May 2017

Neither Here Nor There: Northern Ireland, Myth, and the People In Between

Amanda L. Judge
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Dr. Brock Millman
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in History

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

© Amanda L. Judge 2017

Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd

Part of the European History Commons

Recommended Citation
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4513

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact tadam@uwo.ca.
ABSTRACT

Northern Ireland is often portrayed in political, journalistic, and academic literature as having two main communities – Catholic/Irish/nationalist/republicans and Protestant/British/unionist/loyalists. This study argues that there is a Third Community in Northern Ireland that consists of political moderates, those who resist categorization into these two communities, and those who consistently defy traditional communal boundaries. Through an examination of primary and secondary sources, including political party literature, the press, web sites, poetry, short stories, music, and important academic studies, this community is depicted in great detail. It has a history and a mythology in addition to its own political ideals, symbolism, and rituals. Most importantly, the Third Community was a supportive force in the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and itself benefited from that journey to compromise. The Third Community has helped to ensure the continuation of a much more peaceful and progressive Northern Ireland in the years since the 1998 accord.

This study is comprehensive, dealing with politics and culture, rather than one or the other. It challenges the misconception that the Third Community is small and inferior to the two traditional majority communities in the quest for compromise. This study also builds on previous work by demonstrating that shared cultural elements can be and are used to create the Third Community, rather than just two divided and often hostile ethnic groups. Furthermore, despite traditional hostilities, people in Northern Ireland have a number of different identities - religion and nationality do not govern all people at all times. In the Third Community there is room for differences and for what people have in
common. The Good Friday Agreement reflects this reality as it combines recognition of different identities with shared aims, such as peace and equality.

Finally, contrary to the emphasis on continued division and hostility that appear in other studies, this work argues that mindsets have changed in Northern Ireland. The post-Agreement era has seen genuine change in the Province as former enemies governed together within the framework of the GFA and militant dissidents are firmly rejected by society in general. The continuance of peace remains of greater importance than the violent defence of different traditions.

Keywords

DEDICATION

For my parents, Elizabeth and David Judge, and my grandfather, Bud Goetz, without whose support I never could have pursued the life I wanted.

I also dedicate this dissertation to my grandmother, Theresa Judge, whose generosity has enabled me to continue my academic studies. She made me promise I would not give up.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks to my advisor, Dr. Brock Millman, of Western University, for his incredible patience during the writing process and his invaluable suggestions for content and for detail. Without his assistance, this project could not have been completed.

I want to acknowledge the skilled assistance of the D.B. Weldon Library staff, especially Mr. David Murphy, for their help in obtaining materials and for offering instruction in new library technology. Thanks also to the staff of the Linenhall Library in Belfast, in particular Ms. Monica Cash, for their assistance and generosity, scanning and sending documents that I could not have accessed otherwise.

A number of individuals assisted by answering inquiries and providing documents related to the groups and organizations with which they are involved. Among them are Mr. Paul McLaughlin of the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA); John Hardy, Chair of the Green Party (Northern Ireland); Kevin Kerr, Membership Secretary of the Humanist Association of Northern Ireland (Humani); Brian McLinton of Humani; Boyd Sleator, Development Officer of the Northern Ireland Humanists, and Carole Stapleton, Personal assistant to the Chief Executive Officer of the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education (NICIE).

I am also greatly indebted to my family and friends for their love and support. Thank you to my parents, Elizabeth and David Judge, and to my grandparents, Bud Goetz and Terry Judge. Thanks as well to my dearest friends, Dr. Patricia Skidmore and Dr. Sharon Roberts, for listening to me talk about my work and offering their assistance. Finally, to my beloved friend Jaclyn Hamilton and her wonderful children, Jack and
Alice, who never failed to make me smile even during the most difficult times. I love you all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... ii

DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... vii

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ xi

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... xiv

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

The Political Context: 1969 to the Present ......................................................................... 17

CHAPTER 1: COMMUNITIES AND MYTHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND ....................... 25

The “Two Communities” and their Cultures and Myths ...................................................... 25

Shared Traditions, Ambiguities, and Contradictions .......................................................... 31

Parades and Symbols ........................................................................................................... 31

The Past and its Uses .......................................................................................................... 36

Identity and Allegiance ....................................................................................................... 39

The “Third Community” and the “Third Myth” .................................................................. 44

CHAPTER 2: DELINEATING THE “THIRD COMMUNITY”

PART 1: WHO ARE “THE PEOPLE IN BETWEEN?” ......................................................... 48

Non-Traditional Catholics .................................................................................................. 48

Non-Traditional Protestants ............................................................................................... 53

Atheists, Humanists, and the Non-Religious ..................................................................... 57

Intermarried Couples ......................................................................................................... 65

CHAPTER 3: DELINEATING THE “THIRD COMMUNITY”

PART 2: UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, AND IDENTITY .................. 74

Ethnicity .................................................................................................................................. 74

Nations and Nationalism ...................................................................................................... 75

Identity, Pluralism, and the Nation ....................................................................................... 77

Ethnicity and Nationalism in Northern Ireland ................................................................... 78

Geographical and Political Factors ..................................................................................... 83

CHAPTER 4: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:

EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH

SOCIETY

PART 1: THE CHURCHES AND PEACE GROUPS .............................................................. 89

The Churches and Clergy ..................................................................................................... 89

The Churches: Human Rights, Violence, and Peace ............................................................... 96

Peace Organizations and Activities ...................................................................................... 108
The Corrymeela Community ................................................................. 108
Peace People .................................................................................. 110
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 118

CHAPTER 5: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 2: THE POLITICAL MIDDLE GROUND ...................................... 119
  Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) ................................... 119
  Women’s Activism, Feminism, and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC) .............................................................. 133
  The Green Party ........................................................................... 146
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 155

CHAPTER 6: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 3: ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNITY AND TRANSCENDENCE .......... 156
  The Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Northern Ireland Committee .... 157
  The Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA) ................. 161
  Integrated Education and its Advocates ...................................... 166
  Humanist Groups and Progressive Thinkers .................................. 170
    Platform for Change ................................................................... 177
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 179

CHAPTER 7: CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN’S LAND":
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY
PART 1: MUSIC AND LITERATURE .................................................. 180
  Music ........................................................................................... 182
    Classical and Chamber Music .................................................. 182
    Traditional Music ..................................................................... 189
    Popular Music ......................................................................... 195
  Literature .................................................................................... 203
    Poetry ...................................................................................... 203
    Short Stories .......................................................................... 208
Conclusion ..................................................................................... 213

CHAPTER 8: CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN’S LAND":
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY
PART 2: SPORT .................................................................................. 214
  The GAA .................................................................................... 215
  Cricket ....................................................................................... 216
Rugby .......................................................................................................................... 218
Field Hockey............................................................................................................... 221
Association Football................................................................................................. 223
Boxing......................................................................................................................... 232
Equestrian Sport......................................................................................................... 237
Golf.............................................................................................................................. 238
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 245

CHAPTER 9: MYTH AND THE THIRD COMMUNITY:
THE ‘REAL’ OR ‘DECENT’ PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND ................. 247
A Pattern is Set: Third Community Responses to Violence in 1972 .......... 247
Anti-Violence, Remembrance, and the Third Community from the 1980s .... 253
The “Decent” People of Northern Ireland................................................................. 253
Angels and Demons: Peaceful Martyrs and "Hell-Inspired Monsters" ...... 256
Rituals of Sorrow and Commemoration................................................................. 261
Cross-Community Victims: The Quinn Children and Catholic Policemen... 268
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 284

CHAPTER 10: THE QUEST FOR COMPROMISE:
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (10 APRIL 1998)
........................................................................................................................................ 285
The Struggle for a Middle Ground Resolution in the 1970s ......................... 285
Setting the Stage for Success: The Gradual Revival of Moderation in the
1980s.................................................................................................................................. 290
The Triumph of Moderation in the 1990s: Good Friday Agreement (1998).... 304
Initiative ’92 and the Opsahl Commission................................................................. 306
The Journey to Compromise: Republicans, Mainstream Politicians, and the
People ........................................................................................................................... 317
The Good Friday Agreement and the “Yes” Campaign...................................... 342
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 346

CHAPTER 11: A NEW NORTHERN IRELAND: STAYING THE COURSE.... 347
Devolution and Decommissioning ....................................................................... 347
Promising Developments: Policing and Cross-Border Cooperation.............. 355
The Rise of Sinn Fein and the DUP......................................................................... 362
Political Progress of the "Radicals".......................................................................... 366
Devolution Achieved................................................................................................. 380

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 386
ENDNOTES................................................................................................................ 393
# LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 600

Table 2: Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 600

Table 3: Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 600

Table 4: Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 601

Table 5: Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 601

Table 6: Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 601

Table 7: Political Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 601

Table 8: Political Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 602

Table 9: Political Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 602

Table 10: Political Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 602

Table 11: Political Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 602

Table 12: Political Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 602

Table 13: Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) .......................................................... 603

Table 14: Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) .......................................................... 603
Table 15: Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) ........................................ 603

Table 16: Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) ........................................ 604

Table 17: Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) ........................................ 604

Table 18: Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys) ........................................ 604

Table 19: Percentages of Same-Religion and Different Religion Partnerships/Marriages (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys) ......................... 605

Table 20: Percentages of Same-Religion and Different Religion Partnerships/Marriages (According to NILT (1998-2005) Surveys) ......................... 605

Table 21 (Graph 1): Protestant and Catholic Identities Over Time .......................... 605

Table 22 (Graph 2): No Religion, Religion Not Stated, and Methodist Populations (According to the 1991, 2001, and 2011 Censuses) ................................. 606
# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Church of Ireland Provinces ......................................................... 90
Figure 2: Irish Political Borders ................................................................. 91
Figure 3: Irish Churches Peace Project Logo/Banner ............................... 103
Figure 4: Youthlink Logo ........................................................................ 106
Figure 5: Youthlink Banner 2013 .............................................................. 107
Figure 6: Corrymeela Symbol ................................................................. 110
Figure 7: APNI Assembly Elections Manifesto Image (Stormont) (2003) ...... 131
Figure 8: APNI Assembly Elections Manifesto (2003) Stability and Diversity Banners ............................................................ 132
Figure 9: Alliance Party Assembly Election Manifesto Image (2011) ............. 133
Figure 10: Green Party Northern Ireland Logo .......................................... 154
Figure 11: European Green Party Banner .................................................. 154
Figure 12: Green Party in Ireland Logo ...................................................... 154
Figure 13: NIMMA Logo (Present Version) ................................................. 164
Figure 14: NIMMA Logo (Earlier Version) .................................................. 164
Figure 15: Introduction to NIMMA (Pamphlet Image) ............................... 165
Figure 16: Getting Married (Pamphlet Image) ............................................. 165
Figure 17: British & Irish Lions Logo ......................................................... 221
Figure 18: Team Ireland Equestrian Logo .................................................. 237
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACT – All Children Together
AIA – Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985)
AOH – Ancient Order of Hibernians
APNI – The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland
BHG – Belfast Humanist Group
BIC – British Irish Council
BIIC – British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference
BMS – Belfast Music Society
CGI – Confederation of Golf in Ireland
CIRA – Continuity IRA
DSD – Downing Street Declaration (1993)
DUP – Democratic Unionist Party
EWL – European Women’s Lobby
FAI – Football Association of Ireland
GAA – Gaelic Athletic Association
GFA – Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) (1998)
GPNI – Green Party Northern Ireland
GUI – Golfing Union of Ireland
HSI – Horse Sport Ireland
HUMANI – Humanist Association of Northern Ireland
IABA – Irish Amateur Boxing Association/Irish Athletic Boxing Association
ICBC – Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference
ICC – Irish Council of Churches
ICPP – Irish Churches Peace Project
ICTU – Irish Congress of Trade Unions
IEF – Integrated Education Fund
IFA – Irish Football Association
IICD – Independent International Commission on Decommissioning
ILGU – Irish Ladies Golfing Union
IMC – Independent Monitoring Commission
INLA – Irish National Liberation Army
INTO – Irish National Teachers’ Organisation
IPP – Irish Parliamentary Party
IRA – Irish Republican Army
IRB – Irish Republican Brotherhood
IRFU – Irish Rugby Football Union
LVF – Loyalist Volunteer Force
MEP – Member of European Parliament
NGO – Non-government organization
NIC – Northern Ireland Committee (Irish Congress of Trade Unions)
NICIE – Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education
NICRA – Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NIHE – Northern Ireland Housing Executive
NIMMA – Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association
NIO – Northern Ireland Office
NIWAF – Northern Ireland Women’s Aid Federation
NIWC – Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition
NIWRM – Northern Ireland Women’s Rights Movement
NIWEP – Northern Ireland Women’s European Platform
NSMC – North South Ministerial Council
NWCI – National Women’s Council of Ireland
OIRA – Official IRA
PIRA – Provisional IRA
PSNI – Police Service of Northern Ireland
PUP – Progressive Unionist Party
RHC – Red Hand Commando
RIRA – Real IRA
RTÉ - Raidió Teilifís Éireann
RUC – Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP – Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF – Sinn Fein
SNI – Sport Northern Ireland
SSO – Studio Symphony Orchestra
UDA – Ulster Defence Association
UDP – Ulster Democratic Party
UFF – Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA)
UKUP – United Kingdom Unionist Party
UO – Ulster Orchestra
UPNI – Unionist Party of Northern Ireland

UPRG – Ulster Political Research Group

UUC – Ulster Unionist Council

UUP – Ulster Unionist Party

UUUC – United Ulster Unionist Council

UTU – Ulster Teachers’ Union

UVF – Ulster Volunteer Force

UWC – Ulster Workers Council

WAG – Women’s Aid Federation

WIG – Women’s Information Group

WILPF – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

WRDA – Women’s Resource and Development Agency
INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that Northern Ireland is a divided society. Its population is divided along political, social, cultural, and religious lines, consisting broadly of the Catholic/nationalist population and the Protestant/unionist population. Traditionally, the former have supported reunification with the South of Ireland in an independent republic. Protestants and unionists, meanwhile, have consistently wanted to maintain Northern Ireland's place as part of the UK. Within each of these communities there have existed radical wings who have supported the use of militant tactics to achieve their goals. These extremists are most easily referred to as republicans on the nationalist (Catholic) side and loyalists on the unionist (Protestant) side.¹ Both the Catholic and Protestant communities also have cultures and myths that, at first glance, appear to set them completely apart from each other.

Despite these divisions, Northern Ireland has gone through many political changes and developments since the onset of the “Troubles” in 1969, including a “Peace Process” that went on for well over a decade as the struggle to find a final resolution to the situation took place. Acceptance by the majority of voters within Northern Ireland as well as the Irish Republic of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 has been viewed by some as a major turning point. Since then, despite some major setbacks, the principle of power-sharing between Catholics and Protestants, supporters of a united Ireland and supporters of the continued existence of Northern Ireland within the UK, has been upheld.² Protestant hardliner Ian Paisley (Democratic Unionist Party) and republican Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein headed a power-sharing executive and assembly in the offices of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively, despite the fact that
Paisley had originally been very much against the Good Friday Agreement.\(^3\) Paisley held the First Minister's position from May of 2007 to June of 2008 when Peter Robinson took over as DUP leader and First Minister. The DUP’s Arlene Foster became First Minister in January of 2016 and remains head of the party. Martin McGuinness continued as Deputy First Minister until January of 2017. He passed away in March of that year.\(^4\)

Academics have acknowledged the division in Northern Irish society; however, despite the clear existence of “two communities” in Northern Ireland, some scholars have pointed to the fact that the population of Northern Ireland is more complex than this framework allows.\(^5\) As Boyle and Hadden have argued, while the existence of “two communities” cannot be denied, “their composition is flexible and variable and there is a significant third community in between.” This “third community” very likely consists of people in “mixed marriages”, immigrants, and people who, for whatever reason, do not wish to be forced into one group or the other. Furthermore, this community contains Catholics and Protestants, unionists and nationalists, "who want to be left to get on with living peacefully together."\(^6\) Paul Dixon acknowledges the third community as well, noting the existence of “a much smaller third group, perhaps a few per cent...who reject the domination of nationalism and unionism and see themselves as occupying the ‘moderate’ centre ground between the two dominant unionist and nationalist communities”.\(^7\) Pamela Clayton emphasizes the existence of moderates, noting that they emphasize "what unites the people of Northern Ireland and associate the majority of Catholics with the Protestant majority in their desire for peace and friendly relations, excluding only Sinn Fein and republican paramilitaries."\(^8\)
An even more complex vision of Northern Ireland society has been put forth by several scholars. Buckley and Kenny note that people have many identities/"partial identities", depending on the situation or context they are in. They recognize Protestant and Catholic communal divisions, but argue that Northern Ireland's two communities possess cultures that are strikingly alike and "The two ethnic identities are, in effect, constructed in similar ways from the same cultural materials." Protestants and Catholics who dwell in a particular area and share membership in "the same social class" probably have very similar cultural backgrounds. Still, Buckley and Kenny argue that "Ethnic and other forms of identity" come from how groups have interacted with one another: "The identification of Catholics with the whole island of Ireland and of Protestants with Ulster and the United Kingdom has little to do with cultural similarities and differences. It has a lot to do with power relationships between the endogamous social groups." Nonetheless, a lot of people in Northern Ireland want peace and most individuals go about their business without religion, Orange Order membership, and the like dominating their existence. They are not mainly preoccupied each day with emphasizing "the distinctiveness of their ethnic identities."

More recently, Nic Craith has questioned the notion of two traditions in Northern Ireland – the concept itself as well as the wisdom of its use and the reasons for its popularity. Nic Craith acknowledges that “two major self-defined ethnic groups” exist within the Province. However, she argues that one cannot state with confidence that these groups have “separate cultural traditions.” Catholics and Protestants utilize “similar symbols and traditions” – for example, loyalists as well as republicans consider Cú Chulainn (a legendary hero) important and they both claim him. A lot of traditions
associated with Catholics and Protestants once were shared. Furthermore, often traditions or practices are linked to class as opposed to religion, area, and so on. Creation of murals in Northern Ireland, for instance, is not an activity of the wealthier but of the economically deprived classes. At this level, nationalists and unionists are involved. In addition, Nic Craith argues that “many traits of Northern Irish society are not particularly representative of an Irish or British cultural tradition.” The fact is, the peoples of “the British Isles have had a considerable influence on one another” and “share many common narratives.”

While the concepts of two communities and two separate cultures have been seriously questioned, the notion of a moderate, shared, or center ground has been expressed at the cultural and mythological level by some scholars in the idea of a “Fifth Province.” Although nationalist/republican and loyalist traditions have their own mythologies, symbols, and belief systems, as will be shown, “Editorial 1/Endodermis” from Hederman and Kearney’s 1977 edition of the Crane Bag asserted that “There must be a no-man’s land, a neutral ground where things can detach themselves from all partisan and prejudiced connection and display themselves as they are in themselves.” The editorial went on to point out that Ireland has four provinces which have been around since ancient times. However, in Irish, cóiced is “province”, but this word translates to “a ‘fifth’.” Still, no consensus exists as to what the fifth is or where it can be found. According to one tradition, the five provinces came together “at the Stone of Divisions on the Hill of Uisnech,” Ireland’s center point. At Uisnech, conflicts ended. Another tradition argues that Meath was “the fifth province.” Most importantly, however, each of these traditions separate the island “into four quarters and a ‘middle’.” According to this
editorial, Ireland’s “political centre” was Tara. However, this other middle was very significant too “and acted as a necessary balance. It was a non-political centre.” Both were needed and “acted like two kidneys in the body of the land. The balance between the two was essential to peace and harmony in the country.”

Similarly, using the Crane Bag image, “Editorial II/Epidermis” added an additional perspective to that of the first. Here the argument was made that the Crane Bag (or fifth province) does not take a particular stance, is not located in a specific place, for none are unaligned or neutral. Indeed, “truth…is always plural.” According to this editorial, “The Crane Bag is empty until it finds contributors” and the latter have specific stances and ideas. The Bag does not turn into what it contains. Rather, it “holds these [things] in a tension which unites them in their very difference.” As is the case with the Crane Bag, “the fifth province is nothing without the other four.”

Imelda Colgan McCarthy echoes the notion of a mythological Fifth Province, noting that, essentially, the Fifth Province was and is metaphoric, drawn from Celtic myth. It was a non-partisan ground on which differing views and experiences could interact. A holy location for Druids, provincial leaders came there to resolve differences as well as get advice. They would arrive weaponless. In the Fifth Province “conflicts and oppositions were presented, accepted and re-viewed in dialogue.” At this location, the various different perspectives “met and were held together so that divisions could be transcended and new harmonious solutions might emerge….this was a place where spiritual solutions emerged for pragmatic difficulties.” Nonetheless, this Province likely “never existed in historical time or in geographical space.” Shannon Bugos concurs, arguing that this Province is a location of the imagination. It comes from “a belief in the
lost secret center of Ireland where prejudices fell away and harmony thrived.” It can and has been created in and through art. She emphasizes the importance of the imagination for resolution of conflict, arguing that “in the end peace comes from those who have experienced violence at its worst yet can still imagine a peaceful future.”

The strength and impact of a Third Community and moderate center in Northern Ireland, with a particular focus on peace and voluntary groups and NGOs, has been assessed by academics. Boyle and Haddon’s early 1994 analysis recognized that allowing the people to have a role in finding a resolution had some merit. Such a notion rested on the idea that many ordinary Catholics and Protestants were more prepared "to compromise" than those who represented them politically. According to Boyle and Haddon, surveys and the Opsahl Commission offered an indication that this notion had a basis in reality. It ought to be possible for Britain and Ireland "to harness sufficient popular support for a package deal to make it difficult either for party leaders to refuse to cooperate with it or for paramilitaries to continue to oppose it." Their analysis, however, was completed before the Peace Process had come even close to reaching a settlement. Paul Dixon, in contrast, takes issue with elements of this "Civil Society approach" when dealing with "conflict resolution". He contends that the evidence does not indicate that political leaders do not reflect the views of supporters when it comes to constitutional issues. While the SDLP did not suffer politically for taking part "in power-sharing" in 1973 to 1974, the Unionists did, as did Alliance. Dixon points out that Terence O'Neill and Brian Faulkner both seriously undermined themselves politically when they made compromises or gestures to "the other side". Even the elections to the Forum in 1996 saw the more intransigent unionists doing very well. Dixon also points
out that "The power of 'uncivil' society over 'civil' society, demonstrated...in the Ulster Workers Council Strike 1974 but also in events around the Siege of Drumcree in July 1996, is impressive."20 For Dixon, the 1998 accord came about "in spite of the fact that Northern Ireland appeared to be more divided in 1998 than it had been in 1989."

Evidence from polls did not support "public convergence driving the GFA."21

Feargal Cochrane takes a different perspective, arguing that, while local and international elites "have had the most immediate effect on the political process," civil society's role cannot be ignored.22 He focuses especially on "P/CROS" - "peace/conflict resolution organisations," arguing that they significantly but indirectly influenced the peace process.23 Indeed, the 1998 accord probably would not have been reached if not for Sinn Fein, the UDP, PUP as well as NIWC. Considering that "'community activism'" was very important to all of these groups, it can be argued "that the voluntary and community sector, and the wider civil society in which it is located, was pivotal to the success of the 'peace process'." Such groups offered people the chance to leave militancy and ultimately influence the peace process directly through Sinn Fein, the NIWC, and the PUP.24 Adrian Guelke similarly draws attention to the power of civil society, noting that at certain points, before as well as in the midst of the peace process, civil society was very involved in Northern Ireland politics. There was the Opsahl Commission as well as the independent campaign to achieve a Yes vote on the 1998 accord. The former's suggestions and the accord are alike in various ways, indicating that the Commission had some impact. Furthermore, the Yes campaign had some responsibility for the success of the referendum on the accord. Civil society also provided backing for the accord when problems arose regarding "implementation." There is evidence, though, that mindsets
and views in the Province, overall, have not really changed a lot because of civil society's efforts. Politics remains divided. Indeed, according to Guelke, civil society's impact went down after the referendum. As the Agreement was a consociational one, the focus was on the elite again.\textsuperscript{25}

More recently, Maria Power has acknowledged the importance of the presence and work of peace groups since the Troubles began, arguing that they have tried to offer "an alternative vision to the polarisation that has dominated Northern Irish politics since partition." In her view, the "community relations" and peace segments of society were important in finding a way out of conflict. Civil society groups provided backing for the Agreement, trying to get people to support it at the polls. She notes that leaders of civil society, community relations bodies, and so on are able to relay their supporters' outlooks to political and elite leaders. This could be seen at the time of the talks that resulted in the accord. Nonetheless, she contends that the Agreement reinforced division, recognizing the main dividing line between two communities. Northern Ireland is still not at peace and divisions have not gone away.\textsuperscript{26}

Finally, Timothy J. White has argued that the impact of peace and community relations groups has not been viewed as really significant because of the extent of communal division and mistrust. If they had not existed, though, the conflict could have been more horrible and there might have been "less fertile ground for the emergence of the peace process." Nonetheless, White's analysis is more prescriptive and focuses on the future. He argues that civil society is key when it comes to achieving genuine peace under the accord and that not many groups have really managed to connect the two communities "to help foster a civil society in Northern Ireland." An opportunity for the
development of "civil society", however, has been brought about by the peace process as well as the 1998 settlement. Violence in the Province has been lowered by both of these developments. White believes "that increased cross-communal association would put democratic pressure on political elites to bargain and compromise. This would consolidate the fledgling democratic framework and institutions created by the Agreement." Importantly, White believes that civil society "is not created by voluntary associations as much as it reflects...public culture. Changes in public culture prompt associational groups to emerge across communal lines and foster civil society."27

Despite the excellent work done on the middle ground community and its influence on the peace process, studies have been very fragmented. A focus on the cultural or political realm, rather than both, is common as are more narrow case studies examining particular groups, sections of society, or types of cultural output, such as peace organizations, the churches, sport, or literature.28 This study takes a much broader, more comprehensive view, embracing this Third Community’s history, civil society presence, symbolism, political and cultural expressions, mythology, and contribution to the peace process, the 1998 Agreement, and developments since. This study represents the most comprehensive and up to date examination of this community available.

In particular, this study reveals that there is indeed an identifiable Third Community in Northern Ireland and it is more complex than scholars such as Dixon have allowed. To begin with, Dixon’s definition of the Third Community is far too narrow. It is not, in fact, a small community and it has proved to be very beneficial to the peace process. Boyle and Haddon’s definition is much more accurate, recognizing that this community embraces people who are part of the Catholic/nationalist and
Protestant/unionist populations, in addition to more unaligned groups and individuals. This study builds on and updates Boyle and Haddon’s 1994 work by exploring this community’s levels and ways of expressing itself – elite, civic, popular, cultural, ritual, symbolic, mythic, political, and personal. This study also goes beyond the broad outlines of membership offered by Boyle and Haddon, to examine a wide range of more specific groups and organizations that create and reinforce the Third Community. In addition, it incorporates detailed study of the symbols and rhetoric of groups often ignored, such as the Green Party and humanist organizations, whose significance in the culture of the region is increasing.

This study also adapts and expands the notion of the “Fifth Province” to detail what amounts to a third tradition in Northern Ireland. As will be shown, the Third Community has a history and has its own political, artistic, ritual, symbolic, and mythic expressions. Between the republican “martyrs for a united Ireland” and the loyalist “No Surrender” there is a moderate, more cross-community, vision that rejects violence, highlights the "decent" people of Northern Ireland, and envisions a peaceful, shared, even progressive, society. Although the concept of the Fifth Province is a useful one for discussing this mythological dimension, this “myth” reaches beyond the boundaries of art and poetry and is actively lived and created in Northern Ireland politics and culture. The Third Community has created safe, neutral ground in peace/reconciliation organizations such as Corrymeela, collectively demonstrated in favour of shared goals, such as an end to violence, and openly maintained their differences while working together, for example in the NIWC and through the GFA. Ultimately, the Third Community is both “a neutral ground,” as expressed by “Editoral I”, and a place where
differences exist together, as outlined by “Editoral II” – sometimes “in tension”, but
together nonetheless.

The co-existence of plurality and common ground, as noted above, is key to this
study, which builds on the work of Buckley and Kenny, Nic Craith, Jarman, and Bryan.31
The shared cultural elements noted by these scholars are not used solely to create or
reinforce two different communities, identities, cultures, and mythologies. Nor is it a
case of one side only proclaiming a shared history. Rather, these elements are used to
create a Third Community and mythology, a neutral ground, and/or a shared space with
common aims – peace, stability, good relations, athletic victory, commemoration, to
name but a few, open to all “decent” people, regardless of background. In such contexts,
both sides together acknowledge what is shared. For example, traditional “sectarian”
activities such as parading and protest have become shared rituals of opposition to
violence and sectarian hatred. Nonetheless, this shared Third Community identity is open
and flexible enough to encompass the variety of identities people otherwise hold.
Through literature, political parties, sport, peace groups, parades, and so on, it can be
seen how similar language and techniques, including imagery and symbolism, are used to
create neutral ground, reflect pluralist realities, and create and reinforce a moderate, non-
violent, “decent” tradition.

It is this pluralist reality combined with a common ground that underlies the
significance of the Third Community’s contribution to, and the benefits it received from,
the peace process. A person can be firmly in the unionist or nationalist camp, but
compromise on a resolution because they abhor violence and want to move forward and
these feelings, their membership in the “decent” Third Community, are stronger than
their sectarian or political allegiances. These are the people who, as Buckley and Kenny point out, want to live normal, stable lives. Although, Buckley and Kenny argue that identity comes from group interactions in a major way, this does not necessarily mean that those groups must be at odds with one another. Many Third Community groups are cross-community, deliberately so, and, in some major areas, such as the Churches and sport, cross border as well. Therefore, their internal relationships and perceptions can and do differ from the traditional sectarian pattern and they can act on these experiences and engage in shared passions in politics, the arts, and on the streets of Northern Ireland. Indeed, when power relationships are evened out, or power is limited for a previously dominant group, relationships can also change, and space be created for the progress of moderates, as will be seen.

The Third Community has proven to be a much more significant and complex force in Northern Ireland society than it has been given credit for. It has influenced political developments, not just as, or through, specific organizations, but as a body of opinion. The Third Community, its leaders, and sympathetic outsiders were an important supportive force in the drive for and achievement of peace. The Good Friday Agreement and the politicians who negotiated it benefited significantly from the Third Community’s support, guidance, and demands, and the radicals were brought to heel. The Third Community is indeed greater than the sum of its parts and helped drive the hardliners in Northern Irish politics and society to the fringes. Compromise was achieved in 1998.

Ultimately, while Cochrane, Guelke, Power, and White have acknowledged a role for the middle ground in finding a new political arrangement, the sheer power of the fact that most people are to some degree members of the Third Community and do not turn to
the gun or support violence is demonstrated in this study. Here, public reaction to violent events and demands for change become an integral part of the story of the peace process and post-GFA environment, rather than mere footnotes to change. Indeed, although Dixon is right that “uncivil society” can be strong and that leaders do have backing from their respective publics regarding constitutional issues, the fact remains that people can still prove willing to make concessions to achieve a resolution and political opposites can work together and be supported in doing so. A shared desire for an end to violence and upheaval on the part of the Third Community, political leaders, and the British and Irish governments did, in fact, trump sectarianism and the result was the GFA. Furthermore, unlike Cochrane, this study contends that the people and civil society did directly influence the peace process through various activities and events. “Ulster says No” became “Ulster says Yes.”

The Third Community also helped shape the type of agreement and arrangement achieved. Indeed, contrary to Power’s argument that the Agreement reinforced division, it provided a solution reflective of Northern Ireland’s pluralist reality and shared goals. After the GFA, Northern Ireland’s government has been very representative of “Editorial II’s” Crane Bag concept – a government where people can express either main identity, or “other,” where different groups work together, a pluralist government with North-South and East-West cooperation. Like “Editorial II’s” Crane Bag, the GFA “holds things in tension” and allows them to be what they are. Without the different groups the political arrangement is “empty” - it cannot function. Yet here, too, there is common ground as the shared goals of peace and justice are recognized and upheld. Such is the importance of this community and its vision.
Furthermore, the Third Community itself benefited significantly from the search for a resolution. For instance, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement and republican recognition of the limitations of armed struggle created an environment in which moderates could thrive. Ultimately, the Third Community can be credited with helping to preserve the peace after the Belfast Agreement and with creating a more forward thinking, optimistic Northern Ireland. While Guelke and Power’s post-Agreement perspectives focus on the continuity of division, this study argues that mindsets have changed in significant ways post-1998. Yes, there is still division, even, at times, violence, but the Third Community has helped bring about both political and mythological change. Northern Ireland’s pluralist government is generally accepted and strong resistance to violence has taken place since the Agreement was achieved, effectively marginalizing violent fringe groups. Indeed, if one looks beyond the common ideas of “two communities” and division, it is possible to see just how significant this new mindset is - former war heroes have been maligned and former enemies Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness proved capable of sufficiently cooperative co-leadership that they were referred to as the “Chuckle Brothers”. From 2007 to 2017 Sinn Fein and the DUP remained in government together, despite the inevitable challenges and difficulties this created as these two very different parties and leaders struggled to lead Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ireland currently awaits a resolution to a dispute between the two parties, political leaders are expected to resolve the issue fairly and without violence. In short, the pluralist Third Community system and vision now dominate.

The current study revises common public views of Northern Ireland and its politics. Northern Ireland is a pluralist society with different identities and levels of
identity. It is a place where Orange and Green are not dominant all the time and where being Catholic or Protestant does not mean an inability to ever cooperate or compromise. Even parades and demonstrations, usually in the news due to the violence and protest that accompany them, are a stereotypical means of characterizing reality in Northern Ireland. Such events are not always Orange, not always at odds with Catholicism, and not always one community against the other. The Catholics versus Protestants and British versus Irish narratives do not tell the whole story. Even in nations with troubled histories such as Northern Ireland, nationality, ethnicity, and religion are not all powerful in every circumstance.

The perception of scholars, meanwhile, that the center ground is small, or always secondary to the “majority” communities in importance, is similarly inaccurate. The Third Community is, in fact, the largest and, now, the most powerful community in the province. It has also, historically, represented most accurately the reality of Northern Ireland’s population. Furthermore, despite the continued existence of division and mistrust post-1998, the notion once articulated by American writer Leon Uris - “in Ireland there is no future, only the past happening over and over” – is incorrect, a true myth.34 Northern Ireland is progressing; its sectarian violence is no longer a daily reality or a constant probability for its people and they have had a solid decade of pluralist, power-sharing government.35

This study also suggests new avenues of research that are particularly relevant in current times. With secularism and environmental politics current topics of discussion, studies such as this that examine in detail groups like Humani and the Greens have the potential to offer insights into changes and developments at grassroots level in even the
most religious and traditional of societies. Furthermore, examination of the role of women and women’s movements, smaller political parties, and NGOs in societies dominated by one or two major parties may create a new understanding of the power and contribution of minorities to the nature of government. In particular, the variety of identities that people have, beyond the political and the ethnic, ought to be considered in societies where division along such lines is long-standing and entrenched. Common ground can exist even here and impact the shape and likelihood of political progress.

This current study examines the Third Community’s existence and contributions through an examination of surveys, web sites, political documents, literature, press coverage, and other readily available sources. Such sources are widely accessible to the Northern Irish public and both nurture and reflect the Third Community. In order to have a community, especially one that crosses boundaries and covers a broad geographical area, an accessible culture as well as opportunities to express that culture are necessary. The Third Community is not a “closed” group, whose documents are mainly accessible only via a trip to the library or archives or participation in regular meetings. People participate in this community in numerous ways, at different levels, and on an ongoing basis over time. Some read poetry and participate in the classical music scene. Others play golf and vote SDLP or APNI. Many read newspapers and belong to unions that include people from different backgrounds among their subscribers and members. Still others join peace organizations, volunteer groups, or humanist associations and demonstrate for peace with like minded people, some of whom have no official group affiliations at all.
The wide variety of sources used in this study include those that have been, to date, underused by historians. Web sites, for instance, offer insights into the current and developing political, social, and cultural perspectives of many organizations. As the fastest and most easily accessible means of information for interested people in a digital age, websites are also a valuable source for assessing the public image a group wants to project. Furthermore, in a society such as Northern Ireland, in which symbols, imagery and even use of certain colours provide meaning and context for groups and their activities, websites and manifestos have much to offer scholars. As will be shown in this study, image and colour choices are carefully made and, at times, connect with groups and organizations beyond Northern Ireland. Indeed, although political manifestos (many of which are also available online) have long been used by historians to analyse party platforms, it is not merely what is written, but the colours, symbols, and imagery used that are important in disseminationg a group’s message. Although ever changing, digital sources are a resource of living history and combined with more traditional sources, such as newspapers and archived political documents, enrich understanding of people and communities.

**The Political Context: 1969 to the Present**

A study of this nature is timely in light of the political developments which have occurred in Northern Ireland since the beginning of the “Troubles” in 1969. In the wake of unrest and violence in Northern Ireland, the local Protestant and Unionist controlled Stormont Parliament was dissolved and the province was placed under the direct rule of the government at Westminster. Since the establishment of Direct Rule in 1972, a number of attempts have been made to resolve the problem of Northern Ireland. The two
most important tactics which have been developed are: “power-sharing”, that is, the co-governing of Northern Ireland by both Catholics and Protestants, nationalists and unionists; and the “all-Ireland dimension”, providing for cooperation between Northern and Southern Ireland as well as Britain and the Irish Republic. However, Protestant/unionist/loyalist fears of being forced into a united Ireland have also been acknowledged by the British and Irish governments. When it comes to Northern Ireland’s status, both governments have made it clear that before Northern Ireland would ever become part of a unified Irish state, most of the population of Northern Ireland would have to decide that was what they wanted.36

A significant development in the peace process was the Good Friday Agreement of April 10, 1998. If implemented, it would involve power-sharing by the different groups within Northern Ireland. Most of those who voted in the referendum on the Agreement in Northern Ireland supported it; the vast majority of the Catholic/nationalist community endorsed it and it appears that slightly more than half of Protestants/unionists voted for it. Over 90% of those voting in the Irish Republic endorsed the Agreement. Following acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement, a new power-sharing Government was established, led by Unionist leader David Trimble, as First Minister, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party’s Seamus Mallon, as Deputy First Minister.37 Sinn Fein got two out of ten seats on the executive. Authority “was transferred to this new devolved government” in December 1999.38

In subsequent developments, the controversy over the decommissioning of PIRA arms and other issues undermined the success of the executive and the assembly, which were suspended several times.39 Following the St. Andrew’s Agreement of fall 2006,
local Government was reinstated in the spring of 2007, with Ian Paisley as First Minister and Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. The significance of two men from opposite ends of the political spectrum jointly leading Northern Ireland was noted in the pages of the *Belfast Telegraph*: “what was unimaginable for many people will finally come to bear later today - Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness heading up a power-sharing government.” The significance of the event was re-iterated by security expert Brian Rowan:

> It was a day of many words, but a day when the pictures spoke so much louder - and they spoke to us of peace. On their journey to yesterday, two men have travelled a great distance, one through war and the army council, the other through no and never, and they’ve come to the same place. And in that place, on those seats in that Stormont hall, their shoulders touched. Martin McGuinness fought and ended the IRA’s war. And Ian Paisley has come to the place of power-sharing. And, in their hands, those two men now hold our political future. This is the new era, the new beginning, and it can work.

Recently, some additional political progress was made when, in the Spring of 2010, with the Hillsborough Agreement, the Assembly was given the powers of Justice and Policing by Westminster, thus fulfilling the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.

Along with these political changes, some of the most significant developments in the peace process have come from paramilitaries. The Troubles took the lives of well over 3,000 people in a population of under 2 million, not counting the numbers of injured and bereaved. Both communities have been victimized. Nonetheless, the movement of paramilitary groups towards non-violent strategies represented an important shift. At the end of August 1994, the PIRA began a ceasefire which lasted until February of 1996. The PIRA entered into another major ceasefire in the summer of 1997. Approximately eight years later, the culture of violence received a great blow when, at long last, in the
summer of 2005, the Army Council of the PIRA declared “its armed campaign” was finished. In September of 2005, the PIRA was believed to have finally disarmed.\textsuperscript{45} As Noel McAdam of the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} put it, “the International Decommissioning Body has confirmed that the Provisional IRA has put its arsenal beyond use.”\textsuperscript{46} It was the Independent Monitoring Commission’s position as of October of 2006 that the PIRA had ceased to be a danger.\textsuperscript{47}

In the wake of the PIRA ceasefire in August of 1994, loyalist militants announced a ceasefire of their own the following October. Included in the announcement was, as McKittrick and McVea have put it, “an unexpected note of apology, offering ‘the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past 25 years abject and true remorse’”.\textsuperscript{48} A further significant development came from loyalists in the Spring of 2007 when the Ulster Volunteer Force declared that: "as of 12 midnight, Thursday 3 May 2007, the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commando will assume a non-military, civilianised, role."	extsuperscript{49} Then, in June of 2009, the Governments were informed by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) that a large amount of weaponry belonging to the UVF and Red Hand Commando had been decommissioned in the presence of witnesses. According to these organizations’ leaders, the weapons in question represented the total over which they had control.\textsuperscript{50} Less than a year later, in January of 2010, in front of witnesses, "a major act of decommissioning" was completed by the Ulster Defence Association. According to its leaders, they have decommissioned all weapons over which they had control.\textsuperscript{51}

Progress has been made politically on both the republican and loyalist fronts as well. Sinn Fein, the PIRA's "political wing," originally refused to sit in Stormont, the
Dail, or Westminster and, thus, were not seriously involved in the general political scene during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{52} More serious engagement with politics came in the 1980s when Sinn Fein embarked on its policy of "armalite and ballot box", the utilization of both politics and militant means to achieve republican goals.\textsuperscript{53} In 1986, the Sinn Fein \textit{ard fheis} (or convention) decided to end their policy of abstentionism and sit in Dail Eireann.\textsuperscript{54} Sinn Fein ultimately became a participant in the peace process and backed the Good Friday Agreement.\textsuperscript{55} Then, in May of 1998, the party decided that it would actually sit in an Agreement-based Assembly, rather than boycott it, should the party win seats.\textsuperscript{56} In 2007, Sinn Fein took two more important steps forward when its \textit{ard fheis} decided to back the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the party joined the DUP in a powersharing government a few months later.\textsuperscript{57}

On the loyalist side, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), the political wing of the UVF, also backed the Good Friday Agreement and is against sectarianism.\textsuperscript{58} The PUP was involved in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Agreement and won two Assembly seats in 1998. Following the suspension of devolved government, and during the talks at St Andrews, the party backed the return of the Assembly and Executive.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to the PUP, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and its political "advisor", the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), generally backed the Good Friday Agreement. However, the party was unsuccessful in the Assembly elections (1998) and did not gain a single seat. 2001 witnessed the dissolution of the UDP.\textsuperscript{60}

The movement from violence and division to politics and power-sharing reflects the reassertion of non-violent, or constitutional methods, ideals, and visions. Indeed, while Irish nationalism in particular has long had among its supporters advocates of
physical force, or "republicans," the militant section or element has also had as its rival “a
dominant tradition of democratic compromise” epitomised by Daniel O’Connell in the
1800s. Also included in the tradition of constitutional nationalism is the Home Rule
movement (1870-1918) which aimed at achieving an Irish parliament. Constitutional
nationalists Isaac Butt, Charles Stewart Parnell, John Redmond, and John Dillon, at
different times, all led this movement. The Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) represented
the cause of Home Rule at Westminster and essentially ruled the nationalist political
scene from the latter 1800s to 1918. After World War I (and, in part, thanks to the Easter
Rising (1916) and the Conscription Crisis (1918)), the IPP and Home Rule were
overtaken and displaced by the more radical Sinn Fein and the militant republicanism of
the IRA. From 1919 to 1921, Britain was at war with the IRA and Irish republicanism
in Ireland. It is true, then, that, occasionally, the advocates of militancy can get the
upper hand, in one way or another. This was the case within Northern Ireland during the

Compromise, however, has proved the most dominant and resilient tradition
within Ireland. After Irish republican representatives signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty
(1921), which offered an Irish Free State instead of an independent Republic, the Dail
ratified it, but Irish republicans in the Dail, the IRA, and Sinn Fein separated into pro and
anti-Treaty factions. The voting public took the pro-Treaty side in the general election
of June 1922, when candidates opposed to the Treaty took a mere 36 out of 128 seats.
Nonetheless, Civil War began in June of 1922, pitting supporters of the Treaty and the
Free State against anti-Treaty republican forces. Inside a year, the Free State side won
the war. The majority of its citizens considered the Free State government to be
legitimate and they demonstrated this again in the "Free State general election" held in the summer of 1923, in which republicans who opposed the Treaty took a mere 44 seats out of 153. They demonstrated this again in the "Free State general election" held in the summer of 1923, in which republicans who opposed the Treaty took a mere 44 seats out of 153. Then, in 1927, de Valera (who had sided with the anti-Treatyites) brought his Fianna Fail republican party into government and, over time, he and his party pulled most Treaty opponents into "the constitutional fold", further weakening the IRA in the south. The Irish government under de Valera (1932-1948) would ultimately prove unfriendly to the IRA, which was declared an illegal organization in 1936. In the late 1940s, the IRA decided to cease official campaigns aimed at the state in the south.

The IRA’s evolution continued. The IRA began to move left in the 1960s, under Chief of Staff Cathal Goulding who, in 1967, "publicly downgraded the traditional republican reliance on 'physical force' and announced a radical socialist agenda." When the IRA leadership in the Republic wanted to remove the traditional abstentionist policy (where republicans would not take seats in the Irish parliament), militants within the IRA had had enough. They had not been happy about the republican shift in the direction of Marxism. The end result was a split in the movement, out of which came the Officials and the Provisionals. The PIRA basically inherited and carried on the tradition of armed struggle.

In line with these earlier developments, since the 1990s, compromise, with an added dimension of non-violence, has been winning out over violence and militarism within the North. Sinn Fein and loyalist parties became involved in the peace process and radical militant groups like the RIRA and CIRA and their violent activities have been denounced and repudiated by politicians and the people. Northern Ireland, while still struggling with sectarianism and the transition to a modern, pluralist, and peaceful
society, is no longer the seemingly hopeless and unworkable entity it was in the 1970s and 1980s. It has had a functioning, power-sharing government backed by a citizenry and civil society determined to uphold the peace.
CHAPTER 1
COMMUNITIES AND MYTHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The “Two Communities” and their Cultures and Myths

The existence of “two communities” in Northern Ireland cannot be denied. The largest proportion of people in Northern Ireland are Protestant; during the 1960s, around “two-thirds” of the people in Northern Ireland were Protestant. According to the census of 1991, 50.7% of the people described themselves as Protestant and 38.4% as Catholic.\(^1\) The census of 2001 reveals that 45.6% of the people were Protestant and 40.3% were Catholic.\(^2\) If people raised in a certain religion are included, the percentage of Catholics rises to 43.8 while the percentage of Protestants rises to 53.1.\(^3\) In the latest census (2011), the gap has narrowed with 40.8% of respondents identifying themselves as Catholic and 41.6% identifying themselves as members of Protestant or "Other Christian (including Christian related)" denominations.\(^4\) If people raised in a certain religion are included in these figures, the percentage of Catholics rises to 45.1 and the percentage of Protestants rises to 48.4.\(^5\) Here, the Protestant population makes up less than half of Northern Ireland's people even when religious background is taken into account. This increases tensions as Catholics, historically, have had much higher birth rates than Protestants\(^6\) and any increase in their overall numbers and decrease in Protestant numbers serves as a reminder that the Protestant majority is not firmly assured. There is a fear among Protestants that Catholics will one day outnumber them.\(^7\)

Most Protestants were and are unionists. They support and want to uphold the connection to Britain and keep Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom. The majority of Protestants also consider themselves to be “British or Northern Irish” versus Irish.\(^8\) Despite the fact that Protestants in Northern Ireland have not always liked or
agreed with the government in London, they have had a great fear of being made part of a united Ireland where they would be vastly outnumbered by Irish Catholics who would have little or no respect for their religion, culture, and opinions. Most Protestants supported the Unionist Party between 1921 and 1972 and have continued to support parties dedicated to keeping Northern Ireland within the UK; however, few Catholics support such parties.

Catholics, meanwhile, for the most part, have historically considered themselves Irish, rather than British, and have viewed Northern Ireland to be “an unsatisfactory and even illegitimate state”. As far as they were concerned, the island of Ireland as a whole belonged free and united. The average Catholic was a nationalist - wanting and believing in a united and independent Ireland. Thus, during the latest Troubles, Catholics largely supported the constitutional nationalist SDLP or, in more recent years, the republican party of Sinn Fein.

The political and religious divisions in Northern Ireland have resulted in a population that has not been educated together or intermarried in great numbers. When it came to housing, schooling, as well as jobs, Catholics and Protestants remained isolated from each other. Thus, it is not surprising that both communities have historically had their own “cultures”, including “myths” and the symbols and images that accompany them. “[L]oyalist iconography,” for instance, portrays Northern Irish Protestants to be as the Chosen people, facing “an alien culture,” dwelling in a country in which they are confronted on all sides with “sinners and heathens.” Biblical scenes can be seen on Lambeg drums and on banners carried in loyalist parades. It has been noted that the
scenes on the banners are those “of a chosen people”, endangered by enemies on all sides.¹⁴

Indeed, perhaps the most well-known means of expressing Protestant heritage or “culture” is through parading and the imagery and rituals connected with it. The "Marching Season" runs from Easter Monday through August - a number of parades and events take place in this period - and the loyal orders involved include the Orange Institution, the Apprentice Boys, and the Black Institution.¹⁵ Perhaps the most well-known, the Orange Order, is an organization for Protestants only, established in Ireland in 1795. Orange marches and parades are considered a Protestant tradition and expression of heritage and many parades of Orangemen are held every summer in Northern Ireland - July 12th being the major parade day and celebration.¹⁶ Pictures of King William as well as images from the Williamite period can be seen in the parades, on banners and such, reflecting the Protestant defeat of the Catholic foe. The image of “King Billy” is often found painted on walls in Protestant areas of Belfast and elsewhere in Northern Ireland. Additional events that can be found, or are referenced, on Orange banners are 1641, when revolt and massacres took place, and the 1689 Siege of Derry. Other communal traditions associated with the Twelfth include the building and lighting of massive bonfires in Protestant areas, which include the burning of the Irish Tricolour flag and/or the Pope in effigy on the tops of these fires.¹⁷ Despite the fact that Orange parades have been responsible for causing and increasing tension and conflict between Catholics and Protestants, Protestant supporters view them as a legitimate means of expressing their heritage as both Protestants and supporters of civil as well as religious freedoms.¹⁸
In addition, via parades and murals and “rituals of public display”, Protestant unionists also proclaim their Britishness, even as the English, Scots, and Welsh generally view them to be Irish. The Orange Order, unionists, and the vast majority of Protestants generally have emphasized that the tie with Britain needs to be upheld. Protestants assert that they are loyal “to crown and country”. Yet their identity can be complex. According to Pamela Clayton, Protestants in Northern Ireland can, and in some cases do, possess and adhere to more than one identity, at times simultaneously, be it British-Irish, Ulster, or even Protestant itself, versus only British in all cases. Still, there is no doubting the connections between Northern Protestants and their mainland counterparts, especially in Scotland. It is interesting to note, for instance, that the Scottish St. Andrew's Cross flag has appeared "on Loyalist Murals suggesting the affinity between Ulster Protestants and Scots." 

Meanwhile, in response to Protestant discrimination and monopolisation of political power, Catholics in Northern Ireland turned inward and created their own culture, with the Church as well as “Catholic/nationalist institutions” at the core of it. While “Constitutional Nationalists” did not support violence to achieve a united, independent Ireland, the militant republican tradition embraced noble sacrifice and militant struggle in pursuit of this goal, considering such methods necessary and legitimate. Republicans have also historically viewed their cause as being a battle against “British imperialism”. Murals have been found within Catholic areas of Belfast which are intended to show “solidarity” between the Irish, struggling as they are against Britain, and other “oppressed” groups and people around the world, such as Native Americans and Nelson Mandela.
Furthermore, Catholic imagery and symbolism entwines with nationalism and republicanism in Northern Ireland. The Ancient Order of Hibernians, a Catholic and nationalist organization which has also engaged in parading, has carried banners depicting St. Patrick as well as St. Columba. Patrick as well as Columba are depicted to be among “the founders” of the Irish nation. As Jarman has put it, “Ireland is portrayed as coming into being at the time when Christianity arrived and established its dominance”.

Slogans such as “Faith and Fatherland” or “Faith of our Fathers Living Still” appear too on banners. St. Patrick's Day as well as August 15, or "Lady's Day," which is "the feast of the assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary," are dates on which the AOH has paraded. Ireland and the Irish nation are clearly connected and entwined with Catholicism.

The fact remains that Catholicism has had a huge impact “on the development of Irish nationalism,” including the extreme end of the nationalist spectrum. Catholic images and ideas are part of the tradition of martyrdom and redemption among republicans. Christ was crucified and was resurrected. He defeated death and offered salvation to the human race. In Ireland’s nationalist/republican version of history, patriotic individuals suffered and died, martyring themselves for Ireland. Thanks to their sacrifice, “Ireland regains what has been lost and becomes a living nation.” The 1916 Rising, known as the Easter Rising, mirrored Christ’s Passion. Irish republicans died at the hands of their enemies and their sacrifice inspired and justified the violence and deaths of those who came after them, including those on the streets of Belfast and Derry. Indeed, in much more recent times, Irish republicanism and religious (Catholic) symbolism, imagery, and language have appeared alongside each other - perhaps the
most famous occurrence being during the 1981 Hunger Strike. During the course of the hunger strike itself, the men involved often were likened to or represented as “the crucified Christ.” Such portrayals could be seen in murals in Northern Ireland, for example, and the utilization of Catholic imagery was easily understood by the wider Catholic/nationalist community and culture. The hunger strikers, like all republicans who fought and died for Ireland, joined the mythological ranks of Ireland’s martyrs, much as the faithful Catholic dead are believed to rejoin Christ in Heaven.

It should be noted, however, that tension as well as outright hostility have frequently marked the relationship between republicans and the Catholic Church. The 1848 Rising was denounced by the Church. Similarly, the Catholic Church was very much against the Fenians. Catholic bishops in Ireland, from 1861, released pastoral letters which informed Catholics that taking the oath of the Fenians bore with it the punishment of excommunication. The Church did not as a body come out in favour of the Rebellion of 1916 - a mere 7 bishops condemned it, but 22 said nothing. Furthermore, the bishops came out very much in opposition to Sinn Fein in 1918 and when Sinn Fein triumphed in the election they would not "accept the 'mandate' of the people implicit in Dail Eireann's declaration of war." Later, a number of republicans who were against the Free State suffered excommunication in the Civil War. In the most recent period of Troubles in the North, the Catholic Church would, on more than one occasion, join with members of the Presbyterian, Church of Ireland and Methodist churches in calls for peace. Indeed, the entire "Irish episcopal conference" denounced the PIRA in the fall of 1971. However, unlike in earlier periods, the bishops of Northern Ireland did not think excommunication was worthwhile or "useful in their
situation;" according to Edward Daly, the men of violence separated themselves from the Church.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition, it should be pointed out that as heavy an emphasis on the connections of Ireland and Irishness with Catholicism is not entirely the case for all Catholic nationalist groups. The Irish National Foresters carry banners depicting Irish heroes who were Protestant, such as Charles Stewart Parnell and Henry Joy McCracken, along with Catholic ones. While “religious images” also can be found, the shared Irishness or “nationality” of Protestants as well as Catholics is acknowledged. As Jarman puts it, “the broader ideal of national unity, encompassing the Presbyterian, Church of Ireland and Roman Catholic faiths, is the aim.”\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Shared Traditions, Ambiguities, and Contradictions}

\textbf{Parades and Symbols}

Despite appearances, the history of the “two traditions” in Ireland is riddled with complications and surprises. For example, despite recent conflicts centering around the parades of Orangemen and other Protestant loyal orders, parading is, in fact, an \textit{Irish} tradition going back centuries, involving those of both communities.\textsuperscript{37} Jarman and Bryan have pointed out that in the latter 1800s parades were a means of "defining an Irish nationalist identity" to as great an extent as they were a means of "defining a Protestant British identity." Indeed, there is a shared element in the parading traditions of both sides. For instance, on St. Patrick's Day, nationalists in Derry have, in the past, walked Derry's walls, something the loyal Apprentice Boys have also done on August 12 to celebrate the relief of Derry (1689).\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, while a Lambeq drum is currently considered a "Protestant instrument", elderly members of the AOH have remembered
keeping such drums on their premises and claimed that Hibernians played them in a very similar fashion to how Orangemen play them today. 39

Certain symbols have also been used by elements of both traditions, or are otherwise ambiguous. The Ulster Banner, known also as the "Ulster Flag" (six counties) and the "Government of Northern Ireland Flag," is a case in point. Considered a loyalist flag, it has at its heart the Red Hand of Ulster. 40 While the simultaneous use of a Crown and a Star of David indicate its loyalist and six county identity, 41 the Red Hand (minus the Crown and Star) also appears on the nine county Ulster Flag, considered nationalist. 42 Indeed, the Red Hand itself is not a British symbol. Its roots are Celtic and it is among the very few images that Catholics and Protestants have used, even as its connection with the latter population is stronger. 43 The use of this image is further complicated by its appearance on other flags - the "Alternative 'Ulster Flag'", and the Ulster Independence/Ulster National Flag. In the former, the Red Hand appears without a Crown, although a Union Flag can be seen at the upper left corner. While this flag is considered "a Loyalist UDA flag," the fact that it does not have a Crown indicates "a more independent stance, due to a disillusionment with Britain and mainstream Unionism." Finally, the latter flag, which also does not include a Crown or even, in this case, a Union Flag, has been around since 1988 and is associated with the Ulster Independence Committee, more recently the Ulster Independence Movement (UIM). The UIM supports independence from Britain as well as Ireland. Others have used this flag, too, including some within the UDA. 44

Other Irish symbols have also been used by Protestants as well as Catholics. The flag of Leinster Province, which includes Dublin, is green with a golden harp in the
center. The United Irishmen utilized this flag in 1798, the Repeal movement of O'Connell made use of it, as did the Irish Republican Brotherhood. In the Rebellion of 1916 the flag appeared as well. Due to the fact that green was a 'Catholic' colour, Sinn Fein, in 1918, preferred the Tricolour for its representation of Protestant as well as Catholic. The harp itself has been a symbol of Ireland for centuries. Gaelic leader Owen Roe O'Neill "adopted a green flag incorporating the harp." The harp has even been used by the British to symbolize Ireland. The harp, with a crown above it, has symbolized "Loyalist Irishmen" as well. Indeed, such an image made up the crest of the RUC, which also included shamrock, a national symbol of Ireland, underneath the harp.

Particular individuals have been held in esteem and used within the two main traditions. For example, loyalists have taken the Irish (and Ulster) legendary warrior Cuchulainn as one of their heroes. For loyalists, Cuchulainn protected Ulster from its Irish foes. Indeed, Cuchulainn was utilized by the UDA News "as its emblem" and there was also "a 'tinny bas-relief' of Cuchulainn" in UDA leader, Andy Tyrie's, office. A 1994 East Belfast loyalist mural featured Cuchulainn as well. Republicans have seen Cuchulainn in heroic terms, too. For them he was "a hero against the English invader". Pearse drew inspiration from Cuchulainn and in Dublin's General Post Office there is a statue of him that honours 1916.

St. Patrick is yet another complex figure, who has, to an extent, held a place of significance in both Irish Catholic and Irish Protestant traditions. He is seen as an "Irish" saint and has certainly been celebrated as that country’s patron. However, Patrick was not native to Ireland, his place of birth having been given, variously, as Scotland, England, and, more broadly, Britain. Taken prisoner as a 16-year-old, he was a slave for
six years in Ireland before escaping. He subsequently went back to Ireland for missionary purposes. The general acceptance of Patrick as Ireland's saint remains a reality in both communities and March 17 has been St. Patrick's "feast day" since the 1600s, anyway.\textsuperscript{50}

While St. Patrick and St. Patrick's Day have had a strong history within the Irish Catholic community, Protestants have also celebrated the saint, albeit not always as consistently or with the same ardour.\textsuperscript{51} Indeed, that Patrick has been viewed in a positive way by Protestants can be seen in the fact that there are a lot of Irish Anglican churches that bear his name. Furthermore, cross-community recognition of Patrick and his feast day can be found in the 1800s and during the initial years of the 1900s. For example, according to the Belfast \textit{Northern Whig}, a unionist paper, in 1850: "the anniversary of Ireland's patron saint was celebrated by the observance of the usual festivities amongst our townsmen of different religious and political persuasions." One of the Orange Lodges even arranged a dinner. Stated the \textit{Northern Whig} in 1907, "Locally the recognition of St. Patrick's Day is by no means a sectional observance. All classes and creeds are at one in their celebration of the anniversary and the shamrock was worn generally yesterday."\textsuperscript{52} According to legend, St. Patrick used shamrock as a way of representing the Trinity. Shamrock is a popular image every March 17th and it is not absent in unionist culture, even as it is, for the most part, a nationalist symbol. In addition to being part of the crest of the RUC and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), shamrock is worn by groups like the Royal Irish Rangers on St Patrick's Day.\textsuperscript{53}

Partition accentuated differing outlooks towards the day. St. Patrick's Day was marked in Northern Ireland, but more quietly. Still, in the interwar years there is some
evidence that significant numbers of people wore shamrock. Wearing shamrock continued to be common in Northern Ireland following World War II. Indeed, despite sectarian tensions, St. Patrick’s Day traditions have been practiced in Northern Ireland among both communities. The Ulster Schools Rugby Cup Final (rugby being considered a Protestant sport) traditionally takes place on St. Patrick’s Day. Furthermore, interest in St. Patrick’s Day was sparked again among Catholics in the North in the 1970s as well as 1980s. A "St Patrick's Day parade" took place on Belfast's Falls Road in 1974 and one occurred in Derry in 1977. It appears that there was a bit more interest within the Protestant population in the 1980s as well. Orangemen were involved "in a St Patrick's Day parade" in a Protestant area of Belfast in 1985. "St. Patrick's flag" could be seen flying above Orange headquarters, Belfast, on March 17, 1994. In Armagh, the usual "catholic procession" involved "protestant boy scouts" in 1995; this had not happened before.

It is further interesting to note that there is a Belfast Church of Ireland church named in honour of St. Aidan of Lindisfarne. Unlike Patrick, Aidan was a native of Ireland, or at least very likely so. He lived a monastic life in Scotland (Iona) for a long time and, according to Ian Bradley, "did his greatest work in England." Northumbria's King Oswald wanted the faith brought to his northern lands. Thus, Aidan took up residence at Lindisfarne, where he created a monastery and remained abbot as well as bishop at Lindisfarne until he died. Considered the Iona of England, it "was a center of...missionary activity for all of northern England." According to one account, Aidan's death took place "at the royal castle at Bamburgh." Bradley argues that Aidan would be
a good choice to be the UK's patron saint as he can be linked with Ireland, Scotland, as well as England - much like the Protestants of Northern Ireland themselves.\textsuperscript{60}

**The Past and its Uses**

There is no doubt that the two major communities in Northern Ireland both utilize history as a means of understanding and discussing the contemporary/current situation in which they find themselves. As Santino writes, “they use the past to talk about the present.” For instance, the Siege of Derry of 1688-1689 is not merely an event that happened centuries ago. There are Protestants/unionists within Derry who believe and argue that “they are “still under siege” as this is how they feel within the present political context. Murals with such slogans as well as “No Surrender” can be found in Northern Ireland, meaning “No Surrender” to the foe (the Catholic Irish and those who would rob Protestant British citizens of “their rights” of culture and citizenship).\textsuperscript{61} “Remember 1690” can also be found on walls in the North and Estyn Evans has noted that this "is not the motto of an historical cult...so much as the reminder of present day threats to the Ulsterman's security and independence."\textsuperscript{62} Similarly, the Easter Rising of 1916 has appeared as a subject of republican murals as well as commemorations. Parades in honour of the 1916 Rising have taken place in Northern Ireland; indeed, the 1916 Rebellion's 50th anniversary was marked by big commemorations around the Province.\textsuperscript{63} According to Jarman, “Easter 1916 provides the historical legitimacy, the ideology, the heroes and the models of activity for the contemporary republican movement.”\textsuperscript{64}

Nonetheless, "traditional" celebrations or remembrances are not always as "traditional," or even as divisive historically, as they are today. A century after 1690, it does not appear that the Boyne was considered of major importance among Ulster
Protestants. In Dublin the 100th anniversary of the Boyne was commemorated but, in Ulster, it appears that it was marked merely by a couple of dinners - one in Downpatrick and one in Doagh. Here, though, what was commemorated was "a constitutional victory" rather than a Protestant one. William was toasted; however, toasts were also made to things like the American Revolution and the Irish Volunteers. Similarly, a procession occurred in the summer of 1789 in Derry to commemorate the city's relief and, while the destination was "the Church of Ireland cathedral", Philip McDevitt, "the Catholic bishop," as well as a few Catholic clerics took part. 1689 was remembered as a victory for freedom here; it was not merely a Protestant success. It is true that, for Derry's Apprentice Boys, the 1689 Siege of Derry was a major Protestant triumph; however, the Apprentice Boys came into existence only in "the early" 1800s. Similarly, while 1690 was important to the Orange Order, they have been around merely since 1795. Even the August 15 parades of the AOH only began in the late 1800s. A lot of Protestants did not see 1641, 1689, as well as 1690 as of extreme importance before the 1800s. There were a lot of commemorations of the events of those years two centuries later and at that point these events were viewed to belong to a "sense of history" common to a lot of Protestants.

The ambiguities and contradictions within nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist history must also be acknowledged. A "nationalist view of history" developed in reaction to circumstances in the 1800s as well as the first part of the 1900s. In this view, current nationalism was tied to a notion of an ancient and constant battle against the English. In reality, the "Irish" people in the first part of the 1600s cannot be accurately described as making up one nation. The racial roots of those on the island
were "mixed" and there was no agitation for "a political national independence". The English monarch was considered Ireland's monarch by the people. This reality can be seen even in the famous 1641 Rebellion. This was originally a localized revolt on the part of Ulster Gaels to regain land that had been taken from them. It evolved into a struggle on the part of Ireland's Catholic population to protect their faith and their property. The rebel Catholics, however, were not separatist; they were loyal to the king - openly so. Even James II's Irish supporters desired him to be their monarch; they were not looking to sever all links with England/Britain.  

Furthermore, although it is true that the Rebellion of 1798 was in opposition to English power in Ireland as well as its military presence, 1798 was "a civil war" too. The militia as well as yeomanry who battled rebel forces with British troops were Irish and the Dublin "Ascendancy government" commanded the anti-rebel Irish forces.  

More recent history further undercuts nationalist and republican mythology. De Valera claimed, in a 1918 letter, that Ireland had been held by the English for 700 years, "as Germany holds Belgium to-day, by the right of the sword." In reality, from 1845-1919, 12,000 Irish Catholic members "of the Royal Irish Constabulary" "held" the country. These men came in great part from the peasant class. Indeed, in 1916, most people in Ireland did not support the Rising and there were Dubliners who taunted or sneered at prisoners as the British took them away. Furthermore, when it comes to "judicial executions", the British hung or shot 24 Irish republicans in the years 1919-1921. However, the government of Ireland killed a lot more Irish republicans in 1922-1923. Finally, even the Civil Rights activists of the late 1960s wanted internal reform in Northern Ireland. They were not making a case for Irish unity.
Nationalist and republican heroes have also included a lot of Protestants, despite the fact that the seven men whose names appear on the Proclamation of the Irish Republic (1916) were Catholic. For instance, Irish republican and Protestant Robert Emmet joined the ranks of republican heroes after his failed 1803 Rebellion (which included the printing of "A proclamation of the Irish Republic") and subsequent execution.80 Even Catholic republican and martyr Patrick Pearse’s "apostolic tradition" prior to the Rebellion of 1916 included Wolfe Tone, John Mitchel, Thomas Davis, James Fintan Lalor, as well as Parnell - Protestants all, with the exception of Lalor.82

**Identity and Allegiance**

Identities and loyalties in Irish history frequently defy more modern expectations. When it comes to determining who was actually Irish, things can get very complicated. As of the 1700s, any person who was established in Ireland was "Irish." The Protestant ascendancy was Irish and if a Catholic or a Dissenter converted they could then enter the ascendancy. Indeed, there were members of the ascendancy who had Gaelic roots and had converted.83 In examining the famous 1916-1922 period, the divisions between "Irishness" and "Englishness" are especially complex. For instance, Erskine Childers, who was English, was a champion of Irish republicanism. He was killed by "a firing squad" made up of Irishmen. Cathal Brugha, a famous republican, was really Charles Burgess, and was also killed by Irish troops. Furthermore, "British Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1918," Sir Henry Wilson, can be considered just as Irish as his IRB murderers.84 Sir Edward Carson, a hero of loyalists, was firmly against the independence of Ireland, but considered himself Irish. Carson, who led the Ulster Volunteers, was from
Dublin, not from Belfast, and had participated in "Gaelic games" while at university in Dublin.\textsuperscript{85}

Even "traditional" divisions and allegiances amongst Ireland's people cannot always be easily upheld in a historical context. For example, Brian Walker notes that a lot of unionists consider the northern conflict to be very old. They frequently refer to their "traditional enemy". Walker, however, has pointed out that there have historically been divisions among Protestants - for example, between Church of Ireland adherents and Presbyterians. There were parts of the penal laws of the 1700s that impacted Presbyterians and the power as well as status of the Church of Ireland was a source of Presbyterian antagonism towards it.\textsuperscript{86} Also, Catholics and Protestants did at times live peacefully with each other or even cooperate with one another. During the 1800s a lot of examples can be found of Protestant generosity towards "new catholic churches". Also, political cooperation involving some Presbyterians and Catholics took place in 1798 as well as in attempts to achieve "land reform" during 1850-1880.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, Catholics and Protestants were not completely at odds at all times from the 1600s to the latter 1800s, any more than Protestants were always united against Catholics.

Even the current strong connections between nationalism/republicanism and the Catholic population in the North can be, on the surface, deceiving. Indeed, Irish patriotism among the Protestant population is actually of great historical significance. For example, in the 1700s opposition and resistance to Irish parliamentary dependence upon the parliament of Britain arose among Protestants in Ireland.\textsuperscript{88} Irish Volunteer companies were created, starting in 1778, to protect Ireland in the event of an invasion by France and they would become a sort of "national force". They were well supplied with
weapons and believed, as did many at this point, that Ireland's parliament ought to be completely free to legislate for Ireland beneath the Irish Crown. The existence of the Volunteers gave a lot of added power to the likes of Henry Grattan as such "Protestant 'Patriots'' tried to achieve the removal of restrictive commercial policies as well as recognition of Irish "legislative" freedom. Volunteer power increased greatly and a convention made up of Volunteer representatives took place in Dungannon in 1782. According to the convention, "a claim of any body of men, other than the King, Lords and Commons of Ireland, to bind this kingdom is unconstitutional, illegal and a grievance." The government gave in in the face of the possible use of force. Grattan managed to convince Ireland's parliament to give total support to a Declaration of Independence in 1782. The government of England "accepted" the Declaration and this was followed by 19 years of "Grattan's Parliament".

Credit for republicanism's existence in Ireland must also be given to Protestant patriots. For example, in 1791 the Society of United Irishmen was established, in large part by Belfast Presbyterians, and aimed at reform of parliament as well as uniting Protestants and Catholics, making them a single nation. As of 1796 the United Irishmen had become "a secret society" and their goals had become more extreme. They aimed at a revolution that would bring together Protestants and Catholics in one Irish nation, independent of England. In 1798, Catholic Defenders as well as United Irishmen battled together in opposition to the government. Although the Rebellion of 1798 would pass out of Protestant memory in favour of events of the 1600s, in 1798 a lot of Presbyterians were involved as part of the United Irishmen. On the other hand, while there were Catholics involved in the revolt, there were also those who fought on the side
of the authorities and, in the case of the North Cork militia, were very brutal towards their co-religionists.97

Furthermore, in the wake of 1798 the Irish parliament was removed by the Act of Union and, at the start of 1801, Ireland and England were officially united. Ironically, a lot "of the old Protestant patriots" were against the Act of Union; however, in general, Catholics supported it, figuring that they would be better off united with the English than being left at the mercy of the Irish Protestant upper class. As it turned out, the majority of Protestants eventually ended up believing that maintaining the Union was the most likely means for them to hold onto their position. Thus, Catholics, over time, concluded that severing the Union was the right course of action for them.98 As Kee puts it, "Modern Irish nationalism, which had been invented by Irish Protestants, thus came to be adopted by Irish Catholics as their own."99

Protestant nationalism did not disappear with 1798, however. A lot of Protestants could be found among Young Ireland's leaders in the 1840s, including Thomas Davis, John Mitchel, and William Smith O'Brien.100 Young Ireland belongs to the tradition of romantic nationalism and crossed the sectarian divide, consisting of those belonging to both Catholic and Protestant faiths. They supported Irish language revival as well as an Irish literature and Irish music. Young Ireland's newspaper was called The Nation and it promoted a shared nationality, including Catholics as well as Protestants. It supported repeal and was intended to spread Irish nationalism.101 Indeed, Young Ireland were part of (Catholic) O'Connell's struggle to achieve repeal but eventually split with O'Connell.102 In 1848 William Smith O'Brien was the leader of the unsuccessful Young Ireland Rising.103
Irish Protestant nationalism even extends to the Fenians. The Fenians were to come from the 1848 Rising, despite its rather inglorious reality. James Stephens, a lieutenant of Smith O'Brien's, was able to evade arrest and go to France. Stephens, a southern Irish Protestant, decided he wanted to set up an effective "secret society" to assist in achieving a Republic in Ireland. In Dublin on March 17, 1858, Stephens and some like minded individuals pledged "in the presence of God, to renounce all allegiance to the Queen of England and to take arms and fight at a moment's warning to make Ireland an Independent Democratic Republic, and to yield implicit obedience to the commanders and superiors of this secret society". This group would eventually be the infamous Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). Stephens went on to found the Irish People newspaper in 1863. It supported complete Irish independence. Such freedom would not be achieved through "parliamentary" means. Stephens styled himself the "Chief Organizer of the Irish Republic." Unfortunately for Stephens, he put off the rebellion more than once and, ultimately, was removed from his position as leader of the Irish organization in 1866. Although the Fenian Rising of 1867 was a failure, the Fenians became part of national mythology. Indeed, the modern IRA has its origins in Fenianism.

Even Protestant displays of loyalty and remembrance can fail to take into account historical realities of identity and allegiance. It is mainly in Northern Ireland, for instance, that Remembrance Sunday is observed and those who commemorate it are mainly Protestant. Indeed, the deaths of Ulstermen at the Somme have been held up as the Protestant/loyalist equivalent of the republican sacrifices of 1916. However, most Irish casualties were Catholic in the World Wars. As for war heroes, James Magennis
received a Victoria Cross in World War II and he was a Catholic from Belfast. Four Southern Irishmen received Victoria Crosses in World War II as well. Also, war remembrance has not been totally Protestant at all times. In 1924, for example, Portadown's war memorial was officially opened and the event included the local priest - AOH and Orange Order "representatives" placed wreaths. Commemorating the war dead would quickly come to be linked with unionism and Catholic clerics as well as "nationalist politicians" would, in the main, remain aloof. There were places in Northern Ireland, though, where Protestant as well as Catholic veterans took part in commemorations then processed "to their" own places of worship. More recently, there have been Catholic clerics who have participated in "services" on Remembrance Sunday. Also, since the first part of the 1990s, a certain number of SDLP representatives have been present at Remembrance Sunday events within the North.

**The “Third Community” and the “Third Myth”**

Although two major communities do exist within Northern Ireland and they have long histories, the Third Community's roots can be found deep in these same communities' shared past. As can be seen in the discussion above, the reality behind the myths, traditions, and ideologies of the two majority groupings in Ireland is complicated and, at times, contradictory. Irish, British, rebel, loyalist - these labels were flexible and did not neatly correspond to sectarian labels. There have been a number of Protestant republicans and nationalists considered heroes by their modern (Catholic) counterparts. Furthermore, Protestants do not have a monopoly on loyalty, historically speaking. At times even symbols and historical figures have been the subject of shared use and admiration. The Third Community's existence lies in these ambiguous realities, in the
transcending and flouting of recognized boundaries and expected divisions. Third Community members do not live "republican" or "loyalist" lives, but possess a more nuanced, varied outlook.

The Third Community exists throughout society, at all its levels. Surveys reveal the presence of those who defy traditional labels and identity combinations, such as Catholic and nationalist, in favour of more middle ground or unusual positions. Many institutions and organizations – churches, peace groups, political parties, and others - have similarly crossed or challenged sectarian boundaries and advocated peace and political progress for all. Even in the realm of leisure and popular culture, standard identity divisions and sectarian politics do not dictate the lives and careers of all participants. For example, in the world of sport, national and communal frontiers are regularly crossed by athletes who place competition, career, and loyalty to teammates ahead of politics and ethnic background.

Furthermore, the Third Community expresses itself through a “Third Myth”. This myth and vision is clearly communicated in and through political documents, the press, the websites and literature of various organizations, and so forth. It is also conveyed in literature and music through a deconstruction or undermining of other, more violent or divisive, mythologies and the presentation of alternatives. In its essence, this myth is an alternative vision for, or of, Northern Ireland. It envisions a Northern Ireland of cooperation, peace, decency, even tolerance and diversity. It is less concerned with the rights of a specific community, or with romantic nationalist utopias, and more focused upon a fair and peaceful resolution of conflict and sectarian division that will allow
people in general to live side by side in peace. In a sense it is the mirror image of the republicans’ United Ireland and the loyalists’ No Surrender.

The Third Myth has its own body of adherents – a core of devotees who are genuinely moderate and non-sectarian and those “decent” people who do belong to the two main communities within the Province, but long for, or claim to long for, peace and a normal, positive society. Furthermore, this myth, like those of the republicans and loyalists, has its own martyrs - innocent victims, good, decent people who have died or suffered at the hands of those adherents of a violent nationalism or sectarianism. Indeed, victims of violence have served to draw people together in temporary fulfillment of the Third Myth, in shared mourning rituals in which people from both the Catholic and Protestant communities “stand shoulder to shoulder”, together in their bereavement or protest. At such times, in the context of tragic events like the Enniskillen (1987) and Omagh (1998) bombings, the violent offenders are side-lined and ostracized by a different vision, the myth of a decent, peace loving people. This mirrors what happens in the republican/nationalist community when a Volunteer is gunned down – especially if his murderer is a member of the British Army – except, in the case of the former, the mourners include all decent people, regardless of religious and political affiliations.

The moderate Third Community’s desire for a resolution to the conflict was beneficial to the peace process and assisted progress towards achievement of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The efforts of moderate politicians, leaders, voters, ordinary people, organizations, and participants in important public opinion surveys were part of the process leading to an accord that could be endorsed by the people. Republican and loyalist radicals came to realize that the future lay in agreement, compromise, and
consensus, not in violence and intransigence. With this new understanding came
decommissioning and a new, more forward looking Northern Ireland, governed by people
from both sides of the traditional community divide. Public desire to avoid returning to
the Province’s era of violence has helped to ensure that paramilitary activity has remained
the preoccupation of fringe elements, abhorred by all sides.
The emphasis on the presence of “two communities” within Northern Ireland by academics, commentators, and the media, has generally overshadowed the complexities of the population of this part of the United Kingdom. The dividing line between the two groups is not one that cannot be and is never crossed and those who do cross it on a regular or more permanent basis, such as intermarried couples, can find themselves in a difficult, but nonetheless unique, position. Others, such as atheists and the non-religious, who resist or reject being categorized as clearly part of one religious group or the other, can also be considered part of a “third community.” There are also individuals who consider themselves Catholic or Protestant, nationalist or unionist, but see themselves as moderates, people who reject violence and intransigence and want to live in peace with their neighbours, whatever their religious or political traditions. Furthermore, the connections between certain labels, such as “Catholic” and “nationalist” or “Protestant” and “British” are not always a given for every person. Some people can be considered part of the “third community” by virtue of their non-traditional views of themselves and their place in Northern Ireland.

**Non-Traditional Catholics**

To begin with, in terms of identity, “Irish” is commonly believed to be the identity held by Catholics in Northern Ireland. Survey evidence supports the connection between “Catholic” and “Irish.” Seventy-six per cent of Catholic respondents selected "Irish" as their national identity in a 1968 survey and 69% did in 1978 ("Northern Irish" was not an option in either year). In a 1986 survey the majority of Catholic respondents
considered themselves to be Irish - 61%.\textsuperscript{2} Indeed, survey results from 1989 and 1991-2012 support this, with more than half of Catholic respondents choosing “Irish” each year when asked the question “Which of these best describes the way you [usually] think of yourself? (British, Irish, Ulster, Northern Irish)” (See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2).\textsuperscript{3} Nonetheless, a small portion of Catholic respondents in these surveys did choose “British” when asked this question, between 6 and 12%, thus setting them apart from their “Irish Catholic” counterparts (Appendix, Tables 1 and 2).\textsuperscript{4} This is down from the 1968 and 1978 surveys, when 20% of Catholic respondents chose British.\textsuperscript{5} Choosing the label “British” for oneself is evidence that that individual (or individuals) acknowledges and accepts both Northern Ireland’s membership in the UK and their citizenship as essentially citizens/members of the United Kingdom.

Interestingly, there are a significant number of Catholics who reject an Irish and a British identity in favour of a more middle ground alternative. A "Northern Irish" identity is reasonably popular among Catholic respondents to these surveys. In the 1989 and 1991-1996 NISA surveys, the lowest percentage of Catholics to choose this identity when asked “Which of these best describes the way you usually think of yourself? (British, Irish, Ulster, Northern Irish)” is 23% in 1995 and the highest is 31% in 1996 (See Appendix, Table 1).\textsuperscript{6} The lowest percentage for the NILT surveys is 17% in 2012 and the highest is 29% in 2005 (See Appendix, Table 2).\textsuperscript{7} By generally considering themselves to be Northern Irish, these individuals are opting for an identity that falls in between Irish and British. However, they are also rejecting a more specifically "British" identity in favour of maintaining a sense of "Irishness".
Related to issues of national or personal identity, is political identity. Although the religious label “Catholic” and the political term “nationalist” are closely associated with one another, to the point they have been at times used interchangeably, evidence indicates that the Catholic/nationalist community is more complex than this. It is true that surveys undertaken between 1989 and 2012\textsuperscript{8} show that “Nationalist” is a popular choice for Catholic respondents, with anywhere from 40 to 71\% of Catholics choosing this label to classify themselves (See Appendix, Tables 7 and 8).\textsuperscript{9} Few Catholic respondents see themselves as “unionist” in these surveys, the lowest figure being 0\%, the highest being 3\% (See Appendix, Tables 7 and 8). However, a significant percentage of Catholics do not “generally” consider themselves to be either nationalist or unionist, choosing “Neither” as their response (Appendix, Tables 7 and 8).\textsuperscript{10} According to the *Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Surveys* for 1989, 1990, 1993, and 1996, and the NILT survey for 2008, more than half of Catholic respondents chose “Neither” when asked the question “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a unionist, a nationalist or neither?”\textsuperscript{11} The highest recorded percentage of Catholic respondents in these surveys to choose “Neither” is 59\% in the 1989 NISA survey and the lowest is 27\% in the NILT survey for 1999.\textsuperscript{12}

It is true that Catholics have displayed support for a united Ireland. Rejoining the South is a popular choice for Catholic respondents in certain surveys conducted between 1989 and 2012. Catholic participants who believe that the North should eventually unite with the South include over half of Catholic respondents in the 1989-91 and 1994-95 NISA surveys, the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Survey, and the 2001 and 2006 NILT surveys (See Appendix, Tables 13 and 14). Indeed, support for a united
Ireland among Catholic participants never drops below 32% (2010 and 2012) in the NISA and NILT surveys.\(^{13}\)

However, despite the “Irishness” of a substantial portion of Catholics surveyed, and the popularity of Irish unity among Catholic survey respondents, there are indications that "Catholic" does not rigidly correspond to a desire for a united Ireland. In a 1987 study, “42% of those identifying themselves as ‘Catholics’ were for, 16% were against and 41% were undecided” when it came to wanting a united Ireland. Then, an *Irish Times* survey completed in 1996, which provided a greater number of choices for those who were “‘undecided’”, revealed that, among respondents, 39% of Catholics supported a united Ireland, while the next greatest number, 23%, preferred “‘A local Parliament for NI within the UK with power-sharing and North-South links’”. The following year, the basic finding “that the goal of Irish unity was only an absolute good for a minority within the minority” was supported by “*The Belfast Telegraph*/Queen’s Survey.”\(^{14}\)

These findings are further supported by NISA (1989-1996) and NILT (1998-2012) surveys. In the 1993 and 1996 NISA surveys, 49% and 47% of Catholic respondents, respectively, thought that the North ought to eventually rejoin the South. Similarly, less than half of Catholic respondents thought this way in the 1998-2000, 2002-2005, and 2007-2012 NILT surveys (See Appendix, Tables 13 and 14).\(^{15}\) In recent years, the number of Catholic NILT respondents supporting an eventual reunion with the South is particularly low, amounting to 38% in 2008, 40% in 2009, and merely 32% in 2010 and 2012.\(^{16}\) These lower percentages since 2008 may reflect the renewal of power-sharing government in 2007 and the fact that ten years had passed since the GFA had been achieved.
Furthermore, respondents to the NILT surveys (1998-2012) who said they thought “that the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it” “to reunify with the rest of Ireland” or who chose the option “(Independent state)”, “Other answer”, or “(Don’t know)”, were also asked “If the majority of people in Northern Ireland never voted to become part of a United Ireland do you think you” “would find this almost impossible to accept. Would not like it, but could live with it if you had to, Or, would happily accept the wishes of the majority” or “(Don’t know)”. In every year, more than half of Catholic respondents to this question claimed they “would happily accept the wishes of the majority”, the lowest percentage being 55% in 2006. In other words, even among nationalists and those who think a united Ireland is the best solution, a willingness to accept a different outcome is evident.

Finally, some Catholics actually take a more unusual stance on this political issue. In the NISA surveys for 1989-1996, between 24 and 36% of Catholic respondents thought that “the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be” “to remain part of the United Kingdom.” In the NILT surveys between 1998 and 2012, anywhere between 15% (2001) and 51% (2010) of Catholic respondents thought that “the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it” “to remain part of the United Kingdom” (See Appendix, Tables 13 and 14). The higher percentages of pro-UK Catholics since 2007 likely reflects both the reinstatement of devolved power-sharing in 2007 and the fact that by 2010 the GFA was over a decade old and another group of young people would have reached adulthood in a Northern Ireland that was a much less violent place than it had been in their parents’ time. Catholic individuals preferring a UK connection place themselves more in the middle of a divided Northern Irish society than on any one side.
Indeed, if the support given the Good Friday Agreement is any indication, the Catholic/nationalist people of Northern Ireland are generally much more prepared to come to terms with their Protestant/unionist counterparts than could be supposed. Those who voted “‘yes’” to the Agreement included nearly every nationalist who voted in the Province as well as most unionists, which is significant in that the traditional dividing line between the two communities was being crossed. A vote in favour of the Good Friday Agreement was a tangible demonstration of support for power-sharing between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland as well as a desire to see peace and stability in the Province. It represented a rejection of physical force and militancy in favour of peaceful, democratic process.

**Non-Traditional Protestants**

As far as identity is concerned, there is no doubt that Protestant and "British" are strongly linked in Northern Ireland. In 1978 67% of Protestant survey respondents said they were British and the majority of Protestant respondents to the NISA Surveys of 1989 and 1991-1996 claimed to be British. The highest percentage was 70% in 1994 and the lowest was 59% in 1996 (see Appendix, Table 3). Similarly, the highest percentage of NILT Protestant participants to claim a British identity is 75% in 2002 and the lowest is 57% in 2008 (see Appendix, Table 4). Correspondingly, Protestants claiming to be Irish are much fewer. 20% of Protestants claimed an Irish identity in 1968 and a mere 8% chose Irish in 1978. It is likely that the significant drop in the Irish group and rise in the British group (from 39% in 1968 to 67% in 1978) was due to the Civil Rights Movement and the ensuing Troubles violence as Protestants became targets for republican paramilitaries. "Irish" Protestants are exceptional in the NISA and NILT
surveys. The lowest percentage to choose the Irish label in the NISA surveys is 1% in 1993 and the highest is 7% in the NISA survey of 1996 (see Appendix, Table 3).\textsuperscript{26} In the NILT surveys, the percentage of Protestant respondents choosing "Irish" is highest in 2005 at 6%. The lowest is 2% (see Appendix, Table 4).\textsuperscript{27} Those who do claim an Irish identity are clearly breaking with the majority of their fellows to select this label, no doubt aware of its strong association with the Catholic/nationalist community.

The traditional pairing of Protestant and British does not reflect the views of all Protestants surveyed. Thirty-two percent of Protestant respondents in the 1968 survey chose an Ulster identity (as opposed to 39% who considered themselves British) and 20% chose Ulster in 1978. NISA and NILT survey results show that a minority of Protestants, anywhere from 2 to 16%, describe themselves as "Ulster", thus revealing a focussed regional identity, rather than a strong attachment to their UK nationality (see Appendix, Tables 3 and 4).\textsuperscript{28} Still, this is traditionally a very Protestant choice of identity; very few Catholics choose this option. In 1968 and 1978 surveys, only 5% and 6% chose Ulster, respectively. In the later NISA and NILT surveys, the figures fall between 0 and 4%, in line with the traditional Catholic rejection of "Ulster" as an accurate or legitimate term, as the territory of Northern Ireland does not include all nine counties of the original Ulster Province (see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2).\textsuperscript{29}

Nonetheless, there is yet another identity option offered in these surveys that is chosen by a significant minority of Protestants, that of "Northern Irish." While this appears to be a more popular identity among Catholics, anywhere from 11 to 32% of Protestant respondents to these surveys have chosen this identity (see Appendix, Tables 3 and 4).\textsuperscript{30} Eleven per cent of Protestant NISA respondents chose it in 1993 and 32% of
Protestant NILT respondents chose it in 2008. While the percentage rises and falls across the years, recent percentages of Protestant NILT respondents choosing this identity have been higher. Between 2006 and 2010, the number has never dropped below 26% (the figure was 24% in 2012). This may reflect the arrival within this period of devolution and power-sharing – a Northern Ireland based government. In short, some Protestants have chosen, like some of their Catholic counterparts, to identify themselves with Northern Ireland specifically, rather than openly choosing the broader, more traditional and divisive identities of "British" or "Irish". A significant minority of both Protestant and Catholic respondents share a sense of being "Northern Irish" and, therefore, to some extent, consider themselves as separate and unique from the rest of the UK and the Republic of Ireland.

In addition, traditionally, Protestants have been associated, very strongly, with a unionist political identity and the connection between Protestantism and unionism is shown by recent survey evidence (see Appendix, Tables 9 and 10). NISA surveys reveal that between 69 and 74% of Protestant respondents think of themselves as unionists. NILT survey evidence in subsequent years shows that high percentages of Protestants continue to see themselves as unionist. The lowest percentage of Protestants to choose "unionist" in a NILT survey was 60% in 2012; the highest was 73% in 2002. Indeed, according to the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Survey (2003), 81% of Protestant respondents chose the label unionist to describe themselves. This survey took place right after the November 2003 elections to the Assembly in Northern Ireland, which may explain the apparent spike in the number of unionists.
But not all Protestant respondents have proven so traditional in their thinking. While an extremely low number of Protestant respondents have claimed to be nationalist - the percentage for the annual NISA (1989-1996) and NILT surveys (1998-2012) never rises above 1% and is often 0% - a significant minority of Protestant respondents to both surveys have claimed to be "neither" nationalist nor unionist when asked "Generally, [sic] speaking, do you think of yourself as a unionist, a nationalist or neither?" (see Appendix, Tables 9 and 10). The highest proportion of Protestant NISA participants claiming to be "neither" is 30% in 1989 and the lowest is 26% in 1990 and 1994. Similarly, for NILT Protestant respondents, the highest percentage to claim to be "neither" is 36% in 2012 and the lowest is 24% in 2002. Therefore, there are Protestants in the Province who, for whatever reason, choose to reject both traditional political labels, (at least generally), even while maintaining membership in the majority religious community.

There is no doubt that strong support for Northern Ireland's position in the UK is, in addition to a sense of "Britishness" and political unionism, rightfully attributed to most Protestants. Protestant NISA survey participants are overwhelming in their support for keeping the Province within the UK - 93% wanted this in 1989 and 1990 and the lowest percentage of Protestants in favour of the Province staying in the UK was 85% in 1996 (see Appendix, Table 15). When it comes to the NILT surveys, the percentage of Protestant participants who want to remain in the UK is, at its lowest, 79% in 2001 and, at its highest, in 2009 and 2010, 91% (see Appendix, Table 16). In 2009, 2010, and 2012 (as well as in 2007-2008) this percentage represents the number of Protestant
respondents who chose to either continue in the UK under direct rule or "with devolved government".\footnote{41}

Interestingly, however, there does exist a minority of Protestants who are less traditional in their thinking, even here. When asked the question "Do you think the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be for it to remain part of the United Kingdom, or to reunify with the rest of Ireland?" a small number of Protestants chose "to reunify with the rest of Ireland" - between 3 and 8% in the NISA surveys and anywhere from 2 to 7% in the NILT surveys (see Appendix, Tables 15 and 16).\footnote{42} Furthermore, the participants in the NILT surveys who chose a different option than a united Ireland were also asked how they would respond "If the majority of people in Northern Ireland ever voted to become part of a United Ireland".\footnote{43} Anywhere from 14 to 29% of Protestant respondents to the NILT surveys claimed that they "would find it almost impossible to accept" should most of the Province's people ever choose to reunite with the South.\footnote{44} However, a comparable percentage of Protestant respondents claimed that "they would happily accept the wishes of the majority" should most of the Province's citizens one day decide they want to rejoin the South. The highest percentage to say this is 37% in 2005 and the lowest is 23% in 2008 and 2010.\footnote{45} Not all Protestants take the "No Surrender" position with regards to Irish unity.

\textbf{Atheists, Humanists, and the Non-Religious}

By far, most people in Northern Ireland still consider themselves to be part of, or connected to, a major religion.\footnote{46} In the 1951 and 1961 censuses, under 100,000 people in a population of around 1.4 million either did not state their religion or did not belong to one of the four main religions in the Province.\footnote{47} Furthermore, in the 1968 Loyalty
Survey, 96% of people said they were Catholic, Presbyterian, Anglican, or Methodist. The 2001 census reveals that, of Northern Ireland's more than 1.6 million people, around 80% still consider themselves as belonging to one of the four main religious denominations - Catholic, Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist. Indeed, if the "Other Christian (including Christian related)" category is included, the amount of Christians in Northern Ireland reaches almost 86% in 2001. The percentage of those belonging to the four main religious categories remains high in 2011, including around 77% of the Province's 1.8 million people. Again, once the "Other Christian (including Christian related)" category is included, the number rises to about 82%. Thus, most people in the Province remain, at least on paper, members of the Protestant and Catholic majority communities.

Furthermore, Northern Ireland's rates of actual religious practice are high when compared with others. According to Harding and Phillips in 1986, with the exception of Southern Ireland, more people went to church in Northern Ireland than in any other Western European country. Over half of the population went to church a minimum of one time per week. According to survey evidence from 1993, 58% went to church often in Northern Ireland. Fifteen per cent did so in Britain. "Rare" churchgoers amounted to 32% in Northern Ireland and 78% in Britain. More specifically, according to a 2007 Tearfund report, 45% of people in Northern Ireland attend church once a month or more. For England the proportion is 14%, for Scotland 18%, and for Wales 12%.

