November 2014

Space, Territory, Occupy: Towards a Non-Phenomenological Dwelling

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Master of Arts

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Space, Territory, Occupy: Towards a Non-Phenomenological Dwelling

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Brett Mommersteeg

Graduate Program in Theory & Criticism

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
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Master of Arts

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the relationship between the body and space through the works of Henri Lefebvre, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The aim of the project is to move beyond Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space, which relies on a phenomenological understanding of the body and space. In order to do so, it will find in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘territory’ a non-phenomenological and constructivist concept of space that does not posit the ‘lived body’ as a transcendent ground. As a result, it will also attempt to trace out a non-phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’ that is not based on a concept of the subject, but is ‘involuntary’ and constructive, and emphasizes the spatio-temporal dynamisms or rhythms that a ‘space without world’ consists of. Finally, by being loosely guided by the global Occupy movement, it seeks to invoke a politics ‘of’ space, where the concept of ‘occupy’ emphasizes a being-in-space that is primarily political and only secondarily ontological.

Keywords

Space, Territory, Lefebvre, Deleuze, Guattari, Phenomenology, Constructivism, Art, Abstraction, Body
Acknowledgments

First, I would like to thank my advisor, Daniel Vaillancourt, for his considerate and careful readings and re-readings of this thesis, and for his guidance through the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. But more importantly, I would like to thank him for his advice to take a risk and to attempt to seek my own ideas. I would also like to thank my other advisor Michael Gardiner for his consideration and very helpful suggestions throughout these 2 years. Also, I would like to send gratitude to Melanie Caldwell for her kind assistance throughout my time at the Centre. Finally, thank you to everyone who had influenced this thesis, in some way, whether through conversation or dispute.
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Introduction

The project that follows will attempt to determine a politics only of spaces. It is a politics without faces and, in lieu of actors, the spaces themselves will be central. They will be like the dramatizations of a *mise-en-scène* from where the people or actors are inextricable, tied to their surroundings and indistinguishable from the atmosphere. It is a project whose focus is specifically the organizations of space-times, pure blocs of space-time. As Deleuze writes, these are “worlds of movements without subjects, roles without actors” (1994: 219). In fact, as the project develops, the focus will move from linear perspectives to perspectives with multiple lines, to a powerful abstraction, whose image emerges from a ‘cartographic eye’, which is capable of connecting different things into unnatural mixtures. We will be able to watch from above and survey *[survol]* the event in order to map out other possibilities and experiment with forms of space-time.

This vantage point will also render an unrecognizable space, a space of disorientation. We will not recognize the objects, the people or their habits. It will be a space dissolved into fog and mist, “a corpuscular space” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 273), a space of intensity. New and unforeseen shapes will begin taking form in the fog. The project will attempt to trace out a space no longer human or phenomenological, but a space without world: the dramas of the desert at night.

Space as an object of study often eludes traditional categories because it is neither an object nor a subject. The ontological and epistemological bases of space, what they are and how they are known, are difficult to grasp. Space is not a physical object that can literally be touched or picked up; it is ungraspable. Even the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which contains 17 different definitions of ‘space’, has difficulty. Common sense traditionally denotes space as an extended expanse and a passive locus where objects and events take place. It is the medium we live. In a sense, space renders objects and events perceptible, but what is space in itself. Or, it is understood through distance and time: space is the span of here to there, or the time it takes to from there to here. It is what is in between. In contrast, in French, the definition of space takes a more qualitative sense. *L’espace* can designate a region or a place (*lieu*) that has a qualitative significance, which
is typically how phenomenology understands it. That is, space is given meaning by the subject it surrounds, who appropriates and suffuses that particular space.

Modern philosophers have tended to place a stronger emphasis on questions of time and finitude, and in consequence have generally overlooked questions of space. As Rob Shields indicates, for most of the history of thought, “[s]pace is just there (and thus colonized): a context that will be ignored by most analysts in favour of the objects it contains and their interaction and development” (2013:15). Space is either a category for classifying sensations or phenomena, or an Absolute like the Cartesian *res extensa* or in Newtonian physics. As a result, it is either completely subjective, a form of intuition, or completely objective, equated with physical, extended matter. In either case, absolute or transcendental, space as such is impossible to define.

However, beginning with Einstein and theories of relativity in physics, the constitutive and relative nature of space, space’s constitutive power, becomes more apparent. No longer a passive, absolute background to physical processes, space consists of the threads of the social fabric that constitute subjects and objects. And with the advent of topology in mathematics and non-Euclidean geometries, the idea of an absolute space dissolves; instead, it is something that can be experimented with. There are spatial scales, layers of spatialities nested in other spatialities. Instead of speaking of space, we are forced to speak of spaces. They are not passive, static mediums, but dynamic, multilayered and constitutive. Again, as Shields writes, space is “an operation rather than a fact” (2013: 137). Space is *operative*: not simply something that is there, but is fully bound up with power; not only as something that contains, but has a productive power.

In his *The Production of Space*, published in the original French in 1974, Henri Lefebvre offers a critique of the Enlightenment idea of space as a container (the Aristotlian *topos*). For Lefebvre, then, as the title indicates, space is a product; it is not a naturally eternal topos. Instead, he illustrates “the active — the operational or instrumental — role of space, as knowledge and action, in the existing mode of production” (1991: 11). For Lefebvre, space is both a product of the social relations that it consists of, but is also operative in its (re)production in relation to the current mode of production. As a result,
space is not simply the locus of politics, but the object of politics; politics for Lefebvre is a politics of space.

Lefebvre’s thesis re-focused the understanding of space, from abstract measurements and distances to its social and qualitative diversity. Space is, undoubtedly, social: “(Social) space is a (social) product” (1991: 26). However, it is not simply a product like a commodity, or a thing, “rather, it subsumes things produced and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity” (73). Shields refers to Lefebvre’s concept of ‘social space’ as “spatialization” (1999: 161), in order to stress its fluid and processual nature. Space is not a static container, but the network of relations that composes a bloc of space-time.

Space, in other words, is not solely at the level of actualized, interacting objects, but is instead also, to borrow a term from Gilles Deleuze, virtual. It is intangible, ungraspable, uncontainable, and yet real. Space, as such, can never be completely actualized; it always contains possibilities. Space is “not a concrete object, but a ‘virtuality’, or set of relations that are real but not actual” (Shields, 2013: 8). As Lefebvre affirms, social space is a product “conceived not as a completed reality or an abstract totality, but as a set of possibilities in the process of being realized” (2008: 134). He also defines the ‘urban’ form, “not as an accomplished reality, situated behind the actual in time, but, on the contrary as a horizon, an illuminating virtuality” (2003c: 16-7). Space, in other words, is never a homogeneous realm, but is in continuous variation. It is not simply the res extensa, the extended reality of actualized objects, but contains a depth, an intensive spatium.

As the ‘illuminating virtuality’ or horizon, space is also the enabling constraint for action; it is the local horizon of meaning. It is the set of possibilities that allow subjects and objects to act; or, in other words, the set of affects that determines what a body can do in a given situation. In phenomenological terms, Jeff Malpas calls it a ‘spatial framework’, that allows a creature to be able to have a “grasp of space” (1999: 49). A being is oriented according to its surrounding space; it allows it to grasp the difference between oneself and what it encounters: “for otherwise it would be unable to distinguish, and so to
control, its actions in contrast to those other events” (1999: 50). The spatial framework, in other words, allows a being to navigate space; it gives objects signification and sense and provides direction.

The philosophical collaboration between Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari develops a philosophy that focuses more precisely on a concept of space as such, abstracted out of the subject-oriented spaces of phenomenology. In What is Philosophy?, they call it a ‘geophilosophy’, where thought does not occur between a subject and object, but rather “thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (1994: 86). The actors of this philosophy are not subjects and objects, but territories, sets of possibilities and spatio-temporal dynamisms. It is an attempt to “reorient philosophy from a concentration on temporality and historicity to spatiality and geography” (Protevi and Bonta 92). Geophilosophy moves beyond the subject-object divide, to questions of assemblages, events and territories. The territories themselves are the focus. Philosophy is more like a cartographic project that maps out the sets of possibilities, or the relationships between different territories.

As a result, Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy moves beyond Lefebvre’s theory of space because Lefebvre’s concept of space is limited to a ‘phenomenological’ space; it is always tied to the subject. In this case, space is simply the illuminating horizon for a subject. Therefore, it is a ‘transcendental’ space, yet one that remains Kantian.\footnote{That is, only concerned with the possible conditions of experience.} In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the territory as the set of possibilities is illuminated by a virtual space of real conditions (the Earth).

This project will thereby be an attempt to move Lefebvre’s concept of space beyond its phenomenological restrictions through Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy, and in particular, their concept of the territory. In the process, it will also seek to develop a non-phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’, which will be called ‘occupation’. Here ‘occupation’ will be understood as the art of the territory; it will be an attempt at understanding how the territory functions in space. Therefore, where Lefebvre’s concept
of space functions around a phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’, this project will attempt to situate Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory in relation to a concept of ‘occupation’. In general then, while subjects dwell in phenomenological spaces, territories occupy spaces without worlds, or the Earth.2

Moreover, the central issue throughout the project is the idea of a politics of space: a politics of spatial forms or territories. As a result, it will posit that Deleuze and Guattari develop a ‘geo-politics’, a spatial politics that emphasizes becoming over being.3 First, it will be a politics of space that stresses the ahistorical and the asubjective. As a geopolitics of becoming, it is an ‘involuntarism’, where “the will no longer precedes the event” (Zourabichvili, 1998: 350). There are only involuntary and unpredictable encounters that invariably take place in space, for instance, an encounter in the street. Thus, a geopolitics “wrests history from the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 97), the necessity of contingency.4 It emphasizes the unpredictable, the untimely, and the unrecognizable.

Secondly, it will stress the necessity of construction or creation. It does not assume that we are always already in the world, but that worlds or territories need to be constructed, which is always political. As Deleuze writes in an essay on May ’68, the event “creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the immediate surroundings, with culture, work…)” (2007a: 234). Territories are not naturally there, but need to be constructed in response to the event that forces

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2 In fact, we can say that while Lefebvre, in a move similar to Marx’s, strove to put Heidegger ‘back on his feet’, i.e., to concretize his phenomenology, Deleuze removes the ground out from under Lefebvre’s feet. The empirical space that Lefebvre grounds his theory of space is inadequate for a politics that seeks to develop new spaces. As a result, we need to go beyond, into spaces that precede us, ‘spaces without worlds’, where we no longer recognize our surroundings, where we no longer confront Worlds and Worlds no longer confront us.

3 As Deleuze notes, “Becomings belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exists” (2002: 3).

4 Quentin Meillassoux describes contingency as “something that finally happens — something other, something which, in its irreducibility to all pre-registered possibilities, puts an end to the vanity of a game wherein everything, even the improbable, is predictable” (108).
thought or creation. Where the world and the subject are assumed to be in a ‘pre-established harmony’ in phenomenology, in contrast, a ‘geopolitics’ will emphasize the necessity to construct territories in order to establish provisory instances of ‘harmony’.

Revolution is then always a question of organization: what sort of connections can we experiment with in order to adequately confront a certain set of problems and possibilities. It is a matter of constructing different space-times and thus different assemblages, which are always geographical in nature: they are written in space, not history. As Deleuze states, “[t]he Question of the Future of the revolution is a bad question because, in so far as it is asked, there are so many people who do not become revolutionaries, and this is exactly why it is done, to impede the question of the revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place” (2002: 147).

Revolutions occur in situations in everyday life, in contracted space-times; they are untimely and ahistorical. They are not about beginning again, but about living differently, according to a new set of possibilities, a new territory.

Ultimately, this project will attempt to drag Lefebvre’s thought through the machinery of Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy in order develop non-phenomenological concepts of space and dwelling. The first chapter will outline Henri Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space; and will conclude by describing its limitations, in particular the fact that his concept of space relies on an idea of the ‘lived body’: space is explained via the body, but the body as such remains unexplained. The second chapter will then find within Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘territory’ a non-phenomenological concept of space; the ‘territory’ is the set of possibilities within a particular space and time. In fact, here, the concept of ‘territory’ replaces that of the ‘body’ from Lefebvre’s thought, but instead of focusing on what a body or what a ‘territory’ is, Deleuze and Guattari focus on

5 It is important to note, that for Deleuze and Guattari, the notion of the ‘subject’ is fundamentally spatial; in fact, the concept of the ‘territory’ replaces the subject in their thought. As Deleuze notes: “there is a whole geography in people” (2002: 10); the subject as territory is the set of affects that one is capable of at a particular moment in space and time, and thus the construction of territories is always the production of subjectivities, or new ways of being-in-the-world.

6 Lefebvre’s concept of space is almost indistinguishable from the notion of ‘world’ [Umwelt] in phenomenology.
the set of affects or possibilities of what a body can do. As a result, instead of an anthropomorphic understanding of space, there is a ‘geomorphism’. The third chapter, in consequence, will be an attempt to understand what ‘dwelling’ would be in terms of ‘territory’; where instead of ‘dwelling’ in a territory, we ‘occupy’ them. Occupations are not the voluntary acts of a subject, but occur through the involuntarism of an ‘encounter.’ Occupations are not within territories, but as the ‘art’ of the territory, occupations are the constructions of territories; or in other words, they are the spatio-temporal dynamisms rhythms that territories express.

The thesis will conclude with a discussion of how the concepts of ‘occupy’ and ‘territory’ can be used for politics, and in terms of the contemporary political movements. The idea of ‘Occupy’ in this thesis is thus borrowed from the Occupy Movements that began in 2011, including the political revolutions in the Arab Spring and the Gezi Park movement in Turkey. However, it will not be referred to in order to judge whether they have succeeded or failed in terms of history; the thesis will neither attempt to understand the Occupy movement through these philosophical concepts nor attempt to create solutions. It will only take up the problematic that the Occupy movement has rendered visible in terms of our contemporary political moment, which is the problem of occupying space (squares, parks, streets, etc.) and to transform the way that this space is lived. Therefore, the question that implicitly resounds throughout this thesis is: ‘how do we occupy space and time politically’?

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7 In fact, in what follows, the Occupy Movement as such rarely manifests. It will only be used as a loose framework to guide us toward a concept of non-phenomenological dwelling.
Chapter 1

1 Space: Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space

Henri Lefebvre’s Marxist and ‘phenomenological’ study of space, whether through his studies of urbanism or *The Production of Space*, develops a study of space, where space is the object of study in and of itself. It is not a concept qualified by adjectives, but becomes a character or actor on its own. It is the space that acts. In the same way that Henri Bergson focused on time *in itself*, as duration, and not time imagined through space, for instance, through the image of a line, Lefebvre’s work gives space an agency of its own. Moreover, Lefebvre’s work addresses how politics is not a politics *in* space, but ultimately a politics *of* space; space cannot be forgotten as a neutral backdrop, the mute setting to a scene, but has a constitutive effect and power of its own, which, in terms of contemporary political movements, from Occupy to the Arab Spring, has become increasingly evident. Think of the street, the square, the park, *la place*. Politics no longer simply occurs in space, but very much *takes place*; the actors are no longer parties, figureheads, or faces, but the crowds, the masses, and the spaces that they constitute, like a flock of birds or a cloud of flies. In other words, space itself has agency; it is not only a politics *in* the street, but of the street, where the form of the street transforms and becomes another form of the street, a different street. As a result, Lefebvre’s ‘dialectical thought’ accounts for difference and contradictions, not just through time, but also, through space. There are not only contradictions *in* space, but also contradictions *of* space.

Here, the *texture* of space gains focus. Being in space is not being in a void, in a pure distance, but being in a meshwork or a network. Space is an entanglement of relations that affords a particular manner of being in space, a particular spatial practice. As Lefebvre writes, “it is helpful to think of architectures as ‘archi-textures’, to treat each monument or building viewed in its surroundings and context, in the populated area and associated networks in which it is set down, as part of a particular production of space” (1991: 118). There is a fabric or texture of space, which, moreover, contains shadows, folds, ripples, and holes. Here Lefebvre refers to Georg Lukács’s idea of the ‘chiaroscuro
of everyday life’ (2002: 356; 1991: 174), where the lived experience of space is not a totally enlightened space, but is full of shadows. The light of space always brings with it its shadows. For Lefebvre, this means that space holds within it possibilities, spaces for other ways of living.

1.1 What is (Social) Space?

Space is neither a subject nor an object. For Lefebvre, it is a product and a work, a set of relations and a process. At the beginning of The Production of Space, Lefebvre lists previous concepts of space, from Descartes’ idea of the res extensa, space as the objective world, to Kant’s concept of space as an a priori form of intuition, internal to subjectivity, and to the “‘indefinity’ so to speak, of spaces” (2) that mathematicians have invented (“non-Euclidean spaces, curved spaces, x-dimensional spaces,” etc. (1991: 2)). Yet each of these concepts of space fail to adequately address what space is. Negatively, space, for Lefebvre, is not an eternal and natural background or container wherein things and events take place. An understanding of space will thereby need to move beyond the idea of space as an empty container: Euclidean, isotropic, homogeneous and infinite.

In fact, Lefebvre is hardly interested in the question about what space is in itself. As he writes, “(Social) space is a (social) product” (1991: 26). It is produced through social relations as they interrelate with one another. Therefore, he is not interested in the actual consistency of space, its ontological status, or the metaphysical substance of space. As Christian Schmid highlights, “[s]pace should be understood in an active sense, as a multilayered fabric of connections that are continually produced and reproduced” (2014: 74). Space is both a product of societal relations, but also has a constitutive power that produces things in space: “itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others” (1991: 73). As mentioned already, Rob Shields offers another term that seeks to emphasize the fact that space, for Lefebvre, and in general, is not a thing or object, but is a collectively (socially) produced process, a “spatialisation”, which, for Shields, “stresses relationships and settings” (2013: 20). Space is then not a thing but a set of relations between things; it is multilayered and constantly fluctuating. Lefebvre refers it to as a “structure far more reminiscent of a flaky mille-feuille pastry than of the homogeneous isotropic space of
classical (Euclidean/Cartesian) mathematics” (1991: 86). There is a plurality of
spatialisations interacting with other spatialisations, interpenetrating one another. Another
analogy he uses, which better stresses the fluid nature of these spatialisations, is from
hydrodynamics: “where the principle of the superimposition of small movements teaches
us the importance of the roles played by scale, dimension and rhythm. Great movements,
vast rhythms, immense waves — theses all collide and ‘interfere’ with one another”
(1991: 87). As a result, space, or spatialisations, for Lefebvre, is closer to the idea of a
network, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, an assemblage.

Space is then not an eternal container that we walk through and build things upon and it
does not fill a room like air. For Lefebvre, the image or representation of space as a
homogeneous isotropic space is simply that: a representation of space that was
historically produced. It is a product of thought, yet nevertheless integral to a concept of
space because space is both a mental representation or abstraction and concrete.
Therefore, for Lefebvre, space is a ‘concrete abstraction’, a ‘realized abstraction’. As
Elden notes, “[h]ere there is a balance struck […] between idealism and materialism.
Space is a mental and material construct” (2004: 189). That is, while a representation of
space, for instance the plan of a neighbourhood, may be an abstraction, drawn out of
reality, it nevertheless has a constitutive effect in the spatial practices and experiences of
that space. Space, for Lefebvre, is “at once lived and represented, at once the expression
and the foundation of a practice, at once stimulating and constraining” (1991: 288). In
The Production of Space, Lefebvre also uses the example of a house to illustrate this. Our
‘common sense’ image of the house is that of a rigid structure, with equally rigid rooms,
each with an assigned function: kitchen, living room, washroom, bedroom, etc. But
Lefebvre explains that this is an illusion. In fact, the house is “permeated from every
direction by streams of energy, which run in and out of it by every imaginable route:
water, gas, electricity, telephone lines, radio, and television signals, and so on. Its image
of immobility would then be replaced by an image of a complex of mobilities, a nexus of
in and out conduits […]. [T]his piece of ‘immovable property’ is actually a two-faceted
machine analogous to an active body” (1991: 289). Therefore, the house-space is lived or experienced both according to an abstraction, that of the immovable property, but also, perhaps imperceptibly, as a ‘hypercomplex’, multilayered, processual material space. Space is both lived immediately at a concrete level, but also mediated through concepts and abstractions; he understands this relationship through his version of the dialectic, which will be addressed below.

Moreover, space is both a mental and material product: it is produced abstractly, according to plans or blueprints, and concretely, through the material and social relations that constitute it. But it is important to note that our experience with space is not clear-cut; the way we experience it is dialectically intertwined with our conceptions or categories for experiencing space. As Elden describes it: “there is not the material production of objects and the mental production of ideas. Instead, our mental interaction with the world, our ordering, generalizing, abstracting and so on produce the world that we encounter, as much as the physical objects we create. This does not simply mean that we produce reality, but that we produce how we perceive reality” (2004b: 44). Thus, for Lefebvre, space is a concrete or real abstraction; it is akin to what Marx understands by commodities and money. They may be abstract, but nevertheless have a constitutive effect in reality; they are not illusions, masks, or fantasy, but are truly operative in the world. As Marx writes in the Grundrisse, “individuals are now ruled by abstractions” (321), money and capital as abstractions have real-world consequences. Therefore, for Lefebvre, there are ‘codes’ for spatial activity. As Lefebvre writes, “activity in space is restricted by that space; space ‘decides’ what activity may occur, but even this ‘decision’ has limits placed upon it. Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order — and hence also a certain disorder […]. Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances” (1991: 143). Space is not only a product,

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8 This example of the house foreshadows his discussions of Things and ‘thingification’ in Rhythmanalysis. For instance, he mentions how when one watches a garden from above there seems to be a “spatial simultaneity”, but this is only ‘apparent’, as he directs us: “Go deeper, dig beneath the surface” (2004: 31). There you will witness that each flower, each tree, each insect, etc., has its own rhythm, its own duration. Thus, the garden is not a space that is void and neutral, but full of interacting rhythms, movements and gestures. (2004: 31)
something produced, by social relations or mental activity, but also it, in the words of J.J. Gibson, *affords* or determines one’s behaviour in space. It does so either through its material layout, or according to how the space is designed, which is more evident in urban space than in natural spaces or environments. In sum, space is not a neutral milieu, but rather has a constitutive power of its own.

Keeping in mind that space is produced both mentally and materially, Lefebvre posits two notions of production; the first is a Marxist-Hegelian notion, the second is more Nietzschean. In the first notion, production is in the industrial orFordist sense. Production takes the form of a series of repetitive gestures, for instance how a commodity is produced in a factory production line. In this case, space is a product of the repetition of gestures, of movements, or of habits within a space. In contrast, space is also a production in the sense of a work or *oeuvre*, an artistic activity. The work of art, to borrow a term from Walter Benjamin, possesses an *aura*, a distance and uniqueness, whereas the *product*, in the industrial sense, can be reproduced exactly (1991: 70).

Lefebvre uses the example of the city of Venice in order to exemplify the distinction. Thus, Venice “is a space just as highly expressive and significant, just as unique and unified as a painting or sculpture” (1991: 73); it is the expression of the everyday life of its inhabitants during a particular historical period. There is spontaneity to its architecture and planning; in other words, it is not a pre-planned urban form. There is a spontaneous *texture* to it, which expresses the space as it is lived, or as Lefebvre writes, “a sort of involuntary *mise-en-scène*” (1991: 74). However, for Lefebvre, the “moment of creation is past” (1991: 74) and the city as a *work* is disappearing. It is becoming more and more planned, more and more a *product*. The abstract is dominating the lived.

This distinction between the ‘product’ and the ‘work’ of space can also be found in Lefebvre’s distinction between the ‘appropriation’ and ‘domination’ of space. “Dominated” space would be related to space as a product. However, as Lefebvre notes, it is not a ‘product’ in the narrow industrial sense (they are not products according to a spatial activity, in other words) because they dominate space prior to the activity in space: “in order to dominate space, technology introduces a new form into a pre-existing space” (1991: 165). Space, here, is more like a *construction site* than a work [*oeuvre*],
where space reproduces the plan or blueprint. As construction sites, they are “closed, sterilized, emptied out” (1991: 165); Lefebvre uses the example of a motorway that “brutalizes the countryside and the land, slicing through space like a great knife” (1991: 165). These ‘dominated spaces’, in a sense, construct a space, like concrete slabs, whereupon or wherein spaces as products can be produced, like the factory or urban space, and where a spatial consensus is forcibly ensured.

In contrast, space can also be produced through what Lefebvre calls *appropriation*. Appropriated space is like an *oeuvre*, a work of art. As Lefebvre writes, “[a]n appropriated space resembles a work of art” (1991: 165); here space is either individually or collectively appropriated, and through these lived and spatial activities, a new space is *spontaneously* produced as a work of art. Appropriation is a creative activity. For instance, Lefebvre was interested in how the inhabitants of spaces were able to appropriate the spaces that pre-exist them in order to transform and create new spaces. In his study of the *Pavillons* in postwar France, Lefebvre introduces a concept of dwelling [*habiter*] in order to account for how the inhabitants appropriate space. Against the practice of ‘functionalism’ that was dominant at that time, Lefebvre wanted to show how people did not simply use space according to pre-assigned functions, but that they dwelled in them by appropriating and creating them according to their own aesthetic enjoyment.

