Winter 2000

Canada’s NATO Commitment: Current Controversies, Past Debates, and Future Issues

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Introduction

Canada has been a committed member of NATO since its founding in 1949. It has been one of Canada’s most controversial commitments—as evidenced by the recent debate about NATO enlargement and the controversy over NATO’s bombing of Kosovo and Serbia. In fact, we can probably expect yet another debate about Canada’s commitment to NATO later this year as Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has promised to question the Alliance’s continued reliance on nuclear deterrence. There is also bound to be future dissension over whether the allies should undertake a ‘second round of expansion’, taking in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. While issues related to NATO expansion and the war in Kosovo have dominated the news lately, it is also useful to stand back and look at Canada’s overall relationship to NATO. This essay surveys some current controversies, past debates, and possible future issues related to Canada’s NATO involvement since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.

Current Controversies

*Expanding NATO Membership could be Risky*

Last spring, before the war in Kosovo, NATO was preparing for its fiftieth anniversary celebration in April. The plans were to have a big party in Washington, Celine Dion was to sing, and NATO jet fighters were to fly in formation overhead. One
achievement the allies wanted to celebrate was NATO’s expansion from 16 to 19 members, taking in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the first round of NATO enlargement.

NATO expansion had been vigorously opposed by the Russians—every political party in Russia was opposed—but at the last moment President Boris Yeltsin agreed not to forcefully oppose NATO’s enlargement. Yet the issue still raised a great deal of controversy. Expansion was seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations and balance of power politics. There were fears it represented a reversal back to the policy of containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defence, and possibly extended deterrence. Others viewed expansion as a challenge to current efforts, under the United Nations (UN) for example, to coordinate security at lower levels of defence expenditure. In many respects, the issue of expansion raised other questions about priorities and preferences—should we expand a regional collective defence organisation, possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organisation, like the UN?

There were others who wrote about the possibility that NATO expansion could risk another security dilemma, that efforts NATO made to increase its security could lessen Russia’s sense of security, leading possibly to greater tensions, and possibly military competition—to another arms race in a divided Europe. Others argued that the West was being short-sighted. We—that is the West—were urging Russia to undertake onerous democratic and market reforms in a difficult period of transition. At the same time, NATO expansion would provide Russian nationalists with another excuse to turn back the clock, and reverse reforms.
Despite these criticisms, plans were made for NATO to expand in any case. But the big party last April was cancelled in favour of a quiet meeting about what to do about the crisis in Kosovo. The black ties and tuxedos were never unpacked.

Now that the first round of expansion has taken place, NATO policy-makers must forge a consensus among 19 allies—as NATO officially runs by consensus, not majority vote—to decide who will be accepted in the ‘second round’. There will still be risks that expansion, the first or the promised second round, could lead Russia to eventually move some of its conventional or nuclear arsenal into defensive positions along a newly-defined border, along a new Central Front.

We also do not know which countries to invite into NATO during the second round. Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Bulgaria want membership. NATO policy-makers are merely uttering ambiguous phrases right now, such as ‘the door is open’ to NATO expansion. Their reluctance stems, in part, from concerns about the risk of undermining the credibility of NATO’s article 5. I call article 5 ‘the three Musketeers’ article. It guarantees that an attack against one is an attack against all. This is by far the most important article in NATO’s founding treaty. For example, during the Kosovo debate, the fact that Serbia’s President had not actually attacked a NATO ally was raised as a salient issue. Technically, Mr. Slobodan Milosovic had not violated article 5. This important article raises other troubling questions. For instance, if Hungary, now a NATO ally, is drawn into a war with Romania over Transylvania, an area over which they have argued for centuries, are we automatically involved? Both countries made a great effort to patch up their differences in order to be invited into the NATO club. But a few years or decades from now, if they fall into an armed conflict (just
as Greece and Turkey—NATO allies—have done), would we be left in a quandary about our article 5 commitment?

It is fair to say that NATO expansion posed, and will continue to pose, a daunting challenge and commitment; one that is not entirely risk–free.

