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Ethics and Responsibility of Post-Colonial Allyness

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Abstract

The history of the past few centuries is the history of European colonialism. Colonialism was the conquest and control of geographies and populations through the structuration of capitalist economies and violent relationships with the colonized. Since decolonization, there have been many remnants of colonial legacy: poverty, violence, trauma, and corruption. Many colonized participate in removing these remnants, yet the struggle requires partnerships with persons who occupy the other side of the colonial question. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to adapt the notion of alliances in other fields of struggle using post-colonial theory to chart out the specific ontological nature of the global legacy of colonialism in order to create a set of ethics and responsibility required to be a post-colonial ally to those who are undergoing the decolonial struggle. The ethics and responsibility will provide a means and justification for the awareness of the legacy of colonization and how to dissolve it, as well as a way to integrate these ethics into everyday life.

Key words: post-colonial, colonization, coloniality, ethics, responsibility, allies, alliances, tactics, Mignolo, Stoler, Fanon, Mbembe.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The events of the past few centuries of the world are the history of European colonialism. The countries of Western Europe had spread their power and influence by force throughout the world and have prospered for from the acquisition of riches. Specifically, colonialism is defined by Ania Loomba (2015, 20-24) as the conquest and domination of a specific geographical area and population that resulted in the restructuration of the economies of the colonized as well as the creation of complex relationships between the colonized and colonizer countries which facilitated a flow of both human and economic resources. One of the lasting effects of colonialism was the development and spread of European capitalism, technology, and thought (Loomba, 23). Furthermore, colonialism was marked by oppressive policies that included enslavement, racism, violence, and genocide, wreaking devastating effects on the colonized (Rönnbäck, 2009, 135-136; White, 2007, 217-218).

However, when colonization officially ended with the formal cessation of sovereignty from European countries to the colonized and the withdrawal of the occupying military forces and administration, there was not an increase of freedom for the colonized. Instead, what had resulted was “poverty, corruption, violence, and sometimes chaos” in realm of the formerly colonized, which continues to this day (Memmi, 2006, 1, 123). As such, colonization is not simply a historical event but survives as a continuous process of implicit subjugation that I will refer to as *coloniality*, the material and symbolic apparatuses and processes that further and enforce colonization, in terms of imperial powers of control and violence, do not exist in their original historical contexts. No longer do empires hold

explicit, conscious, and direct power over their colonial subjects, nor do these empires even persist in terms of their constitutive political sovereignty; yet their legacies still remain through the continuous presence of coloniality and its vast social, political, cultural, economic, and psychological conditions in which it exists and creates. Colonization was the active process of subordinating subjects into an exploitative hierarchical relationship that is both material and symbolic between themselves and the colonizer through the implementation of various means of force. Such means of force need not always be considered as physically violent in terms of conflict, although such conflict was undoubtedly common as a means of repression and control by colonial powers. Rather, the material and symbolic forces of colonization additionally and violently manifested themselves by the imputation of technology, thought, and symbols (in terms of things like infrastructure, identities, states, and economic systems) onto the colonized subjects (Schaffer, 2004, 138-147). The concept of coloniality refers to the state of being and nature of the relationships that the colonized and post-colonized subjects experience as a result of colonization. Anibal Quijano (2000, 533) argued that coloniality refers to a matrix of power which connects colonialism, capitalism, racism, and modernity that continually expresses colonial subjugation and inhabits vestiges of global power that exists today. The solution to tackling the matrix of coloniality is that the intersections of the matrix must be identified in their material and symbolic impacts to explain how the matrix exists outside of the temporality and spatiality of typical and explicit modes of governance and action such as states. Achille Mbembe (2003, 12) argued that sovereignty exists in a state of necropolitics, where the exercise of sovereignty is derived from control over life and morality. To

illustrate how sovereignty can exist after a juridical structure has ceased existing after a point in time, Mbembe (2003, 13) adapts Giorgio Agamben's postulation that sovereignty can remain as a fixed spatial arrangement that continually resides outside of a normal state of law. Sovereignty in this case for Mbembe "consists in society's capacity for self-creation through recourse to institutions inspired by specific social and imaginary significations" (Mbembe, 2003, 13). Given that the control over life was one of the primary methods of the establishment of colonialism over the use of various types of violence towards the colonized, I therefore posit that the continued presence of coloniality within post-colonized subjects are the ruins of colonialism and colonization in the form of material and symbolic processes of force. In this case, the ruins of colonialism are a structural force whereas colonization is a more micro-level process. As such, it is important to define and delineate coloniality and its conditions so that the post-colonial ally can identify and deconstruct the remnants of colonialism.

Colonialism is the historical event that caused coloniality, while coloniality itself is an ontological mode of existence. I only make such a distinction to illustrate that decolonization is not fully over even though colonialism itself as a historical phenomenon is thought to be over. The challenge of this thesis then becomes of how to frame these conditions of coloniality so as to accurately depict the times, relationships, location, impact and processes in which they exist.

To rise to this challenge, I will argue that coloniality exists as an ontological mode of existence in the form of assemblages bound together by simultaneously material and symbolic instances of physical and temporal violence that perpetuate an implicit and

autonomous process of continuous and liquid colonial sovereignty. I will postulate that coloniality is formed through the presence of three conditions in a colonized area: ruination, violence, and *commandement*. Stoler (2013, 9) proposed that academia should cease perceiving empire as a fixed location, and rather as a set of relationships that comprise colonial control and power. As such, Stoler maintains that scholars should look at ruination as a continual process rather than examining the ruins of colonial power and control. Fanon posited that what distinguished the practice of colonialism were the unique applications of violence and the physical and psychological traumas they caused. Lastly, Mbembe put forth the concept of *commandement*, the intersections of violence that create organizational rationality and the relationship between the post-colonized and violence which form colonial sovereignty. To summarize, ruination is the existence of coloniality as a continuous and linear phenomenon that cannot be affixed to any one physical centre. Violence is both the method of colonization and the residual impacts that affect the colonized. *Commandement* is the structuration of violence that continually recreates an implicit mode of colonial sovereignty through the linking of intersections of colonial violence. I will now develop each of these conditions in further detail to illustrate how the effects of colonization still persist as an implicit and continuous process of subjugation.

Condition of Ruination

The concept of an empire in itself implies a stable geographical and administrative centre, even as its borders grow or shrink. Ann Stoler provides a solution to this issue by proposing that scholars should instead focus on the nature of the relationships that

constitute imperial power and control rather than as a fixed conception of a state in both space and time:

To look at “imperial formations” rather than at empire per se is to register the ongoing quality of processes of decimation, displacement, and reclamation. Imperial formations are relations of force. They harbor those mutant, rather than simply hybrid, political forms that endure beyond the formal exclusions that legislate against equal opportunity, commensurate dignities, and equal rights. Working with the concept of imperial formations rather than empire per se shifts emphasis from fixed forms of sovereignty and its denial to graded forms of sovereignty and what has longer marked the technology of imperial rule. Imperial formations are defined by racialized relations of allocations and appropriations. Unlike empires, they are process of becoming, not fixed things. (Stoler, 2013, 9)

An example of a colonial ruin as “racialized relations of allocations and appropriations” is the historical violence between the ethnic groups of Hutus and Tutsis in Central Africa. The Belgian and German empires that colonized Central Africa created institutional arrangements that solidified the historically fluid social, economic, religious, and linguistic boundaries between the Hutus and Tutsis. Colonial authorities, following European racial theory at the time, imputed static labels of racial hierarchy onto both colonized groups. The Tutsis were labelled as pseudo-European ethnic elites whereas Hutus were portrayed as having an inherently servile nature. Such identities became reified under the political, social, and economic construction of the African colonial subjects under Belgian and German hegemony (in this case modern day Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe). Tutsis were granted economic and political privileges (particularly in the form of employment under colonial administrations) and Hutus were replaced in traditional positions of power by Tutsis. Mandatory social identification was imposed through the distribution of identification cards based on scientifically based physical characteristics that were recorded by colonial authorities and forcibly imputed

onto the identities of Hutus and Tutsis (White, 2009, 472-474). These previously fluid ethnic identities were effectively racialized by the state. Even after decolonization occurred in these African countries, the imputed characteristics of race and much of the norms and systems of administration, such as the identification cards, were still maintained by the Hutu majority. Following the period of decolonization in Africa, several instances of extreme violence by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority occurred as a result of the remnants of the colonial administrations. The most notable case was the Rwandan genocide of 1994 where 800, 000 Rwandans were killed in ethnic cleansing orchestrated by the government (White, 2009, 472). Such tragic violence amongst the Hutus and Tutsis in Central Africa unfortunately has not yet abated. The United Nations has reported that 436 people have died and that 200, 000 people have fled as a result of government violence in Burundi, a country that has similar proportion of Hutus and Tutsis as Rwanda (Reuters, 2016). Therefore, the racialized relations of appreciations and allocations on the part of the Belgian and German colonial empires still persist to this day due to the fact that their use of violent repression, symbolic hegemony, and demographic marginalization are reprised in recurring instances of extreme violence. Given that these symbolic and violent remnants continue to exist independently of the actual presence of direct imperial apparatuses, a suitable theoretical framework is required to control for the apparent disjunction between the material and symbolic elements of coloniality.

Stoler (2013) argued against the tendency of academics to consider imperial forms as limited to specific locations and time by advocating that the language and framework

used should switch from fixed instances of events to an understanding of imperial formations as an active process:

The fact that imperial forms have changed should provide a challenge, not render study of their obscured entailments obsolete. Our focus is less on the noun ruin than on “ruination” as an active, ongoing process that allocates imperial debris differentially and ruin as a violent verb that unites apparently disparate moments, places, and objects. (Stoler, 2013, 8)

As such, coloniality must be understood as a continuous phenomenon that exists independently of the tangible presence of colonizers and their apparatuses. At the same time, the circumstances and conditions of coloniality have to be recognized as transforming alongside the transformation of imperial conditions amongst the post-colonized. These imperial conditions have not yet subsided; they have simply changed their appearance and their processes, while their core ramifications, methods, and design have persisted and become entrenched. In other words, the prose of colonization has shifted, but the overarching narrative has not. This is not to be taken as a statement that all of the conditions of coloniality themselves become subtle, inconspicuous, and invisible to the colonized. Rather, it is the epistemic power of the colonizers that has rendered the perception of the conditions of coloniality as invisible to the colonizers, the colonized, and the non-colonized.

Condition of Violence

Now that I have explained how coloniality can exist and how it must be understood particularly in their specific contexts in time, attention must now be turned to

its explicit impacts. Stoler posits that the ruins of imperial assemblages must be analyzed in their material effects on the lives of the post-colonized:

This is not a turn to ruins as memorialized monumental ‘leftovers’ or relics—although these come into our purview as well – but rather to what people are left with: to what remains blocking livelihoods and health, to the aftershocks of imperial assault, to the social afterlife of structures, sensibilities, and things. Such effects reside in the corroded hollows of landscapes, in the gutted infrastructures of segregated cityscapes and in the microecologies of matter and mind. The focus, then, is not on inert remains, but on their vital refiguration. The question is pointed: how do imperial formations persist in their material debris, in ruined landscapes and through the social ruination of people's lives? (Stoler, 2013, 9-10)

To be able to answer Stoler's question, the explicit effects of previous instances of colonization must be considered in the context of the present. Stoler (2013, 10) provides the psychiatric analysis of the impact of colonization of Frantz Fanon as an example of how imperial debris functions. Fanon (1963, 181-185) argued that the violence undertaken through colonialism was unique in their implementation as opposed to other forms of imperialism, which resulted in a wide range of psychiatric trauma in addition to physical damage. Violence in this case characterized the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. The lingering effects of colonial violence are what partially comprise imperial ruins amongst the colonized in the eyes of Stoler (2013, 11). Such psychological symptoms are one of the conditions of coloniality that must be addressed by a new post-colonial ethics, which will now be further discussed.

The imperial assemblages of coloniality within the psychology of the post-colonized manifest themselves in the impact on the minds and bodies of the colonized. These pass through the generational effects on mental health and psychological well-being due from the previous implementation of constraints, identity reconstruction, and

violence by colonizers. Fanon (1963, 181) identified the mental conditions affecting those subjugated under the French colonization of Algeria and subsequent repression of resistance as the “seeds of decay” that result from imperialism.¹ For Fanon (1963, 182), colonization represented a “systematic negation of the other” that attempted to deny attributes of humanity to the colonized. In effect, the colonized Algerians became symbolic pawns of control for the French colonizers, which distorted the perceptions of self-worth on the part of the Algerians. Fanon (1963, 185-215) listed several of the mental conditions and symptoms of various Algerian and European individuals that were treated during the period of active Algerian resistance to French colonization. These conditions and symptoms included: sexual impotence, major depression, psychosis, anxiety, insomnia, incontinence, sadism, post-partum depression, anorexia, phobia of sound, phobia of electricity, delusions, social anxiety, and verbal incoherence. Fanon also identified conditions that were and are not typically associated in psychiatry and psychology, such as a phobia of collective discussion, as well as psychosomatic conditions that arose from colonial violence like stomach ulcers, muscular failure, hypersomnia, arrhythmia, premature aging, and abnormal menstrual cycles. The situations that caused all of these symptoms were involved in the colonialist violence at the time, such as rape and torture, as well as the trauma experienced from witnessing violence and its symptoms like murder and such. Although similar mental and physical

1 I use the term “condition” to describe the psychological impacts of colonial violence instead of the words “disorder” or “illness”, even though Fanon himself uses them in his writing. Fanon (1963), spoke of how colonial doctors described the pathologies of mental illness as a “congenital stigma of the native.” I therefore wish to avoid such colonial subjugation by abstaining from language that implies an individual failing and obscures the systemic contexts in which it occurs.

conditions can arise from the implementations of violence in non-colonial contexts, these particular instances carried with them the symbolic attachments of coloniality which transformed the impact of colonial violence. For example, Fanon (1963, 186) describes the use of rape by colonial forces against women labelled as attached to the Algerian resistance movement. Moreover, the perception of self that is distorted by coloniality (as Fanon argued as the “negation of the other”) also mutated the symptoms of colonialist violence and thus intensifies their effects. In other words, the medium of violence is used to deliver the message of coloniality while simultaneously being the message itself.

All of these conditions can continue to negatively affect their environments and the descendants of those who suffered colonial violence. However, the original symbolism of coloniality involved in colonial violence and its implementation through colonization may grow more implicit and inconspicuous and become attributed to other factors, thereby making the “negation of the other” invisible. This is not to say that the colonized are permanently damaged, as that would be reifying coloniality and thereby precluding the point of a post-colonial ally. Rather, this is to emphasize any particular events that occur within a previously colonial context must be held in consideration of this past damage. As Ann Stoler (2013, 6) argued, these impacts of violence in their present form can produce “new exposures and enduring damage” on the colonized. Therefore, the psychological and physical effects of colonization through violence must be considered as a form of current coloniality

Condition of Commandement

In addition to the psychological and physical conditions of coloniality as violence, there are the organizational conditions of coloniality, or in other words the underlying rationality of coloniality. Achille Mbembe (2001, 24), in his search for the type of rationality that allows the continual subjugation and regulation of post-colonized peoples, postulated the concept of *commandement*. *Commandement* rested on the “imaginary of state sovereignty” that used power to determine what is right. According to Mbembe, the use of power in *commandement* depended on three forms of violence: founding violence, the initial conquest that established the colony which created the space that where power is exercised and justified the user of power; a violence that I term as violence of legitimization, where violence occurred to create the legitimacy of colonial authority through the construction of language and justification of the necessity of the colonial mission; and the last form of violence is what I term violence of maintenance, where violence was used to “ensure the maintenance, spread, and permanence of authority” (Mbembe, 2001, 25). Mbembe (2001, 26) argues that the areas that colonial sovereignty and its authority exists in the intersections of these forms of violence:

Colonial sovereignty only existed in areas where these three forms of violence were deployed, forming a seamless web. This violence was of a very particular sort, immediately tangible, and it gave the natives a clear notion of themselves in proportion of the power they had lost. Its distinctive feature was to act as both authority and morality; it could do so for two reasons. First, it eliminated all distinction between ends and means; depending on circumstances, this sovereign violence was its own ends and came with its own “instructions” for use. Second, it introduced virtually infinite permutations of between what was just and what was unjust, between right and not-right. Thus, in regards to colonial sovereignty, right was on *one* side. And it was seized in the act of occurring. In face of it, there could be only one “wrong” and infraction. Anything that did not recognize this

violence as authority, that contested its protocols, was savage and outlaw.
(Mbembe, 2011, 26)

Commandement is thus one of the conditions of coloniality: It exists as both an organizational rationality and as the relationship between the post-colonized and violence, which in turn structure and affect the other conditions of coloniality such as the aforementioned psychological effects of colonial violence.