As Lukasz Stanek writes, “[f]or Lefebvre, [appropriation] became a way to grasp dwelling as a poetic practice, a possibility of shaping space as an individual work (*oeuvre*) within the overarching cultural and social reality” (2011: 89). This concept clearly refers to Heidegger’s concept of dwelling [*wohen*] and Bachelard’s idea of the *poetics* of space, both seek to move beyond the merely calculative planning and understanding of space that is based on Cartesian coordinates. However, Lefebvre does move beyond Heidegger’s understanding of production or creation as *poiesis*, which is, for Lefebvre, a “restricted and restrictive conception of production, which he envisages as
a causing-to-appear” (1991: 122), because it has no basis in concrete reality. Therefore, he seeks to put Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’ into everyday life, and he finds in the inhabitants of the pavillons examples of this mode of ‘dwelling’ [habiter], who transform their ‘housing’ through appropriation into an œuvre or a ‘dwelling’. 

Finally, for Lefebvre, space is a product of a society’s ‘mode of production’. Each ‘mode of production’ produces its own space, both abstract and material; and that the representation of space is utilized in order to maintain and reproduce space. The space of capitalism therefore is what Lefebvre calls ‘abstract space’, which is used to facilitate the flows and networks of capitalism. As he writes, “every society — and hence every mode of production with its subvariants [...] — produces a space, its own space” (1991: 31).

For Lefebvre, the importance of ‘space’ is that modes of production attempt to hide their contradictions through or in space. Yet, these contradictions in space inevitably become contradictions of space; each space, for Lefebvre, “carries within itself the seeds of a new kind of space” (1991: 51). Accordingly, as modes of production change there is a production of a new space. Moreover, in order to be successful, revolutions must create or produce new spaces; in fact, for Lefebvre, revolutions occur through the transformation of space, whether it is through the contradictions that a mode of production produces or through the creative appropriation of space by inhabitants. As he writes, “[a] revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses” (1991: 53); hence, for Lefebvre, the Soviet revolution did not succeed because it had not produced a new mode of spatialisation or social space, a new manner of living.

The production of space indicates that space is not a natural, absolute space in the Newtonian sense. It is not a neutral background wherein or whereupon events take place, objects and subjects interact, things grow, etc., but that it has a constitutive effect in what

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9 cf. Lefebvre, 2003a: 112.
10 As it is translated in The Production of Space, appropriation creates ‘residences’ [habiter] (314).
occurs. There is a politics of space. In fact, for Lefebvre, politics is fundamentally of space. There is, in other words, a history of space. In *The Production of Space*, he orders the history of space into different epochs, yet acknowledges that there is no distinct limit between epochs and they tend to bleed into each other: absolute (sacred) space, historical space, abstract space, differential space (urban space). It is important to note that each of these is associated with a particular mode of production: nature / feudal, city-states, industrial capitalism and what he calls, urbanization or planetary urbanization.

### 1.2 A Dialectics of Space

Lefebvre’s theory of space is an attempt to construct a unified theory of space. It is what he calls a ‘unitary theory’, or a unitary urbanism, a term he shares with the Situationists. Lefebvre describes that his project “does not aim to produce a (or the) discourse on space, but rather to expose the actual production of space by bringing the various kinds of space and the modalities of their genesis together within a single theory” (1991: 16). That is, space cannot be understood as a reality, a mere “collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) data” outside of human thought, or as a ‘form’ “imposed upon phenomena” (1991: 27). Space has a multi-faceted social reality; it is also both static and processual, which Lefebvre attempts to encompass through his own version of the dialectic. As he writes, “the dialectic thus emerges from time and actualizes itself, operating now, in an unforeseen manner, in space” (1991: 129). This spatial dialectic is an attempt to understand space as one of coexistence, simultaneity and succession. The moments of the dialectic, therefore, do not simply succeed each other through time, but coexist, are simultaneous to each other. As Schmid writes, “Lefebvre advances his own version of the dialectic, the ‘triadic’ or the ‘ternary’, that is three-valued analysis. It posits three moments of equal value that relate to each other in varying relationships and complex movements wherein now one, now the other prevails against the negation of one or the other” (2008: 34). It is not a simple linear movement that ends with resolution or sublation. Instead, the dialectic ‘operative in space’ is more akin to a prism or crystal, where space is seen through three different lenses *at one time*. These lenses provoke conflicts or contradictions, or resonances and synthesis.

Space is understood through three dialectically interconnected dimensions: ‘spatial
practice’, ‘representation of space’ and ‘spaces of representation’ (1991: 38-9). Space is the interaction of these three ‘moments’ or ‘formants’; in other words, it is through the simultaneous interaction of these three moments that space is produced and understood. Briefly, ‘spatial practice’ is related to the everyday practices and routines that make up space: it “secretes that society’s space” (1991: 38); it is how space is enacted or perceived. The ‘representations of space’ consist of the abstract knowledge or discourses about space that are utilized both by apparatuses of power in order to organize the spaces, but also by the users of space in order to conceive it. Lastly, ‘spaces of representations’ are spaces as they are lived by the inhabitants or users of space: the lived experience of space. It is within the third moment, the ‘spaces of representation’, where the contradictions of and in space are the most acute. As Rob Shields describes it: “[spaces of representation are] derived from both historical sediments within the everyday environment and from utopian elements that shock one into a new conception of the spatialization of social life” (1999: 161). It is therefore through these dialectically intertwined elements that the prism of space is formed; and it is through these lenses that Lefebvre wants to grasp space and its complexity.

He also supplements this triad with a more phenomenologically-based dialectic, which is internal to the spatial dialectic. The three moments are the perceived [perçu], conceived [conçu] and the lived [veçu] and map onto the moments explained above, respectively. Most importantly, for Lefebvre, is that the phenomenological method, the perceived-conceived-lived triad, grasps the concrete; it cannot be treated as an “abstract model” (1991: 40). As a result, this triad puts an emphasis on the role of the body in its relationship with the space surrounding it. As Lefebvre writes, “social practice presupposes the use of the body: the use of the hands, members and sensory organs, and the gestures of work as of activity unrelated to work. This is the realm of the perceived [perçu]” (1991: 40). And, the way we perceive space through our body is ultimately through or coded by our conceptions of space and of our body in space.

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11 As Rob Shields indicates in his book on Lefebvre, the English translator of *The Production of Space*, Donald Nicholson-Smith had translated ‘espaces de la représentation’ as ‘representational spaces’. I will follow Shield’s amendment, however.
Finally, for Lefebvre, the *lived experiences* of space are different than how we perceive and conceive it; they seem to transcend them. It is therefore the third moment, the *lived* [veçu] spaces of representation as that which acts, in Hegelian terms, as the *aufhebung* or sublation in the dialectic. It is what resolves the conflicts between the perceived and the conceived. Moreover, the lived experiences of space occur through the *body*. This is because, for Lefebvre, “there is an immediate relationship between the body and its space, between the body’s deployment in space and its occupation of space” (1991: 170). It is this *lived* ‘total’ body that refers to the Nietzschean ideal of the ‘total person’, which is the “‘fully lived’, pre-conscious and authentic shards of spatiality that animate people” (Shields, 1999: 165). It is an immediacy that precedes one’s perceptions of space, which are influenced by the sort of knowledge or conceptions one has, or one has been taught, about that space. It is therefore the body, “which Lefebvre sees as the site of resistance within the discourse of Power in space” (Elden, 2004: 189).

In other words, perceptions of space or how one acts in space are mediated by the conceptions of space, that is, the *categories* by which one senses and perceives things in space. But these conceptions of space are nevertheless susceptible to disruption through the contradictions that *lived* experiences in space provoke or experience. As a result, à la Michel Foucault, Lefebvre emphasizes that time and space are not eternal categories of experience, but they too are conditioned according to their historical *epistemes*. As Elden points out, “[n]o longer the Kantian empty formal containers, no longer categories of experience, time and space could be experienced *as such* and their experience was directly related to the historical conditions they were experienced within” (2004: 185). These categories of experience are also, therefore, tied to the modes of production and the spaces it produces.

It is within the third moment of the dialectic, the lived ‘spaces of representation’, wherein the contradictions of and within space are expressed, or are the most evident. It is a creative moment of “poesy and desire as forms of transcendence” (Schmid, 2008: 33), that does not reconcile in a moment of synthesis or sublation, but rather keeps the dialectic open. As Elden illustrates, it is a non-linear and Nietzschean take on the dialectic. It does not simply resolve two conflicting terms, but rather opens them up into
“a three-way process, where the synthesis is able to react upon the first two terms. The third term is not the result of the dialectic: it is there, but it is no longer seen as a culmination” (2004: 37). The third moment becomes a *moment* of possibility. Lefebvre’s term for this moment is *dépassement*, which as Elden and Schmid point out, is closer to Nietzsche’s concept of *Überwinden*, that is, an overcoming or over-winding, than the Hegelian or Marxist *aufhebung* (which is a negation and a preservation). In other words, it is a moment of Dionysian expenditure and creation. To return to terms mentioned above: it is a moment of *appropriation*, where space becomes a work [*œuvre*] of art, and not a product of repetition or reproduction.

Therefore, while spatial practice seems to be ordered, stifled by conceptions, the *conçu*, into monotonous, repetitive rhythms, associated with capitalism, Lefebvre emphasizes that, despite the monotony of everyday life under capitalism, there remain ‘moments’ of creation or appropriation. As he writes, a moment is a “higher form of repetition, renewal and reappearance”; they are societal paroxysms. Michael Gardiner describes them as “flashes of perception into the range of historical possibilities that are embedded in the totality of being” (2004: 243). They are “‘authentic’ moments that break through the dulling monotony of the ‘taken for granted’” (Shields, 1999: 58); or moments of ‘presence’ where one can access possibilities to create another space, or another manner of living. The ‘moment’ is similar to Walter Benjamin’s notion of *Jetzzeit*, or ‘Now-time’.\(^\text{12}\) The ‘Now-time’, for Benjamin, is a rupture within the historical continuum; it is a qualitative moment of lived time, a *kariological* moment that is discontinuous with the quantitative, abstract and mechanical time of capitalism. A moment of *disalienation*. It is a *non-linear* moment in history that opens history up to other possibilities. As Andy Merrifield writes, the moment “disrupt[s] linear duration, detonate[s] it, and drag[s] time off in a different contingent direction, toward some unknown staging post. The moment is thus an opportunity to be seized and invented” (2006: 28). It is a moment for accessing a set of possibilities: a moment of contingency, which escapes the limitations of the

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\(^\text{12}\) Lefebvre’s theory of ‘moments’, here, is also comparable to Gilles Deleuze’s notion of the ‘Aeon’, which he contrasts with ‘Chronos’ in *The Logic of Sense* and with Martin Heidegger’s concept of the *Augenblick* or the ‘blink of an eye’.
principle of sufficient reason.

In more spatial terms, the theory of moments is related to what Stanek has called ‘the dialectics of centrality’. For Lefebvre, urban space, the city, centralizes; it is where people, commodities, and capital gather. For instance, within the city the marketplace, the square, or le centre-ville attracts people and commodities. As Lefebvre writes, “[u]rban space gathers crowds, products in the markets, acts and symbols. It concentrates all these and accumulates them” (1991: 101). Centrality is a form that attracts content. It attracts everything: “piles of objects and products in a warehouse, mounds of fruit in the marketplace, crowds, pedestrians, goods of various kinds, juxtaposed, superimposed, accumulated” (2003c: 116). In The Urban Revolution, Lefebvre describes the urban as a “pure form: a place of encounter, assembly, simultaneity. This form has no specific content, but is a centre of attraction and life” (2003c: 118). The dialectics of centrality is that the urban attracts, yet at the same time disperses and excludes: “the centre gathers things together only to the extent that it pushes them away and disperses them” (1991: 386). As a result, the urban is in essence contradictory because it attracts heterogeneous things, people, etc., but at the same time desires homogeneity. Thus, the contradictions in space eventually lead to contradictions of space. While centrality may be a pure form with no specific content, it is nevertheless “not indifferent to what it brings together” (2003c: 116); in fact, the content informs the form: “the content of these forms metamorphoses them” (1991: 150). There is a unity in difference and when the difference cannot be contained it creates something new, a new form, a new space.

For instance, Lefebvre uses the example of the form of the street. He writes that the street is “more than just a place for movement and circulation” (2003c: 18) because it is where people and things come together. The street is where unexpected encounters take place. As Lefebvre notes, but in relation to the urban form, “virtually, anything can happen anywhere. A crowd can gather, objects can pile up, a festival unfold, an event — terrifying or pleasant—can occur” (2003c: 130). It is fraught with contingency, the unexpected. In relation to his idea of the dialectic, it is where lived experience contradicts expected perception (perçu) or our ideas or knowledge of the space (conçu). As he writes, “[i]n the street and through the space it offers, a group (the city itself) took shape,
appeared, appropriated places, realized an appropriated space-time. This appropriation demonstrates that use value can dominate exchange and exchange value” (2003c: 19). The street, or in general terms, the urban, for instance, centralizes and creates the conditions for encounters or moments of spontaneity, and thus for creating new space-times, or new ways of living. It is an example of how dialectics becomes operative in space.

1.3 Abstract Space and Art

While *The Production of Space* does trace a history of space, in its relation to different ‘modes of production’, it is also fundamentally an indictment of the current mode of production (which for him was at a time when capitalism was transitioning from postwar, Fordist capitalism to what could be called ‘neoliberalism’), and the space it produces, what he calls ‘abstract space’. The capitalist mode of production therefore produces a particular knowledge of space that attempts to render space abstract. For Lefebvre, it is associated with modernity, capitalism and bureaucracy; it emphasizes, above the other moments of the dialectic, the conceived representations of space that aim to stifle spatial practices and the lived experiences of space into repetitive and monotonous routines; it aims at a spatial consensus, in order to facilitate the flows, expansions and flows of capitalism.

For Lefebvre, it operates according to the triad of homogeneity-fragmentation-hierarchy. Space, under capitalism, is ordered hierarchically into homogeneous fragments. As he writes, “[e]verything that is dispersed and fragmented retains its unity, however, within the homogeneity of power’s space; this is a space which naturally takes account of the connections and links between those elements that it keeps paradoxically, united yet disunited, joined yet detached from one another, at once torn apart and squeezed together” (1991: 365-6). It is, moreover, a space of Cartesian co-ordinates and Euclidean dimensions: the “reduction of three-dimensional realities to two dimensions” (1991: 258). Or as Gardiner explains, “[t]here is a kind of ‘flattening out’ of spatial complexity and the depth of human experience occurring here, a reduction of the world to a single logic or plan” (2000: 246). In other words, the “Cartesian system of representation became ‘practically true’ in capitalism” (Stanek, 2011: 152). Space is experienced and perceived
as if it is actually made up of Cartesian co-ordinates; it is how space is commonly sensed. Yet it is important to note, as Lefebvre does, that “[a]bstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its ‘lens’” (1991: 287). Instead, abstract space renders homogeneous continuously. Nevertheless, the repetitions and reproductions that occur in space produce a difference that it cannot contain. One just perceives space as if it is homogeneous.

It also has three ‘formants’: the ‘geometric’, based on Euclidean geometry and Cartesian mathematics; the ‘optical’ or ‘visual’, what he calls, borrowed from Erwin Panofsky, a ‘logic of visualisation’ based on the technique of linear perspective; and lastly, the ‘phallic’, a space that “symbolizes male power and virility” (Gardiner, 2000: 248). Therefore, another triad: the geometric-optical-phallic. Here, for Lefebvre, there is a “predominance of the visual” (1991: 284), an ‘ocularcentrism’ that creates a voided and disembodied space. In the words of Derek Gregory, it acts through a process of “decorporealization” (392), as if, within space, “bodies are transported out of themselves, transferred and emptied out, as it were, via the eyes” (Production 98). This space in other words negates “the manifold qualities and potentialities of the human body” (Gardiner, 2000: 248), wherein the gaze of the eye dominates. As a result, as Lefebvre writes, “lived experience is crushed, vanquished by what is ‘conceived of’” (1991: 51), namely abstract space(s), empty rooms and empty streets. Space is only experienced through the eyes detached from a body, and if the body experiences space, its experience leaks out of the eyes through visual or optical coordinates.

Lefebvre traces the ‘logic of visualization’, which is what guides ‘abstract space’, to the emergence of the techniques of linear perspective in Renaissance or Quattrocento art. Linear perspective is, in art, an attempt to map three (or four) dimensional space onto a two-dimensional plane, the flat space of the canvas. As Erwin Panofsky describes, “perspective transforms psychophysiological space into a mathematical space” (31; italics removed); it is an abstraction of space out of space. In his essay, “Reverse Perspective”, Pavel Florensky formulates a list of more or less five premises of linear perspective: 1. it is founded upon a belief in Euclidean space; 2. it is based on a transcendental subject, or a transcendental Right Eye that “legislates the universe”; 3. and
not the eye of a fleshy body, but the static “glass lens of the camera obscura” (263); 4. it creates a static world, and; 5. a mechanical world (262-3). To summarize, linear perspective is an attempt to create a one-to-one correspondence between the world and the canvas. The perspectival picture therefore “wants to convey between the points on the skin of the world” to the “points of a representation”, the world itself (264). It is a way of framing and reducing the world to a single perspective and a single horizon: it creates a homogenous world, squeezing all of the difference out of a vanishing point. Space is limited to Alberti’s window frame.

However, Lefebvre also locates within art the power to produce new kinds of spaces. For instance, he refers to Paul Klee’s statement that ‘art does not reflect the visible; it renders visible’ (1991: 125, fn. 16). Artists create spaces; in fact, art, particularly painting and sculpture, make or render space palpable. Lefebvre also claims that, “Picasso’s space heralded the space of modernity. It does not follow that the one produced the other. What we find in Picasso is an unreservedly visualized space, a dictatorship of the eye” (1991: 302). Therefore, Picasso invented a new way of seeing space, for Lefebvre, that is without any points of reference (1991: 300); where reality cannot be distinguished from its own representation. It is a space without depth, no longer organized according to linear perspective. For Lefebvre, it is the abstract space of capitalism: at once homogeneous and fragmented. But, as a result, Picasso also “bore witness to the emergence of another space, a space not fragmented but differential in character” (1991: 303). In other words, the contradictions of abstract space are clearly expressed through the ‘spaces of representation’ that art creates. As Elden writes, “Cubism therefore both renders the abstract space of three dimensions perceivable (sensible) and makes the perceivable abstract” (2004: 182). Art is, for Lefebvre, then a way to express the ‘spaces of representation’, a way to expose the contradictions that the ‘representations of space’ produce when they are applied to the lived experience of space.

Art is associated to Lefebvre’s ‘revolutionary romanticism’ and his theory of ‘moments’, where space and the ‘appropriation’ of space is a work [oeuvre] of art. Art is not necessarily a sculpture or painting, but could be the creation of situations in everyday life, a détournement à la the Situationists. It is, nevertheless, a means of constructing
moments of disalienation. They are the creations of ‘spaces of representation’, a *mise-en-scène*, in other words. As he writes, a “[space of representation] is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or centre: Ego, bed, bedroom, dwelling; or: square, church, graveyard. It embraces a loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time. […] It may be directional, situational, or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic” (1991: 42). Art accesses this ‘affective kernel’ and exposes it, renders visible another type of space beneath the abstract spaces of capitalism: the immediate and qualitative space of lived experience.

Against the ‘logic of visualization’ that organizes the abstract spaces of capitalism, ‘spaces of representation’, whether in art or in revolution, would need to emphasize the *lived* experience of the body in space, or rather the body-space relationship. For Lefebvre, the “fleshy (spatio-temporal) body is already in revolt” (1991: 201) against the abstractions of capitalist space, which attempts to exclude the body. The body has an immediate relationship with space, a sort of natal secret or complicity. The *total* body, i.e. the synaesthetic body, is a “*differential field*”, that “breaks out of the temporal and spatial shell” (1991: 384) that is imposed upon it by capitalism and labour. As Lefebvre writes, “[t]he enigma of the body […] is its ability […] to produce differences ‘unconsciously’ out of repetitions — out of gestures (linear) or out of rhythms (cyclical)” (1991: 395). Space is, in other words, ‘biomorphic’ or ‘biogenetic’. It is generated via the total, synesthetic body. The body and its immediate experiences, gestures, rhythms, affects generate for instance, the internal rationality, or the immanent laws of space. Space emerges from the body itself prior to the production of space by architects or urban planners. As a result, the Lefebvrian art *par excellence* would be an embodied art whose ‘spaces of representation’ would be of the *lived experiences* of space itself.13

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13 A good example would be Paul Cézanne’s landscapes through the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his two essays “Cézanne’s Doubt” and “Eye and Mind”. Merleau-Ponty describes Cézanne’s paintings as possessing a ‘duration’; it is a depiction of the “constitution of the landscape as an emerging organism” (2007a: 75), not as an abstract object within an abstract space. Here space is depicted in metastasis, as a complex organism in action.
### 1.4 Conclusions and Limitations

Lefebvre’s history of space ultimately politicizes space; to reiterate, there is not simply a politics *in* space, but a politics *of* space. Space is not a neutral container, but rather is produced (there is a history of space) and produces (it is a tool for hegemony and revolution). In other words, it is a product of social relations, but also has a constitutive effect on social relations or social behaviour. The structure of space affords particular habits, spatial practices or behaviours. As a result, for Lefebvre, politics is fundamentally a politics of space because politics is about constructing or creating new spaces and thus new manners of being, new modes of behaviour or spatial activities. It creates a new ‘everyday life’, new social rhythms.

In *The Production of Space*, Lefebvre sought to construct a unitary theory of space and politics by positing a ‘spatial dialectic’, or a dialectics that is operative *in* space, which is capable of articulating or expressing the ‘contradictions *of* space’. The spatial dialectic therefore acts like a prism or crystal that shows how contradictions arise between one’s *lived experience* [*véçu*] of space and one’s perceptions [*perçu*] and conceptions [*conçu*] of that same space. The dialectic here does not *solely* occur through time, but is rather a way to conceive of differences at a particular moment, in a here-and-now. It shifts a focus from a historical narrative to a more geographical analysis and attempts to capture how difference can accumulate in a particular space at a particular time; it is akin to what Gilles Deleuze calls a ‘disjunctive synthesis’, a relation of non-relation, where heterogeneous things are in a synthetic relation at one point in time, that is, a simultaneous co-existence. Lefebvre will also call this dialectics a “unity in diversity” (2004: 77); for instance, the urban square does not assemble identical things, but different or heterogeneous things: it unites difference without reducing it.

An example of the spatial dialectics is the ‘dialectics of centrality’, which is, for Lefebvre, the logic of urbanization, or what he calls, ‘planetary urbanization’, “the complete urbanization of society” (2003c: 12; Brenner 2014). Capitalism centralizes, while at the same time pushes things and people to the peripheries. This works at multiple scales: at a global level, at state level and within the city itself. Capital assembles and gathers toward a centre, which, in order to maintain equilibrium and to avoid points of, to
borrow a word from Louis Althusser, ‘overdetermination’, needs to push the excess to its peripheries. Lefebvre also describes it as a dialectics of ‘implosion-explosion’, a term he borrows from nuclear physics. He describes it as “the tremendous concentration (of people, activities, wealth, goods, objects, instruments, means, and thought) of urban reality and the immense explosion, the projection of numerous, disjunct fragments (peripheries, suburbs, vacation homes, satellite towns) into space” (2003c: 14).

Urbanization is the mode of production that gathers, yet disperses. It, therefore, for Lefebvre, creates conflicts or exacerbates contradictions between the ‘abstract spaces’ of capitalism and the differential spaces that capitalism nevertheless produces. He uses the example of the ‘street’, which, through the representations of space that capitalism produces, is a space of circulation and movement, but is also the space of encounter, of difference, of unpredictability. Unexpected events occur in the street: a car crash, a mugging, meeting unexpected people, etc. The street is “a form of spontaneous theatre, I become spectacle and spectator, and sometimes an actor” (2003c: 18). For Lefebvre, therefore, capitalism harbours within it, due to its own processes, a different from of space, what he calls ‘differential space’, that causes ‘contradictions’ between it and the representation of space (i.e. abstract space) that it produces or requires in order to function.

Despite itself, capitalism sows the seeds of another space within its own. Lefebvre ultimately locates this sort of space emerging in the lived experience of space, in the grey zone between the body and space. Here differences emerge that cannot be contained, differences emerge that are not “induced differences”, or differences that are prefabricated or already ‘accepted.’ Instead, they are “produced differences” that “presuppose the shattering of a system; [they] are born of an explosion” (1991: 372). A space of difference, a differential space, emerges that calls for a new manner of being, that is, new habits and a new everyday life.

