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(Re)Making Men to Make Peace: Masculinities, DDR, and Peacebuilding in the Kivu Region

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Introduction

Throughout the past 30 years, the expansion of gender lenses into conflict analyses has led to a plethora of research attempting to recognize and rectify the negative gendered outcomes of conflict and post-conflict environments. The result has led to policies, even governments and cabinets, oriented to removing obstacles to women and their empowerment in political, social, and economic spheres following the fallouts created by conflict. The full awareness of gender sensitivity in conflict and post-conflict environments, after decades of activism and advocacy, finally came with the violence incurred in the 1990s with the Yugoslav Wars and Rwandan Civil War, their ethnic cleansings and genocides, and the widespread use of rape and sexual violence against targeted groups (namely, Bosniaks and Tutsis).[1] The consequences of gendered violence carried on in gendered outcomes, resulting in programs which sought to aid and empower women throughout society as they moved into post-conflict and post-genocide worlds, whether it was maternal care, health care, or empowerment in economic and political spheres.[2] These peacebuilding programs sought to right the wrongs committed in conflict, while also correcting the unjust and unequal gender relations which preceded it.

However, there is a problem. The inclusion of gender lenses for all the positives it has and continues to do remains one rather one-dimensional in its focus, leaving out entire swathes of gender which continue to have their own experiences and challenges in conflict and post-conflict settings. Most notable of this exclusion is the experiences and challenges of men, who tend to be unaccounted for in conflict and post-conflict gender lenses. Additionally, the men who fight within

[1] The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first case of rape being held as an act of genocide. International Committee of the Red Cross, 'ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,' accessed 5 December 2021, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/ictr-prosecutor-v-jean-paul-akayesu.

[2] This is especially apparent in the programs created to aid women with the care of children born from rape, who had been transmitted HIV/AIDS, and include them in economic and political structures that not only had been vacated by men due to their participation or death in conflict.

these conflicts are treated more so as combatants transitioning towards civilian life, rather than men in conflict transitioning towards men in peace. The exclusion of lenses of gender thus leaves out the myriad of tensions that masculinity faces (the pressures of what it is to be 'doing male'); which first lionized the use of arms, strength, fearlessness, and the suppression of emotions to be able to conduct soldierly life, that is now out of sync with civilian life that prioritizes masculinity with civilian labour, non-violence, and emotional openness to deal with the consequences of conflict.[3] Post-conflict masculinity must also negotiate an environment where gender relations have changed, as women step into traditionally male roles. Such tensions may produce feelings of threat, which may produce a reaction in an attempt to reassert masculinity that may derail peace processes or create violence in civilian life.[4]

The purpose of this paper is to inspect the place in which ex-combatant men navigate masculinity and manhood as they transition from conflict to peace in their experiences with the peacebuilding process, namely the processes of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) that attempt to bring ex-combatants into civilian life through demilitarization, education, and community integration. The analysis will be centered on the Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and its adjacent states of Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, of which the security environment is highly interconnected and interrelated.[5] The region, which has seen warfare conflict as an everlasting presence, has had many different attempts of peacebuilding, DDR, and reconstruction, as it contends with various state and sub-state actors vying for control of

[3] Brandon Hamber, 'Masculinity and Transitional Justice: An Exploratory Essay,' *Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding* 3, no. 1 (2010): 11–12.
[4] Hamber, 'Masculinity and Transitional Justice,' 12.
[5] Kivu Security Tracker, 'Kivu Security Tracker | Crisis Mapping in Eastern Congo,' Crisis Mapping in Eastern Congo, accessed 5 July 2022, https://kivusecurity.org/map#. In numbers, the Kivu Security Tracker reports that since 2017, there have been 9,002 reported incidences from violent deaths to the destruction of property, with 3,388 of them involving Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan state forces. For a map detailing the Kivu and Ituri regions, see Appendix 1.

territory, its people, and its resources.[6] The region will be used as a center of focus, rather than a particular case study, intended to capture as much information while keeping relative factors of history and culture consistent. Altogether, the aim is to provide a wider approach to gender in conflict spaces and give a more holistic view of the complicated dynamics of gender relations as they transition to peace. By adding dimensions of manhood and masculinity, the aim is to provide more stability and success to peace processes through their relationships to economic, political, and familial environments and the institutions that are meant to support them. The paper will utilize pre-existing literature, research, and analyses from scholars across disciplines, from economics to gender studies, to provide a multi-disciplinary and qualitative approach to masculinity and peace practice.

The paper will be divided into five sections, beginning with the concepts, practices, institutions, and goals of peacebuilding. This will explore how DDR and gender fit within the larger program. It will then move to the theoretical dimensions of gender and masculinity to explain the various interpretations, structures, and practices of multiple masculinities within conflict, post-conflict, and peace processes. It will explain the concept of 'masculinities' as conceptualized by R.W. Connell to understand the notions of violent/militarized masculinity and its transitions to post-conflict environments. From there, the history of the Kivu region will be discussed to outline the context in which analyses will be made. The region's history from its experiences under colonialism onward towards the contemporary conflict environment, with particular focuses on the Rwandan genocide and Great African Wars of the 1990s. This will lead to analyses of how peacebuilding and DDR processes in the region contend with masculinities in peace transitions and what

[6]Reagan El Mirivi and Pierre Boisselet, 'Does the New Disarmament and Demobilization Program Stand a Chance of Success?' *Kivu Security Tracker* (blog), 16 September 2021, https://blog.kivusecurity.org/does-the-new-disarmament-and-demobilization-program-stand-a-chance-of-success/. The Security Tracker also lists approximately 122 armed groups active in the eastern DRC.

are potential gendered challenges faced by men as they transition to civilian life, such as broken state institutions and economies, psychosocial damage and rehabilitation, and the subsequent gender-relations of post-conflict society. Lastly, analysis of how the Kivutien case rests across conflict, post-conflict, and peacebuilding processes across the world, and what the utility in lenses of masculinity in peacebuilding globally may have to offer, such as providing differential gender lenses, lenses of victimhood and perpetrators, psychosocial and behavioural consideration, economics and politics, and the overarching international gender framework of Resolution 1325.

Section I: What is 'peacebuilding'? How does DDR fit and contribute to the peacebuilding program?

In the aftermath of conflict, the structures that create peace environments are weakened, if not destroyed. These structures range from the economies, political apparatuses, to social settings and everything in between, including gender relations. Nestled between the peacebuilding structure and its programs lies DDR, as it attempts to reintegrate ex-combatants into the post-conflict environment. However, given the destruction of the state and social structures from conflict, the problem becomes what ex-combatants reintegrate or reinsert themselves into. Writing on the reintegration of ex-combatants in Mozambique, Jaremy McMullin recalls an in-joke between the participants of the DDR program, in which they share a laugh on the poverty they experience in a post-conflict society, stating: 'The government told us, 'Congratulations. Now you are all equally poor. You have been reintegrated back into basic poverty.''[7] This tongue-in-cheek joke exemplifies the difficulties of post-conflict peacebuilding and DDR, where problems become self-reinforcing as economic/political insecurity directly impacts the post-conflict livelihoods of ex-

[7] Jaremey McMullin, *Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State: Challenges of Reintegration*, (London, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 8, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=1366415.

combatants, sometimes threatening the very foundations of sustainable peace. This section will further explain what peacebuilding means in its goals, how DDR fits within the program, and how gender fits within the picture.

Peacebuilding as a concept and practice

The term 'peacebuilding' first appeared in sociologist Johan Galtung's 1976 essay 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding', where he outlines peacebuilding as a structural and systematic process of building preventative measures that induce war and conflict, stating: 'structures must be found that remove causes of war and offer alternatives to wars where wars may occur.'[8] While Galtung outlined the theoretical conceptualization of peacebuilding in the 1970s it was not until the 1990s that it would see mainstream practice or policy.

The introduction of peacebuilding to the international community flowered when Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his *Agenda for Peace* to the UN in 1992, outlining his recommendations in dealing with post-Cold War era conflicts (of which his tenure as Secretary-General would see many, including the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide within it.) He outlined post-conflict peacebuilding as ending civil strife, disarming warring parties, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, training security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing human rights, reforming and strengthening institutions, and promoting political participation through both informal and formal means.[9] In addition, he emphasized the sustained and cooperative effort to deal with the underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, establishing a robust foundation for peace to flourish.[10] This hoped to address the most profound

[8] Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding,' in *Peace, War and Defense*, Galtung, Johan. Essays in Peace Research; v.2 (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1976), 298.
[9] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping.' (United Nations, 31 January 1992), 32, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749.
[10] Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace,' 33.

causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression.[11] Boutros-Ghali's agenda would be adopted by the UN General Assembly later in 1993, adding post-conflict peace-building into the international policy toolkit.[12]

Altogether, as envisioned by Galtung and Boutros-Ghali, peacebuilding was an expansive project of post-conflict programming that had not been seen before. In the era of rising intra-state conflict (or 'New Wars' as theorized by Mary Kaldor), peacebuilding takes upon a deeply ambitious project that may be characterized as essentially remaking post-conflict societies.[13] This immensity is a source of the most significant difficulties of peacebuilding, as the tasks at hand often become wholly too expansive to manage, especially in the hands of the complicated nature of international politics, economics, and the UN.

Considering the gravity of which the international community (especially the UN, which has increasingly taken up peacebuilding and peacekeeping as its bread-and-butter since the 1990s) has not gone without its share of problems. With many peacebuilding efforts taking place within the African continent, longstanding spectres of colonialism, various rebel/militia activities, ethnic loyalties and rivalries, political strongmen, boundary/border disputes, inter-woven political interests and interventionism become lofty barriers to the very precarious work of peacebuilding.[14] Additionally, problems born from conflict present new challenges; the proliferation of weapons, sexual slavery, abduction, torture, displacement and refugees, environmental degradation and

[11] Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace,' 8.
[12] United Nations General Assembly, 'A/RES/47/120 B. An Agenda for Peace' (UN Documents, 20 September 1993), http://www.un-documents.net/a47r120b.htm.
[13] The "New Wars" concept that posits that post-Cold War conflict are dominated by sub-state entities fighting for reasons of identity, fought with unconventional means, and financed in largely illegal or non-direct transfers. See more: Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999); Mary Kaldor, 'In Defence of New Wars,' *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (7 March 2013): Art. 4, https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.at.
[14] Kenneth Omeje et al., *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region* (Bloomington, United States: Indiana University Press, 2013), 1–2, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=1211185.

destruction, and health crises (especially HIV/AIDS) provide confounding issues that further compromise efficacious peacebuilding responses.[15] To highlight the difficulty of peacebuilding in the Congolese case, 70% of peace processes fail to deliver durable and lasting peace arrangements, and 20% of peace agreements relapsed into large-scale violence.[16]

The intrinsic difficulty of peacebuilding is made more difficult by the various actors that attempt to work in complicated post-conflict environments. Sometimes, peacebuilders themselves add to the disharmony of peacebuilding as various actors attempt to push through with their idea of what 'peace' will look like. In an already strained environment, the loss of clarity may lead to operational haziness, which seriously undermines efforts. This has led to characterizations of peacebuilders being technocrats who are out of touch with the realities on the ground; or as characterized in an interview conducted with a local Congolese as the 'humanoids,' as 'those who came with ideals, vigour, but come from a different planet.'[17] By this he meant that peacebuilders 'have their own world, its own customs, its own beliefs, its own roles, its own stars, its own villains, its own taboos, its own meeting places, and its own culture.'[18] This means that within peacebuilding, the goals and the means to them are often unsettled debates, often disconnected from the populations they are meant to serve, causing gaps in trust and legitimacy, if not actively detrimental to

[15] Omeje et al., *Conflict and Peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes Region*, 2.
[16] Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding / [Electronic Resource]*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 5.
[17] Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 1. The local interviewed was an elderly Congolese man of European descent, of which there are very few.
[18] Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 1; Some have critiqued peacebuilding as potentially neo-colonial or neo-imperial in its practice. See more: David Roberts, 'Saving Liberal Peacebuilding From Itself,' *Peace Review* 24, no. 3 (July 2012): 366–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2012.704328; Roger Mac Ginty, 'Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace,' *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no. 2 (2008): 139–63, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836708089080; Kristoffer Lidén, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver P. Richmond, 'Introduction: Beyond Northern Epistemologies of Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?,' *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 5 (2009): 587–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310903303230; Kimberly Zisk Marten, 'Peace, or Change?,' in *One. Peace, or Change?* (Columbia University Press, 2004), 1–20, https://doi.org/10.7312/mart12912-002.

efforts themselves. Altogether, peacebuilding is a complex and massive endeavour both in intrinsic and extrinsic means and requires holistic planning and coordination for its success to be realized.

