularly women of colour – have disproportionately become unemployed during this time (Reichelt et al., 2020), leaving them vulnerable to abuse (Doyle et al., 2020).

Clearly, we still need feminist activism, but as alluded to above, what it means to be a feminist has shifted over time. In the next section, I describe the complexities of adopting
a feminist identity that reflect the present state of feminism, and the challenges it presents for the study of feminism and feminist identity.

1.2 Feminism Today

Today’s feminism has a number of different branches of thought (e.g., lesbian feminism, radical feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, ecofeminism; Tong, 2009), but the most common stream of feminist thought in the Western world is liberal feminism (Henley et al., 1998). Liberal feminism is rooted in:

A faith in rationality or reason; a belief that by virtue of reasoning capacity, women and men are equally and essentially the same, a belief in civil rights, education, and equality of opportunity, assured by law, as the means to social change, and a belief in the limitation of government to the public sphere, reserving the rights of the individual to a private life not touched by the government (Henley et al., 1998, p. 320).

Liberal feminist activism does not generally call for the reorganization of society in the way that radical feminism does, but rather liberal feminists desire for the present social order to protect the women within it.

In addition, over the past thirty years, increased attention has also been paid to intersectional feminism (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Intersectionality refers to the layered nature of prejudice experienced by those who are members of multiple marginalized social groups (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Specifically, intersectionality recognizes that those whose social location situates them at the intersections of multiple axes of oppression (e.g., Black, transgender women) are subjected to additive (or multiplicative; Cole, 2009) forms of oppression, compared to those who are members of only one minority group (e.g., White, cisgender women). While it has long been understood and acknowledged in psychology that people are differentially influenced by their social locations and demographic features (e.g., race, gender, (dis)ability, class, sexual orientation, age, body size, etc.), psychological research has historically ignored intersectional issues (Cole, 2009; McCormick-Huhn et al., 2019; Warner et al., 2018). White women have historically excluded Black feminist perspectives from feminist
initiatives, and some continue to do so today (Kendall, 2020). The phenomenon of White, justice-oriented women failing to recognize the importance of intersectionality is so prevalent that it has been termed “White feminism” (Daniels, 2015; Ortega, 2009). Women, regardless of their race, who recognize the importance of an intersectional perspective also demonstrate less social dominance orientation, system justification, and right wing authoritarianism, and they engage in more social justice activism (Curtin et al., 2015).

Further, feminist scholars have identified a regressive counterculture within the larger push for women’s progress. Though this ideology goes by many names (choice feminism, white feminism, soft feminism, equality feminism), it is most frequently referred to as “postfeminism” (Budgeon, 2015; Gill, 2007; Hall & Rodriguez, 2003; Harris, 2004; McRobbie, 2008; Pomerantz et al., 2013). Rooted in neoliberal ideology, in which women are positioned as self-determined, independent, fully-agentic and willing subjects (Gill & Scharff, 2011), postfeminism comprises a series of competing and contradictory ideologies which converge on the themes of femininity, sexualization, and the denial of continued, structural sexist oppression (Gill, 2007). Postfeminism in this context reflects a “double entanglement,” or simultaneous acceptance and rejection, of feminist attitudes (Gill, 2007, 2016; McRobbie, 2008). In this way, postfeminism represents "the simultaneous incorporation, revision and depoliticization of many of the central goals of second wave feminism" (Stacey, 1990, p. 339). Under postfeminism, women are positioned as fully self-determined and agentic subjects for whom all decisions are freely conferred and for whom life experiences are not constrained by sexist discrimination (Budgeon, 2015; Rottenberg, 2014). Research and scholarship on postfeminism have proliferated in recent years (see Gill, 2016); yet, it is unclear how accurately these (often contradictory) characterizations of postfeminism coincide with women’s lived experiences and attitudes (see Riley et al., 2017), and what this means for modern feminist identity.
1.3 Feminist Identification and the Complications of Labelling

When studying feminist identity, it is important to distinguish between feminist identification and feminist attitudes. Feminist identification refers to labeling oneself a “feminist,” either publicly or privately (Szymanski, 2004), whereas feminist attitudes refer merely to supporting the goals and objectives of feminism (i.e., “ending sexist oppression”). Feminist identification is important because research consistently shows that identifying as a feminist predicts engagement in feminist activism and behaviours above and beyond merely holding positive views about feminists and supporting feminist goals (Conlin & Heesacker, 2016; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004). Yet, feminist self-labelling can be influenced by a number of situational and contextual factors, such as social desirability and exposure to positive stereotypes about feminists (Crossley, 2010; Moore & Stathi, 2019; Quinn & Radtke, 2006; Roy et al., 2007).

Indeed, research suggests that many people who support feminism are reluctant to call themselves feminists. The phenomenon by which people support feminist principles but reject the feminist label has become known as the “feminist paradox” (also referred to as the “I’m not a feminist, but…” phenomenon; Griffin, 1990; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008). This tension is pervasive: in a nationally representative sample of 1150 American adults, although 69% of women reported that the women’s movement had enhanced the quality of their lives, only 24% were willing to label themselves feminists outright, and 17% suggested that the term “feminist” was an insult (Alforno, 2009). Similarly, in a study of 131 college-aged students, only 25% identified as feminists, but nearly two-thirds of participants (63%) reported that they were “not feminists, but in support of feminist goals” (Williams & Wittig, 1997). In virtually all published research on the psychology of feminism, women score more highly on measures of feminist attitudes, compared to measures of feminist identity (e.g., Burn et al., 2000; Eisele & Stake, 2008). This discrepancy is even more pronounced among men, who are generally reluctant to adopt a feminist label for themselves (Cai & Clement, 2016; Siegel, 2020). While
postfeminist ideology is an important consideration for understanding the feminist paradox, this concept is not sufficient for explaining the multiplicity of ambivalent attitudes and beliefs endemic of modern feminism (Riley et al., 2017). Indeed, both qualitative research and personal accounts reveal a variety of ways that people simultaneously embrace and refute feminism (see Frances-White, 2018; Gay, 2014; Scharff, 2012). However, as feminism has become popular in recent years, it is unclear how relevant the feminist paradox is for understanding feminism today.

It is important to note that, while most research on feminist identity and attitudes has been conducted with samples of women, some men also identify as feminists and hold gender egalitarian attitudes. However, men often report resistance to adopting a feminist label (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017), and many are averse to the term “feminist” (Conlin & Heesacker, 2018; Ogletree et al., 2019). Although feminist identification is becoming increasingly common among both genders, men consistently report lower levels of feminist identification compared to women (Siegel, 2020). This resistance occurs despite the fact that men’s gender-related attitudes have shifted toward more support of egalitarian principles over the past 40 years (Scarborough et al., 2019), and men endorse mixed attitudes toward feminists (see Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). There are a variety of reasons why men may be reluctant to call themselves feminists. Notably, some men hold sexist attitudes and disagree with the principles of feminism. Past research suggests that these men may believe that feminist activist campaigns, such as #MeToo, will unfairly harm their reputation (see Kunst et al., 2019) or perceive feminists to be “man haters” (see Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Further, although the contemporary feminist movement is generally inclusive of people across the gender spectrum (Baily, 2015), some men believe that feminism is a “women’s movement” and that the term “feminist” is reserved for women (Kretschmer & Barber, 2018). However, more research is needed to understand how, when, and why men do choose to engage with feminism.

Research suggests that stereotypes about feminists influence men’s and women’s willingness to identify with the feminist label. Various studies have corroborated the colloquial knowledge that there are negative tropes associated with feminism and
feminist women, including, but not limited to: angry, ugly, aggressive, egotistical, man-haters, lesbians, feminazis, and bra-burners (see Anderson, 2015; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Yet, consistent with the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002), people also tend to hold positive stereotypes about feminists, such as ambitious, independent, and motivated (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Women who hold negative stereotyped implicit or explicit attitudes about feminists are less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in feminist behaviours (Liss et al., 2001; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018). Yet, when exposed to positive stereotypes about feminists, people are more likely to adopt the label and report higher levels of solidarity with feminists, a finding which has been supported in samples of both women and men (Moore & Stathi, 2019; Roy et al., 2007; Wiley et al., 2013).

Other research suggests feminist self-labelling is influenced by perceived discrepancies between oneself and feminists, regardless of the valence of those discrepancies. For example, in a study by Liss et al. (2001), feminist identification differed based on the magnitude of the discrepancy between participants’ own support for various branches of feminist thought and their perception of “typical feminists”’ support for the various feminist perspectives. Put another way, participants were more likely to label themselves as feminists when they believed that the feminist views they held were consistent with the views they felt others held. Another study (Moradi et al., 2012) explored how feminist identification can be influenced by the extent to which perceptions of feminists differ from perceptions of one’s self. In this study, participants rated a series of bipolar dimensions on constructs of interest (e.g., stubborn/submissive, shy/outgoing, warm/cold, etc.) three times: first based on which they saw as representative of themselves (actual), second as who they wish they were (ideal), and third as if they were a “feminist” (feminist-self). Perception of “feminist threat” was calculated by subtracting the feminist-self score from the number of times the actual self and ideal self matched with it. This score was proposed to measure the magnitude of the threat introduced by the potential incorporation of “feminist” into their self-concept. In this study, feminist threat was significantly negatively associated with positive evaluation of feminists, positive attitudes
toward feminism, affirmative feelings toward feminist acquaintances, and feminist self-identification (Moradi et al., 2012).

A recent series of studies (Meijs et al., 2017) further examined how discrepancies between the self and stereotypes about feminists can influence women’s feminist self-identification, specifically the dimensions of warmth and competence. Participants generally saw feminists as less warm and more competent than themselves, and the magnitude and direction of the discrepancy between their ratings of themselves and feminists negatively predicted feminist identification. Specifically, when the women in the study perceived that feminists were less warm, or more or less competent than themselves, they were less inclined to label themselves as feminists. Finally, a study (Conlin et al., 2019) of women who held strong feminist attitudes explored the effects of perceived knowledge deficits, and belief and behaviour inconsistencies (e.g., “My life choices do not always match a belief in gender equality,” “The way I view my body is inconsistent with a belief in gender equality”) on feminist activist behaviours. Through a structural equation model, the researchers found that support for feminist attitudes was positively predictive of feminist self-identification, which was positively predictive of feminist activism. However, they also discovered that “bad feminism” (deficits and inconsistencies) negatively predicted gender equality self-esteem, feminist self-identification, and feminist activism. This study suggests that not just stereotype discrepancies, but also other identity conflicts, may similarly challenge and complicate willingness to align oneself with feminism and engage in behaviour that supports gender equality.

Taken together, these studies suggest that stereotypes and discrepancies influence people’s willingness to identify as feminists, regardless of their feminist attitudes. It is important, therefore, that studies of feminist identity include questions that directly assess attitudes toward stereotypes and perceived solidarity with feminists. Yet, the most widely-studied model of feminist identity (the Feminist Identity Development [FID] model) does not incorporate these components. In the next section, I outline the FID model (Downing & Roush, 1985) and its various limitations.
1.4 Existing Models of Feminist Identity

One of the most common models of feminist identity is Downing and Roush’s (1985) Feminist Identity Development Model (FID). Modeled on Cross’s (1971) model of Nigresence, the FID consists of five stages (or dimensions; Hyde, 2002) through which women pass on their way to becoming feminist activists. It is important to note that the FID model was designed only to evaluate women’s experiences and is not appropriate for use with men or nonbinary individuals (Siegel & Calogero, 2021). During the first phase, passive acceptance, women are unaware of the impact of gender inequality, and tend to see continued feminist progress as unnecessary or unwanted. However, during revelation, the second phase of the FID model, women begin to recognize gender inequality in their lives, and their own participation in it, and many feel angry or distressed due to this new perspective (Fischer & Good, 2004). In order to learn more and deepen their feminist consciousness, many women then enter the third stage, embeddedness-emanation. During embeddedness-emanation, women wish to embed themselves in a community of other, like-minded women and develop an appreciation for women’s talents and accomplishments. Stage four is Synthesis, the point at which women stop seeing all men as oppressors and begin to evaluate men individually, recognizing that they, too, are oppressed by sexism. It is during this phase that women would theoretically adopt a feminist label and develop a more integrated self-concept. During the final stage, active commitment, women engage in collective action to translate their feminist attitudes into action.

Despite its widespread adoption, this model has been criticized on several grounds (see Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002; Moradi & Subich, 2002; Siegel & Calogero, 2021). Perhaps the clearest limitation of the FID model is that it cannot be readily applied to individuals who do not identify as women. Given the gendered nature of the dimensions proposed in this model, it is unlikely that this model is appropriate for men or nonbinary individuals. Similarly, the model has been criticized for failing to accurately reflect how Black women and Women of Colour may experience feminism. In fact, a parallel, four-stage model was developed by Helms (1984) to more accurately capture the female politicized
identity development process among Black women (i.e., the Womanist Identity Development Model).

What is most concerning about the FID model, however, is that it does not seem to accurately capture the experience of even the very population it is intended to reflect: cisgender, White women. For example, the hypothesis that women adopt a feminist identity in the Synthesis stage was not supported in a large sample of undergraduate women (Erchull et al., 2009). In fact, the Synthesis stage consistently fails to predict involvement with feminism, and has even been associated with support for the present gender system (Liss & Erchull, 2010). Indeed, the individualism associated with synthesis would seem to be inconsistent with the collectivism necessary for social-identity based social change (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Further, the model does not seem to be linear, and many women who endorse beliefs consistent with more advanced stages of feminist identity development report no prior experiences with the earlier stages (Liss & Erchull, 2010), suggesting that either the FID model does not appropriately capture the linear trajectory of women’s feminist identity development processes or the model is not relevant for understanding the experiences of young women today (Erchull et al., 2009; Liss & Erchull, 2010; Marecek, 2019). Models of feminism that do not deliberately disentangle feminism and postfeminism may not produce true insight into understanding feminist identity and attitudes (Marecek, 2019). Put simply, although the FID model defined an era of research on feminist identity and attitudes, more research and theorizing is needed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the developmental process underlying contemporary feminist identity.

1.5 “Feminist” as a Social (Collective) Identity

In general, given that feminist identification “is too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis” (Brubaker & Copper, 2000, p. 2), attempting to understand feminist identity, or any identity for that matter, simply through the labels people do or do not adopt is a generally fruitless endeavour. This is particularly true of feminist identity today due to the diversity of feminist thought and the emergence of
postfeminism. Many people who hold feminist attitudes avoid the label of feminist, and even people who do label themselves as feminists define the term differently and only do so under specific social contexts. Further, as described above, theoretical models of feminist identity are outdated and fail to capture the ways that feminist identity is experienced by individuals across the gender spectrum. By taking a social identity approach to understanding identity (Hornsey, 2008), however, people’s understandings of themselves as individuals belonging to particular social groups and teams can be understood more comprehensively.

The social identity approach (Hornsey, 2008) comprises Self-Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which are conceptually-related theories that aim to clarify the role of the social selves in people’s individual identities. A social identity approach is a natural next step for research on feminism: identifying broad and social, rather than unique and individual, factors that motivate behaviour was the inspiration for the development of the social identity tradition (Hornsey, 2008), and in recent years, a social identity framework has been applied to various groups not typically studied through a social psychological lens (e.g., gay and lesbian identity, disability identity; Cox & Gallois, 1996; Dirth & Branscombe, 2018).

Broadly, social identity can be defined as the knowledge that one belongs to a broader social category, and that group has emotional significance to that person (Tajfel, 1974). For the purposes of SIT, a social group is any combination of two or more people who evaluate themselves as comprising an ingroup, or an “us.” Self-categorization is a process of depersonalization or seeing oneself as representative of a category of people. If one perceives themselves as prototypical of, or having similar attributes to, the group, they may begin to see themselves as a group member. Self-identification with a group is more likely when groups themselves are cohesive (i.e., when the group has strong comparative fit) and when the individual’s personal identity is consistent with their prototype of the group (i.e., when the individual has normative fit). While, of course, there are individual differences between group members, social group identification adheres to the metacontrast principle, or the idea that intergroup differences are accentuated, and intragroup differences are devalued through our social identities (Hornsey, 2008).
Therefore, while people may see themselves as more or less similar to group members, once they see themselves as a group member, they may begin to blend their personal attributes with those prototypical of the group and engage in behaviours that are consistent with group behaviour prototypes. However, many factors complicate people’s relation to social groups and the extent to which they engage in behaviours that are prototypical of group members. As Hogg (2008) notes, “if they have no sense of belonging, do not identify, and do not define and evaluate self in terms of the properties of the group, then they are unlikely to think, feel, and behave as group members” (p. 117).

Not all social identities are equally socially valued, of course. There are some identities that are perceived favourably in society and others that are stigmatized. Of those that are stigmatized, there are some that are visible to others (e.g., skin colour) and others that are not visible to others (e.g., mental health status). For those whose personal identity is entwined with a stigmatized one, the social identity process is somewhat more complicated, as the person managing the stigmatized identity may wish to eschew identifying with the stigmatized group so as to evade the stigmas associated with that category. The development of a stigmatized social identity “is an issue of group identity as much as individual identity” (Cox & Gallois, 1996, p. 9). Given the myriad negative stereotypes attributed to feminists, it is clear that “feminist” represents a stigmatized identity. In fact, women often report a “complex negotiation” (Crossley, 2010, p.125) of their support for feminism and identify themselves as feminists only under certain circumstances (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016, 2017; Crossley, 2010; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008). For example, in Calder-Dawe and Gavey’s (2016) New Zealand-based study of 20 students’ attitudes toward feminism, nearly all endorsed feminist beliefs and desired to address gender inequality, yet few identified as feminists, and those who did identify did so conditionally.

Social or collective identities may also be understood as political identities when the social group is evaluated as being unjustly lower in social status, compared to another social group (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Assuming system-legitimating ideologies are not absorbed by the low-status group (i.e., they do not believe that the unequal
distribution of power is somehow warranted), they should feel motivated to enhance their social status. Politicized collective identities “can be understood as a form of collective identity that underlies group members' explicit motivations to engage in ... a power struggle” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). In the context of feminist social identity, whereas woman represents a social identity, feminist represents a politicized identity (see Frederick & Stewart, 2018). Aligning oneself with the movement for gender equality necessitates a recognition that women’s and men’s social status is presently unequal and a desire to rectify this injustice.

Ashmore and colleagues (2004) have outlined core components of multidimensional collective (social) identities. Although there is no singular definition of a collective identity, Ashmore et al. (2004) have defined a collective identity as “one that is shared with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic in common” (p. 81). Social identities may be formed by any number of commonalities, including (but not limited to): visible characteristics (e.g., race or age), preferences and hobbies (e.g., Leafs fans, gamers), believed shared goals (e.g., sports teams, organizations), values (e.g., vegans, environmentalists), or beliefs (e.g., Democrats or Jewish people). While there are some aspects of collective identities that are common across identity categories (i.e., self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioural involvement, and content and meaning; Ashmore et al., 2004, p.83), each social identity comprises aspects unique to that particular social group. Measures designed to evaluate the multidimensionality of social identities must be uniquely tailored to the groups they are designed to evaluate. For example, the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity Inventory (Mohr & Kendra, 2011), contains an “internalized homonegativity” subscale, given that this is an attitude that is often reported for members of this population (Szymanski, 2002).

Feminism is a complicated subject for social identity analysis (see Skevington & Baker, 1989), given that it is an ideological (Devine, 2015), stigmatized (Anderson, 2015), politicized (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and often (though not always) gender-bound identity. However, a multidimensional social identity approach to understanding and
analyzing feminist identity may help shed light on the variety of ways that feminism is lived and experienced. Indeed, understanding people’s alignment with feminism across myriad theoretically-relevant dimensions provides a more comprehensive evaluation of feminist social identity than merely evaluating feminist attitudes, perceptions of feminists, or willingness to label oneself as feminist. As will be described in greater detail in Chapter 2, the extant measures of feminist identity and attitudes are limited in a variety of ways, one of which is that they capture only one dimension of what is more likely a complex and multidimensional construct.

1.6 Feminist Social Identity and Mental Heath

Social Identity Theory was not conceptualized as a theoretical framework for understanding mental health; however, decades of research have supported the links between maintaining a positive social identity and maintaining positive mental health. Specifically, a social identity approach posits that our social identities provide us with a sense of purpose and meaning in the word, and a strong sense of identification with an ingroup may be protective against adverse mental health outcomes (see Cruwys et al., 2014). Indeed, research suggests that identification with an ingroup that is positive and distinct has positive implications for people’s sense of self-esteem. Feminism is no exception: several studies have supported the link between holding an advanced feminist identity and self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-acceptance (Carpenter & Johnson, 2003; Conlin et al., 2021b; Eisele & Stake, 2008; Leavy & Adams, 1986; Yoder et al., 2011), often times above and beyond merely holding feminist attitudes.

However, the benefits of holding a feminist identity extend beyond self-esteem. While findings are mixed, feminist attitudes have been associated with a variety of positive mental health outcomes for women, which can largely be categorized into four broad topics: better coping with sexist treatment (e.g., Ayres et al., 2009; Carretta & Szymanski, 2020; Kucharska, 2018; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Moradi & Subich, 2002; Watson & Grotwiel, 2016), better body and eating attitudes (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016; Feltman & Szymanski, 2018; Hurt et al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), healthier sexual attitudes and sexual agency (e.g., Fitz & Zucker, 2013; Schick et al., 2008;
Tolman et al., 2006; Yoder et al., 2012), and more general happiness and well-being (e.g., Conlin et al., 2021b; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; Yakushko, 2007).

One psychological construct that is relevant to feminist identity is self-objectification. Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) proposes that women’s routine experiences of sexual objectification may become internalized into a state of self-objectification, in which the societal “male gaze” (i.e., the omnipresent awareness that women’s appearance is being evaluated and judged) is turned inward (Calogero, 2004). This objectified self-perspective is theorized to link to several subjective experiences (e.g., body shame, personal safety anxiety; Calogero et al., 2020), which are proposed to link to adverse mental health outcomes in women (e.g., eating disorders, sexual dysfunction, depressed mood; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Two decades of research on objectification theory has supported and extended most of its links (Calogero et al., 2020; Roberts et al., 2018). Given that feminist women should, theoretically, recognize and reject sexist treatment, maintaining a feminist identity could help prevent women from internalizing sexually objectifying treatment.

Yet, the links between feminism and self-objectification are not straightforward. Two studies that examined the links between feminist identification and self-objectification (Hurt et al., 2007; Siegel & Calogero, 2019) demonstrated that while feminist identification does not directly link to self-objectification, (less) conformity to some feminine norms may help to link the two. Specifically, feminist identity may be negatively associated with thinness, less dedication to romantic relationships, and less investment in appearance (Hurt et al., 2007), and less conformity to these norms may be associated with less self-objectification (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). It is possible that having a more fully developed and central feminist identity may be linked to self-objectification in a way that lower levels of feminist identity are not.

Further, the female body has long been a site of domination and oppression (Bartky, 1990; Calogero et al., 2007; Wolf, 1991). Beauty standards and ideals are virtually unattainable for most women (Calogero et al., 2007), and cisgender women’s natural
bodily attributes and functions (e.g., body hair, menstruation) are regarded by many as dirty and animalistic (Fahs, 2012; Haymond, 2020; Roberts, 2004). As such, women’s bodies are constantly under construction, and many women may feel that their bodies must be altered, changed, and enhanced in order to conform to dominant beauty ideals of women. While the ideal woman’s body has changed from thin and waif-like to “curvaceously thin,” scholars have posited that women may actually do “double damage” (Harrison, 2003) to their bodies in trying to attain this figure: they may engage in disordered eating to be thin, and they may pursue cosmetic surgery to enhance their curves (Calogero et al., 2007; Harrison, 2003).

However, feminist scholars have recognized that beauty norms and ideals keep women occupied with their bodies, rather than on their social treatment, and have encouraged women to embrace their natural bodies (see Tovar, 2018; Wolf, 1991). Consistent with feminist principles, in a meta-analysis of 27 studies examining feminism and body image (Murnen & Smolak, 2009), women who endorsed higher levels of feminist ideology also scored more highly on measures of body satisfaction and lower on measures of disordered eating attitudes (see also Peterson et al., 2008). Similarly, women enrolled in a course in which they grew out their body hair for extra credit reported increased sociopolitical awareness at the end of the course, due to their participation in the assignment (Fahs, 2012).

Feminist women may also be less inclined to engage in strategies to alter their bodily appearance, such as disordered eating and cosmetic surgery. However, the links between feminist attitudes and body-related behaviours are small and inconsistent (see Mazzeo et al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), and research suggests that feminist women’s heightened awareness of patriarchal bodily pressures does not necessarily translate into less internalization of these pressures or less disordered eating (Borowsky, et al., 2016; Myers et al., 2012; Ojerholm & Rothblum, 1999). Given these mixed findings, the links between feminism and body related attitudes and behaviours must be subjected to further empirical scrutiny.
Moreover, despite evidence to the contrary, some of the most common stereotypes attributed to feminists is that they are man-haters, lesbians, and incapable of being in romantic relationships (Anderson et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Rudman & Phelan, 2007). However, research suggests that feminist women may actually have more equally satisfying romantic relationships and healthier sexual attitudes and behaviours, compared to non-feminist women. A study by Schick et al. (2008) revealed that liberal feminist ideology was linked to higher sexual subjectivity, condom use self-efficacy, more sexual motivation, and higher sexual satisfaction. In fact, women with strong feminist attitudes may be better able to discuss condom use even in the face of hostile sexist treatment (Fitz & Zucker, 2013). Similarly, feminist women maintain more egalitarian expectations for relationships (Yoder et al., 2007), and feminist attitudes are unrelated to relationship quality, equality, and stability (Rudman & Phelan, 2007).

Yet, as with most research on correlates of feminist attitudes and identity, these findings are mixed. While Schick et al. (2008) identified a significant correlation between feminist ideology and sexual satisfaction, this link was not detected by Rudman and Phelan (2007), and other research has failed to detect a significant link between advanced stages of feminist identity development and sexual assertiveness (Yoder et al., 2007). Further, some feminist women enjoy the experience of sexualization (Erchull & Liss, 2013). Taken together, the research on feminism’s links to sexual and relationship outcomes is mixed. By examining these outcomes of interest as they related to distinct components of feminist social identity, we may be able to clarify how, and why, and for whom some of these links hold.

1.7 Conclusion

In sum, due to continued gender inequity around the world, feminism is a topic of interest for many social psychologists. However, theoretical models that presently exist in the psychological cannon do not accurately reflect or capture women’s experiences and are not grounded in social psychological theory. Given the complexities of modern feminism, in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of feminist identity as it is experienced in today’s cultural context, bottom-up, inductive research is necessary.
Further, this research should form the foundation for novel tools to evaluate feminist identity.
Chapter 2

2 Study 1: Critical Review of Existing Measures of Feminist Attitudes and Identity

2.1 Introduction

Although the core goal of feminist activism, to end sexist oppression, has remained consistent over time (hooks, 1984), the beliefs and principles that constitute a feminist identity and attitudes vary across cultural, sociopolitical, and historical contexts. Early popular feminist thought has been criticized for centering the experiences of middle-class White women (Kruks, 2005). Arguably, one of the most significant (and often misunderstood) challenges to the study of modern feminism is the deliberate assessment of intersectional feminist identities and attitudes (Davis, 2008; Grzanka, 2020). The integration of intersectionality into the feminist movement has highlighted the unique relationship women and nonbinary individuals may have with feminism when their life experiences are also shaped by factors such as racism, ageism, ableism, hetero- and mono-sexism, transphobia, and prejudice against women involved in sex work (see Robnett & Anderson, 2017; White, 2006). In order to study modern feminism, measures of feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of diverse groups of women. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which measures of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with diverse samples.

Another challenge to the study of modern feminism is the relevance of assessment tools for men and nonbinary individuals. Although social psychological research highlights the importance of feminist allyship across gender categories (hooks, 2000; Wiley et al., 2013), some argue that cisgender men’s privileged status creates a structural and psychological barrier to their involvement in feminist activism (Burrell & Flood, 2019).

An extended version of this paper has been published in Sex Roles. Siegel, J. A., & Calogero, R. M. (2021). Measurement of feminist identity and attitudes over the past half century: A critical review and call for further research. Sex Roles. Published online first. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-020-01219-w
Some research suggests that men can and do identify as feminists and engage in feminist activism, although they may express discomfort adopting the label around others (Conlin & Heesacker, 2018). This discomfort is not unfounded: both men and women report mixed reactions to men who identify as feminists (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). In addition, some people reject the binary classification of gender entirely and do not identify as male or female, but may identify as feminist and/or endorse feminist attitudes. In order to operationalize modern feminism, measures of feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of cisgender men and nonbinary individuals. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which measures of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with cisgender men or persons across the gender spectrum.

An additional challenge to the study of modern feminism is the rise of postfeminism (Girerd & Bonnot, 2020; Rottenberg, 2014). Specifically, some critical feminist scholars have questioned and problematized the newfound cultural interest in feminist identity, suggesting that the mainstreaming of feminism has diluted its potency and purpose (see Gill, 2016; Zeisler, 2016), resulting in a widespread cultural “postfeminist sensibility” (Gill, 2007). Therefore, people may choose to adopt a feminist identity without supporting or understanding the fundamental principles of the modern feminist movement (e.g., reproductive justice, anti-racism; Banet-Weiser, 2018; Banet-Weiser & Portwood-Stacer, 2017; Gill, 2016; Moon & Holling, 2020; Zeisler, 2016). A feminist identity that is bolstered by endorsement of postfeminist ideology represents a “double entanglement” of feminist and antifeminist beliefs fueled by neoliberal principles of self-determination, meritocracy, and individualism (McRobbie, 2008, p. 12). Under postfeminism, the adoption of a public-facing, collective feminist identity may reflect support for neoliberal attitudes (Gill, 2007), and women who label themselves as “feminist” may do so from a perception that any and all choices they make, even those that arguably defy principles of gender equality, can be considered “feminist” choices (Gill, 2007, 2016). In order to study feminism as it is experienced and understood in the present cultural moment, measures of feminist identity and attitudes should include items that distinguish between collective (feminist) and individualized (postfeminist) identities and attitudes, and they should consider how to assess and interpret paradoxical and/or
hybrid orientations toward feminism. To date, no known review has specifically examined whether measures of feminist identity and attitudes are able to distinguish between these more nuanced and paradoxical forms of feminist identity and attitudes.

### 2.2 Method

To identify measures of feminist identity and attitudes, we searched three databases (i.e., PsycINFO, PsycTESTS, GenderWatch) for the terms feminism and feminism in combination with the terms attitudes, identity, ideology, beliefs, scale, instrument, inventory, and measure within the title, abstract, and/or keywords. The search was conducted in August 2019. After removing duplicate results, this search yielded 722 articles. All measures of feminist identity and attitudes described in these articles were included in this review if they (a) were published between January 1, 1969, and August 1, 2019, in peer-reviewed academic journals; (b) were written in English (or an English version was available) and constructed for U.S. samples; (c) assessed a broad conceptualization of feminist identity and/or feminist-based attitudes, as opposed to gender-based issues (e.g., Acceptance of Myths about Intimate Partner Violence Against Women Scale; Megías et al., 2018) or parenting or therapeutic style (e.g., The Child Gender Socialization Scale; Blakemore & Hill, 2008); (d) assessed profeminist, rather than non-sexist, attitudes and perspectives; (e) reported information on the scale’s psychometric properties and validity; and (f) were specific to feminist identity and attitudes and did not assess broader, related constructs (e.g., Intersectional Awareness Scale; Curtin et al., 2015).

After screening on the noted inclusion criteria 10 scales were identified, some of which had extended and short forms, resulting in 13 measures that were included in our review: The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976), the Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986), the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987, 1989), the Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), the Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Woman’s Movement Scale (Fassinger, 1994), the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale and its short form (Morgan, 1996), the Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998) including the Lesbian subscale (Simoni et al.,
1999) and a short form of the measure (Henley et al., 2000), the Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000), the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004), and the Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004).

The scales were grouped separately into measures of feminist identity and measures of feminist attitudes based on what the scale was intended to assess and how it was described. Specifically, scales that were designed to examine attitudes toward issues, topics, and goals that represent broad feminist principles and ideologies were classified as measures of “feminist attitudes” and scales that assessed individual variations in internalization of feminist principles, personal alignment with feminist goals, and the use of the feminist label were categorized as measures of “feminist identity.” However, because many scales fail to distinguish between the two categories (Eisele & Stake, 2008; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), there is substantial overlap between them. A chronological list of each of the scales included in the present review, along with key psychometric information about each (e.g., subscales, alphas, descriptions, readability values, validity) can be found in Tables 1 (identity measures) and Table 2 (attitude measures). All of the studies presented in this review were conducted with U.S. samples unless otherwise noted. In the present paper we assess a variety of measures of feminist identity and attitudes across four primary domains: (a) evidence of scale validity, (b) sample diversity, (c) inclusion of the term “feminist” in items, and (d) ability to distinguish between feminism and postfeminism (for an overview of our findings, see Tables 3 and 4).
Table 1. Measures of Feminist Identity in Chronological Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscales</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Reliability (α)</th>
<th>Evidence of Validity</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>Min–Max</th>
<th>Reading Ease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Encounter</td>
<td>Womanist Identity Attitudes Model</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>Convergent (Ossana, 1986) Factor analysis (EFA and CFA), convergent, (Moradi et al., 2004)</td>
<td>23.49 (3.53)– 24.64 (3.76)</td>
<td>8–40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immersion–Emersion</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>Convergent (Ossana, 1986) Factor analysis (EFA and CFA), convergent, (Moradi et al., 2004)</td>
<td>38.05 (6.43)– 40.06 (8.08)</td>
<td>16–80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internalization</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>Convergent (Ossana, 1986) Factor analysis (EFA and CFA), convergent, (Moradi et al., 2004)</td>
<td>44.26 (4.32)– 45.06 (4.12)</td>
<td>11–55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td>Four dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>3.12–4.02</td>
<td>7–35</td>
<td>(61.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Four dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>2.64–2.99</td>
<td>12–60</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad &amp; Hyde, 1991)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>3.35–3.75</td>
<td>5–25</td>
<td>(67.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness–Emanation</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>2.69–2.97</td>
<td>12–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>2.49–2.55</td>
<td>7–35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Commitment</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, known groups (cited by Rickard, 1989) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>2.98–3.00</td>
<td>7–35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Acceptance</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.74–.75</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Fischer et al., 2000) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>3.42–4.23</td>
<td>7–35</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revelation</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.75–.80</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Fischer et al., 2000) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>3.42–4.50</td>
<td>7–35</td>
<td>(61.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embeddedness–Emanation</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.84–.86</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Fischer et al., 2000) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>4.23 (56)</td>
<td>4–20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthesis</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.68–.71</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Fischer et al., 2000) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>4.39 (50)</td>
<td>4–20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Commitment</td>
<td>Five dimensions of Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.77–.81</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Fischer et al., 2000) Factor analysis (EFA, CFA), convergent, discriminant, content (Moradi &amp; Subich, 2002)</td>
<td>3.27 (.59)</td>
<td>9–45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Feminist self-labeling</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA), convergent, discriminant</td>
<td>4.05 (.97)</td>
<td>1–20</td>
<td>9 (44.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Support for core feminist beliefs, labeling</td>
<td>3, 1 for feminist/no feminist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Known-groups validity, criterion</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.8 (81.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* N/A = not applicable.

*a* Standard deviation not reported. *b* Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade = Measure of readability based on word length and sentence length. A Flesch-Kincaid Reading grade level of 8 or below suggests that the items can be easily understood by a person with an 8th grade education.
### Table 2. Measures of Feminist Attitudes in Chronological Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscales</th>
<th>Aims</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Reliability (α)</th>
<th>Evidence of Validity</th>
<th>$M$ (SD)</th>
<th>Min–Max</th>
<th>Reading Ease&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Reproduction</td>
<td>Attitudes about</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.71–.76</td>
<td>Image analysis, known–groups</td>
<td>8.18–13.82</td>
<td>6–30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>specific feminist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.83–.85</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.35–12.73</td>
<td>5–25</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies/Legislation</td>
<td>goals of the</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.87–.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.30–40.00</td>
<td>16–80</td>
<td>(47.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1970 National Organization of Women</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>.81–.82</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.60–40.09</td>
<td>15–75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage/Family</td>
<td>Women platform</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>.85–.87</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.05–23.69</td>
<td>17–85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overcoming Self–Denigration</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.84–.91</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.45–50.09</td>
<td>8–40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness–Raising/Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.89–.93</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.85–36.91</td>
<td>12–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.88–.90</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.79–30.70</td>
<td>11–55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.95–.95</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.85–62.27</td>
<td>30–150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale (Fassinger, 1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(54.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (Morgan, 1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Roles</td>
<td>Attitudes about</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.87–.90</td>
<td>Factor analysis (CFA; Ormerod, 1991), convergent, discriminant</td>
<td>35.17(6.61)</td>
<td>10–50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Goals</td>
<td>liberal feminist</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, concurrent, known–groups</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Political Agendas</td>
<td>social change</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>20–120</td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination/Subordination</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td></td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td>(61.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Action</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td></td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td>10–60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sisterhood</td>
<td></td>
<td>10&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td></td>
<td>45(W),</td>
<td>10–60 (W),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.15 (M)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>5–30 (M)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(d) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale – Short (Morgan, 1996)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes about liberal feminist social change</td>
<td>10–11</td>
<td>.81–.84</td>
<td>Factor analysis (ESEM, EFA; Woodbrown, 2015)</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>11–66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11-item) (10–60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10-item) (61.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Femscore</td>
<td>Support for different</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.88–.92</td>
<td></td>
<td>203.00 (37.07)</td>
<td>50–350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.65–.77</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.38 (9.98)</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch</td>
<td>Support for</td>
<td>Scores</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.46–.62</td>
<td>Factor analysis (EFA), convergent, discriminant, known-groups validity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51.68 (8.00)</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.78–.86</td>
<td>36.57 (11.71)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist ideology</td>
<td>.76–.79</td>
<td>34.65 (10.20)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>.58–.75</td>
<td>35.02 (8.93)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womanist</td>
<td>.68–.75</td>
<td>45.72 (9.03)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
<td>(45.2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fembehave</td>
<td>.41–.52</td>
<td>61.57 (9.62)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18–126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Femscore</th>
<th>Support for</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Convergent, known-groups validity</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>260.1 (53.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>53.7 (8.2)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>41.2 (12.5)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist ideology</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>39.2 (9.8)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>40.0 (10.4)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>48.4 (10.1)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womanist</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>37.8 (14.1)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fembehave</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>73.6 (13.4)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21–147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Femscore</th>
<th>Support for</th>
<th>Scores</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>Convergent, discriminant, concurrent, known-groups validity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>103.68 (18.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>12.98 (5.84)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical (anti)feminist ideology</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>26.67 (4.58)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist ideology</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>16.53 (5.78)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>16.66 (5.28)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womanist</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>19.40 (4.69)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fembehave</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>24.22 (5.15)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5–35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. N/A = not applicable. NR = Not reported.

*Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade. *When administered to individuals who do not identify as women, only five items, rather than 10, are used.
### Table 3. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Identity Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Convergent/</th>
<th>Validity Evidence</th>
<th>Sample Diversity</th>
<th>Contains “feminist” in items</th>
<th>Distinguishes feminist/post-feminist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Discriminant</td>
<td>Known-groups</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Identity Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Identity Development Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Identity Composite</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. N/A = not applicable for this particular measure.*

*aAlthough tests of structural validity were conducted, the hypothesized factor structure was not always supported.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scales</th>
<th>Validity Evidence</th>
<th>Sample Diversity</th>
<th>Contains “feminist” in items</th>
<th>Distinguishes feminist/post-feminist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Convergent/Discriminant</td>
<td>Known-groups</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Feminist Issues Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale - Short form</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Perspectives Scale</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Perspectives Scale +</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesbian Subscale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist Perspectives Scale - Short</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. NR = Not reported.*

*aAlthough tests of structural validity were conducted, the hypothesized factor structure was not always supported. bAlthough explicit tests of convergent validity were not conducted, the measure has shown positive associations with related constructs.*
2.3 Measures of Feminist Identity

2.3.1 Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale

The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (WIAS; Ossana, 1986) measures the various attitudes associated with the developmental stages of a womanist identity. The scale was initially created as part of a larger project assessing women’s perception of the campus environment and self-esteem in relation to womanist identity development (Ossana, 1986). Due to its conceptual similarity with instruments designed to measure feminist identity development, we have chosen to include it in the present review. The scale contains 43 items that are scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The WIAS assesses four stages of Womanist Identity Development: Preencounter (8 items), Encounter (8 items), Immersion-Emersion (16 items), and Internalization (11 items). Internal consistency for the subscales has been reported in the poor-to-fair range in samples of 649 and 659 U.S. undergraduate female participants (Ossana, 1986; Ossana et al., 1992, respectively), with the exception of the Immersion/Emersion subscale (α = .82; Ossana et al., 1992).

2.3.1.1 Psychometric properties

In further examination of the scale’s psychometric properties, the measure demonstrated poor internal reliability in a sample of 201 women, balanced between 101 Black and 100 White participants (Moradi et al., 2004), with many of the items loading negatively on their respective subscale. Convergent validity was assessed through links with relevant constructs: Preencounter scores were significantly linked to more negative attitudes toward women and significantly positively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism. Encounter and Immersion-Emersion followed the same general pattern, although these links did not achieve statistical significance (except for benevolent sexism, which was positively correlated with both Encounter and Immersion-Emersion). Internalization was significantly positively correlated with positive attitudes toward women, but not with modern, hostile, or benevolent sexism (Moradi et al., 2004). Ossana, et al. (1992) also reported a positive association between Internalization and self-esteem and an inverse
association with perceived gender bias on campus. Although the scale was designed to capture the four stages of the Womanist Identity Development model, exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a poor fit of the data to the theoretical model (Moradi et al., 2004). Moradi et al. (2004) also conducted a multivariate test of equality of covariance matrices between Black and White women and found that the tool assessed womanist identity similarly in both groups. To our knowledge, there have been no updates to this scale in recent years.

2.3.1.2 Critique

The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986) explores a developmental model of feminist attitudes that is distinct from Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model, yet Moradi et al. (2004, p. 264) concluded that the WIAS is better conceptualized as a measure of “traditional gender-role ideology, pro-woman attitudes, and anti-man attitudes” than a measure of identity development. The scale itself does not ask participants to label themselves as either a feminist or a womanist, suggesting that this scale assesses unique dimensions of womanist attitudes rather than identity. Also, intercorrelations among subscales have been identified that would seem inconsistent with the theoretical framework underlying the measure. For example, a significant, positive correlation between the Preencounter and Immersion/Emersion subscales has been detected in at least two samples (Moradi et al., 2004; Ossana, 1986). The items on the WIAS pertain exclusively to female-identified people (e.g., “I would have accomplished more in this life had I been born a man”), and the measure does not disentangle feminist from postfeminist attitudes. The “internalization” stage assesses exclusively individualized feminist attitudes (e.g., “I believe that being a woman has caused me to have many strengths”; “I find that I function better when I am able to view men as individuals”) without assessing solidarity with feminists. In fact, the words “feminism” or “feminist” are not included anywhere in the scale items.

2.3.2 Feminist Identity Scale

The revised Feminist Identity Scale (FIS-R) was designed to measure the cognitive,
affective, and behavioural components of the first four stages of the FID model (Rickard, 1989). The revised version of the scale contains 37 items with four subscales, which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), including Passive Acceptance (5 items), Revelation (14 items), Embeddedness-Emanation (6 items), and Synthesis (12 items). Notably, this scale does not assess Active Commitment specifically because Rickard (1989) conceptualized this stage as a behavioural manifestation of Synthesis and not as a distinct developmental stage; however other scholars have disagreed with this interpretation and measurement of Active Commitment as part of Synthesis (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi & Subich, 2002).

The original development and validation of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987) was presented at a conference and is not available for evaluation, but because the Feminist Identity Development Scale and the Feminist Identity Composite are derivatives of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1989), we chose to also include the revised form of this instrument.

### 2.3.2.1 Psychometric properties

The FIS-R has yielded inconsistent estimates for internal reliability. In a sample of 63 female students at a large university in the southwest United States, internal reliability exceeded .85 for each subscale and 3-week test-retest reliability (.83–.93) was strong for each subscale (Rickard, 1989). In a larger sample of 191 female students (Fischer et al., 2000), internal reliability was poor-to-fair (see Table 1). In another large independent sample of 240 undergraduate women and female staff members at a midwestern U.S. university (79% White; Moradi & Subich, 2002), internal reliability ranged from poor-to-good for each of the subscales, with significant intercorrelations found among the scales.

Rickard (1989) cited findings from the original version of the scale to support known-groups and convergent validity for each of the four subscales based on positive correlations with self-esteem and traditional gender role adherence. Additional convergent validity has been reported based on ascending correlations between the four stages of the FIS with positive attitudes toward working mothers (Tetenbaum et al., 1983), quality of life (Rickard, 1987), and dating behaviours that were “atypical” of
women at the time (e.g., asking men on a date, leaving a tip, holding the door; Rickard, 1989). Three of the subscales (i.e., Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and Synthesis) were positively correlated with lifetime exposure to and appraisal of sexist events, and Synthesis was positively correlated with self-esteem (Moradi & Subich, 2002). Although Rickard (1987, 1989) proposed a four-factor structure for this measure, a subsequent confirmatory factor analysis did not support this model (Moradi & Subich, 2002).

2.3.2.2 Critique

As summarized in Table 3, there are a number of concerns with the conceptual meaning and distinctiveness of the items included in the FIS-R. Given the scale was limited to the first four stages, Synthesis represents the end stage of feminist development in this measure. Yet, the operationalization of Synthesis does not appear consistent with such an advanced stage of identity development. For example, the Synthesis item, “I have incorporated what is female and feminine into my own unique personality,” does not reflect any active commitment to or involvement with feminism on the part of respondents, and it may be more consistent with a postfeminist identity. In addition, the items composing Passive Acceptance and Synthesis do not allow for a clear interpretation of responses. For example, the Passive Acceptance item, “I like being a traditional female,” is not readily distinguishable from the Synthesis item, “I enjoy the pride and self-assurance that comes from being a strong female.” Most women, even traditional women, would identify with the label of “strong” or “competent” (Liss & Erchull, 2010), particularly in a postfeminist context in which the promotion of confidence has become ubiquitous (Gill & Orgad, 2016). Similar to the WIAS, the scale items are written for woman-identified people, and none of the items includes the term “feminist,” limiting its wider utility for assessing feminist-mindedness and identification. The tool also does not inquire into intersectional feminist issues or topics, rendering it both psychometrically lacking and outdated for the study of modern feminism.

2.3.3 Feminist Identity Development Scale

The Feminist Identity Development Scale (FIDS; Bargad & Hyde, 1991) was designed to
measure all five stages of the FID model, which contains 39 items, which are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including Passive Acceptance (12 items), Revelation (7 items), Embeddedness-Emanation (7 items), Synthesis (5 items), and Active Commitment (8 items). An additional nine items were included with the development of the measure, but they did not map onto any stage of feminist identity development and were not used in future research using the FIDS (e.g., “I can finally feel very comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”; “I feel angry about the way women have been left out of history books”).

2.3.3.1 Psychometric properties

Bargad and Hyde’s (1991) exploratory factor analysis of the FIDS based on a sample of 156 predominantly White (82.7%) women from an introductory psychology course yielded a five-factor solution for the measure. A second factor analysis based on a sample of 328 predominantly White (96.2%) female students enrolled in a women’s studies course supported this solution (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), and in a confirmatory factor analysis of 240 racially diverse university and community women, most fit indices supported this five-factor model (except RMSEA; Moradi & Subich, 2002). Within the second sample of the original study (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), alphas for each of the subscales ranged from .65 to .85 (see Table 1), and subscale scores were not significantly correlated with social desirability scores. Yet, this factor solution has not been upheld in other exploratory factor analyses in studies of primarily White female undergraduate students (Fischer et al., 2000) or in a Mexican American adolescent sample (Flores et al., 2006). In other studies of exclusively female students (Fischer et al., 2000; Gerstmann & Kramer, 1997), internal consistency was also more variable, ranging from .48 to .81, with the Synthesis subscale consistently demonstrating the lowest reliability.

2.3.3.2 Critique

The FIDS assesses the five stages of feminist identity development in women, but its items cannot be applied to men or nonbinary individuals in their present state, and many contain heteronormative language (e.g., “If I were married and my husband was offered a
job in another state, it would be my obligation as his spouse to move in support of his career”). In addition to having limited generalizability beyond woman-identified people, scholars have suggested the FIDS does not provide an adequate assessment of the underlying developmental model of feminist identity (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi & Subich, 2002). Indeed, contrary to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the FID model, the Synthesis subscale does not reliably differentiate between feminist and nonfeminist women (Erchull et al., 2009), which is suggestive of postfeminist identity (Downing & Roush, 1985). This failure may be partly due to the fact that all of the items refer to attitudes toward men (e.g., “I feel that some men are very sensitive to women’s issues”; “I evaluate men as individuals, not as members of a group of oppressors”) rather than to attitudes toward women, feminists, and feminism. Although one scale item assessing feminist identification was proposed for the scale (“I can finally feel very comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”), it is not included in the final measure because it did not load with the other items in any stage in the exploratory factor analysis. Additionally, one item relates specifically to the Equal Rights Amendment), which would not be relevant for those outside the United States. Although the term “feminist” is never used directly, the Active Commitment subscale does probe participants’ involvement in the women’s movement.

2.3.4 Feminist Identity Composite

The Feminist Identity Composite (FIC) was also designed to assess women’s degree of feminist identity development (Fischer et al., 2000), as per Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model, while addressing the psychometric limitations of the scales described previously. The FIC comprises 33 items derived from the FIS and the FIDS. Specifically, Fischer et al. (2000) administered both the FIS (Rickard, 1987) and the FIDS (Bargad & Hyde, 1991) to a sample of 191 female undergraduate students (90% White) at a large public midwestern university in the United States. After discovering that neither scale reliably contributed to the measurement of feminist identity development, the authors restructured the instruments. Individual items were reviewed by five independent judges and were retained for a new instrument if they loaded highly onto one (and only one) factor. The resultant 33 items (Passive Acceptance [7 items], Revelation [8 items],
Embeddedness-Emanation [4 items], Synthesis [5 items], and Active Commitment [9 items]) represented a more coherent set of items for assessing feminist identity development. Items on the FIC are rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

2.3.4.1 Psychometric properties

Using the same dataset from the original study, a joint factor analysis was conducted, demonstrating that a five-factor solution was most interpretable, and the internal reliability ranged from .68 (Synthesis) to .84 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Similar internal reliability estimates were demonstrated in an independent sample of 295 female non-university community residents and college students, ranging from .71 (Synthesis) to .86 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Convergent validity for the subscales of the FIC were established in a second sample through positive correlations between Passive Acceptance and the Foreclosure subscale of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (Adams et al., 1989) and Active Commitment with identity achievement. Also, Revelation was associated with both recent and lifetime sexist events (Klonoff & Landrine, 1995), and increasing involvement with feminist activism was observed as respondents moved from Revelation to Active Commitment, but not in relation to Synthesis. None of the subscales was significantly associated with socially desirable responding. The five-factor structure was upheld in this sample, as well as another sample of predominantly White undergraduate women (Moradi & Subich, 2002), but not in a study of exclusively sexual minority women (DeBlaere et al., 2017) or a large sample of Chinese women (Liu & Zheng, 2019).

2.3.4.2 Critique

The FIC is regarded by some as more reliable and valid than the FIS or the FIDS (Moradi & Subich, 2002), but its psychometric properties are not substantially stronger than the other two instruments (Hansen, 2002). The items composing the Synthesis subscale are still limited in the ways we noted, and the Embeddedness-Emanation subscale contains only four items, all of which are related to respondents’ interest in learning more about
women and women’s work (e.g., “I am very interested in women’s studies”; “I am very interested in women musicians”). These items would appear to be more distally related to holding a feminist identity rather than essential to a desire to surround oneself with women with similar attitudes.

Given that the set of FIC items was derived from existing scales, the FIC contains the same weaknesses (e.g., applicable only to women, no mention of intersectional ideas or attitudes, no use of the term “feminist”; see Table 3). Like the FID, the FIC allows for researchers to choose which phase of feminist identity development they wish to use to represent advanced feminist identity, but the Synthesis subscale is especially problematic, not only because it does not reliably distinguish between feminist labelers and non-labelers (Erchull et al., 2009), but also because it explicitly assesses an individualistic, rather than a collective, feminist identity (e.g., “As I have grown in my beliefs I have realized that it is more important to value women as individuals than as members of a larger group of women”), making it reflective of postfeminism. We encourage researchers to use the final subscale, Active Commitment, when assessing advanced feminist identity.

Overall, measures used to assess the FID model do not appear to be relevant for understanding the development of a modern feminist identity (Marecek, 2019). Although some subscales may represent a meaningful personality dimension and be linked to clinically relevant outcomes, researchers should use caution when using and interpreting measures derived from the FID model (FIS, FIDS, FIC).

2.3.5 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale

To eschew some of the complexities associated with measures of feminist identity development, Szymanski (2004) developed the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (SIF), which is a four-item measure that assesses four components of feminist self-identification (i.e., beliefs, public identification, private identification, and support for the feminist movement). The items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including “I consider myself a feminist,” “I identify myself as a feminist to other people,” “Feminist values and principles are
important to me,” and “I support the goals of the feminist movement.”

2.3.5.1 Psychometric properties

In a sample of 227 primarily White (87%), sexual minority (82% lesbian, 15% bisexual, 3% unsure) women, the scale was determined to be unidimensional and internally consistent. Convergent validity was established through significant positive correlations with a measure of involvement in feminist activities (Szymanski, 2004), attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement (Fassinger, 1994, see below), the FIC subscales except for Synthesis (and negatively for Passive Acceptance; Fischer et al., 2000), and all of the subscales of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (negative for Conservative; Henley et al., 1998), including the Lesbian Feminist subscale (Simoni et al., 1999). SIF scores were not significantly correlated with social desirability.

2.3.5.2 Critique

The SIF is a psychometrically sound measure that was not derived from the FID model and would appear to offer a more precise assessment of what it means to claim a feminist social identity. The scale includes the word “feminist” in each of its items and is non-gender-specific. In particular, the four items were designed in a way to allow respondents to differentiate between public and private feminist self-identification, providing a way to quantify aspects of the “feminist paradox” around self-labeling and potentially differentiate between individuals with feminist and postfeminist identities (Abowitz, 2008; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008). Its simplicity makes it usable for people across the gender spectrum and societal contexts. Of the feminist identity scales reviewed thus far, the SIF most reliably assesses identity. That being said, the SIF does not assess the content underlying said feminist identity. Higher scores on the SIF suggest greater personal alignment with the “feminist” label but may or may not offer insight into the ways that respondents identify as feminists. Overall, when the aim is to assess feminist identity independent of underlying attitudes, the SIF is a well-suited and valid measure for this purpose.
2.3.6 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale

The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) was designed to assess core beliefs that are observed across branches of feminist thought, as well as feminist identification, in order to categorize respondents as feminists, egalitarians, and non-feminists. The beliefs portion of the scale consists of three items: “Girls and women have not been treated as well as boys and men in our society,” “Women and men should be paid equally for the same work,” and “Women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued.” Participants indicate whether they “agree” or “disagree.” The scale also includes a behavioural paradigm in which participants are asked to respond to one page of the questionnaire if they consider themselves “feminists” or a different page if they consider themselves to be “non-feminists” (directing all to the same next page). Zucker (2004) found that 272 of the original 333 predominantly White, heterosexual female participants could be classified into three categories: “feminists” (45%; those who agree with all three cardinal beliefs and answer questions for feminists), “egalitarians” (31%; those who agree with all three cardinal beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists; later called “non-labelers”), and “non-feminists” (24%; those do not agree with all three cardinal beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists). The remaining participants, those who identified as feminists but did not support all three principles, were not categorized.

2.3.6.1 Psychometric properties

Psychometric properties. Convergent validity was established through the differential association between the feminist categories and outcomes relevant to gender relations and equality. Participants categorized as feminists endorsed more positive perceptions of feminists, held more positive attitudes toward feminism, and were more discontent with power relations than participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists. Compared to participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists, those categorized as feminists also scored more highly on the Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and Active Commitment scales of the FIDS (but not Synthesis), as well as four dimensions of feminist group conscious. Those categorized as egalitarians scored between non-feminists and feminists on all measures. Criterion validity has also been demonstrated, with those
categorized as feminists reporting higher levels of engagement in six types of political feminist behaviours (e.g., signing petitions) compared to those categorized as egalitarians or non-feminists (Zucker, 2004).

2.3.6.2 Critique

Overall, the CBF is a brief and useful tool for assessing a person’s general feminist orientation, but not the strength of that orientation, due to its yes/no response format. Strengths of this measure include that it requires participants to indicate whether or not they use the feminist label to describe themselves, and it can be used with individuals across the gender spectrum. However, although the feminist identification paradigm is a novel approach to assessing feminist self-labeling, the typical format of a single forced-choice question is not sufficient for assessing feminist identity, especially if it is unclear precisely what selecting a “feminist” option will entail for the participant (e.g., Will they be asked trivia about their knowledge of feminism? Will they be asked to donate to a feminist cause?). Given the broad scope of the items, this measure is not able to disentangle feminist from postfeminist ideology (indeed, Zucker transformed her language from “egalitarians” to “non-labelers” in future research) and has not been shown to represent diverse samples of respondents. However, the CBF may be a useful measure for some research designs, particularly in studies that aim to assess group-level differences between individuals who do and do not identify as feminists.

2.4 Measures of Feminist Attitudes

2.4.1 Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale

The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (ATFIS; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975) assesses attitudes toward particular feminist goals based on the National Organization for Women’s 1970 national platform. The scale contains nine subscales consisting of 120 items associated with women’s liberation: Human Reproduction (6 items), Child Care (5 items), Policies and Legislation (16 items), Employment (15 items), Marriage and Family (17 items), Overcoming Self-Denigration (8 items), Consciousness-Raising in Media (12 items), Religion (11 items), and Education (30 items). Respondents
answer each item on a 5-point Likert style scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

2.4.1.1 Psychometric properties

The scale was initially validated in a sample of mixed-gender women’s studies and psychology students (race unspecified; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975). Image analysis revealed that one factor accounted for 80% of the common variance between scale items, suggesting that despite its various subscales, a global feminist attitudes factor exists (Elmore et al., 1975). Fully 105 students (61 women’s studies, 44 psychology) completed the ATFIS on the first day of each course, and 31 women’s studies and 36 psychology students completed the measure again on the last day. Participants in the women’s studies course scored significantly lower (more liberal) than those in the psychology course at pre-test and post-test. Male participants scored significantly higher (more conservative) than female participants on all subscale scores, except for childcare. At post-test, those in the women’s studies course, but not the psychology course, endorsed significantly lower (more liberal) attitudes compared to their pre-test attitudes. For the entire sample, the full scale (Cronbach’s α = .93) and the subscales (Cronbach’s αs = .77–.96) demonstrated good-to-high internal consistency. Test-rest reliability was adequate for all of the subscales except childcare and education (< .70; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975). To our knowledge, no other validity tests have been performed with this measure.

2.4.1.2 Critique

The ATFIS (Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975) provides a comprehensive assessment tool for covering a wide range of feminist topics. Given that these items were derived explicitly from the National Organization of Women’s platform, they arguably represent key feminist, rather than postfeminist, political issues. Indeed, the word feminist appears twice on the scale. Further, its items can be supported by individuals across the gender spectrum, although many items are heteronormative and do not acknowledge nontraditional family structures (e.g., “The wife should be able to keep her
own name or the husband should be able to take his wife's name, and/or there should be
the option of both partners choosing a neutral second name to be used also by the
children, or the children should use both the wife's and husband's name”). That the scale
has not undergone a more rigorous validation process, including convergent,
discriminant, incremental, or predictive validity, nor a confirmatory factor analysis,
makes it unclear whether this instrument is appropriate for psychological research. On the
whole, a more rigorous assessment of the validity of the scale across diverse samples of
respondents is necessary before recommendations can be made regarding the use of the
ATFIS.

2.4.2 Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale

The Attitudes toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement (FWM) scale was designed
to assess a person’s subjective attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement
(Fassinger, 1994). Participants rate their level of agreement with the items on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale does not
define “feminism” or “women’s movement” for respondents, and thus intentionally
leaves these items open to broad interpretation.

2.4.2.1 Psychometric Properties

Psychometric properties. The original instrument was validated in a sample of 117
undergraduate psychology students (76 women) at a large public university in the
northeastern United States (57% Caucasian/White, 16% African American/Black, 4%
Hispanic/Latinx, 17% Asian-American/Pacific Islander). Internal reliability was good
across the full sample (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$) as well as for women (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .87$
and men (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .90$). Other studies have suggested comparable reliability
estimates in demographically similar samples (Szymanski, 2004; Twenge & Zucker,
1999).

Convergent and discriminant validity were also established through significant positive
correlations with attitudes toward women and gender roles, as well as feminist self-
identification. The scale was unrelated to dogmatism and social desirability,
demonstrating the tool’s discriminant validity. Researchers demonstrated that endorsing more positive attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement was related to unconventional career choices for undergraduate women (O’Brien & Fassinger, 1993), less concern with weight in women between the ages of 30 and 49 (Tiggemann & Stevens, 1999), more involvement with feminist activities and identification with feminism (Enns, 1987; Zucker, 2004), and greater egalitarianism, sexual assertiveness, and a sense of common fate with women (Yoder et al., 2012). The FWM has been subjected to a CFA, although the results have not been published or otherwise reported (Ormerod, 1991, as cited in Fassinger, 1994).

2.4.2.2 Critique

The scale is short, non-gender-specific, and purportedly psychometrically sound, which makes it a useful tool for researchers who wish to assess subjective attitudes toward the feminist movement broadly. An important caveat is that higher scores on this scale would only reveal general support for feminism and would not be able to distinguish between more specific types of attitudes and movements, including intersectional feminist attitudes or meritocratic beliefs (i.e., postfeminism). For example, the scale’s generic form refers to “leaders of the feminist movement” and the application of “feminist principles”; however, it is unclear which leaders and principles “come to mind” for the respondents when completing these items. Because this tool is a measure of feminist people and practices, and not necessarily an assessment of support for feminist principles, a high score on the FWM does not necessarily mean respondents endorse all aspects of feminist ideology or support the goals of every feminist-based movement.

2.4.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale

The Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996) was designed as an explicit sociopolitical measure of feminist attitudes that reflects the degree of support for feminist goals, gender roles, and feminist ideology. The LFAIS is composed of 70 items across six subscales: Gender Roles (10 items), Goals of Feminism (10 items), Specific Political Agendas (20 items), Discrimination and Subordination (10 items),
Collective Action (10 items), and The Sisterhood (10 items if administered to women; 5 items if administered to men). Although the full Sisterhood subscale contains 10 items, all of which are relevant to the lives of women, when the instrument is administered to men, only half of the items are to be presented. The items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Using the same data from the validation of the full LFAIS, Morgan (1996) also published a theoretically unidimensional short form of the instrument, consisting of 11 items positively related to feminist self-identification, support for the feminist movement, and positive attitudes toward feminism. Each of these items was derived from the feminist ideology or feminist goals domains rather than the gender roles items. Morgan has suggested that one item on the short form of the LFAIS should be removed in some samples.

2.4.3.1 Psychometric properties

In a sample of 209 mixed-gender and mixed-race (43% Asian American, 37% Caucasian, 12% Hispanic, 4% African American 2% Native American) undergraduate students (136 women), the full scale and each of the subscales demonstrated adequate-to-strong internal consistency in women and men, with the exception of the Sisterhood subscale (α = .45 in women; α = .15 in men; see Table 1). The scale demonstrated strong concurrent validity with personal identification as a feminist, support for the women’s movement, and positive attitudes toward the feminist movement. Across two samples, the 4-week test-retest reliability was .83 in both a group of 22 avowed feminists and a mixed-gender group of 32 undergraduates at a medium-sized midwestern U.S. university. Known-groups validity was also determined for the full scale and each of the subscales by establishing that undergraduate men scored lower than undergraduate women, both of whom scored significantly lower than avowed feminists (Morgan, 1996).

For the brief measure, the initial validation was completed in the aforementioned two samples and demonstrated good internal reliability (Sample 1: α = .81; n = 69 undergraduate women and Sample 2: α = .84; n = 234 mixed-gender undergraduate students; Morgan, 1996). More recent studies have demonstrated similar reliability scores (αs = .87–.95; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Conlin et al., 2019). Using an exploratory
structural equation modeling strategy in a sample of 890 mixed-gender participants, Woodbrown (2015) demonstrated that when several items were removed, a two-factor solution could be obtained for women, but no discernable factor structure was obtained for men. Although the tool has never been explicitly subjected to tests of convergent validity, it has been employed widely and shown positive correlations with related constructs such as feminist identification, gender self-esteem (Burn et al., 2000), and positive implicit attitudes toward feminists (Breen & Karpinski, 2008).

2.4.3.2 Critique

The LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) is a comprehensive measure of feminist attitudes that can be used in women and men (although no scoring instructions exist for nonbinary individuals). However, the scale is not without its limitations. Notably, the full scale has not been subjected to tests of structural validity, and it lacks an intersectional focus. For example, nearly all items included in the Gender Roles subscale refer to heterosexual partnerships and childrearing, thus failing to capture attitudes toward diverse expressions of gender and sexuality. What is potentially the most unique contribution of the LFAIS is unfortunately also one of its weaknesses: the Sisterhood subscale. This subscale moves away from postfeminism and reflects women’s political solidarity with others within the movement. However, its low internal consistency reliability (α = .45 in women; .15 in men) suggests the scale is unreliable and the items should be reexamined. Further, neither the long nor short forms of the tool contain the word “feminist,” suggesting that these attitudes may reflect “a more covert type of feminism” (Burn et al., 2000, p. 1084). The short form of the scale has been widely used to assess liberal feminist attitudes, but it does not adequately capture the multidimensionality of liberal feminist thought, and some research suggests that the 10-item form lacks structural validity (Woodbrown, 2015). Yet, for those researchers merely hoping to include a brief measure of support for some aspects of liberal feminist attitudes, particularly in U.S. samples, the short form of the LFAIS may be a reliable tool for doing so.
2.4.4 Feminist Perspectives Scale

The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS) has three variations: the original scale (FPS-2), the abbreviated form (FPS-3), and the expanded form, including a Lesbian feminist subscale (FPS-4). In the following, we provide psychometric information for each of the measures, followed by a general discussion of the scales’ strengths and weaknesses. The original item pool was labeled the FPS, which was condensed into the 78-item FPS2.

2.4.4.1 Feminist Perspectives Scale-2

The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS-2) was designed to measure the degree of endorsement of an array of feminist attitudes and behaviours across multiple feminist ideological perspectives (Henley et al., 1998, 2000; Simoni et al., 1999). The scale contains 78 items, with 60 assessing feminist ideology and 18 assessing feminist behaviours across six different feminist perspectives. The ideology items comprise Liberal Feminism (10 items), Radical Feminism (10 items), Socialist Feminism (10 items), Cultural Feminism (10 items), Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (10 items), and Conservatism (10 items). Three behaviour items relevant to each feminist perspective compose the remaining items (18 total). Separate scores are calculated for the attitudes (not including Conservativism; Femscore2) and behaviours items. Conservative behaviours, including “My wedding was, or will be, celebrated with a full traditional ceremony,” are not counted in the total behaviour score. Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the attitudes items and from 1 (very untrue of me) to 7 (very true of me) for the behaviour items.

The scale was initially developed in a sample of 92 mixed-gender, ethnically diverse undergraduates and validated on an ethnically-diverse (40% European American, 25% Latin American, 18% Asian American) sample of 344 undergraduate and community women and men. In the validation study, the measure demonstrated high internal consistency and stable two- and 4-week test-retest reliability in both the full scale and its subscales, with the exception of the Fembehave subscale at two-week retest (r = .49;
Henley et al., 1998). The individual subscales also demonstrated high internal consistency (see Table 1), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale ($\alpha = .46$–.62), and these reliability estimates have been upheld in later research (Szymanski, 2004). Convergent validity was established with positive correlations between the five feminist subscale scores and attitudes toward women, involvement in women’s studies courses, and feminist self-identification (Henley et al., 1998). Scores on the five feminist subscales were also linked to less religiosity and less conservative political orientation. Exploratory factor analyses of the ideology items revealed a four-factor structure of Radical Feminism and Socialist Feminism items (Factor 1), Conservativism (Factor 2), Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (Factor 3), and Cultural Feminism (Factor 4). The Liberal Feminism subscale items did not load onto any factor (Henley et al., 1998).

2.4.4.2 Feminist Perspectives Scale-3

A 36-item short form of the scale (FPS-3) was also developed (Henley et al., 2000). Each of the six primary subscales are included in this abbreviated tool, each with five attitudinal items and six behavioural items that best capture the various perspectives. In a sample of 209 mixed-gender and ethnically diverse undergraduate students, the Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of the feminist subscales (Femscore3) was .85, and the internal consistency estimates for the subscales ranged from .53 (Liberal Feminism) to .73 (Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism). Femscore3 and subscale scores correlate highly with items on the original measure, ranging from .54 (Liberal Feminism) to .87 (Femscore3), and the instrument has demonstrated strong 2-week test-retest reliability (scores ranging from .87 for the Conservativism and Femscore3 subscales to .54 for Liberal Feminism items). Convergent validity for the abbreviated instrument was established through correlations with self-rated degree of feminism and liberal political orientation (all in the positive direction except conservative, which was also negatively linked to having taken a women’s studies course and positively linked to religiosity). In their sample, women scored higher than men on all scales except Conservativism, and Participants of Color had higher Femscore3s and scored higher on Radical Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism subscales than White participants. In a sample of 95 undergraduate students, only a few
of the subscales (Conservative, Liberal Feminism, and Fembehave) linked with the Attitudes toward Women Scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972) or femininity items on the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1984). Notably, Respondents of Color scored significantly higher on the full scale, as well as the Radical Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism subscales, compared to White participants. To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor analysis for this version of the scale.

2.4.4.3 Feminist Perspectives Scale-4

Feminist Perspectives Scale-4. Shortly after the publication of the FPS-2, an additional subscale was added to the instrument to assess Lesbian Feminism (FPS-4; Simoni et al., 1999, p. 835) to address the FPS-2’s “blatantly heterosexist” nature. The subscale positions compulsory heterosexuality as a primary source of oppression for women, encouraging women to define their goals and perspectives outside those of men. The final 10 items for the attitudinal and behavioural Lesbian Feminism subscale were selected based on the highest corrected item-total correlations and relations with one another from previous studies with lesbian-identified women.

When the full FPS-4 (FPS-2 plus the Lesbian Feminism subscale) was presented to a mostly European American (76%) mixed-gender student sample (n = 76) and a sample of women attending a LGBTQ cultural gathering (n = 41), the internal consistency was high for the Lesbian Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s α = .91) and the remaining subscales (Cronbach’s αs > .70), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s α = .64). The Lesbian Feminism subscale was significantly positively correlated with feminist identification and attitudinal items (Femscore4) and each of the subscales, all in the expected directions. A more liberal political orientation and past experience in a women's studies course were also linked to Femscore4 and subscales in the expected directions. Known-groups validity was supported with women consistently scoring higher than men on the FPS-4, and those who self-identified as less heterosexual (“more” or “exclusively homosexual”) scored higher than those who identified as more heterosexual (“equally heterosexual and homosexual,” “more” or “exclusively homosexual”; Simoni et al.,
To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor analysis for this full version of the scale.

2.4.4.4 Critique

The Feminist Perspectives Scale (and its multiple iterations; Henley et al., 1998; Henley et al., 2000; Simoni et al., 1999) is a unique instrument because it allows researchers to explore diverse feminist perspectives simultaneously. Yet, the scale has been critiqued and scrutinized by various feminist social psychologists (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; Russo, 1998; Spence, 1998). In particular, the Liberal Feminism subscale has been criticized for its inability to capture the diversity within liberal feminist thought (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; Henley & McCarthy, 1998; Spence, 1998). Given that items representing liberal feminism would be most applicable to U.S. women today (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; Morgan, 1996), this subscale’s poor reliability and lack of coherence further limits its utility for assessing endorsement of feminist ideology.

As others have noted, the FPS is not comprehensive and does not cover many branches of feminist thought (e.g., ecofeminism, Marxist feminism; Frieze & McHugh, 1998), and the Cultural Feminism subscale does not appear to be widely endorsed by feminists or non-feminists (Liss et al., 2000). For example, participants who identified with the “radical right” in Henley et al.’s (1998) original study had the highest scores on this subscale (although, notably, the number of participants in this category was small). Spence (1998) has also critiqued the theoretical underpinnings of these scales, noting that they generally fail to capture the core assumptions of each perspective. Although the scale allows for the assessment of feminist attitudes and behaviours in tandem through the inclusion of the behaviour subscale, the psychometric properties of the behavioural subscale are weak, and many of these items are quite specific and seemingly outdated (e.g., “I have read non-exploitative erotica written from a woman’s point of view”) and may not represent the behaviours of modern feminists (Kelly, 2015). Additionally, considering that the major strength of the FPS is that it allows for the assessment of nuanced aspects of feminist attitudes, the brief form of this measure loses this nuance and ability.
Further, despite the length of these measures, the terms “feminist” or “women’s movement” are not included in any version of the scale. The tool can be used across gender categories, although items pertaining specifically to men (e.g., “It is a man's right and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary”) are not included in the total FemScore. The radical, socialist, liberal, and lesbian (in FPS-4) feminism subscales clearly align with a feminist orientation, although the Cultural Feminism subscale could potentially reflect postfeminist ideology (“Beauty is feeling one's womanhood through peace, caring, and nonviolence”). Notably, the scale does have an intersectional component to it, particularly in the Womanism/Woman of Color and Lesbian Feminism subscales. By assessing attitudes toward the interlocking prejudice experienced by women who are also members of sexual or racial minority groups, the FPS stands out among other measures of feminist attitudes. Overall, the FPS represents a unique measure of feminist attitudes that assesses endorsement of a variety of diverse feminisms, but the various dimensions have not shown consistent reliability and validity across samples.

2.5 Discussion

Our review provides a critical evaluation of 13 scales of feminist identity and attitudes (10 of which were unique measures) that were published in the last 50 years and used in psychological studies of feminism. We critically assessed each scale along four distinct dimensions: (a) type of validity evidence; (b) diversity of the validation samples across race, age, and gender; (c) inclusion of the term “feminist” within scale items, and (d) the ability to disentangle collective (“feminist”) and individualistic (“postfeminist”) attitudes (see Tables 3 and 4). Across the scales, there was substantial variation in the reliability and validity evidence available for determining their utility. Concerns have been reported about the psychometric properties, content validity, and relevance for all scales we included in our review. Some scales appeared to be used infrequently, whereas others had been used across a wide variety of samples. Of the 13 scales examined, nine had been subjected to factor analytic tests, offering some evidence for their structural validity; however, the factor structures observed for these scales did not emerge consistently across samples.
It is important to note, however, that inconsistent factor structure among measures of feminist identity and attitudes may not necessarily point to psychometric weakness of these measures; rather, these discrepancies may be reflective of the diverse ways feminism is understood and experienced by individuals from different backgrounds and at different points in time. We also observed that no measure is known to have been subjected to tests of measurement invariance across groups. Given the qualitatively different experiences faced by people across demographic categories, as well as the different ways that feminist identity is understood and conceptualized across racial groups (Robnett & Anderson, 2017), assessing group-level differences and the factor structure of scales across populations seems to be a logical next step for those who aim to study feminism quantitatively.

Another limitation of the measures reviewed in this paper is that they cannot reliably be used with samples outside of the United States, given that each measure was validated in American samples. Indeed, in non-American samples, several of these tools have not maintained their factor structure, and several instruments contain items that ask about “American” women and society (LFAIS, FPS-2, FPS-4, WAIS) or assess attitudes toward U.S.-specific legislation, such as the Equal Rights Amendment (LFAIS, FIDS). For those conducting research outside of the United States, it will be critical to consider whether these tools contain language or items that are relevant and appropriate to the sample and to examine the factor structure of the instrument prior to conducting quantitative analyses.

The reading ease of the items also varied across the scales. Based on Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level values, the measures of feminist identity included items that are easy to read and understand by students ranging from Grade 5 (or an average 11-year-old) to Grade 8/9 (or an average 13- to 15-year-old). The measures of feminist attitudes were less consistent, with some scales including items that are easily read and understood by students in Grade 8 and other scales with items at the Grade 11 level and fairly difficult to read.