However, Northern Ireland is also home to those who reject easy categorization into the standard Protestant and Catholic majority communities. A close look at census results bears out the consistent presence, and even growth, of a minority non-religious or
unaffiliated population. According to the census for 1951, there were 221 respondents who considered themselves to be “freethinkers” as well as 64 respondents who viewed themselves as atheists within the Province. This translated to a mere 0.02% of Northern Ireland’s people. Also, 5,865 respondents refrained from declaring a religion – 0.4% of the people.\(^{55}\) In 1961, 2% of the people did not give a religious affiliation (amounting to 28,418 people). That year 285 people claimed to be "freethinker", 87 described themselves as "atheist", and 12 said they were "humanist."\(^{56}\) Then, beginning with the 1971 census, the question dealing with religion could be answered or not, according to the wishes of the respondent. In 1971 the vast majority of Northern Ireland's population of over 1.5 million were Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, or Methodist. However, 230,449 respondents fell into the "Other and not stated denominations" category.\(^{57}\) While the majority of these individuals did not give their religious affiliation - 142,511 persons, or 9.4% of the Province's people - most of the rest did belong to minority Christian faiths or other religions, such as Judaism. However, there were those who placed themselves outside a clear religious category. For example, 1,200 people identified as "Agnostic", 512 as "Atheist", 171 as "Humanist", and 31 as "Free Thinkers".\(^{58}\) In 1981, out of Northern Ireland's 1.48 million people, 387,406 persons fell into the "Other and not stated denominations" category, with 274,584 not stating their religion, amounting to 18.5% of Northern Ireland's people.\(^{59}\) Among those who did identify themselves, 1,171 are Agnostics, 730 are Atheists, 146 are Humanists, and 94 are Free Thinkers.\(^{60}\) In 1991, out of a population of over 1.5 million, 59,234 or 3.7 % stated "None" when asked their religious affiliation (they were given this specific option that year), 114,827 or 7.3% did not state their religion, and, of the 122,448 people who were
grouped in the "Other denominations" category, 742 were Agnostic, 470 were Atheist, 69 were Humanist, and 56 were Free Thinker. In 2001, around 14% of Northern Ireland's approximately 1.7 million people were categorized as "persons with no religion or religion not stated". In 2011, about 10% of Northern Ireland's 1.8 million people had "No religion" and around 7% did not give their religion.

The fact that 59,234 people (3.7%) in 1991 claimed to be of no religion is of particular significance. In 1971 and 1981 it appears as though the rise in the number of people not giving their religious affiliation was due to the fact that the question was optional. However, the 1991 results indicate that a lot of such people did not consider themselves to be members of a specific faith as the percentage of people not providing any religious affiliation dropped significantly from the 1981 census and was lower even than the percentage for 1971. Meanwhile, in 1991, the group claiming no religious affiliation seriously rivals the Methodist denomination, which consists of 59,517 persons (3.8%) and, if the atheist, agnostic, and other "non-aligned" people are considered, actually surpasses it. Indeed, as McAllister points out, as of 2001, those who can be considered to belong to “the secular group” are ahead of the Methodists in numbers within the Province, and behind the Catholics, Presbyterians, as well as Church of Ireland adherents (see Appendix, Graph 2). According to census results in 2001, almost 14% of respondents claimed that they did not belong to any religion or they did not identify their faith. This is up from 11% in 1991 (see Appendix, Graph 2). In 2001, only 3.5% of respondents identified themselves as Methodists. The 2011 figures are even higher for the specifically non-religious in comparison to 1991, at 10%. If those who do not identify their denomination are included, the figure rises to around 17% (see Appendix,
Graph 2). In this year the "No religion" figure is well above the percentage of Methodists (3%) and is approaching the Church of Ireland figure of around 14%. Therefore, there are people in Northern Ireland who defy conventional religious labels and are either totally non-religious (such as the atheists) or locate themselves outside the standard Catholic/Protestant divide by claiming no religious affiliation or refusing to state it.

Who, more specifically, are these non-religious or secular individuals? While delineating this group in detail is a challenge, some insights may be provided. In McAllister's graph, entitled "Religious affiliation, 1961-2001 Censuses," the religion "not stated" group peaks in 1981 at 18.5%. That same year, the Catholic group has its greatest dip to 28%. In 1991, the Catholic group increases again to 38% while the "Secular" (including here the "None" and "not stated" population) goes down to 11%. This indicates, that, in 1981, the substantial growth "in the 'not stated' category" was in significant part due to Catholics not giving their religious affiliation. Furthermore, the Catholic group increases slightly again in 2001 to 40% and the "Secular" population increases to just under 14% that same year - a greater increase since 1991 than the Catholic group experiences. Meanwhile, the Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist populations display a decline in numbers every year between 1961 and 2001. Thus, it would appear that a significant number of the non-religious population are coming from a Protestant background.

There is also evidence that religion in Northern Ireland was becoming a less formalized activity for some people between 1989 and 2004. According to McAllister's survey based findings, over 60% of people went to church a minimum of once a week during the latter 1980s. However, as of “the early 2000s” only about 50% did so. The
reduction in regular attendees was highest for Catholics who, in the past, have been the ones to go to church most faithfully. Hayes and Dowds echo these findings, (also utilizing survey data), contending that weekly churchgoing amongst Catholics, Presbyterians, and Church of Ireland adherents declined between 1968 and 2008, with, again, the greatest drop amongst Catholics. Thus, there is evidence of a secularizing process taking place in the North and that people who are serious about formal religious worship on a regular basis are declining in numbers. It is quite possible, then, that we will see the "non-religious" numbers in the Province continue to increase over time.

There are a number of possible explanations for such changes within Northern Ireland. There is the possibility that demographic developments are the main cause of secularisation, developments like individuals remaining in school longer and not getting married and having children as early. If such is the case, the percentages of people who do not consider themselves as belonging to a religious faith ought to get larger as age cohorts get younger when different cohorts are compared. Utilizing survey data, a comparison of the percentage of non-religious people born in six different time periods demonstrates that the greatest percentages of people who do not belong to a religion can be found to have been born between 1960 and 1986. The percentage of non-religious individuals born between 1900 and 1914 is lower than for any of the other five, more recent, age groups. Such evidence would indicate that as the population turns over, secularisation increases. It also suggests that those who do not have a religion have a tendency to be younger.

There is also, however, the issue of parents passing religion to their children. McAllister has found, again utilizing survey data, that religion transmits most powerfully
within the Catholic group. The next greatest degree of transmission can be found among the people who had a non-religious upbringing. The degree of transmission was lower within the Protestant religions and differed between these. In short, McAllister’s discoveries indicate “that the gradual turnover of age cohorts, supplemented by differential rates of parental transmission of religion” have roles to play in the expansion of the non-religious population in Northern Ireland.79

The question also arises as to whether increased or more widespread access to education has reduced the connection of people to religion. McAllister notes that the evidence indicates that education’s impact on “religious affiliation” is moderate at the most. His findings demonstrate that the level of education for Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Methodists is comparable. Nonetheless, individuals who do not belong to a religion have a greater likelihood of having received “tertiary education.” According to McAllister’s research, the non-religious had a greater likelihood of having postsecondary education and a degree than was the case for Methodists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, or Catholics. They were also less likely than the religious groups to have no educational qualifications.80 It is possible, then, that those of no religion may be found in particular among the more educated segment of Northern Ireland’s people.

Another consideration is the relationship between secularisation and politics. McAllister examines the non-religious, Methodist, Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic respondents to various surveys, including NISA and NILT, who rejected the labels of ‘nationalist’ and ‘unionist’, claiming they were “‘neither’”. Interestingly, 67% of respondents of “No religion” did not select either term, claiming to be “‘neither’” as compared to 39% among Catholics, 27% of Methodists, 26% of Anglicans, and 23% of
Presbyterians. Indeed, in the NISA (1989-1996) surveys, the percentage of "No Religion" respondents claiming to be "Neither" 'nationalist' nor 'unionist' never fell below 66% (1990, 1995). The highest percentage to claim to be "Neither" in the NISA surveys was 78% in 1993 (see Appendix, Table 11). In the NILT (1998-2012) surveys, the lowest percentage of non-aligned respondents of "No Religion" was 54% in 1999 and the highest was 83% in 2010 (see Appendix, Table 12). The percentages of Catholic and Protestant respondents who were "Neither" are significantly lower (see Appendix, Tables 7-10).

Therefore, it would appear that the non-religious have a far greater propensity to separate themselves from standard political identities.

McAllister examines two possible explanations for such results. He points out that there may be those who, as a means of withdrawing from or rejecting a “religiously-based political system”, have disconnected themselves from the faith in which they were raised: “In other words, political disaffection has led to secularisation.” However, the motivations of respondents for rejecting or disconnecting from a faith could, for the most part, have nothing to do with politics and the outcome could be that these people hold political views that are different from or in opposition to those of people with whom they once shared a religion or faith. If this is the case, then “secularisation has led to political disaffection.”

McAllister does note that we cannot “definitively test either model, since we do not have data on the same individuals over time.”

Nonetheless, there is a means to assess the probability of each explanation and this is by studying “the distribution of opinions across the six cohorts identified previously.” In a case where secularisation is a result of "political disaffection", then the percentages of non-religious respondents to have “no national identity” should rise from
one cohort to the next. Therefore, non-religious individuals born in the first part of the 1900s would demonstrate political views much like those of respondents who belonged to a religion. Meanwhile, individuals who were born in later periods “would have more distinctive outlooks.” In contrast, should “political disaffection” be a result of secularisation, we ought to see a “flat” “trend” as the impact would be the same for every age cohort or group.\textsuperscript{86} McAllister’s assessment offers powerful evidence that secularisation is a result of political disaffection. Non-religious respondents who claim that they are “‘neither’” nationalist nor unionist can be found in greater numbers within the ranks of those born in later periods.\textsuperscript{87} Secular or non-religious individuals, as difficult as they can be to locate and quantify, fit much more easily and naturally into a “Third Community” or group, one that is not Catholic or Protestant and not nationalist or unionist.

\textit{Intermarried Couples}

The connections between religion, politics, and nationality in Northern Ireland extend through and impact the social world, and, therefore, marital choices.

Denominational schooling has been a reality for many people in the North, as have exclusive neighbourhoods, occupied by people of the same religion and political background, to the virtual exclusion of the “other side”. Thus, it is not surprising that people’s marital selections have been impacted and that Catholics usually marry Catholics and Protestants usually marry Protestants. Indeed, NISA survey evidence indicated that, in Northern Ireland, 90-93\% of partnerships/marriages were between people who shared a religion (see Appendix, Table 19).\textsuperscript{88} In the NILT surveys of 1998 to 2005, between 83
and 89% of respondents claimed their partner or spouse shared their religion (see Appendix, Table 20).\textsuperscript{89}

The marriage of a Catholic and a Protestant is commonly referred to as a “mixed marriage”\textsuperscript{90} among Northern Irish people, and, historically, such marriages have faced opposition in Ireland. These marriages were against the law in the time of the Penal Laws. Mixed marriages occurred in the 1700s as well as 1800s and could not be classified as rare. However, they were regarded negatively and were frequently “discouraged”.\textsuperscript{91} The initial quarter of the 1900s was also a difficult period for such unions. There was the Catholic decree \textit{Ne Temere} (1908) which, according to the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA), was a particular source of tension when it came to mixed marriages as this decree “reaffirmed the Roman Catholic stance that “mixed marriages” should be conducted in a Roman Catholic Church performed by a Roman Catholic priest.”\textsuperscript{92} The Catholic ought to try their best to bring his or her partner into the Catholic faith. All children ought to be Catholic; also, they had to go to Catholic schools.\textsuperscript{93} Naturally all this was considered unacceptable or problematic by members of Protestant denominations in Ireland. Great concern was felt by the “Protestant Churches” as well.\textsuperscript{94} In addition to \textit{Ne Temere}, there was, in this era, Home Rule and the response it engendered among Protestants in Ulster. Also, there was World War I, the 1916 Rebellion, as well as the Anglo-Irish War and the division of the island. This overall context did not create an easy atmosphere for intermarriage as all of these events heightened tensions between the two main communities within Ireland. All in all, negative views of and feelings towards intermarriage solidified amongst
Protestants and Catholics and NIMMA contends that “our society is still experiencing the consequences of this almost a century later.”

Indeed, couples who want to marry across the divide confront a variety of issues and challenges that those who share a faith do not. Generally, the couple are not viewed to be married in the eyes of the Catholic Church if they do not declare their marital vows in the presence of a priest, unless they were given “a dispensation from canonical form order” allowing them to have “some other kind of wedding.” A “dispensation from form” needs to be obtained in the event that the marriage is going to occur within a church that is not Catholic with a non-Catholic cleric officiating. Furthermore, in order for a mixed marriage to occur even within a Catholic Church, the bishop must receive from the Catholic party a request “for a dispensation to marry.” Unfortunately, the experience of marrying over the religious boundary in Northern Ireland is not uniform. When it comes to the necessary permissions or dispensations, Robinson notes “The inconsistency with which people are treated when they make application for these…is surprising. However, from the experience of our couples it has become easier to obtain a dispensation over recent years.” Still, in the Catholic church, how an area’s bishop sees things is frequently very important. It can impact how such marriages are handled in a diocese and potentially create difficulties for mixed couples. On the Protestant side, the churches did not have comparable legislation or rules about marriage. However, the majority of “Protestant denominations” were decidedly not supportive of intermarriage. This was due to the depth of “theological differences” between Protestantism and Catholicism as well as objections to Catholic “teachings and practice”. In addition, in the case of certain “smaller and more evangelical Protestant
denominations”, hostility regarding marriages that cross the divide remains powerful.\textsuperscript{101}

As far as such groups are concerned, working with Catholics is not possible; the “theological differences” separating them are too significant. Furthermore, Protestant clerical attitudes can also be a problem; a rigid or unsympathetic bishop or cleric can pose challenges for couples who try to wed outside their denomination and place them at odds with one or both traditions.\textsuperscript{102}

When it comes to the Protestant as well as Catholic churches’ "formal" stances regarding intermarriage, no major alteration has occurred in recent decades. However, in practice, positive developments have taken place that may be opening up a bit of ecclesiastical middle ground. For instance, on the Catholic side of things, the *Codex Iuris Canonici*, or Code of Canon Law, was altered in 1983 in order to bring it in line with the Decree on Ecumenism as well as the Declaration on Religious Liberty (both of Vatican II). Furthermore, taking into account legislation dealing more particularly with intermarriage in the 1966 *Instructio Matrimonii Sacramenturn* as well as the 1970 *Motu Proprio Matrimonia Mixta*, "the principles" regarding Catholics marrying outside their faith are still in place, but procedures have become more flexible. Having Catholic priests as well as Protestant ministers take part in weddings is viewed with a lot more acceptance within the Catholic church. Also, the rules regarding children have been eased. While Catholics are supposed to promise that they will do all they are able to to have the children raised Catholic, their Protestant spouses-to-be do not have to make any required declaration anymore.\textsuperscript{103}

Meanwhile, “the major Protestant churches have begun to clarify their policy on mixed marriage, including accommodating the views of the Catholic partner and
formulating procedures for the participation of a priest in a Protestant marriage ceremony or of a minister in a Catholic ceremony.” Currently, there are clerics who are open to preparing a wedding that includes some Catholic as well as Protestant characteristics or liturgical elements. As one Irish Anglican cleric reports: “We try to be as open and accommodating as possible and, if it is wanted, the priest and myself will get together and almost rewrite a service if the couple aren’t happy and we will always attend the wedding in the other church if requested”.  

It can be challenging to establish numbers when it comes to inter-religious marriages and partnerships in Northern Ireland, but efforts have been made. According to Lee, based on census data, 1.2% of couples were in mixed marriages in the Province in 1971. Figures provided for such marriages between the late 1980s and 1996 have ranged from 2 to 10%. Lloyd and Robinson (2008) point out that, annually, about 10% of those who take part in the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey report that they are partnered with someone who does not belong to their faith. Finally, the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA) contended in a December 2008 Press Release that over one out of ten Northern Irish marriages per year are mixed. There were, according to NIMMA, over 800 the previous year. In short, for Northern Ireland overall, the recent figure appears to be around 10%. In the Appendix, Tables 19 and 20, it can be seen that the percentage of cross-community partnerships is higher in the NILT surveys when compared with NISA results, possibly reflecting the achievement of the GFA and the ongoing peace process.

Although there is some evidence that views of Catholic-Protestant marriages are mellowing, these marriages are still not wholly accepted. In their Research Update,
entitled “A World Apart: Mixed marriage in Northern Ireland,” Wigfall-Williams and Robinson study the NISA Survey of 1989 as well as the NILT Survey from 1998 and see some differences in views of mixed marriage. A moderate change in the numbers of people who actually claimed they would be accepting of an intermarriage taking place in their family can be seen between 1989 and 2009, when the NILT survey results from that year are added to the Wigfall-Williams and Robinson study. Those who "Would not mind" amount to 67% in 1989, 71% in 1998, and 78% in 2009. At least on paper, it would seem that tolerance levels are increasing.

Nonetheless, marriages that cross the religious divide are still not really plentiful and prejudice towards these unions remains. In 1989 31% of respondents to NISA would mind either "a lot" or "a little" if a near relation wed outside their religion. The figures for 1998 and 2009 are 26% and 21%, respectively. Even as late as 2009, then, nearly a quarter of respondents felt some opposition. Therefore, there is still much progress to be made, even though there have seemingly been some alterations and progressions of attitudes in Northern Ireland. Marrying over religious and community boundaries can still be a significant challenge for couples and place them at odds with family and some members of both main communities.

Certain characteristics also appear to distinguish those who form interreligious partnerships from those who do not. The differences that Lloyd and Robinson found between NILT respondents in relationships that crossed religious boundaries and participants whose relationships did not (utilizing the 1998-2005 "pooled dataset" mentioned earlier) provide evidence that mixed couples may indeed be a unique sub-group within the Province. To begin with, the authors report that those participants
whose partners were not of the same religion had a higher probability of being more youthful than individuals who shared a faith with their significant other. The youthfulness of this group is indicated by the fact that 56% of respondents whose partners were members of another faith were younger than 45. 39% of people who shared a faith with their partner were below 45.

When it comes to education, the two groups also differ in interesting ways. For instance, 16% of those in inter-religious relationships had gone to a school that was, to some extent, mixed as opposed to 11% of participants in single-religion relationships. To add to this, 32% of respondents whose partner was of a different faith claimed “that a child in their care had” been sent to a school that included both Catholic and Protestant pupils within the Province. Only 17% of participants who had significant others who shared their faith said the same. It would appear, then, that people who cross religious boundaries in their marriages or partnerships have a higher probability of having done so as schoolchildren and/or are more likely to do so when it comes to their own children, in comparison to those whose relationships are with those of their own religion.

The difference in educational qualifications between the two groups is also revealing. 41% of participants who did not share a religion with their significant other had A Level/BTec educational qualifications or higher, as opposed to 27% of participants who had the same faith as their partner. Indeed, the percentage of respondents in inter-religious partnerships who possessed educational qualifications of a recognizable sort was higher than those whose partners shared their faith in every case. This pattern is also modestly reflected, in reverse, at the lowest level, where 9% of respondents who had partners who shared their religion claimed "None" as their educational qualification and
7% who had partners belonging to a different faith than they did said they had no educational qualifications. Therefore, there is some evidence in Lloyd and Robinson's study to indicate that those who marry or partner across the sectarian divide have more education, on average, than those who do not.\textsuperscript{122}

There has been some discussion as to whether inter-religious couples have a higher probability of being middle class. Robinson (1992) notes that questions about participants' jobs and salaries “were not asked directly” in the study.\textsuperscript{123} Nonetheless, due to the fact that the majority of interviews were held within the homes of participants, assessing the class level of interviewees could be done. Most would fall in the middle class category.\textsuperscript{124} More recently, Lloyd and Robinson (2008) acknowledge the "suggestion that mixed marriage is predominantly a middle class phenomenon" and argue that "Evidence from the NILT survey partly supports this contention."\textsuperscript{125} In addition to having more education, NILT participants who were in a mixed marriage or partnership made more money in comparison to respondents whose partners shared a religion with them.\textsuperscript{126} Still, according to Lloyd and Robinson, "there were no significant differences in relation to the respondent's social class (based on current or previous job)."\textsuperscript{127} In short, there may well be a greater probability that those whose marriages or partnerships are interreligious belong to the middle ranks of society, at least when it comes to their income levels.\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, differences in political stances between mixed and non-mixed participants reveal more middle ground attitudes amongst those in inter-religious partnerships. Lloyd and Robinson note that, when it comes to politics, 17% of adult respondents whose partners were of a different faith claimed to back Alliance instead of
parties which are more decidedly associated with the Protestant or Catholic communities. 6% of respondents in relationships with someone of the same faith claimed to support Alliance. Furthermore, 59% of respondents whose partners were of a different religion claimed to be “neither Nationalist nor Unionist”. This is against 27% of those whose partners belonged to the same faith as them. Thus, it would appear that those who marry across the sectarian boundary are more likely to be politically moderate and opt for more middle ground parties, like Alliance, and to resist traditional communal labels like 'Nationalist' and 'Unionist'.

Survey and census data provide evidence of a multifaceted population in which traditional pairings such as Catholic/Irish/nationalist and Protestant/British/unionist appear but do not encompass all individuals. While Protestant nationalists and Catholic unionists are, indeed, very rare, significant numbers on both sides consider themselves to be “neither” unionist nor nationalist and/or embrace a “Northern Irish” identity. Furthermore, there does exist a non-religious or secular population that, in the majority of cases, rejects being categorized as nationalist or unionist. Finally, despite Northern Ireland’s long history of sectarian tension, there are people who are willing to marry or be involved with those outside of their religious faith or community. Such people appear to have a greater likelihood of being educated, middle class, and politically centrist than those whose partners are co-religionists. In short, Northern Ireland is, despite its obvious divisions, a truly pluralist society, in which there is room for moderates and alternative views.
Survey and census figures tell only part of the story of Northern Ireland’s complicated society. A deeper explanation of the motives and realities of the Province’s people and their respective communities is needed. Understanding ethnicity and nationalism helps clarify views of identity and difference in Northern Ireland and provides greater insight into the facts and figures that more quantitative forms of analysis have to offer.

**Ethnicity**

It has been argued that "Ethnicity is a socially constructed phenomenon" and is distinct from race. Race stresses the biological, whereas the utilization of "ethnic" occurs mainly within a cultural milieu to denote difference.\(^1\) It has been suggested "that ethnicities are the social organisation of cultural difference and the essence of an ethnic identity is to emphasize the boundary between insiders and outsiders." Indeed, inter-group relationships are much more important than whatever traits or attributes those within a group have in common. According to Nic Craith, "tensions caused by conflicts between territorial groups frequently result in a heightened awareness of one's own identity." Nic Craith believes that "dissent" has brought about an enhanced "ethnicity" in Northern Ireland.\(^2\) Hostilities between the two majority communities over territory as well as conflicting political aspirations help explain the popularity of “Irishness” among Catholics and “Britishness” among Protestants. Such tensions explain, too, the infrequency of British Catholics and Irish Protestants in the North.
"Nation" and "nationalism" are also notions for which definitions have been much discussed. According to Anderson, a nation is "an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." Anderson points out that a community like this has to exist in the imagination due to the fact that individuals within it will not ever come into contact with every other "fellow-member". Nonetheless, all members are aware that these others are present and they feel connected or linked to the community as a whole. Also, the people of a nation are aware that is has limits or "boundaries." It does not embrace every person in the world.\(^3\)

Kohn, a predecessor of Anderson's, similarly argued that nationalism involves identifying with countless other individuals a person will not meet, as well as with a land, the absolute whole of which a person will not ever see. Indeed, for Kohn, primarily, nationalism "is...a state of mind, an act of consciousness." According to Kohn, nationalities are created out of ethnographic and political elements when nationalism breathes life into the form built by preceding centuries....Nationalism is a state of mind, permeating the large majority of a people and claiming to permeate all its members; it recognizes the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization and the nationality as the source of all creative cultural energy and of economic well-being.

Also, nationalist feeling brings about positive sentiments towards others who belong to a nationality and a lack of feeling, suspicion, or even loathing of those who do not belong.\(^4\)

Michael Ignatieff has contended that nationalism can be politically defined as the view that humankind is made up of different nations, all of which are entitled to "self-determination." On a cultural level, nationalism argues that even as people possess a number of "identities", "the nation" is what gives people "their primary form of belonging." On a moral level, "nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice" and legitimizes
violence to protect the nation from its foes, whether they are outside or inside the nation. According to Ignatieff, "These claims - political, moral and cultural - underwrite each other."5

There are civic as well as ethnic types of nationalism. The former revolves around the state and is "assimilationist". According to civic nationalism, every person who accepts the political credo of the nation, no matter what religion, race, ethnicity or sex they are, ought to be part of the nation. Citizens would have rights and be connected or linked through support and loyalty to common political principles and "practices". Such nationalism, argues Ignatieff, has to be democratic as it places sovereignty within the entire people. The majority of nation states in the West today equate national belonging with citizenship versus a shared "ethnicity".6

Ethnic nationalism revolves around the "Volk". It is "differentialist."7 Ethnic nationalism arose in Germany in the early 1800s. Language, traditions, religion, such "ethnic characteristics" were held to be what united a nation. Ethnic nationalism holds that a person’s "deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen. It is the national community which defines the individual, not the individuals who define the national community."8 Ethnic nationalism does not permit a person to be him or herself alone. They are part of a larger, at times demanding, communal whole.9 Ethnic and civic nationalism are in conflict, argues Ignatieff. There are those who continue to think that everyone, regardless of religion or race, ought to have a place in a nation. There are those, too, who wish to include "only...their own" in "their nation."10
Identity, Pluralism, and the Nation

Despite the power of national identity, whether civic or ethnic, it does not follow that nationality represents a person’s main identity, at least at all times. Individuals possess more than one identity. People have social identities, role identities as well as personal identities that rest upon what groups they belong to, the responsibilities they carry out, and what values they believe are important. Certain identities can come to the fore, depending on the situation or context. When more than one identity is stimulated or brought into play, the one that is most powerful or important may impact the other(s) more significantly. Some identities are more important to a person than others.

In addition, globalization and other modern realities can undermine long-standing identities, encourage new ones, or result in a focus on regaining identities believed threatened or lost. The variety of identities held by every person, in combination with modern developments, such as secularization and global connections, can, for instance, help explain the existence of those in Northern Ireland who reject or refuse to acknowledge a religious identity. These factors also help account for the majority within this non-religious population who prefer to avoid local political identity labels like nationalist and unionist. These individuals have determined that such identities are not part of who they are or, at least, are not of primary importance to them, regardless of which party they may vote for in an election, assuming they vote at all.

These complex realities of identity connect with pluralism and the nation. Berry notes that people living in nations of significant size are not likely to be “homogenous.” Generally, there are several clear “groupings” who possess their own or unique cultures,
and/or characteristics. Argues Berry, “This natural state of affairs has been termed pluralism.” Furthermore, a person’s identity is often “hyphenated” and people can identify with their class, locality, ethnicity, and so on. Indeed, personal and national desires or conceptions can even conflict and differ. Still, contends Berry, “at the psychological level of argument, we have noted that the search for [national] unity need not in all cases significantly reduce identity or freedom of choice [underlining Berry’s].”¹⁴ It is possible for a person in Northern Ireland to be Catholic and British, or to hold more traditional identity combinations, such as Protestant and British, yet also simultaneously support compromise arrangements such as those offered by the Good Friday Agreement. This reality is not surprising, for, as Nick Hopkins points out, “National pride” does not necessarily mean or result in hatred of others. Nationalism can be portrayed to be against racism, for instance, or for peaceful cohabitation under the terms of a political accord.¹⁵

**Ethnicity and Nationalism in Northern Ireland**

Frequently, Northern Ireland is viewed as an area in which varieties of nationalism/nationalists clash. For example, there are civic as well as ethnic sides to Britishness within the North. "British Unionists" "identify" mainly "with Great Britain" as opposed to Northern Ireland. Nic Craith believes the UK is this group's main "imagined community". They are dedicated to keeping Northern Ireland - as well as Wales and Scotland -inside a united kingdom.¹⁶ For these unionists, citizenship is at the core - Britishness represents citizenship versus nationality.¹⁷ Supposedly, due to its civic nature, every tradition is embraced. A 1997 UDP statement demonstrates this:

> Britishness - unlike a single Irish identity which is fully exercised by the issue of ethnic community - is a civic concept which is pluralist,
overarching and inclusive. The Union embodies equal rights and respect of values of its different national components: Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland....With the emphasis being on citizenship rather than ethnicity, Britishness is able to accommodate people regardless of ethnic identity or religion. It is a modern political doctrine based on rights and citizenship which transcends the limited concepts of nationalism. Therefore, the UDP believes that the best future for all the people of Northern Ireland lies firmly within the United Kingdom and within a form of unionism which is democratic, responsible, accountable and inclusive.  

Here citizenship and nationality are not treated as one and the same thing. Indeed, civic unionists especially see themselves as uninhibited by a "cultural nationalism." A civic understanding of Britishness could account for at least a portion of the small minority of Catholics who identify as British in surveys. 

Porter, meanwhile, has differentiated between what he calls "Liberal Unionism" and his vision of civic unionism. Liberal unionism, he argues, "strips unionism of its cultural Protestant connotations, [and] aspires to a political way of life shared in common with the rest of the United Kingdom." Northern Ireland, as far as liberal unionists are concerned, "is the site of a British political way of life shared in common with the rest of the United Kingdom." It leans in the direction of "an integrationist solution" for the Province. In contrast, he points out that the first aim of civic unionism is "making Northern Ireland work" as opposed to protecting "the Union." For civic unionism, "self-government...[is] a primary political good and it requires public institutions that command the allegiance of all citizens." Northern Ireland would be "better" conceived to be a place in which Irish as well as British "factors" mix, conflict, and require acknowledgement. Unlike liberal and cultural unionism, civic unionism views the Union "as one among other ends", not a satisfactory end on its own. The Union is not civic unionism's final goal in itself; rather the focus is quality of life within the North. The aim
is a North which is inclusive of unionists, nationalists, and others.\textsuperscript{23} This form of civic unionism may play a role in creating the “Northern Irish” identity that some Catholics, Protestants, and those of no religion claim in surveys.

Meanwhile, Ulster loyalists’ main imagined community is in Northern Ireland. This territory of six counties is frequently referred to as Ulster. It seems that, generally, loyalists are more interested in and focussed on culture and espouse ethnic versus civic “Britishness.” According to Nic Craith, “The ethnic version of Britishness celebrates the Union as an expression of British Protestant accomplishment and lays particular emphasis on various discourses of belonging.”\textsuperscript{24} Porter has labelled the loyalist ideology "Cultural Unionism." Northern Ireland, as far as cultural unionists are concerned, is the home "of a Protestant-British way of life" and only it "warrants public institutional recognition."\textsuperscript{25} The Britishness it depends upon is "unrecognisable" on the mainland and it overemphasizes Protestantism's importance when it comes to upholding religious and civil freedoms.\textsuperscript{26} Normally, cultural unionism "involves a defence of the integrity of Northern Ireland and" supports devolution inside the UK. For cultural, as for liberal, unionists, upholding the Union is of the utmost importance; it is their cardinal aim.\textsuperscript{27}

This preoccupation with both Northern Ireland/Ulster and Protestantism among cultural or ethnic unionists/loyalists illuminates the “Ulster” identity espoused by Protestants in surveys. “Ulster” is very much a minority identity in the NISA and NILT surveys, especially among Catholics, who can not be expected to be sympathetic to a six county Protestant dominated state. Nonetheless, an “Ulster” identity is also quite rare among Protestants, which supports the contention that it represents, at least in part, the
views of a more hardline, Protestant minority for whom Northern Ireland or Ulster is their special territory. Those espousing an ethnic Britishness also frequently have Scottish ancestry and are eager to stress Scotland and Northern Ireland's special connection. Indeed, there were Highland Scots in the area before the 1600s. Scots also settled in the North in the early 1600s during the Plantation. Calvinists from Scotland who settled in Ulster during the first part of the 1600s "were motivated by a form of persecuted righteousness," arguably not unlike the Ulster Protestant loyalists today. Religious connections with Scotland were firm - Presbyterian ministers were mainly Scots up to the late 1600s. From 1691 to 1720 most of Ulster's Presbyterian clerics were natives of the area. Since they were not allowed to attend Dublin's Trinity College, they received their education in Scotland, then went back to minister in Ulster. Even today, Northern Irish and Scottish Orange Lodges have firm connections with each other.

Furthermore, there are Scottish symbols or "emblems" which are especially meaningful within the North today. Scottish images, such as the St Andrew's flag/Scottish Saltire, have been or can be seen on the murals of loyalists and "Scotland the Brave" marks the start of Black Preceptory marches. An Ulster Scots language "revival" is taking place in Northern Ireland as well. Those who endorse or back Ulster Scots are mainly found in loyalist ranks as it is mainly loyalists who support "its relevance as a separate and distinct tradition." Nic Craith has argued that, in a way, "a new Ulster-Scot tradition" is being invented and that a "recreation of the Scottish Lowland tradition" can be seen in the North. This overall Scottish connection also helps clarify the "Ulster" affiliation among a minority of Protestants. It potentially
combines a Northern Ireland (Ulster) focussed identity with Ulster-Scottish religious and cultural traditions.

A division in types of nationalism can be seen within the “Catholic” community as well. Although "Ethnic nationalism" has been supported by republicans,36 with constitutionalists placing more stress upon "the question of citizenship," Irishness remains, in many ways, a "narrow" identity.37 Irishness and nationalism currently remain closely connected and nationalists, as a whole, want to see a united Ireland. The majority of republicans today support political means to reach this goal, in line with the constitutional nationalists.38 Still, in the view of republican "ideology", "nation-state" and "ethnic group" borders ought to be the same or "co-terminous". As far as they are concerned, "the Irish ethnic nation" embraces all 32 counties. According to Nic Craith, "Characteristics such as language and religion already operate as important cultural affirmations of this Irish ethnicity. By promoting these emblems in Northern Ireland, they strengthen their affiliation with the Republic."39

Indeed, unionists continually reference the powerful link between the Catholic faith and real or genuine Irish identity in the South. Limited views of Irish identity like this stop or interfere with a lot of unionists' assertion of their own Irishness.40 Nic Craith argues that "Catholicism in the Republic has become more liberal and less essential to the general definition of Irishness."41 For a lot of Protestants in the North, however, the Republic remains "the physical embodiment of an Irish, Catholic-nationalist tradition."42 Thus, the low number of "Irish" Protestants in surveys carried out in Northern Ireland is not surprising.
Nonetheless, as Walker has pointed out, "There have been efforts recently from various quarters to remove Irish identity away from a territorial, political framework." In the first half of the 1990s, some Northern Irish Protestant unionists expressed a desire "for the promotion of a sense of Irishness, without a political agenda." In 1994 Sam McAughtry pointed out that he considered himself Irish while also being a UK citizen. He did not wish to lose or give up his UK citizenship. Rather, "the Irish nation" included everyone in both parts of Ireland: "We protestants should see ourselves as Irish people with British citizenship. We are a national people, within two national systems....Unionists, in proclaiming their Irishness, should proclaim also that the Nation and the State need not necessarily be enclosed within the same boundaries." This view may help explain the existence of the small minority of Protestants claiming an "Irish" identity in the NISA and NILT surveys.

**Geographical and Political Factors**

Finally, certain geographical and political factors also impact the identity of Protestants and Catholics, unionists and nationalists, in the North. Northern Irish unionists live on a different island than their fellow Britons. Separated or "Outpost people" are described by Ascherson as "faithful defenders of some tradition whose centre is far away and which, often, is already decaying into oblivion." Commonly, their identification with, and defence of, a tradition is more extreme. Indeed, Protestantism no longer holds a place of high importance in Britishness, in comparison to earlier times. Britain has "secularized." As Ignatief points out, "Catholic Ireland has ceased to be one of the mirrors in which the British define who they are." Among the British, it is only Protestants in Northern Ireland who continue to confront the old Catholic and Irish enemy
and it makes sense that their Britishness, and even their Protestantism, remains the most intense. Furthermore, Northern Irish unionists are politically on the fringes - the British Labour Party and Liberal Democrats do not participate in elections in Northern Ireland - and unionists know there is a possibility that Britain may one day surrender Northern Ireland. In a way, unionists in Northern Ireland face two "others" - the mainland secularized British and the Catholic Irish - and this effects unionist self-identification. Divided and outnumbered, it is not surprising that strong assertions of Britishness are made, nor, on the other hand, that a significant minority of Protestants recognize their differences from Britain and the rest of Ireland by choosing a "Northern Irish" or, to a lesser extent, an "Ulster", identity.

The Irishness of Catholics in the North, meanwhile, has remained strong. They existed in the North in sufficient numbers that they could "maintain...group solidarity around a strong nationalist and catholic consciousness." Northern Ireland's nationalists consider themselves to belong to "the Irish ethnic nation" and the fact that they are UK citizens fails to reduce or take this away. Still, Irish nationalists in the North are, as a group, aware that they are divided politically from those in the South and this has increased "their sense of ethnic nationality." Although the population of the Republic has been independent from Britain for years and have ceased to "view themselves simply in opposition to the British," the North continues within the UK and the British link remains key to both Protestants and Catholics there. According to Nic Craith, "Their sense of Irishness is still defined in opposition to their Britishness." Thus, a lot of nationalists in Northern Ireland consider emblems of culture especially important and it makes sense that many would cling to an "Irish" identity and nationality.
Nonetheless, Elliott points out that Catholics in Northern Ireland were not looked upon with great warmth in Southern Ireland. Following the 1922 death of Michael Collins, the government in the Free State encouraged Northern Catholics to acknowledge the government in Belfast. On occasion, Nationalist MPs asked to be allowed to take seats in the Dail and never managed to do so. When the South became a republic in the late 1940s, it was a blow to nationalists in Northern Ireland - it represented a "rejection" by the South. Indeed, Catholics continuing to desire and hope for Irish unity during the first part of the 1990s were discovered to have "inherited a powerful sense of betrayal and rejection by the southern state." Nationalist politician Eddie McAteer said, during the 1960s, "We are the bastard children of the Republic...sometimes they must needs acknowledge us, but generally speaking they try to keep their distance."54 Such alienation may help explain why some Catholics choose a "British" or a "Northern Irish" identity in the NISA and NILT surveys.

Despite the continued existence and strength of Irishness and nationalism within the Catholic population of Northern Ireland, very few members of this community opposed the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 - which effectively maintained Northern Ireland as part of the UK, at least for the near future. Support for this Agreement makes sense, however, given Northern Catholics’ political history. The era prior to the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland in 1969 shows that most Catholics were completely constitutional in their nationalism. There was even a willingness to cooperate on the part of certain nationalist politicians during the 1920s. As of 1927 there were 10 Nationalist Party MPs sitting in Belfast. The party was constitutional and pledged "conciliation and co-operation" as it worked to achieve its nationalist goals.55 Eventually, though, in 1932,
unhappy with the situation, Nationalist leader Joe Devlin and his men left parliament.\textsuperscript{56} After this, nationalists turned into "part-time MPs".\textsuperscript{57} They did not take their seats most of the time and the Party was not in good shape by the middle of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{58}

Still, the Nationalist Party was constitutional and, along with Catholics more generally, was receptive to the appeasing gestures of Terence O'Neill, who wanted to bring about reconciliation in Northern Ireland during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{59} O'Neill made positive gestures to the Catholic community, such as offering sympathy after the Pope died. Such actions were completely new for "a Unionist leader" and they did not go unnoticed in the nationalist community. The \textit{Irish News} had opposed Unionism for years, but now backed what O'Neill was trying to do. There were Catholics who "voted Unionist" in the "November 1965" general election, having never done so before.\textsuperscript{60}

Nonetheless, the probability of discrimination was higher for Catholics in jobs, housing, and politics than it was for Protestants in Northern Ireland and the struggle for civil rights would be a major issue during the tenure of O'Neill. Calls for equality inside Northern Ireland on the part of Catholic professionals began. The Campaign for Social Justice was established in 1964 by Catholic doctor Conn McCluskey and his wife and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) came into being in 1967.\textsuperscript{61} The Civil Rights Movement called for "British rights for British citizens".\textsuperscript{62} Indeed, Mulholland argues that "For many, impressed by the liberalism and shared prosperity of the United Kingdom, some form of common citizenship with Britain was to be welcomed."\textsuperscript{63}

Civil Rights marches began in 1968 and would bring about unrest and angry reactions among loyalists, especially followers of Paisley. Still, the Cameron Commission O'Neill created in 1969 ended up taking a positive view of "the civil rights
movement" and, overall, found that it was not a republican front, a frequent charge made by those who opposed or were suspicious of it. In other words, many of the Catholics participating in the movement, at least at first, truly wanted fair change and equality within the state, rather than to simply destroy the state entirely.

O'Neill's attempts at change would ultimately fail to establish stability and reconciliation within the Province and O'Neill stepped down in April of 1969. Still, at this point, nearly every one of the civil rights demands "had been granted". Elliott acknowledges "the contribution of O'Neill to a real climate of hope in the 1960s which allowed many Catholics to identify with Northern Ireland, often for the first time." Indeed, there were Catholics who became Unionist party members during the O'Neill era.

Catholics who, in more recent times, have claimed to be Northern Irish and/or to be neither nationalist nor unionist are actually logical outcomes of this history. A desire for fairness, a preparedness to compromise, and a willingness to respond to positive gestures most certainly existed in previous eras and, judging by the support provided to the 1998 accord, have not disappeared. A willingness to embrace a Northern Irish identity or to reject traditional political identities may well be a sign of a continued openness to the existence, at least for the present, of Northern Ireland as an entity – provided concerns for justice and equality are addressed.

All of these various national and political identities reveal and reflect the existence of complex, differing versions of the nation and national belonging. Northern Ireland is British, Irish, Ulster, or its own entity – just like the people themselves. Yet even within this complicated mix, political and national identities are not necessarily
more important than fairness or avoidance of further conflict. They are not even the primary ways in which all citizens define themselves. There are, as has been shown, many people who are neither unionist nor nationalist, despite the prevalence of those labels in the wider society. Furthermore, most Catholics and significant numbers of Protestants would be willing to accept a majority decision regarding Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, even if it differed from their own ideal. Thus, their political ideals and identities and, by extension, their national identities, are not so important they cannot be flexible. Only a minority among Catholics and Protestants would find an outcome opposed (at least potentially) to their political and identity goals to be extremely unacceptable – likewise only a minority on both sides ever took up the gun. For either side to express such a willingness to adhere to majority decisions is telling as a principled hardliner would not be likely to make such a claim, even in a survey. They would want their feelings to be clear on this, for them, fundamental issue. Essentially, Northern Ireland, whether recognized officially as such or not, is a pluralist entity.

There are many reasons and explanations for choice of identity, both personal and political, in Northern Ireland. When concepts such as ethnicity and nationalism are understood and applied in a Northern Irish context, statistics and survey information are better understood. Individual and communal identity are strongly connected to each other and to the past. While these relationships are always complex and it is impossible to be certain of every survey respondent’s motivations and reasons for choosing a particular label to apply to himself or herself, it is possible to explain the forces that impact these decisions.
CHAPTER 4
THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 1: THE CHURCHES AND PEACE GROUPS

The third community in Northern Ireland has not been a passive segment of the population, but, rather, has expressed itself and demonstrated its existence via a variety of religious, political, and community organizations and bodies. The major religious denominations, for instance - Catholic, Church of Ireland, Methodist, and Presbyterian - have transcended the border between North and South, rather than focussed on defending it. Furthermore, the leaders of the churches have denounced violence and intolerance over the years in an effort to promote peace in the Province. In addition, particularly at the community level, there have been groups and organizations which have crossed or attempted to cross traditional communal borders in the name of peace, unity, and tolerance. Two of these groups - Corrymeela and Peace People - have brought people from different traditions together in fellowship and in an attempt to bring violence to an end.

The Churches and Clergy

Despite strong links between Protestantism and Britishness and the large Protestant presence within the North, the three most significant individual denominations within Ireland and Northern Ireland (Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist) are essentially Irish and cross-border. Prior to 1871, Irish Anglicans belonged to “the United Church of England and Ireland.” However, disestablishment occurred in 1871 and, following this, Church of Ireland bishops ceased to be given their positions by the Crown and stopped being called “to attend the House of Lords”, among other changes.¹ Thus,
despite any relationships with British Anglicans, the Irish Anglican church is, itself, Irish. In addition, the church serves members in Northern as well as Southern Ireland. Indeed, in the wake of the establishment of Northern Ireland, the Church, along with its fellow Protestant (and Catholic) counterparts, refused to accept that the separation of the island politically would henceforth operate religiously as well.

The Church of Ireland's structure defies the border. There are two archbishoprics for the Church of Ireland, one in Dublin and the other in Armagh – Dublin and Armagh being the “two provinces” of the Irish Church. The boundaries of the Church of Ireland Province of Armagh are not exactly those of Northern Ireland, although the political boundaries of County Armagh itself are firmly within the borders of Northern Ireland. Within the religious province are included some parishes within the Republic. The following maps illustrate the complexity of boundaries, showing the religious border between the two Church of Ireland provinces (Figure 1) and the political divisions between the four Irish provinces and between Northern and Southern Ireland (Figure 2).

**Figure 1: Church of Ireland Provinces**
Furthermore, using the name “Church of Ireland” and referring to the archbishops as Primates “of all-Ireland” (Armagh) and “Ireland” (Dublin) reinforces the view and nature of the church as crossing the political border.

The church operates on an Ireland-wide basis in its government as well. The Church of Ireland’s General Synod is basically its “Parliament” or governing body. Every diocese (there are twelve in Ireland) chooses representatives to the Synod where legislation as well as resolutions are arrived at. Although the Synod always met in Dublin prior to 1986, when it gathered in Belfast, since then it has met in cities such as Armagh, Cork, Kilkenny as well as Galway, in addition to Dublin, thereby reinforcing its identity as a church not confined within the political borders of either Northern Ireland or the Republic.
Yet, despite its Protestant identity, the Church of Ireland does have a long history in what is now the Republic of Ireland and its stronghold continues to be in Southern Ireland. This makes sense given that two of the church's most longstanding institutions are located in the South - Saint Patrick's Cathedral and Trinity College. Both are in Dublin. After disestablishment, "Saint Patrick's Cathedral became the National Cathedral for the Church of Ireland," thereby linking all members of the church to the traditional southern capital, and the old "Irish" Protestantism.

Trinity College also has a very Anglican heritage. It was established in 1592 and those in favour of its creation felt that it would help reinforce Protestantism in Ireland. The College educated the vast majority of Church of Ireland clerics who went to university. The divinity school at Trinity remained the main educational venue for Anglican clerics following disestablishment. Today, the College is non-denominational and would-be Anglican clergy receive their education at the Church of Ireland Theological Institute, set up in 2007, which continues to have a partnership with Trinity. In short, Trinity gave (and continues to give) Anglican clerics in Ireland a shared “Irish” educational history and culture, whether they are stationed in the North or the South.

The Irishness of the Church of Ireland can be found as well in the cultural and scholarly activities of its elite. The Church of Ireland and its adherents have displayed concern and enthusiasm for Irish culture and language and have had some connections to the Celtic Revival of the latter 1800s. The Revival involved a number of Church of Ireland clerics. For example, James Henthorn Todd as well as Charles Graves were past presidents of the Royal Irish Academy in the latter half of the 1800s. The Academy was established in 1785. Its goals were the support and scholarly investigation and
discussion "of the sciences and the humanities". A notable focus was antiquities. Some clergymen were especially interested in the Irish language. Euseby Cleaver (1746-1819) supported Irish being taught in the schools of the Gaeltacht and Maxwell Close (1822-1903) argued "the notion that Irish is a barbarous language, or one to be ashamed of...is not only an egregious mistake, but, what is more to the point now, an essentially vulgar notion." Close provided financial support for the Gaelic Journal, which began in 1882 and was "a periodical...devoted to the interests of that language and its literature." For more specifically religious reasons - a desire to reach and convert people - an Irish Chair was set up at Trinity in 1838. This position was linked with the Divinity School and Anglican clerics filled it for almost a hundred years. At Queen's, "a lectureship in Celtic was" set up in 1909. Its initial holder was a Church of Ireland clergyman.

Church of Ireland laypeople were important supporters of the Irish language and scholarship as well. E.J. Gwynn, a clergyman's son, was a Provost of Trinity College between 1927 and 1937 and was "a celtic scholar". Douglas Hyde is perhaps the most well known of the "Irish" enthusiasts. The Gaelic League was established in 1893 in order to preserve the language with Hyde among its creators. Hyde's father was a Church of Ireland clergyman. Anglican laypeople were also important to the " Anglo-Irish Literary Revival". The most well-known were W.B. Yeats, J.M. Synge, Lady Gregory as well as Sean O'Casey. All were devotees of Irish culture, including the language. For the more religiously minded, the Irish Guild of the Church was established in 1914. Its aim was/is to maintain "the spirit of the ancient Celtic Church and promoting the use of Irish language, art and music in its life and worship." In 1919 the Guild established the periodical The Gaelic Churchman, aimed at opposing "English political idolatry" within
the Church. The Guild was behind the release of an Irish language *New Testament*, by Canon Cosslett Quin, in 1970. The *Book of Common Prayer 2004* in Irish was a Guild publication as well. The Guild remains active and is funded by the General Synod. Irish church services take place in Dublin as well as other Irish cities, including Belfast. The Guild is headquartered at Dublin's Christ Church Cathedral.

Presbyterianism is another major Protestant denomination within Ireland. Irish Presbyterians have historically been and are currently found mainly within the northern or north eastern part of Ireland. Still, the church does not view itself as a Northern Irish or Ulster church. Indeed, as Alan Megahey has pointed out: “the *Witness* – the Belfast-based semi-official newspaper of the church – declared in June 1900: ‘We are not to be styled the Presbyterian Church of Ulster.’” Following the establishment of Northern Ireland, these words can be found in the *Presbyterian General Assembly Reports, 1923*: “‘Whatever the political future of Ireland’…‘there is one point in which we must take our stand as Presbyterians – there must be no partition in our Church…We are all members of one Church – the Presbyterian Church in Ireland.’” This view has not changed. The 2009 website of the church contended that “The Presbyterian Church in Ireland serves the whole island, both North and South”. This reality is reflected in the General Assembly, which rules the Presbyterian Church and represents the church as a whole in Ireland.

In addition to the Church of Ireland and the Presbyterian Church, Ireland is home to a number of other minority Protestant groups. The Methodist Church is among these. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were over 60,000 Methodists within Ireland. Around 5% of Protestants belonged to the Methodist faith. Currently, according to the website of the Methodist Church, there are over 50,000 Methodists in
Ireland. The Methodist Church maintained stronger connections between itself and its English counterpart when compared with the Church of Ireland. The same is true in comparison to any connections between Irish Presbyterians and their Scottish fellows.

The Methodist Church is, like its Anglican and Presbyterian counterparts, an all-Ireland church. There are Methodists in both parts of the island and the church holds a yearly Conference which, according to the church’s website in 2008, “brings people from all over the island together to worship, administrate and be inspired.” This Conference gathers in places around the island, not solely in the North or the South. Indeed, according to the church’s website, “The Methodist Church in Ireland extends throughout the island, and refers to itself as ‘the Connexion’, to remind individual members and local churches of their interconnected and interdependent nature.” The church at present has eight districts, three of which cross the border between Northern and Southern Ireland to include congregations in both states. Furthermore, like the Presbyterian Church, the Methodist Church refers to itself as “The Methodist Church in Ireland”.

Although the majority of Ireland’s Catholics can be found in the South, in the Republic of Ireland, the Catholic Church in Ireland, like the main Protestant churches, is not divided between a Catholic Church of Ireland and a Catholic Church of Northern Ireland. The Irish Church embraces the entire island and has its own Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference - or Irish Episcopal Conference. It is thus distinct from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales and the Bishops’ Conference of Scotland, despite the fact that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. According to the ICBC website, the Conference “is the assembly of the Bishops of Ireland exercising together certain pastoral offices for Christ’s faithful on the whole
island of Ireland”, thus leaving no doubt as to its all-Ireland mandate. Nonetheless, the Irish Catholic Church does not completely isolate itself from other churches, including those in Britain. For example, the Irish Catholic Church is an Associate Member of Churches Together in Britain and Ireland. Pointing out that a lot of "issues" that the church must deal with or confront "benefit from a unified approach", Churches Together "works with member churches to co-ordinate responses, share resources and learn from each other's experiences."46

The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic is not given official recognition through the structure of the Catholic Church in Ireland. When it comes to religious borders in Ireland, there are four Provinces and Archdioceses for the Catholic Church on the island: Armagh, Dublin, Cashel (Cashel and Emly is the name of the archdiocese) and Tuam. As with the Church of Ireland, the top Catholic churchmen in Ireland are the Archbishops of Armagh and Dublin. The Archbishop of Armagh of the Catholic Church is, like that of the Church of Ireland, known as the Primate of All Ireland, while the Archbishop of Dublin is the Primate of Ireland – as is the case in the Irish Anglican Church as well. The Catholic Church and the Church of Ireland "claim continuity from the ancient Celtic Church of St Patrick".

The Churches: Human Rights, Violence, and Peace

In general, all of the main churches have tried to support peace and social justice in the Province. While there was support among the Catholic clergy and hierarchy for the campaign for civil rights in the late 1960s, the church did not back violence. A statement released by the North’s bishops early in 1969, for example, had the bishops backing civil rights and arguing that, by far, most people involved in the movement were peaceful.
Furthermore, the bishops “once again urge our people to shun all violence and we ask parents to instil this into our young people, some of whom may be carried away by excitement or provocation.”

The Roman Catholic hierarchy has continually and repeatedly denounced the violence of republicans. Such a stance is not new as the Church has a history of either keeping aloof from politics (pre-1820s) or supporting constitutional movements for change. For instance, priests and bishops supported Daniel O'Connell's non-violent struggle to achieve Catholic emancipation in the 1820s. O'Connell also had some Church backing for his non-violent Repeal movement, which followed that of Catholic emancipation. However, the Church was firmly against the Fenians, who believed in the necessity of violence to end British power over Ireland.

During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Church maintained its opposition to physical force republicanism. For example, Bishop Philbin of Down and Connor, in 1974, said that those involved in violent republican activities were “wholly in the grip of the powers of evil – devil people”. Indeed, in the Province, a mere two priests have received convictions for actively helping the IRA. A mere three priests “have openly refused to condemn IRA violence there”. One is no longer a priest, having resigned. Consistent condemnation of violent behaviour on the part of the Church has played a role in forcing republicans to carry out their struggle within an atmosphere that is morally hostile to their activities.

Concern for peace among the Catholic clergy can be seen from the early days of the Troubles. The bishops of the North, obviously aware of the rising power of republicanism among Catholics, released "a statement" in the spring of 1970 in the wake
of riots in Ardoyne. In it the Bishops contended that, by far, most Catholics did not support or desire violence. They wanted Catholics “to cooperate with those groups who genuinely reflect the peaceful intentions of the people as a whole and who are working hard to restrain militant elements.” Later on, in April of 1972, priests in Belfast’s troubled places issued a statement which people heard at Mass. The priests made clear their belief “that the choice must be for a cessation of armed conflict on all sides and the use of peaceful methods.” Clerics also backed citizens’ “peace petitions” as well as protests for peace.

The Catholic Church also demonstrated a desire for a fair political resolution to Northern Ireland's problems that involved Catholics and Protestants. When the Province received “a power-sharing Executive” in 1973, the Irish Cardinal (and Belfast native) William Conway backed the Executive as did Bishops Philbin and Cahal Daly. Later, the reaction of Ireland’s Bishops to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 showed a desire to support the quest for a solution as well as a concern to avoid further problems with Unionists. A statement was released for the Irish Episcopal Conference’s standing committee that recognized the suffering of both groups in the Province and claimed that people wanted the violence to stop. The statement went on to express a “sincere hope that the Anglo-Irish agreement will make a genuine contribution toward reconciliation. We ask our people to continue their prayers for peace”. A case can be made that the bishops chose not to remark supportively on the particular proposals due to a desire to avoid having Unionists consider this “Rome’s blessing”.

When it came to the Good Friday Agreement (1998), Roman Catholic leaders chose not to try to dictate people's voting decisions in the referendum, being mainly
concerned that people participated in the vote and made an informed choice. Churchmen
did take a positive view of the Agreement, however. Dr Sean Brady, Catholic Primate,
said that it "gives great hope for the future" and could possibly "remove the nightmare
forever." According to the Church, the Agreement was "complex and carefully
balanced....It points a way forward from the conflict which has left so many people
heartbroken in both the nationalist and unionist communities, so many lives wrecked and
so many families, Protestant and Catholic, devastated."  

The Protestant Churches, meanwhile, proved capable of placing principle above
sectarian and political division right from the beginning of the Troubles. For example, at
times Protestant church representatives joined Catholics to show support for civil rights
and human rights. The Industrial Churches Council, including Church of Ireland,
Methodist, Presbyterian, as well as Catholic members in Derry, made clear, in the latter
half of October 1968, its desire for “an impartial examination of the allegations made in
matters such as housing, employment and the electoral system”.

Not long after this, this Council acted in support of the Derry Citizens' Action Committee over a march.

There were also Protestant clergy who supported Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill and openly said so. Late in 1968 a clerical gathering in Banbridge expressed backing of O’Neill and its message bore the signatures of several Catholics, Methodists, Anglicans, and Presbyterians, as well as a Baptist clergyman. Early in 1969 over twenty Presbyterian clerics published a statement which contended “that ‘a wide cross-section of moderate and Christian opinion in the country’ recognised ‘the lasting benefits for the whole community under Captain O’Neill’s leadership’.”
Protestant ecclesiastical concern for a fair and just society continued after O'Neill stepped down in 1969. Shortly after O'Neill's leadership ended, the Church of Ireland had its General Synod. Although the Synod’s “printed record” did not include any resolutions regarding the occurrences in Northern Ireland, the Church of Ireland Primate did make what Megahey has termed “a highly generalised call to ‘stand firmly for the equal rights of every man irrespective of nationality, colour or religion’, and to be ‘seen to be firmly opposed to all forms of fanaticism – religious or political’.” Similarly, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, which met shortly after the General Synod, made it clear that it backed the government of Northern Ireland “in its efforts to create a unified and prosperous community on the basis of equality, justice and reform.” The Assembly encouraged the government to make swift progress in the “elimination of all legitimate grievances.” Finally, the Conference of the Methodists acknowledged “that ‘peace and understanding in Northern Ireland cannot be attained without full justice for all sections of the community’. The Conference encouraged “all people, and especially Methodists, to make determined attempts to understand the hopes and fears of every section in the community.” The Conference condemned “acts and words of violence from whatever quarter.”

Politically, the Protestant churches have demonstrated a desire for some sort of reasonable resolution to Northern Ireland's problems. In 1974, the Irish Council of Churches claimed "That the Council welcomes the principle of power-sharing as offering an opportunity for all sections of the community in Northern Ireland to make a positive contribution to the public good. That it endorses the principle incorporated in the Sunningdale Agreement of mutual respect for divergent aspirations in Northern Ireland.
and between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is true that, later, the Presbyterian Church as well as the Church of Ireland came out against the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985). However, the Protestant ecclesiastical response to the 1998 Agreement was essentially the same as that of the Catholic Church. In the wake of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, neither the Methodist nor the Presbyterian church officially backed the 'Yes' campaign. Both Churches encouraged voters to decide for themselves whether to back the Agreement or not. According to the Presbyterian Church, the Agreement did not amount to a nationalist or unionist "defeat". Rather, it put forward an arrangement that might result in an end to decades of violence. The Moderator encouraged Presbyterians to examine the Agreement in order to determine if it held out a genuine possibility for peace for Protestants and Catholics. The President of the Methodist Church, meanwhile, encouraged his people to examine the Agreement carefully. The Church requested that Methodists consider the Agreement via the following questions, as reported in the Belfast Telegraph - "Does the Agreement increase the prospects of a more compassionate, just and peaceful society? Is it generally fair to the aspirations of the main traditions? Does it represent a reasonable accommodation between nationalist and unionist, bearing in mind the hopes and fears of the people in both parts of this island?" Similarly, the Church of Ireland did not attempt to tell those in the church how to vote. Rather, Anglicans were encouraged to "record their opinion for the common good according to individual conscience". The concern was what was best for everyone, despite religious differences.

A preoccupation with peace and a willingness to cooperate with religious rivals to achieve it can be seen among the four main churches since the late 1960s. For example,
the leaders of these churches did issue “a joint new year appeal for peace” in 1968. The signatures of the Primate, President, Cardinal, and Moderator were all on it.\textsuperscript{76} Later, in 1974, the Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist and Church of Ireland leaders said they were going to conduct a campaign for peace. They advertised in area papers in December. These denominational leaders also said prayers with each other on television on December 12, 1974. They "called rallies". The peace campaign surged in this period. A great many people prayed in churches as well as halls around the island. An estimated third of Northern Ireland’s people took part.\textsuperscript{77} Six years after this, as 1980 came to a close, leaders of the four main churches "called for a week of prayer for peace and reconciliation." To get ready for this week, they visited schools, charities as well as hospitals in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The Cardinal issued an invitation to three Protestant clerics, one from each of the main denominations, to speak in his Armagh cathedral in the near future. All three said they would do so.\textsuperscript{78}

Much more recent developments underline the continued willingness of the churches to cooperate in the service of peace. The Irish Churches Peace Project was launched at the end of September 2013 and was "successfully concluded in June 2015."\textsuperscript{79} The Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, the Primate of the Church of Ireland, a member of the Catholic hierarchy, as well as the Presidents of the Methodist Church and the ICC all took part in the launch of the ICPP.\textsuperscript{80} According to Keith Hamilton, ICPP Director, "ICPP has been set up to promote reconciliation in our communities through the churches working together....We are working for the transformation of Northern Ireland and the Border Region with the vision to build a peaceful and stable society, with a better and shared future."\textsuperscript{81} The ICPP created some resources aimed at helping groups talk
about various issues. Among them are "The Elephant in the Room," and "A Cultural Experience and A Cultural Journey." The former deals with parades, identity, symbols, history, and community. The latter "enables local people and migrants to build relationships and explore their various cultures."\textsuperscript{82}

A "Prayer for Belfast" in December of 2013 was an ICPP event illustrative of the project's goals. A Catholic priest and a Methodist minister were mainly responsible for arranging the "prayer vigil" with the help of the ICPP. Belfast's mayor as well as High Sheriff were present as were about 70 individuals of different religions. According to Father Martin Magill, "We want to pray for peace and reconciliation in our city at this time. We want to send out a message of hope and celebration of difference at this Christmas season.” Catholic and Methodist musicians were involved and the event included the "Prayer for Belfast", whose authors were Father Magill and two Protestant ministers.\textsuperscript{83}

The ICPP used bright colours on its website and avoided sectarian colour combinations and images. Their main symbol, a cross made up of four different coloured sections, effectively demonstrated the partnership and the shared Christianity of Ireland's four major churches (Figure 3).

\textit{Figure 3: Irish Churches Peace Project Logo/Banner}

This logo appears on a white background. The “splashes” of colour that make up the cross are, clockwise from top left, green, blue, orange, and dark pink/purple. “Irish Churches” appears in dark blue and “Peace Project” in dark pink/purple.\textsuperscript{84}

On a broader level, the mainstream churches have made efforts to cooperate and maintain good relations with one another, proving capable of recognizing and acting on
common concerns. Cooperation between the Catholic and Protestant churches has taken place via the Irish Council of Churches.85 A significant example involves the establishment, in 1970, of a "Joint Group" or "Inter-church Group".86 Included in it were clerical as well as lay Catholics "and an equal number of representatives of the member Churches of the ICC." The group was supposed to provide advice to the Churches, the ICC, and the Hierarchy when it came to "the 'role of the Churches in Irish society with special reference to such matters as alcoholism, drug abuse, unemployment, housing, world poverty etc.'"87 This group established "working parties" for the purpose of producing reports about certain topics and problems, including the abuse of drugs and alcohol consumption by teenagers.88

It is in this context that, in 1976, a report entitled Violence in Ireland was issued. Methodist minister Eric Gallagher as well as Catholic Bishop Cahal Daly were joint chairmen of the working party responsible for this report.89 The report included several sections. It began by surveying "the roots of discord in Ireland" starting from early history and continuing up to the present round of IRA militancy.90 The report also included a section that dealt with the impact of violence and, finally, focussed on "'The Task of the Churches'". The report ended with complete agreement "that there is no justification in the present situation in Ireland for the existence of any para-military organisations." The report also "recommend[ed] that the Churches actively support peace and reconciliation movements." Finally, the report recommended that politicians ought to "be encouraged to see their task as that of reaching a just agreement with their opponents rather than of achieving victory over them; and that to this end they should be open to any reasonable settlement proposed."91
Inter-church cooperation has continued in recent years in efforts to improve society and sustain peace. Notably, the churches have made an attempt to cooperate and bridge divisions when it comes to young people. Youth Link: NI was set up in 1991/1992 by the three major Protestant churches and the Catholic Church. In keeping with the Lund Principle, which states "Act together in all matters except those in which deep differences of conviction compel them to act separately," the churches came to agreement on a constitution for Youth Link in 1991. An Executive Council governs Youth Link and includes representatives from each of the four churches. A central goal of this organisation is to establish and nurture connections or “links” amongst young people from these denominations. As Youth Link put it on their website in 2013: “It exists to provide support and training for youth workers and community relations experiences for young people.” Youth Link wants to see youth being active in creating “a shared future” rather than one of conflict or division.

Youth Link offers a number of courses and programmes. Past programs include their “Kairos Project”, which was described as “A Journey in Understanding and Building Community”. Kairos wanted youth “to be creative peace makers and builders of a new future”, rather than unquestioningly reinforcing and buttressing the divisions of the past. A major programme offered in 2013, entitled “Peace Building and Reconciliation Training”, described as a “Conflict Management/Transformation Programme”, was for those between the ages of 16 and 25. It aimed to aid the growth of “a culture of non-violence” and provided an opportunity for youth to find as well as experiment with new means of confronting conflict and differences. The programme aimed “to contribute to peace and reconciliation activities within areas of sectarian
Current courses include "Good Relations and Cultural Diversity," "Practical Youth Ministry Skills," and "Understanding Life's Conflicts." Youth Link also currently offers a "BA Honours Degree in Youth & Community Work and Practical Theology." These programs represent the non-violent values of the Third Community and aim to help develop a better way to a peaceful community and society in Northern Ireland.

Youth Link has now been around for over 20 years and the organization has become "a high profile and significant player in the youth sector in Northern Ireland." Youth Link received both the American President's Prize and the First Investors in People Award. Youth Link even received an invitation to Washington to see the President. Youth Link has been acknowledged "as the largest provider of accredited training in youth work in Northern Ireland." In 2013, 650 people were involved with "accredited programmes." As of 2013 Youth Link had "processed in excess of 8,000 accredited participants."

The design of the Youth Link website is also telling. It does not include any symbols or images which could be considered sectarian or divisive. The current emblem or logo of Youth Link is colourful and appealing:

*Figure 4: Youthlink Logo*

The colours, clockwise from top left, are blue, green, red, and yellow/gold. The word “youth” appears in grey and “link” appears in red. With its white background, the colours seem to combine the traditional red, white, and blue of the Union flag with the green, white, and, in this case, gold, of the Irish Tricolour.
The site's banner in 2013 included, beneath the caption “churches together building excellence in youth work,” male and female figures, each figure coloured red, gold, green, or blue.

![Figure 5: Youthlink Banner 2013](image)

The background of the site was and remains white. Both images suggest a coming together of different colours or people. In addition, there were and are photos of youth on the site’s homepage. In 2013 one picture included four young people, one of whom was black. Two others were of youth participating in activities. Currently, a succession of changing photos highlights happy youth with captions such as "Building a Shared Future" and "Committed to Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation." Such photos serve to highlight the fact that, essentially, young people from different backgrounds are the same. They are, collectively, the future of the Province. The site is colourful and clearly meant to be attractive and positive in its presentation and in the statement of its goals.

Cooperation among the churches also continues today with the Irish Inter Church Meeting. Four Inter Church Committee meetings take place each year. Representatives of the (Catholic) Irish Bishops Conference occupy half of the committee seats and representatives of the Irish Council of Churches fill the remaining positions. The Inter Church Meeting and the efforts above all mark a notable attempt on the part of the major religious groups in Ireland to maintain relationships and communications with one another, despite the sectarian and political conflicts of the times. They share common social concerns beyond politics and have proven willing to address such issues together.
In sum, on a divided island, the Catholic, Church of Ireland, Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches transcend the border, serving people within Northern as well as Southern Ireland. As such, they act as a connecting force, however remote at times from individual lives and however tenuous, for the people of Ireland. Also, as Christian churches, they are supposed to refrain from encouraging hatred, injustice, and murder and, instead, advocate peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, justice, and love. This they have done, in the face of sectarian and theological divisions and prejudices. It is a powerful irony that republican as well as loyalist violence has been steadfastly opposed by the Churches, on many occasions together. Furthermore, by far, most active members of the churches back their leaders’ stance, truly desiring the violence to cease. Gallagher and Worrall note that "It is in the translation of this general will towards reconciliation, which they have effectively fostered, into practical steps that would be socially and politically effective, that the Churches have so far failed." Still, despite their differences and their failures, the refusal of the mainstream churches to remain silent or actively encourage violence has undoubtedly acted as a restraining force and a source of stability for their people. The nature of the churches and their perception of themselves as carriers of Christ’s message, has inspired them to act on many occasions as members of the Third Community.

**Peace Organizations and Activities**

**The Corrymeela Community**

The Corrymeela Community is an early example of a peace-oriented initiative. Presbyterian minister, Reverend Dr. Ray Davey, wanted to establish a community, a place at which individuals, no matter what their religion or background, would have the
chance to interact and spend time with one another "and learn to live in community." Davey, with help from some Queen's University students, established Corrymeela in 1965. The community's Ballycastle site began its work that year. The "area" was known as "Corrymeela" at the time the site was bought. Alf McCreary notes that "The decision to use the name Corrymeela for the centre came slowly but firmly....the name Corrymeela which had been used for the original building, was taken from a townland nearby, and its translation from the Gaelic meant 'The Hill of Harmony'. Such a title for such a centre was apt and irresistible."

Corrymeela has expanded from the original building and remains an active centre of community. In 2014 the Community had around 160 members as well as over "5,000 friends" in Ireland and elsewhere. More than 11,000 individuals annually pass through Corrymeela's "residential centre". According to Corrymeela, "Communities, families and individuals from all walks of life, backgrounds, beliefs and faiths are welcomed." Corrymeela offers various programmes as well as space for groups who have a programme they wish to undertake at the centre. There are groups who spend time living at the Centre as well as those who come for just one day. Peace, reconciliation, as well as learning from and about one another are key elements and aims of Corrymeela and its work. Indeed, a sign photographed by Martin Melaugh in August of 2004, found at Corrymeela's Ballycastle location entrance, read as follows: "Corrymeela is people of all ages and Christian traditions, who, individually and together are committed to the healing of social, religious & political divisions that exist in Northern Ireland and throughout the world."
In line with their non-sectarian, yet Christian, ambitions, the main Corrymeela symbol is that of four triangles making up a cross, which appeared in light blue against a white background on their 2014 website.

Figure 6: Corrymeela Symbol

The words below “The Corrymeela Community” appeared in grey.

The words below emphasized the community's main aims and reasons for being, all of which clearly place them in the Third Community as they willingly attempt to transcend divisions and end conflict between people.

Peace People

The most well-known of the initiatives and organizations aimed at achieving peace within Northern Ireland is the Peace People. This movement arose in the wake of three Catholic deaths: those of eight-year-old Joanne Maguire and her two brothers, toddler John as well as Andrew, aged just six weeks. The incident occurred in West Belfast on the 10th of August 1976. Soldiers on patrol were shot at and saw the culprits making their getaway. Descriptions were passed on, resulting in the pursuit of a car by the army. The vehicle’s driver, young IRA man Danny Lennon, was hit and killed by British army gunfire. His car veered, hitting the family, and killing the three youngsters.
The public response to the incident was strong and, in light of what the citizens of the Province had experienced in recent years, the reaction did not come out of nowhere. Indeed, Northern Ireland had, by 1976, witnessed seven years of unrest, political failures, violence, and murder. Well over 400 people had died in 1972. Furthermore, Fraser and Morgan point out that the week in which the children died was an especially “bad” one. Fraser and Morgan contend that the Maguire deaths “undoubtedly touched a raw nerve in the public psyche, confirming for many the futility of the communal violence and simultaneously exposing a desperate, fundamental need to find some more overt and tangible way of demonstrating opposition to it.”

Journalist, and later Peace People member and leader, Ciaran McKeown, argued that “something had to break somewhere. A volcano working up from the depths of the communal soul was looking for an outlet.”

The incident provided the impetus for a major Third Community revolt against violence. Initially, people reacted informally, to an extent spontaneously, to the incident. Ciaran McKeown, claims that, on the 10th of August, in the wake of the event, “Women grouped at street corners to weep or say the Rosary.” Also, many people went to Mass that evening. At the scene of the incident a memorial quickly appeared. On August 12, the night before the youngsters’ funeral, women gathered and prayed the Rosary on site. Then, on the 14th of August, thousands of people met to demonstrate in the vicinity of the incident. Among the people who took part in the rally were Shankill Protestants, making it an event that included people from both sides of the Northern Irish conflict assembling in a Catholic area. Ciaran McKeown characterizes the August 14th rally as “a remarkable occasion, not least for the fact that it had no particular focus, no platform,
no speaking equipment—and no speeches.” He claims that it was an “almost silent demonstration”. It marked a shared response to the deaths of three Catholic innocents, even if, as McKeown points out, this demonstration “had been an expression of feeling, but…was not yet a ‘movement’.”

A "movement" was shortly to follow. On August 17th, women, from both religious groups, marched along the Andersonstown Road for a demonstration “at Milltown Cemetery”. It was at this time that Ciaran McKeown, Betty Williams, as well as Mairead Corrigan, all Catholics, chose to create an organized, coherent “movement for peace.” The movement would involve a series of rallies and marches between August and December of 1976. Such events would occur in Northern Ireland, the Republic, as well as Britain. The movement was entitled Peace People.

The title "Peace People" represents the boundary-transcending nature of the movement. The name was and is such that men, women, Catholics, Protestants, and those who do not belong to either community, or who resist being so labeled, can support and belong to the movement. This fact is brought home in “The Declaration of the Peace People”, which was written by Ciaran McKeown in August of 1976 and then published in the press. McKeown also thought it a good idea to read it at demonstrations. Nowhere in this Declaration does any specific political party or religious affiliation appear. It makes clear that the Peace People desire peace and are against violence: “We want to live and love and build a just and peaceful society....We reject the use of the bomb and the bullet and all the techniques of violence.” Its final paragraph sums up the goal of the Peace People: “We dedicate ourselves to working with our neighbours, near and far, day in and day out, to building that peaceful society in which the tragedies we have known
are a bad memory and a continuing warning.” There is in this final paragraph an acknowledgement of shared tragedy as well as a desire to collectively achieve the type of society that is wanted.

The chosen venues for Peace People demonstrations reflected a clear willingness and desire to cross traditional boundaries, or at least meet on more ‘neutral’ territory. On the 21st of August 1976, a demonstration took place in Belfast’s Ormeau Park. The park is very large and, according to McKeown, “stretches from the predominantly Protestant East Belfast into the mixed Ballynafeigh area.” This was the “central, neutral ground” that participants marched to and assembled in. McKeown notes that thousands marched, Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams at the front, to the park where others were assembled. At this event, the "Declaration of the Peace People" received its first public recitation. This demonstration was very well attended, and, arguably, "the biggest" Northern Irish peace demonstration, involving as it did many thousands of participants. By meeting in a park that connected a Protestant and a mixed Protestant and Catholic part of Belfast, the movement laid claim, for the purpose of the rally, to a space used by both communities, reflecting the aim of expressing a desire for peace and an end to violence that was shared by the people in the Province at large.

The intention to cross or transcend boundaries of religion, politics, and sectarian geography was epitomized in the Shankill and Falls events which followed the Ormeau Park event. On the afternoon of the 28th of August 1976, a march on the Shankill and a rally in Woodvale Park took place, involving Catholics and Protestants. Among the marchers were “Catholic clergy”, including a nun who had never set foot on the road in her lifetime. McKeown notes that many spectators were present and a number left the
sidelines to hug those who were marching, then ended up taking part in the event. He points out that there were “Strange apparitions” seen that day, “like Catholic nuns in full habit…embracing and being embraced on the most Protestant of Protestant holy ground”. At the rally, speeches were given by Mairead Corrigan as well as Betty Williams, but also by long-time Protestant activist Saidie Patterson. Participants recited the "Our Father" and hymns were sung. Also sung was “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling”, which, according to Fraser and Morgan, was “the unofficial anthem of the peace movement.” Following the rally, those involved walked along the Shankill again, an action that seems not to have been an element in the initial plan.

The Shankill event effectively defied community division, violence, and sectarian geography. Protestants and Catholics claimed the loyalist Shankill in the quest for peace, walking, rallying, praying, and singing together. Indeed, by walking in a loyalist district, the home base of many Protestant paramilitaries, the marchers offered a powerful challenge to these men of violence. According to David McKittrick, discontent was present, particularly within the ranks of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Those who supported them were apparently calling for the RUC to prohibit the procession. Nonetheless, local UVF leaders “felt sufficiently constrained by the situation” to declare they did not feel any hostility “towards those who worked for peace”, claiming that their organization “had ‘constantly worked and fought for peace in Ulster’.”

Even the date of the Shankill procession, whether intended or not, defied sectarian tradition. The final Saturday of August was when the Royal Black Preceptory held its march. They processed along the Shankill that morning and returned that evening. The peace march occurred in the interval, thus claiming the road, temporarily, in the name of
peace and non-sectarian unity in a common cause. The choice of this date was also an intelligent one in terms of strategy as any prohibitions on the peace march would have appeared extremely unjust unless the Royal Black Preceptory parade was banned as well.

Another of the significant marches, especially in a symbolic sense, was the October 23, 1976 event on the Falls Road. As Ciaran McKeown tells it, supporters from the Shankill as well as others from around Belfast and elsewhere “met the Falls and other groups at the Northumberland Street corner from which the August 28 march on the Shankill had started.” The march began “With the Shankill and Falls well mixed in the front rows”. Despite the unity of the marchers, however, this event along the Falls Road was not to be without its difficulties. The atmosphere of the area itself was tense. There were bystanders and spectators who appeared scared and told the marchers to be careful as “they’d heard there was going to be ‘trouble’.” A few people spontaneously joined the march, but not nearly to the extent that had occurred during the Shankill event. As the participants came up beside Falls Park, in which the rally was to occur, McKeown saw that members of both Sinn Fein as well as People’s Democracy had taken over the peace people’s platform. There were people on the other side of “the railings” of the park hurling projectiles. In the end, the marchers did not enter the park, but walked by it, McKeown swiftly engineering this response. The rally took place “nearly a mile further on”. McKeown recalls that the participants weathered the experience “with dignity and courage” and were happy and excited at the rally: “they were in the highest spirits imaginable: they had been ‘through the fire’.” It appears those involved were thus able to transform what might have been considered a triumph for extremists into a victory for themselves.
Perhaps the most significant symbolic event took place on the 5th of December - the Boyne demonstration. It was, as Ciaran McKeown tells it, “another great success, the Southern and Northern contingents approaching to meet at Peace Bridge”. Considering that the Battle of the Boyne remains a foundational part of Protestant and loyalist culture and mythology (marking in effect the beginning of the Protestant Ascendancy) and thus so does the geographical area itself, the peace event was made especially powerful by being held in such a place. Rather than Catholic and Protestant, or even North and South, meeting in battle or conflict, the two groups and sides met in peace, at least temporarily defying the old myths and creating a new vision in their place. Even in the midst of his political realism and probing analysis, in his memory of the event, McKeown expresses a sense of its mythological power, recalling that “the mists over the Boyne…magically lifted as the crowds converged in this historic act of reconciliation”.

The Peace People was intended to be an organization and movement that avoided the divisive iconography and words that could be found on banners and murals around Northern Ireland. For instance, at the Ormeau Park event on August 21st, 1976, some banners were to be seen, but Peace People co-founder and member Ciaran McKeown points out that “We had decided that the only banners in this much bannered city would be simple white cloth with the district names in blue letters, and some were already appearing. Many more would show their areas in the coming weeks”. At the October 23, 1976 Falls Road event, for example, several banners were photographed and appeared in the Irish News. One read "Andersonstown" and the other read "Shankill." Moving ahead to much more recent times, the Peace People's current website does not include any sectarian colour combinations, using mainly blue, white, and blue-grey. The use of a
white and blue colour scheme is significant as these colours have also been used by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the United Nations and, at times, the EU - all institutions concerned with unity and peace. The UN flag is white on blue and, when necessary, the stars on the blue European flag can be presented in white, even though they are normally yellow.\textsuperscript{141}

In terms of images, the Peace People's logo is an outline of a white dove carrying an olive branch. The dove and olive branch image is also used by the WILPF. The WILPF is of particular interest as it is "the oldest women's peace organisation in the world" and was established in 1915. Women of many different traditions have been involved in it and focused on achieving peace. Still active today, the WILPF believes that women have a right to be involved "in decision-making on all aspects of peace and security."\textsuperscript{142}

The Peace People are still in existence, although no longer the mass movement they were in 1976. The Peace People suffered from divisions in the latter 1970s and Betty Williams left in 1980. A major issue was the money awarded to Williams and Corrigan as winners of the Nobel Prize for peace. The money issue divided the Peace People - how would the money be spent or would the women keep it? Williams opted to keep her share as she was in financial distress. There were those who were upset about her decision.\textsuperscript{143} Nonetheless, the Peace People still aim to achieve "a just and peaceful society through nonviolent means - a society based on respect for each individual and that has at its core the highest standards of human and civil rights." Recognizing that Northern Ireland continues to face the problems of division and sectarianism, the Peace People contend that they have attempted, during their existence, to bring people together
and "to create debate on the type of future we want for our children and for ourselves."

According to the Peace People, "We refuse to accept a life of fear and injustice or a life pervaded by violence - whether the violence is perpetrated by the state or by paramilitaries." The Peace People also have an international perspective and concern, claiming they have the same aims for the rest of the world and have participated "in dialogue and protest in Iraq, Israel, Palestine, the USA, [and] Austria..."144

**Conclusion**

The desire to achieve a stable society without violence and sectarian hatred has motivated religious and community representatives and activists to cross traditional boundaries. They have cooperated across community lines, denounced violence, marched for peace, chosen their symbols and imagery with care, and, above all, opened and upheld a center ground against the powerful ideologies of nationalism/republicanism and unionism/loyalism. Their achievements, although seemingly modest at times, have provided ordinary citizens who desire to move forward peacefully with a voice and, in the case of Corrymeela, a refuge in troubled times.
CHAPTER 5

THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY

PART 2: THE POLITICAL MIDDLE GROUND

While moderates can and do express themselves politically as members of mainstream parties like the UUP and SDLP, the Third Community has also had its own unique political voice. From the 1970s onwards, political parties and groups have appeared, or been revamped, advocating a non-sectarian, progressive vision and approach in the Province. A pluralist society where people are free to possess a variety of identities and opinions, where peace and equality and human rights are prioritized, is often the ultimate aim of the following groups. These parties have recognized that political and religious differences can be lived with in pursuit of other goals that will improve society as a whole. Among these aims are an end to violence, gender equality, and a healthy planet.

Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI)

The most significant of Northern Ireland’s “middle ground” political parties since the start of the Troubles in the late 1960s, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, was set up in the Spring of 1970. Its roots can be found in the Ulster Liberal Party and the New Ulster Movement.\(^1\) Alliance was intended to be both “cross-community” in composition and support as well as “non-sectarian” in its ethos.\(^2\) The party has managed to draw support from both main communities over the years - for example, middle class Catholics who were not happy about the SDLP’s refusal to take part in the assembly (1982) would occasionally back Alliance where it was a viable option. Also, middle class unionists who were not happy about mainstream unionism’s "obstructionist tactics" in the wake of
the Anglo Irish Agreement (1985) supported Alliance. The party did appeal to genuine moderates as well as to those in both communities who were less rigid in their political allegiances.³

Alliance has not been an extremely successful party, as defined by election results. District council, provincial, and Westminster seats have been gained by Alliance, but not European ones.⁴ At no point has Alliance received greater than about 14% support in local government elections between 1973 and 2015.⁵ When it comes to elections to regional bodies, Alliance has received, at most, around 10% of votes.⁶ Alliance has also had minimal success at Westminster - 11.8% is the largest percentage of the vote that Alliance has garnered in Westminster elections between 1974 and 2015.⁷ Still, in 2010, they won their first Westminster seat in the General Election when Naomi Long was the victor in East Belfast.⁸

Despite its limitations, the existence of this party, presenting as it does an option for voters outside the confines of more popular parties, such as the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP, and, more recently, Sinn Fein and the DUP, can be considered representative of some elements of the Third Community. The Catholics who vote for this party are deliberately choosing to avoid aligning themselves with the SDLP and Sinn Fein in favour of a party that (initially at least) was at its heart basically unionist.⁹ Alternatively, they are choosing what they see as the lesser of possible evils when living in an area with few viable political alternatives. Protestant supporters of Alliance meanwhile, demonstrate, with their votes, that they are not vehemently opposed to “conciliation” or inclusiveness and in some cases, no doubt, are actively for such developments. Alliance and its supporters can be viewed as evidence of the existence of
a Third Community, made up of those committed to a non-sectarian, shared home and future and those who are open to it or not actively against it.

The party's members and leaders have reflected its middle ground and cross-community position. For example, three MPs from Stormont became Alliance members early in 1972 - two were unionists and one was nationalist. Furthermore, Alliance has had seven leaders, including individuals from both main communities, since its founding - Oliver Napier, Robert Cooper, Phelim O'Neill, John Cushnahan, John Alderdice, Sean Neeson, and David Ford. Napier, Cushnahan, and Neeson were Catholic. The diversity of its leaders reflects the openness of the party and its supporters to leaders and representatives from both major traditions.

The commitment of Alliance to cross-community representation and leadership was especially reflected in the Assembly elections in June of 1973. In these elections, Napier (a Catholic) stood in the Protestant area of East Belfast. Cooper (a Protestant) stood in the Catholic area of West Belfast. They were each successful. The fact that a Catholic and a Protestant candidate not only stood for the same party, but crossed sectarian boundaries to run in the territory of the other community shows a third community commitment to transcending traditional divisions. The support they received from voters indicates the presence of people on both sides who were also willing to back a mixed party and a candidate from the "other" side. 4,941 people supported Napier and 3,160 supported Cooper in their respective constituencies.

In addition, despite being seen as a unionist party, Alliance was instrumental in Belfast getting its first mayor from the nationalist community, a significant step forward for that city. In 1997 the newly elected city council in Belfast included 13 Sinn Fein and
UUP representatives, 7 SDLP and DUP representatives, 6 Alliance representatives, and 3 PUP representatives. The UDP had 1 representative. Alliance backed their nationalist colleagues to put the SDLP’s Aldin Magginis in the office of mayor. Alliance then received nationalist backing for another mayor from Alliance in 1998. John Alderdice's brother, David, became mayor in 1998. Alliance has clearly proven willing to work on a cross community and cross-party basis with others to their mutual advantage. Here they, arguably, assisted in moving city politics forward by backing a nationalist as mayor.

The Alliance Party’s position on violence and its views on political, social, and cultural issues within Northern Ireland provides evidence of its attempt to maintain a moderate or “middle ground” stance in a society that is very much divided. To begin with, Alliance, since the 1970s, has insisted on the necessity of “non-violent” methods of resolving differences and handling issues. In a 1975 manifesto, Alliance claimed to have no respect whatsoever for "those politicians who have entered into pacts with paramilitary organisations, whether republican or loyalist, and who have given tacit support to criminal conspiracies of evil men in the name of patriotism." According to the party in 1997, all votes in favour of Alliance were against violence from any quarter. More recently, in their 2003 Assembly elections manifesto, Alliance claimed among its core values a "Commitment to exclusively democratic and non-violent principles." Alliance continues to make clear their opposition to paramilitary activity and violence and to point out the necessity of dealing with it effectively. With regard to violence, Alliance opposes it, whether it comes from republican sources or unionist/loyalist ones.
Alliance, while defined by some as essentially a unionist party, has consistently focussed on "consent" with regards to the Province's political position. In its 1975 manifesto, Alliance clearly backed Northern Ireland continuing to belong to the UK, arguing that, democratically speaking, this was the wish of the people. They also argued that the British connection “is in the best economic and social interests of all the people of Northern Ireland”\(^{20}\). In recent years, the Party, rather than specifically emphasizing support for Northern Ireland’s membership in the UK in its manifestos, has reiterated and stressed the necessity and importance of “consent” on the part of the citizens of the Province as to its political status. In 2003, the party’s manifesto actually read: “The ‘constitutional issue’ is not a defining issue that preoccupies the Alliance Party….the party’s main concern is that the people’s consent is paramount and that the legitimate interests of all are safeguarded.”\(^{21}\) Currently, on the party's website, Alliance makes clear that "Unless the people of Northern Ireland determine otherwise, Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom," thereby, once again, emphasizing consent.\(^{22}\)

In its political activities, Alliance has also demonstrated a more moderate, middle ground position. The party has shown consistent enthusiasm for power-sharing over the years. Alliance went to all NIO assembled conferences held to talk about establishing a power sharing government - they were present at Darlington (1972) as well as at Sunningdale (1973).\(^{23}\) Alliance has stated its belief in “Partnership in Government” within Northern Ireland, the importance and need for people from “both sections of our divided community” to take part in running Northern Ireland.\(^{24}\) In 1987 the party declared that "The Alliance Party believes that a power-sharing solution within the United Kingdom offers the best chance of moving forward and healing our fundamental
community divisions.” A decade later, Alliance was a supporter of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. As David Ford, Alliance leader, wrote in 2003, “The Agreement remains the only way forward to peace and stability in this society.” The Party reiterated their support for power-sharing and cooperation towards the good of all in their 2010 manifesto.

Nonetheless, Alliance views the Agreement as something to be built upon to establish “a better future,” and this is reflected in their belief in the need for certain changes to how things are being done. To begin with, Alliance supports real power-sharing within a government that is not preoccupied with traditional labels and divisions. Alliance has expressed disagreement with the "designation" aspect of the 1998 Agreement. Elected politicians need to register as either "unionist" or "nationalist" at the initial meeting of the Assembly. Those who object to either of these designations are viewed as "others". Such designations are to enable effective cross-community decision-making. Alliance thinks that having Assembly members use these divisive labels results in "Institutional sectarianism". In the party's post-Millennium manifestos, they make it a goal to have cross-community voting within the Assembly rest upon "a weighted majority" that does not include sectarian labels. Alliance believes that the utilization of such "a system" will provide support over both communities, but will not uphold sectarian separations.

When it comes to actual government leadership and function, Alliance has emphasised the importance of voluntary cooperation. According to Alliance, coalitions that are not voluntary, where parties receive portfolios according to Assembly seats or power, no matter whether they can be expected to work together effectively or not,
increase the possibility of stalemate and impasse.\textsuperscript{34} Alliance argues that parties can, through negotiation, establish an Executive that is "balanced...with an agreed programme for government, based on collective responsibility. This would be required to achieve a cross-community weighted-majority vote in the Assembly in order to come into effect.\textsuperscript{35} According to Alliance, entitlement to membership on the Executive would not be "automatic" for any party and political progress and government would not be subject to unnecessary obstruction. Parties would have incentive to cooperate more and power sharing would be more effectively nurtured. Creating an Executive in this way would "better promote the concept of a single Northern Ireland polity."\textsuperscript{36}

Alliance’s vision for Northern Ireland provides the foundation for their progressive views on government and involves unity, as opposed to division. Alliance has portrayed itself as a living example of diversity and working together, pointing out in their 1975 manifesto, \textit{Together We Stand}, that the party consists of members who belong to various religions, “social classes”, as well as “cultural backgrounds”, but are able to “work out common policies by discussion and democratic agreement.”\textsuperscript{37} In 1997 the party asserted that supporting Alliance meant supporting "A Northern Ireland we can all share, based on respect for all rights and traditions, in which all sections of the community can participate, and which will let us shape a peaceful future together."\textsuperscript{38} This theme of unity continues in an especially clear manner in the party’s post millennium manifestos. For example, according to David Ford, the leader of the party, in the 2003 Assembly elections manifesto, “Building a united community and creating a shared future lie at the heart of the Alliance policy agenda.”\textsuperscript{39} The party's ideal for the Province was especially well expressed in their 2011 manifesto: "The Alliance Party has
a vision of a cohesive, shared and integrated society, where people are safe and prosperous, have ample opportunities, are treated fairly and with respect. We want to deliver a normal, civic society underpinned by our shared values of equality, respect for diversity and interdependence.”Unity and a transcendence of old, hard line, and communal divisions remain key elements of the party's outlook.

Furthermore, in recent years, Alliance has clearly turned away from the “two communities” framework within the Province, although it recognizes its common usage, and takes a more complex stance regarding identity. According to Alliance, part of sectarian thinking is labelling or “putting people into boxes” and Ford argues that the party does not accept that everyone in Northern Ireland has to be placed within either the Catholic or Protestant community. In its 2007 manifesto, Alliance contended that “In terms of identity, more and more people are casting off traditional labels and challenging the notions that Protestant = British = unionist or Catholic = Irish = nationalist.” Indeed, in its recent For Everyone document, Alliance acknowledges that the old "two communities" notion was at no point sufficient to encompass all the people of the North and that times are changing:

Our community is becoming increasingly diverse. The old simplicity that there are two sorts of people here, where Protestant = British = Unionist, or Catholic = Irish = Nationalist, can no longer be the basis of progress. The emerging vision of a united community, based on both equality and good relations, allows for a society at ease with its diversity. We recognise within this context that some people may adopt multiple identities. The increase in the numbers of people describing themselves as 'Northern Irish’ in the 2011 Census is indicative of this rapid change.

In addition, Alliance argues that, despite the long-standing reality of division, a shared humanity takes primacy: "While the population of Northern Ireland has been deeply politically divided on grounds of ethno-nationalist identity, we do not believe that this
overrides our common humanity nor determines that the future must look like the past. In short, Alliance is rejecting the traditional view or myth of “two communities” in favour of a different, more complex, vision, yet to be fully realized.

In light of their hopes for the Province, it is not surprising that Alliance has been a supporter of integration. The party wants people to mix and interact with each other, irrespective of their religious and cultural backgrounds. For example, in their 1973, 1977, and 1987 manifestos, they made it clear that they backed integrated schooling. In later manifestos, Alliance even claimed that, as of 2010, they wanted to see one-tenth of Northern Ireland’s children attending "integrated schools." In Alliance's 2011 manifesto, this number was up, as they pledged their dedication "to ensuring that 20% of our children are taught in integrated education and 40% in mixed education by 2020." The party backs such schooling for the children of the Province, believing that “it fosters understanding and tolerance between the different traditions in our community.” In addition to mixing in schools, Alliance, for its part, wants to “Make the promotion and maintenance of mixed housing an explicit objective of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive.” Indeed, in 2011, the party included among their commitments "Making it law that the Housing Executive must actively encourage and facilitate mixed housing." Such housing is important for "a shared future."

In addition to its deep concern for Northern Ireland and its people, the Alliance Party has an international dimension to its thinking. The Party recognizes the fact that nations are growing more and more interdependent. Indeed, Alliance argues that “19th century notions of sovereignty are no longer appropriate in the early 21st century.” Alliance wants Northern Ireland to be outwardly active in the world, rather than isolated
and completely immersed in its internal issues. In line with this, the party has, in the past, belonged to the European Liberal Democratic and Reform Party and is currently a full member of Liberal International. Alliance also backs the EU and the UK/Northern Ireland’s belonging to it and would like to see the EU grow. As the party put it in their 2005, 2007, and 2010 manifestos: “We strongly believe that the best future for Northern Ireland is as an integrated region within a deepening and widening European Union.”

Alliance remains firmly behind the EU as "it has broken down barriers between people. Just as Alliance supports overcoming divisions in Northern Ireland, it also supports overcoming divisions between states, regions, nation and communities across Europe." In short, the party demonstrates an openness to others on an international scale and, while there is a definite belief in the uniqueness of Northern Ireland, it is not coupled with a strong and tangible fear of “surrender” of culture or rights.