However, there are some limitations. Following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, it is important to note that “no one has ever died of contradictions” (1983: 151). By which they mean that capitalism feeds off of its contradictions, off of the instability that it creates; in other words, the ‘differential space’ it creates will not herald its demise, but
will simply provide another space for which it to grow and develop. As a result, Lefebvre does not go far enough: the ‘differences’ that he posits still rely on Identity. It is identity and difference. As Elden writes, in relation to Lefebvre’s understanding of ‘logic’: “We should note here that Lefebvre recognizes that as well as being crucial for identity ‘1+1’ also creates difference, because of the repetition. […]” (2004: 31); the second ‘1’ is already different than the first because it is second, repeated. In other words, for Lefebvre it is the repetition of representational forms that produces difference. There is no ‘difference in itself’, as Gilles Deleuze would call it.

In terms of phenomenology, Lefebvre’s ‘differential space’ is reduced to the lived body’s experience in space. The differences are therefore reduced to the ‘phenomenological’ body’s experience in space. The body is a transcendent ground that organizes space; it does not reach, what Deleuze and Guattari call, the ‘plane of immanence’ or the ‘Body Without Organs’. As a result, space is always recognizable and familiar: the body always experiences itself reflected therein. Lefebvre’s analysis does not go beyond the given, to address how the given is given. ‘Differential space’ is merely an extension of the body, or the immediate experience of a lived body.

In his book, *The Politics of the Encounter: Urban Theory and Protest Under Planetary Urbanization*, Andy Merrifield seeks to develop a kind of synthesis of Deleuze and Lefebvre. Within it, he posits that Lefebvre’s notion of ‘differential space’ requires “another way of seeing”, no longer derived from the logic of visualization, that Lefebvre associates with the abstract spaces of capitalism, but “derived from abstract expressionism” (2013: xvii). Within this book, he delineates a theory of politics based on Lefebvre’s analysis of the urban under ‘planetary urbanization’, which emphasizes ‘encounters’. For Merrifield, this politics occurs in an “[u]nframed space” (2013: 9), a space based on “fractal geography” (2013: xvii). It is not a space organized according to linear perspective, but which explodes into disorienting, unorganized and differential lines and colours, which, for Merrifield, become a non-representational means of expressing the spaces of urban protest or urban politics. This is a ‘representation of space’ [*conçu*] that does not attempt to smother the lived experience [*veçu*] of space, but only approximates it, tries to sketch, alongside it, what a ‘differential space’ may be like.
It seeks to let the differences vibrate in themselves. Therefore, Merrifield notes that the differential space creates a *difference in itself* that allows for a politics of ‘encounter’. It, in a way, urbanizes Deleuze’s political philosophy.
Chapter 2

2 Territory: Deleuze and Guattari and the Art of Territories

The world is layered in territories on multiple scales: from the territories of states and international actors, to the everyday territories of humans and animals, and to environmental and geological processes. Everything and everyone constantly claims and appropriates space and territories; the world is a sheaf or a stack of territories. However, as a concept, territory is not clearly understood. To begin, it needs to be distinguished from similar notions like space, region, place, etc.; as a result, it opens up to other problems and possibilities. ‘Territory’ typically has two broad understandings. The first, and the most common, is the territory tied to the sovereign State: the delimited space wherein the State governs. The second, which stems from processes of territoriality, and is derived from socio-biology, ethology, and phenomenology, is more of an existential territory than the traditional ‘political’ one.

Traditionally, territory is understood as a passive background that the state operates and governs within. Territory is the space (absolute à la Newton) of the sovereign State. French geographer Jean Gottmann, in his essay on the concept of territory, illustrates this well: “[t]erritory is a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extent of a government’s jurisdiction. It is the physical container and support of the body politic organized under a governmental structure. It describes the spatial arena of the political system developed within a nation state or a part thereof endowed with some autonomy” (29). Stuart Elden corroborates this definition in his history of the concept of territory, “[t]o be in territory is to be subject to sovereignty […]; [territory] is the spatial extent of sovereignty” (2013: 329). However, territory, as such, is not an empty space or passive background, but is permeated by power. Anssi Paasi highlights, as the etymology of ‘territory’, which is derived from terrere, ‘to frighten’, suggests, “territory and power are inextricably linked” (110). This frightening nature is best manifested in Max Weber’s famous definition of the state: “a state is that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory, this ‘territory’ being another defining characteristic of the state” (310-11; Elden, 2013: 327-)
Territory in this case is the political and politicized space of the State.

In fact, in a Foucauldian tenor, Elden states that “[t]erritory should be understood as a political technology, or perhaps better as a bundle of political technologies” (2013: 322). Territories are used by the State in order to regulate and govern its population; it is a means of measuring and controlling. As a result, ‘territory’ is not a static, passive product or object, but part of a political rationality that controls and regulates; it is a means of organizing the population of the nation, through an active and productive, governmental power.

The concept of ‘territoriality’, on the other hand, assumes a concept of ‘territory’ detached from the nation-state. Instead, drawing from sociobiological and ethological studies, it asserts that everything living stakes a claim to territory. However, the problem with the original idea of ‘territoriality’ is that it is based on a ‘deterministic’ argument, where “the need for space is a characteristic innate to all species, including humans” (Storey 14). The naturalized concept of territoriality ignores the power relations involved in territorial processes.

Beginning with Robert Sack’s defining study, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History, territoriality is not understood as a basic and innate instinct, but is instead a ‘spatial strategy’. As he writes, “territoriality is best understood as a spatial strategy to affect, influence or control resources and people, by controlling area […]”. In geographical terms, it is a form of social behaviour” (1-2). Therefore, territories are not natural entities, like a particular section of ‘natural’, material space tied to basic instincts like aggression. As Elden points out, Sack’s thesis “effectively argues that territoriality is a social construct, forged through interaction and struggle, and thoroughly permeated with social relations” (2013: 4-5). Territories in this sense are constructions produced through social relations. As a result, the concept of ‘territoriality’ allows us to understand that “territories are not frozen frameworks where social life occurs. Rather they are made, given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action” (Paasi 110). It allows us to rethink the limits and power of social relations.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, posit a different concept of
'territory’ that resonates with Sack’s formulation of ‘territoriality’. However, in Sack’s formulation, territories are the products of social relations or territoriality, in Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis, it is the opposite, territories in fact precede territoriality and social relations; territories afford particular behaviours or functions. Territories, in other words, are similar to Lefebvre’s concept of ‘space’: both a product and productive. Yet here territories are not necessarily attached to the subjects, objects and functions that emerge from them. They have a power and life of their own. Therefore, contra Konrad Lorenz, who asserts that aggression or the defense of a resource through the making of critical distances produces territory, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the territories themselves are primary. Moreover, territorial processes precede the functions and activities that take place therein: processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, or what they call a ‘geomorphism’ (1987: 319), the movements of the earth, are primary. Dynamic processes always precede the formed results.

Territories are not simply organizations or techniques for the management and control of a population, but organizations of desire and agency; they are the enabling constraints or the local horizons of sense [sens]. Following from the geographer Claude Raffestin, who states that “[t]erritoriality is, in some sense, the ‘skeleton’ of everyday life as analyzed by [Henri] Lefebvre” (2012: 129), territories are bound up with a politics or praxis of everyday life. Our territories allow us to navigate the world. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept, therefore, tries to understand the political agencement or the political organization of affects, or territories, that occurs at a concrete and practical scale.

To simplify, we can, by borrowing from the French geographer Jacques Lévy, posit four basic conditions of a territory: first, territories are ‘local spaces’ or horizons, that nevertheless have “linkages” and leakages “beyond the local” (273); second, territories are “limited and controlled spaces”: one must know thy borders (274); three, territories are ‘appropriated spaces’, they “would designate a space beholden, in one way or

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14 In French, ‘sens’ has a double meaning: the first has a psycho-physiological meaning, where information in the surrounding world impinges upon the body, makes it have sense; but it also means direction or way. That is, here, the territory provides a sense [sens]: a collection of information that directs one’s behaviour, where one should go, how to act, etc.
another, to an attribution of either *ownership* or *identification*” (274); and lastly, territories are inevitably ‘inhabited’ and occupied spaces, territories emerge from occupations (at any level or scale).

### 2.1 An Introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s Concept of Territory

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the territory is not strictly a political concept, but is drawn from ethological and ethnological studies (e.g. Jacob von Uexküll and Konrad Lorenz), developmental biology (e.g. Raymond Ruyer), and the theory of territoriality. Ronald Bogue remarks that the most common understanding of territoriality is a “mode of social organization whereby the strongest males (generally) secure mates and desirable habitats, establishing through various aggressive communicative actions with conspecifics an equilibrium of population density across a given area” (57). The territory in this sense would be the defended area or environment. This traditional definition of territoriality stems from studies of animal behaviour, ethology, by Konrad Lorenz, who ties aggression to territoriality. Lorenz understands aggression as a biological and hence natural instinct, that animals are programmed to fight over resources. For Lorenz, therefore, territoriality is based on a survival impulse. Or in other words, the function of aggression, of defending a territory, is the basis for territory. Bogue describes it is a “familiar mechanistic, stimulus-response model” where “territoriality is simply a random outgrowth of the primary drives that has proved to possess survival value” (57). In accordance with the mechanistic model, therefore, the birdsong is stripped of its aesthetic and playful qualities; it is no longer a complex gesture, but an ‘instinctual communicative signal’ for the function of sex or aggression.

Deleuze and Guattari diverge from this functional understanding of territoriality — and this is where the novelty of their concept of territory arises. For them, territories are not based on functions because functions cannot explain territoriality. For them, “[f]unctions in a territory are not primary; they presuppose a territory-producing expressiveness. In this sense, the territory, and the functions performed within it, are products of territorialization” (1987: 315). Functions develop due to the fact that they are already territorialized and this is why they cannot accept Lorenz’s thesis, “which tends to make
aggressiveness the basis of the territory” (1987: 315; emphasis theirs).

Instead territories are fundamentally artistic and appropriative.\(^\text{15}\) For them the territory is “a result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark” (1987: 316). As a result, territories, in themselves, are creations or constructions. Territories are “in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them” (1987: 314). More importantly, “there is a territory precisely when milieu components cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become expressive” (1987: 314-5). The territory vibrates, pulsates on its own, in itself. For example, the birdsong, no longer tied to a sexual or aggressive function in a milieu, is the expression of a territory: the territory vibrates with sound molecules; the song marks the limits of the territory. Or as Deleuze and Guattari write, in terms of the colours in bird feathers and in fish, “colour is a membrane state associated with interior hormonal states [i.e. interior milieus], but it remains functional and transitory as long as it is tied to a type of action (sexuality, aggressiveness, flight” (1987: 315), but they become expressive when they “acquire a temporal constancy and a spatial range that make it a territorial, or territorializing mark: a signature” (1987: 315). In other words, the territory is the art of expressing one’s territory, the sound or colour that permeates a specific time and space. Similar to Lefebvre’s notion of ‘appropriation,’ territory is the act of capturing and expressing one’s habitat or abode irreducible to function or spatial codes; it is primarily an artistic and aesthetic act.

The territorializing act, however, is differentiated from Lefebvre’s notion of ‘appropriation’ because territories are not tied to a subject or object.\(^\text{16}\) The expressiveness of a territory does not express “qualities that belong to a subject, but in the sense that they delineate a territory that will belong to the subject that carries or produces them” (1987:

\(^{15}\) It is interesting to note the similarities between both Deleuze and Guattari and Lefebvre’s criticisms of ‘functionalism’ in support of aesthetic and creative appropriations of space. For all three of them, space or territory at its foundations is artistic.

\(^{16}\) In fact, as the concept of agencement or assemblage highlights, the territory is the subject or agent abstracted beyond its body in a phenomenological lived experience. The territory is Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a subject: a particular set of affects and forces within a contract space-time, or assemblage. In a sense, our habits are our habitats.
in other words, the signatures that express a territory are not the signatures of a subject, but the “constituting mark of a domain, an abode. […] the chancy formation of a domain” (1987: 316). There is a sort of non-phenomenological ‘intentionality’ or creativity. In relation to their ‘geophilosophy,’ territories are not the creations of subjects, but emerge through the relationship of territories with other territories or with the Earth. Territories have a power beyond that of the subject. One can take anything from around it and make it express a territory that it possesses, but the territory itself has a life of its own, a *style*: there is a ‘geomorphism.’

Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, territories are experimentations with one’s milieus that eventually take on a life of their own. Milieus, on their own, are pulsating space-times, “a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component” (1987: 313); they are coded environments, ordered and measured space-times. They serve “as a frame, at both an organic and existential level, for our acts, for our ‘effectuations’” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 95). The milieu is the qualified space-time that we inhabit and the world that provides us with the components from which we use to orient ourselves, to give our actions meaning and significance. The repository for our territorializing acts. In his essay on the milieu, philosopher Georges Canguilhem defines it as “the field of [one’s] pragmatic experience, the field in which his actions, oriented and regulated by the values immanent to his tendencies, pick out quality-bearing objects and situate them in relation to each other and to him” (118). The milieu contains the components that we appropriate to construct territories; territories are abstracted or carved out of milieus. The *acts* of territory cut into milieus and unclasp milieu components from their milieus in order for them to act as markers of new territorial limits. In other words, the milieu components are ‘deterritorialized’, unclasped from their original significations, and are creatively appropriated, open to other possibilities, and then reterritorialized and

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17 In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Deleuze describes this process in terms of cinema with the notion of the ‘close-up,’ where the close-up functions by *tearing away* the image from its spatio-temporal coordinates “in order to call forth the pure affect of as the expressed”; it, in other words, de-territorializes the face from its milieu and territorializes it someplace else. The face has a new meaning. (95-97).

18 In fact, Canguilhem also refers to Von Uexküll and his example of the tick in relation to its territory or milieu (110-112).
consolidated into another space-time expressing a different sense.

Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the stage maker (*Scenopoeetes dentirostris*) who “lays down landmarks each morning by dropping leaves it picks from its tree, and then turning them upside down so the paler underside stands out against the dirt” (1987: 315). In other words, the stage maker constructs territories, a particular *mise-en-scène*, by appropriating the leaves from their natural milieu, the tree, removing them, and placing them elsewhere, giving them a different meaning. In this case, “[a] milieu component becomes both a quality and a property, *quaide proprium* (1987: 315): the expression of one’s home, or the signature of a delimited territory. But milieu components are also used in order to leave, to determinatorialize and create new territories. For instance, the Australian grass finch, who re-appropriates the grass stem: it is no longer for nesting, but for courtship. As Deleuze and Guattari explain, “the matter of expression, ‘grass stem’, acts as a component of passage between the territorial assemblage and the courtship assemblage” (1987: 324); it acts as “an operator, a vector. It is an *assemblage converter*” (1987: 325). The grass stem is a vector to another territory; nothing is inextricably connected to a natural place; territories are not like trees deeply rooted in the ground, but spread out like rhizomes.

The territory, it is important to reiterate, is not the result of the signature of a formed subject. In fact, it is an autonomous self-reproducing process that occurs prior to the division of a subject and an object. As mentioned above, the territory is prior to functionality; functions and behaviours arise out of a territory. In fact, territories need to be understood as expressions of, what Deleuze calls in *Difference and Repetition*, ‘spatio-temporal dynamisms’ or rhythms (218). These are rhythms that occur underneath or beyond representational forms like the everyday habits of someone who, in the process, expresses their territories. Therefore, for them, territories are not simply the expression of a signature, but a ‘style’. This moves it further away from any phenomenological understanding. As a result, territoriality is not the aggressive defense of an already

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19 This will be worked out further at the end of the chapter.
established territory, but the constant constitution of a territory as one enters compositions and relations with other bodies (other territories). This ‘style’ is best illustrated as “two schizophrenics [who] converse or stroll according to laws of boundary and territory that may escape us [because they] draw an inflatable, portable territory” (1987: 320). Evidently, there is nothing eternal or natural about territory. They emerge as the consolidation of rhythms, the production of a provisory subjectivity, or to gain one’s bearings in a heterogeneous reality. The tortoise carries his territory on its back, in order to live as a tortoise in the chaos around it, yet as soon as it loses its utility, it discards it for another. Territories are like shells that emerge from the spatio-temporal dynamisms that express subjectivities, i.e. the space-times that are constructed through experimentation with the surrounding world.

In order to stress the ethereal, fluctuating and compositional nature of the territory, Deleuze and Guattari utilize musical terms, drawn principally from the ethological studies by Jakob von Uexküll. Von Uexküll explains animal behaviour through what he calls, “[m]usic composition theory” (172). For him, nature harmoniously organizes the environment through contrapuntal relations. These relations between two organisms are characterized as relations between a ‘point’ and ‘counterpoint’ or ‘motif’.

Within Deleuze and Guattari’s own work, an example of a contrapuntal and compositional relationship is shown through the example of the wasp and the orchid, where there is a “becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp (1987: 10). The wasp has taken up certain motifs of the orchid melody, and vice versa. Von Uexküll refers to this relationship as a musical ‘duet’, which is perhaps best exemplified through another relationship, that of the spider’s web and a fly: “the spider’s web is configured in a fly-like way, because the spider is also fly-like. To be fly-like means that the spider has taken up certain elements of the fly in its constitution: not from a particular fly but from the primal image of the fly” (2013: 190). In other words, there is no imitation. The spider does not reproduce an image of the physical fly in its web, but only

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20 Motif also signifies the meaning of a motive, a sort of musical intentionality beyond the subject.
its ‘primal image’ [Urbild]. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, there is “an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome” (1987: 10). There is the creation of a disjunctive synthesis or a heterogeneous composition. In his *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze also calls this relationship, in Spinozian terms, a ‘common notion’: “the idea of something in common between two or more bodies that agree with each other, i.e., that compound their respective relations according to laws, and affect one another in keeping with this intrinsic agreement or composition” (1988b: 44-5). The spider’s territory, the web, does not seek to imitate or reproduce the fly, but only what Von Uexküll calls its ‘primal image’, or the fly’s spatio-temporal dynamisms, or its Idea, in Deleuze’s terms. The spider attempts to map the fly’s dynamisms, to literally capture the fly’s imperceptible movements.

Territories are also constantly deterriorializing because we are not simply one milieu, an interior milieu, in relation to an exterior milieu. One does not only have an ‘interior milieu’, but as Deleuze and Guattari point out, “the living thing has an exterior milieu of materials, an interior milieu of composing elements and composed substances, an intermediary milieu of membranes and limits and an annexed milieu of energy sources and actions-perceptions” (1987: 313). In addition, they insist that the milieu is not ‘unitary’ because living beings do not only continuously pass from one milieu to another, but milieus are constantly passing into one another, communicating. These are processes of transcoding or transduction (1987: 313). The living thing is simply the milieus that they have, claim or inhabit and this act of claiming or selecting milieus is the act of ‘territorialization’. Territorialization is the attempt to consolidate and make consistent the movements of the milieus. It is an attempt at getting a grasp, at holding onto and to inhabit. As they explain, “the territorial assemblage is a milieu consolidation, a space-time consolidation, of co-existence and succession (1987: 320). This is the pragmatic aspect of the ‘territory’, which is the act of discrimination and selection: consolidating a

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21 As Deleuze continues to explain, it is also when “our capacity for being affected is exceeded and we are content with imagining instead of comprehending” (1988b: 45) that we create abstract ideas. Or, in other words, as we shall see in the next chapter, we develop maps or diagrams (abstractions) in order to experiment with connections that exceed our territories (and our lived experiences), that is, in order to deterriorialize.
limited territory.\textsuperscript{22} It is the act of consolidating these heterogeneous blocks of space-time that communicate \textit{au milieu} and making them become a sort of ‘monument’ or image that expresses itself.

The question then is what takes hold of the heterogeneities and makes them \textit{consistent}, or what holds things together in a consistency? How does the assemblage or the territory consist? Deleuze and Guattari reject the hylomorphic model.\textsuperscript{23} Instead they affirm the power of consistency as it arises from \textit{within} the relationships of the material; the consistency or stickiness of consistent material originates from within the material itself through its contrapuntal relations. In their words, it is not an arborescent model, but the rhizomatic model: “there is no form or correct structure imposed from without or above, but rather an articulation from within” (1987: 328). The consistency of the material self-organizes according to the relations that constitute it. Consistency comes from within.

Deleuze and Guattari, moreover, call that which makes consistency a ‘transversal’\textsuperscript{24}: “[w]hat holds all the components together are \textit{transversals}, and the transversal itself is only a component that has taken upon itself the specialized vector of deterritorialization” (1987: 336). In other words, the feature that holds the components together is a specialized milieu component, but, importantly, this component that organizes the territory is also that which deterritorializes it.

The ‘transversal’ is also what they call the ‘refrain’ \textit{[ritournelle]}. The refrain is the central organizing principle of the territory. It territorializes a space and a time, a situation, but at the same time enfolds the outside into it, opening itself up to new

\textsuperscript{22} This is why Deleuze and Guattari are very interested in the example of the tick, which they get from Von Uexküll. The tick is able to contract or comprehend a limited territory (three affects) out of the vast given diversity of the forest. The tick is a clear example of how the process of territorialization works, of contracting habits and subjectivities, our capacities to act, out of milieus.

\textsuperscript{23} The hylomorphic model, which comes from Aristotle, explains that matter is organized according to a transcendent form. Deleuze and Guattari take their critique of hylomorphism from Gilbert Simondon, who posits a non-hylomorphic understanding of production or individuation; form emerges immanently according to an internal consistency or information.

\textsuperscript{24} This is a concept that comes from Félix Guattari. See “Transversality” in \textit{Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics} (18).
territories or directions for action and thought. Deleuze and Guattari, at the beginning of
the plateau on the refrain, tell us that there are three simultaneous aspects of the refrain.
First, the refrain can act as a little phrase, a ‘tra la la’ or “rough sketch” (1987: 311) that
constructs a fragile but stable territory. Second, the refrain can be used to construct a
territory or home out of ‘sonic bricks’; it “organize[s] a limited space” (1987: 311). The
refrain is a tool for the territorialization of a space and a time. However, thirdly, the
refrain is the component or tool that allows one to launch out into chaos. The refrain
enables one to deterritorialize: “[o]ne launches forth, hazards an improvisation. […] One
ventures from home on the thread of a tune” (1987: 311). The labour of the refrain is at
once to create a stable territory, but also to launch from it in search of new territories. As
Zourabichvili tells us, “the refrain does not delimit a territory without at the same time
enveloping the outside from which it distinguishes itself (without being detached from it).
It therefore virtually implicates a movement of deterritorialization and refers the territory
(which is consequently never originally) to an ‘Earth’” (2012: 134, fn. 6).

The refrain or the ritournelle is a portmanteau of Nietzsche’s eternal return (éternel
retour, or flipped retour éternel). Thus Deleuze and Guattari write, “[l]et us recall
Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return as a little ditty, a refrain, but which captures the
mute and unthinkable forces of the Cosmos” (1987: 343). The refrain is what constantly
returns, a beginning again, which creates a difference, or a reterritorialization. One cannot
reterritorialize on the same spot, or as Deleuze and Guattari claim, “[t]he great refrain
arises as we distances ourselves from the house, even if this is in order to return, since no
one will recognize us any more when we come back” (1994: 191). The refrain allows one
to comfortably confront and experiment with chaos; we leave home, yet ‘come home
with bloodshot eyes’. It the bare and empty repetition, a musical note, that allows us to
breach the chaos without becoming mad or falling apart; it remains with us throughout
life, a constant and empty repetition, allowing us to experience difference as such. 25 The
refrain reassures us, like the child in the dark, to create connections with the outside, to

25 It is interesting to note that there is a form of music therapy for people who suffer from Alzheimer’s and
dementia. After we lose the memories of our selves, we cling to the musical refrains of our lives.
soberly venture out.

The refrain and the territory become a means of orienting oneself and of organizing a local horizon of sense in order to experiment from. Experiments and experience do not occur in a void. Either one utilizes a piece of the territory in order to venture out, or digs into the territory in order to infect it. However, the refrain is the stabilizing force. In the words of Jean-Clet Martin, “the ritornello [refrain] is in effect completely devoted to the possibility of rendering the earth practicable” (181). It is Ariadne’s Thread, which guides us through the labyrinth of the Earth.

2.2 A Territory is not a Place: Heidegger and Deleuze

The territory is a de-limited and organized structure of sense [sens]. In the similar way that territories appropriate and are abstracted out of milieus, assemblages [agencements] are able to de-territorialize or abstract out of the territories. Thus, territories are understood as the limited frameworks for pragmatically orienting oneself. It is what gives one meaning and direction. In this sense, it has apparent resonances with a phenomenological Umwelt or surrounding world, particularly the concept that Martin Heidegger develops in Being and Time. This section will, first, describe Heidegger’s understanding of the ontology of space, both from Being and Time and in some of his later writings, through certain commentators (Jeff Malpas and Edward S. Casey) who find in Heidegger a phenomenological concept of ‘place’. Secondly, it will draw a distinction between Deleuze’s non-phenomenological concept of ‘territory’ from the phenomenological concept of ‘place’.