Whereas most measures of feminist attitudes employed diverse samples in the initial
validation studies, measures of feminist identity had overwhelmingly White samples or did not report on race/ethnicity, with the exception of the WIAS. Several tools, particularly measures of feminist identity, were validated with—and therefore can be reliably used only with—individuals who identify as women, leaving the feminist identity process in men and nonbinary individuals underexamined. Notably, only a handful of the scales that assess feminist attitudes or identity actually use the term “feminist” anywhere in the scale, which may affect the way participants responds to these items (Conlin & Heesacker, 2016, 2018). Most of the scales were theoretically murky on dimensions of identity and attitudes, and few identity scales appeared to differentiate between feminist and postfeminist identities. In the remainder of the present paper, we offer a number of recommendations for future use of these measures in psychological studies of modern feminist identity and attitudes, as well as considerations for new scale development.

2.5.1 Recommendations for Using Existing Measures

For researchers interested in the study of individual differences in feminist self-identification, we would recommend the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004) as a brief, reliable, and valid scale for this purpose. Researchers may also examine the four items contained in this scale individually, rather than average them, to categorize and compare participants as public feminists, private feminists, feminist movement supporters, and feminist attitudes supporters. The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004) may be used to assess attitudes toward three core components of feminism in relation to feminist self-labeling. Specifically, the measure has utility for assessing between-group differences among individuals who support feminist principles but who do not identify as feminists and those who support feminist principles and use the feminist label. Given the recent uptick in feminist self-labeling, we encourage future researchers to consider exploring the category of responses that is often omitted from analyses: participants who identify as feminists but do not support all three cardinal beliefs. What function does a feminist identity serve when it is not bolstered by support for feminism’s basic principles? More research is needed to better-understand the motivations and attitudes of those who fall into this category.
Any study utilizing scales derived from the FID model or the Womanist Identity Development Model (WIAS) should consider the nonlinearity of the proposed stages of identity development and must carefully consider which stage(s) best correspond to the research questions (Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002). The FIS (Rickard, 1987, 1989) omits the Active Commitment stage, meaning that Synthesis (e.g., “I find myself much more willing to trust my perception of events than I have been in the past”) represents the ultimate stage of feminist identity development on this scale, and researchers who choose to use it should be clear about the scale’s operationalization of feminist identity when interpreting the findings. Although Moradi and Subich (2002) have recommended the use of the FIC, rather than the FIS or the FIDS, to assess the stages of the FID model, other feminist psychologists disagree (Hyde, 2002).

Additionally, the WIAS is not a conceptually or psychometrically valid tool for assessing feminist (or womanist) attitudes, and we agree with other scholars that the interpretation and generalizability of findings from this scale are problematic (see Moradi, 2005). Those wishing to assess Womanist attitudes may choose to utilize the Womanism/Woman of Color subscale of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998; Simoni et al., 1999). Although it did not meet criteria for inclusion in the present review, and it is not a measure of feminism per se, researchers may wish to employ the Intersectional Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) or Intersectional Political Consciousness Scale (Greenwood, 2008) to assess a more general understanding of structural inequality at multiple intersection and the ability to critique it.

For the assessment of feminist attitudes, the LFAIS offers the most comprehensive analysis of multiple components of liberal feminist thought and political orientation, as well as attitudes toward feminists and the women’s movement, particularly among cisgender women in the United States and, therefore, it would appear to subsume the purpose of the FWM scale. Yet, until a factor analysis is conducted on the full LFAIS scale, its structural validity cannot be determined. In addition, the FWM scale assesses subjectively positive or negative attitudes about the feminist movement, rather than support for feminist principles, and therefore it is not a proxy for feminist attitudes or individual support for feminism on its own. Although the ATFIS (Brodsky et al., 1976)
assesses agreement with various topics and goals of the feminist political movement, it does not assess engagement with feminist thought to the same degree as the LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) or FPS (Henley et al., 1998). Those researchers wishing to employ the ATFIS in their research may wish to consider updating the items to reflect the issues facing women and nonbinary individuals today.

Researchers considering the FPS should think clearly about their research question in relation to specific branches of feminist thought and be wary of its psychometric and theoretical limitations. It is possible that the FPS can be utilized creatively because some researchers have found alternative ways to use the scale, such as combining the Radical Feminism and Socialist Feminism subscales to constitute a general measure of strong feminist attitudes (Erchull & Liss, 2013; Liss & Erchull, 2010). The combined measure has demonstrated strong internal consistency across samples ($\alpha = .87–.91$) and links to relevant constructs (less enjoyment of sexualization, gender system justification, and beliefs in a just world; more gender collectivity, positive attitudes toward women, and collective action). Yet, without additional tests of validity, we suggest caution in the widespread use of the FPS and its multiple iterations.

2.5.2 Recommendations for the Next Generation of Measures

When developing tools to assess ever-changing sociopolitical attitudes, identities, and ideologies, “repeated iterations and refinements are often needed” (Spence, 1998, p. 353). Therefore, we offer some suggestions to researchers to improve upon the existing instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes, as well as those researchers aiming to develop novel tools to study modern feminism. All scales must be updated and validated to account for the shifting sociopolitical climate and sociodemographic landscape in which the scale is being used. In particular, given feminism’s emergence in mainstream culture, new measures should examine not merely use of the feminist label but also participants’ understandings of this term. Notably, qualitative and mixed-methods studies have shown that definitions of feminism vary widely, and these diverse perceptions of what constitutes feminism have been linked to feminist self-identification (Hoskin et al., 2017; Swirsky & Angelone, 2016). Further, given that scale language can
influence participants’ response patterns, those creating new measures should weigh the costs and benefits of including the term “feminist” within scale items (Conlin & Heesacker, 2016, 2018; White, 2006). During the age of postfeminism, examining potential overlap or discrepancy between feminist identification and feminist attitudes may be more useful for predicting feminist behaviours than assessing either attitudes or identity in isolation.

Language of scale items should be easily understood, both in regard to reading ease and use of complex or outdated terms. With all scales, where words or phrases are used that may be unknown to respondents (e.g., the Equal Rights Amendment), we recommend including brief definitions in order to clarify these terms for research participants. The cross-cultural utility of many scales was limited by their context-specific nature. Indeed, various scales referred to specific feminist issues that do not apply outside a U.S. context (i.e., WIAS, LFAIS, and ATFIS, each of which reference “American women” or American political jargon), so researchers studying participants outside the United States must be cautious when selecting measures to be certain that each item is relevant to the population being studied. We encourage the development of novel instruments to assess feminist political attitudes in countries outside the United States. For example, scales used to assess support for feminist politics in Canada may include attitudes toward the Inquiry on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.

Future research on feminist identity development would also benefit from integrating the lived experiences of self-identified feminists discerned through qualitative, and particularly feminist qualitative (Beckman, 2014), research methods to inform item generation to increase content validity. In addition, most of the scales in our review focused on holding a positive, coherent identity around feminism, and they were not designed to assess more ambivalent feminist identities reflected in the current cultural wave of feminism (Banet-Weiser, 2018; Gill, 2016). Future research on feminist identity would benefit from the assessment of postfeminist identities, which are not represented in earlier generations of feminist identity scales. We encourage the continued use of the term “feminist” either within survey questions or somewhere within study designs given the importance of feminist labeling for predicting behaviours of interest (i.e., collective
action; Radke et al., 2016; Yoder et al., 2011). Given that people more readily identify with feminism when a definition of the term is provided (see Siegel, 2020), future measures may wish to include a definition of the term “feminist” in the instructions. We suggest a broad definition, such as “a person who supports and advocates for gender equality.” Alternatively, researchers may allow participants to provide their own definitions of what a feminist is and thematically analyze the responses (Hoskin et al., 2017; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014, 2016). In addition, the importance of allies for achieving gender equality means theoretical frameworks and instruments should be developed to examine men’s and non-binary people’s experience of feminist identity development.

Researchers must consider whether scale items are formulated for hetero/cis-normative individuals and thus exclude individuals outside these categories, such as gender fluid and nonbinary respondents. For example, if pronouns are used in scale language, we suggest the use of singular “they/them” as per the recommendations of the seventh edition of the APA Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 2020). In regard to language, the items should be written in an accessible way to widen their utility across samples and populations. In scales with items that refer to men as a social group, we recommend distinguishing between cisgender and transgender men, given that these different classifications of men likely have different relations with women as a social group, as well as experiences of power and oppression (Watson, 2019). We also support the development of instruments that can reliably be used by male-identified and gender nonconforming people (see Sudkämper et al., 2020). Although it is unlikely that any instrument can capture the full breadth of feminist identity and attitudes, measures should be updated to assess the unique concerns of feminists today (e.g., intersectional awareness; Curtin et al., 2015; Greenwood, 2008) and be inclusive of respondents across the gender spectrum.

We would also recommend more attention to scale validation in the measurement of feminist identity and attitudes. Validity evidence was minimal across the scales, and a priori hypotheses for the scale’s associations with relevant outcomes were lacking. Notably, despite research and theory suggesting that feminism holds different meanings
for individuals from different racial/ethnic backgrounds, samples included in scale validation efforts—specifically in measures of feminist identity—were overwhelmingly non-Hispanic White. Future researchers should deliberately seek out diverse samples as well as assess measurement invariance between racial/ethnic groups. Age likely also contributes to feminist identity and attitudes, although nearly all scales were developed and validated in undergraduate samples. We encourage careful attention to diversity across demographic categories in future scale development efforts, perhaps by setting quotas of different groups or targeting specific groups in recruitment advertisements. Moreover, very few of the scales demonstrated systematic tests of ecological validity. The validity and utility of these scales would be strengthened by testing whether they predict key constructs of interest such as involvement in feminist collective action, willingness to intervene in sexist situations, or allocation of compensatory funds to a feminist organization. Overall, future research should address the gaps in the construct validation of feminist identity and feminist attitudes scales.

Overcoming the challenges of operationalizing feminist identity and attitudes is critical for the study of modern feminism because people’s feminist attitudinal orientation and alignment with the feminist movement have far-reaching consequences for individual and collective well-being, including body image and subjective well-being (Murnen & Smolak, 2009; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; Yakushko, 2007), how individuals cope after experiencing sexism and sexual violence (Carretta & Szymanski, 2020; Moradi & Subich, 2002; Sabik & Tylka, 2006), use of safe sex practices (Schick et al., 2008), resistance to stereotype threat (Leicht et al., 2017), and gender-based collective action motivation (Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011). As we move forward, it will be critical to understand if, how, and why modern feminist identity and attitudes map onto other social identities and attitudes, such as environmentalism, fat acceptance, and anti-racism to examine whether cultivating feminist identity can motivate support for and engagement with other social justice movements. Some measures, such as the Intersectional Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) and Intersectional Political Consciousness Scale (Greenwood, 2008), have begun to examine these intersections.

Quantitative research on feminist identity and attitudes is also relevant to other domains
of psychology beyond the social and personality area. Specifically, industrial/organizational psychologists may explore how feminist identity and attitudes among managers influence employees’ career satisfaction and trajectory, and clinical psychologists should continue to explore how feminist identity may buffer against mental health concerns (e.g., Sabik & Tylka, 2006) and how developing feminist attitudes may influence recovery from clinical psychological conditions (e.g., Holmes et al., 2017).

In conclusion, feminist identity and feminist attitudes are important areas of study. The validity and utility of measures designed to assess these constructs in quantitative research should be considered carefully. Ultimately, the selection of measures should derive from the specific research question. Given the challenges and complexity of studying modern feminism, researchers may need to use multiple instruments in tandem to assess those aspects and forms of feminist identity and attitudes most relevant to their study (see Yoder et al., 2012). On the basis of this review, we identified a need to update measures of feminist identity and attitudes that would improve on the psychometric properties of measures assessing feminist identity and attitudes, to provide more systematic validation of feminist identity and attitudes scales in diverse samples, to incorporate gender-inclusive language and content to widen the utility of the scales across social groups, and to allow researchers to assess context-specific content relevant to modern feminists, including intersectionality and disentangling individualized from collective feminist identities. To continue to study modern feminism in relevant and meaningful ways, it is imperative that researchers develop and validate new measures that capture the multidimensional nature of feminism as a collective, social identity (Ashmore et al., 2004) and situate the meaning of feminist identity and attitudes in the context of other relevant identity characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, (dis)ability, age, and gender identity.
Chapter 3

3 Study 2: A Grounded Theory Analysis of Young Women and Nonbinary Individuals Navigating Ambivalent Feminist Identities

In this study, I aimed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the ways that young people navigate and negotiate their feminist identities in daily life. I was specifically interested in the areas that present challenges to feminist identity, and the identity management strategies employed by people who call themselves feminists in the face of these challenges. As scholars continue to debate the legitimacy of today’s feminism(s) across fields and disciplines, the experiences and perspectives of modern self-identified feminists in the United States and Canada have been generally absent from the conversation. Scholars have noted that “now, more than ever, is the time to develop a nuanced approach to understanding contemporary versions of feminism” (Lewis & Marine, 2015, p. 119) and this information must be gleaned from the voices and experiences of young people themselves (Keller et al., 2018). Given the complexity of modern feminist identity, rather than imposing past theory onto feminists’ experiences, I used a grounded theory approach, which allowed me to take a bottom-up approach to developing a theoretical framework for understanding feminist ambivalence.

3.1 Introduction

As reflected by recent, popular feminist social movements and the rise in feminist identification among young people around the world (for a review, see Siegel, 2020), feminism has become mainstream in recent years (Gill, 2016). However, scholars have argued that this mainstreaming of feminism has resulted in the watering down of feminist principles in order to make feminism more palatable to the masses (see Gill, 2007; Zeisler, 2016). When feminist identification is a part of popular culture, and the stigma attributed to feminists no longer serves as a deterrent to feminist identification, people may choose to use the label “feminist” to describe themselves without necessarily
knowing enough about feminism to be certain of their commitment to the movement. Similarly, people may use the label conditionally, or only in situations where they feel that it is acceptable and normative to do so (Crossley, 2010). Qualitative research suggests that young people distance themselves from feminism that they feel others will think is “unreasonable” and instead strive for palatable politics and “fair feminism” that supports equity without disrupting the status quo (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016).

In addition, the past decade has seen a proliferation of various “feminist memoirs” and “feminist media” in which self-identified feminist women grapple with the contradictions and limitations that surround their support for feminism. Most famously, in her popular essay collection *Bad Feminist*, author Roxane Gay explains that she feels she is “failing as a feminist” (2014, p. 18). While she holds strong pro-woman attitudes regarding important feminist issues such as sexual violence and depictions of women in the media, she allows herself to indulge in various sexist practices such as listening to music that blatantley degrades and objectifies women. Similarly, on Deborah Frances-White’s *Guilty Feminist* podcast, she explains that she is “a feminist, but…” followed by a statement that arguably is inconsistent with feminist principles (e.g., “I am a feminist, but when a fashion designer recently told me I had lost so much weight I could be a plus-size model, I was secretly pleased”). Her book on the subject encourages women to embrace “guilty feminism” and adopt a feminist label, regardless of their continued support for sexist practices (Frances-White, 2018). Given the popularity of these books and podcasts, and the changing face of feminism, feminist self-labelling may no longer reliably be considered reflective of strong pro-feminist attitudes and behaviours.

While these quasi-feminist positions are framed as entryways into feminist politics, maintaining ambivalent feminist attitudes may have negative downstream consequences for the women’s movement more broadly. Recent research with women and men with strong feminist beliefs has revealed that “bad feminism” (i.e., perceived knowledge and behavioural inconsistencies) can disrupt the link between feminist beliefs, identification, and behaviour (Conlin et al., 2019). It is also possible that ambivalence nullifies the protective effect of feminist attitudes on women’s mental health. Though some research suggests that feminism is linked to better mental health outcomes in women, the research
on these links is mixed, and the benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may be overreported due to publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012). It is possible that core feminist principles may have a beneficial effect on women’s mental health, but ambivalence about feminism may prevent women from reaping the full benefits that an established feminist identity may afford (Yoder et al., 2012).

This study sought to develop a more comprehensive understanding of modern feminist identification from the perspective of self-identified feminist women and nonbinary people. To date, theoretical frameworks for understanding feminist social identity have been derived from the literature on stigmatized identity development. However, I deliberately sought to make “women the subjects of the sociological act of knowing” (Smith, 1987, p. 69), and allowed women and nonbinary people to give life to the theory, rather than deducing or inferring their tensions from past research or models. Importantly, while cisgender men may also choose to identify as feminists, this study focused on the experiences of those who are the principal beneficiaries of feminism. However, men’s feminist identity development is examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. This study builds on the various qualitative endeavors that have attempted to clarify the role of ambivalence in the lives of modern feminists, but, to my knowledge, it is the first to utilize a constructivist grounded theory approach in doing so (Mills et al., 2006).

Through semi-structured interviews with self-identified feminist women and nonbinary people, I aimed to address the following research questions: 1) What are sites of ambivalence for modern feminists? 2) What does feminism mean to modern feminists? 3) What aspects of feminism are accepted and refuted by modern feminists? 4) How do modern feminists advance women’s rights (or not)? 5) What are the psychological and behavioural consequences of endorsing ambivalent feminist attitudes?

3.2 Method

3.2.1 Participants

Twenty-eight self-identified feminists and nonbinary people were interviewed for the study, though two interviews were omitted due to issues that arose during the interview
process. The final sample consisted of 26 participants, who ranged in age from 19 to 37 (\(M_{\text{age}} = 25.92, SD = 4.82\)). They identified as predominantly cisgender (\(n = 21; 80.77\%\)), non-binary (\(n = 2; 7.69\%\)), transgender (\(n = 2; 7.69\%\)), and gender fluid (\(n = 1; 3.85\%\)). They were mostly heterosexual or straight (\(n = 15; 57.69\%\)), bisexual (\(n = 5; 19.23\%\)), queer (\(n = 3; 11.54\%\)), pansexual (\(n = 2; 7.69\%\)), or lesbian (\(n = 1; 3.85\%\)). Participants varied in age, ethnicity, and (dis)ability status. See Table 5 for demographic information about each participant interviewed, including chosen pseudonym and pronouns\(^3\), reported age, gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, highest level of education attained, and (dis)ability status.

### 3.2.2 Procedure

Given its amenability to feminist scholarship (Keddy et al., 1996; Plummer & Young, 2009; Wuest, 1995), I utilized a constructivist grounded theory approach for data analysis (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Mills et al., 2006). The literature review leading up to this study depicted feminism as in a state of flux, with some decrying postfeminist apathy and others applauding renewed feminist activism. Considering the inappropriateness of existing models of feminist identity and the inadequacy of published instruments for capturing core components of feminism (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), a grounded theory approach was suitable for understanding feminist-identified women and gender diverse people’s experiences in the present cultural context. I acknowledge that grounded theory typically does not include a comprehensive literature review prior to data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but given that this study was undertaken as part of a program of dissertation research, it was necessary to familiarize myself with the extant literature ahead of time.

To be eligible to participate, participants had to identify as women or nonbinary, speak English fluently, and be 18 or older. The grounded theory approach allows for researchers to begin with broad questions and narrow in on more specific inquiries as

---

\(^3\) I use the language of “chosen pronouns” because it is possible that participants preferred to use pronouns that were not consistent with their own personal pronouns for the sake of this study.
interviews progress (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Therefore, while feminist self-identification was not initially a requirement for inclusion, early in the research process (after interview 7, the first participant who did not identify as a feminist when asked directly), I chose to interview only those who self-identified as feminists. Following interview 11, I chose to include only those who were under the age of 40 because the experiences of those who were active during feminism’s second wave appeared to be different than those expressed by younger feminists. A recruitment advert was posted to Twitter and was able to be reposted by other researchers and those interested in the topic (“re-tweeted”). Eligible participants were encouraged to contact me via email to express interest in participating in an interview about feminist identity. After initial contact was made by the participant, they were sent an electronic version of the Letter of Information, which they signed and emailed back to me, along with a pseudonym to maintain anonymity within study records and reports.

Interviews were conducted via Skype and recorded to later be transcribed verbatim. I chose to keep my camera off during interviews, though some participants chose to keep their videos on during the interview. I chose to keep my video off during these interviews because I did not want participants to make assumptions about my position on feminism on the basis of my age or appearance. Participants were compensated $10 USD or $13 CAD (depending on geographic location) in the form of an Amazon gift card. I stopped collecting data once I felt that theoretical saturation was reached (the point at which I did not derive new codes from the interviews; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019 for a critique of saturation). After 10 interviews, I prioritized those with diverse gender identities, given that the perspectives of transgender women and gender expansive people have historically been omitted from studies of feminist identity. After the 24th interview, I specifically sought out participants with racially diverse backgrounds. Interviews ranged from 52-76 minutes and were transcribed into 328 single-spaced pages of usable text for data analysis.

---

4 It was observed by those online that compensation through Amazon may have deterred some potential participants, given that some feminists also hold anti-corporate attitudes.
3.2.3 Addressing Social Positions

At the time of the interviews, I was a 24-year-old white American cisgender woman completing her second year of PhD at a Canadian university who identified as heterosexual and able-bodied. Though this information was not revealed to participants, she also identified as a liberal, intersectional feminist and supported feminist goals, including, but not limited to, reproductive justice, pay equality, Black Lives Matter, and Health at Every Size, through both advocacy and public activism. The first author conducted, transcribed, and coded all of the interviews. The second author and coder was a 42-year-old white, able-bodied, cisgender woman and tenured professor of social psychology who also identified as feminist and has published widely on topics related to the psychology of gender, sexist ideologies, women’s self-concept, and body image.

3.2.3.1 Analytic procedure

I began with a broad set of questions derived from an extensive literature review on the subjects of feminist theory, postfeminism, feminist identity development, feminist ideology, and feminist stigma. Because I did not want my own assumptions to guide the interviews, the questions were initially broad to allow participants to explain their experiences and concerns for themselves. Throughout the interview process, the questions were revised in order to shed light on the emergent coding scheme (Agee, 2008) and to explore new, conceptually-related ideas. Interview questions covered a wide range of topics, including identity development (i.e., “Have you always identified as a feminist? How did your feminist identity develop?”), definitions of feminism (i.e., “What is a feminist? Define it in your own words based on what it means to you”), and feminist stigma (“Have you ever experienced discrimination or backlash for being a feminist?”).

Reflexivity was paramount throughout the interview process (England, 1994). To this end, I was conscious of the power dynamic established between myself as a researcher and participants and sought to humanize and empower the participants (Pillow, 2003). Specifically, I allowed participants to steer the discussion, avoided intrusive interruptions, and responded appropriately to disclosures of potentially-sensitive subject
matter. Participants were able to contact me after the interview to discuss their experience, and a few thanked me for encouraging them to think more about their identities as feminists. Participant creativity was encouraged in choosing a unique pseudonym, and the participants sometimes selected single names (e.g., Mrinalini, Zipporah), full names (e.g., Nicky J. Kent), or numbers (e.g., 150) to represent themselves. Participants also chose the pronouns they would prefer to be used for the purposes of this study (See Table 5). Reflexivity notes were maintained and regarded as critical to the analyses (Ackerly & True, 2008; England, 1994). The quotes that I have chosen to present in this manuscript not only reflect the participants’ lived experiences, but also their unique personalities.

Table 5. Demographic Information for Study 2 Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chosen pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Pronouns</th>
<th>Sexual orientation</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>(Dis)ability status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruth</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adriana</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Queer</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>Physical and psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicky J. Kent</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>They/them</td>
<td>Pansexual</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melody</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicia</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrinalini</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Eastern European</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoebe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Non-binary</td>
<td>They/them</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginger</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Non-binary</td>
<td>They/their</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>High school</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patty</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Queer</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Pronouns</td>
<td>Orientation</td>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Gender fluid</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Pansexual</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>Physical and psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zipporah</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veronica</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White/Latina</td>
<td>Graduate degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayla</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Woman (T)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Lesbian</td>
<td>White/Latina</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jennifer</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>West Indian</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brenda</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>Multi-racial</td>
<td>Bachelor’s degree</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisa Simpson</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Woman (C)</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Woman (T), genderqueer</td>
<td>She/her</td>
<td>Queer</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>Cognitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Chosen name reflects participant chosen pseudonym. Woman (C) represents cisgender women. Woman (T) reflects transgender women.

Each interview was conducted and transcribed verbatim. After the initial transcription was completed, the transcript and audio recording of the interview were sent to one of four female research assistants to review for any potential paraphrasing or omissions. Edited transcripts were sent back to the primary coders who completed line-by-line coding of the interviews, first independently and then together. Throughout the analytic process, the data were coded inductively (Morrow, 2007), using an interactive, constant comparison technique (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) whereby emergent themes from past interviews were routinely compared against the new data to ensure their appropriateness and completeness (Kolb, 2012). As interviews progressed, the earlier interviews and original themes that had been identified were revisited so as not to prioritize the experiences of later interview subjects (Charmaz, 2014). Often, this meant revisiting major categories and revising core themes in the model to better suit the broader patterns as described by the participants.

I followed the general principles of grounded theory analysis, beginning with open coding (Fassinger, 2005). Specifically, I divided the data from each transcript into line-by-line segments, which were related to our overall research questions. Throughout this stage, I engaged in memoing (see Birks et al., 2008), or making notes about ideas for
potential higher-order themes as they emerged. Both coders individually coded the first ten interviews before meeting to discuss potential themes. After this initial meeting, we met more frequently to discuss the new interviews as they occurred to assess for novel findings within the coding scheme. In the second phase (axial coding), I condensed the most frequent and robust codes into higher-order themes, which served as our initial framework for the development of a more formal coding scheme. Major themes were derived on the basis of perceived higher order theoretical constructs that subsumed the meanings of the codes based on commonalities among them (Gioia et al., 2013). On the basis of this initial coding, I revised the original interview schedule and devised subsequent questions (Agee, 2008). After the generation of the initial codes and themes, we utilized an iterative technique as a means of engaging in a constructivist form of selective coding (Creswell, 2013).

Given the complexity of the topic, the unique influences of gender and racial group, and the inconsistencies present within participants’ discussions of the subject, developing a cogent model of ambivalent feminism was a challenging task. I created numerous visual and narrative representations of the data, and we both commented and explored the themes until we felt they best represented associations among constructs as they were described by the participants (Creswell, 2013). To increase the credibility of the analysis and to ensure that the proposed model resonated with participants’ own lived experiences, I used a member checking technique (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), whereby the final model was sent back to a subsample of the original participants for validation. Of the 10 participants contacted, eight responded with feedback, all of whom approved of the final model. Upon receiving insightful feedback from additional experts in the field, I revised the model once again to take a more compassionate approach to understanding participants’ experiences, given the unique challenges faced by young feminists in the current cultural climate (Lewis & Marine, 2015) and engaged in theoretical sampling to fill the potential gaps our initial sample may have left. Additional, minor revisions were made to the model and grouping of themes. This final model is presented in Figure 1.
3.3 Results

While each of the participants self-identified as a feminist when asked directly, they expressed various tensions that complicated their relationship to feminism more broadly, which I refer to as domains of ambivalence. In particular, the tensions were concentrated around six domains: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment of feminine norms, identity incongruence, fear of backlash, and evasion of stereotypes. Further, these tensions appeared to co-occur with particular experiences within the personal and political spheres. In the personal sphere, the tensions were connected to body image disturbances, gendered appearance management strategies, and negotiated sexual agency. In the political sphere, the tensions were connected to conditional feminist self-labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and lifestyle feminism. Our analytic process moved from repeating ideas to consistent themes to theoretical constructs (see Table 6).
Table 6. Coding Scheme for Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repeating idea</th>
<th>Common theme</th>
<th>Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary/intersectional</td>
<td>Representation and inclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory feminism</td>
<td>Feminist self-concept</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences with other feminists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived knowledge deficit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills deficit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossibility of change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminine power</td>
<td>Entrenchment of feminine norms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal importance of femininity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for traditional gender role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural conflicts</td>
<td>Identity incongruence</td>
<td>Domains of ambivalence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious conflicts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality conflicts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Angry feminist”</td>
<td>Evasion of stereotypes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Radical feminist”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Man-hater”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical harm</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social ostracism</td>
<td>Fear of backlash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familial disapproval</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romantic rejection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational/educational stigma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body image disturbances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendered appearance management</td>
<td>Personal outcomes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated sexual agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional feminist labeling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist bystanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political (in)action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle feminism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1 Domains of Ambivalence

Throughout the interviews, participants expressed frustrations and complications in their relationships to feminism. These tensions were varied and differed between the participants, but several appeared fairly consistently. The primary domains of ambivalence were representation and inclusion (i.e., perception of what and whom feminism is for), feminist self-concept (i.e., feminist self-esteem and self-evaluation), identity incongruence (i.e., incompatibility between feminism and other important aspects of one’s life), entrenchment of femininity (i.e., desire to present and live as both feminine and feminist), evasion of stereotypes (i.e., wish to avoid the negative stereotypes attributed to feminism and feminists), and fear of backlash (i.e., anxiety regarding real or perceived negative repercussions of feminist identification and activism).

3.3.1.1 Representation and Inclusion

Participants engaged with feminism somewhat differently, depending on their perceptions of who is represented (or not) within feminism. First, a few participants felt that feminism was exclusionary to people who do not identify as women. Due to this perceived exclusivity, some participants wished to distance themselves from the “feminist” movement. For example, Melody had mixed feelings about feminism’s recognition of people outside of the gender binary. She explained:

I hear the word feminist, and I think automatically female, but I think it’s, like, it’s an exclusionary term almost… you know, the issues that are facing women – and that should be trans women, you know, all type of women, needs to be heard… I care about the issues on a broader level. [Melody]

It is worth noting that the four non-cisgender participants in the sample did not express ambivalence regarding feminism’s inclusion of marginalized gender identities. Each recognized various sects of feminism that were reductionistic but did not see these groups as a barrier to their own involvement in the movement. Kayla explained, “There’s trans exclusionary radical feminism. There’s a different - there’s all different kinds of subsets of it… When it comes to the current feminist movement, I don’t have many criticisms of
it right now.” Similarly, Ginger noted, “SWERFS and TERFS - these are people who are sex worker exclusionary feminists and trans-exclusionary feminists… I’m not in agreement with the SWERFS and TERFS because I think that sex workers and trans women need to have rights.” While some cisgender feminists perceived all of feminism as trans-exclusionary, at least in this particular sample, those who did not identify as feminists were able to distance themselves from the pockets of the movement that did not support them.

Some participants saw feminism as a movement rooted in intersectionality (see Crenshaw, 1991) and thereby encapsulated other social justice initiatives, such as “Health at Every Size” [Alexandra, Adriana, Ginger] and “Black Lives Matter”5 [Nicky J. Kent, X]. For example, when asked what feminism meant to her, Alexandra responded, “what’s really important to me about feminism and my definition of feminism is that it’s intersectional always.” She continued to expand on this point throughout the interview, drawing attention to the various ways that her attitudes about equality expanded into various other social justice issues, such as transgender, racial, and (dis)ability rights. This strong desire for intersectional liberation was not well-understood or incorporated by other participants, such as M, for whom feminism was perceived as narrowly catering to the needs of (White) cisgender women. Toward the end of the interview, she expressed that she wanted to talk about “all lives matter,” but noted:

If we’re talking about equality across genders, then feminism is the word. If you’re just talking about equality, then you’re talking about racial injustice and you’re talking about you know socio-economic issues… is there a word for that? [M]

For Alice, not only was feminism not inclusive of fat acceptance, but she felt that this social justice initiative was “damaging” to society and desired to distance herself from it:

5 Health at Every Size refers to the social movement to end the oppression of fat bodies (see Bacon, 2010), and Black Lives Matter is a social initiative that demands justice for black people wrongfully subjugated to police brutality due to their race (Khan-Cullors & Bandele, 2018).
Have I been a [fat] activist? I wouldn’t say so because I don’t necessarily agree with the movement. Like I think body positivity is very damaging these days… I just think [body positivity] comes with a lot of stories and activists who are damaging, like, the minds of growing individuals who are not maintaining healthy lifestyles because they see role models in the field who are unhealthy but love themselves still. [Alice]

Despite the fact that women (and nonbinary individuals) are located at various axes of privilege and oppression, some participants saw the “women’s movement” as solely advocacy for women like themselves. When participants did not incorporate intersectional perspectives into their feminist attitudes, they often felt that feminism was not a cause worth fighting for.

A few participants felt that feminism was compulsory, explaining that they felt that most people were already feminists and so they did not need to be active in the feminist movement. For example, Laura noted that endorsing a feminist attitude was “just the way to be,” and Ruth explained that in the city where she grew up, “it was weird if you weren’t a feminist.” Some participants even felt that structural change was no longer necessary, such as Alice:

The first wave and second wave of feminism, I think women were concretely fighting for something tangible and for rights. [Modern feminism] doesn’t look to solve anything but really just looks to identify more problems that don’t necessarily exist or exacerbate them to the level where you feel bad. [Alice]

Despite the tensions these women felt regarding feminism, they felt that some degree of commitment to feminism was socially compulsory. Yet, those who held more ambivalent attitudes toward the feminist movement were less inclined to engage deeply with it. Some of the participants noted that they practiced a form of apolitical feminism that centered on “personal autonomy” [Adriana] and authenticity, rather than supporting and advocating for women as a collective. Mrinalini was among those for whom feminism was a very personal stance, noting that she did not want to be labelled as an “activist.” She went on to explain, “I’m less concerned with changing the world or the way a large
group of people sees, and that’s an incredible thing to be able to do, but it’s not necessarily how I operate.”

It also appeared that the participants’ feminist attitudes were shaped by their experiences with other feminists, including their attitudes towards feminist activists they had seen and their sense of inclusion within the feminist movement. Penny explained that some other feminists she knew engaged in “clout grabbing,” or constantly trying to one-up others, rather than supporting and encouraging their growth:

Instead of being like, “Oh, wow, it looks like you and I both read that Audre Lorde book” [or] “It seems that we both seem to enjoy that bell hooks article a lot,” it’s like “Actually, you’re misquoting that” or “What other books have you read by that author?” You know, this like weird gatekeeping … that shouldn’t be the emphasis. [Penny]

For Olivia, her engagement with activism was hindered by “infighting” within the movement. She recalled a recent “disheartening” experience:

No one’s perfect, but when you throw a lot of people together that aren’t perfect, you bring a lot of imperfection into one place, and then everybody gets mad because there’s so much imperfection in the room… there’s less acceptance of the imperfection and there’s more finger pointing… In this last year, I was on this accountability pod for someone and the response in the community was disheartening with the amount of infighting and the amount … just the sheer lack of wanting there to be change and the sheer lack of desire for anyone to even try to change. [Olivia]

Participants seemed to use their negative experiences with feminists to justify their lack of engagement in the movement. When they believed that their opinions or contributions would not be welcomed, they disengaged. Overall, representation and inclusion, composed of exclusion and intersectionality, socially compulsory feminism, and experiences with other feminists, was a primary domain of ambivalence for the participants in this sample.
3.3.1.2 Feminist Self-Concept

Participants sometimes noted that they perceived themselves to be poor representatives of feminism (i.e., a “bad feminist;” Conlin et al., 2019; Gay, 2016) or that their activism would be ineffectual, a conglomeration of attitudes I have labelled feminist self-concept. For some, feminist self-concept was hindered by perceived knowledge deficits. For example, Mrinalini had never taken a gender or women’s studies course, and she felt uneasy advocating for feminism without adequate knowledge about it:

I want to know what I’m talking about before I talk about it, and as much as I’d like to engage in rights rallies, I’m not entirely confident on – for myself, just to be a political activist. I would like to be much more well-versed in the activism before I step into it… I’m focused on developing my ideology, less than, like, espousing it. I really want to be firm and understand and learn as the world learns. That’s where I’m at. [Mrinalini]

Others felt as though they had a skills deficit and would not be able to actively advocate for feminism. For example, Veronica felt very knowledgeable about feminist issues, but she stated, “I don’t feel like I’m the expert debater, and while I feel comfortable in the knowledge that has led to my own decision making, I – and I have that knowledge, I feel concern about my ability to express it persuasively.” Because she was uncertain about how effective she would be as an advocate for feminism, she often chose to silence her feminist beliefs and values, rather than try (and potentially fail) to engage in debate with others about them.

A few participants said that they did not put their feminist attitudes into action because they did not feel that they (or anyone else) would be effective in changing the minds of others (impossibility of change). M, for example, rationalized her lack of feminist activism by acknowledging:

People have different experiences, right? So, you can’t make somebody have a different experience than what they have… sometimes people just have different abilities and understandings than you and, like, what are you gonna do? You gotta live with it. You can’t change it. [M]
Because M and others felt like their attempts to engage with people would be ineffectual or uninformed, they chose not to challenge sexism when the opportunity arose. Christina spoke about this directly when referring to a past relationship in which she held “differing” views from her partner’s family:

I thought like maybe these are just things that I’m thinking, that I’m observing, but I’m being, like, too critical or I’m overreacting, or there’s nothing I could do about it anyways, so it wouldn’t be worth the fight to me. [Christina]

In general, when participants in the sample had poor feminist self-concept, whether from a perceived knowledge or skills deficit, or if they felt that change was impossible, they were disinclined from actively engaging with feminism in their own lives.

3.3.1.3 Entrenchment of Femininity

Participants also expressed a tension between being feminine and being feminist. Some participants felt that femininity had a unique power or felt an allegiance to the feminine gender role and had difficulty incorporating their feminist beliefs into a feminine gender expression. Others preferred traditional gender roles within their relationships. A sense of “feminine power” was particularly strong for Kim, who also queried whether her adherence to feminine norms was truly reflective of her own choices:

I genuinely enjoy dressing and presenting in a more stereotypically feminine way. That is something that I really do enjoy, but I never know how much of that has been internalized pressure to enjoy that or to seek that… I never know how much of it is just me being a person who enjoys how I present myself and then how much of it is just me expecting – what is expected of me. [Kim]

For Alicia, the relationship between femininity and feminism was similarly complicated, though this tension arose from her perceptions of other feminists’ attitudes about femininity, which were different from her own:

I do wear makeup or dress up or I do like to wear fancy dresses when I go out sometimes. I don’t like to think that that’s weakness, and I get this from other women who are
feminists… the parts of feminism that I don’t like are the parts that are critical of … women for being the traditional, societal ideal of feminine, and I think that is probably because I, I am that way. That’s how I present. [Alicia]

Those pursuing romantic (especially heterosexual) relationships expressed tension regarding their preference for traditional gender roles in these relationships. Some of these tensions took the form of changing one’s surname [Phoebe], gendered domestic work [Melody, M], or adopting conventionally gendered romantic roles [Laura]. For Laura, it was difficult to embody her feminist stances when she was dating men:

I really give into gender norms [in relationships]… I’m constantly like, “No, no, no, it’s okay for me to go in and say that, like, I like them or for me to cover the bill,” and I’ve tried to do that before, but it’s just so innate for me to be like, “if they like me, they will say it first,” and “if they want to progress the relationship, they will do it first.” [Laura]

Laura’s “innate” proclivity for stereotypical demonstrations of femininity in romantic relationships underscores the entrenchment of her adherence to traditional gender roles within romantic contexts, and this conformity made her feel like she was not living up to her feminist values.

