

2010

Engaging the Tamil Diaspora in Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka

Michael Potters

Follow this and additional works at: <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr>

Recommended Citation

Potters, Michael (2010) "Engaging the Tamil Diaspora in Peace-Building Efforts in Sri Lanka," *Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review*: Vol. 1 : Iss. 3 , Article 5.

Available at: <https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss3/5>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact tadam@uwo.ca, wlsadmin@uwo.ca.

ENGAGING THE TAMIL DIASPORA IN PEACE-BUILDING EFFORTS IN SRI LANKA

Michael Potters

Refugees who have fled the conflict in Sri Lanka have formed large diaspora communities across the globe, forming one of the largest in Toronto, Canada. Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have infiltrated these communities and elicited funding from its members, through both coercion and consent, to continue the fight in their home country. This paper will outline the importance of including these diaspora communities in peace-building efforts, and will propose a three-tier solution to enable these contributions.

On the morning of October 17, 2009, Canadian authorities seized the vessel Ocean Lady off the coast of British Columbia, Canada. The ship had entered Canadian waters with 76 Tamil refugees on board, fleeing persecution and violence in the aftermath of Sri Lanka's long and violent civil war. This was the first group of refugees to arrive in Canada by boat in more than 20 years, but more importantly, it was the first large group of people to arrive in Canada since the end of the war in Sri Lanka in May 2009.¹

Since the beginning of the war in 1983, Canada has accepted thousands of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. From a population of fewer than 2,000 Tamils in 1983, Canada's Tamil population has grown to between 110,000 to 200,000 persons,² 90 percent of whom live in Toronto.³ The arrival of the Ocean Lady was significant. It not only brought attention to the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, but also to the significance of Canada's Tamil diaspora – the largest in the world – and their role in the affairs of their homeland.⁴

¹ Canadian Tamil Congress, "The Case of Ocean Lady's 76 Tamil Refugees," accessed March 25, 2010, www.canadiantamilcongress.ca.

² International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Diaspora After the LTTE," February 2010, accessed March 25, 2010, www.crisisgroup.org.

³ Sarah Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora," *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 405-426, accessed March 25, 2010, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097925>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 418.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and significance of the transnational Tamil diaspora in relation to the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, with emphasis on the Canadian diaspora, particularly in Toronto, and support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). First, it will examine the role of the Tamil diaspora in the perpetuation or prevention of conflict in Sri Lanka. This section will begin with an explanation of the history of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Second, it will explain the continually evolving role of the diaspora in relation to the conflict. The paper will conclude with a three-tier prescription for diaspora involvement in peace-building efforts.

In order to understand the role of the transnational diaspora network in the civil conflict of Sri Lanka, it is important to understand its history. Sri Lanka is an island state in the Indian Ocean, south of India. Its population is divided into four ethno-religious groups. The Sinhalese majority comprise approximately 74 percent of the population and control the government. They are primarily Theravada Buddhist, speak the Sinhala language, and populate the southern and central parts of the country.⁵ Sri Lankan Tamils make up 11 percent of the population. They are mostly Hindus, and most of them settled in the northern part of the island around the city Jaffna. The two other groups are the ‘up-country’ Tamils, as well as the Sri Lankan Moors.⁶ The conflict, however, is largely between the Sinhalese Majority, and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority.

Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, the Tamils have demanded more power and better representation in government in order to protect their interests and autonomy from the Sinhalese majority. The Tamil demand for representational power in government, however, was

⁵ *Ibid.*, 412.

⁶ International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”

not accommodated.⁷ Eventually, disillusioned by conventional politics, many Tamils began to argue for the creation of a separate Tamil state called Eelam. A secessionist agenda was born as an ethnic consciousness and sense of nationalism developed within the Tamil population. In 1975, The LTTE became the guerilla organization at the forefront of the secessionist struggle, harnessing the frustrations of the Tamil minority and becoming the ‘sole spokesman’ of the Tamil quest for sovereign statehood.⁸ As frustrations mounted, violence escalated, and Tamil youth in particular began to participate in the insurgency movement.⁹ A civil war erupted in the northeastern part of the country in 1983, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, and continued until the official military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.