In line with their moderate, Third Community position, Alliance takes a clear stand against sectarian symbols and images. The party has made clear its rejection of "paramilitary, sectarian or racist flags, murals and graffiti." They want the property of the Northern Ireland Housing Executive and the Road Service to be clear of such things. In its list of "Key Policy Commitments for the Assembly," in 2011, Alliance included "Cease tolerance of illegally-erected flags and emblems" and "Work with communities to secure the removal of 'peace walls'." Furthermore, while Alliance acknowledges the long-standing use of things like flags "to intimidate" others and lay claim to a particular area, the party contends that "This threatening and divisive use of cultural expression is not something that can be tolerated in a society that is seeking to move forward and become more inclusive to all." In short, Alliance’s rejection of paramilitarism,
sectarianism, violence and division, includes a resistance to allowing such things space in the public symbolic arena.

Interestingly, Alliance is not content to simply do away with old, divisive symbols and images, but wishes to establish new, more inclusive ones. In their 2002 policy document, *Building A United Community*, as well as in their 2003 manifesto, the Party actually supported the establishment and use of “new symbols” that would “give expression to Northern Ireland as a region” and “give expression to this regional identity”, among them “a new flag”. According to their 2002 document, “Any new flag should not be a marriage of the symbols of the two dominant traditions but reflect the real diversity to [be] found in Northern Ireland.” In addition, the party claimed that “the European flag” ought to be utilized more as well.63 Basically, the party recognizes the distinctiveness of the Province, at the same time as it encourages a connection with Europe at large, one that in its very nature goes beyond traditional and local sectarian politics and identities.

Furthermore, as recently as 2012, Alliance attempted to steer a middle course when it came to symbols. In December of that year, a vote took place in the City Council of Belfast that would alter the "policy of flying the union flag at Belfast City Hall all year round." Nationalists on council desired the flag not to fly at all. However, they chose to support a suggestion by Alliance that the flag fly on certain days, like the birthdays of members of the royal family.64 According to Alliance, "A Sinn Fein proposal passed at committee stage would have seen the flag removed permanently if Alliance had not proposed our amendment."65 Flying the flag on certain days demonstrates both the Province's status within the UK as well as acknowledges the people of Belfast who do not
consider the flag to be their symbol. For Alliance, "The flying of the Union flag on designated days is a sensible compromise that reflects Belfast's nature as a shared city." Furthermore, a councillor from Alliance pointed out the successful compromise's significance: "For the first time in their history both Sinn Fein and the SDLP have voted in support of the Union flag. This proves in a practical way that they acknowledge the constitutional position of Northern Ireland."

Alliance has been careful to keep its own literature and visual materials free of sectarian colour schemes and images. The party's main manifesto colours in 1973 and 1977 were red and black. Later, the colour of the cover of the 1987 Westminster manifesto was bright yellow with the lettering in black. The colour scheme of Alliance in their manifests since 2003 has been basically blue and yellow/gold, with, at times, some white and black used. Blue, yellow/gold and black are used on the current Alliance Party website. These colour choices reflect their liberal and international outlook as yellow/orange and black are used by the UK Liberal Democrats and blue and gold/yellow are also the colours used in the flags or logos of Liberal International, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and the European Union. Furthermore, there are no clear green, white, and orange, (Irish tricolour), or blue, white, and red, (Union flag), combinations in their literature or on their website. A choice of more neutral colours allows them to appeal to both communities and the use of a bright, sunny yellow/gold in their manifests since 2003 pairs well with their message of forward thinking, hopeful politics.

Furthermore, Alliance generally avoids traditionally partisan symbols or visual images in its literature or on its website. In an early 1973 manifesto, the only obvious
symbol used was a stylized "A" done in black ink. The same symbol appeared in a 1977 manifesto, only in white within a square of red, and on the cover page of a 1987 manifesto, again in black ink. An examination of a number of manifestos and website versions since 2000 reveals that Alliance does not make use of the British flag or of any Irish symbols or images that could be construed as divisive. They did utilize photographs of Stormont in their 2003 manifesto, but they overlaid the large main photo of the front of Stormont with progressive and non-sectarian words and phrases:

Figure 7: APNI Assembly Elections Manifesto Image (Stormont) (2003)

The photographic images are in blue and the arrows are in yellow or are outlined in yellow. Text is in yellow and blue. The arrows on the title page served to emphasize progress with the words “forward thinking” and "equal citizenship". This pattern continued throughout the document in the alteration of the following two banners, one of which appeared on each page:
Similarly, a large photograph of Stormont was used again on the title page of Alliance’s 2007 manifesto for the Assembly elections. On the photograph, centered beneath the building itself, were the words “The Alternative An Agenda for a United Community”, again pairing Stormont with the notion of unity, rather than division or oppression. In each of these cases, Alliance took a former symbol of the power of unionism and Protestantism and superimposed upon it their vision of a better society, a society that they as a party remain dedicated to achieving. Alliance effectively reinvented Stormont as a symbol or image for a power-sharing, representative government and society. Lastly, and perhaps most intriguing, was the party's recent Northern Ireland Assembly election manifesto (2011), where a new and decidedly non-sectarian, non-traditional image was used:
This image was both neutral and comprehensive, representing a party concerned with people, quality of life, and the environment. The image was cheerful, normal, and non-sectarian. Any person, regardless of background, could be attracted to a party utilizing such images.

**Women's Activism, Feminism, and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC)**

Women's priorities and concerns have united women in Northern Ireland over the years. There have been organizations focused on "women's issues," such as abortion and violence in the home, groups at local level lobbying to get better amenities, and so on. Efforts to prevent communal violence have been prominent, too. Indeed, Morgan notes that "The recognition of shared experience and of the direct impact of such issues on the lives of considerable numbers of both Catholic and Protestant women, has led many activists to develop strong links across the community divide."  

Feminists and women's activists in Northern Ireland have come from all walks of life and all traditions over the decades and the results of their activity have been
impressive. For example, in 1975 women at Queen's university took part in establishing the Northern Ireland Women's Rights Movement. In addition to Queen's University women, NICRA women played a role as well. Others included those involved in trade unionism, women from the Communist Party, republicans, and women on their own who had different "backgrounds." The desire was for the movement to "be the nucleus of a federation of women's groups throughout Northern Ireland, which would enhance the effectiveness of those interested in promoting women's interests." As women in the NIWRM had different views when it came to politics, the Movement chose not to take a stance on the "constitutional" question. Rather, the NIWRM addressed "the issues of equal pay, childcare" and other concerns of women.  

Among other significant women's groups is Women's Aid, which became active in the North in 1975 and is still in existence. Women's Aid organizations appeared in a number of cities and towns in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 80s. In 1978 a "Northern Ireland Women's Aid Federation was" established. Women's Aid raised awareness of violence suffered by women in the home. They campaigned to get legislation changed to help women suffering domestic violence and offered help to those needing sanctuary. Like the NIWRM, the NIWAF chose neutrality on the constitutional issue. Women from different backgrounds have backed Women's Aid and it has done well. There are currently 9 Women's Aid groups in the North and the Women's Aid Federation operates a helpline that is "Open to all women and men affected by domestic & sexual violence."  

Another group that remains in existence is the Women's Information Group, which was established in 1980. Today this organization is known as Women's
Information Northern Ireland. Women in West Belfast set it up to uphold as well as establish connections across religious boundaries and give women "information which would allow them to make informed choices in respect of health, family, housing and finance." The organization claims to currently have more than 1200 people in it. They offer "Information Days" every month and various courses for women. They remain dedicated to supporting "contact with other religions and cultures." ⁸³

Sharing information and raising awareness of women's concerns remains a focus for activists. The Women's Resource and Development Agency was established in 1983 and continues to be active. ⁸⁴ WRDA's goal is to have "a fair and equal society where women are empowered and are a visible force for change and influence in all areas of life." They work with women from different backgrounds "in the most disadvantaged...areas of Northern Ireland." Such areas are traditionally where sectarianism is at its strongest. WRDA provides information relevant to women as well as attempts to increase awareness of the concerns of women "in the wider media." WRDA tries to ensure that politicians and women are informed of relevant concerns and issues. They, too, offer courses that address subjects that include women and health as well as women and finances. In terms of membership, they claim to possess "a wide and diverse membership base of just over 300, including community based women's groups, national organisations, trade unions, women's centres and individuals. We also have more than 300 associate members in our Community Facilitators." ⁸⁵

When it comes to community relations, one of the early organizations that proved particularly effective in crossing boundaries, and was especially active during the 1990s, was Women Together. In 1970, Women Together was established by Ruth Agnew and
Monica Patterson. The former was Protestant and the latter was both English and Catholic. They both dwelt in Belfast. They appealed to women who had had enough of religious prejudice and violence to come to a meeting. Hundreds attended and Women Together was created. According to Anne Carr, who joined in 1990, Women Together had been known to create "human chains across roads to keep stone-throwing youths apart". They also removed children from violent neighbourhoods on holiday. In 1990 new goals were established: to end "sectarian violence" within the province, support those who had been "victims of sectarianism", provide women with "a "voice" in society", and establish "a pluralist society where there is mutual understanding and respect for our diversities."

These common goals united women in attempts to combat sectarianism and aid victims of conflict. Anne Carr and Pat Campbell from Women Together in Lisburn cooperated with women of different backgrounds and beliefs around the province. They set up "Talking and Listening Circles" for women to share their experiences and desires. A Catholic and Protestant woman from Women Together would visit grieving families with flowers. Vigils were arranged after tragedies. At St. Anne's (Belfast) the women arranged "a special service" following the 1993 Warrington Bombing in which two children died. Catholic and Protestant women processed "through Belfast City Centre, carrying a beautiful spray of white flowers which we lay in the Garden of Remembrance at City Hall." Women Together assisted with the Warrington Peace Initiative in its infancy. In addition, concerned with ensuring victims had enough support, Women Together reached out to Victim Support Northern Ireland chair, Marion Gibson. Gibson assisted the women in setting up "a working group to map the support available and
identify the gaps in provision." This report brought the problem to government attention and resulted in the 1998 Bloomfield Report - *We Will Remember Them*, which addressed victims and their issues.\(^8^7\)

Women Together supported the peace process. Following the Canary Wharf Bombing in 1996, Carr, backed by Women Together, began helping to arrange "a vigil" at City Hall. Prior to the bombing, Women Together, worried for the peace process, had "cut out over 3000 little white paper doves" for use in a possible demonstration. On February 12, 1996, more than 5,000 individuals went to gather before City Hall in Belfast. There was "two minutes of silence" and they held up the doves. According to Carr, "This image travelled the world via global media. It was a very significant message and its impact was phenomenal. The people of Northern Ireland wanted peace not violence." During the pre-Agreement period, Women Together pressed politicians to do what was needed to achieve peace.\(^8^8\)

Another initiative, called People Moving On, was set up and involved Women Together. People Moving On backed the 1998 accord and, after the Agreement was achieved and voted on, Women Together/People Moving On pressed for the Agreement to be completely implemented.\(^8^9\) In September of 1999, during the Agreement Review process, People Moving On demonstrated at Stormont in favour of progress. Speaking for the group, Anne Carr declared "We are sick and tired of stalemate, we are appalled at the continuing brutality and violence being inflicted on people of all traditions and feel that the spirit of hope, compromise and generosity encompassed in our Good Friday Agreement is being lost through lack of progress."\(^9^0\) Then, in November of 1999, a gathering took place involving People Moving On at Waterfront Hall in Belfast, where a
very important unionist council vote was to take place on whether or not "to accept the latest peace package." The People Moving On activists wanted the UUP to accept it and supported Trimble's efforts to win backing from the UUP. The vote was a success, with a majority of UUC members conceding to Trimble going into government with Sinn Fein.

Carr and Women Together were also involved in the creation of Community Dialogue. Established in 1997, Community Dialogue was created by people from a wide variety of backgrounds on both sides of the political and religious divide. Problems are confronted by having people talk to each other. There are "workshops, residential sessions, and training courses." Community Dialogue is non-partisan. Women Together moved into Community Dialogue in 2001. In that year, Carr took up a position as "Dialogue and Research worker with Community Dialogue." Community Dialogue is currently in its second phase of development, entitled "Envisioning A Multicultural Future," recognizing and supporting the growing pluralism in society and acknowledging the reality that "sectarianism overlaps conflicts about racial, ethnic, gender, economic and sexual identity issues." Their focus has grown beyond the traditional boundaries of conflict to the more complicated and diverse context of the present.

Northern Irish women have forged links beyond the Province through the Northern Ireland Women's European Platform. The NIWEP aims to give Northern Irish women a means of expressing their opinions and concerns about issues at local, European as well as global level. It allows "women to understand United Nations, European and domestic legislation, conventions and policies that focus or impact on women and to use them to advocate for equality." The NIWEP ensures that Northern Irish concerns are
made known "to the UN Committee on the Status of Women." Together with colleagues in the other regions of the UK, the NIWEP "represents the UK on the European Women's Lobby" via the UK Joint Committee on Women, which includes NIWEP, Engender (Scotland), and National Alliance of Women's Organisations (England). The Republic of Ireland is an EWL member as well through the National Women's Council of Ireland. The EWL was established in 1990 and actively pursues gender equality in Europe. The main concern of groups like the EWL is equality and fair treatment for women within the various European states and across state borders. The shared challenges faced by women in these areas is the focus, not what divides them.

Organizations such as the National Women's Council of Ireland and the Northern Ireland Women's European Platform have crossed boundaries and worked together at times. The NWCI has several member groups from the North, including Derry Women's Centre, Foyle Women's Aid, and Women's Resource & Development Agency (located in Belfast). The NWCI and the NIWEP together reacted to the Downing Street Declaration (1993). Following the 1994 ceasefires, they arranged an important conference, which took place in Dublin that October, called "Women Shaping the Future Political, Economic and Social Development on the Island of Ireland." More than 200 women attended. Northern Irish women and Southern Irish women came. Together the NWCI and the NIWEP also made a "submission to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation" in 1995. The Forum took place in Dublin and the government of the Republic "sponsored" it. The women contended that equality must be the foundation for the future: "Social, economic, cultural and political inclusion is a basic requirement for any genuinely democratic society."
In 1996 the concerns of women's activists for enhancing women's status, cooperating with others and establishing good cross community relationships, and achieving a fair and peaceful Northern Ireland came together in the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC). In existence from 1996-2006, the NIWC began with a desire, among other aims, to see more women become active and represented in political life. Although never large in terms of membership or support, the NIWC contributed significantly to the 1998 Agreement. Two members, Pearl Sagar and Monica McWilliams, participated in the talks. According to Jane Morrice, who helped establish the NIWC, they "made sure that commitments were made in the agreement to integrated education and mixed housing." Morrice notes, too, that "We also made sure that the rights of victims and the equality agenda were addressed." Even though the NIWC ended in 2006, Morrice notes that "Our former members are active in other spheres like the policing board, the parades commission and the human rights commission."

The NIWC consistently promoted itself as “cross-community” in its ethos and makeup. In its 1997 Westminster election manifesto, for example, it claimed to represent “all walks of life and all shades of political colour”; it was a group open to people of both sexes as well. In their 1998 Assembly election manifesto, the NIWC reiterated this point, arguing that it had demonstrated its ability to cooperate with different political parties as the NIWC was a genuinely “cross-community” party itself, made up of people of both sexes who had a variety of “backgrounds and traditions” - including unionist, nationalist, loyalist, republican and those who did not belong to any of these categories. In 2001, the NICW reminded voters that it was "cross-community" and that its "members are women and men from diverse backgrounds: rural and urban;
young and old; nationalist, unionist and 'other'." As such, the NIWC offered voters a different option from the standard nationalist/unionist and republican/loyalist parties.

In line with their own "mixed" nature, the NIWC supported the "mixing" of people in the Province. For example, the NIWC contended, in its 1998 manifesto, that the chance to have their sons and daughters attend “a school with an integrated ethos” ought to be available to all parents. Indeed, in 2003, the Party pointed out that education could play a role in reducing division as well as confronting bigotry in the Province. Thus the NIWC wanted "More resources for integrated education, and more co-operation between schools" as well as a teacher's college that was integrated, where teachers could receive "training in community relations."

When it came to living spaces, the NIWC indicated its intent to support "discussion about promoting and protecting mixed housing schemes - not just in terms of religion, but also class." The Party even supported "Creating space to understand the other communities better - be they based on religion or ethnic origin, perhaps with local history programmes, exhibits, events and discussions in a positive and safe environment." In short, the NIWC demonstrated its belief in and understanding of the importance of shared space in the Province and interaction between people from a range of religions, ethnicities, and classes.

The NIWC also claimed to carry out an alternative political practice and ethos that they termed “a politics of accommodation rather than confrontation.” This can be seen as early as 1996 when those canvassing for the NIWC were asked about the group's stand "on the constitutional question." While there was no doubt that people in the NIWC did have different views regarding Northern Ireland's constitutional position, those who were
canvassing told people that the power of the NIWC was in avoiding a rigid stance. Rather, the party supported a non-exclusionary process which took account of different thoughts, opinions, and possibilities to find "a workable solution." In a 1997 Westminster manifesto, the NIWC made clear that it desired to play a role in developing “acceptable constitutional arrangements which protect and respect all our traditions and identities.” In line with this position, they helped create and then supported the Good Friday Agreement (1998). The party went on to claim, in 2001, that "Our experience tells us that, guided by principles of human rights, inclusion and equality, it is possible to manage our differences and achieve agreement on the issues that affect all of our lives." The NIWC was basically presenting itself as an example of a group who had successfully crossed or broken down barriers in favour of cooperation and was willing to continue to do so on the political stage for the good of Northern Ireland and its people.

The work and experiences of the NIWC in the talks prior to the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement help to illustrate their middle ground position. For example, a willingness to transcend sectarian divisions can be seen in the NIWC's approach to other groups involved in the talks. The NIWC were behind the creation of the "Group of Four". The NIWC teamed up with three other small parties to cooperate with regard to certain issues, while recognizing the reality of their differences and ultimate aims. The other three parties involved were the Progressive Unionist Party (the UVF's political wing), the Ulster Democratic Party (which had contact with and roots in the UDA), and the Labour Coalition. The NIWC, via the Group of Four, tried to comprehend loyalism, including "the pressures" loyalist politicians were under. According to Fearon, this allowed the NIWC to put forward proposals which would ultimately help the talks
progress. Fearon also argues that "the experience of nationalist women in the NIWC helped inform PUP and UDP positions." Furthermore, the NIWC met with Sinn Fein, even before they were in the talks.\textsuperscript{118} The NIWC wanted the talks to be inclusive and meetings were requested by the NIWC and were utilized by the women involved to share opinions and positions, establish relations, as well as to encourage Sinn Fein to take part.\textsuperscript{119} This commitment of the NIWC to resolve problems by coming together across sectarian lines and achieving "an agreed accommodation"\textsuperscript{120} represented, in its way, a realigning of traditional boundaries to acknowledge and act as a more cohesive, even a single, community.

The NIWC was also not opposed to reaching across national borders. The NIWC was willing to cooperate with the Republic of Ireland when such cooperation would be beneficial.\textsuperscript{121} During the negotiations phase, prior to the Agreement, the NIWC suggested the creation of a Council of the Regions. This would be a "consultative" body and would include the British and Irish regions. It was the NIWC's belief that positive connections or interactions did not have to be supported and developed only East to West or North to South. Rather, this could take place in both directions. As Fearon points out, "In its submissions the NIWC asserted its aspiration for the development of a recognised interdependence and mutuality between the people of the two islands, rather than narrow concentration on territorial claims."\textsuperscript{122} Such an outlook demonstrated a more practical and even neutral, rather than fearful, perspective on relations with neighbours.

Like Alliance, the NIWC was not isolationist. Although in 1997 the party expressed a desire for “more autonomy for regions like Northern Ireland,” it backed membership in Europe\textsuperscript{123} and recognized the growing importance of Europe for the
people of the Province. It was in favour "of greater European integration" and wanted "Closer cooperation between Northern Ireland businesses and the enlarged European Union." In addition, in its 2001 Westminster General Election manifesto, the Party noted "the importance of the single [European] currency for developing the Northern Irish economy." In 2003 the NIWC made clear its desire and goal for the UK to join the Euro. This broader, more international perspective, going beyond the borders of the Province, Ireland, and the UK itself, was consistent with the other significant middle ground parties, Alliance and the Green Party.

While definitely among the moderate and middle ground parties in Northern Ireland, the NIWC never garnered a lot of votes within the Province. However, it did have its supporters and it was a definite presence in the politics of the North. To begin with, the 1996 Northern Ireland Forum elections were contested by the party and two of their candidates (Monica McWilliams, a Catholic, as well as Pearl Sagar, a Protestant) received seats. Thus, the Party had a role in the talks which ultimately led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The Party achieved its greatest electoral success in the Assembly Election (1998), with over 13,000 first preference votes. They received two seats in the 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly. The Party continued to back the Agreement, but did not do well in the elections for the Assembly held in the fall of 2003, receiving 5,785 first preference votes and gaining no seats. Things did not improve for the party and, by the end of 2005, the NIWC did not have any more individuals in elected positions. The party came to an end in the Spring of 2006.

The fact remains, those who did support the NIWC, whether in the hundreds or the thousands, were backing a middle ground political alternative to the standard, and
much more popular, nationalist and unionist parties. More importantly, they were voting for a party that allowed for its members and supporters to be unionist or nationalist, Catholic or Protestant, unaligned or non-religious. Those who backed the NIWC included those who wished to see the conflict resolved in a fair and peaceful manner, those who were not satisfied with the more traditional choices, and those who placed their feminist principles ahead of other concerns. At heart, the NIWC was a pluralist party that recognized the reality that people are a complex mix of beliefs and priorities and did not demand that all people hold the same views aside from a desire to resolve the conflict. Therefore, NIWC members and supporters can be considered part of the Third Community in Northern Ireland due to their willingness to try a new approach even while not necessarily discarding their older views.

The NIWC, like Alliance, avoided the use of sectarian or partisan colours or images. According to Kate Fearon, when the party was officially launched on May 17, 1996, their colours were "the purple, green and white that the English suffragettes had used at the beginning of the twentieth century." This concern for colour could also be found in the NIWC's campaign in favour of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. On their bus, which they drove around to different towns promoting a "Yes" vote, they used purple lettering on the banners they attached to it. They also ordered flags that were supposed to have "green lettering" on a purple background. Unfortunately, they received flags that had purple letters on a green background. Fearon notes that "from a distance the bus looked too politically 'green'" because of this. Thus, on the following trip, those involved went and purchased some inexpensive purple cloth. This was torn into the appropriate size. According to Fearon, "Purple and green flags wouldn't make the bus
look quite so republican." In keeping with this non-sectarian trend, in the NIWC’s Assembly election manifesto for 2003, the background was a bright pink and headings were in bright yellow. The portraits of women that appeared on the first page were set against backgrounds of bright yellow, green, orange, purple, and several shades of blue. The only images to appear throughout were photos of women (although several times men appeared in the photos as well, as did children). None of these colours or images were sectarian or inaccessible to any particular group or community.

**The Green Party**

Environmentalism and the Green Movement is a growing area of cross-border and cross-culture cooperation. The environment and concern for the welfare of the planet and its resources remain issues that attract people from a variety of religions, ethnicities, and political backgrounds, both locally and internationally. Ireland is no exception. As a political grouping, the Greens do not fit neatly into the nationalist/unionist or Catholic/Protestant divide in Northern Ireland, nor are borders insurmountable obstacles to relationships and cooperation. Indeed, cross border awareness and solidarity began early. The Greens appeared on the Province's political scene in 1981. In that year, Peter Emerson, Avril McCandless, as well as Malcolm Samuels ran for office under the banner of the Ecology Party. In 1981 "Green Politics was born in the Republic," too. In an early show of solidarity, a number of members of Northern Ireland's Ecology Party attended the initial southern Green convention, which took place in Wicklow in 1982. The following year, the Northern Ireland Ecology Party had its official launch in Belfast. *Comhaontas Glas* as well as other UK Greens were present. They all cooperated to create a shared Northern Ireland policy. According to the Green Party of Northern
Ireland, "It was the first time that a political movement representing Ireland, Northern Ireland and the UK came together to find common ground on the increasingly fraught situation in Northern Ireland."\(^{138}\)

A second launch of the Green Party in Northern Ireland took place in 1990 in Belfast and, subsequently, cooperation with Irish and British Greens continued to grow. At the beginning of 1995, a cooperative effort by Greens in the North and South took place when the Northern Greens "formed part of the Comhaontas Glas team for the Dublin Forum for Peace and Reconciliation." Then, in 1996, a press conference was hosted by the Northern Irish and Irish Green parties which expressed a desire for "a top-up form of PR-STV" to be used in the elections to the Forum.\(^{139}\) After the election of Dr. John Barry as party leader in 2003, a "'green summit'" took place in June of that year, arranged by Greens in Northern Ireland and the Republic, and involving Greens from the UK mainland. Environmental issues as well as political ones were discussed, among them the situation in Northern Ireland.\(^{140}\)

Northern Ireland's Greens have continued to see themselves as belonging to a large, cross-border movement. In 2005, Green Party members in the North "voted to join the Green Party of Ireland." The decision "was formalised at the National Convention in 2006." Currently, "the Green Party in Northern Ireland is a regional group within the Green Party/Comhaontas Glas [sic]." Furthermore, the party "has constitutional links to the Scottish Green Party and the Green Party of England and Wales". Greens in Northern Ireland are allowed to be members of whichever of these parties they choose or they can belong to them all. According to John Hardy, GPNI Chair, "This reflects the intertwined and overlapping relations of the British Isles and the trans-national nature of the Green
In short, the Northern Ireland Greens are not afraid to reach across political and national boundaries to cooperate with others or achieve their goals.

Greens on the island of Ireland have connections to Europe as well, via the European Parliament. This is significant because in the European political arena localized conflicts and divisions are overshadowed by the need for cooperation on a shared agenda, in this case environmental concerns. Furthermore, MEPs do not sit specifically with members of their own nation. Rather, they sit according to what political group they belong to. The European Parliament has eight such groups, including the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (established in 1999). Northern Irish and Irish Greens cooperate with their counterparts at the European level, although they do not have any Irish Green MEPs. The Green Party of Ireland belongs to the European Green Party (established in 2004), which "operates as a federation of political parties across Europe supporting green politics." Green MEPs sit as part of "the Greens-EFA Group." Northern Irish Greens take pride in their European connections, noting that they are among “the most influential groups in the European Parliament. We have also served in a number of European Governments.” Greens in Northern Ireland clearly see themselves and Greens in Europe as members of the same movement and identify with their successes.

In line with their “motto” “Think Globally, Act Locally”, the Green Party supports the European Union as well as the United Nations. They contend that the Union’s most important accomplishment lies in the structures that allow for and aim at establishing non-violent, positive links and connections amongst countries. They back the Union increasing its membership. The Greens are supportive of the European
Union as well as the United Nations because they believe that these organizations and collectivities are necessary for dealing with issues that impact everyone – pollution, for example, is not confined by national boundaries. In line with this expansive vision, the Green Party took a more flexible view of borders in its 2004 manifesto, claiming that Greens yearned for a time “when the borders which divide this island and these islands no longer hold the significance they held in the past.”

Basically, they indicated their support for a move away from old separations towards a more peaceful and cooperative world.

The Green Party focuses on the environment and their vision of Northern Ireland is heavily tinged with a concern for the world around them. In 1996, supporting the European Convention on Human Rights applying in Northern Ireland, (preferably "throughout these islands"), the party argued that "human rights should be extended to include": "the rights of all to a clean and healthy environment, and the responsibilities of all both in regard to the amount of pollution they may cause, and the manner in which they dispose of that pollution". Later, in their 2003 Assembly election manifesto, the party declared that “Protecting our environment will form an integral part of everything the Green Party will do in Government.” Indeed, when it comes to the environment, the Greens are aware that such problems are not confined by borders and claimed in a 2011 manifesto that they "would make a difference by: Supporting the promotion of coordinated activities between environmental monitoring bodies on the islands of Ireland and Great Britain". Later on in the same manifesto, the Party claimed that it "would make North/South institutions work by" the establishment "of a cross-border Sustainable Energy Authority" as well as "a cross-border Environmental Protection and Enforcement
Agency." The party's concern for and focus on the environment can be shared by people of different communities, crossing boundaries at the ballot box, and even national borders.

The Green Party, in line with their Third Community status, takes a more representative and less simplistic approach to political life in Northern Ireland. In their 1996 manifesto, they pointed out that the majority rule system was problematic when it came to the constitutional issue as one side got everything while the other was left with nothing. A different politics was required, "a new form of power-sharing and decision-making so that...everyone wins something; to this end, the Green Party believes democracy should be a means by which, on any contentious issue, society as a whole can come to a collective compromise." Although supportive of the 1998 Agreement, they did not like that it upheld and basically made sectarianism official by forcing MLAs to be labeled “as ‘Unionist’, ‘Nationalist’ or ‘Other’.” Indeed, in their 2004 European manifesto, in discussing both Ireland as well as Cyprus, where division was an issue, the Greens expressed their desire to avoid strictly divided, categorized, and restricted politics. As they put it, “we ask for political institutions and voting procedures which are not based on designations: Unionist and Nationalist….we ask for more open, i.e., multi-option polls, instead of the closed questions which invariably end with vetoes: Ulster says ‘no’….” The Greens argued that "all constitutional plebiscites should be based on a multi-option vote by which may be identified the collective highest average preference." The Greens recognize that the people of Northern Ireland are pluralist - they have many concerns, loyalties, and identities. Providing more opportunities to
express these in the political decisions they make has the potential to move the Province forward, beyond nationalist and unionist and 'yes'/'no' choices.

The Green Party is also firmly against violence. Its ethos is pacifist and, in 1996, the party made clear its opinion that decommissioning of all illegal arms ought to take place right away. As far as the Greens were concerned, "At a personal level, in any group exchange, and in any international conflict, we eschew the use of violence for the maintenance or achievement of any political goals or indeed for any other purpose."

Interestingly, the party did not highlight any particular group, here, such as the IRA or the UVF, as an example of such violent behaviour. They kept their condemnation broad and neutral. In 2005, the party claimed to be "A clear choice for....rejecting paramilitary violence". The Greens leave no room for romantic nationalism and its associated violence, nor for any violence related to a militant Protestant/loyalist desire to maintain the constitutional status quo.

The Green Party supports social justice and equality in Northern Ireland and, in doing so, recognizes the variety of identities and loyalties in the Province. For instance, the Party argues that reducing the divide that separates the wealthy from those in poverty is "the most efficient way of" ensuring a good standard of living for everyone. Indeed, “Social justice” remains fundamental to establishing peace. Furthermore, the Green Party thinks that women need to be present and active in the politics and running of Northern Ireland. In 2003 and 2007, the Party argued "that Northern Ireland can only benefit from a true gender balance in all aspects of life....Women must be represented fairly in political life, at the levels where real decision-making is made.” In 2003 and 2007, as well, the Greens supported the end of discrimination towards Northern Ireland's lesbian and gay
populations. They backed firm application "of anti-discrimination legislation" to achieve this. They also acknowledge the reality of immigration to the Province and back more initiatives and actions against racism within the North. The Greens' vision for a fair Northern Ireland, thus, goes beyond a narrow focus on Catholic/Protestant or nationalist/unionist “rights” and identities.

The Greens have not had a lot of success at the polls, but still represent a small, non-sectarian voting bloc. The party also appears to be growing in popularity. In a 1990 Westminster By-Election (Upper Bann), Green Party representative Dr. Peter Doran received 576 votes or 1.6%. Electoral fortunes improved for the Greens in 2005, the year the party took three council seats. Two years later, in the Assembly elections for 2007, the Greens received almost 12,000 first preference votes, making them the Province’s sixth most popular party. In that election, Green Party candidate Brian Wilson garnered 2,839 first preference votes in North Down, which was enough to make him the party’s first MLA. Steven Agnew of the Green Party currently represents North Down in the Assembly, having been "elected in 2011."

The Green Party, in their manifestos and on their website, generally avoids using a colour scheme which could be read as representing one “side” or the other in Northern Ireland. For instance, in their Local Government Elections manifesto for 2005, the Party did use green (an expected use of colour for the Green Party and an environmental colour). However, they paired several shades of green with blue in this pamphlet and avoided the colour combinations used in the Union and Irish flags. Later on, the cover page for their manifesto for the Assembly election of 2007 utilized white lettering on green and included a wider variety of colours, such as red, orange, yellow/gold, and
violet. Their 2010 manifesto used green, blue, and white, mainly, as did their 2011 manifesto (with some bright pink as well). Until recently, on the party website, green was again the main colour, but blue also appeared. Currently, the main colours of the Green Party's website are blue and white, with some orange and green.

The Green Party, like Alliance and the NIWC, avoids the use of symbols or images that could be viewed as belonging to or representative of one side or another. Nature images are common. In their leaflet for the Assembly Election in 1998, their main party symbol resembled the head of a flower, in the center of which appeared a sun, peaking out from behind a body of land, underneath which was water. Images of children were also popular, appearing as main images on manifestos from 2005, 2007, and 2009. The main image in the Green manifesto in 2011 was a sunflower and the party relied on photographs of Green Party candidates and representatives in their 2014 and 2015 manifestos. Until recently, the main images on their website appeared in banners across the top of each page of the site and consisted of natural or environmental images, such as floating dandelion seeds, a hand holding the planet Earth with a blue sky and cloud as background, young people, and wind turbines. None of these images have any particular ties to any community or religious group in Northern Ireland, but represent a concern for the natural world and the future (represented well by images of children and the young) that all can share. Currently, the website's only significant image is the party's sunflower logo (discussed below).

The Green Party's current active logo, appearing in its 2009, 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2015 manifestos and on its current website, is a non-sectarian, natural, and even international image of a sunflower:
Figure 10: Green Party Northern Ireland Logo

The background of this image is blue, except for the strip at the bottom, which is green. All text is in white. The center of the flower is green and the petals are in orange. The green strip containing the words “northern ireland” in white does not always appear.176

The European Green Party also uses a sunflower image:

Figure 11: European Green Party Banner

The background of this banner is green, the center of the flower is dark green, and the petals are in gold. The words “European” and “Party” are in black and the word “Green” is in white.177

So does the Republic of Ireland. Indeed, the Green Party in Ireland's website logo is the same as that of the Green Party in Northern Ireland, with only several minor differences, as can be seen below:

Figure 12: Green Party in Ireland Logo

The background of this logo is green, the center of the flower is in a lighter green and the petals are in orange. The text is in white.178
There is an obvious recognition of connection here between Greens in both parts of Ireland (and Europe), but the Northern Greens' use of the colour blue and the absence of the Irish language allows them to avoid clear nationalist or republican overtones.

**Conclusion**

Although the emphasis of APNI, the NIWC, and the Green Party differ to an extent, all three have offered the people of Northern Ireland political alternatives to the mainstream parties. Their emphasis has been less on what divides than on what unites the people of the Province. The desire for a fair government, representative of the people and responsive to their needs, where people work together to achieve a better society, is clear. Cooperation across sectarian divides and national borders is viewed as both possible and preferable to isolation and intransigence. Above all, peace and an end to violence are key goals for all of these parties. Paramilitarism has had its day and the political middle ground believes it is time to move on.
CHAPTER 6
THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 3: ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNITY AND TRANSCENDENCE

Members of the Third Community in Northern Ireland have established groups and organizations to directly address fundamental problems that they have had to face on a daily basis as members of a divided society. Among such organizations is the Ireland-wide Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and its Northern Ireland Committee, which address the needs and concerns of workers, both Catholic and Protestant. Intergroup relationships on a more intimate level have also been a focus for activists. Ordinary Catholics and Protestants have fallen in love with members of the "opposing" community and found themselves caught between hostile families and at odds with Northern Ireland's sectarian neighbourhoods and living spaces. The Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA) arose out of a shared understanding of such challenges. Furthermore, parents, some of them in such marriages, have struggled to raise and educate their children with a knowledge of both communities. Supporters of integrated education, many of them parents, have fought with some success to establish schools that welcome and serve children from different religions and none. Similarly, humanists have advocated for those children and adults who resist or reject religious tenets and want to live, learn, and move forward in a secular and equitable society. Finally, together, members of the Third Community have called for genuine power-sharing and responsible government that serves every individual and community in the Province.
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Northern Ireland Committee

The ICTU was established in 1959 and is Ireland’s “largest civil society organisation.”\(^1\) It is Ireland-wide and represents around 800,000 individuals. Presently, Congress has more than 50 unions connected with it in the Republic and Northern Ireland.\(^2\) Over 30 Trades Councils on the island, representative of “groups of unions at local/regional level,” are ICTU affiliates.\(^3\) These include Councils on both sides of the border, among them the Belfast and District Trades Council, Derry Trades Union Council, Dublin Council of Trade Unions, and Cork Council of Trade Unions.\(^4\)

The ICTU includes a Northern Ireland Committee. Over 30 unions in the North are connected with the NIC and, thus, with the ICTU. No other civil society group in the Province is as large.\(^5\) The NIC caters to members of different communities and political affiliations noting, as early as 1969, that it “is the most representative body covering all sections of religious and political opinions.”\(^6\) Sales concurs, pointing out that “Protestant” and “Catholic” unions have been and are affiliated with the NIC. Among these is the Ulster Teachers’ Union, which supports teachers in the North and, according to Sales, draws its members mostly from the controlled or “Protestant” sector of education.\(^7\) Still, the UTU’s constitution insists it is “non-sectarian and non-political.”\(^8\) Also affiliated to the NIC and ICTU is the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation (INTO), which is Ireland’s biggest union for teachers.\(^9\) It supports Irish and Northern Irish teachers and draws its members mostly from “Catholic schools” even as it is, ostensibly, “non-party, non-sectarian, non-sexist and non-racist.”\(^10\) Still, both unions remain connected via the NIC and ICTU.
The NIC has been a progressive organization focused on justice and good community and work relations. The Northern Committee opposed sectarianism and acted as a bulwark to keep the Troubles out of the work environment. They and the ICTU have supported equality, regardless of political beliefs or religion. Indeed, in August of 1969, the NIC released its *Programme for Peace and Progress in Northern Ireland*. In it, the NIC supported “full democratic and civil rights for all citizens.” Nonetheless, the NIC acknowledged Northern Ireland’s place in the UK. It accepted that this reality would remain the case unless most of the North’s citizens chose to alter the Province’s status. Furthermore, the NIC opposed violence from any quarter, yet did believe in the right of people “to advocate change by democratic means.” They also supported people from different backgrounds living together and backed integrated education.

The Head Office of the ICTU and the Northern Office work together on peace related concerns and activities and are against sectarianism and paramilitarism. According to ICTU Northern Ireland officer Terry Carlin in 1997: “This congress reaffirms that the first and foremost fundamental right of every human being is the right to live free from violence, intimidation, sectarianism and discrimination.” Indeed, the ICTU and the NIC have been behind a number of peace demonstrations over the years. In January of 1998, a demonstration occurred in Belfast for people from both communities and was organized by the ICTU. People came out in Belfast and elsewhere to demonstrate against sectarian murder. ICTU “deputy Northern Ireland officer” Tom Gillen declared “We know that rallies in themselves will not stop the killings, but this is an opportunity for people to still make that call for peace and that’s something many people want to do.” Similarly, in 2002, demonstrations occurred in
Northern Ireland in opposition to violence as well as sectarianism. The trade unions arranged them. In Belfast, the ICTU’s Peter Bunting had this to say at the event: “To each and everyone of you in attendance here today, sectarianism is an evil, the one we must all combat at every opportunity, in our workplaces, societies, clubs and in our immediate and extended families.” The ICTU also arranged a protest in Belfast after a Catholic policeman was killed in 2011. At the Belfast event the ICTU’s Pamela Dooley declared “we will not permit the clock to be turned back.” Dooley defiantly went on to say that “As trade unionists, as workers and as members of our community we will strive to build that inclusive, just and equal society where all can work together without fear of intimidation, violence and death.”

The ICTU has also supported political progress. They supported the Good Friday Agreement and wanted people to back it at the polls. In 1998 the ICTU’s vice president Inez McCormack claimed that “We realise that the Agreement is a starting point for healing the wounds of 30 years of conflict and sets the framework around which new relationships can only be built with commitment and hard work. ICTU particularly welcomes the inclusion in the Agreement of provisions to ensure the promotion of equal opportunities, human rights, civil and social justice and the agenda of the disadvantaged.” Years later, in 2014, Peter Bunting, ICTU assistant general secretary, expressed the importance of the government making progress on key issues and areas in the North: “We are convinced that the people of Northern Ireland would like to see the NI Assembly concentrate on delivering decent public services, like schools and hospitals, while facilitating more and better jobs, especially for our young people.” Bunting also stated that “We want an economy that works for all. We want the promises of the Good
Friday Agreement and the St Andrews Agreement to be met. We want a shared society and we want a Bill of Rights to empower the citizens.”

The ICTU does not only cross the Irish border, but has connections internationally and is a supporter of Europe. It is affiliated with both the European Trade Union Confederation as well as the International Trade Union Confederation. The ICTU also wanted the UK to continue to be a member of the EU. The NIC put out ads and literature advocating continued participation in the EU, believing it was the best thing for working people, the economy, and peace. At the “Biennial Delegate Conference” of the NIC in the Spring of 2016, the motion to oppose leaving the EU was strongly supported. The Union of Shop, Distributive & Allied Workers (USDAW) “submitted” this motion. In the motion it was noted that “Thousands of jobs in Northern Ireland rely, directly or indirectly, upon close links with the EU. Conference expresses concern that exit from the EU could put these jobs at risk.” Furthermore, “Political and economic co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland facilitated and supported by both being members of the EU, helps to support the peace process. This co-operation benefits both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.” It was argued that “UK exit from the EU could disrupt the cross-border links and could undermine this important part of the peace process.” The motion appealed to “the Northern Ireland Committee to campaign in the run-up to the forthcoming referendum to urge workers in Northern Ireland to vote to remain in the EU.” The NIC did so and there was disappointment when the vote to leave was successful.
The Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA)

A longstanding organization that transcends traditional boundaries is the Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA). In existence since 1974, this is a group that those in Northern Ireland who have married outside their community can turn to for information as well as support. The organisation’s purpose is “Supporting couples who are united in love across traditional Christian divisions and promoting acceptance of these relationships within Northern Ireland society”. NIMMA has tried to increase clerical understanding of intermarriage, its associated issues as well as benefits, and attempts to positively impact communal perceptions towards such marriages or “relationships.” NIMMA also recognizes and focuses on the common Christian identity of both Protestants and Catholics, as opposed to emphasizing the divisions.

As an organization that has been around for over four decades, it has been estimated that NIMMA has provided aid to thousands of people. The organization has about 40 volunteers who "are active members who can be called upon to help others if necessary." According to NIMMA's Paul McLaughlin, "We do not have a general membership as such. The vast majority of couples/individuals who come to us are not interested in joining an ‘organisation’. They simply want their problem solved, their life made easier, someone to listen.”

Mixed marriage numbers have fluctuated over the years in Northern Ireland. It is believed by NIMMA that one out of 10 marriages crossed religious boundaries just prior to the onset of the conflict. There was a drop in Catholic-Protestant marriages in the years of violence. However, with the Troubles era being consigned to the past, mixed marriages are on the increase. Currently, it is safe to say that around 1 out of every 10
marriages are mixed in the North once again. In truth the numbers are likely a lot higher. Furthermore, a lot of individuals are partnered with people from across the religious divide, but have not married. 30

The importance and positive possibilities of intermarriage are clearly acknowledged and pointed out by NIMMA, thus demonstrating this organization’s support for interaction and unity amongst the people of the Province. In their pamphlet Getting Married, NIMMA points out that “Wherever you wish to get married remember that the marriage of an inter-church couple provides a wonderful opportunity to celebrate the richness of two traditions.” 31 For NIMMA as well, mixed marriage is a “method of reconciliation.” On their website NIMMA contends that marriage between different communities has the potential to bring about greater “understanding” as well as awareness or “knowledge”. NIMMA argues that: “These marriages, by the fact that they happen at all, can be a beginning of the reconciliation so needed in our community and are increasingly recognised as such by the main Churches and some political parties.” 32

The necessity of catering to the needs of those who are Catholic as well as those who are not, at the same time, means that, by definition, NIMMA’s activities must find and express a middle ground. 33 Their 34th conference, which took place March 21, 2009, is an example. It was held at St John’s Church, which is Church of Ireland, in Malone. This conference’s “theme” was “inter-church spirituality”. A Jesuit – Father Tom Layden – talked about “the shared spirituality in mixed marriage.” Ken Dunn, the chairman of NIMMA, noted that this theme as well as the scheduling of the conference was “particularly relevant to this time of year”. According to Dunn, “We had just
celebrated St Patrick’s Day and the saint’s central role in the shared spirituality of all Christians on this island, so it was appropriate that Fr Tom’s talk focussed on the sharing of the roots of our faith and their importance in mixed relationships.” Dunn’s portrayal of St Patrick – a person who is claimed by Catholics and Protestants – as a figure representative of a common Christianity in Ireland as a whole, is non-sectarian and takes an island-wide view, rather than focusing on North or South and the border that divides. Indeed, this conference was a mixture of both traditions, in the sense that the location was an Anglican church, the keynote speaker was a Catholic cleric, and the theme was concerned with sharing what was, and what could be, held in common.

NIMMA is very aware of the problems that intermarriages can bring about for people who undertake them and have tried to be helpful wherever possible. For example, the problems of intermarried people can be particularly difficult when it comes to settling into a home and NIMMA has been quite active in its support for mixed living areas. They saw the Shared Neighbourhood Programme, for instance, as a positive step, and claimed that they played a role in making it a reality. The programme’s goal was to "develop 30 shared neighbourhoods across the Province over a three year period." By being involved in the advocacy for mixed spaces, NIMMA is demonstrably seeking physically neutral ground or shared territory. They want to see spaces where people of different communities can dwell alongside each other without violence and fear. Such territory or space is a concrete expression of a middle ground and evidence of NIMMA’s Third Community status and vision.

NIMMA, like other Third Community organizations or representatives, avoids the use of obviously sectarian colour schemes and imagery on their website and in their
associated publications and pamphlets. NIMMA’s 2012 website included the key colours blue, white, and green. There was no attempt to use, together, green, white, and orange, which are the colours of the Irish Republic’s flag, or red, blue, and white, the colours of the Union flag. Even red and white, the colours of the traditional flag of Northern Ireland, were avoided. On NIMMA’s current website, the main colours are brown/grey. 39 Similarly, NIMMA’s logo is non-sectarian in both colour and image:

**Figure 13: NIMMA Logo (Present Version)**

The background of the logo is blue. The two “comma” style images are light blue (lower one) and green (top one). The “ni” is in green and the “mma” is in white. 40

The oval image is unifying; the two separate lines effectively become one, here, without losing their unique colours. It also should be noted that neither the green nor the two shades of blue in the logo are the traditional shades of these colours associated with the Irish or Union flags. The green is a lighter, seedling colour and the blues are much paler shades than what is found in the Union flag. 41 Another, apparently earlier, version of NIMMA’s logo, found in their pamphlet on baptism, is similar:

**Figure 14: NIMMA Logo (Earlier Version)**

The left side of the square is blue and the right side is purple. The oval is in white. The word “NIMMA” appears in blue. 42
It is clear that both versions of this logo are intended to show how two people who are different - Catholic and Protestant, in a mixed marriage context - can join together harmoniously without losing what makes them unique.

NIMMA’s on-line pamphlets use non-sectarian colour and image schemes as well. The pamphlet Introduction to NIMMA utilizes blue as its main colour, with green highlights and the NIMMA logo on the front and back. Also on the front is an image of a happy couple.

*Figure 15: Introduction to NIMMA (Pamphlet Image)*

Similarly, their Getting Married pamphlet’s main colour is a bright purple with green highlights. A photo of a happy couple on the front, and in the background on the inside of the pamphlet, emphasizes marriage as a positive event and, as in the introductory pamphlet, is an image that should appeal to both partners of a couple about to marry across communal boundaries. The NIMMA logo also appears on the front and back.

*Figure 16: Getting Married (Pamphlet Image)*
There is nothing divisive, political, or sectarian about the colours and images on these pamphlets.

**Integrated Education and its Advocates**

Notions about some form of shared or integrated education are not new in Ireland, North or South. They reach well back into the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ireland's Chief Secretary, Lord Stanley, set up a system of national schools in Ireland in 1831. The schools were supposed to "be managed by reputable people of both Catholic and Protestant faiths" and they were not supposed to "mix religious education with basic teaching." It was felt that children ought to be in class together, Catholics and Protestants, and "Religious instruction by clergy of each denomination would be separately facilitated." Although having Catholics and Protestants manage the schools together did not truly succeed, "there was a reasonable level of success in establishing a public system of primary education that transcended sectarian divisions." Over 50% of Ireland's primary schools contained Catholic and Protestant pupils in 1862.45

A similar struggle for integrated, "non-denominational" primary schooling took place in the North following partition, led by Minister for Education, Lord Londonderry. He brought in mixed primary schooling as well as ended "religious instruction" to try to make schools non-denominational.46 Under the Education Act (1923), "the Londonderry Act", religious education would be allowed solely outside of "school hours with parental consent."47 Unfortunately, Londonderry confronted strong resistance from Protestant and Catholic religious leaders. Protestants were opposed to the prohibition on religious education and did not want Catholic educators teaching at state schools. Catholic leaders opposed the legislation as it interfered with Catholic beliefs about education and the
importance of religion within it. Changes to the Act were made two years later and Londonderry stepped down in 1925. Once he was gone, education became "more sectarian".48

Northern Ireland developed and continues to have a divided education system. While Protestants of different denominations are often educated in the same school (controlled schools), Catholics are few in these schools, being taught mainly in Catholic schools (maintained schools), which have very few or no Protestant students.49 A lot of the schools in the controlled sector were once "Protestant church schools" that were "transferred to the state" following World War I. Controlled schools belong to the Department of Education and they are "managed by boards of governors and the education and library boards." The major Protestant churches, the "Transferors", continue to be connected to a lot of the controlled schools and are able to choose 4 out of 9 school governors for such schools. Officially "non-denominational," the schools are generally considered to be Protestant in outlook and ethos.50 Voluntary maintained schools have Boards of Governors as well. These boards are "nominated by trustees - mainly Roman Catholic." The Council for Catholic Maintained Schools is in charge of hiring teachers.51

From the 1970s on, however, advocates of integrated education in the Province have struggled to have children learn with one another, regardless of religious or ethnic background. Beginning in 1974, All Children Together (ACT) struggled to get religious and state authorities to make efforts to have children from different religious traditions attend "the same schools." When no real progress was made through official channels, parents themselves took action. A few parents who had "children at the age of transfer
from primary to secondary school”, backed by ACT, established Lagan College, "Northern Ireland's first planned integrated school," in September of 1981. It would take in children from all different religions and classes and is located in Belfast. At first, Lagan College did not get any money from the state. Parents provided funding to the best of their ability and efforts to raise money from elsewhere also took place. In 1984 the College achieved Maintained Status - "100% of running costs were met by the Department of Education and the College governors were responsible for 15% of capital expenditure." In 1991, Lagan College "became a Grant-Maintained Integrated School." All of Lagan's "costs, recurrent and capital, are now funded directly by the Department of Education for Northern Ireland." Integrated education has continued to develop over the years. Lagan College grew from 28 students the day it opened to 1,266 at the beginning of 2015. The Mission Statement of Lagan makes clear its cross-community ethos: "To educate to the highest standards the daughters and sons of Catholics, Protestants and others of goodwill, of all abilities, together." Currently there are 63 integrated schools in Northern Ireland, including primary and "second level schools" - those that began as integrated schools and schools that were not originally integrated but transformed to become so. Around "22,000 children [are] benefiting from Integrated Education." In 2014-2015, this amounted to 7% of Northern Ireland's non-university student population. Demand for integrated schooling continues to exist and around 700 youngsters annually are not able to procure "a place in Integrated Schools." In integrated schools, which are Christian rather than secular, Protestant children, Catholic children, and children belonging to other religions or who do not identify as
religious, are taught with each other. Teachers come from a variety of backgrounds as well. Furthermore, students learn about different faiths from around the world as well as humanist ideas. The religious needs of Catholic and Protestant pupils are met and "alternative provision will be made for those pupils whose parents do not wish them to participate in any religious activities or classes." 

Integrated education in Northern Ireland has support from several specialized bodies. The Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education was created in 1987. The NICIE has supported integrated education and played a role in the building of many schools over the years. The NICIE provides support to parents desiring their children to be educated with those of different backgrounds, to the schools themselves, and to schools wishing to become integrated. They also try to help schools wanting to recruit more students. The Integrated Education Fund (IEF) is also a source of support for integrated schooling. Created in 1992, its purpose was "to bridge the gap between the limited government money available for integrated schools and what was actually needed." The IEF provides monetary support for integrated education. NICIE has been represented on the IEF's Board of Trustees.

At the heart of the push for integrated education, however, have been the parents themselves. The IEF acknowledges this, pointing out that "The Integrated Education Movement is parent-led and open to everyone." In the 1980s alone, over 10 schools were established with the determination and assistance of parents. At times governmental and other authorities have claimed "that an integrated school would not be viable in a certain area" yet parents have pressed on, turning to the IEF for help, and successfully reached their goal of having an integrated school. Parental demand
continues. Today a lot of integrated schools do not have enough places for all of the pupils desiring to be educated in them.

**Humanist Groups and Progressive Thinkers**

The tiny but active humanist population in Northern Ireland offers an excellent example of progressive thinking within the larger movement towards a more pluralist vision of Northern Ireland exemplified by groups like APNI, the NIWC and the Greens. The Province is home to six humanist/atheist groups which reject adherence to a religion and embrace alternative views such as atheism and agnosticism and emphasize reason, human rights, and human needs. These organizations support a broad range of rights and diversity, including women's rights, LGBTQ rights, complex identities, integrated education, and middle ground politics. These groups include the Humanist Association of Northern Ireland, or Humani, the North Coast Humanists, the Queen's Humanist Society, the Belfast Humanist Group, Atheist Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Humanists. The latter group is "A section of the British Humanist Association." There is also a cross-border group, the Irish Freethinkers and Humanists, very recently established.

The two most prominent groups in recent years, the Belfast Humanist Group and Humani, advocate and emphasize what they consider to be human rights, interests and values, rather than those of any religion or political party. This focus was made clear in the following words from the homepage of the BHG’s website in 2009: “The Belfast Humanist Group is an organisation for people who do not believe in gods or goddesses, angels and demons, heavens and hells. Humanism is an approach to life based on reason and our common humanity.” Currently, the BHG characterizes itself on its website as
follows: "The Belfast Humanist Group is a small, friendly group who meet regularly to discuss matters of interest to people who think that the welfare and happiness of human beings depend on the decisions of free thinking people rather than religion." Similarly, Humani defines Humanism as follows: "Humanism is the belief that we can live good lives without religious or superstitious beliefs. Humanists make sense of the world using reason, experience and shared human values....We take responsibility for our actions and work with others for the common good." According to Humani: "We promote freethought, tolerance, compromise and community in a society dominated for so long by sectarian religious and nationalist ideologies."

At times their secular and human rights based outlook has placed humanists at odds with traditional religious morality and the Christian churches. For instance, humanists have backed abortion rights for women. Les Reid, writing for the Belfast Humanist Group in July of 2008, made it known that the Group supported “the proposal of the all-party Parliamentary group to extend abortion facilities to N Ireland.” Furthermore, Northern Ireland's main humanist organizations have a solid record of supporting gay and lesbian rights, despite traditional religious prohibitions and problems with homosexuality. For example, in a June 2008 press release, Les Reid, on behalf of the Belfast Humanist Group, argued that “Gay and lesbian people should be able to live freely in a liberal society as long as they respect the freedom of others. And the same goes for heterosexuals.” Humani, meanwhile, contends that it backs equal rights for homosexual, bisexual as well as transgendered individuals. Both the BHG and Humani participated in the 2011 Belfast Pride event. In short, the importance of human rights and freedoms takes precedence over religious and political divisions.
Humanists have also expressed support for non-sectarian education. This stance places them at odds with the traditional religious domination of education, supporting instead diversity and inclusion. As the BHG put it, under the heading “Humanist Education Policy”, in their “Statement submitted to the Religious Education Review” in 2004: “Humanists advocate a genuinely inclusive school system in which all pupils are educated together, not separately according to the beliefs of their parents.” As far as Reid and his fellow humanists were concerned, separating children of different faiths or backgrounds in different schools was “folly”, as education ought to encourage and sow peaceful and good relations. Similarly, Humani wants children to "be taught together in a loving, friendly and tolerant atmosphere." It is completely behind "integrated education" and provides links to the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education and the Integrated Education Fund.

Both Humani and the BHG as organizations have come out in support of a non-sectarian political approach in the North. A "third way" or a centre based solution is advocated by each humanist group. Humani, for its part, contends that the time has come "for a new, more cosmopolitan, type of politics for Northern Ireland, which looks beyond Orange and Green to a third discourse focused on the common good." They argue that Platform for Change aims to achieve this and provide a link to this group (which will be discussed below). Similarly, Les Reid, on behalf of the BHG, wrote about the problem of sectarianism in Northern Irish politics in February of 2010. According to Reid, the Province would remain mired in sectarianism as long as parties like Sinn Fein and the DUP dominated its politics. Reid, on behalf of the BHG, contended that what was required was "a coalition of the centre to outnumber the extremists." If they were able to
come together in a coalition, the UUP, SDLP, Greens, Alliance, as well as the Independents, would be able to take Northern Ireland "in a new direction."\textsuperscript{78}

In line with an opposition to sectarian "Orange and Green" politics, Northern Irish humanists demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with those in the Republic. The border does not appear to hold a great deal of political or ethnic significance in this respect. For example, Northern Irish and Irish humanists hold a yearly Summer School. The BHG has been involved in the Summer School, along with Humani as well as the Humanist Association of Ireland.\textsuperscript{79} It takes place in the Republic, at Carlingford. At the School event participants can listen to speakers, engage in discussions - in addition to taking part in recreational activities.\textsuperscript{80} This Summer School is evidence of an island-wide perspective, rather than a narrow territorial focus on North and South. The southern Irish humanists do not appear to be viewed as enemies or with suspicion by the Northern humanists, or vice versa.

Both Northern Irish and southern Irish humanists have proven able to cooperate closely in a literary fashion as well. \textit{Humanism Ireland} was established with the coming together of the southern Humanist Association of Ireland’s journal, \textit{The Irish Humanist}, and the Humanist Association of Northern Ireland’s journal, \textit{Humani}. This magazine is intended to cover and be read around the entire island. The editor points out that humanists “hope it [\textit{Humanism Ireland}] will raise the profile of Humanism from Malin Head to Mizen Head.”\textsuperscript{81} According to the editor, reflecting the complexity of Ireland is a goal of the magazine,\textsuperscript{82} as is providing an outlet and place for self-expression and discussion for the minority within Ireland who are not religious. The editor argues that “issues of concern to Humanists are much the same on either side of the Irish border”\textsuperscript{83}.
This emphasis on what is held in common by humanists transcends the divide between the Republic and Northern Ireland and between different cultures and ideas.

The BHG and Humani also demonstrate a willingness to look beyond Irish borders to connect with others in the British Isles generally and worldwide. For instance, the Belfast Humanist Group and Humani are "affiliated to the British Humanist Association." Furthermore, both Northern Irish groups participate in the Humanist Council of the Isles. According to Humani, this Council “is an annual meeting of humanist associations from across the UK and Ireland to discuss common objectives and exchange information on current work.” Finally, the BHG and Humani are "affiliated to the International Humanist and Ethical Union." Transcending traditional national or ethnic borders and interaction with other groups does not seem to be politically or ethically problematic for humanists in Northern Ireland.

As people who do not fit into either of the majority sectarian communities in the North, the BHG and Humani do not revere the iconic figures of these communities. Their heroes do not include the usual assortment of militants, martyrs, and mythological figures commonly associated with the Catholic and Protestant populations of Ireland. Rather, humanist heroes tend to be thinkers, intellectuals, and scientists, many of whom are not Irish at all. For example, Reid notes that “Many of the foremost scientists, writers and philosophers of today are Humanists”. Among those listed by Reid are British scientist Richard Dawkins, literary figures Salman Rushdie and Ian McEwan, and American philosopher Daniel Dennett. Meanwhile, Humani’s homepage has a continually shifting set of pictures of individuals they admire, accompanied by quotations from these people. They include the philosopher Socrates, scientists Charles Darwin, Richard Dawkins, and
Stephen Hawking, as well as Thomas Paine and Bertrand Russell. Thomas Paine is quoted by Humani, thus: “My country is the world, and to do good is my religion”. These words echo the broader, at times global, focus of Irish humanists as well as their emphasis on the importance of leading good lives and aiding one’s society and community, unhindered by divisions of nationality or creed. Similarly, Bertrand Russell's words "Remember your humanity and forget the rest" also emphasize the importance of seeing past arbitrary or outdated divisions to what is shared between people.88

Both Humani and the BHG pay particular attention to Darwin. Humani has a yearly Darwin Day Dinner around the time of Darwin's birthday. Humani claims that it wants Darwin Day to be "a public holiday". The Dinner includes a lecture. The 2011 lecture was about "The Origins of Life".89 Similarly, the BHG marked Darwin's birthday with an "Opinion poll on Evolution" in 2008 and have conducted a "Darwin Bicentennial Debate" entitled "The Science of Evolution has rendered Genesis obsolete."90 The focus on evolution and the "Origins of Life" naturally opposes a conflict over religion and nationality. Human beings share a biological, evolutionary origin and fighting over superficial differences and religious mythologies seems ridiculous in light of this fact. Thus, Darwin Day could be a public holiday that all people, regardless of background, could celebrate and enjoy - unlike July 12th, for example.

Humanists have even managed to create a non-sectarian, middle ground ritualistic space in a society known primarily for its divisive parades and demonstrations. For instance, baby-naming rituals (in lieu of the standard religious christenings or baptisms) generally are done at home, unlike traditional church christenings, and the ceremony is intended to allow the individuals who are “closest to the baby to express their love and
commitment formally, in the presence of family and friends.” The focus is on love and human connections, rather than on the link between a family and child and a religious faith or ethno-political community.91 Humanist marriages are similarly personal, secular affairs and may be done at National Trust Properties, hotels, and so forth, depending on what the couple wish. The Humanist celebrant assists in creating this ceremony. Once again, the focus is on the human beings involved, rather than on declaring a marriage and love before God in the traditional institutional space of a church (which would help define a couple as part of a specific community).92 Even funerals, a ritual that has a long and complex history in Ireland, can reflect a broader, more human ethos. According to Humani, the officiant meets with family members and then puts together “a tribute, and this, plus other tributes, poems and a piece of favourite music, form the basis of the ceremony”. A humanist funeral, rather than occurring in a church, generally takes place at the funeral home or crematorium.93 Like the other humanist rituals, funeral ceremonies center on the people being honoured and those who are there to support or show respect for them. Divisions of religion or politics have no obvious place in such rituals.

The websites for Humani and the Belfast Humanist Group avoid the use of divisive symbols. Overtly Irish or British political or cultural symbols are not used. Rather, Humani’s major symbol on its site in 2009 was that of two human figures, each with one arm around the other, while raising one arm each in the air.94 Comradeship and human connection were clearly suggested by Humani’s symbol, especially in the context of Ireland, which has a history of being in conflict or even at war with itself. Currently, a single figure with arms upraised is the main image found on Humani's website and was
also the key figure on the website of the BHG in 2012. This figure effectively emphasizes the humanist focus on human beings, rights, and issues.

The use of colour on the Northern Ireland humanist sites is also worth noting. While Humani did, in 2009, use a mainly red, white, and blue colour scheme – their main banner was blue, the text of the site was on a white background, and some of the text was printed in red - green was also included as a background colour for the headings of a number of sections, thus breaking up what could otherwise have been construed as a Union flag colour scheme. However, the use of orange was avoided – a colour associated with the anti-Catholic Orange Order. On its current site, Humani continues to use blue as a main colour and uses a variety of colours for text - including green, blue, red, even purple. Similarly, the colours for the Belfast Humanist Group’s site in 2012 were basically blue (a paler blue than what is seen on the Union flag) on a white background with black text. Currently, the site is not a colourful one, using blue, black and grey text on a white background. Thus, whether deliberate or not, there is little in terms of image or colour scheme that is offensive or partisan on either of these sites.

**Platform for Change**

Platform for Change was a recent manifestation of the Third Community in Northern Ireland and extended beyond the humanist population to embrace humanists and others who took a more progressive and liberal view towards politics in the region. It started in 2009; the people behind it were "non-partisan activists and thinkers". It was a "democratic organisation" and those who belonged to it ran it and funded it. Their platform, in essence, aimed at a Northern Ireland where the government and its elected members were willing to work with each other to serve everyone in Northern Ireland
(they wanted "a genuine power-sharing coalition") and where politics was not about scoring sectarian points or protecting sectarian interests. They wanted a "normal" political life for Northern Ireland, where everyone was served well by politicians and genuine discussion and debate about issues important for all citizens could take place without the hindrance of political impasse between essentially sectarian parties and agendas. Among Platform for Change's signatories were humanists Brian McClinton and Les Reid and writer Glenn Patterson. Other prominent individuals signed as well from various groups and sectors of society. Among these were Steven Agnew of the Green Party, ex-rugby star Trevor Ringland, Edna Longley and poet Michael Longley, academic Dominic Bryan, Women Together activist Anne Carr, and APNI politician Stephen Farry. It was a truly diverse group with pluralist aims.

Although Platform for Change came to an end in November of 2014, it served to draw attention to a number of issues in Northern Ireland politics and society. It hosted "panel discussions" that addressed controversial topics, such as flags, education, and politics, and included participants from various backgrounds and areas of expertise. Participants on such panels included Green Party MLA Steven Agnew, academic Edna Longley, John O'Doherty of the Rainbow Project, which focuses on the well being of LGBTQ people in the North, representatives of the Churches, and other political parties and organizations. Since 2010, Platform for Change has released a number of documents and submissions, in an effort to catch the attention of area politicians. In the course of 2010-2014, Platform for Change supported publication of a Bill of Rights, the removal of Peace Walls, reconciliation, and an end to community designation in politics/the Assembly.
**Conclusion**

The Third Community at grassroots level has pushed traditional boundaries as it struggles to create a more modern and forward thinking Northern Ireland. Advocates for workers from all backgrounds, those in mixed marriages, supporters of integrated education, humanists, and reformers have, each in their own way, fought for a pluralist society. They desire a Northern Ireland where differences, political or otherwise, are not cause for division, violence, or inequality. The NIC and ICTU recognize the common needs of all workers in Northern Ireland and the South. They have made efforts to support peace and equality for people, regardless of background. Intermarried couples, meanwhile, and those who support them, have shown that religious differences are not insurmountable to living peacefully together and have helped bring about shared space in Northern Ireland. Similarly, supporters of integrated education have successfully managed to bring together children belonging to different religious traditions as well as the non-religious on a daily basis in schools that cater to pupils' common needs and their unique backgrounds. Even humanists, while abhorring religious privilege, advocate human rights and personal freedoms and a politics that serves all citizens. Most recently, Platform for Change harnessed the passions of moderates from across the spectrum in an effort to create a modern and ethical society. All of the groups and individuals in this chapter are prepared to live peacefully with difference and diversity.
CHAPTER 7
CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN'S LAND":
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY
PART 1: MUSIC AND LITERATURE

In a discussion of culture in Northern Ireland it is important to understand both the meaning of "culture" as well as the importance and role of pluralism within the Province. Here "culture" refers to "the beliefs, customs, [and] arts" of the people of Northern Ireland. This includes both "high" and "popular" culture. High culture can be defined as that which the elite create and enjoy, "the elite speaking to the elite". This can include certain types of literature, such as some poetry, that are more likely to be enjoyed by those who have received a higher education or who have grown up in an environment where they have been exposed to the "arts". Popular culture, by definition, is more widespread in terms of accessibility and enjoyment. It has been argued that the market is key in popular culture. An album that is popular is purchased by a lot of people, for instance. The acclaim of an authority or musical expert is not needed. Boundaries can be crossed between cultures, however, as a piece of opera music (which could be considered high culture) might appear in a popular film. Also, high and low in society can share certain passions, such as football or Gaelic games.

The question of identity is also an important one. People are pluralistic - they have more than one identity - and their most fundamental identity is not actually the "nation." As Stern has pointed out in his "proto-theory of national loyalty and sacrifice," "nationhood is not a primordial condition" - basic and fundamental in human life. According to Stern, "human groups are primordial," but "nations are imagined communities" rather than the "primary group". Human beings are connected most
fundamentally to "family and community." Today societies are complicated, though, and people are connected to a lot of groups and they all on occasion offer needed "services." Getting people behind a war or other national effort means that the "national identity" has to "preempt" "other group identities." Successful national mobilization takes place when "the claims of other identities" go unnoticed. When the nation is made to stand for or represent "family and community", for instance, it can allow strong feelings to develop and a willingness to sacrifice to arise among the people - even when such goes against what is best for oneself and one's family. Leaders and nationalists generally depict the nation in familial terms - "blood" or "sons of Ireland", "our people." Community terms are used, too - "homeland", "Jewish community." National identity is also able to overcome "other identities" when nations are "personalized" and are made to represent or stand for the individual. Then "international relations are interpersonal relations."³ Thus, the Ireland-Britain and North-South dynamic in Irish politics becomes even more powerful.

Cultural activities, however, can actually create and reinforce pluralism among those involved. Through music, literature and sport, people express and emphasize identity and offer interpretations and criticisms of their world. In the cultural realm in Northern Ireland there are those who place their identity as performers, creators, and competitors ahead of notions of nationality, religion, and even ethnicity. Thus, the crossing of boundaries and the struggle to find and exist in a "middle ground" is apparent in Northern Irish high and popular culture. Musicians and writers challenge or even rewrite traditional mythologies in their work. At times, they challenge them by defiantly refusing to acknowledge sectarian boundaries and appealing to what is shared by their
audience or their fans. Sports teams and bodies, meanwhile, do not always respect national divisions and borders. Instead, they cross them, at times shifting identities in order to pursue their athletic lives as far as they are able.

**Music**

**Classical and Chamber Music**

Northern Ireland has an impressive history of classical and chamber music performance featuring artists from both communities and abroad. Classical organizations and musicians have generally placed membership in a musical community ahead of nationality and sectarian identity. They have crossed boundaries, creating a mainly non-aligned cultural space and artistic identity. For example, the Belfast Music Society traces its origins to 1921, when it was "a branch of the British Music Society," and supports "classical chamber music" in Northern Ireland. The BMS has an "Equal Opportunities Policy" - they "are committed to....securing fair participation for Catholics and Protestants." They have a tradition of arranging performances involving talented artists from Northern Ireland, Europe, and elsewhere. Performers have played works by the likes of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Rachmaninov, Ravel, and others. Every year, from 2005 on, the International Festival of Chamber Music has taken place, with the BMS as hosts. The first Festival showcased the talents of London’s Nash Ensemble and China’s Xue Fei Yang (who plays classical guitar) with pieces by Mozart, Schubert, Strauss, Scarlatti and Tarrega. The 2015 Festival continued to include UK and international performers with appearances by the Piatti Quartet (UK) and Alexander Melnikov, a Russian piano player. These artists performed the music of Mozart, Brahms, Schubert, and others.
The BMS's Night Music series, meanwhile, consists of concerts showcasing artists from Northern Ireland and the South. In 2014, the featured artists were the Altissimo Quintet, Carol McGonnell with Finghin Collins, and Ioana Petcu-Colan. The Altissimo Quintet is a Dublin based quintet and they performed works by Northern Irish born, but Dublin-residing, Stephen Gardner, as well as the Englishman, Vaughan Williams. According to the Ralph Vaughan Williams Society, Williams "composed music notable for its power, nobility and expressiveness, representing, perhaps, the essence of ‘Englishness’!" McGonnell and Collins, a clarinet player and pianist, respectively, are both Dubliners, while Petcu-Colan is a native of Cork. The latter's background is Romanian and in 2014 she was "associate leader of the Ulster Orchestra." In 2015 the Hard Rain Soloist Ensemble, a Belfast based group, was featured in Night Music. Among the pieces played was *Sliabh Geal gCua*, written by Northern Ireland native pianist Ryan Molloy in 2012. There is clearly a willingness within the BMS and among its featured performers to showcase talent irrespective of national boundaries, musical or otherwise. Old and new work is performed, including international classics, English, and Irish pieces.

Another Northern Ireland musical group, the Studio Symphony Orchestra, has been around since 1947 when it was established in Belfast. It allows amateur musicians the chance to perform different music. They perform the music of artists from various countries. The SSO has performed around the North and in Dublin. They have performed in settings associated with both communities - for example, Joanmount Methodist Church, Shankill Leisure Centre, as well as St Agnes Parish Hall in Andersonstown. The SSO has performed in St Patrick's Church in Belfast, a Catholic
Church, with the Renaissance Singers. They performed Berlioz's *L'enfance du Christ*. The SSO has also put on *St Matthew Passion* (Bach) at St Anne's Cathedral (Church of Ireland). Classical columnist Rathcol has pointed out that "A commendable feature nowadays is the use of churches for classical music." As venues, churches can provide a suitable atmosphere and acoustics and the SSO willingly performs in Protestant and Catholic houses of worship, placing such musical considerations ahead of sectarian concerns.

Among the most well known classical performance organizations is the Ulster Orchestra, which has been around since 1966. The UO then had "37 international players" and their conductor was an Englishman named Maurice Miles. The UO is currently made up of local and international talent, with Rafael Payare of Venezuela the Chief Conductor. The UO has no problem crossing boundaries. They have travelled the British Isles and abroad, including the Republic. Auditioning musicians are not queried as to their religions. While "the information has to be acquired sooner or later in accordance with Northern Ireland's equal opportunities laws", UO chief executive, David Fisk, has noted that it basically comes down to completing forms - "And if a player chooses to have no religion, that's perfectly O.K." In short, the UO is open to players from both communities and abroad, the main focus and criteria being a person's musical talent, not their national or ethnic identity.

Attempts to reach and acknowledge all sides in Northern Ireland is characteristic of the UO. Fisk noted in 2001 that "When the Royal Philharmonic Society award for education was set up...the orchestra won it straight away for a project that brought together children from the Falls and Shankill Roads. Now we go everywhere. There are
26 local authorities in the Province...and we work with them all." The UO Board has even had a Sinn Fein member on it and Paisley and McGuinness have attended UO performances. Notably, in 2000, a concert took place in honour of "the new Millenium and the Centenary of the Clonard Monastery [sic]" and the UO performed. Gerry Adams was in attendance. Clonard is a Catholic monastery of Redemptorist monks and priests! In 2008, the UO performed with Sinead O'Connor, one of the Republic's most well known artists, and in 2013 they honoured Catholic Northern Irish poet Seamus Heaney, following his passing. The UO truly places musical and artistic community ties above religious and national borders.

Among the most notable performances the UO has been part of was the 2013 performance of "The Relief of Derry Symphony". The piece's history and 2013 staging strove towards a vision of a unified community, rather than simply reflecting divided and warring national allegiances. The symphony is the work of Protestant Northern Irish composer, Shaun Davey. Derry "commissioned" this symphony in the late 1980s and it was staged at the Guildhall in 1990 in remembrance of the 1689 Siege of Derry. According to Davey, "the whole piece was originally written to commemorate not celebrate [italics mine] the Relief of Derry....I needed to mark the tercentenary without alienating anyone." Indeed, a celebratory approach would have been more in line with the loyal orders and anti-Catholic sentiment, represented by the Apprentice Boys and their Relief of Londonderry Parade, which takes place annually in August. Instead, the Symphony permitted both sides of the community to be involved and the audience was mixed at the original 1990 performance. After this, the Symphony was performed in
Dublin. Derry and Dublin's Mayors attended as did representatives from Derry's local Council.25

Despite its original official name, "The Relief of Derry Symphony" has since become known as The Symphony of Peace."26 Indeed, in 2013 the symphony was performed in an old "British Army barracks in Ebrington which has become a symbol of change from conflict to peace."27 At the 2013 performance, Liam O'Flynn (a native of the Republic and a friend of Shaun Davey) played the Uilleann pipes with the UO. A huge drum as well as harp could be seen onstage - the former a symbol of the Protestant/unionist community and the latter a symbol of the Catholic/nationalist community.28 Clearly, music and the UO are more concerned with crossing lines of division than with upholding them.

There are other smaller musical groups and organizations in the North that also embrace a cross-community, pluralist ethos. Rebekah Durston established the Ballymena Chamber Orchestra in 2006. It is made up "of professional musicians, teachers and interested amateurs and...[has] an educational, inter-generational and cross-community focus."29 In addition, there is the Walled City Music Festival, established in 2008.30 Dr Cathal Breslin and Dr Sabrina Hu set up the Festival. Breslin is a pianist from Northern Ireland and Hu is a flautist from the U.S. The aim of Breslin and Hu "is to give audiences and young musicians the inspiration and artistic opportunities that Cathal did not have when growing up in Derry during the Troubles--ultimately to create a brighter future for the next generation." Workshops take place as part of the festival as well as classes and opportunities to meet the performers.31 Breslin and Hu want "to inspire the youth and communities from all backgrounds." They want people in Northern Ireland
and the South to come to the Festival. A further goal of Walled City Music is "bringing outstanding classical music making to the heart of cultural life in Derry." The Festival has drawn musicians from a variety of countries and Walled City Music continues to be active in supporting music through workshops and concerts. Once again, the focus is on nurturing and supporting a shared musical and cultural community and identity, regardless of Irish and even international borders and divisions.

Classical groups and musicians have been involved in community work, demonstrating a concern for the welfare of local people on all sides and for international causes. For instance, in 1998, a concert to benefit Omagh bombing victims took place at the Waterfront Hall. The Ulster Orchestra participated. In 1999 *The Messiah* was performed in Carrickfergus at Downshire School. It was described as "a cross-community performance." Funds raised would help the Northern Ireland Hospice Children's Service as well as the "St Coleman's parish church [Church of Ireland] restoration fund." The performance included an "orchestra and well known soloists." Similarly, the Ulster Orchestra and Belfast Philharmonic Choir performed to help the MS Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 2000. Furthermore, the BMS Chair, musician Elizabeth Bicker, was one of the arts representatives to the Civic Forum in 2000. The following year, the SSO was involved with A Choral Jamboree. It involved three choirs from the North and six southern choirs. It would benefit "Peace and Reconciliation, administered by Co-operate Ireland." In 2012, the UO and The Priests - three Catholic clerics who sing classical pieces - together put on a performance to aid Haiti. The three singing clergymen are Northern Ireland natives. Recently, in 2015, A Concert for Paris was performed at St Patrick's Cathedral (Dublin). The UO and RTE
Concert Orchestra (Dublin based) participated. It is clear that musicians are prepared to play together for the benefit of people in general, rather than for one local ethnic group or nation in particular.

There is no doubt that the classical and chamber music community in Ireland is very fluid and cosmopolitan and capable of seeing past traditional "Orange" and "Green" identities. Musicians are more than willing to transgress national and religious boundaries in order to pursue their love of music and prioritize their identity as musicians and composers. For example, Havelock Nelson was among the SSO's founders. A Corkman by birth, Nelson was an OBE (since 1966), a pacifist, and a Quaker. He was a lover of opera, classical music, and Irish music. He attended Trinity College and the Royal Irish Academy of Music. Fionnuala Hunt, a Belfast native and violinist, was director of the Irish Chamber Orchestra for a time and under her tenure the orchestra were to put on a concert "with the School of Music at Queen's" consisting of various classical pieces. Hunt's alma maters include the Ulster College of Music as well as London's Royal College of Music. Deirdre Gribben, another Belfast native and composer, went to school along the Falls Road and used to go to UO performances as a child. The UO performed one of her works, which was "commissioned from her." The piece was called "Unity of Being". Gribben saw it as her "peace anthem - a hope for a better future." According to Gribben, "the sense of unity I want to convey is that of Northern Ireland: neither Ireland, nor Britain, but a place with its own distinct identity." Composer Shaun Davey, Belfast native, Protestant, and Dublin dweller, provides yet another example - Tara Music noting that "it is perhaps part of Shaun's persona to cross boundaries. He has chosen, in his concert works, to explore the turning points in Irish History, celebrating
that which unites rather than divides the Celtic people. Large numbers of the music loving public are prepared to take this journey with him." People have responded with great enthusiasm to his "Concerto for Uilleann Pipes and Orchestra" and his "Relief of Derry Symphony," among other works. Finally, Ruth McGinley, pianist and Derry native, attended the Royal Irish Academy of Music in Dublin as well as London's Royal College of Music. McGinley has performed around Europe and has played with both the Ulster Orchestra and Ireland's RTE Concert Orchestra. These artists and players provide merely a few examples of what appears to be standard practice in classical music circles in Ireland. Musicians perform and nurture music wherever they are welcomed and attend schools in Northern Ireland, the Republic, and mainland Britain, as opportunities arise.

Traditional Music

Northern Ireland is home to a variety of other musical types and styles, one of them being "traditional music". According to Fintan Vallely, this music can be considered "the dance music, forms of dance and style of songs that were the one-time entertainment of rural people prior to urbanisation and the development of mass forms of entertainment." There is a real oral element to traditional music, too - how it is passed on. Such music can be heard in the North of Ireland, the South, as well as among Irish emigrant communities in other countries and has a long history among the people.

Although the majority of Protestants within the North consider "traditional" Irish music as Catholic, there is a truly shared musical heritage in Northern Ireland. To begin with, there have been and are Protestants involved with traditional music. Some are unionist or even loyalist. For example, James Perry was a Northern Protestant musician
and he performed music prior to as well as following the 1950s "revival" era. He played fiddle, flute and fife. According to Perry's daughter, "He played all types of music and played for Irish nights, Orange Dances, Irish dancers and classical musical evenings."

Perry's fife music collection includes a number of tunes that can be found around Ireland as well as further afield. Among these, the "sectarian" tunes are rare, except for maybe "The Boyne Water". According to Cooper, "many, perhaps the majority, of these tunes have been the common currency of performers for many years, whether Catholic or Protestant, Unionist or Nationalist, and...they would generally not in themselves have been the source of discord, though the manners and context of their performance (and more specifically, the lyrics associated with them) may well have been." Similarly, Robert Cinnamond, a singer from Ulster, who died in 1968, performed songs from both sides of the community. According to Cooper, Cinnamond's religion as well as "cultural background cannot be determined from his repertoire, and this is a characteristic that is shared by many Ulster traditional singers." More recent Protestant interest and participation in traditional music has been noted by musician Willie Drennan (a Northern Irish Protestant himself): "Since coming back to Northern Ireland in 1997, after 21 years of absence, I have witnessed an amazing revival of traditional concerts, soirees and festivals within the Protestant community. Traditional music, along with singing and storytelling is a key element at these functions which often see halls being packed." According to Vallely, Protestant musicians belong to every profession. They can be found in the prison system as well as the police.

There is also the reality that music cannot be readily separated into various traditions as it moves with people and does not respect borders. Fintan Vallely rightly
points out that "Traditional music....is the product of much mixing and blending of the music traditions of all these islands." A lot of tunes exist that are played in Northern Ireland, Southern Ireland, and Scotland. Music from Northern England has similarities with Irish as well as Scottish music, too. Also, "As far back as the seventeenth century, dance music structures in England...were similar to what was practised in Scotland and Ireland." The dance music in Ireland in the latter 1800s as well as first part of the 1900s has similarities and "overlap[s] with" music from Scotland.55

Furthermore, Irish song "owes much to the Lowland Scots and English ballad traditions."56 According to Sam Hanna Bell, "the main stream of our Ulster folk-songs has its source in the Gaelic Irish tradition, but it has been enriched and widened by two important tributaries, Scots and English'." There are a lot of songs that are sung or performed in various places in the British Isles, including Ireland. For instance, "'The [or My] Bonny Labouring Boy'". This song is apparently well liked in the South of England and in Northern Ireland.57 Another song, "'Rakish Paddy'", is an Irish song which can be found in old "Scottish collections" under the title "'Cabar Feigh'", meaning "The Deer's Horn." Similarly, "'The Shanghai'", which is an "Orange marching tune", as well as the "'Boys of Tandragee'", an Irish song, and "'The Swallow's Tail'", a reel, are basically one song. "'The Shanghai" can be heard in ballad form in Scotland as "'The Shearin." Ballads from Scotland moved around Ireland, especially in northern areas.58 Indeed, the melody which is generally called "'The Wearing of the Green'" has its origins with Scotsman James Oswald, who died in 1769. He was also a Freemason. "The Wearing of the Green" is considered a nationalist song.59
Various tunes or songs are enjoyed by both sides within the North, albeit sometimes with separate lyrics. For instance, "The Wearing of the Green" tune has been used by loyalists, too, using different words. Another example of musical crossover is "On The Relief of the City," which is an "Orange" song. Yet its melody is that of "Erin Go Bragh", which means "Ireland Forever", a melody which has potentially English roots as well. "Erin Go Bragh" was also a phrase used by the United Irishmen. It could be seen on certain United Irish flags, under a harp. Another example is offered by "The Bould Orange Heroes of Comber", a loyalist song. "Come Out Ye Black and Tans" (or "Lanes of Killeshandra"), is republican. They are the same tune. Similarly, the Irish song "Mo Ghile Mhear" is Dublin's "The Spanish Lady" as well as "Sons of Levi", which is a Protestant song. The "drinking song" "Olain Punch" and "Lurgan Town", an "Orange song," use one melody. The latter deals with an Orange parade that was prohibited during the mid nineteenth century. Tunes taken from elsewhere, too, like the US, are also used by both sides, with different words. George Root of America wrote "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp the Boys are Marching" in 1863. The Fenians used it. "God Save Ireland" was written by T.D. Sullivan in 1867 using this tune. "No Pope, Priest or Holy Water" is the Orange version. In short, according to Brian Mullen, "when it comes to music and song you can't talk in terms of two traditions. There's either one tradition or there's a million traditions - it's shared."

Instruments also cross borders and boundaries. The Highland bagpipes as well as the Uilleann pipes have been played in Ulster for hundreds of years. Catholics and Protestants have performed on the "Great Highland Bagpipes." The Royal Scottish Pipe Band Association has a "Northern Ireland branch." There were over "90 bands" in this
branch in 2007. There is also an Irish Pipe Band Association. In 2007 it had 35 bands. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the past, the Lambeg drum, considered an "Orange" or loyal instrument, was part of AOH parades.64 Also, Protestants have steered clear of the bodhran in the past, considering it an instrument of the other side and, indeed, it is an iconic emblem of Traditional Irish music. Yet, lately, it has appeared in Protestant groups. Willie Drennan, a Protestant, for example, plays both the bodhran as well as the Lambeg.65

Further evidence of a shared musical tradition also exists. David Cooper remembers some traditional Irish performers, whose background was nationalist, performing at Cliftonville Moravian Church Hall.66 During the pre-Troubles era in Belfast, a witness remembers that "'Coaches Street was a little dance hall which was on the border [between the Shankill and the Falls roads]. Both Protestants and Catholics went to Coaches Street. They would'a played Traditional music, all types...You had the Irish Traditional music, which we all hum and sing, there was no problem.'" Indeed, as far as a lot of "Traditional" songsters are concerned, "a good song is a good song" no matter what their own politics are. Says one musician "'I play Irish music because I like it. It wouldnae care if Pope John wrote me a hornpipe, I wouldnae care if Ian Paisley was to write me a jig...I only play the stuff I love.'" According to a Protestant musician, a Canon Cahill wanted him and others to perform "The Sash" in a locality that was Catholic. They did so!67

There have also been times when Protestants have defended traditional music, providing additional evidence that, at least among some, the music is regarded as theirs as well. In the early 1990s, Orange Order Director, George Patton, stated "'The perception I
suppose is that Traditional music is associated with republicanism...And it's not! But it takes you a wee while to get that out of your mind.'" A revealing incident took place several years after this. Traditional music was being played in County Down at the Jolly Judge bar on August 25 of 1993. Loyalists put a bomb in the rear of the bar. The Red Hand Commando said they were responsible and stated that places where traditional music was performed were fair game for militant actions, belonging as they did to the "'pan-nationalist front'." People who played traditional music in Down as well as Antrim responded with great anger that this group believed that Catholics alone performed this music. Unionist political representatives became involved. Wilbert Magill of the DUP, who played the Lambeg drum, argued "'Does this mean that if someone sings The Green Glens of Antrim, Danny Boy or The Mountains of Mourne, he is republican-oriented? The thing is ludicrous.'" The Red Hand Commando actually pulled their warning a day later. The loyalists did not remove their threat due to the fact that the majority of those performing in that place belonged to the Protestant community. They did so because "a genuine goodwill towards music, as music," was expressed by Protestant leaders in the area.68

Finally, there are members of both communities who play and make music together outside the political realm. For example, unionist Rois Ni Ogain and some fellow Protestants were very important in arranging the initial "Feis na nGleann in the Glens of Antrim." This occurred in 1904. The event was backed by unionists as well as nationalists.69 The purpose of the Feis was the preservation as well as celebration of Irish music, language, sport, and arts. It is still held today, with Feis na nGleann 2015 taking place in July.70 More recently established, the Counties Derry and Antrim Country
Fiddlers Association had and has performers from both sides performing together. The Association was established in 1953, but has roots in the 1940s. Among those who created it were Orangeman Alex Kerr and republican Mickey McIlhatton. Those in it included Catholics and Protestants. They played for charity within church halls on both sides as well as in Orange halls and Hibernian venues. Frequently singers would be present, too.\(^{71}\) The Association remains very active and makes it clear that it is “absolutely non-sectarian and non-political.”\(^{72}\)

There is also the all-Ireland (and beyond) Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (CCE) who, in 1956, incorporated Northern Ireland into its orbit. The CCE aims to protect as well as encourage the performance and learning of traditional Irish music. There are Protestants in the CCE.\(^{73}\) It is true that, on occasion, the CCE has behaved in a way that upset Protestant players. The All-Ireland Fleadh was called off by the CCE in 1971 after Internment. According to one individual:

> Internment was the first real hurt, when Comhaltas cancelled the All-Ireland Fleadh. Protestant Ulster musicians and singers were up in arms at the time....We felt that the position which we had taken, that the limb which we had put ourselves on, had just been cut off by Comhaltas, who had made a political statement when no political statement should have been made in terms of the music. I had good friends interned, people with whom I never would agree with politically were, musically, firm friends.\(^{74}\)

It is nonetheless significant that Protestants have belonged and continue to belong to the CCE, placing their musical identity and love for performing ahead of religion and nationality.

**Popular Music**

Popular music also has a history of being a shared scene in Northern Ireland. Showbands, for example, dominated the music scene around Ireland during the 1960s and
their popularity was not confined by the border.\textsuperscript{75} Showband devotee Father Brian D'Arcy, who would enjoy as many as forty dances every week, recalls that, prior to the summer of 1975, "bands played anywhere and everywhere."\textsuperscript{76} They covered American as well as British popular songs.\textsuperscript{77} According to D'Arcy, Catholics and Protestants, Northern Irish musicians as well as those from the Irish Republic, could be found in showbands. Indeed, three Miami Showband members, for instance, were natives of Northern Ireland and the other three came from the Republic. Two were Catholic, three were Presbyterian, and one was Anglican. Unfortunately, this relaxed cross border and cross-community environment changed when, at the end of July in 1975, three Miami Showband performers were killed by the UVF.\textsuperscript{78} Musical performer Ronnie Greer notes that "Up until then, all musicians enjoyed a free pass - we weren't targets for any organisation and we had no bother travelling anywhere". D'Arcy recalls that the "heart went completely out of the community after the massacre."\textsuperscript{79} It brought a halt to "the cross-border showband scene." Northern Ireland became labelled as unsafe for bands and groups to travel to and play in, including rock acts from Britain. While this did not last, "the showband scene - already waning in 1975 - was never the same again."\textsuperscript{80}

On the positive side, local music creation grew during the latter 1970s within the North, in particular, punk. In 1977 The Clash came to Belfast, marking, in the opinion of many, punk's appearance and growth as a "subculture" within the province.\textsuperscript{81} This occasion assisted and encouraged a number of punk groups in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{82} According to Joe Strummer of The Clash in 1976, "'we're anti-fascist, we're anti-violence, we're anti-racist and we're procreative. We're against ignorance.'" Such sentiments were appealing within the context of the North.\textsuperscript{83} Campbell and Smyth have argued that "punk
in Northern Ireland...supplied 'a two-fingered salute' to the 'politicians', the 'authorities',
and the 'paramilitaries' too." The "establishment", as far as punks in Northern Ireland
were concerned, included the previous generation. They were against "the status quo"
and the militants who had made everyday life miserable. As McLoone puts it, "Punk was
a third space beyond the fixed binaries of these opposing forces." Indeed, in Shellshock
Rock (1979), a movie by John T. Davies that covered punk in the North, one punk argued
that 2,000 people dying had brought no gains: "Who wants a united Ireland? Who wants
to be in the United Kingdom or anything?""

Punk was very much alive in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. It offered a
rare scene for people from both sides to be in contact with each other. There were
"'kids from Catholic and Protestant areas mixing together freely...without fear or
intimidation'." Henry McDonald recalled the police stopping him and other punks in
Belfast in 1978. According to McDonald, "'It must have been the first time since 1969
that he [the police officer] had encountered a large group of youths from working-class
republican and loyalist areas that were not trying to kill each other.'" Similarly, Deb, in
2011, noted "'the p-stops, their faces when we used to reveal the places we lived. We'd
crossed the divides, we didn't care so it was such a geg that they did.'" According to one
witness "'punk transcended religion.'" Singer for The Defects, Ian Murdock, claimed
"'All the punks got on really well. Both Protestants and Catholics, the only real religion
was punk.'" Sean O'Neill claimed "punk provided a third tradition, a new religion, an
alternative way of life. During the darkest days of the Troubles, punk brought together
kids from both religions to venues where the most important thing was that you were a
punk, not which side of the political divide you were born into [italics Stewart's]." For
these youth, punk offered a separate primary identity that operated in defiance of traditional sectarian groups and nationalities.

Certain home-grown bands became well known in the North and resisted the pull of the status quo and sectarianism. For example, Stiff Little Fingers was a band out of Belfast. Initially they played punk covers. Gordon Ogilvie, a journalist from England, saw an SLF show. He encouraged SLF "'to write their own songs based on life in Northern Ireland'". He would help in creating the lyrics. In 1978 "Alternative Ulster" came out, their most famous song. Paul Muldoon, Northern Irish poet, has approved of its "'well-judged, and justifiable rage'". In the song, the band cried out against "the RUC dog of repression" and asked "Is this the only life we're gonna have?" They went on to declare that "What we need is / An Alternative Ulster". SLF chose to oppose those who supported violence. They attacked the militants as well as "state forces".

Ultimately, though, what they really seemed to want was for youth of both communities to have some room. In "Suspect Device" (1979) they sang "They take away our freedom / In the name of liberty / Why don't they all just clear off / Why won't they let us be". SLF were Protestant and, still, youth from both communities went to their concerts in Belfast.

Another "Protestant" band called Ruefrex came out of "a loyalist area of North Belfast." Ruefrex was established during the latter 1970s. According to Allan Clark, Ruefrex singer, "our message has always been anti-sectarian." The band played in Protestant localities as well as Catholic ones. Their 1979 song "Cross the Line" included the words "I'm gonna be out front, gonna blaze a trail / I'm gonna cross that line...Revolutions start when someone crosses the line." 1985's "Wild Colonial Boy"
opposed Irish American backing for the violence of republican paramilitaries. The band also took action on behalf of mixed schooling. Campbell and Smyth note that "by the mid-1980s the band were at the forefront of a fund-raising concert for Lagan Valley College, the first integrated school for Catholic and Protestant youngsters in Northern Ireland."  

Not many punk bands directly addressed the Troubles, however. This is perhaps not surprising considering that a 1994 "radio series" called Rockin' the North had a majority of long time punk interviewees claim that the music's purpose or goal was to get away from Northern Ireland's conflict. The Undertones, for instance, were Catholic and came out of Derry. They did not say much at all about the Troubles in their music. They focussed on ordinary life, being a teenager. Indeed, their initial single was called "Teenage Kicks" and the first song on the band's second record was entitled "More Songs About Chocolate and Girls". The lyrics included the words "Sit down relax / And cancel all other engagements / It's never too late to enjoy / Dumb entertainment." The Undertones' music provided the band and those who enjoyed them with "utter escapism!", to quote Undertones singer Feargal Sharkey. Sharkey claimed in 1990 that "People used to ask early on why we didn't write songs about the troubles: we were doing our best to escape from it." Indeed, some in Derry in the 1970s were distrustful of or unfriendly to The Undertones as they did not appear willing to go along with "what was expected and what was imposed upon them almost as a sort of communal duty to be part of the Bogside and the Bogside struggle". According to McLoone, "In a way, 'Teenage Kicks', by being about the ordinary, was an extremely political statement in the highly charged, extraordinary atmosphere of Northern Ireland at the time." Youth of
all traditions could and did enjoy such music, identifying as teenagers and punks, regardless of background.

