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Addiction: the colonization of rituals

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in
Theory and Criticism

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ADDICTION: THE COLONIZATION OF RITUALS

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Matthew Prokopiw

Centre for the Study of Theory & Criticism

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

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Abstract

What is addiction? Since its transformation as a word in the late 19th century, not only has it taken on the form of a scientific concept, but it also contains a complex social-historical component that tells a story of how and why addiction is now conceived of as a harmful and deviant behaviour. The objective of this text is to highlight how addiction fundamentally eclipses scientific discourses and instead functions as a social concept in the interests of colonization – comprised of forces of State and capitalism. Based on a critical reading of Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane*, we will find that the colonizing forces of State and capitalism express the post-modern form of the sacred, wherein rituals that sustain the sacred world are deemed good and promoted, whereas those rituals which threaten the State or capitalist mode of being are classified as bad, or profane. Thus, we will contrast the figure of the sports fanatic through his/her participation on online forums as they exhibit institutional characteristics of addiction, to the criminalized and demonized subjects and objects of addiction, with the intent of portraying two forms of institutional addiction with contrasting relations to colonial ideals. Moreover, in three films by Satyajit Ray (*The Music Room*, *The Chess Players*, and *Charulata*), we will not only see how social processes delineate the primary nature of the drug/user relationship which characterizes addiction, but also how forces of colonization repurpose rituals to serve colonial ideals. By tracing the transformation of the word addiction to authoritative relations with drunkenness, it will become evident how the impositions of morality and higher social forces have made addiction a social tool and a concept irreconcilable with scientific theories. Finally, in contrasting texts by Gabor Maté, Bruce Alexander and Stanton Peele, with texts by Harry Levine, Alfred Lindesmith and Thomas Szasz, we will see distinguishing types of discourses which attempt to address the problem 'what is addiction?'

Key words: addiction, colonization, ritual, capitalism, discourse, science, drugs, sports, sports fan, film, Satyajit Ray, Eliade, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari.

Acknowledgments

This thesis represents the cumulative effort of many people, whose large or small contributions have greatly affected the outcome. I owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Ariel Fuenzalida, who gave me opportunity and endless academic feedback. I would also like to express sincere thanks to my supervisor Dr. Daniel Vaillancourt, and my second reader, Dr. Michael Gardiner, for their contributions. Lastly, my friends and family who shine bright, giving energy and meaning to every day.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgments.....	ii
Introduction.....	1
More than a Scientific Concept.....	2
Problematizing Discourses of Addiction.....	4
Chapter 1	
Discourses of Addiction: a false problematic.....	7
What is Addiction and What are its Limits?.....	9
We Still Do Not Understand Addiction.....	12
The Transformation of Addiction: the ‘Harmfulness’ model.....	18
Opium Laws and the Further Legitimation of Addiction.....	22
Addiction as a Territorialized Subject and Object.....	26
Addiction and Religion as a Sense of Belonging.....	30
Chapter 2	
Profane Addictions in a Sacred World: the sports fanatic as drug addict.....	34
Eliade’s <i>The Sacred and the Profane</i> in Addiction.....	37
The Economy of Drugs.....	42
The Sports Fanatic as Drug Addict.....	46
The Colonization of Sports.....	48
Online Discourses of the Sports Fanatic.....	52
Chapter 3	
Distinguishing Between Discourses <i>Of</i> and <i>On</i> Addiction.....	67
The Nature of Addiction.....	68
Discourses <i>Of</i> Addiction Territorialize the Story of the Addict.....	72
Discourses <i>On</i> Addiction from the Films of Satyajit Ray.....	75
<i>Jalsaghar</i> (The Music Room, 1958).....	78
<i>Shatrank-ke-Khilatri</i> (The Chess Players, 1977).....	82
<i>Charulata</i> (1964).....	86
Conclusion.....	90
Bibliography.....	92
Curriculum Vitae.....	97

Introduction

In 2013, psychologists Robert West and Jamie Brown published a second edition of their text *Theory of Addiction*. In it, not only do they attempt to construct a testable scientific theory of addiction, but they do so “to address the significant challenges that addiction presents to modern society” (Brown and West, ii). These two points characterize a type of discourse which will be problematized in this text, a discourse *of* addiction. Based on these discourses, our contention is that the transformation of the word addiction in the late 19th to 20th century has not produced a scientifically acceptable theory of addiction and that this is in large part due to the function of harmfulness in the concept. Brown and West elaborate on the role which ‘harmfulness’ plays in defining addiction by making it a distinguishing characteristic from the condition of ‘dependence’¹: “It may be useful to distinguish between addiction as a repeated powerful motivation to engage in a rewarding but harmful behaviour and ‘physical dependence’ as a state of physiological adaptation to a drug which then needs to be taken to prevent adverse withdrawal symptoms” (Brown and West, 12).

As the determination of what constitutes harmfulness represents a moralistic function (while science only tells us that we’re dying, morals define it as ‘bad’), the question of addiction – ‘what is addiction?’ – implicates more than simply a scientific theory, which forms the basis of a discourse *of* addiction. At stake in a discourse *on* addiction is an economy of control (individual

¹ Brown and West note that, while at one point the definition of addiction followed the characteristics of what we now call dependence, harm is now a primary component of the concept: “...for a long period, there remained the same theme of addiction involving a state of physiological adaptation to [the] presence of a drug in the body so that absence of the drug leads to physiological dysfunction which is manifest to the sufferer as unpleasant or even life-threatening ‘withdrawal symptoms’. An addict was someone who needed to take a drug in order to maintain normal physiological functioning...Nowadays, the term ‘addiction’ tends to be applied to a syndrome at the centre of which is impaired control over a behaviour to a degree that is causing or could cause significant harm” (Brown and West, 11).

and collective) and its history of conquest. In this respect, this text addresses how the function of morality (as a concept of power) not only facilitated a scientific concept of addiction, but rationalized the colonization of people and drugs.

More Than a Scientific Concept

So long as morality factors into the equation, addiction is not simply a scientific concept. In spite of Brown and West's recognition that theories of addiction are "social constructs," wherein a definition would "serve a [social] purpose" (Brown and West, 44), their text, along with all discourses of addiction whose purpose is to forward a scientific theory of addiction, creates a scientific concept out of a moral classification – akin to classifying professional athletes or nuclear physicists as scientifically higher forms of the human species.

The scientific theory of addiction excludes crucial social components of addiction, wherein we may trace the use of the word 'addiction' to a much earlier epoch, but one which has no connection to the connotations of the contemporary notion: "The Oxford English Dictionary traces the term 'addiction' back to Roman Law where it involved 'the formal delivery of a person or property to an individual, typically in accordance with a judicial decision'" (Brown and West, 11). And yet, the scientific theorization will gloss over social developments and simply proclaim that "by the end of the nineteenth century, physicians were becoming increasingly interested in the scientific study of addiction...Early efforts in this direction focused on establishing addiction as a medical disease rather than a moral or spiritual issue" (*ibid*).

Unconcerned, scientific theories of addiction are based on a concept whose religious, State and economic² basis rationalized the marginalization of substances (alcohol, hemp/cannabis³,

² The 'harm's which rationalized the eradication of the poor and drugs such as heroin and cocaine not only consist of the notion of self-harms, but social harms: Therefore, while Erickson notes that "the criminalization of drugs in

opium/heroin, coca/cocaine/crack⁴) and social groups (immigrants⁵, the poor⁶). The concept of addiction, therefore, is ineludibly connected to the fact that “the origin of Canada's anti-drug laws in 1908 had little to do with the dangers associated with illicit drug use – these laws were based on public fear as well as on political and monetary gains” (Gordon, 8).

The problem of a moral basis for a scientific concept of addiction is not only that it is a highly uncontrollable variable (which has rightfully led to inter-disciplinary confusion and an inability to construct an acceptable scientific theory), but the prescription of morals are also subject to forms of power that produce social distinctions in order to further colonize social spaces by marginalizing the ‘undesirable’ and promoting the ideal. In respect to the concept of addiction,

Canada was made possible because of the strongly held belief that certain drugs had the ability to enslave users” (Erickson 1992:247), “many people believe that illegal drugs result in lower productivity, extra costs to health care, business loss, and significant law enforcement costs; specifically police, courts, and prisons” (Oscapella 1998). Retrieved from (Howard, 2003).

³ The relation between ‘hemp’ and ‘marijuana’ was constructed by William Randolph Hearst, who “was able to exploit white America’s bigotry toward the Mexican immigrants by artificially creating a fear of marijuana as a dangerous intoxicant. As Robert Deitch notes, Hearst “had a financial interest in outlawing hemp. Now that he owned so much forest land, he had no interest in returning to hemp-based paper. Furthermore, Deitch continues, noting that “although the utilization of hemp had severely declined after the Civil War, it was reemerging as a viable basic raw material because of the 1917 introduction of a machine designed by George Schlichten, known as the ‘Decorticator’.” However, “the cultivation and use of hemp certainly did threaten the monopolies of Rockefeller, Mellon, Hearst, and the DuPont Chemical Company, in several markets (fuel, paper and plastics). The evidence indicates that, as indirectly and discreetly as possible, they set out to eliminate the competition” (Deitch, 115).

⁴ “In the United States, between the years of 1983-1993, the number of incarcerated drug offenders increased from 57,000 to 353,000. In 1996, one in every four prisoners was either awaiting trial or serving time for drug-related offences. Within this, the number of black people arrested for drug offences increased from 24% to 39%. In 1996, Blacks and Hispanics combined constituted nearly 90% of all prisoners sentenced to state prisons for drug offences (Mauer 1996:11). Black people are only 12% of the entire United States population. Some of these disparities can be explained by the racism that exists in laws for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. It takes five grams of crack to get five years in federal prison versus 500 grams of powder cocaine. Ninety-four percent of 3,430 crack defendants in federal courts in 1994 were black (Mauer 1996:11). It is clear that incarceration with relation to illicit drugs in the United States is based on racism” (Howard, 16).

⁵ In the case of opium it was a racial and economic endeavour: In the 1880’s, when “the Chinese became an economic threat’ to other Canadians,” “hostility towards Chinese began to be reflected in legislation, which was designed to end Chinese immigration and drive the Chinese out of the economic mainstream in Canada.” This resulted in the passing of The Opium Act of 1908, “Canada's first anti-drug legislation” (Howard, 10).

⁶ “Marijuana is perhaps the most widely used recreational intoxicant other than alcohol. It was traditionally known as a poor man’s intoxicant. Marijuana was always available at low cost, or no cost; whereas alcohol is harder to produce at home. Not surprisingly, the first anti-marijuana laws coincided with the massive migration of Hispanics into the United States because of the Mexican Revolutionary War. Before Alcohol Prohibition, marijuana was only illegal in a few Southern and Western states; that was purely intended to discourage settlement of black or Latino populations” (Deitch, 158).

the (empowered) function of determining what constitutes harmfulness has historically exceeded a scientific basis: drunkenness was tolerated and unclassified for generations (one would often refer to a drunkard as having a strong ‘love’ for the drink), until the drunkard’s inability (or lack of desire) to fulfill their social duties led to not only contempt for the behaviour, but an attempt to eradicate it and classify it as a disease of ‘dependence’. In this example, we see how the classification of ‘addiction’ followed a desire to eradicate (colonize) a population of people or drugs. Therefore, while there continue to be ongoing clinical researches – in neuroscience, biology, psychology, chemistry, sociology – in search for the perfect theory of addiction, the concept of addiction invariably lies beyond the sciences.

Problematizing Discourses *of* Addiction

How do we account for a scientific theory of addiction based on moral precepts of harm? While the task of a discourse *of* addiction is to propose a theory of addiction as a singular medical condition, a discourse *on* addiction does not attempt to solve the scientific problem ‘what is addiction?’ but rather it is based on delineating such a concept, as each of the next three chapters attempt to do.

The first chapter introduces addiction as a concept of power – discursively, materially and socially, all of which are implicated in the discourses of Bruce Alexander (*The Globalisation of Addiction*), Gabor Maté (*In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts*), Harry Levine (*The Discovery of Addiction*), Alfred Lindesmith (*The Addict and the Law*), Thomas Szasz (*Ceremonial Chemistry*), Jonathan Ott (*Pharmacothoeon*), the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the *Controlled Substances Act* and the *Harrison Act*. The response to drunkenness by religious temperance members will be highlighted to illustrate the transformation

of the word addiction into a medical condition by virtue of the power and contempt facing drunkenness. As the medical condition of addiction was formed based on a moral precept, we find that contemporary research in addiction is in a helpless state of trying to scientifically explain addiction. Moreover, addiction will be shown to be a social concept which functions based on the ability to materialize moral distinctions, as it will be shown to do not only for religious temperance members, but as part of a larger movement of State and economic colonization, whose domination supplanted pre-modern religions.

In the second chapter, based on the text *The Sacred and the Profane* by Mircea Eliade, the modern conquest by State and economic forces will be evoked as a religious function, which will implicate the creation of the sacred world and its ritualizations, and the opposing world and rituals of the profane. We will focus particular attention on the relation between sacred power and rituals, as sacred rituals become promoted (because they sustain the sacred world) and profane rituals are marginalized (because they threaten the sacred world). While the first section incorporates the religious function of distinguishing between ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’, the second section will delineate the scientific concept of addiction based on a contrast to sports and the sports fanatic. While historical discourses will trace the colonization of sports and the sports fanatic by State and economic forces in order to invoke a social war on rituals that implicates drug addictions, online discourses of hockey and soccer (football) fanatics will be incorporated to illustrate strong characteristics of conventional notions of addiction, which is meant to further dissolve the supposed continuum of addiction.

The third chapter revisits addiction as a discursive, material and social concept of power, namely in three films by Satyajit Ray: *Jalsaghar* (The Music Room – 1958), *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri* (The Chess Players – 1977), and *Charulata* (1964). These films facilitate a discourse *on* addiction,

based on their depictions of subjects of addiction. Specifically, each individual story of addiction is ineludibly related to greater social forces that have and are in the process of colonizing rituals. Thus, a ritualization of idleness, in the form of chess, is inextricably linked to an absence of necessity of working for aristocratic landlords. Moreover, we will see how perceptions by sacred powers inform the harmfulness of ‘addictive’ behaviours, implying that the classification of a condition known as addiction based on moral precepts of harm is an effect of colonization.

Chapter 1

Discourses *of* Addiction: a false problematic

In a survey of modern texts of addiction, one ineludibly encounters a frequent question: ‘what is addiction?’ How can there be a simultaneous failure to understand the concept of addiction and a social history predicated on its categorical presence? The objective here is not to solve this question of addiction, but rather to regard the question as the very problem which produced and now sustains a concept that carries the form of a truth. There is a crucial difference between trying to solve the problem ‘what are the universal characteristics of addiction?’ and problematizing the object and the subject of addiction. To speak or to write *of* addiction is to presuppose the reality of the thing *as we have been told about it*. Conversely, this text may be considered *on* addiction because it is a problematization of the discourses *of* addiction which have formed our knowledge (and its respective manifestations). In that respect, a discourse *on* addiction incorporates the genealogical approach⁷.

Anyone can believe that there is a nature to such a thing as addiction, but a discourse’s relation to power confers legitimation and truth⁸ to the concept. The role of discourse in addiction invokes the works of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, wherein there is a

⁷In the essay *What Is Enlightenment?* Michel Foucault invokes his genealogical method as it relates to the subject by asking: “How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” (Foucault Reader, 49).

⁸A truth is, as Nietzsche wrote in his essay *On Truth and Lies*, an illusion which we have forgotten is an illusion, and yet still remains a source of knowledge: “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms, in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, canonical, and binding” (*The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, 146)

palpable relationship between power and knowledge, especially as it pertains to the territorialization⁹ of the object and the subject:

“...in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.” (Power/Knowledge, 93).

Whether something is legal or illegal, prohibited or promoted, does not reflect a natural (universal) essence, but rather a power over the body and the word.

While discourses of addiction rely on a Cartesian model of the body¹⁰ by reference to either physiological symptoms, self-destructive habits, or a sense of belonging¹¹ this text follows the genealogical method of Foucault, whose purpose in *The History of Sexuality* was to “analyze sexuality as a historically singular form of experience...to treat sexuality as the correlation of a domain of knowledge [*savoir*], a type of normativity, and a mode of relation to the self...” (Essential Works, 199-200)¹². In this respect, this chapter will not only trace our contemporary meaning of addiction back to its transformation (re-signification) in the 19th century and into the

⁹ In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari initiate the language of territorialization: “The primitive territorial machine, with its immobile motor, the earth, is already a social machine, a megamachine, that codes the flows of production, the flows of means of production, of producers and consumers...” (*Anti-Oedipus*, 112)

¹⁰ “Starting from the assumption of a purely mechanical body,” Silvia Federici notes that the reduction of the Cartesian body to “mechanical matter allows for the development of mechanisms of self-management that make the body the subject of the will” (Federici, 148).

¹¹ While physiological symptoms and a harmful behaviour (typically of drug use) form the two main pillars of the modern transformation of the concept of addiction, we will also highlight Bruce Alexander’s more recent (compared to the earlier transformative discourses of addiction in the late 19th and 20th century) discourse of addiction which claims that addiction provides a social sense of belonging.

¹² “My object was...to decipher how, in Western societies, a complex experience is constituted from and around certain forms of behavior: an experience that conjoins a field of knowledge [*connaissance*] (with its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines), a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, and so on), and a mode of relation between the individual and himself (which enables him to recognize himself as a sexual subject amid others)” (*Essential Works*, 200)

21st century, ostensibly beginning with the religious temperance movement, but it also asks how addiction works¹³, following Deleuze and Guattari's assemblage theory¹⁴. The focus in this chapter therefore will be on sources of authority that have contributed to the production of a knowledge *of* addiction.

The difference between a discourse *on* addiction and a discourse *of* addiction is present in the texts *of* addiction by Bruce Alexander (*The Globalisation of Addiction*) and Gabor Maté (*In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts*), and the texts *on* addiction by Harry Levine (*The Discovery of Addiction*), Alfred Lindesmith (*The Addict and the Law*), Thomas Szasz (*Ceremonial Chemistry*) and Jonathan Ott (*Pharmactheon*). The former texts are chosen because, despite the fact they revert to an attempt to answer the question 'what is addiction?' by presupposing the conventional affects and reaffirming the concept, they also precipitate an effective problematization of the question. The latter texts, most notably Lindesmith and Levine's, are a methodological genealogy of the development of the concept. While these texts scrupulously document the role of law and the temperance movement in transforming the referents of addiction in the 19th and 20th century, Thomas Szasz and Jonathan Ott articulate the assemblages which grew from and now sustain addiction, from the 20th century to the present.

I. What Is Addiction and What Are Its Limits?

One of the crucial points of a discourse *on* addiction is that the traditional conception of addiction was transformed in the late 19th century onward into its now unrecognizable form. The

¹³“We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 257). The same methodology can be seen in Foucault, especially in texts such as *The History of Sexuality*.

¹⁴*Assemblage theory* is an implicit component of the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as insisted by Manuel De Landa: “An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows simultaneously...The only assemblages are machinic assemblages of desire and collective assemblages of enunciation” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 22).

two main features of this transformation are: (1) the modern conception of addiction holds no resemblance to its prior referents; (2) the context which precipitated the change was anything but scientific. As this chapter traces the genealogy of these two points, the presupposed contemporary criteria of addiction come starkly into question.

The conception of addiction prior to the temperance movement contained two elements: a judicial¹⁵ element and a social¹⁶ element. It is crucial to note that, as psychologist Bruce Alexander asserts in *The Globalisation of Addiction*, “the examples of usage over the centuries that are provided by the dictionary show that addiction, thus defined, may or may not be destructive to the addicted individual and to society...strong devotion (i.e. addiction) to a worthy cause or a benevolent god can be the foundation of a positive, fulfilling life” (Alexander, 28). The implication of this notion of addiction is the *capacity* to devote oneself to a pursuit. Therefore, the pre-modern location of addiction is not strictly in the body or in the substance, but instead refers to a potential devoting relationship. More importantly, however, is the inherent ambiguity within this conception – it is not associated with a moralistic judgment or categorization of the pursuit.

The purpose of a genealogical investigation, then, is to understand how the conception illustrated above became transformed into what addiction exists as today. The contemporary and dominant discourses of addiction contain mainly medical (including scientific) and state assemblages which produce diverse images of addiction and the addict. The addiction assemblage is now

¹⁵ “In Roman law the word *addicere* had the more prosaic job of signifying a giving or binding-over of something or someone by sentence of a court: the assignation of slave to master, debtor to creditor” (Farrell and Redfield, 2). “The traditional English definition appeared in the first ‘fascicule’ of the authoritative dictionary of the English language, the *Oxford English Dictionary*, published in 1884: **Addiction**...1. *Rom Law*. A formal giving over or delivery by sentence of court. Hence, a surrender, or dedication, of any one to a master” (Alexander, 27-8).