Heidegger’s ontology grants precedence to questions of temporality and finitude, where the inevitability of one’s own mortality, one’s finitude, is constitutive for one’s possibility to live. However, he does address questions of space and place, which are concerned with how one, or how Dasein, pragmatically circumnavigates the world. Jeff Malpas, in his formulation of a concept of ‘place’, points to the importance of this concept throughout Heidegger’s oeuvre. For Malpas, place is the transcendental source or origin for being: “being has to be understood as, one might say, an ‘effect’ of place […], being emerges only in and through place” (2006: 7). Place, in Malpa’s understanding of
Heidegger, is therefore the sort of matrix or khôra of being. Furthermore, places are not simply where beings emerge, but the place of a gathering, i.e. where subjects and objects take on significance within a network of meaning in relation to one another. As Malpas defines it, place is “indeed just the idea and image of a concrete gathering of otherwise multiple elements in a single unity” (2006: 16); they are, in other words, multiple unities. Place is then seen as that which colours the world and gives objects meaning within a cohesive unity.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger departs from the traditional metaphysical concept of space drawn from Newtonian and Cartesian physics, where space is understood as the empty container wherein objects are placed and thus where place is understood as a position or location, a point on an x-y grid. In contrast to this objectively present space is the *existential* spatiality of Dasein. In fact, for Heidegger, the objectively present space emerges from Dasein’s ‘world’ [*Umwelt*], the ‘wherein’ [*Worin*] of Dasein: “the world is not objectively present in space; however, only within a world can space be discovered” (2010: 351). The existential spatiality of Dasein, moreover, does not precede Dasein’s encounters in the world, but is rather *equiprimordial* with Dasein; in other words, it emerges with Dasein’s circumspective encountering of things-at-hand in the world, namely its being-in-the-world.

For Heidegger, Dasein has a particular way of ‘being-in’ [*Sein-in*] the world that is distinct from the objectively present object, which would be how one is in a Cartesian space. Instead of a *res extensa*, Dasein occupies space by being ‘absorbed’ in its world, that is, through a circumspective ‘taking care’ of the world. In other words, Dasein *dwells* in its world. As Heidegger explains this idea of ‘being-in’ or dwelling: “‘In’ stems from *innan-* , to live, *habitate*, to dwell. ‘An’ means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of something. […] “Ich bin” [“I am”] means I dwell, I stay near…the world as something familiar in such and such a way” (2010: 54-5). Dasein is ‘in’ the world by dwelling with

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26 In relation to Heidegger, it has a meaning of the ‘clearing’ [*lichtung*], where Being *takes place*.

27 It is similar to Lefebvre’s definition of the dialectic as a ‘unity in diversity’ (2004: 77).
it, by taking care of it, through a familiarity. Moreover, Dasein is pragmatically ‘in’ space because it encounters things-at-hand [Zuhandene] according to the structure of its ‘in order to’, namely utility. In other words, things-at-hand are never encountered individually, but “[t]here always belongs to the being of a useful thing a totality of useful things in which this useful thing can be what it is” (2010: 68). Thus, Dasein does not simply encounter objects objectively present in an objectively present space because Dasein first encounters the totality of useful things, i.e. the context within which some thing becomes useful (Heidegger also calls this context a ‘region’ [Gegend]), which is what Malpas calls ‘place’). Dasein’s being-in-the-world, in other words, is a dwelling in a place. Dasein is in the world as an inhabitant who dwells or inhabits. Importantly, the world emerges from its dwelling as it dwells in its world; they are equiprimordial, co-constitutive. One dwells in ‘nearness’ within what is familiar.

Dasein is not a subject prior to an objective space; it is not, what Heidegger calls, a ‘cabinet of consciousness’. In fact, it is more ‘spatial’, a being-there. It is an inside that is always outside of itself, a sort of fold. As Heidegger points out, “[i]n directing itself toward…and in grasping something, Dasein does not first go outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated, but, rather, in its primary kind of being, it is always already ‘outside’ together with some being encountered in the world already discovered” (2010: 62). Dasein is therefore suffused throughout its region, its place; it is like a mist or an atmosphere that is spread throughout its surrounding world. Dasein designates its placed-ness by taking care and bringing things near, that is, by dwelling. It is the organizing principle of its region or place.

There are two ways in which Dasein organizes its space, creating a place: de-distancing and orientation or directionality. First, Dasein occupies space and creates place through a circumspective bringing near of beings into its surrounding world, by and for taking care — it gives them relevance. This is ‘de-distancing’. Hence Dasein’s Da- or its being-there. In Heidegger’s words: “Dasein understands its here in terms of the over there of the surrounding world” (2010: 105). Dasein does not move through space through measured distances, but rather creates its own space by bringing things near, that is by organizing spaces into places filled with meaning. Moreover, Dasein needs to be oriented in order to
de-distance, and for Heidegger it is important to note that the “directionality that belongs to de-distancing is grounded in being-in-the-world” (2010: 106). That is, Dasein orients or marks out space according to ‘indicators’ or signs embedded within a totality of relevance. As Heidegger explains, “[t]he sign applies to the circumspection of heedful dealings in such a way that circumspection which follows its direction brings the aroundness of the surrounding world […] into an explicit ‘overview’” (2010: 78). Space becomes a place. Signs, as that which provide direction to Dasein’s actions within the world, do not mark out the edges of the world that pre-existed Dasein’s being-in-the-world, but emerge from within it.

As a result, Dasein actually generates the place surrounding it; it never leaves its workshop.\(^ {28}\) It, in other words, never encounters an outside that has not already been absorbed into a network of meaning. The region wherein Dasein dwells has an “inconspicuous familiarity” (2010: 101). The ‘there’ is always already subsumed ‘here’; the ‘there’, the surrounding space, is always there from the position of the ‘here’ or the subject. This is exemplified through an example where Heidegger asks us to imagine walking into a familiar room that has been disorganized, where the lights have gone out.\(^ {29}\) He begins by rejecting Kant’s (early) position that, in the dark, we orient ourselves according to the asymmetry of the body, left and right. In contrast, he claims, “I necessarily orient myself in and from already being in a ‘familiar’ world” (2010: 106).

Moreover, he insists that the directions ‘left’ and ‘right’ is “grounded in the essential directionality of Dasein in general, which in turn is essentially determined by being-in-the-world” (2010: 107). Therefore, the orientation of space is oriented according to a subject’s \textit{a priori} being-in-the-world.

As a result, there is no leaving one’s territory; instead, the outside is necessarily transformed into an inside as the subject makes it familiar. In the later Heidegger, the

\(^ {28}\) Compare this to Lefebvre’s thesis that the lived and differential ‘body’ generates the surrounding space of a subject. We dwell in space because our body has already pre-emptively sensed it (gave it direction) and oriented it for us.

\(^ {29}\) We will return to this example in the succeeding chapter.
idea of ‘place’ is the gathering place of the Fourfold: it is the Clearing [Lichtung] for
Truth or Being to appear. Despite, Heidegger’s Turn, there is still a sense of ‘dwelling’ in
Truth. In contrast, for Deleuze and Guattari, the organizing principle of territory, the
refrain, is not a model in the search of Truth; it is not a return to an Origin. Instead, the
refrain generates disguises and masks, simulacra. As Deleuze argues in *Difference and Repetition*, “this modern ontology nevertheless remains inadequate” because it
“[substitutes] for the force of repetition the impoverishment of the already said or the
stereotypes of a new common sense” (196). It operates according to the model of
recognition: the surrounding world [Umwelt] is just a mirror for reflection, for
recognition. Refrains, Deleuze and Guattari tell us, do not operate under the form of the
Same, but as the secret within the repetition, it is more like a ‘synthesizer’, which “unites
disparate elements” (1987: 434). No longer *grund*, the refrain, a repetition of difference,
is the creation of variations on a theme.

2.3 Ethology

Territories are not phenomenological places emanating from a transcendent and
primordial subject. To repeat, territories are prior to the distinction between subject and
object. Instead of phenomenology, Deleuze and Guattari refer to ‘ethology’ in order to
understand territory and territoriality. In his lecture on Spinoza, Deleuze defines ethology
as the “practical science of the manners of being”. 30 In other words, the study around the
question of what one can do. Hence the petite phrase, or refrain, of Deleuze and Guattari:
what can a body do? The study of territory is concerned with the conditions of what one
can do, i.e. where does the territory permit one to go.

Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology departs from traditional ethology because it does not
give primacy to animal behavior; instead, the territory is primary because the territory or
territorial assemblage is what constitutes or marks out the limits of what is possible. As
Zourabichvili explains, “the territory marks out the relations of propriety or of
appropriation (and concomitantly, of distance) in which all subjective identification

consists” (2012: 167). One’s capacity to act, or the field of meaning, the set of possibilities, that enables one to act, is formed by territorialization. Behaviour is determined according to the relations or assemblage [agencement] that constitute them. It is here that “all subjective identification consists” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 167). The subject is the territory or territories it inhabits. As Deleuze and Guattari assert the “I is a habit” (1994: 105), which relates to the idea of a “having [that] is more profound than being” (1987: 316). The subject is the territory: the expression of a particular set of spatio-temporal dynamisms or rhythms and habits within a delimited set of possibilities. The subject is, in ethological terms, its capacity to act, what it can do. As Zourabichvili clarifies, “[t]he Deleuzian cogito is an ‘I inhabit’ or an ‘I claim’” (2012: 95). Ethology in this sense is a study of spatial relations and subjectivity: the study of what one can do according to the territories one has, that one has appropriated, instead of what one is, in terms of history and typology.

Again, we can see how this concept of ‘territory’ is non-phenomenological through Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. First, he claims that “Spinoza offers philosophers a new model: the body in order to ask the question: what can a body do?” (1988b: 17). However, this is not the subject or ‘total body’ of phenomenology; the body is instead equivalent to a territory; it is a disposition. The body is determined by the affects that constitute it and give it power. This is the having that precedes being: what one can do is determined by the territory that one has. The ‘body’ or territory does not refer to any natural predisposition, but simply to one’s disposition, where one is in a network of relations. The body is defined, moreover, “by longitude and latitude” (1988: 127); in other words, the body is mapped. In order to determine what one can do one must map the territory, to survey one’s disposition, to figure out where one is. Deleuze calls the “longitude of a body the set of relations of speed and slowness, of motion and rest,

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31 Hence Guattari calls territories ‘existential territories’ (see his essay “Ritornellos and Existential Affects” in The Guattari Reader or The Machinic Unconscious).

32 In his interviews with Claire Parnet, collected in Dialogues II, Deleuze says that “things, people, are made up of varied lines, and that they do not necessarily know which line they are on or where they should make the line which they are tracing pass; in short, there is a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight, etc.” (2002: 10).
between particles that compose it from this point of view, that is, between unformed elements”, and understands the latitude as the “set of affects that occupy a body at each moment, that is, the intensive states of an anonymous force” i.e. one’s capacity to be affected (1988: 127-8). In other words, ethology studies the compositions of relations between different things that compose a territory, which also determine, not what something is, but what something can do.

Deleuze and Guattari use the example of the tick. The tick is interesting to them because it is able to contract, that is have, the habit of a limited territory (habitat) based on only three affects: light, smell, and heat. First, the tick is able to climb to the top of a branch, due to sunlight; secondly, it then can wait up on that branch for up to 18 years until it smells an animal below, whereupon it falls onto it; and thirdly, it searches a hot area where it can dig in to feed on blood (1988b: 124). This is the territory the tick territorializes out of the given diversity of the forest: only three affects. Therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari, ethology is not interested in studying animals based on history, form, being, or organ, but rather “by the affects of which it is capable” (1988b: 124) in a particular situation or assemblage, or the territory in which it inhabits and claims.

However, as mentioned above, territories are never self-contained; they are constantly leaking. The ethical test is then not to see how long you can stay in one spot, but is to attempt to enter into relations, compositions or connections, which extend one’s power rather than decompose it. Deleuze distinguishes these as joyful and sad encounters: “we experience joy when a body encounters ours and enters into composition with it, and sadness when, on the contrary, a body or an idea threaten our coherence” (1988b: 19). In other words, how far can you open your territory or extend your territory without falling apart or becoming mad.

The idea of the territory here comes close to an understanding of Dasein’s spatiality in Heidegger, whose ‘here’ is determined by its ‘there’ and vice versa. The territory, whose “interior is only a selected exterior, and the exterior, a projected interior” (1988b: 125), is nevertheless in communication with an absolute Outside that has no relation to it. In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari call it the ‘Earth’, a plane of immanence. And
as Deleuze claims, there is no sheltering oneself from the Outside; as he writes, “[a]ll that we call bad is strictly necessary, and yet comes from the outside: the necessity of accidents” (1988b: 41-2). Therefore, there is a necessity of contingency as the territory is always bordering an Outside it cannot contain or preempt, and that it nevertheless already envelops without reducing.

As a result, ethology is also a study of limits and thresholds, of determining what a body is capable of in a certain space and time, not in order to remain, but in order to forge new connections and compositions. Limits are the products of relationships. As Claude Raffestin claims in his study of the frontier, “any action of relationship with the environment, of rapport between beings and objects requires the creation or recognition of limits” (1986: 12). They are not only constituted by the relationship between bodies, but also mark out the limits of one’s capacity to act. For Deleuze and Guattari, there is a conceptual difference between limits and territories: where “the limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change” (1987: 438). The limit, therefore, marks the point at which the assemblage “must reproduce itself”, namely it necessitates a relative deterritorialization and a reterritorialization, whereas the ‘threshold’ marks the point “when the assemblage must change its nature”, an absolute deterritorialization (1987: 438). Thus we see that it is at the borders of territories where one either tries something different within the assemblage it is in or leaps into a new assemblage or composition. It is at these territorial limits that creativity occurs.

In regard to material, inorganic processes Theodor Schwenk explains that, “it is as though the creative, formative impulses needed the boundary surfaces in order to be able to act in the material world. Boundary surfaces are everywhere the places where living, formative processes can find a hold” (42). This is because it is at the border, where inside meets outside, that encounters occur: “[t]he encounter can be located as much at the limit of the thought-facility as within a field of radical exteriority” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 73). And Zourabichvili continues, the “contingency and exteriority of an encounter […] gives rise to an authentic act of problematization, a creation of thought (2012: 73). The encounter
spurs us to creation because it jolts us out of the territories we have, that reassure us, into a disorienting and incomprehensible exteriority.

### 2.4 Territory and Rhythm

The ‘territory’ is “an act of rhythm that has become expressive” (1987: 315). Territories are rhythmic, ‘sonorous landscapes’; they are the actualization of a rhythmic difference, the temporary solution or integration of a rhythmic problematic. The notions ‘territory’ and ‘rhythm’ are, for Deleuze and Guattari, in essence Kantian. The ‘territory’ is connected to the idea of a grund or ground, and the conditions of possibility. While, ‘rhythm’ is for Deleuze and Guattari, the “critical solution of the antinomy”; for them “[m]eter is dogmatic, but rhythm is critical” (1987: 313). Rhythm is a ‘spatio-temporal dynamism’, the germ of order, in a heterogeneous chaos. In other words, rhythm is the germ of territory, the means by which units of measure emerge out of chaos.

Rhythm, here, is neither a homogeneous beat nor a regular or irregular meter. Meter “assumes a coded form whose unit of measure may vary, but in a noncommunicating milieu” (1987: 313). Meter occurs within milieus; it is the periodic repetition or coded form that stabilizes a milieu; the repetition of the same, a cliché. Rhythm, on the other hand, is the repetition that occurs au milieu, between milieus or between a milieu and chaos. Rhythm is always of difference; it is the “Unequal or the Incommensurable” (1987: 313). As Deleuze and Guattari note, “[rhythm] does not operate in a homogeneous space-time, but by heterogeneous blocks. It changes direction” (1987: 313). Rhythm does not reproduce an identically coded milieu, but is instead productive. It produces new space-times.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze also describes it as a ‘rhythm-repetition’, which he relates to ‘symmetry’. He draws a distinction, through Matila Ghyka’s work on symmetry

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33 This comparable to what Deleuze calls “sedentary distributions” in *Difference and Repetition*, he contrasts this with a “nomadic distribution” or processes of ‘deteriorialization’ (283). “Nomadic distribution” also takes the form of “smooth space” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where ‘smooth spaces’ are non-discrete, non-metric, topological multiplicities. Smooth spaces are rhythmic rather than metric.
and rhythm, between ‘static symmetry’ and ‘dynamic symmetry’.\textsuperscript{34} Deleuze describes static symmetry as “cubic or hexagonal”, whereas dynamic symmetry is “pentagonal and appears in a spiral line or in a geometrically progressing pulsation” (1995: 20). In other words, he explains, that within a “network of double squares” there is an immanent, irrational logic that repeats itself in a delirious, nomadic way. Disguised within symmetrical formations are asymmetrical processes. As he points out, “[t]he negative expression ‘lack of symmetry’ should not mislead us: it indicates the origin and positivity of the causal process” (1995: 20). This is dynamic symmetry. The mathematician Hermann Weyl illustrates, in his series of lectures called Symmetry, how life emerges from asymmetrical processes: “[i]t is well known that the heart of mammals is an asymmetric screw”, and he continues, “the deeper chemical constitution of our human body shows that we have a screw, a screw that is turning the same way in every one of us” (26; 30). In fact, purely symmetrical processes are states of equilibrium. It is a state of rest and order. Asymmetrical systems, on the other hand, are associated with dissipative, far-from-equilibrium states (in the language of thermodynamics), where new orders emerge and the structure of space is not preserved.

The notion of a ‘rhythm-repetition’ is also contrasted with a ‘cadence-repetition’, which is what was referred to above as ‘meter’: “a regular division of time, an isochronic recurrence of identical elements” (1995: 21). In contrast, rhythm-repetition has a “tonic accent, commanded by intensities” that creates “inequalities or incommensurabilities between metrically equivalent periods or spaces” (1995: 21). Similar to ‘dynamic symmetry’ and its asymmetrical productive core, rhythm-repetition, what Deleuze and Guattari simply call ‘rhythm’, is the source or matrix of the metered repetition: “a bare, material repetition (repetition of the Same) appears only in the sense that another repetition is disguised within it, constituting it and constituting itself in disguising itself” (1995: 21). Deleuze and Guattari are interested in this idea of rhythm because it is a way

\textsuperscript{34} He takes this distinction from the historian and mathematician Matila Ghyka’s work on symmetry, rhythm and sacred geometry, specifically from his book Nombre d’or. Rites et rythmes pythagoriciens dans le développement de la civilisation occidentale. Ghyka’s work in English is best summarized in his book entitled The Geometry of Art and Life.
to understand how extensive magnitudes emerge; it is a way to try and conceptualize the ‘internal genesis of grounds [grund]’. As Deleuze states, “the ground [fond] as it appears in a homogenous extensity is notably a projection of something ‘deeper’ [profond]: only the latter may be called Ungrund or groundless” (1995: 229); the Ungrund is the intensive space, the space where intensities differentiate, the “pure spatium” (1995: 230). It is in this field of dynamic symmetry or rhythm-repetition that there is only “an Idea and a pure [spatio-temporal] dynamism which creates a corresponding space” (1995: 20), which is the extensive space of the grund or territory. This rhythmic space is an intermediate set of possibilities, an intensive depth.

Deleuze further examines the concept of ‘rhythm’ in his lectures on Kant. Within these lectures he describes the role of intensive magnitudes within Kant’s philosophy, in relation to the sublime, symbolism and the concomitant ‘discord of the faculties’. He is interested in what he calls the great problem within Kant’s philosophy: the correspondence between two heterogeneous fields, between ‘spatio-temporal determinations’ and ‘conceptual determinations’, which take place through two synthetic operations. They are “necessarily synthetic since [they] are heterogeneous, so the act which puts them into correspondence can only be a synthesis of heterogeneities”; and these synthetic acts are acts of the imagination.35 There is the act of synthesis and the schema, which are both productive, ‘productions of space-time’. First, ‘synthesis’ is the “synthesis of perception”, it is the means of constituting or contracting a “certain space and a certain time in space and time”.36 One marks out the limits of a limited space-time out of a given diversity in space and time but also of spaces and times.

There are three operations that constitute a synthesis of perception. The first is the “successive synthesis of the apprehension of parts”, which is to perceive all of the parts of the situation; it is a way to figure out what the situation consists of in a particular space and time. The second aspect is what he calls the “synthesis of reproduction”: “you must

35 These quotations come from Deleuze’s lectures on Kant, which can be found at webdeleuze.com. Hereafter I will cite the specific dates of the lecture. This quote comes from 04/04/1978.
36 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com
reproduce the preceding part when you come to the following part so not only must you produce successive parts, but you have to reproduce the preceding parts with the following ones”. The third operation is then to reduce the given to a general form, an object \(=x\) or an “any-object-whatever”.\(^{37}\) This is an act of recognition, and for Kant an operation of the understanding. As Deleuze explains, “I go beyond purely spatio-temporal forms towards the form of an any-object-whatever that the spatio-temporal form will determine as such or such an object”. In sum, whenever we encounter an object we cannot grasp the totality of its parts immediately; instead we must survey and apprehend the multiplicity of parts in a space and a time. We also need to take all of the extensive parts together as a whole in order to apprehend the object completely, i.e. a ‘synthesis of reproduction’ of all of the preceding parts, which is then retroactively synthesized into a whole by an act of the imagination. Finally, the understanding attempts to recognize this object by squeezing it through its categories. This is, in other words, the labour of ‘common sense’: the harmonious accord of the faculties, which simplifies the given in order to satisfy its desire to know.

The problem is to find a correspondence across the heterogeneous fields of objects and concepts. Deleuze explains this as the search for ‘units of measure’ \([\text{metron}]\) that allows one to understand the phenomenon. Deleuze illustrates this by explaining that it is a “qualitative measure according to the object”; for instance, one sees a tree and carries out an ‘apprehension of successive parts’: one surveys the tree, goes from top to bottom, from bottom to top, etc., and the tree is then measured as “big as ten men”.\(^{38}\) One, therefore, measures phenomena qualitatively, ‘sensibly’. Moreover, “the unit of measure is variable in each case in relation to the thing to be perceived”; there is no universal, abstract measurement.\(^{39}\) Perception is fundamentally creative.

The unit of measure must also be in ‘harmony’ with the object measured. As Deleuze

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\(^{37}\) Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com  
\(^{38}\) Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com  
\(^{39}\) Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com
remarks, perception creates “some amazing variations”.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com} However, Deleuze finds in the later Kant, that there are instances when the correspondence or synthesis is corrupted and cannot take place, that is when “what I see is incommensurable to any unit of measure”.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com} The Incommensurable emerges from below. Something other emerges that cannot be comprehended, something monstrous, something catastrophic. In \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, it emerges \textit{au milieu}, between two coded milieus, and produces a Rhythm. It is difference \textit{as such}. It is, in other words, an encounter and it forces one to think; it is based neither on good sense nor common sense, but simply \textit{sense [sens]}; it forces one to seek a new direction, to try something new.

In other words, recognition occurs from the ground within a coded ‘milieu’. We apprehend the objects we perceive according to the local horizons of sense we inhabit. This is in fact the act of the transcendental imagination: “to imagine is to determine a space and a time in space and time”; one contracts a territory, a \textit{habitus}.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com} However, Deleuze is not interested in what occurs on the ground, which is the object of a phenomenology. Here formed subjects perceive formed objects. Instead, he seeks to grasp the genesis of the ground, how the given is given. As we have seen, Deleuze states, “the ground [\textit{fond}] as it appears in a homogeneous extensity is notably a projection of something ‘deeper’ [\textit{profound}]” (1995: 229). Below the crystalized units of measure, there is a secret \textit{art}, which, Deleuze and Guattari later call the ‘act of territorialization’.

As Deleuze notes, the synthesis of apprehension, of recognition, “already implies something like a lived evaluation of a unit of measure”, which he also calls “the aesthetic comprehension of the unit of measure”.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com} The extensive units of measure emerge from
this lived evaluation, which takes place intensively rather than extensively. It is also what Deleuze also calls an “evaluation of rhythm”; evaluations of rhythm allow one to determine which unit of measure will work in a given situation.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 28/03/1978, webdeleuze.com} We must “plunge into [rhythms] in a sort of exploration” in order to create new units of measure, in order to apprehend the object we are attempting to perceive. Rhythm is a pure abstraction beyond the given, the empirical; it is the consistency of the intensive \textit{spatium}, the “matrix of all extensity” (1995: 229).

The corruption or disruption of syntheses of apprehension is also an event or an encounter with what Kant calls the sublime. As Deleuze writes, “[t]he sublime is when the imagination is in the presence of its own limit”.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com} The perceiving subject experiences a vertigo or disorientation. The subject is abstracted out of all spatial-coordinates: in a state of darkness. It does not allow one to carry out a ‘synthesis of apprehension’; instead, one can only sense what is incommensurable to any unit of measure. Therefore, the state of the sublime shows that our structures of perceptions are founded “not in the sense of a ground [\textit{fondement}], but in the sense of a foundation [\textit{foundation or sol}]”.\footnote{Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, webdeleuze.com} Thus the structures of perception, the foundations of subjectivity, are founded upon an aesthetic comprehension or an evaluation of rhythm. It is by plunging into the rhythmic \textit{spatium} that one \textit{thinks otherwise} and becomes otherwise; it is from here that we can re-territorialize and produce new subjectivities.