However, the question is now how to frame the location and nature of time, power and space with regard to the transposition of instances of coloniality in a post-colonial period where colonization no longer occurs. The concept of post-coloniality represents a tacit form of colonization by framing the status of imperial power over the colonized as the criterion of emancipation of the colonized rather than allowing the colonized to determine what they call emancipation. Therefore, we must understand the continuation of coloniality in its temporal construction. To understand the location of the post-colony in time, Mbembe (2001, 15) posits that the post-colony is the combination of several temporalities where it is difficult to place a beginning and end. These temporalities exist as time of passing, where time is a current that carries societies and individuals from a “background to a foreground”; and a time of entanglement where African existence is a multitude of interlocking past, present, and futures. Mbembe (2001, 15-16) contends that African social futures are not moving towards any single point in time, and that research on Africa failures to incorporate non-linear phenomena. Ato Quayson argues on a similar note that the use of history within colonial studies “cannot be separated by the task of integrating a grasp of the mutual imbrication of history's temporalities and their concomitant and intertwined spatialities.” Such a link is argued by

Quayson to be present in post-colonial studies without being fully acknowledged.

Therefore, I argue the final aspect of the condition of coloniality as *commandement* is the continued imposition of a linear temporality onto the post-colonized as it is enforcing a specific organizational rationality onto the entirety of the colonized which is the same as replicating colonialism.

Assemblages of Coloniality

Now that I have identified what the conditions of coloniality are, the challenge is now to determine how they all fit together. What is especially problematic is that these conditions exist in separate dimensions and forms: the concept of ruination is an ongoing process that can't be located to a fixed point in time while violence exists in a fixed space and *commandement* is a linear temporality. Furthermore, it can seem rather redundant to chart violence as a separate condition of coloniality and then define *commandement* as an organization of violence. The point is that these conditions do not operate within the realm of typical structures such as states. Instead, their symptoms occur as a result of a matrix of the different spatial and temporal intersections that the ruins of coloniality create (as determined by the political, social, cultural, and economic histories of said ruins).

Much of the symbols of coloniality, such as racial characteristics, are the result of material processes of colonial apparatuses like the aforementioned identification cards in Central Africa. While these symbols do independently exist from their material origins, they cannot be independently understood without this material context. Moreover,

colonialism involved the forced development of modern technology onto the colonized. Western technology, such as industrial and infrastructural technology, was imposed on the social, political, and economic spheres of the colonized, and the colonized themselves were integrated into these technological apparatuses by being forced into roles of subjugation under technical principles of the capitalist system. Thus, a bond between humanity and technology already exists as a result of colonization and all that is needed is for that bond to be recognized and integrated into analysis. It is important to understand this role of technology. Part of the enforcement of colonialism involved the imposition of machine-like state apparatuses onto the colonized. Therefore, to include technological analysis provides an opportunity to understand the interaction between the material nature of technology and the material sphere of colonial sovereignty. This will allow the post-colonial ally to better comprehend how coloniality exists as a continuous and autonomous process of ruination much like a machine in a factory that has been left to its own devices.

Therefore, understanding imperial formations as assemblages captures the heterogeneity and fluidity in which the formations exist. Separating the material apparatuses from concepts like states and assembling them with the post-colonized actants allows for the understanding of how the presence of colonizers in terms of their creation of subject positions still exists alongside different conceptions of time and space. Analyzing the remnants of colonization as assemblages thus allows us to accurately understand the specific moments of coloniality with regard to the multitudes of relationships that are present (cf. Latour, 2005, 1-13). Therefore, I will analyze imperial

formations and colonialist formations as assemblages for the remainder of this thesis. For this reason, I will also refer to imperial formations as imperial assemblages or as assemblages of coloniality according to the context.

Using assemblages as a method of analysis provides the ability to frame the symbolic and material aspects of coloniality in whichever manner to fit the current assemblage of coloniality in question, especially given the presence of temporal distance provided by the ruins of the imperial past. The ruins that Stoler cautions scholars against appear to them symbols of their past forms as a material force. Likewise, certain symbolic elements that existed in the past may have transformed into material forces, such as racial motivations behind violence. As such, there is a temporal distortion between the imperial power of the past and the presence of today. Equal consideration must be given to both their previous material and symbolic force as to how they transformed to their present form and beyond if we are to negotiate the temporal distance involved. Quijano (2000, 533) argued that coloniality is a matrix between colonialism, racism, capitalism, and modernity. All of these facets of coloniality are argued by Quijano to have originated different points in time in various symbolic and material forms. Therefore, to conceptualize ruination as a non-linear and continuous phenomenon will require the merging of symbolic and material analysis that Actor-Network Theory provides.

In addition, the organizations and spheres that the colonized may operate in outside of the West may exist in different forms (such as non-structural like fluid forms of social organizations). Therefore, to adapt the fluid definition of assemblages provides the

opportunity for the post-colonial ally to operationalize and comprehend the various conditions of coloniality.

Overview

As a result of the persistence of coloniality, there have been ongoing struggles for full decolonization, or the removal of the remnants of colonial legacy, among the groups that were formerly colonized around the world (Memmi, 2006, 16-24). However, decolonization by the colonized is only one piece of the puzzle. I believe that to have full decolonization involves the decolonization of everyone and all of the institutions around the globe through the removal of coloniality. Only the colonized may decolonize themselves; but it is up the rest of us to assist in the removal of the forces of oppression that inflict coloniality on the colonized.

In other fields of struggle in societies around the world like homosexuality, racism, and feminism, we recognize the faction of allies. Allies are individuals that understand and support the emancipation of those who are directly involved in fields of struggle against a particular form of oppression (Bishop, 1994, 1-4; Indigenous Action Media, 2014, 1; Davis, 2010, 4). Allies are a suitable concept for framing the types of partnerships that are required to break down the legacy of colonialism. However, these previous conceptions of alliances exist on a local scale, and colonialism is something that occurred on a global scale. Moreover, the global web of colonialism is a far more complex and systematic structures that also intersects with the other fields of struggle like racism and feminism. Thus, the definition of ally must be expanded upon with a knowledge and plan of action

regarding all aspects of colonization: historical, geographical, political, social, cultural, and economic.

Therefore, this thesis will present an argument for a form of ethics and responsibility for a type of post-colonial ally that is needed to aid in the post-colonial struggle of decolonization. To do so, I will adopt a previous framework of ethics and responsibility that deal with issues on a global scale, and then integrate post-colonial theory and current conceptions of alliances in other fields of struggle. The next chapter of this thesis will develop a theoretical framework for the type of ethics and responsibility that the post-colonial ally will require. To that end, I will adapt the thought of Hans Jonas to build such a framework. Jonas wrote on the topics of the threat of the extended reach of technology towards nature, the ethics and responsibility to counter this threat, the philosophy of biology, and the implications of Gnostic religion. There are three primary themes within Jonas' thought that are integral to my task: *ontological distance*, or the symbolic measure of theoretical disparateness of two or more objects; *spatial distance*, referring to the frequency of interaction between two or more agents; and *temporal distance*, in terms of the distance in time between two or more agents. These three concepts of distance will aid us in conceptualizing ways to bridge the width of the web of colonization that spans across the world, help bring awareness to the impacts of historical colonization, and will also explain how colonization constructs the complex relationships of difference between the colonizer and the colonized.

The third chapter will construct a definition of "allyness" that expands upon earlier conceptualizations of allies and alliances from other fields of struggle. Specifically, I will

argue that post-colonial allies must act in a mode of being known as allyness towards the colonized rather than forming an alliance with the colonized. There are two reasons why I propose this: that the immense ontological, spatial, and temporal distances between the those who are not colonized, the legacy of colonization, and the colonized are too great to use typical structures of alliances; and that the alliance has the connotation of a structure which runs the risk of reinforcing Western ontology onto the colonized, which was a historical method of colonization in itself. In addition, I will justify how allyness can and must operate from a position of everyday life.

The fourth chapter will be the crux of the thesis, as it will delineate the forms of ethics and responsibility required for post-colonial allyness. I will argue that there are three ethical principles for one to be a post-colonial ally: awareness, which requires the ally to learn about and be aware of the specificities of the post-colonial struggles in terms of the conditions of coloniality and how they affect the colonized; conductivity, which is a state of being that acts against the notion of empire as a fixed point of sovereignty; and dissolution, referring to the process of diffusing the historical privilege of those not directly affected by colonization. The non-colonized, as I refer to them as in this thesis, enjoy political, cultural, and social privilege over the colonized, such as their position in certain countries known as “white settler colonies”. Such privileges reinforce the post-colonial hierarchy around the world and thus reproduces coloniality. Furthermore, I will describe the responsibility of individuals that mandates the necessity of post-colonial ethics. Finally, I will argue how these post-colonial ethics and responsibility can co-exist with personal ethics and responsibility by postulating the concept of ethical synthesis: where ethics are

reduced to their nucleus comprised of their core values free of any spatial and temporal specificity so that that an ethical action can have the best possible impact on any socio-historical location that the action can reach.

For the final chapter, I will posit the tactics for the post-colonial ally to disrupt the material and symbolic aspects of coloniality. I will argue that the post-colonial ally must counteract the knowledge production of colonial institutions by shifting their relationship with the symbols that these institutions produces. In addition, they must recognize the inherent differences in the groups involved in the post-colonial struggle. Lastly, I will argue that a global network of forums is required to facilitate this recognition of differences.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework

This chapter will delineate the theoretical framework for the type of ethics and responsibility that I propose here. My primary focus will be on the ethics and sense of moral responsibility of Hans Jonas. I will argue in this chapter that the core foundation of Jonas' thought across his works is the concept of distance which for Jonas takes three forms: ontological distance, which is the symbolic measure of the theoretical separation or disparateness between two or more concepts within a specific paradigm; spatial distance, referring to the frequency and intensity of the impacts of actions between actants; and temporal distance, in terms of the measure of the potential of actions as well as lack of action made in the present and past that can affect the future. To do so, I will organize and discuss the thoughts of Jonas using his work under these three themes in this chapter.

Jonas' understanding of distance and his set of ethics and responsibility provide an excellent theoretical framework with which to develop my idea of post-colonial ethics and responsibility. Two of the major subjects of Jonas' writings, which I will review and summarize in greater detail next, are the extended global reach of technology in the modern age and the subsequent ecological threat to nature and humanity. Technology was a major tool in the spread of colonialism across the world. It not only facilitated the administration of colonies on a global scale, but also participated in the economic structuring of colonies and the subjugation of the colonized (Arnold, 2005, 85-87; Kusiak, 2010, 871-875). What must also be understood is that discussion of the global spread of technology must include consideration of the historical pattern of

development. Colonization developed and enforced the infrastructure, societal norms, and practices required for Western technology to exist and propagate in those areas of the globe (Mbembe, 2001, 14-31). In other words, modern technology does not solely facilitate global impact through the merit of its technical qualities, but rather through the enforcement of technological infrastructures and norms of use of technology around the globe. In this sense, colonization and the extended reach of technology in the modern age are symbiotic. Therefore, an adaptation of Jonas' themes of distance alongside his notion of ethics and responsibility not only provides a suitable framework to develop a post-colonial ethics but also an imperative to do so, since discussion of the role of colonialism in the extended reach of technology is absent from Jonas' work. Jonas does not explicitly address the notion of post-colonialism; This thesis will serve as an advancement of Jonas's work with the theme of post-colonialism.

Review

In this section of the chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the writings of Jonas. The works of Jonas can be categorized under three consecutive themes in order of when they were written: Gnosticism; the philosophy of biology; and the ethics of technology (Scodel, 2003, 339).

When writing on Gnosticism, one of Jonas' major foci was the separation of mind and body as well as the separation between humanity and God in Western thought and their theological implications. Jonas' work on Gnosticism and the separation between humanity and God originated as responses to the theology and ontology of Martin

Heidegger. Rather than Christianity existing as an event where all aspects of Christianity were destined to happen as was posited by Heidegger, Jonas instead argued that Christianity exists beyond time and thus defied any attempts at ontological classification. In addition, Jonas postulated that the specific commands that God gave to Biblical figures were ethical mandates rather than ontological imputations (Wolin, 2001, 101-103), thereby changing the focus to a set of principles for action.

Later, when writing on the philosophy of biology, Jonas (1966) tackled the distortion between philosophy and science due to the differences in ontology involved, and the philosophical implications of the nature of organisms. I feel that Jonas was continuing the same Heideggerian framework for this later argument that Jonas used in his analysis of Gnosticism. While using the analysis of the ontological separation of God from humanity, Jonas replaced God with nature instead. Most importantly, it is in his writings on the philosophy of biology that Jonas attempted to solve the separation of mind and body in Western thought by interweaving both philosophy and biology in order to integrate both symbolic and material understanding of nature and life.

Lastly, in the work that Jonas is most known for: *The Imperative of Responsibility In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age*, Jonas grappled with the threat of the extended reach of humanity into nature and the future, and subsequently proposed a set of ethics and responsibility meant to address these issues. For Jonas (1996, 99), the development of modern technology gives humanity the ability to damage the future and its inhabitants for an unforeseeable period of time since the extent of the damage is unknowable due to humanity's inability to perceive the future. However, Jonas felt that

current versions of ethics were not equipped to deal with the impact of the future as they were focused on the immediate spatial and temporal circumstances. Jonas ultimately posited a “heuristics of fear” that would provide the foundation for these technological ethics and responsibility where humanity would constantly recognize the uncertainty of the future to continually adapt their actions with regards to their potential (Scodel, 2003, 339-368). Even though Jonas appears to have shifted into a field separate from biological philosophy, I argue that Jonas still maintains a Heideggerian framework. Firstly, the eschatology that Jonas imputes onto the threat of modern technology on nature resembles Heidegger’s concept of destiny. Moreover, the ethics that Jonas proposes stem from his analysis of Biblical commands as ethical mandates in that Jonas wishes to avoid humanity to have a destructive destiny by developing an ethics that considers the implications of action and modes of being towards the future.

Distance

For this section, I will outline the concepts of ontological distance, temporal distance, and spatial distance that are present in the thought of Jonas. These three concepts of distance will serve as a framework for developing an ethics specifically for the unique case of post-coloniality. It is important to note that these different types of distance are not mutually exclusive in the different strands of thought of Jonas; they often overlap with each other, although certain measures of distance tend to be more prominent than others.

Ontological Distance

This section of the chapter will discuss the measures of ontological distance in the various arguments that Jonas put forth, such as the distinction between mind and body in Western thought, the distance of the Western mind to the rest of nature, the relationship between philosophy and the sciences, and so forth. Mainly, the primary form of ontological distance is the distance between the conception of humanity and nature which is comprised of various aspects that I turn to now.

