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Policing Cyber Bullying: How Parents, Educators, and Law Enforcement Respond to Digital Harassment

Ryan Broll
The University of Western Ontario

Supervisor
Dr. Laura Huey
The University of Western Ontario

Graduate Program in Sociology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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POLICING CYBER BULLYING: HOW PARENTS, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPOND TO DIGITAL HARASSMENT

(Thesis format: Integrated Article)

by

Ryan Broll

Graduate Program in Sociology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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Abstract

Some prior research has emphasised how adults ought to address cyber bullying, yet little is known about how they actually prevent and respond to digital harassment. This study addresses this gap in the literature by exploring the formal and informal “policing” of cyber bullying by a network of security actors: parents, teachers and school administrators, and the public police. Data were collected through a mixed methods research design consisting of semi-structured qualitative interviews with eight parents, 14 teachers, and 12 members of law enforcement (n = 34) and quantitative surveys completed by 52 parents.

Drawing upon nodal governance theory as a guiding framework, the results of this study suggest that parents are the central figure in the cyber bullying security network, calling upon school officials and members of law enforcement when required. The relationship between parents and school officials and the police is strained and characterised by conflict. Conversely, the relationship between school officials and the police is formalised and relatively well-functioning. However, social, structural, and cultural barriers exist within the security network, weakening inter-group relations and likely undermining security outcomes.

In addition to studying the larger security network, I also conducted an in-depth examination of two members of the security network: the police, who are usually considered reactive, and parents, who are often thought of as being preventative. First, contrary to current legislative efforts to criminalise cyber bullying, police officers prefer to prevent digital harassment whenever possible via their position as knowledge brokers. In addition, when police intervention is required, officers believe that current laws are effective and they try to avoid the courts whenever possible by engaging in restorative justice approaches. Second, parents
strive to proactively manage their children’s risk of becoming involved in cyber bullying by restricting youths’ access to technology, using monitoring software as a surveillance mechanism, being emotionally available for their children, and encouraging their children to unplug from technology. Given parents’ own uncertainty with social technology, when their children do become involved in cyber bullying they often look for collaborative ways of responding so as to minimise harms to their children.

To effectively improve the ways in which adults prevent and respond to cyber bullying, I argue that we must first understand current approaches and the limitations of such efforts. This study does just that, and the results provide a foundation upon which improved efforts to more effectively support those young people affected by cyber bullying may be constructed.

**Keywords**

cyber bullying, policing, nodal governance, risk, youth technology use, social media, parenting
Co-Authorship Statement

Laura Huey contributed to Chapter 4, “‘Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn’t a Police Matter’: Police Perspectives on Policing Cyber Bullying” as a second author. All research, analysis, and writing included herein are the work of Ryan Broll.
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Chapter 1

1 Cyber Bullying: Bullying in the Age of Networked Publics

As a high school student in the early 2000s, I grew up alongside the rise of social media and “networked publics” (boyd1, 2008). At that time, teens’ social interactions were beginning to blur the lines between online and offline. Rather than gathering at malls, movie theatres, or hockey arenas to socialise outside of school hours, teens flocked to the Internet to participate in conversations with individuals or groups of friends using newly popularised forms of “social” media. Instant messaging (IM) was rapidly increasing in popularity by offering young people a new way to socialise in real time. At my high school, it was still rare for students to have their own cell phone, but “MSN2” use was near ubiquitous. Though once dominant, IM programs have since lost nearly all of their market share; however, their fundamental purpose to youth—socialising with friends—has been replaced by newer and, in some instances, more public platforms in the form of social networking sites (SNSs).

Social media, more broadly, is the collection of websites, programs, and apps that allow users to create and share their own content (boyd, 2014). Social media is exceptionally popular among young people. Today, among teen Internet users, more than 8 in 10 use

1 Social media scholar danah boyd legally changed her name to include all lowercase letters. When referencing her work, I use her chosen legal name and do not capitalise.

2 “MSN” was the colloquial term for Microsoft’s MSN Messenger program (now Windows Live Messenger).
social media sites or apps, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Vine, Snapchat, and Pinterest (Lenhart et al., 2011). Moreover, even when holding age and gender constant, YouTube is the favourite website among fourth to eleventh grade students (Steeves, 2014). In addition, by the eleventh grade almost all students have their own cell phone, usually a smart phone (Steeves, 2014). Of course, these phones are used to text, but they also provide teens with access to an exorbitant number of apps that aid their continued socialising.

Cell phones and the Internet have provided new venues for socialising, but this socialising “is not separate from or in addition to ‘real life’; rather, all this activity is rooted in and part of it” (Collier, 2012, p. 2; see also, Gardner, 2010; Orgad, 2007). Early studies found that the Internet supplements social capital by extending pre-existing relationships into the electronic world (Wellman, Quan-Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001). More recent research has supported this assertion, finding that those who are the most social offline are also the most social online (Quan-Haase, 2008) and that the strongest offline social relationships are also the strongest online social relationships (Dutton, Helsper, & Gerber, 2009; Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007). The lives of contemporary young people are being defined by their complex relationship with new media, and they have been dubbed the “digital generation” (Buckingham, 2006).

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3 Although a majority of Canadian households have Internet access, a meaningful segment of the population lacks connectivity (Statistics Canada, 2011). I recognise the existence of this digital divide but, as a general rule, will not focus on it in this dissertation since cyber bullying, by its nature, requires at least one of the parties to have some degree of connectivity. See Quan-Haase, Haight, and Corbett (2013) for a recent analysis of the digital divide in Canada.
New technologies have positively impacted young people by increasing their empowerment and improving opportunities for creative expression (Katz, 1997; Tapscott, 1998; Wellman, 1997). In addition, the Internet has offered teens enhanced opportunities for learning and civic participation (Livingstone & Haddon, 2009; Montgomery & Gottlieb-Robles, 2006), and it has afforded young people the chance to freely express themselves and experiment with their identities (Shariff & Churchill, 2010). For example, via social networking sites, youth can openly express their ideas, worldviews, likes and dislikes, and emotions to their friends and strangers (Spies Shapiro & Margolin, 2014). Moreover, these opinions and statuses can be changed and updated as often as users’ desire. The Internet has also provided youth the opportunity to express their emerging gender identities within networks of likeminded individuals (Davies, 2004; Stern, 2004, Thiel, 2005).

Social technology can also enhance teens’ feelings of connectedness towards others. New communication mediums, like social networking sites, can improve one’s sense of belonging and have been found to improve feelings of connectedness to others in offline settings (Boudreau, 2007). Some teens with weak offline relationships also benefit from strong online relationships, especially if they find technologically-mediated communication more comfortable than offline communication (Spies Shapiro & Margolin, 2014). Findings from the Pew Internet and American Life Project also indicate that two-thirds of young people have had a positive experience on a social networking site and almost 60% have developed a stronger bond with somebody because of their online interactions (Lenhart et al., 2011).
At the same time, some have suggested that several social forces have coalesced to create new technologically-mediated risks for young people (Buckingham, 2005), and even that cyberspace is an unsafe place for youth to socialise (Shade, 2007). Accordingly, the argument is made that young people’s use of social media is in need of adult regulation. However, adults and young people tend to engage with technology differently, which can problematize media regulation and monitoring for many adults. For example, although many adults use email, cell phones, and social networking sites, these platforms are considered tools and are not integrated into their lives to the same extent as they are for youth (Shariff, 2008). Moreover, “although computers were developed for adults, adolescents have fully embraced these technologies for their own social purposes and typically are the family experts on how to use electronic media and social networking sites” (Spies Shapiro & Margolin, 2014, p. 1). Further complicating matters, many adults think of youths’ lives in terms of binaries—online versus offline, public versus private, and so forth—but young people view their lives as being much more fluid without a clear distinction between their online and offline worlds (Collier, 2012).

Given these divergent perspectives on the uses and values of new media, and many adults lack of comfort with and knowledge of social technologies, the regulation of young people’s media use and digital behaviours is often difficult. To describe adults’ monitoring of youths’ cyber activities, Shariff and Hoff (2007) draw an analogy with Golding’s (1954) Lord of the Flies. In Golding’s well-known novel, a group of boys is left alone on an island with no supervision. Over time, the boys begin harassing, terrorising, and, eventually, killing one another. New technologies, such as the Internet
and cell phones, are similar in that youth are placed on a virtual island that often has little supervision (if any) and few rules. As a result, bullying and other harmful behaviours ought to be expected to escalate in the electronic world. Like the boys in *Lord of the Flies*, youth can use technology to experiment with different identities and, in doing so, will sometimes make poor choices.

1.1 Defining Cyber Bullying

Like traditional bullying (e.g., Olweus, 1992, 1993), cyber bullying consists of three key characteristics. First, cyber bullying is intentional and its purpose is to harm the target. Second, electronic bullying is characterised by a real or perceived power imbalance between the bully and the young person who is bullied. This power imbalance affords an individual or group an advantage over a more vulnerable person, which makes it difficult for the bullied individual to defend him- or herself (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012).

Traditional bullies often have a physical or social advantage over their targets, but in the electronic world technological proficiency may create such an imbalance (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007; Walrave & Heirman, 2010). Third, the harassing behaviour is repetitive; however, this characteristic may be academic since the often public nature of cyber bullying (e.g., forwarding harassing messages to others or posting such messages on

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4 The spelling of cyber bullying has been debated since its origins, with the most common spellings being “cyber bullying,” “cyberbullying,” and “cyber-bullying.” I use “cyber bullying” to exemplify its underlying similarities to other forms of bullying. By convention, physical, social, and verbal bullying are neither hyphenated nor written as closed-form compound words; thus, I similarly write cyber bullying in its open compound form.

5 I use the term “traditional bullying” to refer collectively to those offline forms of bullying sometimes characterised as “schoolyard bullying” and most commonly consisting of physical, verbal, social, and emotional bullying.
public “walls” or forums, circulating embarrassing photos, etc.) commonly results in repeated victimisation (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). In addition, similar to traditional bullying, cyber bullying is rooted in unhealthy youth relationships and frequently results from break-ups, envy, or intolerance. In summarizing their findings, Hoff and Mitchell (2009) reported that “students’ inability to handle social tensions, particularly those that centre on relationship issues, was at the root of most cyber bullying among these teens” (p. 655).

Unlike traditional bullying, cyber bullying is imbedded in technology. The specific type of technology through which cyber bullying occurs is variable, but it often takes place via the most popular types of media (Juvoven & Gross, 2008). In addition, traditional and cyber bullying differ with respect to levels of supervision of the places in which bullying occurs (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006; Shariff & Hoff, 2007). In contrast to school settings in which youth are frequently monitored by one or more adults, many young people use computers outside of the view of parents, teachers, or other adults (Williams & Guerra, 2007) and Internet conversations are rarely subject to regulation (Patchin & Hinduja, 2010). Furthermore, traditional bullying usually occurs at school during school hours, but cyber bullying is a 24/7 phenomenon (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006; Slonje & Smith, 2007). For instance, in Mishna and colleagues 2009 qualitative study of electronic bullying, one participant described cyber bullying as “non-stop bullying.” The pervasiveness of bullying that occurs through ‘always on’ communication may be a contributing factor to the more negative psychosocial outcomes experienced by young people who are cyber bullied (Tokunaga, 2010; Wang, Nansel, & Iannotti, 2011). Additionally, cyber bullies
can remain anonymous by using fake e-mail addresses or social networking profiles and by blocking their telephone numbers—anonymity is much more difficult, if not impossible, in traditional bullying (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Patchin & Hinduja, 2010). Similarly, there are fewer social barriers online and on one’s cell phone, meaning that it is generally easier to send mean or hurtful messages or images by text message, e-mail, blog post, Facebook message, or tweet than it is to do these things in person (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006). Espelage and Asiado (2001) found that middle school students who had been involved in traditional bullying expressed remorse when they directly saw the impact of their actions on others (e.g., seeing another student crying); such cues are inherently removed online and may increase the length of time over which cyber bullying occurs (Dooley, Pryzalski, & Cross, 2009).

1.2 The Prevalence of Cyber Bullying

The frequency of cyber bullying is difficult to establish since vastly different rates have been reported across studies. Some researchers have reported that cyber bullying is an almost non-existent phenomenon (e.g., Kowalski & Limber, 2007; Riebel, Jager, & Fischer, 2009) and others have found that almost every young person is either being cyber bullied or cyber bullying others (e.g., Calvete, Orue, Estevez, Villardon, & Padilla, 2010; Juvoven & Gross, 2008). However, on average, studies find that between 20% and 40% of young people experience cyber bullying (Tokunaga, 2010). In their comprehensive literature review, Patchin and Hinduja (2012) reported a mean victimisation rate across studies of 24.4% and a mean perpetration rate of 18%. Differing methodologies, including diverse operational definitions of cyber bullying and varied
timeframes studied, likely account for the large discrepancy in prevalence rates (Tokunaga, 2010). Nevertheless, it appears to be the case that cyber bullying is less common than traditional bullying (Sourander et al., 2010; Wang, Iannotti, & Nansel, 2009).

### 1.3 Demographic Characteristics of Young People Involved in Cyber Bullying

There is evidence to suggest that traditional and cyber bullying are not mutually exclusive social problems, with some youth being involved in both (Anderson, Buckley, & Carnagey, 2008; Barlett & Gentile, 2012; Kowalski & Limber, 2007; Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). Furthermore, a clear distinction between cyber bullies and cyber victims does not exist: approximately one-third of youth involved in cyber bullying are both aggressors and targets (Kowalski & Limber, 2007). The high proportion of bully-victims has been attributed to victims’ ability to instantaneously retaliate against their bully, thereby becoming aggressors themselves (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). Indeed, one of the most commonly reported reasons for cyber bullying others is for revenge (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). Furthermore, technology removes physical size advantages and disadvantages, which may make it easier for some victims to retaliate online.

Cyber bullying is not limited by age, but most research is focused on those under the age of 18 (Tokunaga, 2010). Whereas some studies have found no association between age and involvement in cyber bullying (Beran & Li, 2007; Didden et al., 2009; Juvoven &

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6 I, too, focus on this youth demographic.
Gross, 2008; Patchin & Hinduja, 2006; Smith et al., 2008; Wolak, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, 2007; Ybarra, Diener-West, & Leaf, 2007), this lack of association may be the result of a specification error. Tokunaga (2010) argues that the relationship between age and involvement in cyber bullying is almost certainly non-linear, meaning that those studies focused on a limited age range would be unlikely to find a significant association. In support of Tokunaga’s argument, it seems as though cyber bullying is most common in middle school, but the shape of the distribution across grade levels is unclear. Some studies have found that cyber bullying follows an approximately normal distribution peaking in middle school (Cassidy, Jackson, & Brown, 2009; Williams & Guerra, 2007), and others have found a J-shaped distribution with cyber bullying beginning to increase in prevalence during middle school and continuing to increase throughout high school (Wolak et al., 2006). Still others have observed a bimodal distribution in which cyber bullying increases in middle school, levels off between the eighth and tenth grades, and then is highest among eleventh and twelfth grade students (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012).

Quantitative studies have generally found that females are disproportionately more likely to be cyber bullied and to cyber bully others (Dehue, Bolman, & Vollink, 2008; Kowalski & Limber, 2007; Patchin & Hinduja, 2012; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2008; Ybarra et al., 2007). These findings are consistent with research on traditional bullying, which finds that males are more likely to be involved in physical bullying (Bosworth, Espelage, & Simon, 1999) and females are more likely to be involved in social, emotional, and relational forms of bullying (Stephenson & Smith, 1989). Of course, cyber bullying is most similar to the latter. The nature of cyber bullying is also gendered. Females are
likely to have hurtful comments posted about them or to spread rumours about others. In contrast, males are likely to have hurtful videos posted of them or to post hurtful pictures of others (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). Similarly, females are often cyber bullied because of their appearance and sexual experience, and males are often harassed as a result of their (lack of) athletic ability and real or perceived sexual orientation (Hoff & Mitchell, 2010).

Qualitative studies have suggested that some quantitative findings may be overly simplistic or lack validity, however. Kowalski, Limber, and Agatston (2008), who conducted focus groups with about 150 male and female middle and high school students reported that females perceive cyber bullying to be a greater problem than males. Thus, they may be more attuned to cyber bullying when it occurs, or they may consider teasing and other less egregious forms of peer aggression to be cyber bullying. Mishna, Saini, and Solomon (2009) also conducted focus groups with middle school students. In their study, males and females were equally likely to agree that cyber bullying is a problem, but males were more likely to question its seriousness. In their mixed methods study, Hoff and Mitchell (2010) found quantitative evidence to suggest that females are more likely than males to report being cyber bullied. However, upon analysing their qualitative data, the authors questioned the validity of this result. Examining the qualitative data, Hoff and Mitchell found that females described cyber bullying that had been directed towards themselves. On the other hand, males described incidents directed towards their friends, but boys’ accounts were so detailed that the authors wondered whether males “were misreporting incidents in order to avoid being labelled as victims” (p. 55).
1.4 The Impact of Cyber Bullying on Young People

Although it is likely less common than traditional bullying, young people who are cyber bullied report poorer outcomes in some domains than victims of only traditional bullying (e.g., Wang et al., 2011). Young people who are cyber bullied have higher rates of social anxiety (Dempsey, Sulkowski, Nichols, & Storch, 2009; Juvoven & Gross, 2008), anger, sadness, fear, and powerlessness (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009) than their peers. Youth who are cyber bullied also have decreased self-esteem (Didden et al., 2009; Katzer, Fetchenhauer, & Belschak, 2009; Patchin & Hinduja, 2010). Suicides resulting from cyber bullying have been the focus of expansive media attention. Although the relationship is not as simplistic as presented in the media, a relationship does seem to exist between cyber bullying and suicidal ideation and suicide attempts. Hinduja and Patchin (2010) found that young people who are cyber bullied and those who cyber bully others are both more likely to report contemplating suicide than those youth uninvolved in cyber bullying. Although they noted that bullying explained a small amount of the variance in suicidal ideation (7% for victimisation and 4% for perpetration), they also found that, in comparison to young people uninvolved in bullying, youth who are cyber bullied are two times more likely to have attempted suicide and those who cyber bully others are 1.5 times more likely to have attempted suicide.

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7 In stating this, I do not mean to undermine the seriousness of any type of bullying, nor am I stating that cyber bullying is “worse” than traditional bullying. All bullying is problematic and has the potential to be quite harmful to all youth involved.
A recent Canadian study of eighth to tenth grade students in British Columbia finds additional support for the relationship between cyber bullying and suicide. Bonanno and Hymel (2013) found that involvement in cyber bullying—as either the bully or victim—uniquely contributes to depressive symptomatology and suicidal ideation beyond the contribution of involvement in traditional bullying and beyond the contribution of gender. Specifically, although being cyber bullied and cyber bullying others accounted for only an additional 1% and 2% of the explained variance in depressive symptomatology among cyber victims and bullies, they accounted for an additional 5.8% and 4%, respectively, of the explained variance in suicidal ideation. Bonanno and Hymel also found that those who are both cyber bullies and cyber victims are not at an increased risk for depression, but they have a much greater risk of experiencing suicidal ideation. It is important to note that young people’s experiences with cyber bullying often coincide with many other issues, such as traditional bullying, emotional or psychological distress, academic problems, and a lack of social support (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009), but the association between cyber bullying and suicide is nevertheless deserving of further research.

