2012

Contemporary Peacekeeping

Taylor McCarten

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr

Recommended Citation

Available at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol3/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact tadam@uwo.ca, wlswadmin@uwo.ca.
Contemporary Peacekeeping

Taylor McCarten

Abstract

As a body composed of the governments of the major nations on earth, the United Nations is a powerful diplomatic peace negotiator and world actor. Its ability to function as it was designed is of the utmost importance to international security. With the UN we have a chance to make peace a reality for the world; without it, we face a multitude of states acting in self-interest and at cross purposes. Through a comparison of current and past UN operations using the UN’s own criteria for success, this paper highlights several inadequacies in current United Nations peacekeeping operations. This paper then examines the potential causes of this inadequacy and the potential consequences if it continues. Finally, there will be a consideration of policy options that the UN could pursue in order to address these problems which undermine its legitimacy and, in some cases, cost the world in human lives.

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today.\(^1\)

The quote above comes from the first page of the ‘Brahimi Report’. Published in 2000, the UN report was a self-critical analysis designed to identify what needed to change within the UN structure so that, through effective peacekeeping, the international organization could meet its founding principle.

As the Cold War dominated international politics until the early 1990s, United Nations conflict mediation was exclusive to circumstances where the Soviets and Americans did not support or oppose a side in the conflict. Where these rare situations did occur, peacekeeping was the United Nations response. When the Cold War ended, humanitarian disasters in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Kosovo gained the attention of the world and peacekeeping, under the same principles, was often the expected response to these crises. But new problems require new solutions, and it is through the UN’s attempts to resolve these post-cold war crises that it has become widely seen as inadequate. In the Post-Cold War reality, these new situations have proven that past peacekeeping methods are in dire need of adjustment. Through a comparison of current and past UN operations by using the UN’s own criteria for success, this paper examines the dysfunction of contemporary peacekeeping.

**Defining the Problem:**
Current UN peacekeeping missions are still based on past UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) principles and definitions of success, but these operations are now encountering situations in which such principles simply cannot be abided by if any sort of success is to be achieved. The current UN operation in Darfur and the past missions in Lebanon and Somalia show how both contemporary and past missions do not meet the criteria of successful peacekeeping. According to the DPKO, a successful peacekeeping operation must:

---

2 Ibid.

The DPKO also lists some other criteria that drive a successful operation, these include:

- Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep),
- Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and financial resources,
- Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active support to UN operations in the field,
- Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement,
- An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and population and
- The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem).4

The highly publicized and most recent United Nations mission is the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID); a province of seven million in Western Sudan.5 In 2003, Darfurian Rebels in two groups known as the Sudanese Liberation

---

4 Ibid.
Army/Movement (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) openly opposed the Government of Sudan (GoS) over the extent to which Darfur was receiving central government resources. In response, the GoS enlisted informal militias known as the Janjaweed to attack Darfuri villages which were supposedly sympathetic to the rebel cause. The result was thousands of deaths and the internal displacement of over 2 million Darfuri residents as well as the flight of another 200,000 into Chad where they still live in desperation.\textsuperscript{6}

Four years later, in July of 2007, the UN Security Council passed resolution #1769 to authorize supplementing the 6,000 troops which the African Union had provided with a hybrid force of 26,000 soldiers and 6,000 civilians along with other support forces.\textsuperscript{7} As of the 31\textsuperscript{st} of July, 2011, the mission is still undermanned with fewer than 18,000 troops and just over 5,000 police forces.\textsuperscript{8}

According to the Darfur Relief and Documentation Center (DRDC), “the deployment of UNAMID in Darfur has played a positive role in creating relatively improved life conditions in areas of their presence.”\textsuperscript{9} However, they also report that the effect of UNAMID’s presence on the situation in Darfur is limited and remains precarious because of UNAMID’s weak capabilities and inability to cover the whole region.\textsuperscript{10} Progress is being made. Troop numbers continue to rise each year and the October 12, 2011 Report of the Secretary General stated increasing success at being granted access to regions in which the government had previously barred UN forces, regions

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 159
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 162
\textsuperscript{10}Jibril, 24
often essential to the operation. However, the DRDC also reports “ongoing efforts of the international community in Darfur are unlikely to succeed as most of the key recommendations made by the UN Security Council…have been sabotaged by the GoS.” Worse still, Security Council members have been accused of selling weapons to the GoS; an act violating UN resolutions.

Noting the UN’s principles of success, it is clear that in Darfur, there is no peace to keep, the mission is undermanned, Security Council members are fueling the conflict, and the Government of Sudan is resisting. In these respects, it is clear that UNAMID does not meet the UN’s criteria for success and it is therefore unsurprising that UNAMID is disparagingly viewed. In 2007 the BBC reported that “even after all 26,000 troops and police are deployed, they will not be able to stop the rebels, army, and pro-government militias from fighting if they really want to.” Donald M. Snow of the University of Alabama claims that “UNAMID has not only been unsuccessful but is also arguably an abject failure.”

Unfortunately, Darfur is not the only UN mission that breaks some of the DPKO’s principles. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was launched in 1978 after the Israeli invasion, purposed with confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the government of

---

12 Jibril, 23
16 Snow, 160.
Contemporary Peacekeeping

Lebanon in ensuring the restoration of its authority.\textsuperscript{17} This was all impossible given that Israel refused to cooperate and maintained an occupation of the area, showing no commitment to work towards peace.\textsuperscript{18}

UNIFIL is far from the only other case. The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was initially launched with the intention of ensuring the delivery of humanitarian supplies but expanded its mandate when the US contributed troops. The mission’s original mandate was achieved and so mission was deemed a success.\textsuperscript{19} However, with the resources of the United States, the UN attempted to disarm the lawless factions of the region and restore order. In this effort, rather than an effective joint command, troops were, for the most part, commanded by their respective countries. With such minimal cooperation, lightly armed soldiers engaged in warfare for which they were unprepared. According to Retired Colonel Terence O’Neil, “the end result was a sorry mess and a humiliating UN withdrawal.”\textsuperscript{20}

These cases illustrate the clear dysfunction of current UN peacekeeping missions that are still based on past UN DPKO principles and DPKO definitions of success. It is clear UN initiatives are encountering situations in which the principles simply cannot be abided by. Continuing this dysfunction is not without consequences.

\textbf{The Possible Consequences}

This analysis states three main consequences of current peacekeeping techniques: the continuation of the negative externalities of peacekeeping, the diminishing reputation of the UN, and the

\textsuperscript{17} Terence O’Neill. "UN Peacekeeping: Expectations and Reality." \textit{Irish Studies in International Affairs} 13 (2002): 204
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} O’Neil, 204.
precedent these failed peacekeeping operations set for the rest of the world. Michael Lipson uses the term ‘Peacekeeping externalities’ to refer to the negative byproducts peacekeeping missions have produced in recent decades. These can include the “sexual exploitation of local populations by peacekeeping personnel, increased human trafficking to provide prostitution, and the consequent spread of HIV/AIDS.”

Negative externalities of UN operations have occurred as far back as 1996, and have not shown signs of dissipating. In 2005, a UN inquiry found that UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo were sexually abusing girls as young as 13. In 2006, an article published in the Weekly Standard went so far as to suggest that “international peacekeeping missions are creating a predatory sexual culture among vulnerable refugees--from relief workers who demand sexual favors in exchange for food to U.N. troops who rape women at gunpoint.” In the same year, a BBC investigation in Haiti uncovered more allegations of sexual abuse of children by peacekeepers. Even the most recent mission in the Sudan has had its allegations. As listed in the criteria for success, peacekeeping that

26 Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, "UN staff accused of raping children in Sudan," Telegraph, January 2 2007, accessed December 8, 2011,
Contemporary Peacekeeping

is doing harm to the populations it is supposed to protect is not effective peacekeeping.

Promisingly, a paper published in *International Peacekeeping* in 2009 analyzed the public health impact of HIV positive peacekeepers and found that “while misconduct by, and risk of infection among individual peacekeepers cannot be ruled out, there is strong evidence that as a rule peacekeeping does not pose a major public health concern in terms of HIV transmission to host countries.”

Unfortunately, the accusations that have been tossed around have already done a large amount of damage; and some countries already resist the deployment of troops from high HIV prevalence countries.

Peacekeeping externalities are issues the UN is aware of and claims to be addressing, but they are also a problem which the institution admits it has not solved. As long as the UN does not pursue effective reforms to prevent them, these externalities will continue to be a black mark on the reputation of the institution.

This reputation is already being diminished by the publicly perceived ineffectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions as a whole. The UN is in dire need of a highly publicized successful mission to challenge the literature that is being published aimed at discrediting the organization. One example of this negative literature is the blunt analysis of the UN’s ability and failed attempts at reform by Joshua Muravchik, professor at the Institute of World Politics. Another potent example is be the 2004 book by Dori Gold, former Israeli


28 Ibid., 352.


ambassador to the UN, entitled *Tower of Babble: How the United Nations Has Fueled Global Chaos*. The starkest pieces of evidence for the damage which continued UN peacekeeping does to the institution’s reputation are the arguments that peacekeeping should be done by other forces; or worse, that it should not be done at all.

Finally, one of the gravest consequences of not addressing the problem of ineffective peacekeeping is the precedent it sets for the rest of the world. This is particularly relevant to the world today given the “Arab Spring”; a wave of revolutionary protests occurring around the Arab world that have often been met with violent oppression by the ruling governments. This wave sparked revolution in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, but has been met with severe governmental crackdowns and gross violations of human rights. Additional protests have occurred in Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco and Oman. These are situations in which humanitarian action could likely save lives.

There is a growing awareness that UN peacekeeping missions are unlikely or ineffective, and that non-intervention in humanitarian disasters is tolerated, and this risks establishing a precedent in which oppressive regimes can abuse their citizens without fear of international condemnation. Consequently, the deterrent effect of UN action may be lost. This is clearly one of the most compelling

---

reasons why solutions must be found to current UN peacekeeping challenges.

**The Probable Causes:**
In “Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?” Michael Lipson proposes that the UN is saying one thing and doing another as a response to conflicting pressures. His accusations arise from the situations in Bosnia and Rwanda when the Security Council passed resolutions authorizing peacekeepers to protect humanitarian safe areas and provide security but then failed to approve the necessary forces to actually do so. Lipson argues that these are instances not simply of hypocrisy in the ordinary sense of the word, but of ‘organized hypocrisy’, a phenomenon identified by organization theorists to explain how organizations respond to conflicting pressures in their external environment. Lipson explains that “as an organization charged with representing the nations of the world, the UN’s legitimacy rests largely on its ability to reflect external constituencies’ inconsistent values and preferences;” therefore, to be seen as representing the interests of each separate nation, “the UN has to uphold contradictory goals and principles.”

Organized hypocrisy provides the benefit of UN peacekeepers being able to pursue robust peacekeeping despite supposedly maintaining the peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense. Another benefit is that, through promises for reform but failure to actually pursue it, the UN “preserves the ability…to reflect the inconsistencies of its institutional environment, and thereby maintain support in the form of both legitimacy and material resources such as member-states’ dues.”

---

36 Ibid., 6.
37 Ibid., 12.
38 Ibid., 19.
39 Ibid., 22.
However, all things considered, there are also disadvantages. Responses to political and humanitarian crises are met by symbolic resolutions and are not supported by the resources or political commitment necessary to act effectively.\textsuperscript{40} Prime examples are the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, where “passing Security Council Resolutions – organizational ‘decisions’ – diffused and deflected political pressure to act in response to ethnic cleansing and genocide.”\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, in the UN’s calls for reform, including the previously mentioned Brahimi report, organized hypocrisy creates repeated reform efforts that are not followed through and “the fundamental problems that the [reports attempt] to address will continue to persist.”\textsuperscript{42}

Whether or not one wants to call it hypocrisy, Lipson certainly reveals the contradictions within the institution’s actions that are a cause of inefficiency. Given the diminishing reputation of UN peacekeeping efforts, it would seem that the costs of Lipson’s organized hypocrisy have begun to outweigh the benefits.

In another purported dysfunction, Philip Cunliffe makes the case that decision making in UN peacekeeping is not only disjointed between different states and actors, but is also critically lopsided from an uneven distribution of responsibilities with the strategic, political, and military risks falling on the poor and weak states least able to handle them.\textsuperscript{43} He attributes this problem to troop-contributing countries that may only be doing so in order to expand their possibilities for consultation within the Security Council, increasing their access to

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{41} Lipson, 15.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 16.
the major powers and their influence in UN affairs. This is one important boon of being a peacekeeping contributor.

This brings us to two important points: First, due to the institutional structure of the UN, decisions can be made and policies can be implemented with the decision-making states not bearing responsibility on the outcome of operations. This is a serious lack of accountability. And second, troop-contributing countries are continuing to do so in order to gain political influence with the institution, which means that it is the least well-off states that are providing underequipped and poorly trained troops and suffering the consequences. Figure One and Figure Two illustrate the dysfunction of troop versus financial contributions.

There are many other potential factors that influence the likelihood and degree of difficulty of peacekeeping missions. One further example is the action of other states advancing their own interests and even the actions of non-governmental organizations and institutions, some of whom have been accused of profiting from the conflicts that peacekeeping seeks to prevent. However, while these causes can be prominent, they are beyond the ability of UN peacekeeping to address, and therefore beyond the scope of this analysis.

---

44 Ibid., 326.
45 Ibid.
As of September 2011:

1. Bangladesh - 10,609
2. Pakistan - 9,115
3. India - 8,192
4. Nigeria - 5,667
5. Nepal - 4,333
6. Ethiopia - 4,195
7. Egypt - 4,118
8. Jordan - 4,012
9. Rwanda - 3,669
10. Ghana - 2,991
53. Canada - 197
60. United States - 123

Figure 1 shows the top 10 peacekeeping troop contributing countries. Contributing expands countries possibilities for consultation within the Security Council, increasing their access to the major powers and their influence in UN affairs.

---

Top 10 Providers of Assessed Contributions (2011-2012):
1. United States (27.14%)
2. Japan (12.53%)
3. United Kingdom (8.15%)
4. Germany (8.02%)
5. France (7.55%)
6. Italy (5.00%)
7. China (3.93%)
8. Canada (3.21%)
9. Spain (3.18%)
10. R. of Korea (2.26%)  

Figure 2 shows the cost of major American foreign policy related programs. This minor expenditure places the US as the top contributor at 27.14% of contributions in 2011-2012. The small green bar under State Dept/USAID/UN shows how minimal UN related contributions are.

---

Policy Options and Recommendations

In 1998, Kofi Annan stated that the world may not be ready to privatize peace. Today, some argue this may no longer be the case. Through multinationality and international cooperation, UN peacekeeping forces gain a certain amount of legitimacy, but it comes with a large number of operational difficulties. Arguments for privatized peacekeeping cite “a lack of common weaponry, of compatible communication systems, of similar operational experiences and doctrine, and sometimes of a shared language,” all as good reasons for why current peacekeeping efforts need privatization. Proponents argue that private military and security companies (PMSCs) have: (1) better organization, training, and equipment; (2) heightened willingness to apply violence offensively in order to serve UN mandates; and (3) enhanced readiness to respond.

Already, although their participation has not widely been acknowledged, private companies have long been involved in peacekeeping operations. They are utilized to protect UN field offices, warehouses and personnel, and in a few instances even UN mandates.

As PMSCs are being used to fill some of the gaps conventional peacekeeping forces are leaving behind, it is easy to imagine an entire private force to enforce a UN mandate in a region, particularly when private sector services routinely cost the UN 10-40 percent of what it costs for similar state-provided services as they are used today. But financial benefits must be weighed against a loss of accountability and regulation of peacekeeping troops. Using PMSCs as peacekeepers is a

52 Ibid., 197.
53 Ibid.
54 Brooks and Laroia, 122.
55 Ibid., 122.
56 Ibid., 123.

controversial and still hypothetical solution to conventional peacekeeping difficulties and its logistical, political, and ethical viability have yet to be fully determined. Using soldiers of fortune to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war seems counter-intuitive and leaves a bad taste in the mouths of those who would see a world without violence. Nevertheless, the option poses an intriguing solution to current peacekeeping challenges.

Beyond arguments for privatization, there are solutions that can still be pursued within the UN sphere. This paper provides two antithetical directions UN Peacekeeping can potentially move toward in order to become more effective; robust peacekeeping and promoting peace culture. Thierry Tardy offers a critique of robust peacekeeping in contemporary peace operations to determine whether or not it is a viable solution. The concept of robust peacekeeping emerged after the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica where UN peacekeepers did little to stop the massive violations of human rights.57 As a result, the majority of the new mandates have authorized peacekeepers to use ‘all necessary means to protect civilians when under imminent threat of physical violence’ and new operations increasingly include the idea that peacekeepers must be given the political and operational means to successfully implement their mandate.58 Robustness is designed to allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to provide freedom of maneuver, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the mandate and the peace process is obstructed.59 However, the UN has always had difficulty reconciling its central role in the maintenance of international peace and security with the idea of coercion beyond the principle of state sovereignty; our analysis of Darfur is a prime example. Tardy finds “the nature of the organization, its broad composition, and the politics within its main organs have made

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
coercion conceptually and practically ambiguous.” Therefore, robustness essentially falls into ‘the grey area of peacekeeping’, somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and it thus challenges the DPKO’s key principles.

Fundamentally, the concept implies a willingness to use force in order to prevent atrocity and stop conflict in circumstances where there is either no peace to keep, or where doing so would be a violation of a country’s sovereignty, but it is basically impossible for the UN to do so and maintain its legitimacy as a neutral institution. Operationally, robust peacekeeping is equally undermined by the commitment gap in troop contributions, financial support, and the absence of Western states in UN operations.

Robust Peacekeeping clearly faces some serious challenges if it is to be implemented. Reforms that better arm peacekeepers and mandates that allow for increased use of force are useless so long as peacekeepers are continually restricted by the UN’s main principles of peacekeeping. For Robust Peacekeeping to be a viable solution, it needs to the resource contributions materialize and it needs to have set, clear guidelines that member states all agree on that lay out conditions under which sovereignty can be violated.

Taking peacekeeping away from the use of force and towards a softer solution, there is an argument emerging from many scholars that “culture, redefined specifically as peace culture, can have a more proactive role in terms of mobilizing energies for sustainable peace building at different states of the conflict spectrum.” This is the idea that a ‘culture of peace’ must overcome our current ‘culture of

---

60 Tardy, 153.
61 Ibid., 165.
62 Ibid.
64 Douglas J Roche, The Human Right to Peace (Toronto: Novalis, 2003), 110.
war.’ This is examined in detail by Douglas Roche in his book *The Human Right to Peace*.  

A culture of peace seeks to transform the cultural tendencies toward war and violence into a culture where dialogue, respect, and fairness govern social relations, and it has examples of success.  

Thus far, the primary channel through which peace culture has been used is the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In its Culture of Peace pilot project, UNESCO helped to bring together the conflicting forces in the 12-year El Salvador war, aiding their negotiations and decision making by involving them in the planning and implementation of human development projects; one successful example was the production of daily radio broadcasts and educational campaigns directed at the most needy in the country.  

Translating this cultural UNESCO success into successful peacekeeping, Thomas Woodhouse explores this idea of culture as a contributory factor in the emergence of what he and others term “cosmopolitan peacekeeping.”  

In this redefined peacekeeping, Woodhouse proposes a model in which a peace culture is added to peacekeeping’s three conventional goals; security, humanitarianism, and politics.  

In its fourth function, UN peacekeepers represent and adopt the symbols of a pacifist global order, the opposite of state-based militarism.  

A culture of peace seeks “a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes, solving problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups, and nations.”  

This is a culture that can be promoted by all forms of cultural creativity: music, drama, cinema,  

---

65 Roche, 100.  
66 Ibid., 107-108.  
67 Ibid., 109.  
68 Woodhouse, 486.  
69 Ibid., 491.  
70 Ibid., 486.  
71 Woodhouse, 492.
and so on. In particular, the use of sport has historically proven itself an effective conflict mediator.\textsuperscript{72,73}

Peace Culture, then, is a far softer solution and is in many ways far more agreeable to member states who are attempting to protect their sovereignty. It may seem peculiar to have our armed UN peacekeepers promoting cultural activities, but granting that it is perceived differences that drive human beings to kill one another, focusing on our similarities could be a potent cure to any conflict. Additionally, because organizations such as UNESCO and other Humanitarian NGO's already exist, if all of these organizations can cooperate, Cosmopolitan peacekeeping would not demand the resources that Robust Peacekeeping does. Nevertheless, for those who still feel the injustice done in Rwanda and Darfur could have been prevented by affirmative action, Robustness will still seem like the practical solution.

In Conclusion
In the Post-Cold War reality, new situations have proven past peacekeeping methods are in dire need of adjustment. Through a comparison of current and past UN operations with the UN’s stated factors of success, this paper has revealed the dysfunction of contemporary peacekeeping. It has listed the potential consequences if this inadequacy continues and has examined potential causes of that inadequacy. Finally, this paper has outlined the proposed solution of privatized peacekeeping, and internally, two different directions the UN could pursue, one in which peacekeepers become a more robust, forceful, and effective force, or one in which a cosmopolitan peace culture is integrated into the peacekeeping principles. New problems require new solutions; we can only hope the UN, its member states, and the powerful countries that drive our world will pursue them.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 487.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 494.
Bibliography:


http:\migs.concoridia.ca/links/documents/past_and_future_of_UNAMID.pdf


Contemporary Peacekeeping