Since 1983, the conflict between the Tamil separatists and Sinhalese government forces in Sri Lanka has claimed over 65,000 lives and displaced over a million persons.¹⁰ The tragic loss of life cannot be understated. According to scholars however, the displacement and upheaval of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population, both internally and through migration abroad, is one of the most significant consequences of the war.¹¹ Formed by several migration waves since independence in 1948, the Tamil diaspora is estimated at one million as of 2010, or approximately one quarter of the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population.¹² Tamils abroad, despite their diversity – including date of arrival, length of stay, and legal status in their host countries, gender, caste, region, socio-

⁷ For further discussion and a brief history on the issue of political accommodation for the Tamil minority, see the section in Wayland entitled “Overview of Ethnicity and Conflict in Sri Lanka” (pg. 411-415).

⁸ Sumantra Bose, *States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam Movement* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 87.

⁹ For further discussion on the importance of radicalization of Tamil youth, see Bose, pg. 114.

¹⁰ Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 414.

¹¹ International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”

¹² Ibid.

economic standing and political orientation – usually continue see themselves as belonging to the diaspora.¹³

Sarah Wayland, research associate at the Centre for Excellence on Immigration and Settlement - Toronto, defines the modern diaspora in her piece, “Ethnonational Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.” She states, “A diaspora is a type of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members permanently reside in one or more ‘host countries,’ and possess a collective, sometimes idealized, myth of the homeland and will to return.”¹⁴ Gabriel Sheffer, Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, adds more to this definition by describing fundamental characteristics of the modern diaspora:

They maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly derived from their homelands and related to them ... display communal solidarity, which gives rise to social cohesion ... They are engaged in a variety of cultural, social, political and economic exchanges with their homelands, which might be states or territories within states ... often create trans-state networks that permit and encourage exchanges of significant resources, such as money, manpower, political support, and cultural influence, with their homelands as well as with other parts of the same diaspora.¹⁵

Further, Wayland focuses on and describes the Tamil diaspora in particular. She states,

Diasporas such as the Tamil one exist largely because of ethno-nationalist conflict and persecution in the homeland. The Tamil diaspora in particular is comprised of refugees and exiles who are forced to leave their home country because of conflict rather than because of economic need or the wish to forge a new life abroad.¹⁶

Once accepted into liberal democratic host countries with refugee status, it becomes possible for the diaspora to express Tamil linguistic, cultural, and religious identity as never before. Tamils who migrate from a closed society to one that is open capitalize on the country’s

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 408.

¹⁵ Gabriel Sheffer, “Ethno-National Diasporas and Security,” *Survival* 36, no. 1 (1994): 60.

¹⁶ Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418.

freedoms to publish, organize, and accumulate financial resources to an extent that was not possible in their homeland.¹⁷ This collective sense of empowerment in combination with a shared vision of an independent state of Eelam in their home country provides an opportunity structure whereby social, political, and financial support is mobilized. In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, this was consolidated in the LTTE.

The LTTE claims to represent the political interests of the Tamils. Before its defeat, it consistently propagated a three-fold message through its political and diplomatic activities in an effort to condemn the Sri Lankan government and strengthen political support for the insurgency, both within the diaspora and outside of it.¹⁸ Christine Fair, assistant professor at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, explains this three-fold message propagated by the LTTE,

That Tamils in Sri Lanka are innocent victims of military repression by Sri Lanka's security forces and of Sinhalese anti-Tamil discrimination; That the LTTE is the only legitimate voice of the Tamils and is the only vehicle capable of defending and promoting Tamil interests in Sri Lanka; There can be no peace until Tamil's achieve their own independent state under the LTTE's leadership.¹⁹

It would appear from this message that the Tamil community is united under the banner of the LTTE. However, this may not be the case. The diaspora community is divided in this respect. Not every diaspora Tamil donates funds to the LTTE or supports them politically, and countless Tamils have fallen victim to LTTE violence.²⁰ Throughout the 1980s, the LTTE waged war and conducted a campaign of assassinations and bombings against rival militants and moderate

¹⁷ Ibid., 417.

¹⁸ Christine C. Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11, no. 1 (2005): 143, accessed March 25, 2010, doi:10.1080/13537110590927845.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE."

Tamils in an effort to silence dissent and consolidate support in Sri Lanka.²¹ This intolerance and violence forced many Tamils to seek refuge abroad. As a result of their exile, some Tamils feel a sense of victimization and injustice by the LTTE and do not support them.²² Others support the LTTE to satisfy feelings of guilt for leaving their homeland behind.²³ In this sense, it is very difficult to determine the true level of diaspora support for the LTTE insurgency.