Cyber bullying often occurs off school property (Beale & Hall, 2007), yet its impact frequently carries over to school environments. Compared to those uninvolved in bullying, young people who are cyber bullied have poorer grades (Beran & Li, 2007), higher truancy rates (Katzer et al., 2009), are more likely to cheat on tests (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007), and are more likely to believe that their school is an unsafe place (Varjas, Henrich, & Meyers, 2009). Young people who are cyber bullied are also more likely than other youth to have assaulted another young person, damaged property, or shoplifted
(Patchin & Hinduja, 2007), and to have been suspended or brought a weapon to school
(Ybarra et al., 2007). However, these negative behavioural outcomes have been attributed
to the strain experienced by cyber bullied youth (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007). Much less
research has examined outcomes for cyber bullies, but young people who have cyber
bullied others are at an increased risk for substance use and other delinquent behaviours
(Hinduja & Patchin, 2007, 2008; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004), and report lower levels of
self-esteem (Patchin & Hinduja, 2010). Overall, the poorest outcomes have been
observed among those who experience regular long-term victimisation (Didden et al.,
2009; Tokunaga, 2010; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004). That being said, an obvious limitation
of many of these findings is that they are drawn from cross-sectional studies. Thus,
temporal, and therefore causal, relationships are difficult to establish.

1.5 Youths’ Coping Strategies

Most young people who are cyber bullied do something to address their victimisation
(Patchin & Hinduja, 2006), but they are far more likely to address their victimisation on
their own than to tell others about their experiences. Smith et al. (2008) found that almost
half (43.7%) of respondents in their sample of secondary school students in England did
not tell anyone they were cyber bullied. Some youth who are cyber bullied employ strict
privacy controls across social media platforms (Aricak et al., 2008; Juvoven & Gross,
2008; Smith et al., 2008) or change their usernames, passwords, or email addresses
(Juvoven & Gross, 2008; Smith et al., 2008) to avoid unwanted encounters with bullies.
In addition, about 15% to 25% of young people who are cyber bullied actively confront
the bully online or offline (Aricak et al., 2008; Juvoven & Gross, 2008; Patchin & Hinduja, 2006).

Some young people who are cyber bullied do tell others, most commonly a friend (Aricak et al., 2008; Dehue et al., 2008; Slonje & Smith, 2007; Smith et al., 2008). Smith et al. (2008) found that a minority of young people tell a parent (15.5%) or teacher (8.5%) about their experiences with cyber bullying. Hoff & Mitchell (2009) observed somewhat higher reporting rates at 35.9% for parents and 16.7% for teachers. Thus, though many young people threaten to tell an adult about their harassment (Tokunaga, 2010), few follow through on this threat.

Many young people do not tell an adult because they believe the harassment will stop on its own, even though the evidence often suggests otherwise (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009). Three additional reasons have been put forth to explain why young people do not report cyber bullying to adults. First, young people often believe that it is important to learn how to manage problems encountered in the digital world themselves (Juvoven & Gross, 2008). In other words, many young people believe that seeking help in response to cyber bullying is something that kids do, and they want to be seen as adults (Tokunaga, 2010). Second, many youth fear that adults will restrict their access to technology if they report cyber bullying. Thus, coping with the problem on their own is considered an acceptable risk in exchange for technology-use privileges (Agatston, Kowalski, & Limber, 2007, 2012). Third, many young people do not tell school officials about cyber bullying because they do not think that their reports will be taken seriously, will not be handled
confidentially, that nothing will be done, or that reporting will exacerbate their problems (Agatston, Kowalski, & Limber, 2012; Hoff & Mitchell, 2009).

1.6 Adults’ Responses to Cyber Bullying

Even though many young people do not report cyber bullying to adults, an important minority do. Furthermore, anti-bullying advocates usually encourage young people to report their harassment to a trusted adult. Shariff (2008) argues that young people and adults perceive of and use technology differently. As a result, adults’ current responses to cyber bullying—which are often centred on the development of new regulations (e.g., laws, codes of conduct) to ‘clamp down on bullies’ or banning access to technology and social media—are misguided, ineffective, and counterproductive. If adults’ responses are fragmented or ineffective, as Shariff suggests, it is likely that those who do report cyber bullying will not do so again in the future, and it is unlikely that others will consider reporting a viable option. Currently, a handful of scholars have addressed adults’ responsibility to intervene (Hinduja & Patchin, 2006; Shariff, 2008), but few have examined adults’ responses. Nevertheless, understanding adults’ current responses to cyber bullying is essential for improving responses in the future and better serving those young people affected by cyber bullying.

Traditional bullying was considered a school-based problem, so teachers and school administrators were held responsible for intervening when incidents occurred (Holt & Keyes, 2004). Since cyber bullying occurs in a more abstract arena and is unlikely to be witnessed first-hand by an adult, it is more difficult to respond to than traditional bullying.
(Hoff & Mitchell, 2009) and there is no clear stakeholder group with the primary responsibility for addressing digital harassment (Tokunaga, 2010). In addition to teachers and school administrators, there is a greater expectation that parents will be engaged with preventing and responding to cyber bullying (Campbell, 2005). Clearly, parents have an important influence on their children’s behaviour. Supportive, involved, attentive, and non-permissive parenting styles are associated with lower rates of delinquency in children (Glueck & Glueck, 1951; Simons, Simons, & Wallace, 2004; Simons, Simons, Chen, Brody, & Lin, 2007), as are age-appropriate, clear, and consistent messages and attitudes of pro-social behaviour (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen, 1996). Family support has been identified as a protective factor against both cyber bullying behaviours and cyber victimisation (Fanti, Demetrious, & Hawa, 2012). However, many parents express challenges protecting their children from cyber bullying given their own lack of comfort with media (Campbell, 2005). Ribak (2001) describes such challenges in terms of a “digital generation gap,” wherein many young people understand technology better than their parents; in fact, Ribak explains that it is often children who teach their parents how to use technology.

Teachers and school administrators have an important role in promoting healthy youth relationships (Tomey-Purta, 2002). School connectedness, having positive bonds with adults at school, and attending a school with clear rules and respectful relationships between students and teachers are protective factors against youth delinquency (Cernkovich & Giordano, 1992; Resnick, Harris, & Blum, 1993). Despite their expertise in addressing traditional bullying, teachers and administrators often lack the resources
and knowledge to adequately prevent and respond to cyber bullying (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009). In addition, administrators’ regular disciplinary approaches may be ineffective for addressing cyber bullying. For example, suspending cyber aggressors is counterproductive because it allows students greater access to technology. Madigan (2010) explains that most schools restrict student technology use during school hours; without these restrictions, suspended students may be able to cause more harm to their cyber victims than if they were at school.

An inverse relationship has been observed between traditional bullying and the presence of school resource officers (SROs) in schools. Humphrey and Huey (2001) found that self-reported bullying victimisation declined by 67% and bullying perpetration declined by 53% following the introduction of SROs in New Hampshire schools. In relation to cyber bullying, Hinduja and Patchin (2012) reported that 95% of SROs surveyed in the summer of 2010 considered cyber bullying a serious problem deserving of a law enforcement response. Moreover, 70% of officers surveyed had investigated a cyber bullying case during the preceding school year (mean number of cyber bullying investigations = 13). The officers surveyed by Hinduja and Patchin also felt that their role in responding to cyber bullying should be largely focused on addressing young people’s behaviour that is clearly criminal, rather than that which has simply violated a school’s

8 School resource officers (SROs) are sworn and usually armed police officers assigned to a school or community of schools (Theriot, 2009). SROs perform typical policing functions within these environments by enforcing criminal laws, but they are also frequently involved in duties outside the realm of other officers (e.g., enforcing a school’s code of conduct; Lawrence, 2007). SROs also tend to emphasise crime prevention work, such as by providing educational presentations for students and other members of the school community (Finn, Shively, McDevitt, Lassiter, & Rich, 2005).
code of conduct. However, little is known about the ways in which police officers actually prevent or respond to cyber bullying.

Researchers have only recently begun to explore how young people would like adults to address cyber bullying. Agatston, Kowalski, and Limber (2012) asked students to offer suggestions as to how adults can prevent cyber bullying. According to the students, age-appropriate parental monitoring is preferable—if the monitoring is done for supervision and safety purposes and not to “snoop.” Whereas the students reported that one-time informational assemblies are ineffective⁹, they noted that hearing real stories about the impact that cyber bullying has on others may be effective in preventing future cyber aggression. These findings suggest that schools should be selective when considering speakers for assemblies related to cyber bullying, and that other preventative approaches ought to be considered.

Canadian teens are growing up in media-saturated environments. Recent technological advancements, especially the widespread use of the Internet (particularly social media) and cell phones (Steeves, 2014), have positively impacted youths’ lives in many ways (Livingstone & Haddon, 2009; Shariff & Churchill, 2010; Spies Shapiro & Margolin, 2014; Wellman, 1997; Wellman, Quan-Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001). At the same time, some young people choose to exploit these technologies to cause harm to others. Cyber bullying, which is not bounded by age (Tokunaga, 2010) or gender (Hoff &

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⁹ School assemblies have little long-term impact on students’ attitudes and behaviours around violence. Frequently, assemblies occur—often when requested by a member of the school community—and receive little if any follow-up in class (Elliott, Hamburg, & Williams, 1998).
Mitchell, 2010; Kowalski et al., 2008), affects a sizable number of young people (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012; Tokunaga, 2010). In addition, cyber bullying negatively affects both cyber bullies and those who are cyber bullied in a variety of academic, social, and emotional domains (Beran & Li, 2007; Bonanno & Hymel, 2013; Hinduja & Patchin, 2007, 2008; Juvoven & Gross, 2008; Patchin & Hinduja, 2010). Although most young people try to address cyber bullies on their own (Juvoven & Gross, 2008; Smith et al., 2008), an important minority do inform an adult (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Smith et al., 2008). However, little is known about how adults respond, and the limited literature that does exist suggests that parents’, educators’, and police officers’ responses may be flawed (Campbell, 2005; Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Madigan, 2010).

1.7 Governing Security through Nodes and Clusters: The Nodal Governance Model

It is now accepted that policing is complicated and provided by a variety of formal and informal agencies, and even private citizens (Bayley & Shearing, 2001; Ericson, 1994; Nhan & Huey, 2008; Shearing & Marks, 2011). Neoliberal policies have forced communities and, sometimes, individuals or groups of individuals to take responsibility for tasks that were once the responsibility of the public police (Shearing & Marks, 2011). Simultaneously, increased awareness of everyday threats (Beck, 1992; Lupton, 1999) and the nature of contemporary social risks have contributed to the establishment of a security quilt (Ericson 1994), or the pluralisation of policing (Jones & Newburn, 2006). Thus, current security governance focuses on the management of risks by networks.
Nodal governance theory (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) provides a valuable means of understanding networked relations, such as those found within plural policing environments and recommended in response to cyber bullying. Nodal security is derived from the work of a variety of interconnected actors, or “nodes” (Johnston, 2006) or, in their aggregate form, “nodal clusters” (Nhan & Huey, 2008). Security networks are the result of nodal clusters combining their resources and expertise to address a common security threat (Dupont, 2004, 2006; Nhan & Huey, 2008). The nodal governance framework is particularly useful for understanding distributed policing arrangements in cyberspace (Huey, Nhan, & Broll, 2013; Nhan, 2010; Nhan & Huey, 2008; Wall, 2007).

The mediums through which cyber bullying occurs are largely devoid of physical boundaries making cyber bullying difficult for adults to observe first hand. Indeed, cyber bullying may occur via technologies accessed at home, school, or elsewhere and hurtful content may similarly be received virtually anywhere. Furthermore, parents, teachers and school administrators, and police officers (who are notorious for their difficulties addressing cybercrime, more generally; Huey, 2002; Wall, 2007) all have some obstacles to overcome to effectively prevent and respond to cyber bullying. As a result of these limitations, it may be the case that nodal, or networked, responses—in which various stakeholders work together, thereby augmenting their strengths and attenuating their weaknesses—may be the most effective approach to addressing cyber bullying. Kowalski et al. (2008) urge educators and parents to work together to teach students about the importance of ‘netiquette,’ maintaining their privacy, and monitoring their digital footprints (see also Jordan & Austin, 2012). In addition, Hinduja and Patchin (2012)
recommend that SROs work closely with educators and others to ensure that young people receive consistent messaging about cyber bullying.

1.8 Policing Cyber Bullying: The Current Study

Cyber bullying is the most common risk that youth face online (Palfrey, boyd, & Sacco, 2009), and even though the first studies on cyber bullying were only published in 2004 it is agreed that it is a serious social concern (Tokunaga, 2010). However, since cyber bullying research is still in its infancy, many important questions remain unexplored. In particular, there is a lack of knowledge about the role of various stakeholders in addressing cyber bullying (Shariff & Churchill, 2010). This dissertation addresses this critical gap in the literature by empirically studying the policing of cyber bullying in Canada. I use the term “policing” loosely here to refer to both formal and informal response mechanisms\(^\text{10}\)—that is, I examine the ways in which various key stakeholders, including parents, teachers and school administrators, and law enforcement personnel prevent and respond to cyber bullying.

Organised around the common theme of policing cyber bullying, this dissertation is comprised of three empirical chapters that contribute to a greater understanding of the ways in which adults currently address cyber bullying. In the following chapters, I address four research questions:

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\(^{10}\) See Johnston and Shearing (2003, pp. 9-13) for a good discussion of the distinction between “police” and “policing” and an explanation as to why some prefer to use the term “security governance” to avoid conflating the two. In this dissertation, I use “policing” and “security governance” synonymously to refer to the myriad of actors involved in the provision of security.
(1) What forms of expertise and resources does each stakeholder group (nodal cluster) possess that allows it to promote valued security outcomes within the security network?

(2) To what extent do gaps, or limitations, in the security network undermine stakeholders’ responses to cyber bullying?

(3) As the largely reactive group in the network, what are police officers’ perceptions regarding the criminalisation of cyber bullying, and how do they prefer to address cyber bullying to achieve desirable security outcomes?

(4) As the largely preventative group in the network, in what specific ways do parents prevent and respond to cyber bullying? What limitations impact the effectiveness of these efforts?

In Chapter 2, “Collaborative Responses to Cyber Bullying: Preventing and Responding to Cyber Bullying through Nodes and Clusters,” I engage in a comparative analysis of the ways in which parents, teachers and school administrators, and police officers prevent and respond to cyber bullying. The distributed nature of cyberspace requires that security issues be addressed within plural policing environments, in which public and private actors work together to form a security quilt (Ericson, 1994). Drawing on nodal governance theory, in this chapter I use data from in-depth qualitative interviews with 34 members of the parent, educational system, and law enforcement nodal clusters (Nhan & Huey, 2008) to explore adults’ responses to cyber bullying. In particular, I examine the types of capital possessed by each cluster (Dupont, 2004), their position within the cyber bullying security network, how they achieve security, and limitations experienced by
each cluster. The parent cluster was identified as central to the security network, whereas the educational system occupies a secondary position and the law enforcement cluster serves primarily as a knowledge broker (Ericson, 1994). Each cluster is limited by a lack of familiarity and comfort with cyberspace and electronic communications. An examination of internodal relations revealed several gaps in the security network and a number of structural and cultural variables that limit the network’s security potential.

In Chapters 3 and 4 I focus, in greater depth, on individual clusters within the security network outlined in Chapter 2. Increasing public awareness of cyber bullying, coupled with several highly publicised youth suicides linked to electronic bullying, have led law makers and politicians to consider new criminal legislation specifically related to cyber bullying. However, little is known about how the police—arguably, the reactive nodal cluster within the security network—currently respond to cyber bullying, and it is not clear whether new laws are necessary. In Chapter 3, “‘Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn’t a Police Matter’: Police Perspectives on Policing Cyber Bullying,” I draw upon in-depth interviews with Canadian street patrol officers and school resource officers to explore police perspectives on policing cyber bullying. In contrast to the reactive hard-line approach proposed in much legislation and public discussion, I find that police officers prefer to take a more preventative approach by educating youth and raising awareness about the dangers of digital communications. Although there are instances when criminal charges must be laid, these incidents transcend “bullying,” a term that has little legal meaning for police officers.
Despite their prevention-oriented position within the security network and their important role in providing for their children’s safety, little research has examined parents’ approaches to preventing cyber bullying, and their reactions once a child has become involved in cyber bullying. In Chapter 4, “Governing Security at Home: Parental Monitoring in Response to the Cyber Bullying Risk,” I use mixed methods data from in-depth interviews and surveys with parents of children involved in cyber bullying. Within the context of parental monitoring and risk theories, I critically examine the parental monitoring strategies employed to combat real or perceived cyber bullying threats, and parents’ responses to cyber bullying. Parents attempt to manage their children’s risk of involvement in cyber bullying by strictly regulating their children’s behaviour and by using electronic surveillance strategies reminiscent of the panoptic monitoring of convicts. However, their prevention efforts are often frustrated by a lack of knowledge about the media through which cyber bullying occurs. Recognising these deficiencies, parents’ responses to cyber bullying are often collaborative.

Lastly, Chapter 5 offers a conclusion to this dissertation. In this final chapter, I briefly review the research findings presented in Chapters 2 to 4, before discussing the policy implications of these findings. Given the results of this study, directions for future research are suggested before I conclude by offering some final thoughts regarding the policing of cyber bullying.
1.9 References


Chapter 2

2 Collaborative Responses to Cyber Bullying: Preventing and Responding to Cyber Bullying through Nodes and Clusters

Mere weeks before her death, Amanda Todd became an Internet sensation after she posted a video to the social media website YouTube, in which she used a series of flash cards to detail her experiences of blackmail, bullying, and suicidal ideation. In the video, Amanda explains that when she was 12-years-old she began frequenting online video chat rooms to meet new people (Shaw, 2012). During one such chat, a stranger convinced Amanda to flash her breasts for the camera. Unbeknownst to Amanda, the stranger took a screen capture at that same moment and the ensuing photograph was soon posted online. As news of the image spread among her peers, Amanda became the target of relentless bullying on- and offline (Keneally, 2012).

In an attempt to escape the ongoing harassment, Amanda’s family moved and she transferred schools multiple times. However, each time she changed schools, the stranger would reappear. On one occasion, in order to befriend her classmates on Facebook, the stranger posed as a young boy about to begin classes at Amanda’s school. The topless photo of Amanda was used as the “new student’s” Facebook profile picture. Another time, the stranger created a fake e-mail account and brazenly emailed the picture to Amanda’s classmates, teachers, and family (Shaw, 2012).

11 A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication.
Each time the image was spread, Amanda again became the target of cyber bullies. Trying to escape her suffering, Amanda experienced multiple failed suicide attempts. Sadly, after these attempts Amanda experienced further cyber bullying from her peers, especially on Facebook (Ng, 2012). For example, after being released from hospital following treatment for severe depression, Amanda was repeatedly called “psycho” (Shaw, 2012) and urged to attempt suicide again (Ng, 2012). On October 10, 2012 15-year-old Amanda Todd committed suicide at her home in Port Coquitlam, British Columbia, Canada.

