Event Title

Objectivity—still an androcentric concept?

Presenter Information

Franziska Martinsen

Start Date

28-6-2010 10:45 AM

End Date

28-6-2010 12:15 PM

Description

This presentation is part of the Objectivity and Impartiality track.

The epistemological concept of objectivity and its commonly assumed inherent connotation as ‘neutral’, or as “a view from nowhere” (Th. Nagel) has been pungently contested and unmasked as particularly androcentric by feminist philosophers during the 1980s and 1990s, e.g. by N. Hartsock, S. Harding, D. Haraway, L. Code, E. Fox Keller, P. Hill Collins, S. Hekman and many others. For them, the main aim consisted not merely in the modification of certain circumstances of science, but rather in the fundamental change of both scientific and socio-political structures. According to this integral idea of emancipation, feminist theorists strived to invade the core of the issue: One of the most crucial criticisms brought forth by feminist theorists concerned the androcentric bias of philosophy as a whole. This view was based on the assumption that (western) philosophical thoughts reflect the maleness not only of the actors (e.g. the philosophers) or the social circumstances, but also of philosophy itself as a scientific discipline. They claimed that the traditional notion of objectivity as being neutral because of its abstraction from contextual and concrete aspects is to be doubted and critically reflected. Although ‘objectivity’ stands traditionally for (Weberian) value-neutrality par excellence, it is the very abstraction from concrete, ‘lifeworldly’ dimensions of the human existence which conceals the in fact double-valued dualisms within the philosophical thinking. These dualisms are characterized by a hierarchical gender-connotation, within which the allegedly feminine part of the dualism is seen as inferior (e.g. form versus matter, transcendence versus immanence, activity versus passivity, culture versus nature, rationality versus emotionality). Feminists criticized therefore the philosophical ideal of objectivity as being a ‘phallogocentric’ (J. Derrida) system of representation and value.

It seems, however, that the request to reflect the term ’objectivity’ concerning its gender-related implications has weakened in the course of the increasing institutionalization of gender topics within the realm of academic research, especially in the context of the paradigmatic shift from ‘women’/’feminist’ studies to ‘gender’/’intersectionality’ studies. Evidently, the feminists’ politically agonistic tendency has faded away, the close connection between politics and theory broke during the paradigm shift as put forward by deconstructivist and postmodern approaches. After an incipient enthusiasm over a possible resort from the simple man-woman-enmity, one can increasingly observe that the category gender looses its former subversive analytic power – both in epistemological and socio-cultural perspective.

There is one central problem I would like to discuss in my paper: Obviously, feminist epistemology particularly shows the insufficiency of refusing the scientific legitimation of gender hierarchies (e.g. the androcentric concept of objectivity) in order to initiate emancipatory processes. In my paper, I hold that there is a connection between the loss of emancipatory impulse in political/socio-cultural terms on the one hand and the decrease of the exploration of the underlying (e.g. androcentric) structure of the concept of objectivity on the other. As long as ‘objectivity’ will be considered as a value-neutral warrantor for non-sexist (non-racist etc.) science, an emancipatory practice (both in science and society) will be impeded.

In this context, it is the very dualistic structure of thinking itself, which is to be reflected again with regard to a revisited concept of objectivity. Even for critical scientists, it seems impossible to think one part of a conceptual couple without its counterpart. Therefore, it appears to be impossible not to think in dualistic terms, because couples are logically intertwined with each other. This structural and categorical condition of our thinking has far-reaching consequences in regard to the evaluation of binarity, since the difference between the two parts of a binary couple is not conceived as a simple dissimilarity or even a contrast, but as a contradiction (e.g. objectivity vs. subjectivity). Moreover, we have internalized the gender connotations of the following pairs of polarized opposites: mind - body, intellect - emotion, rationality - irrationality, autonomy - dependence, power - weakness, courage - modesty, publicity - domesticity, culture - nature (c.f. Aristotle’s category theory). The critical-epistemological question is here, whether dichotomies need necessarily be conceived as hierarchical. In other words, is there any alternative with regard to binarity?

My thesis in the paper is therefore, that a stricter methodological differentiation between an analysis concerning the phenomenological gender distinction on the one hand and an analysis on the basis of the logical/conceptual character of the gender distinction on the other is required in philosophy and theory of science. This differentiation could entail a more detailed qualification of the epistemological spectrum and its inherent values. (The gender-dichotomy serves here as the prime example for other potential hierarchical dichotomies which might bear insights for studies in the field of intersectionality.) Philosophical research could be committed to clarify, whether conceptions really have to be viewed through ‚polarizing glasses‘. The assessment of possible ways out of the hierarchical dichotomic raster could be settled thoroughly in the context of subversive infiltration of established norms and values. This kind of request would not entail a great revolution at first instance. However, revisiting the conception of “situated knowledges” (D. Haraway) may offer a theoretical grasp on genderness without any androcentric or other lopsided traps. For even feminists themselves are not immune to ideology! For Haraway, the possibility to meet the constraints of knowledge consists not in the ‘view from nowhere’, but rather in marked positions and perspectives. Haraway compasses the claim of cognition not to be disposed to arbitrariness, but to be applied constructively in the persuit of knowledge. A (self)critical reflection of conceptual dichotomies could make problematic gender connotations and values transparent instead of reproducing them. A pluralistic scope on research items could foil existing dualistic-hierarchical patterns of thinking by multiple constructive, subversive and interactive infiltrations. This need by no means result in a total destruction of values. The accretion of diverse new criteria can be understood as a utopian experiment with open outcome. The aim is, at least, to liberate concepts from hierarchical binarity.