The fact remains, however, that the diaspora community plays a major role in the conflict through varying degrees of support for the LTTE. As Fair explains, “The diaspora has been a fundamental component of the Tamil insurgency and the backbone of the LTTE’s global operations.”²⁴ Since 1980, the LTTE has established a global network of offices and cells that spans at least 40 countries and is unrivaled by any other insurgent organization.²⁵ This network, or what Fair describes as a “global infrastructure,” is based to a great extent on the support and participation of the diaspora.²⁶

Wayland describes three fundamental activities Tamil elites used to mobilize diaspora activity, ultimately impacting the conflict in Sri Lanka. These activities were: “information exchange within the Tamil community via Tamil language newspapers, radio, the Internet and ethnic organizations; spreading awareness of the Tamil struggle through marches, conferences, and the lobbying of government officials; and lawful as well as illegal fundraising.”²⁷ All three types of activities, namely Intra-Tamil communication, outreach from the community and

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ For further readings on the importance of guilt in Tamil support for the LTTE, see Chapter D “Creating One Voice”, in the issue brief titled “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” by the International Crisis Group.

²⁴ Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 139.

²⁵ Ibid., 140.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418

political lobbying and fundraising, reinforce a proud, independent Tamil identity.²⁸ The impact of these activities played a crucial role in the civil war in Sri Lanka and may continue to play a role in the future.

Tamil diaspora networks and communications are a rich and fundamental element of Tamil identity formation and group cohesion. This is evident in the rise of the Tamil society in Toronto over the past two decades.²⁹ In 2004, there were ten weekly Tamil language newspapers, four Tamil language radio stations broadcast seven days a week, three cinemas showing Tamil language films, and many other outlets of Tamil expression and information exchange in Toronto.³⁰

The internet has also provided a very important means of communication among Tamils. Tamil websites provide access to news about Sri Lanka, often analyzing current events with a Tamil perspective and providing an up-to-date chronology of the conflict in the homeland. The internet has also been extensively used to establish cyber communities, chat rooms and user groups.³¹ These networks and forms of technological communication are crucial to reinforcing the Tamil ethnonational identity and affiliation with their homeland. Moreover, they are used by elements of the LTTE to consolidate support for their efforts.³² Through these networks, the LTTE, or supporters of the LTTE, distribute propaganda and manage the perception of the conflict in the homeland, further legitimizing their image as protectors of the interests of Tamils.³³

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid., 419.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 139.

³² Ibid., 143.

³³ Wayland, "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities," 418.

Tamil identity networks are reinforced by political mobilization in the form of conferences, marches, and various types of advocacy or lobbying.³⁴ This is a major activity of the diaspora in the host countries.³⁵ The increasing number of refugees and their transition from refugee claimants to citizens or permanent residents has empowered and enabled the diaspora to become influential players in the politics of their host countries, capable of bringing attention to the Tamil issue and impacting policy.

Before being labeled a terrorist organization in 2001 by the United Nations, the LTTE lobbied host governments through umbrella organizations, openly espousing its secessionist agenda and ‘three-fold message.’³⁶ In Canada, lobbying was primarily conducted by the Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils (FACT), an LTTE umbrella organization of ten Tamil associations with a pro-secessionist stance.³⁷ Since 2001, political participation has evolved. Supporters of the LTTE in the diaspora now focus on working within the system by getting Tamils elected to office and using electoral clout and money to influence policy makers.³⁸ Even those pro-LTTE diaspora initiatives carrying forward the struggle for an independent state in democratic and transparent ways remain committed to the LTTE’s agenda.³⁹

The LTTE have been very effective at mobilizing the massive Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. This mobilization is described by Fair as the “economic backbone of the militant campaign,” and is carried out through both coerced and consensual contributions.⁴⁰ Sometimes this money is

³⁴ Ibid., 420.

³⁵ R. Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post-Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka,” Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies (September 2003): 10-12, www.sangam.org/articles/view2/523.pdf.

³⁶ Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 142-144.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”

³⁹ Ibid., 23.

⁴⁰ Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 140.

given willingly out of belief that the efforts of the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy and security for the Sri Lankan Tamils. In other cases, ‘donations’ are collected like a tax by force, by the threat of force, or through the exploitation of individuals who may be in a given country illegally and are seeking protection or assistance from the LTTE.⁴¹ This ‘tax’ system is used to ensure a regular flow of income to the LTTE. In Canada, the minimum tax was roughly \$30 per person or family per month depending on the individual’s income,⁴² and other sources allege that Tamil businesses abroad are forced to pay Tigers a portion of their earnings.⁴³ Significant funds also come from individual contributions through community temples, cultural and political events, as well as other activities held in support of the Tamil population.⁴⁴

It is important to note that Tamils in Canada are not alone in supporting the LTTE from abroad. Yet, the Canadian connection is very significant. As a police spokesman in the largest city and commercial capital of Sri Lanka, Colombo, stated, “Canada has been a hotbed of the Tigers. That is where the biggest contributions come from.”⁴⁵ In Toronto, in particular, police claim that LTTE supporters sent as much as \$1 million Canadian a month to finance the war in Sri Lanka.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibid., 141.