DDR, its goals, and practices

The place that DDR occupies in the wider peacebuilding picture is a mechanism of demilitarization and is often done alongside its close relative, security sector reform (SSR), as part of a wider post-conflict security arrangement.[19] The goal of DDR is to *disarm* the combatants involved in the conflict (with collection and disposal of small arms), *demobilize* combatants from the field and their operational units (sometimes with stays in demobilization camps when 'home' is not clear or inaccessible) and *reintegrate* (or reinsert) former combatants into civilian life (with a wide variety of programs or packages to ease the transition, from vocational training to medical care).[20]

As outlined in the UN Brahimi Report, DDR attempts to address the immediate aftermath of conflict on the ground level to provide stability for prolonged peacebuilding and prevent conflict reoccurrence, often coinciding with a larger peacekeeping mission.[21] The report, especially for the Kivutien case, is important as it sought to address the major flaws of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding after the failures experienced in Rwanda. It outlines the intrinsic need for all three pillars to succeed for the overall program, stating that ex-combatants are at risk if they find no legitimate livelihood in the post-conflict environment (i.e. reintegrate into the local economy) of returning to lives of violence.[22] While maintaining a prominent place within the more extensive peacekeeping/peacebuilding apparatus, DDR tends to have shifting funding, planning, and support

[19] Broadly, SSR is the reformation of military and police forces in the post-conflict environment.
[20] Chandra Lekha Sriram and Johanna Herman, 'DDR and Transitional Justice: Bridging the Divide?,' *Conflict, Security & Development* 9, no. 4 (2009): 457–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800903395999.
[21] United Nations Security Council, 'Brahimi Report,' 21 August 2000, 7, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F55%2F305&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
[22] United Nations Security Council, 'Brahimi Report,' 7–8.

structures both within and outside the UN, leading to what they concede as 'lacks a designated focal point within the United Nations system.'[23]

In peacebuilding, DDR is the process of dealing with the combatants themselves, providing the avenue from soldier to civilian in a society that is moving from conflict to peace.[24] However, much like the overarching peacebuilding effort, this can also be a tremendously difficult endeavour. For example, after periods of conflict and instability, ownership of weapons may be perceived as a status symbol, complicating the collection of small arms.[25] Since DDR occurs during periods of transition, ex-combatants are taking a risk by disarming and thus need to be assured of their security and well-being and that their giving up of arms is part of a long-term investment of peace and security.[26] This carries onto the demobilization process; ex-combatants may fear losing what is, to many, the only life they know in soldiering. Moreover, they may be fearful of losing the prestige gained them as a combatant or the loss of power of their political faction/leadership.[27] The challenges posed by reintegration (or reinsertion) tend to be the most substantial and wide-reaching from the program, as it is multidimensional in terms of what it needs to address (from economic aid to psychosocial care), as well as requiring the support of not just combatants, but also the support of the entire conflict-affected population (as a process of broader reconciliation).[28] The conditions made by conflict make this process extremely difficult, as conflict robs communities of

[23] United Nations Security Council, 'Brahimi Report,' 8.
[24] It is worth mentioning that DDR, in terms recognizable to lay-persons, are akin to western programs such as the American GI Bill, which provide benefits, resources, and other compensations to veterans (ex-combatants) in their post-service life.
[25] United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration': (New York, United States: United Nations, 11 February 2000), 6, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/407791.
[26] United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' 6.
[27] United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' 11.
[28] Sriram and Herman, 'DDR and Transitional Justice,' 465–66; United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' 15–16.

their economies, infrastructure, social cohesion and trust, on top of the factors that pushed them into conflict in the first place.[29] Should peacebuilding actors fail to provide an adequate environment for peace to thrive, the risk of failure grows. When put into the wider context of peacebuilding, DDR provides a functional microcosm for the overall process to succeed as it aims to deal with factors born from and of conflict, from the disposal of weapons to the social atmospheres of both combatants and non-combatants.

DDR and Gender

As part of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 and its commitment to address the impacts of conflict on women and girls, DDR and peacebuilding have followed suit to analyze and rectify the gendered impacts of conflict and post-conflict life.[30] Resolution 1325 is the Security Council document which codifies the inclusion of gender analyses, supports women's rights in conflict and post-conflict environments, and includes their participation in post-conflict negotiations and reconstruction. As outlined before, part of the peacebuilding program is to confront the issues of sexual slavery, torture, HIV/AIDS, and other forms of oppression, often of which come with explicit or implicit gender impacts. The UN's document outlining its engagement with DDR highlights the need for special protection measures for women, girls, and children, with considerations for child soldiery, forced violence, sexual abuse, and the parenthood of children born from wartime sexual violence.[31] In the halls and practices of the UN, gender sensitivities included in peacebuilding and DDR processes have become central to the organization's larger Women, Peace,

[29] United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' 16–17; McMullin, *Ex-Combatants and the Post-Conflict State*, 19–20.
[30] UN Security Council, 'Security Council Resolution 1325,' PeaceWomen, 2000, http://www.peacewomen.org/SCR-1325.
[31] United Nations Secretary-General, 'The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,' 18.

and Security (WPS) agenda and are understood to be among the central tenets of peacebuilding work.

Within the UN's integrated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration standards (IDDRS), gender is highlighted as a 'cross-cutting issue' for DDR practices. They find that within DDR programs, women are often neglected (or shielded by armed groups) for a myriad of reasons, from fear of legal and social consequences (on the part of groups and commanders), they do not fit the 'role' of combatant (such as not carrying a weapon), having experienced gender-based violence (GBV), or being associated with an armed group.[32] This was most evident in DDR processes in Colombia and Liberia, where women combatants were given the same treatment or were excluded from DDR, due to gendered factors.[33] In response, the standards set forth by the IDDRS attempt to match the involvement of women in armed groups with the appropriate DDR procedure to accommodate for all forms of participation. Moreover, the representation of masculinity and the effects on combatants are also increasingly beginning to be recognized, with the IDDRS recognizing traditional masculine roles, violent masculinity, and masculinities effects on the reporting of sexual gender-based violence (SGBV), while outlining the need for accessibility for men and women for services.[34]

The importance of such sensitivities coincides with peacebuilding's desire to reform and remedy not just the after-effects of conflict but to build a more resilient and just society than that

[32] United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 'Operational Guide IDDRS' (United Nations), accessed 24 May 2022, https://www.unddr.org/operational-guide-iddrs/. – See more: Hauge

[33] See more: Cherilyn Elston, 'Nunca Invisibles: Insurgent Memory and Self-Representation by Female Ex-Combatants in Colombia,' *Wasafiri* 35, no. 4 (2020): 70–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/02690055.2020.1800254; Laura C. Cullen, 'Female Combatants and the Post-Conflict Process in Sierra Leone', *Journal of International Women's Studies* 21, no. 2 (April 2020): 114-125,114A.

[34] United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, 'Operational Guide IDDRS,' 207. This growing sensitization of masculinity and men as a gendered element of conflict also coincides with UNSC Resolution 2106, which first "enlisted" men and boys' effort to address unjust gender relations, and recognized the effects of gender relations on them as well.

preceded the ravages of conflict. With gendered lenses applied, peacebuilding and DDR attempt to remedy the gendered harms inflicted during conflict and reform the structural gendered injustice and violence of pre-conflict societies. By doing so, the peace made in post-conflict society does not become patriarchal but introduces a holistic peace and agency for both men and women.

Building Peace

In peacebuilding's goals to rebuild and reform post-conflict societies, the place of DDR is as a pathway for combatants to see themselves over to peaceful co-existence. This includes a peaceful, just, and mutualistic gender co-existence for both men and women. Texts such as Galtung's 'Three Approaches for Peace,' Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, and UNSC Resolution 1325 all provide guidelines for the dynamics of peacebuilding as a practice, what DDR does within its functions, and how gender is enveloped within it all. For women, their inclusion in programs, unique experiences and vulnerabilities, and their participation in conflict must be addressed. On the other hand, men's gendered vulnerabilities and sensitivities must be addressed as they transition from combat to peace, a perspective that is only lightly taken in contemporary peacebuilding. By not taking into account all gender perspectives in post-conflict programs, there is a severe risk of remaining unaware of how conflict affects both combatants and civilians throughout the spectrum of participation and victimization while also risking the overall success of peacebuilding projects. In response to the self-reinforcing issues born from conflict, it is important to address the injustices and inequalities in a way that creates robust environments for peace to thrive where ex-combatants are better off in civilian life than in their lives of violence.

Section II: Men and Masculinities in Conflict, Transition, and Peace

The concept of masculinity and masculinities must be unpacked and applied to the subject to fully comprehend the gendered paradigms of DDR processes concerning male combatants.

Additionally, it is important to move away from gender binaries and expectations which confine the ability to fully explain and critically analyze masculinities, as monolithic expectations lead to oversimplification of the diverse factors of what one can consider 'masculine.' Moreover, it is important to remember gender as an organization of social practices, often dictated (but not wholly) by bodily structures.[35] Factors such as race, class, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and gender are largely determinate and dictating factors surrounding what constructs masculinity (and femininity) and how it is performed.[36] These factors and their norms are wholly present in how combatants behave in conflict and peace and the transition between, acting as both pathways and barriers to successful DDR processes.

As an anecdotal example of how masculinity may be implicated in peace development, General Romeo Dallaire notes in his memoir *Shake Hands with the Devil* that Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers (who were predominately young men) had wished for the civil war to end so that they may start their families, according to the masculine and familial norms they subscribed to as young Tutsi men.[37] While gender and masculinity are not the full dictating factor in the success of transitional programs such as DDR, it is important to understand the implication that they may have on these programs as cross-cutting and supporting features. In this section, the concept of masculinities is further unpacked, alongside the concepts of violent masculinities and masculinities in peace transitions.

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[35] R. W. Connell, *Masculinities*, Second Edition (University of California Press, 2005), 71.

[36] Miliann Kang et al., 'Masculinities,' in *Introduction to Women, Gender, Sexuality Studies* (University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, 2017), 56, https://openbooks.library.umass.edu/introwgss/chapter/masculinities/. The inclusion of gender may be felt as "obvious," but the authors note that female-assigned people may themselves perform and accomplish masculinity. As explained earlier, women often themselves are directly and indirectly involved in a conflict, sometimes as combatants, and are seen as "one of the men" because of the gendered notions of being in combat.

[37] Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, Vintage Canada edition. (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2019), 153.