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS
 
Jun 28th, 10:45 AM Jun 28th, 12:15 PM

Objectivity—still an androcentric concept?

This presentation is part of the Objectivity and Impartiality track.

The epistemological concept of objectivity and its commonly assumed inherent connotation as ‘neutral’, or as “a view from nowhere” (Th. Nagel) has been pungently contested and unmasked as particularly androcentric by feminist philosophers during the 1980s and 1990s, e.g. by N. Hartsock, S. Harding, D. Haraway, L. Code, E. Fox Keller, P. Hill Collins, S. Hekman and many others. For them, the main aim consisted not merely in the modification of certain circumstances of science, but rather in the fundamental change of both scientific and socio-political structures. According to this integral idea of emancipation, feminist theorists strived to invade the core of the issue: One of the most crucial criticisms brought forth by feminist theorists concerned the androcentric bias of philosophy as a whole. This view was based on the assumption that (western) philosophical thoughts reflect the maleness not only of the actors (e.g. the philosophers) or the social circumstances, but also of philosophy itself as a scientific discipline. They claimed that the traditional notion of objectivity as being neutral because of its abstraction from contextual and concrete aspects is to be doubted and critically reflected. Although ‘objectivity’ stands traditionally for (Weberian) value-neutrality par excellence, it is the very abstraction from concrete, ‘lifeworldly’ dimensions of the human existence which conceals the in fact double-valued dualisms within the philosophical thinking. These dualisms are characterized by a hierarchical gender-connotation, within which the allegedly feminine part of the dualism is seen as inferior (e.g. form versus matter, transcendence versus immanence, activity versus passivity, culture versus nature, rationality versus emotionality). Feminists criticized therefore the philosophical ideal of objectivity as being a ‘phallogocentric’ (J. Derrida) system of representation and value.

It seems, however, that the request to reflect the term ’objectivity’ concerning its gender-related implications has weakened in the course of the increasing institutionalization of gender topics within the realm of academic research, especially in the context of the paradigmatic shift from ‘women’/’feminist’ studies to ‘gender’/’intersectionality’ studies. Evidently, the feminists’ politically agonistic tendency has faded away, the close connection between politics and theory broke during the paradigm shift as put forward by deconstructivist and postmodern approaches. After an incipient enthusiasm over a possible resort from the simple man-woman-enmity, one can increasingly observe that the category gender looses its former subversive analytic power – both in epistemological and socio-cultural perspective.

There is one central problem I would like to discuss in my paper: Obviously, feminist epistemology particularly shows the insufficiency of refusing the scientific legitimation of gender hierarchies (e.g. the androcentric concept of objectivity) in order to initiate emancipatory processes. In my paper, I hold that there is a connection between the loss of emancipatory impulse in political/socio-cultural terms on the one hand and the decrease of the exploration of the underlying (e.g. androcentric) structure of the concept of objectivity on the other. As long as ‘objectivity’ will be considered as a value-neutral warrantor for non-sexist (non-racist etc.) science, an emancipatory practice (both in science and society) will be impeded.

In this context, it is the very dualistic structure of thinking itself, which is to be reflected again with regard to a revisited concept of objectivity. Even for critical scientists, it seems impossible to think one part of a conceptual couple without its counterpart. Therefore, it appears to be impossible not to think in dualistic terms, because couples are logically intertwined with each other. This structural and categorical condition of our thinking has far-reaching consequences in regard to the evaluation of binarity, since the difference between the two parts of a binary couple is not conceived as a simple dissimilarity or even a contrast, but as a contradiction (e.g. objectivity vs. subjectivity). Moreover, we have internalized the gender connotations of the following pairs of polarized opposites: mind - body, intellect - emotion, rationality - irrationality, autonomy - dependence, power - weakness, courage - modesty, publicity - domesticity, culture - nature (c.f. Aristotle’s category theory). The critical-epistemological question is here, whether dichotomies need necessarily be conceived as hierarchical. In other words, is there any alternative with regard to binarity?

My thesis in the paper is therefore, that a stricter methodological differentiation between an analysis concerning the phenomenological gender distinction on the one hand and an analysis on the basis of the logical/conceptual character of the gender distinction on the other is required in philosophy and theory of science. This differentiation could entail a more detailed qualification of the epistemological spectrum and its inherent values. (The gender-dichotomy serves here as the prime example for other potential hierarchical dichotomies which might bear insights for studies in the field of intersectionality.) Philosophical research could be committed to clarify, whether conceptions really have to be viewed through ‚polarizing glasses‘. The assessment of possible ways out of the hierarchical dichotomic raster could be settled thoroughly in the context of subversive infiltration of established norms and values. This kind of request would not entail a great revolution at first instance. However, revisiting the conception of “situated knowledges” (D. Haraway) may offer a theoretical grasp on genderness without any androcentric or other lopsided traps. For even feminists themselves are not immune to ideology! For Haraway, the possibility to meet the constraints of knowledge consists not in the ‘view from nowhere’, but rather in marked positions and perspectives. Haraway compasses the claim of cognition not to be disposed to arbitrariness, but to be applied constructively in the persuit of knowledge. A (self)critical reflection of conceptual dichotomies could make problematic gender connotations and values transparent instead of reproducing them. A pluralistic scope on research items could foil existing dualistic-hierarchical patterns of thinking by multiple constructive, subversive and interactive infiltrations. This need by no means result in a total destruction of values. The accretion of diverse new criteria can be understood as a utopian experiment with open outcome. The aim is, at least, to liberate concepts from hierarchical binarity.