⁴² International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”

⁴³ Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 141.

*This is described by Fair as “proxy lending” by the LTTE. The LTTE puts up an initial investment in Tamil-run small businesses abroad. The profits made are then split between the LTTE and the owner. Fair claims that if the figures still remain valid from the mid 1990’s, this proxy lending in Canada generates roughly \$1 million per month.

⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.”

⁴⁵ Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 422.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 421

The Sri Lankan government estimates that the LTTE's overseas fundraising reached \$80 million per year.⁴⁷ During the conflict, funds raised from abroad were used for destruction and reconstruction alike. Initially, most of the money was used for sustaining Tamil societies in war affected areas. However, as the war continued, increasing amounts shifted away from humanitarian aid towards sustaining the insurgency.⁴⁸ Despite the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora continue to raise funds in order to carry forward the struggle.⁴⁹

The defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has left much of the diaspora in a state of shock and denial, and has caused a reevaluation of the role that the diaspora plays in the affairs of the homeland. There is a general acceptance amongst some Tamils across the globe and political spectrum that the LTTE is a spent military force with little chance of returning.⁵⁰ Most of the pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora have acknowledged, albeit reluctantly, that militancy has failed and the struggle for an independent Tamil state should proceed non-violently. However, the more hardline elements of the diaspora would still prefer the LTTE to be fighting for Tamil Eelam, choosing militancy over peaceful politics and ignoring its failure.⁵¹ Some leaders who have been considered radical in their politics have been frustrated by what they perceive as a

⁴⁷ Ibid., 421.

*This figure is disputed by Tamil leaders, claiming it is much less than \$80 million. Tamil leaders claim it is impossible for such a newly formed diaspora to raise such a large sum, a sum that would require average annual contributions of more than \$100 from every Tamil individual living overseas.

⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE."

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

lack of attention being paid to the Tamil situation. These leaders choose unconventional and sometimes illegal means to convey their message.⁵²

It is clear that as the diaspora struggles with new political realities, and as new strategies emerge, so too will divergent opinions on a way forward. Yossi Shain, professor of comparative government and diaspora politics at Georgetown University, explains this in his article entitled “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation and Resolution.” He states, “When the conflict is hot and the homeland is under severe threat, diaspora concerns about the homeland’s existential survival are paramount, and divergent opinions may be subsumed under a broader show of support. But when the possibility of peace arises, homeland-diaspora debates and power struggles emerge.”⁵³ In the case of Sri Lanka, the possibility of peace has arrived. These internal struggles should be carefully negotiated in order to prevent a return to the violent LTTE agenda.

In the field of conflict resolution, the current stage of this particular conflict might be referred to as the conflict de-escalation and negotiation stage. This stage is crucial for the creation and maintenance of peace. As this article has explained, the diaspora have played a critical role in the conflict through the support of the LTTE insurgency. With the defeat of the LTTE, there is room to reconstruct a peaceful agreement between the Tamil community and the Sri Lankan government, with the support of the well-established Tamil diaspora. In order to

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (July 2002): 135, accessed March 25, 2010, http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10883142/v22i0002/115_trodicpor.

*Divergent opinions exist within the diaspora community, but also exist between the diaspora and the Tamil community that remains in Sri Lanka - between homeland and diaspora. There is considerable difference in the opinions of these two groups, although they may share a common goal. However, for the purpose of this essay, the difference in opinion between these two groups will not be discussed in detail. For more information on these differences, see the section “Divergent Opinions,” in “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE” by the International Crisis Group.

avoid a reemergence of conflict, all elements of the diaspora community must be considered as important factors in the negotiation process.

I suggest a three-tier prescription for engaging the Tamil diaspora in peace-building efforts in Sri Lanka. The first tier of this prescription focuses on the role of host governments. Host governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to homeland conflict and engage them. Governments have the necessary task and responsibility of ensuring public safety and security, as well as promoting peace abroad. Therefore, it is important that host governments better understand the nature of all diaspora within their borders, and their connection to conflict in their homelands. Governments, including the Canadian government, should acknowledge the possibilities and benefits of engagement of diaspora communities and incorporate them in policy-making decisions.

