1992

Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989

Timur Kuran

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/economicsperg_ppe

Part of the Economics Commons

Citation of this paper:
Paper No. 27

“Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989”

Timur Kuran
The Political Economy Research Group was established in the faculty of Social Science at the University of Western Ontario in 1988. Its purpose is to foster scholarship, teaching and interdisciplinary research in political economy, with a focus on:

1. the application of economic models and methods to the study of political processes and institutions,
2. the economic impact of political processes and institutions,
3. the influence of economic factors on the formation of public policy and on institutional change,
4. the politics of economic policy making,
5. the political, social, and economic effects of public policy.

*Co-directors:*
Ronald Wintrobe (Economics)
Robert Young (Political Science)

*Board of Directors:*
Peter Howitt (Economics)
B.B. Kyńulicka (Political Science)
John N. McDougall (Political Science)
Peter Neary (History)
John Whalley (Economics)

*Staff:*
Jayne Dewar

*For further information:*
Political Economy Research Group,
Department of Economics,
Social Science Centre,
London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
phone: (519) 661-3877
fax: (519) 661-3292
NOW OUT OF NEVER:
THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IN THE
EAST EUROPEAN REVOLUTION OF 1989

TIMUR KURAN

ABSTRACT

Like many major revolutions in history, the East European Revolution of 1989 caught its leaders, participants, victims, and observers by surprise. This paper offers an explanation whose crucial feature is a distinction between private and public preferences. By suppressing their antipathies to the political status quo the East Europeans misled everyone, including themselves, as to the possibility of a successful uprising. In effect, they conferred on their privately despised governments an aura of invincibility. Under the circumstances, public opposition was poised to grow explosively if ever enough people lost their fear of exposing their private preferences. The currently popular theories of revolution do not make clear why uprisings are easily explained after the fact even if they were not anticipated. The theory developed here fills this void. Among its predictions is that political revolutions will unavoidably continue to catch the world by surprise.

Acknowledgements. The research embodied here was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant no. SES-8808031. A segment of the paper was drafted during a sabbatical, financed partly by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities, at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. I am indebted to Wolfgang Fach, Helena Flam, Jack Goldstone, Kenneth Koford, Pavel Pelikan, Jean-Philippe Platteau, Wolfgang Seibel, Ulrich Witt, and three anonymous readers for helpful comments.
1 United in amazement

"Our jaws cannot drop any lower," exclaimed Radio Free Europe one day in late 1989. It was commenting on the electrifying collapse of Eastern Europe's communist regimes. 1 The political landscape of the entire region changed suddenly, astonishing even the most seasoned political observers. In a matter of weeks, entrenched leaders were overthrown, the communist monopoly on power was abrogated in one country after another, and persecuted critics of the communist system were catapulted into high office.

In the West, the ranks of the stunned included champions of the view that communist totalitarianism is substantially more stable than ordinary authoritarianism. 2 "It has to be conceded," wrote a leading proponent of this view in early 1990, "that those of us who distinguish between the two non-democratic types of government underestimated the decay of Communist countries and expected the collapse of totalitarianism to take longer than has actually turned out to be the case." 3 Another acknowledged her bewilderment through the title of a new book: The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State ... And Other Surprises. 4

Also amazed by the events of 1989 were scholars who rejected the concept of a frozen and immobile region. In 1987 the American Academy of Arts and Sciences invited a dozen specialists, including several living in Eastern Europe, to prepare interpretive essays on East European developments. As the Daedalus issue featuring these essays went to press the uprisings took off, prompting many authors to change "whole sentences and paragraphs in what were once thought to be completed essays." Daedalus editor Stephen Graubard remarks in his preface to the issue: "A quarterly journal has been obliged to adapt, inconveniently, but in some measure necessarily, the

3 Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev's Russia: Breakdown or Crackdown?" Commentary 89 (March 1990), p. 16.
techniques of a weekly or even a daily newspaper." Graubard proudly points out that even before the last-minute revisions the essays offered remarkable insights into the intellectual, social, and political stirrings that were transforming the region. But he concedes that neither he nor his essayists foresaw what happened. Recalling that in a planning session he had asked whether anything could be done to avoid publishing "an issue that will seem 'dated' three years after publication," he goes on: "Was this passage a premonition of all that was to follow? One wishes that one could claim such extraordinary prescience. Regrettably, it did not really exist."  

Wise statesmen, discerning diplomats, and gifted journalists were also caught off guard. So too were futurologists, who operate in long time frames. John Naisbett's celebrated Megatrends, which sold eight million copies in the early 1980s, does not predict the fall of communism. As The Economist observed even before the East European Revolution had run its course, 1989 turned out to be a year when "the most quixotic optimists" were repeatedly "proved too cautious."  

Within Eastern Europe itself, the revolution came as a surprise even to leading "dissidents." In a 1979 essay, "The power of the powerless," Vaclavev Havel recognized that the regimes of Eastern Europe were anything but invincible. They might be toppled, he wrote, by a "social movement," an "explosion of civil unrest," or a "sharp conflict inside an apparently monolithic power structure," among other possibilities. For reasons spelled out below, this essay is at once a brilliant probe into the communist system's stability and a penetrating prognosis of its ultimate demise. Yet it stays clear of speculation on the timing of the collapse. It is replete with statements such as "we must see the hopelessness of trying to make long-range predictions" and "far-reaching political change

---

5 Stephen R. Graubard, "Preface to the issue 'Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe'," Daedalus 119 (Winter 1990), p. vi.
6 Ibid., p. ii.
7 John Naisbett, Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (New York: Warner Books, 1982). The months following the East European Revolution saw the appearance of John Naisbett and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New Directions for the 1990's (New York: William Morrow, 1990). This sequel characterizes the East European developments of the late 1980s as an unforeseen "political earthquake." It goes on to predict that in the 1990s we will witness the further erosion of communism (ch. 3).
is utterly unforeseeable," although it ends on a cautiously optimistic note: "What if [the 'brighter future'] has been here for a long time already, and only our own blindness and weakness has prevented us from seeing it around us and within us, and kept us from developing it?"10

Eight years later Havel himself would exhibit "blindness" to events that were ushering in a "brighter future." Less than three years before the revolution he commented as follows on a Prague crowd's rousing welcome to the visiting Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev:

I feel sad; this nation of ours never learns. How many times has it put all its faith in some external force which, it believed, would solve its problems? ... And yet here we are again, making exactly the same mistake. They seem to think that Gorbachev has come to liberate them from Husák"11

In late 1988, with less than a year to go, Havel was still unsure about the direction of events:

Maybe [the Movement for Civil Liberties] will quickly become an integral feature of our country's life, albeit one not particularly beloved of the regime ... Perhaps it will remain for the time being merely the seed of something that will bear fruit in the dim and distant future. It is equally possible that the entire "matter" will be stamped on hard ...12

Other Czechoslovak dissidents were just as unprepared for the revolution. In November 1989, Jan Urban suggested that the opposition contest the national elections scheduled for June 1991. His friends ridiculed the proposal for being hopelessly utopian.13 Within a matter of days, they were all celebrating the fall of Czechoslovakia's communist dictatorship.

A few months before the revolution, negotiations were under way in neighboring Poland between the communist regime and Solidarity, a trade union which for years had been insisting on political pluralism. To almost everyone's surprise, the regime agreed in April 1989 to hold openly contested elections for a pluralistic parliament. In elections scheduled for June all 100 Senate seats and 161 of the 460 Assembly seats would be contestable. As things turned out, Solidarity won all but one of the Senate seats in addition to all of the Assembly seats it was allowed to contest, exceeding the wildest expectations. Stunned by the immensity of this success, Solidarity officials

10 Ibid., pp. 87, 89, and 96.
felt that the electorate had gone too far. The victory would force Solidarity into making bold political moves, they reasoned, simply to satisfy raised hopes. These moves would provoke a communist crackdown. The significant point is that neither the government nor Solidarity was prepared for such a lopsided result. The April accord was designed to give Solidarity a voice in Parliament, not to substantiate and legitimate its claim to being the voice of the Polish people.14

We will never know how many East Europeans did foresee the events of 1989, or at least the impending changes in their own countries. But at each step, journalistic accounts invariably painted the picture of a stunned public. For example, two days after the breaching of the Berlin Wall, The New York Times carried an article in which an East German remarks: "It's unfathomable. If you had told me that one week ago, I wouldn't have believed it. Mentally, I still can't. It will take a few days before what this means sinks in."15

I know of only one systematic study of relevance. Four months after the fall of communism in East Germany the Allensbach Institute asked a broad sample of East Germans: "A year ago did you expect such a peaceful revolution?" Only 5% answered in the affirmative, although 18% answered "yes, but not that fast." Fully 76% indicated that the revolution totally surprised them.16 These figures are all the more remarkable given the I-knew-it-would-happen fallacy—the human tendency to exaggerate foreknowledge.17 Even trained historians succumb to this fallacy, portraying

14 On the elections and the reactions they generated, see the reports of John Tagliabue, New York Times, June 3–6. The events leading up to the April accord have been chronicled and interpreted by Timothy Garton Ash, "Resolution: The springtime of two nations," New York Review of Books 36 (June 15, 1989): 3–10. He observed: "... almost no one imagined that the great gulf between 'the power' and 'the society', between Jaruzelski and Walesa, could be so swiftly bridged" (p. 6).
16 Question 36 on the East German Survey of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, February 17–March 15, 1990 (Archive no. 4195 GEW). I am indebted to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the Institute's director, for agreeing to insert this question into a broader survey on East German political opinions.
unanticipated events as inevitable, foreseeable, and actually foreseen. In view of this fallacy, if East Germans had been asked a year before the revolution "Do you expect a revolution in a year's time?" the percentage of unqualified negative answers would undoubtedly have been even higher.

The events that sealed the fate of East Germany's communist regime got rolling in the final days of summer when thousands of East German vacationers in Hungary took advantage of relaxed border controls to turn their trips into permanent departures for West Germany. The East German government responded by restricting its citizens' access to Hungary, only to see thousands show up at the West German Embassy in Prague. In the ensuing days it acceded to a series of face-saving arrangements under which the vacationers could depart for the West by first returning home. But each new concession created further waves of emigrants, confuting the government's expectation that the exodus would quickly taper off. The government was not alone in failing to anticipate where events were headed. Thousands of East German citizens rushed to join the exodus precisely because they felt their chances of reaching the West would never again be so good. If they knew that the Berlin Wall was about to come down, few would have left in such haste, leaving behind almost all their possessions, including their cars.