Masculinities

While the study and discussion of masculinities had blossomed alongside the formation of men's studies in academic spaces in the 1970s, the publishing of *Masculinities* by R.W. Connell produced the most influential and impactful conceptualization of masculinities for social science analysis. Much like explained above, Connell states: 'Masculinity is not a coherent object about which a generalizing science can be produced' and 'if we broaden the angle of vision, we can see masculinity, not as an isolated object, but as an aspect of a larger structure.'[38] She articulates that the norms and practices that define masculinity largely depend on the social and cultural environments they are surrounded by. More importantly, masculinity is defined by its 'opposing' and contrasting relations with femininity. Lastly, Connell warns that even with the consideration of race, class, and other factors, it is important to not sub-categorize or oversimplify within these factors (e.g., a defined working-class or black masculinity), as shifting *milieus* exist between them.[39]

Despite the immeasurable diversity of various masculinities, it is still an *organization* of socialized gender relations with power structures created within it. This stratification creates what Connell conceptualizes as *hegemonic* masculinities and *subordinated* masculinities, based on Antonio Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony,' where social constructions give authority and legitimacy to ruling classes.[40] The hegemonic form of masculinity is characterized by an accepted cultural and institutional ideal of what the 'archetypal' man is meant to be as the dominant position.[41] The

[38] Connell, *Masculinities*, 67.
[39] Connell, *Masculinities*, 76.
[40] Thomas R. Bates, 'Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,' *Journal of the History of Ideas* 36, no. 2 (1975): 351, 353, https://doi.org/10.2307/2708933.
[41] Connell, *Masculinities*, 77. Those who display the relevant archetypal behaviours of masculinity themselves do not have to wield great power, they may be actors or even fictional characters, to define and practice the hegemonic form.

accepted form of hegemony may ebb and flow with time but remains the generally accepted and dominant form of performed masculinity. With the existence of the accepted dominant and hegemonic masculinity, there is the obverted subordinated masculinity, which is politically, socially, and structurally stigmatized (and often punished) as the 'not-preferred' performance of the masculine gender.[42] This will often subordinate and delegitimize men that deviate from the accepted normative masculine framework for reasons ranging from non-violence to being homosexual.[43] Often, this delegitimization will take on characterizations of femininity onto those displaying subordinate forms of masculinity (often with demasculinizing and feminizing vocabulary and actions levied towards them).[44] Between the hegemonic and the subordinated belong those who are 'complicit' in the masculine order, those who may not be striving for the hegemonic but loosely uphold the values and norms of the hegemonic construction and uphold their position over the subordinate.[45] For Connell, this acts as a 'patriarchal dividend,' as they get to enforce the social capital of being 'not them' and continuing the patriarchal power they maintain over others, both male and female.

The utility of Connell's concept of masculinities allows us to analyze the power structures, normative structures, and the diversity of masculinities that may be found within conflict. With the three 'positions' of masculinity outlined by Connell (hegemonic, complicit, and subordinate), we may be able to explain what masculinity in conflict prioritizes (such as strength, carrying of arms, and the use of violence), what is the cultural and social context that surrounds it (and may

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[42] Connell, *Masculinities*, 78.
[43] For literature on Western and African hegemonic masculinity and its relationship with homosexuality, see: Michael S. Kimmel, 'Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity,' in *Theorizing Masculinities* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994), 119–41, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243627; Kopano Ratele, 'Hegemonic African Masculinities and Men's Heterosexual Lives: Some Uses for Homophobia,' *African Studies Review* 57, no. 2 (2014): 115–30, https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2014.50.
[44] Connell, *Masculinities*, 78–79.
[45] Connell, *Masculinities*, 79–80.

be complicit, or benefitting, in its continuation), and why it may be difficult to transition from the militant masculinity to a peaceful/citizen masculinity. Functionally, this transforms DDR as not only a process of security but as a process of transforming masculine norms from violence to peace.

Connells' scholarship on masculinities has been the most influential basis of masculinities as a theoretical study and has since been utilized throughout different fields and topic areas, from sociology to health sciences.[46] It has since grown to have been discussed in non-Global North terms, using Global South epistemologies and ontologies, where strong criticisms can be levied. Scholarship by Sakhumzi Mfecane discusses the disconnect between individualist and non-physical western orientations of masculinity compared to African ones that have a profound relationship with the community, ancestry, and the body.[47] For this paper, Connell's work will be continued to be used, primarily due to the fact it remains the most influential, complete, and understood theory in masculinity research.

Violent and Militant Masculinity

One important concept to unpack is the centrality of *violence* and *militancy* to masculinity within conflict environments as the point of transition. Within this environment, part of 'doing' masculinity is the participation in conflict and violence. Part of this performance usually is built around the traits and actions of aggression, endurance, unemotionality, and heterosexuality (usually prowess/conquest).[48] Almost universally, militias and military units become incubators for violent and militarized masculinities to take hold. Langa and Eagle note that similar processes of

[46] Other prominent scholars have developed or worked upon masculinities, both related and unrelated from Connell. See more: Sexuality

[47] Sakhumzi Mfecane, 'Towards African-Centred Theories of Masculinity,' *Social Dynamics* 44, no. 2 (2018): 291–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/02533952.2018.1481683.

[48] Malose Langa and Gillian Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity: A Case Study of Former Self-Defence Unit Members in the Kathorus Area, South Africa,' *South African Journal of Psychology* 38, no. 1 (1 April 2008): 153, https://doi.org/10.1177/008124630803800109.

militarization and socialization in the context of masculinity have been seen in places such as Germany to Vietnam, as combat groups become a place of identity formation.[49] In this, militaries and combat groups become places where men and boys are held to the militarized hegemonic standard and often become places where 'initiation' into manhood is situated.[50] David Morgan illustrates the deep connection between masculinity and militarizing processes:

> Of all the sites where masculinities are constructed, reproduced, and deployed, those associated with war and the military are some of the most direct. Despite far-reaching political, social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity…The stance, facial expressions, and the weapons clearly connote aggression, courage, a capacity for violence, and sometimes, a willingness for sacrifice. The uniform absorbs individualities into a generalized and timeless masculinity while also connoting a control of emotion and a subordination to a larger rationality.[51]

Inversely, any traits or behaviours deemed feminine are ridiculed and repressed in the process.[52] However, while the traits are often deeply engrained in military/conflict spaces, they often are preceded by traditional ideals of masculinity before a conflict has taken place in society at large.[53] Often, militaries and combat groups exploit gender expectations and vulnerability to recruit young men into their units, with images such as 'machismo' (and other varieties of the concept) being important features of masculine appeal.[54]

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[49] Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,' 153; For combat socialization see: Dara Kay Cohen, 'The Ties That Bind: How Armed Groups Use Violence to Socialize Fighters,' *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 5 (2017): 701–14; For masculinities within peacekeeping forces context, see: Paul Higate, 'Peacekeepers, Masculinities, and Sexual Exploitation,' *Men and Masculinities* 10, no. 1 (1 July 2007): 99–119, https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X06291896.

[50] Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,' 153.

[51] David H. J. Morgan, 'Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities,' in *Theorizing Masculinities* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994), 165, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243627; See also: Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, Critical Security Studies (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2004).

[52] Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,' 153; Brian Heilman and Gary Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections.' (Promundo, 2018), 70. Heilman and Barker outline that hazing may be utilized to punish and repress empathy or emotionality as a strategy to ensure uniformity.

[53] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections.' 69. Very often, the idealized traditional masculinity is already heavily militarized. It is easy to think of it in the sense of how boys look up to fictional characters like GI Joe, Captain America, and other action heroes.

[54] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 69; Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity', 154.

Equimundo, a gender and social justice NGO, links harmful masculine norms to violent behaviours such as intimate/non-intimate violence, violence against children, sexual abuse, bullying, homicide and violent crime, suicide, and participation in war and conflict.[55] While women are increasingly understood to be complicit or participants in these just as men are, men largely take up the majority of those who perpetrate these actions, largely because of the normative structures of violent masculinity.[56] Structurally, the norms which spawn violent behaviours are the pursuit of 'achieving' manhood (often stated as becoming 'a real man'), policing masculine performance (the gatekeeping of men's masculine social status), developing norms around emotional expression (often the repression of emotions), and dividing spaces according to gender expectations (largely 'men's work' and 'women's work').[57] Overall, this reinforces the power of patriarchal power in the social, economic, and political spheres. This, as Connell would state, provides the structural mechanism to perpetuate the maintenance of masculine hegemony. Further, this allows for a self-reinforcing *homosocial* atmosphere, where male bonds are made and reinforced over militarized norms and violent behaviours (ex. brothers in arms/comradeship) which often become even more reinforced through acts of violence and conflict (especially in cases of rape).[58] These factors become points of legitimization for the perpetration of violence of all forms.

Lastly, it can be argued that conflict spaces become a place for the *contestation* or *proclamation* of masculinity. Men, especially young men, may seek out violent and destructive behaviours in cases of social, economic, or political exclusion.[59] They may act violently to objectify and

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[55] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 8. Equimundo was formerly known as Promundo.
[56] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 68–69.
[57] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 19–22.
[58] Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,' 163–64; Miranda Alison, 'Wartime Sexual Violence: Women's Human Rights and Questions of Masculinity,' *Review of International Studies* 33, no. 1 (January 2007): 77, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210507007310. In many cases, the use of drugs and alcohol also acted as both a homosocial bonding experience, but also a way to suppress guilt about the violence used.
[59] Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 69.

dehumanize both women and other men, often leading to violent actions such as rape or torture to degrade and subordinate women and other men.[60] Oftentimes, the contestation of masculinity is part of a 'struggle' logic (expressed as 'struggle masculinity'), where violent struggle *creates* men. This can be seen in places of oppression, such as Apartheid South Africa, where young combatants galvanize a militarized masculinity and a culture of violence in opposition to repression.[61]

Men in Transition and Masculinities in Peace Transitions

Given the deeply entrenched structures of hegemonic and militant masculinity, the challenge of DDR concerning it becomes to provide a pathway for men and boys to disengage from the militant and violent expectations and norms into civilian and peaceful ones. This is especially important and challenging in the context of those who were recruited as children, as much of their lives have been dictated by the conditions of war and conflict. With ex-combatant men previously inhabiting a space of power by way of hegemonic masculinity and the spoils of war attached to militancy, moving into a space not only uncertainty in economic or political terms but also in social and psychological/emotional terms. This makes DDR a focal point for not only the transition from war to peace but a transition of the gender norms expected from those who previously engaged in militant masculinity.

It is also important to consider the inverse; conflict environments also give rise to new gender realities for women, where boundaries of femininity which previously may have strictly resided in the 'domestic' world may now come to take on more 'masculine' roles and traits.[62] This

[60] Alison, 'Wartime Sexual Violence,' 76–77; Heilman and Barker, 'Masculine Norms and Violence: Making the Connections,' 69–70.
[61] Langa and Eagle, 'The Intractability of Militarised Masculinity,' 155.
[62] For the public and private growth of women in post-conflict scenarios, see: Aili Mari Tripp, 'Women and Leadership in Postconflict Countries,' in *Women and Power in Postconflict Africa*, Cambridge Studies in Gender and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 193–217, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316336014.010; Caroline Williamson Sinalo, ed., 'Rwanda's Women and Post-Traumatic Individualism,',in *Rwanda After Genocide: Gender, Identity and Post-Traumatic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 85–118, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108591478.005; Caroline Williamson, 'Genocide, Masculinity and Posttraumatic

creates a place of tension, if not violence, in the post-conflict environment, which needs to be addressed in DDR for the benefit of both men and women involved. In this environment, the risk becomes one that a place of productive 'challenge' becomes one of a 'crisis.'[63] Additionally, men now expected to do work deemed 'domestic' such as child care, are woefully underequipped and unexperienced in child care and how to be fathers, causing insecurity and anxiety as they return home.[64] Moreover, peacebuilding's broader attempt to address the acute effects of conflict and the preceding injustices, including those of gender, makes the harmonization of post-conflict women's gains and the reintegration of men of utmost importance.

While the 'making' of militant masculinity has been a highly discussed topic of feminist literature, its subsequent 'unmaking' has been less analyzed. Existing masculinities literature has largely been dominated by psychological issues surrounding post-traumatic stress and analyses of western military veterans, which some inferences may be made. An analysis of Israeli veterans found high reluctance to engage in psychological therapy for post-traumatic stress symptoms due to norms and cultures instilled by hegemonic and military masculinity. In response, there is a creation of 'new masculinities' or 'hybrid masculinities' that expands the allowances of traditional/hegemonic masculinity to include new features (such as openness for mental healthcare).[65] This coincides with Connell's assertion that masculinity and gender practices are 'onto-formative' which new meanings are continually constructed.[66] States have become very involved in this

Growth in Rwanda: Reconstructing Male Identity through Ndi Umunyarwanda,' *Journal of Genocide Research* 18, no. 1 (2 January 2016): 41–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2016.1120463.

[63] V. Robinson and J. Hockey, *Masculinities in Transition* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011), 18–19, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=678791.

[64] Kimberly Theidon, 'Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,' *Human Rights Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (February 2009): 31.

[65] Gabriela Spector-Mersel and Ohad Gilbar, 'From Military Masculinity toward Hybrid Masculinities: Constructing a New Sense of Manhood among Veterans Treated for PTSS,' *Men and Masculinities* 24, no. 5 (1 December 2021): 866–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X211038049.