The Amanda Todd case sparked outrage in the media, and soon after her death British Columbia Premier Christy Clarke campaigned for new laws to address cyber bullying (Fowlie, 2012). Others argued that failures at multiple levels resulted in the preventable death of a young girl (Shapiro, 2012). For instance, although the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) were aware of the photograph of Amanda soon after it began circulating online, it was not until after her death that the police agency assembled a task force and devoted expansive resources to identifying the paedophile who posted the picture online (Theodore, 2012). Moreover, transferring schools multiple times did little to help Amanda, and following her death reports suggested that schools ought to better communicate with one another about bullied students when they transfer schools (Mertl, 2012). Furthermore, despite their best efforts, Amanda’s parents struggled with their daughter’s learning disabilities, spirited nature, and personal struggles (Shaw, 2012) and were unable to—on their own—provide the supports their daughter required.
TheToddcase, and others like it, demonstrates the difficulties that any one individual or stakeholder group faces when responding to cyber bullying, which refers to repeated behaviours performed by one or more people through electronic media for the purpose of harming a less powerful individual (Tokunaga, 2010). Indeed, because “there is no clear individual or groups who serve to regulate deviant behaviour on the Internet” responses to cyber bullying are complicated (Tokunaga, 2010, p. 279). Teachers and school administrators are unlikely to witness cyber bullying first hand, which makes it difficult for them to respond to incidents (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009). Parents are disadvantaged by a “digital generation gap” in which children often explain technology to their parents (Ribak, 2001), thereby making it difficult for many parents to develop effective strategies to monitor their children’s technology use or respond to incidents (Campbell, 2005). Despite movements to criminalise cyber bullying (Broll & Huey, 2014), the police have been largely uninvolved in responding to traditional bullying and structural, organisational, and cultural barriers have undermined their responses to cybercrime (Huey, 2002; Wall, 2007). Given these challenges, some have suggested that coordinated interventions may better support cyber bullied youth. Kowalski, Limber, and Agatston (2008) urge parents and educators to work together to teach young people about netiquette, maintaining privacy online, and monitoring their digital footprints (see also Jordan & Austin, 2012). Similarly, Hinduja and Patchin (2012) advise school resource officers to work closely with teachers and others to ensure that young people receive consistent messaging about cyber bullying.
Although some research has examined adults’ responsibilities for responding to cyber bullying (e.g., Shariff, 2008), to date no studies have systematically examined stakeholders’ responses. In the pages that follow, I draw upon empirical data collected from parents, teachers and school administrators, and police officers to first study individual stakeholder groups’ responses to cyber bullying, before I use the nodal governance theoretical framework to preliminarily examine the relationships among these three groups to identify the nature and extent of the relationships among security partners. This paper concludes with recommendations for future intervention and research.

2.1 Plural Policing and Nodal Governance

Coordinated interventions are not a new phenomenon suggested in response to cyber bullying. Rather, risk management has long relied on the differentiated expertise of several institutions that together form a security quilt (Ericson, 1994). According to Ericson (1994), institutional legitimacy results from the unique expertise contributed by each member of the security quilt. Indeed, the provision of security is no longer a monopoly—if it ever was—of the public police. Like Ericson, Bayley and Shearing (2001) use the term “multilateralisation” to refer to the increasing number of security providers, and Loader (2000) describes the “fragmentation and diversification of policing provision” (p. 323) characteristic of plural policing environments (see also Bayley & Shearing, 1996). Similarly, Stenning (2000) argues that “it is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police that is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies” (p. 93). However, much of the scholarship on the pluralisation of policing has
focused on formalised policing arrangements among public, private, hybrid, or voluntary organisations (Button & John, 2002; Loader, 2000).

Building upon a similar view of security as a diverse enterprise, the nodal governance framework (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) follows from Castells’ (1996) seminal work on social networks, which treats human relations as being analogous to a computer network (Nhan 2010; Nhan & Huey, 2008). Within a nodal framework, the provision of security results from the work of interconnected institutional actors, or “nodes” (Johnston, 2006). Nodes may be public, private, or hybrid institutions (Nhan & Huey, 2008) that are stable enough to facilitate the mobilisation of resources over time (Wood, 2006). In aggregate, nodes are referred to as “nodal clusters” (Nhan & Huey, 2008)\(^\text{12}\). Although nodes within a cluster tend to share a unified worldview, they may possess different institutional agendas, structures, technologies, and access to resources (Nhan & Huey, 2008). When nodal clusters combine their independent resources to manage common security threats they form a security network (Dupont, 2004, 2006; Nhan & Huey, 2008). However, whether nodes come together to form a security network is an empirical question (Fleming & Wood, 2006).

Within the security network, individual clusters possess unique forms of capital that determine the structure of the security network and each cluster’s relative contribution to

\(^\text{12}\) For example, in his analysis of cyber policing in California, Nhan (2010) studied four nodal clusters: law enforcement, private industry, government, and the general public. Within the private industry “nodal cluster,” however, he examined the contributions of the film industry “node” and the high tech industry “node.”
network security goals (Dupont, 2004, 2006). Dupont (2004) identified five forms of
capital. First, economic capital is defined as a node’s ability to secure financial resources
that can be directed towards security outcomes. Second, political capital denotes a node’s
ability to influence policy and use government resources to achieve network goals. Third,
cultural capital represents the unique knowledge that a node possesses in a given field
that can be directed towards security outcomes. Fourth, social capital refers to a node’s
ability to create and maintain social relations with its security partners to produce desired
outcomes. Fifth, symbolic capital is an intangible asset related to institutional legitimacy
that allows a node to direct other forms of capital. According to Wood (2006), analysing
how nodes’ negotiate, obtain, or receive capital allows us to understand the nature of
relations within a security network (see also Nhan, 2010).

Importantly, although nodal governance was originally employed to understand public-
private policing partnerships in the physical world, recent scholarship has used the theory
to understand formal and informal policing arrangements in cyberspace. The distributed
nature of the Internet means that security deficits in cyberspace cannot be simply
resolved by the public police. Instead, security is better achieved within plural (or nodal)
policing environments wherein the unique security capital of multiple actors can be
accessed (Nhan, 2010; Nhan & Huey, 2008; Wall, 2007; Wall & Williams 2007).
Recently, the nodal governance model has also been used to study informal policing
arrangements involving the general public as security agents (Huey, Nhan, & Broll, 2013;
2.2 Method of Inquiry

Data for this study were drawn from in-depth interviews conducted between March 2012 and February 2013 with 34 participants in south-western Ontario, Canada. The interviews ranged from about 30 minutes to two hours in length, with an average length of approximately one hour. Following a review of the cyber bullying literature and an examination of responses to traditional bullying, parents, the educational system, and law enforcement were identified as key nodal clusters in the cyber bullying security network. Members of the parent nodal cluster ($n = 8$) included parents or guardians of young people who had been cyber bullied or who had cyber bullied others. In one case, the cousin of a young person who had been cyber bullied was interviewed instead of a parent because she had more intimate knowledge of her cousin’s experiences than did the victim’s parents. Most parents were recruited from the membership list of a local anti-bullying coalition; two additional parents volunteered to be interviewed after completing a separate survey about parents and media violence. Survey respondents were asked whether their children had been involved in cyber bullying and those who responded affirmatively were asked whether they would agree to be interviewed about the subject.

Members of the educational system nodal cluster ($n = 14$) included teachers and school administrators from a large public and medium-sized Catholic school board serving the same community who had some experiences dealing with cyber bullying. In both school boards, research officers emailed an information letter to teachers and school administrators describing the study and asking those interested to contact me directly. Lastly, the law enforcement nodal cluster ($n = 12$) was comprised of public police
officers who had some exposure to cyber bullying, either because they investigated a case that featured cyber bullying-like behaviours (e.g., harassment or threats perpetrated by one young person against another via digital communications) or because they worked in schools as school resource officers\textsuperscript{13} or doing crime prevention work. Letters were sent to the chiefs of police of three law enforcement agencies seeking permission to conduct research. Two chiefs consented, and assigned sergeants at local detachments to coordinate interviews. These sergeants provided me with a list of names of officers with recent involvement in cyber bullying-like cases, whom I then contacted and explained the study to. All officers contacted agreed to participate. A summary of interview participants is presented in Table 1.

The interview guide was flexible and designed to allow participants to dictate the flow of the interview, but it also served as a means of ensuring that all participants were asked similar questions and that the same themes were covered in each interview. For example, all participants were asked what actions they have taken when they became aware of a cyber bullying incident, what they consider a successful resolution to be, the extent of their collaboration with members of the other two nodal clusters, and barriers that restrict or impede collaboration. All interviewees were informed of their rights as research

\textsuperscript{13}In response to high profile incidents of school violence (e.g., the Columbine High School shooting), a number of security measures have been introduced in schools. One of the most common measures has been the introduction of school resource officers (SROs), who are sworn and armed officers placed within a school or a community of schools (Theriot 2009). Within schools, SROs perform typical policing duties (patrol, investigation) and some duties that are usually the responsibility of school administrators (e.g., responding to school code of conduct violations; Lawrence 2007). SROs also have greater responsibilities to educate students and engage in violence prevention work (Finn, Shively, McDevitt, Lassiter, & Rich, 2005).
participants, including their right to refuse to answer questions and to withdraw from the study at any time without penalty, and all provided active consent prior to the commencement of the interview. The study protocol was approved by the University of Western Ontario’s Research Ethics Board and by the research departments of the public and Catholic school boards in which this study took place.

Table 1: Description of Interview Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Category</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents (n = 8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other family member</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators (n = 14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school teacher</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school teacher</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary or secondary school administrator</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement (n = 12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school resource officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school resource officer</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and secondary schools resource officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime prevention officer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly to Nhan and Huey (2008), in this article, I examine the policing work of nodal clusters. Data were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), which allowed for the identification of key themes, such as the capital possessed by each nodal cluster, how this capital is used to achieve security goals, the strengths and limitations of each cluster, and the general structure of the broader security network. Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) five-step analytic method, I employed an inductive approach and
first read and re-read interview transcripts to identify preliminary themes. Second, I used open coding to systematically code interview transcripts. Third, focused coding was employed to collate my specific original themes into broader and more meaningful categories. Fourth, these themes were carefully reviewed to ensure they accurately represented the data. Fifth, the themes were further refined and re-categorised until the “story” of the policing of cyber bullying became clear. It is important to note that this process was iterative and non-linear, and earlier steps were returned to when necessary. All data were coded and later independently verified by the author.

2.3 Results

2.3.1 Parents

The parent nodal cluster consists of parents, guardians, and related “parent figure” family members of young people who are involved in cyber bullying as targets, perpetrators, or both. As a result of their close relationships with their children and being the nodal cluster whom cyber bullying is most commonly reported to, parents possess a wealth of security capital. Since they do not have to negotiate bureaucratic and political barriers to economic resources like the educational system and law enforcement clusters, parents have relatively easy access to economic capital. Importantly, though, it is this very form of capital that is often used to purchase electronic devices for their children, on which cyber bullying tends to occur. At the same time, however, economic capital can be used to purchase monitoring software for surveillance of those devices. Also possessing significant social capital resulting from their relationships with members of the educational system (e.g., teachers and administrators at their children’s school) and as a
result of being a key contact with the law enforcement cluster, parents serve as a security broker and router of information for the other nodes. As the cluster with the greatest emotional investment in the outcome of cyber bullying incidents, parents also possess some degree of cultural capital—especially knowledge of their children and best practices for supporting and sanctioning them—that can be used to direct the network’s security resources to the most appropriate cluster. Political and symbolic capital is also often harnessed by the parent cluster following tragedy. For example, in Canada, after the suicide of 15-year-old Rehtaeh Parsons was linked to cyber bullying, the Prime Minister met privately with Parsons’ parents to discuss possible criminal law changes (Smith, 2013) and Parsons’ parents have lobbied lawmakers to criminalise cyber bullying (Cheadle, 2013).

Possessing all five forms of security capital, and especially by virtue of their social, cultural, symbolic, and political capital, parents operate as the central node within the cyber bullying security network (see Figure 1). Oftentimes, however, parents reported a desire to address cyber bullying on their own without the assistance of other clusters. Such approaches were usually related to past frustrations, in which parents were disappointed by the responses of their security partners. As a result, parents sometimes launch their own investigations that have little legal significance, or they address incidents directly with other members of the parent cluster (e.g., one mother resolved an incident by calling the other child’s parents). Interviewees described three other methods through which the parent cluster achieves security: (1) By “being friends with your children first” so that they feel comfortable discussing their cyber bullying experiences;
(2) By restricting children’s access to technology in their homes; and (3) By monitoring children’s technology use, often by requiring children to inform them of passwords or by using parental monitoring software. Although many parents reported monitoring their children’s technology use, they were also conflicted with trying to balance their children’s right to privacy with their own goals of protecting their children. Even still, many parents felt that panoptic approaches—“My wife and I, we keep dropping in and checking on [our daughter] to see what is happening”—are particularly effective.

![Figure 1: Organisation of the Cyber Bullying Security Network](image)

Parents often have antagonistic relationships with the other nodal clusters that weaken the capacity of the network. Many parents expressed concern that their children’s situation would be worsened by involving their network partners. For example, the cousin of a teenage girl who was bullied on Facebook reported that involving the school would “just make it worse because [the cyber bullies] will torment her more if they know” the victim’s family reported them to the authorities. However, many parents also felt that
their concerns are often not taken seriously by members of the educator and law enforcement clusters. For example, one mother stated, “The cops don’t take me seriously, the teachers don’t take me seriously,” and another said, “It is frustrating. It is very frustrating, because I should not have to be in the school three times a week” before the bullying is addressed.

The parent cluster is not without its own limitations. Notably, many parents are not as technologically savvy as their children are, which can undermine their efforts to prevent and respond to cyber bullying. Additionally, many young people—and especially teenagers—are reluctant to discuss their personal lives with their parents. As one mother said, “Half the battle is that if you don’t know it’s going on, how can you help?” Lastly, many parents struggle to control their own children’s behaviour, and they can exert little influence over the behaviour of others. Indeed, parents seemed resigned to the fact that “if the bully wants to continue their behaviour, it’s not going to change because you’ve told them that it’s wrong.”

2.3.2 Educational System

The educational system nodal cluster is defined as consisting of elementary and secondary school teachers and administrators (vice principals and principals). Although other members of the educational system, such as counsellors and other paraprofessionals, may support young people who are cyber bullied, their contact is secondary to that of the front line educators included within this cluster. The educational system cluster possesses political, cultural, and social capital. Its political capital is
derived from its position as a state entity and, in Canada, teacher unions are large and powerful bodies that are able to exert influence over policy directives. The educational system’s cultural capital stems from its established educational abilities, unique knowledge of student learning and safe schools initiatives, and its authority to swiftly discipline students without the extended timeframes of the judiciary. Lastly, its social capital relates to its close relationships with parents and law enforcement, especially police officers assigned to schools. However, educators’ actions are often dictated by the other clusters (especially parents, who often report offences to them), which affords them a secondary position in the security network.

Related to their important cultural capital around youth learning outcomes, the educational system cluster aims to address cyber bullying through preventative education and awareness campaigns targeted at students and parents. For example, educators express simple messages for younger students, like “if you’re not digitally responsible, you’re digitally abusive.” For older students, they may link cyber bullying to friendliness and civility:

I say that to my grade 9s all the time—you make a decision every day how nice you’re going to be … Every day you come into school and you decide whether you’re actually going to be nice to other people … You make those decisions all the time. So what decisions are you going to make today?

The educational system cluster also achieves its security goals by using schools’ codes of conduct to prohibit cyber bullying and restrict access to technology. Individual nodes within this cluster (i.e., teachers) also carefully observe student interactions within the classroom for signs of cyber bullying, and collaborate intranodally by sharing
information about students who have been cyber bullied or may be cyber bullying others. However, when particularly serious cases arise school administrators often contact the law enforcement cluster for support, because a uniformed presence in the school “scares [cyber bullies] a little bit.” It should be noted that the educational system cluster frequently received high praise from law enforcement for its security efforts.

The educational system nodal cluster has a stronger relationship with law enforcement than with parents since they rely on the police to provide added security capital on school campuses. With that being said, some educators indicated that the workload of some school resource officers can limit their utility as a source of information and advice to schools. For example, a secondary school teacher said, “We do have a police officer here at the school, it just hasn’t been that convenient because they’re in and out.” Other teachers described a willingness to involve law enforcement only in the most serious circumstances, such as if a “child was in imminent danger.”

The educational system’s greatest limitation is related to teachers’ and administrators’ lack of knowledge about cyber bullying and youth technology use—several teachers and administrators identified a need for greater professional development in these domains. For instance, an elementary school teacher stated, “Professional development is needed to teach teachers how to approach these topics, how to be sensitive to these issues, [and] how to negotiate the boundary between school and home life.” The educational system’s structure and culture also inhibits administrators’ ability to fully discipline offending students, which is a limitation not present in other clusters. According to a secondary
school vice principal, “We have to be very nurturing and politically correct. And police officers can just say it.”

2.3.3 Law Enforcement

The law enforcement nodal cluster consists of public police personnel at the municipal, provincial, and federal levels responsible for the policing of cyber bullying. These officers include school resource officers (SROs), crime prevention officers, and general patrol officers. The law enforcement cluster possesses political capital related to its status as a public institution and its ability to influence policy around law and order objectives. Additionally, it possesses cultural capital stemming from its highly regarded security knowledge and knowledge of crime prevention and the criminal justice system—that is, through its role as a knowledge broker (Ericson, 1994). Finally, law enforcement possesses a great deal of symbolic capital, including a desirable monopoly over the powers of arrest (Nhan, 2010), and valued security capital related to its forensic expertise.

As an elementary SRO said,

We don’t always need a witness for cyber bullying because we have two computers that have that information stored on them. If somebody calls us and says I was threatened, they have the message. That message has an IP [Internet Protocol] address. Now we just have to go and get a search warrant and get the other one off the other computer.

Quite simply, parents and educators do not have similar forensic technological capabilities as law enforcement.

However, members of law enforcement are relative outsiders in young peoples’ lives and are rarely the first point of contact when a cyber bullying incident transpires. Indeed,
several officers acknowledged that they are often only contacted about cyber bullying because parents have not received a desirable response from their child’s school, or because schools are unsure how to proceed with a case. According to a crime prevention officer, “If people have called the police, it’s probably their last resort and they’re not happy with where they’ve gone in the first place.” In past years, law enforcement had little involvement in responding to bullying, but recent high profile cases with tragic outcomes and related demands to criminalise cyber bullying (Broll & Huey, 2014) have expanded the value of law enforcement to the security network. Nevertheless, the law enforcement cluster occupies a peripheral position in the security network and has little influence over the network’s strategic direction.