It might be said that some very knowledgeable observers of the Communist Bloc did predict its disintegration before the century was out. As early as 1969, for instance, the Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik claimed in a tract entitled Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? that the Russian Empire would break up within a decade and a half. Although it is tempting to credit Amalrik with exemplary foresight, a re-reading of his famous essay shows that he expected the Soviet Empire to meet its end following a protracted and devastating war with China, not through a string of popular upheavals. In fact, he explicitly suggested that the Soviet system of government had left people too demoralized and too dependent on authority to allow a spontaneous uprising.

Amalrik did not really foresee the events of 1989. Like a broken watch that tells the correct time every twelve hours, he got the timing of the first crack in the Empire essentially right, but on the basis of a spurious forecast of events.

I do not mean to suggest that the East European explosion came as a total surprise to absolutely everyone. Most people were astonished when it happened, and few of those who saw it coming expected it to be so peaceful. Only a small number of commentators prophesied that the revolution would be a swift and remarkably bloodless affair. Oddly, in view of his above-quoted remarks, they include Havel, on whose observations concerning the communist social order I shall say more later. Someone who came close to predicting major change was Vladimir Tismaneanu, a Romanian émigré living in the United States. About a year before the collapse of the Romanian regime, he depicted it as "probably the most vulnerable" in Eastern Europe. Sensing an "all-pervasive discontent," he observed that "[t]he Brasov riots in November 1987, when thousands of citizens took to the streets, chanted anti-Ceausescu slogans and burned the dictator's portraits, represent an unmistakable signal for Moscow that uncontrollable violence may flare up in Romania."21 Tismaneanu failed to place the Romanian uprising in the context of an upheaval spanning all of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies. Nor did he predict that Romania would be the last Soviet satellite to overthrow its government. Still, it is remarkable that he diagnosed the Romanian regime's vulnerability. Like Havel, he succeeded where many Western observers failed because he understood the essence of the communist system's apparent stability. This understanding prepared him for the type of explosion that occurred, although as discussed further on, it could not have enabled him to predate it.

While the collapse of the post-World War II political order of Eastern Europe stunned the world, in hindsight it appears as the inevitable consequence of a multitude of factors. In each of the six countries the leadership was generally despised, lofty economic promises remained unfulfilled, and freedoms taken for granted elsewhere existed only on paper. But if the revolution was indeed inevitable, why was it not foreseen? What made people overlook signs that now, after the fact, are so plainly visible? One of the central arguments of this essay is that a web of social and psychological

factors make it inherently difficult to predict the outcome of political competition. I shall argue that the East European Revolution was by no means inevitable. What was inevitable is that we would be astounded if and when it arrived.

"The victim of today is the victor of tomorrow, / And out of Never grows Now!"22 This couplet by Bertolt Brecht captures perfectly our central paradox: seemingly unshakeable regimes saw public sentiment turn against them with astonishing rapidity, as tiny oppositions mushroomed into crushing majorities. The currently popular theories of revolution offer little insight into this pace, nor for that matter, into the element of surprise in previous revolutions. They all claim predictive power, even though none has a track record at veritable prediction. The next section briefly critiques the pertinent scholarly literature. Without denying the usefulness of some received theories at explaining revolutions of the past, I go on to present a theory that illuminates both the revolutionary mobilization process and the limits on our ability to predict where and when mobilizations will occur. Subsequent sections apply my argument to the case at hand.

To prevent confusion, I ought to specify what I mean by "revolution." I am using the term in a narrow sense to denote a mass-supported seizure of political power which is aimed at transforming the social order. By this definition it is immaterial whether the accomplished transfer of power brings about significant social change. With regard to the East European Revolution, it is too early to tell whether the post-revolutionary regimes will succeed in reshaping the economy, the legal system, international relations, and individual rights—to mention just some of the domains where reforms are on the agenda. But even if the ongoing reforms all end in failure, the upheavals of 1989 can continue to be characterized as a region-wide revolution.

2 Received theories of revolution and their predictive ineffectiveness

In an acclaimed book on States and Social Revolutions, Theda Skocpol treats social revolutions as the product of structural and situational conditions.23 Specifically, she argues that a revolution occurs when two conditions come together: a state's evolving relations with other states and local

23 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
classes weaken its ability to maintain law and order, and the elites harmed by this situation are powerless to restore the status quo ante, yet strong enough to paralyze the government. Through their obstructionism the elites generate a burst of anti-elite sentiment, which sets in motion an uprising aimed at transforming the social order. The appeal of Skocpol's theory lies in its invocation of structural causes to explain shifts in the structure of political power. It does not depend on such "subjective" factors as beliefs, expectations, attitudes, preferences, intentions, and goals, although they do seep into structuralist case studies, including those of Skocpol herself.

Tracking emotions and mental states is a treacherous task, which is why the structuralist school considers it a virtue to abstract from them. Social structures are ostensibly easier to identify, which allegedly endows the structuralist theory with predictive superiority over "voluntarist" theories based on "rational choice." Theories that fall under the rubric of rational choice have certainly been unsuccessful at predicting mass upheavals. What they explain well is the rarity of popular uprisings. The rational-choice school's crucial insight is that an individual opposed to the incumbent regime need not cooperate toward its removal, since his personal risk from joining a revolutionary movement could outweigh his personal benefit from the movement's possible success. It is generally in a person's self-interest to let others make the sacrifices required to secure the regime's downfall, for a revolution constitutes a "collective good"--a good he can enjoy whether or not he has contributed to its realization. With most of the regime's opponents choosing to "free ride," an upheaval may fail to materialize even if the potential revolutionaries form a substantial majority. Yet from time to time a revolution does break out, and this presents the theory of rational choice with a puzzle that it does not solve, at least not in its standard form. The standard theory simply fails to make sense of why the first people to challenge the regime choose selflessly to gamble with their lives.

---


With respect to the East European Revolution in particular, the standard theory illuminates why, for all their grievances, the nations of the region were remarkably quiescent for years on end. It does not explain why, all of a sudden in 1989, their docility gave way to an explosive demand for change. For its part, the structuralist theory elucidates why the revolution broke out at a time when the Soviet Union was emitting increasingly convincing signals that it would not try to preserve the East European status quo by force. But it explains neither why the old order collapsed so suddenly in several countries at once nor why the events of 1989 outdistanced all expectations.

It is not my intention to deprecate either school. I do wish to point out that neither has come to terms with the deficiency of its foresight. If this is granted, one may wonder whether the predictive weakness in question might be overcome by incorporating into these theories additional relationships. For reasons developed below, I lean toward the view that perfect predictability is an unachievable objective. As we shall see, my own theory accommodates some of the major features and implications of these two theories. It has the virtue, however, of illuminating why major revolutions come as a surprise and why, even so, they are quite easily explained after the fact.

Like all unanticipated revolutions, the East European Revolution is generating multitudes of retrospective explanations that draw attention to its diverse causes and warning signs. To cite just one example, an essay written shortly after the fall of the East German regime begins with a flashback to April 1989: two East German train passengers, mutual strangers, share with each other their anti-regime feelings within hearing range of others—a highly uncommon event, because of the ubiquity of informants. This opening gives the impression that East Germany was obviously reaching its boiling point, although the rest of the essay makes clear that the East German uprising was in fact scarcely anticipated. Like so many other writings now rolling off the presses, this essay leaves unexplained why events seen in retrospect as harbingers of an imminent upheaval acquired significance only after the actual revolution.

Not that signs noticed in retrospect are necessarily fabrications. The "availability heuristic," a mental shortcut that we use to compensate for our cognitive limitations, makes information consistent with actual events gain salience at the expense of information inconsistent with them. Accordingly, events considered insignificant while the regime looked stable may suddenly gain enormous significance after it falls. Among all the events that are consistent with a particular event, the ones that become the focus of attention will be those that fit into the models at our disposal. Thus, a structuralist will be predisposed to treating as significant the structural signs of the coming revolution. These signs need not be imaginary, but there is nothing in the structuralist theory--or, for that matter, in the standard theory of rational choice--that explains why it is better at explanation than at prediction. This paradox is seldom appreciated, partly because the authors of retrospective accounts do not always concede their own bafflement. They generally write as though their favored theory shows the revolution to have been inevitable, seldom pausing to explain why, if this is so, they themselves did not offer unambiguous, unequivocal forecasts.

If one bête noire of the structuralist school is the rational-choice approach to the study of revolutions, another is the "relative-deprivation" approach. In this third approach revolutions are propelled by economic disappointments, that is, by outcomes falling short of expectations. If the consequent discontent becomes sufficiently widespread, the result is a revolt. With respect to the major revolutions she investigates in detail, Skocpol correctly observes that they began at times when levels of discontent were by historical standards not unusual. More evidence against the relative-deprivation theory comes from Charles Tilly and his associates, who find that in France

---


the level of collective violence has been uncorrelated with the degree of mass discontent. Thus, the relative-deprivation theory fails at both prediction and explanation. The reason is simple. While relative deprivation is doubtless a factor in every revolution in history, it is all too common in politically stable societies to provide a complete explanation for every observed instability. By implication, if we were to treat relative deprivation as an unmistakable sign of impending revolution we would subject ourselves to a continuous string of alarms, mostly false.

3 Preference falsification and revolutionary bandwagons

So mass discontent does not necessarily generate a popular uprising against the political status quo. To understand when it does, we need to identify the conditions under which individuals will display antagonism to the regime under which they live. After all, a mass uprising results from multitudes of individual choices to participate in a movement for change; there is no actor named "the crowd" or "the opposition." On this basic methodological point I am in agreement with the rational-choice school. As we will see, however, my model departs in important ways from the standard fare in rational-choice modeling.