[66] Connell, *Masculinities*, 81.

formation/protection of militarized/hegemonic masculinities within transitions between military and civilian life. Two large reasons exist; 1) ex-combatants may use their influence as carriers of hegemonic masculinity to impede the legitimacy of their policies and governance, and 2) the continuance of the recruitment/retention of boys and men within the armed forces within the hegemonic masculinity framework (and even the continuance of hegemonic masculine norms in the wider civilian world).[67] It is for these reasons that post-war transition projects are often built around masculine norms and disadvantaging of women.[68] This stage of transition thus becomes a very fluid stage where hegemonies are re-constructed and reinforced and has the potential to further entrench masculine privileges over subordinate men or women.

Understanding Masculinities

The theoretical importance of understanding the fluidity and multitudes of masculinities allows us to analyze and examine masculinities in their places of power, vulnerabilities, their factors, the allowances created under them, and ways that militaries and armed groups may use norms of masculinity in their benefit. Within post-conflict environments, the utility of these understandings can give insights on how to create gender-just DDR and peacebuilding for both ex-combatants and the broader communities affected by conflict and existing gender structures. As stated above, the study of the 'undoing' of militarized and violent masculinity has been largely absent from analyses. Thus, the continued study of its proximity to peace processes gives insights for future programming of these structures.

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[67] Sarah Bulmer and Maya Eichler, 'Unmaking Militarized Masculinity: Veterans and the Project of Military-to-Civilian Transition,' *Critical Military Studies* 3, no. 2 (4 May 2017): 169–70, https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2017.1320055. The authors note the influence of dissident Vietnam veterans who came to be the greatest critics of the continuance of the Vietnam War. Additionally, we also may understand why governments and militaries may be so defensive against the inclusion of women and LGBTQ+ in the armed forces as protection of hegemonic norms.

[68] Bulmer and Eichler, 'Unmaking Militarized Masculinity,' 170. An example of this would be the American GI Bill which was put in place after World War II.

Section III: The Kivu Region and its Neighbours: History and Context

The wounds of conflict and violence within the DRC's Kivu region are deeply entrenched in the complicated context of its history of colonialism, imperialism, interventionism, authoritarianism, inter-group violence, and continental war. The region is characterized by an ever-changing and complex environment of various actors, interests, identities, and histories that are complicated and multifaceted but are tremendously important to consider for peacebuilding processes and development. Further, the nature of its history and the factors above make the problems of the Kivu region inherently interconnected with its neighbours, especially Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, adding a dimension which further complicates the ability to bring lasting peace to the region. To fully explore all the historical factors and the peoples that have been affected them fall outside the scope of this paper and would need a study of its own; thus, this paper will briefly and concisely cover the history of each state through three "benchmark periods," namely, their colonial periods (the late-1800s and early-1900s), their decolonial periods (1950s-1970s), and aftermath of the Rwandan genocide (the 1990s-2000s).[69] These periods will detail the nature of colonial administration and its practices, the dynamics presented by the decolonization, and the fallout that the states experienced in the 1990s into the early 2000s. The section will end with a brief explanation of the confluences of these histories in the Kivu's contemporary history. By adding the broader historical dynamics of the region and its neighbours to analysis, greater inferences on how and why peace processes such as DDR struggle (and fail) may be obtained.

[69] Barry Buzan and George Lawson, 'Rethinking Benchmark Dates in International Relations,' *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 2 (1 June 2014): 437–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066112454553.

The Colonial Context

All four countries are by-products of their colonial pasts, with Uganda being ruled by the British, while the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi were ruled by Belgium.[70] In Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi, colonial powers ruled under divide and conquer strategies where power was privileged to a few, causing deep inter-group resentment and paving the future for ethnonational strife, while also setting in place the structural allowance for authoritarian rule.[71] In the Congo, the personal rule of the Belgian King Leopold II and the later administration by the Belgian government were intensely violent, causing one of the continent's first modern genocides.[72] Foreign domination from those powers in many ways set in motion the circumstances of conflict and insecurity experienced by those states currently, as they built systems of control, oppression, and extraction with little regard of the consequences for those subjected to them.

Additionally, the coloniality of gender is also part of the picture, alongside the racialization built into the power structures.[73] This includes the primacy of patriarchal power expressed through

[70] Rwanda and Burundi were ruled under a single territory as Ruanda-Urundi. Additionally, they had briefly been administered by the German Empire.

[71] Joanna R. Quinn, 'Background and History of Conflict in Uganda,' in *Thin Sympathy: A Strategy to Thicken Transitional Justice* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 11–12, https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812299632-005; Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6–13; Jack Palmer, 'Trajectories towards Independence, 1945–1965: Multiple "Societal Self-Understandings,"' in *Entanglements of Modernity, Colonialism and Genocide* (Routledge, 2018), 30; Nigel Watt, *Burundi: Biography of a Small African Country* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 37–44; René Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, Woodrow Wilson Center Series (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996), 37–44. Uganda was ruled as a protectorate by the British, and was brought into British control by a series of agreements and treaties over time. This is part of the reason of Uganda's fractious internal politics, as it had never been a centralized polity. In Rwanda and Burundi, power was largely centralized in Tutsi *Mwami* (kings,) or in bi-ethnic, but Tutsi dominated *ganwa* (chiefdoms.)

[72] Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People's History* (London; Zed Books, 2002), 15–22. The ethnographic and territorial realities were squarely ignored, best exemplified with Leopolds annexation of Katanga in 1884. On the genocide experienced by the Congolese, estimates place the death toll to around 10 million people, with the overall population plummeting from 20-30 million to 8.5 million from the start of colonization to 1911.

[73] María Lugones, 'The Coloniality of Gender,' *Worlds & Knowledges Otherwise* 2, no. Spring (2008): 12–15; Shirley Anne Tate and Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, *The Palgrave Handbook of Critical Race and Gender* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing AG, 2022), chap. 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/west/detail.action?docID=6914961; Andrea Cornwall, *Readings in Gender in Africa* (Indiana University Press, 2005), chap. Introduction, 1, 2, 5, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb04122.

binate sex roles, and the narrowing of the resources, labour, authority, and the construction of race. The effects of the colonial era would reverberate through towards the present, as the structures and states that precede the current era had sown the seeds for the continuous insecurity felt today, as a region, states, and gender relations.

The Cold War, Independence, and Post-Independence Insecurity

The wave of independence was followed by an explosion of the structural inequities formed during the colonial era, with genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass displacement, coup d'états, and warfare consuming the region, while also becoming embroiled with the Cold War politics waged by Western and Eastern actors. The same tools of control and violence used in the colonial era were the same used by the strongmen and elites in independence, perpetuating the violence suffered for generations.

In Uganda, the boiling cauldron left from divide and conquer strategies fermented itself into racial, class, and tribal division, with a government unreceptive to its citizens. From the period of the 1960s to the 1980s, power was violently passed through dictators, first in the hands of Milton Obote, then Idi Amin Dada, back into the hands of Obote, before being wrestled away by the current leader Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM).[74] Alongside the jockeying for power and the struggles between strongmen, hundreds of thousands, if not millions of civilians, were killed, raped, and tortured, alongside mass destruction of property and looting.[75]

In the Congo, independence was immediately met with complete fallout. Within weeks, mutinies within the military and secessionist forces in Kasai and Katanga threw the newly formed

[74] Quinn, 'Background and History of Conflict in Uganda,' 11–14.
[75] Quinn, 'Background and History of Conflict in Uganda,' 12–13. Amin, known as "The Butcher," expelled 70,000 Asians (who had migrated during colonization), with estimates of 300,000 to 500,000 killed during his rule. Under Obote, targeting of Baganda, Banyarwanda, and Ankole, claimed around 300,000 to 320,000 killed.

state into immediate turmoil.[76] The first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, successfully petitioned the UN for a peacekeeping mission while asking the USSR for support in confronting the uprisings.[77] The inclusion of the USSR by Lumumba led to his overthrow and assassination in a Belgo-American-backed coup, which would later pave the way for Western-backed Colonel Joseph-Désiré Mobutu to the presidency of which he would over the coming decades create a lasting dictatorship.[78] Mobutu's rule would see harsh repression at the hands of military and mercenary forces, while social, political, and economic infrastructure was routed for the gain of Mobutu and his regime.[79]

In Rwanda and Burundi, the two states forked in their political and social development but would remain deeply implicated in each other's post-independence experiences. Colonization in Rwanda brought a form of counter-elite to Hutus who previously were disenfranchised in colonial administration, resulting in the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy to place a Hutu republican government, with many Tutsis fleeing.[80] A coup would put Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana in

[76] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 94–95. These mutinies and secessionist movements were directly supported by Western states, notably Belgium and the US, and mining interests who feared the nationalization of mineral resources.

[77] Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, 94–95. The mission, *Opération des Nations unies au Congo* (ONUC), was criticized by Lumumba as he felt it was not forceful enough against secessionist forces. Secretary-General of the UN Dag Hammarskjöld who resisted their inclusion preferred non-interference, but the use of force would be authorized later by U Thant.

[78] Jason K. Stearns, 'The Historical Background,' in *The War That Doesn't Say Its Name: The Unending Conflict in the Congo* (Princeton University Press, 2022), 24–36, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691224527-002. Mobutu's regime was by-product of Cold War politics, with his political power shielded by Western *realpolitik*, with politics serving the interests of the regime rather than any responsibility to Congolese citizens.

[79] Stearns, 'The Historical Background,' 28–29; Nzongola-Ntalaja, *The Congo from Leopold to Kabila*, chap. 5. During Mobutu's regime, the countries name was unilaterally changed to Zaire, and a Mobutuist cult of personality was established alongside a greater cultural project of *Authenticité* or *Zairianisation*, which aimed to 'purge' Western and colonial influences from the Congo and affirm Mobutu's power through cultural legitimization. This is why Mobutu's name was changed from Joseph-Désiré to Sese Seko, as a wider attempt to discard 'Western' influences.

[80] Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 41–54; Palmer, 'Trajectories towards Independence, 1945–1965', 108. This was largely aided by the general sympathies of Catholic institutions and changing sympathies in Belgium. This also culminated in the formation of Hutu political parties/movements such as the *Mouvement démocratique républicain - Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu* (MDR-PARMEHUTU) and the Tutsi political party in *Union nationale rwandaise* (UNAR). The counter-elite Hutu also experienced what is known as the "Hutu Revolution", which would also spur back-and-forth pograms between Hutu and Tutsis. Many Tutsi would flee to the Congo, Burundi, and Uganda, creating a large diaspora. Tutsi refugees in Uganda would aid Museveni's NRM against Obote, and would go on to

power in Rwanda in 1973, continuing anti-Tutsi policies and quotas.[81] Burundi, in contrast, supported the monarchy more as ethnic divisions were not as pronounced; however, *ganwas* postured politically and with more hostility.[82] Early attempts at building a bi-ethnic government were cut short with the assassination of two Prime Ministers.[83] The result of the repeated collapsed attempts of bi-ethnic governance led to the abolishment of the monarchy, with a Tutsi dictatorship under Michel Micombero placed in its stead, with the justification of harshly 'defending' against Hutu uprising.[84]

Independence and the insecurity and conflict felt after it firmly demonstrated that the structures created in the colonial era had firmly implanted themselves in the region, even among its political classes. Violence became part of day-to-day life both inside and outside political structures. The movement of the displaced through the borders of each state also exemplifies how interconnected the region's security is, as push-and-pull factors, from ethnic relations and political situations, directly and indirectly, affect the neighbours. While the violence experienced in this time was abhorrent, it would only serve as a precursor to the events in the post-Cold War.

The 1990s, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Kivutien Connection

Resting squarely in the center between the states, the Kivus would become the centrepiece of the horrible effects of a century of colonial violence, dictatorships and strongmen, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and large-scale displacement. While the events in one state did tend to have a strong

form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) within the Ugandan military to one day militarily return Tutsi exiles to Rwanda.

[81] Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 74–78. Habyarimana would govern in near-totalitarianism through the *Mouvement révolutionaire national pour le développement* (MRND.)