Outside of punk, certain bands were also known to cross boundaries and draw together a broad fan base. Horslips were a 1970s folk/rock band that would play in Northern Ireland despite the Troubles. Although out of Dublin, "'Kids from both sides of the community stood shoulder to shoulder for those two hours and forgot about everything else....they were actually forming the peace process through their music.'" M105 Mama's Boys, meanwhile, were a hard rock or metal band from County Fermanagh, established in 1979. The band was made up of three brothers with a family background in traditional Irish music. The brothers were Catholic and they performed all over Ireland, North and South, and had fans in both areas and from all sides. Notes Pat McManus, "'We took great pride in going to Belfast and all those people would gather for our shows, Catholics and Protestants. For two hours we were all rockers, we were all united....There was no prejudice when it came to the music, because there was no prejudice in our music. None at all.'"106 At least for a short time, people were able to enjoy a shared identity as rock fans, setting aside, but not necessarily needing to repudiate, their communal allegiances.

Other bands and artists have also achieved popularity in Northern Ireland and abroad and have resisted becoming spokespersons for sectarian ideologies. Van Morrison is a prime example. Morrison has essentially avoided addressing the Northern Ireland conflict in music and song, making his music especially accessible to all. Others, like Gary Moore, have made some mention of it. Moore, a rock musician from Belfast, wrote "Wild Frontier," which came out in 1987.107 It is clear in the song that Moore
recognizes the price the people are paying for the violence: "I remember my city streets / Before the soldiers came / Now armored cars and barricades / Remind us of our shame". He goes on to note that "We are drowning in a sea of blood / The victims you have seen / Never more to sing again / The forty shades of green". Overall, though, Moore seems to keep his distance from where he came from in his work. Therapy? another rock act, this time from Larne, were active during the 1990s. They made reference to the Troubles in "Potato Junkie" (1992). The lyrics expressed resistance to sectarian mythology: "How can I remember 1690? / I was born in 1965".

Northern Ireland continues to produce talented musicians who have cross-community appeal and who resist or test the limits of traditional divisions. For example, Neil Hannon and The Divine Comedy are a well known band. Hannon fronts The Divine Comedy and is a native of Derry City. His father was a minister in the Anglican Church and in 1981 assumed the position of Bishop of Enniskillen. Hannon generally does not address the Troubles in his music. An exception appears on the album Fin de Siecle that came out in August of 1998. The last song on this record is a Hannon composition called "Sunrise." The track was laid as the peace process was going on but appeared the same month as the Omagh attack. The lyrics are very non-sectarian as the Protestant-raised Hannon sings "I was born in Londonderry / I was born in Derry City too" and "I grew up in Enniskillen / I grew up in Innis Kathleen too." Here he consciously utilizes the Irish/Catholic as well as the British/unionist/Protestant names for these towns, willingly embracing a pluralist identity. He goes on to question the purpose of violence: "Who cares where national borders lie / Who cares whose laws you're governed by / Who cares what name you call a town / Who'll care when you're six feet beneath the ground". It is
clear that he backs the peace process as the song concludes in a positive way: "From the
corner of my eye / A hint of blue in the black sky / A ray of hope, a beam of light / An
end to thirty years of night...What is this strange and beautiful thing / It's the sunrise....I
can see the sunrise."\textsuperscript{111}

Snow Patrol is another band with Northern Ireland performers that has cross-
community appeal and has gained an international following. Frontman Gary Lightbody
is a native of Bangor.\textsuperscript{112} According to Campbell and Smyth, "it may...be suggested that
Snow Patrol evoke the sentiments of a certain post-ceasefire youth, troubled mostly by
their own adolescent crises.\textsuperscript{113} In 2008, however, Snow Patrol's \textit{A Hundred Million Suns}
album was released and it contained the song, "Take Back the City." Lightbody has
confirmed that "it's a love letter to Belfast", noting that

There were always bits I loved about Belfast and bits I hated and there still
are. Growing up, the clash of ideologies totally frustrated and irritated me
— I guess irritated isn’t a strong enough word. I saw them both as the
same, reading — often literally — from the same hymn book and I just
wanted to get out of the place. But now I’ve moved back home and
everything’s changed for the better. There are so many reasons to love the
place. I think now is the right time

It is clear that Lightbody felt constricted by the divisions in the North and yet is hopeful
for the future. In the song, the audience is exhorted to "Take back the city for yourself
tonight \ I'll take back the city for me". The song also tells listeners, in true post-
Agreement fashion, "now it's time to make your own demands" and "Pick a side, pick a
fight / But get your epitaph right."\textsuperscript{115} What matters, in the end, is the legacy that is left by
people's actions, not what "side" they came from.
Literature

Poetry

The deconstruction or rewriting of traditional mythologies can be seen in literature. How writers have dealt with the conflict and the tensions in their society remains a common interest among scholars.\textsuperscript{116} It has been pointed out that many Northern Irish poets deal with and respond to the Troubles in ways that are often subtle as well as complex. Metaphors, analogies, classical literary references as well as the use of allegory are all means by which Northern Irish poets have addressed, responded to, and referenced the Troubles. Seamus Heaney has written of the “search for images and symbols adequate to our predicament”. In other words, the attempt to find ways of responding to the problems of Northern Ireland that are honest and have integrity and avoid sanctimoniousness.\textsuperscript{117} The strategies used by Northern Irish poets have been pointed out and analysed, including the work of writers considered particularly prominent and significant, such as Ciaran Carson, Paul Muldoon, John Hewitt, Tom Paulin, and Michael Longley, among others.\textsuperscript{118}

Among the interesting images found in the poetry of Northern Irish poets is that of twins. For instance, the image of twins can be found in Catholic poet Ciaran Carson’s 1986 poem “Jacta Est Alea” as well as in fellow Catholic poet Paul Muldoon’s 1977 “Armageddon, Armageddon”. In Carson’s poem, the twin image (representing the “self and other”) is “Siamese”.\textsuperscript{119} In other words, they are, “self and other”, as Carson puts it, “inextricable”. They are conjoined and reliant upon one another: "He is pro. I am con. / We are arm in arm; inextricably, we wade into the / Rubicon."\textsuperscript{120} Similarly, Paul Muldoon utilizes the image of twins to embody the Northern Ireland conflict. As he puts
it, “Were Twin and Twin at each other’s throats?”121 The twin image is an acknowledgement of a fraternal bond regardless of the viciousness that can exist in a war or conflict between siblings. Both sides have engaged in violent acts and suffered from them. In a sense, this makes them “twins”, siblings, sharers of a past and a present.

There are poems that reveal an awareness of the humanity of those outside a poet’s or speaker’s community. In recognizing this, and in reaching out to the “other”, a poem and its speaker can be located within the Third Community. For example, in Catholic poet Padraic Fiacc’s ”Enemy Encounter” the speaker meets “a British Army Soldier / With a rifle and a radio / Perched, hiding.” Right away, the speaker notices the human characteristics of the soldier - that the man is a red-head and that “He is young enough to be my weenie / -bopper daughter’s boyfriend.” The speaker “Can nearly hear his heart beating” the two of them are so close. The narrator’s human sympathy for the soldier is evident when he reaches out and, unsuccessfully, tries to get the soldier to smile. He knows the soldier fears him as a possible assassin.122 The Irish man’s awareness and comprehension of the other man’s feelings demonstrates an understanding of their shared human identity, despite the soldier’s "Britishness".

Similarly, a 1978 poem by Protestant poet John Hewitt, entitled, "The Irish Dimension," reveals a quiet awareness of difference as well as a more personal knowledge of the “other” that does not ring with suspicion or hatred. The speaker of the poem describes his or her new neighbours who consist of “a mild man, an Army Officer” as well as “two girls, a boy” who, as it turns out, “were Catholics, the very first I ever came to know.”123 It is acknowledged by the speaker that “To other friends they might be Teagues or Micks” (both derogatory, slang terms for Irish Catholics). Nonetheless, the
speaker discovers that the boy, the same age as the speaker, was “no sort of foe.” The speaker recognizes the differences between them – the boy attends a Christian Brothers school that “seemed cruel” to the narrator. The Catholic youngster was also a frightened “altar boy” who “served with dread” and “His magazines were full / of faces, places named, unknown to me. / Benburb, Wolfe Tone, Cuchullain, Fontenoy.” Nonetheless, the speaker’s portrait of these people is non-threatening and he ends the poem with the words: “I still am grateful, Willie Morrissey.” The ability of the speaker to successfully and non-violently encounter a member of the other tradition, and to see the human side of him, makes it possible to read this poem as a success story. Genuine differences do not disappear overnight, but civilized encounter can be a positive event and serve to emphasize what is held in common by both sides.

In poetry by Northern Irish poets the perpetrators of violence are often portrayed negatively or tragically, rather than as true “freedom fighters”. Sam Burnside's "In and Out of Derry" (1981) and Ciaran Carson’s poem "The Mouth" (1989) portray the cruelty of paramilitaries. Burnside, for instance, writes: “The city’s odd shop-keepers, sour and mean enough, Clang their rat-trap tills and keep the doors guarded. / For there are those who disregard limb and life / Who blast and bomb with red-eyed, mad-dog malice”. The sense of madness given in this portrayal and the callous view and treatment of life does not equate with true patriotism or even a genuine military campaign. Carson's poem, meanwhile, is written, evidently, from the perspective of a paramilitary individual or group and takes a dismissive view of human life. The opening lines read: “There was this head had this mouth he kept shooting off. / Unfortunately. / It could have been worse for us than it was for him. / Provisionally.” A big mouth seems to be the motive for
the murder of this unnamed victim. The cold view of the narrator(s) of this poem is
demonstrated by their initial characterization of the individual in question as “this head”.
The mouth is the focus, rather than any sense of the person as a human being with any
thoughts or feelings. Indeed, it is contended that “By the time he is found there’ll be
nothing much left to tell / who he was.”¹²⁷ There is no mention here of any noble goal or
cause, simply a selfish concern for personal preservation. This outlook represents
isolation from community, rather than concern for it.

Occasionally, the youth of violent perpetrators is emphasized and this only
increases the horror and senselessness of the events in question. For example, in
Protestant poet Michael Longley's "Wounds" (1972/1973) a bus conductor is murdered in
his home “By a shivering boy who wandered in / Before they could turn the television
down / Or tidy away the supper dishes”. The terrorist killer's “shivering” lends him an air
of vulnerability and even innocence. He is not a hardened man with a purpose (he
“wandered in”) and his victim is a bus-conductor, not a soldier or politician.¹²⁸ The
image of the boy killer also appears in Protestant poet Tom Paulin’s "Under the Eyes."
Paulin writes of “a Judge / Shot in his hallway before his daughter / By a boy who shut
his eyes as his hand tightened.”¹²⁹ This gunman does not come across as intrinsically evil
or heroic. He is simply a tragic, frightened figure. The damage violence does to these
young perpetrators is brought especially to the fore in Catholic poet Padraic Fiacc’s
"Station/An Ordo." Here the killer is a boy, described as “The teener with the frizzy
hair”. The reader learns that he “Plays the guitar / For his kid sister, is / Her big pop
star”. Readers are then informed that this young man “shoots / [new verse] Dead the boy-
faced policeman / Guarding the chapel”. The gunman is caught, but claims that “It was
The violence has made victims out of both boy and soldier - the young killer unthinkingly doing what he is told.

The senseless cruelty of the violence perpetrated in Northern Ireland is also driven home by the accounts made by poets of those killed. The victims are often ordinary people, not enemies or terrorists. At times they are engaged in simple, innocent activities when they lose their lives. In Michael Longley's "Wounds", a bus conductor "collapsed beside his carpet-slippers / Without a murmur, shot through the head." Similarly, in the first part of Longley's "Wreaths" (1979), entitled "The Civil Servant," an unnamed man is murdered, abruptly and without ceremony, while “preparing an Ulster fry for breakfast”.

In Protestant poet Gerald Dawe’s "Count" (1978), the narrator describes hearing of the death of someone he or she seems to know on the radio: “It sounded crazy, somehow or other / as incoherent as a dream: / your name, age, place of birth, / and then the on-the-spot commentary / reasoning details of why and how they / waited in a car for you coming out / of a huckster-shop with cigarettes / and pumped six bullets: five when you / sprawled on the street.”

The fact that most of the bullets were fired after the victim had already fallen only makes the crime seem more callous. There is no indication that any of these people deserved what happened to them and the contrast between ordinary people going about an ordinary, innocent day and their violent murder leaves no room for heroic myth-making on the part of any militant group.

Perhaps the single most well known and used poem relating to the Troubles is John Hewitt’s powerful poem “Neither An Elegy Nor a Manifesto” (originally published in 1972), which is “for the people of my province and the rest of Ireland”. It attempts to situate itself on neutral ground or territory and draw attention to those who have died in
Hewitt begins his poem with the call to “Bear in mind these dead” and claims that he “dare not risk using / that loaded word, Remember / for your memory is a cruel web”. Hewitt deliberately avoids calling for prayers or making any requests that could evoke partisan, violent, or empty responses. He makes this point clear in the third verse of his poem, contending that “The careful words of my injunction / are as unrhetorical, as neutral / and unaligned as any I know: /...they do not pound with drum-beats / of patriotism, loyalty, martyrdom.” Indeed, Hewitt urges his readers to “Bear in mind / those men and lads killed in the streets; / but do not differentiate between / those deliberately gunned down / and those caught by unaddressed bullets: / such distinctions are not relevant.” He calls upon readers to “Bear in mind the skipping child hit / by the anonymous ricochet; / the man shot at his own fireside….the policeman dismembered / by the booby-trap in the car.”134 He wants people to think about these victims, consider them and their fates. None of the victims are given religious labels, judged, or have their deaths justified or put into any specific context. They are all casualties, whatever side or walk of life they came from. They are, in effect, a community of victims.

**Short Stories**

Short stories abound that deal with the Troubles of the North and within them can be found complex, non-ideological visions of the conflict and the society in which it takes place. For example, in a number of short stories that address or are set in the Troubles can be found characters that are remarkably complex and difficult to classify as neatly belonging to either the Catholic or Protestant, nationalist, unionist, republican, or loyalist communities. Two of the most notable are from the stories of Belfast-born Catholic writer Bernard Mac Laverty - Liz O’Prey, of “The Daily Woman,” from Mac Laverty’s
1982 collection of stories *A Time to Dance*, and John Shields from Mac Laverty’s 1994 story “Walking the Dog”. Liz lives with her abusive husband, Eamonn, who is a drinker and a regular patron of a “Provos club”. Liz also works in the home of a well-to-do Protestant Unionist man called Henderson who bribes Liz with money for sex, claiming that “I can afford better but I want you”. Liz herself is located awkwardly between these characters. Indeed, when she meets an American journalist who questions her and wants to know “which side are you on?”, she tells him that she is “sort of in the middle.” She explains that “I was born nothing – but a Protestant nothing and I married a Catholic nothing and so I’m now a mixture of nothing. I hate the whole thing. I couldn’t give a damn.” She is, as the American so clearly puts it, “One of the silent minority.”

Similarly, the character of John Shields in “Walking the Dog” is also difficult to classify. He is taking his dog for a walk on a cold night when he is abducted by two men claiming to be members of the IRA. They immediately attempt to classify their captive as Catholic or Protestant by getting him to reveal certain details about himself. Unfortunately, John proves a slippery catch. His name, John Shields, is not sufficient to categorize him, but he denies having a middle name or a confirmation name. He then refuses to tell his captors where he went to school, contending “It’s none of your business.” Finally, his interrogator asks him straight out: “Are you a Protestant or a Roman Catholic?” The easiest, apparently safest, thing for John to do would be to claim to be Catholic. However, the kidnapper has to ask John twice before getting the following answer: “I’m… I don’t believe in any of that crap. I suppose I’m nothing.” The men also demand that John give his opinion of the Provos. John replies “I hate the Provos. I hate everything you stand for….And I hate you for doing this to me.”
reader cannot be certain if John has picked up that these individuals are not actually the IRA, but loyalists. Either way, he rejects them. In the end, John never openly admits he is a part of either community. It is the kidnappers who decide he is “one of our persuasion” and let him go. John's general ambiguity, his refusal to clearly take one side or the other is, arguably, ultimately what saves him. Thus, John can be counted a fictional representative of the Third Community.

At times, a character is portrayed who seems to have difficulty with aspects of themselves, who resists or even rejects part of their heritage. In Protestant writer and Belfast native Linda Anderson’s “The Death of Men”, the narrator, Helen, is a woman whose Protestant father died not long ago and who goes with her mother to a relative’s home as the relative's husband has just died and it is Christmas Day. Helen does not like the idea that she is in any way like either her father or the female Protestant relations she encounters at the home of Samuel, the man who has died. Indeed, as she confides to one of Samuel’s son-in-laws, she “used to” take her father’s knife and cut herself with it: “I made very neat incisions, in the thighs and arms mostly. It made me feel better. It was like drawing boundaries to keep him out.” As for her Protestant relations, Helen expresses a hard-edged repugnance for them, thinking: “Oh Dad, why did you inflict these relatives on me? These smug saturnine Protestants?” Helen does not want to be as like them as she is. She wants to “be utterly different….Why couldn’t I be a willowy Catholic with a soulful face, a pilgrim to Croagh Patrick with stones lacerating my ascetic feet?” We are never clear what Helen's actual religious affiliation is, but whether she is a Catholic with a heritage that includes Protestantism, or a Protestant who longs for
membership in the Catholic community, Helen can be seen as caught in between what she is and what she wants to be.  

Short stories that include paramilitary characters often do not portray them in a heroic or positive manner, thus undermining any idealistic image that might be associated with them. One example is offered by Belfast writer Brenda Murphy in her 1988 story “A Social Call.” The narrator of this story, Teresa, goes to visit a woman named Bernie whose husband, Joe, arrives at home with two men and immediately starts criticizing his wife, then orders her to “Make these fellas a cuppa tea”. She follows Joe upstairs “to get my wages” and he hits her after she catches him with a gun and questions him about it. Joe threatens the narrator as well when she comes to her friend’s defense, pushing him away as he prepares to kick his wife, who is already curled up “on the floor”:

He grabbed me by the sweater and flung me against the wall. He grabbed a handful of sweater again just below my neck, pulled me over to him, nose to nose. I could smell the drink on his breath.

‘Now you listen, you interfering wee whore. This is my house, that is my wife. Keep your fucking nose out of my business or I’ll break it for you’.

In short, Joe is a cruel bully whose behaviour is hardly that of a noble freedom-fighter. He uses violence on those who are weaker than himself. Indeed, the ultimate irony of Murphy’s tale comes at the end of it, when, the morning after the incident at Bernie’s, Teresa picks up the Irish News and sees a story entitled “Punishment Shooting”.

Apparently three men pulled a teenager out of his house and two of them restrained the boy so that the other one could shoot the young man in the knees. According to Teresa:

“The local paramilitary group, who claimed they were responsible, said they shot the boy for repeated anti-social behaviour.” There is little doubt that the men involved were the ones at Bernie’s house the previous night and that the shooter was her husband, Joe.
Three grown men against one teenaged boy makes these men look cruel and even cowardly. The attack also makes Joe a hypocrite. This story documents the pain and terror that violent men can inflict upon others, in particular those they ought to love and respect.

In another treatment of paramilitary and sectarian violence, the focus is on the victims and the brutality of what is being done. In Protestant writer David Park’s 1990 story “Oranges from Spain”, the paramilitary or sectarian killers are presented as violent and anonymous intruders who kill and then make quick their escape. The narrator of the story recalls his days as a teenager when he had a job in the fruit shop of Gerry Breen, a local character who the boy comes to know during the summer he works at the shop. Just before his death, Breen shares “his dream”, his plans should he ever win a lot of money playing the pools. He tells his young employee that he would “go to every country whose fruit I sell, go and see it grow, right there in the fields and the groves, in the orchards and the vineyards. All over the world.” Unfortunately, Gerry’s dream would never come true because "Four days later, Gerry Breen was dead. A man walked into the shop and shot him twice....They needed a Catholic to balance the score – he became a casualty of convenience, a victim of retribution, propitiation of a different god. No one even claimed it. Just one more sectarian murder." The killer and the organization (if any) that he is a part of remain anonymous. He simply shot down a shopkeeper with “a tray of oranges” in his hands and then disappeared on a motorcycle, leaving behind a traumatized teenaged boy who continues to have bad dreams about the incident as an adult. The murder is senseless and achieves nothing. These are not soldiers in the service of a noble cause.
Conclusion

In cultural terms, there is much crossing of boundaries in Northern Ireland, despite the continued existence of division and prejudice. Music in particular can be very fluid in its borders, uniting and dividing people, depending on the context. Classical and chamber music, traditional music, punk, and rock are played and enjoyed by Catholics and Protestants, nationalists and unionists. Musicians themselves have ignored or defied long-standing communal boundaries in their lyrics and performances, choosing to prioritize an artistic and at times common identity with members of different backgrounds. Similarly, writers have challenged the status quo in their work, utilizing complex characters who cannot be easily placed in either of Northern Ireland's main communities. Writers also confront the violence of the paramilitaries with powerful accounts of victimization and loss that destroy traditional myths of heroism.
CHAPTER 8
CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN'S LAND":
CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY
PART 2: SPORT

There is no doubt that “Sport is one of the most significant elements of Northern Ireland’s community life.”¹ It provides opportunities for people to express their communal and political identities and at times the results have been violent. Societal divisions have affected athletes and sports organizations, events, and structures. Indeed, what community as well as culture a person comes from frequently rules what sports they like or are involved in.² Nonetheless, when it comes to Northern Ireland, sport can unite as well as divide a community.³ It creates and encourages pluralism, providing athletes with opportunities to shift national identities and even hold more than one identity at a time. This can be seen in the island-wide organization of certain sports, the willingness to represent Ireland on the part of some athletes from Northern Ireland, as well as in shared feelings of pride for local teams and sportspeople.

Despite the political division of the island, the partition of Ireland has not always been reflected in sport.⁴ For their 1995 study, Sugden and Harvie surveyed a number of sports in the Province. They queried participating sports as to how they were structured.⁵ They found that, by far, most sports involved in their study fell into the all-Ireland category, “with provincial branches or councils directly responsible for their activity within a nine county Ulster.” In other words, many sports were willing to ignore the border dividing the six-county Northern Ireland version of “Ulster” from that of the ancient province, which includes three additional counties located in the Republic. Among the all-Ireland sports were badminton, GAA, Ladies Golf, Motorcycling, and
rugby union.\textsuperscript{6} Those classified as “All-Ireland/Ulster” included basketball (at the amateur level), boxing, ladies’ hockey, and men’s hockey.\textsuperscript{7} At the same time, Northern Ireland has its own national football team and is associated with FIFA.\textsuperscript{5} When it comes to Commonwealth Games sports, the Province takes part as Northern Ireland. This "speaks to the existence of Northern Ireland as a place apart."\textsuperscript{9}

People in Northern Ireland can demonstrate a complex series of loyalties when it comes to national sports teams. On occasions where Ireland-wide teams compete against those from Scotland or England, most Ulster citizens will back Ireland. When Ireland is playing against England, their support will be especially enthusiastic and strong.\textsuperscript{10} A lot "of national rivalry" can be found inside the UK and rivalry is especially strong between the English and their Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish counterparts. The sporting arena is a place where such rivalry is strongly expressed. Here defeating England stimulates much enthusiasm and Northern Ireland is as pleased to win such contests as are Scotland and Wales.\textsuperscript{11} However, when it comes to sports where there is no Northern Ireland team, the majority of Northern Irish people have no problem backing and belonging to "an all-Ireland team", including a lot of unionists as well as Protestants.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, in the absence of Southern Ireland's team, Catholics as well as Protestants might back Northern Ireland's soccer team in World Cup or international competition even as the strength of their support can differ.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{The GAA}

There is no doubt that Ireland and Northern Ireland sporting history does have its share of division and at times animosity.\textsuperscript{14} For example, in 1884 the GAA (Gaelic Athletic Association) was established.\textsuperscript{15} According to Bairner, different religions as well
as political views were initially not shut out of the GAA. Indeed, Charles Stewart Parnell (a Protestant and a nationalist) and Douglas Hyde, a Protestant and Ireland's first President, were each for a time among the GAA's patrons. Nonetheless, it was not long before the GAA "came to be regarded as providing sporting space for certain types of Irish people, mainly men and certainly Catholic and/or politically Nationalist." Indeed, a lot of "younger" GAA men belonged to Sinn Fein as well as the Irish Volunteers as of 1914. In addition, prior to 1971, those belonging to the GAA were not allowed to take part in or be spectators of "foreign games" such as rugby, hockey, and soccer.

Furthermore, those belonging to the "security forces" could not belong to the GAA, according to its Rule 21. Needless to say, due to its history and political connections, the GAA was not liked or trusted by Protestants and unionists in the North following Northern Ireland’s establishment. Gaelic sport has never been an area of much participation or interest for Northern Protestants.

There have been changes within the GAA. In 1971 the regulations against "foreign games" were lifted. Rule 21, however, continued through 2001. After Rule 21 was lifted, however, policeman became active in the GAA. Indeed, the Republic's police service, the Garda Siochana, as well as Northern Ireland's PSNI have established "the Thomas St. George McCarthy Cup," which these forces compete for each year. The Cup honours Thomas St George McCarthy who was both an RIC man and a GAA founder. In 2006, the PSNI's GAA side finally won the cup in a football victory. These changes have allowed people from both communities to participate in "Irish" games and in non-Irish games regardless of "nationality."

**Cricket**
Ireland’s sporting tradition also includes “British” sports or activities, which, in many cases, have become “Protestant” and middle class activities within Northern Ireland. For instance, cricket as well as rugby football were among the sports that the British brought to Ireland. There were some significant nationalists who played cricket in its earlier years, such as GAA founder, Michael Cusack. Cricket was also played by some Catholic schools. John Redmond played at school. However, a lot of clubs beyond Dublin, the Pale, and Belfast dissolved once Irish nationalism “gathered momentum and cricket was labeled a ‘foreign’ game”.25

Cross-border connections have remained, however. In 1923 the Irish Cricket Union was established. Northern Irish and Southern Irish players have maintained good relations despite wider political issues and changes. Indeed, Ireland's "international eleven” are selected on an all-Ireland basis.26 The men's senior team includes athletes from Northern Ireland and the South. Today, cricket's Ireland-wide "National Governing Body" is Cricket Ireland. Five "Provincial Unions" exist which administer cricket within their areas - Northern, North West, Leinster, Munster, Connacht. The North West Union crosses the boundary between Northern and Southern Ireland by including Donegal within its mandate.27

Attempts have also been made to avoid divisive symbolism. Despite cricket’s traditional status as a "Protestant" or "Unionist" sport,28 Cricket Ireland's logo (and that of the men's and women's teams) is a cricket ball, inside which is a cluster of three green shamrocks. The teams’ jerseys are navy blue and green. Ireland's cricket team uses the Irish Cricket Union flag in competition as opposed to the tricolour out of respect for unionist feelings. It consists of three shamrocks on a blue background.29
**Rugby**

Irish rugby also has British roots and yet it is played on an island-wide basis.

Two rugby unions were in existence between 1874/75 and 1879/80 - The Irish Football Union and the Northern Football Union of Ireland. The rugby unions decided to unite in 1879 to create the Irish Rugby Football Union, which would cover the entire island. There would be Munster, Leinster as well as Ulster branches. In 1885 Connaught entered the IRFU bringing Irish rugby beneath one "administrative body." Ireland was represented by its own team that started to compete with fellow British Isles squads.

The Irish Rugby Football Union is still functioning. Rugby union remains island wide in its organization. Athletes continue to compete as "Ireland" against Wales, Scotland, and England as well as against other countries.

An affiliation with the Protestant, unionist community has not prevented the crossing of traditional boundaries in rugby. For instance, rugby has a history among middle class Catholics in Southern Ireland. There have been nationalist or Catholic players - Michael Cusack, a GAA founder, participated in rugby. Cusack even coached it. There were rugby participants who became involved in the fight for freedom. Among them are Kevin Barry. Eamonn De Valera was a big rugby union fan as well. Also, rugby was played in some "Jesuit schools". Among the GAA’s most talented athletes there have been those who have left to play rugby union and there are "Irish rugby internationals" who have played Gaelic football for "their counties."

While rugby football is played mainly by Protestants within the North, Northern athletes do not seem to face many problems when chosen to play on Ireland’s team for Ireland. Some have been able to comfortably maintain multiple identities with little
conflict. There are Protestant athletes who say playing for Ireland "allows them to feel a flexible sense of Irishness." For example, Trevor Ringland wore the rugby jersey of Ireland in competition even though he was loyal to the UK and would, in the future, became involved in "unionist politics", running for the UUP in East Belfast in the General Election of 2010. Ringland represented Ulster as a rugby player and was a member of the British and Irish Lions, in addition to playing rugby for Ireland. When asked about the Irish team, Ringland noted that "It was always built around a concept of friendship. It was an Irishness that could reflect a Britishness and a Britishness that could reflect an Irishness. Ringland went on to point out that "The more I look at sport the more I realise it actually enables us to have a far more complex identity than extremes would like us to have." Indeed, Ringland declares that "I'm an Ulsterman, I'm Irish and I'm British, and I'm also European." 

A further example of rugby sportsmen crossing boundaries is provided by Andrew Trimble. Named Andrew David Trimble for the famous unionist leader, the two are not relatives. The younger Trimble is Protestant, yet prefers the less divisive term "Christian." Trimble has played for Ulster and Ireland in rugby. With rugby being an Olympic sport in 2016, Andrew Trimble has said he will represent Ireland: "if it came to it for the Olympics, my allegiance would have to be with Ireland because that's who I have played all my rugby for. I couldn't really imagine playing for Britain." Trimble notes that "I wanted to play for Ireland since I was about 10, when I was playing mini and schools rugby. My dad took me to all the games and always wanted to wear the green of Ireland." Politics and religion, thus, come second to Trimble in his sporting career.
Rugby officials have struggled to protect the sport from sectarian and political difficulties. Beginning in 1925 the IRFU chose to use a non-partisan flag rather than the tricolour for international games. According to Munster Branch secretary, Louis Daly, in the early 1930s: "'In my opinion, we are not insulting or casting any slur on the tricolour or Union Jack, by not flying either, as rugby football in Ireland knows no border.'"

Pressure to use the tricolour was placed on the IRFU in 1932. The Irish government got involved and rugby authorities gave in. However, today, Ireland's "international XV" uses a non partisan flag in competition. Despite being traditionally a Protestant and unionist sport, the IRFU's logo is a cluster of three shamrocks with a rugby football in the center. The Irish men's squad's jerseys are green and bear this logo and it appears on the IRFU flag.

The anthems question has also been carefully addressed in rugby. In Belfast in 2007 Ireland's rugby squad competed in a home game against Italy at Ravenhill. The IRFU did not permit the playing of "God Save Our Queen" prior to the contest. They went with "Ireland's Call" instead. This song, which Phil Coulter composed, embraces all of Ireland in a non-sectarian fashion. According to a representative of the IRFU during the dispute in 2006, "Symbols and emblems should be put to one side....This is a game and a sport." It is true that "The Soldier's Song" continues to be played for games in the South. "Ireland's Call" is also played, however. Prior to 1995, when the latter became the "rugby anthem," Irish games that took place in Belfast included "God Save the Queen" while "The Soldier's Song" was heard at Dublin games. There was no anthem for international matches.
Finally, British and Irish athletes (including athletes from the North and South of Ireland) have joined together on one team on occasion. The British Lions, or British and Irish Lions, is supposed to be made up of British and Irish athletes. This team has competed in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and other places over the years. The team received a significant amount of public backing for their tours in 1997 as well as 2001. The current logo for the Lions reflects its heterogeneous nature, being a shield consisting of four symbols to represent England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. The rose represents England, the thistle represents Scotland, the three feathers represent Wales, and the shamrocks represent Ireland. The shield is surmounted by a "lion" (a heraldic leopard, a traditional all British symbol):

\textit{Figure 17: British & Irish Lions Logo}

The outline of the shield and the heraldic leopard are in gold. The rose is red, with a green stem, on a white background. The thistle is white against a blue background. The shamrocks are green on a white shield against a green background. The feathers are white against a red background.

\textit{Field Hockey}

Field hockey is another traditionally Protestant sport that is not divided based on the border between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, although hockey does illustrate the complexities of athlete identity and affiliation. The Irish Hockey Union (men's) was set up in 1893 in Dublin and the Irish Ladies' Hockey Union was set up not long after. Leinster and Munster as well as Ulster would form "regional governing bodies, meaning that the Union was in fact a federation with each Province being
partially autonomous." Then, in 2000, the Irish Hockey Association was established, which combined both sexes under one organization. It was Ireland-wide in its mandate and authority. Today Hockey Ireland controls field hockey island-wide, with various Branches running hockey "at regional level."

Historically, male Northern Irish players could represent Britain, Ireland, or Britain and Ireland. This arrangement worked because Ireland was not involved in hockey “at the highest level of world competition, in this case the Olympic games [sic]”. The two nations would, thus, not face one another here. Still, especially in external quarters, unease existed regarding participants playing on more than one national team at the same time. Difficulties arose when “for the 1992 Barcelona Olympics a qualifying tournament was to be held, thus opening the door to Irish participation.” If Ireland took part in this tournament the stronger athletes from Northern Ireland would have to deal with the hard decision of who to play for. Ireland participated but did not qualify, as it turned out. Nevertheless, men’s hockey noted “a “clash of loyalties between the UK birthright and eligibility to play for Ireland’s hockey side”.” Still, Ireland had a hockey team for the 2016 Olympics in Rio and the team is referred to as "the Green Machine," regardless of the backgrounds of individual players.

Northern Irish elite female players have been making hard decisions for a long time. Problems have resulted. For instance, Violet McBride as well as Jenny Redpath were high level Ulster players. They had “a 6 year ban” placed upon them by the Irish Ladies’ Hockey Union in 1980. When chosen for the Great Britain as well as Irish teams, these ladies chose the Great Britain team. Redpath was Ireland’s team captain when "the ban was" instituted. The British team was the better of the two so, in a sporting sense, the
choice was understandable. Also, Redpath "felt more British than Irish." Nonetheless, in the case of McBride, her desire to represent both sides was obvious throughout her career. McBride "won 38 caps for Ireland, 64 caps for Great Britain." As athletes had to choose who to play for at the Olympics, McBride decided to play for Britain in 1988 at Seoul. However, she had represented Ireland "in two World Cups" prior to this. Hockey athletes Jackie Burns as well as Joanne Menown made like choices in 1991. Both players from Ulster, who belonged to Ireland's ladies' team, they chose to represent Great Britain. Britain’s team were bronze medalists in Barcelona in 1992. Britain’s success in this Olympic hockey contest demonstrates why players may be drawn to decide to join Great Britain’s team, regardless of identity or nationality issues.

Hockey also tries to avoid problematic political symbolism. Hockey Ireland's logo is green, white, and navy blue and includes the images of a hockey stick and a shamrock. Irish hockey teams compete internationally using their own flag, rather than the tricolour, which might cause problems for some players. On this flag is a shield containing crests or images representing Ireland's four provinces - Ulster, Leinster, Munster, and Connaught. Underneath it is the word "Ireland". The background of the flag is green. It is used for men's and ladies' hockey. This flag represents Ireland as a whole without being politically divisive. The Red Hand of Ulster appears as does the harp. Players from any part of the island can identify with this flag.

**Association Football**

There are also sports that are harder to categorize as belonging clearly to one group or the other, despite some obvious divisions. In Northern Ireland, association football is a very significant sport and has garnered Catholic/nationalist interest.
sport draws spectators in significant numbers and involves Catholics as well as Protestants in the roles of players and fans. Currently, association football’s structure is Northern Irish (including that entity’s six counties, rather than Ulster’s original nine). Initially, the Irish Football Association (IFA) (established in 1880 in Belfast) ran the sport for all of Ireland. In the wake of Partition, the League of Ireland as well as the Football Association of Ireland (FAI) governed the sport within Southern Ireland, while the Irish League and Irish Football Association presided in Northern Ireland. Currently, the pinnacle of Northern Ireland football competition is the Danske Bank Premiership, which is organized by the Northern Ireland Football League (NIFL). The Premiership includes the famous Linfield, Cliftonville, and Glentoran clubs. The NIFL has Senior Division representatives on the IFA Council.

Divisions in football between Catholics and Protestants are longstanding. This can be seen at club level. Among the earlier clubs that arose in the North were Linfield (established 1886) as well as Belfast Celtic (established in 1891). It was not long before these clubs were connected with particular labouring class populations. Belfast Celtic became linked with the Catholic community and Linfield with the Protestants. Two clubs that Catholics supported, Derry City (established in 1928) and Belfast Celtic pulled out of the Irish League - Belfast Celtic in 1949 and Derry City in 1972. Derry City became part of the southern League of Ireland in 1985. In Belfast, Cliftonville eventually became the club that Belfast nationalist football fans generally backed. In terms of football allegiances beyond the Province, there is backing among Catholic football fans in Northern Ireland for Glasgow Celtic. Protestants can be found backing Glasgow's Rangers.
Sectarian divisions and behaviour have been issues at fan level over the years. Indeed, the impact of sectarianism on football has been much greater than has been the case in or for other sports. To begin with, Windsor Park, where the Province’s home games take place, is Linfield’s space and Linfield is a club with very strong Protestant affiliations and identity. Catholics who actually went to matches “have confirmed that the sectarian songs-[sic]and banners and pro-British and/or pro-Ulster regalia found there were hardly conducive to feelings of safety and harmony”. Sugden and Bairner point out that a lot of fans "use the sport as little more than a convenient excuse to re-enact the inter-community battles of old and to re-endorse political and cultural prejudices." They contend that "international matches at Windsor Park have become disfigured by gross sectarian abuse which prompts critical comments, but absolutely no action from the I.F.A."

There is evidence that division has occurred between Catholic and Protestant football followers in the Province in terms of national teams supported. Northern Ireland did not do so well following its 1980s achievements (they made it into the World Cup competition in 1982 and 1986) and it seems that, coinciding with this, Protestant ownership of the side was more and more asserted by heavily loyalist segments of the population and Catholics did not feel comfortable at Northern Irish fixtures. Meanwhile, Southern Ireland’s team had a significant increase in its success. The European finals of 1988 saw Ireland defeat England. Ireland had success in the World Cup of 1990, too. More and more Northern Irish Catholics have become backers of Southern Ireland’s side. Northern Irish nationalist youth have “in relatively recent times” demonstrated a greater desire to represent the southern state in football at the international level.
It is true that when Northern Ireland’s and even the Republic’s teams do well, both sides might unite to a degree in the short term. Many Protestants in Northern Ireland back Southern Ireland’s team rather than England when they face each other, but it is wrong to interpret this as showing "a more general leaning towards Dublin." Rather, it shows just how suspicious and wary are Protestants in Northern Ireland due to attempts on the part of London to resolve the situation by including Dublin in discussions. Furthermore, such cross-community togetherness has a high probability of disintegrating as long as no resolution is found for the “issues of national identity”.

Nonetheless, despite the very real divisions and sectarian problems faced by football over the years, the boundaries between Northern and Southern Ireland and Catholics and Protestants are crossed in the sport. To begin with, there was a period following the division between southern Ireland and Northern Ireland where Northern Ireland chose athletes island-wide to play in international matches under the “Ireland” label. They basically were not recognizing any separation. Athletes were chosen island wide up to the first part of the 1950s. The side was formally called “Ireland” before the 1970s. After this it was “Northern Ireland.” For the FAI, too, athletes were drawn from around the whole island, at least at first. More than one athlete played on the two sides. It has been noted that “we had the spectacle of players appearing for ‘Ireland’ on a Saturday and the next week another ‘Ireland’” – up to the 1950s, that is. For instance, Johnny Carey, a Dublin native and a Manchester United player, represented both the North and the South up to 1949.

Catholics and Protestants are also not completely divided when it comes to football teams, clubs, and fans. For instance, Catholic and Protestant athletes have
always made up Northern Ireland’s “national squad”. George Best as well as Pat Jennings were well liked Northern Ireland football team athletes, for instance. Best came from the Protestant community and Jennings from the Catholic community. Both men are icons in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, even though football loyalties have polarized, Sugden and Harvie have noted that, “this has happened at a time when the playing squads of each national side have become more cosmopolitan than ever before.”

While football is separated between North and South in its organization, a Northern Ireland player in possession of “an Irish passport” could represent Ireland. So could a player who was born of Southern Irish parents or had a grandparent from the South. Perceived "nationality" and religious identity, in short, do not rigidly determine who an athlete represents in football.

Also, despite the existence of strong connections between certain clubs and communities within the Province, these divisions are not always hard and fast. For example, it is interesting to note that Cliftonville’s identity has not been completely Catholic. Cliftonville drew a lot of backing within the surrounding area, prior to the latest round of Troubles, and fans at that time included Protestants as well as Catholics. Although the club would become "Catholic", Cliftonville’s “structure” continued to include Catholics and Protestants. The “playing staff” as well as administrators continued to include members of both communities. Cliftonville’s manager was even a clear loyalist at one time. The needs of sport have thus overridden sectarian concerns at times. Athletic ability crosses political and communal boundaries and is often the primary determination of player selection.
Similarly, despite Linfield’s Protestant history, the crossing of boundaries has also occurred. Linfield has had Catholic players even though not many Catholic athletes were Linfield players after the latter 1960s. Those that were (up to the early 1990s, anyway) came from beyond Northern Ireland's borders. Safety issues in the face of external dangers rather than simple bigotry may have been a key factor here. A Northern Ireland Catholic finally became part of the team in 1992. Indeed, Linfield has signed Northern Irish as well as Southern Irish Catholic athletes. Finally, when it comes to Glentoran, Catholic as well as Protestant athletes have been on that team "consistently". Thus, political beliefs and communal affiliations do not necessarily remain hard and fast in all areas or aspects of the sporting world. Boundaries are crossed.

Passion for the game has also defied religious and geographical boundaries further afield. Manchester United, an English football team, has drawn Irish fans, both Catholic and Protestant. This team has been, and to an extent still is, considered to have "Irish Catholic connections" and a lot of Protestants in the North have chosen not to back it. Still, there are a significant number of Protestants who do, in Belfast and elsewhere, (and these fans may also back Northern Ireland's team when they face other nations - including England). Indeed, Ireland has about 80 Manchester United fans' clubs. Of these, 43 can be found in the North. Of particular note, there is a Falls Road bar called The Red Devil Bar which is "named in honour of Manchester United." A picture of George Best holds a place of honour at this pub. Best was perhaps the most well known of Protestants from the North to have been part of Manchester United, playing there in the years 1963 to 1974. There were others, however, including Harry Gregg as well as Jackie Blanchflower. The existence of such a bar on the Catholic Falls Road shows the extent
to which love of football can take precedence over religious and political ideologies.

Pride is taken in local athletes, regardless of their backgrounds.

George Best offers a clear example of how sport and those who participate in it can defy traditional boundaries. Best was a native of Belfast and a Presbyterian Protestant. He even became an Orange Order member, which ran in his family. Nonetheless, Catholics and Protestants admire Best. He was an amazing soccer player and kept himself aloof from sectarianism, enabling Catholics to support him over the years. His stand against prejudice was clearly articulated at times, as when he declared that "'Creed and colour have never been an issue for me. I just believe in each to his own, unless that involves hurting someone else, which is wrong whichever religion or political dogma you believe in.'" Furthermore, a lot of Best's dearest soccer friends belonged to the Catholic religion. Among them were Pat Crerand, Shay Brennan as well as Denis Law. Best even to some extent embraced his Irishness and used the phrase "'mad Irish sod'" to characterize himself. Best also went so far as to back a national team for Ireland. According to Best: "'I have always believed that the two associations should have got together and formed one national team.'" Nonetheless, Best was chosen on 37 occasions as part of the Northern Irish team and he belonged, for a time, to Cork Celtics as well, demonstrating a willingness to cross national and sectarian boundaries. Best is still much loved within the North and was made a Northern Ireland Sport Star in 2011.

There is also some evidence of cross-community pride when it comes to Northern Ireland’s side. For a lot of Protestants in Northern Ireland, the national football squad represents Northern Ireland's separateness. The country is more than a region of Ireland as well as more than just British. Catholics have consistently been prepared to be part of
this squad, too.¹⁰¹ The North’s side did well in the first part of the 1980s – better than they ever had before. The Northern Irish team’s performance during the World Cups of 1982 as well as 1986 offered “glimpses of how sport could cross the sectarian boundaries, albeit in a tenuous and transitory way.”¹⁰² It appears that Catholics as well as Protestants were proud of the side’s accomplishments, outside of a small number of localities that were very republican. The pinnacle of the side’s success came when Northern Ireland beat Spain during the World Cup Finals competition in 1982. A theme in the “popular media” was the impact of the side’s achievements in uniting both of Northern Ireland’s main populations.¹⁰³

There is indeed some evidence of local pride and a sense of independence in Northern Ireland football among fans from the Province who resist having their national side categorized as British or Irish. For instance, after the Soviet Union’s demise, a number of independent countries who are involved in soccer now exist. Also, “new soccer powers” beyond South America as well as Europe have arisen. All this has resulted in FIFA being under growing pressure “to discover ways of rationalising its existing membership.”¹⁰⁴ Having one world team represent Britain is one idea that has been raised. Included in this is the notion that Northern Ireland would become part of Britain’s team; alternatively, it could unite or become part of the Republic’s team to represent Ireland in its entirety.¹⁰⁵ According to Sugden and Harvie’s case study, though, Northern Ireland’s football fanbase, which is mainly labouring class, has expressed a great deal of “resistance” towards both solutions or notions.¹⁰⁶

Such sentiments are further revealed in more recent reactions to the issue of a 2012 UK or British Olympic football team. The UK or Great Britain does not normally
have a national football team. In June of 2011, however, it was made clear there would be a single "Team Great Britain" for the 2012 Olympics in both men's and women's football (a first for women). The English Football Association (FA) was given the task of "overseeing" the British team by the British Olympic Association. Officials of the game in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales were concerned that this would threaten their separate status in FIFA and did not support it. According to Jim Boyce, FIFA's new Vice-President, however, non-English athletes did not face any legal prohibitions keeping them from taking part and British teams did indeed participate in the 2012 Summer Olympics. Still, with the exception of four athletes, all the women on the British women's team were born in England. Two were born in the U.S., one in Scotland, and one in Nigeria. The men's team did not include athletes from Northern Ireland or Scotland, being made up of 13 English and five Welsh athletes.

Finally, despite football’s divisions and the sectarianism that has been part of the sport, Catholics and Protestants are both involved in football throughout its levels. This sets it apart from a lot of sports. While it has been pointed out that, by far, most “clubs...operating at senior level [in Northern Ireland] are associated to a greater or lesser degree with the Protestant community”, (for the most part, run as well as backed by Protestants), such “is less likely to be the case at lower levels of the game.” Generally, the game “at lower levels is “a game of mass participation, played by Protestant and Catholic, Unionist and Republican, sometimes separately but frequently together. Thus…despite the way in which it is administered, soccer brings people together across geographical, political and cultural boundaries”.
Boxing

The sport of boxing is one in which Catholics as well as Protestants have been involved and is not an activity that belongs to any one group specifically. An individual’s politics or religion is not inferred from involvement in the sport. All sides have been instrumental in its development. The British army had a role in establishing “the foundations for organised amateur boxing in Belfast.” Prior to the latter 1960s, army boxing squads would compete against area boxers on a consistent basis in Belfast. In addition, the Royal Irish Constabulary was involved in boxing’s development in Belfast before 1921. The Royal Ulster Constabulary took over following the division of Ireland and, up to 1969, the RUC had a major part in the sport in the North as athletes as well as administrators. It must be noted, too, however, that “The Catholic Church has also played some part in the growth and development of boxing in Belfast.” Priests have been involved in the establishment of clubs dedicated to the sport.

Boxing has also been a labouring class sport, historically and at present. Nearly every one of the clubs in Belfast could be found in one of two kinds of areas. Clubs are found “in long standing inner city neighbourhoods”, among them the Shankill as well as Divis. Others are found in “dislocated, low income housing estates”. Examples of these would be Andersonstown and Turf Lodge. It is possible to label every one “of these” areas as belonging to one community or the other. Indeed, in the mid-1990s, over two thirds of Belfast’s around thirty boxing clubs could be found within areas occupied by nationalists. These served the needs of boxers who came from the Catholic community. Unionist area groups would also serve mainly members of their community.
Nonetheless, despite these geographical divisions, boxing has proven capable of crossing boundaries and transcending political divisions and violence. Sugden and Harvie have argued that “In the case of boxing, it is the city’s demography which is sectarian rather than elements within the sport itself.” The reality is, boxing teams, as well as those supporting them, visit one another’s venues or clubs, unconcerned about being harassed. They are given a friendly welcome, despite the probability of the areas concerned being politically hardline. Non-professional boxing kept going even at the conflict’s peak during the first part of the 1970s. A lot of other activities suffered due to concerns or fears about entering other localities. Still, Falls area boxers consistently took part in matches held inside a Shankill Road club.  

Furthermore, Sugden and Harvie have noted that after fighters have gotten older as well as devoted themselves to boxing, the ring takes priority over communal boundaries. Such a boxer will go to a different gym, including one located within an area occupied mainly by their religious or political opponents, if it is thought the quality of coaching will be higher or improved for them there. For instance, the Holy Family & Golden Gloves Boxing Club is located in a Catholic area. However, its members/those who use it include Catholics as well as Protestants. The boxers here compete as well as train alongside one another. Also, their coaches and trainers include Catholics and Protestants. According to John Loughran, a talented County Antrim boxer: "It's good, there's no bigotry here at all....In amateur boxing there's a mutual respect for everyone in the club. It's a fraternal thing." In 1992, the club, at this point called the Holy Family-Golden Gloves Boxing Club, despite its "Catholic" location, included a Protestant membership of 60%.
The organization of boxing allows fighters to cross boundaries and may allow certain fighters to resist simplistic national or sectarian labeling and divisions, to an extent beyond what occurs in other activities. The fact is, there is room in boxing for Catholic and Protestant boxers in Northern Ireland to fight on behalf of the Province as well as Ireland as a whole. Amateur boxers from Northern Ireland are governed by the Irish Amateur Boxing Association (now called the Irish Athletic Boxing Association). The IABA was set up in 1911 and covers the entire island. It is headquartered in Dublin. Other than in the Commonwealth Games, boxers from the Province have to compete for Ireland internationally.121

Athletes were and are willing to compete for Ireland, regardless of their religion. Two boxers in particular, Wayne McCullough and Barry McGuigan, serve as examples of the blurring of traditional boundaries and identities that can occur in this sport. In between being an Irish boxer for the 1988 and 1992 Olympic Games, taking a silver medal at the latter, McCullough took a gold medal in the 1990 Commonwealth Games, where he fought as a Northern Irish boxer. In 1988, at Seoul’s Olympics, McCullough was even Ireland’s flag bearer for Seoul’s opening ceremonies. This is notable - not only is McCullough a member of the Protestant community, he also is a native of the Shankill Road, the most famous Protestant and loyalist area and street in Belfast. It is obvious that, whatever McCullough may believe religiously and politically, he is willing to compete for both parts of Ireland, as the context calls for it. This, as well as his bearing of the Irish flag, demonstrates his willingness to place sport above political or religious divisions – despite the consequences.122 He has embraced a flexible Irish/Northern Irish identity.
McCullough demonstrated strong cross-border and non-sectarian citizenship on more than one occasion, despite the sectarian behaviour of some of his own countrymen. Belfast City Council held a reception in McCullough’s honour when he came home in the wake of his 1992 medal win. However, they would not extend an invitation to Irish boxer Michael Carruth. Carruth (a Catholic) hailed from the South. He was McCullough’s team mate as well as a gold medalist in Barcelona. McCullough was in attendance for Carruth’s Dublin reception shortly before. He, McCullough, “had been guest of honour”. The problem, ostensibly, was that Carruth held the rank of corporal in Ireland’s army and as Ireland continued to uphold its right to the Province, Belfast’s City Council contended that inviting Carruth was not something they could do. When Belfast City Council would not pay tribute to Michael Carruth, McCullough was upset. Said McCullough, "I am disgusted that Michael Carruth was not invited. He is a friend of mine." In response to Mayor Herbert Ditty's statement that "I can only go along with things that are British," McCullough scoffed "That's a lot of nonsense....Both religions were at the dinner. They think it's politics. To me it's sport. Down in Dublin they're not worried what religion you are."

Much more recently, McCullough demonstrated his continued willingness to cross traditional boundaries when, in June of 2012, he handed the Olympic flame over the boundary between Northern Ireland and the Republic to his old Olympic teammate, Michael Carruth. According to McCullough, "to cross the Border is a big, big thing, a big step. I carried the Irish flag in the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, Korea, and that was an honour and this is a big honour as well." McCullough also contended that "Boxing was
always a sport where Catholic and Protestant always came together, nobody brought them together, they came together themselves.”

Barry McGuigan is another example of an Ulster boxer who resisted standard divisions and easy categorization. McGuigan is from Monaghan. This county belongs to Ulster but not to Northern Ireland. When he was fighting as an amateur, he did so beneath the IABA. In 1976 he was the winner of Ireland's All Ireland Amateur Championship. In the 1978 Commonwealth Games, though, McGuigan, despite being from the Republic, fought for Northern Ireland. Two years later he fought for Ireland during the Moscow Olympics in 1980. He became a professional boxer in 1981 and was very popular during the middle of the 1980s and his King's Hall, Belfast fights usually sold out. After becoming a professional, his manager told him he should fight for British titles instead of Irish ones. He took the British Title in 1983. For McGuigan, his athletic career took priority over traditional divisions and he, too, displayed a pluralist identity as an Irish, an Ulster, and even a British boxer.

McGuigan, despite being officially from the Republic, tried to walk a line between unionists and nationalists. He utilized the UN flag. The “Londonderry Air” or “Danny Boy” was chosen over the national anthems of Ireland and Britain. Unfortunately, many nationalists who were not involved in or with boxing held McGuigan’s fighting for British titles against him. To them he was a traitor. Indeed, McGuigan, bearing a world title, visited Belfast, and phrases like “Barry the Brit – sold his soul for English gold” could be seen in nationalist localities. However, during this 1985 Belfast visit, "McGuigan and his wife were feted in a public reception through the
streets of Belfast that attracted several hundred thousand spectators.”¹³¹ Today, McGuigan is considered a Northern Ireland Sport Star.¹³²

**Equestrian Sport**

Equestrian activities cross borders and have involved people from both communities. Prior to the establishment of Horse Sport Ireland, the Equestrian Federation of Ireland was responsible for such sport. At the end of 2006, Horse Sport Ireland was established. In January of 2008 it took over as "the Governing Body for equestrian sport in Ireland (32 counties)".¹³³ HSI was acknowledged as the ruling body by the Irish Sports Council, Olympic Council of Ireland as well as the Federation Equestre Internationale. The following summer, HSI took over the upkeep of the Irish Horse Register. Sport Northern Ireland officially acknowledged HSI as equestrians' ruling body in 2010.¹³⁴ North and South work together to nurture athletic talent. The HSI/SNI Talent ID Programme aims to assist talented riders who wish to compete at "Senior European Championship Team Level".¹³⁵

HSI chooses the international teams and "All Irish teams competing in FEI international competitions do so as part of Team Ireland Equestrian". The latter includes showjumping and dressage.¹³⁶ In 2009 the "Team Ireland Equestrian brand was" created so that every FEI sport was beneath a single brand. The Team Ireland Equestrian logo is a green, white, and orange shamrock on a darker green background.

*Figure 18: Team Ireland Equestrian Logo*
Riders have crossed national and sectarian boundaries quite easily in equestrian sport. Sherelle Duke, a 28-year-old Protestant native of Portadown, is a case in point. A skilled rider, she died in 2006 in a competition accident in England. However, prior to the tragedy she had represented Ireland in the European Championships in 2003 and was preparing for the Beijing Olympics at the time of her death. She was instrumental in the qualification of Ireland for the 2004 Olympics in Athens as well. Duke was also supposed to ride for Ireland the following month at the Burghley Horse Trials. Other equestrians from Northern Ireland include Sam and Stephen Moore. Both brothers died after falling in competitions, Sam in 1997 and Stephen in 2008. In the case of Stephen, his death came several weeks after his accident. Both brothers had a Protestant background. Sam lost his life in the Blenheim Palace International Horse Trials, representing Ireland. Stephen at one point "was long-listed for the Irish team for the Olympics." Unfortunately, he suffered a broken leg when a horse kicked him, ending his chances of an Olympic performance.

**Golf**

Golf is another sport that crosses borders and transcends religion. The Golfing Union of Ireland was set up in 1891 and is an Ireland-wide body. The Union's founding clubs - there were 9 - were Ulster based. Still, golf existed outside of Ulster, too. There were 28 golf courses operating in Ireland when the Union was created. In 1986 the GUI had 248 affiliated clubs. These served the needs of 123,000 players. There are now 425 clubs, including more than 150,000 people. Golf is extremely popular and it has been noted that "more Irish people were officially registered to play golf than soccer or Gaelic football according to 2006 statistics." 1 out of 15 individuals in Ireland as a whole "is a
registered golfer." This greatly exceeds the majority of European countries.\textsuperscript{142} Talented Northern golfers, Graeme McDowell, Rory McIlroy as well as Darren Clarke have all benefited from the GUI.\textsuperscript{143}

The Confederation of Golf in Ireland was founded in 2013/2014 and is also all-island. The GUI and Irish Ladies Golf Union (ILGU), along with the PGA, set up the CGI. It is a cooperative effort involving the men's and ladies' game as well as the Irish Region of the PGA.\textsuperscript{144} The latter region's headquarters is Dundalk, County Louth in the Republic. The PGA in Ireland has "two sub-branches", a Northern Branch and one in the South, but the North is considered part of the Ireland Region.\textsuperscript{145} The CGI was established to nurture and aid golf across Ireland as a whole. Sport Northern Ireland and the Irish Sports Council participated in the work resulting in the establishment of the CGI and they back it. The CGI covers every player in Ireland, regardless of region, age or status. It is based in County Kildare.\textsuperscript{146}

Irish female amateur golf is run by the Irish Ladies Golf Union and crosses the border between the North and the South. The ILGU was born in Belfast in 1893. The Union wanted to include all female players in Ireland. The organization wanted to have a yearly "championship competition". The initial one occurred in 1894. To begin with, though, clubs in the South were hesitant to become members of the Union. A mere 3 out of 18 ILGU affiliated clubs in 1902 were from the South. Decisions were made to attract more southern membership. The choice was made to have the Championship of 1904 take place at County Clare's Lahinch Club. The general meeting of 1906 was to occur in Dublin in yet another gesture to the South. After this, these meetings alternated between Belfast and Dublin. Currently, the base of the ILGU is Dublin (Sandyford). It became so
in 2008. Five "administrative Districts" exist. These are Ulster, Connacht, Munster, East Leinster as well as Mid Leinster. Around 42,000 women players can be found in Ireland who golf regularly. They range in age from child to senior citizen. Players and teams are chosen by the ILGU to play for Ireland in International competition.\textsuperscript{147}

Another significant development came in 1972 when "the LGU [Ladies Golf Union, established in 1893]\textsuperscript{148} took the decision that ladies golf in England, Scotland and Wales should be independently administered, as was already the case in Ireland." The ILGU would henceforth carry out its business beneath the LGU as an "umbrella" organization, as would the ELGA, WLGU and SLGA. Prior to this, Irish clubs on their own could link with or affiliate with the LGU. The Irish union chose two people to be on the Executive Council of the LGU. This remains the case.\textsuperscript{149} The LGU covers Great Britain and Ireland non-professional women's golf. It is headquartered at St. Andrews in Scotland and is currently made up of England Golf, the Scottish Ladies' Golfing Association, the Golf Union of Wales, and the ILGU. It should be noted that "Operational activities are undertaken by a wholly owned subsidiary, LGU Championships Limited." Together, the LGU as well as the LGUCL make up the LGU Group. The Ricoh Women's British Open is owned as well as administered by the Group. This competition was set up in 1976 and is played by professionals.\textsuperscript{150}

There are occasions where golfers from Ireland and Great Britain compete together on a single team. The LGU Group chooses the teams for competitions like the Curtis Cup as well as the Vagliano Trophy.\textsuperscript{151} The Curtis Cup began in 1932. This event occurs every other year and pits an American women's golfing team against one from Great Britain and Ireland. The LGU chooses the golfers for the Great Britain and Ireland
The Vagliano Trophy, established in 1959, meanwhile, has a single women's Great Britain and Ireland team taking on the European Continent. The competition in June of 2015 saw four Irish golfers take part - two for the Junior team and two for the Senior team. On the former, one of these players, Mairead Martin, was from the South and the other, Annabel Wilson, was from the North. This was also the case on the Senior team, where Olivia Mehaffey was from Northern Ireland and Leona Maguire was from the Republic.

The crossing of national boundaries and the ability to hold more than one identity is very much endemic to the sport of golf and it can be seen among some of Northern Ireland's most talented athletes. For example, Graeme McDowell is a golfer who has transcended traditional boundaries. Although a Protestant himself, McDowell has a Catholic mother and has said "Irish - British, call me what you want." He is also a fan of Manchester United. In 2009 McDowell played a role in Great Britain and Ireland (as a single team) winning the Vivendi Trophy against Europe. Yet he and Rory McIlroy came in second representing Ireland at the World Cup. Indeed, McDowell has claimed that he "grew up wanting to wear the green jacket and have the golf bag with the Ireland logo on it." He has also stated that he has "always enjoyed" playing under the GUI.

Rory McIlroy, meanwhile, has a Catholic background yet grew up in an area that was mainly Protestant. He went to "a non-denominational school" and has "a British passport." He has golfed for Ireland and been part of a Great Britain and Ireland team at the Walker Cup. His identity has proven to be very fluid, as he noted in 2011 that "I'm Northern Irish. If people want to take me for British they can, and if they want to take me for Irish they can."
Both golfers have confronted the issue of whether they will play golf for Ireland or Britain in the Olympics in Rio in 2016 as golf will once again be an Olympic sport this year. The fact that McIlroy and McDowell are Northern Ireland natives means they can play for either team.\textsuperscript{158} In 2009, McIlroy stated that "I'd love to win an Olympic gold medal" and "I'd probably play for Great Britain."\textsuperscript{159} In 2012 he stated that "What makes it such an awful position to be in is I have grown up my whole life playing for Ireland under the Golfing Union of Ireland umbrella....But the fact is, I've always felt more British than Irish."\textsuperscript{160} Finally, in 2014, McIlroy stated he would golf for the Irish team at the Olympics. He had feelings of loyalty towards the GUI and noted that "I played boy junior and boys golf for Ireland, I played my amateur golf for Ireland - just because I'm getting paid that doesn't mean I should change that."\textsuperscript{161} Unfortunately, in June 2016, due to worries about the Zika virus, McIlroy chose not to compete at the Rio Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{162}

As far as which Olympic golf team he would rather compete for, McDowell said in 2010: "It'd be an honour to represent your country and I don't mind which one I play for."\textsuperscript{163} McDowell, however, expressed the hope in 2012 that the International Olympic Committee would decide which nation he ought to play for at the upcoming Olympics in Rio. He stated that "We are in a unique scenario in Northern Ireland in that we [he and McIlroy] have one foot on each team. So I think it's going to be a lot easier if someone makes the decision for us." Noting that he has a parent from each religious tradition, McDowell claimed "I always kind of sit on the fence because that's exactly the only place I can sit. I'd play for whatever team would have me come 2016."\textsuperscript{164} Yet, McDowell ultimately, by default, put himself on the Irish team for the Olympics in 2016.\textsuperscript{165}
chose to represent Ireland at the World Cup in 2013 and that automatically placed him on Ireland's side in the 2016 Olympics as three years would have had to separate the 2013 World Cup and McDowell representing Britain at the Olympics. Regardless of the outcome, the *Belfast Telegraph*, the mainstream unionist newspaper in the North, laid claim to both McDowell and McIlroy, declaring that "No matter who G-Mac or Rory play for in Rio, the public here should be right behind them in their bids to bring gold home...to Northern Ireland." In the end, however, like McIlroy, McDowell chose not to go to Rio - even when an opportunity to step in for his fellow Northern Irishman presented itself. He wanted to remain with his pregnant wife.

Both golfers have to some extent managed to appeal to Protestant and Catholic, Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, fans alike. The *Irish News* has referred to McDowell and McIlroy as "Irish", despite the difference in their religious backgrounds. At one point, the *Irish News* noted that McDowell "join[s] [Fred] Daly and Padraig Harrington as Irish Major champions." Daly, a native of Portrush in County Antrim, was the winner at the British Open in 1947 and Harrington is a golfer from the Republic. Both appear to be Catholic. Yet McDowell's religious affiliation did not prevent him from being included in such company by a primarily Catholic Northern Ireland paper. Meanwhile, in the *Belfast Telegraph*, a unionist, but also cross-community, paper in the North, McDowell has been called an "Ulsterman" and an "Irishman". The paper has noted that "For the people of Northern Ireland, McDowell's win [at the U.S. Open of 2010] has evoked much national pride." He is able to aid in demonstrating "that we are a civilised people on this island [italics mine]." He represents "so much of what is good about this province." Colin Walker, captain of Rathmore
Club, where McDowell played, said of his achievement: "It is massive. We have come through, as a country, such doom and gloom over the years it is great that we have another sporting hero....and this is a major achievement for golf here in Northern Ireland and for Irish golf [italics mine]." Indeed, Northern Ireland's leaders, Peter Robinson (DUP) and Martin McGuinness (SF), both praised McDowell.  

McDowell's transcendent popularity was also clear when he came home to Portrush and the Rathmore Club and "Hundreds turned out in the rain to" show him their respect and affection. In Portrush, McDowell was described as "everyone's best friend". Rory McIlroy even came by Rathmore Club to see McDowell. Perhaps the most telling evidence of the cross-community appeal of golfers like McDowell came from teenage golfer, Thomas Beaumont (13), of Northern Ireland, stating that "I would love one day to turn professional and win competitions at that level the way Rory McIlroy and Graeme McDowell have done."  

Rory McIlroy has also proved to be a darling of the northern press. He as well as McDowell have been referred to as "Ulstermen" in the Belfast Telegraph. At one point McIlroy was called a "brilliant young Ulsterman." One headline even referred to him as "our Rory". Another exclaimed "Go for it, Rory; We're behind you all the way in US glory bid". This sense of ownership was spelled out very clearly in the Belfast Telegraph when McIlroy won at the 2011 U.S. Open: "he is ours...and our wee country, united behind him as he strode down the 18th green last night, is immensely proud to call him one of our own." Later, the paper stated "Sorry, Eire but you're not having him. Oh, and you lot from across the Irish sea can lay off, too." Although Catholic, Rory McIlroy belongs to all people in Northern Ireland - and to no one else!
McIlroy's cross-community appeal is astonishing. Lots of people were watching at Holywood Golf Club when McIlroy played and it burst "into cheers and tears of joy" when he won the U.S. Open. The Belfast Telegraph claimed that "His victory is welcomed by people from all backgrounds in Northern Ireland." James McKerrow, North Down mayor and UUP politician, remarked "I think all the councillors will be with me in wanting to make sure as many people as possible see Rory and the cup, perhaps through using an open-top bus." Ruth Patterson, deputy Lord Mayor of Belfast and DUP member, wanted Belfast City Council to acknowledge his achievement. Assembly activity also halted at one point so members could congratulate McIlroy. Peter Weir, member of the Assembly from North Down and also a DUP politician, "stayed up late" so he could watch McIlroy. McIlroy was invited to Stormont to meet with Robinson and McGuinness who offered the golfer congratulations as well. McIlroy gave the men some golf tips on Stormont lawn. In 2014, following McIlroy's Open Championship victory, Stephen Dunne, a "DUP councillor" in North Down, was at the Holywood Golf Club parking lot in case McIlroy came and brought his Claret Jug. According to Dunne, "Everybody is delighted and I have been working with the council to get special banners put up." Like McDowell, McIlroy is seen as a positive representative for the province. According to Peter Robinson, "We are really proud of him, not only because of the achievement of a fantastic golfing career and the competition he has won but he is a tremendous ambassador for Northern Ireland." McIlroy himself has claimed that "I am very proud to be from Northern Ireland."

**Conclusion**

Sport has a strong tradition of fluidity when it comes to boundaries and identity, with organizations and athletes regularly crossing borders and representing Northern
Ireland and the Republic and sometimes even Britain. Sportsmen and women play together, regardless of communal background, in various cases, even though sectarian divisions do remain a problem. Sport creates, to a surprising degree, a shared space for people in Ireland, North and South, and for the British Isles more generally. There is, of course, much room for improvement and many barriers yet to cross, but culture, including sport, is, to a significant extent, shared in Northern Ireland/Ireland.
CHAPTER 9

MYTH AND THE THIRD COMMUNITY:
THE ‘REAL’ OR ‘DECENT’ PEOPLE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

The Third Community has expressed itself with particular strength in reaction to events of significant violence. The responses of citizens to the murder of William Best, the Bloody Friday and Claudy bombings (all taking place in 1972), the Enniskillen bombing (1987), the Omagh bombing, the deaths of the Quinn brothers (both in 1998), and the deaths of Catholic police officers between 1998 and 2011 reveal a deconstruction of traditional myths and the presentation and construction of alternatives. These include the notion that most people in Northern Ireland are “decent” people who do not hate others and who wish to see an end to violence. The reactions of “ordinary” people to these violent events effectively located extremist (in particular, paramilitary) elements outside the boundaries of civilized society. In place of republican and loyalist martyrs, new heroes and martyrs emerged, members of "decent" society, whose main attributes were their goodness and innocence.

A Pattern is Set: Third Community Responses to Violence in 1972

On May 21 of 1972, William Best (19), who was a Northern Irish Catholic and belonged to the British Army (specifically the Royal Irish Rangers), was killed by the OIRA. The reaction of local people was immediate and powerful. Around 200 women from Derry's Bogside "marched on Official IRA headquarters", expressing their opposition to Best's murder. According to one woman, "This is murder and we are sick of it." Said a fellow protestor, "They have brought themselves down to the level of the Paras on Bloody Sunday....We want rid of them." Supposedly the OIRA promised protestors on May 22 "that offensive shootings in the city" would cease. Shortly
afterward, many women went to Best's funeral and "Twenty-five priests from local parishes led about 5,000 mourners from St. Mary's Church on the Creggan to the nearby cemetery."4

The fight for peace, galvanized by the Best murder, continued. On May 23, over 2,000 citizens participated in "a peace meeting" and "voted for an end to the violence." Catholic priest the Reverend Martin Rooney spoke at the gathering as did Reverend Hugh O'Neill. The two clerics "put proposals for peace to" those gathered, including women and men. Best's killing was denounced as was violence generally. According to John White, a leader in the OIRA, "I never felt that the killing of Best would lead to this."5 Several days later, a demonstration took place in Dublin at the headquarters of Provisional Sinn Fein. Over 100 protesters were there. The group behind the demonstration was called the North Demands Peace Movement. Members of both communities from Northern Ireland as well as the Republic were involved. The Archbishop of Dublin (Church of Ireland) made an appearance, as did the SDLP's Austin Currie and Fine Gael's Garret Fitzgerald.6 Finally, around 5,000 gathered for "an assembly of intercession for peace" on May 28 in Derry. St. Patrick's (Pennyburn) priests as well as parish council arranged it. According to Reverend Anthony Mulvey, the event consisted "of Christian people who had come to demonstrate their desire for peace."7 Indeed, clerical opposition to violence was made very clear when the Catholic, Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist Church leaders released a statement which appealed for "all Christian people to pray more insistently than ever for a just solution to present problems, and to show forth their rejection of violence and their commitment to peaceful means."8
The people's anger and protests produced results eight days after Best's death. On 29 May the OIRA declared a ceasefire and, the following day, the *Belfast Telegraph* rightly credited this ceasefire to "the people". The reaction to Best's death and the number of people who mourned him was astonishing given the fact that Best was a member of the British armed forces, a "collaborator" in the eyes of republicans. For local people, however, he was an innocent victim, a member of their community murdered by fringe elements who were no better than the British soldiers who had killed unarmed demonstrators on January 30 of 1972 (Bloody Sunday). Society's reaction was testament to the existence of a Third Community opposed to violence, but also to a belief in that community, a belief that ordinary, decent people wanted peace.

The Bloody Friday bombings of 21 July 1972, carried out by the PIRA, similarly set off a wave of horror and anger among the population. The 19 explosions in Belfast that day took the lives of 9 and wounded well over 100 others. The victims included all sides to the conflict - Protestants, Catholics, and two British soldiers. Right away, victims and their families were singled out for their innocence and nobility. The family of Stephen Parker (14) was trying "not to feel bitter". According to Parker's father, Reverend Joseph Parker, "If we thought Stephen's death would help bring an end to all this, it would make it easier to bear." Joseph Parker was assisting rescue efforts before learning his son had been killed. Another victim, Margaret O'Hare, who had seven children, was killed when, fearing for her loved ones, she went to get them at a family member's house. O'Hare was "a very nice person and a devoted mother." According to Monsignor Arthur Ryan, O'Hare died "on a mission of mercy." Meanwhile, William Crothers (15) was remembered by neighbours as a "shy, quiet, blond-haired boy who
looked after his mother so well and lived for football." Jack Gibson (bus operator) who also died on Bloody Friday "was a chap on whom neighbours placed a great deal of reliance. He died at his post of duty...on the buses, where he had a smile for everybody." Furthermore, Billy Irvine (18) lost his life because he willingly remained at his old job "for another week" as a fellow worker was sick. All of these victims came across as selfless, decent people who cared about others. In their acts of bravery and daily kindness they were portrayed as possessing a quiet heroism. During a service for those who had died, Reverend Sydney Callaghan (Methodist) took this view a step further and spoke of the dead in the terms of Christian martyrdom, claiming that "Some have called last Friday Bloody Friday. There was another Bloody Friday long ago. We now call it Good Friday, because it led to Easter Day and the triumph of good over evil and love over hate." 

The militants, in contrast, were quickly isolated and their mythical "freedom fighter" status destroyed. According to the *Belfast Telegraph*, "The Provos have again underlined that they are no mean enemy of everyone in this community [italics mine]." Those responsible "are not folk heroes, but cold-blooded murderers." Indeed, according to Monsignor Arthur Ryan, the IRA were guilty of "perverting the noble virtue of patriotism into a hate-filled ideology, which they hold to justify any barbarism perpetrated in its name." In a letter to the editor of the *Belfast Telegraph*, Cothrom na Fianna declared that "The bombers...are of no religious convictions, they cannot be, and they defile and debase those of the people they purport to fight for. Neither are they Republicans - this particular form of political and cultural idealism demands a great love of our people, our land and of God." Even Southern Ireland's Taoiseach (Prime
Minister) Jack Lynch, at an AOH convention, declared "We reject the action of the current IRA - actions which are anathema to the men of the old IRA who fought for freedom 50 years ago." In short, the IRA perpetrators of Bloody Friday had their "ancestral" connections with the old IRA, which they cherished, and therefore their legitimacy, disputed.

Members of the Third Community clearly expressed themselves and declared their existence after the deaths. A lot of people were at Jackie Gibson's and Margaret O'Hare's funerals. A Catholic and a Protestant bishop went to see bomb casualties in hospital, defying sectarian divisions. A Catholic citizen of Belfast wrote to the editor of the Belfast Telegraph arguing that "The decent Catholic and Protestants [sic] make up the large majority of the population" and "the true Christians and pacifists of this province wish to live in peace and harmony." Monsignor Ryan echoed this sentiment at Margaret O'Hare's funeral, where he argued "that the vast majority of Catholics are as good and kindly and God-fearing as the gracious lady we mourn today." Queen's students also denounced IRA violence and spoke up for the Province's regular citizens. According to a statement "It is always the ordinary people who suffer while fanatics devoted to inhuman ideologies use them as fodder for their political activities." They argued that "It is time for the IRA to realise once and for all that no substantial section of the population supports these obscene acts against humanity." About a week after the bombings, around 300 people were present for a service at the location of one of the major explosions - a bus station. Jim Kilfedder (UUP MP) organized the event. Catholic and Protestant clergy were involved and present, once again in defiance of sectarian and political divisions.
The people of Northern Ireland were still recovering from the tragedy of Bloody Friday when, ten days later, the little town of Claudy was targeted by republican militants and there were nine bombing deaths. Again, the Third Community raised its voice in defiance. According to one man, "This isn't going to drive a wedge between the Protestants and Catholics in Claudy. They'll be closer together than before." A fellow local similarly declared "We've never fought and we're not going to start now." Victims were once more praised and recognized. One person described victim Tracy McElhinney as "the nicest woman in God's earth...And it didn't matter who you were, she couldn't do enough to help you." William Temple's (16) funeral, meanwhile, was attended by members of both communities. Catholics and Protestants followed the casket.

As with Bloody Friday, the militants were denounced, a Catholic from Belfast claiming "These men are not protectors, liberators or defenders; they are heartless killers." A Catholic priest from Ardoyne called on people to "Close your doors to these deluded people. Throw their publications in the fire. Refuse them all financial aid." This priest, Father Aquinas, further argued that "a vast difference exists between those ferocious, fanatical, mis-guided, deluded men, and people of such noble character as Pearce [sic], Connolly and Plunkett." Methodist Reverend Robert Livingstone supported Aquinas' stance against violence, whatever side it came from. According to Bishop Cahal Daly, "The only people now who seem to think that a military solution is possible are extremist unionists and extremists [sic] republicans." Ordinary, decent people were not in favour of using violence to deal with the Province's problems.

Peace demands also took on a ritualistic form in the wake of this tragedy. Two processions for peace took place in Dublin on July 31. They concluded in Christ Church
Cathedral. There "an interdenominational service" took place. Protestors stopped at Sinn Fein headquarters to submit a written protest against the violence taking place in the North. People had had enough and were willing to cross religious boundaries to pray for peace in a Church of Ireland Cathedral. Indeed, one set of marchers traveled to Christ Church from St Mary's Pro Cathedral, the Catholic Primate of Ireland and Archbishop of Dublin's seat.35

Anti-Violence, Remembrance, and the Third Community from the 1980s

The “Decent” People of Northern Ireland

Public reactions to deadly atrocities continued to follow a similar pattern in subsequent years. An examination of the press coverage of the IRA’s bombing in Enniskillen in 1987, which resulted in 11 Protestant casualties, and the Real IRA’s bombing in Omagh in August of 1998, in which 29 people of both major communities were killed, reveals a recognition of the divided nature of Northern Irish society as well as a belief that such atrocities were abhorred by “decent” Northern Irish people. This is the case whether one is perusing the pages of the nationalist/Catholic Irish News, the Protestant/unionist News Letter (also known as the Belfast Newsletter and the Belfast News Letter), or the non-sectarian, unionist Belfast Telegraph.36

The 1987 Enniskillen bombing drew forth strong statements in favour of the peaceful majority. In response to the bombing, the regular “Viewpoint” column in the Belfast Telegraph claimed that the perpetrators “could not have calculated...on the way the tragedy has shocked the entire community, Protestant and Catholic, unionist and nationalist....The politicians are as united as the people in condemning the IRA as an organization which is beyond the pale of human sensibility.”37 A cleric, Reverend
Russell Birney, was also paraphrased in the *Belfast Telegraph* as saying that “There was no mandate from the people for one more drop of blood to be shed.” In a similar vein, the following response appeared in the unionist *News Letter* in the wake of the bombing of Enniskillen: “Expressions of revulsion and condemnation cannot adequately convey the horror, which will be shared by decent people in both sections of the community both Protestant and Roman Catholic, over the murder and maiming of Service personnel and innocent civilians”. There was a clear attempt to separate the bombers of Enniskillen from the “decent people” of Northern Ireland of both communities who opposed such callous actions.

Similar reactions to the Enniskillen bombing could be found among nationalists. The perpetrators were effectively ostracized by the *Irish News*, which referred to the bombers as “maniacs” on November 10. The following day, the *Irish News* responded to Enniskillen by commenting that “The ordinary people of Ireland, North and South, Catholic and Protestant, have had their fill and more of the peddlers of hate and the merchants of bitterness.” The editorial went further to argue that “Tawdry and misguided romantic images of freedom fighters espousing a justifiable cause deserve contempt and ridicule. There is nothing romantic about the placement of no-warning bombs, the firing of bullets which strike victims from close range or the destruction of decency and fair mindedness through the use of malice-laden rhetoric.” There is even an attempt by some ordinary Catholics to denounce the bombers as unrepresentative of their community. For example, one woman wrote to the *Belfast Telegraph*:

> You claim to represent the Catholic community. I and the vast majority of my friends, acquaintances, family and colleagues, Catholic and otherwise (including some elderly Irish patriots who fought in the War of Independence!) completely reject you and what you presume to do in our
name….You, or people like you, cannot possibly represent anything or anybody truly Irish.\textsuperscript{42}

In both cases republican mythology was contested by nationalists, the \textit{Irish News} going on to argue that all the people must “find a way forward, even if it means that in treading that most difficult of routes, political values once placed on an untouchable pedestal, have to be reassessed in the light of new realities.” In short, the men of violence and hate were not supported by “the ordinary people” and were set apart from them by their actions.\textsuperscript{43}

Similarly, following the Omagh bombing of 1998, there were calls for unity and peace, clear rejections of violent men, and a strong belief in the decent majority. The \textit{Belfast Telegraph} made the following appeal: “Let our entire community unite against this evil which has manifested itself in Omagh. Let us commit ourselves to peace, and peace alone….Let us resolve to build a new future together, unionist and nationalist alike.”\textsuperscript{44} The desired “utopia” here was one of Protestant/Catholic togetherness. The notion that most people desired peace was reflected in Reverend Ian Mairs’ words, quoted in the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} as follows: “I believe, as never before that there exists a corporate will to work together to build a new community under the mantle of the new political structures, which the vast majority of the decent, God-fearing, peace-loving people of this island of Ireland have voted for.”\textsuperscript{45} The \textit{Irish News} reiterated the point that the people of Ireland, north and south, supported the Good Friday Agreement in the May referendum:

The bombings since that vote, particularly Saturday’s, are as close to an act of treason as it is possible to get….The handful of people who make up the Real IRA must not be allowed to stand in the way of the expressed wish of the people of Ireland. They cannot succeed if we all, Catholic and Protestant, nationalist and unionist, republican and loyalist, unite against them.\textsuperscript{46}
Here support for the Good Friday Agreement was used to reinforce the notion that most people did not want violence and to strike at those who continued to use it. Indeed, SDLP politician Seamus Mallon was quoted in the *Irish News* as saying of the perpetrators of Omagh: “These people have nothing to offer society but death, destruction and suffering. They represent no-one but themselves. Their actions are totally against the wishes of the vast majority of the people of Northern Ireland and their political representatives who have tried so hard to find a peaceful way forward”.47 The belief that the men of violence were unrepresentative of the people was also made clear in the *News Letter*, which stated: “the people of Northern Ireland want peace above all else, and real peace can only come when evil men are removed from society and decent people resolve to respect and protect the rights of every other citizen, regardless of class or creed.”48 There was a sense here, as elsewhere in the press, that most people were “decent people” who desired peace and therefore had a duty to stand together against the men of violence. The divisions in Northern Irish society were acknowledged, but they appeared alongside the belief in the decency of the majority.

**Angels and Demons: Peaceful Martyrs and “Hell-Inspired Monsters”**

Connected to the belief in the decency of ordinary people in Northern Ireland and the abhorrence and revulsion expressed at violent acts, was the creation of new or different kinds of martyrs. These martyrs were not republican freedom-fighters or loyalist soldiers, but sacrificial victims whose nobility lay in their innocence, goodness, and, in some cases, their ordinariness.49 For instance, one Enniskillen casualty, 71-year-old Kit Johnston, it is pointed out, had, in the past, been given a “British Empire Medal for his ambulance service”.50 Another, Ted Armstrong, according to Reverend John
Faris, was “a very decent, unassuming, uncomplicated Christian man....He was no ogre, no oppressor, just an ordinary off-duty policeman who went out to Church on Sunday to worship God, to meet his friends and to remember the fallen”. 51 In a similar vein, Marie Wilson, the Enniskillen bombing’s youngest casualty, was a “student nurse” who “brought cheer to everyone she knew”. 52 Her father characterized her as “a gentle girl. She did not ask a sick man or a sick child if they were a Protestant or a Catholic. She would not have wanted any bitterness.” 53 Similarly, following the Omagh bombing in 1998, the fact that 17-year-old Samantha McFarland “died alongside....her best friend Lorraine” was pointed out in the press. 54 Samantha McFarland was characterized by Reverend Derek Quinn as “a wonderful young girl.” Quinn went on to say that “She was a kind and caring person, very interested in the environment and obviously concerned with other people when she gave up her time to work in Oxfam.” 55 All of these people were portrayed as polar opposites to the violent terrorists. They were characterized as ordinary, but good, people who cared about others and who were innocent victims of violence.

Biblical or religious imagery and diction proved to be a very effective tool for separating good people, like those above, from the evil men of violence. In the News Letter, following the 1987 Enniskillen bombing, the IRA was argued to have demonstrated through the years that they were “totally devoid of the last vestiges of humanity”. However, the bombing “in Enniskillen most surely assures those who planted the bomb a place in the darkest pit of hell.” 56 Indeed, Paisley was quoted referring to Enniskillen as a “diabolical deed by hell-inspired monsters.” The bombing was “sacrilege of the worst kind.” 57 In the same vein, William Fleming, the Presbyterian
Moderator, quoted in the *Belfast Telegraph*, claimed that “The spirit which motivated this brutal massacre is so inhuman that it can only be described as satanic.” Following the Omagh bombing, Reverend Ian Mairs proclaimed that “We must commit ourselves to resist, and actively pray against, the activities of the demonic minority who are hell bent on destroying us, our loved ones, our community, our island, and our future.” The notion that the forces behind the violence in Northern Ireland were “demonic” or “satanic” was an obvious way of distancing such people from the rest of society, of exorcising the demons from that society, especially in a country in which religion is a major part of political, social, and cultural life. The people of Northern Ireland must fight against the forces of hell to establish their Kingdom of God on earth.

Meanwhile, victims like Marie Wilson and those in Omagh, and sometimes their surviving family members, were transformed, via Christian language and concepts, into a unique pantheon of martyrs and even Christ-like saviours in the wake of atrocities. According to the *Belfast Telegraph*, in the wake of Enniskillen, Marie Wilson’s mother “felt no hatred or bitterness, even towards those responsible for the bomb.” Her sentiments were echoed by Reverend Robert Armstrong, who claimed he did not hate those who murdered his brother Wesley: “Hatred only leads to more hatred and is no answer.” It could be argued that Marie’s mother’s apparent refusal to be dominated by hatred, as well as Robert Armstrong’s rejection of hate, was both noble and victorious - robbing the perpetrators of their victory by denying them the power to destroy the forces of good in those they hurt. Furthermore, the goodness of victims like Marie Wilson lived on to nurture those left behind, thus overpowering the forces of darkness, as was made clear in the minister’s words at Marie’s funeral:
You tell me Marie Wilson is dead and presently we will lay to rest her mortal remains with much love....But I saw the spirit of Marie in the casualty department of the Erne Hospital. I saw the spirit of Marie in the waves of compassion and practical caring that crossed over the religious divide as a shattered community came close together in love and succour for the bereaved and injured.\textsuperscript{63}

Wilson's "spirit" manifested as Christian virtue and, like Christ, lived on after her body.

Religious language and ideas were similarly used after the Omagh bombing. In the wake of Omagh, it was said by the chairman of the Youth Council for Northern Ireland, Michael Murphy, that “Somehow out of this carnage and out of the suffering and sorrow...the ordinary people of Omagh have become extraordinary people by their actions. They have given to the rest of us a renewed faith in people and a determination to achieve peace in Northern Ireland.”\textsuperscript{64} In other words, the courage of the citizens of Omagh in the face of the violence transformed them into inspirational, larger-than-life figures - like martyrs. They were people to be admired and from whom the remainder of the country could draw hope and strength. The transformation of the victims of Omagh into martyrs was made particularly clear in the following words from \textit{The Irish News}:

\begin{quote}
The people who died in Omagh have paid the price for whatever peace the rest of us enjoy from this day on. And what a price - the mindless slaughter of men, women and children, cut down as they shopped in a busy market town on a Saturday afternoon.....The remarkable heroism of those who survived and those who helped them was in marked contrast to the evil of those who manufactured, primed and planted the bomb.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

As Christ paid the price for humanity’s sins, so the people of Northern Ireland were in debt to the victims of Omagh for any future peace they experienced. In a similar vein, one man, who lost his wife in the Omagh bomb, was quoted as saying: “If this is the last bomb, then my wife will not have died in vain.”\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, the “memorial plaque” to the
Omagh victims concluded with the following words: “May their memory serve to foster peace and reconciliation”.67 In short, in contrast to republican and loyalist “martyrs”, the victims of incidents like Enniskillen and Omagh were martyrs, or potential martyrs, for peace and the redemption of Northern Ireland and its people.

Christian language and beliefs also shaped ideas about the future in the wake of such violent incidents. In particular, the need for reconciliation appeared in the press. Reverend Jimmy Hughes argued that the sole way to truly honour and respect those who were killed was for violence to be rejected by all: “That would bring some good out of all this suffering and sorrow. Reconciliation isn’t a dream. It is the will of God and it is the only way that leads forward.”68 “AN IRISHWOMAN” wrote to the Belfast Telegraph that “It’s time to pick up the pieces; to forgive, and to try to work together for the future - while we still have one.”69 Indeed, overtones of the Christian concept of “turn the other cheek” could be found in the press. For instance, in the News Letter, in the wake of the Enniskillen bombing, were the following words: “The bombing was intended by the Provisionals as an act of provocation; let no-one in this community fall into that trap by indulging in any form of retaliation.”70 In a similar vein, John Hume was quoted in the Belfast Telegraph as saying, following Enniskillen, “The doctrine of an-eye-for-an-eye leaves everybody blind.”71 Father James Grimes, uncle to two of those killed in the Omagh bombing, preached forgiveness of the perpetrators to the assembled congregation: “‘Father, forgive them, they know not what they do’ – ‘I think we know how difficult that is but we must try to do likewise’.72 Calls for reconciliation and forgiveness framed the conflict in terms of a religious battle which called on the righteous or would-be righteous to reconcile and forgive in order to progress.
Rituals of Sorrow and Commemoration

Rituals of mourning, remembrance, and protest also provide evidence of the existence of a third tradition which resists categorization as either Protestant or Catholic, unionist or nationalist, or which at least resists in a ritualized, symbolic manner the extremities of loyalism and republicanism. For example, in the wake of the Enniskillen bombing, which took the lives of 11 Protestants, Catholic schoolboys who went to a local Enniskillen Catholic school “attended a Remembrance Service in Portora Royal School as a “gesture of solidarity” with the Protestant community”, according to the *Belfast Telegraph*.73 Similarly, the *Irish News’* provision of the “Order of Service” for the “Day of Reflection” in Omagh is illuminating. Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Anglican church leaders participated together in the service. Interestingly, the “Welcome” was given in three languages, Irish, English, and Spanish (due to the Spanish casualties of the bomb), but the Catholic priest gave the “Welcome” in English, while the Presbyterian minister gave it in Irish.74 The standard division between Protestant/Catholic and British/Irish was upended here, not only by the participation of Catholic and Protestant clergy together in an act of social mourning, but by the fact that they took a moment to speak one another’s languages. At the Omagh service as well were “Dignitaries from across Ireland and Britain”, along with “First Minister David Trimble and his deputy Seamus Mallon, as well as Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams and SDLP leader John Hume”.75 The message sent was the unity of people and their political representatives against the violence and sectarianism of the minority. It is also interesting to note that, in the wake of the Omagh bomb, people in Dundalk "marched on the
McKevitt-Sands' home in nearby Blackrock to protest about the slaughter in Omagh."

Michael McKevitt founded the RIRA.\textsuperscript{76}

The Enniskillen and Omagh bombings would also be marked in subsequent years by rituals and memorials. Ten years after the Enniskillen bomb, two remembrance vigils drew hundreds of participants on the evening of November 7, 1997. In the first vigil, over 200 people of all ages stood silently together while "church bells tolled for 10 minutes." The greatest number of people congregated in the heart of Enniskillen. Here places shut their doors early. Employees then came out to mark the occasion. Vehicles moving through Enniskillen's centre halted in respect of the victims of the bomb. Churches remained open throughout the day. A vigil also occurred later on that evening at the Cenotaph. It was arranged by Enniskillen Together, a "peace group". 250 people came. A few hymns were sung and there were 5 minutes of silence and then the Our Father.\textsuperscript{77} On November 8, the actual anniversary of the event, family members of the dead, those wounded, as well as people who had assisted in getting people out of the debris went to "a private service in Enniskillen Presbyterian Church".\textsuperscript{78} On Remembrance Sunday, November 9, 1997, around 800 came to "the Remembrance Sunday parade at the memorial".\textsuperscript{79} A few family members of the people who died in 1987 were there. Jim Dixon, who was badly hurt in the bomb, came too.\textsuperscript{80} Patrick McCaffrey, Fermanagh Council Chairman, did not have a poppy on at the November 9 service; still, he did place a wreath "at the Cenotaph" as council representative.\textsuperscript{81} Meanwhile, Robin Eames, at St. Macartin's Cathedral, claimed that "For all of us who were here in Enniskillen 10 years ago, Remembrance Sunday is something much more than reflection on the supreme sacrifice of two world wars. Ten years ago Enniskillen
represented loss, tragedy and sorrow. Today, Enniskillen represents hope, resilience and vision for the future."\(^82\)

Later, on the 25th anniversary of the bombing, in November of 2012, one minute of silence commemorated the detonation of the bomb. At the war memorial in Enniskillen family members of casualties as well as people who survived placed wreaths. Politicians as well as Irish governmental "representatives" paid their respects. Alasdair McDonnell, leader of the SDLP, was invited to attend and was honoured to do so.\(^83\) Peter Robinson placed a wreath with a note saying "On behalf of the people of Northern Ireland." Lord Morrow, a "DUP peer" spoke to those present, calling the people who died "salt of the earth". According to Morrow, "They were not soldiers answering for battle. They were not armed. They were not at the cenotaph to harm or do anyone harm."\(^84\) Most tellingly, the Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, was present in Enniskillen on Remembrance Day. Never before had a Minister from the South come to such an event in the North. He laid a wreath at the cenotaph which included the words "In remembrance from the Government of Ireland."\(^85\) Enda Kenny was also present for a service in St Macartin's Cathedral where he met relatives of the bomb victims as well as those who survived.\(^86\)

The use of the War Memorial in Enniskillen for future remembrance of the massacre is significant. As Dacia Viejo-Rose has pointed out, "memorials evolve over time to suit new social and political needs." These needs can include reconciliation in later years. For instance, the Douaumont Ossuary and Cemetery commemorating those who died at the Battle of Verdun in World War I was not at first used as a site for Franco-German reconciliation. This despite the fact that Germany and France both lost many
men in the battle. However, many decades later, in 1984, "the memory of Verdun and the memorial site of Douaumont became firmly associated with a reconciliatory symbolism."

On September 22, 1984, the leaders of France and Germany took their places before the ossuary as well as a casket that was covered in the flags of both countries. Germany's national anthem was played and so was the “Marseilles.” During the latter, the two leaders stood hand in hand. Viejo-Rose notes that "For 70 years Verdun had been a landmark in the French historical landscape as a symbol of heroism, martyrdom, sacrifice, until that memorial gesture in 1984 converted it into a symbol of European reconciliation."87 In a similar fashion, the Enniskillen cenotaph, formerly representing the war dead and offering unionists an opportunity to honour and respect those who had fought and died under the British/Union flag, became a sight of peace, reconciliation, and a new "agreed" Ireland. Representatives of the Northern and Southern Irish community (mainly Catholic), in the form of SDLP and Republic of Ireland leaders, came together with their unionist counterparts to pay tribute to the victims of war and the Poppy Day Bomb.