*The War in Yugoslavia and the Debate at Home:*

Most recently, the Canadian government’s strong support of NATO’s actions in Serbia and Kosovo during the war seemed to many to be proof of the country’s loyalty to the Alliance. For example, the fact that the Canadian government, along with most of the other allies, did not publicly raise doubts and reservations about the decision to bomb Serbia and Kosovo was presented by the United States Information Agency as proof of these countries’ basic allegiance to NATO.¹

However, the bombing did incite substantial public discussion about the role Canada should take in NATO’s management of the crisis in Kosovo and Serbia. It also prompted fears about the measure of Canada’s NATO obligations in case the war spilled over into the rest of the Balkans. During the crisis in Kosovo, concerns were voiced about whether Canada should condone bombing a sovereign country that had not attacked any member of the Alliance, and that was technically out of NATO’s territory of responsibility. That CF-18 Canadian fighter planes were sent to assist with the aerial bombing of Serbia and Kosovo prompted debate over whether air strikes were necessary or morally unjustifiable.²

Considerable controversy also arose over the prospect of contributing ground forces to Kosovo. Many radio hot-line shows burned up the airwaves on this issue, and
the question of whether we should take in refugees. The Defence Department housed thousands of refugees, temporarily, at various Canadian Forces bases. Not surprisingly, the possibility of a ground war in the former Yugoslavia incited a great deal of debate across the country and in the media.

While it is not yet known whether the federal cabinet was internally divided about all these sorts of questions, certain comments by Lloyd Axworthy indicate that, as Foreign Minister, he harboured reservations about unequivocally supporting NATO’s actions in the Balkans. Put simply, the war served to remind Canadians that NATO membership entails obligations and commitments that might be difficult to sustain.

As a NATO member, Canada has been a committed contributor to this international organization, and governments have wanted to remain constructively engaged for fifty years. But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you that any commitment entails obligations—challenging obligations that may be comforting at times, while very trying at others—sometimes even grounds for separation in more demanding circumstances. It is worth reflecting on how Canada has managed its relationship with NATO since the end of the Cold War.

**Debates since the End of the Cold War**

*Challenge and Commitment:*

The Mulroney government's 1987 *Defence White Paper*, was called “Challenge and Commitment,” or sometimes rather derisively the ‘coffee table white paper’ because of its many colour photographs. In 1987 the Defence Department promised a significant increase in defence spending—because of, ostensibly, the challenge from the Soviet
Union—and it promised to strengthen Canada's NATO commitments. Specifically, the government intended to acquire a fleet of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of 10-12 billion dollars. It wanted to double our troop strength in Europe and modernise our equipment on NATO’s Central Front for high-intensity warfare. Basically, the government committed to spend 183 billion dollars on defence over the next fifteen years until the year 2002. It was a very expensive package for countering the primary threat of the Cold War.

Then a couple of years later, in 1989, the Conservatives suddenly announced an abrupt change in defence policy, freezing defence spending. They cutback major capital expenditures. The nuclear submarines were cancelled, as well as new main battle tanks, and plans to deploy a division in Europe. It was evident, to almost everyone, that the nature of the threat from the Soviet Union—the challenge—had changed. We no longer had to, or could, devote so much money and resources toward improving our collective defence, particularly our NATO commitments.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and the Persian Gulf War in the winter of 1991, Canadians continued to debate whether there was any reason for Canada to retain its NATO commitments, especially its expensive troop commitment in Europe. The government spent approximately 1 billion dollars a year merely to maintain our troops in Europe—and that did not include the cost of training and equipping the rest of the Armed Forces, which were also structured primarily for big-league NATO roles, including war in Europe, with all the related costs of equipment, training and supply.