In his lectures, Deleuze points to a second operation of the productive imagination: the schema. The schema is the rule, sketch, or outline that attempts to bridge objects in space and time with representational concepts.\footnote{In \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, Deleuze and Guattari, in their own formulation of the schema, refer to it as a ‘diagram’ or ‘abstract machine’; where the ‘schema’ is no longer tied to a subject or a Transcendental} According to Kant, the power of the
imagination is to schematize sensation by fitting it into categories. The subject accesses and apprehends the objects through the schema. However, in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze indicates the weakness of Kant’s idea of the schema: “since it remains external to the concept, it is not clear how it can ensure the harmony of the understanding and sensibility, since it does not even have the means to ensure its own harmony with the understanding without the appeal to a miracle” (1995: 218; emphasis mine). Deleuze’s alternative, from *Difference and Repetition*, is to investigate “the spatio-temporal dynamisms [rhythms] which act within or beneath [the concept], like a hidden art” (218); it is to investigate the non-representational dramas or the dramatizations of Ideas, which are the differential relations or intensities that produce concepts. It is the “dynamic space and time of [the concept’s] actual constitution” (1995: 219). The schema, for Deleuze, cannot be related to the transcendental subject because the subject is not an *a priori* ground, but itself is a provisory effect of these spatio-temporal dynamisms. Therefore, for Deleuze, in order to understand how concepts or territories form, we need to abstract out of the lived experience of a subject, to a ‘plane of immanence’ beyond the empirical, to an intensive *spatium* from which the subject and its categories emerge.

For Deleuze, the schema is the reverse of the synthesis. A synthesis is an act by which “you carry out a spatio-temporal operation and you specify the concept according to this determination”, that is you recognize a concept according to the ‘aesthetic comprehension’ within a space and a time. The schema on the other hand begins with the concept and the problem is “to determine the spatio-temporal relation which correspond to this concept”. The schema is therefore the “rule of production” of space and time according to a concept. The example Deleuze uses is that of the circle. The schemata of a circle are not the empirical instantiations of a circle, like a plate or a wheel, but rather circumference because it “allows you to make rounds, which allows you to round things,
which is to say to produce in experience something conforming to the concept of the circle, that doesn’t depend on the concept of the circle”. The schema is the trace or outline of a concept. It is not a set of examples but traces the way something occupies space and time, its spatio-temporal dynamisms. It is the drama of the concept. For instance, he uses the example of the lion. The schema of the lion is not an example of a lion, or the genus of the lion, but rather the way it occupies space and time, its “spatio-temporal rhythms, spatio-temporal attitudes [allures]”, that is its territory and domain, the paths it uses at certain times, the manners it has. As Deleuze claims, “the schema of an animal is its spatio-temporal dynamism”. Deleuze also uses the example of the ethnologist. For him, the “ethnologist constructs schemata of men to the extent that he describes manners: a civilization defines itself, amongst other ways, by a block of space-time, by certain spatio-temporal rhythms”. Schemata are therefore loose outlines of how things occupy space-time; they are spatio-temporal dynamisms without subjects or actors.

The schema operates, not on the level of representation, but in reality, and neither at the level of composed objects in space and time, the level of the extension, but at the intensive level, according to spatio-temporal rhythms. The rhythms, as blocks of heterogeneous space-times, nevertheless produce new territories; they are not reproductive. Rhythm is not a homogeneous beat, but the heterogeneous, the Unequal between two beats; like the wasp and the orchid, the effect of two heterogeneous space-times communicating. The rhythm is this communication. As Zourabichvili states, rhythms are haecceities, events that “do not combine two preexisting empirical space-times, rather [they] precede over their genesis. […] . It is the birth of a space-time” (2012: 128). Deleuze and Guattari corroborate this in their plateau on the ‘War Machine’, stating that a “rhythm without measure, which relates to the upswell of a flow” (1987: 364) is a

49 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, www.webdeleuze.com
50 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, www.webdeleuze.com
51 Deleuze, Kant Lecture, 04/04/1978, www.webdeleuze.com
52 They are in other words maps or diagrams.
turbulent, self-organizing form, a vortex within the flow of a river. As Schwenk explains, the vortex is a “form which has separated itself off from the general flow of water; a self-contained region in the mass of the water […]. Closer observation reveals that this vortex has a rhythm of its own” (44; emphasis mine). Thereby, rhythms, understood as vortices, are the origins of new space-times as they emerge immanently.

In his essay on the etymological origin of the word rhythm, Émile Benveniste illustrates how rhythm or, rhuthmós [ῥυθμός], refers to an ephemeral form of something unstable; it “designates the form in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving, mobile and fluid, the form of that which does not have organic consistency; it fits the pattern of a fluid element, of a letter arbitrarily shaped, of a robe which one arranges at one’s will” (286). Rhuthmós is an arrangement or disposition “without fixity or natural necessity and arising from an arrangement which is always subject to change” (Benveniste 286). As Roland Barthes points out, rhuthmós is “very close to and yet very different from schema”, where the schema is a fixed form, rhuthmós, as shown above, is “an improvised, changeable form” (7). But rhuthmós not only refers to a temporary arrangement, a fluid form, but also, as Benveniste writes, it literally means “the particular manner of flowing” (286). As a result, it relates to agency and spatio-temporal dynamisms, the way or manner in which one moves.

Rhythm as rhuthmós also helps us understand what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘chaosmos’, and thus, how order emerges from chaos immanently. As referred to above, where matter takes on form, not according to a hylomorphism, but organizes itself immanently, according to immanent relations. These immanent relations consist according to potentialities that are developed through the relations or interactions between impersonal singularities. They come together as a rhuthmós, a rhythmic and

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53 In Greek, (th)mós means a way, a manner, a sens.
fluid form, as an arbitrarily shaped robe.

Deleuze also understands these spatio-temporal dynamisms, or rhythms, as the dramatization of Ideas. For instance, to refer back to the stage-maker bird, who constructs a scene by laying down landmarks, leaves and sticks (1987: 315). This bird is enacting a drama, a mise-en-scène. However, this is not a bird constructing a territory intentionally. For Deleuze and Guattari, every living thing constructs these scenes, albeit unconsciously. We act out our habits, our routines. In ethological terms, the body does what a body can do according to the affects afforded to it by its assemblage or territory. These are dramas without subjects or representative actors. As Deleuze writes, “[t]here is necessarily something cruel in this birth of a world which is a chaosmos, in these worlds of movements without subjects, roles without actors” (1995: 219); the cruelty is that the actors or subjects are unknowingly produced by their assemblages, and unknowingly express their territories. In terms of the stage maker bird, by constructing the scene, it is acting out its schema or diagram: the way it occupies space and time, or in other words, the drama of its life that the territory expresses.

For Deleuze, “dynamism thus comprises its own power of determining space and time, since it immediately incarnates the differential relations, the singularities and the progressivities immanent in the Idea” (1995: 218); the dramas take place at the intensive level below concepts and representations, yet incarnate the differential relations of the Idea. For instance, the schema of the lion is not the history of its species, nor a typology or list of attributes, but its spatio-temporal dynamisms: how it takes up space and incarnates the differential relations of its Idea. Territories are the auto-poietic acts that make these dramas expressive; the self-consolidation of the dramas into “consolidated aggregates, of succession as well as coexistence” (1987: 329). It is the synthesis of heterogeneities into a disjunctive synthesis that do not require a subject or a God to organize. Territories are not content to come after; they are fundamentally creative, organizing and expressing themselves.

2.5 Conclusion: ‘to dwell as a poet or as an assassin?’

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory is a non-phenomenological concept of space
because it is not tied to a subject or body that stands above and organizes or unifies it. For instance, Lefebvre’s notion of space, as described in the previous chapter, is inextricably tied to the body; the surrounding space is always attached to the body, emerges from the body. Or, as in Heidegger, as shown above, the pre-ontological spatiality of Dasein revolves around Dasein: the ‘there’, of Da-sein is always anchored to a ‘here’, the subject. Therefore, there is no Outside, or non-stratified space, as such. In contrast, the concept of ‘territory’ is abstracted beyond the lived experience of a subject or body. It allows us to understand a transcendental plane beyond the empirical or the given, which is always given to a subject or sensible body. Territory is, rather than being limited by the horizon or narrow perspective of a subject, abstracted to a larger plane that includes a set of possibilities beyond that of a subject. It brings together as many different and heterogeneous connections as possible.

In fact, this concept replaces that of the ‘subject’. As they note in What is Philosophy?, within their ‘geophilosophy’, thought no longer takes place between a subject and an object, but “takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (86). There are no longer subjects, but territories, which are the spatio-temporal dynamisms or rhythms, the dramas, that take place within a set of possibilities in relation to a field of impersonal forces. No longer the transcendental subject, but a geography of affects: the ethological question about what a body can do according to the assemblages, or set of relations, it is in. These are the ‘movements without subjects, roles without actors’ noted above. The drama of a landscape as it endures time. For instance, Cézanne’s landscape paintings divorced of Cézanne himself. These landscapes are not rhythms, as Cézanne’s body perceives them; they take on a life of their own, the self-expression of a territory or landscape as it emerges and mutates. It is solely the drama of the spatio-temporal rhythms of the landscape.

These landscapes invoke inhumanism: a space that precedes the human. They also avoid the arrogance of a phenomenology that assumes that the world exists solely through the correlation of the subject and the surrounding space. However, these dramas, first, express an impersonal, asubjective world, a meaningless landscape. As a result, it brings up the question of what it means to be in a world that is no longer my world, but that
precedes me. In other words, how can we conceive dwelling in a space that one is not
*always already* in, or that one is not already in a ‘pre-established harmony’ with? That is,
how can we conceive of a ‘dwelling’ that does not already begin within a home because
one is not primordially at home in the world? The concept of territory departs from this
phenomenological ‘proto-belief’ that we are always beings-in-the-world; instead, the fact
territories must be constructed. It highlights that we are in a becoming-with the world or
the space around us, and the creative possibilities that this entails.

This leads us to the question that Deleuze and Guattari pose: “[t]o dwell as a poet or as an
assassin’?” (1987: 345). That is, it is question concerning how we want to inhabit our
worlds, what sort of territories should we construct. The assassin blocks assemblages and
closes off possibilities in despair, whereas the poet opens up the chaosmos “in hopes that
this will sow the seed of, or even engender, the people to come” (1987: 345). The poet
does not render the visible, but renders visible the imperceptible forces or the rhythms
that constitute us; they create monuments, pure blocs of affects and percepts, or territories
that pulsate on their own.
Chapter 3

3  Occupy: a non-phenomenological dwelling

As the two previous chapters have shown, both Lefebvre and Deleuze attempt, through their respective concepts of space and territory, to assign autonomy to space. Spaces that exist and vibrate on their own: a space in itself. The major difference is that Lefebvre’s concept of space is still tied to and unified by a body. It is a phenomenological space. Territory, in Deleuze and Guattari’s formulations, however exists prior to the subjects and objects that emerge from it. Territories are impersonal transcendental fields that pre-exist subjects and objects, the sets of possibilities or problems that subjects and objects are the temporary solutions or formations of. In ethological terms, the territory, i.e. the delimited range of activities a body can do, is how we should define a subject or understand an actor, rather than according to a typology of attributes or a history of the genus. As Deleuze notes, “there is a whole geography in people” (2002: 10).

Nevertheless, it begets the question, how can we understand ‘dwelling’ in non-phenomenological spaces and in this case ‘territories’? How do we understand, to rely on terms that will be discarded later, being in space-times that exist prior to subjects, and from which, subjects emerge? The concept of ‘occupy’ and ‘occupation’ will be a way to understand a non-phenomenological dwelling; it is a form of being in space that does not assume that one is always at home in the world, but that our homes (worlds) need to be constructed, experimented with, in relation to a space that exists alongside it, indifferent to it.

The verb ‘to occupy’ contains three central meanings. Drawing from the French verb ‘occupier’, due to its richer history, and beginning in the 13th century, one was ‘occupied’ [occupé] that is, one had something to do, activities: one had an occupation. To be occupied, in other words, was to occupy one’s time, to fill it up, to have duration, and therefore it had a more temporal meaning. Beginning in the 14th century, however, occupations became military endeavours. It was to possess or seize, to capture a space and time, to inhabit another’s territory. Furthermore, aside from being occupied by an invading army, ‘to occupy’ also had a more commonplace or everyday sense: that of
objects occupying or filling up space ("remplir un certain espace").\(^{54}\) In other words, occupations seize time and space, and occupy them, make them occupied, fill them up and make them *endure* by giving the space something to do. Occupations make space-times (or assemblages) *consist*.

The question of what it means to occupy is also related to the ethological question of what a body can do. ‘Occuper’ is derived from the Latin *occupare*, which carries within it the verb ‘*capere*’ or ‘to capture’. To occupy is then to capture time and space and to take hold of it: that is, to appropriate and arrange it. Thus, in reference to the previous chapter and the concept of ‘territory’ described therein, occupation is always of a territory. To have a territory is to occupy it, to appropriate and to possess the forces or affects that a territory consists of. To occupy is to capture the forces and affects that makes a territory consist. Therefore, one does not *occupy* a pre-established territory. Occupying is the means of constructing or creating a territory through *capture*. Furthermore, occupying territory is to make it *do* something and to alter the agency of the territory, its *agencement*.

The concept of occupation inevitably conjures up images of military occupations and colonialism. However, contemporary political movements, generalized under the title of the Occupy Movement (they are all preoccupied with the tactics of occupying spaces: parks, squares, streets, etc.), have in a sense occupied the common understanding of ‘occupation’. As W.J.T. Mitchell writes, “[o]ccupations of large civilian populations and territories by military administrations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine now must face their positive counterparts in the form of democratic occupations that promise to bring something new into the world” (7). Therefore, by taking the new meaning of ‘occupy’ that the recent Occupy movements have created as a loose guiding framework, the verb ‘*occuper*’ will allow us to re-conceptualize how we ontologically take up space. In effect, occupation allows us to move beyond the phenomenological concept of ‘dwelling’; ‘to occupy’ space is not to be in harmony with space, or to dwell with Being,

\(^{54}\) [http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/occuper](http://www.cnrtl.fr/etymologie/occuper)
but instead, occupying space precedes Being, one occupies a ‘space without world’. As a result, occupying space is always political in the sense that ‘politics precedes Being’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 203). Occupations are captures of anonymous forces and impersonal singularities in a transcendental field of pure immanence prior to the formation of subjects and objects. As a result, neither subjects nor objects occupy space; occupations are the art of the territory. The concepts of ‘occupy’ and ‘territory’ highlight the fact that our occupations in space are primarily, that is, fundamentally, political, and only secondarily, ontological.

3.1 Lefebvre and Dwelling: an architectonics of space

There is in Lefebvre’s work on space and ‘dwelling’ a nearing towards a concept of ‘dwelling’ that moves beyond the phenomenological concept of a body-in-space to a more political understanding. For Lefebvre, occupying space is a way of orienting it and through orientation creating space. As seen in the first chapter, he draws a connection between dwelling and appropriation or creation. It is not simply about entering a space pre-fabricated, but about creating new space-times; it is not, in other words, a passive being-in-the-world, but a creative, appropriative ‘dwelling’. He concretizes Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’ [wohnen], and transforms it into a political concept. In other words, Lefebvre develops a political ontology out of Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’.

Lefebvre, as we shall see, comes close to the idea that by occupying one dwells politically and not just poetically. But, restricted to phenomenological ideas, he does not adequately develop a concept of ‘occupation’ that moves beyond ‘phenomenology’.

Heidegger develops his concept of ‘dwelling’ [wohnen] through a reference to Höderlin’s poem, which says that ‘poetically man dwells’, that is, man is not in the world like an object present-at-hand, self-enclosed and indifferent, like a point on a grid, but is in-the-world, entangled in its web. For Heidegger, as shown in the second chapter, one dwells in space, or inhabits, as one who cares for one’s surroundings [Umwelt]. You are in space by bringing the ‘there’ here, by making it relevant to you. In contrast, in the later Heidegger, dwelling is related to poiesis or creation. Heidegger here differentiates between two kinds of space: a pre-ontological spatiality and the profaned spaces that emerge. Therefore, a plurality of spaces can emerge from one’s primordial dwelling:
“[s]paces open up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man” (2008: 154). Through dwelling in *spatiality* man builds or, through *poiesis* man *causes-to-appear*. Dwelling as *poiesis* makes the profaned objectively present spaces appear. As Heidegger writes, “[p]oetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building” (2001: 213). Space does not preexist dwelling; instead dwelling in-gathers the world around it and creates spaces.

Lefebvre draws upon these themes in his studies of urban space and dwelling. In *The Urban Revolution*, he distinguishes between dwelling [*habiter*] and *habitat*. As already mentioned, the latter is associated with the functionalism that he finds within the urbanism and architecture of postwar France. Thus “[h]abitat was imposed from above as the application of a homogeneous global and quantitative space, a requirement that ‘lived experience’ allow itself to be enclosed in boxes, cages or ‘dwelling machines’” (2003c: 81). Habitats are organized according to basic functions: eating, sleeping, reproducing, playing, etc. The ideology of the habitat is, in other words, the “segregation of needs and their transformation into a self-contained system of functions, the search for an equilibrium and the banishment of the spontaneous” (Stanek, 2011: 120); there is no room therefore for possibilities other than the function that the space was designed for. The lived experiences of space are reduced to the particular functions assigned to the spaces; the users of space encaged in ‘dwelling machines’.

In contrast, *habiter* is similar to Heidegger’s concept of ‘dwelling’. In *The Urban Revolution*, Lefebvre claims that ‘dwelling’ allows us to get closer to understanding the lived experience of the inhabitant; and he understands Heidegger’s analysis as meaning “the relation of the ‘human being’ to nature and its own nature, to ‘being’ and its own being, is situated in habiting, is realized and read there” (2003c: 82). Lefebvre first approached this concept of *habiter* through his studies of *les pavillons* (housing projects) and *les grandes ensembles* in France (Stanek, 2011: 82). Within these studies, he was

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55 In *The Production of Space*, the translator has translated it as a relationship between ‘housing’ and ‘residence’, where ‘housing’ refers to habitat and ‘residence’ to *habiter* or ‘to inhabit’. See in particular p. 120-122 and 314.
primarily interested in *how* the inhabitant of the *pavillon* inhabited; that is, how the inhabitants occupied and transformed the space. His conclusions maintained that the inhabitant did not simply occupy the *pavillon* as an indifferent user, but as a dweller that was *in* space through care. They *cared* for their spaces, rendered them familiar, their own.

As a result, the inhabitant or dweller occupied through the other sense of ‘occupation’, *appropriation*. They re-arranged their spaces, re-created them: a *poetics of space*. Thus, as Stanek notes, Lefebvre, through references to Heidegger and Bachelard, “sketch[es] a concept of dwelling that, in the conditions of postwar urbanization, preserves the possibility of poetic dwelling understood by means of the Greek term *poiēsis*, that is to say, as a human creation” (2011: 88). These inhabitants did not only abide by the functions pre-determined, but appropriated space by manipulating them and the objects in space. Therefore, Lefebvre does not remain within the confines of Heidegger’s concept: he attempts to concretize it within the ‘everyday’. In his “Preface to the Study of the Habitat of the ‘Pavillon’”, Lefebvre writes that “[Heidegger] does not tell us how to construct, ‘here and now’, buildings and cities” (2003b: 112). He wants to put Heidegger back on his feet. Thus his aim: to show how within the folds of everyday spaces there are possibilities for creating another way to live together (by occupying and appropriating space).

The distinction of ‘habiter’ and ‘habitat’ maps onto another distinction Lefebvre offers: appropriated spaces and dominant spaces. Dominant spaces are spaces “transformed – and mediated – by technology, by practice (1991: 165); it is a construction, rather than a work [*œuvre*]; it is not, therefore, a creation, but something thoroughly and fundamentally planned: an attempt to conduct and manage the use of the space. They are construction *sites*, as Edward S. Casey understands them, “leveled-down, emptied-out, planiform residuum of place and space eviscerated of their actual and virtual powers” (1997: 183). It is a space devoid of imagination; there is no poetry, only rules and calculations.

 Appropriated spaces, by contrast, are full of spontaneity. Appropriation “transforms [space] – the body and biological life provided, and the time and space – into human
property” (1991: 130). It is a creative activity: “an appropriated space resembles a work of art” (1991: 165). In The Production of Space, Lefebvre refers to the spontaneous architecture within the favelas of Latin America. For him, “the vast shanty towns of Latin American (favelas, barrios, ranchos) manifest a social life far more intense than the bourgeois districts of the cities” (373) because they appropriate their spaces. Here the habitats are formed spontaneously, without plans, and with found objects. As Lefebvre describes, “their poverty notwithstanding, these districts sometimes so effectively order their space […] as to elicit a nervous admiration. Appropriation of a remarkably high order is to be found here. The spontaneous architecture and planning […] prove greatly superior to the organization of space by specialists” (1991: 374). These inhabitants create their spaces by using them, by dwelling there.

Lefebvre, therefore, seemingly in response to Deleuze and Guattari’s question about whether to dwell as poets or assassins, writes that the “human being […] cannot do anything but inhabit as a poet. If we do not provide him (as an offering and a gift) the possibility of inhabiting poetically or of inventing a poetry, he will create it as best as he can” (2003c: 82). Insofar as one inhabits a space as a dwelling [habiter] one appropriates a space and creates a new manner of being in space. Despite the dominated spaces and ‘dwelling machines’ that humans are enclosed in, imagination prevails, for Lefebvre: “the human being cannot build and dwell, that is to say, possess a dwelling in which he lives, without also possessing something more (or less) than himself: his relation to the possible and the imaginary” (2003c: 82). Wherever, so long as one is dwelling [habiter], one is exposed to the possibilities of another way of living. Dwelling exposes the shadowy folds in space, the new space-times that nevertheless exist.

Within the chapter ‘The Architectonics of Space’ Lefebvre develops an understanding of what it means to occupy space and how space is produced through this occupation. He seeks to determine the nature of space as the harmony between the body and space: the mutual intertwining of the body and space. This middle chapter is the motor of Lefebvre’s unitary theory of space. He defines its task as “an approach […] which embraces and seeks to reassemble the elements dispersed by the specialized and partial disciplines of ethnology, ethnography, human geography, anthropology, prehistory and
history, sociology and so on” (1991: 229). Stanek has called it an archaeo-
elogical analysis of space (2011: 194). Thus it is not similar to a Kantian architectonics because it does not seek to systematize ‘space’, but rather, like archaeology, it excavates through the many strata, perceptions, levels, temporalities and scales of space.

As an archaeology, the architectonics attempts to capture the immediate genesis of space by using the lived body as a unit of measure. There is an immediacy of the body in space: we reach space through our bodies. For Lefebvre, there is a complicit and intimate relationship between the body and space. Thus, Lefebvre wants to insist that the internal consistency or immanent composition of space does not refer to a transcendent form, but to the relationship of the body in space: symmetry, affects, energies, the mirror-reflection, rhythms, and gestures. Instead of Descartes’ spirit and Leibniz’s mathematician god, space is understood, here, as a material composition. There is a depth. As Lefebvre asks: before the depths of space we stand perplexed: how do we explain it? Instead of resorting to a transcendent source, he explains that what confronts us “consists perhaps merely in the material modalities of an active ‘occupation’—specifically, the occupation of space” (1991: 172). Thus, space is fundamentally occupied by the material forces of the body.

Lefebvre begins his architectonics of space with Leibniz’s understanding of the ontological status of space in itself as ‘indiscernible’. Lefebvre points out, for Leibniz, “in order to discern ‘something’ therein, axes and an origin must be introduced, and a right and a left, i.e., the direction or orientation of those axes […]. [W]hat Leibniz means to say is that it is necessary for space to be occupied” (1991: 169). Empty space, the void, is indiscernible: it is nothing. Space, in order to be space, needs to be occupied. Ultimately, for Lefebvre, space is occupied by a body; the body which is “capable of indicating direction by a gesture, of defining rotation by turning round, of demarcating an orienting space” (1991: 170). The body produces its space and occupies it – makes it do something.

Lefebvre describes the complicity between body and space as such: “[t]his is a truly remarkable relationship: the body with its energies at its disposal, the living body, creates

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56 As we shall see, however, this is not the case: he does rely on a transcendent form, the Body.
or produces its own space; conversely, the laws of space, which is to say the laws of discrimination in space, also govern the living body and the deployment of its energies” (1991: 170). There is a mutual accord between them. The body produces space, orients it according to its gestures, movements, etc., but these very gestures and movements are already delimited by the specific material conditions (the space itself) within which they are enacted. The body and space work together and affect each other. It is always from and against this preoccupation that occupations take place. Thus space is composed from within, immanently, according to an “internal rationality” (1991: 174) or the “basic geometric laws of space – symmetries, axes, planes, centres and peripheries” (Stanek, 2011: 192). This is the internal composition of space, what holds it together; it is not a transcendent form or creator god, but these internal relationships, resonances or rhythms. In fact, there is a vitalism inherent in Lefebvre’s architectonics space, ‘a biogenetic force’, a creative energy that runs through it, concentrating in places (subjects, objects) and exploding (expenditures) as productions of space and time (1991: 399). The body is, for Lefebvre, a concentration of energy: an interior milieu holding in reserve deployable energy always connected to an exterior milieu and its environment.