Consider a society whose members are indexed by i. Each individual member faces a choice between supporting the government in public and opposing it. All this means is that each person is perceived as either a friend of the government or an enemy, for the political status quo or against. In private, of course, a person may feel torn between the government and the opposition, seeing both advantages and disadvantages to the existing regime. I am thus distinguishing between an individual's private preference and public preference. The former is effectively fixed at any given instant, the latter a variable under his control. In so far as his two preferences differ—that is, the preference he expresses in public diverges from that he holds in private—the individual is engaged in preference falsification.

---

Let $S$ represent the size of the public opposition, expressed as a percentage of the population. Initially it is near 0, implying that the government commands almost unanimous public support. As a mass-supported seizure of political power, a revolution may be treated as an enormous jump in $S$.

Now take a citizen who wants the government overthrown. The likely impact of his own public preference on the government's fate is negligible; it is unlikely to be a decisive factor in whether the government stands or falls. On the other hand, it may bring him personal rewards and impose on him personal punishments. If he chooses to oppose the government, for instance, he is likely to face persecution, though in the event the government falls his outspokenness may be rewarded handsomely. Does this mean that our individual will base his public preference solely on the rewards and punishments flowing from the two rival camps? Will his private antipathy to the regime play no role whatsoever in his decision? This does not seem reasonable, for history offers countless examples of brave individuals who stood for their causes in the face of the severest pressures, including torture.

On what, then, will our disaffected individual's choice depend? I submit that it will depend on a tradeoff between two payoffs, one external and the other internal.\footnote{For a detailed analysis of this tradeoff, see Timur Kuran, "Private and public preferences," \textit{Economics and Philosophy} 6 (April 1990): 1–26.}

The external payoff to siding with the opposition consists of the just-discussed personal rewards and punishments. In net terms, this payoff is apt to become increasingly favorable (or increasingly less unfavorable) with $S$. The larger $S$, the smaller the individual dissenter's chances of being persecuted for his pro-opposition identification, and the fewer hostile supporters of the government he has to face. The latter relationship reflects the fact that government supporters, even ones privately sympathetic to the opposition, participate in the persecution of the government's opponents, as part of their personal efforts to establish convincing pro-government credentials. This relationship implies that a rise in $S$ leaves fewer people seeking to penalize members of the public opposition.
The internal payoff is rooted in the psychological cost of preference falsification. The suppression of one's wants entails a loss of personal autonomy, a sacrifice of personal integrity. It thus generates lasting discomfort, the more so the greater the lie. This relationship may be captured by postulating that person i's internal payoff to supporting the opposition varies positively with his private preference, \( x^i \). The higher \( x^i \), the costlier he finds it to suppress his anti-government feelings.

So i's public preference depends on \( S \) and \( x^i \). As the public opposition grows, with his private preference constant, there comes a point where his external cost of joining the opposition falls below his internal cost of preference falsification. This switching point may be called his revolutionary threshold, \( T^i \). Since a threshold represents a value of \( S \), it is a number between 0 and 100.

If \( x^i \) should rise \( T^i \) will fall. In other words, if the individual becomes more sympathetic to the opposition, it will take a smaller public opposition to make him follow the call of his conscience. The same will be true if the government becomes less efficient, or the opposition becomes more efficient, at rewarding its supporters and punishing its rivals. In fact, anything that affects the relationship between \( S \) and the individual's external payoff to supporting the opposition will change his revolutionary threshold. Finally, \( T^i \) will fall if i develops a greater need to stand up and be counted. For then, the internal cost of preference falsification will come to dominate the external benefit at a lower \( S \).\footnote{The theory outlined in this section is developed more fully in Timur Kuran, "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice 61 (April 1989): 41-74. A summary of the present formulation was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Washington, D.C., December 28-30, 1990. Under the title "The East European Revolution of 1989: Is it surprising that we were surprised?" this presentation appeared in the American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 81 (May 1991), 123-27.}

This simple framework offers a reason why a person may choose to voice a demand for change even when the price of dissent is very high and the chances of a successful uprising very low. If his private opposition to the existing order is intense and/or his need for integrity is quite strong, the suffering he incurs for dissent may be outweighed by the satisfaction he derives from being true to himself. In every society, of course, there are people who go against the social order of the day. In capitalist societies, Joseph Schumpeter once observed, this group is dominated by intellectuals. Their position as "onlookers" and "outsiders" with much time for deep reflection causes
them to develop a "critical attitude" toward the status quo. And the value they attach to self-expression makes them relatively insensitive to social pressures. The same argument applies to non-capitalist societies. As a case in point, a disproportionately large share of the East European dissidents were intellectuals.

Returning to the general model, we can observe that individuals with different private preferences and psychological constitutions will have different revolutionary thresholds. Imagine a ten-person society featuring the threshold sequence

\[ A = (0, 20, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100). \]

Person 1 \((T^1=0)\) supports the opposition regardless of its size, just as person 10 \((T^{10}=100)\) always supports the government. The remaining eight people's preferences are sensitive to \(S\): depending on its level, they opt for one camp or the other. For instance, person 5 \((T^5=40)\) supports the government if \(0 \leq S < 40\), but joins the opposition if \(40 \leq S \leq 100\). Initially, let us assume, the opposition consists of a single person, or ten percent of the population, so \(S=10\). Because the nine other individuals have thresholds above 10, this \(S\) is self-sustaining. That is, it constitutes an equilibrium.

This equilibrium happens to be vulnerable to a minor change in \(A\). Suppose that person 2 has an unpleasant encounter at some government ministry. Her alienation from the regime rises, pushing her threshold down from 20 to 10. The new threshold sequence is

\[ A^* = (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100). \]

Person 2's new threshold happens to equal the existing \(S\) of 10, so she switches sides, and \(S\) becomes 20. Her move into the opposition takes the form of tossing an egg at the country's long-standing leader during a government-organized rally. The new \(S\) of 20 is not self-sustaining but self-augmenting, as it drives person 3 into the opposition. The higher \(S\) of 30 then triggers a fourth defection, raising \(S\) to 40, and this process continues until \(S\) reaches 90—a new equilibrium. Now

---

the first nine individuals are in opposition, with only the tenth supporting the government. A slight shift in one individual's threshold has thus generated a revolutionary bandwagon, an explosive growth in public opposition.33

Now consider the sequence

\[ B = \{0, 20, 30, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100\}, \]

which differs from \( A \) only in its third element: 30 as opposed to 20. As in the previous illustration, let \( T^2 \) fall from 20 to 10. The resulting sequence is

\[ B^- = \{0, 10, 30, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100\}. \]

Once again, the incumbent equilibrium of 10 becomes unsustainable, and \( S \) rises to 20. But the opposition's growth stops there, for the new \( S \) is self-sustaining. Some government supporters privately enjoy the sight of the leader's egg-ridden face, but none follows the egg-thrower into public opposition. We see that a minor variation in thresholds may alter drastically the effect of a given perturbation. And in particular, an event that causes a revolution in one setting may in a slightly different setting produce only a minor decline in the government's popularity.

Neither private preferences nor the corresponding thresholds are common knowledge. So a society can come to the brink of a revolution without anyone knowing this, not even those with the power to unleash it. In sequence \( A \), for instance, person 2 need not recognize that she has the ability to set off a revolutionary bandwagon. Even if she senses the commonness of preference falsification, she simply cannot know whether the actual threshold sequence is \( A \) or \( B \). Social psychologists use the term pluralistic ignorance to describe misperceptions concerning distributions of individual characteristics.34 In principle, pluralistic ignorance can be mitigated through polls that accord individuals anonymity. But it is easier to offer people anonymity than to convince them that the preferences they reveal will remain anonymous and never be used against them. In any case, an outwardly popular government that knows preference falsification to be pervasive has no


interest in publicizing the implied fragility of its support, because this might inspire the disaffected to bring their anti-government feelings into the open. On the contrary, it has an incentive to discourage independent polling and discredit surveys that reveal unflattering information.

We have already seen that the threshold sequence is not fixed. Anything that affects the distribution of private preferences may alter it, for instance, an economic recession, contacts with other societies, or inter-generational replacement. But whatever the underlying reason, private preferences and, hence, the threshold sequence, can move dramatically against the government without triggering a revolution. In the sequence

$$C = (0, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 60, 100),$$

the average threshold is 30, possibly because most people sympathize with the opposition. Yet S=10 remains an equilibrium. It is true, of course, that a revolution is more likely under C than under A. C features seven individuals with thresholds of 20, A only one. A ten-unit fall in any one of the seven thresholds would trigger a revolution.

The point remains that widespread disapproval of the government is not sufficient to mobilize large numbers for revolutionary action. Anti-government feelings can certainly bring a revolution within the realm of possibility, but other conditions must come together to set it off. By the same token, a revolution may break out in a society where private preferences, and therefore individual thresholds, tend to be relatively unfavorable to the opposition. Reconsider the sequence A', where the average threshold is 46, as opposed to 30 in C. Under A' public opposition darts from 10 to 90, whereas under C it remains stuck at 10. This simple comparison shows why the relative-deprivation theory of revolution has not held up under empirical testing. By treating the likelihood of revolution as the sum of the individual levels of discontent, the relative-deprivation theory overlooks the significance of the distribution of discontent. As our comparison between A' and C indicates, one sufficiently disaffected person with a threshold of 10 may do more for a revolution than seven individuals with thresholds of 20.

Imagine now that a superpower long committed to holding the local government in power suddenly rescinds this commitment, declaring that it will cease meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. This is precisely the type of change to which the structuralist theory accords revolutionary significance. In the present framework, such a change may ignite a revolution, but
there is no guarantee. The outcome depends both on the pre-existing distribution of thresholds and the consequent shifts. Since the postulated change in international relations is likely to lower the expected cost of joining the opposition, people's thresholds are likely to fall. Let us say that every threshold between 10 and 90 drops by 10 units. If the pre-existing threshold sequence were A, B, or C, the result would be an explosion in S from 10 to 90. But suppose that it were

\[ D = (0, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 30, 100). \]

The structural shock turns this sequence into

\[ D' = (0, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 100). \]

Fully four fifths of the population are now willing to switch over to the opposition but only if someone else goes first. No one does, leaving S at 10.