Although the police possess the powers of arrest, charges are rarely brought forward in response to cyber bullying. Instead, the police officers I spoke to considered themselves a resource for their security partners. Often providing strategic advice as knowledge brokers, officers may guide parents or educators “in the right direction” or work collaboratively with other members of the network to reach “some type of resolution where we can get the bullying to stop.” The law enforcement cluster is also frequently called upon by other clusters in the network to assist with achieving security goals. For example, officers are regularly called to schools to “scare” cyber bullies into changing their behaviours, as explained by a patrol officer: “Sometimes the teachers think they’re better off to have somebody in a uniform speak to [the cyber bully] … The kid might think, ‘Wow, this is pretty serious.’” In other instances, the police may be called upon by the educational system to reaffirm key messages with parents “because they tend to take
that from us, and not the school.” Thus, even though cyber bullying occurs through high tech media, low tech policing strategies are often valuable resources for achieving security goals. Furthermore, whereas the law enforcement cluster has a positive relationship with educators, relations with parents are often strained because of parents’ over-willingness to call the police for apparently trivial matters. As a patrol officer said, “When [parents] don’t know who to call, they call the police;” an elementary SRO similarly stated, “A lot of parents are quick to jump on the police bandwagon.”

Security limitations of the law enforcement cluster relate principally to structural and cultural barriers. As one officer remarked, “it’s hard to police the Internet,” and many officers do not possess the technological skills to confidently intervene in cyber bullying cases. During a discussion about social media, for instance, a secondary SRO said, “It just gets confusing … For an investigator, I’m like, I don’t understand this.” Furthermore, since its inception policing has been closely linked to clearly demarcated jurisdictions (see Huey, 2002), but cyber bullying often occurs across jurisdictional boundaries based on physical geography and “there’s a lot of bickering between agencies because of that.” Another substantive limitation of the law enforcement cluster relates to the minimal police resources directed towards cybercrime. A secondary school teacher acknowledged that “if [the police are] dealing with, like, child exploitation and fraud and a whole bunch of things, I don’t think they would have time” to respond to cyber bullying. Indeed, an elementary and secondary SRO admitted, “We can’t solve everything. We want to, but the reality is we can’t.” Lastly, police responses in Canada are structured by the biological age of offenders. Many cyber bullies are under age 12 and cannot be charged
or they are considered minors, in which case progressive discipline and court-avoidance is preferred under the *Youth Criminal Justice Act*. Therefore, police responses to cyber bullying tend to be “more informal than it is formal. Help them and educate them.” These informal responses can be contrasted with parents’, and occasionally educators’, formal security goals when they involve law enforcement in cases.

### 2.3.4 Internodal Relations

A closer examination of the relationships between nodes can elucidate social, structural, and cultural variables that impact the security network’s ability to effectively prevent and respond to cyber bullying. In this section, I explore internodal communication—or, “bandwidth” (Nhan & Huey, 2008)—and relations by focusing on the bonds between the law enforcement-educational system clusters and the parent cluster. This analytic approach was selected because the relationship between the educational system and law enforcement clusters is generally positive (e.g., a SRO stated that schools are “absolutely partners” and a vice principal reported that “the police are really great to deal with”), whereas both clusters’ relationship with parents is characterised by some degree of conflict. Moreover, the parent nodal cluster is the central node in the security network, and the educational system-law enforcement clusters occupy a secondary status. In the following sections I highlight five factors that inhibit internodal relationships: (1) The compatibility of security goals, (2) Different cultural understandings of what constitutes cyber bullying, (3) Institutional mistrust, (4) Structural constraints that impede timely resolutions and internodal information sharing, and (5) Normative expectations regarding roles in the security network.
The first factor inhibiting internodal relations is the incompatibility of nodal clusters’ security goals. In most instances, the law enforcement subculture prioritises high-risk takedowns and arrests; however, with respect to cyber bullying, the law enforcement and educational system nodal clusters share a common goal of educating young people about the dangers of cyber bullying and, more generally, about safe technology use. For example, several police officers expressed a preference for offering in-school presentations for students and discussing safe technology use with affected children and their parents. Likewise, most of the educators shared the view that media literacy education and lessons around managing one’s digital footprint are more effective responses to cyber bullying than suspension or expulsion. In contrast, parents tended to desire punitive sanctions, such as expelling cyber bullies from school or pressing criminal charges. These divergent worldviews strain internodal relationships and, as an elementary school vice principal said, “make it hard to work together.”

Related to divergent security goals are nodal clusters’ conflicting definitions of cyber bullying. Members of the educational system and law enforcement clusters rely on specific and highly structured definitions that guide their interventions, whereas parents’ conceptualisation of cyber bullying is more fluid and related to their family’s circumstances. Indeed, the police’s definition of cyber bullying linked the phenomenon with existing criminal offences (e.g., harassment, threats) and the educational system routinely draws upon definitions of cyber bullying as it is set out in education statutes. Conversely, parents were often perceived as using the term “cyber bullying” because they knew it would get a reaction from their security partners, regardless of whether or not
their child was truly experiencing cyber bullying. As an elementary school principal told me, cyber bullying “has become the new phrase that we use that I think [parents] feel they get immediate attention or response, whether it’s from the teachers or the administrators or the police department.” As such, parents’ actions can strain relationships with other clusters in the security network.

There is much institutional mistrust between members of the law enforcement and parent nodal clusters. This may be a function of ad hoc parent-police relationships, whereas the stronger educational system-police relationship is characterised by formal SRO arrangements. Parents’ heightened emotions when their children are experiencing cyber bullying may further problematize relations. For example, a patrol officer described being micromanaged by a concerned father whose child was the victim of online bullying: “He was calling me a lot … We went over the same things over and over again, but he was calling me quite a bit. So he was just wanting to make sure I was doing my job, basically.” At the same time, many parents felt that their concerns and, by extension, their child’s welfare were not taken seriously by other members of the security network. One mother expressed “disappointment” with the school’s response to cyber bullying involving her son. Of the police, another mother exclaimed, “Do they deal with cyber bullying? No!” Parents’ mistrust of other clusters’ willingness or ability to respond to cyber bullying creates friction within the security network, and frequent micromanaging may actually slow responses as the educational system and law enforcement must calm parents rather than investigate incidents.
A fourth factor that can affect internodal relations is related to nodal structural constraints that prolong resolutions and impede information flow among clusters. Given the potential negative outcomes associated with cyber bullying, parents desire swift responses from their security partners. However, members of the educational system and law enforcement nodal clusters must follow due process before sanctioning cyber bullies. While acknowledging parents’ concerns, an elementary school vice principal explained why cases take time to investigate:

Often the parents don’t feel like the school is ever doing anything about the situation … Parents will say, ‘You’ve done nothing!’ Or, ‘I haven’t heard from you in a week, what’s going on?’ Well, in the course of a day, that’s not the only thing I’m doing in this building.

Similarly, an elementary SRO explained that the police must fully investigate incidents before arriving at a conclusion regarding culpability:

Quite often [parents will] go to the principal as well, and the principal’s trying to sort through things, but not fast enough. So then they’ll come to us. Well, it takes us time, too. You can’t just jump and say, ‘You’ve said this is the way it is, well that’s the way it is.’ You have to look at everybody’s side and listen to everybody.

Once cases had been resolved, parents continued to express frustration about a lack of information sharing among clusters. For example, many parents indicated that they wanted to know how the cyber bully was sanctioned; however, the educational system and law enforcement clusters must abide by privacy and confidentiality guidelines, even when interacting with other members of the security network, which can further problematize internodal relations.
Lastly, normative expectations regarding nodal clusters’ responsibilities in prevention and response efforts creates friction within the security network. Most frequently, interviewees contested the role of parents in providing security for their own children. The educational system and law enforcement nodal clusters reported that parents ought to be parents to their children first, and friends second: “[Parents] want to be friends and they want their kid to be happy … What [young people] don’t always have are people who give them guidance.” Such a lack of guidance was frustrating for the educational system and law enforcement clusters, prompting an elementary SRO to say, “We’re parenting people’s kids way too much. And the schools are parenting the kids way too much. The parents need to step up again and realise some of these issues are being caused by not enough stuff happening at home.” Furthermore, several educators relayed stories of parents calling or text messaging their children during the day, and thereby not respecting externally imposed technology use restrictions. The following exchange with a school administrator is illustrative:

A: Ring! ‘It’s mom calling.’ ‘Do you have to answer that right now?’ ‘Well, it’s my mom—I just have to check about my soccer game. Hi, mom?’ So parents are part of the problem.

Q: But they must know their child is in school?

A: Yeah, but they think that’s how it should be. I don’t understand it.

A disconnect exists between how the parent cluster and the educational system-law enforcement clusters perceive of parents’ role in the provision of security for young people. This disjuncture undermines the security efforts of educators and police officers and further strains internodal relations.
2.4 Discussion

Increasingly recognised as a serious social concern (Campbell, 2005; Tokunaga, 2010), much public debate has centred on the most effective responses to cyber bullying (Broll & Huey, 2014; Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Madigan 2010). However, little is currently known about how adults respond to cyber bullying after they become aware of incidents. Since it is questionable whether new cyber bullying-specific laws will be effective in combatting digital harassment (Broll & Huey, 2014), it seems likely that collaborative responses to cyber bullying (Hinduja & Patchin, 2012; Jordan & Austin, 2012; Kowalski et al. 2008) are worthwhile undertakings. Indeed, current cyber bullying security efforts seem to be following broader trends in policing, in which diverse actors work together to achieve desired security outcomes (Bayley & Shearing, 1996, 2001; Ericson, 1994; Loader, 2000; Stenning, 2000). The nodal governance framework (Johnston & Shearing, 2003) provides a useful theoretical and explanatory tool for studying security responses to cyber bullying. Unfortunately, the results of this study suggest that current security efforts are fragmented and plagued by limitations in each nodal cluster, and that internodal conflict likely weakens security outcomes for the young people affected by cyber bullying.

As the central node in the cyber bullying security network, the parent cluster serves as an information router passing evidence and other key materials to its security partners as needed. Although the parent cluster possesses all five forms of capital, its strained relationships with the educational system and law enforcement nodal clusters problematize internodal relations. At the same time, because parents are unable to
influence the behaviour of cyber bullies, they are highly reliant on their security partners. The educational system is able to swiftly discipline cyber bullies outside of the judiciary, but their interventions are often dictated by parents’ information sharing and law enforcement’s expert knowledge. Furthermore, many nodes within the educational system cluster, including teachers and school administrators, expressed a lack of comfort and knowledge when responding to cyber bullying incidents. The law enforcement cluster is aptly situated in its comfortable role as knowledge broker and expert advisor (see Ericson, 1994). This position can be contrasted with other security networks in which the police’s state sanctioned powers of arrest are highly valued, and this actionable capital is what places them as a central figure in security governance (Nhan, 2010).

Moreover, the counselling services offered by law enforcement, especially in relation to parents, is reminiscent of the treatment and diagnosis approach inherent in problem-solving policing (Goldstein, 1990). Though law enforcement’s security capital and forensic capabilities are highly valued, structural constraints (e.g., legal statutes governing responses to incidents involving minors) tend to necessitate informal responses. Likewise, the police culture, which often undermines the seriousness of cybercrimes, and organisational weaknesses related to training officers to adequately respond to cybercrime (Huey, 2002; Wall, 2007), minimise the law enforcement cluster’s position in the network.

Internodal relations between the educator-law enforcement and parent nodes are characterised by friction, and a number of gaps in the network were observed. Specifically, the results of this study suggest an incompatibility of internodal security
goals, varied cultural understandings of what constitutes cyber bullying, institutional mistrust that strains internodal relations, structural constraints that impede timely resolutions and the flow of information, and conflicting normative expectations regarding parents’ role in the security network. Moreover, the digital generation gap noted by Ribak (2001) emerged as an important limitation for all nodal clusters.

Two limitations to this study should be noted. First, it employed a small qualitative sample so the results are not generalisable. Second, all participants were recruited from a small geographic region. The school boards from which teachers and school administrators were recruited have received recognition for their leading approaches to safe schools initiatives, so they may not be reflective of educators more generally. Likewise, the police officers interviewed come from medium sized urban and small rural communities. It is possible that these officers are able to spend more time on educational and preventative initiatives than officers in larger urban centres. Therefore, future studies should aim to use larger, more representative samples to further improve our understanding of stakeholders’ responses to cyber bullying and the functioning of the cyber bullying security network.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study represents an important first step in mapping network relations and identifying the security strengths (capital) and limitations of nodal clusters, as well as internodal conflicts (or “gaps”; Wood, 2006) that impede the realisation of desirable security outcomes. Furthermore, this study indicates the importance of continued professional development for the educational system and law
enforcement nodal clusters, and continued education for parents, around issues related to safe technology use, social media, and cyber bullying. Additionally, it seems imperative that parents be educated about realistic timelines to resolutions when they seek the support of their network partners in responding to cyber bullying. At the same time, the educational system and law enforcement clusters should be encouraged to be patient with parents who are navigating emotional situations in which their children are being harmed. In contrast to the current organisation of the cyber bullying security network presented in Figure 1, Figure 2 demonstrates the ideal organisation and information flow of the network. In this model, information flows more freely among nodes (notice the two-way arrows between parents and other members of the network), and relations among all nodes are equally strong (in Figure 1, the arrow between the educational system and law enforcement clusters is bolded, indicating a stronger relationship). Much work remains to achieve such an ideal model, but certainly the gains for youth of such achievements would be great.

2.5 Conclusion

The literature suggests that few young people report their cyber bullying experiences to an adult (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Smith et al., 2008), sometimes because they fear that nothing will be done or that reporting will only aggravate their situation (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009). However, most advocates strongly encourage reporting and urge young people not to deal with cyber bullying on their own. Certainly, one method of improving reporting rates is to ensure that young people who do come forward experience desirable
Figure 2: Ideal Organisation and Information Flow in the Cyber Bullying Security Network

outcomes. Unfortunately, current responses to cyber bullying are fragmented and characterised by nodal limitations and internodal conflict. Accordingly, members of the cyber bullying security network should take steps to address their own limitations, as well as their relations with other members of the security network, so as to improve security outcomes for young people impacted by cyber bullying.
2.6 References


Chapter 3

“Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn’t a Police Matter”: Police Perspectives on Policing Cyber Bullying

Rehtaeh Parsons lived in a quiet Halifax, Nova Scotia suburb in eastern Canada. On November 12, 2011, 15-year-old Rehtaeh and a close friend attended a small house party. Although she was not yet legally old enough to consume alcohol, Rehtaeh reportedly became intoxicated and passed out at the party, at which point four teenage boys took turns raping her (Ross, 2013). One of her abusers used his cell phone to take photographs of another boy sexually assaulting Rehtaeh. The photographs of the assault were soon circulating among Rehtaeh’s peers online. It was not until November 17 that Rehtaeh learned of the photographs (Pepler & Milton, 2013); shortly thereafter Rehtaeh’s peers began to relentlessly bully her on social networking websites, referring to her as a “slut” (Taber & Walton, 2013).

After a police investigation failed to result in charges (Ross, 2013), Rehtaeh was left unable to return to school where she would have faced her attackers. Traumatised by the attack and subsequent bullying, transferring schools and attending counselling sessions did little to lift the suicidal depression she fell into. On April 4, 2013, she attempted suicide by hanging. Rehtaeh fell into a coma and was taken off life support three days

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later (Ross, 2013; Smith, 2013). Following her death, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper described the cyber bullying of Rehtaeh as “criminal activity,” and met with her parents privately to discuss possible criminal law changes (Smith, 2013; Taber & Walton, 2013).

The Canadian federal government is not alone in seeking to use the resources of the criminal justice system to address problematic personal online behaviour. Nova Scotia, Parsons’ home province, enacted new anti-cyber bullying legislation just four months after her death. Nova Scotia’s legislation allows for victims to obtain protection orders against cyber bullies and it permits victims to sue the parents of young people who engage in cyber bullying (Davison, 2013). The new legislation also created a special policing unit to handle cyber bullying investigations in the province (Mertl, 2013). A number of Canadian municipalities have also enacted by-laws in efforts to combat cyber bullying. For example, Regina, Saskatchewan and Port Coquitlam, British Columbia have instituted by-laws prohibiting bullying—including cyber bullying—in public places. In these municipalities, bullying is punishable by fines of up to $2,000 and 90 days in jail. Others have passed legislation sanctioning even harsher punishments for bullies. For example, Blackfalds, Alberta has passed a by-law permitting fines of up to $10,000 for repeat bullies, and Hanna, Alberta has passed a by-law in which bullying is punishable by a six-month jail term (Walton, 2012). However, critics have argued that these by-laws are largely symbolic and have reported that tickets are rarely issued (Mertl, 2013; Walton, 2012).
Legislative amendments in response to growing concerns about cyber bullying are not isolated to Canada. As of January 2013, 49 American states and the District of Columbia had enacted some type of anti-bullying legislation (the exception is Montana; nor is there a federal law). Moreover, 47 states had updated, or proposed updates, to their bullying laws to include references to electronic harassment and 21 states and the federal government had specifically included “cyber bullying” in their enacted or proposed legislation. Notably, 10 of 21 states (48%) with laws specifically addressing cyber bullying include criminal sanctions for bullies (Hinduja & Patchin, 2013). And yet, in the midst of public furore over cyber bullying incidents, and the spate of new laws and legislative amendments generated in response, what is seldom referenced are the implications for the criminal justice system of recasting online bullying into a form of criminalised activity. Indeed, what are too often missing from public debates are the voices of those who are, or who would be, tasked with the investigation of such activities: the public police. Furthermore, as the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, the police make fundamentally important decisions with respect to what types of conduct will be treated as the property of that system. While it is the case that they make such decisions within political environments that might place pressure on police forces to privilege tougher responses to particular forms of behaviour, as an example, individual members continue to exercise a significant degree of discretion when it comes to many violent and nonviolent offences. Consequently, individual officer perceptions about the relative importance of cyber bullying tell us much about how these cases will be handled not only by police members, but by policing agencies and the larger criminal justice
system. Or, more candidly, regardless of political rhetoric on the importance of treating cyber bullying as a criminal phenomenon, if police members do not adopt a similar attitude and process cases thusly, we can expect the criminalisation of cyber bullying will largely not happen.

In this chapter, I draw on in-depth qualitative interviews with 12 Canadian police officers with frontline experience relating to the policing of cyber bullying incidents. The purpose of this study was to understand police officers’ preferred method of responding to cyber bullying and to examine whether charges are typically considered in cyber bullying cases. After briefly reviewing the current literature on the impact of cyber bullying on young people and adults’ responses to cyber bullying, I outline this study’s research methodology. I then present the results of my analyses, outlining three key themes that emerged from the data. The implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding section.

3.1 Cyber Bullying and its Impact on Young People

Cyber bullying is generally understood as an intentional and repeated behaviour performed through electronic media for the purpose of harming others (Tokunaga, 2010). Although estimates vary widely, according to a 2010 meta-synthesis of studies from several countries, between 20% and 40% of young people are cyberbullied (Tokunaga, 2010); likewise, about 20% of young people report cyber bullying others (Patchin & Hinduja, 2012). An important feature of all types of bullying, including cyber, is the existence of a real or perceived power imbalance that gives a group or individual an
advantage over vulnerable or weaker individuals (Mason, 2008). For both traditional and cyber bullying, this power imbalance can take many forms, including psychological and social. However, in the digital world physical size advantages are diminished, whereas technological proficiency might create such imbalances (Hinduja & Patchin, 2007). Frequently, adult intervention is required for youth who are bullied to overcome these power imbalances on- or offline.