Put simply, when participants felt tension regarding their feminine and feminist subjectivities, their commitment to feminism was complicated. Yet, for those in the sample who did not strongly value femininity, this tension appeared to be alleviated. Penny, for example, saw her role as a woman as “defiant,” explaining, “For me, I guess, like, femininity or being a woman, specifically being a woman, is sort of a way of – of destabilizing – destabilizing alpha male identity.” Contrary to others whose desire to appear feminine was in conflict with their feminism, the participants who sought to redefine and restructure their gender identity in the absence of a feminine gender expression found feminism to be a more natural fit.
3.3.1.4 Identity Incongruence

Participants also noted various instances of identity incongruence, or conflicting aspects of their identity that complicated their relationship with feminism, such as cultural, religious, and personal identities. For example, Marie noted that she, as a Black woman, felt uncomfortable about feminism because she felt as though Black women were not adequately considered within feminism’s newest wave:

How can I rally behind this movement that’s not even considering, like, another important part of my identity? … People are gonna discriminate against me or treat me differently because I am - not just because I am a woman, but because I am a Black woman, you know? So, it’s hard to, like, fully be behind a movement that, like, doesn’t really acknowledge another part of my identity. [Marie]

Similarly, Rose noted:

I find [conventional feminism] can be less welcoming, and also less fruitful. And I find that generally, I find that my efforts are usually more valuable in creating and fostering communities where everyone feels included, like the queer people and people of color who feel excluded by those larger communities and sort of trying to work with those larger communities. [Rose]

For some, religious conflicts made it challenging to subscribe completely to feminism. Adriana was raised in a devoutly Catholic community, and the backlash she experienced from friends and family regarding her progressive stances complicated her relationship with feminism:

If I talk to my Catholic, Christian friends, family members, acquaintances, then I get told that I drank the Kool-Aid… in my church setting, I definitely cannot be as feminist as I otherwise would be in a normal, non-religious setting. [Adriana]

This tension ran deep, and Adriana (as well as Alicia and Alice) refused to support reproductive justice initiatives due to her religious upbringing. The same was true of
Alice, who chose not to participate in political activism because she did not agree with feminism’s “liberal” platform on reproductive healthcare:

I grew up in a very conservative home … I don’t agree with the liberal platform, especially like a couple hot topics. So reproductive rights. I don’t agree with abortion, and I am pro-life… I know there’s controversy about like, “Oh, they’re just, like, a clump of cells” but, like, as a Christian, I believe that it’s life-forming. [Alice]

Others, such as Mrinalini, noted that their personalities were incongruent with those of feminists. Mrinalini’s perception of a “feminist” personality was not consistent with her own, so participating in feminist events or behaviours felt inauthentic to her. She explained:

I would be acting if I tried to [be active with the feminist movement]… and I’m also not as, like, loud and aggressive. That’s kind of just the way – like my personality is like that. So, the way that I am a feminist is just a little bit more [reserved] and that’s why I like to have conversations one on one. If I can’t control the way someone else believes something, then I can only control myself. [Mrinalini]

Mrinalini and others’ suggestion that their individual personalities and characteristics make feminism incompatible with other important parts of their identities is consistent with feminist theorizing on postfeminist identities. Specifically, Mrinalini draws on negative feminist stereotypes (i.e., loud, aggressive) to distance herself from the movement, and to suggest that she is dissimilar from other feminists. Rather than allowing feminism to shift her personality – as is consistent with past models of feminist identity (Downing & Roush, 1985) – Mrinalini’s individualized perspective on feminism allowed her to maintain her “authentic feminist” identity (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2017; Pruchniewska, 2018).

When the participants felt as though other aspects of their identity competed with their feminist identities, or when they experienced identity incongruence, they equivocated on their feminist positions and were often less involved with feminism more broadly.
3.3.1.5 Evasion of Stereotypes

Consistent with past research (Ramsey et al., 2007), each of the feminist-identified participants held fairly positive views of feminists, but they largely felt that some people still endorsed negative stereotypes about feminist women. For example, a few noted that they feared coming across as “angry.” Christina, when asked why she was not involved in feminist social activism, explained, “I’m still like a little bit self-conscious because I’m like, ‘Are people gonna see me as this angry feminist?’” Veronica echoed this refrain when she noted, “[I’m] afraid of being fully engaged because I'm afraid I'll be dismissed by people who do have those stereotypes… angry and irrational.” Derived from both a desire to eschew negative judgment and to be taken seriously, the possibility of being seen as “angry” dampened women’s interest in feminist activism.

Others worried about coming across as “radical,” “militant,” or “extreme.” Alice explained, “I think there is this like very loud, radical group of feminists – third wave feminists – that I definitely would not identify myself with.” Mrinalini similarly noted, “I’m so concerned with how someone – and it’s usually men or people who are male-identifying – who become uncomfortable and some women also – with me saying I’m a feminist because I think the association is really radical or really negative.” Consistent with feminism’s mainstreaming, while the participants generally sought to procure and protect rights for women and nonbinary people, they wanted to do so in a way that did not appear to disrupt the status quo or make them seem unappealing to other people.

A few participants reported that they were fearful about coming across as “man-haters.” Kim clearly and humorously articulated her perception of others’ views of feminists when she explained:

There’s an assumption that you hate men and that you are, you know, just staunch liberal and that you’re gonna burn bras and you’re going to fight [men]… and that you’re about, like, cutting off their dicks and burning them in a bonfire and dancing around while the bras burn, as well. [Kim]
Similarly, Nicki J. Kent explained their feelings regarding others’ attitudes toward feminists:

They think that we hate men. I mean, I can’t tell if that’s like a thing people genuinely believe or just a thing they each other so that they’re not as threatened by our - our voice or something… I think that men think it’s emasculating for women to be feminists. [Nicky J. Kent]

As will be explained in the next section, this fear followed Nicky, and she later recalled an experience in which she was blatantly objectified, but did not voice her outrage because “you don’t want to make men angry… they might do violence to you, and it’ll be your fault.”

Many of the participants in this study who were self-identified feminists sought to distance themselves from negative feminist stereotypes (angry, radical, and man-hating). These findings are also consistent with past research on young people’s desire to put distance between themselves and “extreme, man-hating, and unfeminine” feminists (Sharff, 2013), which some have suggested is grounded in performance of femininity which appeals to heterosexual men (Scharff, 2010). Mrinalini’s concern about disclosing her feminist identity to men, as well as Christina’s fear of her boyfriend’s family’s backlash, potentially supports this idea. However, Nicky J. Kent’s comments on this subject suggest that her fear of being stereotyped as man-hating was grounded in a legitimate fear of violence.

3.3.1.6 Fear of Backlash

Many participants described a fear of being penalized or punished for being openly feminist, and therefore deliberately avoided espousing feminist attitudes and beliefs in certain situations. The most striking of these fears was fear of physical harm. Even among those who reported generally low levels of ambivalence around feminism in the other domains, the fear of physical harm for expressing feminist ideals was sufficient to keep some participants from speaking up. For example, Ginger explained that she did not generally hide her feminist stances, but when she did, “it’s mostly a safety issue… there
are times when I’ve definitely just kept my head down because I’m terrified of what might happen if I don’t keep my head down.” Ginger’s fear of safety is consistent with the personal safety anxiety many women feel (Calogero et al., 2020); however, she noted her experience of fear may have been compounded by her physical disability (see Milberger et al., 2003).

Others feared negative consequences from their families. While some of the participants were raised in progressive households, others grappled with the tension between their family’s beliefs and their own. For example, Veronica explained:

I have to be very careful with the way that I talk to my parents … I minimize my potential for backlash – I don’t engage – I purposely don’t engage in ways that I think it’ll cause backlash or confrontation to. I’m currently in the process of figuring out how to be my full self with these people who raised me. [Veronica]

Regardless of the fact that Veronica felt close to her family, she was uncertain how to be a feminist and a member of her family at the same time. Laura similarly hid her feminist identity from her family, explaining that her choice not to engage with family members about their traditional beliefs was “mostly as a form of preservation, and knowing that – like, having politics get in the middle of my family ties isn’t appropriate.” Laura worried that her family would not accept her because of her nontraditional attitudes toward issues such as marriage and (not) having children, so she kept quiet about her feelings on these topics around them.

Others feared social ostracism if they were seen defending their feminist beliefs or engaging with feminism as thoroughly as they would like. Although most felt that peers would support their stances, the fear of encountering someone who opposed their feminist attitudes and threat of losing friends was palpable. 150, for example, explained:

You have to watch what you say… they kind of see you as – just, like, a negative, like, sensitive person who just, like, can’t take a joke… especially with a lot of my guy friends. I’ll feel uncomfortable when they say things about women, but I’m not always –
like, I don’t always feel justified in saying, “No, that’s not okay. Like, stop.” Because then I seem really… not fun. [150]

Though she felt “uncomfortable” by her friends’ comments, 150 did not intervene in instances of sexism because she was afraid of the potential backlash she may experience for doing so. On the other hand, Adriana had grown up with a close-knit circle of religious friends, and she was well aware of their attitudes toward feminism. She explained that fear that her friends with conservative attitudes would not accept her for speaking up:

I also have not completely separated from my Catholic friend circle yet, not that I will ever not be Catholic, but I also haven’t separated from that circle and made it my own journey, so I’m still very much afraid of backlash from them. [Adriana]

Among those sampled, it was important to feel socially accepted by their families, friends, and peers. When they felt that expressing their feminist stances around those close to them could potentially jeopardize their close social relationships, they behaved in ways that were inconsistent with their feminist attitudes.

For many (heterosexual) participants, fear of romantic rejection presented a barrier to openly embracing feminism. Kim explained, “If I’m at a party and someone says something sexist, I’m not about to like pull up the Prezi about why they’re wrong because I’m like, ‘I’d still like you to think I’m cute.’” Kim’s (and Zipporah’s) concern about coming across as “sexually undesirable” [Zipporah] influenced the times and places they chose to act on their feminist attitudes. Olivia was similarly influenced by this fear:

Dating, of course, is when it gets to be the trickiest because… most folks seem to have sort of a bizarre, inaccurate view of feminism. So, to then turn around and say, “Hey I’m a feminist, how does that make you feel?” tends to turnoff a lot of people. [Olivia]

For Olivia, feminism became “tricky” when there was a potential for backlash from potential romantic partners. Many of the participants chose not to speak their mind if they perceived that their feminist attitudes would make them undesirable or “unfuckable” (Zipporah) to potential partners.
Finally, a few participants felt as though feminism would not be welcomed in their place of employment, fearing negative occupational or educational ramifications. Adriana was surrounded by politics yet explained that she chose not to join the feminist circles around her: “I am too afraid of it impacting my job prospects… I – at this point – need to appear as bipartisan as I possibly can in terms of the job market.” For Phoebe, it was much the same:

I’m thinking about the workplace … if I didn’t know [my boss’s] opinions, I certainly would never – I wouldn’t tread into those waters. I would try to stay very neutral… If I were in that type of situation, I’m honestly not sure how I would respond. [Phoebe]

Adriana and Phoebe worried that inserting their feminist opinions in the workplace would have negative consequences at work and chose to limit their feminist expression and behaviour to seem “impartial.” This tension was also felt by students [Kim, Alexandra], who often encountered sexism in their universities, but felt that their academic trajectory may be thwarted by taking a feminist stance against it:

I find it very difficult to be completely honest and open about my feminist ideology in classrooms run by guys, by male profs, because there is such a profound power imbalance there. Your marks, and your scholarship, and your reputation is very much in the hands of this person … you’re not gonna super step up to your white, straight – assumedly-straight - prof and be like, “Well actually here’s all of the bullshit about what you just said” because then, you know, you’re gonna tank their course, and then there goes your GPA. [Kim]

In general, the threat of social, relational, or occupational backlash seemed to influence open expressions of feminism, with many participants avoiding or actively hiding their feminist attitudes to protect their relationships and careers.

3.3.2 Body-Related Attitudes and Involvement in Feminist Activism

The participants in this sample often noted discrepancies between their feminist identity, their attitudes about their bodies, and their involvement in feminist behaviours. These
discrepancies appeared to be underscored by their ambivalence about feminism more broadly. In particular, ambivalent attitudes regarding feminism seemed to be linked to personal consequences (body image disturbances, gendered appearance management strategies, and negotiated sexual agency) and political outcomes (conditional self-labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and everyday feminism).

3.3.2.1 Ambivalent Feminism and the Body

Across the interviews, participants described a tension between their feminist attitudes and their attitudes toward their own bodies (see also Rubin et al., 2004). These consequences included body image disturbances, gendered appearance management, and negotiated sexuality. Disturbed body image was relatively common among participants. For example, when asked about her relationship with her own body, Kim explained:

It’s really weird to like to hate [my body] so much but then also be super sexualized at the same time, and so it’s very much like my body is not really ever truly mine… it’s just impossible to navigate because, like, no matter how much weight I gain or I lose or, like, anything, like, I’m always gonna feel shit about my body… I’m never going to feel okay in my body. [Kim]

Kim’s ambivalent feminist attitudes, underscored by her desire to appear feminine and sexually desirable, complicated her relationship with her body. She knew she was “supposed to feel empowered,” but although she was aware of these external forces, she was unable to embody feminism in the ways that she desired.

Yet, as participants’ relationship with feminism clarified, so too did their relationships with their bodies. For example, X expressed:

Since engaging with feminism … I’ve discovered to kind of like love my body, which is, like, really nice because I’ve put my body through like a tremendous amount through the years because I think that, like, I was angry, and I didn’t understand… I’ve dealt with my fair share of self-harm and eating disorders because, like, I felt like I needed to kind of look a certain way… there’s this really great rhetoric that feminism comes along with
that, like, everybody should love their bodies no matter how they look. I’ve started to grow out my body hair. I have, like, armpit hair and I’ve started to go to the gym and really build muscle because that’s what I want to look like, and that’s what makes me happy. [X]

The consequences for body image also pertained to gendered appearance management practices more broadly, such as wearing makeup and shaving. Alexandra explained, “I don’t need to shave my legs, and I am fully aware that that expectation is sexist and rooted in patriarchal standards, and I am very aware of that, but I still shave my legs regularly.” Despite the fact that Alexandra was conscious of the roots of these practices, she still felt compelled to do them. The same was true of makeup use, as evidenced in the following quote by Ginger:

If I feel like I’m having a day when I really need, like, an extra boost, like I’m not feeling well or I really need a psychological pick me up, I will wear a lot more makeup because I feel like it’s sort of like my armor. [Ginger]

For Marie, gendered appearance management was rooted in racialized, gendered expectations for appearance, yet she queried the roots of this cultural imperative:

In the Black community, there’s a lot of pressure to like upkeep your hair. And like your hair is like your - your crown. Like, you’re proud of it, you know? We spend a lot of money on getting our hair done and like maintaining it… I think that speaks to, like, how much pride Black women take in their hair, but I think that also the root of that is the pressure of like to look feminine or like attractive. [Marie]

The same pattern of results seemed to emerge in terms of negotiated sexual agency. When participants felt conflicted about their relation to feminism, they also seemed to endorse lower levels of sexual agency. For example, Kim acknowledged the difficulty in trying to negotiate being a sexual object and a sexual subject, and wrestled between her feminist and anti-feminist attitudes:
You’re allowed to want sex, but you’re also not supposed to be desperate for a man... So, trying to navigate that – being and – and enjoying being a sexual person but not, like, objectifying myself or not being, like, the desperate bitch, you know? [Kim]

150 felt much the same way, noting that she enjoyed “dressing up,” “going out,” and engaging in self-sexualizing behaviours. She found it difficult to disentangle her own autonomy from her desire to be the object of the male gaze, noting that she sometimes found herself “dressing a certain way to attract male attention.”

Others, such as Zipporah, noted that, though they had previously experienced mitigated sexual agency, their relationship with feminism had allowed them to become more sexually empowered over time:

I certainly have become more educated about my own body, more assertive in, you know, finding what makes me feel good, less embarrassed when I’m talking about it with my friends and exploring new things. So, I think that my relationship with my body would be very different if I hadn’t become more engaged with feminism. [Zipporah]

Overall, ambivalent feminist attitudes seemed to be associated with inability to translate social attitudes into personal behaviours in the realms of body image, gendered appearance management strategies, and sexual agency.

3.3.2.2 Ambivalent Feminism and Feminist Activism

While each of the participants in the sample identified as a feminist when asked explicitly, for many, their feminist self-labelling was conditional. Some qualified their statements immediately, such as Melody, who explained that she preferred the term “humanist,” rather than feminist, and Alice, who agreed she was a feminist, but preferred the term “libertarian.” Mrinalini explained that there were “definitely safe spaces for calling yourself a feminist,” and she avoided the label around people if she was uncertain if the term would be well-received. Laura put it simply when she said, “I would say ‘I’m a feminist’ when I think about my actions, but I don’t go around telling people I’m a feminist.” In fact, many noted that there were situations in which they would be hesitant
to call themselves feminists (especially when they feared backlash). For example, Alicia explained that even within her long-term romantic relationships, her feminism sometimes came second.

I am not proud of it, but there have been times in my life where I have been dating men … and I have denied that I was a feminist. Or not denied it but never brought it up. But those were shameful moments for me. [Alicia]

When participants held ambivalent attitudes about feminism, or in situations where they did not feel that feminists would be welcomed, they put their feminism “on and off like a coat” [Alexandra].

When they were afraid of being stereotyped or experiencing backlash, or when their feminist self-concept was not strong, several participants were passive and silent in the face of sexist treatment, a phenomenon I call feminist bystanding. Sometimes, this occurred in the context of interpersonal relationships. Christina, for example, explained:

There are times when I think I could stand up, but I don’t…. my ex and his family were very almost old fashioned and, like, super nice but super traditional. They would just make sometimes, like, these comments, and I would just let them go because I thought, “Oh, it’s not worth it.” [Christina]

Other times, feminist bystanding occurred around friends and relatives. Melody, for example, explained, “In high school, I was in a group of people who used to laugh, making a joke of ‘Woman, make me a sandwich’ and I used to, like, you know… I wouldn’t say anything.” Even when sexism was being perpetuated at them, ambivalent feminism rendered many of the participants speechless, and they engaged in self-silencing so as not to disrupt the status quo.

Yet, as their feminist self-concept strengthened, and when they were in situations where they felt safe and supported to express their feminist attitudes, some participants felt a duty to intervene. This was especially true for X, whose intersectional feminist attitudes compelled them to speak up, and their strong feminist self-concept empowered them to use their voice:
It’s often difficult – sometimes it gets tiring, but I still engage with it. I still will not back down because I know that there are people who don’t necessarily have the voice to speak up… Black, queer folks, or Indigenous folks… I visualize like a kind of suit of armor on myself, and in that sense, I’m shielding myself from things I know they’re gonna throw at me, and that’s what I use to go into battle with them. I build armor around myself to have these tough conversations, and really researching and engaging with folks about how they engage and how they have these difficult conversations has been a really good tool for me to go into essentially battle with people who have these really dangerous beliefs. [X]

Ambivalent feminism also seemed to serve as a barrier to collective action. Relatively few of those sampled were actively engaged in feminist activism, and most held mixed feelings about participating in collective action. For example, Laura explained that she had never attended any feminist protest events around her because she maintained mixed feelings about them, explaining, “I haven’t participated in the [Women’s] March, but just like reading about it, it seems like a lot of like... yelling about pussy power.” Laura’s reliance on negative stereotypes about feminists seemed to be a tool to justify her inaction in the feminist movement. Many expressed that they were too busy to participate due to school, work, and family responsibilities, or they feared that they would be subjected to negative stereotypes for participating in activism. Mixed feelings about feminism, regardless of feminist self-identification, appeared to serve as a barrier to full participation in feminist collective action to challenge the gender status quo.

Those in the sample were much more apt to (try to) engage in various acts of everyday feminism. We use the term everyday feminism to refer to low-risk interpersonal experiences that counter sexist cultural trends and promote gender egalitarianism.

Examples of everyday feminism include posting feminist articles on social media [Adriana, Veronica, Nicky J. Kent], talking to children about gender diversity [M, Ruth, Nicky J. Kent], creating feminist zines [Penny], and becoming involved with feminist communities [Veronica, Kayla]. Yet, participants’ everyday feminism was often fraught with complexities and complications. For example, Veronica only posted feminist articles on social media platforms where she did not fear backlash, a strategy criticized by Phoebe as “yelling into feminist echo chambers.” Similarly, M was trying to raise her two
sons in a feminist manner, but struggled to fully incorporate feminism into her child-rearing:

I want my son to be able to wear a skirt if he wanted to, right? I’m pro-everything. But at the same time, I don’t take him shopping in the girls’ section… I want my kids’ life to be easy. I don’t necessarily want to encourage feminine behaviours, and then… what the fuck did I just say?! [M]

Despite her feminist intentions, M’s ambivalence made it challenging for her to fully enact her feminist attitudes. In sum, ambivalent feminist attitudes may act as a barrier to political involvement in feminism, be it through conditional self-labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, or everyday feminism.

3.4 Discussion

Overall, this research highlights a novel conceptual framework for understanding modern feminist attitudes: *ambivalent feminism*. Through grounded theory analysis of interviews with 26 nonbinary people and women, six unique domains were identified that contributed to feelings of ambivalence around feminism, even among those who self-identified as feminists: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment of femininity, identity incongruence, evasion of stereotypes, and fear of backlash. Endorsing these tensions was linked to negative personal outcomes, such as dysfunctional body image attitudes, negotiated sexual agency, and gendered appearance management strategies, as well as political outcomes, including conditional feminist labelling, feminist bystanding, collective (in)action, and everyday feminism. As suggested by their feminist self-labelling, each of the participants supported the basic tenets of feminism and agreed with feminist ideologies. Yet, there were various tensions and sites of ambivalence surrounding their feminist attitudes and behaviours, which depict a more nuanced understanding of modern feminist attitudes, and some of the personal and political implications of this ambivalence.

It is worth noting that there were a few participants who expressed less ambivalence and seemed more comfortable and confident with their bodies, and they engaged in more
political activism. These participants described previous periods of time where they had felt ambivalent about feminism, but they had worked through the tensions and were now more fully committed to putting their feminist attitudes into action, both personally and politically. In this way, it is possible that ambivalent feminism may represent a liminal phase of modern feminist identity development, in the space between passive acceptance and active commitment to feminism that is anchored to prescriptive and proscriptive gender role norms and expectations (Riley & Scharff, 2012). Given that these data were collected at a single timepoint, we hesitate to delineate a stepwise model merely on the basis of these data alone. However, future research should explore ways that feminists resolve these tensions over the course of their feminist identity development.

3.5 Conclusion

Over the past few years, feminism has resurfaced in the media and western cultural consciousness. Yet, despite feminism’s recent popularity, progress toward gender equality remains stalled, and in some cases, is being actively reversed. Ambivalent feminism represents a conglomeration of interrelated attitudes held by self-identified feminist women and nonbinary people, which complicate and potentially weaken adherence to feminist principles and feminist collective action. Given that the most effective way to bring about social change is activism by ingroup members on their own behalf, ambivalence around being feminist and embracing feminism may serve as an additional barrier to gender equality. This research provides a new conceptual framework for identifying and understanding critical sites of ambivalent feminism, which can be specifically targeted for intervention and resolution. These domains of ambivalence also form the framework for the development of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), which is outlined in Chapters 4-6.
Chapter 4

4 Study 3: Initial Development and Validation of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS)

The goal of the next set of studies was to develop and validate a novel, multidimensional measure of feminist social identity that accounted for diverse components of modern feminist social identity, the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Theorizing for the scale was grounded in Ashmore et al.’s (2004) model of multidimensional collective identity, as well as the qualitative results from Study 2. Ashmore et al. (2004) have suggested that measures of social identity should capture various elements of collective identity, such as self-categorization, public and private evaluation, and social embeddedness of the identity (Ashmore et al., 2004, p. 83). However, measures of social identity should be specifically tailored to capture the important elements of that particular identity. When considering possible relevant dimensions of feminist social identity, I consulted other multidimensional evaluations of stigmatized social identity, such as the Lesbian and Gay Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger, 2000), the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity Scale (Mohr & Kendra, 2011), and the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (Sellers et al., 1997). I also reviewed the literature on predictors of feminist collective action to consider which specific identity dimensions may be uniquely important for understanding how and why people engage with feminist activism.

The first four dimensions I designed related to the basics of social identity, and some were designed to mirror the subscales of other multidimensional assessments of social identity. The first dimension I proposed was Beliefs. Given the various branches of feminist thought and different positions on several political topics espoused by individuals who hold different feminist beliefs (Henley et al., 1998; Liss et al., 2000), I deliberately did not generate items that evaluated support for specific feminist principles. Rather, I wrote ten items relevant to a perception that one holds the same beliefs as feminists (e.g., “If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points made”). People should feel more connected with a social group when they believe that
they hold similar values to those within the group; the specific content of those beliefs is somewhat less relevant. The second theorized dimension was Competence. The Competence dimension was designed around the results of Study 2, as well as Conlin et al.’s (2019) study, which found that women who perceived themselves to be less knowledgeable about feminism were less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in feminist activism. Therefore, ten items were designed to evaluate a sense that one has the competence and capacity to engage in feminist behaviours (e.g., “I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people”). The third dimension I designed was Centrality, designed to assess the extent to which a feminist identity is a salient and personally meaningful component of their identity (e.g., “When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind”). Despite the fact that women report fluctuating identification and closeness with feminism across situations and over time (Chapter 2, this dissertation; see also Crossley, 2010), to date, no scale has specifically assessed this unique dimension of feminist identity. The fourth dimension, Politicized, was specifically designed to evaluate the extent to which people’s feminist social identities also maintained an activist dimension (e.g., “I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender diverse people”). These items tapped into behavioural willingness and perceived importance of politics in the feminist movement.

Following the development of the first set of items, I then focused on generating items that related to how people feel about their feminist identity, given that sense of belonging and emotional connection to a group can positively influence social identity (Ashmore et al., 2004). These three dimensions specifically evaluate the extent to which people feel connected to other feminists, proud of their identities, and how well feminism “fits” into their lives. The Acceptance dimension was generated based on the sense of exclusion some participants reported in Study 2, and tapped into how connected people felt to other feminists. Example items included “I enjoy being around feminists” and “I prefer to spend my time with feminists.” The Affirmation dimension refers to a sense of pride associated with being feminist (e.g., “If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it a compliment”). This cluster of items was specifically designed for the FSIS because of the potent stigma attributed to feminists; rather than try to evaluate the extent to which people felt stigmatized, I opted for a positive approach consistent with the Affirmation
and Belonging subscale of the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992) and the Private Self-Esteem subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Finally, the Identity Congruence dimension evaluated how well people’s feminist identities blended with other important components of their identity, or if people felt as though competing parts of their identities made being a feminist more challenging for them (e.g., “Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully engage with feminism”).

The next set of dimensions were largely drawn from the results of Chapter 2 and were designed to evaluate the different forms of ambivalence that feminists may have about their identities. Notably, the Uncertainty dimension was designed to capture doubt or waffling regarding feminist identification, beliefs, and principles (e.g., “In some ways I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”). This dimension is consistent with the Identity Confusion subscale of the Gay and Lesbian Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger, 2000), which contains items such as (“I’m not totally sure that I’m a lesbian/gay”). The Individualized subscale was designed to evaluate a sense of postfeminist identity, comprising items that tapped into individual empowerment (e.g., “To me, being a feminist means being confident and empowered”) and a disregard for the uncomfortable or less socially acceptable components of the movement (“When I encounter feminist arguments that are not consistent with my worldview, I disregard them”). Because a postfeminist identity contains many complexities and contradictions (see Riley et al., 2017), these items were designed to be quite broad.

4.1 Expert Review

An initial battery of 95 items was constructed for the FSIS. Items were initially reviewed by a panel of six experts in the fields of body image, feminist identity, and feminist research more broadly. The experts rated the items in terms of grammatical clarity, coherence, and relevance to the construct it was intended to evaluate. Items could be rated from “very low” to “very high” on each criterion. For each individual item, experts could also provide any additional feedback through open-ended responses. The initial items were quite broad and more specifically focused on the results from Study 2, rather
than the collective identity framework proposed by Ashmore and colleagues (2004), and the experts generally commented that the items were difficult to interpret, given that some were double barreled or overly-complex. Given that I intended to greatly reduce the length of the scale, I removed all items that did not score “very high” on any dimension by two or more evaluators, and I made additional changes and revisions in response to the evaluator’s comments, some of which suggested a clearer focus. Items were revised to more closely reflect the collective identity framework, with the results of Study 2 more closely guiding the identification of critical dimensions. After several items were revised or rewritten, 90 items remained and were included in the Q-sort task.

4.2 Q-Sort Task

A Q-sort task was completed by seven members of the Stigma, Objectification, Bodies, and Resistance lab. Q-sort tasks are useful during the preliminary stages of scale development to help assess construct validity, maximize distinctiveness between categories, and improve internal consistency of scale items (Nahm et al., 2002). For the purposes of this task, an email was sent to all members of the Stigma, Objectification, Bodies, and Resistance lab at Western University (https://calogerolab.wordpress.com), which redirected them to a Qualtrics survey, which housed the full set of 90 items from each of the initial nine subscales (i.e., Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Politicized, Personal, Uncertainty, Centrality, Affirmation, Acceptance, Competence). Participants initially read a description of each of the nine categories, and these definitions were available for participants to refer to throughout the task. They then read the items and were asked to sort them based on which of the nine categories they felt was most appropriate for that particular statement. Participants also had the option to place the item into the “unclear” category if they could not determine where the item fit.

Results for the Q-Sort are presented in Table 7. Some of the dimensions stood out as clear and distinct, with high agreement across raters. Notably, items in the Competence and Uncertainty subscales were clearly identifiable. Other scales, however, were less distinct. For example, items on the Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Individualized, and Affirmation subscales were frequently miscategorized. Given the items meant to
comprise these dimensions were not clearly distinguishing between these dimensions, I collapsed and revised the items comprising these dimensions to produce a Prototypicality subscale. Prototypicality refers to the degree to which an individual feels they are representative of the social group (Hogg, 2001) and includes the concepts of perceived congruence and similarity with the group. This category was designed to capture a core aspect of Social Identity Theory, but it also captures a concept that would likely be negatively related to Individualized (i.e., a person who feels they are prototypical of the group sees their identity as similar to that of the group) and less ambiguous than the Identity Congruence subscale. Given that I felt this condensing resulted in a loss of richness, and that in the initial iteration of the scale (the version that had been sent to expert reviewers), I had included a Disavowal of Stigma dimension, I also incorporated a Fear of Stigma dimension into the initial exploratory factor analysis. In the initial Disavowal of Stigma subscale, I had encountered difficulty when attempting to create questions that were not double barreled. Therefore, I decided to reverse the directionality of the items and include statements that captured apprehension regarding disclosing one’s feminist identity to others. The next step was to subject the items to an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to determine the factor structure. The final set of 90 items included in the EFA are presented in Appendix B.

Table 7. Results of Q-Sort Task for Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The problems facing feminists are similar to my own.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a number of qualities typical of feminists.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have blended my identity as a feminist with other important parts of my life.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The personality traits of feminists are much like my own.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully engage with feminism. (Reverse scored)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminists and I have a lot in common.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am subjected to the same treatment as feminists.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have woven my identity as a feminist into my personal identity.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What happens to feminists will affect what happens to me.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things that are true of feminists are also true of me.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points made.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I believe the same things that feminists do.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not agree with most feminists. (Reverse scored)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I stand for the same things that feminists stand for.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes feminists hold.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see eye to eye on many things.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I see the world the same way that feminists do.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am glad that I am a feminist.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I take pride in my feminist identity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would be offended if someone thought I was a feminist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reverse scored)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would not bother me if someone thought I was like a feminist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it a compliment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like being a feminist.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would be annoyed if someone called me a feminist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am proud to be a feminist.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel good about my feminist identity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I see activism as a necessary part of feminism.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think it is possible to be a feminist without being an activist.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reverse scored)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I see myself as a feminist activist.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women and gender minorities are treated unfairly.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When it comes to feminism, I am very political.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocating for feminist principles is important to me.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to me that feminism is political.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am willing to advocate for feminist issues.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I hear about feminist activism, I want to be involved.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender diverse people.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a feminist is not particularly central to who I am.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Reverse scored)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a feminist is a central part of my identity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am who I am today because I am a feminist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a feminist is an important part of my identity.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a feminist is more important to me than many other parts of my identity (e.g., age, ethnicity).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know that I am a feminist.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cannot imagine what my life would be like if I were not a feminist.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My identity as a feminist is one of the impost important things about me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have the skills necessary to be an effective feminist.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people.</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism.</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to me for answers.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are important to me.</td>
<td>1 1 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice.</td>
<td>6 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can speak competently about many feminist topics.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me, being a feminist means doing what you want when you want.</td>
<td>4 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When it comes to feminism, I don’t usually step out of my comfort zone.</td>
<td>1 3 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I encounter feminist arguments that are not consistent with my worldview, I disregard them.</td>
<td>1 1 1 2 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me, being a feminist means being confident and empowered.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me, feminism is more of a personal attitude than a political agenda.</td>
<td>1 1 2 1 1 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I mainly concern myself with feminist issues that are relevant to my own life.</td>
<td>1 2 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m not trying to change the world with my kind of feminism.</td>
<td>1 2 3 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To me, being a feminist means finding ways to empower yourself.</td>
<td>5 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself a feminist because I do things that make me feel empowered.</td>
<td>6 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I pick and choose the parts of feminism that work for me.</td>
<td>1 5 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In some ways I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not.</td>
<td>6 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel like I am a bad feminist. (Reverse scored)</td>
<td>6 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I’m not sure how I would respond.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times, I do not.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are situations and circumstances when I would not call myself a feminist.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not sure whether or not I can call myself a feminist.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes, I think I am a feminist, but other times, I do not.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When someone tells me they are a feminist, I immediately like them.</td>
<td>1 2 1 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy being around feminists.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I prefer to spend my time with feminists.</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I enjoy meeting people who are feminists.</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I learned someone was a feminist, I would want to spend time with that person.</td>
<td>2 2 2 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel accepted by feminists.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel embraced by feminists.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of feminists.</td>
<td>1 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis and Initial Examination of Convergent Validity

4.3.1 Method

4.3.1.1 Participants

In total, 350 MTurk workers completed the survey. However, after removing participants for failed attention checks, or indicating that they did not meet inclusion criteria when asked a second time at the end of the survey, the final sample consisted of 267 participants ($M_{age} = 31.61; SD = 4.98$). Recommendations for an adequate sample size for EFA is to include approximately 200 – 250 participants (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012; MacCallum et al., 1999). A majority of participants identified as female (97.0%; $n = 259$), with a few identifying as transgender female (1.1%; $n = 3$), nonbinary (1.1%; $n = 3$), two-spirit (0.4%; $n = 1$), and gender fluid (0.4%; $n = 1$). They identified primarily as White (69.0%; $n = 185$), African American (12.3%; $n = 33$), Asian/Asian American (7.7%; $n = 21$), and Latin American (6.3%; $n = 18$), with some identifying as multiracial (3.4%, $n = 9$), Native American (0.7%, $n = 2$). One participant (0.4%) responded “prefer not to disclose.”

Most participants were married (34%, $n = 91$) or single (32.5%; $n = 87$), followed by involved in long-term relationships/partnered (24.3%, $n = 67$), with fewer being engaged (3.7%, $n = 10$), or divorced/ separated (4.1%, $n = 11$). Most participants were heterosexual (78.3%, $n = 209$), and some were bisexual (12.4%, $n = 33$), lesbian/gay (4.1%; $n = 11$), asexual (2.6%, $n = 7$), pansexual (2.2%, $n = 6$), and one preferred not to disclose (0.4%). Most had attained a Bachelor’s degree (45.3%, $n = 121$), with others having completed some college (31.8%, $n = 85$), graduate school (10.9%, $n = 29$), some graduate school (3.7%; $n = 10$), a high school degree (7.1%; $n = 19$), or less than a high
school degree (0.7%; $n = 2$). One participant did not respond to this question. When asked directly, 60.3% ($n = 161$) of participants categorized themselves as a “feminist,” 21.3% ($n = 49$) identified as “not a feminist,” and 18.4% ($n = 49$) were “unsure” whether or not they were a feminist.

4.3.1.2 Measures

4.3.1.2.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale

The initial version of the FSIS contained ninety items related to nine distinct dimensions of feminist social identity: Beliefs (10 items; e.g., “I stand for the same things feminists stand for”), Affirmation (10 items; e.g., “Being a feminist makes me happy”), Fear of Stigma (10 items; e.g., “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist”), Activism (10 items; e.g., “I see activism as a necessary part of feminism”), Prototypicality (e.g., “When people think about feminists, they probably think about someone like me”), Competence (10 items; e.g., “If someone asked me about feminism I would feel prepared to talk about it”), Centrality (10 items; e.g., “My feminist identity is at the core of who I am”), Acceptance (10 items; e.g., I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists”), and Uncertainty (10 items; e.g., “I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist”). Items were rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6).

4.3.1.2.2 Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale

The Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale (IFAS; Szymanski, 2004) is a 17-item scale that assesses participation in various activist behaviours associated with feminism (e.g., “I am a member of one or more feminist/women’s organizations and/or groups”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at very untrue of me (1) to very true of me (7). Higher scores reflect more involvement in feminist activities. In the original sample, IFAS demonstrated high internal consistency reliability ($\alpha = .94$) and converged positively with measures of feminist self-identification, feminist attitudes, and feminist identity development (Szymanski, 2004). In this sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .97.
4.3.1.2.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale

Liberal feminist attitudes were assessed using the short form of the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996). The LFAIS is an 11-item measure of general attitudes toward liberal feminist stances (e.g., “Men should respect women more than they currently do”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale of from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Higher scores indicate more support for liberal feminist principles. In the original sample, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .81 to .84 for the 11-item scale (Morgan, 1996). Morgan (1996) however, cautions against the use of one item (“America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment”), so this item was omitted in this study. In this sample, alpha was .87.