¹⁶ “That legal meaning gave rise to a now obsolete English verb, “to addict,” meaning “to bind, attach, or devote oneself or another as a servant, disciple, or adherent, to some person or cause.” (Farrell and Redfield, 2). Part two of the definition from the 1884 *OED* states addiction as being: “2. The state of being (self-) addicted or given *to* a habit or pursuit; devotion” (Alexander, 27).

primarily characterized by the *law* and *drugs*: while medical and state acceptance of addictions to pursuits such as gambling have recently gained recognition, they lack the legislative force which controlled substances encounter. Drug addiction, then, is the face of contemporary and dominant discourses *of* addiction.

According to these discourses, *what is addiction?* Based on the most recent publication of the ‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM-V) by the American Psychiatry Association (APA), addiction is a ‘substance use disorder’, which combines the categories of ‘substance abuse’ and ‘substance dependence’ from previous DSM’s, namely DSM-IV. The current definition of addiction, according to the APA¹⁷, is “a condition in which the body must have a drug to avoid physical and psychological withdrawal symptoms. Addiction’s first stage is dependence, during which the search for a drug dominates an individual’s life. An addict eventually develops tolerance, which forces the person to consume larger and larger doses of the drug to get the same effect” (APA). The discrepancy between the traditional and contemporary form of addiction is clearly evident, as are the elements of contemporary addiction: based entirely on drug use, addiction is characterized by symptoms such as tolerance and withdrawal, which compel the drug addict to continue using. Described this way, addiction takes on the form of a symptomatic classification¹⁸.

¹⁷ According to the DSM-V, addiction, now labelled as ‘substance use disorder’, is characterized by symptoms of: tolerance; withdrawal; dosage; craving; unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and recovering; usage getting in the way of social or occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in spite of knowledge of physical or psychological harms associated with use (DSM IV and V).

¹⁸ As Brown and West note, “A feature of the definition of addiction that currently prevails is that it is a clinical disorder and in fact it is a disorder of motivation. We also know that it is chronic and in many cases life-threatening. Like most psychiatric disorders, and many physical disorders, it is diagnosed by reference to a set of symptoms rather than an underlying pathology. There is no laboratory test or scan that can be used to say that an individual is suffering from addiction; the symptoms are the sole means of determining whether the disease is present in any one case. But the symptoms are only markers and, for various reasons, an individual may have some symptoms but not others” (Brown and West, 20).

Addiction is not only encountered medically, however, but also by the state. The *Controlled Substances Act (CSA)* of the United States of America stipulates that “the term 'addict' means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction” (CSA). In this case, the “addict” is subject to the CSA only in relation to his/her abuse of an illegal substance, wherein substances are criminalized based on several factors, such as “actual or relative potential for abuse,” “scope, duration, and significance of abuse,” or its “psychic or physiological dependence liability” (*ibid*). The addict, therefore, is not only a pathological subject, but also a criminal. While the purpose of this legislation is evidently to limit the availability of harmful substances which people become addicted to, the availability of these drugs on the ‘black market’ coupled with the conventional pathological notion of addiction creates the reality of a highly criminalized subject.

We Still Do Not Understand Addiction

Gabor Maté is a clinical doctor who works with addicts (typically of heroin or crack cocaine) in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, Canada’s most notorious drug and addiction haven. His book *In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts* encapsulates the false problem of modern addiction: it tries to answer the question ‘what is addiction?’ while it also names, categorizes and defines it.

Therefore, while Maté ponders “how to understand the death grip of drug addiction? What keeps Penny injecting after the spinal suppuration that nearly made her paraplegic? Why can’t Beverly give up shooting cocaine despite the HIV, the recurring abscesses I’ve had to drain on her body and the joint infections that repeatedly put her in hospital?” (Maté, 194), he equivocally determines the condition of addiction several times within his text, wavering between the two different locations: addiction is either a physiological compulsion, or it is the inability to quit a

habit which produces negative consequences (he also makes reference to an addiction as a “home,” but he doesn’t elaborate an argument for it). And yet the lack of clarity or understanding of addiction can be traced in Maté’s text through his clinical references to the location of addiction as being concurrently a disease of compulsion¹⁹ but also the resulting negative consequences,²⁰ neither of which provide a sufficient understanding of addiction for Maté²¹. While these two locations are historical developments which form the presupposed affects of addiction, the salient point is that while an understanding of addiction remains equivocal, discourses of addiction project a reality that there is something (addiction) that *makes* addicts do things they *shouldn’t* do²². This is the language of drug addiction, where the cart was put before the horse: to determine behaviour as being of a state of loss of control is a discursive function; to operationalize and prove it in clinical studies is a scientific function. How can we accept the arbitrary determination of drug addiction as being inherently led by a ‘loss of control’? It was only *after* drug addiction was categorized as containing a destructive loss of control did science begin to try filling the empirical void, which attempts to fulfill the historical prophecies:

¹⁹ “In the words of a consensus statement by addiction experts in 2001, addiction is a ‘chronic *neurobiological disease* ... characterized by behaviors that include one or more of the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and craving’. [D.K. Hall-Flavin and V.E. Hofmann, “Stimulants, Sedatives and Opiates,” in *Neurological Therapeutics*, vol. 2, ed. J.H. Noseworthy (London and New York: Martin Dunitz, 2003), 1510–18.]” (Maté, 92).

²⁰ “The key features of substance addiction are the use of drugs or alcohol despite negative consequences, and relapse ... The issue is not the quantity or even the frequency, but the impact. ‘An addict continues to use a drug when evidence strongly demonstrates the drug is doing significant harm.... If users show the pattern of preoccupation and compulsive use repeatedly over time with relapse, addiction can be identified.’ [N.S. Miller and M.S. Gold, “A Hypothesis for a Common Neurochemical Basis for Alcohol and Drug Disorders,” *Psychiatric Clinics of North America* 16(1) (1993): 105–17.]” (*ibid*).

²¹ “Helpful as such definitions are, we have to take a broader view to understand addiction fully... To get anywhere near a complete picture we must keep shaking the kaleidoscope to see what other patterns emerge.” (Maté, 93).

²² “Because the addiction process is too multifaceted to be understood within any limited framework, my definition of addiction made no mention of “disease.” Viewing addiction as an illness, either acquired or inherited, narrows it down to a medical issue. It does have some of the features of illness, and these are most pronounced in hardcore drug addicts like the ones I work with in the Downtown Eastside. But not for a moment do I wish to promote the belief that the disease model by itself explains addiction or even that it’s the key to understanding what addiction is all about. Addiction is “all about” many things” (Maté, 94).

“Brain science is at the core of our future understanding of how drugs affect behaviour...Major advances have been made on two fronts. First, our understanding of the major neural components of the ‘reward’ or reinforcement system in the brain in animals has improved...Second, understanding has improved in cognitive neuroscience, elucidating how the human brain processes information, particularly within the cerebral cortex. Convergence between these areas is beginning to enable us to understand the neurobiological underpinnings of the effects of psychoactive substances in humans...” (Nutt, 12).

What this passage from 2007 illustrates is the currently developing domain of scientific research on drug addiction, which has already been an institutionally accepted concept and condition for one century.

Gabor Maté, while drawn to developments in neuroscience which begin to help explain severe drug addictions, does not rely on this discourse – given its inability to provide answers – and moreover, provides a fundamental criticism: “It’s safe to say that any pursuit, natural or artificial, that induces a feeling of increased motivation and reward—shopping, driving, sex, eating, TV watching, extreme sports and so on—will activate the same brain systems as drug addictions” (Maté, 146). In Bruce Alexander’s chapter on “quantitative research and clinical reports,” he also concludes “...it is difficult [and inconclusive] for clinical researchers to prove *why* people become addicted or cling to their addictions” (Alexander, 154).

While the presupposed affects of addiction lack clinical or unequivocal validity, they act as a tracing²³ to enable a ‘legitimized’ identification of addiction. In *Addiction and Self-Control*, a synthesis of perspectives from “Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience” based on a conference in 2010, the absence of clinical certainty led the editor of the essays Neil Levy to

²³ “All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction... Its goal is to describe a de facto state, to maintain balance in intersubjective relations, or to explore an unconscious that is already there from the start, lurking in the dark recesses of memory and language. It consists of tracing, on the basis of an overcoding structure or supporting axis, something that comes ready-made” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 12)

conclude that we still do not fully understand addiction²⁴. Yet, while a clearer understanding in all forms is needed on addiction, this does not stop Levy from classifying diagnostic criteria. First, as addiction is related to the notion of dependence, which is diagnosed by physical manifestations of compulsion: “[There is] a wealth of evidence emerging (especially) from cognitive neuroscience about the ways in which the mechanisms involved in addiction seem to be different from those engaged in ordinary choice” (Levy, 2). While Levy distinguishes between addictive (drug-related) and non-addictive ‘losses of control’, both feature a primary component of addiction: harmfulness. Thus, according to Levy, an addiction is a “failure of self-control,” where “rational agents act contrary to their own best judgments” (*ibid*). However, Levy is careful to note that ‘loss of control’ is only “one of the defining features of addiction,” as “loss of control is also an enormous and growing problem in spheres beyond addiction: obesity, impulsive spending, failures to save for retirement, and dozens of other behaviors that cause social and individual problems” (Levy, 1).

Have we lost all sense of what addiction is, or was there no such *thing* as addiction to begin with? Given the uncertainty in the presence or locations of addiction, how can we even differentiate between the addict and the non-addict? The inability of the presupposed notions and affects to distinguish between addictions and non-addictions has led to an eruption of addictive classifications, both culturally and institutionally. The DSM-IV features ‘Pathological Gambling’ as one of the ‘Impulse-Control Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified’: “The essential feature of Pathological Gambling is persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior (Criterion A)

²⁴ According to the editor Neil Levy, the lack of clarity and certainty surrounding addiction is what compels the text *Addiction and Self-Control* to be produced: “This volume is motivated by the belief that understanding addiction, and loss of self-control more generally, requires a scientifically informed and philosophically sophisticated perspective on human agency... understanding addiction requires the synthesis or coordination of work on the subpersonal mechanisms involved in behavior with the personal level at which we understand ourselves. Progress on these difficult issues will come, therefore, from the interchange between researchers in diverse fields—neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers...” (Levy, 2).

that disrupts personal, family, or vocational pursuits” (DSM-IV, 615). While addiction is not specifically mentioned in the feature, the diagnostic criteria are equivalent to addiction²⁵. The fifth edition of the DSM now also includes a section on Internet gaming disorder, which “is included to reflect the scientific literature on persistent and recurrent use of Internet games, and a preoccupation with them, [which] can result in clinically significant impairment or distress”; and caffeine use disorder, because “research shows that as little as two to three cups of coffee can trigger a withdrawal effect marked by tiredness or sleepiness” (DSM V). These eruptions arise from the problem ‘what is the limit of addiction – where will it stop?’ which is the false problem resulting from the scientific query ‘what is addiction?’

The inability of the principle of loss of control to explain addiction has left a void which needed to be filled in order to legitimize the discourse *of* drug addiction. The absence of clinical certainty based on the fundamental principle of loss of control in addiction has led many authors to not only question what addiction is, but also to formulate a new basis for addiction. The second location of conventional addiction is not within the body, but rather in its relation to a pursuit – it can be described as the criteria of ‘harmfulness’ of addiction, wherein a compulsive habit is addictive only as a result of the consequences being perceived as ‘bad’ (harmful). The ‘harmfulness’ discourse *of* addiction is prevalent in many texts, such as by Gabor Maté:

“The use of substances like heroin, cocaine, nicotine and alcohol are only the most obvious examples, the most laden with the risk of physiological and medical consequences. Many behavioural, nonsubstance addictions can also be highly destructive to physical health, psychological balance, and personal and social

²⁵“Diagnostic criteria for 312.31 Pathological Gambling: is preoccupied with gambling; needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired excitement [tolerance]; has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling; is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling [withdrawal]; has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling; has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity because of gambling (DSM-IV, 618).

relationships. Addiction is any repeated behaviour, substance-related or not, in which a person feels compelled to persist, regardless of its negative impact on his life and the lives of others.” (Maté, 145).

For Bruce Alexander, who distinguishes between four kinds of addictions, the criteria for locating any of the four addictions (addiction1, addiction2, addiction3 and addiction4) is related to a logic of ‘harmfulness’. As he enumerates, addiction1 “entails overwhelming involvement with drug habits, but with no other habits or pursuits”; addiction2 is a “non-overwhelming involvement,” wherein the ‘addict’ is “self-medicating” or simply “dependent,” such as “on their jobs, their families, their recreational sports, their cars, their times of prayer or meditation, or on one or more drugs, in order to carry out their lives in successful ways”; addiction3 is “the set of overwhelmingly involving, destructive addictions that includes, but goes far beyond, drugs and alcohol”; whereas “non-destructive addictions will be called addiction4 in this book... These kinds of addiction are often seen as admirable” (Alexander, 27-56).

In these four conceptions of addiction not only do we see Alexander’s attempt to “finally fulfill the unredeemed promise of psychology to comprehend the entire spectrum of human motivation, from the horrors of compulsion to the triumphs of faith and love” (Alexander, 37), but we can see the domination of the moralistic good/bad binary which characterizes the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction. While the imposition of an addict who has lost a sense of control does feature in addiction3 for Bruce Alexander, all of his conceptions of addiction are related to a criteria of ‘harmfulness’, where addiction is located in its determination of bearing negative consequences. However, the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction proves to be more than just a modern rhetorical strategy in discourses *of* addiction, but rather it was a fundamental component of the modern creation and conservation of the concept of addiction itself.

II. The Transformation of Addiction According to a ‘Harmfulness’ Model

The inability of clinical studies to provide conclusive evidence of the presence of addiction is directly related to the discursive transformation of the concept beginning in the 19th century. The reclassification of addiction did not occur from laboratory results, but by members of the religious temperance movement. As such, the two contemporary locations of addiction – in the body and in the body’s relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour – were produced in the Protestant discourses *of* alcohol addiction²⁶, and while they continue to remain fundamental to discourses *of* addiction today, it is the reason why clinical science is unable to fill the empirical void left by the reclassification of addiction.

The Discovery of Addiction by Harry Levine not only traces the principles of addiction back to their authoritative utterances, but he also does not attempt to answer the scientific question ‘*what is addiction?*’ For this reason, Levine’s text is the prototypical discourse *on* addiction, as it contributes to the problematization of the concept by illustrating how the principle of a loss of control and an addiction by relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour were originally conceived of.

Levine marks the transformation of the concept of addiction not only by referring to the traditional definition of the word, but more importantly, by illustrating its absence in prior discourses: “In the colonial period the most common words used to describe the drunkard's desire for liquor were ‘love’ and ‘affection’, terms seldom used in the 19th and 20th centuries” (Levine, 5). Moreover, the principle of a loss of control in the drunkard was equally absent:

“During the 17th century, and for most of the 18th, the assumption was that people drank and got

²⁶ “Members of temperance organizations were deeply concerned with the pernicious effects of alcohol on their own group – primarily the Protestant middle class; they worried about themselves, their relatives, friends and neighbors” (Levine, 13).

drunk because they wanted to, and not because they ‘had’ to” (Levine, 4). That many people liked to drink and get drunk is an unmistakable fact: “Seventeenth-century and especially 18th-century America was notable for the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed, the universality of their use and the high esteem they were accorded. Liquor was food, medicine and social lubricant...” (Levine, 2)²⁷.

And yet, as Levine points out, the absence of a classification of alcohol addiction had much to do with a relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour, meaning that drunkards were tolerated because they still fulfilled their duties: “In general, drunkards as a group or class of deviants were not especially problematic for colonial Americans. If they had property, or were able to support themselves, they were treated much like anyone else of their class” (Levine, 4). This characterizes one of the main principles of the criteria of ‘harmfulness’, which is that substances or pursuits which are in accord with the precepts of the ‘good’, ideal body, namely as a producer and a consumer (but also as a political subject), are not demonized as addictive but promoted as socially acceptable (as will be addressed in the second chapter).

Before he “clarified for the world the effects of alcohol abuse and gave moral support to those who saw alcohol as evil” (Deitch, 49)²⁸, the physician (and one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence) Dr. Benjamin Rush gave acceptance to the social ritual of drunkenness and only urged moderation: “Have we not seen hundreds who have made it a constant practice to get drunk almost everyday for thirty or forty years, who, notwithstanding, arrived to a great age, and

²⁷ “Workers received a daily allotment of rum, and certain days were set aside for drunken bouts; in some cases, employers paid for the liquor. The tavern was a key institution in every town, the center of social and political life, and all varieties of drink were available. Americans drank wine, beer, cider and distilled spirits, especially rum. They drank at home, at work and while traveling; they drank morning, noon and night. And they got drunk” (Levine, 3).

²⁸ “In 1784, Dr. Benjamin Rush, with a particular interest in mental diseases, wrote “An Inquiry into the Effects of Spirituous Liquors on the Human Mind and Body,” a scathing account of alcohol’s ill effects...The staunchly religious Prohibitionist crusaders promoted Dr. Rush’s findings as conclusive evidence — although not many doctors in those days agreed with all his conclusions” (Deitch, 49).

enjoyed the same good health as those who have followed the strictest rules of temperance?” (Rush, 22). Yet despite the general social acceptance of drinking before the temperance movement became popular, Levine cites examples of a small minority of individuals and groups who viewed the prevalence and excesses of drinking as highly contemptuous, namely religious figures²⁹. The seeds of addiction were thus being sewn according to the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction, wherein an individual’s immersive habit would be considered an addiction based on the perceived negative consequences which arose from the pursuit, such as drunkenness being “a waste of time and of the good creatures of God” (Levine, 3)³⁰. Whereas the groups and individuals who considered habitual drinking and drunkenness contemptuous, it was their desire and ability to stop this habit which produced a realization of the drunkard’s “inability” to quit. Therefore, it was the notion of alcohol addiction as ‘harmful’ which resulted in “terms like ‘overwhelming’, ‘overpowering’ and ‘irresistible’ being used to describe the drunkard's desire for liquor” (Levine, 5).

The main feature in the transformation of the concept of addiction was propelled by the desire of a powerful group (temperance members) to eradicate a particular behaviour, in this case, drunkenness. This very same notion continues today in the differential categorization of what is addiction and who is addicted. It was the drunkard’s desire to not be coerced into stopping to drink which produced the idea that there was such a thing as (alcohol) addiction, a disease of the

²⁹ “From time to time some wealthy and powerful colonials complained about excessive drinking and drunkenness. In 1637 there was concern about “much drunkenness, waste of the good creatures of God, mispense of time, and other disorders, which took place at taverns.” In 1673 Increase Mather published his sermon “Wo to Drunkards” deploring the frequency of excessive drinking in the colonies. By 1712 things had gotten even worse, and he reissued his pamphlet...By the 1760s John Adams was so concerned about the level of drunkenness that he proposed limiting the number of taverns, and Benjamin Franklin labeled taverns ‘a Pest to Society’ (Levine, 3).

³⁰ “Those that follow after Strong Drink, have not the Art of getting or keeping Estates lawfully, Danforth warned in 1710. They cannot be diligent in their Callings, nor careful to improve all fitting Opportunities of providing for themselves, and for their families” (Levine, 4). This characterization of harmfulness was particularly prescient to the dominant economic force of the Protestants.

will or a sense of loss of control³¹. Meanwhile, it was the work of Dr. Benjamin Rush that created a new model of habitual drunkenness, one based not only on the location of addiction in the body, but also based on the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction: “In the bulk of his writings about alcohol, Rush was not only, or even mainly, concerned with diagnosing the condition of the drunkard or prescribing cures. He wanted to awaken Americans to an entire catalog of pernicious results which followed from the consumption of spirits – particularly disease, poverty, crime, insanity and broken homes” (Levine, 8). Nonetheless, Levine outlines how Benjamin Rush created the four fundamental principles of the discourse *of* addiction: “First, he identified the causal agent – spirituous liquors; second, he clearly described the drunkard's condition as loss of control over drinking behavior – as compulsive activity; third, he declared the condition to be a disease; and fourth, he prescribed total abstinence as the only way to cure the drunkard” (Levine, 8).