Lefebvre’s architectonics is an attempt to grasp this a priori material realm, the rhythmic depths of a space, where the body and space are intertwined. This is the ‘lived experience’ of space. Space, as such, is experienced prior to thought: “in the beginning was the Topos” (1991: 174); space is thought afterward. Lefebvre describes this intimate relation between the body and space through three different lenses: affects, symmetries and rhythms.

I. Affects

57 We can draw a comparison here between these rhythms that hold space together, and the ‘transversal’ refrain described in chapter 2; the difference, however, is that, in Lefebvre’s version, that which holds together emanates out of the body: the body’s rhythms. In Deleuze and Guattari, the ‘transversal’ is a powerful abstraction that does not refer to a transcendent body, but an empty repetition that can draw many different things that would otherwise remain apart.

58 In the architectonics, Lefebvre also refers to sounds, smells and gestures; however, sounds and smells are ultimately affective, while gestures and movements are rhythmic.
Before there is an intelligence of the mind there is the “intelligence of the body” (1991: 174). Here Lefebvre’s analysis has resonances with Deleuze and Guattari’s ethology, where the body is marked by a longitude and latitude, the capacity to affect and be affected. For instance, Lefebvre refers to “‘primitive’ people – seasonally migrant herders, let us say” (1991: 192), a conceptual persona akin to, but not quite, the nomad of Deleuze and Guattari. For Lefebvre, ‘primitive people’ occupy space not mediated by abstractions like a grid or a metrics, but rather “remained purely qualitative in character, like those of animals” (1991: 192); in other words, they occupied space according to affects or spatial indices “invested with affective significance” (1991: 192-3). Therefore space is immediately experienced or lived as affects prior to any representation or geometrical abstraction of space. Space is originally oriented or given direction according to the affects of a body.

In order to illustrate this, Lefebvre uses the example of the spider in its web.\(^{59}\) The spider’s web is not spun according to a higher design: the spider does not utilize an abstract blueprint. Instead, the spider “produces, secrets and it occupies a space which it engenders according to its own lights: the space of its web, of its stratagems, of its needs” (1991: 173). There is an intelligence of the spider that is not analytic in nature, but bodily, affective: “the spider produces, which manifestly calls for ‘thought’, but it does not ‘think’ in the same way as we do” (1991: 173); it is capable of “demarcating space and orienting itself on the basis of angles” (1991: 173) without the use of abstract units of measurement or plans.

The spider and its web provides Lefebvre with a clear example of how one does not leave one’s space: the body is constantly producing its space and even when you try to leave, perhaps on a line of flight, you are only producing other different space-times. In fact, like the spider, the human cannot leave its web. The living body spins its web through its affective relationships. The production of space “beginning with the production of the body, extends to the productive secretion of a ‘residence’ [habiter]” (1991: 173). In other

\(^{59}\) Deleuze uses a similar example in his study of Marcel Proust, *Proust and Signs*. See “Conclusion to Part II: Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider” (117).
words, inhabiting space, dwelling or occupying, is how we create our residences, webs or spaces. In the same way that the spider cannot be understood outside of its web, the living body cannot be understood outside its space. Hence the complicity between the body and the world or the body and space; there is not one without the other. As Watson clarifies, “Lefebvre is suggesting that the living body, all living bodies, should be understood as an environment, consisting in a creature and a structure” (100). There is a pre-established harmony between the body and space. The spider does not leave its web and nor the living body its dwelling or home.

II. Mirror-reflections & Symmetry

For Lefebvre, space is also a mirror, a reflection. One can see one’s body in space through space: we even become conscious of ourselves through the reflection of space: “it is an activity which serves to generate consciousness” (1991: 184). Yet this is not a psychoanalytic mirror because it does not occult the body; instead, this mirror reflection emphasizes the role of the body in space: “the mirror discloses the relationship between me and myself, my body and the consciousness of my body” (1991: 185). The mirror situates one’s body in space; it allows one to imagine oneself in space. In other words, it informs us about the body-space relationship. That is, because space is a product of the body, I can see myself in space as the space I have produced. The surrounding space is organized according to my body; therefore I can see myself in it.

Moreover, for Lefebvre, the mirror’s reflection repeats what it reflects, yet inversely; it is a repetition with difference. As Chris Butler explains, “the mirror’s reflection […] provides a symmetrical duplication of the reflected world, but also establishes a virtual spatiality founded on differentiation” (193-4). The mirror, as a result, and to use Michel Foucault’s term, is a heterotopia. For Foucault, “the mirror functions as a heterotopia in

\[^{60}\text{It is important to note, again, that the Lefebvre does not provide a distinction between his concept of space and the phenomenological concept of 'world'; they are almost indistinguishable, despite, as already noted, Lefebvre’s placing it in the ‘concrete’.}\]

\[^{61}\text{While Lefebvre does not directly cite or refer to Michel Foucault’s essay on heterotopias, “Different Spaces”, which was published in 1967, about 7 years before The Production of Space, Lefebvre does give}\]
the sense that it makes this place I occupy at the moment I look at myself in the glass both utterly real, connected with the entire space surrounding it, and utterly unreal—since, to be perceived, it is obliged to go by way of that virtual point which is over there” (1998: 179). The mirror creates an imaginary space, which is actual space repeated differently. The mirror as an object produces an imaginary space, an ‘other space’, which has a real effect on how one gestures and lives in space. Or, as Lefebvre notes elsewhere, “[Space, my space,] is first of all my body and then it is my body’s counter-part, or ‘other’, its mirror-image or shadow: it is the shifting intersection between that which touches, penetrates, threatens or benefits my body on the one hand and all other bodies on the other” (1991: 184). Space is the ‘shifting intersection’ between one’s body and other bodies, the touched-touching, the sensible-sentient, akin to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the flesh.

The mirror also creates symmetry within the surrounding world; it orients the world and gives it material axes. The body, split into a left and a right, reflected in space inversely, creates a compass. In order to understand the symmetry of space, Lefebvre, like Deleuze, refers to Hermann Weyl’s lectures Symmetry. Symmetry is thus a means of understanding the emergence and organization of space materially and immanently. It is, in this sense, embodied in space. For instance, crystals or shells organize themselves according to the forces or singularities within its space or interior milieu in relation to an exterior milieu. In Lefebvre’s words: “the poetry of shells […] has nothing to do with some mysterious creative force, but corresponds merely to the way in which energy, under specific conditions […] is deployed” (1991: 172); the shell organizes itself immanently according to principles of symmetry; they self-regulate, in other words. In geometry and in physical systems, symmetry means that there is an invariance of form under any kind of transformation, rotational or reflectional, etc. A sphere, for example, would have more

us a hint by calling the mirror-space, an “‘other’ space” (1991: 185), which is in reference to another way to translate the title of Foucault’s essay.
symmetry than a cube (De Landa 18). For Lefebvre, the importance of the mirror is that it “extends a repetition (symmetry) immanent to the body into space” (1991: 182, fn. 14). Symmetry allows us to understand how space is occupied; the symmetry of the body is projected into space and orients it, and produces it.

**III. Rhythms**

Lefebvre also understands, first in *The Production of Space* and then more thoroughly in *Rhythmanalysis*, the relationship of the body and space through rhythms. Space is lived through rhythms. Both the body and the surrounding world are ‘bundles of rhythms’, which intertwine or resonate in a *polyrhythmia*, a symphony of rhythms. As a result, “rhythms in all their multiplicity interpenetrate one another. In the body and around it, as on the surface of a body of water, or within the mass of a liquid, rhythms are forever crossing and recrossing, superimposing themselves upon each other, always bound to space” (1991: 205). Therefore, before the subject and object, there are rhythms intertwining or resonating with other rhythms: a body’s access to the world is through rhythm. Lefebvre’s *Rhythmanalysis* is thereby an attempt to understand the ‘pre-established harmony’ that the body experiences with its world or space through rhythms; the body is capable of perceiving or sensing heterogeneous things by resonating with their rhythms. In other words, the body is *always already* established or connected with the surrounding space.

The rhythmanalyst utilizes his body, his ‘metronome’, in order to access the world, and to critically analyze the space-times of the world: “[t]he rhythmanalyst calls on all his senses” (2004: 21); his synaesthetic, ‘total body’, as a bundle of rhythms, enters into the polyrhythmic world: “by integrating the outside with the inside” (2004: 20). In order to illustrate how the rhythmanalyst would work, Lefebvre uses an example of himself on a balcony listening and watching a garden below. Here the rhythmanalyst must lose oneself in a method akin to Henri Bergson’s concept of ‘intuition’: “to grasp a rhythm it is necessary to have been *grasped* by it; one must *let oneself go*, give oneself over, abandon
oneself to its duration” (2004: 27). The rhythm analyst sympathizes with its fleeting object (a bundle of rhythms) in order to be grasped by its duration. Instead, of perceiving objects and spaces as static, self-enclosed, the rhythm analyst sees them “polyrhythmically, or if you prefer symphonically” (2004: 31). The body is always in connection with the rhythms of the surrounding space, as Lefebvre notes, “the passage from subject to object requires neither a leap over an abyss, nor the crossing of a desert” (2004: 36); one just has to utilize the method of intuition and to let go of the abstractions or conceptions that block the accord.

3.2 Spaces Without Worlds

Lefebvre’s understanding of space, when bracketed out of its historical analysis, is fundamentally a phenomenological understanding. There is a lived experience of space by means of the body; the body is the common denominator. Despite only referencing Merleau-Ponty in three notes in The Production of Space, there are clear resonances between their understandings of the relationship between the body and the world.

In Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology, there is no body without the world or world without the body. As he describes in the essay “Eye and Mind”, the body is an enigma: seeing and seen, sentient and sensing. It is “visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing […]. Things are an annex or prolongation of my body; they are incrusted in its flesh […]; the world is made of the very stuff of my body” (354). And as philosopher Alia Al-Saji describes “the lived body is a power to synchronize with its environment” (110). Al-Saji continues to describe the relation of the body and the world as one of negotiation, a relationship between two mutual, consensual partners: “For its part, the sensible world does not simply take over my body; it beckons to it and negotiates with it” (111; Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 214). It is not an actualized subject that confronts a determined world; they are both indeterminate: “both subject and object,

62 There is therefore, despite not referencing Bergson, a resonance with his intuitionist method, which he refers to as a “kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within in an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible” (24).
sensing and sensible, are constituted through the process of sensation” (Al-Saji 111). They are completely enveloped. The body nevertheless pre-emptively develops its surrounding world in order to be there in-the-world: it seeks points of resonance in the world in order to correspond with. The surrounding world is an augmented body, and the body is an augmented world. As a result, there is an intimacy between the world (space) and the lived body.

The later Merleau-Ponty has two notions for the harmony or sympathy between body and space: depth and flesh. Depth is the source or matrix of the body-space relationship: it is a zone of indetermination, an entanglement, where one cannot locate the limits of the body and the limits of the world. Henry Somers-Hall points out that, with the concept of ‘depth’, “Merleau-Ponty is attempting to move beyond the world of perception to the conditions for the experience of perception” (125). It is not a world partes extra partes, or composed of res extensa; he is interested instead in understanding the genesis of the world. In “Eye and Mind”, Merleau-Ponty refers to it as the first dimension, “a global ‘locality’ in which everything is at the same time” (369), or a volume. In his book Getting Back into Place, Edward S. Casey, refers to depth as a primal depth, where the near and far coincide in a particular place (68). This primal depth is the Deep, the matrix, out of which places emerge and concretize. As Merleau-Ponty indicates, it is “first and foremost a participation in the being of space beyond every particular point of view” (363; emphasis mine). In the words of Heidegger, it is the spatiality of space, the pre-ontological basis of space.

Moreover, the concept of flesh, as depth incarnate, is both the visible and the invisible, the perceptible and the imperceptible at once. For instance, he claims that the depth is “not a thing, but a possibility, a latency and a flesh of things” (2007c: 395). For Merleau-Ponty, the body-world relationship is what constitutes flesh; it is a “shared participation of the subject and object in a generalized visibility” (Grosz “Flesh” 101); similar to Lefebvre’s understanding of the mirror-reflection of space, the flesh is the reflection, where one sees oneself seeing oneself. It is a ‘generalized Visible’. Thus, he refers to it as a “crisscrossing” (2007c: 395): the feeling of your left hand touching your right hand. This is the flesh of the world intertwined with the flesh of the body, where the limit of
each is indeterminable. For Merleau-Ponty, then, the flesh of the body-world is the 
spatiality or the ‘depth’ of the world.

As a result, Deleuze and Guattari describe Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Fleshism’ as the “final 
avatar of phenomenology” (1994: 178) because, while it does attempt to expose the real 
conditions of the possible, it does not move beyond a ‘science of the actual’; it 
nevertheless remains in the empirical realm, tied to the body. Somers-Hall explains that 
this ‘Fleshism’ is the final avatar of phenomenology because it still posits a transcendent 
lived experience, wherein Merleau-Ponty conflates the depth of space with actualized 
spatiality, or in Deleuze’s terms, the virtual and the actual. As he writes in “Eye and Mind”, 
in relation to Cézanne’s paintings: “We must seek space and its content together” (369). 
Here “depth attempts to fulfill two functions”: it attempts to represent the actualization of 
the virtual along with the actual itself (Somers-Hall 127). It results in a ‘hermeneutics of 
facticity’, where Cézanne becomes a kind of icon painter.

A similar criticism can be applied to Lefebvre’s work. For instance, in Rhythmmanalysis, 
(in a veiled allusion to Heidegger) he refers to Van Gogh’s painting of peasant shoes. As 
he notes, “[f]rom any given object, from a simple thing (Van Gogh’s shoes), a great artist 
creates a strong presence, and he does so on a canvas, a simple surface” (2004: 24). 
Through the depiction of everyday objects Van Gogh was capable of capturing, not 
profaned presents, but a sacred presence, or the thing’s duration. However, this is not a 
negative theology, as Lefebvre makes clear, the rhythmanalyst “is not a mystic!” (2004: 
25). Instead, Lefebvre’s rhythmanalysis, like Merleau-Ponty’s ‘Fleshism’, is an attempt 
to recover ‘the sensible’.

The issue with Lefebvre’s attempt to recover the ‘sensible’ through the lived body is that 
it remains limited within the realm of the possible. It does not go far enough, settling with 
the empirical body. As a result, space becomes reduced to the body, unified by the body. 
In order to liberate space and to be able to create new spaces, we need to go beyond the 
given, beyond the lived, through what Deleuze calls a ‘transcendental empiricism.’ As 
Deleuze states, “the transcendental exercise must not be traced from the empirical 
exercise precisely because it apprehends that which cannot be grasped from the point of
view of common sense, that which measures the empirical operation of all the faculties according to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration” (1995: 143). As a result, for Deleuze, the lived body or lived experience reintroduces a transcendent into space.

In the case of Lefebvre, who tries to formulate space as immanent, space becomes ultimately immanent to the body and the experience of the body in space. A transcendent body standing upright in the river of immanence. This, as Zourabichvili highlights, only “‘trace[s]’ the conditions from the conditioned, the form of the transcendental from the empirical” (2012: 173); it cannot adequately think genesis. Tracing the transcendental from the empirical is similar to conflating the actual and its actualization, or the genesis of space and space itself. Thus, in Rhythmanalysis, Lefebvre, as shown above, through ‘intuition’, analyses the rhythms of bodies, which are immanent to the body. But as Deleuze notes in Bergsonism, “intuition leads us to go beyond the state of experience toward the conditions of experience. But these conditions are neither general nor abstract. They are no broader than the conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience” (27). Deleuze’s understanding of the method of ‘intuition’ seeks the conditions of real experience whereas Lefebvre’s is restricted to the realm of the possible. Real experience, for Deleuze, “is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given. It is therefore in a certain sense the imperceptible [insensible]” (1995: 140). For Deleuze, then, Merleau-Ponty and Lefebvre, as avatars of phenomenology, do not go far enough; they restrict their studies to a transcendent body or Flesh and, in consequence, cannot adequately think the sensible, the being of the sensible.

In relation to the three ways that Lefebvre claims the body occupies space, as delineated above, that is, affect, symmetry and rhythm, it can be shown that his idea of the body is limited to the given instead of searching for its genesis. First, Lefebvre states that the lived experience of space begins with the affective experience of space via the body. Seemingly akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the affect, it does not go far enough because it is the body that determines the affect and not vice versa. Thus they are the affects or feelings of a subject. Second, space has an immanent consistency based on
symmetry; in other words, space is immanently created according to the symmetry of the body, which is reflected into space (and reflects back onto the subject). Space is a repetition or duplication of the body, yet inversely. This difference, however, is a difference that is produced after the form of the Same; it is not difference in itself. As developed in Chapter 2, Deleuze refers to a dynamic asymmetry that precedes and produces symmetry.\(^{63}\) Lastly, Lefebvre understands space as an animated space of rhythms. But these are rhythms of bodies, whereas Deleuze, as he notes in his monograph on Francis Bacon, insists that rhythms “can be discovered only by going beyond the organism” (2012: 44); rhythms are experienced at the limit of the body. Lefebvre, therefore, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, reintroduce the lived body as a Transcendent in order to understand the immanence of space. In sum, his ‘architectonics of space’ is supposed to describe the immanent constitution of space, but in order to do so he relies on a notion of the lived body.

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari trace a brief history of ‘immanence’ in philosophy. Within which they summarize it into three distinct phases: 1. The Greek, contemplative phase: where “immanence is immanent ‘to’ the One, so that another One, this time transcendent, is superimposed on the one in which immanence is extended […] the neo-Platonists’ formula will always be a One beyond the One” (1994: 44). 2. The Kantian, reflective phase: immanence is now immanent to a transcendental subject. They note that “Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)” (1994: 46). 3. The phenomenological urdoxa, or ‘communication’ phase, where transcendence emerges out

\(^{63}\) For instance, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze discusses a more primary asymmetry that produces symmetry. The static repetition of symmetry, for Deleuze, always “refers back to a dynamic repetition” (21). Moreover, here, space, or extended space, is not produced according to symmetry, but according to an intensive spatium, and ‘symmetry-breaking processes’, which Manuel Delanda describes as “a process which converts one of the entities into the other by losing or gaining symmetry. For example, a sphere can ‘become a cube’ by loosing invariance to some transformations” (18; emphasis his). Therefore, new spaces are produced through an asymmetry, symmetry-breaking. The mirror of space can shatter.
of immanence, “in Husserl and many of his successors who discover in the Other or in the Flesh, the mole of the transcendent within immanence itself” (1994: 46). In Lefebvre’s phenomenological understanding of space, he seems to be straddling between phase 2 and 3, where immanence is immanent to the body or to the rhythms of the sensible world.

The lived body, as the fundamental ground of space, for Lefebvre, is the ‘transcendent mole,’ the Something that space is immanent to. Space is experienced through this lived body. As a result, Lefebvre’s philosophy of space presupposes the lived body as self-evident; it is the pre-philosophical and pre-conceptual ‘Everybody knows’: ‘Everybody knows’ that space is accessed through the body (Deleuze, 1995: 129-30). He thus relies on a concept of the body as a given without actually addressing how the body is given.

The lived body, what Lefebvre calls a ‘total’ body, “multisensorial” (Gardiner, 2000: 243) body, is a synaesthetic body. The synaesthetic body is a body whose faculties and senses work together, intercommunicate, and agree about a given object; it is a body whose faculties are in a ‘harmonious accord’. This body works according to the model that Deleuze names ‘recognition’: “[r]ecognition may be defined by the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, remembered, imagined or conceived” (1995: 133). The synaesthetic body recognizes a given object within the objective manifold by generalizing it into an object = x. The body determines a given intuited object by subsuming it under categories, or in other words, the flux of the Outside is reduced to the “sedentary distributions” of the Kantian categories. It therefore acts according to a common sense, a sensus communis, where all of the faculties work together; and also according to a good sense, that which qualifies the object. For Deleuze, “good sense and common sense complete each other in the image of thought: together they constitute the two halves of the doxa” (1995: 134). As Renoylds and Roffe explain, Kantian and Husserlian phenomenology, “assume that sensibility is natively apposite to every form of experience. The subject is in advance

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64 The idea of the ‘total’ body is also found in Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology: “[s]ynaesthetic perception is the rule” (2002: 265).
predisposed to the structure of experience (common sense) and experience is always structured meaningfully in advance (good sense)” (232). The lived body, in these terms, pre-form the given according to ‘good sense’ and then understand it according to its categories or faculties through a ‘common sense’.

Recognition functions according to a doxa, clichés or opinions that pre-determine how one experiences the world; it works like this: “[w]e pick out a quality supposedly common to several objects that we perceive, and an affection supposedly common to several subjects who experience it and who, along with us, grasp that quality” (1994: 144). But doxa also refers to a urdoxa, a proto-belief in a pre-established harmony between the body and space, “the presupposition of a perfect fit, or a natural harmony, between self and world” (Renoylds and Roffe: 232). For instance, Deleuze and Guattari refer to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh as being such a urdoxa; that is, while flesh is “freed from the lived body, the perceived world” (1994: 178), it is nevertheless founded on the belief that there is a natural harmony between beings, an “ideal coincidence” (1994: 178). Or as they write elsewhere, phenomenology always “goes in search of original opinions which bind us to the world as to our homeland (earth)” (1994: 149). As if there is an ontological harmony between self and world, body and space. In Lefebvre’s work, this proto-belief in an ontological harmony is most clear in the sympathy he assumes between bodies and rhythms, between the rhythms of the body and the rhythms that compose the space around the body.

In contrast to the urdoxa of a pre-established harmony between the body and space, Deleuze refers to the para-doxa of a contingent encounter. As discussed in chapter 2, he finds in Kant’s philosophy, through the ideas of the sublime and symbolism, a groundless ground, the harmonious discord of the faculties. Here, instead of a pre-established harmony, there is a “contingent accord of Nature with our faculties” (Deleuze, 1985: 64), which, in Difference and Repetition, he renames ‘the encounter’.

65 Compare this to a note Merleau-Ponty has written in his essay “The Intertwining-The Chiasm”, from The Visible and the Invisible: “a correspondence between [the world’s] inside and my outside, between my inside and [the world’s] outside” (469; ft. 5). The world and the body are intertwined and compose a knot of flesh.
The encounter is what *forces* thought and sensation, whereas in *recognition* the body relies on clichés that pre-emptively constrain the given object: “[s]omething in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition, but of a fundamental *encounter*” (1995: 139); the encounter forces us to sense that which can only be sensed; it is to perceive the imperceptible. In front of something that we cannot recognize, we are forced to create, to think (to think is to create) something new, in order to get a grasp on the situation.

However, it is important to note that there are encounters precisely because there is no pre-established harmony between the body and space; there is an encounter because the outside cannot be contained in general categories. For Deleuze, in fact, there is only ever a contingent accord (or harmony) through the encounter at the limit of the body; otherwise, the model of recognition intervenes and pre-emptively guides sensation and thought. Therefore, there is no affinity between the body and space; instead, there is the man without presuppositions or qualities, the Idiot, who gropes around, seeing, hearing, touching, and smelling anew. Otherwise, we remain engaged within what Lefebvre had called ‘dwelling machines’, and our narcissistic space-worlds within which we confuse space with our reflections.

In fact, there is a cruelty in the space surrounding the body. Space is fundamentally *cruel* because it does not need the body; it does not rely upon the body to be oriented, as Lefebvre insists. In other words, there is a reality of space beyond the lived experience of the Body — a realism of space that needs to be taken account of. In *Difference and Repetition*, in reference to the poet Antonin Artaud’s notion of cruelty, Deleuze points out that “cruelty is nothing but determination *as such*, that precise point at which the determined maintains its essential relation with the undetermined” (29). Life is cruel

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66 See Deleuze’s discussions of the Idiot in *Difference and Repetition*, where the idiot is “an underground man who recognizes himself no more in the subjective presuppositions of a natural capacity for thought than in the objective presuppositions of a culture of the times, and lacks the compass with which to make a circle” (130). See also his lecture, published in *Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975-1995*, called “What is a Creative Act?”.

67 Refer to Artaud’s *The Theatre and Its Double*, particularly the essay “The Theatre and Cruelty” (84).
and indifferent. Determination is the unilateral emergence of difference: “[t]he act of determination whose line of movement is that of unilateral distinction, […] distinguishes x from its chaotic background to make a difference” (Negarestani: 70). This space without subjects and objects, without actors, is a world not organized from the point of view of the human, for the survival of the human, but is a space in itself that is inherently cruel and indifferent. As Deleuze writes, “[t]here is necessarily something cruel in this birth of a world which is a chaosmos, in these worlds of movements without subjects, roles without actors” (1995: 219); it is “like a ‘restless space’, or movement of turning and wounding gravitation capable of directly affecting the organism […]. Spaces are hollowed out…” (1995: 219). These hollowed out spaces are spaces without worlds or spaces without metrics, i.e. non-phenomenological spaces. They are spaces without subjects and objects, a space of absolute immanence. It is a ‘frontier’ space, terra incognita.