Other differences between traditional and cyber bullying include a lack of supervision of electronic media (Williams & Guerra, 2007), the perception of increased anonymity online and on cell phones (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009), fewer social barriers online making it easier to say things one would not say in person (Patchin & Hinduja, 2006), and the pervasiveness of cyber bullying that no longer limits bullying to the school day (Slonje & Smith, 2008). For example, in past years, bullying was often a school-based problem and young people had some refuge from their torment at home. Nowadays, unless they entirely disconnect, which is an unrealistic and ineffective solution, youth who are cyberbullied can be bombarded with hurtful messages and content from an army of emboldened others hiding behind the anonymity of a screen at any time. Nevertheless, similar to traditional bullying, youth who are cyberbullied are more likely than non-bullied young people to be depressed (Didden et al., 2009; Wang, Nansel, & Ianotti, 2011; Ybarra, 2004), report social anxiety (Juvonen & Gross, 2008), or indicate decreased self-esteem (Didden et al., 2009). Additionally, Hinduja and Patchin (2010) found that youth who are cyberbullied are about two times more likely to have attempted suicide than non-bullied youth. For many at-risk youth, such as those who are cyber
bullied, feeling a connection with meaningful adults and adult care can serve as a protective factor promoting resiliency (Kazdin, 1993; Resnick, Harris, & Blum, 1993). Thus, adults are likely to have an important role in mediating some of the negative effects of cyber bullying on youth.

### 3.2 Adult Responses to Cyber Bullying

In recent decades, policing agencies have assumed a greater role in the governance of security on many school campuses. Largely in reaction to high-profile incidents of lethal violence in schools in the late 1990s—such as the shootings in Littleton, Colorado and Taber, Alberta—increased attention has been focused on protecting students and teachers at school. Fears of extreme school violence and a desire to offer greater protection on campus subsequently led to the rapid implementation or expansion of a variety of security measures, such as metal detectors, surveillance equipment, and school resource officers (Theriot, 2009). In Canada, much like in the United States, school resource officers (SROs) are sworn police officers, who are usually uniformed and armed, assigned full-time to one or more elementary and/or secondary schools (Theriot, 2009). In smaller communities, SROs are sometimes assigned part-time to patrol schools and part-time to other community-service tasks, such as developing and delivering educational presentations for parents or doing media relations work.

SROs perform typical policing functions within the school (e.g., patrolling hallways, investigating criminal complaints, minimising disruptions) and some duties that are usually considered the responsibility of school administrators (e.g., dealing with students
who violate school rules and codes of conduct; Lawrence, 2007). Most SROs are also tasked with educating students and school staff about violence prevention, serving as mentors or role models to students, and helping to improve school climate (Finn, Shively, McDevitt, Lassiter, & Rich, 2005; Rich & Finn, 2001). According to Theriot (2009), “today, these officers represent a significant and popular trend in school violence prevention … [and] school-based policing is the fastest growing area of law enforcement” (p. 281).

Although some studies have suggested that much schoolyard bullying can be considered criminal behaviour (Theriot, Dulmus, Sowers, & Bowie, 2004), bullying has historically been excused as being a normal part of growing up, as a rite of passage, or of “boys being boys” or “kids being kids” (Limber & Small, 2003). Therefore, there was no expectation of legal intervention. At best, bullying was considered a school problem to be handled internally as school administrators deemed appropriate (Campbell, 2005). Unlike traditional bullying, there is much confusion surrounding who is responsible for responding to cyber bullying incidents (Broll, Burns, Parkington, Pandori, & Ducette, in press; Tokunaga, 2010). School administrators are often reluctant to become involved in cyber bullying cases because they fear they will overstep their legal authority, especially if the bullying behaviour took place off campus (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009). Indeed, there are several cases—especially in the United States—in which the courts have ruled that schools were extra judicious and infringed upon students’ freedom of expression (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009; Shariff, 2008).
Since much cyber bullying occurs at home (Fegenbush & Olivier, 2009; Patchin & Hinduja, 2006), there seems to be a greater impetus on parents to intervene than was the case with traditional bullying. However, youth often understand the devices through which cyber bullying occurs better than their parents do making many parents uncertain of how and when to respond (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009; Shariff, 2008). Lastly, the reluctance of law enforcement to respond to traditional bullying, in concert with the recognition that the police are often “ill-equipped organisationally, occupationally, and culturally” (Wall, 2007, p. 197; see also Huey, 2002) to respond to cybercrime raises questions regarding the police’s ability and willingness to effectively respond to cyber bullying. Given the lack of one clear stakeholder responsible for responding to cyber bullying it may be the case that security networks are necessary to provide effective responses, as they are with other types of cybercrime (Drahos, 2004; Dupont, 2004; Huey, Nhan, & Broll, 2013; Wall, 2007).

Several cyber bullying cases have included police investigations, and a handful of high profile cases have received a great deal of media attention. One of the earliest cases involved the suicide of American teenager Megan Meier. Following her death, a police investigation revealed that the mother of one of Meier’s friends had been anonymously harassing her online. Lori Drew was indicted and convicted of offences in violation of the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), but her conviction was overturned on appeal (Zetter, 2008). More recently in Canada, eight London, Ontario high school girls were arrested and charged with criminal harassment in October 2012 for bullying and cyber bullying a classmate (Dubinsky, 2012). Likewise, following much public scrutiny,
and several months after her death, two boys were charged with distributing child pornography in relation to the Rehtaeh Parsons case described above (Bruce, 2013). Notwithstanding these high profile cases, and despite increasing demand for greater police involvement in responding to cyber bullying, relatively little is known about how the police routinely respond to cyber bullying or how they would prefer to tackle this problem. Furthermore, it is largely unknown whether current laws can be used effectively to respond to cyber bullying, or if cyber bullying-specific laws are necessary. In the pages that follow, I intend to shed some light on these issues.

3.3 Method

Data for this study were drawn from in-depth qualitative interviews conducted with 12 Canadian police officers. Officers interviewed were either involved in a recent case that prominently featured cyber bullying-like behaviours (e.g., harassment or threats perpetrated by one or more youth against another youth via digital communications), or they worked in schools as resource officers or worked in another police unit doing crime prevention work. Two research questions guided this study. First, I sought to understand police officers’ preferred method of responding to cyber bullying. Second, I wished to examine whether charges are typically considered in cyber bullying cases and, if so, what charges are pursued. By extension, I also explored whether police officers see current laws as being effective or whether new legislation is necessary. The interview guide contained a series of open-ended questions related to these guiding research questions (see Table 2).
To answer the research questions, authorisation to conduct interviews with police personnel was sought by sending a letter to the Chief of Police of three municipal and provincial police agencies in south-western Ontario, Canada. Two police agencies responsible for policing a medium-size city and smaller rural communities agreed to participate. The Chief’s offices provided the contact information for sergeants who would help arrange the interviews. The sergeants then provided me with the names and contact information for officers who had been involved in cases featuring cyber bullying-like behaviours. Twelve officers were contacted and all of the officers contacted agreed to be interviewed. I proceeded to conduct interviews with general patrol officers ($n = 3$), elementary SROs ($n = 3$), secondary SROs ($n = 3$), an SRO who worked in both elementary and high schools ($n = 1$), and crime prevention officers ($n = 2$). Participants were evenly distributed by sex (50% female). Interviews were conducted with the officers at their preferred location (e.g., precinct, school) during regular business hours. The recruitment and interview process was the same for all officers, regardless of whether or not they worked in schools. The interviews ranged from about 30 minutes to two hours in length, with an average length of approximately one hour. Each interview was audio recorded and then manually transcribed. Prior to commencing the interviews, all research participants were informed of their rights, including their right to withdraw their consent at any time, and they were informed that their confidentiality would be maintained to the maximum extent allowable by law. The University of Western Ontario’s Research Ethics Board approved the study protocol and all research participants provided active consent.
Table 2: Interview Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Probing question(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Please explain how law enforcement agencies become involved in cyber</td>
<td>How often are incidents reported?</td>
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<tr>
<td>bullying cases</td>
<td>Specifically, who contacts you (e.g., parents, students, educators)?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>How are cases typically brought to your attention (e.g., word of mouth, informal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>reports, formal reports)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What factors determine which cases you choose to follow up on?</td>
<td>What factors are of greatest influence when determining whether to pursue a case?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do you typically respond to reported incidents of cyber bullying?</td>
<td>Why is this the usual course of action?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What factors result in atypical responses?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Are charges usually brought against those persons involved in cyber</td>
<td>If so, what are they charged with?</td>
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<tr>
<td>bullying incidents?</td>
<td>If not, why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is a successful outcome or resolution to these cases?</td>
<td>What barriers prevent this resolution?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think that current laws and/or education acts are adequate to deal</td>
<td>Why or why not?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with cyber bullying?</td>
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Data were analysed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis approach.

Thematic analysis is a flexible method for analysing qualitative data that permits rich, detailed, and complex accounts of the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I systematically coded the data by first reading and re-reading interview transcripts to identify initial promising themes. Next, an open coding approach was used to code the transcripts line-by-line to identify initial descriptive and analytic themes. Open coding was followed by more focused coding that involved collating the initial themes into broader, more meaningful categories. During the focused coding stage, themes were formulated based
on recurrent patterns or responses that aided in better understanding the meaning of the data in relation to my research questions. These focused themes were then carefully reviewed to ensure that they accurately represented the data, before they were further refined, re-categorised, and named until the “story” of the research became clear. Rather than following a linear path, I returned to previous steps as needed as additional questions arose that required clarification. In their article, Braun and Clarke (2006) more fully describe each of the steps of their analytic process, and offer several examples of how such an approach should be undertaken. In analysing the data collected for this study, I utilised an inductive approach in which the themes were grounded in the data. All data were coded, and later independently verified, by the author.

3.4 Results

3.4.1 Cyber bullying is Not, and Should Not be, a Crime

“Sometimes I find myself telling complainants, or kids that come up to me, ‘Sometimes I can’t make a mean person nice’. ”—Secondary School Resource Officer

At present, cyber bullying is not a crime in either Canada or the U.S. However, as noted, the Canadian federal government and many U.S. states have contemplated criminalising cyber bullying. The police officers interviewed for this study did not endorse such plans; instead, they expressed concern about the burden that such laws will place on already strained criminal justice systems (see Table 3). In particular, eight of 12 participants were concerned with the prospect of having to charge youth for being mean to one another.

When discussing current laws, one patrol officer said,
Just being mean to somebody isn’t a police matter, right? So, I mean, if somebody says, ‘Well, I don’t like you and you’re a jerk,’ or they criticise them or they’re just generally mean to them … that is bullying. Once it reaches a certain point, then it becomes a criminal matter and it’s a police matter.

The same officer further explained a recent service call that he responded to in which a mother called the police because a classmate on Facebook called her daughter a name. The officer agreed that the name-calling was not nice, but he also explained to the girl’s mother that no laws had been broken and that there was nothing he could do. This individual felt that if he had to investigate this case further because of new laws, it would have taken time away from what were perceived to be more serious crimes, including cyber bullying cases that involved criminal harassment or threats. Another secondary SRO perhaps best summed the perspective of the officers interviewed for this study by facetiously remarking, “If they ever make name-calling an offence and I have to run around charging people with that, I quit. I’m not doing that.”

Table 3: Description of Research Themes (N = 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme and Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CYBER BULLYING IS NOT, AND SHOULD NOT BE, A CRIME</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Cyber bullying-specific laws may overburden the criminal justice system</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Just being mean to somebody isn’t a police matter, right? … Once it reaches a</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>certain point, then it becomes a criminal matter.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Public expectation that the police will solve all interpersonal problems</em></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Now we’re getting to the point where if somebody doesn’t have a perfect day,</td>
<td></td>
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<td>they think somebody should be charged.”</td>
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New legislation needs to clearly differentiate between “cyber bullying” and current offences

“From my standpoint, it’s more is it harassment? Is it a threat? Is it an assault …? Bullying is a pretty general term.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT LAWS ARE EFFECTIVE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Officers can distinguish between “bullying” and a current criminal offences</td>
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<tr>
<td>“If we have reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge, then that’s what’s going to happen.”</td>
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<td>“Bullying” behaviours can be criminal</td>
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<td>“He hit me. Well, now we’re at an assault. It’s not just bullying anymore.”</td>
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<td>Cyber bullying-specific laws are unnecessary</td>
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<tr>
<td>“The laws are already there. Pretty much anything you can tell me about [cyber bullying], there’s a law against it.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Court-avoidance is preferable</td>
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<tr>
<td>“We try our hardest to keep [young people who cyber bully others] out of the courthouse.”</td>
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<th>PREVENTION THROUGH EDUCATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>Educating youth about safe technology use and healthy relationships is effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Youth don’t understand that if they’re going to threaten somebody face-to-face, it’s no different than using the computer to threaten them.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teaching youth how to behave appropriately when using technology is important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“If the kids don’t know the proper way of using technology then they set themselves up to be harassed or end up harassing people.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educating parents about how to protect their children is important</td>
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<tr>
<td>“You’ll talk to them about what they’ve been doing to this point, but they need that little bit of guidance for the next step.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents ought to be parents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents should monitor their children’s technology use and ask them important questions about what they’re doing online and who they are talking to, just as they would offline</td>
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**Officers are an important resource for schools**

“Sometimes [school administrators] just call and say, ‘This is what’s going on, what would you suggest?’”

**Some school administrators wait too long to involve the police**

“When it becomes a big mess, that’s usually when we’re called in.”

Seven participants also discussed the strain on the justice system caused by increased public expectation—and especially parents’ expectations—that the police are available to solve all interpersonal problems. Several officers noted that awareness about cyber bullying and expectations that the police will always intervene have seemingly increased in parallel. According to a patrol officer,

> Before cyber bullying, I guess, and when bullying was occurring at the school, typically that was dealt with within the school. Now that it’s happening kind of outside the school as well, I find the public looks to the police to resolve these issues.

A secondary SRO stated, “The parents are really, really fast to come in and it’s getting to the point, too, where some of the stuff that’s coming in it’s like, ‘Really? You really, honestly think the police should be involved in this?’” When the officers were asked to explain why parents may expect police intervention for seemingly trivial matters, several said that when parents are frustrated by the school’s response to cyber bullying involving their child they call the police out of desperation. For example, one officer stated,

> I find sometimes with these [cyber bullying incidents] that have no criminal element, because the parents aren’t either getting the response from the school they want or they just don’t know what else to do and they call the police … We can only act on the law, right, so if it’s not a crime then I can only do so much. But the
parents will expect the police to solve this issue, and that can’t always be done by the police.

Participants also indicated that they felt like well-paid babysitters when they respond to cyber bullying incidents that could be better dealt with by parents or the school. For example, a patrol officer related how he had recently responded to a call for service in which one young girl had decided that she no longer wished to be friends with another young girl, and the first girl’s parents wanted the officer to inform the other child about the dissolution of the friendship. Laughing, but also visibly frustrated, the officer said, “How about you go tell them not to talk to you anymore? If you don’t want them to talk to you, tell them not to talk to you!” A secondary SRO reported similar experiences involving students: “Now we’re getting to the point where if somebody doesn’t have a perfect day, they think somebody should be charged.” Each of these officers expressed worry that criminalising cyber bullying will result in a further increase in what they perceived to be frivolous service calls.

If new cyber bullying laws are created, half of the officers interviewed indicated that the legislation would need to be carefully crafted and include specific guidance regarding what constitutes cyber bullying and how cyber bullying differs from threats or harassment. The officers also explained that the legislation must clearly distinguish “minor” acts of cyber bullying like name calling from more serious incidents requiring police intervention. For the officers we spoke to, the term cyber bullying is too generic to be of investigative value. One patrol officer said, “At least from my standpoint, it’s more
is it harassment? Is it a threat? Is it an assault that’s about to take place? Bullying is a pretty general term.”

3.4.2 Current Laws are Effective

“There’s a difference between bullying, which is socially unacceptable, and criminal harassment. Now it’s a police matter, I would say, because a crime is involved.”—Patrol Officer

Criminal bullying laws were deemed unnecessary by eight of the police officers interviewed for this study, who felt confident in their ability to distinguish between bullying and criminal offences. All officers agreed that such distinctions need to be drawn because some cyber bullying-related behaviours can and do cross into criminal harassment or other offences, a point at which they believed the police should become involved. As a crime prevention officer succinctly explained, “If it’s involving a criminal offence, then we have to act on it.” An elementary SRO similarly said, “If we have reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge, then that’s what’s going to happen.” In this way, cyber bullying is no different from any other form of interpersonal violence.

Eight interviewees also explained that behaviours that may seem like bullying simply because they involve youth can often cross the line and become crimes. As one elementary SRO who drew upon examples of physical bullying stated, “‘He hit me.’ Well, now we’re at an assault. It’s not just bullying anymore.” Other officers similarly explained how electronic communications can become criminal. For example, according to a patrol officer, “If somebody says, ‘I hate you and I would kill you’, or ‘I’m going to beat you up at school tomorrow, you’re dead,’ now that has a criminal element.”
In response to the belief that cyber bullying behaviours require specific laws, the participants were unanimously of the view that current laws already provide effective responses and most (8 of 12) agreed that there is no need for cyber bullying-specific laws.

For example, an elementary SRO stated,

I’m sure if you talk to any anti-bullying group you’ll hear them lobbying the government for anti-bullying laws. My response to them is the laws are already there. Pretty much anything you can tell me about [cyber bullying], there’s a law against it.

As examples, police officers cited instances where charges were laid for criminal harassment, uttering threats and mischief. Describing harassment and threats as “the two big ones,” a patrol officer said the nature of the bullying allows officers to determine the most appropriate charge: “It depends what’s in the message and what they’re saying … If they’re just constantly harassing them about stupid things, then criminal harassment, right. If there’s threats involved, then uttering threats.” In certain situations, mischief charges may also apply. One patrol officer described having recently charged a teenage boy with four counts of mischief manipulating data because he had hacked into four female classmates’ Facebook accounts and posted derogatory comments. The accused also photoshopped the girls’ faces onto semi-nude bodies and posted these pictures to their profiles. According to the officer, “the accused has gone on with the criminal intent of causing her some inconvenience or some level of harassment. And in doing that he manipulated the information on her website, which she has an expectation of privacy to. In law, that’s a big thing.”
Ten interviewees also pointed out that—in contrast to the hard-line approach advocated for by many politicians and law makers—even when charges are laid the police usually attempt to avoid the courts whenever possible. As one patrol officer remarked, “People don’t realise it’s not like what people see on TV. We try our hardest to keep [young people who cyber bully others] out of the courthouse.” Most commonly, officers will use justice circles, conflict resolution, or other diversionary approaches to resolve the situation without involving the courts. Of these, participants found justice circles—which typically involve school administration, the police, the youth involved in the cyber bullying incident, and the youths’ parents—to be especially effective. As one secondary SRO explained, “We’ll all sit around a table and discuss how we got to where we’re at and how we’ll move forward from here.” An elementary SRO similarly described the circles as beneficial because “it’s good for the victim to be able to have their say and let everybody understand how it affected them.” Importantly, the officers saw the justice circles as also providing a means to better understand and address those factors that led to the cyber bullying, a view expressed by a secondary SRO:

We would like to actually get to the root of the problem so that it stops. So my job, as a high school resource officer now, is to try to find a way not to run the kids through the courts. The easiest thing to do is just take a statement from everybody, submit the report, give them a court date, and I don’t have to deal with it anymore. But now when you have to sit down in justice circles and all this other stuff and try to get to the root of the problem and get people to a happier place, that’s a lot more work. But it’s worthwhile. When it works, it really works.