[82] Watt, *Burundi*, 30. The two main political parties were the *Union pour le Progres National* (UPRONA) and *Parti Démocratique Chrétien* (PDC). The former was more nationalist in ideology and generally made of Bezi, while the latter was more favourable to the Belgians and generally made of Batare.

[83] Watt, *Burundi*, 30–31. The first, Prince Louis Rwagasore was killed by a PDC supported gunman, while the seconds, Pierre Ngendandumwe, was killed by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee.

[84] Watt, *Burundi*, 31–34. Micombero would oversee a genocide of the Hutu in Burundi, with approximately 200,000 dead and 300,000 fleeing the country.

effect in another, none other was as strong as the events which unfolded during and after the Rwandan Genocide. As stated by Gérard Prunier:

> Let me be clear: the Rwandese genocide and its consequences did not *cause* the implosion of the Congo basin and its periphery. It acted as a *catalyst*, precipitating a crisis that had been latent for a good many years and that later reached far beyond its original Great Lakes locus. This is why the situation become so serious. The Rwandese genocide has been both a product and a further cause of an enormous African crisis: its very occurrence was a symptom, its nontreatment spread the disease.[85]

In the context of Prunier's observation, the Kivu region was the first major (and lasting) casualty of the disease.

The genocide was preceded by a civil war fought between the Rwandan MRND government, supported by Zaire, and the exiled Tutsi RPF, who had received training and support from Uganda. Burundi would also be engulfed in a civil war, as their President, Melchior Ndadaye, would be assassinated and succeeded by Cyprien Ntaryamira (a Hutu), causing unrest.[86] Flying back from Dar-es-Salaam, where talks to end the Rwandan Civil War were conducted, Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira were shot down.[87] The assassination sparked the genocide in Rwanda, prompting the RPF to go on the offensive. The aftermath of the genocide would have the genocidaire regime and many ordinary Hutus flee to Zaire, while the RPF claimed a pyrrhic victory and formed a new Rwandan government.[88]

This mass migration and security environment was the flashpoint that caused the continent to fall into large-scale warfare with the beginning of the First Congo War.[89] Ethnic Tutsis

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[85] Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2009), xxxi.
[86] Watt, *Burundi*, 44–59.
[87] Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 198–205. Ntaryamira was at the regional summit as the meeting had originally been meant to discuss Burundi's security situation, however, it had quickly turned into a meeting on implementation of the Arusha Accords for the end of the Rwandan civil war.
[88] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 53–56, 67–72; Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 265. The genocide would claim the lives of at least 800,000 lives. The approximate number of refugees into Zaire numbered around 1,244,000. Additionally, Hutu Power politicians enjoyed, for a short time, support from Mobutu.
[89] The First Congo War is also colloquially known as the African First World War.

(Banyamulenge) in the Kivu region were increasingly vulnerable and targeted by both Zairean and genocidaire officials and militants, and with deteriorating regional relations between Rwanda/Uganda and Zaire, the region descended into warfare.[90] The conflict was spurred and sustained by various factors; first, the ethnic interconnections and insecurity of the Kivu region caused concern while also allowing for alliances to be made in Zairean territory.[91] Second, the mineral wealth within the region had made the conflict a wealth-seeking venture for many 'entrepreneurial' generals and combatants.[92] Third, growing dissent, both internal and external, with the Mobutuist regime had united many for regime change in Zaire.[93] By the end of the war, Mobutu was overthrown and replaced with Laurent-Désiré Kabila, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

While the First Congo War had ended with the overthrow of the Mobutuist regime, it would not be long until conflict sparked again. Kabila, who had needed the support of Rwanda and Uganda to overthrow Mobutu, ordered the retreat of Rwandan and Ugandan troops.[94] The order caused an immediate fracture between Kinshasa and Kigali/Kampala, which had sustained territorial, security, economic, and ethnological interests in the Kivu region.[95] In addition, many Banyamulenge in the Kivu region felt like Kinshasa had turned its back on them, prompting them to take up arms against the Congolese government, with support from Uganda and Rwanda starting the

[90] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 67–72.
[91] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 71–72; Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006* (Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press, 2009), 45–53. As Zairian officials had called for Banyamulenge "to be treated as rebels", RPF seized the opportunity for a *casus belli* and reach into the ethnic Tutsi population of Zaire for support.
[92] Agathe Plauchut and Fabienne Le Houérou, 'Uganda', in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives*, 4 vols (Thousand Oaks,: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2017), 1735–37, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781483359878.
[93] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 67–70, 76–80, 113, 116–21; Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 102–8. Kabila, with the support from Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, would form the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre* (AFDL). This coalition was motivated principally for the overthrow of Mobutu and protection of Banyamulenge.
[94] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 177–79.
[95] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 218–23.

Second Congo War.[96] With the DRC returning to conflict, many outside actors, including Angola and Zimbabwe, joined in, expanding the scope of the conflict.[97] Changing alliances, the proliferation of armed groups, and frequent splintering of armed groups further complicated the security environment.[98] After almost five years of war, the assassination of Kabila (and the ascension of his son, Joseph) and fatigue of war spurred many states to settle in various peace agreements and settlements, while the first UN peacekeeping mission of MONUC was started to implement the various peace processes.[99]

Post-Congo Wars and Present Conflict

While the states involved had quietly retreated from the Congo Wars, the conflict had yet been settled, and the Kivu region was as insecure as when the wars started, as high-intensity conflict between states had been replaced by sustained low-intensity conflict between non-state actors (but often with some state backing). This is abundantly true in the Kivu region, which has now a conflict of its own, known as the 'Kivu Conflict.' Armed groups range from Islamic State-sponsored Allied Democratic Front (ADF), to Rwandan-backed groups such as the *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple* (CNDP) and *Mouvement du 23 mars* (M23), to local Mai-mai rebel groups have all contributed to nearly 20 years of conflict in the region.[100] Additionally, while state militaries face off with militias (with Ugandan, Rwandan, and Burundian forces often in Congolese

[96] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 174–79.
[97] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 186–93.
[98] The splintering of various rebel movements itself is a very complicated and puzzling effort. See more: Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, sec. The Rebel Movements.
[99] Reyntjens, *The Great African War*, 244–71; Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 265–83. Peace processes were not completely unified, due to the fractious and multi-state nature of the conflict. The first peace agreement, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, failed as militias were not disarmed. It was only until the Sun City Agreement and Pretoria Accord that direct state involvement was effectively ended.
[100] Jason K. Stearns, 'From CNDP to M23 The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo' (London, UK: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), sec. The Creation of the CNDP, The M23 Mutiny, https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23; Kivu Security Tracker, 'Kivu Security Tracker | Armed Groups,' Kivu Security Tracker | Crisis Mapping in Eastern Congo, accessed 18 July 2022, https://kivusecurity.org/about/armedgroups; Lindsay Scorgie, *Conflict at the Edge of the African State: The ADF Rebel Group in the Congo-Uganda Borderland* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), chap. 1.

territory), they often themselves commit crimes against humanity, adding to the chaos already felt.[101] The effects have meant vast amounts of internal and external displacements and hundreds of thousands of combat deaths and excess deaths.[102] The UN mission, which had been started in the aftermath of the Congo Wars, was upgraded to a Chapter VII mission (MONUSCO), substantially broadening its mandate to a 'stabilization mission' with the UN itself engaging in military operations against insurgent forces alongside the Congolese military.[103] Countless attempts at DDR, supported by the national government and the international community, have struggled to adequately civilianize many combatants whom many have not known a life without conflict in the region.[104] This often stems from a loss of political will, bureaucracy, funding, economics, and fragile and failing security environments which ex-combatants are meant to reintegrate to. Lastly, it is impossible to understate the place that sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence has throughout history, present in the violence of the colonial era, the wave of independence, the regional wars, and the present.[105]

[101] Steve Wembi, '7 Congo Army Officers Charged With War Crimes in Massacre,' *The New York Times*, 18 March 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/18/world/africa/congo-massacre-war-crimes.html; UN Security Council, 'United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - Report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/252) - Democratic Republic of the Congo' (United Nations, 21 March 2022), https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/united-nations-organization-stabilization-mission-democratic-11.

[102] Human Rights Watch, 'DR Congo: New "Kivu Security Tracker" Maps Eastern Violence,' *Human Rights Watch* (blog), 7 December 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/07/dr-congo-new-kivu-security-tracker-maps-eastern-violence.

[103] Denis M. Tull, 'The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo,' *International Peacekeeping* 25, no. 2 (15 March 2018): 167–90, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139.

[104] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 305,321, 337; MONUSCO, 'DDR/RR,' MONUSCO, 22 February 2016, https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddrrr.

[105] Rape and other forms of gender-based violence was always a product of the violence felt within the region. It was not until the conviction of Jean-Paul Akayesu in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide that it would be punished at an international level. The use of sexual violence as a weapon remains a scourge in the Kivus, used by state and non-state actors alike.

Section IV: Analysis - Masculinity, Conflict, and DDR in the Kivu Region

Aside from the great political complications in the Kivu region, a great number of smaller and equally complex factors complicate facilitating peace within the region. As stated by Verwimp, Justino, and Brück: 'at a fundamental level, conflict originates from individuals' behaviour and their interactions with their immediate surroundings', which in the context of gender, influences the behaviours of both individuals and groups and shapes their interactions with society at large.[106] The effects of gender also collide with the individual experiences of the ex-combatant in conflict and peace, whether the combatant was recruited as a child, how they are socialized, indoctrinated, and had agency in conflict, and how they interact with society in post-conflict life, and how they adjust into the varying circumstances presented to them in peace.[107] The distinctions which individuals experience will significantly change how DDR is implemented and delivered to ex-combatants. DDR, a process that reinserts them in civilian life, interacts with the gendered expectations of ex-combatants, their families, and the communities in which they are re-entering, and how they deal with the effects sustained during the conflict. Lastly, it also begs the question of how masculinity is changed, affirmed, and prioritized in the post-conflict world, whether DDR programs are helping with a more just post-conflict environment, whether they are entrenching the exact patriarchal and masculine expectations that existed before the conflict had arisen, and how they interact with the place of women, who likely had to endure their transitions during periods of conflict.

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[106] Philip Verwimp, Patricia Justino, and Tilman Brück, 'The Analysis of Conflict: A Micro-Level Perspective: Introduction,' *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 307.

[107] Joanna Quinn, 'Aide aux enfants dans le nord de l'Ouganda : la réinsertion des enfants soldats (note de recherche),' *Anthropologie et Sociétés* 31, no. 2 (2007): 179–80, https://doi.org/10.7202/018688ar. In the case of Northern Uganda, many child-soldiers were merely rebadged and served within the Ugandan military, with varying degrees of compulsion.