4.3.1.2.4 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale

The Self-Identification as a Feminist scale (SIF; Szymanski, 2004) is a four-item measure that assesses the extent to which one identifies with feminist principles and uses the label. Example items include “I consider myself a feminist” and “I identify myself as a feminist to other people.” Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). Higher scores reflect more open feminist self-labelling. In the original sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .93 (Szymanski, 2004). In this sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .93. For the purposes of this study, I was interested in both public (“I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private (“I consider myself a feminist”) feminist identification.

4.3.1.2.5 Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16 (BIDR-16; Hart et al., 2015) is a brief survey designed to capture the likelihood of socially desirable responding. It consists of two subscales: impression management (e.g., “There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone” [reverse-scored]) and self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). Items are rated on an 8-point Likert-style scale anchored at totally disagree (1) and totally agree (8). After reverse
scoring, higher scores indicate more desirable responding. In this sample, Cronbach’s alpha = .87.

4.3.2 Procedure

A recruitment advertisement was posted to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), inviting participants to complete a study titled, “Women and Gender Diverse People’s Social Attitudes.” When compared with data gathered from college student samples, data gathered from MTurk have been shown to be more diverse and nationally representative, but just as psychometrically sound (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Only MTurk workers who a) were located in the United States, b) had completed ≥ 10,000 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs), and c) had a HIT acceptance rate ≥ 95% were able to view the task. It was explicitly stated in both the short and long form of the HIT description that, in order to be eligible to participate, individuals must be between the ages of 18 and 40 and identify as female or gender diverse. Three attention checks were embedded within the 90-item FSIS, as well as a reCAPTCHA verification.

Interested MTurk workers followed a link to the survey hosted on Qualtrics. Upon opening the survey, participants first responded to a screening questionnaire to determine eligibility. If they responded that they were any age below 18 or over 40, and/or if they responded that their gender was “male” or “transgender male,” they were directed out of the survey. Participants then read the letter of information and consented to participate. They responded to the 90-item FSIS, followed by a series of counterbalanced surveys, and a demographics questionnaire. An online version of the debriefing form appeared on the screen, and they received a unique 3-4 digit code to be inserted back into MTurk for compensation. Participants were awarded $0.90 within three days after completion.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses

Using SPSS Version 24.0, I first ran a missing data analysis using Little’s MCar test, which suggested that the values were missing completely at random, $X^2 (318) = 329.56, p$
=.32. The percentage of missing values was very low (0.19%), so I did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).

4.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis

I began by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with all 90 items using JASP 0.11.1 The results of the EFA are presented in Table 8. Anticipating correlated factors, I used a direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation. The number of factors was determined by screening the eigenvalues for values greater than 1, as well as the scree plot (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Items were retained if they loaded higher than .4 onto any one particular factor and did not have a cross-loading higher than .3.

I first obtained an estimate for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = .965) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, \(x^2(4005) = 28088.58, p < .001\). A KMO value close to 1 indicates that the data is likely multifactorial (Sharma, 1996), and a significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity is required for factor analysis (Tobias & Carlson, 2010; see also Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, the data was suitable for factor analysis.

The scree plot (See Figure 2) revealed a rapid “dip,” with two factors clearly observable, and three additional factors located along the “elbow” of the plot. Using eigenvalues greater than 1, a 5-factor solution was extracted. I retained an item if it had a factor loading of at least .50 on a primary factor and cross-loading(s) less than .30 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The first factor subsumed the Acceptance, Beliefs, and Political items, with the highest factor loadings for the Beliefs items and accounted for 48.60% of the total variance. The second factor comprised the Centrality items, and most of the Prototypical items. This factor accounted for 10.21% of the total variance. The Politicized items were split between the first two factors. The third factor was made up exclusively of the Fear of Stigma items (4.20% of variance), the fourth comprised exclusively the Competence items (2.73% of variance), and the fifth was exclusively the Uncertainty items (2.72% of variance).
Figure 2. Scree Plot for Study 3 Data

Note. Dashed line represents an eigenvalue of 1.
Table 8. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 90-item FSIS for Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Centrality</th>
<th>Stigma</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance10</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance2</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance3</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance4r</td>
<td>-0.755</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance5</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance6</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance7</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance8</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance9</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation1</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation10</td>
<td>-0.620</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation2</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation3</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation4</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation7</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation8</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation9</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs1</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs10</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs2</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs3</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs4</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs5</td>
<td>0.786</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs6</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs7</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs8r</td>
<td>-0.736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs9</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.712</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality3R</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality8</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.807</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.817</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.818</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.543</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>Stigma</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>Uniqueness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence8</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics10</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics3</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics8</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical1</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical10</td>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical2</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical3</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.721</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.595</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical8</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.602</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prototypical9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma10</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.757</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma3</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.730</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma8</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty1</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty10</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty3</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty8</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Applied rotation method is oblimin.
I aimed to create a practical, multidimensional tool that could be quickly administered and incorporated in quantitative psychological research on feminist identity. Particularly given that a limitation of past measures of feminist identity is their length (e.g., the Feminist Perspectives Scale contains 78 items, the Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale contains 60 items), creating a brief, psychometrically-sound measure was an important goal of this research. As such, I intended to retain no more than five items per subscale.

Given that Factors 1 and 2 were not as clearly defined as Factors 3-5, I examined which items seemed to constitute the core of these factors. By looking at the factor loadings for Factors 1 and 2, I detected that the highest factor loadings on Factor 1 were from the Beliefs subscale (with one single exception, “I feel like feminists are always judging me,” from the Acceptance subscale). Given that the beliefs items loaded very highly onto this subscale (loadings ranged from .66 to .88), I decided to extract the five items from the Beliefs subscale with the highest factor loadings (loadings ranged from .74 to .88). Two items shared similar loadings on this factor (loadings = -.74 and .74); however, given that reverse-scored items are sometimes misinterpreted by participants (see Rodebaugh et al., 2007; van Sonderen et al., 2013), I elected to retain only the positively-keyed item. While some have argued that reverse scoring is critical for ensuring that participants are responding honestly to the scale items, others have suggested that interpreting scores on reverse scored items is particularly challenging because one will never know if the score reflects a genuine response or a misinterpretation of the item (see Spector et al., 1997). For Factor 2, although some items from the Politicized and Prototypical scales also loaded onto this factor, the five highest loadings came exclusively from the Centrality subscale, and the five items with the highest factor loadings were retained, ranging from .81 to .85 on this dimension.

The items retained comprised three dimensions that reflected alignment with a feminist identity (Beliefs, Centrality, Competence) and two dimensions that reflected ambivalence toward a feminist identity (Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). Together, these dimensions
allow for the simultaneous evaluation of alignment and ambivalence inherent in modern feminist social identities.

I ran a second EFA with the 25 items that had the highest factor loadings on their respective factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .913 and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (300) = 5714.78, p < .001$. All items loaded onto their respective factors ($ps < .001$) with no cross-loadings above .30. Factor loadings ranged from .61 (Uncertainty7) to .90 (Beliefs7). The uniqueness values refer to the amount of variance attributable to that item that is not shared with other variables. The higher the uniqueness value, the less relevant the item is to the factor model. As can be seen in Table 8, uniqueness values ranged from .136 (Beliefs7) to .511 (Uncertainty7).

Factor 1 (Centrality) accounted for 36.33% of the total variance. Factor 2 (Fear of Stigma) accounted for 18.23% of the total variance. Factor 3 (Beliefs) accounted for 6.09% of the total variance. Factor 4 (Competence) accounted for 5.57% of the total variance. Factor 5 (Uncertainty) accounted for 5.09% of the total variance. Together, this solution explained 71.30% of the variance in the factor structure. See Table 9 for the factor loadings for the 25 items from the EFA.

**Table 9. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 25 Key FSIS Items for Study 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality</th>
<th>Beliefs</th>
<th>Competence</th>
<th>Stigma</th>
<th>Uncertainty</th>
<th>Uniqueness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs3</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs5</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs6</td>
<td>0.856</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs7</td>
<td>0.901</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs9</td>
<td>0.708</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality2</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality5</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality7</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality8</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality9</td>
<td>0.831</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence2</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence3</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence4</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence6</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence7</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>0.352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis

I subjected these 25 items to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to support the factor structure of the FSIS, with the intention of conducting a second confirmatory factor analysis in a new sample. This analysis was conducted not to confirm the factor structure but rather to determine whether the fit of the previously specified EFA model would be regarded as an adequate fit to the data if all cross-loadings were set at zero (see Showshoe et al., 2014). I tested a five-factor model, anticipating highly correlated factors. To determine adequacy of the fit, I examined a combination of indices to determine whether consensus could be achieved from these values. Specifically, I examined the comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and standardized root-mean square residual (SRMR). Hu and Bentler (1999) have suggested that values around .95 for CFI, .08 for SRMR, and .06 for RMSEA can be interpreted as an acceptable fit. According to these values, the model was a generally good fit to the data, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08), SRMR = .051, $\hat{\chi}^2(265) = 622.324, p < .001$. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor ($p < .001$), and none of the confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor covariances between the subscales ranged from -.20 (Stigma with Beliefs) to .70 (Centrality with Beliefs), suggesting that each factor captured a distinct component of feminist identity. See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of the confirmatory factor analysis with standardized loadings and variances for each observed variable and standardized covariances between factors.
Figure 3. Visual Representation of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 25-item FSIS for Study 3
I examined the modification indices to explore the possibility of significant cross-loadings or correlated residuals. The modification indices suggested that allowing the item Beliefs9 (“I see the world the same way feminists do”) to cross-load onto the Centrality subscale would improve the model fit. I explored this option and found that the model fit did improve significantly, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08), SRMR = .051, $X^2(264) = 596.65$, $p < .001$. The critical value was 3.84, suggesting that this model was a better fit to the data compared to the original. Yet, the item still loaded onto its original factor much more highly than onto the centrality factor, therefore the cross-loading was removed for parsimony. In addition, the modification indices for residual covariances suggested to allow for correlated residuals between Uncertainty10 (“In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”) and Uncertainty7 (“Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not”). Given the conceptual similarity between Uncertainty10 and Uncertainty7, the high degree of shared variance further supports the removal of item Uncertainty7. Because this model was still in the exploratory phase, however, I retained this item, with the intention of exploring its fit in a second confirmatory factor analysis in a second sample.

4.4.4 Means and Standard Deviations

I examined the means and standard deviations of the FSIS subscales, as well as their internal consistencies and skewness and kurtosis values. Participants responded to the FSIS items on a six-point Likert-style scale anchored at one and six, so the midpoint would be 3.50. On average, participants scored above the midpoint on the Beliefs ($M = 4.08$) and Competence subscales ($M = 4.16$), and below the midpoint for Centrality ($M = 3.05$), Fear of Stigma ($M = 2.82$), and Uncertainty ($M = 2.72$). This pattern suggests that the sample was largely feminist-oriented, which is consistent with the high mean scores on measures of feminist beliefs and identification. Standard deviations ranged from 1.29 (Uncertainty) to 1.58 (Centrality), and Cronbach’s alpha scores ranged from .87 (Uncertainty) to .96 (Centrality). Cronbach’s alpha scores above .70 are generally regarded as evidence of a measure’s internal consistency, so these findings support the subscales’ internal consistency reliability. Byrne (2010) has suggested that data should be
considered skewed if its skewness values are less than -2 or greater than 2, or if kurtosis values are less than -7 or greater than 7. Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed these values, suggesting that all subscales were normally distributed.

4.4.5 Convergent and Discriminant Validity

To explore initial convergent validity for the FSIS, I analyzed the bivariate correlations between the FSIS subscales and measures of feminist identity, attitudes, and behaviours, as well as socially desirable responding. See Table 10 for means, standard deviations, alphas, and bivariate correlations between subscales and key variables of interest.

Table 10. Zero-order correlations between FSIS subscales and related constructs for Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Centrality</td>
<td>.67***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Stigma</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Competence</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Uncertainty</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>-.27***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Identification (private)</td>
<td>.82***</td>
<td>.73***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>-.13*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Identification (public)</td>
<td>.73***</td>
<td>.77***</td>
<td>-.15*</td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
<td>.85**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. LFAIS</td>
<td>.59***</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.41***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Activities</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.76***</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.52***</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.60**</td>
<td>.67***</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. BIDR-16</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.34***</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.28***</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alpha  | .94 | .96 | .89 | .93 | .87 | -     | -     | .87 | .97 | .87 |
Mean    | 4.08 | 3.05 | 2.82 | 4.16 | 2.72 | 3.48 | 3.19 | 4.76 | 2.99 | 4.93 |
SD      | 1.35 | 1.58 | 1.40 | 1.39 | 1.29 | 1.42 | 1.48 | 0.94 | 1.67 | 1.24 |

Note. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). *** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). LFAIS = Liberal Feminist Attitudes and Ideologies Scale. BIDR-16 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding.

As expected, many of the FSIS subscales demonstrate significant correlations with one another. Specifically, the Centrality, Competence, and Beliefs subscales were significantly and positively intercorrelated. Fear of Stigma was significantly and positively associated with Uncertainty \((r = .51, p < .001)\), but unrelated to Beliefs and Centrality \((ps > .05)\). Uncertainty was unrelated to Beliefs, but significantly and negatively linked to Centrality \((r = .67, p < .001)\) and Competence \(r = -.27, p < .001)\).
For feminist self-identification, private feminist identification was positively related to the positive identity dimensions (i.e., Competence, Beliefs, and Centrality; $ps < .001$), but negatively associated with Uncertainty ($r = -.13, p = .01$). Fear of Stigma was unrelated to private feminist identification ($r = -.01, p = .89$). Public feminist identification was positively associated with the positive identity dimensions ($ps < .001$), but negatively correlated with the negative dimensions (Uncertainty, $r = -.14, p < .001$; Fear of Stigma, $r = -.15, p = .01$). Involvement in feminist activities was positively associated with the positive identity dimensions Centrality ($ps < .001$), but unrelated to Fear of Stigma ($r = .037, p = .55$) and Uncertainty ($r = -.01, p = .68$). Liberal feminist beliefs were positively associated with the positive identity dimensions ($ps < .01$) and negatively related to Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty ($ps < .01$). These results support the tool’s convergent validity.

As evidence of discriminant validity, Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality were unrelated to socially desirable responding ($ps > .05$). Stigma and Uncertainty were negatively associated with socially desirable responding ($r = -.34, p < .001$; $r = -.28, p < .001$, respectively), potentially suggesting that these subscales are associated with a more honest response style. These findings provide support for the tool’s discriminant validity.

### 4.5 Discussion

As acclaimed feminist writer Jessica Valenti (2014) once wrote, “When everyone is a feminist, is anyone?” Indeed, with more people identifying as feminists than ever before, dated understandings and operationalizations of feminist identity are inadequate for understanding the complexity of people’s feminist social identities in the present cultural context (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). This study outlined the first stages of the development and validation of the Feminist Social Identity Scale. I conducted an EFA with direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation in a large sample of female-identified and gender expansive MTurk workers. The data supported a five-factor scale with both positive identity subscales (i.e. Beliefs, Competence, Centrality) and negative identity subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). A second EFA supported the five-factor structure, and each scale demonstrated high internal consistency and was normally distributed. A confirmatory factor analysis supported the five-factor structure of
the FSIS. However, several items that had low factor loadings on the Beliefs factor seemed to reflect a sense of solidarity with feminists, an idea which will be explored in the next study. Initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity was established through positive links between the positive identity subscales and feminist beliefs, public and private identification as a feminist, involvement in feminist activities, and a measure of socially desirable responding, as well as negative links between the negative identity dimensions and these measures.

4.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions

Perhaps the most serious limitation of this study is the population from which participants were selected. Although MTurk data is typically considered to be a fast and reliable alternative to undergraduate student samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011), a quarter of the data collected was unusable for the purposes of this study, even when several checks and strategies were put in place to maximize the usability of the data collection (Mason & Suri, 2012). Further, while nonbinary and gender expansive were invited to participate in the study, a substantial majority of participants were female-identified, and thus results should be interpreted with caution when attempting to generalize to nonbinary and gender expansive individuals. Given that male-identified people were unable to participate in the study, results should not be generalized to men’s feminist identities. Finally, it may be argued the approach taken to selecting items for Factors 1 and 2 may have homogenized the factors without taking the unique factor loadings from the initial Political, Prototypical, Acceptance, and Affirmation scales into account. Therefore, in my next exploratory study, I will include items that tap into additional dimensions of feminist identity to see if these factors emerge more clearly and discretely.
Chapter 5

5  Study 4: Further Confirmation of Factor Structure of FSIS and Links with Gender-Related Attitudes and Norms

Best practices in scale construction recommend completing a confirmatory factor analysis in a new sample to support the underlying structure identified in the exploratory factor analysis (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Therefore, the first aim of Study 4 was to examine the factor structure of the FSIS via confirmatory factor analysis in a large sample of women. The exploratory factor analysis in Study 3 revealed five factors; four distinct factors and one general factor, upon which the Beliefs items all strongly loaded. However, upon further inspection of the items that loaded onto the general factor, I determined that many of the items with lower loadings on this scale reflected a sense of solidarity with feminists. Therefore, in addition to the 25 items retained and confirmed in Study 3, I generated a further 10 theoretically-relevant items that captured the essence of solidarity, bearing in mind the feedback I received from the expert reviewers from Study 3. With the addition of these ten items, I aimed to examine the possibility that the items that loaded onto the “general” factor of the FSIS reflected a “Solidarity” with feminists subscale.

The second aim of Study 4 was to conduct additional tests of convergent validity for the FSIS by examining how women’s feminist social identity relates to a wide array of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that are shaped by gendered norms and attitudes. Gender-related norms and stereotypes have the potential to shape behaviour (Fiske, 1993) and cause harm to individuals who cannot or do not want to adhere to them (Morgenroth & Ryan, 2020). Feminist identity does not necessarily protect people from adopting gendered attitudes and complying with gendered norms for behaviour. Indeed, past research has demonstrated that feminist women do not necessarily conform to feminine norms to a lesser degree than non-feminist women (Siegel & Calogero, 2019; see also Hurt et al., 2007), and neither feminist identification nor liberal feminist attitudes have been found to link to less adherence to traditional gender expectations of women (Conlin
et al., 2021a). It is possible that the aligned dimensions of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may be associated with weaker endorsement of gendered attitudes and less gender-role conformity, while the ambivalent dimensions (i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) may be associated with stronger endorsement of gendered attitudes, and more gender-role conformity.

To further examine convergent validity of the FSIS, I tested the associations between the FSIS and four clusters of gender-related attitudes and norms: feminist self-identification and sexist attitudes; feminine beauty and power beliefs; self- and body image; sexual and relationship attitudes.

The first cluster of variables is focused on feminist self-identification, hostile sexist attitudes, and benevolent sexist attitudes. Specifically, one would expect that individuals with a more aligned feminist social identity would be more likely to identify as feminist in public and private and less likely to endorse sexist attitudes. Past research supports these ideas: People with greater endorsement of feminist principles are more likely to label themselves as feminists (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Reid & Purcell, 2004), and people who identify themselves as feminists are more likely to be involved in feminist activism, compared to those who merely hold feminist beliefs (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).

However, ambivalent feminist identity dimensions should predict weaker feminist identification; the more people are afraid of experiencing feminist stigma, the less likely they should be to label themselves as feminists. Similarly, the more uncertain people are about whether or not they are feminists, the less likely they should be to identify as feminists.

Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) suggests that sexist attitudes have both blatant and subtle components. Hostile sexism refers to blatant hatred toward women, whereas benevolent sexism may actually appear to some as subjectively positive in valence. Benevolent sexism comprises three distinct components: complementary gender differentiation (i.e., acceptance of stereotypes about women and men due to the essential differences between them), heterosexual intimacy (i.e., a perception that men are entitled to women), and protective paternalism (i.e., a feeling that women are unable to fend for
they should therefore protect them). Benevolent sexist attitudes are grounded in traditional gender role norms and stereotypes about women and men, and ultimately work to “keep women in their place” by bolstering the gender status quo. They are subtler than hostile sexist attitudes, and women are less likely to detect and protest against benevolent sexist treatment (Becker & Swim, 2011; Connor et al., 2015). In fact, many women find benevolent sexist treatment to be flattering, and some women prefer to have benevolent sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010; Gul & Kupfer, 2018). Despite their differences, hostile and benevolent sexism are highly correlated with one another (Connor et al., 2015; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001).

Feminist identity has been linked to less endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism (Kunst et al., 2019), so it would follow that aligned dimensions of the FSIS would be negatively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism. However, women who are uncertain about their feminist identities may support those aspects of sexism that flatter women, and those who are afraid of being stereotyped as a feminist may hold this fear because they endorse traditional gender attitudes, such as benevolent sexism.

Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and negatively associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist attitudes.

H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be negatively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and positively associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist attitudes.

The second cluster of variables is focused on beliefs about feminine beauty ideals and women’s social power. Notably, many feminist scholars have denounced the cultural fixation on women’s beauty, and the cultural pressure for women to vigilantly manage and monitor their appearance, weight, and shape, with some even labelling it as a “political sedative” (Wolf, 1991, p. 187) in the way it consumes women’s cognitive,
emotional, and economic resources, and dampens motivation to challenge the status quo. Indeed, women who support myths about traditional feminine beauty are more likely to hold gender system justifying attitudes and support sexist hiring practices (Ramati-Ziber et al., 2020). Women with a stronger feminist social identity may be more likely to recognize the harm done by trying to adhere to unrealistic cultural norms and expectations about women’s bodies and be more accepting of a wider range of women’s body types. They may also reject gender ideologies that suggest women can achieve social power and mobility through their sexuality or beauty.

Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H3) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization of beauty and (b) acceptance of body hair on women, and negatively associated with (c) a belief that sex is a form of power, and (d) that beauty is a form of social currency for women.

H4) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be negatively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization of beauty, and positively associated with (b) a belief that sex is a form of power and that (c) beauty is a form of social currency for women, and (d) attitudes that body hair is undesirable.

The third cluster of variables is focused on women’s self-concept and body image attitudes and behaviours. While some research suggests that feminism is linked to positive self-body relations and body-related attitudes, some have suggested that the benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may be over-reported due to publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012), and the links identified between feminism and body image are often small and inconsistent (see Murnen & Smolak, 2009). In fact, several studies have suggested that feminist women and non-feminist women do not differ in their levels of body satisfaction or desire for thinness (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016; Siegel & Calogero, 2019). One possibility for these mixed findings is that existing measures of feminist identity and attitudes are not sufficiently nuanced to capture the multiple and ambivalent dimensions of feminist identity, and findings may be muddied by a failure to
attend to these dimensions. By evaluating multiple aligned and ambivalent identity dimensions of feminist identity simultaneously, the FSIS allows for testing this possibility.

Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H5) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be negatively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b) make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e) self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes.

H6) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be positively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b) make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e) self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes.

The fourth cluster of variables is focused on women’s sexual and relationship attitudes. Past research suggests that feminist women may hold more positive and functional sexual attitudes, compared to non-feminist women. This may be due, in part, to the fact that sexual relationships are situated within the wider domain of gender relations. Sexual scripts are often grounded in traditional gender roles and norms (Eaton & Rose, 2011; Siegel et al., 2021), even in non-heterosexual relationships (Hoppe, 2011; Pham, 2016). However, women with stronger feminist attitudes may be less inclined to adhere to normative expectations about romantic relationships and sexuality. There is some research to support this idea: Feminist attitudes have been associated with more willingness to refuse unwanted sex (Yoder et al., 2012), more erotophilia and less support for the sexual double standard (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007), more intrinsic motivations for sexual activity (Schick et al., 2008), and refusing to fake orgasm (e.g., Lafrance et al., 2017).

Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) entitlement to sexual pleasure from
one’s self, (b) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and negatively associated with (c) fear of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm.

H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be negatively associated with (a) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s self, (b) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and positively associated with (c) fear of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm.

In summary, Study 4 aimed to confirm a six-factor structure for the FSIS and examined the scale’s convergent validity by testing the links between the FSIS subscales and a wide set of gendered norms and attitudes that are expected to be related to feminist social identity.

5.1 Method

5.1.1 Participants

The final sample consisted of 415 female participants. Initially, 491 participants completed the survey. Participants who failed one or more attention checks were removed from the dataset, resulting in 416 participants. One participant indicated that we should not use their data based on how much they were paying attention, resulting in a final sample of 415. Kline (2011) suggests that an adequate sample size for a confirmatory factor analysis is roughly 200 cases, or 5-10 participants per parameter; as such, the current sample was adequate for CFA.

Four hundred and six participants (97.8%) indicated that they were cisgender, and two (0.5%) participants indicated that they would prefer not to answer the question. Seven participants (1.7%) did not respond to the question. Respondents ranged in age from 19 to 73 with a mean age of 33.22 and standard deviation of 9.52. The sample was primarily European American or White (n = 347, 83.6%), with some participants identifying as Asian (n = 21, 5.1%), African American or Black (n = 8; 1.9%), Native American (n = 2; 0.5%), Aboriginal (n = 1; 0.2%), and Maori (n = 1; 0.2%). Thirty-two participants (7.7%) indicated that their racial group was not listed, and three participants (0.7%) indicated
that they would prefer not to report their racial group. Additionally, 350 participants \((n = 84.3\%)\) indicated that they were non-Hispanic/Latinx, and 35 participants indicated that they were Hispanic/Latinx \((8.4\%)\). Thirty participants \((7.2\%)\) did not respond to this question. The majority of the sample identified as heterosexual \((n = 277; 66.7\%)\), bisexual \((n = 92, 22.2\%)\), lesbian \((n = 13; 3.1\%)\), pansexual \((n = 12; 2.9\%)\), and asexual \((n = 9; 2.2\%)\). Nine participants \((2.2\%)\) indicated that their sexual orientation was not listed, and three participants \((0.7\%)\) indicated that they preferred not to report their sexual orientation.

One hundred and twenty-eight participants \((30.8\%)\) were married, 123 \((29.6\%)\) were single, 123 \((29.6\%)\) were involved in a long-term relationship, 19 \((4.6\%)\) were engaged, 9 \((2.2\%)\) were divorced, four \((1.0\%)\) were separated, and one \((0.2\%)\) was widowed. Eight participants \((1.9\%)\) indicated that their relationship status was not listed. The sample was fairly well-educated: 260 participants \((62.7\%)\) responded that they had graduate degrees, 55 \((13.3\%)\) indicated that they had completed some graduate school, 76 \((18.3\%)\) indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree, 21 \((5.1\%)\) had completed some college, and 3 \((0.7\%)\) responded that they had graduated from high school.

5.1.2 Materials

5.1.2.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale

A 35-item version of the FSIS was presented to participants. This version of the tool had subscales to evaluate Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6). The complete FSIS, including the entire solidarity subscale presented in this study, is presented in Appendix C.
5.1.2.2 Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes

5.1.2.2.1 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale

The Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (FSIS; Szymanski, 2004) is a unidimensional, four-item measure that assesses the degree to which participants support feminist principles and label themselves as feminists. Items cover both public feminist identification (e.g., “I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private feminist identification (e.g., “I consider myself a feminist”). Items are rated on a Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) to strongly agree (5). Items are averaged, and higher scores reflect more feminist identification. The measure has shown positive links with feminist attitudes and involvement in feminist activities in diverse samples of women, supporting the tool’s construct validity (Siegel & Calogero, 2021; Szymanski, 2004).

5.1.2.2.2 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) consists of 22 items that assess participants’ attitudes toward gender relations in society. The scale contains two distinct subscales: hostile sexism (e.g., “When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against”) and benevolent sexism (“Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility”). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree (scored at 5). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores on each subscale reflecting more sexist attitudes. The ASI has been used widely and has demonstrated structural and external validity in samples of women and men around the world (Glick & Fiske, 2001).
5.1.2.3 Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs

5.1.2.3.1 Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale

The Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale (BCB; Tylka & Iannantuono, 2016) consists of nine items related to perceptions of beauty. Example items include “Even if a physical feature is not considered attractive by others or by society, I think that it can be beautiful” and “A woman's acceptance of herself can change my perception of her physical beauty.” Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Scores are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more flexible and open attitudes toward women’s beauty. In a large study with four community samples of women, the BCB demonstrated strong internal and test-retest reliability, as well as convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity (Tylka & Iannantuono, 2016).

5.1.2.3.2 Body Hair Attitudes Scale

The Body Hair Attitudes Scale (BHAS; Basow & Braman, 1998) is a unidimensional, 13-item measure which evaluates the extent to which people hold negative attitudes toward body hair on women. Example items include “body hair is unfeminine” and “body hair makes a woman look like an animal.” Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (5). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more negative attitudes toward body hair in women. The scale has not been widely used, but in a sample of 195 mixed-gender undergraduate students, the measure demonstrated strong internal consistency (α = .88), and female participants had more positive attitudes toward body hair than male participants, providing evidence of known-groups validity for the tool.

5.1.2.3.3 Beauty as Currency Scale

The Beauty as Currency Scale (BCS; Forbes et al., 2007) consists of five items that evaluate the extent to which respondents feel that a woman’s beauty serves as a form of social capital. Example items include “It is more important for a woman to be pretty than
to be smart” and “If a woman cannot do a good job of taking care of her appearance, she probably cannot be trusted to do a good job at anything else.” Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that beauty is an essential form of social currency for women. Convergent validity for the measure has been demonstrated in mixed-gender and women-only samples of college students through positive associations with measures of thin-ideal internalization and sexist attitudes (Calogero et al., 2017; Forbes et al., 2007).

5.1.2.3.4 Sex Is Power Scale

The Sex is Power Scale (Erchull & Liss, 2013) was employed to evaluate the extent to which participants viewed sex as a form of social currency for women. While the full scale consists of attitudes toward the self and women in general, we used only the 5-item women subscale (W-SIPS). Example items include “men are easily manipulated by beautiful women” and “women can control men through sex.” Items were rated on a 6-point Likert style scale anchored at disagree strongly (scored at 1) and agree strongly (6). Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that women can control men through their sexuality. In a large sample of undergraduate students, the W-SIPS demonstrated good internal consistency and positive associations with hostile and benevolent sexism, supporting the scale’s convergent validity (Erchull & Liss, 2013).

5.1.2.4 Self- and Body Image

5.1.2.4.1 Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire

To evaluate menstrual attitudes, we employed the “menstruation as bothersome” subscale of the Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire (MAQ; Brooks-Gunn & Ruble, 1980). The subscale contains six items that are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Example items include “I hope it will be possible someday to get a menstrual period over within a few minutes” and “Men have a real advantage in not having the monthly interruption of a menstrual period.” After
reverse scoring, higher scores reflect more negative attitudes toward menstruation. The bothersome subscale of the MAQ has shown links to self-objectification (Roberts, 2000) and a desire to suppress menstruation (Johnston-Robledo et al., 2003). In a sample of 327 women who menstruate, women with extremely negative menstrual experiences scored more highly on this subscale than women with neutral or positive experiences (McPherson & Korfine, 2004), supporting the tool’s known-groups validity. For the purposes of this study, scores were reversed so that higher scores reflected more positive menstrual attitudes.

5.1.2.4.2 Makeup Questionnaire

The Makeup Questionnaire (MQ; Smith et al., 2017) was administered to evaluate the extent to which participants feel insecure (e.g., “If I do not have makeup on, I feel less attractive”) and uneasy (e.g., “I do not leave the house without any makeup”) when they are not wearing makeup. The scale consists of six items, which are rated on a 5-point Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (scored at 5). In a sample of 5,284 undergraduate women, both subscales demonstrated significant positive correlations with body discomfort, weight and shape concerns, and endorsement of thin-ideal stereotypes (Smith et al., 2017).

5.1.2.4.3 Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale

The Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale (ATCS; Henderson-King & Henderson-King, 2005) was used to evaluate attitudes toward receiving cosmetic surgery. The scale contains three subscales describing intrapersonal motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g., “Cosmetic surgery is a good thing because it can help people feel better about themselves”), social motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g., “I would seriously consider having cosmetic surgery if I thought my partner would find me more attractive”), and considering having cosmetic surgery oneself (“In the future, I could end up having some kind of cosmetic surgery”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). In a sample of 1,288 mixed-gender participants, each of the subscales evidenced positive correlations with attitudes toward
makeup use, and social motives for cosmetic surgery was positively linked with lower state social, appearance, and body self-esteem in women and men (Henderson-King & Henderson-King, 2005).

5.1.2.4.4 Weight Bias Internalization Scale

The Weight Bias Internalization Scale - Modified (WBI-M; Lillis et al., 2010; Pearl & Puhl, 2014) was used to evaluate the extent to which participants believe that the stereotypes attributed to individuals with larger bodies are personally true of them. Items are rated on a Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more internalized weight stigma. Example items include “I am less attractive than most other people because of my weight” and “I wish I could drastically change my weight.” The WBI-M has demonstrated strong internal consistency and shown positive correlations with dislike of fat, drive for thinness, depression, and eating disorder symptoms, and negative correlations with self-esteem in a sample of 150 U.S. participants (Pearl & Puhl, 2014).

5.1.2.4.5 Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale

The Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale (SOBBS; Lindner & Tantleff-Dunn, 2017) was used to assess the degree to which individuals self-objectify. Participants rate 14 items that reflect on taking an observer’s perspective toward the body (e.g., “I often think about how my body must look to others”) and treating the body as though it were capable of representing the self (e.g., “My body is what gives me value to other people”) using a 5-point Likert scale, anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting a more objectified self-perspective. In samples of college and community women, the scale has demonstrated strong internal consistency and positive links with other measure of self-objectification, some dimensions of femininity ideology, disordered eating attitudes, appearance anxiety, and depressed mood (Lindner & Tantleff-Dunn, 2017; Siegel & Calogero, 2019).
5.1.2.4.6 Eating Attitudes Test-26

The Eating Attitude Test-26 (EAT-26; Garner et al., 1982) is a measure designed to evaluate eating disorder symptoms, specifically dieting (e.g., “I engage in dieting behaviour”), bulimia and food preoccupation (e.g., “I have gone on eating binges where I feel that I may not be able to stop”), and oral control (e.g., “I display self-control around food”). Items are typically rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (6). However, for the purposes of this study, I used a 5-point scale with the same anchors, as I was interested in all scores, not just those that were clinically relevant. Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting more eating disorder symptoms. The EAT-26 has been used widely in clinical, college, and community samples. Across studies, the EAT-26 has shown strong internal consistency for the full scale, with reliabilities ranging for the subscales (see Gleaves et al., 2014). Convergent validity has been demonstrated through positive associations with constructs such as self-objectification and body shame in samples of college women (Garner et al., 1982), and drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction in athletes (Doninger et al., 2005).

5.1.2.5 Sexual and Relationship Attitudes

5.1.2.5.1 Fear of Being Single Scale

To assess participants’ felt need to be involved in a romantic relationship, we used the Fear of Being Single Scale (FOBS; Spielmann et al., 2013). The FOBS is a unidimensional, 6-item scale that evaluates how anxious participants feel about the idea of being single. Items are rated on a five-point Likert-style scale anchored at not at all true (1) and very true (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more anxiety about being and staying single. Example items include “I feel it is close to being too late for me to find the love of my life” and “It scares me to think that there might not be anyone out there for me.” The scale has shown strong internal consistency and measurement non-invariance in samples of women and men. Convergent and discriminant validity has been demonstrated through positive links with anxious
attachment and neuroticism and nonsignificant associations with social approach (Spielmann et al., 2013).

### 5.1.2.5.2 Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale

The Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale (Cooper et al., 2014) contains four subscales, but only the altruistic deceit subscale was used for the purposes of this study. The altruistic deceit subscale contains fifteen items related to faking orgasm out of concern for a partner’s feelings. Participants are prompted with the question “How often do you fake orgasm for the following reasons?” Example items from this subscale include “So your partner doesn’t feel guilty if you don’t have a real orgasm?” and “So your partner isn’t embarrassed if you don’t have a real orgasm?” Items are rated on a 15-item Likert-type scale anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Higher scores reflect greater endorsement of pleasing a partner as the reason for faking orgasm. In a sample of 481 female undergraduate participants, the altruistic deceit subscale demonstrated strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .96$) and was positively associated with other reasons for faking orgasm (Cooper et al., 2014) as well as attachment avoidance and anxiety (Láng et al., 2020).

### 5.1.2.5.3 Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory

The Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory (FSSI; Horne & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2006) consists of 20 items with five subscales. For the purposes of this study, we employed the entitlement to sexual pleasure from partner (e.g., “I think it is important for a sexual partner to consider my sexual pleasure”) and self (e.g., “I believe self-masturbating can be an exciting experience”) subscales. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored at not at all true of me (scored at 1) and very true of me (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more entitlement to sexual pleasure. In a sample of 449 young women between the ages of 16 and 20, these subscales demonstrated acceptable internal consistency ($\alpha = .78–.91$), and positive links with sexual consciousness, safe sex self-efficacy, resistance to the sexual double standard, and self-esteem, and negative links with self-silencing in intimate relationships (Horne & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2006).
5.1.3 Procedure

Ethics approval was granted from Western University’s Non-Medical Research Ethics Board. Participants were recruited via social media. Specifically, I posted a recruitment advertisement to my personal Twitter account with a link to the Qualtrics survey, which hosted the study. Interested participants clicked the link to the survey and responded to a series of screening questions to determine eligibility. Participants who indicated that they identified as women, were above the age of 18, and passed a reCAPTCHA verification test were shown a Letter of Information and indicated their consent to participate by selecting a box that read, “I understand what is being asked of me, and I consent to participate in this research.” Participants then responded to the measures listed above, which were presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics questionnaire. Following completion of the demographics survey, participants were shown a debriefing form and thanked for their participation. Participation was completely voluntary.

5.2 Results

5.2.1 Preliminary Analyses

Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using JASP 0.11.01. All other analyses were conducted using SPSS 25.0. Given that less than 0.10% of the data was missing, I did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).