Structural factors are thus part of the story, yet by no means the only part. While they certainly affect the likelihood of revolution, they cannot possibly deliver infallible predictions. A single person's reaction to an event of global importance may make all the difference between a massive uprising and a latent bandwagon that never takes off. So to suggest, as the structuralists do, that revolutions are brought about by deep historical forces, with individuals being simply the passive bearers of these forces, is to overlook the potentially crucial importance of individual characteristics of little significance in and of themselves. It is always a conjunction of factors, many of them intrinsically unimportant and thus unobserved, if not unobservable, that determine the flow of events. A major global event can produce drastically different outcomes in two settings that differ trivially. Structuralism and individualism are not rival and mutually incompatible approaches to the study of revolution, as Skocpol would have it. They are essential components of a single story.

We can now turn to the question of why an unanticipated revolution may in hindsight appear as the inevitable consequence of monumental forces for change. A successful revolution brings into the open long-repressed grievances. Moreover, people who were relatively content with the old regime embrace the new regime, and they are apt to attribute their former public preferences to fears of persecution.

Reconsider the threshold sequence
\( A^* = (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 100) \).

The relatively high thresholds in \( A^* \) are likely to be associated with private preferences more favorable to the government than the opposition.\(^{35}\) Person 9 \( (T^9=80) \) is much more satisfied with the government than, say, person 3 \( (T^3=20) \). As such she has little desire to join a movement aimed at toppling it. Remember that public opposition settles at 90, she being the last to jump on the revolutionary bandwagon. The important point is this: person 9 changes her public preference only after the opposition snowballs into a crushing majority, making it imprudent to remain a government supporter.

Having made the switch, she has every reason to feign a longstanding antipathy to the toppled government. She will not admit that she yearns for the status quo ante, because this would contradict her new public preference. Nor will she say that her change of heart followed the government’s collapse, because this might render her declared sympathy for the revolution unconvincing. She simply claims that she has long had serious reservations about the old order and sympathized with the opposition’s objectives. An unintended effect of this distortion is to make it seem as though the toppled government enjoyed even less genuine support than it actually did.

This illusion is rooted in the very phenomenon responsible for making the revolution a surprise: preference falsification. Having misled everyone into seeing a revolution as highly unlikely, preference falsification now conceals the forces that were working against it. One of the consequences of post-revolutionary preference falsification is thus to make it even less comprehensible why the revolution was unforeseen.

The historians of a revolution may appreciate the biases that afflict people’s post-revolutionary accounts of their pre-revolutionary dispositions without being able to measure the significance of these biases. Consider the sequence

\[ C^* = (0, 10, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 20, 60, 100). \]

Like \( A^* \), this sequence drives \( S \) from 10 to 90, implying that nine out of ten individuals have an incentive to say that they despised the pre-revolutionary regime. If thresholds below 50 reflect

\(^{35}\) Relatively high thresholds may also be associated with relatively great vulnerability to social pressure.
private support for a revolution and those above 50 private satisfaction with the status quo, eight of the nine would be telling the truth, the one liar being person 9 \( (T^9=60) \). Under the same assumption, four out of the nine would be lying if the threshold sequence were \( A \). But once again, thresholds are not public knowledge. So historians may face great difficulty determining whether the pre-revolutionary sequence was \( A \) or \( C \)--or for that matter, whether the post-revolutionary sequence is \( A \) or \( C \).

Before we move on to the East European Revolution, it may be useful to comment on how the foregoing argument relates to three sources of controversy in the literature on revolutions: the continuity of social change, the power of the individual, and the significance of unorganized crowds.

The proposed theory treats continuous and discontinuous change as a single, unified process. Private preferences and the corresponding thresholds may move gradually over a long period during which public opposition is more or less stable. If the cumulative movement establishes a latent bandwagon, a minor event may then precipitate an abrupt and sharp break in the size of the public opposition. This is not to say that private preferences change only in small increments. A major blunder on the part of the government may suddenly turn private preferences against it.

Such a shift could also occur in response to an initial, possibly modest, increase in public opposition. The underlying logic was expressed beautifully by Alexis de Tocqueville: "Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds." In terms of our model, Tocqueville suggests that the threshold sequence is itself dependent on the size of the public opposition. If so, a revolutionary bandwagon may come about as the joint outcome of two mutually reinforcing trends: a fall in thresholds and a rise in public opposition. Imagine that public opposition rises sufficiently to convince those privately sympathetic to the government that a revolution might be in the making. This realization induces many of them to think about possible alternatives to the status quo. Their

---

thinking starts a chain reaction through which private preferences shift swiftly and dramatically against the government. The consequent changes in the threshold sequence cause the revolutionary bandwagon to accelerate.

The theory depicts the individual as both powerless and potentially very powerful. The individual is powerless because a revolution requires the mobilization of large numbers, potentially very powerful because under the right circumstances he may set off a chain reaction that generates the necessary mobilization. Not that the individual can know with precision when his own choice can make a difference. He may sense that his chances of sparking a wildfire are unusually great but never be certain about the consequences of his own opposition. What is certain is that the incumbent regime will remain in place unless someone takes the lead in moving into the opposition.

As we saw in the previous section, the standard theory of rational choice depicts the potential revolutionary as paralyzed by the realization of his powerlessness. Many social thinkers who, like the present author, accept the logic of collective action have struggled with the task of explaining how mass mobilizations get started. Among the proposed explanations one rests on a cognitive illusion: the individual overestimates his personal political influence. Another invokes an ethical commitment: the individual feels compelled to do his fair share for the attainment of a jointly desired outcome.37 My own approach, which is not incompatible with these explanations, places the burden of igniting the mobilization process on the individual's need to be true to himself. This approach is consistent with the fact that revolutionary leaders tend to be surprised when their goals materialize. The cognitive-illusion explanation is not: people who challenge the government out of a belief in their personal ability to direct the course of history will not be surprised when their wishes come true. My approach is also consistent with the fact that some people risk their lives for a revolution even as the vast majority of the potential beneficiaries refrain from doing their own fair shares.

Finally, the outlined theory accords organized pressure groups and unorganized crowds complementary roles in the government's overthrow. Organized oppositions enhance the external payoff to dissent, both by providing the individual dissenter with a support network and by raising

---

37 Each of these is developed by Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller, and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Personal influence, collective rationality, and mass political action," *American Political Science Review* 83 (September 1989): 885–903.
the likelihood of a successful revolution. They also help break the appearance of the status quo's invulnerability, and through propaganda, they shift people's private preferences in favor of change. So Charles Tilly is right to draw attention to the structural and situational factors that govern a society's pattern of political organization. But as Pamela Oliver warns us, we must guard against overemphasizing the role of organization at the expense of that of the unorganized crowd. A small difference in the resources at an organized opposition's disposal may have a tremendous impact on the outcome of its efforts. This observation makes perfect sense in the context of the theory developed here. Where a small pressure group fails to push a bandwagon into motion a slightly better organized or slightly larger one might.

4 East European communism and the wellspring of its stability

Communist parties came to power in Russia, and then in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, claiming that "scientific socialism" would pioneer new dimensions of freedom, eliminate exploitation, vest political power in the masses, eradicate nationalism, and raise standards of living to unprecedented heights—all this, while the state was withering away. They did not deliver on any of these promises. Under their stewardship, communism came to symbolize repression, censorship, ethnic chauvinism, militarism, red tape, and economic backwardness.

The failures of communism prompted a tiny number of Soviet and East European citizens to criticize official policies and established institutions. Such dissidents expressed their frustrations through clandestine self-publications (samizdat) and writings published in the West (tamizdat). Given the chasm between the rhetoric of communism and its achievements, the existence of an opposition is easily understood. Less comprehensible is the rarity of public opposition—prior, that is, to 1989. The few uprisings that were crushed—notably, East Berlin in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968—are the exceptions that prove the rule. For most of several decades, most East Europeans displayed a remarkable capacity to put up with tyranny and inefficiency. They remained docile, submissive, and even outwardly supportive of the status quo.

This subservience is attributable partly to punishments the communist establishment meted out to its actual and imagined opponents. In the heyday of communism a person speaking out against the leadership or in favor of some reform could expect to suffer harassment, lose his job, and face imprisonment, in short, be denied the opportunity to lead a decent life. Even worse horrors befell millions of suspected opponents. Just think of the forced-labor camps of the Gulag Archipelago and of the liquidations carried out by intolerant leaders under the pretext of historical necessity. "We can only be right with and by the Party," wrote a leading theoretician of communism, "for history has provided no other way of being in the right." 40 Such thinking could, and did, serve to justify horrible crimes against nonconformists.

Yet official repression is only one factor in the durability of communism. The system was sustained by a general willingness to support it in public. People routinely applauded speakers whose message they disliked, joined organizations whose mission they opposed, and signed defamatory letters against people they admired, among other manifestations of consent and accommodation. "The lie," wrote the Russian novelist Solzhenitsyn in the early 1970s, "has been incorporated into the state system as the vital link holding everything together, with billions of tiny fasteners, several dozen to each man." 41 If people stopped lying, he asserted, communist rule would break down instantly. He then asked rhetorically, "What does it mean, not to lie?" It means "not saying what you don't think, and that includes not whispering, not opening your mouth, not raising your hand, not casting your vote, not feigning a smile, not lending your presence, not standing up, and not cheering." 42

In "The power of the powerless," Havel speaks of a greengrocer who places in his window, among onions and carrots, the slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" Why does the greengrocer do this, Havel wonders,

Is he genuinely enthusiastic about the idea of unity among the workers of the world? Is his enthusiasm so great that he feels an irrepresible impulse to acquaint the public with his ideals? Has he really given more than a moment's thought to how such a unification might occur and what it would mean?

---

42 Ibid., p. 276 (emphasis in original).
Havel's answer is worth quoting at length:

[T]he overwhelming majority of shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our greengrocer from the enterprise headquarters along with the onions and carrots. He put them all into the window simply because it has been done that way for years, because everyone does it, and because that is the way it has to be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble. He could be reproached for not having the proper 'decoration' in his window; someone might even accuse him of disloyalty. He does it because these things must be done if one is to get along in life. It is one of the thousands of details that guarantee him a relatively tranquil life in 'harmony with society', as they say.\textsuperscript{43}

So our greengrocer puts up the assigned slogan to communicate not a social ideal but his preparedness to conform. And the reason the display conveys a message of submission is that every submissive greengrocer has exhibited the same slogan for years. By removing the poster—-or worse, replacing it with one that reads "Workers of the World, Eat Onions and Carrots!"-—our greengrocer would expose himself to the charge of subversion. He therefore displays the required slogan faithfully and fends off trouble. In the process, he reinforces the perception that society is solidly behind the Party. His own prudence thus becomes a factor in other greengrocers' willingness to promote the unity of the world's workers. Moreover, it pressures farmers, miners, bus drivers, artists, journalists, and bureaucrats to continue doing and saying the things expected of them.