Child-Soldiers: Boys and young men in transition

Within the Kivu region, the use of child soldiers has been and continues to be heavily used by many different armed groups, including government military forces. It is speculated that 60% of combatants in the Eastern DRC are composed of child soldiers, some as young as six years old.[108] It is also important to consider that the region is exceptionally young, with 47% of the population in the DRC being under the age of 15.[109] This has also been an issue in both Uganda and Burundi, where conflicts had notorious use of child soldiers in the past and present.[110] For boys, both forcibly and voluntarily recruited into armed groups, indoctrination and socialization into violence are often done in line with norms of masculinity that are often adjusted for the participation and perpetuation of violence, skewing prior notions of masculinity and femininity.[111] Often, this socialization also coincides with traditional rites of passage often seen outside combat life, but would also be reinforced with substance use, beatings or threats of violence, building intergroup complicity and solidarity (often through acts such as gang rape), obedience, the association of masculine traits with those of violence, subjugating of women, and subject them to such living that survival is the only thing on the child's mind, deeply traumatizing them.[112] Additionally, this process of socialization and indoctrination also increases the incidence of PTSS and appetitive aggression (both aggravated by childhood involvement in combat), which complicate the lives of

[108] Romeo Bujiriri Murhega et al., 'Firearm Injuries among Children Due to the Kivu Conflict from 2017 to 2020: A Hospital-Based Retrospective Descriptive Cohort Study,' *African Journal of Emergency Medicine* 12, no. 1 (1 March 2022): 45, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.afjem.2021.11.006.
[109] Jill Trenholm et al., 'Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,' *Men and Masculinities* 16, no. 2 (1 June 2013): 205, https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X12470113.
[110] 'Child Soldiers in Uganda: History and Facts,' The Borgen Project, 16 July 2018, https://borgenproject.org/child-soldiers-in-uganda-history-facts/; 'BURUNDI: Former Child Soldiers,' BNUB, 20 April 2011, https://bnub.unmissions.org/burundi-former-child-soldiers.
[111] Laura Woodbury, 'Reconstructing Gender Identity for Child Combatants in Post-Conflict African Societies,' *Journal of International Service* 20, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 24–25.
[112] Woodbury, 'Reconstructing Gender Identity,' 210–19.

former combatants later in life while also complicating long-term security goals.[113] Lastly, while in many cases, children do not choose to engage in combat groups, they return to their communities where they are not accepted by their family or peers, often adding to the complications of reintegration and post-conflict life.[114]

Until recently, DDR programs have approached issues of child soldiery in terms that were largely a-gendered or gender-neutral, which have had negative impacts on girls involved in combat groups (who were often wholly invisible and unaddressed to the programs), but likely also have not addressed the intricacies of boys' participation either.[115] With DDR programs primarily focused on security concerns, the post-conflict deprogramming/sensitization, psychosocial care, educational needs, and familial aspects remain unaddressed.[116] In terms of gender, this must take resocialization, reformulation, and reconstruction of the conceptions of gender, especially for boys who have likely not known anything other than what was experienced in armed groups. As noted by Trenholm et al., militarized notions of masculinity form a near cult-like condition on ex-child soldiers who continue on highly narrow conceptions of masculinity with hierarchical (that may

[113] Tobias Hecker et al., 'Appetitive Aggression in Former Combatants—Derived from the Ongoing Conflict in DR Congo,' *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, German Forensic Psychiatry: Contemporary Issues and Challenges, 35, no. 3 (1 May 2012): 244–49, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2012.02.016; Sabine Schmitt, Katy Robjant, and Anke Koebach, 'When Reintegration Fails: Stigmatization Drives the Ongoing Violence of Ex-Combatants in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,' *Brain and Behavior* 11, no. 6 (2021): e02156, https://doi.org/10.1002/brb3.2156. Appetitive aggression is the psychological perception of violence in ways that stir emotions of excitement, happiness, or appeal.

[114] Ilse Derluyn, Sofie Vindevogel, and Lucia De Haene, 'Toward a Relational Understanding of the Reintegration and Rehabilitation Processes of Former Child Soldiers,' *Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma* 22, no. 8 (2013): 871–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/10926771.2013.824058; Wenche Iren Hauge, 'Gender Dimensions of DDR – beyond Victimization and Dehumanization: Tracking the Thematic,' *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 22, no. 2 (14 March 2020): 219, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2019.1673669.

[115] Woodbury, 'Reconstructing Gender Identity,' 28–33; For women and girls in DDR in Uganda and Mozambique, see: Jeannie Annan et al., 'Civil War, Reintegration, and Gender in Northern Uganda,' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 6 (2011): 877–908; Dyan Mazurana and Susan McKay, 'CHILD SOLDIERS: What about the GIRLS?,' *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 57, no. 5 (1 September 2001): 30–30.

[116] Derluyn, Vindevogel, and De Haene, 'Toward a Relational Understanding of the Reintegration and Rehabilitation Processes of Former Child Soldiers,' 872.

also have ethnic elements), patriarchal, and violent behaviours in civilian life.[117] Additionally, the ability to provide and protect is further embedded, thus making any form of poverty deeply humiliating and emasculating.[118] This is deeply entrenched in former child soldiers, as their early involvement in their lives had exposed them at an age of high pliability in their identities, high familial dependency, and a highly developmental stage.[119] Thus, boys' involvement with armed groups at a young age positions them early on have interrupted and highjacked processes of manhood, subscribing them to a masculine model that can become a barrier to post-conflict life and have damaging effects upon the attempt of reintegration.

Consequently, DDR processes for ex-child soldiers will likely have to include gender sensitization conjoined with specialized children's programs like sensitized community re-entry (where family and community are educated about the effects, difficulties, and realities of child soldiery), education, and psychosocial care.[120]As Banholzer and Haer add, the impact of social attachments created in the combat group must also be addressed, as child soldiers create informal social networks in place of family structures they would have before their participation.[121] As outlined above, the socialization process of the recruitment of child soldiers follows militarized and masculinist logic of hierarchy, obedience, and solidarity, and as such, are should be part of the overarching resocialization process in DDR transitions.[122] In the case of ex-child soldiers and

[117] Trenholm et al., 'Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,' 220; For more on violence and socialization see: Rebecca Littman, 'Perpetrating Violence Increases Identification With Violent Groups: Survey Evidence From Former Combatants,' *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218757465; Rebecca Littman and Elizabeth Levy Paluck, 'The Cycle of Violence: Understanding Individual Participation in Collective Violence,' *Political Psychology* 36, no. S1 (2015): 79–99, https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12239.
[118] Trenholm et al., 'Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,' 220.
[119] Trenholm et al., 'Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,' 220.
[120] Lilli Banholzer and Roos Haer, 'Attaching and Detaching: The Successful Reintegration of Child Soldiers,', Journal *of Development Effectiveness* 6, no. 2 (3 April 2014): 113–14, https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2014.901401.
[121] Banholzer and Haer, 'Attaching and Detaching,' 115–17.
[122] The links between masculine homosocial bonds made in armed groups and the effect it has on post-conflict processes still yet needs further study.

adults who were recruited as child soldiers, there are added complexities and dimensions to consider which are deeply relevant to the peace processes, as gender conceptions are deeper entrenched than regular ex-combatants.

Broken States and Broken Men

Of course, the post-conflict world will be quite different for many combatants, as conflict will have changed how ex-combatants view themselves and the environment around them. In the Kivu region, there are multiple barriers which intersect with masculine norms which cause friction in the ability of ex-combatants to successfully go through the DDR process. Most glaringly, the extreme poverty which characterizes the region in the post-conflict environment poses the largest threat to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. As Scorgie notes surrounding ADF recruitment and retention in the Congolese/Ugandan borderlands, the persistent state of conflict in North Kivu had left many men without education and employment prospects, causing one of the leading causes in recruitment and retention of insurgent forces (particularly young men).[123] She further iterates that even in the cases of attempted reintegration, ex-combatants were met with the same impoverished conditions that led them to join militant groups in the first place.[124] Following this, the destruction of institutions and the lack of government responses to grievances build tensions that are rife for the opportunism of militia groups.[125] Both institutional decay and poverty are further exacerbated by the effects of mass migrations, as well as adding frictions of ethnic identities, of which the region has seen plenty since the 1990s.[126] Lastly, the regions often suffer from a

[123] Scorgie, *Conflict at the Edge of the African State*, 159.
[124] Scorgie, *Conflict at the Edge of the African State*, 159.
[125] Scorgie, *Conflict at the Edge of the African State*, 159–60.
[126] Phil Clark, 'Bringing Them All Back Home: The Challenges of DDR and Transitional Justice in Contexts of Displacement in Rwanda and Uganda,' *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27, no. 2 (1 June 2014): 235, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fet051; Corruption from the pouring in of humanitarian funds also harms peacebuilding due to lowered trust, and often can empower spoilers in peace transtions. Sometimes, actors may privately deal to protect profits. See more: Christine Cheng and Dominik Zaum, *Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Selling the Peace?*, Cass Series on Peacekeeping ; [29] (London ; Routledge, 2012), chaps 1, 5.

'peace' that is often unstable, incomplete, or simply not present. As stated by Prunier, the most well-meaning plans of DDR become impractical as soon as they hit the ground due to the intractability of the region caused by the power held by regional militias or state dysfunction.[127]

At face value, these seem like obvious and a-gendered reasons for continued instability and DDR difficulties, but these factors will present themselves through the gender identity of the combatant. Feelings of insecurity, poverty, and grievances can and are mediated and negotiated through conceptions of gender. As Hollander notes, the expectations of manhood, such as the ability to protect and provide, prescribe a heavy weight not just placed by men onto themselves, but also on family and the community as a whole.[128] Many gender-oriented interventions, such as microcredit and educational training, are primarily centred on women which have led to men being excluded from transitional programs. Desiree Lwambo writes that the exclusion of men in peacebuilding programs is not just a missed opportunity to educate on gender equality, but also creates friction between community and family members as men's employment is unaddressed, while women access these programs with no consent of male family members.[129] Should the expectations not be met and feelings of emasculation are felt, men turn to avenues such as violence and aggression when productive ones are unavailable.[130] In contexts of conflict, and militarized masculinity, it is logical for men to resort to what they know best in how to reclaim personal power and social capital, using the same traits and virtues instilled through combat, such as risk-taking, physical violence, othering (often other ethnic groups), and overall performing the 'big man' by exerting

[127] Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 337.
[128] Theo Hollander, 'Men, Masculinities, and the Demise of a State: Examining Masculinities in the Context of Economic, Political, and Social Crisis in a Small Town in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,' *Men and Masculinities* 17, no. 4 (1 October 2014): 426–27, https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X14544906.
[129] Desiree Lwambo, '"Before the War, I Was a Man": Men and Masculinities in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,' *Gender & Development* 21, no. 1 (1 March 2013): 61, https://doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2013.769771. Lwambo also notes that the economic empowerment of women is not interpreted as an asset, but a nuisance, as men interpret that economic success of women means disobedience.
[130] Hollander, 'Men, Masculinities, and the Demise of a State,' 427–28.

control on those around them.[131] To return to the concept of hegemony and militant masculinities explored earlier, the inability to effectively carry out what is thought to be owed by the right of hegemony is a humiliating affair, and the traits and expectations of militancy imbued into masculinity provide the avenue to regain what is owed.

Even in the case of post-conflict reconciliation, the ability to move from conflict to peace can be seen as 'unmanly,' with acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, and restitution regarded as feminine, as men are expected to resolve differences in battle.[132] Inversely, some evidence shows that militancy has acted as a *barrier* to masculine norms and has spurred men to return to peace. Friðriksdóttir demonstrates that some ex-combatants in Burundi were able to disconnect their masculinity in combat from that in civilian life, and found that their time in combat distracted them from getting educated and starting their families.[133] However, ex-combatants stated that the socio-economic impacts of being part of combat groups intrude on their self-actualization as men, as it stalled their growth in post-conflict environments, which makes both experiences intrinsically interconnected.[134] This breaks down material and financial considerations are imperative not just for their own sake, but demonstrates that they have deep impacts on feelings of identity and self-expectations.

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[131] Robert Senath Esuruku, 'Beyond Masculinity: Gender, Conflict and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Northern Uganda,' *Journal of Science & Sustainable Development* 4, no. 1 (2011): 27–28, https://doi.org/10.4314/JSSD.V4I1.3; This is intricately demonstrated with the interviews and stories of two Mozambican ex-soldiers as they take on security work in South Africa, see: Godfrey Maringira and Lorena Núñez Carrasco, '"Once a Soldier, a Soldier Forever": Exiled Zimbabwean Soldiers in South Africa,' *Medical Anthropology* 34, no. 4 (2015): 319–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/01459740.2015.1038344.

[132] Esuruku, 'Beyond Masculinity,' 26.

[133] Guðrún Sif Friðriksdóttir, 'Soldiering as an Obstacle to Manhood? Masculinities and Ex-Combatants in Burundi,' *Critical Military Studies* 7, no. 1 (2021): 61, https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2018.1494884.

[134] Friðriksdóttir, 'Soldiering as an Obstacle to Manhood?' 70.