The tenth anniversary of the Omagh bombing was also marked with ceremony, including members from both major communities in the North as well as people from the Republic. Omagh District Council arranged a service on the 15th of August. At 3 in the afternoon hundreds were present, despite the rain, next to the "Garden of Light" to view the proceedings. People also gathered where the bomb went off, on Market Street. Here an "obelisk was due to be unveiled." People from the South and Spain were present at the event. At the service were some relatives of victims, Taoiseach Brian Cowen, Martin McGuinness as well as Jeffrey Donaldson of the DUP, standing in for Robinson. Mark
Durkan (SDLP) was there as was Alban Maginnis (SDLP), Danny Kennedy (UUP), and David Ford of Alliance. On a stage were representatives of the Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches. Among these were the Omagh Churches Forum co-chairs, Reverend William Seale and Monsignor Joe Donnelly. The Omagh Waterford Peace Choir singers offered up a hymn while people "on the bridge beside the memorial garden watched the service on a big screen." Shortly after 3, Omagh Churches Forum members recited a prayer. One minute of silence took place at 3:10. A church bell rang to end the silence. Ronnie Moran of Omagh recited "Neither an Elegy nor a Manifesto," by John Hewitt. The poem's last line is "Bear in mind these dead." Victim Sean McLaughlin's father, John, of Buncrana, read this line "in Irish." Ana Abad, who lost a brother in the bomb, read it "in Spanish." Finally, sister of victim Esther Gibson said this "line in English." Names of the deceased were recited by the Duchess of Abercorn. Next came a bible reading and, a little later, "Let there by Peace on Earth" was performed by the choir. In Market Street, a piper "played a lament" and children spread flower petals at the location of the bomb. Martin McColgan (Sinn Fein), Omagh council chairman, "opened the 'Garden of Light'." Relatives and politicians placed wreaths here. Finally, commemoration of Omagh even extended to the South - about 800 were present in Dublin's Pro Cathedral for a memorial Mass. Two youngsters, aged 10, recited victims' names at this service.

There have been more concrete forms of remembrance of Enniskillen and Omagh as well. These have embraced Protestant and Catholic, honoured all the innocent martyrs, and expressed sorrow and hope, rather than hatred. For example, the Spirit of Enniskillen Trust was established following the 1987 bombing. It was a "cross-
community" peace organization that existed from 1989 until 2013 when financial issues resulted in its demise. The Trust's purpose and aim was "Young people leading change and working towards shared societies." The Trust supported "a cohesive, integrated and diverse society." Catholic and Protestant young people were sent to other countries through this organization. Every year the Trust's Explore Programme sent youth in their late teens abroad for several weeks "where they engage with others who are also facing differences or conflict."

Of particular interest in the commemoration of Enniskillen is what has been done to the War Memorial. A memorial to the victims of the bombing was established as "part of the [original] War Memorial." Connected to Enniskillen's war memorial are 11 doves, made of bronze, representing the eleven people who died in the event in 1987. Doves are symbols of peace, purity, and, in the Christian tradition, the Holy Spirit and effectively commemorate the innocence and redemptive qualities of the victims. The presence of doves on a war memorial offers a message of peace, not hatred. Doves do not inspire a desire for revenge or calls to battle. Indeed, at the memorial's base is a plaque that reads, "IN REMEMBERANCE OF ELEVEN OF OUR NEIGHBOURS WHO WERE KILLED BY A TERRORIST BOMB AT THIS SITE ON REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1987." The names of the victims are then listed. Remembrance of the innocent dead is the focus – the perpetrators are not even named.

There have been established two memorials for those who died in the 1998 Omagh bombing. Both are concerned with light, love, and hope instead of cultural and sectarian divisions. The unveiling of "A crystal memorial obelisk and a 'Garden of Light'
with a constellation of 31 mirrors symbolising the light from 31 quashed lives" took place on the 10th anniversary of the bomb in 2008.\textsuperscript{101} The obelisk, which can be found where the bomb occurred, is of a greenish blue hue and contains a heart inside it near the top.\textsuperscript{102} The obelisk itself is not inscribed. However, a plaque, bearing an inscription, is close by - "A car bomb exploded at this site | on Saturday 15 August 2008 at 3.10 pm. | This act of terror | killed thirty-one people, injured hundreds, | and changed forever the lives of many."\textsuperscript{103} Again, the perpetrators are not acknowledged by name. Meanwhile, not too far from the actual location of the explosion, the Omagh Bomb Memorial Garden includes a pond, mirrors on high poles, as well as "a series of inscriptions on granite stones built on top of a low circular wall." The mirrors "are intended to reflect light from the garden to the monument [obelisk] on Market Street."\textsuperscript{104} The inscriptions in the garden provide the details of the bomb, the number and names of those killed, and even several biblical quotations. These last include: "THE LIGHT SHINES IN THE DARKNESS | AND THE DARKNESS HAS NOT OVERCOME IT" (JOHN 1:5) and "WHAT DOES THE LORD REQUIRE OF YOU? | TO ACT JUSTLY AND TO LOVE MERCY | AND TO WALK HUMBLY WITH YOUR GOD" | (MICAH 6:8).\textsuperscript{105} John Hewitt's words "BEAR IN MIND THESE DEAD" also appear on one of the stones in English, Irish, and Spanish.\textsuperscript{106} There is a sense of hope provided in the memorial garden as well, which notes the support of most Irish people for the Good Friday Agreement (1998).\textsuperscript{107} One of the stones even says that "IN THE YEARS THAT FOLLOWED PEOPLE IN OMAGH AND | ELSEWHERE SOUGHT TO REBUILD THEIR LIVES, THEIR FAMILIES, | THEIR COMMUNITY, AND TO CREATE A NEW FUTURE | REGARDLESS OF THE PAST, EVERY NEW DAY DAWNS AS A GIFT LADEN
WITH ITS OWN POSSIBILITIES, AS THE MORNING SUN BANISHES THE DARKNESS OF NIGHT.  

Cross-Community Victims: The Quinn Children and Catholic Policemen

In addition to large death tolls, where victims are part of a group, the murders of individuals, like William Best, who do not fit easily into the usual Protestant/Catholic categories, or who cross traditional boundaries, are of interest. The killing of the three Quinn children in July 1998 by a loyalist petrol bomb and the murders of Catholic police officers Frank O'Reilly, Stephen Carroll, and Ronan Kerr are examples of victims who can, in a sense, be claimed by both communities and, as such, provide strong rallying points for the Third Community.

The Quinns’ deaths produced powerful reactions due in significant part to the fact that they were children and connected to both communities. The Quinn children were Richard (11), Mark (9), and Jason (7). Their deaths occurred during the Drumcree protest, in which members of the Orange Order were insisting on their right to walk down the Garvaghy Road, which was inhabited mostly by nationalists. At the time there was some discrepancy regarding the Quinns’ communal identity, likely due to the mixed nature of the family. At times the boys were labelled as Catholics. According to the BBC, they were Catholic, but dwelt on an estate that was mainly Protestant. They went to "a Protestant school". Their mother's boyfriend was Protestant, too. One News Letter article referred to the boys as "Roman Catholic" while another claimed that the Quinn children's mother had been born a Catholic but was raising the boys as Protestant. The children "had been collecting money and wood for bonfire night" prior to their deaths.
The reactions among Protestants/unionists to the Quinn killings included disassociation and damage control. Jeffrey Donaldson (MP) blamed extremists, claiming that "The people who perpetrated this evil are guilty of a most grievous sin. Such violence is sickening and disgraces the very name of Protestantism." The Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland expressed horror at the deaths, but also argued that what has happened in a number of incidents this past week is wholly contrary to the principles which we hold dear. It is clear that there are those who are not prepared to let us have the kind of peaceful protest which is intended. In these circumstances the beleagured brethren of Portadown District are agreed to establish a continued presence at Drumcree. The Grand Lodge will support such a peaceful and dignified initiative.

In addition, the Lodge were committed to their "celebrations" being "dignified" and claimed they would acknowledge "local sensitivities". The Lodge made it clear that "peaceful protests will be scaled down." Orangemen at Drumcree were determined to go on with their protest, arguing that they were not to blame for the killings.

The legitimacy of the Drumcree protest was clearly disputed by some, while others decided that respect for innocent lives took priority over tradition. For example, Ronnie Flanagan, Chief Constable of the RUC, declared that "This is not protest. This is not principle. This is not statistics. It is three wee boys...burned to death in their beds." The News Letter contended that the Orangemen should leave Drumcree, ceasing their protest, arguing that "In the words of prominent Orangeman William Bingham, no road is worth a life." David Trimble, the Province's First Minister, recognized that the Orangemen in Portadown had attempted to have a peaceful protest. However, the people who had killed the Quinns and were to blame for violence had "used this protest as an excuse for an appalling act of barbarity." Trimble told the Orangemen
of Portadown that "The only way they can clearly distance themselves from these murders and show the world that they repudiate those who murder young children, the only way to repudiate that, is to *come down off the hill* [italics mine].”\textsuperscript{121} The Church of Ireland went so far as to oppose demonstrators on church property.\textsuperscript{122} According to a representative of the Church of Ireland, "The use of church property for political purposes, demonstrations or violence is unequivocally deplored and condemned....We call upon the Portadown District of the Orange Order to cease using and to end their occupation of church property at Drumcree forthwith."\textsuperscript{123} Furthermore, according to the *News Letter*, a lot of Orange women and men decided they would not march as usual. In a lot of places, the crowds did not appear to be as large as they had been previously. Indeed, the *News Letter* recognized that society was changing and that the Orange Order must modernize. The paper noted that society "now questions the value of such highly-visible and contentious demonstrations of civil and religious liberty."\textsuperscript{124}

Mourning for the three children crossed sectarian lines. An Orange demonstration by Hillsborough Castle was taken down in the wake of the deaths, with Orangemen leaving a wreath for every Quinn killed.\textsuperscript{125} Flowers were also left at the scene of the deaths. One Protestant family's contribution included the words: "A price too great to pay for a 15-minute walk."\textsuperscript{126} One minute of silence took place "at the beginning of proceedings at the Independent Orange Institution gathering at Ballymoney" after the murders. The district master of Ballymoney was not present on the platform as he was related to the children.\textsuperscript{127} Interestingly, in the wake of the deaths, nationalists on "Belfast's Lower Ormeau Road" declared they would not stop the local Orange march "as a mark of respect". Rather, their protest would be peaceful.\textsuperscript{128} Derry's War Memorial
became the site of floral tributes to the boys, put there by citizens of the city.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, thousands of people from both communities were present at the funeral of the children.\textsuperscript{130} Indeed, the \textit{News Letter} noted that "The grief so evident at the funeral of the Quinn boys yesterday was not measured out along sectarian lines. Catholic and Protestant mingled to share the heartache of family and close friends." While the \textit{News Letter} acknowledged "the madness and the evil that is among us", it also argued that the citizens of Northern Ireland wanted both communities to live in peace with each other.\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, Seamus Mallon, who was among those present for the funeral, declared, "As Deputy First Minister, by being here today, I wanted to express the condolences of decent people from across all sections of the community."\textsuperscript{132}

Once again, the victims of this atrocity became martyrs. Alf McCreary noted "the dreadful spectacle of Portadown Orange spokesmen, and others, distancing themselves from the Ballymoney deaths in one of the greatest examples of political hand-washing since Pontius Pilate." He went on to claim that the Quinn "deaths...are a judgement on all of us. The best memorial we can leave these innocents is to begin at last to really sort out our marching and other problems so that next year more innocent children will not be crucified for the manifest guilt of us all."\textsuperscript{133} In the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} it was noted that "The blood around a rear window where Chrissie Quinn's partner, Raymond Craig, had mutilated himself trying to save the boys may be fading, but the full horror of the tragedy remains as vivid as a crucifixion."\textsuperscript{134} Another article, pointedly entitled "Sacrificed on the altar of hatred," claimed the Quinn boys as "everyone's children. They belonged, in their own way, to both sides of the divide." The writer then declared "As the Quinn family buries those innocent brothers, let the rest of us bury our differences."\textsuperscript{135}
The Quinn children were memorialized following their deaths and the message of these commemorations was peace. On 25 March 2000, Chrissie Quinn and her son, Lee, "saw the scene of their terrible pain transformed into a symbol of peace," according to the *Belfast News Letter*. A playground was opened at the location of her former home. The money for the playground came from different agencies, one of which was the Northern Ireland Tenants Action Project. The "grandmother of one of the" brothers called this playground "a symbol of peace."\(^{136}\) In addition, in 2002, the group Warrington Peace 93 came to Ballymoney to gift "apeace [sic] bench" on which appear the following words: "From one community touched by tragedy to another."\(^{137}\) Tim Parry as well as Johnathan Ball, both children, lost their lives in the 1993 Warrington bombing, carried out by Irish republicans.\(^{138}\)

The murders of Catholic policemen in Northern Ireland offer a unique rallying point for the Third Community in the Province as these officers straddle the traditional division between the Catholic community and the security forces, which have historically been identified with the British/unionist/Protestant population.\(^{139}\) Since 1998 there have been three killings of Catholic policemen which have drawn cross-community responses against violence and division. In 1998 Constable and Catholic Frank O'Reilly was wounded "in a loyalist blast bomb attack" while riots related to Drumcree were taking place.\(^{140}\) The Red Hand Defenders took credit for the "attack."\(^{141}\) Badly hurt in September of that year, O'Reilly died on October 6 at the age of 30.\(^{142}\) Despite his willingness to serve the forces of law and order, he was, ironically, killed by loyalists. In addition, O'Reilly, like the Quinns, crossed sectarian boundaries in his personal life as his wife was Protestant. He even had a Presbyterian funeral.\(^{143}\) Over ten years later, another
Catholic officer, Constable Stephen Carroll, was murdered by republican dissidents, apparently of the Continuity IRA, in 2009. Carroll was the first member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI, established in 2001) to die at the hands of paramilitaries. He was also a twenty year veteran. Carroll too crossed traditional boundaries, not only by being a Catholic policeman, but by being English as well. A native of Essex, he had lived in Kildare for a time as a child. Finally, Catholic officer Ronan Kerr died in 2011 after a bomb exploded beneath his car in Omagh. The explosion took place a mere two miles from where the 1998 Omagh bombing occurred.

The perpetrators of these killings were immediately sidelined and denounced in the wake of the policemen's deaths. They had no legitimacy or courage and were denied membership in civilized society. For example, the News Letter argued that O'Reilly's bravery was "in sharp contrast to those responsible for his death.” Ronnie Flanagan, the Chief Constable of the RUC, said that O'Reilly's murderers "have no place in society and are not worth taking into consideration." Similarly, Sir Hugh Orde, PSNI Chief Constable, called Carroll’s killers "criminal psychopaths." He contended that "These people are determined to bring Northern Ireland back to a place that we won't allow it to go to. My officers are supported by the overwhelming majority of the community and we will continue to do our job." Canon Liam Stevenson at Carroll's funeral went so far as to argue that those who murdered Carroll "have abused the term patriotism.” He argued that "A perfectly laudable aspiration such as patriotism is robbed of its intrinsic value when it is allied to violence and death in pursuit of its objectives."
Denunciation even came from republicans in the case of the post-1998 deaths of Carroll and Kerr, demonstrating that the mainstream movement had embraced the Third Community ideals of peace and the use of constitutional means to achieve political goals. Martin McGuinness labelled the perpetrators of O'Carroll's murder "traitors to this island". They had "betrayed the political desires, hopes and aspirations of all of the people who live on this island." In the case of Ronan Kerr, McGuinness referred to dissidents as "enemies of peace and enemies of the people of Ireland." He even called the campaign of republican fringe elements a "useless war against peace." Gerry Adams himself undermined any claims to republican legitimacy, arguing that "Those who murdered Ronan Kerr are not the IRA--the IRA has left the stage." It is a testament to the power of public opinion against violence and to how far militant republicans had come that key figures such as McGuinness and Adams would abhor the activities of militants against people who they themselves at one time considered legitimate targets.

The notion that most citizens opposed such violence was expressed by other prominent figures in the wake of Kerr's death. According to Chairman of the GAA, Gearoid O Treasaigh, "The GAA stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the Kerr family, the PSNI and the entire community in condemning outright this murder. We also send a strong message today to all of those people who continue to engage in this activity: you have no support in our community and your actions do not represent the views and feelings of the vast majority of people in Ireland." Association of Chief Police Officers president Sir Hugh Orde noted that "What is different about this campaign, so-called, is that it has absolutely no community support, whereas one could not argue the same of the old IRA campaign." Similarly, Peter Robinson asserted that "the
condemnation of every section of our community falls upon those who have been responsible....this community is solidly standing against them." According to David Ford, "It is absolutely clear that the small number of people intent on carrying out acts of terrorism stand totally against the wishes of the vast majority of the people of Ireland, north and south." Finally, Ronan Kerr's mother also denied the dissidents any legitimacy, claiming that "The people who did this are only a small minority - 95 per cent of people are good, decent genuine people in this country, we keep reminding ourselves and I keep reminding the children. The majority of people in this country would never have wanted this to happen."161

The men of violence were also spiritually bereft and ostracized in the wake of these police murders. During O'Reilly's funeral, Reverend Philip McConnell informed those in attendance of the futility of violence: "Such action is not 'For God and Ulster', for it clearly glorifies neither. This is a manifestation of a depraved and fallen sinful people."162 Church leaders also denounced the murder of Carroll. A statement was released by Bishop Harold Miller (Church of Ireland) and his Catholic counterpart in Dromore, Bishop John McAreavey, calling the killing "a morally bankrupt act" and arguing that "Those who perpetrated this murder and other recent atrocities have nothing to offer the future of our society....Their 'god' is destruction. They are seeking to destroy the peace we are building....In fact, they will destroy only their own souls."163 Canon Walter Lewis of St Thomas Parish Church (Church of Ireland) in Belfast claimed that the killers of Caroll were guilty of "a terrible sin against God" and that they had sinned "against humanity". He noted that the absence of backing for the killers was clear - "they have acted alone. They have not acted in the name of the people of this island. They
have not acted in God's name either."\textsuperscript{164} In the wake of Ronan Kerr's death, Dr. Seamus Hegarty, Bishop of Derry (RC), argued that the people responsible for the murder had "set their faces against God."\textsuperscript{165} Father Kevin McElhennon of Christ the King Church in Omagh, near where Ronan Kerr was killed, spoke in church about the murder, saying: "Ronan's murder was not of God - it was the work of darkness, it was the work of evil....It was a rejection of God and was a rejection of our country, a rejection of us as a people and a rejection of the hopes and aspirations that we all share for the future."\textsuperscript{166} It can be seen that neither loyalist nor republican perpetrators were exempt from being condemned by churchmen of their own community.

All three police officers were also portrayed in a positive and heroic light. They became martyrs for good and for a brighter future. For example, after Frank O'Reilly was killed, the \textit{News Letter} pointed out that "It takes a particular brand of courage for a Roman Catholic to join the RUC."\textsuperscript{167} David Trimble called O'Reilly "a brave young officer who was simply doing his duty in Portadown protecting people and their property."\textsuperscript{168} Police Authority chairman, Pat Armstrong, went so far as to say that O'Reilly was "a brave police officer who gave his life in service to the community."\textsuperscript{169} Similarly, an October 7 article in the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} called O'Reilly "A policeman who gave his life for his country."\textsuperscript{170} Constable Stephen Carroll was also portrayed heroically. It was noted in the \textit{Irish News} that Carroll died answering "the desperate phone-calls of a mother frightened by thugs attacking her home while she was alone with her child and six-month-old baby."\textsuperscript{171} Carroll and the two soldiers killed several days before him were referred to as "brave" and as "heroes" by DUP member Diane Dodds. The SDLP's Mark Durkan said that "The young people whom the Continuity IRA and the
Real IRA are seeking to recruit need to know that the lesson of Monday night is that the real patriots serving the peace of the new Ireland were Constable Carroll and his colleagues, who went to answer the call of a woman in distress, not those who brutally murdered him. In 2011 it was argued that Kerr "died serving the people of this place" and that Kerr "died serving each and every one of us." It was even argued that Kerr "died so that we can have a life." Father John Skinnader, during Kerr’s funeral, actually likened the young police officer to Jesus, saying: "Our participation in this funeral, the statements from all political parties and the worldwide media coverage shows that his death, like Christ's, has not been in vain but will galvanize everyone to work with greater zeal and vigour for the future good of all." Even Peter Robinson contended that "The story that will inspire the next generation will be the dedication and sacrifice of Const. Ronan Kerr not these murderous thugs."

Both Carroll and, especially, Ronan Kerr were portrayed as representing the future, rather than old and hardline traditions. For example, John O'Dowd of Sinn Fein recognized Carroll as representative of a new era: "Constable Carroll was helping to build the new environment created by the Good Friday Agreement which was about removing forces in our society including security forces." Republican Jim Gibney argued that "Kerr is a product of the peace process and the new police service that I and republicans like me all over the north support. The police uniform he wore was worn on my behalf and behalf of all who supported the peace process. It is not a symbol of oppression, of British occupation. It is a symbol of the new Ireland which republicans helped to negotiate." Father John Skinnader, at the funeral of Kerr, claimed that, prior to Kerr's death "I saw him sitting in a police car and thought: here is a symbol of the new
Northern Ireland." In the press Kerr was referred to as "an example of where this country is going." Kerr was "a son of the new Northern Ireland. In joining the PSNI, he put down his own personal marker for the future." In contrast, those who murdered him represented the past: "They'd rather that time stood still, that we remain the same. Forever and ever a dark grey Tuesday afternoon, sometime in 1972." No matter how old those who killed Kerr actually were, "this was a savage attack by all that represents the old, the calcified, the joyless and the dead against youth and the very idea of life. A rebellion of the young? No, this is a rebellion of the very, very old."

At times people reacted to the deaths with calls to action or engaged in real attempts to make a difference. A Portadown "protest parade" was cancelled after O'Reilly died. Robin Eames, the Primate of the Church of Ireland, argued that "No protest can possibly justify the taking of his life. Once more I call on loyalists to end their prolonged protests in Portadown - protests which are being used by evil and sinister elements to bring shame on the town." In the wake of the killings of Carroll and the soldiers, the Belfast Telegraph pointed out that the Province's political parties had come together against the killers. The parties, including Sinn Fein and the DUP, called for citizens to assist the police. The four main denominational leaders even gathered in Belfast to talk about the murders. Church leaders encouraged citizens to put on purple ribbons or articles of clothing as a means of showing opposition to the killings and violence. The leaders wrote "a joint letter" requesting that clergy have "special services" on the upcoming Sunday. The leaders noted that "It is particularly appropriate this Sunday, the closest to St Patrick's Day, that we offer special prayers for our land and people." In the case of Ronan Kerr, Gerry Adams wanted those
responsible to "stop and stop now." Indeed, when graffiti appeared in the Bogside that said "East Tyrone IRA 1, RUC Scum 0. Ha Ha" and "Ronan Kerr. The price to pay", apparently local Sinn Fein supporters painted over the graffiti! According to one Sinn Fein representative, "The mentality of the people who painted this graffiti really must be questioned....The republican community have made our voices heard loud and clear, the murder of Ronan Kerr was wrong and those people who carried it out are running contrary to the wishes of the people and contrary to the very fundamental ethos of republicanism."

Sometimes the killings resulted in a more ritualized opposition to violence as the Third Community expressed itself. In remembrance of Carroll and the soldiers who died, a vigil took place outside City Hall in Belfast on March 10, 2009. Then, on March 11, according to the *Belfast Telegraph*, "Tens of thousands of people...brought towns and city centres across Northern Ireland to a standstill to demonstrate a united rejection of violence." People met in Derry and Belfast as well as Newry, Craigavon, Downpatrick, and Lisburn to express opposition to violence and "the public disgust over the killings." According to the *Belfast Telegraph*, a number of people held up copies of the paper during the demonstration in Belfast. "End This Madness" was the paper's headline. On a smaller scale, a Catholic priest, Father McAlinden, was among those who arranged "a cross-community prayer service" on March 11 near to where Carroll was killed. This vigil was well attended and a lot of people had on purple ribbons in memory of Carroll. On March 13, prior to Carroll's funeral, an event to honour and remember Carroll and the two soldiers took place "at Downshire bridge". Canon Stevenson (RC), local people, as well as one girl and boy representing every elementary
"and post-primary school" from the vicinity met for prayers and three minutes of silence. The minutes represented the three men who died.\(^{197}\)

Several years later, the reaction to Ronan Kerr's death was similar to that of Carroll's, with thousands participating in demonstrations for peace in the Province in the wake of his death.\(^{198}\) People congregated at City Hall, Belfast, "for a silent lunchtime vigil" arranged by the ICTU's Northern Ireland committee.\(^{199}\) Vigils for peace took place in Newry, Derry, Downpatrick, and Lisburn as well.\(^{200}\) In Omagh, about 8-10,000 congregated at the heart of the town.\(^{201}\) Local Omagh people, as well as those from other places, gathered at Omagh's leisure centre and then walked "through the town centre".\(^{202}\) A diverse group of participants, they passed the site of Omagh's 1998 attack. A lot of people bore placards and had on white ribbons to show their support for peace.\(^{203}\) White ribbons have been used over the years (not only in Ireland) to represent innocence, peace, and those who have suffered at the hands of terrorists.\(^{204}\) People at the Omagh event also had posters that had Ronan Kerr's photo on them beneath the caption "Not In My Name".\(^{205}\) Once the people got to "the bus depot", songs were performed by the Omagh Community Youth Choir.\(^{206}\) Among them were "Love Rescue Me" by U2 and "We Shall Overcome", which was the last song performed.\(^{207}\) David Ford was present (unofficially) at the Omagh demonstration as was Michael Gallagher.\(^{208}\) Finally, one minute of silence was even held to remember Ronan Kerr prior to a GAA football game.\(^{209}\)

The funerals of these police officers were often events of great symbolism. O'Reilly's took place at home, rather than in a church.\(^{210}\) Presbyterian Minister, Reverend Philip McConnell, performed the funeral and "Dr Sam Hutchinson, deputising for Presbyterian Moderator Dr John Dixon, led the mourners in prayer."\(^{211}\) Ronnie Flanagan,
the SDLP's Brid Rodgers, as well as UUP politician Dermot Nesbitt were present at "the private family service" for O'Reilly. Denis Watson, "county Grand Master," was present for O'Reilly's funeral, too. The flag of the Union covered the casket. O'Reilly's medals as well as his hat were on the casket, too. Six policemen, wearing their uniforms, bore the coffin. All of this for a policeman recognized as Catholic. O’Reilly was honoured here by Protestants, unionists, Orangemen, and the nationalist/Catholic SDLP.

Carroll's funeral drew an even stronger demonstration of unity. Sinn Fein, the police, unionists, and the DUP were all represented at Carroll's funeral. Never before had members of Sinn Fein been present at a funeral for a member of the security forces who had been a victim of republicans. Mark Durkan as well as David Ford were at Carroll's funeral, too, and outside the church UDA man Jackie McDonald could be found, having come to offer his respects. Sir Hugh Orde as well as Fachtna Murphy, the Garda Commissioner, were at the funeral and representatives from the governments of Ireland as well as Britain attended, too. The casket was covered by the PSNI flag and Carroll's hat as well as medals rested on it. Carroll also had "a PSNI honour guard."

Hundreds of people watched the sombre procession and over 400 were present in the church for the March 13 funeral. Indeed, the Belfast Telegraph claimed that "Banbridge came to a standstill during the funeral, as thousands of people descended on the town and there was massive traffic disruption as roads were closed."

The funeral of Ronan Kerr was particularly unique, seeming to build upon the symbolism of Carroll's. Formerly divisive symbols came together, as did both communities and their political and religious leaders. At Kerr's funeral, according to the Belfast Telegraph, "PSNI officers stood side-by-side with GAA members to form a guard
of honour, and to take turns as pall-bearers as his coffin was carried into the Church of the Immaculate Conception." 221 The significance of the cooperation between the GAA and the police is made clear in the press: "green and orange. The symbol colours of our two tribes, tribes which historically have identified with the PSNI and the GAA, but never both. But Ronan, being representative of a new generation of Ulster people, wore his allegiance to both proudly and we have united like never before to express how proud of him we were for it." 222 The casket had police gloves and cap on it, which were taken off the casket prior to its entering the church. Attendance at Kerr's funeral was equally mixed, with the presence of Peter Robinson, Taoiseach Enda Kenny (no Taoiseach had attended the funeral of a Northern Ireland police officer before), Adams and McGuinness. 223 Robinson, McGuinness as well as Kenny "arrived together." 224 The UUP's Tom Elliott was at the funeral, too, as was Danny Kennedy, also of the UUP. They both belonged to the Orange Order as well. 225 At the church gates was UDA leader Jackie McDonald. 226 David Ford was also present at the funeral - indeed, Northern Ireland's and the Republic's justice ministers "arrived together". Matt Baggott, Chief Constable of the PSNI was present. So was Martin Callinan, Garda Commissioner. They came at the same time. Stephen Carroll's wife, Kate, was at the funeral, too. Finally, Archbishop of Armagh (Church of Ireland), the Presbyterian Moderator, as well as the Methodist president were there. All in all, about 1,000 people came to the funeral. 227

Anniversaries have, on occasion, been marked as well. The Irish News noted in March of 2010 that around a hundred were present at an anniversary service for the murdered soldiers a year after their deaths. According to the Irish News, the "Royal British Legion held a memorial service" at the site of the soldiers' murders. Ecclesiastical
leaders of the major faiths "spoke at the service." Wreaths were placed as well. Prayers were offered for Carroll. Present were Noreen McClelland of the SDLP, Danny Kinahan of the UUP, and David Ford of Alliance.\textsuperscript{228} In the case of Stephen Carroll, remembrance has been taken a step further. The Steve Carroll Foundation has been established to recognize youth efforts for peace. In January of 2013 this organization "was launched at Stormont." The Foundation "has created a set of annual peace awards."\textsuperscript{229} Ronan Kerr has been remembered as well. A People of the Year Award was bestowed on Ronan Kerr in 2011 in recognition of "his work with the Police Service of Northern Ireland." Nuala Kerr accepted the award in Dublin.\textsuperscript{230} Kerr was also recognized "at the National Police Memorial Day ceremony" in 2011 with another award. Nuala Kerr as well as two of Ronan Kerr's siblings were present. Prince Charles was there, too.\textsuperscript{231} In addition, the Spirit of Ronan Kerr Award was established in 2012. Omagh Harriers Athletics Club and Ronan Kerr's family arranged for the Award.\textsuperscript{232} This "recognises commitment and hard work in the community." Also, "Running for Roney" was created in 2012 in Kerr's memory. In that year, almost 400 out of 2,000 individuals participating in Omagh's "half-marathon and 5k fun run/walk" did so in Kerr's memory.\textsuperscript{233} About 50 individuals had on "Running for Roney' T-shirts." The beneficiary of their efforts was to be a cancer charity.\textsuperscript{234} The evening before the 2012 run a commemorative Mass took place at Beragh's Church of the Immaculate Conception. Here Kerr's murderers were prayed for.\textsuperscript{235} The following year, the money raised in the run was to be donated to The South Sudan Project. In 2013 about 200 individuals participated in "Running for Roney". Shirts with "Run for Roney" on them were worn.\textsuperscript{236}
Conclusion

The Third Community has a history of declaring their existence and their opposition to violence in the wake of tragedy. They have ostracized and denounced the paramilitaries, praised and made martyrs of the victims, and rallied for peace. They have also commemorated the innocent dead in ceremonies and physical memorials in subsequent years, thereby preserving the memory of their own "martyrs". Catholics and Protestants have been involved in such acts together as ordinary citizens and as leaders of the different denominations. The victims themselves have come from both main communities and have in some instances possessed "mixed" backgrounds and identities, allowing them to be claimed by society as a whole. The notion that most people in Northern Ireland are good, decent people was a powerful strain running through the press following these violent events as was the belief that the perpetrators were fanatics and even, in religious terms, "satanic." In short, it was the ordinary people who were the true victims and heroes in Northern Ireland, not the "freedom fighters."
CHAPTER 10
THE QUEST FOR COMPROMISE:
The Achievement of the Good Friday Agreement (10 April 1998)

While there is no doubting the divisions between the two main communities, evidence of moderation and attempts to find a resolution to the conflict were major features of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Ordinary people were a supportive element in the struggle to find a workable peace, tired as they were of bloodshed and unrest. In the majority of circumstances, citizens continued to back the political parties that were less radical and opposed to violence. This reality aided politicians in taking risks for peace. Furthermore, developments such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement provided greater opportunities for the growth of moderation. At times political leaders moved beyond their traditional positions to embrace change. The ultimate result was the breakthrough Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

The Struggle for a Middle Ground Resolution in the 1970s

The 1998 Agreement had its roots in the 1970s and progress began with action on the part of ordinary people. Despite the fact that, following Direct Rule in 1972, it appeared that the moderate centre was virtually gone, a desire for peace and abhorrence of violence among the people played an important role in buttressing the middle ground in Northern Ireland.¹ For example, when William Best was killed by the OIRA in the Spring of 1972, women from the Creggan as well as Bogside parts of Derry protested. The day after his death hundreds of Derry women "attacked" the local Official Sinn Fein offices. The OIRA was pressed to get out of these localities. A cease fire was called by the OIRA a little over a week after the killing.² The organization acknowledged that “The overwhelming desire of the great majority of all the people of the north is for an end
to military actions by all sides."\(^3\) Basically, they had to call off "their campaign" due to Catholic disgust and horror at the killing.\(^4\)

A few months later, the PIRA's status received a major blow with the events of Bloody Friday (July 21, 1972). 20 Republican bombs went off in Belfast. 9 died. Only 2 were not civilians. 130 were hurt.\(^5\) This event wounded the PIRA - "widespread revulsion took root on all sides, and not least from moderate Nationalists."\(^6\) Bloody Friday would show a different side of the PIRA, one that a lot of its post-Bloody Sunday recruits "had not wished to acknowledge."\(^7\) The events of July 21 helped bring forth "a strengthened moderate centre, composed of sections from both communities."\(^8\)

The appalling reality of the violence pushed politicians who wanted a fresh start. In 1972, 467 people lost their lives. Fewer did in 1973, but it did not appear that the paramilitaries were going to cease or significantly reduce their violence.\(^9\) Thus, when Secretary of State for Northern Ireland William Whitelaw put before Parliament the *Northern Ireland: Constitutional Proposals* White Paper in March (1973), there was a greater willingness to consider its contents.\(^10\) In this White Paper, it was asserted "that Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as that is the wish of a majority of its people."\(^11\) Northern Ireland would get an Assembly, which would be the starting point/basis for talks amongst leading politicians "to find an agreed basis for government in Northern Ireland".\(^12\) Upon the agreement and setting up of an executive for the province, it would be able to enter discussions with Britain and the Republic regarding the relationship between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. Despite this move away from "majority rule" as well as towards more formal North-South cooperation, the White Paper was accepted by the UUC, the majority supporting
participation in talks "on the basis of the white paper" - 381 for, 231 against. There was backing for the White Paper proposals in the ranks of the SDLP and APNI as well.\footnote{13}

In June of 1973, Assembly elections took place. Those supporting the White Paper took 52 out of 78 seats.\footnote{14} The UUP's Standing Committee, in the latter part of October 1973, essentially backed participation on an executive, including nationalists, with 132 for and 105 against.\footnote{15} On November 20, 1973, the UUC backed sharing power, with 379 supporting it and 369 against it. The following day, the parties came to an agreement regarding setting up "a power-sharing Executive" for the Province. There would be 11 people on it.\footnote{16} 6 Unionists, 4 SDLP as well as 1 APNI representative would be part of an executive. Thus, while there was a "power-sharing executive" for the Nationalists, Unionists held most of its seats. UUP leader Brian Faulkner would be able to be chief executive. Fitt would be his "deputy." A lot of people were happy about the idea of having a government including members of both communities. Next up were talks about "the Irish dimension."\footnote{17}

The Sunningdale Conference, aimed at resolving this dimension, took place on December 6 of 1973. The British, Irish, and Northern Irish governments were represented. Parties from Northern Ireland who were against power-sharing were not included. It was decided at Sunningdale that there would be a Consultative Assembly made up of 30 representatives each from Northern Ireland's Assembly and the Southern Irish Dail. This Consultative Assembly would be able to discuss issues. It would not possess "legislative powers". There would also be a Council of Ireland. 7 members of the Northern Ireland Executive as well as 7 from the South would be on it.\footnote{18} This Council would possess "'executive, harmonizing and consultative' powers on a limited
number of areas." However, everyone had to agree on decisions. Thus, Unionists essentially could prevent anything they did not like. Furthermore, as part of the Sunningdale Agreement, the South "fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status." 

A coalition government made up of Faulkner, the SDLP as well as APNI began in January of 1974. Faulkner was its Chief Executive. Unfortunately, neither the Executive nor the assembly lasted long. The absence of backing among unionists was the biggest reason the Executive fell. Faulkner had to step down as UUP leader early in 1974 when he failed to win an important "vote in the Unionist Council" regarding the Council of Ireland. The UUC opposed the Council with 427 against and 374 for. Faulkner gave up his leader's position and established a party himself - the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI). He still led the executive, though, thanks to his decreasing backers within the Assembly as well as Nationalist and Alliance supporters.

The breaking point came with the Westminster General Election in February of 1974. Those parties who backed the Executive were competitors while those against Sunningdale worked together. A United Ulster Unionist Council was established by the DUP, the Orange Order, Vanguard as well as the Official Unionist Party, with Harry West as leader. Their catchphrase was "Dublin is just a Sunningdale away." The UUUC took 11 of 12 seats, garnering thrice the support that the UPNI, led by Faulkner, received. UUUC candidates captured 51.1% support in the election. Nonetheless, those in favour of agreement and the executive still outnumbered those opposed within the Assembly. In May of 1974 an anti-power sharing as well as anti-Council of Ireland
motion lost an assembly vote with 44 against and 28 for. This brought on "a general strike."  

The recently created Ulster Workers Council, established "by groups of loyalist trade unionists", was behind the strike, which began on May 15 and included a significant amount of intimidation of the local population in its success. The UWC "coordinated the activities of various Protestant workers" and possessed connections to the major militant loyalist groups. The "coordinating committee" of the UWC had UVF as well as UDA individuals on it. Northern Ireland was essentially shut down by the strike. Faulkner stepped down from the chief executive's position at the end of May 1974 and the executive and Assembly collapsed. Sunningdale was finished. The Council of Ireland had not even met.

Sunningdale's failure does not take away from its significance, however. Genuine comparisons can be made between Sunningdale and the GFA. As Bew, Frampton and Gurruchago note "In terms of the impulses that underlay the two Agreements, both were built on the coming together of moderate unionists and moderate nationalists within Northern Ireland, under the tutelage and encouragement of the British and Irish governments, in the hope that an accommodation could be reached." There were those willing to come to an arrangement on both sides. Faulkner conceded to power-sharing as well as the Council of Ireland for an Executive majority. Northern Ireland's status, under the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973), was accepted by the SDLP as was being an Executive minority. The SDLP's compromises played a role in what success Sunningdale had. Finally, Sunningdale "planted various intellectual seeds among those who were prepared to consider what an eventual settlement for Northern Ireland might
look like." Post-Sunningdale, there were politicians in Northern Ireland who were encouraged to consider the situation differently and look at things from a different perspective.\textsuperscript{35}

Therefore, it is possible to view the 1975 Constitutional Convention, which followed Sunningdale's demise, "as something of a crucible of new ideas."\textsuperscript{36} It is true that, in a standard sense, the Convention was not much of a success.\textsuperscript{37} An election for it occurred on May 1, 1975 and the anti-power-sharing unionists of the UUUC garnered over 50% "of the first preference vote", which amounted to "46 of the" Convention's "78 seats."\textsuperscript{38} No agreed arrangement for the North was reached. Nonetheless, there were ideas that outlasted the Convention, arising again "in modified form" at a future time.\textsuperscript{39} In the Convention, for instance, Trimble proved "willing to countenance voluntary power-sharing with the SDLP."\textsuperscript{40} Such openness appeared to contradict his Vanguard Unionist Party affiliation.\textsuperscript{41} Trimble's willingness to take chances to achieve peace would prove key to reaching the 1998 Agreement.

\textbf{Setting the Stage for Success: The Gradual Revival of Moderation in the 1980s}

Moderation began to revive in the 1980s with the period of the 1981 Hunger Strike. This Hunger Strike has been portrayed as a moral victory for republicanism as well as a propaganda triumph, but it was truly a win for the moderate center ground.\textsuperscript{42} Electoral support for Bobby Sands\textsuperscript{43} had a lot to do with anger at how Britain had dealt with the situation and compassion for young men who were suffering. Indeed election posters of a smiling Sands with the caption "His Life In Your Hands Vote Sands" did not emphasize his connection to a violent paramilitary group or represented such support as a vote for violence.\textsuperscript{44} Furthermore, the SDLP chose not to run a candidate in the April
1981 Westminster by-election (Fermanagh-South Tyrone), leaving the way clear for Sands as the only other person running was the UUP's Harry West. The people's support of Sands at the polls did not in all, or even most, cases necessarily represent support for republican violence. Nonetheless, their decision would provide the republican movement with additional encouragement to pursue a political path.

In the wake of Sands' election and death ordinary people responded to the republican movement with much greater enthusiasm than they ever had for its violent campaign. The funeral of Sands drew between 100 and 150 thousand. Then, in June of 1981, there was a Southern Ireland election. 9 republicans in H-Block stood. 2 won. Sinn Fein garnered 10% support in the Assembly election of 1982, which translated into 5 seats. Sinn Fein then took 13.4% support in the Westminster general election of 1983, which gave them one seat. Adams became the West Belfast MP. That same year he became Sinn Fein president. Politics rather than violence was proving its value.

It was constitutional nationalism and its leaders, especially John Hume, that continued to dominate, but they were galvanized to new efforts by public support for republicanism in the Hunger Strike era. The New Ireland Forum (1983-1984), which Hume played a role in arranging, was partially a reaction to Sinn Fein's new political success and represented a desire by constitutional nationalists to take a stand against the radical, militant wing of Irish politics. The SDLP did not want Sinn Fein to gain at their expense, yet they also wanted to show that they were not saying no to moving forward. The answer to this conundrum was the New Ireland Forum.

The New Ireland Forum began in Dublin in the Spring of 1983. While definitely a nationalist exercise, intended to establish a collective nationalist stance, among its goals
was to make Irish nationalism less narrow and more appealing for the unionist people. Another intent was to take a different perspective on the issue of Northern Ireland and look at the relationships between Northern and Southern Ireland as well as Britain.\textsuperscript{48} There was a desire to shift "the debate away from notions of ownership and conquest, towards reconciliation and accommodation."\textsuperscript{49} Representatives of Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, Irish Labour as well as the SDLP made up the Forum.\textsuperscript{50} The main unionist parties as well as Alliance were asked to be involved, although they would not take part. Purposefully, proponents or supporters of violence were not allowed to participate in the Forum, which meant Sinn Fein was not involved.\textsuperscript{51}

There were genuine differences among those involved in the Forum, but it offered evidence that nationalists recognized political and cultural realities while continuing to repudiate violence.\textsuperscript{52} The \textit{Forum Report} opposed attempts to alter the status quo in the North utilizing violence. The \textit{Report} also contained within its depths "a recognition of the existence of a rival tradition in the community and a commitment to a political settlement capable of securing the agreement of the unionist population."\textsuperscript{53} According to Paragraph 5.2: "the political arrangements for a new and sovereign Ireland would have to be freely negotiated and agreed to by the people of the North and by the people of the South." Furthermore, the Irish as well as British governments needed to cooperate in encouraging and reaching a resolution to the situation in Ireland.\textsuperscript{54}

Meanwhile, unionists came up with a more moderate scenario of their own with the UUP's \textit{The Way Forward} (April 1984). In it the UUP acknowledged the impasse between the two communities at the political level. They argued that the parties who wanted devolution needed to seek authority in and over areas that did not by definition
conflict with the political positions or aims of both sides. It suggested the Assembly take on the responsibilities held by "the unelected area boards for health and education." In this vision, "Control of these regional services would be divided amongst committees composed on a proportionate basis, thus encouraging minority participation." They were not advocating "Cabinet Government". There would be an Assembly and Committees, in their vision, addressing important everyday issues. In the opinion of the UUP, such a strategy would allow cross-community involvement as well as "reconciliation" to "be attempted from the bottom up and not imposed from the top down." Finally, this document also supported "Irish cultural events" receiving money from the state. This was a small move in the direction of acknowledging the identity of nationalists.

The Way Forward and, despite the negative response from Margaret Thatcher, the New Ireland Forum Report, "did pave the way for the Anglo-Irish Agreement" in 1985 and the subsequent progress of moderates. The British Irish Association established a committee to unofficially discover a consensus position between the two documents. Lord Kilbrandon led the inquiry, which started in the Spring of 1984. In November of 1984 the Kilbrandon findings came out in Northern Ireland: Report of an Independent Inquiry. According to Cochrane, "The central principle which lay behind the Kilbrandon Report was that a trade-off was necessary, whereby in return for increased security co-operation, the government of the Republic would be granted some say in the administration of justice in Northern Ireland." Such a "principle" underlay the 1985 accord. It is true that Britain "publicly ignored" the Report. Still, it had a real influence
on Northern Irish policy and it is possible to see a connection between the end of the Kilbrandon Report and the 1985 agreement's "structure":

We believe, as does the Forum sub-committee, that the most appropriate form [of providing institutional reassurance] would be a treaty between the two Governments, terminable, with due notice, by either side, but deposited with the United Nations. Throughout the duration of the Treaty, sovereignty will remain with the United Kingdom, and should it be revoked, all powers conferred on representatives of the Irish Government will revert to the UK Government.63

This is basically an accurate description of what the Anglo-Irish Agreement would be when it was signed a year later.

The AIA was also greatly impacted by the Forum Report and, indeed, it "formed much of the basis for the negotiations leading to the signing of the Hillsborough Agreement" [otherwise known as the Anglo-Irish Agreement].64 To begin with, Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald65 wanted Sinn Fein pushed to the fringes and the SDLP made stronger. He wanted "to ring-fence the south against the spread of Republicanism."
The Report provided Fitzgerald with "a mandate to negotiate with the British Government in a new round of Anglo-Irish talks."

As Fitzgerald would put it in later years, "I had come to the conclusion that I must now give priority to heading off the growth of support for the IRA in Northern Ireland by seeking a new understanding with the British Government, even at the expense of my cherished, but for the time being at least clearly unachievable, objective of seeking a solution through negotiation with Unionists."68 Although Thatcher said no to the Forum's three proposals, Fitzgerald did not give up and managed to establish "a new relationship
between the British and Irish Governments in a joint approach to the Northern Ireland problem, embodied in the Anglo-Irish Agreement.”

Basically the AIA was "a compromise" on the part of Ireland and Britain and within the Agreement were elements intended to draw the two sides to an arrangement or settlement. Ireland officially acknowledged the province's "legitimacy" or reality and Britain would in return consult the Republic regarding issues that impacted nationalists in the North. Article 1 claimed Northern Ireland's position would not alter unless most people wanted it to - a "reassurance" for unionists. Still, "if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the establishment of a united Ireland " this desire would be fulfilled by Ireland and Britain. Indeed, with the AIA "an Irish dimension" was acknowledged and given form, with the presence of an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference as well as Maryfield Secretariat. These structures allowed the South a "consultative role in" Northern Ireland. This Irish dimension also provided the SDLP with what it needed "to engage constructively with Unionism" yet not threaten the backing it had among nationalists. Furthermore, unionists needed to talk to nationalists about different options in order to decrease the influence of Dublin as well as dependence on Britain. Essentially, if unionists were willing to share power with their SDLP counterparts, they would benefit. Indeed, according to Thatcher, "the people of Northern Ireland can get rid of the Intergovernmental Conference by agreeing to devolved government." Finally, Ireland and Britain working together, cooperating, through the Agreement structures, would be key to the achievement of the GFA.

It is true that the reactions to the Agreement were less than enthusiastic.
In the view of Unionists, political change took place without the people's agreement. This went against democratic principles. Unionists staged protests against the Agreement and every unionist at Westminster (there were 15) stepped down at the end of 1985 in order to bring about by-elections which would be focused on the Agreement. Following the vote, it was obvious that support for the Unionists was up, compared to the general election of 1983. In addition, violence by loyalists increased at this time. They placed bombs in Dublin on November 8 of 1986. Nonetheless, the Unionists were not able to bring down or ruin the AIA as it was an arrangement and set of structures involving Britain and Ireland, rather than Northern Irish politicians, as had been the case in 1973 to 1974.

The continued operation of the 1985 Agreement, in spite of unionist, loyalist, and even republican hostility, ultimately provided space for the re-emergence of moderate thinking and proposals, some even from hard-line sources. As 1987 began, a lot of unionists realized the anti-AIA protest was not making progress. The view ultimately arose that a totally "negative, oppositional campaign" directed towards bringing down AIA "structures" was insufficient. In 1987 Common Sense: Northern Ireland - An Agreed Process (1987) came out of the UDA via the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG). The UPRG pointed out in Common Sense that the Anglo Irish Agreement (1985) was not the answer as it involved the governments of Ireland and Britain. It was not an accord arrived at by the Catholics and Protestants of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, according to Common Sense, government by majority would not work anymore. The UPRG actually argued that "majority rule is democratic only when there is alteration in office or when there is broad consensus for it." This had not been the case in
Northern Ireland. Indeed, the UPRG went on to note that "Majority rule in deeply divided societies is likely to be profoundly undemocratic, and the only democratic system is one that allows participation in government by coalition of all groups, majority and minority, on a more or less permanent basis."\(^8^5\) Essentially, *Common Sense* represented "an attempted accommodation with republicans."\(^8^6\) It suggested devolution in a UK context as well as a sharing of power amongst individuals who acknowledged the legitimacy of Northern Ireland. A constitution as well as bill of rights were also part of this vision.\(^8^7\) Despite the real shortcomings of what was being held out to Catholics, Cochrane notes that "the tone with which it was offered at least demonstrated an understanding of Catholic concerns."\(^8^8\) *Common Sense* was a step forward, a good sign, and was looked upon positively by, of all groups, the SDLP. This document would also have a significant impact on UDP thought in the negotiations of 1998.\(^8^9\)

Other unionists were also reviewing their stance and strategies. Due to their inability to bring down the AIA and the criticism they had received from loyalist militants and others, the two main unionist parties set up a Task Force. It was supposed to communicate with different unionist groups and gain backing for the fight against the AIA as well as find out what unionists wanted when it came to "alternatives to the AIA."\(^9^0\) Cochrane has called the Task Force a "unionist version of the New Ireland Forum."\(^9^1\) It drew on the views and contributions of a number of unionist groups and people.\(^9^2\)

The Task Force's *An End to Drift* came out in July of 1987, its authors being Harold McCusker (UUP), Peter Robinson (DUP), and Frank Millar (UUP).\(^9^3\) *An End to Drift* encouraged the leaders to participate once more "in the political process."\(^9^4\) The
report acknowledged that unionists were still firmly against the AIA. Yet, "At the same time our investigations have unearthed deep disquiet about the current protest campaign and a simple disbelief that on its own it can or will persuade Mrs. Thatcher to change course." Indeed, the report acknowledged "the determination of most of those we met that protest can be no substitute for politics."  

Politically speaking, the report's authors supported devolution. They wanted an assembly that had legislative authority. Interestingly, after acknowledging the attention *Common Sense* drew, the authors noted that "Many in addition to the UDA would clearly be prepared to contemplate SDLP participation in the Government of Northern Ireland provided the SDLP agreed to forfeit the role of the Government of the Irish Republic as custodians of the nationalist interest." Furthermore, according to the report, unionists would have to consider an independent Northern Ireland if Britain was not receptive to changing the current arrangement. They noted that joining the South and remaining in the UK did not encompass all possibilities or choices open to Northern Ireland's citizens. They suggested "a Special Commission" be established to look into different options or "constitutional models."

Paisley as well as UUP leader James Molyneaux were not really impressed by the report. David Trimble believes the "report was shelved." There were, however, unionists who thought *An End to Drift's* conclusions actually were taken into account and acted on, which resulted in the 1991-1992 Brooke-Mayhew Talks. DUP politician Sammy Wilson claims the report's conclusions, rather than buried, resulted in these talks:

I think that eventually most of the recommendations that were in the Task Force report were actually put into being. It took a bit of time, but I think that there was some adjustment and at the end of the day, we did put proposals to the government. We did push the government to start talks,
and although the initiative which eventually came from it was called the Brooke initiative, the truth of the matter was that it was a unionist initiative, because it was started when we presented the paper to the Secretary of State in January of 1988.\textsuperscript{100}

Indeed, the majority of unionists realized that talking to Britain as well as the SDLP represented the sole means of progress and "To do this effectively, they would have to establish a political position which presented a practical alternative to the AIA."\textsuperscript{101}

Paisley and Molyneaux met with Secretary of State, Tom King, to discuss talks early in 1988. King received proposals from the DUP and UUP on January 26. They wanted the AIA to be suspended and Britain to announce, preceding talks, its willingness to contemplate an option other than the AIA. They suggested "a new devolved assembly, with a network of committees answerable to it." It was obvious that getting the AIA as well as its secretariat suspended was the primary concern of the two unionist leaders.\textsuperscript{102} Still, this overture represented a step in the unionist political revival and that Spring (1988), Molyneaux was prepared to trade "'position' papers with [Taoiseach Charles] Haughey."\textsuperscript{103}

Voices of reason from within unionism continued to be heard in 1988. In February Harold McCusker appealed to unionists to come up with an arrangement that would be acceptable to unionists, Dublin as well as the SDLP. Even Protestant militants in the UVF believed in the necessity of "a more progressive strategy."\textsuperscript{104} The Charter Group,\textsuperscript{105} meanwhile, began the Campaign for a Devolved Parliament in March of 1988. It was pro-devolution and supported both a constitution as well as a bill of rights. The CDP's \textit{A Better Deal Together} argued that stopping the violence required the establishment of a situation in which unionists and nationalists could work beside each other, where both groups upheld the rule of law. Communication between parties,
official talks, as well as a popular vote on an agreement would take place. Essentially, as with *Common Sense*, the nationalist community would be dealt with in a fair manner inside a Northern Ireland based arrangement. As Cochrane puts it "if they gave up being nationalists and accepted the legitimacy of Northern Ireland as part of the Union, they would be granted minority rights within the state." Even though proposals like these were perhaps not extremely appealing to nationalists, they did give evidence that there were unionists who desired to achieve "a negotiated settlement." ⁷⁻¹⁰⁶

The fall of 1988 demonstrated the continuing existence of unionists in favour of real progress as well as obstacles to moving forward. In October of 1988 the unionists still refused to take part in discussions with Britain to agree on an AIA alternative. According to King, Britain would not give in to the unionists and suspend the accord as well as shut down the secretariat at Maryfield. MP Ken Maginnis expressed a desire that a set date for talks with the SDLP be established. The AIA *would* need to be suspended, though. This same October Sammy Wilson stated that talks with Tom King would not take place prior to King responding to their January proposals. Then, in November of 1988, tension was present at the UUP conference between UUP conservatives and those who were liberal. It seemed Craig Sides of South Down represented "the consensus of opinion when he suggested that, while the party should develop a more positive strategy, this should not involve any political interference from the Irish Republic: '...less "no" and more "go", but "no go" to any input from Dublin'." ⁷⁻¹⁰⁷

The UUP was aware, as the 1980s came to a close, that their current anti-Agreement campaign had not been a success. Talking to the SDLP as well as Britain was necessary. Nonetheless, they were reluctant to do so. They did not want their DUP
counterparts to accuse them of betrayal. Also, they did not want to appear weak to the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and thus be taken advantage of. Furthermore, progress in the direction of talks between the parties faced an obstacle in the complex reality of Unionism. Unionists are not all of one mind or share identical "cultural identities." As Cochrane points out, "This problem of not being able to deliver a united community has been endemic within the unionist ideology since Stormont was prorogued in 1972." Nonetheless, the 1980s did end with some grounds for hope. Unionists as of 1989 wanted "to be involved". As Smith puts it, "If Unionists were not quite ready to 'bite the negotiating bullet', they were undoubtedly keen to chew on it a little."

Although Republicans were against the AIA's partitionist and anti-republican elements, they too faced difficulties in the 1980s. It is true that, in the mid 1980s, republicans appeared to remain completely dedicated to their military campaign as well as a belief that they would win in the end. Still, among republican leaders a serious discussion regarding tactics was arising. Republican achievements had started to level off by the mid 1980s. Nationalists liked the AIA, which was good for constitutional nationalists like the SDLP. A poll was taken that discovered that the AIA was looked upon positively by 32% of Sinn Fein backers. Accepting the AIA, though, would mean surrendering a lot of Republican beliefs and tenets. Adams did not accept the AIA, but, faced with the need to react to it in a pro-Republican way, he took "credit for forcing its concessions from the British and suggested Britain would only ever be moved by Republican pressure." There was also the problem of violence. During the 1980s Sinn Fein's strength and position among nationalists started to go down due to the violence, including PIRA
errors. Non-military deaths or injuries especially hurt Sinn Fein. Certain atrocities were particularly upsetting. In December of 1983 a bomb at Harrods killed 6. This reduced Sinn Fein's support to the Catholic ghetto areas. Also in December, "British industrialist" Don Tidey was kidnapped. During his rescue, a soldier as well as a member of the garda were killed. This hurt Sinn Fein in the Republic. Violence would continue to undercut the political side of republicanism with events like the explosion in Enniskillen (1987) causing genuine upset and grief among the people.

The drop in political backing for Sinn Fein was clear in Northern Ireland in the 1980s. Sinn Fein achieved 13.4% support in the General Election (UK) of 1983, not too far off of the SDLP's 17.9%. In contrast, in the next General Election in 1987, Sinn Fein took a mere 11.4% while the SDLP got 21%. Unsurprisingly, in the "district elections" of 1989, Sinn Fein lost backing once more. It had 59 local council seats before this election - seats the party had won in the 1985 local government election - and 43 after. It was clear that, to increase its support, SF would have to change.

Sinn Fein also did not do well in the South during the latter 1980s, garnering only a tiny amount of support - this despite dropping abstention in 1986. In the 1987 Dail elections, Sinn Fein did not get any seats. Their share "of the vote" was 1.7%. In 1989 they received 1.2%. The 1987 election results showed and emphasized that Republicanism did not have a mandate from the people. As Smith puts it, "Where now would the 'right' to plant bombs and murder people come from?" Sinn Fein could no longer escape political responsibility or "democratic accountability." Sinn Fein would have no choice but to pay attention to what the electorate wanted and thought.
The situation of the 1980s eventually pushed Adams and Sinn Fein towards the moderate nationalist, John Hume, who ultimately took action to draw republicanism into the mainstream of non-violent politics. Among the turning points for Hume was Sinn Fein's *Scenario for Peace*, which came out in May of 1987.\(^{119}\) It contained a pledge that "Sinn Fein seeks to create conditions which will lead to a permanent cessation of hostilities, an end to our long war and the development of a peaceful, united and independent Irish society."\(^{120}\) Adams, 7 months after this, during a December 1987 interview, claimed his readiness "to consider an alternative, unarmed way of struggle, to attain Irish independence. If someone would outline such a course I would not only be prepared to listen, but I would be prepared to work in that direction....There's no military solution, none whatsoever. Military solutions by either of the two main protagonists only mean more tragedies. There can only be a political solution."\(^{121}\) These articulations were considered by Hume a foundation to build on. As far as Hume was concerned, the movement in republican views offered a chance to bring violence to an end and bring nationalist power together. These achievements could be utilized as leverage with Britain to make gains.\(^{122}\)

Adams and Hume engaged in dialogue between January and September of 1988 and it became clear that there was both common ground and areas of dispute between the two sides. Both were against an "internal settlement" in the North. They believed in Irish "self-determination" and they did not accept the right of unionists to veto Irish unity. Britain, in their view, ought to try to convince unionists to agree to Irish unity. Their views diverged, however, when it came to Britain's motives and the use of violence. Adams believed that the British continued to have a stake in the North, a "strategic
interest". For Sinn Fein, Britain pulling out was necessary for true and genuine peace. Hume, however, contended that the British position regarding the division of Ireland was "neutral" at this point. Also, force was not going to work when it came to getting unionists to join a united Irish state. They had to be persuaded. Thus, the armed struggle was a hindrance, not a help. It also solidified Britain's being in the North. According to the SDLP, if Britain pulled out and there was no agreed settlement and the people were not reconciled civil war would result. Nonetheless, regardless of such differences, these discussions brought the republicans out of "isolation" and marked the start of the peace process as well as an effort to establish "a pan-nationalist front." Secret communication between Adams and Hume occurred during the following four years. The talks allowed the two men to understand one another better and made Hume think he could possibly draw the Republicans away from violence. Indeed, in meeting the SDLP, Sinn Fein was essentially going against the "ourselves alone" idea. Republicans were not able to do it themselves. They needed others - in particular, their more moderate political counterparts - and working with them, it was clear, was very unlikely to happen while Republicans maintained their military campaign. Furthermore, the SDLP continued to attract more nationalist/Catholic votes than Sinn Fein, while Sinn Fein's base, which was also Northern Ireland and Catholic, was limited to around 10 to 11% support in elections in Northern Ireland. The people continued to favour the non-violent political approach of the SDLP.

**The Triumph of Moderation in the 1990s: Good Friday Agreement (1998)**

The 1990s were a time of more attempts to resolve the problem of Northern Ireland and some remarkable movement on the part of all parties. The desire of the
people to achieve a settlement and the willingness of their leaders to take risks all played a role in the establishment of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. Certain individuals were very important to this process, among them John Hume, Bertie Ahern, Albert Reynolds, and David Trimble. A willingness to be flexible and realistic on the part of the Republic of Ireland and its people was also a key factor. Finally, an understanding of the political and military realities facing them helped move republicans towards a peaceful solution. These realizations also allowed for additional influence to be exercised by moderates.


The struggle to find a resolution began with the April 1991-November 1992 Brooke-Mayhew talks, which included the major parties (but not Sinn Fein). A willingness to compromise, at least to some extent, is clear both before and during these discussions. Prior to talks, there were problems regarding at what point Dublin ought to take part officially in the talks. In the end, Dublin proved willing to allow Secretary of State Peter Brooke to decide when the South would take part in discussions. This was significant, given that Brooke was a British official. On March 25 of 1991, Northern Ireland's four largest parties accepted "the arrangements for political talks." Brooke declared the discussions would operate along three strands - "arrangements" inside the North, followed by those between the North and the South, and then encompassing Ireland and Britain. It was also accepted that "nothing will be finally agreed in any strand until everything is agreed in the talks as a whole." In April it was made known that the Anglo-Irish Agreement's Inter-Governmental Conference would not be active for 10 or 11 weeks while these talks took place. This was to make sure the unionists took part.
Interestingly, in the face of impending talks, hard-line loyalists reacted by deciding to go on cease-fire while the talks were on. They wanted to pressure their IRA counterparts. The Combined Loyalist Military Command, which spoke for the UVF, UDA as well as Red Hand Commando, declared on April 17 that their ceasefire would start at the end of April 1991. Its purpose was to assist the talks and was intended to hold for the duration of the negotiations. The cease-fire began on April 29/30. It lasted until July 4 of 1991, ending with the breakdown in discussions. Still, they made it clear that they were open to reinstating a ceasefire should the talks start again.

Although the initial round of discussions did not last long - talks began at last on June 17, 1991 and Brooke stopped the discussions on July 3 with agreement remaining a long way off - public support for them was evident. On July 12, an opinion poll came out that demonstrated that continuing the talks was backed by a lot of people. Seventy-three percent of Northern Irish respondents supported this as did 87% of Southern Irish respondents. Talks began once more on April 29, 1992. Although the talks officially ceased on November 10, 1992, with no agreement reached, that they had gone on at all was an impressive achievement considering the differences among the participants.

**Initiative '92 and the Opsahl Commission**

It was during this period that a more grass roots attempt at progress was made via Initiative '92 and the Opsahl Commission. With talks having failed, the situation appeared to be going nowhere and sectarian violence was bad. People desired their leaders to engage in discussions yet felt they themselves did not have sufficient stake in the search for a resolution. Simon Lee (a Queen’s University academic) and Robin
Wilson (*Fortnight*'s editor) established Initiative ’92 to allow people to have their say. Overall, about 3,000 people contributed somehow to the project, including political parties. Initiative ’92 and the Opsahl Commission, which listened to and read people’s contributions, was important in establishing acceptance of the notion that ordinary people, not just politicians, need to have their views heard. The Opsahl report came out in June of 1993 and its recommendations were based totally upon the people’s contributions and discussions.138

Initiative ’92 and the Opsahl Commission was very much a civil society endeavor and involved a number of elements and representatives from the Third Community. For example, Quintin Oliver chaired Initiative ‘92’s management committee and was the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action’s (NICVA) director. He would go on to become a leader in the “Yes” movement in favour of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.139 In addition, 220 people would become “the ultimate owners or ‘patrons’ of the project.” They would receive reports from the management committee. Among these patrons were individuals from Northern Ireland’s literary arts. A number were poets - Michael Longley, Seamus Heaney, and Tom Paulin.140 Writers of novels, stories, and/or plays who were also patrons included Brian Friel, Jennifer Johnston (a native of Dublin who lived in the North), Anne Devlin, Bernard MacLaverty, Sam McAughtry, and Colm Toibin (who is also from the Republic).141 Other artistic and cultural patrons included Paul Brady, a Northern Irish singer and songwriter, as well as Don Allen, Chairman of the Northern Ireland Sports Council.142

Initiative ‘92’s patrons also included clerics and trade union representatives. Among the project’s clerical patrons were Dr. John Dunlop, the Presbyterian Church’s
“outgoing moderator,” and the Methodist Reverend Harold Good (who was the Corrymeela Community Centre for Reconciliation’s director in the 1970s, and who would be a witness to IRA decommissioning, confirming their completion of it in 2005).\textsuperscript{143} Other clerical patrons were Reverend Cecil Orr (Church of Ireland), Father Denis Faul (pro-Irish unity, but anti-violence), and Bishop Samuel Poyntz (Bishop of Connor, Church of Ireland).\textsuperscript{144} The Methodist Reverend Eric Gallagher was among the Commissioners and Archbishop Robin Eames (Church of Ireland Primate) made submissions. The Catholic bishops of Northern Ireland did not participate; however, there were Catholic clerics and religious who submitted their views - for example, Father Denis Faul and Father Raymond Murray (whose work in support of human rights is well known).\textsuperscript{145} Trade union representatives included Lord William Blease and John Freeman (each at one point was involved with the NIC of the ICTU).\textsuperscript{146}

Contributions were also made to the project from a wide variety of people and groups. Activist women were patrons, including Anne Carr, of the future NIWC, Mairead Corrigan-Maguire, a founder of the Peace People, and Bronagh Hinds, who would later be involved in the establishment of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition.\textsuperscript{147} Those people and groups who contributed to the project, in written or oral form, included women and women’s groups, among them North Belfast women (who consisted of women belonging to both traditions who worked in the community), North Down and Ards Women’s Information Group, Northern Ireland Women’s Aid Federation, Women Together for Peace, Women’s Information Drop-In Centre (Belfast), and Women’s Planning Network. Contributions also came from APNI (John Alderdice/David Ford), the Green Party (Belfast), Inter-Church Group on Faith and
Politics, Irish National Teachers’ Organisation, Irish Council of Churches, the Community of the Peace People, the Ulster Humanist Association, the Corrymeela Community (whose representatives Duncan Morrow and John Morrow were also patrons), and the Northern Ireland Committee of the ICTU (with Terry Carlin as well as Alistair Keery, who was also a patron). Notably, Carlin was active in arranging many peace demonstrations over the years and was also an eager participant in the 1998 Yes Campaign on the accord. Finally, Senator Gordon Wilson (who lost his daughter Marie in the 1987 Enniskillen Bombing) and Dr. Colin Irwin (who led the peace polls work, discussed below) were also contributors.\textsuperscript{148}

The Opsahl Commission was to examine how Northern Ireland could move forward and drew attention to some important realities as well as issued many recommendations.\textsuperscript{149} To begin with, it was made clear that a political solution ought to be achievable. This was a very important point in the context of decades of conflict and unsuccessful struggles to end it. The Commission offered grounds for hope to all concerned, shoring up the aims of middle ground politicians, community activists, and ordinary members of the Third Community.\textsuperscript{150}

In the Opsahl Commission report, people read of the importance of “‘Parity of esteem’,” a notion which would become so prominent in the wake of the Commission that it actually appeared in the Good Friday Agreement five years later.\textsuperscript{151} Essentially, the Opsahl Commission recommended that the position of both major traditions be equal. According to the Commission, Catholics/Protestants, nationalists/unionists must have “an equal voice in making and executing the laws or a veto on their execution.” This recommendation had its roots in contributions stressing the importance of complete
equality of both communities. Among the contributions that made this point was one from the Corrymeela Community and one from the Presbyterian Church’s Church and Government Committee. The latter argued that “Within the whole island, the significance of the culture, religion and identity of the Protestant minority must be recognized, honoured and protected. Within Northern Ireland, the significance of the culture, religion and identity of the Roman Catholic minority must be recognized, honoured and protected.” Indeed, based on its findings regarding identity, politics, and religion, the Opsahl Commission “felt that acknowledgement of de facto affiliation to two islands must inform any new institutional framework.” Also, any settlement would require agreement on the part of each side and alterations in Northern Ireland’s position had to be agreed to by the province’s government as well as its citizens.

In terms of the actual type of government Northern Ireland ought to have, the Commission indicated that it needed to be a power-sharing one. Indeed, it was clear in the 1993 report that “The political structure that attracted the greatest number of proposals…was some form of devolved government on the basis of power-sharing, proportionality or weighted majorities, usually with an institutional Irish dimension.” Suggestions along such lines came from individuals and groups with different backgrounds. For example, the Presbyterian Church’s Church and Government Committee, among whom was Dr. John Dunlop, proposed devolution in which Catholics and Protestants participated “in ‘the politics of co-operation’.” Similarly, the Methodist Church’s Council on Social Welfare supported “some form of devolution which will command the support and approval of a majority of both the majority and the minority.” Meanwhile, the Jesuit Reverend Brian Lennon believed that nationalists must hold “an
executive role in Northern Ireland” in order for them to have a real stake in the province. He believed “a Northern Ireland Executive Assembly” was a possibility, involving the two communities (the nationalists possessing more seats than they, strictly speaking, would normally have). In that position, they would have to cooperate with their unionist counterparts. Senator Gordon Wilson likewise foresaw a government involving powersharing and desired both communities to be able to cooperate for everyone’s benefit. Corrymeela also generally supported power-sharing and proposed devolution for Northern Ireland. It would have a parliament, chosen via proportional representation. Interestingly, young Glyn Roberts (21) of Belfast suggested Northern Ireland have an executive of 12 people voted in by the province’s citizens via proportional representation. Northern Ireland would be a single voting area here. There would also be an Assembly of 102 people and it would have to endorse the executive in “a weighted vote.” Successful legislation in the majority of cases would have to be supported via various “weighted majorities”. For example, 80% when it came to difficult issues such as security.158

Working together across borders was also a theme that appeared during the Initiative ’92 and Opsahl Commission process. The Corrymeela Community’s “current affairs group” argued that, when it came to accords reached in the future, Southern Ireland and the UK had a responsibility to cooperate with each other. Agreements were required that acknowledged the province was “a special problem between them.” Indeed, Ireland and Britain needed “to develop their own cross-national co-operation to such an extent that there is no possibility for local political interests to portray Britain and Ireland as enemies, each working to impose their own, conflicting agendas for Northern Ireland.”
Furthermore, “Official recognition, ultimately through joint institutions, of a common heritage and future will have to transcend historical antagonism between Ireland and Britain, if Northern Ireland is to find a way forward.” David Bleakley, who had been Irish Council of Churches general secretary, likewise pointed out that an interdependent model involving Northern Ireland, Southern Ireland, England, Scotland, and Wales was necessary – “an Islands of the North Atlantic (IONA) federation of equals.”  

Regarding the Republic and Northern Ireland’s relationship, acknowledgement that there was, and should be, one came from a number of contributors. The Corrymeela group contended that “Irish involvement in Northern Irish affairs must be both real enough to reassure nationalists and limited enough to reassure unionists.” Indeed, Reverend Brian Lennon wanted there to be “‘an advisory role’” for Southern Ireland. Glyn Roberts was particularly detailed in his contribution, suggesting there be “an executive conference” when it came to North-South concerns. It would meet regularly and involve representatives from the government of Southern Ireland and Northern Ireland. They would take action on shared issues. Their decisions would require the support of Northern Ireland’s assembly. Indeed, a large number of participants wanted Northern Ireland and the South to work together more when it came to the economic arena.  

The Republic’s Constitution was also addressed by some submissions. The current affairs group of the Corrymeela Community suggested that Southern Ireland could take another look at how its Second and Third constitutional articles were worded. It was important that these were not understood to back the militant actions of groups like the IRA. Dr. Bernard Cullen, who was a nationalist as well as a philosophy professor in
Belfast, was even more direct and wanted Southern Ireland’s two problematic constitutional articles dropped. Likewise, according to APNI member and supporter Dr. Brian Eggins, changing or dropping the Republic’s Second and Third constitutional articles “would allay the fears of the unionists and reduce the perceived threat which partially triggers loyalist paramilitary violence.” Doing so could impact the violence of republicans too, as these articles, as they were, offered some legitimacy for the armed struggle as far as the IRA were concerned.162

Security concerns were considered by the Commission as well. They learned that Catholic unwillingness to join the RUC stemmed mainly from the notion that the police exercised authority on the part of a unionist regime – they were a unionist force. Symbols connected to policing and justice were problematic for Catholics, too, and if the RUC name was altered, it would help.163 Reverend Raymond Murray, for example, felt that there were not nearly enough Catholics in the RUC, contending that “The RUC caters only for the British tradition. Persons cannot join the RUC and express their Irishness.” Other contributors also noted that the minority had to play a real part in policing. Nationalists needed to be involved with policing in “an executive and administrative role,” argued Reverend Brian Lennon, Northern Ireland Religious for Justice and Peace, and Corrymeela.165 The SDLP’s Declan O’Loan concurred, noting that “We need to be much more involved in the policing process…putting forward proposals and accepting some of the stick when things go wrong.” Similarly, the Green Party contended that “there is a requirement for a police force which has the respect and support of the entire community.” To help bring this about, Mr. Joseph Peake, participant in Enniskillen Together, a group that transcended the Catholic/Protestant
divide, argued that Northern Ireland’s police ought not to investigate their own when accusations of wrongdoing were made. The North Belfast women added that they felt that members of the security forces ought to receive “community relations training.”

The Opsahl Commission concurred with Peake and noted that “a new Police Authority should be more broadly based and more actively pursuing good community relationships.”

Although Northern Ireland presented many security concerns, a lot of contributors to the Initiative ‘92/Opsahl Commission project still felt that the militants would need to, at some point, be participants in the search for peace. In their contributions, women from North Belfast argued that the militants had to be involved and Bishop Samuel Poyntz agreed that they had to be talked to. Senator Gordon Wilson concurred, stating that “I see the cessation of violence as the vital key to a peaceful solution. Without it, I cannot see how any proposed constitutional solution will work. The IRA must be convinced to abandon the armed struggle and have a place at the negotiating table.”

Indeed, nearly every one of the contributors who addressed the issue of paramilitaries felt the militants ought to join talks following a certain amount of time on ceasefire. There were even contributors who felt militants ought to be given encouragement to go on ceasefire. Perhaps the media ban could be lifted and maybe those in jail could be set free over time, provided the violence did not resume. The Community of the Peace People were among the contributors who wanted broadcasting limitations to cease.

When it came to Sinn Fein specifically, the case was made by contributors that isolating them only encouraged the people who were pro-violence. Indeed, a lot of contributors felt that Sinn Fein needed to be part of talks somehow for a resolution to
work. Still, the belief that Sinn Fein needed to give up the legitimization of violence prior to participating in talks was very popular.\textsuperscript{171} For instance, Archbishop Robin Eames wanted Sinn Fein to have their commitment to peace put to the test for a time prior to their entering discussions. Reverend Victor Griffin argued that Sinn Fein had to be reached out to. However, they needed to give up violence.\textsuperscript{172} The point that Sinn Fein did represent certain groups and was trying to make progress along constitutional lines was made to the Commission. In West Belfast, the Commission were informed “we vote for Sinn Fein because they are a young party, they have a high profile on the ground and we relate to it in a community context; yet the more they move towards the ballot box, the more they seem excluded; if you want to talk to us, talk to the people we elect.”\textsuperscript{173} Indeed, according to Mrs. Mary Leonard and Mrs. Kathleen Feenan (a member of the Women’s Information Group who was later involved with the NIWC), leaving Sinn Fein out increased political alienation among Catholics, in particular the young.\textsuperscript{174} The Opsahl Commission suggested that Sinn Fein ought to receive assistance in becoming part of constitutional politics, should that be what the party wanted.\textsuperscript{175} The Commission also supported Southern Ireland revisiting their broadcasting ban when it came to Sinn Fein.\textsuperscript{176}

The Opsahl Commission played a role in the development of women’s politics, which, in turn, helped bring about a new accord in 1998. During the Initiative ’92 and Opsahl process, it was made clear by the likes of the North Belfast women and the WAF that women had done a lot for their communities. Indeed, the Methodist Women’s Association wanted more women to be involved in the political arena. According to Ms. Grace Bennett, there was no party in the North that women found attractive or that reached out to them. Bennett put forward the notion of having “a forum or think-tank”
involving women belonging to different backgrounds. It could put forward suggestions on policies which impacted women. In light of such contributions, the Commission supported women’s efforts in community and in politics. Women ought to be able to enter politics without facing obstacles as they might have a lot to offer as a resolution for Northern Ireland’s problems was sought.177 Several years later, the NIWC would be established, including women from all traditions and walks of life, and it would contribute to the talks and creation of the Good Friday Agreement (1998).

The contributions to Initiative ’92 and the Opsahl Commission also addressed other basic issues considered important to and within civil society. A lot of contributors supported Northern Ireland getting a Bill of Rights, including the Community of the Peace People as well as the Northern Ireland Committee of the ICTU.178 Furthermore, the Commission received some “strongly argued submissions” that caused it to recommend “that the Housing Executive…examine the feasibility of setting up a number of ‘pilot’ integrated housing schemes, with subsidized rentals and other support mechanisms.”179 Related submissions came from the North Belfast women, who worried about peace walls and physical divisions between people and areas. They wanted there to be discussion around mixed housing. Similarly, the Sisters of the Cross and Passion (Catholic) supported mixed housing. They suggested the establishment of “one or more model integrated housing areas.”180 In the end, backing for mixed housing did appear in the final Agreement in 1998, a cause that the activist Anne Carr had fought for.181 Integrated education received significant support from contributors as well, among them Dr. Colin Irwin, the Methodist Women’s Association, and the Sisters of the Cross and Passion (who supported parents being able to choose integrated schools).182
Acknowledgement of the importance of integrated education also ultimately appeared in the 1998 Agreement.\textsuperscript{183}

Although the political elite were not always huge supporters of Initiative’92 and the Commission, there was no doubt that it had an impact in the public realm. When the political discussions stopped in November of 1992, Initiative ‘92’s profile rose among the people and the media. Contributions picked up. Public (for the most part) hearings began early in 1993 and took six weeks. They received a lot of attention in the media, North and South, and some attention in Britain, too.\textsuperscript{184} The Initiative ‘92 and Opsahl Commission process was not a hidden or secret one and, as will be shown, a number of their suggestions and those of their contributors would ultimately come to pass in the years leading up to, and following, the 1998 accord. These included continued British-Irish cooperation and agreement, drawing the militants, including Sinn Fein, into the peace process, parity of esteem, devolved power-sharing government, the establishment of cross-border structures, and changes to the RUC.

\textbf{The Journey to Compromise: Republicans, Mainstream Politicians, and the People}

The strength of the middle ground majority and the willingness of mainstream politicians to engage in talks with each other played a role in the gradual movement of republicans towards a more moderate approach to achieving their goals. A key factor was republican awareness, as the 1990s began, that the PIRA and Britain were at an impasse, militarily, and that the republicans’ negotiating position would not be improved by more violence. Republicans also realized that their unionist counterparts were not about to go away. Thus, negotiation would have to take place in some fashion. After all, their political and military situation was not promising in the early 1990s. Their armed
struggle was not bringing them their desired results in the first half of the decade. In addition, Sinn Fein received a mere 10% support in the General Election on 9 April of 1992. Adams lost his seat to Joe Hendron (SDLP) in West Belfast and SDLP support was more than twice Sinn Fein's. Without strong support in the community, and confronted with military impasse and stubborn unionists, the republicans were faced with the possibility that their influence would be marginal compared to the SDLP. Adams as well as McGuinness did not want Sinn Fein to be pushed into obscurity with an arrangement made that did not include them. These realities opened up opportunities for moderates to press their case in the search for a resolution.

That obscurity was a real possibility was clear with the 1991/1992 talks, which had not included Sinn Fein. These talks were denounced by Sinn Fein because they were not "inclusive." By the 1990s, the party wanted its place at the table and they "struggled to open a dialogue with anybody but particularly with Hume and Fianna Fail." Thus the party toned down "its rhetoric" significantly and the 1992 manifesto *Towards a Lasting Peace* (Sinn Fein) "impressed" Hume. The importance of the document was found in what seemed to be its greater acknowledgment or awareness "of unionist identity." For instance, Sinn Fein recognized that 20% of people in Ireland were unionist. The party acknowledged that "Peace requires a settlement between Irish nationalists and Irish unionists." While the unionists could not be allowed to maintain a "veto", "To achieve national reconciliation the deep rooted fears of people must be addressed. All gain from a democratic settlement." Evidence of movement on the republican side can also be seen in this year when Jim Gibney, an important member of Sinn Fein, stated in June of 1992, during the memorial to Wolfe Tone, that "We know
and accept that the British government's departure must be preceded by a sustained period of peace and will arise out of negotiations involving the different shades of Irish Nationalism and Unionism."\(^{192}\) Yet, only in 1989, IRA representatives had said "We can state confidently today that there will be no cease-fire until Britain declares its intention to withdraw."\(^{193}\)

Sinn Fein continued to move towards a constitutional solution with the active encouragement of John Hume. Hume and Gerry Adams, having created a rapport with one another during their talks in the late 1980s, were talking again in 1993.\(^{194}\) In the wake of their April meeting, Hume and Adams released a statement in which they expressed a desire for, and support for, a peaceful resolution: "Everyone has a solemn duty to change the political climate away from conflict and towards a process of national reconciliation which see the peaceful accommodation of the differences between the people of Britain and Ireland and the Irish people themselves."\(^{195}\) Both men accepted that support from everyone in Ireland was necessary for any peace:

As leaders of our respective parties we have told each other that we see the task of reaching agreement on a peaceful and democratic accord for all on this island as our primary challenge.

We both recognise that such a new agreement is only achievable and viable if it can earn and enjoy the allegiance of the different traditions on this island, by accommodating diversity and providing for national reconciliation.\(^{196}\)

In their September 1993 statement, the two men argued that "Such a [peace] process would obviously also be designed to ensure that any new agreement that might emerge respects the diversity of our different traditions and earns their allegiance and agreement."\(^{197}\) Inside these statements, the necessity of agreement on the part of unionists was accepted, essentially. An acceptance on the part of Adams that unionists
had to be convinced to be part of Irish unity made, or would make, violence a real drawback. Thus, "in the Hume-Adams statements of 1993 lay the seeds to the IRA's cease-fires of 1994 and 1997."\(^{198}\)

In talking to Adams, Hume concluded that a statement by both governments that adequately backed "Irish self-determination" could possibly persuade republicans to end the armed struggle. Hume pursued this in 1993 with Adams as well as Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.\(^{199}\) In September, the Hume-Adams statement noted that

> Our discussions, aimed at the creation of a peace process which would involve all parties, have made considerable progress. We agreed to forward a report on the position reached to date to Dublin for consideration. We recognise that the broad principles involved will be for wider consideration between the two governments. Accordingly, we have suspended detailed discussions for the time being in order to facilitate this.\(^{200}\)

According to *The Irish Times*, the Hume-Adams Initiative desired "the British government to declare that it has no long-term interest in Ireland and that it will actively pursue unionist consent to" Irish unity.\(^{201}\) Although, in the opinion of Britain, the stance of Hume and Adams was too one-sided, it helped bring about the *Downing Street Declaration* of December 1993.\(^{202}\) The Hume-Adams Initiative likely helped those in government circles working towards peace by offering "an insight into the demands of the Provisional IRA for laying down their arms." Indeed, Reynolds praised Hume more than once for the work he had done.\(^{203}\)

A desire to avoid further violence also stimulated progress on the Northern Ireland situation, brought on, in the short term, by the Shankill Bombing and the Rising Sun Pub Massacre in October of 1993.\(^{204}\) Both atrocities were denounced and pushed Sinn Fein further to the political fringes.\(^{205}\) Southern leaders Albert Reynolds and Dick
Spring (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs) insisted the violence needed to end in the wake of the deaths on the Shankill.\textsuperscript{206} Following the bombing, Spring announced his Six Principles, aimed at helping to achieve progress, in the Dail in late October 1993. They made it clear that violence was not acceptable as a way forward: "we must be prepared to say to the men of violence that they can come to the negotiating table, that they can play a peaceful part in the development of Ireland's future if only they would stop the killing and the maiming and the hurting."\textsuperscript{207} Similarly, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, contended "It must be understood that never is there going to be any bargaining with those who...reinforce their arguments with bombs and bullets, or the threat of violence."\textsuperscript{208} Then, in November, UK Prime Minister John Major made the following statement at an event in London: "Those who decline to renounce violence can never have a place at the conference table in our democracy....But, if the IRA end violence for good, then after a sufficient interval to ensure the permanence of their intent Sinn Fein can enter the political arena as a democratic party and join the dialogue on the way ahead."\textsuperscript{209}

Less than two months later, John Major along with Albert Reynolds came out with the \textit{Downing Street Declaration}.\textsuperscript{210} It had real similarities to the Hume-Adams statements of earlier in the year. According to journalist Mary Holland, a lot of the contents of the April Hume-Adams statement had "now been absorbed into the official policy of the British and Irish governments."\textsuperscript{211} Ireland's right of self-determination was acknowledged in the \textit{Declaration}. However, it was connected to agreement on the part of Northern Ireland and the Republic. The British would help Irish unity if that was what the people wanted. The South, meanwhile, acknowledged that the citizens of Northern
Ireland needed to agree for Irish unity to come about. Also, if an arrangement was arrived at amongst Northern Ireland's democratic parties at some point, Dublin would change their offending constitutional articles (as supported by some contributors to Initiative ‘92/the Opsahl Commission).\textsuperscript{212} Finally, violence was not accepted as a legitimate way forward and would keep those who endorsed it out of the process.\textsuperscript{213}

The 1994 IRA ceasefire was further helped along when Reynolds and others made an effort to demonstrate to republicans the benefits of non-violence. Reynolds lifted the broadcast ban on Sinn Fein (a move recommended by the Opsahl Commission and several of its contributors) that had been in place for over a decade at the beginning of 1994. He also encouraged American President Bill Clinton to let Adams have "a visa".\textsuperscript{214} Clinton decided to allow Adams "a 'limited duration' visa" for the purpose of speaking at "a peace conference."\textsuperscript{215} After receiving his visa, Adams, Hume, as well as APNI leader John Alderdice, spoke to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. Adams' time in America proved to be a Sinn Fein publicity triumph. Prior to returning home, Adams pledged not to let down the people responsible for getting him a visa. He declared "It is our intention to see the gun removed permanently from Irish politics."\textsuperscript{216} Republicans were able to get a sense of the political profile available to them with the end of violence.\textsuperscript{217}

The reality that violence was not going to get them what they wanted was further emphasized to Sinn Fein in this period. Adams had wanted "clarification" "of the Downing Street Declaration"\textsuperscript{218} and this was finally provided in May of 1994 by the Northern Ireland Office.\textsuperscript{219} However, in this document, Britain made clear that violence would get Sinn Fein nowhere. Sinn Fein had to decide whether to be part of a democratic
way forward, or not. If not, "The alternative is isolation - standing on the outside while those committed to democracy shape the agreement, structures and institutions that will determine the relationships between the peoples of these islands." The British document went on to note that Ireland's people wanted the violence to stop and armed struggle could no longer be seen as legitimate. Finally, there could be "no further playing for time" on the part of Sinn Fein. This British position was essentially backed by Irish leaders and was greeted with satisfaction by Reynolds, Spring, and Hume. Dick Spring declared that "My judgment is that it is sufficient to end the clarification debate. It puts the onus on Provisional Sinn Fein/IRA to end the violence and to accept the generosity of the latest gesture and come into the process. I see absolutely no reason or logic why, [sic] the violence should continue." The IRA's most significant ceasefire of the conflict followed several months afterwards on August 31, 1994. It was a "complete cessation of military operations" as demanded by the Irish government. The cease-fire statement paid tribute to the efforts of Volunteers and upheld a dedication to republican aims. However, the statement also went on to note that "We believe that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting settlement has been created. We are therefore entering into a new situation in a spirit of determination and confidence". The document ended with the declaration that "A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations....We urge everyone to approach this new situation with energy, determination and patience." There was no time limit placed on this "cessation" and both Reynolds and John Hume believed the armed struggle of the PIRA was permanently at an end.
Shortly after this cease-fire, Reynolds, Hume, as well as Adams met in Dublin. They released a collective statement that reinforced the changed outlook on Northern Ireland and its future: "We are at the beginning of a new era in which we are all totally and absolutely committed to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving our political problems. We reiterate that our objective is an equitable and lasting agreement that can command the allegiance of all." Furthermore, the three men recognized the importance of unionist consent: "We reiterate that we cannot resolve this problem without the participation and agreement of the Unionist people. We call on everyone to use all their influence to bring this agreement about."  

Soon after, on October 13, 1994, the loyalists instituted a cease-fire as well when the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) declared that "the CLMC will universally cease all operational hostilities as from 12 midnight on Thursday 13th October 1994. The permanence of our cease-fire will be completely dependent upon the continued cessation of all nationalist/republican violence." In other words, loyalists were willing to honour a republican halt to violence with their own. Furthermore, leading loyalists claimed that, in return for this cessation of violence, participation in peace talks was expected. They wanted parties with connections to loyalist militants to be involved to the same extent as Sinn Fein. They recognized the danger of being left out of a process that involved all other major parties. In the cease-fire's wake, loyalist leaders entered the political arena - David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson as well as Gary McMichael. They were intelligent and capable. 

The weapons issue, meanwhile, became central to resolving the Northern Ireland conflict in the 1990s. There was nothing in the DSD about surrender of weapons being
necessary for participation in talks.\textsuperscript{230} Still, Britain and the Unionists, as of the end of 1994, were heading toward decommissioning before talks. Unionists desired that decommissioning be complete prior to talks taking place. Adams, Hume, Reynolds and John Bruton, in contrast, insisted that talks begin right away, talks that were "inclusive."\textsuperscript{231}

Efforts were made to address the impasse and, once again, Anglo-Irish cooperation took place. Britain and Ireland released a “Joint Communique” on November 28, 1995, which declared that they had "agreed to launch a "twin-track" process to make progress in parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party negotiations". It was their desire for talks among all the parties to start by the time February ended. Ireland and Britain intended to set up "an international body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue." George Mitchell (an American Senator) would be among its chairs. It would evaluate the decommissioning question and provide a report early in the year. Although Ireland and Britain did not have to abide by the report's findings, this marked a step towards achieving a resolution.\textsuperscript{232}

\emph{The Mitchell Report} (January 24, 1996) supported discussions beginning right away, as quickly as they could be started, prior to decommissioning. It argued that "The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise."\textsuperscript{233} Also included were what became known as the Mitchell Principles. There were six and they were as follows:

we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment: a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the
satisfaction of an independent commission; d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, f. To urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

Acceptance of these was necessary for every party prior to their participation in negotiations. Despite differences of opinion on decommissioning and on what actions should be taken next, the Mitchell Principles received support from the SDLP, David Trimble and the UUP, Deputy Leader of the DUP, Peter Robinson, the UDP, and the PUP. According to Gerry Adams, "The content of these principles already coincides to a large degree with Sinn Fein positions which are a matter of public policy."

Meanwhile, the progressive thinkers within republicanism faced a serious challenge on the road to peace. Hostility to the peace plan of Adams and his colleagues arose with the initial cease-fire. It grew powerful enough to bring about an end to that cease-fire with the bombing of Canary Wharf in London on February 9, 1996. Two died and a lot of people were hurt. However, with this violent act, republicans undercut their own position. On February 11, John Bruton, now Taoiseach, declared that Sinn Fein would not receive from Dublin the same "political recognition" as those who were only utilizing non violent means. To regain that recognition there had to be a cease-fire. He would not meet with Adams in the absence of one. Shortly thereafter, Ireland and Britain decided to go ahead and have elections as well as negotiations, with or without Sinn Fein. On February 28, Bruton and Major released a “Communique” in which June 10 of 1996 was established as the date talks among the parties would begin. Participants were required to accept the Mitchell Principles. Britain and Ireland would
not let Sinn Fein participate in discussions without an IRA cease-fire, a position very popular among Initiative ‘92/Opsahl Commission participants.\textsuperscript{243} Thus Sinn Fein had to remain isolated for well over a year.\textsuperscript{244}

Furthermore, it was in the wake of the Canary Wharf Bombing that the people of Ireland took a clear stand against violence, which applied pressure for a resolution to be achieved. On February 16, 1996, it was reported that 500,000 peopled signed "a letter poll" for peace.\textsuperscript{245} According to the \textit{Belfast Telegraph}, a phone survey attracted a lot of people as well. Over 150,000 Northern Irish citizens supported "calls for terror to be kept off the streets."\textsuperscript{246} Many thousands of people in both parts of Ireland demonstrated for peace that February. A Dublin demonstration attracted about 25,000. A rally in Cork drew 15,000.\textsuperscript{247} A Belfast rally also brought in around 15,000 and demonstrations took place in other areas in the North as well. In Belfast, people chanted "We want peace."\textsuperscript{248} White ribbons for peace were worn and people were "waving white paper doves" in Belfast. During rallies "All we are saying is give peace a chance" was sung. People also demanded: "Cease-fire now. Give us back our peace."\textsuperscript{249} At the rallies in Dublin as well as Belfast, Sinn Fein members could be seen at the edges of the demonstrations with signs which read "Make Peace Work - Negotiate Now."\textsuperscript{250}

It was shortly after this that another, lesser known, but important element in the peace process began to have an impact. These were opinion polls, which gave ordinary people another means of impacting the peace. In the April of 1996 to May of 2000 period, eight polls took place. In seven of them "the questions...were drafted and agreed with the co-operation of party negotiators."\textsuperscript{251} Participants in the surveys were told who the researcher(s) was, where the funding came from,\textsuperscript{252} its recipients, the way the results
would be distributed. Steps were taken to ensure "a representative sample". Results appeared in the *Belfast Telegraph*, which went on to support the Agreement of 1998. Each party received the entire results, including those not published within the *Belfast Telegraph*. Following the release of every poll result, "progress was made and the negotiations moved forward." The surveys marked a deliberate effort to outline "the details of a settlement" which the people as well as their representatives would be able to accept. It was, in a way, an extension and carrying forward of what Initiative '92 and the Opsahl Commission had begun several years before.

"Peace Building and Public Policy" was the initial poll. It took place during April as well as May 1996. According to Colin Irwin (former contributor to Initiative '92/the Opsahl Commission), this poll was conducted "as a piece of pure research." After this, the 10 parties chose to be involved "in a similar programme of research to address the problems they had to resolve." In this first survey it was found that the Catholic and Protestant communities both had their political preferences and desires. Still, "when preferences for different potential options were analysed [what would be] the proposed central feature of the Belfast Agreement - *power sharing with North-South institutions but no joint authority* - was found to be a viable compromise."

Public support for a constitutional way forward continued to be firmly expressed. In the wake of the Mitchell Report, Major, in March of 1996, declared that a Northern Ireland Forum would be elected. Talks participants would come from this. On May 30, 1996 the Forum elections took place. Most seats were taken by the more moderate and middle ground parties. The UUP took 30 seats, the SDLP 21. APNI gained 7 and the NIWC received 2 seats. The DUP, meanwhile, took 24 and Sinn Fein, 17. The PUP
and UDP took 2 seats each. Altogether, the less extreme parties, including Labour (2 seats), took 62 of the 110 seats, while the remaining 48 went to the more hard line parties. The electorate continued to prefer, overall, the parties who came across as more moderate and were not connected with paramilitary bodies.