Efforts to establish one's loyalty to the political status quo often took more tragic forms than a greengrocer's display of a wellworn Marxist slogan. People tattled on each other. And they participated in the ostracism and vilification of nonconformists who were saying or doing things that they admired. The Romanian dissident Norman Manea writes of authors who "persecuted their colleagues on the 'blacklist' with tireless, diabolical energy."\textsuperscript{44} In the same vein, the Polish dissident Piotr Wierzbicki writes about a famous composer who went out of his way to alert the government to an anti-Soviet insinuation on the sleeve of a record by a Pole living abroad. The squealing composer knew that this information was likely to block the local performance of his fellow Pole's music. He did it to prove his loyalty to the regime—-to earn, as it were, a certificate of normalcy.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Havel, "The power of the powerless," pp. 27-8.
\textsuperscript{44} Norman Manea, "Romania: Three lines with commentary," in Brinton and Rinzler (eds.), Without Force or Lies, p. 327.
In 1977, a group of Czechoslovak intellectuals established a loose association, Charter 77, dedicated to the basic human rights that Czechoslovakia agreed to respect by signing the Helsinki accords of 1975. The government responded by detaining the spokesmen of Charter 77 and launching a nationwide campaign against the association. In the course of this campaign millions of ordinary citizens expressed their opposition to Charter 77 by signing statements of condemnation, sending hate letters to newspapers, and ostracizing its signatories. Many an opponent of Charter 77 did so in betrayal of his conscience.

It is true of course that some of this campaign's participants saw Charter 77 as a menacing organization bent on tarnishing Czechoslovakia's image abroad. And the tale-bearing Polish composer may well have had motives other than a desire to please the regime, for instance, jealousy or professional competition. But East Europeans turned against each other routinely even in the absence of such motives.

Let us return to the story of the greengrocer. Havel asks us to "imagine that one day something in our greengrocer snaps and he stops putting up the slogans." The greengrocer also "stops voting in elections he knows are a farce"; he "begins to say what he really thinks at political meetings"; and he "even finds the strength in himself to express solidarity with those whom his conscience commands him to support." In short, he makes "an attempt to live within the truth." Here are the likely consequences of this revolt:

 )[The greengrocer] will be relieved of his post as manager of the shop and transferred to the warehouse. His pay will be reduced. His hopes for a holiday in Bulgaria will evaporate. His children's access to higher education will be threatened. His superiors will harass him and his fellow workers will wonder about him. Most of those who apply these sanctions, however, will not do so from any authentic inner conviction but simply under pressure from conditions, the same conditions that once pressured the greengrocer to display the official slogans. They will persecute the greengrocer either because it is expected of them, or to demonstrate their loyalty, or simply as part of the general panorama, to which belongs an awareness that this is how situations of this sort are dealt with, that this, in fact, is how things are always done, particularly if one is not to become suspect oneself.

46 The Charter 77 declaration is reproduced in Havel et al., The Power of the Powerless, pp. 217-21.
49 Loc. cit.
The brilliance of this vignette lies in its insights into the pressures that kept East Europeans outwardly loyal to their inefficient, tyrannical regimes. Official repression met with the approval of ordinary citizens and relied crucially on their complicity. By falsifying their preferences and helping to discipline dissenters, citizens jointly sustained a system that many considered abominable. The crucial "line of conflict," according to Havel, ran not between the Party and the people but "through each person," for in one way or another everyone was "both a victim and a supporter of the system."\(^{50}\)

The same idea found vivid expression in a banner hung above the altar in an East German church: "I am Cain and Abel."\(^{51}\) The implied intrapersonal conflict is rooted, of course, in the clash between the individual's drive to exercise autonomy and his need for social acceptance. Until 1989 most East Europeans tended to resolve this chronic clash in favor of social acceptance. By thus avoiding to battle openly with communism, they acceded to battle silently with themselves. In the process, most achieved a measure of outer security, though at the expense of inner turmoil.

Not that communist rule managed to do away altogether with the human propensity to protest. As Wierzbicki points out, newspapers received complaints in abundance. There were letters about shabby housing, the neglected grave of some poet, and the sloppily painted fence of a children's playground. Yet protesters tended to stay within a Party-defined zone of acceptability. Refraining from digging below the surface of issues, they avoided challenging communism itself. A schoolteacher writing furious letters about a defective appliance would not bring herself to blaming the system that produces useless appliances. Nor would she sign a letter expressing solidarity with dissidents or join a demonstration for freedom of speech.\(^{52}\)

The typical East European feigned opposition to the few dissidents, though in private he applauded their mission. Havel suggests that this admiration was coupled with a resentment: people lacking the courage to be true to themselves felt threatened by displays of integrity on the part of others. They thus treated open defiance "as an abnormality, as arrogance, as an attack on themselves,\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 37.


as a form of dropping out of society."53 If it is true that the "iron in the soul" of another reminded a conformist of the lack of iron in his own, this would have served as an additional obstacle to overt opposition.54

Another such obstacle was pluralistic ignorance: people alienated from the communist regime could not know how widely their alienation was shared. They could sense the repressed discontent of their conformist relatives and close friends; they could observe the hardships in the lives of their fellow citizens; and they could intuit that past uprisings would not have occurred in the absence of substantial discontent. Still, they lacked reliable and up-to-date information on the share of society favoring a change in regime. The government-controlled press exploited this ignorance by stressing the "unity of socialist society" and its "solidarity in supporting the Party." In so far as such propaganda led potential revolutionaries to underestimate the prevalence of discontent, it weakened their incentives to join the minuscule opposition.

Throughout history governments have recognized the significance of preference falsification. And in self-interest they have tried to keep themselves informed about the private preferences of their constituents. "The art of governing," King Louis XIV told his heir, consists in "knowing the real thoughts of all the princes in Europe, knowing everything that people try to conceal from us, their secrets, and keeping close watch over them."55 So it is that the communist governments of Eastern Europe conducted numerous surveys to find out the true thoughts and feelings of their subjects. If the fact that they kept the results secret is any indication, these were unflattering to them and their policies. Whatever information they did publish "was checked beforehand and given the appropriate interpretation," to keep it from emboldening the regime's declared and potential opponents.56

56 Jiri Otava, "Public opinion research in Czechoslovakia," Social Research 55 (Spring/Summer 1988), p. 249. On p. 251, n. 2, we learn that every issue of the Czechoslovak government's official bulletin on public opinion stated: "We remind all researchers that this bulletin is not meant for the public, which means not even for your friends and acquaintances, but serves exclusively as internal material for poll-takers and those who collaborate with us."
It would be an exaggeration to suggest that *all* East European supporters of communist rule were at heart anti-communists. Some benefited handsomely from the system, and others felt threatened by major reform. Nor did those who became conscious of communism's failures necessarily lose faith in official ideals. Even leading dissidents remained sympathetic to central planning and collective ownership and ever suspicious of the free-enterprise system.\(^{57}\) By and large, they felt that communism was betrayed by self-serving leaders, not that it was inherently unworkable.

These observations are consistent with opinion surveys Western organizations conducted in the 1970s and 1980s on East Europeans travelling abroad. With remarkable consistency and for each nation, these showed that in free elections offering a full spectrum of choices, including a Democratic Socialist Party and a Christian Democratic Party, the Communist Party would receive at most a tenth of the vote. But invariably the socialists would be the winners.\(^{58}\)

Further systematic evidence is contained in surveys conducted from 1970 onward by the Central Institute for Youth Development in Leipzig, for the benefit of the East German leadership. These surveys, which are now being declassified, suggest that until the mid-1980s most East Germans accepted the official goals of socialism. In 1983, 46 percent of a sample of trade-school students endorsed the statement "I am a devoted citizen of the German Democratic Republic," while 45 percent endorsed it with reservations and only 9 percent rejected it. And in 1984, 50 percent agreed that "socialism will triumph throughout the world," while 42 percent agreed with reservations and 8 percent disagreed. Between 1970 and 1985, these results showed little variation.\(^{59}\)

They may, of course, have been based on a flawed methodology, as much public opinion research in Eastern Europe was. But it is highly significant that after 1985 this same methodology registered, as we shall see later, a sustained deterioration both in the citizenry's attachment to the regime and in its faith in socialism.

---


\(^{59}\) "Daten des Zentralinstituts für Jugendforschung Leipzig" (mimeo.), Tables 1 and 2. These tables were compiled by Walter Friedrich, the Institute's director, and distributed to the participants of a conference held in Ladenburg in February 1991, under the auspices of the Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz Foundation. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann brought the document to my attention; John Ahouse translated it into English.
It thus appears that while the East Europeans overwhelmingly disliked the regimes under which they were living, they were much less troubled by the principles of socialism—at least until the mid-1980s. To make sense of this finding, we need to touch on the cognitive implications of preference falsification. Disaffected citizens choosing to conform to the regime's demands typically paid lip service to official goals, used Marxist forms of expression, and made excuses for communism's shortcomings by pointing to the ostensibly worse failures of capitalism. In the process, they unavoidably kept their fellow citizens uninformed about their private beliefs inimical to the status quo. Worse, they knowingly exposed one another to false facts and misleading arguments. In short, they distorted public discourse. Since public discourse influences what is noticed and how events get interpreted, this distortion undoubtedly affected the evolution of East European private preferences. East Europeans subjected from early childhood to predictions of capitalism's imminent demise and theories of communism's incontrovertible superiority must have become conditioned, in one degree or another, to think in Marxist terms. In other words, they must have developed some mental resistance to the fundamental flaws of their social order.60

If this reasoning is correct, Marxist discourse would also have blunted the East European's ability to articulate an alternative economic order. Vladimir Shlapentokh points to a paradox here. The worker mistrusts the market order, even though he obtains his treasured blue jean through the only free market to which he has access—the black market. Likewise, the manager who turns regularly to the underground economy for vital spare parts dreads economic liberalization. Shlapentokh ascribes such inconsistencies to a disjunction between the "pragmatic" and "theoretical" layers of the individual mind,61 a phenomenon known in cognitive psychology as mental partitioning. This phenomenon is an inevitable consequence of the mind's limitations in receiving, storing, retrieving, and processing information. Handicapped by their mental limitations, people are unable

---

to incorporate the multitudes of variables and relationships that bear on their happiness into one comprehensive model. They thus ignore many interconnections and treat closely related phenomena as unrelated.62

For our purposes, the important implication is this: an East European confronted daily with communism's shortcomings would not necessarily have taken these as a sign of communism's unworkability. He could easily have turned against individual functionaries without losing faith in the system in which they operated. Some East Europeans did recognize, of course, that specific shortcomings were part of a general pattern of failure. Many were intellectuals with much time to think and thus to make the mental connections necessary for identifying the system's fundamental flaws. But many others did not make these connections, partly because the prevailing public discourse provided no help.