The second tier focuses on the relationship between the host government and the diaspora community. This relationship should be built by encouraging the diaspora community to commit to peaceful engagement with the Sri Lankan government. Governments may be reluctant to engage with a non-state group that engages in, or supports, the use of violence. For many host governments, however, a simple rejection of violence by diaspora groups, although a major first step in working towards peace, is insufficient for them to completely support diaspora efforts. In order for the host government to commit to the diaspora, diaspora leaders would not only have to reject violence, but also reconsider the separatist and illiberal policies of the LTTE, as well as recognize the damage that the LTTE has done to communities in Sri Lanka and to the Tamil struggle in general. Consensus within the diaspora in this regard is a goal to work towards. This major shift in strategy can be facilitated with the help of the host governments.

The third tier will, in effect, determine the attractiveness of the second tier. It focuses on the host government and the international community. By encouraging consensus on the need for non-violence within the diaspora, the host government and the international community can increase pressure on the Sri Lankan government to address Tamil grievances. This could take the form of a reconciliation process or institutional reforms at the state and local level. Most importantly, reforms should be made in Sri Lanka which empower and support minority political forces and promote a more democratic Tamil community. The Sri Lankan government will also need to address the longstanding sense of marginalization, disrespect, and insecurity amongst the Tamil minority which essentially gave rise to the LTTE.

This paper has explained the significance of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in relation to the conflict in Sri Lanka through support of the LTTE insurgency. It has described, in turn, three very important activities which diaspora leaders use to consolidate support for the LTTE, namely intra-Tamil communication, political lobbying and outreach from the community, and fundraising. Through varying degrees of support and participation in these activities, the diaspora sustained the LTTE and thus played a role in the perpetuation of conflict in Sri Lanka. This paper has argued that diaspora communities also have the potential to play a significant role in peace-building and conflict resolution processes in their homeland.

The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 has created an opening whereby efforts can be undertaken to utilize the well-established Tamil diaspora for post-conflict peace-building. This article provides a three-tier prescription as one possible way forward. First, host governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in relation to homeland conflict and seek to engage them. Second, this relationship can be built by encouraging the diaspora community to reconsider the violent LTTE separatist agenda and strive for peaceful solutions.

Third, in order for the latter to be successful, legitimate Tamil grievances must be addressed by the Sri Lankan government through pressure from the international community.

After decades of civil war in Sri Lanka, the opportunity for peace-building has arrived. As responsible citizens of Canada, a country which hosts the largest Tamil diaspora in the world, there is an obligation to move forward proactively, engage with the generally respected government, and find a suitable, sustainable, and peaceful solution to the Sri Lankan conflict and Tamil struggle. Members of the Tamil diaspora are members of Canada's immediate community, but are also intimately connected to another community in another part of the world. Thus, Canada plays a unique role in post-conflict reconstruction in Sri Lanka, a role that Canada should embrace carefully, but without hesitation.

Bibliography

- Bose, Sumantra. *States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam Movement*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994.
- Canadian Tamil Congress. "The Case of Ocean Lady's 76 Tamil Refugees." Issue Brief. www.canadiantamilcongress.ca (accessed March 25, 2010).
- Cheran, R. "Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post-Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka." Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies (September 2003): www.sangam.org/articles/view2/523.pdf.
- Fair, Christine C. "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11, no. 1 (2005): 125-156. Accessed March 25, 2010. doi:10.1080/13537110590927845.
- Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar. *The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle for Identity*. Stuttgart, Germany: F. Steiner, 1994.
- International Crisis Group. "The Sri Lankan Diaspora After the LTTE." February 2010. Accessed March 25, 2010. www.crisisgroup.org.
- Manogaran, Chelvadurai, and Bryan Pfaffenberger. *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
- Mayilvaganan, M. "Is It Endgame for LTTE?" *Strategic Analysis* 33, no.1 (2009): 25-39.
- Ponnambalam, Satchi. *Sri Lanka National Conflict and the Tamil Liberation Struggle*. Surrey: Tamil Information Centre, 1983.
- Shain, Yossi. "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution." *SAIS Review* 22, no. 2 (July 2002): 115-144. Accessed March 25, 2010. http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10883142/v22i0002/115_trodicpor.
- Sheffer, Gabriel. "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security." *Survival* 36, no. 1 (1994): 60-79.
- Wayland, Sarah. "Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora." *Review of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (July 2004): 405-426. Accessed March 25, 2010. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097925>.