The central theme of Jonas' philosophical endeavours is that of ontological distance. I contend that ontological distance in the context of Jonas' work *is the symbolic measure of the theoretical separation or disparateness between two or more concepts within a specific paradigm*. Theoretical separation and disparateness are measured by the level of significance and symbolic importance that both concepts place on each other in a paradigm, or at the very least the significance that one concept places on the other. An example of theoretical separation or disparateness would be the view humanity and nature as ontologically distinct phenomena, rather than the contrasting view of humanity being a component of nature. For the purposes of this thesis, ontological distance is defined as being negatively correlated with significance. Significance in this case refers to the intensity and frequency of meaning and understanding of a material or symbolic object by another material or symbolic agent; in other words, the less significant that one concept is to another, the more ontological distance there is between them. Jonas (1984, 4) outlined the ontological characteristics of previous notions of ethics in pre-modern times which he deemed relevant for a contrast of the state of things in the modern world

to denote the relevance of the change of human action. The first of which is that any interactions with the nonhuman world were ethically neutral since nonhuman objects were not held to be significant (Jonas, 1984, 4). Any actions made with regard to the object of the non-human world were not considered to be infringing on the processes of natural life. In terms of the subject, activities that were not seen as a contribution towards the purpose of humanity were seen as outside the realm of ethical significance (Jonas, 1984, 4-5). In this case, I believe that there is an ontological distance between humanity and non-humanity because of the lack of significance imputed by humans to the non-human, thereby denoting a lack of interaction between the two concepts.

The second characteristic of pre-modern ethics in the West for Jonas is that previous conceptions of ethics were anthropocentric in that they only concerned themselves with interactions between humans in themselves. In addition to such anthropocentrism, humanity and its nature were seen as being as constant and immutable phenomena and not responsible for the development of the method of producing objects or determining the necessity of action. As such, I argue that there are two forms of ontological distance inside these anthropocentric traditional ethics. The first is that there is an extreme ontological distance between humanity and nature since there is no symbolic significance at all being placed on nature by humanity. The second is that there is limited ontological distance between humanity itself given the lack of distinction between humans afforded by the perception of a constant and immutable humanity (Jonas, 1984, 4). Immutability in this case refers to the fact that humanity perceives itself

as unchanging and not requiring any change, as well as the fact that humanity is seen as a homogenous entity comprised of individuals.

Jonas also attributes a similar form of such anthropocentrism to the Western philosophical tradition. For Jonas (1996, 59), Western philosophy erringly fixes its gaze solely on the human subject and “attributes to him as a unique distinction much of what is actually rooted in organic existence as such.” As a result, Western philosophy prevents an understanding of the organic world by inhibiting the width of human self-perception. Biology thus becomes limited to explaining physical facts of life thereby preventing full understanding of the nature of life by humanity. To regain this understanding, Jonas advocates for reading biological texts with a philosophical lens. Doing so would aid the reconciliation of the conceptual separation of mind and body in the West, and simultaneously improve the understanding of both the organic and human realms in nature.

In addition, Jonas (1996, 61-67) argues that the attributes of nature and humanity's role toward them are not wholly considered and argued by previous conceptions of ethics. This is not necessarily only due to the type of ethics, but rather stems from the perception of nature by humanity that Jonas refers to as scientific and domineering. Nature is reduced to being seen as a passive and accidental phenomenon instead of something honoured. As such, Jonas posits that the natural sciences are not fully sufficient in providing a full explanation of nature even though the human mind is allegedly capable of recognizing its responsibility for the planet. Jonas reverses the direction of the ontological relationship by pondering the implications for the responsibility and

relationship of nature itself towards the human mind. I would say that there is an ontological distance from nature towards the human mind.

Continuing his theme of ontological distance between biological concepts, Jonas (1966, 17-18) maintained that the differentiation between life and death in Western thought is a significant distinction that substantiates the development of the dualist and monist schools of thought. For Jonas, (1966, 8) death represented the unintelligible and unknown in pre-modern times, whereas life was perceived as self-evident and no need of any sort of explanation. I argue that this argument coincides with the previously discussed ontological distance between humanity and nature. Because life is seen as self-evident, and nature is seen as something that originated with life, nature takes on the guise of being passive and accidental since it lacks an appearance of ontological agency. In other words, humanity sees nature as passive because humanity assumes nature happened by itself.

Jonas also argued that there is no longer a distinction between the realm of humanity and that of nature: “the boundary between ‘city’ and ‘nature’ has been obliterated: the city of men, once an enclave in the non-human world, spreads over the whole of terrestrial nature and usurps its place” (Jonas, 10, 1984). In this case, it can be said that there is no ontological distance between humanity and nature considering that they occupy the same realm.

Spatial Distance

The second foundational theme of Jonas' writings, spatial distance, is most prevalent in his thought on ethics and responsibility. Spatial distance refers to more than just the typical definition of a physical measure of range, and includes the frequency and intensity of the interactions of actants in a given setting. I argue that for Jonas, the increase of spatial distance between actants is one of the primary characteristics that ground his emphasis on ethical thought and action regarding the extended impact of humanity around the globe and in nature. This section of the chapter will accordingly analyze how Jonas' work theorizes spatial distance, and the utility of this idea for our comprehension of the impact of spatial distance on coloniality.

Jonas (1984, 50) argued a certain form of knowledge was required to be aware of the space and time of action in order to be moral. This form of knowledge exists not in the realm of esoteric technical expertise but a sort of common sense that can be shared by all good humans. Such knowledge was only possible because the space and time of action was only limited to a specific and immediate physical, cultural, and social context.

Jonas (1996, 4) maintained that traditional ethics had to maintain some sense of intimacy between the values in question, the action itself, and the objects involved: "The good and evil about which action had to care lay close to the act, either in the praxis itself or in its immediate reach, and were not matters in remote planning." (Jonas, 1996, 4-5) Jonas provides the example of Christian commandments to emphasize the sense of closeness within their tenets such as loving one's neighbour as oneself and doing unto others what they wish to do to them. What is particularly indicated here is that both the

actions and presences of the ethical agent and the other are close to each other or simultaneously present in time. Thus, there is a short spatial distance involved in these traditional ethics given that there is only emphasis on action and responsibility to members of one's own community.

The concept of spatial distance in Jonas' writings on the relationship of the mind and the increased power over of the planet and technology also corresponds to measures of ontological distance between the body and mind, for there is now spatial distance between the human mind and the rest of the world. For Jonas (1996, 53-55), the separation of the concepts of mind and body in Western thought alongside the expansion of global technology have resulted in the expansion of the influence of the human mind over nature. Because of such separation, the human mind is seen as serving the human body, and with the inflation of consumption and power over the nature, Jonas argues that the human mind "wreaks havoc on nature" (Jonas, 1996, 53) by encouraging immense gluttony by humanity. With this gluttony of humanity growing at an ever-increasing pace, the intensity of the consumption of the human species of the resources of the environment likewise increases and thus changes the degree of consumption from a sustainable model of harmony to an unsustainable one. To provide an alternate perspective on how to solve this issue, Jonas (1996, 55) reverses the direction of the relationship between humanity and nature by asking if nature can continue to tolerate the presence of the human mind as well as if nature should eliminate the human mind in order to be able to preserve itself. In order to solve the conflict between humanity and nature, Jonas (1996, 51) casts light on the problems with the ontological equipment of philosophy that would ostensibly

provide the answer to this issue. Jonas contends that the human mind is capable of recognizing its own responsibility for ensuring the survival of nature and the planet from the threat of the extended reach of the mind. As such, he calls for a renegotiation of the underlying framework of philosophy. In philosophy, the analysis of “the good life of the individual, about the good society, about the good state...” (Jonas, 1996, 51) is limited to exploration of human actions strictly between human beings but rarely concerns the individual as an actor in nature. To solve this, Jonas proposes that there should be the creation of a new conception of human beings. In this fashion, the new conception of human being would be one that sees no ontological distance between itself and nature which would in turn reduce the spatial distance between the human mind and the rest of the globe.

Temporal Distance

The final form of distance featured in Jonas’ writings is that of temporal distance, or the distance between two actors in time. Temporal distance refers to the measure of the potential of actions made as well as the lack of action taken in the present and past that can affect the future. This section of the chapter will demonstrate the instances of temporal distance that are discussed in Jonas’ work. The main channel where Jonas (1996, 99) measures temporal distance is in both the assumption and mandate of the continued existence of humanity in the near and far futures, which Jonas (1996, 99) labels as an “ethics for the future.” However, he clarifies that this is meant to be a contemporary ethics that defends the denizens of the future from the actions of the past. What characterizes this temporal moral responsibility is the lack of consent that the denizens of

the future have to their existence, as well as to the actions of the past. Given that it is physically impossible at the current moment to gain complete knowledge of the future as well as the consent of those in the future, individuals are called upon to consider the consequences of their actions and modify their behaviour.

Jonas (1984, 162) specifically indicates that the major problem with the Baconian ideal of power over nature is not a question of an intrinsic flaw in its processes and performance, but rather that it is too successful at what it aims to accomplish. With the total rise of human power over nature, Jonas (140) claims that there has been extreme economic and biological success as a result. Such economic success is the extreme increase in per capita production and the immense variety of goods available for consumption. This has the danger of rapidly depleting the finite amount of resources that exist within the world. In terms of biological success, the population growth around the world has risen to a substantial level that will render its potential economic benefits pointless and remove said growth's capacity to control itself. However, both Marxism and capitalism cannot fully contend with the possibility of mitigating such seemingly unstoppable success. Marxism does attempt to provide a new set of ethics, but it is seen as insufficient as Jonas (147-160) views it to be built on the technological foundation of capitalism. As a result, Jonas (141) argues that humanity's power over nature needs to be reigned in since both humanity and nature are both in danger from each other. To do so, "only a maximum of politically imposed self-discipline can ensure the subordination of present advantages to the long-term exigencies of the future" (Jonas, 142). Likewise, such dire warning extends to his call for a new form of humility over such an incredible

magnitude of power. This humility would regulate the temporal distance between the exigencies of the future and the advantages and exigencies of the present.

The reach and persistence of these technological actions and their implications are perceived to be bound by the duration of the existence of the ethical agent and the other. By reach and persistence, I am referring to the impact that technology has on the future and across the continents of Earth. In addition, Jonas (1996, 101) argues that humanity are the only beings who can assume and take responsibility for the future, due to the “ontological capability” of humanity which is the ability to decide on which action to take. For Jonas, this means that responsibility is a necessary component of freedom, as responsibility exists regardless of the authority that that is present. A notion of responsibility for the impact of technology is therefore necessary in this case. Because of the constantly increasing power of modern technology, there is an increase in the degree of responsibility for humanity to be mindful of the impact of its actions in time. In this case, there is temporal distance between humanity and the impact of its actions in the future. However, there is a unique mathematical condition to this incarnation of temporal distance, in that this temporal distance is exponentially increasing due to the constantly increasing power of modern technology.

Another type of temporal distance was present in Jonas’ (1974, 12) discussion of the implications of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative: where individuals are called to act so that their actions can be made into universal law. The issue that Jonas (1974, 13) took with this imperative is that it primarily has a logical foundation rather than a moral one. Because logic in this case is the basis of the categorical imperative, Jonas argued that

there is no moral space for a responsibility towards humanity in the future, as the logical basis for sacrificing the past for the future is the same as sacrificing the future for the present given that there is no self-contradiction in both.

In an attempt to postulate a more suitable imperative for the purposes of mitigating the potential impact of human action in the future, Jonas (1973, 14) dictated an imperative that has a moral basis rather than solely a logical one, where humanity must act in a manner where the permanence of humanity's existence in the future is guaranteed. With this imperative in mind, Jonas is calling for a continuous and unlimited extension of the temporal horizon of the actions made by humans today towards the humanity of the future.

To exemplify the nature of a future-oriented ethics, Jonas (134) cites the relationship between a parent and its child as an archetype of responsibility. For Jonas, a newborn child represents several states of being. A child already is something by being born as a living biological organism. It also carries with it the potential to be a full adult human being with the necessary physical and mental capacities, and thus it is othered. In creating a child, there is an implicit pledge to continue its existence as an organism and as its future as an adult human being. Even others who are observing the growth of the child are argued to have an innate duty to ensure that the growth of the child occurs safely. Jonas argues that there is a continuing necessity for everyone to participate in where the power of the parent and of the community result in any forms of action and inaction having possible negative consequences. This notion of responsibility is thereby derived from the necessary conditions for existence in itself. Jonas claims that governments have

a responsibility towards the children that is unique from its the responsibility towards the adults: “Infanticide is a crime like every murder, but a child's dying of hunger, that is, permitting its starving to death, is a sin against the first and most fundamental responsibilities in which man can occur” (Jonas, 1974, 135). As such, since childbirth is a perpetual phenomenon, there is a continual sense of responsibility for humanity. Thus, there are two instances of temporal distance at play in the adult-child framework of responsibility. Since childbirth is a constant phenomenon that tends to occur at almost every interval of time alongside the presence of already existing humans, there is an extremely short temporal distance between humanity and childbirth. However, the assumed perpetual constancy of childbirth also creates a second instance of a much longer and seemingly infinite temporal horizon given the predication of children existing in the future.

I argue that Jonas’ theorization of the adult-child relationships serves as the prime synopsis of the theoretical foundation of Jonas’ work. Jonas continually espouses the necessity of developing and maintaining knowledge throughout his work. In this case, knowledge is required to not only be mindful and act on the necessities of childhood at the current moment, but to also simultaneously care for the future of the child. In other words, the knowledge of childhood in the future must inform the knowledge and actions towards childhood in the present, and knowledge of the childhood of the present must inform the actions and knowledge of the childhood in the future. In this fashion, the two instances of temporal distance would be able to be bridged. Moreover, such temporal distance indicates the power dynamics involved where the parent has both the constant

and fixed degree of involvement by being compelled into the position of caring for a child due to the events that led up to it such as giving birth to it or agreeing to adopt it. I do not mean to convey this parent-child relationship as my choice of theoretical groundwork for post-colonial ethics and responsibility as that would be infantilizing the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized which in turn would unintentionally justify a paternalistic responsibility. Instead, I mean to distinguish the example of the parent-child relationship as indicative of the effects of power and socio-historic positions that implicitly bind humanity together and which determines the degree of ethics and responsibility required for those particular socio-historic positions. There is only spatial and temporal distance between actants because of the links created between socio-historical positions by the historic legacy of colonization. When an individual is born, they are not born into their own blank slate of history where they are free to determine their own socio-historic position independent of all others. Rather, they are immediately thrust from birth into a specific condition of history with all of the circumstances that led to that very moment.

Jonas (1984, 142) also grappled with the possibility of the ideologies of Marxism and capitalism in providing emancipation from the question of the survival of humanity.² According to Jonas (1984, 140), Marxism and capitalism both espouse a problematic worldview that reflect the intrinsic dominance of science, technology, and industry in

2 Jonas does not give any sort of specific definition of Marxism in his discussion. Walter Weisskopf argues that Jonas is broadly referring to Marxism as any ideology or system that is non-capitalistic and/or actively opposed to it. On a similar note, Weisskopf infers that Jonas uses capitalism as a universal and generalized term to refer to any system that involves capitalist elements regardless of the amount of control and command in a free market. (Gordon and Buckhart, 2014, 32)

human civilization: the Baconian concept of assuming power over nature through the growth of technology, which results in the notion that linear cultural, political, social, moral, and technical progress is a beneficial, necessary, and perpetual phenomenon. It is here where Jonas implicitly interweaves the questions of ontological and temporal distance with the question of ideology. Because of the three actants of time, ideology, and humanity, in this equation, there are three instances of temporal distance at play here. The first is the temporal distance that the Marxist and capitalist ideologies create and interact with. Such temporal distance arises from the frequency of change that is slated to occur in the future. Marxist ideology involves assumptions of future change in its statements, whether it is the notion of improved technology, the perpetuity of dialectical struggle, and the eschatological end to such dialectical clash. Capitalist ideology, on the other hand, requires the continual presumption of the existence of the resources necessary for the production of commodities, the potential for perpetual growth, and the constant innovation of technology.