It is from these prescriptions traced back to Dr. Rush where we see the origins of the contemporary discourse *of* addiction. While developments in clinical studies of psychoactive drugs have conclusively rejected an inherent addictive nature in drugs (meaning the notion that if *any* individual were to ingest drug x they would become addicted, has been rejected), the temperance discourse of identifying the substance (liquor) as the causal agent of disease and the cure as being total abstinence has unmistakably led to the contemporary prohibition models of drugs, such as the *Controlled Substances Act*. Furthermore, the imposition of habitual drunkenness as compulsive and a disease also laid the foundation for the contemporary discourse *of* addiction as being located strictly in the body. But the latent mechanism of temperance

³¹ “Of all colonials, Puritan ministers were the most troubled by habitual drunkenness, and in some scattered phrases and sentences we find evidence of their trying to stretch beyond the ideas of their days. Increase Mather, for example, declared that habitual drunkenness was a kind of madness, and Foxcroft warned moderate drinkers that they were ‘in danger of contracting an incurable Habit’” (Levine, 6).

prohibition lies with the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction, meaning that a group identifies a particular behaviour and substance as undesirable (or bad/evil) and moves towards its eradication, either by force or through discourse. In the case of addiction, its discursive function materialized by Rush’s “reconstruction of madness as disease,” whereby “within the asylum the mad could be freed from their chains and taught to constrain themselves” (Levine, 16)³². The creation of inebriate asylums³³, penitentiaries and reformatories illustrates the extent of forceful coercion that temperance members were willing to go to in order to eradicate habitual drunkenness³⁴. Today, we see the same model applied to drug addiction: prohibition of the addictive substance and criminalization of the addict.

Opium Laws and the Further Legitimation of Addiction

While substances of varying uses (medical, recreational, sacramental) have been prohibited and controlled for centuries, the temperance movement and modern opium relations engendered a language *of* addiction that concurrently developed a language *of* drugs. In the Jiaqing Emperor’s explanation in 1799 for why opium was being outlawed (again, because the first law proved

³² With the implication of self-control as a fundamental component of modern society, Levine invokes Michel Foucault, who he says “argues that the establishment of the new view of madness was made possible by the achievement of economic and political power by the bourgeoisie. Grounded in the optimistic Weltanschauung of the Enlightenment, the middle class assumed that evil need not exist – social problems were solvable or curable. However, the conditions of a “free society,” meaning individual freedom to pursue one’s own interests, required shifting social control to the individual level. Social order depended upon self-control” (Levine, 16).

³³ “In 1838, Samuel B. Woodward, the Superintendent of the famed mental asylum at Worcester, Massachusetts, and probably the leading American physician concerned with mental health at that time, published a series of articles describing alcohol addiction as a ‘physical disease’: ‘The appetite is wholly physical, depending on a condition of the stomach and nervous system, which transcends all ordinary motives of abstinence. The suffering is immense, and the desire of immediate relief so entirely uncontrollable, that it is quite questionable whether the moral power of many of its victims is sufficient to withstand its imperative demands’” (Levine, 9-10).

³⁴ “The efforts to develop inebriate asylums were supported by important temperance organizations and leaders. Benjamin Rush had been the first to recommend a ‘sober house’ where drunkards could get special treatment. Samuel Woodward also argued strongly for the idea. In 1865 and again in 1867 the Massachusetts Temperance Alliance issued strong statements of support for the work being done by the Washingtonian home, one of the first functioning inebriate asylums... In addition, the National Temperance Society published several pamphlets arguing that asylums were needed because of the very nature of the disease of inebriety. ‘The inebriate is the victim of a positive disease, induced by the action of an alluring and deceptive physical agent, alcohol’, said one writer, and he urged that the law provide well-appointed asylums, in which the victims of alcoholic disease can be legally placed, until ... the disease and morbid appetite are effectually removed” (Levine, 11).

“unenforceable”) and penalties were being made more severe in China, we will see a language that mimics the language *of* addiction that we know today³⁵, but does not refer to addiction specifically:

“The use of opium originally prevailed only among vagrants and disreputable persons . . . but has since extended itself among the members and descendants of respectable families, students, and officers of the government. When this habit becomes established by frequent repetition, it gains an entire ascendance, and the consumer of opium is not only unable to forbear from its daily use, but on passing the accustomed hour, cannot refrain from tears or command himself in any degree...” (Heyman, 25).

Two things are mutually occurring, analogous to the temperance movement: the behaviour of a particular group of opium users is held in contempt by an authority – this type of opium user is eradicated but so is the substance of opium outlawed or heavily controlled. In this instance and most others, the eradication of the ‘addictive’ behaviour occurs co-dependently with the prohibition or strict control of the demonized substance.

And yet, the control of a substance and the control of behaviour are two separate bodies: there are substances which are controlled/prohibited without relation to a type of behaviour, and there are types of behaviour which are outlawed that have no relation to a substance. As the heretical psychiatrist Thomas Szasz remarks in *Ceremonial Chemistry*,

“...let us note carefully just what drug abuse is. Jaffe himself defines it as any deviation ‘from approved medical or social patterns’ of drug use. We are thus immediately plunged into the innermost depths of the mythology of mental illness: for just as socially disapproved pharmacological behavior constitutes ‘drug abuse’, and is officially recognized as an illness by a medical profession that is a licensed agency of the state, so socially disapproved sexual behavior constitutes ‘perversion’ and is also officially recognized as an illness...” (Szasz, 9).

³⁵ As Gene Heyman notes, “although the emperor’s observations are more than two hundred years old, his remarks describe addiction as it is understood today” (Heyman, 25).

The word addiction is a linguistic symbol of a type of language, the modern discourse *of* addiction, whereas the discourse *of* addiction is an old authoritative form of discourse which has re-produced a new and highly evocative concept (addiction), as Sarah Graham Mulhall, the Deputy Commissioner of Narcotics Control of New York City in the 1920s, invokes: “Opium metamorphises the human soul; it debauches the human will; it entangles the human mind; it wrecks the human system. The addict ceases to be a voluntary agent; he becomes a slave, a tool, a victim of his own weakness, and a menace to society” (Mulhall, 605). This description of the drug and the addict follow an analogous discourse of the temperance movement, where an old form of a discourse *of* drugs produced a discourse *of* addiction. As “around twenty years after its inception in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, “*the first entry in the OED in which “addiction” refers to drug use is dated 1906*” (Farrell and Redfield, 2), the contemporary coupling of drugs with addiction can be said to have been engendered by the temperance movement, but facilitated by former and latter discourses of controlling substances and behaviour.

The fundamental characteristic of addiction and the addict since the temperance movement has been one of exclusion³⁶: the drug, the drug user and the drug dealer are poisons, physically and rhetorically – and the determination of these objects as poisonous produces a social necessity for their eradication. We have seen that the temperance movement was characterized by the behaviour of habitual drunkards being determined to be socially repulsive, yet it is this social determination which led to a medical determination of addiction as a disease: the behaviour of drunkards is abhorred; there is power and authority willing to eradicate it; as it is difficult or

³⁶ Though, as we will see, the subject of exclusion is engendered by the presence of an inclusive space, therefore, while the subject and object of addiction are excluded, they are also inclusive, either as giving a sense of identity or being, or by their exclusion within inclusive space – an addict who is prohibited from engaging in his addiction to heroin is excluded, yet, when he is confined in prison, he is in the inclusive space of the State.

impossible to reform or coerce the alcoholic into abstention, he appears unable to quit and becomes a diseased body.

In his book *The Addict and the Law*, Alfred Lindesmith traces the legal history of opium and addiction, which for him begins with a tax law: “The Harrison Act of 1914 was passed as a revenue measure and made absolutely no mention of addicts or addiction...All that [it] clearly and unequivocally did require was that whatever drug addicts obtained were to be secured from physicians registered under the act and that the fact of securing drugs be made a matter of record³⁷” (Lindesmith, 3). While this law illustrates the influence of the medical assemblage spoken of by Thomas Szasz, where “only the physician is allowed to dispense ‘dangerous drugs’, [and] if anyone else does so, he is called a ‘pusher’, and is condemned and punished regardless of the consequences of his efforts” (Szasz, 66), the State imposed itself into the previously medical (and religious) discourse:

“[citing the Harrison Act] ...in the Jin Fuey Moy case of 1920, the Court ruled that a doctor could not legitimately prescribe drugs ‘to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug,’ meanwhile after the Behrman case in 1922 the legal position of the addict seemed quite clear. He was simply denied all access to legal drugs” (Lindesmith, 6).

The crucial problem for Lindesmith is that the State has imposed itself into the domain of medicine, where typically the doctor is the practicing authority on how to best treat a patient. Not only has abstention from drugs proven to work ineffectively in treating addiction, but in contrast, a regulated dose of the drug helps most in treating addiction and withdrawal³⁸.

³⁷ Because, he says, “previously, drugs were available for purchase in pharmacies and even from mail-order houses” (Lindesmith, 5).

³⁸ Dr. Charles E. Terry, who had been working with addicts in Jacksonville, Florida, from 1911 until the Harrison Act went into effect in 1915, said: “After the Act, addicts were treated with rapid withdrawal...I was not prepared for the extreme suffering which I witnessed in these cases and I realized more than ever that here was indeed a medical problem and I began to harbor my first doubts as to the wisdom of legislation based upon habit and vice

The encroachment of the State into the domain of medicine did not go unnoticed in the Supreme Court, but Lindesmith notes that its dissenting findings have had no practical significance in the face of control over drugs and the addict. As

“the Linder case dissented from [earlier] cases, it decreed that addiction was a disease, [and it affirmed] the rule that a physician acting in good faith and according to fair medical standards may give an addict moderate amounts of drugs to relieve withdrawal distress without necessarily violating the law.” Once again, “in June 1962 the Supreme Court did again affirm its position in the *Robinson v. California* case, by ruling that the California statute which made it a crime to be addicted to the use of narcotics, was unconstitutional” (Lindesmith, 9-12).

Yet, as Lindesmith remarks, “the federal courts have done next to nothing to restrict their [the State’s] jurisdiction in narcotic cases in a manner consistent with their own doctrine that disease is a disease...which leaves the determination of legitimate medical handling of addicts within the police domain” (Lindesmith, 14). This apparent contradiction is a function of the ‘harmfulness’ model which amounts to a collective enunciation of knowledge and the prohibition and exclusion of drug addiction. The prescription of ‘harm’ is a material (physical coercion and prohibition) and linguistic (authority, binary) framework used by authoritative sources to differentiate between the good and the bad, that which should be included and promoted, and that which should be excluded and prohibited from the group.

Addiction as a Territorialized Subject and Object

The concept of addiction is situated within a long history of the use and prohibition of sacred substances. The contemporary notion of ‘recreational drug use’ did not exist in pre-modern societies that were saturated by the sacred, thus sacred rituals (now considered recreational drug

theories of drug addiction...It would seem unnecessary to state that the narcotic drug addict must be supplied with his drug in doses physically necessary, and that to supply this drug is not only necessary, but is vital, that to deny it is to cause a physical and possibly moral wreck, and will ultimately drive the addict to the underworld for their supply...” (Lindesmith, 23).

use) and their prohibition, even in contemporary society, follows a historically religious model, as Jonathan Ott notes in *Pharmactheon*: “Although they are disguised as ‘Public Health Laws’, the strictures against the entheogens are first and foremost limitations on the practice of religion in a broad sense” (Ott, 22)³⁹. The convergence of Protestantism with economic forces highlights the main function of the addiction assemblage: the expulsion (a religious function, to be addressed in the following chapter) of behaviour that does not conform to the dominant (religious or economic) ideal.

The genocides of European witches⁴⁰ and American Indians⁴¹ reflect historical points of an ongoing war on sacred rituals in the name of religion and economy:

“Destined to convert the Indians to the ‘Holy Catholic Faith’ ... on 19 June 1620, the ‘Inquisitors against heresy, depravity and apostasy’ formally decreed in Mexico City that: ‘The use of the Herb or Root called Peyote ... is a superstitious action and reproved as opposed to the purity and sincerity of our Holy Catholic Faith, being so that this said herb, nor any other cannot possess the virtue and natural efficacy attributed to it for said effects, nor to cause the images, phantasms and representations on which are founded said divinations...’” (Ott, 83-4).

The relation of drug usage and the territorialization of social groups who don’t conform to the ideal invariably continued into the 20th century, with a seemingly endless list that includes (but is not limited to) ethnic blacks⁴², Mexicans and Chinese⁴³.

³⁹ In the introduction to *Pharmactheon*, Ott writes: “I use the neologism *entheogen{ic}* throughout this book, a new word proposed by a group of scholars including Dr. R. Gordon Wasson, Prof. Carl AP. Ruck and me. As we know from personal experience that shamanic inebriants do not provoke ‘hallucinations’ or ‘psychosis’ and feel it incongruous to refer to traditional shamanic use of *psychedelic* plants (that word, pejorative for many, referring invariably to sixties’ western drug use), we coined this new term in 1979” (Ott, 15).

⁴⁰ “...hundreds of thousands of women were burned, hanged, and tortured in less than two centuries” (Federici, 164).

⁴¹ “...although in 1620 the Inquisition in Mexico formally declared the use of entheogenic plants like *péyotl* to be a heresy and the Church vigorously extirpated this use and tortured and executed Indian shamans, ecstasy survives there even now” (Ott, 60)

⁴² “In countless lurid stories in the press, the message was driven home that ‘cocaine is open the direct incentive to the crime of rape by the negroes of the South’. Such racist and immoral charges exacerbated racial tensions and led to numerous lynchings. History again repeated itself in the thirties, as the spectre of marijuana, the ‘Assassin of

While Jonathan Ott suggests that the violent expulsion of witches was a result of the heresy of states of ecstasy, Silvia Federici, in *Caliban and the Witch Women*, invokes the developing economic landscape as the requisite enemy of the witch, namely that the emerging convergence between Protestantism and capitalism left magic and pre-modern economic models for dead. In other words, the Protestant desacralization of the world and the subsequent mechanization of the body forged the modern principles of a war on drugs, and its corollary concept of addiction. As Federici notes, “eradicating these practices [of magic] was a necessary condition for the capitalist rationalization of work, since magic appeared as an illicit form of power and an instrument to obtain what one wanted without work...and because it undermined the principle of individual responsibility...” (Federici, 142). Moreover, Federici invokes the seminal work of Max Weber, by appealing to the notion that “the reform of the body is at the core of the bourgeoisie ethic because capitalism makes acquisition ‘the ultimate purpose of life’, instead of treating it as a means for the satisfaction of our needs; thus, it requires that we forfeit all spontaneous enjoyment of life” (Federici, 135)

The addiction assemblage represents the historical territorialization of individual and collective bodies which fall outside the moral or economic boundaries imposed by dominant powers.

Therefore, while drunkenness was tolerated by temperance members so long as drunkards were able to fulfill their economic duty, their ultimate inability to do so meant the failed eradication of

Youth’, a drug then associated with poor Mexican immigrants. was employed to discriminate against Mexicans, leading to the infamous ‘Marihuana [*sic*] Tax Act’ of 1937” (Ott, 52).

⁴³ “After 1912...the rhetoric coming out of Washington, DC, especially from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and suggesting that the Red Chinese were trying to addict America’s youth to heroin, helped create and promote anti-communist hysteria” (Deitch, 66). More importantly, however, is that Deitch notes that “economic conditions have always been a determining factor in race relations,” namely in the prospect of classifying addiction. Thus, when “railway owners convinced Congress that they would need to import thousands of less demanding Chinese workers, the public became angry at the Republican Congress for giving away their jobs... By 1882, anti-Chinese sentiment forced passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibiting immigration for ten years. Not surprisingly, America’s first ‘anti-drug’ laws (early 1880s) were enacted to close the Chinese opium dens that sprang up in and around San Francisco, which had an enormous Chinese population” (Deitch, 68-9).

drunkenness produced the notion of an ‘inability to stop drinking – *addiction*’. This is situated within the historical development of the spirit of capitalism – a primarily religious and economic force. In his text *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Max Weber outlines the Protestant ‘calling’ of the emergent economic model of capitalism as they dominated and territorialized traditional social models: “... one’s duty in a calling, is what is most characteristic of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is an obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his professional activity...” (Weber, 19).

Although the convergence between religious and economic forces into a greater assemblage can be considered a characteristic of pre-modern social models as well, the modern predominance of the economic is unparalleled. In this respect, as the religious power over the natural world gave way to an economic power, the social function of inclusion and exclusion based on prescribed laws (of the good and evil) reflected this transformation: “The old leisurely and comfortable attitude toward life gave way to a hard frugality in which some participated and came to the top, because they did not wish to consume but to earn, while others who wished to keep on with the old ways were forced to curtail their consumption” (Weber, 30). While Weber cautioned that “one can easily see the limits of the concept of selection as a means of historical explanation,” he nevertheless conceded that “the capitalism of to-day, which has come to dominate economic life, educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest” (Weber, 20). Thus, we bear witness to the colonization of rituals.

Georges Bataille asserts that the historical production of a surplus was generally followed by its consumption: “Human sacrifice testifies at the same time to an excess of wealth and to a very painful way of spending it” (Bataille, 65). Moreover, the Protestant ethic, which developed

through the notion of work as an end in itself, also contained the ascetic quality of “a hard frugality” that territorialized the ritual consumption of the surplus into a ritual of accumulation, which evidently became a more dominant economic law. Thus, the power over the natural world, fostered predominantly by religious forces, gave way to the rationalization or capitalization of rituals.

Addiction and Religion as a Sense of Belonging

In his text *on* addiction, Thomas Szasz re-considers the addict and addiction as a condition of inclusion and exclusion, typical of social groups:

“...acceptance or non-acceptance of an identity between ceremonial symbol and ceremonial referent is a matter of membership in a community, and not a matter of fact or logic...As the term ‘communion’ implies, the celebration of the Lord’s Supper through the Holy Communion at once symbolizes and realizes the joining together, in a community, of all those who participate in it...The adherents to our majority religions thus congregate at cocktail parties and ‘smokers’; and have elaborate ceremonies symbolizing the virtues of mixed drinks and wines, cigars and cigarettes, pipes and tobaccos, and so forth. These are the holy communions of our age” (Szasz, 39).

Similar to Szasz’s conception of a ritualized sense of belonging, some discourses *of* addiction, motivated by the general lack of understanding in the scientific field of addiction, propose an essence to addiction based on this very sense of belonging. Thus, for the heroin addicts that Gabor Maté encounters on the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, their addiction represents “the only home they’ve ever had” (Maté, 18). Furthermore, Bruce Alexander asserts that “many, perhaps most, types of addiction actually provide a kind of community or subculture that entails some real psychosocial gratifications...The importance of addiction-centred communities with norms, rituals, values, stable social relationships, and certain areas of mutual trust...gives some sense of belonging...” (Alexander, 164).

The texts by Maté and Alexander are attempts to answer the scientific question ‘what are the universal qualities of addiction?’ because, as we have seen, the field of addiction has not objectively understood the modern concept of addiction, which is ineludibly a response to the objective claims of universal characteristics made by religious and State lawmakers. Thus, beyond the physical symptoms and problematic behaviours which signified the earlier transformation of addiction, a sense of belonging has also been ascribed as a fundamental characteristic of addiction, as we can also see in Stanton Peele’s text *of addiction Love and Addiction*: “Unsure of his own identity, the addict sees other people as objects to serve his needs...Because he is so vulnerable, what the addict is ideally striving for is perfect invulnerability. He only gives of himself in exchange for the promise of safety” (Peele, 72-87)

When Thomas Szasz asserts that “medical values have replaced religious values [and] medical rituals have taken the place of religious rituals” (Szasz, 29)⁴⁴, he invokes the sense of belonging that occurs with religious membership, which invariably involves prescriptions of the good and the evil, thus he writes: “...we oppose illicit drugs not because they are the wrong chemicals but because they are the wrong ceremonials...” (Szasz, 46). The collective tool of inclusion and exclusion functions effectively paired with an ideal body (the ideal religious body, the ideal body of medicine, the ideal body of the state, the ideal body of capital), as Thomas Szasz notes its presence in the assemblages of drugs and addiction:

“The modern American drug laws have the same social function and same symbolic significance as had, for example, the dietary laws of the ancient Jews. The aim is still to be holy, which now means to be healthy; and to be healthy means to take those drugs prescribed by physicians (rabbis) and to avoid those prohibited by the state

⁴⁴ Szasz cites theocratic societies and the war against witches, wherein “only the priest was allowed to practice healing.” For him, the basic principle in these assemblages is the “fundamental law of social organization in general, and of religious ritual in particular—namely, ‘the conservation and promotion of life’,” which means that “societies thus seek to include that which they consider good, and to exclude that which they consider evil” (Szasz, 22-29).

(God). As the dietary rules of the Jews developed the metaphor of holiness on the lines of prescribed and prohibited foods, so the drug rules of the Americans (and of other contemporary people) develop the metaphor of healthiness along the lines of prescribed and prohibited chemicals” (Szasz, 36).