5.2.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis

I subjected the 35 FSIS to a CFA to examine the six-factor model in this new sample. CFA was appropriate in this case because a factor structure had been predetermined, and a substantial portion of the factor structure had been confirmed in Study 3 (see Bandalos & Finney, 2019; Orçan, 2018). Anticipating correlated factors, I used a direct oblimin rotation with maximum likelihood, which allowed for the latent variables to correlate. Similar to the criteria applied for evaluating the fit in Study 3, fit was again assessed using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations (CFI > .95, TLI > .95, RMSEA < .06,
SRMR < .08). In addition to reporting on the chi-square goodness of fit statistic, which is sensitive to sample size and violations of assumptions of multivariate normality, I used the ratio of the chi-square to the degrees of freedom as another index of fit. Hoelter (1983) suggested that a ratio of 2.00 or less indicates a good fit for the hypothesized model, while Marsh and Hocevar (1985) suggested that a ratio within the 2.00 to 5.00 range indicates an adequately fitting model. The GFI (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1972) is an index of the amount of variance/covariance information that can be accounted for by the hypothesized model. GFI values can range from .00 to 1.00, with higher values reflecting better fitting models.

The six-factor model was a fairly good fit to the data, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, GFI = .80, RMSEA = .07 [90% CI = .07, .08], SRMR = .06, $\chi^2 (511) = 1615.421$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 3.16$. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor ($p < .001$), and none of the confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor covariances between the subscales ranged from -.67 (Centrality with Uncertainty) to .84 (Centrality with Solidarity). Given that no covariances were greater than .9, these patterns suggest that each factor captured a distinct component of feminist identity.

Given that the six-factor model with 35 items produced only a fairly good fit to the data, and that five items were added to clarify the Solidarity factor, I examined the modification indices to determine whether any of the Solidarity items had high cross-loadings with items on other subscales that would warrant their removal. Removing items was an iterative process of examining modification indices and considering the relevance of the item. See Table 11 for the steps followed in the removal of five of the items. With a 5-item Solidarity subscale, the six-factor model was a better fit to the data, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, GFI = .84, RMSEA = .07, [90% CI = .06, .07], SRMR = .05, $\chi^2 (390) = 115.63$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 2.96$. 
Table 11. Rationale for Deletion of Solidarity Items for Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Modification index</th>
<th>X^2/df</th>
<th>CFI</th>
<th>TLI</th>
<th>RMSEA</th>
<th>SRMR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove item 20</td>
<td>Cross-loading with Centrality</td>
<td>36.09</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove item 15</td>
<td>Cross-loading with Beliefs</td>
<td>25.72</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove item 5</td>
<td>Cross-loading with Beliefs</td>
<td>24.56</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove item 22</td>
<td>Cross-loading with Centrality</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove item 3</td>
<td>Cross-loading with Beliefs</td>
<td>15.54</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that the values for CFI and TLI were somewhat lower than would be desired, and RMSEA was somewhat higher, I again examined the modification indices to determine if a simple revision would improve the model fit. Notably, two items on the Fear of Stigma subscale (Fear of Stigma Item 1 “I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist” and Fear of Stigma Item 2, “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist”) shared high residual variance (MI = 172.26). Given that Fear of Stigma Item 1 also shared variance to a high degree with other items, this item was removed, resulting in a four-item Fear of Stigma subscale. With the deletion of item 6, the six-factor was a good fit to the data, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, GFI = .86, RMSEA = .06, [90% CI = .06, .07], SRMR = .05, \( \chi^2 \) (362) = 949.725, \( p < .001 \), \( \chi^2/df = 2.62 \). For a visual depiction of the 29-item FSIS, see Figure 4. The final 29-item FSIS can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 4. Visual Depiction of Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the 29-item FSIS for Study 4
Mean scores and standard deviations for each of the subscales can be found in Tables 11 and 12. Items on the FSIS are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale, so a score of 3.50 represents the midpoint. Means for the aligned identity subscales were all above the midpoint, with the highest mean value for Beliefs \((M = 4.98, SD = .71)\), followed by Competence \((M = 4.80, SD = .97)\), Solidarity \((M = 4.32, SD = .93)\), and Centrality \((M = 4.06, SD = 1.25)\). The means for the ambivalent identity dimensions fell below the midpoint: Fear of Stigma had a mean of 2.72 \((SD = 1.17)\), and Uncertainty had a mean of 2.18 \((SD = .92)\). For Beliefs, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty, mean values ranged from 1.00 to 6.00. For competence, values ranged from 1.40 to 6.00, and for Solidarity, scores ranged from 1.20 to 6.00. Scales are considered to demonstrate internal consistency if their alpha values are .70 or above. In this sample, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .84 (Uncertainty) to .92 (Competence, Centrality), supporting each subscale’s internal consistency reliability. Data is generally regarded as normally distributed as long as skewness values do not exceed \(|2|\) and kurtosis values do not exceed \(|7|\) (Byrne, 2010). Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed these values, suggesting that all subscales were normally distributed.

5.2.3 Bivariate Correlations

To evaluate convergent validity of the FSIS subscale scores, I examined the bivariate correlations between the FSIS scales and the above-mentioned measures related to gendered norms and attitudes (See Tables 12 and 13). Each of the FSIS subscales were correlated with one another in the expected directions, with the link between Centrality and Solidarity demonstrating the strongest association \((r = .85, p < .001)\), and Fear of Stigma and Beliefs demonstrating the weakest association \((r = -.25, p < .001)\).

5.2.3.1 Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes

See Tables 12 and 13 for means, standard deviations, alphas, and bivariate correlations between key study variables. Providing support for Hypothesis 1a, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively associated with feminist self-identification, suggesting that higher scores on these subscales were associated with
a more explicit labelling of oneself as a feminist. Hostile sexism was significantly and negatively associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality, supporting Hypothesis 1b. Benevolent sexism was significantly and negatively associated with Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality, but not Solidarity ($r = -.08, p = .11$), providing partial support for Hypothesis 1c.

Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty subscales were significantly and negatively associated with feminist identification. These subscales were also significantly and positively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism, providing support for Hypotheses 2b and 2c.

To replicate and extend the patterns found in Study 2, I ran bivariate correlations between the individual items of the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004) and the FSIS subscales to explore their associations. The patterns identified in this analysis provide additional support for the findings in Study 2. The aligned identity subscales (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were significantly and positively associated with importance of feminism ($rs = .49-.57, ps < .001$), support for feminist goals ($rs = .43-.59, ps < .001$), private feminist identification ($rs = .54-.59, ps < .001$), and public feminist identification ($rs = .46-.68, ps < .001$). The ambivalent identity subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty, $ps < .001$) were significantly and negatively associated with importance of feminism ($rs = -.14-.48, ps < .001$), support for feminist goals ($rs = -.17-.42, ps < .001$), private feminist identification ($rs = -.15-.59, ps < .001$), and public feminist identification ($rs = -.38-.59, ps < .001$).
Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Gender-Related Attitudes for Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Stigma</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Identification</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile sexism</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolent sexism</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty as currency</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad beauty</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex is power</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body hair attitudes</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Competence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.61***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Solidarity</td>
<td></td>
<td>.67***</td>
<td>.59***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Centrality</td>
<td></td>
<td>.62***</td>
<td>.72***</td>
<td>.78***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Fear of Stigma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.22***</td>
<td>-.40***</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
<td>-.32***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Uncertainty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.55***</td>
<td>-.64***</td>
<td>-.54***</td>
<td>-.64***</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Menstruation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Internalized Weight Stigma</td>
<td></td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Makeup Use</td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.19***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Cosmetic Surgery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Eating Attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Self-Objectification</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.60***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Fear of Being Single</td>
<td></td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Pleasure - Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>-.11**</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Pleasure - Partner</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.15**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.10**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Faking Orgasm</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.20***</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>.11**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cronbach’s alpha</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
5.2.3.2 Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs

Mixed support was found for Hypotheses 3a-d. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with having a broad conceptualization of beauty; however, no link was detected between Beliefs and broad conceptualization of beauty ($r = -.08, p = .12$). Hypothesis 3b was fully supported: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively associated with acceptance of body hair on women. Hypothesis 3c was fully supported: Each aligned identity subscale was significantly associated with body hair attitudes in the expected directions. Hypothesis 3d was partially supported: Competence was significantly and negatively related to beauty as currency beliefs ($r = -.10, p = .04$), but Beliefs, Solidarity, and Centrality were not associated with this construct.

Hypotheses 4a-d were all supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both significantly negatively associated with endorsing a narrower conceptualization of beauty and acceptance of body hair on women, and positively associated with perceiving beauty as a form of social currency for women and viewing sex as a legitimate form of social power for women.

5.2.3.3 Self- and Body-Image

Hypotheses 5a-f were not supported in this analysis. Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were not significantly associated with menstrual attitudes, makeup use, endorsement of cosmetic surgery, internalized weight stigma, self-objectification, or disordered eating. Hypotheses 6a-f received mixed support. Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were unrelated to menstrual attitudes, makeup use, and endorsement of cosmetic surgery. These findings do not support Hypothesis 6a-c. Partial support was found for Hypothesis 6d. Fear of Stigma was significantly and positively associated with internalized weight stigma ($r = .15, p = .003$), but Uncertainty was unrelated to this construct ($r = .06, p = .21$). Hypotheses 6e and 6f were supported: both Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were significantly and positively associated with self-objectification and disordered eating attitudes.
5.2.3.4 Sexual and Relationship Attitudes

Hypothesis 7a-d and 8 a-d were partially supported in this sample. Hypothesis 7a was fully supported: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self. Hypothesis 7b, sense of entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner, was only partially supported. While Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with this construct, no significant association was found for Beliefs ($r = .08$, $p = .12$).

Hypothesis 7a was partially supported: Beliefs, Competence, Centrality were all significantly and negatively associated with fear of being single. However, Solidarity trended in the same direction ($r = -.10$, $p = .05$) but did not meet the traditional $p < .05$ significance level. Hypothesis 7d was not supported in this sample: Willingness to fake orgasm was not significantly associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, or Centrality.

Hypotheses 8a-d similarly received mixed support. Hypothesis 8a was fully supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both significantly and negatively associated with entitlement to pleasure from oneself. Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner ($r = -.15$, $p = .003$), but Fear of Stigma was unrelated to this construct ($r = -.05$, $p = .36$), providing partial support for Hypothesis 8b. Hypothesis 8c was fully supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both significantly and positively related to fear of being single. Partial support was found for Hypothesis 8d: Fear of Stigma was positively related to faking orgasm ($r = .10$, $p = .04$), but Uncertainty was not significantly associated with this construct ($r = .07$, $p = .18$).

5.3 Discussion

In this study, I confirmed the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) in a large sample of women recruited from social media. The six-factor structure demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data, and includes the following
dimensions to assess modern feminist social identity: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty.

This study also provided insight into the associations between these dimensions of feminist social identity and other gender, body, and sexuality-related variables, providing additional evidence of convergent validity for the FSIS. The aligned identity subscale scores (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were negatively associated with hostile and benevolent sexism and positively associated with feminist identification, supporting the tool’s convergent validity. The aligned identity subscales’ negative links to hostile sexism are unsurprising: any measure of progressive gender attitudes should show negative associations with blatantly sexist attitudes. However, given benevolent sexism is harder to detect (Becker & Swim, 2011; Becker et al., 2014) and that many women – even feminist women – prefer benevolently sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010; Gul & Kupfer, 2018) and view benevolent sexism as flattering (Hopkins-Doyle et al., 2019), it is noteworthy that each of these subscales also showed significant negative links with benevolent sexism. The ambivalent identity subscale scores (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) demonstrated the reverse pattern. Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty appear to reflect the more ambivalent parts of a modern feminist social identity that are associated with endorsement of sexist attitudes.

These results also suggest that, while feminist women may be conscious of social restrictions on women and have more open and supportive attitudes toward other women (i.e., social-body attitudes), these attitudes may not necessarily be internalized (i.e., personal-body attitudes; see Rubin et al., 2004). Aligned identity subscales (Beliefs, Competence, Centrality, and Solidarity) were – to varying degrees – significantly associated with adopting a broader conceptualization of beauty than what is portrayed in the media, and less agreement with the belief that women’s beauty and sexuality reflect legitimate forms of social power. Feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma demonstrated reverse patterns. Both subscales were significantly and positively associated with the belief that beauty is a form of social currency and that sex is a form of power for women. They were also significantly and negatively related to a broadened conceptualization of women’s beauty.
Unlike the aligned identity subscales, the ambivalent feminist subscales were significantly and negatively linked with self-objectification and disordered eating attitudes, and positively linked to attitudes that body hair is undesirable. Fear of Stigma was significantly associated with internalized weight stigma. What these patterns suggest is that the aligned components of feminist social identity may not necessarily be associated with less personal support for traditional and restrictive societal feminine beauty ideals, but feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma may actually be positively associated with these constructs. Put another way, aligned dimensions of feminist identity may not necessarily provide any additional protection above neutral attitudes; however, ambivalent identity dimensions may restrict women’s capacity to experience full embodiment due to the influence of gendered societal body attitudes.

I also examined associations between FSIS subscales and sexuality-related variables. In contrast to the self- and body image variables, holding aligned identity attitudes did seem to correspond with more positive experiences in this domain. Specifically, aligned identity subscales were associated with less fear of being single and more entitlement to sexual pleasure from oneself and one’s partner. Ambivalent identity subscales demonstrated the opposite pattern, and Fear of Stigma was associated with more faking orgasm to please a partner. Aligned identity subscales’ links to less fear of being single is significant because it puts a positive spin on a negative stereotype about feminists, specifically that they are “unfuckable” (see Study 2). Indeed, one stereotype about feminists is that they are less likely to be in romantic relationships (Rudman & Phelan, 2007); however, research suggests that feminist women are no less likely to be in romantic relationships than their non-feminist counterparts (Rudman & Phelan), and these findings suggest that feminist women may be less likely to pursue or maintain unhealthy relationships out of fear of being single. Greater comfort with being single has been associated with less willingness to lower one’s standards for a partner, less dependence on a partner, and more satisfying romantic relationships (Spielmann et al., 2013). Feminist women’s comfort with being single may reflect a rejection of harmful, traditionally gendered romantic and sexual scripts.
The links between FSIS subscales and entitlement to pleasure is noteworthy because there is an oft-cited “gap” in orgasm frequency among women and men in heterosexual relationships (Lentz & Zaikman, 2021; Mahar et al., 2020; Mintz, 2017). Feminist women have been found to be more sexually motivated and erotophilic, compared to their nonfeminist and non-labeller counterparts (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007; Schick et al., 2008), and these findings support this pattern. However, fear of feminist stigma scores were also associated with more likelihood of faking orgasm for their partners’ sake, perhaps reflecting a general desire to present one’s self in a manner that is pleasing and desirable to the male gaze. Uncertainty’s significant negative correlation with entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner may reflect a sense of ambivalence about traditional gender roles and norms and an inability to dispel sexual scripts, including the sexual double standard. Both Uncertainty and Fear of Stigma were significantly and negatively associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self, suggesting that women with ambivalent feminist identities may still be holding onto some norms of femininity, such as sexual fidelity – a finding that is consistent with other studies (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). Given that women who engage in solo sexual activities regularly find the experience to be sexually empowering (Bowman, 2013), the traditionally gendered attitudes associated with feminist ambivalence may serve as a barrier to women embracing their sexuality and coming to enjoy their bodies.

5.3.1 Limitations and Next Steps

While this study has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. Despite a broad recruitment strategy, the sample was overwhelmingly White and well-educated. Indeed, the sample was over 80% White, and over 60% responded that they had at least a graduate education. This is likely due to the fact that the recruitment advertisement was initially shared on a popular academic Twitter account and then resharred on LinkedIn and Facebook by a well-known feminist entrepreneur. Another limitation that was acknowledged by participants was that there was no option to indicate if participants did not menstruate at all, potentially limiting the interpretability of the findings using this scale. Given that the Menstrual Attitudes Scale did not significantly correlate with any of the FSIS subscales, this leaves open the possibility that menstrual attitudes may, in fact,
show some links to feminist identity, and future research should examine feminist identity in relation to a variety of different attitudes regarding menstruation, not merely a sense that menstruation is bothersome.

5.3.2 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided support for the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Specifically, the aligned identity subscales (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) tap into various components of feminist identity that constitute a committed and consistent feminist orientation. The ambivalent identity subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) tap into feelings of insecurity or lack of confidence around being a feminist. Given that some women may hold ambivalent feminist identities, this measure advances and updates the psychological study of modern feminist social identity by allowing for the simultaneous evaluation of both commitment and resistance to being a feminist.

This study also provided evidence for the FSIS subscales’ links with feminist self-identification and sexist attitudes, feminine beauty and power beliefs, self- and body image, and sexual and relationship attitudes. The findings from this study suggest that the FSIS’s six-factor structure fits the data well and that the aligned identity dimensions of the FSIS are linked to less support for traditionally gendered attitudes and behaviours for women in general; however, these links did not always hold for women’s own body related attitudes and behaviours. This pattern is consistent with other research suggesting that feminist women’s awareness of these pressures does not make them any less real or legitimate for themselves. However, the aligned identity dimensions were generally positively associated with empowered and independent sexuality- and relationship-related attitudes, suggesting that women’s social and interpersonal attitudes may translate into their romantic and sexual relationships. The ambivalent identity dimensions were generally associated with more traditionally gendered social and personal attitudes.

This pattern of results provides support for the convergent validity of the FSIS. Specifically, these results suggest that aligned dimensions of feminist identity are associated with more rejection of traditional feminine attitudes, norms, and expectations,
whereas the ambivalent dimensions of feminist identity are associated with more support for these norms – for others and for oneself. Ambivalent dimensions of feminist social identity were also significantly and positively associated with some measures associated with self- and body-image, such as disordered eating and self-objectification; yet the aligned identity dimensions were unrelated to these attitudes and behaviours. This supports feminist theorizing (see Calogero & Thompson, 2010; Engeln, 2017; Wolf, 1991) and past research (e.g., Rubin et al., 2004), suggesting that having a strong feminist social identity does not change the day-to-day reality or impact of living in an appearance-centric and sexually objectifying culture. Indeed, the ambivalent dimensions of feminist social identity may have an adverse influence on women.
Chapter 6

6 Study 5: Further Examination of External Validity of the FSIS with Gender and Racial Behaviours

In this study, I examined convergent, incremental, criterion, and known-groups validity for the FSIS in a sample of White women. I tested the scale’s convergent validity by examining the correlations between the FSIS subscales and willingness to engage in both feminist and anti-racist activism, as well as willingness to intervene in racist and sexist situations. I then evaluated whether the FSIS subscales had incremental validity for predicting feminist action willingness above hostile and benevolent sexism. I also examined whether the FSIS subscales could predict willingness to intervene in racist situations and participation in racial collective action above awareness of White privilege. Criterion validity was evaluated by regressing the percentage of their compensation that participants were willing to donate to a feminist organization on the FSIS subscales. To evaluate known-groups validity, I tested whether feminist-identified women scored differently on the FSIS subscales, compared to women who endorse feminist attitudes but who do not use the feminist label, as well as non-feminist women.

6.1 Introduction

6.1.1 Feminist Identity and Feminist Activism: Tests of Convergent, Incremental, and Criterion Validity

Consistent with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), it is well-established that feminist self-labeling is a robust predictor of feminist behaviours, often above other relevant dimensions of feminist attitudes including feminist beliefs, as well as implicit and explicit attitudes about feminists (e.g., Conlin & Heesacker, 2019; Conlin et al., 2019; Duncan, 2010; Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; Redford et al., 2018; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004; see also Radke et al., 2016). Further, feminist beliefs and feminist self-
identification have been linked to willingness to intervene in sexist situations (Weis et al., 2018). Therefore, it is likely that the aligned identity subscales of the FSIS will positively predict feminist activism and willingness to intervene in sexist situations.

However, ambivalence about one’s feminist identity could disrupt the link between feminist attitudes and feminist activism (Conlin et al., 2019). A recent study explored the effects of feminist ambivalence, or “bad feminism,” on feminist activist behaviours (Conlin et al., 2019). In a sample of 333 MTurk workers with strong feminist beliefs, inconsistencies in feminist beliefs, knowledge, and behaviours mediated the relation between feminist attitudes (e.g., feminist self-labeling) and behaviours (e.g., collective action). Therefore, it is expected that ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) may be negatively associated with feminist activism and willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Given that sexist beliefs should have a strong, negative correlation with feminist beliefs, I did not make hypotheses about incremental validity of the Beliefs subscale beyond the variance explained by hostile and benevolent sexism. As such, I hypothesized that:

H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be negatively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism, and positively associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations and (d) feminist activism.

H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be positively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism, and negatively associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations and (d) feminist activism.

H3) Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality would predict engagement in (a) willingness to intervene in sexist situations and (b) feminist activism above hostile and benevolent sexism.
H4) Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty would negatively predict engagement in (a) willingness to intervene in sexist situations and (b) feminist activism above hostile and benevolent sexism.

Further, tests of criterion validity are important for psychological research because responses on self-report measures are influenced by a variety of factors such as social desirability, demand characteristics, and perceived goals of the study (Haefel & Howard, 2010). In the context of this study, people may overestimate their willingness to intervene in sexist situations or exaggerate their past feminist behaviours. However, they may be less willing to actually participate in feminist behaviours. One behaviour of particular importance is donation to organizations doing work to support survivors of sexual and domestic violence, such as the Rape, Abuse, and Incest, National Network (RAINN). While people may report that they would be willing to donate to a feminist organization, when faced with the choice to actually donate their compensation to such an organization, they may choose not to, particularly if they are ambivalent about their feminist identities. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that people who belong to a social ingroup should be willing to engage in behaviours that support their social group. One would expect, then, that the aligned dimensions of feminist identity (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be associated with more willingness to donate, whereas the Uncertainty may be associated with less willingness to donate. Given that donation is a private activity, Fear of Stigma should be unrelated to donation amount. Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H5) The aligned FSIS subscales (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be associated with donating more compensation to a feminist organization.

H6) Uncertainty, but not Fear of Stigma, would be negatively associated with donating more compensation to a feminist organization.
6.1.2 Feminist Identity and Anti-Racism: Tests of Convergent and Incremental Validity

In recent years, there has been increased attention to the concept of intersectional feminism (Crenshaw, 1991), or the recognition that women who face multiple forms of marginalization experience sexism in a manner that is qualitatively different than women who sit at only one axis of oppression. Understanding the links between dimensions of feminist identity and attitudes toward racial justice is important because the feminist movement has a long history of ignoring the needs, desires, and demands of non-White women (See Breins, 2006). As a notable example, during the “first wave” of feminism, when suffragettes advocated for voting rights for women, many advocated exclusively for White women (Taylor, 1998). However, White women have been reluctant to support causes that affect Black women for decades (Breins, 2006; Taylor, 1998), and this remains a persistent problem today. In fact, White women’s casual racism has become such a widespread phenomenon that at least two meme-based archetypes have proliferated in recent years – Beckys (i.e., White women being suspicious of Black people in public spaces) and Karens (i.e., calling the police on Black people for no discernable reason; Williams, 2020).

White women who are keyed into social justice have the potential to be strong advocates and allies for anti-racism. However, history suggests this is not always the case. One potential reason why some people who identify as feminists may not explicitly advocate for racial justice is because they are unaware of racial injustice. White privilege refers to the “invisible package of unearned assets” (McIntosh, 1989, p, 291) that White people are born into simply because of the colour of their skin. People who are born White benefit from a considerable advantage in society, as they are not subjected to the same structural, systemic, institutional, and interpersonal racism that Black people and People of Colour face. However, White people – and all dominant groups – may not be able to recognize the privilege they experience on the basis of the colour of their skin. In fact, group identity is less salient for those who are privileged in society, compared to those who are not (Pratto & Stewart, 2012), and White women – even those who hold feminist attitudes – may not recognize the ways that racial justice and feminist justice are intertwined.
However, it is possible that different dimensions of feminist identity may be uniquely linked to White privilege awareness and participation in racial collective action. Feminist beliefs are typically not a strong measure of willingness to participate in activism (see Conlin et al., 2019). However, higher scores on the other aligned identity subscales (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may reflect an awareness of social justice issues and a commitment to advocacy. Women who feel a sense of solidarity with other feminists may feel closer to women of all racial backgrounds and be more likely to advocate in support of Black women. Similarly, women who feel they are competent in engaging in feminist behaviours may also feel competent to engage in behaviours related to racial justice. Those who see feminism as sitting at the core of who they are as a person may be more likely to see all social activism as personally important.

On the other hand, the ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) may negatively predict willingness to engage in racial collective action and intervene in racist situations. Uncertainty about one’s feminist identity (e.g., “I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist”) may be grounded in either a lack of knowledge about social justice or mixed feelings about gender equality, and those who are afraid of experiencing stigma for their feminist values (e.g., “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist”) may similarly fear the potential backlash they may elicit through participation in behaviours that support racial justice.

Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial collective action, and (c) willingness to intervene in racist situations.

H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) would be negatively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial collective action, and (c) willingness to intervene in racist situations.
H9) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would positively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and (b) racial collective action, above White privilege awareness.

H10) The ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) would negatively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and (b) racial collective action, above White privilege awareness.

6.1.3 Feminist Identity and the Importance of Labelling: Testing Known-Groups Validity

While feminist self-identification is an important predictor of collective action, some women are reluctant to label themselves as feminists, a phenomenon so prevalent it has been termed the “I’m not a feminist, but…” phenomenon or the “feminist paradox” (see Dottolo, 2011; Radke et al., 2016). Women’s reluctance to adopt a feminist identity – or their ambivalence with the feminist label – has implications for their relationship with feminism more broadly. For example, in a study by Duncan (2010), women who felt uncertain about the feminist label expressed less commitment to feminism, compared to women who confidently self-identified as feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) research, non-labellers (i.e., women who support feminist principles but do not use the term to describe themselves) scored significantly lower on measures of feminist activism, compared to those who labelled themselves as feminists. In fact, this group showed levels of interest in feminist activism similar to non-feminists (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Zucker and Bay-Cheng (2010) have noted that it is important for future research to determine the roots of feminist non-labellers’ ambivalence. Therefore, I hypothesized that:

H11) Women who label themselves as feminists will score higher on (a) Beliefs, (b) Competence, (c) Solidarity, and (d) Centrality, compared to non-labellers and non-feminists.

H12) Women categorized as feminist non-labellers will score higher on (a) Fear of Stigma and (b) Uncertainty, compared to feminists and non-feminists.
6.2 Method

6.2.1 Participants and Procedure

One hundred and fifty women were initially recruited for the study via Prolific Academic. Prolific Academic is a website where individuals can register to participate in survey research. Prolific is different from other recruitment platforms in that equitable remuneration is required. Unlike MTurk, participants are required to be compensated at least $6 USD/hour. Data from Prolific is generally of higher quality than data from other online recruitment platforms (Peer et al., 2017).

In order to be eligible, participants needed to indicate that they identified as women, were located in the United States, were over the age of 18, and spoke fluent English. Eligible participants were shown a recruitment advertisement, which directed them to a Qualtrics survey. We aimed to recruit 150 participants. When participants clicked the Qualtrics link, they confirmed that they met eligibility criteria. They were then shown the letter of information and indicated their consent by clicking a box that said that they had read the letter and agree to participate. Participants responded to the scales below, which were presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics questionnaire. Once all survey measures were completed, a debriefing form appeared on the screen, along with a code that was to be entered on the Prolific platform. Participants who entered the code received $1.20 ($6/hour for 12 minute survey) as remuneration for their time.

Several attention checks were embedded in the survey. Six participants were excluded for failing at least one of the three attention checks. Therefore, the final sample size was 144 White women. One hundred and twenty-six women (87.5%) identified as cisgender, two identified as transgender (1.4%), and 11 indicated that they would prefer not to say (7.6%). Five participants (3.5%) did not respond to this question. All participants indicated that they were European American or White and none identified as Hispanic or Latinx. Most of the sample ($n = 97, 667.4\%$) identified as heterosexual or straight, and others identified as bisexual ($n = 27, 18.8\%$), asexual or demisexual ($n = 7, 4.9\%$),
lesbian or gay \((n = 5, 3.5\%)\), queer \((n = 2, 1.4\%)\), pansexual \((n = 2, 1.4\%)\), questioning \((n = 1, 0.7\%)\), and one \((0.7\%)\) participant indicated that their sexual orientation was not listed. Two participants \((1.4\%)\) indicated that they would prefer not to say.

A majority of participants \((n = 57, 39.6\%)\) indicated that they were married, with others indicating that they were single \((n = 38, 26.4\%)\), in a long-term relationship \((n = 25, 17.4\%)\), engaged \((n = 8, 5.6\%)\), dating \((n = 7, 4.9\%)\), divorced \((n = 6, 4.2\%)\), and one participant indicated that they preferred not to say \((0.7\%)\). Participants also varied in their educational backgrounds. Fifty participants \((34.7\%)\) had completed a Bachelor’s degree, 41 \((28.5\%)\) had completed some college or university, 23 \((16.0\%)\) had completed a graduate degree, 12 \((8.3\%)\) had a high school degree, 3 \((2.1\%)\) had completed some high school, and 2 \((1.4\%)\) had completed some graduate school.

### 6.2.2 Materials

#### 6.2.2.1 Feminist Social Identity Scale

A 35-item version of the Feminist Social Identity Scale was administered to all participants\(^6\); however, only the 29-item final version from Study 4 was used for analyses\(^7\). Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at `completely untrue of me` (scored at 1) and `completely true of me` (6).

#### 6.2.2.2 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale

The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) evaluates both feminist attitudes and feminist identification. Specifically, participants indicate whether or not they agree with three essential feminist beliefs: “Girls and women have not been treated

---

\(^6\) Study 4 was conducted at the same time as Study 3, before the factor structure had been confirmed. As such, all 35 items were administered.

\(^7\) A second confirmatory factor analysis was run using the data from this study. The fit indices supported the structural validity of the 29-item, six-factor FSIS, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, GFI = .78, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .06, \(\chi^2(362) = 674.24\), \(\chi^2/df = 1.86\). While some indices are marginally lower than Hu and Bentler’s (1999) cutoffs, the modification indices revealed no obvious modifications to improve the overall fit of the measure.
as well as boys and men in our society,” “women and men should be paid equally for the same work,” and “women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued.” After indicating their agreement with each item, participants select whether they would like to complete the “feminist” or “non-feminist” version of the survey (a proxy for feminist identification). Participants who agree with all three attitudinal items and select “feminist” are labeled as feminists. Those who agree with all three attitudinal items and select “non-feminist” are categorized as non-labellers. Participants who do not agree with all three attitudinal items are labeled as non-feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) study with 333 women, 272 participants (81.6%) could be categorized into these three categories: 45% of women were classified as feminists, 31% were non-labellers, and 24% were non-feminists.

6.2.2.3 Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a 22-item measure that evaluates two dimensions of sexist attitudes. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree (5). The hostile sexism subscale contains 11 items that measure the extent to which participants hold traditionally prejudiced attitudes toward women (e.g., Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist). The benevolent sexism subscale contains 11 items that assess patronizing, condescending, and essentialist beliefs about women (e.g., Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility). Around the world, in both community and college samples of men and women, the ASI has demonstrated internal and test-retest reliability, as well as convergent validity with other measures of prejudiced attitudes toward women and other minoritized groups (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001).

6.2.2.4 Willingness to Intervene in Sexist Situations

The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexism Scale (Weis et al., 2018) is a 6-item measure that assesses how likely participants are to intervene in instances of both hostile and benevolent sexism. An example item from the hostile sexism category is “Imagine that you’re at a party and someone tells a joke that is degrading to women. How willing
would you be to speak out against this?” An example item from the benevolent category is “Imagine that you are on a date with a male partner, and he insists on opening the car and restaurant doors for you. How willing would you be to speak out against this?” Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at very unwilling (scored at 1) and very willing (7). However, both subscales are averaged to create an overall behavioural willingness score. In a sample of 428 adult U.S. women, the scale demonstrated adequate internal consistency reliability (α = .69) and was positively associated with feminist beliefs and identification (Weis et al., 2018).

6.2.2.5  Willingness to Intervene in Racist Situations

The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Racism Scale was a modified version of this scale that evaluated both modern and old-fashioned racism. An example from the modern racism items is “Imagine that you are in a group of friends and someone states that discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in the United States. How willing would you be to speak out against this?” An example of an old-fashioned racism item is “Imagine that you are at a costume party and you notice a person in blackface. How willing would you be to speak out against this?” This scale was designed for the purposes of this study and used the same scoring system as the Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexism scale above.

6.2.2.6  Privilege and Oppression Inventory - White Privilege Awareness Subscale

The White Privilege Awareness subscale of the Privilege and Oppression Inventory (Hays et al., 2007) is a unidimensional, 13-item measure that evaluates respondents’ knowledge about the myriad ways that White people are socially privileged and valued in Western society. Example items include “The media (e.g., television, radio) favors Whites” and “I believe that being White is an advantage in society.” Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (6). Across two samples of trainees in counselling programs, the subscale demonstrated
internal consistency, two-week test-retest reliability, and positive associations with awareness of other forms of privilege and oppression (Hays et al., 2007).

6.2.2.7 Engagement in Feminist and Racial Collective Action

Given that this study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and many in-person activist behaviours were prohibited due to social distancing, activism measures were created for the purposes of this study. Each scale contained seven items related to modern feminist and racial collective action: attended a protest dedicated to a feminist/racial justice issue, signed a petition in support of a feminist cause/racial justice, donated to a feminist/anti-racism charity, contacted a representative about a feminist/race-related issue, shared a post on social media in support of a feminist/racial justice topic, met with others to discuss a feminist/racial justice topic, and read feminist/anti-racist literature. Participants are asked to indicate how frequently they have engaged in 7 different behaviours over the past 12 months. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-style scale anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Both scales demonstrated strong internal consistency (see Table 14).

6.2.2.8 Donation

A one-item measure was included to evaluate the extent to which participants were willing to donate their compensation to a well-known and reputable organization to support survivors of gender-based violence, the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National Network (RAINN). Specifically, participants were prompted with the instructions: “You will have the option to donate a portion of your earnings to RAINN, the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network. RAINN is the largest anti-sexual violence organization in the nation and has been supporting survivors of sexual violence since its inception in 1994. What portion, if any, of your proceeds would you like to donate to RAINN?” Participants indicated the portion of their $1.20 compensation they wished to donate using a sliding scale that ranged from 0% to 100% of their compensation.
6.3 Results

All analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 25.0. A missing values analysis revealed that only .07% of data were missing. Given the small number of missing data points, I did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).

6.3.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1-6: Convergent, Criterion, and Incremental Validity

Bivariate correlations can be found in Table 1. Supporting Hypothesis 1a-d and consistent with Study 4, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales were all significantly and negatively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism, as well as willingness to intervene in sexist situations and feminist activism. Hypotheses 2a and b were only partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and positively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism, but Fear of Stigma was not related to hostile ($r = .06, p = .51$) or benevolent sexism ($r = .05, p = .52$). Hypothesis 2c was supported: both Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were significantly and negatively associated with willingness to intervene in sexist situations. However, Hypothesis 2d was only partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with feminist activism, but Fear of Stigma was not significantly related to willingness to intervene in sexist situations ($r = -.06, p = .52$).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Beliefs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Competence</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Solidarity</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Centrality</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Stigma</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Uncertainty</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.33</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hostile Sexism</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>-.56</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Benevolent Sexism</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Racial Consciousness</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.59</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Feminist Behaviours</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Racial Behaviours</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Everyday Sexism</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Everyday Racism</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Donation</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: 4.23  4.23  3.70  3.07  2.86  2.69  2.18  2.56  4.54  1.86  2.05  4.85  5.54  31.86
Standard deviation: .98  1.15  1.25  1.36  1.29  1.30  .99  .94  1.22  .81  .85  1.08  1.32  35.34
Alpha: .93  .94  .93  .96  .89  .93  .93  .88  .97  .70  .87  .85  .85  N/A

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
Although no a priori hypotheses were made regarding differences in the correlations between FSIS scores and hostile and benevolent sexism, an examination of the table of correlations revealed that the correlations were stronger between the FSIS scales and hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism. As such, I conducted exploratory Fisher’s r to z transformations to examine the possibility that this difference was statistically significant. This difference was significant for Beliefs ($z = 3.00, p < .001$), Competence ($z = 2.15, p = .016$), Solidarity ($z = 3.20, p < .001$), and Centrality ($z = 2.58, p = .005$). The difference was not significant for Fear of Stigma ($z = .08, p = .466$) or Uncertainty ($z = .40, p = .345$).

To test Hypotheses 3a and 4a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations, above hostile and benevolent sexism (see Table 15). The dependent variable was willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Hostile and benevolent sexism were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. Only hostile sexism explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a and 4a were not supported: none of the FSIS subscales explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations.

**Table 15. Incremental Validity Tests for Study 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion: Feminist activism</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>$adj , R^2$</td>
<td>$\Delta R^2$</td>
<td>$\Delta F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 1</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile sexism</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>-5.10$^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.94$^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolent sexism</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Step 2</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile sexism</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolent sexism</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSIS-Beliefs</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSIS-Competence</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>3.40$^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSIS-Solidarity</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>3.83$^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSIS-Centrality</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSIS-Stigma</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Criterion: Willingness to intervene in sexist situations

**Step 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.10</th>
<th>-1.23</th>
<th>.000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Hostile sexism**  
- .26  -2.33  .035

**Benevolent sexism**  
- .07  -.61  .002

**Step 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.17</th>
<th>-1.95</th>
<th>.021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Hostile sexism | .11  .82  .004 |
| Benevolent sexism | -.15  -.13  .009 |
| FSIS-Beliefs | .14  .92  .005 |
| FSIS-Competence | .21  1.80  .018 |
| FSIS-Solidarity | -.29  1.62  .015 |
| FSIS-Centrality | -.10  -.67  .003 |
| FSIS-Stigma | .01  .07  .000 |

### Criterion: Racial collective action

**Step 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.52</th>
<th>7.28***</th>
<th>.27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Privilege awareness | .52  7.28***  .27 |

**Step 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.34</th>
<th>4.28***</th>
<th>.068</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Privilege awareness | .34  4.28***  .068 |
| FSIS-Beliefs | -.25  -1.98*  .014 |
| FSIS-Competence | .24  2.57*  .026 |
| FSIS-Solidarity | .48  3.64***  .048 |
| FSIS-Centrality | -.02  -.12  .000 |
| FSIS-Stigma | -.08  -1.09  .004 |
| FSIS-Uncertainty | -.06  -.86  .003 |

### Criterion: Willingness to intervene in racist situations

**Step 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.53</th>
<th>7.52***</th>
<th>.28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Privilege awareness | .53  7.52***  .28 |

**Step 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>FSIS-Uncertainty</th>
<th>.33</th>
<th>3.91***</th>
<th>.063</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Privilege awareness | .33  3.91***  .063 |
| FSIS-Beliefs | .16  1.22  .004 |
| FSIS-Competence | .37  3.80***  .058 |
| FSIS-Solidarity | .23  1.65  .020 |
| FSIS-Centrality | -.29  -2.22*  .012 |
| FSIS-Stigma | .07  .87  .004 |
| FSIS-Uncertainty | .003  .04  .000 |
Note. $^* = p < .05$, $^{**} = p < .01$, $^{***} = p < .001$

To test Hypotheses 3b and 4b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist activism, above hostile and benevolent sexism. The dependent variable was feminist activism. Hostile and benevolent sexism were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. For feminist activism, Competence accounted for 4.2% of the variance in feminist activism, and Solidarity accounted for 5.3% of the variance, above hostile and benevolent sexism. Beliefs and Centrality did not account for any significant degree of variance in feminist activism. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b was partially supported: two of the aligned identity dimensions of the FSIS explained unique variance in feminist activism. Hypothesis 4b was not supported: The ambivalent dimensions did not explain unique variance in feminist activism.