Talks began June 10, 1996 and, once again, Sinn Fein was isolated due to the IRA’s choice to resume violence. Indeed, in a further example of British-Irish cooperation in the search for peace, the following statement was released regarding Sinn Fein’s absence:

Sinn Fein are not at today's talks because there has seen [sic] no restoration of the August 1994 cease-fire. It has been the consistent position of both Governments since February, reflected in paragraph 9 or [sic] the Groundrules for Substantive All-Party Negotiations, that the resumption of Ministerial dialogue with Sinn Fein and their participation in negotiations, requires the unequivocal restoration of the cease-fire of August 1994.

Controversy over procedure as well as the means of making decisions encumbered the talks, but ultimately an effective compromise was achieved that allowed all sides to have influence - "sufficient consensus". If a decision was not unanimous it needed to fulfill four criteria in order to pass. Most talks participants had to back it. Most Nationalist and most Unionist participants had to back it. Most parties had to support it - every party possessed a single vote. Britain and Ireland had to back it.

Although problems over Orange marches would soon result in the SDLP deciding to leave the Forum on July 13th, following a summer break negotiations resumed early in September of 1996. Participants decided to adhere to the three strand approach used in 1991/1992.
Meanwhile, the people continued to express a desire for peace and a ceasefire. On October 7, 1996, British Army Headquarters in County Antrim was bombed by the IRA, who took responsibility the following day. 31 were hurt. One man died on October 11. On that day a demonstration for peace that Women Together had arranged took place at Belfast City Hall. Around 1,500 took part. The next day PUP leaders called on loyalist militants to stay on ceasefire. The SDLP as well as UUP "agreed on a draft agenda for the Stormont talks" shortly thereafter, on October 14. A little over a week later, information from a survey came out in the press. The vast majority of respondents desired the IRA to cease its armed campaign - 89% of Catholic participants and 98% of Protestant participants. 71% of those who backed Sinn Fein desired there to be a ceasefire right away, too.

In the 1996 to 1997 fall and winter months, pressure by the more moderate politicians and parties continued to be brought to bear on Sinn Fein for a republican ceasefire. Early in the new year, according to the Irish Times, Sinn Fein reached out to the SDLP regarding establishing "an electoral pact" for the next Westminster election. Hume made it clear that his party would agree to an arrangement like this solely if the IRA was on ceasefire and Sinn Fein agreed to sit in Westminster. On February 24, Fianna Fail leader, Bertie Ahern, said in Belfast that a ceasefire by the IRA had to be "real, not a sham." Later, on April 9, Bruton appealed to northern nationalists to not support Sinn Fein at the election as supporting them was a "vote for murder." Also in April, Adams once again expressed a desire for a Sinn Fein-SDLP electoral agreement. The SDLP would still not agree to this. Hume declared: "I as leader of the SDLP made very clear that we would discuss electoral strategy with them if there was an IRA
ceasefire. They have done nothing about that and therefore have made a pact impossible.” In short, leaders of constitutional nationalism were standing apart from their more hard line counterparts.

A desire to find a non-violent solution to the situation was also evident among the people of Northern Ireland. It was in this period that the initial poll to occur including the parties' participation took place (March 1997). Publication occurred that April. The poll's initial question received promising answers: "Do you support the principle of a negotiated settlement for the political future of Northern Ireland?" Those who responded in the affirmative amounted to 94%. 97% of Catholics backed this and 93% of Protestants did. Northern Ireland's citizens desired peace, but "Not at any price". As long as there were ceasefires, they were in favour of negotiations involving all of the parties.

Northern Ireland's political status and structure were addressed in detail in this survey and respondents' answers revealed the existence of a centre ground and room for compromise. The following question was asked: "With regard to the status of Northern Ireland please indicate which of the following options you consider to be 'Preferred', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'?" An independent Northern Ireland did not have a lot of overall support, more than 50% of Protestants and Catholics viewing such a solution to be "Unacceptable." Protestants were clearly pro-Union. Eighty-five percent desired Northern Ireland to continue within the UK. Catholics proved to be less rigid, other than those who backed Sinn Fein desiring Irish unity. A mere 39% preferred "A new all Ireland state". Twenty-eight percent liked the idea of staying in the UK! Twenty-three percent preferred "Joint authority". A mere 25% of Catholics felt staying
in the UK was not acceptable. Interestingly, among Sinn Fein supporters, 78% favoured Irish unity. Sixty percent found staying in the UK "Unacceptable." These are surprisingly low percentages, all things considered.

When it came to Northern Ireland's government, the choices were "Devolved majority rule", "Devolved responsibility sharing", "No special regional government (UK)", "No special regional government (Ireland)", "Separate institutions for the two main communities". Most Catholics, 53%, preferred "Devolved responsibility sharing". A Northern Ireland Assembly with "majority rule" was what Protestants desired (43%). Still, 76% of Protestants could at least tolerate "Devolved responsibility sharing." Interestingly, 58% of Protestants were solidly against "Separate institutions" as were 49% of Catholics. A desire to find an arrangement that would encompass both communities was evident.

Politically, moderate and pragmatic politicians were still dominating the political scene in 1997 and would prove key to the achievement of an Agreement in 1998. In May 1997, Tony Blair and Labour took power. A mere week following his election, Blair was in Belfast giving a speech. In it he claimed "The government will not be persuaders for unity," which offered some unionists a certain amount of comfort. Meanwhile, Bertie Ahern and Fianna Fail took over the government in the South in June of 1997. Ahern was known for his pragmatism and he would prove willing to work with Britain and take chances for peace. In Northern Ireland, meanwhile, Sinn Fein's support did rise in the May 1 General Election - 16.1% of voters backed the party. Still, despite the fact that it was now Northern Ireland's third party, taking two seats, the UUP as well as SDLP remained the most favoured parties in the North, capturing 10 and 3 seats, respectively.
Even in the Local Government Elections of May 21, where Sinn Fein improved its performance as well, the SDLP and UUP remained the most popular parties in Northern Ireland. Without a powerful mandate from the people and a ceasefire from the IRA, Sinn Fein remained isolated.

In June of 1997, not long after negotiations began once more, following a hiatus that started in March, Britain and Ireland made it clear that the IRA had five weeks to go on ceasefire. According to Blair, "The settlement train is leaving, with or without Sinn Fein." After a ceasefire was established, Sinn Fein would be able to participate in the Stormont talks. However, "a six-week 'purifying' period was required." Sinn Fein would be required to accept the Mitchell Principles. If republicans did not take advantage of their opportunities, they would be left on the fringes. Once again, such a stance reflected a common position found several years earlier among Initiative '92 participants. Furthermore, those already involved in the talks had "a similar timeframe to decide if they" were ready "to remove the decommissioning roadblock." In Britain and Ireland's “Document on Decommissioning,” which came out in late June, they desired the parties to agree that they would fulfill "all aspects of the Mitchell Report, including its proposal that some decommissioning should occur not before or after, but during, the process of negotiation." Basically, IRA decommissioning would not have to take place prior to the participation of Sinn Fein in discussions. An Independent Commission would handle decommissioning as talks were going on.

Pressure continued to mount on republicans from politicians and people. On July 12, Hume appealed to the IRA for another ceasefire. The people backed up this call in the wake of the death, on July 15, of 18-year-old Catholic, Bernadette Martin. She died
after being shot while sleeping at her boyfriend's house. Her boyfriend was Protestant and it was thought that the LVF were most likely to blame. Three days after her death, over 1,500 came to Martin's funeral - both Catholics and Protestants. On the same day, Adams and McGuinness appealed to the IRA for a ceasefire. A ceasefire was duly declared the following day, to start on July 20. In the wake of the ceasefire, Bernadette Martin's father encouraged political leaders to negotiate in order to make sure the violence did not come back to Northern Ireland. He stated his hope that the murder of Bernadette "might have brought the ceasefire about."

The IRA's ceasefire statement on July 19 marked a new phase in the peace process. While insisting that they still desired Britain out of Ireland, the IRA made it clear that "We want a permanent peace and therefore we are prepared to enhance the search for a democratic peace settlement through real and inclusive negotiations." Less than a week later, on July 25, Ahern, Adams and Hume met. In their statement they agreed that "the participation and agreement of the Unionist people" was needed for a solution. Then, in a move of great significance, Sinn Fein officially accepted the Mitchell Principles on September 9 and took its seat on the 15th for talks. When Sinn Fein entered the talks and accepted the Mitchell Principles it was repudiating the use of violence, "the armed struggle."

Meanwhile, on the unionist side, Trimble proved willing to take chances for peace, unlike his more hard-line counterparts. On July 23, the DUP as well as UKUP declared their non-participation in talks. If Trimble left, though, the talks would be ruined and responsibility for the collapse of "the peace process" would be placed on the Unionists. Still, a lot of Ulster Unionists were not able to accept Trimble and Adams
sharing a negotiating table. To do so before decommissioning was even worse. Yet, ultimately, Trimble supported participation and the UUP (as well as the UDP and PUP) came back to Stormont for discussions on September 17. This reflected a major movement in the Unionist stance as far as decommissioning was concerned, with the focus now on having arms decommissioned while talks took place, rather than before. Trimble was not about to allow Unionism to be relegated to the fringes. Furthermore, as Smith has pointed out, "above all else Trimble, like all those now around the table, genuinely wanted to bring the Troubles to an end and was willing to take risks to achieve that." UUP willingness to give the process a chance allowed for progress to be made. On 23 September, Sinn Fein and the UUP were together in one room for "a plenary session of the multi-party talks". However, the UUP were not willing to talk "directly" to Sinn Fein at that point. The UUP representatives exited the room once UUP delegate Ken Maginnis had spoken for a half hour, expressing his party's opposition to Sinn Fein. He directed his words to Chairman Harri Holkeri, not Sinn Fein. Still, this marked "the first formal unionist-republican encounter in 75 years." Not long after this, at the end of the month, a three strand format was agreed by the parties for negotiations and on October 7 serious discussions started in Belfast. While difficulties remained, the peace process was now very much underway and, on December 11, Adams, along with Sinn Fein representatives, entered Downing Street and met with Blair. It had been 76 years since Sinn Fein leaders had talked with a Prime Minister of Britain at this location. The talks ceased for a Christmas break on December 23.
It was in this period that further evidence of public backing for peace was found. The third poll took place in September of 1997. The vast majority - 92% - of Northern Ireland's citizens wished their party to remain "in the talks." Eighty-six percent "of Protestants" did and 98% of Catholics felt this way. Along party lines, 76% of supporters of the DUP desired the party to remain within the talks, despite the party's actual stance, and much higher percentages of other parties' supporters took this stance - 93% of UUP voters, 99% of SDLP and Alliance backers, and 100% of Sinn Fein voters. The *Belfast Telegraph* published the results in September, immediately prior to a meeting of the UUP (on 13 September) where they would have to choose whether or not to enter talks with their Sinn Fein counterparts the following week. The UUP chose not to leave "the talks process." Rather, the specific "tactics" used would be decided by "Trimble and his negotiating team." 

Another important poll took place in December of 1997. Publication occurred the following month. It involved completing a booklet of questions, as opposed to an interview. Irwin notes that "By employing a method of analysis based on the voting system used in the talks - a simple majority from both communities - a summary of what an acceptable agreement would look like was produced as follows." This settlement included an Assembly for Northern Ireland, "North-South bodies", "a Council of the Islands" in place of the 1985 Agreement, a "Bill of Rights" as well as police reform. It ended up being a lot like the 1998 Agreement. Also, it "was used as a basis for testing a 'Comprehensive Settlement' package in poll number five." Indeed, talks participants began to focus on settlement details after the December 1997 poll results came out. There was a new energy. As Irwin points out, "All the major elements of a
comprehensive settlement, and public attitudes towards them, were now plainly visible for everyone to see."

British-Irish cooperation continued to help move things along. Mitchell suggested in 1997 that Britain and Ireland come up with "a draft agreement that embraced all the various issues and strands." In January 1998 Ireland and Britain's "Propositions on Heads of Agreement" was put before the parties. The governments released a statement about this document as well. "Propositions" was intended to be "a basis for discussion, which we hope could help the talks' participants move towards agreement." It was a short document. However, "it did set out for the first time an embryonic settlement." Consent was upheld in "Propositions." It supported an Assembly for Northern Ireland and a North-South Council. It also envisioned "A new British-Irish agreement to replace the existing Anglo-Irish Agreement." The majority of parties involved in the negotiations took a positive view of the paper. Sinn Fein, however, was not happy. The republicans did not want a strong Assembly in Northern Ireland and believed "Propositions" stressed "a 'partition solution'." On January 21 "Propositions" was "rejected" by the IRA. To them it was Unionist in character. Still, the document, and the outlined settlement in the December 1997 poll, were largely like the Agreement that would be made mere months later. Both were also similar to suggestions and ideas expressed through the Initiative '92/Opsahl Commission.

Militants' options were clearly limited by this point. It was very obvious that violence was not going to be tolerated by the Irish or British governments and would get paramilitaries and their supporters nowhere. On January 22, Ronnie Flanagan, Chief Constable of the RUC, declared the UFF responsible for the deaths of three Catholics -
Eddie Treanor, Larry Brennan, and Ben Hughes. As soon as blame was placed upon the UFF, it announced its ceasefire was on again. Demands that the UDP be kicked out of the talks could be heard and, on January 26, the UDP was declared by Britain and Ireland "no longer entitled to participate in the negotiations," due to the murders. Ireland and Britain released "a document" about the involvement of the UDP which suggested they would be able to come back should the "renewed ceasefire" of the UFF be upheld.

The desire for a non-violent solution was reemphasized by the people days later when, on January 30, thousands met at City Hall Belfast to protest sectarian murder. The mayor and his deputy attended the demonstration as did Forum politicians. A few hundred, including John Hume, gathered at Derry's Guildhall Square, and at Lurgan about 200 congregated. One minute of silence took place in memory of conflict victims. In Antrim as many as 300 demonstrated. According to Antrim mayor, Paddy Marks, "We want to send a clear message to the gunmen and the terrorists saying we do not want you." Three hundred also demonstrated in Coleraine and events occurred at Omagh as well as Enniskillen. People also signed peace books in Belfast and elsewhere.

A refusal to surrender to violence continued in political circles and Sinn Fein was kicked out of the negotiations on February 20. The two governments officially threw them out over two murders which had occurred in February. A statement was released by the governments explaining why Sinn Fein had been expelled. Adams and Sinn Fein were upset, but had not been able to avoid expulsion. The power of violence had become a liability rather than a means of gaining ground in discussions. As long as the Irish government was willing to cooperate with Britain and the mainstream nationalist
and unionist parties, supported by the likes of APNI and the NIWC, remained in talks, the ability to influence and map out the future lay with them, not the hardliners. Sinn Fein rejoined discussions on March 9.\footnote{331}

Paramilitary murders continued, but were confronted with a determination to stand firm for peace. In March, Catholic Damian Trainor and his Protestant friend Philip Allen were killed in Poyntzpass. People were horrified and Seamus Mallon (SDLP Deputy Leader) and Trimble both went to Poyntzpass to see the men's loved ones.\footnote{332} It was "a rare show of unity".\footnote{333} According to Mallon, the murders of Trainor and Allen ought to drive everyone to do all they could to achieve a real peace - "It is a debt of honour to these men which the political process has got to pay, and now is the time to pay it." Trimble contended that the parties would continue to search for an agreement, despite the killings. Meanwhile, Mary Harney, the Republic's deputy prime minister, claimed the killings would only enhance the resolve of Dublin to reach an agreement.\footnote{334}

Even the Churches denounced the violence, with Reverend Sam Hutchinson, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, declaring that the search for agreement could not be permitted to be undermined by the actions of the murderers. The Archbishop of Armagh stated that "We are told we are on the threshold of a possible breakthrough, but people engaged in dialogue must not be put off." Reverend Norman Taggart, President of the Methodist Church, argued that "Those on both political extremes who are responsible for shootings and bombings are at one in their endeavour to end the process. They must not be allowed to succeed. Politicians of all parties must continue to seek a way forward that enables us to live in peace."\footnote{335} The Trainor and Allen funerals occurred on March 6 and members of the two communities were present.\footnote{336}
That the people of the North were ready for an agreement was made clear to the parties in the fifth poll, which took place in March of 1998. Publication occurred on March 31 and April 1. The talks participants were very much encouraged by the results. Proposed options from Sinn Fein, the DUP and UKUP were part of the poll. However, the poll showed that the suggestions of the radicals on both sides did not have backing across party lines. A "test 'package'" the other parties accepted was part of the poll, too. A Northern Ireland Assembly, Council of the Isles, North-South bodies, police reform, a Bill of Rights and constitutional change were all part of this possible settlement. The question was asked: "If a majority of the political parties elected to take part in the Stormont talks agreed to this settlement would you vote to accept it in a referendum?" Most Northern Irish people claimed they would (77%). This included most Catholics and Protestants - 81% and 74%, respectively. DUP voters were divided evenly in half, but most UUP, Alliance, SDLP and Sinn Fein backers claimed they would. Basically, "the centre ground settlement agreed to by the seven remaining parties could win support if put to the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum." Thanks to the poll, prior to the Agreement, the politicians knew that a referendum victory was possible.

In the poll it was also found that Catholics and Protestants continued to be very much against certain specific changes - yet they would accept these "as part of an overall agreed settlement." When it came to North-South bodies, a significant minority of Protestants (40%) viewed "this proposal...to be 'Unacceptable' by itself." Still, most (74%) would go along with this within the context of a detailed "settlement." Regarding the Council of the Isles, there were a number of Catholics (30%) who were hostile to it on
its own. However, most (81%) would accept this within the context of a settlement. When it came to RUC reform, a significant minority of Catholics saw this as "Essential." However, almost half of Protestants (48%) were against this. Still, most Protestants (74%) would accept such changes "as part of a comprehensive settlement agreed at the talks." In other words, a willingness to compromise existed among Northern Irish people.

This poll in turn confronted Sinn Fein once more with the necessity of compromise. According to Colin Irwin, the poll demonstrated "a lack of cross-community support for Sinn Fein's non-partitionist agenda of no local assembly, completely independent North/South bodies, no Council of the Isles, consent on an all Ireland basis and replacing the RUC." Most respondents on both sides of the sectarian divide felt an assembly was "acceptable". In addition, the survey showed "that a deal supported by the main centre parties - the Ulster Unionists, Alliance and SDLP - would have a good chance of a positive outcome" when put to the people. Sinn Fein already knew that the Unionists and SDLP could come to an agreement founded on sufficient consensus. Indeed, an "Irish source" noted this in the days before the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement was achieved: "The Ulster Unionists are necessary, not least because of the rule of sufficient consensus ....Sinn Fein isn't necessary for sufficient consensus - the SDLP represents more than 50% of nationalists." Furthermore, the survey showed that a significant minority in the Catholic community (33%) supported the North remaining within the UK. This fact, combined with strong Protestant backing for upholding the British connection, "explodes anew the musty argument of those nationalist
apostles who see partition crumbling with each census return." Sinn Fein needed to either compromise or risk sacrificing what political clout they had accumulated.

**The Good Friday Agreement and the “Yes” Campaign**

Compromise came a mere ten days afterwards when the Good Friday Agreement of April 10, 1998 was reached. Every one of Northern Ireland's major parties accepted it, other than the DUP. The accord reached very much reflected Initiative ‘92/the Opsahl Commission’s findings as well as what was learned from opinion polls. According to the deal's terms, Northern Ireland would have an Assembly with 108 people in it. The Assembly would be chosen via PR(STV). There would be an executive in which power was shared. It would consist of 12 people (suggested by Glyn Roberts in the Opsahl report). There would be a North-South Council accountable to Northern Ireland's Assembly as well as the Dail (again, similar to the suggestion by Roberts). "A British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference" and "a British-Irish Council of all the Isles" would also be set up, thus continuing the cooperation of both states advocated by Corrymeela in the Opsahl report. Ireland's Second and Third constitutional Articles would be changed, as desired by certain contributors to Initiative ‘92/the Opsahl Commission, and the 1920 Government of Ireland Act would be removed. Furthermore, "A whole raft of safeguards, rights and protections for the individual...[was] built into the agreement." There was also a "vague commitment to decommissioning". The Independent Commission for Decommissioning would oversee it. There would be "a commission on police reform" as well. Prisoners would be out in two years. Finally, the Agreement acknowledged the various identities in Northern Ireland and supported “parity of esteem between the two main communities,” as advocated by the Opsahl
Indeed, the accord provided for the setting up of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and supported the Province getting a Bill of Rights – something much desired by many participants in Initiative '92, including the Peace People, and by those who were involved with the polls.\textsuperscript{360}

The response to the Agreement was complex, but demonstrated that the hardliners and those clinging to "traditional" inflexible positions had lost. Significant numbers of unionists considered the GFA to be a plan that would result in a united Ireland. There were UUP members who felt this way as well as the UKUP, LVF, and DUP.\textsuperscript{361} Still, the UUP Executive supported the Agreement 55 to 23 on April 11 and the UUC backed the settlement with 540 for and 210 against on April 18 of 1998.\textsuperscript{362} On April 24 the UDA as well as UFF backed the Agreement. They claimed Irish unity would not result from it.\textsuperscript{363} Gary McMichael, leader of the UDP, argued in early May, "We are in a position where Ulster can finally say YES and unionism can move into the Millennium with confidence and strength, leaving the nowhere men behind."\textsuperscript{364}

Although for certain republicans the accord was "a traitor's charter," most ultimately accepted the necessity of compromise.\textsuperscript{365} It is true that, on April 30, an IRA statement declared the accord "falls short of presenting a solid basis for a lasting settlement." According to the organization, "there will be no decommissioning by the IRA."\textsuperscript{366} Yet, soon after, the IRA supposedly altered their constitution so that their political representatives would be able to be part of the Assembly in the North.\textsuperscript{367} Sinn Fein leaders backed the Agreement and Adams openly supported republican involvement with an Assembly on May 6, noting "that Sinn Fein must remain at the centre of the political process."\textsuperscript{368} Then, on May 10, Sinn Fein's Ard Fheis backed the accord and
sitting in the Assembly. This involved altering the party's constitution so that their people could be active MLAs. The vote was 331 of 350.

The fight to win the adherence or opposition of the population began in earnest. Even the Republic was involved. Fine Gael's Bruton praised the Agreement and it was supported by his party. In early May, Fianna Fail's Yes campaign was begun by Ahern. Once again, this stance is noteworthy considering that Fianna Fail had its roots with the anti-Treaty republicans in the 1920s. The party, in the past, has been viewed to be "more nationalist and republican" when it came to the North as well as Irish unity. Accepting and promoting the 1998 Agreement represented a compromise the party's founders had not wanted to make in 1921.

On the unionist side, there was strong opposition to the Agreement from certain sections. On April 23 a rally against the accord took place involving DUP, UKUP, and some UUP politicians and their supporters. Other rallies would follow. Then, the United Unionist Campaign against the Agreement officially began on May 5 and involved DUP, UKUP and some UUP members opposing the Agreement together. The slogan of the United Unionist Campaign was "It's right to say no." In a strange twist, on May 15 a ceasefire was declared by the LVF, the most stubbornly violent of the loyalist groups during the Peace Process, with the aim of getting voters to oppose the accord. They knew that their violence was more likely to drive their more moderate fellow citizens in the direction of the Agreement, rather than away from it. Indeed, according to a survey, "the main reason people were planning to vote 'No' was the planned release of paramilitary prisoners under the Agreement." In other words,
antipathy to continuing and increasing violence, in addition to not wanting those guilty of it released, were powerful concerns among ordinary citizens.

The Northern campaign for the Agreement was a less organized, but nonetheless striking, affair. APNI, the UUP, the SDLP, and Sinn Fein had Yes campaigns. There was also a "non-political Yes campaign" managed by Quintin Oliver (formerly of Initiative ‘92/the Opsahl Commission), who stated that "The politicians do the political job. We are here to support them....We are here to persuade, encourage and help people to vote Yes." The campaign to get popular support brought with it some very symbolic events. At a UDP pro-Agreement demonstration at Belfast's Ulster Hall on May 14, people stood and clapped when Michael Stone entered. In 1988, the loyalist Stone killed 3 at the Milltown Cemetery. Now he was at a rally in favour of an accord. During the event, Gary McMichael summoned loyalists to support the Agreement in the referendum. He argued the deal met loyalism's goals. Another significant "Yes" moment followed on May 19. On this date, Trimble and Hume together appeared with U2's Bono on the stage at the Waterfront Hall (Belfast). Their appearance and handshake were not lost on an enthusiastic audience who stood and applauded.

The vote in favour of the Agreement was achieved. A lot of people took part - Northern Ireland's turnout was 81.10%. The South's was considerably less - 55.6% - indicating a certain amount of apathy on the part of its population. This in itself is notable, demonstrating that Irish irredentism was not a powerful force in the Republic. Indeed, in Southern Ireland 94% supported Ireland's constitutional revisions. And, of course, most people in the North ultimately supported the Agreement in the referendum - 71%. Even though the UKUP as well as the DUP worked together to bring down the
Agreement, and the parties in favour of the Agreement lacked cohesion in their efforts, the campaign for a Yes vote managed to keep support from dropping really far. It merely went down to 71% from the 77% the fifth poll had shown.384

**Conclusion**

There is no doubt that there were leaders from both communities who proved capable of taking major risks to achieve peace. Also, the AIA and the political and military realities facing republicans benefited the forces of moderation. Still, the Good Friday Agreement (1998) was not simply a compromise worked out by politicians. The people in Northern Ireland were tired of a violent struggle that was going nowhere and taking the lives of citizens of all ages and backgrounds. Combining deaths and the wounded indicates that one person out of 33 has been effected by Northern Ireland's violence.385 As Smith puts it, "Quite literally, every family in Northern Ireland has been a victim of the Troubles."386 Decades of unrest and murder with no clear prospect of resolution was a bleak future in comparison to the possibility of a settlement, and by 1998 the centre ground was able to assert itself. The people, along with their more moderate political representatives, pressed the militants to choose between isolation or participation in a peace process that would make armed struggle a thing of the past for the majority of such groups and individuals.387 Those who continued to defy the peace and the will of the people would suffer rejection and isolation by the wider society in the coming years.
CHAPTER 11
A NEW NORTHERN IRELAND:
STAYING THE COURSE

It would be unrealistic to expect Northern Ireland to be a completely peaceful and stable society after decades of unrest and violence. However, the fact that there was no return to the Northern Ireland of the pre-Peace Process period owes much to the desires of its people to move forward from the Troubles and find a means of addressing political and cultural differences constitutionally. The apparent triumph of Sinn Fein and the DUP in the post-1998 era does not represent a desire for a return to violence and disorder. Rather, it is a testament to the entry of republicans into the political realm, becoming a party who has moved on from violence and taken up a position (popular with the citizens of Northern Ireland) against republican dissidents. Even the DUP has seen its way to joining its former enemies in government and trying to maintain a stable political environment in the Province. The widespread opposition of the people in both communities to continued violence and threats to the peace demonstrates their desire to stay the course towards a new, stable, and peaceful Northern Ireland.

Devolution and Decommissioning

There was much hope after the GFA and there were a number of promising developments. To begin with, despite divisions within unionism over the accord, most backed it. In the wake of the Assembly elections of June 1998, 30 unionist Assembly members backed the accord - 28 from the UUP as well as 2 from the PUP - and 28 unionists were against it. This number included 20 DUP MLAs, 5 from the UKUP as well as three other unionists. Altogether, 80 MLAs of 108 were pro-Agreement, including SDLP, Sinn Fein, Alliance, and other members. The Assembly met for the first
time on July 1 of 1998 and David Trimble (UUP) and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) were chosen to head Northern Ireland's new government. Trimble addressed the assembled politicians and while he noted that the UUP was not willing to govern alongside those who continued to support and practice violence, he also offered Sinn Fein another way: "We have never said that simply because someone has a past they can't have a future." He even stated that "violence was "not all in one corner"." This initial meeting was called "a historic day" in the Belfast Telegraph as Sinn Fein was now part of an assembly in the North "when not 20 years ago the same men and women had been virtual outlaws confident the destruction of the state was just around the corner." Furthermore, the DUP was there, despite their opposition to the Agreement and the Peace Process. Even more significant, Sinn Fein and the PUP sat next to each other, the two "once lethal enemies."

Then, in August of 1998, an event occurred which cemented an end to mainstream violence on both sides of the sectarian divide. On 15 August, in Omagh, County Tyrone, a very large bomb, planted in a parked car, detonated in a busy area of the town. It was the work of the Real IRA, a group of disaffected republicans. Omagh was the conflict's most terrible tragedy, taking 29 lives, 31 including a pregnant victim's unborn twins. The fact that it happened so soon after the peace deal had been endorsed by the people made it seem a betrayal of ordinary citizens of all traditions, North and South. Thus, in its immediate aftermath, people were very much in favour of the peace process. After Omagh, a return to paramilitary activity and support for violence on the part of mainstream republicanism was a virtual impossibility. Indeed, with Omagh, "republican rhetoric" altered. Adams, in September 1998, stated "'the violence we have seen must be for all of us now a thing of the past, over, done with and gone'." He specifically
recognized the feelings of the majority in his statement as well as his party's peaceful intentions:

My position on what happened in Omagh on 15th August is quite categoric. I have condemned it without equivocation. This appalling act was carried out by those opposed to the peace process. It is designed to wreck the process and everyone should work to ensure the peace process continues as is the clear wish of the people of the island. Sinn Fein has called for a complete halt to such actions and has urged all armed groups to stop immediately....Sinn Fein is committed to exclusively peaceful and democratic means to achieve a way forward.  

Fringe republican elements were quick to follow the Omagh massacre with ceasefires. The first was the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) who went on "complete ceasefire" on 22 August of 1998. In their statement they clearly acknowledged that they were deferring to the wishes of a population that wanted peace:

Although we, for our part believe that the Good Friday Agreement was not worth the sacrifices of the past 30 years and are still politically opposed to it, the people of the island of Ireland have spoken clearly as to their wishes....The onus is now on all political parties, governments and observers to ensure that the democratic wishes of the Irish people are upheld. This includes all armed groups. Therefore we have taken this ceasefire decision to take account of the people's desires.

A little over a decade later, in October of 2009, the INLA decided to officially call off its use of physical force: "the armed struggle is over and the objective of a 32 County Socialist Republic will be best achieved through exclusively peaceful political struggle." The Republican Socialist Movement (of which the INLA is a part) declared its continued opposition to the 1998 Agreement even as it gave up the use of violence to achieve its ends.

The Real IRA, those to blame for the tragedy in Omagh, were also negatively affected by it and forced to rethink their strategy. Left scrambling after public revulsion at the atrocity, the RIRA took responsibility for the massacre on August 18, but insisted
that "three warnings" had been given and that the aim had not been "at any time to kill any civilians." Rather, the event was "part of an ongoing war against the Brits." They extended their "apologies to the civilians." The Irish News received another message from the RIRA, also on August 18, indicating that they had been badly damaged by their violent action in Omagh: "As a direct result of the Omagh tragedy and also in response to the appeals of Bertie Ahern [the Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister)] and others we are currently embarking on a process of consultation on our future direction. In the meantime all military operations have been suspended from 12 midnight." The "ceasefire" lasted from August of 1998 to January of 2000 at which point the group released a statement saying "Once again, Oghlaigh na hEireann [made up mainly of Real IRA as well as dissidents who had belonged to other groups] declares the right of the Irish people to the ownership of Ireland. We call on all volunteers loyal to the Irish Republic to unite to uphold the Republic and establish a permanent national parliament representative of all the people.". Even at this point, however, the group felt compelled by the Omagh disaster and the state of public opinion to admit that it was important not to kill or hurt civilians. The group also recognized that it was to blame for the deaths of a lot of "innocent" people. Still, in an effort to shift or offset blame, it contended that if Britain had stayed out of Ireland such deaths would not have occurred. Fringe republican elements in the Real IRA and other organizations have continued to carry out acts of violence, but have remained isolated, with little public support.

Loyalist groups responded with caution rather than violence in the aftermath of Omagh as well. The LVF, for one, stated that they would not break their ceasefire. The UDP called the bombing "mindless" and called on loyalists "not to be drawn into any
retaliatory action which would play into the hands of those republicans intent on wrecking this peace process." According to one source "There is a realisation that this [the Omagh bombing] is counter-productive to the organisation which carried it out." A source also argued that "There is no real justification for loyalists going back to violence, given the high percentage of the nationalist community which supported the Agreement which involved the two main loyalist groups."¹⁵ The PUP were so concerned about the ceasefires collapsing that they wanted Irwin to run a survey to try and "get the peace process back on track." In the first part of 1999, according to Irwin, "we started to draft a questionnaire that would hopefully move things forward." The PUP and Sinn Fein alone took part.¹⁶ This survey, the "Implementation of the Belfast Agreement", included the question "Do you want the Belfast Agreement to work?" The response was strong - 93% responded "Yes".¹⁷ Eighty-nine percent of Protestants did and 97% of Catholics did. The majority of supporters of the DUP, UUP, PUP, APNI, SDLP and Sinn Fein answered "Yes." The DUP was lowest at 73%.¹⁸ Post 1998, there were some violent hostilities between the UDA and UVF; however, "the transition towards peace remained generally steady and cohesive."¹⁹

Despite the impact of Omagh, decommissioning remained an obstacle to peace and stability in Northern Ireland. The problem was that Trimble wanted republican decommissioning to take place before an Executive was set up which included Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein, meanwhile, insisted that decommissioning prior to the establishment of the Executive was not mandated by the accord. As a result of the impasse, the Mitchell Review took place 6 September-18 November 1999. This review proposed that paramilitary decommissioning be completed as of May 22, 2000. The IICD would
oversee it. On 17 November, the IRA promised they would select an IICD representative. On November 18, 1999, Mitchell declared "'a basis now exists for devolution to occur, for the institutions to be established'". He stated "'Devolution should take effect, then the executive should meet, and then the paramilitary groups should appoint their authorised representatives [to the IICD], all on the same day, in that order.'" The UUC agreed to "these proposals" at the end of November. They backed "the Mitchell deal" with 480 for and 349 against. This permitted Trimble to say yes to establishing "a devolved government." However, Unionists made their agreement dependent on republican decommissioning beginning prior to their next Council meeting the following February. Trimble produced "a post-dated resignation letter to have effect in the absence of decommissioning by February 2000." The Executive was established, via d'Hondt, at the end of November of 1999.

Although credit must go to Mitchell for his efforts, public opinion ultimately played a crucial role in moving the situation forward. A poll - "the Mitchell Review poll" - took place in this period and provided a popular foundation for the Review's success. The Belfast Telegraph reported on October 26 of 1999 that, according to the survey, 65% of people in Northern Ireland would support the accord in a referendum today - 88% Catholic, 49% Protestant. Support only dropped below 50% for those who backed the DUP (31%). 56% of those who backed the UUP and PUP would still vote for the Agreement, 79% of Alliance, 95% of SDLP and 90% of Sinn Fein. Importantly, 83% of respondents still desired the accord to succeed. Even 50% of DUP backers wanted this. Furthermore, as far as the Review, the Belfast Telegraph went on to note on October 27 of 1999 that 85% of respondents desired the review to work. Even 58% of DUP backers
did. The percentages for APNI, SDLP, Sinn Fein, UUP, PUP were 98%, 96%, 94%, 91%, 91%, respectively.\(^{25}\) The fact that the parties would have been aware of these numbers before the conclusion of the Review is significant as the figures illustrated the level of support that existed for finding a way forward and maintaining and achieving peace. To not move forward with the Review was to risk political damage and loss of support at the polls, not to mention a possible return to conflict, which, it was clear, nobody wanted.

There was no denying the significance of the new government. The coalition Executive established in late 1999 "was the first power-sharing government in Northern Ireland since the short-lived Sunningdale Executive of 1973-4." Only this time, former militants were part of it, with Sinn Fein no longer abstaining on republican principle. Representatives of the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the UUP as well as the DUP were on it, with Sinn Fein holding 2 seats.\(^ {26}\) The latter had effectively been co-opted by constitutional politics and David Trimble was now serving in government with Martin McGuinness, quite possibly the most well known and infamous republican after Gerry Adams. The UUP's Trimble was First Minister and the SDLP's Seamus Mallon was his Deputy.\(^ {27}\)

The Assembly functioned, with a few interruptions, up to October of 2002 and, despite various challenges and problems, in particular those over decommissioning, there was a clear desire for it to work effectively.\(^ {28}\) For example, problems arose when the IRA did not progress on decommissioning by February of 2000. Suspension of devolution occurred.\(^ {29}\) Nonetheless, when the IRA made a move, unionists were quick to respond. In May of that year a statement was released by the IRA claiming the organization was determined to achieve "a just and lasting peace".\(^ {30}\) They then
reconnected "with the IICD." According to the IRA they would "initiate a process that will completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use." Also, two inspectors could view the dumps in late June. However, the Executive would have to be set up again first. Shortly thereafter the UUC backed Trimble going back into government with Sinn Fein. At the end of May 2000, devolution returned.

Once more, public opinion had a role in this development. The last survey's fieldwork took place on May 12-15. In the *Belfast Telegraph* on May 25 it was reported that, in this poll, 74% claimed they would support the Belfast Agreement today. This included 55% of Protestants. Regarding the question "Given the new proposals from the two governments and IRA should the Ulster Unionists now go back into the Executive including Sinn Fein?" most UUP backers (72%) thought the UUP ought to re-enter the Executive. Sixty-three percent of Protestants agreed, too! Seventy-four percent of respondents believed the DUP ought to enter the Executive - including 63% of Protestants. The UUC agreed to "the new arrangements for decommissioning" a couple of days following the survey's release. The vote was 459 for, 403 against, or 53% for. Devolution returned May 30/June 1, 2000.

The struggle over decommissioning continued, but was notably marked by a willingness on the part of Trimble and the UUP to move forward if such actions actually took place. On July 1 of 2001, Trimble stepped down because of the unsatisfactory progress of the IRA in decommissioning. Suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly took place in August and September of that year. On October 16 Trimble declared that, should the beginning of decommissioning be "accepted and verified" by the IICD, then he would move to be elected First Minister again. Two days later, Trimble met with
Adams to talk about decommissioning and even though the UUP's three ministers left the Executive on this day, it was clear that the UUP were prepared to come back in the event that decommissioning began.\textsuperscript{37} On October 22 of 2001 Gerry Adams publicly encouraged the IRA to decommission. This was followed on the 23rd by the IRA declaring that decommissioning had started.\textsuperscript{38} The IICD backed up their claim. After talking to IICD Chair General de Chastelain, Trimble advised UUP leaders to resume their positions on the Executive. They supported Trimble's stance and insisted UUP Assembly members back Trimble "in any re-election as first minister."\textsuperscript{39} For such developments to take place, public support was needed and Trimble had it. According to a survey the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} published at the beginning of November, most Protestants (54\%) desired Trimble to re-enter the government and be First Minister. Trimble and Mark Durkan (SDLP) became First and Deputy First Ministers on November 6 of 2001. The IRA carried out further decommissioning in April of 2002.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Promising Developments: Policing and Cross-Border Cooperation}

Further developments also marked progress in Northern Ireland and it was clear that the middle ground was ready for change. A major turning point came with alterations to policing in the wake of the 1998 Agreement. There was a clear desire for the police to successfully deal with militants and their activities. Survey results reported in the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} on March 4 of 1999 revealed that the vast majority of Catholics, Protestants, UUP, and PUP found the following at least tolerable - "Republicans should co-operate with the RUC with a view to bringing an end to all paramilitary beatings and violence." Even 53\% of Sinn Fein participants said this was at least "'Tolerable'." Protestants, UUP and PUP came in at 97\% support and Catholics at 81\%. Furthermore,
support for all these groups for "Everyone should co-operate with a new agreed police service with a view to bringing an end to all paramilitary beatings and violence" did not fall below 90% seeing it as at least "'Tolerable'".41

Policing changes began to take shape in the latter part of 1999 and ultimately resulted in a new force being set up two years later. It all began in September 1999 when the Report of the Patten Commission was released. It was entitled "A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland."42 The Commission did not support the republican desire to "disband" the RUC. Various alterations to the RUC were suggested, however, to make the service more fair and reflective of the citizens of the Province. Among the changes to the police put forward was a new name - "the Northern Ireland Police Service [italics theirs]." It was also proposed that there ought to be "a new badge and symbols which are entirely free from any association with either the British or Irish states." It was further proposed that police stations ought not to fly the Union flag anymore. When a flag needed to fly it ought to be the Northern Ireland Police Service flag which ought to also "be free from association with the British or Irish states."43 Perhaps most importantly, 50% of recruits needed to be Catholic.44

An additional step forward was achieved in 2000 (although movement in this direction had begun in 1995) with the creation of the Police Ombudsman’s Office which was responsible for looking into accusations of wrongdoing on the part of the police in the Province. The Office is an independent one, over which the police and government have no control. Prior to 2000, the police themselves had looked into accusations against colleagues.45 The possibility of renaming the police, the problematic reality of the symbols associated with them, the importance of involving more Catholics, and the need
for independent evaluation of complaints about police conduct had all been addressed in the Opsahl Commission report of 1993.46

There was significant unionist backlash over the Patten proposals,47 but, ultimately, the desire for progress on the part of Northern Ireland politicians and people won out over intransigence when the British government released an Updated Implementation Plan for policing in August of 2001.48 The Plan was quickly supported by Ahern: "We believe a basis now exists for realising the new beginning in policing envisaged in the Good Friday Agreement."49 Alliance was also satisfied and argued it was time that the SDLP took part in policing structures. According to Stephen Farry of APNI, "The time has come for the SDLP to finally make a decision, if they are indeed still an independent political party. They have run out of excuses."50 Even the Catholic Church spoke out in support of the plan, stating that it provided "sufficient ground for real hope on policing."51 The Bishops of the North issued a statement in which they supported the involvement of nationalists with the police board and noted that "young Catholics must feel totally free to choose whether or not to participate in the new Policing Service....Policing is a noble vocation in the service of the common good."52 The day of the Church's statement, the SDLP supported the new police plan. They had never backed the police before.53 The party went on to choose three members to join the Police Board in September of 2001, even as Adams argued that it was "a mistake."54

As far as the unionists were concerned, the UUP looked favourably on the SDLP's choice to back the police and, along with other unionists, followed suit soon after.55 On September 20 of 2001, a BBC survey came out that showed that people backed the UUP taking part in and on the Policing Board with their SDLP counterparts. In response to the
question "Do you think that the party that best represents your views should support nominations to the new Policing Board?", 64% of unionists and 61% of nationalists said "Yes." The vast majority of UUP supporters said "Yes," at over 79%. Their PUP and UDP counterparts agreed at 67% and 57%, respectively. At the very end of the day that the poll came out, both the DUP and UUP decided to be involved with the Police Board, although they were not at all pleased with the Patten report or the new plan. The importance of this development was pointed out on 21 September by the Belfast Telegraph: "For the first time in Northern Ireland's history, the police will have the backing of both nationalist and unionist politicians."

Once again, however, the hard liners in Sinn Fein were isolated. Even the UUP acknowledged this in August when the SDLP made its decision to be involved. Michael McGimpsey, UUP Executive Minister, stated then that "This is a major concession by the SDLP. It is particularly significant when also combined with the declaration of support by the Catholic Church for the police....It should now be clear to everyone that Sinn Fein is isolated on policing, isolated on decommissioning and....out of touch." Sinn Fein made it clear that they would not sit on the board, despite being entitled to 2 seats as the changes to policing were not sufficient. Once the unionists decided to participate in the board, Sinn Fein remained the sole "eligible party to decline membership of the board". A change in name and emblem for the police followed in the fall of 2001. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was established on 4 November, consigning the "Royal Ulster Constabulary" to the past. Then, in December of that year, a compromise on a PSNI badge received total support from the Policing Board, including unionists and nationalists, with the SDLP being very instrumental in its acceptance. The
SDLP did not object to the design, even though it included a crown. It was a significant action for the SDLP to take as their refusal to accept it would have meant that the Secretary of State, Dr. John Reid, would have been the one to make the choice. Reid was prepared to back a badge that did not have any "British or Irish symbols." According to the UUP's Fred Cobain (who was on the Board), "Without the support of the SDLP we wouldn't have got this through. Everything was in their lap." Indeed, The SDLP knew that the absence of a crown would cause real problems for unionists and chose to support an emblem that had Irish and British symbols as well as other, more neutral images. Finally, the badge was yet another sign to republicans that progress could be made without them. Sinn Fein was left to severely criticize the SDLP over their decision from outside the Board and the deliberations.64

The changes to the police badge were significant, but the new version did pay homage to the original emblem. Also, the people themselves had an impact on its development. The old RUC badge included a crown above a harp, under which was a bunch of shamrock.65 On the new badge, around St Patrick's cross, are the following: "a crown; harp; shamrock; laurel leaf; torch; and scales of justice."66 The scales are at the top, above the harp and the crown. Furthermore, the harp and crown are presented as being on the same level. Thus, Joe Byrne of the SDLP, who was on the board, was able to argue that the emblem was "not a victory for any single community identity in Northern Ireland."67 Ordinary people had some influence over the process as well. The Belfast Telegraph held a contest to get ideas for a badge and it was noted that the final emblem chosen at official level included "elements of the design which proved most
popular with our readers." This design, created by a former member of the RUC, included the Cross of St. Patrick as well as shamrock.

Although at this time Sinn Fein kept away from involvement with the new police, the party's intransigence would, in the long run, come to an end. Their participation in policing was predicted in 2001 by both the SDLP and Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan. As the *Belfast Telegraph* noted in the wake of the successful choosing of a police badge, "The republican movement cannot have it both ways. It must choose between consensus and confrontation." In November of 2001, with regard to Sinn Fein backing policing and the Board, Flanagan stated "I am not sure whether it will happen in the short order but I have every confidence it will happen....It will have to happen....It is easy to complain from the outside. It is time for them to get in the inside and if they want to see change, be a part of that change and be a part of it in a positive way." Flanagan's prophecy did come to pass. Sinn Fein's ard fheis [party conference] chose to back the police service at last at the beginning of 2007.

Along with the Executive and Assembly, there were other significant elements to the Agreement that also began to operate at the end of the 1990s, institutionalizing a measure of cooperation among all sides. These included a British-Irish Council as well as a British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference. The BIC was set up in early December of 1999. The governments of Ireland and Britain are represented on it as are Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Jersey and Guernsey as well as the Isle of Man. The purpose of the BIC is to encourage good relations among those who live in the British Isles and "provide a forum for consultation and co-operation." Also set up at the end of 1999, the BIIC superseded the Anglo-Irish Conference. These bodies effectively fulfilled the
necessity for cooperation between the Irish and the British pointed out by, for example, a Corrymeela group in the 1993 Opsahl report.

Of perhaps even greater significance were the cross-border Irish bodies, the structure of which are similar to Glyn Roberts’ “executive conference,” outlined in the 1993 Opsahl report. The North South Ministerial Council, for example, consists of Northern Ireland Executive members as well as representatives from the government of the Republic. The purpose of the NSMC is to nurture cooperation across Ireland. Ministers work with each other when it comes to issues that are good for Northern Ireland as well as the South. Decisions are carried out or fulfilled by the North-South bodies.

Under the 1998 accord, there were to be six such bodies which answered to the Assembly in Northern Ireland, the Dail as well as the NSMC. These bodies, officially set up in March of 1999, included the Food Safety Promotion Board, Waterways Ireland and InterTrade Ireland. A further "six Areas for Co-operation" were decided when the NSMC met for the first time in December of 1999. They were Education, Agriculture, Health, Environment, Transport as well as Tourism. They "were to be developed via existing bodies." Significantly, when devolution was suspended in the fall of 2002, the cross border institutions remained.

There have been significant successes in cross-border cooperation. For example, Tourism Ireland was set up at the end of 2000. This body remains active, and is open about owing its existence to the 1998 Agreement. Its purpose is to get more people to come to Ireland for vacations. Their focus is the entire island, rather than a single part of it, and they promote North and South. They point out their cooperative aspects, noting that they have had assistance from both "Failte Ireland, the national tourism development
authority of the Republic of Ireland, and the Northern Ireland Tourist Board.” There are Tourism Ireland offices on both sides of the border - at Dublin and Coleraine.  

The existence of such bodies is no longer as problematic an issue as it once was. According to the 2000 NILT Survey, a minority of Protestants (25%) were against North-South structures being set up. 38% were supportive and 30% were "Neither." According to the *Irish Times* in February of 2001, surveys showed that people's priorities did alter once certain issues were sufficiently handled. Opposition to cross border, "North-South bodies" has gone down within the Protestant community. These bodies proved to be pretty non-threatening in actual fact. This bodes well for future cooperation within Ireland.

**The Rise of Sinn Fein and the DUP**

Among the most concerning of political developments has been the increase in the power of the more radical parties since the 1998 accord. In the June 2001 Westminster election, Sinn Fein came in ahead of the SDLP, garnering around 51% support (and 4 seats) among nationalists. Then, in the November 2003 Assembly election, both "extreme" parties took the lead. The DUP took 30 seats (up from their previous 20) and Sinn Fein took 24 seats (up from their previous 18). The UUP took 27 seats while the SDLP took 18 seats. The latter had held 24 before. This trend continued in 2005 when the DUP really outshone the UUP in the local elections. It took 182 seats to the UUP's 115. Sinn Fein gained 126 seats to the SDLP's 101. In that year's Westminster election, which occurred on the same day, the DUP and Sinn Fein came in ahead of their rivals as well and Trimble was unable to keep his seat. He stepped down as UUP
The DUP and Sinn Fein have continued to attract more support than their more moderate counterparts in every election since.\textsuperscript{89}

What made these two traditionally hard line parties so appealing? The attractiveness of the DUP undoubtedly stems from a number of factors - none having to do with a desire for violence on the part of the voting public. To begin with, unionists were not deeply or significantly involved in the peace process's early stages. They did not have a lot of influence on the Downing Street Declaration and no say in the AIA and Framework Documents. The peace process did not feel like it belonged to them and this included unionists who were in favour of the Agreement. Furthermore, the 1998 accord altered Northern Ireland's traditional unionist character very significantly. Unionists were concerned and worried and experienced "a general sense of loss".\textsuperscript{91} The DUP was able to use this to their advantage. There is no doubt that they stressed the problematic issues - alterations to the police, prisoners being set free, decommissioning concerns, Sinn Fein's involvement "in government", and so on, tapping into unionist fears.\textsuperscript{92}

The DUP also appeared to be unionists' safest alternative in the new post-Agreement environment. McAuley points out that, in uncertain times following the Agreement, the DUP offered a seemingly strong support for the traditional and familiar.\textsuperscript{93} The DUP portrayed itself to be maintaining "traditional unionist values" as well as being the sole reliable protector of Northern Ireland's position within the UK.\textsuperscript{94} The DUP did so, in part, by making the UUP and Trimble out to be the representatives of surrender while they and others (including some UUP individuals) were the "realists".\textsuperscript{95} Indeed, after the Agreement, more and more unionists came to think that republicans had reaped the greatest rewards "from the peace process."\textsuperscript{96} The DUP portrayed the accord as
essentially a series of surrenders to republicans while unionists lost out. They argued that fellow unionists were guilty of betrayal or that they would probably prove traitors to the Union.97

The DUP also managed to appear the architects of a victory for unionism in the post-Agreement decade. In particular, they argued that the Agreement had been "renegotiated" by them with and after St Andrews. The republicans had been pushed back. Republicans had acquiesced to "partitionist institutions and" were willing to be involved in these.98 In other words, the DUP had stood firm and made a gain for their community.99 Indeed, before he left office, Paisley claimed to have beaten Sinn Fein as that party had acquiesced to "the right of Britain to govern this country". Said Paisley, "I did smash them, because I took away their main plank. Their main plank was that the [sic] would not recognise the British Government. Now they are in part of the British Government." The DUP have unionist voters believing in their version of events.100

As for Sinn Fein, public backing for this party was closely related to its participation in democratic politics, not its support for the gun. The backing the Agreement received from nationalists in Northern Ireland as well as the South placed pressure upon Sinn Fein and the IRA. The possibility of marginalization should they oppose the accord was real. In contrast, Sinn Fein support and promotion of the Agreement would probably bring them electoral support. Thus, Sinn Fein became the Agreement's champion and it appeared that republicans were "the most ardently 'pro-peace' actors in the process."101 In its 1998 Assembly election manifesto, Sinn Fein claimed that "People voted for Sinn Féin's peace strategy and our commitment to building a lasting peace settlement through inclusive dialogue."102 The party would repeatedly
insist on "the full implementation of the Agreement." For instance, in its 2001 Westminster manifesto, the party declared that "Sinn Féin has been consistent in demanding that the Agreement is implemented in full." This support for the peace accord appealed to nationalist voters who wanted the Agreement to succeed and Sinn Fein reaped the rewards of this stance at the polls. Furthermore, by 2001, Sinn Fein was a “safe” vote as they were now a peace supporting, essentially constitutionalist party.

There were other factors as well. The GFA was very much an SDLP agreement and the SDLP had dominated non-violent politics in earlier decades. Following the Agreement, though, voting nationalists sought representatives who would "advance the agreement." Nationalists wanted a party that would stand up for their interests. Sinn Fein came to stress the accord's "equality agenda" and what it gave nationalists. In 2003 the party noted that "Equality agenda is central to building a new Ireland."

According to Adams in this manifesto, "At the core of our Agenda for Government is one simple word - Equality....As republicans we are totally committed to ending inequality and to bringing about a society where all are treated equally." Equality has long been a major concern for the nationalist community, making this an appealing factor for the electorate. For significant numbers of nationalists Sinn Fein came across as a strong party that would protect and further their interests. According to Tonge, "Sinn Fein's new agenda has led to perceived gains for nationalists within the northern state and has thus drawn considerable support from the Catholic community."

Furthermore, republicans have taken clear "ownership" of the peace process and agreement. In 2001 Sinn Fein claimed that "We have been the driving force behind the Irish Peace Process. The Peace Process grew out of Sinn Féin's peace strategy. It has
delivered the Good Friday Agreement and offered us a route map out of conflict and into a new Ireland based on equality and justice." According to the IRA itself in September of 2002 "There is no threat to the peace process from the IRA....There would be no peace process but for IRA initiatives." Republicans continue to stress their own peace credentials. In 2004 the republican newspaper noted that this was "the tenth anniversary of the IRA cessation". The paper argued that "Throughout those ten years, republicans have been the driving force of the Peace Process." Canary Wharf was left out of this picture as was the military campaign and violence that ran from then until the summer of 1997. Indeed, republicans often referred to the various movements they made as "historic" or "ground-breaking". In short, republicans, ultimately, were playing to the more moderate majority among the nationalist people who desired peace and progress. It was, therefore, the people's general antipathy and unwillingness to back violence that helped shape a great deal of republican strategy and policy.

Political Progress of the "Radicals"

The rise of the DUP and Sinn Fein marked a new and even more significant phase in the search for peace and stability. In the 1998 to 2001 period DUP leaders made the DUP the main unionist party against the Agreement. The difficulty was, the Agreement did have backing among unionists, including a lot of those who supported the DUP. Also, there were a lot of unionists against the Agreement who were less so than the DUP leaders. The "principled no" stance of DUP leaders was not necessarily going to convince "pragmatic no" unionists to back the DUP. Thus, the DUP altered its strategy after 1998, especially after 2001. DUP leaders started to shift the DUP toward "softer anti-Agreement territory," while holding on to their integrity within their long standing
electorate by not embracing the Agreement wholeheartedly. In 2003, for example, the electoral slogan of the DUP "was 'It's time for a fair deal'", as opposed to no deal at all. Their strategy paid off quickly. This was the year the DUP became the North's strongest unionist party. According to Trimble in 2004, "it is unlikely that the DUP would have got their head in front of us had they fought a simple "No" campaign as in 2001. What may have made the difference were the hints of a new pragmatism summed up in the 'fair deal' slogan. Their manifesto, however, was a commitment-free zone without any specifics on what that deal might be." 

In 2004 the DUP continued their "fair deal" theme. Their vision encompassed "a lasting replacement for the failed Belfast Agreement." They argued that "Ultimate power should reside with the Assembly rather than with the Departments and should be exercised in a manner which can command cross-community support." They backed the setting up of "a Voluntary Coalition, where there would be agreement between the Government partners and a Cabinet exercising collective responsibility." The DUP claimed they were prepared to be involved in this kind of arrangement with their SDLP counterparts. They even appeared open to Sinn Fein being in government if they proved to be truly done with violence and dedicated to democracy. Again, the apparent movement towards reasonableness on the part of the DUP was recognized by Trimble that year. Trimble declared in March of 2004, at the yearly UUP conference, that "The ground which the Ulster Unionist Party staked out in 1997/8 is now the ground upon which DUP stands today....they have...stolen our clothes - stolen them because they know that there is nothing else to fit the political realities."
Developments among republicans were also significant. Although Sinn Fein was becoming increasingly legitimate in the political arena, that they were vulnerable to public opinion and abhorrence of crime and violence became very clear for the party in 2004-2005. In December of 2004 the Northern Bank was robbed in Belfast. Over 26 million pounds was taken. It was not long before the IRA was being blamed for it. Chief Constable Hugh Orde openly declared that he thought the culprit was the IRA. The two governments chose to believe Orde. Michael McDowell, Ireland's Justice Minister, argued that the IRA had "'engaged for many, many years in very high-profile criminality.'" He claimed Adams and McGuinness "were 'not committed to peace'." He considered them IRA leaders. Early in 2005 Ireland's Foreign Minister as well as the Northern Ireland Secretary of State came out in agreement that the bank robbery was the work of the IRA. In February the Prime Ministers of Britain and Ireland met and, in the wake of this, the two men stressed that criminal actions by the IRA were the main problem when it came to moving forward.119 According to Blair, "'The obstacle now to a lasting and durable settlement in Northern Ireland is the continuing paramilitary activity and criminal activity of the IRA'". This must "'stop in its entirety.'"120 When the IMC named the IRA the culprits in the Northern Bank scandal, Britain declared Sinn Fein would not receive its "'Westminster parliamentary allowances...until republicans verifiably distanced themselves from criminal activities.'"121

Then Robert McCartney was killed in Belfast on January 30 of 2005. This murder became more significant with people becoming concerned that the IRA had been responsible. McCartney's murder was horribly violent, yet his family reacted with dignity as they fought for justice.122 Sinn Fein wanted to appear helpful to the family.
Relatives of McCartney were asked to attend the party's *ard fheis* that March. At the *ard fheis* Adams stated that "Those responsible for the brutal killing of Robert McCartney should admit to what they did in a court of law . . . Others with any information should come forward." According to Adams "I am not letting this issue go until those who have sullied the republican cause are made to account for their actions." During early attempts to save face, three individuals were kicked out of the IRA and seven Sinn Fein members were suspended by Adams, who also gave the Police Ombudsman the names of these individuals. The Ombudsman, in turn, submitted the names to the police.

Among the republican movement's most startling and damaging decisions, in public relations terms, was when the IRA said it was willing to shoot several individuals considered linked to the McCartney murder. However, according to the IRA statement, "the family made it clear that they did not want physical action taken against those involved. They stated that they wanted those individuals to give a full account of their actions in court." In deciding not to accept the IRA's violent retribution, McCartney's family "challenged the IRA - and Sinn Fein - within their own community and outside it," choosing to trust the official justice system, including the police, a course of action Catholic families had been wary of in the past. In contrast, republicans appeared to the public to be criminals at heart, wanting to resolve problems with violence and murder. This offer to use violence undercut the genuineness of the republican movement's ceasefire and the work they had done to achieve political legitimacy. According to one nationalist, "Gerry Adams could not have approved of this. It's mind-boggling, it's political stupidity - these guys must have lost their minds." Eddie McGrady (SDLP MP) argued that "This obscene proposal by the IRA to kill the alleged murderers
of Robert McCartney is sinking to the lowest depths of terror in the community." \(^{130}\) In addition, Hugh Orde, Chief Constable of the PSNI, stated his belief that "the IRA statement showed they had meant to kill. "It's what they do." \(^{131}\)

The reaction in the South and the US was also negative. Pat Rabbitte, leader of Labour in the Republic, claimed that the IRA's statement "shows that the IRA has learnt nothing from this shocking murder. It shows that the IRA is still committed to the law of the gun rather than the rule of law." He called the offer "obscene" and asked "How are we expected to reconcile this statement with repeated assurances from leaders of the Provisional movement that they were committed to exclusively democratic and peaceful means?" \(^{132}\) While recognizing that the IRA and Sinn Fein were not synonymous, Ahern argued that "It's an extraordinary statement...We all want to see justice being done. That their response to that was to eliminate three or four people is horrific." \(^{133}\) In the US, American Senator Edward Kennedy, who had played a role in getting a visa for Adams a decade before, now would not meet with Adams as planned on St Patrick's Day of 2005. According to his representative, "Senator Kennedy has decided to decline to meet with Gerry Adams, given the IRA's ongoing criminal activity and contempt for the rule of law." A meeting would occur involving Kennedy and the McCartney family in its place. \(^{134}\) In short, Sinn Fein and its leaders ceased to be given the respect that had been shown them before. \(^{135}\)

Frampton has argued that "The events of late 2004 - early 2005, then, had made the issue of continued republican paramilitarism an albatross around the neck of Sinn Fein." The bank job as well as McCartney's killing caused a strong reaction among the people that hurt Sinn Fein as did worries over criminal activity by the IRA. Sinn Fein
had to fully give up on its "'Armalite and ballot box'" strategy. In this context, Adams called on the IRA to engage solely in non-violent means on April 6 of 2005.\footnote{136}

\begin{quote}
In the past I have defended the right of the IRA to engage in armed struggle. I did so because there was no alternative....Now there is an alternative....The way forward is by building political support for republican and democratic objectives across Ireland and by winning support for these goals internationally. I want to use this occasion therefore to appeal to the leadership of Oíglaigh na hÉireann to fully embrace and accept this alternative. Can you take courageous initiatives which will achieve your aims by purely political and democratic activity?\footnote{137}
\end{quote}

The IRA said Adams would receive a response "in due course".\footnote{138}

Then, in May of 2005, a local as well as general election occurred in the North and concerns about Sinn Fein's political fortunes would play a part in real movement by the IRA towards peace. In the latter election Sinn Fein took 5 Westminster seats and the SDLP took 3. It appears that Sinn Fein had expected better from the election. According to the elections director in 2006, although "'it was anticipated that the Adams initiative to the IRA made in advance of the election would help galvanize our vote, this did not happen because of the hostile political climate relating to the bank robbery and the McCartney murder....and in actual fact the Party's overall performance dipped in both elections when compared with the European election of 2004.'"\footnote{139}

Several months after the elections the IRA called off its struggle on July 28, 2005, declaring that "All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever." The statement went on to note that "The outcome of our consultations show very strong support among IRA Volunteers for the Sinn Féin peace strategy." Finally, although making very clear their continued
dedication to republican aims, the IRA acknowledged that "The overwhelming majority of people in Ireland fully support this [peace] process" and desire the 1998 accord be fulfilled. While insisting that the use of physical force had been needed in the past, this statement was the ultimate acknowledgment by the republican militant movement that times had changed and people wanted to move forward in and with peace. Indeed, that September the IICD declared the IRA had fully decommissioned. All of this went a long way to repairing the image of Sinn Fein.

Notably, in line with their longstanding advocacy of peace, the Churches had a role to play in the decommissioning process through two individuals with strong Third Community backgrounds. Understanding the importance of having respectable witnesses from each of the two main communities to the event, the IRA noted in their July statement that "We have invited two independent witnesses, from the Protestant and Catholic churches" to be present. Father Alex (sometimes referred to as Alec) Reid, representing the Catholic Church, and Reverend Harold Good, a Methodist cleric, were the men chosen. Reid was described by the Belfast Telegraph as "a notable bridge-builder" and was known for cooperating with Presbyterian Reverend Ken Newell to bring Catholics and Protestants together through the Fisherwick-Clonard Fellowship. In addition, Reid had been involved in "behind the scenes work with the republican movement on a number of important and politically sensitive initiatives, including the first IRA ceasefire in 1994." Good, meanwhile, had previously been a patron of Initiative ‘92/the Opsahl Commission, President of the Methodist Church, and had been Centre Director of Corrymeela in the 1970s and, according to the Belfast News Letter, had, "In recent years...been involved with the Alliance Party." He was also known for
being "a bridge-builder". Described in the *Belfast Telegraph* as being "highly-respected within their own churches and among inter-church and inter-community groups", the two clerics made for ideal witnesses as they carried a certain amount of weight across both communities. Indeed, referring to themselves as "the eyes of the community", the two men confirmed republican decommissioning in September of 2005, having watched it take place.

There have also been important developments among militant loyalists, in particular a movement from armed struggle to political methods. Violence on the part of the UVF and other loyalists faced strong opposition inside their community from 1998 onwards. In the 1998 NILT Survey, the following question was asked: "thinking about the reasons why some Loyalist groups have used violence during the troubles, would you say that you have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence - even if you don't condone the violence itself?" Most Protestants, 74%, claimed to have "No sympathy at all." The same question was asked in 2007 and the response of 69% of Protestants was also "no sympathy at all." When it came to the question of decommissioning, support for it was even more clear. A *Belfast Telegraph* Peace Poll carried out early in 1999 found that the vast majority of Protestant respondents - 93% - desired decommissioning to take place right away. This trend continued in 2001 when, in another poll, it was discovered that almost all Protestant respondents - 97% - wanted loyalist militants to get rid of their weapons. It was also discovered that the vast majority - 85% - of UDP and PUP supporters were in favour of loyalist militants carrying out full or partial decommissioning.
Indeed, the climate in the first post-Agreement decade was very much opposed to violence and loyalist killings were strongly denounced. For example, in January of 2002, a young Catholic, Daniel McColgan, who worked for the postal service, died of gunshot wounds inflicted by two men believed to have been loyalist militants.\textsuperscript{155} The Red Hand Defenders admitted to the killing.\textsuperscript{156} Opposition to the murder was very public. Two DUP MLAs claimed the murder lacked "purpose or rationale."\textsuperscript{157} The Assembly held one minute of silence to honour the young victim and Trimble stated that "Sectarian attacks have no place in a civilised society and we condemn those responsible."\textsuperscript{158} The funeral attendants included Catholic and Protestant churchmen and lay people.\textsuperscript{159}

Trade union-arranged demonstrations also occurred around the North in the wake of McColgan's killing. The participants were demonstrating against militant threats and sectarian killings. Trimble and Durkan were present at a Belfast protest that drew 15,000 people.\textsuperscript{160} According to the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} "An affirmation [was] read at all rallies" demanding that militants cease their violence and "disband" right away. The Catholic, Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, and Methodist Churches all backed the demonstrations as did the majority of political parties, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce, the Northern Ireland Civil Service, and the Federation of Small Businesses.\textsuperscript{161} Church of Ireland leader Dr Robin Eames declared: "On this day from countless hearts and minds across Northern Ireland there is but one call: 'In God's name stop this evil madness and let us find peace together.'"\textsuperscript{162} The fact that this uproar had been over the death of a Catholic was clear evidence that society had had enough of paramilitary murder.

There were, in addition, politically savvy loyalists who could see that the time for political movement had long since arrived. The PUP, while very pro-Union, had long
backed power-sharing and an Assembly as well as a constitution for the North.\textsuperscript{163} McAuley has argued that "The PUP...was relatively successful in drawing support for its position and presenting itself as a new voice within unionism. They also proved capable of convincing others, both within the UVF and the wider Protestant working class, of the validity of a political path."\textsuperscript{164} The PUP remained proud of its role in bringing about the 1998 Agreement and in 2011 expressed its support for cultural tolerance, improved community relations, integrated schooling, peace, and "politics in Northern Ireland mirror[ing] that in the UK where social - rather than constitutional - issues decide elections."\textsuperscript{165} The party has faced challenges in recent years. The PUP took one seat in the Assembly election of 2007 and received no seats in the 2011 Assembly election.\textsuperscript{166} Yet the party continues to contest elections and to win a small number of votes, which have given them a few seats at local council level on more than one occasion.\textsuperscript{167}

Meanwhile, the UDP ceased to exist at the end of November of 2001\textsuperscript{168} and the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) took the UDP's place early in 2002.\textsuperscript{169} When a ceasefire was announced by the UDA in the first part of 2003, it looked to "the UPRG to 'steer the organisation down a diplomatic path'".\textsuperscript{170} The UPRG gave the ceasefire announcement in Belfast for the UDA in February.\textsuperscript{171} It included support for peace, noting that "An agreed, acceptable and equitable final settlement will produce even greater peace and stability within the confines of our beloved Ulster." The UDA and its affiliates were willing to give peace a chance. Indeed, Frankie Gallagher, politician and member of the UPRG, pointed out that no one was innocent: "The blood of everybody who has been murdered over these past 30 years, and especially most recent years, is not just on the hands of those who pulled the triggers. It is on the political leaders’ hands, it is
on the police force’s hands and it is on the communities’ hands as well.” According to Gallagher, "What we are trying to do is create an environment where those conditions do not exist." The UDA's ceasefire was acknowledged again that November.173

From the latter part of 2004, a move towards politics was more and more key within UDA and UPRG views, despite some continuing problems.174 The UDA consulted its ordinary members in 2005 and discovered that there was a desire for the UDA to be involved "in transforming Loyalism and helping to create a more stable and peaceful society." The UPRG was looked to to come up with "a process which would facilitate such a development." The Conflict Transformation Initiative (CTI) thus arose. According to a UPRG representative in 2006, regarding the CTI, "we wanted to address the causes of conflict and to play a meaningful role in the regeneration of our communities. And thereby create a long and lasting peace." A conference involving loyalists and others from abroad, an "'International Foundation Workshop'," occurred over 8 days in Belfast in October of 2006. The UDA, UPRG, and representatives from Israel, Moldava/Transdniestria and Palestine participated.175 At this event a representative from the Inner Council of the UDA said that

We hope to make Northern Ireland a better place....we don’t want our children and our grandchildren going through all the things that we have suffered. We want this society to change and become a better place, but we need to play a part in making that happen....We fought the IRA when they tried to destroy this country...and we will still fight them. But it will be in a different way, not on the battlefield but through the force of our arguments."176

The CTI marked a significant attempt on the part of loyalists to be progressive.

Change also appeared to be in evidence when a meeting of the Assembly occurred on November 24 of 2006, post St Andrews Agreement.177 Evacuation took place as
Michael Stone, a loyalist with a background in the UDA, was dealt with by security. He had entered Stormont carrying weapons, including at least one explosive device. Representatives of the UPRG called his behaviour "a 'gimmick' designed to undermine what they described as 'real politics'." The UPRG claimed that "For Michael Stone to act out this gimmick in the most eccentric way was to make our people look petty and irresponsible." This response was significant as Stone had become a hero after his 1988 attack on a republican funeral in which three were killed. Times had changed. As McAuley notes, "It was clear that not all those associated with the paramilitaries were seeking to play insular or backward-looking roles." Furthermore, the concern expressed for the possible damage done to the reputation of loyalists by Stone's action indicated that radical behaviour was problematic from a public relations standpoint.

Although the new outlook of certain loyalist elements facilitated progress to decommissioning, arms remained a problem until representatives of the police and the people combined to push the militants into action. Early in 2009, Shaun Woodward, Northern Ireland Secretary of State, declared that loyalist militants would have an additional year to decommission. However, this plan was only backed by MPs once "the government agreed to take action against loyalists if there was not verifiable proof of decommissioning within six months." In early January, the Police Federation, which represents the ordinary members of the PSNI, clearly objected to the loyalists receiving a further year for decommissioning. Terry Spence, Chair of the Police Federation, argued that "The fact is that loyalist paramilitaries have had 11 years to decommission. Rather than a further year they should be told that they have until February 9, the date of the legislation deadline." Ultimately, the Police Federation proved willing to give the
extended time frame a chance as long as "this is the last possible extension of the legislation" and because they were promised that in the absence of real progress over the course of "the next few months" the government "will immediately annul the legislation and end the amnesty arrangements." According to Woodward: "This is their [loyalists'] final opportunity to join the rest of society in building a shared future for Northern Ireland or else face the consequences." The significance of this deadline was recognized in June 2009 by Sir Hugh Orde who stated "I think the legislation put an additional pressure on these groups and they had to make a decision."

Politicians from all significant parties clearly recognized that the situation had changed in Northern Ireland and wanted decommissioning to take place. They offered little support for paramilitary groups' maintaining their arsenals. Peter Robinson stated in June of 2009 that the DUP had been talking to UVF and UDA leaders for nine months in order "to assist the organisations' transformation from paramilitary organisations into people who are playing their full part in a peaceful and democratic Northern Ireland, with violence and criminality being firmly a thing of the past." Robinson went on to state that "The party [DUP] will continue to engage with these organisations in order to impress upon them the need to leave violence and criminality behind and to complete the decommissioning process." Sir Reg Empey, UUP leader, noted that his party had talked to loyalist paramilitary groups as well. Empey himself had been talking to loyalist militants "for several years." David Ford of Alliance, representing perhaps the most non-sectarian electorate in the Province, put the situation confronting loyalists in stark terms in June of 2009: "Loyalists are now at the point where they must comply with the IICD before the expiry of the six month deadline. If they do comply, they have the
opportunity to play a full part in civil and political life, if not, the consequences are clear."\textsuperscript{188} Alban Maginness (SDLP) weighed in as well, pointing out the very important reality that Northern Ireland was no longer the same state it had been during the Troubles: "We now have a settled system of devolved government in which there is no place for paramilitary bodies with or without weapons." Furthermore, Gerry Kelly of Sinn Fein reminded everyone that the "old enemy" had stood down and that militant groups, loyalist or otherwise, were no longer needed: "The IRA dealt with the issue of arms in a decisive way four years ago....It is...important that other armed organisations go down this road. Politics is now working and there is no basis for any organisation holding onto arms."\textsuperscript{189}

With little beyond internal feuding to motivate them to hold on to their weapons, the loyalists finally made real progress. On 27 June of 2009, the UVF released a statement declaring that they had decommissioned. In it, UVF and RHC leaders announced that they had "completed the process of rendering ordnance totally, and irreversibly, beyond use." Notably, they stated "We have done so to further augment the establishment of accountable democratic governance in this region of the United Kingdom; to remove the pretext that Loyalist weaponry is an obstacle to the development of our communities and to compound our legacy of integrity to the peace process."\textsuperscript{190} This was a total turnaround from a UVF statement to the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} in a previous era that "Quite frankly decommissioning is not a word that we use in our vocabulary."\textsuperscript{191} Loyalists did not want to be viewed as obstacles to good government or be considered detrimental to their people. In the new climate of change, they did not want to be left behind.
On the same day, 27 June of 2009, the UDA declared that it had begun decommissioning. In their statement, the organization noted that

The struggle has ended. Peace and democracy have been secured and the need for armed resistance has gone. Consequently we are putting our arsenal of weaponry permanently beyond use.... The dark days are now behind us and it is time to move on. There is no place for guns and violence in the new society we are building. It is time to work for a better future.192

The UDA had completed decommissioning, according to the IICD, in January of 2010.193

The UPRG's Frankie Gallagher said, during a press conference in the wake of this: "we are determined and are willing to play our full part in ensuring that [the] tragedy of the last 40 years will never happen again."194

**Devolution Achieved**

The issue of devolution remained a problem with the two more extreme parties - Sinn Fein and the DUP - needing to reach agreement on sharing power together. Once again, British and Irish cooperation further stimulated progress. In April of 2006 Britain and Ireland brought forward a plan to re-establish devolution. In it "the Assembly was to be recalled in May 2006".195 Discussions would then occur until November 2006. Then, according to Blair, "we close the chapter or close the book".196 If an agreement was not achieved, MLA salaries would supposedly cease and the governments of Britain and Ireland would cooperate "to implement the Agreement through 'British-Irish partnership arrangements'."197 Although Sinn Fein responded positively to the April plan, the DUP did not. According to Paisley "there is no evidence that Sinn Fein/IRA will be any further advanced in giving up criminality in November."198 Thus, "there will be no executive formed for the foreseeable future".199
Talks then took place in Scotland at St Andrews in October of 2006. An agreement was not arrived at. Britain and Ireland, though, released their St Andrews Agreement. The parties had to respond to this Agreement that November. The Agreement included a schedule "for the restoration of devolved power sharing by 26 March 2007." The emphasis was on power sharing as well as policing. Republicans would need to back law and order and policing for the political situation to move forward and their DUP counterparts would need to agree to sharing power. November 10 was the date the parties needed to respond by. The DUP did not agree nor disagree. In the first part of November Sinn Fein gave "qualified support".

The issue of policing was resolved first, with Sinn Fein succumbing to pressure. Prior to St Andrews, Sinn Fein was firm that republicans would not support the police without devolution. They wanted policing as well as "justice powers" to be devolved before the party backed the PSNI. In September of 2006, Gerry Kelly of Sinn Fein told the Belfast Telegraph that "a decision by Sinn Fein to participate in policing could come within weeks of a timeframe being agreed for the transfer of powers to democratic political institutions." This was as far as Sinn Fein was prepared to go at that point. Britain and Ireland, though, prior to the talks at St Andrews, indicated this stance was not acceptable anymore. Thanks to the events of 2004-2005, devolution including Sinn Fein participation depended upon republicans supporting the police beforehand.

The position of Britain, Ireland, the US, and the DUP made Sinn Fein alter its stance. Under the St Andrews Agreement, Sinn Fein and the DUP were supposed to make Executive nominations by November 24 of 2006. This did not happen. The Secretary of State altered things to allow Sinn Fein and the DUP to simply signal their
intent to fulfill this requirement at some point. This did not occur either. Still, Hain stated elections to the Assembly would take place. Paisley meanwhile remained immoveable - sharing power with republicans without their backing the PSNI was not an option. Britain's "willingness to improvise [alone]...had allowed the process to continue". Republican leaders understood that Britain would not be able to do this again without much difficulty. If Sinn Fein did not give in when it came to the police, devolved structures would not be set up and people would blame republicans. This would hurt Sinn Fein in the Republic as well as in the North.²⁰⁵

Furthermore, after McCartney was killed, republicans were not able to get or use "fund-raising visas to the US".²⁰⁶ This was very significant because from the mid 1990s to 2004/2005 it was estimated that the party had received "between £15 and £20 million from the US."²⁰⁷ In November of 2006 Adams was permitted to carry out fundraising in America once more, an indication that the Americans were pleased "with the progress Sinn Fein...[was] making towards acceptance of the...PSNI."²⁰⁸ To not back the police would potentially lose or severely compromise a major funding source for republicans. Thus, at the beginning of 2007, at a Sinn Fein ard fheis, policing was backed. More than 90% backed the leadership's "motion".²⁰⁹ According to Frampton, "Sinn Fein’s commitment to back the police confirmed that new Assembly elections would be held in Northern Ireland."²¹⁰

The DUP faced pressure as well. The governments of Britain and Ireland were firm "that the [Assembly] elections were part of a timetable, whereby if devolved government were not agreed by 26 March 2007 then the whole venture would be scrapped."²¹¹ According to Secretary of State Peter Hain in February of 2007, "We are
determined to ensure that everybody understands with crystal clarity that March 26th is the day for devolution, or dissolution will follow." Furthermore, Hain noted that, with Sinn Fein having backed policing, there remained "no excuses for unionists to balk at power-sharing during the election or after". Considering these choices, the DUP were under pressure to go with power-sharing.212

Several weeks after the Assembly election in 2007,213 politics took a great and symbolic turn. On March 26, Adams and Paisley appeared next to each other at Stormont. The two men indicated they were committed to the re-instatement of devolved government.214 Ian Paisley declared that "the DUP executive overwhelmingly endorsed a motion committing the party to support and participate fully in Government in May of this year....we, as a party, have agreed the timing, setting up and working of the institutions. Today, we have agreed with Sinn Fein that this date will be Tuesday 8th May 2007."215 Notably, Paisley emphasized the future, rather than the past in his statement: "We must not allow our justified loathing of the horrors and tragedies of the past to become a barrier to creating a better and more stable future....With hard work and a commitment to succeed I believe we can lay the foundation for a better, peaceful and prosperous future for all our people."216 Similarly, Gerry Adams noted that "I believe the agreement reached between Sinn Féin and the DUP, including the unequivocal commitment, made by their party Executive and reiterated today, to the restoration of political institutions on May 8th, marks the beginning of a new era of politics on this island." Adams also emphasized the future: "Sinn Féin is about building a new relationship between orange and green and all the other colours, where every citizen can share and have equality of ownership of a peaceful, prosperous and just future."217 On
May 8 of 2007 the Executive "took office." Paisley was First Minister and McGuinness was his Deputy. 218

Several startling gestures accompanied these political developments. That April Paisley went to Dublin. A handshake took place between him and Ahern. Paisley talked about "'the prospect of mutual and respectful co-operation'". He also claimed that "'I am proud to be an Ulsterman but I am also proud of my Irish roots'". Then, the two men met where the Battle of the Boyne took place on May 11. 219 On this occasion Paisley stated that "'It would be a good thing for nationalists to know orange history and for Unionists to know green history....At last we can embrace this battle site as part of our shared history. Understanding our past is the only sure way to understand our present.'" This was a substantial step for a man who had tried to hit Sean Lemass with snowballs during his 1965 visit to Belfast. During the 2007 visit, Paisley presented Ahern with a musket that had been used in the battle. Along with Paisley, Orange Order members and fellow DUP members were also present. The two men "planted a walnut sapling" as well. Ahern acknowledged the importance of the location for Protestants and noted that "'We are all coming to acknowledge that we have a shared and complex past.'" 220

Furthermore, that July, the NSMC as well as the BIC met. The DUP attended the meeting of the NSMC. They had been unwilling to do this before. Indeed, Paisley and McGuinness essentially arrived at the same time, a significant symbolic moment. 221 According to Paisley, "'I think we have turned the corner. It is up to us to see that now we build something that will be stable and strong.'" McGuinness offered very complimentary remarks about his First Minister: "'I want to pay tribute to the leadership shown by the leader of the DUP, our First Minister Ian Paisley....I think he has made a very powerful
contribution to bringing the position to where it is….there is tremendous hope on this island."\textsuperscript{222}

Northern Ireland has continued to progress in a hopeful direction, despite the ongoing existence of sectarianism, the danger presented by dissident paramilitaries, and the fact that Sinn Fein is still a republican party and a united Ireland is still their end goal. Frampton contends that although it is true that "the republican movement's 'long war' may have ended, this has been translated into a 'long negotiation', or perhaps even more appropriately a 'Cold War'"\textsuperscript{223}. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the vast majority of republicans have adopted a non-violent course of action and the mainstream IRA has decommissioned. Sinn Fein's strength and influence grew up around and continues to rest upon their commitment to peace and the Agreement, which in essence represents political compromise. Furthermore, the Executive and Assembly continued to function on a power-sharing basis between 2007 and 2017. It is true that Northern Ireland currently faces serious challenges. Martin McGuinness stepped down in January of 2017 due to a disagreement with the DUP. The DUP and Sinn Fein are currently in talks aimed at once again establishing a functioning power-sharing regime. Still, at this point, it is not expected that Northern Ireland’s Troubles will resume.\textsuperscript{224}
CONCLUSION

The Third Community is a complex segment of society that includes those who are in-between the two recognized majority communities in Northern Ireland, those who deliberately or otherwise cross traditional boundaries, and those who are moderate Catholics and Protestants, nationalists and unionists. There are levels within this community – personal, civic, and political. At the most basic level ordinary members can go about their daily lives in defiance of sectarian divisions and avoid professing radical political or religious views. Their opinions have been sought for surveys and public opinion polls and, at times of crisis, community members have taken to the streets to oppose violence and express a desperate wish for peace. Otherwise, however, most members of this community, most of the time, live active, but private, Third Community lives. Nonetheless, at the civic and political levels, members are able to express themselves or connect with like minded individuals via churches, peace groups, moderate political parties, NIMMA, integrated schools, and humanist organizations. The number of organizations dedicated to peace, good community relations, and progress testifies to the passion felt by members of this community for creating a better society.

The Third Community has a strong basis in the history and culture of Ireland. Irishness and Britishness have rarely been mutually exclusive categories and there are many examples of people who cannot be neatly divided along those lines. The same is true of the connections between Catholicism and republicanism and Protestantism and unionism/loyalism. Republicanism has had its share of Protestant activists and Catholics have not, historically, been in all cases and in every era opposed to connections with Britain, some even stepping forward to defend or support those links. Furthermore, non-
violent agitation for reform and change has been very significant in Irish history, notably in the work of Daniel O’Connell. Violence and militancy has not, for most people most of the time, been the path of choice. Thus, it is, ultimately, not surprising that this tradition has come to the fore in Northern Ireland.

The Third Community’s cultural roots and presence are clear as well. Parading, traditional song and dance, and popular culture are traditions that are shared, even if, at times, elements or rituals are used to proclaim different messages or mark specific territories. In literature characters cross the divide or are located in a “no-man’s land” between the two traditional sides. Connections between people of different backgrounds are, at times, forged or attempted, while violent militants are condemned, even pitied. Finally, in sport, athletes and organizations have long transgressed both sectarian and national borders, representing more than one side or placing their athletic achievements ahead of political and religious ideas. Here Catholics and Protestants, Irish and British, have competed on the same teams and taken pride in their accomplishments.

It is in the reaction of members of the public to bombings and murder, however, that we see the Third Community assert its presence most powerfully. Here the traditional activities of parading and protest have become shared rituals of opposition to violence and sectarian hatred. Catholics, Protestants, and moderates in general have stood up to the paramilitaries, side-lining them and claiming the “good” and “decent” people are the true majority community and they are against violence. The people have been supported and encouraged in this belief by the press and political and religious leaders in the wake of violent paramilitary attacks. Furthermore, such tragic events have raised up new martyrs and heroes, good people who are not sectarian but whose innocent
blood has been shed by the bigoted and the depraved. Their deaths have been memorialized in subsequent years in many cases. Bloody Friday, Enniskillen, Omagh, and other events provide evidence both of the Third Community’s physical existence and its mythic proportions. It is a community with a story, martyrs, and heroes all its own that opposes and challenges both the loyalist and republican traditions.

This community was a supportive force in Northern Ireland’s journey from conflict to the 1998 Agreement and a stable power-sharing government. The people of Northern Ireland and their more moderate political leaders, including John Hume, helped demonstrate to militants that the future lay in politics, not violence. In the South as well the desire to avoid enduring conflict with a public swing in the direction of Sinn Fein drove the Irish government towards accommodation with Britain in 1985 – the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Thus was forged a new cooperative arrangement and relationship between the two countries that would, despite tensions, largely remain intact in subsequent years and help bring about the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.

The 1980s, thanks to the AIA and the people, were a decade of progress in many ways. More practical and moderate voices began to be heard among unionists, including some in loyalist circles. Many unionist people wanted their representatives to be active politically, recognizing that a simple anti-Anglo Irish Agreement position and protests were not enough to make progress on their aims. Similarly, nationalist voters in the 1980s were turning away from Sinn Fein due to satisfaction with the AIA and opposition to republican violence. This situation pushed Adams and his colleagues into the orbit of the moderate John Hume and talks took place in 1988 and after.
The early 1990s was not a period of strength for Sinn Fein and republicans. They were at a military and political impasse with their opponents and the people were not backing their campaign or the party at the polls in sufficient numbers. SDLP popularity was far higher. If Sinn Fein wanted to increase their influence, they would have to consider compromise and aligning themselves more fully with public opinion. Such realizations opened up opportunities for moderates as Sinn Fein reached out to Hume again and he and Adams talked in 1993. Hume and Adams’ talks helped the emergence of the Downing Street Declaration (1993). It was made clear in this Declaration by the British and Irish leaders that violence would keep those responsible for it out of any movement for a settlement. Therefore, it was no surprise that in August of 1994 the IRA went on ceasefire and loyalists followed in October.

Republican violence continued to prove a liability in this decade. The Canary Wharf bombing in 1996 brought people onto the streets to demonstrate their desire for peace. Furthermore, their support for peace and a resolution was obvious from opinion polls taken in 1996-2000, with results accessible in the *Belfast Telegraph*. The IRA’s return to militancy only brought Sinn Fein further isolation and they were not in talks when they began in June of 1996. Indeed, practical and more moderate political leaders remained the public’s main representatives in 1997. The SDLP and UUP continued to be Northern Ireland’s parties of choice, and Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern held office in London and Dublin. As far as Britain and Ireland were concerned, to be involved in settlement talks, republicans had to be on ceasefire. Faced with these realities, another IRA ceasefire began in July of 1997. Sinn Fein entered discussions in September, essentially giving up the militant campaign when they agreed to follow the Mitchell
Principles. Despite the “no surrender” stance of the DUP and UKUP, Trimble and his UUP did not turn away from talks.

The people as well as Britain and Ireland continued to make it clear by protest, poll, and policy that violence was no longer an acceptable element in the search for a resolution. When the GFA was achieved in April of 1998, it was supported by all major parties in Northern Ireland (beyond the DUP). Power would be shared and violence would have no place. Britain and Ireland would continue to cooperate as would Ireland, North and South. The people supported the accord that May, encouraged to do so by moderate politicians in the North, South, and in the UK, as well as by a people’s Yes campaign. Even Sinn Fein backed the accord as did the UDP! Power-sharing became a reality in 1999, including Sinn Fein.

The people and their political leaders continued to abhor violence and criminal activity post-Agreement. The public reaction to the Omagh bombing of August 1998 pushed dissident republicans into ceasefires. Despite future actions, these militants have not received much support from their fellow citizens. Later on, reactions to the Northern Bank robbery (2004) and the Robert McCartney killing (2005) caused Sinn Fein and the republican movement a great deal of grief, politically and in terms of morale. The IRA ended, officially, the armed struggle in July of 2005, recognizing that was what the Irish people wanted and that militant tactics were no longer useful.

Loyalist militants’ violence was also not popular among their people in the wake of the 1998 Agreement. For example, the loyalist murder of Catholic Daniel McColgan in 2002 brought public, political, and ecclesiastical revulsion and protest. Intelligent loyalists realized political involvement was key to their future, to the point that former
hero Michael Stone was derided for a radical incident at Stormont. Pressure by police and public representatives ultimately led to loyalist decommissioning in 2009/2010.

Although the DUP and Sinn Fein have become Northern Ireland’s most popular parties in the years following the Agreement in 1998, this is not in homage to gunmen, but to a desire to protect communal interests, improve and uphold equality, and to a belief among Protestants and unionists, post St Andrews (2006), that the GFA had been reworked by the DUP, driving republicans back. According to this perspective, Sinn Fein had lost, as Northern Ireland remained with the UK and Sinn Fein was participating within this structure. Furthermore, the DUP became Northern Ireland’s major unionist party in 2003 when it emphasized the necessity of a fair arrangement, rather than just being against the 1998 Agreement.

After St Andrews in 2006, Sinn Fein had to support the police and the DUP share power for a devolved government to be established. Under pressure from Britain, Ireland, the US, and with the knowledge they had to make progress or risk public backlash, Sinn Fein supported policing in 2007 so that devolved structures could be established. Not to be outdone, the DUP agreed with Sinn Fein to set up a government and this occurred in May of 2007. Power-sharing continued between republicans and unionists until January of 2017.

Finally, along with actual political changes and progress, changes in language and attitude in line with the Third Community myth and vision can be found in the post-Agreement decades. Politicians emphasized the future after the 1998 Agreement. By March of 2007, and after, Adams and Paisley were speaking the language of peace and stability for all and better relations among the members of both communities. Such
concepts and phrases had been used since the 1970s by APNI and other moderates and members of the Third Community. The Third Community vision had triumphed.
INTRODUCTION


3 Noel McAdam, “Moment of history; Paisley and McGuinness say they will put hate in the past,” *Belfast Telegraph*, May 8, 2007. See also, McKittrick and McVea, 221.


6 Boyle and Hadden, 23, 28, 65.


8 Clayton, 77.


11 Mark Patrick Hederman and Richard Kearney, “Editorial I/Endodermis,” *The Crane Bag* Vol. 1 No. 1 (Spring 1977): 4. Mark Patrick Hederman and Richard Kearney were the editors of the *The Crane Bag* and responsible for the editorials in this 1977 volume - “Editorial I/Endodermis” and “Editorial II/Epidermis.” Neither editorial is signed, however, and Hederman noted in a 1985 article that “one of us wrote the editorial in the front and the other continued it at the back” as the two editors had their own perspectives. Although Hederman provides some evidence that he may have been responsible for the first editorial, he does not specifically claim sole authorship of it. Mark Patrick Hederman, “Poetry and the Fifth Province,” *The Crane Bag* Vol. 9 No. 1, Contemporary Culture Debate (1985): 110, 114. Other reputable scholars, including Chris Morash, Shaun Richards, and Frank Shovlin, have credited both men with the first editorial. See Chris Morash and Shaun Richards, *Mapping Irish Theatre: Theories of Space and Place* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 199; Frank Shovlin, *The Irish Literary Periodical 1923-1958* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 194. Therefore, the focus in this study will be on editorial content, as opposed to specific authorship, and both men will be credited with each one.

12 The Crane Bag was the property of the Sea God, Manannan, according to legend. The bag was constructed “from the skin of a woman who had been magically transformed into a crane.” All of the god’s valuables could be found in this bag – “When the sea was full, all the treasures were visible in it; when the fierce sea ebbed, the crane-bag was empty.” Hederman and Kearney, “Editorial I/Endodermis,” 3.


19 Again, according to this view, "public opinion is more moderate than the extreme political elites. By mobilizing 'the people' and civil society, and through democratization, the extreme elites could be brought into line with the moderates." Dixon notes that the Civil Society stance could be found within APNI, among British politicians, as well as the NIWC and, to an extent, the SDLP and the notion "of a 'People's Peace Process'" was founded upon the Civil Society view of events. Indeed, when power was devolved in the Spring of 2007, Blair credited the people with the victory, they were the real root of success: "The leaders played their part. But, ultimately, the people gave the leadership. They set the terms. They held us all to them. They gave the final imprimatur." Dixon, Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace, 281, 284.


22 Cochrane defines "'civil [or civic] society'" as "the actors (group and individual) in society below the formal state level that act, or combine forces to act, to give form and substance to the 'civility' of that society." Feargal Cochrane, "Unsung Heroes or Muddle-Headed Peaceniks? A Profile and Assessment of NGO Conflict Resolution Activity in the Northern Ireland 'Peace Process'," Irish Studies in International Affairs 12 (2001): 99-100.

23 Among them are the major churches as well as trade unions, sports groups, NGOs, the arts, and others. Cochrane, "Unsung Heroes or Muddle-Headed Peaceniks?", 98, 100-101, 112.

24 Cochrane, "Unsung Heroes or Muddle-Headed Peaceniks?", 111-112.


Timothy J. White, "The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Peace in Northern Ireland," in Building Peace in Northern Ireland, ed. Maria Power. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2011), 38, 43-45. According to White, "a civil society is based on the organisations and relationships that exist among individuals and groups that allow people of different backgrounds and identities to engage each other peacefully and democratically outside of the formal framework of government." White, 42.


See Jonathan Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 2nd ed. (Harlow, England: Longman, 2002), 67; See Santino, 45-46. Indeed, as Jack Santino has pointed out, people who call Northern Ireland home are upset that the violence is what the media outside of Northern Ireland focusses on and reports, making the people of the province appear to be generally violent and Northern Ireland itself to be a terrible place to live. Santino, 99.

"Myth", here, basically means “a story which...a society tells itself about itself in order to describe itself to itself - and to others.” Richard Kearney, Transitions: Narratives in Modern Irish Culture (New York: Manchester University Press: Distributed in the USA and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1988), 270.


38 McKittrick and McVea, 226.


41 “The Torturous Road to Devolution.”

42 Brian Rowan, “Two adversaries have travelled a long way, and now a journey begins for all of us,” *Belfast Telegraph*, May 9, 2007, city edition.


Noel McAdam, “IRA Disarms: Move to be Verified by Church Witnesses,” *Belfast Telegraph*, September 26, 2005.


McKittrick and McVea, 199-201.