While Szasz contends that to be holy now means to be healthy, which does not sufficiently account for the non-medical discourses evident in the transition from the temperance movement into contemporary drug and addiction assemblages, he does recognize the influence of the social inclusion/exclusion model of drugs and addiction, which stipulates that while some things are prohibited, others are equally promoted: “Our contemporary drug problems cannot be understood without paying proper attention to the subtle but powerful tensions between accredited and unaccredited healers, physicians and quacks, licit and illicit drugs, scientific medicine and folk medicine” (Szasz, 61)⁴⁵. For Szasz, this means recognizing the “legitimizing [of] certain drugs by defining them as not drugs at all, and by encouraging their consumption,” or the aggressive promotion of “the use, through medical prescriptions, of certain types of new (non-traditional) mood-affecting drugs” (Szasz, 32)⁴⁶.

Janet Farrell and Marc Redfield claim that “the addict emerged with the development, a little more than a century ago, of a medico-legal discourse capable of reconceiving human identity in the language of pathology” (Farrell and Redfield, 2), but they do not account for the religious and economic components of the assemblages of drugs and addiction. The following chapter will further investigate the convergence of a religious function with State and capitalist assemblages, necessarily as it relates to addiction in the form of social inclusion/exclusion (which, in the next

⁴⁵ While Szasz articulates his discourse *on* drugs through the presence of the medical assemblage and alcohol as the prototypical modern ceremonial, he does not account for other assemblages with their own ideal bodies. For instance, he writes “The plain historical facts are that before 1914 there was no “drug problem” in the United States; nor *did* we have a name for it” (Szasz, 11). Clearly, Szasz does not apply the temperance movement to his discourse *on* drugs and addiction.

⁴⁶ As we will note in the third chapter, Richard Degrandpre refers to the discursive relation to the pharmaceutical industry as *pharmacologicalism*.

chapter, will be identified as a primarily religious function based on Mircea Eliade's conception of the sacred). As we will see, the subject of addiction belongs as a profane ritual in the sacred space of the State and capitalism, wherein sacred rituals ensure inclusion within sacred space, and where profane rituals materialize through the creation of the sacred. More importantly, we will investigate the similarities between the sacred rituals of sports and the profane rituals of addiction.

Chapter 2

Profane Addictions in a Sacred World: the sports fanatic as drug addict

Following Deleuze and Guattari's distinction between a major and minor language, a discourse *on* addiction delineates the 'accepted as truth' function of addiction, which is presupposed and applied in the *majority* language of discourses *of* addiction (such as were invoked in the first chapter – DSM-V, CSA, Gabor Maté): "Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around...Minor languages do not exist in themselves: they exist only in relation to a major language and are also investments of that language for the purpose of making it minor" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 104-5)⁴⁷.

In the first chapter, we stated the currently accepted principles of addiction alongside a trace of historical discourses that contributed to the modern transformation of the concept in order to draw attention to authoritative rationalizations of social and individual control. What emerged was a question ('what are the scientific characteristics of addiction?') founded on a false problematic: the moralistic categorization of principles of addiction prevents a sufficiently scientific concept. In other words, while addiction masquerades as a scientific truth, it was transformed (from its pre-modern signification) and sustained by moralistic religious and state

⁴⁷ "It is a question not of reterritorializing oneself on a dialect or a patois but of deterritorializing the major language. Black Americans do not oppose Black to English, they transform the American English that is their own language into Black English. Minor languages do not exist in themselves: they exist only in relation to a major language and are also investments of that language for the purpose of making it minor. One must find the minor language, the dialect or rather idiolect, on the basis of which one can make one's own major language minor...having to conquer one's own language, in other words, to attain that sobriety in the use of a major language, in order to place it in a state of continuous variation (the opposite of regionalism)...Conquer the major language in order to delineate in it as yet unknown minor languages. Use the minor language to *send the major language racing*... Majority implies a constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it...Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around." (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 104-5)

authorities⁴⁸. Thus, when Nietzsche asks ‘what is a truth?’ and ‘what is good and bad?’ he rightfully implicates the power which ineludibly fosters knowledge: “The right of the master to give names extends so far that we could permit ourselves to grasp the origin of language itself as an expression of the power of the rulers: they say ‘that is such and such’, seal every object and event with a sound and, in the process, as it were, take possession of it” (*Genealogy of Morals*, 2)⁴⁹.

Based on the discourses *of* addiction from the first chapter, it is our contention that the authorities which have prescribed a universal or natural condition of addiction have been primarily a religious, State or capitalist power. While the first chapter evinced a discourse *of* addiction that was mostly prohibitive in nature, it must also be noted that the movement of control and prohibition of substances and behaviours occurs interdependently with a promoted ideal, whether it is medical (healthy, sane), religious (Protestant), racial, economic (capitalist), or state (law-abiding). Therefore, these territorializing assemblages not only resist the behaviours which they deem immoral, but they also create and promote their own ideal behaviours. Thus, the power over determining social morals controls and produces behaviours which sustain or reaffirm that power. In this respect, the question which emerges out of the first chapter is

⁴⁸ “If someone hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place and then finds it there, his seeking and finding is nothing much to boast about; but this is exactly how things are as far as the seeking and finding of ‘truth’ within the territory of reason is concerned. If I create the definition of a mammal and then, having inspected a camel, declare, ‘Behold, a mammal’, then a truth has certainly been brought to light, but it is of limited value, by which I mean that it is anthropomorphic through and through and contains not a single point which could be said to be ‘true in itself’, really and in a generally valid sense, regardless of mankind” (*The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings*, 147)

⁴⁹ What, from an etymological perspective, do the meanings of ‘Good’ as manifested in different languages really mean? There I found that all of them lead back to the same transformation of ideas, that everywhere ‘noble’ or ‘aristocratic’ in a social sense is the fundamental idea out of which ‘good’ in the sense of ‘spiritually noble’, ‘aristocratic’, ‘spiritually high-minded’, ‘spiritually privileged’ necessarily develop—a process which always runs in parallel with that other one which finally transforms ‘common’, ‘vulgar’, and ‘low’ into the concept ‘bad’.” (*Genealogy of Morals*, 8)

whether these moralistic prescriptions take on the form of the religious, and moreover, how this contributes to a discourse *on* addiction.

In his text *The Sacred and the Profane*, Mircea Eliade's conception of the religious and sacred rituals offers an effective model with which to not only delineate the principles of addiction, but also to forward the notion of moralistic prescriptions of the good and the bad as being a characteristically religious function which the territorializing powers of the modern State and capitalism have appropriated. The limitation of Eliade's distinction between the sacred and the profane reflects the mechanism which transformed and sustains the concept of addiction, which is formed from a prescribed ideal (the sacred) and its opposite (the profane). As Eliade attempts to form a universal essence of the sacred, he misses the ostensible function of the religious: to create and sustain the sacred through which the profane is engendered. If, beyond Eliade's notion, the religious is conceived of as an epistemological and ontological power of creation over the sacred and profane, then the supposedly scientific principles of addiction can be re-situated as moral judgments and, moreover, the determination of addiction as a profane ritual can be contrasted with sacred rituals. Therefore, the discussion of Eliade's texts will address the concept of addiction as materializing from moral authorities, which gives a sense of belonging through ideals that must be ritualized.

The proceeding section will encounter the sacred ritual of sport and the sports fanatic as a prospective subject of addiction. Much as addiction (as a concept and its materializations) underwent drastic territorializations by religious, State and capitalist authorities, so too have sports become an object of conquest. In this respect, we can see how the territorialization of sports (as a ritual) has conformed to the ideals of these authorities. Moreover, as characteristics of the sports fanatic will be shown to contain elements of addiction, this further implicates the

moral authorities which have desacralized rituals based on the physiological and self-destructive components discourse *of* addiction, and have sacralized rituals which not only display these same components, but at times to an even worse degree. To effectively evoke these components in the sports fanatic, we rely on the endless supply of discussions from online sports forums.

I. Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane* in Addiction

At the end of the first chapter, we invoked discourses *of* addiction which claim that an addiction is a ritualization that gives an addict a social sense of belonging or identity⁵⁰. For Thomas Szasz, these ritualizations imitate or embody religious rituals, and moreover, Szasz infers that contemporary sources of authority (such as agents of law or medicine) have overtaken the prescriptive power over rituals previously held by religious authorities. Consequently, he says “our contemporary drug problems cannot be understood without paying proper attention to the subtle but powerful tensions between accredited and unaccredited healers, physicians and quacks, licit and illicit drugs, scientific medicine and folk medicine” (Szasz, 61). To pay attention to these tensions, as Szasz says, is to trace the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ rituals to their authoritative utterance in the form of moral laws.

When Nietzsche concluded that there is nothing naturally ‘true’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ beyond their anthropomorphic significations, he cast a light of inquiry onto the voices of authority which hold power over the manifestation of these concepts. In contrast, in his texts *The Sacred and the Profane*, Mircea Eliade asserts that there is a *real* (natural or universal) difference between the modern nonreligious man and his religious ancestors based on a *real* difference between the sacred and the profane. While according to Eliade modern man embodies the profane, it is our

⁵⁰ The notion from the first chapter that an addiction provides a sense of belonging or membership to a group comes from several authors, including Bruce Alexander, Thomas Szasz, Stanton Peele and Gabor Maté – each author, however, described this sense in their own terms.

contention that, based on Eliade's own conception of the sacred, State and capitalist rituals actually embody the sacred. Therefore, despite Eliade's presupposition of a reality where there is an objective difference between religious man and nonreligious man, his texts provide a framework for a concept of the religious as containing a power over the creation of the sacred (and thus the profane), which contributes to the delineation of the concept of addiction as moral prescription.

According to Eliade, "...the sacred is pre-eminently the *real*, at once power, efficacy, the source of life and fecundity" (*Sacred and Profane*, 28). While this conception of the sacred is constructive because it theorizes a higher power which gives the subject life (social identity), Eliade elaborates a further conception of the sacred which eventually leads him to desacralize religious man from nonreligious man:

"Whatever the historical context in which he is placed, *homo religiosus* always believes that there is an absolute reality, *the sacred*, which transcends this world but manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real. He further believes that life has a sacred origin and that human existence realizes all of its potentialities in proportion as it is religious – that is, participates in reality" (*Sacred and Profane*, 202).

For Eliade, the function of belief is paramount to achieving the sacred, given that the 'right' kind of belief is what separates religious man from nonreligious man: "Modern nonreligious man assumes a new existential situation...he refuses transcendence, accepts the relativity of 'reality', and may even come to doubt the meaning of existence...he only makes himself completely in proportion as he desacralizes himself and the world" (*Sacred and Profane*, 203).

In this respect, the separation of the sacred from the profane is crucial for Eliade: "the first possible definition of the *sacred* is that it is *the opposite of the profane* (*Sacred and Profane*, 10)." The basis for Eliade's distinction is his belief in 'the *real*', 'true reality', and 'objective

reality', wherein the experience of the profane is *outside* of 'true reality': "Revelation of a sacred space makes it possible to obtain a fixed point and hence to acquire orientation in the chaos of homogeneity, to 'found the world' and to live in a real sense. The profane experience, on the contrary, maintains the homogeneity and hence the relativity of space" (*Sacred and Profane*, 23).

A problem arises when Eliade elaborates on the opposition between sacred and profane rituals:

"Since 'our world' is a cosmos, any attack from without threatens to turn it into chaos... An attack on 'our world' is equivalent to an act of revenge by the mythical dragon, who rebels against the work of the gods, the cosmos, and struggles to annihilate it. 'Our' enemies belong to the powers of chaos. *Any destruction of a city is equivalent to a retrogression to chaos. Any victory over the attackers reiterates the paradigmatic victory of the gods over the dragon (that is, over chaos)*" (*Sacred and Profane*, 47-8).

Eliade takes this line of thought further by sacralizing the ritual conquest and colonization:

"Whether it is a case of clearing uncultivated ground or of conquering and occupying a territory already inhabited by 'other' human beings, ritual taking possession must always repeat the cosmogony. For in the view of archaic societies everything that is not 'our world' is not yet a world. A territory can be made ours only by creating it anew, that is, by consecrating it"⁵¹ (*Sacred and Profane*, 32).

Eliade's opposition of the profane to the sacred reflects the territorializing aspects of the religious and the sacred – they are done *in the name of God*. If sacred or religious authorities control the natural world (or its territories), then their prescription of sacred rituals form an illusion of choice (such as the one created in the sacred world of capitalism – modern man still follows the hierarchization of religious rituals, only it occurs under the illusion of choice and variety).

⁵¹ Eliade's sacralization of ritual conquest and colonization is based on his stance on the 'goodness' of the sacred: "To settle in a territory is, in the last analysis, equivalent to consecrating it. When settlement is not temporary, as among the nomads, but permanent, as among sedentary peoples, it implies a vital decision that involves the existence of the entire community" (*Sacred and Profane*, 34).

Eliade's concept of the sacred begins to complexify with his relation of beliefs to rituals.

Religious rituals, or hierophanies, create and recreate the sacred world: "What is to become 'our world' must first be 'created', and every creation has a paradigmatic model – the creation of the universe by the gods" (*Sacred and Profane*, 31) As Eliade prescribes sacred rituals a power to create 'true reality' (and escape the profane world), he highlights their crucial presence in pre-modern religious men: "we might say that the archaic world knows nothing of 'profane' activities: every act which has a definite meaning hunting, fishing, agriculture; games, conflicts, sexuality, in some way participates in the sacred... The rest of his life is passed in profane time, which is without meaning" (*Cosmos and History*, 27) While the functional role of rituals will become more relevant in relation to an upcoming discussion on rituals of addiction and capitalism, the divergence between two principles of Eliade's sacred must be addressed – the sacred which creates and the sacred which believes.

For this, we return once again to Nietzsche, who traces the distinction between the good and the evil to a moral difference of ritualization: "The 'pure man' is from the start simply a man who washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods which produce diseases of the skin, who doesn't sleep with the dirty women of the lower people..." (*Genealogy of Morals*, 10). Thus, we find that rituals, being a highly functional component of re-creating the sacred, are a battlefield on which sacred wars take place. Furthermore, *the greater power will possess the territory for proclaiming the sacred*.

While according to Eliade the sacred is saturated with 'true reality', we are more concerned with Eliade's conception of the creative function of religiosity, which "*founds the world* in the sense that it fixes the limits and establishes the order of the world" (*Sacred and Profane*, 30). In the context of capitalism, the hierarchization of the sacred model of creation engenders the

prescription and prohibition of our present day rituals. There is little doubting the fact that capitalism and the State hold significant territorial power over the natural world, and that they account for a significant portion of the limits and order of the natural world.

That capitalist and State assemblages behave like a sacred group can be illustrated by analogous mechanisms of territorialization by coercive social inclusion/exclusion: "...part of the structure of corporate capitalism is that the players in the game try to increase profits and market shares—if they don't do that, they will no longer be players in the game" (Chomsky, 26). Max Weber also noted the exclusionary function of capitalism: "The manufacturer who in the long run acts counter to (these) norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a job" (Weber, 19).

In other terms, the contemporary persecution of drugs, drug users and drug dealers, by authoritative members of religion, State or capitalism follows Eliade's model of religion and the sacred. For instance, we may compare the treatment of *cannabis sativa* (illegal) and tobacco (legal) according to the morals and rituals of the capitalist religion, as Noam Chomsky does:

"It can't be because of the health impact, because that's exactly the other way around—there has never been a fatality from marijuana use among 60 million reported users in the United States, whereas tobacco kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. My strong suspicion ... is that the reason is that marijuana's a weed; you can grow it in your backyard, so there's nobody who would make any money off it if it were legal. Tobacco requires extensive capital inputs and technology, and it can be monopolized, so there are people who can make a ton of money off it. I don't really see any other difference between the two of them, frankly—except that tobacco's far more lethal and far more addictive" (Chomsky, 49).

Furthermore, the drunkard, the witch, the American Indian, the Chinese, the junkie, and the Black man all posed a threat to a sacred world, with its own sacred rituals which are considered ‘pure’, in contrast to the impurity of the profane. Here we refer once again to Thomas Szasz’s recognition that authorities “...oppose illicit drugs not because they are the wrong chemicals but because they are the wrong ceremonials...” (Szasz, 46).

As Eliade asserts that modern spaces are typically saturated by the profane, it is our contention that they are instead a different form of ritualized sacred space, and that traditional gods have been supplanted by State and capitalist creators. Moreover, while capitalist rituals reflect the sacred space which it has territorialized, and oppose rituals of addiction (making them profane rituals), the sacred is a concept with an illusory continuity, meaning that rituals of addiction are not necessarily religious rituals – they only perform ritualistically. A more salient point, in regards to addiction, is that while in modern society we may focus our problematization on the mechanism of the profane, it is equally critical to recognize the sacralization of spaces, subjects and objects by the State or capitalist assemblages. In other words, there are sacred state and sacred capitalist rituals, such as gambling, drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes, and there are forms of the profane, such as heroin, *cannabis sativa*, or idleness.

The Economy of Drugs

By invoking the conception of addiction from the DSM and *Controlled Substances Act* in the previous chapter, the fundamental association between drugs and addiction was illustrated – the relation between alcohol and the drunkard, or of opium to the opium addict precipitated complete abstinence and prohibition of these substances. While the use of alcohol and opium was viewed as the causal source of an insatiable craving, it was also unknown as to why it afflicted some but

not others, a question which persists today⁵². As abstinence from alcohol was prescribed only for addicts (and temporarily for all), non-addicts could still obtain and use the substance. Today, in North America, alcoholics and non-alcoholics can obtain alcohol. Opium, however, cannot be obtained without a prescription from an authorized physician, and as Lindesmith noted in his text *The Addict and the Law*, addiction to opium is not an acceptable condition for receiving opium. While discourses of drugs and addiction rationalize the prohibition of illicit substances through logics of harmfulness, they veil the relation of the profane ritual to State or capitalist principles.

The criteria of harmfulness which rationalized prohibition can be observed to be strikingly contradictory, such as in the above comparison between *cannabis sativa* and tobacco. Moreover, according to the *Controlled Substances Act* of the U.S.A., marijuana is a substance with “a high potential for abuse...which may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence,” wherein it is “essential that the United States cooperate with other nations in establishing effective controls over international traffic in such substances” (*Controlled Substances Act*). And yet, clinical studies are unequivocal in their determination of the negative health effects of tobacco⁵³, while Schedule I drugs such as marijuana have shown comparatively negligible harms.

While people can be subjected to medical categories of normal or sick, these categories are subsumed and propelled by higher ideals, such as profit: “It costs in the order of \$1 billion and takes 10 years to develop and approve a drug...The market for treatments for addiction is small and there is a potential for stigma to be attached to any business that might develop treatments

⁵²“Genomics is helping us to identify why certain groups of people are at greater or lesser risk of harm from recreational drugs, or of becoming addicted to them, than others” (Nutt, 2).

⁵³ “Apart from caffeine, which is the most used psychoactive substance but is rarely associated with serious harm, alcohol and tobacco are the main legal drugs. In the UK, alcohol is associated with 22 000 premature deaths a year, 30 000 hospital admissions and 50% of violent crime. Harm associated with alcohol costs the UK economy about £20 billion per year. Smoking is in decline in the UK but is associated with a fifth of all deaths, 106 000 per year, and a third of all cancers” (Nutt, 3).

for illicit drugs” (Nutt, 3). In a text sponsored by the UK government, several authors, including David Nutt, profess to the medicalization of sacred substances and the imposition of the religious function onto recreational drugs, which represents the twin axis of drugs and addiction. First, with the territorialization of the promoted ideal:

“There is a large unmet need for medicines for mental health... We have already seen excessively active children diagnosed as having ADHD (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder), and excessively shy people being diagnosed as having social anxiety disorder. Effective treatments have been made available for both conditions” (Nutt, 2).

This approach by the state-authorized medical assemblage illustrates a religious relationship between drugs and addiction: a differentiation between “normal life” and “mental health conditions” facilitates a control over what are considered to be medicines (those which put the subject back onto the path of normal life) and poisons (those which put the subject into a condition of medical pathology, such as addiction).

Besides the determination of what is good and sacred, there is an accompanying territorialization of what is a poison, typically associated with death, disease, crime or economics:

“The current economic and social costs of illicit drug use to the UK are in the order of £13 billion a year. Crime accounts for most of this cost. Health harms are also significant, with an estimated 350 000 problem drug users in the UK. Many of these are injecting users and are at risk of transmitting hepatitis C and HIV infections” (Nutt, 3).

While Thomas Szasz remarks that the medical assemblage has replaced the religious assemblage in terms of sacred rituals, this does not account for recreational rituals which are sacralized, such as alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, gambling, television, sports, etc. The problem in differentiating between ‘what is healthy?’ and ‘what is harmful?’ represents the false problematic which

obscures the intent of a (state-sponsored and economically-driven) medical assemblage, which is social control according to higher ideals, as it begs the question ‘what is sacred in our world?’

A dominant mechanism of assemblages of drugs and addiction incorporates not only the prohibition and demonization of substances and behaviours, but also the idealization and promotion of others. Therefore, a powerful State or capitalist assemblage subsumes both drugs and addiction into a prescribed ideal, in which one is either an included or excluded member. Of course, this does not encompass the totality of how the territorialized body is produced, but it does offer a trace of how an assemblage is sustained: social, material and semiotic production, consumption, and exclusion. And yet, the emergence of the capitalist assemblage into addiction reflects the complimentary nature of inclusivity and exclusivity: while the majority of capitalist subjects are producers and consumers, the minority exists on the fringes, such as in prisons or homelessness.

That the affects of addiction go beyond the conventional linguistic limits imposed on it is exemplified by the capitalist body. In the capitalist assemblage, addiction has become a self-identifying norm (and its ‘positive’ discourse is flowering): “I’m addicted to food...I’m addicted to television...I’m addicted to the internet...I’m a gym addict...I’m a sports addict...I’m addicted to sex...I’m addicted to chocolate...I’m addicted to video games...I’m addicted to Ritalin...I’m addicted to buying things...I’m addicted to collecting things...I’m addicted to money...” Most of these affects of addiction do not carry the negative (a need for suppression) label of addiction, but are points of pride for the identity of the subject: ‘workaholic’, ‘gym rat’, ‘collector’, ‘entrepreneur’, ‘gamer’, ‘sports fan’, are discursive examples of how the capitalist machine has inclusively re-signified the addiction affect, but yet still maintains the traditional functionality of the subject’s inclusion/exclusion within the medical, capitalist, state or addiction assemblage.

Therefore, the ‘non-addict’ is not a body that lacks the addictive affects, but rather incarnates the ideal State or capitalist body. Moreover, we can say that capitalism and the State apply the religious function of the creation of sacred time, space and rituals, with their accompanying profane counterparts: “Remember, that *time* is money...Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on...” (Weber, 15).

At stake here is the presupposed continuum⁵⁴ of addiction constituted by the presupposed absence of addiction (or its affect) in the sacred body of the State and capitalism. This ‘problem’ can be approached from the fallacy of making such a categorization, based on the dependence of the utterance on authority (and not as an objective truth), but also from the inability of the concept (of ‘addiction’) to contain its self-inscribed parameters/limits. How broad is the “continuum” spoken of addiction? It is being made to believe that what is conventionally considered to be addiction is a physiological and/or harmful condition, whereas that which is not addiction lacks these affects. These notions of the fundamental characteristics of addiction are thus being put under question in the form of a contrast to the sacred rituals of the State and capitalism, specifically, sports fanaticism.

II. The Sports Fanatic As Drug Addict

“CanuckUKinToronto: Outside of what I do for money, other than direct family, Leafs/hockey is my world.... or so the wife tells me when i dont miss any games and always on this site.”

What is the consequence of capitalism or the State being conceived of as a religious source?

According to Eliade, this means it “*founds the world* in the sense that it fixes the limits and establishes the order of the world” (*Sacred and Profane*, 30). More importantly, however, is that

⁵⁴See *In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts*, by Gabor Maté, pages 11, 78, 134, and notably 193.

those who live within sacred space conform to the prescribed sacred and profane rituals, wherein the profane rituals that are opposed to the sacred rituals are legitimated by moral authority and not by scientific truth – which is the primary basis of the legitimation of the concept of addiction. In other words, the choice between being addicted to alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, or the gym is a choice between sacred rituals (those which are morally promoted), whereas the profane rituals (which are morally prohibited, and in this case, imbued with a naturalistic evil essence) would situate oneself outside of sacred reality (following Eliade's conception of the sacred)⁵⁵. Yet, that the profane is only a moral idea engendered by the sacred is reflected in the fact that when a junkie is confronted by the State for using heroin and is confined for his profane use of a profane substance, he nevertheless remains within the sacred territory of the prison. Eliade's conception of the sacred as containing essential elements of *reality* (and thus to be in the profane is to be outside of reality) fails to address the anthropomorphic cause behind the creation of the sacred world. Therefore, in relation to Eliade, the authoritative creation of sacred space can be viewed as an eminent religious function, characteristics which capitalist and State assemblages conform to.

For a discourse *on* addiction the notion of the religious function, which materializes from Eliade's texts, reiterates Nietzsche's investigation into the origins of "good and evil": the essence of addiction as it has been prescribed, as a natural/scientific concept, was formed by the religious function – as an authoritative moral distinction. If the prohibition of *péyotl*, *cannabis sativa*, heroin, or any other restricted substances – rationalized by, among the reasons, a proclivity to addiction – represent the profane, then sports represent one of the more popular sacred rituals.

⁵⁵ This illusion of choice is elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari in their distinction between the majority and the minority: "A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem. This is evident in all the operations, electoral or otherwise, where you are given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the limits of the constant ("you mustn't choose to change society...")" (A Thousand Plateaus, 105).

While we have already drawn attention to the contradictory differential prohibition of *cannabis sativa* in contrast to the promotion of tobacco⁵⁶, sports offer a new discourse from which to delineate the concept of addiction (discourses of addiction surrounding tobacco and gambling have grown increasingly in recent times). Moreover, online sports forums, on which sports fanatics congregate to exchange messages and ideas, offers an attractive selection of discourses from which to incorporate into a discourse on addiction.

The Colonization of Sports

Are sports a sacred ritual? In *Football as World-View and as Ritual*, Christian Bromberger wavers between the fact that sports engage a ritualistic behaviour, but “contrary to a religious system, football matches and the fervour they arouse do not form an autonomous and coherent body of representations, beliefs and practices... We usually expect a ritual to remind us of the ultimate meaning of existence, to tell us about the next world, to assure us of our salvation...” (Bromberger, 310). While Bromberger is concerned with a “transcendent” content to religion and rituals, based on the preceding section on Eliade’s *The Sacred and the Profane*, we focus on their primary functions: having the power to create a sacred world and sustain it. Thus, while Bromberger enumerates the ritualistic qualities of football, specifically as they relate to characteristics of religious rituals, it is the football ritual as a capitalist spectacle of the sports fanatic which is most intriguing:

“Every match between rival towns, regions and countries takes the form of a ritualized war, complete with anthems, military fanfares and banners wielded by fans who make up the support divisions and who even call themselves ‘brigades’, ‘commandos’, ‘legions’ and ‘assault troops’...[and] it is often those towns -

⁵⁶ The prohibition of marijuana is rationalized based on a model of medicine; the far worse negative health effects of tobacco – not to mention rates of addiction – reflect the dubiousness of the conceptualization of drugs as dangerous or addictive.

Liverpool, Marseilles, Naples – which have fallen on bad times, that in their nostalgic yearning for past glories, are most passionate about the clubs that represent them, as if the team’s exploits will dress and heal their current wounds” (Bromberger, 302).

Bromberger draws a link between the function of the sports ritual and greater social forces, where for instance “...in Italy under the Fascists, as in Argentina under the military junta, the national team’s successes were exploited as propaganda,” however, this notion is not elaborated any further beyond sports rituals functioning to “blur people’s perception of their place in society and of their everyday problems, both as individuals and as a group...” (Bromberger, 294). Yet, as we will see, modern sports engage participants in a ritual that is overcoded⁵⁷ by the State and capitalism.

In *Sport Matters*, Eric Dunning traces the development of sports to a time when they were not territorialized by the modern State or capitalism, an event which, according to Dunning, proliferated in England – as such, he traces the modern form of football (and rugby) to “a type of medieval folk game...with locally specific oral rules... played in ways which involved levels of violence that were considerably higher than would be permitted in soccer, rugby and comparable games today”⁵⁸ (Dunning, 50). Dunning goes on to claim that the development of modern sport occurred within the climate of State and economic forces, as

⁵⁷ ‘Overcoded’ is a term from Deleuze and Guattari: “What begins with the State or the apparatus of capture is a general semiology that overcodes the primitive semiotic systems. Instead of traits of expression that follow a machinic *phylum* and wed it in a distribution of singularities, the State constitutes a form of expression that subjugates the phylum: the phylum or matter is no longer anything more than an equalized, homogenized, compared content, while expression becomes a form of resonance or appropriation” (A Thousand Plateaus, 444-5).

⁵⁸ “Modern soccer and rugby are descended from a type of medieval folk games which, in Britain, went by a variety of names such as ‘football’, ‘camp ball’, ‘hurling’ and ‘knappan’... They were played by variable, formally unrestricted numbers of people, sometimes in excess of a thousand. There was no equalization of numbers between sides, and the rules were oral and locally specific rather than standardized, written and enforced by a central body. Despite such local variation, the games in this folk tradition shared at least one feature: they were play struggles which involved the customary toleration of forms of physical violence which have now been tabooed and were generally played in ways which involved levels of violence that were considerably higher than would be permitted in soccer, rugby and comparable games today” (Dunning, 50).

“the initial development of modern sport was a process which occurred...principally in two main, overlapping stages: a stage in the eighteenth century when members of the aristocracy and gentry were predominant; and a stage in the nineteenth century when members of ascendant bourgeois groups joined the landed classes in taking the lead” (Dunning, 53); forces which developed interdependently: “It was in the context of an increasingly pacified society subject to more effective forms of parliamentary rule that recognizably modern forms of sport based upon written rules first began to emerge” (Dunning, 56).

While at one point Dunning poses the question of sports as a problem of the individual (as an object of sociological study), he highlights the fact that for centuries “unsuccessful attempts were made by state and local authorities to ban (these) wild games” (Dunning, 51). The crucial point is that Dunning had traced modern football (and rugby) to epochs that were absent of a major presence of “state and local authorities,” and, moreover, that the modern game of football is now saturated with the effects of a “civilizing process,”⁵⁹ a concept which Norbert Elias formed to account for an increasingly visible progression in the transformation of social rituals towards what he terms ‘the civilized’ – which invariably implicates the State and economic forces which emerged at the same time. A conclusion we draw from the aforementioned texts by Dunning and Bromberger is that modern sports represent a sacred State and sacred capitalist ritual.

Bromberger and Dunning each argue, in their own terms, that sports embody the forms of religious rituals. More importantly, however, is the transformation of the function of sports into a

⁵⁹ Dunning notes that the transformation of sport into modern games was “more a function of wider social developments, especially of the peculiarly English variants of the state-formation and civilizing processes...” (Dunning, 53). Dunning uses the concept “civilizing process” based on Norbert Elias’ text *The Civilizing Process*, wherein Elias wanted to account for “the elaboration and refinement of manners and socially required standards of behaviour; increasing social pressure on people to exercise an even measure of all-round self-restraint over their feelings and behaviour, that is regarding all aspects of bodily functions and in more and more social situations; a shift in the always socially necessary balance between external constraints and self-constraints in favour of self-constraints; an advancing threshold of repugnance regarding bodily functions such as eating, drinking, defecation, urination, sex and sleeping, a process in terms of which these functions and the connected bodily organs came to be increasingly laden with taboos and surrounded by feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, guilt and shame; an advancing threshold of repugnance regarding engaging in and even witnessing violent acts; and, as a corollary of this generally advancing threshold of repugnance, a tendency to push violence and acts connected with biological functions increasingly ‘behind the scenes’” (Dunning, 44).

capitalist or State ritual. Both of these conclusions can also be drawn from *Sports, Culture and the Media* by David Charles Rowe, who traces a historical function of sports, wherein he says the development of the role of media in sports is unmistakable⁶⁰: “By the second decade of the twentieth century, ‘Spectator sport was [now] attracting massive crowds’, especially of working-class men. On this basis, a whole economy of sport developed” (Rowe, 21)⁶¹. Furthermore, Rowe draws a link between sacred rituals and capitalist rituals: “If sport and religion have certain qualities in common, they also share an involvement with business, especially where the religion is, as Max Weber pointed out, the Calvinist form of Protestantism...” (Rowe, 72). In this respect, Rowe supports our contention that the rituals of sports have become overcoded by capitalist and State assemblages: “Once elements of sport had become rationalized and industrialized, they necessarily entered into relations with other economic entities that acted as conduits, carrying sports culture far beyond its places of origin” (Rowe, 24). While the discourses of Bromberger and Dunning evoke the territorialization of sports rituals beyond simply technological ones, as Rowe suggests, the technological development which has enveloped the spectacle of sports has occurred primarily through State and economic forces:

“With the development of national and international sporting competitions, the maturation of media advertising and the emergence of broadcast media for which there was no or limited direct payment by the ‘consumer’, new revenue streams and uses of the sports media were created. In this way, the media sports text became

⁶⁰ Rowe argues that the development of technology reciprocates with economic forces, invoking our contention that many contemporary rituals, such as sports, have been overcoded by capitalist or State assemblages: “I have argued here that the media are both the driving economic and cultural force in sport because they provide (or attract) most of the capital that in turn creates and disseminates the images and information, which then generate more capital and more sport, in an ascending spiral” (Rowe, 68).

⁶¹ “By the second decade of the twentieth century, ‘Spectator sport was [now] attracting massive crowds’ (Clarke and Critcher 1985: 74), especially of working-class men. On this basis, a whole economy of sport developed as: sporting clubs and associations were formed by subscribing members; competitions were established with attractive prize money; imposing venues with large crowd capacities were built; state funds were donated to the development of sport; sportswear and fan merchandise were manufactured and sold; and (of particular significance for this book) newspapers, magazines, newsreels, films, radio (and, later, television) programmes became devoted to sport” (Rowe, 21).

increasingly valorized, a commodity that could be produced, sold, exchanged and distributed” (Rowe, 69).

While capitalist and State assemblages have signified sports as sacred rituals and addictions as profane rituals, as will become clear in the upcoming discourses from online sports forums, the sports fanatic expresses a strong similarity to characteristics of addiction. Writing on modern football, Bromberger muses that “we are told that we are dealing with the opium of the people...” (Bromberger, 294). Based on the messages exchanged by sports fanatics, we can see how addiction’s supposed distinction from sports becomes increasingly blurred.

Online Discourses of the Sports Fanatic

What is considered harmful and who defines it? As the contemporary conception of addiction has a demarcated criteria⁶² with which the condition can be properly diagnosed and distinguished from ‘normal’ behaviours, we can contrast these characteristics – tolerance; withdrawal; dosage; craving; unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and recovering; usage getting in the way of social or occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in spite of knowledge of physical or psychological harms associated with use (DSM IV and V) – with the promoted rituals of sports. As such, the sports assemblage has spawned passionate online communities devoted to discussing, supporting and criticizing the state of ‘our team’ that reflect a burgeoning dissolution of distinctions of harmfulness (in addiction). While members of the online social groups write about their affections to the team, they also solidify these emerging

⁶²Institutional discourses of addiction prescribe two fundamental locations of addiction, at times not mutually exclusive: a physiological presence (in a drug user), associated with a pathological compulsive behaviour; and the consistently negative consequences of a (drug) habit. Furthermore, the conventional conception of ‘addiction’, now often described as ‘dependence’ or ‘substance abuse’, is defined by: tolerance; withdrawal; dosage; craving; unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and recovering; usage getting in the way of social or occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in spite of knowledge of physical or psychological harms associated with use (DSM IV and V) We have also added another notion from Bruce Alexander, Stanton Peele and Gabor Maté that addictions provide a sense of belonging, or community.

discussion forums as a highly functional rhetorical component of the sports assemblage, invoking the claim that addictions are highly ritualized behaviours (in the sense that a junkie may be ‘addicted’ to the rituals of using, in addition to the affects of the drug – further blurring the essentiality of the principles of addiction). Therefore, the sports fanatic embodies the exclusive principles of addiction, in its physiological affects, its ritual functions, its sense of belonging to a social group (or the sacred), and its relation to a harmful model of behaviour.

The following discourses come from the online forums of four sports teams covering two sports: the Toronto Maple Leafs, of the National Hockey League, and the soccer clubs of Liverpool, Manchester, and Tottenham. The structure of these forums are largely the same, despite some variety in the interface: in the hockey forum, there is one main page of open discussion, whereas the soccer forums have demarcated threads for specific topics – yet both have been conducive to providing unparalleled discourses of the sports fanatic, wherein not only is there a re-creation of the religious function through the ritualization of moral laws and an opposition to the profane, but we may also observe essential elements of addiction, such as craving and tolerance:

“LN-093> Loric76: Today is like game 1 against Boston. I can't focus at all.

peterbleafs> LN-093: Ditto my mind is not on work. :)

DoiT4DougIE> LN-093: haha ya I agree, I couldnt sleep well at all last night. I had to call in "sick" (excited) to work cuz i knew nothing productive would get done.”

“burroz: I need another trade!!! Too long since the last one.

nrandreycharles: WHO IS NEXT I ALREADY WANT MORE :(trades is a hell of a drug..

Reimoceros: Thank you for the trade Maple Leafs. I'll take another now please.”

“wiski: Be patient they said.....Fuck that I said. :)

Loric76: Can't wait for tonight.”

In drug addiction, a body’s physiological response to an expected contact with a drug has been observed clinically, and at times we see that the body releases dopamine (endorphins) in its

excitation and expectation *before* actual contact with the drug (Watson, 1032-3)⁶³. The pleasure outside of ‘being-high’ or ‘being-addicted’ (noted as the process of ‘becoming-high’ or ‘becoming-addicted’) may also be illustrated in the spectacle of sports, which implicates our conventional notions of drugs:

“LeafsFanSince93: OHHHH BABYYYYYY! Like a kid on Christmas. Except I’ll probably be too nervous to actually enjoy the game. I’ll enjoy the build up more than sweating the game.”

It is being suggested that the spectacle of sports functions in the same manner as what is conventionally categorized as drugs. Thus, when we question ‘what is a drug?’ we find another sacred space of moralistic ideals. This is because the dilemma of knowing what drugs and addiction are is the false problem of their respective discourses of prescription, which Jacques Derrida recognized in his brief essay *The Rhetoric of Drugs*:

“There is not in the case of drugs any objective, scientific, physical (physicalities), or ‘naturalistic’ definition... Already one must conclude that the concept of drugs is not a scientific concept, but is rather instituted on the basis of moral or political evaluations: it carries in itself both norm and prohibition, allowing no possibility of description or certification - it is a decree, a buzzword (*mot d'ordre*)” (Derrida, 229).

For this reason, a discourse *on* drugs and addiction does not presuppose the pre-existing affects, but rather it encompasses the traces of its functions: “As with addiction, the concept of drugs supposes an instituted and an institutional definition: a history is required, and a culture, conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire network of intertwined discourses, a rhetoric, whether explicit or elliptical” (*ibid*). To speak only of the molecular structure of THC (the psychoactive

⁶³ “...there is evidence in primates that dopamine cell firing appears to be associated with the expectation, rather than the receipt of reward. Consistent with this in humans, expectation of methylphenidate has been shown to result in larger increases in brain metabolism in cocaine-dependent individuals, than when it is unexpected. Also dopamine release in response to cocaine cues has been demonstrated in the dorsal striatum of individuals abusing cocaine. Increased dopamine levels in the right putamen have also been reported to heroin-related cues in abstinent opioid-dependent individuals” (Watson, 1032-3).

compound in *cannabis sativa*) or the human dopamine system is to presuppose and reaffirm the prominent discourses *of* drugs and addiction.

In sports as in drugs, as one eventually reaches 'being-high', it is never a feeling which lasts and is always met with the experience of withdrawal, or the 'post-high body'. Sports create a relief for this by inherently having a next game and a next season:

"Xxxxxnew: I've been watching since '1961, and I remember my dad saying after the leafs sucked in the 67-68 season after winning the cup the year before, 'Don't worry, they just had an off year.'"

"Burtonboy: nine "fuckin" years waiting for this one [game]. Been a long time coming and many many times I wondered if it was worth it. YEEEEEEEEEE
HAWWWWWWW . Bring on the Bruins, it's worth every minute right now."