Withdrawing from the Central Front in Germany:
The government's September 1991 announcement of its intention to withdraw all but 1200 troops from the Central Front in Germany came as no great surprise. It was estimated that a gradual withdrawal would result in financial savings of some 1.2 billion dollars over five years. Then in February 1992, the Minister of Finance announced plans to withdraw Canada's contingent from Europe completely. The members of the Canadian delegation were given only a few hours’ notice of the change in policy. Initially the decision was difficult for them to justify, especially since Prime Minister Mulroney had only a few months before assured Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany that Canada intended to retain a visible military presence on European soil. The European allies and the American military representatives at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) sharply criticised the timing of Canada's decision, particularly as it was taken without consulting the other allies through proper channels.  

On the other hand, Canadian delegates to NATO and SHAPE in Brussels consoled themselves by pointing to the significant role Canada's Ambassador to NATO was playing in establishing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). They also lauded Canada's commitment to European security through its peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia.  

**Canadian Efforts to Promote NACC and Peacekeeping**

The idea of according former Warsaw Pact nations associate membership in NATO had been broached by Prime Minister Mulroney in 1991. When the possibility of associate status was rejected—mainly by Britain and France because of the security
guarantee it entailed—the Canadian Ambassador to NATO worked to institute a form of
NATO membership for the Eastern Europeans under NACC auspices.7

The portrayal of Canada's contribution to the peacekeeping operation in
Yugoslavia as a renewed contribution to European security was also a source of
consolation to the Canadians in Brussels, whose efforts were assisted by the high media-
profile of the Commander of the UN Forces, Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie.
Indeed, it was not long before Canadians at NATO headquarters were receiving requests
from the other allies, including Americans, for more information on peacekeeping. While
high-level representatives from allied countries such as Britain and Germany pointed out
that Canada's most valuable contribution to European security remained the maintenance
on European soil of troops earmarked for NATO, in the early 1990s it seemed as if the
sudden shift of interest to peacekeeping might somehow brighten Canada's image at
NATO headquarters.8

Although Canada's status at NATO headquarters appeared to diminish with the
announcement of the troop withdrawal, the general attitude of the Canadian delegation
was one of resignation; indications were that the Canadian announcement was a precursor
to similar announcements of reductions and cut-backs among the other allies. It was clear
that Canada would remain an active participant in the North Atlantic Council, in the
hundreds of committees at NATO and SHAPE, and in the discussions surrounding the
implementation of the ‘New Strategic Concept.’ As NATO’s Secretary-General,
Manfred Woerner, assured the allies in February 1992, after the announcement of the
troop withdrawal, Canada would meet its other commitments to NATO.9
Canada’s Continuing Alliance Commitments:

Despite the end of the Cold War, many of Canada's other NATO commitments remained unchanged after the 1992 announcement. For instance, the nation retained the capability to dispatch an expeditionary brigade group, two squadrons of CF-18s, and an air defence battery to Europe. The government was responsible for maintaining a Canadian Forces battalion prepared to deploy to Europe with the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force or the NATO Composite Force. Canadians continued to serve as part of the NATO Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system in Geilenkirchen, Germany, and as aircrew aboard NATO AEW aircraft. Canadian destroyers and frigates were prepared to sail with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic while eleven destroyers and frigates, one supply ship, three submarines, fourteen long-range patrol aircraft and twenty-five helicopters retained their role in patrolling the North Atlantic as part of NATO's ‘augmentation’ forces. Canada was to do its part to defend NATO's Canada-U.S. region as well as contribute to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), which is responsible for the defence of NATO's largest single land mass. Canada also offered the allied countries its facilities and territory for military training, such as those at CFB Goose Bay in Labrador and CFB Shilo in Manitoba, and the underwater naval testing range at Nanoose Bay in British Columbia.10

The Conservative government continued to demonstrate its support for NATO through other means. The portion of the infrastructure budget at NATO headquarters paid by Canada, although not widely known, was viewed at NATO headquarters as a significant contribution. The government's intention to retain approximately 650 Canadian personnel at NATO and SHAPE as military planners, attachés, and representatives on the Canadian delegation was also seen to be an important commitment. And the announcement regarding
the renewal of a ten-year contract to train approximately 6,000 German Armed Forces annually at CFB Shilo and CFB Goose Bay was described as yet another example of Canada's intention to help strengthen the Alliance. Although aboriginal residents complained about the environmental effects of low-flying jets, and Goose Bay was slated to be closed as the United States deemed it too expensive for training purposes, German and other NATO planes continued to train at this base.11