So processes rooted in preference falsification kept private opposition to communism far from unanimous. This does not negate the fact that vast numbers remained outwardly loyal to communist rule primarily out of fear. But for widespread preference falsification, the communist regimes of Eastern Europe would have faced persistently severe public opposition, very possibly collapsing before 1989. In view of its profound impact on both private and public sentiment, preference falsification may be characterized as the wellspring of the communist system's stability.

5 The revolution

The foregoing argument has two immediate implications. First, the regimes of Eastern Europe were substantially more vulnerable than the subservience and quiescence of their populations made them seem. Millions were prepared to stand up in defiance if ever they sensed that this was sufficiently safe. The people's solidarity with their leaders would then be exposed as an illusion, stripping the veneer of legitimacy from the communist monopoly on power. Second, the support of the people genuinely sympathetic to the status quo was rather thin. Though many saw no superior

alternative to socialism, their many grievances predisposed them to embracing the promise of fundamental change. If public discourse were somehow to turn against socialism, they would gain consciousness of possible improvements, as if awakened from a long sleep.

But what would get the revolutionary mobilization process started? With the benefit of hindsight it appears that the push came from the Soviet Union. In the mid-1980s festering economic problems, until then officially denied, convinced the top Soviet leadership to call for perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (public openness). Repressed grievances burst into the open, including dissatisfaction with communist rule itself. And with Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to the helm in 1985 the Soviet Union abandoned its longstanding policy of confrontation with the West, seeking accommodation and cooperation.63 In Eastern Europe these changes kindled hopes of greater independence and meaningful social reform.

Lest it appear that these developments provided a clear signal of the coming revolution, remember that Havel dismissed a Czechoslovak crowd's jubilation over Gorbachev as a sign of naivety. In his pessimism he was hardly alone. Even if Gorbachev wanted to liberate Eastern Europe, a popular argument went, it was anything but obvious that he could. Surely, the military and hard-line conservatives would insist on retaining the Soviet Union's strategic buffer against an attack from the West.

Nor was this the only obstacle to liberation. Economic and ethnic tensions within the Soviet Union could provide the pretext for a conservative coup. There was always the precedent of Khrushchev, toppled in 1964. Around the time that Havel was exuding pessimism, a joke was making the rounds in Prague: "What is the difference between Gorbachev and Dubcek [the deposed leader of the 1968 Prague Spring]?" The answer: "None--except Gorbachev doesn't know it yet."

Significantly, in the fall of 1989 Moscow was ripe with rumors of an impending coup.65 Some observers expected Gorbachev to survive, but only by reversing course and becoming increasingly

---

64 Economist, July 18, 1987, p. 45.
repressive. There is an old Soviet joke that gives expression to the underlying thinking. Stalin leaves his heirs in the Party two envelopes. One is labelled, "In case of trouble, open this." Trouble arises and the envelope is opened ceremoniously: "Blame me." The other envelope is labelled, "In case of more trouble, open this." More trouble comes and the second envelope is opened: "Do as I did."

In support of their prediction that the conservative elements in the leadership would sooner or later prevail, pessimists frequently invoked the conservatism of the Soviet people. In a widely discussed 1988 article, for instance, a Russian social scientist argued that seven decades of bureaucratic regimentation had suppressed individual creativity, reorienting the "Soviet value system away from revolutionary transformation to conservative immobility." Communism had quashed the very personal qualities on which the reformists were counting: individual responsibility and creativity. In June 1989 another Soviet observer would confess: "For three years I have tried to find out whether or not there is mass support for perestroika, and now I feel I can conclude that it does not exist." He blamed not only the individual citizen's fear of change but also the Soviet ethic that identifies social justice with economic equality. The upshot of such comments, to which scores more could be added from diverse sources, was that Soviet citizens tended to be deeply suspicious of Gorbachev's intentions. Many commentators inferred that Gorbachev's reforms were doomed. He could not rely on the masses, they reasoned, for protection against a conservative challenger.

As Gorbachev was trying to restructure the Soviet Union, Poland was testing the limits of its freedom from Moscow. The struggle to legalize Solidarity had already given the country a taste of pluralism, and in fits and starts government censorship was being relaxed. Everyone recognized that this softening enjoyed Gorbachev's approval. Yet few informed people put much faith in Gorbachev's ability to push the liberation of Eastern Europe substantially forward, and once again,

66 With the revolution, the notion that Gorbachev would turn to the army and the KGB in a bid to stay in power lost plausibility. It regained plausibility in late 1990 with the resignation of his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, who accused Gorbachev publicly of plotting with hard-liners to create a repressive dictatorship.


it was not clear that he intended to try. "Dissidents throughout Europe," wrote *The Economist* in mid-1987, sound "sceptical" when talking about Gorbachev. "This is not because they question [his] reforming zeal. It is simply that many thinking people in Eastern Europe have come to believe that real change in Communist countries cannot be imposed from the top—or from outside—but must emerge from below." 70 Plenty of events lent credence to this reasoning. For instance, Gorbachev did not prevent the East German regime from falsifying the results of local elections held in the spring of 1989 or from endorsing China’s Tiananmen Square massacre that summer. Nor did he keep the East German regime from using force to disperse small demonstrations against these two acts. 71

In sum, prior to the actual revolution it was not at all clear that the Soviet Union would allow its six Warsaw Pact allies to overthrow their communist regimes. Statements, events, and trends in hindsight appear as unmistakable signs of an explosion in the making co-existed with serious obstacles to change. Some of Gorbachev’s actions did indeed suggest that he wanted to institute fundamental reforms in many areas, including the Soviet Union’s relationship with its East European satellites. But there were many reasons for expecting his efforts to end in failure.

Yet, since the revolution it has seemed as though Gorbachev engineered the liberation of Eastern Europe. In fact, he was a master at putting the best face on events that had pushed past him. In the fall of 1989 there were many reports that events were going much further or faster than Gorbachev wanted. Reportedly, he was willing to permit moves toward democracy, provided the communists were not humiliated and Eastern Europe’s military ties to the Soviet Union were preserved. And like leaders in Washington, Paris, Bonn, and elsewhere, he was reluctant to support anything that might disturb Europe’s hard-won peace. But when the peoples of Eastern Europe grabbed political power, pushed the communists aside, and proclaimed their intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev just accepted reality, giving his blessing to events generated by forces beyond his control. One is reminded of the horseman who, thrown off his horse, explains with a smile that he has "dismounted."

---

The point remains that the Soviet reform movement fueled expectations of a freer Eastern Europe, reducing for increasingly many individuals the perceived risk of challenging the status quo. In terms of the model described in section 3, it lowered the revolutionary thresholds of East Europeans, making it increasingly easy to set in motion a revolutionary bandwagon. But no one could see that a revolution was in the making, not even the Soviet leader whose moves were helping to establish the still-latent bandwagon.

Recall that revolutionary thresholds are influenced also by people's private preferences. Since private preferences are governed to a considerable extent by public discourse, the dissent generated by Soviet glasnost probably pushed the private preferences of East Europeans against communism and communist rule. The above discussed East German surveys provide some dramatic evidence to this effect. After 1985, they show, East German attachment to socialism steadily deteriorated. By October 1989, only 15 percent of the surveyed trade-school students endorsed the statement "I am devoted to the German Democratic Republic," down from 46 percent in 1983. Fully 60 percent endorsed it with reservations, and 25 percent rejected it. In the same month, as few as 3 percent continued to believe that "socialism will triumph throughout the world," down from 50 percent in 1984. Just 27 percent agreed with reservations, and a whopping 70 percent disagreed.72 The contrast between the figures for 1989 and those for 1983–84 is striking. It points to a massive rise in discontent in the second half of the decade, a rise that must have lowered the revolutionary thresholds of individual East Germans.

What specific events pushed the revolutionary bandwagon over the hill? It should be recognized that this task is akin to identifying the spark on which to blame a forest fire or the cough responsible for a flu epidemic. There were many turning points in the East European Revolution, any one of which might have derailed it.