Distance and Colonization

This section of the chapter will discuss how the three themes of ontological, spatial, and temporal distance will serve as the theoretical framework for this thesis. The legacy of colonialism and the relationship between the colonizers/non-colonized are characterized by the instances of immense social distance between them.

There is a great ontological distance between the colonizers/non-colonized and the colonized in the form of the anthropocentrism present in Western thought and ethics

that Jonas criticized which post-colonial ethics must keep in mind. Colonization involved the ontological domination of the colonized through the hegemony of Western anthropocentrism. The separation between mind and body is not native to the cultures of the colonized, yet the processes of colonization were constructed under such a division. Moreover, the description of humanity as an immutable phenomenon comprised of similar individuals is also an incompatible notion, and thus must also be revised in a post-colonial ethics.

In addition, the extension of the human mind over nature is a strikingly similar parallel to the historical structures of colonization, and represent an ontological distance between the mind of the colonizers and the bodies of the colonized. The colonies were providers of materials meant for the consumption of the colonizers in their home domain. In this fashion, the mind of the colonizers extended over the body of the colonized world. Thus, colonization can be considered as part of the extension of human's overconsumption of nature. This is not to say that I am equating the colonized to the phenomenon of nature. Rather, I am identifying a similar form of relationship between the colonizers of the colonized as a homogenous entity similar to nature as the "body" of the colonized. In addition, this postulation of the power of the mind over nature also betrays an implicit and most likely unintentional implementation of the anthropocentrism that Jonas is cautioning against. Humanity is held as a collective agent responsible for the spread of technology and the ever increasing pace of gluttony, yet humanity is held as a homogenized agent behind this rather than the processes that guide such consumption.

There is also ontological distance in that the colonized and non-colonized can live in many different physical, cultural, political, and social contexts even if they occupy the same spaces in which these contexts exist. Therefore, a certain form of knowledge must also be discovered for the possibility of post-colonial ethics. However, the caveat lies that this form of knowledge cannot be held as universal lest it falls in the same trap that colonialism did with its claims to universality.

These conceptions of ontological distance are relevant to post-colonial ethics as they also illustrate the historical relationship of the colonizers to the colonized. Throughout colonization, the colonized were seen as non-human by the colonizers. However, this was not in the literal sense that they lacked the attributes of humanity. Rather, they were considered to be part of the environment for the purposes of its synthesis and its reconstruction (Carr, 1985, 50). In other words, they were seen as building blocks in the same way as the land and resources that they resided. Furthermore, the ethics of the colonizers towards themselves did not extend towards the colonized as evidenced by the violence and modes of control exercised on the colonized. Such violence and modes of control were not used towards the colonizers. Therefore, post-colonial ethics will require a recognition of the humanity of the colonized free from the dehumanizing aspects of coloniality.

In terms of spatial distance for the post-colonial question, there is a short spatial distance between the intentions of people using the ethics of everyday life in the West and the colonized. This is because the ethics of everyday life lack an accurate understanding of the consequences of and situation surrounding their actions. This should

not be taken to mean that the common ethics of today ignore the colonized. Indeed, many popular altruistic actions such as charity, volunteering, and other “humanitarian” works are oriented towards the subaltern by the former colonizers of the West. Rather, individuals use the same ethics for their everyday life that they use for the plight of the colonized. In a sense, people act as if the colonized live in the same political, cultural, economic and social spaces as they do, even though this is not the intention of the Westerners. This is partially because, as Jonas pointed out, previous conceptions of Western ethics are only concerned with their immediate settings. Through any attempts at altruistic action are guided by the ethics of today, said ethics are rooted out from their original contexts when applied onto the colonized and thus may have unintended consequences. Therefore, the closure of the spatial distance between the colonizers and the colonized in the realm of ethics should not be simply be an inclusion of the colonized themselves in our conceptions of ethics. Instead, ethics must be modified in consideration of the vast amount of spatial distance between the colonizers and the colonized, but these ethics must retain a certain amount of fluidity in order to be able to consider the specific and varied conditions in which the colonized live.

Such an understanding of a lack of spatial distance between realms is necessary for post-colonial ethics, especially in consideration of my call of the modification of ethics for the immediacy of the colonized. Much like how the human realm has overlapped with that of nature according to Jonas, the realm of the colonizers has absorbed the realm of the colonized. Colonization was practised through the enforced spread of technology, capitalism, and other incarnations of Western thought. The

economic, cultural, ontological and political boundaries of the West thus extended themselves through the realm of the colonized. The fact that the colonized were labelled as a distinct other in contrast to the colonizers did not stymie the absorption of the colonized realm by the colonizers. The subjugation and subsequent redefinition of the colonized into the techno-rational machinery of the colonizers ensured their compatibility. Today, the colonized still remain within the realm of the colonizers due to the fact that they still live in these political, economic, cultural, and social boundaries alongside the remnants of imperial machinery. For example, the near-entirety of the world is organized into the Westphalian system of states. Given that we, the non-colonized, exist in the same colonial realm as the colonized, there is no spatial distance between us even in light of the vast geographical distances involved.

For the question of temporal distance in relation to post-colonial ethics and responsibility, Jonas' central argument against the threat of the temporal distance between humanity and the state of the future is one of the most important foundations for the framework for post-colonial ethics. It must be understood that the state of the post-colonial world today is the manifestation of the impact of the previous actions of humanity. What is especially pressing is that the damages of the impact of colonial action continue to persist even after the imperial machinery has ceased functioning in their previous explicit forms, and thus the colonized are still held under the actions of the past. The old colonial authorities are no longer present, but their descendants of the colonized and the colonizers are still beholden to their authority, thereby making Jonas' statement that responsibility exists regardless of the authorities present rather prescient. The

challenge of post-colonial ethics is to dissipate the legacy of colonial authority while being aware of the legacy. In addition, the colonizers and the non-colonized enjoy an unfortunate and simultaneous sort of negative and positive freedom in that not only so they escape the conditions of coloniality, but can continue to enjoy the privileges derived from the conditions of coloniality. Therefore, the temporal distance that Jonas advocates that humanity be mindful of must be extended to not only measure the distance from the present to the future, but backwards from the present to the past, and from the past to the future.

Another instance of temporal distance relevant to post-colonial ethics and responsibility is the temporal simultaneity of Jonas' concept of the parent-child relationship and responsibility must also be extended towards the process of decolonization. I am not evoking a paternalistic sense of responsibility when I say this. Rather, I am referring to the temporality involved in the parent-child relationship that I have discussed earlier in this chapter with regards to the socio-historic positions that actants occupy. Colonization is not an event that can be readily stopped like a war or famine in a discrete timeframe. It is rooted within the minds and bodies of the colonized through the norms, language, practice, violence, and feelings that the colonizers have imposed on the colonized. Much of the connotations of colonization can fade in time in the perception of the colonized while it remains in one way or another of experiences of the colonized (like how the subaltern is labelled as the "Third World" or is simply known as an panoply of regions that is contrasted with the West by the imposed master status of its poverty). In order for a post-colonial ethics to be possible, the knowledge of the

impacts of colonization must be identified and continually transferred on. Moreover, the knowledge of the impacts of colonization must also be readily adapted for the ways that they mutate over time in their contact with the exigencies of the future, like the evolution of an organism.

The final conceptualization of temporal distance that is relevant to post-colonial ethics and responsibility is the notion of a linear history. Colonialism itself was both spawned and predicated out of this Baconian concept of assuming power over nature and the linear progress of technology through its total reconstruction and manipulation of what it perceived to be nature. The pre-colonized world, through the mere crime of not existing within the political, cultural, economic, and social sphere of Europe, was labelled as a homogenous primordial phenomenon similar to or considered as nature in itself. Colonization was one of the processes by which humanity thus assumed power over humanity, and thus if a post-colonial ethics hopes to exist, this conceptualization of power must be included in notions of responsibility.

Chapter 3 - Allyness and Coloniality

This chapter will demonstrate the requirement of allies in the post-colonial struggle to overcome coloniality and the justification of the necessity for allies to be allies in their everyday lives. To do so, I will analyze the conceptualizations of post-colonial alliances as well as other alliances in other context of struggles such as race and gender. Furthermore, I will illustrate the colonial legacy present within non-colonizer identities and the subsequent ties to the post-colonial struggle that mandate the necessity and requirement of post-colonial allyness.

I will discuss the writings of Anne Bishop, Lynne Davis, Heather Yanique Shpuniarsky, Kevin Fitzmaurice, Adam Barker, and Patrick Wolfe, on the various incarnations of alliances between the indigenous and non-indigenous that revolve around the development of empathy in the relationships between them. Furthermore, I will expand upon their definitions and conceptualizations using the themes of distance and coloniality derived from Jonas, Stoler, Fanon, and Mbembe. Lastly, I will draw upon the writings of Michel de Certeau on his concept of adopting a certain set of tactics for patterns of action in everyday life in order to subvert and shift current practices and traditions in order to foster allyness.

In addition, I will assert that the status of being an ally must be conceptualized as allyness rather than as an alliance as previous post-colonial theorists and indigenous studies scholars have described it. The word “alliance” carries with it a connotation that implies it is a fixed and static structure where all parties consent to it. In light of the concept of historical and continued process of coloniality as imperial ruination according

to Ann Stoler, the identity of the post-colonial ally must in itself be fluid and dynamic in that it is dialogical with the needs of the colonized in order to accurately capture the liquid vastness of the temporal and spatial locations of coloniality. Moreover, the status of alliance as a structure harkens to it having a potential ontological similarity to the imperial processes existing through structures in colonialism. Wolfe in a similar fashion argues that the “invasion is a structure, and not an event” (1999, 3). Therefore, to avoid any colonial trappings when theorizing post-colonial allyness, it must be categorized as a relationship of action in conjunction with the needs of the colonized rather than a state of being.

Allies and Alliances

In this section of the chapter, I will outline the definitions and framework for “allies” and allyness in the context of coloniality.

Anne Bishop (1995, 9) believes that allies in any context of struggle are necessary for oppression to be overcome. Bishop (12-13) defines an ally as a member of an oppressive group that seeks to end oppression by understanding and forsaking the privilege that constitutes oppression. For Bishop (10), all forms of oppression in society are part of a complex and self-perpetuating system that is constructed on the basis of competition. Competition has many different roles in the generation of oppression in this case: the competition of the various forms of oppression against each other thereby amplifying existing oppression; the continued propagation of ontological separation between people; and the perpetuation of hierarchy amongst individuals, which forms

class systems. However, while decrying competition as the source of oppression, Bishop (11) is quick to deny that the experience of oppression is homogeneous. Rather, all forms of oppression are held to be interdependent, arise from the same worldview, and are unable to be solved in a state of isolation. Competition therefore becomes a resource for the rich and powerful as it prevents unity and cooperation among the oppressed. Coloniality exists within an implicit hierarchical structure that gives its superordinate members privilege, and thus allies must recognize and dismantle the privilege that they enjoy in order to cease the downward pressures on the colonized.

The word “ally” has always carried a particular connotation in my mind from the day that I learned of it, even outside of the context of oppression. I feel that “ally” refers to someone who is cooperative and/or sympathetic, but not necessarily from the same identity or faction of the individual or group that they are an ally to. Thus, one is still an other towards those that they are allies to, even though they are not necessarily in a state of conflict. Even though such etymological distinction may seem self-defeating for the purposes of engendering unity and cooperation, it is actually ideal and necessary for the post-colonial struggle. Being an ally is thus being cognizant of one’s status as an other and thus allows the non-colonized individual to isolate the conditions of coloniality present within their identity.

There is also the question of how the previous conceptions of alliances can span the width of the global matrix of coloniality if allies are to act in accordance with the colonized across the world. Bishop (1994, 5) is concerned with the forms of oppression such as racism and sexism that occur within society and how they created privilege and

exploited divisions in society. All of the forms of oppression in society for Bishop form a “single complex, interrelated, self-perpetuating” hierarchical system (10). To help break down this system, Bishop (10-13) argues that everyone in society should become allies that are mindful of the unique nature of the oppressions that everyone else faces while recognizing that they come from the same sources, recognize that they may have power and privilege over others, and understand that identity is steeped in ideology. Fitzmaurice explores the idea of post-colonial alliances amongst the indigenous in Canada. (Davis, 2013, 351). What Fitzmaurice argues is that alliances that are formed with “high degrees of respect and trust” can facilitate a harmonious and eternal relationship with the colonized as well as their practices and knowledges. Such an engaged relationship would be able to “transcend the powerful binaries of colonizer and colonized and the corresponding effects of colonization” (Davis, 363-364). However, both of these arguments, while prescient and suitable in their own contexts of oppression, are not wholly sufficient in considering the other colonized that are affected by the forms of coloniality that the colonizers and non-colonized propagate in the colonial formations around the world. The challenge thus becomes in being able to identify and mitigate the downward forces of coloniality that exists across the vast spatial distance between the non-colonized and the colonized in colonial assemblages, and subsequently rethinking and reforming the structure of alliances in order to compensate.

Therefore, any existing alliances between the non-colonized and the colonized must be reconfigured and defined into the state of allyness in addition to the establishment of assemblages of post-colonial allyness to begin with in order for colonial

assemblages to be removed from the relationship between the non-colonized and the colonized in decolonization. This is especially problematic in light of the vast amount of spatial distance involved between the non-colonized and the colonized that exists around the world. In addition, there is the challenge of overcoming temporal distance between the non-colonized/colonized and the past through the notion of imperial assemblages existing in a continual process of ruination rather than as ruins. The word “alliance” that implies it is a fixed structure with a discrete starting point based in a dialogical agreement between the multiple parties that comprise the alliance. Through that definition, it carries similarities to the Western ontological concept of the word “structures”. Colonialism was imposed through the construction of structures such as the imposition of the Westphalian system of states onto the colonized; the materialized racialization of the colonized; the creation and mutation of the economic systems through the enforcement of capitalism onto the colonized; the uses of structures such as the military, international corporations, and media to colonize; and so forth. Since the non-colonized exist above the colonized in the hierarchy of coloniality, entering an alliance would reinforce it as a structure. For example, Lynne Davis and Heather Yanique Shpuniarsky, in their efforts to understand successful ecological coalitions between Canadian indigenous and non-indigenous persons, indicated that relationships between the Canadian government and the indigenous have historically been and continue to be paternalistic. In order to avoid this, the Indigenous believe that they must have control over the agenda of any coalitions. Otherwise, Davis and Shpuniarsky argue that the belief in racial superiority would take prevalence in the agent given that colonialism tended to be paternalistic and the current

administrations are still influenced by the legacy of colonialism. In this fashion, alliances between indigenous groups and the Canadian government become structures as the Canadian government assumes a paternalistic position over the colonized (Davis, 2010, 339). More importantly, alliances tend to have similar and coincidental goals that maintain a certain status. The goals of the colonized and non-colonized may be difficult to reconcile. As Adam Barker points out: "...some Settlers attempting to act in alliance with Indigenous peoples have missed the contradiction between their goals and their stated actions, ultimately replicating the effects of colonization" (Davis, 2010, 318). Lastly, as before stated, alliances are dialogically formed. This is oftentimes impractical and impossible given the spatial distance involved between the non-colonized and the colonized in colonial assemblages around the world. Instead, allies should act and be in a form of allyness that recognizes colonial assemblages and seeks to engage them.