**The Chretien Government’s Defence Review:**

In November 1993, the new Liberal government of Jean Chretien announced a comprehensive review of Canadian defence policy, precipitating another debate about Canada’s NATO commitments. By February 1994, a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was established to initiate consultations and report to the government. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, some policy-makers continued to argue that the Alliance had to remain a priority for both defence and foreign policy. They emphasised the wide array of new conflicts in the world, particularly in Europe, the instability of the Russian leadership, and the remaining military threat. They advised that the government ensure the country had modern military equipment and sufficient tri-service personnel to fulfill the strategic requirements of deterrence as well as NATO's New Strategic Concept. Canada, they argued, must continue to structure and train its military for mid-to-high intensity combat operations. In testimony before the Special Joint Committee, they acceded that Canada should contribute to United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, but such contributions should remain a low priority for the Canadian Forces relative to their
general combat capability for defending Canada and its allies. As some argued, the alternatives posed a risk to security and stability as well as to Alliance relations. In their opinion, NATO was adapting to this new environment of uncertainty, and NATO alone retained the political coherence and military capabilities to ensure collective defence and security.\textsuperscript{12}

Others argued that NATO was now less a priority given the disintegration of the Soviet military threat and the disappearance of both the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. They noted the unlikelihood of an attack across Europe's Central Front, and frequently cited the historic inability of military alliances to combat diffuse threats such as ethnic conflict, environmental degradation, and human rights violations. Some suggested that Canada should de-emphasize its military commitments to NATO while retaining a diplomatic and consultative presence in the higher councils of the Alliance. Alternatively, many favoured increasing Canada's foreign aid and contributions to UN agencies and operations. There were also related proposals for new defence priorities that would emphasize the monitoring and surveillance of Canadian territorial waters and air space as well as expand the country's commitment to peacekeeping operations under UN auspices. Rather than attempt to maintain a general-purpose, combat-capable army, navy, and air force, there were calls for specialization. Accordingly, Canadian Forces should be restructured and retrained in order to contribute more productively to peacekeeping and the various initiatives outlined in the 1992 UN \textit{Agenda for Peace}. Given this new environment, there would be unnecessary risks and expenses in adhering to the prevailing assumptions, practices, and institutions of the past fifty years.\textsuperscript{13}
In the midst of this defence review, the government announced its commitment to the conversion of Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis in Nova Scotia into a multinational training centre for UN and NATO-affiliated personnel. At the new Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, the government planned to sponsor some training for military and civilian personnel from countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace, as well as from developing countries under Canada's Military Training Assistance Program. This decision provoked yet more controversy about peacekeeping training and the advisability of establishing a privatized peacekeeping training centre.14

_NATO and the 1994 Defence White Paper_

In December, the Department of National Defence released _The 1994 Defence White Paper_, announcing that Canada would remain a full and active member of NATO. The monolithic threat to Western Europe had disappeared, and the principal responsibility for European defence lay with the Europeans, but at the same time, the government valued the transatlantic link and recognised that the Alliance had made progress in adapting to a post-Cold War world. The _White Paper_ noted in particular those aspects of NATO that reflected a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of NACC, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force Concept. According to the _White Paper_, this perspective on NATO ‘underpinned’ the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces Canada maintained for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO.15 Yet for the first time, the
Defence Department consistently referred to Canada’s NATO defence commitments after pointing out the country’s UN obligations. This seemed to herald a fundamental reordering of Canada’s defence priorities.16

The Costs of NATO Enlargement:

Predictably, the release of this *White Paper* in 1994 did not terminate the debate over the measure and extent of Canada's NATO commitments. Gradually some high-level foreign and defence policy advisors became concerned about the costs of NATO enlargement for Canada. Prime Minister Jean Chretien initially supported expanding NATO membership from sixteen to twenty member states (adding Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia). However, estimates of the costs of enlargement tended to vary widely, in part because of uncertainty about the number of new members that should be admitted. Nevertheless, in 1997 many high-level American officials agreed that NATO expansion would cost somewhere between US$27 billion and US$35 billion over the next 13 years. Would Canada’s defence costs jump with NATO enlargement?