For portion of compensation donated, responses ranged from 0% to 100%, with the mean percent of compensation donated reflecting about one-third of the total possible compensation, 31.86% (or $0.38). However, there was substantial variability in this value, with the standard deviation being 35.34. While the skewness statistic did not suggest that the data was significantly skewed (.89), an examination of the frequency values for donation amount revealed that 28% of respondents were not willing to donate to the organization, and 15% were willing to donate all of their compensation. Supporting Hypothesis 5, each of the aligned identity dimensions of the FSIS was associated with donation amount ($rs$ ranged from .23 for Competence to .33 for Solidarity, $p < .01$). Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with donation amount, and Fear of Stigma was unrelated to donation amount, supporting Hypothesis 6. These findings offer initial evidence for the criterion-related validity of the scale.

6.3.2 Tests of Hypotheses 7-10: Convergent and Incremental Validity

Supporting Hypotheses 7a-c, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales were all significantly and negatively linked to White privilege awareness, racial collective action, and willingness to intervene in racist situations. Hypothesis 8a was partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and negatively related to racial
collective action, but Fear of Stigma was not significantly related to this construct. Hypotheses 8a and 8b were not supported: neither Uncertainty nor Fear of Stigma was associated with willingness to intervene in racist situations.

To test Hypotheses 9a and 10a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in racist situations, above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable was willingness to intervene in racist situations. White privilege awareness was entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in racist situations, Competence accounted for 5.8% of the variance, and Centrality accounted for 1.2% of the variance. Interestingly, feminist Centrality was negatively predictive of behavioural willingness. These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 9a, but not 10a: some of the aligned FSIS subscales explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in racist situations; none of the ambivalent subscales did.

To test Hypotheses 9b and 10b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in racial collective action, above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable was racial collective action. White privilege awareness was entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in racist situations, Solidarity accounted for 4.8% and Competence accounted for 2.6% of the variance. Interestingly, Beliefs accounted for 1.4% of the variance in racial collective action; however, feminist beliefs were negatively predictive of racial collective action. These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 9b: some of the aligned FSIS subscales explained unique variance in racial collective action; none of the ambivalent subscales did.

6.3.3 Tests of Hypotheses 11 and 12: Known-Groups Validity

In order to examine known-groups validity, I evaluated mean-level FSIS scores for feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists based on the CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004). Using this classification, 97 participants were categorized into the “feminist” group, 22
participants were categorized into the “non-labellers” group, and 12 participants were categorized into the “non-feminists” group. Under this classification system, 13 participants could not be categorized. Results of a one-way ANOVA indicated significant group differences for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, and Uncertainty, but not for Fear of Stigma (See Table 16).

Table 16. Test of Known-Groups Validity for the FSIS for Study 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Feminist M (SD)</th>
<th>Non-labellers M (SD)</th>
<th>Non-feminists M (SD)</th>
<th>Welch’s t</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>η²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs</td>
<td>4.77 (.66)</td>
<td>3.34 (.87)</td>
<td>2.95 (.89)</td>
<td>45.06***</td>
<td>61.16***</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>4.57 (.92)</td>
<td>3.29 (1.27)</td>
<td>2.95 (1.19)</td>
<td>18.16***</td>
<td>24.71***</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>4.18 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.45 (.98)</td>
<td>2.05 (.65)</td>
<td>62.28***</td>
<td>45.66***</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrality</td>
<td>3.56 (1.20)</td>
<td>1.63 (.71)</td>
<td>1.70 (.78)</td>
<td>58.30***</td>
<td>37.91***</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stigma</td>
<td>2.97 (1.28)</td>
<td>2.73 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.15 (1.01)</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty</td>
<td>2.53 (1.28)</td>
<td>3.29 (1.37)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.23)</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.55*</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001

Revealing the unique importance of feminist self-identification, post-hoc Bonferroni tests revealed no significant differences between non-labellers and non-feminists for any of the FSIS subscales (see Table 16). Statistically significant differences were detected for Beliefs scores between feminists and non-labellers (p < .001) and feminists and non-feminists (p < .001). The same pattern was observed for Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality scores, with feminists scoring higher on these subscales than non-labellers (ps < .001) and non-feminists (ps < .001). A statistically significant – albeit weaker – difference was also detected between feminists and non-labellers for the Uncertainty subscale (p = .04); however, no significant difference was detected between feminists and non-feminists. Overall, this pattern supports the known-groups validity of the FSIS subscales: feminists (i.e., those who hold feminist attitudes and label themselves as feminists) also scored higher on the aligned dimensions of feminist social identity (Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality) compared to non-labellers (i.e., those who hold feminist attitudes but do not label themselves as feminists) and non-feminists (i.e., those who do not hold feminist attitudes or label themselves as feminists). These results support Hypotheses 11a-d, as well as Hypothesis 12b. However, Hypothesis 12a
was not supported. While significant differences were detected between self-identified feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, and Uncertainty, no difference was found between these groups for Fear of Stigma.

The CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004) allows for the examination of mean-level differences across three groups: feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists. However, some participants may not be able to be categorized into one of these three categories: those who identify as feminists but do not support all three feminists beliefs. Therefore, I ran an exploratory ANOVA to probe for potential mean-level differences between this group and others. Given that no past research has specifically examined this group, I did not specify any a priori hypotheses.

The results suggested that the mean for Beliefs for this group was significantly higher than the mean for non-labellers and non-feminists (ps < .001), but no difference was detected between this group and feminists (p = .57). Similarly, for Competence, this group scored similarly to feminists (p = 1.00), but higher than non-labellers (p = .001) and non-feminists (p = .004). A similar pattern was detected for Solidarity: the mean of this group did not significantly differ from the mean of the feminist group (p = 1.00), but differed significantly from non-labellers (p < .001) and non-feminists (p = .001). This group also scored similarly to feminists (p = .761) on Centrality, but higher than non-labellers (p = .016) and non-feminists (p = .002). No significant differences were detected between this group and the other groups for Fear of Stigma or Uncertainty. Overall, this group scored similarly to the feminist group across both aligned and ambivalent identity subscales.

6.4 Discussion

By examining additional convergent, criterion, incremental, and known-groups validity, this study provided further evidence of construct validity for the FSIS. Support for the convergent validity of the FSIS was observed through the FSIS’s associations with relevant measures. The FSIS subscales demonstrated the expected differential
associations with sexist attitudes, with the aligned identity subscales linked to less endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, and the ambivalent identity subscales linked to more endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism. The one exception was for the Fear of Stigma scale, which was not significantly associated with hostile or benevolent sexist attitudes. Notably, the pattern of associations between the aligned identity subscales and benevolent sexist attitudes were weaker than for hostile sexist attitudes, consistent with the idea that benevolent sexism is more difficult to recognize as sexist and therefore less readily rejected (see Connor et al., 2015), even among women who report a strong feminist social identity. Moreover, the positive associations between sexist attitudes and the Uncertainty dimension of the FSIS supports the idea that ambivalent aspects of a feminist social identity may explain how some women are able to hold both feminist and sexist views.

The FSIS subscales also demonstrated the expected differential associations with measures of feminist collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to more engagement in feminist collective action, whereas one of the ambivalent identity subscales, Uncertainty, was linked to less engagement in feminist collective action. Notably, women’s engagement in feminist collective action did not vary in relation to their fear of stigma toward feminists. The same patterns were observed for willingness to intervene in sexist situations, with the aligned identity subscales linked to greater willingness to intervene in sexist situations, whereas both ambivalent identity subscales were linked to less willingness to intervene in sexist situations.

The FSIS subscales also demonstrated the expected differential associations with measures of racial collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to greater awareness of White privilege, and one of the ambivalent identity subscales, Uncertainty, was linked to less awareness of White privilege. Fear of Stigma was not significantly associated with awareness of White privilege. The aligned identity subscales were associated with more willingness to intervene in racist situations; however, the ambivalent identity subscales were unrelated to willingness to intervene in racist situations.
The results for the tests of known-groups validity were consistent with theorizing on the importance of feminist identity, above merely agreeing with feminist principles, for predicting feminist action (Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). Specifically, no significant differences were found between non-feminists and non-labellers on any of the FSIS subscales. However, those who support feminist principles and labelled themselves as feminists scored more highly on the aligned identity subscales, compared to non-feminists and non-labellers. Further, as expected, non-labellers scored more highly than feminists and non-feminists on the Uncertainty subscale. In concert, these findings support the known-groups validity of the FSIS. In my exploratory analyses, the group that is typically excluded from analyses (those who identify as feminists but do not agree with the three feminist beliefs) scored similarly to the feminist group on every subscale. Despite the fact that these participants responded similarly to non-feminists on the beliefs items, scores were significantly different between these groups across the other FSIS dimensions. (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, Centrality). This pattern of findings suggests that those who identify as feminists score more highly on the FSIS subscales, regardless of whether or not they support feminist beliefs. Given the unique importance of identity for collective action willingness (van Zomeren et al., 2008), as well as the complexities of feminist self-identification (see Zucker, 2004), the tool’s value as a measure of identity may allow researchers to make more precise predictions regarding feminist activism. This distinction also addresses a critique of some measures of feminist “identity,” which may actually capture feminist attitudes (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).

Finally, the FSIS Competence and Solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist activism participation, above the variance accounted for by hostile and benevolent sexism, suggesting that feeling equipped with the knowledge and skills to enact one’s feminism and being aligned with other feminists may foster more collective action willingness. These findings are partially consistent with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), which suggests that identity and perceived efficacy of collective action (as well as perceived injustice) may predict collective action. Interestingly, feeling that feminism is at the core of who one is as a person (Centrality) did not predict feminist collective action, suggesting that perhaps
sense of community – rather than identity salience – may be important for getting people to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist attitudes and identities.

The same pattern was true for engagement in racial collective action, suggesting that a sense of competence in one’s ability to address social injustice, and a sense of solidarity with other like-minded individuals, may encourage women to think about social justice more broadly and intersectionally. Competence also predicted willingness to intervene in instances of everyday racism, but not everyday sexism. While there are many potential interpretations of this finding, one possibility is that it reflects the difficulty of intervening in instances of everyday sexism for women. Indeed, women who take a feminist stand against sexism, and against encounters of benevolent sexism in particular, run the risk of experiencing backlash for violating gender norms and expectations for women (Connor et al., 2015).

6.4.1.1 Limitations and Future Directions

It is important to note that this research is cross-sectional and correlational so no causal claims can be made about the nature of the FSIS subscales and its ability to predict specific behaviours. Further, the sample size for this study was somewhat smaller than other studies in this dissertation and consisted of exclusively White women. The findings cannot and should not be generalized to women outside of this demographic. Future research should examine measurement invariance in the FSIS to determine whether the subscales of this particular measure maintain the same factor structure in women across racial and ethnic groups. Although attention checks and quality assurance measures were embedded into the survey, there is always a possibility of low-quality data with online surveys. Also, three of the measures used for this study (i.e., Willingness to Intervene in Instances of Everyday Racism Scale and both measures of collective action) have not been subjected to a full program of construct validation, and therefore any changes to scale items in the future could change their relations to the FSIS subscales. It is also possible that links may have been different if other items had been used to assess racial and feminist activism. One additional limitation is that the survey was advertised as a study of “gender attitudes and activism.” It is therefore possible that participants who
were involved in activism or interested in this particular topic are overrepresented in this sample.

6.4.1.2 Conclusion

This study provided additional evidence of convergent, incremental, criterion, and known-groups validity for the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) in a sample of White women recruited from Prolific Academic. These findings add support for the overall construct validity of the FSIS. This study also highlights important associations between aligned and ambivalent dimensions of feminist social identity with awareness of White privilege and engagement in feminist and racial collective action, which is consistent with intersectional feminist identity. It is possible that some “White feminists” inaction on matters of racial justice is grounded in more than a lack of awareness of White privilege, but also uncertainty regarding their feminist identification. In this way, it appears that feminist ambivalence may not only serve as a barrier to feminist progress, but also progress toward racial justice.
Chapter 7

7 Study 6: Feminist Identity Development and Growth in Cisgender Men

In Study 2, I developed a theoretical framework for understanding ambivalent feminism among women and nonbinary individuals. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a measure of feminist social identity that contained both positive and negative identity subscales. However, none of these studies included men. This choice was deliberate, given that feminist identity – and feminist identity ambivalence – likely differs between the people who feminism primarily benefits (women and gender diverse individuals) and those who may feel threatened by it (cisgender men). In this study, I took a bottom-up approach to understanding how men who identify as feminists develop their identities, and examining potential areas of ambivalence within men’s feminist identities.

7.1 Introduction

At present, feminist men are a difficult subject for empirical analysis. Virtually every psychological theoretical model of feminist identity development is restricted to women, and most instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes have been validated with exclusively women samples, or contain items that make them irrelevant for men (see Siegel & Calogero, 2021; also Chapter 2, this dissertation). Given that instruments and theories of feminism have historically excluded men, it comes as no surprise that nearly all of this research has been conducted on exclusively women samples. Understanding men’s feminist identities, and the ambivalence inherent to them, requires special attention and consideration. Across national surveys and psychological studies, men are less likely than women to identify as feminists (for a review, see Siegel, 2020), and men often report negative attitudes toward feminists (Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019; Twenge & Zucker, 1999).

However, many men support gender equality, and some identify as feminists, work to combat sexism, and serve as feminist advocates and educators (Bojin, 2013; Drury &
Kaiser, 2014; Edwards, 2008). Recent research has begun to examine the role of men in the feminist movement (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Madsen et al., 2020; Sudkämper et al., 2020; Wiley & Dunne, 2019), but men’s feminist identity development process, remains elusive. The current study aimed to address this gap in the literature by exploring the dimensions of feminist identity development in men and identifying potential barriers to men’s feminist advocacy and activism.

While feminist identification is not a necessary condition for men’s feminist activism (Becker & Swim, 2011; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), some research has found that men’s use of the label “feminist” (rather than “profeminist” or “antisexist”) can uniquely influence their willingness to engage in feminist activism (White, 2006). However, many men express reluctance about identifying as feminists, potentially due to the stigma attributed to feminist men. The few studies that have specifically examined the stigma attributed to men who identify as feminists have yielded inconsistent results regarding whether feminist men are viewed more positively or negatively than their non-feminist counterparts (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). Indeed, stereotypes about feminist men are mixed, with male feminists regarded as more warm, affectionate, open-minded and kind, but also weaker, less masculine, more feminine, less attractive, and more likely to be gay compared to non-feminist men (Anderson et al., 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). The negative stereotypes attributed to male feminists may serve as a powerful deterrent to men’s feminist identification due to the cultural mandate for men to adhere to stoic, powerful, and hegemonic masculine norms (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).

Precarious Manhood Theory (Vandello et al., 2008; Vandello & Bosson, 2013) proposes that the social title of “man” must be earned by repeated displays of traditionally masculine behaviours, such as restricted emotionality, unrelenting competition, and conquest over women. Men who deviate from these expectations risk being seen as less than “real men” and may receive verbal or physical backlash for their inability or unwillingness to follow the manhood mandate. In a culture in which rigid adherence to restricted cultural norms of masculinity is regarded as optimal for men, aligning themselves with a stigmatized social group, particularly one that makes them appear
more “feminine” to others, may be regarded as anathema to the principles of manhood. Indeed, the more men adhere to traditionally masculine stereotypes, the less likely they are to support feminist principles and practices (Silver et al., 2019; Toller et al., 2004; Wade & Brittan-Powell, 2001).

Due to the lacuna of empirical research into men’s feminist identity growth and development, I aimed to address the following four research questions: 1) What factors promote the development of a feminist identity in men? 2) What life events precipitate men’s feminist identity development? 3) How is masculinity negotiated within the context of a male feminist identity? 4) How does men’s feminist identity development compare to women’s?

7.2 Method

7.2.1 Participants and Procedure

A recruitment advertisement was posted on several social media websites (e.g., Twitter, Facebook). Interested participants were instructed to contact the first author for a 45-60 minute interview about their attitudes and experiences as a male feminist. Upon initial contact, the first author confirmed that the participants met inclusion criteria (i.e., identified as male, identified as feminist, spoke fluent English, and had access to Zoom). Once this information was confirmed, a letter of information and consent was sent via email, which participants signed and sent back to the first author. Once the first author received the signed consent document, a mutually agreeable time was arranged for a Zoom video interview. All participants selected a pseudonym to maintain their anonymity in study records.

A video interview was chosen over an in-person interview to accommodate schedules and diverse geographical locations. This decision was integrated into the initial design of the study, but it proved beneficial to the project, given that interviews were conducted amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Being in the comfort of their own homes also allowed the research team to observe participants in their most comfortable and natural spaces. For example, on a few occasions, interviews were interrupted by roommates, coworkers,
partners, or internet connectivity issues. Notably, during Mitchell Oreskes’s interview, the participant’s mother stopped the interview to deliver him banana pancakes, which he waited to eat until after the interview had completed. One participant (Doug Fisher) started the interview by lighting a pipe and drank two beers over the course of the 45-minute chat, laughing and swearing for the duration of the discussion. When asked about masculinity, Jordan read relevant passages and poetry from his personal diary. Moments like these, some tender and others humorous, consistently reminded the research team to honor and uphold our epistemological commitment to conduct research that is attentive to our participants’ humanity.

The final sample consisted of 27 men (Mage = 33.08, SD = 8.42), all of whom were cisgender and identified as feminist. All participants who met inclusion criteria were interviewed until the authors felt confident that no new themes would be identified in future interviews (i.e., theoretical saturation was reached; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019 for a critique of saturation). Sixteen of the men were residing in Canada at the time of the interview, nine were in the United States, one was in England, and one was living in Japan. They were mostly straight (n = 21), queer (n = 3), or gay (n = 2). One indicated that they would prefer not to report their sexual orientation (n = 1). A majority of the participants were in a long- or short-term relationship at the time of the interview (n = 8), single (n = 7), and some were married (n = 6) or in common law relationships (n = 2). One participant was engaged (n = 1), and one preferred not to say (n = 1). Two participants indicated that they were polyamorous, but this question was not asked explicitly in the interviews. They varied in number of children, race, level of education, occupation, and (dis)ability status (see Table 17).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sexual orientation</th>
<th>Relationship status</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Highest Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Disability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garth Superhalk</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Queer/questioning</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>MA, pursuing PhD</td>
<td>PhD candidate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell Oreskes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>White/Jewish</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry L.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Postdoc</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Gay</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Cherokee/White</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Doctoral candidate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June Donut</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>White/Hispanic</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Long-term relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Grant writer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>MA, pursuing PhD</td>
<td>PhD candidate</td>
<td>Anxiety, depression, ADD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bradley</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Middle Eastern</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BS, pursuing PhD</td>
<td>PhD student</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Psychologist</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Malden</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>University lecturer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>College/Trade school</td>
<td>Sales and service agent</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Commonlaw</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA, pursuing PhD</td>
<td>Graduate student</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Queer</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>BA, pursuing JD</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Sexuality</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>Current Role</td>
<td>Health/Other Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Gay</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>No PhD</td>
<td>Associate professor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No Bachelor's PhD</td>
<td>Program officer</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galean</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Asian/Indian</td>
<td>USA, from India</td>
<td>Prefer not to say</td>
<td>Prefer not to say</td>
<td>No Bachelor's PhD</td>
<td>Visiting researcher</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Pines</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Queer, polyamorous</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No Bachelor's PhD</td>
<td>Mover</td>
<td>Bipolar disorder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>White/British</td>
<td>Japan, from UK</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No MA</td>
<td>University instructor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No MA, pursuing PhD</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobalon</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>White/Ojibwe</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight, polyamorous</td>
<td>Commonlaw</td>
<td>Yes PhD</td>
<td>Assistant professor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willem</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Yes PhD</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skylar</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>In a relationship</td>
<td>No MA</td>
<td>Music educator</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>White/French-Canadian</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Engaged</td>
<td>No “University dropout”</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Pilipino</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No PhD</td>
<td>Postdoc</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cole</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No Pursuing BS</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Yes PhD</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curt</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Chinese/Vietnamese/American</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Straight</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>No BS, pursuing MS</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interviews were semi-structured in nature, and minor revisions to the interview schedule were made throughout the course of the project to shed light on the emergent coding scheme (Agee, 2008). The final interview schedule can be found in Appendix C. To create an environment in which participants felt heard and respected, no notes were taken during the interview (see below for more information on my reflexivity process). Interviews ranged in duration from 38 minutes to 84 minutes, depending on the length of participants’ responses and their desire to share more or fewer experiences with me. The average interview length was 50 minutes. In two instances, internet connectivity issues necessitated interviewing in two separate recordings. I transcribed the interviews verbatim, resulting in 461 single-spaced pages of data.

7.2.2 Positionality and Analytic Method

I coded the data according to the principles of reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Thematic analysis was selected over other forms of qualitative analysis due to its flexibility; this technique allowed me to approach the data with a set of theoretical assumptions about feminist identity and masculinity, but also to explore the unique and nuanced perspectives of my participants. Braun and Clarke (2020a) define reflexive thematic analysis as an approach that “fully embraces qualitative research values and the subjective skills the researcher brings to the process” (p. 6). With this reflexivity in mind, I stress that this interpretation of these men’s experiences is one of many possible interpretations, and a different research team may have extracted alternative themes from these data. Therefore, it is important for the research team to socially locate ourselves within the context of the study. I was responsible for advertising the study, interviewing participants, transcribing the interviews, analyzing the data, and writing the manuscript for this research. At the time of this study, I was a young, White, able-bodied, cisgender woman studying feminist identity and feminist qualitative research. I was also an American Ph.D. candidate, completing my doctoral studies in Canada. Another coder was a young, White, able-bodied, cisgender man, holding a B.Sc. in psychology with an honors specialization. He was responsible for identifying exemplary quotes from the analysis to support each theme and subtheme. A third coder
supervised the study and assisted with manuscript revisions, providing invaluable feedback throughout the research process. She was a White, able-bodied, cisgender woman and full professor of psychology at a Canadian university with expertise in the psychology of gender. Each member of the research team identifies as a feminist.

I created the initial coding process. I familiarized myself with the data by conducting and transcribing the interviews, and reading carefully through each, highlighting seemingly-important quotes as I read. I recorded instances where these codes could potentially form the framework for higher-order themes. I engaged in a variety of reflexivity practices, ranging from memoing and reflexive journaling to drawing and discussing preliminary coding with labmates (Birks et al., 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Consistent threads of meaning ran through several of the preliminary codes, which were grouped into higher-order themes. However, as participants shared their diverse experiences, themes and codes were juggled and regrouped until a cogent set of themes and subthemes was agreed upon by all coders. In order to increase the trustworthiness of the analysis (Nowell et al., 2017), the write-up of the document was sent to each participant, who had one week to provide feedback, suggestions, and revisions to the manuscript. Eleven (40.74%) participants responded, all of whom indicated that the manuscript was a good fit for their experiences and that they were grateful to be involved in this stage of the process. Some men recommended minor revisions to the paper or asked clarifying questions, which were addressed and incorporated into the manuscript.

7.3 Results

Rather than a clear developmental trajectory, the men described a feminist identity development process that was cyclical and ongoing. As such, I henceforth use the term “feminist identity growth” to describe this process. Participants often noted that no one had ever asked about their experiences as feminists and expressed gratitude for the opportunity to contribute to feminist research, with some stating that it was “validating” (Skylar, Jordan). Five themes were identified that comprised men’s feminist identity growth process: *Diverse Feminist Foundations, Turning Points, Evaluation and*
(Un)Learning, Taking Action, and Feedback. See Table 18 for a list of themes, subthemes, and exemplary quotes.

Table 18. List of Themes, Subthemes, and Exemplary Quotes for Study 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Subtheme</th>
<th>Exemplary quote [Speaker]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diverse feminist foundations</td>
<td>Culture and upbringing</td>
<td>I grew up on the North Shore of Chicago. It was the 70s and 80s. Yes, I had - I think a lot, a lot of ingrained sexist and misogynistic stereotypes from culture, from friends, culture, movies, television shows, books, what have you that was swiftly beaten out of me by becoming more mature, becoming going to college. Holy God. You know, because I was I was a typical American child in the sense that I played a lot of sports. I played a lot of organized sports I played, I played Little League Baseball. [June]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminist figures</td>
<td></td>
<td>My mom would have identified as feminist, absolutely, and still does. And so I grew up in a household that was very much about equality. And [I had a] sense of like, women are equal, and, you know, people of different races, ethnicities, language, disability status, that sort of thing are equal, and, you know, equally valid and have - should have the same rights...my mom took me and my sister to a Gloria Steinem lecture. [Patrick]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experiences with</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hmm... I mean, in, in basically every way [okay]. Um, I think that - I don't, I don't think that, that the gays would have been allowed to marry without a shit ton of groundwork that was laid by multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning points</td>
<td>Aha moments</td>
<td>Recent social movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waves of feminist thought. And I think it's wild the extent to which, collectively we gays do not acknowledge that fact. [Steven]</td>
<td>I was 18, 19. I was reading a textbook. And I could, I just realized that when like, names of people were coming up, I was just assuming they're all men. Like in this book, right? It was like a scientific book. It was like nonfiction. It was names of scientists, whatever. And I was just in my head. They were just all men. And then I realizing that was like, &quot;Whoa, there's like, there's something going on here... We gotta - We gotta dig deeper on this.&quot; [Mitchell]</td>
<td>There was a - an international &quot;wear pants to church day&quot;... there's nothing in the Bible that says that women can't wear pants to church, right? And so a bunch of women wore pants to church, and a bunch of people got real upset about it, which was their point.... and then also, you know, contemporaneously, I am coming to terms with my own sexuality, which of course, makes me question a lot of gender roles and so forth. Because like if I am suddenly looking at, you know, my future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal education</td>
<td>One of my classmates in a course I took [on feminism] made buttons for everyone in the class out of rocks with the letters printed on them: &quot;feminist killjoy&quot; and I have been proudly wearing it on my backpack that I use every single day ever since. [Wayne]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships being between two men then, right, that sort of upsets the applecart in a lot of ways. [Patrick]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversations</td>
<td>And when my ex, actually, she, I think she has sort of impacted the way I think about a lot of stuff, as well. She's like a very sex positive person. That's sort of - I had conversations with her about, sort of, gender identity, sexual and sexual identity and stuff have also been pretty influential. [Bradley]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation and unlearning</td>
<td>Observing other men</td>
<td>The men who have influenced my feminism in sort of, in the &quot;I don't want to behave like that&quot; way have added value. But it's - it's always bittersweet to learn by - to learn from someone else's mistakes, and, and to know that they don't necessarily see them as mistakes... which is more problematic on it and can be troubling on a philosophical level, right? Like this person doesn't even realize how far out to lunch they are. [Right, right.] Or what they're teaching their kids or, you know, just through exhibited behaviours, so it's really challenging. [Nigel]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Distancing from sexist friends | Men let me down a lot.. thinking that somebody's kind of a good person, and then you get to know them more. And then you kind of realize like, you realize their actions… I guess most of my friends are women now. And then, if I ever find like, a male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh, yeah, he like sexually assaulting my friend like
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Trial and error</strong></th>
<th>four years ago,&quot; and I'm like, &quot;oh, okay, like, I guess he's kind of out.&quot; [Cole]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off on a tangent and becoming like, the dominant kind of role in something, and then I think back the next day, I'm like, &quot;Oh, I kind of like dominated that whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on very absolute terms about everything that I was talking about, right? [Garth]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reimagining masculinity</strong></td>
<td>My understanding of what it means to male identify while also being a male feminist has to do with like a - for me, it has to with a - what's the word I'm looking for? not a role a - responsibility to, let's say, to challenge the kind of norms that I was just like talking about, and, and support the, challenge the norms that I was just talking about. And then to also support the things that go against those norms and normal - and normalize those, or give those kind of safe space. [Mitchell]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taking action</strong></td>
<td>I think I'd like to model as many as I try to do as much housework and childcare as my wife does whenever possible. And try to model the idea that this is a two way street that there's two parents active here and that I don't use terms like &quot;babysitting&quot; to refer to the times when my wife's out of the house and I'm the one who's taking care of the kids. [Andy]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Egalitarian relationships** | }
| Raising children | You don't want to necessarily fall into this trap of reinforcing what's already out there as the background of - the background noise of everything being gendered, right, especially when it comes to kids. So if it's available in some color other than making baby blue, I usually find in that color, it's like that. [Andy] |
| Educating men | So, when I came to back to Toronto and was looking, looking at different community initiatives to get involved in. I was specifically researching for, for initiatives that target young men and try to deconstruct these, these ideas of masculinity and like promote alternative masculinities. So I was specifically looking for that and trying to connect with those groups because the problem that I saw with gender equality in general, was it wasn't you know, "we need to advocate more necessarily on the women's side,” but I think we need to change the mindset of the men's side. [Skylar] |
| Advocacy and activism | Yep. I have absolutely signed petitions. I participated in a protest… There was somebody, an academic, who was being invited to campus to give a lecture series. I think he was like in kind of Jordan Peterson-esque kind of guy, I can't remember his name. And it became very apparent that, you know, he was still very vocal about all of these attitudes that really were not - quite contrary to feminism, right, that men are superior to women that, that ridiculous stuff. And so the protest was |
against his being welcome to the University to give a lecture. So I participated in that protest. There was a counter protest for the anti-abortion movement at the university community center. I participated in that, as well, just sat around carried a sign, that sort of thing. [BS]

Feedback

Praise

When I'll talk to my dad about [feminism… he's like, "Well, that's crazy. You're like a hero. Like you're such a good guy." And I'm like, "No, no I'm not" like, just like, I'm literally doing like, like, I'm just learning about this like, that's it like, as I said to you, I'm not even doing any work yet. Like, I'm I have - I literally haven't done anything.” [Cole]

Backlash

I teeter on whether I identify as male feminist, or as someone who's working to deconstruct patriarchy. Like, obviously, those things are directly linked, but sometimes I feel like - I've had conversations with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you can't identify as a feminist even though you're doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked through whether I can take up that space that, that label. [Kobalon]

7.3.1 Diverse Feminist Foundations

Participants often discussed how their background and upbringing set the stage for the ways they understood gender and feminism. Notably, these men did not share all share common experiences or understandings of the world as children. In particular, men’s culture and upbringing, relationships with feminist figures, and personal experiences with discrimination influenced the way they learned about and engaged with feminism. Several men explained that they had grown up in cultures where traditionally masculine
values of competition and violence against women were normative. Consistent with Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) writing on masculinity, men’s understanding of masculinity varied based on cultural and regional factors. Men who were raised in highly religious (Willem, Steven) or rural communities (Garth), where traditional gender roles were dominant, or were involved in sports where there was a high premium on masculinity (BS, June) often spoke an unwillingness to initially engage with feminist principles. Kobalon’s experiences growing up in a First Nation household was an extreme example of the way men’s cultural understanding of masculinity shaped their understanding of gender dynamics:

It was very conservative and very homophobic and very misogynistic… [I] witnessed misogynistic violence… that's what we were introduced to as a form of masculinity and therefore, really, like a very patriarchal form, a misogynistic form of masculinity. (Kobalon)

While masculinity was sometimes embedded in cultural attitudes and practices, some men experienced interpersonal pressure to conform to masculine roles and norms. Several participants recalled instances when peers or parents would challenge their masculinity (Doug Pines) or when they were mocked for not being “man enough” (Kobalon, Patrick). Those who were raised to place a high premium on masculinity often suggested that they initially rejected feminism as it was not in line with their understanding of the world and their place within it.

However, despite the cultural backdrop of hegemonic masculinity, several men explained that they had childhood encounters with feminist activism and advocacy through their mothers or other important women in their lives. Men with feminist mothers or godmothers (Bradley; Clark; Charles Michael Che), and those who were encouraged to adopted inclusive masculinities as boys (Clark, Lee, Joseph, Jordan), were generally more open to learning about feminist principles, and some actively sought out this information. Many explained that their mothers performed non-traditional roles in their homes and were taught to respect women from a young age. Some had mothers who were involved in the feminist movement, such as Joseph, who recalled:
I learned initially about feminism from my mom. She was like, really big into like, I guess, the second wave of feminism. She wanted to go see Gloria Steinem speak and Germaine Greer. She had all these books, and she kind of taught me about feminism. (Joseph)

Based on the responses of Joseph and other men who had strong feminist figures in their lives growing up, it seems that the attitudes of family members, teachers, and others that help raise and support young men can help to counteract cultural messages about masculinity and set the stage for men’s eventual engagement with feminism.

A few participants also suggested that they had an awareness of social issues prior to their involvement in gender-based advocacy because they themselves were members of a minoritized group (e.g., sexual orientation, race, class). For example, participants who had experienced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation (e.g., Nigel, Steven) felt that prejudice against the LGBTQIA+ community and prejudice against women were intertwined. Nigel said:

Growing up gay, particularly in [redacted] in the 90s is - you live with a lot of the same sort of oppressive things that happened to women: you're silenced, you're not allowed to share, you're expected to behave in a certain way. (Nigel)

Steven similarly explained that he felt feminism paved the way for LGBTQIA+ rights and his gratitude for feminists encouraged him to learn more about it, joking that “I think it's hard for a gay [sic] to not be a feminist.” For others, awareness of class discrimination (Clark) or being interested in racial and social justice broadly (Bradley) eventually facilitated their interest in feminism.

In sum, men had a variety of different experiences that set the stage for their feminist identity growth process, pointing to the potential for men from diverse backgrounds and with different life experiences to build solidarity with women and help advance the movement for gender equality. The heterogeneity in men’s childhood experiences suggests that all men, regardless of their background and upbringing, have the potential
to overcome structural and internalized sexist and misogynistic attitudes. Below, I identify specific moments in men’s lives when they felt catalyzed to identify as feminists.

7.3.2 Turning Points

The men in the study spoke to various adult life experiences that served as direct catalysts for their interest in feminism. Many participants recalled a variety of turning points throughout their lives, rather than one specific incident, which prompted an “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth (Charles Michael Che, Joseph) that strengthened, deepened, and expanded over time. Unsurprisingly, for men who grew up with flexible attitudes toward gender roles and strong feminist role models, the transition to adopting a feminist identity was met with little resistance. While rare, a few participants suggested that they had come to recognize feminist issues unexpectedly, which I have labelled aha moments. For example, Wayne recalled an experience as an educator that he referred to as “the bulletin board incident.” He explained:

I was trying to get my students to do a little project about someone like really, really well known who plays their instrument, so I set up a bulletin board in my classroom with a picture of like a household name kind of jazz performer that - for every player in my band ... I had all the players up on the board, it looked great. And I stepped back and I said, "Oh, sh*t, there's no women up there." (Wayne)

For Wayne, the recognition that he had inadvertently omitted women from his project encouraged him to critically consider his treatment of women in his own life, as well as social attitudes toward women. For others, feminist identification was sparked by formal education, either through reading books about feminism recommended to them by peers (e.g., “Inferior” by Angela Saini [Galean]; “The Beauty Myth” by Naomi Wolf [Fred]) or enrollment in a gender studies course. Clark remembered his experience in gender and sexuality class, which opened his eyes to gender inequality:

I was actually the only man in the course… Just reading the definition of feminism, it’s just common sense, like equal rights… that's how I adopted [a feminist label], probably
in that college course, and ever since then, I don't think my perspective has changed, at least too drastically. (Clark)

Clark’s experience in a women’s studies course mirrors past research on the effectiveness of education about gender inequality for promoting feminist identification in women students (Baird et al., 2007; Bargad & Hyde, 1991; Nelson et al., 2008). Moreover, a few participants mentioned that they had been inspired to involve themselves with feminism due to recent social movements. Most commonly, men spoke about large-scale social activism, such as the #metoo movement (Mitchell), the Women’s March (Patrick), and Gamergate (Fred), but others referred to smaller local events, such as one Mormon church’s “Wear Pants to Church Day” (Steven).

Participants also recounted conversations with trusted and respected people in their adult lives, including partners and friends that changed their perspectives on feminism. Most often, these conversations were with women who shared their experiences and perspectives with the men. For example, Skylar remembered when a conversation with his (woman) partner encouraged him to see the world differently:

There was sort of a turning point where I was having a conversation with my, my partner, my ex, my previous partner, and we were talking about feminism, and I didn't really understand what it was... I think she really helped me understand like, what it actually is. So I'd say that was the turning point for me. (Skylar)

While these conversations often focused on gender relations in general, in some cases, this dialogue was intimate and personal, such as learning that a friend had been sexually assaulted or that they were being paid less for doing the same work (Larry L.; Jordan; Nigel). For the men in the study, learning about discrimination and violence happening to those close to them galvanized them to learn more about how they could support feminist goals and objectives. These conversations also sometimes took place with other men who held feminist attitudes or identified as feminists (Garth).

Consistent with the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth that many men described, participants indicated that their feminist identities grew, changed, and
expanded over time. Reading “tweets” (posts on Twitter) and blogs written by women, as well as listening to podcasts about diverse women’s experiences, were all reported as events that had sparked new rounds of the feminist identity growth cycle for participants (Garth, Joseph, Patrick, Cole, Nigel, Bradley). Other men deliberately sought out literature written by women, such as Patrick, who had “stopped reading books by White men” in order to focus his attention on better-understanding women’s experiences. Some, such as Cole and Skylar, went to public talks given by women from diverse racial backgrounds. For many, as they learned about intersectional prejudice faced by members of the LGBTQ+ community (e.g., “an out lesbian friend” [David]; “a trans scientist” [Bradley]) or Black, Indigenous, and other Women of Colour (Willem).