McEvoy, 57-58. The republicans became more seriously politically engaged in the context of the 1981 hunger strikes. When Fermanagh/South Tyrone MP, Frank Maguire, died in March of 1981, Sinn Fein leaders decided to take advantage of the sympathy that existed within the Catholic population for the striking republican prisoners. Hunger striker Bobby Sands was put forward as a candidate to take Maguire's place. Sands won the election, defeating the UUP candidate, Harry West. Sands died less than a month later. That June, two other hunger strikers won seats in the Dail and in August of 1981 Owen Carron, who managed Sands’ campaign, took the Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat in the by-election. Confident now of its ability to win votes, Sinn Fein declared it would take part in future elections. It would not, however, actually occupy any seats won, not

54 There were key republican figures who considered abstentionism from the Dail to be a hindrance rather than a useful measure. Sinn Fein once again divided over this and those who opposed the end of abstention established Republican Sinn Fein. McEvoy, 58.

55 In 1988, the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Fein began talking. John Hume, SDLP leader, wanted to convince republicans to cease using violence as a tactic. These talks did not result in a lot that was significant that year, but Hume-Adams discussions were reactivated in 1993. McEvoy, 58. The Peace Process basically began with these discussions. Following the IRA's July 1997 ceasefire, Sinn Fein was permitted to be involved "in the multi-party talks" that September. Sinn Fein, thus, had a part in the talks which led to the 1998 Agreement. Martin Melaugh, Brendan Lynn and Fionnuala McKenna, "Sinn Fein (SF)," CAIN Web Service, accessed March 18, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/sorgan.htm. Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, saw the agreement as a stepping stone or "phase" in the achievement of a united Ireland. There were republicans, however, who were against the Agreement. Republican Sinn Fein as well as the Continuity IRA, the RSF's militant wing, were against the Agreement. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement as well as its militant wing, the Real IRA (RIRA), were against it, too. They would only support a united Ireland. No dilution or half measures were acceptable in their eyes. McEvoy, 59-60.

56 Martin Melaugh, Brendan Lynn and Fionnuala McKenna, "Sinn Fein (SF)," CAIN Web Service, accessed March 18, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/sorgan.htm; McEvoy, 59. Acceptance, in any form, of a Northern Irish based government or parliament, in the absence of an actual united Ireland, was problematic for a number of republicans, but does represent a significant development in Sinn Fein's political evolution. McEvoy, 59-60.

57 It was a special convention and over 90% of those present supported the motion to back the police as well as "the criminal justice system". McEvoy, 169. This was a very significant development as, historically speaking, the police were seen as an enemy by republicans. Nearly 300 police died at the hands of militant republicans in the Troubles era. Owen Bowcott, "Historic vote ends Sinn Fein's long battle with the police service in Northern Ireland," *The Guardian*, January 29, 2007, accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jan/29/uk.northernireland; McEvoy, 174.

58 McKittrick and McVea, 201. See also, Tonge, *Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change*, 61-62; Jonathan Tonge, *The New Northern Irish Politics?* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 61-62. The PUP was established in 1979. Leftist and socialist, the PUP aims to be the voice of labouring class loyalism and also aims to ensure the continuation of the tie with Britain. McEvoy, 62.


See Smith, 30-40.

Isaac Butt (1813-1879), an Irish Protestant, lawyer, and parliamentarian, can be considered "the founding father of the Irish Home Rule movement." He came to believe that Ireland should have "an Irish parliament" with Westminster continuing to have authority over things like foreign policy and defense of the Empire. The Irish Home Rule parliamentary party was created in 1874 with Butt as its chairman. As leader of the Irish Home Rule MPs, Butt took a conciliatory approach to achieving Home Rule at Westminster, in the hope of attracting the interest and support of British MPs. He did not make Irish MPs vote as a group on any issue except Home Rule. This made him a less effective leader than he might otherwise have been. Thomas E. Hachey, _Britain and Irish Separatism: From the Fenians to the Free State 1867/1922_ (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), 16-20; Thomas E. Hachey, Joseph M. Hernon, Jr., and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, _The Irish Experience: A Concise History_, rev. ed. (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 111-113.

Irish Protestant, nationalist, and statesman, Parnell (1846-1891) disagreed with Butt's conciliatory strategy. He took part in obstructionism at Westminster, which slowed the pace of parliamentary business. He believed that Home Rule required backing from a British party to succeed and getting such support required Home Rule MPs to be active and to influence British and imperial legislation. It needed to be made clear that if Ireland did not get Home Rule that the Irish would continue to interfere in the affairs of Britain and the Empire. Parnell would eventually become chairman of the Irish party in 1880 and he reformed the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1882. IPP MPs were to vote together on all matters related to Ireland at Westminster and Parnell would utilize a "balance of power" strategy, giving Irish support to the party most likely to help the Home Rule cause. Hachey, _The Irish Experience_, 113-115, 118-119, 123-125, 132.

John Redmond (1856-1918) and John Dillon (1851-1927) were both Irish Catholic nationalists and statesmen. Redmond led the IPP from 1900 to 1918, after which Dillon became its leader. Hachey, _The Irish Experience_, 137, 159-160.

Richard English, _Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-29. In 1918 the British government threatened conscription in Ireland. The Irish people were hostile to such a measure and Sinn Fein received votes from angry and disgruntled Irish citizens in the following election. The conscription threat also increased interest in and support for militant nationalism. English, 11-12.
Sinn Fein took 73 seats and the IPP took 6 seats in the general election of 1918. Sinn Fein then established their own Dublin-based parliament, Dail Eireann, in defiance of Westminster. English, 15-16. It is important to note that Sinn Fein's 1918 victory was due, in significant part, to the Representation of the People Act. This act broadened voting rights so that every man older than 21 and every woman older than 30 could vote. In 1910, 701,475 Irish people could vote. After this act, 1,936,673 Irish people could vote. In constituencies where there was a contest, the IPP's vote went up. Former voters, as well as the wives of those voters, appear to have remained loyal to Home Rule, with the more youthful crowd supporting Sinn Fein. Hachey, *The Irish Experience*, 160.


69 The Treaty provided for an Irish Free State, made up of the southern 26 Irish counties. It would have Dominion status, remaining a member of the Commonwealth. Hachey, *The Irish Experience*, 165. Michael Collins felt that the Anglo-Irish Treaty gave the Irish "the substance of freedom" and it was the greatest concession they could get at that time. The Treaty could be a basis from which to achieve the desired republic. English, 31.

70 Hachey, *The Irish Experience*, 167-171. 64 Dail members were for the Treaty and 57 were against it. A lot of those republicans opposed to the Treaty wanted their complete republic; such individuals were not interested in compromise. Most IRA members ended up opposing the Treaty and they repudiated the authority of the Dail in March of 1922. English, 30-35.

71 Still, it is possible that electoral support for the pro-Treaty side represented an understanding that Britain had more power than Ireland and compromise of some sort would be ultimately inevitable. What nationalists would have chosen if they did not have to fear or be concerned with British might is open to question. English, 33-34.

72 English, 30-35. The Free State was officially born in December of 1922. Britain supported the Free State side in the Civil War. English, 35.

73 Cumann na nGaedheal, who supported the Treaty, came out the victor in this election. English, 35-36, 38.

74 Upon gaining power in the 1930s, de Valera's regime wanted to bring republicans onside and they were very successful in doing so. In the 1930s de Valera removed the majority of the unpalatable aspects of the Treaty, such as the oath of allegiance and the 1922 constitution. He basically demonstrated that Collins' view of the Treaty as a basis upon which to achieve the republic was correct. Southern Ireland was the Republic of Ireland as of 1948/1949. In addition, for a lot of citizens, de Valera undercut the reason for further IRA action in the South. English, 44-47, 71.

75 The cabinet after 1932 was made up of the old anti-Treatyites. The next really important IRA campaign was its Border Campaign of 1956-62. The campaign did not
garner any real level of support among people in either part of Ireland. It was a failure and the IRA called a halt to it in February of 1962. English, 46-47, 52-53, 59-60, 71-76.

76 English, 82-108; Mulholland, 78-79. Cathal Goulding became IRA Chief of Staff following the end of the 1956-62 campaign. The IRA of 1962 was not in very good shape. Lack of funding and a shortage of arms were important problems. Also, an insufficient number of Volunteers were available to offset the ones who had lost their lives or were incarcerated. While thus weakened, "some significant rethinking emerged" in militant republican ranks. English, 82-83.

77 Sinn Fein split along the same lines in January of 1970. While the Officials did engage in violence within Northern Ireland, they were not as "aggressive" as their Provisional counterparts. They went on ceasefire in 1972 and came to reject revolutionary/rebellious violence. Mulholland, 78-79; English, 106-107.

CHAPTER 1: COMMUNITIES AND MYTHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

1 Boyle and Hadden, 23; McKittrick and McVea, 1-2; Jarman, 87.


6 Mulholland, 30, 51.


8 Boyle and Hadden, 63-64; McKittrick and McVea, 1-2; Santino, 19, 21; Tonge, 51, 206.
See McKittrick and McVea, 1-2. These fears are still present and real. McKittrick and McVea, 2, 6. See also, Tonge, 51, 55, 63-64, 206-207.

McKittrick and McVea, 2, 6. See also Tonge, *Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change*, 51, 54-55, 63-64, 206-207.

Boyle and Hadden, 64; McKittrick and McVea, 2.


Grant, *Breaking Enmities*, 159; Santino, 66.

There are also parades and events later in the year. For instance, October's final Sunday, Reformation Day, is marked by Orangemen. Also, on the closest Saturday to December 18, the "Closing of the Gates of Derry" (1688) is commemorated in the city by the Apprentice Boys. A large representation of Lundy is burned. A parade takes place beforehand. Lundy is considered a great traitor in Protestant/loyalist tradition. Bryan, *Orange Parades*, 123, 183-184.


Santino, 36, 64-66; Walker, 1.

See Jarman, 125-131. A key idea within the Northern Irish Protestant tradition is that they are upholders and defenders “of civil liberties” in opposition to enemies of these liberties (aka Catholicism, the Catholic church and its adherents). Grant, *Literature, Rhetoric and Violence*, 12.

Santino, 6-7.

Daber, 85-86. Beginning in 1885 significant ties were made which connected the Unionist Party and the Orange Order. Walker, 95.


Within the Catholic community a “victim psychology,” stressing Catholic grievances, arose. Garvin, 21-22. Indeed, Lissi Daber has pointed out that, historically, the “Catholic view of history stressed exploitation, sacrifice, emigration, and the nationalist fight for self-determination, with Planter and Gael as oppressor and oppressed.” Daber, 85-86.

Republicans believe that there exists “a distinctive Irish nation state” with a right to independence and unity. Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 65-67, 69.

Grant, Breaking Enmities, 36; Santino, 41.

Jarman, 192-193. The AOH was established in Ireland during the 1800s. It originated in the US. Walker, 106-107.


Jarman and Bryan, 96; Walker, 106.

Jarman, 193, 195-196.


Grant, Breaking Enmities, 161.


Davis, 121-122, 127, 145.

The statement was an "even-handed" one in that it saw internment as being behind a lot of the violence. Still, Republican News was very angry. It should also be noted that, earlier in September of 1971, Conway as well as 6 other bishops denounced "the IRA for
disgracing noble causes." They also asked how the Protestant population could "be bombed into" Irish unity. Davis, 128-129.

35 None of this is to say that there were no clerics with republican leanings. A survey taken in 1986 showed a small minority of priests (3.9%) would be willing to support Sinn Fein at the polls. 87.9% backed the SDLP. Davis, 134, 148.

36 Jarman, 201-203.

37 In Northern Ireland nationalist parades and such did not always enjoy the same freedom as Protestant/unionist ones. Jarman and Bryan, 95-96, 108.

38 Jarman and Bryan, 95; Walker, 104-105.

39 Buckley and Kenney, 199. See also, Jarman and Bryan, 100-102, 104-105.


41 There are several theories as to the use and meaning of the Star of David, or British Zionist Star. It may be to emphasize the notion that Protestants in Ulster resemble "the Lost Tribe of Israel who are continuously persecuted." Or, perhaps this symbol was selected for its six points, representing the number of counties in Northern Ireland. Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Unionist and Loyalist Symbols," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 16, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/unionloyal.htm.

42 The Red Hand represents the O'Neills of Ulster, being their "official seal". Their Chieftains were famous for opposing the English and, for this reason, the Ulster (nine county) flag is perceived to be Nationalist. Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Flags Used in Northern Ireland," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 14, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/flags.htm; Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Symbols Used by Both Main Traditions in Northern Ireland," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 14, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/crosstrad.htm.

43 Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Flags Used in Northern Ireland," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 14, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/flags.htm; Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Symbols Used by Both Main Traditions in Northern Ireland," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 14, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/crosstrad.htm. The Red Hand indicates "loyalty to Britain" for Protestants, despite the fact that, among the British, the image is meaningless. Also, according to Derek Lundy, when it comes to the Red Hand, there is more than one tale explaining its origins. In one, Viking warriors approach the north of Ireland in their longboat. According to their leader, the strand would belong to whoever touched it first. A man named O'Neill is on the ship. He cuts off his hand, tosses it on the shore and thus wins this area "of Ulster." The "bloody hand" becomes O'Neill's "crest and symbol." Another version has two clans from Scotland trying to beat one another to reach Ireland.
The clan who gets to the shore of Ulster before the other one gets the land. The MacDonnell clan leader's boat is losing the race. He cuts off his hand, then tosses it on shore. "He claims the land for himself and takes the red hand as the crest of the MacDonnells of Antrim." The stories are not factual or "true", Lundy points out; they were actually invented post-1700. The two tales above "are merely the two most popular of many versions that purport to identify the owner of the red hand." Derek Lundy, *The Bloody Red Hand: A Journey through Truth, Myth and Terror in Northern Ireland* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada), 1-3, 13.


45 Dara Mulhern and Martin Melaugh, "Flags Used in Northern Ireland," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 14, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/symbols/flags.htm. The Irish Tricolour, which includes a white section between the green and the orange, made its public debut in March 1848 in Waterford when Thomas Meagher of Young Ireland "flew the flag from the Wolfe Tone Confederate Club." According to Meagher a month later, "The white in the centre signifies a lasting truce between the \textquoteleft orange\textquoteleft and the \textquoteleft green\textquoteleft ." The flag was then used in the Rebellion of 1916 as well as during the Anglo-Irish War that followed, during which it was an IRA emblem. It became the Free State flag in 1922. Darragh Murphy, "Fifteen facts about the Irish flag and 1916," *The Irish Times*, September 24, 2015, accessed August 24, 2016, http://www.irishtimes.com/culture/heritage/fifteen-facts-about-the-irish-flag-and-1916-1.2362893.


49 Davis, 106; Walker, 69.
There were Protestant groups, like the Order of St. Patrick as well as the Friendly Brothers of St. Patrick. These were established in the 1700s. Walker, 76, 78, 83.

52 Walker, 76-80.


54 Walker, 80-81, 83.


56 Walker, 84-85.


59 "St. Aidan of Lindisfarne."

60 Bradley, "Wanted: a new patron saint."

61 Santino, 8, 45-47. See Grant, Breaking Enmities, 159; Grant, Literature, Rhetoric and Violence in Northern Ireland, 12; Santino, 66; Tonge, Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change, 7.

62 See Walker, 13.

63 Jarman and Bryan, 97, 106.

64 Republican martyrs such as Bobby Sands are seen as joining the ranks of revolutionaries Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, both casualties of the 1916 Rising, and continuing their struggle for Irish freedom and nationhood. Jarman, 154, 238-239.

65 In the summer of 1790 there were no reports of anniversary commemorations in Belfast in the pages of the Belfast Newsletter. Walker, 2-3, 91.
Indeed, Irish reformers considered William one of their heroes up to the latter 1790s; at this point William was claimed by Orangemen. Walker, 2-3, 5, 91.

Walker, 3, 5. Official commemorations of this siege in Derry had stopped by the 1820s when "the Apprentice Boy Clubs were" established. Walker, 105.

"Mass support" of Protestants in Ulster for the Orange Order and their July commemorations occurred only in the late 1800s. Walker, 5, 91-92.

It is true that August 15 had frequently been treated as a Catholic holiday before, however. Walker, 106.

Walker points out that "After the emergence of nationalist/unionist confrontation in the 1880s, however, interest in these historic events became significantly more widespread than before." Walker, 3-5.

Walker, 3-4.

Walker, 14.


It is true that the highest executives of the government were English. However, the rest were Irishmen. Lundy, 197.


Interestingly, the British men guarding these prisoners included a Robert Barton. In 1921 he would be part of the Treaty signing "Irish delegation." Kee, The Green Flag, 7.

Kee, The Green Flag, 8.

Jarman and Bryan, 107.


He gave a famous speech before he died in which he supposedly stated: "Let no man write my epitaph....When my country takes her place among the nations of the earth, then and not till then let my epitaph be written." Robert Kee, Ireland: A History, rev. ed. (London: Abacus, 2003), 66, 69; Kee, The Green Flag, 167-168.

Republican hero and United Irishman Wolfe Tone (a middle class Protestant from Dublin) actually did not have a major role in 1798 and had no respect for the papacy as an institution. He was deistic in his outlook. It can be seen in Tone's Autobiography that he and Paisley had a degree of similarity in their outlooks when it came to Catholicism. Davis, 80, 82, 85; Kee, The Green Flag, 38.
During the middle of the eighteenth century, a quarter of the people in Ireland were Protestant. However, this is counting Presbyterians. "Protestant" at this time was synonymous with Anglican and thus the Protestant Ascendancy was Anglican. Lundy, 139-140; Kee, *The Green Flag*, 28.


Walker, 1, 9-10. According to Lundy, "Anglican propagandists often described the Dissenter as just another version of a papist." For Presbyterians, the Anglican faith was essentially Catholic, minus a pope. Lundy, 139-140.

Walker, 9-10. See also, Kee, *The Green Flag*, 35; Lundy, 140-141.

Kee, *The Green Flag*, 30-32. The Protestant Ascendancy dominated Irish politics as well as society even as it remained "subservient to England." The Parliament of England was able to alter Irish parliamentary bills. Westminster could make laws for Ireland as of 1720. The Irish executive as well as administration officials were responsible "to the English ministry that appointed them" rather than to the parliament in Ireland. The Lord Lieutenant as well as the Lord Lieutenant's secretary led the Irish executive. They were English, not Irish. Lundy, 139.

The Volunteers came to reflect and represent the political ideals and goals of Protestants in Ireland. As 1778 came to a close, around 40,000 people were in the Volunteers - they were entirely Protestant. A significant number of Catholics would ultimately become Volunteers. Kee, *The Green Flag*, 30-32.

It is important to note that Protestant patriots were not opposing the Crown. Grattan attempted to get support in Ireland's House of Commons for a "Declaration of Independence" in 1780. However, the Crown, via patronage, controlled the Irish parliament and Grattan failed. Kee, *The Green Flag*, 32-33.

This was a kind of extra-parliamentary parliament. The possibility of the use of force added to its power. Kee, *The Green Flag*, 32.


Theoretically, Ireland now had parliamentary independence. The monarch of England remained the monarch of Ireland. Grattan was not seeking a republic or total separation of Ireland from Crown and Empire. Unless the Irish parliament was reformed, however, London would continue to have a powerful degree of influence in Irish politics. Patronage was used even in the wake of 1782 by the London government to influence Irish politics. After "independence" the grip of London on the parliament in Ireland was
strengthened through patronage. Grattan would come to see that there was no real substance to Ireland's independence. Grattan did not, even at this point, want a republic or total separation from Britain, however. Kee, *The Green Flag*, 32-34, 36-37.


95 During the 1780s, the Defenders, a Catholic group, came into existence in Armagh. They spread across Ulster and Ireland. Initially they were focussed on defending Catholics. The French Revolution inspired the Defenders to consider whether such change was possible within Ireland. According to Lundy, "When the middle-class Presbyterians who formed the Society of United Irishmen looked around for a bridge to the Catholics, they found the like-minded Defenders." Irregular contact would evolve into an actual alliance in the 1790s. Lundy, 153-155, 197, 202, 270.

96 Walker, 4, 107-108. For instance, Presbyterian Henry Joy McCracken was a United Irish leader within Antrim. He was executed. Similarly, the United Irish leader in the Battle of Ballynahinch was Presbyterian Henry Munro. He was hanged. Davis, 82.


99 The idea that Protestants and Catholics could come together as patriots was part of this new nationalism. Still, it would become "a Catholic cause with Protestant sympathizers." Kee, *Ireland: A History*, 66. Lundy echoes this, noting that there continued to be Protestant republicans post-1798, although there were not many of them. Lundy, 175.


In America, Stephens and the emigrant John O'Mahony established the Fenian Brotherhood. Due to the necessity of secrecy "under British rule, it was under the name of the American part of the organization, which was able to function openly, that the whole movement was usually referred to in Ireland." Kee, *Ireland: A History*, 106-107.


As of 1865, thousands of people were involved with Fenianism. The Fenians received backing within Ireland and among Irish immigrants. Despite being republican advocates of physical force, they supported the "non-sectarian nationality" of Thomas Davis. They in general supported a division between state and church. Hachey, *Britain and Irish Separatism*, 10; Kee, *Ireland: A History*, 112.


When it comes to the 36th (Ulster) Division on 1 July 1916 at the Somme, the majority belonged to the Orange Order and had their sashes on. Prayers were said and hymns were sung. It was the 226th anniversary of the Boyne. (The Boyne took place on 1 July according to the Julian calendar. The Gregorian calendar had been used by Ireland and Britain since 1752. According to this calendar, the Battle of the Boyne occurred on 11 July. Lundy claims that "The Orange Order decided to celebrate the battle on July 12 because it seems to have misunderstood the calendar reform.") On 1 July 1916 the 36th Division lost over 2,000 men. Altogether, they sustained more than 5,000 casualties. Four Ulster members of the Division received Victoria Crosses for their efforts on 1 July 1916. This day is an iconic and symbolic day for Ulster Protestants. It was their sacrifice as well as martyrdom for what they held dear and believed in. Lundy, 225-229; Walker, 99, 103.

One of these, Canon Hugh Murphy, M.C., had been a "naval chaplain". Walker, 103.

Walker, 99, 102-103.

One of these, Canon Hugh Murphy, M.C., had been a "naval chaplain". Walker, 103.

Walker, 99, 103.

CHAPTER 2: DELINEATING THE “THIRD COMMUNITY”

PART 1: WHO ARE “THE PEOPLE IN BETWEEN?”

Richard Rose carried out the 1968 survey and Edward Moxon-Browne was responsible for the 1978 poll. Walker, 123-124.


3 For comparative purposes, figures from the SOL time series tables are generally used in this chapter. Occasionally there are differences between the figures in these tables and those in the original *Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Surveys* and *Northern Ireland Life and Times* surveys, but these differences are not significant. When they occur, however, they are pointed out in the relevant note. SOL Surveys Online, “Community Relations: Identity,” *Community Relations and Political Attitudes – extracts from surveys over time – 1989 to 2012*, ARK, accessed February 8, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/CRencyidentity.htm#table2. The word ‘usually’ does not appear in the original question for 2003, and maybe other years as well.


5 Moxon-Browne; Walker, 123-124. The reason for this drop may well lie in the fact that by 1989 the Troubles had taken a toll on the Catholic community, including the 1981 Hunger Strike which further alienated Catholics from the British Government. Also, by 1989, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was in place, which offered an “Irish dimension” for the Catholic community in the North.


8 The surveys/studies referred to here are the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes Survey (1989-1996), the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (1998-2012), the Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Study (1998), and the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Study (2003).

9 The 71% comes from the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Study (2003), appearing in the time series as 2003a. SOL, “Community Relations: Identity,” accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/CRencyidentity.htm. There are some discrepancies between the SOL figures and the original NILT figures here. In all cases, but one, the difference is only a single percent. In 2012 the SOL figure is 49% and the original NILT figure is 51%. See NILT, (2012), accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2012/Political_Attitudes/UNINATID.html.


414


20 Interestingly, respondents were given the opportunity between 2007 and 2012 to choose "Remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule" or "Remain part of the United Kingdom with devolved government" and, it has been pointed out, this might have impacted respondents' answers. SOL, "Community Relations Issues: Constitutional Issues," accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/crconstit.htm#table1.

21 It is also interesting to note, that of those Catholics who believed Northern Ireland ought to continue within the UK, or who chose another option aside from a united Ireland, a small percentage claimed that should most of the Province's people at some point choose to rejoin the South, "they would find it almost impossible to accept" - between 1 and 5% (according to the original NILT figures). In addition, a much higher number of Catholics in this group claimed they "Could live with it" or "would not like it, but could live with it if you had to" - between 13% (1999) and 33% (2010). Thus, a substantial minority appears to be quite strongly in favour of an option other than Irish unity. See NILT, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/results/searchyear.html. See also, SOL, "Community Relations Issues: Constitutional Issues," accessed August 12, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/crconstit.htm.

22 Garvin, 26; Daber, 93.


25 Moxon-Browne; Nic Craith, 14-15. According to Nic Craith, the "change would appear to confirm Renfrew's (1996) perception that an enhanced ethnicity is often a result, rather than a cause of war." Nic Craith, 14-15.

26 SOL, "Community Relations: Identity," accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/CRencyidentity.htm#table2. In the SOL table it says that 1% of Protestants claimed this identity in 1993, but the original NISA table says 3% for that year. If the latter figure is accurate then the lowest percentage of Protestants to declare an Irish identity is 2% in the NISA survey for 1991. See SOL, NISA (1993), accessed August 13, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/gen_social_att/nisa/1993/website/Community_Relations/NINATID.html.

Furthermore, there is evidence that identification with or as Ulster is especially popular among labouring class people. Trew suggests that labouring class individuals do not receive a lot of rewards from the connection with Britain. Thus, the probability is higher that they will, as Nic Craith puts it, "identify with regional rather than national structures." Higher class Protestants, on the other hand, who do gain financially are dedicated to staying within the UK. Nic Craith, 16.

In 2009 the SOL table claims 4% chose "Ulster", but the original NILT table gives the figure as 0%. See NILT (2009), accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2009/Community_Relations/NINATID.html.

Nic Craith has pointed out that Protestants who select Northern Irish have a good education and are happy to continue as part of the UK. In addition, they possess a really favourable perspective towards Europe and think the UK ought to "align itself more closely with the EU. This group is likely to consist of younger females who support the Alliance Party." Nic Craith, 16.

Unionist or unionism, with a small "u," denotes a person or persons who support the connection between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom. A Unionist with a capital "U" can be considered to be a member or supporter, more specifically, of the Unionist Party (UUP).

In the SOL table for 2005 the figure is 72%, but in the original NILT table it is also 73%. The original NILT table for 2010 gives a figure of 65% as opposed to the SOL figure of 64%. Also, the original NILT table for 2012 gives a figure of 61%.

SOL Surveys Online, "Community Relations: Identity," accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/community_relations/time_series/CRencyidentity.htm#table5. In the SOL table for 2005 the figure is 72%, but in the original NILT table it is also 73%. The original NILT table for 2010 gives a figure of 65% as opposed to the SOL figure of 64%. Also, the original NILT table for 2012 gives a figure of 61%.


47 NISRA, “Table 19: Religions,” *Northern Ireland Census 1951 General Report*; NISRA, “Table 19: Religions,” *Northern Ireland Census 1961 General Report*. The numbers listed in the column “Other and Not Stated Denominations” for 1951 and 1961 are 69,362 and 97,717, respectively. Furthermore, only a small, but growing, minority in each of these years can be clearly classified as non-Christians. In Northern Ireland in 1951 there were 1,474 Jews, 54 Mohammedans, 52 Hindus, and 30 Sikhs. In 1961 there were 1,191 Jews, 316 Hindus, 272 Mohammedans, 62 Sikhs, 50 Buddhists, 32 Baha'i World Faith, 15 Chinese Religion, and 12 Singh.


49 “Table KS07a: Religion” *Northern Ireland Census 2001 Key Statistics*, 20, NISRA, accessed March 17, 2012, http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/census/2001/key%2020statistics/Key%2020Statistics%20Report%20Tables.pdf. A mere 0.30% of the population falls into the "Other religions and philosophies" category in 2001 and those "with no religion or religion not stated" amount to 13.88% of the population that year.


51 Comparison with census statistics from elsewhere in the UK is revealing. According to the latest census results (2011) 59.3% of people in England and Wales consider themselves to be Christian. This amounted to 33.2 million individuals. Islam followed in numbers, encompassing 4.8% of people, or 2.7 million individuals. About 25% of the people (14.1 million) claimed to "have no religion." 7.2% of respondents gave no answer to this question. According to the Office for National Statistics, the percentage of the population claiming to be Christian is less in 2011 than it was in 2001, when 71.7% of people could be found in the Christian category. Meanwhile, the percentage claiming "no religion" was 14.8% in 2001 and in 2011 was 25.1%. The Muslim population, meanwhile, has expanded, being only 3.0% in 2001. The 2011 census also offers percentage figures for those who claimed affiliation with more minority religious groups: 1.5% Hindu, 0.8% Sikh, 0.5% Jewish, and 0.4% Buddhist. "Religion in England and Wales 2011: Changing picture of religious affiliation over last decade," Office for National Statistics, accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html#tab-Changing-picture-of-religious-affiliation-over-last-decade; "Religion in England and Wales 2011: Key points," Office for National Statistics, accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html#tab-conclusions.


54 Jacinta Ashworth and Ian Farthing, *Churchgoing in the UK: A research report from Tearfund on church attendance in the UK* (UK: Tearfund, April 2007), iv-v.

55 McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 1; NISRA, “Table 19: Religions: Analysis of column headed ‘Other and not stated denominations,’” *Northern Ireland Census 1951 General Report*.

56 McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2; NISRA, “Table 19: Religions: Analysis of column headed 'Other and not stated denominations',” *Northern Ireland Census 1961 General Report*.

57 NISRA, “Table 8 Religions,” *1971 Summary Tables*.

58 Altogether, 86,024 people belonged to other religious faiths or groups (including those who labeled themselves "Undenominational" (852 people) or who fell into the category "Other Denominations" (177 people)). NISRA, "Analysis of Column Headed 'Other and Not Stated Denominations'," (1971). See also, McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2.


60 Altogether, 110,681 people belonged to other religious faiths or groups (including those who were "Indefinite Answer" (10,228 people), "Undenominational or Unsectarian" (1,217 people) or who fell into the category "Other Denominations" (44 people). NISRA, "Table 8A: Analysis of Column Headed "Other and Not Stated Denominations" in Table 8," (1981).


63 The exact figures are 10.11% and 6.75%. NISRA: Department of Finance and Personnel, “Table KS211NI: Religion,” *Census 2011 Key Statistics for Northern Ireland*, 19.

64 McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 1-3.

McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2-3.


McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2.


McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2-3. The number of Catholics in Northern Ireland is rising - "proportionally on the increase." More Catholics have been born annually than Protestants from 1978 on. Thus the Catholic population is more youthful. When it comes to deaths in Northern Ireland, Protestants predominate, due to the fact "they represent the greater number in older population." Nic Craith, 13.

As McAllister notes, “once the particular circumstances of the 1981 census are removed from the trend, the increase in the size of the secular group has been almost exclusively at the expense of the main Protestant churches." McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 2-3. Hayes and Dowds' research, using information from the 1968 Loyalty Survey, the Social Attitudes Survey of 1978, the NISA Survey of 1989 and the NILT Surveys of 1998 and 2008, supports McAllister's findings to an extent as well. Here they note that the percentage of people saying they are Presbyterian goes down "from 30 percent to 23 per cent" during the years 1978 to 1989. In this time frame, meanwhile, the percentage of Church of Ireland adherents goes down from 23 to 18% and the percentage of people saying they do not belong to a religion increases from 3 to 12%. Those identifying themselves as Catholics, however, rises, from 32 to 37% in this time frame. Hayes and Dowds, “Vacant Seats and Empty Pews,” 1-2.

McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 3. Regular churchgoing was up around 90% for Catholics in 1989 and declined to a little over 60% in 2004. In 1989 almost 50% of Presbyterians went to church weekly and just under 40% did so in 2004. Church of Ireland attendance dropped from just under 40% to the low to mid 30s. McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 3.

In 1968, 95% of those who claimed they were Catholic went to church, at minimum, once a week. As of 2008, however, under 50 per cent went to church on a weekly basis. Meanwhile, the Church of Ireland and Presbyterian groups demonstrate a decline in weekly church going; over 40 per cent of both groups went to church each week in 1968 but just over 20 per cent of Presbyterians did so in 2008 and under 20 per cent of Anglicans did so. It should also be noted that Hayes and Dowds' research does indicate that, in 2008, a little more than 50% of affiliated people did attend church on a more infrequent basis than one time each week; indeed, survey evidence shows that, across the years 1968-2008, at most, around 20 per cent of respondents who identified themselves as belonging to a religion said they never went to church. Hayes and Dowds, “Vacant Seats and Empty Pews,” 2-3.
Furthermore, although it would seem that the Protestant churches are doing better than the Catholic church when it comes to dealing with secularisation, it must be recalled that, based on evidence provided above, a greater number of people are separating themselves "from the Protestant churches" entirely than they are the Catholic Church. McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 3-4.

McAllister contends that a means of assessing the degree of influence of demographic developments “is to examine a series of birth cohorts, and to estimate the proportion within each cohort who has no religion. If the demographic explanation is correct, the proportion of those with no religion should be highest among the most recent cohorts, and lowest among the older cohorts.” McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 4.

Indeed, following the percentages for those born between 1960 and 1986 (the estimates for these periods are divided into people born between 1960 and 1974 and individuals born between 1975 and 1986), those born in the years 1945-1959 were the next highest in terms of the non-religious, followed by those born between 1930 and 1944, and, finally, people born between 1915 and 1929. McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 4.

It is true, though, that the differences in percentages are not, generally, enormous between the five groups. For instance, 16% of non-religious respondents had a degree as opposed to 10% of Catholics, 9% of Presbyterians and Methodists, and 8% of Anglicans. Similarly, 22% of respondents of no religion had postsecondary education, compared to 20% of Methodist respondents, 17% of Anglicans, 18% of Presbyterians, and 16% of Catholics. Where the difference appears most obvious is in the percentage of those who had no educational qualifications. 33% of respondents of no religion had “None”, compared to 40% of Methodists, 49% of Anglicans, 44% of Presbyterians, and 48% of Catholic respondents. Only in the area of secondary education do the non-religious come in second to any group. Here 31% of Methodist respondents have secondary education as opposed to 29% of respondents of no religion (who tie for second place with Presbyterian respondents, 29% of which also have secondary education). McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 5-6.

It should also be noted that, in terms of identity, "British" is the most popular identity every year for No Religion respondents in the NISA surveys, followed by "Northern Irish." In the NILT surveys, "British" remains popular, but on three occasions is overtaken by "Northern Irish" (in 1998, 2005, and 2010). See Appendix, Tables, 5 and 6. Also, when it comes to political preferences, the percentage of No Religion respondents supporting Northern Ireland remaining in the UK is significantly higher every year in the
NISA and NILT surveys than the percentage supporting Irish unity. See Appendix, Tables 17 and 18.

84 McAllister points out that in America connections between faith and politics are particularly strong when it comes to “moral issues” like the right to die as well as abortion. This growing “alignment” of politics and faith, according to some, could be driving individuals away from religion as they might not want to be linked with the political associations of a particular faith. McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 6.


87 In contrast, among respondents who were born between 1900 and 1914, the percentage of non-religious who were not nationalists or unionists is comparable to the percentage of non-aligned Catholics and higher than non-aligned Protestant respondents in the same age category. Indeed, while the percentage of Catholic and Protestant respondents who were not unionists nor nationalists never reached above 50%, respectively, in any of the birth cohorts, the non-aligned as well as non-religious included over 50% of secular respondents in at least four of the cohorts, encompassing those, collectively, born between 1930 and 1986. Catholic respondents, in fact, have not shown any drastic rise in the percentage claiming to be neither nationalist nor unionist when the cohorts are compared. The Protestant trend, while, for the most part, gradually ascending in terms of the percentage of people who do not believe they belong to the nationalist or unionist groupings, has remained below that of the non-religious as well as Catholic groups in each cohort. Indeed, when charted, the line representing non-religious and non-aligned respondents continues in a very steady arc upwards over the entire range of cohorts. McAllister, “Driven to Disaffection,” 7.


90 While not all of those in the Province whose marriages fall into this category use or accept this term, its use is significant. It has been pointed out that “In other contexts terms such as ‘inter-faith’, ‘cross-community’ or ‘inter-racial’ are used to describe marriages in which the partners are from different religious, cultural or linguistic backgrounds”. However, marriages that include two people who share a Christian faith, even though they are not members of the same denomination, often are not viewed to need or require “special description.” In Northern Ireland, however, they are. Generally, “mixed marriage” means a Catholic-Protestant union, specifically, rather than one involving partners of different races or a Jew marrying a Christian, and so forth. The very word "mixing" emphasizes the differences between the individuals involved, rather than their similarities. The use of "Mixed marriage" reflects the importance of this societal division and the significance of crossing this communal boundary. Valerie Morgan, Marie Smyth, Gillian Robinson and Grace Fraser, Mixed Marriages in Northern
Legislation passed during the 1700s made mixed marriages very problematic. Protestants contracting such unions lost land as well as inheritance. Catholic clergy conducting these marriages were subject to execution. A 1750 Act stipulated that mixed marriages carried out by clerics from the Catholic Church were not legitimate. Repeal came in 1879. In the latter 1700s Catholic priest conducting interreligious marriages faced 500 pound fines. Six clerics were thus fined in the years 1820-1832. Repeal of the statute came in 1833. According to Nic Craith, interreligious marriages were commonly reprimanded by the Catholic Church beginning in the middle of the 1800s. She argues that although "the Protestant churches were less public in their opposition to mixed marriages in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is probable that individual clergymen counselled their communities against it." Nic Craith, 61.

Nic Craith, 61. Intermarriages remain quite uncommon in the North even though Ne Temere is not officially in force anymore. Nic Craith, 69.

For instance, the Association of Loyal Orange Women was linked to anti-Ne Temere demonstrations around the island. "Historical perspective," NIMMA.

"Historical perspective," NIMMA.


Interestingly, however, the Catholic bishops currently support the common custom of the wedding occurring within the church of the bride. Thus, they will usually give the needed permission. Robinson, Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni1.htm#14.

Should a dispensation be received and the Protestant minister prove open to going to the wedding, he is supposed to be welcomed by the priest as well as, ideally, given the option to take part in it. Robinson, Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni1.htm#14. See also, NIMMA, Getting Married (March 2004), NIMMA, accessed February 3, 2013, http://www.nimma.org.uk/docs/Marriage_leaflet.pdf.


Morgan, Smyth, Robinson and Fraser, Mixed Marriages in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/mixed.htm#three.


103 Morgan, Smyth, Robinson and Fraser, *Mixed Marriages in Northern Ireland*, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/mixed.htm#one.

104 Morgan, Smyth, Robinson and Fraser, *Mixed Marriages in Northern Ireland*, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/mixed.htm#one.

105 Robinson (1992) has pointed out that “The question pertaining to religion of spouse is optional and so these figures may not be very accurate”. Nonetheless, they provide a notion of numbers in the early 1970s. Robinson, *Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland*, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni1.htm#11.


107 According to Lloyd and Robinson, “a dataset has been created that pools eight years (1998 to 2005) of information on respondents to the *NILT* survey and which contains questions that have been asked in all eight years.” 802 participants, when “this method” is utilized, report that their partner belongs to another faith. According to Lloyd and Robinson, “This represents 10% of all respondents who had partners (8,229).” Katrina Lloyd and Gillian Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap? Catholic-Protestant Relationships in Northern Ireland," *Research Update 54* (2008), 2-3, ARK, accessed February 13, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/publications/updates/update54.pdf. See also, Appendix, Table 20.


It is true that “Catholic respondents are still more likely than Protestants to say that they would not mind a mixed marriage within their own family – but the gap has narrowed.” Wigfall-Williams and Robinson, "A World Apart: Mixed marriage in Northern Ireland," 4.


Among Catholics the figures are lower when it comes to those who would oppose such marriages to some degree: 16% would mind at least a bit in 1989, 17% would in 1998, and 13% would in 2009. This represents a small but real minority. When it comes to Protestants, the numbers are higher. In 1989 44% would be unhappy to a degree about a near relative contracting such a marriage. In 1998 36% would and in 2009 33% would. In each case, this represents over a quarter of Protestant respondents. See SOL, NISA (1989), accessed March 5, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/sol/surveys/gen_social_att/nisa/1989/website/Community_Relations/SMARRRLG.html; NILT (1998), accessed March 5, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/1998/Community_Relations/SMARRRLG.html; NILT (2009), accessed March 5, 2012, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2009/Community_Relations/SMARRRLG.html.

Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?”, 2-5.

In line with the difference in age, more people whose partners belonged to a different faith had a job – 64% as opposed to 53%. Furthermore, 10% of those whose partners were of a different faith were retired as opposed to 21% of respondents whose partners
were co-religionists. Marital status itself differed between the two groups, further reinforcing the age difference. The number of respondents whose partners belonged to a different religion who were unmarried was triple the number of unmarried people whose partners shared a faith with them – 12% as opposed to 4%. While Lloyd and Robinson have pointed out that there is “Anecdotal evidence” indicating that there are mixed couples who might decide to forgo a wedding due to the difficulties associated with selecting the location of a wedding, as well as other issues, this finding also hints that the “mixed” group is more youthful, and may even possess less conservative moral codes. Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 3-5.

120 Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 5.

121 It has been argued that interaction, or at least contact, between people from separate sides may indeed make a difference to people’s views of their opposing counterparts, the so-called "contact hypothesis". According to “Hayes et al (2006)”, those who went to a school with Catholic as well as Protestant students seemed not to possess views that were as negative against the other side as people who went to schools where their classmates all shared their faith. Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 1, 5.

122 Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 3-5.


124 Robinson acknowledges that the study “is over representative of those in the middle class and those with third level education.” Robinson, Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni.htm#summary. Nonetheless, it does offer important insights into the issues and potential difficulties present for those who cross community lines in their relationships. Robinson, Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni2.htm#23.

125 Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 4.

126 Eleven percent of participants whose partnerships were mixed made at least 30,000 pounds each year; the comparable percentage for those partnered with a co-religionist was 7%. Meanwhile, 48% of those whose partners shared their faith made under 10,000 pounds each year, while 37% of participants whose partners belonged to a different faith fell into this category. Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 2, 4.

127 Thirty percent of respondents whose partners were co-religionists were in the "Professional/Managerial" class as opposed to 33% of participants in mixed relationships. Similarly, 10% of respondents with partners who shared their faith were "Unskilled", while 7% of those with partners who did not share their religion fell into this category. Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 3-4.

128 There are several possible reasons that more middle class than working class people may marry or form partnerships across the sectarian divide. Middle class couples and
their peers may have had more education and exposure to those beyond their religious tradition, perhaps at university, in comparison to those from working class or ghetto areas. Living as an intermarried couple may be less difficult for middle class people as well. In her 1992 study, Robinson notes that a lot of participants, who were middle class, believed that marrying across the religious divide was not as difficult for those in the middling ranks of society. One young Catholic woman claimed that “it’s an awful thing to say and people think that you’re being snobbish, but it’s a fact of life that it’s easier to be in a mixed marriage if you’re middle class”. While she offers no clear reason for this, it may well be due to the fact that middle class couples may be better able to afford homes in less sectarian or religiously homogenous areas. Robinson, Cross-Community Marriage in Northern Ireland, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/marriage/ccmni3.htm#36.

External experiences also appear to be an area of difference between mixed and non-mixed participants. Thirty-five percent of those whose partner was of a different faith had spent over half a year outside the Province. Twenty-one percent of those whose partner belonged to the same faith had. This could relate to income levels as well, as those who spend time outside of the Province are likely to have had the financial means to do so. Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 4-5.

Lloyd and Robinson, "Intimate Mixing - Bridging the Gap?", 5.

CHAPTER 3: DELINEATING THE “THIRD COMMUNITY”
PART 2: UNDERSTANDING ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM, AND IDENTITY

1 Frequently, "there is...inconsistency in the use of both terms." Nic Craith, 136.

2 Nic Craith, 135-137.


5 Nonetheless, all such claims are open to dispute. A lot of ethnic groups as well as "tribal peoples" do not consider themselves nations. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (Toronto: Viking, 1993), 3.

6 Nic Craith, 138-141; Ignatieff, 3-4, 166-167, 184.

7 Nic Craith, 138-141.

8 Ignatieff, 4-5.

9 Still, there are people who are patriotic, but do not go in this direction. Their primary loyalty continues to be "to themselves". According to Ignatieff, "Their first cause is not the nation, but the defence of their right to choose their own frontiers for their belonging." These individuals are outnumbered. Ignatieff, 188-189.
According to Burke, “Identities are the meanings that individuals hold for themselves – what it means to be who they are.” Peter J. Burke, “Relationships among Multiple Identities,” in *Advances in Identity Theory and Research*, eds. Peter J. Burke et al. (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2003), 196.


Generally, "British" refers to a person's citizenship versus nationality. Nationality is English, Scottish, or Welsh. Nic Craith, 163.

Still, it is not possible to always maintain an absolute separation of civic and ethnic nationalism. The reality can be more complicated. For instance, concern has been shown by unionists regarding British cultural elements like Orange parades. Unionists have come together in support of these. Indeed, for civic unionists, things like the Union Jack are very important, even though they say they are "culturally blind." Their feelings of being part of the UK are strengthened by such symbols. Nic Craith, 169-170.


It, however, does not adequately recognize the power of culture within the political realm. Porter, xvii. Liberal unionism does not show up only in a single party. However, it is inside the UUP that those supporting or advocating it have the greatest probability of being found. Also, Robert McCartney (UKUP) is a well known liberal unionist. Porter, 20.

Porter, xiv, 169-170.

Indeed, Porter portrays the North "in terms of a 'difference through openness' thesis - which acknowledges the cultural and political entitlements of unionists and nationalists". Porter, 170, 216.
"British Ulster" cultural emblems are particularly important to such people. Among these symbols are Orange parades, the Red Hand, and William of Orange. A number of these symbols do not have much significance or meaning beyond Northern Ireland. Rather, they strengthen "the loyalist sense of belonging in Northern Ireland." Nic Craith, 170. In addition, according to Ignatieff, British "civic symbols" are utilized by ethnic nationalist Loyalism as a means of demarcating "an ethnic identity". Civic meanings are lost. Ultimately, symbols like the Union flag or the Crown become "badges of ethnic rage." Ignatieff, 184-185.

Those supporting a type of cultural unionism can be found over the unionist political "spectrum." Porter, 19.

Clan leaders in Ireland used mercenaries from Scotland between the 1200s and the 1500s. They spoke Gaelic and were especially desired within Ulster. It is true, though, that a lot of the Scottish people who came to live in the North, beginning in the 1200s belonged to the Catholic faith. Nic Craith, 55, 99-100.

A lot of Presbyterians wanting a career in medicine or law also went to Glasgow to train until the early 1800s. Nic Craith, 102-103.

A lot of Orangemen from Northern Ireland take part in marches "in the Strathclyde region" one weekend prior to July 12 and, in return, there are a few Scots who travel to Northern Ireland to participate in Orange rituals there. Nic Craith, 111.

It is true "Scotland the Brave" goes under another name, that of "Join the Parade". Nic Craith, 102, 111-112.

It has been suggested by "the Ulster Scots society" that the language is spoken by around 100,000 individuals, amounting to around 7% of Northern Ireland's population. Nic Craith, 107-108, 113.

Although there are loyalists for whom Ulster Scots is symbolically important and meaningful, it does not seem to be attractive to a lot of unionists of the civic variety. In addition to a citizenship emphasis, it is possible that a lot of civic unionists cherish English "as a potent symbol of their British (really English) tradition." Nic Craith, 109-110.

She contends "that the Highland tradition" may not be drawing a lot of backing due to a perceived strong likeness between it and "Gaelic Irish traditions." There are, actually, real similarities between "the Lowland" and "the Gaelic Irish" traditions. Nonetheless, as Nic Craith puts it, "the reinterpretation of these Lowland traditions has not yet gained popularity across the general unionist or Northern Irish population." Nic Craith, 112-113.
According to Conor Cruise O’Brien, Irish Republicanism’s form is not religious; it is formally secular. It has roots in the Enlightenment as well as the French Revolution. Wolfe Tone was among those who spread the ideas of revolutionary France. Irish republicanism arose “among deists and agnostics drawn from the Irish Protestant community, and claims to transcend the old sectarian differences, substituting for them "the common name of Irishman," a secular national identity." This notion or ideal has not corresponded to reality for many years. In fact, what can be found “is Irish Catholic holy nationalism." Pearse is the actual creator as well as the iconic figure for modern republicanism of the Irish variety, not Tone. Pearse combined nationalism and the Catholic religion. The Republicanism of Pearse, in O’Brien's view, has driven an extended and violent "religious war" in the North. According to O’Brien, the conflict is not totally religious; however, "religion defines the parties to the struggle, and holy nationalism supplies a large part of the motivation." There are those who possess "a will to martyrdom" comparable to people in the Hizbollah. Bobby Sands would fall into this category. Conor Cruise O’Brien, God Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 39-40.

Nic Craith, 142. Irish identity at the moment "really only" includes Southern Ireland, in which only 3% of people are Protestant, as well as the nationalist and Catholic population in Northern Ireland. Never before has [an] Irish identity been so weak or reduced within the Northern Irish Protestant as well as unionist population. According to Walker, "Today it is probably fair to say that the Irish nation and Irish nationality are defined in practice more exclusively than at any stage in the last two hundred years. The variety in views of Irish identity which used to exist has now largely disappeared." Walker, 127.

Nic Craith, 142; Walker, 127.

Emblems include Catholic faith, the GAA, as well as the Irish language. Nic Craith, 142.

The tie between Irishness and Catholicism has deep roots. In the 1600s, "the new English" connected Catholicism and the people of Ireland. They took for granted that every Catholic was Irish, even Anglo-Normans. During the time of the Penal Laws, priests gained an important position within the Catholic population. Catholics, on the other hand, linked "Protestantism with British domination" even as a lot of Protestants maintained an Irish identity. Despite O'Connell in the 1800s, the connection of Catholicism with Irishness increased and grew stronger. Most of the population of Ireland was Catholic, thus, they generally believed they were the authentic "Irish". Indeed, Catholicism became the "indisputable emblem of Irishness" with the “decline" of "the Irish language". The division of Ireland gave clergy in the Catholic Church the chance to play a powerful political role in southern Ireland. By far, most citizens in the South were Catholic and this impacted legislation. The 1937 Constitution reflects Catholic influence and the strength of Catholicism as well. Nic Craith, 142-143.
The Catholic Church's "special position" within the Constitution of Ireland came to an end in 1972. The power of priests has declined as fewer people go to church each week. The clergy also do not have as much control over education as they once did. Nic Craith, 144.

Protestants in the North do not all feel the same degree of antagonism regarding the Republic. However, even Protestants who possess a belief in their own Irishness emphasize that it is not like the Irishness of "narrow-minded Catholic nationalists." Nic Craith, 144-145.

Walker, 125. Indeed, in 1995, Irish President Mary Robinson said:

Irishness is not simply territorial. In fact Irishness as a concept seems to me at its strongest when it reaches out to everyone on this island and shows itself capable of honouring and listening to those whose sense of identity, and whose cultural values, may be more British than Irish. It can be strengthened again if we turn with open minds and hearts to the array of people outside Ireland for whom this island is a place of origin. Walker, 126.

Ian Paisley, junior, as well as John Taylor, are among those who do not believe unionists belong to "the Irish nation." Interestingly, though, Rhonda Paisley has said she is Irish. Walker, 126.

See Nic Craith, 161.

Ignatieff, 170.

Nic Craith, 161-162. Indeed, the people on the mainland do not display a strong nationalist fervour to keep Northern Ireland. Ignatieff, 165-166. According to Ignatieff, "British state- and nation-building" did not succeed with Ireland. The core Protestantism of Britishness meant that assimilation of Irish Catholics as part of the Union was not possible. British understanding of their failure with regard to Ireland goes a long way towards explaining why the British cannot regard the North as being "an essential part of itself." For the British, the Northern Ireland conflict has strengthened the belief that the Province is, ultimately, different, alien, or Irish. Ignatieff, 169-170.

See Nic Craith, 161.

Catholic schools, the AOH as well as the GAA played very significant roles in preserving the identity of the community. Walker, 120.

Rather, they are able "to define themselves in a dual context; as Irish nationalists in a British state." There may be those who do not want to be in the UK. However, there are also those who are not as unhappy when it comes to the Union. Nic Craith, 139.

Nic Craith, 139. Initially, Northern and Southern Catholics were a lot alike. However, this is not so much the case now. Religion, nationalism as well as Gaelicism are
powerfully connected among labouring class Northern Catholics. All three are no longer as important or tightly connected in Southern Ireland. Nic Craith, 145, 154.

51 Thus, religion as well as the Irish language are not as important anymore. Nic Craith, 154.

52 Nic Craith, 154-155.

53 These include, for example, the GAA. Nic Craith, 154. Also, it has been argued, Northern nationalists' affinity with the South filled a psychological need. Nationalists in the North desired to be part of a state. They did not accept Northern Ireland and it was not especially accepting of them. This, according to Elliott, "caused the identification with the southern state to become a necessary crutch." Also, due to the fact a lot of "nationalists believed (or, rather, wanted to believe) the political rhetoric in the south claiming an overwhelming desire to unite the six Ulster counties with the republic, they began culturally to think of it as home." One of the ways nationalists would express a link or connection to the South was through utilization of the Tricolour. Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 399.

54 Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 396, 398-399.


56 Devlin had this to say about how the government handled Catholics:

You had opponents willing to co-operate. We did not seek office. We sought service. We were willing to help. But you rejected all friendly offers. You refused to accept co-operation...you went on on the old political lines, fostering hatreds, keeping one third of the population as if they were pariahs...and relying on those religious differences and difficulties so that you would remain in office forever. Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 397.

57 Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 397. Elliott has argued that "there were times like the late 1930s or the 1950s when increasing numbers would have accepted integration into the state had they been given any encouragement." Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 384.

58 No Nationalists ran in the 1955 Westminster elections and therefore a lot of Catholics turned to Sinn Fein. This did not mean Catholics backed the IRA. However, Sinn Fein representatives appeared the sole options capable of maintaining "the traditional protest." Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 397, 401.

59 Indeed, the Party proved willing to be "the official opposition". Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 401, 407, 409.

60 Elliott, The Catholics of Ulster, 409.
NICRA was essentially "an umbrella organisation for" civil rights. A number of different types of people could be found beneath it - from nationalists to socialists, republicans, and Catholic moderates from the middle class. There were "liberal unionists" who participated in the campaign early on as well. Garnering backing from Protestants was difficult, however. Interestingly, the "reformist agenda" of O'Neill and the aims of NICRA were not extremely far apart. Tonge, *The New Northern Irish Politics?*, 12-13.

Mulholland, 61. The Movement wanted "one man, one vote" at local level (prior to this a person had to be a rate-payer to vote), gerrymandering to stop, fairness in housing distribution and entrance to public sector jobs, an end to the B-Specials (a Protestant police reserve force), and removal "of the Special Powers Act." Martin Melaugh, "The Civil Rights Campaign - A Chronology of Main Events," CAIN Web Service, accessed August 31, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/chron.htm.

63 Mulholland, 61.

64 Elliott, *The Catholics of Ulster*, 413-415.

Elliott, *The Catholics of Ulster*, 415-416. It is important to note as well that, initially, Catholics were happy to see the British army in Belfast and Derry in 1969. Events like the 1970 Falls curfew, Internment, and Bloody Sunday (1972) drove people into the IRA. Provocation was a key element in paramilitary recruitment, versus an innate desire among the average Catholic to take up arms for the cause of Irish unity. Elliott, *The Catholics of Ulster*, 419-421.

CHAPTER 4: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION: EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 1: THE CHURCHES AND PEACE GROUPS


2 While it remains a member “of an international fellowship of churches known as the Anglican Communion”, the Church of Ireland is not ruled by any external body. Association for Promoting Christian Knowledge, (hereafter cited as APCK), *Irish and Universal* (1996), Church of Ireland, accessed December 4, 2013, http://www.ireland.anglican.org/information/5.

3 According to the Church of Ireland web-site, there are 390,000 people who belong to the Irish Anglican church. Most of these, 248,821, can be found in the North, while 129,039 are located in the South. “About Us,” Church of Ireland, accessed December 4, 2013, http://ireland.anglican.org/about/.

“About Us,” Church of Ireland; APCK, *Irish and Universal*; Megahey, 8.


The General Synod gathered in Dublin each year as Dublin remained the “administrative” center of the Church of Ireland. Megahey, 12.

“General Synod,” Church of Ireland; Megahey, 12.


There are those who believe that the Church of Ireland's links with the Celtic Revival were tenuous at best. R.B. McDowell has noted that the Church was not very concerned with "the Irish revival." McDowell, 115. David Greene has concurred, pointing out that
between 1869 and 1919 "either apathy or antagonism was the normal attitude of the dignitaries of the Church of Ireland, and of Trinity College, to the Irish language movement." David Greene, "The Irish Language Movement," in Irish Anglicanism 1869-1969, ed. Michael Hurley SJ. (Dublin: Allen Figgis Limited, 1970), 112.


20 Greene, 113. Irish was mainly spoken on a day to day basis only in certain parts of Ireland as of the latter 1800s - in "the Gaeltacht regions of the south-west, west and north-west." APCK, The Irish Language and the Church of Ireland.


22 In 1919 "modern Irish studies" started at Trinity. After this, Anglican clerics no longer were Chair. Greene, 110-111; McDowell, 16; Megahey, 109.

23 Megahey, 109-110.


25 APCK, The Irish Language and the Church of Ireland.


27 Megahey, 110.

28 APCK, The Irish Language and the Church of Ireland.

29 At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were over 400,000 Presbyterians within Ireland. Megahey, 12. Currently, there are more than 240,000 Presbyterians within Ireland. “About Us,” Presbyterian Church in Ireland, accessed December 4, 2013, http://www.presbyterianireland.org/About-Us.

30 Megahey, 12, 46.


33 Megahey, 16.


35 Megahey, 17.

36 As Alan Megahey has pointed out: “The President of the English Wesleyan (later, Methodist) Church presided at the annual Irish Conference, and continues to do so. From 1883 an Irishman held the post of vice-president, and was in effect the President of the Methodist Church (as opposed to Conference) in Ireland, though that title did not come into use until 1921.” Megahey, 17. According to the current website of the Methodist Church in Ireland, John Wesley summoned Ireland's initial conference in 1752. It took place in the South of Ireland, at Limerick. Outside of a small number of instances, "the Irish Conference had been chaired by the successor of John Wesley, the President of the Methodist Church in England, until recently." In recent history, a President has been chosen yearly and this individual is the chair of the Conference. He or she visits Methodists around Ireland as well as is the Church's public representative. "How We Are Organised," The Methodist Church in Ireland, accessed December 4, 2016, http://www.irishmethodist.org/how-we-are-organised.


39 “How We Are Organised," The Methodist Church in Ireland.

40 The three districts in question are Lakelands, North West, and Portadown. "How We Are Organised," The Methodist Church in Ireland.


44 “About Us," Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference.


46 "Our work," Churches Together in Britain and Ireland.


48 Interestingly, even the Catholic Archdiocese of Armagh is not encapsulated within the boundary of Northern Ireland, as is the secular County of Armagh. The Archdiocese of Armagh covers some territory belonging to the Irish Republic. Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference; "Armagh," Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference, accessed December 7, 2013, http://www.catholicbishops.ie/dioceses/armagh/.

49 The current Archbishops of Armagh and Dublin, respectively, are Archbishop Eamon Martin and Archbishop Diarmuid Martin. The former is the ICBC’s President and the latter is its Vice-President. "Bishops," Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference, accessed January 10, 2016, http://www.catholicbishops.ie/bishops/.

50 Gallagher and Worrall, 9.


Irish Times, April 10, 1972. See also, McElroy, 43-44.

McElroy, 44-46.

McElroy, 48-49.

Irish Times, November 19, 1985, 8; McElroy, 64.


McElroy, 12-14.

The Derry Citizens’ Action Committee was behind the organization of the civil rights movement locally between October of 1968 and April of 1969. It was established/appeared after an October 5, 1968 event that turned violent. No clerics were to be found among the “elected officers” of the DCAC. However, the Church backed it, from the start. McElroy, 11-12.

On this occasion, William Craig, Minister for Home Affairs, prohibited a march which was supposed to take place in Derry. According to the Derry Journal on November 15 of 1968: “...It is planned to present the petition to Captain O’Neill through the Industrial Churches Council which is representative of all the main denominations in the city. It will ask him to reconsider the ban on portion [sic] of the route for Saturday’s march and that the Citizens’ Action Committee should be allowed to use the route they had originally requested.” Around 15,000 were at the demonstration/march. The ban was not rescinded. Quoted in McElroy, 12-13.

Megahey, 163. Gallagher and Worrall note that, among the Protestant denominations, "official church committees and officers" generally backed O'Neill's' attempts to forge connections between Catholics and Protestants. They also acknowledged that the civil rights movement did have a certain amount of legitimacy. Still, there were a lot of Protestant clerics, especially ones who had connections to the Loyal Orders, who did not share such an outlook, desiring instead that "law and order" be upheld. Gallagher and Worrall, 40-41.

Megahey, 163.
In 1923, the Irish Council of Churches was established and operates as the vehicle for discussion, cooperation, and action amongst the churches who are part of it, including the Presbyterian, Methodist and Church of Ireland churches, among others. There is one ICC for the entire island and there are four meetings of the Executive of the ICC each year.


It is important to note that backing for the Council of Ireland was not offered here. Gallagher and Worrall, 88.

Belfast Telegraph, April 18, 1986; Belfast Telegraph, June 14, 1986; Megahey, 182.

Martina Purdy, "Rivals launch a slogan war; Yes and No camps step up vote hunt," Belfast Telegraph, May 5, 1998.

Indeed, it should be noted that the General Assembly of the Church did support the participation of politicians in talks the previous year. Dan McGinn, "Churches respond to Agreement; Congregations 'must weigh up value of deal'," Belfast Telegraph, May 5, 1998.

McGinn, "Churches respond to Agreement."

Michael Devine, "Vote with conscience says Eames; Church avoids giving advice," Belfast Telegraph, May 6, 1998; Michael Devine, "Eames tells Synod of need for total accord," Belfast Telegraph, May 12, 1998. See also, Noel McAdam, "Eames agonised before deciding to back Deal; 'We cannot sink back into sectarian violence'," Belfast Telegraph, May 22, 1998.

Megahey, 161; Gallagher and Worrall, 37-38.

Gallagher and Worrall, 98-99; McElroy, 51-52.

Gallagher and Worrall, 152.
Interestingly, financial support for the ICPP also crossed traditional boundaries in Ireland and at the international level. The ICPP’s funding came from the European Union PEACE III Programme, the Executive in Northern Ireland via the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister, as well as the Republic’s Department of Environment, Community and Local Government. Hamilton, "Churches Launch New £1.3M Peace Initiative."

Hamilton, "Churches Launch New £1.3M Peace Initiative."


"About," Irish Council of Churches/Irish Inter Church Meeting; "Members," Irish Council of Churches/Irish Inter Church Meeting; Gallagher and Worrall, 10.

Towards the end of 1969, it was determined by the Irish Council of Churches that the Council needed “to face what form of relationship, if any, it should seek to have with the Roman Catholic church.” In 1970 “the proposal that joint working parties on social questions be set up involving the ICC and the Roman Catholic hierarchy” was supported by the churches. Gallagher and Worrall, 134-135; Megahey, 166, 171.

Gallagher and Worrall, 134-135.

Gallagher and Worrall, 110, 134-135; Megahey, 166, 171-172, 175-179.

Gallagher and Worrall, 110, 134-135; Megahey, 166, 171.


Violence in Ireland, 42-55, 67-89, 90, 93.


This targeted youth (Catholic as well as Protestant) between the ages of 15 and 17. Kairos aimed to provide the opportunity for youth “to reflect on and consider the issues of identity, culture, faith, politics and history in Northern Ireland”. Another purpose of Kairos was to have youth interact with their counterparts from different traditions and contexts. Kairos involved youth in a shared project that “impacts positively on community relationships.” “Courses,” Youthlink: NI, accessed December 9, 2013, http://www.youthlink.org.uk/courses-for-young-people.html.


"History," youthlink.


“Welcome to Youthlink: NI,” Youthlink: NI.


"About," Irish Council of Churches/Irish Inter Church Meeting.

See Megahey, 185-186.

Gallagher and Worrall, 198.

Davey was a prisoner of the Germans in the Second World War. He was not far from Dresden during the Allied bombing. This event had a great impact on him, "underscoring the futility and destructiveness of all conflict." Davey became Presbyterian Dean of Residence (Queen's) following World War II.

McCreary, 30. More than one "interpretation" of "Corrymeela" is possible, including "Hill of Harmony", "Hill of Honeysuckle", as well as "Lumpy Crossroads". "The History of Corrymeela"; "Our History," Corrymeela.


Joanne as well as her youngest brother died immediately, and John would later succumb to his injuries. The children’s mother, Anne, was badly hurt as well. Grace Fraser and Valerie Morgan, “‘Miracle on the Shankill’: The Peace March and Rally of 28 August 1976,” in The Irish Parading Tradition: Following the Drum, ed. T.G. Fraser. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 2000), 143-144; Ciaran McKeown, The Passion of Peace (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1984), 138-140.

There had been unrest in the western part of Belfast in the wake of “a republican rally” held two days before. Also, during the span of August 8 to August 15, “the British Army had logged 147 shooting incidents making this week the one in which ‘more shots were fired at British soldiers than in any other week of the whole IRA campaign.’” Then, on
August 14th, another youngster, Majella O’Hare (12), was shot dead while going for confession. South Armagh was the scene of the incident. Fraser and Morgan, 144-147; McKeown, 138-140.

An agitator for peace and a writer, Ciaran McKeown can be considered a member of Northern Ireland’s Third Community. McKeown, 3, 12-15, 17, 139.

McKeown, 138-139.

"Shoulder to shoulder in the name of peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 14, 1976, 1. See also, Fraser and Morgan, 144-145; McKeown, 142-143.

McKeown also notes that when this rally dispersed, a significant number of those who had taken part walked with “the Shankill contingent back down the Falls Road to the top of the Donegall Road where they would get a bus home.” McKeown, 142-143.


Fraser and Morgan, 147-148; Ciaran McKeown, who created the original schedule of events, included locations around the Province as well as in other parts of the UK, and in the Irish Republic. McKeown, 145-146, 163-164, 203-204.

"The words of war...and the weapons of peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 20, 1976, 1; "The weapons of peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 20, 1976, 4; McKeown, 145-147. "The Declaration of the Peace People” was written up by McKeown after seeing a draft statement that Corrigan and Williams had come up with that they could “give to” journalists and media people who were trying to get them to make statements. McKeown claims that they were not at ease with their work. The statement included things like “we say to the gunmen, get out, we don’t want you’.” McKeown wrote “a statement of purpose” on the spot and both women indicated that what he wrote expressed their sentiments accurately. McKeown, 145-147.

Each point or paragraph of the Declaration begins with the word “We”, indicating a collective and shared vision for the Peace People. No religious labels are used. “The words of war...and the weapons of peace,” 1; "The weapons of peace," 4; McKeown, 146. See also, "First Declaration Of the Peace People," Peace People, accessed January 18, 2016, http://www.peacepeople.com/?page_id=10.

McKeown, 146-147.

Participants included individuals from around Belfast as well as individuals from the Irish Republic. Among these last was Judy Hayes, of the Glencree Centre of Reconciliation, which is located in the south. Fraser and Morgan, 148; McKeown, 146-147; "Thousands Rally for Peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 21, 1976, 1.
Fraser and Morgan point out that credit for the organization of the demonstration must go to a variety of peace or community groups, not the Peace People alone, although the Peace People considered it a Peace People event. Fraser and Morgan, 148; McKeown, 146-147.

"Derry the Next Stop on Road to Sanity," Irish News, August 30, 1976, 1; Fraser and Morgan, 154; McKeown, 160. The Shankill is a labouring class Protestant road and area in Belfast identified with loyalism, just as the Falls is Catholic and identified with republicanism and the IRA. Those involved in organizing the Shankill rally were not blind to the symbolic act of walking and rallying for peace in this place. If this event went off successfully, then there would be very few places, if any, in the Province that a peace demonstration could not take place. Fraser and Morgan, 142-143, 148-150.

According to McKeown, “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” was initiated by Betty Williams and received a positive response from those present and thus became part of subsequent events. "Derry the Next Stop on Road to Sanity," 1; Fraser and Morgan, 155; McKeown, 160.

Fraser and Morgan, 154. See also, "Derry the Next Stop on Road to Sanity," 1; McKeown, 160.

Fraser and Morgan, 148-155.

The Blackmen are “an organization of Protestant lodges like the Orange Order”. Fraser and Morgan, 150; McKeown, 160.

McKeown, 197. See also, "'Greatest Victory Yet for Peace'," Irish News, October 25, 1976, 1. McKeown himself had two women from the Shankill put their arms through his as they marched. It appears to have been a simple gesture of unity in a cause between two Protestant women and a Catholic man. McKeown, 197.

However, McKeown was also aware of “some very alert young men at various points outside the park”. He felt that the men in question were members of the PIRA who were thus positioned to ensure the marchers were not going to suffer any real injury. Indeed, it came out later on that members of the PIRA had received the command that the marchers were not to be injured. The projectile throwers and unruly elements were PIRA supporters, not Volunteers themselves. McKeown, 197-200. See also, "'Greatest Victory Yet for Peace'," 1.

No participant suffered serious harm, although a few had gone to the hospital. McKeown, 198-201.

McKeown, 210-211.

McKeown, 146. See also, "'Greatest Victory Yet for Peace'," 1.


144 "What we do," Peace People.

CHAPTER 5: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION:
EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY
PART 2: THE POLITICAL MIDDLE GROUND

1 The ULP was a very small "nonsectarian party" active in the 1960s. They kept "the university seat" within the Stormont government between 1961 and 1969. Queens faculty and students made up the voters. There were links between the ULP and the British Liberal Party, even though the former was not simply the British party's Northern Ireland branch. The New Ulster Movement was established by four ULP members early in 1969. Among the four was Oliver Napier, ULP Vice President. The NUM was established "as a liberal political pressure group." The ULP disintegrated. Branches of the NUM met at the end of 1969 to address the possibility of starting a party. The following Easter was chosen as a "tentative launch date" for the party. 21 April 1970 marked the official beginning of Alliance. The NUM became "a think tank" and came to an end in 1978. Thomas G. Mitchell, Indispensable Traitors: Liberal Parties in Settler Conflicts (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2002), 10-11, 34-36.


3 Alliance faced its first genuine rival in the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (established 1996) when it came to nonsectarian middle class support. Up to this point, the party vied with the UUP as well as SDLP for those parties’ less committed supporters. Mitchell, 36.


7 Melaugh, "Political party support in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 2015.” Westminster elections operate "on the first-past-the-post system." Since Stormont's demise, no other elections in Northern Ireland use this format. Should the PR-STV system be used in Westminster elections, Alliance could gain two seats. According to “Alliance election analysts”, the party would have gained two seats in a few elections had a PR-STV system been used. Mitchell, 37.


10 These men included a cousin of Terence O'Neill, Phelim O'Neill. Phelim O'Neill had been a Unionist and member of cabinet. There was also Robert McConnell, an "independent unionist". Finally, there was Tom Gorley. Gorley was "an independent nationalist". He had belonged to the Nationalist Party. Despite differences in previous political thinking and background, these three men chose to join Alliance. Mitchell, 35.


12 Mitchell, 64-72. Interestingly, John Cushnahan could speak Irish and was from Andersonstown in West Belfast. He went to school with Gerry Adams. He had,
however, no love for the IRA or Sinn Fein. Rather, despite his background, he proved his Third Community credentials by becoming involved with the Alliance Party. Mitchell, 67.


14 Mitchell, 74.


16 APNI, Together We Stand.


18 APNI, Alliance Works (2003), 3.


20 APNI, Together We Stand.


23 Mitchell, 65. According to a 1973 Alliance manifesto, "The Alliance Party is in favour of power-sharing and is willing to work in the Assembly and in its Executive with other elected members who are prepared to work by peaceful means for the benefit of the entire community." APNI, People Come First (1973).

24 APNI, Together We Stand (1975).


26 Melaugh, “Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI).”


32 The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations (10 April 1998), CAIN Web Service, accessed January 18, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/agreement.htm#strand1; "Designation." Northern Ireland Assembly Education Service, accessed January 18, 2013, http://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa/designation. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, cross-community consent is needed for certain important decisions. The required support can be achieved via "parallel consent" or "a weighted majority". The former means that most of the individuals who are present, as well as casting votes, support a measure - this includes most nationalist as well as unionist members who are present and participating. Consent by weighted majority means that 60% of those on hand and casting votes support a measure. It requires that a minimum of 40% of both unionists and nationalists who are present and participating support a measure. The Agreement (1998); "Power-sharing." Northern Ireland Assembly Education Service, accessed January 18, 2013, http://education.niassembly.gov.uk/post_16/snapshots_of_devolution/gfa/power_sharing. According to the BBC, parallel consent means that a minimum of half of those voting back a measure. This includes "at least 50% unionist and 50% nationalist." "Cross-community support," BBC Democracy Live, accessed February 9, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk-democracylive/hi/guides/newsid_8227000/8227593.stm.


APNI, *Together We Stand*. The party's June 1973 manifesto made a similar claim. APNI, *People Come First*.

APNI, *Agenda for Change*, 3.


APNI, *Alliance Works* (2007), 7. Indeed, Mitchell was informed by more than one party member that, in their view, rather than being Protestant or Catholic, they as individuals were part of "a third or "other" tradition", separate from Protestantism and Catholicism. Politically speaking, according to an Alliance member, "Alliance is unusual in that it caters for various political persuasions, left-wing and right-wing, which come under one leadership in response to a polarised society." Mitchell, 73.
In line with their recognition of the complexity of identity, Alliance is aware of the presence as well as needs of ethnic minority individuals within Northern Ireland – they are not solely focussed on the Catholic/Protestant or Nationalist/Unionist divide. In 2005, David Ford claimed that “Alliance welcomes the growing diversity in Northern Ireland, and recognises that our new citizens are valuable members of our community.” Ford, “Introduction by the Party Leader,” *Alliance Works* (2005), 2. The party recognizes that there are newcomers, immigrants, and minorities within the Province and contends “that the needs of a more diverse population must be taken into account within future planning and policies, consistent with equality, human rights, and the creation of a shared future.” Indeed, for Alliance, diversity remains a positive attribute, not a threatening one: “Some of the most successful societies in the world, open to new people and new ideas are the most diverse.” The party claims that they “will support measures to support the integration of immigrants into Northern Ireland society, including resources for English language skills.” Thus, the party demonstrates a desire to have Northern Ireland be a united society, inclusive of all residents, whether Catholic, Protestant, or other.


In 2011 the party listed, among the "Social benefits" of such education, not only the interaction of "children from different backgrounds," but also "a system of education that better reflects a society in which more and more people are defining themselves differently, taking into account the growing number of ethnic minority families and an increased number of mixed marriages and mixed relationships." APNI, *Leading Change*, 64-65.


APNI, *Step Forward in Europe*, 3.


APNI, *Leading Change*, 5. See also, APNI, *Leading Change*, 27-30. Peace walls were constructed in various troubled areas to separate members of the two main communities in order to prevent physical conflict.

APNI, *For Everyone*, 44-45.

APNI, *Building A United Community: Alliance Party Policy Document* (Approved by Party Council: 7 December 2002), 11, Alliance, accessed September 29, 2009, http://www.allianceparty.org/resources/sites/82.165.40.25-42fa1bb0bef84.24243647/Policy%20Documents%20(PDF)/Alliance+Party+Policy%3A+Building+A+United+Community.pdf; APNI, *Alliance Works* (2003), 7. The old flag of the Province, white, with a red cross on it and a red hand in the center, is a flag that has been largely connected with and to the Protestant segment of Northern Ireland’s population, as has the Union flag in the same context. See Dara Mulhern, "Symbols in


65 "Frequently Asked Questions about the Recent Vote on the Union Flag at Belfast City Council." In November of 2012, "Belfast City Council's policy committee...recommended that the Union flag no longer fly over the City Hall." During a "policy and resources committee" meeting the motion in favour of taking down the flag received sufficient support. However, the entire council had to ratify it the following month before it could "take effect." "Belfast council committee votes to take down Union flag," BBC News: Northern Ireland, November 23, 2012, accessed January 7, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20466154.

66 "Frequently Asked Questions about the Recent Vote on the Union Flag at Belfast City Council."


They also, generally, with one clear exception listed below, avoid orange in their
manifestos and on their website, a colour associated specifically with the Protestant
community and the anti-Catholic Orange Order. They avoid bright green, too, the colour
of Catholic nationalists and Irish republicans. See APNI, *Alliance Works* (2003); APNI,
*Alliance Works* (2005); APNI, *Alliance Works* (2007); APNI, *The Politics of Hope*
; APNI, *Alliance Works* (2010); APNI, *Leading Change*. See also, Alliance, December 2,
See also, Alliance, December 27, 2003, http://www.allianceparty.org/, at Internet Archive:
This 2003 version of the website included blue and orange as main colours. See also, Alliance, December
This version of the website used blue and yellow as the main colours. See also, Alliance Party,
This version of the website used dark blue and grey as its main colours. See also, Alliance Party: Alliance
recent version of the site, the main colours were yellow, blue, and black. This continues
to be the case. See Alliance, accessed December 16, 2013, http://allianceparty.org/;

APNI, *People Come First*; APNI, *This Time Put it There*, 3; APNI, *The Alliance
appeared on the cover of the 1987 manifesto.

Works* (2007); APNI, *The Politics of Hope*; APNI, *Alliance Works* (2010); APNI,
*Leading Change*. See also versions of the Alliance website since 2000 – Alliance,
It should be noted that there was a photograph of Westminster on the front of Alliance's 2010 Westminster Elections Manifesto - not an unreasonable choice of image, given the context, despite any possible negative associations for nationalists. But there were no other accompanying images or symbols that could be construed as divisive. APNI, *Alliance Works* (2010).

77 APNI, *Leading Change*.


79 Morgan, "Women and the Conflict in Northern Ireland," 67. This is not to say that women always acted alone, however. Groups in favour of reconciliation are usually not women only, yet they frequently have more women than men in them. Community groups focused on the issues caused by bad housing, insufficient amenities, and the like, were not frequently established to be women only. Still, women often set them up and operate them and they include more women than men as well. Morgan, "Women and the Conflict in Northern Ireland," 60, 68.


Cullen, "Women, Emancipation and Politics," 366.


Anne Carr was Women Together's coordinator between 1990 and 2001. She served at local government level as a NIWC member. Carr is Protestant but was married to a Catholic. Carr, "Women Together in the darkest days of the 'Troubles'."


Carr, "Women in Northern Ireland should be leading peacebuilders again.”


Carr, "Women in Northern Ireland should be leading peacebuilders again.”


Carr, "Women in Northern Ireland should be leading peacebuilders again.”


Martin Melaugh, Brendan Lynn, and Fionnuala McKenna, "Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC)," CAIN Web Service, accessed February 27, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/norgan.htm#niwc. Indeed, a press statement issued that explained why the NIWC was established pointed to the lack of female participation within political discussions up to this point. Kate Fearon, Women's Work: The Story of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1999), 11.


Susan McKay, "After 10 years, the party's over for Women's Coalition in North," The Irish Times, May 12, 2006, 1.

NIWC, New Voices, New Choices---Women for a change (Belfast: The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, 1997), 4, CAIN Web Service, accessed February 26, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/niwc/niwc97.pdf; NIWC, 2001 Local Government Election Manifesto. A survey carried out that examined candidates for the NIWC discovered that, among participants, 45% belonged to the Catholic community, while 28% belonged to the Protestant community. While this would not appear to be a strong balance, it does represent a clear mixture of individuals from different backgrounds. Furthermore, according to Fearon, the survey "concluded...that a linear relationship between religious beliefs and political beliefs was not characteristic of the candidates. They emerged as more likely to be 'switchers' - those who have no consistent voting patterns." In other words, they were not rigid adherents to any particular party. They were also often very heavily involved in their communities as well as voluntary work. Overall they were above average in terms of educational qualifications. About 50% of them had re-entered the education system as adults. All of these traits may indicate a greater open-mindedness and explain the willingness of such women to be involved with a "party" that crossed communal lines in Northern Ireland. Fearon, 23.
One woman who decided to be a candidate, Audrey Johnston, like a lot of NIWC women, said she was not unionist or nationalist. She was in between. Fearon, 30-31, 165-166.

106 NIWC, New Voices, New Choices—Women for a change, 4.


111 NIWC, 2001 Local Government Election Manifesto.

112 NIWC, New Voices, New Choices—Women for a change, 4.

113 Fearon, 24, 27.

114 NIWC, New Voices, New Choices—Women for a change, 2.

115 In their Assembly Election Manifesto for 1998, they emphasized their willingness to cooperate “with politicians from across the political spectrum to build a society that will respect people’s rights to be different and to hold different aspirations.” NIWC, A New Voice for New Times.

116 NIWC, 2001 Local Government Election Manifesto.


118 Fearon, 77-82, 99. Originally, Sinn Fein's participation was lacking as they could not be there without a cease fire. Fearon, 69.

119 Fearon, 79-82.

120 See NIWC, New Voices, New Choices—Women for a change.

121 For instance, in a 1998 Manifesto the Party was in favour of “An integrated, cross-border public transport system.” The NIWC desired there to be better “road-rail links” around Ireland for the purpose of nurturing trade. In addition, the Party backed better
“road-sea links between Northern Ireland and Scotland, as well as between the East and the West of this island.” NIWC, *A New Voice for New Times*.

122 Fearon, 92.


125 NIWC, *Change the Face of Politics*, 3.

126 NIWC, *Still on the Right Path*.

127 NIWC, *Change the Face of Politics*, 3.

128 The NIWC garnered 7,731 votes, ranking ninth in votes among those fighting the election. Fearon, 37, 51.


132 The colours decorated the room during the press conference launching the party. These were also the colours of the party's initial campaign. Fearon, 23-24, 37. This colour combination avoided the Union Jack or Irish Tricolour effect that could be found in some unionist and nationalist political images and literature. Its association with the suffragettes reflected an obvious focus on women's political participation and freedom. Furthermore, the fact that these colours were used by *English* women early in the century reflected a willingness on the part of Catholic party members to set aside any political
differences with their Protestant counterparts in favour of a shared sense of the importance of women's political action.

133 Fearon, 123-124.

134 The text of the document was white. A bit of black appeared as well. In one photo in particular, a large group of people could be seen standing on the steps of Stormont. They included women and men, some of whom clearly belonged to visible minorities, reflecting the NIWC's concern with ethnic minority issues. NIWC, Change the Face of Politics, 1-6.


141 John Hardy, e-mail message to author, January 29, 2016. The Northern Greens have a lot of independence when it comes to choosing candidates, dealing with the media, "policy development," and so on. Hardy, e-mail message to author, January 29, 2016.

142 To create "a political group" 25 people are required. A minimum of one fourth of the nations belonging to the EP need to have representation in each group. An MEP is not allowed to be part of two or more groups. There are members who have no political group. They are called "non-attached Members." "Organisation," European Parliament:
As a Party that highlights its European and even global dimensions and vision in some of its political literature, the Greens are also clearly supportive and insistent on the importance of local, "grassroots democracy." In its 2004 European Manifesto, the Green Party argued that "The EU must…take subsidiarity more seriously and devolve more power back to States and regions. Local authorities must be given more powers, with true de-centralisation of decision-making." Such a principle is in line with the Greens’ contention that decisions ought to be made "at the lowest effective level, as close as possible to the people affected by those decisions." The Europe desired by the Greens is one which recognizes that the citizens of a region or place are the experts when it comes to the communities they live in and are thus the ones “best placed to make decisions that affect their daily lives.” The Greens also believe in the necessity for more power to be given to the European Parliament inside the Union as the Parliament is the elected voice of Europe’s citizens. Green Party, European Election Manifesto 2004, 2-6, 24-25; Green Party, A Green New Deal for Europe: Manifesto for the 2009 European Elections, 12, CAIN Web Service, accessed April 1, 2014, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/green/green0609man.pdf; "Our Principles," Green Party Northern Ireland, accessed April 1, 2014, http://test.greenpartyni.org/who-we-are/our-principles/; Green Party Northern Ireland, European Election Manifesto (2014).
Interestingly, the Greens did not limit their vision of decommissioning only to paramilitary bodies. The party did acknowledge that the necessity for "minimum force" to be used by the state might, at times, arise - for a while. However, the party argued that it was necessary for major amounts of arms to be decommissioned, "state" ones as well as "non-state" arms. Green Party, *Manifesto for the Elections to the Forum and All-Party Talks*, 3-4.

Such a stance would not likely be supported by conservative Protestant and Catholic clergy or laity, demonstrating that the Party is not bound by traditional ecclesiastical mores on the political stage. Green Party Northern Ireland, *Meeting the Challenges*, 19; Green Party, *For All Our Futures*, 19.


Other than photographs of Green Party leaders and candidates in the party's 2005 manifesto, there was a blue photo of a child’s face on what appeared to be the front of the Manifesto pamphlet. The use of a child’s photograph could be read as an expression of both innocence and a new beginning – indeed, the caption across the top of the photograph was “Vote for a Change”. The Green Party, Vote for a Change.

The use of children’s pictures continued in the Party’s 2007 Manifesto for the Assembly Election. Five children’s photographs were included on the cover. The title of the Manifesto was “for all our futures”, thus linking the images of children with the notion of the future. Interestingly, two of the children had animal features sketched on their faces, like they had their faces painted. One child had black circles drawn around her eyes, a black nose, and black whiskers and another child had an orange or gold face with black lines, reminiscent of a tiger. This further emphasized the party's environmental concerns. Indeed, included on the cover of this Manifesto was a picture of an Irish elk, an image of nature in line with the Green Party’s concern for the environment. Green Party, For All Our Futures.

In their European elections Manifesto (2009), entitled "A Green New Deal for Europe," an image of a young boy wearing a hard hat and tool belt and holding a green sledgehammer was used. This was representative of the party's focus on a better,


CHAPTER 6: THE THIRD COMMUNITY IN ACTION: EVIDENCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE AND ROLES IN NORTHERN IRISH SOCIETY

PART 3: ORGANIZATIONS FOR UNITY AND TRANSCENDENCE


2 “Mission & Objectives.”


10 “Teachers Unions”; Sales, 180.

11 “A Short History of Congress”; “About Congress.”

12 Irish Congress of Trade Unions: Northern Ireland Committee, Programme for Peace and Progress in Northern Ireland.


18 Claire McNeilly, “Thousands are expected to join anti-violence rally,” Belfast Telegraph, April 5, 2011, final edition, 2.


NIMMA began in the wake of a Corrymeela meeting that included intermarried couples, those intending to marry across the divide, and a few clerics who supported these marriages. The couples found that talking to one another was helpful and positive. From NIMMA’s creation onward, meetings have continued to take place. Originally functioning out of the houses of members, and using Belfast’s Corrymeela House as “a contact address,” NIMMA set up its own office in 1994 on Bedford Street in Belfast. "Origins of NIMMA," NIMMA, accessed February 26, 2012, http://www.nimma.org.uk/about/origin.htm; "About NIMMA," NIMMA, accessed January 14, 2014, http://www.nimma.org.uk/about/about.htm.


Paul McLaughlin, e-mail message to author, December 23, 2015.


32 The families involved are firmly connected within the offspring such partnerships produce and the people involved gradually get so they are not as afraid of each other. "About mixed marriage"; "Towards Reconciliation," NIMMA, accessed January 16, 2016, http://www.nimma.org.uk/history/definition.htm.


35 "About mixed marriage"; "Housing," NIMMA, accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.nimma.org.uk/activities/housing.htm. NIMMA has pointed out that “for a couple to acknowledge they are “mixed” can almost be the equivalent of “coming out” and it is unwise for mixed couples to live in a number of local communities where there can be intimidation.” "About mixed marriage.” NIMMA claims that a lot of couples have contacted them who have not been able to locate a secure place in which to live or have already been the victims of intimidation. "NIMMA and housing," NIMMA, accessed February 26, 2012, http://www.nimma.org.uk/action/house.htm; "Housing."

36 “NIMMA and housing.” NIMMA’s supportive role vis a vis this programme was acknowledged by Jennifer Hawthorne, who was Housing Executive Head of Community Cohesion: “NIMMA has brought experience and knowledge to the table that have helped ensure that this programme for shared living is already off to a very successful start. Its determined lobbying has paid dividends and we can rely on its continued support and advice as we roll-out our programme across the Province.” "Everybody needs Good
"NIMMA and housing." Anne Odling-Smee, who represented NIMMA “on the NIHE Housing Advisory Committee”, pledged that “Progress is being made and we will continue to work with the NI Housing Executive and the housing associations to ensure the future of shared social housing.” "Sharing begins at Home," NIMMA News (Conference Special April 2009), NIMMA, accessed February 26, 2012, http://www.nimma.org.uk/news/news%202009/news0409.pdf.

See “Everybody needs Good Neighbours.”


"Welcome to NIMMA.”


Getting Married.


Brewer with Higgins.

"Types of school," nidirect, accessed December 2, 2015, http://www.nidirect.gov.uk/types-of-school. After Northern Ireland was created, "the Protestant Churches transferred their schools to the new state in return for full funding." They were assured a place in running the schools controlled by the government. Religious education that was not denominational was provided in these schools. The Catholics, meanwhile, continued to run their "own system of voluntary maintained
schools." At first they were given a mere "65% of capital funding." Alan Smith, "Religious Segregation and the Emergence of Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland," *Oxford Review of Education* vol. 27 no. 4 (2001): 559. Currently, the Educational Authority funds and manages controlled schools via Boards of Governors. The Protestant churches have representation on many of these boards. "Types of school."

50 Lindsay Fergus, "Protestant leaders hit back at O'Dowd 'attack'," *Belfast Telegraph*, September 3, 2014, national edition, 17. The three major Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland - Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist - are represented by the Transferor Representatives' Council when it comes to education. Fergus, "Protestant leaders hit back at O'Dowd 'attack'," 17.

51 "Types of school."


53 "History," Lagan College.

54 "History," Lagan College.


57 "The History of NICIE."


60 "The History of NICIE."

"Who We Are," Integrated Education Fund.

"Chronological History," Integrated Education Fund.

"Who We Are," Integrated Education Fund.


"Campaigns," Humani.

"Campaigns," Humani.


“Events,” Humanist Association of Northern Ireland, accessed September 28, 2009, http://nireland.humanist.org.uk/Events.html. According to the Humanist Association of Ireland, the BHG were co-hosts with the HAI and Humani in 2008 and 2009. Since then, the Summer School has been arranged by the latter two groups. See, "Summer School," Humanist Association of Ireland, accessed February 1, 2016, http://humanism.ie/events/summer-school/.


The editor contends that both parts of Ireland are developing “a more diverse and plural society.” Minority populations are expanding or becoming more vocal and visible and this is a positive development. The editor argues that “The most successful societies are those which utilise all their diverse cultures, divergent opinions and varied talents for the common good. They recognise the right to be different, while at the same time cherishing the universal values we all share as part of our common humanity.”


"Articles," Humani. Currently, the “All Ireland” humanist magazine is the Irish Freethinker and Humanist and Humani has its own journal, entitled New Humani.

About Us,
Belfast Humanist Group; Humani, accessed February 1, 2016, http://humanistni.org/dynamic_content.php?id=48. The BHA is a charity that supports those who are not religious and who want to lead good lives based on "reason and humanity." According to the BHA, they "promote Humanism, a secular state, and equal treatment of everyone regardless of religion or belief." This focus on fairness and equality above and beyond sectarian divisions and political allegiances reflects the views of both Northern Irish groups discussed above. British Humanist Association, accessed February 1, 2016, https://humanism.org.uk/.

The Council currently includes the Belfast Humanist Group, Humani, the Humanist Association of Ireland, the British Humanist Association, the Humanist Society Scotland, as well as the Isle of Man Humanist Group. “Humanist Council of the Isles,” Humani, accessed February 1, 2016, http://www.humanistni.org/dynamic_content.php?id=134.


Les Reid, “Request to Queen’s University re Humanist Chaplain,” Belfast Humanist Group, accessed October 3, 2009, http://belfast.humanists.net/BHG%20letter%20re%20QUB%20chaplain%204-07.htm. None of these individuals are specifically Irish or are traditionally revered in Northern Ireland, reflecting the cross borders focus on humanity as a whole epitomized by the BHG’s website slogan: "One Life, One Earth, One Humanity". Belfast Humanist Group, accessed February 6, 2012, http://belfast.humanists.net/index.htm.

Humani, accessed February 1, 2016. Indeed, this quote from Russell, as McClinton pointed out, comes from the 1950s Russell-Einstein Manifesto, which McClinton quoted more fully in a 2006 conference talk: “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new paradise; if you cannot, nothing lies before you but universal death.” Brian McClinton, "Non-Violence in the Humanist Tradition," Humani (November-December 2006), Humani, accessed February 6, 2012, http://humanistni.org/filestore/image/humanist%20non-violence.pdf.


Activities," Belfast Humanist Group.

All guests, religious and otherwise, ought to be able to relate to a baby naming because “The ceremony is based on that which we all have in common – our humanity and human values – which transcend any religious beliefs which may be held by some of those

92 While “Humanist celebrants” do not possess the right to actually marry a couple, a lot of those seeking a marital ritual that is secular desire more than just the short ceremony they get at the Registry Office. Humani contends that more and more people are interested in marriage rituals that are secular or not religious. "Weddings and Civil Partnerships," Humani, accessed February 3, 2016, http://humanistni.org/dynamic_content.php?id=129.


97 Humani, accessed February 1, 2016; "Campaigns," Humani.


CHAPTER 7: CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN'S LAND": CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY
PART 1: MUSIC AND LITERATURE


8 "A Short Biography," The Ralph Vaughan Williams Society.


“An epic finale to Derry's 2013 celebrations.”

Ebrington still housed soldiers when "The Relief of Derry" was performed in 1990. "City of Culture events near end," Belfast Telegraph, December 20, 2013.


“About WCM,” Walled City Music.


Mark Hilliard, "Musicians to take part in concert for Paris," The Irish Times, November 18, 2015, 6; "Not helping when France is being terrorised is not neutrality," Irish Examiner.com, November 24, 2015.
A traditional music Revival coincided to a significant extent with both the Civil Rights Movement as well as the subsequent conflict. The music became very "affirmative of identity" for the Catholic community. Also the revival was centred in the Republic and Catholics, for the most part, were friendly to, or looked positively on, Southern Ireland, unlike many Protestants. According to Vallely, "Protestantism as a culture, in urban areas, since the 1960s has...progressively relinquished its participation in Traditional music." Vallely, 137, 147, 150, 153.

Vallely, 2, 22.

Cooper, 76-79, 81, 99, 123-124.

Vallely, 14.

Vallely, 4, 10, 96, 109-110.

Vallely, 10.

Cooper, 33, 40.
Interestingly, lyrics which have to do with the Rebellion of 1798, and that era, are seen as belonging to "the Traditional repertoire." As the era included participation by Catholics and Protestants, these works are not viewed as sectarian. Today's loyalist might find such works repellent, though. Vallely, 14.

This tune might even have been the original work of William Shield, an Englishman, in the eighteenth century. Its first printing was in 1783 in *The Poor Soldier*, a "ballad opera" by Shield. Englishman George Colman and Samuel Arnold worked together on *The Surrender of Calais*, another opera. In it was the Shields tune. However, this latest one was "set to the words Savourneen Deelish, which went on to become one of the most popular and anthologized of Irish lyrics." Cooper, 57-58.

Ogain "published the three volumes of *Duanaire Gaedhilge* [italics mine]", a compilation of well known songs, in the years 1921 to 1930. Cooper, 117-118.


Bill Rolston, "'This is not a rebel song': The Irish Conflict and Popular Music," Race & Class Vol. 42 (3) (2001): 51. Van Morrison was originally a performer in such a band. Campbell and Smyth, 234.

Watson, "Miami Showband: Massacre devastated Northern Ireland live music scene; Campbell and Smyth, 235.

Watson, "Miami Showband: Massacre devastated Northern Ireland live music scene."

Campbell and Smyth, 235. See also Watson, "Miami Showband: Massacre devastated Northern Ireland live music scene."