Behind-the-scenes, some senior policy-makers worried about the looming costs of NATO expansion in the twenty-first century, and about the extent to which Canada should or could support the rebuilding of the newer allies’ defence systems. In the weeks prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in the United States Congress, the US State Department concurred with NATO’s revised assessment that enlargement could cost only $1.5 billion rather than $27-35 billion. Yet these wide variations in estimates among such reputable analysts as the United States Congressional Budget Office, the Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters raised more questions about the
measure of Canada’s NATO commitments, and about whether all these estimates might prove to be low. Even as the Alliance opened the door to the first round of expansion, many Canadians worried about the potential cost of Canada’s NATO obligations.17

Future Issues

NATO’s Nuclear Strategy and the Middle Powers Initiative:

One issue that promises to incite further controversy revolves around Canada’s critique of NATO’s reliance upon nuclear deterrence strategy. The NATO Summit in Washington last April opened the door to a broad-ranging review of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy. NATO’s New Strategic Concept, which since 1991 has reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons, will be reviewed and re-examined. Pressure from the leaders of the Middle Powers Initiative and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Japan, may result in a serious review of the Strategic Concept. In particular, key policy-makers from the Middle Powers Initiative could influence NATO’s decision-making regarding its nuclear commitments, leading to important and subtle shifts in the Alliance’s deterrence strategy over the period between 2000-2002.

The issue that NATO has promised to review is of historical, practical, as well as theoretical interest. After fifty years of relying upon nuclear weapons for our defence, recent developments, including the end of the Cold War, have presented an opportunity to enter the new millennium with a plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Many distinguished world figures are arguing that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They believe
that the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, an opportunity that must be exploited quickly or it will be lost. They see the Middle Powers Initiative as a bold attempt to encourage NATO leaders to ‘break free from their Cold War mindsets’ and move rapidly to a nuclear weapon-free world.

Hundreds of international and nongovernmental organisations have focused on abolishing nuclear weapons, and to buttress this grassroots effort the Middle Powers Initiative was launched in 1998. Countries without nuclear weapons coalesced and are now lobbying the nuclear-armed nations to disarm themselves. Canadian Senator Douglas Roche is the chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative, and joining Canada as members are other non-nuclear weapon states, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Mexico. Whereas NATO’s Strategic Concept has hardly changed on the issue of maintaining reliance upon nuclear weapons since 1991, the Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by NATO heads on April 24, 1999, committed NATO to ‘review’ its strategic policy. At a news conference on April 24, Foreign Minister Axworthy confirmed the willingness of NATO “to have a review initiated” of its nuclear weapons policies. Explaining that this was the thrust of the recommendations that came out of the report of Canada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: “It’s a message that the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders… I think we have now gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that about.”\(^\text{18}\)
This gives the non-nuclear weapon states in NATO, and the 12 abstainers on the New Agenda Coalition’s 1998 resolution at the UN, a new opportunity to press for a ‘quality review’, not a perfunctory one. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative, headed by Senator Roche, believe that the NATO communiqué strengthens the possibility that appropriate representations can be made to a number of important countries around the world. Indeed, it was Canada, in its official policy statement, that urged NATO to begin a nuclear weapons review, and this was carried into the NATO Summit. Members of the Middle Powers Initiative are expected to press for further changes to NATO’s deterrence strategy in the near future. Success will depend on whether a new coalition of leaders from countries respected by the Nuclear Weapon States—especially by the United States—generates sufficient political momentum and media attention.