Thus, officers believed in their ability to distinguish between what they consider to be minor incidents of cyber bullying and more serious incidents that may have violated criminal law and are deserving of police intervention. When such violations do occur, the
officers interviewed were of the view that current laws permit effective responses, and
that one of the most effective of these was the use justice circles.

3.4.3 Prevention through Education

“Mainly, you just want to do education, because when you peel it all back they’re usually kids that are left alone with technology and then they misuse it.”—Elementary School Resource Officer

Although punitive responses to cyber bullying seem to be the preference of legislators, according to the police officers interviewed for this study preventative approaches are superior because they better address the root causes of harmful behaviour, and do so in a way that avoids criminalising young people. When asked about her work, a SRO who is responsible for policing more than two dozen elementary and secondary schools replied, “My goal, my job, is to be the preventative person rather than the reactive person. That’s what they guys working front lines are for—doing reactive.” A similar view was held by the other SROs.

According to 11 of the officers interviewed, one of the most effective approaches to being the “preventative person” involves educating youth about safe technology use and healthy relationships. The need for such education comes from a perceived lack of awareness or understanding by youth that their online behaviours have real offline consequences. For example, an elementary SRO explained that “youth don’t understand that if they’re going to threaten somebody face-to-face, it’s no different than using the computer to threaten them.” When asked to elaborate on why so many youth apparently do not recognise the consequences of their electronic actions, several officers suggested
that problems likely arise from the perceived social distance provided by technology. In particular, the officers explained that many youth feel emboldened to say or do things behind a screen that they would not otherwise say or do in person. As a patrol officer stated, “People get braver, I find, when they’re behind the computer and they’ll say a lot of things…they’re braver on the computer than they would be in person.” Such increased bravery, coupled with an enhanced sense of anonymity online, creates an atmosphere where cyber bullying can flourish.

To counter prevailing attitudes, all of the officers reported that they often find themselves teaching students about how to behave appropriately when using technology. A secondary SRO explained, “There’s social etiquette and expectations when you’re online and you need to follow the same rules if you were with that person.” According to these officers, many young people do not recognise or understand such rules. Education with students also frequently centres on teaching young people how to protect themselves from becoming cyber bullied. For example, an elementary SRO argued that “if the kids don’t know the proper way of using technology then they set themselves up to be harassed or end up harassing people.” Another officer remarked that her goal is not to scare youth into behaving appropriately or protecting themselves, but to make them aware of some of the risks online and to encourage them to want to take steps to ensure their own safety.

In addition to educating students, 11 of the officers indicated a need to educate parents about how to protect their children when they engage with technology. Such education
frequently involves offering parents suggestions as to how they can protect their children or possible next steps they can take if their child is being cyber bullied. A SRO who works in both elementary and secondary schools explained that she regularly provides small, manageable pieces of advice to parents in an effort to guide them towards more effectively supporting their children:

You’ll talk to them about what they’ve been doing to this point, but they need that little bit of guidance for the next step … and what they can do to make sure they’re continuing to watch. What they’re going to be watching for so they’re kind of proactive in knowing, ‘Oh, okay, I can look for that. I don’t have to be a computer expert because my kids can unlock every parental control.’

Later in the interview, the same officer returned to the topic of educating parents, adding that she finds many parents are concerned that their children know more about technology than they do, and they are worried that “their kids are going to pull the wool over their eyes.” She then explained that a particularly effective approach to educating parents involves providing concrete suggestions for ways they can protect and support their children that do not require technology. For example, the officer suggested that parents are often adept at picking up on their children’s social cues, so providing parents with cues to look for that would suggest cyber bullying is occurring is often helpful.

Nine of the participants expressed the view that parents must remember to continue to parent their children online by monitoring their activities and asking them important questions, such as who they are talking to online and what their favourite websites are. Accordingly, a number of officers reported that their educational plan for parents usually involves a discussion about their children’s access to technology. For example, several
officers reported providing parents with lists of websites they can visit to learn more about how to set privacy controls on social networking websites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) and how to talk to their children about Internet safety. Interviewees also noted that it is important for parents to know where to find additional information and resources to help them protect their children. As one elementary SRO stated,

I think it takes the people, the parents, knowing what privacy settings are there, knowing all the stuff to protect your kids so they don’t get bullied or they don’t put information on there they don’t realise is going out to the whole world.

Lastly, 11 of those interviewed indicated that they are an important resource for school administrators and frequently offer informal advice or guidance when the administrators are unsure how to proceed. According to an elementary SRO, “sometimes [administrators] just call and say, ‘This is what’s going on, what would you suggest?’” When such requests arise, officers explained that they typically gather information to assess the situation and, if it seems as though the cyber bullying may have become criminal, they will support the school administration by attending meetings with the involved students’ parents and writing a report about the incident. Another explained the importance of writing reports by noting that although most elementary school students are too young to be formally charged, reports allow the police to more easily recognise repetitive problematic behaviour and take appropriate action if such behaviours continue to occur when the child is older.
Although most officers indicated having frequent contact with the principal or vice-principal of the schools they serve, four officers stated school administrators only call them when cyber bullying is especially serious. One participant explained,

A lot of the administrators will try to deal with it themselves without bringing in police, but because I’m pretty much attached to the schools quite often they’ll call me if it’s a serious situation and it doesn’t seem like they can resolve it, or they think it’s maybe going a little bit south and getting more towards a criminal aspect of things…So when it becomes a big mess, that’s usually when we’re called in.

Other school administrators, however, take a more proactive approach and request for their SROs to speak to students about cyber bullying and Internet safety. Unfortunately, these administrators may be in the minority, as many officers reported that presentations are usually requested only after serious cyber bullying incidents have occurred at their school. Reactive responses to cyber bullying can be a source of frustration for police officers who prefer prevention to reaction, as can be seen in the following exchange:

Q: Do you have a preference as to when you go in?
A: I would absolutely rather be involved earlier, because I think in the schools that I go in earlier I have less times I’m going back to them—there’s less times I’m going and dealing with students throughout the year.

3.5 Discussion

Recent public discussion, following several highly publicised suicides, has shifted from preventing to criminalising cyber bullying (Hinduja & Patchin 2009, 2012). History shows that it is common for lawmakers to react to serious school violence by passing new anti-bullying legislation; indeed, such was the case following the infamous shooting at Columbine High School (Furlong, Morrison, & Greif, 2003) and the suicide of Phoebe
Prince (Neiman, Robers, & Robers, 2012). In Canada, the 2013 suicide of Rehtaeh Parsons has led many to propose a stronger criminal justice response to cyber bullies (Taber & Walton, 2013). This study used data from in-depth interviews with 12 Canadian police officers to explore the extent to which current laws are effective, the need for cyber bullying-specific laws, and officer’s preferred method of responding to cyber bullying. Analysis of these data yielded three key themes. The first theme was that, despite increasing calls for service, cyber bullying is presently not a crime and that these officers, whose duties range from regular patrol to school resource work, do not endorse attempts to criminalise everyday cyber bullying activities. Rather, they see such moves as reactive and unnecessarily punitive. The second theme that emerged through interviews was that participants, who shed some necessary light on their cyber-policing duties, believe that current laws are effective for dealing with behaviours online that cross into criminal territory. The third and final theme was that prevention through education is the best means of addressing the potential for problematic computer use among young people.

The police officers interviewed for this study do not agree with enacting more punitive approaches. Instead, they see cyber bullying as a behaviour that can be prevented through education, which is an important objective for many SROs (Finn et al., 2005; Rich & Finn, 2001). Interviewees noted that many youth are left alone with technology and receive little guidance on how to effectively use it to foster and maintain healthy interpersonal relationships (see also Patchin & Hinduja, 2006). As a result, they suggest, a sizeable proportion of young people use technology inappropriately. The police officers
are not alone in this view as there is a growing body of literature that suggests that youth need to be taught relationship skills to the same extent that they are taught other essential skills, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic (e.g., Wolfe, Crooks, Hughes, & Jaffe, 2008; Wolfe, Jaffe, & Crooks, 2006). There is reason to believe that youth ought to be taught these same healthy relationship skills online, as well. However, as the police officers interviewed for this study were clear to also note, educational efforts must extend to parents and schools, as well, so as to foster well-rounded, effective responses to cyber bullying and to ensure all stakeholders are aware of their role in preventing cyber bullying.

Further, police interviewees are also opposed to new cyber bullying criminal laws, which are likely to be more punitive in their approach and could tie up limited police resources with issues that could be better dealt with outside of the criminal justice system. Indeed, many cyber bullying incidents that involve things like name-calling or minor disagreements among peers need not be pursued criminally and can be better dealt with by parents, educators, or informal police interventions (e.g., talking to the involved students). At the same time, the officers felt that more serious cases—those involving harassment, threats and mischief, among other criminal offences—can be responded to within the existing legislative framework. Current laws, they believe, are clearly written and understood by all police officers, whereas, to the extent that cyber bullying is an often ill-defined concept (Tokunaga, 2010), officers worried that new legislation would contain language too vague to be of value. Concerns over a lack of specificity in anti-bullying laws, more generally, have been noted elsewhere. In their content analysis of
state bullying laws, Limber and Small (2003) found that in 2003 of the 15 U.S. states with laws addressing school bullying only nine (60%) clearly explained which behaviours constitute bullying. More recently, Weaver, Brown, Weddle, and Aalsma (2013) examined state laws that specifically mention bullying in the title or subtitle of the law. The authors reported that only 13 of 36 U.S. states (36%) with such legislation identify actions associated with bullying in the law.

3.5.1 Limitations

Two limitations to this study should be noted. First, the study consisted of a relatively small sample of officers from a small geographic area consisting of a medium-sized city and rural communities. It is possible that the workload of officers in these communities differs from officers in larger urban centres, which may make preventative educational efforts more feasible and manageable for the officers in this study. Furthermore, the qualitative sample included in this study is not generalisable. Second, most of the officers interviewed worked in schools as SROs. It is possible that officers who apply for these positions differ from other officers in meaningful ways (e.g., 50% of my sample was female officers, but females account for only 19.6% of officers nationally; Statistics Canada, 2011). As such, the views expressed by many of the officers I interviewed might not be universally held within the policing community.

3.5.2 Policy Implications

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study addresses a notable gap in the literature by examining police responses to cyber bullying and police preferences concerning the
criminalisation of cyber bullying. Law makers and politicians are often quick to react to tragedies by enacting popular laws. Sometimes, these reactions are spurred by pressure from victims’ families, as was the case following Rehtaeh Parsons’ death (Cheadle, 2013). Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest that policy makers ought to proceed cautiously when enacting new legislation related to cyber bullying. My findings offer preliminary evidence that police officers would prefer to maintain the status quo when it comes to responding to cyber bullying, which allows them the discretion to use existing criminal laws when the need arises but also allows them to engage in more educational and restorative approaches to manage cyber bullying. Furthermore, schools might be wise to include their SROs in future cyber bullying prevention efforts, particularly those that take place early in the school year. Regularly including SROs in meetings with parents of youth who have been involved in cyber bullying might also be effective. Lastly, educators should continue to make use of their SRO and take advantage of the officers’ expertise in crime prevention and criminal law. If an educator or school administrator is unsure how to proceed in a given situation, seeking guidance from their SRO is a positive step. Future research should endeavour to study this topic with larger, representative samples to further identify police officers responses to cyber bullying and to permit more definitive guidance to be offered to legislators and educators.

3.6 Conclusion

In contrast to the reactive hard-line approach proposed in much legislation and public discussion, police officers prefer to take a more preventative approach by educating youth and raising awareness about the dangers of digital communications. Although there
are instances when criminal charges must be laid, the officers I spoke to believed that these incidents transcend “cyber bullying,” a term that has little legal meaning for police officers. Moreover, the study’s participants felt that current criminal laws are effective for responding to these more serious cyber bullying cases. Further, when crimes have occurred, the officers generally expressed a desire to pursue diversion rather than the court system in hopes of avoiding criminalising young people. The results of this study offer preliminary evidence that lawmakers would be wise to proceed cautiously when considering the criminalisation of cyber bullying.
3.7 References


Chapter 4

4 Governing Security at Home: Parental Monitoring in Response to the Cyber Bullying Risk

Over the course of the last decade, cyber bullying has been linked to several highly publicised and tragic youth suicides. As the story, seemingly so often, goes, a young person is digitally harassed by anonymous cyber bullies or, more often, by somebody they know (Wolak, Mitchell, & Finkelhor, 2007) during the school day, in the evenings, or on weekends. After enduring the harassment for some period of time, alone, lacking support, and unable to envision a future that does not include incessant bullying, the young person takes his or her own life to escape their torment. As one columnist concluded, “A number of high-profile incidents in recent years have demonstrated that cyberbullying … can lead to grave consequences if not handled properly” (Manasan, 2012; emphasis added). The clear assumption in this columnist’s statement, which is shared by many commentators and experts, is that more should be done to support young people who are cyber bullied. And, further, that when such tragedies occur, it was because the situation was not handled properly.

When cyber bullying-related suicides occur, society’s gaze tends to focus on the victim’s parents and a public determination is made as to whether or not they did all that they could to support their child. Indeed, among those tasked with preventing and responding

15 A version of this chapter has been submitted for publication.

16 Suicides that may have resulted from cyber bullying are sometimes referred to as “cyber bullicide” (see, for example, Hinduja & Patchin, 2010).
to cyber bullying, parents are the actors with primary responsibility for risk management and security governance (Broll, 2014). Risk can refer broadly to external dangers ranging from natural disasters to threatening behaviours; however, following Johnston and Shearing (2003), in the pages that follow I focus on risk, more narrowly defined, as arising from social life. Regardless, risk exists within vast communication systems that produce and publicise threats (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997). As mass communication systems prioritise cyber bullying as a real and legitimate threat, parents’ risk management practices become more visible.

Aside from accounts presented in the mass media, little is known about how parents govern security in response to the risk of cyber bullying. It is clear that parents are concerned about the threat of cyber bullying (Livingstone, 2009), and rightly so since cyber bullying is the most common risk that young people are exposed to in cyberspace (Palfrey, boyd, & Sacco, 2009). However, despite the potential dangers, young people have little choice but to participate in social media since this is where their peers congregate; not to participate would mean missing important updates from their friends, which could diminish their social capital (Young & Quan-Haase, 2013). Nevertheless, as neoliberal governments increasingly offload state protections onto parents, it becomes increasingly important to understand how parents regulate their children’s technology use. However, research has only begun to explore parental monitoring in cyberspace.

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17 For example, the provincial government in Nova Scotia, Canada recently passed an anti-cyber bullying law that allows victims of electronic bullying to sue the cyber bully’s parents (Davison, 2013). The implication of such legislation is that parents ought to closely regulate their children in cyberspace or risk being the subject of civil action.
(Lobe, Segers, & Tsaliki, 2009), and little is known about how parents govern security in response to specific risks. In this chapter, therefore, I examine the ways in which parents prevent and respond to the pervasive threat of cyber bullying.

4.1 Parental Monitoring as Security Governance

Johnston and Shearing (2003) propose that the governance of risk is most naturally applied to corporate settings, wherein there is an intense focus on maximising benefits and minimising losses. Within such environments, risk managers “anticipate, identify, and appraise the seriousness of risks and … deploy actions to remove them. When their removal is not possible, however, the risk manager will take steps to reduce the likely losses arising from them” (Johnston & Shearing, 2003, p. 76). Or, as Beck (1992) suggested, we are “no longer concerned with obtaining something ‘good,’ but rather with preventing the worst” (p. 49). Similar logics apply outside of the corporate world in response to “increasing awareness of the threats inherent in everyday life” (Lupton, 1999, p. 12). Within familial environments in the risk society (Beck, 1992), the “job” of parents may be seen as analogous to that of risk managers: parents are responsible for fostering a sense of security in their children just as risk managers must do for their shareholders (Lobe et al., 2009). Security exists as both an objective and subjective condition. In its objective form, security is characterised by a lack of imminent threats, the neutralisation of threats (i.e., protection), and the avoidance of risk. In its subjective state, security is represented by feelings of being safe (Zedner, 2003). In other words, therefore, parents govern risks so as to create spaces within which their children feel objectively and subjectively secure.
Sometimes, security governance is reactionary; usually, it is proactive and preventative (in fact, even reactionary governance usually has the goal of addressing the source of the threat and deterring future threats; Johnston & Shearing, 2003; Shearing & Johnston, 2005). In this way, as risk managers parents must strive to “repair the future” (Shearing & Leman-Langlois, 2004). Or, as Shearing (2001) explains, “Instead of going ahead, doing things, and then coping with the problems this might create, when they arise, we now seek to anticipate problems and avoid them” (Shearing, 2001, p. 207).

Surveillance is a common tool in future-oriented security governance (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Johnston & Shearing, 2003). Indeed, surveillance activities facilitate the identification of threats before any harm occurs, thereby allowing risk managers and security experts to neutralise the threat and/or steer targets away from the source of the threat. Within the highly securitised and monitored risk society, all persons are subject to surveillance. However, marginalised and dependent groups—such as children and youth—are subjected to the greatest scrutiny (O’Malley, 1992). Even within broad risk categories, certain demographics are targeted for additional surveillance. For example, girls’ behaviour in cyberspace tends to be monitored more closely than that of boys, because girls’ risks are calculated to be greater (Steeves, 2014).

The educational, expressive, and civic possibilities of the Internet (e.g., Quan-Haase & Young, 2010) are easily clouded by panics about the risks and dangers young people face in cyberspace (Livingstone, 2009; Livingstone & Bober, 2005; see Buckingham, 2000 for a review of electronic risks). Cyber bullying—the greatest threat to young people (Palfrey
et al., 2009)—appears to be less common than traditional bullying (Wang, Iannotti, & Nansel, 2009), but has been the focus of greater attention in recent years. In particular, law makers in many jurisdictions have attempted to legislate out cyber bullying via the establishment of new civil and criminal laws (Broll & Huey, 2014).

Parents are seemingly well-aware of the risks of cyberspace. “Paranoid parenting” is common in many families (Fueredi, 2002; Nelson, 2010) as parents worry about what their children might be exposed to (boyd & Hargittai, 2013). According to boyd and Hargittai (2013), “generally speaking, parents are encouraged to take measures to protect their children from risks; proactively engaged parents are seen as good parents” (p. 246). Thus, parental monitoring can be conceptualised as a form of risk management. An extensive literature has found that parental monitoring (Capaldi & Paterson, 1989) serves as a protective factor against personal and social problems for youth. For instance, parental monitoring is inversely associated with youth substance use (Martins, Storr, Alexandre, & Chilcoat, 2008), depression (Hamza & Willoughby, 2011), delinquency (Willoughby & Hamza, 2011), and relational aggression (Leadbeater, Banister, Ellis, & Yeung, 2008).