Campbell and Smyth, 236. The concert was cancelled by the authorities. This resulted in "a near riot" and soldiers came to break up the gathering of people. That evening punks in Belfast came together to form "a scene". A lot of subsequent bands had their roots in these occurrences. The Clash would come back, more than once, in the future. Martin McLoone, "Punk Music in Northern Ireland: The Political Power of 'What Might Have Been'," Irish Studies Review Vol. 12 (1) (2004): 29; Francis Stewart, "The Outcasts: Punk in Northern Ireland during the Troubles," 3-4, Academia, accessed September 11, 2015, https://www.academia.edu/8005228/The_Outcasts_punk_and_the_troubles_in_Tales_From_the_Punk_Side.

Campbell and Smyth, 236.

McLoone, 30-31.

Campbell and Smyth, 237.

McLoone, 35, 38.

Stewart, "The Outcasts," 1.

Campbell and Smyth, 237.

McLoone, 32.

Stewart, "The Outcasts," 4, 6, 8. Punk does not take a positive position on religion. It is harmful or at least not relevant. Punks in the North believed it was harmful and a


91 Campbell and Smyth, 237-238.


94 Campbell and Smyth, 241.


97 Campbell and Smyth, 241.

98 Rolston, 53, 59-60.


101 Campbell and Smyth, 238-239.

102 McLoone, 37.

103 Campbell and Smyth, 239.

104 McLoone, 37.

106 Walsh, 48-49, 57-58.

107 Rolston, 55-56.


110 Magennis, 178-179; Campbell and Smyth, 247.


112 Snow Patrol's 2006 album Eyes Open was the top seller in the UK that year. Campbell and Smyth, 247.

113 Campbell and Smyth, 248.


117 Corcoran, 142-154.

118 See Corcoran, 140-154; Hufstader.

119 Edna Longley, 112-114.


The word “Provisionally” seems to hint that the perspective here is that of a member or members of the Provisional IRA, although, like in other poems, this organization is not mentioned by name. Ciaran Carson, "The Mouth," in *A Rage for Order: Poetry of the Northern Ireland Troubles*, ed. Frank Ormsby (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1992), 166-167.


Michael Longley, “Wounds.”


Indeed, there is some evidence to indicate that Eamonn might be involved with the Provos, or at least in some kind of secret activity. Bernard Mac Laverty, "The Daily Woman," in *The Hurt World: Short Stories of the Troubles*, ed. Michael Parker (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1995), 136-137.

Mac Laverty, "The Daily Woman," 141, 149.


During the discussion of John’s job, clues are dropped that these men are in fact Protestant or Loyalist extremists masquerading as IRA men. Mac Laverty, "Walking the Dog," 159-160.


While it is never specified, there is a possibility that this woman is the product of a mixed marriage.


Murphy, "A Social Call," 273.


CHAPTER 8: CROSSING BOUNDARIES AND "NO-MAN'S LAND": CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS OF THE THIRD COMMUNITY

PART 2: SPORT

1 Sugden and Harvie point out, in a 1995 study, that it appears that up to 250,000 individuals take part in sporting activities in an official capacity. They may be players, administrators, referees, or coaches. Not included in this number are people involved in activities that were not covered by the survey as well as individuals who take part in
activities in an unofficial or "casual" capacity. Also not included are people who watch or are fans of various sports. If these groups of people are also considered, the number connected to sport increases. In any case, sporting activities are important, in one way or another, to a lot of people in the Province. John Sugden and Scott Harvie, “Conclusion and Summary of Findings and Recommendations,” *Sport and Community Relations in Northern Ireland* (University of Ulster, Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, 1995), CAIN Web Service, accessed October 8, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/sugdenharvie/sugdenharvie95-6.htm.

2 When it comes to the important team sports in Northern Ireland, such is especially the case. Certain sports or groups of activities are viewed to belong mainly or even solely to one or another community and this is reflected in the backgrounds of the athletes who take part in them. Sugden and Harvie, "Conclusion and Summary.”


5 Respondents were allowed to choose between “five structural bases; all-Ireland; UK; Northern Ireland (6 counties); Ulster (9 counties); and Other”. These options were “offered in both amateur and (where appropriate) professional categories.” John Sugden and Scott Harvie, “Chapter 3: The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland,” *Sport and Community Relations in Northern Ireland* (University of Ulster, Coleraine: Centre for the Study of Conflict, 1995), CAIN Web Service, accessed October 8, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/sugdenharvie/sugdenharvie95-3.htm.

6 Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport.” At first, rugby was administered by two bodies – one in Dublin and the other in Belfast. However, in 1879, the single Irish Rugby Football Union or IRFU was established. Its headquarters was Dublin. Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community.”

7 It should be noted that boxing made it clear that, while all Ireland in organization, it was “also treated as a province of the British Amateur Boxing Association for certain specific purposes (Commonwealth Games).” Indeed, boxers can box for Ireland at the Olympics and Northern Ireland at the Commonwealth Games, thus allowing athletes from Northern Ireland to be Irish or Northern Irish, depending on the context in which they are competing. Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport.” When it comes to basketball, "Basketball Northern Ireland (BNI) is an area board of Basketball Ireland (BI)”. The latter governs basketball across Ireland as a whole. According to BNI, they serve "as a conduit of B.I. in which we try to facilitate all participation of the sport." BI belongs to FIBA Europe, which governs basketball at European level, as well as FIBA, which does so at world level. BI's responsibilities include administering and promoting


9 These complicated structures make for equally complicated athlete representations. Nationalists from the North represent Northern Ireland in sport, yet do not "necessarily" acknowledge its "legitimacy". Also, unionists from the North compete in, for example, rugby, representing Ireland, yet may not see themselves as Irish beyond the world of sport. Indeed, it must be noted that, overall, athletes appear willing to move beyond or cross the boundary of "ethnic identity" if it is good for their athletic future. Bairner, "Still Taking Sides," 222; John Sugden and Alan Bairner, Sport, Sectarianism and Society in a Divided Ireland (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1993), 18.

10 Still, it is possible that Protestant "nationalism" when backing the Irish rugby side is cultural and has parallels with that of Welsh and Scottish people in the realm of sport. Protestant fear and/or wariness of Ireland-wide entities does affect their feelings. Meanwhile, the appeal of an Ireland-wide rugby team for Catholics in Northern Ireland "is counterbalanced by a reluctance to be seen affiliating with a sport which clearly belongs to an anglophile tradition." Sugden and Bairner, 18-19.

11 Indeed, nationalism of the British variety is not as strong as Scottish, Welsh and English nationalism. Outside of Northern Ireland, these nationalisms are generally "expressed" on the cultural plane versus that of politics and "Often the sharpest expressions of this nationalism are to be found within sport." Soccer games pitting Scotland and England against each other, for example, provide opportunities to express national pride - "celebrating and confirming national differences." Sugden and Bairner, 18-19, 66.

12 For these people, though, such a cultural connection with Ireland "does not translate into a political preference and is quickly abandoned in favour of patronage for combined United Kingdom teams and organisations when the level of sporting competition is raised to include Great Britain as an entity, as is the case with the Olympic Games." Thus it is possible to contend "that the Northern Irish Protestants are Irish in the same sense that the Welsh are Welsh and the Scots are Scottish: that is, at the level of culture they preserve a strong separate national identity while generally accepting the political authority of the British state." In contrast, when it comes to a lot of Catholics in Northern Ireland, displays "of Irish nationalism" in the realm of sport reflects or demonstrates "a deeper seated feeling of fidelity to the Irish Republic and the desire for a united Ireland." Sugden and Bairner, 66. Bairner reiterates this point in his 2008 article, claiming that "there is a version of unionism which takes on board the Irishness of Ulster Protestants but which nevertheless stops short of supporting moves towards the establishment of a thirty-two-county Irish Republic." There are people who politically are British yet are able to acknowledge "an Irish dimension of their lives". In such cases, representing
Ireland in sports like rugby and supporting Northern Ireland remaining in the UK is possible and not a contradiction. Association football and Gaelic sport, however, have, by and large, not succeeded "in encouraging Ulster unionists to recognise their Irishness." Bairner, "Still Taking Sides," 224-225.

Sugden and Bairner point out that "Protestant civil society is" very much "Northern Irish." However, a lot of British characteristics are also present as are certain ones that are held in common with Southern Ireland. Thus, the majority of Protestants in Ulster are capable of backing Northern Irish, Irish and British teams provided such teams are open to or include their own people. When the political situation is unstable, Protestants in Northern Ireland have a higher probability of directing their focus and loyalties towards athletes and sides from Northern Ireland. According to Sugden and Bairner, "it is at this point that a more normal sense of national or at least quasi-national identification emerges." Sugden and Bairner, 20.

13 There are Catholics who will focus on the Irishness of the side and thus back it. Some will connect Northern Irish soccer with Unionism and support the team's rivals. Sugden and Bairner, 19.

14 Sugden and Harvie, "Conclusion and Summary."

15 Michael Cusack was the key figure in the GAA's establishment. Cusack had been involved in rugby and cricket. In 1867, Cusack swore the Fenian Oath. In 1880 he became a staunch supporter of Home Rule. According to Sugden and Bairner, Cusack "was concerned that the dominance of English sports coupled with the elitist manner in which they were played, denied access to the vast majority of native Irishmen." Sugden and Bairner, 27-28, 31.


17 "Timeline 1884-1945," GAA, accessed November 10, 2015, http://www.gaa.ie/about-the-gaa/gaa-history/history-timeline/timeline-1884-1945/; Sugden and Bairner, 24, 27, 29-31. Parnell backed the GAA and, early on, those backing Parnell in the GAA outnumbered those supporting the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) and the use of militant tactics to achieve a Republic. Indeed, six GAA men bore the Protestant Parnell's coffin at the 1891 funeral. Thousands more carried hurley sticks "draped" in black (hurling is the most "Irish" of the main Gaelic sports and the hurley stick is a symbol of "Irish nationalism"). However, restrictive GAA rules as well as the GAA's movement towards more radical nationalism made it uncomfortable for Unionists and Protestants. The Catholic Church was even opposing the GAA by the late 1880s due to the power of the IRB within it. Sugden and Bairner, 24, 27, 29-31.

18 Bairner, "Sport and the Politics of Irish Nationalism," 192. The charter of the GAA supported a united and independent Ireland. The GAA has not ceased to be "essentially" a nationalist organization/body. Sugden and Bairner, 27-28, 31.
Patrick Pearse belonged to the GAA and there were others as well who were involved in the Rising and were executed after. Sugden and Bairner, 32. Militant and non-violent or “constitutional nationalists” were in conflict over who would have authority in or over the GAA, which was “implicated in the Easter Rising of 1916”. Those who backed and belonged to it were victims of security force persecution in the wake of it. A lot of GAA members “were interned”. Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community.”

"The Removal of Douglas Hyde as Patron of the Association 1938," The GAA Library and Archive, GAA Museum: Croke Park, accessed November 18, 2013, http://www.crokepark.ie/gaa-museum/gaa-archive/gaa-museum-irish-times-articles/the-removal-of-douglas-hyde-as-patron-of-the-assoc. According to Bairner, bans aimed to keep those in the GAA away from non-Irish games and make sure that these games did not use the "facilities" of the GAA. Bairner, "Sport and the Politics of Irish Nationalism," 189, 192; Sugden and Harvie, “Sport and the Community.” "The Ban", as it was called, was subject to the enforcement of "Vigilance Committees". These groups would actually go to games covered by the ban in order to inform on spectators and players who belonged to the GAA. Such individuals faced suspension. This ban was lifted temporarily between 1897 and 1901 after which it was reinstated. Its presence over the years "caused divisions" inside the GAA. "The Removal of Douglas Hyde as Patron of the Association 1938.” Douglas Hyde himself lost his position as a GAA patron in 1938 because he went to a soccer game between Ireland and Poland. “Timeline 1884-1945,” GAA.


In Gaelic football, Donegal, Derry, and Down’s successes in island wide contexts resulted in the sport being covered more within the Province. Still, along with the higher profile the game received came a greater percentage of anti-Catholic/anti-nationalist or anti-republican attacks upon "Gaelic clubs” within the North. Arms have also been found “at Gaelic sportsgrounds” and due to concerns about connections between the republican movement and the GAA, the authorities have focussed on GAA clubs as well as certain people involved in the organization. Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community." Interestingly, though, the GAA has received money via "the Department of Education and the Sports Council." In the Province, the GAA benefited from 819,000 pounds of
grant money in the years 1962-82. Their funding is limited because of their prohibition on security force members and the police. Sugden and Bairner, 35-36.

23 May 29, 1998 witnessed the deferment of "a resolution" to drop Rule 21 at a GAA Central Council meeting. An editorial in the *Irish News* complained "every aspect of rule 21 is contrary to the spirit of the initiative endorsed by 85 percent of the entire Irish population ten days ago." It is important to remember, though, that GAA members had experienced "harassment" by the authorities, even to the extent of having British forces take over part of the "property" of Crossmaglen Rangers Gaelic Athletic Club. In context, thus, Rule 21 is understandable. It is true that there were a lot of officials, including the president of the GAA, who were in favour of ending Rule 21. Still, this shows a "failure to take account of grassroots sentiments in the North." The situation in Northern Ireland is different and has been since 1921. The majority of the push for keeping the rule emanated from Northern Ireland's counties. Bairner, "Sport and the Politics of Irish Nationalism," 192-193, 195-197. Also, one must keep in mind that the GAA is an Ireland-wide organization. Just because Rule 21 was dropped does not automatically mean the views of nationalists in the North have undergone a sea change. Bairner, "Sport and the Politics of Irish Nationalism," 202. Indeed, it has been noted that, apparently, every GAA county in southern Ireland supported ending the Rule in 2001. However, all but one of the Northern Irish counties supported maintaining the Rule. McDonald, "100-year GAA ban lifted on security forces."


25 Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community." Ireland's "first recorded" game of cricket occurred in Dublin (1792) with "an All-Ireland" team losing to "the Garrison." The Irish team's best scoring player would be among those whose task it was to use bribes to get Irish MPs to support the Act of Union. Sugden and Bairner, 47-48. It is also interesting to note that Charles Stewart Parnell's father, John Henry, brought cricket to Wicklow. Hone argues that the younger Parnell was a long time captain of Wicklow's team prior to his nationalist political career. Parnell played "against members of the British administration and garrison." Sugden and Bairner, 27-28, 31, 49.

26 Sugden and Bairner, 47, 50.

In the North, by far, most of those who belong to clubs are Protestant. Also, clubs are, in the majority of cases, found in localities that are mainly Unionist. Also, Catholic schools in the North rarely play cricket. Sugden and Bairner, 51.


The former governed or managed clubs located in Munster and Leinster as well as certain areas in Ulster. The latter oversaw "the Belfast area." At the initial International between Ireland and England, early in 1875, Ulster athletes as well as Leinster athletes made up Ireland's side. "History of the Irish Rugby Football Union," IRFU, accessed March 3, 2014, http://www.irishrugby.ie/irfu/history/history.php; Sugden and Bairner, 55-56.

The establishment of Connaught's branch occurred in 1886. "History of the Irish Rugby Football Union"; Sugden and Bairner, 55-56.


Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community"; Rigby and O'Callaghan, 98-99.

Sugden and Bairner, 55. It is also interesting to note that Thomas St. George McCarthy was a rugby player for Ireland as well as a hurling enthusiast. Furthermore, McCarthy was good friends with Cusack who helped him prepare for "his RIC cadetship examination in 1882." "GAA's Forgotten Founder 125 Years Later."

Sugden and Bairner, 42, 55, 57. The fact that Catholics in the South play this game "for Ireland" is actually stranger than Protestants from Northern Ireland representing Ireland in rugby! The majority of those involved with rugby in the South have a private school background where their schools "were modelled on those English institutions in which the game of rugby football was first developed." Over 60% of these schools play the sport. A mere one quarter of private schools in the South "offer Gaelic" sports. Rugby in the South appears to be a "middle- to upper-class" sport. In the North, overall, rugby is a middle class, Protestant sport. Therefore, according to Sugden and Bairner, "because of their social backgrounds, whether they come from the north or the south of Ireland, rugby players and administrators tend to be comfortable in a middle-class culture which is at least partially rooted in English traditions." Sugden and Bairner, 61-62.
This is not to say that Irish or Catholic players have no sense of Irish patriotism. Not many would look positively upon the use of violence to achieve Irish unity, it is true. Rugby players are patriotic, though, and utilize rugby to display such feelings. Sugden and Bairner note that "just as sportsmen in other former colonies strive for excellence in games brought to them by their former masters as a means of confirming national confidence, the Irish use rugby as an expression of their patriotism in much the same way." Sugden and Bairner, 61-62.

37 Bairner, "Still Taking Sides," 223-224; Sugden and Bairner, 62-63; Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community."

38 Rigby and O'Callaghan, 99.


40 Rutherford, "Trevor Ringland."


43 Wildman, "Trimble sees the light."


The lyrics of "Ireland's Call" are as follows:

Come the day and come the hour  
Come the power and the glory  
We have come to answer  
Our Country's call  
From the four proud provinces of Ireland

Ireland, Ireland  
Together standing tall  
Shoulder to shoulder  
We'll answer Ireland's call

From the mighty Glens of Antrim  
From the rugged hills of Galway  
From the walls of Limerick  
And Dublin Bay  
From the four proud provinces of Ireland

Ireland, Ireland  
Together standing tall  
Shoulder to shoulder  
We'll answer Ireland's call

Hearts of steel  
And heads unbowning  
Vowing never to be broken  
We will fight, until  
We can fight no more  
From the four proud provinces of Ireland

Ireland, Ireland  
Together standing tall  
Shoulder to shoulder  
We'll answer Ireland's call


In addition, it has been said that 30,000 supporters journeyed to New Zealand to back the Lions in 2005. The British & Irish Lions, at Internet Archive: Wayback Machine, accessed September 30, 2013.


Survey evidence indicates that about three quarters of those who play hockey are middle class and around 90% of athletes belong to the Protestant population. Generally, hockey is not a sport where “political conflict” is seen, no doubt at least partially because there are not nearly as many Catholics who play it as is the case in, for instance, football. John Sugden and Scott Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies," Sport and Community Relations in Northern Ireland, CAIN Web Service, accessed October 8, 2013, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/sugdenharvie/sugdenharvie95-7.htm.

Ulster and Leinster were the bastions of the sport. Sugden and Bairner, 63.

“Hockey: Ulster officials at the helm in Irish merger,” Belfast Telegraph, May 29, 2000. According to the IHA website, it “is responsible for the management and overall development of all areas of the sport.” There are connecting branches which control hockey in the various regions and localities of Ireland. Ladies’ and men’s hockey are run by different branches in some areas. However, according to the IHA, “plans are in place to merge the sport across all Branches, as is the case at national level.” “About Us,” Irish Hockey Association, accessed March 3, 2010, http://www.hockey.ie/ih/about_us.cfm. For example, prior to the establishment of the Leinster Hockey Association Limited (LHA) in 2011, there were the Leinster Ladies Hockey Union, the Leinster Branch Irish Hockey Association, as well as the South East Branch. These came together in 2011 to form the LHA. "About the Leinster Hockey Association," Leinster Hockey Association, accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.leinsterhockey.ie/contentPage/157691/about_the_l_h_a.

The Irish men’s hockey team did not take part in the Olympics prior to “the 1990s”. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” Also, Great Britain's men's side was made up just for Olympic purposes. Otherwise, Ireland, England, Wales, and Scotland "have fielded" their own sides. As there is no Northern Irish team, Ulster's star athletes have been part of the Irish team. Sugden and Bairner, 64.

In addition, the probability was that not too many athletes would be impacted. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

Sugden and Bairner, 64-65; Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community”; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies”; Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland.”


Sugden and Bairner, 64; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” See also, Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland.”


Sugden and Bairner, 64; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” See also, Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland.”

"Olympics,” Hockey Ireland.


Football, an important sport within Ireland and Britain, has its roots in the public schools of England. Football, though, swiftly grew into a sport associated with the labouring classes. Cricket as well as rugby, however, remained associated with the higher and middle echelons of society. Bairner, "Sport and the Politics of Irish Nationalism," 200; Sugden and Bairner, 21, 41-42, 70-91; Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community.” See also, Ann Bourke, "Organising and Managing Football in Ireland," in The Organisation and Governance of Top Football Across Europe: An Institutional Perspective, eds. Hallgeir Gammelsaeter and Benoit Sennaux (New York: Routledge, 2011), 62.

Sugden and Bairner, 21, 41-42, 70-91; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” Interestingly, a lot of talented Irish athletes, among them Niall Quinn and Kevin Moran, both from Southern Ireland, chose soccer over Gaelic. Their choice was no doubt due to the greater opportunities offered by the sport in terms of exposure and financial benefits. Sugden and Bairner, 42.
Belfast Celtic's history should be noted, however, and began with a cricket team. "Sentinel" cricket team defeated "Model Star" in an 1891 game. The majority of Sentinel athletes were from the "Falls area". These players figured the area had a lot of athletic ability and a football side ought to be created. Belfast Celtic was the result. The officials of Belfast Celtic at no point considered it a club for or of Catholics only. A lot of Belfast Celtic's most well known athletes came from the Protestant community. Sugden and Bairner, 81.


When a game between Belfast Celtic and Linfield in 1948 resulted in a draw, supporters of Linfield "poured over the terrace barriers" forcing the Belfast players "to run from the pitch for their lives". Several players were badly injured. This marked the end of Belfast Celtic. "The History of the Grand Old Team," Belfast Celtic 1891-1949. Sugden and Bairner note that a Linfield player's ankle was broken during a collision involving him and a Celtic player; the collision was not deliberate. When exiting the field the Celtic team was "attacked by" some spectators. The Celtic player who had been involved in the collision was badly beaten. In the wake of this event, a lot of Linfield fans as well as its board "expressed their disgust at what had happened." The directors of Belfast Celtic did not want this kind of thing to happen again. Belfast Celtic pulled out of the Irish League. Sugden and Bairner, 82-83.

In 1929 Derry City entered the Irish League. Derry City fans included Catholics and Protestants. Problems started to occur when Derry City and Linfield played each other. The IFA investigated after athletes were attacked "at a cup tie in Belfast in
February 1955”. The “foolish action of the Derry City player” was blamed for the situation. It was contended “that a religious emblem had been waved to the crowd.” Derry City’s Protestant fanbase dissolved after the latter 1960s’ unrest. In 1971 there were riots while a game was occurring between DC and Ballymena United. Rioting also occurred following the game. A team’s bus was set on fire - it had transported the Ballymena United team to the game. The DC directors felt DC ought to play the rest of their home games for that season in Coleraine. Brandywell, the Derry team’s home base, was "closed in 1971." The Coleraine location was nearly 40 miles from the Brandywell. The financial hardship brought about by the change in location led to the suspension of DC activity for a time. Senior football was not present in Derry for a number of years after this. In 1985, DC joined the League of Ireland's First Division. They became part of the Premier Division not long after. Interestingly, Sugden and Bairner point out that DC was "the most successful and best-supported club playing football in the Irish Republic during the second half of the 1980s”. Yet it was a Northern Irish club. Later, in another crossing of borders, the "League of Ireland's League Cup Final” in 1990-1991 took place in Northern Ireland. This Final had never taken place beyond the border of the Republic of Ireland before. It is true that DC does not have the number of Protestant fans it had in its earlier days of Irish League success. Still, in 1991 a one time manager of Linfield, Roy Coyle, was appointed by DC. Sugden and Bairner, 85-87; Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community”; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

71 Sugden and Bairner, 81; Sugden and Harvie, “Appendix – Case Studies.” See Bairner, "Still Taking Sides," 225, 227. Sugden and Harvie discuss Cliftonville and another club, Crusaders, in a 1990s case study. The clubs could both be found within North Belfast. Interviews took place with Cliftonville and Crusaders fans in 1993. It was thought that 95% of Crusaders fans were Protestant while 99% of Cliftonville’s fans were Catholic. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”


73 Sugden and Bairner, 90. Windsor Park was also situated in a strongly loyalist area and even the name Windsor had political associations that could be problematic for some. None of this helped bring Catholics out to watch. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

74 Indeed, in a 1990s case study, there were Cliftonville fans who claimed they went to watch Northern Ireland’s team “in the 1970s and early 1980s”. However, the sectarianism there had turned them “off”. Northern Ireland’s team included Catholics and Protestants. However, it seemed to these fans that all of those cheering for the side were Protestant. In the case of a 1988 as well as 1993 Northern Ireland versus the Republic game, taking place in Belfast, most nationalist fans, by far, did not physically go to it. Viewing the game at home or inside bars seems to have been the preference for Catholic/nationalist fans. In 1993, “trappings of the crowd’s Ulster and/or British identity and sectarian songs and slogans were much in evidence.”

In addition, the notion has been put forth that, over the years, Catholics were more and more unwelcome at Windsor Park. “Taigs Keep Out” could be found “on a wall near
one of the approach routes to the ground”. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

75 Sugden and Bairner, 90-91.


77 The team qualified "for the final stages of the European Championships in 1988 and of the World Cup in 1990," Sugden and Bairner, 77, 80; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

78 Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

79 The success of the teams, vis a vis each other, offers some explanation for this. This probably also mirrors a rise in sectarian views, in particular within youthful circles. Bairner, "Still Taking Sides." 227-228.

80 Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

81 England and Ireland faced each other in the European Championships (1988) as well as the World Cup (1990) - both post-Anglo-Irish Agreement. Sugden and Bairner, 80.

82 Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” It appears, from Sugden and Harvie’s case study, that national football is not likely to unite Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. It appears that identity related issues are unavoidably brought into the situation, as when it comes to the notion of an Ireland-wide side. In a 1990s case study in which fans of two clubs, Crusaders (a “Protestant” club) and Cliftonville (a “Catholic” club), were interviewed, thoughts on having a football structure that was island wide as well as a single side for Ireland demonstrated some telling concerns. Fans of Crusaders opposed this. Among their concerns, Crusaders backers were worried “that the status of Northern Irish football would be lost in its absorption in an all-Irish set up”. They also made clear their worries of this being perceived to be a move in the direction of Irish unification beyond the realm of football or sport. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

83 At FIFA’s 1954 yearly congress it was suggested by the FAI that their teams alone ought to be called Ireland. The IFA called their representative teams Ireland too, then, as well as "into the 1960s." Officials in Dublin did not like them using Ireland. However, the IFA chose their international teams from around Ireland up to 1950. The IFA opposed the FAI's proposal and won in 1954. Sugden and Bairner, 74; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”
It should be noted that “‘Ireland’ was dropped in favour of the more commonly acknowledged, ‘Northern Ireland’.” Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”


Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community." See also Bairner, "Still Taking Sides," 228; Sugden and Bairner, 75-76; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

While such players may be more likely to come from the Catholic community, the fact that it is possible for a player from Northern Ireland to represent Ireland does allow for a transcendence of the border in a similar manner to the crossing of communal boundaries that can and does occur on Northern Ireland’s team. Sugden and Bairner, 75; Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland”; see also, Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

After one-time English football player and World Cup victor, Jack Charlton, was appointed manager during the 1980s, athletes started being selected by the FAI who had Irish connections via grandparents, versus parents or where they were born. Thus international teams have been chosen by an Englishman where fewer than 50% of those on the team were native to Ireland or arguably "natural members of the Irish nationalist community." It is true that athletes not native to Northern Ireland have been chosen by the IFA as well, albeit "in general, this policy has been less strenuously followed." Sugden and Bairner, 75; Sugden and Harvie, "The Organisational Politics of Sport in Northern Ireland”; see also, Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

The majority of Cliftonville’s success came long before 1969. In 1979 the club did win the Irish cup. It gained a significant and almost completely Catholic fanbase during this time. Also, Cliftonville, in the 1990s, at one point, “did go on to reach the semi-final of the Irish cup.” The club's fanbase fluctuates with how well the club does. Still, regardless, when Cliftonville takes on Glentoran or Linfield, its fanbase is strong. Sugden and Bairner, 84; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

Due to Troubles related “demographic” alterations, Cliftonville became a Catholic-backed club with nearly no Protestant fans. Protestants did not appear to be comfortable or feel safe entering the area around Cliftonville’s playing field. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.”

One of Linfield’s past managers noted that incorporating a Catholic player would mean that serious measures would be necessary in order to ensure the athlete was protected, especially during the worst period of religious conflict during
the latter 1960s as well as the first part of the 1970s. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

95 Sugden and Bairner, 78-79; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

96 Glentoran was open to hiring Catholics and this was acceptable to the majority of Protestant Glentoran fans. Supposedly there were Catholics who became Glentoran fans when Belfast Celtic was no longer a viable option. However, Protestants seem to have made up the vast majority of the fans of Glentoran “in more recent times”. It is also interesting to remember the strength of competition or “rivalry” existing between Linfield and Glentoran. This kind of competition or “rivalry” amongst Protestant clubs and fans could possibly “detract from the intensity of the main sectarian cleavage”. Yet, it is also true that supporters of Glentoran as well as Linfield would unite in backing Northern Ireland’s team. Thus, divisions and the transcendence of boundaries in sport are not always solely along Catholic-Protestant lines. Sugden and Bairner, 84; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."


99 Bairner, "Where did it all go right?", 135-137, 143-145.


101 Bairner, "Where did it all go right?", 137.

102 They qualified "for the final stages of the World Cup in both 1982 and 1986." This success did not continue through the rest of the decade, though. Indeed, Northern Ireland was soundly beaten by the Republic in October of 1989 in Dublin during "the qualifying round of the European Championships." Sugden and Bairner, 76-77; Sugden and Harvie, "Sport and the Community"; Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

103 Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

104 Sugden and Harvie, "Conclusion and Summary."
Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England have separate teams. Such teams are not acknowledged by the Olympics. Rather, the Olympics "recognizes them as a block known as Great Britain." Clemente Lisi, "'Team Great Britain' for Olympics a Farce," Real Clear Sports, February 20, 2012, accessed November 29, 2013, http://www.realclearsports.com/articles/2012/02/20/team_great_britain_for_olympics_a_farce_97602.html.

It is true that a team representing Great Britain has taken part in the Olympics, but not in many years. Lisi notes that 1960 was the last time there was a Great Britain soccer side (men's) at the Olympics and there has not been a women's side at all. Lisi, "'Team Great Britain' for Olympics a Farce."

According to the British Olympic Association, an "historic agreement" was arrived at "with the English Football Association over fielding teams at the 2012 Games." Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland disputed this in a statement, arguing "No discussions took place with any of us, far less [has any] historic agreement been reached." The statement made clear that the Northern Irish, Welsh, and Scottish did not support there being a "Team Great Britain" in 2012. According to the statement: "We have been consistently clear in explaining the reason for our stance, principally to protect the identity of each national association. With that in mind, we cannot support nor formally endorse the approach that has been proposed by the Football Association." The signatures of the chief executives of the Irish and Scottish Football Associations as well as of the Football Association of Wales appeared on the statement. Lisi, "'Team Great Britain' for Olympics a Farce"; "Scots deny GB Olympic football team agreement is close," BBC Sport: Olympics, June 20, 2011, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/13830342; "Team GB Olympic football deal angers nations," BBC Sport: Olympics, June 21, 2011, accessed November 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/13854492; "London 2012: Stuart Pearce and Hope Powell to lead GB teams," BBC Sport: Olympics, October 20, 2011, accessed November 29, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/olympics/15382675.

It was noted in March of 2011 that a deal was arrived at by "the Home Nations" that basically would have the British team consist solely of English athletes. However, the British Olympic Association was contesting this. Telegraph Staff and Agencies, "London 2012 Olympics: Gareth Bale and non-English players have 'legal right' to play for Team GB," The Telegraph, March 24, 2011, accessed December 1, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/olympics/8404386/London-2012-Olympics-Gareth-Bale-and-non-English-players-have-legal-right-to-play-for-Team-GB.html.

Also, according to Lisi, as far as soccer is concerned, Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland, and England "have historically been bitter regional rivals. Trying to get all these fans to back one, unified team is a tall order." Lisi, "'Team Great Britain' for Olympics a Farce."
This, despite the fact that "Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have made it abundantly clear they do not want their players to be involved in this competition."

Telegraph Staff and Agencies, "London 2012 Olympics: Gareth Bale and non-English players have 'legal right' to play for Team GB."


Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

Sugden and Harvie have pointed out, however, that most Northern Irish boxers are from the Catholic community. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

Boxing has had a long-standing presence within Ireland and its history in Belfast goes back two centuries, at minimum. The history of Britain’s army in the North goes back over three centuries. Regiments in Belfast, prior to the latest round of conflict since 1969, would allow army leisure facilities to be utilized by civilians. They would also participate in various athletic events in the area. Among these was boxing. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

According to Sugden and Harvie, “This can be seen as an attempt to instill physical and spiritual discipline while at the same time turning boys and young men away from the ill-discipline and vice of the streets.” Clubs dedicated to boxing can be found on church property or within churches. There are also clubs that are not connected with the church, but are called by the local church’s name within Catholic areas. Interestingly, the Protestant churches, while demonstrating significant support and dedication towards young people’s athletics, via groups like the Boys Brigade or Scouts, have not been as open towards boxing in this respect. Clubs located within Protestant areas generally are connected to factories, “works”, and non-religious groups for young people. Frequently they are established by former fighters from the area. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."
Protestant militants ran this club!

There were fighters at this club whose home localities had “radically different political reputations”. See also, "About Us," Holy Family Golden Gloves, accessed May 16, 2016, http://holyfamilygg.btck.co.uk/About%20us.


Sharrock, "McCullough points a way for refugees from hatred," 20.

Cronin, "Which Nation, Which Flag?", 141-142.

Sharrock, "McCullough points a way for refugees from hatred," 20.

It can be assumed his manager encouraged this due to the fact there was more money in it as well as a greater likelihood that McGuigan would receive international attention. Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies." See also, "Barry McGuigan: Early Career."

“Danny Boy,” being a popular song in Ireland generally, yet also the tune of the “Londonderry Air,” can be seen as a means of catering to Irish of both religious and political persuasions. See Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies."

Sugden and Harvie, "Appendix – Case Studies.” See also, Sugden and Bairner, 2.

"Barry McGuigan: Early Career."


"Background," Horse Sport Ireland. Indeed, Sport Northern Ireland is one of the bodies that funds HSI. "The Board," Horse Sport Ireland, accessed October 3, 2015, http://www.horsesportireland.ie/about/the-board/.


"How victory, a visit and a vision can prove we have come of age," Belfast Telegraph, June 28, 2010, first edition, 26; "2002..." Belfast Telegraph, June 22, 2010, 62.


Brown, "Rory McIlroy faces dilemma."

Lawrenson, "Team GB in Rio?"


James Corrigan, "Graeme McDowell torn between Britain and Ireland for Rio 2016 Olympics," The Telegraph, October 25, 2012, accessed October 7, 2015,

165 Liew, "McIlroy and Graeme McDowell show their 'rift' was merely a confection."

166 According to regulations, should a person play for a particular nation "in an event recognised by the relevant international federation, in this case the International Golf Federation, three years must pass before they can represent another in the Olympics." McIlroy, meanwhile, had not represented a country "since 2011" at the World Cup and was not at the 2013 Cup and therefore could still decide his Olympic fate. Beacom, "Graeme McDowell answers Ireland's Olympic call."

167 Beacom, "Graeme McDowell answers Ireland's Olympic call."


171 "'I think that I've died and gone to heaven'; Graeme's joy as he lands a major triumph at the US Open," Belfast Telegraph, June 21, 2010, 1; "McDowell enjoying the perks of trophy glory," Belfast Telegraph, June 23, 2010, first edition, 60.

172 "Victory that elevated Graeme to golf’s elite," Belfast Telegraph, June 22, 2010, 4.

173 "How victory, a visit and a vision can prove we have come of age," 26.

174 Archer, "Graeme McDowell - Golfer first from north to win a major since 1947," 4.


"Can anyone stop our Rory now?" *Belfast Telegraph*, June 18, 2011, first edition, 62; "Go for it, Rory; We're behind you all the way in US glory bid," *Belfast Telegraph*, June 18, 2011, Derry edition, 64.

"Why everyone just can't get enough of our new superstar," *Belfast Telegraph*, June 20, 2011, first edition, 4.


"McIlroy's triumph is one for us all," *Belfast Telegraph*, June 20, 2011, first edition, 28.


3 The OIRA promise followed two protests over Best's death. One occurred in the afternoon and one in the evening. The latter included men. "Now the No-Go Women See Provos," *Belfast Telegraph*, May 23, 1972, 3.

4 "The Violence Must Stop say 2,000 at Creggan Rally," *Belfast Telegraph*, May 24, 1972, 3.

5 "The Violence Must Stop say 2,000 at Creggan Rally," 3.

"5,000 at Derry service for peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, May 29, 1972, 3.


"Messenger Boy who Predicted His Own Fate," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 22, 1972, 1.

"Mother who tried to save family," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 22, 1972, 1.

"The IRA have 'dirtied' patriotism, says priest," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 25, 1972, 2.


"Viewpoint: An End to All Our Yesterdays," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 22, 1972, 1.

"The scene around six on Bloody Friday," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 24, 1972, 6.

"The IRA have 'dirtied' patriotism, says priest," 2.


"The Final Death Toll was Nine," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 24, 1972, 7.


"The IRA have 'dirtied' patriotism, says priest," 2.


"Service in ruins of bus station," 1.

John Burns, "Claudy: The village that was murdered," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 1, 1972, 6.


33 "I take a Stand with Father Aquinas'," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 14, 1972, 2.


36 McKittrick and McVea, 16, 30, 50, 171-172, 223-224; Mac Ginty and Darby, 13.


38 “‘Ultimate winners are men of faith,’” *Belfast Telegraph*, November 11, 1987, north west edition, 1.


52 Doran, “Mother tells how brave daughter died,” 1.


59 Cowan, “Tears for a ‘bright happy’ mother.”


61 Doran, “Mother tells how brave daughter died,” 1.


69 “Enniskillen atrocity: ‘stop before you kill the very soul of Ireland,’” 9.
70 “Morning View: Atrocity at War Memorial,” 6.


80 Breen, "Our Memories Will Never Dim," 1, 11.


82 Breen, "Our Memories Will Never Dim," 1, 11.


84 Maguire, "Hundreds gather as wreaths are laid," 5.

His deputy, Eamon Gilmore, meanwhile, was in Belfast at its war memorial. According to Gilmore, "I don't think there's a family or community or a parish anywhere in Ireland that wasn't touched by the great wars or that didn't have family members, members of the community who lost lives or who suffered in those wars." He went on to argue that "This is part of our shared history and I wanted, and the Irish government wanted, to be part of sharing that remembrance." Indeed, the movement in the direction of shared commemoration could be seen the previous January, when Belfast "city fathers...passed a resolution inviting the Irish government to "participate" in events to mark both the anniversary of the Somme and Remembrance Sunday." Alan Kelly, Transport Minister, participated "in the annual Somme commemorations in Belfast in July." Kelly placed a wreath at Belfast's Cenotaph as a memorial to "those lost at the Battle of the Somme, on behalf of the Government of Ireland." Men in the 36th (Ulster) as well as the 16th (Irish) Divisions took part in the Battle of the Somme (1916). Fergus, "A simple tribute," 14, 15; McAdam, "Taoiseach will attend Enniskillen poppy day," 19.


Claire Simpson, "The Omagh Bombing - 10th Anniversary - Hundreds brave torrential rain to remember the dead," Irish News, August 16, 2008, 6. It should be noted that there were relatives of the Omagh dead who were not present at this service. They chose to go to "their own personal service" on the 17th of August because of issues regarding what was written on the memorials. In the Garden, there are inscribed these words on a wall: "To honour and remember 31 people murdered and hundreds injured from three nations by a dissident republican terrorist car bomb." However, where the bomb occurred there are the words: "A car bomb exploded at this site on Saturday 15 August 1998 at 3.10pm. This act of terror killed thirty-one people, injured hundreds, and changed forever the lives of many." It does not say who set the bomb. This is a problem for some families and people, among them Michael Gallagher. "The Omagh Bombing - 10th Anniversary - Relatives miss anniversary," Irish News, August 16, 2008, 7; "Thousands gather to mark Omagh outrage," Irish News, August 16, 2008, 1.


This choir consists of Protestant and Catholic singers who come from Waterford, in the Republic of Ireland, and Omagh, in Northern Ireland. According to the choir's Facebook page, "Our mission is simple, that after the catastrophe that struck Omagh in 1998, we want to bring peace to our country and to try and bridge any gaps between religious differences! We aim to do this through our music." They claim to "strive to build community relations and show how all denominations [sic] can work together to bring peace to our land!" Omagh Waterford Peace Choir, "About," Facebook, accessed May 26, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Omagh-Waterford-Peace-Choir/126234397455426?id=126234397455426&sk=info.

Simpson, "The Omagh Bombing - 10th Anniversary,” 6; "Thousands gather to mark Omagh outrage,” 1.


"Thousands gather to mark Omagh outrage," 1.


Alf McCrery, ""Sorrow is a frost that settles on your heart,"" *Belfast Telegraph*, November 3, 2012, edition 1 national edition, 14, 15; Johnson, "Peace group’s call to young.” See also, Andalo, “Guardian Charity Awards 2011.”


110 The Garvaghy Road path is a traditional one. However, it became a real problem from 1995 on. The Orange Order, from 1997, was not allowed to parade along the Garvaghy Road. "Children die in Drumcree protests."

111 "Children die in Drumcree protests."


113 Emma Flynn, "Grown men in tears as Quinns face heartbreak," News Letter, July 13, 1998. According to a Protestant relative of the Quinn boys, their mother, Chrissie, was Catholic yet raised her boys Protestant. Apparently their mother had not brought her children up Catholic as she desired the boys to decide for themselves. The News Letter also noted that the children's mother's mother was a Protestant by birth who had wed a Catholic. "Boys' mother tells of torment," News Letter, July 17, 1998, 1, 4; Flynn, "Grown men in tears as Quinns face heartbreak."
Flynn, "Grown men in tears as Quinns face heartbreak." The week prior to the murders, some Catholics residing on the estate received bullets in the mail. Chrissie Quinn's home was not targeted. Flynn, "Grown men in tears as Quinns face heartbreak." See also, 'Boys' mother tells of torment," 1, 4.


"Statement from the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland," 2.

According to the News Letter, the Grand Lodge of Ireland supported the Orangemen taking up their protest at Drumcree hill again. The decision to do so received full support from area lodges, despite calls from well known or important Orangemen, politicians as well as church leaders to stop the protest. Ric Clark, "Drumcree Orange defiant on stand-off," News Letter, July 13, 1998, 2.


The paper goes on to note that, "The wonder is that the Order for one moment even imagined that it could assert authority over those who would inevitably attach themselves to their protest and by doing so drag the name of Orangeism into the gutter." The paper does acknowledge that "both sides" are to blame for the conflict, even as it denounces those responsible for the Quinn killings, arguing that "far too few people have been prepared to stand up against intolerance and bigotry. And often the reward for those who have is to suffer ridicule and contempt." However, people want the violence and conflict to end and be consigned to the past. "Morning View: Day of Celebration has become a Time of Mourning," News Letter, July 13, 1998.

Clark, "Drumcree Orange defiant on stand-off," 2.

The Representative Church Body owned the majority of the land "at Drumcree parish" and was ready to take "legal action if Orangemen trespass[ed] on its ground". Lindsay Fergus, "Lodge gets its marching orders," News Letter, July 16, 1998.

Locks had been placed on gates to try to prevent Orangemen from entering. Fergus, "Lodge gets its marching orders."


"Chaplain pleads for Brethren to go home."

Flynn, "Grown men in tears as Quinns face heartbreak."


Clark, "Drumcree Orange defiant on stand-off," 2; "Disappointing Response over Drumcree Protest," 6. Citizens of the Lower Ormeau Road "held up black flags in
protest" as Orange members walked by. "Tune stays the same; Sides fail to bridge the gap," *Belfast Telegraph*, July 16, 1998.


134 "'Lovable, like all wee boys,'" *Belfast Telegraph*, July 14, 1998.


139 Traditionally Catholics were a minority in the RUC and the Catholic community harboured a strong distrust of the police during the Troubles era. Considered legitimate targets by the PIRA, policemen have been murdered by paramilitaries over the years and Catholic policemen have, in some quarters, been considered traitors to their community.

became clear that the *worthy* [italics mine] objective of maintaining a peaceful protest was an impossible objective." "The Courage of a Catholic Constable," 6.


143 O'Connor, "Protest Goes on as RUC Man Dies," 2, 3; O'Connor, "'No Justification for this waste of a life'," 5.


145 Bimpe Fatogun, "Peace Shattered - Victim had been due to retire in 2010 after 24 years' service," *Irish News*, March 11, 2009, 2. In a 2012 *Belfast Telegraph* article it is said that Carroll was a native of County Kildare, then had gone to live in England when he was a boy. He then came to live in Down. David Young, "Officer's last words to his wife were to reassure her," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 31, 2012, first edition, 8.

146 Claire McNeilly, "My wonderful son, by a heartbroken mum," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 4, 2011, first edition, 2. The *Belfast Telegraph* reported that a group consisting of former PIRA individuals claimed responsibility for Ronan Kerr's killing. They said they would cooperate with dissidents. However, *they* "are the IRA". According to these people: "We are engaged in bringing our struggle to a successful conclusion through military operations such as the recent execution of the RUC member in Omagh."


149 McCreary, McAleese and Harrison, "Orde shows his grief ," 1.

150 Matthew McCreary, Deborah McAleese and Claire Harrison, "Orde's grief at officer's death; Chief Constable pays tribute, then hits out at 'criminal psychopaths,'" *Belfast Telegraph*, March 10, 2009, final edition.


He insisted that "Nothing these people will do will do will break Peter Robinson's or my determination to ensure that this peace process continues to go from strength to strength." Deborah McAleese, "The community is going to resist you...a defiant message of unity from the politicians," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 5, 2011, first edition, 2.

Martin McGuinness went so far as to declare "I know that there are many young Catholics in the police who are very nationalist and indeed republican-minded. I am as proud of them as Nuala Kerr is of Ronan." Diana Rusk, "The murder of Constable Ronan Kerr - McGuinness 'proud' of Catholic police officers," *Irish News*, April 5, 2011, 3.

Deborah McAleese, "Reward of £50,000 as SF seeks to meet killers," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 6, 2011, first edition, 6.

Claire McNeilly, "A body comes home, a shaken community mourns," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 5, 2011, first edition, 4. See also, Suzanne McGonagle and Allison Morris, "Murder is attack on our family says GAA," *Irish News*, April 5, 2011, 1. According to Gearoid O Treasaigh of the GAA, "Ronan Kerr was a Catholic, an Irishman and a Gael who joined the PSNI because he wanted to play his part in making our society better." McNeilly, "A body comes home, a shaken community mourns," 4. Aogan O Fearghail, president of the Ulster GAA, claimed that "In the GAA we acknowledge that there has to be a shared future and mutual respect. We are angry that we have been attacked as an association, that a family has been robbed of a young man and that the PSNI have lost a valuable comrade." McGonagle and Morris, "Murder is attack on our family says GAA," 1. See also, Seanin Graham and Diana Rusk, "The murder of Constable Ronan Kerr - GAA observes a minute's silence for one of its own," *Irish News*, April 4, 2011, 6.


O'Connor, "'No Justification for this waste of a life'," 5.

Lewis even brought St. Patrick into it, pointing out that the saint was "a very humble and self-effacing man" and that "We would do well to recall that our patron saint was not an Irishman." He was "a Roman Briton." Patrick's uppermost concern, according to Lewis, "was not political identity, but how he and all people stood with God. Here in Northern Ireland in 2009 the broad political course for the future has been agreed among us. We will love and not hate." He called for prayers for the killers "that they may be turned from evil to the way of truth and peace." Canon Walter Lewis, "Cruel deeds will not change the views of this island," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 14, 2009, first edition, 26.


O'Connor, "Protest Goes on as RUC Man Dies." 2, 3.


"Murder most foul; Frank O'Reilly: A policeman who gave his life for his country," *Belfast Telegraph*, October 7, 1998.


Noel McAdam, "Sinn Fein should 'produce names', says UUP," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 12, 2009, city edition, 2. The two soldiers were murdered outside Massereene Barracks (Antrim). The soldiers were the victims of the Real IRA. They were getting "a take-away delivery" when they were gunned down. The soldiers were both from England and in their early 20s. McCready, McAleese and Harrison, "Orde shows his grief," 1.


Gibney goes on to argue that "The killing of Constable Kerr has nothing to do with the united Ireland that I still strive for today." Jim Gibney, "Thursday - Constable Kerr wore his uniform on behalf of us all," *Irish News*, April 7, 2011, 2.

"We're starting to reveal our true colours...," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 14, 2011, east edition, 12.


Reverend Tony Davison who was Irish Council of Churches President was there too, as was Reverend Stephen Cave, National Director of Evangelical Alliance Northern Ireland. David Young, "Wear purple for peace, urge church leaders," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 13, 2009, first edition, 4.

The church leaders pointed out that "Purple is associated with Lenten reflection and is offered as a strong outward symbol of people's commitment to working together." Young, "Wear purple for peace,” 4.

The church leaders extended their condolences to the victims' relatives, workmates, and friends. They pointed out that "As Church leaders, and in discussion with others, we are very aware that people want to do more and send a clear unambiguous message that we are one community united against anyone who wants to return to threat and violence...We are therefore asking all our Churches to create opportunities for our people to send out a strong message of hope and determination to move forward together." Young, "Wear purple for peace,” 4.

Young, "Wear purple for peace,” 4.

Claire McNeilly, "Bomb 'could have been underneath the car for days,'" *Belfast Telegraph*, April 4, 2011, first edition, 2. McNeilly, "My wonderful son,” 2.

Lesley-Anne Henry, "Outrage as social sites are used to praise murderers," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 4, 2011, first edition, 6.

This vigil was arranged via "the ‘Support Our Troops' page on the social networking site Bebo." Victoria O'Hara, "Candlelit vigil staged at city hall," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 11, 2009, first edition, 12.

Victoria O'Hara and Steven McCaffery, "The silent majority takes to the streets," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 12, 2009, first edition, 2. It should be noted that the *Belfast
"Telegraph actually encouraged citizens "to take to the streets to demonstrate their resolve to stand up to the gunmen who would dearly love to plunge this province back into turmoil." "Take to the streets and protest," Belfast Telegraph, March 11, 2009, first edition, 28.

193 O'Hara and McCaffery, "The silent majority takes to the streets," 2. The Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions was behind the majority of these protests. Their purpose was "to face down the terrorists' "agenda of sectarianism"." Noel McAdam, "A united front; Thousands gather in protest against terrorist violence," Belfast Telegraph, March 11, 2009, city edition, 1. While pre-arranged demonstrations took place at 1 in the afternoon in Derry, Belfast, Downpatrick, Lisburn, and Newry, the Irish News notes that "spontaneous demonstrations took place at other centres across the north in one of the largest mass anti-violence displays ever seen in the north." The rally in Belfast drew the most people. About 1,000 participated in a demonstration in Newry. As many as 2,000 were present in Guildhall Square, Derry. Bimpe Fatogan, "Peace Shattered - Thousands show silent solidarity with victims," Irish News, March 12, 2009, 4.


195 According to McAlinden, "It is a prayer service which is being organised by the local churches....It is a way for people in the area to come together for a few minutes' silence and to offer prayers." Adrian Rutherford, "Area quiet again after overnight disturbances," Belfast Telegraph, March 11, 2009, county edition, 4. At the vigil people "heard representatives from the four main churches in the area condemn the violence of the last few days and make a heartfelt plea for peace." According to Father McAlinden, "These prayers are just our way of saying that we don't want to go back to the troubles of the past....What we have tonight is a symbol of the other side of Craigavon." Adrian Rutherford, "Candles lit for peace at scene of evil murder; Craigavon," Belfast Telegraph, March 12, 2009, first edition, 4.


197 McNeilly, "A brave man who'll never be forgotten," 2.

198 The Belfast Telegraph noted that "Anger at the murder by dissident republicans has united people from across the country's traditional divides, Catholic and Protestant, republican and unionist." Deborah McAleese, "In quiet defiance they gathered on the streets," Belfast Telegraph, April 7, 2011, first edition, 8.

199 McAleese, "In quiet defiance they gathered on the streets," 8. See also, Maeve Connolly, "The funeral of Constable Ronan Kerr - 1,000 people gather for peace," Irish News, April 7, 2011, 12. "Amazing Grace" was performed by a piper. Then the ICTU's
Pamela Dooley spoke: "Two years ago the Trade Union movement came here to give public voice to our revulsion over the murders of Constable Stephen Carroll and soldiers Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey. We resolved then, as we do again today, that we will not permit the clock to be turned back." McAleese, "In quiet defiance they gathered on the streets," 8.

McAleese, "In quiet defiance they gathered on the streets," 8.

Lesley Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache, says Omagh," Belfast Telegraph, April 11, 2011, first edition, 6; Lesley Houston, "10,000 at rally for murdered PSNI man," Belfast Telegraph, April 11, 2011, first edition, 1; "The Voice of youth resonates loudly with a true message of hope--"'We Shall Overcome,'" Belfast Telegraph, April 11, 2011, first edition, 6. While the Omagh demonstration occurred, other vigils went on in Belfast as well as Enniskillen. Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache," 6.

Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache," 6. See also, Michael McHugh, "The murder of Constable Ronan Kerr - Peace-walk organisers to send out simple message - Minute's silence at Policing Board," Irish News, April 8, 2011, 6.

Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache," 6; Andrea McKernon, "Dissident Republican Threat - Slain policeman's brother among 10,000 in Omagh's peace march," Irish News, April 11, 2011, 12. Prior to the march the Irish News noted that flags, symbols and banners were not permitted. However, participants "are being encouraged to wear white ribbons symbolising the desire for peace." McHugh, "The murder of Constable Ronan Kerr,” 6.


Houston, "10,000 at rally for murdered PSNI man," 1. The Irish News reported that "In one touching moment, just across the road from the Omagh bombing memorial, the crowd held up the placards bearing the image of Constable Kerr and the slogan "Not in my name". " McKernon, "Dissident Republican Threat," 12.

This choir was established "in response to the" 1998 atrocity. Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache," 6. Mike Reynolds, director of the choir, noted that the purpose of the choir was "to foster peace and reconciliation and to bring young people aged 16-21 from the Roman Catholic and Protestant communities together." "The Voice of youth resonates loudly with a true message of hope," 6.

Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache,” 6; "The Voice of youth resonates loudly with a true message of hope,” 6. According to the Belfast Telegraph, "As the choir came to their final song...the crowd held aloft posters of Mr Kerr in a spontaneous
and moving tribute to the...PSNI officer and in solidarity with his grieving family." "The Voice of youth resonates loudly with a true message of hope," 6.

Houston, "Let this be an end to our heartache," 6.

Kerr had been a Beragh Red Knights football player. It had been eight years since Kerr had been a Beragh Red Knights player. Still, GAA officials stated that Kerr had belonged to the organization. Graham and Rusk, "GAA observes a minute's silence for one of its own," 6.


O'Connor, "O'Reilly death 'senseless waste'.

O'Connor, "No Justification for this waste of a life','" 5.


According to John O'Dowd of Sinn Fein, "We are giving public voice to the unified community stance we have seen this week, with people clearly saying 'we are not going back'." McNeilly, "A brave man who'll never be forgotten," 2.

McAdam and McNeilly, "Side by side in show of respect," 1. According to John O'Dowd of Sinn Fein, "We are giving public voice to the unified community stance we have seen this week, with people clearly saying 'we are not going back'." McNeilly, "A brave man who'll never be forgotten," 2.

McNeilly, "A brave man who'll never be forgotten," 2; David Young, "A familiar, painful story unfolds from a new location," Belfast Telegraph, March 14, 2009, first edition. According to the Irish News, McDonald was inside the church. Rusk, "Funeral congregation makes for a symbolic political mix," 6. McDonald had "come to show support for the Carroll family and to let everybody know that loyalism is against this sort of thing." Bimpe Fatogan, "Loyalists and republicans stand together at funeral," Irish News, March 14, 2009, 1.

Rusk, "Funeral congregation makes for a symbolic political mix," 6.

Young, "A familiar, painful story unfolds from a new location," 2.

Fatogan, "Loyalists and republicans stand together at funeral," 1; Young, "A familiar, painful story unfolds from a new location," 2.

McNeilly, "A brave man who'll never be forgotten," 2.

Kerr's casket was borne in turns by those belonging to his Beragh Red Knights GAA club and fellow PSNI members. Patrice Dougan, "Ronan's death will make us work for better future," Belfast Telegraph, April 7, 2011, first edition, 4. According to the Irish News, Kerr's casket "was lifted first by his former police colleagues and then transferred symbolically to members of his GAA club, before being handed back to the PSNI officers and on to GAA dignitaries led by president Christie Cooney and Tyrone manager Mickey Harte before being taken finally by family members." Archer, "The funeral of Constable Ronan Kerr - Defining moment in a journey for peace," 3. See also, Bimpe Archer, "The funeral of Constable Ronan Kerr," Irish News, April 7, 2011, 1; "We're starting to reveal our true colours," 12.

"We're starting to reveal our true colours," 12.

"A family says farewell to a hero as old foes lay their past prejudices to rest on day full of symbolism," Belfast Telegraph, April 7, 2011, first edition, 2.

Dougan, "Ronan's death will make us work for better future," 4. The Irish News notes that there were "a series of choreographed entrances designed to emphasize unshakeable unity on both sides of the border." Enda Kenny, Robinson, and McGuinness gathered "at the gates" then entered the church with one another. Bimpe Archer, "The funeral of Constable Ronan Kerr - United in grief - and rejection of violence," Irish News, April 7, 2011, 6.

He said he was present to express his "abhorrence" about Ronan Kerr's murder. "A family says farewell to a hero," 2.


"Kerr family run for Ronan." According to Father John Skinnader, "I think that, as a people on the island of Ireland, we have moved into a new era of the peace process. It has come at a terrible price. We thank Ronan for giving his life for it." Adrian Rutherford, "From evil has sprung hope and goodness, Mass is told," Belfast Telegraph, March 31, 2012, first edition, 16.

Maguire, "Murdered Ronan's mum to run half-marathon," 16; "'Running for Roney' event raises funds for Sudan."


4 Smith, 100.


6 Smith, 101. The significance of this event was such that 30 years later the IRA would reference it in an apology for the suffering its actions brought about. See Irish Republican Army, "Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement of Apology," July 16, 2002, CAIN Web Service, accessed April 1, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira160702.htm.

7 "Bloody Friday: What happened," BBC News, July 16, 2002, accessed February 3, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/2132219.stm. In January of 1972 the IRA had gained sympathy and support following the Bloody Sunday killings. A lot of people entered the IRA with the notion that this action was the only means they had of protecting themselves and their people. See Smith, 92-93.


13 Smith, 103; McEvoy, 74; Mulholland, 117; Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchago, 44.
Among these seats, pro-Faulkner Unionists who seemed "more likely to negotiate along the lines set down by Whitelaw" took 24 seats. Those Unionists completely against a power-sharing executive including Nationalists took 26. Dixon notes that unless Alliance and NILP are considered unionist, most unionist assembly members were not supportive of Faulkner or the White Paper. The fact remains, however, that at this point in time, both NILP and APNI must be considered unionist parties in the sense that they backed the British link. Thus, their 9 seats (1 for NILP and 8 for APNI) should rightly be counted as part of the unionist "side" in the Assembly and, as they were pro-White Paper, belonging to a unionist majority supporting the paper. Dixon, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace*, 133-134; Farren and Mulvihill, 63, 74; Fionnuala McKenna, "Assembly Election (NI) - Thursday 28 June 1973," CAIN Web Service, accessed April 2, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/election/ra1973.htm; Smith, 103; Nicholas Whyte, "Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1973," ARK, accessed February 20, 2016, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fa73.htm.


Farren and Mulvihill, 75; Smith, 104.


Barton, 16; Smith, 105, 107; Mulholland, 118.

Barton, 16-17; Smith, 107-108. When Faulkner stepped down as UUP leader, he was left with 19 supporters in the Assembly. Those against Faulkner were in the majority. Farren and Mulvihill, 77.

McEvoy, 76; Mulholland, 118; Smith, 108.

Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchago, 46; Farren and Mulvihill, 78; Smith, 109; Mulholland, 118-119.

Smith, 109.

McEvoy, 76.
There was a lot of violence while the strike was going on and it was at this time that bombs went off in Monaghan and Dublin. Loyalists were responsible for these car bombs. 33 individuals died. The strike had been on for "three days." Smith, 109.

However, Brian Barton has argued that the party was more rigid than its appearance. In December of 1972, the SDLP advised Whitelaw to choose/support joint authority when it came to Northern Ireland. The SDLP argued "what was needed was the long-term certainty of political union by 1980, within the context of the EC." Barton points out that "By inflating the powers and role of the Council of Ireland, it made Faulkner's position untenable." Barton, 18.

The purpose of this body was to get political leaders in Northern Ireland to come to an agreement on "a governing structure." Smith, 112.

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees received from the Convention a very biased plan, essentially favouring the Unionist perspective. Rees rejected it. Smith, 112-113.

This party had been against Sunningdale and had backed the 1974 strike. Bew, Frampton, and Gurruchago, 47.

Smith, 115.

In April of 1981 Hunger Strike leader Bobby Sands became an MP, voted in by the nationalist electorate of Fermanagh-South Tyrone after the sitting MP Frank Maguire's death. Smith, 117.


Barton, 20; Smith, 117.


Barton, 22; Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 5; Smith, 123.

Smith, 123.


These differences made the 1984 Forum Report more confusing than would have otherwise been the case. Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 5.

Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 6.


The British Irish Association was established in 1972 and is still in existence. Their goals are "to promote mutual understanding between the peoples of our islands, to identify emerging issues, to support positive change and to look to the future." Through the BIA, people from different walks of life, including political and community representatives, gather annually to talk about important issues. "About us," The British-Irish Association, accessed February 21, 2016, http://www.britishirishassociation.org/aboutus.htm.

Cochrane, *Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism*, 8-9. There were differences of opinion within the Committee regarding how much the Republic ought to have a voice in the North. Thus, there were "majority and minority proposals." The minority did not want Dublin's influence to undermine the authority of Britain over the North. They supported "joint authority" just in certain arenas - for example, tourism. They did not support sharing power. They believed the assembly ought to possess just "local government powers." These would be carried out via committees as opposed to "a devolved executive." The majority, however, supported executive and consultative powers and influence for Dublin in the North. They believed that a type "of legislative devolution" was needed. They suggested "'co-operative devolution'". There would be an assembly chosen by the people. There would be an executive of five people, including three Northern Irish members, chosen by the electorate, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as well as the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Northern Ireland members would include two majority representatives and the other would represent the minority. Cochrane, *Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism*, 9-10.


Morton, "Anglo-Irish Agreement - Background Information."

66 Smith, 123.


68 Kenneth Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of Northern Ireland (Liverpool, UK: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 146-147. Although by 1985 it did not seem as though Sinn Fein was going to become the nationalist party of choice, as had been the case several years earlier, Fitzgerald claimed that, by 1985, "the negotiations had now gained a momentum of their own, and the joint fear of Sinn Fein electoral success had gradually been replaced on both sides by a positive hope of seriously undermining its existing minority support within the nationalist community." Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 22.

69 Sinnott, 51. Fitzgerald's actions and stance are not surprising given that his party had its roots among the pro-Treaty republicans of the 1920s. Historically, Fine Gael has been considered more moderate and subdued on the topic of the North. Tim Pat Coogan, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (London: Hutchinson, 2003), 815. See also, Martin Melaugh, Brendan Lynn, and Fionnuala McKenna, "Fine Gael (FG)," CAIN Web Service, accessed March 1, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/fgorgan.htm.

70 Smith, 125.

71 Britain was not, according to the letter of the Agreement, required to pay attention to what the Republic said. Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 23.

72 Barton, 22-23. The consent principle had been accepted by the Republic back in 1973 and Britain had backed Irish unity should that be the desire of most Northern Irish citizens. However, "the Sunningdale agreement was only a joint communiqué, while the Anglo-Irish Agreement wrote these clauses into an international treaty that was registered at the United Nations (UN)." Alan Morton, "Description of the Agreement Contents," CAIN Web Service, accessed March 1, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/describe.htm.


74 Smith, 124-125.
Smith, 124-126. Barton points out that the "consultative" power of the South would lessen if the parties in the North could come to a power-sharing arrangement. It would not be "'knocked out'", though. Barton, 23.

Smith, 125.


However, Sinn Fein's support had fallen 5% compared to the local election of 1985. Melaugh, "Anglo-Irish Agreement - Chronology of Events."


Smith, 128-129.

Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 216.

Barton, 25.


UPRG, Common Sense.

Barton, 26.

Barton, 26; UPRG, Common Sense.

Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 226. The UDA knew how to address different groups in a way that was most appealing to them. Via "McMichael and
the UPRG it presented itself to the general public as the soul of moderation.” The UDA journal Ulster, though, took the position that sharing power was not an option, ”on offer”, claiming the UDA ”has been accused of a sell-out because it has the 'audacity' to advocate political consensus. The UDA’s crime is to suggest that a form of 'qualified' majority rule should be considered for Northern Ireland. Of course the majority would rule, but minorities would have an input - albeit a minority one. This qualified majority rule would also mean that the SDLP would have to agree that Northern Ireland is part of the U.K., until the vast majority of its people desired otherwise.” The UDA also killed Catholics in this era - Catholics who were not IRA or paramilitary members. Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 225-226.

89 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 217; Barton, 26.


91 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 226-227.

92 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift.

93 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift.

94 Smith, 147.

95 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift.

96 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift. See also, Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 227-228.

97 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift. See also, Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 226-228.

98 McCusker, Robinson and Millar, An End to Drift.


100 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 236.

101 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 243.

102 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 244-245, 250.

103 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 251; Smith, 131.

104 Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 246-247.

Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 245-246.


Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism, 265-266.

Smith, 148.

English, 242; Barton, 26; Smith, 133.

Smith, 134.

In the initial two decades of the conflict the PIRA's armed struggle had resulted in double the number of Catholic casualties that the authorities were responsible for. Barton, 26; Smith, 132.

Smith, 132.


Smith, 132-133, 138.


Smith, 136.

Smith, 143-144.


Smith, 144; Barton, 27.
The more modern thinkers centred on Adams had been wanting to establish "a pan-Nationalist front" including themselves and the SDLP as well as the government of the Republic, southern parties, and Irish America. Smith, 143.


Smith, 150.


137 Mark Brennock and Frank Millar, "NI talks end with no plan to resume," *The Irish Times*, November 11, 1992, city edition, 1; Smith, 156.


536


153 A Citizens’ Inquiry, 358.


159 A Citizens’ Inquiry, 163-165, 248.

160 A Citizens’ Inquiry, 139, 163.


A Citizens’ Inquiry, 277-278.


A Citizens’ Inquiry, 50.


A Citizens’ Inquiry, 308; Fearon, 8-9.


“A Citizens’ Inquiry, 120.

A Citizens’ Inquiry, 299, 328. As demonstrated earlier, NIMMA and the Housing Executive have done work in this area.


“Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity,” GFA.


Smith, 157.

Smith, 157.

Barton, 28.

Smith, 157-158.

Barton, 29-30.


Smith, 160.

Barton, 30.


Hume and Adams, "First joint statement.”


Smith, 161.

Smith, 167.

Hume and Adams, "Second joint statement.”

Smith, 167-171.


Ten died, including children, in an IRA attack at a Shankill fish shop in October 1993. Over fifty were hurt. Those who lost their lives were all innocent Protestants except for a republican bomber who died as well. Two Catholics were promptly shot in retaliation. Seven died one week after this in the Rising Sun pub. One was Protestant and the rest were Catholic. Loyalists were responsible. This was payback for what happened on the Shankill. Dick Grogan, "Adams under pressure to end violence as 12 die in North," *The Irish Times*, October 26, 1993, city edition, 1; Martin Cowley, "Halloween massacre leaves a small village numbed in grief," *The Irish Times*, November 1, 1993, city edition, 1; "Five still in serious condition in hospital," *The Irish Times*, November 1, 1993, city edition, 4; Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1993"; Smith, 167-168.


Grogan, "Adams under pressure to end violence," 1.


The DSD and the Hume-Adams Initiative document were actually not all that different from one another. Smith, 176.

Mary Holland, "Have they gone far enough for Sinn Fein to deliver the IRA?" *The Irish Times*, December 16, 1993, city edition, 16.

British and Irish Governments, “Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration (Wednesday 15 December 1993),” CAIN Web Service, accessed March 4, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm. Smith, 170. On Reynolds' part, his positive move and willingness to make adjustments to Ireland's long-standing claim to the North, in the interest of peace, was a necessary factor in achieving the

213 As it was put in the Declaration:

The British and Irish Governments reiterate that the achievement of peace must involve a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence. They confirm that, in these circumstances, democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue in due course between the Governments and the political parties on the way ahead. British and Irish Governments, The Downing Street Declaration.

214 Smith, 177.


216 O Clery, "Adams asks US to take more active role on North," 1; Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1994." When he arrived in Dublin, he faced a demonstration by people who had suffered from IRA activity. Adams stated his opinion that the Troubles were in "the final phase". Paul O'Neill, "Angry voices from North greet Adams," *The Irish Times*, February 4, 1994, city edition, 8; Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1994."


IRA, "Ceasefire Statement, 31 August 1994."

"A new era that holds the promise of peace," The Irish Times, September 1, 1994, city edition, 1; Maol Muire Tynan, "Reynolds emphasises IRA campaign is over for good," The Irish Times, September 1, 1994, city edition, 4.

Maol Muire Tynan, "Reynolds joins hands with Adams and Hume to say IRA campaign has "ended for good"," The Irish Times, September 7, 1994, city edition, 4.


Smith, 182.

British and Irish Governments, "The Downing Street Declaration"; Smith, 188.

Smith, 188-191.


238 Smith, 212-213.


242 Smith, 195.


244 Smith, 197-198.

245 "Call for Peace," *Belfast Telegraph*, February 16, 1996.
Northern Ireland's five major papers arranged the survey. The papers involved were the *Belfast Telegraph*, *Irish News*, *Sunday Life*, *Sunday World*, and the *News Letter*. David Walmsley, "'Give us peace' is message from phone poll," *Belfast Telegraph*, February 19, 1996.


Colin Irwin, *The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 11. The UUP, DUP, UKUP, PUP, UDP, SDLP, Sinn Fein, APNI, NIWC, as well as Labour Party of Northern Ireland chose people to be involved in and with the polls. Irwin, 5-6. Following the 1998 referendum, the parties supporting the agreement alone remained involved with the survey work. Nonetheless, "all the survey reports were still made available to all the parties elected to the new Northern Ireland Assembly whatever their political persuasion." Irwin, 41-42. As parties participating in the talks and peace process were involved with the polls work, they were unable to easily ignore or refute the results. Irwin, 1. Ten parties were chosen to be part of the Northern Ireland Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. These were the parties the researchers chose to deal with. Sinn Fein received a spot in the Forum. However, they chose to abstain. Sinn Fein were outside the talks at the beginning of the research. A ceasefire was not being maintained by the IRA. Sinn Fein was still involved with the research, though. Irwin, 41.

The *Belfast Telegraph* said they would fund the initial poll. According to Irwin, “the Rowntree Trust agreed to pay most of the bills after that.” Irwin, 43.

Irwin, 40.

Key variables consisted of "gender, age, social class, geographical area, religious affiliation and political support.” Irwin, 39.
The *Belfast Telegraph* is Northern Ireland's most popular paper. Catholics and Protestants read it. Still, the *Belfast Telegraph* "would generally be regarded as a Unionist paper with a small 'u'." The parties did not want their role in the research or project to be widely known. Thus the sole "public reference" regarding it appeared "in the *Belfast Telegraph* report accreditations." Irwin, 40-42.

Irwin, 211. The parties received "detailed reports". The British and Irish governments received these too as did the Office of the Independent Chairmen. Irwin, 39.

Irwin, 4, 27.

Irwin, 7. The first poll was the work of Queen's University "academics." Irwin, 11-12.

Irwin, 7, 12. 715 questionnaires were answered for this poll. Participants listed, "in their order of preference", eight political possibilities for Northern Ireland. Nearly all participants could list their number one option and the majority could put the eight possibilities in the order they preferred them, with little trouble. Irwin, 114, 130.


Smith, 199.


Smith, 201.

On July 8, the DUP, UUP as well as UKU (United Kingdom Unionists) left the discussions because the RUC had chosen to not allow the Drumcree march. Gerry Moriarty, "Violecne [sic] flares across North as Drumcree confrontation spreads," *The Irish Times*, July 9, 1996, city edition, 1. On the 11th, the Chief Constable chose to let the marchers travel on the Garvaghy Road. Marie O'Halloran and Gerry Moriarty,

267 Smith, 202.


271 The poll had 1,038 participants. "71% of SF backers want ceasefire-poll," The Irish Times, October 22, 1996, city edition, 8. See also, Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1996."

272 Smith, 203.


Irwin, 14, 133-135.

Along party lines, 99% of Alliance supporters responded positively. More striking is the fact that 90% of DUP backers did! Support was very high (not below 90%) all across the board. Irwin, 14, 134.

Irwin notes that the amount of support did drop off to a small degree during the survey period with the realization that compromise was necessary to achieve an arrangement. However, more people also came to think agreement could really be achieved. Irwin, 134-135.

Irwin, 15. The survey offered several alternatives to participants regarding parties with connections to paramilitaries' participating in talks. Participants were to indicate the policies which were, for them, "Preferred', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable'." 40% of Protestants chose "All-party 'talks' after a ceasefire" as their "Preferred" option. Only 17%, 34%, and 18% preferred the other alternatives. 45% of Protestants thought "No to parties with paramilitary connections" was "Unacceptable." 65% of Catholics selected "Immediate all-party 'talks'" as their favoured option. However, for most Protestants (59%) this was "Unacceptable." Thus, a ceasefire right away, after which "All-party "talks"" followed, looked like the "most acceptable choice" of and for citizens. Irwin, 136.

These figures offer evidence that some people vote for Sinn Fein for other reasons besides a united Ireland. For some voters, supporting Sinn Fein may have been simply about seeking better terms for their community. Irwin, 147-149.

Labour had a very large majority in the House of Commons. Thus, they were not dependant upon Unionist support. Smith, 204-206.

Smith, 206-207.


"The settlement train departs," 15.


IRA, "Ceasefire Statement, 19 July 1997."


Deaglan de Breadun, "History event quiet, almost staid, affair," The Irish Times, September 10, 1997, city edition, 7; Smith, 213.

This really upset parts of the IRA. The PIRA divided in the fall of 1997 over "the peace strategy." The Real IRA was born. Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict – 1997"; Smith, 213.


Mark Simpson, "I entered with a heavy heart,'" Belfast Telegraph, September 24, 1997; Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1997."


The UUP had, days earlier, moved for Sinn Fein to be made to leave over an IRA "indication" of September 11 that the organization was not fully supportive of Mitchell's Principles. Also, a bomb had exploded at Markethill on 16 September and blame was being placed on republicans. Mark Simpson, "UUP seeks expulsion of SF team," Belfast Telegraph, September 17, 1997.

Mark Simpson, "I entered with a heavy heart"; Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 1997."


"'Yes' to talks"; Irwin, 92.

Mark Simpson, "Unionists dig in," Belfast Telegraph, September 13, 1997; Irwin, 16.

Survey fieldwork took place 4-22 of December 1997. Irwin, 166.

Irwin, 17. The UKUP as well as DUP did not stop being involved with the surveys despite the fact they refused to enter official talks with their Sinn Fein counterparts. Irwin, 166.

Irwin, 18.

"Why Ulster now wants to have new assembly [sic]," Belfast Telegraph, January 12, 1998; "Feasibility and reality of north -south bodies," Belfast Telegraph, January 13,
When it came to making changes to the RUC, most Protestants and Catholics viewed bringing in a greater number of Catholics as "Acceptable", at least - 72% and 97%, respectively. Interestingly, a mere 28% of Protestants viewed having the RUC remain the same as "Essential." 54% saw it as at least "desirable." Irwin, 175.

Most Catholics and Protestants in the December poll viewed "An elected assembly" as acceptable at least - 80% and 86%, respectively. Irwin, 177.

As far as North-South cooperation was concerned, most Catholics and Protestants would accept it when it came to shared issues. Irwin, 182-184.

Also, most Catholics and Protestants would accept a Council of the Islands. Irwin, 188-190.

Irwin, 19.

There were parties who wanted the statistics in electronic form. Irwin, 197.

Irwin, 197.


326 Staff Reporters, "Silent majority unites against killings,” Belfast Telegraph, January 30, 1998.

327 Smith, 218.


331 Smith, 218.


334 Noel McAdam, "'Gunmen aim to de-rail peace'," Belfast Telegraph, March 4, 1998.


337 Survey fieldwork occurred March 12 to 22. Irwin, 210-212.
Colin Irwin, "Majority say yes to the search for settlement," *Belfast Telegraph*, March 31, 1998; Irwin, 19, 198. Respondents were also asked "If you said 'Yes' would you still accept these terms for a settlement even if the political party you supported was opposed to them?" The result was that half said yes, half said no. 53% of Catholics said yes, but only 46% of Protestants. Irwin, 198-199.

All participants were to indicate what aspects "of a comprehensive settlement" were "'Essential', 'Desirable', 'Acceptable', 'Tolerable' or 'Unacceptable' to them." Irwin, 200.

Colin Irwin, "Deadline Ulster," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 1, 1998; Irwin, 204-206, 208.


Eric Waugh, "It's time to show cards," *Belfast Telegraph*, April 1, 1998. See also, Irwin, "Majority say yes to the search for settlement."


Smith, 238.


Smith, 238.


The decision was taken in secret. "IRA assembly move reported," The Irish Times, May 6, 1998, city edition, 8.


Fianna Fail, accessed March 12, 2016, https://www.fiannafail.ie/; Melaugh, Lynn and McKenna, "Fianna Fáil (FF)."

"UU MPs Break Ranks to Say 'No',' Belfast News Letter, April 24, 1998, 1, 2.


Irwin, 213.

Smith, 13-14, 21. It is thought that "a little over 42,000" people have been hurt due to the conflict. Smith, 21.

Smith, 21.

CHAPTER 11: A NEW NORTHERN IRELAND: STAYING THE COURSE


3 Martina Purdy, "'We have got to work it out','* Belfast Telegraph*, July 2, 1998.


7 Frampton, 124.


16 Irwin, 214.

17 Irwin, 214-215, 229.

18 Irwin, 215.


22 McAuley, 76.

23 Irwin, 251.
24 McEvoy, 137-138, 140-141.

25 Irwin, 233-236, 243-244.

26 McEvoy, 137-138.

27 McEvoy, 143.


29 McEvoy, 150. See also, McAuley, 76.


31 McEvoy, 150; IRA, ”Statement, issued (at midday) Saturday 6 May 2000”.

32 This new plan for the GFA to be completely in operation was declared on May 5 of 2000 by Britain and Ireland. The IRA gave their official agreement the following day. Irwin, 251-252.

33 McEvoy, 150.

34 Irwin, 252-253. In an October 2000 Belfast Telegraph survey, 69% of Northern Ireland respondents said they would support the Agreement today. Only 47% of Protestants said this. Irwin, 260.

35 Irwin, 253-254.

36 Irwin, 258.


39 McAuley, 78. Two UUP Assembly members opposed this, but with assistance from APNI and the NIWC Trimble was able to take up the position again. McAuley, 78.

40 Irwin, 272-273; McEvoy, 150.

41 Irwin, 225-226.

43 A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, 99.


47 They were considered an attack on a force that had stood up to terrorism for many years. Trimble called the Report a "shoddy piece of work". Darwin Templeton, "Trimble's 'shoddy' rap," Belfast Telegraph, September 9, 1999. The UUP was particularly incensed over changes to RUC symbols, seeing such an action as "a "gratuitous insult". The DUP and UDP were similarly upset. Noel McAdam, "Unionists fall out as they attack 'gratuitous insult'," Belfast Telegraph, September 9, 1999.


50 "Parties at odds over RUC reforms," Belfast Telegraph, August 17, 2001. Northern Ireland's revamped police would be overseen by a Police Board. The comparable body for the RUC had been the Police Authority which the SDLP had refused to be involved with in the past. Chris Thornton, "SDLP 'poised to back policing proposals'," Belfast Telegraph, August 18, 2001.

51 Noel McAdam, "UUP reaction to police plan 'could be delayed'," Belfast Telegraph, August 20, 2001.


55 The UUP had not at this stage decided to officially support the plan. Noel McAdam, "Party's move hailed a 'major concession'," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 21, 2001.


57 SDLP supporters also said yes (82%), while Sinn Fein and the DUP were not supportive. Over 65% of Sinn Fein supporters said "No" as did DUP supporters at 54%. "Hearts and Minds poll: Detail," BBC News. See also, Irwin, 272.


59 “At last, unionists take their places.”

60 The UUP had not at this stage decided to officially support the plan. Noel McAdam, "Party's move hailed a 'major concession'," *Belfast Telegraph*, August 21, 2001.


62 “At last, unionists take their places.”

63 Sinn Fein remained uninvolved. The latter's seats were redistributed to the Board's participants. *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland*, 107-122; Ben Lowry, "Flanagan urges Sinn Fein to support police," *Belfast Telegraph*, November 5, 2001; McEvoy, 152-153.

64 Chris Thornton, "Badge is a credit to SDLP - Cobain," *Belfast Telegraph*, December 13, 2001.


67 Thornton, "Badge is a credit to SDLP - Cobain."


“Badge agreement is a sign of hope.”


McEvoy, 154.


A Citizens’ Inquiry, 139.


According to McEvoy, "The NSMC and the north-south bodies operated on a 'care and maintenance' basis undertaken by the British and Irish Governments." Cross-border cooperation did not cease. McEvoy, 146-147.

McEvoy, 147.


Prior to 2003, the UUP was only not the North's biggest party twice (not including European elections). These times were the 1981 local elections when the DUP moved ahead, although not in a major way, and in the 1998 Assembly elections the SDLP took more first preference votes. Still, in the latter case, the UUP took more seats. Farrington, 165. In 2003 there were a lot of unionists who viewed the UUP as having let Sinn Fein enter the government. McAuley, 80-81; McEvoy, 161-162. Three UUP members, including Jeffrey Donaldson, ultimately defected to the DUP. Frampton, 132; McEvoy, 161-162.

Altogether, 58% of nationalists supported Sinn Fein. 42% supported the SDLP. Frampton, 132; McEvoy, 161-162. See also Melaugh, "Assembly Election (NI) Wednesday 26 November 2003."


Nicholas Whyte, "The 2005 Westminster elections in Northern Ireland," ARK, accessed April 16, 2016, http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fw05.htm. Reg Empey took over. McEvoy, 165. Trimble was faced with some hostility within the UUP as well as increasing alienation from the Agreement and his party within the Protestant voting bloc. Thus, Trimble went back and forth from showing real dedication to a pluralist Northern Ireland and using the "ethnic unionist card." Jonathan Tonge, "From conflict to communal politics: the politics of peace," in Northern Ireland after the troubles: a society in transition, eds. Colin Coulter and Michael Murray (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 56.

Tonge, "From conflict to communal politics," 56. In June of 2006, Empey was interviewed by the Irish News. Here he did acknowledge, to a degree, unionist parties' responsibility for division and violence during the Troubles. McAuley, 87.


Farrington, 148, 152.

Tonge, "From conflict to communal politics," 55. Indeed, alterations to the RUC, although mainly "symbolic", appeared to be a real unionist loss. The UUP did not have much influence when it came to the Patten Commission, even as they did select a commissioner. The UUP was held mostly responsible for the outcome, though, as far as Unionists were concerned. Farrington, 158.
93 McAuley, 87-88.


95 DUP, Your Best Guarantee for the Future; DUP, Leadership to Put Things Right; Farrington, 153-154.

96 McAuley, 103.

97 DUP, Leadership to Put Things Right; McAuley, 188.

98 McAuley, 188.


101 Frampton, 121-122, 185.


103 Frampton, 122.


105 Tonge, "From conflict to communal politics," 56-59.


107 Tonge, "From conflict to communal politics," 58-59.

108 Farrington, 151.

109 Sinn Fein, Building an Ireland of Equals, 1-2.


Farrington, 176. According to Irwin, in 1999, over 70% of those who backed the DUP desired the accord to be a success. The percentage has since gone down to 29%. Farrington, 176.

Farrington, 176.


DUP, Leading for Ulster, 8.


Frampton, 156-159.


Frampton, 160. The New York Times describes the killing as follows: "Mr. McCartney was attacked in a crowded Belfast bar, then taken outside and beaten with iron pipes. His throat was slit and his torso was slashed open with a knife. The attackers left him to bleed while they went back to the bar, scrubbed it of evidence and warned customers that the fight had been an internal I.R.A. matter." Lizette Alvarez, "A Killing in Belfast Is Turning Backers Against a Defiant I.R.A.," The New York Times, March 7,
killing-in-belfast-is-turning-backers-against-a-defiant-ira.html.

123 Frampton, 161.


125 The Sinn Fein individuals in question were supposedly "in the bar where the McCartney incident began." Ronan Henry, "Provos expel three," Belfast Telegraph, February 26, 2005; David McKittrick, "IRA offered to shoot killers of McCartney," Belfast Telegraph, March 9, 2005.


128 People were also upset at Sinn Fein's Mitchel McLaughlin who said on TV on January 17 of 2005 that he did not see the killing of Jean McConville in 1972 as "a crime". The IRA were responsible. McConville had 10 children. Frampton, 161.

129 David McKittrick, "IRA offered to shoot killers of McCartney," Belfast Telegraph, March 9, 2005.


131 Noel McAdam, "Fury at IRA offer to shoot killers," Belfast Telegraph, March 9, 2005.

132 Mark Hennessy, "McDowell says IRA is living in a twilight zone," The Irish Times, March 9, 2005, 5; McAdam, "Fury at IRA offer to shoot killers."

133 Joe Humphreys, "Offer to shoot McCartney killers horrific, says Ahern," The Irish Times, March 10, 2005, 11.


135 Frampton, 163-164.

136 Frampton, 164-165, 185.


In the European elections of 2004 Sinn Fein took more than 11% support in Southern Ireland and over 26% support in the North (the highest to date at that point in a Northern election). The party returned 1 MEP in Southern Ireland. They also returned an MEP in the North. This was a first on both counts. Melaugh, "Political Party Support in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 2015"; Frampton, 155-156.


Frampton, 171-173.


Alf McCreary, "Key role played by pair of clerics," Belfast Telegraph, September 26, 2005.


McCreary, "Key role played by pair of clerics.”


When it comes to defining loyalism, McAuley notes that class is a key element dividing loyalism from unionism. Loyalism is more than just armed struggle. McAuley argues that "It is...more meaningful to understand loyalism as an expression of unionism seen through the prism of Protestant working-class life." McAuley, 109.


152 Martina Purdy, "80% want weapons to be handed over now," Belfast Telegraph, February 9, 1999.


156 This "was a cover name used by the UDA." Kevin Hurley and Ben Lowry, "Murder victim will be buried tomorrow," Belfast Telegraph, January 14, 2002.


161 Fitzgerald, "Give Us Peace.”


164 McAuley, 122-123.


168 It was obvious Gary McMichael, leader of the UDP, remained very pro-Agreement. However, although it had backed the Agreement, more and more UDA members were against it. Indeed, Britain had "specified" the UDA as well as UFF over their violence in October of 2001 - in other words, their ceasefires were no longer on as far as Britain was concerned. Martin Melaugh, "A Chronology of the Conflict - 2001," CAIN Web Service, accessed May 30, 2015, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch01.htm; McAuley, 134.
169 They were essentially a "think tank," not a party. Noel McAdam and Ben Lowry, "Welcome for new loyalist 'think-tank'," Belfast Telegraph, January 14, 2002; McAuley, 120.


171 It was stated that "As from February 21, 2003, all units of the Ulster Freedom Fighters, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Young Militants in mainland Britain and in Northern Ireland have begun to observe a 12-month period of military inactivity." It was noted that a review would take place "every three months to ensure that there is a real and genuine political movement during and after the election of the new assembly in Northern Ireland." "Loyalist groups to swap guns for votes.”

172 "Loyalist groups to swap guns for votes.”

173 McAuley, 120. See also, Gordon Gillespie, The A to Z of the Northern Ireland Conflict (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 255.

174 McAuley, 150. Loyalist riots took place in Belfast in September of 2005. Police and militant loyalists shot at each other. The UVF as well as RHC ceasefires had their "recognition" revoked. McAuley, 143.


176 Hall, 5-6.

177 McAuley, 144-145.

McAuley, 145.

McAuley, 156.


Under the 1997 Decommissioning Act paramilitaries received "a partial amnesty" while working with the IICD and arms that were turned in would not be subject to "forensic testing." Allison Morris, "Amnesty extension 'must be last'," The Irish News, January 30, 2009, 14.


Victoria O'Hara, "Party leaders say arms move is the way forward," Belfast Telegraph, June 18, 2009.


O'Hara, "Party leaders say arms move is the way forward."


"Decommissioning is now a word that can be used," Belfast Telegraph, June 18, 2009.


McAuley, 196.


"Reaction to NI devolution plan”; Frampton, 173.


"Agreement at St Andrews," BBC: News, October 14, 2006, accessed June 26, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/13_10_06st_andrews_agreement.pdf. See also, "What is the St Andrews agreement?"; McEvoy, 166-167. According to the IMC in October of 2006, the IRA was not the organization it had been and did not want to resume the armed struggle. However, the DUP as well as others were not going to be happy without more. A pledge by republicans to back the police was imperative. Frampton, 174.


McEvoy, 169; Frampton, 177.

Frampton, 178.

McAuley, 181.


The March 7th Assembly election in 2007 saw a strong performance from the DUP and Sinn Fein. The DUP took 36 seats. Sinn Fein took 28, doing better than it ever had in an election in the Province. The UUP took 18 seats. The SDLP got 16. Interestingly, APNI received an additional seat, giving them 7. Frampton, 178; McEvoy, 170-171.


Ian Paisley, "Full text of Dr Paisley's statement," Belfast Telegraph, March 26, 2007, accessed June 26, 2015, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/full-text-of-dr-paisleys-statement-28396737.html. See also, McEvoy, 172. Not every unionist was happy about this. There were unionists during the election of 2007 who were upset that Paisley and
his party would consider sharing power with the republicans. When Adams and Paisley met in March of 2007 some left the ministry of Paisley's Free Presbyterian Church. DUP MEP Jim Allister established Traditional Unionist Voice, arguing that the "lure of office has clouded the Party's judgement." McAuley, 191.

216 Paisley, "Full text of Dr Paisley's statement."


218 McEvoy, 174; Frampton, 178.


223 Frampton, 187-188, 190.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
(Individual articles are cited in full in the endnotes)

An Phoblacht/Republican News
Belfast News Letter (sometimes known as the Belfast Newsletter or the News Letter)
Belfast Telegraph
Christianity Today
Derry Journal
The Docklands & East London Advertiser
The Guardian
Horse & Hound
The Huffington Post
Humani
Humanism Ireland
The Irish Catholic
Irish Examiner (Republic of Ireland)
Irish Independent (Dublin)
Irish News (Northern Ireland)
The Irish Times (Dublin)
Londonderry Sentinel
MailOnline
Mirror
The New York Times
NIMMA News
The Scotsman
The Telegraph (UK)
The Times (London)
Ulster Herald

PRIMARY SOURCES

CENSUS AND SURVEY MATERIAL


NISRA. “Table 19: Religions.” *Northern Ireland Census 1951 General Report.*


NISRA. "Table 8 Religions." *1971 Summary Tables.*

NISRA. "Analysis of Column Headed 'Other and Not Stated Denominations'" 1971.


NISRA. "Table 8A: Analysis of Column Headed "Other and Not Stated Denominations" in Table 8." 1981.


NISRA. "Table 8A: Analysis of column headed "Other Denominations" in Table 8." 1991.


**FICTION AND POETRY**


**PARTY MANIFESTOS**


APNI. This Time Put it There: Local Government Manifesto. 1977.


POLITICAL DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS


REPORTS


http://www.communitydialogue.org/content/women-and-sectarianism-ni.

http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/taskforcereport87.htm.


SECONDARY SOURCES

ARTICLES IN EDITED BOOKS


**BOOKS**


**ELECTRONIC BOOKS AND ARTICLES**


JOURNAL ARTICLES


**UNPUBLISHED THESIS**


**WEB SITES**

(Individual web pages and more minor websites are cited in full in the endnotes)


Ballymena Chamber Orchestra. http://www.ballymenachamberorchestra.co.uk/.


Belfast Humanist Group. https://sites.google.com/site/belfasthumanistgroup/. (Current site)


Church of Ireland. https://www.ireland.anglican.org/.


Department of Education. https://www.education-ni.gov.uk/.


Irish Council of Churches/Irish Inter Church Meeting. https://www.irishchurches.org/.


  http://www.gaeleaglais.ie/eolas-fuinn/culra/.


Northern Ireland Mixed Marriage Association (NIMMA).


  http://www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/.


Trinity College Dublin. https://www.tcd.ie/.


Youthlink: NI. http://www.youthlink.org.uk/.
APPENDIX: IDENTITY AND POLITICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS

Table 1: Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1990 or 1992.

Table 2: Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 2011

Table 3: Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1990 or 1992.
### Table 4: Identities of Protestant Respondents

(According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Identities of No Religion Respondents

(According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1990 or 1992.

### Table 6: Identities of No Religion Respondents

(According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Irish</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7: Political Identities of Catholic Respondents

(According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Political Identities of Catholic Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Political Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Political Identities of Protestant Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Political Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Political Identities of No Religion Respondents (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionist</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 13: Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1992.

**Table 14: Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Catholic Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 2011. Also, beginning in 2007, respondents could choose to "Remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule" or "Remain part of the United Kingdom with devolved government". It is possible that this alteration impacted respondents' answers. Percentages since 2007 in the above table combine figures for both responses.

**Table 15: Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1992.
### Table 16: Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of Protestant Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 2011. Also, beginning in 2007, respondents could choose to "Remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule" or "Remain part of the United Kingdom with devolved government". It is possible that this alteration impacted respondents' answers. Percentages since 2007 in the above table combine figures for both responses.

### Table 17: Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 1992.

### Table 18: Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Irish Unity and Percentage of No Religion Respondents Supporting Northern Ireland Remaining Within the UK (According to NILT (1998-2012) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For Irish Unity</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Remaining in UK</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: There is no data available for 2011. Also, beginning in 2007, respondents could choose to "Remain part of the United Kingdom with direct rule" or "Remain part of the United Kingdom with devolved government". It is possible that this alteration impacted respondents' answers. Percentages since 2007 in the above table combine figures for both responses.
Table 19: Percentages of Same-Religion and Different Religion Partnerships/Marriages (According to NISA (1989-1996) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Religion</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religion</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: From 1990 on, respondents could also choose "No religion at all." This table does not include these figures.

Table 20: Percentages of Same-Religion and Different Religion Partnerships/Marriages (According to NILT (1998-2005) Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same Religion</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different Religion</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This specific question was not asked after 2005.


Table 22 (Graph 2): No Religion, Religion Not Stated, and Methodist Populations (According to the 1991, 2001, and 2011 Censuses)
CURRICULUM VITA

Amanda Judge

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor (sabbatical replacement), September 2010 – April 2011
Huron University College
Course: History 3411E: Britain from 1688 to the Present

Instructor (sabbatical replacement), September 2006 - April 2007
Brescia University College
Course: History 020E - Modern Europe, 1715 to the Present

Teaching Assistant, September 2005 - April 2006
The University of Western Ontario
Course: History 231E - Canada: Origins to the Present
(Course Director: Professor Pierre Claude Reynard)

Teaching Assistant, September 2003 - April 2004
The University of Western Ontario
Course: History 020E - Modern Europe, 1715 to the Present

POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION AND DEGREES

Ph.D., History, the University of Western Ontario, 2017
Dissertation Title: Neither Here Nor There: Northern Ireland, Myth, and the People In Between.
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Brock Millman (The University of Western Ontario)

M.A., History, the University of Western Ontario, 2002 (Awarded in June 2003)
Thesis Title: Terence MacSwiney: Constructing the Myth of an Irish Catholic Martyr in Print and Ritual.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Gary Owens (Huron University College)

Hons. B.A., English/History, Brescia University College, 2000 (Awarded in June 2000)

HONOURS AND AWARDS

Graduate Scholarships:
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Doctoral Fellowship
(Awarded in the Spring of 2002. I took it up in January of 2003 when I began Doctoral
studies. The duration of the Fellowship was 48 months).