One turning point came in early October, when East German officials refused to carry out Party leader Honecker's order to open fire on street demonstrators. On October 7 Gorbachev was in Berlin for celebrations marking the fortieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic. With scores of foreign reporters looking on, crowds took to the streets, chanting "Gorby! Gorby!" and the police clubs went into action. These events were immediately played back to the rest of

72 "Daten des Zentralinstituts für Jugendforschung Leipzig," Tables 1 and 2.
East Germany on West German television. The scenes alerted disgruntled citizens in every corner of the country to the pervasiveness of discontent, while the government's weak response revealed its vulnerability. A peaceful protest broke out in Leipzig on October 9. Honecker ordered the regional Party secretary to block the demonstration, if necessary by force. But bloodshed was averted when Egon Krenz, a Politburo member in charge of security, flew to Leipzig and encouraged the security forces to show restraint. Local leaders—some of whom had already appealed for restraint—accepted this contravention, and tens of thousands marched without interference. Sensing the shifting political winds, more and more East Germans took to the streets, throughout the country. The East German uprising was now in full swing. As the regime tried to stem the tide through a string of concessions, the swelling crowds began to make increasingly bold demands. Within a month the Berlin Wall would be breached, and in less than a year the German Democratic Republic would become part of a unified, democratic Germany.73

Another turning point came on October 25, while Gorbachev was on a state visit to Finland. Two months earlier a Solidarity official had formed Poland's first non-communist government since the 1940s, following the Communist Party's stunning defeat at the polls. A legislative deputy to Gorbachev had declined detailed comment under the pretext that events in Poland are its own business.74 The communists were in retreat also in Hungary. In meetings with dissident groups the Hungarian Communist Party had endorsed free parliamentary elections. Then, in the belief that its candidates would do poorly running under the banner of communism, it had transformed itself into the Hungarian Socialist Party.75 This was the first time that a ruling communist party had formally abandoned communism. With the world wondering whether the Soviet Union had reached the limits of its tolerance, Gorbachev declared in Finland that his country had no moral or political right to interfere in the affairs of its East European neighbors. Defining this position as "the Sinatra doctrine," his spokesman jokingly asked reporters whether they knew the Frank Sinatra song "I Did It My Way." He went on to say that "Hungary and Poland are doing it their way." Using the

Western term for the previous Soviet policy of armed intervention to keep the governments of the Warsaw Pact in communist hands, he added "I think the Brezhnev doctrine is dead." Comiing on the heels of major communist retreats in Poland and Hungary, these comments offered yet another indication that Gorbachev would not try to silence East European dissent.

If one effect of this signal was to embolden the opposition movements of Eastern Europe, another must have been to discourage its governments from resorting to violence on their own initiatives. This is not to say that Gorbachev enunciated his Sinatra doctrine with the intention of making East European oppositions dart to power. Nor is it to say that in the absence of this move the revolution would have petered out. By the time Gorbachev renounced the Soviet Union's right to intervene, opposition movements in Poland, East Germany, and Hungary already commanded mass support, and it is unlikely that anything short of massive brutality would have broken their momentum and restored the status quo ante. Nonetheless, some incumbent communist leaders were seriously considering a military solution, and the proclamation of the Sinatra doctrine may well have tipped the balance against the use of force. Had even one East European government resorted to force at this stage, the result may well have been a series of bloody and protracted civil wars.

Just as we cannot be certain that a delay in announcing the new Soviet doctrine would have altered the course of history, we will never know whether the contravention of Honecker's order to shoot had a significant impact on the subsequent flow of events. What can be said is this: had Honecker's subordinates enforced his order, the opposition's growth would have slowed, and later demonstrations would probably not have stayed peaceful. The same historical significance can be attributed to the restraint shown by the individual soldiers on duty during the demonstration and by the individual demonstrators. In the demonstration's tense atmosphere a shot fired in panic or a stone thrown in excitement might have caused a violent confrontation. It was an extraordinary conjunction of individual decisions that kept the uprising peaceful and prevented the revolution from being sidetracked.

The success of anti-government demonstrations in one country inspired demonstrations elsewhere. In early November Sofia was shaken by its first demonstration in four decades as several

---

thousand Bulgarians marched on the National Assembly. Within a week, on the very day throngs broke through the Berlin Wall, Todor Zhivkov's 35-year leadership came to an end, and his successor began talking of radical reforms.

Up to that time Czechoslovakia's communist government had yielded nothing to its own opposition. But conscious of developments elsewhere, it had promised economic reforms and made concessions on travel and religion.\(^{77}\) These retreats encouraged the swelling crowds to ask for more. On November 24, just hours after Alexander Dubček delivered his first public speech since 1968 to a crowd of 350,000, the Communist Party declared a leadership shakeup, only to face a much larger rally of people shouting "Shame! Shame! Shame!" The new government tried to placate the demonstrators by vowing to punish the commandant of the paramilitary forces that had roughed up protestors a week earlier. Unimpressed, the opposition leaders labelled the announced changes "cosmetic" and promised to redouble their pressure. They called a general strike for November 27, whose success led the Communist Party to give in within a matter of hours to their major demands, including an end to its monopoly on political power.\(^{78}\) "Not since the Paris crowd discovered that the dreaded Bastille contained only a handful of prisoners and a few terrified soldiers has a citadel fallen with such ease," wrote The Economist a few days later. "They just had to say boo."\(^{79}\)

This brings us back, for one last time, to Havel's brilliant 1979 essay. When the greengrocers decide that they have had enough, he predicted there, communism will fall like a house of cards. So it turned out: when the masses took to the streets, the Czechoslovak government's support just vanished. The mobilization process followed the patterns of East Germany and Bulgaria. Emboldened by signals from the Soviet Union and the successes of opposition movements in neighboring countries, a few thousand people stood up in defiance, joining the tiny core of long-persecuted activists. In so doing they encouraged additional citizens to drop their masks, which then impelled more onlookers to jump in. Before long fear changed sides: where people had been afraid to oppose the regime, they came to fear being caught defending it. Party members rushed to burn their cards,


claiming they had always been reformists at heart. Top officials began sensing that they might face retribution for standing in the way of change and for any violence. They hastened to accept the opposition's demands, only to be confronted with bolder ones.

Had the civilian leadership or the top brass attempted to resist the opposition's moves, the transfer of power would not have been so swift, and certainly not so peaceful. One of the most remarkable aspects of the East European Revolution is that, with the partial exception of Romania, the security forces and the bureaucracy just melted away in the face of growing public opposition. Not only did state officials shy away from putting up a fight, but many crossed over to the opposition as a transfer of power appeared increasingly likely. This is highly significant, for a defection from the inner establishment gives an unusually good clue as to the prevailing political winds. A Politburo member distancing himself from the Party leader does more to expose the regime's vulnerability than a greengrocer who stops displaying the obligatory Marxist slogan. In turn, a defiant greengrocer does more harm to the regime's image than a prisoner in solitary confinement who makes an unequivocal declaration of opposition.

In the simple model of Section 3, the perceived strength of the public opposition is measured by $S$, the share of society publicly in opposition. This variable treats all individuals equally; with ten individuals, each individual carries a weight of 10 percent. In reality, I have now argued, members of society differ in their contributions to the opposition's perceived strength. So a more realistic measure of perceived strength would be some *unequally weighted* indicator of public opposition, where the weights correlate with levels of relative influence. Such a weighted measure would assign a Politburo member more weight than a greengrocer, and the latter more weight than a nameless prisoner. Were we to introduce this refinement into our model, the central argument would remain unaffected; with public preferences still interdependent, there would remain the possibility of an unobserved latent bandwagon.\(^80\) My reason for abstracting from this refinement in Section 3 was to keep the presentation simple.

Some of the officials who, as the uprisings took off, distanced themselves from the Party, or even moved into the opposition, may at heart have disliked the communist social order. Many others were undoubtedly motivated by opportunism rather than conviction. Sensing the imminence

---

\(^80\) See the model in Kuran, "Sparks and prairie fires."
of the old order's collapse, they abandoned it in the hope of finding themselves a place in the order about to be born. They might have chosen to resist, as a few did. But the speed of the anti-communist mobilization allowed them insufficient time to plan and execute a coordinated response. Had the mobilization been slower, they may well have succeeded in mounting a credible, effective response.81

Timothy Garton Ash, an eyewitness to the mobilizations in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, characterizes 1989 as Eastern Europe's "year of truth."82 This designation is accurate in so far as it captures the end of feigned support for communism. But it conceals the push the revolution got from preference falsification on the part of the status quo's sympathizers. As non-communists threw off their masks in joy and relief, many genuine communists slipped on masks of their own--masks depicting them as the helpless functionaries of a repressive system, former preference falsifiers thrilled to be speaking their minds after years of silent resentment. Yet there is another sense in which Ash's label is meaningful. The flowering of anti-communist discourse has exposed the official ideology more clearly than ever before as a heap of sophistries, distortions, and myths. It has awakened millions of dormant minds, confronting citizens resigned to the status quo with the conflicts between the pragmatic and theoretical layers of their beliefs. This is to say neither that the thoughts of every East European have become internally consistent nor that none continues to think in Marxist terms. It is to suggest that the transformation of public discourse has opened many minds to new possibilities.

In the days following the fall of Czechoslovakia's communist regime, a banner in Prague read: "Poland--10 years, Hungary--10 months, East Germany--10 weeks, Czechoslovakia--10 days."83 What caused the implied acceleration is that each successful challenge to communism lowered the perceived risk of dissent in the countries still under communist rule. In terms of our model, revolutionary thresholds in neighboring countries fell, making the revolution increasingly contagious across the region.

81 The pace of events was undoubtedly a key factor also in the failure of conservative groups in the Soviet Union to block Eastern Europe's liberation. Had events proceeded more slowly, they might have had time to oust Gorbachev and order the Red Army into action.
82 Ash, "Eastern Europe: The year of truth."
Had this banner been prepared a few weeks later, it might have added "Romania--10 hours."
As the Czechoslovak uprising neared its climax, the executive committee of the Romanian Communist Party was busy reelecting Nicolae Ceausescu as President and interrupting his acceptance speech with standing ovations. Three weeks later protests broke out in the Western provinces, but they were put down brutally by the security forces. Confident of his ability to prevent a replay of the events that brought down other communist regimes, Ceausescu went on a state visit to Iran, but the protests intensified. Upon his return he organized a rally to denounce the "counterrevolutionaries," but when he started to speak he was booed. The shock on his face was seen on television, and the Romanian revolt was on. The consequent change of regime turned out to be bloodier than the previous five, as the security forces responsible for the earlier week's massacre resisted the revolution, causing hundreds of deaths until they were beaten by the Army. Ceausescu tried to escape, though he was caught and summarily executed.84

Yet again, the world watched a nation jump with little warning from quiescence and subservience to turbulence and defiance. As the year went out, commentators were still marveling at the speed with which the political landscape of Eastern Europe changed. Long-persecuted dissidents now occupied high government positions. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, Havel was President, Dubcek Chairman of the Federal Assembly, and Jiri Dienstbier, a Charter 77 signatory serving time as a coal stoker, Foreign Minister. All six countries began planning free elections, and they committed themselves to economic liberalization. Some even moved to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.