While part of the institutional understanding of addiction is based on physiological symptoms as those which have been described, addiction is also characterized based on a scale of harmfulness, which at times includes the happiness of the addict: "Just as 'junkies' are not otherwise happy, well-integrated people who happen to want some heroin every few hours, severe gambling, food, sex, and work addicts³ are not otherwise happy, well-integrated people who happen to overindulge regularly" (Alexander, 41). That addicts³ are not "well-integrated or happy" represents a relation to an authoritative moral ideal which speaks on behalf of the addict. This very same mechanism, which is an authoritatively prescribed ideal that subjectifies bodies, can be seen in the body of the sports fanatic. The ideal body of the sports fanatic, in the private languages of sports, is phrased as such: "are you a true fan or a fair-weather fan?" While the conventional problem of addiction is that a particular behaviour either does or does not follow the path of the ideal, the foray into the body of the sports fanatic reveals two things at the start: an identification between 'your' team and the enemy; and an identification between the "true" fanatic and the "plastic" or "fake" fanatic:

“20 Bobby Pulford: I have been a Leaf fan since 1959. I am also a native Torontonion and this team is wrapped up in my identity. That was just the way it was when I was a kid, so I was brought up on this stuff. I cannot even imagine supporting another team, so I live and die with them every year. I do love this site though; I really believe the true Leaf fans are here.”

When it comes to a prescribed ideal, which in modern society may be reduced to a subject that produces, consumes, and follows the law, it is engendered by a model of duration and repetition and functions based on the mechanism of group inclusion/exclusion (you’re born into a group – wherein you have a choice of excluding yourself from the indoctrinated ideal, or maintaining the path of the ideal). Like in many religions, the effectiveness of repetition from an early age functions as a powerful mechanism for affects and rhetoric. For Deleuze, the first drink of the alcoholic repeats the last one⁶⁴. While a Christian baptismal is the symbolic subjection (of identity) into the religion, the child being born into parents who already self-identify, along with the repetition of rituals and spectacles, are the functioning machines of reproducing the assemblage. For a sports fanatic, there is also a first introduction into the assemblage: from a young age, identification can be produced from a parent’s identification with a team or through the geographical territory that the fanatic occupies (is born into). This can be illustrated by what it means to be the “best Red” (“true” fan):

“Being local. Buying the new shirt every season. Going to all the home games. Going to lots of away games. Being the best moaner. Knowing the words to YNWA [team song]. Understanding the history of the club. Backing the owners.”

The capture of attention and subsequent attachment of the body of the sports fanatic is affectual (consuming the spectacle, a sense of belonging to a community), semiotic (creating a community through languages, inclusivity/exclusivity in discourse and membership, the establishment of hierarchies and norms), territorial (identity based on birthplace, a totalizing subjectivity) and

⁶⁴ See (Boutang and Pamart, 1996).

mechanistic (memorizing team songs and history). Furthermore, the production of affects and the norms necessary to sustain these assemblages of identities is most successfully created linguistically, typically through authoritative utterances. In these cases, the *nomothetes*, or the creator of the ‘ideal’ carries the authority, and most importantly, distinguishes the failure to fulfill the norms as meaning exclusion from the group. Here is an online thread created to categorize and identify the “true” fan:

“Have you been to more than 50 matches? Does your father follow the same team as you? Will your son be brainwashed into supporting the same side as you? Does a shitty result ruin your weekend? Can you name the most recent starting XI? Do you know who your game next week is against? Have you only ever supported one club side? Have you ever stayed up until 3am to watch a crappy stream? Have you ever changed/cancelled plans to watch a match? If you can answer yes to at least 5 of these, you pass the test.”

The hierarchy between a “true” and “fake” fan or the “good” and “bad” team is analogous to the transcendent hierarchization of religious subjects (as outlined by Bromberger⁶⁵), namely between sacred and profane subjects. Mimicking the religious function of creating a hierarchized world, these norms lead sports fanatics to embody a similar sense of belonging, such as when **20 Bobby Pulford** proclaims that: “...I cannot even imagine supporting another team... this team is wrapped up in my identity.” The illusion of a difference between sports teams, nations, or religions and their accompanying identities is sustained by the difference between groups (“my team” vs. “the other team”) and the ritualizations of the ideal. In sports, there is an ideal of success which the subject can pursue:

⁶⁵ “...the organization and the working principles of the world of football also share some common ground with the world of religion. After the fashion of church bodies, the world of football has its own laws and strict hierarchy...Secondly, the distribution of spectators within the precincts of the stadium recalls, in many respects, the rigorous ordering of the different social groups attending important religious ceremonies. In both cases, three main concurrent principles determine how the space will be occupied: the usual social hierarchy (with the V.I.P.’s who flaunt themselves in the best seats and boxes); the hierarchy of the football world itself (directors, representatives of the leagues and federations, etc., are accommodated in reserved seats), then a hierarchy based on the fervour and the strength of support” (Bromberger, 307).

“Insidious: Have you no sense whatsoever of what Liverpool Football Club is about??? We are about winning football matches and winning trophies. That's it.”

“palmers_green_yid: I think a majority of modern football fans are prepared to sacrifice identity if they think that it may give them a chance of success. Success is their equivalent of the money the businessmen are after; it makes them do desperate things.”

As ‘success’ or the ‘ideal’ (in sports or heroin) is evidently short and temporary, an addiction becomes located in the relations external to the object. Bodies of addiction that are formed by ideals of success necessarily experience the reciprocating struggle of dealing with withdrawal from success, which seems to be a natural element of sacred ritualizations of alcohol, tobacco, and sports:

“alex callis: Blah, I'm so sick of this team.

Radar O'Rielly: So quit being a fan.

JR from Halifax: Why should he quit?

Radar O'Rielly: Why shouldn't he?

JR from Halifax: Because he is a fan.....frustrated like many of us”

In an online discussion thread named “how do you get over a bad result?” sports fanatics evoke their personal struggles with withdrawal symptoms:

“Irrational: Obviously bad results affect some people more than others. Like yesterday, when a result completely ruins your weekend - what do you do to get over it or make you feel better? Any rituals in particular that you partake in? I usually replay the game on FIFA [video game] and beat the team heavily, that eases the pain somewhat. Then go out with friends and pretend the result never happened, and think about the FIFA result. For me ignoring it is the only way I can get it out of my head and ruining my day further.

2 Man Midfield: Just ignore football/sport media for a day or two. After a while the withdrawal symptoms are enough to get me excited about the next fixture.

unitedbhoy: Talk it out with my dad. I always need to have a reason for a defeat - what went wrong, who to blame, what can be improved and how. Also like to point out some positives from the game, if there are any. Then watch more football, or watch the NFL if the games on Sunday, accompanied by alcohol.

JohnnyLaw: I can't, the only way I'll get over it is if we win the next game. Needless

to say, my spirits kind of crushed at the moment.

Roopea: For me, it just completely ruins my day. Nothing has improved my mood after we have had a bad result, even during the successful Fergie years when I knew everything would be alright come the end of the season.

izec: Nothing helps, it ruins the day for me if we lose like yesterday.

The-Natural: The defeat to Real in 2013 was the hardest result I've ever had to get over. I was off work all week and drank every night and got in to so many heated arguments with strangers in pubs. The anger just wouldn't subside for a good fortnight."

These overwhelming attachments even lead to participants considering quitting their addiction.

Whether it's for a team whose recent history sports enviable success (such as the above discussion between fans of Manchester United, who have won 9 championships in recent memory) or a team whose most recent success (in winning a championship) was over 40 years ago, as we have already seen with examples of withdrawal, the body of the sports fanatic will encounter these conventional characteristics of addiction, and others, such as failed attempts to quit:

"Burtonboy: Fuck it . I'm tired of all this negativity surrounding the Leafs . After 50 + yrs following the buds it looks like its time to get a new team.

Yaknowwhat: If only it was that easy BB...we're all hopelessly addicted to this team..."

"Yaknowwhat: sometimes I truly believed we are cursed....we seem to be the loveable laughable losers...year in....year out....trying times to be fan of this team....that's for sure...

phaneufoundlander If I could change colours I'd be gone long ago....the team is a disgrace

Yaknowwhat: Yep....for whatever reason I can't leave....I was born in Toronto...the Leafs were always a part of me...like it or not I will have a Leaf logo on my casket..."

"XXXXXnew: I've been a fan since 1961. Year after year is Groundhog Day.

20 Bobby Pulford Since 1959 or so myself. I stopped drinking the cool aid a while ago, because it has been feeling like April Fool's Day."

Such behaviour results in the forum performing the functions of a therapy group, supporting members who want to quit, successfully or not:

“TuckerForCompassion: So there you all have it. I'm addicted to this place like many but don't like the taste anymore. And am quitting. Thank you for the years of great fun MLHS. But nothing lasts forever.

Responses: “see you in a couple hours,” “I understand the sentiment,” “Take care, enjoy your vacation and hopefully see you back soon.”

Another response: **Knights2Leafs:** Take some time away. I did for 4 months and I don't let it bleed into my everyday life any more.”

“TuckerForCompassion: How many in their processing of grief have taken any blame? I at least have in admitting I got carried away these past few seasons focusing on the negative constantly.

MaxwellHowe: You must learn to laugh at the Leafs. The Leafs are a carnival..it'll be great when they win again....but at least, when they lose, they do so hilariously. The key is laughter my friend.

colino17: I am a die hard Leafs fan and always will be no matter how the team is doing, but @MaxwellHowe is right, the key to maintaining sanity through the tough times is a combination of hope and humor. Lose either and all you have left is misery.”

Affects of addiction can be illustrated to the extent and intensity in non-conventional sources to the point where the “broad continuum” of ‘addiction’ becomes a stratum⁶⁶ or apparatus of capture which reinforces the arbitrary differentiation between ‘problematic’ and ‘non-problematic’ uttered by authoritative sources, and in the case of the state or capitalist machine, is why the sports fanatic is not and will not be considered an addict, despite the prevalence of affects of addiction. The crux of the issue is how and who determines what is ‘problematic’,

⁶⁶ “Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing them into molar aggregates. Strata are acts of capture, they are like “black holes” or occlusions striving to seize whatever comes within their reach. They operate by coding and territorialisation upon the earth; they proceed simultaneously by code and by territoriality. The strata are judgments of God; stratification in general is the entire system of the judgment of God...” (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 40)

especially given the limitless presence of ‘problematic’ affects that conventionally characterizes addiction.

While winning games and championships appears to be the *raison d’être* of being a sports-fanatic, other ideals can be transmuted onto the sports fanatic, meaning that not only is there a sense of belonging to a team, but a collective sense of belonging with family too:

“Niagara_Leafs: Here's a thing for you folks.....Im almost 46,,,,,my son is 18.....TONIGHT, we shared every Leafs shot.....GOAL, and finally the WIN. I'm a divorced Dad...always did my best.....But tonight was special.....

MSM>Niagara_Leafs: I watched four cup wins with my dad. I remember it fondly.”

As ‘being-high’ is short and temporary, the pleasure of the high needs to become associated with external relations. For the heroin addicts that Gabor Maté encounters on the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, their addiction represents “the only home they’ve ever had” (Maté, 18). It is becoming evident that the sports fanatic is attracted to much more than the enjoyment/immersion into the actual game, which Guy Debord would consider as the commodity as spectacle. Yet, what appears to make sports so popular is the reconciliation of Debord’s proclamation that “the spectacle’s function in society is the concrete manufacture of alienation” (Debord, 10). In effect, the spectacle of (professional) sports encompasses much more than the game itself, but is all of the things which are attached or engendered by the game, such as the sense of belonging to a team, the feeling of community and friendship on online forums, or, illustrated by the fevered dialogue above, the pleasures taken from the management of the team, such as in ‘trades’ (exchanges of players by one team with another).

In the sports assemblage, this totalization is evidenced by the prominence and popularity of sports media (radio, television, newspaper, blogs and discussion forums) and in our case, we see

how important the engagement with an online forum is to the connection of being a sports fanatic:

“CanuckUKinToronto: One thing about MLHS, we are all Leaf fans.. many die hard.. We dedicate a lot of free time on this site.. so it also becomes a hangout in some way... Many of us are quite diverse but have great conversations/debates on the Leafs.. and sometimes in the Mashup on other points.. learning, or debating.. The site has great articles with authors who are very informative and the extra value is just how contributory many posters are on there- for their insight, comments, retweets etc... sharing info on the Leafs and hockey.. but also not just a good hockey social network but also brings together some comradory with diverse people who end up sharing some other interests and commentary some times.. like tunes/ other worldly discussions too... "Virtual Friends"..”

“Burtonboy: Thanks to you most of all for giving us this site to vent out frustrations and cheer for the Leafs. Friendships that will last a lifetime”

“Bon Scott was a Leaf fan: Nice way to cap off the workweek, coming home to another MLHS interview with Leaf brass. Great work guys!! Keep it up!!”

“OTL: Alec: Just wanted to say that your site has been a GREAT MEMOIRE of what the Leafs have gone through to get to this point.”

“Murph2417: I've been off of MLHS [the forum] for about a week and I didn't realize how much I missed it. So glad I stumbled upon this site AND signed up to have some conversation. This site is my most visited by far.”

What this is attempting to show is that the duration and location of the ‘being-addict’ is much wider than initially categorized. Moreover, the take-over of the body and soul of the addict by the totalizing addiction, a form that even Bruce Alexander relies on⁶⁷ as he alludes to a loss of soul in the addict³, as his life becomes almost totally related to his fix (getting it, using it, recovering from it, etc.), can be expressed by a continuum to be present in many pursuits, in this

⁶⁷ Alexander uses the modern transformation of the location of addiction as a presupposition to its existence, illustrated by his proclamation that “the material and social harm of addiction¹ can be horrendous, yet the spiritually minded temperance activists perceived – correctly I believe – an even more nightmarish feature: addicted¹ people seemed to have lost their *souls* to alcohol. In nonreligious terms, those who became addicted¹ were so overwhelmingly involved with drinking that they became different people, alien to their own society and to their own previous identities... Why, apart from a kind of possession by ‘demon rum’, would anyone give themselves over to the horrors of life as an alcoholic?” (Alexander, 31).

case sports fanaticism. As the time outside of the spectacle is accounted for in sources of consumption (and their accompanying affects, such as friendship), such as online forums or sports radio, it becomes clear that the spectacle itself is structured by norms and rituals.

Richard Doyle makes this claim for psychedelic drugs, wherein he argues that rhetorical discourses surrounding psychedelic drugs structure our experience with them. He points to online trip-reports, which describe in detail a user's firsthand experience, acting as maps or frames for an experience⁶⁸. This notion may be analogously observed in sports, as we have seen, by the prominence of an online discussion forum in the enjoyment of being a sports fan. But it is also observable in the 'direction' of the discourse – in psychedelic trip reports⁶⁹, it would be the difference between positive or negative experiences to report. A reader of the report may desire or expect to find positive or negative reports, or they may search and read neutrally. So too in sports discourse do we see that fans search for a directional discourse which suits their engagement, either positively or negatively:

“MaxwellHowe: Thanks Aaron, and MLHS, for continuing to permit readers to see the many rays of sunshine beaming on our team. So much doom and gloom with the MSM [mainstream media] and other lesser Leaf websites.”

“Grant: The most amazing thing for me in this playoff run has been the number of regular posters on this site who have totally disappeared. It's as though they weren't really Leaf fans at all but posters who get the most enjoyment out of nitpicking every shift the team plays.”

⁶⁸ In *Darwin's Pharmacy*, Richard Doyle pursues the notion that “rhetorical technologies structure and enable fundamentally different *kinds* of ecodelic experiences” (Doyle, 21). Moreover, Doyle writes “language becomes the occasion for a feedback loop, where utterances and writings that seem to enable the endurance and enjoyment of psychedelic experience are replicated, programming further ecodelic investigations, and so on” (Doyle, 115).

⁶⁹ The function of psychedelic trip-reports according to Richard Doyle is being ascribed to online forums of discussion for sports fanatics: For Doyle, “trip reports are first and foremost protocols, scripts for the better or worse ingestion of psychedelic plants and compounds” (Doyle, 47). They are rhetorical software: “linguistic, visual, musical, and narrative sequences whose function resides less in their ‘meaning’ than in their capacity to be repeated and help generate patterns of response. They are part of the psychonaut apparatus, not a supplement to it” (Doyle, 50).

A furthermore example is in the fact that sports games are characteristically accompanied by play-by-play analysts or color commentators. This rhetorization of the game can be illustrated to structure the experience, most evidently within the language of the dualism of “my team” and “the other team.” Here are some dialogues of commentaries about particular announcers:

“**Wook:** Cole is such a Leafs fan, which is great for us but not surprising that other fans do not like him. It was pretty humorous listening to him during the turds [opposition team] game, repeating things like "Ottawa regains the zone but there is nothing to it once again as the Leafs handily clear the puck". I love his use of pro-Leafs adjectives.”

“**hockeyfanfirst:** Can't stand CBC. All of them are critical of the leafs.”

“**daniel marois:** Guys, I have always been a huge Chris Cuthbert fan and a shame CBC let him get away to TSN many years ago. His Crosby gold medal winning call still gives me chills... I cannot STAND Hughson/Simpson. His play call "Great save!" makes me throw something at the TV every time. Simpson is so wooden and provides nothing to the telecast.”

The point here is not only that the similarity between what are the medically (and conventionally) accepted notions of addiction do not distinguish themselves from non-addictive behaviors, but also that even within the space of behaviors which may resemble addictive behavior but are not so considered, there is an illusory experience between ‘harmful’ and ‘not-harmful.’ That is, the fans of those teams who have an ‘acceptable tolerance level’ of success and moreover those that have had some or more success, do not consider their indulgences as harmful or questionable; meanwhile, sports franchises who have had little to no success in an unacceptable time-frame exhibit a much more pronounced ‘harmful’ discourse which questions their own ‘addiction’, devotion, or loyalty to the team in spite of all the misery. It is here, in the difference between the ‘harmful’ devotion or loyalty to a sports team and a not-harmful one where we can see the fallacy in conceiving of ‘addiction’ based on a ‘harm’ model.

Who defines what is harmful, abusive, overwhelming, or addictive? Who differentiates between the affect of a ‘drug’ (artificial) and the affect of a ‘normal’ (natural) substance? When the gambler becomes ‘problematic’, he becomes an object in need of further study and proper classification, but only under the category of ‘addiction’. Is the gambler ‘addicted’ only because the consequences of his use are defined as problematic? There continues to be an absence of certainty within the conventional discourse of addiction on whether the fundamental components of addiction are physiological or social, yet this failure has not restricted the creation and reproduction of the conventional affects and assemblage of addiction. In addictions discourse, the presupposed affect of addiction can be carried as far as it is desired – the boundaries continue to widen: Avram Goldstein goes as far as to say that “there is no basis whatsoever in medical science for setting aside the legal addictive drugs as different from the illicit ones,” which for him means to include “heavy nicotine smokers,” “heavy alcohol drinkers,” and “heavy coffee drinkers” as addicts (Goldstein, 4). His book argues that “drug addiction...is primarily a public-health problem,” because it is understood that “the misery suffered by addicts and their families is enormous. The costs to society—to all of us—are measured as loss of productivity, additional needs for medical care, dangers of drug-induced behaviors, destruction of family life, corruption of children, and burden on the criminal justice system” (Goldstein, 13). The criteria for categorizing the affects of addiction are created not as a component part of a body (human or drug), but only in relation to a discursive ideal that defines ‘problematic’ from ‘non-problematic’. If this is the case, why is ‘addiction’ related to affects such as tolerance or withdrawal and not to criteria such as “the costs to society” outlined by Goldstein? If they were related according to the latter, the continuum of addiction would quickly be diluted by its

inability to be differentiated or captured and therefore, conventionally, the experience of any substance or pursuit would be subject to 'addiction'.

Chapter 3

Distinguishing Between Discourses *Of* and *On* Addiction

As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that “an assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows simultaneously” (A Thousand Plateaus, 22), we may remark that in addiction we also encounter its discourses, its material manifestations, and its relation to authority. That is, after the first two chapters, we may say that the concept of addiction is much more complex than a simple scientific classification: the concept is traced to a notion of conquest, characterized by the colonization of rituals by sacred authorities who have rationalized a distinction between the good and bad (truth and lie, healthy and harmful). The territorialization of the addiction assemblage reflects the colonization of truth, rituals, people and drugs.

The power which emanates from conquest can be effectively reflected in Eliade’s terms of religion: the ordering of chaos (which creates life) engenders the distinction between the sacred and profane (the *real*, objective world where truth can be found). Such a relation to power is what Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari so vociferously attempt to resist – the false sense of a universal truth. Moreover, Foucault traces the production of truth as a rationalization for subjugating the body (which develops into the concept of biopower⁷⁰). As these models of knowledge are remnants of the conquest of modern rationalism, the second section of this chapter will encounter the industrial colonization of rituals in the films *Jalsaghar*, *Shatrank-ke-*

⁷⁰ According to Nadesan, “Foucault developed the idea of biopower to capture technologies of power that address the management of, and control over, the life of the population...For example, efforts to manage the health of populations through pharmaceutical interventions serve market interests by relying on commodity solutions (e.g., drugs) and by purportedly delivering a healthier workforce without changing the conditions under which workers labor, without changing market commodities consumed by labor (e.g., soda), and without changing industrial pollutants that affect workers’ health. In 2005, Americans spent more than \$200 billion on prescription drugs (Tone & Watkins, 2007)” (Nadesan, 3).

Khilatri, and *Charulata*, directed by Satyajit Ray, wherein the films facilitate an effective discourse *on* addiction.

Meanwhile, the first part of this chapter will engage the chaos of drugs and how in a sacred world, such as one based on the presupposition of objective truth, a discourse *of* drugs (and addiction) has materialized. The text *Love and Addiction* by Stanton Peele will be complimented by discourses from Richard Degrandpre in order to engage semiotic, material and social flows, wherein the presupposition of a universal object of addiction rationalizes resistant attitudes towards safe injection sites, paramilitary wars on drugs, mass incarceration of society, the infiltration of law and profit into the medical body, and the prohibition of some substances and the promotion of other substances and rituals.

I. The Nature of Addiction

What is the nature of addiction? The primary continuity present within our experiences with drugs is their prescribed legitimacy – a material and discursive manifestation of power. In fact, a characteristic of drugs may be that they actually lack continuity. In other words, not only do physiological effects or a drug's molecules not encompass a nature of drugs, but moreover, factors external to drugs and the body fundamentally affect and shape our relation with drugs. In some discourses *on* drugs, this is referred to as *setting*⁷¹. The notion of *setting* delineates both the notion that drugs have an essential manner in which they affect the body, and the notion that all bodies have an essential reaction to a drug: "Animal research uniformly demonstrates that

⁷¹ The usages of drugs reveal experiences that are amenable to factors such as set and setting. Betty Eisner denotes *set* as the subject and *setting* as the environment of the experience. Studies on both humans and animals have exposed that critical factors in a drug experience are affected by mentality and surroundings. "In a classic study of the placebo effect, Louis Lasagna and his co-workers found that 30 to 40 percent of a group of postoperative patients couldn't tell the difference between morphine and a placebo that they were told was morphine...Lasagna's placebo experiment demonstrated that people's reactions to a drug are determined by what they think the drug is as by what it actually is" (Peele, 28).

nondrug factors figure prominently in the development of drug desires and drug experiences” (Degrandpre, 80).

The malleability of the drug experience and its relation to authoritative sources of truth was evoked by Degrandpre: “Early studies provided animals unlimited access to intravenous cocaine or morphine in highly isolated and impoverished environments. The result was that monkeys and rats sometimes self-administered drugs until death...These findings...reinforced the prevailing ideology of angels and demons.” (Degrandpre, 78). However, what becomes ignored are results which do not fit the narrative or the original moralistic propulsions:

“there is a vast array of animal studies, not seen in the media, showing that these toxic patterns of drug use are not sustained except under the most sterile conditions. When drug-taking environments are filled with alternative activities and the opportunity for social interaction, drug use fades...The notion that one can generalize from a barren laboratory model to human drug use conforms to the prevailing pharmacologicalism, where drug effects have nothing to do with context and culture, and everything to do with assumptions about fixed pharmacological actions of drug molecules” (*Ibid*).

Despite writing a discourse *of* addiction based on the ‘fixed actions’ of humans, Stanton Peele also recognized the notion that drugs may escape classification: “The response people have to a given drug is determined by their personalities, their cultural backgrounds, and their expectations and feelings about the drug” (Peele, 20). Moreover, “since people who take narcotics often do not get addicted, scientists are beginning to think that addiction does not exist” (Peele, 3). Peele does not affirm the notion that ‘addiction does not exist’. Instead, his conclusion to the clinical observation that drug experiences are highly variable, is not that a condition such as drug addiction cannot contain the empirical continuity of a pathological concept, but rather that the natural condition of addiction usurps its drug-based origins: “If addiction is now known *not* to be primarily a matter of drug chemistry or body chemistry, and if we therefore have to broaden our

conception of dependency-creating objects to include a wider range of drugs, then why stop at drugs?” (*ibid*). While Peele rejects a body- or drug-based essence to addiction, he locates his object in a social psychology. Indeed, in order to legitimize his idea of the pathology of love, he presupposes the *thing* of addiction, wherein some love relationships are “just about the most common, yet least recognized, form of addiction” (Peele, 5).

Herein we may see the modern relation of the sacred (which believes in a ‘true reality’) to the profane: in the science of addiction, we have presupposed the existence of an ‘objective reality’ which engenders a theory of addiction; however, since an ‘objective reality’ is nothing more than an anthropomorphic creation, akin to religious creation, it is unable to provide a rational certainty (or a complete understanding) of objects, thereby sustaining the moralistic underpinnings to scientific theories of addiction. In Peele (as in most discourses *of* addiction), the essence of addiction lies in the moral valuation of a behaviour (in the first chapter, this was described as the ‘harmfulness’ model, wherein a scientific truth has been created by classifying deviant behaviours):

“If what a person is engaged in enhances his ability to live – if it enables him to work more effectively, to love more beautifully, to appreciate the things around him more, and finally, if it allows him to grow, to change, and expand – then it is not addictive. If, on the other hand, it diminishes him – if it makes him less attractive, less capable, less sensitive, and if it limits him, stifles him, harms him – then it is addictive” (Peele, 60).

In discourses *of* addiction, the addict and the drug appear as the problem of addiction – “*the problem drinker*.” This moralizing evaluation which engenders a scientific concept of addiction is also evident in the rationalizations of colonization, whether they are territorial, discursive, social, individual or ritualistic. The scientific theorization of addiction is the sacred prescription of profanity onto an object, thereby colonizing the signifier of the object (it now represents evil)

and its material manifestations (it becomes prohibited or transformed). Whether it is a religious, discursive or social mechanism, engendering an objective law (such as the natural laws of scientific concepts) through moralization is essential to discourses of addiction, such as when Neil Levy, the editor of *Addiction and Self-Control*, decries the “problem” of addiction: “Addiction, especially addiction to nicotine and alcohol, is a serious public health problem...Process addictions like pathological gambling also produce great harms” (Levy, 1).

In effect, when the traditional word addiction was transformed from an ambiguous capacity for devotion into a natural condition by sources of authority, the concept of addiction became a discursive and material apparatus that would always “find a desire to reconstitute the ‘ideal body’ or the ‘perfect body’” (Derrida, 244). In other words, the transformation of the word addiction enabled authorities to not only legitimize a conception of what they determine to be ‘harmful’ behaviour (as has been discussed, according to Eliade, that which threatens the sacred world, is deemed the profane), but to facilitate the manifestation of sacred rituals. In regards to modern drug laws, Richard Degrandpre describes the religious language of *pharmacologicalism* as reinforcing an “essentialism of drugs, of angels and demons,” wherein the drug cocaine represents the profane and the drug Ritalin⁷² represents the sacred, meanwhile both drugs share essential similarities: “methylphenidate [Ritalin], like cocaine, increases synaptic dopamine by inhibiting dopamine reuptake, it has equivalent reinforcing effects to those of cocaine, and its intravenous administration induces a ‘high’ similar to that of cocaine” (Degrandpre, 77).

In this respect, we can see how the concept of addiction functions as an apparatus of the State of capitalism: despite the fact that Ritalin and cocaine share essential similarities, the former has

⁷² Ritalin is “the most commonly prescribed psychotropic medication for children in the United States” (Degrandpre, 77).

become a multi-million dollar social drug, while the latter was used as a mechanism to control the black population in the United States of America (as noted in the first chapter, in reference to Jonathan Ott's text *Pharmacotheton* – p. 52). There is thus a dynamic relation between discourses *of* drugs and addiction, power over our bodies, and sources of authority, wherein the knowledge and power within the concepts territorialize individual and social bodies. Saran Ghatak has thus articulated a Foucauldian approach to the concept of drugs and addiction as a form of biopower which we *continue to endure*: “As the drug problem was constructed as a deadly threat to the health, wealth and morals of the nation, it legitimized surveillance and intervention at an unprecedented level within a democratic system of governance” (Ghatak, 52). Furthermore, beyond only the violent apparatuses of the State, the ‘drug problem’ also emerged alongside the discursive and material formation of medicine (the ‘good’ drugs) or rituals such as sports or drinking

In discourses *of* addiction there is no space for the chaotic (drug) experience beyond the prescribed conceptual limits, therefore the object of a discourse *on* addiction is not the classification of a natural law, but the authoritative function of concept formation. As was noted at the beginning of the second chapter, a discourse *of* addiction functions as a ‘majority language’, while a discourse *on* addiction as a ‘minority language’: “Majority assumes a state of power and domination...A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian” (A Thousand Plateaus, 105).

Discourses *Of* Addiction Territorialize the Story of the Addict

Nick's father drilled into his twin sons the notion that they were nothing but 'pieces of shit'... Another man described the way his mother used a mechanical babysitter when he was three years old. 'She went to the bar to drink and pick up men. Her idea of keeping me safe and from

*getting into trouble was to stick me in the dryer. She put a heavy box on top so I couldn't get out.*⁷³

While Gabor Maté tells the stories of the addicts he encounters to better understand the scientific nature of addiction (meaning, his text remains a discourse *of* addiction), he nonetheless uses genealogical methods by historicizing the concept which delimits the location (of the presence) of addiction. In other words, while the concept of addiction is sustained by power and rationalized through a discourse which locates the presence of addiction in physiological symptoms characteristic of a disease and/or the relation of a habit to its negative consequences, a historical discourse deterritorializes the prescribed characteristics of addiction (though Maté reterritorializes addiction based on prescribed discourses). For Maté, this is related to the purpose of his work at *The Portland Hotel* in Vancouver: “We do not expect to cure anyone, only to ameliorate the effects of drug addiction and its attendant ailments and to soften the impact of the legal and social torments our culture uses to punish the drug addict” (Maté, 21). As Maté’s material encounters with addicts resist the sacred discourses *of* addiction (which clearly reject the addict), his historical discourses are also reticent of a resisting discourse *on* addiction.

While discourses *of* addiction presuppose the profanity of addiction in relation to a sacred body or world, which engenders the subjection of the drug, drug abuser, and drug dealer, Maté’s re-situation of addicts, while categorical, does not invoke but rather implicates the imposition of medical, capital, or state assemblages, such as in the currently occurring battle to create safe injection sites in Canada:

⁷³ “The research literature is unequivocal: most hard-core substance abusers come from abusive homes. The majority of my Skid Row patients suffered severe neglect and maltreatment early in life. Almost all the addicted women inhabiting the Downtown Eastside were sexually assaulted in childhood, as were many of the men. The autobiographical accounts and case files of Portland residents tell stories of pain upon pain: rape, beatings, humiliation, rejection, abandonment, relentless character assassination. As children they were obliged to witness the violent relationships, self-harming life patterns or suicidal addictions of their parents—and often had to take care of them” (Maté, 32-3).

“One afternoon in August 2006 I called a CBC radio program to discuss Insite, Vancouver’s controversial supervised injection facility for drug users. Just before the moderator turned to me, he interviewed an RCMP officer. Dozens of addicts who have overdosed at Insite have been successfully resuscitated, the host pointed out. Lives have been saved that might otherwise have been lost. That’s not necessarily a good thing, the Mountie spokesman explained. ‘It’s well known that negative consequences are the only major deterrent to drug use. If you are saving people’s lives, you are sending the message that it’s safe to use drugs’” (Maté, 210).

While the social contextualization of addiction still reterritorializes a concept of addiction, it also features a problematizing technique that, without a categorical interpretation, would discursively implicate the creators of sacred ideals, just as Gabor Maté writes about his encounters with addicts: “How to offer them comfort when their sufferings are made worse every day by social ostracism—by what the scholar and writer Elliot Leyton has described as the bland, racist, sexist and classist prejudices buried in Canadian society: an institutionalized contempt for the poor, for sex trade workers, for drug addicts and alcoholics, for aboriginal people” (Maté, 21).

Analogously, Bruce Alexander implicates the State and capital in his discourse *of* addiction:

“Dislocation and addiction are mass-produced by free-market society, which is a form of hypercapitalism that any regime can impose, whether it labels itself as capitalist, neo-conservative, neo-liberal, market socialist, socialist, labour, or anything else” (Alexander, 4).

While these authors reaffirm and sustain the concept of addiction, they do so by taking recourse to resisting the sacred authorities which facilitate addiction’s material and semiotic subjugation. In other words, while they discursively reaffirm discourses *of* addiction, the relations of their material encounters with places such as safe injection sites resist the materiality of discourses *of* addiction.

II. Discourses *On* Addiction from the Films of Satyajit Ray

According to discourses *of* addiction, one is either addicted or one is not. This is typically distinguished by the presence of symptoms or a pathology which compels addicts to keep doing something (such as using drugs, or gambling), even in spite of its harmful consequences. Yet, how can a diagnosis of addiction be subject to a moral interpretation? For this is precisely how addiction is determined, as it has been based on the relation of a ritualized behaviour to its perceived harmful consequences. In a discourse *on* addiction, however, there is no presumption that there is a nature to addiction, and the focus is on sources of authority that prescribe morals which have excluded rituals of addiction from the sacred.

The films *Jalsaghar* (The Music Room – 1958), *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri* (The Chess Players – 1977), and *Charulata* (1964), directed by Satyajit Ray, facilitate a discourse *on* addiction which does not morally interpret or categorically determine addiction, but rather, offers a depiction of the transformative qualities of individuals and society, notably from the pre-industrial society through to the modern world. Ray's upbringing was situated in a post-colonial time-period where India had been colonized by the British, a reality which fostered an intimate subject matter for Ray's films, wherein the emancipatory struggles of the Indian woman emerged alongside the social colonization of rituals. Therefore, according to Ben Nyce and Keya Ganguly, Ray's depictions of colonization was groundbreaking in Indian film, wherein "Ray is probably the Indian film director most responsible for establishing a serious cinema in India which looks at life as it is" (Nyce, 95)⁷⁴.

⁷⁴ Ganguly writes that "[Ray's] work becomes paradigmatic when he is placed within a wider artistic and political conversation that attempted to rethink the conditions of possibility of art under capitalism" (K Ganguly, 25).

Furthermore, Ray's depiction of social rituals facilitates a discourse *on* addiction by portraying the conventional characteristics of addiction within a contextualized space, opposing a naturalized condition. For instance, in *Jalsaghar*, we encounter a *zemindar* who has a reckless obsession to music, or *jalsas* (a classical Indian music recital), so much so, that not only does he sell the remainder of his wife's jewels in order to fund another *jalsa*, but he also orders his wife and son back from a journey in order to attend the *jalsa* – a demand which results in both of their drowning. A discourse *of* addiction would identify the reckless behaviour, the cravings, and the attachment. And yet, as was mentioned in the first chapter, Georges Bataille describes pre-modern ritualizations of the surplus as necessitating their consumption, as opposed to their modern transformation into rituals of accumulation. The *zemindar*'s belonging to the sacred social caste meant participating in sacred rituals, such as the consumption of excess. The film's depiction of the *zemindar*'s 'reckless obsession' with music was thus driven by a belonging to a social (sacred) group and participation in their prescribed rituals, and not as an underlying condition of addiction. As Reena Dube notes in her text *Satyajit Ray's The Chess Players and Postcolonial Theory*, "It is only in and through this struggle that Ray allows the viewer to question the value and function of music" (Dube, 23).

A common theme for Satyajit Ray is the conquest of the traditional aspects of life by modern forces, including rituals. Thus, in his film *Jalsaghar*, as Ray opposes the disintegration of the horse-riding *zemindar* to the modern automobile-driving character Ganguly, Darius Cooper refers to the function of music in his text *The Cinema of Satyajit Ray* as not simply a ritual of the traditional culture: "India's classical musicians, we are made to realize, owe a great deal to these aristocrats who had an authentic passion and deep understanding of their art" (Cooper, 68). But moreover, the totalizing colonization of spaces such as India meant that traditional rituals were

also being colonized, so that “the nouveau-riche like Mahim Ganguly, who succeeded the old *zamindars*, only *pretended* to take over this patronage. They had neither the temperament nor the ancestry to appreciate classical music...” (*ibid*). Ray succeeds in not only drawing attention to the functional (and aesthetic) role of rituals in the time of pre-colonization, but also to the notion that the rituals were being taken over, allowing the viewers to consider the function of contemporary rituals. Thus, beyond the film, we may observe that over time the ritualization of music has transformed into a global industry which contributes to sustaining the sacred worlds of capitalism and the State.

The colonizing transformation of traditional rituals is also reflected in the subjects of addiction in Ray’s films, as they all engage in ‘addictions’ which invoke the work/play binary of colonization. As Dube elaborates,

“Enterprise depends on the following binary oppositions: colonial enterprise names the industriousness and productive labour of empire building; it is a discourse that represents itself as primarily oriented towards work, even play within enterprise is oriented towards work and is a means of learning the rules of work; the binary half of the discourse is indigenous work and play, described as wasteful and unproductive exercises in valueless activity” (Dube, 1).

Furthermore, the depiction of rituals in Ray’s films evoke a playfulness which is so completely opposed to the rationalized colonists, that this playfulness was itself the rationalization for conquest. Thus, the ‘addictions’ become reckless only through their opposition to a more powerful model, in this case that of the colonizers (otherwise, the ‘addictions’ would simply be playful devotions to music, poetry or chess).

While, given the period and the place, Ray was not in a position to depict the post-modern transformation of rituals, his films do lead us to an inquiry of the continued colonization of post-modern rituals, and moreover, his films contribute to a discourse *on* addiction because he

provides an alternative to the dominant discourse (of colonization): “Colonialist discourses foreclose and disallow the possibility of alternate understandings of the work/play binary, other than the binary of enterprise as work and native culture as unproductive play” (Dube, 29). Moreover, his depictions of addiction follow a historical-functional model of ritualized behaviours that opposes the naturalization of a behaviour: In *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri*, his depiction of the two Lucknowi chess players was unsympathetic because their obsession with the game prevented them from confronting or resisting their colonization, and yet in the same film, his depiction of King Wajid, despite his obsession with poetry, music and dance, which became the rationalization for his colonization (and therefore the demise of Indian autonomy and traditional culture), was very sympathetic. While, as Dube notes, Ray’s “discourse of the indolent and debauched feudal landlord is resituated both in relation to questions concerning culture and cultural authority,” it is our contention that Ray facilitates a discourse *on* addiction by re-situating all his subjects of addiction to “questions concerning culture and cultural authority” (Dube, 28).

***Jalsaghar* (The Music Room, 1958)**

Jalsaghar is more than simply about documenting “the fading away of the feudal era (and its replacement by the merchant middle class),” as scholarly critics Darius Cooper and Ben Nyce proclaim⁷⁵. Instead, Ray uses film to depict a transformative historical time with images of colonization, specifically by following the story of Biswambhar Roy, a *zamindar* (feudal landlord), who as Nyce says, is “the last of his line of landed aristocrats in British India” (Nyce, 44).

⁷⁵ (Cooper, 2) and (Nyce, 44).

While Nyce and Cooper reduce the story of the *zamindar*, who is the subject of addiction in the film, into a reckless addict who has “inherited a fatal love for music” (Cooper, 66)⁷⁶ and squandered “the meager remains of his wealth on musical evenings (*jalsa*) in the name of family pride, as well as for the music itself” (Nyce, 44), Reena Dube asserts in contrast that

“critics like Seton and Nyce have tended to interpret Bishwambhar in an individualistic manner, as a feudal landlord obsessed with music. To take this view is to overlook the fact that Bishwambhar *is* a cultural leader... Therefore Bishwambhar is positioned historically and culturally as the representative of culture, and as the self-image of a culture” (Dube, 24).

As we have noted, Georges Bataille’s categorization of the rituals of the wealthy encompassed the notion that a surplus was always consumed, not accumulated; thus, the rule of the ritual implicated the sign of wealth as being created through the extravagance of its consumption. Therefore, instead of the reckless spending of an addict to music, we can consider the zamindar’s arrangements of music recitals, in spite of the predictably negative consequences, as a final resistance to an impending colonization, a notion elaborated by Dube: “his refusal to lie down and passively die, his reckless abandon in arranging one last *jalsa*, and even the excitement of his manservant, all signal the colonial subject’s defiance of historical time” (*ibid*).

Biswambhar’s role of resistance is further elaborated in contrast to the two chess players from Ray’s film *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri* (The Chess Players). While Ray’s depiction of Biswambhar’s relation to music includes the appearance of reckless decisions being made (which we have

⁷⁶ Cooper bluntly appraises the zamindar’s reckless behaviour mimicking a discourse of addiction: “Biswambhar’s manager informs him that the banks will not lend him any more money. [Therefore], to meet this expense, he orders his manager to pawn some of the family jewels. This consolidates the *vibhava* or source of the *zamindar*’s downfall, which lies principally in his obsessive love for classical music and the extravagance with which he consummates this passion” (Cooper, 66).

accounted for as a form of resistance), he also portrays the *zamindar* sympathetically; meanwhile the music which is produced is some of the finest in film⁷⁷. In contrast, as Darius Cooper notes, “Ray is very unsympathetic to the Lucknowi chess players, constantly undermining their points of view. This enables him to exhibit their characteristic blindness to everything around them because of their obsession with chess” (Cooper, 203). There is little doubt that Ray infused in the *zamindar*’s seemingly irrational decisions a form of social resistance, as Ganguly, who was “the contrast figure to Biswambhar Roy...and represented the new age,” was a character given “no redeeming features...no depth, no sympathy” (Nyce, 45). And, according to Nyce, this is because Ray “has none of the modernist’s excitement and relish in the creation of new forms...and is a classicist in his response to turbulence and change” (Nyce, 170). In fact, the characters Roy and Ganguly evoke Eliade’s distinction between religious and nonreligious man, wherein the *zamindar* is depicted as representing the sacred and Ganguly as the profane. This notion is further supported by Cooper, who describes Biswambhar’s re-emergence into the *jalsaghar*, which had been closed for four years in response to the death of the *zamindar*’s wife and son who were ordered back from their journey in stormy weather in order to attend another *jalsa*: “As [the servant] unfurls the carpets and dusts, the music room is counterpointed by Biswambhar’s gradual emergence from his grieving passive state into the world of the living” (Cooper, 67). As we know from the second chapter, according to Eliade “the sacred is pre-eminently the *real*, at once power, efficacy, the source of life...” (*Sacred and Profane*, 28). Thus, while the *zamindar*’s ritualization of music gave him a sense of being⁷⁸, the ritual was

⁷⁷ Despite his earlier proclamation, Ben Nyce says of *Jalsaghar*: “Its real subject is music – classical Indian music, to be more exact – and it is one of the great treatments of music in film” (Nyce, 44).

⁷⁸ Both Dube and Nyce suggest the notion that the *jalsa* (musical recital) re-creates and sustains a hierarchical (sacred) class and provides a sense of being: “the *jalsa* is the place where Bishwambhar and the audience experience their cultural identity and self-proximity” (Dube, 26); “Ray subtly gives the impression that Biswambhar is as much pleased by the social impression he has made on his guests as by the music itself” (Nyce, 47).

sacred not in relation to a cosmology, but as a sustainer of the wealthy class⁷⁹, evidenced by the fact that all *jalsas* were attended by royalty, and no servant was seen enjoying the performance. Hence, we find in the case of Biswambhar Roy's love for music a sacred ritualization which Eliade would have otherwise deemed profane, supporting our earlier notion that modern State and capitalist rituals are sacred, not profane, as Eliade proposed.

Nonetheless, a more salient point is that the *zamindar*'s ruthless decisions in staging musical recitals, characteristic of a naturalizing discourse of addiction, are re-situated within a discourse of prescribed sacred rituals, even in light of further characterizations which reflect components of addiction, such as in the depiction of Biswambhar's craving for the re-opening of the *jalsaghar*⁸⁰, or the *zamindar*'s deteriorating relationship with his wife: the *zamindar*'s wife confronts her husband about their child's problematic submersion (promoted by the *zamindar*) and full attention to music, as the son has begun to neglect his studies. The discourse of the wife reproduces the 'harmfulness' model associated with categorizing addiction, in which an authority ascribes values of good/bad to different rituals. Only, in this case, while focusing on studies is considered the good (sacred), and attention to music as an obstacle (profane) to attaining the sacred, the creator of the discourse is the wife, who does not hold enough power to assert these moral laws. The wife's lack of power evokes the dual character of the religious function, namely the creation of truths and the power to enforce them. This principle becomes more clearly exemplified in the film *The Chess Players*, where the ruling King of Oudh, who also leads a life of idleness and attraction to musical performances, is conquered by the British for his lack of imperialist rule.

⁷⁹ To be a connoisseur of classical Indian music was a primarily wealthy ritual, thus it developed its own indicators of social inclusion, such as the lifting of the index finger at the end of a sixteen track beat, an action partaken by Biswambhar Roy during a *jalsa*.

⁸⁰ "As he waits for Ananta to unlock the *jalsaghar*, Ray cuts to a close-up of Biswambhar's fingers nervously tapping the knob of his cane" (Cooper, 67).

***Shatrank-ke-Khilatri* (The Chess Players – 1977)**

Much like Ray's earlier film *Jalsaghar*, his cinematic depiction of a story by Munshi Premchand also engages the colonization of rituals. While Premchand's story focuses on the decadent aristocratic society of Awadh (present-day Lucknow) as an unquestioned rationalization for British take-over (Premchand's portrayal of the chess players is highly unsympathetic), Ray's introduction of King Wajid and the British General Outram positions the viewer into a more contextualized perspective of the subjects of addiction in the film – the aristocratic class of landlord and king in a region (Awadh), that, according to Dube was “in popular memory and folklore, the signifier for native excess in play” (Dube, 206)⁸¹. Therefore, as a site for “the expanded cultural critique in colonialist discourse” (Dube, 29), the film goes beyond the discourse of *Jalsaghar* as it highlights British discourse that engenders the negative perceptions of idle pleasures.

While Ben Nyce suggests that “the film's message is that the British were able to take over because the kingdom and its citizens were ripe for the taking,” he not only cannot reconcile King Wajid's sympathetic portrayal, who “is revealed as fully human; and not villainous” (Nyce, 166), he also does not address Ray's change of the story's ending which results in a more sympathetic and ambiguous depiction of the two chess players than Premchand's (in Premchand's ending, the two chess players died at the hands of their own obsession; in Ray, they remain alive as

⁸¹ From Dube: “As late as 1901 Rudyard Kipling in his novel *Kim* refers to Awadh (modern day Lucknow) in the following terms: ‘There is no city – except Bombay, the queen of all – more beautiful in her garish style than Lucknow...’ (*Kim*, ed., intro. and notes, Edward W. Said [1989] 168)”

predictably colonized subjects⁸²). While several critics discuss the political ambiguities of Ray's films, our interest lies in his depictions of the subjects of addiction.

Despite Ray's change to the end of the story, the characters Mir and Mirza remain unsympathetic⁸³, though not for the reasons of an underlying pathological condition. In fact, the British participation in chess depicted in the film suggests a disinterest in the nature of obsessions as an object of study, substituted instead by addressing the force of colonization. For instance, not only does Ray suggest that the British themselves played chess, but moreover, in some instances their obsession and immersion into the game was greater than Mir and Mirza's: The visitor who interrupted Mir and Mirza's chess game to tell the men that the East India Company will take over their region of Awadh, after realizing his mistake offered to leave promptly, saying that his British colleague wouldn't even answer the door to any callers when they played chess together. The key notion here is the fact that the British did not neglect to play games like chess, but did so as a compliment to their territorial and economic objectives:

“—I see you're playing the Indian way.

—What other way is there?

—The British way.

—Don't tell me the Company has taken over chess too! ... But why change the rules?

— Because it's a faster game.

⁸² Ray writes of his ending: “To spell it out for Rajbans what it says in effect is a) that *Nawabi did not end* with the takeover; b) that upper class values were only *superficially* affected by British rule, and c) that feudal decadence was a *contributing* factor in the consolidation of British rule in India” (Dube, 141).

⁸³ After Mirza's wife has taken away the chess pieces, Ray depicts Mir and Mirza as pathetic junkies, suffering from craving and withdrawal: In the morning, the two men stand in bewilderment, asking “what do we do now?” Mirza replies, “shops are closed on Fridays. The entire day is ruined.” They set off to go to see an old friend, because they remember he has a chess set in his house. When they arrive, he is gravely ill; however, their mind remains on the chess set and not on their ill friend. On their way home, and still without a game of chess to play, Mirza and Mir stop to gamble at a controlled fight between goats, wherein Mir becomes very attracted before Mirza pulls him away, perhaps because such a pursuit does not conform to the norms and values of noblemen. Sitting on a park bench, with Mirza drawing a chess board in the dirt, Mir proclaims “What a glorious day, yet we have to spend it in idleness.” So they decide to go home, with their chess table still in their possession, and use fruits, vegetables and spice containers to represent chess pieces. They proceed to call the servant for the hookah, which is a fundamental ritual to their enjoyment of the game. The servant then says to Mirza's wife, “Who knows what magic there is in that game?”

–So they find our game too slow?

–Like our transport. Now we’re to have railway trains and the telegraph.”

While at first we may confuse Ray’s negative portrayal of Mir and Mirza as a result of their obsession to chess (hence, intimating a pathological obsession), the object of his film is ineludibly the authoritative moral position which can cast either a positive or negative light on a ritual or obsession. Therefore, when Mir’s wife proclaims that “a man with his eyes on the chessboard is lost to the world,” one can get the impression that an obsession to chess contains a pathological essentialism. Yet, with the inclusion and castigation of the highly motivated and prosperous British into the game of chess, we find such a universalism rejected. Moreover, Ray’s treatment of King Wajid supports the notion that a ritual obsession is essentially neither good nor bad. Thus, King Wajid, whose demeanour was in complete opposition to imperialist rule, and whose immersion into music, poetry and dance became a rhetorical catalyst for the colonial take-over of the region, was nonetheless depicted as a ruler loved by his people.

Ray engages the idea that as some people perceived King Wajid lovingly and as aesthetically rich, others viewed his rituals as an unacceptable form of rule: “Did you know,” General Outram rhetorically questioned his assistant Weston, “that the King prayed five times a day?” As Cooper notes, “the implication is that instead of ruling and administering, Wajid is more interested in trivial and nonmonarchial activities like praying” (Cooper, 207). More importantly perhaps is the notion that, as Dube claims, “Ray’s screenplay outlines how colonial discourse permits a narrow range of terms and disallows true inquiry” (Dube, 31). The demonizing cultural critique of

Awadh by the British was therefore not an objective account⁸⁴, but was rather engendered from

⁸⁴ “By 1856, the year of Awadh’s takeover by the British, the colonialist expanded cultural critique evolved into a full-fledged discourse. The expanded cultural critique of Awadh was based on scholarship and hearsay by British administrator-scholars who did extensive research into Awadh, only in order to condemn various aspects of the culture such as dance, poetry, music, all forms of popular entertainments like kite flying, cock-fighting, gambling as well as Hindu and Muslim practices of dress, food, and religion” (Dube, 29).

the start by a territorializing State and economic force which condemned any social practices that opposed sacred ideals. Thus, by prescribing idleness and play as characteristic of the profane, not only was the colonization of Awadh rationalized, but also in addition we may recognize the same 'religious' mechanism of colonizing rituals into the sacred and the profane.

That Ray is disinterested in facilitating a discourse *of* addiction is supported not only by his implication of authority in the colonial work/play distinction, or in the implicit acceptance of Mir and Mirza's chess obsession by their Muslim authorities (as they were evidently able to fulfill their religious duties), but also in the territorializing attempts of Mirza's wife. That is, besides the colonial discourse, with Mirza's wife we encounter the profanization of idleness and play. Furthermore, in contrasting the discourses of colonialism and Mirza's wife, we see that the wife in fact reflects a discourse closer to the characteristic discourse *of* addiction. That is, while the colonial discourse refers to the decadent play of Awadh as a wastefulness of time and resources, it is Mirza's wife who materializes a model of the chess ritual as an individualized manner which ought to be stopped. Thus, as Mirza's wife, as well as the *zamindar's* wife from *Jalsaghar*, attempt to create a moral law ('*jalsas* are bad!' or 'chess is bad!') but fail on account of a lack of sacred power, we see the elaboration of an object of Ray's films, namely the abstract power to colonize rituals, despite whether they are rationalized by 'sacred' cosmologies or economic principles. In this respect, the same territorialization of rituals based on moral rationalizations may also be said to have materialized in discourses *of* addiction.

While Cooper proclaims that Mir and Mirza "have invited their own doom and the collapse of their beloved city by displaying a completely futile and reckless whim of aristocratic excess," and in spite of their harsh moral depiction by Ray, we are given the sense that their idleness and ritualization of excess goes beyond the individual. Thus, in the prologue to *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri*,

we are introduced into the chess players' condition as such: "You may ask, 'Have they no work to do?' Of course not! Whoever heard of the land gentry working? These are noblemen..." Yet, as Cooper elaborates, "Since both have "hereditary *jagirs*" (inherited property) and don't have to earn a living, chess becomes a consuming passion to pass their idle hours" (Cooper, 186). The contradictory subject of the sacred is thus evoked by Cooper, who states separately that Mir and Mirza 'have invited their own doom' at the same time that they 'inherited' their ritualizations of idleness. Ray's response to this contradiction appears to be in the valuation of resistance to (the seemingly unpreventable⁸⁵) conquest, as he sympathetically portrays the resistor and desacralizes the coward.

Charulata (1964)

While the previous two films have dealt directly with a primary character immersed in their idle rituals, the film *Charulata* subjectifies the *bhadralok* Bhupati⁸⁶, who is not only greatly occupied with his newspaper (which leaves his wife Charulata with no time for affection), but he also contends that it represents the *real*, as opposed to the rituals of decadence, literature and women. *Charulata* is another film by Satyajit Ray that addresses rituals of boredom (or idleness) within the manifestation of the modern age. Furthermore, these rituals are once again territorialized based on their relation to sacred ideals. In this case, they oppose the colonial ideal of economic imperialism and are therefore deemed profane; yet, for Charulata, her rituals of idleness actually re-create her secondary position in society. Therefore, the colonization of rituals can materialize

⁸⁵ According to Nyce, both King Wajid and the *zamindar* Biswambhar Roy faced a futile situation: "King Wajid brings to my mind the feudal landlord Biswambhar Roy of *Jalsaghar*. Both are aware that they represent the end of a way of life which exalts beauty, and yet both are unable to prevent the forces of change from destroying them" (Nyce, 168).

⁸⁶ A *bhadralok* was "a bourgeois elite whose exposure to European literature, philosophy, and science bred a profound enthusiasm for the liberal-humanist traditions of the West" (S Ganguly, 56).

into more than simply strict prohibitions; rather, profane rituals can be permitted to the extent that they reaffirm sacred authorities.

Bhupati's immersion into politics and the newspaper can be traced "to 1835 when British legislation introduced Western education into India," wherein a class of people were designed to be produced as "Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect" (S Ganguly, 56). An image of the colonization of rituals emerges in the celebration Bhupati and his friends were holding to honor the new British Premier, wherein "we learn that Bhupati's friend, on the eve of the election, made an offering to the Hindu goddess Kali to ensure a liberal victory" (S Ganguly, 60). In contrast to the castigation by the invading British General Outram of the ritual prayers of King Wajid of Lucknow, the Hindu ritual performed by Bhupati's friend invoked the permission (by sacred authority, in this case the British) to engage in rituals, so long as they re-create the sacred world – thus, by using a Hindu sacrifice to ensure a liberal British victory, we encounter the materialization of colonized rituals.

Moreover, as Bhupati represents a subject of British colonization, his distinction between 'the real' and 'decadence' evokes the function of the sacred in Eliade's texts, as discussed in the second chapter, by not only separating the world into sacred and profane space, (where only the sacred represents true reality), but also by rationalizing the profanization of a ritual based on a moral law (which typically means a ritual that opposes the re-creation and sustainment of a sacred world). Thus, in the film, Bhupati engages his cousin: "Amal, politics is different. Politics is a living thing. Real. Palpable." Meanwhile, that which opposes his newspaper ("plays, novels, poetry" – idleness) is deemed decadent, or profane. Bhupati's insistence that politics and the newspaper represent the *real* ineludibly reflects British ideals of liberalism, wherein work

represents the sacred ideal, and in opposition, ‘decadent’ rituals of literature are deemed unproductive, ornamental and part of the profane⁸⁷.

That idleness represents a colonized ritual of the profane is evidenced by its presence in Charulata and its opposition in the work-obsessed Bhupati – who, by enumerating his wife alongside the “delights” of plays, novels and poetry, inscribes her secondary or profane status. Moreover, as Cooper notes, to trace the etymology of each of the characters’ names would reveal that “both masculine names (bhupati and amal) are given connotations of importance, independence, and patriarchal privilege, [while] the feminine name is not allowed any autonomy” (Cooper, 83). Therefore, Charulata’s rituals of idleness, while representing the profane, are permitted because they contribute to re-creating the sacred ideals, in this case patriarchy. As modern nonreligious authorities tend to evoke a sacred function, the profanization of some rituals may only perform a hierarchical distinction, whereas their materialization actually re-creates the sacred world: “She is expected to sew, supervise all domestic chores, serve meals to her husband, and cultivate her idle moments in the practice of ‘feminine’ pastimes like playing cards, embroidery, reading, playing the piano, and decorating herself for her spouse” (Cooper, 86).

Similar to *Jalsaghar* and *Shatrank-ke-Khilatri*, Ray depicts Bhupati as a subject of addiction only in relation to his wife (the title of the original story, written by Tagore, is *The Broken Nest*). As his colonized ideals have spawned a preoccupation with his work, this has left him unable to satisfy the emergence of his wife, Charulata. Ray’s depiction of Bhupati’s failure to help

⁸⁷ In his summation of British liberalism, M.R.R. Ossewaarde identifies the sacralization of work and the profanization of play: “Mandeville, Adam Smith and David Ricardo insisted that the market was the ideal embodiment of the ‘liberal’ principle of individuals being the best judges of their own (selfish) interests. They polarized the roles of the State and the market, and held that limited government maximized the collective interest. Market Liberals do not give priority to human creativity and selfimprovement, but to market efficiency” (Ossewaarde, 3)

facilitate Charulata's emergence, primarily a result of his obsession with his newspaper, is elaborated by the director's gaze at Charulata in the opening sequence of the film, wherein the camera gives Charulata (and her idle musings) the attention she deserves, and with the scene's transition through the wistful steps of Bhupati who walks right Charulata without noticing her. Nonetheless, Ray's portrayal of Bhupati as a subject of addiction remains highly historicized and non-pathological.

Conclusion

*Extol the Soviet Union,
Our ninety-proof communion!*
—from the “*Song of the Komsomols*”⁸⁸

“They said they would rather be outlaws a year in Sherwood Forest than President of the United States forever.” —Mark Twain, *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*

We certainly have a problem at hand, but it is mostly a social problem, not a drug problem per se. —Robert Deitch, *Hemp – American History Revisited*

The films by Satyajit Ray discussed in the third chapter effectively evince the failure of discourses of addiction (which propose scientific theorizations of addiction) to account for the social components of the concept. Instead, the scientific affirmation of addiction based on harm re-creates a discourse that materializes into techniques of colonization, whether it is people, territory, drugs or rituals. Moreover, we have seen how religious, State and economic forces have, to a large extent, formed the scientific characteristics which are associated with addiction today.

While the modern form of addiction was originally constituted by a substance related abuse, the institutional inclusion of gambling and the internet as having addictive potential has opened the doors wide open for prospective diagnoses. And yet, while scientific discourses continue to theorize addiction (as they evidently have for over a century), the function of power as a tool of social (class, State) relations will continue to colonize the ‘harmful’ drugs or rituals.

The theorization of addiction lies outside the sciences, just as addictions lie within moral precepts of the bad (or outside moral precepts of the good). As State and economic/class forces prescribe the sacred (the good path in life) and the profane (the bad path), in addition to addictive

⁸⁸ See Alicia Chudo’s *And Quiet Flows the Vodka*.

rituals the so-called non-addictive pursuits have also been thoroughly colonized, only their ritualization includes belonging to the sacred world, unlike profane subjects of addiction. As noted in the second chapter, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on this illusion of choice between ‘sacred’ rituals:

“A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem. This is evident in all the operations, electoral or otherwise, where you are given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the limits of the constant (‘you mustn’t choose to change society...’)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 105).

In the films by Ray, we find a similar dual presence of force and resistance. In particular, as Reena Dube asserts, in *Jalsaghar* the *zamindar*’s “refusal to lie down and passively die, his reckless abandon in arranging one last *jalsa*, and even the excitement of his manservant, all signal the colonial subject’s defiance of historical time” (Dube, 24). She says that “this resistance to colonial/national history has to be understood in social, not personal terms” (*ibid*). Can we theorize addiction in a similar manner?

In contrast to a discourse *of* addiction, a discourse *on* addiction reverses the object of addiction from the addict to the authors of moral laws and the forces which precipitate them. What is at stake in these discourses is not only the bourgeois subject and the subject of addiction, and their respective rituals, but the Other outside of the sacred and profane. How do we resist the illusion of choice which Deleuze and Guattari referred to? How do we subvert the over-saturation of pharmaceutical, economic or State discourses and ritualizations?

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