Rotman Events and Speakers Series

Evidence, Argument and Mixed Methods

Nancy Cartwright — Fri, 23 Mar 2012 18:04:42 PDT

Wiser Use of Social Science, Wiser Wishes, Wiser Policies

Nancy Cartwright — Fri, 23 Mar 2012 18:04:40 PDT

How Many Philosophers Does it Take to Haul a Ship? Thoughts on the Philosophical Reception of Ancient Greek Mechanics

Sylvia Berryman — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 20:51:51 PST

Unity, Change, and What There Is

Katherine Brading — Thu, 10 Nov 2011 20:21:43 PST

GMOs and Policy in a Complex, Diverse World

Sandra Mitchell — Mon, 17 Oct 2011 19:30:24 PDT

Bodily Immunity to Error

Frederique de Vignemont — Wed, 28 Sep 2011 22:47:39 PDT

The Experiential Origins of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel — Sun, 05 Jun 2011 17:06:07 PDT

Several recent authors - Loar, McGinn, Strawson, and Horgan, among others - have argued that the intentionality proper to conscious experience is somehow prior to, and grounds, other forms of intentionality. Here as elsewhere in philosophy, however, it is not always clear what is meant by "priority" and "grounding." Although the kind of priority these authors have in mind is distinctively metaphysical, in this paper I present a way of unpacking the priority of the intentionality proper to conscious experiences in epistemological terms.

Should Probabilities be Countably Additive?

Colin Howson — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:43:24 PDT

Three Concepts of Cause in Newton's Thought, Part 1

Andrew Janiak — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:43:22 PDT

Three Concepts of Cause in Newton's Thought, Part 2

Andrew Janiak — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:43:20 PDT

The Difference Between Ice Cream and Nazis: The Evolutionary Function of Moral Projection

Kyle Stanford — Sun, 17 Apr 2011 18:19:16 PDT

Six Signs of Scientism

Susan Haack — Thu, 20 Jan 2011 23:49:37 PST

Alienation and Its Dangers

Philip Kitcher — Tue, 23 Nov 2010 23:00:46 PST

Authority, Responsibility, and Democracy

Philip Kitcher — Tue, 23 Nov 2010 23:00:45 PST

Rotman Institute Opening

Joseph Rotman et al. — Tue, 23 Nov 2010 22:35:07 PST