6 The predictability of unpredictability

Unexpected as they were, these developments now seem as though they could easily have been predicted. Was it not obvious that the economic failures of communism had sown the seeds of a massive revolt? Was it not self-evident that the East Europeans were just waiting for an opportunity to topple their despised dictators? Did the Soviet Union's severe domestic problems not necessitate its withdrawal from Eastern Europe, to concentrate its resources on economic

84 For the New York Times reports of these events, see Gwertzman and Kaufman, The Collapse of Communism, pp. 332-39.
reforms? Retrospective accounts of 1989 offer a panoply of such reasons why the East European Revolution was inevitable. "It is no accident that Mikhail Gorbachev declined to intervene," writes one commentator, in an account of the Soviet Union’s role in the uprisings.86 This, in a volume peppered with comments on how 1989 surprised one and all.

I have shown in this essay that the warning signs of the revolution remained cloudy until it was all over. Moreover, the unobservability of private preferences and revolutionary thresholds concealed the latent bandwagons in formation, and also from appreciating the significance of events that were pushing these into motion. My explanation for this predictive failure transcends the particularities of Eastern Europe. As a prelude to my reasoning, let me point out that this is hardly the first time a major social uprising has come as a big surprise.

The French Revolution of 1789 shocked not only King Louis XVI and his courtiers but also outside observers and the rioters who helped end his reign. Yet it had many deep causes—all developed at great length in literally thousands of volumes. This paradox is one of the central themes of Tocqueville’s *The Old Régime and the French Revolution*. "Chance played no part whatever in the outbreak of the revolution," he observes. "[T]hough it took the world by surprise, it was the inevitable outcome of a long period of gestation, the abrupt and violent conclusion of a process in which six generations played an intermittent part."86

In this century, the Nazi takeover of Germany took place at astonishing speed. Within a few months entrenched political institutions were turned upside down, all democratic opposition was destroyed, and a labor movement with millions of members was driven underground.87 Though it was not foreseen, there is no shortage of explanations for the rise of Nazism. The Iranian Revolution of 1979–80 offers yet another example of an unanticipated uprising. A panoply of competing explanations now exist, including ones that invoke class conflicts, governance failures, foreign

exploitation, economic reversals, the disaffections of bazaar merchants, and Islamic ideology. Yet for all their differences, students of this revolution agree that it stunned almost everyone—the Shah and the Ayatollah Khomeini, the CIA and the KGB, statesmen, diplomats, academics, and journalists.

The very revolution that prepared the ground for the first communist regime in history was an unforeseen event. Weeks before the Russian Revolution of February 1917 Lenin told an audience in Switzerland that Russia's great explosion lay in the distant future and that older men like himself would not live to see it. And with just days to go, foreign observers in Petrograd were advising their capitals that the monarchy was stable and secure. But the Tzar fell, and before the year was over the communists gained full control of the government. It has since been recognized that Marxist scholarship did not prepare us for the world's first successful communist revolution occurring, of all places, in backward, semi-feudal Russia.

Nor did Marxist scholarship—or for that matter, non-Marxist scholarship—anticipate the mid-century uprisings in the communist states of Eastern Europe. "The Hungarian uprising of October 1956 was a dramatic, sudden explosion, apparently not organized beforehand by a revolutionary center; neither outsiders nor the participants had anticipated anything like the irresistible revolutionary dynamism that would sweep the country." Thus begins a monograph on this failed attempt to overthrow communism. Entitled *The Unexpected Revolution*, it is replete with evidence of widespread preference falsification right up to the uprising. Prior to October 1956, writers who

---


91 Further evidence concerning the element of surprise in the French, Russian, and Iranian Revolutions may be found in Kuran, "Sparks and prairie fires," sects. 2, 6-7.

were to play leading roles gave not the slightest sign of opposition to the political status quo. For another example, clerical employees remained docile and submissive until the uprising in which they participated, often hiding their grievances even from family members.93

The Prague Spring of 1968 offers another example of an unforeseen attempt to crack the wall of communism. In 1967, Havel writes in a retrospective account, the entire nation was behaving like the Good Soldier Svejk, accommodating itself to the regime's demands. "Who would have believed ... that a year later this recently apathetic, skeptical, and demoralized society would stand up with such courage and intelligence to a foreign power!" Havel continues: "And who would have suspected that, after scarcely a year had gone by, this same society would, as swiftly as the wind blows, lapse back into a state of deep demoralization far worse than its original one!"94

This tally of unanticipated uprisings could be expanded, but the point has been made: the Revolution of 1989 was not the first to have surprised us. Time and again entrenched authority has vanished suddenly, leaving the victors astonished at their triumph and the vanquished at their defeat.

Should we conclude, along with John Dunn, that revolutions are ineluctable "facts of nature," events that fail "to suggest the dominance of human reason in any form"?95 In other words, is the culprit human irrationality? The argument developed in this paper does not point in this direction. It suggests, on the contrary, that predictive failure is entirely consistent with calculated, purposeful human action. Underlying an explosive shift in public sentiment are multitudes of individual decisions to switch political allegiance, each undertaken in response to changing incentives. So just as a failure to predict a rainstorm does not imply that the clouds obey no physical laws, a failure to predict some revolution does not imply individual irrationality.

Dunn also suggests that revolutions have too many determinants to make them amenable to a grand, comprehensive theory. Shunning the futile exercise of constructing a theory with universal applicability, we ought to focus, he says, on the particularities of each situation. I agree that

---

93 Ibid., pp. 60 and 84-5.
revolutions are complex events brought on by a symphony of interacting variables. Where I depart from Dunn is in regard to the usefulness of general theorizing. Obstacles to forecasting particular revolutions do not rule out the production of useful insights into the process of revolution. Even if we cannot predict the time and place of the next big uprising, we may prepare ourselves mentally for the mass mobilization that will bring it about. Equally important, we can understand why it may surprise us. There are other spheres of knowledge where highly useful theories foreclose reliable predictions of specific outcomes. The Darwinian theory of biological evolution illuminates the process whereby species evolve, but without enabling us to predict the future evolution of the gazelle. Sophisticated theories of the weather elucidate why it is in perpetual flux, but without making it possible to say with much confidence whether Rome will see rain a week from next Tuesday.

Such general theories have a common virtue: they reveal the source of their predictive limitations. The reason why they cannot predict infallible predictions is not simply that they contain large numbers of variables. In each theory variables are related to one another nonlinearly, which is a technical way of saying that a small perturbation in one variable, which normally produces small changes in other variables, may under the right set of circumstances have large consequences. Consider the theory of climatic turbulence developed by Edward Lorenz. It shows that a sparrow flapping its wings in Istanbul—an intrinsically insignificant event—can generate a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. This is because the weather at any given location is related to its determinants non-linearly. In other words, its sensitivity to other variables, and their sensitivities to one another, are themselves variable. Accordingly, variable $x$ may be impervious to a jump in $y$ from 20 to 200, yet exhibit hypersensitivity if $y$ rises a bit higher, say, to 202. It may then start to grow explosively, effectively feeding on itself. The notion that small events may unleash huge forces goes against much of twentieth century social thought, with its emphasis on linearity, continuity, and gradualism. But in contexts as different as technological diffusion and cognitive development it is the key to understanding a host of otherwise inexplicable phenomena.

In the context of political change, what endows intrinsically insignificant events with potentially explosive power is that public preferences are interdependent. Because of this interdependence, the equilibrium levels of the public opposition are related to the underlying individual
characteristics nonlinearly. A massive change in private preferences may leave the incumbent equilibrium undisturbed, only to be followed by a tiny change that destroys the status quo, setting off a bandwagon that will culminate in a very different equilibrium. Partly because of preference falsification, the nature of the interdependence is *imperfectly observable*. This is why a massive rise in public opposition may catch everyone by surprise.

Because preference falsification afflicts politics in every society, major revolutions are likely to come again and again as a surprise. This is not to assert the impossibility of accurate prediction. If we possessed a reliable technique for measuring people's revolutionary thresholds, we would see what it would take to get a revolution started. And if we understood the determinants of these thresholds, we would know when the required conditions would come together. For all practical purposes, however, such information is available only in highly incomplete form. In any case, there are irremovable political obstacles to becoming sufficiently knowledgeable. As we have seen, vulnerable regimes often block the production and dissemination of information potentially harmful to their own survival. Censorship and the regulation of opinion surveys—both widely practiced in pre-revolutionary Eastern Europe—are two of the policies that serve these objectives.

I have deliberately characterized the source of unpredictability as *imperfect* observability, as opposed to *unobservable* ability. The degree of imperfection obviously constitutes a continuum. Societies with strong democratic traditions feature less imperfection than ones where democratic freedoms are nonexistent or fragile. This is because there is less preference falsification in the former group, at least with respect to the political system itself. Accordingly, one can track the course of anti-government or anti-regime sentiment more confidently for Norway, Switzerland, or France than for Pakistan, Brazil, or Ghana. This is why developments in Pakistan are more likely to catch the world off guard than developments in Norway. By implication, we can predict Norway's political future with greater confidence than we can predict that of Pakistan. Most countries of the world, I hasten to add, lie closer to Pakistan than Norway as regards the significance of preference falsification in sustaining their political regimes.

Lest this emphasis on unpredictability is considered offensive to the scientific spirit, I ought to point out that establishing the limits of knowledge is itself a contribution to the pool of useful knowledge. Accepting the limits of what we can expect from science is not an admission of defeat.
On the contrary, it is a necessary step toward charting a realistic scientific agenda. "To act as if we possessed scientific knowledge enabling us to transcend [the absolute obstacles to the prediction of specific events]," wrote Friedrich Hayek in his Nobel Memorial Lecture, "may itself become a serious obstacle to the advance of the human intellect."96

Unpredictability should not be confused with the unfalsifiability of theory. The theory developed in this essay is fully falsifiable. Since it implies that political revolutions will continue to surprise us, a string of successful predictions would render it suspect. Simply put, this theory can be falsified by developing an theory capable of predicting revolutions well--capable, that is, of making genuine forecasts that prove to be on the mark. In principle, if not in practice, the presented theory can also be falsified by showing that preference falsification was not a factor in unanticipated revolutions of the past.