Conclusion

Canada’s policy record since the end of the Cold War indicates that we will remain committed to NATO, but on somewhat different terms than before. One seldom reaches the silver or golden anniversary in any relationship without experiencing doubts and the occasional shift in terms of commitment. Still, as many concede, this has been a relatively successful alliance over the last fifty years. The challenge for Canada, once again, is to remain constructively engaged—to chart a safer course—and to ensure NATO responds cost-effectively and responsibly. Canada must remind the other NATO allies that some arguments, controversy, debate, and dissension can and should be expected in what is alleged to be a democratic relationship—indeed, they may help improve this longstanding institution.
Biographical Note:

Erika Simpson (PhD, University of Toronto) is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. She has been a CIIPS Senior Barton Fellow, a DND Security and Defence Forum scholar, and a NATO Fellow. She has written numerous articles and a book on Canadian defence and foreign policy, *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders confront Critics* (McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming fall 2000). A frequent commentator on television and radio, she co-authored the original proposals to establish a Canadian and multinational peacekeeping training centre at former Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis, now the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
Most recently, it has come to light that NATO was internally fractured. For example, see “The Dilemmas of War: What went wrong for NATO?” CBC Television, 11 June 1999, online transcript available at http://tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/kosovo3/nato.html and “NATO’s inner Kosovo conflict,” BBC Two program, 20 August 1999, online transcript at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_425000/425468.stm

For some Canadian reservations about Canada’s NATO commitments, see and “Canada on the attack: daily military updates,” CBC News Online. Available at http://www.cbcnews.cbc.ca/news/indepth/canadaattack/updates.html and “Canadians against war on Yugoslavia,” available at http://www.stopwar.net/


See Erika Simpson, NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders confront Critics (forthcoming fall 2000: McGill-Queen’s University Press) for a detailed analysis of
Canada’s approach toward NATO after the end of the Cold War, 1987-1999 (ch. 1) and during the Cold War years, 1957-1987 (chs. 2-9).


6 Briefing by Ralph Lysyshyn, Deputy Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council, NATO headquarters, October, 1992 on NACC and interviews of Angela Bogden, Canadian Delegation, and Glen Brown, Canadian Liaison Officer, NATO headquarters, Brussels, October 1992.


9 "NATO greets troop pullout from Europe 'with regret'," Montreal Gazette, 27 February 1992. Despite Woerner's comments, apparently a classified report was issued at NATO headquarters that took Canada to task for the withdrawal. Confidential interview, NATO headquarters, October 1992.


Although this is a generalization of different positions, it is evident in various presentations to the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy. For example, see the testimony of Professor Michael Hennessy and Professor Greg Kennedy in Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 2, (19 April 1994); the testimony of Vice Admiral Daniel Mainguy (ret.) of the Defence Associations National Network, issue

13Once again, this is an approximation of various arguments and proposals. For testimony which reflects this approach, however, see for example the testimony of those affiliated with the ‘Canada 21 Council,’ including Donald Macdonald, Professor Janice Stein, and Maurice Archdeacon in Minutes and Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy, issue no. 3, (20 April 1994). See also the analysis put forward by Professor Harriet Critchley, issue no. 10, (9 May 1994); Admiral Robert Falls (ret.), issue no. 4, (26 April 1994); and, H. Peter Langille, issue no. 26, (21 June 1994). On the detailed recommendations of the Canada 21 Council see, Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century, (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, 1994). On the Agenda for Peace, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General, 31 January 1992, (New York: United Nations), 1992.


16 See for example, Ibid., 27-39.


Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the Canadian government’s stand on NATO and nuclear weapons, it is noteworthy that Canada recently abstained on crucial nuclear disarmament resolutions put forward by the New Agenda Coalition at the 1998 and 1999 sessions of the UN First Committee, and voted against resolutions put forward by China and Russia to strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. For more information on Canada’s weak voting record, see Senator Douglas Roche, “Canada’s voting record at the UN First Committee,” special issue on Ridding the World of Nuclear Weapons, Press for Conversion!, December 1999.