It is important to note that, while these conversations and experiences often helped the men learn more about why feminism was important, they were sometimes more challenging. Charles Michael Che explained:

I've encountered a lot of people who have talked about [feminism] who are very judgmental about it, and they make it less fun to they make it less enjoyable to try to explore. And there are a few times where it's definitely shut me out… the instances in my life where this has happened… they're like, Oh, you're stupid. I'm not even going to talk to you about it. (Charles Michael Che)

As will be explored in the feedback section, negative feedback about their interest in feminism could deter men’s willingness to participate in feminist behaviours.

Overall, men reported a variety of experiences that inspired their feminist identities, which challenged and changed their relationship with feminism over time. Many felt as though their understanding of feminism needed to be continually reassessed as they reflected on new information, which reignited the cycle of feminist identity growth.

7.3.3 Evaluation and (Un)learning

Participants often spoke about periods of reflection and private, internal work prior to engaging in public feminist actions to calibrate their involvement in the movement.
Indeed, participants were often initially hesitant to speak about feminism or act on their feminist intentions. Men in the study often spoke about how they had observed other men - for better or for worse – who had influenced their desire to engage with feminism. Participants often joked that other men served as examples of how “not to be a feminist” (Wayne) and what they “shouldn’t be doing” (David Pines) to advance the feminist movement. Clark explained that he and his friends distanced themselves from “toxic masculinity”:

Together, we were always like, *we're not going to be that kind of man* like we made sure to distance ourselves from what the norm was …. it was always these toxic masculinity things that were around us growing up - the hyper competitive, the *you have to push other people down to make yourself better*, like these kinds of things that we constantly saw. (Clark)

Clark’s decision to distance himself from other men whose behaviours and attitudes he observed as “toxic” falls in line with another commonly-endorsed strategy: reevaluating male friendships. Several (but not all) men noted that, once they became aware of feminist issues and topics, they distanced themselves from men in their lives who did not hold the same beliefs as they did. This was particularly true for the younger men in the study, such as Cole, who explained:

My experience, like, where it's like, maybe thinking that somebody's kind of a good person, and then you get to know them more… Most of my friends are women now. And then, if I ever find like, a male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh, yeah, he like sexually assaulting my friend like four years ago.” (Cole)

When men learned that their male friends held sexist attitudes (Joseph) or had been accused of sexual violence (Jordan, Cole), they felt they could no longer maintain those relationships. By separating themselves from other men whose attitudes were not consistent with their own burgeoning feminist identities, participants were free to surround themselves with like-minded individuals. Notably, one participant, Larry L., explained that he had not altered his relationships with other men who held sexist
attitudes, and he chose to keep his feminist identity and attitudes hidden from this crowd out of fear of backlash.

It is worth noting, however, that several men felt a sense of solidarity with other progressive men. For example, Willem explained, “In spite of like the lack of male allies, I definitely feel like there's a community… there’s a group of us doing [feminist work].” In fact, some even noted that they felt like their friend group was an “echo chamber” [Bradley] because members of the group held such similar, progressive attitudes. This suggests that feminist men may cluster together to enhance and deepen their understanding of feminism. Although many men explained that other men did not influence their feminism, Garth, Lee, Skylar, and Willem all pointed to feminist men who had helped them understand feminism better.

Several men also referred to a process of trial and error, either through internal reflection or due to comments made by others. For some men, the self-correcting process was organic, arising naturally as they engaged in their day-to-day lives. For example, Garth explained:

Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off on a tangent and becoming like, the dominant kind of role in something, and then I think back the next day, I'm like, Oh, I kind of like dominated that whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on very absolute terms about everything that I was talking about, right? (Garth)

Some men even suggested that they would sometimes overcorrect and ultimately do more harm than good as they attempted to calibrate their feminist efforts. For these men, in their attempts to support women, they inadvertently ended up “interrupting” them (June) or “speaking for” women in their lives (Larry L.).

Some participants referred to reconstructing their own understanding of masculinity as a form of feminist work within themselves. Indeed, the work of unlearning masculinity was seen as foundational to their progress as a feminist man. Kobalon said:

It's me like basically f*cking up along the way, and then realizing … there's a number of things that I'm unconscious of, that I participate in and do... I believe the only thing I can
do is that, as I become conscious of these things that I have been complicit in, to consciously unlearn them or hold them back and stop doing them. (Kobalon)

Many men referred to challenging their understanding of masculinity as a “responsibility” (Garth, Jordan). While this process was sometimes painful and challenging, several men described a sense of personal fulfillment from this internal change. Joseph, for example, explained:

I could tell [feminism] had a great impact on my life. Not that that's what it's about, but it's just like, I think it's making me a better person, continually…. I think it made me a better partner, a better husband. It has made me a better son. I think it made me a better brother. Or not that it has made me. It's making me, because I see it as a process. (Joseph)

Others, such as Andy, derived a sense of fulfillment from perceived involvement in making the world a more just and equitable place. Some were happy to be more “mindful” (Garth), and others still felt relieved to have the pressure to perform masculinity taken off of them so they could be more authentically themselves (Joseph, Patrick). Overall, every man was reflective in his feminist identity, synthesizing information and working internally prior to engaging in feminist advocacy and activism with others.

7.3.4 Taking Action

Each man in the study engaged in feminist action somewhat differently, including nurturing egalitarian relationships, raising children, educating men, and in some cases, engaging in advocacy and protest. Several men referred to defying conventional gender norms within the context of their relationships to alleviate the burden of emotional and domestic labour for their partners (Patrick, Willem, Andy, BS). Some also deliberately sought out opportunities to reduce their female partners’ financial burdens, such as BS, who paid for half of his partner’s birth control. He explained:

The fact that she paid for birth control by herself is complete bullsh*t because birth control is something that couples both use… She was kind of astounded that that hadn't
even occurred to her because no one in her life had ever even thought of that… I don't know that I would have arrived at that without having been aware of feminist issues through feminism beforehand. (BS)

Those involved in egalitarian partnerships often felt that their feminist relationship style not only benefitted their partners, but also themselves. When speaking about how feminism influenced his relationship with his wife, Patrick noted:

Flexibility as being a key factor of being a feminist in a relationship especially like relationship-wise, masculinity-wise, of having the flexibility to do whatever without having to worry about if it's appropriate for a guy or a woman… you just have so much more that you can do in life and that I wouldn't want to trade that for anything. (Patrick)

Others chose to do feminism in their relationships by doing additional household chores or spending equal time with children (“without calling it babysitting;” Patrick). Only four participants had children at the time of the interviews, but each suggested that feminism was an important part of their child-rearing, either because it was “always in the background” (Andy), because their children were taken to LGBT and feminist protests (Patrick), or because the children were encouraged to grow up in non-traditional ways (John Malden). For example, John Malden explained that, while he allowed his girls to explore feminine gender stereotypes, he challenged the assumptions associated with them:

We've come up with the concept of princess scientists so that what princesses do is that they are scientists and they invent stuff and they go out on adventures. So, so if they want to be a princess, that's fine, they can have a nice princess dress, but then we subvert what it means to be a princess. (John Malden)

Several participants were involved in one or more forms of advocacy and activism. Due to their status, these men recognized that they had opportunities to champion, support, and amplify women personally and professionally. For example, David Pines hosted a radio show at his university and used the platform to discuss feminist issues with female guests:
I often have guests and, and often, you know, when I have guests, women that are musicians or artists or, or that kind of thing, [feminism] is often a thing we talk about. And that's often a thing that I'm interested in. And I think that - I think that - I think that we should talk about on the radio. (David Pines)

Some men saw their role in the feminist movement not on the frontlines, but rather on the backend by specifically creating opportunities for educating men because, as Skylar explained, “we need to advocate more necessarily on the women's side, but I think we need to change the mindset of the men's side.” Participants cited numerous tactics in which they engaged to educate men, such as giving conservative friends feminist literature for their birthdays (Bradley), mentoring young men (Curt), or even creating more formal workshops for male peers. Cole spoke about a program he had created for men on his college campus:

It was like sexual violence prevention on university campuses… I just did a few presentations throughout this year, and one of them was on like, online, like online messaging, kind of like - etiquette is the wrong word, but just like kind of dos and don'ts of that. And it was like geared towards men. (Cole)

Others had used their status as men to speak up for women in their lives, such as Nigel, who collected the harassment experiences of women in his workplace and presented it to his boss. A few men noted that their social-level activism was quieter, such as by supporting feminist media (Fred) and signing petitions (BS). Others, however, were happy to be involved in feminist protests and rallies. Patrick recalled:

I went to the - when the - the Women's March after Trump was inaugurated, went to that one here in [my town], and got a lot of positive responses from everyone there… As a guy, I felt like I fit in completely. I didn't feel excluded or that people didn't want me there or anything like that. (Patrick)

In sum, participants were involved in a variety of feminist behaviours, ranging from personal work and interpersonal behaviours to advocacy and activism, often directly targeting men. Unsurprisingly, men were more likely to engage in feminist behaviours if
they received positive reactions and feedback from others, and less likely to be involved when reactions were confrontational or unpleasant.

7.3.5 Feedback

Men reported a wide range of responses to their interest and involvement in feminism. Some explained that their experiences as male feminists had been uniformly positive. In fact, several men felt they had been given undue attention or had received more “praise” (Garth) than was warranted for their feminist efforts. Patrick recalled an experience from the Women’s March he had attended:

I felt sometimes that people were paying too much attention. Like I was - like someone from a local newspaper, put a microphone and said, "Why are you here?" Like, Jesus, there's like, yeah, there's like 40 women for every guy and you're finding the guy and putting a microphone in his face? (Patrick)

However, men were aware of the stigma attributed to feminists, and male feminists in particular. Examples of stereotypes attributed to male feminists included “not a real man” (Skylar), “in it for dates” (Steven), “social justice warrior” (Bradley), and “p*ssy” (Larry L.). While most men surrounded themselves with like-minded individuals, many could recall at least one experience when they had experienced backlash for their feminist ideals or behaviours. Some men experienced teasing, bullying, and belittling from their male friends due to their involvement in feminism, such as Skylar, who explained:

When I'm with my guy friends, like my longtime guy friends that I made when I was a young kid, and they're sort of teasing me about being like “PC police”… I think those moments where I feel sort of shut down and yeah just trivialized, that, that can take a toll on me. I only have so much tolerance for that. (Skylar)

While men generally brushed off the comments made from other men, they often struggled to understand how best to respond to women who chastised them for their involvement in feminism. Wayne Campbell recalled:
I … was being clearly supportive that like some kind of measure was needed to address some imbalance that we're talking about. I don't remember now what it was. And she goes, "Oh, god, you're a feminist." I said, "Yeah. Aren't you?" She says, "No, I don't think we need feminism." (Wayne)

Some men were even told by women that they could not call themselves feminists because they did not have the same lived experience of gender-based prejudice that women do. Kobalon explained:

I've had conversations with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you can't identify as a feminist even though you're doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked through whether I can take up that space that, that label. (Kobalon)

As such, men were generally hesitant about using the term publicly and wary of other men who used the feminist label. Humorously, Lee explained, “You don’t get a cookie for being a feminist,” and Doug similarly noted:

I think that you should always be suspicious of men that just like come out and call themselves ‘feminists’ because it's almost like they're doing it sometimes for like, wokeness brownie points or something, you know, like, they've learned that like, this is the new way to, you know, gain the trust of people that they're preying on. (Doug)

7.4 Discussion

This study is one of the first to examine the feminist identity growth of cisgender men through their lived experiences of being feminist. In the current study, we identified several steps of the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth in a sample of 27 cisgender men with varied life experiences. Through a reflexive thematic analysis, we identified a nonlinear, five-dimension process of male feminist identity growth: Diverse Feminist Foundations, Turning Points, Evaluation and (Un)Learning, Taking Action, and Feedback.

Men who had been raised in families or environments where feminist attitudes and ideas were more normative were generally more open to the ideas and principles underlying
feminism, while men who had grown up with a high premium on masculinity were generally less receptive to it initially. Importantly, however, the feminist-identified men in our sample all started with diverse feminist foundations, signaling that there is the potential for all men to join the fight for gender equality. Men with strong feminist figures in their childhood, including parents or godmothers, were not deterred by the stereotypes associated with feminists, a finding that is also supported in samples of women (Nelson et al., 2008). These findings support the idea that gender-egalitarian attitudes can be honed and shaped during childhood in cultural attitudes and the immediate home environment. It is worth noting that, in general, participants did not indicate that their fathers or other male family members influenced their interest in feminism or identification as a feminist. It is possible that feminist mothers were more outspoken about feminist issues in egalitarian homes, and men were more easily able to recall their mother’s activism. Alternatively, men raised in homes with feminist fathers may have regarded their fathers’ behaviours as normative. We encourage future research into the role of feminist fathers.

The men identified several *turning points*, which expand upon the types of incidents described in Baird et al.’s (2007) findings. Some participants were receptive to simple motivations to identify as feminists, such as taking a women’s studies course or conversations with trusted friends and loved ones. For others, catalysts to feminist identification came only after painful or personal experiences. Participants in this study suggested that their support for feminism came from a wide range of experiences, such as aha moments, formal education, conversations with others, and recent social movements. The participants’ observations on catalysts to their feminist identification suggest that conversations and education about gender (in)equality should start early, and that young men should be introduced to a diverse range of role models to learn about the experiences of people across the gender and sexuality spectrum. Further, women’s and gender studies courses may wish to advertise to men specifically. While not all men are receptive to formal education about feminism (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017; Thomsen et al., 1995), our findings suggest that it is possible that men who feel inclined toward feminism may feel inspired to deepen their involvement with the movement in response to education (see also Harris et al., 1999). Men may wish to attend feminist lectures, read feminist
literature, or attend programming specifically tailored toward men who wish to become more feminist-minded.

The men discussed periods of *Evaluation and (Un)learning*, during which time they reassessed their understandings of masculinity and their friendships. Reflection could be helpful for men’s feminist identity growth as they learned and became more sensitive to the ways their actions affected the women they sought to support. The work of “undoing patriarchy” was seen as an effortful and painful experience for some men. While this type of feminism may not be readily visible, men viewed their internal work as critical to their feminist activism, as it shifted and shaped the way they engaged with the women in their lives. While, of course, the objective of feminist activism is not to comfort or placate cisgender men, female and nonbinary feminists may wish to be tactical in the ways that they approach correcting men for their inadvertent errors as they calibrate their feminist identities. Rather than “calling out,” we encourage men to be “called in” to these conversations so they can continue to listen, learn, and reflect on these experiences.

Many men also were engaged in some form of feminist advocacy or activism. In the “doing” feminism phase, participants reported involvement in several types of feminist advocacy and activism. Several men sought to level the power dynamics in their romantic relationships by striving toward gender-egalitarian relationships. Research suggests that partners in more gender-egalitarian relationships have higher sexual empowerment and enhanced communication, compared to those in more traditionally-gendered relationships (Carlson & Soller, 2019), so it is likely that men’s feminist behaviours in their relationships contributed to their increased relationship satisfaction. Interestingly, though two participants had sons, conversations about child-rearing tended to focus on daughters, making men’s feminist parenting a topic ripe for empirical examination. Further, the men expressed feeling welcomed and accepted when they attended feminist protests. Men should consider engaging in feminist collective action, particularly in ways that can help alleviate the burden for female and nonbinary attendees.
7.4.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

While these findings shed novel light on the process underlying feminist identification in men, this research is not without its limitations. Most notably, each participant was cisgender, and the feminist identity growth process in transgender men still requires specific exploration. Moreover, while the sample was diverse in terms of sexuality and life experiences, most participants were at least partially White, and a majority resided in the United States and Canada. Given that attitudes toward gender equality may vary by geographical location and ethnic background (Ipsos, 2019; Robnett & Anderson, 2017), it will be important for future researchers to examine how men from countries outside of the United States and men from different ethnic backgrounds become involved with feminism.

While there is some research to suggest that Black men and women are both interested in feminism (White, 2006), future research should explore the unique complications of feminist identification for men of diverse racial backgrounds. It is important to note that, due to the general racial homogeneity of this sample, it is possible that racial discrimination would have come up as a precipitating factor for non-White men, and I encourage future research to explore feminist identity in more diverse samples to explore whether experiences of racism can predict feminist identification. Kobalon noted that he witnessed misogynistic violence in his First Nations tribe, suggesting that feminism in the Ojibwa tribe may be another promising avenue for empirical examination.

Further, the sample was fairly well-educated, with 22 of the 27 men having obtained a bachelor’s degree at the time of the interview. This is somewhat unsurprising, given that men often cited formal education as a turning point for their feminist identity growth, and attending university introduced them to different people, ideas, and perspectives than they had been exposed to prior to university. It is also possible that the recruitment advertisement reached a narrower audience than would be representative of the population. I encourage continued examination of feminist identity growth and development in men from diverse backgrounds. Finally, this study did not disentangle “male feminist allies” from “male feminists” from “profeminist men.” Future research
may wish to dive more deeply into the attitudinal and personal differences between these categories, particularly as feminist identification has a uniquely powerful impact, even above other gender equality identifiers (White, 2006).

Importantly, this research provides insight into the experiences of men who currently label themselves as feminists. Future research should also examine the experiences of men who are feminist-minded yet eschew the feminist label. While one study suggests that negative stereotypes contribute to men’s distancing from the feminist label (see Wiley et al., 2013), there are likely other factors that discourage men from self-identifying as feminists. These other factors should be explored to understand more fully the barriers to men’s engagement in feminist advocacy and activism. Future research is also needed to examine how and when men choose to disclose their feminist identities to others. Given that men may sometimes face backlash for identifying themselves to others as feminists, it would be useful to know what factors motivate or hinder men’s feminist self-labelling. Others may wish to explore how men who identify as feminists are perceived as potential romantic partners. It is possible that feminist men are perceived as more desirable partners to individuals with social justice values but may be perceived as less desirable partners to those who support traditional gender roles and norms.

7.5 Conclusion

Men who identify as feminists can serve as “comrades in the struggle” (hooks, 2000) and can meaningfully contribute to gender-based social change. These findings add to the limited research on the experiences of outgroup allies and highlight the experiences that may catalyze or hinder the development of a feminist identity in cisgender men. This research suggests that feminist identity growth in men is an “ongoing process,” comprising several stages, through which men cycle and recalibrate as they encounter new information and receive feedback on their attitudes and actions. Given the importance of allies for social change, these data indicate that conversations about race, gender, social class, and other social issues should begin early in life and happen often.
These findings also suggest that the FSIS subscales of Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty may be relevant for cisgender men, as well. In many ways, the uncertainty and ambivalence noted by women and nonbinary individuals overlaps and intersects with the uncertainty and ambivalence expressed by men in this study. Much like femininity serves as an anchor, keeping women tied to restrictive gender-based norms and customs, men’s understanding of masculinity must be reexamined and reimagined in order to embrace a feminist identity. Men’s fear of stigma does not appear to be rooted in the same fear of potential physical harm and occupational backlash as women’s – in fact, several men specifically noted that they knew that they likely would not experience harm or serious penalties for defending feminist principles. Rather, these men feared social ostracism among friends and with potential romantic partners, and some men felt uncertain about their place and voice in the feminist movement.

When developing tools to evaluate feminist social identity in men, the insights gleaned from this study should be taken into account. Notably, researchers assessing feminist social identity in may also wish to examine a subscale about adherence to traditionally masculine norms, given that most men in this study seemed to denounce some negative elements of masculinity, while holding onto some positive elements, as their feminist identities developed. Another potentially useful subscale may be the extent to which men spend time with other men who are feminists, given that some men expressed a sense of solidarity with other like-minded men. While the Solidarity subscale may capture some of this, researchers may wish to specifically tailor the items to other feminist men.
Chapter 8

8 Conclusion

8.1 Review of Studies

Although feminism has become a cornerstone of the cultural zeitgeist, modern identification as a feminist is characterized by a notable ambivalence that has heretofore not undergone systematic examination. In this dissertation, I present six studies that shed light on the phenomenon of modern feminist identity in the hopes of elucidating the complex ways in which feminism and antifeminism are intricately intertwined in modern feminists’ presentation and embodiment of feminist identity. Specifically, this dissertation provides initial evidence that normative components of feminist identity, such as identity ambivalence and conditional disclosure of feminist identity – while beneficial for making the movement palatable to those who oppose gender-based social change – may actually dilute women’s feminist consciousness and prevent them from reaping the benefits of advanced levels of feminist identity development. Similarly, uncertainty about their “place” in the feminist movement can prevent men, even those who feel comfortable adopting a feminist label, from serving as the powerful allies they have the potential to be in the workplace and beyond.

In Study 1, I provided a critical review of 10 popular measures of feminist attitudes and identity, and their long and short forms. This review revealed a number of conceptual and psychometric limitations of the extant measures designed to evaluate people’s support for and alignment with feminism. This analysis also revealed a need for an updated measure of feminist identity grounded in the experiences of those who identify as feminists themselves.

In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews with women and nonbinary individuals who identify as feminists, and I proposed a theory of ambivalent feminism that is grounded in seven inherent tensions: (lack of) representation and inclusion, feminist self-consciousness, entrenchment of femininity, identity (in)congruence, evasion of stereotypes, and fear of backlash. As suggested by the
participants, these tensions give rise to both personal outcomes (e.g., body image disturbances, negotiated sexual agency), as well as political outcomes (e.g., political [in]action, conditional feminist self-labelling). The results of this study laid the theoretical foundation for the dimensions of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), specifically the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales.

In Study 3, I outlined the initial development of the FSIS, beginning with item generation, expert review, item refinement, and a Q-sort task. In a large sample of women recruited from MTurk, the initial nine dimensions were condensed to five as per the results of an exploratory factor analysis. The initial analysis revealed three dimensions that represent an alignment with a feminist identity (i.e., feminist beliefs, centrality of feminist identity, feminist competence) and two dimensions that represent an ambivalence toward a feminist identity (i.e., fear of stigma, identity uncertainty). The aligned subscales were significantly and positively linked to liberal feminist attitudes, public and private feminist identification, and involvement in feminist activities (e.g., protest, letter-writing). The ambivalent identity subscales evidenced significant and negative links with these constructs. This study provided initial evidence of structural and external validity for the FSIS (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Flake et al., 2017).

In Study 4, I subjected the FSIS to a confirmatory factor analysis; however, I also included one additional subscale that seemed to capture the essence of the four additional subscales that fell out of the exploratory factor analysis. Therefore, the 25-item FSIS and 10 additional solidarity items were analyzed via confirmatory factor analysis, and results suggested that the six-factor, 35-item version of the scale showed acceptable fit to the data using data collected from a large sample of women recruited via social media. An abbreviated, 30-item version with only five items in the solidarity subscale evidenced a better fit to the data.

Aside from structural validity, this study also provided additional evidence of external validity for the FSIS, as well. Linking the FSIS to gender-related attitudes, the aligned identity subscales demonstrated significant and negative associations with hostile and benevolent sexism and significant and positive associations with feminist identification,
whereas the ambivalent identity subscales evidenced an opposite pattern. Linking the FSIS to attitudes toward women’s bodies, ambivalent identity subscales were significantly and positively associated with a sense that beauty is a form of social currency and sex is a source of power for women, and these subscales were significantly and negatively linked to a broad sense of women’s beauty. The aligned identity subscales showed significant negative links to the idea that sex is a form of power and significant and positive links to a broad sense of beauty for women. The aligned FSIS subscales were also positively linked to relationship- and sexuality-related variables, such as a higher sense of entitlement to pleasure from one’s self and one’s partner, and less fear of being single. The ambivalent identity subscales were negatively associated with entitlement to pleasure, and positively associated with fear of being single and likelihood of faking orgasm for a partner’s sake. Links were not as strong between the FSIS subscales and own-body attitudes. None of the scales was significantly linked to attitudes toward menstruation, attitudes toward cosmetic surgery, or makeup use. However, fear of stigma was positively associated with internalized weight stigma, and all subscales were associated with attitudes toward body hair in the expected directions. This study provided initial evidence that the FSIS can be used to evaluate women’s attitudes toward gender relations, sexuality, and other women’s bodies; however, the scale is not an excellent predictor of attitudes toward one’s own body.

In Study 5, I provide further external validity for the FSIS by examining additional convergent, incremental, known-groups, and ecological validity in a sample of White women. Specifically, I examined the FSIS subscales’ relations to dimensions of sexism, awareness of White privilege, willingness to intervene in instances of everyday racism and sexism, participation in feminist and anti-racist activism, and willingness to donate to a feminist charity (RAINN). The aligned identity subscales were positively associated with willingness to intervene in feminist and anti-racist activism, participation in feminist and anti-racist behaviours, and willingness to donate to a feminist organization. The ambivalent identity subscales showed the opposite pattern. The competence and solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist behaviours above and beyond hostile and benevolent sexism, and these subscales accounted for unique variance in anti-racist behaviours above and beyond awareness of White privilege in this sample
of White women. I also evaluated known-groups validity using the grouping from Zucker’s (2004) Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale. Women who identified as feminists and endorsed feminist attitudes scored significantly more highly than “non-labellers” and nonfeminists on each of the aligned identity subscales. “Non-labellers” scored significantly more highly than feminists and nonfeminists on the uncertainty subscale. These findings help to distinguish the FSIS from other measures of feminist identity and attitudes because they tap into the unique importance of identity.

Given that patriarchy largely benefits men, cisgender men’s relationship to feminism warrants special attention. As such, rather than evaluating men’s scores on the FSIS, I conducted a thematic analysis in Study 6 to understand the ways that men’s feminist social identities develop over time, and the factors that facilitate and hinder this process. My analysis resulted in the development of a new model of feminist identity growth in cisgender men. Rather than a static linear process suggested by other models of feminist identity development in women, the feminist identity growth model suggests that men may enter into the growth process at any time, and that feminist identity may shift and change over time in response to feedback from others. While feminist men evidenced similar discomfort in their feminist identities to feminist women and nonbinary individuals, this discomfort took a different form. While individuals both groups felt excluded from the movement due to lack of representation, feminist men faced the additional discomfort of backlash from women and men who made them feel as though their contributions were unwelcome. When men experienced this stigma, they were less likely to continue wanting to engage with the movement and learn more about how to leverage their privilege to best support women. These findings suggest that men may score similarly on the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales of the FSIS, and future research should evaluate measurement invariance between women and men on this scale.

### 8.2 Implications and Future Directions

This research suggests that modern feminist identity contains complexities that are not captured in previous measures of feminist identity. The development and implementation
of the FSIS addresses many of the limitations identified in past measures in Chapter 2, and will allow scholars to evaluate multiple dimensions of feminist social identity simultaneously, in order to develop a broader picture of modern feminist identity.

While the FSIS has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. One key limitation of this program of research is the overwhelmingly White, Western samples. There are a number of reasons why White women may have been more drawn to studies on feminism, compared to Women of Colour. For example, Black women may prefer to label their alignment with the principles of gender equality “Womanism” or may generally be averse to mainstream feminism (Kendall, 2020). However, given that this is a common limitation of measures of feminist identity, it will be critical moving forward that tests of measurement invariance are conducted to compare the factor structure of the FSIS in White women and women from other racial and ethnic groups. Further, the FSIS has not yet been tested in men. The results from Study 6 suggest that men’s experiences of uncertainty may be greater, but their fear of stigma may be weaker, than women’s. Finally, tests of measurement invariance could also potentially shine light on potential differences between sexual minority women and heterosexual women. Given that lesbian women consistently score more highly on measures of feminist identification and activism (see Moore & Stathi, 2019; Szymanski, 2004), potentially due to comfort adopting stigmatized labels (Duncan, 1999), one would expect that lesbian women would score more highly than heterosexual women on the aligned subscales, and less highly than heterosexual women on the ambivalent sexism. The measure should also be validated cross-culturally, to determine whether these dimensions of feminist identity are appropriate for individuals in Eastern cultures.

Another promising avenue for future exploration is the development of feminist profiles using Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). It is possible that different combinations of scores on the FSIS subscales may be linked to different patterns of feminist attitudes. This is consistent with past research which has used conglomerated measures of feminist attitudes and identity to determine different feminist “types” (Yoder et al., 2012; Zucker, 2004). For example, in a 2012 study by Yoder and colleagues, canonical correlation analysis revealed three distinct types of feminist attitudes: established feminism, woman-
identified traditionalism (i.e., nonfeminism), and a third category of “awakening feminism,” which was characterized by supporting feminist principles and scoring highly on revelation subscale of the Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000); this subscale was negatively related to well-being. Zucker (2004) has also evaluated a third dimension of feminist identity beyond feminists and nonfeminists, with a special emphasis on the unique role of feminist identity. The “in-between” category of non-labellers has been associated with less support for feminist principles and practices (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). It is possible that further examination of the FSIS via canonical correlation or LPA may reveal additional feminist identities that help encapsulate the tangled set of attitudes different feminists may experience.

An additional area that is ripe for examination is tracing the development of feminist social identity over time. While interview-based qualitative research provides the opportunity to glean rich data from participants, tracing people’s historical experiences relies on recall, which is notably faulty. A longitudinal qualitative approach, such as the approach taken by Dr. Niva Piran in her Developmental Theory of Embodiment (2017) may allow for scholars to understand how and when feminist identities take on an ambivalent nature, and in response to which triggers, as well as the moments that help to reduce this uncertainty.

Further, both women and men in these studies were less likely to be involved in feminist activism and more inclined to participate in less “extreme” forms of everyday feminism. Given the popularity of social media activism, it is possible that the shift away from in-person collective action and toward the deliberate integration of feminist principles into one’s daily life and social media presence may be the way of the future for social activism. Social psychologists and sociologists studying social identity and social movements should consider examining the efficacy of everyday feminism, as well as motivations for participating in certain types of activism over others.

Finally, Studies 2, 4, and 6 of this dissertation highlighted the ways that traditional gender role norms and expectations can serve as barriers to feminist identity, and conforming to these norms may restrict people from reaping the benefits that feminist
identity brings (for a discussion about the limitations of the gender binary, see Morgenroth & Ryan, 2020). Both women and men in these studies indicated that developing a feminist identity meant renouncing some aspects of their gender role. However, most participants still felt aligned with their assigned gender. Future research should specifically examine how feminist identity is negotiated and navigated for individuals who are transgender and nonbinary. While Study 2 included some participants who were transgender and nonbinary, due to the unique role gender seems to play in feminist ambivalence, individualized attention should be paid to these populations.

8.3 Conclusion

Overall, this package of research sheds light on the ambivalence inherent in many modern feminists’ identities. Through a critical review, two qualitative studies, and the development and validation of a novel psychological instrument to evaluate the multidimensionality of contemporary feminist identity, this dissertation deepens the field’s understanding of social identity, the psychology of feminism and postfeminism, and the psychology of gender and allyship. Developing and maintaining a fully aligned feminist identity may be nearly impossible in a patriarchal and heterosexist culture. However, this research suggests that overcoming feminist ambivalence may be a necessary step toward gender equality.
References


Rivers, N. (2017). Between ‘Postfeminism(s)’: Announcing the arrival of the fourth wave in N. Rivers (Ed.), Postfeminism(s) and the Arrival of the Fourth Wave. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 7-28).


Valenti, J. (2014, November 24). When everyone is a feminist, is anyone? Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/24/when-everyone-is-a-feminist


Zeisler, A. (2016). *We were feminists once: From Riot Grrrl to CoverGirl, the buying and selling of a political movement*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Appendices

Appendix A. Final Interview Schedule for Study 2

1. What does feminism mean to you?
2. Where did you learn this definition?
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed?
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist?
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists?
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with what it means to be a man?
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models?
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how?
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist?
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying as a feminist?
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”? Why?
13. Are you involved with any feminist activism? In person? Online?
Appendix B. Initial Battery of Items Presented to Participants in Study 3

IA = Identity Affirmation, S = Stigma, P = Political, A = Acceptance, Pro = Prototypicality, U = Uncertainty, Comp = Competence, Cent = Centrality, B = Beliefs

1. I am glad that I am a feminist. (IA)
2. I take pride in my feminist identity. (IA)
3. I feel good about my feminist identity. (IA)
4. I like being a feminist. (IA)
5. My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me. (IA)
6. I am overjoyed to be a feminist. (IA)
7. If someone called me a “feminist,” I would consider it a compliment. (IA)
8. Being a feminist makes me happy. (IA)
9. I am proud to be a feminist. (IA)
10. My life would be a lot better if I were not a feminist. (IA)
11. I am selective about who I tell that I am a feminist because I am afraid of others' reactions. (S)
12. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist. (S)
13. I do not want people to think I am an “angry feminist.” (S)
14. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist. (S)
15. I'm worried that if I tell people I am a feminist, they will think I hate men. (S)
16. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist. (S)
17. I worry about people’s perceptions of me as a feminist. (S)
18. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond. (S)
19. I only call myself a feminist when I know it will not cause problems. (S)
20. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist. (S)
21. It is important to me that feminism is political. (P)
22. I see myself as a feminist activist. (P)
23. I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women and gender minorities are treated unfairly. (P)
24. When it comes to feminism, I am very political. (P)
25. Advocating for feminist principles is important to me. (P)
26. When I hear about feminist activism, I want to be involved. (P)
27. I am very interested in feminist politics. (P)
28. I am willing to advocate for feminist issues. (P)
29. I see activism as a necessary part of feminism. (P)
30. I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender diverse people. (P)
31. I see myself as similar to most feminists. (Pro)
32. I have a lot in common with a typical feminist. (Pro)
33. If someone painted a portrait of a feminist, it would look a lot like me. (Pro)
34. When people think about feminists, I’m probably not the kind of person that comes to mind. (Pro)
35. When people think about feminists, they probably think about someone like me. (Pro)
36. I am a good example of what a feminist is like. (Pro)
37. When I think about what a feminist is like, I think of myself. (Pro)
38. I am a good example of a feminist. (Pro)
39. I am just like a feminist. (Pro)
40. When people talk about feminists, they are talking about people like me. (Pro)
41. I have the skills necessary to be an effective feminist. (Comp)
42. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people. (Comp)
43. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it. (Comp)
44. I can speak competently about many feminist topics. (Comp)
45. I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice. (Comp)
46. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone. (Comp)
47. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism. (Comp)
48. If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to me for answers. (Comp)
49. I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation. (Comp)
50. I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are important to me. (Comp)
51. In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know that I am a feminist. (Cent)
52. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me. (Cent)
53. Being a feminist is not particularly central to who I am. (Cent)
54. Being a feminist is more important to me than many other parts of my identity, such as my age or ethnicity. (Cent)
55. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am. (Cent)
56. Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am. (Cent)
57. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am. (Cent)
58. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity. (Cent)
59. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind. (Cent)
60. Being a feminist is an important part of my identity. (Cent)
61. I prefer to spend my time with feminists. (A)
62. I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists. (A)
63. When someone tells me they are a feminist, I assume we will get along. (A)
64. I feel like feminists are always judging me. (A)
65. I feel accepted by feminists. (A)
66. I feel embraced by feminists. (A)
67. When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed. (A)
68. I enjoy meeting people who are feminists. (A)
69. I enjoy being around feminists. (A)
70. I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of feminists. (A)
71. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
72. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
73. If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I am not sure how I would respond. (U)
74. I am not sure if I can call myself a feminist. (U)
75. Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times I do not. (U)
76. There are situations and circumstances when I would not call myself a feminist. (U)
77. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not. (U)
78. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
79. I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others. (U)
80. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not. (U)
81. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them. (B)
82. I see the world the same way that feminists do. (B)
83. When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see eye to eye on many things. (B)
84. I believe the same things that feminists do. (B)
85. My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes feminists hold. (B)
86. The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles. (B)
87. I do not agree with most feminists. (reverse, B)
88. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for. (B)
89. If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points made. (B)
90. When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct. (B)
Appendix C. Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS)
Instructions: Regardless of whether people see themselves as feminists or not, people have a variety of different attitudes about feminism and feminists. Regardless of whether people see themselves as feminists or not, people have a variety of different attitudes about feminism and feminists. Please read the following questions and answer them based on how true they are of you.

Scale: Completely untrue of me (1) to completely true of me (6)

Beliefs
1. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for.
2. When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct.
3. I believe the same things that feminists do.
4. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them.
5. I see the world the same way that feminists do.

Competence
1. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism.
2. I can speak competently about many feminist topics.
3. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone.
4. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it.
5. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people.

Solidarity
1. When someone speaks negatively about feminists, it feels like a personal insult.*
2. If someone tells me they are a feminist, I feel like I can trust them.*
3. I experience a deep sense of connection with other feminists.
4. When I learn that someone is a feminist, I want to support them.
5. I feel as though I am a part of a community of feminists.*
6. I feel connected to the feminist movement.
7. I feel a sense of closeness with feminists.*
8. When I talk with feminists, it feels like we are speaking the same language.*
9. Being a feminist makes me feel like I am a part of something bigger than myself.
10. I feel I have a commitment to feminists.

Centrality
1. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind.
2. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am.
3. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity.
4. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am.
5. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me.

Fear of Stigma
1. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist.*
2. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist.
3. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist.
4. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond.
5. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist.

Uncertainty
1. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist.
2. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not.
3. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist.
4. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not.
5. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist.

Note. *Item was not retained in the final version of the FSIS.
Appendix D. Final Interview Schedule for Study 6

1. What does feminism mean to you?
2. Where did you learn this definition?
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed?
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist?
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists?
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with what it means to be a man?
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models?
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how?
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist?
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying as a feminist?
   Why?
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”?
13. Are you involved with any feminist activism? In person? Online?
# Curriculum Vitae

**Name:** Jaclyn A. Siegel

**Post-secondary Education and Degrees:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Villanova University</td>
<td>Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA</td>
<td>2013-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The University of Western Ontario</td>
<td>London, Ontario, Canada</td>
<td>2017-2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Honours and Awards:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Award</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Janet Hyde Graduate Research Grant (Honorable Mention)</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario Graduate Scholarship</td>
<td>2019-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Grants-In-Aid</td>
<td>2019-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAC 610 Outstanding Research Contribution Scholarship</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network for Economic and Social Trends Fellowship</td>
<td>2020-2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Related Work Experience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Assistant</td>
<td>The University of Western Ontario</td>
<td>2017-2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor of Record (Psychology of Prejudice)</td>
<td>King’s University College</td>
<td>2020-2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Publications:


