

7-26-2022

The Effect of Foreign Policy on Ethnic Outreach Campaigns: A Canadian Case

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**The Effect of Foreign Policy on Ethnic Outreach Campaigns:
A Canadian Case**

By:
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*An MA Research Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts*

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July 26th, 2022
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Abstract

As the Canadian state has adopted a more multicultural conception of integration, new Canadians and ethnocultural communities have emerged as important players in Canadian election campaigns. Foreign policy is often considered less consequential in federal election campaigns and is thought to be less salient amongst the Canadian public. However, new Canadians and ethnic groups consider foreign policy with importance as any policy decision can affect their communities and country of origin. As a result, this Major Research Paper considers the question: To what extent does foreign policy play in the ethnic outreach campaigns of Canadian political parties? In approaching this question, this paper reviews the foreign policy commitments the Federal Conservative and Liberal parties of Canada have made throughout their election campaigns from 2008-2019 and then compares those with the more recent 2021 Canadian Federal Election. In doing so, this Major Research Paper makes three central claims:

First, I expect to see foreign policy be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these communities tend to display and develop significant attachments to international affairs due to personal and emotional devotions. Additionally, I will argue that ethnocultural communities should be major players in foreign policy developments as ethnic interest groups have a unique understanding of issues abroad that domestic policymakers do not. Finally, I will demonstrate that foreign policy has played a significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic outreach campaigns, although the Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts. The last claim emerges to be a prominent focus throughout as the explicit outreach efforts by the Conservative party were shown to be crucial for the party's success; however, as the party has evolved since 2015, the ethnic outreach efforts may be left in the past as the party begins its new way forward.

Keywords:

Ethnic Outreach; Ethnocultural communities; Group Politics; Interest groups; Foreign Policy; Ethnic Targeting

The Effect of Foreign Policy on Ethnic Outreach Campaigns: A Canadian Case

Chapter One: Introduction:

1.1 Introduction and Structure:

Canada has labelled itself as a multicultural and diverse state comprised of multiple ethnocultural communities. Many multicultural states (such as Canada) have begun to adopt a more multicultural conception of integration through which ethnocultural minorities are recognized for their ethnic identity, and the state accepts an obligation to accommodate these ethnic identities in their political institutions and practices (Kymlicka, 2007, 72). As a result, new Canadians have become increasingly important players in election campaigns. One-way political parties have started accommodating ethnocultural minorities is through foreign policy initiatives. Foreign policy represents a reasonable avenue for political parties to engage with ethnic citizens, as public opinion has often been unreliable in international affairs as domestic citizens often care less and know little about issues abroad (Baum and Potter, 2019, 748). To this end, political parties have adopted a marketing strategy known as ‘ethnic outreach’ whereby different groups of voters are segmented, and policies are targeted toward them to lure ethnic voters.

Reflecting on these developments, the purpose of this Major Research Paper is to examine the question: *To what extent does foreign policy play in the ethnic outreach campaigns of Canadian political parties?* In doing so, this paper will make the following claims: First, I expect to see foreign policy be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these communities tend to display and develop significant attachments to international affairs due to personal and emotional devotions. Additionally, I will argue that ethnocultural communities should be major players in foreign policy developments, as ethnic interest groups have unique understandings of issues abroad that domestic policymakers do not. Finally, I will demonstrate that foreign policy has played a

significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic outreach campaigns, although the Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts.

This paper will be divided into three main parts: The first will act as a literature review, exploring scholarly work related to interest group politics – specifically focusing on ethnic interest groups. In addition, the third chapter will examine the foundations behind political marketing strategies such as ethnic outreach campaigns and review how ethnic interest groups can sway policymakers to develop foreign policy commitments that meet their group’s collective interests. The second part will conduct a case study focusing on the Federal Election campaigns of the 21st century and compare how Canada's federal Conservative and Liberal parties have targeted ethnic groups through foreign policy initiatives. This section seeks to illustrate how the Conservative party of Canada under Stephen Harper and Jason Kenney gained political success by targeting ethnocultural communities thought to have natural conservative tendencies while additionally displaying how Liberal efforts towards ethnic outreach have followed a similar path as their Conservative counterparts. Finally, the third part will wrap up the central foundations of this paper and discuss the potential future direction of ethnic outreach campaigns by Canadian political parties.

Part I

Chapter 2: Group Theory and Theories of Group Behavior

2.1 Group Politics:

Before approaching the central question of this paper, it is helpful to explore the literature that will help explain why ethnic groups are selected for outreach campaigns. This chapter will begin by outlining the foundations of group politics and group behaviour in addition to discussing the politics of interest groups and how ethnic communities represent a vibrant form of interest group.

The discussion on group politics begins through Larry Achen's and Christopher Bartels' book *Democracy for Realists*, which stresses the failings of the 'folk theory of democracy' as ordinary citizens display limited interests in politics.¹ Instead, Achen and Bartels note how people are naturally tended to form groups, which enables an "us vs them" mindset and sees group activity directed through emotion rather than reason (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215). In other words, group attachments are easily orchestrated as "people are naturally group-oriented" (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215).

The idea of group theory originates from 19th and 20th-century advancements in the social sciences finding humans everywhere to be part of a group and consider human thought to be primarily conditioned by cultures and sub-cultures (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215). Influenced by Karl Marx, who saw entire societies having their own culture, the sub-cultures evident within these societies affect how individuals behave, what they believe, and what they value. (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215). Marx, of course viewed sub-cultures through a class lens however these can extend to include national, racial, religious, professional, and ethnic groups as well (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215).

The previous paragraphs highlight the natural tendencies for groups to form in society; however, the question now asks how these groups might affect the political landscape. *The Process of Government* by Arthur F. Bentley emphasizes the importance of groups in politics. The critical point is that groups are not just capable of pressuring governments, most individuals structure their political thinking around their group membership (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 221). As a result, in events such as election campaigns, groups can mobilize to benefit a particular party that meets their interests (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 221). This claim finds further support through the Columbia

¹ The folk theory of democracy is the belief system that the voting public supports, elects and embraces candidates who reflect the collective "wishes and desires" of the people.

scholars revealing that group membership affects vote choice; in addition, *The American Voter* (Campbell et al., 1960) unveiled how voters lack stable attitudes towards major political issues as most view politics through groups, with membership mainly driving policy preferences (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 222-223). This can be compared with *folk theories of democracy* – can people busy with their everyday lives form policy preferences, assess where candidates stand on issues, and then select a candidate that matches their preferences—the answer more often than not is no. Democratic citizens often display little interest in politics and public affairs and instead mainly identify with ethnic, racial or religious groups. For most citizens, group loyalties are the primary drivers of vote choice (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 299). This introduction from Achen and Bartels asserts that groups are a driving factor in political decision-making. With this, the discussion shifts into revealing how groups become significant players in the policy-making process by looking into the habits of interest groups.

2.2 Interest Group Politics:

Interest groups are a natural occurrence in democratic systems as individuals will work together to protect their interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 2). In relation to Bentley's earlier contributions, David Truman also places groups *at the heart of politics and policymaking*. Moreover, he establishes the idea of a pluralist state where competition in and out of government will produce “policies roughly responsive to public desires and no single set of interests will dominate” (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4).² However, the impact of interest groups and group politics is not universally supported as some scholars suggest that citizens should not become group

² “Pluralist theory assumes that within the public arena there will be countervailing centers of power within governmental institutions and among outsiders. Competition is implicit in the notion that groups, as surrogates for individuals, will produce products representing the diversity of opinions that might have been possible in the individual decision days of democratic Athens.” (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4).

members as it might be economically unwise for some people to join (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4). Additionally, the pluralist vision of politics is critiqued with arguments that some groups continuously win, as some benefit is granted to all societal interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 5). This makes group influence seem less impactful. Despite these objections, this paper continues with the claim that groups' interests remain an impactful part of the policy-making process.

Support for this is found in Cigler's and Loomis' *Interest Group Politics* as the authors suggest that decentralized political parties are less disciplined, which opens the potential for "alternative political organizations such as interest groups to influence policy." (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 6). The relationship between groups and political parties is not entirely one-way as policies do not only contribute to group proliferation, political parties also directly intervene in group creation (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 14). Group sponsorship evolved for two main reasons:

First, there is the ever-present danger that administrative agencies may exceed or abuse their discretionary power. In this sense, the regulators need regulating. Although legislatures have responsibility for doing this. . . the administrative bureaucracy has grown too large for them to monitor. Therefore, citizen participation has developed as an alternative means of monitoring government agencies. Second, government agencies are not entirely comfortable with their discretionary power. . . [T]o reduce the potential of unpopular or questionable decisions, agencies frequently use citizen participation as a means for improving, justifying, and developing support for their decisions (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 15).

From this, the latter point of citizen discretion appears to be particularly important as political parties may seek to use interest groups to justify potentially controversial policy considerations. As a result, political parties and interest groups are more closely related than thought. First, both seek to stabilize the relationship between the public and government, and secondly, while interest groups do not wish to hold government, they care about who does – thus, interest groups and political parties have strong reasons to work with and shape one another (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 194-195). In sum, groups and parties do not compete directly with each other, parties may be

larger than groups, but groups have institutionally created advantages that allow them to navigate behind the scenes of partisan politics (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 214). From this, the interest group that is the central focus of this paper is ethnic interest groups as I consider how Canadian political parties approach the interests of ethnic communities.

Ethnic groups represent an intriguing group to study as membership in interest groups acts as a form of social identification (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 196). Moreover, ethnic interest groups are a relevant research subject for both their engagement in foreign policy and their transnational identity networks (Rytz, 2013, 15). This paper will understand ethnic interest groups as “institutionalized non-governmental political actors whose members share a collective identity to which belonging to the same immigrant community is central.” (Rytz, 2013, 15). This aligns with a ‘constructivist’ vision of ethnicity by understanding ethnic groups through “imagined transnational communities” and allowing for the mobilization of ethnic identities (Rytz, 2013, 16). Important for discussion is differentiating ethnic communities from (1) nations and (2) diasporas. Unlike a nation, ethnic interest groups do not claim rights over a particular territory, their primary attachment is to the country of origin, reinforcing the understanding of ethnic communities to be transnational rather than national (Rytz, 2013, 17). As for diasporas, which are people of a common origin living permanently outside their homeland, this definition implies no political activity, whereas ethnic interest groups represent political actors (Rytz, 2013, 17-18). With this understanding of ethnic interest groups cemented, the question turns to how influential they are in policy making.

First, it is important to ask what influence is. Some interpret it as impact, while others view it as success. Legislators do not just respond to pressure but also design the rules of engagement with interest groups and use them as political tools. Groups may be integrated into the policy-

making process to such a degree that the resulting interdependence makes it hard to discern any external impact (Rytz, 2013, 25). To this end, the debate around ethnic interest groups' influence over foreign policy sees one side arguing that ethnic interest groups are capturing foreign policy, whereas the other side views ethnic interest groups as an integral part of the political system (Rytz, 2013, 28).

2.3 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter approached our question by revealing that groups are important players in the political and policy-making process. The central claim is that groups often influence their members' mindsets, and as a result, group loyalties often drive political decision-making. To this end, this section advances the first argument presented in this paper as it identifies how people are naturally group-oriented and structure their political habits around these memberships. Ethnic groups were identified to be the interest group of major focus in this paper, and from this, we can expect ethnic groups to be more invested in political issues abroad as members of their community hold personal ties to their homeland and place foreign policy at the heart of their political decision making. The next chapter will work off this and discuss the relationship between ethnic groups and political parties, specifically around foreign policy.

Chapter Three: Ethnic Groups Outreach Campaigns:

3.1 Ethnic Outreach Campaigns:

The question this paper considers asks how important foreign policy is in ethnic outreach campaigns – but what exactly are ethnic outreach campaigns, and why might ethnocultural communities consider foreign policy with a greater degree of importance? This chapter begins by

setting out approaches to ethnic outreach and how it has been applied in Canada and then investigates why foreign policy might be important to ethnic communities during outreach initiatives.

Ethnic outreach is a form of political marketing. Three primary forms of political marketing exist: product-oriented-party (POP), sales-oriented-party (SOP), and market-oriented-party (MOP). POPs mainly operate to attract voters who share a predisposed ideology, while SOPs structures promotional activities to market themselves (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 48). Our focus remains on MOPs as these parties promote certain activities that align with targeted electors' usages (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 48). The difference is that MOPs promote 'malleable' products that "responds to the median voter's preferences by demonstrating ideological flexibility" and results in an "efficient appeal to the largest number of possible supporters" (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 48). The Conservatives near decade in power (2006-2015) can be attributed to the party's ability to influence a shift in voter preference by marketing a product that coordinated between specific voting segments and their long-standing supporters (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 49).³ With that, ethnic outreach follows the market-oriented approach toward political marketing as it sees political parties – such as the Federal Conservatives and Liberals – develop flexible policy commitments that respond to both segmented voters (ethnocultural communities) and their long-standing supporters.

We can begin to understand the commitments of ethnic outreach campaigns through James McCormick's article "Democratizing Canadian Foreign Policy." Here, McCormick stresses that democracies such as Canada expect public organizations to respond to the demands of those they

³ The Conservatives have been labelled as being somewhere between an SOP and MOP; however, Canadian history demonstrates that holding a marketing strategy is important to hold government, and with that, the Pearson and Chrétien Liberals, alongside the Mulroney and Harper Conservatives, are examples highlighting how responding to elector preferences is crucial for parties to win seats (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 50).

represent. These governments are evaluated on how the development of domestic policy matches public sentiments and as a result, foreign policy is not given much attention (McCormick, 2006, 113-114). In other words, the public maintains limited interest or knowledge of foreign policy matters, which limits their effectiveness as they cannot represent a reliable source on foreign policy (McCormick, 2006, 114). In response to this, McCormick discusses the differences between indirect and direct democratization.⁴ Direct democratization is more useful for our purposes as it entails continuous involvement in the foreign policy process and, as a result, must include direct consultation with government officials, engagement activities, and governmental outreach initiatives (McCormick, 114).

The Pierre Trudeau government is often identified as kickstarting direct democratization in regards to Canadian foreign policy as Trudeau believed there was a need to “plug people into the decision-making process” and in effect greater public involvement began with ethnic groups weighing in foreign policy questions, most notably through Jewish and Ukrainian communities (McCormick, 2006 118). However, this increased involvement, or “participatory democracy” had certain constraints attached to it as collaboration in the foreign policy realm was “based on a desire to interest and educate Canadians rather than let their opinions determine government policy” (McCormick, 2006, 118). Otherwise put, public opinion was more meaningful around policy decisions Trudeau had no interest in or did not affect his core concerns (McCormick, 2006, 118).

Following this, Stephen Harper’s government campaigned under commitments to increase direct democratization in both the foreign and domestic policy arenas. For example, the 2006 Conservative platform *Stand Up for Canada* called for the direct election of senators, more votes

⁴ Indirect democratization of foreign policy is probably the way most familiar to many observers. In this approach, the public participates in periodic elections and determines the selection of Parliament and the government, but only indirectly affects foreign policy, since the prime minister, cabinet, ministries, and perhaps the Parliament decide on foreign policy actions (McCormick, 2006, 114).

in free parliament, and enhancing the power of Parliament and parliamentary committees in reviewing spending estimates (McCormick, 2006, 126). In the foreign policy realm, the Harper government had largely continued the outreach efforts that had been in place before them (McCormick, 2006, 126). Nonetheless, the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century saw an uptake in direct democratization efforts when considering foreign policy matters, with the overall aim of this effort hoping to create a culture of outreach to the public (McCormick, 2006, 127). Outreach efforts are crucial in a diverse nation such as Canada maintaining several linguistic, regional, and ethnic differences/concerns (McCormick, 2006, 127). To this end, the Canadian state offers a robust case study on how the public can and should be more involved in foreign policy-making. However, this does not stretch to the larger Canadian public but rather considers how well-organized and connected civil-society groups impact the foreign policy process (McCormick, 2006, 127-128). For our purposes, this paper will move forward and consider how ethnocultural groups in Canada have been incorporated into the policy-making process.

Ethnocultural political mobilization became a significant feature of Canadian political life as multiculturalism was adopted into Canadian public policy and a feature of Canadian national identity during the latter part of the 20th century (Kobayashi, 2008, 123). To this end, Audrey Kobayashi argues that the rights of ethnocultural groups are influenced mainly by the public policy process, suggesting that while the Charter of Rights and Freedoms along with additional legal documents have provided a baseline, the achievement of political rights requires “a high level of political openness and a will to action from government, the public in general, and ethnocultural groups themselves” (Kobayashi, 2008, 123). It is well known that minority and ethnic groups in Canada faced and continue to face challenges and constraints from the Canadian government. Asian immigrants were brought over to be exploited for cheap production of railway lines, Black

and African Canadians were marginalized from Canadian society for centuries, and immigrants from Eastern and Southern European descent were designated into the lowest paying jobs (Italian Canadians in the construction industry) (Kobayashi, 2008, 124-125). These government actions display a clear attempt to preserve the dominance of British and French heritage as immigration policy was constructed to establish “oppressed workers” (Kobayashi, 2008, 125).

The widespread adoption of the concept of human rights by Canadians during the second world war fomented the recognition of minority groups and kickstarted the era of multiculturalism. As a result, ethnocultural groups were recognized as Canada’s “third force” in political life (Kobayashi, 2008, 127). The Canadian Ethnocultural Council (CEC) was established in the 1980s and acted as an umbrella organization for groups of various communities and worked with the following mission statement:

... to secure equality for of opportunity, rights and dignity for ethnocultural communities in Canada. The CEC membership works by sharing information so as to develop a consensus on issues of concern to its membership and by advocating for changes on behalf of ethnic and visible minority groups (Kobayashi, 2008, 128).

The CEC became a significant lobby organization by influencing several public policy and legislative changes during the 1980s, that not only empowered ethnocultural groups, but additionally reached out and pushed the agenda to “mainstream” society (Kobayashi, 2008, 129).⁵ The CEC no longer acts as a lobbying organization and has transitioned into an “outreach organization” that provides information to groups on health care, social services, and immigration (Kobayashi, 2008, 142). As a result, ethnocultural communities have begun to act as their own interest groups, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

⁵ Some CEC members have success in doing things for themselves such as the Canadian Armenian Federation which lobbied Ottawa on the specific purpose of encouraging the government to recognize the Armenian genocide and received an acknowledge with Parliament classifying the genocide as a “crime against humanity” (Kobayashi, 2008, 142).

For now, studies on ethnic interest organizations have noted that ethnic communities – such as Greek, Israel, Cuban, and African-American interest organizations—have been able to integrate into North American political society and influence foreign policy directives (Singh, 2012, 340). The common understanding of this effect suggests that group influence is dependent on the community’s relationship with policymakers; however, Singh suggests that the impact lies in the activities of transnational entities that have extensive networks in both their home and domestic state:

Diaspora-based interest groups such as the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC), the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)¹ and the Canada-India Foundation (CIF) have lobbied the federal and provincial governments for improved relations with India to varying degrees of success (Singh, 2012, 340).

Despite this claim from Singh, this paper will review the relationship between ethnic communities and domestic policymakers. Nevertheless, Singh’s work is beneficial in that it reinforces the claim that ethnic communities are powerful interest groups in the foreign policy process, not only domestically but internationally as well.

We can see a form of widespread ethnic targeting beginning in the 2008 federal election as Canada’s three main parties used a micro-targeting voter profile tool that outlines people’s ethnicity, social values, and income level, which is then cross-listed with the party they support (Jiménez, 2008, 1). The demand for multicultural research tools like this one emerges from Canadian ethnic communities gaining size and political importance; for example, immigrants are no longer considered a clear voting bloc as all parties reach out for their support (Jiménez, 2008, 1). The Conservative Party is targeting specific ethnic groups that have assembled a “detailed database of voters” in key ridings (Jiménez, 2008, 1). For example, suburban upscale ethnic groups are described as recent immigrants from China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines that have “white collar” or service sector jobs. The usefulness of this information is to “help candidates with

messaging, how to talk to these people, and what their core belief systems are” (Jiménez, 2008, 1-2). Campaigns are already structured to have a good sense of their supporters' demographics; however, this tool allows them to go deeper and identify on a street-by-street level (Jiménez, 2008, 2). As a result, three of the five parties in Canada have begun (2008) using tools to identify and profile ethnic voters to enhance their campaigns in battleground ridings (Jiménez, 2008, 2).

Communities that feature single group enclaves in each riding often take advice from community leaders on a variety of topics, including who or who not to vote for (Furey, 2010, 14). This encourages political strategists to spend significant time engaging with and attempting to sway ethnic voters into siding with their party's platform (Furey, 2010, 14). For example, Michael Marzolini, a/the former chief pollster, and strategist for the Liberal Party, who held a major role in election campaigns, says, “I never recommend any courting any ethnic group above the any other group—people know when they [are] being patronized” (Furey, 2010, 14). Marzolini also suggests that outreach becomes more challenging to pull off the longer each group has been in Canada:

as each wave of immigration evolves, matures, and becomes absorbed into the mainstream Canadian fabric, they are less inclined to vote homogenously – in the 1970s 80% of Italian Canadians voted Liberal, that number has now reduced to around 58% (2010) (Furey, 2010, 14).

Columnist Angelo Persichilli firmly believes in the presence of an ethnic voting bloc, suggesting that cultural affinities play a role in voting habits however suggests that ethnic Canadians do not easily assemble into nested voting blocs (Furey, 2010, 14). Persichilli advocates that the best strategy for engagement is to avoid patronizing at all costs (Furey, 2010, 15). Conservative campaigner John Capobianco additionally sees the presence of ethnic voting blocs and advises:

Don't only go to events or sit down with community leaders...sit down with average voters...you have to build a relationship, build trust...never make an assumption. Don't assume a group is voting Liberal and thus not spend any time with them (Furey, 2010, 15).

Capobianco additionally cites Jason Kenney's work as the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism based on efforts to reach out and try to understand various communities – which the Conservative Party of Canada is hoping will translate into electoral success (Furey, 2010, 14):

As South Asian and Asian immigration replaces European as the dominant source of new immigrant to Canada, they bring with them different political, social, and community values, perspectives, priorities, and experiences. Many new South Asian and Asian immigrants feel that the Conservatives better reflect their political experience and values -
- Sean Hill (Furey, 2010, 15).

Nonetheless, Hill continues to believe that campaign strategies are best spent on individuals not groups claiming ethnic voters not to be much different from general voters, “the secret is targeting the campaign resources to attract the support from those who are predisposed or willing to consider voting for your candidate or party” (Furey, 2010, 15).

3.2 Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy

Upon review of ethnic outreach campaigns this section delves into why foreign policy may be important to ethnic communities when political parties structure outreach campaigns. In response to increased levels of immigration to Canada, questions have arisen on how this will affect foreign policymakers, specifically regarding what foreign policy priorities ethnic groups have and how they might influence the policy-making process (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 31). There are many factors to consider when assessing influence with thousands of ethnic groups in Canada all differing in their goals, membership, and access to government (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 31-32). In the United States (US), ethnic groups are significant players in US foreign policy (Smith, 2000, 1). This is not surprising as the US is a purist democracy with social forces involved in policy deliberations, such as interest groups attempting to have their concerns be given priority in foreign affairs (Smith,

2000, 2). Despite this involvement, some oppose this collaboration between government and ethnic communities. Two passages from Granatstein's chapter "Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign Policy" kickstart our discussion: Toronto journalist Zuhair Kashmeri, who published "The Gulf Within Canadian Arabs, Racism and the Gulf War" in 1991, argued that Canada failed to consider "the views of its large Arab and Muslim communities before it decided to join the US-sponsored coalition in the Gulf" (Granatstein, 2008, 79). Thought to be unacceptable, he then quoted the views of Reverend Tad Mitsui of the United Church of Canada, who viewed race as a factor in determining who is an enemy and who is an ally:

Canadians will never think of America as an enemy, and neither can they think of British or the French as enemies ... But it is so easy to think of Arabs as the enemy (Granatstein, 2008, 79).

Following this, political columnist John Ibbitson of the *Globe and Mail*, wrote in August 2005 about Canada's governor general, Mme Michaëlle Jean, who spoke about the situation in Haiti, where she was born, and stressed that troubles abroad are not "foreign aid issues for Canada, they are foreign policy priorities:"

They reflect our demographic transformation, from predominantly European to truly multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are our problems because India and China and Haiti are our motherlands (Granatstein, 2008, 79).

Those arguing against ethnic influence in foreign policy deliberations suggest that collaborative foreign policy discussions turn objectives into "policies of the heart, not policies of the head" (Granatstein, 2008, 79). The classic opposition to involvement in foreign affairs comes from Alexis de Tocqueville:

I have no hesitation in saying that in control of society's foreign affairs, democratic governments do appear decidedly inferior to others...Foreign policy does not require the use of any of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but does demand the cultivation of almost all those which it lacks...It has little capacity for combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the result...In politics, the tendency of a democracy [is] to obey its

feelings rather than its calculations and to abandon a long-matured plan to satisfy momentary passion (Smith, 2000, 5).

Advocates against group involvement in foreign affairs note that “foreign policy is not about loving everyone or even helping everyone, it cannot be about doing something only to satisfy one group’s ties to its mother country, national interests are and must be top” (Granatstein, 2008, 79). This is not to say that ethnic communities should not speak out on policy with their interests in mind, but rather suggests a form of democratic commitment that obligates ethnic units to the national community they are a part of (Smith, 2000, 16). Moreover, those critiquing a collaborative foreign policy critique the actions of elected officials as well, noting that effective foreign policy is not constructed to win support from ethnic groups and want the government to stress that those coming into Canadian society accept the values of the Canadian public (Granatstein, 2008, 85-86). From this, responses to the claims from Kashmeri and Ibbitson continue to stress the idea of national interest:

understanding what our national interests are is the way to make foreign policy, rather than pandering to opinion polls and ethnic polls. Our foreign policy must be based on what is important to Canadians as a whole, not to Canadians wearing only their Old Country/ethnicity religious hat. (Granatstein, 2008, 89).

Paul Martin's government ... must send a zero-tolerance message to those who bring a new country the troubles that make it so attractive to leave an old one... It will also help greatly if our leaders can focus on the aspects of foreign policy that are important to the nation as a whole and stop playing to ethnicities that make up our population (Granatstein, 90).

Diplomats in Canada generally argue that Canadian national interests cannot be served by bending to the pleas from special interest groups, special pleas from groups such as Jews about Israel is universally by the policymaking community as “damaging to national interest (Carment & Bercuson, 2008, 207).

Despite these claims, I move to argue that input from ethnic groups should be a crucial part of foreign policy deliberations as national interests are not always clear and identifiable. Moreover, domestic Canadians and elected officials might not always comprehend issues abroad, and as a

result, collaboration should be welcomed to establish a coherent understanding between ethnic groups and policymakers.

Turning our attention to David Goldberg's *Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups* kickstarts the discussion on how ethnic groups may begin to influence foreign policy decisions. The impact of ethnic groups on foreign policy reflects several tendencies of group behaviour. The first of these follows the discussion held in Chapter two of this paper as Goldberg reinforces groups to be important participants in political life with interest groups evident in all cultures and governments (Goldberg, 1990, 2). The second tendency notes the impact organized interest groups have upon the state's foreign policy process – which includes all types of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with foreign policy (Goldberg, 1990, 2). Finally, the third tendency in group behaviour acknowledges an increased appreciation for ethnicity as a foundation for group formation and organized political action (Goldberg, 1990, 2-3). To this end, ethnicity has become a standard component in North American politics, and as a result, scholars tend to focus on how ethnic groups interact with those making foreign policy decisions concerning their groups (Goldberg, 1990, 3).

With this, literature typically focuses on ethnic groups' attempts to influence foreign policy directions, with most studies suggesting a strong relationship – direct or indirect—between ethnic group activism and the foreign policy decisions produced by government officials (Goldberg, 1990, 3).⁶ The factors that most help explain ethnic interest groups' potential impact on government foreign policy include: how the group is oriented (issue or institutionalized), how the state structures its foreign policy decision-making system; such as the extent to which the state's decisional process is open to intervention from NGO actors (ethnic interest groups), and

⁶ Since the 1970s many studies on ethnic interest group impact of foreign policy have pointed to the pro-Israel lobbying activities of the Jewish communities in the United States and Canada (Goldberg, 1990, 3).

finally, the amount of attention the issue receives relative to other features of the ethnic group's foreign policy agenda; such as the extent to which the issue is a crisis for the group. (Goldberg, 1990, 7-10). Ethnic groups do not perceive all foreign policy issues to be of equal importance, there is a gradation of issues, with the greater perceived issue making the group more willing to use resources to have the government address its concern. (Goldberg, 1990, 10).

Ethnic groups typically have interests that encourage them to lobby policymakers. These tend to include but are not limited to, immigration, with immigrants keen on bringing loved ones to Canada and ultimately pressure the Canadian government to expand their immigration and refugee laws (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 34). Additional areas of focus concern expanding trade partnerships with their country of origin, increasing aid to places of birth, and taking stances on tense political issues occurring in their homeland (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 34). Immigrants and refugees come with strong emotional ties to their country of origin, and when they arrive in Canada, they can stay informed on the situation abroad, which may encourage them to seek levels of Canadian assistance (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 36).⁷ There are two principal avenues by which ethnic communities may exert influence in the policymaking process: (1) The electoral process and (2) forming of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to lobby the government. First 'The Electoral Process': Recent arrivals, such as immigrants and refugees often settle in geographically concentrated areas, which increases their potential to influence electoral outcomes (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 40). With ethnic communities being concentrated they are expected to exert influence over political choices, mainly in the domestic realm, however, foreign policy takes priority with matters related to immigration/refugee policy, trade deals, and international politics concerning their

⁷ When a tsunami struck South Asia in 2004, Asia groups were quick to lobby the Canadian government for aid to the affected regions, in addition to working with media to generate donations towards relief efforts overseas (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 36).

country of origin (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 40). Second, 'NGO Advocacy': Recently, ethnic groups have shown advanced involvement with foreign policy issues as ethnic communities now have their own lobby groups, which act as national umbrella organizations (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 42). These groups are classified as 'issue-oriented,' which focus on narrow, short-term goals and tend to lack internal cohesion, focus, and structure. (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 43). However, as groups become more established, they can advance into becoming a more institutionalized unit (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 43).⁸

However, an additional facet of group influence is affected by its goals, the degree to which it is perceived to be credible, its sense of timing, and its ability to court allies (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 44). In other words, it is easier for policymakers to get a sympathetic ear when the goals align with national interests (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 44). As a rule, it is best to start lobbying earlier in the process rather than waiting until after the policy has been announced as official government policy (Riddell-Dixon, 44). With their rising numbers and growing sophistication, ethnic groups are increasingly able to meet these internal requirements (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 45). With this, the next section will review literature discussing the voting habits of ethnic communities in Canada.

3.3 Ethnic Group Voting Habits

Throughout the paper so far there has been a clear discussion suggesting group membership to impact political behaviour. From this, when considering ethnic group voting it is generally accepted that ethnicity affects voting behaviour (Landa et al., 435). A rational model of ethnic voting behaviour holds that ethnic voters support candidates belonging to the same ethnic group

⁸ Institutional: Groups with established and cohesive organized structures, permanent offices, paid staff, and stable membership that understand the policy process and enjoy long-term relationships with relevant sectors of government. They are often well positioned to monitor government policy and cultivate ongoing relations with key policy makers. Issue-oriented groups focus on short-term goals and often lack the internal cohesion yet as they become more established issue groups can develop into institutional (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 43).

due to the rationale that the candidate will act for the group's interest while in government (Landa et al., 1995, 435-436). This is known to be a form of ethnic affinity voting.⁹ Karen Bird et al. test the results of ethnic affinity voting during Olivia Chow's run as a visible minority candidate in the 2014 Toronto Mayoral election. Following the investigation, the 2014 Toronto Mayoral election exemplified a case where "visible minorities" were more likely to support Olivia Chow (Bird et al., 2016, 369). Additional studies in Canada support these findings, highlighting that affinity voting patterns increased within compact ethnic minority settings (Bird et al., 2016, 364). Nonetheless, what is most revealing from this case is that these ethnic affinity patterns were more significant among Chinese voters than other visible minorities, showcasing ethnic Chinese voters to be more likely to support Chow – who is of Hong Kong descent (Bird et al., 2016, 371). This discussion on ethnic group voting habits is crucial to the study of this paper as it notes how policy related to ethnic groups' interests is not the only factor driving ethnic group voting habits. The presence of ethnic affinity voting further affirms the foundations of group politics suggesting group membership to be the driving factor of political decision making. With this, moving forward into the case study it will be interesting to see how ethnic representation unfolds as an important outreach initiative for ethnocultural communities.

3.4 Chapter Conclusion:

In summary, this chapter established the position that ethnic groups should be essential players in the foreign policy-making process. While the view exists that foreign policy should solely center on national interests, I develop a position advocating for ethnic groups to work alongside government and policymakers as they can deliver unique insight into issues abroad better than

⁹ The authors here reveal that affinity voting occurs when a candidate is identified by their membership and thought to be "acting for" the group's interest (Bird et al., 2016, 362).

domestic Canadians. Additionally, this chapter highlights how ethnic groups have particular foreign policy interests related to areas such as immigration, trade, and the politics of their country of origin. To this end, the next section of this paper will review how ethnocultural communities have surfaced as critical political players and been targeted by Canadian political parties during federal election campaigns by reviewing how parties have committed to specific ethnic groups through their foreign policy proposals.

Part II

Chapter 4: Canadian Party Ethnic Targeting

The previous chapter established how ethnic groups have the potential to influence foreign policy decisions during outreach campaigns by political parties. This paper will continue to examine the importance of foreign policy in ethnic outreach campaigns as the previous chapter discussed how ethnic group foreign policy interests often regard immigration, trade, and political stances involving a group's country of origin. This chapter will investigate how Canada's Conservative and Liberal parties have targeted ethnic concerns around these topics in their election campaigns. It is helpful to examine the manifestos of these parties over the last two decades as party platforms are symbolic statements of party positions (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 199). Though they might not directly reflect each candidate's position, they may influence the public's perception of a party as groups work to define an individual party's positions (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 199). Conversely, others might view these statements as simply *baiting for votes*, with comments on Patrick Brown's bid for Conservative leadership suggesting that lifting the terrorist title of the LTTE is a "good way to rustle Tamilian votes" (Ahmed, 2022).

4.1 Party Approaches to Ethnic Outreach:

4.1 (a) Conservative Ethnic Targeting

The 2011 federal election resulted in the Conservatives winning a majority government for the first time since merging the former Reform and Alliance party. Upon winning the election, former Citizen and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney declared that the Conservatives were “the party for new Canadians” as it found its new pillar of electoral support, the ethnic pillar (Carlaw, 2015, 105). The party’s ties to the Reform party originally alienated many ethnic voters due to inherited baggage and harsh policy stances by Reform members (Carlaw, 2015, 106). Tom Flanagan (Conservative political activist) attributes the Conservatives’ electoral success to hard work rather than any significant policy innovations:

the patient effort of establishing contact — visits...to ethnic events; recruiting multicultural candidates and political organizers; printing political materials in [other] languages. These, Flanagan noted, were steps easy to enumerate, but took years to achieve” (Carlaw, 2015, 106).

Jason Kenney, former Conservative Minister of Citizen and Immigration and Alberta Premier had long argued that the party should “show up” to the political contest following years on the sideline and form interpersonal relationships with diverse communities (Carlaw, 2015, 107). Flanagan notes that the Conservative's plan was not to offer a plateau of new benefits but instead to show new Canadians that their interests would be best represented by a Conservative government (Carlaw, 2015, 107). The Conservative party has promoted a conformist, militarist nationalism agenda along with the rhetoric of inclusion for new and ethnic Canadians (Carlaw, 2015, 118). Through these steps, the party had adopted aggressive outreach efforts that had helped them obtain a “minimum winning coalition” that was large enough to receive a majority government in 2011 (Carlaw, 2015, 118).

To this end, the objective of Conservative ethnic outreach campaigns was understanding, seducing, and attracting ethnic communities to the Conservative party — a bloc usually taken for

granted by the Liberals — this strategy designated Kenney to be the architect of the Conservative majority (Castonguay, 2013, 2). Kenney pitched his theory on ethnic targeting to Harper on the basis that even with a united right (following the merger of Reform and Alliance parties) “conservatism has peaked” (Castonguay, 2013, 3). Therefore, Kenney thought the party had to branch out to immigrants, “look at demographic trends—it’s the future ... Immigrants have the same values as us, we have to talk to them, to convince them” Kenney said to Harper (Castonguay, 2013, 3). Harper, who was skeptical until taking power at the helm of a minority government in 2008, proposed that Kenney pursue the mission that he had defined — “prove to me that I was wrong” (Castonguay, 2013, 3).

The ethnic outreach work by Jason Kenney had turned him into a celebrity figure. In ridings with significant immigrant populations such as Trinity-Spadina, Kenney is noted to be welcomed with honking horns, stopped frequently, and is as well known in the Chinese community as Justin Bieber; Whereas in Calgary, Kenney’s home riding, he can go on for hours without being recognized (Castonguay, 2013, 5). The Conservative outreach strategy is outlined in the document “Breaking through: Building the Conservative brand in cultural communities” aiming toward Chinese, Jewish, Ukrainian and South Asian communities.

If Greater Toronto’s South Asians formed their own city, it would be the third-largest city in the country,” it read. The take-away points were neatly summed up: there are lots of ethnic voters. There will be quite a few more soon. They live where we need to win (Castonguay, 2013, 6).

In 2011 the Conservatives won 24/25 suburban Toronto ridings — “without the support of the ethnic communities, we could have never done that” — and the Conservatives estimate that they accumulated about 42% of the ethnic vote in 2011, which is 30% higher than they had in 2008 (Castonguay, 2013, 7). After the election, there were rumours that Kenney may change positions however, when asked about that Harper said the thought never crossed his mind,

He had too many important reforms under way, and the message sent to the cultural communities would be all wrong. After having courted and then obtained their vote, we take away their champion? No. (Castonguay, 2013, 7).

Having established the foundations around Conservative ethnic outreach, we can now examine how they targeted groups through immigration, trade, and political issues related to their country of origin.

(1) Immigration:

We can review the Conservative party's immigration policy by revisiting the commitments made in their party manifestos from 2008-2019. The merger of the right saw significant transformations in the party's immigration policy as the Conservatives felt that the immigrant and minority vote was a crucial margin to form government as this segment had been dominated by the Liberals for decades (Tolley, 2018, 101). Skeptics of the party's commitments to immigration noted the anti-immigrant rhetoric that was profound to the former Reform Party and Canadian Alliance. Nevertheless, determined to earn the support of immigrant voters they reminded Canadians that it was John Diefenbaker's Tories who introduced Canada's first Bill of Rights and Brian Mulroney's government who enshrined official multiculturalism in law (Tolley, 2018, 101). To this end, upon the merger of the right, the Conservative party essentially adopted immigration and multiculturalism into their policy agendas as they began to regard the ethnocultural communities as an important voting bloc (Tolley, 2018, 102). Nonetheless, a review of Conservative immigration policy during the Harper years seemingly showcases a focus on supporting immigrants in Canada, as opposed to reunification, which Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon notes as a central concern among immigrant group lobbyists. Examples of such commitments are evident in the following manifestos:

1. *2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper's plan for Canadians:*

- A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper is committed to implementing the reforms contained in the 2008 Budget to reduce the immigration processing backlog and to expedite applications from people with the skills and professions most in demand in Canada. (17-18).
- A re-elected Conservative Government will build on the creation of the Foreign Credentials Referral Office to work with the provinces and territories to ensure greater standardization of workplace and professional credentials across the country and standards for assessment of foreign credentials and will place this issue on the agenda of the next meeting of First Ministers. (17-18).
- In order to protect immigrants and potential immigrants and their families, a re-elected Conservative Government will make immigration consulting a regulated activity. (17-18).

2. *2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada:*

- Canada is fortunate to attract hard-working immigrants from around the world, eager to earn a better life for their families and to contribute to Canadian society (10).
- But obstacles in the recognition of foreign credentials can make it hard for them to find a suitable job. And for those who need to upgrade their skills for use in Canada, it is difficult to qualify for existing programs or private loans (10).
- Stephen Harper's Government has invested new funds to implement a common approach to foreign credentials recognition across Canada, and established the Foreign Credentials Referral Office (10).
- But more is needed. To build on our actions so far, we will provide loans for recent immigrants to help pay for skills training and accreditation (10).
- This new measure will make it easier for new Canadians to find jobs that take full advantage of their experience and expertise, and help them to contribute fully to the growth of the Canadian economy (10).

3. *2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy*

- To ensure that newcomers succeed, while growing the Canadian economy, the Conservative Government has made important reforms, including: (32-33)
 - Moving to a fast and flexible immigration system where the priority focus is on meeting Canada's labour market needs.
 - Creating the Canadian Experience class that invites foreign students who have graduated from Canadian universities and colleges to stay and obtain permanent residency.
 - Radically improving the geographic distribution of immigrants across Canada, partly by increasing the Provincial Nominee Programs by tenfold.
 - Eliminating massive backlogs created by previous Liberal governments that left aspiring Canadians waiting for years.
 - Establishing a new Expression of Interest system that shifts from a passive processing of applications to fast-tracking of applicants with jobs offers or in-demand skills.

- Reforming the Temporary Foreign Worker Program to prevent abuses, and ensure that Canadians always get the first chance at available jobs.
- Increasing family reunification by 10%, while introducing the popular new ten-year multiple-entry Super Visa for parents and grandparents.
- Cutting the Liberals' right of landing fee in half, saving newcomers hundreds of millions of dollars.
- Tripling funding for settlement services, like free language classes and job search skills.
- Creating free pre-arrival orientation counselling for selected economic immigrants to help them get a head start on credential recognition and finding employment before they get to Canada.

From this, the Conservatives seemingly placed immigration as a central component of their foreign policy under Harper; however, they appealed to immigrants with promises to improve their living conditions in Canada instead of reunification or expansion. The dedication to immigrant voters was most beneficial in the 2011 election as the Conservatives won a majority government after capturing several seats in dense immigrant metropolitan areas previously dominated by the Liberals (Taylor et al., 2012, 2). The Conservative party and many media commentators hold that the 2011 victory stemmed from the party's aggressive commitment to ethnic outreach as the party attempted to lure recent immigrants from societies known for social conservative values and therefore would be attracted to the party's more conservative platform (Taylor et al., 2012, 2).

Upon transition to Andrew Scheer as Conservative leader, immigration policy still delivers the narrative it did under Harper, however, it seemingly shifts and presents policy that encourages adopting more immigrants and refugees into Canadian society.¹⁰

4. *2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead*

- To support the many generous Canadians waiting to help sponsor refugees to Canada, we will remove the annual cap on the number of sponsorship applications that can be

¹⁰ To better support new arrivals to Canada, we will continue to support settlement services for newcomers. Language training, credential recognition, and specific services for vulnerable newcomers such as women and girls and members of the LGBTQ+ community, are key to the successful integration of new immigrants into their new home. A new Conservative government will preserve the integrity of our immigration system and make sure that our immigration programs lead to newcomers being fully supported and integrated into Canadian society and Canada's economy (58)

submitted. Private sponsors have told us that the government gets in their way and that there are costs and needless red tape that restrict the good work they do. Canada's churches, mosques, community groups, temples, synagogues, and cultural associations can offer so much to newcomers. So often, Canadians come together and devote their resources of time and money to support a refugee and their family. Their compassion and investments of time and money cannot be replicated by the government. Government data show that even a decade after privately sponsored refugees arrive, they earn more and depend less on government than those who come through government sponsorship. A new Conservative government will do more to enable and support private sponsors welcoming newcomers to Canada (56-57).

- To further support sponsorship groups in the process of privately sponsoring a refugee, a new Conservative government will reduce wait times to approve a privately sponsored refugee by ensuring that departmental resources are sufficiently focused on PSRs (56-57).
- To ensure that all individuals are well supported to integrate to society, we will prioritize genocide survivors, LGBTQ+ refugees, and internally displaced people in the Government-Assisted Refugees program (56-57).

The comparisons between these two policy presentations are best summed up with the Harper Conservatives adopting a “buffet style approach” by pursuing policies that were both expansionist and restrictionist by advocating for immigration policy in economic terms, which would be attractive to immigrant and minority voters while at the same time not alienating their traditionally Conservative base (Tolley, 2018, 107).¹¹ As for the shift in immigration approach, the Conservative's response 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis perhaps triggered new pathways forward with the crisis catching the public's attention. The government was accused of inaction and callousness with *The Globe and Mail* reporting that the Prime Minister's Office had halted the processing of Syrian refugee claims for several weeks in 2014 (Tolley, 2018, 108). To this end, the Conservatives under Scheer might have pitched a foreign policy agenda around immigration and refugees that targeted genocide survivors and refugees to showcase their commitments to Canadians with immigrant/refugee backgrounds. As a result, the Conservative Government employed an ethnic

¹¹“Referring to the right of landing fee as a “head tax,” the government cut this amount in half, a move that not only fit with their reputation as tax-cutters but also appealed to immigrant voters” (Tolley, 2018, 108).

outreach strategy towards immigration policy that was targeted to appeal to ethnocultural communities believed to have “natural” Conservative leanings (Tolley, 2018, 122).

(2) Trade

The next avenue we can examine Conservative ethnic targeting in their foreign policy is through their commitments to trade. For example, we can see expanded trade talks in the Conservative’s 2006 platform proposing “Canada [to be] a trading nation, and Canadian jobs depend on our ability to pursue free and fair-trading relationships with like-minded countries throughout the world” (Conservative Manifesto, 2006, 47). As a result, a Conservative government would begin to “explore the possibility of free-trade negotiations with Canada’s democratic and economic partners in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, and India” (Conservative Manifesto, 2006, 46). To this end, Conservative trade policy over the subsequent four campaigns (2008, 2011, 2015, 2019) was committed to exploring and expanding trade opportunities with diverse markets abroad. Interestingly, the explored markets seemingly targeted Canadian ethnocultural communities, specifically focusing on those from the Asia Pacific region. We can see this unfold with a review of the Conservative party’s trade policy from 2008-2019.

1. 2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s plan for Canadians

- A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will continue to pursue trade agreements, such as those successfully reached with the European Free Trade Association, Colombia, Peru and Jordan. We are committed to seeing these deals passed by Parliament. In light of the recent setback at the World Trade Organization negotiations, a re-elected Conservative Government will move aggressively to improve Canada's network of bilateral and regional free trade and economic agreements (16).
- To improve Canada's position as a global trader, a re-elected Conservative Government will proceed with plans to open new trade offices in China, Mongolia, Mexico, Brazil and India (in Hyderabad, Kolkata and Ahmedabad) (16).

2. 2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada

- To create more jobs and opportunities for Canadians, Stephen Harper's Government has signed new trade agreements with eight countries – Panama, Jordan, Colombia, Peru, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – and we are in negotiations with many more; and made major steps forward in trade relations with China (11).
- CANADA-INDIA FREE TRADE
 - India – one of the world's fastest growing and largest economies, with one billion customers – building on the personal ties and business expertise of our **large Indo-Canadian community** (11).
 - Since taking office in 2006, Stephen Harper's government has made it a priority to revitalize Canada's relationship with the great nation of India. For example, to help Canadian businesses gain greater access
 - Opened three new trade offices in India
 - signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; and
 - in 2010 Prime Minister Stephen Harper and India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh launched negotiations on a comprehensive economic partnership between Canada and India (11).
 - We will aim to complete negotiations on a Canada-India Free Trade Agreement in 2013 (11).

3. *2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy*

- Canada is a trading nation and we've made historic strides to open new markets for Canadian businesses and their workers. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the largest free trade deal in history. It provides almost 800 million new customers throughout the Asia-Pacific region for Canadian goods and services. Membership in this agreement is a good deal for Canada, one that will create jobs and opportunities and protect our economy (5).

4. *2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead*

- To diversify Canada's trade toward emerging markets and reduce dependence on the US, we will sign free trade agreements with Mercosur, ASEAN, and the UK. We will stand up for Canada's strategic industries and pursue opportunities for Canadian manufacturers to increase growth and exports. (36).

The Conservative party would deny that they had taken any steps to target specific communities directly; however, several media reports indicate that the party was specifically focusing on Canadians with Korean, South Asian, Persian, Polish, Jamaican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Jewish, and Chinese (particularly Cantonese) backgrounds (Tolley, 2018, 115). Moreover, several of Minister Kenney's speeches were targeted toward Chinese Canadian communities and advertisements during the 2011 campaign were designed to reinforce the shared values of ethnocultural

communities and the Conservative party held (Tolley, 2018, 115).¹² From this, it becomes clear that the Conservative party was structuring their foreign trade initiatives around specific ethnic communities. This became another outreach strategy the Conservative party implemented in attempts to secure ethnic votes with Prime Minister Harper getting involved as he was reported to be the main speaker at the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Vaughan, where he “boasted of Canada's improved trade ties with India” (Iverson, 2008). To this end, we see the Conservative party take specific steps to expand trade ties with regions that several Canadians have ties to. Moreover, it appears these foreign policy positions were developed as an outreach strategy to attract votes from ethnic communities.

(3) Political Stances

The third channel of foreign policy initiatives the government could use to target ethnocultural communities is taking stances on political issues facing a particular group’s country of origin. The Conservative Government under Harper placed defending human rights and freedoms as a central component of its foreign policy:

1. 2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s plan for Canadians:

- A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will make the promotion of Canada's democratic values on the world stage a major focus of our foreign policy. We will establish a new, non-partisan democracy promotion agency that will help emerging democracies build democratic institutions and support peaceful democratic change in repressive countries. (30)

2. 2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada

- DEFENDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (40)

¹² One ad featured Nina Grewal, a member of Parliament of Sikh faith. Accompanied by images of Indo-Canadians arriving in Canada, the voice-over notes, “For over 100 years, Indo-Canadians have worked hard to build Canada. Things haven’t always been fair for us, but the Conservatives have always recognized our history and our community’s sacrifice.” (Tolley, 2018, 115)

- Around the world vulnerable religious minorities are subject to persecution, violence, and repression.
- Canada has a proud tradition of defending fundamental human rights, such as freedom of religion and freedom of conscience; and our Government recognizes that respect for religious pluralism is inextricably linked to democratic development.
- But we can and should do more to respond to the plight of those who suffer merely because of their faith. We will:
 - Create a special office Religious Freedom in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to monitor religious freedom around the world, to promote religious freedom as a key objective of Canadian foreign policy, and to advance policies and programs that support religious freedom;
 - continue to ensure that Canada offers its protection to vulnerable religious minorities through our generous refugee resettlement programs; and
 - ensure that the Canadian International Development Agency works with groups supporting such vulnerable minorities.

To this end, the Conservative's foreign policy style was understood as a neoconservative approach to foreign affairs, adopting a strong sense of patriotism, rejecting forms of world government, and distinguishing allies from enemies (Narine, 2018, 317).¹³ The latter point of allies from enemies has defined Conservative foreign policy, especially concerning their politics of state recognition. Neoconservative policies towards the Middle East are tied to the security and support of Israel, with neoconservatives viewing Israel as the only democratic entity in the region; an approach that was demonstrated in Harper's foreign policy towards the region and reiterated by Scheer's leadership (Narine, 2018, 317).

3. *2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy*

- We'll also continue to follow a principled foreign policy and stand up for what's right rather than what's popular. In a dangerous and unstable world, we need a government that recognizes risks to Canadian interests and our security and speaks with clarity. And we've done that. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been a leader on a wide range of global issues including standing up for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, defending Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and to defend itself, and speaking out against the persecution of religious minorities and women and girls around the world. (77)

¹³ Neo-conservatism holds the domestic and international sphere to a clear moral and ideological standard and champions the use of militarism to further that standard globally (Narine, 2018, 317).

4. *2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead*

- Recognize that Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel
 - To formally recognize that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, we will move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem. Israel is one of Canada's strongest allies and a beacon of pluralism and democratic principles. Israel has an inherent right to defend itself and the right to determine where its capital is located, a right claimed by all sovereign nations. Furthermore, we will always defend Israel's interests at the United Nations. (81)

Even though about 57% of the Canadian public (BBC, 2013) held negative views towards the state of Israel, the Government's support was never questioned; with this, by unequivocally supporting Israel, the Conservatives successfully attracted the loyalty of many Jewish Canadians:

In the 2011 election, around 52 per cent of Jewish Canadians voted Conservative (Simpson 2011). Though fewer in number than Canadian Muslims, the Canadian Jewish community is far better established, organized, politically engaged, and wealthier (Sasley 2011) (Narine, 325).

To this end, the Conservative's backing towards Israel and other countries with tense political situations helped them gain the support of ethnocultural communities with a vested interest in the situation abroad.¹⁴ Nonetheless, policies like the three discussed above are not the only factors that sway ethnic and minority voters.

Ethnic outreach strategies also include candidate selection (Taylor et al., 2012, 9). As made evident in the last chapter, representation matters to ethnic voters. As a result, the Conservatives worked this into their ethnic outreach strategy as they began to nominate proportionally more racial minority candidates than all other parties during the 2004 election (Tolley, 2018, 119).

¹⁴ Canada stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine, and will continue to do so. Our position has been clear: We will never accept Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwarranted and illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, nor his continued proxy war in other parts of eastern Ukraine; A re-elected Conservative Government will toughen Canada's sanctions regime by: Adding "gross human rights violations" as a new ground for sanctions; And closing loopholes that allow sanctioned individuals to circumvent travel restrictions; These measures will reinforce our support for the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom, as well as strengthen our ability to respond to international crises, and align our sanctions regime with our broader values. They'll also reinforce our commitment to standing up for freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law abroad. (Conservative Manifesto, 2015, 89-91).

However, the party's commitments to representation remain questioned as the number of diverse candidates reduced significantly in the 2006, 2008, and 2011 elections (Tolley, 2018, 119). Moreover, in 2015, the Conservatives fell short of the Liberal's commitments to diverse candidates even with additional seats added in ethnically diverse ridings within the Greater Toronto Area to the House of Commons (Tolley, 2018, 119).

To this end, the Conservative's approach to ethnic outreach was "premised on forging alliances and targeting their policy agenda at key demographics" (Tolley, 2018, 122). Moreover, the government targeted its policy agenda to include initiatives that would be attractive to ethnocultural communities thought to have "natural Conservative leanings"; however, it is believed that these communities were used instrumentally and pandered in order to gain ethnic support without alienating their core members (Tolley, 2018, 122). The 2015 election showcased the party's commitment to ethnic outreach as their proposed ban on the niqab — which was opposed by both the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party—was part of their undoing (Tolley, 2018, 122).

4.1(a) Liberal Ethnic Targeting

The 2015 Canadian federal election ended the near decade of Conservative power in Ottawa as calls for change resulted in Justin Trudeau's Liberals earning a majority government. As the last section highlighted how the Conservatives were able to conquer the votes of communities that had been inherent to the Liberal's base for a while, this section will analyze how the Liberal Party of Canada targeted ethnocultural communities in the elections up to and following the 2015 federal election. The Liberal Party of Canada has historically been able to attract minority communities and has relied on these votes for decades (Globe and Mail, 2017). However, with the Conservatives

attracting more immigrant and minority voters in the early 2000s, the Liberal party was inspired to develop similar ethnic outreach strategies (Tolley, 2018, 112-113). As a result, it was not a coincidence that after declaring his run for Liberal leadership Justin Trudeau's first stops were in Richmond, BC and Mississauga, Ontario, two cities with heavy immigrant populations and ridings that were once Liberal but had been conquered by the Conservatives (Castonguay, 2013, 2). This section will now proceed to review the Liberal Party manifestos from the 2008-2019 Canadian federal elections by specifically analyzing their foreign policy positions related to immigration, trade, and political issues abroad as the party worked to maintain and recapture the support of ethnocultural communities.

(1) *Immigration*

The first avenue by which the Liberal Party of Canada appealed to ethnic voters was through their immigration policy. As made evident thus far, the Liberal Party had notoriously been supported by new Canadians and immigrant voters. Jiyoung Kim and Andrea Perrella highlight this in their paper “Beyond the Liberal Party: Immigrant Voting Behavior in Canada” noting that:

partisan affiliation of immigrants with the Liberal party has been widely accepted (Blais et al. 2002; Blais 2005); According to the Canadian Election Study of 2006, about 50 percent of foreign-born immigrants voted for the Liberal party (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 1).

However, this is not a blanket statement for all immigrant voters, as immigrant support for the Liberal party is mainly from visibly minority immigrants (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 1). Kim and Perrella present two reasons for this occurrence:

First, the Liberal party is perceived as being on “our-side” by non-European immigrants on issues that matter to them greatly, but issues that matter only to a limited extent to other immigrant groups. Second, different levels of re-socialization and re-politicization lead them to different voting behavior. If the Liberal party is an “incumbent” for those who are yet to be socialized and not familiar with Canadian politics, more socialized and politicized immigrants should consider a wider array of options (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 2).

To this end, the idea that an immigrant voting bloc in Canada exists is not accurate as there appears significant variations in vote choice based on an immigrants country of origin, with those from Northern Europe being more likely to cast their ballots for the Conservatives, whereas non-European immigrants often favoured the Liberals in the early 2000s (Kim & Perrella, 5). Moreover, an immigrant group's loyalty is influenced by its intra-group identity. As a result, non-European immigrants might tend to support the Liberals more as they regard the party to be more compassionate towards their members as the Conservatives under Diefenbaker garnered the reputation as being less tolerant of immigrants not from Britain (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 5). The Liberals were able to capitalize on this and, in turn, market themselves as being more open to immigration (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 5). Liberal immigration policy from 2008-2019 maintained this appeal to immigrant voters with commitments to inclusiveness, pathways to citizenship, and improving the determination process.

1. 2008 Liberal Manifesto: Richer, Fairer, Greener An Action Plan For The 21st Century

- A Liberal government will revamp Canada's immigration points system to give greater weight to skilled trades, to better align our immigration policy to the needs of the labour market. We will create In-Canada Fast Track – a new program to allow temporary workers, international students and live-in caregivers to apply for permanent residence within Canada, as well as increase the number of landed immigrants into our country consistent with our “immigrant success strategy.” (46-47).

2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada

- Immigration has been central to the Canadian experience throughout our history. Immigrant stories are Canadian stories, woven into the fabric of our identity. Liberals understand that our immigration and refugee system often fails to meet expectations for efficiency and fairness. That is why a new Liberal government will make fixing the immigration and refugee determination processes a top priority. Waiting times are too often unacceptably long, information and communication inadequate, and procedures confusing and inefficient. **These services are too important to leave them in disrepair. We will consult with new Canadians, immigration stakeholders and experts to develop solutions. (60)**

- Family reunification must remain a crucial part of Canada’s immigration policy. After five years of reductions in family class immigration under the Harper government, Liberals will restore balance by increasing family class visas. (61)

3. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class

- Canada’s story is the story of immigration. Those who choose to make Canada their new home bring with them their unique cultures, languages, and an entrepreneurial spirit that strengthens our economy. We need a new plan for our immigration system that is grounded in compassion and economic opportunity for all. (62)
- Immigration has always been an important part of Canada’s economic growth, but over the past decade, Stephen Harper has turned his back on welcoming those who want to contribute to our country’s success. (62-63)
 - We will take immediate steps to reopen Canada’s doors, and will make reuniting families a top priority.
 - We will immediately double the number of applications allowed for parents and grandparents, to 10,000 each year.
 - We will also nearly double the budget for processing family class sponsorship. Wait times will come down – which currently average almost four years for parent and grandparent applications.
 - We will provide more opportunities for applicants who have Canadian siblings by giving additional points under the Express Entry system, and we will restore the maximum age for dependents to 22 from 19, to allow more Canadians to bring their children to Canada.
 - We will also grant immediate permanent residency to new spouses entering Canada, eliminating the two-year waiting period.
- **We will welcome more refugees from Syria to Canada, and offer more help to those providing aid in the region. (64)**
 - Canadians have been deeply moved by the suffering of refugees in Syria and the surrounding region. Canada has a strong history of helping those in need, from Hungarian refugees in the 1950s to Ismaili Muslim refugees in the 1970s to those fleeing South East Asia by boat in the 1970s and 1980s.
 - Many Canadians have already offered to help those fleeing Syria, and it is time for the federal government to offer more help, too. We have a responsibility to expand our refugee targets and give more victims of war a safe haven in Canada.
 - To that end, we will expand Canada’s intake of refugees from Syria by 25,000 through immediate government sponsorship. We will also work with private sponsors to accept even more. To do this, we will invest \$250 million, including \$100 million this fiscal year, to increase refugee processing, as well as sponsorship and settlement services capacity in Canada.
- **We will restore Canada’s reputation and help more people in need through a program that is safe, secure, and humane. (65)**
- Canada once welcomed refugees openly, but that proud history has faded after a decade of mismanagement under Stephen Harper. We will renew and expand our commitment to

helping resettle more refugees, and deliver a refugee program that is safe, secure, and humane. We will:

- fully restore the Interim Federal Health Program that provides limited and temporary health benefits to refugees and refugee claimants;
- establish an expert human rights panel to determine designated countries of origin, and provide a right to appeal refugee decisions for citizens from these countries; and
- appoint individuals with appropriate subject-matter expertise to Canada's Immigration and Refugee Board.

4. 2019 Liberal Manifesto: Forward: A Real Plan for the Middle Class

- Canada's story is the story of immigrants – of people who came here seeking a better life for themselves and their families – and of the people who welcomed them. Together, we have helped to grow our economy, build strong communities, create good jobs, and make Canada the best place in the world to call home. (74)
- A More Affordable Path to Citizenship (75)
 - We will make applying for Canadian citizenship free for permanent residents.
 - With the right supports, immigrants are able to get to work, help build up our communities, and grow our local economies in short order. But arriving in Canada is just the first step on a long journey to citizenship.
 - Becoming a citizen allows new immigrants to fully participate in Canadian society, and the process of granting citizenship is a government service, not something that should be paid for with a user fee. To make citizenship more affordable, we will make the application process free for those who have fulfilled the requirements needed to obtain it.

From these policy proposals, we see the Liberals display an ethnic outreach strategy that appeals to immigrants by supporting immigrants and recognizing that increasing immigration into the fabric of Canadian society draws support from immigrant populations. Alisa Henderson offers support for the view that immigrants might be more likely to support the Liberals due to the party's acceptance of immigration however additionally notes that Immigrant voters are regarded as ideal citizens in terms of their voting habits as they are more likely to be influenced by ideology (Henderson, 2005, 57). In contrast, Canadian-born voters often base their decisions around satisfaction with democracy, and as a result, immigrant voters conform to the notion of “ideal citizenship in classical democratic theory” (Henderson, 2005, 59-60). To this end, the Liberals

appeal to immigrant voters by establishing a foreign policy agenda committed to increased immigration.

This was most apparent in 2015, as the Syrian refugee crisis emerged as a central campaign topic.¹⁵ The debate between the parties turned this into a high-profile election issue, with Trudeau and the Liberals disagreeing with Prime Minister Harper's view that military action was the best course forward (Nossal, 2018, 42). Instead, Trudeau upheld his established opinion from 2013, maintaining that a more open and generous policy toward Syrian refugees was needed, and as a result, the Liberals enacted their promise to adopt 25,000 Syrian refugees (Nossal, 2018, 42-43). It might not be clear if the acceptance of 25,000 refugees was targeted toward immigrants and minority Canadians, however, this Foreign Policy initiative demonstrates the Liberal Party's commitment to inclusiveness and openness within the Canadian state. Nonetheless, what is clear is that the results of the 2015 federal election indicate that the belief that immigrant voters are now Conservative voters was premature, as many racial minority voters remained Liberal (Tolley, 2018, 103-104).

(2) Trade

The next avenue through which the Liberal party has incorporated ethnocultural communities into their policy objectives is through trade. Similar to the Conservatives, we see the Liberals specifically focus on expanding trade towards the Asian Pacific throughout their 2008-2019 campaign manifestos:

1. 2008 Liberal Manifesto: Richer, Fairer, Greener An Action Plan For The 21st Century:

¹⁵ The Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 was initially not an issue in the Canadian election campaign. On 2 September, however, news outlets around the world published a photograph of the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian boy, drowned on a Turkish beach. The Kurdi family had been trying to flee to Greece from the Syrian civil war when their overloaded inflatable boat capsized. Alan, his mother, and his brother drowned. While that powerful image of Alan Kurdi had a transformative impact on the refugee crisis globally, it had particular resonance in Canada when it was discovered that the Kurdis were eventually trying to join Alan's aunt in Coquitlam, British Columbia (Nossal, 2018, 41).

- We will also strengthen our ties to the broader Asian market, investing in infrastructure such as the Pacific Gateway, and in additional measures and initiatives to increase our presence in Asia, and particularly in India. A Liberal government will establish a Canada-South Asia Trade Foundation with an initial endowment of \$40 million. This foundation will be similar to the Asia Pacific Foundation and will focus exclusively on developing trade and foreign policy strategies to strengthen our ties with South Asia. (59)

2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada

- Global Network Agreements with China and India: Canada is an Asia-Pacific nation, and yet we are the only member of NAFTA without a trade agreement with an Asian country. We have to take action to deepen relationships with the major emerging economies that are shaping the future. A Liberal government will pursue new bilateral agreements with China, India, and other emerging powers. A new model is needed to reflect how the world works today. Boosting trade will be a major part of new “Global Network Agreements”, but they will go far beyond exports and imports. (77)

3. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class

- Properly negotiated and implemented, free trade agreements are good for the Canadian economy. We will carefully consider all trade opportunities currently open to Canada, and explore deeper trade relationships with emerging and established markets, including China and India. (67)

4. 2019 Liberal Manifesto: Forward: A Real Plan for the Middle Class

- Trade is essential to Canada’s economic success. It gives Canadian businesses access to new markets and new customers and creates good, middle class jobs – jobs that pay better wages, help families make ends meet, and build strong communities. We will make it easier to trade here at home, and around the world. (26)

There is reason to believe that these trade expansions occurred due to the number of links between Canada and members of the Asia Pacific. Initially, the ties were people-to-people links with Indian and Chinese workers from the old rushes, in the forestry industry, and on the transcontinental railway (Nossal, 2018, 365). However, contemporary ties have increased in importance with a significant portion of Canadian trade and investment placed in Asian markets, in addition to maintaining several people-to-people links as Canada remains a destination of choice for many

(im)migrants from the Asian Pacific (Nossal, 2018, 366).¹⁶ The people-to-people links remain important, with census data from 2016 reporting that 4.3 million of the 35.1 million Canadians enumerated had ethnic origins in the Asia Pacific, with most being from China and the Indian subcontinent (Nossal, 2018, 366).¹⁷ In addition, the Liberal's victory in the 2015 election brought a modest change in China policy as the government signalled that it was committed to resetting the Canada–China relationship (Nossal, 2018, 370). Again, it remains to be questioned whether the Liberals pursued these extended partnerships to attract votes from the ethnic individuals that represent these communities within Canada, however, these policy positions clearly target regions that make up a significant portion of the Canadian ethnocultural community.

(3) Political Stances

The third avenue of ethnic targeting in the Liberal's foreign policy agenda considers political stances the party made concerning political issues abroad. Compared with the Conservative's position on these issues, there remains a degree of similarity in addition to attempts to forge new paths forward. In 2015, for example, we see the Liberal party maintain a willingness to commit military support to Eastern Europe:

1. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class

- **We will remain fully committed to Canada's existing military contributions in Central and Eastern Europe.**
 - This includes Canada's participation in NATO assurance measures in Central and Eastern Europe (Operation REASSURANCE) and the multinational training mission in Ukraine (Operation UNIFIER). (71)

¹⁶ By 2016, Canada was exporting C\$51.7 billion to the countries of the Asia Pacific and importing C\$119.9. By 2016, foreign direct investment (FDI) ties had grown significantly: inward FDI from Asia amounted to C\$74.8 billion, a massive hundred-fold increase from 1980, when it was just C\$730 million. Outward FDI in 2016 was C\$66.4 billion, a substantial increase from 1980, when it was C\$1.6 billion (Nossal, 2018, 366)

¹⁷ Other links have been created by foreign students: of the 494,525 international students at all levels of study in Canada in 2018, some 40 percent are from Asia, with China accounting for 28 percent of all international students. Moreover, given that a majority of foreign students from the Asia Pacific say that they intend to remain in Canada following their studies, foreign student enrolments have longer-term implications for trans-Pacific links (Nossal, 2018, 366).

Upon election, Trudeau's liberals committed to this promise and in 2017, the government extended its military training to Ukraine for two additional years (Nossal, 38). Despite this agreement between the two parties on a policy position, the motives seemed to differ as former Liberal leader and Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion suggested that Canada gains more by engaging with Russia than shunning them as the Conservative government had (Wyld, 2016). Dion held the position that Canadian support for Ukraine could continue while renewing relations with Moscow as it is in Canada's best interest to do so (Wyld, 2016):

Somebody will have to explain to me in what way it is helping Ukraine that Canada has not engaged Russia about the Arctic. Canada and Russia are neighbours, he said. If we don't engage in Russia, we don't help Ukraine (and) we don't help Canada or Canada's interests - Stéphane Dion (Wyld, 2016).

To this end, further investigation into the Liberal's diplomatic relations with foreign countries reveals further divergence from the Conservative party:

2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada

- Liberals believe in a two-state solution and that true regional stability can only happen when a safe, secure and democratic Israel exists in peace beside a viable, secure and democratic Palestinian state. (82)
- On the ground, Canada has played a constructive role assisting Palestinian authorities with governance and policing capacity, and must continue doing so. We should facilitate dialogue between Israel, the Arab world and Palestinian leadership. (82)
- Iran is the major threat to peace in the region, and Canada should be forthright in condemning its menacing rhetoric, and should support international efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. (82)

The Liberal under Michael Ignatieff demonstrates a position favouring a democratic solution between the two middle eastern entities, further promoting its intent to hold Iran accountable. However, as leadership within the party transferred to Trudeau in 2013 and Dion became Foreign Affairs Minister, the tune towards Iran changed as Dion promised to restore relations with the Islamic republic (Wyld, 2016). Furthermore, Dion's reasoning for lifting sanctions appears to be very clear as he is on record saying, "it will hurt Canadian industry [and] the Canadian citizens

that have families in Iran...What is the rationale to do that” (Wyld, 2016). To this end, the Liberals appear to be strongly diplomatic in their political stances while also considering how certain attitudes might affect ethnic Canadians with personal ties towards situations abroad.

4.2 Chapter Conclusion:

This chapter investigated the Conservative and Liberal Parties of Canada approaches to ethnic outreach from 2008-2019. Reviewing the parties’ positions on immigration, trade, and political stances abroad allowed for comparing how the parties structure their foreign policy agenda to target ethnic voters. In doing so, it becomes apparent that the Conservatives were more explicit in their ethnic targeting than the Liberal party has been as the Conservatives developed robust ethnic outreach campaigns spearheaded by Minister Kenney to attract ethnic voters they believed to have ‘natural conservative leanings.’ These outreach campaigns and targeted policy proposals are largely considered to be instrumental in granting the Conservatives a majority government in 2011. However, they are also thought to be what led to their downfall as accusations of “pandering” towards ethnocultural communities question the party’s commitments towards the policies they present. Nonetheless, there is no ethnic outreach ‘champion’, but what is clear is that both the Conservative and Liberal Parties of Canada constructed foreign policy positions that targeted ethnic communities inherent to Canadian society.

Chapter Five: Contemporary Comparisons

5.1 2021 Campaign Comparisons

The previous chapter outlined Canadian parties’ commitments to ethnic targeting throughout four election cycles. Ethnic outreach was revealed to be a significant factor in both the Conservative’s

and Liberal's electoral strategies. This chapter will continue into this investigation, analyzing how ethnic targeting through foreign policy was present during the 2021 Canadian federal election. The 2021 election was unique in that it was called only two years after the previous federal election and took place during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, topics related to immigration, trade, and other foreign affairs held their importance throughout the campaign, and because of that, this chapter will review how both the Conservative and Liberal parties approached these topics in their campaign:

(1) Immigration:

2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada's Recovery Plan:

- Diefenbaker was a lawyer who was passionate about human rights. He introduced Canada's first law protecting human rights, the Canadian Bill of Rights. He also radically reformed Canada's immigration laws to substantially remove racial discrimination and passed a law allowing Indigenous people to vote in federal elections while maintaining their treaty status. His vision of full equality and inclusion for New Canadians needs to be advanced in every generation. (106).
- Canada's Conservatives are the party that ended racial discrimination in Canadian immigration, the party that streamlined processes for refugees and persecuted minorities, and the party that ensured that those who arrive on our shores have the greatest chance to succeed. There will never be a circumstance in which Canada's Conservatives will fail to stand beside Canadian immigrants. There will never be a time when the immeasurable contributions of newcomers to our national life will be forsaken. (125)
- To secure Canada's future and restore Canada as the model immigration system for the world, we need to rebuild a robust immigration system that:
 - Welcomes the best and brightest from around the world to fill critical gaps and robustly grow our economy.
 - Offers refuge to heroic human rights defenders and those fleeing persecution who would enrich our national life.
 - Strengthens Canadian families by uniting them with their loved ones. (125)
- Canada's Conservatives recognize the essential interconnectedness of a well-ordered asylum system focused on the most vulnerable, an effective immigration enforcement system, and enabling Canadians to invite friends and family to visit for important occasions. We will work to fix these problems by:
 - Increasing the capacity of the Immigration and Refugee Board to hear asylum claims without delay.
 - Strengthening integrity and enforcement overall.
 - Exploring mechanisms to pursue a more generous and fairer visa system for visitors by including more enforceable commitments to abide by the terms of their visitor visa.

2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:

Strengthening Family Reunification and Reducing Processing Times (36)

- We have worked hard to reverse damaging Conservative policies that led to delays and deep cuts to immigration levels. We know immigration is important for economic growth and have worked to increase immigration levels, reduce wait times, and build a fairer system.
- Many people leave their families behind to build a better future in Canada, in hopes that they can be re-united in Canada. But the wait is difficult and COVID-19 has caused further delays.
- A re-elected Liberal government will:
 - Reduce processing times that have been impacted by COVID-19 to under 12 months.
 - Introduce electronic applications for family reunification.
 - Implement a program to issue visas to spouses and children abroad while they wait for the processing of their permanent residency application

(2) Trade

2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada's Recovery Plan:

- Increasing trade with free nations: Canada is a trading nation. Millions of jobs depend on trade. We need to pursue new trade deals - but we must focus on countries that share our values and treat workers with respect. (18)
- Canada's Conservatives believe in the importance of trade agreements to open export markets and create jobs, but we also believe that trade agreements must also respect the interests of Canadian workers and our country's commitment to human rights, the rule of law, protection of the environment, and respect for Indigenous Peoples.
- We do not promote free trade for the sake of free trade but instead believe in engaging international markets to create Canadian jobs, investment, and strategic partnerships.
- We will negotiate new agreements with free countries that safeguard workers' rights and the environment, rebalancing our trade priorities away from countries like China and towards the Indo-Pacific and Africa. (30)
- Canada and India share strong, historical bilateral relations. Canada is home to a large and vibrant multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indo-Canadian community over a million strong. Canada's Conservatives will repair and restore ambition in Canada's relationship with India by:
 - Resuming free trade talks started under the previous Conservative government and derailed by Trudeau, and concurrently pursuing an investment treaty, to expand upon Canada's strengths as one of the world's largest investors in India. (108).

2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:

- Launch a new comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to deepen diplomatic, economic, and defence partnerships in the region, including by negotiating new bilateral trade agreements, expanding FIPAs, and building stronger economic linkages (66).

- Develop a strategy for economic cooperation across Africa, including support for the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, facilitation of increased infrastructure investment, and expanding partnerships in research and innovation (66).

(3) Political Stances

2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada's Recovery Plan:

- The Iranian regime has supported Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza, creating the world's worst conflict-driven humanitarian disasters. Despite this, Justin Trudeau has failed to hold the Iranian regime accountable
- Canada's Conservatives will always support Israel's existence as a sovereign democratic Jewish state with the right to self-determination and to live in peace and security. . To enhance the bilateral relationship and support Israel in the region, Canada's Conservatives will:
 - Set clear objectives to enhance economic, political, and security cooperation to benefit both countries.
 - Recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the Canadian embassy to Jerusalem.
 - Return Canada to its longstanding policy of not singling out Israel for criticism at the United Nations and international fora.
 - Combat the delegitimization of Israel, including opposing the denial of the 5,000 years of indigenous Jewish history throughout the Middle East.
 - Boycott Durban IV in September 2021.
 - Oppose the International Criminal Court's politicization and intrusion into bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
 - Promote and support regional initiatives that foster peace between Israel and its neighbours.

2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:

- Continue to help support Afghan citizens through humanitarian assistance and to work with our allies to protect democratic and human rights, including for women, girls, and minorities. We will continue to facilitate the safe passage and resettlement of Afghan citizens and will increase the number of eligible refugees from 20,000 to 40,000. Many of these individuals will be women, children and minorities fleeing the Taliban, or individuals who supported Canada and our allies over the past two decades. As with the Syrians who have resettled in Canada over the past five years, these individuals will enrich our communities and make invaluable contributions to Canadian society.

From this, review of the competing parties' foreign policy agendas, it is clear that they focused on immigrants, Indo and Asian pacific communities through trade, along with political stances directed towards the Middle East. Furthermore, in reviewing the parties' commitments to

immigration, trade, and foreign affairs some comparisons become apparent. First, with immigration, the Conservatives present a platform that showcases their commitments to bringing immigrants to Canada. While the Liberals present the same message, they stress the shortcomings of the Conservative party in this area in an effort to attract votes from new Canadians to their party. As for trade, both parties present a rhetoric of increased trade takes in the Asian-Pacific region along with Africa, however the Conservatives make clear their intentions to derail relations with China. Lastly, for political issues abroad the Conservatives continue with their commitments to Israel, while the Liberals focus on the situation in Afghanistan.

These targeted directives additionally are noted to have had a powerful impact on the election resulting in the Liberals winning their third election in a row under Trudeau. Specifically, the Conservative party took considerable steps back in their ability to capture the ethnic vote from new Canadians, winning only one of the 41 ridings where more than half the population is racialized (compared to the 20 of those 41 seats won in 2011) (Platt, 2021). Leger vice-president Andrew Enns, who did internal polling for the Conservative Party during the Harper years, said building and maintaining Conservative support among immigrant communities has always required a committed strategy:

(This support) is not something that comes naturally to the party, Enns said. He said the individual effect of Kenney has taken on a bit of myth-making over the years, but it still represents a successful larger effort by the party. It was a very deliberate task that the prime minister set him out to accomplish, Enns said. And that hasn't been replicated, as far as I can see, by the party since then (Platt, 2021)

With this step back, there are those close to the party and supporters of Kenney who believe the party ought to make its ethnic outreach strategy a top priority again. For example, Tung Chan, who was CEO of the immigrant service agency during Kenney's tenure as Immigration Minister,

suggests that the Conservatives failed to institutionalize ethnic outreach after Kenney left and furthers that the party needs support from minority communities (Platt, 2021). In addition, Chan's review of the Conservative platform under Erin O'Toole was very critical, especially of the fact that the word "racism" did not appear once in their 2021 manifesto (Platt, 2021).

As for the Liberals, the party's focus on continuing partnerships in the Asian Pacific could be a critical step for their success moving forward. Canada's rapidly growing Indo-Canadian population has Indians representing the largest group of new immigrants in the country (Duckwork et al. 2021). In 2019 alone, more than 80,000 Indians made their way to Canada from India — one-quarter of all immigrants arriving that year (Duckwork et al. 2021). From this, it makes sense that immediately following the election in 2021, the government recruited a panel of advisers — including academics, businesspeople, a military commander, and former Liberal and Conservative politicians — to lead the Indo-Pacific foreign policy strategy (Nardi, 2022). The Indo-Canadian community has long been perceived as being consistent Liberal voters however, forging stronger relationships with the Indo-Canadian community is important now more than ever as there appears to be a demographic skew within the community (Duckwork et al. 2021). Older voters (above 30) favour the Liberals over the NDP by a two-to-one margin, however younger Indo-Canadians divide their vote almost evenly between the two parties (Duckwork et al. 2021).

Additionally, a divide between first-generation Indo-Canadians (who came as immigrants) and second-generation citizens (born and raised in Canada) is shown, with half of the first-generation Indo-Canadians supporting the Liberal party, compared to a third of those second-generation citizens born in the country (Duckwork et al. 2021). The NDP is noted as the beneficiary of this occurrence as the emergence of Indo-Canadian leader Jagmeet Singh has made the

community more enthusiastic about the party due to Singh's Indian and/or Sikh roots (Duckwork et al. 2021). However, the main reason that more Indo-Canadians do not vote NDP is the perception that the party has little chance of forming government and that Indo-Canadians do not want to "waste their vote" (Duckwork et al., 2021). With this, the Liberal Party of Canada has been able to maintain a base of support amongst immigrant communities from India. Moving forward, they might consider strengthening those relationships with their second-generation members as the Indo-Canadian community represents a significant ethnic voting bloc.

5.2 Chapter Conclusion:

This chapter showcased the Canadian Conservative and Liberal parties' current commitments to ethnic targeting during the 2021 Canadian federal election. Staying consistent with previous targeting initiatives, the parties developed foreign policy positions related to immigration, trade, and political issues concerning Israel, Palestine, and Afghanistan. In reviewing the results of the election, it is clear that ethnic communities had an impact on the Liberals forming government as they were able to appeal to the sizeable Indo-Canadian immigrant community, however, what is perhaps more glaring is the fact that the Conservative party performed poorly in areas that hold diverse and minority populations. This failure has called into question the Conservative's ability to appeal to ethnocultural communities following the Harper and Kenney era and perhaps further demonstrates the party's positions towards minority communities during the 2015 Federal election (such as the niqab ban) still haunts them to this day.

Part III

Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Directions:

In the multicultural and ethnically diverse Canadian state, ethnocultural communities emerge as influential political players as ethnic groups can influence policymakers to develop foreign policy commitments that meet their interests. Given this occurrence, this Major Research Paper considered the extent foreign policy plays in ethnic outreach campaigns by Canadian political parties. In posing this question, I made three central arguments. The first contends foreign policy to be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these communities tend to display and develop significant attachments to international affairs due to personal and emotional devotions. The second position supports ethnocultural communities lobbying efforts in the policy-making process as they have a unique understanding concerning issues abroad. While the last demonstrated that foreign policy has played a significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic outreach campaigns, although the Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts. Nonetheless, to unpack the research question this paper explores, I conducted a case study into the campaign platforms of Canada's federal Conservative and Liberal parties throughout the 21st century to investigate the extent to which these parties target ethnic communities in their foreign policy commitments. Upon review of the literature, the foreign policy areas where ethnic communities attempt to exert the most influence include immigration, trade, and political stances related to their country of origin. After reviewing these commitments and their aftermath in each party's manifesto, two central conclusions become clear.

The first reveals that for political parties, foreign policy seems to be a significant part of their ethnic outreach commitments as both the Conservatives and Liberals initiated policy proposals that committed to immigrant communities, promised to expand trade with the Asian-Pacific region, and took clear stances towards conflicts occurring in the Middle East and Eastern

Europe. These policies appear to be targeted toward ethnic communities that represent significant voting blocs, thus making foreign policy an essential component of political parties' ethnic outreach campaigns. However, for ethnocultural communities, the impact of foreign policy remains to be questioned. While it has been showcased that immigrant segments and specific communities' vote choices were affected by some of the policy proposals, candidate representation appears to be a major factor structuring ethnic group voting as forms of ethnic affinity voting appear to be evident with Canadian ethnocultural communities.

The second conclusion drawn in this paper is that the Conservative party's support amongst ethnocultural and minority communities has declined drastically since its failures in the 2015 election as the party lost a significant portion of minority votes due to their positions in the 2015 campaign such as their views on the niqab ban. From this, members within the party have suggested that the party has fumbled their approach to ethnic outreach since Kenney has left and, as a result, motivates the question as to whether re-institutionalizing robust ethnic outreach into the Conservative party's platform moving forward is what the party needs to do to win a majority again. Patrick Brown was committed to this approach with ethnic outreach initiatives structuring his bid for the Conservative leadership; however, his disqualification may signal the party's commitment to abandoning ethnic outreach initiatives in their political marketing. Nevertheless, ethnic and minority communities will always be a part of the Canadian state and moving forward, it will be interesting to see how Canadian political parties incorporate these groups into their political commitments.

Acknowledgements:

Upon completion of this Major Research Paper, there are several people I would like to thank: A special thanks to Dr. Adam Harmes whose supervision and guidance throughout made this paper possible. Thank you to the Political Science Departments at Western University and Kings University College, as several members of these departments continuously encouraged my academic goals during my Undergraduate and Graduate studies. And finally, thank you to members of my 2022 Graduate cohort, my friends, loved ones, and family members for delivering constant support and motivation for this project and my academic success.

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