Psychosocial Issues for Post-Conflict Men and Boys

On top of the material factors of post-conflict life, men return to their communities with deep psychological and emotional scars that will likely remain with them for the rest of their lives. As shown in the case of child soldiers, the process of militarization and socialization in armed groups has dramatic implications on the psychosocial wellbeing of ex-combatants, with many displaying symptoms of PTSS, appetitive aggression, and substance abuse, as well as depression and suicidality.[135] In the terms of psychosocial care, men have some normative barriers to overcome in seeking treatment, such as the need to be courageous, emotionless, and physically and mentally strong. For example, in an analysis of male victims of sexual violence, many men rejected or were extremely hesitant to participate in mental health care, largely due to the fear of being perceived as weak or feminine.[136] Additionally, the norm of being able 'to fend for yourself' poses a barrier to seeking care, and is likely even more complicated by militarized experiences, which demanded that emotional and mental trauma be repressed to carry out duties.[137] The risks of the avoidance of such care are great. Schmitt et al. present that many ex-combatants, in part due to their psychosocial state from combat, have high degrees of stigma attached to them, with 66% of respondents of s survey in the eastern DRC expressing that they were not comfortable sharing a village or neighbourhood with ex-combatants.[138] This stigmatization often leads to violent outbursts and

[135] Schmitt, Robjant, and Koebach, 'When Reintegration Fails,' 2. While not all ex-combatants were child soldiers, similar experiences may provide salient comparisons. Additionally, by examining them both for their similarities, programming may be augmented to better suit both groups.
[136] Ali Bitenga Alexandre et al., 'A Man Never Cries: Barriers to Holistic Care for Male Survivors of Sexual Violence in Eastern DRC,' *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 38, no. 2 (3 April 2022): 131, https://doi.org/10.1080/13623699.2022.2056211; Maringira and Núñez Carrasco, '"Once a Soldier, a Soldier Forever"', 325. Alexandre also states that the implementation of specialized support programs for men are rejected due to the costliness of doing so.
[137] Alexandre et al., 'A Man Never Cries,' 132.
[138] Schmitt, Robjant, and Koebach, 'When Reintegration Fails,' 2; Maringira and Núñez Carrasco, '"Once a Soldier, a Soldier Forever,"' 617.

recidivism, as ex-combatant hindsight may look fondly on the feeling of respect and power that was given to them in armed group life.[139]

Building New Masculinities or Simply Recreating Old Ones?

One major danger of the masculine lens towards the DDR process is building a framework that over-prioritizes men's programing or reinforces pre-conflict masculine conceptions. As expressed in an earlier section, the conception of hybrid masculinity takes on new 'feminine' traits, such as discussions of emotions, vulnerability, and the acceptance of changed gender norms, establishing new hegemonic masculinity which still subordinates women or non-hegemonic males. This becomes even more problematic as women take up traditionally masculine roles in times of conflict, and often turn to be points of friction (and violence) with returning men.[140] For DDR programming, there is a series of risks and opportunities for post-conflict gender relations, where men can be returned to civilian life with new expectations of themselves and others, or they can be returned in line with preconceived gender norms.

The experiences of Rwanda show both sides of this experience. Duriesmith and Holmes note that the Rwandan processes of DDR/SSR were highly skewed to pre-conflict notions of masculinity, while SSR programs were highly oriented to traits and norms of militant masculinity. The authors outline that post-civil war/genocide narratives surrounding military service were embroiled in 'masculinity nostalgia' which mythologized pre-colonial peace, characterized by 'patriarchal power, authority, and gender certainty,' and binaries of male 'good soldiers' and female

[139] Schmitt, Robjant, and Koebach, 'When Reintegration Fails,' 3.
[140] Claire Wallace, Christian Haerpfer, and Pamela Abbott, 'Women in Rwandan Politics and Society,' *International Journal of Sociology* 38, no. 4 (2008): 113, https://doi.org/10.2753/IJS0020-7659380406; See also: Erin Stern, Lori Heise, and Lyndsay McLean, 'The Doing and Undoing of Male Household Decision-Making and Economic Authority in Rwanda and Its Implications for Gender Transformative Programming,' *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 20, no. 9 (2018): 976–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/13691058.2017.1404642.

'peacebuilders'.[141] On the side of DDR, many 'special interests', such as men suffering from physical and mental trauma, child soldiers, LGBT and the elderly, were discreetly put into DDR to maintain the public image of gender.[142] On the other hand, the post-conflict world was also a time of transition, somewhat, from traditional roles and combatting GBV. Williamson notes that post-genocide Rwanda had also scarred the general population from notions of violence in proximity to masculinity, and through the process of *ndi umunyarwanda* (Rwandicity), reprioritized labour in place of violence as masculine virtues.[143] Moreover, Carlson and Randell note that Rwandan state institutions had focused on dismantling structural violence toward women, challenging traditional masculinity and working with communities to allow for more significant advancements in gender equality.[144] This is in large part due to the large demographic deficit suffered in Rwanda as a result of the genocide, where the Rwandan population had gone a drastic shift as women represented around 57% of the overall population.[145]

Remaking Men

These cases remind us that whether intentional or not, DDR is deeply implicated in the manner in which gender relations are treated going forward in peace. The processes which peacebuilding and DDR attempt to create for lasting post-conflict settlements will have impacts, and be interpreted, in the terms given by gender norms and expectations. They can provide a pathway for new understandings of gender, either by reinforcing hegemonic conceptions or altering them. For

[141] David Duriesmith and Georgina Holmes, 'The Masculine Logic of DDR and SSR in the Rwanda Defence Force,' *Security Dialogue* 50, no. 4 (2019): 370–71, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010619850346.
[142] Duriesmith and Holmes, 'The Masculine Logic of DDR and SSR in the Rwanda Defence Force,' 374–75.
[143] Williamson, 'Genocide, Masculinity and Posttraumatic Growth in Rwanda,' 51.
[144] Katie Carlson and Shirley Randell, 'Gender and Development: Working with Men for Gender Equality in Rwanda,' *Agenda* 27, no. 1 (2013): 115–17, 119–22, https://doi.org/10.1080/10130950.2013.796075.
[145] Adam Jones, 'Gender and Genocide in Rwanda,' *Journal of Genocide Research* 4, no. 1 (March 2002): 85, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520120113900. This was due to the *gendercidal* killing of men and boys within the Rwandan genocide, often targeted for killing due to the patrilineal nature of ethnicity in Rwanda, as well as notions of "fifth columns" that they represented.

ex-child soldiers, whose only experiences with manhood are bound by conflict, these will be difficult to overcome as psychosocial factors, material factors, and societal factors create intersecting and complicating barriers to post-combat life.[146] These continue for adult combatants, which will have to navigate re-entry into civilian life with deteriorated economics, institutions, social fabrics, and changed gender relations. The success of peacebuilding and DDR are attached to the virtues and norms felt by ex-combatants and their social environments as a whole, whether peace is felt positively by the combatant, and whether they re-enter the post-conflict world ready for the changes it has undergone.

Section V: A Man's World - Masculinities, DDR, and Peacebuilding Globally

The case of the Kivus provides a lens to analyze gender frameworks and responses to conflict on the global stage. Often, the place of masculinity and the vulnerabilities of men and boys has not been fully explored, not just in the Kivus, but also in post-conflict transitions around the globe. As explored in past sections, the implications of masculinity are closely entwined with the creation and perpetuation of conflict, and transitions are not just judged based on their material conditions, but also the perceptions of how it supports 'what it is to be men.' The Kivutien case provides several lessons for the global gender and peace frameworks and practices. Additionally, the inclusion of the masculine lens mustn't displace the work done to incorporate women and girls into gender frameworks, but rather supplement a greater and more holistic picture of how gender is related to post-conflict environments. Importantly, the inclusion of masculinities ought to

[146] Monica Bandiera, 'Ex-Combatants in South Africa: How to Address Their Needs,' *Intervention* 7, no. 1 (March 2009): 64–66, https://doi.org/10.1097/WTF.0B013E32832AD335; Oliver Kaplan and Enzo Nussio, 'Explaining Recidivism of Ex-Combatants in Colombia,' *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 1 (2018): 67–69; Michael Wessells, 'Psychosocial Well-Being and the Integration of War-Affected Children: Toward a Community Resilience Approach,' in *Re-Member: Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Reconciliation of War-Affected Children*, ed. Cindy Mels et al. (Intersentia, 2012), 57–76, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781839700705.005. Literature broadly suggests needs are attached to political reintegration and recognition, economic empowerment, psychosocial support, and community and familial supports.

dismantle binate assumptions on the vulnerabilities and power dynamics in conflict. This section will explore lessons for the greater gender and peacebuilding community, and how they can lead to better gender responses in the future.

Gendering Men

As Kimberly Theidon wrote in her study between masculinity and DDR within the context of Colombia, the 'gendering' of DDR was a form of policy speak for 'adding women' and failed to address the men as gender subjects within itself.[147] This was and is a gross omission, considering how the affairs of war are generally dictated by men and that the effects of militarization on gender ideology are as crucial as the armaments that fight them.[148] The effects of militarized identities surrounding prestige, security, and access, perpetuated by general culture, encourage the use of violence and makes them susceptible to the recruitment tactics of armed groups.[149] The scholarship speaks to the intrinsic need of tying the progression of peace to the perceptions of those that fight within them, adding factors of identity that can make post-conflict processes more salient than without such analyses.[150] This is further reinforced for our case by Woodbury, as she discusses how gender factors help induce reasoning when political dispositions and ideology are unclear.[151] Gender analyses from the masculine lens allow for the ability to see insecurities and vulnerabilities (for both women and men) from another light, allowing for greater refinement in how post-conflict processes affect the lives and perceptions of ex-combatants.

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[147] Theidon, 'Reconstructing Masculinities,' 3–5.
[148] Theidon, 'Reconstructing Masculinities,' 3–4.
[149] Theidon, 'Reconstructing Masculinities,' 14.
[150] Some literature as example of this: Chris Dolan, 'Letting Go of the Gender Binary: Charting New Pathways for Humanitarian Interventions on Gender-Based Violence,' *International Review of the Red Cross* 96, no. 894 (2014): 485–501; Chris Dolan, 'Militarized, Religious and Neo-Colonial: The Triple Bind Confronting Men in Contemporary Uganda,' *Men and Development: Politicizing Masculinities*, 2011, 126–38; Frances Cleaver and Michael Kimmel, *Masculinities Matter!: Men, Gender and Development* (Zed Books, 2002); Prisca Benelli, Dyan Mazurana, and Peter Walker, 'Using Sex and Age Disaggregated Data to Improve Humanitarian Response in Emergencies,' *Gender and Development* 20, no. 2 (2012): 219–32.
[151] Woodbury, 'Reconstructing Gender Identity,' 24–25.

Breaking Victim/Perpetrator Dichotomies

The additional benefit of bringing lenses of masculinity to gender issues and post-conflict processes is the disruption of victim/perpetrator dichotomies. By no means does this mean that focusing more on masculinity and its effects will allow those who commit violence off the hook; however, it can lead to greater analyses of why and how men react to their environments before and after conflict.

This can best be demonstrated with the effects of poverty and ongoing insecurity as factors which induce many men to recruit into armed groups, expressing a material dilemma that exacerbates gender identity struggles. In the case of Colombian combatants, many in precarious and marginalized positions only have their 'bodily capital' to trade on the labour market and often carry and use weapons as a result.[152] With men's 'bodily capital' involved in fighting comes with the after-effects of doing so, namely the physical and psychosocial damages attached to it.[153] In the post-conflict environment, men may feel 'feminized' by their dependent roles while also receiving the benefits accrued by their masculine/patriarchal dividend, causing an in-between of feminization/masculinization while straddling between perpetration/victimization. This is made even more clear with the involvement of child soldiers, who were often abducted or forced into conflict while also having agency for the actions they commit.[154]

The breaking of victim/perpetrator dichotomies produces many challenges to DDR and transitional justice as a whole, as it has to reconcile the pre-determining factors of conflict

[152] Theidon, 'Reconstructing Masculinities,' 23; On the womens perspective of victim-perpetrator dynamics in Colombia and Guatemala, see: Sanne Weber, 'Defying the Victim-Perpetrator Binary: Female Ex-Combatants in Colombia and Guatemala as Complex Political Perpetrators,' *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 15, no. 2 (1 July 2021): 264–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijab006.
[153] Bulmer and Eichler, 'Unmaking Militarized Masculinity,' 172.
[154] Ilse Derluyn et al., 'Victims and/or Perpetrators? Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue on Child Soldiers,' *BMC International Health and Human Rights* 15, no. 1 (14 October 2015): 5–11, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12914-015-0068-5.

participation while also detangling the factors of reconciliation as it deals with ex-combatants that perpetuated the same conditions that had pushed them into conflict, to begin with, and their participation in violence on their communities.

Psychosocial/Behaviour

Taking masculinities into consideration can also give perspectives on psychosocial and behavioural components of post-conflict processes.[155] Factors of post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS), appetitive aggression, and other post-conflict psychosocial issues and interventions should be analyzed through lenses of gender and masculinity, with their utility and effectivity tied into the gendered structures they inhabit. As stated in the last section, some men may hesitate to engage in psychosocial treatments due to gendered expectations and stigmatization.[156] This is further compounded with factors of appetitive aggression, which were ingrained as part of their socialization processes in combat groups, and worsened in cases of child soldiery, as factors of aggression are built into the conceptions of masculinity.[157] This may produce research and programming on how to deliver psychosocial care in gender-sensitive ways and increase the effectiveness of psychosocial treatments for men and their communities.

There are also lessons to be had in the individual and group behaviours around violence perpetration, giving insight on how to provide pathways to peace.[158] Research by Rebecca Littman

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[155] On psychosocial rehabilitation of ex-combatants in non-western settings, see: Erin Martz, *Trauma Rehabilitation After War and Conflict: Community and Individual Perspectives* (New York, NY: Springer New York, 2010, 2010), chap. 9, https://books-scholarsportal-info.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/en/read?id=/ebooks/ebooks2/springer/2011-03-04/1/9781441957221#page=1.

[156] Alexandre et al., 'A Man Never Cries'.

[157] Hecker et al., 'Appetitive Aggression in Former Combatants—Derived from the Ongoing Conflict in DR Congo,' 244–45; Anja C. Zeller et al., 'A Combination of Combat Experience, Early Abduction, and Severe Traumatization Fuels Appetitive Aggression and Violence among Abductees of Rebel War in Northern Uganda,' *Aggressive Behavior* 46, no. 6 (2020): 466–67, https://doi.org/10.1002/ab.21914; Woodbury, 'Reconstructing Gender Identity,' 26.

[158] Verwimp, Justino, and Brück, 'The Analysis of Conflict'; Thomas Elbert et al., 'Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in the Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo : Insights from Former Combatants' (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2013), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/17852; Cohen, 'The Ties That Bind'; Michael J. Apter and Mitzi L. Desselles, 'Understanding the Motivation to Fight: A Reversal Theory

and Miranda Alison, both inside and outside the Great Lakes region, describes how violence can be a process in which bonds are created and strengthened while allowing for the suppression of guilt and doubt.[159] This violent socialization process should be further studied and addressed in post-conflict processes, including DDR programming, both at collective and individual levels.

Economics and Politics

Through the post-conflict environment, the realities of economics and politics will likely be heavily altered from what came before. The intersections of economic and political structures with gender in post-conflict are places of tension, as men attempt to integrate into civilian economic life while women have assumed greater positions in economic and political structures in the absence of men. As outlined by Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, post-conflict involvement of women in economics and decision-making has led to increased capacity, local participation, regeneration, and encourages reconciliation.[160] Therefore, it is imperative that ex-combatants reintegrate into post-conflict environments with not only skills training and educational opportunities, but they should be reintegrated with skills conducive to supporting domestic tasks, such as childcare. Moreover, as discussed in the past section, post-conflict programs such as micro-credit and fiscal education may be more effective when applied universally rather than singling out women. This provides a greater ability to participate in post-conflict society and resocialization while providing a pathway for a more gender-just transition for women.[161]

Perspective,' *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 25, no. 4 (November 2019): 335–45, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000390.

[159] Alison, 'Wartime Sexual Violence,' 77; Littman, 'Perpetrating Violence Increases Identification With Violent Groups,' 1084.

[160] Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 'Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding,' *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (2009): 505.

[161] Gizelis, 'Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding,' 509; Chris Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes? Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and UN Security Council Resolutions,' *IDS Bulletin* 45, no. 1 (2014): 58, https://doi.org/10.1111/1759-5436.12071.

On the political end, politics must become wholly sensitive to positions of both women and men, inclusive of the political rights of women and be responsive to frustrations experienced by ex-combatant men. Dolan explains that in the wake of the Arab Spring, many ex-combatant men were shunted out of political decision-making, leading to feelings of powerlessness and resentment, leading to change but not structural change.[162] The sense of powerlessness resulted from young males being unable to perform many traditional roles expected of them, mainly providing for (or even starting) their families.[163] Often, this powerlessness leads to resentment towards women and frameworks that outline the disempowerment of women instead of addressing the root causes, which are often entrenched in patriarchal systems.[164] Some work has been done to allow women to be included in post-conflict transitions in Rwanda, especially in economics and political structures; Carlson and Randell outline that the key to doing such transitions has rested upon changing normative structures around masculinity.[165]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

One aspect of recognizing masculinities in the face of post-conflict transitions and gender relations is the effect it may have on UNSC Resolution 1325. The UN document, outlining the inclusion of a gender lens to peacebuilding and transitions to peace, was designed to increase the participation of women in post-conflict mechanisms and peace agreement negotiations. The inclusion of women into these programs, without a doubt, is integral to gender-just transitions into peace. However, the limiting of the gender lens down to strictly women causes two significant issues: oversimplifies gender-relations from a set of diverse social practices for both sexes down

[162] Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes?' 57–58.
[163] Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes?' 57.
[164] Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes?' 55.
[165] Carlson and Randell, 'Gender and Development,' 116–17.

to solely that of the positions of women and girls, and second, erases the factors, vulnerabilities, and experiences that men in post-conflict scenarios may uniquely feel.

On the first point, some feminist scholars have outlined that Resolution 1325 has struggled to fundamentally alter the structural change of post-conflict security structures and discourses, which continue to be dominated by patriarchal attitudes. This is the position of Dolan in which he states: 'in short, simplistic and stereotypical gender binaries, characterized by a unidirectional balance of power in favour of all men, to the disadvantage of all women, are continually re-inscribed.'[166] Further, Nadine Puechguirbal notes that: 'women are primarily represented in a narrow essentialist definition that allows male decision-makers to keep them in the subordinated position of victim, thus removing their agency.'[167] This essentialized and limited view of women crystalizes women into a place of vulnerability and men into places of power. This disconnects women from power in post-conflict environments as a 'special interest group.'[168] It also entrenches men as solely advantaged, which downplays their places of vulnerability in conflict. While Resolution 2106 attempts to reconcile this gap, it still does not truly attempt to grasp the binary the resolution texts set out in the first place.[169]

This brings us to the second point; that the unique vulnerabilities felt by boys and men are not as discussed as those of women in Resolution 1325. In a reversal from Cynthia Enloe's original question in 'where are the women?', the question now being asked is 'where are the men?' in the analysis and inclusion of masculinities in peace frameworks. This may be due to feminist lenses being primarily occupied with the struggles of women and girls in security, conflict, and policy

[166] Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes?'81.
[167] Nadine Puechguirbal, 'Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325: A Textual Analysis of UN Documents,' *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 2 (2010): 173, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533311003625068.
[168] Puechguirbal, 'Discourses on Gender, Patriarchy and Resolution 1325,' 178–79.
[169] UN Security Council, 'Security Council Resolution 2106,' PeaceWomen, 2013, http://www.peacewomen.org/SCR-2106.

circles, dealing with evident inequalities women face in conflict and post-conflict environments.[170] Phillipp Schulz outlines that 'gender' has been presented in limited, reductionist, and dichotomous accounts of victimhood, with men being characterized as naturally violent perpetrators.[171] Within this framework, the attention to men and masculinities may seem counter-productive, or even ignorant, in the face of the obvious deficits in representation for women in post-conflict arrangements. However, as outlined throughout this paper, this response to gender being synonymous with women and girls is often spurred from a conception that they are being subjects of victimization and protection, while men are treated as an 'exception.'[172] In light of the gendercidal consequences of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the soldiery of boys, and the sexual violence perpetrated against men and boys in conflict spaces due to the assumptions of their patriarchal power and their societies, the frameworks and responses to conflict ought to take note of their gendered vulnerabilities just as those suffered from women.[173]

Altogether, the Kivutien case, among many others worldwide, exposes that current international gender-sensitivity frameworks are oriented in overly binate terms and fail to fully incorporate the vulnerabilities of men and boys. The orientation of Resolution 1325 policy enshrines a power dynamic which keeps women in a state of victimization and 'special interest,' while masculinity and male experiences remain a-gendered. The inclusion of masculinity in peace

[170] Philipp Schulz, 'Towards Inclusive Gender in Transitional Justice: Gaps, Blind-Spots and Opportunities,' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14, no. 5 (2020): 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2019.1663984; See also: Andrea Cornwall, 'Taking off International Development's Straightjacket of Gender,' *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Providence, United States: The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Fall 2014); Jerker Edström, Abhijit Das, and Chris Dolan, 'Introduction: Undressing Patriarchy and Masculinities to Re-Politicise Gender,' *IDS Bulletin* 45, no. 1 (2014): 1–10.
[171] Schulz, 'Towards Inclusive Gender in Transitional Justice,' 2.
[172] Dolan, 'Has Patriarchy Been Stealing the Feminists' Clothes?' 81–82.
[173] Callum Watson, 'Begging the Question: What Would a Men, Peace and Security Agenda Look Like?' *Connections (18121098)* 14, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 50–51, https://doi.org/10.11610/Connections.14.3.04.

frameworks and responses allows for a greater picture to be accounted for in formulating post-conflict programs and responses.

Holistic Gender Practice and Peace

Through the Kivutien case, the most important lesson to be gained is that every ex-combatant is a product of gender relations and practices that inform how they perceive the post-conflict world. The dangers of ignoring such perceptions and the subsequent discontent are to ignore very real threats to both short-term and long-term successes of post-conflict gender programming for both women and men. Economic and political conditions and their relationships with ex-combatants pressure them into spots of precarity and insecurity, which endangers the peace process, other civilians and their own families. Mounting research shows that psychosocial care and accessibility are imperative to a functioning peace process. Still, dimensions of masculinity in post-combat life have been primarily studied only in Western contexts. Lastly, the implications of how masculinity is implicated and is changed in post-conflict processes are due for much more study and debate. Overall, there are gender and power implication that have real effects on post-conflict responses, the structures and programs that implement them, and the global institutions that configure them.

Conclusion

The Kivus, a region followed by a long shadow of colonization, conflict, genocide, and humanitarian catastrophe, still faces the uphill battle of building a lasting and robust peace for its civilians, citizens, and those in its neighbouring states. The expansion of gender lenses of men and boys, the masculine roles they seek to assume, and how they interact with the world around them provides a greater view into the experiences, difficulties, and realities of what it is to be a man in conflict and in peace. By no means is this a rebuke of feminist work, which the field of masculinity

studies rests so firmly upon, but rather an attempt to build upon it towards a more whole representation of the gendered world.

Gendered norms, violence, and the outcomes they produce must be inspected in the fullest picture that can be assumed and include the men and boys that interact with it as perpetrators, victims, survivors, and everything in between. Overall, this is a lens that needs to be more widely utilized by peace practitioners, researchers, NGOs, and international institutions alike, as it remains widely under-explored throughout conflict and gender research and practices. This exclusion will likely perpetuate existing inequities and deficiencies in gender frameworks and policies, with men falsely assumed to be a-gendered participants in a gendered world. Additionally, the inclusion of masculine lenses allows for the greater ability to inspect the structures of gender relations, including patriarchal systems that continue to stratify the masculine and non-masculine.

The gender roles of combatants and ex-combatants as they attempt to enter and re-enter civilian life must be included in these analyses, as extremely precarious environments are sure to strain the roles and expectations many have in their identities. Throughout their difficulties and failures, DDR programs must take into account every factor that flows through them for them to be successful and replicable programs for peacebuilding. While DDR programs pose a series of challenges, they also pose unique opportunities to build peaceful societies which are free from the inequities, inequalities, and structural violence that may have given rise to conflict in the first place. That opportunity is also one for gender justice for all, and it should not be missed.

Appendix:

Appendix 1:



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