As boyd and Hargittai (2013) explain, “Fears and anxieties regarding young people are not new, but new technologies create new sites of concern. The rise of the Internet and social media have reinforced and magnified existing fears” by making risks more visible (p. 248). Importantly, the ways in which parents incorporate these concerns into their parenting practices influences their children’s behaviour and guides public discourse
Certainly, parents’ fears may translate into the monitoring of their children’s technology use. Early studies on the impact of parental monitoring on youths’ television viewing habits and other outcomes still form the basis of much of what is known about the monitoring of media. These studies demonstrate that active parental television co-viewing, in which parents watch television with their children and engage their children in discussions about the positive and negative content they witness, improves youths’ retention of positive messages and increases their likelihood of rejecting negative messages (Strasburger & Donnerstein, 1999). On the other hand, passive co-viewing, in which this deconstruction of content does not occur, reinforces negative messages and stereotypes (Nathanson, 2001).

Most parents set rules governing the websites that their children are permitted to visit and the types of information they are able to disclose online (Lenhart & Madden, 2007). Approximately two-thirds of parents monitor their children’s text messages and about half of parents restrict when their children may use their cell phones (Lenhart, Ling, Campbell, & Purcell, 2010). The short- and long-term impact of these efforts have yet to be studied, but passively glancing at computer screens and examining Internet browser histories are considered ineffective approaches for reducing children’s cyber risks (Kerr & Stattin, 2000; Mitchell, Finkelhor, & Wolak, 2001), despite the popularity of these approaches for many parents (Lenhart and Madden 2007). In addition, although the parental monitoring of young people’s Internet use is initially high, parents’ vigilance seems to decrease over time (Wang, Bianchi, & Raley, 2005).
Parents’ anxieties may provide the impetus for them to monitor their children’s technology use, but several barriers exist to prohibit effective monitoring. One of the most obvious barriers is related to the lack of comfort many adults express in relation to new technologies. In fact, in contrast to widely accepted norms in the offline world, it is often children who teach their parents how to use technology (Ribak, 2001; Spies Shapiro & Margolin, 2014). There are also fundamental discrepancies between the ways in which young people and adults interact with technology. Although most adults now engage with technology regularly, it often does not occupy the central position in their lives, and especially their social lives, that it does for youth (Shariff, 2008). In addition, adults often understand youths’ lives as a series of binaries (e.g., online vs. versus offline, public vs. private), but young people perceive their lives as being more fluid and do not clearly distinguish between their online and offline selves (Collier, 2012; Gardner, 2010). Furthermore, as the tools for accessing the Internet diversify and become more portable, parents’ regulation of their children’s Internet access becomes more challenging (Livingstone & Bober, 2005). Lastly, the dynamic nature of the Internet and digital communications means that one-size-fits-all solutions are ineffective when it comes to the safety of young people online (Collier, 2012).

Given the risk of cyber bullying (Palfrey et al., 2009), the ways in which parents prevent and respond to (monitor) cyber bullying is particularly important to understand. boyd and Hargittai (2013) found that parents who have had a familial experience with cyber bullying perceive cyber bullying to be a greater risk than those who have not had a personal experience with it (see Davison, 1983), but the actions taken by parents to
address this threat are greatly understudied. This study addresses this gap in the literature by answering the following research questions:

(1) What strategies do parents use to address the perceived risk of cyber bullying?

(2) After their child has become involved in cyber bullying, as either the victim or perpetrator, what actions do parents take to minimise the harms associated with digital harassment?

(3) In what ways are parents’ cyber bullying risk management strategies limited?

4.2 Method

Data were collected through a mixed methods design in the spring of 2012. Qualitative data were collected to understand the depth of parents’ prevention and response approaches, and to elucidate their rationale for their security governance strategies. However, to offset some of the weakness of the qualitative design—especially the homogenous population from which participants were recruited—secondary quantitative data were also analysed to add some breadth to the analyses. Quantitative data also allowed for an examination of parental and familial characteristics that may influence security governance.

4.2.1 Qualitative Method

Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with eight parents and guardians\textsuperscript{18} of young people involved in cyber bullying (victim and/or perpetrator). In one instance,

\textsuperscript{18} For simplicity, in the remainder of this chapter I use the term “parents” to refer to both parents and guardians.
the cousin of a young person who had been cyber bullied was interviewed rather than a parent of the victim because the cousin had much greater knowledge of the young girl’s experiences. Six parents were recruited from the membership list of a local anti-bullying coalition and two parents volunteered to be interviewed after completing the quantitative survey (see section 4.2.2). The director of the anti-bullying coalition sent an information letter about the study to the coalition’s membership via email, and interested parents contacted me directly. Survey respondents were asked whether their children had been involved in cyber bullying and those who responded affirmatively were asked whether they would agree to be interviewed about the subject.

All interviews were conducted in south-western Ontario, Canada and followed a general guide to ensure key themes were discussed with all participants. All parents were asked some variation of the following questions: “In your home, where do your children typically access media?” “Do you employ any technologies (e.g., parental monitoring software) to monitor your children’s technology use?” and “What actions have you taken when you were made aware that your child has been involved in cyberbullying?” All interviewees were informed of their rights as research participants and they provided voluntary active consent prior to interviews commencing. Interviews ranged from about 30 minutes to more than two hours long, with an average length of about 60 minutes.

Qualitative data were analysed using Braun and Clarke’s (2006) thematic analysis procedure. Thematic analysis is a structured, yet iterative, analytic method that allows the researcher to better understand the “story” being told by participants. Using an inductive
approach, I first read and re-read interview transcripts to identify preliminary themes. Next, the transcripts were coded using an open coding procedure. This was followed by focused coding, which allowed for the identification of more meaningful themes. These themes were then carefully reviewed to ensure they accurately represented the data, and were refined and re-categorised until a complete understanding of the data was reached. Despite the small sample size, theoretical saturation was approximated, although this may be a function of the homogeneity of participants.

4.2.2 Quantitative Data

In addition, quantitative surveys were completed by 52 parents (76.9% female). Participants were drawn from the second wave of a longitudinal study of parental monitoring and the consumption of violent media (see Broll, Crooks, Burns, Hughes, and Jaffe, 2013). Survey participants were invited to complete the survey by telephone interview or online; 96% of participants completed the survey online. An implied consent procedure was used and survey participants received a $10.00 gift certificate to a popular café as compensation for their time. Survey participants’ children were approximately evenly distributed among grade levels: 15.4% had a child in senior kindergarten or younger, 28.8% had a child in the first through fifth grades, 17.3% had a child in the sixth through eighth grades, and 38.5% had a child in the ninth through twelfth grades. Most parents reported that their children consume between one and two hours of media per day (53.8%), with a smaller proportion consuming between three and four hours (32.7%) or one hour (13.5%) of media daily.
Survey participants responded to a series of open- and closed-ended questions. Three sections were of import for this study (corresponding sample questions are provided in parentheses). In the “Participate and Share” section, parents were asked about the ways in which they actively monitor their children’s technology use (“Have you asked your children to show you their favourite website?” and if so, “Was this a one-time thing, or have they shared multiple websites?”). Given Facebook’s popularity among youth (Common Sense Media, 2012), parents were also specifically asked if and how they monitor their children’s Facebook accounts (“Do you monitor your children’s’ Facebook account?” and if so, “How do you monitor your children’s Facebook account?”). In the “Cyber Bullying” section, parents responded to questions regarding their children’s involvement in cyber bullying (“Has your child ever been involved in an incident of cyber bullying?”) and how they responded when they learned that their child was involved (“How did you respond to the incident?”). Since not all survey participants had children who had been involved in cyber bullying (only 13.5% of parents reported a familial experience with cyber bullying), those parents whose children had not experienced or perpetrated digital harassment were asked to indicate how they would respond if an incident were to occur. The responses of parents of children who had and had not experienced cyber bullying were pooled. Lastly, in the “Background Information” section, parents were asked to respond to questions regarding their gender, the number of children living at home, and the age(s) and grade level(s) of their children. Quantitative data were analysed descriptively and bivariate associations were explored using Chi Square tests; all analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS version 20.
4.3 Results

4.3.1 Parental Risk Management Strategies: Preventing Cyber Bullying

Parents use a variety of strategies to manage their children’s risk of becoming involved in cyber bullying. Although parents share the common goal of “preventing the worst” (Beck, 1992; Ericson & Haggerty, 1997), specific strategies vary. Such strategies range from discrete and overt surveillance, to making themselves emotionally available for their children, to the removal of the source of the threat (technology). Closely monitoring children’s technology use was commonly referenced as a favourite risk management strategy among parents. However, parents differed in the application of their surveillance strategies. For example, some parents described allowing their children to use technology—especially computers (which were almost always laptops) and tablets—only in common areas of the familial house. The mother of an 11-year-old girl who was physically threatened on Facebook requires her children to use laptops in the kitchen, which is the most frequented common area of her home. Referencing a long-standing and widely held belief among many experts that children should not have access to technology in their bedrooms, this mother simply explained, “My children are not allowed to use laptops in their bedroom.” Another mother reported that her 12-year-old daughter was suspended from school for cyber bullying a classmate. Before this incident, her children were allowed to freely use technology throughout the house; now, laptop use is also restricted to the kitchen and several other rules have been imposed to further enhance her surveillance activities:
We have two laptops and they sit here [in the kitchen], and we monitor when they work on homework. They’re allowed 15 minutes for e-mailing their friends … and they know that we monitor it at any time. We know their passwords, and we have parental controls on the computers. … We’ve got time constraints, so they can only go on at certain times.

Given this mother’s personal experiences with cyber bullying, more stringent surveillance has been deemed necessary to prevent her children from future involvement in digital harassment. Many survey participants reported managing their children’s digital risks in similar ways. As shown in Table 4, almost two-thirds of parents surveyed co-view Internet content with their children. Co-viewing their children’s favourite websites was an ongoing process for many parents: of those who have been shown their child’s favourite website, more than 60% have been shown multiple websites.

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<tr>
<th>Table 4: Parents' Prevention and Response Strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>% Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Active Parental Monitoring</strong></td>
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<td>Shown favourite website</td>
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<td>Shown other websites</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor Facebook account</td>
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<td><strong>Responses to Cyber Bullying</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do nothing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manage at home</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contact school</td>
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<td>Contact police</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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Other parents employed subtler, but perhaps more invasive, surveillance and risk management approaches. Sometimes, such approaches were taught to parents by police...
officers. For example, the mother of the girl who cyber bullied her schoolmate learned of standard parental monitoring software available within the Microsoft Windows operating system only when an officer who had become involved in the case demonstrated its use to her. According to this mother, the officer explained that “laptops actually come with parental controls that you don’t even have to buy. It’s like right in Microsoft, or whatever.” Now, every time this mother logs onto her computer, “it will say, ‘Check the parental controls to see...’” Other parents went one step further by installing key logging software on computers. Whereas monitoring software usually allows parents to restrict their children’s access to certain programs or websites and provides a general overview of their activities (e.g., time spent online, websites visited, etc.), key logging software records every key stroke typed. The father of two teenage children casually explained, “We have what is called Net Nanny, and then we also … have software where we record every single keystroke. That’s not a big deal, really.” According to this father, such software surveillance is necessary because his children are technologically savvy enough to render more benign risk management strategies—which his children apparently disapprove of—moot.

Social media, and especially Facebook, are exceptionally popular among youth (Common Sense Media, 2012). Parents expressed specific anxieties in relation to these sites, especially in relation to their children’s privacy and the threat of cyber bullying. Accordingly, rather than celebrating the positive features of social media, parents instead strictly regulated their children’s social media use. Parents of younger children simply and effectively managed the risks associated with social media by refusing to allow their
children to use these sites. Interestingly, the costs of these restrictions, such as the potential loss of social capital, were not referenced by parents. Survey responses indicated that older children are much more likely to have a Facebook account and younger children are much less likely to have an account, $\chi^2 (3, n = 51) = 27.402, p < .001$ (gamma = -.906, $p < .001$). Among the parents of children who were permitted to have Facebook accounts, 71.4% monitor those accounts (see Table 4), although specific monitoring strategies vary. Some parents require their children to share their social media passwords with them, which allows parents to log in to their children’s accounts and view all content at any time: “Then I know what is going on, and if I know what’s going on, I can respond and deal with it.” Other parents more passively browse their children’s social media profiles for troublesome content. Interestingly, parents’ gender, number of children, and children’s ages did not predict parents’ likelihood of having viewed their children’s favourite website and other websites, or the monitoring of their children’s Facebook accounts.

Parents also explained the apparent value of “being friends” with their children. According to these parents, if their children consider them friends—as opposed to parents—their children will be more forthright with the dangers they are exposed to online and will readily report cyber bullying to their parents when it occurs. The father of two teenaged children was a vocal supporter of this risk management approach, and he spoke at length of the benefits of being friends with his children: “You keep all lines of communication open all the time. … If that happens, and once they accept you as an
equal, then the problem is over.” According to this perspective, emotionally supporting children significantly reduces cyber risks.

Lastly, a popular governance strategy was to eliminate the source of the threat (technology) by encouraging young people to unplug from technology. One mother described tirelessly working to find a “real world” hobby for her child. After countless failures, eventually her daughter took a liking to horseback riding, which has reduced her exposure to technology. The mother of twin 11-year-old boys explained that when her children’s friends visit her house, computer time is not permitted. Instead, “it’s always go outside and play, go outside and play.” By encouraging their children to engage in non-technologically-mediated activities, parents’ felt that they were reducing the opportunities for cyber bullying to occur. With that being said, parents’ responses to open-ended survey questions revealed the gradual age-appropriate relaxing of rules. For example, the parents of a pre-schooler do not permit more than 30 minutes of computer time per day, but the parents of a sixth to eighth grade student permit unlimited screen time as long as all devices are turned off by 8:00pm. Further along the continuum, the parents of a high school-aged child also allow unlimited screen time, but do not require devices to be turned off until 10:00pm. Although parents did not elaborate as to why this age-appropriate relaxing of rules occurred, this finding is consistent with previous research that has found dramatic increases in young people’s media consumption as they age. Such increases have been attributed to parents’ desire to offer their children greater privacy as they age and the fact that older children sleep less thereby having more time to consume media (Roberts & Foehr, 2004). Indeed, pre-schoolers are unlikely to be awake
4.3.2 Parental Harm Reduction Strategies: Responding to Cyber Bullying

Once their children have become involved in cyber bullying, parents’ objectives shift from a focus on risk management—preventing the harm from occurring—to a focus on harm reduction. Few parents would do nothing in response to cyber bullying involving their child (3.8%) or try to resolve the issue on their own (7.7%). Instead, most parents would involve others to collaboratively address cyber bullying (see Table 4). Sometimes, parents’ responses involve directly engaging with the bully. Parents’ felt that by making the presence of capable guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979) visible to electronic bullies, their children would become a less desirable target. For example, when one interviewee’s daughter was threatened via Facebook, the mother used the social media platform to inform the bully that she monitors her daughter’s account, that the bully’s behaviour was unacceptable, and that if future threats were made the police would be contacted. This mother stated that no further bullying occurred following this exchange. Similarly, the cousin of a teenage girl who was bullied on Facebook reported that another individual in her family frequently responds to harassing Facebook posts that appear to target her cousin to ensure the bullies know adults are observing their behaviours.

Parents also espoused the perceived value of contacting the bully’s parents directly. Interviewees who advocated for this approach trusted the kindness and sensitivity of other parents, believing that once the bully’s parents learned what their child was doing,
they would intervene and discipline their child. More often than not, this approach seemed to accomplish parents’ goal of swiftly stopping bullying that was targeted toward their child. The mother of a teenage girl who was cyber bullied by a male classmate said, “I called the mom right away, and I said, ‘Do you know your son said this?’ And he was in big trouble.” In another instance, the parents of the cyber bully learned about their daughter’s behaviour before the parents of the bullied child became aware of the situation. The bully’s father contacted the victim’s parents to tell them “we know our daughter is doing it, we don’t know how to tackle it. The parents were very understanding and gave us some time to work it out.”

In addition to involving other parents when responding to cyber bullying, participants often reported cyber bullying to school authorities. About 20% of survey respondents indicated that they had or would contact their child’s school following a cyber bullying incident; interviewees concurred. The cousin of a teen girl who was cyber bullied attended the girl’s school and said, “Look, this is what’s going on, I don’t know what to do about it.” Indeed, in several instances school personnel were thought of as resources, who could share their expertise in responding to bullying with parents. With that being said, some parents reported negative encounters with school administrators that would make them wary of informing members of the school community of future bullying incidents. For example, upon learning that her daughter was cyber bullying a classmate, one mother took her daughter to her school to tell the principal what she had been doing. This interviewee felt that she was “doing the right thing” by asking her child to admit her poor behaviour to school authorities and make reparations for her actions. However, after
learning about the cyber bullying, the school principal developed a “personal vendetta”
toward the offending student, incessantly calling her to the office and disciplining her for
the most trivial of things. In the end, the young girl chose to switch schools and the
mother wished that she had never informed the principal about the cyber bullying.

Few participants referenced contacting the police for support, but one-quarter of all
survey respondents said they would contact law enforcement if their child was being
cyber bullied. At the same time, almost half of all survey respondents indicated that they
would take some other approach in response to cyber bullying. Frequently, this involved
following a progressive approach by first trying to resolve the situation themselves and
then involving additional resources, such as school personnel or the police, as necessary:
“I would start with dealing [with it] at home and progress to school [and the] police as
needed.” The father of a sixth to eighth grade student referenced the complexity of cyber
bullying when championing such progressive approaches:

There are many variables involved in cyber bullying. I would carefully address
the situation at home, with the other parent(s) involved, the other children
involved, the school, etc. to see if a solution could be found together. Depending
on the severity of the incident, I may or may not call the police. I think ‘mild’
incidences are a great opportunity for dialogue and for children to learn about the
impact of their online behaviour, and I would hope to be able to use such an
incident as an example. We all have the opportunity to learn from our mistakes,
parents too.

Although all parents wanted the bullying directed towards their child to stop, their wishes
varied along a continuum from altruistic to self-centred. For some parents, their goal was
simply to minimise the harms directed toward their child, regardless of who else may be
hurt. As one father said, “Let your kid bully somebody else, just don’t bully mine.” In
contrast, other parents wished to address the root causes of cyber bullying—a rarity in the risk society. For instance, another father suggested, “Maybe my daughter escapes or my son escapes, but maybe somebody else’s daughter or son doesn’t. So we wanted to address the whole issue. It’s not a cosmetic treatment we’re going in for, it’s not my children alone.”

4.3.3 Parents’ Challenges Managing Electronic Risk

Despite their best efforts, parents’ cyber bullying prevention and response efforts were undermined by two challenges: balancing their children’s protection with their freedom and their own lack of comfort with social technologies. Many parents visibly struggled to reconcile the competing interests of managing their children’s digital risks (i.e., keeping their children safe in the online world) and allowing their children to manage their own risks (i.e., incrementally increasing their children’s privacy and freedom). When one mother, who spoke at length about these competing demands, was asked where her children use computers at her house, she replied, “They’re in their rooms, and that’s a function of giving them freedom as well as trust.” Likewise, the father of a 16-year-old girl suggested that “the idea is not to pry, and many a times we respect their privacy.” At the same time, these parents questioned whether their strategies were appropriate and effective. As the latter father later remarked, in an exasperated tone, “I don’t know. I hope I’m doing it right because, you know, you never know.”