In the ecological psychology of J.J. Gibson, there is a concept of space that pre-exists subjects and objects because it ‘affords’ them. His ‘theory of affordances’ stipulates that the environment has niches, or sets of affordances, that are what it “offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes” (128) and that “different layouts afford different behaviours for different animals” (128). It is very similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the assemblage [agencement], which determines what one can do. For Gibson, “a niche refers more to how an animal lives than to where it lives” (128). Most importantly, however, is that the niche is not the phenomenal world of the inhabitant; it is not an Umwelt. The environment exists prior to its inhabitants; it is ‘invariant’. Gibson’s ecology posits a real outside of the subject that does not revolve around a subject. As a

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68 These hollowed out spaces, or spaces without worlds, are comparable to what Emmanuel Levinas calls the il y a, or the ‘there is’: the object in its abject objectivity without meaning (see his Existence and Existents). It could also be related to what Slavoj Žižek calls, in psychoanalytic terms, the ‘inertia of the real’. Moreover, there are resonances with Quentin Meillassoux’s concept of the ‘Great Outdoors’, which is a space outside of what he calls ‘correlationalism’, which he describes as “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other” (2008: 5). Therefore, he refers to the ‘great outdoors’ as the “outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere” (2008: 7).
result, the environment exhibits a cruelty: it is indifferent to that which inhabits it. For Gibson, “the organism depends on its environment for its life, but the environment does not depend on the organism for its existence” (129); these hollowed out spaces do not care for their dwellers. Space, as a result, is not automatically a dwelling; one must capture it, occupy it and territorialize it.\(^69\)

These spaces are similar to the chiaroscuro-like differential spaces that Lefebvre asserts is produced immediately by the lived body in a lived experience underneath the abstract spaces of capitalism. The difference is that there is no harmony, sympathy or unity in the cruel, hollowed out spaces. As Deleuze notes, “there is no amicability, such as that between the similar and the Same, or even that which unites opposites” (1995: 145). There is no dialectical unity here, what Lefebvre refers to as ‘unity in diversity’. Instead, there is a transversal communication through the discordant voice of the ‘dark precursor’, that is “sufficient to enable communication between difference as such” (1995: 145), but, it is important to note that “the dark precursor is not a friend” (1995: 145). The dark precursor is cruel, violent, has a habit of betrayal. There is, to reiterate, no harmony, no sympathy.

In the dark spaces of the encounter, the “terra incognita” (1995: 136), subjects are idiots in the dark, groping around for a semblance of stability. For Heidegger, as noted in the previous chapter, the room is always already familiar; the space of the room is preemptively my world and is oriented in the a priori of my being-in-the-world.\(^70\) In an early essay of Kant’s, the dark room would be oriented according to the asymmetry of the body, the left and the right. However, in his essay “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” Kant indicates that when experiencing disorientation in the face of the immeasurable supersensible, i.e. when our metrics cannot map onto the world, both

\(^69\) This can be understood in other words. For instance, the theory of affordances highlights the fact that “the perceiving of an affordance is not a process of perceiving a value-free physical object to which meaning is somehow added […]; it is a process of perceiving a value-rich ecological object” (140; emphasis added). Therefore, there are values and meanings outside of the phenomenological world of a subject. One simply has to capture them in order to territorialize them.

\(^70\) Heidegger: “I necessarily orient myself in and from already being in a ‘familiar world’” (2010: 106).
memory and reason prevails. As he states, “it will be a concern of pure reason to guide its use when it wants to leave familiar objects (of experience) behind” (2001: 8:135). In an unrecognizable space, i.e. in a dark room, subjective principles, pure reason, will guide the subject. Likewise, Lefebvre’s rhythm-analyst, in the dark, would rely on the harmony of rhythms; the synaesthetic body would guide the rhythm-analyst around the space it is always already concretely, via rhythms, in communication with. As if there is an amicable negotiation without deception: as if the surrounding space is always easily grasped. Within all of these examples, faced with the immeasurable horror of disorientation, which is the horror of a hollowed out space, the horror of a world without meaning, there is Something to rely upon: Being, Reason, the Lived Body.

However, Deleuze finds within the disorienting darkness of these hollowed spaces, not simply a cruelty, but a source of thought and creativity. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the child who hums a refrain in the dark in order to create territories, new units of measure, in order to see in the dark. And in his monograph on Francis Bacon, Deleuze refers to the ‘diagram’, which functions as the ‘refrain’ in painting. He states that the painter uses the diagram as a means of sketching units of measure, experimenting with the chaos in the infinite darkness. He illustrates that the painter, in a fit of hysteria, experiences a catastrophe, “where he or she no longer sees anything and risks foundering: the collapse of visual coordinates” (2012: 72). It is with the loss of vision, a moment of blindness, that the painter experiences a bout of creativity in a zone of indetermination. No longer shackled by the clichés attached to recognition, the painter can at last paint something new: “the painter’s hand intervenes in order to shake its own dependence and break up the sovereign optical organization: one can no longer see anything, as in a catastrophe, a chaos” (2012: 71). In the dark room, with the loss of visual coordinates, the painter experiences the chaosmos, the rhythms, which pulsate below the categories and units of measure of recognition. The painter does not rely on Reason, Being or the Lived Body to fend off the chaos; instead, he or she attempts to capture and conserve these sensations (affects, percepts) that exist prior to the body and the subject. One can only reach the pre-subjective if one lets go of one’s self and one’s
body: that is, to occupy the hollowed out spaces of absolute immanence.  

Hollowed out spaces or spaces without worlds can only be understood as absolutely immanent. It is in the dark, during the vertigo of disorientation, that we can experience movements of the infinite. In the abyss there is only the infinite, an infinite “abstracted from all spatio-temporal coordinates, restored to their pure sense, expressible by the infinitive verb” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 191). For Deleuze, absolute immanence, or the plane of immanence, can only truly be immanent when it is “no longer immanent to something other than itself” (1994: 47). Or as he writes in the essay “Immanence: A Life…” “[a]bsolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, not to something; it does not depend on an object and does not belong to a subject” (170-1). The plane of immanence is therefore without subject and object; it is the transcendental plane prior to subjects and objects, the field of perception and lived experience. As Jean Khalfa notes, “[i]mmanence most often ends up being conceived no longer in itself, but simply as a property, an attribute, as when we say ‘being immanent to something’: this implies there is something else and the immanence is no longer absolute” (64). It is the transcendental field that “escapes every transcendence of the subject as well as of the object” (1999: 170). As a result, “immanence has neither a fixed point nor a horizon that can orient thought” (Agamben, 1999: 157): contrary to Kant’s thesis that “to orient oneself means to use a given direction (when we divide the horizon into four of them) in order to find the others — literally, to find the sunrise” (2001: 8:134), in absolute immanence, a space without world, the sun never rises. There are only the speeds and slownesses of the wind, the dramas of a desert at night.

It is important to note, nevertheless, that these hollowed out spaces are not empty or void.

71 It is important to note that for Deleuze the plane of immanence can only be thought, it cannot be known because it is not experienced by a subject, but only prior to a subject. He thus retains the Kantian distinction between thought and knowledge. The plane of immanence is experienced through thought: it forces one to think, to create.

72 Deleuze retains Kant’s distinction between the transcendent and the transcendental. In fact, he finds a notion of an impersonal ‘transcendental’ in Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay The Transcendence of the Ego, where Sartre develops “an impersonal transcendental field [that] restores the rights of immanence” (1994: 47).
They are occupied by events or *haecceities*. Subjects and objects come after these *haecceities*. Hence for Deleuze, “the whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology” (1995: 52); phenomenology is always secondary. The haecceity is an event that occurs before subjects and objects develop; it “presents a mode of immanent individuation distinct from the organic individual forms that cut up [*découpe*] *a priori* the empirical field” (Zourabichvili, 2012: 195). They take place prior to the empirical field, beyond the realms of the lived body as anonymous and impersonal forces and affects. They constitute what Deleuze and Guattari call “relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements”, “subjectless individuations” (1987: 266). It is the space of affects and percepts, and the assemblages that constitute the subjects and objects.

For Deleuze and Guattari, then, on the plane of immanence one is not yet a subject who encounters an object; instead there is only a set of affects encounter another set of affects. As Deleuze writes, “you will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable” (1988b: 124). In other words, the individual on the plane of immanence is not a list of attributes, a typology, but the spatio-temporal rhythms of events and haecceities. As illustrated in the previous chapter, in his lectures on Kant, Deleuze posits that instead of using sedentary categories in order to understand a lion, the schema is a resort to abstraction in order to map out the lion’s spatio-temporal rhythms or *haecceity* (how it occupies space) in order to define it. As a result, the plane of immanence is not distributed (or ordered) according to a genealogy or history, but according to ‘latitudes’ and ‘longitudes’, *a geography*.

Thus the haecceity (the unformed bodies that populate the plane of immanence) is a “longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set

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73 Thus, in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, he uses the example of the plow horse and the ox. Instead of understanding organisms according to species or genus, just look at what they are capable of, what sort of affects they have. As he writes, “there are greater differences between an ox and a plow horse. This is because the racehorse and plow horse do not have the same affects nor the same capacity for being affected; the plow horse has affects in common rather with the ox” (124).
of nonsubjectified affects” (1987: 262). It is a pre-ontological, yet material field. They are assemblages [agencements] or compositions out of which actualized states of affairs emerge. The haecceity is, for example, “the animal-stalks-at-five-o’clock” (1987: 263). The haecceity is the spatio-temporal event of the animal stalking in that place at that time; the way it occupies a space and a time within a certain block of space and time.

As they write, “it should not be thought that a haecceity consists simply of a decor or backdrop that situates subjects, or of appendages that hold things and people to the ground. It is the entire assemblage in its individuated aggregate that is a haecceity” (1987: 262). As they note later, “[s]patiotemporal relations, determinations, are not predicates of the thing but dimensions of multiplicities. The street is as much a part of the omnibus-horse assemblage as the Hans assemblage the becoming-horse of which it initiates” (1987: 263). These events do not take place between a subject and object, but the entire assemblage that precedes that confrontation and assembles it. These haecceities or events that occupy a plane of immanence are therefore spatiotemporal assemblages. The actualized subject and object domain emerges from these transcendental fields populated by events, haecceities and atmospheres that are subjectless.

The plane of immanence is therefore the impersonal transcendental field that precedes subjects and objects. It is a subject-less landscape of flux populated only by speeds and slownesses. As Deleuze and Guattari write, in What is Philosophy?, “it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events” (47). As illustrated above, this is not an event that refers to a subject or an object: “[t]he event does not relate the lived to a transcendent subject = Self, but on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject” (1994: 48; emphasis mine). The transcendental field can no longer take the perspective of

74 As Zourabichvili notes, in relation to Deleuze’s reading of Proust, “we do not love someone apart from the landscapes, hours and circumstances of all kinds that they envelop” (195). In other words, we do not only love a subject, but we love the spaces and times they envelop with them. Or as Deleuze states in his interview with Claire Parnet, in L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, “You never desire someone or something, you always desire an aggregate […]. I don’t desire a woman, I also desire a landscape that is enveloped in this woman” (“D comme Désir”).
a consciousness unifying it, but is instead, a survey \textit{[survol]} over a field without a subject. Paul Bains refers to it as “autopoietic immanence”, a field that self-organizes (102). There is nothing external to organize it. All there is is an immanent survey \textit{[survol]}: “A ‘fourth person singular’. An in-itself that is not for-itself. Auto-affection. A self-feeling unicity. A real space. Not a Cartesian or Bergsonian space” (Bains 105). There is no Body here to constitute it; the formed bodies emerge afterward. Deleuze and Guattari refer to Ruyer’s concept of ‘survey’ \textit{[survol]} in order to understand the plane of immanence; in French, sur-vol, literally means a ‘flight over’ or an ‘overview’, a view from above. It is like a satellite recording an image of Earth from above, detached from all human perspective. It creates an image that is ‘absolute’, “that is not relative to any point of view exterior to itself, which knows itself without observing itself”. It is an abstracted image beyond the lived experiences of any subject that survey the hollowed out spaces or spaces without worlds.

### 3.3 Abstraction and Occupation

We are commonly told that abstractions are passive and withdrawn, removed from a living reality. Etymologically, it comes from the Latin \textit{abstractus} or \textit{abstrahere}, ‘to be drawn away’ or ‘to draw away’— \textit{trahere} meaning ‘to draw’. Abstraction is then to be \textit{withdrawn}: to draw a line outside. To abstract is to withdraw from the sensible world. Abstract art, for instance, is not concerned with representing the world, or figuration, but of creating something else, another world.

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75 ‘Autopoiesis’ refers to living systems that are capable of self-reproducing, for instance biological cells. The biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela introduced it as a concept in the 1970s. See their \textit{Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living} (1980). Guattari often refers to Maturana and Varela in order to understand the production of subjectivity. See Guattari’s \textit{The Three Ecologies}.

76 Raymond Ruyer was a French philosopher who is known for his work on socio-biology and cybernetics, particular in his work \textit{Néofinalisme} (1952). Deleuze and Guattari refer to his concept of the brain in their conclusion to \textit{What is Philosophy?} in order to conceive of a concept of Life beyond phenomenology.

77 This quote is from Ruyer’s \textit{Néofinalisme} (p. 98), quoted here from Paul Bains’s essay “Subjectless Subjectivities” (109); translation his.

78 Or abstraction is to draw \textit{with} the sensible world, instead of imitating or attempting to reproduce it.
In his book *Abstraction and Empathy*, art historian Wilhelm Worringer draws a distinction, in order to clarify an understanding of abstraction, from what he calls empathy. Empathy is seeing oneself in the external world; artists guided by what he calls the ‘urge to empathy’ thereby paint themselves into the outside world, and moreover spectators enjoy this art because they, also, see themselves there. As Worringer describes, empathy is the “complete confidence in the external world, this unproblematic sense of *being at home in the world*” (45, fn. 14). Worringer, therefore, in proto-Heideggerian fashion, declares that empathetic art seeks to portray man’s dwelling, a being-in-the-world. Empathetic art is ultimately a phenomenological art: it paints the pre-established harmony between humans and space as if humans are always already at home.

In contrast, abstraction, or the ‘urge to abstraction’, is, for Worringer, the urge “to wrest the object of the external world out of its natural context, out of the unending flux of being” (16-7). One abstracts in order to escape the horrors of an incommensurable world: the urge to abstraction in art is, for Worringer, the “outcome of a great inner unrest inspired in man by the phenomena of the outside”, and he describes this state as “an immense spiritual dread of space” (15). Abstraction is then a way to assuage the cruelty of the space outside of one’s dwelling. The painter paints abstractions because he or she understands that there is no pre-established harmony between the interiority of the subject and the external world.79

In Marxist terms, moreover, abstraction is alienation: to abstract out of reality is to be alienated from the concrete relations of production of labour and of society. Capitalism is, in the words of Alberto Toscano, “the culture of abstraction *par excellence*, as a society that, *pace* many of the more humanist denunciations of the dominant ideology, is really driven, in many respects, by abstract entities, traversed by powers of abstraction” (2008a: 273). As the latter half of the quote maintains, not only does capitalism work with abstractions, but it also functions through abstractions. Toscano continues:

79 However, it is also clear that Worringer’s concept of empathy, or the ‘urge to empathy’, seems to function according to the same dread; and instead of seeing the outside world as such the painter paints his reflection there as a façade; as a result, it is still an abstraction.
“something really happens when abstraction takes place” (2008a: 279) because “abstractions are not mental categories that ideally precede the concrete totality; they are real abstractions that are truly caught up in the social whole, the social relation” (2008a: 275). In other words, abstractions have a real effect in concrete relations; they are not totally withdrawn in an ideal realm. In fact, what Marx calls ‘real’ or ‘concrete’ abstraction precedes thought and is “operative in the world” (Toscano, 2008b: 68).

Abstractions thereby have a constitutive effect in reality. In order to understand how we are ‘in’ space, we cannot solely invoke immediate lived experience, but need to address the role of abstractions in the occupations of space and territories.

Paolo Virno, in his essay “The Two Masks of Materialism,” summarizes the issue of reducing abstraction to a pure ideality. In this essay, he points out that in critical thought, notably Marxist, there are two different figures: the sensationalist and the materialist-sociologist. The latter seeks to “shed light upon the socio-historical conditionings of abstract thought and thereby to deny its supposed purity” (167), but during this journey (“looking for dirty laundry”) this figure “fail[s] to grasp the status of knowledge, he also loses hold of the very ‘society’ in whose name he claims to speak: he fails to notice the abstract connections (‘real abstractions’, as Marx called them) that pervade society and make it cohere” (168). In contrast, the sensationalist’s “dominant theme is the shadow thrown by the body unto thought, the role played by the sensible in the abstraction that would like to efface it” (168). The sensationalist seeks in an immediate experience the differences that the categories of language cannot contain or could not foresee, where “what is perceived in the silence of touch remains independent from the speculative power of language” (169). However, what this figure fails to notice are the real or concrete abstractions that have an effect in reality. In both cases, the figures lose touch with the ‘real abstractions’ that pervade society, both productive and produced. Virno’s thesis is that instead of simply searching for the socio-historical conditions or accessing
via an intuition or the body an immediate experience, abstractions need to be *politically*.\(^{80}\)

Lefebvre is caught between these two figures; he straddles the line as a Marxist and a phenomenologist, the sociologist and the philosopher. The main thread throughout his *oeuvre* attempts to understand how Marx’s concept of ‘alienation’ infiltrates everyday life (and space). For Marx, alienation is what “estranges man [sic] from his own body, from nature as it exists outside him, from his spiritual essence [*Wesen*], his *human* essence” (1992: 794); alienation abstracts the human from his or her concrete relations within the world, from his or her ‘species-being.’ Abstractions are not only mental categories, but have a social influence.

The clearest example of Lefebvre tackling the issue of abstraction is through his concept of ‘abstract space’, which as shown in the first chapter, is the space that capitalism produces. However, it is important to note that he considers theses ‘abstract spaces’ as concrete abstractions that nevertheless have an impact in how spaces are lived in and conceived. Stanek states that Lefebvre bases his understanding of abstract space as a concrete abstraction from “Marx’s analysis of labor in his *Grundrisse* as an ‘abstraction which became true in practice’” (2008: 67). To return briefly to Lefebvre’s concept of ‘abstract space’, it is important to remember that ‘abstract spaces’ attempt to smother the differences that the lived experiences of space produce through conceptions and discourses of space, the ‘representations of space.’ These are abstractions, however, that do not only have an effect at the level of ideas, but, as Derek McCormick points out, “for Lefebvre the space of capitalism can be understood as a concrete abstraction – something borne of a withdrawal from the world which nevertheless becomes a constitutive element of that world” (718). In other words, the abstract representations of space are not detached from the relations within space, but have a constitutive effect upon spatial practices. In a sense, these abstractions are enacted and lived. As Lefebvre explains, “lived experience is crushed, vanquished by what is ‘conceived of’” (1991: 51). These

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\(^{80}\) For example, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the ‘line of flight’, which is an abstraction, drawn out of reality, yet nevertheless carves through reality in search of weapons.
are lived abstractions: “how abstractions affect us and modify our capacity to affect and be affected by other agencies and forces in the world” (McCormick 728). Moreover, they are not descriptions, but affect the capacity to imagine other possibilities, or other space-times. In relation to Worringer’s distinctions above, ‘abstract spaces’ are representations of space that attempt to cover-over the dread that space elicits; they are façades that render the external world livable according to a common sense.

Yet in reference to Virno’s two figures above, it is still unclear which mask Lefebvre wears. As he expresses the importance of the lived experience of the body, he appears to be, what Virno calls, a ‘sensationalist’. The body is always already in revolt; it is the source of differences against the abstractions of capital. However, this is not completely correct. In The Production of Space, for instance, Lefebvre refers to the role of art and ‘representational spaces’, the creation of spaces in art as a means to imagine new spaces in reality. The abstract art of Klee and Picasso, for him, “bore witness to the emergence of another space, a space not fragmented but differential” (1991: 303). Lefebvre highlights the fact that one cannot escape abstraction when dealing with space, which is evident in consideration of his spatial dialectic: space must be understood through the three different moments at once; in other words, it can never be experienced without an abstraction. Nevertheless, as McCormick points out, Lefebvre does not explicitly develop “an affirmative critique of abstraction” (720). His criticism of abstract space relies on a ‘phenomenologically’ influenced notion of lived experience that precedes thought and logos. The immediate presence of the body prevails.

Abstract Machines

Lefebvre’s understanding of dwelling and space is limited because he bases them on the immediacy of a lived experience, missing the fact that abstractions are a constitutive fact of being in space, and a means of creating different spaces. It “is a constituent element of the background infrastructures that allow life to show up and register as experience. Seen in this way, abstraction is an irreducible part of the ontogenetic character of the worlds we inhabit” (McCormick 720). For instance, perceptual systems rely on abstractions in order to register information that comes form the external world. There is no immediately
lived experience prior to abstraction. In fact, what Deleuze’s concept of the encounter illustrates is that the experiences of the plane of immanence that occur beyond the doxa of coded and striated space are fundamentally abstract.

Abstractions allow us to withdraw from the actual states of affairs, of the empirical field. As McKenzie Wark writes, “[t]o abstract is to construct a plane upon which otherwise different and unrelated matters may be brought into relations” (008). As a result, abstractions are not simplifications or reductions, but move beyond the naturalized borders of the human body in order confront the transcendental conditions of real conditions, i.e. what Deleuze calls the ‘virtual’. Abstractions in this sense will allow one to construct many different unnatural mixtures, that is, to experiment with heterogeneous spaces and times.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari rebuke certain linguists whose abstractions are “not abstract enough” (1987: 141), and then, in contrast, offer a form of abstraction they call the ‘abstract machine’, which does not set up abstract limits, but instead withdraws in order to allow for a greater connection between disparate things. Abstract machines, for them, are the immanent motors of assemblages. As Deleuze and Guattari describe it, the abstract machine “in itself is destratified, deterritorialized; it has no form of its own (much less substance) and makes no distinction within itself between content and expression” (1987: 141). It is a “pure abstracted function” that “links two incongruous systems together” (Zdebik 5; 4). Essentially, abstract machines or abstractions as such, for Deleuze and Guattari, are neither meant to reduce the world into “schematic simplification[s]” nor in order to reproduce or retain a “resemblance to any previous reality (whether conceived or existing)” (Vellodi 87), but are to “connect with, and draw together, as much of the world as possible without reducing it” (McCormick 723). It is, therefore, the essence of assemblages as they mutate or modulate; the abstract machine is its ‘piloting device’, probing into future connections or conjugations, sharpening the edges of deterritorialization.

Moreover, the abstract machine is a ‘concrete’ or ‘real’ abstraction, operative in reality. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, “this is the height of abstraction, but also the moment at
which abstraction becomes real” (1987: 145-6); it is a “Real-Abstract” (1987: 142). Reality is constructed through abstractions.81 The abstract machine operates, therefore, on what Deleuze has called, elsewhere, the virtual. Abstract machines map out virtualities in their processes of actualization and in effect accelerate these actualizations. For Deleuze and Guattari, reality is a construction, not by humans or society, but by abstract machines that disregard any nature-culture divide. McCormick describes it as a concept “that provides a way of plugging into materialities across diverse forms of life, allowing them to be conceived in terms of non-reducible consistencies and gatherings rather than in terms of concreteness” (723). The abstract machine is not quite a ‘structure’ in the sense of ‘structuralism’ because its “alliances weave a supple and transversal network” that renders the structure supple in a “perpetual disequilibrium” (Deleuze, 1988a: 36); it is instead a virtual framework, the ‘immanent cause’ of the assemblage as it mutates, de- and re-territorializing on the ‘plane of immanence’.

The abstract machine, for Deleuze and Guattari, takes on different names: the diagram and the map/cartography. However, despite these terms, the abstractions of the diagram or the abstractions of the map, despite being withdrawn from the world, do not intend on imitating or reproducing the world, but are constructive and pragmatic. They construct new types of realities: “[t]he diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (1987: 142; emphasis mine). That is, new spaces or new worlds. Abstractions, do not simply experiment with ideas, but with reality. John Rajchman underlines the constructive nature of abstractions: they “consist in an impure mixing and mixing up, prior to Forms, a reassemble that moves toward an outside rather than a purification that turns up to essential Ideas” (56). In a word, abstractions affirm the ab-, the ‘outside’ and non-stratified space. Rajchman continues: “[o]ne can then see abstraction not as elimination of figure or story but rather as an invention of other spaces with original sorts of mixture or assemblage, a prodigious ‘and’” (61). These abstractions not only allow us

81 Not in the sense that there is no ‘real’ outside of our constructions, nor that ‘reality’ consists solely of social constructions. Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is a reality in itself, but that material processes construct this reality.
to understand *how* heterogeneous things hold together, but also, how we can experiment and construct new types of mixtures, new types of spaces.

Moreover, abstractions are tools that allow us to perceive and work with space. Space, contrary to the *urdoxa* of phenomenology, is not something that can be immediately experienced. Abstractions must be understood as means to experiment with spaces; they are necessary “precisely because something of lived experience is always partially withdrawn from us” (McCormick 720). Contrary to Lefebvre’s theory of space, there is no pre-established harmony between the body and space. Therefore, insofar as abstraction is a withdrawal from the reality of space, and insofar as space is always withdrawn from the subject (one is not always already at home in the world): “the abstraction provides a way of drawing out elements of the world in ways that make them thinkable and sense-able” (McCormick 727). They are tools for capturing anonymous forces that precede subjects and objects; that is, tools for experiencing the plane of immanence. 82 To occupy, then, is a way to introduce the power of abstraction into ‘dwelling’; in other words, to occupy is not to dwell in a home, but to take up a space that is always in connection with the Outside via abstractions and to construct territories.

**Diagrams and Cartography**

A diagram is an example of an abstraction as an epistemic tool: it is a way to capture information and to experiment with spaces that are not already known, and thus to create new spaces. The diagram itself, however, is a “configuration of lines” (Zdebik 1); it is a type of spatialized thought, abstracted out of an actualized state of affairs, in order to experiment with other spatial forms in order to create new spaces by capturing forces. It does not seek to represent a fully formed object, but an object-in-movement, an emergent object. For instance, in architecture, the diagram does not represent the building actualized, but is rather an abstraction of the building in its process of being built, as it actualizes. Etymologically, from the Greek *diagramma*, the diagram is a drawing of lines,

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82 Keeping in mind the double meaning of the world *experience* in French: not only in the sense of a practical contact with events or facts, but also the sense of experimentation.
or to withdraw via lines, and not simply of a corresponding reality, but in order to forge a new kind of reality. Jakub Zdebiak describes Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the diagram as “the dynamic, fluctuating process occurring between static structures. As a concept, it describes the flexible, elastic, incorporeal functions before they are setting into a definitive form” (1). In a sense, it operates au milieu between stratified structures. It is a sketch or schema that seeks to map processes of actualization.

In his impressive study of the diagram in mathematics and science, *Figuring Space: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics*, Gilles Châtelet equates the diagram to a thought experiment “where Nature and the Understanding switch places” (12). For instance, in moments where the faculties of the understanding break down, in, what Deleuze calls, an encounter. He uses the example of Archimedes in his bathtub where Archimedes “imagines that his body is nothing but a gourd of water” (12), where he is becoming-wineskin because “to understand floating, it is necessary to turn oneself into a wineskin” (12). Diagrams are not attempts to understand being, what something is. Instead, it is a non-representative and spatial means for grasping states of becoming. As Châtelet describes, “[diagrams] capture gestures mid-flight; for those capable of attention, they are moments where being is glimpsed smiling” (10). Yet the diagram can never contain the smile. The ‘dotted lines’ of diagrams, for Châtelet, are not attempts at immobilizing a gesture; they refer “neither to the point and its discrete destination, nor to the line and its continuous trace, but to the pressure of the virtuality” (10; emphasis mine). The diagram does not trace the real, but attempts to capture a heterogeneous reality in becoming. It is a way to understand the virtual abstracted out of the actualized states of affairs. The dotted lines do not reproduce an actualized object, but delimit the real conditions of the object’s actualization.

The diagram, then, does not attempt to reduce reality to essential, Platonic Forms. Instead, the diagrammatic abstraction “as a process is provisional and prospective, intended to open up potential space-times rather than close them down” (McCormick 724). As the spaces around us withdraw, diagrams can be utilized in order to capture potential space-times, instead of fixing them according to sedentary categories. They are then ‘devices of equilibrium’ that allow us to make cuts out of the real in order to
confront the chaos of reality.\footnote{Refer to Deleuze’s discussion of the technique of \textit{découpage} in cinema, which is the act of cutting and reassemblage or the process of constructing blocs of space-time in film. See p. xii of \textit{Cinema 1: The Movement-Image} (1986) for the translator’s explanation of this idea and the \textit{productive} and constructive relation it draws between cinema and philosophy.} Diagrams are used to make cuts out of the real, to remove pieces of matter, and to attach it somewhere else, where it did not ‘belong.’ As Châtelet describes the process: “this consists in cutting out a part by thought and propelling oneself there, inventing a passage by an interior and exterior decided on by the geometer” (34). Diagrams allow us to construct with reality, to create new mixtures and new disjunctive and heterogeneous syntheses.

Deleuze ultimately draws his understanding of the diagram from the work of Michel Foucault, who is no longer, for him, a historian, an archivist, but a cartographer, he who plots lines. For Deleuze’s Foucault, the abstract machine or diagram is the ‘immanent cause’ within in a field of power: the power relations that precede reality and produce it. Deleuze defines Foucault’s diagram as that which “acts as a non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field: the abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete assemblages that executes its relations; and these relations between forces take place ‘not above’ but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce” (1988a: 37). In other words, the diagram, here, consists of the spatio-temporal relations out of which society organizes itself: the real conditions of reality. It is “a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak” (1988a: 34). It determines the visible and the sayable: the real ‘distribution of the sensible’ and thinkable.\footnote{Jacques Rancière has developed the concept of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ in order to understand the nexus between politics and aesthetics; while there are resonances between his work and Deleuze’s and Foucault’s, his concept is ultimately limited to the \textit{possible} conditions of sensible experience. See his book \textit{The Politics of the Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible} (2004).} It determines what can be experienced and thought.

However, the diagram is not something actualized; it is the virtual transcendental field of real conditions of experience. In the example of the \textit{Panopticon}, the diagram is not the actual prison, but captures the function of \textit{seeing without being seen}. As Zdebik describes, the diagram is not “the cells, the walls and the tower, but the relationship...
between the prisoners within that environment. This relationship, abstracted from the prison structure, can be transposed to other structures — such as schools, barracks and hospitals — which are built around a similar relationship between surveillance for the purpose of control” (5-6). It does not represent the actual prison, but is concerned with the abstract functions of power. In a disciplinary society, like the one Foucault describes, the Panopticon is the diagram of how the society immanently organizes itself. As Deleuze writes, a diagram of power or of organization is solely concerned with imposing “a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity” (1988a: 34; emphasis his). It produces a reality according to the specific function of ‘seeing without being seen’.

The diagram is essentially a tool for mapping out the relations of force or power that constitute society. Therefore, for Deleuze’s Foucault, the cartographer, “the diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography coextensive with the whole social field” (1988a: 34). As a map, the diagram does not solely trace extensive space, but “is a map of relations between forces, a map of density, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relations (1988a: 36). The cartographer is not concerned with Being, which is the historian’s domain: “history is the archive, the design of what we are and cease being” (2007b: 345). The cartographer’s map is concerned with becoming; it is a non-representative tool for capturing anonymous forces. Thus Foucault, as a cartographer, is not concerned with the past, but with what Deleuze calls ‘currentness’, where “the current is the sketch [i.e. diagram] of what we will become” (2007b: 345). The cartographer draws diagrams, sketches, of a possible future.

Deleuze also describes Foucault’s concept of the ‘dispositif’ as a map. It is “a skein, a multilinear whole. It is composed of lines of different natures. […] Each line is broken,

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85 Later in this essay, Deleuze relates ‘currentness’ to what Nietzsche has called the ‘untimely’, i.e. “not predicting, but being attentive to the unknown at the door” (2007b: 346). Giorgio Agamben, in his essay “What is Contemporary?” describes this untimeliness or time-out-of-jointness as a relationship with time, a con-temporariness, where one “firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to perceive not its light, but rather its darkness” (2009: 44).

86 It is important to note the difference between ‘apparatus’ [appareil] and dispositif. Apparatus refers to the idea of machinery, a device, a system, whereas the dispositif (disposition) has a meaning closer to the idea of a heterogeneous arrangement of things in movement, like the disposition of troops in battle or of sheep in a pasture. (See: Bussolini 95).
subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subjected to derivations” (2007b: 338). As the abstract machine of society, the ‘dispositif’ is an immanent map, a configuration of lines, of latitudes and longitudes. It “acts in part by determining what one can see and say in a certain historical configuration of forces” (Bussololini 100). Thus, Foucault’s critical ontology is a cartographic or an ethological project, where “to criticize means to expose one’s own ontological status” (Lemke 70-1); that is, to draw a map, to map out one’s dispositif, to determine the limits of what one can do and to experiment with them. As Deleuze states, “[u]ntangling the lines of an apparatus [dispositif] means, in each case, preparing a map, a cartography, a survey [survol] of unexplored lands” (2007b: 338-9). The map of the dispositif is not in order to determine what one is, but to determine where one is going; it is a way to analyze a multiplicity of forces in movement; it is a “tool to think about power in the perpetually dynamic social field” (Bussolini 90) that does not reduce it to a prior reality, but seeks to capture it in its movement and transformations.

Cartography also supplies a new ‘image of thought’, not tied to a Transcendental Subject or consciousness, but rather a rhizomatic image of thought that surveys [survol] from an absolute point of view and allows, instead of a singular perspective, a multiplicity or heterogeneity of perspectives. In the introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to cartography as the fifth principle of the rhizome because the map does not seek to trace the real, but experiment with it; it does not seek to grasp what something is (Being), but to sketch where it is going (Becoming). It is similar to Foucualt’s critical ontology, which is a “historico-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond” (1997: 127). The rhizome-map is a pragmatic and experimental groping, a ‘probing device’. As Manola Antonioli asserts, in his essay “Singularités cartographiques”, “[l]ike the rhizome, the map appears like a tool that aims to multiply the routes of access to the real, that affirms the complexity, multiplicity and singularity through a productive or constructive activity of which never has a pre-given sense”.87 As a spatial tool, the map

87 “Comme le rhizome, la carte apparaît ainsi comme un outil qui vise à multiplier les voies d’accès au réel, qui affirme la complexité, la multiplicité et la singularité grâce à une activité de production et de construction d’un sens qui n’est jamais donné préalablement.”
provides a means to experiment with space, i.e. the spaces without world. Both the map and the diagram operate on the plane of immanence. They are not transcendent; but, like Ruyer’s ‘absolute survey’, the map surveys the plane of immanence at infinite speeds. It is an absolute point of view that connects heterogeneous spatio-temporal realities. It is a tool to aid our *thinking* of the plane of immanence about which we cannot have knowledge or experience. Hence it is an ‘image of thought’.

In his essay “What Children Say” and in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze refers to the work of Fernand Deligny, whose method of psychology was to map out the movements of autistic children. Deligny develops what Deleuze calls a “geoanalysis” (2002: 128). For Deleuze, Deligny’s maps are instructive because, in contrast to the ‘archaeological model’ of psychoanalysis, they do not search for the origin of the symptom in the past, but instead maps out lines of trajectories in movement. He describes these maps of autistic children as a mixture of lines, “the lines of custom and also the supple lines where the child produces a loop, finds something, claps his hand, hums a ritornello, retraces his steps, and then the ‘lines of wandering’ mixed up in the two others. All these lines are tangled” (2002: 127). In other words, these maps do not intend on reducing the children to their pasts (as subjects), but are the maps of the children’s spatio-temporal dynamisms, their rhythms. These are the dramas of a milieu, of a set of problems. The map captures the *haecceity* of the child as it occupies a certain space-time or milieu. It does not follow a subject, but instead allows us to follow “the subjectivity of the milieu itself, insofar as it is reflected in those who travel through it” (1997: 61). It is a map of a territory, of a space-time, and not of a subject; it is not a photograph, but a map. It seeks to capture a *mise-en-scène*, a drama without actors, a scene not reduced to the perspective of a body or of a subject.

The map provides an image of thought, not tied to a subject, but abstracted out to a territory or assemblage; it expresses the set of real conditions of experience: what a body is capable of in a certain space-time. Deleuze notes that a map is comparable to a painting “insofar as a painting is less a window on the world à la Italienne, than an arrangement *[agencement]* on a surface” (1997: 66). In other words, the map does not present a single field reduced to the linear perspective of a consciousness or of a particular body, but a
cartographic plane that brings together a heterogeneity of perspectives and possibilities, a multiplicity of lines. The images of maps should not “be understood only in extension, in relation to a space constituted by trajectories. There are also maps of intensity, of density, that are concerned with what fills space, what subtends the trajectory” (1997: 63); that is, with what occupies a territory. These are maps of the intensive spatium or of the virtual.

As a result, cartography produces a new type of visibility, an image of thought, which is akin to Ruyer’s ‘absolute survey’ [survol], a sort of satellite view. Christine Buci-Glucksmann describes the cartographic perspective as a “veritable alternative to the Albertian model of the window opened onto the world, and it gives rise to a descriptive and constructed visual arrangement, a space that is open to multiple entrances, a ‘plateau’ where the gaze becomes nomadic”. Infinite space shifts from the black hole of linear perspective to the nomadic gaze that traverses the planar space. The map introduces what Buci-Glucksmann calls “un œil monde” (1997: 56), the look of a world, or a cartographic eye, that captures “two infinities: the cosmic infinity of the world (the sea dusted with light at the horizon) and the extreme concern with the molecular detail of places and surfaces”. Space is not reduced to the phenomenological subject or body. Instead there is the ‘cartographic cogito’, which is “thus that of a voyage in space-time and of a plural subject: being here and elsewhere, being near and far, being multiple”. In this sense, cartography posits a new kind of cogito removed from its bodily cage (‘dwelling cage’) in order to grasp itself as a spatial or territorial being, a spatio-temporal dynamism, a set of habits and routines, that are nevertheless open to other possibilities, other trajectories, other lines.

Abstractions moves thought beyond the restrictions of phenomenology and the lived experience of the body in order to capture the becomings that are drawn in spatio-temporal territories and assemblages. For Deleuze, becomings “belong to geography, they are orientations, directions, entries and exits” (2002: 2); the map is an attempt to

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88 From her essay, “From the Cartographic View to the Virtual”.
89 From her essay, “An Impure Abstraction: from Marcel Duchamp to Cartography”.
90 From her essay, “From the Cartographic View to the Virtual”.

capture this geography that takes place beyond consciousness and bodily experiences. The map is, moreover, an abstraction that facilitates occupations; it allows us to survey [survol] the ‘virtual,’ to evaluate lines of becoming, ways to experiment with space, to create more connections, to construct different assemblages, and produce different subjectivities.91

3.4 Conclusion: Occupation as the Art of the Territory

As shown above, Lefebvre’s concept of space is necessarily tied to the idea of a lived body through the concept of ‘dwelling’ [habiter], where, if one brackets history out, space is organized and oriented according to the lived body, that is according to affects, symmetry and rhythms. It is fundamentally a ‘phenomenological’ concept of space. It is, in other words, the lived experience of a body in space that produces space prior to the ‘representations of space’ of the dominant mode of production. For Lefebvre, “the fleshy (spatio-temporal) body is already in revolt” (1991: 201). As a result, it assumes that the body and space are always already in harmony, in a pre-established harmony. But this does not allow for a space without a subject, or a space that is not already pre-emptively organized and oriented by a subject or the body. In this case, the body is a transcendent force that unifies space into a field of perception. It reduces space the level of the empirical, the given, indistinguishable from a phenomenological ‘world’.

In order to move beyond phenomenology, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize a transcendental field that is not traced from the empirical, but rather explains the genesis of the empirical or how the given is given. That is, not the sensible, but the being of the sensible. This concept of the transcendental however differs from the Kantian transcendental, which concerns the conditions of possible experience. The transcendental here concerns the conditions of real experience; it is what Deleuze calls the virtual.

91 This is how Deleuze and Guattari describes the pragmatic use of abstraction: “This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. It is through a meticulous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines of flight” (1987: 160).
Where a ‘dwelling’ \textit{[habiter]} posits an always already being-in-the-world, the pre-established harmony with a space, a space that revolves around a body, occupation emphasizes the necessity for the construction and creation of territories in a \textit{space-without-world}. Occupation is a non-phenomenological dwelling because it goes \textit{beyond} the lived experiences of the subject or of the body through abstractions that allows one to think the transcendental conditions of real experiences. Abstractions like diagrams and maps facilitate occupations by allowing one to survey the transcendental field, to select and evaluate possible routes, possible lines to take to create new states of affairs. Occupations do not construct phenomenological spaces that emerge from a transcendent body; rather they are \textit{captures} of forces and affects that precede the lived experience of a subject or body. Dwelling is always to return home, to return to Being, whereas occupation is a betrayal of Being, the capture of a time and a space, in order to territorialize it.

Occupations, in other words, allow us to experiment and connect with the spaces without worlds that precede and exist without us; in fact, we occupy the world before we dwell in it, that is, before we build our houses to dwell in there are the occupations that are like the spatio-temporal dynamisms or the dramas without actors that Deleuze discusses in \textit{Difference and Repetition}. As discussed in chapter 2, occupations have a rhythmic form, the \textit{rhythmós}—a fluid dis-position. They are how both organic and non-organic things take up space and time in an \textit{intensive spatium}. It is, in other words, the \textit{art} of the territory, the dramatizations that the territory expresses. For instance, the schema or map of the lion traces its spatio-temporal dynamisms, its particular dramas in its everyday life, or how it occupies space-time, which is what the territory expresses. The lion \textit{is} how it occupies space and time, what sorts of movements it is capable of; its subjectivity is not simply determined by the territories it occupies, but \textit{is} that territory. Occupations are how territories (a notion of a subject abstracted beyond its lived body to the sets of affects it is capable of within a particular space-time or assemblage \textit{[agencement]}) capture impersonal forces and subjective affects, like the cold mists of the space without world.
Conclusion: “…Man [sic] Politically Occupies…”

The Occupy movement as it has manifested around the world, and beyond its seeming success or failure within the judgments of History, has altered the way politics is understood. It has renewed a set of problems and possibilities for political practice. This thesis has taken it as a guide to re-conceptualize how one occupies space in terms of politics. In fact, all occupations of space are primarily political. In other words, the Occupy movement highlights, not only that politics occurs in space, but also that politics is of space. For example, W.J.T. Mitchell indicates, “the iconic moments, the images that promise to become monuments of the global revolution of 2011 are not those of face but of space” (12). It is a politics without identity and without representation. It can be understood in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘minor politics’, where, as Nick Thoburn points out, “there is no identity to unfurl [because] the ‘people’, as Deleuze puts it, ‘are missing’”.

It is a politics abstracted beyond that of the lived experience of a people to a politics of space, to spaces of possibilities, or ‘territories’ that will, in turn, be the ‘fabulation’ of a new people.

Occupy is the politics of spaces, territories and assemblages. The squares, parks, places, and streets: these are the actors in the politics of Occupy. Politics is, as a result, the construction of space-times, of assemblages [agencements], of territories, which is fundamentally the production of subjectivity. It is akin to the way Deleuze and Guattari describe the board game Go. In contrast to chess, which “codes and decodes space”, “Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterritorializing [space] (make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory; deterritorializes the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorializes oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere…). Another justice, another movement, another space-time” (1987: 353). It is an inhuman politics: no longer

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anthropomorphic, but ‘geomorphic’, the shifting landscape of a de-populated space, the dramas of the desert.

The ethico-politics of Deleuze and Guattari also emphasizes a sober, pragmatic constructivism: the construction of territories. As Simon O’Sullivan argues, in Deleuze and Guattari, the “emphasis on cohesiveness, on a consolidated territory, is needed before anything new can either be identified or utilized. This amounts to saying that a rupture or acceleration on its own is not enough and that the production of subjectivity is nothing if not a procedural and constructive project” (97). As a result, despite the typical criticisms of Deleuzean politics,93 it is not only a valorization of acceleration, but also emphasizes the slow and sober processes of construction and creation. In fact, politics is the construction of territories, of capturing a specific space and transforming it, and out of which new subjectivities, new practices and new agencies emerge.94 In the words of Isabelle Stengers, politics is the betrayal of a territory: “the fabrication of a line of flight […] does not denounce, but rather betrays, makes perceptible, the special power of the territory” (42). There is no experience of the virtual, or the molecular as such. A political practice that emphasizes virtual or molecular processes nevertheless must go through the actual.95 There are only experiences of the ‘actual’. Hence the necessity of abstractions, maps and diagrams, in order to access the ‘special power of the territory’ that latently lies there, imperceptibly.

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93 See the works of Slavoj Žižek, Peter Hallward, and Alain Badiou for the typical criticisms of Deleuzean politics, which they all claim is incapable of explaining how a politics could take place in the ‘actual’, and thus it valorizes the ‘virtual’; and in Žižek’s case, he goes so far to call Deleuze and Guattari the ideologists of neoliberal capitalism.

94 See Thomas Nail, who writes in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s political constructivism: “while philosophy creates concepts, politics creates practices” (27); that is, politics creates new space-times or assemblages out of which new practices emerge.

95 See Rodrigo Nunes’s essay “Politics in the Middle: For a Political Interpretation of the Dualisms in Deleuze and Guattari”, wherein he describes the actual/virtual, molar/molecular, striated/smooth as ‘dyads’ instead of dualisms because there is “no choice between the two poles, because one can only ever choose in between them” (120). One can only experience the ‘virtual’ “insofar as it is mediated by an actual encounter” (119).
Occupy, then, as a politics without subjects, is not a ‘voluntarist’ politics,⁹⁶ instead it occurs through what Zourabichvili calls Deleuze’s ‘involuntarism.’⁹⁷ Involuntarism is a politics of the event, chances and accidents, which one cannot anticipate. For example, one experiences an encounter and cannot recognize what is happening; in response, one must construct or create an idea or a concept in order to regain orientation. One must re-orient the space around them, or in other words: construct new territories. Veronique Bergen describes it as a “passivity inscribed in a constructivist choice” (38-9). It is a politics that is oriented towards the virtual conditions of an actual state of affairs; it is about constructing new real conditions of Being.⁹⁸

In other words, occupation can be called the ‘art’ of the territory. Art, for Deleuze and Guattari, never aims to reproduce or imitate a preceding reality; its aim is solely “of capturing forces” (2012: 40) i.e. the impersonal percepts and asubjective affects that precede the subject and produce subjectivities. As Anne Sauvagnargue writes, “the task of [art] is to make the haecceity last by fixing it to a support” (140). It is to express pure spatio-temporal events, to render visible otherwise imperceptible events. Therefore, the occupation of the territory, or the art of occupation, is to capture the event of a space-time, which the territory expresses. Occupation is not the art of dwelling: it is “not synthesthesia in the flesh, but blocs of sensation in the territory” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994:184). Occupation, in sum, is the politics of capturing forces that construct new manners of being, new spatio-temporal dynamisms that the territory expresses.

In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that architecture is the first art; it is the construction of territories or houses wherein the phenomenological body blossoms. Territories are like the meaningless bones that give structure to our flesh. However, they take pains to note that these houses are not composed of insular walls and always have

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⁹⁶ For instance, those espoused by Peter Hallward and Alain Badiou
⁹⁷ See Zourabichvili’s essay “Les deux pensées de Deleuze et Negri” wherein he describes Deleuze’s ‘involuntarism’ as where “on ne saurait anticiper ce qui ne peut être que créé […] ou bien il est possible de souligner des axes de lutte d’un nouveau type parce que ces luttes sont déjà à l’œuvre” (2002: 2-3).
⁹⁸ As Deleuze and Guattari write, “before Being, there is politics” (1987: 249).
windows open onto the cosmos.

Taking an example from the Occupy movement, the ‘tent’ is perhaps that wherein one does not dwell, but ‘occupies’. Tents are easily built, yet easily taken down: they are the territories of the nomad. In his excellent description of the tent, Vilém Flusser writes, the tent is “a piece of cloth that is open to experiences (open to the wind, open to the spirit and that stores this experience) [...]”. The screen wall blowing in the wind assembles experience, processes it and disseminates it, and it is to be thanked for the fact that the tent is a creative nest” (110-1). The tent does not assume we are eternally beings-in-the-world; it is a ‘creative nest’ that captures forces and assembles new experiences, or new ways of being-in-the-world.

The tents that occupied the various parks and squares during the Occupy movement, moreover, transformed those spaces, manifesting different spatio-temporal rhythms and different manners of Being. They constructed new territories. The ‘tent’ commands a different lifestyle, different spatial practices and a different spatial code. People take up space differently. As a result, the Occupy movement was a revolution of space because it transformed how one lived in those spaces at that time by constructing a different space or different assemblages.

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In order to conclude, therefore, with a great resonance between the works of Deleuze and Guattari and Lefebvre: revolutions are always of space. As Deleuze and Guattari write, “the success of a revolution resides only in itself, precisely in the vibrations, clinches and openings it gave to men and women at the moment of its making” (1994: 177).

Revolutions, for them, are a question of geography: of taking up space-time differently, according to new sets of possibilities and new territories. Likewise for Lefebvre, who asserts that revolution only occurs through a transformation of the spatio-temporal rhythms of everyday life, a revolution of space.99

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99 For instance, in his discussion of the Paris Commune, Lefebvre notes that the Commune was not a failure because it did not successfully transform society’s mode of production (as Marx and Lenin both assert), but
A common theme then: the politics of space, or the construction of new spaces and new territories, which create new ways of being in the world. The difference is that Lefebvre reduces space to the lived experience of a ‘phenomenological’ body, whereas Deleuze opens it up to a virtual plane where different and unrelated matters are connected. Where Lefebvre ends with a symphony of rhythms, Deleuze leaves out the window, straddling a witch’s broom, into the cosmos.

was actually a success for those who lived it: during the Commune, Lefebvre writes, “Paris lived its revolutionary process” (2003b: 189), which means that the everyday life of Paris had changed, had vibrated to a different set of rhythms. And that is all that mattered.
Bibliography


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