Requirement of the Post-Colonial Ally

The non-colonized that live in the West today are tacitly linked into the matrix of coloniality that exists to this day, whether they are conscious of that link or not. By non-colonized, I refer to the individuals that did not directly participate in the construction and maintenance of processes of colonization nor were expressly targeted by colonization in itself but who benefit from the privilege granted by their position in the assemblages of coloniality. More specifically, the non-colonized are the descendants of the colonizers through the symbolic lineage of nationality, ethnicity, and race. Moreover, they are the descendants of colonizers through the fact that they unknowingly or knowingly

perpetuate the continued processes of coloniality that the colonized face to this day. Such passive subjugation is why I do not designate the non-colonized as “non-colonizer” as it would insinuate an active role and thereby obscure the true nature of coloniality as a residual and subtle process. By virtue of the fact that the non-colonized are linked into the matrix of coloniality, post-colonial allyness requires them from their end to dismantle the downward forces of coloniality. Adam Barker (Davis, 2010, 318) illuminates the gap present in calls for the colonized to decolonize where the non-colonized are conspicuously absent in the call for decolonization. The absence of the non-colonized takes the form of the ignorance of the violence and oppression against the colonized which allows the non-colonized to maintain their power and privilege by lacking the ability to recognize their complicity in the matter. Instead, Barker calls for the non-colonized to recognize the fact that solutions to the problems caused by colonialism in the form of political structures, social norms, and chosen lifestyles continue to fail, and to understand why. Therefore, in this section of the chapter, I will argue that coloniality is an implicit hierarchical structure that gives its superordinate members privilege, and thus allies must recognize and dismantle the privilege that they enjoy in order to cease the downward pressures on the colonized. This privilege arrives from two sources: the local sphere in which the non-colonized operates, as well as the spheres where the colonized exist. The dismantlement must occur on both ends for coloniality to dissipate. It is this dismantlement of privilege that necessitates the requirement for non-colonized actants to act in a framework of post-colonial allyness.

I believe that what must be understood by all within the matrix of coloniality is

that regardless of our individual status as a colonizer, non-colonized, or colonized, we all occupy positions within the matrix of coloniality. Such a position still exists even in consideration of the vast spatial, temporal, and ontological distance between the non-colonized and the colonized in terms of the lack of interaction between the two groups, as well as the physical geographical distance involved.

The matrix of coloniality occupies all political and social spheres of the world, even those that are not traditionally considered to be directly attached to colonialism. This is why there is a need for post-colonial allyness. For example, the Western countries that arose from the efforts of colonialism, such as Canada and the United States of America, existed as “white settler colonies” in their respective colonial empires that differed from the other colonies in terms of their prestige, modes of governance, the nature of racial identity, and demographics amongst other factors (Abu-Laban, 2001, 265-267). Wolfe (1999, 1) identifies the location of the indigenous as the focal point that distinguishes settler colonies from the colonial formations of Africa and Asia. In a settler colony, the indigenous were displaced or replaced from their lands, whereas in the colonies of the subaltern the indigenous were exploited to extract surplus value from their labour. I contend then that the location of the indigenous thus becomes the cultural substructure of the colony in question where the political, economic, and social structure form on top. White settler colonies and colonial assemblages in Asia and Africa differed in their political, economic, cultural, and social developments as the imperial processes continued throughout history. For example, the former British white settler colonies of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia gained greater political autonomy much earlier

while the colonial assemblages of Asia and Africa tended to be under more centralized administration and did not maintain any semblance of autonomy in a lot of cases.

Furthermore, in the colonial assemblages of Asia and Africa, the administration and demographics existed as a racialized hierarchy of a white minority ruling over the colonized majority where the colonized majority largely comprised the employees of the colonial infrastructure. Conversely, white settler colonies had white majorities ruling over colonized minorities where the minorities were excluded or ignored by colonial administration.

The historical position of privilege of the non-colonized in the matrix of coloniality becomes even more problematic because it is inconspicuous, and its hiddenness obfuscates the other fields of struggle. In the global post-colonial struggle, the matrix of oppression simultaneously becomes pronounced and invisible. Coloniality in itself involves, overlaps, and structures all of the other fields of struggle that allies seek to combat such as racism and misogyny. The temporal, ontological, and spatial distances involved in coloniality all complicate the notions of overcoming the sense of competition that comprise forms of oppression that Bishop identifies. The identity of the non-colonized in colonized countries is heavily rooted in coloniality, yet it is not recognized and oftentimes even celebrated by the non-colonized. Moreover, the identity of the non-colonized is predicated on an implicit competition between itself and the identity of the colonized due to their hierarchical juxtaposition of symbolic privilege. Everyone in Canada for example, lives in the aforementioned category of the “white settler” colony. Since the historical narrative of Canada and its subsequent cultural, social, political and

economic futures centred around its identity as a white settler colony, the Canadian national identity is entwined with the status of a white settler. In the case of the global post-colonial struggle, non-colonized white settlers are unconsciously locked into a competition of identity with the colonized which reinforces the colonial hierarchy. To exist as a white settler, one requires the other of the non-white settler colonized as a symbolic juxtaposition. However, the competition is one-sided as only the colonized are identified as existing in a history of coloniality whereas the coloniality of the non-colonized is either unknown or ignored. This is why the competition is unconscious for the non-colonized.

Kevin Fitzmaurice (Davis, 2010, 351) pondered the possibility of white obsolescence against the backdrop of alliances in the indigenous struggle. According to Fitzmaurice, (Davis, 2010, 354) a macro-reality of colonial structures create a hierarchy of racialized identities and sites of interpersonal oppression despite the potential presence of indigenous agency in some relational instances in Canada. Colonial flows of power are thus for Fitzmaurice a combination of dynamic negotiations of influence in a continuous structure of inequality. Such negotiations are downward and oppressive forces, and the only location of escape on a structural level from colonial power is to be white. White people, however, are claimed to be deliberately evasive of recognizing their whiteness in order to maintain their status as individuals and their levels of power. This is why I maintain that there is a need for a post-colonial ally.

Since the identity of the white settler is ingrained within the national and ethnic identities of the non-colonized, the non-colonized are firmly rooted within the matrix of

coloniality whether they are aware of it or not. The white settler identity is dependent on the perception of innate subjugation within the identity of being colonized in a colonial formation. Therefore, by not engaging in critical self-reflection, the non-colonized and colonizers are propagating downward oppression towards the colonized. Recalling Mbembe's (2001, 25) concept of *commandement* as one of the conditions of coloniality, the power behind *commandement* involved three different uses of violence, the last of which I termed violence of maintenance. Violence of maintenance was used and is still used in the maintenance, spread, and permanence of authority against the colonized. Since the colonial hierarchy is being maintained in the presence of the legacy of white settler colonialism in the identities of the non-colonized, I argue that the non-colonized are implicitly perpetuating violence of maintenance against the colonized. In addition, Fanon (1986, 186) discussed the "negation of the other" where the perception of self is distorted by coloniality. By denying and/or celebrating the coloniality present within the identity of the non-colonized and only recognizing the colonized as existing within a state of coloniality, the non-colonized are participating in the negation of the colonized other. Such a hierarchy is in itself a manifestation on the individual level of the binary of Occident/Orient that Edward Said (1978, 65-67) posits where the strong, rational, and masculine Occident of the Wests and its self-image cannot exist without the romanticised, feminine and inferior perception of the Oriental East. As such, coloniality essentially exists within ourselves as the colonized, and thus allyness is needed to overcome the imperial processes of coloniality.

Allyness for Decolonizing Ethics

In addition to the fixed presence of the individual actant within the global matrix of coloniality, there is another factor involved in overcoming coloniality that necessitates post-colonial allyness because it frames our notions of ethics and altruism and the actions we undertake as a result. We as non-colonized individuals may certainly feel grief, guilt, and/or sympathy for the plight of the colonized, but these emotions become sifted through the processes of coloniality. What we deem as right and just is based in the same values that underpinned colonialism, such as Christian thought, capitalism, Enlightenment thought, modernity, and technology. Colonialism was in itself at least legitimized by the colonizers as an altruistic process through concepts such as the “white man’s burden” and the linear mode of history. It requires a certain amount of power to actualize the notions of altruism that we deem necessary to aid in decolonization; yet this power travels down through the colonial assemblages. In a sense, the non-colonized are maintaining their position in the colonial hierarchy by exerting power over the colonized. Orientalism is the perception of the Orient as weak, feminine, and antithetical to the Occidental West. (Said, 1978, 65-67) To assume that the colonized are in need of help and/or lack the power and means to do so is simply propagating Orientalism, which is precisely what sustains the assemblage of coloniality. Decolonization through the action and perspective of the colonized must be considered as an assemblage of in itself for removing and mitigating the formations that perpetuate coloniality.

Requirement for Allynness from the Ally Themselves

The time has come to explain why the post-colonial ally must be an ally themselves. I will argue in this final section of the chapter that this is because the post-colonial ally actant possesses the means and the ability to shift through everyday actions the meanings of the symbols and traditions that the assemblages of coloniality impose onto them. I will adapt Michel de Certeau's concept of tactics within the strategy of everyday life, where individuals use the opportunities of everyday life to reconfigure the symbolic aspects that comprise society for this purpose.

For de Certeau (1984, 6-10), the social sciences lack the ability to examine the symbols and rituals that individuals have the means to modify in everyday life, even though they already examine the symbolic aspects of society. Given that the social sciences do not have the ability to examine the reconfiguration of practices and symbols from the perspective of the individual, they run the risk of creating a symbolic notion of individuals that simply consume and regurgitate the symbols of culture without any activity in the process (de Certeau, 30-32). Individuals in this case become consumers who act in social spheres that the institutions of society (such as governments and corporations) produce. The institutions of society that create these social spheres create them according to "strategies" which are the planned patterns of action that they wish to place upon individuals in society. The individuals of society then interpret these plans of action using their own perspective that determine the "tactics" that motivate and instruct their individual behavior and actions as a result. In effect, tactics are an individual reaction to the strategies of structures. To illustrate this argument, de Certeau (91-93)

provides the example of a city. Looking down from a tall building in a city provides the opportunity to have a panoptic view of the pedestrians from above, which is what the producers of society occupy. The consumer pedestrians, however, tactically determine their movement throughout the street independently from the intentions of the institutions that constructed them. The nature of action and the variance of the nature of patterns of action and movement provide the means of shifting the impact of action and symbols. It is in this way that individuals can influence the outcome of the goals of structures and thereby have an opportunity to subvert and resist them.

These tactics of everyday life are precisely why individuals are required to be post-colonial allies. In the current global matrix of coloniality, colonial assemblages are routinely carrying out their intended yet tacit strategies previously implanted by the colonized. By refusing to adapt our tactics of everyday lives against these strategies of the assemblages of coloniality, we as the non-colonized are routinely recreating the strategies of the institutions that comprise coloniality, or by not seeing the ethical demand to do so. So not only do the non-colonized act as nodes that perpetually transmit coloniality, but we are also condemning ourselves to be passive consumers. There is therefore a double impact in our non-action. Much of the transmission of coloniality, especially those within the primary realms of the non-colonized, is conveyed through the symbolic aspects of the material assemblages and the material conditions of these assemblages, as per the condition of coloniality known as ruination. Therefore, it is up to the non-colonized to adapt the tactics of post-colonial allyness in their everyday life to not only cease and reappropriate the transmission of symbols and practices imposed by colonial

assemblages, but to also reconfigure their relationship towards these symbols and practices in the form of the actions they take as a result.

Now that the necessity and requirement of allyness has been delineated, the question is now of what the ethics and responsibility of post-colonial allyness should be.

Chapter 4 – Ethics and Responsibility of the Post-Colonial Ally

With the determination of the conditions of coloniality and the necessity of post-colonial allyness, the time has come to discuss the ethics and responsibility of the post-colonial ally in detail. In this chapter, I will outline my position using the theoretical framework of the previous ecological ethics and responsibility of Hans Jonas in terms of the concepts of ontological distance, spatial distance, and temporal distance. Moreover, I will also discuss the implications that arise from these ethics and responsibility and the solutions needed as a result. Namely, I will explore how these post-colonial ethics and responsibility can be integrated into one's personal framework of ethics and responsibility.

Firstly, I will delineate the three ethical principles of post-colonial allyness: *awareness*, *conductivity*, and *dissolution*. Awareness is the mandate that all efforts should continually be made to minimize the ontological, spatial, and temporal distance between the post-colonial ally and the colonized through the expansion of the visibility and dialogue between the post-colonial ally and the colonized. Conductivity is the demand that the post-colonial ally must be visible and vocal in their actions in order to mitigate the vast spatial and temporal distances between themselves and the colonized. Dissolution is the dismantlement of the downward forces of the imperial assemblages that comprise the matrix of coloniality. Specifically, the post-colonial ally should act so that their privileged position in the matrix of coloniality can ultimately be dissolved. These three ethical principles of the post-colonial ally should not necessarily be held as being mutually exclusive. Rather, I discuss them separately to convey a clear understanding of

the framework and principles of each for the ease of the post-colonial ally to integrate and implement.

Ethics

In this section, I will present the ethics required for post-colonial allyness. Ultimately, my aim for this is to postulate post-colonial allyness as its own matrix of ethics that will displace the downward forces of oppression of the matrix of coloniality that stem from the colonizers and non-colonized towards the colonized. To construct such a matrix of ethics, I will present three principles of allyness ethics that the non-colonized should follow so as to act as an ally towards those involved in the processes of decolonization. This should not be taken to mean that I am proposing a version of virtue ethics. Rather, I am simply categorizing these ethics under these three principles for the purposes of organizational clarity and efficiency, and to indicate their divergence from typical conceptions of ethics. These three principles are: awareness, conductivity, and dissolution. Each of these ethical principles bridge the ontological, spatial and temporal distance between the colonized and the post-colonial ally.

Awareness

The first principle of the ethics of the post-colonial ally is awareness. Awareness is the foundation of decolonization for everyone involved in the struggle as the assemblages of coloniality can only be dismantled if they are made conspicuous. The main role of awareness is to bridge and decrease the ontological, spatial, and temporal

distance between the post-colonial ally and the colonized as well as the imperial assemblages in question. It involves perception of the inconspicuous and implicit assemblages of coloniality that press downwards from the colonizers and non-colonized onto the colonized. However, it also involves an understanding of being able to locate the specificity of the role and experiences of the colonized and the post-colonial ally within the assemblages of coloniality. It should not be entirely difficult to be able to understand how the assemblages of coloniality operate as metaphorical machinery, given the widespread understanding of other assemblages present in everyday life such as bureaucracies and states, but it is much more complicated to fully comprehend the role that one personally takes in the assemblages of coloniality in addition to empathizing with the experience of the colonized under the strain of coloniality. Thus, awareness must be the primary principle that the post-colonial ally always has in mind when regarding and acting towards the post-colonial struggle.

As I have pointed out in Chapter Three, the assemblages of coloniality are a continuous, active, and indiscrete process. Therefore, awareness in itself must always be an active process that is continually adaptive towards the evolving characteristics of the assemblages of coloniality. The physical ruins of empire may one day entirely fade away into oblivion with the dust and ashes scattered into the wind, but they may still live on in the minds and emotions of the colonized. These ruins are not easily seen nor understood especially by those not directly affected by coloniality especially in consideration of the existence of coloniality as an assemblage. In addition, the appearance of the ruins of empire can change from the impacts of time, spatial distance, and the guise of other forms

of oppression that exist. For example, the presence of war or seemingly oppressive ideologies amongst the colonized (like religious extremism) might further obscure the memory of coloniality as those events will appear as the central issues that the colonized face at the time.

With that in mind, I do not intend to argue that the post-colonial ally should always place the colonized in the context of the past when thinking of the colonized and coloniality. That would run the risk of unintentionally colonizing the colonized in a different way by labelling the colonized as artifacts of the past rather than embedded in the current situation of their everyday life. Moreover, it would also take away the agency of the colonized, as it would be the equivalent of essentially telling them what their reasons and motivations are in understanding their personal experience. At its best, such misplaced understanding is a form of patronization. At its worst, it would be reinforcing the power of the colonizers and non-colonized over defining what characterizes knowledge. Instead, the post-colonial ally should simply work to understand the bigger picture to the situation of the colonized by recognizing that the past events of empire are a significant part of the foundation of the oppression that the colonized experience.

The non-colonized certainly do face many challenges that appear similar to the symptoms of coloniality such as violence and mental illness, but these are experienced and caused in different ways and have different solutions that are required to dissolve them. The post-colonial ally cannot approach the conditions of coloniality from their own perspective, as that would cause them to act and think on their terms rather than that of the colonized. Awareness is a more thorough and active implementation of the basic

value of empathy in everyday life: to fully empathize with someone else stuck in an undesirable situation, one has to be able and willing to learning what the experience and history of the person is going through. Because the colonized as a group are affected by the ruins of the past, being empathetic is a lot more complicated in this case than it is with a single person in the familiarity of everyday life. Therefore, awareness requires a distinct and reflexive effort on the part of the post-colonial ally to be able to perceive the presence of coloniality that lives on in the colonized and the non-colonized. It is in this fashion that awareness can bridge the temporal distance between the non-colonized and the assemblages of coloniality.

However, that is only one piece of the puzzle of post-colonial awareness. For awareness to be implemented and actualized on the part of the post-colonial ally, especially in consideration of the ever-changing assemblages of coloniality, the process of the function of awareness in terms of the actual perception must be detailed in order for post-colonial allies to actually identify the specific and unique assemblages of coloniality that suppress the colonized.

As a concrete example of how of perception can be gained by the post-colonial ally, I will adapt the idea of perception proposed by the indigenous activist collective of Indigenous Action Media. They facilitate action and media representation for indigenous communities in North America in order to directly address the issues that these communities face. Indigenous Action Media (2014, 8) advocates the concept of accomplices as a replacement for the impractical and harmful solution of alliances and have called for those accomplices to listen to the colonized and learn of their experiences

in order to be able to allow them to work against colonialism. However, I feel that this definition of accomplice is insufficient for the purposes of the entirety of the post-colonial struggle, given the breadth of the assemblages of coloniality around the world and the overwhelmingly vast spatial distance between the non-colonized and the colonized. The etymology of the word “listen” in this particular context implies an action of a direct dialogue between the accomplice and the colonized, which is the entire point of Indigenous Action Media. However, this is not possible for post-colonial allies as they cannot always be present to engage in dialogue with the activists and other similar actants of the colonized for various reasons and thus it proves ineffective for allies in a global context. Listening only is possible within the local context such as the nation where the colonizer actively exists and functions.

As I argued in the preceding chapter, the non-colonized occupy a hierarchical position within the global matrix of coloniality over the colonized, and thus they are connected with the colonized whether they are conscious of it or not. There is a short ontological distance between the colonizers/non-colonized and the colonized regardless of the spatial distance between them because they all occupy the same matrix of coloniality. As such, the symbolic privilege of the colonizer/non-colonized is entrenched within the matrix of coloniality, because the colonized/non-colonizers derive significance and meaning from the colonized to generate their privileged identities. Therefore, there must be an action and state of being that takes into consideration of this particular form of ontological distance which goes beyond the action of listening that the idea of accomplices demands. What complicates matters is not just the inhibition of dialogue but

also the factors that can affect the transmission of meaning from the colonized with regard to the struggle of decolonization. These factors can involve the presentation of colonial symbols or remnants by institutions of power like the mass media in a manner that does not identify the coloniality present within them or the misidentification of fields of struggle faced by that do not elucidate the presence and significance of coloniality or falsely correlates coloniality within them.

One of the primary requirements of achieving the principle of awareness is that the post-colonial ally should not only attempt to learn as much history as they can about the colonized, their relationship towards them, and imperial assemblages, but also to be able to identify and dissolve the narratives of coloniality present within general history. For example, the history of Canada is presented as a linear series of heroic struggles of increasing scale through the narrative that the white English settlers overcame the clashes with the political, geographical, cultural, and social factors at the respective time, and thus Canada had been shaped and legitimized by these clashes. Such an obscured history of colonialism is a direct symbolic representation of Stoler's (2013, 8) process of imperial ruination.

However, to simply remember the victims of said tragedy while ignoring the victims of colonialism reinforces the colonial hierarchy of history by privileging the labels and images of those who were not colonized over the colonized left outside of the picture of history. In other words, it essentially is an implicit and seemingly unintentional legitimization of violence against the colonized by saying that systemic violence against one group of people is wrong and subsequently making an extreme effort to remember it,

yet not doing the same with another group that experienced the same thing. In addition, this discriminatory remembrance entrenches the matrix of coloniality by obscuring the violence that comprises coloniality and does not adequately serve the lesson of developing our ethics as individuals so as to prevent and disarm violence and suffering as intended. Moreover, it obfuscates the history of colonialism, hampering understanding, dialogue, and empathy with the colonized and the presence of coloniality that they suffered through by obscuring the context of their struggle. Such obfuscation of the colonial history increased and continually increases ontological distance between the colonized, non-colonized, and colonizers. The ontological distance between the colonizers/non-colonized and the colonized in the sphere of history is extreme. This is because there is absolutely no significance placed on the violence against the colonized. Therefore, in order to achieve the principle of awareness for the purposes of being a post-colonial ally, we must identify and understand the presence of coloniality and the colonial privilege that it creates and reinforces.

Such an understanding of history must also be utilized to further the second aspect of awareness: awareness of heterogeneity of struggle and being in the colonized. I am not suggesting that the decolonial struggle is inherent to the being of the colonized when combining both concepts of struggle and being. I am indicating that there are forced intersections between the two spheres that affect each other. A historical example would be the aforementioned history of the reified division of the Hutus and Tutsis in Central Africa. These policies later culminated in extreme violence (later in the form of genocide) between the two groups, with remnants of it persisting to this very day. Both the Hutus

and Tutsis have a shared field of struggle in that they are both affected by violence structured by the legacy of colonialism, yet they occupy different fields of being due to their current status as separate ethnic groups. It is challenging for the post-colonial ally to recognize that in this case that the Hutus and Tutsis share some of the same experiences without painting them all with the same brush. To solve this challenge, I turn to Anne Bishop (1994, 62), who argued that allies should be wary of the invisible and visible forms of oppression which in turn increases competition thereby reinforcing hierarchy. The homogenization of the colonized dilutes the visibility of the conditions of coloniality. The post-colonial ally must then be aware of the specificity of the historic differences and variances among the colonized lest we fall into the same trap as the colonizers. We may describe the subaltern as colonized to categorize the width of the presence of coloniality, but we cannot homogenize their respective beings and experiences. Moreover, the historical experience defines each struggle of the specific faction that is dealing with coloniality in whichever spatial or temporal context and thus provides a superior chance for collaboration. Ultimately, an awareness of the heterogeneity of the experiences of struggle and modes of being will close the ontological distance between the post-colonial ally and colonized by allowing the post-colonial ally to understand the greater significance of the experiences and nature of the different groups that comprise the colonized.

Conductivity

The second principle is conductivity, in that allies have the need to vocalize, communicate, and make their actions against coloniality as apparent as possible. In other words have to “conduits” of anti-colonial action in the various contexts that imperial assemblages inhabit, and the positions they occupy within them in that they have to be constantly making it clear to both the colonized and the colonizers that they are acting and thinking against coloniality regardless of whether they are doing so actively or passively, encouraging other non-colonized to do the same, and most importantly keep the anti-colonial action that the colonized undergo functioning in the spaces that the colonized do not or cannot occupy. The purpose of the ethic of conductivity is to close the ontological, temporal, and spatial distances between the post-colonial ally and the colonized. Conductivity is the counterpart to awareness for the post-colonial ally. What the ally must learn through awareness, they must subsequently conduct through action and meaning that communicates the intention and praxis of the dismantling of the assemblages of coloniality that inhibit decolonization.

I choose to use the word conductivity rather than the more expected word of conduction when describing this principle, as there is a temporal etymology that needs to be distinguished in order to keep up with imperial assemblages as an active process. Furthermore, my use of the tense of conductivity also attempts to maintain the deconstructive spirit of post-colonial allyness as the word conduit is something that can be seen as a structure. We as post-colonial allies should not act in such a manner as we

would be reinforcing the notions of structures in the remnants of structures in imperial assemblages. Although it will appear needlessly pedantic to be so technical and precise when comes to selecting language, such nuance exactly captures the spirit of post-colonial allyness. The best way to summarize it would be that the ally must be like the conduction of electricity. Electricity continuously flows through a conduit, and a conduit is always ready to conduct electricity even if there is no electricity passing through at the moment. In this case, the ally is the conduit, the electricity going into the conduit is the information and understanding gained by awareness, and the electricity going out is the communication and display of action from the ally.

By being in a state of conductivity, the ally is navigating the most efficient path in cutting through the structural remnants present within imperial assemblages. In such a state, the post-colonial ally must express that they are directly engaging with coloniality, and not disguise their actions under the persona of other struggles such as poverty, racism, homophobia, religious intolerance, and such. Other struggles can and certainly will intersect with coloniality as coloniality involves many factors such as race, gender, violence, and so forth, but the ally must still take care to elucidate and indicate the presence of coloniality within them.

Conductivity is also a call for a specific state of being that constantly maintains the continual process of the dissolution of coloniality until it is ultimately complete. As I have argued, the assemblages of coloniality are a continuing process. They cannot be directly dismantled in a single event like the demolition of a building. Rather, what replicates the conditions of coloniality (such as violence and *commandement*) are the

intersections of the patterns of actions and symbols that are being generated by actants in the assemblages of coloniality. The dismantlement of coloniality thus requires that every single actant in the assemblages of coloniality ceases replicating coloniality. In a sense, conductivity is both a call to action and a call to stop doing certain actions.

In addition, the post-colonial ally cannot always be engaged in decolonial struggles as it is not realistically feasible for various reasons. This is because there is a limited number of struggles that can occur at any given time and the majority of struggles are isolated by a vast amount of spatial distance, and the post-colonial ally is constrained by the unavoidable challenge of the limitations of their existence. The post-colonial ally cannot be reasonably expected to make active activism their full-time occupation, even though post-colonial allies are meant to be in a constant state of allyness. This is not simply for their own sake, but it would not be feasible for everyone in society to suddenly abandon what they are doing to constantly watch and act for decolonial struggles. I do not mean to imply that the post-colonial ally should not make sacrifices, but rather to state the unfortunate fact of reality that the post-colonial ally cannot be constantly be everywhere at once. In addition, not everyone in society has the particular means to act as effectively as others can due to factors such as class. Instead, in whichever position that the post-colonial ally finds themselves in life, they should maximize their means to dissolve coloniality. No matter what, they should always be willing to be a dynamic ally in that they are ceasing to replicate the conditions of coloniality in their everyday life. Therefore, the ally must also always ensure that they are not replicating the conditions of coloniality and therefore propping up any imperial assemblages.

Decolonial struggles can only be precipitated by the colonized. As per the ethic of awareness, the colonized are the ones that are directly affected by coloniality, it is they who have the experience and knowledge of what constitutes coloniality. Coloniality is not something that can be easily charted like statisticians tallying a census. Even though I have identified what the conditions of coloniality are, these conditions are formed and appear differently by the socio-historical location of each of the assemblages of coloniality in terms of the different political, economic, social, historical, and cultural factors involved. Because of this, the post-colonial ally cannot precipitate decolonial struggles on behalf of the colonized. Therefore, like how a conduit is always *able* to conduct electricity even if there is no electricity passing through it yet, the post-colonial ally must always be ready to act whenever the colonized engage in decolonial struggles. Moreover, they must also encourage and educate others to become post-colonial allies. Education of this sort must involve the explanation of how coloniality is replicated through the actions of everyday life, such as: national identities can be based off of coloniality; how coloniality affects the colonized in tandem with the other fields of struggle such as poverty; how others can cease replicating coloniality in everyday life; the history of colonialism; how they must use their privileged positions in society to attack the institutions of coloniality; the ethical importance of doing so; and the sacrifices that will have to be made. Such dynamic allyness should still be followed while one is being an active ally. It is simply important to emphasize that the ally must still be active even if not undertaking action.

Dissolution

Dissolution is the final ethical principle of the post-colonial ally, and it is the one that will guide the post-colonial ally in the dismantlement of the oppression of coloniality. In this particular case, it involves the removal of ontological, spatial, and temporal distances in several fashions. I chose this motif because it uniquely depicts the non-violent and deconstructive actions and attitudes that it aims to achieve in the dissolution of coloniality. The primary goal of the ethic of dissolution is the liquidation of the privilege and position that the post-colonial ally enjoys in the global matrix of coloniality.

Dissolution is a temporal description of state of power that explains what its fate should be simultaneously alongside the tactics and strategy of its use to disintegrate the matrix of coloniality. While the privilege of the post-colonial ally is something that must be diffused, privilege is also the means and tactics that the post-colonial ally must adopt in dissolving the matrix of coloniality. The post-colonial ally is embedded within the privilege that they must destroy in that they occupy the institutions and positions of power that replicate coloniality or at the very least are not directly affected by the symptoms of coloniality. It is within their capacity that they can affect the assemblages of coloniality and thus be of the most assistance in that context. The non-colonized do not operate within the political, social, cultural, and economic spheres of the colonized, yet these spheres of the non-colonized are what partially replicate coloniality to begin with. Therefore, the post-colonial ally must use their privileged position to directly target the ways that coloniality is replicated, such as any oppressive laws, symbols, languages,

policies, and so forth that are not directly within the domain of the colonized. In other words, the post-colonial allies have to deal with the instances of coloniality that they are responsible for and have the ability to change.

Furthermore, if the ally does not directly engage coloniality itself, then the ally is merely reinforcing the position of relative powerlessness that the colonized occupy. To join the level of action on behalf of the colonized is to reify their position of relative powerlessness as it obfuscates and ignores the presence of power that the non-colonized have over the colonized. Coloniality is an external force of oppression that impacts the colonized; it is not a deficiency on the part of the colonized that cannot be removed or cured by the post-colonial ally. By attempting to directly help the colonized implies that the non-colonized are attempting to elevate to the position of the colonized rather than recognizing that the position of the non-colonized has been built on the backs of the colonized.

Moreover, any interactions with the colonized will always be characterized by the ally's elite position within the assemblages of the matrix of coloniality, which thereby problematizes any collaboration with the colonized. The post-colonial ally will occupy the gaze of the institutions of coloniality simply because of the status of the ally as a "normal" member of society. There is a risk that the post-colonial ally may unintentionally (or even intentionally) speak for the colonized due to the relative power of the non-colonized. This would be self-defeating and even more harmful towards the colonized. To act against colonial power without dissolving our own would mean that we would be occupying the spaces that the colonized exist and struggle in. We would be

continuing coloniality in that manner even if we were ostensibly acting against it.

Ultimately, the point of post-colonial allyness is to eventually ensure its own obsolescence.

Lastly, the post-colonial ally must be willing to suffer the violent consequences of power and violence in whichever context that the ally is operating it in. Such violence might include the use of force to suppress protests, movements, or symbolic violence such as eye-blackening and mudslinging. Indigenous Action Media describes alleged allies who do not wish to make sacrifices as “floaters”. Undergoing the consequences of struggle and power means that the ally is fully engaging with power to the best of their ability, and thus their actions provide the greatest impact. The dissolution of the matrix of coloniality involves the removal of violence that downwardly affects the colonized. To remove the presence of coloniality would be the establishment of equilibrium. I do not necessarily mean equality in this case, because that could engender a sort of symbolic and material homogenization of both the post-colonial allies and colonized, which was a process of colonialism and thus a potential latent node of coloniality between the non-colonized and colonized. The idea is not that the colonized should be brought up to “our level” in society, but simply given the agency to determine their own manner of living. Thus, the violence that coloniality reinforces against the colonized can and will be brought with the colonized once the colonizers/non-colonized are brought down and the colonized are brought down. Therefore, the consequences of power and violence are an inevitable aftermath of the colonial struggle. I do not mean to for this to be some vainglorious and

guilt-ridden call to self-retribution, but an acknowledgement of the reality that one will face.

Responsibility

I will now discuss the responsibility needed by post-colonial allyness in this section of the chapter. Although it may seem redundant to postulate a separate notion of responsibility alongside a set of ethics as the two concepts appear to be similar in definition, there is an important distinction to be made that dictates that both concepts be given thorough elaboration in this thesis. Scott Schaffer (2004, 84) argued that the postulation of responsibility is a requirement for the existence of ethics, as he contended that ethics in their current form serve to replicate a certain set of social structures of society; in that fashion, ethics are a form of inertia that individuals become trapped in as the same actions and consequences are perpetually repeated. For Schaffer (85), a concrete morality for a concrete freedom should be the goal of ethics which is the responsibility that he is arguing for. What characterizes this concrete freedom is a state of human agency and collective and individual freedom. In concordance, concrete ethics “focuses upon human beings situated in particular sociohistorical contexts and posits concrete goals” (Schaffer, 2004, 85). To illustrate a potential concrete goal of concrete freedom, Schaffer (85-89) proposes that new collective meanings must be created that takes into account the vagaries of everyone’s existence. In addition, freedom must also be considered as a process of action. Concrete freedom would then result from the congruence of humanity being active in understanding and shaping the conditions of their

social organization and existence; humanity would no longer suffer inertia from repeating the same actions and replicate their same social conditions and thus would be able to create the best social conditions for their current historical position.

Concrete freedom for both the colonized and the non-colonized should be the responsibility for the post-colonial ally. Coloniality has bound together the colonizers, non-colonized, and colonized through the imperial assemblages that comprise coloniality. We are forcibly and invisibly bound together by power, exploitation, violence, as well as the explicitly implicit imperial ontologies such as individualism that have overridden the meanings that the colonized hold or have held. Coloniality is thus one of the obstacles that lies in the path of concrete freedom for not only the colonized but also for the non-colonized. Our currently colonized ethics replicate the assemblages that reinforce coloniality, and thus it is the responsibility of the post-colonial ally to align their ethics along the path of concrete freedom. How ethics can be reconciled towards concrete freedom will be explored in a later section.

Necessity of Post-Colonial Ethics and Responsibility

Ania Loomba (2015, 181) analyzed Aime Cesaire's postulation that colonial Europe had a limited lifespan through the weakness presented by the violence of the colonizers. With this prophecy in mind, Loomba (182-198) explored the relationship between nationalism and colonialism. The European system of nation-states was discovered to have colonialism as its foundational aspects through the unity of language, state force, shared white identity, and the marginalization of groups such as women. This

was in contrast to the South American development of nations, where nations were formed from the factionalization and collaboration of all colonized groups present in the area. Colonialism is present within our original social structures. Thus, if coloniality is to be dismantled, then the very assemblages of the colonized must be retooled in order to fit the new system of concrete freedom, otherwise the existing social assemblages will be ill-equipped to exist alongside the decolonized.

Stan van Hoof (2007, 303-314) proposed that cosmopolitanism should be a virtue as a solution to what he deemed as the negative aspects of the current state of global relations that included poverty, intolerance, and the dominance of a single Western epistemological perspective. Cosmopolitanism as virtue is a set of ethics where people are called on to pursue responsibilities that are meant to be extended across global spatial distances. To that end, Hoof describes five specific virtues that he deems necessary for cosmopolitanism: tolerance, curiosity, generosity, optimism, and justice. The purpose of these virtues is to reassert cosmopolitanism's original emphasis on the individual's moral responsibility towards everyone else regardless of their geographical location, religious or political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, race, gender, or socioeconomic status.

The issue with cosmopolitan ethics is that the world is already in a state of cosmopolitanism through being bound in the matrix of coloniality. Actants all share the same global relationship in the interconnected relationships, and coloniality already dominates the shared values and ways of thinking that cosmopolitanism seeks to create. The tolerance that Hoof calls for would be framed through the lens of coloniality.

Therefore, coloniality must be dismantled before there are any attempts at a notion of global human harmony.

Personal Reconciliation of Ethics and Responsibility

One of the major implications that arises from my postulation of the ethics and responsibility of post-colonial allyness is the latent incompatibility between the ethics of post-colonial allyness and the ethics and responsibility that are followed and replicated in everyday life.

In order to be able to reconcile these separate strands of ethics, the individual actant must understand and actualize ethics and responsibility as fluid phenomena. Contemporary notions of ethics in everyday life are rooted in a discrete temporality and assumption of either a universal or specific location and action. For example, the ethic of altruism is seen as universal acts of good that are perpetually beneficial in any circumstance. Regardless of the normative ethical framework taking primacy in the consideration of the actant towards the act of altruism, both the intention and the consequence are automatically assumed to be beneficial. The perception of good starts and ends with the action of altruism and is presumed to be valid in any possible situation. An example of such a universal situation would be the popular activity of volunteering in subaltern countries which is viewed as beneficial and altruistic actions in society. However, this seemingly helpful volunteering may in fact have unintended ethical consequences such as the creation of a state of dependency or the damage of local economies through the upstaging of local labour. On the other hand, specific situation

might be seen to govern medical ethics in Western society are meant for a saliently specific time and location and are not meant to go beyond those boundaries. They are meant to guide the actions and decisions of those who practice and maintain medicine within the social contexts of places like hospitals and clinics, such as the principles of non-harm towards the patient and medical privacy. However, the ethics and responsibility of medicine are not expected to extend into the everyday life of the patient. The duty of the doctor is limited by their authority and is in turn limited by the bounds of the social space in which medicine occurs. An individual in Western society is meant to maintain a separate set of universal and specific ethics and responsibility, while post-colonial ethics and responsibility are meant to combat the universality of coloniality while being aware of the specificity of the situation of each of the colonized. Thus, the challenge to reconcile post-colonial and personal ethics is to fuse the concepts of universality and specificity in ethics.

To be able to understand ethics and responsibility as a liquid phenomenon and thus subsequently reconcile post-colonial ethics and responsibility with the ethics and responsibility of everyday life, I propose two intertwined concepts: *streams of ethics* and *ethical synthesis* that post-colonial allies should integrate into their ethical frameworks. Streams of ethics are the spatial and temporal locations of the assemblages that different human actants exist in. The location and layout of these streams are determined by the intersections between political, social, cultural, geographical, economic, and other historical factors. Ethical streams should not be taken as an attempt to redefine previous ontological attempts at describing existing human assemblages such as nations, states, or

ethnic groups, but rather to simply provide a quasi-topographical framework for the post-colonial ally to better understand and determine the context and consequences of the ethics and responsibility that they understand. Comprehension of the streams of ethics is to be meant simultaneous with the exploration and deconstruction of the imperial assemblages that affect the non-colonized and colonized in addition to becoming the replacement for the imperial assemblages of coloniality. In essence, the streams of ethics is simply meant to explain that the consequences of the ethics and responsibility that one undertakes within their own ethical assemblages travels and reverberates throughout the other connected ethical assemblages. Furthermore, ethics and responsibility that are relevant in a specific ethical assemblage may have different outcomes in another ethical assemblage. This is not simply a question of symbolic differences between conceptions of ethics in opposing cultures, but rather the measure of what the effects of ethical frameworks are when modified by the intersections of cultural, political, social, and economic factors involved. The best way to visualize the stream of ethics would be the way water flows in a river. The chemical nature of the water of the river stays the same, but its shape, speed, direction, and the items it carries (like sticks, junk, and animals) along the way are affected by the geography of the river. In this case, the intentions and implementation of the ethics of the individual that performs an ethical action are the water itself flowing in the river. The impacts that arise as a result of ethical action are the geography that affects the speed, shape, direction, and content of the river. Much like how the shape and speed of a river can shift in unexpected ways, the consequences of an ethic can shift according to the cultural, political, social, and economic factors that the

impact of an ethical action can have. The question is now how to navigate the streams of ethics that course and fork their way around the world.

Ethical synthesis (similar to molecular synthesis in this case) is thus the second piece of the puzzle for the reconciliation of post-colonial and personal ethics and responsibility. The key notion behind ethical synthesis is that ethics should simultaneously be considered both universal and specific. Ethics must be determined by the spatial and temporal distances where the actant has any chance of effecting consequences. As such, the ethics pursued and used by an actant such as the post-colonial ally should be acted upon and modified based on their effects and relationships towards others in other spatial and temporal contexts in addition to the original spatial and temporal context. The post-colonial ally then should remove the remnants of coloniality from their personal ethics and responsibility so as to prevent coloniality from existing in their own personal contexts and prevent it from further affecting the colonized. To do so, they must identify and diminish the colonial remnants in their ethical principles and adapt and reconfigure them in consideration of the political, cultural, economic, and social circumstances of the respective contexts that are mutated by the spatial and temporal distances. As Jonas (1996, 4-6) argued, previous conceptions of Western ethics had limited spatial and temporal distances in mind. In order to make these ethics synthesizable, the value and principle (such as mutual relationships of respect, or at least harmonious relationships for the aforementioned example) of the ethics must be extracted from their limited spatial and temporal contexts and then modified so that it are applicable to all different spatial and temporal contexts that the actant exists in as well as

their impacts. An apt comparison for how ethics work and how ethical synthesis should work is the nature of atoms and molecules. The core of an atom is its nucleus. The amount of electrons that surround the nucleus determine what kind of element that particular atom is. In this way, an ethic must be reduced to the nucleus of their core principle. To do so, the ally must strip the electrons of the ethic atom that are their implied spatial and temporal locations. The element that the atom itself is are the latent consequences of the ethics. The element of ethical atom must then be reconfigured by adding the appropriate electrons from each spatial and temporal location in the stream of ethics that the consequence that an ethic can reach to ensure that it has the preferred consequences of its core. By synthesizing ethics in this way, allies can generate a set of principles of acting that is applicable to every location that their actions can impact.

Ethical synthesis requires a turning of ethics not only on their head, but back again as well. Schaffer (2004, 84) argued that ethics replicate the social structures that ethical individuals are active in. Much of our ethics in Western society are based on previous ethical frameworks such as Christianity which was formed, as Jonas (1996, 4-5) pointed out, in a specific spatial and temporal context. This means that the ethics that we follow in society are continually replicating a certain social structure of the past; yet these social structures are vague due to the ambiguity presented within the generality of the ethics (in how virtues have limited definitions, for example) and the lack of certain knowledge of the intended and unintended consequences of such ethics. Moreover, the fact that ethics change as a result of other societal factors such as the effects of material reality like economic factors or other shift in ethical thought such as Renaissance

humanism or the Enlightenment further obscures the origins of our ethics. Not only does this complicate our understanding of the context and consequences of the original sources of our ethics, it continually modifies our ability to comprehend which social structures are being replicated by ethics. Therefore, there is a temporal distance between the ethics of the past and the actants of today. Such temporal distance is why we need to have ethical synthesis. We must separate the intentions from our actions and understand that our ethics are in fact forces that transform according to the environment. Ethics have multiple consequences that occur in tandem and as a result of each other, and therefore they must be shaped with this mind.

What problematizes the development of ethical synthesis is that current conceptions of values such as virtues in societies are ambiguous both in their definition and prescription of how they are to be enacted. There is no explanation as to why these values are beneficial, as they are assumed to be so without full consideration of their context and consequences. We are stuck without blueprints explaining how to build a society with these ethics; we do not have the means to make the blueprints to do so; and we are building a society according to an invisible blueprint that can never be found. For example, the notion of honour implies that someone or something is deserving of some level of symbolic prestige granted by passive deference or action. What is not explained are the implicit social structures that honour creates and relies upon in the form of the expected role that someone is to be honoured or honourable, and someone else is not honoured or honourable in contrast. I am not necessarily calling for an end to social roles such as in-groups or out-groups, but an inclusion of their understanding and an evaluation

of their worth. The point of ethical synthesis is that we have to ask ourselves what are the actual points of all the ethics that we use in everyday life, and then reconfigure our ethics and actions we take as a result so that those points actually happen. Thus, we must reconstruct our own ethics entirely to an understanding of the entire reality that actants inhabit, have inhabited, and will inhabit. Ethics must be reclassified and redefined as to their spatial, temporal, epistemological and ontological origins and consequences such as their previous, present, and future political, social, cultural, and economic underpinnings to all be made clear. They must be pieces to a puzzle where the puzzle is changing to the one that is required by humanity in whichever situation, rather being seeds of a tree that stands independently and immutably from the rest which are what the virtues of day are.

There are two tasks for the post-colonial ally with these two tools of reconfiguring ethics with the three ethical principles that I have outlined in this chapter. First, the ally must act under the principle of awareness to understand how the streams of ethics function. The streams of ethics that currently exist in the world today are mutated by coloniality at every step of the way: from the source of the ally's actions to the streams at the very end. Thus, the ally must be aware of how coloniality affects their ethical actions against the colonizers and towards the colonized are affected by these colonized streams of ethics. In addition, the ally must act under the principle of conductivity in order to facilitate the free flow of ethics in the stream of ethics. Allies must continually ensure that they conduct the ethical actions of the colonized and the non-colonized at any time, as well as change the direction of their currents of action to whichever direction that they need to go.

The second task is that the post-colonial ally must synthesize their ethics to be free from coloniality, as well as ensure that their actions have their true intended beneficial consequences travel across the vast spatial and temporal distances that the colonized live in. To do so, the ally must act under the principle of awareness to imagine and operationalize as many possible outcomes that their actions can have in each spatial and temporal location that each action can reach. This isn't to say that the ally must meticulously plan out every single outcome that could be possibly foreseen as if they were playing a game of chess, but must simply understand that having the ideal circumstances everywhere will require wholly different patterns of action for each location. This will necessitate recognition on the part of the ally that only certain ethics are valid in their immediate geographical location. That will sometimes mean that the best way to help others is to do nothing. The question is now of how to directly target the strands of coloniality in imperial assemblages. I will elaborate these tactics in the next chapter.

Chapter 5 – Symbolic and Material Tactics of the Post-Colonial Ally

For this final chapter of this thesis, I will now delve into the concrete areas of struggle for the post-colonial ally. In the previous chapter, I outlined the three principles of the ethics of the post-colonial ally. The question is now to specify the direct manner in how the post-colonial ally should act with these ethical principles in mind.

The principle of awareness dictates that the post-colonial ally be aware of the presence of coloniality and their relationship with it, as well as the impact of coloniality on the colonized. In addition, the principle of conductivity expects the post-colonial ally to overcome the obstacle of coloniality in order to be able to communicate with the colonized and express the action made by the ally towards coloniality. Many of the forms of coloniality that affect the colonized, and especially those that exist in the realm of the post-colonial ally, exist as symbolic constructions that are reflective of the relationships constructed by the matrix of coloniality. Finally, dissolution involves the disintegration of coloniality through the dissolution of power and privilege that comprise coloniality. In this case, much of what form the power and privilege that exist as coloniality are constructed as material processes that downwardly oppress the colonized and thus these material processes of coloniality must be dismantled or reconfigured. As Mbembe wrote: “La décolonisation sans la démocratie est une bien piètre forme de reprise de possession de soi, fictive” (Mbembe, 2010, 29). The challenge here becomes then for the post-colonial ally to target these material processes of coloniality.

As such, I will identify the material and symbolic processes that form coloniality and explain how the post-colonial ally should dismantle or reconfigure them. To do so, I

will integrate Walter Mignolo's (2009, 1) concept of delinking as epistemic disobedience as the framework for awareness and conductivity of colonial symbols, Kuan-Hsing Chen's concept of deimperialization, and Yasmeen Abu-Laban's (2001, 262) analysis of the colonialist elements present within Canadian national symbols and framework of decolonization of Canadian institutions as possible means of deconstructing material processes of coloniality. Furthermore, I explain the construction of symbols of coloniality in their relation to the conditions of ruination, violence, and *commandement*. I must clarify that I do not intend to argue that these material processes are no less symbolic in their manner, nor that the aforementioned symbols of coloniality are in themselves immaterial. Rather, I am simply categorizing them in terms of their external appearance, relationship, and spatiotemporal position in the matrix of coloniality with regard to the perspective of the post-colonial ally. Since navigating ontological, temporal, and spatial distances is part of post-colonial allyness, it stands to reason to maintain that distinction when describing their interaction with the post-colonial ally. For example, symbols have a lesser degree of temporal distance from an individual actant because they tend to be more overt and conspicuous than material objects and processes. In other words, the symbols of coloniality are the symptoms of coloniality, whereas the material aspects of coloniality are the modes of knowledge production for these symbols. Thus, the tactics of the post-colonial ally must be to assist the colonized in both combating the symbols of coloniality and their methods of production. If the only the methods of production of symbols of coloniality were to be destroyed, then the symbols of coloniality might exist on as imperial ruins in their own right.

Symbols of Coloniality

In this section of the chapter, I will discuss what the symbolic aspects of coloniality are, and how the post-colonial ally should mitigate them. The symbols of coloniality are the actants present in the matrix of coloniality that transmit a certain aspect of coloniality such as violence, ruination, or *commandement*. These symbols still carry material connotations and forms even though I am referring to them as symbols for the purposes of this section, I am simply describing them in terms of how they may appear to the post-colonial ally and am arguing that the coloniality results from the dialogical interaction between the ally and the symbol, rather than the coloniality being directly generated by the symbol. In this case, I am referring to the specific instance of the coloniality generated by the non-colonized individual's relationship with a given symbol. Coloniality is also generated by the content of the symbol itself.

It is important to note that these symbols of coloniality are not in any way static displays or performances like paintings or plays (although paintings and plays can still certainly transmit images of coloniality). To define them in this way would be problematic and self-defeating for several reasons. Firstly, they would reify specific symbols as being inherently colonial and thus inhibit the potential reconfiguration of such symbols, which would otherwise necessitate their destruction. Secondly, to concretely define symbols of coloniality would result that the colonized are colonized in a separate ideological reality without the means to decolonize on the part of anyone involved. Lastly, it would disguise the true nature of coloniality and the symbols of coloniality. I argue that the symbols of coloniality are tacit relationships (not merely indicators of a

relationship) between the colonized and the colonizers/non-colonized in the matrix of coloniality. The relationship that forms a symbol of coloniality is created by the explicit and implicit set of meanings that the non-colonized and colonized absorb and reproduce as a result. Such meaning is not merely the emotional-aesthetic understanding of the symbol in question, but rather the political, social, economic, and ethical connotations that the colonize the symbol. For example, a colonial symbol that once belong to the colonized themselves may be stripped of its colonial implications and have its meaning reconstructed by the colonizers to refer to something else entirely. This would represent the suppression of the history of coloniality as well as the removal of the ability of the colonized to create their own meanings in a form of cultural colonial violence. Another type of symbol of coloniality may implicitly and falsely represent a constructed image of the colonized, and subsequently justify or legitimize violence against them. Thus, the challenge for the post-colonial ally becomes to be aware of the relationship between themselves and a symbol of coloniality, and subsequently reconfigure their relationship with it to remove the conditions of coloniality from it. The point is that the symbols of coloniality do not unilaterally generate coloniality but rather as a symptom of the interaction between the non-colonized and the symbol of coloniality.

One example of a symbol of coloniality is Abu-Laban's (2001, 273) postulation that Canadian institutions' homogenization of minority groups and ignorance of their differences from the dominant settler groups in Canada lead to an implicit reproduction of settler-colonial relations through the continued image of the superiority and immutability of the settlers. This is argued to be evident through practices such as negative stereotypes

that Canadian institution produces which reinforces a dissociative attitude. Abu-Laban (273) cites the example of a *Maclean's* magazine article that represented the Canadian Sikh community as a homogenous, powerful, violent, and potentially terroristic entity. Sikhism is a religion whose members largely originate from formerly colonized countries such as India and Pakistan. Such negative stereotypes further the perception of the Sikhs as an other, and reinforces the superiority and the perception of universality of norms and attitudes of settler Canadians. In this fashion, any form of violence such as legal or social exclusion becomes easier to justify against Sikhs.

I argue that such violent, homogenized, and power infused negative stereotypes and ignorance of difference generated by Canadian institutions represent the violence of maintenance, which is one of the forms of violence that comprises the condition of coloniality of *commandement*. I do not mean to communicate that the idea of negative stereotypes are in themselves violent and reproduce coloniality (even though they are oppressive in their own right). Rather, such reproduction of *commandement* is because of the violent subtext present within the negative stereotypes which increase the degree of ontological distance between the colonized and the colonizers/non-colonized. This ontological distance justifies the use of symbolic and material repression by Canadian institutions and reinforces the dissociative attitudes of the general public against the colonized. As such, symbolic violence in the form of violent negative stereotypes reproduces the settler-colonial relations present within Canada, and thereby maintain Canada's status as a colonial assemblage within the global matrix of coloniality.

For the post-colonial ally, this means that they must act according to the principle of awareness and be aware of such symbols of coloniality. The post-colonial ally must recognize if there are problematic notions of any aspect of coloniality within a given symbol in society, such as homogenization, violence, ignorance of similarities and differences to the in-group of a given colonial assemblage. In addition, they must re-evaluate their own reactions and actions that arise from symbols of coloniality. That being said, that the most challenging aspect of all this as these epistemic attitudes are internalized by the non-colonized by the processes of the same institutions of coloniality through the everyday process of socialization that every human being undergoes at every stage of their existence.

In order to avoid colonial homogenization by institutions, Abu-Laban (273) surmises that the only solution is an ongoing dialogue between groups in society whose differences are explicitly recognized and given redress that is appropriate to their exact condition. To provide an epistemic framework for the recognition of the differences between groups for post-colonial allies to facilitate an ongoing dialogue, I propose the adoption of the framework behind Mignolo's concept of delinking. Delinking is a process of political and epistemic resistance against the colonization of knowledge generation that Mignolo deems part of "necessary steps for imagining democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies" (Mignolo, 2009, 160). For Mignolo (*loc. cit.*), the geopolitical and historical location of an individual is what determines their ability and desire to speak and to think. The issue, however, is that the epistemologies Europeans enforced as universal ideas have hidden the geographical/historical locations in which they were

created. Mignolo (160) posits that one must “delink” themselves from the perception of a lack of an epistemological position in geography and history that causes knowledge to appear as falsely universal. To do so would be to participate in “decolonial thinking” where one detaches themselves from the “web of imperial knowledge” (Mignolo, 178).

For the post-colonial ally, to delink themselves means that they must always recognize that all of their customs, ethics, and ideas are rooted within a specific historical and geographical location. They must never for once assume that such notions are universal and self-occurring.

I believe that delinking is the only way that post-colonial allies can fully distinguish and understand the differences between the various groups and their constituent divisions. If a non-colonized individual were to analyze and engage the colonized groups within a specific geographical/historical location without delinking, then said individual would be acting from their specific epistemology that is laden within coloniality. It would be effectively enforcing that geographical/historical location onto the colonized.

Delinking also serves a potent framework for my concept of ethical synthesis that I have argued for in the previous chapter as a way to reconcile post-colonial ethics with the personal ethics of an individual. Ethical synthesis involves reducing a particular ethic to its core values without a specific context, and then adapting and expanding it based on the impact that a given action based on the particular ethic in question could have on the different spatial and temporal locations it reaches. To modify an ethic to make it suitable for all spatial and temporal locations that it could affect, one must delink that ethic from

the geographical/historical position in which it was born, and then modifying it according to all geographical/historical principles. Although ethical synthesis does appear to be like the concept of delinking by another name, the key distinction is that ethical synthesis is meant to guide action, rather than knowledge. Furthermore, it is meant to also transform action to fit each historical/geographical location.

Therefore, there are several tactics of the ally for the post-colonial to implement when dealing with the symbolic aspects of coloniality. First, they must be in a state of constant awareness of how symbols can transmit coloniality. Second, they must delink themselves from the web of imperial knowledge by recognizing that their ethics and ideas are not universal and have in fact implicit historical and geographical locations. Lastly, they must work to create lateral forums of dialogue across the world to communicate with the indigenous and allies that exist there.

Now that there is a set of tactics for the post-colonial ally to deal with the symbolic aspects of coloniality, the time has come to discover the tactics required for the material aspects of coloniality.

Material Processes of Coloniality

I will explore the material aspects that comprise the conditions of coloniality that structure the colonial assemblages of the global matrix of coloniality, as well as the means to dismantle them in this section of the chapter.

Abu-Laban (2001, 268-269) believes that even in the case of the dissolution of neo-liberalism and capitalism in Canada, there would still be inequality between the colonized and the colonizers due to the inter- and intra-group dynamics present within

Canada as well as institutional issues. To solve this, Abu-Laban proposes an “explicit initial acknowledgement of inequality created by Canada’s settler-colonial origins” that has been historically ignored or masked by policy responses from the Canadian government (Abu-Laban, 269). The reports and commissions that the Canadian government have set forth have largely indicated the issues facing the indigenous communities of Canada such as residential schools, relocation of indigenous communities, unequal treatment of Indigenous veterans, and the Indian act. However, there has been a noted lack of state response as well as public opposition to the findings of the reports and conditions made towards the plight of the indigenous.

To provide a solution to this, Abu-Laban (269) looks towards the acknowledgement model of truth and reconciliation of post-apartheid South Africa, given the historical similarities of South Africa to Canada in terms of colonization and the subsequent policies made against the indigenous in the duration. However, Abu-Laban (271) ultimately wishes to move against the existing ineffective institutions and structures in Canada such as courthouses and legislatures with the creation of an entirely new one: a “Forum for a Post-Colonial Future” whose membership would comprise both state actants and societal actants such as legislatures, and aboriginal, immigrant, ethnocultural, and labour organizations, as well as having a rotating executive position. Such a forum would address injustices and grievances to actants by the Canadian state, and provide a location for discussion and learning of the relationships various identities that comprise Canada. Moreover, this forum should not have a termination date, and should also directly work from the explicit acknowledgement of colonial inequalities rather than

being based on previous institutions such as historical treaties.

The post-colonial ally should participate in forming such forums not only in their particular assemblages of coloniality, but to also assist in generating a network of forums alongside other colonized and post-colonial allies that are active across the globe. This network of decolonial action must be created in order to match the fact that the matrix of coloniality spans the entire globe as well, as the conditions of coloniality that generate assemblages of coloniality often intersect with each other on a global scale. Only in this way can the spatial and ontological distances between the colonized and the non-colonized can be shortened.

Such a network should be reflective of the nature of the fora that comprise them: decentralized and mindful of the different forms of redress required for their constituent groups. In addition, additional forums should not be actively created by other allies from different assemblages of coloniality. Essentially, the network of fora must be a fluid association rather than a rigid institution so that all groups are given the redress they required and to avoid forming a global organization that would quickly resemble an empire.

However, there is an issue that the nature of forums are going to have to address: that different assemblages of coloniality are going to have different ontologies for their specific social and political structures. To solve this issue, I argue that post-colonial allies must adopt the method of analysis present within Chen's (2010, 3) process of "deimperialization" for the remnants of colonialism and later imperialism (in the form of Japanese and American imperialism during the 20th century) within Asia. Chen (227),

adopting the position of Partha Chatterjee, argues that existing notions of civil society are rooted solely within the Western social historical position, and ignores how colonized groups have been able to generate alternative political spaces outside of the civil society that is dominated by social elites. The distinction here is that the colonized groups exist outside of both the global North concepts of state and civil society (due to many being seen as illegal, for example) and are forced negotiate with the “public sphere” that is a combination of both civil society and the state. Chen (228) appropriates Chatterjee’s term of the “political society” to refer to these external spheres of colonized groups. To counter the appropriation of civil society by social elites, and to ensure that it remains a viable strategy against colonial and imperial authorities, Chen (233) argues that the notion of civil society should become an analytic category rather than a normative one in order for those inside civil society to become more aware of the spatiality and temporality of the social forces involved. This distinction would allow individuals to better support the struggles of colonized groups that are a part of political society. As an example of this, Chen presents the case of intellectuals in civil society who have to determine how to exercise power and resources in order to assist colonized groups in civil society. I believe that the transformation of the notion to civil society from an normative category to an analytic one is a suitable framework with which to map out the spaces and assemblages in which the colonized around the world act against coloniality.

There are three important lessons to draw from this method of analysis for the post-colonial ally. Firstly, the post-colonial ally must always be observant for the social and political spaces that exist outside of the mandate, control, and view of the colonizers,

and be aware of the various distinctions that demarcate such spaces. As such, the forums of post-coloniality must be liquid in their construction so that they can adapt to the various shifts in spaces in colonized civil and political societies. This is precisely why the global network of forums must be non-hierarchical, as any semblance of hierarchy in the network would replicate the local fields of struggle in colonized civil and political societies around the globe. Secondly, the appropriation of civil society under the accordance of the locations of social forces affected the colonized by the post-colonial ally is precisely how allies can use their privilege to directly attack the conditions of coloniality and assist the colonized in the struggle for decolonization. Finally, it illustrates the chief point that the material aspects of coloniality are a form of violent knowledge production. Disrupting this violent knowledge production is the key for removing coloniality and thus should form the crux of the tactics of the post-colonial ally.

Epilogue

In this thesis, I have outlined the ethics and responsibility required for post-colonial allyness. To do so, I have argued that the effects of colonialism exists today in the present form of coloniality, which is characterized by three conditions: ruination, the idea of imperial violence and structuration as an ongoing process; violence, the unique psychological and physical impacts caused by colonial violence which continually mutate and affect future generations of those descended from the colonized; and *commandement*, which was the use of colonial violence to establish, legitimise, and maintain colonial authority. I adapted the concepts of ontological distance, spatial distance, and temporal distance to frame the extent of an ethics required to tackle a global and historical issue such as these conditions of coloniality. I argue that those acting in post-colonial allyness must be in a state of awareness, conductivity, and dissolution. I postulated the idea of ethical synthesis which is a new way of considering and create ethics to fit on a global scale. Afterwards, I adapted a responsibility of an ultimate freedom for all humanity that necessitates the post-colonial struggle for allies. Finally, I posited that allies must form a global network that works to disrupt colonial institutions of knowledge production.

The position of an ally is a paradoxical position of necessary suicide. I believe that the roles of an ally and martyr are synonymous as the goal of an ally should be its own destruction through obsolescence. However, post-colonial allies are required as soon as possible to dismantle colonial assemblages alongside the colonized as the legacy of colonialism becomes further obscured by the pages of history, and the struggles against colonialism become much more difficult as they may be overshadowed and absorbed by

the other fields of struggle that may arise in the future. You have nothing to gain from your sacrifice but for a prospect of a harmonious humanity that prospers in a symbiosis of its differences. All non-colonized of the world, unite!

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