Parents’ also reported struggling to manage their children’s digital risks given their own unfamiliarity with the media through which cyber bullying often occurs. This difficulty
was noted by the cousin of a teenaged girl who was cyber bullied: “If their parents don’t understand computers very well, they don’t know what’s going on, they can’t really even talk to her about it.” The mother of a 12-year-old girl who cyber bullied a classmate and was cyber bullied herself explained this challenge in more detail:

We didn’t have computers growing up, we had keyboarding. It is, to me, a scary new world. It’s great, the computers, but there’s so much for kids to get into trouble with on the computer, and I find that kids, when they’re younger and immature, they don’t see the big picture. They don’t realise what they can get into.

Later in the same interview, this mother returned to the challenges of monitoring her daughter online, stating “It is kind of scary for parents because it’s a whole new world of things.”

4.4 Discussion

Previous research has identified parents as having primary responsibility for managing young people’s risk of involvement in cyber bullying (Broll, 2014). As social risk managers, parents engage in reactive and preventative security governance to foster a sense of security among youth. In particular, parents are expected to use common surveillance approaches (Ericson & Haggerty, 1997; Johnston & Shearing, 2003) to anticipate problems and address security threats before they occur (Shearing, 2001). Thus, proactive parenting—in which parents aim to lessen their anxieties and fears and protect their children by pre-emptively addressing risks—has become synonymous with good parenting (boyd & Hargittai, 2013). Accordingly, parents are expected to formulate rules governing their children’s Internet (Lenhart & Madden, 2007) and cell phone
(Lenhart et al., 2010) use to minimise their children’s exposure to risk. When harms do occur, as risk managers parents must strive to minimise losses, or mitigate the damage caused by cyber bullying (Johnston & Shearing, 2003).

This study explored the ways in which parents prevent and respond to cyber bullying, and the challenges that may undermine the effectiveness of their risk management efforts. Parents were found to employ a number of strategies to reduce the threat of cyber bullying. Commonly, parents restricted their children’s access to technology to common areas of the house during pre-determined hours of the day. Many parents, it would seem, walk a fine line between protecting their children and over-protecting their children, thereby reducing young people’s opportunities to learn, explore, socialise, and formulate identities in the digital world (boyd, 2014; Livingstone & Haddon, 2009). Many parents also engaged in overt and/or covert surveillance of their children’s technology use. Rather than teaching their children how to use technology safely—a decidedly preventative, but perhaps time consuming approach—parents instead used a variety of types of monitoring software to observe their children’s behaviour. In an era of single parent and dual income families, parents may be busier than ever before. As such, these monitoring programs serve as their electronic eyes (Lyon, 1994).

When preventing cyber bullying fails, parents must transition to harm reduction approaches to prevent the “worst” from occurring (Beck, 1992). Parents’ most common responses were collaborative (see also Broll, 2014), and many referenced contacting the parents of the other child, administrators at their child’s school, or, in particularly serious
incidences, the police. A number of parents also acknowledged the complexity of cyber bullying, thereby espousing the value of progressive responses proportionate to the perceived harm of this incident. This latter approach is notable in that it contrasts with actuarial crime control practices in the risk society (Feeley & Simon, 1992) by considering the nature of the offence rather than the offender’s statistical risk of recidivism. Despite these efforts, parents were challenged by their own desire to balance their children’s safety with their freedom, and their personal lack of comfort with new technologies (Ribak, 2001). Although not referenced by the parents who participated in this study, other frequently cited challenges include adults’ and young peoples’ contrasting conceptualisations of the social nature of technology (Collier, 2012; Gardner, 2010; Shariff, 2008) and logistical challenges with monitoring increasingly portable and miniaturised technologies (Livingstone & Bober, 2005).

This study has three limitations that deserve consideration. First, the qualitative and quantitative samples were both convenience samples drawn from a small geographic region. Thus, the results cannot be generalised to other settings. Second, all of the interviewees were family members of children who had already experienced cyberbullying, and many were members of a local anti-bullying coalition. As a result, the study participants may be more attuned to cyber risks than other parents and their prevention and response efforts may be more thoughtful than usual. Certainly, they are more engaged in the anti-cyber bullying movement than many parents. Third, this study did not measure the effectiveness of parents’ risk management and harm reduction efforts, nor did it explore the moderating effect of the challenges experienced by parents.
on youth-related outcomes. Future research should examine whether parents’ efforts do protect young people from cyber bullying, and what impact parents’ responses have on the short- and long-term outcomes of involvement in cyber bullying.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this study addresses an important gap in the literature by examining the ways in which parents prevent and respond to the threat of cyber bullying in the current risk society. Although it is no doubt important for parents to manage their children’s risk of involvement in cyber bullying, parents’ efforts should also focus on teaching their children how to use technology safely and appropriately. As Ribak (2001) explains, young people understand technology better than many adults; however, adults understand the social relationships embedded within those technologies far better than youth do. By making young people aware of the social impact of their digital actions, parents can help to broadly improve security—and reduce risks—in the digital world.
4.5 References


Chapter 5

5 Conclusion

Although some research has identified adults’ responsibility to prevent and respond to cyber bullying (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009; Shariff, 2008), little is known about how adults actually address cyber bullying (Shariff & Churchill, 2010). This dissertation, therefore, fills an important gap in the literature by examining how parents, teachers and school administrators, and members of law enforcement prevent and respond to cyber bullying.

Using the nodal governance theoretical framework to understand networked risk management, I identified the types of capital possessed by each group of stakeholders and found that parents are the impetus behind efforts to address digital harassment. However, social, structural, and cultural impediments may undermine the security network’s efforts. I also closely examined two members of the network responsible for managing risks: the police and parents. Police officers prefer to manage risks through preventative efforts and serve largely in the capacity of knowledge brokers (Ericson, 1994). Parents manage the threat of cyber bullying by closely monitoring their children’s social media and cell phone use and by engaging network partners in response to harms.

This dissertation serves as a first step towards improving adults’ efforts to address cyber bullying. It is my contention that to improve future responses, we must first understand the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches. Drawing upon nodal governance theory, in Chapter 2, “Collaborative Responses to Cyber Bullying: Preventing and Responding to Cyber Bullying through Nodes and Clusters,” I analysed the types of
capital possessed by each cluster, how they achieve security, their limitations, and their overall position in the security network. The results of these analyses indicated that parents represent the central node in the security network, with educators and, especially, police officers occupying more peripheral positions. This finding—that the police occupy a peripheral node in the security network—represents a significant contribution to the policing and nodal governance literature. Past studies, even of cybersecurity (e.g., Nhan, 2010; Nhan & Huey, 2008), have found that the police occupy the central node in security networks. According to Nhan and Huey (2008),

law enforcement agencies can provide critical human skills (such as forensic and investigative abilities), economic and technological resources (largely in the form of access to existing labs or other equipment) and the state sanctioned power of arrest, each of which makes this nodal cluster a significant cog in the cybersecurity machine (p. 76).

Although some of these powers are valued by other members of the cyber bullying security network, other forms of capital are more important (e.g., parents’ social capital and position as an information router). Furthermore, since many youth involved in cyber bullying may be too young to be legally charged, the police often do not have the opportunity to harness these resources and, instead, tend to be called upon to provide advice and guidance when necessary.

A post-hoc examination of internodal relations revealed significant limitations in the functioning of the network towards desired goals—many limitations are similar to those observed by Nhan and Huey (2008) in their study of cyber policing more broadly. Incompatible security goals, diverse cultural understandings of what constitutes cyber
bullying, institutional mistrust, structural constraints that slow responses and information flow, and conflicting normative expectations of parents’ role in the network undermine the network’s ability to respond to the needs of cyber bullied youth. In addition, all groups were hampered by a lack of familiarity with technology and social media.

In Chapter 3, “‘Just Being Mean to Somebody Isn’t a Police Matter’: Police Perspectives on Policing Cyber Bullying,” I examined police officers’ beliefs about the applicability of existing criminal legislation for cyber bullying cases and their preferred approaches for addressing digital harassment. I found a clear lack of support for new cyber bullying laws: the officers reported that most existing laws can be successfully applied to cyber cases, and that they are familiar with the application of these sections of the Criminal Code. At the same time, the officers’ expressed a preference to engage in preventative action whenever possible by speaking to young people, their parents, and school administrators in their capacity as knowledge brokers (Ericson, 1994). When legal interventions are necessary, the officers expressed a preference to avoid the courts and to instead engage in restorative approaches. Thus, police officers who participated in this study advocated for softer approaches for addressing cyber bullying than those suggested in recent legislation and public policy.

In Chapter 4, “Governing Security at Home: Parental Monitoring in Response to the Cyber Bullying Risk,” I examined the ways in which parents prevent and respond to cyber bullying. Parents continue to have a strong influence on their children throughout adolescence (Steinberg, 2004). Although they are also the most likely nodal cluster to be
informed about cyber bullying (Hoff & Mitchell, 2009; Smith et al., 2008), little previous research had explored how they address the topic. I found that parents manage their children’s risk of becoming involved in cyber bullying by closely monitoring and regulating their children’s behaviour, especially their technology use—many parents made use of parental monitoring-type software that served as their electronic eyes (Lyon, 1994). However, parents’ also acknowledged their difficulties in policing cyberspace, especially given their lack of knowledge and comfort with technologically-mediated communications. As such, parents often partnered with other parents, school personnel, or the police to address cyber bullying targeted towards their children.

While collecting data for this study, it became clear to me that although all stakeholders with whom I spoke genuinely wanted to resolve youths’ problems with cyber bullying, many felt that they lacked the skills necessary to achieve this goal. In addition, internodal relations are strained, thereby weakening the efficacy of collaborative responses. Although cyber bullying laws are currently being passed or implemented in almost all jurisdictions as a supposed solution to seemingly relentless digital harassment, these laws have little support among the police officers interviewed for this study. As the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system, a lack of buy-in from the police greatly undermines the effectiveness of new legislation.

Rather than criminalising young cyber bullies, adults will most certainly be more effective in addressing digital harassment if they are able to work together to prevent cyber bullying and respond effectively and responsibly when the need arises. Given the
existing gaps in the cyber bullying security network, a positive first step may be for network partners to better understand the role and function of other nodal clusters, and for all security actors to set realistic expectations about likely outcomes when other nodes become involved in the policing of cyber bullying. For example, parents should understand that the police try to avoid the courts whenever possible. Even when the accused is between 12- and 18-years-old, police officers prefer to use restorative justice or other diversionary approaches. Furthermore, even if a young person is charged and convicted for bullying-related offences, it is unlikely that person will spend time in jail. Cyber bullying investigations are also time consuming, especially if computer forensics teams become involved. Many cybercrime units are underfunded, and cases involving child predators or abuse are often given priority over digital harassment. In addition, parents should remember that continuously contacting officers for status updates may impede the investigations as officers are taken away from other duties.

Similar levels of understanding are warranted at the school level, particularly regarding administrators’ need to investigate reports in their entirety, their inability to violate confidentiality regulations, their desire for prevention rather than reaction, and district and provincial requirements to use progressive discipline when possible. At the same time, some commonly used responses to school deviance may be counterproductive in reaction to cyber bullying (e.g., suspending cyber bullies may increase their access to technology, whereas restricting victims’ access to technology may discourage future reporting). As a result, schools ought to work with their security partners, but also engage bystanders, since they are more likely to hear about cyber bullying and may feel more
comfortable speaking out against bullying online than in person. Teaching students about healthy relationships, appropriate and respectful behaviour online, and safe technology use as a means of preventing cyber bullying may also be effective in addressing digital harassment.

It is also important for police officers and members of the educational system to be sensitive when approached by parents for support and to understand that parents of children who are being cyber bullied are likely to be emotional themselves. Given many parents’ unfamiliarity with technology and uncertainty about how to protect their children in digital spaces, they often rely on their network partners for assistance in addressing cyber bullying. If educators and police officers take the time to sincerely acknowledge parents’ concerns, explain the organisational and legal processes and procedures that they must follow, and discuss likely outcomes of investigations, the strains, frustrations, and misunderstandings of the investigative process may be reduced.

There is growing evidence that the policing of cyberspace is most effective when done collaboratively (Huey, Nhan, and Broll, 2013; Nhan 2010, Nhan and Huey 2008, Wall 2007); there is no reason to believe the policing of cyber bullying is any different. However, given the number of gaps identified in the cyber bullying security network, it is clear that several social, structural, and cultural variables must be addressed if nodes are going to effectively address the needs of young people affected by digital harassment. Until these limitations are addressed, responses to cyber bullying will continue to be
fragmented and characterised by internodal mistrust and conflict. Such conflict does nothing to support youth, or to prevent or eliminate cyber bullying.

5.1 Directions for Future Research

This dissertation has represented a first step towards addressing a notable gap in the literature by empirically studying the policing of cyber bullying in Canada. However, the results of this study also suggest directions for future research. For instance, this study was limited by small sample sizes covering a limited geographic region; thus, the results cannot be generalised. Future research would benefit from larger and, ideally, random samples drawn from a more diverse geographic area. In addition, the participants who agreed to be interviewed for this dissertation are among those who are the most committed to addressing cyber bullying. Most of the police officers interviewed were SROs who spend much more time dealing with youth and doing crime prevention work than other officers. Accordingly, their stated desire for prevention and education may be a function of their job, and may not be reflective of the broader police culture. In many cases, the teachers and school principals whom I interviewed held strong opinions about cyber bullying and it is possible that their perspectives are not representative of the larger education community. Similarly, the parents who were interviewed for this dissertation all had children who were involved in cyber bullying and most of these parents were recruited through an anti-bullying coalition. Again, these parents are quite committed to the anti-bullying movement and, in many cases, they joined the anti-bullying coalition out of frustration with current responses to cyber bullying. It is unlikely that their responses can necessarily be generalised to other parents. Large-sample quantitative
research that focuses on describing and explaining the policing of cyber bullying will be a welcome complement to this exploratory qualitative study.

Although I identified adults’ responses to cyber bullying, I was unable to explore whether or not these responses are effective. Network limitations and strained internodal relations suggest that current responses may be lacking, but further research should explore important questions regarding the efficacy of current interventions. Such research should include young people who have been or are currently involved in cyber bullying, and explore whether their situations become improved upon informing an adult of their circumstances.

Likewise, it may be useful for future research to further examine young people’s preferred responses to cyber bullying—that is, when they inform an adult that they are being digitally harassed, what do they expect to occur and what would they like to happen? It also seems worthwhile to consider the role of youth in the security network. Engaging bystanders in prevention and response efforts is important for addressing traditional bullying (Samivalli, 2010) and there is no reason to suspect that bystanders’ responses do not matter in cyberspace. It is also important to understand how youth define cyber bullying and how such definitions structure their position in the security network. For example, boyd (2014) suggests that while many adults use the term bullying to refer to all types of teen cruelty, young people use the term much more selectively. Many youth, according to boyd, only consider the most serious incidents of ongoing harassment to be bullying; most other forms of meanness otherwise classified as bullying
by adults are simply considered “drama” by teens. Obtaining the input of those most affected by cyber bullying seems like a worthwhile undertaking when attempting to improve adults’ responses.

5.2 Final Thoughts

A common refrain is to tell children that they ought to inform a trusted adult if they are being bullied or if they witness somebody else being bullied. Research shows that this is easier said than done: only a minority of children tell an adult when they are being bullied. Although some choose not to tell an adult because they want to learn to handle risky cyber situations on their own, others do not report their abuse because they fear their technology use will be restricted, or because they worry that telling an adult will actually make their situation worse. These latter two reasons for not disclosing cyber bullying suggest that improvements to adults’ responses are warranted. Young people should not feel punished for doing what adults ask of them, and they certainly should not feel that adults cannot do anything to help. If our goal is to improve reporting rates, steps must be taken to address youths’ concerns. Collaborative responses to cyber bullying, wherein network partners come together to pool their resources and expertise toward the alleviation of cyber bullying, seem promising. Many adults struggle to effectively police technology but, in tandem, the skillsets of multiple nodes minimise the weaknesses of any single security actor.

Responding to cyber bullying is only a first step, however. Prevention is a more desirable goal and members of each nodal cluster verbalised the importance of preventing cyber
bullying. The road to prevention, and hopefully to the elimination, of cyber bullying is no doubt long, but the rewards are great. Currently, the efficacy of security networks are reduced as a result of social, structural, and cultural conflicts, but if network partners can work together to address these limitations I am hopeful that youth will receive consistent messaging, appropriate monitoring, and guidance as to how to safely and appropriately engage with technology. Although young people may understand how to use technology better than many adults, adults understand the social relationships embedded within technology use to a much greater extent. It is in this realm—the territory of promoting healthy youth relationships online and offline—where prevention efforts are most likely to be successful.
5.3 References


Appendices

Appendix A: Ethics Approval Notice, University of Western Ontario

Use of Human Participants - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. Laura Hays
Review Number: 183645
Review Level: Full Board
Approved Local Adult Participants: 45
Approved Local Minor Participants: 0
Protocol Title: Policing Cyberbullying: The Role of Parents, Educators, and Law Enforcement in Responding to Digital Harassment
Department & Institution: Sociology, University of Western Ontario
Sponsor:
Ethics Approval Date: December 08, 2011
Expiry Date: April 30, 2014

Documents Reviewed & Approved & Documents Received for Information:

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This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB’s periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussions related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

The Chair of the NMREB is Dr. Riley Hinson. The UWO NMREB is registered with the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services under the IRB registration number IRB 00050941.

Ethics Office to Contact for Further Information:
Grace Kelly
gkw@sowi.uwo.ca

James Netherald
jneth@uwo.ca

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The University of Western Ontario
Office of Research Ethics
Support Services Building Room 5150 • London, Ontario • CANADA • N6G 1C9
PH: 519-661-3036 • F: 519-850-2466 • ethics@uwo.ca • uwo.ca/research/ethics
Curriculum Vitae

Name: Ryan Broll

Post-secondary Education and Degrees:

University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2010-2014 Ph.D. Sociology

University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2008-2010 M.A. Sociology

University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada
2004-2008 B.A. (Honours) Sociology, Minor Psychology

Honours and Awards:

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Doctoral Fellowship
2012-2014

Ontario Graduate Scholarship
2010-2011, 2011-2012

Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)
Canada Graduate Scholarship – Master’s
2009-2010

Related Work Experience:

Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology and Legal Studies
St. Jerome’s University in the University of Waterloo
2014-

Research Associate
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH) Centre for Prevention Science
2011-2014

Instructor, Sociology 2206 (Research Methods in Sociology)
University of Western Ontario
2012, 2014
Instructor, Sociology 2205 (Statistics for Sociology)
King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario
2014

Teaching Assistant
University of Western Ontario
2008-2013

Research Assistant to Dr. Laura Huey
2008-2010

Publications:


